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PAX BRITANNICA

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UNTO CAESAR

PAX BRITANNICA

by

F. A. VOIGT

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To the Memory
of
J. G. HAMILTON

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

From 1938 to 1947 I had the honour of editing *The Nineteenth Century and After*.

The general character of this book was fixed during the year 1944.

The substance of Chapter I (Pax Britannica) was written in March 1944. I had to make one radical change in this chapter, for, when I originally wrote it, I did not appreciate the disastrous consequences of the conference held in Teheran at the end of the year 1943. I still hoped that the liberation of Eastern Europe would be accomplished and that the result of the Second World War would be a Europe which, if not united, would nevertheless have a certain cohesion. But the fate of Poland, which soon became evident, and, only a little later, the fate of Yugoslavia, destroyed this hope and, with it, the hope of a just and enduring peace.

At the beginning of 1944 I still believed that Great Britain and Europe would be able to recover out of their own wealth and strength. The loss of Eastern and Central Europe made us dependent upon American aid. We now owe Providence all the gratitude we are capable of because this aid has been granted so generously and with such realism.

I have found no reason for making any changes in the substance of the remaining chapters. The substance of Chapter II (Germany) was written in 1944; of Chapters III and IV (Poland and Yugoslavia) in 1943, 1944, and 1945. The main thesis of Chapter V (Greece) was outlined in *The Nineteenth Century and After* in February 1945. Two visits to Greece, in 1946 and 1947, enabled me to make a deeper and more detailed study. The substance of Chapter VI (Russia) was first outlined in 1943 and expanded in 1946. Chapter VII (the security of Great Britain) was written in 1947.

The book was completed at the end of that year, but I was able to make some slight alterations in the proofs at the beginning of 1948.

As I hope that the book may be helpful to students of foreign affairs, I have given references whenever I have used accessible sources. I have made some use of unpublished sources: private notes, memoranda, and verbal statements by participators in negotiations and by eyewitnesses of events. I must ask the studious reader to pardon the omission of references to such sources, but it cannot be helped.

Chapter One

PAX BRITANNICA

It is said that because the conditions of England's rise to greatness no longer prevail (seeing that she is rivalled or out-rivalled in trade, finance, and industry) her greatness is of the past, and cannot be of the future.

Her greatness is of the present. It is of the future if it be her will: for without the national will to be great, there can be no national greatness.

To maintain her national greatness and make it greater still, she must be resolute in defence of her security as an island and an Empire, she must jealously guard her national honour, she must have more confidence in herself than in others, she must (to the best of her power) uphold the Rule of Law, she must solve the German problem, she must consolidate the *Pax Europæa*—the peace and freedom of all Europe, from the Arctic to the Aegean and from the Atlantic to the confines of the Soviet Union.

If she does these things, the *Pax Britannica* will be more strongly established than it ever was before.

The *Pax Britannica* and the *Pax Americana* are complementary and interdependent. This interdependence created what Henry Adams called the *Atlantic System*.¹ Had it not been for the *Atlantic System*, the First and Second World Wars would have been lost. The *Atlantic System* is the one secular hope of mankind today. Only the *Atlantic System* can save the *Pax Europæa* from being overwhelmed and the *Pax Britannica* from being shattered by the *Pax Muscovita*.

The *Pax Americana* shows immense power combined

¹ In a letter he wrote to a friend in 1906.

with admirable forbearance. In the Western Hemisphere the armed might of the United States has no rival. Nevertheless, that Hemisphere lives, not under oppression, but in the enjoyment of peace, prosperity, and freedom.

A war between Central or South American States can be stopped by the United States without endangering the world's peace, for the intervention of Washington would not, and could not, be challenged by any non-American Power. That the United States, while constantly impinging on Central and South American affairs, rarely resort to forceful intervention, is evidence of a wise empiricism. A permanent crusade against war, even if confined to one continent alone, would impose bigger burdens upon the crusader than all his crusading would be worth, even if the complete success of every crusading expedition were assured in advance. It would draw upon himself the lasting animosity of those who would be the losers, or who (because a conflict which seemed to promise some advantage has been averted) would believe themselves the losers. Their animosity would be all the greater in so far as none would believe in the impartiality of the ostensibly impartial crusader.

Russia alternates between periods of immense strength and extreme weakness. She is the strongest military power in Europe. But she is not as strong as Europe. Her power is impaired by the dread she inspires. When she is on the defensive, Europe will be divided between those who are for her and those who are against her—and always there will be more for her than against. But when she is on the offensive, all Europe will endeavour to unite against her. That is the reason why Russia is promoting division amongst those European countries she cannot unite under her domination.

Russia is in Europe, but not of Europe. England is of Europe, but not in Europe. She and Europe are one.

Without her, Europe cannot be. Without Europe, she cannot be.

Germany and Russia are Europe's dread. They are most dreaded by their neighbours. England is Europe's hope. She inspires no dread, save the dread, felt so little by herself and so much by others, lest she have less faith in herself than others have in her. Long before the Second World War was won, this dread came upon Europe to dim the brightness of oncoming victory.

Russia is in Asia, but not of Asia. She is an Empire differing more widely from all other Empires than they differ from one another. She is herself a continent with a civilisation so different from European civilisation, that to pass from one to the other is to pass, as it were, into another world.

For the second time in one generation the Germans attempted to impose upon Europe the *Pax Germanica*. They twice destroyed the *Pax Europæa*. The *Pax Germanica* and the *Pax Europæa* can never be identical. The former can, and must, be an integral part of the latter, but no more than a part. If the Germans can become Europeans and work for the *Pax Europæa*, they will not be the vanquished of the peace as they were the vanquished of the war. But they will not become European merely by adopting a democratic system of government as they did in 1918. Europe is bigger than democracy, although Europe needs democracy.

This or that European nation may endure tyranny, but Europe, as such, will not endure it. A despotism may be benevolent, a tyranny can never be so. The benevolent despot will side with the weak against the strong, the tyrant with the strong against the weak. The despot may overthrow tyranny, quell anarchic violence, and lay the foundations of legitimate order which alone is true peace. Even if the Germans had won the war and had made themselves masters of Europe, they would not have remained

masters. Europe has form and structure, Europe—despite present appearances—is an organic whole, though with sharp contrasts and subtly graded variety. Europe is inexhaustible and ultimately unconquerable. “Europe is a huge thing within the walls.”¹

National and international peace are always an equilibrium of opinions, beliefs, interests, classes, nations. The despot may hold the scales until a natural equilibrium is achieved. The tyrant holds no scales. Under tyranny there is a fixed disequilibrium. The natural order is crushed beneath the weight of tyrannic power, and the foundations of authority perish.

Despotism may be the only defence against barbarism, whether it be the rude barbarism that precedes, or the ruder barbarism that follows, civilisation. It may prepare the way for humane and more liberal forms of government. England owes much to the Tudor despotisms. Without her acceptance of despots, and her rejection of tyrants, she would not have achieved the freedom she enjoys today.

Most of the States which were created or re-created by the First World War were, of necessity, despotisms, though all were groping towards democracy. The German Republic, at first a semi-despotism, became, under its mathematically perfect constitution, a pure democracy, only to be turned into a pure tyranny with no constitution at all.

“The liberal deviseth liberal things; and by liberal things shall he stand.”² Germany was neither liberal nor did she devise liberal things. She made herself master over the greater part of the European mainland, but had not sufficient liberalism even to act the benevolent despot. Nowhere was she able to establish even the beginnings of a legitimate

¹ “The Walls of Europe! take heed what you say, signor, Europe's a huge thing within the walls.”—Ben Jonson: *Every Man out of his Humour*.

² Isaiah xxxii. 8.

order. She invaded countries where there was oppression, but was more oppressive than the oppressors. She claimed to have conferred independence upon nations who wanted nothing more than independence—and then wanted nothing more than to be independent of her. By illiberal things she fell.

The war brought the *Pax Germanica* to an end. The *Pax Europæa* and the *Pax Muscovita* can and must exist side by side. But co-existence and collaboration are not identical. The word collaboration has come to be used as a magic formula to exorcise divergencies between the nations. It is widely believed that, however intractable the divergencies may be, they can be made to vanish if the exorcisms be sufficiently solemn and frequent. But when divergencies are deep, distance or aloofness may avert a conflict which proximity would render sure. The supreme task of western statesmanship is not collaboration with Russia but the establishment of the *Pax Europæa* and its peaceful co-existence with the *Pax Muscovita*. But peaceful co-existence is only possible when there is a clear delimitation of national and imperial interests, and when the deep diversities existing between the two Empires are respected.

There can be no integrated Europe and, therefore, no *Pax Europæa* without the small States. The small State is the ideal State—a peculiarly European ideal. The bigger a State, the more it tends towards despotism. The tendency can be counteracted by devolution, that is to say, by making the big State resemble an assembly of small States, like the United States of America. A despotism will always endeavour to curb the oppositions and conjunctions that are natural to every human community, and will, if too successful, become tyrannical. Every centralised, planned, or uniform system is despotic and tends towards the tyrannical, more so in a big State than in a small, for increased unwieldiness demands increased coercive powers.

The modern form of tyranny is Socialism, which took the form of National Socialism in Germany, of Fascism in Italy, and of Marxian Communism in Russia.

The religion of the big, planned, and centralised State is the *Cult of the Colossal*.¹ It has all the presumptuousness that comes of immense coercive power. It will strive to be ever bigger and to excite awe at home by arrogance abroad. To this cult the small neighbour is a welcome (because an easy) sacrifice.

The menace of general war arises from the big State. The small State may be the occasion, but never the cause, of general war. Without the small States, Europe cannot survive either as a structural or as a spiritual reality. They may, it is true, be her weakness in an immediate sense—but they are her strength, her only strength, in an ultimate sense. Some of those that are called small are too big, even now—big not so much by their geographical extent as by their multinational character. They must, if they are to survive, undergo not dissolution, still less partition, but devolution.

Because England is not in Europe, but of Europe, she could not dominate Europe even if she wished. That is why none—except her enemies in war-time—have cause to fear her. Ultimately, the *Pax Europæa* and the *Pax Britannica* are one.

It is an old truth that the domination of one Power in Europe is incompatible with England's island security, but, like so many old truths, it must be reaffirmed against new falsehoods and against those half-truths which are more dangerous than falsehoods. It is through necessity that England is the champion of freedom in Europe. That she remain so is the condition of Europe's survival. And of her own.

¹ As far as I am aware, this term was first used by Ludwig von Mises in his great book on Socialism.

Chapter Two

THE GERMAN IDEA

I

WE are often told that the Germany which was established by the National Socialist Revolution of 1933 was not the real or true Germany: that there was "another Germany" which was the real or true Germany, the Germany of "ordinary decent people" who, so we were told, are everywhere alike—the Germany of tolerance, probity, enlightenment, genius, the Germany of Goethe, Beethoven, and so on.

If a nation were two nations when composed of good men and bad, every nation would be two nations.

There is no *other* Germany, just as there is no *other* England, France, Russia, Spain, and so on. Every enlightened, humane, and patriotic Englishman has been ashamed, upon occasion, of what his country has done and will be fearful of what she may do yet. He would be a Pharisee were he to assume that there is a separate England of evil-doers: that this England is not *his* England, the real England, but another England.

Even those who have feared and foreseen the ascendancy of evil forces over their own people, and have opposed these forces, and have sustained their opposition at the risk of their lives, will not, unless they are Pharisees, say of their fellow-countrymen, who submit or connive, *they are not as we are*. Englishmen, if they are not *Pharisees*, will recognise no *other* England but will say *right or wrong our country*. To say this is to say that our country may be wrong, but that, even if wrong, it is still our country, and not *another* England. Germans who spoke of the *other* Germany—*das andere Deutschland*—were Pharisees. When Germany was fighting

for her life, patriotic Germans thought in terms of *right or wrong our country*, even if they regarded Hitler as an evil creature and his rule an abomination.

He who is never ashamed of his country has as little patriotism as he who is never proud of his country. Whoever proclaimed the *other* Germany, the good or true Germany—as distinct from *Nazi* Germany—made a pharisaical distinction which Germans, who are not Pharisees, must reject.

The *other* Germany—the true Germany, so we were told—was in the concentration camps, in exile, or silent under the Brown Terror: this was the Germany of the German *people*. The England of the English *people* was the England that found its leader in Winston Churchill and was waging war—the war that would free the German people and so establish the *other* Germany.

Vox populi, vox Dei is a saying that never was and never will be true. But it has often passed for true, especially in our own day. It has become a kind of popular philosophy and has amongst its exponents many Scribes and Pharisees. It is a sort of cult, the cult of “the Common man,” that godlike being to whom we pray: *Thy will be done, Thy kingdom come*. The cult is also a vote-catching medium. It is part of modern political and literary salesmanship. The people everywhere are good. The Second World War was a good war, because it was a *people’s war*, and it was a people’s war because it was a good war. The German *people* are good—therefore the war was not a people’s war, but Hitler’s war.

And yet, despite six years of victory and defeat, the German people did not repudiate Hitler, but fought with unsurpassed valour in the field and discipline at home. The terror exercised by Russian tanks and artillery and by British and American bombers far exceeded the terror which the *Gestapo*, the Brown Shirts, and the Black Shirts

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exercised. It was not the terror that made the German people submissive to the internal foe and defiant to the external. It was patriotism and the fight for survival as a nation.

Let us dismiss the *other* Germany as a simulacrum, a projection of the pharisaical mind, and consider Germany not as two, the one good, the other bad; the one of "the people," the other of their "rulers"—but as one which, like any other nation, is made up of the few who are good, the few who are bad, the many who are both good and bad.

The degree of German national unity achieved under Hitler was much underrated at the time, especially by English observers who thought in terms of that liberalism which is not confined to the Liberal Party but permeates the Conservative and the Labour Parties. Bismarck united the Germans with the help of brute force at home. Hitler employed a far greater brutality which would have appalled Bismarck. But Hitler united the German nation.

To what end? Imperial expansion, an end which was pursued by the German nation as a whole! Long before 1939 the Germans were a nation in arms and much more powerful than the *Gestapo* and the Brown Shirts and Black Shirts whom they could have exterminated overnight. They did not use their power because they did not want to. They waged aggressive war—as a united nation.

Long before the war began and even before they came into power the National Socialists persuaded the German nation that Germany had a right to territories beyond the national frontiers, especially to the provinces of Poznan and Pomorze, although these were an integral part of the Polish Republic and had an indubitably Polish population. Almost all Germans, including German Socialists and Liberals, took it for granted that Germany had a right to these provinces, which made up the so-called "Polish Corridor." The existence of this "Corridor" was an

inconvenience, but no more than an inconvenience, in so far as it separated East Prussia from the rest of the Reich. There were special trains by which German subjects could cross the Corridor with a *visa*. All was done that could reasonably facilitate the transit of passengers and goods. But the frontiers of the Corridor, being frontiers of Poland, were a barrier to local traffic, as every national frontier is today. The Germans persuaded themselves that this inconvenience was a smarting wound and a humiliation, though when they had to travel across the Corridor they felt no more than the inconvenience. It was when they looked at the map and saw Polish territory cut across German territory that they felt wounded and humiliated.

Whatever the personal view of many Germans may have been with regard to National Socialism, there was widespread agreement that Germany had a right to the possessions of others. The provinces of Poznan and Pomorze was the least the Germans claimed for themselves, and with regard to this claim almost all Germans were agreed. Almost all were agreed that Austria should be incorporated in the Reich—and this desire was reciprocated by the Austrians in so far as the Austrian *Right* was for the union (the *Anschluss*) when the German *Right* was in power, and the Austrian *Left* was for the union when the German *Left* was in power. Most Austrians have at one time or another been for the Union.

Different parts of Germany were provided with their own special aims, their own spheres of interest. Northern Germany looked with cupidity upon northern Slesvig and even upon Scandinavia, the former being regarded as rightful German property, the latter as a prospective German sphere of interest. Saxony looked upon the Sudetenland and to Czechoslovakia in the same way, Prussia not only to the "Corridor," but to all Poland.

The invasion of Austria and the Sudetenland met with

little or no disapproval, except among a few Germans of discernment who, while not disapproving morally, disapproved because they feared the consequences. That the occupation of Prague in March 1939 was wrong occurred to few Germans, though a few greatly feared the consequences. The demand for the former German colonies was opposed by almost none in Germany, not even under the Republic, when it was perfectly safe to oppose.

Opposition to National Socialism grew steadily weaker after the National Socialists came into power. When the war broke out, it almost ceased to exist. There was hatred of the National Socialist leaders, and some disgust over their venality, an immense longing for peace and for a normal existence, but no serious opposition to National Socialism as such, except the heroic conspiracy which, but for a series of mischances, would have brought Hitler's life to an end. Many of the leading conspirators did not belong to what, in England and America, was believed to be "the other Germany" but to the officer corps and the nobility. Nevertheless, they were good Germans who died for Germany and for Europe.

The National Socialist regime brought unemployment to an end and so gained much support amongst the younger generation of workmen. Nevertheless, there was a deal of disillusionment, for although work was more abundant, life became harder under a war economy, which was imposed long before the war. But disillusionment was submerged in the general willingness to take part in national defence.

The Germans began the war by an act of aggression against the Polish Republic. But they did not regard it as such. They were of opinion that the German Government had shown great moderation in so far as they believed that less had been demanded of Poland (and refused by her) than was Germany's by right. The German Government

demanded that the Free City of Danzig be reincorporated in the Reich, that a plebiscite be held in the Corridor.¹ And that there should be easier transit across the Corridor if, as a result of the plebiscite, it were to remain Polish.

The demands of the German Government were accompanied by hostile actions, such as the arrest and maltreatment of Polish officials in Danzig, assaults—by rifle and machine-gun fire—on Polish frontier guards, violations of the Polish frontier itself by bands of armed Germans, and so on. But these actions were either unknown to the German public or were condoned. The widespread German habit of regarding the Poles as inferior beings would have precluded any general feeling of indignation even if the truth had been generally known.

The Germans, in any case, regarded the conflict with Poland as their own business and not England's. Only when England went to war on the 3rd September 1939 did the Germans consider themselves engaged in war, instead of in a mere punitive expedition against a refractory neighbour. In 1914 Austria declared war on Serbia; Germany declared war on Russia and on France. The German-Austrian coalition at once took the offensive. It was easier then than it was in 1939 to demonstrate that Germany was the aggressor. In 1939 she invaded Poland, but she did not declare war on England or on France. It was they who declared war on her. At the same time she remained at peace with Russia, whom England and France had tried to draw into the anti-German coalition. To the Germans, not the 1st September, when their armed forces invaded Poland, but the 3rd, when England went to war, was the first day of the Second World War, to them a war of aggression begun by England, followed by France, and,

¹ *The Polish White Book*, p. 121. The German Government demanded that all Germans who were resident in Poznan and Pomorze in 1918 should be entitled to vote, whereas Poles who were not resident in the same year should not be entitled.

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later on, by the United States of America. This is how the Germans saw the Second World War.

They were convinced from the beginning that the war would decide their fate as a nation. The prodigious success of German arms stimulated imperialistic aspirations, the more so as success was, at first, easy, and the prospects of future glory, power, and profit dazzling. But failure to hold the territories they had gained in the east and to protect their cities against British and American bombers, the blockade, the fearful casualties, and the ever-receding prospect of even a tolerable peace, consolidated German national unity. Weariness, both mental and physical, worry, sorrow, and disillusionment engendered immense apathy, but apathy matters less under a despotism than it does in a free country. Apathy is the deadliest foe of the free, but deepens the servitude of the unfree. Astute propaganda increased the moral corruption of the German people. All propaganda is evil. The end of propaganda is unbelief. Germans who were not Christians no longer believed anything, except that all was lies. Distrust of all that was said, written or broadcast, and distrust of one another: this was and is the mental disease afflicting the German nation.

Unbelief will never inspire active opposition, least of all when it goes with apathy. And beyond unbelief and apathy there was fear—fear, above all, of Russia. The time came, as the war pursued its favourable course, when the German nation was willing, even eager, to capitulate before the British and American armies, but not before the Russian armies. Russia shortened the war by her victories in the field and lengthened it by the fear and hatred she inspired.

II

If the *other* Germany was the true Germany, the Third Realm was not. Why not? Why should Germany,

strong, united, and independent, filled with energy and the spirit of enterprise, not be the *true* Germany? Was the Germany between the Frederician and Bismarckian wars and between the First and Second World Wars—weak and disunited—the true, the *other* Germany?

It will be said that there was a wonderful efflorescence of German literature, music, and philosophy during the period of national prostration that ended with the defeat of Napoleon. That, some Germans aver, was the *true* Germany. It was Germany, indeed, but Germany in one of her many aspects—an aspect neither more nor less *true* than other aspects that were a curse to mankind. It is said that only when the Germans are weak and disunited are they great—great, that is to say, in art and letters, in science, in speculative thought. It was so once; but because it was so once, it does not follow that it will be so again.

It will be said that the Germans enjoyed freedom under the liberal institutions of the Weimar Republic, whereas they were enslaved and oppressed under Hitler's tyrannic rule. But the Germans are not interested in freedom as the English understand it. When they say freedom, they do not mean the liberty of the individual to do what he likes within the limits imposed by the written and unwritten law, but the liberty of the nation to do what it pleases in defiance of international law. The Western European conception of freedom was accepted, though without being understood, by the moderate *Left* in Germany. But the ease with which this conception was extirpated shows what an unnatural growth it was in the German soil and climate. And as the Germans developed prodigious vigour after the extirpation, it is not surprising that they should regard this growth as part of the disease under which, according to their own belief, they lay prostrate.

What is the *true* or *other* France? The France of Louis XIV? The France of the Revolution? The France of

Napoleon? The France of Louis Philippe—or of Gambetta, or of Clemenceau, of Poincaré, or of Daladier, or of de Gaulle? Which is the true England? The England of Queen Elizabeth? Of Cromwell? Of Charles II? Of the Glorious Revolution? Of George III? Of Queen Victoria? Of Mr. Baldwin? Of Mr. Churchill? Of Mr. Attlee?

Every France is France, every England is England. There is no *other* France, no *other* England—and no *other* Germany.

The German Revolution of 1918 consolidated what had been before. The German Workers and Soldiers' Councils (*Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte*), although modelled on the Russian Workers and Soldiers' Soviets, served the opposite purpose. The Soviets were, at first, instruments of revolutionary disintegration, but the German Councils were, from the beginning, instruments of integration. It was chiefly the Soldiers' Councils that made it possible for the defeated German Army to return home in good order and not as a disordered rabble. The German Revolution carried further the work begun by Bismarck. The dynasties, which had been the chief obstacle to centralisation, were removed; the posts, the railways, and the civil service were centralised. Bavaria retained a measure of federal independence. It was from Bavaria that the full counter-revolution, under the leadership of Hitler, advanced to the conquest of Prussia—and then to the conquest of Europe.

The German Revolution saved Germany by making irrevocable the armistice and, therefore, the peace, by saving the foundations of German political, economic, and military power, and by consolidating German unity upon that foundation. It resorted to lawless brutality against rebellious workmen, using armed forces whose officers were the predecessors of Goering and Röhm. The beginnings of the Third Realm are to be found in the Revolution of 1918.

When the Revolution was established, it became one of

the most liberal of dispensations. Nowhere was there more freedom than in the Weimar Republic, nowhere could humaner laws be found, or a constitution as impeccable on paper. But the Republican Government lacked authority. Justice is not humane if it is never severe.

Political murderers were leniently judged. The law was unequal as well as lax. Members of the Communist Party could not count on verdicts as mild as those passed on members of the Nationalist and National Socialist Parties. The Republic did not spare its misguided friends, but it spared its deadliest enemies.

Pictures too sombre have been drawn of moral laxity and corruption in the Republic. Moral laxity and corruption under the National Socialist despotism were much worse. The law which in the Republic was too unequal became in the Third Realm much more unequal, with some the law dealt ferociously, with others it dealt not at all. Many were placed above the law.

The Republic fell because, when besieged by believers, there was unbelief within. The symbols of the Republic did not command respect. The Reichstag lacked dignity. It had no collective consciousness as a parliament, and most of the political parties, who were much too numerous as the result of proportional representation, were so deeply antagonistic to one another that they lacked the common ground for debate without which there can be no true parliament.

Parliamentary government does not suit the Germans. They cannot conceive of loyal opposition or of opposition without personal animosity. They care little for individual freedom. But they do care for equality and they have a passion for justice. Egalitarian States tend to be despotic, and when the passion for justice becomes a frenzy that moves whole multitudes, it will lead to extreme injustice. The German could not be expected to believe in parliament or in the parliamentary system. The German republican

dispensation derived its principles from the western democracies and from the shallow rationalism of the period.

The German Republic—and the Republican colours, black, red, and gold—could, it is true, command a widespread allegiance. Millions of Germans, chiefly industrial working men and women, supporters for the most part of the Social Democratic Party, were prepared to fight for the Republic against the National Socialists, who were also Republicans, though they followed a different flag. But these millions did not believe *in* the Republic. They believed that the Republic was better than the Monarchy. In defending the Republic they were fighting not for something they loved, but against something they hated.

The Communists, although themselves Republicans, hated the Republic as *bourgeois* and *capitalistic*. Despite the large, though always fluctuating, number of their followers their influence was small, negative, and destructive. They were a Russian, and not a German, Party. This was their weakness. They had no reforms to their credit. They never shared the responsibilities of Government either in the Reich or in Prussia. In Saxony and in Thuringia they held office in a precarious and transitional manner, only to promote the disintegration of the Left and the consolidation of the Right. They split the vote in the Presidential elections of 1925 and so carried Hindenburg into power. It is doubtful whether Hitler could have made himself master of Germany if it had not been for the Communists. The Right suffered from no inner divisions as deep as the division which, thanks to the Communists, so fatally weakened the Left. All attempts to unite the Communists and the Social Democrats failed: between a Russian Party and a German Party, a Party of violent revolution and a Party of constitutional reform, there could be no compromise.

The National Socialists hated the Republic not because it was a Republic (Hitler was always hostile to the monarchy)

but because it was not National Socialist. They were revolutionaries, much more so than the Communists, and were masters of revolutionary practice. They were National and they were Socialist. The official appellation *National Socialist* defines them accurately.

The Nationalists (*Deutschnationale*) hated the Republic because it was not monarchist. They allied themselves, not very willingly, with the National Socialists, because their hatred of the Republic was greater than their love of the monarchy, and because the National Socialists were National and not International.

The Populists (*Volkspartei*) were but moderate Nationalists. Their greatest leader, Gustav Stresemann, was an imperialist and a monarchist. Had he lived, he might, by astute manœuvring and strength of purpose, have defeated Hitler, in which case Germany might have become master of Europe without a European war.

The Roman Catholic Centre (*Zentrum*) favoured the Republic because it eliminated the Prussian Protestant monarchy. It is true that it also eliminated the Roman Catholic Bavarian monarchy, but it did so to leave the Roman Catholics stronger in Bavaria than they had been before. The Republic was, for the Centre, an insurance against the return of the *Kulturkampf*.¹ The Republican system of proportional representation also kept the Centre permanently in office. As the foundation of their strength was denominational and not political, it remained constant. Their following was drawn from all classes. They were the middle, the *Centre* in the literal sense of the word. They kept the balance, and they always held key positions in the Reich and in Prussia.

The Centre seemed impregnable, the more so because, in

¹ The *Kulturkampf*, waged by Bismarck, in alliance with the National Liberals, against the Roman Catholic Church, was essentially a struggle, and a severe one, for that ministerial and administrative territory for which Church and State tend by their true natures to be in conflict.

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a world of changeable political doctrine, it owed allegiance to unchanging religious dogma. But it was impregnable only within the structure of the Republic. When the Republic fell, the Centre fell with it. The faithful, thereafter, were defenders of the Faith only, and no longer of political positions.

Unlike the Roman Catholics, who held all the shades of political opinion that existed between National Socialism and Communism, the German Protestants were mainly conservative. Their greatest stronghold was Prussia, but it was the reaction and the militarism rather than the moderate Socialism of Prussia that had their chief support. In the struggle for the souls of the industrial workmen, Roman Catholicism, on the whole, held its own, but Protestantism left the field to Marxism. In Berlin, the workman who was not a Roman Catholic and yet went to church was looked upon as peculiar by his fellow workmen. To most Roman Catholics the Republic seemed useful, to most Protestants hateful. The Republic was devoid of religious sanction. Prayers for the Republic were unknown.

Only amongst the élite of German industrial labour, and amongst the ever-dwindling number of men and women who voted for the Democratic Party, did the Republic command any devotion. To them the Republic was defence against militarism and political reaction, against those things that threatened freedom.

Freedom means something different in every country. To the English it means the preservation of their way of life—the week-end, for example, or a holiday at the seaside, and as little interference as possible by those in authority. That everyone should go his own way and mind his own business under the law is the essence of freedom to the English. To the English freedom is, above all, individual, to the Germans collective. To the English freedom is, above all, the freedom to be something, to the Germans the freedom

to do something. That is why the English love of freedom is a boon to mankind, and the German love of freedom a menace. The individual in action is likely to do more good than harm, for society sets a limit upon the harm he can do, but not upon the good, if it is a free society. Collective man is an inferior man, and against collective man in action there is no ultimate defence except armed force.

Not that Germany has been without men of individual character. She has had some of the greatest in the world. But in a nation given to collectivism, the individual will always be alone. Germany is the land of lonely genius.

The Germans tend to think in terms of the universe, of continents, of nations, of masses, of collectivities. By freedom, they mean the freedom of the collectivity, the nation. The individual German does not demand *Lebensraum*—ample space to live in and to move about. This demand for *Lebensraum* is the demand of his nation for room to expand, colonise, and conquer.

The English do not habitually think in terms of good or evil systems. To them it is this or that ruling individual, this or that Government, Prime Minister, usurper, tyrant, Monarch or Protector, who is good or bad. But to the Germans it is the political, social, or religious system, the national or international order, which is good or bad. The individual, to the Germans, is good or bad in so far as he belongs to a good or bad system or order.

The National Socialist movement called itself a movement of liberation—*eine Freiheitsbewegung*. It did so with genuine conviction. It felt itself to be such, passionately. The individual National Socialist found his own freedom not in release from the mass, the existing collectivity, but in the new and rising collectivity. He saw the wider freedom, the prospective freedom of the German nation, and of himself as one of the nation, in the emancipatory triumph of that collectivity.

Freedom and unfreedom are relative and subjective. The National Socialist *felt* unfree—oppressed, stifled, hemmed in, and menaced on all sides by dark and malignant powers, both real and imaginary. The rise and triumph of National Socialism was an explosion that liberated him as his will soared and expanded in a greater will.

The worship of freedom is the death of freedom. It is tyrannical to *impose* freedom, or democracy, or happiness. The true spirit of the French Revolution was revealed more clearly, because with less sophistication, in the Provinces than in the Capital. It is chiefly in the Provinces that we encounter the crude and cruel persecution of "all who do not desire liberty," of those "suspected of moderation," and of those "to whom the idea of happiness is torture."¹

The State means much to the Germans. They are by nature *étatiste* and, therefore, socialistic. To the English the State means little. The word rarely occurs in the language of the English people. In the German language it is frequent—even in the language of the people. Such terms as *staatserhaltend*, *staatstreu*, and so on, have no exact equivalents in English. The English tend to think in concrete terms—of the Cabinet as a gathering of men, of the House of Commons, of the civil service, the law, and so on, rather than of the State in the abstract. The image is visual, rather than mental. The policeman to the German is the arm of the State, to the Englishman of the law.² To the German the law is an abstraction. To the Englishman the law is trial by jury, the Bench, the police-court, and so on. But although the Germans think in abstract terms, they endow the abstraction with concrete potency. To them the State is a formidable power, protective or hostile. It is also a power with which something can be done, or which

¹ v. the very illuminating article *La Terreur en Provence* in the *Revue politique et parlementaire*, pp. 87, 91, 93, 10th Jan. 1935.

² One only has to contrast the London "Bobby" with the Berlin "Plempe" to realise the difference in outlook.

must do something to other States. The English, who think little in terms of their own State, think even less in terms of other States. They think in terms of foreign countries—the Germans in terms of foreign States. The Germans insist that the German *State* have *Geltung* in relation to other States, that it *count*; that it must, to use a colloquialism, throw its weight about.

To the German, a political party is a means to achieve power. The English voter hopes that his Party will take office. But taking office is not quite the same thing as wielding power. To the German, a political movement is always a revolutionary potential, a collective means of achieving power and imposing upon the nation, or even upon the world, an *idea*—a *Weltanschauung*. No true Conservative would want an England that will always be conservative and nothing else, nor will a true Liberal want an England that will always be exclusively Liberal. Both regard what their Parties stand for as a contribution to the general well-being. With the Labour Party it is a little different. Having accepted Continental Socialism, which is a *Weltanschauung* arrogating a peculiar potency as the one political, social, and economic idea that can establish well-being throughout the world, the Labour Party is more inclined to intolerance than the other two Parties. This is particularly so of its *Left Wing*, which, in its general disposition, resembles Fascism. But the English character and English political order are inimical to intolerance, although the war, the abdication of the governing class, the rise of a new bureaucratic class impatient for power, the craze for planning, standardisation, and the increased prestige of non-British political systems, are provoking a kind of passive but none the less effective intolerance. We see, in England today, the transition from the nonconformist to the conformist conscience.

The German does not regard what his Party stands for

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as a mere contribution to the common good, but as the common good itself which, because it is not commonly accepted, must be imposed. To the German a *loyal opposition* is a *contradictio in adjecto*. How can a man be loyal to the thing he regards as evil and wishes to destroy?

The Reichstag was not a forum for debate. It was a political battlefield. The Germans take their politics more than seriously. Political fanaticism, so rare in England, abounds in Germany.

The German Republican State imposed but small restraint even upon those movements which were resolved upon the destruction of that State. Splendid work was done in Prussia, above all, for penal reform, housing, social legislation, and so on. Prussia was consistently liberal under the Braun-Severing administration for more than a decade until, in the summer of 1932, the reactionary administration of von Schleicher and von Papen was established by a *coup d'état*.

The Germans are deeply interested—much more so than the English—in equality. But, as the present generation has begun to discover, or rather rediscover, equality and liberty are incompatible—the ideal State will have something of both, the ideal English State more of the latter than of the former, the ideal German State more of the former. Liberty will always mean inequality, difference between classes, privilege, and a wide range of incomes. These will always be where there is liberty and without them there can be no liberty. The tendency of egalitarian dispensations is to reduce wealth on the false assumption that to do so is to reduce poverty. Socialists are inclined to hate wealth more than poverty. The egalitarian State is always despotic:

“Every form of social justice tends to confiscation, and confiscation, when practised on a large scale, undermines moral standards, and, in so far, substitutes for real justice the law of force.”¹

¹ Irving Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership*.

Socialism is always destructive of liberty unless it be adulterated and restricted. The Germans who supported the Revolution of 1918 and made the Republic possible wanted freedom and Socialism, not realising that they could not have both. They wanted Socialism the more of the two, but failed, because they were unable to command sufficient power. But they had freedom—the freedom that enabled a new form of Socialism, namely National Socialism, to establish itself:

“Socialism cannot but be destructive of freedom in the broadest sense of the term. It desires to crown the work of emancipation and cannot but lead to the severest subjection of the individual.”¹

The Russian Socialism of the German Communists, the liberal Socialism of the Social Democrats, the national, and therefore German, Socialism of the National Socialists—Socialism, in one form or another, was desired by the vast majority of Germans. In the end, Socialism prevailed.

The weaknesses of the Republic do not alone explain the triumph of National Socialism. This triumph came chiefly because of the tremendous faith which animated the National Socialist movement—a faith not in Russia, not in western democracy, but in Socialism and in Germany.

The weakness of the Left was displayed when the National Socialists, having taken control by means that were, in the main, constitutional, destroyed not only all who opposed them but all who might at any time oppose. Nothing was able to resist them except Christianity. German Protestants underwent a purification whence emerged the “Confessional Church” and some of the greatest theological writing of our day. The Confessional Church remained as a Christian challenge to the claims, not merely of Hitler

¹ W. Röpke, *Wirtschaftsverfassung und Staatsverfassung* (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*), 20th March 1941.

or of National Socialism, but of every secular religion. It is necessary to point out, however, that the German religious conflict had nothing to do with freedom of conscience, or freedom of any sort. The National Socialists *did* believe in freedom of conscience. That was why they set their own conscience, the German conscience, above religion and law, making it a tyrant. The Confessional Clergy did *not* believe in freedom of conscience. They were not, as they were represented, fighters for the freedom of the individual. Man has free-will, but not a free conscience. His conscience registers the width of the chasm wrought by the Fall. The chasm widens with sin and the widening is registered in degrees of spiritual pain. There is nothing so free as the will, nothing so unfree as the conscience. The Confessional Clergy were not rebels. It was Hitler and the National Socialists who were rebels. The Confessional Clergy called them and the whole German nation to obedience—obedience to the First Commandment. The conscience was admonished that it can in no circumstances be free.

The Roman Catholic Church, unlike the Protestant, remained united. Today it commands great spiritual and temporal authority amongst the Germans amid the dismay and desolation of defeat.

War has been a mighty leveller. Millions of the German middle class were expropriated by inflation in the year 1923, millions have been ruined by the air-raids—they have lost their homes,¹ their belongings, and indeed all except what they can carry on their person, and not much of that. The prevalent mood is profoundly nihilistic. There is hatred of Russia, hatred of England, and hatred of America. But hatred of Russia is the strongest of all. An Anglo-American occupation of all Germany would have been welcomed as vastly preferable to a Russian occupation

¹ As far back as May 1944 it was calculated that 15,000,000 Germans were homeless.

by the German people, though not, perhaps, by the Party. But today there is little of the internationalism and of the liberal and democratic outlook that gained such a hold over the Germans at the end of the First World War.

Neither representative government nor democracy would seem to be suited to the Germans. Security under a just, strong and patriotic administration is what the Germans need.

III

Europe is not Europe without Germany. The German genius, no less than the English, French, and Italian, is an integral part of the European genius.

What happened to the German genius under the National Socialist visitation? Books were banned or burnt, works of art were destroyed or consigned to lumber rooms, artists were condemned to solitude, writers were silenced or driven into exile. Upon the genius of Germany a crude, anti-scientific, anti-philosophical, pseudo-religious ideology animated by a narrow, ruthless fanaticism was impressed. Despite all its youthful fervour, Hitler's National Socialism was not a rejuvenation. It was old ignorance in action which Goethe regarded as the most terrible of all things.¹ It was the triumph of superstition over religion, and of barbarism over civilisation. It knew no mercy, and charity it despised. National Socialism created a system of repression more efficient and terrible than any ever known, excepting Muscovite Communism. But the German tyranny did not last as long as the Russian has lasted, and was not able to complete the work of inner corruption and extirpation.

Progress, if it is not organic growth, is an aberration, the development of one part at the expense of others, that will,

¹ "Nichts ist schrecklicher als tatige Unwissenheit" (*Maximen und Reflexionen*).

if it goes on long enough, produce a monstrosity. Much that is known as progress today is of this nature. Organic progress is a deepening, a widening, and an elevation of the human spirit. The spirit, in its progress, lives more intensely in the past than it did before, and more intensely in the present. A nation must find itself in its own past, just as a man must find himself in his own youth, if he is to remain young until old age.

Tyrannic power engenders an unbelieving conformity that will, in time, become an accepted convention that is neither belief nor unbelief, and is destructive of the inner life of all but the strongest natures. But under a tyrannical system there will also be a heightened sense of responsibility. A serious author will weigh every word, when every word may send him or his friends to prison, or injure rather than promote the truths that command his devotion. Human thought may be hardened, tempered, and purified, as it were, by the terrific heat and almost unendurable pressure which tyranny engenders, so that a book written under a despotic dispensation may stand the test of time better than many a work which has been produced in the irresponsibility of unbounded freedom.

Tyranny, also, by destroying much that was, engenders gratitude for what remains, and a deeper reverence for permanent things. Ingratitude is the vice of our era. Freedom, by preserving the good with the bad, will often promote indifference of heart and mind. Freedom is always dangerous. It is essential to the defence of freedom that the danger of freedom be perceived and overcome.

The Germans, more than the English, are avid for trash that parades as philosophy. The output of Marxist literature for years after the Revolution of 1918 was prodigious, but it hardly satisfied the demand. To a vast reading public everything—including life itself—was expounded in terms derived from the works and speeches of Karl Marx, Engels,

and Lenin. The Revolution of 1933 purged Germany of Marxist literature. But the purge allowed few books that were better and many that were far worse to replace those that had disappeared. In its antecedents, National Socialist literature is superior to Marxist literature, for it is not divorced from nature and from religion. None of the Marxist writers of Germany since the First World War is equal to Möller van den Bruck or Ernst Jünger. Jünger is still amongst the living. His book *Marmorne Klippen*, published at the beginning of the Second World War, is a formidable attack on tyranny and a masterpiece of German prose. Its weakness lies in its fundamental nihilism. On the other hand, there is nothing in all Marxist literature so ignoble as the antisemitic writings that invaded the German book-market with the Revolution of 1933.

The impact of propaganda would seem to be weakening everywhere. The force of Marxist and of National Socialist propaganda is almost spent. In this there is hope for Europe and for Germany most of all. There were never so many who believe in nothing as there are today. The superabundance of false beliefs has led to unbelief. But today the way to belief is through unbelief. There is no other way. That all is lies, that the newspapers, the wireless, the politicians, are all lying, that the war came about because there was too much lying, that the war itself was one colossal lie, that all politics are lies—such beliefs or unbeliefs may open the door to the inner life, to the emancipation not only *of* the masses but *from* the masses. As long as the masses exist as masses, there can be no true community. Emancipation *of* the masses and *from* the masses are the two most important tasks of all reformers and educators today, though that task cannot begin until the reformers and educators are themselves reformed, educated, and emancipated. The Germans have been exposed to the nihilistic impact of what, to them, is a

cosmic catastrophe, for they were always inclined to identify themselves with the cosmos.¹ Their cosmos has become chaos. But by returning to the sources of their own spiritual greatness—to Goethe, above all—they will have begun this re-education.

Amongst the many errors which distort the picture of Germany, as presented even by experienced observers, there are some that call for special attention: that the Germans are by nature evil, and more so than other men; that their greater sinfulness is revealed not only in their wars, but in their *Weltanschauung*; that German philosophy *as such* is evil, and that the Germans of today are the victims of their own philosophers; that, amongst the Germans, the Prussians are the most evil; that not “Germanism,” but rather “Prussianism,” has brought two world-wars upon mankind; that the “German spirit” would be sound if it could be emancipated from the domination of the “Prussian spirit”; and that the *other*, or better Germany, the Germany of the German *people*, the Germany of the future, is the Germany of the *Left*.

Philosophy is a highly specialised pursuit. The amateur philosopher is a bad philosopher if he does not realise that he is not a philosopher, for there is a big difference between one who is a philosopher and one who is merely interested in philosophy, or what he imagines to be philosophy. It is no more possible to be an amateur philosopher than to be an amateur architect or amateur statesman. To write but one philosophical work years of thought, study, and labour are needed. There is no such thing as popular philosophy, for philosophy cannot be made easy. If it is easy, it is philosophy no longer. No philosopher is, or can be, popular.

English and Scottish philosophers, more than most others,

¹ Some one or other said of Spengler years ago, “*Wenn die Deutschen Schläge kriegen, glauben sie die Welt geht unter.*”

have respected the confines of philosophy. The English have been less cursed than the Germans, the Italians, the Russians, and even the French, with philosophies that are but dreams of power. Philosophy can refine action. It can formulate ultimate criteria which, when apprehended, can be a corrective to action. It may impose upon action a certain discipline and, upon those who act, a certain humility, a sense of things greater than their actions, greater than themselves.

Philosophy is above action. If it is translated into action it becomes a menace and ceases to be philosophy. The modern ideologies are not philosophies, but attacks on philosophy. They have no meaning apart from action. They amplify the coercive power of action by justifying it *ante factum* and *post factum* and by endowing it with spurious significance. No ideology will stand the test of philosophical criticism. Modern ideologies are derived from various philosophies but always through mediators whose task it is to corrupt philosophy so that it may be transformed into ideology. Whenever an ideology triumphs, philosophy is destroyed.

Hegel may or may not have been one of the greatest philosophers. Even competent critics disagree on this point. But he was a serious thinker. Marx was not a philosopher at all. Marxism is a vulgarisation and falsification of Hegelian philosophy, though it is something more as well. Marx narrowed and simplified Hegel's philosophy, but is not always easy to read. He was not without profundity. A further process of vulgarisation was needed to make Marxism popular. This process was most successfully carried out by Lenin, whose utterances are always clear, or seem to be so, by reason of their narrowness, their superficiality, and the singleness and simplicity of purpose that pervades them all. Lenin was the complete ideologue, with nothing of the philosopher.

Nietzsche and Möller van den Bruck were not systematic philosophers. Nietzsche was a profound, if intemperate, thinker. Möller van den Bruck had moments of deep insight. They are but two amongst those who were vulgarised to make up National Socialist doctrine, that conglomerate of ideologies which has been fused into an organic whole by Hitler in writings, speeches, and in action. Mussolini vulgarised Nietzsche, the English Guild Socialists (who are amongst the fathers of Italian Fascism), and Sorel, who was himself an ideological vulgariser. Hegel and Nietzsche would have been horrified at the notion that anything they had written could have helped to establish the Russian and German despotisms. Some of Nietzsche's ideas may have been taken over by the leading National Socialists, but it is difficult to trace any influence of Nietzsche's *Weltanschauung* as a whole upon National Socialist theory and practice. There is no fundamental kinship, but rather a fundamental antithesis. Nietzsche hated Socialism. He attacked Plato as one of the first Socialists and the *Republic* as the forerunner of modern despotisms. His *Uebersch* had nothing in common with the *Herrensch* of National Socialism. The *Uebersch* is something of a saint, though not of a Christian saint. And nothing is remoter than National Socialism from sainthood.

Nietzsche hated the Germans. He saw in them what has revealed itself to the world, later on, as National Socialism. In this sense he was a prophet—a prophet of oncoming spiritual darkness. His life was a lonely struggle against what was to become the deadliest peril to the civilisation he loved.

The influence of Hegel upon Marxism is plain, and the borrowings are acknowledged by Marxists. In Russia today more of Hegel has been published than of any other non-Russian philosopher except Voltaire (if Voltaire may be

called a philosopher).¹ Marx owed less to Hegel than is generally supposed. While borrowing some of Hegel's terminology, he projected into Hegel's philosophy his own ideas, and then extracted them again in the form of the self-contained ideology known as Marxism. Hegel's teaching is moral, whereas Marxism and Leninism are non-moral. Hegel's approval of individual freedom was qualified, but it was approval. He did not deny the validity of the moral law, he did not hold that the State should be omnipotent, or that one State has not duties towards other States. He did not believe in despotism.

There is no word in English for the German *Weltanschauung*. A philosophy may be a *Weltanschauung*, but a *Weltanschauung* may be, indeed usually is, unphilosophical. Ideologies are, as we have seen, not only unphilosophical, but anti-philosophical. But an ideology may be a *Weltanschauung* though a narrow one, for whereas a *Weltanschauung* is an attempt at all-inclusiveness, ideologies are exclusive. A *Weltanschauung* is a conception or an idea, not merely of life, but of the cosmos (*Welt*). The idea may be philosophical, scientific, idealistic, materialistic, mystical, religious, artistic, intellectual, or imaginative and emotional. It may be several of these, or even all—it may be vague, or clear-cut, inwardly consistent or inconsistent. But it is a whole. It is the result of that striving for completeness which

¹ According to a paper read by M. Mitin at the Jubilee Session of the Russian Academy of Sciences (*Philosophy*, April 1944), "200,500 copies of Hegel were published in Russia from 1917 to 1938 and 228,600 of Voltaire." It is not clear whether by "copy" is meant the complete works, one or more of the principal works, or a volume of selected passages. Amongst works of "classical" philosophy published in Russia "during the Soviet period," according to Mitin's paper, are "the works of Aristotle, Lucretius, Spinoza, Priestly and others, but not of Plato, Kant, St. Thomas Aquinas. Side by side with the translated text of non-Marxist philosophical works published in Russia there is, according to this same paper, a "Marxist analysis." All philosophy in Russia, therefore, is interpreted in terms of Marxism. v. the very interesting discussion on this subject between K. M. Knox and E. F. Carritt in *Philosophy* (June-July 1940).

is so strong in the German mind, for something that has been worked out, something that has been prepared and planned, something that must be rounded off, and then imposed. A *Weltanschauung* is not so much an awareness of the inner and outer world as a projection of the mind into the cosmos. The cosmos becomes, as it were, a *Lebensraum*. The projector of the *Weltanschauung*, having filled the cosmos, endeavours to impose his projection upon his fellow men. National Socialism, as expounded by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, is certainly a *Weltanschauung* and not mere propaganda. While it is true that the Germans began the Second World War for material gain, for expansion, for *Lebensraum*, it is not the whole truth. They also began it to impose upon their fellow men their *Weltanschauung*. Its idealistic character has done much to make National Socialism both so formidable and so cruel. To be completely an idealist is as fatal as to be completely a materialist. The two things that are so opposed meet at the extremes.

The same is true of Bolshevism. Idealistic revolutions are always cruel beyond even the alleged necessity of removing the opponents of the revolution. The French Revolution has been so glorified as an emancipatory achievement that the suffering, the outrage, and the corruption of moral standards are condoned or excused as necessary means to a necessary end. The tumbrils proceeding to the guillotine with their innocent victims have been so romanticised that they hardly horrify anyone any more. They are amongst the allurements of popular fiction and of the films. Even so great a humanitarian as Dickens, with his large-hearted indignation over wrong done to the poor and defenceless, allows himself to be carried away by vulgar sensationalism in the most unworthy of his novels *A Tale of Two Cities*.¹ The iniquity of these things is not realised because they are taken for granted. The less familiar

¹ The subject also of a vulgar, sensational film.

iniquities of the French Revolution appear more iniquitous today because they are less familiar—the *noyades*, for example, and the awful deeds perpetrated by minor, but locally all-powerful, terrorists in the remoter regions of France.¹

Revolutions exercise such fascination over the minds of men that everything is forgiven if they are successful, or seemingly successful. Even if it be true that the end justifies the means, the radical and inhuman means employed in an undertaking so uncontrollable as a violent revolution must have consequences that none can foresee. Besides, what is the end? Is there, in politics, or in the life of the human community, an end in the secular sense? Is there not much truth in Paul Valéry's utterance: "The end never justifies the means because there never is an end"?²

Often, in a revolution, the means are such that they will themselves become a "vested interest" defended with obduracy by those who profit by it, whether in terms of money or of power. The Terror, for example, always begun as a temporary measure, may become an established institution. Not every revolution has its Thermidor. Neither in Germany nor in Russia was there a Thermidor.

It may be that the decay of institutions, the decline of authority, or tyrannical government reduce a nation to such a state that forceful change becomes a necessity. Men of character and high principle will take an active part in bringing the change about, much as they may loathe revolution in itself. But what could be more wicked and foolish than to regard revolution not merely as a means to an end, but as an end in itself? Yet this is precisely what innumerable popular writers are doing today. They depict revolution as a thing of intrinsic excellence. This

¹ *La Terreur en Provence en 1794*, already referred to.

² "La fin ne me justifie pas les moyens car—il n'y a pas de fin" (*Revue de Paris*, 15th December 1937).

has become the fashionable picture, though it does not at all correspond with the general character or the present inclinations of England—or, for that matter, of Europe. The ideologues of revolution attribute special revolutionary cravings to urban labour. But their picture is as romantic, and as remote from the urban life of today, as the *Pastoral* was remote from the rural life of the eighteenth century.

Every great revolution, whether it succeed or fail, has enduring consequences. No country is the same before and after a revolution. Even counter-revolution never re-establishes what was, for it is but a new revolution. The differences between revolution and counter-revolution are specific, not generic.

Every revolution has a potency that operates through the centuries, sometimes strongly, sometimes feebly, but always influencing events. Even today the French Revolution exercises a potency which has not spent itself amid war, defeat, and counter-revolution. The capture of the Bastille, in itself a sordid incident of little importance but of great symbolical potency, divides the French people still.

Much of what was achieved by the German Revolution of 1933 has been undone by defeat, but the Germany that existed before the war can never come back, and the potency of that revolution will never be wholly lost. Just as to the French their revolution appears the most significant event—whether glorious or inglorious—in their history, so will the German Revolution appear to Germans of the future: To some of them it will be the most shameful event in their history. But others will identify Hitler with Germany at her greatest, with the titanic struggle in which that greatness fell before a world of foes. Whatever happens, the National Socialist Revolution will retain a menacing potency, a cause of potential discord, and not in Germany alone—a rupture, as it were, in the heart of European civilisation. Germany alone cannot heal that rupture. Only Europe can heal it.

No good, but much harm, can come of the endeavour to make the Germans accept "democracy" and to "re-educate" them. Those who believe in democracy, especially in educated democracy, believe that amongst the blessings it will confer upon a nation are unity, strength, and well-being. Was it to give Germans unity, strength, and well-being that we went to war with them? What is preferable—a strong democratic or a weak undemocratic Germany? It will, perhaps, be said that a democratic Germany, however strong, will be peaceful. But history does not show that democratic nations are always peaceful, and that undemocratic nations always warlike. Besides, the passage from a democratic to an undemocratic order is sometimes easy and sudden, as the National Socialist Revolution of 1933 showed. Nor is it as certain as many would have us believe that Germany before the Revolution was altogether democratic, and Germany after the Revolution altogether undemocratic. Is a political system that is condemned to a state of deadlock in all major issues because, under proportional representation, there is a mechanical, as distinct from an organic, balance, altogether democratic? And is a political system which breaks the deadlock and establishes itself as the embodiment of an immense popular will, with the support of a parliamentary majority, altogether undemocratic? Does democracy mean the *demos* in power or does it not? When those elected by the greater part of the *demos* are in power, is that democratic or undemocratic? Even if a political system were devised with every good intention towards Germany, a system suited to German character, a system which an impartial and discerning jury would pronounce both good in itself and good for its purpose, to impose it upon the Germans would be to corrupt it immediately and to defeat its true purpose. The Germans must be left to work out their own political system, whatever it may be, for good or for ill. It can

never be for good if it is not their own, though it may be for ill even if it is their own. Those who would re-educate the Germans must assume that they themselves have a superior education. It is true that the educational system imposed by the National Socialist despotism was vicious. But the Germans have produced some of the greatest pedagogues in the world and have abundantly shown their ability to organise superior education on a national scale. It is one of the paradoxes of the German problem that a nation that could rise so high and have conferred such benefits upon the world should have fallen so low and have become such a curse to mankind. But the cure must come from within.

True education is always mutual. No one can educate others without educating himself at the same time. Those who would educate the Germans must themselves accept education from the Germans. Mutual education, as between Germans and other Europeans, there must be. But it must not be forced. Mutual accessibility, free intercourse between universities, institutes, schools of thought, and so on, can alone educate, or re-educate, the Germans—and the English, and all Europe. Between them, there must be constant interplay. To impose upon another nation either a political system or a system of education, or both, is presumptuousness that shows a profound lack both of political sense and of true education.

The phenomenon of German evil-doing must be considered in a Christian, not in a pharisaical, spirit. By "Christian" we do not mean lenient. Christianity is a severe religion. Some who have witnessed German wickedness, or have direct knowledge thereof, are so appalled that they have come to abominate everything German. To react in this way is not Christian, though it is not necessarily pharisaical, nor is it inhuman. What is un-Christian, pharisaical, and inhuman is the attitude of those who assume

that German evil-doing can be explained away with the help of alleged economic or political causes; that evil-doing pertains only to *Fascism* and will disappear when *Fascism* has been overthrown; that men are bad only when bad systems, such as capitalism, make them so.

Only a prophet can pass judgment on a nation,¹ and today there are no prophets. Least of all can a whole nation sit in judgment on another. Is there a guilty nation? If so, do all of that nation share the guilt? And, if so, shall the whole nation be destroyed? What of the children? Are they also guilty? What of the "fifty righteous within the city"—of the forty-five, or forty, or thirty, or twenty, or ten?² There are such in every city—even in Berlin.

And yet, to assume that the Germans are no worse than, for example, the English, is but false magnanimity and an evasion. We do not know whether the English could in no circumstances do such things as the Germans have done. But we do know that they have not done them, although they had many opportunities.

To say that the Germans were forced by their tyrant to do evil is no exculpation. Not only did their tyrant proclaim his purpose aloud, not only did he gain a vast following when he proclaimed that purpose; not only did he establish himself in power with the help of many millions of "the common people": despite the abominations perpetrated under his authority, he was able to arm them all, so sure was he of their support. He had no fear that, once armed, they would turn against him and make peace with the world. He knew that they would follow him and wage war against the world.

¹ Burke is constantly misquoted as saying that "we cannot indict a nation." What he said was, "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people" (*Speech on Conciliation with America*, 1775).

² Genesis xviii. 23-32.

IV

England shares the responsibility for the war. Germany's fault was one of commission, England's one of omission. The German record in the war itself was surely the blackest known of a modern civilised nation. It is far blacker than the German record of the First World War, though that was black enough. The Romans were a ruthless people, but, compared with Hitler, Caesar was nobility itself—and yet was assassinated as a tyrant:

Caesar's was a soul magnanimous
 Clement; and as belongeth to noble worth;
 Midst greatest deeds, full alway of knightly parts
 Caesar waged war with honour; this fellow hath
 It dastardized.¹

What of the British and American record in the war itself? It does not compare with the German for individual fiendishness, for wickedness of purpose. And yet, some of the British and American air-raids were massacres. Surely Hiroshima was an atrocity that did little or nothing to win or shorten the war.

The war divided Europe by fearful hatreds. But it also involved Europe in one fearful tragedy. Perhaps in this common tragedy Europe will find itself. The hatred—and the deeds of vengeance or retribution which this hatred engendered—cannot last, nor will those deeds be perpetuated unless hot demagogues incite to further deeds and cold pharisees lend illicit sanction.

The sense of justice has been fearfully outraged in Europe. If the sense of justice perishes in Europe, there will be no European order, but only a European anarchy of which Russia at first will be the master, and then Germany. Men will always prefer order, no matter what sort of order, to anarchy. And if Europe must be dominated by one Power,

¹ Charles Doughty, *Mansoul*, Book IV.

as the only alternative to anarchy, Europe will always prefer domination by a *European Power* to domination by Russia.

So that the sense of justice may survive and be restored, there must be some belief in an existing justice, in some standards and constants upheld by some authority. England, more than any other country, has been, and is still, associated with justice in European eyes. If she turn away from Europe, Europe will accept a tyrant, and therefore, injustice, for the sake of order, and will then turn against her. Tyrants have endeavoured to turn Europe against England to destroy her, and have always failed. If Europe itself turn against her, she will be destroyed.

England must remain the sure defender of Europe against anarchy and against domination by one Power, if only that she may herself survive. But by being the defender of Europe against anarchy and domination, she but defends herself and Europe against injustice.

It is not enough that she be no more than the automatic holder, as it were, of the Balance of Power. Her policy and institutions must be founded in justice. If they are not, none will believe in her, her prestige will sink, and she will find herself unable even to sustain the Balance of Power any longer, for her honour and her prestige, as well as her armed might, enable her to conclude alliances, to have friends in Europe. She must, above all, be just, but to be so is not the same thing as inflicting upon others what she imagines to be justice. She must be civilised, but to be civilised is not the same thing as inflicting what she imagines to be civilisation upon others.

She must be European and see Europe as an organic whole. Certainly, the nations of Europe must learn what she is from her, as she must learn what they are from them. But they, the Germans included, must learn for themselves, as she must learn for herself. The lesson will not be learnt if it is forced. She cannot teach them what she is except

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by being what she is. To see Europe as an organic whole, she must see Germany as part of that whole.

Europe is more than a geographical expression. Europe is a civilisation and, therefore, an idea. Ideas have formative, creative, and destructive power. The power of ideas is the greatest power on earth. It is necessary to understand the German idea, so that it may be integrated in the European idea and not destroy the European idea—and Europe with it.

The German mind is more swayed by ideas than the English mind. This is, perhaps, the chief difference between the two minds and a cause of profound mutual incomprehension. Nor is the difference merely one of degree, for he over whom ideas have much power is a different man from one over whom they have none or little; he is not only different in mind, but different in character; not only different in thought, but different in action.

Englishmen who try to understand the Germans find their incomprehension deepen when they see that ideas with such potency are often nonsensical. An idea may be the more potent for being nonsensical. Indeed, it is doubtful whether a sound idea—that is to say, an idea which is the product of reasoning, experience, intuition, understanding and vision, such as the ideas of Edmund Burke, Coleridge, and Burckhardt—can wield power at all, at least in an immediate sense. It will permeate many minds and will, in time, become an integral part of that great organic whole which we call civilisation. It may influence policy and the growth of institutions, but will hardly cause a big event. Two kindred ideas have wielded immense power in our own day—Marxism and National Socialism, both of them German. Neither will stand critical analysis. Marxism is a kind of secular eschatology. But a true eschatology cannot be secular, and the secular cannot be eschatological. The Marxist dismisses the transcendental as “superstition,” but the transcendental cannot be dismissed

merely by being called what it is not. Heaven and Hell cannot be abolished by Decree, or even by an Act of Parliament.

To call the transcendental "superstition" is to lend superstition an immense importance, indeed to make it the most important thing in the world. But the Marxist shirks the answer to the question which his arbitrary interchange of words imposes: "What is superstition?" Marxism professes to be scientific, indeed it makes a cult of science. But nothing is more unscientific than the cult of science. Marxism enthrones the reason, and, in doing so, sets the superstition of ultimate unreason on a throne. The worship of the Goddess Reason is as irrational as it is irreligious.

Both Marxism and National Socialism are anti-rational. But as Marxism claims complete objectivity and as National Socialism insists on the primacy of the subjective and recognises the existence of dark and mysterious forces in man and nature, it is the less destructive of pure reason. To challenge pure reason as such is to admit its validity. Under an ideal National Socialist dispensation pure reason would have a chance; it would be an outlaw, it might go into hiding, but it could fight, and fight with its own weapons. Under an ideal Marxist dispensation pure reason would be integrated in a complete, logically constituted system of unreason.

But an idea is not necessarily destructive because it is irrational. It may acquire the character of a myth that has creative power. Such ideas are what that rational genius, Erasmus, called *Folly*.

"Folly is that that laid the foundation of Cities; and by it, Empire, Authority, Religion, and Public Actions are preserved; neither is there any thing in Human Life that is not a kind of pastime of Folly."¹

To say that one nation is more in the power of ideas than another is not, therefore, to make a comparison in its dis-

¹ Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*.

favour. But that nation will become very dangerous when armed and united under one idea.

The English possess ideas but are not readily possessed by them. The "man possessed" exists in England, as in other countries, but he does not rise high. Cromwell is the one conspicuous exception, and it is characteristic of the English that the Cromwellian revolution is to them an episode rather than one of those deep seismic displacements that have permanently changed the very configuration of the historical landscape of the European mainland.

France never bridged the chasm that divided her national consciousness, the chasm that opened in 1789. In 1940 she fell before the internal counter-revolution as well as before the foreign invader. Today she is again threatened by a revolutionary displacement, by a kind of Jacobin Risorgimento. Even Cromwell was not wholly a "man possessed," for he was too religious. "No man," he said, "rises so high as he who knows not whither he is going."¹ The "man possessed" knows, or thinks he knows, exactly whither he is going, or whether he is being led by God or destiny. In England the "man possessed" can hardly rise at all. The incipient Robespierre, Lenin, and Hitler, will be considered "queer" and will engender gathering incredulity. The "man possessed" cannot rise high, save amongst men who are, as it were, passively, or latently, "possessed." The most that "men possessed" can hope for in England is to become leaders of sects or small factions. They will be constantly and instinctively inhibited, by lack of response rather than by conscious opposition, in the exercise of power. Our English ideologues are, mostly, men who do not believe anything at all. Except in so far as they help to lower canons of taste, to promote a confusion of standards, and to replace critical by uncritical judgment, their influence, although today not small, is by no means

¹ Gardiner, *Civil War*, iii. 143.

comparable with the power wielded by the great Continental demagogues. In place of belief they have what Baudelaire called "sentimental materialism" in characterising the much overrated genius of Heinrich Heine. Because the "sentimental materialism" of our ideologues expresses the temper of an abdicating and unbelieving class on the one hand, and of an uncultured and equally unbelieving, but self-assured, rising class on the other; because its constant appeals to youth only expose its lack of youthfulness; because its adulation of "the people" reveals its remoteness from the people; because its ideas are without reality and its reality is without an idea, it can be but an imperfect incentive to action. Only through its disintegrating effect is it conducive to action, the action which follows when in politics, as in nature, a vacuum is created.

But in Germany the ideologue may wield immense power. The ideas of Fichte, Treitschke, Lagarde, Langbehn, Chamberlain, Haushofer, Möller van den Bruck, Rohrbach—a strange assortment of great and little men—were translated into action, though not always the action as originally conceived. These men did much to make German history, though they did not make history themselves. They helped to bring on the First and Second World Wars, especially the Second—which was what some of them had wanted, others not.

V

Bismarck made much German history—and, therefore, much European history—and made it himself. He made Prussia master of Germany, though not of "Greater Germany." By going to war with Austria he prevented "Greater Germany" from coming into existence for another seventy years. Austria became master of a Central Europe

that was, for the most part, non-Germanic. Having made Prussia master of a German Federation that found its unity in war with France and became the German Empire, Bismarck established the ascendancy of that Empire upon the European mainland.

The prodigious force at his command was the armed nationalism of a disciplined, efficient, highly organised, and fervent modern people, disposing of the needful resources and holding a central strategic position.

He believed war to be the legitimate instrument of policy. He regarded power as the expression of national will and attributed legitimacy to all actions needed for the fulfilment of that will. He therefore placed that will above morality and so established the fatal distinction between the morality of the individual and the morality of the nation.

A dualism as deep as Bismarck's—deep, not only because it was so forcefully implanted, but also because it was sanctified by the Frederician example—cannot be removed without a moral revolution. No such revolution was to be expected in Germany: even that great and uncompromising enemy of the German idea, Friedrich Nietzsche, not only accepted, but reinforced this dualism which the English aptly characterised by the words "Might is right."¹ Private morality has no primacy over national morality, for in a last analysis the two are one. When the primacy of national over private is made absolute, then private morality is destroyed: and national morality will be destroyed with it. This is what happened under Hitler.

Bismarck would surely have been appalled, for he was a Christian with a pietistic strain,² and although inclined to be rough, sometimes to the point of brutality, he had human

¹ I have been unable to discover the origin of this expression—it can hardly be German.

² Arnold Oskar Meyer, *Bismarck's Glaube* (1933).

greatness. He would have been appalled by the complete reversal of his Russian policy—doubly appalled by the two-fold reversal, despite his own grave warnings and the unlearnt lesson of terrible events.

On the 3rd May 1886 he wrote to the German Ambassador in Vienna:

“The best we can do, in my opinion, is to consider her [Russia] a natural danger against which we can maintain dikes but which we cannot cause to disappear from the world. By attacking Russia we but strengthen her cohesion; only by awaiting her attack can we perhaps promote her internal ruin and decomposition.”

The idea of breaking Russia up into her component parts and, especially, of creating a Ukrainian State independent of Moscow and dependent on Berlin, existed long before Hitler. Its chief exponent was Paul Rohrbach, from whom it was borrowed by Hitler. About projects for the break-up of Russia, Bismarck wrote, in the same letter:

“Even if separated from one another by treaties they [the Russian people] would reunite rapidly like a mass of mercury that has been broken up into globules. There is one nationality, *a much weaker one*, the Polish, which three great Princes could not destroy in a century. The vitality of the Russians will not be less tenacious.”¹

The Russians were separated from one another by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. They reunited, just as Bismarck said they would. In 1941, because they were attacked, the Russians formed a new and most powerful cohesion, exactly as Bismarck had foreseen.

He would surely have been appalled, also, by the decline of Prussia, had he lived to see it. The original Prussians were ethnologically akin to the Lithuanians. They were

¹ *Official Documents published by the German Foreign Office*, vol. vii. p. 274.

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conquered by Germans, by the Teutonic Knights who, in the thirteenth century, arrived to impose Christianity upon the pagan Prussians. The Knights became a formidable power, and all the resources of the Poles and Lithuanians were needed to keep this power in check. The Knights were amongst the greatest administrators in history. The architectural monuments of the civilisation they established are amongst the finest in Europe.

Many, perhaps most, of the pagan Prussians were massacred, but the race must have had great powers of survival. The Prussian language, which was related to Lithuanian and Latvian and was descended from the pre-historic Slavolatvian group, persisted until the seventeenth century.

Historically, there are two distinct Prussias—East and West. In 1410, the Teutonic Order was heavily defeated by the Poles and the Lithuanians at Tannenberg. In a subsequent war the Poles won further victories, and at the Peace of Thorn (Torun) in 1466, West Prussia and Ermland, together with Danzig and Thorn, were incorporated in the Kingdom of Poland, while East Prussia remained under the administration of the Order, which was placed under Polish sovereignty. In 1498 the Order refused to pay homage to the Polish crown, whose authority was never restored.

The two Prussias were further differentiated by the Reformation, which prevailed in East Prussia. West Prussia remained Polish and Roman Catholic.

It was from the Mark of Brandenburg and not from the Prussias that the Prussian State was organised later on. Frederick William of Brandenburg, the son of the Great Elector, allied himself alternately to Poland and Sweden. At the Peace of Oliva in 1660, he secured recognition of his full sovereignty over East Prussia. Brandenburg was part of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Elector could not be

King under the Emperor. But the Duchy of East Prussia was outside the Empire, and in 1701 Frederick William's son, Frederick III, could take the title of "King in Prussia." Thus it was that the powerful State which was to make European history came to be called "Prussia" and not Brandenburg. The wide gap between East Prussia and the Mark of Brandenburg was closed when West Prussia was annexed by Frederick the Great through the First Partition of Poland. Partition was the price which Poland had to pay for the territorial unity of Prussia. The growth of Prussian power, interrupted by the Napoleonic Wars and brought to consummation by Bismarck, came to an end in 1918. Although Prussia remained the largest of the German Federal States after 1918, she no longer exercised a hegemony even in the Reich. The disarmament of Germany, the disappearance of the German dynasties, the growing preponderance of German industry over agriculture, and the unification of posts and railways gave the Reich a homogeneity it never had before. Prussia herself became a land of political moderation and social reform.

The National Socialist movement was mainly south German and Austrian in origin, both in the physical and ideological sense. Prussianism¹ was severely puritanical with a strong rationalist strain, though not without piety, whereas the National Socialist movement represented the ascendancy of the irrational and the rejection of the severe Prussian ethic. None of the leaders of the National Socialist Party was a Prussian. The triumph of National Socialism was in the nature of a second German conquest of Prussia. Perhaps the regeneration of the Germans will chiefly come through a revival of the Prussian ethic purged of Bismarckian dualism. Bismarck was the greatest of German political

¹ Or rather *Preussentum*, which is but inadequately rendered by the word "Prussianism" which was so misused in the First World War. "Prussianism" was fathered upon Hegel and Treitschke, neither of whom was a Prussian.

thinkers. His memoirs are a repository of political wisdom, of trenchant analysis, and mature reflection, as well as of practical guidance. He observed that "India, as well as Constantinople, can be more easily defended against the Russian danger on the Polish than on the Afghan frontier."¹ He never allowed his personal feelings for countries other than his own to influence his policy. Only for one other country did he have any real affection: "Only for England and her inhabitants."² Bismarck was no ideologue and his influence on the German mind is relatively small. Hardly a trace of his ideas will be found in *Mein Kampf* and other National Socialist literature. He is admired but not followed. He believed in God, in Prussia, and in the Monarchy, although, towards the end, he had profound misgivings about the latter. To Sir Charles Dilke, who was on a visit to Friedrichsruh, he said, "People look on me as a monarchist. Were it all to come over again I would be a republican and a democrat."³ He was often overbearing and yet had a deeper modesty. To Dilke he said, "Cavour, Crispi, even Kruger were greater than myself. I had the State and the army behind me; these men had nothing."⁴

The ideologue, the German ideologue least of all, is incapable of speaking, thinking, feeling as Bismarck did. It was the ideologues of Germany who finally destroyed the political heritage that had begun to wilt and crumble before his own death.

His beliefs were inward, inherited, traditional. The German ideologue, although borrowing from predecessors with much freedom and little acknowledgment, is the projector of a new form or structure which he would impose

¹ Bismarck, *Erinnerung und Gedanken*, p. 148. This work was first published in 1919. Two volumes, entitled *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, had been published in 1898.

² *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. i. p. 171.

³ C. Grant Robertson, *Bismarck*, p. 486.

⁴ *ibid.*

upon his fellow men. He is sure that there is something radically wrong with mankind, with the Germans above all: what is wrong must be set right, and radically so! Only his idea, his projection into the future, his hard vision, his fanatical obsession, his unshakable infatuation, can set it right.

The idea must, therefore, be imposed. Upon the cosmos, first of all. A task is all the more delusive, all the surer to make infatuation the more infatuating, because it can be done with such seeming ease in a book or a pamphlet. *Mein Kampf* was Hitler's first conquest—the easiest of all, and the only one that was complete.

The idea must then be imposed upon the often so intractable, and yet, at times, so strangely docile, German nation. And then upon Europe. That Europe would never accept the German idea and would, if that idea were enthroned, arise with seemingly cosmic force to dethrone it—that is the deeper cause of the German *Weltschmerz*. *Weltschmerz* is but the German's tragic sense of Europe's refusal to accept his *Weltanschauung*.

The Russians, too, have their ideologues. Their chief ideology, Marxism, they borrowed from the Germans—with the intention, always deferred, of imposing it upon them in return. But the Russians do not consider themselves superior to the rest of mankind although they believe that only in their own ideology, their own way of life, is the salvation of all. They do not think in terms of the *Herrenmensch*, the *Herrenvolk*, or the *Herrenrasse*. They do not want to impose their idea—and yet they do impose it. They assume that their idea alone is good and true, is alone natural to men: that whatever stands in the way is evil, and that nothing else is evil. The Russians believe themselves to be one with all mankind. Their purpose is not subjugation but secular salvation. Narrowly as they may limit their immediate purposes and widely as they may

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interpret the demands of expediency, their ultimate purpose is universal and fixed. The difference between Stalin and Trotsky is but this: the former believes in the piecemeal, the latter believed in the simultaneous, liberation of all mankind. The end is the same. But the means are subjugation through disintegration.

Every social order—and the Russian social order is no exception—is made up of different strata. The Russians disrupt the stratification of society in their endeavour to replace what they regard as an artificial order by the single stratum, the classless order, which they regard as the natural order. The Germans did not interfere with the stratification of the countries they conquered but superimposed a stratum of their own. In this way they made their *Neuordnung*.¹ They established themselves as the new ruling class under which the existing classes continued to exist in a condition of servitude.

We can speak of *the* German idea and of *the* Russian idea but not of *the* English idea. The English are poor ideologues. There are many English ideas, but no one dominant English idea. And this is so of each normal Englishman as it is of the English nation as a whole. That is why ideologues are distrusted in England, and are distrustful of England. The ideologue is always a prodigious worker. He gives himself no rest. The Continental ideologue is contemptuous of the English week-end, which he regards as peculiarly English. And, indeed, it is an English institution. Continentals would even call it an English idea, an idea incompatible with Fascism and Communism, a defence, indeed, against both. Unremitting labour is characteristic of all militant revolutionaries. Burke, the greatest of political thinkers, saw, in the disregard for the

¹ *Neuordnung*, is usually mistranslated by *New Order*. *New Order* would be *Neue Ordnung* in German. *Neuordnung* could be most nearly rendered by *re-arrangement*, or *re-organisation*.

week-end, a sinister aspect of the French Revolution, a cause of oppression and mental gloom.

“They who always labour can have no true judgement. You never give yourselves time to cool. You can never survey, from its proper point of sight, the work you have finished, before you decree its final execution. You can never plan the future by the past. You never go into the country, soberly and dispassionately, to observe the effects of your measures on their objects. You cannot feel distinctly how far the people are rendered better and improved, or more miserable and depraved, by what you have done. You cannot see with your own eyes the sufferings and afflictions you cause. You know them but at a distance, on the statements of those who always flatter the reigning power, and who, amidst their representations of the grievances, inflame your minds against those who are oppressed. These are amongst the effects of unremitting labour, when men exhaust their attention, burn out their candles, and are left in the dark.”¹

If the ideologue has philosophy, he will be at war with himself—a war that will not come to a conclusive end until his philosophy has destroyed his ideology or until his ideology has imposed upon his philosophy a shameful peace. It is because the English are not ideologues that their underrated philosophy is superior to the overrated philosophy of the Germans. The war in the German mind is rarely, if ever, fought to a conclusive finish. The German philosopher usually remains something of an ideologue, while the German ideologue is often a bogus philosopher as well. All ideologues are by nature polemical. A nation infatuated by an ideology and swayed by an ideologue (for the infatuation, to become general, must proceed from one person) will make war at home—on the Jews, for example, or the Roman Catholics—as long as it is weak, and war abroad when it is

¹ Burke: *Letter to a Member of the National Assembly*.

strong. It was Pitt who said that England, in his own day, was at war with an armed doctrine. In 1939 England went to war with an *armed doctrine*. The general recognition that this was so led us to assume that the doctrine—or ideology—must be destroyed as well as disarmed. Some even hold that it is enough to destroy the doctrine and replace it by sounder and more pacific doctrine which will be harmless even if armed. To argue that sound doctrine should be armed may be plausible, but it is not politic. Germany, even if democratic, would not remain democratic if she became strong. National Socialism, the German idea, is the manifestation of a highly potent national impulse that cannot be destroyed. The *armed doctrine* which was disarmed at Waterloo was not destroyed. It retained the potency of a volcano, sometimes quiescent and sometimes eruptive, through the generations.

The Germans are visionaries because they are able to see the invisible. In this, chiefly, lies their greatness. Their vision will not be one of invisible aims or invisible conquests, if it can, by effort, sacrifice, intrigue, and force, be translated into the visible, the tangible. If all hope of realisation is denied, the Germans will remain true visionaries. All deeper dreaming is of dreams that can never come true. Mankind's noblest visions—of a Golden Age, of the City of God, of Utopia—are all visions of what can never be in this world. They elevate the spirit, they deepen the mind, they establish permanent criteria and set lasting standards. They are the only man-created constants. They cannot *come* true because they *are* true. The endeavour to make them come true will always lead to falsehood and oppression. It is no accident that no dream has been the cause of so much oppression as the dream of impossible freedom translated into reality. The Germans were greatest when this dream could not come true. It was then they had a Goethe, the greatest of Europeans as well as the greatest of Germans.

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What matters ultimately is not that Germany be weak but that Europe be strong. Germany must for a while be kept weak so that Europe may grow strong. Europe, in growing strong, must not exclude, but include, Germany. Without Germany, there can be no Europe, and Germany must be strong again so that Europe may be the stronger.

What, then, is the answer to the German problem? That the German idea become European and that the German order become an organic part of the European order. This is the answer to the German problem. There is no other.

Chapter Three

THE POLISH CATASTROPHE

I

IF the independence of a nation, having neighbours more powerful than itself, be based only upon abstract rights, treaties, and charters, and not also upon man-power, wealth, defensible frontiers, and alliances, the history of that nation will be but the story of one catastrophe after another. And when the neighbours are, by reason of circumstance and of their own nature, more inclined to enmity than concord, that nation will be extinguished for ever in one final catastrophe, unless it have a national spirit that will persist, through years, or even centuries, of loss, dismemberment, and servitude, to re-assert itself when those neighbours are themselves overtaken by catastrophe.

Such has been the history of Poland. Marshal Pilsudski remarked, in 1914, that the Polish question would be decided in favour of Poland if Germany were to defeat Russia, and France were to defeat Germany.¹ Events proved him right. The Poles recovered their independence because the three great Empires—the German, the Russian, and the Dual Monarchy, who had been their masters—were themselves overthrown.

The nation with no ultimate hope except in the weakness of its neighbours will always be regarded with extreme distrust by those neighbours who, however much they may fall out over other matters, will always have one interest in common: to keep that nation for ever prostrate.

In the seventeenth century Poland was a menace to

¹ B. H. Sumner, *Survey of Russian History*, p. 390.

Russia because the Polish-Lithuanian coalition, which had defeated the Teutonic Knights, could, if circumstances were favourable, defeat the Russian armies, for even between Poland and Russia there was no great disparity in population and resources. In the eighteenth century the population of Russia was about 13,000,000,¹ of Poland about 11,500,000.² In 1939, the population of Russia was 170,000,000, of Poland 35,000,000.³

Sweden was a great power and, early in the seventeenth century, there was an extensive partition of territory between Sweden and Poland.⁴ But Sweden ceased to be a great power and abandoned dreams of conquest. Lithuania lost her identity and did not re-emerge until 1918, too small and poor a country to be a menace.

The Poles, although their relative numerical strength decreased, and although they lost their national independence, came to be feared by reason of their efficiency. Until 1851, there was an internal Russian tariff wall to eliminate Polish competition in the Russian market. When the wall was removed, Polish competition made itself felt on the Russian market. At the same time the Poles contributed much to the development of Russian railways, harbours, and factories. They shared in the growing prosperity of the Russian Empire. But they also suffered from the evils of the Russian system—from political imprisonment, execution, and deportation.

Prussian distrust of Poland was deepened by the higher birth-rate, the frugality, the tenacity and the patriotism of the Polish peasant. By an edict of 1885, thirty thousand Poles were expelled from Prussian soil. In the following year, a bill was passed in the Prussian Diet, enabling the Prussian Government to acquire Polish estates and lease

¹ In 1725.

² In 1760.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 390.

⁴ The partitioned territories belonged to the Teutonic Knights. They became Russian after the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721.

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them to German farmers who were not allowed to marry other than German women. By the rigorous control of elementary education, the Prussian Government hoped to deprive Polish children of their language, their traditions, and their national consciousness. But

“every decade after 1886 clinched the conclusion that the Poles were successfully competing with the Teutons in all the qualities that make a civilisation worth preserving. So far then from solving the problem Bismarck’s policy made it more formidable; worse still, it carried within itself a Nemesis, the beginning, but not the end, of which he witnessed. It made all Poles, not merely Prussian Poles, the enemies of the German Empire. In his determination to localise the purely Prussian problem Bismarck internationalised the whole Polish question, since the principles on which he worked were no less disastrous to other races in a similar position both within and without the Empire. It was not only the Poles in whom the conviction deepened that the destruction of the Bismarckian Empire and its reconstruction on different principles might be essential in the interests of a true nationalism, of the European system, and of the whole world: and that without such a reconstruction progress in civilisation and an international system were impossible.”¹

It has been Poland’s misfortune that her western and eastern frontiers are without natural defences.² Her only powerful allies in modern times, France and Great Britain, are so remote, that they can come to her aid only after she has been overrun, if Germany is her foe, and not at all, if Russia is her foe. She must always reckon with the possibility that her powerful neighbours will combine against her, as Prussia, Russia and Austria did in the eighteenth

¹ C. Grant Robertson, *Bismarck*, pp. 390-391.

² Except for the Pripet Marshes in the east. But modern warfare has greatly reduced their defensive value.

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Poland in its hands as France held it, and no nation has disappointed Poland so much.”¹

France was minded to prevent the First Partition of Poland but she found no support in England. Burke, with his customary insight, wrote that:

“ . . . a languor with regard to so remote an interest, and the principles and passions which were then strongly at work at home, were the causes why Great Britain would not give France any encouragement in such an enterprise. At that time, however, and with regard to that object, in my opinion, Great Britain and France had a common interest.”²

The First Treaty of Partition, which reduced Poland by nearly a third, was signed by Prussia and Russia on the 6th February 1772. After the Seven Years War, Frederick the Great sought reconciliation with Russia so that Prussia should not remain isolated in Europe. A Treaty of Mutual Defence between the two Powers was signed on the 11th April 1764. It contained secret clauses regarding the political order in Poland, and, especially, with regard to the person of the Polish King (the two signatory Powers agreed to disallow the Polish hereditary monarchy so that they themselves might determine the succession). Maria Theresa sympathised with the Poles and wanted to help them. She was thwarted by her son Joseph, whom she had made co-Regent, though she limited his competence to foreign

¹ *Darstellung der inneren Verhältnisse in Polen: Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Grafen Helmuth von Moltke*, vol. ii. p. 117. Von Moltke attributes the inconstancies in the Polish policy of France before the Revolution to “the frequent changes in the sway exercised by royal mistresses” (*Maitressenherrschaft*) at Versailles.

² Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on French Affairs* (1791). Cf.: “The present violent dismemberment and partition of Poland without the pretence of war or even the colour of right is to be regarded as the first very great breach in the modern political system of Europe.” These words, in the *Annual Register*, are attributed to Burke. (v. Sir John Marriott, *The Fortnightly*, January 1945, p. 20.)

affairs, the army, and justice. He met Frederick of Prussia in 1769 and, against his mother's wishes, laid claim to Polish territories that had once been Hungarian. This was the beginning of the *Partitions*.

Maria Theresa was manœuvred into tearfully unwilling connivance in the First Partition which she had long and reluctantly foreseen. Austria acceded to the Treaty on the 5th August 1772. She prophesied that the Treaty would be "the source of future evil." Unlike Frederick and Catherine, Maria Theresa did not go down to history as "the Great," but if qualities of the heart, as well as of the mind, go to the making of greatness, she had a better claim to the title than her two fellow Sovereigns. Time was to show how rightly she judged the political drama in which she had played so reluctant a part.

On the 3rd May 1791 the Polish Diet enacted a new constitution. It was well received in Europe as an emancipatory reform. The 3rd May became a national festival in Poland. It hardly deserved such an honour, for it changed little except that it fortified the royal prerogative, made the throne hereditary to the House of Wettin, and removed the *liberum veto*. The Polish gentry were chivalrous but also egotistical, turbulent, and more concerned with the preservation of their rights and privileges than of their country. The *liberum veto* made it possible for any one of them to hold up any bill. It often had a paralysing effect on legislation. The peasants were a submerged mass who derived little benefit from the reform. Frederick William of Prussia and the Emperor Leopold II of Austria recognised the new constitution. The establishment of the hereditary principle in some measure removed the throne from external control. That is why Catherine of Russia demanded that the old constitution should remain in force. The reform was denounced as "Jacobin" and Poland was invaded by a Russian army of 64,000 men in the following year, 1792.

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Prussia intervened, but not in favour of Poland. Just as in September 1939 the Poles believed that the invading Russian army had come to help them against the Germans, so in January 1793 they believed that the Prussian army had come to help them against the Russians. The truth was that Prussia had only intervened to secure her share of the spoil. The Second Treaty of Partition was signed on the 23rd January. Poland was reduced to one-third of her original size.

There was an immediate international crisis. Public opinion in England was shocked, both by what had been done and by the way it had been done. As in 1939, the Russians endeavoured to impose upon the Poles not only a new formal allegiance, but a new allegiance of the heart. Then, as in 1939, real or supposed recalcitrants were deported to Siberia. Speaking in the House of Commons on the 28th April 1793, Richard Brinsley Sheridan quoted from the manifesto of Catherine's Minister, in which that Empress announced her intention of annexing Polish territory:

“Her Imperial Majesty expects from the gratitude of her new subjects, that they, being placed by her bounty on an equality with Russians, shall, in return, transfer their love of their former country to the new one, and live in future attached to so great and generous an Empress. . . .’

“A glorious equality,” remarked Sheridan, “liable to be sent to Siberia with other Russian slaves . . .”

“For this mighty favour,” Sheridan continued, “they were to transfer, as naturally might be expected, the whole love they had for their native country to Russia, their new and happy land; for the same Minister of this equitable and generous Empress proceeded to say:

“I, therefore, inform every person, from the highest to the lowest, that within one month they must take the

oath of allegiance before the witnesses whom I shall appoint; and if any gentlemen, or other ranks possessing real or immovable property, regardless of their own interest, should refuse to take the oath prescribed, three months are allowed for the sale of their immovables, and their free departure over the borders, after the expiration of which term all their remaining property shall be confiscated to the Crown.'

"Really, after such specimens, one would have supposed, but for the well-known character of the council of these confederate Powers, they were actuated under the influence of madness, or they would not thus think of insulting the feelings of human nature. But this was not enough: an oath, it seemed, must be taken, for:

"The clergy, both high and low, as pastors of their flocks, are expected to set the example in taking the oath; and in the daily service in their churches they must pray for Her Imperial Majesty, for her successor, Grand Duke Paul Petrovitz, and for all the Imperial Family, according to the formula which shall be given them.'

"Here again there is evidence of a great and good mind, for this pious Empress was determined that perjury should be very general in her dominions, and that the example should be set by the clergy."¹

Prussia had, in that same year, 1792, concluded an alliance with Poland. The two Powers pledged themselves to guarantee one another's territories and to render mutual aid if either were attacked. When Poland was invaded, Prussia carried out a partial mobilisation. In England, it was hopefully believed that the real destination of the Prussian army was the Rhine, for there was a seemingly favourable prospect of an Anglo-Prussian alliance against France.

¹ A complete version of Sheridan's speech will be found in E. R. Jones' *Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738-1914*. (Oxford University Press.)

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Mr. Eden,¹ the British Ambassador to Prussia, knew better. On the 20th November 1792 he wrote to his government that the Prussian army was intended not for the Rhine, but for Poland. He prophesied "a new partition," despite "the different solemn guarantees" which Prussia had given, despite the assurances he had personally received from Schulenberg and other Prussian statesmen, that the army was destined for the Rhine. He added that "however iniquitous" the new Partition might be, "it would have the general approbation" of Prussia. In a further letter, dated the 1st January 1793, Mr. Eden reported on the perfidy of Prussian statesmanship and on the futility of his protests:

"Having more than once represented to the Prussian Ministers the extreme injustice of this measure and even its impolicy at this awful crisis, and having been answered only by miserable elusions, it appears unnecessary to say anything further on the subject."²

The Prussian army, under the command of General Möllendorf, invaded Poland on the 14th January 1793.

In the same month, Tadeusz Kościuszko, who had fought under Washington and had been rewarded with the thanks of Congress and the privilege of American citizenship, visited Paris to win France over to the Polish cause. To Poles, who lived amid the uncouthness and perfidy of Eastern Europe, the civilisation of the western world seemed brilliant and elevated by comparison. The wickedness of their two powerful neighbours made them the more inclined to idealise the American and French Revolutions which offered, or seemed to offer, the prospect that the western world would inaugurate a new Golden Age, and, in time, extend that age to all mankind.

¹ Afterwards Lord Henley.

² Lecky, *England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. vi. p. 88 ff.

The Poles are idealists by nature, but while possessing in eminent degree a clear, hard, almost metallic quality of intellect, they incline towards that grandiosity of thought which is not easily accommodated in the modest dwellings of unadorned truth. Kościuszko was a hero-patriot who favoured that extravagant liberalism which is to be found amongst aristocrats who turn away from the egotism of their class to engage in transports of universal philanthropy. He arrived in Paris, not so much as a diplomat who would expound the interests which Poland and France had in common, and the consequences which would attend the final extinction of Polish independence, but as the projector of a League of Republics against a League of Monarchies. Although such a project might have suited Jacobin theory, it went ill with Jacobin practice, which, at that moment, was chiefly a striving to be on good terms with Prussia.

Kościuszko's mission failed. France had little desire to help the Poles, at least not without the support of England. Burke, as we have seen, thought that France and England were mistaken—and Burke was usually right.

Kościuszko returned to Poland. On the 24th March 1794 the Poles rose against their oppressors. He took command of the insurgent forces and, on the 3rd April, defeated a superior Russian army at Raclawice. He tried to avoid antagonising the Prussians and Austrians, but the Prussians occupied Cracow and laid siege to Warsaw. The Poles fought with desperation and were finally defeated by the Russians at Maciejowice on the Vistula. Kościuszko was wounded and taken prisoner. He was kept in prison at St. Petersburg by Catherine. He was freed by Paul I, went from Russia to America and, in 1798, arrived in France. When the Allies were advancing on Paris, after the defeat of Napoleon, some of their Polish soldiers prepared "to commit depredations" in the village where Kościuszko was living. Without revealing his own identity, he ordered them "to

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abstain from plunder." They resented his imperious manners and asked him what right he had to interfere. He then told them he was Kościuszko:

"At the sound of this name—so beloved, and seeing before them the hero, even then the idol of his country—the men prostrated themselves on the ground and heaped the mud and snow upon their heads, to indicate their unworthiness to appear in the presence of so illustrious a chief."¹

When Kościuszko returned to his own house, he found it guarded by troops who had been detailed for this duty by order of Tsar Alexander "as a mark of the esteem in which he held the incorruptible patriot."²

The Third Treaty of Partition was concluded by Russia and Austria on the 3rd of January, and by Russia and Prussia on the 24th October 1795, at St. Petersburg. In accordance with a "principle," which was to reappear in 1943, Austria received Polish territory which included the ancient city of Cracow as "compensation" for Belgium, which she had lost to France. Of Poland, nothing was left—she ceased to exist as an independent nation.

Such, in brief, is the story of the Three Partitions. It offers certain precepts which have been applied afresh in our own day.

Not only the Russian and Prussian Monarchs and their spokesmen during the eighteenth century, but also their successors in the twentieth gave the world to understand that the true purpose of the Partitions was to end the state of anarchy which prevailed in Poland. Indeed, the assurances given at the time suggest that the reason for the great interest taken by Russia and Prussia in Polish affairs was a deep solicitude for the welfare of the Polish people. Mr. Eden,

¹ *A Victorian Diarist, Extracts from the Journals of Lady Monkswell*, 1944, p. xiv.

² *ibid.*, p. xv.

in his letter of the 20th November 1792, foresaw that "the unquiet state of Poland . . . will, of course, be alleged as an excuse" for the impending presence of Prussian troops on Polish soil.

The Empress of Russia, in the manifesto quoted by Sheridan in the House of Commons, declared it her purpose to allow Poland "the means of procuring without prejudice of her liberty, a well-ordained and active form of government, of maintaining herself in the active enjoyment of the same, and preventing, by these means, the disturbances which have so often shaken her own tranquillity, and endangered the safety of her neighbours." The Empress, in the same manifesto, showed herself solicitous to preserve the Republic of Poland "from the dreadful consequences of internal division" and "rescue her from utter ruin."

In September 1939 the German and Russian Governments used a similar argument to justify the Fourth Partition. In the agreement, signed by them on the 28th of that month, they announced "the collapse of the former Polish State" and declared that they considered it "exclusively their task to restore peace and order in these territories and to assure the people inhabiting it a peaceful existence."¹

German historians have supported the view that the purpose of the Partitions was essentially humanitarian.² Even Polish historians have recognised that the condition of Poland in the eighteenth century was chaotic,³ though they habitually allege that Polish political institutions only failed because they were too perfect for this world.⁴

But there is no country that has not passed through a period of anarchy—England in the fifteenth century, Germany in the seventeenth, Russia in the early seventeenth

¹ *The Polish White Book*, p. 191.

² e.g. Paul Roth, *Die Entstehung des polnischen Staates*, p. 1, and Brandenburger und Laubert, *Polnische Geschichte*, Part IV.

³ e.g. Dyboński, *Outlines of Polish History*.

⁴ e.g. Choloniewski, *Duch dziejów Polskich*.

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century, and so on. It is true that a country in an anarchic state is always a temptation to powerful neighbours. Russia would support Polish liberties—especially the *liberum veto*—when they seemed to promote anarchy, but she would oppose them—even to the point of insisting on the return of the *liberum veto*—if these liberties promised to consolidate law and order. Poland grew accustomed to the presence of Russian troops who remained on her soil at one time to protect supposedly oppressed religious minorities, at another to defend the rights of the nobility, at another to support a monarch on the throne, and at another to remove that same monarch from the throne.¹ The purpose of Russian, as of Prussian—and, later on, German—policy towards Poland was that she should have a compliant government, or what today is called a “friendly government.”

Real or feigned concern over religious or political doctrine was also a frequent reason or excuse for intervention in Polish affairs. Catherine objected to the “Jacobin”—or what we, today, should call “democratic”—character of the very moderate reforms enacted in 1791. In the manifesto, from which we have already quoted, she declared that it was her intention “chiefly to withdraw her [Poland’s] inhabitants from the horrors of the destructive Doctrine which they are but too prone to follow.”

The discovery was constantly being made in Moscow and in Berlin that Poland was too big: her frontiers were unnatural, or they were ill-drawn from the strategic or from the ethnographic point of view. Always they had to be redrawn—and always, of course, for the alleged benefit of the Polish nation. They were redrawn and redrawn to such effect, that, in the end, Poland, as a State, ceased to exist. But this, too, was a desirable condition, for when Germany was minded to attack Russia, or Russia Germany, an independent Poland would be in the way. And when

¹ Von Moltke, *op cit.*, p. 122.

Germany and Russia were desirous of drawing together in eternal concord, an independent Poland would also be in the way. Catherine, in her manifesto, declared that

“the safety of our States [Russia and Austria] did require to set to the Republic of Poland such boundaries which are more compatible with her strength and situation.”

Today, Poland has been deprived of about a third of her territories, to receive, in compensation, extensive German territories, and so to be weakened by the existence of a permanent cause of conflict between her and Germany. And yet she is to be “strong and independent.”¹

Every *Partition* produced an international crisis, but the crisis had never matured, so that no help came to Poland. Neither the Prussians nor the Russians were to be intimidated by political crises that led to nothing more than diplomatic protests. Nor were they at all affected by the transports of moral indignation that, from time to time, convulsed the British public.

Poland's two catastrophic disabilities, her unfavourable strategic situation between three hostile Powers, and the ever-increasing disparity between her strength and theirs, were augmented by a third: her inaccessibility which, although it did not preclude her from acquiring allies, made it impossible for allies to assist her effectively, in the eighteenth century, as in the nineteenth and the twentieth.

Poland replaced Sweden as the ally of France in the eighteenth century, but whenever the alliance was invoked, France lacked either the ability, or the will, or both, to do more than intervene diplomatically on Poland's behalf or to offer counsels of moderation to all concerned, especially to

¹ Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons, 22nd February 1944. Also Stalin's statement made in reply to questions asked on behalf of *The Times* and *The New York Times*, 3rd May 1943.

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Poland herself. On the other hand, Poland probably saved France in 1793. In 1831, she helped, perhaps decisively, to save Belgium, thereby rendering France a great, and England an even greater, service.

To say this may appear fanciful, and it may savour of that luxuriating weed, Polish propaganda. It is, however, borne out by serious authors of the most varied opinions—by Jacques Bainville, for example, who was, perhaps, predisposed in favour of the Polish cause, but also by Professor Sumner, who has no such predisposition.¹

In 1793, the French Republic would probably have been crushed if England had supported the Vendée and if Prussia, Austria, and Russia had not been engaged in partitioning Poland. The revolutions of the year 1830 drew Prussia, Austria, and Russia together in anti-revolutionary zeal. The Tsar Nicholas was particularly incensed against Louis Philippe, above all when the Belgians, who were menaced by Dutch domination, elected the Duke of Nemours, Louis' son, to be their King. Louis refused the crown on his son's behalf to avert a war. But even so, it is very doubtful if the Belgians would have retained their independence, had not the Polish insurrection immobilised both Russia and Prussia.²

Did Poland save France, Great Britain, and much more in 1939? Did she, perhaps, save Russia, even? It seems to us that she did, though there can be no conclusive answer. In any case, she did not save herself.

Polish hopes rose high when Napoleon prepared to invade Russia. Amongst his advisers was a certain Pole, General Sokolnicki. He had that penetrating, but one-sided, insight into the Russian affairs which was, and still is, common amongst his fellow-countrymen, who are, on the whole,

¹ Poland "victime substituée à la France . . . Sans ce répit, la Révolution n'aurait pas pu écraser ses ennemis de l'intérieur," Jacques Bainville, *Histoire de France*, p. 375. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

² Bainville, *ibid.*, p. 461; Sumner, *ibid.*, p. 408.

better acquainted with Russia's penal system than with her more constructive achievements. Sokolnicki was the author of the famous *Testament of Peter the Great*. This document still passes for genuine, although like the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and the *Tanaka Memorandum* it has been exposed as a forgery.¹ The *Testament* attributed to Peter the Great and, by implication, to Russia, vast plans of conquest that made her appear a menace to the world. The *Protocols* lent lurid colour to the case against the Jews, and the *Tanaka Memorandum* to the case against Japan. The *Testament* gave seeming justification to Napoleon's designs against Russia. Aggressors have ever deemed it politic to appear as the victims of aggression, or at least as the forestallers of prospective aggression, and therefore as benefactors to mankind.

The Poles assembled an army of 80,000 men to serve under Napoleon. They fought with customary heroism and suffered fearful casualties, especially in covering Napoleon's retreat. The Duchy of Warsaw, which he had established, was occupied by the Russians.

Great Britain was not, in those days, blind to the fact that when the Balance of Power had been restored, after the downfall of the enemy, it might be threatened afresh by one or more of the Allied Powers. Castlereagh, like Pitt before him, was apprehensive of Russian imperial expansion. He was for a completely independent Poland. He knew that Tsar Alexander, for all his idealism, would not agree. But Castlereagh's policy had the support of the great Prussian statesman and reformer, Hardenberg, who did not wish to

¹ Henri Rollin's masterly *Apocalypse de notre Temps* (published in 1939). It must be said in defence of Sokolnicki that he himself did not expressly assert that the "Testament" was authentic. He pronounced it to be the result of "two years of meditation in the prisons of St. Petersburg" as well as of sundry "researches" and of "information" supplied by fellow countrymen of his "who had been in a position to dip into Russian archives which had been seized at Warsaw" (Rollin, p. 26).

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see Russia expanding too far into Europe. But when it came to the point, Prussia, in conformity with her traditional part in Polish affairs, went over to the Russian side, Hardenberg being overruled by his King, Frederick William III.

The Congress of Vienna did little more with regard to Poland than rearrange and modify the Third Partition. The Duchy of Warsaw, established by Napoleon in 1807, and enlarged by him in 1809, was an independent State—*de jure* and *de facto* until it was occupied by the Russians in 1812, and *de jure* until the *Acte Final* of the Vienna Congress came into force.

The territories of the Duchy were reduced—Galicia went to Austria, Thorn (Torun) and the district of Poznan to Prussia, while Cracow became a Free City. What remained, with Warsaw as its capital, received qualified independence under the Russian crown. Except that under Article I of the *Acte Final*, the reduced Duchy of Warsaw—which came to be known as “Congress Poland”—was to be “re-united to the Russian Empire” but with “a distinct administration.” The precise nature of this “administration” was left for the Tsar to determine later on. Poles residing outside the “Kingdom” in Russia, Prussia and Austria, were to have “representative and national institutions” conformable with those of the States of which they were the citizens¹—a sort of anticipation, in shadowy outline, of the “Minorities Treaties” of the year 1919. Castlereagh, whom Jacobin writers² were fond of denouncing as a friend of tyrants, favoured the Polish cause. Unlike Metternich he did not regard democracy and revolution as the same thing. It was to Castlereagh, above all, that the

¹ For the texts of the relevant documents *v. d'Angeberg, Recueil des traités, conventions et actes diplomatiques concernant la Pologne.*

² For example, Shelley, in *The Masque of Anarchy* :

“ I met Murder by the way,
He had a mask like Castlereagh.”

Poles owed the guarantee conferred upon them by the Congress of Vienna.¹

Tsar Alexander was constantly dreaming of the universal brotherhood of men. He aspired to be the architect of perpetual peace. His proposals made him a forerunner of President Wilson. They were but partly his own. The principal authors, besides himself, were Czartoryski, Kotchubey, and Novosiltsov, his most intimate collaborators, and, according to Thiers, the Abbé Piatoli.²

France having been "liberated" from "despotism," it was not enough, in the opinion of the Tsar, to make new frontiers, it was also necessary to base the future relations between States on "the sacred rights of humanity." It would be possible to promote the ideal of perpetual peace if, in the treaty, which would end the general war, the principles upon which those "sacred rights" were based could be clearly formulated. It would be possible to contract "the obligation never to begin a war until all the means of mediation by a third party had been excluded, the grievances of both sides exposed, and their removal attempted." In this way it would be possible to produce "general pacification" and "give birth to a League" which would embody a new international "code." After so many "alarms," and after sustaining the drawbacks "of a precarious or illusionary independence, most governments would probably wish to join a League which would, in the highest degree, assure their tranquillity and their security. The States of second rank, above all, would attach themselves to [the League] heart and soul."³

These proposals reached Pitt when Napoleon was preparing to invade England. Pitt was unimpressed, but he did not want to offend the Tsar of Russia. He was not

¹ v. Seton Watson, *Britain in Europe*, p. 46.

² Robert de Traz, *Alexandre Ier et le Président Wilson (Revue de Paris, 15th Dec. 1935)*.

³ *ibid.*

averse to the idea of a League if it took the form of an armed coalition against Napoleon.¹

Later on, the Tsar came under the influence of Baroness Krüdener, who, after numerous *aventures galantes*, had embraced a mystical piety. He drafted a new manifesto, clothed in devotional language, and proposing, amongst other things, a system of mutual aid amongst the signatory States. Napoleon, at St. Helena, protested that such, and similar ideas (which were becoming fashionable), had been stolen from him.

The Tsar had his manifesto read in all Russian churches. The Prince Regent expressed approval of so magnanimous a document, but intimated that the English constitution would not allow him to sign it. Louis XVIII had no such hesitations. Metternich qualified the manifesto as a "sonorous nothing" and as "a philanthropic aspiration disguised under the mantle of religion." What Metternich objected to above all was that the lesser States should be admitted to the councils of the greater.²

The Tsar—to the consternation of Metternich—began to put his liberal and Christian principles in practice. He restored to the Finns their capital, Helsinki, allowed them to found a university, to speak their own language, and to issue their own currency. He encouraged liberal movements in Germany, France, and Italy. He proposed that even Russia might have a constitution. As for Poland, he was resolved to right her immemorial wrongs. Honouring the obligations he had contracted at Vienna, he issued a proclamation to the Poles on the 25th May 1815, announcing that the "new state" would become "the Kingdom of Poland." On the 15th November he conferred a Constitution under which the *Kingdom* had only the Sovereign and the conduct of foreign policy in common with Russia. It had its own Cabinet and administration, its own Diet, its

¹ *ibid.*

² *ibid.*, p. 771.

own army, and its own currency. The successors of the Tsar were to be crowned in Warsaw as Kings of Poland.¹

The *Kingdom* had a status somewhat resembling that of a British Dominion. It was a *persona* under international law. It did not exist for long *de facto*, but *de jure* it existed until the establishment of the Polish Republic in 1919. It was, *de jure*, one of the Allied Powers in the First World War, for Nicholas II declared war on Germany not only as Tsar of Russia but also as King of Poland, under Article 9 of the Constitution of the *Kingdom*.²

In 1818 the Tsar declared to the Diet at Warsaw that he wished "to extend the salutary influence of representative institutions to all the countries which Providence had entrusted to his care."³ But his idealism, like that of President Wilson, was of the kind that produces a certain obduracy in its possessor when, having discovered, to his own mortification, that there is a deep discrepancy between the ideal and the real, he decides that, as the ideal cannot be wrong, it is men who are at fault. The Poles, at least those of the *Kingdom*, had independence of a sort, with a relatively liberal constitution. Poland was "strong" in the protection of the mighty Russian Empire. But then, as now, she was expected to produce "friendly governments."

The Poles did not always elect to their Diet those members of whom Alexander happened to approve. The workings of even a relatively liberal dispensation did not always produce a government which the autocrat, despite his cosmopolitan benevolence, chose to regard as "friendly." That two are needed to make "friendliness" was never recognised. Then, as now, "friendliness" was expected of one side only.

Polish independence became more and more unsub-

¹ d'Angeberg, *op. cit.*

² Roth, *Die Entstehung des polnischen Staates*, p. 64.

³ Robert de Traz, *op. cit.*

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stantial as the result of constant interference by the Tsars. In 1828, the Polish Diet declined to pass sentence of death on certain persons accused of plotting against the life of Nicholas I. The result was that the *Kingdom* was reduced to little more than a legal fiction.

The French Revolution of 1830 acted like a detonator. It started a series of revolutionary upheavals. The already disaffected Poles were particularly responsive. In November 1830, a rising, led by students, broke out in Warsaw. The movement became a formidable national insurrection. Again the Poles fought with their habitual valour, again they won victories, and again they were defeated by overwhelming numbers. The usual repression followed.

The constitution of the Kingdom remained in force *de jure* until the 14th February 1832, when it was abolished by Nicholas I and replaced by what was called the *Organic Statute*. The Diet, the Ministries, and the Polish army disappeared. Poles called up for service with the Russian colours were sent to Caucasian and Siberian garrisons. A *Department for Polish Affairs* was created in the Russian capital. There were to be no more Coronations in Warsaw. The Polish universities of Vilna and Warsaw were suppressed: Poles who wanted to take degrees had to take them in Russia or abroad. A severe censorship was imposed.

The intentions of the Tsar were known in London. On the 23rd November 1831 Lord Palmerston, through the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, made "friendly representations" to the effect that "His Majesty's Government could not with indifference see the Poles deprived of the advantages of which they had been assured by the Treaty of Vienna."

Palmerston expressed "the greatest admiration" for the Poles, but was very pessimistic with regard to their future. He held that their struggle had caused a diversion which

assured the independence of Belgium¹ and called them "a great and noble people."

The Russian Ambassador in London was instructed to reply that

"the Emperor never had and never will have any thought of deviating from the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, but is firmly resolved not to admit foreign intervention in matters that lie exclusively within his own competence. . . . The constitution which, in his magnanimity, the Emperor Alexander, of glorious memory, accorded to the Kingdom [of Poland] was not a consequence of the Treaty of Vienna, but a spontaneous act of his sovereign power."²

Palmerston had to take the snub.

The Polish insurgents found many champions in France. Lamennais and Montalambert proclaimed Poles fighters and martyrs in the general cause of human freedom. The fall of Warsaw was greeted by Lamennais' newspaper *L'Avenir* in the following words:

"Que chacun garde ce qui est á soi: aux égorgeurs, le meurtre et l'infamie; aux vrais enfants de la Pologne, une gloire pure et immortelle; au czar et ses alliés la malédiction de quiconque porte en soi un cœur d'homme."³

But no help came from France.

The Roman Catholic clergy of Poland had supported the insurrection—some of the priests had shown great heroism in the national cause. The Russian Government, seconded by the Austrian, insisted that the Vatican disavow the rebels. Pope Gregory XVI feared revolution in his own territories and was anxious on behalf of the Roman Catholics and Uniates in Russia. He therefore advised the Poles

¹ Seton Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

² *ibid.*, pp. 179, 250.

³ Sept. 17, 1831. v. E. L. Woodward, *Three Studies in European Conservatism*, 1929, p. 263.

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“to have confidence in the kindness of their most powerful emperor [Nicholas I], and were reminded of the Christian duty of submission to divinely appointed authority.”

The draft of the apostolic brief abandoning the Poles to the generosity of Nicholas contained the text : “ bonum certamen fidei certate ” : “ fight the good fight of faith.” Gregory thought the implication too dangerous, and erased the words with his own hand.¹ The Papal brief implied “a toleration of the fearful reprisals taken by Russia.”²

The Poles were indeed abandoned by all the Powers of this world, spiritual as well as temporal. But their insurrection had one unexpected consequence. For the Poles it was an unmitigated disaster—but it saved the independence of Belgium, as we have seen.

It was about this time that the Polish cause began to find widespread public sympathy in England. During the insurrection, the Poles had appointed Prince Czartoryski to be their political leader. Had the insurrection been successful, they would, apparently, have made him King of Poland. When it collapsed, he escaped and came to London, where he engaged in propaganda on his country's behalf. He had no success, except in the literary clubs and amongst ladies of fashion.

Poland became a favourite subject for poets. On the 2nd January 1832 a public banquet was given to Czartoryski. Thomas Campbell made a speech in his honour. He exhorted his own countrymen not only to preserve their ancient virtues, especially their love of freedom, but also to

“ . . . Let the world revere us
For our people's rights and laws,
And the breasts of civic heroes
Bared in Freedom's holy cause. . . . ”³

¹ *ibid.*, p. 366.

² *ibid.*

³ Thomas Campbell, Song, *Men of England*.

He also exhorted them to defend the cause of the Poles, the Greeks—and the Germans.¹

He wanted the British fleet to attack the Russian fleet and suppress the Russian mercantile marine:

“Hast thou ² not fleets enow
With Glory’s streamers, lofty as the lark,
Gay fluttering o’er each thunder-bearing bark,
To warm th’ Insulter’s ³ seas with barb’rous blood
And interdict his flag from Ocean’s flood.”

But if the British Government declined to venture upon so hazardous a policy, and if

“ . . . there should be none to aid you, Poles,
Ye’ll but to prouder pitch wind up your souls. . . .
In Fortune’s frown, on Danger’s giddiest brink,
Despair and Poland’s name must never link.”

He called upon the poets of succeeding generations to defend the Polish cause:

“Poland recasts—though rich in heroes old,—
Her men in more and more heroic mould:
Her Eagle ensign best among mankind
Becomes, and types her eagle-strength of mind:
Her praise upon my faltering lips expires;
Resume it, younger bards, and nobler lyres.”⁴

¹ Campbell apostrophised the Germans as follows:

“The Spirit of Britannia
Invokes across the main
Her sister Allemania
To burst the Tyrant’s chain:
By our kindred blood she cries,
Rise, Allemanians, rise,
And hallowed thrice the band
Of our kindred hearts shall be.”

Ode to the Germans.

² *i.e.* Britannia.

³ The “insulter” was Tsar Nicholas I.

⁴ Thomas Campbell, *Lines on Poland*. W. R. Morfill, in his admirable *Poland* (1893), wrote of Campbell: “Our English Tyrtæus got up a kind of spasmodic enthusiasm, but although he talked a great deal

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Even amongst the Germans there was sympathy for the Poles, though there too it was chiefly confined to the world of letters—to poets like Uhland and the incomparable Platen.

Polish literature itself went through a wonderful effervescence in that period. The crack-brained genius, Adam Mickiewicz, recognised that Poland's only hope lay in a world war. In one of his semi-religious patriotic rhapsodies will be found the following pious utterance:

“O Lord, give us, we pray Thee, a general war for the freedom of the nations.”¹

Morfill, who was reader in Slavonic languages at Oxford University, and a good judge of Slavonic literature as well as of English, wrote of Mickiewicz's masterpiece *Pan Tadeusz*²:

“The whole poem³ is steeped in the most delightful descriptions of scenery. . . . We do not consider him one whit inferior to Wordsworth or Shelley in his splendid cloud of forest pictures.”⁴

Mickiewicz was a better poet⁵ than politician. He believed that the coming Messiah of the Polish nation would be a member of the Napoleonic family. He proclaimed this belief in Paris, where he lectured on Slavonic literature, about which he knew very little, except that of his own country, and incurred the disfavour of the French authorities. Some years before, Mickiewicz had spoken at a

about Polish authors and statesmen, his zeal does not seem to have carried him so far as to attempt to learn the language; at least to judge from his ludicrous misspellings and confusions of names and places” (pp. 260-1).

¹ Adam Mickiewicz, *Księgi Pielgrzymstwa Polskiego*.

² There is an English translation of this work in the “Everyman” series.

³ It is really a poetic novel, but Morfill uses the word poem as a German would use the word *Dichtung*.

⁴ *op. cit.*, p. 301.

⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 303, 305.

banquet in Moscow, where he eulogised "those eagles and those flags at which all Emperors had trembled," and prophesied that "the oppressed peoples" will again "be led forward by one of the members of that dynasty" [Napoleon Buonaparte's].¹

This was not a tactful thing to say in Moscow, where Napoleon was not looked upon as a Messiah. The Russian revolutionary, Alexander Herzen, was present and described the scene. When Mickiewicz had spoken, there was an embarrassed silence. Herzen describes Mickiewicz as follows:

"Much care and suffering were expressed in his face. . . . The general impression produced by his appearance, especially by his head with its abundant grey hair and his weary look, was experience of unhappiness, familiarity with mental distress, trouble amounting almost to madness—the very embodiment of the fate of Poland."

Herzen was struck by "the extraordinary mysticism" which seemed "to restrain, to preoccupy, to distract Mickiewicz."²

In 1852 Mickiewicz received a small reward for his devotion to the Buonapartes. Prince Napoleon made him librarian at the Arsenal in Paris. In 1885, the French Government sent him on a mission to Constantinople. He was to discover how Christians were faring under Turkish rule and what manuscripts there were in the Turkish libraries. He was also to help in raising a Polish legion to serve under the Turks against Russia. He did not take to his new surroundings. While enchanted by their beauty, he was disgusted by the dirt and barbarism he saw around

¹ Uhland wrote of Mickiewicz in 1833:

"Leben, schaffen solche Geister,
Dann wird Totes neu geboren:
Ja, mir bürgt des Liedes Meister
Noch ist Polen nicht verloren!"

² *ibid.*, p. 304.

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him. Some of the Polish officers in the service of the Sultan adopted Islam outwardly, but were unable to conform inwardly. One of them, Ilinski, who had assumed the name of Iskinder Pasha and had fought at Silistria, became a friend of the poet. Ilinski

“carried a little flask of brandy in a case looking like a . . . Koran. Thus, while pretending to pray and kiss the sacred volume devoutly, he had an opportunity of drinking at a secret hole in the box.”¹

Polish literature has not appealed to the English public as Russian literature has, nor is its influence at all comparable. There is a lack of good translations.² Polish poetry, in particular, when done into English verse appears almost unintelligible. Slowacki's *Tomb of Agamemnon* is an exception, a great poem that has found an English rendering worthy of the original.³ It is free from the extravagant mysticism which would identify the sufferings of Poland with the Crucifixion, a mysticism alien to the western mind and hardly compatible with the Christian faith. Although Slowacki's poem has the national self-obsession that runs through Polish literature, that obsession is permeated by profound self-criticism. The obsession is, thereby, detached, as it were, and made to appear statuesque, like a symbolical figure carved in marble. The destiny of Poland is lifted out of its tortured Eastern European context, into a world of classical grandeur and endowed with a tragic, universal validity.

Slowacki fled from Poland after the fall of Warsaw and

¹ *ibid.*, p. 309.

² There are German translations of all the more important Polish novels, plays, and poems. There is a passable English translation, in four volumes, of Reymont's wonderful epic novel *The Peasants* (publ. Knopf, New York, 1942).

³ *Grób Agamemnona*, Dzieła Juliusza Slowackiego, Vol. 1, p. 32. Rendered into English by Antonina Kulaska and Helen Waddell, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, January 1944.

sought spiritual refuge and consolation in Greece, or rather in the memory of ancient Greece, in her monuments and sacred places. But, as he approached Thermopylae, he was put to shame :

“I from the grave of Thermopylae could
 Be driven away by a legion of Spartan dead,
 For I am from the melancholy land of helots,
 From the land where despair
 Does not heap up the burial mounds,
 From the land where ever after evil days
 Lingers the half-sad host of knights—alive. . . .

On Thermopylae—what account would I give,
 If the men stood up from the grave,
 And, showing me their wounded breasts,
 Would sternly ask: ‘*How many were you?*’ . . .
 Poland, thou art deceived with tinsel!
 Thou wert a peacock of nations and a parrot—
 And now thou art a stranger’s handmaid. . . .”

The rising of 1830 was followed by a period of severe repressions, which created a harsh contrast between Russian and Prussian Poland. There was prosperity amongst the Polish peasants of Prussia and a Polish middle class came into existence, so that the greatest weakness of the Polish nation—the abyss that sundered the highly privileged gentry from the disfranchised peasants—began to disappear under Prussian rule. In Austria, there was a period of oppression which was alleviated after the Revolution of 1848. After her defeat by Prussia in 1866, Austria was compelled to conciliate her subject nationalities. The Poles were able to play an influential part in Austrian politics and, in Eastern Galicia, they enjoyed a large measure of home rule. The Austrians played off Pole against Ukrainian, and even in those days the Ukrainians suffered disabilities under the Poles who were as masters, though they were themselves

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under Austrian rule. But the Ukrainians at least had the possibility of appealing, sometimes with success, to Vienna, whereas their appeals to the League of Nations were always in vain although their wrongs were greater than they had been when they were subjects of the Dual Monarchy.

In Russian Poland, the last remnants of Polish freedom were removed after the disastrous rising of the year 1863.

There was widespread sympathy for the Poles amongst German and Russian liberals and revolutionaries. For Marx and Lenin it was axiomatic that the Poles should recover their national independence, although Lenin, when he had become successor of the Tsars, qualified the term "independence" as Stalin was to qualify it later on.

During the revolutionary period of 1848 and 1849, the German Liberals¹ were openly pro-Polish and indignant over the cruelty with which General Pfuell treated the Poles in Posen. They were also alarmed, for they believed that the Prussian troops which were suppressing freedom in Posen would be used to suppress freedom in Berlin.²

During the sanguinary and abortive Polish insurrection of the year 1863, liberals and socialists throughout Europe displayed such enthusiasm for the Polish cause, that the insurgents were led to believe that behind this enthusiasm there was effective power which could compel the Governments to intervene on their behalf. The insurrection was, in consequence, prolonged far beyond the time when it had become hopeless. Many lives were needlessly sacrificed and the repression that followed was ferocious.

On the 22nd June 1863 there was a great pro-Polish demonstration in London. It was attended by representatives of French as well as of British labour. It could no

¹ Heine affected the revolutionary liberalism of the day, but sneered at the Poles: v. his *Zwei Ritter* (in *Romanzero*, 1851), one of the most ignoble of his poems.

² v. C. E. Maurice, *Revolutions of 1848-9* (publ. 1887), an undeservedly forgotten masterpiece.

longer help the cause of the insurgents, which was already lost, but it led to something altogether unforeseen, something of great consequence to labour throughout the world. The demonstration was followed by others which were joined by Italians and by Germans, of whom Karl Marx was one. They culminated in a meeting at St. Martin's Hall, Long Acre, on the 28th September 1864. It was

“a complete success. The big hall was filled to the point of suffocation. Speeches were made by Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, and Irish. An unanimous resolution was passed to found an International Working Men's Association, with headquarters in London, and a committee was elected to draft the programme and statutes. Marx was elected a member of the Committee.”¹

This was the beginning of the Red International.

Palmerston had penetrated the designs of Russia before they matured. At least it cannot be said of him that he deceived himself, or that he did not see the truth because he did not want to. In a despatch, dated 1st August 1860, he wrote that

“The Russian Government perpetually declared that Russia wants no increase of Territory, that the Russian Dominions are already too large, and that the whole attention of the Government is directed to internal Improvement. But while making in the most solemn manner these Declarations, the Russian Government every year adds Large Tracts of Territory to the Russian Dominions, and the only Shadow of Foundation for the above Disclaimer is, that these yearly acquisitions are not made for the Purpose of adding so much Territory to an Empire already too large but are carefully directed to the occupation of certain Strategical Points, as Starting Places for further encroachments or as Posts from whence some neighbour-

¹ v. Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen, *Karl Marx: Man and Fighter* (1936), p. 264.

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ing States may be kept under Control or may be threatened with Invasion.

With regard to such matters at least, the assertions of the Russian Government are not entitled to the slightest Confidence.”¹

But when the expected happened, all efforts to induce the British Government—and the French—to intervene on behalf of the Poles were in vain. Palmerston, perhaps, remembered his earlier rebuff. He was *fortiter in modo, suaviter in re*. He readily deferred to powerful nations, but in his dealings with weak nations he was overbearing to excess when he saw, or thought he saw, an affront to Britannia’s pride. It was chiefly this that exposed him to Lord Salisbury’s trenchant criticism in the *Quarterly Review*. Lord Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil) was hostile to the Polish cause which others had defended with more enthusiasm than judgment. Lord Salisbury made a searching examination of the internal weakness of the Polish State, as it had been in the period of its sovereign power—above all, of its turbulent character, both at home and in its relations with neighbouring States. At the same time, he put forward certain political maxims that are applicable to Poland in particular and to Europe in general, today, as in his own day.²

The defeat of France in 1871 destroyed whatever hope the Poles may still have had in the Western Powers. Bismarck’s

¹ v. H. Temperley, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy*.

² For example: “Influence, if it be excessive and constant, is veiled conquest,” and “In a carefully balanced structure like the European system of nations, each State has a vested right in the complete and real independence of its neighbours.” (*Essays: Foreign Politics*, publ. Murray, pp. 40-41.)

Lord Salisbury opposed what, in our own day, has come to be known as “appeasement”: “If, by timid language and a false love of peace, Germany is encouraged to believe that she can set treaties at defiance with impunity, a Continental war will result, in which it is almost impossible that England should not be forced to take a part” (*op. cit.*, p. 148).

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Russian policy denied them every hope of recovering their independence in a German-Russian conflict.

The struggle between Prussian and Pole was a struggle of populations, a hard and silent struggle for the land, in which the Prussian peasant and farmer had the protection and support of a powerful State. For the individual Pole, there was little opportunity of advancement, except as a member of an urban middle class that employed Polish doctors, lawyers, and so on. Although the Poles returned members to the German Reichstag, they had little influence in German politics.

Under Austrian rule, the Polish upper class achieved a political ascendancy that made them a power to be reckoned with in Austrian affairs. But this power diminished after the electoral reform of the year 1907.

For the individual Pole, provided he was not too interested in politics, Russia offered the best opportunities. The high intelligence and efficiency of the Poles—as of the Finns and Balts—and their spirit of enterprise, while an object of veiled or open apprehension on the part of the Russians, then as now, did much for Russian trade, industry and engineering, as we have seen.

II

The European crises that culminated in the First World War revived the national aspirations of the Poles. But they were deeply divided. There were two main tendencies, the one represented by Roman Dmowski, the leader of the National Democrats, the other by Josef Pilsudski, a Socialist. Both had greatness.

Dmowski was a linguist, a scholar, an orator, an astute politician, and a leader who inspired unstinting devotion amongst his immediate followers.¹ He believed war be-

¹ Dmowski could make extemporaneous speeches in Latin, Ancient Greek, French, German, Italian, Russian, or Polish. He could reply promptly in any one of these languages to a speech in Japanese.

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tween Germany and Russia to be inevitable and that Russia, in alliance with the Western Powers, would win. For a while, he even supported the Pan-Slav movement which the Poles had always distrusted as an instrument of Russian imperialism. In 1908 he attended the Pan-Slav Congress at Prague and spoke in favour of a democratic union of Slav nations under Russian leadership. The Russians were unresponsive. For them, the Pan-Slav movement was a means of assimilating the Poles. The only leadership, under their own, in the movement, which they were willing to contemplate, was that of the Czechs, for they were always confident that Czech leadership would remain secondary, while affording them access to Central Europe.

At the next Pan-Slav Congress, in 1912, Poland was no longer represented.

Nevertheless, Dmowski and his powerful following did not abandon their main political speculation and did not cease to work for it. Russia, so they believed, would, after victory, take extensive territories from the German and Austrian Empires : the Poles would find unity under Russian rule in a Poland that would no longer be divided between three Empires, and would play an important part in the administration and economic development of the regions annexed by Russia.

Pilsudski saw no hope for Poland in association with Russia. The Polish Socialists always were, and still are, the most western of the Polish political parties. Polish Socialists were to take a distinguished part in the Russian Revolution. Later on, they were to break with Pilsudski because of his nationalism. He and his followers believed that the Balkan question would keep Russia and the Central Powers permanently at variance. They hoped that, in return for support in the conflicts that would arise out of this question, the Poles would secure a large measure of home-rule under German and Austrian sovereignty. Pilsudski himself was

one of the few who believed that the three Empires—the Russian, the German, and the Austria-Hungarian—might founder in a general war, though he seems to have regarded this event as insufficiently certain to serve as a basis for a practical policy, although in no other event could the Poles hope to achieve complete national independence.

When the First World War began the prospect seemed to favour Dmowski's thesis. On the 14th August 1914 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch gave a promise that the Poles under Russian, German, and Austrian rule would be united in one autonomous State of the Russian Empire.

But in less than a year Congress Poland was occupied by the Germans, who formed a Polish "Puppet Government" in Warsaw. The Austrians formed a similar Polish Government in Lublin. The effective administration remained in the hands of the German and Austrian military authorities.

Pilsudski and his followers refused to accept projects that would not give the Poles some reality, even if but a restricted reality, of national independence. His *Legiony* (Legion), composed of *Strzelcy* (Sharpshooters) whom he had organised on Austrian soil before the war, fought under Austrian operations command, and fought well, as Poles always do. But after the Austrian defeats in 1916 the Germans gained political control over the entire eastern front. A measure of local autonomy was granted to the Poles, and a Polish *Provisional Council of State* was formed towards the end of 1916 and opened in January 1917. Pilsudski was appointed to this *Council* and placed in command of the *Legiony* under the German High Command. But the *Legiony* would not rally to the German colours and Pilsudski refused to take the oath of loyalty to the German Imperial Crown. From that time onwards the Germans regarded him as a dangerous person. On the 22nd July he was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress at Magdeburg.

Even in 1917 the Poles looked forward, not so much to the

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overthrow of the three Empires, as to the spirit of accommodation which these Empires would surely display as the result of their worsening plight—a plight which would surely increase the sacrifices they would have to make for the continued allegiance of their Slav subjects. The Poles maintained that the Kingdom of Poland, created by the Congress of Vienna, had never ceased to exist *de jure*. They hoped for a reversion to the *status* conferred upon them when the Kingdom was established and for such reforms, on that juridical foundation, as would meet the requirements of the modern age.

The Poles always had, and still have, a legalistic attitude which is essentially European. It was natural, also, that so proud a people with so ancient a history should be unwilling to admit that there were periods when they had no State of their own. They regarded Poland, through history—at least since the Congress of Vienna—as a juridical continuum. What they claimed from the three Empires was not only natural justice but what they regarded as an inalienable legal right. Even after the Polish Republic was founded, the Poles affirmed the juridical continuity of their State.

The case of Weisholz is an example:

A Polish subject of that name (a Polonisation of the German *Weisholtz*) was sentenced for High Treason because he had worked for the German Secret Service under the German occupation of Poland. The sentence was passed under the Russian penal code, for a specifically Polish code did not exist.¹ The defence appealed against the sentence on the ground that the alleged offence had been committed not against Poland, but against Russia, and under the Russian penal code which recognised offences against

¹ In those Polish territories which had been Russian, the Russian law continued to prevail, in those that had been German, the German law, and in those that had been Austrian, the Austrian law.

Russia only. On the 17th October 1919 the appeal was dismissed on the ground that Poland had not ceased to be a sovereign State *de jure* and that she had, therefore, been in a state of war with Germany. This ruling implied that the Polish Republic was not, juridically, a new creation, but was, juridically, identical with the Kingdom of Poland.

It is hard to accept this ruling. There is no reference to the Kingdom of Poland in the instruments by which the Polish Republic was established. The juridical continuity of the Kingdom, which was tenuous enough in any case, was surely ruptured when the Republic was established. The dismissal of the appeal in the case of Weisholc must be regarded as a concession, made by the legalistic mind to historical romanticism.

Towards the end of 1916 Polish hopes that the three Empires would make voluntary concessions under the pressure of events approached their fulfilment. On the 15th November in that year, the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy issued a proclamation offering Poland a *status* analogous to that of the former Kingdom, but in association with the German and Dual Imperial Crowns instead of the Russian Imperial Crown. Preparations for electing a Polish Diet were authorised by the German Governor of Poland, General von Beseler.

In March 1917 the Russian Monarchy collapsed. On the 27th of that month the *Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates* in Petrograd issued a *Proclamation*, informing "the Polish people" that "the Tsarist régime, which, for a century and a half had enslaved the Polish, together with the Russian, people," had been overthrown, and that "Russian democracy," recognising the right of self-determination,¹ declared that Poland was entitled to "complete independence." On the 30th March the Russian *Provisional Govern-*

¹ "In recognition of the national and political self-determination of peoples."

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ment issued a *Proclamation*, declaring that it regarded "the creation of an independent Polish State," formed out of all the regions with a Polish majority, "as a hopeful guarantee of lasting peace" in Europe.¹ The authors of the *Proclamation*² declared that they were acting in "loyalty to the agreement with the Allies and to the common plans for the fight against aggressive Germanism." They proposed "a free military union" between Poland and Russia "which would make the Polish State a firm rampart against the pressure of the Central Powers."

By the "agreement with the Allies," referred to in their *Proclamation*, the authors, presumably, meant the reply of the Allied Governments to the proposals for peace made by the Central Powers on the 10th January 1917. In this reply, the Allied Governments underwrote the Tsar's manifesto of the 25th December 1916 promising "the formation of a free Poland."

The collapse, not only of the Russian Monarchy, but of the Russian State, relieved the Poles, whom historical experience had rendered so deeply distrustful, of their direst fears with regard to Russia. The evident weakness of the Austro-Hungarian Empire left them with but one formidable enemy, the Empire of the Hohenzollerns. They began to hope not for mere concessions, but for the complete victory of the Polish cause as part of the prospective victory of the Allied cause. They solicited recognition from Great Britain and France, where Dmowski was their principal agent, and from the United States, where they were represented picturesquely and not incompetently by the great pianist Paderewski.

The Polish *National Committee*, founded in Lausanne and transferred to Paris, was recognised by France on the 20th September 1917, by Great Britain on the 15th October, by

¹ *Russkoye Slovo*, 17th (30th) March 1917.

² Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Gutchkov, Kerenski, and others.

Italy on the 30th October, and by the United States on the 1st December. Recognition of the *Committee* did not signify recognition of a Polish State. The *Committee* was not a Government, not even a Government "in exile." It was recognised as "an official Polish organisation" by France, Great Britain, and Italy. It was recognised by the United States without any specific qualification. France declared that she would collaborate with the Allies in creating "an autonomous Polish army on French soil," in accordance with a decree issued by the French Government on the 4th June 1917, that is to say, before the *Committee* had been founded.

On the 28th September the French Government, in a note to the *Committee*, proposed the formation of an "autonomous and belligerent army under Polish command." This army was to be placed under the political authority of the *Committee*. The Commander in Chief was to be appointed by agreement with the French, and, possibly, other Allied Governments. The proposal was accepted,¹ and recognition of the Polish army as a belligerent force was granted by Great Britain, Italy, and the United States before the end of the year 1917.

An attempt was made, after the March Revolution, to organise a Polish army on Russian soil. A *corps* and two smaller separate units were assembled. But the Russians—or, rather, the *Bolsheviki*, whose power was rapidly growing—were distrustful, chiefly because they believed that these Polish forces would share the hostility to Bolshevism which had begun to show itself in Paris and in London. The *Bolsheviki* were prepared to go further than anyone before or since in granting national independence to the Poles; but by national independence they also meant freedom from

¹ It amounted to a sort of military convention. Acceptance was by no means unqualified. The French Ministry of War, in particular, remained critical, objecting that such a convention would confer upon many persons, who could be classed as deserters or insurgents, the status of belligerents.

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capitalism—they could not conceive of the one without the other—and were not prepared to countenance a policy which might establish *capitalism* in Poland, least of all in a Poland dependent on the Western Powers. This attitude, which was consistent with their doctrines, became much more pronounced after the 7th November 1917, when the *Council of People's Commissars* took power, with Lenin as Premier and with Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Poles reciprocated the distrust of the Bolsheviki and were quick to realise that conformity between the Polish and Russian political systems would, in the end, mean Russian domination. Russia again appeared as a formidable enemy, though in a new form.

The Polish *corps*, commanded by General Dowbor-Muśnicki, clashed with Russian forces, and thereupon opened negotiations with the Germans. But the negotiations came to nothing and the Germans dissolved the *corps*. The two small units, commanded by General Osiański, also negotiated with the Germans with a view to creating a Polish national army for the defence of Congress Poland. But these negotiations also failed, and, on the 10th May 1918, there was an engagement between Polish and German forces near Kaniów. The Polish force was defeated and disbanded.

On the 29th August 1918 the Russian Government—that is to say, the *Council of People's Commissars* of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic—magnanimously proposed a complete, unqualified, and final solution of the Polish problem. They issued a Decree by which “all agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire and the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in connection with the partitions of Poland” were “annulled for ever.” The “inalienable right of the Polish nation to decide its own fate and to become united” was recognised in the same Decree.¹

¹ The Decree was signed by Lenin, Karakhan, and Bontch-Bruyevitch.

The three Partitions were thereby invalidated *vis-à-vis* Russia. The Polish-Russian frontier became, *de jure*, what it had been before the First Partition, a line more favourable to Poland than the line proposed by Dmowski in his memorandum to President Wilson on the 8th October 1918, and in his note to the Peace Conference in 1919,¹ and more favourable to Poland by 120,000 square miles than the line, accepted by Russia and Poland as the future eastern frontier of the Polish Republic, in the Treaty of Riga on the 18th March 1921.

But the Decree was not legally valid with regard to the western frontiers of Poland. The German Empire and the Dual Monarchy were still in existence, though it was evident that not they, but Great Britain, the United States, and France—and the Polish *National Committee*—would determine the western frontiers of the future Republic.

On the 22nd January 1917 President Wilson had, in his "peace message," referred to "a united, independent, and autonomous Poland." On the 18th January 1918 he had, in his *Fourteenth Point*, declared that

"An independent Polish State should be erected which would include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish population, which should be assured of free and secure access to the sea and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant."

On the 3rd June 1918 the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France pronounced in favour of an independent Poland at Versailles. But the western Allies had not, as yet, recognised a Polish State—they did not regard the *National*

¹ Dmowski "renounced all claim to the historic boundaries in the East as they existed before the first partition, but he maintained a frontier line corresponding fairly exactly to the one which existed after the second partition in 1793." (W. F. Reddaway, *Poland and the U.S.S.R.*, p. 3.)

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Committee as a Government. France tried to secure recognition of the *Committee* as a “*de facto* Government,” but it was not clear what standing the *Committee* had amongst Poles in Poland. They certainly hoped much from it, but whether it could have exercised more than a limited moral authority over them was doubtful. It certainly could not have exercised the combined moral, juridical, and executive authority which the Polish Government, although in exile, exercised over the Poles in Poland during the Second World War. Great Britain declined to recognise the *Committee* as a Government because Poland was not, in the words of Lord Balfour, “a recognised independent state.” According to Lord Balfour’s note of the 30th November 1918, formal recognition of the *Committee* would “be premature” as it might alienate “general opinion in Poland, whose wishes have never reached the Allied Governments in any substantial form.”

And, indeed, it was not the *Committee* which was to constitute the Polish State *de facto*, but Pilsudski and his *Cabinet* which took over the functions of the *Regency Council* appointed by the Emperors William and Francis Joseph. On the 6th October the *Regency Council* issued a manifesto to the Polish nation, declaring for a *National Government* and a Diet which would represent “a free and united Poland.” Pilsudski arrived in Warsaw on the 11th November. The *Regency Council* appointed him Commander in Chief of the Polish Forces, and he made himself head of the *National Government* which, on the 3rd November 1918, proclaimed the Polish Republic.

The *National Committee* in Paris had, however, been the principal advocate of the Polish cause abroad. It came to terms with the *National Government*, thanks, chiefly, to the efforts of Paderewski. Pilsudski took the title of *Naczelnik Państwa* (Head of State), Dmowski and Paderewski were appointed representatives of the Polish Republic at the Peace

Conference. Paderewski was, at the same time, made Premier and Foreign Secretary.

On the 18th January 1919 Poland was admitted to the first Plenary Session of the Peace Conference. Poland was thereby recognised as an independent State *de facto*. The note, inviting a Polish delegation, was addressed to the *National Committee*, but the delegation itself was qualified as representing not the *Committee* but Poland.¹

De jure recognition followed—on the 30th January 1919 by the United States, on the 24th February by France, on the 25th February by Great Britain, on the 27th February by Italy, and so on.

Elections for a *Constituent Assembly* were held on the 26th January 1919. The *Sejm* (Parliament) met on the 10th February and passed a vote of confidence in Paderewski's Government.

On the 28th June 1919 Poland signed the Treaty of Versailles.

III

The recorded history of the Polish Republic—as of the other States that emerged new or renewed from the First World War—is short, but highly concentrated. Those countries had, in less than one generation, a history such as older countries had in the course of several generations. It is no small matter to become a State and to find a form and a structure, not by slow evolution but by an almost unexpected act of creation, as it were, followed by the rapid growth and efflorescence as of one short season, to be extinguished even more suddenly—and perhaps for ever—in one engulfing catastrophe.

When the Republic was established Poland was a national unity by virtue of a common loyalty to a national ideal, a

¹ “ Il a été décidé que la Pologne pourrait s'y faire représenter par deux délégués ” (italics my own).

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common language, and a common tradition, but not by virtue of one political, economic, or legal order. The Republic was composed of three different political systems—the German, the Austrian, and the Russian: of three different economies, which had served three different protected markets, and of three different legal and constitutional orders. She had to combine three civilisations that had been imposed upon her own, and impose her own upon them, to centralise three economies and unite and standardise transport by rail, road, and river.

Within her was stuff for wars abroad, for civil war, revolution, counter-revolution, break-neck progress and dark reaction. Beyond her confines were further territories that might, perhaps, be conquered. But she was also threatened by secession from within. She had to overcome immense poverty. She could not satisfy the greatest need of her peasantry, the need for land, because she had not the means required for extensive agrarian reform; because, although thinly populated, she was over-populated; because agrarian reform could not keep pace with the increase of her population.

Like all the newly created or re-created States, she adopted a written constitution of western type. But a constitution that is an organic part of the national order must be unwritten or, if it be written, the letter must conform with experience and with the national spirit. All the new States erred in supposing that a fixed constitution would promote fixity, for all were, in their outlook, rationalist. Having adopted written constitutions, they tried to make the spirit conform to the letter, not the letter to the spirit, and so did violence to the spirit. They accepted despotism, with much reluctance and even with some opposition, but helplessly, as the only remedy against instability.

The new constitutions were either suspended or they were

superseded by decrees that defeated their original purpose. The general political trend throughout Eastern Europe was towards a weakening of the legislature and a strengthening of the executive. In all of them, liberal democracy, as understood in the West, tended to promote either anarchy or paralysis. The preconditions of liberal democracy—a balance of classes and of interests and those habits of tolerance and moderation which only long and hard historic experience will establish—were lacking. Not that the peoples of Eastern Europe are unpolitical, or without political shrewdness. On the contrary, they are more political than Western European (or, at least, more preoccupied with politics) and are exceedingly shrewd. But they had not that experience which can only be gained in freedom from alien domination. Considering their past, and the perils which beset them, it is noteworthy, not that they were so immoderate, but that they were so moderate, that despite all defections from the mean, it was on the mean their hearts were set, that their ideals remained western, and remain so still, and that they consistently rejected those extremes that prevailed in Russia, Germany, and Italy, even when Germany and Italy were victorious, and even now that they are under Russian domination.

Much was expected of the Eastern European countries. Being new-born, as it were, they were believed to be in a state of innocence, or at least nearer the mythical condition of natural goodness than the western nations, and free from the evils presumed to be inherent in capitalism, imperialism, and even in civilisation itself. It was forgotten that "oppression maketh a wise man mad"¹ and that nations, like men, are born in anguish and grow up in sorrow and are sorely tempted.

The countries between the Arctic and the Aegean were expected to achieve almost immediately, or at least in a few

¹ Ecclesiastes vii. 7.

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years, a degree of order, freedom, and prosperity which in western lands had been achieved only after many generations. It is a wonder that they achieved so much in the brief period of twenty years which their bitter destiny had granted them for their own redemption. Another twenty years, another ten years, even, and they would surely have made good.

That is a reason why Germany struck them down; and that is why Russia struck them down afresh and is, today, keeping them down, for, if ever again they are free, and if ever they make good, then, and only then, Europe will have security and will no longer be susceptible to the domination of any one Power.

The countries between the Arctic and the Aegean had each a leader who was also a hero, a father to his people, an object of veneration, of uncritical veneration, sometimes, but not of adulation. Mannerheim in Finland, Laidoner in Estonia, Masaryk in Czechoslovakia, Maniu in Rumania, King Alexander in Yugoslavia, Raditch in Croatia, Stambuliski in Bulgaria, Pilsudski in Poland—all had greatness. Some were despotic, some were crafty, but all of them were men who lived not for themselves, not for an idea or an abstraction, but *for* their own people and *with* their own people. They were both loved and hated by their own people—and more, far more, loved than hated. But they were never the object of a cult. One or the other may have aspired to be Caesar in his own land, but not one of them ever aspired to be God-Caesar.

Pilsudski was a man of drastic, impetuous radicalism. His solution, when dealing with the intractable, was to smash it. He was not a statesman like Masaryk, least of all was he like Benes, the politician who will back every horse on the assumption that one of them is bound to win. Pilsudski was always true to himself and to Poland, to the good and bad in himself, to the good and bad in his people.

He had not the wisdom and moderation of Masaryk, but

would have mocked at Masaryk's spurious philosophy. He had a mordant wit, and would have spurned the corruption which Benes turned into a system. Pilsudski would rather kick a man into compliance than pay him to comply. He never flattered, and he did not shrink from terrorism. When the elections for the Sejm were approaching in the year 1930, he and his Party were menaced with crushing defeat. The elections were won with the help of force and fraud, by arresting candidates of the opposition (some of whom were physically maltreated), by terrorism, and by falsifying returns. With such aids was his large minority converted into a small majority. Czechoslovakia, compared with Poland, seemed peaceful and democratic. At no time could the methods of government employed by Masaryk and, later on, by Benes justly be described as terrorism. But they had not to contend with an opposition as stubborn as the Polish opposition or with a national minority as redoubtable as the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia.

Pilsudski was one of the few statesmen for whom Hitler felt a genuine regard. He commanded the respect of the German national minority, who, before the advent of Hitler, wished that Germany, too, might have a national leader of such stature. The Ukrainians hated him because of the inhuman *Pacification*. He did not hate them because they were Ukrainians, but because they stubbornly resisted his will—stubborn resistance always called forth the truculence in his nature. The Jews regarded him as a protector in the sense that they believed that anti-semitism, bad as it was in Poland, would, without him, be much worse. He himself was free from anti-semitism. His memory, after his death, was revered by most, though execrated by some. But even his opponents would not deny that he had greatness.

Of the three great Poles of the last generation he was surely the greatest. Witos was the Polish peasant, the wealthier peasant, as wealth goes in Poland—crafty, supple

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and subtle, but with steel wire, as it were, in his soul. Dmowski embodied the finest *bourgeois* spirit, the tenacious purpose, the versatility, and the brilliance of Poland. But Pilsudski was Poland—for good or ill. His daring and simple thoughts were all for Poland—never for humanity, for Europe, for art, science, or even politics, never even for himself, but only for Poland. He did not idolise his fellow countrymen and at times he seemed to hate them, though in truth his hatred was but angry love. He lived for them and would have scorned to gain their affections by seductive oratory or by promising the impossible. He was often cynical in his utterances, but he was above the cynicism of a Mussolini, of a man without faith or any deeper passion. Pilsudski's cynicism was that of a great love, often thwarted, often wounded, often goaded to corroding scorn and malignant fury, but unquenchable, nevertheless.

He was originally a Socialist, but when the Polish cause and the cause of Socialism were at variance, he abandoned Socialism at the call of the deeper loyalty.

Poland adopted a liberal constitution and parliamentary government with enthusiasm. But Pilsudski did not think much of constitutions and he hated and despised Parliament. His humour was sometimes scatological.¹ He would, in frequent interviews, which were really addressed to the nation, especially to the peasants, inundate Parliament and its members with a kind of cackling, guffawing, Rabelaisian mockery. Jacques Bainville wrote of him that "never since Cromwell did a Republican dictator treat a Parliament so rudely."²

Of the Polish politicians he wrote:

"When I look on, and smile, and see little children talk solemnly to their dolls as though the dolls were living

¹ Some of his jokes, especially those made at the expense of Parliament, are unprintable in an English book.

² Jacques Bainville, *La Russie et la Barrière de l'Est*, p. 191.

creatures, ordering them to do the things they themselves do; when I see my little daughters, with their dolls seated beside them, and, when I see them solemnly bring their spoons close to the china faces, I find it charming, though I can take no part in the game.

“But when these gentlemen [Members of Parliament] are in acrimonious competition with the President of the Republic, when they jealously defend privileges they have in no way deserved, and when, in the course of their labour, they use methods that are entirely meaningless, doing as little children do when they apply spoonfuls of soup to a doll’s mouth—then indeed I am in no condition either to listen or to look on. Such labour, which consists exclusively in speech-making, is the most monstrous invention that was ever born of the human spirit.”¹

Pilsudski was sombrely aware of Poland’s perilous situation. It was true that her three mighty opponents were broken: the Austro-Hungarian Empire for ever, but the German and the Russian Empires surely not for ever, unless the Coalition of victorious Powers kept them broken—and this the Coalition seemed unwilling, or not sufficiently willing, to do. Nor was it at all certain that the Coalition would continue to exist. None was better able to observe its divergencies than Poland was.

Mr. Lloyd George held that the terms of the Armistice should be such that they would create a foundation for the Treaty of Peace, that the Armistice should be in the nature of a provisional Treaty. Sir Henry Wilson held that the Allies should, under the terms of the Armistice, secure “assets which would enable them to enforce the terms which they thought absolutely essential to peace”—the “establishment of a Polish State” amongst them.² Bonar

¹ *Messageur polonais*, 2nd July 1925 (quoted by Jacques Bainville, *ibid.*, p. 192).

² v. W. M. Jordan, *Great Britain, France, and the German Problem, 1918-1939*, p. 17.

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Law and Balfour were inclined to agree with Wilson. Sir Douglas Haig held that it would be enough if the Allies occupied Alsace-Lorraine. Lloyd George and Lord Milner were inclined to agree.¹ Lloyd George did not oppose the establishment of a Polish State (to which the Allies were, in any case, irrevocably committed); he looked upon "an independent Poland" as "an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe."²

Balfour, and others with him, even in the Cabinet itself, were not eager to see the dissolution of the Empire of the Hapsburgs, for he feared—what indeed came to pass some twenty years later—that the Germanic subjects of Austria would unite with the Germans of the Reich. Nor was Balfour, with his contemplative mind, the man to welcome disruption anywhere.

The belief that the Empire of the Hapsburgs was doomed existed in high places long before the First World War and was accompanied by apprehensions similar to Balfour's. For example, in June 1899 the Russian diplomat, Prince Cantacuzene, who had just returned from St. Petersburg, told his colleague, von Derenthall, who was Prussian Minister in Stuttgart, that the disintegration (*Zerfall*) of Austria would lead to the union (*Angliederung*) of the Austrian Crown Lands to the German Reich, and that "so extensive a displacement of power (*Machtverschiebung*) could not leave Russia indifferent."³ Throughout the '90's and after European statesmanship reckoned with the collapse of the Empire as an unwelcome possibility. Germany needed the Dual Monarchy as an ally, as the one Great Power on which she could count in all circumstances. Pan-Germanism, which Bismarck had always opposed, was not yet in the ascendant. Russia needed the Dual Monarchy

¹ *ibid.*, p. 15.

² *ibid.*, p. 221.

³ v. Friedrich Meinecke, *Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901*, p. 137.

for the Balance of Power and as a barrier against German expansion into the Balkans, where the Dual Monarchy itself could be held in check.¹ The possible accession of Slav populations as dependent allies of Russia was not regarded as adequate compensation. Pan-slavism was not yet in the ascendant. Great Britain needed the Dual Monarchy for the Balance of Power.

There was, about the turn of the century, a widespread belief that the Dual Monarchy would not survive the Monarch, the Emperor-King, Francis Joseph. During the negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance, Lord Lansdowne expressed the opinion that the British public would not be against a treaty concluded with the German Empire, which was progressing "on a liberal basis" and was inhabited by people of the same race, but would be averse to any lasting contract with any degenerate country partly inhabited by Slavs, like Austria, or with a country inhabited by people of Latin race, like Italy.² It was the Germans who were least convinced of the instability of the Dual Monarchy, although they too had their doubts. There were similar doubts about Turkey and even about Russia.

If the collapse of the Dual Monarchy was possible, it was the Monarchy itself that made it certain. Sure of German support, the Monarchy precipitated the First World War by rejecting the Serbian reply to the ultimatum that followed the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. He had visited Bosnia despite the warnings given by the Serb authorities. He had, it is true, been assassinated by a Bosnian Serb, named Printsip, but there was no proved complicity on the part of the Serbian Government, which conceded the main demands of the Austrian ultimatum. There was some provocation on the part of Serbian public

¹ Not always, though, as the annexation of Bosnia and Hertsegovina showed in 1908. This annexation was amongst the causes of the First World War.

² Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

opinion, which was in a truculently warlike mood. The Serbian Government was more cautious. It did not believe that Serbia was prepared for war. It would not have been incompatible with the honour and dignity of the Dual Monarchy to have accepted the Serbian reply. Rejection was a deed arising out of false pride, out of that obstinacy which often goes with weakness, and out of that exaggerated confidence in another's strength. It would not have been difficult for Germany to exercise adequate restraint. She could, indeed, have gained much glory as a peacemaker. She would have saved herself, and much more, had she done so. Her action was that of a strong man who is afraid, perplexed, clumsy, and, therefore, overbold.

It is hard to see how the Dual Monarchy could have been saved, or at least how the Western Powers could have saved it without making new enemies.¹ But the Monarchy was an organic part of an organic whole, namely of Europe, and necessary to the Balance of Power, which was not merely a British but also a European principle, and one constantly invoked by the Great Powers throughout the nineteenth century. If the Dual Monarchy was to disappear, something else had to take its place—and that something else could only be a confederation of Central and Eastern European States.

But the sense of Europe as an organic whole began to wane towards the end of the century, and the clear perception of the Balance of Power as a necessity was dimmed by the pacifism and the internationalism of the twentieth century. The possible European Order was sacrificed to an impossible World Order.

¹ The First World War, like the Second, lasted too long. Had the Austrian peace offer in 1917 been accepted, it is conceivable that there would have been an organic transition from the old European order to the new. Even so, the danger of a Germanic union would have arisen. But Europe would have been spared much—a year of bloody and destructive war, at least. The Austrian attempt to make peace was wrecked by Italy. *v. Austria's Peace Offer 1916-1917* (ed. by G. de Manteyer, 1921).

Until the 'sixties and even later the conception of Europe as an organic whole restored to equilibrium by the Congress of Vienna permeated European diplomacy. The "Belgian question" was not merely the concern of France, Great Britain, and Germany—it was the concern of Europe as such:

"Dans les affaires belges, c'est la voix de l'Europe elle même qui s'est fait entendu."¹

In the *Eastern Question*, as it was called, not only the Powers directly interested, but Europe as a whole, was the arbiter:

"La grande Europe se constituant en arbitre, elle doit égaliser la position de ceux dont elle juge le différent."²

When the Austrian Government supported the Danish Monarchy, the British Government expressed their gratification, not only because the attitude of the Austrian Government conformed with international treaties and declarations, but also because the Danish Monarchy was

"part of the system of Europe and cannot be changed without the concurrence of Powers interested in the Balance of Power."³

The rise of Prussia and the unification of Germany—the transformation of the *Staatenbund* into a *Bundesstaat*—was recognised as a menace to the Balance of Power and to Europe as an organic whole, at an early date. The Federal principle as applied to Germany was regarded as the concern of all Europe:

¹ Duc de Gramont to the French diplomatic agents abroad, 21st July 1870 (*Fontes Juris Gentium*, Part I, p. 4).

² Prince Gortchakoff to the Comte de Stachelberg (Paris), 25th Dec. 1868, *ibid.*, p. 6.

³ Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield (Vienna), 24th Feb. 1864, *ibid.*, p. 18.

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“L'organisation fédérative de l'Allemagne a toujours été regardée comme un des éléments les plus importants du système politique de l'Europe.”¹

It was evident that if the Dual Monarchy were to break up, and nothing were to take its place, Germany would be strengthened by the accession of Germanic peoples—as she was by the accession of Austria and of the Sudetenland in 1938. It was equally evident that Russia would be strengthened by the accession, whether free or forced, of Slav peoples. But what was not so evident, but real, nevertheless, was the danger that the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy would promote the dissolution of Europe. It would seem that the British Foreign Office and Lord Balfour were not unaware of this danger, which was incomprehensible to President Wilson, whose thought was abstract and never organic.

The principal disruptive force in the Dual Monarchy was nationalism. This force was greatly increased during the First World War, by doctrines or “ideologies” which sanctified and stimulated the effort of subject nations. President Wilson was the most eminent of the ideologues. His Fourteen Points were a series of propositions embodying principles that had some ethical and political validity, but, cast in the form of doctrinal theses, imperfectly related to the needs of the time, and dogmatically imposed so as to override other principles of equal validity, they were, in a last analysis, destructive. The good that was in them could have been better achieved if they had never been propounded. They represented a kind of cosmopolitan Jacobinism and exercised a disintegrating power in Europe where integration, or rather re-integration, was needed above all else. The task of restoring Europe as an organic whole is surely the task of our generation, and one of which President Truman,

¹ Drouyn de Lhuys to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne (London), 17th April 1866, *ibid.*, p. 48.

although not endowed with equal intellectual capacity, seems to be more conscious than his Jacobin predecessor. This task does require certain principles, but principles implicit rather than explicit, organic rather than mechanical, and conceived with due regard for imponderables, for existing as well as for future institutions, for the illogical as well as for the logical, for the pragmatic, and for the traditional, rather than for some theoretically conceived consummation of supposedly universal validity.

The forces of disintegration operated, as it were, vertically and horizontally. Wide fissures opened, never to be closed: the vertical fissures, sanctified by Wilson's Jacobin doctrines, that severed nation from nation, and the horizontal fissures, sanctified by the teaching of Marx and his successors, that severed class from class.

The Dual Monarchy was a piece of European civilisation. It was *par excellence* a European institution of a kind inconceivable in any other continent. It is true that for some of the people who threw off Austro-Hungarian rule there was a new freedom. But a new unfreedom, too, was created. And many people, especially those belonging to the new national minorities, who were, in the past, able to find justice in Vienna, could not find it in Warsaw, Prague, or Belgrade. There was certainly more respect for the Rule of Law under the Dual Monarchy than in any of the Succession States. And in terms of trade and industry, the dissolution of so great an economic unit was a loss to every constituent part and to Europe as a whole.¹

It is possible to argue at length, though not conclusively, whether it was for good or for ill that the Dual Monarchy collapsed. It may be argued that the disintegration of the old Europe was necessary for the integration of the new.

¹ That this is so has been demonstrated—conclusively, in my opinion—by Frederick Hertz in *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States* (1947).

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But the integration of the new never came about. It could not have come about in so short a time as twenty years.

IV

By the year 1920 the German "problem" had been "solved" by the defeat of the German armed forces and by the Treaty of Versailles. The Polish "problem" had also been "solved" by the restoration of Polish national independence through the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, the forced renunciation by Germany, and the voluntary renunciation by Russia of the territories with a Polish population, and the re-emergence of Poland as a European Power.

The Russian "problem" had not been solved. There was, in Great Britain, strong feeling both for and against the Russian revolutionary dispensation. But British foreign policy was not hostile to Russia as such and never departed from the assumption that Russia was necessary to the Balance of Power. Great Britain intervened in the Russian Civil War because she feared—and, at the time, this fear was not unreasonable—that Germany might repudiate the Treaty of Versailles and conclude an alliance with the Soviet Union. But as soon as the danger receded Great Britain brought her intervention to an end.

Great Britain never regarded Poland as a substitute for Russia in the Balance of Power and was reluctant to estrange Russia by enlarging Poland at her expense. Great Britain tried to restrict the eastward extension of the Polish Republic so that it should not transcend limits justified by a severely conservative interpretation of Wilsonian principle. The paradox was engendered that "capitalist" and "imperialist" England wished, for reason of pragmatic policy, to retain for revolutionary Russia territories which Russia herself was, for reasons of revolutionary principle, willing to assign to Poland.

France regarded the new Eastern and South-Eastern

European countries—Poland, above all—as a coalition which would replace Russia in the Balance of Power. She was, therefore, interested in making them as strong as possible and Russia as weak as possible. That is why she continued to intervene in the Russian Civil War after Great Britain had abandoned intervention.

Poland, therefore, saw her Western Allies divided, the United States standing aloof, Great Britain favourable to Russia, and only France interested in promoting a Poland which would be anything more than a minor Power completely dependent on the good-will of the Western Powers and on the maintenance of the European peace through the instrumentality of the League of Nations.

Pilsudski was equally hostile to Russia and to Germany and indifferent to the character of the Russian or German dispensation. He cared little whether Russia was a capitalist or a Communist State, revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. He was convinced that Russia would always be despotically governed, that she would be always imperialistic, and that her existence as a Great Power would always be incompatible with the existence of Poland as an independent Power.

In 1919 Paderewski, who was then Prime Minister of Poland, and was representing his country at the Peace Conference in Paris, proposed a march on Moscow with an allied army of half a million men.¹ The proposal was rejected.

At the end of 1919—or early in 1920—Marshal Pilsudski, Chief of the Polish State and Commander in Chief of the Polish forces, conceived an audacious, comprehensive, and final “solution” of the Russian “problem.” What Russia, in connivance with Prussia and Austria, had done to Poland in the eighteenth century, Poland would, in some measure,

¹ The relevant document, on the secret minutes of the Peace Conference, was released by the State Department in January 1947 (*v. The Daily Telegraph*, 20th Jan. 1947, p. 5, col. 5).

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and out of her own strength, do to Russia who was still in some danger from her internal enemies and their foreign supporters. Pilsudski's plan was to create a Federation consisting of Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, and to recover, for Poland, the "historic" frontier which had been left to her by the First Partition in 1772. There might have been room for an arrangement with regard to the frontier, but none with regard to the Federation, which would have meant the dismemberment of European Russia, the loss of her richest territory, and her elimination from the community of Great Powers. It seems unlikely that even if the plan had been carried out the "solution" would have been "final," for Poland would surely have become a secondary Power in the new Federation, whereas the Ukraine, with its vigour, its expanding population, and its vast resources would, even if politically separated from Moscow, have found in Muscovite Russia an ally for the future conquest of Poland.

Rationally, Pilsudski was a Socialist, as we have seen. To him, Socialism seemed a reasonable system—simple, easy to understand, eminently practical and fair to all alike. But he was also a nationalist with all the impetuosity of his nature. He was convinced that all nations were nationalistic above all and that the Ukrainians were no exception. He was confident that they would welcome the Polish troops as liberators from Muscovite domination.

On the 25th April 1920 the Polish army took the offensive. Within a fortnight it had reached Kiev, the Ukrainian capital. But there was no considerable response from the Ukrainian population. Poland found herself alone—without support from those she had come to liberate, and without support from the Western Allies who had liberated her.

Meanwhile the Red Army took the counter-offensive, defeated the invaders heavily, and advanced on Warsaw. Poland, threatened with the extinction of her national independence, appealed to the Western Powers for media-

tion. Great Britain proposed that the Polish forces should withdraw behind the "Curzon Line" and that the representatives of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland should meet in London "with the object of negotiating a final peace between Russia and its neighbouring States."¹ What Great Britain desired was a "general settlement" in Eastern Europe, or a "final solution" of the Eastern European "problem," especially of the Polish "problem," a solution which would have left Russia the predominant Power in Eastern Europe and protected against Germany by a zone of smaller States which would be to her what the Low Countries were to Great Britain. The security of this zone would be guaranteed by the Great Powers through the League of Nations. This was the British conception of what has been so misleadingly called the *cordon sanitaire*—a *cordon* not against Russia but against Germany.

By agreeing to mediate and to convene a conference attended by the representatives of the Soviet Union and of other Eastern European Powers in London, Great Britain afforded the Soviet Union the possibility of securing *de jure* recognition for her revolutionary Government, of participating in the task of European political and economic reconstruction, of joining the League of Nations, and of weighting the Balance of Power securely against a German national resurgence.

But the successes of the Red Army fortified Russia in the conviction that Communism would be in the ascendant throughout Europe. A Communist Poland would surely mean a Communist Germany—and a Communist Germany would, in 1920 as in 1948, mean a Communist Europe. Russia, therefore, refused the British offer and, as the Red Army approached the outskirts of Warsaw, offered to negotiate directly with Poland. Great Britain advised Poland to comply.

¹ Earl Curzon to Lord Harding (Spa, 11th July 1920).

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But, just as Pilsudski had misjudged Ukrainian nationalism, so Lenin and Trotsky misjudged Polish Socialism. Except for a small minority of Communists, the industrial workmen and peasants of Poland were intensely patriotic. The Polish "workers" did not, as Russia had expected, welcome the Red Army as a liberator from capitalism, imperialism, and "feudalism." They fought for their country. The Russian advance on Warsaw united the Polish nation. The Red Army was not only defeated but routed when it seemed on the point of capturing the capital.

On the 25th July 1932 Poland and Russia signed a *Pact of Non-Aggression*. In the *Preamble* to this *Pact* the Treaty of Riga was re-affirmed. Under *Article 1*, the signatories undertook to abstain from "any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence" of the other, and to "avoid all warlike manifestations." Under *Article 3*, the signatories undertook "not to be a party to any agreement openly hostile to the other." Russia concluded *Pacts* of the same kind with Finland, Lithuania, and Estonia. A *Non-Aggression and Conciliation Pact* had been concluded between Russia and Lithuania on the 28th September 1926.

In 1928 the *Pact of Paris*, generally known as the *Kellogg Pact*, was signed by Great Britain, the United States, and France. The signatures of nearly all the other Great Powers, including Russia, and nearly all the small, followed in quick succession. Under this *Pact*, the signatories renounced the use of war "as an instrument of policy." Before the signatures were ratified, Russia proposed that the *Pact* should be in force as between herself and her western neighbours before it had been ratified by the signatories. Protocols to this effect were signed at Moscow by Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Rumania, and Poland in February 1929. Lithuania signed on the 1st April in that year.

Between Russia and her western neighbours a system, theoretically perfect, of security against aggression, was erected, chiefly on her initiative. Certain questions, however, had remained without a satisfactory answer: What is aggression? Who, in a given conflict, is the aggressor?¹ Can a definition be found which will enable the Powers—or the League of Nations—to designate the aggressor when a conflict begins, or even before it begins?

Russia, in the person of her Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, who was extremely popular in Geneva, supplied the answer, which was embodied in the *Geneva Draft Convention*. During the World Economic Conference held at London in June 1933, three months after Hitler had made himself master of Germany, Litvinov proposed that Russia and her neighbours should apply the principles of this convention to their relations with one another. A special *Convention for the Definition of Aggression* was signed at London on the 3rd July 1933, with exceptional solemnity, by the Presidents of the Polish, Estonian, Latvian, and Turkish Republics, by the Kings of Rumania and of Afghanistan, by the Shah of Persia, and by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The representatives of Lithuania and of Finland gave their signatures on the 5th and the 23rd of July respectively.

The text of this document, which is rather long and is phrased with excessive elevation of style, need not detain us here; but its particular purpose, namely, to define *aggression*, is of some interest, for the means and methods specified as constituting aggression in the document are precisely those which were soon to be adopted by Germany and, almost as soon, by Russia.

That open warfare, armed invasion, aerial attack, naval

¹ To Clemenceau was attributed the definition: *l'agresseur, c'est l'autre.*

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blockade, and so on, constitute *aggression*, under *Article 2*, is clear enough. Under that same *Article* support given to "armed bands" in another State also constitutes aggression. And, under *Article 3*, "no political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in *Article 2*." The *Annexe* gives examples of such "considerations": amongst them "the internal conditions of a State," such as "its political, economic, or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war." The system of security against aggression was complete. At least, it is hard to see what more could have been done on paper to establish permanent peace between Russia and her western neighbours.

Agreements, treaties, pacts, and conventions are necessary to give the Rule of Law precision both in general and in particular, but the Rule of Law cannot be founded on paper. If it does not command respect, if it is not founded on the sense of justice and equity between nations, and if it is not sustained by a Balance of Power, it will collapse.

On the 14th of February 1934 Maxim Litvinov spoke on behalf of the Russian Government at a reception in honour of the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, in Moscow. He referred in cordial terms to the excellent relations that existed between Russia and Poland and to "the profound process of *rapprochement*" which "largely occurred during your [*i.e.* Colonel Beck's] direction of Polish affairs." Maxim Litvinov then proposed "a toast to the further strengthening of the friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Poland."¹

On the 5th of May 1934 the *Pact of Non-Aggression* between Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia was

¹ The text of Maxim Litvinov's speech will be found in *The Polish White Book of Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939*.

renewed, on the initiative of the Russian Government, until the 31st of December 1945.

On the 24th of October 1938 Poland was invited to join the *entente* between Germany, Italy, and Japan, known as the *Anti-Comintern Pact*. On the 19th November she gave her refusal.

In May of 1939, when the aggressive intentions of Germany had become abundantly clear and every competent observer realised that a European war was probable, if not certain, Colonel Beck received an assurance from the Russian Envoy, Mr. Potemkin, that Russia would adopt "une attitude bienveillante" towards Poland in the event of an armed conflict between Poland and Germany. This "assurance" was given "in accordance with special instructions" which Mr. Potemkin had received from his Government.¹ On the 31st May 1939 Mr. Molotov, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, addressing the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, declared that Russia stood "for the cause of peace" and that "a certain general improvement" was "noticeable" in the relations between Russia and Poland.²

On the 23rd of August 1939 a *Non-Aggression Pact* was concluded between Russia and Germany. The *Pact* was signed by Herr von Ribbentrop and Mr. Molotov and is generally known as the *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*. It was ratified at once. Germany and Russia agreed to refrain from attacking one another and from aiding any third party that might attack either. Attached to the *Pact* was a *Secret Protocol*. Under this Protocol, Russia and Germany agreed on the *Partition*, not only of Poland, but of all Eastern Europe. Estonia, Latvia, all Polish territory east of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San, and the Rumanian province of Bessarabia, were assigned to the Russian "sphere of interest." The question whether an independent Poland

¹ v. *The Polish White Book*, p. 183.

² *ibid.*

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should be allowed to exist at all was left for settlement "in the course of further political developments"—these "developments" answered this question in the negative before many months were out.¹

On the 1st September 1939 Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War began.² On the 3rd September Great Britain went to war with Germany under the terms of the Anglo-Polish *Agreement of Mutual Assistance* which had been signed on the 25th August 1939. A *Secret Protocol* was attached to this *Agreement* also—we shall examine it later on.

The Polish armed forces were unable to withstand the immensely superior weight of the German attack. The Germans had 40 divisions in Poland, including all her 14 armoured and mechanised divisions. It is true that Poland had 39 divisions, 10 mounted brigades, and two mechanised cavalry brigades. But some of the Polish divisions were wretchedly equipped. The German divisions had far greater fire-power and mobility. The Poles were short of artillery. In the air, the Germans outnumbered them by about 7 to 1.³

Russia invaded Poland on the 17th of September. Again the Poles were immensely outnumbered. Some withdrew fighting. Others, who believed, at first, that the Russians had arrived as Allies, were thrown into confusion and

¹ This *Secret Protocol* was obtained by Mr. Thomas Dodd, the deputy United States prosecutor at Nuremberg, and published in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. When questioned in the House of Commons on the 14th October 1946, Mr. Mayhew, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, admitted that the text of the *Protocol* had been found, but that the British Government had no intention of making it public. But publication in the United States was naturally followed by publication in Great Britain (*v. The Daily Telegraph*, 22nd Nov. 1946, and other dailies). On the 28th October 1946 the terms of the *Protocol* were modified: Lithuania was assigned to Russia, while the districts of Lublin and Warsaw were assigned to Germany.

² The beginning of the Second World War is sometimes dated the 3rd September 1939, when Great Britain and France went to war with Germany. The correct date is the 1st September 1939.

³ *v. Lt.-Gen. M. Kukiel, Six Years of Struggle for Independence* (Newtown, 1947).

were taken prisoner. On the day of the Russian invasion, 25 Polish divisions were still offering resistance to the Germans, who suffered a reverse near Lemberg where Polish armoured forces rallied under the command of General Sosnkowski, afterwards Commander in Chief of the Polish army. Warsaw was still holding out. The fortress of Modlin fell on the 30th of September. The peninsula of Hel, on the Baltic coast, was defended until the 2nd of October.

The last organised battle fought by the Polish forces on their own soil came to an end on the 5th of October in the region of Kock.¹ Two divisions of Polish infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and detachments from various scattered units, fought against the combined German and Russian forces for three days, until all their ammunition was exhausted.

On the day Russia invaded Poland the Russian envoy, Mr. Potemkin, handed a note to Mr. Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, stating that "the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State" had been "revealed," that Poland had "lost all her industrial areas and cultural centres," although the university town of Lemberg was still resisting and did not fall until the 22nd September when, after a stubborn defence against the Germans, it was taken by the Russians. Warsaw, according to the Russian note, "no longer exists as the capital of Poland," although Warsaw was still resisting (the garrison did not sue for an armistice until the 29th September). "The Polish Government has disintegrated and no longer shows any sign of life," the "Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist," and "therefore the Agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate."

The armed invasion of Poland by Russia was a violation of the *Pact of Paris*, signed in 1928 and ratified as between Russia and Poland in 1929; and of the *Pact of Non-Aggres-*

¹ Pronounced *Kotsk*.

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sion, signed on the 25th July 1932. The explanations given by Russia were precisely those, like "the internal condition of a state," which were inadmissible as "excuses" for "aggression" as defined under *Article 3* and in the *Annexe* of the *Convention for the Definition of Aggression*, signed on the 3rd July 1933, as we have seen.

In her note of the 17th September 1939 Russia also stated that she could not "view with indifference the fact that the kindred Ukrainian and White Russian people, who are in Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenceless," that the Russian troops had invaded Poland "to take under their protection the lives and property of the populations of the Western Ukraine and Western White Russia," and that the Russian Government proposed "to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged" and "to enable them to live a peaceful life."¹

On the 28th September Russia and Germany signed an *Agreement* declaring that they "considered it as exclusively their own task to restore peace and order in these territories [*i.e.* the territories of the Polish Republic] and to assure the people inhabiting it a peaceful existence which will correspond to their national characteristics." Under *Article 1* of this *Agreement*, the "frontier between the German and Russian State interests in the territory of the *former*² Polish State" was defined. Under *Article 2* this frontier was recognised as "final" by both Powers. Under the same *Article*, they declared that they would "resist any interference with this decision on the part of other Powers."³

It was the Fourth Partition of Poland.

Russia annexed nearly half the territory of the Polish

¹ *The Polish White Book*, p. 190.

² Italics my own.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 191. The frontier defined in this *Agreement* was a modification of the frontier agreed upon by Germany and Russia under the *Secret Protocol* attached to the *Non-Aggression Pact* which had been signed on the 23rd August 1939 (*v.* p. 113 and footnote).

Republic with a little more than a third of the population. Germany annexed the remainder. The Polish city of Vilna, with the surrounding country, was ceded to Lithuania, which was, later on, incorporated in the Soviet Union. The Polish Republic remained at war with Germany. The Polish army, navy, and air force were serving far from the homeland—in France, Great Britain, North Africa, and elsewhere. Irregular and secret warfare against the Germans began in the homeland itself. Resistance to the Russians was abandoned.

Russia established a military and civilian administration in Eastern Poland. The territory was divided in two regions: *Western White Russia* and *Western Ukraine*, which were treated as extensions of the White Russian¹ and Ukrainian Soviet Republics which are members of the Soviet Union.

The heads of the administration were mostly drawn from the Soviet Union, though a few Polish Communists were allowed to take part. The Polish police were replaced by Russian militiamen. Law courts were suppressed and many Polish schools and churches were closed. Many Polish subjects were arrested and deported to Russia with or without their families. These deportations, to which we shall return later on, increased during the first few months of the year 1940.

On the 22nd October 1939 the Russian authorities in Eastern Poland held "elections" for *Popular Assemblies* which were to "represent" *Western White Russia* and the *Western Ukraine*.² Although the Poles were not unfamiliar with elections held under illicit pressure, they had never

¹ Or White Ruthenian. *Ruthenia* is a Latinised form of Russia.

² According to the Polish census of the year 1931, the population of the Polish territories annexed by Russia totalled 13,200,000 :

5,274,000 Poles (40 per cent.).

4,841,000 Ukrainians (36·7 per cent.).

1,596,000 White Russians (12 per cent.).

1,109,000 Jews (8·4 per cent.).

(The remainder was made up of Russians, Germans, Lithuanians, Czechs, and others.)

These figures have been challenged by some authorities. Members of

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known the like. These elections were organised in about a fortnight. Only a few days were allowed for creating 2424 constituencies with a total population of 12,662,000.¹

The electorate was unaware, or hardly aware, what the polling was for and what purpose the *Popular Assemblies* were to serve. The Municipal Council of Lemberg issued a statement that the Ukrainian *Popular Assembly* would decide the future national status of the Western Ukraine. But only those Poles who were familiar with Russian history and with Russian methods could have known that this meant the incorporation of Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and, therefore, in the Soviet Union. In a city so enlightened as Lemberg such knowledge was probably widespread. That is doubtless the reason why Lemberg produced such a meagre poll. The polling in the remoter villages was much higher as a result of ignorance and justified fear.

The *Election Committees*, which superintended the polling, were composed of persons who were, for the most part, strangers, though here and there a local Communist would be a member. The elections were organised by the Russian military and civil administration. Many Russian officials, including members of the NKVD,² arrived from Moscow as organisers.

The candidates were chosen neither by the electorate nor the Polish Parliament (Sejm), representing Ukrainian constituencies in Eastern Galicia, subjected the census to severe and, in certain cases, apparently justified criticism. There were, in Eastern Poland, no absolute criteria of "nationality." Many peasants were without a developed national consciousness and, when asked by the census officials whether they were Polish, Ukrainian, or White Russian, would answer "Roman Catholic," "Orthodox," or simply *tutejsi* ("of these parts" — *hiesige* in German).

¹ Those residing in the Polish districts which had been ceded to Lithuania were excluded.

² The initials of the Russian "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs," or Home Office. These initials also designate the Secret Police which are under the Home Office. The Secret Police were formerly the GPU; before that (under Lenin), the Cheka; before that (under the Tsars), the Okhrana.

by any existing Parties. Nearly all of them were persons unknown in the constituency where they stood for election. Many of them, if not most, were *Politruks* (Political Officers) from Russia. The workmen in some factories tried to put forward their own candidates, but were invariably overruled by the *Politruks*. In some constituencies the candidates were officials of the Russian military and civil administration. In one constituency¹ Mr. Molotov and Marshal Voroshiloff were the candidates, though it does not appear that either had ever visited this constituency. In some of the rural constituencies the candidates were illiterate.

While Polish subjects—political leaders, party officials, and organisers—were being deported to Russia, many subjects of the Soviet Union arrived not only to organise but also to vote as “permanent or temporary residents.” 100,000 Russian agitators were drafted into Poland.² Speeches and lectures and propagandist plays—some of them with well-known Russian casts—were given. “Propaganda trains” of the kind used in Russia during the Revolution were sent to Poland. Russian troops acted as canvassers—“the soldier agitator was here and there and everywhere.”³ The propaganda was chiefly directed against imperialism and capitalism, against the Polish landowners, against Ukrainian nationalism, and, of course, always for the Soviet Union. “Polish landlords” and “British Imperialists” were sometimes classed together. *Pravda*, describing the “elections”—which were extensively reported by Russian correspondents—wrote:

“Is there another people in the world, with the only exception of the peasants of India, groaning under the

¹ Constituency IV, Krzemieniec (*Pravda*, 19th Oct. 1939).

² 100,000 agitators were sent to “Western White Russia” (*Pravda*, 22nd Oct. 1939). At Zolkiev there were 600 agitators for 11,000 inhabitants (*Pravda*, 15th Oct. 1939).

³ *Izvestia*, 2nd Feb. 1940.

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boot of British imperialists, which has gone through such a tragedy as the Ukrainians and the White Russian peoples under the yoke of the Polish landlords?"¹

But more effective than propaganda was force—the fear of arrest, the fear of being deported to Russia, the fear of anything the new, all-powerful, and tyrannical master could inflict.

The polling was as follows: There was only one name—the name of the local candidate—on the ballot-paper. There was a screen, behind which the voter could retire and mark his paper. But this screen was not adequate to protect him from observation. Many a voter was observed, by one or other of the officials in the polling station, to cross out the name of the candidate or to scribble some comment of his own on the paper. A mark would then be put against his name in the register—and he could fear the worst.

In some polling stations voters were "advised" by the officials present—Russian militiamen, Russian soldiers, agents of the NKVD, or some local Communist—to drop their papers into the ballot-box without retiring behind the screen. Many persons arrived who had no identity card and were not on the register. They were allowed to vote, nevertheless. Many Russian soldiers voted. The voting, though theoretically free, was in practice compulsory.² Agents of the NKVD would call on persons who stayed away from their polling-station and warn them. In some localities, when noon approached, and no voters, or only a few, appeared in the polling stations, Russian soldiers or militiamen rounded up the constituents and escorted them to the station. In some districts, the polling was preceded by numerous arrests. In some, many of the younger men fled to the forests.

¹ *Pravda*, 2nd Oct. 1939.

² *Pravda*, on the 23rd Oct., referred to those "elections" as proceeding "under the conditions of class-war" and "therefore . . . a form of class warfare."

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The votes were counted by *Regional Committees* which the Russian authorities had established. The *Regional Committees* forwarded their returns to the *Central Committee* similarly appointed. The electorate had no means of checking the counts. The official results were:

	<i>Electorate</i>	<i>Votes</i>
Western Ukraine	4,776,275	4,433,997 (92·83%)
Western White Russia	2,763,191	2,672,280 (96·71) ¹

No returns were made for the constituencies, but only for *Regions* (every *Region* comprised several constituencies) and for the larger towns. There were countless abstentions in town and country, but they were not traceable in the returns. In Lemberg, the poll amounted to only 43·48 per cent. of the electorate. The Russian authorities ordered a second to be held in the city to make good this defection on the part of the inhabitants. But the second ballot was never held.²

Of the 1495 candidates who stood—or had been made to stand—1484 were returned. What happened to the remaining 11 candidates is not clear. As there was only one candidate in every constituency and as there could be no vote against him (the utmost the electorate could do was to abstain or to spoil their ballot papers, and this at great risk to themselves and their families) it is hard to see how there could have been any unsuccessful candidates. It may be that a few disappeared, or died, or were arrested as “unreliable” by the Russian authorities.³

The successful candidates formed two *National Assemblies*, the *Ukrainian* and the *White Russian*, which met at the end of October. The latter was attended by Marshal Timo-

¹ *Pravda*, 25th Oct. 1939.

² *Pravda*, 25th Oct. 1939.

³ Most of the illiterate candidates stood in the White Russian constituencies. It may be that some of these got drunk when they were elected or, if natives of their constituency, were afraid to face their constituents.

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shenko. Both *Assemblies* passed the following resolutions, by a show of hands and unanimously:

1. That *Western White Russia* and *Western Ukraine* pass into the hands of the working class.
2. That *Western White Russia* and *Western Ukraine* be admitted to the Soviet Union.
3. That the big estates be confiscated.
4. That the banks and industries be nationalised.
5. That homage be paid to the great Stalin.¹

In this way, the Fourth Partition was officially consummated. The principles of Russian policy towards Poland had not changed except in detail. The methods were more elaborate and outward concessions were made to modern conceptions of democracy, but in all essentials the Fourth Partition resembled the First.

These events received little notice in the wider world, for bigger events absorbed the attention of mankind. The Russians were, before long, to be expelled from the Polish territories they had invaded to be invaded themselves, to be brought to the verge of defeat, and to gain much more than they had lost.

On the 11th January 1944 the Russian Government issued a *Declaration*, reaffirming the verdict of the "elections" held in October 1939. According to this *Declaration*, "the injustice committed by the Riga Treaty of 1921 . . . was in this way [*i.e.* by the 'elections'] rectified . . . the incorporation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia² in the Soviet Union not only did not violate the interests of Poland, but, on the contrary, created a reliable basis for stable and permanent friendship between the Polish people and its neighbours the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. . . ." ³

¹ *Pravda*, 28th, 29th, and 30th Oct. 1939.

² *i.e.* Western White Russia.

³ *The Times*, 12th Jan. 1944.

What Russia had gained in collaboration with Germany in 1939 at the expense of Poland she regained in collaboration with Great Britain and the United States five years later.

Poland lost 51·6 per cent. of her territory, 37·3 per cent. of her population, more than half her timber, about half her chemical industry and of her peat for fuel, more than 40 per cent. of her water-power, about 85 per cent. of her oil and natural gas, her potassium mines, phosphates, and most of her grain. Later on she was "compensated" for these losses at the expense of Germany, as we shall see. Amongst her losses most grievously felt were those of her two old cities and universities, Vilna and Lemberg. Of the Polish—as distinct from Ukrainian and White Russian—population in the annexed territories, hundreds of thousands were deported to Russia with their families, the remainder were, later on, expelled to settle in Western Poland (including the territories taken from Germany). All lost their estates, their land, their homes.

The three Baltic States were incorporated in the Soviet Union during the year 1940 and by similar methods. These methods, as applied by the Russians to Estonia, were described so concisely by Mr. Justice Atkinson¹ that we cannot do better than quote his words which, *mutatis mutandis*, also fit the case of Latvia and Lithuania:

"On the 16th June [1940] the Estonian Minister in Moscow, Mr. Rei² . . . received an ultimatum from the Soviet Government. A new Government was to be formed in Estonia friendly to the Soviet Union and Russia was to have the right to send unlimited numbers of troops into Estonia. Nine hours were given for the reply. The

¹ *Judgment in the case A/S Tallinna Laevaukiskus and others v. Tallinna Shipping Co. Ltd. and another*, King's Bench Division (Commercial List), 25th Jan. 1946.

² Mr. Rei gave evidence in the case.

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reply had to be, and was, in the affirmative. On the 17th and 18th Russian troops were pouring into Estonia. On the 19th an emissary of the Soviet Government presented to the President [of the Estonian Republic] a list of men who were to constitute the new Government. On the 21st certain disturbances were organised in Tallinn, and in the evening the President was forced to comply. On the 21st July the President was replaced by the new Prime Minister.

“Now Estonia had a constitution, and by the constitution the legislature consisted of the National Assembly. The wording is ‘The National Assembly passes the laws and performs its other functions as determined by the Constitution. The National Assembly is a two-Chamber representative body. It consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the National Council.’ By the election law then in force, the Republic was divided into 80 independent constituencies. Each were to elect one member so that the Chamber of Deputies consisted of 80 members. The location of the areas and the polling booths were to be determined by a supreme electoral committee, and the elections were carried through by this supreme electoral committee and by district committees, but the importance of it was the supreme electoral committee which decided all questions which might arise. It consisted of the Chancellor of Justice, the Secretary of State, the President or head of a division of the Tallinn District Court by appointment of the district court’s plenary session, the Lord Mayor of Tallinn, and so on. It is a body in whom everybody would have complete confidence. There was a right of appeal by Article 16 from this body to the Administrative Department of the State Court of Justice, and there were to be 35 days’ notice between the determination to have an election and the polling date.

“Now, on the 5th July, the Estonian State Gazette published a decision of the President to this effect: ‘For reasons of State I decree elections for a new Chamber of

Deputies and the formation of a new National Council. The Government of the Republic shall make the corresponding arrangements for speedily carrying through the elections,' and on the 6th July there appeared the directions for the carrying out of this election . . . and it ordered that the election should take place on 14th and 15th July: 'In conformity with the law relating to the elections of the Chambers of Deputies, whereby, in order to carry through the elections at greater speed, the mentioned law shall be applicable to these elections with the following amendments,' and then a great number of Sections were to cease to be applicable. 'The Supreme Electoral Committee shall be composed of a chairman and six members. The chairman and the members of the Supreme Electoral Committee shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic,' and 'shall be competent to pass decisions if there are three members present, and the decisions are to be final,' and candidates were to be nominated by the evening of the 9th July . . . all those directions were wholly illegal according to the Constitution of Estonia. They [the candidates] were all to be nominated by the 9th July, and there was one candidate for each constituency on the so-called working people's list. There were many other nominations: in some places three or four candidates were entered. After the time for nomination had expired a new decree . . . was published requiring every candidate to present his political programme by 2 o'clock on the following day. All but four of the candidates managed to do that . . . but on the day following all newspapers published the decision of the Electoral Committee that every candidate except the 80 on the working people's list was declared disqualified. Although the decree of the 5th called for a new National Council none was elected. The old was never convened, and to all intents and purposes was completely ignored from that date onwards. Dr. Rei says that this new Chamber of Deputies was, of course, an unlawful body; it was just a cooked assembly, and to judge by the Constitution nothing it did

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could have any legal validity in Estonia and that the Estonian Courts would have been bound to declare, if the matter had come before them, that this so-called legislation was null and void. But even apart from the illegality of the Chamber of Deputies they [it?] had no legislative power without the second Chamber, which was not re-elected and never again convened. . . .

“On the 21st July . . . this new body, which was called the Estonian State Duma, passed a long declaration setting out all sorts of grievances, that Estonia had been turned into a powerless toy in the hands of European Imperialists, and so on, and that the Estonian people had driven away the hateful Government and for the first time in history had obtained the possibility of carrying out free elections of its people’s representatives. It refers to the elections which were the glorious triumph of the union of the working class. I think one might think it was a glorious triumph for those who engineered the elections, but still, that is how it was put, and they express what purported to be ‘The unanimous will of the free working people of Estonia for the establishment of Soviet power over all the territory of Estonia.’¹ Estonia is declared a Socialist Soviet Republic, and from now on all power in the Estonian Socialist Republic belongs to the toiling masses of the cities and countryside as represented by the Soviet of Toilers’ Deputies.

“Then on the following day they passed a resolution determining to request the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, that is Russia, to admit Estonia into the Soviet Union.”

Mr. Molotov submitted this resolution—and identical resolutions from Latvia and Lithuania—to the Supreme Soviet which assembled on the 1st August 1940. The Supreme Soviet announced the incorporation of the three

¹ Similar elections were held in Latvia and Lithuania. The returns—that is to say, the votes for the *Union of the Working People*—were as follows: 81.6 per cent. of the total vote in Estonia, 94.7 per cent. in Latvia, and 95.5 per cent. in Lithuania.

Baltic States in the Soviet Union on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th August 1940.

V

In the territories they annexed the Russians imprisoned, executed, or deported all those persons who were in any way *Pillars of Society*. The victims, in Poland, were not only Poles, but also White Russians and Ukrainians, including those who had been uncompromising opponents of Polish rule. Ukrainian nationalists—especially the leaders of the largest political party in Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, known as the UNDO—were all arrested, except for a few who escaped in time. Although in constant conflict with the Polish State, the UNDO cherished the dream—a dream, rather than an object of practical policy—that there would, some day, be a Ukrainian State, independent both of Moscow and of Warsaw, and extending from the Caucasus into the heart of Europe. Most leaders of the UNDO perished in Russian prisons or places of exile. The Polish Socialist Party, known as the PPS and affiliated to the Second International, suffered severely in those days. All persons suspected of being in communication with the outside world were liable to arrest.

There was in Poland a Jewish Socialist Party known as the *Bund*. In its political outlook it corresponded roughly with the British Independent Labour Party, but it was uncompromisingly hostile to Zionism. Some of its leaders had taken part in the Russian Revolution and had been friends of Lenin and Trotsky. The most distinguished leader of the *Bund* was Henryk Ehrlich. He had spent years of imprisonment and exile in Tsarist Russia. He had represented the *Bund* in the Russian *Duma*. In 1917 he was elected to the *Petrograd Soviet* and became a member of the *Central Committee of the Workers' Soviet*. On

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behalf of the latter, he helped to organise the *International Socialist Peace Conference* which met at Stockholm.

When Poland had achieved her independence, Ehrlich became a severe critic of Polish nationalism. He wrote and spoke in terms of uncompromising opposition to Pilsudski's Russian policy which carried Poland to the verge of disaster in 1920. In the years that followed, he was prominent amongst those Polish politicians who worked for an enduring peace with Russia.¹ He was a man of some intellectual power, of deep humanity, chivalrous, and fearless, a devoted Jew, a Polish patriot, and a European. He was arrested by the Russian authorities in September 1939 and was kept in prison. In July 1941 he was tried for working on behalf of "International Fascism." Nothing could have been further from Ehrlich's whole outlook and character than to work for anything that could be called "Fascism." In any case, the alleged offence could not have been committed under Russian jurisdiction, seeing that Ehrlich had been arrested almost immediately after Russia invaded Poland, and had been kept in prison until he was charged. He was released, with many other Poles, in September 1941, under the agreement between Russia and Poland which was signed on the 30th July in that same year. Thereupon he began, with the collaboration of the Russian authorities, to organise a Jewish Committee "to fight Hitlerism." At the request of Beria, the Russian Commissar for Internal Affairs (that is to say, the head of the NKVD), Ehrlich, and his friend and fellow-*Bundist*, Alter, submitted the programme of this Committee to Stalin. At the same time, he worked assiduously to promote recruiting amongst Poles resident in

¹ They were by no means confined to the *Left*. Professor Grabski, who was a prominent member of the conservative *National Democratic Party*, also opposed Pilsudski's Russian policy. Professor Grabski was deported to Russia in 1940, sentenced to 8 years in a Labour Camp, and released under the Polish Russian Agreement in 1941. He became chairman of the Polish National Council in London and returned to Poland to serve with the Polish Provisional Government in 1945.

Russia. But on the 4th December 1941 he and Alter were arrested at Kuibishev and, for a while, nothing more was heard of them. Their friends grew increasingly anxious on their behalf. The Polish Government appealed for his release as well as for Alter's. On the 27th of January 1943 a petition appealing for their release was sent to Mr. Molotov from the United States. It was signed by William Green (President of the American Federation of Labour), Professor Albert Einstein, Dr. Alvin Johnson, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Mr. Raymond Gram Swing, and others. A month later, Mr. Litvinov, the Russian Ambassador in Washington, informed Mr. William Green that Ehrlich and Alter had been executed.¹

Other members of the *Bund* who suffered were Anna Rosental, Batist, and Szreiter. Anna Rosental was over sixty. She had spent ten years of imprisonment and exile under the last of the Tsars. She was executed by the Russians soon after they invaded Poland. Batist and Szreiter spent two years in prisons and labour camps of the Soviet Union. They were released, but died soon afterwards of the treatment they had received.

Little by little, the richer peasants were included in the

¹ Szmul Zygielbojm, an intimate friend of Ehrlich and Alter, a fellow-member of the *Bund*, who had taken part in the defence of Warsaw, had been held as a hostage by the Germans, but had escaped through Germany to England, endeavoured to arouse sympathy for his two friends in this country. Mr. Brailsford published a noble protest on behalf of Ehrlich and Alter in *Reynolds News*. A memorial meeting was held at the Caxton Hall on the 28th March. It was addressed by Mr. Camille Huysmans, President of the Labour and Socialist International, and attended by a few members of the British Labour Party. The news that Ehrlich and Alter had been executed was followed by a widespread movement of protest in America. This movement was deprecated by the *New Statesman and Nation* on the 5th April 1943. Zygielbojm was deeply disillusioned by the indifference of the once so chivalrous English *Left*. The last desperate fight of the Polish Jews, who, in May 1943, fought with utterly inadequate means against an overwhelming German force in the Warsaw Ghetto, threw him into despair. He committed suicide in London on the 11th May. Mr. Hannen Swaffer published a dignified tribute to his memory in the *Daily Herald* on the 18th May.

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arrests and deportations (rich, that is, by eastern standards, though poor by western), indeed, all persons employing labour, bank-managers, civil servants, members of the upper and middle classes generally.

Many who have lived under the Russian and German rule have drawn comparisons between the two. The question: Which was worse? is not easily answered. Jews were not persecuted as Jews by the Russians, though they suffered much, especially if they were Zionists and if they were in touch with the outside world, as many Jews were. It is probable that Ehrlich and Alter were executed because, had they lived, they might have informed the outside world of the things that were being done in Russia, and could not easily be discredited as "Fascists" or "Reactionaries," seeing that they were too well known throughout the international labour movement. Death alone could silence them. What the Germans did to Poland is well known—the Jews, under German rule, were doomed as Jews. The German domination was, as it were, horizontal. The Poles were segregated in a narrow territory and degraded to the status of a lower caste. But within these limits, and provided they did not offer resistance, they could live according to their own ways, their own civilisation. When the Germans met resistance, they struck it down ruthlessly, taking no chance, so that many innocent persons were engulfed in the vortex of German cruelty. National resistance to the Germans was more united and better organised in Poland than in any other country. There was not only an "underground" army, known as the *Home Army* (*Armia Krajowa*), there was an "underground" State with its civil service, its schools, its universities, its courts of justice, its Government in London—a State to which both the army in the field and the *Home Army* owed allegiance. The Government, although in exile, was not a mere symbol or *locum tenens*, it was an executive, as well as a legislature. It represented

a nation united as never before. Its writ—with severe limitations, of course—ran in its own country, or rather in that part of its own country that was under German, not under Russian, occupation. By secret wireless a living contact was maintained between Warsaw and London. Messages could be sent out and answered within the space of one day, men and women came and went by aeroplane and parachute, or, when speed was not a necessity, by devious but sure overland ways. Russian domination was vertical, as it were. It went deep into the life of the country, penetrating the spirit of the Polish people. The Germans were not interested in that spirit, as long as it did not offer resistance. It could live or perish, for all they cared. The Russians were determined to transform it. The Germans did not attempt conversion, for they despised the Poles too much. Under the Germans, the Poles were Europeans still, and, in their own hearts, amongst the proudest of Europeans. Under the Russians, they were cut off from Europe.

Although the Poles had endured much oppression under their own rulers, they had endured nothing comparable for barbarism with the oppression exercised by the Germans and Russians. They regarded both with hatred. But of the Germans they were not afraid. Of the Russians they were afraid. To be shot, or to be imprisoned in a German concentration camp—or even to suffer in the sanguinary and destructive reprisals which the Germans carried out against whole communities—was not so terrible, not so charged with utter darkness, with hopeless and senseless tragedy, as the deportations of men, women, and children to the interior of Russia. With the Germans it was war, and the Germans were going to be beaten (the Poles were never in doubt of this). With Russia it was not war, but some kind of fate, without a redeeming or consoling aspect. At least it was possible to hope for the defeat of

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Germany. But how was it possible to hope for the defeat of Russia?

About 1,500,000 men, women, and children were deported from Poland, the Baltic States, and Bessarabia during the Russian occupation—that is to say, between the autumn of 1939 until the summer of 1941. About 1,200,000 were deported from Eastern Poland, chiefly during the spring and early summer of 1940—about 300,000 from the districts of Vilna, Lida, Grodno, and Bialystok, about 200,000 from Polesie, about 15,000 from Volhynia, and about 400,000 from the districts of Lemberg, Tarnopol, and Stanislawów. These exiles were sent either to *Penal Camps*, known as *Lageri*,¹ as individuals, or to *Penal Settlements* (*Posiolk'*) in families, or to the *Free Settlements*, where they lived, with or without their families, as hired labourers amongst the original residents. The various camps were scattered as far north as Komi, Kola, and Novaya Zemlya, and as far east as the Kolyma River, Kamchatka, and Khabarovsk. There were camps on the eastern and western side of the Urals, in Central and Southern Siberia, near the Mongolian border, and north of Lake Baikal.

The first mass-deportations from Poland, in February 1940, comprised about 70,000 persons. Several Polish villages were entirely depopulated by the exodus—the upper and middle classes were by no means the only victims—especially in the district of Sambor and near the Russian border. Even the aged and ailing were not spared, but had to leave their homes, or even their beds, at brief notice, sometimes within an hour, or less than an hour, and travel for many days, or even weeks, in overcrowded, unheated trucks. Diseases — whooping - cough, measles, typhus — spread amongst young and old.

The second mass-deportation, in April 1940, comprised families of persons who had been arrested or deported

¹ From the German word *Lager*, meaning *camp*.

previously: civil servants, policemen, retired and serving officers, and again many aged and ailing people, as well as little children. The third mass-deportation was made up chiefly of refugees who had fled from the Germans and the ravages of war in Western Poland. Amongst them were many Jews. The deportations went on until the Germans invaded Russia in the summer of 1941.

The prisoners in the *Lageri* were—and are—persons who have been sentenced by the tribunals of the NKVD to terms varying from 3-15 years.¹ They are employed in constructing canals, railways, and factories, in mining, timber-felling, canning, draining of marshes, and so on. Every *Lager* is surrounded by barbed wire with look-out posts at intervals of about 100 yards. Political offenders are mixed with ordinary criminals—the latter are privileged and sometimes hold minor administrative posts. The working day is twelve hours long, not including the time taken in marching to work and back again—often a distance of several miles. The rations are graded according to the amount of work done. There is an exceedingly high mortality amongst prisoners who are old, in failing health, or unused to hard manual labour. In the winter of 1940 to 1941, at least a quarter of the Poles deported to the northern *Lageri* perished of exposure, undernourishment, exhaustion, and disease.

The *Posiolki* were settlements of exiled families in villages far away from towns and railways. Men, women, and children were employed in forests, on the roads, in mines, and were paid a small wage. Those whose work fell short of the required amount were penalised. The life of the Poles in the *Posiolki* was lightened by parcels from friends and relatives in Poland. Many were able to buy food or clothing by the sale of rings and jewelry.

¹ The commonest sentence is 8 years. Few persons in the *Lageri* survive for more than two or three years. The population of the *Lageri* is variously computed. According to David Dallin, the total is about 15,000,000 (v. his *Forced Labour in Soviet Russia*).

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The exiles in the *Free Settlements* worked on *Kolkhosi* or *Collective Farms* and suffered great hardships, especially in winter. The local population was often extremely primitive, living in clay huts. Poles, accustomed to a European existence, had to live in stables or cow-sheds. Their food was of the most wretched kind. They were officially free, in the sense that they were not under the supervision of the police and could, theoretically, go where they liked, but the vastness of the country and the remoteness of their places of exile made escape impossible—there was nowhere they could escape to, no possibility of sustaining life except in the wretched villages of which one was just like another. Exiles—whether from Eastern Europe or from the Soviet Union itself—were normally sent to the *Free Settlements* to spend the rest of their lives there. Some of the Poles were released under the Polish-Russian Agreement. In some of the camps and settlements there were tragic scenes when the Poles left and said good-bye to those who had been deported from the Baltic States, who had no hope of returning to their homes or of seeing Europe again.

There is a fairly abundant literature about the Deportations. Most of it was never published and exists in typescript or mimeograph for private circulation, for there was little public interest in this subject during the war and a general reluctance to print anything that might give offence to Russia. One of the greatest tragedies of our time, that afflicted an allied nation in the struggle for life and death against the common foe, was almost unknown to the people of England and is today forgotten. Forgotten, too, are those many thousands of Poles—men, women, and children—who are still exiled in remote regions of Asiatic Russia. The relevant literature is characterised, almost without exception, by a high regard for truth, by sober judgment, and precision of detail. Amongst this literature there is one book which made a deep impression, *The Dark Side of the*

Moon,¹ one of the few masterpieces written during the Second World War. The anonymous author, a woman, collected abundant evidence amongst Deportees who returned from Russia. Many tell their own story in this great and terrible book—a book about Russians, as well as about exiled Poles, a book written with sure psychological insight, with deep humanity and humility, and without bitterness.

There were, amongst the exiles, many Polish Communists, who, unable to reconcile the Russian reality with the ideal society of their beliefs and aspirations, fell—if they were men of some righteousness—into a deep despair,² from which other Poles, men, women, and children, were saved by their religion and their patriotism. The best amongst the Polish Communists perished except for a few who were too old or hardened to change. Only the most worthless survived to become the new masters, under Russian domination, of the new Poland, the Poland of today.

Many exiles, including women and mere girls, were put to the torture while in prison. Some were beaten to death. The Russian officials whose duty it was to extort information from these prisoners genuinely believed that there was incriminating information which had to be extorted. Indeed, they had no doubts at all that their victims were spies, agents and counter-revolutionaries, or accomplices or harbourers of such. They knew no better, for they knew no world other than the Russian world, and had never been able to compare that world with any other. Ordinary criminals were treated with far more humanity than alleged political

¹ Publ. by Faber and Faber, 1946, with an introduction by T. S. Eliot. A dignified and illuminating record of a deportation is the little book by Ada Halpern, with an introduction by Eleanor Rathbone (Max-love Publ. Co., 1945). A useful survey of the Deportations is *Beyond the Urals*, by Elma Dangerfield, with an introduction by Rebecca West (publ. by The British League for European Freedom, London, 1947). A memorandum on the Deportations was prepared for the War Cabinet but was never published.

² *The Dark Side of the Moon*, p. 75.

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offenders, for they were regarded as the products of their environment and, unlike counter-revolutionaries or reactionaries, not *essentially* wicked. To convicted criminals great powers were delegated in the *Lageri*.¹ Political prisoners, irrespective of nationality, were subjected to personal treatment, to employment, and to an environment calculated to transform them into human, or rather inhuman, beings of a different order, into men or women of the Russian world. With the Poles in particular the Russian officials and gaolers were wholly unsuccessful. With but few exceptions, the Poles remained true to their religion, their country, their European way of life. Most heroic of all, perhaps, were the children. They clung passionately to their parents, they hungered—they even cried for hunger—after spiritual food as they did for bread. They were, at times, fierce in defence of their loyalties amid pitiless cold, vermin, and starvation, disease and death, under the unrelenting, often brutal and always insidious, pressure of the Russian educational system, under that process of “sovietisation,” devised and applied to make them not only surrender, but hate, the world they loved, and exchange, for that proud love, an obsequious adulation of the world they had learnt to hate. The impossible was demanded of these children who were unable to show even that outward conformity with which an adult, with an experience of duplicity alien to childhood, might attempt to save his inner being, at least for a time.

The author of *The Dark Side of the Moon*, so self-restrained throughout her book, is overcome in the course of her narrative when she writes of the children:

“Of all the tragic pictures presented by that assembly of spectres in the Soviet Union, I know of none more heart-rending than the picture of those stunted and starving children, imploring to be given books and instruction,

¹ *ibid.*, p. 101.

imploing to be allowed to make up at least the grossest leeway of the time they had lost in the mines, in the kolkhozy, and the penal settlements of an alien State which declares on all occasions its protection of and care for defenceless children. I have written with calm of other wrongs; I have attempted to approach with objectivity the starvation, demoralisation, enforced labour, and terrorisation of these unhappy infants. It is impossible for me to write with calm of this further grief, of this supremely moving demand on a society which had robbed them of everything. I am not able, I shall not even try, to forgive a world in which that demand could be, and was and is refused.

“All of these children were devitalised, many blind and deaf from the effects of long starvation; the majority had frost-bitten limbs, scurvy wounds, itch and sores of all kinds. . . . When, later, a small number of these children did leave Soviet territory, months passed before they could be fed on anything like the normal diet of a human animal. . . .”¹

Most of the deported families were made up of women, children, and old people, because the men had been arrested or deported previously, or had been killed or taken prisoner in the war, or were with the Polish army. The women

“had to fight single-handed the long, losing battle against cold, hunger, heat, disease, terror, sovietisation and their own growing exhaustion. Too often, aged and invalid parents and other relatives were also dependent on the same pitiful one woman’s earnings; on her courage, resource, and the efforts of her despairing love. Besides everything else, these same women had struggled with no less determination to care for their children’s minds and souls. Such husbands, fathers, brothers as had been deported with their families had, if they had survived and if they had not already been separated from those families

¹ *The Dark Side of the Moon*, p. 192.

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on Soviet territory, either to set out or to find the Polish Army on the first news of its being formed on Soviet soil, or were too ill or disabled to move. Sons and brothers who had reached the age of sixteen were now being called up to *trud* [labour]-battalions and to the Red Army. In letters written by children themselves at this period—children who looked on at the mounting exhaustion and martyrdom of their mothers with no less anguish than the mothers at the sovietisation and moral disarray of their children; an agony to which, in the children's case, was added a panic fear of losing their last and only protector . . .—I find a reiterated cry; almost as if one of them were passing it to the other, a cry as of a creature only then coming to full consciousness of his state, a cry swelling and mounting and mounting in volume: 'Where, where are our daddies?' writes one child after another. 'We want, we *want* our daddies'." ¹

Only a rough computation of mortality amongst the exiles is possible. The figures relating to certain camps were established with reasonable accuracy after many of the exiles had been released and it was possible to collect and collate the evidence. The mortality was highest in the *Lageri*, especially in those exposed to Arctic winters. The number of persons deported from Poland to Russia is estimated at about 1,200,000. Of these, about 270,000 had perished by the end of the year 1942.² Out of about 140,000 children, at least 40,000 perished.

When war broke out between Russia and Germany there were about a million Polish exiles alive in Russia. Of these,

¹ *ibid.*, p. 194.

² An analytical attempt to estimate the mortality amongst the exiles is made by Elma Dangerfield (*op. cit.*, pp. 79, 80, 87). The total of 270,000 is disputed by some authorities. The lowest estimate is 220,000. About one adult in five perished, and one child in three or four. Much higher figures, both of persons originally deported and of those who perished, are given by W. Baczkowski on p. 199 of his masterly *Journals on Understanding of Russia* (Hamadpis Lipshitz Press, Jerusalem, 1947).

114,943 reached Iran after their release under the *Agreement* of the 30th of July 1941, when Russia resumed diplomatic relations with Poland. When diplomatic relations were again broken off, on the 25th of April 1943, after the Polish Government had appealed to the International Red Cross for an enquiry into the deaths of Polish officers whose bodies had been found near Katyn, some 845,000 Polish exiles still remained in the Soviet Union. How many of them survive today is not known. Some have returned to Poland, but most of them are probably lost for ever.

In a *Protocol* appended to the *Agreement*, Russia undertook to release "all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U.S.S.R." These "Polish citizens" included Polish officers and men who had been made prisoners of war by the Russian army when it invaded Poland in 1939.

On the 12th of August 1941 the *Praesidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union* issued a *Decree* giving effect to this Protocol. On the 14th of August a military agreement was signed, authorising the enlistment, both by voluntary service and by conscription, of all able-bodied Poles with the Polish colours under a Polish Commander in Chief who would himself be under Russian operational command. The release of Polish men, women, and children from prisons, labour camps, and settlements began. A Polish army came into existence on Russian soil.

The rout of the Polish army in 1939 by the combined Russian and German armies and the complete occupation of the country by the two united enemies made it impossible for the Poles to give more than a conjectural estimate of their losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners, the more so as records and archives were lost and clerical staffs were dispersed. The Russian figures do not allow a sure estimate, for there seems to have been some overlapping of returns made by different commands. According to the Russian

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official military journal *Red Star*, in an article commemorating the first anniversary of the war with Poland, "10 generals, 52 colonels, 72 lieutenant colonels, 5431 officers, 4096 non-commissioned officers, and 181,223 men of the Polish army" were taken prisoner by "one group of the Armies of the Ukrainian front alone."¹ According to the same issue of the *Red Star*, in an article by Borzhevik, the Commander of an Army Corps, further figures relating to captures by other units were given, but in round numbers, some of them comprising both officers and men. These figures come to a total of a little over 40,000 of all ranks. After the end of the campaign, some 2300 Polish officers who had been interned in Lithuania and Latvia were handed over to the Russian authorities when these two Republics were incorporated in the Soviet Union, but there appears to be no accurate published record of their number.

The total number of Polish prisoners, officers, and men finally in Russian hands must have been at least a quarter of a million, of whom about 10,000 were officers. These officers were urgently needed to organise and lead the new Polish army which was being organised on Russian soil. From the autumn of 1939 until the spring of 1940, 8820 of them were interned in three camps: Kozielsk (east of Smolensk), Starobielsk (near Kharkov), and Ostashkov (near Kalinin). Besides those officers, there were, in the camp at Starobielsk, 380 Polish doctors (of whom some were distinguished specialists), several university professors, and a few civil servants. Of all those prisoners—military and civilian—numbering more than 9000, only 448 survived.

There is a considerable literature about what came to be known as the *Massacre of Katyn*, as there is about the Deportations, but little of it has reached the public.² It was

¹ *The Red Star*, 17th Sept. 1940.

² Ann Su Cardwell's book *Poland and Russia*, already referred to, gives a brief, objective survey both of the Deportations and of the Massacre.

easier for the Press to pass over the Massacre in silence than over the Deportations, because it was possible to assert—and at first with some truth—that the former was a mystery, although by the end of 1941, when hope that the missing men were alive was being abandoned, a sense of truth and honour (though higher, perhaps, than could reasonably have been expected in a war that was rapidly becoming “ideological”) might have made an impartial scrutiny of the available evidence and a demand, or at least an appeal, for an enquiry seem a matter of principle. The relevant literature is characterised by a regard for veracity, and by freedom from railing protestation. One of the 448 officers who survived, Josef Czapski, has published an account, in French, of the time he spent as a prisoner in the camp at Starobielsk, and of his efforts, later on, to trace the missing men—efforts that took him into the presence of high Russian officials in Kuibishev and Moscow. His little book, *Souvenirs de Starobielsk*,¹ is a quiet, sober narrative, distinguished by a rare visual precision of detail, and permeated by a great nobility.

The treatment of the prisoners in the three camps was hardly normal by western standards, but it was not inhuman to excess. The prisoners were not physically maltreated, nor were they subjected to those methods of extortionary coercion, half physical and half mental, which are habitually applied to political suspects in Russia irrespective of nationality. There were prolonged inquisitions, sometimes lasting for many consecutive hours, or even for several days with but brief intervals, and by threats that if the prisoner were not compliant he would never see his family again. The questions put by the inquisitors, who were mostly officials of the NKVD who had come from Moscow, related to the prisoner’s political opinions; his views on the military

¹ Publ. in *Collection “Temoignages,” Cahier I* (Paris, 1945).

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situation, on the war as a whole, and on the policy of the Western Allies.

Josef Czapski had lived as a painter in Paris for eight years before the war. In the course of the interrogations he was asked by the Russian official:

“What orders did you receive from the [Polish] Minister of Foreign Affairs when you went to Paris?” When Czapski replied that the Minister did not even know he was going, he was asked: “What orders did the acting Minister give you?”

“He did not know either . . . I went to paint, not to spy.”

“Do you really believe that, being a painter, you could [not] have drawn a plan of Paris and have sent it to the Ministry in Warsaw?”¹

It was the experience of all Europeans under interrogation that any reasons they might give, for anything they had done, remained unintelligible to the inquisitor if these reasons were not political. That anyone could travel abroad for any other reasons was a phenomenon wholly alien to the world in which these officials lived.

Every prisoner was treated as a “case”—a political “case”—and the purpose of the interrogations was the elucidation of this “case” in the general setting of Polish and Allied policy. Each prisoner was repeatedly photographed, and a “case book” was compiled about every one.

Prisoners who sympathised with the Russian political system were in eager demand by the Russian authorities, but not more than twenty out of the 8000 showed sympathy of this kind and were willing to undergo the special political training which would qualify them for the Russian service. These, later on, formed the nucleus of the Polish army which fought as a separate unit of the Red Army under the command of Colonel Berling, who was one of the twenty.

¹ *Souvenirs de Starobielsk*, p. 78.

PAX BRITANNICA

The Russian authorities in the camp at Kozielsk were more communicative than those in the other two camps. They held Great Britain responsible for the war and said she had used Poland as an instrument for the attack on Germany. They had a favourable opinion of Germany and would refer to Poland as "the late Poland." "Poland," they would say, "does not exist and never will exist."¹

The prisoners were not interrogated any more after March 1940. Presumably the Russian authorities considered the "case books" complete. The prisoners in all the three camps were told that they would be moving elsewhere, but were not told where. Many believed they would be sent back to Poland. The first large contingent of prisoners left Kozielsk early in April, the last contingents left Starobielsk and Ostashkov about the middle of May. The contingent from Kozielsk was moved to the railway station of Gniezdovo, near Smolensk, and from there to Katyn, where nothing more was heard about them until their dead bodies were discovered. The contingents from Starobielsk reached Kharkov, those from Ostashkov passed through Vyazma. They were never heard of again.

The prisoners in all three camps had been allowed to write monthly letters to their families in Poland. No letters were received from them after May 1940.

448 prisoners, who had been selected from all the three camps, 245 from the camp at Kozielsk, were drafted to Pavlishchev Bor. From there they were moved to Griazoviets, near Vologda, and released, in accordance with the *Agreement*. The reasons why these 448 prisoners were selected are conjectural. Some believed that they were suspected of ability to disclose more information than the other prisoners and that they were to undergo a severer interrogation. But the reasons, whatever they may have

¹ From a statement by a University Professor who was a prisoner at Kozielsk.

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been, saved the lives of these 448, the only survivors from amongst the prisoners in all the three camps.

By the *Agreement*, signed on the 30th of July 1941, the Polish Government was recognised *de jure* and *de facto* by Russia. The Polish State which, according to the Russian contention, had ceased to exist in September 1939 existed once again. Russia was too hard pressed by the victorious German army to alienate the Western Allies and to forgo the service of a Polish army, which, with recruits from amongst the Deportees in addition to the released prisoners of war, might amount to 300,000 men or even more. It was not until the menace of total defeat by the Germans had begun to recede that Russia resumed her historic attitude towards Poland.

The new Polish army was organised at Tatischchev, near Saratov. Here Polish soldiers began to arrive from prisons, labour camps, and settlements, many of them after travelling for weeks on foot, by lorry or by train. Many perished on the way and many arrived in the last condition of wretchedness—exhausted, diseased, and clothed in rags. But, except for the 448, none of the officers arrived who had been interned at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov, although others were arriving from places much more remote.

The new Polish authorities asked for detailed information about Polish citizens in the Soviet Union, for lists of their names, and the location of the prisons, camps, and settlements where they had been detained. But they received only general assurances that all had been released under the *amnesty* (as the Decree of the 12th of August 1941 was called).¹ On the 20th of September, and on the 6th, 13th, and 14th of

¹ *Polish-Soviet Relations*, p. 110. This publication, issued by the Polish Embassy in Washington, contains all the principal treaties, agreements, pacts, decrees and so on, concerning the relations between the Polish Republic and the Soviet Union from 1918-1943. It is indispensable to any serious study of the subject. We shall, hereafter, refer to it as PSR.

PAX BRITANNICA

October 1941, the Polish Ambassador, Mr. Kot, by word of mouth and in writing, asked Mr. Vishynsky, the Russian Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, where certain categories of Polish citizens—professors, doctors, civil servants, officers, and so on, known to have been interned or imprisoned, but still missing—were to be found.¹ On the 13th of October Mr. Kot addressed a note to Mr. Vishynsky, pointing out that many Polish citizens were still being detained, that, as winter was coming on in the northern regions, their release was an urgent matter.² On the 15th of October General Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister, sent a note to Mr. Bogomolov, the Russian Ambassador in London, concerning the failure of the Russian authorities to release "several thousands of Polish officers" whose "fate . . . continues to remain uncertain." Mr. Bogomolov replied, though not until the 14th of November, that "all Polish officers on the territory of the U.S.S.R. have . . . been set free."³ On the 22nd of October Mr. Kot had a conversation with Mr. Molotov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and received an assurance that "all Polish citizens have been released as a result of the amnesty, but in a number of regions have no doubt remained in their former place of residence." He referred to the "great administrative and transport difficulties," but gave an assurance that the Russian authorities were "giving the Polish Government all possible help in this matter." Mr. Kot asked for "lists of those centres where Polish citizens have been released and are continuing to reside." Mr. Molotov replied that "everything necessary" would be done, and that the matter would be referred to the NKVD.⁴

¹ PSR, p. 110. Also *Report on the Massacre of Polish Officers in Katyn Wood*, p. 18. This compilation, privately printed (London, 1946), contains official documents and minutes of official conversations concerning the fate of missing Polish prisoners of war. I shall, hereafter, refer to it as RM.

² PSR, p. 110.

³ *ibid.*, p. 115.

⁴ RM, p. 21.

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The Polish authorities had, with the help of Poles released from prisons, camps, and places of exile, compiled lists of those who were still missing, with the names of the places where they were still detained. These lists grew in volume and were submitted to the Russian authorities with a view to accelerating the work of release. On the 2nd of November 1941 Mr. Kot had a further conversation with Mr. Vishynsky, reminding him that he had promised to supply the Polish Government with the Russian official lists. Mr. Vishynsky replied:

"I did say so, but on the 15th [October] the departure from Moscow took place [*i.e.* the transfer of the seat of Government from Moscow to Kuibishev], and, as a result of this, contact between the various departments deteriorated. This really caused the delay in obtaining data."

Mr. Kot had also asked about the fate of 9500 Polish officers, believed to be missing. Mr. Vishynsky said that "the NKVD Central Office states that there never was any such number of Polish officers in the Soviet Union" — although, if the number of Polish officers taken prisoner by the Red Army, according to Russian official sources, and of those who were interned in Latvia and Lithuania and then handed over to the Russian authorities, be added together, the resulting figure will not fall short of 9500. There is no evident reason to doubt the Polish official estimate that about 10,000 Polish officers had been in Russian hands. Mr. Kot replied that he did not insist on this exact figure, but that there had been more than 4000 officers in the camps at Starobielsk and Kozielsk. "There is," he said, "an impenetrable wall between us. . . . We are asking you to enable us to cross this wall." ²

On the 12th of November Mr. Kot had another conversation with Mr. Vishynsky. He told him that a list of Polish officers interned at Starobielsk had been submitted to the

¹ *ibid.*, p. 23.

² *ibid.*, p. 23.

NKVD by General Anders. Lists of the officers interned at Kozielsk and Ostashkov were still being compiled. Mr. Vishynsky replied: "I am convinced these men have already been released. It is a matter of confirming where they are." Mr. Kot pointed out that the Commanders of the three camps had "accurate lists" of the prisoners, and all that was needed was an order for the release of persons named in these lists. Vishynsky replied: "Certainly, if they were there."¹ On the 14th of November Kot spoke to Stalin himself, who simply said: "We have released everyone."²

On the 3rd of December General Sikorski had a conversation with Stalin. The General said he had a list of 4000 Polish officers who were still in prisons and camps, and that even this list was not complete. None of the officers were in German camps, none were in Poland. "These men are here," he said, and "none of them has returned." Stalin replied: "That is impossible. They have escaped."

Sikorski: "Where could they escape to?"

Stalin: "To Manchuria!"

Sikorski replied that this was impossible, that, in any case, they could not all escape, that he knew from Polish officers who had returned that fellow officers, many of whom he knew personally, were still being detained in Kolyma, Novaya Zemlya, and elsewhere. "There are among them my staff officers and commanders. These people are perishing there in the most appalling conditions."

Stalin: "They have certainly been released and have not yet reached you."

Sikorski replied that perhaps the Russian authorities had not carried out the instructions. He added that if any Polish officer had escaped over the Russian frontier he would have reported for duty.

Stalin replied that the Russian Government had "not the slightest reason for retaining a single Pole."³

¹ RM, p. 24.

² *ibid.*, p. 25.

³ *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

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On the 18th of March General Anders, the Commander in Chief of the Polish forces in Russia, and General Okulicki were received by Stalin and Mr. Molotov. General Anders said that Polish officers who had been released were still reporting for duty, but that those who had been interned at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov "have not been found. They must be here somewhere." He handed two lists of additional data about them to Mr. Molotov. Stalin suggested that perhaps they were in territory occupied by the Germans and that they had escaped from there. "That is impossible," said General Okulicki, "we should know of it."¹

As time passed it grew clear that the Russian Government was not carrying out the promise to release all Polish subjects in accordance with the *Agreement* of the 30th of July 1941 and the *Decree* of the 12th of August. Several notes had been addressed by the Polish Government in London to the Russian Government with regard to this matter.² The last note of this nature was addressed by Count Raczynski³ to Bogomolov on the 28th of January. It referred "in particular" to "the painful fact that all the officers and soldiers registered in the prisoner-of-war camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov, 12 generals, 94 colonels, 263 majors, and about 7800 officers of lesser rank had not yet been set free."⁴

Mr. Bogomolov, in his reply, dated London, 13th March, simply asserted that the *Decree* had been "strictly carried out," and that the "amnesty" applied "to the Polish officers and soldiers" no less than to "other Polish citizens." Mr. Bogomolov ended with an assurance that the Soviet

¹ *ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

² Kot to Vishynsky, 13th Oct. 1941; Sikorski to Bogomolov, 15th Oct. 1941; Bogomolov's reply, 14th Nov. 1941; Raczynski to Bogomolov, 28th Jan. 1942; Bogomolov's reply, 13th March 1942.

³ He had been Ambassador, but was appointed Foreign Minister to the Polish Government in London.

⁴ PSR, p. 117.

Government was, in this respect, doing "all that is necessary for the future of Soviet Polish relations."¹

The Polish authorities in Russia had entrusted Captain Josef Czapski with the task of aiding, advising, and interrogating all the men who arrived at Tatishchev for service with the Polish colours. None had any news of the missing men. Towards the end of the year 1941 Czapski set off on a journey of official enquiry. He interviewed officials of the Gulag (the Russian Camp Administration) and of the NKVD at Chkalov, Kuibishev, and Moscow. In Moscow he was received by General Raichman, one of the chiefs of the NKVD, under Beria, in the offices of the famous prison known as the Lubianka. While awaiting his turn, he noticed, with astonishment, that the visitor who had been received just before him was a certain Shodas, the Commandant of the camp at Griazovets, whither the 418 prisoners, including Czapski himself, had been transferred from the camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov.

Czapski submitted a memorandum to General Raichman, explaining that the officers and men who had been interned in the three camps were still missing, except for the 418, and that, excepting these, the only Polish officers who had reported for duty by the 1st of January 1942 were 2300 who had originally been interned in the Baltic States. The others—estimated at 8300—were missing.

Czapski was treated with courtesy, but he received no information whatever. The only hope that remained—a faint hope indeed—was that prisoners interned in the Arctic regions might not have been released in the summer of 1941 and could not, even if they had been released later on, have made their way southwards during the winter, and could not, therefore, be expected before the summer of 1942. But the summer came and went, and there was no sign of them.

¹ PSR, p. 118.

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All these things were well known in Poland, where the families of the missing officers had been waiting for news of them for more than a year. The months passed but nothing was heard about them, who numbered more than 8000, the greater part of the Polish officer corps. Nothing was heard of the others, the university professors, doctors, and civil servants, who had been interned with them in the three camps. 15,000 persons in all were missing still. Russia was accountable for them. But she gave no account.

The belief that they had been murdered began to gain ground in Poland. In the autumn of 1942 there were rumours that Polish workmen, who had been pressed into the German service, had found the dead bodies of unknown persons in the neighbourhood of Katyn, not far from Smolensk, and had erected wooden crosses over them. Long before any suspicions reached the outside world, the suspicion that there had been a massacre deepened into certitude in Poland itself, although confirmation was still lacking.

But in February 1943 the German Secret Military Police (*Geheime Feldpolizei*) was informed of the existence of graves holding many bodies in a forest near Katyn, and began to investigate. On the 13th of April the German wireless announced to the world that the missing Polish officers had been found, and began to broadcast lists of names, many of which were known to relatives and friends in Poland, to fellow officers, and to the Polish authorities, as names of officers who had been interned in the camp at Kozielsk.

The Germans revelled in their discovery and made it the principal item of their propaganda over a long period. They gave gruesome details of the appearance and condition of the corpses and, at first, exaggerated the number, asserting that 10,000 had been found.¹

¹ In subsequent broadcasts the German wireless stations reduced this number to 3000. The German Commission of Enquiry, later on, gave 4143 as the total number of bodies found.

Nevertheless, the German announcements—especially the lists of names which were read out on the German wireless every day—made a deep impression. In Poland, wives, parents, children, and friends, whose anxieties had begun after May 1940, when no more letters arrived from the prisoners, found their darkest suspicions confirmed, although the well-known mendacity of the German wireless still afforded some faint hope that perhaps the Germans had perpetrated some masterpiece of diabolical inventiveness.

The Polish Government in London was not a free agent. Public opinion in Poland, terribly exercised by what the enemy had announced, insisted on knowing the truth. The least the Polish Government could do was to ask for an impartial enquiry. On the 17th of April 1943 the Polish representative in Geneva was instructed to ask the *International Red Cross* if it would undertake the enquiry and send a commission to examine the dead bodies which had been found. The Polish Government issued a statement—which was published in London on the 18th of April—informing the world of its appeal to the *International Red Cross* and denying, in drastic terms, that the Germans who had themselves committed so many crimes had any right to accuse others. The Polish Ministry of National Defence issued a statement, giving the known facts about the prisoners who had been interned at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov, and a summary account of the many attempts made by the Polish authorities both in Russia and in London to obtain from the Russian authorities information about the missing prisoners.

On the 20th of April Count Raczynski addressed a note to Mr. Bogomolov, the Russian Ambassador in London, again asking for information. He pointed out that, according to a report issued by the German Military authorities, 155 of the bodies discovered at Katyn had been identified:

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“This report, although emanating from enemy sources, has produced profound anxiety not only in Polish public opinion but also throughout the world. . . . I regret the necessity of calling your attention, Mr. Ambassador, to the fact that the Polish Government, in spite of reiterated requests, has never received either a list of the prisoners or definite information as to the whereabouts of the missing officers and of other prisoners deported from the three camps . . . only irrefutable facts can outweigh the numerous and detailed statements concerning the discovery of the bodies of many Polish officers murdered near Smolensk in the spring of 1940.”¹

The *International Red Cross* at Geneva, after an exchange of telegrams with the *Polish Red Cross* in Warsaw, declared that it was willing to appoint neutral experts who would hold the enquiry on the usual condition that all the interested parties gave their consent. The *German Red Cross* informed the *International Red Cross* that it was willing to give all the assistance in its power. On the 22nd of April Max Huber, the head of the latter, informed the Duke of Coburg, the head of the former, that the Polish Government had asked for an enquiry and that, as the consent of the interested parties was needed (under the Statutes of the 12th September 1939), it would be for the Polish Government to obtain the consent of the Russian Government to an enquiry by neutral observers whom the *International Red Cross* would appoint.

Had the bodies found near Katyn been bodies of persons murdered by the Germans, as the Russian press and wireless were now asserting, a post-mortem would at least have established the fact that they had been murdered since the German occupation, that is to say, since the autumn of 1941, and that they could not, therefore, have been murdered by the Russians. The Russian contention, if true, could only have been endorsed by an impartial enquiry.

¹ RM, p. 38.

Instead of consenting, Russia, through her press and wireless, attacked the Polish Government in violent language, although, in making its request, that Government had implied no accusation against Russia. The *Soviet War News*, a weekly journal issued by the *Press Department* of the Russian Embassy in London, declared that "The Ministerial circles of General Sikorski" were "the accomplices of the cannibal Hitler." ¹

The Polish Government was accused of entering "into contact with the Hitlerites," of "perfidious conduct," and of striking "a treacherous blow at the common cause." ² No evidence in support of these accusations was produced, nor was there any evidence that Polish prisoners of war in Russian camps had at any time been captured by the Germans, as the Russian press and wireless were asserting. ³

Relations between Russia and Poland had been deteriorating for some time past. On the 16th of January 1943 the Russian Government had issued a decree that all Polish subjects on Russian territory would become Russian subjects. The Russian authorities began to take over all Polish institutions in Russia and to place Poles, both men and women, under severe pressure to accept Russian identity papers. On the 1st of March 1943 the *Union of Polish Patriots* was formed in Russia under the auspices of the Russian State with a view to organising a new Polish army on Russian soil and forming the future Government of Poland. The Polish Government's appeal to the *International Red Cross* was not the cause, but only the occasion, when, on the 26th of April, Mr. Molotov informed Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador in Kuibishev, that the Soviet Union would break off relations with the Polish Republic.

On the 30th of April 1943 the *Polish Telegraphic Agency*

¹ *Soviet War News*, 30th April 1943.

² *ibid.*, 21st April 1943.

³ *e.g.*, *ibid.*, 17th and 20th April 1943.

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announced that as the Committee of the *International Red Cross* had explained the difficulties (*i.e.* the refusal of the Russian Government to give its consent) that made it impossible for the *Red Cross* to grant the appeal for an enquiry, the Polish Government would regard the matter as settled.

The German authorities, however, were determined that an enquiry should be held and, as the *International Red Cross* refused to appoint a commission, they invited a medical commission to serve the same purpose. The enquiry began in April on the scene of the murder. Twelve experts took part—one of them was Dr. Naville, Professor of Forensic Medicine at the University of Geneva.¹ British officers, who were prisoners of war in German hands, were present as witnesses when the post-mortem examinations on some of the bodies were held.

By the 7th of July 1943 the commission—according to the German *White Book*,² published in the same year—had disinterred 4143 bodies, of which 2805 were identified. The dead were in a fair state of preservation. They were in Polish uniforms. Most of them had identity papers, pay-books, and other documents, but no rings or watches. They had been killed by being shot in the nape of the neck—the common method of execution by the NKVD.³ The Commission certified that the bodies had been dead for about three years.

Professor Naville was repeatedly attacked by the quasi-Communist *Party of Labour* in his own canton of Geneva

¹ The twelve experts, who made up the medical commission, were from the following countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Holland, Bohemia, Moravia, Rumania, Switzerland, Slovakia, Hungary. In addition to these, Dr. Costodoat, appointed by the French Government, and Dr. Buhtz, Professor of Forensic Medicine at Breslau University, were present at the request of the German High Command.

² *Amliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn* (Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1943), p. 331.

³ This method was sometimes used by the Gestapo.

because he had been a member of the Commission at Katyn. It was suggested that he had consented to take part for political reasons, that the enquiry could not have been impartial, and that he had, therefore, been guilty of unprofessional conduct. He was completely exonerated by the *Grand Conseil du canton* on the 18th of January 1947.¹ He himself stated that he had taken part, not in order to oblige the German Government, but to fulfil what he regarded as the justified wish of the Polish Government for an impartial investigation; that he had accepted no money or any favour; that the investigation had been conducted in complete freedom; that the medical experts had been able to make their own selection of bodies and to carry out the post-mortem themselves and examine uniforms and all other objects that might lead to identification; and that they were satisfied that the bodies could not have been dead less than three years.²

In the autumn of 1943, after Western Russia had been reoccupied by the Red Army, the Russian Government appointed its own Commission of Enquiry. All the members were subjects of the Soviet Union. No representatives of Allied or neutral Powers took part, not one Pole, not even a member of the *Union of Polish Patriots*. The Commission issued a long report, of which the main points were the following:

The Polish prisoners of war, interned in three camps west

¹ v. *La Tribune de Genève*, 20th Jan. 1947.

² M. Picot, the President of the *Conseil d'Etat* and head of the *Department of Public Instruction*, in reporting to the *Grand Conseil*, stated that if the victims met their deaths in 1940 or in the winter of 1940-41, they were killed by the Russians; that if they were killed in the autumn of 1941 or 1942, they were killed by the Germans; that, considering the local climate, it was possible to establish the time of death by the state of decomposition of the bodies—if the victims died in the spring of 1940, the bodies were subjected to the action of heat during the summer of 1940, 1941, and 1942, whereas if they died at the end of 1941 or early in 1942, they were exposed to the heat of only one summer. (*La Tribune de Genève*, 20th Jan. 1947.)

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of Smolensk, and employed on road-making, were still in that region after the German army arrived. In the autumn of 1941 the Germans executed Polish prisoners of war from these camps. Early in 1943 the general situation had become unfavourable from the German point of view, and the Germans, to promote antagonism between Russia and Poland, ascribed "their own crimes to the Soviet authorities." To serve this end, the "German Fascist invaders," by means of "persuasion, attempted bribery, threats, and barbarous persecution," tried to find "local witnesses" and to "obtain false evidence" that Polish prisoners of war had been executed by the Russian authorities. The German authorities gathered the bodies of Polish prisoners of war from other camps and threw them into the graves in Katyn wood so as to "erase the traces of their own crimes" and "increase the number of the 'victims of Bolshevik bestiality'." The Germans employed 500 Russian prisoners of war in their task and executed them when the work was done. The post-mortems showed that the executions had been carried out in the autumn of 1941. This was confirmed by the documents found on the bodies. In executing Polish prisoners of war, the "German Fascist invaders" were carrying out "their systematic policy of the physical extermination of Slav nations."

This report,¹ dated Smolensk, the 24th of January 1944, was signed by eight persons: Alexey Tolstoy, a Member of the Academy of Sciences; the Metropolitan Nicholas; Lt.-Gen. Gundorov, the Chairman of the Pan-Slav Committee; S. Kolesnikov, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Combined Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent; V. Potemkin, Soviet Commissar for Education; Lt.-General Smirnov, Chief of the Medical Service of the Red Army; R. Meknikov, Chairman of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee.

¹ It was published in the *Soviet War News* at the time.

The report leaves several questions unanswered. It would have been unusual for prisoners of war, with commissioned rank, to be employed on road-making, but if it was true, as stated in the report, that Polish officers were employed in this way, why was not the Polish Government told so in the summer of 1941? The German armies did not reach Smolensk until the end of September in that year. Why were the Polish officers missing from May 1940 onwards? It is inconceivable that thousands of officers, prisoners of war in Russian hands, could have been captured by the Germans without the knowledge of the Russian authorities. If they were indeed captured, why did not the Russian authorities say so? They would, in that case, have given a complete answer to the persistent enquiries of the Polish Government! Why did not the Russian authorities supply the Polish Government with lists of interned prisoners? The Russian report says that documents found on the dead officers showed that they were still alive in the autumn of 1941.¹ Why were none of these documents submitted to the Polish Government—or to the British Government? Why did the families and friends of these officers receive no letters from them after May 1940 whereas, until then, monthly letters had been received? Of those who signed the Russian report, only one, Lt. Gen Smirnov, appears to have any title to be considered an expert in medicine or pathology. Why was no expert of international repute included?

¹ The German *White Book*, which gives much fuller details concerning the pathology of the disinterred bodies, the documents, medals, and other articles found upon them, the uniforms, and so on, reproduces a diary found on the body of a Polish officer identified as Major A. Solski. The diary describes the departure of a draft of prisoners from Kozielsk on the 7th April 1940. The final entry, dated the 9th April, is as follows: ". . . Departure in prison coach in cells (terrible). Taken somewhere into a wood, something like a country house. Here a special search. I was relieved of my watch, indicating 6.30 a.m. (8.30 a.m. Polish time), asked about a wedding ring. Roubles, belt and pocket knife taken away." Here the diary ends.

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There was a conversation, related by Captain Czapski and others, which would seem to have some significance, a conversation held in October 1940. Beria, the head of the NKVD, his deputy, Mierkulov, were discussing, with certain Polish officers, including Berling (who, as we have seen, was one of those who had attracted the attention of the Russian authorities at Kozielsk because he showed Russophile leanings), the possibility of forming a Polish army on Russian soil. Berling suggested that volunteers for this army might be recruited from amongst the prisoners at Kozielsk. Beria replied: "We have made a big mistake about these!" Mierkulov, later on, repeated to one of the Polish officers present—who, in 1941, reported for duty with the Polish colours, and related what he had heard—"Not these, we made a big mistake!" There were three witnesses to this conversation who told Captain Czapski their story.¹

The Germans, in their broadcasts, at first referred to 10,000 as the number of Polish dead found at Katyn, but the report of their Commission of Enquiry is more precise. It states that 4143 bodies were found, and that 2250 were identified.² The Russian Commission, in its report, states that 925 bodies were exhumed and examined. In the official *communiqué* of the Russian Commission, to which the report is appended, it is stated that "the total number of bodies, according to the calculations of medical and legal experts, reaches the figure of 11,000." But neither in the *communiqué* nor in the report—the two comprise more than 30 pages—is there any indication as to how this figure was calculated.

The names of the dead, identified by the Germans, were all names of prisoners who had been in the camp at Kozielsk. These had originally numbered 4500. Of these, 245 had been transferred to the camps at Pavlishchev Bor and

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 109. v. also RM, pp. 50-51.

² One of them was an Army Chaplain.

Griazovets between the 26th of April and the 12th of May 1940. The number of missing officers who were interned at Kozielsk was, therefore, 4255—a number very close to 4143, the number of bodies discovered by the Germans.

It is evident that, except for the 245, all the prisoners interned at Kozielsk were murdered in Katyn Wood towards the end of April or early in May 1940.

The figure of 10,000 or 11,000 reiterated in German and Russian propaganda was well known as representing the total number of missing Polish officers, as stated many times in communications between the Russian and Polish Governments from the summer of 1941 onwards. By the beginning of 1943 this figure can hardly have been a secret to the Germans, for it was widely known in Poland.

When the Germans discovered that the dead at Katyn were Polish officers, they assumed, no doubt, that they were those who had been missing—the 10,000. Investigation showed they were less than half that number—only those, in fact, who had been interned at Kozielsk (and the German wireless stations thereupon reduced the totals accordingly). The Russians, on the other hand, by declaring that they had found 11,000, ostensibly accounted for all the missing officers.

The fate of the officers who were interned at Starobielsk and Ostashkov remains a mystery. So does the fate of the university professors and other civilians. In all three camps were interned the greater part of the Polish officer corps who had been taken prisoner by the Russians and an *élite* taken by the Russians from amongst the Polish liberal professions—about 15,000 in all.

They all vanished in the spring of 1940. Nothing has been heard of them since—except for the 448 who were drafted to Pavlishchev Bor, and the 4143 who were discovered by the Germans, murdered in Katyn Wood.

VI

The frontier between Poland and Russia was negotiated as the result of regular warfare which was begun by Poland, after a period of irregular border warfare, with a purpose far transcending the establishment of a favourable frontier. Pilsudski's purpose, as we have seen, was to "solve the Russian problem" by creating a Federation which would consist of Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine. But when Russia defeated the Polish offensive, she resolved to achieve what even the Tsars could not have attempted—the incorporation of all Poland in the Russian Empire.

First Russia, and then Poland, were in mortal danger. The Treaty of Peace, known as the Treaty of Riga, established the new frontier in the year 1921.

On the 28th of January 1920 the *Council of People's Commissars* of the Soviet Union issued a *Declaration*, which was signed by Lenin, the Chairman of the *Council*, by Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and by Trotsky, Commissar for the Army and Navy. The Council was apprehensive lest Poland be forced into war with Russia by the "Imperialist" Powers. Great Britain and the United States had no intentions of this kind. France might, perhaps, have been willing to incite, though hardly to force, Poland against Russia, if she could have counted on British support—and on this she knew she could not count.

But according to the *Declaration*:

"Everything shows that the extreme imperialists of the Entente, the supporters and agents of Churchill and Clemenceau, are at present directing all their efforts to draw Poland into a futile, ill-considered and criminal war against Soviet Russia."

In the hope of deterring Poland from waging such a war, the *Council* re-affirmed the *Decree* of the *Council of Political*

Commissars, made on the 29th of August 1918, and annulling "for ever" the "partitions of Poland," and affirming the "inalienable right of the Polish nation to decide its own fate." On behalf of the Soviet Union, the *Council* abjured all aggressive intentions, pledged the Red Army to engage in no military operations west of a line which corresponded, roughly, with the Polish eastern frontier as it was before the First Partition, and affirmed that all "contentious matters" between Russia and Poland could be "settled by friendly negotiation."

The British Government regarded the Polish attack which followed as extremely imprudent. On the 24th of February 1920 the *Supreme Council* assembled in London advised the Poles to desist from their "policy of aggression against Russia," though it also declared that if they were attacked "within their legitimate frontiers" the Allies would give them "every possible support."¹

What the "legitimate frontiers" were, was not stated. The "Curzon Line" had been projected, but not, as yet, disclosed.

When the Polish forces had been driven back from Kiev, and it seemed that the Red Army would soon occupy the Polish capital, the Western Allies were disquieted. However wrong they believed Poland's action to have been, they could not be indifferent to the danger that she might cease to exist as an independent State and that Russia and Germany might become neighbours—and, perhaps, allies.

The disappointed hopes created in Marxian hearts by the Revolution of 1848, which the *Communist Manifesto* characterised as "the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution," were revived by the Russian Revolution. In 1917 Lenin wrote that "the maturing of the inevitability of the world-wide Socialist revolution is beyond doubt."²

¹ Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference in Paris*, vol. vii. p. 319.

² Lenin, *The Threatening Catastrophe*, p. 62.

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At the *International Socialist Conference*, held at Berne, in February 1919, Lenin declared that “The victory of the universal Communist revolution is assured.”¹ At the *Second Congress of the Communist International*, he declared that “the bourgeoisie behaves like an arrogant brigand who has lost his head, but commits blunder after blunder, thus making his position more acute and hastening his own doom.”² Events in Germany, however, caused deep disappointment, the more so as Marxists had regarded the German Revolution as the necessary prelude to the universal revolution.

Nevertheless, it was with special reference to Germany that Lenin wrote: the “proletarian vanguard” had been “ideologically won over,” but “from this first step” it is “still a long way to victory.”³ This “long way” would be shortened if Russia were to carry her revolution into Poland—and from Poland into Germany.

Poland, in her seemingly desperate plight, appealed to the Western Allies. Great Britain desired peace in Eastern Europe, the removal of the last of the Russian counter-revolutionary armies (which was commanded by General Wrangel), and a general settlement in which the Soviet Government would receive international recognition and Russia would take her place in the comity of nations. She proposed that a conference be held in London, as we have seen, that the Polish army withdraw behind the *Curzon Line* and that the Red Army advance no further than that same line and conclude an armistice with General Wrangel’s army which was to withdraw to the Crimea.⁴ Russia agreed to a conference in London but rejected the chief item in the British proposal, namely, mediation between herself and Poland, and insisted on direct negotiations (“pourparlers”)

¹ Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. xvi. p. 36 (Engl. edn.).

² *ibid.*, vol. xxv. (Russian edn.).

³ Lenin, *Left Wing Communism*, p. 72.

⁴ Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. vii. p. 320.

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between the High Command of the Red Army advancing into Poland and Polish emissaries ("parlementaires").¹

The *Curzon Line* had been proposed by the Allied and Associated Powers in the previous year—on the 8th December 1919—as the eastern frontier of the territory "within which Poland was entitled to maintain an administration," but without prejudice to her claims to territories further east—"the rights which Poland shall have in the territories east of that line are expressly reserved."²

The *Curzon Line* was, therefore, proposed, in 1919, as a minimum, which would allow Poland to organise her administration, pending a final decision with regard to her eastern frontier. The British Government seems to have believed that this line would be suitable as a final frontier, for the reasons we have given. But it was never proposed as such by the Western Allies as a whole. The Soviet Union condemned it as unjust to Poland, and in the note rejecting the British offer of mediation expressed willingness to accept a "territorial frontier more favourable to the Polish people."³ In her offer of mediation Great Britain did not propose the *Curzon Line* as a frontier (as the Supreme Council had done in the previous year), but as an armistice-line, or a line of demarcation between two armies, and without reference to any subsequent decision with regard to Poland's eastern frontier.

When it seemed that Warsaw was about to fall, confidence in world-wide revolution, as a result of Russian victories in the field, rose high. Zinoviev, who had been elected

¹ For text of Russian note *v. Hansard*, 2nd August 1920.

² Two lines—the *Botha Lines* A and B—were proposed as alternative extensions of the *Curzon Line* into Eastern Galicia, the one running west, the other east, of Lemberg.

³ Russian note of the 18th July 1920 refusing the British offer of mediation. This note, which was signed by Chicherin, contained the accusation that Great Britain had "elaborated" the frontier (*i.e.* the *Curzon Line*) "under the pressure of counter-revolutionary Russian elements, adherents of the Russian capitalist and landed class."

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President of the Communist International the year before, described how the Delegates of the Soviet Congress, which was in session during the month of July 1920,

“every morning . . . with immense interest crowded in front of the map. This was to a certain extent symbolic. The best representatives of the international proletariat, holding their breath, one might say with holding pulses, followed every advance of our troops, and clearly understood that the fulfilment of the military task would mean the speeding of the international revolution. All knew that the fate of the international proletarian revolution literally depended at that time on every forward move of the Red Army.”¹

In August 1920 Poland, in the presence of apparently irremediable disaster, sued for peace. A Polish delegation arrived at Minsk on the 14th of that month. The delegates were treated with extreme discourtesy. Their sojourn in Minsk was little better than an internment.² They were allowed so little communication with the outside world that, for a time, they remained in ignorance of what was happening. They did not even know that the Red Army had been defeated before Warsaw when the Russians presented their terms:

Poland was to reduce her regular army to a total of 50,000 men, but she was to create an “armed gendarmerie” consisting of 200,000 trade unionists.³

Had Poland been compelled to accept them, she would have lost her independence, as Mr. Lloyd George perceived at the time.⁴ Poland would, in fact, have been incorporated in the Soviet Union. She would have been completely defenceless in any case, with the victorious Red Army in

¹ M. T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 51-2.

² For a detailed account of the negotiations v. Jan Dabski, *Pokoj Ryski*.

³ Temperley, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

⁴ *ibid.*

occupation. Her own army of 50,000 would have been impotent. Her "armed gendarmerie" would have come under Communist control, it would have been purged of all dissidents and have become a means of establishing a Communist dictatorship. A Committee,¹ which was to have the same function as the *Lublin Committee* more than twenty years later, the function of usurping the authority of the legitimate Government, had been formed on Russian soil. It was in the rear of the Red Army in readiness to establish itself in Warsaw, under Russian protection, as the "Provisional Government"—exactly as the Polish *Provisional Government* did in 1944.

The Polish delegates rejected the terms and broke off the negotiations. When they learnt that Warsaw had been saved and that the Red Army was in retreat, they proposed that the negotiations be resumed in a neutral country. The Russians agreed. The negotiations were resumed at Riga, the Latvian capital. Here the atmosphere was entirely different. This time the two delegations treated one another courteously. The negotiations were not easy, but, as Joffé, the head of the Russian delegation, said afterwards, the difficulties related chiefly to "the settlement of economic and financial problems."² There was little difficulty with regard to the frontier. Russia claimed a line somewhat further west than the line eventually agreed upon, but withdrew this claim against a larger portion of the gold deposited in the former Imperial Bank of Russia and claimed by Poland. At the end of the conference Joffé declared that "the conclusion" was "satisfactory."³

The Treaty, signed on the 18th of March 1921, was known

¹ The members of this Committee were: Kohn, Djerzhinski, Marchlewski, Prochniak, and Unszlicht. Djerzhinski, himself a Pole, was head of the GPU (afterwards NKVD). Presumably he was made a member of the Committee so as to extend the Red Terror to Poland as soon as the Red Army should be in occupation.

² Stanislaw Grabski, *The Polish-Soviet Frontier*, p. 35.

³ *ibid.*

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as the Treaty of Riga. The frontier, which was fixed in detail in the *Polish-Russian Delimitation of Frontiers Agreement*, signed on the 28th of November 1922 under the Treaty of Riga, was roughly that of the Second Partition in 1793. Russia and the Ukraine abandoned "all rights and claims to the west of that frontier," which was much more favourable to Poland than the *Curzon Line*, but less favourable than the line originally offered by the *Council of People's Commissars* in 1918 and re-affirmed in 1920. It was recognised by a decision of the *Council of Ambassadors* on the 15th of March 1920.

At no time, until the Second World War, was there any Russian complaint about the frontier. Indeed, it was one of the few of the new European frontiers which were not regarded as unjust by at least one of the countries they separated from one another. The Treaty of Riga was one of the few treaties that did not embody a "dictated peace"—a *Diktat*—but a peace which was a fair compromise after an inconclusive war. In Russia, as in Poland, the war was represented as a victory, for Russia had defeated the Polish plan of conquest, whereas Poland had defeated the subsequent Russian plan. In *The Great Encyclopaedia*, issued by the *Russian State Institute*, the *Riga Frontier* is referred to as unfavourable to Poland because "Soviet Russia emerged victorious from this struggle."¹

The borderland on either side of the frontier never assumed the character of an irredenta, except in so far as the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia desired union with the greater Ukraine—but only if that greater Ukraine were independent of Moscow.

The Treaty of Riga inaugurated an era of peace and—with but a few lapses—of growing amity between Russia and Poland. Even the Polish Communist leader, Domski, wrote, a year after the Treaty was signed, that one of "the

¹ *The Great Encyclopaedia*, vol. 46, p. 247 (1940 edn.).

principal characteristics of Polish foreign policy" was "*its peace policy towards Soviet Russia.*"¹

Poland took repressive measures against the Polish Communist Party and against the *Hromada*, which was but the White Russian Communist Party under another name, but Russia raised no objections. The White Russian and Ukrainian minorities were victims of persecution which was, at times, extremely severe, but there was no complaint from Russia, although in 1939 when she annexed their territories she declared both these minorities "brother Ukrainians and White Russians"²—brothers, that is to say, of the Ukrainians and White Russians in the Soviet Union.

We have already surveyed the improvement in the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union which culminated in Colonel Beck's visit to Moscow in 1934.

It was clear that if two neighbours as formidable as Russia and Germany were to grow hostile, Poland would be doomed unless she could find a powerful ally. An alliance with Russia alone was impossible, for although Poland might have survived it as an ethnographic or even as an administrative entity, she would not have survived it as an independent Power, as a member of the European community. As an ally of Great Britain as well as of the United States she might—and indeed did—hope to save her independence and her European heritage. But events were to show that this hope was illusory.

Theoretically, an alliance with Germany would have been much more attractive than an alliance with Russia. Poland could have concluded such an alliance any time from 1933 to 1938. But in 1933 Marshal Pilsudski proposed that Poland and France take action to overthrow the National

¹ *International Press Correspondence*, 14th March 1922 (italics in the original).

² "Our brother Ukrainians and Byelorussians" (speech by M. Molotov on the 31st October 1939).

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Socialist Dictatorship.¹ Pilsudski, himself something of a tyrant, knew the ways of tyrants, and correctly read the signs and omens which the statesmen of Western Europe could not or would not read. France refused, and so consigned herself and all Europe to catastrophe. In 1936, when the Germans re-occupied the Rhineland, Beck repeated Pilsudski's proposal. It was, perhaps, the last opportunity of averting the Second World War.² Poland, thereafter, was compelled to temporise with her two mighty neighbours.

Hitler did not share that contemptuous dislike of the Poles which was—and still is—general amongst the Germans. Hostility to Poland was in the Prussian, rather than in the Austrian, tradition. Hitler openly expressed his regard for Pilsudski. In his speech on the 7th of March 1936 he referred to the so-called *Polish Corridor*—which Germans of all Parties habitually treated as a sore grievance—in terms of studied moderation. He said “we [*i.e.* the German Government] recognise that it is unreasonable, because impossible, to dispute the question of access to the sea for so great a State [as Poland].”³

What would an alliance with Germany have meant to Poland? She would, in any case, have been compelled to relinquish Poznan and Pomorze (the *Corridor*), and Eastern Upper Silesia; she would have been forced to take part in a campaign against Russia, and would, no doubt, have received “compensation” for her losses in the west by acquiring territories at the expense of Russia in the east—territories comprising Smolensk, Kiev, perhaps, and Odessa.

¹ *v. Russian-Polish Friendship*, by W. W. Kulski, in *Foreign Affairs* (New York, July 1947). Mr. Kulski was legal expert on the staff of the Polish Embassy in London from 1940-1945.

² It would seem that Beck, in 1936, like Pilsudski in 1933, proposed that the French should occupy the Rhineland and the Poles Danzig and East Prussia.

³ Kulski, *op. cit.*, p. 670. Mr. Kulski suggests that what Hitler had in mind was a project for giving Poland access to the Black Sea instead of to the Baltic.

Germany would have taken the offensive against France in September 1939 instead of against Poland, and would, no doubt, have invaded Russia in the spring of 1940. There can be no certainty in such matters, but if we consider how near Germany came to victory in 1941, it is at least a plausible hypothesis that, with Poland as an ally, and France defeated in 1939, she would have been victorious in 1940—or would at least have achieved a strategic ascendancy of such strength that she would have been secure against defeat.

Poland's situation would, in that case, have been much as it is today, except that her losses and her sufferings would not have been nearly as great. But she would have been a *Satellite*, a German, instead of a Russian, Protectorate, and the territories she would have received as "compensation," while *de jure* under the control of Warsaw and open to Polish settlers, would have been, *de facto*, an extension of German power into Russia, just as her present western territories are an extension of Russian power into Europe.

But an alliance with Germany would have been so unpopular in Poland that no Polish Government concluding it would have survived. An alliance with Russia would have been unpopular too, but less so than an alliance with Germany—the year 1941 was to show that, in given circumstances, it could be concluded without difficulty.

We have seen how Polish relations with Russia improved in the early 'thirties. Although Poland temporised with Germany and conformed with the policy of *appeasement* followed by the Western Powers (while trying to persuade those Powers, or at least France, to take decisive action against Germany), she refused to sign the *Anti-Comintern Pact*. This caused a reversal of Hitler's Polish policy. Poland was asked to surrender her rights in Danzig and to grant special rights to the German minority in Poznan and Pomorze. She refused, although she knew that she would be the first victim in the war which was visibly approaching.

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She hoped that the German attack would, for a time at least, take a south-easterly direction and be made without open warfare. When the *Munich Agreement* was signed, it was clear that Czechoslovakia was doomed and that Germany had gained access to the basin of the Danube. Poland, together with Hungary, took part of the spoil produced by the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Her attitude was the counterpart—perhaps deliberately so—of the Czechoslovak attitude to herself in 1920, when President Masaryk advised the Western Powers not to help Poland in her desperate struggle against Russia¹ and Czechoslovak troops occupied Teschen.² In taking Teschen the Poles claimed that they

¹ Lord d'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World*, p. 20.

² The town and district of Teschen (Tešín in Czech, Cieszyn in Polish) is rich in coal and is an important junction of roads and railways. In 1921, 76·5 per cent. of the population was Polish, 20 per cent. German-Austrian, 3 per cent. Jewish, and 3 per cent. Czech. Both Poles and Czechs claimed this area as part of their own share of what had been Austrian territory. According to population, the Poles had the juster claim, but administratively and industrially the area was an integral part of Austrian Silesia, a province which had fallen to Czechoslovakia. The Czech claim, like the German claim to the whole plebiscitary region of Upper Silesia later on, was based on the contention that Teschen and the surrounding district were an economic unit, that they were an organic part of a larger unit, and that they could not be detached or partitioned without irreparable loss. The two Republics agreed, in the summer of 1918, to settle the dispute by negotiation. But when members for Teschen were returned to the Polish Sejm, the Czechs naturally assumed that the Poles regarded the town as a part of Poland. Czech troops thereupon occupied Bohumin (Oderberg), an important strategic point. The Western Powers intervened and decided upon a plebiscite which would determine the future allegiance of the whole area together with the adjoining areas of Spis (Zips) and Orava. But the Commission appointed by the Powers found such a state of animosity and disorder at Teschen that they thought it unwise to hold a plebiscite. The danger of irregular violence, arising out of the political campaigning which would inevitably precede a plebiscite, and of intervention by Czech and Polish regulars—and, therefore, of war between Poland and Czechoslovakia—was evident. On the 20th July 1920 the Conference of Ambassadors decided that there should be no plebiscite and gave a verdict which Poland and Czechoslovakia were persuaded to accept. Czechoslovakia obtained part of the mining area and the Bohumin-Jablunkov railway, and Poland the main part of the town of Teschen, as well as an agricultural area. The economic unity of the district was preserved for a transitional period.

When the Red Army was advancing on Warsaw Poland could not,

were retaking what was their own, but even if their claim was justified—which is doubtful—their action brought them much condemnation and no ultimate gain.

In the autumn of 1938 reconciliation between Germany and Russia was indicated by the diminishing discourtesy with which the press of either country discussed the affairs of the other. The "appeasement" of Germany by the Western Powers came to an end when the Germans occupied Prague in March 1939. On the 31st of that month the British Prime Minister declared that Great Britain would defend Poland against attack. The Anglo-Polish Treaty of Alliance—officially known as the *Agreement of Mutual Assistance*—was signed in London on the 25th of August 1939.

Poland had an ally at last. She was no longer wholly dependent on the will of Germany and Russia. From that

therefore, afford to antagonise them by rejecting the verdict of the Powers—she had, indeed, agreed in advance to accept it. But she did so under protest. Paderewski, at the end of a letter addressed to Millerand, the President of the Supreme Council, wrote :

" . . . it is doubtful whether the noble aim of the Supreme Council, which was to liquidate the conflict and promote normal, friendly relations between the Polish and Czechoslovak Republics, is likely to be attained. The decision of the Council of Ambassadors has formed a chasm between the two nations which nothing will be able to reduce.

"The Polish Government had undertaken a formal obligation, which must be carried out. I shall sign with profound grief the document that robs us of a part of our nation which we value so highly and which has so much of our affection. But before doing so, however, I desire to declare that although the Polish Government is willing to carry out loyally and fully its undertaking, the Polish nation will never believe that justice has been done. National consciousness is stronger than governments and lives longer." (v. Jan Kliza, *Cieszyn Silesia*, p. 19.)

In September 1938 Czechoslovakia was herself in desperate case, and, on the 21st the Polish Government demanded that the Polish minority in the district of Teschen should have the same rights as had been accorded, under duress, to the German-Austrian and Hungarian minorities. The Czechoslovak Government agreed to negotiate. This time the Poles occupied Bohumin. Then they occupied the district of Teschen, alleging that if they did not do so the Germans would.

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day onwards she was uncompromising in her resistance to German demands.

The Western Powers attempted to conclude a military agreement with Russia. The attempt failed, for, whereas they offered Russia war *plus* nothing, Germany offered her peace *plus* vast territorial acquisitions. Russia and Germany had compounded long before the negotiations between Russia and the Western Powers began. To Russia, these negotiations had no meaning except in so far as they might secure the connivance of the Western Powers in her Eastern European annexations. Russia insisted that "indirect aggression" be redefined so that she might be able to do with the consent of the Western Powers what she did the following year without their consent, namely, to annex Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. She demanded the right not only to send troops through Poland (which was reasonable enough, if she was to assist Poland against Germany) but also to establish military administrations in the districts of Vilna and in the Ukrainian regions of Southern and South-Eastern Poland—in other words, to annex, with the consent of the Western Powers, those Polish territories, subsequently called Western White Russia and Western Ukraine, which, in November of the same year, 1939, she annexed with the consent of Germany alone, and, later on, of Great Britain and the United States. What Russia demanded amounted to this: That Great Britain and France underwrite the Partition of Poland as negotiated between Russia and Germany and executed under the *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*.¹

As Lenin and Stalin had long foreseen, the "contradictions" of the "Imperialist" and "capitalist" worlds were breaking out in armed conflict which would leave both sides weakened and a prey to revolution. This would be Russia's

¹ "They [the Russians] asked France and Great Britain for political concessions which corresponded exactly to the offers which the Germans were ready to make" (Kulski, *op. cit.*, p. 671).

opportunity at last. She, with her armed forces intact, her industrial power at its height, her resources unimpaired, her territories unravished, would be incomparably the greatest Power in the world, and would impose her will. World Revolution was in sight once more—this time really in sight. Having taken the precaution to temporise with Germany and to share Eastern Europe with her,¹ she had skilfully diverted the “imperialist offensive” against “western imperialism.” She had no intention whatever of saving either side but would confidently await the destruction of both.²

On the 5th of December 1939 Lord Halifax spoke in the House of Commons. Speeches more eloquent than his were made by others in the years that followed, by Mr. Churchill above all, but it was a speech in the noblest English tradition, permeated by a deep sense of national honour.

“England,” said Lord Halifax,

“was true to her engagements. . . . Earlier in the year we tried to improve our relations with Russia, but always maintained the position that the rights of third parties must remain intact and unaffected by our negotiations. I think that events have shown that the judgement and instincts of the British Government in refusing agreement with the Soviet Government on the terms of the formulas covering cases of indirect aggression on the Baltic States were right, for it is now claimed that these formulas might have been the cloak of ulterior designs,³ and I have little

¹ In August 1939 a Russian military mission arrived in Berlin under General Purkayev to discuss the line of demarcation between Russian and German interests. The discussions were of wide range—they even covered the Middle East and Afghanistan.

² The Polish Government was fully aware of what was in the Russian mind and knew perfectly well that if the Western Powers had agreed to the Russian demands, Russia would have occupied all the territories she was soon to occupy anyhow, and, whatever her pledges to the Western Powers might be, would in no circumstances go to war with Germany in their support.

³ Events in 1920 showed this claim was justified.

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doubt that the people of this country would prefer to face difficulties and embarrassments rather than feel that we had compromised the honour of this country and the Commonwealth."

The Treaty between Germany and Russia, known as the *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*, after the names of the two signatories, was signed in Moscow on the 24th of August 1939, and a *Secret Protocol* was appended, as we have seen. When the German and Russian armies had successfully concluded their combined military operations against the Polish army, Stalin sent Hitler a congratulatory telegram, saying that

"The friendship of Germany and the Soviet Union is based on blood which has been shed in common, and has all the prospect of being enduring and steadfast."¹

Russia denounced the British blockade of Germany as a violation of international law. She offered Germany "a well-situated base near Murmansk," and, according to the opinion of Admiral Raeder's chief of staff, "Russian economic help was so decisive that the success of the British blockade seemed impossible."² On the 1st of August 1940 Mr. Molotov declared that "friendly relations . . . between the Soviet Union and Germany are not based on fortuitous considerations of a transient nature, but on the fundamental interests of both the U.S.S.R. and Germany."³

Germany attacked Russia on the 22nd of June 1941. Within a month her armies occupied twice as much Russian territory as they had occupied Polish territory in three weeks of September 1939. Her victories were so sweeping, the rout of the Red Army so catastrophic, that the total defeat of Russia before the end of 1941 seemed probable.

¹ This telegram was disclosed at Nuremberg. v. W. R. Cooper, *The Nuremberg Trial*, p. 206.

² Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

³ Speech delivered at the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet.

German aggression had turned Russia into an ally of the Western Powers and, therefore, of Poland. In her perilous state she had to abjure conquests made in connivance with the enemy and incompatible with the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Poland and with the declared principles of the Western Powers. She had to reverse her Polish policy. Poland, who could have no hope of recovering her independence except as an ally of all the Allies, willingly accepted the reconciliation with Russia which was pressed upon her by Great Britain.

Diplomatic contact between the Polish Government and the Russian Embassy was established in July. Poland demanded that the *de jure* and *de facto* status created by the Treaty of Riga be restored, that all Polish subjects imprisoned, exiled or detained in Russia be released, that Polish subjects in Russia be placed under the authority of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, and that a Polish army be organised on Russian soil.

The prestige of Poland, whose army, navy, and air-force had played a glorious part in many battles against the common enemy—in the Battle of Britain above all—was high throughout the world. In Poland itself, resistance to the enemy, more powerful than in any other occupied country, was offered by an organised State and a united nation under a legitimate Government, the constitutional successor to the Government which had been the first amongst the Governments of the Allied coalition to take up arms in the common cause. It was impossible for Russia to sustain the fiction put forward by her in September 1939, when she was the accomplice of Germany, that the Polish State did not exist. She at once conceded all the Polish demands, with one reservation, namely, that as Eastern Poland (that is to say, Western White Russia and Western Ukraine) had been incorporated in the Soviet Union as the result of elections expressing (so Russia alleged) the wishes of the inhabitants,

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it would be necessary to postpone any decision with regard to the Polish eastern frontiers. On the 4th of July Mr. Maisky, the Russian Ambassador in London, informed the British Foreign Office that Russia was "in favour of an independent *national* Polish State" and that the frontiers of this State would correspond with "*ethnographical* Poland," that certain districts and towns occupied by Russia in 1939 might be "returned to Poland," and that the form of Polish Government to be established was the concern of the Poles only.¹ It was, therefore, clear from the beginning that Russia was not prepared to recognise Poland as the multinational State she had been before the war, and was not willing to renounce the Polish territories incorporated in the Soviet Union in the *Fourth Partition*.

On the 30th of July 1941 General Sikorski, on behalf of the Polish Republic, and Mr. Maisky, on behalf of the Soviet Union, signed an agreement in which the Government of the Union recognised that the treaties concluded between Russia and Germany in 1939 "relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity." The Soviet Union no longer based its claim to Eastern Poland on her treaty with Germany, but on the "elections" held in those territories under the control of the Red Army and the NKVD. The chief purpose of these elections was thereby made clear—they had been held to confirm Russia in possession of these territories irrespective of transient or changeable treaties with other Powers. The agreement was signed at the Foreign Office. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were present at the ceremony. Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski an official declaration, stating that

"His Majesty's Government do not recognise any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939."

¹ Kulski, *op. cit.*, p. 675 (*italics* my own).

On the 31st of July 1941 Mr. Sumner Welles made a similar declaration on behalf of the United States. The *de jure* status established by the Treaty of Riga was thereby reaffirmed. An agreement (referred to as an "amnesty") relating to the release of Polish subjects and to the formation of a Polish army on Russian soil was embodied in a *Protocol* attached to the agreement. The Polish Government, fully aware of the significance of the reservations Russia had made, desired a more specific declaration with regard to the eastern frontier, but was overruled by British advice and reluctantly refrained from pressing the point.

It seemed that the intractable "Polish problem," which had troubled Europe for two centuries—and had, indeed, been the immediate occasion of the Second World War—would be solved at last, by the defeat of Germany and by a complete reconciliation between Poland and Russia. The Poles confidently hoped that this consummation would be brought about, chiefly by the good offices of Great Britain, by her power and her prestige in the world, her respect for treaties, her high regard for honour amongst nations, and her own vital interest in preserving the Balance of Power.

But some misgivings remained, for the lack of specific assurance with regard to the eastern frontier left the future of nearly half Poland uncertain—indeed, the future of Poland herself, even beyond the uncertainties of a war in which the principal enemy was winning prodigious victories.

In the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Russia, which was signed on the 26th of May 1942, the signatory Powers declared, under *Article 5*, that "they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States." In the *Preamble* to the Treaty, Great Britain and Russia reaffirmed the Declaration made on the 14th of August 1941 by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden—the so-called *Atlantic Charter*. It was specific-

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ally stated in this *Preamble* that "the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered" to the *Charter*.¹ According to *Points* 2 and 3 of the *Charter*, the signatory Powers "desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned," and "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." On the 24th of June 1941 Mr. Eden had declared in the House of Commons: "The Polish people . . . will redeem their freedom. That remains our pledge."

The release of Polish subjects in Russia began, and a Polish army was formed on Russian soil, as we have seen. But as the fortunes of war began to favour Russia, it became evident that Russia did not want a Polish army on her soil. Polish battalions were formed but were supplied with wholly inadequate equipment. Most of them received only a few rifles and a few rounds of ammunition apiece. The Polish Government requested that a Polish army be formed in the Middle East, that it be equipped by Great Britain and fight under British operational command. The Russian and British Governments gave their consent. Poles, many of them accompanied by their families, began to arrive in Iran—starved, diseased, and in rags. They formed an army of about 30,000, which, later on, distinguished itself in North Africa and Italy.

But before the year was out, the exodus came to an end. Polish exiles and prisoners were no longer released. The mystery surrounding the Polish officers who had been interned in Western Russia and were missing began to trouble the new friendship between the two Powers deeply. The Polish organisation created for the relief of exiles and prisoners was subjected to ever-increasing interference

¹ Mr. Maisky had stated on the 27th September 1941 that "the Soviet Government proclaims its agreement with the fundamental principles of this declaration."

from the Russian authorities. Its members were spied upon and falsely accused of spying. On the 1st December 1941 the Russian Government reaffirmed a *Decree* which had been enacted in November 1939, imposing Russian citizenship on all persons domiciled in Western White Russia and Western Ukraine, that is to say, in Eastern Poland, those designated as having "Polish nationality" being exempted. Subjects of the Polish Republic, who were members of the White Russian and Ukrainian national minorities and were residing on the territory of the Republic in 1939, were thereby turned into subjects of the Soviet Union. The Russian authorities then began to call up for service with the Red Army all persons who came under this *Decree*. Poland was, therefore, deprived of some 6,000,000 of her citizens.¹

It was clear that Russia was reverting to her historic Polish policy: that not only Eastern Poland but all Poland was in danger. There were some amongst the Polish leaders and their advisers who held that the danger might be averted by timely concessions, that Poland, by sacrificing part of her eastern territories, might save the rest, especially the city of Lemberg, and that timely compliance might, by placating Russia and gratifying Great Britain and the United States, promote the survival of a Poland which would at least be independent, even within reduced frontiers. Polish public opinion—which was by no means inarticulate even under the German occupation—was wholly opposed to the sacrifice of territory and left no doubt that it would regard any compromise as a betrayal, and although there was little love between Poles on the one hand and the White Russians and Ukrainians of Poland on the other, and

¹ According to the Polish census of 1931, the White Russians and Ukrainians inhabiting the territories occupied by the Russians in 1939 totalled 6,437,000, or nearly half the population. How far this figure had been reduced by death and dispersal at the end of 1941 is impossible to tell.

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although the Ukrainians in particular had been subjected to cruel persecution and had engaged in violent reprisals, every liberal and patriotic Pole was distressed at the suggestion that more than 6,000,000 Polish subjects should be surrendered to Russia against their will. That the vast majority of those 6,000,000 preferred Polish rule to Russian was beyond reasonable doubt.¹ Some of the Ukrainians hoped much from the Germans and served the Germans as soldiers, agents, or terrorists, but most of the Polish Ukrainian leaders were loyal to the Polish Republic. None, except a few Communists, were willing to serve the Soviet Union. The Polish Government decided to uphold the rights of the Polish nation as established and guaranteed by existing treaties and declared principles and to reject every compromise. Nor was this the attitude of a merely stiff-necked people. It had been Polish experience through history that every compromise between Poland and either of her powerful neighbours was, first of all, a compromise at her expense, and, secondly, a means for further compromise, also at her expense, that the "compromise" was but another word for sacrifice, for the surrender of territory and a limitation of sovereignty, and that, once the process began, the end was that Poland was compromised out of existence and that, having sacrificed something to save the rest, she had but accelerated the sacrifice of all.

All Polish subjects in Russia—including those of the White Russian and Ukrainian minorities, as well as of the Polish majority—claimed Polish citizenship. Russia exempted from her *Decree* only those who were Roman Catholics, thereby making religion the sole test of citizen-

¹ During the time of the severest persecution, the so-called "Pacification" in 1930, Eastern Galicia was reminiscent of Ireland during the troubles, even if the conflict between Poles and Ukrainians did not reach nearly the same degree of violence. At the same time, nothing the Ukrainians in Poland suffered was in the least comparable with the sufferings of the Ukrainians in Russia during the "collectivisation."

ship. All the Jews who had been deported from Poland to Russia claimed Polish citizenship, but none were exempted—all had to take Russian citizenship under the *Decree*. On the 16th of January 1943 the Russian Government informed the Polish Embassy at Kuibishev in a note that there would be no further exemptions of any sort and that the Polish “claim” to the “western districts of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics” conflicted with Russia’s “sovereign rights.” Such a “claim” had never been made. Nor could the Polish Government regard these territories as the object of any “claim,” seeing that the validity of their allegiance to the Polish Republic was beyond serious dispute.

By her note, on the 16th of January, Russia, in effect, reaffirmed her title to what she had received under the *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact* and proclaimed her re-annexation of Eastern Poland. The men, women, and children who had been deported to Russia from Poland, and had not been released under the “amnesty”—the great majority of the original 1,200,000, that is to say—automatically became citizens of the Soviet Union under the law of the Union and were, thereby, for ever denied all help and protection from their own Government and any hope that they would ever again be free citizens of a free country.

While Russia was annexing nearly half of Poland (in anticipation, as it were, for all Poland was still occupied by the Germans) she was emphatic in her assurances that Poland was to be “strong and independent.” Speaking in the House of Commons on the 22nd of February 1943 Mr. Churchill said:

“With great pleasure I heard from Marshal Stalin that he, too, was resolved upon the creation and maintenance of a strong and integral independent Poland as one of the leading Powers in Europe.”

A week after Mr. Churchill had spoken, on the 1st of March 1943, the *Union of Polish Patriots* was formed.

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In April, as we have seen, Russia broke off relations with the Polish Republic—the State, which had been the first to defy the might of Germany, on the 1st of September 1939, which, on the 17th of that same month in the same year, had “ceased to exist,” which, on the 31st of July 1941, was recognised as existing by Russia, was, on the 26th of August 1943, recognised no longer, ostensibly because it had asked for an impartial enquiry into the circumstances in which thousands of its officers had perished, but in reality to thrust it aside, so that the *Union* could be nurtured, trained, and educated to be an instrument of the Soviet Union.

Poland had not the power to defend her rights and her interests. Her territory was occupied by the common foe, her armed forces, under British operational command, could fight in the common cause, but could not avert the new menace to her independence that came from the new ally. The dilemma of the Polish armed forces was indeed tragic. They shed their blood in fighting both for and against Polish independence. If the common cause did not prevail, Poland was lost. If Russia prevailed, she was also lost, unless Great Britain and the United States were strong and resolute enough in vindication of treaties, promises, and declared principles. It is astonishing that the Polish armed forces fought with such valour and discipline until the end, the more so as most of them were from Eastern Poland and would never see their homes again. There were many whose parents, wives, or children were, if still alive (which none could tell), far away, in Asiatic Russia, with little or no hope of seeing their men again. Political disaffection caused the dangerous mutinies that tarnished the renown of the Greek army and navy, but neither politics, nor torturing doubts and perplexities that went far deeper than politics, ever shook the loyalty of the Polish armed forces.

It was not easy for Great Britain to give her consent to

Russian enactments which were incompatible with her own pledges and promises. The United States were in the war and they, too, although not bound by pledges so specific, were bound by declared principles that were by no means so general as to be incapable of application to the special case of Poland.

But neither Mr. Churchill, who was devoted to the Polish cause which appealed so strongly to his chivalrous temper, nor President Roosevelt, were equal to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov in statecraft, knowledge of the subject, singleness of purpose, and tenacity. They do not appear to have understood what Russia's ultimate purpose was. They were upon every occasion outmanœuvred in the contest over the body and soul of Poland. Every demand made by Russia was, in the end, conceded. If Russia was rebuffed, she would make the same demand in another form and so gain her point. She would then make new demands that arose out of the old. She knew what she wanted, and she knew it with complete precision. Mr. Churchill wanted Poland to be independent—he wanted it ardently. He sorrowed over the thought that she might be cheated of her independence. But he was ignorant of Eastern European affairs, ignorant of Polish history, and dependent on inferior advisers. Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Eden with him, soon found themselves in a tangle of inconsistencies and contradictions. Their public statements no longer corresponded with the realities, and what was a wretched compromise that thinly concealed their defeat in the conflict over Poland, they represented as a compromise that was altogether honourable and, on balance, successful. And if it did not seem as successful as it might have been, they attributed the deficiency neither to themselves, nor to the Kremlin, but only to the Polish Government in London.

That this Government made mistakes was recognised even by its own Ministers, but it is hard to see how the

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ultimate outcome could have been affected even if it had done the humanly impossible and made no mistakes at all.

Mr. Churchill blamed the Polish Government for not consenting to a sacrifice of territory along the eastern border. There were loyal supporters of that Government who believed that it would have been better if such a sacrifice had been made and at an early date¹—not later, say, than the end of 1943. But again it is hard to see how the outcome could have been affected—how the resulting Poland would have differed from the Poland of today. Mr. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons on the 22nd of February 1944, argued that, if the sacrifice had been made, there would have been no *Lublin Committee*. But such an argumentation showed little understanding on Mr. Churchill's part. The purpose of the *Lublin Committee* had, at the most, a merely incidental relevance to the frontiers of Poland. The *Committee* was formed, sponsored, and directed by Russia as an instrument of Russian policy, to be the future Polish State, the Russian dependency of today. Later on, Mr. Churchill showed more understanding when he expressed his misgivings over the *Lublin Committee*.

“The area administered” by it, he said, would grow, and “its contacts with the Soviet Government will become more intimate and strong. I do not know what misfortunes will attend such a development.”²

These words failed to indicate the truth—that the *Lublin Committee* was completely subservient to the Kremlin, and that there could be no question of “contacts” as though between one autonomous body and another. Mr. Churchill's misgivings with regard to “misfortunes” to come were certainly fulfilled, but he does not appear to have realised that what he called “misfortunes” were the essential pur-

¹ Mr. Kulski was one of these, *v. op. cit.*, *passim*.

² *v.* his speech in the House of Commons on the 15th December 1944.

poses of the *Lublin Committee* and an object of Russian foreign policy. They were "misfortunes" for Poland, for Great Britain, for Europe—but not for Russia: for Russia they were gains of great importance, not only the exclusive control of all Poland, but access to Germany and a decisive, perhaps even a commanding, influence in German affairs, and a powerful strategic position in Eastern and Central Europe.

Mr. Churchill, apparently in an attempt to justify the sacrifice of the Polish city of Vilna, remarked in the same speech that "we did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920."

When Poland and Lithuania emerged as independent States from the First World War there was no definite frontier between them. The city of Vilna was claimed by both. In 1919 Lithuania and Russia were at war, and Vilna was taken by the Russians. In 1920 the Russians, retreating from Poland, evacuated Vilna and handed it over to the Lithuanians.

An agreement between Poland and Lithuania was signed at Suwalki, in the presence of a Control Commission, representing the League of Nations. It was simply an agreement to negotiate a final settlement of the dispute over Vilna. It was to come into force as from the 10th of October 1920. A provisional line of demarcation, which left Vilna on the Lithuanian side, was drawn to keep the Polish and Lithuanian forces apart. But on the 9th of October General Zeligowski, acting under orders from Pilsudski, occupied Vilna, thereby breaking the agreement. This action was severely criticised in London and in Washington, and even in Paris, though most of all in Geneva. Nevertheless, on the 15th of March 1923 the Conference of Ambassadors confirmed Poland in the possession of Vilna and the surrounding district.

When the Treaty of Riga had been signed, on the 18th March 1921, Russia ceased to support the Lithuanian claim

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to Vilna.¹ She objected to a plebiscite which the Western Powers contemplated in that same year to establish the wishes of the inhabitants of Vilna and the surrounding district (in the city itself the Poles outnumbered the Lithuanians, in the rural areas the Lithuanians outnumbered the Poles).²

Mr. Churchill's remark, that "we"—by which, presumably, he meant the British Government—did not "approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920," was historically correct, but irrelevant. The manner in which the Poles forestalled a judicial decision was, no doubt, reprehensible, but the validity of that decision, made by the Conference of Ambassadors, on which Great Britain was represented, was in no way impaired by any new contention. Mr. Churchill—and President Roosevelt—had given way to Russian pressure. President Roosevelt remained silent. Mr. Churchill laid the blame upon Poland.

In November 1943 Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin held a conference at Teheran and concluded an agreement. This agreement was made public in terms so general that its significance was concealed from the world. Even today the precise nature of the agreement is not known. But it was at Teheran that the proposal, repeatedly discussed during the year 1943, that Poland should receive "compensation" in the west for her loss of territory in the east was accepted by Great Britain and the United States, who, thereby, agreed to the annexation of these territories by Russia and so confirmed her in the possession of conquests she had made in 1939 by arrangement with Germany.

¹ Russia did not, however, cease to regard the independence of Lithuania as a vital interest. She almost certainly saved Lithuania from being annexed, or being forced into a federation with Poland, between the First and Second World Wars.

² The plebiscite was to be supervised by an international force. Russia was suspicious lest this force should be used against herself. The Western Powers abandoned the plan.

On the 11th of January 1944 the Russian Government issued a *Declaration*, as we have seen.¹ This *Declaration* and two other events—all three occurring within a brief space of time—foreshadowed Russia's general European policy: the appointment of Josip Broz, known as Tito, at the head of a new Yugoslav "Government," which was to usurp the authority of the legitimate Yugoslav Government, just as the *Lublin Committee* was to usurp the authority of the legitimate Polish Government, and the conclusion of the commercial treaty between Russia and Czechoslovakia, the embryo, as it were, of the future integration of the Czechoslovak economy in the Russian.²

The *Declaration* referred to the Polish Government as *émigré*. This term, which had, in the past, been a term of honour—Kossuth, Kościuszko, Marx, Lenin, and others had been *émigrés*—became a term of dishonour.

The Polish Government was not inaccurately termed *émigré*, for it resided in a foreign country. But the term was only used of those Governments in exile out of favour in Moscow—of the Yugoslav Government, as of the Polish, but not of the Norwegian or Czechoslovak. In the early days of the war Dr. Benes, being in disfavour, was an *émigré*. But when he found favour in Moscow, he was an

¹ For the official text of the *Declaration*, v. *The Times*, 12th January 1944.

² Under *Article 4* of the Treaty, "economic relations [between Czechoslovakia and Russia] will be developed on the largest possible scale, and either party will give the other every economic assistance after the war" (the full text of the Treaty will be found in *The Times*, 14th December 1943). As far back as 1940 an attempt was made, on the initiative of the Polish Government, to end the conflict, which was more than twenty years old, between Poland and Czechoslovakia. A federation, to include Rumania and Hungary, was proposed as a task to be carried out when the war was over. The Greeks and Yugoslavs discussed the possibility of a Balkan Federation. Beyond these plans, a wider scheme to promote a federation of the countries of the *Middle Zone*—the countries, that is to say, between the Arctic and the Aegean—was discussed unofficially amongst leading citizens of those countries in London. In May 1943 the Czechoslovak Government decided under Russian pressure to break off negotiations with Poland.

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émigré no longer although he continued to reside in London. The Polish Government in London was not *émigré* when the military situation in Russia was so critical that the help of every possible ally was needed. The Yugoslav Government in London was not *émigré* until Russia wanted to get rid of it. The insinuation conveyed—and stressed by constant repetition in every conceivable context—was that governments or persons thus designated had run away from the enemy, that they were not participating in national resistance against that enemy, that they represented retrogressive opinion, that they were, in reality, conspiring against the Soviet Union, and against the true democratic and patriotic movements which were fighting the true war of national liberation on the native soil, and were, as a matter of course, friendly to the universal liberator, the Soviet Union.

Governments and persons designated as *émigré*, as *reactionary*, and as *Fascist* became, through a metamorphosis skilfully and cumulatively induced by Russian propaganda, friends of the enemy, or *collaborators*, a word that came to be synonymous with *traitors*.

Traitors to what? Words, in Russian propaganda, are not meant to designate objective realities, but to serve a political end. At the same time, that end is conceived as an objective reality, although it has but a prospective existence in a problematic future. Men like Bór-Komorowski, who led the great insurrection against the Germans in Warsaw, Mihailovitch, who was the first man to raise the flag of armed resistance in occupied Europe, were not designated as traitors only for the purpose of destroying them—although this purpose, too, was assiduously pursued—but also for the purpose of establishing what was, according to the Russian conception, their real treason: treason far more serious than collaboration with the enemy, treason to the universal Communist State which, according to the Russian conception, is immanent, or emergent, and will,

in time, be established through the dialectical process of history.

According to the Russian conception, all governments which are not Communistic, or are not directly or indirectly promoting the advent of Communism, are enemies of mankind in so far as they are in a state of rebellion against the natural order—that is to say, against the dialectical emergence of universal Communism. This conception has never been relinquished since the Russian Revolution even if it has, for tactical reasons, been concealed, especially from western eyes, during certain periods. Today, the British and American governments are rebel governments in this sense, and no occasion is missed by the Russian organs of publicity to designate these governments or their actions as *undemocratic*—*democratic* being the name given at the moment, for tactical reasons, instead of Communistic or Socialist, to the natural and emergent order. A government designated as *democratic* is one that serves the purpose of Russian policy no matter how tyrannically it may govern. Tyranny, serving that purpose, is but force employed to overcome the obstacles that stand in the way of its fulfilment, according to the Russian conception. Progress is but the dialectical movement of history towards that fulfilment and Russian foreign policy is the means by which that movement is sustained, directed, and accelerated. All who support Russian foreign policy are *progressive*—all who do not are *reactionaries* or Fascists. Hitler was no *Fascist* when he was at war with the western democracies. He became a *Fascist* only on the 22nd June when he went to war with Russia.

The Russian Government, in their *Declaration* of the 11th January 1944, stated that “the territories of the Western Ukraine . . . and the territories of Western Byelorussia”—that is to say, of Eastern Poland—“were incorporated in the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia”—and, therefore, in

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the Soviet Union—"in accordance with the will of the population . . . as expressed in a plebiscite which was carried out on a broad democratic basis in 1919."

We have seen how this "plebiscite" was, in fact, carried out. The use of the term "democratic" in this context must appear cynical or hypocritical to the European mind. But it is a *terminus technicus*, as it were, and must be understood according to criteria pertaining to the Russian conception. According to this conception, *democratic* elections or plebiscites cannot be democratic or free according to European conceptions, because they are a form of warfare, a war of liberation, in which the class-conscious workers, the "vanguard of the proletariat," assisted by the liberating agents of the NKVD and by the Red Army, break through the *reactionary, Fascist*¹ front, and impose the immanent will of the people upon what may, in appearance, be a majority composed of voters who are either open enemies of the people or indifferent (that is to say, not yet class conscious). The natural order—in the present juncture known as *democracy*—prevails. If it did not, there would be no point in holding elections!

According to the *Declaration*, the plebiscites "rectified" the "injustice" committed by the Riga Treaty of 1921. The "incorporation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia not only did not violate the interests of Poland, but, on the contrary, created a reliable basis for stable and permanent friendship between the Polish people and its neighbours the Ukraine and Byelorussia"—that is to say, with the Soviet Union itself. For eighteen years the Soviet Union had maintained that the Treaty of Riga was not only just but advantageous to the Soviet Union. But, unlike Germany, Russia is patient—to her eighteen years is but a

¹ The word *bourgeois*, as designating the enemy of the *proletariat*, has gone out of use, like the word *proletariat* itself, since the Communist appeal has been directed to the middle and lower middle classes.

brief space of time. The apparent peace between her and Poland was a tactical necessity—it served the purpose of averting, or postponing, the “inevitable” conflict with the western world, while it enabled her to extend and consolidate her conquests in Central Asia.

According to the *Declaration*, “the Soviet Government has repeatedly declared that it stands for the re-establishment of a strong and independent Poland and for friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland”—these are the words which Mr. Churchill repeated “with great pleasure” in the House of Commons soon after. But what the Russian Government meant and what Mr. Churchill understood them to mean were not the same. The Polish people would, according to the Russian conception, be “independent” of their own governing class, of the landowners, of capitalism, of western imperialism, and, in time, of their church, and they would be “strong” in their enforced “friendship” with the Soviet Union. This is not what national strength, national independence, and friendship with other nations mean to Europeans, including Mr. Churchill—including the Polish nation itself.

According to the Russian conception, the *plebiscite* in Eastern Poland was necessary for the liberation of Poland—in fact it was itself the first act of liberation. The second act was the exile of more than a million Poles—men, women, and children—to distant parts of Russia. In this way not only the opponents, but also those who might conceivably become the opponents, of the new dispensation were removed. The third act was the extermination of the Polish officer corps—of those men who, by their fighting qualities, their discipline, their solidarity, their nationalism, were such formidable opponents of liberation as understood by Russia and such formidable champions of liberation as understood by Europeans: were not their fellow officers in the Polish air-force and navy fighting on the side of “imperialistic” Britain?

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The inhabitants neither of the "Western Ukraine" nor of "Western Byelorussia" had any wish to be incorporated in the Soviet Union. Racial and linguistic kinship meant no kinship in outlook and in their way of life. Before September 1939 the eastern border of Poland was a frontier between two different civilisations—to pass from one side to the other was to pass into a different world, as the Polish exiles found the moment they crossed into Russia, and as the soldiers of the Red Army found the moment they crossed into Poland. The difference between Russia and Poland, which is the difference between Russia and Europe, is far greater today than it was in the eighteenth century, the century of the first three Partitions. The Russian Revolution, although bearing the deep impress of European doctrine, increased the difference. Today the difference is greater than ever. Even to the White Russians and Ukrainians of Poland Russia is an alien world—incomprehensible and forbidding.¹ This is true not only of the educated classes, but also of the unlettered peasantry to whom religion means much, to whom the Church is a stronghold against the afflictions and perplexities of this world.²

No State, not even a multinational State which has existed for only a score of years, is lightly to be torn asunder. Even if certain frontiers may, originally, have been unfortunate, the process of administrative and economic integration is one that cannot be undone without injury, just as old wounds cannot be healed by being torn open afresh. The frontiers established after the First World War were not

¹ Many Ukrainians deported from Eastern Galicia had occasion to meet Ukrainians of the Soviet Union, but they found themselves with strangers speaking a language which, though philologically the same, conveyed a different meaning at almost every turn. With fellow deportees who were Poles these Ukrainians were with fellow countrymen, and felt it to be so as never before. With Ukrainians of the Soviet Union they were with strangers who were not even Europeans.

² The Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church of Eastern Galicia has been the object of severe persecution since Eastern Galicia was annexed by Russia.

all just, but they were, on the whole, an approximation to justice. The process of making and remaking frontiers must stop some time, for it is a kind of surgery—injurious to the organism and exceedingly painful. But the frontiers remade before the Second World War are the product of surgery so crude that further surgery is surely inevitable.

Russia, in her *Declaration*, did not insist on precisely the same frontier with Poland as the line negotiated between her and Germany, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Line, and confirmed by the *plebiscite* held in that same year. She proposed a frontier “approximately” following the *Curzon Line*, which was a little more favourable to Poland and bore the name of a respected statesman. It had, originally, been proposed by Great Britain and had been recommended by the Western Allies of the First World War some twenty years before, though with a purpose, with qualifications, and in circumstances very different from those that prevailed in 1939 and in 1944, as we have seen. But to call the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line by a more respected name was to make it more acceptable to a public which had little knowledge of what the original *Curzon Line* represented and was wholly uninitiated into the real significance and purpose of the newly proposed *Line*. Embarrassed statesmen, like Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, found it easier to assuage such small anxieties as were expressed in the House of Commons with regard to decisions of dubious rectitude and fateful to all Europe when they could invoke the name of Lord Curzon, although that name had no relevance to the issue.¹ The original *Curzon Line* did not extend into Eastern Galicia, so that the Poles could conclude nothing from the *Declaration* with regard to the future of Lemberg. In effect

¹ Criticism of the “Polish settlement” was confined to a few Members of Parliament. Only one member of the Government, Mr. Henry Strauss, resigned on the Polish issue. The daily press was, almost without exception, unaware of the gravity of what had been done. The public, on the whole, was indifferent.

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the *Declaration* confirmed, with insignificant modification, the act of spoliation perpetrated by Russia in connivance with the common enemy at the expense of an ally. And, by masterly political craftsmanship, Russia manœuvred Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, and President Roosevelt into a position in which they were obliged to endorse, on behalf of Great Britain, what Stalin had arranged with Hitler less than four years previously.

The *Declaration* referred to the newly founded *Union of Polish Patriots* as offering "the possibility of the regeneration of Poland" and denouncing the "émigré" Polish Government in London as "incapable of establishing friendly relations with Russia" and "of organising an active struggle against the German invaders in Poland itself." The "struggle against the German invaders" was more "active" in Poland than in any other occupied country, as we have seen. Before long, this struggle was to culminate in the fiercest and most stubborn battle fought against those "invaders" in any country they occupied. This battle made the Russian Government the more determined on the destruction of the *Polish Home Army*. Had that *Army* been inefficient, had it been inwardly divided, or had there been many Communists in its ranks, it would have given the Russian Government little concern. But it was loyal to the Polish Government in London; it was drawn from all classes of the Polish people, and represented both a political as well as a military force which might be able to dispute the usurpation which Russia was preparing in Poland. The *Union of Polish Patriots* and the *Lublin Committee* represented nothing in Poland—they commanded no respect and had no authority except the authority derived from their Russian masters, they played no part in the struggle comparable with the part played by the Polish army, navy, and air-force abroad and by the *Home Army*. That is why the Polish armed forces abroad and its commanders

had to be discredited as *reactionaries* and Fascists; that is why the *Home Army* had to be destroyed and the *Legitimate Government* had to be removed. Poland had to be deprived of her armed forces, her administration, and her Government to make way for the usurpers—the successors of the Committee which gathered in the rear of the Red Army as it advanced on Warsaw more than twenty years before.

Poland was called upon to renounce her eastern territories, but she was, in the words of the Russian *Declaration*, to receive as “compensation”—“ancient Polish lands which were wrested from her by the Germans,” and so to “unite the whole Polish people” and secure “an outlet to the Baltic Sea.” “Ancient lands” which had been “wrested from her by the Germans” were restored to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants as determined by plebiscites. Poland had an “outlet to the Baltic Sea”—Gdynia, and, with certain restrictions, Danzig. Events were soon to show that “lands . . . wrested from her by the Germans” was a phrase covering extensive annexations, unjustifiable by any historical, ethnographical, and juridical arguments, wholly incompatible with the declared principles of the Allied Powers, and far exceeding the demands of the legitimate Polish Government which were limited to the annexation of East Prussia and Upper Silesia.

The British Government tried to convince the Polish Government in London that it must come to terms with Russia and that it could only hope to do so—and, indeed, return to Warsaw when the war was over—if it accepted the *Curzon Line* and the “compensation” that had been offered. The Polish Government were divided. Mr. Mikolajczyk, who had succeeded General Sikorski as Prime Minister, believed that if the offers were rejected, Poland would lose not only her eastern territories, but her independence—not only something, but everything—whereas, if she accepted the offer, she might be able to retain the city of Lemberg and

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survive as an independent State. Mr. Mikolajczyk believed that Great Britain would honour her pledges, that the independence of Poland was an interest, perhaps even a major interest, of Great Britain's, and that Poland could count on sustained British support if she at once made the heavy sacrifice that was demanded. Mr. Mikolajczyk's opponents were convinced that nothing could be gained by making the sacrifice, that the extinction of Polish national independence would only be accelerated, and that some stand must at last be made somehow, somewhere, and by someone against what was clearly becoming a Russian incursion deep into Europe—something that far transcended the "Polish problem," and that Poland, who had said "No" to Germany, must also say "No" to Russia, although the immediate consequences to herself would be calamitous, in 1944 as in 1939. Perhaps nothing could be saved—and certainly nothing could be saved by compromise (so the opponents of Mr. Mikolajczyk maintained)—except national honour, while refusal would set an example to future generations against that time when Poland would rise again.

On the 15th December 1944 Mr. Churchill clinched the matter in the House of Commons as we have seen.¹ He was convinced that the *Declaration* represented "the settled policy of the Soviet Union," and left no doubt at all that it had his support and would have the support of Great Britain. Then he said:

"Here I may remind the House that we ourselves have never in the past guaranteed, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, any particular frontier line of Poland. We did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920. The British view in 1919 stands expressed in the so-called

¹ What Mr. Churchill said on the 22nd of February, with regard to the conference held at Teheran and the subsequent negotiation in Moscow, he repeated on the 15th of December 1944.

'Curzon Line' which attempted to deal, at any rate practically, with the problem. I have always held the opinion that all questions of territorial settlement and readjustment shall stand over until the end of the war, and that the victorious Powers should arrive at formal and final agreements pending the articulation of Europe as a whole. . . . I cannot feel that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her western frontiers goes beyond limit of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the north and west. . . .

"I must . . . say . . . speaking on behalf of His Majesty's Government in a way which I believe would probably be held binding by our successors, that at the Conference [*i.e.* the Peace Conference after the war] we shall adhere to the lines which I am now unfolding to the House and shall not hesitate to proclaim that the Russians are justly treated, and rightly treated, in being granted the claim they make to the Eastern Frontiers along the Curzon Line."

Mr. Churchill's speech on the 15th of December 1944 represents the final capitulation of Great Britain in the Polish question—final, because all subsequent decisions merely confirmed what Mr. Churchill had accepted at Teheran. Marshal Stalin had confronted Mr. Churchill with a series of *faits accomplis* which, together, produced this result. Not one of these *faits accomplis* was Mr. Churchill able to undo or even to modify. And, having been outmanœuvred by an opponent so much craftier than himself, he confronted the House of Commons with the final *fait accompli*. The House endorsed the annexation of Eastern Poland, the annexation of extensive territories at the expense of Germany, the end of the legitimate Polish Government and of Polish independence.

Mr. Churchill, in his speeches on the 22nd of February and

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15th of December 1944, withheld a matter of some importance, indeed of great importance. He spoke of rights and wrongs, but either in terms so general as to have little or no meaning, or in terms which, although specific, were based on a misreading of history. He made no attempt to reconcile what had been done with existing declarations, promises, assurances, pledges, both general and specific—in particular, with a specific assurance given to Poland by Great Britain in the *Agreement of Mutual Assistance*.

This *Agreement* pledged Great Britain to assist Poland if she found herself at war with Germany. But attached to the main text was a *Secret Protocol*, specifically referred to as “an integral part of the *Agreement* itself.”¹

Under *Article 6* of the *Agreement*, Great Britain and Poland were pledged to inform one another of any new “undertakings of assistance which they have already given or may give to other States” (par. 1). They also agreed that “any new undertakings by either party shall neither limit their obligations” under the *Agreement*, nor indirectly create new obligations between the contracting parties not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned (par. 3).

When, in 1939, the *Agreement* was negotiated there was uncertainty—and great anxiety—about the intentions of Russia.² The purpose of *Article 6* was clearly to preclude any “undertakings” between Poland and Russia that might be incompatible with the interests of Great Britain or between Great Britain and Russia that might be incompatible with the interests of Poland. Under *Article 3* of the *Protocol*, “undertakings” referred to in *Article 6* of the *Agreement* must “be so framed that their execution shall at no time

¹ The existence of this *Protocol* was disclosed by Mr. Petherick, the Member for Penryn and Falmouth, in the House of Commons on the 28th of February 1945. The text was published as a *White Paper* (Cmd. 6615) on the 5th of August 1945.

² v. the speech by Lord Halifax from which I have quoted.

prejudice either the sovereignty or territorial inviolability of the other contracting party." It is true that the word "frontier" does not occur in the *Protocol*, but the expression "territorial inviolability" cannot mean anything other than the inviolability of the frontiers, so that when Mr. Churchill said that "we ourselves have never in the past guaranteed, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, any particular frontier line of Poland," he was hardly candid, for Great Britain had, under *Article 3* of the *Protocol*, pledged herself to refrain from precisely such "new undertakings" with a third Power, which Mr. Churchill had negotiated with Russia, "undertakings" distinctly "prejudicial" to the "territorial inviolability" of Poland because they shifted her eastern frontier so far westward as to deprive her of more than one-third of her territory.

It is possible to violate the sovereignty of a country without violating the frontiers. The sovereignty can be changed or usurped by internal revolution managed from outside. Poland could have become a Russian dependency without any change of frontiers. *Article 3* of the *Protocol* shows that in 1939 the British and Polish Governments recognised the twofold danger that threatened Poland: the danger to her sovereignty (and therefore to her independence) by internal revolution, and the danger to her frontiers (and therefore to her territorial inviolability). Both dangers had threatened her again and again throughout her history, usually in organic connection with one another, so that as her territories were reduced her sovereignty was reduced also, until she existed no longer as an independent State. Against this twofold danger she was specifically guaranteed by Great Britain in 1939. To this twofold danger she was abandoned by Great Britain despite the pledges given at Teheran in 1943. The conferences that followed—Moscow, Yalta, and Potsdam—endorsed this abandonment.

At Teheran, Marshal Stalin seemed ready to negotiate

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with the Polish Government, but made it clear that a few members of the *Union of Polish Patriots* would have to join it.¹ Neither Mr. Churchill nor President Roosevelt appear to have made any objection (or, if they did, the objection was overruled), although it should have been evident to them that they were asked to admit the Trojan Horse in modern form.

In July 1944 Russian troops crossed the *Curzon Line* and, on the 22nd of that month, formed the *Polish Committee of National Liberation*, with men drawn from the *Union of Polish Patriots*. This *Committee* was controlled by Polish Communists who, as such, were under the control of the Russian Government. It became the *de facto* Government of the Polish territories occupied by the Russian army west of the *Curzon Line*. It established itself at Lublin and came to be known as the *Lublin Committee*.

Towards the end of July the citizens of Warsaw heard the artillery fire of the advancing Russian army. The German civilians began to leave the city, the German newspapers ceased to appear, and the German wireless closed down. The Red Army approached the suburbs of Praga on the right bank of the Vistula. The Germans withdrew to the left bank. On the 30th of July, at 3 p.m., the *Kosciuszko Wireless Station*, which was under Russian control, broadcast the following exhortation:

Warsaw is shaking with the roar of guns. The Soviet armies are driving on and are already near Praga. They are coming to us to bring us deliverance.

The Germans, driven from Praga, will try to defend themselves in Warsaw and will wish to destroy everything. In Bialystok they destroyed everything for six days. They murdered thousands of our brothers. Let us do everything so that this is not repeated in Warsaw.

Inhabitants of Warsaw! To arms! Let the whole

¹ Kulski, *op. cit.*, p. 681.

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population rally round the KRN,¹ round the Warsaw Underground Army, and attack the Germans! Prevent the Germans from destroying buildings. Help the Red Army to cross the Vistula, give information to show the way.

The million and more inhabitants of Warsaw should become an army a million strong which will win deliverance and drive out the German conquerors.

This transmission was repeated at 8.55 p.m., at 9.55 p.m., and at 11.00 p.m. on the 30th of July. At 8.15 p.m. on the same day the Moscow Wireless Station broadcast similar messages in the Polish tongue:

. . . For Warsaw, which did not yield, but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived . . . by direct active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, in its houses, factories, and stores, we not only accelerate the moment of final liberation, but also save the nation's property and the lives of our brothers.

The Gestapo, which remained in Warsaw, began to execute Polish prisoners and threatened to deport the entire male population for labour at the front.

Plans for an armed rising in Warsaw had been prepared in September 1943 and had been submitted to the Allied Powers. These plans were elaborated in July 1944. On the 31st of that month Mr. Mikolajczyk, who was in Moscow, informed Mr. Molotov that the rising was about to begin. It began at 5 p.m. that same day.

General Bór-Komorowski, the Commander in Chief of the *Home Army*, who directed the operations in the city, sent a request for aid to Moscow. The request was forwarded by the British authorities on the 2nd of August. On the same day Marshal Stalin informed Mr. Mikolajczyk that he expected the Red Army to occupy Warsaw on the 6th

¹ *Krajowa Rada Narodowa*, the central organisation of the Communist *Polish Workers' Party* (PPR).

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of August. On the 3rd Mr. Mikolajczyk asked Stalin to help the *Home Army*.

A Russian liaison officer, Captain Kalugin, arrived in Warsaw on the 5th and sent a report, full of praise for the *Home Army*, to Moscow. The report was forwarded by the British authorities.¹

On the 10th of August the British authorities forwarded, through their military mission in London, a list of places in and around Warsaw where arms and ammunition could be dropped for the *Home Army* by the Red Air Force. More detailed information of this nature was forwarded on the 12th and 16th of August. But there was no response of any sort from the Russians.

The fighting in Warsaw was extremely violent and the *Home Army* was getting desperately short of ammunition. But by the middle of August it had taken whole quarters of the city by storm. About the middle of September it established operational contact with the Red Army which had entered Praga. On the 24th of September General Bór-Komorowski issued a *communiqué* stating that there were Russian liaison officers with the *Home Army* which was in direct wireless communication with the Russian command on the right bank of the river, and that Polish observers were directing Russian artillery fire.

The Russians not only gave no help, but, until the 18th of September, they refused the American request for the use of landing-grounds, so that no shuttle-service of aeroplanes which could bring help to the *Home Army* from Italy was possible. British, South African, and Polish airmen flew from Italy, dropped supplies for the *Home Army* in Warsaw, and flew back without landing, a distance of nearly 1800 miles.

General Bór-Komorowski ordered units of the *Home Army* in different parts of Poland to fight their way through

¹ The *Home Army* was in constant wireless communication with London.

to the capital and, if possible, bring food. Thereupon the *Lublin Committee* showed its hand. Zymierski, the Commander in Chief of the *Union of Polish Patriots*, assuming the title of Commander in Chief of all the Polish armed forces, gave orders that detachments of the *Home Army* that were making their way to Warsaw should be disarmed and that their officers should be arrested.

The *Home Army*, opposed by superior numbers of the German army, by dive-bombers, by armour, and by immensely superior weight of metal, and denied all help except the restricted amount that could be flown from Italy, had to evacuate street after street.

A little Russian help came in the second half of September. It was both too little and too late, but it enabled Zymierski to extol the help given by the Red Army (which was not a mile off) and deride the help given by the Royal Air Force from bases nearly 900 miles away.

The insurrection collapsed on the 2nd of October 1944 after lasting for 63 days. General Bór-Komorowski was taken prisoner by the Germans.¹

Warsaw is an important railway junction and it was a reasonable expectation that the rising, so near the front of battle, would help the Russian army to enter the city. It was also a reasonable expectation, on the part of the Polish *Home Army*, that if it were master of Warsaw when the Russian army entered it would be the legitimate and representative authority in Warsaw, because it owed allegiance to the legitimate Polish Government. The Polish Government in London could be transferred to Warsaw in a day by aeroplane, and the Polish State, which went to war against the common foe on the 1st of September 1939, would be re-established in its own capital, with its constitutional government and its own army at home and abroad. In

¹ The casualties of the *Home Army* in Warsaw are estimated at 120,000. The German casualties were heavy, but no figures are known.

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brief, Poland, the true Poland, would have been restored at last.

No longer would the Polish Government, in its dealings with Russia, have to rely only on treaties, promises, and declarations of principle; no longer would members of that Government have to wait and watch how Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were outmanœuvred by Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov; no longer would they endeavour, again and again, and utterly in vain, to enlighten the two British statesmen who groped, as it were, in semi-darkness or to correct those misconceptions of history in which they were constantly reinforced by their experts who belonged to a world that had been dead some twenty years and more. Poland, restored, would be weak compared with the immense power of Russia. But she might have a chance. When Germany capitulated, there was widespread disintegration in the Russian army. A frenzy of looting, incendiarism, rape, and indiscipline swept over Eastern Europe. For a united, disciplined, independent Poland there would have been just a chance. It was, therefore, not in the interest of Russia that the armed rising in Warsaw should succeed. The rising was, therefore, doomed.

Why did the Russian wireless exhort the inhabitants of Warsaw to rise?

It is significant that the exhortation was addressed specifically to the KRN, the *People's National Council*, which was the central committee of the Polish Communist Party, which went under the name of the *Polish Workers' Party* (PPR).

If the Polish Communists were to rise in arms, they would show the world that they, and not the *Home Army*, were the Polish nation; that the *Lublin Committee*, and not the Government in London, were the representatives of the Polish people. And if the *Home Army* rose in arms also, there would be a rivalry, perhaps even a conflict. In that case, the Russian army would intervene and "liberate"

the "workers" of Warsaw—that is to say, the Communists—not only from the Germans, but also from the *reactionaries* and *Fascists* of the *Home Army*, and from western capitalism and imperialism, and its *lackey*, the Polish Government in London. A Communist Government would then be established in Warsaw which would be joined by the *Lublin Committee* and Poland would be a Russian dependency forthwith as though by the will of the Polish workers themselves.

But the rising was carried out exclusively by the *Home Army* under the leadership of General Bór-Komorowski. It was immediately shown that the Communists counted for nothing. There were only two forces in Warsaw—the German army and the *Home Army*.

Although the rising failed, it had nevertheless made a deep impression even in Great Britain and in the United States. There was a danger that it would give truth to a legend, the legend of Warsaw, inspired by fervent patriotism, and indomitable, as so often before in her history. But this legend would be a national legend—it would have no connection with Communism, with the *Lublin Committee*, or with the Russian liberator. It was necessary, so that Poland might be subjugated morally, as well as politically, that the rising and its leader be discredited, that the legend be poisoned at the source, that it should never effloresce in Polish folk-song and literature, and never become an inspiring example to future generations.

The Communist press began to disparage the rising almost as soon as its true character became evident. The *London Daily Worker*, on the 14th of August 1944, condemned it as

“a tragic political game, staged by the extreme Polish reactionaries in London.”

The Russian press and wireless began to transfer the responsibility for the rising to the Polish Government in

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London. On the 13th of August, TASS, the Russian Telegraphic Agency, referred to "a revolt begun in Warsaw on the 1st of August by order of the Polish émigrés in London," and accused those responsible for the "revolt" of failure to "co-ordinate the result with the Soviet High Command." On the 23rd of August a spokesman of the *Union of Polish Patriots* spoke as follows on the Moscow wireless:

The reactionary gang of Sosnkowski and Raczkiewicz [the President of the Polish Republic, residing in London] intended to make a political business of the blood being shed in Warsaw in order to show they have influence in Poland. . . . Sosnkowski, Bór, and their civilian advisers in Poland and abroad, had only one aim—to worsen Polish-Soviet relations. . . .¹

It became necessary to represent the *Union of Polish Patriots* as the real heroes and as the true liberators of Poland with the Red Army. While the *Home Army* was fighting in Warsaw, the *Union of Polish Patriots* was inactive with the Red Army at Praga, only a few miles off. The gradual process by which the truth was reversed can be seen in the articles and broadcasts of the Russian and Russian-controlled press and wireless during the months that followed. On the 17th of January the wireless station at Lublin transmitted the following:

While the Polish Army [*i.e.* men from the *Union of Polish Patriots* serving with the Red Army] was shedding its blood, fighting for Praga, Count Bór-Komorowski, Commander of the so-called *Home Army*, at the order of the reactionary chief abroad [*i.e.* General Sosnkowski, whose headquarters were in London], surrendered to the Germans. His misplaced rising and subsequent surrender of arms considerably helped the Germans.

¹ v. R. Umiastowski, *Poland, Russia, and Great Britain*, p. 290.

While the Polish soldier [*i.e.* members of the same Union] was fighting for Poland's freedom, bandits of national [*i.e.* reactionary] forces in agreement with the Germans and the *Home Army* murdered the best sons of the Polish people.¹

In this way the rising was represented as an armed conspiracy in which the *Home Army* connived with the Germans to destroy the flower of the Polish nation.

When the Germans had withdrawn from Warsaw, officers of the *Home Army* and members of the Polish *underground* administration emerged and established contact with officers of the Red Army. Many were arrested, more were executed. As an organisation the *Home Army* was suppressed and dispersed by the Russian authorities. Remnants that rallied to maintain some sort of cohesion were hunted down as bandits and exterminated.

In territory occupied by the Red Army, deportations of Poles to camps, prisons, and places of exile in Russia were resumed.

In October 1944 Mr. Churchill went to Moscow, taking Mr. Mikolajczyk with him. Mr. Mikolajczyk tried to save the city of Lemberg for Poland, but in vain. He was even willing to include a few Communists in the Polish Government, but insisted that they should not be a majority. But the *Committee of National Liberation* demanded control of the Government. The *Committee*, which could count absolutely upon Russia, was already a power, a far stronger power, in fact, than the Polish Government, which could count but little upon Mr. Churchill, and upon President Roosevelt hardly at all. Mr. Mikolajczyk returned to London and tried to persuade his Government to accept the *Curzon Line*, with "compensation," and to admit members of the *Committee*. The Polish Government refused. It resigned, but was replaced by another Government, with

¹ R. Umiastowski, *Poland, Russia, and Great Britain*, p. 405.

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Mr. Arciszewski, a Socialist and an old revolutionary who had spent years in Tsarist prisons, as Prime Minister. Mr. Arciszewski's Government was just as uncompromising.

In December 1944 the Russian Government allowed the *National Committee of Liberation* to call itself the *Provisional Polish Government*. On the 2nd of January 1945 the *Committee* held a *National Council* at Lublin. The speeches were broadcast to the world that same day. The Prime Minister, as he was called even then, Osobka Morawski, denounced the Polish Government in London as one of "united Fascists" and accused Mr. Mikolajczyk of complicity in the "murder of Polish democrats by terrorists." As for the *Home Army*, he declared that it was "moving more and more closely into a league with the Germans," and warned all those who persisted in "reactionary and terrorist practices" that they could not expect "indulgence or mercy." General Rola Zymierski, who had commanded the *Union of Polish Patriots*, was officially proclaimed "Commander in Chief of all the armed forces of the Polish Republic."

On the 5th of January 1945 Russia recognised the *Committee* as the *Provisional Government* of Poland and exchanged envoys. This act of recognition merely confirmed *de jure* the status already conferred *de facto* upon the *Committee* by the Russian Government. The *Committee* had already concluded treaties with Federal States of the Soviet Union; it had already been entrusted by Russia with the administration of the "liberated territories" west of the *Curzon Line*, and had already prepared plans for the political, social, and economic reconstruction of the new Poland.¹ In the "liberated territories" the *Provisional Government*, assisted

¹ As far back as September 1944 the *Communications Department* of the *Committee* announced its programme for the railways. All railways in the liberated territories were to be taken over by the *Committee*, and narrow-gauge lines were to be replaced by wide-gauge lines (so as to co-ordinate the Polish with the Russian transport system). *Radio Polskie Lublin*, 20th of Sept. 1944, 7.30 p.m.

by the Red Army and the NKVD, exercised a reign of terror, destroying what was left of the *Home Army* by the double process of physical suppression and moral defamation.

This *Polish Government* was not at all to Mr. Churchill's and Mr. Eden's liking. It filled Mr. Churchill with misgiving. He put the blame for its existence on the Polish Government in London. Mr. Eden, speaking in the House of Commons on the 28th of February 1945, said:

"Whether we like or dislike the Lublin Committee—and personally I dislike it—for the moment it is the authority which is functioning there in fulfilling the requirements of the Russian military authorities."

This was true enough, but what were these "requirements"? They were the "requirements" of Russian foreign policy—they were all that was needed to turn the Polish Republic into a Russian Protectorate.

It would, continued Mr. Eden, take some time—"it may take weeks, it may take months"—to form a new Polish Government. During that time, he said, Russia would "continue to recognise the Lublin Government" (even Mr. Eden was calling it a Government by then), while Great Britain and the United States would "continue to recognise" the Polish Government in London. The two "Governments" were thus placed on the same level. Russia had again had her way. On the 26th of July the *Lublin Committee*—that is to say, the *Provisional Government*—became, by undergoing some slight modifications, the Government of the Polish Republic *de jure* and *de facto*, while the Governments of Great Britain and the United States withdrew recognition *de jure* and *de facto* from the legitimate Government of that Republic without any regard for relevant principles of international law.¹

¹ If the Rule of Law means anything at all, recognition of a foreign government cannot be granted or withdrawn at will to suit the purpose of this or that policy. It must be subject to objectively ascertainable legal criteria. v. H. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law, passim*.

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A word must be said about the "compensation" awarded to Poland—or, rather, forced upon her—for the loss of her eastern territories. The Russian contention with regard to the *Curzon Line* was, as we have seen, unhistorical. It was a misrepresentation, but it served a purpose. What purpose? To Poland, her territory east of the *Line* meant much: it meant about a third of the country, with a large population of fellow countrymen, with many important and cherished places, of which two, Lemberg and Vilna, were university towns and old centres of Polish learning; a territory rich in resources which had been greatly developed during the last twenty years. But compared with the immensity of Russia, it was as nothing at all. Why did Russia want it? And why did she offer Poland "compensation"? If Poland had no right (according to the Russian contention which Mr. Churchill had accepted) to her eastern territories, why was she entitled to "compensation" at the expense of Germany who had every right, including even the shaky right conferred by the declared principles of the Allied Powers, to the territories with which Poland was to be "compensated"? The answer was that Russia had only a minor interest in Eastern Poland, but a major interest in Eastern Germany. By annexing Eastern Poland, which meant little to her, she was able, by calling it "compensation" for Poland, to annex Eastern Germany, for as Poland was to be a Russian Protectorate, all territory annexed by her is, in effect, Russian territory and is at the disposal of Russia for any purpose she may determine.

Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons on the 15th of December 1944 that Russia was "justly treated and rightly treated" when Eastern Poland was ceded to her. Why Mr. Churchill believed this to be so and in what moment of illumination he discovered that Poland had no right to a third of her own territory remains a puzzle. On

the 5th of September 1940 Mr. Churchill had said in the House of Commons that

“we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war, unless they take place with the free consent and goodwill of the parties concerned.”

And yet, on the 15th of December 1944, he proposed to recognise “territorial changes” at the expense of an ally and of an enemy, and without “the free consent and goodwill” of either.

While Russia also flouted principles, promises, pledges and treaties, she at least did so under the overriding principles of Communism, and in the successful advancement of her own interests which she identified with those of mankind, whereas Great Britain gained nothing by her disregard for principles and pledges. It is arguable that she could not have saved Polish independence in any case, though there can be no certainty in such a matter. But she allowed herself to be manœuvred into position after position that made her the accomplice of Russia in the destruction of that independence. Had Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden said: “No, we are sorry, we cannot accept this,” had they invoked the declared principles of the Allied Powers, the Treaty of Alliance with Poland, and the many assurances they themselves had given in the House of Commons, neither they nor their country—nor Poland—would have been the losers. By taking a more honourable course, they would have been in a stronger position not only with regard to Russia but with regard to the United States. They would not have served British and Polish interests less well, and might have served them better. They might have averted at least something of present wrongs and of future evils. Even those who hold it justifiable upon occasion to sacrifice honour to interest will hardly maintain that honour should

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be sacrificed when to do so will not serve interest in any manner.

Russia, indifferent to considerations of honour as understood in the western world, pursued a policy which Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden never seemed to understand until it was too late. One is compelled to wonder whether they ever asked themselves what the reason for this or that Russian demand may have been—such as the demand for the *Curzon Line* and “compensation” on Poland’s behalf.

By obtaining “compensation” for Poland, Russia not only obtained German territory for herself, as I have explained, she also increased her own power over Poland and her bargaining power with the Germany of the future, indeed with all Europe, with Great Britain, and with the United States. Even if the Poles were to defy the arrests, executions, terrorism, censorship, disfranchisement, and fraudulent elections, which today are their lot, they could hardly brave Russia if she threatened them with the loss of her western territories—a loss which would reduce her to the wretched fragment of a State, resembling the *General Government*, that *Reservation*, as it were, for a dying helot race. There is no conceivable authority in Poland that would venture to brave such a threat, unless Russia were involved in so disruptive a crisis that the Poles, having preserved, it may be, that instinctive unity that has again and again saved their nation, could reassert their independence and retake the eastern territories of which they have been deprived.

On the other hand, if Russia reverts to that German policy which has been hers several times in the past, she will be able to offer Germany the return of those territories which were ceded as “compensation” to Poland. No representative German Government could accept the permanent loss of those territories.

By agreeing to the *Curzon Line* and to “compensation” for Poland, Great Britain brought the atomic bomb within

rocket range of London and gave Russia a commanding political, economic, and strategic position in Europe—a position Great Britain was to reinforce by surrendering to Russia that other great strategic position in Europe, Yugoslavia.

When, in 1939, Poland took up arms against Germany, she fought for Europe and the security of the British Empire, as well as for herself. When she opposed the demands and exactions of Russia, with the only weapons at her disposal—her national unity, her national honour, and (frail weapons!) the pledges and promises of her allies—she also fought for Europe, for the security of the British Empire. Against Germany she did not fight alone, but against Russia she fought a lonely, unarmed, losing fight.

With the loss of Polish independence, much more was lost, as events today show plainly, and will show more plainly still.

Chapter Four

GALE OF THE WORLD

I

YUGOSLAVIA, the Kingdom of the Southern Slavs (the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes) was invaded by German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armies and by Albanian irregulars. The Germans burnt, destroyed, and massacred, sparing neither undefended towns and villages, nor old men, women, and children. The Italians were generally less ruthless than the Germans. Some of the Italian commanders showed humanity upon occasion. The Bulgars, who behaved with such savagery in Greece, had a fellow-feeling for the Serbs. Thanks to the work of reconciliation promoted by King Alexander of Yugoslavia and King Boris of Bulgaria, and by the Serbian and Bulgarian Peasant Parties, the hatred that existed between the two peoples was abating. Bulgarian peasant soldiers in Serbian villages caused their commanders some concern because they would not treat the Serbian peasants ruthlessly enough.

Hungarian troops occupied a part of Serbia. They perpetrated a terrible massacre at Novi Sad. Rumania received an offer of Serbian territory from Hitler, but she declined the offer, and won the lasting gratitude of the Serbs.

Yugoslavia suffered less destruction but more cruelty from internal than from external enemies. The remnants of the Yugoslav Royal Army which rallied under Colonel (afterwards General) Drazha Mihailovitch, to form what came to be known as the *Home Army*, fought not only the foreign invaders, but also the Croat *Ustashi*¹ and *Domo-*

¹ The Croatian counterpart of the German SS.

brantsi,¹ who were supported by Germany and Italy, and with the *Partisans*, who were supported by Great Britain.

The outcome of the struggle for national independence on the side of the Allied Powers was the loss of that independence. The Yugoslav Communist Party became master of Yugoslavia with the help of Great Britain and the United States. Drazha Mihailovitch, the first man of the Second World War to hoist the flag of armed resistance in an occupied country, was abandoned to a sham trial and was executed as a traitor. The Monarchy, so greatly revered by the Serbs, was likewise abandoned. And what liberties there had been, perished under a bureaucratic absolutism closely resembling the system established in Russia. Albania suffered a similar fate.

In this way the power of Russia was extended to the Adriatic. Her domination over Central Europe, buttressed in the north by her conquest of Poland, was buttressed in the south by the conquest of Yugoslavia. She became unchallenged master of the Balkans (excepting Greece and European Turkey), and was able, without exposing herself to loss or danger, to promote the present undeclared war against Greek independence.

There had been deep dissensions between the Serbs and Croats ever since they were united under one Crown. They belong to different traditions. The Serbs entered the First World War as an independent and united nation. Their spirit of independence and their national solidarity had been hardened by their long struggle against Turkish rule and by their victories in the First and Second Balkan Wars. In the First World War they suffered more than any other of the Allied Powers. About a third of their people perished in battle, or through disease, hunger, and exposure. In the Second World War, none suffered more than they, and, even now, their sufferings are not over.

¹ The Croatian equivalent of a regular army.

The Serbs numbered 8,268,108 in 1941, or just over half the population of Yugoslavia. They are Balkan in character and outlook: dour, uncompromising, and brave. Having fought for their national independence and having created their own State, they tended to respect the State as an institution. That is why they were relatively good taxpayers and ready to make sacrifices for the State. They had a highly developed, democratic co-operative movement. They are of the Greek Orthodox Faith and tolerant in matters of religion.

The Croats numbered 3,575,894 in 1941. They are more "European" and, rightly or wrongly, consider themselves more civilised than the Serbs. They are generally more urbane, flexible, ingratiating and articulate. They are Roman Catholic and inclined to clericalism and religious intolerance. Their civilisation developed under the Hapsburgs and took on some of the polish and elegance that flourished under the Dual Monarchy.¹ As they were constantly in opposition, they had little respect for the State. The Croat co-operatives, unlike the Serbian, were autocratic. Under the leadership of Matchek, they had an almost all-embracing power in the land.

The Slovenes, numbering 1,246,228,² were also under the Hapsburgs. They were subjected to a process of Germanisation because the Pan-Germans regarded them as an obstacle in the way of the German advance on the Adriatic. The Pan-Germans were well aware of the importance of Trieste to Central Europe and, therefore, to the *Greater Germany* of the visioned future. This process of Germanisation which, in peace time, was thwarted by the stubborn re-

¹ Croatia was under Hungarian administration.

² The total population of Yugoslavia in 1941 was 16,261,125. Of these 8,218,700 were Greek Orthodox (nearly all Serbs), 5,749,745 Roman Catholics, 1,821,980 Moslems. Slovenia was made up of territories which, under the Hapsburgs, were attached to Austria. The Slovenes are nearly all Roman Catholics, but less inclined to intolerance than the Croats.

sistance of the Slovenes, was resumed, and ruthlessly so, in the Second World War. In the new Yugoslav State the Slovenes showed much adaptability, sometimes inclining towards the Serbs, sometimes to the Croats, and avoiding deep entanglement in Yugoslav internal conflicts.

King Alexander of Yugoslavia had greatness. Had he lived, he would surely have ranged Yugoslavia on the side of the Allies in the Second World War. He saw the German danger before most European statesmen saw it. His life was devoted to Balkan unity under the watchword "the Balkans for the Balkan nations." But in his effort to unite his country, he imposed a despotism which produced a deeper disunity beneath an artificial unity. On the 6th of January 1929 the Dictatorship was proclaimed. King Alexander dealt severely with all opposition, whether Serb, Croat, or Slovene, and with one object, to create a Yugoslav nation. It was natural that the Croats should regard the Dictatorship, which was exercised from Belgrade, and though administered by Croatian as well as Serbian politicians, officials, and agents, as a Serbian institution, although there were Serbs as well as Croats amongst its victims.

King Alexander, like Marshal Pilsudski, was loved and hated. When he was murdered at Marseilles by *Ustashi* (of whom we shall hear more later on), the Serbian people went into mourning. As the train, bearing the coffin, passed through the country, seemingly endless lines of peasants knelt on either side of the track, many weeping and in prayer.

After his death, there was an ever-growing German economic penetration of the Balkans. In Croatia, ideas akin to Fascism and National Socialism gained ground. Mussolini had found imitators even in the early 'twenties. There was a Yugoslav organisation known as the *Orjuna*, with members wearing black shirts and top-boots, and used chiefly for

breaking strikes and dispersing assemblies of industrial workmen. The *Veliki Chelnik* (Grand Leader) of the *Orjuna* was *Ljuba Leontitch*, a Croat, who became Marshal Tito's Ambassador in London after the Second World War.¹

Matchek, by far the most popular and powerful man in Croatia and commanding, amongst the peasantry, a devotion such as Juliu Maniu commanded in Rumania, was the leader of the *Croat Peasant Party*, the *Hrvatska Seljachka Stranka*, as well as of the co-operatives. A parallel organisation, the *Seljachka Sloga*, resembling the German *Reichsnährstand*, was created. He organised a terrorist organisation, the *Seljachka Zashtita*, which resembled the German SS. The members were armed and were posted throughout the villages. Long before the outbreak of war Matchek was the real master of Croatia. The authority of Belgrade was limited even in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, and in the countryside it existed not at all. It gained complete control over the Croatian agrarian economy. Farmers who failed to comply with its regulations concerning prices, contributions to the funds of the *Peasant Party* and so on, would find their cattle poisoned or their ricks on fire. During the war, the *Seljachka Sloga* was the chief Croatian organisation for supplying the Germans with food.

The system established in Croatia might be described as a kind of agrarian *Fascism*. Whereas the Serbs were wholeheartedly on the side of France and Great Britain, the Croats were divided. They had no great love for the Germans, but partly under duress and partly through animosity against the Serbs, they moved towards close association with Germany, thereby accelerating the Yugoslav catastrophe. When that catastrophe came, they hoped, with German help, to emerge, not triumphant, perhaps, but intact as a nation. Yugoslavia, it seemed, could not be

¹ At the time of writing, December 1947, he still holds that post.

saved, the future of the Western Powers was dark, but Croatia might, with some luck, save herself.

In March 1941 the Germans began to increase their pressure on Yugoslavia to make her fit into their plans for the conquest of Greece and for the attack on Egypt. The Greeks had a fellow-feeling for the Serbs and refused to believe that they would surrender. On the 24th of March, the Athenian wireless broadcast a message that "the Greek people" were "convinced that the brave Serbian people . . . will never let their glorious history be blackened by a deed which they would regard as a stab in the back of an ally."

On the following day, it was announced that Yugoslavia had joined the *Three Power Pact*, generally known as the *Anti-Comintern Pact*, which had been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan on the 27th of September 1940. The conditions were that she was to allow the free passage of German war-material on her main railways, running from north to south; that she was to suppress, within her own borders, all actions directed against the German coalition, and to bring her economic system into conformity with the German. She was, in other words, to become part of the German *Neuordnung*.¹ In return, she was to receive territory on the Aegean, with Salonica as her own port. The *Berliner Boersenzeitung* stated, on the 26th of March, that "Yugoslavia has been unaffected by English bluff" and that England had suffered "a diplomatic Dunkirk."

But on that same day the Serbs broke out into popular revolt against the pro-German policy of their Government. The Government itself had been divided. On the 21st of March three of the Serbian Ministers had resigned, rather than accept the German terms. But Matchek and the other Croatian Ministers were for acceptance. On the 22nd three

¹ *Neuordnung* is inadequately rendered by *New Order* (which would be *Neue Ordnung* in German). *Neuordnung* signifies reform, reorganisation, and reconstruction.

officers of the Yugoslav General Staff left for Greece to serve in the Greek Army, knowing that, whatever happened in Yugoslavia, the Greeks would fight. On the 23rd, the Orthodox Patriarch addressed a letter to Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia, urging him not to sign the *Three Power Pact*. On the 24th the Prime Minister received protests from all patriotic leagues and societies in Serbia. Five Senators of the Serbian Peasant Party resigned.

Nevertheless, on that same day, Prince Paul sent a message to Hitler with "good wishes for the further prosperity of the great German nation." Thereupon Dr. Gavrilovitch, the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow and leader of the Serbian *Peasant Party*, resigned. Fifty officers of the Yugoslav army issued a manifesto at Skoplje, calling upon the nation to revolt.

The revolt came on the 27th of March 1941. It had been organised in a few hours by General Mirkovitch. It was carried out by himself and by junior officers who responded instantaneously to his summons. At 2.20 in the morning, the Regent, Prince Paul, was deposed, the Government was overthrown, King Peter, who was only seventeen, was placed on the throne. General Mirkovitch, having done all he intended to do, disclaimed political office and transferred all power, under the King, to General Simovitch, the Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force, though he made it a condition that the Government be "democratic." On the same day, Mr. Churchill declared in the House of Commons that "the Yugoslav Nation has found its soul."

France had fallen. Russia and the United States were not in the war. England was fighting alone. There was no hope that she would save Yugoslavia from being overrun. The destruction of Warsaw and Rotterdam showed plainly what would soon befall Belgrade. Yugoslavia was deeply divided. But Serbia was not: she was united by the revolution which she alone had made. Her army was

ill-equipped, her air force consisted of a few obsolete aeroplanes. Her strategic situation was hopeless, for she was exposed to a combined German and Italian invasion from the north, the east, and the north-west. The fate of Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France would soon be hers.

But the Serbs, like the Poles, had a twofold belief that transcended the immediate future: belief in themselves and in England. On the 22nd of April 1941 Mr. Eden declared in the House of Commons that it was "the firm intention" of His Majesty's Government "to restore the independence of Yugoslavia." On the 28th and 29th of March the German wireless referred to events in Yugoslavia as the work of "schoolboys," "irresponsibles," "terrorists," and "Serbian street gangs."¹ The German Government asked, in a peremptory note, whether the Yugoslav Government recognised its signature to the *Three Power Pact* as binding.

On the 6th of April the Germans bombed Belgrade. According to an estimate of the municipality, 20,000 men, women, and children were killed in three days. On the 7th, the British Government sent a message to the revolutionary Government in Belgrade, saying "We welcome them [the Yugoslavs] as a resolute and powerful ally," and recalling "the comradeship" of the First World War. On the 5th of March a *Pact* between Yugoslavia and Russia was signed in Moscow: if either Power were to be attacked, the other was pledged "to preserve its policy of friendship."

Matchek had joined the new Government as Vice-Premier.

¹ In 1943 Danilo Gregoritch, a Yugoslav journalist and German agent, published a book on the "end" of Yugoslavia (*So endete Jugoslawien*, Wilhelm Goldman, Leipzig). The book shows wide knowledge of Yugoslavia and considerable, though limited, insight. Gregoritch, who was "in touch with everyone" and reported personally to Hitler, was completely surprised by the events of the 27th of March. In his book he attributes these events to "a small group of politicians and soldiers without conscience," to "irresponsibles" (p. 5), to persons who "destroyed a State and a nation" (p. 254).

It was believed that if he were excluded, Croatia would secede. Home Rule was granted to Croatia on the 1st of April. But the rupture was not averted and, on the 10th of April, a new Dictator appeared in Zagreb. This was the *Poglavnik* (Leader) Ante Pavelitch, who commanded the terrorist *Ustashi*. He seized power and, on the 16th of April, declared that Croatia was independent and "not part of another State."

The Yugoslav Revolution had taken two opposite directions. In Serbia it was democratic and for Great Britain. In Croatia it was anti-democratic and for the German-Italian coalition.

On the 15th of May Croatia was declared a Kingdom, and on the 18th the Duke of Spoleto was proclaimed future King. Pavelitch, supported by the invading Italian forces, remained Dictator under the new Monarchy. When the first German tanks passed through the streets of Zagreb, they were cheered by the crowds.¹

The new Yugoslav Government showed considerable weakness. The order of mobilisation was delayed, chiefly by differences of opinion between Matchek and the Serb Ministers. The army could offer no organised resistance against the rapidly advancing enemy, who had a vastly superior armament. The Croat troops deserted *en masse*. A retrospective article, which appeared in the *Nova Hrvatska* (New Croatia), a journal controlled by Pavelitch, on the 25th of December 1942, related with pride how these desertions helped to bring on the collapse of Yugoslavia:

"The Serbs now say it was the Croats who betrayed them. They are quite right. We have indeed betrayed them.' The Croats, who 'represented the most intellectual, cultural, and civilised section of the Yugoslav army . . . were actually the backbone of disobedience, sabotage, and defeatism. . . . All important positions in

¹ This I have from an eyewitness and from photographs.

companies, battalions, and regiments were in the hands of Croats because they were the true representatives of order and culture.' Amongst the engineers, mechanics, sappers, telephonists, and wireless operators, the Croats were in a majority 'because of their high intellectual and cultural standard. . . . Such a situation gave the Croats the very chance they wanted, to participate, along with the German forces, in breaking up the Balkan front. . . . Purely from the offensive point of view, the glory must go to the German army. The other part, however, the revolutionary, destructive part from within, was played entirely by the Croats. They took care that nothing was in order, that during battle nothing was in its place . . . that nothing went the right way, that no one received correct information. . . . This was the big and decisive part the Croats have played in breaking up the Balkan front. The Croats excelled in the execution of this part. The Croats disobeyed orders, wrecked communications, spread panic, purposely missed the target, destroyed tanks and guns . . . disarmed wild, disorderly Serb multitudes. . . . The Croats were the only people in this war . . . who destroyed the Balkan battlefield from inside while the German army fought outside. . . . Thus great deeds were accomplished by Germans and Croats together. We can proudly say that we succeeded in breaking the nation [the Serbs] which, after the English, is the most thick-headed, the most stubborn, and the most stupid.'"

The article ends with an apostrophe to the Croat divisions which fought under German operational command in Russia:

"We are a small nation, but a brave one. We could not send as many divisions to the eastern front as powerful Germany could, but what we have sent is the best. The Russians call our airmen, soldiers, and sailors 'devils' because they shoot and destroy like devils. . . . The part the Croats have played in breaking up Yugoslavia is revealed by her final collapse, while our deeds on the

eastern front are revealed by the Iron Crosses which Hitler has awarded to our soldiers, sailors, and airmen."

One of the recipients of these Iron Crosses was Colonel Franya Pirts. He deserted from the Yugoslav army during the German advance and was appointed *corps commander* in the *Ustashi*. When the Germans invaded Russia, he was transferred to the Russian front where he commanded a unit of the Croat Air Force. He received the *Order of King Zvonimir* from Pavelitch. From the Germans he received the *Ritterkreuz des eisernen Kreuzes*. In February 1944 he joined the *Partisans*, was promoted to the rank of General by Tito, and placed in command of the *Partisan* air-force, a command he still holds. On the 15th of October 1945 he received the *Order of Kutusov* by a Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.¹

Croatia, despite her services to the Italian cause, had to cede a part of her coastal area to Italy. But she received compensation from the Germans. Under the agreement signed at Zagreb on the 13th of May 1941 she was allowed to annex the whole of Bosnia and Hertsegovina and a part of Dalmatia. She called herself *Greater Croatia* and declared war against Great Britain and the United States on the 14th of December 1941.

The Slovenes remained loyal to Yugoslavia, with the result that Slovenia was partitioned between Germany (who took the largest share), Italy, and Hungary. As for the rest of Yugoslavia, Italy annexed the greater part of Dalmatia; Bulgaria annexed part of Southern and Eastern Serbia and the greater part of Macedonia; Hungary annexed the rich districts between the Danube and the Tisza. Rumania, as we have seen, declined the territory that was offered to her.

¹ *Hrvatska Krila*, the journal of the Croat Air Force, published a photograph of Colonel Pirts (Pirc) in the uniform of the *Luftwaffe* on the 10th of April 1942. The announcement that he had received the Order of Kutusov by a Decree of the Supreme Soviet was published in *Politika*, Belgrade, on the 21st of October 1945. A photograph of this announcement appears in David Martin's *Ally Betrayed*.

The Germans established a *Puppet Government* in Belgrade under General Milan Neditch, a former Minister of War, on the 30th of August 1941. Except for the activities of a few bands of *guerrilleros*, the war in Yugoslavia seemed to be over. The Germans imposed order by pitiless repression. Whole villages and townships were destroyed. Many of the men were shot, even if they had not carried arms. Women were deported to serve in *Labour Corps* or in German brothels. Outside the town of Kragujevats twelve German soldiers were attacked and killed by an armed band. On the 21st of October 1941 the Germans massacred thousands of the inhabitants as a reprisal.¹ Amongst the victims were all the boys of a school, with their masters. They were marched off, ranged against a wall, and shot. Some of the smaller boys hardly knew what was happening. Others, in their terror, held their school-books in front of their faces as though to ward off the German bullets. In February 1942, at Novi Sad, Hungarian troops rounded up the Serbian and Jewish inhabitants, who were herded towards the river in a long queue. As the foremost men, women, and children reached the bank, they were killed by Hungarian machine-gunners. It is estimated that over 450 persons lost their lives.² The Germans made it a rule to execute from fifty to three hundred Serbs for every German who was killed.³

Of the 80,000 Jews in Yugoslavia, none seem to have

¹ Estimates of the total number of people shot by the Germans at Kragujevats vary between 3400 and 6000 (*v. Martin, op. cit., p. 25*).

² I have the account from a survivor of the massacre.

³ It is not certain that this rule was always carried out. Much depended on the character of the local German commander. The Germans widely publicised their threats so as to inspire terror, and some of their commanders seem to have placed more reliance on threats than on deeds. It is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to substantiate figures of massacres. It does not appear that the Hungarians perpetrated any further massacres after the massacre at Novi Sad which caused some stir in the Hungarian Parliament, showing that Hungary was not a "totalitarian" State. As far as I am aware, no Croats were killed in German reprisals.

survived except a few thousand who were in Italian concentration camps and a few hundred who were rescued from their German escorts by detachments under orders from General Mihailovitch. In December 1941 the remnant of the Jewish population of Belgrade, some 4300 women and children, were exposed for several days to the bitter cold in the open market-place and left without food. Many perished during those days. The younger women were then sent away to an unknown destination. The rest—children and older women—were destroyed in gas-chambers. The harmless Gypsies of Serbia were exterminated by the Germans.¹

II

In Bosnia and Hertsegovina the Serbs were just under half the population, that is to say, about 49 per cent., when the war began. About 15 per cent. were Croats, the remainder Moslems. Having annexed the two provinces, the Croats decided upon the extermination or absorption of the Serbian inhabitants. Fortified by their alliance with the Germans, and having at their disposal the *Ustashi*, who as terrorists and executioners vied with the SS, they massacred, expelled, or forcibly converted the Serbs. By becoming a convert to Roman Catholicism, a Serb would cease to be a member of the Orthodox Serbian community and was, therefore, a Serb no longer. The number of conversions was small,² the number of massacred Serbs was enormous. The estimates differ widely. Some observers believe it to have been as high as 600,000.³ The Serbs who

¹ The extermination of the Gypsies of South-Eastern Europe was one of the most ignoble of German crimes. As far as I am aware, it was ignored by the outside world. The Gypsies had no international organisation, no press, and no spokesmen to intercede on their behalf or arraign their murderers.

² Apparently about 200,000.

³ It may have been even more. The evidence was collected and collated with great care, but was never completed.

were not massacred or converted were expelled, if they had not taken flight already. In the region occupied by the Hungarians, the Serbs were a majority. All were expelled. The Bulgars expelled more than 100,000, perhaps as many as 150,000, Serbs from Macedonia.

Into Serbia, therefore, a country much impoverished and reduced in size, there poured a multitude of uprooted and completely destitute people, most of them peasants.

The Serbs had overthrown the domination of the Turks. They had played a big part in overthrowing the Empire of the Hapsburgs. In 1941 they were again at war, and with a coalition that seemed much stronger than the enemy in 1914. Their means were wretchedly inadequate. The Croats had been liberated from the rule of the Hapsburgs by the Allied and Associated Powers, but were now engaged in spoliation and massacre on the side of the present and former enemy. Yugoslavia, the State which embodied the national idea for which all these sacrifices had been made, was in pieces. The sacrifice had been too great and had, it seemed, been made in vain. The national idea began to lose its hold, while, among the stricken, dispossessed, and abandoned peasantry of a defeated, disintegrating country, the social idea gathered strength. Of peace there was no prospect, and, as there was no chance of survival except through war, class-war seemed to offer some hope when war between nations seemed the end of all hope.

The Yugoslav Communists were against the war with Germany. They had denounced the "alliance with British Imperialism," and they had helped to promote the dissolution of the armed forces. Early in 1940 their journal *Communist* had written that

"no danger threatens the Balkans except from London and Paris—war on the side of London and Paris means subjection to western imperialism. The great historic part the Communist Parties have played in the Balkans is

that they have created and still continue to arouse resistance by the wide masses to the imperialist war.”¹

A little later, the *Communist* stated:

“The war-mongers of London and Paris, assisted by the Social Democratic lackeys of capital, are straining every effort to involve other nations in the war and are preparing to fall upon the Soviet Union. . . . Our rulers are preparing to drive Yugoslavia to the slaughterhouse in the interests of the English and French Imperialists.”²

On the 1st of May 1940 the *Communist* published a Proclamation by the Executive Committee of the *Comintern*:

“British and French war instigators and their Social Democratic lackeys are furious because the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of neutrality towards the imperialist war.”³

The response of the Communists to the March Revolution was to organise demonstrations against “imperialist England.”⁴

Their journal *Proleter*—which, later on, became the chief journal of the *Partisans*—stated, under the headlines:

“*Counter-Revolutionary Social Democratic Leaders at the Head of the War-Mongers of the Anti-Soviet Campaign*”

that

“The decadent pacifists, Blum, Citrine & Co., who approved of the Munich policy of their leaders . . . very rapidly became open war-firebrands.”⁵

The Yugoslav Communist Party changed its attitude as soon as Russia was attacked and began a twofold campaign—

¹ *Communist*, No. 1, 1940.

² *ibid.*, No. 2, 1940.

³ *ibid.*, No. 3, 1940.

⁴ For an account of these demonstrations *v. The New York Times*, 28th of March 1941.

⁵ *Proleter*, Nos. 3 and 4 (April and May 1941).

national and social. Communism as expounded by Marx and Lenin had little hold on the Balkan peoples. The Serbian *Peasant Party* strove for free co-operative organisations rather than for planned socialism. But the desperate peasants who had been expelled or had escaped massacre, and were wandering over the country in marauding bands, found, in Communism, the hope of owning a few acres, of dispossessing those who already owned a few, and a possibility of organised action.

It was this mobile *Jacquerie* which, under Communist leadership, first made up the *Partisan* movement. The Communists had but a clandestine existence under King Alexander's dictatorship. They received little support from industrial labour and even less from the peasantry. But the March Revolution, the foreign invasion, and the collapse of central and, in some parts, of local authority, gave them freedom of movement and of action. They were, for the first time, able to organise against the State, and had, for the first time, a following which could be turned into an effective army for waging class-warfare. They found in the *Jacquerie* a serviceable multitude, for the bands of marauders it meant much to acquire a few rifles and rounds of ammunition, to have some sort of leadership and a doctrine that justified spoliation by calling it expropriation.

The only armed defenders of the new State, that is to say, of the March Revolution, were the Serbian remnants of the Yugoslav army who rallied under Drazha Mihailovitch. It was principally against Mihailovitch and his men that the *Partisans* fought while creating the revolutionary organisation which was to undo the March Revolution, to overthrow the democratic State, and establish a tyranny in its place, to sever the ties between Yugoslavia and the western world and to make her a Russian dependency.

The *Partisan* movement, which came under the leadership of a Russianised Croatian Communist, Josip Broz,

known as Tito, afterwards Marshal Tito, was therefore a counter-revolution, a part of the general counter-revolution which, with Russian support, established itself in Central and Eastern Europe, excepting Greece. Tito from the beginning regarded Mihailovitch as his chief opponent. And rightly so, from his point of view, for Mihailovitch was not only the principal defender of Yugoslav national independence, of Yugoslav democracy, of the March Revolution, he was also unshakable in his devotion to the general Allied cause, as distinct from the purely Russian cause (although at no time hostile to Russia, he would never have accepted Russian, or any other, domination). These are the reasons why Mihailovitch had to be destroyed, physically and morally. The *Partisans*, or at least their leaders, regarded not the foreign invaders, but the men serving under the command of Mihailovitch, as the principal enemy. While they fought the Germans, they always, as far as they were able, subordinated that fight to the fight against Mihailovitch. They did not undertake one major action against the Germans, and, although at times they suffered heavy losses, they conserved their armed forces for their ultimate purpose: the complete undoing of the democratic March Revolution and the triumph of the despotic counter-revolution. They succeeded because they were supported by Great Britain, and because she denied her support to General Mihailovitch.

The liberation of the Serbs from Turkish rule was principally achieved by *guerrilleros* who were known as *Chetniks*, the counterpart of the Greek *Klephts*. The *Chetniks* became part of Balkan heroic legend and a symbol of national independence. When the Yugoslav army collapsed in 1941, the word *Chetnik* passed back from the legendary to the actual. Small bands of men, usually numbering a few hundred each, adopted this name, and armed with rifles, machine-guns, and grenades, rallied in the

mountains for the struggle against the invaders. At first they concentrated chiefly in Montenegro, the wild, inaccessible land of black mountains which even the Turks had not been able to invade.¹

The Germans do not seem to have been perturbed. In August 1941 they maintained only a few divisions—seven, perhaps, but not more than ten, and these of inferior quality—in Yugoslavia. But the *Chetniks* did more than lurk in mountain fastnesses. They began to organise small, but destructive, expeditions against German and Italian outposts, lines of communication, convoys, and so on. It was in the late summer of 1941 that Drazha Mihailovitch came to be known as their leader. The Germans still regarded him as a mere Balkan bandit. But as the year advanced, they began to take him seriously. On the 11th of December 1941 the German High Command offered a reward of 200,000 Dinars for his capture. In April 1942 they arrested his wife and children as hostages.

They were having other difficulties. General Neditch's *Puppet Government* had barely been able to function. It commanded little obedience and no respect. The Serbian civil service was sullenly obstructive. The Serbian co-operatives, who were needed by the enemy for the distribution of food, began to supply the commissariat of the *Chetniks*.² By the beginning of 1942, Mihailovitch was a power in the land—not merely in the mountains, but everywhere in Serbia, in Belgrade and other cities, in the civil service, in the trade unions, in all the

¹ The Germans occupied Tsetinye, the capital of Montenegro, during the First World War. Today, there are armed bands of Montenegrins and Albanians in the mountainous frontier region that are still defying the authority of Tito and Enver Hodja.

² The Germans could not suppress the co-operatives without injury to their own commissariat. But in the spring of 1943, they executed two of the leaders of the Serbian co-operative societies, Voja Djordjevitch and Voja Lazitch. A memorial service for the two victims was held in London on the 24th of July 1943.

political parties (excepting the Communists), and in the co-operatives.

He was born on the 27th of March 1893 at Ivanjitsa in Western Serbia. He served as a sergeant in the First Balkan War and held commissioned rank, at the age of 20, in the Second. He served with distinction in the First World War. He took part in the retreat of the Serbian army into Albania and then served with the Vardar Division on the Salonica Front. After the war he studied to qualify for the General Staff. He spent several years abroad as Military Attaché, first in Sofia and then in Prague. He was a lonely man of independent judgement, and an original thinker on the art of war. He was acutely aware of the defects in the Yugoslav military administration and in the strategic conceptions of the General Staff. His proposals for reform made him unpopular with his superiors and, on one occasion, he was confined to barracks for thirty days by order of the Minister of War, Milan Neditch.

He foresaw the Second World War clearly, and was convinced that Yugoslavia must, in all circumstances, fight on the side of the Western Powers. He realised the weakness of her strategic situation. He knew—and he said so—that it would be impossible, in a war with Germany, to rely on the Croats. He urged a radical change in strategic plans to meet a German invasion. He used to discuss his ideas at length with Major Clarke, the British Military Attaché at Belgrade, in whom he found a sympathetic and understanding spirit. Yugoslavia has highly vulnerable frontiers. Not being an industrial country, she could have no heavy armament of her own. Even if the Yugoslav army had not disintegrated at the beginning of the war, it would have been compelled to withdraw before the German armoured columns. Nevertheless, the Revolution on the 27th of March 1941, the necessity of dispersing the Yugoslav army and of occupying a hostile country that lay across the main lines of communica-

tion on the eastern Mediterranean, dislocated Germany's immediate plans. The attack on Greece and, probably, the attack on Russia were delayed. The Revolution, which turned Yugoslavia, or at least Serbia, from an accomplice into an enemy of the Germans, therefore served the Allied cause well at a most critical moment.¹

Long before the war, Mihailovitch, knowing that Yugoslavia would be hopelessly inferior in tanks, aeroplanes, and heavy artillery, insisted that fortified positions and depôts be built and stores be accumulated in the mountains, where they would be inaccessible to the invader's armoured columns. But he insisted in vain. When war came, his darkest anticipations were confirmed.

During the retreat in the spring of 1941, he was chief of staff in a motorised section of the Fourth Army in Bosnia. He tried to break through into Serbia, but the collapse of all organised resistance allowed him no choice except to make for the mountains. He arrived at Ravna Gora on the 8th of May 1941. Here, in a region hard of access, between Western Serbia and Shumadija, the fight against the invaders was organised afresh under his leadership.

¹ Of the Balkan Powers, only Greece was united and inflexible in her determination to fight on the side of the Western Powers from the time when the menace of a European war was evident, that is to say, from the year 1935 onwards. Only Greece made preparations commensurate with her resources. She became an active ally on the 28th of October 1940 when she was attacked by Italy. Yugoslavia declared neutrality as between Greece and Italy on the 1st of November 1940. Her participation in the war began on the 27th of March in consequence of the Revolution. Germany had to reconsider her own plans forthwith. While Yugoslavia was vacillating, the rest of the Balkans, excepting belligerent Greece and neutral Turkey, fell to the German coalition. Yugoslav organised resistance came to an end on the 17th of April. The Greek army continued fighting on the mainland until the 20th of April and in Crete until the 20th of May. The collapse of the Yugoslav army enabled the Germans to enter Greece through Yugoslav territory and by the Vardar and Monastir gaps instead of through Bulgarian territory by the Rupel Pass and further east where the Greeks were holding their defensive positions with skill and heroism (v. the article by the Hon. Christopher Woodhouse in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, January 1948).

The lack of arms and ammunition, of technical equipment, of wireless sets, of stores, and of transport, reduced the military operations to small, sporadic raids. It was Mihailovitch's purpose to revive the national spirit, to give it leadership and a centre of resistance, and to weave a net of secret organisations that would obstruct the enemy's political, economic, and military effort throughout the country. He had considerable success and, in the course of the year 1942, he became the acknowledged national leader of the Serbs. His portrait, and that of the young King Peter, was to be seen in cottages all over Serbia. In Croatia, Matchek was still the revered leader of the peasantry. But with this exception, there was no man in all Yugoslavia as well known and commanding as much devotion as Mihailovitch. The name of Tito was not, as yet, generally known, but the *Partisans* whom, later on, he commanded, were becoming a force to be reckoned with. The Communist organisation, small as it had been, was efficient and secret, having existed as a *cadre* throughout the Dictatorship of King Alexander. But the *Partisans* were hated by the peasantry. Christie Lawrence, who was in Yugoslavia during the year 1942, and was able to observe the war in all its aspects, writes of their unpopularity:

“They of all appeared to have least regard for the good of the people. Their actions were indiscriminate; they killed a German officer here or a soldier there, irrespective of the subsequent reprisals. The occupation authorities had recently declared that, for every German killed by resistance forces of any denomination, 300 Serbian hostages would be shot, and, certainly, for some months, this policy was carried out. But the *Partisans* were in no way deterred by it. Convinced that their ideology would in the end ensure the greatest good, they persevered in spite of the people's sufferings. Except by a small knot of violent supporters in every centre, they

were feared and hated, especially by the peasants, on whom they lived and depended for supplies.”¹

Mihailovitch's own secret organisation spread, thanks chiefly to the support of the co-operative societies. He soon had agents in Belgrade, and even in the ranks of General Neditch's army. Knowing that the war could only be won by the great campaigns of the Allied Powers as a whole, on land, on the sea, and in the air, he was convinced that Yugoslavia could contribute to the common cause by harassing the enemy wherever it was possible to do so without excessive loss, while organising the nation against him and economising in men, ammunition, and supplies against the day when a national rising, well prepared and disciplined, should synchronise with the invasion of Europe by the main Allied armies and with national risings in other occupied countries, and so accelerate and clinch the final victory.²

¹ Christie Lawrence, *Irregular Adventure*, pp. 142-43.

² The history of the period after the 27th of March is full of gaps, obscurities, and confusions. The general disintegration, the loss or destruction of records, the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, the imperfect communications with the outside world, made the complicated struggle in Yugoslavia a poorly chronicled episode. The documentation is very scanty. The archives of the Yugoslav Legations in London and other capitals were taken over by Marshal Tito's Government and no documents that might serve the purpose of critical study are any longer available. General Mihailovitch's own despatches were, with the exception of a few brief extracts published in 1943, passed over in silence by the British press and wireless. They are, however, of great interest and importance. Of published matter, there is little of value relating to Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Branko Lazitch gives a brief, but precise, survey of Mihailovitch's campaign in his *Tragedy of General Mihailovitch*, with many details that are not generally known. John Plamenatz gives a concise and well-informed survey in his booklet *The Truth About Mihailovitch*. R. H. Markham's *Tito's Imperial Communism* (University of North Carolina Press) is a broad and deep survey of the subject. Markham is one of the few in the western world of whom it can be said that they know the Balkans. Monty Radulovic's *Tito's Republic* is a piece of vivid reporting done with great knowledge and sure insight. David Martin's *Ally Betrayed*, to which we have already referred, is a conscientious analysis of the evidence relating to the charges of "collaboration" brought against Mihailovitch, well-documented and reinforced by painstaking personal enquiry amongst

In the second half of 1942 the Western Allies began to realise that Mihailovitch and his men were doing good service to the common cause. On the 1st of August 1942 Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, and Marshal Tedder sent him a telegram of appreciation, saying that his efforts were "of inestimable value to the Allied cause." On the 1st of December 1942 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff sent him a telegram full of praise for "the wonderful undertaking of the Yugoslav army" and for the "undefeatable *Chetniks* . . . who are fighting day and night under the most difficult war-conditions" and expressing confidence that the day would soon come when "all our forces would be united in a Free and united Yugoslavia," the day when the common enemy "will be crushed for ever." On the 1st of January 1943 General Eisenhower sent a telegram to General Mihailovitch with the greetings of "the American armed forces in Europe and Africa" to "their brothers in arms . . . under your resolute command." On the 2nd of February 1943 General de Gaulle conferred the *Croix de Guerre* upon Mihailovitch and called him "a legendary hero, a symbol of the finest patriotism" . . . who "did not hesitate a moment in continuing the struggle on the soil of his occupied fatherland."

The Germans, who perceived how hated the *Partisans* British, American, and Yugoslav officers directly concerned with the campaign. Christie Lawrence's *Irregular Adventure* is a vivid and highly critical picture of the Yugoslav "resistance" during the second half of 1941 and the first half of 1942. Jasper Rootham's *Miss Fire* is an impartial, critical record, though with limited range, relating to the years 1943 and 1944 (Rootham was a member of the British Mission with Mihailovitch). An official manual, *The National Liberation of Yugoslavia*, dealing with the Partisans until March 1944, and issued for the information of British officers in the Middle East, has the character of war-time propaganda and is of no value to the serious student. The same is true of the publication entitled *Documents Relating to the Treason of General Mihailovitch*, issued by the Yugoslav Government. *The Partisan Diary*, by Vladimir Dedijer, is important for the study of the *Partisan* mentality. It is a record, not an analysis. It is of great length, has not been translated, and is now unobtainable even in Yugoslavia (apparently it was withdrawn from circulation).

were, identified them with the *Chetniks* in their press and wireless. They represented Mihailovitch as a bandit and as no better than a Communist. They—and their instrument, the Puppet Government under General Neditch—avoided the use of the term *Chetnik* altogether. They tried to create the impression that there had been no patriotic revolution in Yugoslavia, but that there was only a Communist danger in the Balkans, a danger to all Europe, a danger which Germany would crush in pursuit of her civilising mission. This argument of the Germans was consistent with their general contention that the *Plutocracies* and *Jewish Bolshevism* (as they called it) were the same thing, and that the victory of the *Plutocracies*, that is to say, of Great Britain and of the United States, would really be the victory of Russia.¹

On the 24th of December 1942, 2500 persons suspected of supporting Mihailovitch were executed by the Germans outside Belgrade. On the 19th of January 1943 General Baader, the German Military Governor of Serbia, issued a proclamation, denouncing Mihailovitch and his men as “rebels” and denying that they were belligerents under the terms of the Hague Convention.

In the same month Tassa Dinitch, the Minister of the Interior in the Puppet Government, issued a statement that

“only foreign mercenaries or insane people see nationalism and patriotism in the work of Mihailovitch. He is exactly the same as those miserable Communists who represent the most shameful example of national ignorance.”²

General Neditch signed a proclamation denouncing Mihailovitch and his men as “a handful of bandits and

¹ Cf. Hitler's assertion: “This war proves, above all and in irrefutable fashion, the complete identity [Gleichartigkeit] of Plutocracy and of Bolshevism” (speech at Munich, 24th of February 1943).

² *Novo Vreme*, Belgrade, 3rd of January 1943.

desperadoes" who "often, and jointly with the Communists," perpetrate "misdeeds . . . unworthy of officers and men of honour," and as "a handful of wretches, who are not Serbs, but servants of Moscow and of London the accursed." In this proclamation General Neditch ordered

"all State and other authorities . . . to destroy and persecute this band without mercy and with all the means at their disposal." ¹

But by the spring of 1943 the Germans took a more serious view of Mihailovitch, especially as they were suffering heavy reverses in North Africa and in Russia. They again tried, as they had done early in 1941, to compound with Yugoslavia, or rather with Serbia, for they already had an arrangement with Croatia, while Slovenia was so much in their power that they did not consider her dangerous. The precise terms of the German offer do not appear to be known. *The Times* referred to them as "obscure," but "evidently designed to compromise General Mihailovitch in the eyes of the Allies . . . he turned down these overtures." ² According to *La Syrie et l'Orient*, Mihailovitch replied to the Germans that

"the United Nations have, through the mouths of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, given a final reply to all offers of a compromise with the Axis." ³

La Syrie et l'Orient added a comment of its own:

"The German offer to Mihailovitch shows the strategic importance of the struggle in Yugoslavia as well as the value of the war-effort made by the Yugoslav patriots. The fact that the Germans have, after two years of occupation, of reprisals, of massacre, proposed to Yugo-

¹ *ibid.*

² *The Times*, 8th of July 1943.

³ *La Syrie et l'Orient*, Beyrouth, 19th of June 1943.

slavia, for the second time, the pact of two years ago, is in itself highly significant.”¹

In May 1943 German, Italian, Bulgarian, and Croatian forces, with air support, undertook joint operations against General Mihailovitch, but were heavily defeated.²

III

On the 15th of May 1943 the *Communist International* was officially “dissolved.” It did not, however, cease to exist. The “dissolution” was but a mobilisation. The Communist Parties in all countries at war were engaged in the capture (by penetration, by attack, or by both) of all national movements so as to force them, later on, out of their association with the Western Powers and into what was ostensibly an association with Russia but in reality subjugation by Russia. Everywhere the Communists professed to be patriots and democrats and their attack on patriotism and democracy was concealed by a sustained propaganda in favour of both. The western world was completely deceived by this manœuvre.

The Second World War had shown that nationalism was a force in Europe, perhaps the greatest force. In Poland it had united the country against the common foe. In Yugoslavia it had overthrown a Government which had concluded a highly advantageous treaty with the victorious Germans. It had thereby brought Yugoslavia into the war, had exposed her to immediate invasion and defeat, and had renewed her spirit of resistance. In Croatia, also, nationalism had shown itself to be a force—disastrous to the Serbs, embarrassing to the Allies, and advantageous to the enemy. When Russia was invaded on the 22nd of June 1941, even the Communists no longer spoke of class warfare. As long as Russia was in

¹ *La Syrie et l'Orient*, Beyrouth, 19th of June 1943.

² *The Times*, 8th of July 1943.

extreme peril, it was impossible for the Communists to regard the war as "imperialistic" and to convert it into a civil war in accordance with Marxist doctrine. But as soon as it became evident that Russia would survive, they carried out the doctrine in a concealed form by promoting armed sedition under the banner of patriotism or of "national liberation." They concentrated on the disruption not of the regular armed forces of the principal Allied Powers, for if these were to fail Russia would fail also, but on the various movements of semi-civilian and semi-military resistance which were more susceptible to disruption than regular armies and were incapable of affecting the general course of the war. The Russians, with their experience of irregular and clandestine warfare, did not share the illusions that were so widespread in the western world with regard to the military value of *guerrilleros*, *Partisans*, *saboteurs*, and the like, in a war which was being decided by a maximum deployment of industrial power and of armed and organised force on land, in the air, and on the sea.

The distinction between the enemy and the Western Allies was gradually whittled down. It vanished almost entirely as the defeat of the Germans became irretrievable. The Western Allies and the Germans were made to appear as one: as Fascists, reactionaries, or imperialists. The genuinely patriotic movements in all countries at war (that is to say, those movements that existed to defend national independence) became the chief immediate objectives of the Communist attack. In Greece, as we shall see, the Communists compounded with the external enemy—first with the Bulgarians, then with the Germans—so as to have a free hand for the attack on the patriotic organisations and on Great Britain. To threaten the security of the eastern Mediterranean, to command the Straits, and to have a base for the penetration (whether political or military or both) into the Middle East, Russia

must be master of Greece. That is, no doubt, the reason why even the Greek regular forces were subject to Communist disruption, for there was a danger (from the Russian point of view) that these forces would return to their country at an early date and take part in its defence.

Russia and the *Comintern* were extremely successful, except in Greece, and emerged from the Second World War as the masters of Central and Eastern Europe (Greece alone excepted) and, therefore, with a vast and almost impregnable operational base for the conquest of all Europe.

In Yugoslavia there were three militant revolutionary forces in conflict with one another, two of them "totalitarian," anti-Yugoslav and anti-western, and one of them democratic and pro-western (though not anti-Russian, even if anti-Communist). The one "totalitarian" force was that of the *Ustashi* and *Domobrantsi* who, with the support of the Germans and Italians, were masters of Croatia. The other was that of the *Partisans*, who became an effective organised political and military power during the course of the year 1942. The democratic force was the patriotic revolutionary movement which overthrew the *ancien régime* on the 27th of March 1941. The militant leader of this movement, when it rallied against the external enemy after the Revolution, was Drazha Mihailovitch.

Russia operated with great skill and foresight, making Great Britain, as far as possible (and that was very far indeed), the promoter of exclusively Russian interests. We have seen, in our last chapter, how Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were outwitted by Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov in the conflict over Poland: if it can be called a conflict, for on the one side there was a systematic advance executed in prepared stages on a fixed objective, while on the other side there was a series of improvised retreats.

Great Britain made Russia master of Yugoslavia by

arming and financing the *Partisans*. From the autumn of 1943 onwards, she fought in alliance with the *Partisans* against the March Revolution, against the "soul" which, according to Mr. Churchill, Yugoslavia had "found," against Yugoslav independence, and, therefore, against herself.

Revolutionary romanticism was fashionable in Great Britain during the War. Any movement favoured by Russia and claiming to be zealous on behalf of democracy, while fighting *underground*, or in *maquis* or mountain, and producing an extensive martyrology, could count on the support of the British press and wireless, and of ideologues in the Departments of Political and Psychological Warfare, and in the Political, and even Military, Intelligence.

To destroy General Mihailovitch was a task which might have seemed wholly impossible in 1943, when he was the militant representative of the Revolution which brought Yugoslavia into the war on the side of the Allies, the national leader under whose flag the remnants of the Yugoslav army had rallied, who had been highly honoured by Allied commanders and by the execration of the enemy. But the *Comintern*¹ had, by long experience and by methodical application, acquired a mastery in one of the most important branches of ideological warfare: the moral destruction of an opponent which must precede his physical destruction. Mihailovitch was not destroyed because he was a traitor, for he was none: he was a patriot first and last, and with all his heart, mind, and will. He was represented as a traitor so that he might be destroyed.

Whenever Russia, with all the weight of authority derived from victory in the field as well as from her successful Revolution, condemned a man in her press or wireless,

¹ I shall continue to refer to the Communist Parties collectively as the *Comintern*, which, although officially dissolved in 1943, remained "in being" as an effective organisation.

that man, unless defended by powerful allies or by the laws of his country, was doomed. And so Mihailovitch was doomed. Against him were arrayed not only the Germans, the Italians, the Croats, the Hungarians, the Bulgars, and the Albanians, but also the Soviet Union and the *Partisans*. Against him—supreme tragedy—was Great Britain. His open enemies shot at him from the front, his covert enemies shot at him from behind. He was ambushed at every turn. Great Britain constantly urged him to fight, denied him weapons to fight with, and then abandoned him because he would not sacrifice his men in senseless attacks that were certain to draw fearful reprisals upon innocent people.

President Roosevelt entertained a Jacobinical distrust of British "imperialism." He was desirous of placating Russia.¹ Nevertheless, more was done in the United States to defend the honour of General Mihailovitch than was done in any other country. It was an officer of the American army, Colonel McDowell, who offered to take him overseas when all was lost. But Mihailovitch would not abandon his people in a time of tribulation more sorrowful than the tribulation of the year 1941, when they were bombed, defeated, invaded, and partitioned. They had England for an ally then, and they had hope. In 1945 they were alone and had no hope:

"When the last American officer parted with Mihailovitch, a sage Serb peasant said to him: 'We are being sealed off from the outer world as thoroughly as Jews in a German gas-chamber.'" ²

The revolutionary romanticism, so fashionable in England, found a safe, suitable field to exercise its wit, its craft, and

¹ *v. As He Saw It*, by Elliott Roosevelt. This book, by Roosevelt junior, tells us much about "Pop," as he is called in its pages. "Pop's" ideas about the British Empire might have been gathered from reading the works of Professor Laski. (*v. pp.* 36 ff.)

² Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

its sentiment. De Tocqueville and Lord Acton have shown us how a governing class in decline is eager to propagate those ideas that will ensure its own destruction, how violent revolutions are not initially risings of the people, but an abdication of authority, an enfeeblement of the Moral Law, a dissolution of the fundamental loyalties, a moral crisis, a crisis of belief. England is not, however, a suitable field for revolution. In England classes of society merge into one another, so that an abdicating class is replaced by a rising class without upsetting the balance. But the moral crisis which prepares the coming of revolution was present in England during the War. The opportunity, denied to would-be revolutionaries at home, was provided abroad by the circumstances of the Second World War. It was possible to experience all the pleasures of revolution without suffering the consequences. No attempt to promote revolution at home would have been tolerated. To promote revolution in hostile countries was difficult, although to have done so with success would have served the cause of victory. Besides, the only resolute opposition in Germany, the opposition determined to destroy Hitler and his associates by assassination, was largely conservative. In Italy, as events were to show, the only forces that could seriously challenge the Fascist dispensation were grouped around the Throne. To our romantic revolutionaries, any kind of alliance with traditional beliefs offered no attraction.

But in Allied countries occupied by the enemy, the prospects of a revolution more after their liking were highly favourable. Neither the loyalty due to Allied monarchs and Allied Governments, nor any respect for the cherished beliefs of nations, deterred our own disloyalists from seditious indoctrination in Allied countries which, because they were desperately fighting the common foe, were unable to resist the pressure of a powerful patron and ally. King Peter of Yugoslavia and King George of Greece

became the particular objects of malevolent disparagement, conveyed both by word and by caricature in organs of publicity that would not have ventured to display open disrespect of royalty at home.

England has never known a revolution in the Continental sense. There is little resemblance between the Glorious Revolution on the one hand, and the French, Russian, and German Revolutions of 1789, 1917, and 1933. Analogies between the Cromwellian period and periods of revolutionary upheaval on the Continent do not go deep. That is why revolution is so little understood in this country. The amateur revolutionary finds no following in England except amongst cliques and coteries. But when he found himself in a Government Department, or was holding commissioned rank, when he was engaged in propaganda and various sorts of Intelligence, he could, when certain countries, especially Balkan countries, came within his range, realise his most cherished aspirations, and promote disloyalty, sedition, and political upheaval, while appearing to be engaged in the performance of his patriotic duty. For those whose intellectual accomplishments were brilliant rather than deep, it was an opportunity, which might never come again, of tasting the joys of treason without the odium—and without the just penalty. Even persons of conservative leanings gave way to the temptation, if only to prove that they too were not narrow-minded, that they too were for “progress.” Russia, with her immense power, her strength of conviction, her singleness of purpose, her great experience in revolutionary practice, and her craft in exploiting unbelievers, semi-believers, waverers, semi-traitors, semi-literate pseudo-intellectuals, and the whole species of sophists, ideologues, and *Fellow Travellers*, was able to give the many seditious forces and impulses a single direction.

Russia made the conquest of Yugoslavia one of the principal objects of her foreign policy. To succeed she

needed the connivance of Great Britain. She got it for nothing. She realised that she must destroy Mihailovitch and establish in his place some other leader who would undo the Revolution of the 27th of March 1941, falsify its character and purpose, and extirpate the record in the minds of the Serbian people and exclude it from the history books. The Yugoslav Communist Party struck at the Revolution from below and directed the counter-revolutionary *Partisans* against the *Chetniks* and the *Home Army*. In this they were completely successful.

At first, as we have seen, the *Partisans* were mainly dispossessed peasants who had fled from Bosnia and Hertsegovina. The political allegiance of marauding bands was often uncertain. They would sometimes call themselves *Partisans*, sometimes *Chetniks*. Sometimes have no allegiance at all. In time, any sort of allegiance offered advantages—arms and ammunition, rations, and even a purpose in life.

After Russia was invaded, and the Communists began to organise the *Jacquerie* in groups and units of *Partisans*, the counter-revolution began to show its political character. Short-lived *Soviet Republics* were established at Uzhitse, Kolashin, and other places. Marauding took a more organised form and served a revolutionary purpose. The murder and expropriation of a Serbian farmer would be an act of "social justice." The local *Soviet Republic* would be pronounced a "democracy."

It was impossible for the *Home Army* to allow predatory and murderous sedition to afflict a loyal population in time of war. The *Home Army* requisitioned, but its requisitioning was gradually organised with the help of the co-operative societies, and ceased to be an expropriation. It rapidly gained followers, for it was the army of national defence against the external enemy; it was the army of the patriotic revolution which, on the 27th of March 1941, had overthrown the Germanophile Dictatorship; it was the armed

defender of that revolution against the new Dictatorship, led by Communists, which was threatening Yugoslav democracy and national independence; it was the army which alone had the will to protect the peasantry against marauders and murderers. About the character of the short-lived Soviet Republics there could be no mistake. They were all terroristically administered, clearly indicating the kind of dispensation which would be established throughout Yugoslavia if the *Partisans* were to prevail—the dispensation which we see in Yugoslavia today.

As the *Partisans* came under ever-increasing Communist control, they were joined by young people of the educated classes, by poets, novelists, artists, and lawyers, by persons who had suffered political persecution under King Alexander, by many who saw prospects of personal advancement and power in a movement which was new, vigorous, supported by Russia, and, later on, by the Western Powers. As the war turned against the Germans, members of the *Ustashi* joined in ever-growing numbers, many of them to escape the retribution for the massacres they had perpetrated.¹

At first the *Chetniks* and *Partisans* collaborated against the Germans, but they conflicted with one another at an early date. The advent of Tito is enveloped in obscurity. His name was not generally known until the end of 1942. Christie Lawrence, who frequently discussed the situation and the qualities of different leaders during the first half of the year 1942, never heard Tito's name mentioned in Yugoslavia. An article by Tito in the *Free World*² reveals something of his own mentality. It also offers evidence with regard to the first clashes between *Chetniks* and *Partisans*.

In this article Tito asserts that

“long before the attack on Yugoslavia . . . the Yugoslav

¹ The *Partisan* movement became, in Marxian phrase, an alliance between a *Lumpenproletariat* and a *Lumpenbourgeoisie*.

² *Free World*, vol. vii., No. 6 (New York, June 1944).

Communists constantly warned against the terrible danger threatening the people of Yugoslavia from predatory German fascism,' and that 'they made every effort to rally all the patriotic forces of the country.'" ¹

He does not mention the fact that when, in the summer of 1939, Russia and Germany came to terms, the Communists in Yugoslavia, as in other countries, were by no means hostile to Germany and did not oppose Prince Paul's Germanophile policy, that, so far from promoting *anti-Fascism*, they were openly hostile to the movement of popular revolt against the alliance with Germany, and that only this movement could fairly be called *anti-Fascist*.

Tito asserts that Yugoslavia did not recognise Russia until "the German invaders were loudly knocking at Yugoslavia's door." This is untrue, for the Yugoslav Government recognised Russia *de jure* a year before Yugoslavia was invaded, chiefly because recognition had been demanded for twenty years by the Serbian *Peasant Party*, led by Milan Gavrilovitch, the first Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Yovanovitch, and others, who supported General Mihailovitch, though constantly denounced as reactionaries, Fascists and "collaborators" by Tito and his press and wireless. He refers to the 27th of March 1941 as "one of our most memorable dates," ² but does not mention the fact that the Communists, as we have seen, attacked the Revolution which made that date so memorable.

He refers to the "ten days during which the invaders defeated our country" as "the most shameful period in its history." ³ He omits to mention that it was chiefly "shameful" because the Croats deserted *en masse*. He says that all members of the Communist Party joined the colours in response to "a special summons from the leadership" of the Party. He does not quote this "special summons" or

¹ *ibid.*, p. 491, col. 1.

² *ibid.*, p. 492, col. 1.

³ *ibid.*, p. 492, col. 1.

give any reference that would enable us to find it. He does not mention the fact that the Communists opposed the war against the German invaders until Russia had been invaded. To convey the impression that the Communists were organising resistance against the enemy before Russia was invaded, he asserts that they concluded an agreement with Dr. Ribar,¹ who enjoyed his confidence. He omits to mention Dr. Ribar's declaration that the Communists would take "no part in the imperialistic war."

Tito says that "guerilla detachments" were attacking the Germans in July 1941.² He omits to mention that these "detachments" were *Chetniks*, not *Partisans*, and that most of them were already under the command of General Mihailovitch. He says that by 13th of July 1941 "a general uprising of the people under the leadership of the Communists had already been organised in Montenegro."³ The truth is that the rising in Montenegro (a rising against the Italians) was a national movement and had nothing to do with Communism. The *Partisans* did not enter Montenegro until December 1941. They split the Montenegrin National Movement which, until then, had been united. Tito says that "guerillas liberated almost all of Western Serbia and a considerable part of Eastern Serbia."⁴ He does not mention the fact that these "guerillas" were not *Partisans* led by Communists, but *Chetniks* under the command of General Mihailovitch.

He asserts that Mihailovitch "had no armed forces whatever at his command" and that he himself tried to persuade Mihailovitch to "collaborate in a joint struggle."⁵ He contradicts this assertion later on, when he describes an attack made under his own command at 4 a.m. on the 2nd of November 1941⁶ for the purpose of breaking up

¹ *Free World*, vol. vii., No. 6 (New York, June 1944), p. 493, col. 1.

² *ibid.*, p. 494, col. 1.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 494, col. 2.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 497, col. 1.

a concentration of *Chetniks*, who, according to Tito, were planning an attack on the *Partisans* which was to begin at 5 a.m. He says he learnt of the impending attack from "important documents" captured by his men, that in the engagement which followed, 800 unarmed *Chetniks* were killed. He says that he then ordered an attack on "the *Chetniks*' principal base" and that there was "an extremely bloody battle which lasted all day." He does not explain how there could have been such a battle with an enemy who had "no armed forces whatever."

Mr. Churchill and others complained, later on, that Mihailovitch and his men were fighting the *Partisans* when they should have been fighting the Germans. But the *Partisans* were, on Tito's own admission, the first to attack the *Chetniks*. Tito, in his article, calls it a "counter-attack." His own words show that it was no counter-attack, but an action allegedly made to frustrate a hypothetical attack as revealed in "documents" of an unspecified nature.

The purpose of the article was, evidently, to propagate the belief that only the Communists prepared and carried out whatever resistance there was in Yugoslavia to the German invasion and to discredit the man who first organised and led the resistance. Tito states that Mihailovitch¹ plotted the murder of a certain Ratko Martinovitch. There is no truth in Tito's statement. The truth is that Martinovitch was an officer serving under Mihailovitch and trusted by him.

When Tito denied to Mihailovitch all credit as a patriot and a soldier, and accused him of being a murderer, he passed that sentence which was publicly pronounced on the 14th of August 1945 and carried out by a firing-squad the day after. But it was not enough for Tito's purpose to dishonour and destroy Mihailovitch. All his captains and principal supporters had to be destroyed as well: morally, in any case, and physically if they could be captured,

¹ *ibid.*, p. 404, col. 3.

seeing that it was necessary (to serve the ends of the *Comintern*) that the character of the March Revolution be falsified, and that the product of this falsification be presented to the world as the true Revolution and the exclusive achievement of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Miodrag Paloshevitch, who commanded one of the first units of *Chetniks* to be organised, was proclaimed a war-criminal as soon as Tito's new judiciary had been established. Dragutin Keserovitch, another of the early leaders, was executed in 1945. Boshko Todorovitch, one of the officers who organised units of *Chetniks* in Bosnia and Hertsegovina, was proclaimed a war-criminal. Vuchkovitch, one of the officers who led the successful attack (in which *Partisans* as well as *Chetniks* took part) on Gornji Milanovats, was declared a war-criminal. Pavle Djurishitch, one of the commanders who directed successful operations against the Italians in Montenegro, was declared a war-criminal. There was an armed rising against the enemy in Bosnia during the month of July 1941. It was led by a priest, Iliya Raditch, and by Iliya Desnitsa. They were both captured by the *Partisans* a year later: Raditch was executed with his three brothers, Desnitsa was executed with his whole family. Bora Manitch, who led attacks on German and Bulgarian garrisons, and on the lines of communication leading to Greece, was proclaimed a war-criminal. Nikola Kalabitch, who led a successful attack on the townships of Stragari in August 1943, was declared a war-criminal. Major Lukachevitch, one of the most heroic of Mihailovitch's commanders, who led many successful engagements against the Germans and Italians, was executed in August 1945.¹

¹ Major Lukachevitch came to London in 1943 and attempted to expound the Yugoslav situation to interested persons, but in vain. He had three bullets in his body—one German, one *Ustash*, and one *Partisan*. Soon after, Colonel Velebit, one of Tito's commanders and political agents, arrived in London. He was received with extreme courtesy, entertained by influential persons, and referred to in terms of extravagant flattery by Mr. Churchill.

The Yugoslav Government, which had been put in power by the March Revolution, moved to Cairo when Yugoslavia was occupied by the enemy, and then from Cairo to London. It was, in the words of Mr. Eden, "the properly constituted Government of the whole of Yugoslavia."¹ As it had to be a representative as well as a legitimate Government it included representatives of Croatia and Slovenia, although the Revolution had been the work of Serbs only.

Dr. Matchek's popularity in Croatia was such that neither the Germans, nor the Italians, nor the Government of Ante Pavelitch, nor the *Ustashi*, dared molest him. He was kept a prisoner on his own estate and was guarded by Germans. The Croat Ministers displayed consistent ill-will towards Mihailovitch who, besides being commander of the Yugoslav *Home Army*, was Minister of War in their own Government. The Croats in London had an influence far greater than that of the Serbs. They were particularly successful in the Serbo-Croat Section of Broadcasting House, where they and British sympathisers with Tito's cause played into one another's hands. The Croats had the additional advantage of being Roman Catholic, familiar with western ways, and extremely persuasive, whereas the Serbs are Greek Orthodox and inclined to be inarticulate, with the result that their influence in London became almost negligible. King Peter was a mere lad. Although at first he gallantly tried to withstand the political tide that had turned against Mihailovitch, his resistance was broken by Mr. Churchill, of whom he was unduly afraid.

During the year 1943 both Mihailovitch and Tito were augmenting their influence and their armed might in Yugoslavia. The *Chetniks* were strongest throughout Serbia, the *Partisans* in Croatia and Voivodina. There was heavy fighting between them on the Bosnian-Dalmatian border in Bosnia itself. Later on in the year, the *Partisans*

¹ House of Commons, 23rd of April 1943.

began to prevail in Hertsegovina and Montenegro, for by that time they were receiving arms and ammunition from Great Britain, whereas the *Chetniks*, throughout the war, received almost nothing.

On the 8th of September 1943 a message from Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander in Chief in the Middle East, was broadcast to the Yugoslavs and Greeks:

“The hour of final liberation has been brought much nearer, but it is not here yet. Await a signal for a general rising.”¹

It was widely believed at the time that the Allies would invade the Balkan Peninsula. This was not, however, their intention. But they were successful in convincing the Germans that it was their intention. This is the reason why the Germans maintained more divisions in the Balkans than were needed for the defence of their lines of communication. Mr. Churchill's strategic plan was to hasten on the defeat of Italy, to deploy from Italy into Central Europe,² and to fight the “decisive battle” in Austria. His plan was defeated in the conference held at Teheran in November 1943, for it was opposed not only by Stalin, but also by President Roosevelt, and General Marshall had expressed himself emphatically against it. Great Britain, determined to establish a *Second Front* at the earliest opportunity, had no choice but to establish it in the west. This change in her plans had fateful consequences, for had there been a strong British and American force in Central Europe, a force which would surely have penetrated far into the Danubian basin, the two western democracies would have been in an incomparably stronger position than they are now to decide the future of the Central European and Danubian countries. Mr. Churchill's broad strategic conception was sound. That it was rejected was not his fault, and whatever mistakes he

¹ *The Times*, 9th of September 1943.

² Not, as is generally supposed, to effect a landing in the Balkans.

made with regard to Poland and to Yugoslavia, the overriding decision which did so much to eliminate the western democracies from Central and Eastern Europe and established the hegemony of Russia, was not his, but President Roosevelt's. And, of course, Stalin's—but Stalin can hardly be blamed for making the interests and the aspirations of the Soviet Union his supreme consideration.

The conflict that divides the world so deeply today was reflected in Yugoslavia. Just as the Spanish Civil War was an adumbration of what was to come, so the Yugoslav Civil War was the adumbration of what is upon us now.

Mihailovitch fought for the restoration of Yugoslavia as an independent, democratic, federal State, in permanent free association with the Great Powers, the prospective victors in the Second World War, with Russia, no less than with Great Britain and the United States. This had been the essential purpose of the March Revolution and to that purpose Mihailovitch remained true until the end. Tito fought against that Revolution, he tried to extirpate the revolutionary heritage, as we have seen—and with success, as we shall see.

Mihailovitch was fully aware that the *Partisans* were just as much the enemies of Yugoslav independence as the Germans were. Though he tried to come to terms with them, he must have known, in his heart (or must have come to realise it during the course of the year 1943 at the latest), that their purpose and his were irreconcilable. A genuine compromise could only have been achieved if Mihailovitch and Tito had each betrayed his own cause. And this must be said of Tito: to his cause, the cause of the universal Communist State through the domination of Russia, he remained loyal throughout the war. As for Mihailovitch, his whole life was loyalty itself.

Every little action undertaken against the Germans was followed by terrible reprisals, as we have seen. The peasants in many parts dreaded any band of men—whether *Chetnik*

or *Partisan*—that might provoke the Germans. Sometimes the peasants would themselves offer to mount guard on behalf of the Germans so that their own villages and their own families might be spared. Mihailovitch made it a rule to order no attack that did not serve a serious military purpose. It was chiefly this restraint that drew upon himself the charge that he was “not fighting.” When he was tried, in 1946, one of the charges against him was that he had taken German prisoners but had not shot them—as he could not keep them, he disarmed them, and let them go.¹ Christie Lawrence met a woman doctor at Brus who was looking after some children who had been orphaned after the battle of Kralyevo in the autumn of 1941. Lawrence had taken part in the battle and spoke about the result with pride—the woman doctor then told him “the *full* result”:

“When the battle was over, and your heroes retired to your mountain fastness, the Germans started quietly to take measures against your future action. They shot nine thousand hostages—three hundred for every German you killed. They burned to the ground seventeen villages. In Kralyevo there is not a family which has not lost one of its members, and all refugees from the north were shot.”²

Major Ostojitch, of the Yugoslav General Staff, who escorted a British Mission to General Mihailovitch’s headquarters, said to Lawrence:

“The total result of our revolution was that we killed seven or eight thousand Germans, and lost 125,000 men and women shot by them. Three towns and fifty-three villages in this part of the country alone were burned out.”³

The “revolution” referred to was the series of actions, including the attack on Kralyevo, by men under the orders of

¹ *The Times*, 5th July 1946.

² Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

³ *ibid.*, p. 165.

General Mihailovitch. The total number of villages destroyed ran into hundreds.

"Have you heard," General Mihailovitch asked Lawrence, "of the hundreds of villages burned and the terrible reprisals that the Germans inflicted on our innocent people? When it was over and, with God's help, I was preserved to continue the struggle, I resolved that I would never again bring such misery on the country unless it could result in total liberation.

"We cannot, for the moment, maintain large illegal guerilla companies. The misery which they cause to the peasants is too great. . . . It is far better that my men should stay at home, work on the land, and look after their weapons, if they have them. When the day comes for us to rise, we will rise. With my present organisation, I could raise a large proportion of the country in a week. When it is complete, it will be a matter of forty-eight hours or less."

"Then until Germany's final collapse, you intend to do nothing more active than organise?"

"I did not say that. I said, until the Germans are too weak to deploy sufficient forces against us to retake what we shall have taken from them. In future, I do not intend to capture a town until I know that I can protect its inhabitants."

"But meanwhile, what of the Partisans?" I asked.

"I have twice come to an understanding with them, and twice they have deceived me. I shall not attack them; indeed, I cannot, because my men are not mobilised. But I shall always defend myself against them, for I consider that my organisation is equally important to theirs. Have you," asked Mihailovitch, "ever met in his own house a peasant, in the whole of the year during which you have been with us, who was a Communist?"

"Never," I said, for that was the truth. "Never except with the Partisans."

“If I thought the country wanted their politics, I would willingly place myself under their orders,” said Mihailovitch, “but until then, I shall continue to oppose them. . . .”

As I rose to leave, he said, “Why are the British fighting the Germans on only one small front?”

“Because they are not ready to start another,” I replied, somewhat taken aback.

“That,” said Mihailovitch, “is why I have ordered that none of my commanders shall, for the moment, attack the Germans. We are not ready.”¹

As Mihailovitch’s organisation improved, he and his commanders undertook many operations against the enemy.² Martin writes:

“The most important towns in Serbia proper were liberated by the forces of General Mihailovitch, acting either on their own or else in conjunction with the Russian army. But the world heard nothing about this.”³

Mihailovitch strove to convert the forces under his command into a regular army, so that they might be recognised as belligerents and, as far as possible, wage regular warfare. The name *Chetnik* was, in his opinion, too general a term. A *Cheta* was simply a unit. There were bands of men, calling themselves *Chetniks*, who did not take their orders from him and sometimes acted against him as well as against the *Partisans*. The distinctions between force

¹ *op. cit.*, pp. 232-33. Lawrence repeatedly refers to the hatred which he was able to observe, the hatred the peasants felt for the Communists. The booklet, *The National Liberation of Yugoslavia*, already referred to as propaganda, states that if the Communists prevail in Yugoslavia, it will be because “only the Communist Party proved capable of offering the nation a bold and constructive leadership” (p. 56). This booklet shows how Communistic indoctrination permeated the British Intelligence in the Middle East.

² A survey of these will be found in Branko Lazitch, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³ Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 271. Martin gives many examples in the pages that follow.

and force were often obscure and interchangeable. Towards the end of 1941 the forces under Mihailovitch's command were called the *Yugoslav Home Army* (*Jugoslovenska Vojska u Otadžlini*).¹ As Minister of War, later on, Mihailovitch had a political status which enabled him to associate his army not only with the Yugoslav Government in London but also with the political parties in Yugoslavia, as we shall see. He was criticised, even by friendly observers, for accepting ministerial office which imposed duties, which were beyond the competence of a commander in the field, and responsibilities for which he was officially, but not in fact, answerable. But in his endeavour to create an organised resistance to the enemy that should embrace town and country, all classes and all parties, he believed that it was necessary for himself to have a political status, even if this status was uncongenial, for he never regarded himself as a politician. And when the first congress of the principal political parties was held, as we shall see later on, he was the principal figure.

He never boasted of his own achievements and, indeed, tended towards understatement. This told against him, for the extravagant claims made by Tito and on behalf of Tito dwarfed the work of Mihailovitch in the eyes of the world.

British Intelligence from Yugoslavia was very inferior.² The members of the British Mission with Mihailovitch found little or no hearing in Cairo and in London. Revolutionary romanticism promoted misconceptions with regard to irregular warfare, and concealed not only its hideous character but also its limited value as a contribution to final victory, as well as its catastrophic consequences. The catalogue of bridges blown up, railway lines cut, transport damaged by irregulars is a long one, it is true. Certain isolated actions, like the destruction of the bridge at Gorgo-

¹ Lit. *Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland*.

² The booklet already referred to is evidence of this.

potamos in Greece, were of considerable value.¹ In France, the *Maquisards* helped the advance of the British and American forces by striking at the communications of the retreating Germans. But, on the whole, it is questionable whether irregular warfare, by intensifying deep political antagonisms and, in some countries, as in Yugoslavia and Greece, by degenerating into ferocious Civil War, did not, on balance, profit rather than damage the enemy.

It became clear in the course of the year 1943 that the *Partisans* regarded the *Home Army*, and not the Germans, as their principal enemy. Colonel McDowell was witness of an attack by Marshal Tito's forces who

“passed through the German lines of garrisons on the Western Morava River and ignored the Germans in favour of their attack against men already engaged against the Germans.”²

Colonel McDowell also stated that he and other American officers saw

“‘the plans and orders issued [by Mihailovitch] for an all-out attack on Axis forces’ [in the autumn of 1944] and ‘witnessed the troop dispositions made for this offensive. The evidence was unmistakable that General Mihailovitch had disposed his forces properly for a major effort against the German garrisons, depôts, and lines of communication, but in doing this had been obliged to leave his rear and left flank exposed to attack on the part of major Partisan concentrations which only recently had been attacking the Nationalists’ [*i.e.* the *Home Army*].”³

Thanks to the supplies which Great Britain sent to the *Partisans* and denied to the *Home Army*, Tito was able to make a much greater military effort. But that effort, in so

¹ *v.* the vivid account of this action in Denys Hamson's *We Fell Among Greeks* (p. 107 ff).

² Quoted in *The World's Verdict*, published by John Bellows, Gloucester (p. 38).

³ Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

far as it was directed against the Germans, amounted to little.¹

The *Partisans* were at least indifferent to reprisals which fell upon the civilian population. Reprisals which inflicted such vast misery and destruction maintained, as it were, the original reservoir from which the *Partisans* obtained their recruits, the *Jacquerie*. The evidence is abundant that the Germans regarded the *Home Army* as no less formidable than the *Partisans* and Mihailovitch as their chief opponent in Yugoslavia.²

When General Meissner, the commander of the SS in the Balkans, and Colonel Fuchs, of the Gestapo, were tried in Belgrade, the former stated, on the 13th of December 1946, that the Communists [*i.e. Partisans*]

“swept down from the mountains into the towns and villages killing a few German civil servants, and, at the approach of German armed forces, immediately withdrew again into the woods” and that “a large number of innocent people perished as the result of the reprisals of the Germans.”

Colonel Fuchs, when questioned as to the alleged collaboration between Mihailovitch and the Gestapo, said:

“Not only that the Gestapo did not have any connection with General Mihailovitch, but always considered him enemy No. 1 of the German people. Men in the movement of General Mihailovitch were persecuted and severely punished by the Gestapo, and the Germans always believed that his national movement in Serbia represented the greatest danger to the security of the German troops in the Balkans.”

As soon as Colonel Fuchs had uttered these words, the proceedings in court were interrupted. After a brief

¹ This is shown conclusively by a detailed analysis of all the *communiqués* issued by the *Partisans* in *The Tablet*, 28th of April 1945.

² Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 353 ff., gives a catalogue of extracts from the newspapers and broadcasts of the enemy in proof of this.

interval, the court was cleared, and the trial was resumed *in camera*.¹

The spirit of the March Revolution was that of democratic patriotism. It was a spirit widespread in Eastern European countries, although they had between the wars succumbed to dictatorial or semi-dictatorial dispensations.² The Second World War aroused popular democracy throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

The Polish Government in exile was the first Polish Government to be popular, democratic, and representative of all the main parties. The Yugoslav Revolution was not only the manifestation of a resolve to fight the Germans but also to establish a democratic political order in a federal Yugoslavia.

For the peasantry in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, democracy means the possession of a little land, the representation of local interests in Parliament, a certain easy-going familiarity between the voter and his Deputy, between the humblest peasant and his *Ban*,³ and even his King, with a strong bias against favouritism and corruption. The Throne is an object of reverence, the King of veneration and

¹ *The World's Verdict*, p. 261.

² Even Czechoslovakia was no exception, despite appearances. Czechoslovakia was, it is true, the most liberally governed of all the new countries, excepting Estonia and Finland. The Sudeten Germans, although under disabilities of an economic nature, were not subjected to cruel persecution as the Ukrainians of Western Galicia were, the Communists in Hungary, or the Jews (at different times) in Rumania. But the country was ruled by a kind of permanent caucus under Dr. Benes. The compliant spirit of the Czechs made persecution superfluous and the Czech liberal mentality made it unfashionable. Instead, bribery was common, and politicians were rendered compliant by rewards or threats—office, or the loss of office, economic concessions or the withdrawal of the same. The effect, namely, the unchallenged, though mildly exercised, domination of the caucus, was the same as that of terroristic dictatorships in other countries, and much more agreeable to the victims—and preferable in so far as it was better propaganda for foreign consumption. When war came, it was the liberal Czechs in whom the spirit of resistance to alien domination was weakest. The Czechs made much of Lidice, but the assassination, for which Lidice was a reprisal, was organised in England to provide martyrs for Dr. Benes. Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece had hundreds of Lidices.

³ The Governor of a province (Banovina).

love qualified by the knowledge that if he proves unworthy, he can be removed from the throne by revolt or by assassination. But democracy, or at least peasant democracy, is, in the Balkans, inseparably associated with the Monarchy: as the Communists know very well. This is the reason why Kings are the principal objects of Communist hostility, and it is one of the greatest achievements of Communist propaganda to have persuaded the western world that royalty is undemocratic. Balkan democracy requires that personal, almost paternal, rule which the Monarchy alone can give. The fate of democratic institutions in the Balkan countries is organically connected with the fate of the Monarchies.

In Greece, the Dictatorship established by General Metaxas remained in power when the war came, because, unlike the Dictatorship in Yugoslavia, it identified itself with a nation which was wholly for war on the side of Great Britain. When war came, the Dictatorship lost its political relevance and became an administrative apparatus for wreaking the popular will on the Italians and Germans.

Even in the countries that joined the enemy, the democratic spirit was awake. If the word "reaction" has a meaning, then the Hungarian political order was "reactionary." It was neither sufficiently democratic nor sufficiently aristocratic to suit the Hungarian people, who had great respect, perhaps too much respect, for western institutions.¹ Hungarian public opinion was strongly

¹ To display a critical attitude towards the established order might lead to imprisonment in Budapest but not in Prague, where a political writer could write and say what he liked. But critical opinion in Budapest was often of a higher intellectual order and had a wider range than the somewhat conventionally democratic outlook that prevailed in Prague. In the war, it was the most liberal of the Central and Eastern European nations, the Czechs, who showed the least fighting spirit. Prague was "liberated" by General Vlassov and his Russian troops. Vlassov had deserted from the Russian to the German army, had been placed in command of other Russian deserters by the Germans, had fought in France (where his men distinguished themselves by their atrocities), and had turned against the Germans in an attempt to expel them from Prague.

Germanophile and Anglophile. The Rumanian dispensation under General Antonescu had some Fascist or National Socialist characteristics. It was crude in its methods and had a coarse *mystique*.¹ It reached the climax of its exaltation in the moment of greatest national humiliation, when Rumania was the helpless prey of both the Russians and the Germans—and of the Hungarians who, as protégés of the Germans, took Transylvania. Nevertheless, the Rumanian peasantry remained democratic at heart and profoundly anti-German.

It can be fairly said that, despite appearances, the whole of the *Middle Zone*,² from the Arctic to the Aegean, was either democratic or in a state of emergent democracy. In no country of that *Zone* was Fascism or National Socialism popular. Nationalism there was, and there was anti-semitism in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, but secular religion, of the kind embraced by many millions of the German people and established under Hitler, never commanded the allegiance of the people, least of all the peasantry, anywhere in that *Zone*. Nor did Communism command a following comparable with that of the German Communist Party. Today the ascendancy of the Communist Parties is exclusively the result of direct or indirect Russian action. Should the power of Russia wane, or should her influence recede in Eastern Europe, those parties are doomed. It can be said that in no country of the *Middle Zone* will the population freely accept any existing "ideology," or any secular religion.

Those who joined the enemy did so in the hope of preserving their national independence. Even in Croatia, which

¹ *v.* the graphic description by Leigh White in his *Long Balkan Night* (p. 110 ff.).

² Called *the Middle Tier* by Sir Halford Mackinder (*v.* his masterly book, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, publ. Constable, 1919). For an attempt to analyse the common characteristics of *the Middle Zone* and to examine the possibilities of a *Federation, v. The Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1943 and August 1944.

broke away from Yugoslavia to join the German-Italian coalition and submitted to a terrorist government, public opinion, the opinion of the peasantry above all, was permeated by the hope that, somehow or other, democracy would prevail. The Germans were welcomed because they seemed to promise national independence. But at no time were the Western Powers unpopular. Nowhere was the defeat of Germany regretted except by rare and small minorities.

This actual and potential democracy, transcending the frontiers of the lands within the *Middle Zone*, led to attempts at external federation accompanied by internal devolution, and to a more liberal attitude towards the national minorities (the German minorities excepted, for all of these had proved to be a menace to the States whose subjects they were). But the Western Allies failed to perceive what was, in a last analysis, a democratic revolution extending from the Arctic to the Aegean. Had they perceived it, had they helped it, had they even led it, they would have won the peace as well as the war.

The Russians understood what was happening in Eastern Europe, and they acted accordingly. With British help, they crushed the emergent democratic revolution. For Russia it would have been inconvenient to have democracies on her border, democracies, above all, which were on the way towards reconciliation with one another. Not that there was any danger of an aggressive coalition, but there was a danger, from the Russian point of view, that the disintegration of Europe and of European society would be averted, in which case Europe would never accept Communism, and would never succumb to Russian domination.

Russia organised and led the counter-revolution with insight, craft, and determination. She took over the German heritage in Eastern Europe. Stalin became the successor of Hitler, and established the present counter-revolutionary dispensations. Her greatest achievement was

her conquest of Yugoslavia, a country out of her immediate reach and not naturally amenable to her influence. This conquest she was able to achieve by her alliance with Great Britain and by her skilful manœuvring, greatly facilitated by the *trahison des clerics anglais*, with which she urged, cajoled, and deceived Great Britain into making a Russian agent master of Yugoslavia.

The Western Powers could, with no great difficulty, have had at their disposal not only the Serbs as an organised nation, but also (as the war turned against the Germans), the Croats, the Albanians, the Hungarians, the Bulgars, and the Rumanians—including the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian regular armies, and these almost intact. Mihailovitch tried to establish an alliance with Greek patriotic organisations, but failed under British discouragement. Tito was more successful—ELAS and the *Partisans* co-operated in pursuit of a common purpose.

What came to be known as political warfare is but revolution applied to other countries. Political warfare may be a useful adjunct to military operations in the hands of experienced practitioners, like the present rulers of Russia, who understand the theory and practice of revolution at home and abroad. But it is exceedingly dangerous in the hands dilettanti such as England produced so abundantly.

When a Power “wars for an idea,” as Edward Freeman said of France—“an idea, it may be, either of past history or of anticipated futurity,” then

“‘treaties are broken, legal rights are trampled under foot, natural justice is cast to the winds; but there is a good reason for every step.’ Such a Power ‘is alike apt at proving the doctrine that the annexed people ought to desire annexation, and the fact that they do actually desire it.’”¹

¹ Edward Freeman, *The Franks and the Gauls* (*The National Review*, October 1860).

Russia "warred" for her own land and people: for survival as a Great Power and a Great Empire, against Germany. At the same time she "warred for an idea": against Great Britain. It was, and still is, Russia's contention that the countries on her borders "ought and indeed do desire annexation," although, by a politic change of terminology, it is called not "annexation" but "liberation." Whenever Russia suggests that a country ought to be "liberated," that country must at once prepare to defend its liberties. And as the borders of Russia are extended by this process of "liberation," she immediately discovers the same desire for "liberation" in her new neighbours. Today we find that the Greeks "ought and do desire annexation." That is why, today, we are witnessing a Greek war of independence. To all countries, Russia turns as an actual or prospective "liberator." Liberator from what? From liberty. And from everything that might sustain or fortify that liberty and, therefore, from every association with Great Britain and the United States.

IV

Russia had established in Tiflis a powerful wireless station which transmitted regular broadcasts under the heading *Slobodna Jugoslavia* (Free Yugoslavia). These broadcasts purported to be *communiqués* from the scene of military operations in Yugoslavia. They consistently magnified the exploits of the *Partisans*. They attributed each success to the *Partisans*, even when it had been achieved by the *Home Army*. Although General Mihailovitch was Minister of War in an Allied Government and although he had been honoured by Allied Commanders, the B.B.C. began to mention him less and less, and to repeat the transmissions of the *Slobodna Jugoslavia*. In this way, the broadcasts in the Serbo-Croat language transmitted by the B.B.C., which

were received with passionate interest by the Serbs, became the principal medium of Russian propaganda. It was at first impossible for the Serbs to believe that the voice which to them was the voice of England could be a transmitter of falsehoods. But disillusionment was, little by little, forced upon them by the enormity of these falsehoods. The B.B.C., in this way, contributed powerfully towards promoting the disintegration of loyalism and the ascendancy of the Communists in Yugoslavia. The effect was sometimes tragic in a manner that was hardly, if ever, understood in England, although it was pointed out by British officers who had witnessed the tragedy with sorrow and indignation. When, for example, after a successful engagement, men of the *Home Army* would turn on their wireless sets in eager hope of recognition from England, they would be deeply mortified and perplexed to hear the truth so falsified, to hear their own achievement, their own sacrifice, attributed to an enemy.

Early in October 1943 men of the *Home Army* blew up three small railway bridges near Vishegrad, on the line from Belgrade to Sarajevo. Then they stormed the town, which was defended by a garrison of about 800. The large railway bridge was guarded by 300 of the enemy. These, too, were killed or dispersed. Colonel Seitz, the head of the American Mission at the headquarters of General Mihailovitch, was present. So was Brigadier-General Armstrong of the British Mission. Colonel Seitz detonated the charges which had been laid by the *Home Army* and saw the destruction of the bridge. Brigadier-General Armstrong sent a report to headquarters requesting that the B.B.C. give due credit for the successful operation. Three days later, he and Colonel Seitz heard the B.B.C. announce that the *Partisans* had destroyed four bridges on the Uzhitse-Vishegrad railway. "Brigadier, this is a terrible thing," said Colonel Seitz. Brigadier-General Armstrong at once sent a message to

Cairo saying that he had himself witnessed the destruction of the bridge, adding words "which he had never used before in an official communication."¹

The Serbian peasant is often very shrewd, even when he is illiterate. Even before the year 1943 there was a dark awareness that the *Partisans* were a terrible menace. Men who owed allegiance to Mihailovitch—an allegiance that was sometimes loose and vague—had committed excesses. Some of their commanders, like Petchanats and Keserovitch, were brutal and personally ambitious.² Petchanats was repudiated by Mihailovitch and went over to the Germans. War between *Chetniks* and *Partisans*, once begun, was not always waged defensively by the former. But the *Partisans* were coming to be regarded, and, as events showed, rightly, as enemies of the Serbian peasantry, of national independence, and of all that the March Revolution represented. The effect of the broadcasts transmitted by the *Slobodna Jugoslavia* and repeated (but without indicating this source) by the British wireless was the more injurious, because broadcasts from German wireless stations, although often tendentious, were much more accurate. The inconceivable was happening: the voice of Britain was speaking falsely while the voice of Germany spoke the truth.

The *communiqués* from the headquarters of General Mihailovitch were at least authentic. They came from the scene of action, from the headquarters of an Allied Commander, with whom there was a British, and, later on, an

¹ Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42. An Australian Captain, who commanded a small force of the *Home Army* that defeated a superior force of Bulgarians early in 1944, has told us how eagerly his men listened in to the British wireless for the recognition they had so well deserved and how bitter their mortification was, when, in a broadcast that gave an otherwise accurate account of the engagement, the victory was attributed to the *Partisans*. *v.* also the article in the *Sunday Express* (26th May 1946) by Captain Michael Lees, who had a similar experience.

² *v.* Christie Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

American Mission. But the *communiqués* of *Slobodna Jugoslavia* came from Russia. This was not known to most Yugoslav listeners. Had it been known, the effect would not have been so injurious. Mihailovitch's *communiqués* were never quoted at length, either by the British press or wireless. After 1943 they were not quoted at all. Reference to Mihailovitch himself became scarce and grudging, while the B.B.C. steadily promoted the prestige of Tito.¹

In July 1943 the German authorities in Belgrade offered an award of 100,000 marks in gold to any person who would give information leading to the capture, whether dead or alive, of Tito and Mihailovitch.² The B.B.C. in its home programme³ broadcast the news that an award had been offered for the capture of Tito, but did not say that the same award had been offered for the capture of Mihailovitch.⁴

On the 1st of June 1944 King Peter of Yugoslavia made a speech urging all Yugoslavs to unite. In his speech there was no reference either to Mihailovitch or to Tito. King Peter had complete confidence in Mihailovitch as a man of honour and a loyal subject. He would certainly have wished the Yugoslavs to unite under him. But in deference to Great Britain and her policy, he refrained from mentioning his name. That the Yugoslavs should unite under Tito was abhorrent to him, though later on he gave way, against his own better judgment, to political pressure and recognised Tito as leader of the Yugoslav "resistance." In his speech

¹ According to Louis Adamic, one of Tito's chief publicists in the United States, the campaign against Mihailovitch was initiated by the *Comintern* in the summer of 1942 (Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 35).

² Notice of this award was posted up in Belgrade. It was published, with rather crude portraits of Tito and Mihailovitch, in the Belgrade daily, *Novo Vreme*, on the 21st of October 1943.

³ 3rd December 1943.

⁴ The *News Chronicle*, 11th December 1943, also mentioned the award for the capture of Tito, but not for the capture of Mihailovitch. So, also, the *Star*. Mr. Pickthorn, the Member for Cambridge University, wrote to the editor of the *Star*, calling his attention to the omission. But the letter was not published.

he called upon the Yugoslavs "to lay aside their differences and to postpone all political issues until after the liberation" of their country. Nevertheless, when the British wireless broadcast the speech to Yugoslavia, its purport was altered by the following introductory words:

"King Peter of Yugoslavia has issued today a declaration in which he calls upon his people to join together under the leadership of those who are at present fighting against the Germans—that is of Marshal Tito and the National Army of Liberation."

On the 7th of July Flight-Lieut. Teeling, the Member for Brighton, speaking in the House of Commons, said that *The Nineteenth Century and After*, which had exposed the alteration which had been made, contained "statements which certainly ought to be contradicted by the B.B.C. if they are not true." Mr. Brendan Bracken, in his reply, evaded the issue and, referring to *The Nineteenth Century and After* in defamatory terms, assured the House that there was no possibility "of answering that paper."¹ On the 2nd of August 1944 Mr. Pickthorn, the Member for Cambridge University, again raised the subject in the House.

"I wish," he said:

"to ask the Foreign Secretary a question. I have pestered him about this by letter, but I reluctantly feel it a duty to ask in public, whether, for instance, this sort of thing is fair. On June 1st King Peter of Yugoslavia issued a declaration, in almost every sentence of which he said they [the Yugoslavs] must at all costs be united, and must have no political dissension. The British Broadcasting Corporation quite properly diffused this declaration in

¹ As Mr. Brendan Bracken's statement was "privileged," it was impossible for *The Nineteenth Century and After* to institute legal proceedings against him. But the *News Chronicle* reproduced, amplified, and supported Mr. Bracken's statement. *The Nineteenth Century and After*, the Editor and the publishers, Constable and Co. Ltd., issued writs against the *News Chronicle*. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs on the 12th of July 1945.

Serbo-Croat; but preceded it with a little preface in which the announcer said: 'King Peter has issued today a declaration,' etc.

"I am not arguing, I would not argue in public, though I would in private, whether or not Marshal Tito represents nought or 50 or 100 per cent. of Yugoslav patriots. What I am saying is that the preface could not be anything else than misleading, and it seems to me that it is an immoral thing that we should let ourselves slip into that kind of misleading.

"What is worse, at least, in the short run, it is a foolish thing. It must be known—it cannot be hidden—that that has happened. It is bound to emerge a day or a week or two afterwards that those words were interpolated. There is bound to be the feeling, 'Who can trust the B.B.C.?' There is bound to be the feeling, 'This may have set out to be fair propaganda but it has turned into policy and it is becoming a policy which is not fair to us. . . .' I beg that propaganda be more carefully watched, and more care taken to see that it does not slip into policy which may have had long-term prospects for us."

Mr. Eden replied:

"I must refer to one or two points made by my Hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University. . . . He asked one specific question to which I must reply. He read out to me the Declaration of King Peter and the interpretation put on it by the B.B.C., and asked whether that was justified. I would certainly say that it was not justified. The King's declaration was addressed clearly to all the peoples of Yugoslavia and the interpretation of that declaration was not justified in the circumstances at all."

But the harm had been done. To his loyal subjects King Peter had been represented, by what they believed to be the voice of England, as one who had gone over to the *Partisans*.

In May 1944 Tito's envoy, General Velebit,¹ arrived in London from Cairo. He informed the press that there was proof that Mihailovitch had collaborated with the enemy. Although he brought this defamatory accusation against one who was an Allied Commander in the Field and a member of an Allied Government (Mihailovitch was still Minister of War) he was not called to account. He produced no valid evidence in support of his accusation. He did, however, make one significant admission. In an interview he said that

“the fight against these elements [*i.e.* the forces commanded by Mihailovitch] was as vital . . . as the fight against the foreign invader.”²

He was received as though he was an envoy of a foreign Power. Mr. Churchill spoke of him in flattering terms and held a private consultation with him. The Yugoslav Government issued a denial of General Velebit's accusations, but, with the honourable exception of the *Manchester Guardian*, the daily newspapers did not publish the denial. Not one of the leading dailies defended the cause of General Mihailovitch. In course of time, even the *Manchester Guardian*, which at least had not been against him, conformed with the general trend. It referred both to the legitimate Yugoslav Government and to General Mihailovitch in terms of growing antipathy, and on the 16th of October 1945 it published an article by Professor Seton Watson, saying that Mihailovitch

“has been gradually unmasked as one whose hatred of Russia and Pan-Serb hostility to the Croats outweighed the crying need for co-operation against the German invader.”

We have been unable to discover—nor did Professor

¹ He had been living in Cairo since September 1943. He entered the aeroplane bound for London a Colonel, and emerged a General.

² *The Central European Observer*, 12th January 1945. In this same interview, Velebit repeated his accusations of treachery against Mihailovitch.

Seton Watson mention—any word said or any action undertaken by Mihailovitch that indicated “hatred of Russia.” Even when Russian troops entered Yugoslav territory, he ordered his units to co-operate with them, and they did so, to their own cost. That he had bitter feelings towards the Croats is hardly to be wondered at. After all, Croatia had seceded from Yugoslavia, her soldiers had deserted from the Yugoslav army in great numbers, she had accepted a Government that willingly co-operated with the enemy under an Italian duke, she had declared war on Great Britain and the United States, she had invaded and annexed Serbian territory, one of her two armies, the *Ustashi*, had massacred many thousands of Serbs, and her other army the *Domobrantsi* had, together with the *Ustashi*, taken part in military operations against the forces serving under Mihailovitch. She had also despatched a force to serve under German operational command on the Russian Front. That Mihailovitch was a Pan-Serb is untrue. The Government in which Mihailovitch was Minister of War included Croats and pronounced for a federal Yugoslavia. The Congress of Yugoslav parties, which met in January 1944 and unanimously expressed its confidence in Mihailovitch, was free from any “Pan Serb” tendency, nor did Mihailovitch, when he addressed the Congress, say a word in favour of the Pan-Serb idea. The Congress also pronounced for a federal Yugoslavia. We shall presently return to this Congress and to the allegation that Mihailovitch was a “Pan-Serb.” The members of the British Mission and American Missions, who were better informed than Professor Seton Watson and the British wireless, were not free to speak, although some have spoken since.¹

¹ The correspondence in *The Times* on the 14th to 21st June 1946 and many other occasions. Also Mr. Greenlees’ articles in *The Tablet* (16th July 1946 and 16th August 1947), etc., etc. Mr. Greenlees was at the headquarters of General Mihailovitch for eighteen months as a member of the British Mission.

In the neutral press there was much recognition for Mihailovitch and his achievement. Turkish observers followed events in Yugoslavia closely, because the future, indeed the survival, of Turkey as an independent Power would be largely determined by these events. They knew something about the kind of warfare that was being waged in the Balkans and understood the deeper implications of which even eminent British observers showed a surprising ignorance: surprising, because there had been a time when "the Eastern Question" (as it used to be called) had greatly exercised the minds of British statesmen and of all who were concerned with British security in the Near and Middle East.

The Turkish newspaper *La République* referred to Mihailovitch's "heroism" and "irrepressible authority" as an example to patriots all the world over.¹ The *Tan* wrote of Mihailovitch as "this daring soldier" who "fights with all his strength for the independence and liberty of his country."² The *Vakit* stated:

"General Mihailovitch's forces have proved themselves to be real, well-organised military units. . . . Knowing that the part played by General Mihailovitch would be very important in the event of an Allied landing in the Balkans, the Germans have begun operations on a large scale to remove this danger."³

The Swedish *Stockholm Extra Bladet* referred to Mihailovitch as "the hero of the Balkans" and said of his army that it had

"prevented Yugoslavia from becoming a base where the Axis could train and organise new armies."⁴

¹ *La République*, 4th April 1942.

² 30th September 1942.

³ 6th July 1942.

⁴ 25th December 1942. This point is of some importance, though it is equally true of the *Partisans*. The general state of insurgence in Serbia made it impossible for the Germans to organise a Serbian force for war in Russia and elsewhere.

PAX BRITANNICA

The Swiss *Zürcherzeitung* stated that Mihailovitch had often "immobilised many German divisions,"¹ and the Swiss *Nation* wrote that the followers of Mihailovitch

"are fighting against the slavery imposed on their country. It can be taken for certain that the accusations against him are unfounded."²

The Spanish *Arriba* published an article from a correspondent who had visited Croatia and referred to Mihailovitch as

"a brave man of undeniable military capacity and possessing the mysterious power of appearing simultaneously in different places."³

The opinion of the enemy was expressed by Hitler himself nearly two years after the March Revolution:

"Having in view the danger in Mihailovitch's movement, I have already, in anticipation of all eventualities, issued orders for the destruction of all his supporters on the territories occupied by my troops. . . . The liquidation of Mihailovitch's movement at the present time will no longer be an easy matter, because of the forces which he has at his disposal."⁴

V

In that same year, 1943, Mihailovitch called up the 1921-22 classes for service with the colours. The response was not, and could not be, universal, for Yugoslavia was too deeply divided in its loyalties. There could be no public recruiting. Recruits had to make their way into the mountains at considerable risk and with the help of guides. Nevertheless the response was extensive. An eyewitness has described

¹ 7th January 1943.

² 1st June 1943.

³ 25th February 1943.

⁴ Speech on the 16th February 1943.

the arrival of recruits on a mountain slope in Western Serbia, and the manner in which they took the oath :

“All night through I travelled with three guides. The sky was cloudy with no moonlight. Sometimes we met groups of young men resting in the dark. Sometimes we met other groups coming by other routes. I noticed all the time that these young fellows were in best order and under a wise command. On all crossings of the routes we were met by small units, well armed, who stopped us for inspection. We came to the spot before dawn. A great crowd was felt everywhere around us. The Corps Commander, a smiling officer of about thirty with a thick chestnut beard, greeted me warmly, saying: ‘You are going to see something very wonderful.’ When the dawn broke I found myself on a woody plateau. In the middle of the woods a great meadow was full of young men. Commands were echoing from all sides. At six o’clock a.m. sharp all was quiet. The recruits were in military formations having before them their officers. The commander of the corps was informed by an officer that five thousand six hundred and seventy-three recruits were ready to take the oath of allegiance to His Majesty. After inspection of the troops the religious ceremony begins. Three Serbian Orthodox priests performed the divine service, at the end of which the young men were asked to raise their right hands with three fingers so as to cross themselves and to pronounce word by word the oath of allegiance. The moment was very solemn. All eyes of the young men were fixed on the cross of the chief priest. In that very moment a huge German plane was roaring in the vicinity but did not fly over us. At the end of this ceremony the priest first made a speech explaining the meaning of the oath, and the Corps Commander also made a very moving speech in which he told the young fellows that from this moment their lives belong to their lawful King and to their country. With long and many times repeated ‘Long live King Peter,’ ‘Long live Yugo-

slavia,' this unforgotten ceremony was ended. A member of the British Military Mission to General Mihailovitch was present at this splendid manifestation of Serbian vigour and love for liberty. No incident was reported either in coming or in going back of this great number of young King's soldiers, some of which had to walk about thirty-five miles." ¹

Towards the end of September 1943 there was a sharp engagement between a small force of the *Home Army* and part of a German division which had aeroplanes at its disposal. The Italians were surrendering under the terms of the armistice, and the *Home Army* successfully forestalled the Germans in securing Italian arms and ammunition. The *Home Army* were, for the first time, aided by a contingent of Albanians.²

Early in October the Germans moved towards the coast between Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Cattaro. Cattaro has a deep and well-protected harbour which could, if in Allied hands, be used as a base for submarines and surface ships. A force of the *Home Army*, under the command of Major Piletitch, destroyed the German garrisons at Brza-Palanka and Jabukovats and captured much war material. A force under Major Kezerovitch attacked a German detachment near Brus and did much damage, especially to the railway, in the valley of the western and southern Morava River.³

When the Italians surrendered, Split (Spalato), which they had occupied, was taken by *Partisans* who were later on ejected by the Germans. A certain Latkovitch, who escaped to join the *Home Army*, gave an account of the Communist régime. The *Partisans* established a Revolutionary Tribunal and a Concentration Camp. According to Latkovitch, between thirty and forty death sentences were

¹ *Communiqué* from General Mihailovitch's headquarters, 17th September 1943.

² *ibid.*, 20th September 1943.

³ *ibid.*, 7th October 1943.

passed by the tribunal every day. Supporters of General Mihailovitch and persons known for their nationalist or monarchist sympathies were amongst the victims. The sentences were carried out "in many barbarous ways"—the place of execution was a rocky stretch between Split and Omis. When Latkovitch was in the concentration camp, the prisoners numbered about 800. Split was bombed by the Germans and badly damaged.¹

In Western Serbia the Germans and *Ustashi* went into action with tanks and Stukas against the *Home Army*. The *Home Army* took Kalinovik, Vardiste, and Chajniche and destroyed two trains with German troops. Six hundred and twenty-seven Germans and *Ustashis* were killed. The *Home Army* captured 250 rifles, much ammunition, nineteen trucks, and seven motor cycles. They also captured the towns of Prijepolje, Nova Varos, and Priboj.² The German losses were heavy. The fighting for the coast between Ragusa and Cattaro was prolonged and fierce. The *Home Army* claimed that, thanks to the intervention of their commanders, the Italians sent nine torpedo-boats, ten seaplanes, and two transport vessels from Cattaro to Allied bases. During these engagements the *Home Army* was attacked in the rear by *Partisans*. Near Mount Tresnjevik and at Andrijevica in Old Montenegro, a force of the *Home Army* under Major Lasitch attacked the Germans, killing 287 and capturing 79. In the *communiqué* (7th October) relating to these actions there is bitter complaint that the B.B.C. attributed the successes of the *Home Army* to the *Partisans*.

In a further *communiqué* it is stated that

"Of the *Partisans* a small minority are Communists, but the Communists have the leadership and whatever effective control there is. In the regions they occupied they at first suppressed religious institutions, but have

¹ *ibid.*, 7th October 1943.

² *ibid.*, 7th October 1943.

latterly shown outward respect for them. They occupied many stricken villages only to leave them more stricken. They murdered those who seemed *bourgeois* and those who refused to join them. They would, as a rule, leave before the Germans and the *Ustashis* arrived, exposing the villages to fearful reprisals. The *Ustashis*, at the same time, favoured the Communists secretly, providing them with arms and ammunition, hoping in this way to escape the consequences of the final defeat of their protectors, the Germans. *Ustashis* also donned the uniform of the *Home Army*. That is one of the reasons why it is often difficult to distinguish between the deeds of the *Home Army* and the *Partisans*, and why the *Home Army* have sometimes seemed to be on the side of the enemy.”¹

There are further complaints about the transmission of the B.B.C.:

“On 18th September the London radio said in our language that the *Partisan* formations had been besieging the town of Kragujevats . . . the truth is that since the Germans invaded our country no *Partisan* force attacked the town of Kragujevats.”²

Two “big German army transports” on the Belgrade-Nish railway line were blown up by time bombs. Two hundred Germans were killed and many wounded—“the whole traffic on this line has been largely disorganised.”³

In a fight for Visegrad the Germans lost 354 killed and about twice as many wounded. After an assault lasting for more than twelve hours, the *Home Army* took thirty German pill-boxes, so cutting a main line of communication. The town of Petrovats was taken by assault, the *Ustashi* garrison was annihilated, and much war material was captured.⁴

¹ *Communiqué* from General Mihailovitch's headquarters, 7th October 1943.

² *ibid.*, 7th October 1943.

³ *ibid.*, 9th October 1943.

⁴ *ibid.*, 11th October 1943.

The punitive expedition composed of Germans and of "White" Russians, under General Vlassov, who were in the service of the Germans, spread terror in the province of Srem.

"The path of this expedition was marked by the hangmen. In the village of Bukovats 160 human beings, 126 of them women, were burnt alive."¹

Three hundred and eighty-five soldiers serving under General Mihailovitch were executed by the Germans in Belgrade.² "According to reliable information," 290 were executed at Chachak.³

The operations in Bosnia were making satisfactory progress in the second half of October:

"Our troops are gaining ground. The town of Rogatica and the railway stations of Ustipracha and Mesits fell into our hands. The Germans and *Ustashis* are withdrawing in complete disorder towards Sarajevo. . . . Our units are still fighting against the Bulgarian division operating west of Uzhitse. . . . In the districts of Pirot and Bela Palanka the Bulgarians burnt 24 villages as reprisals for the activities of our units."⁴

In Srem a punitive expedition of 12,000 German SS, transferred to Yugoslavia from Poland, spread terror, fire, and massacre amongst the Serb population:

"The monastery of Krusedol and five villages were completely burnt down. In the village of Bukovats 30 persons were murdered and another 30 were burnt alive in a house. In the village of Chortanovci 42 persons were killed, Vozanj 30, Putinci 32. About 6000 persons, men and women, were sent to concentration camps. . . . The invader informed the Serbian people by posters that in every place where soldiers of General Mihailovitch appear

¹ *ibid.*, 11th October 1943.

² *ibid.*, 18th October 1943.

³ *ibid.*, 16th October 1943.

⁴ *ibid.*, 18th October 1943.

these places will be bombed. Until now ten villages in southern Croatia were bombed.”¹

In the second half of October the Germans dropped leaflets from aeroplanes at night, explaining, amongst other things, that “Great Britain has abandoned her best and most faithful friend in the Balkans, General Mihailovitch,” that “for reasons of high policy she is now praising and sponsoring the Communist leader, Tito,” that “it is now obvious to every reasonable man that the Balkans are ceded to Russia as a sphere of influence,” and that “the only policy for the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is the policy of collaboration with Germany.”²

Complaints about the manner in which the military situation in Yugoslavia was being misrepresented were, finally, embodied in a message from Mihailovitch “to the free world of the United States of America and Great Britain”:

It is

“notoriously false that the Yugoslav army has been fighting them [the *Partisans*] with the help of the invader and of Quisling troops.”³

On 5th November Lieutenant Momchilo Milojkovich was executed by the Germans at Kragujevats. On the morning of his execution he sent his wife the following letter, with his last thoughts of her, of King Peter of Yugoslavia, and of General Drazha Mihailovitch:

“I shall be executed this afternoon. I am leaving you. That is our fate. I go to death with complete calm, and conscious that I give my life for my King and my country. Do not weep! Keep your head up! I am thinking of you still, my dearest, but my last thoughts in this world

¹ *Communiqué* from General Mihailovitch's headquarters, 19th October 1943.

² *ibid.*, 22nd October 1943.

³ *ibid.*, 19th October 1943.

should be devoted to my King, to Drazha, and to my country. God be with you.”¹

The *Home Army* took a certain Paja Cere prisoner, on whom the following document was found (it was dated 23rd June 1943 and bore the number 785, and the signature of Captain Velimir Terzitch, “by order of Tito”):

“Some communists, relying upon the help from plutocratic England, are forgetting the aim and ideological side of our battle. From the beginning our scheme was to impede every possible help to all guerillas from the Western Powers because that should enlarge the influence of democracy in the Balkans and naturally damage the prestige of our movement which is entirely ideological. The only power from which we intended to ask and receive the help is U.S.S.R. Unfortunately the Soviet Union, owing to her heroic struggle with all German forces, was not able to give us material help. To avoid our complete destruction we were forced to address ourselves to the western plutocracies for two reasons: Firstly, to improve the *morale* of our troops and, secondly, to use the so-called democratic friendship as means of propaganda among the *Chetniks* in order to attract them to our movement. Unfortunately this is not followed by success. With us remained only the faithful units who were ideologically built up. The *Chetnik* movement on the other side was not shaken. From what we have said, it follows that we urgently need to fill our rarefied ranks with men, regardless of their quality and their past. We are in a revolution and for the realisation of our aims we need the masses which we now do not have and without which we are condemned to an inevitable downfall. We must break into the Dalmatian towns as most suitable for us in which we may by spreading terror find a considerable number of soldiers. By this action the initiative will pass from the hands of the Yugoslav army to ours. At the same time it should exercise considerable influence on the followers of the

¹ *ibid.*, 11th November 1943.

Croatian peasant party to come out of their present passivity. Further on we must widely open the doors of our formations to the *Ustashis* who are already ripe to leave Pavelitch. It is very easy to win the *Ustashis* for our movement, putting among them the fear of repression from *Chetniks* for their criminal acts against the Serbian population.”¹

The *Partisans*

“passing through any province where they are unable to stay for long, drive all the cattle before them, take all food away, and burn all they cannot take. . . . The German invaders passing through these regions complete the work of devastation and disaster. This is happening in southern Bosnia, Hertsegovina, and Dalmatia. The people of these provinces, especially those who are far from the lines of communication, are actually starving. Disease, the inseparable comrade of starvation, is completing the misery of these martyred people.”²

“In a hospital at Berane, Montenegro, the *Partisans* murdered nineteen wounded soldiers of General Mihailovitch . . . amongst the killed were Captain Miro Dujovitch, Mita Vukichevitch, Milija Janushevitch, and Mita Seivarovitch.”³

After the collapse of Italy, the *Ustashis* joined the *Partisans* in growing numbers (amongst them was a leading *Ustashi* and member of the Croatian Parliament, Ismet Bej Pausevitch⁴).

Early in December the *Home Army* were attacked by a strong force of Germans and Bulgars in the villages of Svinjarevo and Mirjevo. There was a sharp engagement in which the enemy lost twenty-three dead and eighteen wounded. A detachment of the *Home Army*, under Captain Predrag Rakovitch, attacked the express train from Belgrade

¹ *Communiqué* from General Mihailovitch's headquarters, 6th November 1943.

² *ibid.*, 14th November 1943.

³ *ibid.*, 7th November 1943.

⁴ *ibid.*, 7th November 1943.

to Chachak. Forty-seven German and Bulgarian officers and men were disarmed, and war material, destined for the German troops in Bosnia, was captured.¹

Early in October 1943 a detachment of the *Home Army* took the railway bridge across the river Drina by storm, using only hand grenades. They lost twenty-one killed and thirty wounded. The action was witnessed by the chiefs of the British and American Military Missions. Four bridges on the Uzhitse-Vishegrad railway were also destroyed, so that German communications with the Adriatic were severed. There is a bitter complaint, in a *communiqué* issued from General Mihailovitch's headquarters, that these exploits were attributed to the *Partisans* by the *Slobodna Yugoslavia* and by the B.B.C.²

The moral support originally given to Mihailovitch by Great Britain was never followed by material support. Mr. Churchill admitted in the House of Commons on the 22nd of February 1944 that only "a few droppings from aeroplanes had been sent to him." Nevertheless, the prestige of Great Britain—and of the United States—remained immense, although dark misgivings had begun to creep in. Had a vote been taken in Serbia, indeed in all the countries between the Arctic and the Aegean during the Second World War, to decide who was the greatest man living, Mr. Churchill would have received an overwhelming majority. In Poland he was regarded as almost superhuman. Even in countries that had joined the enemy—in Finland, Hungary, Rumania—Mr. Churchill would have received many votes, perhaps even a majority, if the voters had been free to record what was in their hearts. The prestige of President Roosevelt was second only to Mr. Churchill's. The immense power of the United States, as it grew and became known, filled the peasantry of Eastern Europe with awe. But the deepest devotion amongst those nations who were the most

¹ *ibid.*, 6th December 1943.

² *ibid.*, 6th December 1943.

deeply devoted of Allies—the Poles, the Serbs, and the Greeks—went out to Mr. Churchill and to the might and majesty of Great Britain and the Empire.

All the more distressing were the broadcasts transmitted by the B.B.C. A *communiqué*¹ from the headquarters of General Mihailovitch conveys both the distress and the devotion which Great Britain and the United States inspired:

“You, in America, cannot realise what a delight it is for our peasants to have a wireless set. That is the greatest event in these dark days of our struggles and our sufferings. In the evening they are gathered around the radio awaiting the moment of the American and the London broadcasting in our language. And when the voice came out saying, ‘This is New York,’ or ‘This is London calling,’ all faces were smiling. Every word is retained in the memory of all. Throughout the next day they will discuss what they have heard the night before from America or London. They believe every word and are planning, after the information received through the radio, the course of war and the date of the liberation of our country. It is a great disappointment to them when they hear something they know is not true. This happened, for instance, a few days ago with the London radio saying that the *Partisan* units attacked the town of Kragujevats and disarmed there twenty thousand Italian soldiers. The disappointment came because it is known all over Serbia that in this province of Yugoslavia there are no *Partisan* units worth noticing and that in Kragujevats so great a number of Italians never had been stationed. Among the troops the radio is a beloved weapon. Without it the men feel blind and deaf. The radio is the best and greatest helper of the people’s resistance to the enemy throughout Europe. It happened [one] evening that the Columbia Broadcasting Company gave a full report of President Roosevelt’s address to Congress. You could not imagine what it meant for those fellows.

¹ 20th September 1943.

They were simply delighted. The astonishing figures of production and the cost of the war every day in America deeply impressed the men. Great enthusiasm was caused by the President's words saying that in Quebec it had been decided about the new landings in Europe of the Allied troops. 'There is surely not a better country for landing than Yugoslavia,' said many of the men present in one voice. The broadcasting being over, the conversation began to deal with the new disembarkment of the Allies. There was much betting about the day when Allies will land on Balkan soil."

The Germans perceived the effect of British wireless propaganda in Serbia. While they "jammed" broadcasts in other languages, they did not interfere with the broadcasts transmitted by the B.B.C. in Serbo-Croat.¹ More than this: some of these broadcasts which were particularly favourable to the *Partisans* were recorded by the Germans and re-transmitted by their own wireless stations in Yugoslavia. When, on the 22nd of February 1944, Mr. Churchill referred to General Mihailovitch in disparaging terms, his remarks were reproduced by the Germans in a leaflet which they disseminated by aeroplane in Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Hertsegovina. The Germans had every interest in exacerbating the Civil War. There is, as far as I am aware, no evidence that they regarded Tito and his *Partisans* as a serious enemy from a strategic point of view, but he was a nuisance. They made an attempt to kidnap him. It nearly succeeded. Several of his immediate *entourage* were killed or caught. He himself fled and took refuge with the British on the island of Vis. Mihailovitch

¹ To "jam" a broadcast, all that was necessary was to produce a noise on the same wavelength with a sufficiently powerful transmitter. Any listeners with an adequate wireless set could hear what broadcasts were jammed by the enemy, and it was possible, in London, for listeners to verify what was stated at the time (*e.g.* in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1944, p. 155) that transmissions by the B.B.C. in Serbo-Croat were not "jammed" when others were.

never left the mainland, never left his own people. Even when his doom was impending, he refused to leave.

By concealing their Communism, the *Partisan* leaders deceived many of their own followers. They successfully deceived public opinion in the western world. They deceived the British Mission at the headquarters of Marshal Tito. They deceived Mr. Churchill. They could not deceive the Yugoslav Socialists and Trade Unions who supported Mihailovitch. But the Yugoslav Socialists and the Trade Unions found no support, and indeed little understanding, in the Socialist International or amongst the Trade Unions outside the Balkans. A few members of the British War Cabinet, like Mr. Morrison, had grave doubts as to the soundness of British policy in Yugoslavia. They suspected that the interests of Communism and not the interests of Yugoslavia and of Great Britain were being served. Their suspicions were based not so much on specific knowledge as on a shrewd instinct and on experience of Communism in general. But they were not well enough informed effectively to oppose Mr. Churchill, who was more than sufficiently misinformed. His policy prevailed without a serious conflict within the War Cabinet. And yet, little foresight and only a little insight were needed to see that if the *Partisans* were to prevail, Yugoslavia would become a Communist State, a Russian dependency hostile to the Western Powers. But the information supplied by the British Mission at the headquarters of Marshal Tito was worse than worthless. English revolutionary romanticism operated like some defect of vision that made it impossible for the press and wireless to present an undistorted picture. And there were, in London, Cairo, and Bari, a number of persons employed in the *Intelligence* and other services who perpetrated that kind of perfidy, which, whether unconscious or semi-conscious, is peculiar to the tribe of *Fellow Travellers*. Tainted, doctored, and perverted in-

formation "from below," persistent and cumulative, deflected policy and promoted a betrayal that dimmed the brightness of British honour.

VI

On the 4th of May 1941 Hitler announced that the Yugoslav State had ceased to exist. The collapse of the Royal Yugoslav Army induced General Simovitch to make overtures to the enemy, not with the object of capitulation, but in the hope of gaining time for the Government to escape and to conduct the war from overseas. The Yugoslav army never capitulated. The signal that it would fight on was given by Mihailovitch on the 10th of May, when he hoisted the Royal Yugoslav colours on Ravna Gora. This signal announcement was a juridical, political, and administrative, as well as a military, action, for it reaffirmed the existence *de jure* and *de facto* of the Yugoslav State.

The first *National Committee*, representing the Yugoslav Government, which had gone abroad, and acting as its executive on Yugoslav soil, was formed in August 1941. The Royal Yugoslav Government, recognised as such by the Allied and Neutral Powers, had left the country and was unable to communicate with the *National Committee* which had to meet in secret and was unable to act as an effective administration. It owed allegiance to the Government and, although it could not receive instructions, it acted as best it could on behalf of the Government.

Not until the end of 1943 was it able to hold its first Congress and declare its principles to Yugoslavia and to the world. The Congress was attended by General Mihailovitch, who, as Minister of War, was the representative of that Government at the Congress and the *liaison* between the Government and the *Committee*.

On the 6th of November representatives of the larger

municipalities and districts occupied by the Hungarians met secretly and passed a unanimous resolution of support for General Mihailovitch and of loyalty to the Yugoslav Government and Crown. On the 1st of December General Mihailovitch and the *National Committee* issued a joint manifesto to the Yugoslav nation. This manifesto commemorated the rising of the Serbs under the leadership of Karadjordje, and the liberation from the Turks, as well as the resolution, passed on the 1st of December 1918, by which the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene delegates assembled in the *Narodno Vece* submitted to the Serbian Regent, Alexander, their decision to unite under one crown. The manifesto was also a declaration for a "profound revival" of "social life," for freedom and "true democracy," for the free "development and progress" of the three peoples, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, each on its own territory. It closed with the words:

"Our freedom is now dawning. Our young and beloved King is now not far from his country. Let us prepare what is necessary to welcome our freedom and our King in a dignified manner, remembering the numberless victims we have given and are still giving, aware of the responsibility which these victims have conferred upon us, and of our responsibility in the presence of our history which compels us to take a better road after this war than the road we took after the union twenty-five years ago. Long live his Majesty King Peter II. Long live our martyred nation. Long live the Kingdom of Yugoslavia!"

This manifesto was a reaffirmation of the March Revolution and the promise of a democratic, federal Yugoslavia. It was a complete repudiation of the Pan-Serbs, who, chiefly because of the unhappy association with the Croats between the two wars, the secession of Croatia in 1941, and the massacres of Serbs perpetrated by the *Ustashi*,

turned against Yugoslavia, the multinational State, and demanded a single, national State, Serbia, without Croats and Slovenes.

On the 13th of December the *National Committee*, which included Croatian delegates, passed a unanimous resolution in support of the declaration issued by the Yugoslav Government in Cairo, for the union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in one State, under one commander, the King, under one lawfully constituted Government. In this resolution the *Committee* declared that the Croats who were for Yugoslavia were a majority of the Croatian people, and that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were united "in the ranks of the Yugoslav army under the leadership of the legendary hero, General Mihailovitch."

On the 26th, 27th, and 28th of January 1944 the first Yugoslav *National Congress* since the German invasion was held secretly in the mountains. It was attended by 273 delegates who arrived from all parts of the country and represented the chief political parties (excepting the Communist and Croat Peasant Parties) and the more important religious bodies. The chairman was Dr. Zhivko Topalovitch, the Leader of the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party, who had represented Yugoslavia in the International Labour Office at Geneva. The Congress decided to form a coalition of all parties, to be known as the *Yugoslav Democratic National Union*. A programme was drafted, and adopted unanimously, for a federal Yugoslavia (in which Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia were to have equality of status) and for social and constitutional reform. The Congress declared its allegiance to the constitutional monarchy. It condemned the attempt of the Communists to make arbitrary changes in the constitution, and called upon the Yugoslav Communist Party

"to abandon its injurious disruptive activities, both military and political, and to submit with all other political

and non-political groups to the general national discipline during the war of liberation.”

Many of the delegates had travelled for more than three weeks to attend the Congress. Their journey had been made possible by the national organisation of which Mihailovitch was the chief and by the escorts which the *Home Army* provided.

After the Congress, the delegates reviewed the troops who had guarded the approaches to the place of assembly. These men were wretchedly clad and shod. Many of them had taken part in numerous actions against the enemy. Dr. Topalovitch addressed the troops, thanked them on behalf of the Congress, and expressed the gratitude of the Yugoslav nation for their heroic deeds. Before the Congress dispersed it was addressed by General Mihailovitch, who said:

“I thank you for inviting me to attend this Congress, my dear brothers. I consider it my duty as a man and as the responsible leader in the present struggle for the existence of our three peoples to pay my respect to the warriors and to the innocent victims who have fallen in this struggle. I think I shall interpret your own wishes if I declare, in this historic Congress, that the families of all fallen victims will always be the object of our care and concern. . . . Our nation, which is small in number but great in spirit, was throughout its history, and still is, an object of the world’s admiration by reason of its struggle for life. By its tenacity and its fighting qualities it has compelled even the respect of the enemy. . . . As a soldier, who by birth and character belongs to this freedom-loving and heroic nation, I could not abandon, and did not wish to abandon, my Commander-in-Chief, His Majesty King Peter II. The army and I are faithful and will remain faithful to the constitutional and legal order of Yugoslavia, and, as long as we live, we shall be the defenders of Yugoslav territorial integrity. We, and the

army, and I personally, believe that only a free and democratically elected national representative body has the right to recognise our State in accordance with the constitution. . . .”

The Congress sent greetings to King Peter of Yugoslavia, to the Yugoslav Government, to Mr. Churchill, to President Roosevelt, to Marshal Stalin, to the Polish, Greek, and Czechoslovak Governments, and to General de Gaulle.

Soon after,¹ representatives of all Serbian parties (except the Communists) held a secret joint meeting and passed a resolution of loyalty to King Peter and to the Yugoslav Government, and demanded that democratic institutions be restored in a united Yugoslavia.

Dr. Topalovitch believed that if he were to visit London, he would find a hearing because he had many friends and acquaintances in the International Labour movement and would be able to remove some of the disastrous misapprehensions which existed with regard to events in Yugoslavia. He believed that as a Social Democrat and as former representative of the Yugoslav Trade Unions at Geneva, he would not be treated as a “reactionary.” He left Yugoslavia in May 1944, was able to reach Italy, but could not obtain permission to visit England. So great was the prejudice in favour of Tito and against Mihailovitch amongst the British authorities at Bari and in Cairo, that it had become impossible for anyone who understood the situation as it really was in Yugoslavia to find a hearing. Dr. Topalovitch, when he realised that he would not be allowed to visit England, prepared a Memorandum² in the hope that it might help to remove the misapprehensions that prevailed in London. But in vain.

¹ Late in February or early in March.

² The full text of the Memorandum was published in *The Nineteenth Century and After* (September 1944).

On the 22nd February 1944 Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons:

“In Yugoslavia we give our aid to Marshal Tito . . . in spite of the most ferocious and murderous cruelties and reprisals perpetrated by the Germans, not only against hostages, but against the village populations, including women and children, the *Partisans* have the upper hand. The Germans hold the principal towns and try to keep the railways working. They can march their columns hither and thither. They own the ground they stand on, but nothing else. All the rest belongs to the valiant *Partisans*.

“The guerilla bands under General Mihailovitch . . . were the first to take the field and represent, to a certain extent, the forces of the old Serbia. For some time after the defeat of the Yugoslav army, these forces maintained a guerilla. We were not able to send them any aid or supplies except a few droppings from aeroplanes. General Mihailovitch, I regret to say, drifted into a position in which some of his commanders made accommodations with Italian and German troops, which resulted in their being left alone in certain mountain areas, and, in return, doing very little or nothing against the enemy.

“However, a new and far more formidable champion appeared on the scene. In the autumn of 1941 Marshal Tito made a wild and furious war against the Germans. They wrested weapons from the Germans' hands, they grew in number rapidly; no reprisals, however bloody, whether upon hostages or the villages, deterred them. Soon they began to inflict heavy injuries on the Germans and became masters of wide regions. Led with great skill, organised on the guerilla principle, they were at once elusive and deadly. They were here, they were there, they were everywhere. Large scale offensives have been launched against the Germans, but, in every case, the *Partisans*, even when surrounded, have escaped after inflicting great loss and toll upon the enemy. The *Partisan* movement soon outstripped the forces of General Mihailo-

vitch . . . he [Tito] has at this moment more than a quarter of a million men under him. . . .

“These forces are at this moment holding in check no fewer than 14 German divisions, out of 20 in the Balkan peninsula. Around and within these heroic forces, a national unifying movement has developed. The Communist movement had the honour of being the beginner, but, as the movement increased in strength and number, a modifying and unifying process has taken place, and national conceptions have supervened. In Marshal Tito the *Partisans* found an outstanding leader, glorious in the fight for freedom. Unhappily, perhaps inevitably, these new forces came into collision with those of General Mihailovitch.”

Mr. Churchill recognised that General Mihailovitch had “endeavoured to repress” the “accommodations” alleged to have been made with the enemy by “some of his commanders,” but asserted that

“of course, the *Partisans* of Marshal Tito are the only ones who are doing any effective fighting against the enemy. . . . I can assure the House that every effort in our power will be made to aid and sustain Marshal Tito and his gallant band. The Marshal sent me a message during my illness, and I have since been in constant and agreeable correspondence with him. . . .”

With regard to King Peter, Mr. Churchill said:

“We cannot in any way dissociate ourselves from him. He has undoubtedly suffered in the eyes of the *Partisans* by his association with General Mihailovitch and his subordinate commanders.”

On the 24th of May 1944 Mr. Churchill said, with reference to the formation of a new Yugoslav Government, that

“this process involves the severance from the Royal

Yugoslav Government of General Mihailovitch as Minister of War."

As for Marshal Tito, Mr. Churchill reaffirmed what he had said on the 22nd February:

"We are sending, and planning to send, the largest possible supply of weapons to him and to make the closest contact with him. . . . Marshal Tito has largely sunk his Communist aspect in his character as a Yugoslav leader. He repeatedly proclaims he has no intention of reversing the property and social systems which prevail in Serbia. . . .

" . . . at present upward of 12 German divisions are gripped in Yugoslavia alone and 20 in all . . . in the Balkans and the Aegean islands."

Misled as Mr. Churchill had been, he was not so ill-informed and he was more chivalrous than some of the newspapers.¹ He did not question Mihailovitch's loyalty to the cause of the Allied Powers, but only the loyalty of "some of his commanders." Nevertheless, his remarks were unjustly disparaging and they reveal deep incomprehension, both with regard to the nature of Communism and to events in Yugoslavia. He said that the *Partisans* had "the upper hand" "in spite of the terrible reprisals undertaken by the Germans." But the truth was, that they were growing stronger not "in spite of," but largely because of, these reprisals, as I have tried to show.

The *Partisans* were engaged in armed rebellion against the Yugoslav State, the Throne, the constitutional order, and

¹ *E.g.* the *News Chronicle*, 11th of December 1945, in which Mr. Cummings asserted that Mihailovitch was a "traitor." He invoked the authority of Mr. Zilliacus, who, with other Members of Parliament, "saw a public exhibition of documents which prove incontrovertibly that Mihailovitch was a traitor on the side of the Germans" (*italics my own*). Mr. Cummings went on to say, "I believe he [Mihailovitch] is at present in Switzerland." Mihailovitch never left Yugoslavia from the day the war began until the day of his execution.

the Royal Yugoslav Army.¹ General Mihailovitch and the army were defending the Yugoslav State, the March Revolution, and the independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. He had no illusions with regard to the Communists and the *Partisans*. He knew, as Mr. Churchill did not know, that Tito had in no way "sunk his Communist aspect," that the *Partisans* were under the control of the Communists, that they were not a national movement, but part of an international movement, and that if they prevailed, Yugoslavia would lose her independence. He was under an absolute obligation to resist the *Partisans*—the plain obligation of patriotism and of loyalty as an officer of the King. Had he made no attempt to resist them, he would indeed have been a traitor. He had hoped that it would be possible to collaborate with them as long as the foreign enemy was on Yugoslav soil, that the internal struggle (which he regarded as inevitable) for mastery would be postponed until the time when the foreign enemy had been expelled. At the same time, although a Serb, with a great love of his people, he was not a Serb nationalist. The March Revolution was after his own heart, not only because it brought Yugoslavia into the war on the side of Great Britain, but also because it was popular and democratic (he himself was a Socialist), and because, although almost exclusively Serb, it was a revolution not only on behalf of Serbia but on behalf of all Yugoslavia. General Mihailovitch used his influence with the Royal Yugoslav Government in London to oppose all manifestations of Serb nationalism that might be prejudicial to a federal Yugoslavia. In September 1941 he sent Dr. Sekulitch, a man with a deep knowledge and practical experience of Communism (he had been resident in Russia during the

¹ The Royal Yugoslav Air Force had ceased to exist. What was left of the Royal Yugoslav Navy fought under British command and remained loyal to King Peter until the end.

year 1917), to urge upon his Government the necessity of collaborating with the Communists, of including a member of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the Cabinet, and of opposing all Pan-Serbian and Pan-Croatian tendencies.¹

These tendencies were strengthened by the massacres of Serbian peasants by the Croats and by the obstructive tactics of the Croat Ministers. Nevertheless, they were overcome within the Government itself which unreservedly endorsed the idea of a federal Yugoslavia. Serious collaboration with the Communists became impossible because they regarded the struggle against the external enemy as less important than their struggle for power in Yugoslavia. If we accept their premisses, we must recognise that they were right. The war itself, and the conditions created by the war in Yugoslavia, gave them a possibility of making themselves masters of the country, a possibility that might never recur. They had—at all costs, from their point of view—to be the masters before the Germans left the country, that is to say, as long as the national movement, and, in particular, the *Home Army*, was absorbed by the struggle against the Germans and the allies and auxiliaries of the Germans. Had the war ended earlier—say in 1943—the Communists would have failed. Even as it was, they could not have succeeded if they had not been supported so powerfully by Great Britain, and, later on, by the United States.

The anarchy, destitution, and despair caused by German reprisals were immensely damaging to the national movement, which depended upon the trade unions, the co-operatives, the civil administration as well as upon the *Home Army*. They were wholly advantageous to the *Partisans*, indeed essential to their ultimate triumph. The *Partisans*

¹ The Pan-Serbs were in favour of a *Greater Serbia*, which would include all regions with Serbian minorities as well as Serbia itself. The idea of a *Greater Croatia* was partly and temporarily achieved during the war with German help.

were not injured at all by the reprisals which increased the disintegration of the existing order, an order which the Communists themselves wished to destroy, so that they might replace it by another. The reprisals also enlarged the multitude of the uprooted, destitute, and desperate, a multitude from which the *Partisans* drew so many of their recruits.

As we have seen, it was the *Partisans* who, on Tito's own admission, took the initiative in fighting the *Home Army*. It is true that they were, at first, willing to collaborate with Mihailovitch, but they made a condition which he could not accept: that *Political Commissars* should serve with the *Home Army*. The *Political Commissar* is a Communist institution. He may hold no special military rank, but his competence exceeds that of the military commander. He is concerned with the political indoctrination of the men and with the removal of officers whose political views may be unfavourable to Communism. He can override even tactical decisions and countermand orders given by the officers. Had Mihailovitch accepted this condition, he would not only have exposed his army to seditious propaganda and active disaffection, but also to a struggle for power within the army itself. The *Partisans* and the *Home Army* did fight side by side against the external enemy upon occasion, but general collaboration between them under a united command was impossible from the beginning.

Mr. Churchill said that the *Partisans* "were here . . . there" and "everywhere." Until the war was approaching its end, they were not in Serbia at all. Serbia, except for the principal towns, was in the hands of the *Home Army*. Mr. Churchill, in the same speech, said that "the Germans hold the principal towns." How could the *Partisans* be "everywhere" if they did not "hold the principal towns"? Whoever held these was master of Yugoslavia. It was more important to hold them than to hold the villages and

mountains. The Germans were the strategic masters of Yugoslavia from the time they entered the country until the time they withdrew—only then did the *Partisans* take, what they had been unable to take until then, the “principal towns,” and so became the masters. All the Germans needed to “hold” were the “principal towns” and the lines of communication. They needed the produce of the countryside for their commissariat, and, therefore, they needed the co-operatives. But the co-operatives were supporters of General Mihailovitch, as we have seen, giving his men as much and the Germans as little as they could, and helping to keep the urban populations alive. That is why the Germans found it so hard to feed their own troops. Neuhausen, the German controller of the Serbian economy, was tried as a “war criminal” at Belgrade in October 1947. He was cross-examined with regard to DIRIS, the Food Office established by the Germans. He admitted that DIRIS had been unable to function. When the judge asked him why, he replied, “Drazha Mihailovitch!” There was laughter in court, whereupon Neuhausen turned to the public and said:

“Yes, he [Drazha Mihailovitch] told the peasants not to sell wheat to us, because it was necessary for his army.”¹

The Germans, according to Mr. Churchill, tried to keep the railways working. They did so with success. Bridges were blown up by the *Home Army*, rails were removed, convoys were attacked, but although the lines of communication were extremely long and passed through wild and desolate country, the transport of troops and of supplies for the German forces in the Balkans and in Africa was never effectively interrupted. The Germans could indeed “move their troops hither and thither about the

¹ *Politika*, 26th October 1947.

country," by road and by rail. Mr. Churchill's own words were a complete admission that the Germans were in effective occupation.

Mr. Churchill referred to "effective fighting" by the *Partisans*. But it is impossible to discover, even in the propaganda of the *Partisans*, even in the broadcasts of the *Slobodna Yugoslavia*, any evidence of any major offensive against the Germans. When it seemed that they might become a serious menace, in a military sense, the Germans would attack them. The *Partisans* would then disengage their forces. This they usually did with skill and courage, suffering severe casualties at times, and inflicting casualties on the enemy.¹ But they did not fight one action that could compare even with a minor action in the great campaigns of the war. They were, throughout, resolved to preserve their main forces against excessive loss because these forces were needed, not to defeat the Germans, but for the conquest of Yugoslavia.

It is true that some of Mihailovitch's commanders made "accommodations" with the enemy. They had to contend with a number of enemies. To play off one enemy against the other whenever possible was nothing but sound strategy.

In 1943 the *Partisans* were attacked by the Germans and Italians and retreated into Serbia. The *Home Army* had successfully defended Serbia against them and was under the absolute necessity of maintaining this defence if it was not to lose its great stronghold. In 1943 it attacked the *Partisans* in the Neretva Valley as they advanced through a gap in the line of encirclement which the enemy had thrown. In this manner, Germans, Italians, and *Home Army* were simultaneously in action against the *Partisans*.

Mihailovitch regarded the Italians as far less dangerous than the Germans, and rightly so. He himself never made "accommodations" either with the Germans or the Italians.

¹ There appears to be no evidence that these casualties were heavy.

None of his commanders made "accommodations" with the Germans under his orders. Some of them made "accommodations" with the Italians, not, perhaps, under his orders, but with his tacit consent. They bought arms off the Italians and held captured Italian officers to ransom for arms. The Italian commander, General Roatta, was an Italian patriot who was also an Anglophile. He did not wish Italian troops to serve in Russia. The Italians hoped to retain some influence in the Balkans and feared a peace that would leave the Germans the sole masters. They were more merciful than the Germans. They saved the lives of fugitive Jews and of Serbian families that fled from Croatian massacres. They gave arms to the Serbian peasants, enabling them to defend their lives and their homes against marauders. The "accommodations" between forces of the *Home Army* and the Italians were in no way prejudicial to the Allied cause. On the contrary, they gave the *Home Army* more freedom to fight the Germans and weapons which Great Britain, at first, could not, and then would not, give.

The *Partisans* also made "accommodations" with the enemy, and that, too, was but sound strategy from their point of view. On the 3rd of July 1944 they negotiated a local armistice with the German commander near Gorizia. They agreed not to approach within ten kilometres of the German garrison. The Germans, in return, agreed not to come within ten kilometres of *Partisan* concentrations and to let the *Partisans* have arms and medical supplies.

There was but this difference between the "accommodations" made by the *Home Army* and the *Partisans*. The *Partisans* made them the better to fight the *Home Army*, the *Home Army* made them the better to fight the Germans. The *Partisans* fought the Germans the better to fight the *Home Army* (and knowing that if they did not fight the Germans, they would receive no help from Great Britain).

But whereas the *Partisans* fought the Germans as little as possible to fight the *Home Army* as much as possible, the *Home Army* fought the *Partisans* as little as possible to fight the Germans as much as possible.

Mihailovitch, as we have seen, refused to undertake operations which, although they had little or no military value, provoked terrible reprisals. "Accommodations" which left units of the *Home Army* "alone in certain mountain areas" made it possible to proceed with the task of preparing the general insurrection against the invaders. Mihailovitch had agents in General Neditch's army. They were, of course, on the pay rolls of that army, and this engendered further charges of "collaboration" against Mihailovitch. These agents served under General Neditch, so as to strike at him, when the time should come, and lead his Serbian troops against the Germans.

Mr. Churchill referred to fourteen (or "upwards of twelve") German divisions in Yugoslavia as though they were held by the *Partisans*. It is impossible to say how many German divisions there would have been had there been no *Partisans*—probably more than fourteen, for the Germans would have had to contend with a united nation, or at least a Serbian nation in process of achieving Yugoslav unity, supported by many Croats and many Slovenes, and led by the *Home Army* which would have been able to concentrate exclusively against the external foe. The fourteen divisions were not of the best. The Germans rightly regarded warfare with irregulars as far less exacting than warfare with regulars. After all, the whole of the irregular warfare waged against them in the whole of Europe throughout the war was not equivalent to one day of El Alamein or Stalingrad. The Germans regarded Mihailovitch as more formidable than Tito because he had an army "in being," a regular army, the *cadre* of a national rising against them to coincide with the arrival of the Allied armies. But, in

the end, they could safely leave the task of annihilating the *Home Army* to the *Partisans* and Great Britain. In effect, the *Partisans* were the best auxiliaries the Germans had. They effectively prevented Yugoslavia from becoming a serious menace to the German coalition.

Mr. Churchill said that Great Britain was "sending, and planning to send the largest possible supply of weapons" to Marshal Tito, who did all the "effective fighting," whereas General Mihailovitch had received only "a few droppings" and was, presumably, to receive no more. How could Mihailovitch do as much "effective fighting" as Tito did, or might have done, if he was denied the means?

Mr. Churchill said that Tito the Communist was "largely submerged" in Tito the patriot. He accepted Tito's assurance that there would be no changes in the social and political order in Yugoslavia! Did he expect Tito, a life-long, hardened, indoctrinated Communist, to betray the Communist cause, to miss the opportunity, offered by unimaginable good fortune, to establish a Communist dictatorship in the Balkans and extend the might of the Soviet Union to the Adriatic and to the Aegean? Propagandists call Mihailovitch a traitor even today. Was Tito a traitor? Whether he was so in a legal sense is not certain, for it is uncertain whether he was a Yugoslav subject owing allegiance to the Yugoslav Crown. But his allegiance by personal conviction and life-long service was to the *Comintern*. And to that allegiance he remained faithful. Mr. Churchill did Tito even more dishonour than he did Mihailovitch. He never said, and surely he never thought, that Mihailovitch was a traitor and never expected him to be one. But it would seem that he expected Tito to betray the cause he served.

That Tito was ostentatiously amiable and outwardly compliant when the occasion demanded was not surprising.

He would have been worse than a fool had he not responded to the marvellously favourable opportunities which Mr. Churchill offered to him. If Paris *valait bien une messe*, Belgrade was well worth a little flattery, a few kind words to the British Prime Minister in his illness, a few assurances of political moderation, and a few promises to be broken at the earliest opportunity.

Marshal Tito resembles the late Field Marshal Goering in his crude facetiousness, in a certain joviality, in a love of ostentation, and of food and drink, and even in appearance—in fullness of feature, in resplendence of uniform, in sashed and bemedalled corpulence. Both had cruelty, craft, courage and constancy. Where they differed, they differed to Tito's advantage—at least Tito is not lazy. He is a man of great ability and experience, and a man of iron. His long training as an agent and practical revolutionary was perfected by three years of theoretical schooling in Moscow. He speaks Russian like a Russian, German, French, Hungarian, and probably Spanish (he took part in the Spanish Civil War). He speaks Serbo-Croat with a slight local accent. That Mr. Churchill was captivated, having been so assiduously "conditioned" by his advisers to whom he lent too willing an ear, is a tribute to the expansiveness of the British Prime Minister, but hardly to his political insight. But the nature concealed by the ingratiating exterior of Marshal Tito, the hard fanaticism, the crooked malignance, the calculated mendacity, the cold cunning and the utter ruthlessness, is wholly alien to the confiding and chivalrous nature of Mr. Churchill.

How was such a deception possible? I have referred to the disparity of the two British Missions, the one with Tito, the other with Mihailovitch. The leading members of the former, Brigadier-General Maclean, Colonel Deakin, and Major Randolph Churchill, had the ear of the Prime Minister, but were inexperienced in Balkan affairs and

easily influenced by plausible propaganda. Colonel Bailey, the head of the Mission with Mihailovitch, knew the Balkans and spoke Serbian fluently. Besides, Mihailovitch was no deceiver. Indeed, he had no interest in deception. His interest was that the true state of Yugoslavia become known. Tito's interest was that it should remain unknown.

The leaders of the British Mission with Marshal Tito judged the situation as they saw it, but they saw little, and, what they saw, they saw through spectacles coloured by Tito's propaganda. But mere credulity cannot be urged in defence of those who, in June 1944, compiled a *Handbook* entitled *The National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia*.¹ This *Handbook*, which was issued by the *Political Intelligence* in the Middle East, is a striking example of the illusions that prevailed in certain departments and services during the war, especially in the Middle East.

In their prefatory *notes* the authors of the *Handbook* admit that it is

“necessarily based, whether directly or indirectly, largely on *Partisan* sources” but that “evidence has only been included . . . after having been thoroughly sifted and checked against all other available material” (p. 7).

In the *Introduction* it is stated that

“the military achievements of the *Partisans* have been remarkable. With few arms and supplies they have built up an army of over a quarter of a million men. This army, as Mr. Churchill informed the House of Commons on 22nd February 1944, was then holding in check fourteen out of the twenty German divisions in the Balkan peninsula, in addition to six Bulgarian divisions and other satellite forces” (p. 8).

We search the *Handbook* in vain for evidence of the “remarkable military achievements” of the *Partisans* or for

¹ Covering the period from April 1941-March 1944.

any indication that there might have been reasons other than their presence which induced the enemy to maintain twenty divisions and over (German, Bulgarian, and "other satellites") in Yugoslavia. We are told that the *Partisans* "roused Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to a consciousness of South Slav solidarity" (p. 8), but receive no hint of the deep division which the *Partisans* carried into an already deeply divided Yugoslavia. We are told that they are "resolved to achieve" the "re-emergence of a Yugoslav State" and that they "intend to build" this State "on new democratic and federal lines." Had the authors of the *Handbook* possessed any political insight, they would have known this to be untrue, as events have shown, for the new State is not democratic (and was never meant to be), and although it is federal in form, it is in fact a rigidly centralised bureaucratic absolutism.

We are told that

"armed resistance to the Axis forces of occupation in Yugoslavia first started . . . in June 1941" (p. 9),

and that

"The signal for the rising was given by the German invasion of Russia which, stirring the traditional pro-Russian sentiments of the Yugoslavs, also gave their cue to the Yugoslav Communist Party which lent cohesion, drive, and discipline to the popular movement" (p. 9).

Thus we are led to believe, by a dexterous use of unsubstantiated allegations, that even in 1941 the only serious resistance to the enemy was offered by the *Partisans* under Communist leadership and that they were the "popular movement." Of Communist hostility to participation in the war before Russia was invaded, the *Handbook* makes no mention. As for the "traditional pro-Russian sentiments of the Yugoslavs," they existed only amongst the Serbs. Croatia went over to the enemy and declared war on Great

Britain, as we have seen. She fought both against the *Home Army* and the *Partisans*, and Croatian troops fought on the side of the *Wehrmacht* in Russia.

We are told that the *Chetniks*

“broadly speaking . . . consisted of army officers and the more conservative national elements” (p. 9).

The term *Chetniks* is used uncritically, and, although they did include “army officers” and “conservative national elements,” they “consisted” of far more than this, for their main supporters were the Serbian peasantry as a whole, the co-operatives, and the trade unions, as I have tried to show. The authors of the *Handbook* ignore the existence of the *Home Army* (as distinct from the *Chetniks*). They tell us that the *Partisans* consisted of “workers, peasants, students, and left-wing intellectuals,” so that we are led falsely to believe that General Mihailovitch was but the leader of a conservative and upper-class minority, while Marshal Tito was the leader of industrial workmen and of the peasantry—of *the people*, in short.

There is hardly a page of the *Handbook* that is not packed with misrepresentation. Only here and there do the authors afford a glimpse of the realities they would conceal. Having represented the *Partisans* as the only serious force in Yugoslavia from the beginning, they suddenly extol their achievement in smashing not only the “Fourth Axis Offensive”¹ but also in “liquidating the Četnik bands of Draža Mihailović as a serious political and military force” (p. 11).² To suit their purpose, the authors invoke any authority, however spurious. For example, they tell that, according to Ljotitch, “the Serb Fascist leader,” “as much as four-fifths

¹ The authors of the *Handbook* say they have based their notes on the “Fourth and Fifth Offensives . . . on the official account given by Tito.” But they make no attempt to subject this “official account” to critical analysis.

² Italics my own.

of all Serbia was in the hands of the insurgents" by October 1941 (p. 9). The context would lead us to suppose that "four-fifths of all Serbia" was in the hands of the *Partisans* by that time. Even the *Partisans* themselves had not the effrontery to make such a claim. As for Ljotitch, he was one of the rare Serbs who believed fanatically in the German idea. He was at pains to misrepresent all who resisted the Germans in Yugoslavia as "Bolsheviks." His misrepresentations conveniently support those that are purveyed in the *Handbook*.

The authors assert that the *Partisans* claim to have captured a quantity of "Četnik documents disclosing Mihailović's plan"

"with the assistance of the Germans, Italians and the Ustaše, to destroy the National Army of Liberation and secure for themselves a future rule of repression over the peoples of Yugoslavia" (p. 11).

There is no suggestion that this "claim" made by the *Partisans* might be open to doubt. And yet a falser "claim" could not be imagined. But it serves the purpose of the *Handbook*: to make General Mihailovitch appear the blackest of traitors and the would-be tyrant of Yugoslavia.

The *Handbook* refers to Dr. Gavrilovitch, who was a consistent and tenacious promoter of good-fellowship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,¹ as a "forceful exponent" of "Great Serb . . . convictions" when he was a member of the "émigré Government" in London (p. 36). This statement is untrue. Dr. Gavrilovitch opposed all "Great" or "Pan Serb convictions" as consistently as he supported the plan, endorsed by General Mihailovitch, for a Federal and Democratic Yugoslavia. General Mihailovitch is also referred to, falsely, as a

¹ When Dr. Gavrilovitch was in Moscow he left nothing undone to warn Stalin and Molotov, who were at first incredulous, that Germany would go to war with the Soviet Union.

“Great Serb” and charged—falsely—with having “committed himself to certain political ideas . . . above all, hostility to the Left” (p. 31). Mihailovitch was himself a man of the Left, as we have pointed out. It is the evident purpose of the *Handbook* throughout to identify the *Partisans* with the entire “Left” in Yugoslavia and with the people of Yugoslavia, and to identify Mihailovitch, his supporters, and the Yugoslav Government with the “Right” or with “Reaction.”

We are told that “the Communists, who held the reins of political leadership, had to renounce all claims to a monopoly of political power if the movement was to develop on a nation-wide scale” (p. 53). The truth is that as “the movement” spread, the Communists established a national monopoly of political power.¹

We are told that General Mihailovitch “was regarded by the mass of his countrymen as a traitor” (p. 55), but search the *Handbook* in vain for the evidence. The truth is that Mihailovitch was greatly honoured as a hero-patriot by “the mass of his countrymen” who, today, honour him as a martyr as well.

The authors of the *Handbook* grow enthusiastic over the virtues of the *Partisans* (p. 72 ff.), their love of education, their deep respect for religion, their exemplary system of justice, and so on. The attitude of the Communist Party toward women, in particular, is the object of special commendation. It is, we are told, “in such contrast to the Küche, Kirche, Kinder philosophy of the Nazis” (p. 77). The phrase “Küche, Kirche, Kinder” was attributed to the Emperor Wilhelm II before the First World War. It has

¹ Some glimmering that this would be so dawned even on the authors of the *Handbook*. They say “it seems unlikely” but is “not impossible” that “all political power will be concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party” after the war, but if that is so, it will be so because the nation will be convinced that only the Communist Party can offer “bold and constructive leadership” (p. 56).

nothing to do with "the Nazis," who would be surprised to learn that their "philosophy" could be regarded as a stimulus to church-going.

All assurances of the kind with which Marshal Tito plied Mr. Churchill with regard to democracy, the respect for private property and for individual enterprise (*v.*, in particular, p. 64 of the *Handbook*) are accepted uncritically, although the authors do add a word of caution. To predict the future "order" in Yugoslavia must, so they tell us, "be nothing but speculation, for, of course, the 'people' will choose for themselves" (according to a statement quoted from one of the broadcasts of the *Slobodna Jugoslavija*). Even this speculative prognostication was falsified by events. The "people" were not allowed to "choose for themselves."

The Royal Yugoslav Government was an Allied Government, King Peter was an Allied sovereign, General Mihailovitch was an Allied commander in the field (and, until the summer of 1944, a member of that Government), Yugoslav troops, loyal to their King and devoted to General Mihailovitch, were fighting side by side with British troops in the desert, the small Yugoslav Fleet, manned by crews equally loyal and devoted, was attached to the British Fleet in operations against the enemy. That such mendacious propaganda against all these men believed in was issued under British authority and was circulated amongst British officers in the Middle East is surely one of the scandals of the Second World War.

The Cabinet had formal responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. Effective responsibility was Mr. Churchill's. He never strove to be a dictator. But his conduct of foreign affairs was often extremely personal. He was, in effect, his own Foreign Secretary, being far more of a personality than Mr. Eden. He sincerely wanted the Yugoslavs to recover their independence. It is said, with some truth, that

he abandoned Yugoslavia to Russia. But there is no evidence that he knowingly did so. It was said that Yugoslavia was to have been divided into British and Russian "spheres of interest" after the war. But this was categorically denied by Mr. Churchill himself.¹ It seems improbable that he supported Marshal Tito to placate the Soviet Union. Although by nature given to buoyancy and optimism, he was not spared the anguish a patriot suffers when he contemplates the possibility of defeat. It may be that he tried to placate Russia more than he would have done had he not seen so darkly into the future, as at times he surely did. But it is evident that when he supported Marshal Tito he believed that he would not only increase the discomfiture of the Germans in the Balkan peninsula, but also promote the ascendancy of a man and of a movement which would, after the war, be bound to Great Britain by bonds of interest and gratitude. He was mistaken in both respects, especially in the latter.

Mr. Churchill tried to save Polish independence and to limit the power of the *Lublin Committee*, but was completely outmanœuvred, as I have tried to show in the previous chapter. He seems to have made no such attempt on behalf of Yugoslavia because he did not realise that Yugoslav independence was in danger, and did not perceive, until it was too late, that the Soviet Union pursued the same end in Yugoslavia as in Poland. It is true that the Powers agreed to divide Europe into zones of military occupation, but it is evident that neither Mr. Churchill nor President Roosevelt fully realised the character and the consequences of a Russian military occupation. The Soviet Union has, directly or indirectly, placed all the territories occupied by her armed forces under her permanent control. Only a little knowledge of Russian history was needed to foresee that this would be so. It may be that the Western Powers

¹ House of Commons, 18th January 1945.

had some suspicion that it would be so when they insisted on the establishment of "democratic" and "representative" governments in the countries occupied by the Red Army, but they do not appear to have foreseen that the Western Powers would be wholly impotent to preserve democratic or representative institutions in those countries. According to Mr. Byrnes,¹ Russia's "special interests" were recognised in Rumania whereas Great Britain's "special interests" were recognised in Greece. But it would seem that the meaning of the term "special interests" was never defined. In Rumania Russia has arrogated "special interests" of her own to the exclusion of all others. In Greece she attempted—and is still attempting—to impose her own interests to the exclusion of all others.

According to Mr. Sumner Welles, Great Britain, at the meeting held in Moscow in December 1945, "recognised the predominant interest of the Soviet Union in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Reciprocally, the Soviet Union recognised the predominant interest of Great Britain in Greece."² Mr. Sumner Welles speaks with some authority and his statement contains the substance of a grave charge against the conduct of British foreign policy during the war, for it is surely intolerable that an agreement that would appear to be of such decisive consequence for the whole of Europe, and so hard to reconcile with the vital interests of Great Britain, should have been concluded without absolute clearness with regard to the term "predominant interest" and without consulting Parliament. What meaning did the Western Powers attach to the term? The meaning attached—or imposed—by the Soviet Union is clear enough, namely, "exclusive interest." This could not have been what the

¹ Mr. Byrnes' book, *Speaking Frankly*, is not available in this country at the time of writing, but extracts have appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* and in the *New York Herald Tribune*.

² Sumner Welles: *Where are We Heading?* (p. 128).

Western Powers understood even by "predominant interest." They never had the intention of being excluded from all influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

It has been asserted that the Western Powers feared lest the Soviet Union conclude a separate peace with Germany and that they felt compelled to "appease" Russia at almost any cost. That Russia might conclude a separate peace was but a hypothetical contingency which did not weigh much with the British War Cabinet.¹ Russia might have had either of two reasons for a separate peace—to save herself from defeat and collapse or to ally herself with Germany against the Western Powers. But the danger of defeat and collapse passed with the year 1942 and she could look forward to an alliance with Germany on terms far more favourable after the war, when Germany would be weak, than during the war when Germany was still strong. Had she wanted a separate peace during the war, the Western Powers could have done nothing to stop her. They might have offered her great gains to desist, but she would have taken the gains and would not have desisted. She has, in fact, gained all she could possibly gain from the Western Powers—the whole of Central and Eastern Europe (excepting Greece)—and is now ² striving to make a separate peace with Germany.

Mr. Churchill's policy, although not altogether one of "appeasement," had the effect of "appeasement," namely, the sacrifice of much for nothing in return. This policy was not only supported, it was intensified, by President Roosevelt, who was ready to "appease" Russia so that she might, in return, attack Japan, whose power he greatly overrated. Russia did attack Japan at the last moment, and, by doing so, secured great advantages for herself without contributing

¹ I have been assured of this by a former leading member of the War Cabinet.

² December 1947.

to Japan's defeat. Russia's Far Eastern campaign was mainly a preparation for the annexation of Manchuria and the establishment of a Russian hegemony in China.

There was no one at home or amongst the smaller Allied Powers to oppose or exert influence on Mr. Churchill's policy with realism. The prospective victims of that policy carried no weight in London. Amongst the Poles, Yugoslavs, and Greeks, there were not a few men of experience, insight, and foresight who knew what was happening, and knew what would happen in Eastern Europe. They were filled with a solicitude that grew to the point of anguish on behalf of their countries. They were by no means unsolicitous on behalf of Great Britain. Their opinions were utterly disregarded, but events have shown that they were right.

Perhaps too much was expected of Mr. Churchill. It is impossible even for a Prime Minister of his stature to do everything and know everything. His own more endearing virtues told against him: his sincerity, his magnanimity, his sense of comradeship, and his great loyalty to his friends. A man's friends are, perhaps, more important than he is himself, even when he is a great man. Mr. Churchill was not fortunate in his friends.

It is necessary for a statesman in time of war to contend with allies as well as enemies. Mr. Lloyd George fought tenaciously to defend his country's interests against the United States and against France. In the First World War he and Mr. Churchill were surrounded by men of stature equal to their own: Haldane, Asquith, Balfour, and others, or of greater stature even, like Lord Curzon and Lord Milner. In the Second World War, Mr. Churchill had no equal amongst his colleagues at home.

President Roosevelt confirmed him in some of his gravest errors and opposed his plan for the invasion of Southern Europe. It is, however, assumed too readily that the aban-

donment of this plan meant the abandonment of Eastern Europe. It is true that if Southern instead of Western Europe had been invaded, the mere presence of British and American troops would have affected the political situation in at least some of the Danubian countries. The Western Powers would have been much stronger in relation to Russia than they are now. But the abandonment of the plan was not followed by the abandonment of British action in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, British action was intensified, and rightly so. It was in the British interest that Yugoslavia should be independent, should not become a vassal of the Soviet Union. Mr. Churchill's conception of the future Yugoslavia as independent, democratic, and tied to Great Britain by bonds of interest and gratitude, was entirely sound. He realised the importance of Yugoslavia for the future of Europe and Great Britain. But he misunderstood the situation in that country. He lacked the deep scepticism—the scepticism of a Richelieu or a Bismarck—which is essential to the greatest statesmanship. The greatest statesman will make great mistakes, but he will not make the greatest of all mistakes: namely, those that arise from excessive trustfulness and from a belief that gratitude counts for much in the affairs of nations.

Mr. Churchill, sincerely resolved to promote the freedom and welfare of a heroic people who had suffered atrociously in the common cause, and, as always, solicitous of the honour and the interests of his own country, delivered that people to a man who was but a Russian agent, who, while he was still receiving British support, established one of the most ruthless and most Anglophobe tyrannies Europe has ever known. Mr. Churchill left the hero-patriot Mihailovitch and many gallant and devoted officers and men to the firing-squad and the hangman, and did grievous injury to the honour and interests of his own country. The immensity of the service which he rendered to Great Britain, the Empire,

and all mankind has been extolled by many, and by none too much. Against his detractors there is one thing to be said: England lives! Mr. Churchill himself was no betrayer. In so far as he was deliberately misinformed, he was himself betrayed. Not by him, but through him, was Yugoslavia betrayed. And that betrayal is a terrible defect in his vast achievement. It resembles some grievous flaw in a great masterpiece, something that is the more lamentable because it need never have been, something that can never be forgotten, something that demands a deep contrition.

If we wish to assess the magnitude of the error in purely pragmatic terms, we need but consider the situation as it would be within reasonable computation, if the error had not been made, that is to say if Great Britain had given all possible help to General Mihailovitch and the *Home Army* and to the Royal Yugoslav Government. In that case, Yugoslavia would be an independent country in close association with the Western Powers. The Straits and the eastern Mediterranean would have security. Great Britain and the United States would be Danubian Powers. The leadership in Danubian affairs would, or could, be Great Britain's. Not only the Danubian but the whole Central and South-Eastern European situation would be incomparably more favourable, both in the political and in the economic sense, than it is now, and a large and promising area would be open to British trade, investment and enterprise. The Austrian problem would be nearer to a solution and might even have been solved by now. The German problem would be much less obdurate than it is. That problem can only be solved in a European setting which the present division of Europe has made impossible for years to come. The Security Council and the Assembly would be less like packed juries, for they would be composed of more independent and fewer vassal States. In Greece, Great

Britain would still be the leading Power and would not have had to relinquish her leadership to the United States. Greece herself would be free from civil war, from the threat to her independence, and from the intractable impediments to her recovery. It is even conceivable that the *Marshall Plan* would not have been necessary. Italy would have had her internal troubles, but they would have been far less intractable if Yugoslavia were not a vassal of the Soviet Union and did not menace her, as well as Greece, with militant Communism. Albania would be an independent country and there would be no threat to the security of the Adriatic. The recovery of Europe would be much more advanced. A united Europe, a Europe as an organic whole, would, or could, be in sight, the Soviet Union would not be a menace to the Western Powers, and there would be no danger of a Third World War.

Mr. Sumner Welles, a man not given to exaggeration, has passed a severe judgment on Mr. Churchill's Yugoslav policy. He speaks of the "manœuvre" by which Great Britain gave her support to Tito and his *Partisans* and "permitted General Mihailovitch and the *Chetniks* to go to the wall," and then goes on to say:

"There is no question that the Churchill Cabinet believed that this manœuvre would ultimately preserve British influence in Yugoslavia and thus prevent any Russian domination of the eastern shore of the Adriatic, even after the Combined Chiefs of Staff, over Mr. Churchill's violent opposition, had abandoned all idea of invading Europe through the Balkans.

"It was a foolish gamble on the part of the British, since Tito was wholly under Soviet control. Necessarily, it failed. It represents what is probably Mr. Churchill's greatest mistake in political tactics during the period he served as Prime Minister." ¹

¹ Sumner Welles, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

VII

The *Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation*, known as AVNOJ,¹ held its first meeting at Bihatch on the 26th of November 1942. Fifty-four delegates were present. They were not all Communists, but Tito, the Communist, dominated the meeting. One only has to compare these and the subsequent proceedings of the Council with those of the Congress held in the mountains by the supporters of the legitimate Government to be struck by the autocratic character of the former and the democratic character of the latter.

The Council pronounced in favour of democracy, for private property, and against revolutionary changes, so as to dispel suspicions at home or abroad. A year later, on the 29th of November 1943, it felt strong enough to disclose some of its intentions. It pronounced sentence of exile against King Peter until the end of the war, it proclaimed General Mihailovitch a traitor, conferred the rank of Field Marshal upon Tito, it appointed a *National Council* from amongst the delegates, and declared this Council to be the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. This was an open challenge to the March Revolution. It was the first public act of the Communist Counter-Revolution.

Mr. Churchill and his advisers tried to reconcile the irreconcilable and to effect a fusion between legitimacy and usurpation, between a constitutional and a revolutionary order. King Peter, hard pressed by Mr. Churchill, and frightened of him, especially when he shouted and banged the table, agreed to dismiss his Prime Minister, Puritch, who had consistently refused to abandon General Mihailovitch as Minister of War. Dr. Shubashitch, a politician without personality or principles, was induced to form the new Government. To him was consigned the task of compounding with Tito.

¹ Antifašistiko Veće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije.

The King was in a grievous dilemma. He understood the Yugoslav situation far better than Mr. Churchill did, and in his heart he never would—and never did—abandon Mihailovitch. But when it became clear to him that Great Britain was supporting Marshal Tito and the Counter-Revolution, he began to believe that, as Yugoslav independence could only be restored if she remained in close association with Great Britain (for she had no other friend in the world, the United States not being greatly interested at that time), it was necessary to do Great Britain's will. He also believed that only with British support could the Yugoslav Monarchy be saved. So he did Great Britain's—or rather Mr. Churchill's—will. And he did so with great heaviness of heart.

No doubt a more experienced and stronger man, like King George of Greece, would never have complied. But it must be said in defence of King Peter that he was unfortunate in his advisers. The Yugoslav Government in London was nearly always in a state of semi-paralysis, if not worse. From January 1942 until June 1943 it did not function at all. Tendencies hostile to the March Revolution were strong. General Mirkovitch, the organiser of that Revolution, was deprived of his Yugoslav citizenship as the result of an ignoble intrigue and spent the rest of the war in Central Africa. The King's *Chef de Cabinet*, Lt.-Col. Knezevitch, became "the power behind the throne," a power hostile to the spirit of the March Revolution. Of the many causes which, in the end, led to the downfall of General Mihailovitch, the Government in which he was Minister of War must be reckoned as one. Such a Government was unable to do what little might have been done to counteract the disastrous influence of Mr. Churchill's advisers.

On the 12th of September 1944 King Peter agreed to broadcast a message to the Yugoslav people, declaring that General Mihailovitch was no longer their Commander-in-

Chief and ordering all who could bear arms to fight under the command of Marshal Tito. His previous broadcast, on the 1st of June 1944, created terrible perplexity, for its purport had been falsified by the B.B.C., as I have explained. His broadcast on the 12th of September confirmed the worst apprehensions of his people, especially of the Serbs. Only a few days before, American airmen had sighted bonfires that were burning throughout the countryside, for the Serbs were celebrating the King's birthday. When they had gathered around their wireless sets to hear his voice (the broadcast had been announced beforehand), his words filled them with grief and consternation. A blow, cruelly unjust and incomprehensible, had been struck at their loyalty to their King, at their devotion to General Mihailovitch, and at their veneration for Great Britain. And this blow had been struck by the King himself, speaking from the British capital. Even hardened soldiers wept like children. Many Serbs, men and women, committed suicide.¹ This broadcast did more than anything else, far more, indeed, than anything the Germans could have done, to promote the moral disruption of the Serbian nation.

The *Partisans* were intensely unpopular, as we have seen. But they were gathering strength because they were receiving arms and money from Great Britain, because it was growing evident that their struggle, at least, was not hopeless, and because Russian victories had given a powerful stimulus to the Communist idea, especially amongst young people. But even in 1944 the *Partisans* were still disquieted by their own lack of popularity. In April of that year, Smodlaka, who was "Foreign Minister" in Tito's *Provisional Government*, made a statement at Bari, complaining that

"Tito is merely recognised as military chief . . . huge

¹ In Belgrade there were men and women who, when they heard the King's broadcast in their flats, threw themselves out of the windows.

numbers of Yugoslav people have not yet made up their minds to fight. . . . Recognition [of the Provisional Government by Great Britain] would bring them in swiftly."

The Germans were concerned with the *Partisans* as a military and not as a political organisation. The Yugoslav Government was in London, the administration was largely broken up or paralysed, the police had several masters and little authority. Thus it was that the Yugoslav Communist Party had a freedom to expand and organise such as it never had before. Every circumstance was in its favour—the economic and political condition of the country, the political indifference of the Germans, who were masters of the larger towns, and, above all, the moral and material support of the Allied Powers, especially Great Britain. Every circumstance was in disfavour of General Mihailovitch—except the patriotism of the Serbian peasants and workmen, of the co-operatives, and of the *Home Army*. Even the "few droppings from aeroplanes," as Mr. Churchill called them, had not always reached him. Towards the end of 1941, when the Germans were closing in on his stronghold, Ravna Gora, and the *Partisans* were threatening his only way of escape, the arrival of a consignment of arms by air was signalled. Mihailovitch and his men waited all night in the mountains, but the consignment never came. The disappointment was bitter. Mihailovitch was desperate. He did not know until twenty-four hours had passed that a signal, cancelling the consignment, had been sent by a British officer¹ attached to himself. This officer, having observed that *Partisans* and *Chetniks* had been fighting one another, concluded that the arms in the consignment would be used for a domestic quarrel and not against the enemy. That was why he presumptuously cancelled the order.

The Germans struck at Tito in May 1944. Six hundred paratroopers dropped on his headquarters at Drvar. There

¹ Referred to as Captain X by Christie Lawrence (*op. cit.*, p. 227).

was a battle which lasted for five days¹ until the German force was relieved. The Germans inflicted heavy casualties and took prisoners, including members of the Allied Mission. Tito had a narrow escape and fled to the Island of Vis, which had become a British naval station. He remained under British protection until the middle of August, when he left for Russia. It is surprising that so small a German force could have done so much execution at the headquarters of any army, reputed to be a quarter of a million strong, and "holding fourteen German divisions," that a force of only six hundred men could have held out for five days until relieved, and that the commander-in-chief had to flee and find a refuge overseas.

It is equally surprising that this same supposedly formidable army was unable to offer any serious threat to the main lines of communication used by the enemy through Yugoslavia, although these lines were extremely long and passed through desolate and mountainous country. Occasional damage was done to them both by the *Partisans* and by the *Home Army*. Sometimes traffic was interrupted for a few days, but the enemy was always able to repair the tracks in a short time, usually without being molested. The Germans were able to send troops and supplies by rail through Yugoslavia to Albania and to Greece until about August 1944, when their communications were attacked by British and American bombers. The *Partisans* were unable to keep roads open for supplies sent by Great Britain. All supplies had to come by air. The *Partisans* were unable to take one town of any size or one port which could have afforded British forces a landing. Those towns which were eventually "liberated," were "liberated" by the Russians or by the Bulgarians.

¹ The story of the battle was told in the press later on (v. the vivid account in the *Daily Mail*, 2nd March 1945). The main facts are related by Martin (*op. cit.*, p. 239).

Not only were the *Partisans* far less formidable than they were reputed to be, they also had something better to do than fight the Germans. They could not afford to waste men and ammunition on a war between Great Powers, for theirs was a revolutionary war. That was why, in the latter half of the year 1944, when they might have struck with some effect at the Germans, who had begun to weaken, they were operating in regions where the Germans were not assailable, or where no Germans were to be found.

In the spring of 1944 the American air-force, operating from Italy, attacked German lines of communication. Their objectives were indicated by the *Partisan* command,¹ which therefore had at its disposal a weapon incomparably more powerful than any it had disposed of before. During Easter Week, 1944, American bombers carried out two heavy raids on Belgrade. They do not appear to have done any damage of military importance, but they hit the residential quarters, killing thousands of people. The raid, which broke into the sanctity of the festival, made a terrible impression—it recalled the raid which the Germans had carried out on Good Friday, three years before.

The *Partisans* had been unable to take Podgoritsa. They needed the town for the conquest of Montenegro. The population was, for the most part, loyalist. It had only a small German garrison and was of little importance to the Allies. It was bombed and destroyed by the American air-force. A few Germans and many Yugoslavs were killed. Thereupon the *Partisans* could take it without difficulty.²

¹ v. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 100; Markham, *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 168.

² Markham's account of these raids (*op. cit.*, p. 162 ff.) is the more impressive because he is an intensely patriotic American with a deep and wide knowledge of Balkan affairs. His sympathies, as far as the Balkan peoples are concerned, are chiefly with the Bulgarians. He reveres Dr. Matchek. But he does not allow his sympathies to affect his judgment. Only two of his opinions strike me as mistaken. He refers to Colonel Bailey as a sort of arrogant bully (p. 102), but Colonel Bailey was in a

They had been unable to take the town of Niksitch, although, like Podgoritsa, it had only a small German garrison. On the 6th of September the inhabitants were in the streets, celebrating the King's birthday. It was on that day raided by American bombers, who worked slaughter and destruction, with no military advantage except to the *Partisans*, who were enabled to take the town. Such raids were the more profitable to them because they promoted hostility to the United States, a hostility they had long been trying to instil, and were to deepen, widen, and sustain as soon as they were masters of all Yugoslavia.¹

The Germans were able to evacuate Yugoslavia without great difficulty and with few losses, which were mostly inflicted by the American air-force.

The new Government formed by Dr. Shubashitch under British pressure had no authority whatever. It represented nothing but the British desire to reconcile legitimacy with revolution, loyalism with armed sedition.

Dr. Shubashitch, who had been *Ban* (Governor) of Croatia, had no followers amongst the Croats. When Prince Paul's

terrible dilemma. As head of the British Mission with General Mihailovitch, he had to convey orders and exhortations that were not of his own desiring. He understood the Yugoslav situation far better than his superiors did and he had a great personal regard for Mihailovitch. Markham accuses Puritch of "reactionary stubbornness" (p. 170). Puritch was only "stubborn" in his refusal to abandon Mihailovitch and in his endeavours to avert the disasters which he clearly foresaw.

¹ The beginnings of that artificially engendered anti-American sentiment which has since become an official doctrine in Yugoslavia can be traced as far back as 1942. The *Partisan* journal *Proleter* stated, on the 22nd December in that year: "One of the most repellent aspects of vested interest propaganda [on the part of the Allies] today, is the promise of food, medicaments, and so on, to enslaved Europe from England and America. Aid to Europe is certainly necessary for the reconstruction of economic life. But the manner in which this aid is promised shows that we are faced with a disgusting attempt to exploit the poverty which Hitler has caused so as to make the peoples of Europe 'worthy' of help, and to corrupt them to further the reactionary ends of England and America" (quoted in the *Handbook: The National Liberation of Yugoslavia*, p. 83). Here we have a foretaste of the present campaign conducted by Russia and her dependants against the "Marshall Plan."

Cabinet deliberated whether or not Yugoslavia should join the *Anti-Comintern Pact*, and so compound with Germany,¹ Dr. Shubashitch gave an affirmative vote. He could not, therefore, hope for anything but unpopularity amongst the Serbs. In Slovenia he was unknown. It would have been hard to find a man less representative of Yugoslav opinion! The new Minister of War was General Ristitch. He had been interned by the Germans in Yugoslavia but had been released after he promised "to maintain a certain attitude towards them." What these words mean is not clear, but they are his own. Presumably he was released on parole. In a broadcast, transmitted by the B.B.C. on the 12th of September 1944, he tried to allay the misgivings which his appointment as successor to General Mihailovitch had caused in Yugoslavia. The Germans, he said, had been disloyal to him, so that he could be so to them. A comment on this broadcast in *The Nineteenth Century and After*² drew a further explanation from the General, in the form of a letter to the Editor of that journal:

"THE ROYAL YUGOSLAV
GOVERNMENT, MILITARY
SECTION.

3 QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON, S.W. 7
12th February 1945.

SIR,

In the article 'Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland,' published in your esteemed Review of February, 1945, there was a comment which touches me personally.

I should be obliged if you could kindly publish the following *mise au point* to the above article:

Mistakes are most easily made when dealing with the affairs of others than one's own. This is only natural.

My talk from the B.B.C. was broadcast to my people. It has been understood entirely by them.

My dealings with the Germans was an open legitimate relationship well known to my companions in captivity.

¹ February 1945, p. 57.

² *ibid.*

It was my wish to print a book for which I was soliciting the permission of the Germans, and that was all.

As far as disloyalty is concerned between the Germans and myself, they do not mention it, and I have reasons enough to be satisfied with it.

It is a matter of reciprocity, of action and reaction.

The British may have no interest in the above as they themselves may have many proper reciprocal obligations with the Germans.

It should be left for the discontented to argue about this. To my people it is perfectly clear and they do not ask any explanations.

Thus, I believe, matters have been put right and concluded.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

BORISAV M. RISTIĆ,

Divisional General (Rtd.) of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia."

Such the successor to General Mihailovitch!

In June 1944 Dr. Shubashitch left for Italy to promote a reconciliation between Marshal Tito and General Mihailovitch, who although no longer Minister of War, was still an Allied commander in the field and still had a large and devoted following in Serbia. Dr. Shubashitch saw Tito, but did not see General Mihailovitch. No sort of reconciliation was possible. Marshal Tito must, by this time, have known that he was the future master of Yugoslavia. Dr. Shubashitch's Government merely continued to exist as a legal fiction.

The Russian army had crossed the Yugoslav frontier at Turnu Severin on the 28th of September 1944. Marshal Tito was at the headquarters of the Russian Commander, Marshal Tolbukhin. Tolbukhin asked him if he would give the Russian army permission to enter Yugoslav terri-

tory. In this manner the Soviet Union recognised Tito as the supreme authority in Yugoslavia. Permission was, of course, granted. The Russian forces made no attempt to cut off the retreat of the main German forces in the Balkans. The German commander in Macedonian Greece had, as we shall see in the next chapter, concluded a military agreement with ELAS which enabled the Germans to disengage their forces without molestation from Greece. The *Partisans* concentrated their main attacks on the *Home Army*. The Russians engaged the retreating Germans in minor actions but made the capture of Belgrade and the extension and consolidation of Tito's power their principal objective. They entered Belgrade on the 20th of October 1944. The Red Flag of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Flag with the *Partisan* Star were conspicuously displayed. The *Partisans* did not take Bihatch until the 20th of March; Sarajevo on the 6th of April; Ljubljana on the 5th of May; Zagreb, the Croatian capital, on the 8th of May—the day of Germany's "unconditional surrender." When they held a Victory Parade in the Yugoslav capital, most of the inhabitants remained indoors.

Whenever the Russian troops arrived, the *Partisans* took over the civilian administration and carried out "purges" to remove their opponents.

The *Home Army* engaged the Germans as far as its limited supplies of arms and ammunition would allow. Mihailovitch sent delegates to the Russian commanders to arrange for combined operations. Russian forces and units of the *Home Army* co-operated in battles near Smederevo, Varvarin, Deligrad, Krusevats, and other towns. Krusevats was of some importance because it was on a German line of retreat. It was held by a small force of Germans and of Russians in the German service. It was stormed by a corps of the *Home Army*, under the command of Lt.-Col. Keserovitch, and handed over to the Russian commander. There

were fraternal greetings accompanied by enthusiastic cheering on the part of the population. The Russian commander, observing the Royal Yugoslav coat-of-arms on Keserovitch's uniform, asked that it be removed and replaced by the Soviet Star. He ordered the men of the *Home Army* to report and surrender their arms. They made off, taking their arms with them. Keserovitch was captured by the *Partisans* later on, tried for treason, and executed after making a "confession" (in which his victory at Krusevats received no mention).¹

The Russians showed surprise whenever they saw the *Home Army* fighting the Germans, for they had been told that the *Chetniks* were "collaborators."² A joint attack on the town of Chachak was prepared by Russian officers and some of Mihailovitch's commanders, but while the men of the *Home Army* engaged the enemy, and were suffering heavy losses, they were attacked in the rear by *Partisans*. The Russians looked on without interfering. When the town was captured, they attempted to disarm them. Some were disarmed, others escaped with their arms. After a time, the Russians refused any further co-operation with the *Home Army*, which was, therefore, hemmed in by the *Partisans*, the Germans, the Russians, and, in some regions, by the Bulgarians. To avert clashes between the *Home Army* and the Russians, Mihailovitch ordered his men to abandon Serbia and withdraw into Bosnia and the Sandjak.

British policy in Albania was the same as in Yugoslavia and produced the same results. By the summer of 1943 there was close collaboration between the Albanian and Yugoslav *Partisans*. The Albanian *United Front*, like the Yugoslav *Front of National Liberation*, was organised with the help of Great Britain and dominated by Communists. The Albanian *Partisans* were controlled by committees of

¹ Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

² v. the statement by Captain Voyislav Ilitch (*ibid.*, p. 270).

Communists who appointed the commanders and the political commissars. Their leader, Enver Hodja, a Communist and former schoolmaster, waged a war of extermination against all rivals, except in the towns, where the presence of the Germans prevented civil war. Many Albanians sought the protection of the Germans from massacre and were afterwards denounced as "collaborators" for this reason. Great Britain tried to promote reconciliation between the warring factions, but without success, in Albania as in Yugoslavia. She also incited to constant action, but, as in Yugoslavia, the means were supplied to Communists but denied to loyalists. Captain Julian Amery, who was serving in Albania, was told by a chieftain named Islam:

"There are three parties in Albania: the agents of Germany, the agents of Russia, and the agents of England . . . what none of us can understand is why the agents of Russia are paid in English gold."¹

In Albania, as in Yugoslavia, the non-combatants suffered most. In Albania, as in Yugoslavia, the *Partisans* were more concerned with fighting their fellow-countrymen than with fighting the Germans. In Albania, as in Yugoslavia, the *Partisans* extended their dictatorship to the towns when the Germans began to retreat. The *Partisans* in the two countries acted like two corps of the same army and operating in different but neighbouring sectors under the same supreme command. Abas Kupri, the Albanian Mihailovitch, was gradually abandoned by the British, who did, however, enable him to leave the country when all was lost.

And so Albania, created and maintained in a state of independence by the Powers because of her strategic position on the straits of Otranto, lost her independence

¹ v. Julian Amery's masterly book, *Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerilla War*.

by becoming a vassal of Yugoslavia, herself a vassal of Russia, and was forced into the armed coalition of South-Eastern European States which has, under Russian leadership, been organised against Great Britain, the United States, and Greece.

The results of British policy in Albania reinforced and extended the results of British policy in Yugoslavia. One result was the death of forty-four British sailors, who were killed off the Albanian coast by exploding mines laid with the connivance of the Albanian authorities.

VIII

Whenever the *Partisans* took a town, they arrested supporters of Mihailovitch, sending some to concentration camps and executing others. They allowed the Government of Dr. Shubashitch to exist, for it could do them no harm and was useful because it helped to maintain the pretence that Yugoslavia had a representative Government. The new masters of Yugoslavia, that is to say, the Yugoslav Communist Party, fortified this illusion by the skilful use of words. Arrested persons were called "traitors" or "collaborators." Words like "anti-Fascist" and "democratic" took the place of the word "Communist." Communism was called "democracy," "national liberation," or "the will of the people." Everything that was not Communism was called "Fascism," "reaction," or "collaboration."

The chief organisations, by which a system resembling the bureaucratic absolutism of Russia was established in a short time, were:

The *Anti-Fascist Council of Liberation* (AVNOJ), to which we have already referred. It replaced the Skupshtina, or Parliament, and exercised legislative authority. The President of this Council was Dr. Ivan Ribar.

The *National Council of Liberation* (NOO)¹ was the central executive organ which replaced the legitimate Government. The President was Marshal Tito. Subsidiary Committees were established in every municipality. Nearly all the members were Communists.

The *National Liberation Front* (NOF)² was the Communist Party under another name, though, like EAM in Greece, it included members who were not Communists but had no influence whatever. When the new administration was established, the Communists were the only political party tolerated in Yugoslavia.

The *National Army of Liberation* (NOV),³ usually known as the *Partisans*, under the supreme command of Marshal Tito.

The *Committee for the Protection of the People* (OZNA),⁴ the Yugoslav counterpart of the Russian NKVD, the Greek OPLA, and the German Gestapo. It had powers to make arrests without warrant, to imprison, and to execute. It had at its disposal the *Militia*, an armed force of a military character for internal use. It is by far the most efficient terrorist organisation the Balkans have ever known.

Elections for the *Anti-Fascist Council* were held on the 11th of November 1945. Public demonstrations against King Peter were organised beforehand by the new authorities to bring the monarchy into disrepute and intimidate its supporters. Many names—perhaps a quarter or a third of the electorate—were struck off the registers. The electoral campaign was managed by the Communists. A narrowly restricted publicity was allowed to a few dissidents for the sake of appearances: one of the reasons why it was considered useful to keep up some appearance of true democracy was the need for supplies delivered by UNRRA (the

¹ Narodno-Oslobodilacki Odbor.

² Narodno Oslobodilacki Front.

³ Narodna Oslobodilacka Vojska.

⁴ Odejenje za Zastitu Naroda.

distribution of these supplies was determined by the Communists).¹ The newspaper *Demokratija* was allowed to appear under difficulties artificially created to limit its circulation. It was suppressed immediately after the elections, not by a direct order, but by a printers' strike which the authorities arranged to create the impression that it had incurred the hostility of a liberty-loving people under a too indulgent administration.

Reports were craftily circulated that anyone voting against Marshal Tito—that is to say, against the *Anti-Fascist Council*—would be arrested, deprived of rations, or shot. In some villages militiamen went from house to house, threatening the peasants. In some, fathers of families were compelled to vote on behalf of the family as a whole. In some, after the elections, peasants who had not voted were arrested and many were shot. In some, the homes of peasants who had not voted were burnt down.² What the Germans had done by way of reprisal for the killing of German soldiers, the Communists did by way of reprisal for failure to vote for Tito. Whole villages suspected of harbouring *Chetniks* were burnt down.

One of the principal propagandists of the electoral campaign was the poet, Vladimir Nazor. He is referred to as follows in the *Handbook* issued by the British *Political Intelligence*:

“ . . . the best known of contemporary Croat poets. Though an old man of well over 70, he left Zagreb to join the *Partisans* when he was offered a seat by Pavelitch in the newly founded Croat Academy since—in the words of his message to the Croat people—he ‘preferred to live

¹ For an account of the way in which goods supplied by UNRRA were distributed so as to favour the Communists and fortify the dictatorship, v. the article by E. L. Pridonoff in the *American Mercury*, Jan. 1947.

² We received many names of victims at the time, but even today it is inadvisable to publish even the names of the villages, lest further victims be made by way of reprisals.

in freedom and fight for the ideas of the people.' Despite his age, Nazor went through the full rigours of the Fourth and Fifth Offensives and the stream of poems, speeches and literary works which he still produces indicates that his creative faculty is still unimpaired."¹

What the authors of the *Handbook* refrain from mentioning is that Nazor wrote a panegyrical ode to Pavelitch, the Croatian terrorist, protégé of the Germans and Italians, and chief instigator of the massacres perpetrated by the *Ustashi*. This ode was published on the 8th of August 1941 in *Spremnost*, the journal of the *Ustashi*. A product of Nazor's "creative faculty" will be found in the *Primer and Reader for People's Schools and Illiterates*, a manual of Communist indoctrination, published in Belgrade in 1945. It is a poem glorifying the *Partisan Star*, the emblem adopted by the *Partisans* in imitation of the *Soviet Star*. The last verse runs:

Twinkling high from Russia,
And even from the Urals,
All the Slavs receive the light,
Little New Star.

The town of Podgoritsa, which, as we have seen, was taken by the *Partisans* after it had been destroyed by American bombers, was renamed Titograd. Naturally, the townspeople had to make a special effort to show their gratitude for this newly conferred distinction. One hundred per cent. of the local electorate voted for Tito—or, to be correct, *almost* one hundred, for there was one man in Podgoritsa who did not vote, for, being a priest, he was a "reactionary."

On the 29th of November 1945 the *Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia* was proclaimed. Its structure is modelled on that of the Soviet Union. There are six *Federal Republics* (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hertsegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro), one *Auto-*

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 108.

nomous Region (Voivodina), and one *Autonomous Province* (Krsmet). There are two Chambers: the House of Representatives and the House of Nationalities—with 30 members from each of the *Republics*, 20 from Voivodina, and 15 from Krsmet. Only members of the *National Liberation Front*—that is to say, only Communists—are returned. All legislative measures are preceded by a directive from the Government and all are passed by unanimous acclamation, as in the Soviet Union.¹ Whenever Tito appears in either House, he receives an ovation, just as Stalin does in the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

IX

On the 1st September 1944 General Mihailovitch ordered a national mobilisation against the Germans in the name of King Peter II. There was a widespread response to this order, but the *Home Army* had not nearly enough arms and ammunition for all the recruits who reported for service with the colours. Nevertheless, fighting against the Germans was intensified in different parts of the country by forces under General Mihailovitch's command. The British Mission had been withdrawn from his headquarters, but an American Mission, under Colonel Robert McDowell, remained. He reported that the operations ordered by General Mihailovitch in the month of September were planned and executed thoroughly.² But "at this moment," according to a signed statement by Colonel McDowell,

"the Communist-led forces of Marshal Tito attacked the Mihailovitch forces on a broad front. This attack was personally witnessed by the undersigned and his staff.

¹ In July 1946 Dragoljub Yovanovitch, one of the greatest orators in Europe, pleaded for true democracy in the House of Representatives. He was tried and sentenced to nine years' penal servitude.

² *v.* the article in the *Sun* (New York), 11th June 1946, reproduced in *The World's Verdict*, p. 36 ff.

In attacking the Mihailovitch forces, the forces of Tito passed through the German line of garrisons on the Western Morava River and ignored the Germans in favour of this attack against men already engaged against the Germans."

Colonel McDowell summarised his conclusions with regard to the civil war in Yugoslavia as follows:

"The undersigned is convinced by all the evidence that the rank and file of the movement led by Tito and the other Communist leaders sought to resist the Axis just as did the Nationalists. However, the actual resistance offered to the Axis was strictly limited by the priority imposed by the Communist leaders to the civil war and the effort to destroy the influence of Mihailovitch. Under the circumstances no group of Yugoslav resistance was able to make a substantial contribution during 1944 and 1945."¹

During those two years, Marshal Tito received abundant supplies of war-material from Great Britain, not to speak of the help given by British and American bombers and the Russian army, whereas General Mihailovitch received nothing. Nevertheless, Colonel McDowell was able to say that

"On the basis of all the evidence available, it is my judgment that the Germans held greater fear and hatred of Mihailovitch than of Tito and concentrated proportionally more Axis troops in *Chetnik* than in *Partisan* territory. . . . The most important acts of sabotage against Axis communications were performed by *Chetniks*."²

The Germans began to realise the certainty of defeat in the autumn of 1944. They were even willing to surrender "unconditionally" to the Western Allies, but not to Russia,

¹ v. the article in the *Sun* (New York), 11th June 1946, reproduced in *The World's Verdict*, p. 38.

² Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

for they believed that even "unconditional" surrender to the former would lead to a peace which, however onerous, would establish a condition governed by certain principles and usages of international conduct, although the Germans themselves had usually failed to establish such a condition when they imposed peace on their weaker enemies in the course of the war.

In Yugoslavia, the *Partisans* were losing all interest in the Germans. They concentrated almost exclusively on what had been their primary interest from the beginning—the total destruction of the loyalists. They were *en liaison* with ELAS, and in Greece, too, the destruction of all loyalists superseded all action against the Germans, as we shall see. For the Germans, peace with Russia was a step into a darkness concealing terrors such as the Germans had themselves wrought upon the Russians. They tried, in Yugoslavia, to arrange terms, not with the Russians, or with the *Partisans*, who could hardly be considered their enemies any longer, but with their principal enemy, General Mihailovitch.

A certain Stärker, of the German Foreign Office, who had been a member of Neubacher's staff in Belgrade, tried to approach General Mihailovitch to discuss terms of surrender. But Mihailovitch refused to let German emissaries pass through his lines until Colonel McDowell, who had instructions to receive and transmit any German overtures, insisted. McDowell saw Stärker twice. The result has not been revealed.

The plight of General Mihailovitch and his men grew desperate. They continued to attack the Germans as best they could, but, whatever they might do, their supreme objective, the liberation of Yugoslavia, for which they had been fighting since the spring of 1941, was placed ever further beyond their reach as the fourth anniversary of this war approached. General Mihailovitch appealed to Great Britain and the United States to restrain the *Partisans* from attacking the *Home Army*, so that it should be free to attack

the Germans with all the means at its disposal. But he appealed in vain and saw total darkness descend upon his country.

It would have been easy for him to leave Yugoslavia. The Americans would have saved him, for they recognised the services he had done in the common cause and were grateful to him for having saved 300 American airmen.¹ But Mihailovitch would not abandon his people. He believed it would be necessary to organise a new resistance, perhaps of a secret nature, against the new oppressors. He no longer thought of the immediate future, so replete with sorrow, but of a distant future, when true liberation would come.

On the 13th of March 1946 Tito's Minister of the Interior, General Rankovitch, announced the capture of General Mihailovitch. He had been captured several days before, but the announcement had been postponed to allow the new Yugoslav authorities to take precautions against the stir and the possible disorder which the announcement would cause.

Preparations for his trial were accompanied by a sustained defamatory campaign. In his own country, terrorism silenced every voice that would have been raised on his behalf. In Great Britain and in the United States, the voice of chivalry as well of defamation was heard, though it could not reach his ear. In his prison cell he was completely cut off from the outside world, except that his counsel, who was none of his choosing, was allowed to see him, though never without the presence of officials appointed by OZNA.

Mr. Churchill, in a letter published on the 18th of May 1946 by *Reynolds News*, which supported the cause of the *Partisans* in Yugoslavia, as of ELAS in Greece, wrote that he had

“ . . . no sympathy with the Communists and crypto-Communists in this country who are endeavouring to

¹ The *State Department* had all along been far better informed than the *Foreign Office* about the situation in Yugoslavia.

deny General Mihailovitch a fair trial. He it was who took the lead in making the revolution in Yugoslavia which played a part delaying the German attack on Russia by several weeks."

On the 8th of July Marshal Tito said in a public speech at Uzhitse,

"You, in this historical country, have seen the first signs of treason committed by a certain military formation under the command of Drazha Mihailovitch. This treason did not start at Ravna Gora or somewhere else in Yugoslavia. It started in London, where the Royal Government took refuge."¹

With these words, Marshal Tito not only anticipated, or, rather, predetermined, the verdict, but also gave the trial the direction it was to follow, in so far as he implicated Great Britain. The implied—but principal—charge against Mihailovitch was that he was a British agent.

On the 14th of July, after the trial had opened, Marshal Tito said in a speech at Tsetinye:

"Drazha became intimate with Pavelitch, the executioner of the Serbs, and with Stepinats, the head of the Catholic Church of Croatia. He was a spy, even before the war."²

These are but a few of the lies told by Marshal Tito about his noble opponent, who had been rendered unable to defend himself. When he said "spy," he meant a British spy. Mihailovitch never had any dealings, except those of uncompromising enmity, with Pavelitch. He may or may not have had dealings with Stepinats, the Archbishop of Zagreb and Primate of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, though it seems unlikely. There would, in any case, have been nothing dishonourable in dealing

¹ *The World's Verdict*, p. 15.

² *ibid.*, p. 15.

with so devout and patriotic a dignitary. Tito's evident purpose was to incriminate the Archbishop as having relations with a spy. The Archbishop was arrested on the 18th September 1946. His trial opened on the 30th September 1946. On the 11th October he was sentenced to sixteen years of forced labour.

British and American officers who had served with General Mihailovitch and knew him well offered to give evidence at the trial, but were refused. The Government of the United States requested the Yugoslav Government to allow the American officers to give evidence. The request was twice refused.¹ No request was made by the British Government on behalf of the British officers. On the 3rd of July 1946 a letter signed by Cardinal Griffin, the Bishop of Chichester, Air Chief Marshal Longmore and eight others, appeared in *The Times*, expressing the belief that "a system of justice that refuses to consider a man guilty until he be proved so is one of the most precious of human rights," and pressing "most earnestly for a fair trial."

The Times itself was less chivalrous. On the 11th of June 1946 it published an article by Brigadier Maclean, who, as we have seen, had been head of the British Mission at the Headquarters of Marshal Tito. Brigadier Maclean repeated the familiar charges against General Mihailovitch and his commanders, though without going so far as to suggest he was a traitor. Some of his commanders, he wrote (quoting Mr. Churchill), had made "accommodations with the enemy," but

"The part played by Mihailovitch personally is less clear, although it seems certain that his hatred of Communism and his policy of deliberate inactivity led him into a position very different from that which he had taken up at the start."

¹ v. the letter by Eric Greenwood and Kenneth Greenlees in *The Times*, 14th June 1946.

This was written when General Mihailovitch was on trial for his life.¹

While urging a "fair trial" and disclaiming any intention of "prejudicing a fair trial," the *News Chronicle* used the occasion to publish a defamatory attack on General Mihailovitch.² This attack was allegedly based on "evidence in British official hands." As *communiqués*, documents (both genuine and forged), and propaganda produced by the *Partisans* and relating to General Mihailovitch were passed on to the British authorities in superabundance, it is easy to build up an apparently damning case against General Mihailovitch, if the material is used with suitable discrimination and if evidence from other sources, such as the British and American Missions at the Headquarters of General Mihailovitch, or the reports by numerous observers whose knowledge and integrity are above question, is omitted. This is precisely what the *News Chronicle* did. By the claim that it was "printing for the first time, much of the evidence in British official hands," this journal must have led its readers to suppose that as the material on which the article was based had an "official" character (which, in a sense, it had), it must also be reliable and comprehensive. Few would realise that it was mainly composed of propaganda of which the British authorities might take cognisance as a matter of routine, but that it had no value as evidence. The conclusion drawn by the *News Chronicle*, in its own jargon, was that "hard factual evidence" had "proved" that Mihailovitch "first

¹ As Kenneth Greenlees, who was a member of the British Mission at the Headquarters of General Mihailovitch, pointed out in a letter to *The Times* (21st June 1946). Julian Amery wrote in a letter to *The Times* (3rd July 1946): ". . . it is singularly unfortunate that he [Brigadier Maclean] should have chosen the occasion of the opening of General Mihailovitch's trial for raising an issue which he appears to regard as wholly distinct from the trial itself."

² The *News Chronicle*, 4th June 1946. The article is signed Bertha Gaster.

overlooked collaboration [i.e. with the enemy], then connived at it, then directed it, and ended in it up to his neck.”

The trial opened on the 10th of June 1946. Only a selected public received admission, so that the court was packed by a hostile crowd which booed and hissed every time the Counsel for the Defence got up to speak. He was constantly interrupted by the Public Prosecutor, by the Judge, or by the President of the Court, and rarely allowed to finish a sentence. The crowd jeered at Mihailovitch, shouting “Hang the traitor!” No documents relevant to the Defence were allowed as evidence. On the first day of the trial, Mihailovitch answered questions clearly and promptly. Thereafter he seemed indifferent to the proceedings. A strange lethargy came upon him.¹ He complained of extreme weariness and sometimes his answers were confused. He did not seem to be himself any more.

He was a smallish man, with a slight stoop. He was vivacious, witty, and a gifted *raconteur*. He loved the Serbian peasantry and never felt at home unless he was amongst them. He loved children, and they returned his love. He was full of compassion for his people. He hated the enemy but did what he could, not always with success, to prevent his men from taking the lives of prisoners. The fate of the Jews in Europe filled him with pity. He repeatedly sent expeditions to rescue Jews from the Germans.² He had a temper, and there were times when he would fume and rage, only to relapse into his usual geniality. He never allowed his bitterness over the attitude of Great

¹ It is commonly believed in Serbia that he was drugged, but, as far as we are aware, there is no evidence for this belief.

² Towards the end of April, 52 Hungarian Jews were taken under escort of a German detachment to do forced labour in the copper mines at Bor. General Mihailovitch sent a detachment to rescue the Jews. Twelve Germans and three Jews were killed. The remaining 49 Jews were saved. This incident was mentioned in the American, but not in the British, press. A Jewish battalion was formed under Mihailovitch. His doctor and cook were Jews.

Britain to affect his manner towards the British officers who were with him. Even after he learnt that the British Mission was to be withdrawn, he treated them with never-failing courtesy and consideration. He was brave to a fault.¹ He was a patriot above all. He had an immense veneration for Great Britain. If that veneration was dimmed, he never said so. He had a warm sentiment towards the Soviet Union, "the great Slav brother."

He was devoted to his King until the end. Whether or not he understood the King's dilemma is not clear, but he never spoke of him with disrespect. Although the King complied with Mr. Churchill's wishes, his heart was always with Mihailovitch, and is so still. At Easter, 1944, he wrote in a letter to General Mihailovitch that the time had come "for new ideologies to arise in the present countries"

and that the soldiers would

"carry on the points of their bayonets both national liberation and a new social order. . . . Let us give this ideological leadership to our people, as you, General, have given them leadership in the military field. We shall then, at the same time, have given a strong directive both to the Bulgarian people and to all the peasant peoples of all the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe."

King Peter, therefore, declared anew for the March Revolution and for a democratic league between all the peasant countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But the aspirations of this large-hearted boy were shattered by the intrigues of small men around him and by the incomprehension of the mighty men who were directing the course of the war and laying the foundations of a disastrous peace.

From his opinion of Mihailovitch, King Peter never departed. In a letter to Dr. Sekulitch, dated the 18th

¹ A member of the British Mission tells me that Mihailovitch's audacity in action went beyond the bounds permissible to a commander on whose own life so much depends.

September 1947, he referred to "the late hero and martyr, General Mihailovitch."

On the last day of the trial, Mihailovitch seemed to recover his true self. He spoke at some length, extemporaneously, and in a manner that silenced the booing and jeering of the hostile crowd. He closed with the words:

"I strove for much. I undertook much, but the gale of the world has carried away both me and my work."

He was sentenced to death as a traitor on the 15th July 1946. Two days later he was taken to an unknown place, executed and buried in an unknown grave.¹

So died the noblest figure of the Second World War.

¹ The *Times* (18th July 1946) stated that Mihailovitch was executed because "he had borne arms in civil war against the winning side" and "in the principles which have prevailed in all countries in such periods of internecine strife he was a traitor."

The *Manchester Guardian* (18th July 1946) stated that General Mihailovitch's "weakness was perhaps the genuinely tragic one of being unable to see and understand the complexity of his position. . . . Forces beyond his comprehension . . . drove him into error and confusion until he could no longer distinguish friend from enemy."

The *Daily Worker* (17th July 1946) stated: "There will be no tears shed in Britain over the fate of Mihailovitch except by a few reactionaries who have a fellow-feeling for the quisling breed. . . . Evidence at the trial revealed the complicity of British officers in the Mihailovitch intrigues. It is well to remember that the traitor once enjoyed the active support of influential circles in Britain."

Chapter Five

GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

I

THE dictatorship established by General Metaxas on the 4th of August 1936 left a legend, not amongst those who respected it, but amongst those who hated it, a legend which became a political force, although it had little verisimilitude. It was cultivated for an ulterior purpose: to make the dictatorship established by the Greek Communist Party in December 1944 appear what it was not. The earlier dictatorship, although not without stain, was painted a deep black, so that the blackness of the later should appear less black by comparison.

That later dictatorship so far surpassed the earlier in barbarity, was so different in its methods, and so contrary in its purpose, that it belongs, as it were, to another world. It is commonly represented as a kind of natural reaction by the extreme *Left* against the extreme *Right*, and its excesses are explained away, or minimised, and then condoned, as a sort of understandable retribution for the wrongs suffered by the people under the alleged *Fascist* tyranny in which General Metaxas was *Duce* or *Führer*.

The terms *Left* and *Right*, however, have little or no relevance to Greek affairs. *Fascism* and *National Socialism*, each in its day widely and deeply popular in its own country of origin, were, and are, wholly alien to the Greek character. In Greece there has never been a dispensation of any organised movement having any kinship with either, unless it be the Communist movement. But even Communism is unhellenic. It succeeded in taking root in Greece, but as an alien growth, and one that could not flourish did it not

receive nurture from abroad. The Greek Communist Party is the vanguard of the Pan-Slav advance on the Eastern Mediterranean, an advance directed and sustained by Russia, and the more formidable because today Greece has Russia for a neighbour—not geographically, but politically. If Russia were to convert the advance into a retreat, and lose interest in Greece, there would still be a Greek Communist Party, but it would develop closer affinities with the anarcho-syndicalism which is more congenial to the Greek temper, as it is to the Spanish, than with Marxism, which is congenial to neither.

In 1922 the Greeks were totally defeated by the Turks, who had found a new national unity and a new national purpose under the powerful leadership of Mustapha Kemal. This defeat was much more than a military disaster. For centuries Greeks had lived in Anatolia and had created a flourishing trade which was as beneficial to the Turkish economy as it was to the Greek. All the Anatolian Greeks were compelled to take flight, never to return. The same fate befell the Greeks of Eastern Thrace, a corn-growing region which was ceded to Turkey. Greece has been dependent on imported wheat for about half her total consumption ever since. At all times a poor country, and not fully recovered even from the two Balkan Wars, she was compelled to increase her population of less than 6,000,000 by more than a million refugees, nearly all of whom arrived in a state of extreme destitution.

Five Cabinet Ministers and one general were charged with responsibility for the disaster, brought to trial, and sentenced to death. They were, no doubt, responsible in varying degrees for the invasion of Asia Minor by the Greek army, an enterprise deemed excessively hazardous by men of critical judgment, including Metaxas. In the absence of support from the Western Powers the enterprise could not have succeeded. Great Britain was unwilling, and perhaps unable,

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to give that support, though when disaster had come she helped Greece to save what could be saved from the wreckage and to begin, without delay, the hard task of national recovery. But France was openly unfavourable to the Greek cause, even to the point of risking a rupture with Great Britain. Russia was, in effect, an ally of Kemalist Turkey, though this did not deter the Kemalists from exterminating the Turkish Communist movement. Since that time, Turkey has not been troubled by serious sedition at home (unless revolts amongst Kurdish border-tribes can be called seditious), and has never had what, after the Spanish Civil War, came to be known as a *Fifth Column*.

That the condemned men were even culpable in a moral sense would be hard to prove. Of treachery on their part there was none. In the trial, two different things were confused: responsibility and guilt. Under the law they were not guilty. The verdict was a political verdict pronounced under a Liberal administration. Eleutherios Venizelos, the greatest of Greek Liberal politicians, was abroad at the time. He was urged to intercede. He declined at first, then sent a telegram recommending clemency when sentence had been passed. The telegram arrived too late, for the six prisoners were shot immediately after the sentence. The British Government, to mark its disapproval, broke off diplomatic relations with Greece.

The effect of the executions on Greek public opinion is comparable with the effect of the wrong done to Dreyfus on French public opinion. The effect was the greater because the condemned men faced their executioners with serenity. Greece was deeply stirred and deeply divided. Even today, despite the world-shaking events that have come between, the memory of that judicial murder has not been effaced.

Political executions were so common in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe between the First and Second World Wars that they were hardly remarked upon. Only

in Greece was there a public that could feel a sense of deep and enduring outrage, such as would be felt in Western Europe, over injustice done to a few individuals. We must bear this in mind when we consider the massacres perpetrated in Greece more than twenty years later.

There are no people in the world who dislike despotism more than the Greeks do. All nations prefer order to anarchy, but if there is a nation that will invite the risk of anarchy rather than accept an order that might contain the threat of despotism, it is the Greek nation. And it was precisely this weakness—if it be a weakness—that brought on the despotism of General Metaxas.

Such was the instability of Greek political life, such the turbulence of faction, and so frequent and manifest the failures of constitutional government, that there is hardly a modern Greek politician of any eminence who has not, at one time or another, favoured a dictatorship, even against his deepest inclination, as the only way to overcome threatening anarchy or the paralysis of public life. It is, however, characteristic of the Greeks, that their dictatorships, even when brought about by force, were not without humanity, until the Communists established a dictatorship over nearly the whole of Greece, excepting the capital, in December 1944. This dictatorship was unhellenic in character and origin and was unlike any other Greece had known before.

In the course of the fourteen years that followed the catastrophe in Asia Minor there were eleven armed risings, of which three were of some importance, though none, except the last, was bloody or destructive. In 1925 General Pangalos carried out a *coup d'état* by violence. He was determined to suppress faction, the acknowledged curse of Greek political life. He combined a rather turbulent disposition with a certain benevolence—a rough man, but not an evil one. His abilities were of a modest kind. Of

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political insight or instinct he had little. His dictatorship was short-lived.

On the 5th of March 1933 General Plastiras, a *frondeur* and an ardent Republican, was staying at the house of the great Venizelos, listening as the returns of the elections were being announced. When the figures showed that the Royalists were winning it was more than he could bear. He rushed out and attempted a *coup d'état* with a few troops. He failed through lack of support.

In 1935 Venizelos himself started a rising, the most serious of all. Like the rising attempted by Plastiras, it was a challenge to the result of an election. It was suppressed after long and heavy fighting.

There were many other symptoms of deep political *malaise*. There was chronic unrest, a very unstable public opinion, and a progressive disintegration of the constitutional order. Public opinion fluctuated violently between Republic and Monarchy. The plebiscite held in April 1924 gave a large Republican majority, which was converted into an even larger Royalist majority in November 1935.¹

There were constant changes of Government, which were the more burdensome because in Greece every change is accompanied by changes of *personnel* in the higher administration. The expense is considerable, because many officials have to be pensioned off, and much inconvenience is caused by the influx of inexperienced newcomers. In the twenty years ending in 1936 Greece had 61 Ministers of Justice. In the sixteen years ending in 1937 she had 84 Ministers of Finance (of whom 12 held office in the year 1932, 9 in the year 1933, and 6 in 1935). Some Ministers of

¹ The majority was so large—97 per cent.—that the plebiscite cannot have been genuine. The polling was done in an atmosphere of frivolity. Except that there seems to have been some bribery on both sides, the plebiscite in October 1946 was a serious affair. The result—a majority of nearly 70 per cent. in favour of the King—certainly represented Greek public opinion within a margin of 5 per cent., or 10 per cent. at the most.

Finance held office for only a few days, most of them lasted less than two or three months. In 1937 Apostolidis was appointed Minister of Finance by General Metaxas. He remained in office until 1941, when he was removed by the Germans.

The Greeks seemed unable to find the political and constitutional form that would suit their national character. Faction of an anarchic nature invaded even the armed forces. Appointments, promotions, and pensions were largely determined by politics. On the 9th of June 1935, when the armed rising led by Venizelos had been crushed, elections were held. The Republican parties abstained. The principal Royalist party, the Populists, had an absolute majority in the *National Assembly*, which voted for a restoration. When the King returned after the plebiscite, he insisted, against considerable opposition, on a general amnesty in which even Venizelos was included. Elections were held on the 26th of January 1936 in the confident hope that the Greek political order would at last be placed on a solid democratic and constitutional basis. This time the Republicans voted. The result was a deadlock. Two coalitions faced one another in Parliament, the one broadly Venizelist and Republican, the other anti-Venizelist and Royalist. The former had 142¹ seats, the latter 143.² The Communists, who were attached to neither coalition, had 15 seats and therefore held the balance. This gave them a power such as they never had before.

Europe was moving towards war. In Greece, as in all Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the German danger was foreseen more clearly than it was in western countries, not only by responsible politicians but by public opinion. Greek democracy was paralysed by the perfection of its own mech-

¹ 127 Liberals (led by Sophoulis, who had succeeded Venizelos) and 15 Agrarians.

² 69 Populists (led by Tsaldaris); 63 Populist Radicals (led by Kondylis), 7 Metaxists, 4 Macedonians.

anism and by the impeccability of the constitution, a phenomenon common to all those countries which, through over-estimation of the western world, had adopted political conceptions born of an over-rationalistic attitude. Greece had the further misfortune in that period of gathering crisis to lose her most capable politicians: Venizelos, Kondylis, and Tsaldaris died within a brief space of time. Venizelos had, from his place of exile, sent the King a message of goodwill, but his death defeated the hope of a reconciliation which might have changed the constitutional history of Greece. Demerdjis formed a Government on the 15th of March 1936, but within a month he was dead. Thus it was that General Metaxas, the Deputy Premier, became Premier.

Parliament passed a vote of confidence in the Government and, as a provisional way out of a deadlock that made legislation impossible, agreed to adjourn for five months. It empowered the Government to rule by decrees which were subject to the approval of a Parliamentary Committee of 40 members who included the leaders of all Parties. But factiousness, which had paralysed Parliament, paralysed the Committee. The Communists, who no longer held the balance, resorted to direct action and promoted a series of strikes, especially in Salonica where there was some bloodshed.

The sequence of events abroad was fulfilling the darkest apprehensions: the triumph of Hitler in 1933, the re-occupation of the Rhineland, the Spanish Civil War, the invasion of Abyssinia, the failure of the attempt to restrain Italy, the reunion of Germany and Austria, the German diplomatic victory at Munich, the march on Prague and the collapse of the policy known as "appeasement," and the Second World War. Greece herself was attacked by Italy on the 28th of October 1940, and by Germany on the 6th of April 1941.

When Metaxas became Premier the Greek army and navy

were in a state of disorganisation. There was little discipline, the arsenals were empty, the munition works were paralysed by constant strikes. Eleven armed risings had consumed all reserves of arms and ammunition.

Many a Greek patriot asked himself and others, with deepening anxiety, whether the Greek political order was equal to the tasks which the international crisis would impose upon the Greek nation. One of the leading Liberal politicians, Papandreou, who is referred to by an objective and discriminating British observer as "a true democrat" who "had spent long months in exile or in prison because of his convictions,"¹ wrote in 1934:

"I believe that a dictatorship may, in certain conditions, constitute a historical necessity when the supreme law of the country's salvation demands it. It is then that the dictatorship may be serviceable, on condition that it disappears with the circumstances that made it inevitable."²

Ten years later he said:

"I always believed, and shall be faithful to that belief for the rest of my life, in the ideals of liberty and social justice."³

In the elections, held on the 31st of March 1946, Papandreou led the *Left Centre Bloc* which, after the *Populist Party*, won the largest vote.

On the 4th of August 1936 General Metaxas obtained the consent of King George II to a decree dissolving Parliament and empowering the Government to suspend those articles of the Constitution which relate to the liberty of the subject.⁴

¹ Lt.-Col. W. Byford Jones, *The Greek Trilogy*, p. 174. Papandreou was Prime Minister in the Government that returned to Greece in October 1944. He was "greeted and warmly embraced by the members of his Cabinet, including six EAM members" (p. 101). EAM was a coalition dominated by the Communists.

² v. Papandreou's article in *Kathimerini*, 6th Jan. 1934.

³ Byford Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁴ Articles 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, and 95.

Parliament, before it was dissolved, submitted to the King an *exposé*¹ of the decree, stating that "as soon as the situation allowed" elections would be held. It was well understood that the exceptional measures which had been taken would be revoked as soon as the state of emergency was at an end.² But no end came.

The decree was a *Pronunciamento*. Greek democracy had broken down. Parliament, having proved unequal to the tasks imposed by the international and domestic crisis, had abdicated.³ On that day, the 4th of August 1936, Greece submitted to a more than transitory dictatorship. The Athenian public recognised it as such, with little outward emotion, but as a grave event, nevertheless—an event that had something of inevitability.

II

General Metaxas had been a student at the German *Kriegshochschule* before the First World War. He had acquired an unusual understanding of the German mind, of the German political and social order, and of the art and science of war as expounded and practised by the great German masters. He had been impressed by the respect for the rule of law, and by the discipline, civil as well as military, that prevailed in the Empire of the Hohenzollerns, by the integrity of the officials, and by the paternalistic

¹ Διατάγματα· εισηγητική έκθεσις, 4th August 1936.

² According to Article 37 of the Greek constitution, the King has the right to dissolve Parliament, but a general election must follow within 45 days. On 5th of March 1935 a "special constitutional act," giving the Government special powers in an emergency, was passed. But to make it "constitutional," it had to be ratified retrospectively by the *National Assembly* which was returned by the subsequent elections. For a defence of the dictatorship from a juridical point of view, v. A. Tambakopoulos, 'Ο Μύθος τῆς Δικτατορίας (Athens, 1942).

³ A historical analogy would be the abdication of the Barebones Parliament which, in 1653, resigned its power into the hands of Cromwell (v. Dicey, *The Law and the Constitution*, p. 66).

management of industry. He showed much promise as a student of strategy—his colleagues, so it is said, called him *der kleine Moltke*—a promise he fulfilled when he became a professional soldier.

He opposed the invasion of Anatolia, and for the following reasons¹: The Turkish population outnumbered the Greek by at least four to one. Even in the Vilayet of Aidin, which included the Sandjak of Smyrna, where the Greek population was densest, the Turks had a majority. In the region which Venizelos proposed to claim—that is to say, all Asia Minor west of a line from Cape Phenika on the Gulf of Adalia to the peninsula of Artaki on the Sea of Marmara—the Greeks were greatly outnumbered. The Moslem population was mostly composed of warlike peasants inured to the use of arms, whereas the Greeks were mostly urban and unwarlike. The annexation could only be achieved after a campaign of immense difficulty in which the Greek army, even if successful at first, would be worn down the more it advanced and weakened by the necessity of defending ever-longer and highly vulnerable lines of communication. Sooner or later, so Metaxas contended, there would be an *impasse*, whereupon the Turks would take the offensive and, operating on interior lines in their own country, would attack the Greek army on a vastly extended front and inflict a decisive defeat. The fate of the Greek army would resemble that of the *Grande Armée* in 1812.² Even if it were able to hold Smyrna and a part of the hinterland, the task of maintaining an overseas force against a numerous and warlike enemy would be immense. A Balkan crisis would compel Greece to abandon her Asiatic possessions.

¹ They are summarised by A. A. Pallis in his masterly *Greece's Anatolian Venture and After* (London, 1937), p. 22 ff.

² Pallis points out that the distance covered by Napoleon from the Niemen to Moscow was about the same as from Smyrna to Sivas, namely, 900 kilometres. *ibid.*, p. 62.

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The region Venizelos proposed to annex was offered by the Allied Powers as far back as 1915 as "compensation" because she could not have Thrace or Constantinople which were claimed by Bulgaria and Russia.¹ The offer became so pressing that Venizelos found it hard to resist, especially as a partition of Anatolia amongst the Powers would leave Greece with nothing unless she took part in the armed conquest which would be necessary. She felt particular concern lest Italy be established on the eastern shores of the Aegean. Metaxas expressed the view that if Greece could not resist the offer, she should make it a condition that Allied forces participate in the campaign and that Anatolia be partitioned amongst the Allied Powers, including Greece, or, if not, that the region left under Turkish sovereignty be so small that it could not become a menace to the region around Smyrna which would fall to Greece. If these conditions were not fulfilled, the Anatolian campaign "could only spell disaster and would ultimately involve the ruin of Greece and of the Anatolian Greeks."²

Metaxas' warning was completely justified by events. He had statesmanship but was no politician. He disliked politicians. His overriding purpose in August 1936 was patriotic: to prepare Greece for war with Germany. There was much in Germany he admired, the Germany of the Hohenzollerns, but he was first and last a Greek patriot.

He was unassuming in his person, a man of few words, but eloquent upon occasion. He could be severe but was never brutal. His industry was prodigious: he hastened on his own death by overwork. Unlike Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, he did not believe in the rule of one party. His cabinet was composed of specialists without particular political affiliations. He did not govern in the name or spirit of any doctrine. He was no ideologue.

¹ A. A. Pallis, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

² *ibid.*, p. 25.

His dictatorship was tolerant of opinion but intolerant of opposition. To hold and expound an unorthodox idea under Metaxas was safe, but to oppose, or even to criticise, his administration or his policy in the press or in public speeches was not safe. Metaxas was intolerant of Communism for reasons of a pragmatic, not of an ideological, nature. A *loi d'exception* was passed against the Communists in 1929.¹ Venizelos, expounding this law, disclaimed hostility to Communism as an idea. He condemned the Communists because they worked for the dismemberment of Greece—that is to say, for the secession of Macedonia—and because they received money from “suspect sources.” Events from 1942 until the present day have shown that Venizelos was right in his diagnosis, whatever may be said about the law he sponsored. The secession of Macedonia, as we shall show later on, has been, and is still being, promoted by the Greek Communist Party.

To the Greeks, Communism has, for the last twenty years and more, been not a matter of doctrine, but of defence and of territorial integrity. The Communists were a small minority, and it is not likely that Venizelos, or even Metaxas, who enforced the law which Venizelos had sponsored, would have paid particular attention to them if they had not been associated with Macedonian separatism. In dealing with the Communists, the Greek authorities have had to deal not with certain doctrines but with a sedition which, during the Second World War, became an armed conspiracy, aided by foreign Powers, against Greek independence.

The dictatorship carried out a number of reforms, some of them on the paternalistic German model: minimum wages for industrial workmen, an eight-hour day in all industries, holidays with pay, a system of health insurance, compulsory arbitration in industrial disputes. Some of these reforms had been voted by Parliament before but had

¹ Law 4229, 24th of July 1929.

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not been carried out. Tax evasion had been widespread: it had been practised with impunity by rich persons who would discover a certain latitude on the part of the Inland Revenue if they were willing to support the Government. It was by suppressing this abuse, rather than by increased rates of taxation or by financial reform, that the dictatorship increased the revenue.

Broadly speaking, the financial policy of the dictatorship eased the burden of the poor and augmented the burden of the rich. The tax on olive oil was removed. A third of the indebtedness that weighed heavily on the peasants was cancelled. By the purchase of surplus yields, agricultural production, which had always fluctuated unduly, was stabilised, as the following figures show:

Value of agricultural production (in thousands of drachmas) :

1928	11,292
1931	7,615
1934	14,902
1935	16,562
1936	16,471
1937	25,464
1938	22,656
1939	26,393 ¹

Food kitchens for children were provided. "Children's Courts" were set up to combat juvenile delinquency. The remnants of banditry were suppressed. All over Greece there was security. Malaria and tuberculosis, which had ravaged whole regions, was reduced by a sustained campaign unhampered by the constant displacements of responsible officials inflicted by constant changes of Government. State expenditure on hospitals, sanatoria, and clinics rose from 12,000,000 drachmas in 1936 to 16,000,000 in 1940. Ex-

¹ Henry A. Hill, *The Economy of Greece*. Part I, published by the Greek War Relief Association, New York (undated, presumably 1943).

penditure on social services rose from 347,000,000 in 1935-36 to 536,000,000 in 1940-41. Despite increased expenditure, especially on social services and armaments, there was an increase in the budgetary surplus. The armed forces were reorganised, re-equipped, and purged of political faction. The Greek Civil Code, on which jurists had been working for a hundred years, was promulgated at last.¹

The dictatorship was harsh, and often arbitrary, but it was not bloody. It was incomparably more humane than the Bulgarian dictatorship under Tsankoff, with its public hangings,² its secret executions, and its tortures; than the Hungarian and the Polish dictatorships. It was incomparably more humane than the Fascist, National Socialist, and Communist tyrannies. Not until 1944 did the Greek people know how inhuman a modern tyranny can be.

No one, other than a common murderer, was executed under Metaxas, although Metaxas had to contend with a plot against his own life and with an armed rising which in some other countries would have been followed by sanguinary purges and a reign of intense terror. Even fair-minded and careful historians of modern Greece do not always pursue their enquiries to the end. E. S. Forster, in his excellent *Short History of Modern Greece*,³ refers to the insurrection which broke out on the island of Crete in 1938. The town of Canea was taken by the insurgents, but they lacked popular support and capitulated on the arrival of superior

¹ *v. Discours sur le Code Civil Hellenique* (Hellenic Institute of International Law, Athens, 1940). Martin Wolff, in his *Private International Law* (Oxford, 1945), p. 43, refers to the Greek Civil Code as "a complete code of private international law" and to "the very high standard of modern Greek jurisprudence."

² Of the three men publicly hanged for alleged complicity in the attempted annihilation of the Bulgarian Government in the Cathedral of Sveta Nedelia in 1925, two, Koeff and the Communist Friedman, were innocent. The third, Kambouroff, was an accomplice in so far as he did not report to the authorities the presence of the explosives in the dome of the Cathedral, because he believed they were meant to blow up the Yugoslav Legation and that it was his patriotic duty to say nothing.

³ Methuen, 1941.

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forces despatched by the Government. Forster records that four of the ring-leaders were sentenced to death, but the sequel appears to have escaped his notice. In response to a petition from Cretan notables addressed to King George II on the 30th of December 1938, all sentences of imprisonment passed on insurgents were halved¹ and the four capital sentences were suspended.² Later on, the commander of the insurgent forces, General Mandakas, received a free pardon.³ He lived to be second-in-command of the armed forces, known as ELAS, which were controlled by the Communists, in 1944.

It is often asserted, not only by malevolent and ill-informed but also by sympathetic and learned writers, that the classics suffered under Metaxas. The example commonly given is the alleged suppression of Pericles' *Funeral Oration* in Thucydides' *History*. Kathleen Gibberd, whose knowledge of Greece is wide, deep, and sympathetic, writes in her admirable little book⁴:

“all the features of a democratic state were suspended, even to the expunging of the *Funeral Oration* of Pericles from the text-books of the schools.”

Lt.-Col. Byford Jones, in his dispassionate study, writes that Metaxas

“had stopped the reading in Greek schools of the *Funeral Oration* of Pericles because of its allusions to democracy.”⁵

I hesitate to challenge statements made by these authors, but I have been unable, despite careful enquiry, to discover the evidence. There was certainly a severe censorship under Metaxas, and it would not have been beyond Greek ingenuity to have circumvented it by the

¹ *Ἐφημερίς τῆς Κυβερνήσεως* (Government Journal), 22nd of March 1939.

² *ibid.*, 3rd of Aug. 1939.

³ *ibid.*, 8th of Nov. 1940.

⁴ Kathleen Gibberd, *Greece*, p. 42.

⁵ *op. cit.*, p. 156.

skilful use of classical texts and quotations. It may be that the *Oration* was used to serve such a purpose and that some subordinate authority took exception. But I only think it fair to point out that Metaxas himself was a lover of the classics and that, as far as the *Funeral Oration* is concerned, two uncensored editions (for the use of schools), the one in ancient the other in modern Greek, and a selection of passages from Thucydides, including the complete *Oration* (also for the use of schools), were published in Athens while Metaxas was in office.¹

Nevertheless, his dispensation was illiberal. It suppressed something the Greek public valued more than the classics, namely, their national passion and pastime, politics, by a severe censorship of the press and by the elimination of dissident politicians. It gave excessive power to the police and multiplied the pernicious tribe of spies and informers. Of all nations in Europe, the Greeks are most resentful of interference by the police. Stanley Casson, in his excellent booklet, writes:

“The police force in the average Greek village or town is more like a body of citizens selected for police than policemen selected to oppress citizens. The often recurring tendency of Governments to create specialised police is always resented.”²

Under Metaxas the police were ubiquitous. They made themselves disliked by imposing discipline on pedestrians and enforcing a more rigorous traffic control. The maltreatment of prisoners before trial, so common in most eastern European countries, seems to have been frequent. In Macedonia, the *Slavophone* communities were oppressed.

¹ 1. Θουκυδίδου ὁ Περικλέους Ἐπιτάφιος (Παιδαγωγικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη). Athens, 1939.

2. Μετάφρασις Ἐπιταφίου τοῦ Περικλέους Θουκυδίδου (διὰ τὴν στ' τάξιν τῶν ἐξαιρέτων Γυμνασίων Παλ. Τύπου). Athens, 1940.

3. Ἐκλογαὶ ἐκ τῆς Θουκυδίδου Συγγραφῆς. Athens, 1940.

² Stanley Casson, *Greece* (Oxford Pamphlets).

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The domestic policy of Metaxas could be reduced to one simple order: There shall be no more politics! He curbed the principal players in the national game by sending them to the islands if they attempted individual or collective opposition. Communists were invited to recant. If they did so, they were not molested. If they refused, they were sent to the islands or to prison. The treatment of the exiles was not inhuman. Except that they had to report to the police, they were free to do as they liked on islands blessed by nature, though a man might be seriously injured in his profession by a long period of enforced exile. Some of the orders of banishment were hardly defensible. Kaphandaris, for example, was sent to the island of Zakynthos for criticising the dictatorship severely but not scurrilously in a leaflet. Canelopoulos was banished because he addressed to the King a letter respectfully worded and proposing moderate reforms.

Wounding to Greek pride were the constant exhortations to duty and discipline by posters and loud-speakers. The dispensation advertised its own merits widely and obtrusively, although Metaxas himself never sought personal publicity, and never assumed the airs of a dictator. Perhaps the greatest mistake of all was the creation of a *Youth Movement* on the German model.

Youth Movements have been a curse to modern Europe, and even friendly critics of Metaxas' dictatorship condemn it for creating the organisation known as EON ('Εθνική Ὀργάνωσις Νεολαίας). Later on, a similar organisation was created by the Communists and their political allies under the name of EPON ('Εθνική Πανελληνίος Ὀργάνωσις Νέων). It became a medium not only for the spread of Communist doctrine amongst boys and girls, but of active sedition, in so far as it provided youthful recruits for armed risings under Communist leadership. It was suppressed in the spring of 1947.

Metaxas often spoke with disparagement of democracy as it had been practised in Greece, but not of democracy as such. His defenders argue that his dictatorship was conceived as a transitional measure, as indeed it was by the King and most of its supporters. But he himself did not altogether share this conception. He did not believe that the parliamentary system which had existed before could ever be restored in Greece:

“The old parliamentary system has vanished for ever; the [new] Government is stable and permanent and will apply the existing system until it has achieved a complete re-establishment of Greek Society.”¹

But the chief purpose of the dictatorship was achieved. Greece was ready for war. A disorganised, divided and depleted army and navy and a prostrate war-industry were transformed into the disciplined force and armament that defeated the Italians and defied the Germans. General Metaxas never faltered in his loyalty to the Allied cause. Even as far back as 1934, during the Balkan Conference, he left no doubt that, if war came, Greece would be on the side of the Western Powers.

Gafencu, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Rumanian Government and, subsequently, Rumanian Ambassador in Moscow, visited Athens shortly before the outbreak of war. He gives an account of his meeting with General Metaxas, who

“had seen much in the course of his eventful life . . . his voice had intonations that were astonishingly gentle in expressing the intensity of his fervent patriotism. Love of country filled him altogether since the time when factious passions were quenched. The only purpose he still wished to pursue was to arm Greece so that she

¹ Speech at Salonica, 7th of September 1936 (quoted in *South-Eastern Europe*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 94).

should be in a state of defence. If he had been induced to curb his people's fierce love of freedom, it was, he said, to enable them the better to preserve their national freedom, seeing that the period at hand was no longer favourable to the small nations . . . he stretched out his arm towards the ruins of the Temple of Minerva. 'It is there, it is there,' he said, 'that Europe began. And it is there that Europe may end, if we do not maintain a constant vigilance . . . the sea gives us freedom of action, we shall fight, even if our country is again covered with ruins.'

"General Metaxas kept his word. . . . At a time when nearly all European nations had bent before the Axis, this gesture was immense.¹ The first successes of the Greek army came to my knowledge in Moscow . . . and filled me with anxiety and pride. . . . The [Russian] newspapers reproduced the magnificent words which Metaxas addressed to the Greek people:

" 'A few days ago, a perfidious enemy attacked us without cause. His sole purpose was to rob us of what we hold most dear : independence, freedom, and honour. Greece has risen as one man. She has taken up arms. After fierce fighting, victory smiles upon her. From Macedonia to Epirus, the enemy is in flight along the whole front. . . . Mussolini warned us that Greece would be destroyed. Greece will remain free and independent. As for the Italian people, they will have to assess the consequences of their defeat when they settle their account with Mussolini. . . . We are fighting for the freedom of the Balkan peoples. We are fighting for an ideal which transcends the frontiers of our country and embraces all mankind ' " ²

Such were the words of the Greek General which the Rumanian diplomat read in the Russian newspapers. The

¹ Greece, unlike her northern neighbours, had refused to join the *Anti-Comintern Pact*.

² Grégoire Gafencu, *Derniers Jours de l'Europe* (Egloff, Paris, 1946), p. 213 ff.

Kremlin had not, as yet, decided that Metaxas and King George II were *Fascists* and *Reactionaries*.

The Italians, despite their immense superiority on land, on the sea, and in the air, were defeated in one of the most brilliant campaigns of the Second World War. When the Germans attacked, Greece fought on although the odds were hopeless.

General Metaxas died on the 29th of January 1941. *The Times* wrote on the 30th of January:

“When the history of this war is written, General John Metaxas will bear the honour of having been the first to destroy the legend of invincibility of the armies of the Axis. . . . In the four years of his paternal and bloodless dictatorship he introduced a large number of important social and administrative reforms. Above all, he revived the spirit and self-confidence of the Greek people.”

The B.B.C., on the 31st of January, broadcast the following words:

“Flags on public buildings in England were flown at half-mast for General Metaxas’ funeral. This is the first time since the death of Marshal Foch that such an honour has been shown to a foreign statesman, other than ‘Head of State’.”

When Metaxas was lying in state, the large-hearted people of Athens thought not of the dictatorship, but only of the man who had said *Οχι¹—No!—to Mussolini and Hitler. The queue that moved past the catafalque seemed to have no end. According to some accounts it was more than two miles long.

The German attack came on the 6th of April. To many of the leading Greek politicians, including some who have avowed a lifelong devotion to Great Britain, further resistance seemed like madness. France had fallen. The Yugo-

¹ Pronounced *oh-hee*, the *o* short and accented, the *kh* a guttural (like *ch* in German *ich*), the *ee* short and unaccented.

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slav army had collapsed. Turkey was neutral. Russia was not yet in the war. Great Britain stood alone and, while willing to give what help she could, was wholly unable to give help that could arrest the German advance for a day.¹ There was deep division in high places. It was the unswerving determination of King George II that prevailed. Greece fought on.

III

The defence of the *Metaxas Line* was one of the epics of Greek history. The collapse of the Yugoslav army enabled the Germans to turn that line, and they deployed into Macedonia. The Greek forces in Albania were placed in a strategically hopeless position and their commander, General Tsolakoglou, concluded an armistice with the Italians on whom they had previously inflicted so crushing a defeat. The armistice was never authorised by the King, but repudiation could not affect the further course of the campaign. The Greeks, helped by a small British force, fought a series of rearguard actions that covered an orderly retreat. The Anglo-Hellenic forces, the King, and the Greek Government left Greece to continue the war overseas. As the British contingents embarked, the Greek crowds on the quays threw flowers upon them, in gratitude for the help they had given, and in confident expectation of their return. The Germans entered Athens on the 27th of April 1941.

The Bulgarians invaded Greece in the wake of the Germans and without a declaration of war. All Greece was

¹ For details of this controversial and complicated question of British aid, v. *The Times*, 4th July 1946 and 22nd February 1947. Also Field Marshal Wavell's despatch in the *London Gazette*, 2nd July 1946, and General Alexander Papagos' *The German Attack on Greece* (publ. by the Greek Office of Information, London, 1946). For an excellent summary of the campaign from the 26th October 1940 to the 31st May 1941, v. *Greece's Campaign against the Axis*, by "Fighter" (*The Fighting Forces*, April 1946). For a full account v. General Papagos' *Greece's War*, publ. 1945, but not yet translated.

occupied by the enemy. The Bulgarians established a military administration in Macedonia. Throughout the rest of Greece the Germans dominated. Only a humble share of the occupation was assigned to the Italians.

The Germans behaved with their usual inhumanity. Their regular troops observed a certain correctitude, but when a German administration had been established, when the hostility of the Greek people made itself felt and the *guerrilla* began, the Germans shot, hanged, tortured, took hostages, and destroyed villages.

In no country except Poland did the Germans encounter so stubborn and so solidly hostile a population. There were, of course, native informers and agents who worked for them, such as can be found at all times in all countries. The Germans generally found it impossible to extract, even under torture, useful information from persons they had arrested. There were sundry journalists, civil servants, and a few politicians who temporised with the enemy, or even showed a certain sympathy with the German cause in the belief that it would prevail in the end. But they were very few. The Germans were not admitted into Greek society or invited by clubs or associations. Greece was the only occupied country in which they failed to conscript labour. The attempt was broken by passive resistance and by strikes.

Most of those who have been called *Collaborators* in Greece cannot justly be regarded as traitors. The word *Collaborator* has become a weapon of political propaganda, and if we are to determine whether persons called by that word are traitors or not, that is to say whether their dealings with the enemy were to the detriment or to the advantage of their own country, it would be necessary to examine each case. The life of a community must go on. Work in the factories cannot stop, food must be produced and distributed, the law must be administered, the public services must be maintained, even when the enemy is master of the land.

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It will not always be the least patriotic who hold it their duty to pursue their normal tasks rather than allow their families or their employees to starve, or engage in irregular warfare of doubtful military value, bringing upon their fellow-countrymen retaliatory disaster out of all proportion to any damage done to the enemy. Those who suffered most in Greece were the townsmen, the children above all, who died of starvation by thousands, and those villagers who, with their families and homes, were the victims of reprisals.¹ The *Andartes* (the general term for the Greek *guerrilleros*) suffered less than most. It was relatively safe in the mountains. The *Andartes* were not serious opponents in a military sense and the Germans rarely took the offensive against them. The enemy was chiefly concerned with the communications needed to supply his armed forces in Africa and these he protected partly by guards and patrols and partly by reprisals. German sentries could be attacked and railways could be blown up with little danger. It was the nearest village that suffered. In 1943 *Elasites*, under the command of Aris,² one of their most ruthless and daring leaders, murdered a hundred German prisoners near

¹ For a penetrating study of civilian resistance v. A. A. Pallis' *Problems of Resistance in the Occupied Countries* (Greek Govt.: Dept. of Information, London, 1947).

² He called himself Aris (Ares) after the God of War. His real name was Athanasius Klaras. Denys Hamson, in his *We Fell among Greeks*, says that Aris "was a colourful and important figure in this period of revolutionary Greek history. . . . I suppose he was the most ruthless man I have ever met, the most cold-blooded, the cruellest. He was an ex-schoolmaster, sentenced in Greece for homosexual offences and trained in the Moscow school of Communists, an intelligent, able man with no heart, without human pity, an excellent psychologist, a fanatical leader of men. . . . He was still a pederast and it was noticeable that for henchman he always had a good-looking rosy-cheeked youngster." Major Jordan, M.B.E., M.C., who was a liaison officer with the *Andartes*, writes in his pamphlet *The Truth about Greece* (Araluen Publ. Co., Melbourne, p. 14) that Aris "was worse than a criminal. He was a criminal sadist. Through his dastardly crimes he became hated and feared throughout the land. . . . The bastinado was the mildest of his attentions to those who displeased him, yet it rendered his victims incapable of walking for weeks."

Kalavryta. The Germans retaliated by a massacre of the adult male population. They locked the women and children in the school and set fire to it. The women and children would have been burnt alive, had it not been for the compassion of a German sergeant who opened a small door through which they escaped.

The true heroes under the German occupation were the civilians who belonged to the secret organisations which saved the lives of British parachutists and stragglers, took them from village to village, cared for them with infinite solicitude, and sent them to Egypt or Italy in caïques. Countless men and women who worked in these organisations were caught by the Germans, imprisoned, tortured, and shot.

It would have been more humane, wiser in the immediate sense, and, ultimately, more politic, if Great Britain had given no help and encouragement to any *guerrilleros* in Greece, or anywhere, but had maintained only small and secret organisations of the most loyal men and women, with no more than a small, absolutely reliable, and secret armed force which could undertake actions of a severely limited character and serving an indubitable military purpose.

There were a few "collaborators" out of weakness or compliance. But all who came to be called "collaborators" were not traitors. In modern war, an army of occupation administers a country so as to turn that country's production to its own use. The owner or manager of a factory who has to deal with the commandant, who may have to obtain a licence from the enemy to maintain his factory which may even produce for the enemy, does thereby *collaborate*. Is he therefore a *traitor*? If he is, then are not all his staff and all his workmen traitors too? If so, then there was not a country occupied by the enemy in the Second World War that was not peopled mainly by *traitors*.

If the Government is in exile, is it better to establish an

acting Government in its place, or is it better to surrender the whole administration to the enemy? Is all work of mediation, is every office of intercession, treasonable? A Government established in an occupied country must, of course, *collaborate* with the enemy, must, outwardly at least, obey his orders. But it may, within limits, be able to defend the lives and the interests of the population—it may avert much misery, and it may even afford cover for secret work against the enemy himself.

When Metaxas died he was succeeded by Korizis, who, when the Germans invaded Greece, committed suicide rather than witness what he believed to be the end of his country's independence.

The saintly and venerable Archbishop of Athens, Chrysanthos, who is greatly revered in Greece, held that no Government calling itself Greek may, directly or indirectly, serve the enemy in any particular. He refused to consecrate any such Government and was, therefore, removed from his post by the Germans. Archbishop Damaskinos, who became Regent of Greece after the War and until the King's return, did not share this conviction and consecrated the Government formed under General Tsolakoglou. Damaskinos continued to hold his high ecclesiastical office and was often able to intercede with the enemy on behalf of his people, and to save many lives, including British lives.¹ When the Germans ordered him to prepare a list of hostages, he was forced to comply—but he put his own name at the head of the list. Malignance alone could impugn his patriotism, and if Archbishop Damaskinos was a *collaborator*, then that word has at least two meanings that are incompatible with one another. An example within my own experience (in so far as it was related to me by some of the participants) will

¹ Amongst those he saved was that heroic British officer Frank Macaskie, who is, today (1947), the correspondent of *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* in Athens.

show how hard it may be to pass a fair judgment. The Germans arrested all the men in a certain village. They were taken away to a concentration camp not far off. Their women begged the priest to intercede. He led them to the German commandant whom they, kneeling down and weeping, begged for the release of their men. The German was moved to compassion and the men were released. It seemed to me that the priest had done rightly, but some of those who heard his story expressed condemnation, saying that Greeks should beg no favours of the enemy and it was unseemly for Greek women so to humiliate themselves before him.

The original *Quisling*, Vidkund Quisling of Norway, believed in the German *idea* as expounded by Hitler, just as William Joyce did—and just as Communists believe in the Russian *idea* as expounded by Stalin. He placed loyalty to his native land below loyalty to the foe, and thereby became a traitor, even if his purpose was not venal. Apart from the members of the Greek Communist Party there seems to have been only one *Quisling* in Greece, Logothetopoulos, who, like his Norwegian original, was an *exalté* who believed in the *higher mission* of the German race. But he had no following. Tsolakoglou, who preceded him, and John Rhallis, who followed him as the head of an allegedly *Quisling Government*, might be called *Collaborators*. Perhaps they lacked faith, perhaps they temporised more than was necessary, but they cannot justly be called *traitors*.

No Greek could be a *Quisling* through belief in the higher mission of the Italian race. The Italians can claim a more venerable civilisation than the Germans can, whose ancestors offered human sacrifice to brutish gods when the Romans had established the Rule of Law, but they could not uphold such a claim in the presence of the Greeks whose ancestral land was “the sweet literate world”¹ when Latium was peopled by unlettered tribes.

¹ Chapman, *The Tragedy of Caesar and Pompey*, vol. i.

The Germans were at least the triumphant exponents of a modern secular religion. They were victors in battle. They were hated, but not despised. The Italians were despised. And yet, when Italy surrendered, and the Germans made the Italian troops prisoners and, removing their trousers, marched them through the streets of Athens for the derision of the populace, no derision was shown. There was nothing but silence. The Greeks—men, women, and children—hated the Germans with a passionate hatred, and did them all the injury they could. All the efforts of the Germans—efforts that began years before the war—to create a *Fifth Column* in Greece were failures.

But the Germans and Italians were not the only enemies, nor even the most implacable. The feud between Greeks and Bulgars goes back to the Second Balkan War when Bulgaria suddenly attacked her Greek and Serbian Allies and was herself defeated. In the treatment of the mixed border populations thereafter, the wrongs done were not always done by the Bulgars only, but the wrongs they did in Greek Macedonia during the Second World War made them more hated than the Germans. The Greek Communist Party was their accomplice.

The *Greek Popular Army of Liberation*, known as ELAS (Ἑλληνικὸς Λαϊκὸς Ἀπελευθερωτικὸς Στρατός), was the counterpart of the Yugoslav *Partisans*. It was the Greek Communist Party militant, and is so still under the new name of *The Democratic Army*.

If we examine the character of ELAS, within the wider organisation of the *National Liberation Front*, known as EAM (Ἐθνικὸν Ἀπελευθερωτικὸν Μέτωπον), we shall see that it differs profoundly from all other Greek movements. The *Greek Communist Party* (Κομμουνιστικὸν Κόμμα Ἑλλάδος), known as KKE, is an extension, controlled by the *Comintern*, of the Pan-Slav movement into the Hellenic world.

In the elections on the 26th of January 1936 the Communists polled a little over 6 per cent. of the total vote. There is, as far as we are aware, no evidence that the secret activities of the Communists under Metaxas' dictatorship were very extensive or that they were able to create an efficient clandestine organisation—always a difficult task amongst a people as inquisitive and communicative as the Greeks. They would in any case have found it hard to gather much support against the dictator's policy, which had three principal objects: to preserve the national independence and territorial integrity of Greece, to resist every attempt to array Greece not only against the Western Powers but also against Russia (Metaxas refused to become a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact as we have seen), and to promote social legislation especially favourable to industrial and agricultural labour.

But even to have preserved a small *cadre* through the period of the dictatorship gave the Communists an advantage, as events were to show. Their opportunity came when the regular army and the Government left Greece and the administration of the country was taken over by the enemy. The presence of the Bulgarian authorities in Macedonia was particularly advantageous to the Communist cause.

Before Russia was attacked, the Greek Communists, like the Communists everywhere, remained aloof from active participation in the war against Germany, though they did not oppose the war against Italy. On the 15th of January, Niko Zachariadis, the Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party, issued a letter from prison¹ denouncing

¹ Zachariadis was serving a sentence of nine years' penal servitude when Metaxas took office. He had, in 1929, murdered a friend and fellow-Marxist who became a follower of Trotsky's. It is credibly reported that this proof of political reliability enhanced Zachariadis' reputation in Moscow. Zachariadis was released from prison some time in 1943. He was deported to Austria by the Germans. He returned to Greece after the liberation, apparently in the best of health.

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the Second World War as "imperialistic." He admitted no difference between Great Britain and Germany, referring to them as "England, Germany and Co.", and demanded a "separate, honourable, and immediate peace."¹ When the Germans occupied Greece, they released the Greek Communists who were in prison at Akronauplia—one of them was Andreas Zimas, who was, later on, appointed envoy of EAM at the headquarters of Marshal Tito. The nucleus of a Communist Federation to consist of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and what would be left of Greece after the cession of Macedonia, was created long before the end of the War.

A "Committee of the Communist Balkan Federation" had been in existence for years. In September 1923 it issued a revolutionary manifesto for "the realisation of the Socialist Federal Balkan Republic."² This "realisation" was brought nearer at Petritsi twenty years later, as we shall see.³

When Russia was invaded the Greek Communists acted with circumspection and, like the *Partisans* in Yugoslavia, concealed their ultimate purpose under a display of patriotism. They joined the *National Liberation Front*, a term which, with variations, was generic to all movements of resistance that came under Communist control, whether in Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, or China.

EAM claimed to be national and patriotic without distinction of party and to represent and welcome all who were resolved to fight the external enemy. EAM claimed to embrace organised national resistance as a whole, passive as well as active, political and economic as well as military. ELAS was the armed force included in EAM. It also claimed to enrol patriots—indeed patriots only, at first—but in course of time it excluded all genuine patriots, calling

¹ Zachariadis' letter was republished in *Rizospastis*, the official organ of the Greek Communist Party, on the 28th of October 1945.

² In Bulgaria it was called the *Fatherland Front*.

³ *Inprecorr* (the official weekly journal of the *Comintern*), 1923, p. 857.

them *Collaborators, Reactionaries, Fascists, British Agents*, and the like. In time it came completely under the control of the Communists.

The initials, E, Λ, A, and Σ were cunningly chosen. ΕΛΑΣ resembles ΕΛΛΑΣ—that is, *Hellas*—and is pronounced in exactly the same way, for in modern Greek the aspirate is not sounded as it was in ancient. The Λ stands for Λαϊκός, a word that is but roughly rendered by *popular*. During the war and for some time after the Greek Communists used the word *Laocracy* instead of *Democracy*. They have now reverted to the word *Democracy* so as to conform with the general practice of the *Comintern*. Whereas the *Demos* is *the people* in the social sense—or, as we say nowadays, the *common people*—the *Laos* is the people in the national sense, or the nation as a whole.¹ Democracy is a form of government, but *Laocracy* implies rule by the people without reference to the form. It also implies the rule of the people in all countries and, therefore, a federation of peoples. The word ELAS had a patriotic sound, but the meaning behind it was far from patriotic, for *Laocracy*, had it been established in Greece, would have meant, in the first place, partition into the Greek and Macedonian *Laocracies*, and, in the second, integration in the federal system which is, today, composed of the Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Albanian *Laocracies*. When patriotic Greeks began to detect this inner—and, to them, sinister—meaning, they would say that they wanted Greece with two L's, not with one—(H)ELLAS, not ELAS. These linguistic minutiae may seem trivial, but they are not really so. They reveal a high degree of sophistication which came—and still comes—from the *litterati* who play a big part in the Greek Communist movement, for in Greece the *trahison des clerics* has gone very far. The emotional connotations of words

¹ In ancient Greek ὁ δῆμος meant the *plebs*; λαοί (the plural of *abs*), the *subjects of a prince* (v. Liddell and Scott).

and letters, and the perversions of meaning subtly induced, to disguise and fortify the true character of ELAS, deceived even patriotic Greeks in the beginning—and deceived many British and American observers. It prepared the way for open anti-national, anti-British, armed revolutionary action. Like the *Partisans* in Yugoslavia, the Greek *Elasites* were a revolutionary, militant, and conspiratorial organisation whose primary concern was to exploit the situation created by the war and the help so readily offered by Great Britain to destroy all patriotic or national organisations, to establish Communist dictatorships, to exclude British—and, later on, American influence—and, ultimately, to become Federal States of the Soviet Union and, as such, wage the final revolutionary war which will destroy the might of the British Empire and the United States, and establish universal Communism. To the *Elasites*, as to the *Partisans*, the war with Germany was but a secondary consideration. Just as the *Partisans* regarded the Yugoslav Government in London and the *Home Army* commanded by General Mihailovitch, and not the Germans, as their principal immediate enemy, because they regarded the British Empire and the United States as their ultimate enemy, so the *Elasites* regarded King George II, the Greek Government, the Greek armed forces (in so far as they were loyalist), and all patriotic organisations as their principal immediate enemy, and for exactly the same reasons. Against the immediate enemy they were willing to connive even with the external foe. The only party, group, organisation, or movement in Greece that collaborated with the enemy—first with the Bulgarians and then with the Germans—was the Communist Party. If by *collaborator* we mean one who works with the enemy against his own country, as the original Quisling did, then the Greek Communist Party was, and still is, a Party of Collaborators.

Ostensibly affiliated with ELAS, but in reality controlled

by ELAS, within the largely fictitious structure of EAM, were certain other organisations:

ELAS itself bore a close resemblance to the German SS, but with the difference that it included *Political Commissars* on the Russian model in its ranks. It was interwoven with the equivalent of the German Gestapo, the Russian NKVD, or the Yugoslav OZNA, namely OPLA, the *Organisation for the Defence of the People* (Ὁργάνωσις Προστασίας Λαϊκοῦ Ἀγῶνος). OPLA provided the revolution with its secret police, its terrorists and its executioners. EIION was the counterpart of the *Hitler Jugend*. One of the most important aims of the *Elasites* was to promote disloyalty and disruption in the armed forces, especially the fleet, for these were rightly regarded as one of the foundations of the constitutional monarchy and of the Alliance with Great Britain. It was for this special purpose that the subversive organisation known as ELAN, which was to achieve so spectacular a success, was founded—the *National Popular Liberation Fleet* (Ἐθνικὸν Λαϊκὸν Ἀπελευθερωτικὸν Ναυτικόν). There was also a special branch of ELAS, which gave itself out as a branch of EAM, for promoting strikes in the factories—EEAM (Ἐπιτροπὴ Ἐθνικοῦ Ἀπελευθερωτικοῦ Μετώπου). Of great importance was the Political Committee, ostensibly of EAM, but in reality of ELAS, known as PEEA, the *Political Committee of National Liberation* (Πολιτικὴ Ἐπιτροπὴ Ἐθνικῆς Ἀπελευθερώσεως), which negotiated with the Greek Government and the Powers as though it were itself a Government, and one representing the Greek nation.

The centralised, hierarchic structure of the *Greek Communist Party* with its various forms and its extensions and contractions make it unlike all other Greek movements. There is hardly a political party in Greece which has not, at some time, resorted to direct action. But, with the exception of the Communists, no Greek parties have been

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revolutionary in the meaning of the word as understood in Western Europe, Germany, and Russia. They have overthrown, or attempted to overthrow, Governments, but not to transform the structure of Greek society which, despite appearances, has a certain basic stability. The violent disturbances, the armed risings, and *coups d'état*, which have been so common in Greece, have been more like the *staseis* of classical times than the great revolutions of modern Europe. European *ideological* revolutions, like the French Revolution in 1789, the Russian in 1917, and the German in 1933, have no counterpart in ancient Greece. They are phenomena of the modern world, though not of modern Greece—at least not until the year 1942, when the Russian Revolution, as transformed under Stalin, was carried into Greece by the *Comintern*. The Greeks are not ideologues. They are interested in ideas and ideologies and are not intolerant of them. A Spaniard may kill a man because that man, against whom he may have nothing personally, embodies or represents an idea. A Greek may kill a man for personal reasons (the vendetta in Greece is personal, rather than political), but he will not kill a man in the belief that he is killing an idea. Even today, when the whole structure and character of Greek life, the liberties of the Greek people, and their independence as a nation, are menaced by the *Comintern*, discussion of the Communist idea is singularly free and tolerant. What is held against the Communists is not that they hold certain doctrines, but that they are unhellenic—"Greeks only in name." The Greeks have not lost their ancient gift for monumental brevity. There are two epitaphs on graves of men who fell fighting against ELAS in December 1944. The one reveals a certain magnanimity with regard to the Germans and Bulgars who were buried with the fallen Greek:

" Here lie five Germans and seven Bulgars who fell

fighting bravely for their own country, and thirteen Greeks who fell fighting against their own."

The other is on a grave of British soldiers who were killed when fighting ELAS in December 1944:

"They fell to the bullets of men whose language was Greek and whose hearts were black."

The signature inscribed under this epitaph is *Ephialtes*, the name of the traitor who showed the Persians the path that led up to the pass at Thermopylae and enabled them to attack the Spartans in the rear.¹

EAM at first gathered a large following amongst Greeks who had no sympathy with Communism but were willing to forgo all internal differences in the presence of the external foe. Men and women of all opinions, including many who had been sincere supporters of Metaxas, joined EAM: or if they were not able to fight, helped EAM by giving money, issuing and distributing literature, supplying information, hiding or guiding fugitives, and so on.

EAM was the largest and most comprehensive, but not the only, militant organisation. EDES, the *Greek National Democratic League* (Ἐθνικὸς Δημοκρατικὸς Ἑλληνικὸς Σύνδεσμος), led by Colonel—later on General—Napoleon Zervas, was a patriotic association, with a pronounced pro-British and Royalist tendency, and a liberal political programme. EKKA, the *National and Popular Liberation* (Ἐθνικὴ καὶ Κοινωνικὴ Ἀπελευθέρωσις), was a similar league, but broke up after its leader, Colonel Psaros, was murdered by *Elasites*. PAO, the *Panhellenic Liberating Organisation* (Πανελληνίος Ἀπελευθερωτικὴ Ὄργάνωσις), was a patriotic league that operated in Macedonia. It was destroyed by ELAS.

EAM, under the increasing influence of ELAS, displayed

¹ v. Richard Capell, *Simiomata*, 1946, p. 155. I shall return to this noble work.

its hostility to the Throne at an early date. This hostility had a deep purpose. It was a preparation for the conflict to come. It was covert at first, and overt and unashamed to the point of scurrility later on. It gained the support, both willing and unwilling, of ostensibly "progressive" British newspapers and periodicals.¹ It struck at a symbol of patriotism and, therefore, at patriotism itself. The Greek and Yugoslav monarchies, with their European outlook and their western traditions, were an obstacle in the way of the Communist dictatorships to come. It may be said that a difference of opinion on the merits of the royalist and republican forms of government ought never to have impeded the fight against the external foe. But ELAS was not primarily concerned with the fight against the external foe. The King and his advisers endeavoured to avert a constitutional conflict in time of war by agreeing that the future of the Throne be submitted to the free vote of the Greek people after the war. But in vain. The conflict grew rapidly worse, because ELAS wished it to become worse—because ELAS wished to destroy the Greek monarchy, just as the *Partisans* wished to destroy the Yugoslav monarchy, with all speed, because its destruction would have a disruptive effect upon a fundamental loyalty, patriotism.

In April 1944 the Greek Government, then in Cairo, resigned, but offered to remain in office until "the constitutional question"—the question, that is to say, whether Greece was to remain a Monarchy or become a Republic—could be decided. The Government did so to appease EAM, or rather ELAS, as represented in Cairo by the delegate of PEEA, and to avert, or at least postpone, the

¹ The *News Chronicle* and the *Manchester Guardian* were probably unaware of what they were doing—perhaps they were only trying to be "progressive"—when they commented with such gratuitous discourtesy on King George II. But the *Daily Worker* knew very well. The attack on the monarchy in South-Eastern Europe was an attack on the monarchy everywhere—Great Britain included.

constitutional conflict. King George II arrived in Cairo from London on the 11th of April and, on the 12th, issued a statement that he was "at the disposal of the people" and would "submit freely to their judgment as soon as normal conditions have been restored."

EAM agreed to a plebiscite on "the constitutional question." But what sort of a plebiscite? And to what end? Not as a means of letting the nation decide freely between Monarchy and Republic, but as a means of forcing an indoctrinated and terrorised people to vote for the abolition of the Monarchy not in a true plebiscite but in one of those spurious plebiscites or elections which are but compulsory musters of the electorate which acclaim the decisions of a despotic executive.

The *Varkiza Agreement* was sponsored by Great Britain and signed by the delegates of ELAS and of the Greek Government on the 12th of February 1945. It suspended the civil war, although it was meant to bring it to an end. Under this *Agreement* it was decided that there should be a plebiscite. The delegates of ELAS insisted that it be held soon—"at the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year" (*i.e.* 1945).¹ Their wish was conceded in the *Agreement*. Although ELAS had been defeated by British intervention in the civil war, it still exercised terroristic power in many parts of Greece and, having preserved its centralised organisation at a time when the country as a whole was still disorganised and the lawful executive not yet re-established in full authority, it could still, by intimidation and violence, hope to influence the vote in favour of a Republic. The delegates of ELAS also pressed for elections to be held that same year—and for the same reasons. But when, through the relatively rapid re-establishment of law and order, the freedom and the secrecy of the ballot were assured, ELAS wanted a postponement both of the elections

¹ In Article IX.

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and of the plebiscite, knowing that the elections would show that EAM, which claimed to be the nation, was a small minority, and that the plebiscite would show that a large majority of the nation was monarchist. When elections were at last held, on the 31st of March 1946, EAM abstained so as to conceal the smallness of its following. But even this concealment was in vain, for it was easy to analyse the returns and show that EAM represented no more than about 15 per cent. of the electorate. The plebiscite, held on the 1st of October 1946, produced a majority of almost 70 per cent. for the King. Had ELAS succeeded in postponing the elections and the plebiscite indefinitely, it could, in the first place, have intensified a condition of uncertainty which must, in time, have grown demoralising; in the second, have continued to claim a far bigger following than it really had; and, in the third place, have deprived Greece of representative, or at least of demonstrably representative, government, and of a monarchy established beyond any doubt. Had the elections and the plebiscite been delayed until the year 1947, when civil war had broken out again, it is probable that they would not have been held at all—or held under conditions which, in some parts of the country at least, would have made a free and secret ballot impossible.

Long before the Second World War was over ELAS sent its most competent agents and instructors overseas for subversive action amongst the Greek armed forces. These emissaries cunningly misrepresented the Greek situation. They related how EAM was in control all over Greece and how all who were not with EAM were *Fascists*, *Quislings*, and *Reactionaries*. They were particularly successful in subverting conscripts from amongst the Greek population in Egypt who were wholly ignorant of what was happening in Greece. They promoted anti-Royalist and anti-British opinions. The campaign against Royalty, in Greece as in Yugoslavia, was an organic part of the campaign against

the British monarchy and, therefore, against Great Britain. They circulated catchwords discreditable to the British amongst the Greek forces, calling them *Fascists*, *Imperialists*, *Exploiters*, *Shylocks*, and so on. In their political meetings these emissaries talked as though they represented a Great Power—as, indirectly, they did, for the Soviet Union is a Great Power. At these meetings they would urge Greek audiences to demand “Freedom for India,” the “Abolition of the House of Lords,” and the like.

General Metaxas had removed politics and faction from the armed forces. The *Elasite* emissaries succeeded in restoring both. They had every reason to fear that if the Greek army, navy, and air force returned to Greece after the war, the end of ELAS would be speedy. That is why it was necessary to mobilise disloyalists against loyalists in the armed forces. Compared with such aims, the war with Germany was unimportant, although the *Elasites* had to harass the Germans from time to time so as to keep up patriotic appearances and obtain arms, ammunition, and money from Great Britain. There was no other source from which they could obtain the weapons they needed against their fellow-countrymen—and against Great Britain herself. In the end, more British soldiers fell fighting the *Elasites* in December 1944 than fell fighting the Germans in April 1941.

Faction, deeper than of old, began to show itself amongst Greek soldiers, sailors, and airmen. On the 31st of March several officers of the Greek army and air force in the Middle East presented a memorandum to the Greek Prime Minister, Tsouderos, urging him to form a Government of National Unity based on PEEA, which was becoming the Greek counterpart of the *Lublin Committee* or the Yugoslav *National Committee of Liberation*. The officers were placed under arrest. Thereupon mutinies broke out.

The First Greek Brigade, which was due to leave for the

Italian front, refused to obey orders. It remained in camp for three weeks. On the 4th of April 1944 it was disarmed after a brief struggle which cost the life of a British officer. The crews of three Greek warships, the *Apostolis*, the *Sakhtouris*, and the *Ierax*, mutinied and refused to go on convoy duty. The mutineers were tried for treason, murder, mutiny, and wounding with intent. Some were found guilty of treason, some of murder and mutiny, and were sentenced to death. Others received sentences of imprisonment ranging from five to twenty years. None of the death sentences were carried out. This leniency was well-intentioned. Much sympathy was shown in the British press and wireless for ELAS as for the Yugoslav *Partisans*. The secret wireless station, known as GSIK, which was transmitting in the Greek language from Palestine and was under British control, supported the revolutionary cause in so open a manner that the Greek Government sent a protest to Moscow, thinking that such transmissions could only come from there. Moscow denied its responsibility, and, after a brief enquiry, the Greek Government found, to its own surprise, that the British authorities were responsible. It was believed that leniency towards the mutineers would allay the Greek internal conflict and that severity would intensify it. It is hard to say what the consequences of severity would have been. But leniency taught a lesson—the lesson that treason and mutiny were safe. And it failed to avert an intensification of the conflict.

On the 14th of April a Government was formed under Sophocles Venizelos, the son of Eleutherios. But it was short-lived, for the old instability had returned. Another Government was formed by George Papandreou, the founder of the Greek *Social Democratic Party*.

On the 17th of May a conference was held in the Lebanon. Delegates arrived from different parts of occupied Greece

and represented many parties and organisations. The Communists were disproportionately strong, for apart from the Communist Party itself, which had only one delegate, the PEEA had three delegates, and EAM had another three, so that there were seven delegates who were either Communists or under the control of the Communist Party. The Liberals had four delegates. The Royalists, who probably had more supporters in Greece than any other Party, and certainly far more than the Communists, had only one delegate. The familiar method of "infiltration" had been used with great success by the Communists. As I have pointed out, the chief purpose of the Communists in Greece, as in Yugoslavia, was revolution. Unless this is understood, and unless it is also understood that the external enemy was not their principal enemy (in Greece he became their ally, as we shall see) and that the British were their allies only in an opportunistic sense and, ultimately, their foes, it is impossible to understand Balkan history during the Second World War. Loyalists in Greece, as in Yugoslavia, did not regard the Communists as enemies until they were forced to do so in sheer self-defence. They had no "political commissars," no system of "infiltration" and of "penetration," no "Fifth Column" for the undoing of Communists as the Communists had for the undoing of Loyalists. The Communists captured or created organisations that were ostensibly Loyalist or "democratic," and, as in a stage-army, the few were made to appear as many. They watched the ports and the roads and reduced—sometimes by force—the number of persons who left Greece on political missions on behalf of the Loyalists, and increased the number of their own envoys. At an early date—as early as 1942, perhaps—they secretly discouraged those pro-British feelings which were, and still are, so strong in Greece. British policy, on the so-called "high level" at least, strove to promote the middle way when

there was no middle way. By their well-intentioned efforts to "bring all parties together" and to "unite the extremes," the British authorities gave the Communists constant opportunities of further "infiltration." The Communists gained many tactical advantages in negotiating and even in signing agreements, but they never prejudiced their ultimate purpose by keeping a treaty. Whenever they took part in forming a Government they did so to disrupt that Government and to bring all legitimate authority into discredit. The British, who little understand Communism, judged Communism either by their own high standard of fair play or by the lower standards of that revolutionary romanticism which had become so fashionable, as I have pointed out. The application of either standard promoted the Communist cause and fortified the trend of events that culminated in the open civil war and the massacres of December 1944.

Papandreou, at the opening session of the Lebanon Conference, denounced EAM as a small, organised, and armed minority striving to dominate all Greece. All the delegates agreed that all *Andartes* must be placed under the authority and discipline of the Government. All signed a *National Charter* which, besides expressing liberal and democratic aspirations of a conventional nature, stipulated that when the war was over the electorate should vote on the constitution (that is to say, whether Greece should remain a monarchy or become a republic), the social order, and the composition of the Government. Despite Papandreou's warning, the Communists had succeeded in raising two issues, the constitution (and, therefore, the Throne) and the social order. And to these issues they imparted a highly explosive character.

From the Lebanon Conference onwards the record of ELAS was one of unmitigated perfidy. Whenever there was an agreement, ELAS, usually acting through EAM, found

an excuse for breaking it and submitting new and more exorbitant conditions.

In Greece itself, the *Elasites* gradually established a terroristic dictatorship under the German occupation. Everywhere, except in Athens, they began to usurp the authority of the Greek Government. They imposed conscription—not for war against the Germans but for civil war—they levied taxes. They made arrests, assassinated rival *Andartes*, and fought against EDES,¹ besides carrying out operations of little or no military value against the Germans and, as in Yugoslavia, provoking reprisals which favoured Communism by spreading misery and despair. By their exactions and their cruelties they drove thousands of peasants into the *Security Battalions* (Τάγματα 'Ασφαλείας),² which were armed by the Germans, and gave the peasants the possibility of defending their villages, their families, their possessions, and themselves against the terrorism and the exactions of ELAS. The Germans had an interest in the maintenance of civil conflict in Greece

¹ Major Jordan (*op. cit.*, p. 27 ff.) writes that in the autumn of 1944 a detachment of Loyalists under his command attacked a German company a few miles from Arta: "after a ten-hour battle we drove them off with 27 dead and 49 wounded. We killed their commander and drove them from a fortified position. . . . Yet five days later the Communists were fighting against those lads of mine. The charge was that they were collaborating with the Germans." Major Jordan relates how Lt. Arthur Hubbard, of the 2nd N.Z.E.F., was murdered by the Communists in his presence (p. 29 ff.). Major Hubbard's Greek runner was also murdered (p. 26).

² Major Jordan (*ibid.*, p. 10) writes: "Swashbuckling Red louts, drunk with power, went from village to village not occupied by Germans or Italians, and by force of arms compelled young men to join their ranks. Those who did not join were immediately shot or first faced trumped-up charges of collaboration. . . . In Northern Epirus they [the peasants] would take their mules across to the fertile plains of Thessaly to buy wheat or exchange other commodities for wheat. The Communists refused these people passage during the occupation. Only those who joined EAM and produced EAM membership cards were allowed to go to Thessaly to get wheat. The Communists failed to force the people of Epirus into their ranks even by methods so foul as starving them into submission. Only a small percentage of them deserted to the Communists for bread."

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and they did their best to encourage it. But, as an army of occupation with a needy commissariat, they had an interest in the maintenance of the public services and of work and order in the fields and villages.

IV

Much as the Greeks hated the Germans, they hated the Bulgars more, and for this they give two reasons: First, the Bulgars had not even the right of conquest in their favour—the right to be in Greece at all, and to claim her richest province. It was the Germans who had done the conquering. The Germans at least had fought, and had prevailed by their prowess in the field. Secondly, the Bulgarian cruelties were not only more numerous but also more heinous than the German cruelties which were perpetrated for the security of the troops and of the lines of communication, and did not serve a political purpose. That is why the collaboration of the Communists with the Bulgarians is judged no less severely in Greece than their subsequent collaboration with the Germans.

The Greek War of Independence is in its eighth year and the end is not in sight.¹ The Greek nation has, in those years, fought the Italians and their Albanian auxiliaries; the Germans; followed by the Bulgars; the internal enemy, the Communists, in alliance first with the Bulgars, then (as we shall see) with the Germans, and, today, in alliance with the Bulgars still, with the Yugoslavs, and with the Albanians. Greece has, therefore, been at war with five external enemies as well as the internal enemy. And today the three external and internal enemies who are waging undeclared but destructive and sanguinary war against her are operating as

¹ Written in December 1947.

a single armed coalition under the diplomatic protection of the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria was never at war with Russia except for a brief period when Russia declared war so as to take part, the leading part, in making the Bulgarian peace. The Bulgars used to speak of "our friends the Russians" and "our allies the Germans." Because they did not declare war on Greece, they were able, with the support of Russia, to present their claim to Macedonia and to the Macedonian port of Salonica, as the "legitimate" claim made by a "peace-loving nation" (as the phrase goes), Bulgaria, upon an "aggressive nation," Greece. Because the Bulgars invaded Greece and perpetrated massacres without declaring war, and the Greeks defended themselves, the Greeks are the "aggressors." The Greek territory which Bulgaria expected to acquire with the help of Germany, she now expects to acquire with the help of Russia. In the Second World War she pressed southward towards the Aegean on the tide of Pan-German expansion. Today she presses southward on the tide of Pan-Slav expansion.¹ If Germany had won the war Bulgaria would have lost her full independence, but she would have become the privileged satellite of Germany in the Balkans. That is to say, she would have acquired the status and the territory which Germany offered to Yugoslavia but which Yugoslavia rejected, as we have seen. Except for Greece, the Balkan countries have not been liberated, but have come under a new master. Russia has replaced Germany. Bulgaria has lost her independence, just as she would have done under the Germans, but has not received the compensation she hoped for, seeing that the privileged status which was

¹ To help in reminding the Bulgarian people of this national aspiration, a special stamp has been issued. The superscription of this stamp (2 levas) runs: *Yioushna Trakia—Byelo Moryi*, or *Southern Thrac—White Sea* (the Bulgarian name for the Aegean). The picture is of a Bulgarian soldier, with his right hand raised, standing on the shore and gazing at the sun as it rises over the Aegean.

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offered to Yugoslavia under Prince Paul by Germany has been conferred upon Yugoslavia by Russia. Thanks to the intervention of Great Britain in December 1944 and of the United States in March 1947, Greece has been able to sustain the hard struggle for her independence, and Bulgaria does not, as yet, extend to the Aegean. If Greece were to lose her War of Independence, Bulgaria would acquire neither the privileged status nor such full possession of Macedonia as she would have had if Germany had won the war, but would share, with a Macedonian Soviet Republic and with Yugoslavia, the use of Salonica, which would become the principal port of the Federation of Balkan Soviet Republics.

This is not what Bulgaria hoped for originally, but it is at least something and, in any case, Bulgaria, like Yugoslavia, is no longer a free agent, for her foreign policy is made for her in the Kremlin. But it is an acceptable policy even if it falls short of what Germany had to offer.

The annexation of Macedonia was, and remains, Bulgaria's principal aim, both in the Second World War and in the undeclared Balkan war of today. This aim had the full support of Bulgarian public opinion. It was chiefly promoted by the Committee known as BMPO (VMRO in Latin script), the *Vatresna Makedonska Revolucionarna Organizatsia*, under the leadership of Ivantso Michailoff. This Committee, which found many abettors amongst the pro-Bulgarian Communists of Greek Macedonia, had great influence in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government seldom disagreed with it. The German alliance brought Michailoff into personal touch with Hitler as well as with King Boris, and the Committee became extremely powerful. It disposed of two special organisations: the *Macedonian-Bulgarian Committee of Kastoria*, composed of a few hundred *Komitadjis*, and the *Ohrana*, an armed force of Bulgarian and

Macedonian volunteers under the command of an officer of the Bulgarian army, Kaltseff.

The *Ohrana*, like its prototype in Tsarist Russia, was largely terroristic. Towards the end of 1943 the *Committee of Kastoria* was in dissolution, largely as a result of the Italian surrender. Many of the members had joined EAM, taking their weapons with them. Those that remained were used by Kaltseff¹ to reinforce the *Ohrana* which, on Greek territory, numbered about 1000 armed men, recruited from the Slavophone² population and stationed in the regions of Kastoria, Edessa, and Florina.

Kaltseff, who took his instructions from the Bulgarian Government and from the BMPO, proposed to the Germans that the whole population of Greek Macedonia should be armed and organised. The Germans agreed. They and the Bulgarian army supplied the arms which were distributed by agents of BMPO. Many Slavophone peasants were recruited by force. Officers of the Bulgarian reserve—Dimitseff, Boubaloff, Iltseff, Moutikaroff, Bozilhoff, Karandonoff, Tsevneff, and others—were appointed commanders, under Kaltseff, of the *Ohrana* in the districts of Edessa, Florina, Kastoria, and Yannitsa.

About the middle of 1943 EAM created a special force of its own, called SNOF, the *Slav Macedonian Liberation Front* (*Slavonomakedonski Natsionalen Osvoboditelen Front*). It was recruited from amongst the Greek Slavophones. Collaboration between the *Ohrana*, under Bulgarian control, and SNOF, under the control of EAM, and, therefore, of the Greek Communist Party, followed an agreement that Macedonia should have autonomy. Kaltseff was always well informed about the movements of EAM. Patriotic Greeks

¹ Many details of Kaltseff's activities came to light during his trial at Athens in the summer of 1946.

² The Slavophones of Greece speak a Slav language and regard themselves as the real natives of Macedonia. The Bulgars claim that the Slavophones are really Bulgarian.

in the ranks of EAM, especially amongst the leaders, were reported to the Germans or Italians. Many were executed. None of the pro-Bulgar members of EAM were molested. They mixed freely with men of the *Ohrana* in regions occupied by the Germans. Many Bulgarian Communists were appointed to commands in EAM and, by agreement with the Greek Communist Party, executed Greek patriots who had joined EAM if they refused to support the political aims of the Communists or opposed the demand for Macedonian autonomy. Greek army officers, doctors, professors, police, and priests were executed in great numbers. There was a kind of purge of all "intellectuals" who were not Communists. In Greece, as in Yugoslavia, all who opposed the Communists were denounced as *Fascists* and *Reactionaries* and, later on, as *Collaborators*. To charge such persons as *Collaborators* had the additional advantage of diverting the charge from those who really *collaborated* with the enemy—that is to say, the Communists.

On the 12th of July 1943 an agreement was concluded between the Greek and Bulgarian Communist Parties at Petritsi in Bulgaria. It was agreed that the two Parties were to co-operate in creating a Union of Balkan Soviet Republics which would comprise Greece, Macedonia,¹ Bulgaria, and Serbia. Yugoslavia was to have Fiume, Bulgaria was to have access to the Aegean, Istanbul and the Straits were to be an autonomous republic under the protection of the Soviet Union. Either Party was free to pursue this common aim in its own way.² The agreement was signed by John Ionnidis for the Greek, and Dushan Daskaloff for the Bulgarian, Communist Party.

¹ The new Macedonian State was to be a conglomerate composed of Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian Macedonia, bounded by the River Mestos, Mounts Rhodope, Pindus, Rila, and Olympus, the Albanian Alps, and the Aegean (it was to include the island of Thasos).

² The Comintern had only just been dissolved—i.e. mobilised—for international action, as we have seen, and every Communist Party had a certain freedom to adapt its tactics to local conditions.

Greek villages in Macedonia were burnt down. In villages with a mixed Greek and Slavophone population Greek houses were destroyed. The *Snofites* would sometimes kill a German near a Greek village to draw German reprisals upon the villagers. In many villages the Greek administration was removed by ELAS and records, including registers of births and deaths, were destroyed.¹ Greek officials were replaced by members of EAM who were considered "reliable"—they were, in other words, replaced by Communists. EAM placarded and circulated slogans to the effect that Macedonians and Bulgars were brothers, that the oppressive rule of the Greeks would be abolished, and that they would all live under a *People's Administration*. All Greek *Andartes* were urged to avoid conflict with pro-Bulgars.

The special task assigned to SNOF by EAM was to represent the Greek Slavophones and to organise a Slav-Macedonian administration. Many Slavophones responded willingly, for Greek rule had been oppressive in the past, and they welcomed the opportunity to exact vengeance and to work and fight for what they believed would be an independent Macedonia.²

Andartes known for their pro-Bulgarian sentiments served in Regiments 27, 28, and 30 of ELAS. Their commanders were nearly all Communists—Elias Dimakis, for example (who later on adopted the name of Gotseff), Peios, Korovessis, Papadimitriou, Kolendjis, and the brothers Touroundja.³ It was at the special request of the Bulgarian Government that the Germans had released from prison Andreas Zimas, who, as we have seen, represented the

¹ By way of preparation, no doubt, for future plebiscites or elections.

² For a well-informed analysis of the conflict between Greeks proper and Slavophones, v. the article *Macedonia*, by I. Curran, a British Intelligence Officer who served in northern Greece (*Round the World*, May 1946).

³ It will be noted that most of these names are Greek.

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Greek Communist Party at Marshal Tito's headquarters.¹ Occasionally, *Chetniks* who served under General Mihailovitch found their way into Greek territory. If caught by *Elasites* they were executed. The command of the Macedonian units was entrusted to Dimakis, a Greek Communist of pronounced pro-Bulgarian opinions. Members of the *Ohrana* were enrolled in a special Macedonian contingent which received Bulgarian uniforms from Yugoslavia and was joined by *Partisans* under orders from Marshal Tito.

General Mihailovitch tried to establish a *liaison* with Zervas. But every attempt to promote co-operation between Greek and Yugoslav loyalists was discouraged by the British. On the other hand, the revolutionary movement which embraced Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece was closely co-ordinated, for the leaders and organisers worked in secret and, in any case, cared little for the desires of the British. Amongst the British, at least in Cairo and London, this revolutionary—or, rather, counter-revolutionary—movement, and its ultimate importance, were not understood until too late in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and almost too late in Greece. The warnings of Yugoslavs and Greeks who knew their own countries and understood what was happening carried no weight. King George II tried to impart some of his deep insight to responsible British authorities, but his advice was dismissed as that of a “reactionary.”

The Germans played off one Greek faction against another. When EAM was strong, they strengthened the *Security Battalions*, who were anti-German to a man but feared the terrorists of ELAS more than they feared the Germans. When EDES, led by Colonel Zervas, grew strong, as they did in September 1943, the Germans attacked them and forced them to retire into Epirus. The Germans, when they took prisoners from EDES, would sometimes force

¹ Formally, he was the representative of EAM.

them, under threat of death, to march with the German columns to spread the belief that EDES were collaborating with the enemies of Greece. In this way the Germans reinforced the propaganda of EAM which represented Zervas and his men as *Fascists* and *Collaborators*.

On the 25th of July 1944 a Russian Commission arrived in civilian clothes. They had Bulgarian passes.¹ They crossed the frontier at Kula and took up their residence in the Athenas Odos in Salonica. They established contact with EAM. Their purpose was to arrange for the defection of Greece and the departure of the Germans. There was contact, at the time, between the German and Russian secret services. It would seem that preliminaries for the agreement eventually concluded between ELAS and the Germans were arranged by the Russian mission. It was naturally in the interest of the Germans to withdraw from Greece with rapidity and without loss and to reinforce their western front against the invasion. They were also interested in leaving behind them a situation that would cause the greatest possible embarrassment to Great Britain—and in this they succeeded. The Russians were interested in consolidating their political gains in Eastern Europe and extending the counter-revolution into Central Europe before the Western Allies could interfere, and in completing their Balkan conquests by the conquest of Greece. They were interested, also, in creating a deadlock between the Anglo-American and German armies in Western Europe, for, if the invasion of the west were to be a prolonged and exhausting operation, it might enable the Russians to emerge as masters of all Europe. They were, therefore, interested in the speedy and safe withdrawal of the German forces in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The Greek Communist Party was no longer interested in fighting the Germans but

¹ These passes were made out for one colonel, one lieutenant, and one civilian Commissar.

only in the conquest of Greece before the return of the Greek regular forces and of the Greek Government. It was, above all, necessary for the Communist Party to be master of Athens. Thus there was conformity of interests between the Germans, the Russians, and the Greek Communist Party.

Negotiations between ELAS and the Germans began in July 1944. On the 26th of that month *Kapetan*¹ Kitsos, representing the *Elasite* divisions² in Macedonia (OMM), wrote to Major Erich Fenske, representing the German forces comprising the *Army of the Aegean*, to suggest a meeting.³ An informal and preliminary meeting between a deputation of *Elasites* and Major Fenske followed. Major Fenske did not stay, but left a sergeant of the Gestapo and an interpreter to discuss the arrangements. The Greeks and Germans fraternised and, in the words of an eye-witness, "spent a pleasant evening together." A meeting was fixed for the 20th of August at Leivadi near Salonica. A guard of honour was selected by *Kapetan* Hercules.⁴ He selected thirty *Elasites* for their stature and their generally impressive appearance. They paraded in German uniforms. *Kapetan* Kitsos sent for a monk named Oktopis, who rode a mare called Elektra, to proceed to Leivadi and welcome Major Fenske there. Later on, Major Fenske claimed the mare as his own. Kitsos said he was willing to part with her in exchange for arms and ammunition. Fenske was stationed at Vassilika and proceeded to Leivadi with twenty soldiers of the *Wehrmacht*. He was personally welcomed by the

¹ *Kapetan* is a more general term than *Captain* is in regular armies. It denotes the *Commander* of a unit of undefined size in a *guerrilla* army.

² Division is also a general term, denoting a unit that may be no more than two thousand strong.

³ The following account is based on affidavits made by three witnesses: A. Zesimpoulos, D. M. Stylianos, and Daniel Oktopis, and on a report made by Evangelos Koukidis, a lieutenant of artillery, who examined eighteen persons who were present at the meeting on the 20th of August.

⁴ Iraklis.

monk and conducted to the village of Charalambos where the guard of honour was drawn up. The discussion began at nine o'clock in the morning and went on during the day, in Greek fashion, with much eating and drinking. It was agreed that an armistice between ELAS and the *Wehrmacht* should be arranged and that ELAS should receive a specified quantity of German arms and ammunition. By 6 o'clock in the evening Major Fenske was so drunk that he was incapable of rational conversation, so that a further meeting became necessary. In the period that followed *Elasite* and German units passed one another unhindered. Only of the "Turkestan people" were the *Elasites* suspicious—these were Russian deserters in the German service, whom the *Elasites* regarded as traitors to the Soviet Union. The final meeting between *Kapetan* Kitsos and Major Fenske was held at Leivadi, where the following document was drawn up and signed:

Military Agreement.¹

" ELAS/OMM and German Supreme Military Command of the Macedonian Aegean.

" The undersigned 1. *Kapetan* Kitsos, commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 31st ELAS regiment, acting as representative of OMM with the authority of the commander of the XIth Division, Lasanias, and 2. Major Erich Fenske, commander of unit 31756 at Vassilika, and representing the German armed forces of the army of the Aegean, having met today, 1st September 1944, at the village of Leivadi in the area of Salonica, have agreed to the following:

" 1. ELAS undertakes the obligation not to impede

¹ The text of this agreement (in English translation) was first published by *Time and Tide* (15th of March 1947). The Greek text was published in *The Nineteenth Century and After* (May 1947). The original was drafted in Greek and in German. Both were signed by Kitsos and Fenske; the German text was retained by Kitsos, the Greek by Fenske. I have myself seen the original Greek document with the two signatures.

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the withdrawal of the German army in the area of OMM and will enter each evacuated area after the departure of the last German soldier.

“ 2. At the same time, the German Supreme Military Command undertakes to order the withdrawal of the Security Battalions from the city of Salonica which it will surrender to the ELAS reserve and the political organisation of EAM in accordance with a detailed plan to be specified by the two contracting parties, OMM/EAM and the German Military Command.

“ 3. ELAS guarantees the lives of German soldiers who have entered or may enter its ranks so long as they promise to fight by its side against any enemy of the Popular Army.

“ 4. ELAS bears no responsibility whatever if anti-popular treacherous groups should attack the German forces.

“ 5. The German Supreme Military Command will hand over to ELAS heavy arms and war-material in proportion.

“ 6. Under these conditions and with the co-operation of Bulgarian and Albanian Partisans, ELAS agrees to fight the anti-popular bands of Andartes.”

This agreement allowed the Germans to leave or pass through Macedonia without molestation from ELAS (article 1). It allowed ELAS to occupy Salonica, for the only defence which the population had, the *Security Battalion*, was to be removed by the Germans (article 2). The only loyalist organisation in Macedonia, PAO, had been destroyed by ELAS. A part of the city, including the centre, was occupied by ELAS, and a part, including the suburbs, by the Germans. It was evident to all observers that there was a truce between them. The agreement signed on the 1st of September had been kept secret, but it was clear that such an agreement existed. The Germans

left on the 30th of October. The Communists established a reign of terror in the city and executed about 3000¹ of their political opponents. The person formally responsible for these executions was the Political Commissar, Vafiadis, who later on became known as General Markos, the commander of the *Democratic Army*. ELAS guaranteed the safety of German deserters who had joined the *Elasites* on condition that they took part in the fight against Greek loyalist organisations, such as EDES, referred to in the *Agreement* as "any enemy of the Popular Army"—that is to say, of ELAS (article 3). The Communists, having concluded an alliance with the *Wehrmacht* against the loyalist Greeks, repudiated any responsibility for attacks which loyalists might make on the Germans at the instigation of the British or on their own initiative as patriotic Greeks. In the autumn of 1944, when there was at last a possibility of striking at the Germans with some effect, of harassing them in their retreat, and so of helping the Anglo-American armies in the west, ELAS, which had been armed and financed by the British to fight the Germans, came to terms with the Germans and intensified their warfare on those Greek forces which were loyal to the Greek cause and the cause of the Western Allies (articles 4 and 6). The agreement left the Greek Communist Party free to complete its conquest of Greece, the Germans even supplementing the supplies of arms and war-material which ELAS had received from the British (article 5).

The only considerable loyalist force that remained was EDES, in Epirus. On the 19th of December three *Elasite* divisions, being no longer concerned with the fight against the Germans, took the offensive across the Pindus mountains. One of them went through Albania to turn the flank of EDES. The offensive was successful. The remnants

¹ This figure is the conjecture of responsible persons who were in Salonica at the time.

of EDES were saved by the British Navy and taken to Corfu.¹

V

Even when the Greek Government returned in October ELAS controlled most of the country, including the Peloponnese, where the peasants were, and are, fervently royalist. But the royalist peasantry were unarmed. Colonel Zervas was far away in Epirus. He could, to a limited extent, threaten ELAS from the north, but could do little in the two most important centres—in Salonica and, above all, in Athens. And he was soon to be defeated, as we have seen.

Greek loyalism was strongest in the regular armed forces. The mutineers had never been more than a small minority and the mutinies had been overcome. But the Greek army was not on Greek soil. There was no one to challenge the power of ELAS and to avert what seemed the imminent extinction of Greek independence. The massacres, begun in Macedonia, were extended to the rest of Greece. The Communists established their own terroristic administration throughout the country and began, even before the return of the Government, to murder civil servants and officials suspected of excessive loyalism. Of the Greek regular forces, only a few had landed with a small contingent of British troops.

On the 18th of October Papandreou, the Prime Minister, made a speech in which he announced drastic measures which he was quite unable to carry out. He expressed lofty but irrelevant liberal principles and showed great determination to stand firmly and defiantly on a non-existing basis in the presence of disasters he was wholly unable to overcome. He was a favourite amongst the British, who regarded him as a guide along that "middle

¹ v. W. H. McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma*, 1947.

way" where extremes can meet and march harmoniously together towards peace and freedom.

On the 25th of October a law was passed empowering the Minister of War to call up reservist officers and men of the 1936-39 classes. On the 31st it was announced that the *Resistance* was no longer necessary, as the enemy had departed. All *Andartes*, whether ELAS or EDES, were to be disbanded, regular officers serving with them were to join the regular army, irregular officers were to be trained so as to take commissions later on. It was announced that these decisions had been approved by the Government, including the Ministers who represented EAM and KKE.¹

The Communists had shown themselves to be very astute. While establishing their terroristic dictatorship in Greece, they played the political game constitutionally, though always ready to break off the game and resort to direct action when it was in their interest. EAM served their purpose well. Its complement of Socialists and Liberals had, in the beginning, imagined that they would impose moderation and be the real masters, but they were soon reduced to the inglorious status of *Fellow Travellers*.

It was extremely difficult for Greek loyalists to undertake any decisive political action against the Communists, for to do so would have been regarded as "reactionary" by the British and by the Americans. The Communist dispensation in Greece, as in Yugoslavia and Albania, was not only armed and financed by Great Britain, it was also sustained politically by the British press and wireless and by British political agents and advisers who, to preserve the "mean between the two extremes," used their influence to impose what they imagined to be a "solution," although, in reality, it enabled the Communists to avert a "solution." The

¹ Athenian Wireless Station, 31st Oct. 1944. v. also *Tachydromos*, 2nd Nov. 1944.

flower of the Greek nation was in north Africa and on the sea, fighting for Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and the other Allies, and therefore unable to defend their own homeland. For Greek patriots, with growing awareness in their hearts, those were the days of greatest anguish.

The height of absurdity was reached when men like Zervas, the commander of EDES, and Sarafis, the commander of ELAS, both received the rank of Major-General in the Greek regular army. It was of the utmost importance for ELAS to be represented in that army, partly to promote its disruption from within, and, in any case, to paralyse it as a force that could be used against militant Communism. The height of absurdity was surpassed when, on the 8th of November, Papandreou announced that he found the leaders of the Greek Communist Party, Siantos, Zevgos, and Partsalidis, fully agreed that all *Andartes* must be demobilised. Nothing could be more favourable to the Communists than to demobilise all military organisations, while leaving the secret *cadre* of ELAS intact, and to overcome the danger, not much longer to be delayed, with which the returning regular army threatened the Communists, by disrupting that army from within.

On the 9th of November 1944 the Greek *Mountain Brigade* arrived from Italy. It marched through the streets of Athens amid demonstrations of frantic joy and enthusiasm on the part of the populace.

The Communists thereupon demanded that the *Mountain Brigade*—as well as the *Sacred Squadron*, which had also returned and was the object of special animosity because it had been unaffected by the mutinies in April—should be disbanded, and that the regular army should be officered by men of *democratic* principles. The world has, during the last year or two, become a little more familiar with the uses of the word *democratic*. When serving the purpose of the Comintern, it is a vague and rather general expression to

cover not only all Communists but all who are in any way sympathetically disposed towards Communism. In time, it was narrowed down to cover Communists only. Today, ELAS has become the *Democratic Army*. The Communists hinted that, if their demands were not conceded, civil war would break out.¹ On the 20th of November Siantos made a tacit but significant distinction in a public speech, a distinction between a *National* and a *Regular Army*. He agreed with the Prime Minister that all "volunteer forces" should be demobilised, and that they should be replaced by the *National Army*. But he made no reference to the regulars.²

The 10th of December was the date agreed upon for the demobilisation. Zervas announced that EDES would surrender its arms by that day. Sarafis, to gain time, said he would refuse to authorise the demobilisation of EDES unless the Government issued a special decree. A series of consultations followed and, at length, the decree was issued in a form acceptable to the Communists. But on the 28th of November, Zevgos, the Communist Minister of Agriculture, to gain still more time, submitted a revised version of the decree in which the demobilisation of the regular army was demanded. It was clear that the Communists were determined (rightly, from their point of view) to remove the only force in Greece that could defend the country against a Communist dictatorship and save it from being partitioned and annexed to the Balkan Federation. A deadlock followed and, on the 1st of December, the six Ministers who represented EAM and KKE resigned from the Cabinet.

In the days that followed the Government made a series of hopeless attempts at compromise while ELAS and EAM grew more and more uncompromising. Outside Athens

¹ *Hellas*, 1st Dec. 1944.

² *Rizospastis*, 21st Nov. 1944.

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the Communists were the masters, within the city they were paralysing the authority of the Government. The situation was accurately diagnosed on the 2nd of December 1944 in an intelligence report of the Third Corps of the British Forces in Greece:

“The logical situation, if the Greeks are left to themselves, is civil war, almost certainly ending in victory for the largest and best organised political army, EAM-ELAS.”¹

If the Communists could get rid of the small regular army—of the *Mountain Brigade* and the *Sacred Battalion*—so much the better for the revolution. If not, civil war must begin forthwith and all forces, whether military or political, which were loyal to the constitutional order and in any way associated with Great Britain, must be destroyed before they had a chance to rally and recover. The *Comintern* was, or would soon be, master of Belgrade, Sofia, and Tirana. It was necessary to make it master of Athens and to hoist the Red Flag with the Hammer and Sickle on the Acropolis, or else the Pan-Slav advance on the Aegean would be arrested and Great Britain would retain the command of the eastern Mediterranean. On the 3rd of December 1944 Zevgos gave a plain warning in *Rizospastis*, the official organ of the Greek Communist Party:

“The day has come,” he wrote, “for our powder-blackened guns to speak.”²

Papandreou wanted to make a further concession and sacrifice the *Mountain Brigade*. But General Scobie, who commanded the British forces in Greece, refused his consent. The Second World War was not yet over, and the *Mountain Brigade* might be needed for further service against the Germans. General Scobie saw further and deeper than Papandreou.

¹ Capell, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

² *ibid.*, p. 119.

EAM thereupon announced that they would demonstrate in the heart of Athens on Sunday, the 3rd of December, and that there would be a strike on the Monday. Papandreou issued an order forbidding the demonstration. But EAM defied the order, and, from the dawn of the 3rd onwards, they rallied their followers by loud-speakers, and requisitioned lorries and "buses to bring in men, women, and children from the red suburbs of Kokkinia and Kallithea." ¹

The reports of the bloodshed that followed are confused. EAM intended no ordinary demonstration. Civilian crowds, including women and children, were to serve as cover for an attempt to seize the capital. According to some reports, there was firing in different parts of Athens on the Sunday. Captain Byford Jones, whose book shows him to be a dispassionate observer, saw the Athenian police fire on apparently unarmed demonstrators from a balcony opposite the Hôtel Grande Bretagne and without evident provocation. Although the police had received orders that if the crowd were to grow menacing they were to use blank charges only, some policemen disobeyed the order, for twenty or thirty people, including women and children, were killed, and many more were wounded. ²

Nothing could have suited ELAS better. Legitimate authority had put itself in the wrong. The British and American press, already predisposed in favour of ELAS, was almost completely won over. The world, which knew nothing of the massacres and murders already perpetrated by ELAS, or of the military agreement between ELAS and the Germans, and was quite unaware that a march on Athens

¹ Capell, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

² Byford Jones gives the number of killed as 22 (*op. cit.*, p. 138). Capell (*op. cit.*, p. 122) gives the number as 32. Capell adds that, according to Colonel Evert, the chief of the Athenian Police, 70 policemen had been killed and more than 100 wounded in the course of the preceding fortnight. Mr. W. H. McNeill thinks that only one policeman fired a live round which he had substituted for his blank (*op. cit.*, p. 138).

was being prepared, heard only of the one atrocity, the firing on an apparently peaceful crowd.¹

ELAS at once undertook military operations. They attacked the police stations on the periphery of Athens one after another and massacred the inmates. British detachments intervened to save those stations that held out. About half of the Athenian police force was rescued in this way.² On the 4th of December ELAS attacked the local headquarters of the loyalist organisation known as X³ and made up of men who had rallied in self-defence against terrorism and the massacre. ELAS had a great superiority in numbers and were able to bring up trench mortars. Their opponents were, it seemed, doomed to extermination when a British detachment arrived to save them.

The British during this period rescued whom they could. But their numbers were few. Apart from their forces in Athens, they had a small force in Salonica and another in Patras. In the other towns and in the villages of Greece the *Elasites* massacred without any hindrance. If the Communists could take Athens and the seat of Government

¹ One of Mr. Churchill's critics, Mr. Seymour Cocks, M.P., affirmed, with many others, that the firing in Athens was the cause of the civil war. Col. the Hon. C. M. Woodhouse, the British liaison officer in Greece, replying to Mr. Cocks in the *Daily Telegraph* (5th May 1947), stated, *i.a.* :

"If he [Mr. Cocks] really believes that ELAS could have carried on warfare in Athens for five weeks with no more preparation than the 24 hours between Dec. 3 and Dec. 4, then he might as well believe that the Eighth Army won the Battle of El Alamein on the impulse of an impromptu inspiration of Montgomery's the day before it started.

"Any eyewitness could have told Mr. Cocks that ELAS had been concentrating troops and artillery in Athens for some time beforehand, waiting only for an appropriate *casus belli*.

"What the shots fired by the police did was not to start a civil war but to give a moral pretext for a revolution. If it had not been that one, it would have been another; that one happened to be unimaginably perfect for hoodwinking the press and world opinion."

² W. H. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

³ The Greek *Khi* (X), and the mathematical symbol for the unknown quantity. The members of X were known, collectively, as *Khitis* (X-ites).

they would place Great Britain—and the world—before the *fait accompli*. EAM would then claim that it was the Greek Government, the “democratic” Government “of the people,” and would be able to declare, with some truth, that the whole country was in its hands—that is to say, in the hands of the Greek Communist Party—a fact the world would not immediately realise. But as long as the British were prepared to rescue loyalist Greeks from massacre, even if only in Athens, the *fait accompli* was impossible. The leaders of ELAS, therefore, had to make up their minds whether to attack the British or not. General Scobie had about 6000 men, combat troops, both British and Greek, at his disposal, twenty-four tanks, four squadrons of armoured cars, and a squadron of Spitfires. ELAS disposed of about 8000 men outside Athens and a reserve of 10,000 to 15,000 inside, but these were not battle-trained. ELAS had considerable forces in Thessaly. Orders were sent out from Athens for reinforcements and, within a few days, 2000 men arrived from the Peloponnese. It was evident that the British would soon be greatly outnumbered in fighting under conditions unfavourable to regular troops. The *Elasite* reserves wore no uniforms and, sniping from roofs and windows, were hard to distinguish from the civilian population. On the other hand, it was no small matter to risk an armed encounter with Great Britain. But ELAS could reckon on the moral support of the British and American press, and it did not seem likely that Great Britain would engage in a war against a movement which had so successfully masqueraded as “popular” and “democratic” and crush it in favour of a movement so successfully, and yet so falsely, represented as anti-democratic, anti-popular, reactionary, monarchist, collaborationist, and Fascist.

The *Elasites* could not stop now that Athens was almost in their hands. To stop would have meant more than a reverse. It would have meant defeat. On the 4th of

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December General Scobie issued an order in the name of the Greek Government that all *Elasite* forces must withdraw from Athens and the Piraeus within three days and that they must refrain from attacking police-stations. The *Elasites* thereupon decided to attack the Government buildings to create the *fait accompli* before General Scobie's order had expired. But they found that the buildings were guarded by British sentries and shots were exchanged.

The leaders of ELAS were still divided amongst themselves and still hoped that, with nearly all Greece in their power, they might secure control of the Government without war with Great Britain. But General Scobie insisted on his original order, and fighting began. The British were hard pressed. *Elasite* reinforcements arrived from the mountains.

On the 18th of December *Elasites* captured the buildings where the Royal Air Force were billeted and took several hundred prisoners after a fight which lasted for two days. The area held by the British in Athens was very small. The greater part of the city was in the hands of *Elasites*, who harassed the lines of communication so effectively that the British were seriously short of food and petrol. But when the British reinforcements began to arrive, the *Elasites* realised that they must drive the British out of Athens with all speed. They made their biggest and most concentrated attack in the night from the 15th to the 16th of December. It was defeated and, while the British were being reinforced, the *Elasites* lost heart and their army began to break up. Their main combat forces retained cohesion and, arresting 15,000 civilians, men and women, in Athens, retreated northward and drove these hostages before them. The hostages had little to eat; they were insufficiently clothed and shod for the trek through barren, upland country in severe cold. Many who lagged behind were shot. About 4000 perished.

Although ELAS had been defeated in Athens they were

still masters of nearly all Greece. Except for the British, who were in no way inclined to undertake the pacification of the whole country, there was no organised force to oppose them. Great Britain was confronted with a problem that was both human and political. All but the capital of an allied country was in the power of a merciless and hostile dictatorship. An allied State was threatened by armed sedition, the *élite* (especially the Anglophile *élite*) of an allied nation by massacre, the nation itself by the loss of its liberties and its independence. There could be no reasonable doubt that, if the Greek Communist Party were to prevail, British influence would be eliminated from Greece, as it was from Yugoslavia and Albania, and that Russia would be master of the entire Balkan peninsula. It is difficult to tell how much these political considerations weighed at the time. The full extent of the connivance between ELAS and the enemy appears to have been imperfectly recognised in London.

Nevertheless London, and even Cairo, were better informed about Greece than about Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1944 it seemed doubtful to British observers in Greece whether any military advantage was to be gained by supporting the *Andartes*. Broadly speaking, political, subversive, and irregular warfare as conducted by Great Britain in South-Eastern Europe, did little injury to the Germans while it helped them by causing deep dissensions within allied countries.

The terrible blunder made by Great Britain in Yugoslavia was nearly repeated in Greece—nearly, but not quite. The leading members of the British mission with Tito were the dupes of the Marshal and of his propagandists, as we have seen. The leading members of the British mission in Greece, some of whom knew the language and the country well, were not to be duped in this way.

Nevertheless, British policy in Greece was grievously

mistaken, although the most disastrous consequence, the total loss of Greece, was averted at the last moment. The present war in Greece and the threat to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean is the direct outcome of that policy. Great Britain owed the same loyalty to her allies which they owed to her. It was not loyal on her part to arm and finance subversive movements against legitimate and allied Governments. It was her task, in so far as it lay in her power and as the occasion demanded, to impress loyalty on the subjects of those Governments. It was her practice—which Mr. Churchill expounded in the House of Commons when he spoke on the 9th of December—to “arm anyone who could shoot a Hun.” But the war was far too serious a matter for language of that kind. It had, with the mobilisation of the *Comintern* in July 1943, become a revolutionary (or, rather, counter-revolutionary) war, and there was, under the direct or indirect leadership of the *Comintern*, a growing army of men, and even women, who were eager to promise that they would “shoot a Hun”—and might even do so—if Great Britain would give them the weapons with which some day they would “shoot a Briton.” The *Partisans* in Yugoslavia and ELAS in Greece shot far more loyal Yugoslavs, far more Greeks, far more true friends of Great Britain, than they shot “Huns.” For the sake of a military advantage which was, at best, doubtful, and far outweighed by disadvantages both military and political, Great Britain brought disaster upon countries that stood by her in the days of her own greatest danger. She inflicted upon them evils as great, if not greater, than those against which she professed to be fighting—and, in the end, she brought disaster upon herself, for the present state of Eastern Europe is surely disastrous for Great Britain.

Even Greece would have been lost had not a small British force arrived in Athens before it was too late; had not their

commander been a man of insight and determination; had not Mr. Churchill risen to greatness at the most critical moment.¹

British intervention in Greece was justified by every consideration of honour and interest. To have refrained would have been deeply dishonourable and immensely injurious to Great Britain—injurious, also, to the United States who, in December 1944, assumed an attitude of demonstrative indifference towards General Scobie's men and towards the great responsibility that was theirs. With but few exceptions, such as the *New York Times*, the American press reported events in Greece as malevolently as the British.

Even if the preservation of Greek independence had not been a vital British interest, as it still is, it would have been impossible for General Scobie's men to remain inactive. The British army had acted honourably when it tried to the best of its limited power to help Greece in 1941. It had earned immense gratitude and, when men of that army returned to Greece in 1944, that gratitude was expressed by men, women, and children in a manner deeply moving to all who saw it. Great Britain had, out of a mistaken policy, helped to create ELAS and so to bring on one of the most terrible visitations that afflicted the Greeks in the whole of their tragic history. For the massacres which accompanied the attempt of the *Elasites* to make themselves masters of Greece Great Britain had a large share of responsibility, seeing that these massacres were perpetrated by men who had been largely armed, financed, and encouraged by her. But she seized the opportunity to save a devoted and courageous ally from final disaster. And once British soldiers found themselves on Greek soil it would have been

¹ The names of Churchill and Scobie are revered in Greece today almost as Byron's name is revered—and that is saying much. One of the main streets in Athens is named after Mr. Churchill: *Tsorsil Street*.

impossible for them to look on and do nothing while innocent and friendly people were being exterminated.

The massacres began in the Peloponnese when the Germans were leaving. In October 1944 the *Elasites* descended upon Kalamata from the mountains and murdered the leading citizens. Wherever the Germans were replaced by ELAS there was more fear and despair than there had been before. In town after town, village after village, the *Elasites* massacred loyalists, sometimes exterminating whole families—men, women, and children. The victims were often mutilated—eyes were gouged out, noses were cut off, hands and feet severed. The victims belonged to all classes. Indeed, the most resolute opponents of ELAS were the poor peasantry of the Peloponnese who, in the elections and the plebiscite during the year 1946, showed that they were loyalist and royalist by an overwhelming majority. And it was in the Peloponnese that some of the most terrible massacres occurred. Civil servants, police, traders, and professional people were the special victims everywhere, but it is not true that there was a revolt of the poor against the rich, a war between “Left” and “Right.” There was no popular rising. In the cold ruthlessness and fanaticism of its trained leaders, in the militancy and discipline of its armed forces, the craft and cruelty of its secret police, and in the mendacity and power of its propaganda, it bears a striking resemblance to the German *National Socialist Party*. Only in two important respects does it differ. Hitler and his associates lived that Germany might be great and the master of all. But the leaders of the Greek Communist Party live that Greece may be small and captive. They never had a following comparable with Hitler's. They are not, and never were, a “movement of the people” as Hitler's Party was.

The British Trade Union Delegation, which visited Greece in January 1945, reported:

“We have seen hundreds of bodies of men and women civilians which had been exhumed at Peristeri (one of several such places round Athens) from filled-in trenches. They had, without any shadow of doubt, been executed at close quarters. There was no doubt in our mind that there had been organised and brutal murders.”¹

Other common graves, filled with persons murdered by ELAS, were found at the rifle-range of the Military Academy, at the Uhlen Waterworks, at Kypseli, Kaisariani, Galatsi, and so on. Many bodies were found in pits and disused wells all over Greece.

There were many distinguished victims. For example, the beautiful and gifted actress, Helen Papadaki, of the Greek National Theatre, was murdered and mutilated.² Fenny Xydi, the woman tennis-champion, who played for Greece at Wimbledon, was murdered, together with her step-father, Admiral Kriezis, the former Greek naval attaché in London. Professor Nicholas Eustathianos was murdered and mutilated. In massacring whole families ELAS spared neither old age nor infancy, neither grandparents nor grandchildren.³ Estimates of the total number of men, women, and children who were murdered differed widely. The state of the country, the destruction of records, the disappearance or dispersal of public authorities, the displacements of population, and the frequent incoherence and bias (often under fear of reprisal) in the available evidence,

¹ *What we saw in Greece*, publ. by the T.U.C. (Smith Square); v. also the report of the British Ambassador in Athens, Mr. Reginald (now Sir Reginald) Leeper (Comd. 6592). Byford Jones (*op. cit.*, p. 238) saw many bodies which “revealed that there were savage sadists in the ELAS ranks, whose mutilation of girls, based on and surpassing German atrocities, are too gruesome to describe in cold print.” The only discoverable “crimes” of these victims was political opposition or a family connection with Royalists.

² She played the part of Clytemnestra in Sophocles’ *Electra* at Cambridge in 1938 (at the invitation of the British Council).

³ For example, the Giorgos family of 16 persons, including a child aged 2.

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made a comprehensive survey difficult. According to a survey undertaken by the Greek *Ministry of Public Order*, 45,214 civilians were killed by Communists—a term including ELAS and its successor, the *Democratic Army*—from the middle of October 1944 until the 25th of September 1947. By far the greater number of these victims met their death in December 1944, and most of them in Attica and northern Greece. The total does not include casualties suffered by *gendarmes* or soldiers at the hands of Communist organisations.¹ The total probably represents a minimum as it includes only such deaths by violence as could be ascertained.

The Wars of Independence which the Greeks waged against the Turks were largely wars of mutual massacre. They had not the romantic character suggested by the work of romantic writers. But since that period, massacre has not been a Greek practice and defeated rebels have always been treated with relative leniency. It has been said of the Greeks: "*ce sont des assassins, mais pas des massacreurs.*" The Greek Communists offer the exception to this rule, for they are *massacreurs par excellence*. The Greeks are quick to anger and, sometimes, to kill for personal, rather than for political, reasons. And here again the Communists are the exception. Executions, even of convicted homicides under the law, were always rare in Greece. Legal executions began in the summer of 1946, for severity became a necessity when appeasement and conciliation had failed.

ELAS was, and is, un-Hellenic in its character, structure,

¹ Police and *gendarmes* killed by Communist organisations, whether in battle or by murder (the murder of captured policemen or *gendarmes* has been the common practice of these organisations), number 316 officers and 2715 men. The number of soldiers killed was not available at the time of writing (December 1947). It has not been the custom of Communist organisations to murder soldiers because the Party hopes to win over the sympathisers with the Communist cause which inevitably exist in a conscript army.

and purpose. It is un-Hellenic, even in the manner of its excesses: the gouging-out of eyes, for example, is a Balkan-Slav, not a Hellenic, practice.¹ There were many Slav Macedonians with ELAS, many Bulgars, many savage Albanians, many Armenians from Asia Minor, and, above all, there was the cold ruthlessness of the *Comintern* which, whenever the occasion arises, will exterminate whole categories of people, a practice arising out of a doctrine which is wholly alien to the individualism of the Hellenic world.

Mr. Churchill was the principal promoter of the military and political action that prevented the capture of Athens, brought the massacres to a temporary end, and thereby saved Greek democracy and Greek independence, at least until today. He expounded and defended his policy in the House of Commons on the 8th of December 1944. As he spoke, he towered immeasurably above his opponents. He described, with complete accuracy, how Great Britain had brought extremes together so as to form a representative Greek Government, a Government including members of EAM, which "could take over power in Athens when . . . it was freed from the Germans," how Papandreou had appealed "in the name of his Government of all parties, including the Communists and EAM, to come to the rescue"—in other words, to despatch a British expeditionary force (such an expedition had, in fact, been secretly prepared with the authorisation of the American as well as the British Chiefs of Staff). Papandreou had gathered into his Government "no less than six EAM representatives . . . and the leader of the Liberal Party, Mr. Sophoulis." The latter, according to Mr. Churchill, complained

"that too many EAM and Communist representatives were already installed in places of power."

"M. Papandreou, however, is a man of the Left," so Mr. Churchill went on to say, "a democrat, a Socialist—

¹ It was the common practice of the Croatian *Ustashi*, as we have seen.

not a Liberal or anything like that (laughter), in fact almost everything that is supposed to be correct nowadays; but M. Papandreou put his trust in those six gentlemen. Meanwhile, the forces of ELAS, which is the military instrument of EAM, were planning a descent on Athens as a political and military operation, and the seizure of power by armed force. ELAS is a mixed body and it would be unfair to stigmatise them all as being entirely self-seeking in their aims and actions. Nevertheless, during the years of Greek captivity, I must say that ELAS devoted far more attention to trailing up and destroying the representatives of EDES commanded by Colonel Zervas, a man of the Left by our standards. . . . He was a man who was correct, according to the current jargon, and the wrong element of EAM devoted themselves more to attacking Colonel Zervas and his followers on the west side of Greece than they did to attacking the Germans. For the last two years ELAS has devoted itself principally to preparations for seizing power. We may, some of us, have underrated the extremes to which these preparations have been carried, and the many privations and cruelties which have been inflicted on the village populations over which they prevail. . . . ELAS did not hesitate, on occasion, to help the Germans to catch and kill the representatives of EDES. . . . From the deprivations and ravages of ELAS there was, however, as we can now see, a fairly well organised plot or plan by which ELAS should march down upon Athens and seize it by armed force, and establish a reign of terror. . . . How much the Germans knew about this before they left, I cannot tell, but a number of them are left behind and are fighting in the ELAS ranks. . . .”

Nearly ten months before, Mr. Churchill had spoken, as we have seen, in very different terms of the Yugoslav *Partisans*, an organisation not only similar to ELAS but also pursuing the same purpose—the seizure of power and, therefore, of the capital, and the establishment of a Federation

of Balkan Soviet Republics. He had learnt much in those ten months.

Some of his statements in the House call for comment. ELAS was indeed "a mixed body," but it was none the less a Communist organisation, in so far as it was under centralised military and political Communist control. Every unit had its political Commissar who was always a Communist and was much more powerful than the military commander. Any defections, even of mere opinion, were terroristically suppressed. The higher commanders—like Vafiadis and Aris—united the functions of military commander and political Commissar in their own persons. Mr. Churchill said that they were not all "self-seeking." It would be more accurate to say that most of the leaders—including the political commissars—were idealists, sometimes fanatical idealists, though not the less ruthless for that reason, and perhaps the more so. Few of them were mere bandits or *lansquenets* in pursuit of booty. Although some had personal ambition, the leaders of ELAS were, on the whole, men who fought for a cause. That is why they were more interested in the defeat and destruction of EDES than of the Germans, just as the *Partisans* were more interested in the defeat and destruction of General Mihailovitch and his *Home Army*.

For ELAS and for the *Partisans* the Second World War provided the historic occasion, in accordance with Communist doctrine, to establish Communism. The Germans, although hostile to Communism, did not find it a serious menace. At times it was a nuisance, but, on the whole, it was to their advantage because it promoted division in the countries they occupied. While repelling attacks by *guerrilleros* they never bothered to suppress Communism as such. When the war came to an end they began to look upon Communism with favour (at least outside their own country) in so far as it became a menace to the Western Powers and

opened the prospect of a Third World War in which Germany might retrieve the defeat suffered in the Second. The greatest good fortune that befell the Communists was the failure of the Western Powers to understand what was happening in Eastern Europe (except belatedly, and, even then, imperfectly, in Greece), and their fateful error in giving political, moral, financial, and military aid to a movement which was incapable of striking effectively at the enemy but was eminently capable of striking effectively at the Western Powers, especially Great Britain, as all can see now who have eyes to see.

Mr. Churchill was entirely right in relating "the depredations and ravages of ELAS" to an "organised plot or plan." They were organised with the same purpose as the terror and the purges in the Soviet Union. Later on, they acquired a further purpose—as we shall see—to promote that condition of human wretchedness, ruin, and anarchy which is so favourable to Communism.

On Christmas Day 1944 Mr. Churchill and Mr. Anthony Eden flew to Athens. Their endeavours to promote a settlement in Greece and to establish a representative and democratic government have been recorded in detail, so that I need not dwell upon them here.¹

The negotiations culminated in the agreement which was signed by the representatives of the Greek Government and of ELAS at Varkiza, some miles from Athens, on the 12th of February 1945.² This agreement, which had been promoted by Great Britain, was meant to be, if not a settlement, at least basis for a settlement. It may have been the best that could have been done by Great Britain in the situation as it was then. But it was no solution—indeed, it excluded the possibility of a solution, for it gave ELAS, a seditious organisation, the quasi-legal status of a corporate body

¹ Especially in Byford Jones' *Greek Trilogy*.

² For the terms of this agreement, v. Byford Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 266 ff.

which had negotiated, and could negotiate again, with the legitimate Government. It did not confirm the political defeat of EAM, but only the defeat of ELAS in the field—and even that defeat was not rendered irretrievable, for the *Agreement* did not prevent ELAS from re-organising and re-arming in secret.

VI

The twofold liberation of Greece—liberation from the external and the internal enemy—was followed by a period of reaction. But this reaction was popular, not administrative. Much time had to pass before central authority could reassert itself all over Greece. The administration, at first, was a *cadre*, and a poorly organised *cadre* at that. As the fear of ELAS dwindled, friends and relatives of thousands of murdered persons took heart—and vengeance. In Macedonia there was severe repression of the minority which had taken part in the massacres and the incendiarism which the *Elasites*, in alliance with the Bulgarians, had perpetrated against the loyalist majority. And in these acts of repression the new *gendarmérie* took part.¹

But at no time did loyalist repression rival *Elasite* repression either in extent or in savagery. The number of murders perpetrated by persons seeking personal vengeance for the loss of a friend or a relative, and by loyalist organisations exercising a kind of counter-terrorism, was but a small fraction of the number of murders perpetrated

¹ In the spring of 1947 the *Commission of Investigation* appointed by the *Security Council* devoted part of its enquiry to the treatment of the minority in Macedonia. In its report, the *Commission* stated that it had "received sufficient evidence . . . to warrant the conclusion that immediately after the liberation of Greece the small Slav-speaking and Chamurist minorities in Greek Macedonia and Epirus had been the victims of retaliatory excesses." These "excesses" had "caused several thousand persons to flee to the mountains or take refuge on the soil of Greece's three northern neighbours where they formed groups actively hostile to the Greek regime" (*Report by the Commission of Investigation*, Part III, ch. i. section D, pars. f and i).

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by ELAS.¹ The difference was the difference between murders and massacres. The fatal sequence of terrorism followed by equal terrorism or worse that has characterised the overthrow of so many revolutions was broken in Greece. What was worse, the Red Terror or the White that followed the fall of Bela Kun in Hungary? What was worse, repression in Republican Spain during the civil war or in Nationalist Spain during the period that followed? It is impossible to answer with any assurance.²

In Greece reaction was not only much less repressive, with regard to the number of its victims, it was also different in character. ELAS was a terroristic organisation. The *Elasites* were terrorists first and soldiers last. Terrorism was their way to power and method of using power. After the civil war came to an end there was some loyalist terror-

¹ The proportion, from the middle of October 1944 until the end of 1947, was, perhaps, 10 to 1, although during the spring and summer of 1946, when massacre had ceased (to begin again in November) but murder was frequent, the number of murders perpetrated by loyalist organisations began to approach the number of murders perpetrated by ELAS. According to the figures issued by the Greek *Ministry of Public Security*, 205 crimes of violence were committed from 1st April-20th May 1946 :

85 by Communists.
38 by Nationalists.
28 unidentifiable.
54 non-political.

205

² In my opinion the White Terror in Hungary was worse than the Red, although it was less in evidence. The full extent of the White Terror was never established. The enquiry into the murders committed by White Terrorists in the forest of Orgovany was stopped by the Hungarian authorities, who were determined to represent the Red Terror as extreme and the White as non-existent. But in a subject so imperfectly investigated new discoveries are possible and an opinion formed on the basis of existing evidence may have to be revised. With regard to Spain, I have studied much evidence but am unable to form an opinion, only a general impression. It is certain that massacre was perpetrated on both sides. It seems to me that more persons were murdered by Republicans than by Nationalists during the civil war, but that if those murdered by Nationalists after the Republican defeat are included, we shall find that the number of persons massacred may well be about the same on both sides.

ism in the small towns and villages, but, except for a limited period in Macedonia, there was no administrative terrorism. Successive Greek Governments opposed even loyalist terrorism. To do so was not easy. It was not always possible to prevent local authority from discriminating in favour of the loyalist violence. Although the renewal of the civil war in the summer of 1946 made it necessary to establish courts of summary jurisdiction in Northern Greece, terrorism as a system of government does not exist, and never has existed, in Greece since the liberation from the Turks, except for those regions—which, in December 1944, included almost the whole country—where ELAS has had control, and where its successor, the *Democratic Army*, has control today.

The Greek Government had not the means, at first, to curb either private vengeance or political violence. Nevertheless, Greece was the only country between the Arctic and the Aegean which saw the restoration of personal freedom under the Rule of Law. Even today the substance of freedom under the Rule of Law has been preserved, despite the limitations imposed by an atrocious war—or, rather, by reason of those limitations, for although condemned by an uncomprehending public opinion in the western world, they were imposed in defence of personal freedom and national independence. If the menace to freedom is deadly, then the defence must be stern. Belatedly, and taught by terrible experience, the Greeks have learnt to be stern in defence of their liberties, though not nearly as stern as their enemies have been, and still are, in the endeavour to extinguish those liberties.

There is freedom of investigation in Greece, and it is possible, as in no other country between the Arctic and the Aegean, to gather and weigh evidence and to generalise with some assurance on matters which, in countries under administrative terrorism, remain obscure (because they are

kept obscure). To pronounce a political or judicial system just or unjust is never easy, except, of course, for a propagandist. Is Greek justice impartial or not? In principle and in purpose it certainly is. Is it so in practice? It is harder to give an answer, but, broadly speaking, the answer is Yes. To say this is not to deny that there is much injustice, but the injustice comes from grievous circumstance and from human frailty, not from the law or the spirit of the law. Indeed, if we consider the implacable nature of the war, not only as it was in December 1944 but as it is today, December 1947, we should be guilty of shallow, or even of malicious, judgment if we did not recognise that the Greek judiciary has upheld standards of justice in circumstances that would have tried to the limits of endurance any judiciary in the world.

In January 1946 a *British Legal Mission* visited Greece to conduct an enquiry which no Government in any other country between the Arctic and the Aegean would have allowed. The *Mission* stayed in Greece for about three weeks and its report fills more than forty pages.¹ Its main conclusions are that, normally, the procedure for arrest and preliminary hearing and the safeguards against arbitrary arrest are adequate; that when prisoners are detained, there is a *prima facie* case for detention; that measures to accelerate the examination of cases awaiting trial are adequate, though measures to accelerate trials are not; that methods of investigation and public trial are adequate, except that hearsay evidence is admitted; that the evidence examined by the *Mission* did not support the charges made against Greek judges that they allowed their political convictions to influence the conduct of criminal trials; and that the state of Greek prisons was unsatisfactory.

If we consider that Greece had endured threefold invasion, famine, and an atrocious civil war, that the country was still

¹ *Report of the British Legal Mission to Greece*, Cmd. 6838.

deeply divided by political passions and personal animosities left aflame by recent tragic memories; if we consider the immense difficulty of restoring order with inadequate military and administrative forces after the cruellest, the most anarchic, and the most ruinous period in Greek modern history; if we consider the destruction of houses,¹ the displacement of population, and the extreme penury, which could not but unfavourably affect the state of the prisons; if we consider how often, in other countries, authority, when re-established, has replaced private terrorism by administrative terrorism, we must admit that the *Report of the British Legal Mission* is an assurance that the principal condition of civilised life, the Rule of Law, was restored in Greece.

By the spring of 1946 all those liberties which are regarded as essential to democracy in western countries had been re-established. There was complete freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. There was no censorship of the press. EAM had more newsprint at its disposal than any other organisation or party. It used its journals as a vehicle for vituperative attacks on the Greek Government, on the British forces in Greece, and on Great Britain. The loyalist journals were, and still are, strongly Anglophile, though they would, upon occasion, turn sharply against Great Britain. Whatever faults the Greek press may have (and it has many), obsequiousness is not one of them, and in nothing does the Greek Communist press display its unhellenic character more than in its complete obsequiousness towards the Soviet Union and to the three northern neighbours, despite the immense injury those three

¹ 1,004,695 persons had been rendered homeless in Greece by the end of 1944 (the total population of Greece was 7,335,675 according to the census held in 1940). By the end of the year 1947 about half a million people were rendered homeless as a result of the civil war. The overcrowding of prisons was somewhat relieved in 1946 under Law No. 753 which authorised the release of thousands of remand prisoners (v. p. 32 of the Report).

neighbours have done, and are still doing, to the mother country.

Greek journalism has an intensity unequalled in Europe. It is sometimes brilliant and sometimes flashy. It does not always respect the code of personal honour (and the law of libel is very lax). It is permeated by a trenchant, critical spirit. Some of the Athenian newspapers—the *Hestia*, for example—are equal to any in the world for literary excellence and political acumen.

There were—and are—no restrictions on foreign correspondents and no censorship on outgoing press telegrams. Correspondents in Athens were able to report falsely and maliciously to their newspapers abroad without any interference by the Greek authorities. A large number of correspondents took full advantage of this rare and delectable privilege. So much was it abused that its wisdom was questioned. But the elections in the spring of 1946 were reported with fairness and accuracy by most of the British and American correspondents in Athens, and the few who were neither fair nor accurate bore unwilling or unwitting testimony, *ipso facto*, that reporting was free. Although Greece suffered more than most other countries from misrepresentation, she has surely gained, on balance, by upholding the freedom of the press and by allowing free enquiry.

There was, and is, nothing in Athens to resemble the *Gestapo*, the NKVD, or OZNA. Until the revival of the civil war in the autumn of 1947 there were no arrests without warrant and the law was mildly administered. Of the members of ELAS only those were tried who were guilty of offences under the criminal law, and of these none were executed until the Court of Assizes sentenced to death five members of OPLA for multiple murders.¹

The Report of the Allied Mission to observe the Greek

¹ *v. Daily Telegraph*, 7th July 1946.

*Elections*¹ left no doubt in the minds of those to whom the word *fair* still had a meaning that the Greek elections, held on the 31st of March 1946, were *fair* and that they had nothing in common with elections held in the Soviet Union, in the Yugoslav Republic, or in the Third Realm.

There was a small British force in Greece, and the elections were prepared and supervised by nearly 1200 British, French, and American *Observers* under Mr. R. I. Windle, the Assistant National Agent of the British Labour Party. The British chief of the Greek police, Sir Charles Wickham, decided that the police should not bear arms. The British troops were out of sight. There was not a weapon to be seen in Athens. No display of force was necessary, and for two reasons: the tactful realism of the British authorities and of the *Observers* on the *Allied Mission*, and the reasonableness, despite their not unreasonable fears, of the Greek people. The force at the disposal of the British and Greek authorities could have suppressed armed and open violence, but against widespread clandestine terrorism they could have done little. With rare exceptions, the polling was orderly. In awaiting the verdict the nation was apprehensive but calm.

EAM abstained from voting. They knew that they were in a minority and that their claim to be "the people" was unfounded. By alleging malpractice and falsification they could discredit the returns and, by concealing their own voting strength in the mass of non-voters, they could make it difficult to disprove a claim they could not prove.

But the preliminary work of the *Mission*, the returns, and the *Mission's* analysis of these returns, established the state of Greek public opinion beyond an honest doubt, with but a narrow margin of uncertainty.

According to the *Mission's* estimate, out of an electorate of 1,980,000 (males aged 21 and over), 1,850,000 were validly registered. Of these, 1,117,379 voted. The Royalist

¹ Cmd. 6812.

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parties secured an absolute majority (711,030, or 63·6 per cent.), and of these the *Populist Party* was returned as by far the biggest in Greece.¹ The Republican parties polled less than a third of the votes. There were 730,000 non-voters. According to the analysis of the *Allied Mission*, about 280,000 had abstained for political reasons—that is to say, in response to the slogan 'Αποχή (*abstention*) proclaimed by EAM, and 453,000 for other reasons (illness, indifference, and so on). EAM, therefore, did not represent more than about 15 per cent. of the electorate, the Communist Party even less. The *Mission*, which conducted a careful enquiry all over Greece, found that only about 11,000 persons refrained from voting because they were deterred by fear. Complaints, made by loyalists as well as by EAM, that the results had been vitiated by terrorism, were found to have little substance.

Greece at last had a Government elected by a majority in a ballot certified as free and fair by an international authority that was above suspicion. The claim of EAM to “the people” had been disproved conclusively.

The result seemed like another liberation. Liberation from the Germans had been followed by massacre. Liberation from the terrorism of ELAS and from civil war had been inconclusive. There was apprehension even after the 31st of March 1946, but, as the days went by and nothing untoward happened, it was, or seemed, evident that liberation, true and final, had come at last.

It was natural that Sunday, the 7th of April, as the first

¹ Greece has *Proportional Representation*. The seats in the *Vouli* (Parliament) were distributed as follows :

Populists	206	}	Royalists.
Zervas	20		
Tushovassilis	9		
Liberals	48	—Republican.	
National Political Union	68	} not specifically Royalist or Republican.	
Independents	3		
	354		

holiday after the elections, should be a day different from all other days—a day of immense relief; a day marking, as it were, the end of war, hunger, ruin, and massacre that had lasted since October 1940; a day of victory and of vindication. There was no official ceremony, for there was no formal occasion for such. But it was only natural that there should be spontaneous rejoicing throughout the land on that Sunday which was, as it usually is in that season, a day of sunshine.

It is a lovely and a gracious land. The lofty buff-grey cliffs whiten as they meet the crystalline blue of the sky. Across the rough boulders of the foothills sardonic goats wander past great cushions of *Jerusalem Sage* and crunch the grey-green scrub. Light streams down through purple sprigs of *Judas Tree*. The fields and valleys are charged with light as though with electricity. The flowers are like incandescent jewellery set in glowing verdure, the stocky vines like sticks of twisted bronze, the vine-leaves like green-golden flames. Poppies, a deeper red than ours, are massed in pools of blood on rust-red earth of vineyards charged with light and heat that will swell and sweeten the grape. Pale amber colonnades of poplar burn with a soft inner light; emerald cascades of willow glitter and glow with silvered iridescence. The cottages, white, yellow, pink, and blue, are embowered in trellised wistaria, heavy plumes of lilac, and pendent golden mimosa. Oranges glow like red-hot cannon ball among metallic dark-green leaves. Outside the *taverna* the peasants play accordion, violin, or cither, and sing those songs that are so earthy, so solid, so full of animal desire, so much a part of nature herself; or drink their *retsina*, a clean, dry white wine with smoky, resinous tang; or, arm in arm, follow a tripping, pirouetting, finger-snapping leader in rhythmic, circular dance. As the sun sets, the asphodels catch the horizontal rays and glow with a soft electric radiance like innumerable starry candelabra.

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Rocky barrenness surrounds the capital, and in the streets and squares is dust and clatter of traffic, and vivacity of an exuberant people. High above, and visible from almost every street or corner, is the infinite grace of caryatids and of sun-drenched, honey-coloured fluted column. The Acropolis glows or flushes or grows dim with changing sunshine. Sometimes it is a hard, glittering white; sometimes it is dissolved in a golden translucency, sometimes heavy grey with stains of rust and sepia; or rust-red in the setting sun, like the painted temple of some Inca city. Under the moon it is as though suspended ethereally overhead, light and white as powdered snow.

Near the Areopagus, where St. Paul spoke to the Athenians, who were always ready, then as now, "to hear some new thing,"¹ there is a little church. The Cross upon the portal is lit up by electricity as darkness falls. Glittering as though set with diamonds, it confronts the marble Temple of the *Wingless Victory*, high upon the rock's edge, perpetuating, as it were, the tremendous Pauline challenge to all the wisdom, beauty, and majesty of the pagan world.

VII

The Agreement signed at Varkiza on the 12th of February 1945 left EAM with a legal status, as we have seen, and enabled the Communists to continue the struggle for mastery in Greece by legal and constitutional methods which provided a cover and a defence for clandestine seditious conspiracy in collusion with the northern neighbours of Greece—Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The Greek Communists operated with skill, energy, and singleness of purpose, taking full advantage of the liberty they enjoyed under a dispensation which they constantly denounced as *Fascist*.

¹ Acts xvii. 21.

They were, with the help of assiduous *Fellow Travellers*, particularly successful in gaining sympathy all over the world, especially in Great Britain and the United States.

They acquired considerable wealth, under the German occupation and during the civil war, which gave them many opportunities of "expropriating" farmers, merchants, or other persons with any property that came under their power. The money, most of it in the form of golden sovereigns, which they received from Great Britain, was, for the most part, used to finance their fight against Greeks rather than their fight against the Germans.¹

EAM was by far the richest political organisation in Greece: far richer than the *Populist Party*, which commanded four times as big a following, if not more. It had sufficient wealth to engage in big financial deals and in speculation on the exchange. Its financial organisation was known as OMSA, the *Organisation for the Study of Plans for Reconstruction* (Ὄργανωσις Μελέτης Σχεδίου Ἀνοικοδόμησις), it had secret agents in big banks and some of the commercial houses as well as overseas. It was well-informed about the state of the money-market and about movements of trade. By June 1946 some of its manipulations had been detected, and, when it engaged in a large financial transaction, it was outbidden by private firms and suffered so heavy a loss that it was unable to finance the strike EAM had called for the 17th of June against the Government's bill "for the restoration of law and order." This was one of the reasons for the failure of the strike.² EAM used gold supplied by Great

¹ As far as I am aware, the sum disbursed to finance the Greek "resistance" has never been made known. It may not have been much, but even a relatively small amount of gold in the coffers of a disciplined, centrally organised Party is much in a ruined country with an inflated, unstable paper currency.

² According to the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in Athens, only 10 per cent. of the workers in and around Athens and the Piraeus responded (*Daily Telegraph*, 19th June 1947).

Britain for the purchase of newsprint, for dealings in foreign currency, for promoting strikes, for anti-British propaganda, and so on. There is, as far as I am aware, no proof that EAM was financed by Russia. But it received Russian films free of charge and made a considerable profit by showing them in Athenian picture theatres. It imported cattle supplied by Bulgaria at a low cost and sold them at a high price on the Greek market.

In the world of art, letters, and the theatre EAM had achieved a powerful ascendancy. The *trahison des clercs* went far in Greece. Literary cliques and coteries were led by persons of some brilliance who fascinate the young. Writers of little talent could become successful authors if they made amends by zealotry for EAM. Love of the masterpieces of Greek antiquity was discouraged. To admire Homer or Sophocles in Athens was to be suspected of reactionary leanings. EAM found many recruits among the liberal professions. Like the nationalist movements in the Middle and Far East, it attracted underpaid lawyers, teachers, civil servants, and so on. Greece has a superabundance of lawyers, many of whom have little or no practice. It is from amongst these and from amongst the underpaid school teachers that Greek sedition has received much of its zealotry and most of its malevolence. Great plausibility and a training in the international Muscovite school made it easy for Communist leaders to influence a disloyalist opinion throughout the world.

News of the massacres perpetrated in December 1944 was not imparted to readers of *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, the *News Chronicle*, and other leading journals. The readers of the *Daily Telegraph* were well-informed, thanks to Mr. Capell, whose book I have mentioned, and to Mr. Christopher Buckley later on. Mr. Walter Lucas of the *Daily Express* revealed some of the truth in October and December 1944. But, for the most part, the daily press

carried omission and misrepresentation to an extreme. Mr. Capell arraigned the press, especially *The Times*, in his book.¹ It is a grave reflection on contemporary English journalism that an indictment so grave and so well substantiated should have been ignored, and that not one of the newspapers arraigned should have the wish to vindicate its honour.²

There was a time when the cause of Greek (as of Polish) independence aroused the chivalry of civilised Europe. It inspired some of the finest literature in the world and from many countries came volunteers to fight for Greece. Throughout the nineteenth century to be a Liberal was to be a Philhellene. But when Greece passed through her darkest years since her liberation from the Turks, when, having fought in the common cause with heroism, obduracy, and fearful sacrifice, the menace to her freedom was renewed, British Liberalism expended itself either in condonation of massacre and treason or in pharisaical censoriousness at the expense of Greece for not displaying a perfection of conduct such as no country in her predicament could possibly display and yet remain human. British Liberalism, indifferent to the fate of a country which, in 1944 and since then, as in 1939 and thereafter, was fighting England's battle as well as its own, was indulgent to that country's treacherous and inhuman enemies, although those enemies were England's also. If Greek patriotism, disheartened by the extinction of the Liberal spirit, that was once so powerful and invigorating an ally, and embittered by the discourtesy and ingratitude that have usurped the place of magnanimity, had faltered and compounded with the enemies of Greece, Great Britain herself would

¹ *Simiomata*, pp. 11, 118, 128, 133, 145, 152-3, 155, 163, 165, 178-9, 180, 198.

² Since the beginning of the year 1947 the correspondent of *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* in Athens has reported events in Greece with accuracy and insight.

not have escaped consequences which would have imposed upon her and her people immeasurable danger and sacrifice.

Not one Liberal voice of any weight was raised on behalf of Greece, and those who could not find words strong enough to condemn the slightest excess perpetrated by their own fellow-countrymen in India and elsewhere, who still cherish their indignation (that may have been righteous enough) over the Italian war against the Abyssinians, were silent over the massacre of old men, women, and children, over the burning of villages, the ruin and the misery inflicted upon an innocent population which had endured so much for so many years in the common cause.

It was left to the Socialist Government of Great Britain to sustain the cause of Greek independence. Despite persistent pressure from a considerable public opinion stimulated by the *Opposition* within the Socialist Party, by the Communists, and by the Liberal press,¹ the British Government retained a small army in Greece and so preserved what the Greek people had achieved by their great valour and by their atrocious sufferings, what Mr. Churchill

¹ On the 27th September 1946 the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "if we [i.e. Great Britain] withdraw from Greece we may be weaker strategically but we shall be stronger morally." This was at least an admission that Great Britain was serving some useful purpose in Greece, though I should have thought that any "strategic weakening" on her part would be an exceedingly grave matter, considering the dangers that encompass her. As for the moral strengthening which would, according to the *Manchester Guardian*, compensate for the strategic weakening, it is hard to see how Great Britain would grow "stronger morally" if she abandoned Greece to massacre and to the loss of independence. Indeed, I cannot imagine anything more dishonourable than such an abandonment would have been. I am well aware that national honour does not count for much nowadays; but, honour apart, do not events today demonstrate clearly that to have abandoned Greece in 1946 and even in 1947 would have been to increase incalculably the menace to the security of the eastern Mediterranean? It is to the eternal credit of the British Socialist Government that it lent no ear to advice so wicked, foolish, and dishonourable, but retained a British force in Greece until the protecting hand of the United States made withdrawal possible.

and General Scobie and his men had saved in the last hour.

The British army in Greece took no part in the internal affairs of the country after the Agreement was signed at Varkiza. The Allied Mission, in its *Report*, pointed out that the presence of British troops on Greek soil had no influence on the elections. These troops were often under strong temptation or provocation to emerge from their passivity. They were the objects of constant and often scurrilous attack from the Greek Communist press. When civil war revived, they had to remain aloof when innocent people were being murdered and villages were burnt. On one occasion—in November 1946—three men of the King's Royal Rifles were travelling by train to Salonica when the train was attacked by *Insurgents*,¹ who robbed the three soldiers of their equipment and their boots and then murdered, in their presence, an officer of the Greek *gendarmerie*. A British officer motoring in Northern Greece with his wife had to see his escort, a Greek *gendarme*, taken away by Insurgents, probably to death, and perhaps a very cruel death. The chivalry of many British officers in Greece, fortified, as it was, by the knowledge they had acquired, responded to so tragic a situation with anguish. But the order was that there be no interference. The order was punctiliously obeyed.

The British army in Greece was far too small to stem an invasion from the north. Had they wished, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania could have penetrated far into Macedonia and Epirus. Salonica, which is less than forty miles from the border, would have fallen. It is hard to imagine

¹ It is convenient to call the armed *guerrilleros* by this general name, which corresponds with the Greek term *Andartes*. They were commonly called *Bandits* in the British and American press, but this is a misnomer. They were officially known as ELAS until the Varkiza Agreement brought ELAS to an official, though not a real, end. From the beginning of 1947 onwards they adopted the title of Greek *Democratic Army*.

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how Greek independence could have survived such a war. Why did her three northern neighbours refrain from open invasion and limit their effort to clandestine incursions and to the support of the Insurgents? The answer is, that open invasion would not have been possible without an engagement with the British army. That army would have been vastly outnumbered. But Great Britain would have been at war. It was this that caused the Slav coalition to desist. The small British army—by the middle of 1947 it numbered no more than 5000 or 6000 men—saved the peace. It saved Greek independence; it averted the danger that threatened the security of the eastern Mediterranean; it held the fort, a fort that is one of the key-positions in the world's strategy, until it was relieved by the United States. And all this it did against the might of Russia, against the determination of the external and internal enemies of Greece, and against an obscurantist malevolent opinion at home. And it did so without firing one shot.

VIII

The Greek Communist Party prepared for the renewal of revolutionary civil war as soon as the *Agreement* had been signed at Varkiza. The *Elasites* surrendered only a part of their war-material under the *Agreement*, the inferior part, while they greased and concealed their best material for future use. The term ELAS was abandoned. The term EAM remained as a cover for open and secret action. The Party, knowing that it would be defeated in the elections, pressed for postponement, but with only limited success. It could not prevent the elections from being held on the 31st of March 1946.

The renewal of the civil war was prepared in connivance with the northern neighbours, especially Yugoslavia. A camp for military training and political indoctrination was

established at Bulkes in Voivodina, not far from Belgrade, where *Elasites*, as well as Macedonians, who had fled from the reprisals that followed the massacres perpetrated by ELAS, SNOF, and the Bulgarian army, gathered to form a new army. A small international force was formed from deserters, battle-stragglers, and adventurers who had fought in different armies (especially the German army) during the Second World War. This force was of small military importance, but it was meant to exercise a propagandist appeal. It was called the *International Column* to create the impression that it resembled those chivalrous men who bore that name in the Spanish Civil War. The word *democracy* was adopted to cover all the designs of the Communists, in conformity with Russian propaganda which represented all countries under Russian control as *democratic*. The general theses sustained by the Communists—and therefore by EAM—in their pronouncements, and endorsed by Russia in her press, wireless, and diplomacy, were the following:

1. Greece, under the existing dispensation, is an aggressive Power, as distinct from the “democratic” and “peace-loving Powers” such as Russia, Yugoslavia, and so on. She has “imperialistic” designs on her northern neighbours, she is deliberately promoting “frontier incidents,” and is “a menace to international peace.”

2. The Greek Government is “Fascist” (or “Monarcho-Fascist”). It is not supported by the majority of the Greek people whom it dominates by terrorism.

3. Against its “imperialistic” foreign policy and its “Fascist” home policy the Greek people are in revolt under the leadership of the Greek Communist Party, which is truly “democratic” and truly representative of the Greek people.

4. The British troops in Greece are the instruments of British “imperialism” and the principal support of Greek

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“Fascism” in its offensive against “peace-loving nations” abroad and against Greek “democrats” at home.

To these general theses¹ two demands must be added as representing the immediate purpose of the Greek Communist Party, of Russia, and of the States controlled by Russia:

1. The withdrawal of the British troops from Greece.
2. The “broadening” (or “improvement”) of the Greek Government, so that it should include “democrats” and so become truly “representative.”

The second of these demands, no less than the first, found much support in Great Britain, for it was plausible enough, although events in the countries controlled by Russia had made it plain, to reasonably discerning observers, that governments compelled to include so-called “democrats” really had to accommodate Communists who, having secured certain key-positions, became the real masters of the country. In fact, EAM was nothing but an administration *in embryo* under the control of the Greek Communist Party and, therefore, of Russia. Later on, in September 1947, the Greek Government was “broadened” under American pressure, but not to include any members of EAM. The aged Sophoulis became Prime Minister, but he bitterly disappointed the Communists who had hoped that his florid liberalism, and his apparent sympathy for the “democratic” cause, would weaken the authority of the Greek Government and promote a general disintegration which would give the Communists their opportunity. By that time, also, the United States had acquired a considerable ascendancy in Greece and had no intention of allowing

¹ They are all to be found, with variations, in many issues of *Soviet News* (published by the Russian Embassy in London). On 23rd December, for example, *Soviet News* referred to “the vicious tendencies of the Greek delegation in Paris” and to the “Greek régime” as “a danger to peace in the Balkans and to the security of the world at large.” v. also M. Gromyko’s statement in *Soviet News* on the 23rd January 1947.

Communists to enter the administration and to support the civil war in the north by a disruptive policy in Athens.

On the 25th of March 1946 Niko Zachariadis, who was on his way back from Prague, visited the camp at Bulkes. He had an enthusiastic reception, for the Greeks in the camp believed that he would lead them back to Greece. In a speech lasting only ten minutes he told them that the whole Greek nation and eighty per cent. of the Greek army were on their side, but that the presence of the British troops would not allow them "to act dynamically." He assured them, however, that they would win in the end—"steel your characters and be certain that we shall win." The camp was then visited by Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgar senior officers and officials who spoke to the men about the liberation of Greece from "Fascism," urged them to fight in this cause, and promised them unstinting support. A news bulletin was issued in the camp giving information about the activities of the *Andartes*.¹ Small bands under various *Kapetans* were sent into Greece. In April, a training school for officers was established. Courses of instruction in irregular warfare were given to members of EPON (the Greek Communist Youth Movement). The first 200 of these *Eponites* who had finished their course were organised in the *Zachariadis Brigade*. They were reinforced by a hundred *Elasites* and sent to work on a railway line along the Dalmatian coast, near the Albanian border. They were joined by the *Third Elas Brigade*. In August 1946 the news bulletin worked the emotions of its readers up to a climax by asserting that Greece was in full revolution and that *Elasite* commanders, like Sarafis, Athonaios, and Mandakos, were marching on Athens. After the plebiscite, which was held on the 31st of October and produced a royalist majority of

¹ This bulletin is now (December 1947) issued as a newspaper *Φωνή Μπουλκας* (Voice of Bulkes) which devotes its columns to the cause of Communism and of the *Democratic Army*.

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almost seventy per cent., the inmates of the camp at Bulkes were informed that it had produced a Republican majority.¹ All publicity in Yugoslavia was—and still is—of a kind that excluded news, or any sort of evidence, that might rectify such falsehoods.

Small bands crossed the border. They were highly mobile and had the advantage in every small engagement. They retired or dispersed whenever Greek regulars arrived in force. They were nearly always able to find their way back across the border, which is about six hundred miles long, through mountainous country, and far beyond the control of the forces at the disposal of the Greek State. These bands terrorised whole districts. They could even operate far from the border—in the Peloponnesus, for example—and retire, if necessary, to mountain fastnesses. But it was only in the border regions that they could sustain a constant menace to public security, trade, and peaceful labour. The scarcity of railways, the ruinous condition of bridges and embankments, the wretched state of the roads—the whole destruction wrought by the Germans—made it possible for the *Insurgents* to subsist and to enjoy a freedom of movement denied to forces compelled to guard towns, villages, communications, and so on. Whole areas were so terrorised that the peasants were afraid to work far afield, so that the cornland and the vineyards were neglected. Many villages were deserted.

The first public warning that “undeclared war” was being waged against Greece was given by the Governor-General of Macedonia, Dalipis, in June 1946, a warning that the Greek War of Independence, which began in October 1940, was by no means over:

¹ The above account is based on a detailed statement by the school teacher, Fotios Kontopanos, who was himself at Bulkes (*v. The Nineteenth Century and After*, Feb. 1947, p. 83 ff.). Kontopanos crossed the border with a small band in September 1946. He states that “everywhere our presence inspired horror and terror” (*ibid.*, p. 85).

"It is imperative," he wrote, "that the whole of the Greek people . . . and all the civilised world, should be told of the appalling drama that is unfolding in the blood-drenched Greek soil of Macedonia. . . . We declare to the Greek people . . . that a veritable undeclared war is being waged in Macedonia between Greece and Tito's Yugoslavia whose instruments are NOF¹ and KKE. The ringleaders are the same persons who during the Bulgarian occupation perpetrated murder, incendiarism, and propaganda against Greece and for Bulgaria, the Bulgaria of the Axis. . . ." ²

But Dalipis' warning was unheeded in the wider world,³ although items of news appeared in the press which, had they been put together and expounded in their setting, would have endorsed all he said.⁴

The connivance of the northern neighbours of Greece, especially Yugoslavia, was not recognised and often denied. But it was established in the following year by the *Commission* appointed by the Security Council. That *Commission* stated in its *Report* that:

"On the basis of the facts ascertained by the Commission, it is conclusive that Yugoslavia, and, to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria, have supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece. . . . According to the evidence Yugoslav frontier guards permitted guerrilla bands to escape into Yugoslavia when pursued by the Greek army. There is no doubt that . . . at the Bulkes camp the refugees from Greece were subjected to political indoctrination and propaganda looking toward the overthrow of the Greek Government. . . . The evidence submitted to the Com-

¹ The Macedonian *Popular Liberation Front*, controlled by Yugoslavia, which replaced SNOF.

² For the full text of Dalipis' statement, *v. Ellenikon Aima*, 22nd June 1946.

³ As far as I am aware, it was not mentioned in one British daily.

⁴ *e.g. The Times*, 8th July 1946: "In many provincial districts, especially in Northern Greece, terrorist bands now infest the countryside and do not hesitate to enter towns and attack police and troops."

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mission regarding Bulgarian aid to the Greek guerrilla movement indicated that Greek guerrillas, in groups and individually, were assisted in crossing Bulgarian territory from Yugoslavia to Greece, and that sizeable guerrilla groups had on a number of occasions taken refuge on Bulgarian soil with the assistance of the Bulgarian authorities. . . . Furthermore, it is quite clear that Bulgaria also supported the movement for the unification of the three parts [i.e. Greek, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian] of Macedonia as a republic within the Yugoslav federation . . . there was a considerable body of evidence to show that EAM had itself violated the Varkiza Agreement by failing to carry out its obligation to surrender all its arms to the Greek Government, and by urging its members to hide their arms and to leave Greece or go underground. . . .”¹

On the 1st of December 1946 the Athenian wireless gave a warning to the world—a warning, tragic and true, the authentic voice of Hellas, a voice which Liberal England would have understood a generation ago, but can understand no longer:

“The wisdom of the great may not be disputed by the weak. The weak are only listened to when their flesh stands between the great and their enemies. When Greece was beating back the Italians every Allied newspaper was full of praise for the gallant Greek army. Even Moscow radio spoke with lyrical appreciation of Greece’s contribution to victory. Now Greece is still fighting bloody battles, but, as it is believed that she is only fighting for her own defence, her battles are mentioned only in cold indifferent terms. When short comments are added, the undercurrent suggests that Greece is becoming an international nuisance.

“The attitude of Allied opinion on the war we are now

¹ *Report of the Commission of Investigation*, Ch. I, Section A, 2, 2 (b), (f), 4 (a), (e); Section D, 10 (a), (c). [U.N. doc. S/360, vol. I.] For detailed evidence, v. *Témoignages à l'appui du recours grec au Conseil de Sécurité* (Athens, 1947).

waging in Macedonia is not a question of ingratitude but a great blunder. We are defending the Allied cause more than ever, for we are fighting international totalitarians who have their fifth column everywhere and who may well bring about the disintegration of all democratic countries.”¹

The enemies of Greece were beginning to discover—and she to understand—that they might prevail by a long war of attrition; that they could invade Greek territory with no risk to themselves; that it was possible to circumvent the defence which Great Britain had created by stationing an army in Greece; that, although to conquer in an open campaign was impossible (because of that army), conquest by cumulative massacre and destruction was within the bounds of possibility.

On the 30th of November 1946 *Insurgents*, numbering about 800, crossed the border from Yugoslavia and attacked the village of Skra. They overpowered the small garrison and began to massacre. The village school-mistress, Vassiliki Papathanasiou, was put to the torture and then murdered. The entire Mintsas family of eight persons was murdered. Thirty-three persons in all, amongst them Petrina and Susan Vanoka, both eight years old, Dimitroula Emmanuel, aged thirteen, Dimitroula Roula, aged six, and Athanasios Tsongis, aged two, were murdered with knives or hatchets. Three children were wounded. The *Insurgents* looted the village, destroyed thirty houses by fire, and then withdrew before any regular troops could arrive.

On the 26th of November *Insurgents* attacked the village of Mandalo. The small garrison of gendarmes was overpowered after it had expended all its ammunition and thirteen men had been killed. The *Insurgents* then massacred twenty-three civilians. Amongst those murdered were twelve children, one of them aged three and two aged

¹ Quoted in *The New English Review*, Jan. 1947, p. 71.

five, and a woman aged seventy. The whole Vassiliadou family, excepting one, was exterminated: eleven persons in all, old and young. Despina, the mother of the children, was in an advanced stage of pregnancy. The *Insurgents* cut her open, took out the foetus, killed it, and put it back again.¹ Her husband, the sole survivor of the family, lost his reason when, after the *Insurgents* had gone, he saw what had happened. All the houses in the village were looted; forty-five houses, many stables, cow-sheds, and barns were burnt to the ground. On the 30th of November the *Insurgent* leader, *Kapetan* Stathis, issued a *communiqué*, describing the engagement at Mandolo as an "epic fight."²

On the 20th of November 1946 *Insurgents* attacked the village of Xirovrissi. They massacred forty-two persons, twenty-five of them women, three of them children. Many villagers were wounded, of whom three died later on, so that forty-five were killed in all. Fifty-four out of the hundred and two houses in the village were burnt.

Similar deeds of murder and incendiarism were committed at Vivia, Konstandia, Domokos, Mourieess, Archangelos, Notia, and so on. At Naoussa, fifteen persons were shut up in their houses by the *Insurgents* and burnt alive. On the 2nd of November seven woodmen were in the forest near Kalliroi with their mules. They were overpowered by a band of *Insurgents*, pinioned, and led into a ravine. They begged for mercy, but all save one were murdered.

On the 3rd of December the Greek Government charged the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia with assisting the *Insurgents*, and, on the 19th, the Security Council of the United Nations decided to appoint the Commission which, after many delays and resourceful obstruction on the part of the Powers charged and their sym-

¹ These facts were established by the Greek Red Cross. They are confirmed in the Report of the British Police Mission (v. Hansard, 17th March 1947, p. 14, col. 2).

² "Δραματικωτάτη μάχη."

pathisers,¹ drafted the Report which I have already quoted—a Report which, although by no means uncritical of Greece, endorsed the principal charges, as we have seen.

In February 1947 Greek public opinion was astonished and horrified that Mr. Thomas, the Member of Parliament for Cardiff Central, had accepted the hospitality of the man chiefly responsible for the massacres, namely, Vafiadis, known as *Kapetan* Markos, the Communist Commander-in-Chief of the *Insurgents*, who had gained notoriety as a terrorist in Salonica three years before. According to Mr. Thomas, *Kapetan* Markos is “a mild-mannered, extremely courteous, and obviously educated man.”² But about the time when the Member for Cardiff Central was enjoying the hospitality of *Kapetan* Markos, the wife of the Member for Pelli in Macedonia and the daughter of the Member for Kastoria were murdered by the men of the *Kapetan's* command.

Twelve Members, representing Macedonian constituencies, telegraphed letters to Mr. Thomas and to the Speaker of the House of Commons expressing their consternation. The Member for Kastoria, Iliadis, telegraphed a letter to Mr. Thomas, asking him if

“the most hospitable” Markos had “washed the blood of my innocent daughter from his hands before breaking bread with you.”

¹ No obstacle was placed in the way of the Commission by the Greek authorities, but every obstacle was placed in their way in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, a fact which the Commission reported to the Security Council (*The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, p. 11, col. 2). The *Subsidiary Group* appointed by the Commission to make enquiries in those three countries reported that “it had been prevented from making any investigation in Bulgaria except on conditions laid down by the Bulgarian Government. The Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav Governments in one way or another . . . have disregarded in Sub-Group’s opinion authority vested in it by Security Council and Commission to perform its functions in Northern Greece and such other parts of Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia as Sub-Group might decide necessary (*op. cit.*, p. 11, col. 1).

² The *Sunday Express*, 16th Feb. 1947 (under the headline: “M.P. Three Days on a Donkey,” this being the method of locomotion used by Mr. Thomas to visit his host in the mountains).

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I do not know if Mr. Thomas answered or even acknowledged these missives. And, as far as I am aware, *Kapetan Markos* offered no excuse, denial, or explanation.

In a New Year's message to *Rizospastis*, the principal organ of the Greek Communist Party, Niko Zachariadis declared that the creation of the *Democratic Army* was an event which made the outlook for the year 1947 seem particularly hopeful. On the 16th of January, *Rizospastis* published the first *communiqué* from the *Headquarters of the Democratic Army*. In his New Year's message Zachariadis praised the *Democratic Army's*

“complete attachment to national and patriotic ideals, its democracy, its exemplary and law-abiding behaviour, and its voluntary submission to the democratic movement of the people and their authorised representatives.”¹

By “authorised representatives” of “the people” Zachariadis meant himself, Vafiadis, and the other Communist leaders. By “the people” he meant the Communist Party and its supporters. The fiction that they are “the people” was—and still is—upheld, despite conclusive evidence to the contrary, especially the evidence of the polling in March 1946.

Through this New Year's message the Greek Communist Party for the first time identified itself officially with the *Democratic Army* and with all it stood and fought for. On the 7th of October 1947, *Rizospastis*, the official organ of the Party, published a leading article, declaring that “the first decisive reply to Anglo-American imperialism was given in this land called Greece in December 1944.” The Party thereby admitted for the first time that armed action by ELAS in that month was not merely a matter of domestic policy, not part of a merely internal struggle, but that it was directed against Great Britain and the United States.

¹ *Rizospastis*, 1st Jan. 1947.

In June 1947 Porphyrogenis, the Greek delegate to the Congress of the French Communist Party at Strasburg, stated that "a free Government of Greece" would be established in the regions controlled by the *Insurgents* unless the Greek Government came to terms.¹

In August 1947 Markos, who had, in the meantime, assumed the rank of General, announced on the *Democratic Army Radio*² a *Constitutional Charter* conferring upon the Greek Communist Party legislative and executive functions in a region comprising some two hundred villages, and abolishing the monarchy.

The *Insurgents* exercised a precarious control in extensive mountainous regions, including hundreds of villages. They terrorised the villagers, they conscribed men of military age by press-gangs, and they levied taxes, but they never succeeded in capturing a town of any size. Even if they had succeeded, it is unlikely that they would have been able to hold the town for long. Nowhere did they control an administrative centre. To set up a "Free Government" in a village, without any local administrative apparatus or any possibility of support, whether willing or unwilling, from any considerable population, would have been too transparent an imposture. The "Free Greek Government" was clearly intended to serve the same ultimate purpose as the *Lublin Committee* and the *Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation*. But the *Comintern*,³ victorious in Poland and Yugoslavia, was defeated in Greece. When, in October 1947, Greece had completed the seventh year of her war of national independence, she was an independent country still.

¹ The "terms," presumably, were the admission of Communists into the Greek Government and a general, unqualified amnesty.

² Apparently a wireless station in Yugoslavia.

³ Although the *Comintern* was officially dissolved in 1943, I have retained the term as conveniently and accurately indicating the active and closely co-ordinated international association of national Communist Parties under the absolute control of the Kremlin.

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The *Insurgents*, as I shall, for the sake of convenience, continue to call the *Democratic Army*, are highly mobile and have at their disposal extensive regions of almost inaccessible country. They avoid engagements with Greek regular forces except when they are able to attack or ambush small detachments, garrisons, or outposts in greatly superior numbers. Their tactics are evasive in a military sense, but aggressive in an economic and a political sense. At the end of 1947 their numbers were estimated at about 20,000. The Greek regular forces, who numbered about 130,000,¹ of whom about 20,000 were *gendarmierie*, are compelled to guard towns and villages, stores, depots, power-stations, and exceedingly long and vulnerable lines of communication. It is characteristic of every well-conducted *guerrilla* that the *guerrilleros* cannot be brought to action. The Germans, in Greece as in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, had at their disposal the formidable weapon of reprisal against hostages, against civilians—indeed, against whole communities. Every blow struck by the *guerrilleros* recoiled with vastly multiplied force—but not on the *guerrilleros*, as I have pointed out. It recoiled, in a last analysis, on the nation. But the weapon of reprisal is not at the disposal of the Greek regular army. That army is defending the nation which is being assailed by the *Insurgents*—as it was assailed by the Germans, Italians, and Bulgars. The *Elasites* had little effect upon the Germans, and the *Insurgents* today have little effect upon the Greek regular army, but it has a cumulatively injurious effect upon the nation. It is the Greek people, the peasantry above all, who have been, and are, the chief sufferers, for in the towns there is relative security, and industrial labour is

¹ At the end of 1947 this number was being increased to 200,000, including 50,000 *National Guards* for the static defence of town and countryside (v. *The Times*, 15th Nov. 1947). The difficulty which a regular force has in operating against irregulars is illustrated by the fact that about 100,000 men were needed in Palestine against 4000 or 5000 of Haganah and Irgun.

only affected in so far as the war intensifies—or, at least, perpetuates—economic and financial stringency and impedes both trade and reconstruction.

The *Insurgents* cannot force a decision. But inconclusive warfare is to their advantage and, failing such assistance from the northern neighbours and from Russia as would be a warlike challenge to Great Britain and the United States, inconclusive warfare is their only hope. Their defensive is against an opposing army which is never able to bring more than a small part of their forces to action, their offensive is against the public services, transport, trade, agriculture, industry, wages, the administration, and public order.

The economic distress inflicted directly by the *Insurgents*, and indirectly by prolonged inconclusive warfare, has an additional advantage, from the Communist point of view, of spreading despair and misery. Not all the young men and women recruited by the *Insurgents* in the villages have been pressed into their service by threats to themselves or to their relatives. Many have volunteered because they have nothing left to lose, and some because the Communist idea seems to offer a simple and final solution to all the problems of the world, especially the perplexing, intractable, and catastrophic problems of the hour. Young enthusiasts, some of them mere boys and girls, have fought in the ranks of the *Insurgents* and have perpetrated some of the worst atrocities. Sadistic excesses on the part of women are amongst the most terrible manifestations of implacable warfare in Greece.

In every raid on villages or townships the *Insurgents* wreak as much destruction as they can. Destruction of the kind perpetrated at Mandalo and the other villages I have mentioned is not an excess incidental to warfare: it is a method and it has a purpose—the ruin of Greece. By this method the *Insurgents* increased the financial burden which the maintenance of the Greek army and of the Greek

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economy imposed upon Great Britain and, after the middle of 1947, upon the United States. It rendered Greece incapable of maintaining and equipping an adequate army and *gendarmerie* out of her own resources. Roads, railways, and bridges have been blown up. Communication between Athens and Salonica was made impossible by road or rail during the year 1947. Extensive regions, comprising hundreds of villages, are deserted. By the end of 1947 there were 250,000 internal refugees in Greece.¹ In a country already ruined in the Second World War—and subjected to further ruination by the internal enemy—the presence of a quarter of a million destitute and homeless people is a burden such as can hardly be imagined by those who know only the western world.²

The *Insurgents* have destroyed homesteads, farms, granaries, and stores—including stores supplied by UNRRA. They have spread fear and horror by the massacre of women and children. They have fired on peasants working in the fields and have impeded or even paralysed agricultural labour. They have cut off markets from the sources of supply, so that many market gardeners have been ruined. Within a few miles of Salonica, and even fewer of Volos, there has been complete insecurity. Foreign trade has been disastrously affected, credit and confidence have been shaken. Of the damage done in 1947 little was the result of military operations. Nearly all of it was the desired result of economic warfare, which, if not brought to an end or counteracted by help from the United States, must make it impossible for the Greek State to maintain the public services, to go on paying the civil servants and the armed forces, to make Greek credit collapse, to reduce Greek foreign trade almost to nothing (Greece can no more

¹ *v. The Times*, 15th Nov. 1947.

² More than 10 per cent. of the houses in Greece were totally destroyed in the years 1940-44 and more than a million persons were rendered homeless.

survive without foreign trade than Great Britain can),¹ to transform internal trade to local barter and bring famine upon those regions which are not self-supporting (regions that make up the greater part of the country).

If this were to happen—and it was the principal aim of the Greek Communist Party—EAM, with its modern, disciplined, and centralised economic, political and military power, EAM, a Communist-controlled *imperium* in a disintegrating *imperio*, would, with reasonable hope of success, make the final attempt to be master of all Greece, with overt or covert assistance from across the border.

Greek industrial labour is not highly organised and is, like everything Greek, intensely individualistic. It resembles anarcho-syndicalism without a doctrine. The Communists had a certain ascendancy in the trade unions, especially in Salonica, where, in 1947—the most critical year since 1944—they had some success in impeding production by *ca' canny* and the like. They were able to obtain money for the *Insurgents* by collections, both forced and free, from the workmen and from the employers.² But, generally, the Communists have failed to convert wage strikes into political strikes. Combined action of classical revolutionary type by "soldiers, workers, and peasants" has never been attainable in Greece, thanks to the individualism and the inexhaustible patriotism of the Greek people and to the agrarian reform which was carried out between the two wars.³

¹ Greece imports nearly half her wheat from abroad.

² The Greek Communist Party has supporters amongst the rich, especially those of the rich who aspire to patronise art and letters or have literary pretensions of their own.

³ The Greek trade unions are torn by internal conflicts. Their conflicts with the State have been the subject of much controversy. Broadly speaking they enjoy far greater freedom of action than any trade unions between the Arctic and the Aegean today. The frequency of strikes is evidence of this. For an impartial and penetrating analysis of the status of Greek trade unionism in 1947, *v.* the Report of Irving Brown, of the American Federation of Labour, in *International Free Trade Union News* (May 1947).

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It is admitted by Greeks of all parties that civil servants are wretchedly paid. There was a strike of civil servants in November 1946; but when news came that Greece was invaded—it was the small, but ominous, invasion which culminated in the massacre at Skra—the strike was called off because the strikers, with sure instinct, knew that their country was in danger. It was resumed later on when the immediate danger seemed to have passed. It had the support of the press and of the public. But the efforts made by the Communist Party to give it a political direction were a failure.

IX

The better to understand a country's condition, it is well to spend a little time in some spot far from the capital where the days are uneventful, where the jangling vibrations of violent crisis have passed through the filter, as it were, of time and space, thereby allowing a diagnosis that will separate the essential from the fortuitous.

Nemea, famous of old for its lion and its games, is a small township in the Peloponnese. There is no railway, no cinema, no telephone, no wireless set, and no local newspapers. The roads are so bad that a motor car cannot with impunity move more than ten or fifteen miles an hour.

During the war peasants in the town and in the outlying villages concealed British soldiers and airmen from the Germans and helped them to escape, although to be discovered meant death or torture or both. The Germans executed about a hundred Greeks in the town and the villages around. The *Elasites* massacred another hundred in December 1944. Since that time nothing untoward has happened. But the *Insurgents* are in the mountains which, in the crystalline atmosphere, seem so near. And there is fear amongst a peasantry not given to unreasoning fear.

The massacres which began at Skra were a reminder—

and were meant to be such—of the *December Massacres*, a reminder skilfully fostered and fortified by the whispering propaganda of the Communists that what happened to them will happen again, that the work of extermination begun in 1944, and left incomplete (because “British Imperialism” intervened), will be resumed next time, in the *Third Round*, the *Τρίτος Γύρος*.

The *First Round* was the Communist dictatorship established throughout Greece, excepting Athens, in the autumn of 1944; the *December Massacres* were the *Second Round*; the *Third Round* is to complete the work of extermination, re-establish the Communist dictatorship and extend it to the capital, bring the Anglo-American “occupation” to an end, and proclaim the Greek Republic, and its membership of the Federal Union of Balkan Republics. Of these things the peasants have knowledge that varies in its exactitude, though, on the whole, it is shrewdly near the truth. But of one thing their knowledge is exact, vivid, and indelible—their knowledge of the massacres and their full awareness that these massacres may be repeated, or rather completed, and that every loyalist is as though under sentence of death.

Nemea has 4500 inhabitants, of whom 75 are known to be Communists. To defend the town and the eighteen outlying villages there are eighteen *gendarmes* in uniform, but carrying no weapons, although their weapons are at hand in case of need. They have no wireless, no telephone, and no transmitter, so that if the town is attacked, and the telegraph wires are cut, they will be able to communicate with the nearest garrison, at Corinth, by couriers only. The *Insurgents*, who will make the attack, if it is made, will number forty, perhaps, or fifty.

The arrival of a stranger is an event, especially if he comes from England or America. England is the favourite country still, despite certain misgivings and perplexities. Let me

relate what eight peasants who had walked for more than three hours from their village had to tell me:

“Every friend of England is oppressed!” By this they mean that they are threatened, or even persecuted, because they are known as “friends of England,” or *Angloprodotis*—that is to say, traitors on England’s behalf, in so far as they “betrayed” Greece to “British Imperialism” by saving the lives of British soldiers, sailors, or airmen, or by expressing their love of England and their loyalty to their King—a “British agent”—too plainly and too often. They are made to feel their insecurity by constant reminders of the *Third Round* and by the promise that they themselves and their families will be among the massacred. And any time the *Insurgents* may descend from the mountains to begin the *Third Round*, or to play a few more preliminary *Third Rounds* as at Skra, Mandalo, and other places. They do not enlarge on their fears; they do not rail or repine. They only express the quiet conviction that the *Third Round* will come, while admitting, when pressed, that perhaps it will not come: Who can tell? All they want is to live in peace and work. They work hard, but wonder if there is much use in working, for times do not improve, and the *Third Round* will render vain all work done, for even their children will be massacred.

Seven of them are Royalists, the eighth a Republican.

“Were you glad the King came back?”

“Of course we were! It was we who brought him back. We believed things would get better if he came. They are no better, but we know it isn’t his fault.”

“He’s no democrat!” says the Republican.

“But he must be a democrat, for when he has a guest for tea, he pours out the tea himself!”¹

The retort is unanswerable, all the seven clap their hands gleefully, shouting *Zito o Vasilefs!*²

“Five of my family,” says one, “were murdered in

¹ This was indeed King George II’s habit.

² *Vive le roi!*

December 1944. Father, mother, the wife, and my two children—and the wife was expecting a third. All of us who voted for the King will die.”¹

“I was a Communist,” says another, “but I didn’t stay one. I didn’t know it would be so cruel.”

Another says: “I am afraid. I never sleep at home, always with friends.”

“Why?”

“Because they’re after me!”

“But why are they?”

“Because I saved a British airman.” And he draws from his pocket the certificate awarded to all who did as he did:

“This certificate is awarded to . . . as a token of gratitude for and appreciation of the help given to sailors, soldiers, and airmen. . . . (sgd.) Alexander.”

Many townsmen and villagers, perhaps two hundred in all, have gathered round to question the stranger. Every one of them has an opinion of his own and expresses it with eloquence and animation. One of the Communists is there too. He speaks at greater length than the others but without discourtesy. A quarrel nearly breaks out when he says: “The Germans killed my brother,” and someone interrupts him with “You Communists killed mine!” The priest, who keeps a watchful eye on all, intervenes and the quarrel is averted. Then the Communist, having said that the Greek people have nothing against the Bulgarian people, speaks in praise of Russia. But when asked: “Which is better, Russia or Greece?” he answers “Greece, of course!”

He has been with the *Insurgents* in the mountains, but prefers peaceful employment in Nemea. One or the other of the younger Nemean Communists will go to the mountains upon occasion and serve with the *Insurgents* for a few months and then return to his work.

There is no mistaking the fear that is upon the town and

¹ *i.e.* in the *Third Round*.

the villages, and yet life seems casual enough. Fear of death has become so much a part of life that it seems a natural state. It goes with the natural gaiety of the Greek, the laughter, the fun, and the abandon, the song and dance on days of rest or festival. It has bitten deep, nevertheless, and the deeper because it is fear for wife and children, rather than for self.

“Only a Communist can sleep quietly in bed”—and this in a town where the Communists are a small minority. “But they are so few! Why don’t you get rid of them?” “The police won’t let us!”

True as it is of Nemea, and of so many other towns, that “only Communists can sleep quietly in bed,” it is not true of all. There are loyalist gangs who also inspire fear, as we shall see.

There is always the other question, asked by all, and with far less anxiety than is induced by anticipation of the *Third Round*: “Is there going to be another war?” “No one can tell, but if there is, we shall win it!” Again there is gleeful clapping of hands and shouts of *Zito i Ellas* and *Zito o Vasilefs*.

At Salomos, on the way to Corinth, where the girls in their embroidered costumes dance on the green, the priest, when asked: “Do you ever have trouble here?” replies:

“No trouble at all. We all love one another and have no police and no Communists.”

The crisis in Greece, as in Western Europe, is more than political. It is moral: a crisis of loyalty. In Greece, as in the west, loyalty has been on the defensive, disloyalty on the offensive. Disloyalty has been internationally organised. The loyalty of the peasants, especially in the Peloponnese, solidified around the Monarchy. Not that Greek republicans are disloyal, but republicanism has been too closely associated with liberalism—and liberalism with EAM—to command

that same allegiance amongst a peasantry who are intensely individualistic and freedom-loving, and yet traditionalist. The Republic is something of an abstraction, the Monarchy is not. The visible symbols of the Monarchy and the person of the King have meant much amid the anguish and the perplexities of the hour and the revulsion against the strife of parties.

King George II of Greece was never personally popular. The accusations that he was a "Fascist" or a "reactionary" were all untrue. If the word "democratic" means anything, he was democratic in his outlook and his way of life. He was always Anglophile—and was constantly denounced as such by the Greek Communist Party. He supported General Metaxas because, like the General, he foresaw the Second World War, and was determined that Greece should be prepared and that she should fight on the side of the Western Powers. When, after the defeat of Italy, defeat by Germany became inevitable, the King never wavered. His Cabinet was divided, and there was a moment when even Metaxas was in doubt. The King insisted that Greece must go on fighting. After the defeat he joined his troops. He was hunted by German parachutists in Crete and was awarded the *Distinguished Service Order* for gallantry. The period that followed was one of great bitterness. He was fully aware of the new danger that threatened Greece as it did Yugoslavia, indeed all Europe. Early in 1944 he gave warning that ELAS was nothing but the Greek Communist Party militant and that it regarded not the Germans but the British as the principal enemy. But his warnings went unheeded.

To strike at King George of Greece, as at King Peter of Yugoslavia, was an opportunity for British disloyalists to strike at the Monarchy as an institution—and, therefore, obliquely, and with impunity, at their own Monarchy. King George II was the object of a world-wide propaganda

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inspired, in Great Britain, chiefly by that witting and unwitting malice towards the deeper loyalties that is one of the vices of the age, and, in the United States, by the unfounded assumption that royalty and reaction are inseparable. But all this propaganda—which, over a period of years, was almost unrelieved by a just or chivalrous word in the British and American press—did not deter the Greek people from giving him a large majority in the plebiscite on the 1st of September 1946.

From the time of his return to Greece after the plebiscite until his death, in April 1947, he remained in the background, above faction. He was a shy and lonely man, awkward and uningratiating when in public. He had deep insight and foresight. There was little that happened in Greece or indeed in Europe, from 1939 onwards, that he had not foreseen. He had a tragic sense of life in this world, though in private he could be genial and very witty. He was a great lover of books and of flowers. Towards the end of 1946 his deep apprehensions for the future of his country were renewed. But he lived to hear Mr. Truman's message in March 1947 and knew what it meant. He was wholly free from ambition, disliked politicians, and regarded himself as a soldier. To the end he remained deeply attached to England and English ways.

When he returned to Greece, he was received with immense popular acclamation. He died greatly mourned and honoured by his people. When he was buried, on Sunday, the 6th of April 1947, it seemed as though the entire population of Athens and the surrounding country had assembled to bid him farewell.

The disloyalists of Greece are more articulate than the loyalists, more plausible, craftier, and more modern. They have the plausibility not only of the zealot schooled in political doctrine but also of the crafty swindler and jobber so familiar in lands of the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard.

Today, the master-swindlers, organised as no other collectivity in Greece is organised: wealthy, efficient, ruthless, disciplined, up-to-date, with an armed force at their disposal and with unsurpassed conspiratorial talent, are the Communists and *Fellow Travellers*.¹ The latter were particularly successful in gulling Englishmen and Americans unfamiliar with the plausible manner of Greek politicians in general and Greek liberal politicians in particular. Greek *Fellow Travellers* have done more to spread falsehood about events in Greece, to besmirch Greek patriotism, to whiten the monstrous villainies of the *Insurgents*, and to idealise out of all verisimilitude the fell purpose of the Greek Communist Party. These crafty slanderers of their own country are often men of venerable aspect with a command of Gladstonian eloquence, experienced in dealing with Westerners, and familiar with the English affectation of understatement upon which they play with simulated moderation. Craftier than the *Fellow Travellers* of England, and more sophisticated than those of America, they have been powerful to incite western liberal and socialist opinion against their own country in its desperate struggle for independence.²

The immense penury of Greece, the overcrowding of the civil service and of the liberal professions, and a certain over-sophistication of urban society, displayed chiefly in the self-importance, the cultivated cynicism, and the spurious brilliance of political and literary cliques and coteries, have been amongst the chief recruiting agencies of Communism.

There are, in the Greek Communist Party, men of strong, even fanatical, conviction, although the Greeks as a people

¹ The reality of EAM can be expressed by the equation: EAM = Communists + Fellow Travellers.

² Such was the prejudice stirred up against Greece by a crafty propaganda, that the Greek Ambassador in London had to cancel a visit to the theatre "because disturbances were threatened if he attended the performance" (*The Times*, 28th Jan. 1947, p. 6, col. 3).

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are not given to fanaticism and are singularly undogmatic. Men like Zachariadis and Vafiadis have been hardened in the Communist school and have ability, craft, and determination. Peasant lads and young persons from the towns have engaged in sedition because they were ruined, uprooted, frustrated, and saw no future for themselves. To many it meant much, almost all, to have "something to do," to have some purpose in life, to handle a tommy-gun, to cherish it and use it upon occasion, to have a sense of self-importance, to be part of a big international movement backed by a great and formidable Power, and by a public opinion that extended even to Great Britain and across the Atlantic. The support given to the *Insurgents* in the British and American press, in Parliament, and at public meetings, support conveyed to them by the many channels of Communist publicity and greedily accepted, has done much to sustain the *Insurgents* and to stimulate their sense of impunity in perpetrating their massacres and their hideous tortures and mutilations.

However modest the duty done by a youthful recruit, whether it be distributing propaganda, mounting guard, foraging, or acting as courier between the town and the mountains, it is a duty that gives life a meaning. And to display armed authority amongst terrified villagers is a foretaste and an emblem of the greater authority some day to be wielded over a terrorised nation. It is not penury itself that has induced Communism—the poorest of the Greek peasantry are loyalists, as we have seen—but rather the frustration it has inflicted upon the aspiring and the ambitious, and the rancours of those whose abilities remain unrecognised and unrewarded. In none are these rancours so potent as in those village schoolmasters who find the monotony of rural life in an impoverished country unendurable, and are sufficiently sophisticated by half-knowledge and a semi-modernity to have lost every deeper belief and all love

and awe in the presence of religion and of nature. Communist leanings, usually combined with atheism, are frequent amongst elementary-school teachers in the villages and small towns. The number of school teachers amongst the *Insurgents*, especially amongst the *Kapetans*, is astonishing. But this phenomenon, the spread of disloyalty amongst those entrusted with the care of the young, is by no means confined to Greece. It is not unknown in England. In Germany, Hitler found a large following amongst school teachers. Gaston Deschamps wrote, more than fifty years ago:

“J’ai vérifié que par tous pays, les maîtres d’école ont la même suffisance entretenue par l’habituelle domination sur un troupeau d’écoliers épeuris.”¹

Like Fascism and National Socialism, before they were overthrown, Communism, in Greece as elsewhere, has its genuine enthusiasts amongst the young. But its spirit is ultimately determined by the hardened, indoctrinated leaders.

The humanity and integrity of character that went to the making of the Socialist movements everywhere in the last generation, the chivalrous idealism that inspired the *International Column* in the Spanish Civil War, these are absent from the *International Fifth Column*. In its modern efficiency, in its rigid concentration on one ultimate purpose that underlies all its tactical changes and manœuvres, in its confident claim to possess the final solution to all problems, in its optimism, and its contagious *élan*, it is a terrible power everywhere, but doubly terrible when all the means at its disposal—massacre, incendiarism, military force, armed sedition, secret conspiracy, money propaganda, diplomacy, and the support of a coalition led by a Great Power—are concentrated on one small, exposed and stricken country like Greece.

¹ *La Grèce d’Aujourd’hui*, p. 211.

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What is astonishing is not its success, but its failure to achieve greater success. It enjoyed liberty under liberal laws. The civil war made deep inroads into the constitutional order, but Communism as such was under no disabilities. There is repression, but not of opinion. In Greece, opinion is free. Dismissals of professors, of civil servants, interference by lawful authority with the *Youth Movement* known as EPON which fostered active sedition amongst boys and girls, are part of a war for national independence, a war which must be fought everywhere, not only in the mountains, but in the towns, in the universities and schools, in the professions, and in the factories. There is no censorship of the press. There is an independent judiciary still. There has not been one "political trial" comparable with the trial of Petkov. There is a free opposition under constitutional government. Even after the massacres at Skra and Mandalo, Zachariadis could move about, write and speak freely in Athens, and *Rizospastis* could glorify the deeds of the *Democratic Army*.

Early in March 1947 about 500 persons were arrested without warrant in Athens and exiled to the island of Ikaria.¹ It was an extra-legal measure undertaken, with much misgiving, by the Greek authorities. War-weariness had begun to spread; there was disaffection in the army; the withdrawal of the British troops had been announced; the promise of American help was still to come; there seemed to be no future for the Greek people except cumulative massacre, ruin, and ever-growing penury; and it was clear that military operations in the mountains were useless unless accompanied by action against those who were, in the towns, assisting the *Insurgents* with arms, supplies, and money, and

¹ For an account of conditions in which the exiles live on this island, v. *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*, 27th August 1946. The contrast between exile on Ikaria and life in the labour camps of Russia, Yugoslavia, and even of Czechoslovakia, shows that these countries are not in the same world as Greece.

were themselves engaged in espionage and organising armed sedition. These arrests were a necessity, a matter of life and death.¹ The Greek people had no intention of accepting that condition of tolerant helplessness which sacrificed the German Republic to Hitler. National Socialism was also a conspiracy, armed and seditious, and the toleration it enjoyed under German democracy was the end of that democracy. And, at least, the National Socialist Party was national, whereas EAM is not, although it calls itself *national* — *ἔθνικόν*. Hitler lived and died so that Germany should be the master. Zachariadis and Vafiadis live so that Greece may be captive.

*“It is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse and what conducting to peace.”*² The test is pragmatic. The Greek State passes no judgment on “opinions and doctrines.” But it does pass judgment on a certain conspiracy. That the conspirators hold certain doctrines may not be irrelevant, but it is not relevant under the law in the Kingdom of Greece. Where extra-legal measures have been taken, the compelling cause has been the imminent threat to security.

Despite the irruptions into the constitutional order imposed by a state of emergency, there remained in Greece so much freedom that the Commission appointed by the Security Council was able to report as follows in the spring of 1947:

“The experience of the Commission in Greece, especially in Athens and Salonica, showed that there existed a considerable degree of political freedom: freedom of speech, press, and assembly despite disturbed conditions. Indeed, of the four countries visited by the Commission,

¹ The Communist espionage in the Greek civil service was such that if warrants had been prepared, those against whom they would have been served would have received timely notice. It was, therefore, necessary to effect the arrests with suddenness and secrecy.

² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ii. 18.

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only in Greece did it hear witnesses who criticised the policies of their government or receive delegations from free organisations which presented it with evidence against the Government.”¹

There has been in Greece a strong public opinion against a State that has allowed so much liberty. The State has had critics, inspired by indubitable patriotism and regard for the liberty of the subject, who have pointed out that the political leaders of a seditious conspiracy who enjoy complete freedom under the protection of the law have at least as great a responsibility for massacres, incendiarism, and treasonable connivance with foreign powers as those young people who, under the fascination of a seemingly new idea, take to the mountains, and are killed or wounded in battle, or sentenced for murder, or for robbery with violence.

Many scattered communities in Greece have had no protection at all. And when the law cannot or will not afford protection, men will protect themselves. The *Vendetta*, which died out between the First and Second World Wars, revived in consequence of the massacres perpetrated during the Second. In the summer of 1946, before the massacre of Skra, the murders committed by Communists barely outnumbered the murders committed by Loyalists, as we have seen.² In that summer the leader of a Loyalist band, Manganas, was captured by the *Gendarmerie* and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. He had been caught by *Insurgents*, had been shot, and left for dead. But he recovered consciousness and, although pierced by bullets, returned to his home. There he found that his mother and sister had been murdered. He attributed his own escape

¹ *Report of the Committee of Investigation*, Ch. I, Section A, 10 (a).

² The most serious reprisal by Loyalist bands was perpetrated in October 1946. Seven Loyalists had been murdered by Communists at Vamvakou in the Peloponnese. Several Loyalist bands thereupon joined forces and murdered thirty-six Communists (v. the Report by the Greek Ministry of Public Order, 25th Oct. 1946).

from death to a little plaque with the image of the Holy Virgin which he wore round his neck, and he swore by the Virgin that he himself having been spared he would avenge the murder of his mother and sister. And, gathering a small band around him, he took to the mountains, and did as he had sworn in a series of armed attacks on Communists.

If the *Insurrection* is quelled, the Greek Government will still have to make exceedingly difficult decisions with regard to the future of the Communist Party. Experience has abundantly shown that the Party, whenever it has suffered defeat, has made peace and accepted the constitutional order only as a cover for renewed sedition. If hard pressed, it can transfer its *cadres* across the northern border as before. The ultimate defence of Greece depends on the defence of the free world and, therefore, on the armed might and the policy of the Western Powers. No other outpost of the free world is more exposed than Greece. Her immediate defence depends upon her own people.

For more than seven years her people have fought the external and the internal foe. They were acclaimed by the world at first, and then either denied acknowledgment or assailed by ignoble misrepresentation. No country has been so maligned as Greece. It is as though the exudations and miasmata of disloyalty and ingratitude had gathered against her so that she might sink and suffocate in foulness while fighting the fight of freedom, law, and loyalty. It is as though Ephialtes, Proteus-like, had taken many simultaneous forms, and had, like a multitudinous host of malignant spirits, conspired to betray the defenders of a new Thermopylae.

Greece is not of the present age: only EAM is of the present age. Greece is a country deriving little from classical antiquity, more from the Byzantine era, and most from the nineteenth century—a country of intense individualism, of factiousness, of free trade and private initiative, and yet permeated by custom, religion, and an inexhaust-

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ible patriotism. If we consider how powerful modern movements like the German Trade Unions, and the principal German political parties (whether of the Left, the Centre, or the Right) went down ignominiously before the onslaught of the National Socialists, we must feel amazement that the Greeks, who are the most loosely organised society in Europe, a society almost without a structure, have so long endured the massacres, the terrorism, the hunger, the ruin without end, the bleak penury, the seductiveness of an astute and unrivalled propaganda, the extreme modernity and the sustained and concentrated power of EAM, an organisation which, compared with others in Greece, appears to be more formidable, *mutatis mutandis*, than the National Socialist Party was in Germany, or the Fascist Party in Italy.

The *Democratic Army* was unable, in the course of a year's campaigning (from November 1946), to occupy and hold one town of any size or one region where it could set up an administration of its own, or even the semblance of an administration, and proclaim a *Free Greek Government* comparable with the *Lublin Government*. The intention of the Greek Communist Party to set up such a "Government" was announced by Porphyrogenis, the Greek delegate to the French Communist Party, at Strasburg in June 1947.¹ On the 17th of August 1947 Markos announced, by wireless, a "constitutional charter" conferring legislative and executive powers upon the Communists in the regions they were holding.² But although the *Democratic Army* held extensive territories, comprising some 200 villages, it was nowhere supported by the population and was unable to defend any inhabited position against even a small unit of the Greek army. Any "Government" it might have set up would have been compelled to lead a shadowy itinerant

¹ *The Times*, 18th August 1947.

² *ibid.* The announcement was transmitted by a short-wave station apparently situated at Tirana.

existence in remote mountain fastnesses. Such, at least, was the situation at the end of the year 1947.¹ Until that time, at least, the Greek Communist Party had achieved nothing save the infliction of immense misery and ruin.

Every observer of Greece today whose mind is not warped by malice, whose heart has not lost all chivalry, must ask himself: "How do the Greek people stand it?"

The answer is contained in one word: *Loyalty*. And it is in one Greek word that this loyalty found, and continues to find, expression: the word *ὄχι*, meaning *No!* It was *ὄχι* to Mussolini, despite his immense advantage in superior numbers and weight of metal. It was *ὄχι* to Hitler, despite the certainty of rapid and catastrophic defeat. It was, and is, *ὄχι* to Communism, as it was to National Socialism. It is *ὄχι* to Tito and *ὄχι* to Stalin. It is *ὄχι* amid inconceivable suffering, endured for seven years and with no end in sight. It is *ὄχι*, come what may. In this *ὄχι* there is the stubbornness of the peasant. There is also, in this *ὄχι*, a great love of freedom and a great love of country. It is this *ὄχι* that explains everything, has done everything, has saved everything, for Greece, and for much more than Greece.

¹ As the year 1947 advanced, Markos expressed himself with increasing intemperance of language. On the 9th October he issued a proclamation stating, *i.a.*, that "our dear Hellas has become a jungle where Fascist cannibals under foreign leadership plan assassination against the people and the country" (*New York Herald Tribune*, Paris edn., 10th Oct. 1947).

Chapter Six

GOD—CAESAR

I

THERE are Christians in Russia, but Russia is no Christian land. There are non-Christians in Europe, but Europe is Christian still—imperfectly and most precariously, but Christian nevertheless. The Russian imperative is to render all unto God-Caesar. Russia is under the domination of that imperative. Europe is constantly disobeying the Christian imperative: Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's. Nevertheless, Europe is the land of God and Caesar, Russia of God-Caesar, and in this they belong to different worlds.

Every historic transformation of the Russian and of the European mind has deepened the difference between these two worlds. Russia had no Renaissance and no Reformation. Her Revolution came nearly a hundred and forty years after the French Revolution. It seemed that Russia would become more European than Europe herself, for her Revolution seemed the culmination of the secular forces released in France. The Russian Revolution, it seemed, was *the* Revolution, the beginning of a new epoch, not only in Russian but in universal history, or, rather, the culmination of *all* secular history.

The Russian Revolution struck at the one heritage Russia and Europe had in common—Christianity. Today, the difference between the two worlds, the Russian and the European, is wider and deeper than it ever was before. There is no transition from one to the other, there is no possibility of compromise, of any intermingling, of any middle way. They can exist side by side in a state of truce

or even in peace. But it is a condition of this truce that each lives its own life. The eastern frontiers of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania—the frontier of Europe—are the greatest dividing line in the world. To step across this frontier, marked perhaps by nothing more than barbed wire, was, in the year 1939, to step into a different world, from the Christian world into the non-Christian.

The difference between Russia and Europe not only affects the politics of either, it not only distinguishes the outlook of the cultivated classes of the one from those of the other, it ineluctably decrees that the peasants and the industrial workmen—the “common people”—shall belong to different worlds. The peasant in the Polish Republic, even if he be a Ukrainian or a White Russian, is not the same person as the peasant just across the border in the Soviet Union. Even if he speaks what is philologically the same language, the content of that language is so different that mutual comprehension, except of the most primitive kind, is impossible.

A severe discipline maintains the aloofness of the Russians, but that discipline itself is a function of that aloofness. The Russians know that their world and the western world cannot mix. They know that the intrusion of the European into the Russian world must lead to the downfall of the latter in its present form. They know that the Soviet Union cannot survive the spread of the European outlook within the Union. They also know that the intrusion of the Russian world into the European can only come about if the Russian outlook, as it advances, destroys the European outlook. Those European countries in which Russia is today the master will cease to be European if Russia remains the master. They will either become territories of the Soviet Union, not only in political, economic, and administrative terms, but also in terms of civilisation itself, or they will

again become European. For them, it must be one or the other; either Russia or Europe, either God-Caesar or God and Caesar. It cannot be both, and it cannot be something in between. That is why, as Russia advances into Europe, the dividing line, the frontier, remains unbroken as it moves on. The so-called *Iron Curtain* is the western frontier of Russian domination, and none the less a dividing line because, in a physical sense, it can be crossed. Spiritually, it is becoming impassable. And where the Russian idea has taken root this side of the dividing line, that is to say, where Communist Parties grow, they grow like an alien flora on alien soil, differing not only specifically from all native flora, but generically from all save National Socialism and Fascism, in so far as National Socialism and Fascism, although differing from one another as they differ from Communism, are, like Communism, secular religions, a challenge to the European idea, to the heritage that has come down from Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem: an endeavour to establish the domination of God-Caesar.

Our generation is witness of the German eruption and of the Russian irruption. The internal, the eruptive enemy, has been defeated. The question is: Will he again become an integral part of the European organism? The external, the irruptive enemy, has not been defeated as yet. The question is: Will he prevail or will he withdraw from (or be expelled from) the European organism?

The First and Second World Wars decided that the *Pax Europæa* should not be a *Pax Germanica*. The conflict precipitated by the Russian Revolution more than a year before the First World War came to an end decided that the *Pax Europæa* should not be a *Pax Muscovita*. This same conflict was renewed well before the end of the Second World War. And again the question is: What shall it be: *Pax Europæa* or *Pax Muscovita*? It cannot be both.

If it is to be the *Pax Muscovita*, the conflict will not have

reached its end, it will but have completed its first stage, for it is in the nature of all who worship God-Caesar that they must conquer the world. That worship is meaningless if confined to one country. It can find its meaning only in world-domination, as Lenin and Hitler knew, and as Stalin knows today.

The Russian problem, like the German, is simple, though it does not follow that to solve it will be easy. We are often told, nowadays, that we must try to understand "the Russian people," that we must read Dostoyevsky, and explore the depths of "the Russian soul." Certainly, we should try to understand "the Russian people," and other people too, including our own. Certainly we should read Dostoyevsky, for his own sake, if for no other reason, for he was a mighty genius who has much to tell us. He was a Christian before the dividing line between the two worlds was absolute, and he can speak to us still. As for the depths of "the Russian soul," they are no doubt interesting, but have little relevance to what is, or ought to be, our principal concern: the defence of Europe.

So that we may defend Europe we must understand Russian foreign policy. We must understand that mighty impulse, its direction, and its ultimate purpose. And in this respect, it is true, we shall obtain some guidance from Dostoyevsky, not so much in his grandiose heights and his terrible depths, not where he is greatest, but where he is smallest, not so much in his novels, but in his political writings.

Hitler told us what he was going to do and he did it. Lenin told us what he was going to do and did it. Stalin has told us what he would do and is doing it. Lenin and Hitler were exponents and practitioners of certain principles. So is Stalin. Like Lenin and Hitler, he is a believer, and a believer cannot be understood by unbelievers. Those who imagine that there could have been a compromise

between Europe and the Third Realm, and that there can be a compromise between Europe and the Soviet Union, cannot understand either Europe or the Third Realm or the Soviet Union. To the unbeliever, belief is wholly unreal. That beliefs have shaken the world, have made and unmade empires and civilisations: so evident a fact is not denied, but it is relegated to the historic past by those who hold that modern "progress," the "conquest of space," and the ascendancy of reason will enable men to "see one another's point of view" and "bring them together" in a "working compromise."

Stalin today, Lenin and Hitler in the past, are men of unshakable conviction, a conviction that demands and receives all that a man can give, so that his own life and the lives of others, indeed the lives of whole classes of society, and of whole nations, are as nothing by comparison. To assume that such a conviction can be diluted or adulterated, that some of it can be sacrificed for the sake of a compromise with some other conviction: this assumption is itself a betrayal, the consequence of a leprosy, the leprosy of indifference, which is eating at the heart of our western civilisation. Although events are proving the falsity of this assumption, it remains the underlying assumption of nearly all political, or would-be political, writing today, of nearly all relevant leading articles in the daily press, and in nearly all "talks" about "the international situation" on the wireless. If this assumption is right, then it would have been better, at the Temptation, if Christ had "appeased" Satan, had negotiated "a working compromise," and had agreed to share the Kingdoms of the world with the Adversary. If only He had "taken a more conciliatory line," if only there had been "a better understanding," how much trouble would have been averted!

The nature of Russian foreign policy has been clearly and repeatedly expounded by Stalin. The study of his speeches

and writings is the more profitable because they are without originality. Their purpose is to adapt principles formulated by Lenin for the use of practitioners, that is to say, of those responsible for the conduct of Russian policy and for the management of the *Comintern*. A volume of Stalin's speeches, entitled *Problems of Leninism*,¹ was published in 1939. It had run through eleven editions by the year 1943 and had circulated in millions of copies. It was, and is, for the Soviet Union what Hitler's *Mein Kampf* was for the Third Realm: the principal repository of official doctrine and precept. Some of the speeches were made as far back as 1924, the year *Mein Kampf* was completed.

Of the "October Revolution" in 1917, Stalin says that

"It constitutes the first stage of world revolution and a mighty base for its further development."²

Here we have, in a few words, the evidence that Russia wants the world. The Revolution prevailed in Russia—it shall everywhere prevail!

In a speech on the new Russian draft constitution which was promulgated in 1936, Stalin said, replying to "bourgeois" critics who asserted that the constitution was not "democratic":

"I have to admit that the draft of the new constitution does in fact leave the . . . dictatorship of the working class in force, just as it retains without change the present leading position of the Communist Party."³

and:

"The State is a machine in the hands of the governing class for suppressing the resistance of its class antagonists. In this way the dictatorship of the proletariat differs in no way essentially from the dictatorship of any other class."⁴

¹ J. Stalin, *Voprosi Leninizma* (Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoy literaturi, 1939).

² *ibid.*, p. 105.

³ *ibid.*, p. 523.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 29.

We are told that "democracy" does not, in Russia and in countries under Russian control, mean what it means in the western world. Whatever it may mean in the latter, its meaning in the former is made clear by Stalin himself.

The Revolution has now prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe (excepting Greece). A dictatorship, if not of the working class, yet in the name of the working class, and, in fact, *over* the working class, as in Russia, has been established or is in process of being established under the leadership of the National Communist Parties and under the central control of the Kremlin. The World Revolution will, if it comes about, also be a dictatorship, and the "leading positions" will be held by Communist Parties everywhere, under the supreme control of the Kremlin.

Only one Party can be tolerated:

"In the U.S.S.R. there is no basis for several parties and, therefore, [none] for the freedom of such parties."¹

This precept is being enforced in Central and Eastern Europe. The Communist Party is either the exclusive master, as in Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania, or is becoming so, as in the other countries of that region. And so it is to be throughout the world.

The destruction of "Social Democracy," that is to say, of the British Labour Party and all other Parties that profess both Socialism and democracy, must be achieved before the Revolution can prevail:

"It is impossible to finish off capitalism without having finished off social democracy in the working-class movement."²

"Social democracy" is being "finished off" in Central and Eastern Europe.

¹ *ibid.*, p. 523.

² *ibid.*, p. 181.

In his report to the 18th Congress of the Communist Party on the 10th of March 1939, Stalin gave an illustration to show how effectively opponents are "finished off" in the Soviet Union and how the process helps to consolidate the government:

"In 1937 Tukhachevski, Yakir, Uborevitch and other ministers were sentenced to be shot. After this there were elections to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. The elections gave the Soviet Government 98·6 per cent. of all those who took part in the voting. At the beginning of 1938 Rosengoltz, Rykov, Bukharin and other ministers were sentenced to be shot. After this there were elections to the Supreme Council of the Union Republics. The elections gave the Soviet Government 99·4 per cent. of all those who took part in the elections."

Movements of national independence must be supported if their success will promote the World Revolution by weakening the "capitalist" and "imperialist" Powers, Great Britain and the United States above all:

"The Afghan Emir's struggle for the independence of Afghanistan is objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite the monarchical type of views held by the Emir and his supporters, because it weakens, disintegrates, undermines imperialism." ¹

Today, the Greek struggle for independence is "counter-revolutionary"—or "Fascist"—because the independence of Greece is in the interest of Great Britain and the United States, whereas the struggle of the Indonesians for independence is "revolutionary"—or "democratic"—because it is not in the interest of the "capitalist" and "imperialist" Powers.

The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Poles and Czechs during the Second World War may seem to be

¹ *ibid.*, p. 48.

inconsistent with earlier revolutionary doctrine. The inconsistency is only apparent, as Stalin explains:

“There are times when the national movements for the individual oppressed countries come into conflict with the interests of the development of the proletarian movement. It goes without saying that in such cases there cannot be any talk of support. . . . In the forties of last century Marx supported the national movement of the Poles and Hungarians against the national movement of the Czechs and Southern Slavs. Why? Because the Czechs and Southern Slavs were then reactionary nations, Russian outposts of imperialism, whereas the Poles and Hungarians were ‘revolutionary nations’ fighting against absolutism.”¹

The independence of Poland is incompatible with the extension of the Soviet Union into Europe. Polish patriotism is, therefore, “Fascist.” But if the Soviet Union is successful in reducing the Poles to subservience and converting Poland into an “outpost” of the Union, that is to say, in exterminating the spirit of national independence, then Poland will have become “democratic.” The Czechs were Pan-Slav and Russophile in Tsarist days, and, therefore, “reactionaries.” But the Pan-Slav movement has come under the exclusive control of the Communists and is a means of extending the Russian Revolution. And the Russia of today is not the Empire of the Tsars, but the more despotic and much bigger Union of Soviet Republics. The Czechs, therefore, are no longer “reactionary” but “democratic.”

II

There are certain constants in Russian foreign policy which are doctrinally determined. Let me consider two

¹ *ibid.*, p. 47.

examples. I shall give further examples when I examine apparent inconsistencies of the *Comintern*.

The first example is an official manual, the second is a brief survey of Russian policy in Outer Mongolia over a period of ten years.

The manual, entitled *Précis of the History of the Soviet Union*, is written by the historian Shestakov, and has been approved by a committee of the Russian Government for use in Russian schools.¹ It opens with an introduction stating that there is only one socialist country—"our country," the "biggest in the world," and "in natural resources the richest in the world." The life of "the worker" in Russia "improves incessantly, and grows ever more comfortable and joyful." In no other country of the world is there "a friendship like that which unites the peoples of the U.S.S.R. . . . all the peoples of this country work for the common good." There are no "parasites," no "capitalists," and no "landowners," as there are in other countries, and "exploitation of man by man does not exist." Our country which was the "most backward" has become the "most advanced" and the "most powerful." . . .

"It is the great Bolshevik Communist Party which has shown the way of socialism. . . . We love our country and must know its remarkable history better. Whoever knows history, knows present-day life better, and will know better how to fight the enemies of our country and to strengthen socialism." ²

The manual takes us back to the era of "primitive communism" and of "mammoth-hunting." Then "the class" develops into "the State." The class is still communistic, but inequality, wealth, and private property appear because

¹ A French translation was published in Moscow: Shestakov, A., *Précis d'histoire de l'U.R.S.S.* Approuvée par la Commission gouvernementale de U.R.S.S., traduit par Alice Orène et Georges Roux (Imprimée en U.R.S.S., Moscow, 1938).

² *Précis*, p. 3.

some families are stronger and more numerous than others. Slaves captured in war become a source of wealth. The power of the rich increases, and they make the poor work. The State is "a handful of rich men" who "began to live at the expense of the immense majority of workers whom it oppresses and exploits." ¹

The

"most ancient States of our country . . . were formed in the south of Transcaucasia, about 3000 years ago. The first State in Transcaucasia, Ourarion, was situated in the region of Mount Ararat, near Lake Van. . . . This was the State of our ancestors, the present Georgians. . . . In Georgia the alphabet was invented, more than two thousand years ago." ²

Compared with paganism, Christianity was "a forward step in the evolution of Russia." The early Tsars are praised for strengthening the State and resisting the Mongol hordes, but are blamed for oppressing the people. Much progress was made under Peter the Great, but his rule was founded on oppression. . . .

"The expansion of the Russian Empire under Peter I cost hundreds of thousands of workers their lives."

In the reign of Catherine the Great, the people "groaned under the Tsarist power." ³

Peasant risings, especially the rising led by Pougatcheff, are emphasised. So is Catherine's hostility to the French Revolution. The Russian people rose against Napoleon's armies and "the peasants began partisan warfare," but under Alexander I, as head of the Holy Alliance, Russia "became the policeman of Europe." ⁴ Marx and Engels enter history. The Poles struggle for independence, the First International is founded, and the Commune is proclaimed in Paris. ⁵

¹ *ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 91-3.

² *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 93-121.

³ *ibid.*, p. 83.

PAX BRITANNICA

The First World War leads to revolutionary outbreaks and Socialism triumphs in Russia.¹

“In one-sixth of the globe . . . a new order, the Socialist order, has been created; a new life has been founded, a life which knows neither exploitation nor oppression, nor capitalists, nor landowners, nor merchants, nor Kulaks. . . . Soviet aviators fly higher and further than all others.”²

Russia has friends and enemies beyond her borders:

“The peoples of the Soviet Union are waging a heroic struggle for the happiness of all mankind.”³

Trotsky was “the infamous enemy of the people” and a “Fascist agent.” His friends Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, and Bukharin, were “no less infamous.”⁴

“The Soviet Union is strong and vigorous as no other State in the world. It is strong in its Red Army . . . it is glorious through its marshals and military leaders, through its heroic fighters, the Red soldiers. The Soviet Union is the Socialist fatherland of the workers throughout the world . . . their support makes the U.S.S.R. more powerful still.”⁵

According to this manual—and all relevant Russian manuals, books, articles, and broadcasts—Russia is the only socialist State, the greatest civilisation in the world, and one of the oldest—far older than the civilisations of England, France, Germany, older even than the civilisation of ancient Rome. The ancestors of the Russians had an alphabet hundreds of years before our ancestors had one.

It is, perhaps, not without significance that the original home of the Russians is outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union, in that part of the present Turkish Republic, the region of Mount Ararat and Lake Van, bordering on the

¹ Shestakov, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-41.

² *ibid.*, p. 191.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 292.

³ *ibid.*, p. 227.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 293.

districts of Kars and Ardahan which the Union has been claiming as her own.

The Russian people alone have true happiness and they owe their happiness to Socialism. *Fascism* is the principle of evil—*Fascism* and its antecedents or variants, capitalism, imperialism, and reaction. All persons are “agents” who serve this principle. Trotsky was a “Fascist agent.”

Decisive—and insufficiently understood in the western world—is the Russian conception of loyalty. Russia, in the words of the manual, is “the socialist Fatherland of the workers throughout the world.” To that Fatherland all “workers” owe allegiance. Those leaders who, like MacDonal and Henderson in the past, and Attlee and Bevin today, hold that “the workers” owe allegiance to their own countries are “Social Fascists,” “betrayers of the working class,” “lackeys of the bourgeoisie,” “reactionaries,” and so on. Whoever works as a spy for the Soviet Union in Great Britain, the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, is a patriot of the Socialist Fatherland, for the “workers” owe allegiance to their own countries only in so far as those countries belong to the future universal Socialist Fatherland which will be but an extension of the Soviet Union.

The manual conveys to its readers in simple terms the fundamental principles of Russian foreign policy, connecting those principles with Russia’s past, present, and future. In this way, Russia’s character, destiny, and universal liberating mission, are presented as an organic whole. Whatever she does, whether it be in Greece, Germany, or China, at Lake Success or at the Conference of Foreign Ministers, is thereby made the more intelligible to the Russian public.

If we turn from Russian principles to Russian practice, and take a distant region as an illustration, we shall find that her practice in that region is the same as her practice nearer home, that she has no “special designs” or “special interests” in Europe, but that she observes the same

conformity between practice and principle throughout the world.

The Russian Revolution was observed with some interest and sympathy by the poorer officials and employees of Outer Mongolia, an autonomous State under Chinese protection. The nomads, who made up most of the inhabitants, were indifferent, the princes and the clergy were hostile. The Chinese took alarm and strengthened their garrisons to counteract any Russian influence. At the same time, they were unwilling to antagonise Russia and give her an excuse for intervention in Outer Mongolian affairs, so they arrested and disarmed all officers and men who had served under Koltchak and other "White" commanders and were taking refuge on Outer Mongolian territory.

To increase her own authority, China dissolved the autonomous Government and disbanded the Mongolian forces. Mongolian nationalists, in their resentment against China, began to look for help from Russia. In 1920 Russian troops, led by the "White" commander, Ungern Sternberg, entered Mongolian territory in greater strength than usual (being hard pressed by the Red Army). They were engaged by Chinese troops and defeated. But they received reinforcements, and in February 1921 they took the capital, Urga. Russia, thereupon, prepared to invade Outer Mongolia, on the plea that she could not tolerate the existence of a "counter-revolutionary" State on her border.

Political preparations had been made during the previous year. A *Revolutionary Mongolian People's Party*—a predecessor of similar Parties sponsored by Russia in Europe—was formed on Russian territory. Many of its members were not natives of Outer Mongolia, but Buryats and Kalmuks. The town of Kyakhta, on the Russian side of the border, was occupied by Russian troops, and it was there, in February 1921, that the *People's Party* held its first congress—a congress which, like its Russian-sponsored

successors in Europe, was dominated by Communists. On the 13th of February 1921 a Provisional *People's Government* was formed in Kyakhta, a predecessor of the *Provisional* Polish Government, of the embryonic *Democratic* Greek Government, and others.

The dubious authority of this *People's Government* was confined to a small region on the border. But *Partisan* warfare was instigated by Russia, and a Mongolian *People's Army* was formed on Russian territory for the political conquest of Outer Mongolia. This *People's Army* had no military value, but it enabled the Russian Government to pretend that a Mongolian "war of liberation" was being waged by the "Mongolian people" and that it was the duty of the "Socialist Fatherland" to help them.

A Russian force, assisted by the *People's Army*, captured Urga, now Ulan-Bator. The *Provisional Government* followed the troops and was established in that city.

On the 5th of November 1921 the Russian Government signed an agreement with its own creation, that same *Provisional Government*, recognising it as the Government of all Outer Mongolia and establishing "friendly relations" between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, agents had been sent into Western Mongolia who, with local assistance, formed a *Government* at Musta, near Ulenkom. This *Government* placed itself under the *People's Government* at Urga in 1922.

Russia's authority was not so firmly established that she could afford to withdraw her troops. It was arranged that the *People's Government* should request a postponement of the withdrawal on the plea that the security of Outer Mongolia was still threatened by "White" commanders and their men. The presence of the latter also provided Russia with an excuse for the invasion of Western Mongolia. To the Chinese Government Russia explained that she had not really occupied Urga, but had only sent troops there to

protect the Mongols against the "Whites." But the Russian garrison has remained until the present day.

The *People's Government* was constantly changed so as to exclude all but the most submissive ministers. Those who were not sufficiently submissive were accused of conspiracy and were removed. "Elections" were held for a *Khuruldan*, or Parliament. The "elections" were meaningless, for the "electorate" consisted chiefly of nomads and other illiterate people. But a *Khuruldan* of 54 members was formed nevertheless. It had no authority. It was the submissive instrument of the *People's Government*, which was controlled by the Kremlin.

In 1924 "elections" for a *Great General Congress of the Mongolian People* were held. The princes and religious bodies, or about one-third of the population, were debarred from voting. The nomads took no interest whatever. There was only one list of candidates, but even of these some were unacceptable to the Russians, and when they were "elected," they were disqualified as members of the *Congress*. The *Congress* met, and in November 1924 it appointed a new Government.

In Outer Mongolia, as in Central and Eastern Europe today, the Communist Party was maintained by Russia as an instrument of domination, but the name *Communist* was avoided to veil its identity. It was called the *Revolutionary Mongolian People's Party*.¹ It drew up a *Programme*. According to *Points* 12 and 13 of this *Programme*,

"the Mongolian working masses will resolutely follow the orientation of the *Comintern* and of the Soviet Union as the sole revolutionary centres which effectively assist the enslaved people of the East."

At the *Congress of the Revolutionary Mongolian People's*

¹ Cf. the *Polish Workers' Party* in Poland, the *People's Front* in Yugoslavia, the *Fatherland Front* in Bulgaria, the SED in Germany, EAM in Greece.

Party in 1925, resolutions were passed in favour of maintaining "the connection with the *Comintern*" and with "the national revolutionary movements of the oppressed peoples of the East."

No other *Party* was allowed in Outer Mongolia. At the end of 1927 it had 11,587 members. Many of these were illiterate but had been enrolled so that the membership should be big enough to make an adequate impression.

In 1924, despite many precautions, the *Party* began to develop what was called a *Right Wing*, for there were literate Mongolians who understood what was happening and wished to work for Mongolian independence. Thereupon a "class struggle" began. On the 21st of June 1924 the Mongolian delegation at the *Fifth World Congress of the Comintern* put forward the thesis that, until then, the struggle in Mongolia had been against the "feudal theocratic system" but had become a struggle against "the propertied classes." The *Comintern* instructed the *Party* to strengthen the *Left Wing* and to "liberate the working masses." The leaders of the *Right Wing*, including a certain Donson, who had been chairman of the *Party's* Central Committee and Commander in Chief of the Mongolian army, were accused of secret dealings with the Chinese and executed, although Outer Mongolia was still *de jure* a Chinese Protectorate. Signs of recalcitrance also appeared amongst the younger generation of Mongolians. But a series of *purges* was carried out, the *Party* was packed with illiterates, and all opposition was quelled.

In 1926 the *Party* had 5500 members. At the Congress held by the *Party* in that year, 1700 of these members were expelled and a radical "sovietisation" of Outer Mongolia was inaugurated. The land was "collectivised," all private business was "liquidated," and a propagandist campaign against religion was organised. Popular risings and a decline in production were the result. The Kremlin realised that it had gone too far and, to placate the discontented

people, it accused the *Left Wing* of excesses. Officials who had superintended the process of "sovietisation" were denounced as "enemies of the people" and executed, while "Left Wing Deviationists" were denounced as "counter-revolutionaries."

China never had any illusions as to the true character of the Outer Mongolian Government. The Mongolian princes often appealed to her for help. Hostility to Russia spread to Inner Mongolia. Russia gave repeated assurances that she would continue to recognise Chinese sovereignty over all Mongolia and that she would support "the union of the greater and the smaller peoples who belong, or may later belong, to the Chinese Empire, in one federal, democratic, Chinese Republic.

On the 12th of March 1936 a treaty of mutual assistance was signed at Ulan-Bator by the representatives of the Russian and Outer Mongolian Governments. On the 7th of April China protested. Russia replied that there had been no infringement of China's sovereign rights in Manchuria.

III

Historical writing is used in the Soviet Union, as it was in the Third Realm, for political indoctrination so as to form a public opinion which will in all circumstances support the principles of Russian foreign policy. We have given one example of popular history written to serve this purpose, the *Précis*, by Shestakov. But history of a more sophisticated order is also subordinated to the same end. Indeed, history as a product of pure scholarship does not, and cannot, exist in the Soviet Union. Foreign policy is national history in the making, and whereas in western countries recorded history and history in the making may be independent of one another, in the Soviet Union they are never so. The contemporary Russian historian is there-

fore a propagandist. If Russian policy changes—as it does from time to time, although its ultimate purpose remains the same—books of history must also change, so that work which yesterday had official approval may, tomorrow, be the object of official censure, in which case the author must count on suffering as a “deviationist,” if not as a “Fascist” or “counter-revolutionary.”

Pokrovsky was once a serious historian even by western standards, but after the Revolution he developed the official thesis that the writing of history must serve the purpose of the Communist Party. His works, thereafter, were written entirely from “the Marxist point of view.” He condemned all independent scholarship as *bourgeois*. But he was superseded when the Soviet Union, in the early 'thirties, began to place Russian history in the service of territorial expansion as well as of class-warfare, and tyrants, conquerors, and warriors like Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Yermak, Khmel'nitsky, Suvorov, and others, were extolled as national heroes despite their deplorable attitude towards class-warfare, an attitude which was explained as historically conditioned, as belonging to a stage in the evolution of the Socialist Fatherland.

In December 1946 Alexandrov, the editor of the *Bolshevik*, was appointed member of the Soviet *Academy of Sciences* in recognition of his book, *History of Western European Philosophy*. From the 16th to the 25th of June he was on trial for heresy. The Chief Prosecutor was Zhdanov, who is Stalin's deputy in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The jury consisted of ideologues from all parts of the Soviet Union. Forty-eight of them spoke during the trial. Zhdanov, in his indictment, said,

“Marxism-Leninism knows no compromise in its struggle against foreign bourgeois philosophical opinions . . . and yet the author [Alexandrov] presents the history of philosophy objectively and does not demonstrate the

class-content of various philosophical systems . . . he consistently pursues his objective conception throughout the whole book. . . . As a result, Comrade Alexandrov, perhaps unsuspectingly, was caught in the grip of the bourgeois historians of philosophy, who see in every philosopher first of all a professional ally and only afterwards an adversary. Such conceptions, if allowed to develop among us, would inevitably lead to objectivity, to subservience to bourgeois philosophers and to exaggeration of their merits. . . . Comrade Alexandrov in his book entirely excludes Russian philosophy [the book is about *western*, not Russian, philosophy]. This omission was made as a matter of principle and is in practice equivalent to belittling the role of Russian philosophy. . . .”

Alexandrov was found guilty on all counts, but he expressed repentance and was allowed to remain on the editorial Board of the *Bolshevik*.

Just as the Third Realm grew out of the Empire of the Hohenzollerns, with a brief Republican period in between, so the Soviet Union grew out of the Tsarist Empire, with an even briefer period of quasi-democratic socialism in between. And just as German historians of the last generation adumbrated the Third Realm, so Russian historians adumbrated the Soviet Union. The consistence of Russian foreign policy is not only the product of revolutionary doctrine, it has its origin in a more distant past, a past which is being revived today by Russian historians, so that consistency may become the more consistent.

Dostoyevsky, a glorifier of war and hater of everything European, spoke prophetically to the Russians of his day. We read, in a penetrating study of Dostoyevsky as a political thinker,¹ that, according to his conception:

“Russia must unite under her leadership all the Slav peoples, not for the sake of expansion or empire, as other

¹ Hans Cohn, *Dostoyevsky's Nationalism (Journal of the History of Ideas, October 1945)*.

nations would do, but to ensure their peace and freedom. The next step must be the conquest of Constantinople, acquired not for profit, but for the truth which is preserved only in Russia. That cannot be understood by the Europeans who do not believe in the brotherhood and regeneration of man. But this is the very thing that Russia will bring them; for that purpose the Russians must become more Russian and must have faith in their national idea so that Russia can reveal to Europe the new humanity, the new social order which she alone represents and can bring forth. The great war between Russia and the West seemed to Dostoyevsky inevitable. . . . Dostoyevsky was convinced that the war would end with a Russian victory, and the face of Europe would be completely changed. 'So much that is new and progressive will begin in human relations, that it would be useless to mourn and hesitate on the eve of the last great struggle. . . .'¹ A new epoch will commence for the whole of mankind. In place of Roman Catholicism a revived Eastern Christianity will arise. . . . Bourgeois free society will be unable to survive the great war: the fate of Poland awaits France; and perhaps 'not we, but our children will see the end of England.'² In this terrible time of troubles only one mighty refuge will remain for mankind, one holy altar of truth, Russia. She will have to take over from Europe its science and technical appliances, but not its bourgeois civilisation nor its rotting and inefficient forms of government. Then in this new world order, true civic liberty would develop in Russia to a greater degree than anywhere in Europe and even in the United States."

Dostoyevsky is not the only prophet of those conquests which Russia is pursuing today. In the late nineteenth century, Tiutchev, referring to Russian conquests under Peter the Great, wrote that

¹ Dostoyevsky, *Journal of an Author*, September 1877.

² *ibid.*, September 1881.

"these supposed conquests, these supposed deeds of violence, were the most organic, and the most legitimate achievements which history has ever realised. It was simply an immense restoration which was being accomplished. Thus we understand why under Russia's hand there perished in her path all that she encountered of abnormal tendencies, powers, and institutions faithless to the great principle she represented, why Poland had to perish—not the authentic Polish race (God forbid!), but the false civilisation, the false nationality, which has been imported to Poland. It is from this point of view also that we shall be the better able to appreciate the true significance of what is called the Eastern Question, of this question which people pretend to proclaim insoluble, precisely because everyone has foreseen the inevitable solution. Eastern Europe is three-quarters constituted even now, and the question is, will this veritable Empire of the East, of which the first, the Empire of the Byzantine Caesars, the ancient Orthodox Emperors, was but a feeble and imperfect sketch, receive or not receive its best and most indispensable completion, will it obtain this completion by the natural force of things, or will it be compelled to demand it by force of arms, at the risk of the greatest calamities for the world?"¹

It is precisely in this manner that Poland is being destroyed—not the "authentic Polish race (God forbid!)," but her "civilisation" and her "nationality." It is that the Soviet Union is "solving" the "Eastern Question" and is erecting the "veritable Empire of the East" by the "natural force of things" (as manifested by "democratic" parties and "governments"). And if this "natural force" should fail, then the "force of arms" must decide, even at the "risk of the greatest calamities."

Russian foreign policy does not derive its sanction from pragmatic necessity. Those who assume that its purpose

¹ Tiutchev, *Works* (St. Petersburg, 1913, ed. by Baikoff).

is security miss the central truth. It is only concerned with security in so far as conquests, when made, and the operational bases for conquests still to be must be secured. Conquests made and still to be made are sanctioned by historic precept and example, by the overriding doctrinal imperative of the determinist secular eschatology expounded in the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, by the new orthodoxy which has replaced the old.

The categories *Revolution* and *Counter-Revolution* are relative. A counter-revolution is an attempt to overthrow by force a Government established by Revolution. But if the attempt fails, and if, after a period of years, an attempt is made, in changed circumstances, to overthrow that Government, or to transform it, by force, are we to call that attempt a Revolution or a Counter-Revolution? The Russian Revolution, which prevailed in March 1917, was, broadly speaking, democratic. It was a movement of the people, of industrial labour and, above all, of the peasants. The Revolution which prevailed in October 1917 was the movement of an autocratic minority which overthrew the quasi-democratic Government and, after a prolonged civil war, imposed its will upon all Russia. Was it a Revolution or a Counter-Revolution?

That question has been answered by Trotsky.

Lenin and Trotsky held that terrorism was an indispensable weapon of class-warfare but not of government as such. The *bourgeoisie*, so they believed, ruled terroristically, was incapable of ruling in any other way, and must be overthrown by terrorism, its own weapon. But it was never in their thought that terrorism should become an established system. But that was precisely what terrorism became after the attempted assassination of Lenin in August 1918. Not only persons identifiable as active enemies, but suspects, also, were destroyed. Persons known to be innocent were arrested and compelled, under torture or threat of death,

to inform against others. Hostages were taken. The methodical extermination of dissidents, of suspected dissidents, and of those who might, some time or other, conceivably become dissidents, began. It was then that terrorism was established not only as a system of government, but as the system of government *par excellence* from which there could be no departure.

Like all the revolutionary leaders, Trotsky was a ruthless man, but he was not altogether inhuman. He could be magnanimous upon occasion. He had more humanity than Lenin, and much more than Karl Marx. The malevolence of Karl Marx was altogether appalling. Those who opposed him, or even disagreed with him, were fortunate that he never had a secret police at his disposal as Hitler was to have. Instead, Karl Marx employed the weapons of slander, calumny, and vituperation with all the virulence of frustrated malice, hate, and envy. In using the method of moral annihilation he was a forerunner of Hitler, Stalin, Tito, Dimitrov, and others, who use it to consummate the physical annihilation of their victims. Every man sent to his death under the bureaucratic absolutism of the Russian counter-revolution, whether in the Soviet Union, or in Yugoslavia or any country under Russian control, is dishonoured without any possibility of self-defence. His whole life may have been devoted to the service of the working-class, but he is condemned as the betrayer of that class. He may be the noblest of patriots, but he is condemned as the basest of traitors and a spy in the service of his country's enemies. Generosity to a foe, the recognition that an opponent may have courage and a sincere belief, the magnanimity that will fight without malice: these are qualities which are wholly alien to the Communist world.¹

¹ This is true of Communism everywhere and not only in Russia and Eastern Europe. Never do we find in the *Daily Worker* or in *L'Humanité* one chivalrous or generous word, one admission, however paltry, that there is such a thing as a worthy and honourable opponent.

When did the counter-revolution begin? In his book on Stalin, Trotsky wrote of the terror that followed the attempted assassination of Lenin:

“Something snapped in the heart of the revolution,” the revolution “began to lose its kindness and forbearance . . . something had happened that had saved the revolution” but “a new and great danger was imminent.”¹

Here we have the dividing line. In this passage, one of the most important ever written by a historian, Trotsky records something of which even he himself did not realise the full significance, but something he sensed profoundly and with terrible foreboding.

Lenin and Trotsky tried to arrest the monstrous growth of the new bureaucracy established by the revolution. But there was only one way of arresting it: to turn the terror against the bureaucracy itself. But the bureaucracy was already master of the Soviet Union because it was master of the terror. The terror was bureaucratic and the bureaucracy was terroristic. Stalin, whose part in the revolution had been insignificant, perceived this clearly. It is possible that if Lenin had lived long enough and had recovered his health, Stalin would have been less successful. Lenin realised, as his own end approached, that Stalin was a menace.² But, at the same time, bureaucracy was inherent in the character of the original revolution. Socialism cannot but be bureaucratic, and the only question is: Shall it be terroristically or democratically bureaucratic?

Lenin and Trotsky saw their work menaced by the bureaucratic machine, the machine of their own creation. Stalin was the man, not for the original revolution as conceived by Lenin and Trotsky, but for this machine. Without Lenin's powerful, though narrow intellect, without

¹ *Stalin*, by Leon Trotsky (Hollis and Carter, London), p. 338.

² *v. Lenin's Testament*. The full text of this document appeared in Max Eastman's *Since Lenin Died*, and in several other works.

Trotsky's insight and fervour, and without that sense of comradeship and of honour which existed amongst the Russian revolutionaries in their dealings with one another, Stalin, immensely patient, crafty, and calculating, gained control over that machine. He used it to crush the Russian revolution and to annihilate and dishonour all its surviving leaders. It was he, above all, who made the counter-revolution master of the whole Soviet Union, he, above all, who has extended the counter-revolution into the heart of Europe. Surely Stalin is the greatest counter-revolutionary and reactionary who ever lived!

The revolutions which gave Central and Eastern Europe its new character and configuration at the end of the First World War were democratic and patriotic. They received a powerful stimulus from Russia, but the new countries looked more to the West than to the East, more to President Wilson than to Karl Marx and Lenin, and more to western than to eastern radicalism.

The two German revolutions, in 1918 and in 1933, reveal the deep contradictions in the German character. The first showed much "forbearance." It was never terroristic. In so far as it was ruthless, it was so against its own extremists. It acted brutally against the Spartacists and leniently towards the would-be restorers of the *ancien régime*, using them to restore order in Germany and so preserving a *cadre* which made the second revolution possible. There can have been few revolutionary leaders in history as shortsighted as those who led the first German Revolution!

Too much was expected of the nations that established new or renewed States in Central and Eastern Europe. They were expected to achieve what the western nations had only achieved after many generations in less than one generation, indeed almost at once. The wonder is, not that they did so ill, but that they did so well. Some of them resorted to despotism and even to terrorism in their endeavour to curb

internal disruption. It was not so much the lack of the democratic spirit which made despotism appear necessary to preserve national cohesion, but rather the excess of the democratic spirit. National cohesion was, in every one of the new or renewed States, a necessity for two reasons: every one of these States existed and could only continue to exist as a co-operative effort, and every one of them had to be strong and united in defence against the dangers which were to threaten from Germany and from the Soviet Union.

All the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were making good by the late 'thirties, all were achieving internal stability, all were beginning to prosper, and, while some were still despotically governed, the people in all of them remained democratic in spirit and western in outlook. They all rejected the secular religions, National Socialism, Fascism, and Communism. They all rejected the Pacifism of the Western World. In none did the Christian faith lose its hold over the peasantry. When the Second World War came, all, in their hearts, desired the victory of the Western Powers. Poland and Yugoslavia risked everything and lost everything for that victory. Others, like Rumania and Hungary, fought for the enemy with extreme repugnance and turned against him on the first occasion.¹

The German challenge in 1939 was answered by a re-affirmation of the patriotic and democratic revolutions of the years 1918 and 1919. Those revolutions had, in Central and Eastern Europe, stood the test of twenty years, and had not, as in Germany and in Russia, been converted into counter-revolutions. When the challenge came, despotic

¹ Hungary might seem an exception to my statements with regard to the democratic character of the Central and Eastern European countries. She is the only one of those countries with a régime that could be called *reactionary*. But it was a *reaction* that came after a terroristic Communist dictatorship under Bela Kun, though the *White Terror* was worse than the *Red*, as I have pointed out. But even so, the spirit of the Hungarian peasantry was democratic and almost the entire nation was in sympathy with the Western Powers throughout the war.

Governments were either overthrown, as in Yugoslavia, or became irrelevant, as in Poland.

But the German challenge was followed by the Russian. The twofold assault was too much. The patriotic and democratic revolutions prevailed, with the help of the Western Powers, over the German counter-revolution, but when they were abandoned by the Western Powers to the Russian counter-revolution, they fell, and the heritage of the long emancipatory struggle which culminated in 1918 was destroyed. Today, bureaucratic absolutism extends into the heart of Europe and menaces the Western and the Mediterranean worlds.

IV

No democracy can survive if it is not on guard against itself. If the mechanism of democracy is confused with the spirit of democracy, if the preservation of the mechanism is considered more important than the preservation of the spirit, then democracy is doomed. Universal suffrage was one of the means of establishing democracy. But it also released the three greatest popular movements known to history, movements which were tyrannical in spirit, as all movements of homogeneous masses will always be, and a deadly menace to democracy itself—namely Clericalism, Nationalism, and Socialism. In moderate Socialism—in Continental Social Democracy and in the British Labour Movement—a somewhat precarious balance between the autocratic and the democratic spirit was achieved. But this dichotomy was a fatal weakness when, as in Russia, Italy, and Germany, moderate Socialism was attacked by a resolute external enemy having at his disposal all the allurements, promises, and eschatological expectations of pure and, therefore, autocratic, Socialism.

Every *pure* system is autocratic and tends towards universalism. Those who serve what they believe to be a pure

system in which mankind can alone find happiness are obviously bound to make it prevail throughout the world. That is why some of the most abominable tyrants who ever afflicted mankind have been sincerely convinced that they are mankind's benefactors. Doctrinal purity is needed for the protection of transcendental religion, but it is deadly in the secular realm. Every *one* political system is tyrannical. Democracy perishes when it becomes a *system*. "Pure" democracy will destroy itself or allow itself to be destroyed. A *system* conducive to justice, freedom, peace, and happiness could be no system at all, or at least no *pure* system, but a medley of the systematic and unsystematic. It would be presumptuous to regard any secular order as conforming more to God's will than any other, but that order is the best in which God's will can best be done. And it will surely be found that such an order will be made up of different systems, that, in many respects, it will lack system, that it will have anomalies and inconsistencies, and yet will be an organic order.

A pure poison is deadly, but poison in small doses may be medicinal. A dose of Socialism will be beneficial to any society. Whether the dose which is being administered to Great Britain at the time of writing is an overdose or not, is a question beyond the scope of the present study.

Counter-revolution may transform society in as radical a fashion as revolution and will employ the same mechanism. The revolutions and reforms of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were, in purpose at least, emancipatory. The extension of the franchise to the unpropertied, and to women, was intended to make emancipation general. It was assumed that, if all had the vote, none could be enslaved.

In his profound and comprehensive study, *Election and Representation*, Professor James Hogan writes:

"Twenty years ago it would have been the merest truism to say that democratic election means nothing if

it does not mean the full, free, and direct exercise of the vote by each and every male member of the citizen body, coupled with the right of freely nominating candidates and freely appealing to the electorate on their behalf in speech and writing. These were the basic conditions of democratic election and representation which might be limited in practice on this point, but which were in principle universally accepted or subject to limitation only where their exercise could be legally shown in particular cases to be tantamount to an incitement to commit a penal offence.

“But in the intervening years we have had ample opportunity of discovering that between free voting and the formality of casting votes there can be all the difference in the world. It is now a matter of common knowledge that in the setting of lawlessness or dictatorship, there is nothing to prevent the modes of election and representation from being used by revolutionary or dictatorial ruling groups to mask a calculated compulsion of the electorate. This compulsion is commonly enforced by an elaborately legalised system of regimentation as soon as the revolutionary régime has sufficiently established itself to be able to lay aside the weapon of open terrorism.

“The growth of totalitarianism, in whatever guise it may present itself, has had the effect of posing the question of freedom of election and representation in a manner that would have been unthinkable to Europeans of the nineteenth century. The pioneers of the totalitarian ideologies claiming democratic inspiration and ancestry contemplated, it is true, a transitional period of dictatorship during which the democratic freedoms would have to be suspended; but even so, it was always supposed that with the emergence of the classless, stateless society the democratic freedoms would at length come into their own. . . . Moreover, even by the most ardent and ruthlessly logical of nineteenth-century revolutionaries this grand finale was thought of as something which would take place within a measurable period of time; it was

not, as it is nowadays, something to be projected into the indefinite future. What nobody in the nineteenth century, not even Marx, foresaw as a possibility was that the one-party State would establish itself in *permanent* dictatorship over the whole field of personal and national life." ¹

One of the principal demands of the European emancipatory movement was the demand for land reform. In the countries that made up the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the new governments, no matter what their political complexion, had, in some measure, to give way before this demand. It was assumed (though not always with full regard for the economic consequences) that land-reform would, by extending peasant-ownership, extend political liberty to a class which had been left behind in the emancipatory struggle.

The Russian *March Revolution* was emancipatory in this sense. The franchise was extended to all and the land passed to the peasantry. It was impossible for the men who made the *October Revolution* to alienate the peasants by denying them the ownership of the land. It did, through the new Constitution, proclaim the principle that the land belonged to the State, but the principle could not be put into practice until much later—when the dictatorship was strong enough to do so. That dictatorship, which was to have established the classless State, established a new class, the Communist bureaucracy. Under the Tsars, the bureaucrats and not the landowners were the principal instrument of autocratic rule. The Communist dictatorship was reactionary in the sense that it was bureaucratic and autocratic, and much more so than the Tsarist dictatorship. It extended the bureaucratic administration to the peasantry and, by eliminating the landowners, it subjected the peasantry

¹ James Hogan, *Election and Representation* (Cork University Press), p. 293.

to a domination which was much more autocratic than the one they had previously known, for some, at least, of the landowners had been liberal in their outlook and even in their practice, while the most autocratic landowners were not as autocratic as the new bureaucrats.

The rule of the last Tsars was autocratic, but hardly absolutist, for there was a Duma, there were constitutional and juridical restraints. But under the Communist dictatorship there are none. If we examine the political system which the Soviet Union has imposed on Central and Eastern Europe today, we shall find that it is bureaucratic and absolutist, or is rapidly becoming so. The counter-revolution has been most successful in Yugoslavia, where, as we have seen, the political, social, and economic order reproduces the existing Russian order.

The bureaucratic absolutism of Yugoslavia is intensely unpopular, although it commands the fanatical devotion of a minority. It cannot maintain itself except by terrorism. It claims to be progressive, but is, in reality, static. When certain changes, which are progressive in appearance but are subordinated to the one purpose of consolidating the dictatorship, have been accomplished, no further changes are possible. It is an illusion to suppose that bureaucratic absolutism, as in Russia or Yugoslavia, are, or can be, "progressive." The changes which have been made in Great Britain during the last ten years are much more radical, much more in the nature of "progress" (whether for good or ill) than the changes made during the same period in the Soviet Union, despite purges and drastic administrative measures, and despite the crises which are more intractable in a bureaucratic absolutism than in any other order. It is questionable whether bureaucratic absolutism is an order at all. It is certainly not an organic order, but rather in the nature of a frozen anarchy. It is said by idealistic exponents of the Russian system that,

whereas "Capitalism" is periodically threatened by crises, Communism knows no crises. The truth is that, whereas "Capitalist" countries are indeed afflicted by crises, these crises are overcome. They are largely their own cure. But the Soviet Union is in a state of permanent crisis. Bureaucratic absolutism is not a crisis solved, but a crisis stabilised. As its supreme purpose is to perpetuate itself and to spread over the world, it perpetuates the condition of crisis and threatens the world with that condition. Today we see how France and other countries are able to overcome their crises in so far as they are subjected to the influence of the United States, and unable to overcome their crises in so far as they are subjected to the influence of the Soviet Union. The essential purpose of American foreign policy is to end the European crisis. The essential purpose of Russian foreign policy is to intensify and sustain the European crisis until it becomes a universal catastrophe.

Bureaucratic absolutism resorts to protective mimicry, calling itself "democratic," "progressive," and many other things it is not. It demonstratively employs the mechanism of constitutional democracy, thus making itself appear acceptable to the free communities of the world. It does this with much success. Many people, especially the immature, are not only deceived, but are also fascinated and bereft of their critical faculties. And it is easy to destroy democracy by the crafty and determined use of democracy's mechanism.

Those methods of bureaucratic absolutism which appear to be democratic will, when critically examined, be found undemocratic and destructive of whatever may be left of democracy. It is commonly believed that elections have been held, and will continue to be held, under that absolutism. But such elections are not elections at all, except in so far as the system is still incomplete. Elections were held in Hungary during the year 1946, and again in 1947. They

were, on the whole, free in 1946, less so in 1947, but they were elections nevertheless. They gave a distorted picture of public opinion, but they were not without validity.

When the system is complete, as it is in Russia and in Yugoslavia, and as it was in the Third Realm, the elections cease to be elections. What, then, are they?

They are demonstrative and acclamatory musters. They reveal the difference, "all the difference in the world," as Professor Hogan remarks, "between free voting and the formality of casting votes." Bureaucratic absolutism not only allows, it *exacts*, a maximum extension of the franchise so as to have as large an electorate as possible and to display as large a number of ostensible supporters as possible (though it may, as a special precaution, disfranchise prospective opponents). The electorate is, as it were, on *parade* when polling day comes, a parade that has the character of a muster and inspection. The voting is not an act expressing a free opinion, but an act of submission to the omnipotent State.

The candidates are not representatives of the people. They are the agents of the bureaucracy. They are nominated not by the people, or by constituents, but by the bureaucracy itself. Indeed, no one is allowed to be a candidate who might conceivably be a representative of the people. The people are, in fact, denied representation. While some may be formally disfranchised, in effect all are disfranchised.

The "general will of the people," as Professor Hogan points out, is "a pseudo-reality invented by Rousseau."¹ This "pseudo-reality" is adopted by bureaucratic absolutism and becomes a euphemism for a *reality*, the will of the ruling oligarchy. The people of every country have many wills. In a last analysis there are as many wills as there are people, those of the children being particularly articulate and in-

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 113.

tractable. Candidates returned by the wills of the voters in a democracy represent, or ought to represent, the interests of the nation as a whole. But these interests are by no means identical with the sum-total of the wills that make up public opinion in that nation. Under bureaucratic absolutism, the electorate is compelled by terrorism, by propaganda, and by the exclusion of any alternative, to perform an act of collective acclamation.

This act is a public act, for, given a sufficiently well-established system of espionage and terrorism, there can be no secrecy. In Belgrade there is an official spy who is responsible for the political opinions of everyone in each block of flats. Every street has its spies. If the authorities find that local attendance at *parade*, as we have called it, is unsatisfactory, or that there are persons who have ventured to express dissatisfaction with the candidate (by spoiling their ballot papers, or leaving them unmarked), it becomes a simple matter to arrest so many suspects that some, if not most, genuine dissidents will be included. Even if the suspicions are false, the arrests, the executions, and other penalties will have the effect of terrorising all.

Just as there are no elections, there is no Parliament, no representative assembly, under bureaucratic absolutism. The duty of the "candidates" who are returned to the house of legislature by public acclamation is acclamation and no more. They only meet to accept without criticism and to applaud the decrees ostensibly submitted, but in reality promulgated, by the Government which is but the oligarchic central executive of the bureaucracy. It is their function not to represent the people *vis à vis* the oligarchy, but to represent the oligarchy *vis à vis* the people, to study the reports of spies, watch trends of opinion, spread official propaganda, and manipulate the terror, thus controlling the people for the Government and not the Government for the people.

V

As long as Germany was strong, she set a limit to Russian westward expansion. A strong Russia sets a limit on German eastward expansion. Today, Germany is weak. But potentially she is strong. How can Russia take advantage of that present weakness and turn that potential strength to her own use? Russia can, with relative ease, dominate the countries between the Arctic and the Greek border as long as she remains strong, but to dominate all Germany would not be easy even if Western Germany were not under the control of the Western Powers. To "solve the German problem" in her own way, Russia must have access to Germany. That is to say, she must retain control not only of the countries between herself and Germany, but also of the Central European industrial area and of the Danube, so as to have a permanent industrial and operational base against Germany and against the Western Powers.

The "German problem" is the principal problem confronting Russia in Europe. It is also the principal problem still confronting the Western Powers in Europe. Two world wars have failed to "solve" it. A German-Russian coalition would be the end, not only of the Western Continental countries as independent States, but also of Great Britain as a Great Power, perhaps even as an independent State, and of the United States as a Power in Europe and in the Middle East. A German-Russian coalition could be made of a strong Russia and a relatively weak Germany, in which case Germany would be a vassal-ally, the chief amongst several vassal-allies. Such a coalition could also be made between a strong Russia and a strong Germany who will, as in 1939, have composed their differences in common hostility to the western world. Against this prospective danger to the West, there are two possible remedies:

First, a coalition between the Western Powers and

Germany. Such a coalition would be a sure defence against Russia, but it might well be drawn into an offensive against Russia by Germany, who would, in any case, strive to recover her eastern territories and eliminate the menace to her security—and not to hers alone—in Central Europe. The probable result would be the re-emergence of the “German problem,” and of Germany as the greatest military power in Europe.

Secondly, the restoration to independence of the countries between the Arctic and the Greek border. At the present time this restoration may not be feasible, although, in his message to Congress on the 19th of December 1947, President Truman emphasised the importance of restoring “normal” trade between Eastern and Western Europe. “Normal” trade cannot be restored as long as the Eastern European countries are not independent, because there can be no “normal” trade with the Soviet Union, which is a closed economy and cannot be anything else. All regions that are included in the Union are excluded from international trade. There is, at present, some trade between the Eastern European countries and the outside world, for those countries must live—even if only for Russia—but as, in course of time, they are integrated in the Russian economy, their trade with the outside world must diminish.¹ The Russian economic order is incompatible with free trade. No free-trading country can be part of that order.

That the countries of the *Middle Zone*, as I have ventured to call it, be restored to independence, is essential to the security of the West, for the alternative is the development by Russia of the Central European industrial area and of the Danubian countries until she becomes a great military Power *in* Europe. She would then be in a much more

¹ The territories which receded from the Russian Empire—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Eastern Poland—with a total population of about 25,000,000 (in 1938) thereafter contributed more to international trade as their own economies recovered, than the whole of the Soviet

favourable position than she is now either to force or to attract Germany into an armed coalition with herself. It is as true today as it was in the past, that whoever is master of Central Europe can become master of all Europe.

The "Federal idea" which is being widely propagated calls for more scepticism than it is receiving. Successful federation requires a central executive, an overriding vital interest, and a common sentiment. Unnatural federation means not harmony but the exacerbation of existing antagonisms, not unity but disunity, not peace but conflict. A Federal Europe would contain so many incompatibilities of interest and sentiment that it would be more likely to aggravate European disunity than to bring European unity about. And it would make Germany the master. A western armed coalition is necessary for defence. A certain integration of Western European economy is necessary for defence and recovery. But a western federation could hardly fail to exacerbate the profound differences of manner, outlook and character between the western nations, to engender

Union with a total population of about 170,000,000, as the following figures show :

	Percentage of World Trade	
	1929	1938
Finland	0.49	0.78
Estonia	0.09	0.12
Latvia	0.18	0.19
Lithuania	0.09	0.16
Poland (40 per cent.)	0.38	0.40
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1.23	1.65
Soviet Union	1.35	1.10

The total trade of Great Britain with these territories and with the Soviet Union was as follows :

	1928-30		1936-38	
	Average Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Receded territories	24.5	7.1	33.7	11.7
Soviet Union	27.4	4.4	22.5	4.4

v. Raud : *The Smaller Nations in the World's Economic Life* (pub. King and Staples, London).

new conflicts, and to weaken them for the task of common defence.

A federation of the *Middle Zone* would also be afflicted by internal antagonisms—as between Poles and Czechs, for example. But the overriding interest is vital and threefold, namely the German menace, the Russian menace, and the combined German and Russian menace. All the nations of the *Middle Zone* have experienced the menace in its acutest form, all have suffered exceedingly under German, Russian, or German-Russian aggression and oppression. But the differences between them are not nearly as great as the differences between the western nations. As I have tried to show, the nations of the *Middle Zone* are fundamentally democratic and individualistic, even if they have not always been so in practice. All of them are mainly peasant countries. Only in Czechoslovakia is there a relatively large industrial population. All look towards the West for precept, example, and mutual defence. If there is one name more than any other that represents an ideal amongst the nations of the *Middle Zone*, it is the name of Gladstone. Whatever respect the Germans ever earned in countries of the *Middle Zone*, it was forfeited in the Second World War. The great and, at times, affectionate veneration which Russia could claim amongst the Serbs and Bulgarians has vanished. All the nations of the *Middle Zone* have come to consider themselves superior in their love of liberty and justice, of law and of the European tradition, to their great adversaries and oppressors. All look back with pride to their national and democratic revolution, which has been crushed by the mighty, twofold counter-revolution, as the source of their association with the West.

The differences between the nations of the *Middle Zone* are much smaller today than they were before the war. The Germans and the Russians have been great levellers.

Native bureaucracies and ruling or privileged classes and groups have disappeared. The bureaucracies established by the Russians are hated, ruthless, lawless, and alien.

The time is not ripe, perhaps, to consider more than tentatively the manner in which the nations of the *Middle Zone* could combine—in a loose confederation perhaps, or perhaps in three confederations (a northern, a central, and a southern) *en liaison* with one another. Such a confederation, embracing about 120,000,000 Christian people, ranking amongst the most industrious, intelligent, patriotic, and high spirited in the world, would, if solidly established, solve the German and Russian “problems,” and give all Europe enduring security. Without a *Middle Zone* of independent but associated countries, there can be no Europe—and no enduring *Pax Britannica*.

It would be beyond my scope to enlarge on this subject of a Central and Eastern European confederation, for I am concerned not with a distant (though perhaps not too distant) future, but with a critical analysis of the recent past and of the present. But before returning to the Russian and German “problems,” I would point out that the idea of such a confederation is not new, and that the Russian menace, of which the statesmen of the Victorian age were fully aware, of which statesmanship in our age is, at last, becoming aware, was deeply considered by eminent statesmen and publicists in Central, Western, and Eastern Europe.

The idea of a *Middle Zone* was studied in various forms and with varying degrees of elaboration by William Pitt, Kossuth, Mackinder, Masaryk, and others. The great Polish patriot, General Sikorski, believed in a European federation, it is true, but he also believed in

“an initial confederation of Poland and Czechoslovakia to which Poland desired to see added the three Baltic States and, in time, possibly Hungary, Rumania, Greece, and Yugoslavia.”

President Roosevelt expressed the opinion that General Sikorski's "plan" was

"of great importance not only from the viewpoint of general security, but as a basis of local security and understanding regionally conceived."¹

To appreciate the political sagacity of Masaryk, the first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, there is no need to take him too seriously as a philosopher. Other statesmen, Field-Marshal Smuts, for example, and Balfour, have also written philosophical works which would never have been heard of if their authors had not been renowned in the world of affairs. Masaryk's memorandum, *The New Europe*,² a masterly analysis of the German and Russian "problems," should be studied afresh by all who would give some thought to the *Middle Zone*. As this memorandum is fairly familiar, I would call attention to the writings of another European, the Rumanian, Sturdza, who lived during the last century and prophetically foresaw the Russian challenge as it is revealed today. That challenge, he wrote

"is the real issue that engages all the nations of the world.

¹ v. Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory* (p. 19). Ciechanowski was Polish Ambassador in Washington. His book is an important contribution to the study of relations between Poland, Russia, and the Western Allies during the war. I should have quoted extensively from it in the chapter on *The Polish Catastrophe* had I seen it in time (it was published in the United States).

² Masaryk's memorandum suffers from one serious weakness. It was issued in October 1918 but written in 1917 when the Russian Revolution was still democratic. Masaryk greatly underrated the dangers of Pan-Slavism (though not of Pan-Germanism) as an instrument of national expansion. He believed that the Slav countries could form a federation including Russia and that Russia herself could become a decentralised federation in which the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and so on, would enjoy a large measure of independence. He did not foresee that Russia would be centralised under the domination of one Party and that this Party would strive to extend its domination over the world. Masaryk had that optimism and a certain légèreté which is characteristic of Czech political thought. Nevertheless, his memorandum is important because it demands a "Reorganisation of Eastern Europe" (Part III). On the subject of Marxism, Masaryk is trenchant and sometimes almost profound.

The struggle is of great actuality. We are in the middle of it. Very often we find that the disunited nations of Europe are weak and cannot effectively oppose the well-planned Russian drive which is directed by a single will. Many observers cannot but ask, who will have the final victory?"

Sturdza himself does not doubt the ultimate outcome:

"The moral and material power of Europe is so great that the defeat of those who try to destroy its stature which has been built up by the continuous co-operation of the human spirit is certain."

Twice has this prophecy been fulfilled—in 1918 and in 1945.

Writing of Eastern Europe, Sturdza foretold with exactitude what has happened in our own day.

"Many"—he might have said all—"are threatened with the loss of their individuality and of their ties with the West and with western civilisation, only to be absorbed in the Russian ocean. As the Rumanians are but an island in this ocean, it is of vital interest for them to examine the situation in good time, to be continuously on the look out so that they will always be in a position to discern which is the best course to take in an endeavour to repel the menace.

"The present time is appropriate for a dispassionate appraisal of the situation. The struggle continues, but is conducted by indirect and concealed methods. We are in a moment of relative calm. It is like the time before the battle when the combatants draw their breath to throw themselves against each other with renewed vigour. Let us, therefore, examine the two sides and Rumania's position in the conflict, so that we may draw such conclusions as may serve as beacons for the road to be followed, and that we should never falter. 'Rumanian policy' must become a reality and not only an empty phrase used as bait by outsiders for the ignorant

and for the weaklings who cannot see their own interest."

Of Russian plans, Sturdza wrote that, to obtain a clear picture of them,

"it must be stated briefly how Russia in the last 150 years, up to the Crimean War, gained immense territories in Europe, either by taking up arms or by devious machinations, always at the expense of other States, and not seldom by swallowing up whole countries. This territorial aggrandisement was achieved through a conscious and systematic policy pursued with great patience. Where the circumstances were not altogether favourable, Russia kept her ultimate plans in abeyance, and contented herself with a province, as in the case of Bessarabia, which weakened the importance and the power to resist of the country concerned. After being beaten by the Turks in 1711, when Peter the Great was forced to sign the Pruth treaty, Russia began a gradual and steady growth to power. The Crimean War arrested this growth for a time. Less than twenty years later, however, this great nation resumed its drive on an even bigger scale and with more determination. So far it was the liberation of the Christians from the Turkish yoke, today it is the rights of the Russian nation to dominate the other Slav peoples, Russian and non-Russian alike, and such other non-Slav peoples as the Russians have decided to include in their orbit. Indeed, they claim the right to divide other countries according to their own good will, their lights and their interests.

"More recently, a whole series of books and studies have appeared expounding the fundamental and immutable dogma of the policy of the Great Russian Empire. They are meant to direct the public opinion of Russia and of such countries as are to come within the Russian sphere, either now or in the near or distant future."

One of the authors of such books was I. N. Danielevski, of whom Sturdza wrote:

“He establishes in the first place that in the same way in which Russia is a foreign organism in Europe, Europe does not exist for Russia either geographically or historically. To the European civilisation with its individualistic society Russia opposes her own anti-individualistic society, untouched by the so-called civilising progress of Europe. The Pan-Slav idea is, for Danielevski, a guiding divine principle at one with the Church, and from the national and political point of view ranks higher than *liberty*. It is more valuable than knowledge or any other moral or material good. He further expounds the idea that Russia cannot abandon her thousand-year-old organisation built up by so many sacrifices and so much bloodshed spent in civilising the ragged Kokand, Samarkand and Khiva, and those millions of nomadic Mongolians. She can never forsake her mission to liberate the Slav people, as well as those who are under great Slav influence like the Greeks, the Rumanians and the Hungarians, from the intellectual serfdom of the Western civilisation. From this argument Danielevski draws the conclusion that the Eastern Question is essentially a Russian one inextricably bound up with the Slav World and with the Orthodox Church, both of which in his mind are but external expressions of one and the same thing. He points out that if the Rumanians and the Greeks are not Slavs they feed upon Slavdom through their Church, and that they have been misguided by the Western European countries to maintain their national identity and thus become the tools of those countries against Slavdom. He substantiates his contention by condemning the adoption, by the Rumanians, of the Latin alphabet and the widespread fashion among Rumanians to replace words of Slav origin by their French correspondent although the latter are very often unsuitable for the spirit of the Rumanian language. . . .

“In Danielevski’s opinion Russia must strive to solve the Eastern Question by occupying Constantinople and by creating a Slav federation under the Russian ægis. There

is no other nation that can hold Constantinople without difficulty but Russia, since she is the only country which has real need to have it in the interest of the Slav and orthodox world. For all the other countries it becomes a burden as it prevents Russia from moving freely, thereby provoking Russian antagonism and enmity. The reconstruction in Eastern Europe of the Greek-Byzantine Empire is harmful to the Russian interests because such a creation would lead inevitably to a political dualist formation in the Balkans which would favour the Greeks and the Rumanians. Danielevski concludes that the Russian Slav world will soon have to fight the rotting old European world in order to bring about the Russo-Slav Federation destined to stand up to the whole of Europe. . . .

“But even before Danielevski, as long ago as 1830 John Kollar eulogised on Pan-Slavia, the country of all the Slavs stretching over mountains and valleys from Athos to Triglav and Pomerania, from the Silesian fields to those of Cossovo, from Constantinople to Petersburg, from Ladoga to Astrachan, from Kazakstan to Ragusa, from Lake Balaton to the Baltic Sea, from Prague to Kiev and Moscow, from Kamchatka to Japan and from the Ural Mountains to the Carpathians. Filled with enthusiasm Kollar asks: ‘What will we, the Slavs, be in a hundred years? What then will Europe be?’ And he gives the answer. ‘In a hundred years time the Slav way of life will have extended its empire over all.’ . . .

“The ideas espoused by these Russian writers are not the hallucinations of fanatics devoid of any bearing on reality. These men have merely given a well-ordered and clear expression to the current political ideas of the Russian leaders whether they be statesmen responsible for the framing of Russia’s policy or professional political agitators in the pay of the Russian Government. . . .”¹

Karl Marx himself was severely critical of the Pan-Slav movement as an instrument of Russian expansion. He

¹ Dom Sturdza, *Europe, Russia, and Rumania*, “Revista Noua,” Bucharest, 1890.

maintained that unless the Slav nations enjoyed complete independence, Russia's western frontier would run "from Danzig or Stettin to Trieste"¹—as it does today, from Stettin to Trieste.

Attempts to promote a confederation of the *Middle Zone* were made privately in London during the Second World War by Polish, Czechoslovak, Rumanian, and Yugoslav politicians and diplomats, but received no encouragement. An attempt was made by the Polish Government and the Czech Provisional Government in London to create a basis for a future association, which was to be closer than an alliance, between the Polish and Czechoslovak Republics. But the Czechoslovak Provisional Government broke off the discussions at the request of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union will always oppose unity amongst nations not under her control, but will impose unity upon them as soon as they are under her control. Today, three countries of the *Middle Zone* (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have been incorporated in the Soviet Union. The others (excepting Greece) are dominated by the Union. But in exercising this domination, the Union has, perhaps inevitably, promoted a certain political, economic, and administrative uniformity upon which it may be possible to found the structure of a future confederation of independent countries.

VI

True to her principle of dividing so that she may rule and uniting so that her rule may endure, the Soviet Union is promoting the unity of the German nation.

When the Second World War came to an end, the Germans were cheated of their own revolution. Some leading National Socialists were tried and executed or imprisoned. Many of their followers were penalised by being deprived of reput-

¹ Karl Marx, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. I, p. 155.

able employment, and of these many found less reputable but more lucrative employment in the Black Market. But the retribution which a people would have exacted, ruthlessly and with German thoroughness, for massacres, tortures, oppression, and catastrophic defeat, was averted by the victorious Powers whose own people had suffered atrociously from the same evildoers.

These Powers inflicted two spurious revolutions on the German nation. The one, in the Eastern Zone, was like a caricature of the National Socialist Revolution of the year 1933; the other, in the three Western Zones, a caricature of the Socialist and Democratic Revolution of the year 1918.

The Western Powers, especially Great Britain, attempted the moral as well as the political conversion of the Germans, who were expected to feel guilty for what they had done. Journalists and broadcasters went to Germany in search of the contrite heart, but failed to find it. Pedagogues were sent to "re-educate" the Germans by teaching them "democracy."

The trial at Nuremberg of the leading National Socialists as "war-criminals" was conducted with indubitable fairness, except that neither the prisoners nor their counsels were allowed to question the questionable competence of the court. But the Powers who instigated the trial were judges in their own case, and the distinction between judge and prosecution, although formally maintained, was without reality. International law, which is non-coercive and has for its *persona* the State and not the individual, was misused to punish individuals for infractions of treaties negotiated between States. The maxim, *nulla poena sine lege*, which is inviolable under the Rule of Law, was violated.¹

¹ v. H. A. Smith, *The Crisis in the Law of Nations*; v., also, *Nuremberg in The Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1946.

The attempt to achieve the moral elevation of the Germans by convincing them of their own guilt failed as it was bound to fail. The attempt to achieve their political elevation by converting them to "democracy" also failed as it was bound to fail. Democracy can be learnt, but it cannot be taught. It can be learnt only by long practice in the course of generations. Not until it has become both an instinctive and a conscious habit rooted in a tradition can it be a reality. The assumption that democracy is the only commendable political system is not true and not even democratic.

A political system must be workable. It must have some capacity for survival. It cannot survive if it is not suited to the character of the nation. German democracy, theoretically so excellent, was the negative determinant of its own destruction, as I have tried to explain in the first chapter. It was not overthrown by a minority of the German nation, but by a large majority. Nearly half the German electorate voted for Hitler in 1932, when the last free elections were held. The Nationalists, who had been consistently hostile to democracy, supported Hitler and gave him his majority in the Reichstag. The Communists were as hostile to democracy as the National Socialists. The Democrats, a large Party after the Revolution and disposing of a large and excellent press, shrank to almost nothing in the late 'twenties. The Centre Party supported a democracy that guaranteed complete freedom of religious worship, but whether it was democratic by nature is doubtful.¹ The Social Democrats were certainly democratic, despite their Socialism and the bureaucratic structure of their party. The vast majority of the German nation was, therefore, in favour, and strongly so, of a despotic

¹ It was probably so in the Rhineland, but the affiliated ultramontane Bavarian People's Party was hardly democratic.

system.¹ What system is best suited to the Germans would be hard to say. They must be left to work out their own system. Probably it will be, if not despotic, yet “authoritarian”—an *Obrigkeitsstaat*—and will derive its vitality from a highly developed system of local government.

It would be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose that Europe to have coherence must be exclusively democratic. Europe cannot be Europe without a variety of systems. Only under an unnatural tyranny, such as the National Socialists or the Communists would impose, could Europe be uniform. To suppose that democracy or socialism, or both, are more “Christian” than other political systems is more than a mistake. It is a fundamental misconception. It is a mistake to which certain liberals are peculiarly inclined, as Dostoyevsky pointed out:

“European Liberals in general, and even our own liberal dilettanti, often mix up the final results of Socialism with those of Christianity.”²

Dostoyevsky remarked, with his customary insight, that

¹ This is clearly shown by the following figures: Results of the elections for the Reichstag (five principal parties, in 1000's):

		Nov. 6, 1932	Mar. 5, 1933
For despotic form of government	{ Nat. Socialists .	11,737	17,772
	{ Nationalists .	2,959	3,137
	{ Communists .	5,980	4,848
		<u>20,676</u>	<u>25,757</u>
For democratic form of government	{ Centre (incl. Bav. People's Party) .	5,336	5,499
	{ Soc. Democrats .	7,248	7,182
		<u>12,584</u>	<u>12,681</u>
Total Poll .		35,472	39,472

These figures show the declining opposition of the Germans to the menace of despotism.

² *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book II, Ch. 6

“Socialism is not merely the labour question, it is before all things the atheistic question, the question of the form taken by atheism today, the question of the tower of Babel built without God, not to mount to heaven from earth but to set up heaven on earth.”¹

These words apply with even greater force to Communism, which is but the logical consequence of Socialism. Communists are Socialists who take Socialism seriously. It is one of the dangers of every political doctrine that those who support it may take it seriously, especially if they are Germans. Modern attempts to identify political systems with Christianity are an *attack* on Christianity, perhaps the most serious attack ever made.

The Germans, in their tendency to idealise everything British, and encouraged by British propaganda, which during the war tried to promote spurious revolution in Germany as in those other countries upon which it turned its doctrinal hose-pipe, expected something better than National Socialism. They welcomed the British and American armies as liberators for this reason (amongst other reasons). Instead, they received political instruction that had no relevance to any German, or other, reality. While the British and American administrations were incomparably more civilised than the National Socialist administration, they left the Germans less liberty. The Germans at least practised National Socialism—or opposed it, at terrible risk and sacrifice. But the Germans were deprived of the possibility both of practising and of opposing the “democracy” which the Western Allies imposed. The Germans, therefore, could not possibly have learnt this same “democracy” even if they had wished to.

Disillusionment converted many Anglophiles into Anglophobes. In any case, the sense of inferiority with which

¹ *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book I, Ch. 5.

the Germans are so often credited no longer exists *vis à vis* Great Britain or the United States.

The Russians were more realistic in their treatment of the Germans. What they did was at least intelligible. At least it had, and still has, a clear purpose. The German official—including the trade union official—has no loyalty in the Western Zones, not because he is disloyal, but because there is nothing he can be loyal to. He cannot be loyal to the German State because no German State exists. Nor can he be loyal to the British, American, or French States, for these claim no loyalty from him, except to the irrelevance which is officially termed “democracy.”

But in the Eastern Zone the German official is a part, a humble, even a humiliated part, but nevertheless a part of a State, the Russian State. He has an intelligible function. He may dislike that function. He may even oppose the Russian State—indeed, many Germans are doing so, with tenacity and courage. But in the Western Zone there is nothing even to oppose.

The Germans are convinced that there will be a Third World War. And when we say the Germans, we do not mean many, or even most, Germans, but all Germans who give the matter a thought. Indeed, the question Germans ask is not: “Is another war coming?” but “When is the war coming?”

The Germans know that things will not remain as they are, that the structure of Europe and the moral order in Europe must change. They know that a gigantic conflict is in progress between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, and they know that this conflict cannot be static, that it must, sooner or later, be resolved one way or the other. They see that the Western Powers are on the defensive, a rather weak defensive in fact, while the Soviet Union is on the offensive. The Soviet Union fights in France, Italy, and Greece, but the Western Powers do not fight in

Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland, or, for that matter in Eastern Germany.

The Germans may not know what "democracy" is, but they know what war and revolution are. They know more about these than their would-be "re-educators" do, and they know that war and revolution are of immediate relevance, whereas "democracy" is irrelevant. They see that Russia is waging a war and conducting a revolution—and that the Western Powers are all the time suing for peace. The Germans observe that the *Third International* or *Comintern* is a reality, although it ceased to exist officially, while the *Second International* is unreal, although it exists officially. Behind the *Comintern* there is the whole might of the Soviet Union and of her vassals, whereas behind the *Second International* there is nothing.

The Russian administration of Central and Eastern Germany is terroristic, just as Hitler's was. Russia retains millions of German prisoners in a condition of extreme wretchedness, releasing only those men who are so decrepit that many return to their German homes only to die. She has dismantled factories far beyond the need of "disarmament" and has taken away plant, rolling stock, rails and sleepers, agricultural machinery, cattle, and foodstuffs. She has abducted German engineers, skilled workmen, and even schoolboys. Millions of men, women, and children have wandered westwards, thousands have perished on the roads or in the overcrowded trains.

The Germans believe that the West is more civilised than the East, but they are growing sceptical about the virtues of civilisation and are beginning to esteem certain barbarian virtues. After all, there is a chance for the enterprising individual in the Eastern Zone, despite the barbarism. The Russians talk about "de-nazification" and occasionally hang a "war criminal," but they will accept National Socialists as technicians who will be useful in preparing for war.

They need the "bourgeois Nazis." They also need the "proletarian Nazis" (many of whom were Communists before), just as Hitler needed them to promote the disintegration of the old organised masses and to form the new organised masses. The old "proletarian Nazis" are becoming the new Communists. They are the most ruthless and the most servile of terrorists—the best terrorists, in fact. They, above all others, respond to discipline, if it is severe enough; to leadership, if it is strong enough; and to the martial spirit, if it is aggressive enough.

Multitudes of Germans still leave the Eastern for the Western Zone. Millions would emigrate to America, Africa, indeed anywhere, if they could—anywhere, except Russia, for it is from Russia proper or Greater Russia, which extends to the heart of Germany, that they would escape. But many who wander westward, look eastward.

The Germans are aware of the preparations for war in the Eastern Zone—of the fortifications along the Elbe and Oder, of the experiments with new V-weapons, and so on. They are aware of no such preparations in the Western Zones. They cannot escape the incessant propaganda which is brutally drummed into them or cunningly insinuated by every method of overt and covert propaganda. And they understand its significance. It is all so familiar—the NKVD is but another Gestapo (employing many officials who used to serve in the Gestapo). The propaganda is almost as good as the propaganda which Dr. Goebbels used to direct. It is true that the Germans have become sceptical of all propaganda. They believe that all propaganda is lies—and who would say that they are wrong? But scepticism does not confer immunity. When there is no publicity that is not propaganda, the sense of proportion is destroyed and the most sceptical mind receives the twist which propaganda is meant to give. And even lies have their significance. The Germans do not think the British and Americans are un-

truthful, but they think that the truths the British and Americans tell have no relevance and serve no purpose, whereas the untruths disseminated by the Russians have a purpose. Truths do not matter any more. Lies do matter—lies are realities, truths are not.

Day in, day out, the Germans in the Eastern Zone hear the Western Powers denounced as capitalistic, imperialist, and bent on aggressive war. They hear how much happier life is in the Eastern than in the Western Zone. And although they know the reverse is true, propaganda has its effect. If it is not true, it may at least become true some day. The Germans hear how the Soviet Union defeated the Third Realm and liberated the German people, how she is helping the German people to build a free, prosperous, united, democratic, socialist Fatherland which will be strong and secure in close association with the Soviet Union, and how, within measurable time, the Red Flag will wave over Paris and London.

Hitler made big mistakes. The Germans blame him more for these mistakes than for his malignance, his mendacity, and his fiendishness. They are inclined to admire his cunning and to condemn him for losing the war rather than for starting it. There are, today, Germans who contend that Stalin, whose aims and methods are so similar to Hitler's, will avoid big mistakes—especially the mistake, not of starting a war, but of losing it.

The Western Powers admit that the Germans ought to have national unity and favour a decentralised German State. But the Russians, day in, day out, proclaim the unconditional necessity of a united German democratic nation with a central government. Russia can restore to Germany her eastern territories. Germans and Russians will always agree with one another over the future of Poland. A vision is being born in Germany of future war and victory, of justice (or rather what the Germans believe to be justice),

of an end to hunger, misery, and humiliation, of a mighty ally, the Soviet Union, the revolutionary Power of the First World War and the revolutionary Power of the Second, the true victor—in the Second World War and in the Third to come—the one Power that has a will and a policy, the one Power worthy of being the ally of the Germans in a war waged in common for the mastery of the world.

But what assurance has Russia that Germany will not turn against her as she did in 1941? No assurance except in such precautions as she may take. Russia needs Germany for an ally. Germany alone could not, Russia alone cannot, make herself master of the world, or even master of Western Europe. Germany, even in her prostration, is too strong to be one of many vassal-allies of Russia. She, not Russia, would become the master if the two Powers—the one great, the other potentially great—were to be allies on equal terms. Russia, to achieve her purpose, must therefore have Germany as a privileged vassal-ally, in which case Germany would be master of Europe under Russia. Russia cannot, but Germany can, administer Europe, for she has the administrative ability and can provide administrators.

So that Germany, growing strong, may not turn against her, Russia must have vassal-allies in a coalition against Germany as well as against the Western Powers. Germany, *encadré*, as it were, by Russia and dependencies, must come to terms. Germany, as well as the Western Powers, stands in the way of Russian domination, but when Russia has come to terms with her, when the alliance between the Soviet Union and its dependencies and the re-emergent, united German Socialist Republic are in coalition, with Russia as the leader of that coalition, then Russia will be master of Europe and can begin to realise her ultimate purpose, the universal domination of God-Caesar.

The Germans are Europeans and would a hundred times rather live in association with the Western Powers than

with Russia. But they must have a State of their own, and they *will* have national unity. Whatever Power, or coalition of Powers, denies them these two inexorable demands, will force the Germans into a hostile coalition. That is why Russia, with sure insight, is offering the Germans both.

Today, the Germans look forward to a future in which they will have a State, national unity, independence, and their due place in the councils of Europe. The dream of world-domination has ended in catastrophe. Only the revival of National Socialism can revive it, and only then will the Germans willingly compound with Russia. But today the Germans have a sober patriotism which gives them an underlying unity far more solid than that of the French. No country can survive without patriotism. This virtue has been ravaged by war and corrupted by the modern ideologies, but in Germany it has survived National Socialism, international Communism, and the pacifist and pseudo-democratic ideologies of the West. German patriotism has survived the impact of a catastrophic defeat which in the end may be seen, even by the Germans themselves, as better for the German future, as it certainly is for the European future.

Russia cannot win the Germans unless the Western Powers make terrible mistakes, such as the mistake made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain when he abandoned Yugoslavia to the Communists. Russia counts on the Western crisis, especially on the American crisis. She has done so ever since the Revolution. It is because of this, her expectation, that she believes in the inevitability of war, indeed in the presence of war, a latent war, indicated by a general state of conflict and by many local clashes of arms, a war which must, some day, become open and general. That is why Russia speaks of "the indivisibility of peace," meaning the universality of war—until the last decisive battle for universal domination is fought.

That is why she never deviates from her purpose. Every apparent armistice is but a truce, every *reculer* is a *reculer pour mieux sauter*. The time may come, and soon, when she will endeavour to placate and to appease. That will be the time when the Western Powers are likely to make their most terrible mistake. It may be that Russia is right in expecting a Western crisis, indeed, there has never been, and never will be, a human society that is secure against crises. The Western crisis will also be the time when a terrible mistake will be made, in so far as the crisis will appear to be a matter of far greater urgency than the over-riding menace.

It is for these reasons that Russian foreign policy has so astonishing a constancy and consistency, though not astonishing if the doctrinal foundation of the faith in God-Caesar is understood. The missionaries of that faith are organised in the Communist International, which has never ceased to exist since the October Revolution: the Communist Parties of the World, centrally directed and homogeneous, an international militant and proselytising organisation, soldiers and terrorists as well as missionaries, outposts, pioneers, and advance guards of the Red Army and the NKVD, owing allegiance to no country of their own, but only to the Soviet Union, and having no worship except the worship of God-Caesar, and serving no purpose except the purpose of universal domination.

Let us examine this organisation so as to point the conclusions I have indicated.

VII

The *Third* or *Communist International*, which came to be known as the *Comintern*, held its founding congress under the chairmanship of Lenin from the 2nd to the 6th of March

1919. From the beginning—even before its formal foundation—it was conceived as the *cadre* of a universal administration, each Communist Party being not only the agent of revolution but also the embryo of prospective dictatorial government in its own country. From the beginning, every existing Government that was not dominated by the Communist Party¹ was illegitimate, according to Communist doctrine, and all its supporters rebels or traitors against the people. It was not a usurpation which the Communists were attempting, but a removal of those who had usurped the natural rights of men—not a usurpation, therefore, but a restoration.

The Russian State, which was but the microcosm (although a large one) of the future macrocosm, emerged from the civil wars triumphant though ruined and isolated. In 1922 Turkey defied the Western Powers, drove the Greeks out of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, and so brought down part of the structure erected by the peacemakers after the First World War. Russia supported Turkey throughout the struggle and the two Powers remained on friendly terms when the war was over. This did not prevent the Turks from undertaking so thorough an extermination of their Communists that today Turkey is one of the few Powers that has no *Fifth Column*, and why, although subjected to severe and constant Russian pressure, she has been spared those disasters which internal warfare has brought upon Greece. Russia made no attempt to save the Communists, for she was aware that a rupture with Turkey would have been injurious to her own security in a hostile world and that her own security was essential to the ultimate triumph of Communism. The Turks, on the other hand, knew, as they still know, that every Communist was, and is, a Russian agent. They regarded the existence of a Turkish Com-

¹ There were transient Soviet—i.e. Communist—Governments in Hungary, Bavaria, and elsewhere immediately after the First World War.

munist Party as a Russian menace to their national independence and, therefore, incompatible with friendly relations between Angora and Moscow. About this simple reasoning there could be no argument. The Turks, dour by nature and not much impressed by principles of western liberalism, could not be impressed at all, could only be driven to deeper distrust if such principles were invoked by the Russians. They and the Russians understood one another perfectly and their relations remained harmonious until the Second World War.

The Russian State is embodied in the *Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party*, the so-called *Politbureau*, which is, in effect, the combined legislature and executive of the Soviet Union.¹ The Russian State and the *Comintern* may sometimes go different ways, but they will rejoin one another later on. There can be no difference of opinion between the *Politbureau* and the *Comintern*. Communists who are sacrificed to expediency know why they are sacrificed and do not, as a rule, complain.

The *Comintern* was officially dissolved on the 10th of June 1943, as we have seen. Russia was compelled by the necessities of the war to collaborate with her allies in a cause which was her own in an immediate sense (for she was in mortal danger) but not in an ultimate sense. She was determined, no less than her allies, on the defeat of the German armed forces, but, ultimately, the allies were no less her enemies than Germany was. When they talked of peace, meaning peace of a certain kind, she had peace of a very different kind in view, nothing less, in fact, than the renewal of universal war to establish universal Com-

¹ The *Politbureau* was formally inaugurated in March 1919, but it existed as an effective authority before that time. The members elected in 1919 were Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Stalin. Of these, Stalin is the sole survivor. Lenin died a natural death. Trotsky was murdered by an emissary of Stalin's. Kamenev and Bukharin were judicially murdered.

munism. The signal for this renewal was the "dissolution" of the *Comintern*. The German armed forces were but the incidental, transitory, enemy in this war. The forces, both armed and unarmed, which defended the independence of countries fighting in the common cause were the principal and immediate enemy. The annihilation of these forces—achieved in Yugoslavia, as we have seen, and almost achieved in Greece—was but the preparation for the assault on the ultimate enemy, Great Britain and the United States.

The *Comintern*, so far from being dissolved, acquired unprecedented cohesion. This cohesion was immensely strengthened by singleness of purpose, by the zealotry of a counter-revolution unimpeded by those scruples, by that regard for honour and humanity, which gave the European revolutions at the end of the First World War their great and enduring significance. To this counter-revolution an unprecedented efficiency was imparted by the development of the wireless, which, without couriers and other slow and not always certain means of communication, made control, and consequent uniformity, as well as rapid tactical changes, possible day by day, indeed hour by hour, over long distances, for hostile armies and inaccessible mountains were no longer a barrier. The wireless was able to effect a standardisation and close co-ordination of terminology, so that the counter-revolutionary attack could, even in the most distant villages, be concentrated upon an enemy, designated by the central authority as *Fascist, anti-democratic, collaborationist, reactionary*, and so on. The *Comintern* derived a special—and potent, because initial—confidence from the success with which they found dupes who were willing to serve them at home and abroad. Such dupes, known as *Fellow Travellers*, are no new phenomenon, although there was never a time when they abounded as they do in our own time.

The Communist is constant in faith and strenuous in

perfidy, whereas the *Fellow Traveller* is neither constant in faith nor strenuous in perfidy (*neque fidei constans, neque strenuus in perfidia*¹). The Communist will lie in the service of what he regards the overriding truth. The *Fellow Traveller* neither lies nor tells the truth. The Communist, at least the non-Russian Communist, is disloyal to his own country because he is loyal to what he regards as a higher allegiance. The *Fellow Traveller* is not only incapable of loyalty but feels a deep rancour against the fundamental loyalties. Patriots like Mihailovitch are hated by the *Fellow Travellers*, who welcome every occasion to strike at loyalty itself by conniving at the murder and the defamation of men condemned for the crime of loyalty, the gravest of crimes amongst the disloyal (*damnatos fidei crimine, gravissimo inter desciscentis*²).

The period from the spring of 1943, when the *Comintern* was officially dissolved, until the present time (December 1947), was the most successful in the whole of its history. With little help from Russia, though with much from Great Britain, it made itself absolute master of Yugoslavia and Albania. By the year 1947 it was absolute master of the entire *Middle Zone* (excepting Greece) and of Central and Eastern Germany, not to speak of its prodigious achievement in China. In some countries, in Yugoslavia, for example, Russia was the master without the necessity of maintaining a garrison. The *Comintern* was able to wage a bloody and destructive war in Greece and was a power in France, Italy, and even in Great Britain. It was able to perpetuate the Chinese anarchy and was, at least until the year 1946, able to maintain an *espionage* of unprecedented efficiency in Canada and impart to the Soviet Union secrets of the highest importance relating to atomic research, radar, and submarine location.³

¹ Tacitus, *Histories*, III, 57.

² *ibid.*, I, 59.

³ *The Report of the Royal Commission* (Ottawa, Edmond Chutier, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1946).

It is the disillusioned *Fellow Traveller*, above all, who finds that the Communists are inconsistent. If the *Comintern* changes its course, it does so not because it is inconsistent but because it is consistent: because it always pursues the same end. The *Fellow Traveller* does not know what the end is, for he is a *Traveller* and no more, a *Traveller* from nowhere to nowhere, without a point of departure and without a destination. When the host, upon whom he is parasitic, suddenly changes course, he is disconcerted and, always anxious to appear high principled, complains that a principle has been betrayed, whereas the Communist changes course only in response to the dictates of principle.

It is in its German policy that the *Comintern* appeared to be most inconsistent while preserving its habitual consistency. It has been consistent even in its errors. For years it assumed that revolution was imminent everywhere, in Germany above all. When the revolutions failed to come, it made a slight concession, and assumed that revolution would come fairly soon, within a limited number of years. In 1923 the German crisis was severe enough to convince the *Comintern*—though with some dissidence, which was speedily quelled, on the part of the German Communists—that the German revolution was coming at last, really coming, this time. This conviction was not altogether unfounded, but it was the German nationalists, rather than German labour, which showed revolutionary zeal. The *Politbureau* at once applied the principle which Marx, Lenin, and Stalin had expounded, namely that a nationalist revolution must be supported if it is a menace to “imperialism.” It therefore supported both the German nationalists and the German Communists, whose revolutionary prospects it greatly overrated. The nationalists of that period were the predecessors of the National Socialists, and Russia’s German policy in 1923 was a foreshadowing of her German policy in 1939.

The Western Powers—the United States least of all—had no intention of intervening in Germany, and they certainly had no designs against the Soviet Union. But the *Comintern* reiterated its familiar conviction that they were preparing to intervene in Germany so as to make war on the Soviet Union. Its attitude towards the German nationalists became conciliatory, as it became in 1939—and is again becoming today. It denounced moderate Socialists, especially the leaders of the British Labour Party, as promoters of imperialism, “social Fascists,” “lackeys of the bourgeoisie,” and the like—as it does today, with but insignificant changes of terminology. Then, as now, it represented the Soviet Union as the sole promoter of international peace.¹ Just as the “workers” of Europe are being exhorted to resist the “aggression” of the Western Powers today, so the “workers”—especially the German “workers”—were exhorted in 1923. On the 26th of May in that year, the *International Press Correspondence*, known as *Inprecorr*, the official weekly of the *Comintern*, stated, under the headline: *World Preparations against Soviet Russia*:

“The advance guard of the German proletariat, the Communists, must fill themselves with the consciousness that we are in the presence of another world-war, even if that war is not manifested by the mobilisation of armed millions. . . .

“. . . the broad masses of the proletariat . . . must be prepared for the great battles that await us.”

On the 20th of June 1943 Karl Radek, the principal Russian publicist of that time, addressed the Executive of the *Comintern*. A German Nationalist, Schlageter, had been

¹ The following headlines are selected at random from issues of *Inprecorr* in the year 1923: *The English Campaign Against the Soviet Union* (12th May); *The Decisions of the Moscow Soviets Against the War Danger* (19th May); *The Resignation of Bonar Law and the New War Against the Soviet Union* (26th May); *The Final Attempt of the Soviet Union to Preserve the Peace* (26th May).

executed by the French for trying to blow up a bridge in the Ruhr. Radek paid him a tribute, linking his name with those of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst who, in the Napoleonic era, had "raised the German people from their abasement."¹

On the 8th of September 1923 Karl Radek wrote, in an article entitled "Hands off Germany," that "It will be the duty of the German Revolution to arm the German people." The "German Revolution" came nearly ten years later—and the German people were duly armed.

The term *National Bolshevism* was invented to signify the prospective union of German Nationalism and Communism. *National Bolshevism* was referred to in terms of approval by Karl Radek and the German Communist daily, the *Rothe Fahne*.² It was the precursor of National Socialism. Here could not fail to be an affinity—as expressed in the term *National Bolshevism*—between the Russian Revolution, after it had been transformed into a counter-revolution by Stalin, and the German Revolution, which was itself a counter-revolution, led by Hitler. In 1925, Dr. Goebbels wrote:

"Today Russia is more Russian than ever. What you call the Bolshevik International is Panslavism. . . . Russia is, in truth, the germ of a new articulation [*Gliederung*] of the States of Europe."³

This new "articulation" exists today. It comprises eleven formerly independent "States of Europe" between the Arctic and the Greek border, as well as the German and Austrian territories under Russian occupation.

In 1877 Dostoyevsky wrote:

"One thing is clear: Germany needs us even more than we think, and not for a momentary political alliance,

¹ *Imprecorr*, 1923, p. 627.

² A friendly discussion between Radek and the German Nationalist, Reventlow, appeared in the columns of the *Rothe Fahne* during the autumn of 1923.

³ *Völkischer Beobachter*, 14th of November 1925.

but for an eternal union . . . our two great nations are destined to change the face of the whole world. This is no fantasy, no proposal of human ambition: this is the course of the world.”¹

In the early 'thirties, when the “German people” were being armed by the “German Revolution,” Stalin gave Emil Ludwig, who was touring Europe in the capacity of a verbal court-painter, an interview. Stalin expressed a high opinion of the Americans, but added:

“If we sympathise with anyone, either as a nation, or with the majority of the nation, it is the Germans. The friendly feelings we have for America cannot be compared with our sympathy for the Germans.”

Emil Ludwig thereupon asserted that the Germans prefer order to freedom, indicating that they are not revolutionary, an opinion fashionable amongst the pseudo-intellectual literati of German revolutionary romanticism (of whom Emil Ludwig was one) at a time when the Germans were engaged in one of the mightiest revolutions in the history of the world. Stalin knew better and, contradicting Emil Ludwig, he pointed, without one word of disapproval, to the National Socialist Revolution which was beginning to exterminate the Jews, was sending Communists as well as Socialists to concentration camps, and preparing the Second World War.²

On the 31st of August 1939, when the “German people” had been fully armed by “German Revolution” and were about to begin the war, Mr. Molotov said, in a speech at the Fourth Special Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, that the “Pact of Non-Aggression” with Germany was

“of tremendous value, eliminating the danger of war

¹ Dostoyevsky, *Journal of an Author*, 1877.

² Emil Ludwig, *Führer Europas*, 1939 (pp. 318-19). The date of the interview with Stalin is not indicated. It would appear to have been 1934.

between Germany and the Soviet Union . . . the interests of the peoples in the Soviet Union and Germany do not lie in mutual enmity. The fact that our outlooks and political systems differ must not and cannot be an obstacle to the establishment of good political relations between both States."

On the 31st of October 1939 Mr. Molotov addressed the *Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet*. Germany and Russia had invaded Poland and divided her between themselves. "Nothing was left," said Mr. Molotov, of Poland,

"this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty. . . . Germany is in the position of a State which is striving for the earliest termination of war and for peace. . . . We have always held that a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for a durable peace in Europe." ¹

On the 1st of August 1940 Mr. Molotov addressed the *Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet* and said:

". . . the good and neighbourly relations that have been established between the Soviet Union and Germany are not based on fortuitous considerations of a transient nature, but on the fundamental interests of both the U.S.S.R. and Germany." ²

Of the United States, Mr. Molotov, in the same speech, used words closely resembling those he uses today, despite

¹ On the 18th of June 1940 Mr. Molotov received the German Ambassador in Moscow and "expressed warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of German armed forces" (documents published by the State Department, Washington: *v. The Times*, 22nd Jan. 1948).

² The full texts of the speeches from which these extracts have been taken will be found in *Soviet Peace Policy*, pub. by Lawrence, Wishart, London, 1941. There is an introduction by D. N. Pritt, K.C., who writes, *i.a.*, "Mr. Molotov's life, like his speeches, has been a process of carrying out in action the fight for Socialism—and indeed, of meaning what he says!"

the fact that since the speech was made the United States saved the Soviet Union from destruction :

“Imperialist appetites are growing . . . in the United States where there are not a few people who like to conceal their imperialist designs behind their well-advertised ‘concern’ for the interests of the entire ‘Western hemisphere,’ which these gentlemen are prepared to turn into their property.”

The *Comintern* was planning a Federation of Balkan Soviet Republics in 1923. The league of Balkan Communist Parties, known as *The Communist Balkan Federation*, was the embryo of the present coalition between the Balkan countries. The attempt to force Greece into this coalition is being made according to plans prepared a quarter of a century ago. On the 8th of September 1923 the Executive of that league issued a manifesto¹ for “the national liberation of the subjugated [Balkan] peoples” and “the fight for the realisation of the Socialist Federal Balkan Republic.” Even the term “National Liberation”—as in the “Committee of National Liberation” and the “National Liberation Front,” during the Second World War—was adumbrated in 1923. The same manifesto refers specifically to the “subjugated people of Macedonia”—in 1943 the Greek and Bulgarian Communist Parties signed the agreement at Petritsi, the terms of which I have given in the chapter on Greece, to carry out the principles enunciated in this manifesto.

On the 8th of January 1925 the Executive of the *Communist Balkan Federation* issued another manifesto, in Moscow this time, and signed by Dimitrov, the present master of Bulgaria, for “workers’ and peasants’ republics in Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, etc.,” and for their “voluntary union with the other Free Balkan Peoples in one Balkan

¹ *Inprecorr*, 1923 (p. 856).

Federation.”¹ In that same year, Zinoviev² prepared a statement for the next Congress of the *Enlarged Executive of the Communist International*, insisting on the “Bolshevisation” of all Communist Parties. The term *Bolshevisation* had been discussed at a previous Congress. It meant, in the words of Zinoviev, that “the experience of the Bolshevik Party in the three Russian Revolutions” must “be applied to the concrete situation of each particular country.” For a short period before the Second World War the *Comintern* gave up its polemics against moderate Socialism so as to promote those *Popular Fronts*, as they were called, in which Communists and Socialists must co-operate against *Fascism*. These *Popular Fronts*, while opposing “Fascism” would then be open to capture from inside by the Communists, who would then have three possibilities: to extend the power of Communism in each country; to rally the “workers” for war with Germany in case she were to threaten Russia, and to rally the “workers” for peace with Germany in case she came to terms with Russia. During the Second World War the principle of *Bolshevisation* was again applied. The *Popular Fronts* became *National Liberation Fronts* which the Communists attempted to capture from inside—with complete success in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. The official dissolution of the *Comintern* in 1943 was, in fact, nothing other than the *Bolshevisation* proposed by Zinoviev in 1925. The Communists were, through this process of *Bolshevisation*, able to extend the power of Communism in many countries and to make it the master-power in some; they rallied the “workers” for war with Germany when she invaded Russia in the summer of 1941; and they rallied at least the Communist “workers” and a number of *Fellow Travellers* for peace with Germany during the first

¹ *Imprecorr*, 1925 (p. 69). The “etcetera” presumably include Greece.

² Zinoviev was the head of the *Comintern*. He broke with Stalin soon afterwards and was expelled from the *Politbureau* in 1926. He was executed in August 1936.

period of the war, that is to say, from September 1939 until the invasion of Russia.

There is an apparent inconsistency in the attitude of the *Comintern* towards Zionism. Zionism was constantly attacked as an instrument of British imperialism. On the 20th of August 1925, for example, *Inprecorr*,¹ commenting on the *Fourteenth Zionist Congress*, referred to "the profound discontent of the Jewish masses who are now finally endeavouring to repudiate Zionist propaganda." It denounced the "socialist Zionists" who "always and everywhere rendered faithful flunkey service to the Jewish bourgeoisie," and asserted that only in the Soviet Union was the Jewish problem being dealt with in the right way, while the Zionists, assembled in congress, were preparing "fresh betrayals and deceptions of the people." In April 1925 the *Central Committee of the Palestinian Communist Party* issued a manifesto denouncing "imperialism," the *Balfour Declaration*, and "the Zionist Adventurers."²

And yet, in 1947, Russia pronounced in favour of Partition at Lake Success and, therefore, of a Zionist State in Palestine. Illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe could not have reached Palestine without her connivance. Ships, with Jewish immigrants on board, could not have left ports like Varna and Burgos without the consent of the Russian authorities in control. These immigrants were supposedly fleeing from persecution, or prospective persecution, but the available evidence seems to show that few were fleeing from Germany, where the memory, at least, of persecution—the most inhuman ever experienced by the Jews—might have made emigration seem desirable. But it would appear that the desire to emigrate is strongest amongst the Jews in Rumania, which is, today, completely dominated by the Soviet Union.³

¹ *Inprecorr*, 1925 (p. 929).

² *ibid.*, p. 439.

³ According to a statement by "the senior delegate of the Jewish underground in Europe," published in the *New York Herald Tribune*, "more than half of the 380,000 Jews in Rumania hope to emigrate to Palestine."

When the prospective Zionist State was being sponsored by Great Britain, the *Comintern* looked upon it as an outpost of the British Empire. But when Great Britain decided to withdraw from Palestine, the Zionist State became a prospective outpost of the Russian Empire and a point of leverage for the *Comintern* in the Middle East. It would be regrettable, from the Communist point of view, if the highly explosive matter gathered at such a point should be expended on mutual destruction of Jews and Arabs and not be used against British and American interests. We shall, for these reasons, see the emergence of a powerful Jewish Communist movement in Palestine.

I have given a few examples of the assumption, dogmatically made by the *Comintern*, that war is imminent. The year 1925 was one of European recovery and stabilisation. But the *Comintern* did not for one moment deviate from its assumption. According to Zinoviev, that year was only "a breathing space" and "a partial stabilisation of capitalist economy."¹ As war came in the end, one might have thought that the *Comintern* would be satisfied. But not at all. The Second World War having gone, the Third is in preparation, and the language of the *Comintern* is exactly the same as it was before, even in the small details relating to the dependence of Great Britain on the United States and to the hopeful prospect of a split in the British Labour movement. For example, Zinoviev, addressing the *Enlarged Executive of the Comintern* in 1925, said:

"The most important factors [with regard to England] are the differentiation in the Labour Party and the growth of the Left Wing within it."²

The examples I have given could be multiplied greatly and could be drawn from many countries. In China, more

¹ Speech at the *Enlarged Executive of the Comintern*, 25th of March 1925 (*Inprecorr*, 1925, p. 444).

² *ibid.*, p. 365.

than ten years ago, that master of statecraft, Chiang Kai-Shek, inflicted upon the *Comintern* a defeat of such magnitude that even discerning observers believed that it was final. Events in China today show that it was not.

According to the doctrine of the *Comintern*, all history is the history of class-warfare; all warfare is class-warfare even if it takes on a national or religious form; the world will be at war as long as there are classes, that is to say, until the universal Communist dictatorship is established in the Final World War; the war may, for a time, be latent, although there will never be a year without open warfare here and there; the First and Second World Wars are but preludes to the Final World War; the non-Communist world is inevitably at war, whether in open or latent form, with the Soviet Union because the non-Communist world must avert its own doom; every war, therefore, waged by the Soviet Union is defensive or preventive; even the Final World War will be so, for that war will defend the "workers" against the last attempt of "capitalism" to perpetuate their "slavery" and prevent "capitalism" from rallying against the Soviet Union ever again; it will be the Final War of Universal Liberation.

These are the reasons why the Soviet Union and the *Comintern* is permanently at war, the work of "liberation" cannot be allowed to rest for one moment. When they appear to be conciliatory, conciliation is but a manoeuvre to secure more advantageous strategic positions or to gain time for intensified warfare. They believe, indeed they are absolutely convinced, that final victory is certain, though its certainty allows no relaxation in the struggle and allows no moral or humanitarian scruples, no concession to "bourgeois ethics," for victory in the Final War is the ethical fulfilment of all human endeavours, and it must, when it comes, be complete, it must come soon, and, when it has come, it must be irrevocable, even if to make it so all

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opponents and all dissidents throughout the world will have to be exterminated, as they have been in the Soviet Union.

Such is the problem presented by the *Comintern*, the militant, terrorist, conspiratorial, and proselytising organisation of God-Caesar. It is not a complicated problem and not at all hard to understand. It is so simple, and so massive that it can be clearly discerned from every corner of the earth.

Chapter Seven

SECURITY

I

“DEFENCE,” said Adam Smith, “is of much more importance than opulence.”¹ Home affairs are the internal economy of the ship. Foreign policy is the navigation. It is foreign policy that keeps the ship afloat.

Errors in home policy can be corrected. This or that home policy may fail, but another can take its place. In home affairs there is always an alternative. Disaster at home, when seen to come, may be overcome. It will never be irretrievable unless it so weaken defence as to allow external enemies to sink the ship. Disaster at home is soon felt by the nation. Disaster abroad will be felt immediately if it take a sensational form, like the loss of a battle, a campaign, or a war, but if it take an unsensational form (concealed, perhaps, by dazzling victories in the field) its consequences may not be felt until years have passed and, when they are felt, they may no longer be attributed to their cause. Nation and government can combine to retrieve disaster at home, but their control over foreign nations and governments is limited and precarious. They can only retrieve disaster abroad, if at all, by patience, craft, tenacity, and strength, or by the last resource of foreign policy—war.

The great land-powers, the United States, Russia, and Germany, are ultimately unconquerable. For them, also, defence is more important than opulence. But for them disaster abroad will never be irretrievable. Russia and Germany suffered disaster in the First World War. Within

¹ *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, Ch. 2.

twenty years they were more powerful than they had ever been before. The United States might fail, but it is hard to see how they could fall, and impossible to see how they could fall never to rise again.

But if England falls, who never fell before, she will never rise again. There can be no final failure of home policy: unless it lead to a final failure of foreign policy. But the failure of foreign policy can be final. For England, as for no other of the Great Powers, the final failure of foreign policy is final downfall.

Germany was brought lower by the Second World War than by the First. After the First, she was still a sovereign State, but after the Second she was no State at all. Nevertheless, it is as sure as anything can be sure in politics, that she will rise again. Those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy must reckon with Germany as a future Great Power, they must consider how great she will be, and whom she will choose, or be forced to choose, as friend, and whom as foe.

For England, relations with Germany will be second in importance only to relations with the United States. For the United States, relations with Germany will be second only in importance to relations with England. There is nothing in Europe that can balance the Germany of the future except the rest of Europe, including England. There is nothing that can balance Russia except all Europe, including England. If Europe is not restored as an organic whole, either Germany or Russia, or both in coalition, will be the master. And Europe cannot be an organic whole unless it includes the *Middle Zone*. I repeat what I have said in the last chapter: without the *Middle Zone* there can, ultimately, be no Europe.

If Europe is not restored as an organic whole, there will come about what England fought all her great wars to prevent: her end, not only as a Great Power, but as a Power

—the end of her independence, of her liberties, and of her “opulence,” the end of the *Pax Britannica* and, therefore, the end of the independence, liberties, and “opulence” of all European nations, including those of the west. She will not be able to survive on the fringe of the *Pax Americana*, for despite the vast range and the destructive violence of modern weapons, the United States will be unable to wrest the fringe from so immense a hostile *Hinterland*.

It is untrue that England is no longer a Great Power. Power does not depend only on bulk, population, resources, and on material force, surpassing in magnitude the force which others can command. It is true that without force, and the will to use it, no Power can be a Great Power, but in politics, as in mechanics, effective force depends on balance or leverage. As long as England can hold the Balance of Power, as long as she has leverage, she is a Great Power, perhaps the greatest Power.

The purpose of foreign policy is not to promote freedom, justice, humanity, democracy, civilisation, Christianity, an idea or *Weltanschauung*, or the Rule of Law, although foreign policy is, or ought to be, *under* the Rule of Law. These matters are the concern of the whole nation. But they are not the specific concern of those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. These are responsible for one matter, and one only—the security of England, of the trade routes, and of the confines, communications, and strategic centres of the Commonwealth and Empire.

There are three conditions of a sound foreign policy and, therefore, of security. Because of their permanence, these conditions are in the nature of laws or principles:

First, a coalition of friendly Powers strong enough to resist any possible coalition of hostile Powers.

Secondly, the independence of all nations within striking distance of these islands and of imperial strongholds and communications.

Thirdly, armed strength, and readiness, upon just cause, to fight.

The first of these principles is known as the Balance of Power.¹ The character of the Powers in the coalition is of little moment provided they are reliable, which they will only be if they have vital interests in common and if they have a sense of responsibility sufficient to maintain a state of preparedness commensurate with their resources. It is perilous to seek association with a foreign Power when community of interests is lacking. It is an illusion that foreign policy must be based on confidence and that suspicions must be exorcised before a sound foreign policy is possible. Confidence will be the result, not the cause, of a sound foreign policy, and suspicions are more conducive to a sound foreign policy than confidence. A nation which is distrustful of foreign Powers will take no risks, will shun utopian projects, and will accept the sacrifice which adequate defence imposes more readily than a trustful nation. Excessive distrust is not desirable, but it is better than excessive trust, because it is better to be too strong than not strong enough. Misplaced distrust may mean forfeiture of a momentary advantage, but misplaced confidence may mean disaster.

All vital interests can be reduced to one: the interest in national survival. If an immediate threat to this interest is removed, as it may be by fortune of war, then secondary interests will reassert themselves to the disadvantage of whatever Power is insufficiently distrustful or insufficiently strong. It does not follow that, because two or more Powers have vital interests in common, their secondary interests may not conflict. Secondary interests must be sustained, even

¹ Mr. Bevin, speaking in the House of Commons on the 22nd of January 1948, said that "the old-fashioned conception of the balance of power as an aid should be discarded as soon as possible." It is, however, not possible. He also said that the "first principle" of British foreign policy was that "no one nation should dominate Europe." In saying this he affirmed the "old-fashioned conception." While rejecting the phrase, he accepted the reality.

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against an ally. The sacrifice of secondary interests may, in time, amount to the sacrifice of a vital interest. Secondary interests of England were often conflicted with those of France in the First World War and were resolutely defended. In that war, President Wilson even went so far as to challenge a vital interest of England's by proposing that the *Freedom of the Seas* should be one of the conditions of the peace. Indeed, the President was almost as determined to impose conditions of peace upon the allies as upon the enemies of the United States, a peculiarity from which President Roosevelt was not altogether free. The right of capture at sea and of blockade in time of war was, in the Napoleonic Wars, and in the First and Second World Wars, one of England's most powerful weapons. Mr. Lloyd George served his country well when he refused to surrender that weapon.

All the great masters of statecraft have been distrustful. In his *History of King Henry the Seventh*, that great repository of political wisdom, the English counterpart of Macchiavelli's *Prince*, Bacon says of the King

“To his confederates abroad he was constant and just, but not open. But such was his enquiry, and such his closeness, as they stood in the light towards him and he stood in the dark towards them.”

A maxim of statecraft to be cherished by every Prime Minister and every Foreign Secretary of England!

Tyrannies are by nature distrustful and have this advantage over democracies which, when not excessively trustful, are inclined to excessive distrust. It is not a legitimate purpose of foreign policy to overturn tyrannies, but tyrannies, especially when they are powerful, should be objects of particular distrust, for they are inclined to treachery and wars of spoliation, as the Italian, German, and Russian tyrannies have shown in our time. To defend ourselves and our future, we must cherish our distrust:

“ . . . there is only one common defence which the spirit of sensible men possesses, a good and safe one for all, but invaluable for democracies against tyrants. And what is that defence? It is distrust! Guard it, cling to it. If you preserve it, no harm can touch you.”¹

The people of England were filled with admiration for the prowess of the Russian armed forces, and rightly so. But the press and wireless failed in their duty by promoting an uncritical attitude and by converting admiration into adulation. Those who were patriotically critical could find no hearing. At times they found ill-will amounting to malignance. Of those who were unpatriotically uncritical of Russia, many exploited adulation to belittle the achievements of their own country. Those who employed this dishonourable ruse during the war now simulate an over-critical attitude towards the United States to serve the same purpose: to belittle their own country by representing it dependent to the point of helplessness on a great Power falsely accused of a desire for selfish domination.

It is true that England is dependent on the United States, as she was on Russia during the war. This is commonly taken as evidence that she is no longer a Great Power. The truth is that she is the more powerful because of her dependence on the United States, as she was because of her dependence on Russia during the war. England has always been dependent on other Powers, great and small. But other Powers, including the United States, are dependent on her, as Russia was during the war. The United States are the more, not the less, powerful because of their dependence on England. They would be impotent in Greece and would count for little or nothing in the Middle East were not the Mediterranean *mare nostrum*. They are a Power in Europe because England is a European Power. Had it not been for England, Germany would be master

¹ Demosthenes, *Second Philippic*, 24.

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of Europe and much more. Were it not for England, Russia would be master of Europe and much more. Today, as in the past and as in the future, not dependence, but interdependence is a condition of England's survival as a Great Power. And if she cannot survive as a Great Power, she cannot survive at all.

The second condition of security, the independence of small nations, is commonly expressed in the phrase "rights of small nations," a phrase which conceals a pragmatic interest beneath an ethical abstraction.

While it is for England to uphold the rights of all nations by her example, by her respect for the Rule of Law, and by her moral influence in the world, it is for her, as an island Power off the European mainland, and dependent on overseas communications and bases for her trade and her security, as well as on friendly coalitions freely formed in defence of common interests, to make the defence of small, and therefore threatened, nations a principle of her foreign policy. Her interest in the independence of small nations flanking her seas and her sea-routes is vital. Her interest in the independence of small nations more remotely situated may not be vital, though it may be so upon occasion, but it will never be negligible. Any attack on the independence of any small nation is a threat to the security of all—and, therefore, of England. If a nation flanking her seas or sea-routes is annexed by a foreign Power, then the threat is immediate and calls for immediate intervention. If a remoter nation is annexed by a foreign Power, that Power not only sets a dangerous example, it also augments its own might and, by imperilling the Balance of Power, imperils the security of England—as the annexation of Austria conclusively showed. If all the European nations which were independent before the Second World War were independent today, England would have a greater security than even the Congress of Vienna gave her. That

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more nations lost their independence in the Second World War than gained it in the First, is a condition of England's insecurity and of a Third World War.¹

II

Between the First and Second World Wars it was fashionable to regard the third principle of security, armed strength, and readiness to fight, as the chief cause of insecurity. And as all wars were condemned as unjust, it was assumed that there could be no just cause for making war. Today, the fashion still has its followers, but the present state of the world compels every Government conscious of its responsibilities, and every enlightened public opinion, to resist the pressure caused by this fashion, for the danger of a Third World War is evident, and it is equally evident that the danger will increase if England is weak, and decrease if she is strong. That is why those who want to see Russia master of the world want England to disarm, and others, who at heart care little for Russia but are full of malice towards England, their own country, want her to disarm because they fear that, if war come, she may win.

There is no economy so unwise, and none so uneconomical, as excessive economy in defence. The most extravagant expenditure on works of peace is less ruinous than parsimony in preparation for war. Preparedness, costly as it would have been, might have averted the First World War. It would certainly have averted the Second, or, had that war come notwithstanding, it would have been won in, say, less than a year.

Germany could not have gone to war if the Western Powers had prevented the German reoccupation of the

¹ The vital interest of England and the Empire in the independence of small nations was expounded in masterly fashion by Sir Eyre Crowe in a famous despatch (v. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol. III, pp. 402-3).

Rhineland. They were strong enough to do so without any danger of precipitating a general conflict—indeed, France alone was strong enough to do so.

The public is constantly exhorted to refrain from thinking another war is inevitable and is even told that those who think it so will make it so. Another war is not inevitable, but to think it so will not make it so, whereas to assume that it can be avoided or averted without preparedness or merely through the operation of the Security Council will make it so.¹ The assumption, even if erroneous, that another war is inevitable will be conducive to adequate preparedness, it will give assurance that defence is adequate, and that the war, if it comes, will be short and victorious.

That war can be abolished by simple devices of a general kind, such as disarmament or an international committee endowed with coercive powers, or by a universal federation—such fashionable beliefs have increased the likelihood of wars. This likelihood has been further increased by the spread of bellicosity. In tyrannies it is the rulers who are inclined to be pugnacious, in democracies the people. There was, in this country, between the First and Second World Wars, an almost incessant popular demand for coercive action against foreign Powers, action which was but war under another name, on behalf of fashionable abstractions, doctrines, or those conglomerates of sentiment and doctrine known as *ideologies*. These *ideologies* became a deadly menace to peace abroad and peace at home, the more so because, while they were sustained by a fervent pugnacity masquerading as pacifism, they induced hostile Powers to take the politic precaution of augmenting their own armament. These same *ideologies* were, because of

¹ "Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney General, addressing 2000 school children yesterday at a meeting organised by the Council of Education in World Citizenship . . . said he did not think another war was inevitable. . . . It was the people who spoke about war being inevitable who would make it so" (*The Times*, 3rd January 1948).

their illogical and impolitic nature, and the belief that they were in themselves specifics against war, inimical to adequate preparedness at home. Between the two wars, pacifism advanced as though under a banner inscribed with the words: "Disarm and Fight the World!" British pacifists wanted to fight first Japan,¹ then Italy, and then Germany. The result was that we had to fight all three. And, thanks to the pressure exercised by these same pacifists in favour of disarmament, we were all but defeated by all three.

The modern *ideologies* have increased the inhumanity of war. Ideological wars are waged until the enemy accepts not only defeat in the field but also the defeat of his beliefs. Such wars are, therefore, prolonged beyond the limits imposed by the one legitimate purpose of war—security. The demand for the unconditional surrender of a hostile nation is evidence that reason has ceased to prevail and *ideological* unreason has taken its place, for belligerents in a war serving a legitimate purpose will always be prepared to make peace on conditions such as will satisfy that purpose.

An *ideological* peace will always be a bad peace. Modern war has become a form of forcible conversion effected with a ruthlessness unsurpassed in the religious wars of old. A nation fighting a defensive war becomes an aggressor if it fights for more than security. A modern *ideological* war does not come to an end when the armed forces have won and lost. One form of belligerency is but replaced by another. The Allied Powers did not make peace with Germany when the German armed forces had been defeated, but maintained a Holy War against her official religion, National Socialism, and undertook her forcible conversion to Communism, the official religion of Russia, and to

¹ It was commonly assumed during the Manchurian crisis that if "sanctions"—that is to say blockade—had been imposed upon Japan, Great Britain would have had the full support of the United States. The Stimson-Simon correspondence, if it is ever published, will show that this assumption is erroneous.

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democracy (or what was meant to pass for democracy), the semi-official religion of the Western Powers.

The policy announced by Mr. Truman and translated into practice under the *Marshall Plan* is but common sense applied to foreign affairs. It implies a certain bias in favour of democratic States, but not dogmatically so. It does not apply to Communist States, not because they are doctrinally Communistic, but because they are extensions of the Soviet Union and because the United States rightly decline to finance Russian projects for war and universal domination. Russia cannot logically complain if she and her vassals receive no help from the United States when she herself forbids these vassals to accept help and does all in her power to reduce, by war, strikes, and disruption, the value of the help received by Greece, France, Italy, and other countries.

American policy is but a return to reason by one Great Power. It is self-interested, but the self-interest is enlightened and philanthropic. It is pursued with modesty and moderation. How presumptuous and arrogant the rantings and boastings of Germany's former leaders and Russia's present leaders are by comparison with the quiet utterances of Mr. Marshall and Mr. Truman! American policy offers some hope that the modern era of religious wars will come to an end; that the distinction between wars and peace, which modern religious wars have removed, will be restored; that, while there is no universal remedy against war, war may be averted, here and there; that peace may be consolidated and extended; that if war comes notwithstanding, it may be limited in time and space. War, like peace, is divisible.

III

Conferences have no intrinsic value. They are even harmful if they are not preceded by agreement of fundamentals. International committees like the *League of Nations*

or the *United Nations* are but permanent conferences with fixed rules.

“Yea, who ever knew conferences in so great oppositions to ripen kindly, and bring any fruit to perfection? for many come rather for faction than satisfaction, resolving to carry home the same opinions they brought with them: an upright moderator will scarce be found, who hangeth not to one side; the place will be subject to suspicion, and hinder liberty; boldness and readiness of speech, with most (though not most judicious) auditors, will bear away the bell from solidity of arguments; the passages in the disputing will be partially reported, and both sides will brag of the conquest; so that the rent will be made worse, and more bad spirits conjured up than allayed.”¹

Some day Germany will again be a State, and Japan will not remain a limbeck for engendering the *homunculus* democracy. The *United Nations*, if it survives, will have to accommodate both Germany and Japan, unless it is to be nothing but an old coalition of Powers in new form, without the flexibility and the freedom of action and decision which old alliances had. A coalition of Powers is a necessity in the presence of the Russian menace which has replaced the German. But a coalition must be based on community of vital interests, and such a community does not exist in the *United Nations* because of the fundamental antagonism between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The result is that the *Security Council* has become a school of ill-manners and an exacerbator of conflict.

It is commonly supposed that all nations have a vital interest in the preservation of peace. But different nations have different conceptions of peace and are willing to make war so that one kind of peace may prevail over the other. The Soviet Union is earnestly striving for universal peace,

¹ Thomas Fuller, *Holy War* (1639).

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even at the cost of universal war. Is not England's vital interest in security the vital interest of all nations? It is indeed, but in the world of practical politics we must reckon not only with what is objectively the vital interest of a foreign Power (if objectivity in such matters be possible) but also what such a Power chooses to consider its vital interest. A nation, or its rulers, may even sacrifice its vital interests to what it believes to be a higher cause. It would seem that there was in Hitler much of the sacrificial spirit, that he was willing to sacrifice himself and the entire German nation, indeed the whole world, for such a cause.¹ Russia could have had complete security for at least a generation after the Second World War, whereas in her endeavours to establish universal Communism she is achieving an ever greater insecurity. The time may come, and perhaps soon, when of all the countries in the world she will be the most imperilled.

England and the United States may be compelled to remove the menace of their security by waging a preventive war which, according to prevalent conceptions, would be condemned as a war of aggression. I say "compelled" because neither Power would wantonly go to war. We are being told "nobody wants war," and it is probably true of the western world. But in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, there are many, perhaps millions, who see no hope of liberation from an alien and ideological tyranny except through war.

The true distinction made between just and unjust wars by the great medieval jurists has been replaced by the false distinction between wars of defence and wars of aggression.

¹ I have been informed by one who knew Hitler at the time, that when he had to abandon hope that Great Britain would remain aloof if Germany went to war, he no longer believed that Germany would win. Improbable as this may appear, I am convinced that it is so—that much as Hitler wanted and strove for victory, his conception of sacrificial glory was paramount.

If a foreign Power increases its armament, promotes a potentially hostile coalition and, while keeping the peace, gathers overwhelming force, those Powers which would be exposed to the attack must consider whether they should not attack first, even if, by doing so, they become technically the aggressors.

Whether war is technically offensive or defensive is not the legitimate question. The legitimate question is the justice or injustice of the war. Unless the Atlantic Powers, upon whom the re-establishment or the final overthrow of the Rule of Law in the world depends, accept that distinction, they may be deterred from waging a just war when it is necessary (an unnecessary war cannot be just), or they may wage a war for ostensible reasons that are unrelated to the real reasons, thereby falsifying in advance the true purpose of the war and creating the pre-conditions of an unjust peace. Or they may be manœuvred into coercive measures under the name of "sanctions," which may lead to war when there is no necessity for war. Such a war, not undertaken in defence of endangered security, would be an unjust war, although we may be sure that it will be waged in the name of justice.

The war which the Atlantic Powers may have to wage must be a just war in its conception, in its conduct, and in its conclusion. Unless it be so, the peace that will follow will not be a just peace under the Rule of Law.

The *Charter* of the *United Nations* forbids local wars and decrees world-wars. The principles of the *Charter* can only prevail through the establishment of a universal tyranny armed with irresistible coercive powers in defiance of the Rule of Law.¹

¹ Much harmful confusion has been caused in the minds of the English-speaking peoples by the use of one word where two different things are meant: international *law* and national (municipal) *law*. In Latin, French, German, and other languages two words mark the distinction: *jus* and *lex*, *droit* and *loi*, *Recht* and *Gesetz*.

Professor H. A. Smith writes:

“The lawyer who studies the history of the United Nations during its first year can find but little in the record of its proceedings either to encourage his optimism or flatter his esteem. It is probably true to say that at no time in the three centuries which have followed the Thirty Years’ War have international law and its exponents been so firmly thrust into the background. . . .

“The chief function of law is to impose limits upon the exercise of power, whatever may be the form which power may take. It may be the power of individuals to injure their neighbour, the power of wealth to oppress the poor, the power of a government over its subjects, or the power of independent rulers to do harm to one another. The last is the proper care of the law of nations. Unlike national law it rests upon no visible authority, nor is it equipped with the legislative executive and judicial organs of normal government. . . . As Grotius pointed out in the last chapter of his great work, in the last resort international law can only rest upon good faith. There must be common agreement upon certain principles of international conduct, and a willingness to accept these principles as having an inherent authority superior to the interests and to the will of any individual sovereign state, however powerful it may be. . . .

“In their theory of the nature of law the Marxist and the Nazi doctrines are agreed. Both concur in rejecting the principle hitherto accepted in western Europe and most clearly expressed in the Constitution of the United States that the function of law is to control the exercise of power. The Germans branded this principle as being “liberal,” while the Russians denounced it as being “capitalist,” these epithets being the most abusive in their respective vocabularies, but behind this verbal difference the substantial reason in each case remains the same. In the totalitarian State the function of law is wholly different. So far from controlling the exercise of supreme power, it becomes merely the form or the agency

through which power translates itself into action. Hitler did not definitely commit himself to this doctrine until 1942, but it was consistently applied in Russia since the earliest days of the revolution. . . .

“All power is vested in the Security Council and can be exercised by seven members of the Council, provided that these include all the “Big Five.” Assuming that a majority so constituted can be obtained, the Charter imposes no legal limits whatever upon what the Council may do. . . . In its decision the Council is not bound to observe any rules of law or to respect the provisions of any treaties. There is nothing in the Charter corresponding to the well-known safeguards included in the American and Australian Constitutions to the effect that no State can be deprived of its territory without its own consent. If the Council decided that Utopia must surrender the whole or any part of her territory to Arcadia, the decision is not only binding upon the parties but all the members of the United Nations are pledged to assist in carrying it into effect. The fact that Utopia may have an unassailable legal title to the territory in question ceases to be relevant, for all legal rights are subordinated to the right of absolute power. The law, as such, no longer affords any security.

“For the first time in the history of the law of nations an international authority has now been set up with the legal right to make such changes in the existing order as it may think desirable.”¹

For nations, as for persons, life under the Rule of Law is freedom. Nothing else is, or can be, freedom. The Rule of Law is the negation of tyranny. A universal authority under the Rule of Law can only exist if that authority is itself submissive: submissive to the commandments of a transcendent God, for the Rule of Law has its source not in man but in God.

¹ H. A. Smith, *The Crisis in the Law of Nations*, pp. 82, 89, 90.

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Public opinion may exercise a profound influence on foreign policy, as it did so disastrously between the First and Second World Wars. Popular movements, embracing vast multitudes of men and women, can be fired with fantastic hopes of miracles worked by planners and minor scientists. They can be made homogeneous by the press, the wireless, the film, and the bureaucracy. Popular movements have, in our own day, engendered the most inhuman tyrannies the world has ever known. The "will of the people" is a fiction—or a "pseudo-reality," as Professor Hogan calls it. That fiction, imposed upon the people and represented as their true will, is the most effective instrument ever devised for reducing men to physical and mental servitude. Wherever it prevails, the Rule of Law comes to an end.

All ideologies are radical infidelities. All are violations of the First Commandment. Ideologues are compelled to strike patriotic attitudes to conceal their lack of patriotism. Hitler despised the Germans, Mussolini the Italians, and both sacrificed their own nations to false gods. We shall, in all the long speeches, addresses, and articles by Stalin, find no trace of love, and, therefore, no trace of patriotism. All ideologues place themselves above their fellow-men and reject the Rule of Law. Their self-elevation is progressive, and, from despising their fellow-men, they come to hate and fear them.

The Russian State exercises a particular fascination over our own ideologues. If there were in that State any liberalism and any charity, if it were not such a menace to the world, it would have fewer enemies, but it would also have fewer of those adulators who profess to be its friends. The Soviet Union is to the ideologue the dream-world of his secret ambitions; a world in which he is master; a world in which he can, by uttering a *fiat*, initiate prodigious reforms and display his own power over men; a world in

which he can send all who stand in his way, all who excite his envy and malice by their elevation of mind and character, to death or to the worse-than-death of the Labour Camp; a world in which he imagines himself to be Public Prosecutor, reviling his defenceless victims, or Minister of the Interior, in charge of the Secret Police, or Minister of War, preparing the destruction of other countries (especially his own), or Minister of Education, malforming, to his own will, the minds of the younger generation, and dominating the realms of science, art, and letters. In this dream-world the man of little faith can act the zealot, the weak man pass for strong. In this world the frustrated ideologue can find happiness; in this world, the world of God-Caesar, he can garner the adulation which every free society would deny him; here he can satiate his rancours and soothe the intolerable itch of his vainglory and ambition.

He cares little or nothing for Russia's mighty achievement, for the labour, sacrifice and statecraft which, in the course of a few centuries, established an administration and an order from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea. It is not the good in Russia, but the evil, that exercises so powerful a fascination, the evil that calls forth so much evil.

To ideologues we owe the Second World War, to ideologues we owe the transformation of a just war for security into an unjust, because ideological, war. It is to ideologues that we owe the menace of a Third World War, to ideologues we owe whatever danger there be that the Third World War, if it come, will be lost.

There is nothing in foreign policy more important and more difficult and delicate than the relations with actual or potential confederates and opponents. These relations must be determined by one ultimate consideration—security. It is immaterial whether a confederate or an opponent is democratic or undemocratic, Royalist or Republican, egalitarian or aristocratic, reactionary or progressive. Were

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Russia the Heaven on Earth some pretend she is, she is an opponent as long as she is a menace to our security. Were she the Hell on Earth others pretend she is, she would be no opponent, but a possible confederate, if she were no menace to our security.

It is a fortunate dispensation of Providence calling for deep gratitude in a terrible world that the *Pax Britannica* and the *Pax Americana* have become as one: fortunate because in this union there is a twofold hope: hope of security, and hope, the only hope, that the Rule of Law will be restored in the world. If the rest of the world rigorously observe the Rule of Law, Russia will observe it too, not because the Rule of Law can be imposed upon her by force, but because it will be impossible for her to have any relations with any other countries except under the Rule of Law. Even if she could live in isolation, as Japan did for centuries, that isolation would be better for mankind than relations that are incompatible with the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law between nations cannot, by its very nature, be enforced. But if it is uncompromisingly respected by the nations of Christendom it will, in time, command universal respect.

The *Pax Britannica* and the *Pax Americana* make up the *Atlantic System*. The task of our generation is to strengthen both the internal and external defences of that system within its own domain, a domain which must, if it is to endure, include all Europe and, therefore, the region I have called the *Middle Zone*.

There is, or ought to be, no question of overthrowing the *Pax Muscovita*. It has transcended its bounds and is therefore incompatible with the Balance of Power. But within its bounds it is necessary to the Balance of Power. The Balance of Power can no longer be confined to Europe. It cannot be maintained unless it is universal. The Balance of Power was maintained by the *Concert of Europe*. World-

Government, or universal dominion under one secular system such as the Security Council of the United Nations, would be a universal tyranny and the final overthrow of the Rule of Law.

The *Atlantic System* will not have security, but only increasing insecurity, as long as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with their great and highly gifted populations of Christian men and women and their vast resources, are being forced, as they are now being forced, into political, economic, and military union with Russia. The security of the *Atlantic System* is the first condition of a universal Balance of Power—and, therefore, of a *Concert of the World*.

Only a *Concert of the World* can maintain a *Pax Sinensis*. The vulnerability of contiguous territories and the ever-latent anarchy of China make it impossible to defend her, or for her to defend herself, against Russia, whereas Europe, when restored, will be a greater Power than Russia and well able to defend herself, even without help from England and the United States, on condition that Germany has become an integral part of Europe. It will be one of the main tasks of the *Concert of the World* to establish and maintain the *Pax Sinensis*. It will, perhaps, be said that Russia will sustain her designs on China, the more so as China will remain weak for many years to come. But if Europe is restored, then the authority of the Atlantic Powers, which will then include all the States of Europe, will be so great that it will be a matter of no impossibility to exercise that authority in China and on behalf of China, and establish a Balance of Power that will secure the *Pax Sinensis*. As long as Russia aspires to universal domination, she will do all in her power—even at the risk of a Third World War—to promote the European and the Chinese anarchies. If Europe is united, her aspiration will be vain, and the Chinese anarchy will be brought to an end.

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There is no insurance against fate, and the causes of war, both civil and international, will remain:

“From whence come wars and fightings among you? come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members?”¹

A *Concert of the World* will not be an infallible remedy against wars, but at least it can be a remedy against universal war, at least it will not, like the Security Council, contain the permanent menace of universal war, and at least it can adjust the Balance of Power against the exorbitant might of any State or coalition of States.

To abolish wars everywhere and for ever is impossible. But to establish such security through the Balance of Power and the *Concert of the World* under the Rule of Law, so that God-Caesar will not again be able to threaten all mankind, is an achievement within the bounds of human possibility under the leadership of those responsible for the maintenance of the *Pax Britannica* and the *Pax Americana*.

¹ James iv. 1.

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