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I WAS THERE

THE PERSONAL STORY
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO
PRESIDENTS ROOSEVELT AND TRUMAN
BASED ON HIS NOTES AND DIARIES
MADE AT THE TIME

BY

FLEET ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY

With a Foreword by
PRESIDENT TRUMAN

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WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

FOREWORD

BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN

TH**ES**E **W**A**R** **N**O**T**E**S** by Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy were brought together in pursuance of a request by me that the notes he jotted down from day to day during the war years 1941 to 1945 be made available to the public in convenient form.

The long and brilliant career of Admiral Leahy—as Chief of Naval Operations, as Governor of Puerto Rico, as Ambassador to France, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief—is a sufficient testimonial to the high value of his memoirs. I have drawn extensively upon his notes for guidance. They provide an authoritative source for all those interested in the strategy by which victory was achieved over the Axis Powers in World War II.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.
October 11, 1949.

CHAPTER I

I WAS THERE

I WAS THERE. Throughout almost five years from November, 1940, to the end of World War II in September, 1945, my duties placed me at pivotal points in the High Command that accomplished the defeat of our enemies against what at times seemed heavy odds. These observations are based on participation in many historic discussions at which the course of the war was charted and at which attempts were made to map the road to peace. These discussions include:

Washington, May, 1943, which was the fourth of the nine Allied war councils. At this meeting and others later Winston Churchill appeared to some of us to carry his insistent campaign to preserve the British Empire to a point where it might not be in full agreement with the President's fundamental policy to defeat Hitler as quickly as possible.

Quebec, three months later, where global strategy was hammered out and the British came to an agreement with us in important decisions regarding the American intention to invade Europe by way of the British Channel.

Cairo, November and December, 1943. Here the Allies made a bargain with Chiang Kai-shek which they did not keep, and the Turks would not bargain at all. Here also our persistent British friends strove mightily to create diversions in the Mediterranean area, which the American Command did not consider worth taking precedence over the agreed plan for striking at Hitler close at home with a cross-Channel assault.

Teheran, between the Cairo sessions, when President Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met together for the first time. With their military and political staffs, they mapped the defeat of Germany. They also had their first arguments on post-war settlements, including the Polish border question, which later was to be an example of the ruthlessness of our Soviet ally.

Quebec again in September, 1944. Here the coming Battle of Japan was at the top of the agenda. Nothing had happened to alter my conviction that the United States could bring about the surrender of Japan without a costly invasion of the

home islands of the enemy, although the Army believed such an offensive necessary to insure victory.

Momentous Yalta, February, 1945, when we discussed with Russia participation in the war on Japan, which was, in my opinion, an unnecessary move, but in which Roosevelt joined in the belief that Soviet participation in the Far East operation would insure Russia's sincere co-operation in his dream of a united, peaceful world.

Potsdam, July, 1945, the final war council, where a new American President, Harry S. Truman, and a new British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, learned their first lessons in the difficult task of negotiating with the Soviets, and the unpromising fact of Russia's dominance in Europe was brought home to all present.

My presence was required at all of the purely military meetings of these war councils. In addition, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman both asked me to attend many of the political sessions where only Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt (Truman at Potsdam) and a few of their top advisors sat around the conference table.

Much of this narrative is based on my daily sessions with Roosevelt, and subsequently with Truman, on military affairs and foreign policy. Most of these talks took place in the Oval Study of the White House where so much history has been made. Sometimes they occurred aboard the President's private car or plane, at Hyde Park, at Shangri-la, at hotels, or at sea—wherever the President happened to be. We discussed many matters outside the scope of my military duties as Chief of Staff to the President. These ranged from grave home front problems, such as the man-power crisis, to such matters as Roosevelt's approval of a candidate for Vice-President.

As the senior officer of all American armed forces, I presided over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted to it the basic thinking of the war Presidents on vital strategic and political problems they faced in their efforts to defeat our enemies. When our country was the host, I also presided over the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This group included the highest ranking officers of the various branches of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. We did not have at any time during the war any such helpful coordination with our Soviet ally, although there were a few sessions at Yalta and Teheran when the three staffs met together.

The duties of Chief of Staff to the President required careful selection of all military dispatches of sufficient importance to be read by the President. Also involved was the screening of numerous and, on occasion, insistent demands from many persons—military, diplomatic, and civilian—for conferences with the President on matters having a real or supposed military angle. It was natural that this close daily association with both war Presidents brought all manner of men and causes to my office, seeking intercession in their behalf. Among these were representatives of defeated and exiled governments, as well as our active allies, who often pleaded for more American dollars, more American arms, and sometimes for American troops.

Prior to becoming his Chief of Staff in July, 1942, President Roosevelt sent me on one of the most controversial diplomatic missions of the entire war period—that of being Ambassador to France from January, 1941, to May, 1942, during Marshal Henri Pétain's wavering régime at Vichy.

While executing this difficult assignment, I was called many things by the Axis-controlled Press, none of them complimentary.

So uncertain were our relations that an "escape route" was kept in readiness at all times, with gasoline and supplies cached along the way should it be necessary for us to leave Vichy unexpectedly.

My association with Franklin Roosevelt began in 1913, when he moved to Washington from New York to become Assistant Secretary of the Navy in Woodrow Wilson's administration.

During 1915-16, I commanded the Secretary of the Navy's dispatch boat, the *Dolphin*. Roosevelt made several cruises on the *Dolphin* and we became good friends. I visited with him for short periods in his homes at Hyde Park and Campo Bello. He was at that time a handsome, companionable, athletic young man of unusual energy, initiative and decision. He knew the history, details of the composition and of the operations of the United States Navy since its original establishment. Roosevelt also was a highly competent small-boat sailor and coast pilot. He had a deep affection for everything that had to do with sailing craft. During this close contact, I acquired an appreciation of his ability, his understanding of history, and his broad approach to foreign problems. There developed

between us a deep personal affection that endured unchanged until his untimely death.

After our country's formal entry into World War I in 1917, we had little contact until he as President appointed me Chief of Naval Operations in January, 1937. Thereafter we held many conferences on America's need for an adequate sea defence. His own interest and experience, gained in eight years as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, equipped him with a splendid knowledge of the Navy's problems.

Roosevelt was thoroughly devoted to the avoidance of war by every honourable means, but the lessons of world history, with which he was so familiar, had convinced him of the necessity for adequate naval preparation to prevent any invasion of the United States from overseas. He knew that such preparation had been made and was available to execute defence plans. However, a partial destruction of the American fleet by the unexpected Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor left the United States for the time being without sufficient sea power to neutralize the Navy of Japan.

Roosevelt knew that, barring an unforeseen collapse of the Nazi forces, Hitler was a threat to the very existence of our country and that war was inevitable. At a little ceremony in his study late in July, 1939, at which time Roosevelt pinned the Distinguished Service Medal on me, he remarked: "Bill, if we have a war, you're going to be right back here helping me to run it." Roosevelt actually feared in 1940 that war would come to us. I was then preparing to leave for Puerto Rico to become Governor of that island. War did not come until Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), at which time I was serving as Ambassador to France. When Germany and Italy declared war on us four days later (December 11), he kept me at Vichy until my recall in May, 1942, when Pierre Laval assumed control of the Pétain Government. Two months later I assumed the duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, an office he created to give him a personal representative in the Chiefs of Staff who were charged with the complex task of prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.

When Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and Vice-President Truman became President, I immediately offered my resignation. He rejected this suggestion, and I continued to serve Truman in the same capacity until March 21, 1949.

Working for three years in daily contact with President Truman in much the same way in which I had worked with Franklin Roosevelt, I found him to be, by every measure of comparison, a great American.

President Truman was thoroughly honest, considerate, and kindly in his approach to problems and in his relations with his assistants.

He asked advice in regard to military matters and foreign relations as frequently as did his predecessor. He listened attentively to volunteered advice, and made positive decisions for which he assumed full personal responsibility.

His method of administration differed from that of Mr. Roosevelt in that after reaching a decision he delegated full responsibility for its execution to the department of the Government charged by custom or by law with that duty. In my opinion, his decisions were usually correct and advantageous to the cause of the United States. Where the results were bad the fault was in an inefficient handling of details by departmental officials.

Mr. Roosevelt also made decisions after careful consideration of requested or volunteered advice, but he differed from Mr. Truman in that he had little confidence in some of his executive departments, and therefore took detailed action with his own hands, assisted when necessary by some of his personal secretaries. Action that should have been prepared in draft form by some of the executive departments were frequently handed over to Harry Hopkins or to me for preparation of a draft directive and then later brought into exact accord with his personal ideas by the President himself. This permitted President Roosevelt to be completely familiar with the details of all of his written orders and other official communications.

Under President Truman's practice of delegating such work to the executive departments, a principle of organization in which I thoroughly believed, I did at times find difficulty in understanding the exact meaning of some official communications.

Both of these Presidents were in different ways splendid, outstanding Americans in a period of world crisis.

Both attained about an equal measure of success in solving difficult problems that were presented to them in great volume every day.

It was for me a splendid privilege and a high honour to be

associated in my small way with both of them. Both Presidents will, in my opinion, be recorded in history as having been completely devoted to America in its successful struggle with alien enemies of our philosophy of government, and as having acquired and maintained the enduring affection of all who worked with them to the same end.

During the eventful five-year period beginning with my assignment to Vichy, I made notes from day to day. These "memos to myself" were not written with this book in mind. They were for reference to assist me in handling later tasks in the rapidly changing war situation and were invaluable for that purpose.

They were made by me personally, in my own handwriting, and are correct in their statements of facts and dates. Any appraisals of situations and evaluation of personalities which I made in these notes and from which I shall frequently quote were based on information then available and were, of course, subject to human error. They were the best I could do at the time. Any messages sent in code that are used in whole or in part in these notes have been paraphrased. This has been done, not because of the information contained in the cables, but to protect the security of the codes which were used at that time.

In the hope of being of some small aid to the historians who must fit together the vast jigsaw puzzle of war history, I have been persuaded to condense from these personal records an account of my part in handling some of the pieces of that puzzle. The tedious study of warehouses full of official documents will be left to others. This is my story as I saw it.

CHAPTER II

CALLED TO NEW DUTY

AT MIDNIGHT ON FRIDAY, January 5, 1941, in the midst of what Frenchmen said was the coldest winter in ninety years, the new American Ambassador to France arrived at the provisional capital of Vichy.

I was the Ambassador. At that hour, after a dreary trip north from Madrid in a dirty, crowded train with no heat except that which could be applied internally, I probably had less enthusiasm for this new assignment than any duty required of me in forty-four years of active service to my country.

Just six weeks before, Mrs. Leahy and I had been enjoying a leisurely Sunday morning breakfast in a small guest-house of La Fortaleza, the governor's residence at San Juan, Puerto Rico, when an *aide* interrupted us to hand me a confidential message from President Roosevelt. It read:

"We are confronting an increasingly serious situation in France because of the possibility that one element of the present French Government may persuade Marshal Pétain to enter into agreements with Germany which will facilitate the efforts of the Axis powers against Great Britain.

"There is even the possibility that France may actually engage in war against Great Britain and, in particular, that the French Fleet may be utilized under the control of Germany.

"We need in France at this time an Ambassador who can gain the confidence of Marshal Pétain, who at the present moment is the one powerful element of the French Government who is standing firm against selling out to Germany.

"I feel that you are the best man available for this mission. You can talk to Marshal Pétain in language which he would understand, and the position which you have held in our own Navy would undoubtedly give you great influence with the higher officers of the French Navy who are openly hostile to Great Britain.

"I hope, therefore, that you will accept the mission to France and be prepared to leave at the earliest possible date."

Roosevelt's message was a complete surprise. Some months after reaching the statutory retirement age of sixty-four in

1939, I had completed my work as Chief of Naval Operations and the President had appointed me as Governor of Puerto Rico.

We were not then in the war, but Roosevelt feared acutely that we would get involved despite everything he could do to prevent it. In fact, before I left Washington in September, 1939, he told me that he was apprehensive that Japan might take some action in 1940, doubtless "by mistake," which would make it impossible for the United States to remain out of the conflict.

I had followed the tragic collapse of France in the spring of 1940, Britain's lonely, gallant stand, and the painful slowness of Americans to realize that the outcome of this struggle vitally affected the future of our own country. The transfer of fifty over-age U.S. destroyers to Britain in exchange for base rights in Newfoundland and the West Indies, announced in September, 1940, seemed to me to have been the most valuable accomplishment in the national defence since the expansion of the American Navy. It was a great step toward ensuring the safety of the United States against invasion.

The unfortunate action off Oran early in July, 1940, when the British disabled the battleships *Bretagne* and the newer *Dunkerque*, was to plague me later, but at the time, if I had been the British admiral on the spot, I would have sunk the French ships, too. In Puerto Rico, we naturally followed closely the efforts to preserve the *status quo* of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, particularly the nearby and strategically located island of Martinique. However, prior to the receipt of Roosevelt's message of November 17, 1940, I had not the slightest intimation that shortly I was to be plunged into the delicate and often discouraging task at Vichy.

Conditions in Puerto Rico were improving. Even had they been the reverse, the President's request must take precedence over any other considerations. I scribbled on the back of his cablegram that I would accept the mission and could leave within a week. The reply was sent by Navy radio direct to Roosevelt, who was cruising that week-end aboard the U.S.S. *Potomac*.

Mrs. Leahy and I left Puerto Rico on November 28, greatly heartened by what appeared to be a spontaneous expression of regret by the thousands of people that lined the San Juan streets as we drove to the dock. Orders received *en route* caused

me to disembark at quarantine in New York Harbour early in the morning of December 2 and fly to Washington. The President wanted to see me before leaving at noon on a long sea trip that was to take him close enough to Martinique to train his glasses on the French aircraft-carrier *Béarn* lying in Fort-de-France harbour. He went on the U.S.S. *Tuscaloosa*, the same cruiser that later in the month was to take me to Lisbon.

In a two-hour conference in the President's study, we discussed the mission and he outlined the policies of our Government. As usual, Roosevelt was well informed on his subject. This had always been my experience with him, especially when I was naval operations chief. He had a truly amazing capacity to see the basic points of a problem and also to master a mass of detail. I believe that morning he could have given, sentence by sentence, the exact terms of the harsh Armistice the French had signed with the Axis on June 21, 1940.

He placed particular emphasis on my gaining the confidence first of Marshal Henri Pétain and then of Admiral François Darlan, who controlled the French Fleet. We did not talk much about Premier Pierre Laval, although to my knowledge there was no indication on December 2 that "Black Peter" (a code name for Laval) was to be kicked out abruptly by Pétain within two weeks and succeeded by Darlan.

My major task was to keep the French on our side in so far as possible. This meant convincing Pétain that the best interests of France lay in the defeat of the Axis—not an easy job in view of the military situation at the end of 1940. Roosevelt guessed shrewdly that the Marshal could not trust his ministers and that he did not always know what they were doing. This was true of Laval and almost equally so of Darlan. Therefore, I was to tell Pétain anything I learned that his ministers might be keeping from him. Roosevelt said that the old Marshal at eighty-four was beloved by the French people, and pointed out that under the existing French Constitution his word was law. Pétain even used the royal "we" in his decrees.

One difficult assignment was to explain clearly to the Marshal that this country would continue to give Britain all aid short of war. Roosevelt was aware of the widespread anti-British sentiment in France, but I was to show that the United States would try to assist *any* nation resisting aggression.

The President wanted me to be a "watchdog" to try to prevent France from extending any aid to Germany beyond what was required by the Armistice agreement. He knew that there were persons high in the Vichy Government who believed that an Axis triumph was inevitable and who for selfish reasons wished to be on the winning side. I was to repeat to all and sundry that an Axis victory would mean the dismemberment of the French Empire and reduce France to a vassal state. (I was later to find a few Frenchmen perfectly reconciled to such an eventuality and trusting that Hitler would make France his "favourite" vassal.)

Roosevelt reviewed the numerous assurances this country had received regarding the French fleet. He and I both knew the importance of the French Navy to the defence of the Western Hemisphere. I was to seek renewed pledges that under no circumstances would the fleet fall into German hands, and stress that its preservation would be vital to the preservation of the Empire and restoration of French autonomy. The President already had told Vichy bluntly that if the fleet were to be surrendered to the Axis, France would forfeit the long-standing goodwill and friendship of the United States. I was to renew that warning whenever it seemed necessary to do so. The President wanted me to include hostile operations against the British in that warning.

He knew that as a sailor I should get along well with high officials of the French Navy, and this would provide opportunities to repeat our feelings about the importance of keeping their warships out of Axis hands.

We discussed the problem of getting some food to unoccupied France. I was to explain that this nation wanted to help relieve the very real hunger of the French people, but our paramount interest was in a British victory. Therefore, our Government would have to be absolutely certain, before we would put any pressure on the British to relax their blockade, that no supplies shipped to France would in the slightest way assist the Germans. He brought me up to date on negotiations then in progress to send through the Red Cross some medical supplies and tinned or powdered milk for the French children.

As regards the French West Indies and French Guiana, we were going to continue our policy of maintaining the *status quo*. I was to insist that warships in ports of those possessions remain immobilized and that we have guarantees that the

\$245,000,000 in gold at Martinique would not be used in any manner to benefit Germany.

Finally, we were interested in preserving French authority in North Africa, and I was to indicate that the United States was prepared to assist in any appropriate way in improving the economic status of these French territories.

At the end of the two hours of discussion, I was satisfied that Roosevelt had told me exactly what he wanted me to do. He knew I would carry out his policies explicitly. I thought it would be wise to have his instructions put in writing, as a matter of record, so I suggested that when I saw Secretary of State Cordell Hull (he was not present during the conference), I would tell him about the discussion and ask the State Department to draft a letter for Roosevelt's signature. The President readily agreed.

During the next two weeks, I had conversations with Hull, Under-Secretary Sumner Welles, Ray Atherton, chief of the European Affairs Division, and James C. Dunn. On December 20, the President's instructions, now translated into State Department verbiage, were signed by Roosevelt and given to me by Hull (text in Appendix).

In the State Department, Welles gave me the clearest estimate of the situation. He impressed me as being thoroughly familiar with the details and with the policy of the President. His conversation gave me a very exact picture of what he had in his mind and I felt it was in agreement with what the President wanted. His advice to me then, and throughout my duty at Vichy, was valuable. I had lengthy conferences with the others mentioned, but it was Welles who could get over his ideas best to this sailor.

William C. Bullitt, who had been our Ambassador to France at the time of the Armistice, happened to be in the United States, and gave me some good background information on some of the personalities with whom I would be dealing. There was much Puerto Rican business to clear up at the Interior Department, but Mrs. Leahy and I were able to leave Washington on December 22, and embarked in the *Tuscaloosa* at Norfolk the next morning.

In spite of foul weather and a persistently heavy sea, we had a reasonably comfortable voyage. A half gale was blowing from the north-west on Christmas Day and our dinner had to be served on individual trays. We opened our Christmas

presents on a long settee while bracing ourselves against the cruiser's violent motion.

Lisbon was reached on December 30 and Commander Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Naval Attaché at the Vichy Embassy, was among those who greeted us. We stopped at Madrid for two days as the guests of Ambassador and Mrs. Alexander Weddell. I found our Spanish envoy well informed on the European situation and also received a gloomy picture of Britain's prospects from a tedious interview with British Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare. On the eve of 1941, Madrid was cold and short of food, except for the well-to-do. But it was peaceful, and apparently General Franco was in complete control of the Government.

We took the train to Barcelona and that twelve-hour ride was stretched to twenty-five by long, unexplained stops lasting up to three hours. We were in an unheated and unbelievably dirty car packed with passengers and baggage, including fowls and vegetables. Chilled and fatigued, we left Barcelona in a closed car. Near the French border, we were forced to ford an icy river because of a destroyed bridge. The car mired in the middle of the stream and I spent what seemed to be the coldest hour in my experience before a farmer pulled us across with his horse.

Crossing the French border at sundown at La Perthus, we finally reached Montpellier. After thirty-six cold and sleepless hours, we slept soundly in an icy room, wrapped in our clothes and overcoats. The hotel was filled to the eaves with distressed and thoroughly discouraged refugees from the part of France then occupied by the Germans.

Our caravan proceeded the next day over icy roads to Nîmes, where the polar experiences ended. A special railroad car provided by Marshal Pétain brought us to Vichy at midnight on January 5. The entire Embassy staff greeted us, took us to the relatively comfortable house on Avenue Thermale that was to be our home for the next sixteen months and gave us a good supper. Then came welcome sleep.

The correspondents for the American newspapers and wire services were on the job, and my first official act was to hold a Press conference. I really had no information to give, but, responding to an inquiry, I denied that I had come to Vichy to seek additional U.S. bases from the French in the Western Hemisphere.

I was to grow very fond of these correspondents. They were nice lads and very useful. They had many sources of information, and on occasion gave me much more news than I had for them. Among those who thus performed a valuable service for their own or adopted country were Paul Archembault (*New York Times*), Herbert King (United Press), Taylor Henry (Associated Press), John Elliott (*New York Herald Tribune*), David Darrah (*Chicago Tribune*), Paul Ghali (*Chicago Daily News*) and, lastly, Ralph Heinzen (United Press).

Archembault was the best informed. It was no secret that Heinzen was a "favourite" of Laval. The recently deposed Premier and his son-in-law, Réne de Chambrun, were trying to use Heinzen to get favourable publicity by telling him many things the other correspondents did not get. However, I think Heinzen really used his informers and that his copy was accurate. I once asked him: "Is this propaganda they are getting out for Laval?" He replied it was not and he thought the story we were discussing was a statement of fact. Heinzen was very useful.

With my first Press conference behind me, arrangements were made for me to present my credentials to Marshal Pétain in the forenoon of January 8. I presented my credentials at a formal meeting at the Pavillon Sévigné with the Marshal. The officers of the American Embassy accompanied me. It was largely a courtesy visit, but I received a definite impression that Roosevelt's action in sending a full-fledged Ambassador to Vichy had given Pétain a lift in morale. He appreciated the thoughtfulness of the President in sending a private letter in which Roosevelt expressed again his affection for the French people. I also presented Bullitt's formal letter of recall.

Nearly all Frenchmen in both the occupied and unoccupied zones, regardless of their feelings about Pétain's Government or his Ministers, revered the name of the "hero of Verdun." At eighty-four he showed remarkable vitality, and was mentally alert. Dressed in his Marshal's uniform, he had a splendid, soldierly bearing for one of any age, and a pair of remarkably clear blue eyes. He remembered our only previous meeting, some ten years before, when he had made a speech at Yorktown, Virginia, at the celebration marking the 150th anniversary of the surrender of the British to the Americans and French.

He understood some English, but spoke to me in French

with a clarity of diction and choice of expression that made it easy for me to understand. I had studied the language in school. After all, a sailor picks up a little as he travels around the world. Mrs. Leahy spoke French fluently. She had been to school in France when she was a child of ten or eleven.

The next day, with Mr. H. Freeman (Doc) Matthews, our First Secretary of Embassy acting as interpreter, I spent an hour with Pétain. We met in his little three-room office in the Hôtel du Parc, which served the same function as the Executive Wing of the White House in Washington. There were guards all over the place and the doors were closed when we talked. I was startled by the contrast in the Marshal's appearance. He showed none of the vitality of the day before. He seemed a tired old man. Most of the discussion was carried on by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Étienne Flandin. There were many times when I saw the Marshal in the late part of the day when he appeared thus. I could not, of course, fix the hour of our conferences, but went whenever I could, because the Marshal was carrying a heavy burden of work. On January 9, we talked chiefly about the food situation, which I will discuss later.

My next interview was with Admiral Darlan, then Minister of Marine, but soon to become Premier. He was very friendly, and as one sailor to another we "talked shop" easily.

Darlan spent most of the time telling me how hopelessly inefficient and unreliable the British Naval Staff was. Seven weeks before Germany invaded Norway, he said that he had insisted on the occupation of Trondheim and Narvik, but the British Navy was unable to get approval of the operation until it was too late. He limited his criticism to the high command, and admitted that the individual British officers and sailors were aggressive and courageous. He vowed never again to take the hand of an Englishman, and if necessary to protect French ships or bases he would engage British warships with every expectation of success!

He loved his own Navy. That Navy in turn held him in very high regard. Darlan insisted that his ships would be scuttled if orders were received from *any* authority to turn them over to *anybody*. He described a recent hour-and-a-half conference he had had with Hitler, and said the Führer appeared more like a lawyer than a statesman and that he did not once look directly at Darlan during their conversation. Darlan was not

pro-German, but, like all others in France at that time, he thought the Germans would win and establish a new order in Europe.

He was incurably anti-British. His officers returning from England had told him that the English were well drilled in the manual of arms, but were no good whatever for anything else. However, he did not believe that Hitler could successfully invade the British islands, "even with the existing condition of British inefficiency." He particularly underestimated the power of the British fleet, and was prejudiced beyond convincing.

* * *

The question of American food supplies for unoccupied France was to be with me during my entire stay in Vichy. At the conference with Pétain on January 9, we discussed conditions covering the shipment of milk, medicines, and clothing by the American Red Cross to the children of unoccupied France. Our Government had agreed on January 7 to permit such shipments under certain conditions, including complete Red Cross supervision of distribution. Pétain and Flandin agreed fully to these conditions.

The French were insisting that American food was an immediate necessity for the starving population in order to avoid an overthrow of the Nazi-pressured Vichy Government. However, Darlan, in complete disagreement, said there was sufficient food in France for the entire population, but that the means of distribution was lacking, principally lubricating oil and motor fuel. The Admiral thought the best way to help was to assist in their transportation difficulties.

We worked closely with Richard F. Allen, the American Red Cross representative in Europe, who came to Vichy to discuss plans for distribution of the first shipment of supplies that was expected to arrive in Marseilles in February. Allen felt that the Red Cross was fully capable of distributing any quantity of food and supplies in the unoccupied zone without any danger that such material would fall into the hands of the Germans, directly or indirectly.

He had come down from Paris, and reported that the attitude of all classes of people was increasingly in favour of a British victory and increasingly opposed to the Germans. He told me the Germans were holding vast quantities of food in storage, particularly wheat, and the occupying authorities

were well fed. He believed the Germans might permit conditions in French cities to become desperate and then make political capital by feeding the population from their stored reserves.

My own observation was that the people were suffering acutely from cold, because there wasn't enough clothing, and from malnutrition. This worried Pétain because of the active German Press campaign disparaging his Government for not providing food. The German-controlled Press also had emphasized that the United States would have no difficulty in obtaining passage of relief supplies through the British blockade.

I wrote Welles on January 16 that it was possible to provide relief clothing, food, and lubricating oils in unoccupied France without permitting any useful amount to reach the aggressors. I pointed out that if unoccupied France could have better food and clothing than the occupied zone, it would be difficult for the opposition to attack the Pétain Government on the relief issue.

"If we wish to retain the confidence of the French people through the approaching critical period of food and fuel shortage, it is necessary for us to do something more than talk," I informed Mr. Welles.

In a less serious vein, food was a problem to all of us working at Vichy. We had brought from America extra supplies of coffee, sugar, soap, bacon, and butter, because they were not readily obtainable in France. Any food was hard to get, although my staff managed to live pretty well. People would secrete in closets food that they had wangled from somebody. It took all the renowned skill of French cooks to make the hotel fare even palatable.

* * *

Vichy was unprepared to become the capital of a country. Nevertheless, it managed to function somehow. It had long been a famous spa. At the peak of its seasons there had been upwards of 90,000 persons there, but the normal population was around 50,000. The Government crowded its offices into many of the hotels. This made the housing problem acute for the 130,000 estimated to be at Vichy when we arrived.

Electric light and power were as variable as the moods of a *prima donna*. Ancient charcoal-burning buses struggled to handle the overflow commuter traffic to nearby towns. And it was cold—bitterly cold. The residence commandeered by the

French Government for our use was owned by an American citizen, Mr. Frank Gould. By sealing the doors and windows with cloth and paper strips and using coal-burning fireplaces (salamanders) we made it habitable, but hardly comfortable. Similar measures at our Chancellery met with less success, and we had to wear winter overcoats while working. There were no heating arrangements.

The Chancellery, formerly a doctor's office called Villa Ica, also had been commandeered. I worked in what apparently had been an upstairs sitting-room. We were crowded in amidst ornate period furniture that had to serve our business needs. None other was obtainable. There were many handicaps. Our only mail came by couriers who appeared without advance notice at irregular intervals. Later the Navy managed a slightly better service for my private mail, although I never knew how it was done.

Arrivals of these couriers would send all hands to their writing desks or typewriters, hastily dashing off letters to be taken back to America. Some of my most important letters to the President and Welles were written while the courier waited impatiently to begin his long trek back through Spain and Portugal.

However, I wrote President Roosevelt frequently. I did not correspond with Secretary Hull or other officials except the President and Welles.

Our news was obtained from the British Broadcasting Corporation transmissions, which came through fairly well, despite German attempts to jam them. On occasions we also heard a Boston station (W.R.U.L.). I would stay up late to catch the night B.B.C. newscast and often heard Big Ben striking midnight in London. In our isolated diplomatic outpost at Vichy, it was a most comforting sound.

Paris papers arrived intermittently. They usually had some scurrilous articles about me. If they were sufficiently scandalous, I would send them to Roosevelt. The courier would bring the New York and Washington papers, and we would then catch up on what had happened in the world during the previous weeks.

I kept regular hours, arriving at the office promptly at 9.30, walking home for lunch and leaving on foot at 5.30 p.m. It was said that a luggage shop near Villa Ica set its clocks by these arrivals and departures. What I remember most about that and other shops were their high prices.

The chief available entertainment was opera. I could never be called an ardent opera fan, and Mrs. Leahy had to be very persuasive to get me to attend. She usually succeeded. What I enjoyed most was entertaining my colleagues of the diplomatic corps and their ladies who shared our discomforts. We had the best food in Vichy, sent from America, although some it was stolen from us *en route*. When we made our first round of ceremonial calls, we found our friends in their residences wearing overcoats and mufflers and trying to warm their hands over small heaters of one kind or another.

There was a large diplomatic colony at Vichy. About forty nations maintained diplomatic relations with the Pétain Government. Six of them—United States, Japan, Spain, Turkey, Argentina and Brazil—had embassies. The Papal Nuncio also ranked as an Ambassador. A number of these diplomat friends of mine were very useful in furnishing information. Most of them wanted the Germans defeated. Some were violently in favour of it, but they did not want to do anything: they wanted me to do it.

We were received graciously by everybody, including the people and the officials in Vichy. I soon knew all of Pétain's Ministers and met them socially, but did not do any business with them. I wanted to keep the confidence of Pétain and did not play around with his Ministers, many of whom he distrusted. However, my excellent staff kept extremely useful contacts with the entire Vichy Government.

It was different in occupied France. Although I never went into that area, the activities of our Embassy were a constant irritation to the German occupation authorities. A campaign of vilification started almost the day my appointment was announced and continued until I returned to the United States.

* * *

The President had asked me to keep him informed about the situation through personal letters, the first of which was written on January 25, 1941. I gave him my impressions of Marshal Pétain and added that the burden of work he had assumed was beyond his physical capacity and he did not seem to have complete confidence in his Cabinet. It was obvious that the Marshal had an intense dislike for Laval, who was trying to displace him as the actual head of the Government and relegate him to a position of a symbol.

I stressed Pétain's sensitivity to German pressure, especially as applied to the more than 1,000,000 French soldiers held in German war prison camps, to the food supply, and the authority of his Vichy Government. However, I felt Pétain would try to live up to the Armistice terms.

I stressed that the failure of France even to *delay* the German Army had so impressed the Marshal and his Cabinet that they believed an English victory impossible. I said it certainly was desirable that England accomplish some kind of success against the German forces in the near future. From the French point of view, the "invincible" German Army was not involved in either the Libyan or Albanian campaigns, where the Allies had achieved some success. I told Roosevelt that while the French people appeared to desire a British victory and many Vichy officials hoped for it, they did not expect it. Because of this, many top officials were disposed to make almost any compromise with Berlin, and I wrote that I was afraid, under German pressure, the Marshal would have to take Laval back into his Government, although he believed Laval dishonest, unpatriotic, and called him "a bad Frenchman." I related how I had been trying to stiffen Pétain's backbone by saying that Laval's return to power would be only the beginning of a series of concessions exacted by the Germans' pressure methods and that there would be no end to them.

In summing up, I told Mr. Roosevelt that none of the officials apparently had any regard for France's pre-war form of government. This included the Marshal, who seemed to favour something like the Fascist government of Italy without its expansionist policy.

In another letter to Welles, I stated an impression of Vichy in the words of one Frenchman, who told me that "my people in France likened the Vichy Government to a basket of crabs in which the larger and stronger members of the collection have pushed themselves to the top and then endeavoured to push the others over the side of the basket."

CHAPTER III

THE AXIS MAKES ADDITIONAL DEMANDS

BY THE END OF JANUARY, there were signs that Hitler was about to apply heavy pressure on Marshal Pétain for "closer co-operation" in establishing a "new order" in Europe. The Nazis had a powerful assortment of very real threats, in addition to prisoners and food. They could shut off communications with the occupied zone at any moment, set up a rival puppet government in Paris, move the demarcation line or even forcibly occupy the area ruled by Vichy. This area was roughly that third of pre-war France lying south of Paris and east of the Atlantic coastal strip taken over by the victors.

A fear that the Nazis would impose additional hardships on French prisoners of war or take over the unoccupied zone was constantly on Pétain's mind. He had a very real, if paternal, affection for "his children" (*mes enfants*) and he knew that any harm to the French sons in the prisoner of war camps would bring to their mothers and fathers and wives additional distress. As to the danger of Nazi occupation, he once said to me: "If I go against them [the Nazis] they will come down here, and that would be terrible for my people. They are my people. I am responsible for their welfare." Armed with this understanding of Pétain, many of his actions during my stay in Vichy could be understood when they seemed inexplicable to others in Washington and elsewhere.

Some of the Vichy Ministers, notably Flandin, talked to me about the necessity of a peace without victory. His ideas reminded me of those of President Woodrow Wilson in the earlier world war. They also impressed me as being very close to a policy of collaboration between Germany and France, because in so far as I knew, history did not contain any record of a lasting peace without a military victory.

The "pressure" referred to above turned out to be attempts of ex-Premier Laval to worm his way back into the Government. Pétain showed courage in this particular test of wills and not only refused Laval's demands, but empowered Admiral Darlan on February 8, 1941, to organize a new Cabinet.

Darlan made the most of his opportunity by becoming Vice-President of the Council and "heir apparent" to succeed Pétain. This surprised me, as I had distinct impressions from conversations with the Marshal that he did not have full confidence in the Admiral. However, Pétain had decreed in January that all French Ministers and high officials would be subject to Darlan personally.

* * *

Telephone communications between Vichy and southern France were cut off suddenly on February 11. It was feared that the so-called Spanish Loyalists, then in southern France in great numbers, might try to assassinate General Franco, who was *en route* to Italy to see Mussolini. Rumours followed in his wake, especially when Pétain conferred with him somewhere along the way. The most interesting explanation of their meeting was credited to the Mayor of Barcelona, a close friend of Franco. El Caudillo told him, my source said, that Mussolini had first asked him to come to Spain to discuss the passage of German troops through that country, presumably for an attack on Gibraltar. Franco proposed instead that he himself proceed to Italy.

When he arrived in Rome, Franco told Mussolini that the Spanish people would never permit the Germans to pass through Spain even if he, Franco, wished to authorize such a movement, and that he himself was opposed to the proposition. After the war, it was learned that Hitler had been much irritated in October, 1940, when Franco refused to join actively in the Führer's plans for a pincers movement against the British in the Mediterranean involving Gibraltar and an invasion through Spanish Morocco.

Similar evidence appearing from time to time led me to believe that General Franco, while desiring to appear neutral in the war, really was on the side of the Allies. He was at times of high value to them in preventing a German attack on the Straits of Gibraltar. In view of the low state of the Allied military position in early 1941, Franco either was a good guesser or extremely lucky. Almost everyone with whom I had contact in France at that time was sure of German victory.

* * *

I had my first conference with Admiral Darlan, as Premier and Vice-President of the Council of State, on February 24.

I found him frankly in favour of economic collaboration with Germany—which was unpleasant news, since he had made two short visits to Paris in the middle of the month. He believed thoroughly that British influence in European political affairs was ended, no matter what might be the outcome of the war.

Darlan's representative in Paris was reported to have told the Press that if the British did not ease their blockade pressure, the Admiral would use the Government propaganda machine to tell the French people that Churchill was responsible for their starving and that the Navy would convoy French merchantmen and sink any British ship that interfered. This announcement was of no help to me in my effort to obtain food from America for Pétain's hungry "*mes enfants*."

I had a feeling that the Marshal would oppose any effort to antagonize the French people against the Allies, even though the British blockade policy of preventing minimum foodstuffs reaching unoccupied France appeared to be of the same order of stupidity as many other wartime British policies.

Later (March 4) I wrote Welles that I was still unable to understand why the British Ministry of Economic Warfare or any group in America should desire to acquire or maintain the ill will of the French people by forcing them onto starvation rations. However, some weeks later, Darlan retreated considerably from his defiant Paris utterances, although I suspected that he had sufficient boldness and enough disrespect for the British naval command to attempt to force the blockade.

The Admiral told me that German authorities, understanding the need for bread in unoccupied France, had released to him 200,000 tons of wheat from their stores in northern France. He did *not* tell me what the Germans expected in payment for the wheat.

He had discussed at Paris some pending social reforms which would reorganize French industry and government along the lines of the Italian corporate state system. He was obviously pleased to tell me that he was getting along well with the Germans and that the influence of his chief rival, Laval, was decreasing. As a result of this discussion, I felt Darlan was able, ambitious, and would be dangerous unless restrained by the Marshal, especially regarding his intentions toward the British Navy's blockade. Pétain did not trust him completely, and with reason, as he often was to take actions without consulting the Marshal. When I would learn of such

action and report it to Pétain, the Admiral would be much irritated.

Throughout this hour's conversation, Darlan was agreeable and friendly. He seemed the best man the Marshal could find at the time and likely to keep practical control of the Government unless the Germans forced Laval on Pétain. Admiral Darlan was conciliatory toward the Nazis, but they did not accept him fully. He told me that he had permission from the Armistice Commission, which was at Wiesbaden, to threaten to sink British ships.

In another "political situation" report to President Roosevelt, I said the general impression in Vichy was that Admiral Darlan was much less dangerous than Laval, despite his apparently incurable dislike for the British. I reported also that Pétain attached considerable importance to Roosevelt's estimates of his character, and that the second of those polite little personal messages of his which I had delivered orally had an excellent effect.

A significant angle of the daily barrage of criticism of the Pétain Government (and of the American Ambassador) in the Paris papers was that Darlan now was included in the Press attacks. I was pictured as a tool of Jewish bankers, an ex-British agent, a Freemason, and of having given Pétain an ultimatum to appoint my "sailor friend," Darlan, to his new post as No. 2 man in the Government. Some of this was too much even for Pétain, and he suspended for two months a magazine in unoccupied France for publishing what was termed "an inadmissible article about an official of a friendly nation."

* * *

One good blow for our side came on March 10, when the accord, which came to be known as the Murphy-Weygand Agreement, providing limited economic assistance by the United States to French North Africa was initialled at Vichy. This was largely the handiwork of Robert D. Murphy, former Chargé at our Embassy. There had been some complaint about his activity in North Africa, but he succeeded in making a thorough survey of the political and economic factors involved and laid the ground-work for success in these areas when American forces landed there in November, 1942.

We at Vichy had missed his trained power of observation, attractive personality, and high efficiency. In the old Navy,

we would have marked his name with a star, indicating our certainty of his rapid progress to the highest rank.

The agreement provided for the shipment to North Africa of some staples primarily intended for the Arabs, who were susceptible to German propaganda efforts. Among the items included was cotton cloth. I was told the Arabs buried their dead in cotton robes and if they didn't have any cotton robes the deceased ones probably would not get to Heaven. The Arabs liked tea, so it also was on the list.

Another intelligence project did not go so well. The French complained about the activities of General William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan, who as Director of the Office of Strategic Services was making a tour of Europe and the Middle East. The Vichy Government refused to issue a passport for him to travel in Syria. I did not know either Donovan or the O.S.S. Some of his agents were not entirely innocent of making trouble for the Embassy. We learned later of their efficiency in collecting and evaluating intelligence about Axis military and political plans.

Therefore I was surprised when a young Chicago lawyer, Thomas G. Cassidy, arrived, on "orders from Navy Secretary Knox," to become Assistant Naval Attaché at the Embassy. I soon found he did not know which end of a boat went first and wondered what kind of officers the Navy was commissioning. Some time later I learned he was a secret O.S.S. agent planted in the American Embassy. Cassidy was a very good spy—capable and discreet. He succeeded so well in keeping his secret that when the Embassy staff was imprisoned by the Germans in November, 1942, the Nazis could not make a case against him, although they definitely suspected espionage.

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The radio informed us on March 8 that the Senate had passed the Lend-Lease Bill (it became law three days later), giving the President power to lease or lend military equipment of all kinds to democratic countries at war with aggressor nations. This meant that the United States, for its own security, would be giving all possible aid short of war to Great Britain. All my colleagues at Vichy felt that this action virtually had put our country into the war. It was a boost in morale for many of the sincerely pro-Allied officials in the various Vichy Government departments.

This action coincided with the arrival at Vichy of General Maxime Weygand, the capable soldier who had attempted the hopeless task of rallying the French armies in the final collapse of France and who had been assigned to North Africa as Colonial Delegate-General by Laval. This was one move of the arch-collaborationist which had a result Laval probably never expected. Weygand was to prove of great value to us until German pressure forced his recall.

Pétain first planned for me to meet Weygand at a dinner he was giving for the General, but some of his Ministers feared unfavourable German reaction to a public meeting, so we had a private talk at my home on Sunday, March 9. I have no doubt, however, that the Germans were kept informed of all visitors to the American Residence. Vichy was full of spies.

Weygand first expressed appreciation for America's aid to North Africa. He gave me much useful information on military and political conditions there. He estimated the Germans had one or two divisions in Italian Libya. As for his own territory, he made it plain that he would oppose with all the force at his command an attack on French Africa by *anybody*.

The few Germans in Africa were busy propagandizing the natives, capitalizing on their industrial and commercial distress in an effort to undermine French authority. The Arabs were still loyal to Vichy, but it was hard to estimate how much hardship and privation they would stand before revolting. The General's *aide*, Count de Rose, added that any attempt by the French in Africa to fight Germany at that time would result in complete destruction of the French nation on the Continent, have no favourable effect on the outcome of the war, and reduce Frenchmen to slavery.

Both indicated that if the Nazis did attack, the North African army, which had been reorganized by Weygand, would resist with some hope of success. Later, they said, when Germany faced eventual defeat, the African army might aid the Allied cause considerably if supplied with food and munitions and rearmed. Count de Rose made a good case for standing pat in North Africa until the military situation was more favourable.

Meanwhile, it seemed vital for the anti-Axis nations to provide without delay the necessary assistance, and I was pleased that the Murphy-Weygand Agreement was about to become effective, although the supplies sent under that arrangement were inadequate.

At seventy-four, General Weygand was vigorous, energetic, and determined. I felt he was really on our side, although he insisted he would resist to the end *any* attempt to invade his territory. I was not surprised to be told later that Weygand had said that "if the British come with four divisions, I will fire on them. If they come with twenty, I will welcome them." I felt that his visit to Vichy would strengthen the wavering backbones of some of Pétain's Ministers. I also was fearful that it might cause the Germans to force his removal from the North African Command.

* * *

Roosevelt followed up the Lend-Lease action with his famous "arsenal of democracy" speech on March 15 at the White House correspondents' dinner. The President promised ships, food, guns and planes to the enemies of Hitler. Knowing the local Press would carry only abbreviated and distorted reports, I had complete English and French texts prepared and took these with me to a long interview I had with Marshal Pétain on March 18.

I summarized the results of our good talk in a letter to the President the next day. In it I said:

"I took the opportunity to tell him [Pétain] that your statement is a notice to the world, in language that everybody can understand, that the Axis powers will be defeated.

"If it does not provide stiffening for wavering Gallic vertebræ, there seems nothing for the Marshal to do but have a house-cleaning and find substitutes for his present entourage. I think most of them will now see the light and get on the band-wagon.

"The Marshal was in excellent form—alert, interested and appreciative of what America is doing and has done to assist him."

I wrote about Pétain's belief that the speech would force Germany to try shortly to invade England. He believed, although doubtful of the outcome of such an operation, that it was Germany's only hope of winning the war. I thought such an invasion was impossible, and even if successful would not win the war, and I so informed Pétain.

Darlan's attempts to please the Germans were reviewed for the President, and I passed on the Marshal's remark that "Darlan is now working pretty close to the Germans, and I will have to keep an eye on him." Personally, I thought that

Darlan's ambition for high office would land him squarely on the band-wagon as soon as he thought he could make a certain choice, and told the President that "your statement . . . should point out to them [Darlan and his Ministers] the right wagon to select."

The de Gaullists in France claimed to have Pétain's secret blessing which, of course, made trouble for the Marshal with the Germans. Prime Minister Churchill had informed Pétain privately that General Charles de Gaulle, who set himself up in London in June, 1940, as leader of the "Free French," was of no assistance to the British cause, although the British financed his activities. Pétain could not understand this British action, and pointed out that if the Free French threatened an attack on North Africa or Syria with British support, it might bring loyal French colonial troops in combat with the British. I promised to bring this possibility to Washington's attention, and did so promptly by cable as well as discussing it in the letter to Roosevelt.

Concerning sentiment in France at this time (March, 1941), I wrote Mr. Roosevelt:

"Up to the present time, I believe that America is holding the friendly regard of all the French people, official and otherwise, except a small group of followers of M. Laval who are subsidized by Germany.

"We must, however, keep in mind the fact that France is beaten down and thoroughly sick of the war, that there are now one and a half million war-prisoner hostages, and that almost any peace proposal would appeal to most of the inhabitants."

* * *

Gasoline, merchant ships and food were mixed up together in April.

Italy demanded immediate delivery of 5,000 tons of gasoline from Algeria in accordance with a previous agreement. I reminded Darlan that on March 3, in the presence of Pétain, he had promised not to deliver any petroleum products from Africa to the Axis powers, and that violation of that pledge might halt any American assistance to those colonies and even prevent further relief supplies being shipped to occupied France.

Darlan's explanation that this was a big reduction in original Italian demands did not sound authentic. Privately,

I wondered if he was trying to toss a monkey wrench at General Weygand, who needed every gallon of gasoline he could get in North Africa. While we were talking, Rear-Admiral Paul Auphan, in charge of the Merchant Marine, came in and handed Darlan a dispatch which announced the British had stopped four French merchantmen *en route* from Casablanca to Oran. Darlan barked: "If those ships are seized, I will provide naval escorts for our merchant ships." That may all have been a little "show" staged for my benefit. Darlan finally said he would try to get Italy to agree to accept petroleum from occupied France rather than from North Africa.

Then came word that crews of some of the French ships that had taken refuge in American ports were quite outspokenly anti-British. I told both the Marshal and the Admiral that we would have to keep a close watch on these vessels and possibly put guards aboard. The Marshal didn't object to inspection, disliked the idea of American guards, and said if the American Government would give assurances the ships would not be turned over to or used by the British, he would issue an order that no sabotage be attempted by the crews.

A wheat barter arrangement with the Germans, announced on March 25, was creating strong American opposition to sending even the Red Cross supplies already loaded. I told Pétain at this April 3 meeting that his Government could assist our relief efforts by quieting rumours of convoys, preventing shipment of petroleum to Axis powers, and looking into reports of German infiltration into North Africa.

Ordinarily, our Embassy did not receive much mail from either zone of France. This changed in the weeks following the President's stirring address on aid to Europe and the information that two ships were coming to Marseilles to bring relief supplies. People in all walks of life wrote expressing appreciation of Roosevelt's "courageous and friendly" action. Some were signed, many were anonymous. They contained pleas for relief and gave pitiful examples of the need.

Without exception, the letters showed a desire for expulsion of the Germans from France, even to the point of submitting themselves to starvation rather than permit any of the promised relief to fall into the hands of the invaders. The writers seemed to have full confidence in the Marshal, but they were sufficiently doubtful about his Ministers to insist that control

of the distribution of relief food be placed exclusively in the hands of Americans. There was also a hint in this flood of mail that the de Gaulle movement might be stronger than had been indicated by the Government officials at Vichy. More about that later.

* * *

A Red Cross relief ship, the S.S. *Exmouth*, was due to unload at Marseilles on April 7. It was bringing food, medicine, and clothing for children. Three days before its arrival, Mrs. Leahy and I left to meet the ship. That same day German troops occupied Benghazi in Libya. This news had a distressing effect on French morale. Hopes of an Allied victory had revived as the British scored their first success of the war in North Africa. Now it appeared that victory was to be short-lived.

Our route took us through Limoges, where we went through the great Haviland porcelain factories. A large crowd cheered enthusiastically for the United States and for President Roosevelt as we entered a building to attend a Chamber of Commerce reception. The de Havilands have preserved their American citizenship during three generations of residence in France. They are citizens of whom we should be proud.

During the trip we stopped at a little fourteenth-century village, Entraygues, which showed no visible sign of improvement since that time. When we left the Mayor tried to make a short, prepared address of appreciation, but he was so emotionally affected by discouragement, hopelessness, and the shame of defeat that tears ran down his face. He could not say a word. It was difficult for me to control my own features while trying to give him, in his distress, a word of encouragement.

Great cheering crowds filled the street in front of the Grand Hotel at Marseilles, where we were met by Mr. Allen, the Red Cross Director, our Consul-General, Hugh Fullerton, and Vice-Consul, Hiram Bingham, Jr. The crowd remained packed in the street and would not go away until we came out on to the balcony of our department in the hotel to receive more cheers and salutes.

The next morning, with Captain Junstron of the S.S. *Exmouth* and local French officials, we proceeded with heavy military escort through crowded streets to a storage warehouse on the dock, where we were welcomed by the Red Cross

workers, Boy Scouts, and a great number of people connected with the relief work for children. A cold wind was blowing with gale force and the ceremonies had to be conducted under shelter. We later carefully inspected the method followed in Marseilles for the distribution of the relief supplies. During the next five days we made similar inspections at Toulon, Cannes, Monte Carlo and Nice.

The relief supplies we saw were exclusively food for children, milk, clothing for infants, and vitamins. I learned later that suspicious members of the Italian Armistice Commission examined some of the packages landed from the *Exmouth*, ostensibly searching for "machine guns." They found only "layettes."

From this single shipment, thousands of children were being given much-needed assistance that might succeed in preserving their lives or future health for the benefit of some post-war France. Throughout the journey I had a heartfelt sympathy for the suffering of these innocent little people—and a continually decreasing regard for those in my own country, and for the English, who were making it almost impossibly difficult for us to help them. There was no leakage to the Germans. The parents were more than watchful to see that the very limited amount available got to their children. Any adult caught in appropriating the babies' food probably would have been beaten senseless. The Red Cross supplies were not in sufficient quantity to be of any use to the German war effort, even if they had fallen into Nazi hands.

There was a real outpouring of gratitude everywhere we went. At Nice we were delayed an hour by the thousands of children carrying flowers and flags who crowded around our car. Upon leaving the auto, I was embraced by two highly emotional old women, who presumably had grandchildren beneficiaries of our food and medicine. At Monte Carlo, the distribution centres were efficiently operated under the direction of the young and attractive Princess Antoinette of Monaco, whose grandfather, Louis II, was the reigning Prince and upon whom I made a formal call at noon. The latter had in his palace a small but very interesting collection of things that had belonged to Napoleon and the Emperor's son, the King of Rome. Our inspection tour was cut short by an urgent request that we return to Vichy. The Germans were giving the screw another turn. They were threatening to arrest some

Americans in retaliation for the arrest of German sailors in American ports.

I shall never forget the hundreds and hundreds of children who had been gathered at the relief depots. They looked frail, grey, and under-nourished. Their parents obviously were overwhelmed. They thought, and said: "They are doing this for our children." The cost was negligible compared with the friends we made. There were two reasons for providing this relief. There was the humanitarian attitude, which America normally takes toward people who are suffering, particularly children. The other was to retain for ourselves the confidence of the French people. We did accomplish that. The contribution was not much. It should have been more, but the parents were very appreciative of what we did.

The Germans tried to discount our relief activity, and called my trip to Marseilles a propaganda stunt. The police were reported to have been instructed to suppress any public demonstrations of approval. If that was true, they did not carry out their orders very well.

* * *

When we returned to Vichy on April 10, it was obvious that the Germans were tightening the noose around unoccupied France. The next two months were to be most trying for me, and for Marshal Pétain. He seemed to draw closer to me as his troubles with the Nazis mounted. He asked for me often, and seemed relieved to have somebody to whom he could unburden himself. He said once during this interval: "I have no force. At one time I had an army and I could do anything with it. You know, M. Leahy, if we have no force, we can't do these things."

Pétain said that on any question of interpretation of the Armistice the Germans would make the interpretation, saying it was the privilege of victors to interpret agreements. Lack of power was his chief difficulty. He thought the only possible effective opposition would be armed resistance (I felt that would be futile), or sabotage, which would bring instant and severe reprisals. While the people of France hated the Germans almost unanimously, they then had no arms, no organization, and very little fighting spirit.

Highlights of our conversations, which I reported to the President and Welles, were:

Pétain would not under any circumstances leave "his people" to move the Government to North Africa nor order Weygand to join with the Allies.

He would keep his word about Germany not getting the fleet or occupying North African bases. (Actually, there was nothing except Allied sea power to interfere effectively with the latter.)

He believed a Russo-German war inevitable and that Hitler faced future trouble in the occupied countries because his forces were widely dispersed.

He said that America was the only friend now remaining to France and the only hope for the future of his country and his people.

He did not have full confidence in Darlan, but did not know of any other person who might be better.

All this led me to report to Washington my conviction that we should continue or expand our Red Cross relief to give us an effective means of influencing French public opinion, to which the Marshal was very sensitive and to which his Cabinet Ministers paid some attention. Also I estimated that any demands the Germans might make would be granted by the Vichy Government or permitted without effective opposition. There was ample evidence that such pressure was being exerted.

* * *

Early in April the Nazis sought, among other things, to control shipping on the Mediterranean Coast and to send 200 officers and soldiers to North Africa as an "armistice Commission."

Rumours persisted that Laval would in the near future be forced back into the Pétain Government. Political activity became very hazardous, although there probably was more danger from irregular French partisans than from invaders. More guards were thrown around Admiral Darlan's residence.

The Allies were forced out of Greece and the French greeted cynically the British reports of "falling back in good order." Most of my colleagues in France and probably all Frenchmen expected that the British Army would "retreat in good order" across the sea to Egypt. There were some British naval successes, but Frenchmen noted, with increasing despair, that nobody had even slowed the pace of the German soldiers who had rolled over the "magnificent French Army" so quickly.

Pétain was eighty-five on April 24. I sent him greetings,

although I did not know what that lonely old man should have been congratulated for. It was a futile courtesy, especially now that we know what was done to him after we drove out the Germans and left him to the mercy of other dissident Frenchmen.

One bright bit of news from Washington on April 26 announced that finally the Murphy-Weygand Agreement was to go into operation and essential supplies to care for the current needs of General Weygand's North African Army were to be delivered.

* * *

Meanwhile, the uncertainty deepened. The Egyptian Minister said the British had not allowed Egypt to develop an army, and he feared the Germans would capture the Suez Canal. "Reliable sources" said Hitler was going to demand that France associate herself openly with the Axis. More important, Marshal Pétain told me he knew of the German plan to take Gibraltar. He did not know the time (early spring was the consensus of opinion), but expected a simultaneous attack on unoccupied France—when he would have to make a clean break with the invaders by refusing to make any further concessions.

The Marshal said he would warn me if there should be time. Thus all the anti-Axis missions definitely had to consider that they and their staffs—men, women and children—might be thoroughly isolated unless they could escape by sea or across a narrow border to Switzerland.

At the American Embassy, two escape routes had been mapped long before. One was to the Mediterranean and the other lay across the difficult Pyrenees into Spain. Members of our Embassy, by careful use of the inadequate official allowance of gasoline, had accumulated and buried in tins in concealed places along the roads enough gas to drive in our own cars over either route.

The continued success of the Germans in the eastern Mediterranean led me to wonder if the current pressure on Vichy was part of a plan to seize French North Africa. If the Axis powers could take the Suez and Gibraltar and send an expedition across from French ports, Britain would face a three-way pincers on North Africa with only sea power available to oppose the movement.

* * *

I saw Marshal Pétain on May 3. He looked old, tired, and worried. May 1 is Labour Day in France, and he was fatigued from a trip made in connection with the celebrations. Admiral Darlan was in Paris or some place unknown to the Marshal, conferring with the Germans. It was almost certain he would return with new German collaboration plans. Pétain and I discussed their possible effect on my efforts to obtain more food supplies for France.

Darlan returned to Vichy the next day, stayed just two hours, and rushed back to Paris. On May 7, the Press headlines shouted that Germany was expected to cut the occupation costs by 25 per cent. to 300 million francs daily and to relax greatly restrictions on traffic of various kinds across the demarcation line. I was unable to get any inkling of what Darlan was going to have to pay for these concessions.

The Germans had ordered our Embassy office in Paris to be closed, and Maynard Barnes, who had been in charge there since Bullitt's departure after the Armistice, arrived in Vichy *en route* to the United States. I tried to search his mind, but found only that he had a higher opinion of Laval than prevailed generally. I got a fairly unfavourable impression of Barnes, because he did not seem to be in full agreement with what the President was trying to do.

Amid this tension, we managed to celebrate my sixty-sixth birthday on May 6. Our children had sent the best of all possible presents to anyone living in France—food. Cigarettes ran food a close second. Men were allowed one package each week and women got no cigarette coupons. The ladies were especially appreciative of those sent to us from home.

* * *

A public utility magnate associated with our Red Cross relief work gave us comforting news that children receiving the milk and vitamins in the unoccupied zone showed immediate improvement in health, and the entire adult population was grateful for this assistance. He did tell me that small children in occupied France were dying in large numbers from food-poisoning and malnutrition.

This informant also brought reports that high-ranking Nazis wished to make a peace agreement to evacuate all occupied territory in Western Europe, retaining only Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria, get back Germany's pre-war African

colonies and be given a free hand in Russia, The last matched a current Vichy rumour that Hitler planned to invade the Ukraine sometime during May. We also heard that Japan would enter the war on the Axis side if the United States became involved. To me, this statement, attributed to Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Tokyo, definitely pointed to a long war. The reported German rumour was the first of many that drifted down to us at Vichy.

* * *

Darlan was at Berchtesgaden talking to Hitler on May 11. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Fuehrer's Paris Representative, Otto Abetz, and Jacques Benoist-Mechin, in charge of Franco-German relations, were reported to be with them. There was no positive information about what they were discussing, but all signs pointed to some kind of deal for closer collaboration with the Axis and therefore a crisis in our relations with the Pétain Government. I cabled each development, including the rumours, to Washington as fast as I got them. The President, with his usual accurate timing, sent a strong oral message to be delivered to Pétain. It reminded the Marshal of his pledge not to agree to any assistance that went beyond the Armistice agreement, especially any collaboration measures involving surrender of the French colonies. I saw Pétain on May 12. He was much worried, and asked his War Minister, General Charles Huntziger, to sit in on the interview. He had not seen Darlan and could make no immediate reply to the President's request for new assurances. I felt that British defeats in Libya, Yugoslavia and Greece were pushing the Vichy Government into the German lap and that there was likely to be little further objection by France to any demands the Germans might impose. The only clue I could get was that instead of saying France would give no military assistance to Germany, Pétain remarked significantly that he would give "no *voluntary* military aid."

On May 15, the Council of Ministers unanimously approved the agreement Darlan had made with Hitler, but there was no official information as to what it contained. From the White House in Washington the same day, Mr. Roosevelt issued a statement saying that the French people still cherished "the ideals of liberty and free institutions," and that he could not believe that they would willingly accept any agreement for

“so-called collaboration” that would imply alliance with a military power dedicated to the “utter destruction of liberty, freedom and popular institutions everywhere.”

This was one of the few times that our excellent contacts absolutely froze up on us. No one was able—or willing—to inform me as to what the Germans had demanded. I was convinced that our usual sources did not know and that this information was confined exclusively to the Council of Ministers. Unverified reports claimed Hitler wanted full industrial and political collaboration and that “this was the last opportunity” for France. Rumours also hinted Germany might move the demarcation line north of Paris and release some war prisoners. These two concessions would certainly improve Darlan’s standing, for he seemed to be almost unanimously distrusted at the moment. His propaganda arm was going full blast. His picture began to appear in the Press and in the stores. Shops failing to display the Admiral’s photograph were visited by agents and “advised.” It also was evident that Vichy did not like the President’s statement of May 15, nor his subsequent order placing guards aboard French vessels in American ports.

On May 23 Darlan presented his “triumph” to the French people in a broadcast from Paris. He said Hitler had not asked for the French fleet, as everyone knew, most of all the British, and that he was not going to deliver his fleet to anybody. He said next that the Führer had not asked for any French colonial territory, nor that France declare war on England; nor had he asked the surrender of any of the sovereignty of France.

The Admiral insisted that France had a free choice of the road she would take and on France alone depended the present and future of Frenchmen. He ended by saying France could have peace when France should herself make it and that his country would have in a new European order the place for which she was prepared.

Darlan gave *no* information on what was contained in Hitler’s demands. He said only that it was the duty of the French people to follow the Marshal in his work of national renovation.

* * *

The months of May and June were most discouraging for friends of the Allied powers in France, and very difficult for

me. My assurances that Germany would eventually meet with defeat plainly were doubted. Many diplomatic colleagues wanted to know what the American reaction was to the change in attitude of the French Government. Some told us in confidence that they were prepared to leave France on an hour's notice.

I could only assure them that the unchangeable purpose of my Government was the defeat of the Axis powers and that we would ultimately succeed in that purpose. My friends either refused to believe in the existence of the great military power of the United States or, if it did exist, they thought it would never be employed. In my May 19 letter to Welles I said advisedly: "I do not know whether or not I will hereafter have much useful influence with the Marshal or with other members of the government. . . . I will of course keep you up to date on all the information that anybody has."

I asked the State Department, in case of my recall, to give me, if possible, sufficient notice to permit evacuating women and children connected with the Embassy, and added that "news-gatherers hereabouts have had reports of our already being on our way out via Portugal. The Berlin and Paris radios had started a 'build-up' to have me recalled."

We had a powerful weapon in the radio, which reached a great number of people. My advice to Washington was that news items broadcast by the B.B.C. which originated in the U.S. should state clearly that they came from America. Everybody in unoccupied France considered British news propaganda, but had confidence in American news. It seemed that we might be forced to end our agreements on relief supplies. I suggested that before any decision was made the reason for it should be thoroughly disseminated through the B.B.C. and the Boston station. I thought it would be helpful to light a little radio fire under Darlan and Pétain in advance of any decision on curtailment.

The Marshal, who was honestly devoted to the welfare of his people, was extremely sensitive to public opinion. I thought it desirable to make a special effort through the radio to keep the French people accurately informed, but to avoid for the time being any criticism of the Marshal in person. Radio really was the only means available, because the French Press was completely controlled and violently anti-American. I was encouraged somewhat when Welles wrote in

June that "we have made some progress . . . in the co-ordination of short-wave broadcasts beamed to occupied and unoccupied France."

The disaster at Crete had ended the Greek debacle and played directly into Hitler's hands in dealing with a suppliant Darlan. The cheerful estimate I sent the President in March—that his "arsenal of democracy" speech probably would steer the Admiral toward the Allied band-wagon—looked almost foolish by now. Apparently, the only move which could prevent complete control of France and its colonies by Germany would be a definite setback to the German advance by the application of superior force to some important point before it was too late. It seemed to me that the Mediterranean was that vulnerable point.

If an American army of 250,000 men, thoroughly trained and supplied with modern weapons, should reinforce General Weygand's small, badly equipped force before the Germans could arrive in North Africa, it would, in my opinion, insure the control of the Mediterranean and shorten the duration of the war by half.

At that time, at least part of Weygand's army would have welcomed us. Ninety-five per cent. of the French people would have joined with an American force if it arrived in sufficient numbers to promise success. It made one unhappy to think how easy it would have been to put the Germans back on their heels with so small an army—if it were available and free to move.

Some day, to win this war, superior pressure would have to be applied at a weak point in the German military operation, and it was certain that weak points would develop from time to time as the war dragged on. At the moment, such a spot was North Africa. At earlier times, it had been the Ruhr, Czechoslovakia, and Norway. All of these opportunities were missed. In all probability, it would have to be an American force that applied the superior power, although no one could predict when the United States would get in the shooting. A number of prominent anti-German Frenchmen told me that the experiences of Poland, Norway, and Greece had convinced them beyond the chance of change that they could not place any dependence upon promises of effective British aid.

Four days after Darlan's radio announcement, President Roosevelt announced an "unlimited national emergency" in a

radio address heard in Vichy. Henceforth, the United States would use "all its power" to prevent attack or threat of attack on the Western Hemisphere. In my opinion, this was practically a declaration of war on the Axis, and it meant certain eventual defeat of Hitlerism.

The new collaboration agreements (the text and exact terms of which were never revealed while I was Ambassador) did not set well with the French people. I was able to tell the President that some of Pétain's loyal officials in the field were reporting to the Marshal the highly unfavourable public reaction.

* * *

The controlled Paris Press intensified its vilification campaign against the President and against me, using stories in which there was not a vestige of truth. We got no favourable notice anywhere. The newspapers and magazines of unoccupied France joined in the propaganda drive and were even refusing to print news items about the local Embassy activities, which they had carried up to now. It was impossible to get any publicity for our Red Cross relief programme. The local censorship was designed to build prestige for the Marshal's Government by discrediting Americans and the assistance provided by America.

Personal attacks by the Press or radio have never bothered me. I long have felt that too many men in public life spent too much time worrying about their "publicity." The only thing that matters is that one is carrying out his instructions. Therefore I did not keep the stuff that would come pouring out about me in Vichy, except an occasional clipping sent to the President or Welles. I find one of these among my notes, from *Le Pilon* of June 12, which may be interesting. It is by no means the most scandalous:

"LEAHY
"Admiral of the Famine

"No, Mr. Admiral of the famine, Frenchmen do not eat that kind of bread!

"Since his arrival in Vichy this Admiral of a parade fleet has been much talked about. His task is difficult for an admiral, blackmail not being taught at the Naval Academy, at least in France.

"This Admiral did not find himself at a loss in Vichy,

accustomed as he is to lobbyism, to gossip, and to Washington yachting parties. The hotels of Vichy no longer hold any secrets for him. He knows how to make himself received in a palace reception room as well as he knows how to be patient, sitting in a steaming bathroom, until the Director in the adjoining room has had time to put on his trousers. Despite the fact that he is a parliamentary Admiral, we received Leahy as we would a friend who comes to visit us after a grave illness. We began telling him our present anxieties. He did not listen, instead, with a look he evaluated what could still be told to us.

"Combining Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy with Jewish rapacity, this Admiral was performing a task that we ordinarily confide to secret emissaries called spies.

"When the first American ship arrived at Marseilles it was received with all the publicity boom which characterizes Jewish enterprises: municipality, Prefect, functionaries, generals, curate, pastor, and even rabbi—all the high personalities were on the dock. Admiral Leahy acknowledged the thanks, then advanced toward the rabbi, took him by the hands and said to him: 'It is thanks to the generosity of your co-religionists from America that this ship was thus loaded.'

"No, Mr. Admiral, it is not your Jewish bankers, your Jewish friends, your Jewish relatives, who made possible the loading of this ship because, Mr. Admiral, what became of the sixty billions in gold which we thought we could entrust to you?

"Your Jewish industrialists, seeing that the war was lost for them, sent you to see what they could furnish to us.

"Leahy, Admiral of Their Gracious Majesties Roosevelt, father, woman, sons, daughters, cousins, nephews, fathers-in-law, uncles, wading birds, and little fishes, go back and swim in your financial waters; above all, don't come to Paris. If you have been able to fish in troubled waters in Vichy, don't think you can continue to do so on the banks of the Seine.

"Frenchmen don't know what to do with your calculations and your blackmailing offers. We realize that your position was difficult. Compared to the noble figure of Admiral Darlan, aureoled by the glory of Dunkerque, to which rank could your titles properly assign you? Condemned to being nothing but an Admiral business-man, did you think you could aggrandize yourself by becoming an Admiral Shylock?

"You thought you could attract respect in becoming Admiral of the famine! We can easily see that you know Frenchmen only through the despicable cowards who took refuge among your Jewish co-religionists, hanging on to their purse-strings, and subjected to their orders!

"The only ambassador that the new France will receive from your country, when it too shall have banished its Jews, will be the one who, finally, after two centuries of Jewish intrigues, will come and render to France the salute not yet returned to La Fayette.

"Leahy, Admiral of the famine, return to your country, continue to denature the wheat, continue to uproot your peanut plants, continue to destroy what we lack. France does not live on charity; it knows the cost of Jewish-American friendship.

"Above all, tell those who sent you that Frenchmen do not eat that kind of bread any more."

The attitude of the French Press was interpreted by me and by Washington as a compliment. Welles wrote on June 12 that "it may be a source of some satisfaction to you that such obviously inspired articles are so critical as this gives some evidence of the success of your efforts which we have appreciated here."

The Embassy was under constant surveillance. Some of our Government acquaintances had already been told that they visited the Chancellery too often. Despite all this, I was convinced that continued distribution of baby food and medicines through the next winter would keep alive a smouldering if inarticulate opposition to the collaborationist policy and thus fully justify its cost. There were signs that Darlan's agreements did not meet with the complete favour of Pétain, and I knew that news of our relief activities received pretty good circulation by word of mouth.

Mail was running heavy at the Embassy, reaching fifty letters a day. These Frenchmen were asking that America disregard the action of the Vichy Government and continue its friendship for the French people.

Toward the end of May, Darlan's spies told him I was seeing people at the Embassy who were antagonistic to the French Government. He sent me a message, in the name of the Marshal, naming specifically Louis Marin and Édouard

Herriot, whose hostility to Pétain was well known. I suppose one could say that I "bristled." I demanded and was given a conference with Pétain and Darlan on June 4. The Marshal didn't even know of the message which had been delivered orally, contrary to diplomatic practice. Darlan tried to justify his action, saying he did not question my personal reliability, but that he had such reports from his secret police and telephone intercepts and that some anti-Vichy leaders were claiming to have access to me and the backing of the American Government.

Herriot had called to pay his respects shortly after I arrived at the French capital. I had never seen M. Marin. My political discussions were held only with the Marshal and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All this I told them, making it clear that no personal resentment was involved. My interest was to avoid *future misrepresentation* to the Marshal of my conduct as an Ambassador, and I stated plainly that such misrepresentation could have an adverse effect on the relations between our governments. It was an uncomfortable interview for Darlan, but Pétain was very gracious and agreeable throughout.

* * *

Two incidents in the news brought back memories of World War I. Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II died on June 4 at the age of eighty-two. One could not but speculate on what might be the present condition of world politics if he had been permitted after the war to return to the throne in Germany.

The sinking by a German submarine off Brazil of the American merchant ship, *Robin Moor*, on May 21, with considerable loss of life, was denounced by President Roosevelt as an act of piracy. This might very possibly be the *Lusitania* incident of the present war that would bring us into open conflict with the sea-raiders.

The task of trying to hold the Vichy Government to a policy that would not injure the interest of the United States and the Allies had been especially tedious since mid-March, with diplomatic tension mounting as Darlan took the Pétain régime closer toward the German camp. However, momentarily all attention was fixed in another direction when the radio announced on June 22 that Hitler's armies had invaded Russia. Four days later, President Roosevelt wrote me a letter that perhaps summed up the period better than I can:

“June 26, 1941.

“DEAR BILL,—I have written you very seldom of late because I have been more or less laid up with a low-grade infection, probably intestinal 'flu, since the first of May. The result is that my actual output of mail is about cut in half.

“You have certainly been going through a life that has aspects akin to punching-bags, roller-coasters, mules, pirates, and general hell during these past months.

“I think that both you and I have given up making prophecies as to what will happen in and to France tomorrow or the next day.

“I feel as if every time we get some real collaboration for the good of the French (especially for the children) started, Darlan and some others say or do some stupid or not wholly above-board thing which results in complete stoppage of all we would like to do.

“Now comes this Russian diversion. If it is more than just that it will mean the liberation of Europe from Nazi domination—and at the same time I do not think we need worry about any possibility of Russian domination. I do wish there were a nice central place in the ocean to which you and I could fly in a few hours and spend a few days together. I think of you both often.

“My affectionate regards.

“As ever,

“(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.”

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIAN BAROMETER

ALL OLD SAILORS READ their barometers carefully. The successes and reverses of Hitler's armies in Russia were to provide this sailor, now turned diplomat, with a barometer from which to anticipate the always tenuous relations between the United States and the Vichy Government of France.

This barometer gauged the degrees of collaboration with the Axis of the opportunist gang of politicians around the ageing and sometimes bewildered Marshal Pétain. When the Nazis were advancing, these officials courted the Führer's henchmen. They knew that their jobs, and perhaps their necks, depended on a German victory or at least a draw on the Russian front.

It was harder to "take a reading" of the feelings of the largely inarticulate mass of French people, a great majority of whom I believe wanted an Allied victory and therefore would be buoyed up by Nazi reverses. The pressure of hunger and privation, however, made these millions hope most of all for peace—any kind of peace.

Things did not go well for Pétain's Government in the summer and autumn of 1941. Syria and French Indo-China were lost. The Resistance movement gained strength. The Atlantic Charter bolstered the morale of the people, who heard Pétain formally bury the Third Republic as his chief Minister, Admiral Darlan, forged a tighter dictatorship. As June ended, everyone was trying to figure what effect the new Russo-German War would have on his fortunes and speculating on its outcome.

My first reaction was that Hitler would be sufficiently involved to give England time to perfect its defensive and offensive preparations and that both Japan and Turkey might become involved before Germany could obtain effective control of the Ukraine and the eastern oil-fields. Diplomatic representatives of friendly powers flocked to my residence to get information as to the future attitude of my Government toward the war.

I told all that the United States policy was to insure the destruction of Nazism—and added my assurance that the

invasion of Russia could have no other result than the defeat of Germany and a comparatively early peace. I had no advance information that Hitler was going to march into Russia. I had discounted rumours. You could hear rumours about anything at any time in Vichy. The Führer's move came as a surprise, because I did not think he would be crazy enough to try it. That was my personal opinion. When he did, I knew that Hitler was on his way out.

Very few people accepted that view. My conclusions were based on history, not on any information as to the strength or equipment of the Russian Army. Napoleon was a great soldier and Hitler was not. Charles XII of Sweden also tried to conquer Russia and failed. I made it a point to tell everybody I could see that better soldiers than the Germans had tried, and failed, to defeat Russia by invasion. Most of my colleagues expected a quick German victory. Nothing, they said, had stopped the Wehrmacht, not even the "magnificent French Army." To me, the "magnificent French Army" was only pretty fast on its feet. It almost got away—by running.

When Pétain and I discussed the situation on June 27, the Marshal expected Germany to succeed in occupying the Soviet provinces near the German border and set up buffer states. He believed Hitler would then make a peace offer or launch a vigorous operation against Great Britain. Pétain thought that the fear of an offensive alliance between England and Russia had been the compelling motive in Hitler's decisions to strike eastward.

Most of the French people seemed to hope for German failure, but not to expect it. Some more partisan and presumably well-informed citizens claimed that Germany had been building a revolutionary party in the disaffected parts of the Soviet Union, notably the Ukraine, and they expected whole segments of the population of these areas to go over to the German side at the first promising opportunity.

French military men thought the German campaign would be successful in two or three months. With Pétain, they shared the hope that Communism would be driven back into less fertile parts of Russia, that Stalin's Government would fall, and that the menace of Communism to France would be removed. There was no doubt that Hitler's so-called "attack on Communism" had improved his standing in some important quarters. Many French officials seemed to prefer Nazism to

the danger of Communist domination. There was a Communist group in France, but officials in whom I had the most confidence did not anticipate any serious uprisings. Nevertheless, these officials had a real fear of Communism. Time has now justified those fears.

I saw Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov often. He probably lied glibly because he was a Russian diplomat, but he was a very intelligent man compared to other members of his Embassy. He was well informed on the history of previous Russian wars, and on June 25 we had a long conversation in which he explained at length Russian plans for "defence in depth." He gave astronomical figures on Russian fighting strength—planes, tanks, guns, etc.—of which I was frankly sceptical.

Bogomolov had had no military experience. He was a professor type, but he knew a great deal about German methods of warfare. He said that, if necessary, the "scorched-earth" tactics of Napoleon's time would be repeated. Russia did not expect an attack by Japan, he said, but was prepared for such an event. When he asked what the attitude of my country would be toward Russia in the new situation, I replied that I thought the President's statements showed full sympathy with all nations that were resisting Axis aggression. (I had no special information from Washington on this angle.)

Darlan suddenly severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet at noon on June 30, 1941, ordering the Russian Embassy staff to leave at once and forbidding any communication with Moscow. This was an inconsiderate action without precedent. Bogomolov came to our Chancellery about 5 p.m. to ask that we assume protection of Soviet interests. I referred this to Washington with a broad hint that because of my present standing with the Vichy Government, it would be better for my future status if some other Government took charge of Russian affairs. The Bogomolovs had a baby too small to travel, and I did intervene to get them about twenty-four hours' delay. We learned that they left shortly before midnight on July 1 on a special train for Port-Vendres, where they were to be taken aboard a British ship. Bogomolov later became quite a distinguished person in Soviet diplomatic circles.

Pétain sent Darlan to Paris to try to obtain a relaxation on the line of demarcation in view of the Germans' preoccupation with Russia. All Russians in France were being taken into

custody by the police. Meanwhile, Welles informed me that the United States would have to decline to take over Soviet interests in Vichy, adding that the decision was influenced by "our disinclination to look after the alleged 'Reds' of whom you speak."

America's Independence Day, July 4, provided an opportunity to publicize my certain belief that Hitler's invasion of Russia insured his eventual defeat. We held a reception at the residence for seventy guests, including the newspaper reporters and American civilians at Vichy.

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Meanwhile, the fighting between the Vichy forces and the combined British and Free French in Syria and Lebanon was going against the Government, as had been expected. The invasion had been launched in June, 1941, because, the British said, of German infiltration into Syria and of assistance given to Germany by the French authorities in Syria. Frenchmen were fighting Frenchmen again, as they had done briefly the preceding September in the abortive attempt of General Charles de Gaulle, aided by the British, to take the West African port of Dakar.

When I saw the Marshal and Admiral Darlan on June 12, Darlan said that France had declined German offers of assistance in Syria. He denied that Germany intended to use Syria to capture the Suez Canal. I delivered an *aide memoire* from Secretary of State Hull which asked an explanation of why they had allowed the Germans to use the Syrian airports beyond the requirements of the Armistice and in violation of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1924 to preserve the sovereignty of Syria. Darlan maintained that the deal he had made with the Germans regarding Syria did not go beyond the Armistice terms, and that France would resist invasion of its colonies by any power. Both the Marshal and Darlan realized that because of superior opposing forces they would be unable to hold Syria.

I saw Marshal Pétain again on June 27, this time alone. He spoke freely of the present difficulties in Syria and said his troops could hold part of the area for some time if he could arrange to supply them by way of Turkey. Later I asked the Turkish Embassy Counsellor, M. Ours, if his country would permit the passage of troops to reinforce Syria. He said:

"It may be possible to refuse such a request by France, but

what can we do if Germany, after crushing the Russian Army, wants to send its troops through Turkey?"

That reply expressed the general fear of Germany felt by all of Europe at that time.

Negotiations for an armistice were under way in Syria by July 10, and on July 15 France gave up her twenty-one-year-old mandate and surrendered control to the British and Free French Armies of occupation.

The Free French agreed to repatriate all French soldiers and sailors, with their dependants, who did not wish to join with the Free French. General Georges Catroux directed the Free French forces, and I did not hear in Vichy of General de Gaulle being anywhere near the battlefield.

At this time there still was no indication in occupied France that the self-styled "leader of French resistance" had any important numerical following. There was a group who called themselves "Gaullists." They were French, apparently attaching to themselves the ancient name of France, but they were not "de Gaullists." These underground people would slip in to see me occasionally because they thought I was on their side. I would have to say to them that, although I had a great deal of sympathy for them, I was accredited to the Government of France as represented by Marshal Pétain and he was the only person with whom I could do business.

There were a few of these people who impressed me as being pretty good Frenchmen. Their idea was to make trouble for the Germans, but whenever they made trouble for the invader, the Germans passed it on to Pétain and it made trouble for the Marshal.

Pétain did not like any of the undergrounders, but he had a special hatred for de Gaulle. They had been in the Army together and de Gaulle had been one of Pétain's young officers. At one time the Marshal was very fond of him, but now he considered de Gaulle "a viper that bit the breast that nursed him." The Marshal once said to me: "He [de Gaulle] claims to be a patriot. Why doesn't he come back to France and suffer with the rest of us?" A number of Frenchmen shared the Marshal's view. They looked upon de Gaulle as a paid British agent. Describing the situation to President Roosevelt on July 28, I wrote:

"The de Gaulle movement has not the following indicated in the British radio news or in the American Press. Frenchmen

with whom I can talk, even those completely desirous of a British victory, have little regard for General de Gaulle."

I reported that the de Gaullist organization in the occupied zone was having some small success in annoying the invaders by sabotage and propagandizing the inhabitants. I added: "The radical de Gaullists whom I have met do not seem to have the stability, intelligence, and popular standing in their communities that should be necessary to succeed in their announced purpose." I then related how one of them had told me recently that all the Vichy Ministers were under a sentence of death that could be carried out at any time. This kind of propaganda created some apprehension, and at least some of the high officials of the Vichy Government were guarded carefully. Both the Marshal and Admiral Darlan were constantly surrounded by military and plain-clothes guards.

The Syrian Armistice attracted little attention. The French expected defeat and the resistance appeared to be for the sole purpose of preserving the prestige of Gallic honour.

* * *

During July there was cause to wonder how the American Ambassador stood with the Marshal. Darlan had partially succeeded, through his Press campaign and instructions to his subordinates, in making me look like poison ivy to his colleagues in the Government, who seemed principally concerned with holding their jobs. He continued to be friendly and courteous, as one sailor to another, but it was impossible for me to put any confidence in him. I had increasing difficulty in seeing Darlan or Pétain, or in talking frankly with them. It was evident that Darlan did not wish that I should see Pétain alone, so the Admiral or General Huntziger managed to be present most of the time.

At one point I even wrote Welles (July 18) that we couldn't overlook the possibility that Pétain was a proud old man, showing amity and confidence for the purpose of getting what he could from America while favouring collaboration. He may have even believed that I was sufficiently stupid to be easily deceived—which attitude on his part (if he had it) would not be entirely without advantage from my point of view.

"While Admiral Darlan outwardly is cordial, it is certain that he does not like the attitude of our Government and that

he and his German friends do not trust me. The latter is fully reciprocated.”

* * *

Darlan informed me on July 15, 1941, that Japan would, in the immediate future, occupy bases in Indo-China for the purpose of projecting military operations to the southward. This was the day when, as I left Pétain's office and was out of earshot of Darlan, the Marshal said to me: "Serious events may happen in the near future." I asked if he referred to the Orient. He replied, "Everywhere."

I saw them again on July 19 to deliver orally a message from Washington regarding this new Japanese activity. It was necessary to say bluntly that if Japan was the winner, the Japanese would take over French Indo-China; and if the Allies won, *we* would take it. Darlan suggested that the Germans might help him delay the Japanese move. He did not mention the obvious advantage to Germany if the United States became involved in the Pacific. The next day, following threats of immediate action by the Ambassador from Tokyo, the Vichy Government agreed to the use by Japan of bases in French Indo-China. Later Darlan told me that Germany was not involved in the Indo-China affair and in fact knew nothing about it until after a decision was made. In view of the complete control of the Vichy Government then being exercised by Germany, that statement was difficult for me to swallow. It was entirely possible that the Marshal was not informed of what was going on until negotiations were about completed. He appeared very worried when I referred to the prospective "cession of Indo-China to Japan."

Darlan had explained that the agreement with Japan was a choice of several evils. If France had not agreed, the Japanese would have seized the colony and destroyed the colonial government. Now the Japanese had agreed to respect French sovereignty and to withdraw when the emergency no longer existed. However, in spite of categorical denials, it was my opinion that Germany was a party to the agreement. The whole affair had but one meaning in my mind—the end of the French colonies in Asia.

* * *

Mrs. Leahy and I were attending the opera *Boris Goudonov* on August 12. During intermission, between the fourth and

fifth acts, there was an unexpected and dramatic interruption of the performance. It was an address broadcast by Marshal Pétain. It sounded very much like a final burial service for the Third Republic, which really had passed out when the Armistice had been signed a year previous.

The opera-house audience remained standing during the historical presentation of the Marshal's statement of his difficulties and his intentions. As I listened I had a feeling that Hitler must have written the speech. The Marshal was going all out for authoritarian government. Among the political, economic, and social measures he announced were: abolition of all political parties; prohibition of public and private political meetings; prohibition of the distribution of political literature; stopping of the salaries heretofore given Senators and Deputies; an increase in the police to enforce all of these decrees.

The Marshal ended his long address with "*Vive la France!*" but there was only mild applause from the audience that filled the opera house.

Then, two days later, came the dramatic and epoch-making joint statement of the "Atlantic Charter" by Great Britain and the United States. In stirring language, it pledged these two nations to the destruction of Nazi tyranny, disarmament of aggressor nations first, then reduction of all armaments; *the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government*; no territorial gains for the United States or Great Britain; no territorial changes without consent of the people concerned; freedom of the seas and free access to raw materials. Concerning the tightening of the Vichy dictatorship, I told the President (August 26, 1941):

"It is discouraging, from the point of view of those of us who are confirmed believers in representative government, to see France completely in the hands of a dictator—a benevolent dictator for so long a time as the Marshal survives; but so much of a 'bill of rights' as did previously exist in France has been abrogated by what are, in effect, *lettres de cachet* now to be employed to get rid of opposition. . . . Your joint statement with Mr. Churchill to the effect that people may choose their own form of government probably will work out all right in France after the usual rioting, street barricades, etc., with which the French people are familiar and which appear to them necessary or at least customary.

“Practically the entire population entertains a high regard for America, looks only to America for its salvation, and hopes for a British victory, although they expect little consideration from a victorious Britain without our assistance.”

This government by an individual dictator with complete authority obviously did not have sufficient strength to maintain itself in the absence of support by the German occupation. It did not seem to be in accord with the traditional desires of the people of France. The Churchill-Roosevelt statement which came to be known as the Atlantic Charter was received enthusiastically by my diplomatic colleagues of all shades of political philosophy except those openly allied with the Axis powers. As for Frenchmen—Royalists, Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, Christians, and Moslems—each in his own way, was delighted in the assurance that he would be free to choose the form of government that suited him best and not have a foreign government forced upon him.

At that time we did possess the precious asset of full confidence of the smaller nations in an American promise. I recall that in talking with the President when he assigned me to Vichy, he seemed determined then to do his best to arrange to have the French choose their own form of government by their legal methods. Roosevelt believed in the Atlantic Charter. He would have kept our promise in this matter (choice of government) if he had survived. As it turned out, we did impose the Government of de Gaulle on France. Later we were insisting that some kind of government be adopted in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. At least *somebody* was imposing a government on them, and we didn't object.

Just two weeks before these two important events, Senator Jacques Bardoux, one-time leader in the French Senate, told me about a new constitution for France on which he and some of his colleagues were working with the knowledge and approval of Pétain. They were endeavouring to shape a document that would preserve the essential liberties traditionally demanded by the French people and create a strong executive with powers somewhat resembling those of the President of the United States. Bardoux insisted that the Marshal was in agreement with their purpose.

Under the reorganized Vichy Government, the Army and Air Force were placed directly under Darlan. In view of his psychopathic dislike of England, this might possibly have an

unfortunate effect on the already unsatisfactory French relations with Great Britain. The Pétain decree also named M. Pierre Puchau Secretary of the Interior, in charge of the secret police. He was said to be an open collaborationist who was building a militant organization very similar in its methods to the "Black Shirts" and "Brown Shirts" of other dictatorships. Other new men came into the Government, such as M. de la Rocque, one-time leader of the Cagoulauds. These changes definitely did not assist me in maintaining friendly relations between France and democratic America.

* * *

After the spineless Vichy Government performances in Syria and French Indo-China, it seemed only a question of time before Germany would ask, and get, whatever she wanted in North Africa. It turned out that the Nazis did not get African bases—but that is a story for another chapter.

Greatly exaggerated reports of President Roosevelt's 'flu attack were carried in the French Press in July. "The condition of your health has been a matter of interest to our local 'collaborationists,' who undoubtedly hoped for the worst," I told him (July 28 letter). Reporting on Pétain, I said:

" . . . It seems to me that he is surely, if slowly, being manoeuvred into a position where his only purpose will be to hold the loyalty of the French people and to make speeches to schoolchildren and veterans. . . . It is certain that his popularity is decreasing because of recent approaches to full collaboration, the Syrian fiasco, the failure of Germany to repeat in Russia its performance of last year in France, and the turning over of Indo-China to Japan. . . .

"The French people are still friendly with America and practically all of them look to you as their one and only hope for release from Nazi rule. . . . [However] it is impossible to guess what will happen in France to-morrow or the next day, and almost as difficult for me to point to any useful accomplishment that we have made here since my arrival six months ago. . . . From this point of view to-day, it appears that only a very apparent Axis setback somewhere will sufficiently discredit the collaborationists to hold France even to its present neutral position."

* * *

From those intrepid officials in the French War Ministry who still talked with us, we had estimates that Germany, by the end of July, had suffered 1,000,000 casualties in Russia. I did not believe the Nazis could endure that rate of loss for a long time. The few anti-Axis Frenchmen I saw believed that winter would immobilize for months the great German Army in Russia. There was the chance of a winter collapse of the service of supply such as ruined Napoleon's campaign. One of the newsmen in Vichy who had access to German sources told me that Hitler already was having trouble providing food, water, gasoline and ammunition for his troops.

I tried to get from Marshal Pétain an estimate of the military situation in Russia, but Darlan took over the conversation to deliver a lecture on the efficiency of the German Army. The Admiral said that British and American soldiers demanded beefsteak, but that the Germans could live on a few prepared pills and get water and gasoline by plane.

Rumours that France had decided on a complete change in its political relations with Germany had prompted this interview (August 1). The Marshal said he had not heard of any such proposition. Darlan then got started on his anti-British mania and succeeded in confusing the conversation for some time. "Popeye" appeared very worried about something.

* * *

Life in Vichy apparently was not complete unless one took the "cure," which consisted of drinking prescribed amounts of water from the various springs and taking the baths. The latter routine started with a thorough massage under a spray of hot water by two powerful masseurs. The hot spray was then centred on the liver area for one minute, followed by a thorough spraying of the entire body by a powerful jet of hot water. The patient was next encased in heated, towel-like wrappers, covered with a blanket, and required to lie down for fifteen minutes.

Practically everyone took the cure. People carried their graduated glasses from spring to spring in ridiculous-looking little green baskets. We were told it was dangerous to drink the waters without the advice of a physician, which certainly was advantageous to the doctors, who were in Vichy in great numbers.

Mrs. Leahy and I took the treatment late in July. I was

unable to feel that it accomplished anything, although the massages would have been pleasant at any time. Much more interesting was the Grand Prix of the annual races, which was run on August 3. The horses were good, the weather perfect and the ladies beautiful in their summer costumes. We were seated next to Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato of Japan, an attractive person who did not permit the nearness of war between our two countries to influence his natural courtesy. He was a civilized Jap who had lived abroad most of his life. The Grand Prix marked the only time I went to the race-track while at the French capital.

Dr. A. M. de Fossey, who attended us, suggested a vacation in Switzerland so that we might "get a couple of beefsteaks in preparation for the lean winter ahead." In August, Mrs. Leahy and I took an eight-day trip through that beautiful country. The American Minister at Berne, Leland Harrison, was most kind, and through his influence we were able to get some extra gasoline—at a dollar a gallon. Satisfactory food was available everywhere at high prices. The Swiss were making a continuous effort to remain neutral. Those with whom I talked seemed to be in complete sympathy with the cause of the democracies. They thought Communism more dangerous than Nazism or Fascism, but that all three were bad for a free people.

During the following month, we dined with Mrs. Laura Corrigan, widow of a wealthy American steel executive. She talked incessantly about herself, her accomplishments and her friendships with leaders in social and political affairs in Europe. For her exceptional generosity and efficiency in assisting French war prisoners, she had been awarded the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of Honour. Mrs. Corrigan was a strange combination of kindness, energy, social ambition, egotism, and great wealth, all of which she used with success for the benefit of French prisoners of war and her own social progress.

The story of possible open French assistance to the Germans was an old one, but it was very persistent at this time. The Yugoslav Minister, M. Pouritch, a confirmed gossip and usually in error, claimed to have from German sources the information that in return for direct aid the Germans would withdraw from Paris and reduce the occupation cost. A few weeks after he told me this, it was Pouritch who was withdrawing when Vichy, under German pressure, closed the Yugoslav Legation

and consulates in France. He was an attractive person, but he made up his stories as he went along. When Great Britain and Russia invaded Iran (Persia) on August 25, the Iranian Minister at Vichy told us he feared the Russian Army, which he put at 120,000, would destroy and pillage his country, as they did in the previous war.

* * *

The radio told us on September 12 that President Roosevelt had issued a warning that German and Italian vessels entering American waters did so at their own peril. He called the German submarines the "rattlesnakes of the Atlantic." Compliance with this order, it seemed to me, undoubtedly would create a state of undeclared war with the Axis powers. This announcement was taken more seriously by French officials than previous Roosevelt statements. Coupled with the lack of German success in Russia, there was perceptible change in the Vichy attitude toward America. The controlled Press became less violent in its abuse of the U.S. Ambassador. The "barometer" appeared to be rising. The Marshal singled me out for friendly and courteous attention at the infrequent social gatherings at which we met. Vichy was losing some of that feeling of the certainty of German invincibility. In fact, I reported to Welles on September 13: "The immediate concern of the Vichy Government is fear of a Communist uprising when winter and increasing unemployment produce conditions favourable to revolutionary activity by the disaffected, hungry masses." Officials told me that the food situation for the coming winter was desperate, and I renewed my efforts to have Washington send another Red Cross ship with relief supplies for the children. The arguments were summed up in a September 29 letter to the Under-Secretary:

"... Without any consideration whatever to the humanitarian aspect of providing relief, it will be advantageous to the cause of America to continue to hold the regard of the French people both in Africa and in continental France by the provision of necessities in limited amounts and under controlled distribution. . . .

"If and when the Vichy Government should undertake any specific collaboration . . . we should immediately stop all shipments and recall the Ambassador 'for consultation.' . . . While our view [from Vichy] is limited, I am unable to see

any advantage to America that would result from the stoppage of our shipments at the present time.

"We have succeeded in making the French people and even some officials, including the Marshal, believe that a traditional amity between the two peoples is still maintained and that it is a matter of high interest to the people of America; although in my contacts [with French officials] I frequently thought of a reference in the 'Articles for the Government of the Navy' which in the olden days was read to us with impressive formalities once each month, and which announced the award that should be expected by those who might 'pusillanimously cry for quarter.'"

The Resistance movement began to make itself felt in the latter half of September, when a number of German officers and soldiers were assassinated in Paris. The German army of occupation retaliated immediately by seizing as hostages a large number of alleged Communists and Jews. Several were executed for each German killed. By mid-October, the wave of assassinations and executions had both Pétain and Darlan worried. The Marshal took to the radio to call on his people to abide by the terms of the Armistice, and stated that the "foreigners" who instigated the crimes were cutting into "the flesh of France." Darlan charged that foreign powers were trying to aggravate the situation between the French people and the occupying army. It was reported that Pétain even sent Interior Minister Pucheu with a personal appeal to Hitler. The shootings reached a climax on October 20, when fifty hostages were executed for the assassination of a German lieutenant-colonel.

One did not doubt the sincerity of the Marshal's concern about the mass executions, but he also was fearful of its effect upon the stability of his Government. He had some success, but it still was bad luck for any Frenchman who happened to be collected as a hostage. Many of them were Jews.

There had been discrimination against the Jews at Vichy, aimed principally at getting hold of their money. Many Jewish families feared their homes would be searched or even confiscated. I remember a very attractive Jewish family in the neighbourhood of our residence, the mother of which one day asked Mrs. Leahy if she would keep for her a large sum of American money—I believe it was \$30,000. The Jewish woman was distressed because her fear was real. As Ambassador,

of course, I could not afford to become involved. So far as I know, however, no Jewish houses were searched.

Vichy was disturbed just before daylight on October 6 when some British planes passed over the city, probably *en route* to Italy. We slept peacefully through the alarm and did not know about the so-called "attack" (no bombs were dropped) until the following day.

* * *

At the beginning of October, even the German-controlled Press indicated that the Russians had stopped the German advance for the time being. The best information we could get placed Axis casualties at 1,700,000 killed, wounded and missing. By mid-October, the situation was changed and Vichy expected that the Russians would shortly have to abandon Moscow. The barometric effect of this change was illustrated in my letter to the President on October 15, which said, in part:

" . . . The unexpected difficulties encountered by Germany in Russia caused French officials . . . to lean over toward our side of the question, and their final attitude is dependent on the outcome of the campaign in Russia.

"At the present time, the already partly successful drive on Moscow and the German successes in the Ukraine have caused them to make preparations for a move toward more collaboration with the Axis powers." (There were reliable reports that German consulates would be established in Vichy, Lyons, and Marseilles.)

In a lengthy report on new personalities in the Pétain dictatorship, it was emphasized that what might be called a "palace guard" had developed around the Marshal which directed its efforts to building up a political organization that could preserve order in the immediate future and maintain the present Government if the German Army withdrew from any or all of the occupied area. The most ambitious was young, energetic Pucheu, who was looked upon as a contender with Darlan for the position of dictator when the old Marshal passed to his earned reward.

Although we were told that recent trips fatigued Pétain greatly, he was at the age of eighty-six in an astonishingly excellent physical condition. However, I told the President I believed that without the Marshal as a popular symbol the

existing Government could not be maintained without help from the Nazis. What everyone still wanted most was peace. "A number of Frenchmen recently have talked to me with the purpose of influencing you to join with the Pope in arranging a peace with the Nazis. . . . I have in each instance expressed a personal opinion that America will not make any effort to bring about a negotiated peace with Hitlerism."

The President replied (November 1) that my answer about prospects for any negotiated peace was quite right, and that "this attitude of ours should be clear by now to all the world." As to Pétain's troubles with the shooting of French hostages, Roosevelt said that "this country was profoundly shocked by the actions of the Germans . . . which should have made clear to all Frenchmen the value of their 'collaboration.' It also is felt that the Marshal might have taken a more positive stand."

On Navy Day, 1941, the President made his boldest defiance of the Nazi programme up to that time. The first we heard was that he had announced that the shooting had started and America's Navy was at battle stations. The re-broadcast came through later over the B.B.C. It was a stirring address informing the world that American ships would carry supplies to the Allies and that they would be protected by the Navy. "It can never be doubted that the goods will be delivered by this nation, whose Navy believes in the tradition of 'damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead.' . . . To-day, in the face of this newest and greatest challenge, we Americans have cleared decks and taken our battle stations. . . ."

To me this was as nearly an open declaration of "undeclared" war as it would be possible to formulate. I had felt that we became some kind of belligerent on the day back in March when we began to send supplies, free, to be used to kill Germans. Professional soldiers of my generation had a concept of war based on formal declaration of intentions. The various legislative and executive actions that had followed in rapid succession during the preceding six months caused me to wonder if the President really thought he was fooling anyone about our not being at war. At Vichy it was impossible, of course, to realize the extent of the isolationist bloc in Washington, which could not see that Hitler was aiming at world conquest and that the security of our own nation was at stake. Months later, when

I had returned to Washington, I realized that the President had been steering a skilful course around this bloc to arouse the American people to their danger and give all possible aid to our Allies.

* * *

The Press on November 12 reported the death in a plane crash near Nîmes of General Charles Huntziger, Pétain's Minister of War. There had been many rumours that he was to be replaced by someone more satisfactory to the Germans because of late he had not been as good a "collaborationist" as the Nazis thought him to be. (The General had impressed me as a thoroughly disciplined, honest soldier, but not a particularly strong character.) Stories persisted for several years that his death was "planned" and that the plane was deliberately crashed. A young French lady friend of mine who was active in the "underground" as a spy and messenger between the lines believed this story implicitly. She said Huntziger, who was returning from North Africa, carried important papers and the pilot was acting under secret orders to destroy him. Strange stories are believed in time of revolution.

The fact is that the General and all of his plane crew lost their lives by accident after trying for hours to land at Vichy in very bad visibility with inadequate radio equipment. The airport and the planes operating out of Vichy were notoriously unsafe. I never used them. Mrs. Leahy and I attended the impressive funeral held for the General and the other crash victims in the Cathedral of St. Louis. A German group headed by Otto Abetz, the *Gauleiter* at Paris, was present.

* * *

Cheering news came from the Russian front on November 29. The Germans had been driven out of Rostov-on-Don. This was the first definite repulse suffered by any considerable German force since the war started. This local success by the Soviets appeared to be a real check to an Axis advance by land toward the Caucasian oil-fields.

* * *

That night we had supper with the Military Attaché of our Embassy, Colonel Robert Schow, and forgot all our problems while listening to an exciting Army-Navy football

game at Philadelphia. We got a reasonably good play-by-play broadcast, despite much static. And the Navy won, 14 to 6. We did not have many enjoyable evenings such as this in Vichy. In fact, at this very time the Embassy was waging an all-out diplomatic battle to keep the Axis out of French North and West Africa.

CHAPTER V

COMPLICATIONS IN FRENCH AFRICA

THE LATER HALF OF 1941, for those of us at Vichy, developed into a continuing diplomatic battle between the Allies and the Axis for control of the French North and West African Coasts. Not being clairvoyant, we did not know then that it was in effect a struggle to keep these beachheads in friendly hands to provide a springboard for America's first major military operation of World War II.

General Weygand made trips to Vichy in the first week in June and again on July 10. This was the period during which Admiral Darlan had succeeded in intimidating most of the officials, who previously had been telling us what was going on. Consequently, we had only rumours, which were to the effect that Weygand was opposing the deals that Darlan had made with the Germans, particularly as they respected further use of African bases by the Axis powers.

However, we had no definite information.

These rumours alarmed Washington sufficiently for President Roosevelt to send the Marshal a message admonishing him against any further concessions to the Axis. I tried to see Pétain alone, but when we discussed the President's message on July 16 Darlan was there and did most of the talking. Darlan's repeated use of the phrase, "for so long as the present political arrangement with Germany lasts," referring to the Armistice terms, obviously was intended to lead us to believe that a change was under consideration or imminent. He almost stated categorically that Germany *had* asked for use of French bases in Africa by *declining* to say that Germany *had not* asked for them. This led me to inform President Roosevelt (July 28) that "indications here point to a German move against the Mediterranean upon completion of the Russian campaign, regardless of its outcome. It is practically certain that Germany some time ago demanded the use of French African bases, and that Darlan was unable to deliver because of the resistance offered by General Weygand. It is generally believed here that the demand will be renewed and that Weygand, at that

time, will not succeed in preventing the use of bases by Germany.

“General Weygand may possibly resign rather than agree to give away the African empire, but he is a thoroughly disciplined soldier, has complete loyalty to the Marshal, and he may salve his conscience with an acceptance of ‘Orders is orders.’ ”

By the beginning of August there were specific rumours that the Germans might occupy Dakar on the West African Coast. I discussed this with Pétain and Darlan, reminding them that such an action might bring America actively into the war in Africa. The Marshal replied that the only prospect of a Dakar attack was from General de Gaulle, supported by British troops. The German pressure appeared to become more insistent, and Weygand was back in Vichy on August 9, while Admiral Darlan returned from a visit to Paris on August 11. Rumours still were our only source of information. Rumour said that Pétain had declined to grant a German request to permit the use of Bizerte to supply Axis military forces in Libya. Such use of a French naval base would have been of direct military assistance to the Axis and a positive departure from a neutral position.

If the Vichy Government should grant such a request, it would alienate American sympathy and probably prevent any further American imports into French Africa. It might bring an end to our diplomatic relations with the Vichy Government.

We were told confidentially, however, that the German demand was turned down largely at the insistence of General Weygand. My reaction was expressed in a letter (August 5) to General E. M. (“Pa”) Watson, Military Aide to the President: “in view of the existing Axis difficulties in Libya, it is highly probable that the demand for bases will be repeated and accompanied by pressure, in which event we do not yet know what the reaction of Vichy may be.”

President Roosevelt was advised (August 26) that the importation of essentials into North Africa in agreement with General Weygand had strengthened the latter’s position and was building prestige for America while making it difficult for the collaborators to justify themselves in the eyes of the Arabs.

“I hope the Red Cross will be permitted to continue its

distribution of foods and medicines for children through next winter, or at least until Vichy makes some further concessions to the Axis," the letter said.

Washington continued to be fearful of further Axis-Vichy collaboration, particularly in view of the surrender of French authority in Indo-China. I received from Welles on August 22 a second confidential message from the President to Marshal Pétain, in which Roosevelt stressed the necessity for preserving French sovereignty intact in the African and other French colonies. Roosevelt's letter was delivered to Pétain on September 12. The Marshal stated he had no intention of permitting the Axis powers to use the African bases or to have the assistance of the French fleet. Darlan was present, as usual, and said they might have to permit commercial access to Bizerte, which he termed an "unimportant concession," to avoid forcible seizure of the port facilities. On Darlan's attitude, I advised Welles (September 13) that "he'll make any concessions for which he can obtain the Marshal's approval; he does not wish to permit the Germans to obtain a foothold in North Africa and he definitely will not permit the Axis powers to use the fleet." The letter of the President, arriving at the same time as his September 11 radio address in which he denounced German submarines as "rattlesnakes of the Atlantic," seemed to have a good effect. One of my diplomatic and usually reliable colleagues told us on September 19 that he had heard that Marshal Pétain, within the last few days, had declined to consider a German proposal for peace negotiations with France.

Our next problem was the requisitioning by the Axis of a large number of French Government trucks in North Africa, but Pétain was away from Vichy so frequently that I was unable to get an immediate answer. Welles was informed that unless it could be proved that Vichy had undertaken specific collaboration to which the United States must take serious objection, there appeared to be no advantage in stopping shipments to the French in Africa and that such a move would create serious difficulties for Weygand. That good soldier apparently was having trouble enough. He was summoned back to Vichy on October 22, and we were reliably informed that efforts were being made to replace him as Delegate-General in Africa because of his anti-Axis attitude. It was said he had been offered several attractive appointments

elsewhere, including that of Ambassador to the United States, but he was refusing to resign.

President Roosevelt agreed with my fear of Vichy reaction to stronger German pressure. He wrote on November 1: "Should the Germans change the direction of their main activities from Russia to the Mediterranean, we are fearful that France will not be able to hold out much longer against increasing German demands for what would correspond to military assistance on the part of the French. Events of the next few weeks probably will give us a clearer picture in that respect." How correct he was, because at that very time it appeared that Admiral Darlan and some of the Cabinet members were determined to remove Weygand from North Africa.

Mr. Matthews, our First Secretary, and I had a very agreeable and useful conversation with Pétain on November 4, no other person being present. The Marshal, taking advantage of the absence of Darlan, was very outspoken, friendly, and frank. Regarding the extensive military preparations being made at Dakar, Pétain said they were solely for defending it against attack by anybody and were not being made either at the request or suggestion of Germany. I had a definite feeling that while the Marshal would like to oppose further German aggression, he would be unable to do so if pressure should be applied.

He said Vichy could not refuse the German request for a consulate at Casablanca, but he did not know of any demand for Nazi consulates elsewhere in the colonies. He assumed the consulate would be used for observation and collection of information. (That is exactly what we were doing with our expanded diplomatic force in North Africa, made possible through the Murphy-Weygand Agreement.)

Regarding the military situation, the Marshal was certain that when the Russian front became stabilized the Germans would make some new proposition to France that would add to his difficulties. However, his estimate was that any new German military action would be against its principal enemy, Great Britain.

We had a most interesting report from Counsellor do Paco of the Brazilian Embassy, a highly intelligent and experienced Foreign Service officer. This report said that one Herr Keller, a Nazi observer in the German Embassy at Paris, got "tight" at a recent party and made the following statements:

"The German Government is very much displeased with the Marshal and with General Huntziger.

"The Germans are going to eliminate General Weygand from Africa because he was conspiring with the United States against German interests.

"As soon as the military situation in Russia is stabilized, pressure will be applied to France for use of the African bases, with a guarantee of French sovereignty in the African colonies if permission to use the bases is conceded and a threat to take the colonies if the request is not granted.

"The establishment of a German consulate in Vichy was for the purpose of observing and neutralizing the pernicious activities of the American Ambassador."

Mr. Matthews, who was leaving us to accept a more important position in London, had lunch with the Marshal and his staff on Armistice Day. Darlan talked to him bitterly of America's attitude toward the African situation, particularly the attitude of the Press. Early in September "Popeye" had protested vehemently about a critical article in *Life* magazine, at which time I reminded him that we had freedom of the Press in the United States.

Darlan contended that the Germans would have no interest in North Africa were it not for the presence of Robert Murphy there. We had not sent Murphy to assist either Darlan or the Germans! Both Darlan and the Marshal thought the war would end sooner than had been expected and that France could act with success as a mediator. The inference was that German authorities in France had indicated the probability of an early peace proposal by Hitler. Recent public statements by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were hardly promising of success to any Nazi peace proposals.

It should be noted especially that the Marshal told Mr. Matthews that Weygand was being called to Vichy the next week, but that no action that would not be approved by Weygand was contemplated, and that *the General would return to Africa after the conference*. Despite these assertions, it seemed almost certain at the moment that Weygand would be forced out.

General Weygand, now in his seventies, probably was the best soldier in France. He was almost a religious fanatic. He went to church twice every day. He was devoted to his country and had no confidence whatever in either the promises

or purposes of Nazi Germany—which was more than could be said for many of the men of Vichy. The British even hoped that Weygand might eventually come to a sufficient disagreement with the collaborationists to hold the African empire by force if necessary. He appeared to have the confidence of the native population there and had maintained friendly relations with the American officials in his area. His growing power had attracted the unfavourable attention of the Axis powers.

The removal of Weygand, when and if it should be accomplished, would force on our Government a decision as to whether or not to continue economic assistance to the North African colonies. If we stopped this assistance, there was no other power except Germany to which the French could turn for supplies. My advice to Washington was that until England and America were prepared to occupy this area with sufficient military force to enable the natives to resist successfully an Axis invasion, it was the better part of wisdom not to interrupt the delaying tactics. It was certain that the departure of Weygand would mean more rapid Axis penetration and that in the absence of a military effort by the Allies, the colonies eventually would come completely under the control of Germany.

We did not have long to wait for the denouement. At 6.30 p.m. on November 18 two members of Pétain's staff delivered to the Embassy a note announcing the recall of Weygand. I immediately asked for a personal interview with the Marshal and saw him at four the next afternoon. Pétain received me alone. The only other person present was Douglas MacArthur II, the Third Secretary of our Embassy, who acted as interpreter. Pétain said sadly that he knew all too well why I had come to see him. He seemed distressed.

He said the decision had caused him great pain; that his personal views did not count; his duty was to the French people without reference to his personal hopes or wishes. He repeated twice: "I am a prisoner." The aged "dictator" presented a pathetic figure of a once great leader of a great people. I was very outspoken in our lengthy conversation. My impressions were summed up in a letter to the President written a few days later (November 22). Addressed "Personal and Strictly Confidential," it said:

"With the removal of General Weygand from Africa in

obedience to a German *dictat*, and the beginning of a British offensive in Cyrenaica, which two occurrences presumably are closely related, Thanksgiving Day (November 20 in 1941) was far from dull in this capital of a captive nation. . . .

"I pointed out to him [Pétain] very clearly that the heretofore friendly and sympathetic attitude of the American Government was based on an assumption that he would not, in his relations with the Axis powers, go beyond the requirements of the Armistice Agreement, and that a removal of General Weygand under German pressure cannot be considered by anybody to be necessitated by the Armistice Agreement.

"I told him that in my opinion such an unnecessary surrender to Axis demands . . . would have a definitely adverse effect on the traditional amity between our two peoples, that it would probably bring about immediate suspension of the economic assistance that is being given to the French colonies, and that it might very possibly cause America to make a complete readjustment of its attitude toward his government of France.

"I requested that his decision be reconsidered. . . . He replied that since last December Germany had constantly exerted increasing pressure to remove Weygand . . . that their [German] demands included everything—among other things the bases and the fleet to which he refused to accede. Yesterday, however, the Germans sent him a 'brutal *dictat*,' threatening in event of refusal to occupy all France, to feed the army of occupation with French foodstuffs, and to permit the native population to die of hunger. . . .

"He went on to say that there will be no change in the situation in Africa, that no successor to Weygand will be appointed, that he remains determined to preserve the Empire and that the general command of African forces will be administered from Vichy."

Asked for the reason for German objection to Weygand, the Marshal said that "Weygand was disliked by the Germans first because he is 'undiplomatic' and 'indiscreet.' In this reply, I assume the Marshal knew he was not telling the whole truth. . . .

"While the great inarticulate and leaderless mass of the French people remain hopeful of a British victory and continue to hope that America will rescue them from their present predicament without their doing anything for themselves, the

Government of France to-day, headed by a feeble, frightened old man surrounded by self-seeking conspirators, is altogether controlled by a group which probably for its own safety, is devoted to the Axis philosophy."

The President was advised that it might strengthen Pétain's opposition to future Axis demands if the United States seized the initiative by warning that its Ambassador might be recalled if the Vichy Government granted any further concessions. However, my letter warned that "if the Ambassador should be directed to make such a statement to the Marshal, we must be prepared and determined to carry it out. To avoid a reaction contrary to our interests, it must not be a bluff."

Weygand's "retirement" was announced in the French Press on November 21. The B.B.C. broadcast informed us that America had stopped both the economic assistance to North Africa and the shipment of relief medicines and food, and was reconsidering its entire French policy. The Vichy Government, in its reaction to Axis threats, had shown all the courage and resistance of a jellyfish. It was generally believed that even if Pétain could make peace with Hitler, a withdrawal of German occupation forces would be followed immediately by revolutionary activity instigated by the professional politicians who were out of office at this time.

Colonel de la Rocque, leader of the Croix de Feu and a member of Pétain's staff, called on November 26, and we discussed for an hour the existing desperate situation. Colonel de la Rocque was alert, had an impressive personality, and gave an impression that he possessed powers of leadership. He did not like the Germans or the German ideas of collaboration, and viewed the Marshal's present policy a temporary one necessary to meet the existing emergency. He and Pétain were trying to build up an organization to establish a government that would not have the weakness and corruption of the pre-war Republic. It was realized that such an organization might develop into a "black-shirt Ku-Klux" instrument for imposing some individual's will on the unorganized public. In the hope that he would pass it on to his associates, I told Colonel de la Rocque of my Government's probable reaction to concessions granted by the Pétain régime which went beyond the terms of the Armistice, and that the Atlantic Charter indicated that the United States and Great Britain had no interest in the form of government that might be desired and

established by any people. Time and events were to make that statement highly inaccurate.

That same week, another delegation, representing the Société France-Amérique and the now defunct French Senate, called to urge upon me the necessity of continuing friendly relations between our respective countries. They feared that shutting off supplies to North Africa would disaffect the natives and tend to throw them into the hands of the Axis.

Pétain left Vichy at 10 p.m. on December 1, to meet Marshal Hermann Göring, reportedly at Fontainebleau. The French Press tried to make out that the Marshal had arranged the meeting and nothing important was to be discussed. We had information that it was a Nazi summons, and that Pétain was reluctant to go, fearing the Germans might take him into custody. It appeared that another abject surrender of France to German demands for complete collaboration was imminent. One reliable source did tell us that the Marshal presented a written memorandum protesting demands that went beyond previous agreement, but that Marshal Göring, although accepting it, said contemptuously, "It is the privilege of the victor, not the vanquished, to make demands."

The question of continued shipment of supplies to North Africa, which in my opinion was to our advantage, hinged on a firm assurance from Pétain and Darlan that the ouster of Weygand did not presage any changes of policy regarding French colonies. Before I could see them again on this point, the United States was formally at war. Congress declared war on Japan, December 8, 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Germany and Italy declared war on us on December 11, and at 6 p.m. on December 11 I had a half-hour interview with the Marshal and the Admiral. Many other questions had arisen which will be discussed later, but a continuation of the Weygand-Murphy Agreement still was near the top of the agenda.

I explained that if the Vichy Government would reaffirm in writing the terms of that agreement, my Government would consider as favourably as possible an early resumption of the programme of economic assistance. Pétain replied that he saw no difficulty whatsoever in giving us a confirmation of the Weygand-Murphy Memorandum. This confirmation was delivered in writing to the Embassy the very next day.

The long first round in the battle for control of North Africa had ended with the Axis checkmated. There was no room for pleasant optimism that the situation would remain favourable to our interests. We were at war with Germany, and that condition brought an aggravation of some old problems and many new ones to our isolated diplomatic outpost at Vichy.

CHAPTER VI
BATTLE STATIONS

ADJOINING MY BEDROOM on the second floor of the Embassy residence on the Avenue Thermale was a little room I used as a sort of office. On the top of a desk there was a highly selective Navy radio receiving set. While sitting at that desk Sunday evening, December 7, 1941, whatever programme was on suddenly was interrupted to announce that the Japanese had delivered their barbaric sneak attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor.

We lived by rumours in Vichy, but in my mind there was little doubt about the truth of this radio bulletin. It was the usual Japanese practice to attack before making a declaration of war. They had done it before.

We were distressed by a feeling that most of the Pacific Fleet might have been at the Hawaiian base for the week-end and it might have suffered serious damage. The radio bulletins gave few details.

We recalled immediately a friendly protocol dinner given by Ambassador Kato in his residence the preceding Friday evening. Mrs. Leahy had remarked that Kato appeared ill or at least quite unlike his usual urbane self. I recalled that he did not say very much. He may have known about the Hull "ultimatum," but I was fairly sure he did not know in advance about the pending Pearl Harbor attack.

There was considerable excitement the next morning as the Embassy staff gathered to discuss the news that was coming over the radio in frequent bulletins. However, there was work to do. In the Navy, the order would have been, "Man your battle stations," which sends officers and men to the gun turrets and batteries to engage an enemy. We had a staff of about twenty-five officers and clerks. Many were married and some had small children. The Germans might order their Vichy puppets to throw us out at any time. They might attempt to take us into custody, and I wished to avoid that if possible. (When the Americans invaded North Africa on November 8, 1942, the ranking officer at the Embassy was Chargé S. Pinckney Tuck. He and all the staff in Vichy

at that time were interned.) Most of the diplomatic colony at the French capital lived more or less out of suitcases, because one never knew when a hurried exit might be required.

Of the two escape routes previously mentioned, the best one seemed to be the southern route to a French Mediterranean port. If we were to try to make for Spain, the Germans probably would have been looking for us, and it was a long journey over the mountains. There was no thought of flying. We had no planes.

Plans for quick destruction of our ciphers and confidential documents were re-examined. Some space on the third floor of the Chancellery served as a "code-room." Our two excellent code clerks provided security on a twenty-four-hour basis. They had a small gasoline burner in their room and could destroy our ciphers on a few minutes' notice.

A number of my colleagues called at the Embassy on December 8, and there also arrived a formal calling card of Marie Acki, Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, which had been mailed prior to the Japanese attack the preceding afternoon.

At 6.30 p.m. (Vichy time) of December 8, the National Broadcasting Company short-wave station reported President Roosevelt's request that the Congress declare war on Japan. The voice and words of the President formed a dramatic picture of the most powerful nation of the world embarking on an all-out war to destroy the bandit nation of the Orient. The war formally declared that day would in my certain opinion result in the destruction of Japan as a first-class sea power, regardless of how much time and treasure might be required to accomplish that end. I knew that the President was thoroughly familiar with the Navy's plans to defeat Japan.

Later in the evening of December 8, the radio reported that casualties at Pearl Harbor probably numbered 3,000. This created anxiety for our relatives and friends stationed there, but we later learned that most of them came out of it all right. Later, when the details were available, I found that there were four ships seriously damaged upon which I had served. They were the *Nevada* (executive officer, 1917), the ancient *Oglala* (flagship when I commanded Mine Squadron One, 1921), the cruiser *Raleigh* (flagship when I was Commander of Destroyers, U.S. Fleet, 1931), and the battleship *California*.

It was on the last-named that my four-star Admiral's flag first was hoisted in 1936 as Commander, U.S. Battle Force.

At 4 p.m. on December 9, the formal note informing France of our declaration of war on Japan was delivered in person to the French Foreign Office. Admiral Darlan was in Turin, Italy, conferring with Mussolini's Foreign Minister, Count Ciano. The Acting Minister, M. Romler, assured me that France would remain strictly neutral.

At noon, December 10, the radio announced from Tokyo that the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle-cruiser *Repulse* had been sunk by air attack off the coast of Malaya. If true (and it was), this report pointed to a failure of the British Royal Air Force to be where it was needed when it was needed. A few days after the Pearl Harbor disaster, it appeared to me that we would have to delay any major naval operations in the western Pacific until we could be prepared to send sufficient naval force to defeat the Japanese battle fleet.

I think now, in retrospect, that we overestimated the power of the Japanese Navy and Air forces. We had pretty good information while I was Chief of Naval Operations (1937-9) that the Japanese were comparatively inefficient in gunnery. However, they had good ships, good guns and a lot of air. The whole world in those days was afraid of the air. There was a fear that if we sent our ships near enough to Japan to be attacked by land-based air, it would be very bad for us. It turned out that when we did go there, we took our excellent Naval Air Force with us, and that was bad for the Japs.

We were still without much detail on the damage suffered at Pearl Harbor, but I knew if the Japanese had managed to get in without warning we had suffered a serious setback at a time when we needed that fleet. There were always too many ships in Pearl Harbor to take an air attack.

The wrecking of our fleet in this unanticipated attack gave the Japanese a terrific advantage they did not have before, but their campaign developed pretty much along expected lines. We thought they would strike down the coast of China and the Dutch East Indies to get oil and rubber, which they had to have to win the war. When we were able to stop that, Japan started to lose the war. Back in 1937, when the gunboat *Panay* was bombed and sunk, I felt that if we then blockaded Japan, we could check the Tokyo bandits' ideas of conquest,

possibly even without a war. However, the *Panay* was a local incident and the Japanese Government may not have had any advance information about it. Pearl Harbor was no local incident.

We were getting a little news, all bad, about the Japanese attack on the Philippines. The Navy always had assumed that as the Japs moved south, they would invade the Philippines. If we had fortified Guam, and had other recommendations made to Congress in the preceding five years been accepted, things would have been much more difficult for the enemy. We feared that the Philippines would take a bad beating. I had known General Douglas MacArthur since he was a handsome young officer in San Francisco, back in 1905. He could be depended upon to use his inadequate forces to their full capacity. I had always entertained an extremely high opinion of his ability. His brother had been at the Naval Academy the same time I was there, and his nephew, Douglas MacArthur II, was on my staff at Vichy. The younger MacArthur had the same kind of ability that big Douglas had, which was shortly to be demonstrated again on a special mission I entrusted to him.

Our mission at Vichy now was more important than ever to Washington, but it probably will surprise few people that I wrote to Welles:

“It is not possible for me to avoid a feeling that now when the situation has reached a point requiring action, which you and I have long foreseen, my own professional services should have much more value in the military-naval effort than here. I am, of course, as both you and the President know, completely prepared and desirous of going elsewhere or remaining here, whichever appears to best serve the purposes of the President.

“I hope he may find without difficulty all the public support that is necessary in order that America may adhere to the simple essentials that are needed to insure a complete and certain victory in the Pacific at the earliest practicable date.”

That letter was written on December 10. At 5 p.m. the next day came the news that Germany and Italy had declared war against the United States. The “earliest practicable date” was more than three years distant. A French radio broadcast on December 11 announced that I would be recalled to some national defence post. I suspected the wish was father to a desire expressed in that report!

At 6 p.m., December 11, I had a half-hour interview with Marshal Pétain, with Darlan present as usual. Washington wanted written assurances on several questions besides the North African bases discussed in the preceding chapter. The first was about the French fleet. Darlan said it would not be used against England if the British did not attack first, as they had done in the past. The Marshal nodded his assent.

As for the French aircraft-carrier *Béarn* at Fort-de-France, Martinique, Darlan said she had been disarmed and was of no danger to anyone. No orders had been given for her to move anywhere. He did want to pull out a French cruiser there and put another in its place so that the first one could return for overhauling. President Roosevelt had requested the Marshal to order Admiral Georges Robert, in command at Martinique, not to allow any French naval ship to leave from any French port in the Western Hemisphere so as to avoid all misunderstanding between France and the United States. Both agreed to give Robert such an order.

The most difficult question was my Government's desire for a formal expression of the position that France would take now that Germany and Italy were at war with the United States. I added that it was feared Germany would attempt to force their Government to break relations with my Government, and pointed out that any further concessions, such as bases in North Africa or use of the fleet, would amount to giving active military assistance to an enemy of the United States.

Both Pétain and Darlan emphasized that France wished to remain neutral and to avoid any break in relations, but that they were powerless to resist German ultimatums. The Marshal at this point observed that the Germans could starve the French civilian population. Darlan added that he had been trying for the past three days to find a satisfactory solution to the problem and that a written reply would be forthcoming on all the points raised in the interview. As the Marshal escorted me to the doorway, he said:

"We are unfortunately privileged to be living in one of the great and terrible moments of history. Never before has the whole world been at war—Europe, Africa, Asia, America, Australia. I don't know what will come of it."

At 11.30 that night, Ray Atherton, Chief of the European Division of the State Department, called on the overseas

telephone from Washington to discuss the political situation at Vichy and prospects of future conduct of business by our Embassy. I think this was the first trans-Atlantic telephone call received by me at Vichy. The connection was good. I told him of my conference a few hours earlier with Pétain and Darlan. As for Embassy personnel, I suggested that if we had to leave, a ship be sent to Marseilles.

At 4 p.m. on December 12, the formal notice that the Congress had declared war on Germany and Italy was delivered, and at six the formal replies to the questions raised in the previous day's interview with Pétain and Darlan were delivered to our Embassy. It was the first time the Embassy had received from the Vichy Government a direct, written, categorical agreement with the expressed desires of the United States. However, I had no faith in the ability of the Marshal to carry out the policies stated in these Foreign Office notes. We cabled the texts to Washington immediately.

I saw the Marshal and Darlan again on December 14 to deliver a message from the President in which he said: "These positive assurances [the formal replies regarding the fleet, Martinique, neutrality and North Africa] which I have received pertaining to matters of vital concern to the defence of the United States are a source of profound satisfaction. . . ." This was another of those courtesy notes from Roosevelt that always elicited warm expressions of appreciation from the Marshal. The President appeared to be trying to stimulate Pétain to oppose further Axis demands. At this same meeting the request for American survey parties to inspect the state of disarmament in French possessions in the western Atlantic brought a quick reaction from Darlan. The Admiral said his naval vessels in the West Indies were necessary for defence, that they would not be disarmed, and therefore the question of survey parties was not pertinent. He politely refused the American offer to provide protection for the Western Hemisphere colonies.

As a precautionary step, we made arrangements for Switzerland to take over the American interests in Vichy in event of a break in Franco-American relations. Orders were received on December 16 to transfer at once eight members of the Embassy clerical staff and confidential files to the American Legation at Berne. With these steps completed, we were prepared as well as we could be for any eventuality. The situation

was summed up in my letter to the President on December 22.

"Our unfortunate experience in Pearl Harbor with Japanese treachery, the detailed results of which are completely unknown here, seems to have had little influence on French opinion of the war situation or its future prospects. . . . It seems to be clear that Germany is suffering a major defeat in Russia and is rapidly approaching a smaller but more complete military reverse in Cyrenaica.

"French opinion reacted with a leaning over toward our side on the question, but with reservations and preparations to jump back on a moment's notice. Our friends are coming out into the open a little more, and our enemies are a little less aggressive for the moment."

The new rumours of fresh Nazi demands were passed on to the President, plus news of the arrival on December 21 in great secrecy of General Juin, French Army commander in North Africa, General Noguès, Resident-General of Morocco, and Admiral Esteve, Resident-General of Tunisia. I told him that requisition of the huge liner *Normandie* in New York Harbour had produced no violent reaction whatever.

"Some of our anti-Axis friends believe that, in view of German reverses in Russia, the Axis defeat in Libya, and our entry into the war, there is a possibility that the Marshal may refuse to surrender to German demands to which we may take serious objection.

"Judging from past performances, I would think that it is at best only a possibility and definitely not a probability. It is, however, certain that the Marshal does not desire a diplomatic break with the United States."

Regarding the President's new arrangement of the high naval command, I wrote: "Of all the flag officers known to me, I should, given a free choice, have selected Hart (Asiatic Fleet), King (named Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet in all oceans), and Nimitz (Pacific Fleet) as the best. Of the three, I consider Hart the most reliable, the least likely to make a mistake, and as being physically doubtful because of his age. A sea commander in this war must be capable of taking cruel physical punishment." I might have added that with naval operations extending to all oceans and continents, with the contingent necessity of distributing available forces to meet demands, a single naval command seemed essential to the best possible effort.

The radio next day, December 23, reported that Prime Minister Churchill was in Washington conferring with Roosevelt on joint war plans. At 5.40 p.m. that afternoon, I received another telephone call from Mr. Atherton. Washington had rumours that Pétain had resigned and Darlan had taken over the Vichy Government. Happily, I was able to tell him that the Marshal was still Chief of State. Atherton asked for any news of interest to the conference being held "across the way," which I assumed meant the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations. I told him that the situation was stabilized and no events of political or military importance were expected to happen in France until the first of 1942, but actions of serious importance were expected then.

* * *

Christmas Day was cold and damp. Our presents from home were food and warm clothing of a quality and suitability not obtainable in France and therefore most welcome. Mrs. Leahy and I reminisced that at Christmas a year before we were opening packages aboard the *Tuscaloosa*, which was bringing us to my Vichy assignment. On Sunday in Christmas week we gave a tea in the residence for all officers and ladies and clerks of the Embassy, a total of about forty. There were two important changes in the staff about this time. Mr. Matthews was called to a more important post in London, and Tuck replaced him. Matthews was a highly competent, thoroughly loyal Embassy secretary. He was extremely valuable and had been in Vichy a long time. Commander R. H. Hillenkoetter, Naval Attaché, was called to new duties and replaced by Commander A. C. J. Sabelot.

* * *

A report to Welles at the year's end (December 30) noted the Vichy situation reasonably stable, with only the report of a prospective shipment of 3,500 tons of gasoline from Tunisia to Axis forces in Libya on the agenda. I told Pétain and Darlan this would violate our economic accord regarding North Africa. Darlan gave an involved answer and wound up by saying that Germany threatened to occupy French Morocco if the gasoline was not delivered. I told Welles that Pétain appeared fatigued and older than usual.

The Marshal had instructed Darlan that no Minister may

agree to any Axis interference with the business of our Embassy, and I wrote that "I believe he [Pétain] will inform me in advance if it becomes necessary to stop our use of code messages or take other action which would interfere with our normal routine business."

During the last hour of the old year we heard an excellent broadcast from Edinburgh and at midnight we heard the reassuring striking of twelve by Big Ben in London.

On Sunday during Christmas week, Secretary MacArthur, as he left to put his car in its garage for the night, noticed a German officer in uniform standing near the basement entrance to the Chancellery. When he returned to the building, a French police agent told him that the German had entered the building through the basement entrance. The agent said that when he asked the Nazi officer his name and why he was there, the latter left and drove away in an automobile. This was reported to the proper authorities. We accepted it as a warning that we might at any time be searched or seized. It was evidence of the increased importance of the information and intelligence of our Embassy now that we were at war with the Axis.

I have noted throughout this narrative so far various types of information which we passed on to Washington, sometimes directly to the President. Our attachés had excellent contacts and kept me completely informed of what they were doing. An Ambassador may choose to "forget" some of the things he is told. Intelligence is not a subject to be discussed freely at any time. No mention of this important activity was made in my conversations with the President when we discussed the Vichy appointment, or in his letter of instructions. Many times we had no idea as to the value of the information we were passing on. It would have to be weighed and measured against other intelligence by those in Washington responsible for this work.

No propaganda was carried on by the Embassy at Vichy. We sent information to Washington, and they made propaganda if they wanted to. I had a very small mailing list of perhaps less than a dozen of the top officials of the Pétain Government, including the Marshal and Admiral Darlan. It was a regular practice to send them complete English and French texts of important documents, particularly the radio addresses of President Roosevelt. They told me many times

that they appreciated this courtesy. The French Press and radio were German-controlled and either ignored or distorted news from the United States.

Much of our information came from French officials, many of them high in Government, who were secretly on our side. They stuck their necks far out. The Germans might have killed them. We were careful not to let anyone know we even talked to them, because we were getting information that the Axis powers did not want us to have. The Marshal knew we were getting this data, but he never complained.

There were other sources of information. A number of Frenchmen who were escaping came to the Embassy to tell me what they needed. Of course, this was done very quietly. I did not know where they were going or how they were escaping. They were anti-German. Some of them had obtained their release from occupied France or from prison by purchase or influence, and were trying to get away. I did not supply them with any false credentials, but would outline possible lines of procedure. They would, of course, get the papers elsewhere! No action was required on the part of the American Embassy. They may have obtained forged papers. I don't know. I did not want to know.

From time to time members of the Underground would slip into the Embassy. Sometimes they practically forced themselves on me and told me what they were doing. These undergrounders (*Maquis*) generally seemed to be erratic. They did not seem to be organized or well-directed. They had strange ideas about what they were accomplishing by throwing a bomb here and there. Such information as they gave me was not particularly valuable. Perhaps one exception was the girl spy I mentioned earlier. She was from a good family and was endangering her life for France. She is still alive as this is written, and I hear from her occasionally.

Sometimes Welles or even the President indicated in their letters that the intelligence we were supplying was valuable. I assumed that any pertinent military data was being passed on to the British, but I did not deal directly with our ally. It would have been very unfortunate if I had tried to pass information directly to the British, because the French soon would have found it out.

When I arrived at Vichy early in January, 1941, the whole world was expecting Hitler to invade the British islands. We

were able to get considerable information on the German preparations. Welles was informed on February 4 that reports indicated the Germans were making final invasion arrangements in the Dunkerque-Le Havre area. These reports said new airfields were being constructed and carefully concealed and that civilians in some coastal areas were being moved into the interior. In March we passed on reports that some 3,000 German "scientists and tourists" were visiting Morocco and spreading propaganda among the Arabs. Also, thanks to some loyal friends high in the French War Ministry, we sent to Washington in March the best information then available on the distribution of German land forces. This report accounted for about 230 German divisions, and added that Hitler was still forming more units. We had no idea how accurate it might be. For example, this particular report listed only seventy German divisions on the Polish and Russian frontiers, although there were vague rumours then that Germany was preparing to attack Russia in May.

Early in the spring we had some trouble with General Donovan's O.S.S. agents in southern France. They were sending spy messages through the Consulate, principally at Marseilles. I realized this would be a serious reflection on our foreign service if we should be caught sending unneutral messages under the cloak of diplomatic immunity. I ordered it stopped. Later General Donovan accused me of interfering in his work. I told him that the diplomatic service was *my* business.

There appeared to be very little security in many of our own communications. Our telephones were tapped. Darlan would tell me of information he had gathered from reports of his telephone interceptions of Embassy conversations. I did not trust the security of the State Department codes. I do not know that they actually were broken, but on August 13 Admiral Darlan warned me that the German information service was able to read all of our dispatches sent in diplomatic code. That is why soon after I arrived at Vichy I used the Navy codes for any confidential communiqués. We felt that our courier mail service was secure, but it was too infrequent to be of much value in day-to-day negotiations. By using what was called a "triple priority," we could send a message to Washington and get a reply within a few hours.

Vichy was full of spies. We knew our activities were under

close observation by the Gestapo. All of the diplomatic missions there were trying to get information. Much of this work was concentrated in the hands of the various attachés. There was a popular bar in downtown Vichy that came to be known as "the international spy house." I never went there, but our attachés reported it was quite a place for picking up stray bits of information.

One of the great advantages of the Weygand-Murphy Agreement regarding North Africa was that it permitted us to augment greatly our "consular" force in the French colonies. Everyone knew they were spies. Pétain and Darlan knew what was going on. Of course, we were trying to get relief supplies distributed to the Arabs, but it was also the business of these consular agents to get military information. However, officially we always referred to them as vice-consuls and diplomatic attachés.

In November, 1941, our friends notified us well in advance about the prospective establishment of a German consulate in Vichy. One report said that there would be about seventy officers and clerks and that the whole group would probably number 500 "spies." When finally established, the Consulate was a large operation. However, Vichy had been so full of German spies that a few hundred more did not make any difference. I cannot recall that the additional "coverage" had any effect on the business of our Embassy. We constantly received and passed on information regarding the commercial relations between France and Germany. For example, Welles was informed on November 10 of the reported release of cobalt and shipments of rubber from North Africa. The Germans at that time were believed to be very short of rubber.

Our diplomatic colleagues frequently told us things that seemed worth sending to Washington. The Minister from Mexico, General Francisco Aguilar, gave us some details on what he termed an influential Fifth Column element composed of Japanese, Germans, and Italians then operating in Mexico. Aguilar said they had money and could get more, and his suggestion, which I passed on to Welles on December 10, was that the United States should induce Mexico to declare war at once and take effective steps to prevent the importation of arms by Axis agents.

Early in January, 1942, President Roosevelt was anxious that I talk to General Weygand. Because of the spy-infested

atmosphere of Vichy, I was forced to tell the President that "it does not seem possible for me personally to see your friend, the General, without attracting unfavourable attention to him, as I am constantly under surveillance. Everybody with whom I am associated is suspected of something."

On February 4, 1942, I had my first contact with what became known as "psychological warfare." We came into possession of a copy of a propaganda leaflet recently dropped in large numbers throughout France by British planes. It was entitled "Message from America to the People of France." On one side was an American flag and on the other a full-page picture of the Statue of Liberty with the following legend: "To the country that gave us the Statue of Liberty we will give liberty." The text of the leaflet message ended with: "Keep up your courage. When our victory comes, when victory comes to all the Allies, you will be among the victors."

Psychological warfare was something new to the professional soldier and sailor. I heard that later in the war it had useful results at the time of our invasion of Italy. I am not certain as to what effect it ever had on the Japanese. The best "psychological warfare" to use on those barbarians was bombs, and we used bombs vigorously. As for the leaflets dropped in France at this time, I could see no useful effect that they had on Allied prospects.

What was perhaps the most interesting incident of our intelligence activities involved the German warships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, 26,000-ton battleships, and the 10,000-ton cruiser *Prinz Eugen*, which were anchored at Brest, France. We received estimates of considerable damage being done to these ships by the R.A.F. From a naval viewpoint, it seemed certain that the Germans would have to move them if they expected to make any use of these vessels during the war. We had excellent contact in the Brest area.

These German warships pulled out of Brest on the night of February 11-12. About February 1 we had received intelligence that the nature of repairs being rushed through the shops at Brest indicated the Germans were planning to move the ships. Five days later we had further reports that the torpedo nets in the outer harbour were being removed. On February 9 we rushed to Washington the information that camouflage was being removed from the ships.

On February 11 our Naval Attaché received a cryptic

telephone message from Brest consisting of two words: "They're gone." The fact that these ships were under way was flashed to Washington under the highest possible priority. We knew that it would be passed on immediately to the British.

It was disheartening to hear briefly over the B.B.C. on February 15 that, although engaged and further damaged, the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Prinz Eugen* had run the British Channel successfully and reached the German port of Kiel. Their escape seemed to me to be a complete failure of the British air command. I was not surprised to learn later that, although Mr. Churchill brushed aside the matter as "an annoying incident," the British people were incensed and a storm of criticism swept down on the Prime Minister's Government.

Our intelligence activities continued unabated up to the very hour of the internment of our staff in November, 1942. For me there remained only five more months of tedious service before circumstances made my recall inevitable.

CHAPTER VII

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

FOUR MEN DOMINATED THE unhappy fortunes of France in 1942. At the top was Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, then eighty-six years old, but still the symbol of authority to millions of Frenchmen. He was a dictator in name only, having neither the will nor the stamina to resist the pressure of the conquerors of his people or to put an end to the intriguing of his own "palace guard" of Ministers. Although I was convinced that Pétain believed that the preservation of friendship between the United States and France was the best course for his country, he had no power to resist repeated demands for concessions to the Axis.

The figure of Pierre Laval hung like an evil shadow over Vichy as the year opened. The former Prime Minister was a shrewd and able politician who staked his own future and that of France on an Axis victory. He was favoured by the German occupation authorities. A test of strength between Germany and the United States in Vichy was in the making as 1942 opened. It was to result in April in a temporary victory for Laval when the Germans forced the Marshal to take him back into the Government, which event necessitated my recall to Washington.

The third figure, also ambitious and a capable politician, was Admiral François Darlan, the "heir apparent" to the Marshal's dictatorship. Darlan was a complete opportunist. He endeavoured to walk a tight-rope between the warring powers. Since the military situation during most of my service at the French capital was highly favourable to the Axis, Darlan usually was my diplomatic opponent, although we maintained cordial personal relations. Before the year was out, Darlan had decided that the power of the United States eventually would overcome Hitler, and he came over to our side at a critical moment. Any hope of political reward he may have entertained for that action was ended by an assassin's bullet.

The fourth figure was that of General Charles de Gaulle, around whose Free French resistance movement the British apparently thought they could build an effective military

force to fight Hitler. Like Laval and Darlan, he thirsted for power. Although his political philosophy appeared to be little different from that of the Government of Pétain, when I arrived back in the United States in May, de Gaulle was the "hero" of the so-called Liberals. I had not met him personally, but from Vichy his movement appeared to cause nothing but trouble for the Allies. De Gaulle's wilful action in seizing the small French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, off the Canadian coast, in December, 1941, without the approval of anybody, even his British friends, apparently produced a furore in America. Darlan used it to make trouble for me. My chief diplomatic objective was to see that the French Government observed the terms of an agreement—the Armistice agreement. Pétain and Darlan could now point out that the United States had broken its promise to maintain the *status quo* of French sovereignty over their colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Darlan told me early in January that already he had heard from the Germans that the latter proposed to send troops to North Africa to prevent any similar attempt there by the Free French. The affair dragged on and eventually ended in a compromise.

There was a fifth personality on whom the United States pinned unsubstantial hopes that he might become the dominant figure around which we could build effective resistance to Germany. That was General Maxime Weygand.

At noon on January 12, Henry P. Leverich, Second Secretary to the United States Legation in Lisbon, arrived in Vichy bringing secret oral instructions from President Roosevelt. We were to propose to Weygand that he go back to North Africa and assume command there with the full military and economic support of the United States. Third Secretary Douglas MacArthur II was entrusted with the task of contacting Weygand in southern France, which he did with much skill and diplomacy. My letter of January 25 to the President killed whatever hopes Washington may have entertained concerning General Weygand. I said: "Weygand was courteous and agreeable, but declined to consider our proposition. He said he is a private citizen, with no official status, and completely loyal to the Marshal. MacArthur asked him to keep the matter confidential. Weygand replied that his loyalty to Pétain would make it necessary for him to inform the Marshal, which he could do without it becoming known to others.

I cannot escape a belief that it will come to the knowledge of others, and that it will be transmitted to the German authorities." I also told the President that key Army commanders in North Africa who were Weygand men were being removed and their places taken by a high command completely amenable to Vichy.

Late in January I was instructed by the President to present a personal message to the Marshal, seeking new assurances regarding the French fleet, military assistance to the Axis, and the status of North Africa. I saw him on January 27, with Darlan and Charles Rochat present at the interview. Rochat had been a great friend of ours and recently had been promoted by Darlan to an important position in the Foreign Ministry. In the past he had told us things for which he would have been liquidated had the Germans known about it. It was evident that the Marshal already had been informed of MacArthur's conversations with Weygand. The only unusual angle of the interview centred around any possible invasion of North Africa. The Marshal said his Government would defend the African colonies against *any* foreign power. I asked him: "Does that mean Americans?" I thought he might make an exception. The Marshal replied: "It means anybody—including Americans."

Asked if he would desire American military or naval assistance if the Axis powers invaded French colonial possessions, Pétain replied: "Only if we ask for it."

This was the beginning of another long series of exchanges of notes and conversations which, with occasional variations, were a repetition of what had gone before. I have condensed from my notes made at the time brief summaries of these negotiations, which continued at intervals until the time of my departure from Vichy.

There were four major points of disagreement. In the order of their importance, they were:

1. Military and economic assistance to the Axis.
2. The status of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.
3. Japanese use of French shipping in Indo-China.
4. Changes in the deployment of certain French warships.

The negotiations frequently overlapped. In some conversations all four matters were discussed. At other times, the interviews would be confined to one of these controversies.

(1) *Economic Aid to the Axis*

Early in February, 1942, we had reliable reports that French vessels were transporting material, including heavy-duty trucks, from Marseilles to Tunis, presumably for use of the Axis troops in Libya. These reports said that when Darlan was in Italy in December, 1941, he made a supply agreement with the Italians known as the "Delta Plan," under which France would make shipments on a regular schedule.

Darlan contended (February 9) he had to make the agreement to prevent forcible seizure of the Tunisian port of Bizerte. Washington answered the Admiral's explanation with a strong note that was almost an ultimatum. It was the first positive action taken by America in its relations with France since my arrival in Vichy in January, 1941. The American note, dated February 11, said that unless we were given official assurance that this assistance would be stopped, the American Ambassador would be recalled for consultation and the American policy with regard to the Pétain Government re-examined. Several exchanges of notes produced no satisfactory assurance.

Everything pointed to my early recall to Washington. After more than year in this defeated country where not only the material necessities of life, but also the spiritual values had been destroyed by an invasion of barbarians, the thought of returning to a free, undefeatable country was pleasing beyond the power of words to express.

(2) *Status of French Possessions in the Western Hemisphere*

Under-Secretary of State Welles, on February 21, ordered me to inform Admiral Darlan immediately that Washington had been advised that a German submarine stopped at Martinique for hospitalization of an officer and had there obtained assistance in continuation of its operations against Allied shipping. The United States demanded that the French Government forbid any Axis vessels or planes to enter French ports or territory in the Western Hemisphere. It was implied that should such assurances not be forthcoming, we would take such action as might be necessary in the interest of security of the Western Hemisphere and in accordance with existing inter-American obligations.

It was difficult to see how France could agree to refuse to the Axis entry into French ports such as was permitted under

old international law, except by assuming that France still was in the status of a belligerent and therefore not a neutral.

It required an exchange of two sets of notes before, on March 23 (the same day that the problem of aid to the Axis was settled), Darlan gave us positive assurance that belligerent ships and planes would not be permitted to enter French territory in the Western Hemisphere. In return, my Government promised to resume economic assistance to North Africa.

This action of the two governments seemed to have quieted a real crisis in our diplomatic relations for so long a time as Vichy might resist Axis demands that went beyond terms of the Armistice agreement. On past performance, there was no indication that future Axis demands would not be granted.

(3) *Japanese use of French Shipping in Indo-China*

We had reports that the Pétain Government was about to make an agreement with Japan that would permit the use of French vessels in the Indo-China area by Japanese forces. In two conversations on February 2 and February 9, Admiral Darlan explained that if the French Government did not agree to the use of its ships, Japan might seize them without the consent of France. In April the Japanese were pressing for an answer to their demands. Foreign Office officials informed us that they would attempt to make a local agreement that would allow the Japanese to use 50,000 tons of French merchant shipping between Indo-China and Japan on the condition that these ships would not transport war material or troops. It was apparent that Vichy did not feel free to offer effective resistance to the Japanese pressure. The demands of Tokyo also indicated that shipping was needed badly by Japan to support its widely dispersed war effort. That was the status of this matter when I returned to the United States.

(4) *Changes in the Deployment of Certain French Warships*

At a luncheon on February 21, Admiral Paul Auphan revealed to me that the battleship *Dunkerque* had arrived that day at Toulon for repairs. Since its encounter with the British fleet in 1940 it had been in a disabled condition in the port of Oran. Admiral Auphan added that he was anxious to get the *Jeanne d'Arc* back from Guadaloupe and to change the personnel.

This was a violation of an agreement made by France in

April, 1941, in which the French Government had promised that the *Dunkerque* would not be moved from Oran. Darlan's explanation was that he regarded this agreement no longer binding, since the United States had failed to carry out its obligations to provide relief for unoccupied France and North Africa. He also said that it would require two years to repair the damage suffered by the *Dunkerque* in the Mers-el-Kebir engagement. We had been presented with a *fait accompli* and these negotiations were not pursued further.

I interviewed Darlan again on April 3 regarding a report that the battleship *Richelieu* was to be brought from Dakar to continental France. The Admiral assured me that this was not true and he had no intention of moving any naval vessels from the Atlantic coast of Africa to France or to the Mediterranean.

At several of the interviews during the negotiations summarized above, Marshal Pétain appeared confused and fatigued. He once asked my opinion as to how much longer this war would continue, to which I replied, "Not more than two years." He said that seemed a very long time for France to survive under existing conditions.

* * *

As the new year of 1942 started, Germany was suffering a major military reverse in Russia and the Axis forces in Libya appeared completely defeated. In the Orient, Japan was having much success in the Philippines, in Indo-China and in Malaya. I believed this trend would be reversed as soon as the American fleet, badly damaged in Pearl Harbor, could be brought into action. With the military and industrial power of the democracies moving into determined, co-ordinated action, it appeared a reasonable hope that 1942 might see the defeat of the aggressor nations and thereby bring a period of peace to the world.

We heard the phrase "United Nations" for the first time on January 3. A radio bulletin announced that twenty-six nations in Washington had signed an agreement to use their full resources, military and economic, against the Tripartite Powers, and had bound themselves not to make a separate armistice or peace with the Axis. There was no appreciable reaction in France, however, to this announcement.

That same evening the B.B.C. announced the occupation

of Manila by the Japanese. Our Mexican friend, General Aguilar, had thought that declaring Manila an "open city" was a mistake, because it would have no deterrent effect on Japanese barbarity, and Tokyo would use our action to prevent bombardment of Japanese cities.

Aguilar, who had once been Mexico's minister to Japan, added that manufacture of war material in Japan was largely accomplished at night in the residences of the workmen, and that destruction of almost any dwelling would directly affect the actual production of war material. This information was sent on to Washington with the comment (Roosevelt letter, January 12) that "in fighting with Japanese savages all previously accepted rules of warfare must be abandoned."

* * *

Rumours persisted in January that Germany planned to force France into more active collaboration. One report said Pétain had been summoned to Paris by Hitler. Another asserted that friends of Interior Minister Pucheu, with approval of German authorities, were organizing a cabal to oust Darlan. News of food riots in the Mediterranean coastal area was not allowed to appear in the French Press. The most interesting "prediction of the month" came from Darlan, who told me on January 13 that "Churchill will in the near future be replaced as Prime Minister by Major Attlee, who is the only person in England acceptable to the Soviet and to British Labour." Poor "Popeye" was to be in his grave more than two years before that prophecy became a reality.

I had even less luck than the Admiral with predictions. A group of my colleagues were discussing the Japanese drive down the Malay Peninsula and they feared Singapore would be captured. "They can't take Singapore," I said. "It's a well-prepared fortress." Churchill disqualified me as a prophet when he announced the surrender of the great Far Eastern naval base on February 15. The Libyan retreat, the escape of the three German warships from Brest and now the fall of Singapore depressed British prestige in this part of the world to a new low level. Were it not for the splendid military performances of Russia, the Allied cause would have had little upon which to pin its hope for victory.

The possibility of Germany's defeat by Russia alarmed Marshal Pétain, who feared a subsequent Communist uprising

in Europe. It also produced a steady flow of peace rumours. One rumour said that the French General Staff had reported in a study of the war that Germany could not win and that America would decide the peace terms. We were told one week that Germany desired France to interrupt commercial relations with the United States. Then came contrary reports that the Nazis did not want any rupture, the explanation being that the Nazis might use France as a possible intermediary in presenting peace proposals.

* * *

There was some discussion in the Press at this time^{*} about the important French possession of Madagascar, lying off the African east coast. It long had seemed inexcusable to me that Madagascar, Réunion and Mauritius islands, flanking our supply routes to the Red Sea, had not been occupied by the Allies. There was no reason to hope for any effective French resistance if and when Japan should want them. In stressing this to the President on February 20, I said that “. . . the time has already passed when this war for the preservation of our civilisation permits of giving further consideration to the pride or sensibilities of defeated France in Madagascar, in Indo-China or elsewhere.” The President replied that my suggestions were being referred to the War Council.

Mr. Roosevelt also took note of the generally discouraging tone of my February 20 report. He wrote: “. . . The Joint Staff missions have very definitely urged that we postpone as long as possible any evidence of change in our relations with France. They consider that to hold the fort as far as you are concerned is as important a military task as any other these days. . . . Not only is our presence in France and North Africa the last bridgehead to Europe, but it likewise helps to hold the Iberian Peninsula in line. . . .

“In these critical days we count not only on your presence there as Ambassador, but upon your own military knowledge and experience to give us, in so far as possible, estimates of the French position from this point of view.”

February also brought radio reports of the American naval attack on the Japanese-held mandated Marshall Islands. This looked like a beginning of the War College's classical Pacific campaign, which would require as much as two years to complete and be extremely expensive in lives and treasure.

(The plan was to start an Army with the Fleet and move across the Pacific by steps, taking the islands as we went along until we were near enough to invade Japan itself.)

The Navy (before Pearl Harbor) was prepared to meet the Japanese fleet. I preferred that the mandated islands be attacked from the west together with an interruption of enemy lines of communication. Regardless of what plan might be followed, I never doubted the outcome. *Delenda est Japanico.*

* * *

The trials of former French Government leaders and General Maurice Gamelin charged with the responsibility for the defeat of France in 1940 began at Riom on February 19. The accused were Édouard Daladier, ex-Defence Minister; former Premier Léon Blum; Gamelin who commanded the French Army when it collapsed; and two other Cabinet officials—Guy La Chambre and Robert Jacomet. President Roosevelt took an active interest in the proceedings and requested daily transcripts. I made arrangements to get them and to have someone from the Embassy attend the court occasionally.

It soon developed that the attempt to make scapegoats of those accused was not going well and that the Pétain Government had a "bear by the tail." It appeared that many others—possibly some members of the present Government—might become involved and the whole thing was giving Vichy many unhappy moments as well as arousing the resentment of the German authorities. It surprised no one when the trials were allowed to lapse before reaching any verdicts.

* * *

The British radio reported extensive criticism in Parliament in February of the failure of Britain's air arm to provide adequate defence for the Empire's Pacific possessions or to injure Germany seriously in Europe. Conceivably this criticism might cause the British to spend less effort on advertising its Royal Air Force and more on using it in the offensive efforts of the Army and the Navy. I was not familiar with the air arm's command organization, but it appeared to lack overall efficiency.

While the R.A.F. performed heroically and successfully to beat off Göring's air armada in 1940, it was certain that its

utilization by the British Army and Navy had failed to be efficient anywhere, except possibly in the campaign then going on in Libya. From information available at Vichy, the R.A.F. appeared to have been a sad failure in the French-Flanders 1940 campaign, in Crete, in defence of the Malay Peninsula, and in assisting the Navy. Destruction of two modern battleships by enemy air attack off the coast of Malaya would have been practically impossible if the ships had been provided with a defensive air arm such as is carried by American aircraft-carriers.

British propaganda was advertising the prospect of fatally injuring Germany's morale by bombing attacks. This presupposed a lack of courage on the part of the Germans not justified by either past German history or their present performance, or by the reaction of Englishmen to the destructive *Blitz* of England the preceding year. The air power of Russia, Germany and Japan seemed to have been incorporated as an essential part of their armies and navies, and it operated with such efficiency and success as to need little advertising.

From the experience of the year 1941, it was reasonable to conclude that the R.A.F.'s offensive possibilities could not be approached until an adequate air contingent was made an essential part of land and sea forces under the complete control of local task force commanders. Any task force lacking special training for the duty assigned to it and without a single, controlling responsible commander is in advance almost doomed to failure if it encounters stubborn opposition.

Additional publicity was given late in February to a reorganization of the British Cabinet. If the change continued to permit the existing division of command within the armed forces, we might expect to hear of more British failures and more "magnificent" strategic withdrawals. This propaganda fooled no one, least of all the cynical politicians with whom I was dealing in Vichy.

* * *

British bombers made a destructive raid on the Renault auto works in the northern suburbs of Paris on the night of March 3, killing 500 and injuring 1,200, mostly non-combatants. Violent anti-British feeling flared immediately in both the occupied and unoccupied zones of France. The Paris Press, for good measure, added that the British Intelligence Service had been working under cover of the American Embassy.

March 7 was declared a day of mourning for the victims of the raid. Government departments half-masted their colours. Persons who had visited the Renault works after the bombing told me that the attack had been accurate and effective and that production by the factory which was contributing to the Nazi war effort would be stopped for an indefinite time. No warning had been given and this accounted for the many casualties reported among people living near the factory.

Senator Jacques Bardaux, who belonged to a very positive anti-Axis group, confirmed the previous reports of the thorough wreckage of the Renault works and of the depth of the public reaction. He said it was generally believed in France that the Krupp armament works in Essen had not been damaged by the R.A.F., and the French people were unable to understand why a factory in Paris should be bombed while much more important industries in Germany were permitted to continue production of war material.

Darlan was in Paris the night of the raid. When he returned to Vichy, he found on his desk new American demands for "assurances" that France would not give aid to the Axis. On March 8, the Admiral wrote me a personal letter in his own handwriting which contained highly uncomplimentary remarks about my Government. His note not only revealed that his anti-British mania had been highly stimulated, but was an example of an error made by a Minister of State in writing a letter when he was angry. It is here quoted in full:

"MR. AMBASSADOR,—I permit myself, because of the personal ties of sympathy which exist between us and because of our naval confraternity, to write you in a *strictly private manner*.

"I wish to tell you that the recent notes from the American Government are drawn up in terms of such an unpleasant and unusual character as would justify the non-acceptance of such documents by the French Government.

"If we have, however, accepted these notes, it is because we do not wish to give any pretext for breaking relations to a Government which, for the past few weeks, has given the impression of looking for a quarrel with the French Government.

"I realize that my defeated country is placed in a painful situation; but I did not believe that the Government of a nation which owes its independence in a great part to it would take advantage of this fact to treat it with scorn.

"I told you, a few months ago, that since June 25, 1940, the British had accumulated error upon error. They have just committed a greater one still which we shall never forgive them.

"To murder, for political motives, women, children and old people is a method of Soviet inspiration. Is England already bolshevized?

"Fear is sometimes an ill advisor; Mers-el-Kebir and Boulogne-Billancourt demonstrate this clearly.

"I hope that the American Government will not give way to fear.

"Believe me, etc.

"(Signed) F. DARLAN."

I replied immediately, choosing purposely to ignore the Admiral's insulting implications and his lack of sympathy with the Allied cause.

"DEAR ADMIRAL DARLAN,—It is pleasing to receive in your personal note of yesterday a reference to our common naval traditions and the sympathetic personal understanding that have been of so much assistance in our working together for the welfare of France. This reply is of the same strictly private character as is your note to me.

"In evaluating the attitude of my Government in the difficult situation that confronts both of our nations at the present time, we must give full consideration to the fact that the United States is now involved in a total war in defence of its existence as a free nation and that this war will be prosecuted until the aggressor nations are completely defeated, regardless of the sacrifices that must be made in order to secure a complete victory.

"Under such conditions in a life or death war for survival it seems unreasonable to expect the United States to look with complaisance upon the provision by a friendly nation of any assistance whatever to the military effort of the enemy powers.

"I am certain that President Roosevelt is desirous of doing everything that is practicable to aid in the restoration of France to its traditional position as a standard of civil liberty, civilization, and culture, and I personally shall continue to indulge in a hope that, whatever results from the present situation, it may be possible for me to have some small part

in preserving France and French culture in our distressed world.

“With assurances of sympathy in your difficult problems and expressions of personal consideration,

“Most sincerely,

“WILLIAM D. LEAHY.”

I sent copies of this exchange to the President immediately, who replied on April 3 as follows:

“DEAR BILL,—Yours of March 10 has just come. I am saddened by Darlan’s outburst to you and I am delighted by your absolutely perfect reply to him. On the whole, I think our rather steady pressure has been successful to date, but I hope the present situation will continue to be no worse than it has been in the past.”

* * *

During March, 1942, we received information from several sources that if an Allied expeditionary force should land in France at this time, it would have the immediate assistance of more than 100,000 ex-soldiers residing in the unoccupied zone who (letter to Welles, March 15) “are waiting for an opportunity to fight the Germans and who, under competent leadership, would be less inefficient than they were in 1940.”

In this same letter, I urged that, to maintain the *status quo*, North African economic relief should be resumed without delay and Red Cross relief supplies for women and children should be sent at once, together with any other practicable relief for the people of unoccupied France. I added: “It is generally believed that the fleet and the Army in Africa will carry out any orders issued by Vichy or by a subsequent Government of France.”

* * *

The B.B.C. news broadcast on March 10 announced that Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, had also been appointed Chief of Naval Operations, and that Admiral Harold R. Stark would go to London, relieving Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley. From the point of view of personalities, this appeared to be a good change, provided that responsibility for results at sea were placed on the local sea commands and that efforts were not made by Washington to control details of the operations.

* * *

During March Mrs. F. J. Gould, whose husband owned the Embassy residence, paid us a call while passing through to Paris. Although it was difficult for people to pass between occupied and unoccupied zones, Mrs. Gould seemed to get along amicably with the German authorities and pass freely across the line of demarcation. The Goulds had much property in Paris, and I have no doubt that she "bought" some of the German officers to pay for its protection. I did not believe she could have gone back and forth between Paris and southern France unless she subsidized somebody.

* * *

On Easter Sunday the radio announced that the United States formally had recognized de Gaullist control of French Equatorial Africa. This action was almost certain to irritate the Vichy Government and introduce new difficulties into our diplomatic relations. However, I had been informed by Under-Secretary Welles on March 27 that the United States was adhering to its policy of aiding the Free French in territories which they held while at the same time attempting to hold Vichy to its promises not to give away the fleet or make French territory available for Axis military operations. Welles had added significantly: "The time may come at a later date when these two policies are no longer compatible."

* * *

The Pétain Government on April 4 formally opened its widely publicized military exposition to celebrate the formation of the "new army." Accompanied by our Military and Naval Attachés, and with many other of my colleagues, we attended the opening ceremonies. The exhibits were pitifully poor, consisting largely of photographs and posters, a few ancient planes in the aviation exhibit, and not one single piece of military equipment in the Army section.

The Marshal's "army" looked like a convention of the Knights of Pythias. It was really pitiful. Here was a hero of World War I. He had commanded a great army. He had become Chief of State. Now he had nothing. The Armistice agreement allowed France an army of 100,000, but we were told that it had been impossible to obtain voluntary enlistments to build up to that figure. This attempt at a

military exposition was an impressive illustration of the extent of the defeat suffered by France.

* * *

Early in April Darlan ordered all British subjects in French Morocco to move at once from the coast to points in the interior. Accommodation for so many British subjects did not exist in the interior of Morocco, but they could be sheltered in "residential camps" belonging to the French Government. The Admiral's action appeared to be a reprisal for the recent British bombing of munition factories in the occupied zone that were working for Germany.

* * *

Vichy received the news on April 17 that "enemy planes of undetermined nationality" had bombed Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya and Kobe. This might have been of some assistance to our war effort by requiring defensive Japanese air forces to remain in Japan, but I feared it would bring reprisal bombing attacks on American Pacific coast cities. When David Darrah, Vichy correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*, returned from a winter trip to the United States, he told us that at the time he left America the east coast did not seem to realize fully the gravity of the war's probable effect on our people. He believed there was a better realization of the danger on the west coast.

* * *

The Nazi overlords of France never accepted completely the rise of Admiral Darlan to the position of virtual dictator of the Government of the unoccupied zone. Darlan's rule was subject only to reversal on those rare occasions when the ageing Chief of State, Marshal Pétain, was aroused sufficiently to oppose some detail of the Admiral's more or less open collaboration with the Axis.

As far back as August, 1941, my diplomatic colleagues were at a loss to understand the frequent attacks on the Admiral in the Paris papers. I wondered if the editors had run out of falsehoods to print about the American Ambassador, and turned on Darlan until they could think up some new vilification of me! Seriously, the only explanation appeared to be that Pierre Laval, whom Pétain had dismissed from his Government on December 13, 1940, was only awaiting the opportunity

to return to power. The assassination attempt late in August, 1941, almost ended any such scheme. Laval was wounded seriously, but recovered.

Rumours of a drastic change in the existing Vichy Government, some going so far as to claim that a complete replacement had been selected by Germany, were persistent throughout March. There was much speculation as to what would happen to Darlan or how effective a fight he could make against Laval to hold his place as Foreign Minister. Interior Minister Pucheu, who was thought generally to be intriguing against Darlan, seemed to have no friends in either camp.

Ralph Heinzen, of the United Press, told us on March 26 that Laval had had a secret conference with Pétain near Vichy. That same day M. de Chalvron, one of our friends in the Foreign Ministry, reported that he was certain that Laval would be returned and that contact already had been established through Laval's son-in-law, René de Chambrun. What seemed most significant was the information that Germany would no longer negotiate with the Marshal's Government and that the change would be made at a time chosen by Germany. Washington was kept advised of both facts and rumour. On March 28, I was directed to inform Pétain that President Roosevelt was of the opinion that the appointment of Laval to an important post in the Vichy Government would make it impossible for America to continue its attitude of helpfulness to France. That same day Admiral Darlan had a conference with Laval.

The Roosevelt message was delivered to Pétain on March 30. The Marshal told me it was not pleasing to make decisions that were personally distasteful to him and that he was not hurrying in this matter. Darlan did not say much except that, privately and out of the Marshal's hearing, he told me that the decision could be reached in a week's time, and that, in his opinion, Laval had only a 20 per cent. prospect of rejoining the Cabinet.

As soon as I returned to the Embassy, I wrote Under-Secretary Welles, summing up the situation. It was clear that a political crisis was in the making. There were many secret meetings and conversations. I passed on to Welles the information received from Heinzen, who was close to Laval and whom I trusted. According to Heinzen, Laval wanted Frenchmen to volunteer to fight the Bolsheviks, but would not tolerate

military aid to Germany, which would oblige France to mobilize; he would not permit the French to assist anybody against America; he was determined to oust de Gaullists from French posts in the Western Hemisphere; and he claimed Hitler had no confidence in Darlan but full confidence in him; therefore Germany would give him greater freedom in dealing with the United States. My letter concluded:

"In view of the apparent advantage to Allied interests to maintain at least a competent liaison post with the French Government, it would appear from this point of view disadvantageous to make a complete rupture of diplomatic relations immediately, when and if Laval returns to the Government, and that a recall of the Ambassador, leaving Mr. Tuck as Chargé d'Affaires, would have the desired effect on French public opinion and a better effect on the prospects of the Allied war effort than a complete break in diplomatic relations at this time."

Laval was in Vichy on April 11 and held a two-hour conference with Darlan. It was reported that the Admiral offered him a place in the Cabinet in which he would have equal power with Darlan, but that Laval had demanded full authority. We also were told that Darlan informed the German authorities that the United States was objecting to the appointment of Laval, and that Germany had accepted the Laval crisis as a test of strength between Berlin and Washington. This move probably was a desperate attempt by the Admiral to prevent his complete defeat. It was generally believed that Germany took advantage of this unexpected opportunity to force the issue, and that German action at this time had not been planned in advance.

Heinzen informed us on April 14 that at midnight a decision had been reached by the Marshal, under German pressure, to appoint Laval as Vice-President of the Council with four portfolios—Foreign Affairs, Interior, National Economy, and Propaganda. The next day, April 15, the Press announced that Pétain, Laval and Darlan had agreed to establish a new Government. Laval had gone to Paris for further talks with the German authorities.

During the day Mr. Atherton called me from Washington and indicated that the situation pointed to a need for consultation with me in Washington. That same day all American residents in occupied France who did not have urgent business

were advised to leave as soon as possible. Our consulates assisted in disseminating this warning.

At 6.30 p.m. Admiral Darlan sent me a personal confidential message begging that we not permit any rupture of relations before the beginning of the next week. Thursday, April 16, Washington cabled me that my recall for consultation would be announced shortly following Laval's assumption of power in the Vichy Government. The official announcement of Laval's Cabinet was being delayed, apparently to give the new Premier time to complete the selection of his Ministers.

A personal matter complicating the execution of orders from Washington was the illness of Mrs. Leahy. Her health had begun to fail in February. She was unable to attend many of the interesting parties which brightened our otherwise difficult lives in the provisional French capital. She was particularly disappointed when her doctor advised against her attending a charming luncheon on the last day of February given by Chargé d'Affaires Kuo Tse-fan of the Chinese Embassy and his wife. Our Chinese colleagues were wholly committed to our common war effort and war aims. In courtesy and culture, the Chinese diplomatic officers and their ladies were superior to any other group with which I made contact in France.

By the end of March, Mrs. Leahy's physician recommended an immediate operation. It was considered inadvisable to return to America for the surgery. On Easter Monday, we took a two-hour drive into the country surrounding Vichy, now bursting with the beauty of spring. In a wooded area, the Forest of Marconat, we found places that were so thickly carpeted with white anemones that in five minutes I picked a large bouquet for her.

On April 7, Mrs. Leahy entered La Pergola Clinic at Vichy and the operation was performed two days later. The doctors said it was a complete success and that there was an almost certain prospect of full recovery which should require about a month's convalescence. The President had sent a message of personal regards and best wishes for her speedy recovery, and Washington gave permission to delay my departure until she was able to travel.

De Chambrun called at the Embassy on Friday, April 17, to explain to Counsellor Tuck the purpose of his father-in-law in assuming charge of the Government. I did not see him. Tuck was informed that Pétain would remain as "Chief of

State," that Laval would have the office of "Chief of Government," and that Darlan would not be permitted to exercise any political authority. De Chambrun said Laval believed Germany would either win the war or force a compromise peace, and that a Communist revolution was feared in France when Germany would withdraw its army of occupation. Formation of the new Government had not yet been announced, but that night the B.B.C. stated that President Roosevelt had directed my recall "for consultation" and that I would leave France as soon as Mrs. Leahy was able to make the journey, probably in two or three weeks.

Saturday evening, April 18, Marshal Pétain formally announced the formation of a new Government under the direction of Pierre Laval. Darlan was no longer in the Cabinet, but he was permitted to retain his designation as successor to the Marshal. It was not believed that Laval would permit the Admiral to remain for long as heir apparent to the eighty-seven-year-old Pétain. However, Darlan would have direct command of the land, sea and air forces. (For personnel of the Laval Cabinet, see Appendix.)

Pétain's private secretary and personal physician, M. Menetrel, brought to the Embassy a message from the Marshal, the gist of which was that he was unable to refuse the suggestion of Laval that the latter be permitted to undertake the correction of the existing condition of misgovernment, and that the Marshal continued to hope America would not cause a break in its friendly relations with his Government at that time. On Monday, April 20, I held several conferences with my diplomatic colleagues and explained to them the situation which had brought about my recall for consultation.

On Tuesday morning, April 21, at 9.45, Mrs. Leahy died suddenly in La Pergola Clinic from a post-operative embolism. She was very happy until the attack, and had been looking forward to returning to America with me on the exchange steamer. The surgeons made every possible effort to save her. She had very little pain and passed away peacefully. This sudden and completely unexpected disaster on the eve of our departure together for home at the end of a difficult but interesting diplomatic mission left me in an abyss of emotional distress from which no outlet could be seen and in which there was no hope or ambition.

She was a grand example of the best type of American

womanhood, who was equally admired and beloved by all classes of French people—royalty, aristocracy, and commoners alike.

Immediately following her death, Mrs. MacArthur, the wife of our Third Secretary, quietly established herself in the residence and handled the business of the house in a perfectly capable manner until I left Vichy. She was of great assistance to me in my distress.

I had two interesting callers during the final week at Vichy—Édouard Herriot and Pierre Laval. The first came to the Embassy on Thursday morning, April 23.

Herriot was hopeful of going to the United States to discuss with President Roosevelt future relations between France and America, but since he and the President of the French Senate were the only two effective political leaders still anxious to preserve representative government in his country, he did not feel he should leave at that time.

He declared he would not undertake work of any kind for the Laval Government. Herriot and his followers did not believe that de Gaulle or his movement had committed any offence against France, but, on the contrary, were fighting for French survival and for French ideals.

This veteran leader of the Radical-Socialist Party impressed me as a very able and courageous French patriot—a type not often met in Vichy. He advised me that America must not have confidence in anything that Laval promised or said. Herriot spoke convincingly, but when speaking did not look at his hearer.

Laval came in the following Monday, April 27, with Charles Rochat of the Foreign Ministry. Counsellor Pinckney Tuck translated my remarks, as Laval did not understand English. French diplomatic practice requires that Ministers of State make the first calls on ambassadors. He was a small man, swarthy-complexioned, careless in his personal appearance, but with a pleasing manner of speech.

In a very frank discussion of his policies, Laval gave the impression of being fanatically devoted to his country, with a conviction that the interests of France were bound irrevocably with those of Germany. One's impression necessarily was qualified by persistent reports that he had used his political offices to advance his private personal fortune. It was true that, starting with nothing, he had advanced from a poor

delivery boy in a provincial town grocery to become a very rich man and a power in his country.

He convinced me that his Government was fully committed and might be expected to go as far as it could to collaborate with Germany and assist in the defeat of what he termed Soviet-British Bolshevism. Pierre Laval definitely was *not* on our side in this war.

This same Monday I called on Marshal Pétain to say goodbye. He assured me that our personal friendship would endure regardless of what might happen in the future and that it was his desire that our Governments remain friends. Our relations with France were contrasted with those of Britain. Pétain said the British had, through lack of understanding, done France many injustices, and that in the degree of their regard, he and his people kept England and America completely separated.

I replied that in my opinion the traditional amity between our countries would continue unless France should give assistance to America's enemies. Pétain admitted that Laval was much closer to the Germans than he was and that France might be required by force to give economic aid to the Nazis, but that neither he nor Laval would agree to any armed assistance to an enemy of the United States.

As we parted, the Marshal expressed for himself and for Mme. Pétain deep personal sorrow at Mrs. Leahy's death, and sympathy in my bereavement.

The final official call was on Admiral Darlan in his Hôtel du Parc office. He endeavoured to put a good face on his changed status, emphasizing that he had full command of the national defence directly under the Marshal. Once again, he pledged that the French fleet would not be used against the United States. Darlan also said that he personally wished to maintain the existing friendly relations with America and, with equal emphasis, that he did not wish to have any friendly relations with Great Britain.

It was well known that "Popeye" had made every possible effort to hold his power and had been thrown out by the Laval group. It appeared probable that in the new Government he would have little authority, even in problems exclusively related to national defence. Six months later, when Americans landed in North Africa, this last assumption, fortunately, was to be proved incorrect.

Since Mrs. Leahy passed away expressions of sympathy and condolence had come from our many friends in the diplomatic corps and from many of the Government officials. On April 30, the officers of the Embassy staff came to my office in a body and presented me with a beautiful silver tray engraved with their signatures. They had been generally an able and a thoroughly loyal group of foreign service officers. Most of them were of exceptional ability and promise. All had been completely loyal and devoted to me.

In the afternoon of May 1, Mrs. Leahy's remains were removed from the receiving chapel, which was filled from floor to ceiling with floral tributes, and placed aboard a special private car provided by Marshal Pétain. That evening, we departed for Lisbon, by way of Madrid.

En route, I met General Requin, an energetic soldier with a splendid war record and openly anti-German. Some months previously, I had made a diplomatic effort to have him appointed Ambassador to America. Pétain seemed agreeable, but Requin was unacceptable to the Germans and their collaborationist friends. In Madrid, Chargé Beaulac gave me much useful information and reported that relations with Spain had improved materially since my last meeting with Ambassador Weddell in Barcelona.

During the ten-day delay in Lisbon, waiting for a boat, I had several conversations which brought me up-to-date on some aspects of the North African situation. Lieut.-Colonel William Eddy, then Naval Attaché at Tangiers, discussed in detail German infiltration and the lack of military equipment which handicapped the dissident Frenchmen in the colonies. Our Assistant Military Attaché in Lisbon, Lieut.-Colonel Solberg, had made several recent trips to England, and it was his opinion that Britain had no intentions of taking offensive military action against Germany or in Africa, and that there were not more than 700,000 trained British soldiers available. Solberg expressed a hope that the United States might get an invitation to land in North Africa.

Captain von Packhardt, ex-American Naval Attaché in Berlin, who had been interned since December, had no information of value except the displeasing news that Germany showed no visible indication of a food shortage.

At noon on May 22, with Mrs. Leahy's remains, I embarked on board the Swedish steamer *Drottningholm* for New York,

arriving back in America on June 1. I was told on the ship to be vaccinated to comply with immigration regulations. I told the doctor that I had been vaccinated many times but that it never took. "It's foolish to waste your serum on me," I said. Ten days later, my Washington physician informed me that the vaccination was a perfect take, indicating I had become susceptible to smallpox!

As soon as I reached Washington, I reported my arrival to Secretary of State Hull and Under-Secretary Welles. Both were very complimentary about the performance of duty in France. I was told that the President, who was out of town, contemplated sending me on another mission abroad that could be completed in a month. Mr. Roosevelt never mentioned any such assignment.

Services for Mrs. Leahy were held at St. Thomas Episcopal Church, where I had been a vestryman for many years, at 11 a.m. on June 3. Interment was at Arlington Cemetery.

The State Department gave me a little room in the old building next to the White House in which I could finish my Vichy reports. I saw President Roosevelt at the White House on June 5. He told me to take a rest, have a check-up by the doctors, find out all I could about the military situation, and that he would have lunch with me the following week to discuss several tasks he wanted me to undertake.

At its request, I spent the forenoon of June 17 explaining the French situation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and giving the Senators my understanding of our diplomatic policy regarding Marshal Pétain's Government. I was gratified to read in the Press the next day that Chairman Tom Connally was urging that we continue relations with France.

Prime Minister Churchill was in Washington late in June, discussing strategy and war plans with the President, but I did not meet him at that time. I was, however, then conferring with many of my friends in the Army and Navy to get the best possible estimates of the current military situation, as Mr. Roosevelt had directed me to do.

In an interview with Mr. Finletter of the State Department on July 1, I strongly recommended early action toward providing the natives of French North Africa with material essential to their needs for its propaganda value to our war effort. That afternoon I called on General John J. Pershing in Walter Reed Hospital and delivered a personal message

from his old comrade of the last war, Marshal Pétain. Pershing appeared old, frail, and not particularly interested in current events, but was pleased to hear from Pétain, whom he held in high regard. I also kept my promise to General Aguilar and called on Vice-President Wallace to pay my respects and convey greetings from Aguilar, the Mexican Minister to France. Wallace did not seem much interested and did not show any particular familiarity with the matters I related to him.

My final conference as Ambassador to France with Secretary Hull took place on July 21. I renewed my recommendation that we maintain diplomatic relations with the French Government at Vichy. I told Hull that a break at the present time would offer no advantage to our war effort and might be disadvantageous. This policy was followed, and it was the French Government which finally broke relations with the United States when American troops landed in North Africa on November 8, 1942.

My resignation as Ambassador had been sent to the White House on July 18. The long and sometimes weary mission that had started with a cablegram to me in Puerto Rico on November 17, 1940, was ended. The French Fleet still was unavailable to the Axis; Hitler did not yet have any appreciable military or economic assistance from unoccupied France; the valuable bases in North Africa still were in French control. The mission had been accomplished to the full satisfaction of my personal friend, President Roosevelt, who was calling me back to active military service. That satisfaction was expressed in his letter accepting my resignation as Ambassador.

“THE WHITE HOUSE,

“WASHINGTON.

“July 20, 1942.

“MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—In calling you to active duty as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy, I accept your resignation as Ambassador to France.

“In so doing I want you to know first of all of my great satisfaction in the way in which you have carried out an extremely difficult task at an extremely difficult time, and, second, that there has been such good agreement in our national policy in respect to France during your Ambassadorship.

“In the words of the Navy—‘well done.’

“Always sincerely your friend,

“(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.”

CHAPTER VIII

HIGH COMMAND AT WORK

"THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states when called into active service of the United States. . . ." (Article 2, Section 2, the Constitution of the United States.)

From my study of American history, it appears to me that Franklin Roosevelt performed that portion of his constitutional duties with greater skill and ability than any preceding President.

This was the first truly world-wide war, and there was no land or ocean that did not feel its impact. It was fortunate for our country, and particularly for our Army, Navy and Air Force, that we had in these critical years a President with a superb knowledge of international affairs and an almost professional understanding of naval and military operations. I believe history will record that he exercised greater skill in the direction of our global war effort than did his gallant and brilliant contemporary, Winston Churchill. As we worked in closest liaison with the Chiefs of the British armed forces, there was more than one occasion when we felt that our British colleagues were loyally supporting the views of their Defence Minister only because it was their duty and because they were carrying out orders. On our side, we never laboured under any such handicap. There were differences of opinion, of course, but, due to the mutual confidence and daily contact between the President and his military chiefs, these differences never became serious. This daily contact was achieved through the creation of a new military office—that of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. It was my high privilege to be the first to serve in that capacity.

Speculation about a wartime task for me had been intermittent ever since Pearl Harbor. Dispatches in the French Press after Pearl Harbor said, hopefully no doubt, that I would be recalled from Vichy to take a defence post. On March 15 a Swiss paper said that the President was considering MacArthur, Marshall, and myself for appointment to command

the defence of Australia. Shortly after my arrival in Washington, General Marshall did discuss with me the possibility of putting one commander over the entire Pacific area. I told him frankly that I was too old for that kind of a task. General Marshall then revealed that he had suggested to the President that I be appointed as an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of co-ordinating the effort of all the Armed Services. The need was apparent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been set up in February, 1942, and at that time was composed of General George C. Marshall, Admiral Ernest J. King, and General H. H. Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces. All three felt the need of some kind of daily contact with the President. There were recurring situations affecting one or more of the Services which should be brought to the attention of the President at once; however, Mr. Roosevelt was a very busy man and the Chiefs of Staff could not always get to see him when they wished. From the White House end, it was necessary for the President to summon one or more of the Chiefs to his study and this was not a convenient arrangement.

Following the conversation with Marshall, I discussed the matter at length with Admiral King. He had been holding out against the idea of a White House military adviser. He was afraid that such an appointment would be detrimental to the interests of the Navy. But when Marshall proposed me for the job, King told him that "if he will take it, it will be all right with me." King repeated this to me when I saw him. Informal discussions continued for several weeks. Meanwhile, I had a thorough hospital check-up and Admiral Ross McIntire, the White House physician, reported that my examination had shown me to be in good physical condition.

On Monday, July 6, 1942, the President telephoned to my little office in the State Department Building and asked that I come over at noon for a conference. We talked for half an hour. He had made up his mind. He wanted me to serve on his staff as a military and naval adviser to the Commander-in-Chief. He did most of the talking—he always did. He asked me pertinent questions and I replied as best I could. We reviewed the French situation and at the end of the half-hour it was obvious that the discussion was not completed, so the President asked me to come to lunch with him the next day.

On July 7 we had lunch together in his office. I do not

recall that he recommended the actual title "Chief of Staff," but the duties he outlined, such as daily contact with the three branches of the Armed Services, the reading of reports and giving him summaries and digests, added up to the kind of post that we referred to in the Navy as a "Chief of Staff." It does not carry command authority. A Chief of Staff in the Navy acts in an advisory capacity. The Army definition of "Chief of Staff" is somewhat different. General Marshall had that designation and he was the active commander of the Army. It was planned that as soon as the East Wing of the White House, then under construction, should be completed, I was to move in so that I could be near the President. The President talked at length about the military and naval situation and what he hoped I would be able to accomplish for him in the direction of co-ordinating the effort of the military and naval arms in our national defence.

Later, in a talk with General Marshall, the question of designation of the office arose and I think I suggested the title "Chief of Staff." Marshall thought that a very accurate designation and we all agreed on it.

I did not see the President again until July 18. That morning he informed me that he had directed the Secretary of the Navy to recall me to active duty as "Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." That same day I submitted my resignation as Ambassador to France. The President announced my new appointment at a news conference on July 21. I was not present. There was a barrage of questions from the newsmen as to the scope of my authority and activities. The President was cagey, as he always was in dealing with the newsmen, and did not tell them very much. He said that I would be a sort of "leg-man" who would help him digest, analyse and summarize a mass of material with which he had been trying to cope single-handedly. There was considerable pressure at that time for the naming of a Supreme Commander of all the American forces. Asked if I was to be that Commander, the President replied that *he* still was the Commander-in-Chief. And he was. Asked what kind of staff his military adviser would assemble, he replied he did not have "the foggiest idea." Actually, at no time did my staff number more than two *aides* and two or three civilian secretaries. Someone suggested I should have a public relations man. To me such an officer could only have

been a nuisance! Since I was representing the President at all times, I felt that any talking should be done by Mr. Roosevelt. He was much better at that than I was, anyway.

There was much newspaper comment on the appointment, and numerous conjectures as to the purpose of the office, its probable effect on America's war effort, and the extent of my authority. There was considerable criticism that the President still had not solved the problem of a united command. It was obvious that the entire corps of Washington correspondents at that time did not realize that in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (to be discussed later in this chapter) the President had achieved the very unity of command the editors and commentators were talking about. One fact the newsmen did state correctly—the office was without precedent in American military annals. Sir Hastings Ismay held a similar post under Churchill, which was Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence, but Ismay was not a member of the British Chiefs of Staff.

The general approval expressed in the American Press was in sharp contrast to the almost daily vilification to which the American Ambassador to France had been subjected during the preceding eighteen months. Both were accepted as compliments—the first indicating confidence in the President's decision and the latter being taken as evidence that my work at Vichy was sufficiently effective to get in the hair of the Nazis.

I reported for duty on July 20. Pending completion of the addition to the White House, offices were set up in the Public Health Building at Nineteenth Street and Constitution Avenue, which then was occupied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. When I moved to the White House, offices were maintained in both places. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and our British colleagues later moved to the "New" War Department Building on Twenty-first Street and Virginia Avenue, and finally received permanent quarters in the famous Pentagon Building, which at this time was being constructed across the Potomac River in Arlington.

Almost immediately it developed that there were matters to take up with the President every day, so I made arrangements to meet him every morning at about a quarter to ten. I usually arrived at the office between 8.30 and 8.45. My *aide* already would have gone over the accumulation of overnight dispatches and reports. There would be cables from people in many parts of the world addressed directly to Roosevelt,

copies of cables from the theatre commanders to Marshall, King, or Arnold, and dispatches going out to them.

Most of these documents were stamped "Top Secret," the highest security classification. The enemy probably would have been willing to expend the lives of quite a few intelligence agents to get hold of these papers. For purposes of convenience in identification, a useful colour scheme had been worked out in what I believe the artists call pastel shades. They were *pink*, incoming dispatches from field commanders; *yellow*, outgoing dispatches to field commanders; *green*, papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; *white*, papers of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; *blue*, papers of the Joint Staff Planners, a sub-committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; *orange*, papers from the Atomic Energy Commission.

From this mass of coloured papers I would select those which should be brought to the attention of the President, place them in a tan portfolio, and usually meet Mr. Roosevelt as he emerged from the elevator on his way to his study. After a cheery "Good morning" (he called me "Bill" and I addressed him as "Mr. President"), we would start our discussions as he was wheeled over to his office. Many mornings he would prefer to go directly to the map-room, which was one of the best-guarded portions of the White House.

The President kept himself informed minutely on the progress of the war. The maps in the map-room were so hung that he would not have to get out of his wheel-chair to look at them. There were flags and pins of various colours showing the disposition of our land, naval and air forces over the entire globe. While looking at them, he and I would talk about some overnight development that seemed at the time to have significance.

There were a number of young officers assigned to the White House map-room who received military dispatches twenty-four hours a day. The President could have instant information any time he needed it. From this map-room also messages could be sent by him all over the world, as there was a relay from this point in the White House to the Communications Centre in the Pentagon Building.

War is no respecter of schedules, and there were many mornings when I went up to the President's bedroom to discuss urgent matters. More than once when I would arrive, the President would be in the bathroom shaving. I would pull

out my papers and we would start talking while he continued shaving. (The President used an old-fashioned straight razor.)

Whenever the President left Washington, I usually went with him, except for some week-ends at Hyde Park. One of the bedrooms on his private car was assigned to me. His train always was equipped with communication facilities and we would receive on the train all of the important dispatches that were coming into my office. If those communications had an important bearing on the conduct of the war or on international implications affecting the war, I would so inform the President.

It soon became known that the President's Chief of Staff conferred with him every day. This brought a stream of callers to my office. Many problems were presented to me with the thought that I would pass them on to the President and perhaps get a favourable decision in behalf of those presenting the problem. I did take up with the President many complaints that I thought were serious. Many high officials who themselves had frequent access to the Presidential ear would come to me with their troubles. I would listen sympathetically, but in most cases reminded them that the President was already thoroughly informed on the particular situation they were discussing. It seemed to make them feel better just to have me listen. There came to my White House office a steady flow of callers from embassies, ministries, and various missions of foreign countries. The Free French and the anti-Free French came in to talk. Hardly a week passed without someone from our shabbily treated ally, China, coming in to plead for assistance.

My notes are not in diary form, but the entries for Tuesday, October 20, 1942, appear to be representative of the daily routine that flowed through my White House office:

"At the morning conference with the President, I obtained his oral approval on proposed arrangements and armistice terms to be used by General Eisenhower if and when necessary in the French colonies. (The North African landings were less than three weeks distant.)

"Prince Bernhard, Consort of Crown Princess Juliana of Holland, called before leaving for England. I sent my respects to Queen Wilhelmina.

"Lunch at the Army-Navy Club. (My favourite place. Gold braid would bring no curious stares. The place was full

of it during the war and the food was no worse than that which prevailed generally at the Washington clubs and restaurants.)

“Foreign Editor Constantine Brown of the *Washington Evening Star* called. He had just returned from a lecture tour through the Middle West and said he believed Americans in that area had practically no realization of the danger in the Pacific area, and that some agency should, in the interest of the defence of America, inform our people in regard to the Japanese menace.

“Robert Sherwood of the Office of War Information called to discuss a report which I received from the State Department that Mr. Jay Allen was scheduled to go to North Africa. During my time in France, Mr. Allen was imprisoned in the occupied zone for travelling without the proper visas. He was then working with General George C. Patton. Mr. Allen had initiative and energy, but he lacked discretion.

“Congressman Mel Maas of Minnesota called. He had just returned from a visit to the Pacific area, which he said was in a sad condition of inefficiency because of the lack of unified command, inefficiency of the individuals in high command, and failure of Washington to provide essential material. Mr. Maas said Douglas MacArthur had no independent authority over the Australian troops, and that in addition, MacArthur was N.G. Mr. Maas, who is well known to me, is very free of speech, but, in my opinion, thoroughly honest.

“Dined with Captain and Mrs. Julius Hellweg (old friends of long standing). The guests included Mrs. Virginia Jenks, ex-Congresswoman from Indiana, and Father McNally of Georgetown University.”

Dining out with friends was unusual. There were so many official dinners at which my presence was required that when I could I preferred to spend my evenings at my Florida Avenue home. There always was plenty of “home-work” to do—the endless stream of wordy reports from the Joint Chiefs or some other Government agency. Occasionally it was possible to get away to join a few friends for a quiet dinner.

One important duty was the drafting of messages and statements for the President. I certainly had no talents as a “ghost writer,” my literary output before this present volume having been confined principally to the precise writing of naval orders and the formal language of diplomatic correspondence. There were many others around Roosevelt who did

possess such talents, particularly Judge Samuel Rosenman and Robert Sherwood. Nevertheless, frequently when we would be discussing some situation requiring a communication from the President he would say, "Bill, suppose you take a shot at this." I always did, of course, and he always changed it. He had a skill in using the English language which I never learned to imitate.

The most important function of the Chief of Staff was the maintaining of daily liaison between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was my job to pass on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the basic thinking of the President on all war plans and strategy. In turn, I brought back from the Joint Chiefs a consensus of their thinking. Perhaps at this point it would be well to outline briefly the complex organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

One might gather from arguments heard later when the so-called Unification Bill was being considered by the Congress that there never had been any real co-operation between the Army and Navy. The truth is that many problems common to both services had been solved satisfactorily through the operation of a Joint Board which dated back to 1903. The President, foreseeing that events probably would make it necessary for him to exercise his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had the Joint Board placed under his direction in 1939. As Chief of Naval Operations, I served on this body during part of that year.

Roosevelt assigned many tasks to the Joint Board. For example, there was a logistics problem worked up in 1941, which included an analysis of the basic strategy that was to be followed in this war. This particular paper has been given wide publicity through its discussion in Robert Sherwood's excellent book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*. When Prime Minister Churchill and his *aides* came to Washington shortly after the war began in December, 1941, it was apparent that the Joint Board had to be revised, given more power and placed on a basis where it could work side by side with the already functioning British Chiefs of Staff. Thus was created the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, which held its first meeting in February, 1942, and which absorbed the functions of the old Joint Board.

The Joint Chiefs became the principal agency for Army-Navy-Air Force co-ordination. Its duties during the war never

were defined precisely. I have heard that in some file there is a chit or memorandum from Roosevelt setting up the Joint Chiefs, but I never saw it. The absence of any fixed charter of responsibility allowed great flexibility in the J.C.S. organization and enabled us to extend its activities to meet the changing requirements of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was an instrument of the Commander-in-Chief and was responsible to him. I was his representative on that body. As the senior officer present, I presided at its meetings, prepared the agenda, and signed all the major papers and decisions. General Walter Bedell Smith was its Secretary when I assumed my duties late in July, 1942.

The J.C.S. kept President Roosevelt informed on military strategy, the manpower requirements of the armed forces, the production and allocation of munitions, and all other joint Army-Navy policy matters. Its deliberations and all papers connected with its work were kept secret. I suppose it was the most secret body in the United States, with the possible exception of the Manhattan District project (atomic bomb). Even the carbon papers used in its clerical work were destroyed at the end of each day. All safes were inspected by guards during the night to see that they were "secured," that is, locked. The conference room walls were lined with huge maps, and when American operations extended up to the Arctic Circle (Japanese landings on Attu Island in Alaska, the famed Murmansk convoy route to Russia), a step-ladder was needed to put in the push pins designating details in these areas.

Some idea of the scope of J.C.S. activities may be gained from the mere recital of its most important committees. Specially qualified officers available in the respective services were assigned to these groups which often were divided into sub-committees. The personnel changed rather frequently, as specialists were sent out to become part of some theatre commander's staff. Here are some of the more important subsidiary groupings.

Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Secretariat.

Joint Staff Planners which had a highly important sub-committee called the Joint War Plans Committee.

Joint Intelligence Committee, which included a representative of the Office of Strategic Services and the Board of Economic Warfare.

Joint Psychological Warfare Committee whose director was the head of the O.S.S.

Other groupings covered the fields of transportation, communications, new weapons and equipment, logistics, production surveys, post-war plans, civil affairs, meteorological data, security control, munitions allocation, and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board.

The Joint Chiefs would assign problems to these subsidiary groups. The latter would work up studies covering the subject. They generally did an excellent job, but their papers were too long. There were times when meetings of the J.C.S. seemed rather like a Chautauqua gathering as the chairman of one of these committees "lectured" on his findings. They gave us so much stuff to read that I had to take the reports home. There simply wasn't time during the day to digest them, and part of my duty was to give the President a summary of the findings of these various committees and the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon.

The magnitude of the tasks undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be indicated by recording that a total of approximately 1,457 separate subjects were considered during the period which ended with the surrender of Japan. (The surrender of Japan was officially signed on the U.S.S. *Missouri* on September 2, 1945.) In addition, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered some 902 subjects. Each separate subject might consist of as little as a single paragraph or as much as a small novel. Again, a single page might complete the subject under consideration, or in the case of subjects of continuing interest and great complexity, innumerable "slants" might be submitted.

Secretarial records indicate formal processing of an average of 130 J.C.S. and C.C.S. papers monthly from January, 1943, through August, 1945, with a record high of 223 papers during the month of September, 1944. The diversity of the subjects considered was amazing and ran the gamut from "Abad Area, Naval Reinforcements for" through "Horses, Disposition of, Captured by Allied Forces in Italy" to "Zones of Occupation, Occupied Areas."

Planning of the major campaigns always was done in close co-operation with the President. Frequently we had sessions in his study. With the approval of the President, the J.C.S. issued overall directives that sent millions of American men

to the various battle-fronts and marked the general courses of the thousands of ships that eventually made up the greatest naval armada the world had ever seen. The policy and broad objective were stated by the President; the provisions for transportation, allocation of equipment and munitions were fixed by the J.C.S.; but all details of operations were left to the area commanders. For instance, when it was decided we had to take the Japanese island of Iwo Jima, the Joint Chiefs assigned to Admiral Nimitz the necessary ships and materials and told him to take it. The details of how he was to do it were up to Nimitz. This was in accord with our established principle of single command.

Regular meetings of the Joint Chiefs took place on Wednesdays, beginning with luncheon. Special sessions were held at any time, often on Sundays or even late at night. No one other than the Chiefs of Staff was present at the meetings, except that when an important theatre commander was in Washington he would usually be asked to discuss with us the situation and problems in his area. From time to time representatives of our allies—China, Australia, the Netherlands and the exiled Poles, for example—would ask to be allowed to present their case to the Joint Chiefs. On occasions, these requests were granted.

Throughout the war, the four of us—Marshall, King, Arnold, and myself—worked in the closest possible harmony. In the post-war period, General Marshall and I disagreed sharply on some aspects of our foreign political policy. However, as a soldier, he was in my opinion one of the best, and his drive, courage, and imagination transformed America's great citizen army into the most magnificent fighting force ever assembled. In numbers of men and logistic requirements, his army operations were by far the largest. This meant that more time of the Joint Chiefs was spent on his problems than on any others—and he invariably presented them with skill and clarity.

Admiral King had an equally difficult task. His fleets had to hold Japan at bay while convoying millions of tons of supplies across the Atlantic to our allies in order to build up the stockpiles for the Second Front. He was an exceptionally able sea commander. He also was explosive, and at times it was just as well that the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs were a well-kept secret. The President had a high opinion of King's ability, but also felt he was a very undiplomatic person, especially

when the Admiral's low boiling-point would be reached in some altercation with the British.

King would have preferred to put more power into the Asiatic war earlier. He supported loyally the general strategy of beating Germany first, but this often required concessions of ships and war material which he did not like to make. He could not spare much as he was, until the last months of the war, working on a deficit in ships. America was fighting a two-ocean war for the first time in its history.

General Arnold brought to the staff his wide air experience in the war up to that time. He had a splendid appreciation of what the Air Force could do and was rarely in disagreement with the other chiefs. He knew the limitations of that arm of service. We generally accepted his views on air strategy as correct, and I cannot recall that he ever proposed a move that was not acceptable to the other chiefs. We all acquired a lasting personal affection for our "Air Chief of Staff."

That was the team which under the constant direction of the President of the United States ran the war.

One tribute I shall never forget came from President Truman. Shortly after he became Commander-in-Chief following the death of President Roosevelt, I explained to him in detail the functioning of his Joint Chiefs of Staff. He listened intently. When I was through, Truman said: "Why, Admiral, if the South had had a staff organization like that, the Confederates would have won the Civil War. Lee would not have had Johnson, Beauregard, Longstreet, and the other generals running around on the loose." The same statement could be made in regard to Lincoln's difficulties. Lincoln tried to create a chief of staff and a chain of command. Congress thwarted his effort.

The conduct of combined operations with our British Allies brings me to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This was an organization set up by the President and Prime Minister Churchill when the latter brought his own Chiefs of Staff to Washington in December, 1941. It was realized quickly that there would have to be complete integration of land, sea, and air operations of the Allies if the war was to be fought with the greatest possible efficiency. History already had enough examples of the failures of coalitions to achieve unity in military and naval operations. This was accomplished successfully by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

I was still Ambassador to France at Vichy when this organization was formed and held its first meeting, January 23, 1942. There was some argument about centring its activities in Washington. As a "temporary" measure, deputies of the senior British service commanders were left in Washington as the British Joint Staff Mission. They were assigned quarters next to our own Joint Chiefs and given the same "Top Secret" security status. We met with them every Friday. This "temporary" arrangement lasted throughout the war and was still operating when I started writing this narrative.

Committees paralleling most of those used by the Joint Chiefs were set up in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On the American side, the same officers usually served on both. For "housekeeping" purposes, there was a Combined Administrative Committee; and our British colleagues also had another staff in London, supervising and co-ordinating the work done in Washington. This is by no means a complete description of the work of the High Command, but it does include the essential features of a highly complex organization which, on the whole, functioned efficiently throughout the war.

Members of the British Staff Mission, when I came into the picture at the end of July, 1942, were: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, representing Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, who was Marshall's opposite British number; Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Bart., representing Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, whose position corresponded to that of King; Air Marshal D. C. S. Evill, who was deputy for Sir Charles Portal, Air Chief Marshal; and Lieut.-General G. N. Macready, representing Churchill in the latter's capacity as Minister of Defence.

Cunningham was my favourite because in the first place he was a splendid sailor. He was a daring, experienced, and successful British sea commander, worthy of the tradition of Britain's Nelson. Cunningham also was the best expert in the Allied navies on strategy and tactics in the Mediterranean theatre, which was a focal point of attention of both the Combined and the Joint Chiefs when I assumed my duties. I presided over the meetings of the Combined Chiefs when our country was the host, which, of course, included the regular Friday sessions with the Washington representatives of the senior British command.

Sir John Dill dominated the British representatives on the

Combined Chiefs in all matters relating to military plans, but he deferred to Cunningham on naval affairs. He was considered by General Marshall an outstanding military authority. Field-Marshal Dill was almost invariably in agreement with General Marshall as various questions came up. They were two great soldiers. While he didn't make jokes very often, he was not overly formal, and had a very pleasing manner in addressing a meeting. General Macready also was a highly competent officer, and after I later came to know Sir Hastings Ismay he reminded me a great deal of the latter. Evill represented the Royal Air Force.

I may have indicated in this summary that the men who made up the Combined Chiefs of Staff were the men who ran the war. That is inaccurate. There were two men at the top who really fought out and finally agreed on the major moves that led to victory. They were Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. They really ran the war. Of course, they had to have some people like us to help them, but we were just artisans building definite patterns of strategy from the rough blue-prints handed to us by our respective Commanders-in-Chief.

In recounting some of the highlights of the activities of the Joint and Combined Chiefs, I shall be forced to rely on memory. I did not make notes of our meetings, except pencilled memoranda to be used in reporting the results to the President. These were destroyed as soon as used. Almost every matter taken up was "Top Secret." I had not thought of writing a book and did not want to run the chance of any carelessly written notes getting into hands that they should not be in. There are millions of words in the archives of these two command groups which some day may be completely declassified, but I shall leave the reading of those to the historians.

CHAPTER IX

FULL SPEED AHEAD ON "TORCH"

THE FIRST MEETING OF the Combined Chiefs of Staff over which I presided occurred on July 30, 1942. The war situation in general was reviewed, but most of the discussion concerned details of a projected operation in North Africa which had the code name of "Torch."

Early in the week Admiral King and General Marshall had returned from London with the information that the British high military command considered a cross-Channel invasion of France in 1942 as out of the question. The President then directed that immediate preparations be made for an invasion of French North Africa.

As the second half of 1942 got well under way, the situation was not too promising for the Allies. Roosevelt, early in the war, had marked out a broad strategy of a two-ocean war against the Axis in Europe and the Japanese in Asia. He and Mr. Churchill had agreed to concentrate first on administering total defeat to the Axis powers in Europe, while conducting a campaign of attrition against the Japanese. It was the President's firm intention to throw all American and British forces into a destructive campaign against Japan immediately following a surrender of the Nazi powers.

The Navy generally and the Army in the Far East under Douglas MacArthur would have preferred to employ sufficient forces in the Pacific to move more aggressively against Japan, but they loyally adhered to the general strategy prescribed by President Roosevelt.

As an old Navy man, I could sympathize with my Navy colleagues, but the President's basic concept was sound. Before America was at war, I had written Under-Secretary of States Welles (July 18, 1941): "It would appear that America's essential mission in the near future is in the Atlantic, and that any actual pressure which we may find necessary to apply to the Oriental problem can and should be postponed for so long a time as is necessary to solve the existing immediate differences in Europe."

A review of the battle fronts at this time showed the Axis

generally to be in the ascendancy. In Russia the Nazis were overrunning the western bank of the Don River and pushing their spearheads into the rich valley between the Don and the Volga. Immense numbers of men and amounts of material were involved and the German General Staff apparently had accomplished the miracle of supplying huge forces that had advanced hundreds of miles over territory to which the Russians had applied their traditional "scorched earth" policy. In Europe, any immediate danger of an invasion of the British islands had passed, but there always was a fear in England that the Nazis might try to land. Germany, and especially the Ruhr, was being pounded in air raids employing 1,000 or more planes, although we did not have as yet much indication that this operation was slowing up the German war machine. Premier Laval at Vichy, as I expected, had turned down Roosevelt's proposal to intern the French fleet either at neutral or in American ports.

In Africa the "Desert Fox," General Erwin Rommel, had been halted almost within sight of the gates of Cairo and the important British base at Alexandria. Our "consular agents" were busy in French North Africa sending a large volume of information to this country which shortly was to become very useful.

In the Pacific we had halted the Japanese westward advance with the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Those two actions cost us the carriers *Lexington* and *Yorktown*. To the north, the Japanese were established on the Alaskan islands of Attu and Kiska, but showed no signs of attempting any major development of that operation. The troops of Tokyo had overrun Burma and were advancing against MacArthur's forces in New Guinea.

The Battle of the Atlantic was going badly. Ship sinkings had reached an all-time high in July. Axis submarines were laying mines off Mexico, although our counter-measures were beginning to show results in the waters immediately adjacent to our Atlantic coast.

Evidence of the enemy submarine successes was marked, during the week I assumed office, by the inauguration of gasoline rationing in the East, which later was extended throughout the country. Casualties among tankers supplying the East Coast were particularly heavy and the "Big Inch" pipeline to bring fuel oil eastward had been authorized. The

Little Steel formula for raising the wages of labour had just been announced. There were more than 12,500,000 employed in war industries, but manpower was still a vexing problem. The F.B.I. had rounded up eight German saboteurs who had been landed in this country from submarines. Congress had voted \$8,500,000,000 for a great two-ocean Navy. That was quite a contrast to what happened just four years previous, when I was Chief of Naval Operations and the President had managed to slip me a mere \$270,000,000 in Works Progress Administration funds to start building an adequate Navy! War agencies were mushrooming all over Washington, one of the latest being the Office of War Information, to which Elmer Davis, noted radio commentator, had been named as Director.

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Roosevelt and Churchill had established that intimate relationship which was to remain unimpaired until death removed the former in 1945. There was no such useful working *entente* with our Russian ally. Foreign Minister Molotov had been in Washington in the late spring and had gone back to Moscow with the understanding, at least on his part, that the United States and Britain would attempt to create a second front in Europe in 1942.

The Russians could not have been more disappointed than our own Army people that plans for a 1942 cross-Channel invasion had to be abandoned. There was much grumbling about the British and considerable criticism of Churchill. The Prime Minister was convinced that England was not ready to undertake such a major effort, and I did not think that we were either. I personally was interested in the safety of the United States. A cross-Channel operation could have failed and we still would have been safe, but England would have been lost.

I think that is what Churchill had in mind. He wanted to have much more assurance of success than General Marshall could give him. Marshall's country would have been safe, but England was sitting twenty miles across the Channel, right under the Nazi guns. England could not afford to be defeated in an invasion attempt. Churchill, in his responsibility for preserving the integrity of England, had to be satisfied in his own mind that the expedition could succeed. I cannot blame him for that.

There still remained the question of what to tell "Uncle Joe," as Stalin already was being called, although few of us had met him. To make this problem more difficult, it was necessary to reduce temporarily the extremely hazardous and expensive operation of convoying supplies for Russia over the Murmansk route. We were losing too many ships. As a substitute, a combined Air Force operation on Stalin's extreme left flank in the Near East was proposed and some staff work done on it. Nothing came of it, as the Russian victory at Stalingrad removed the immediate pressure for Allied assistance on that part of the battle-front.

* * *

The first urgent action required of the Joint Chiefs came on the same day that I held my initial session of the Combined Chiefs—July 30, 1942. Axis planes raided Cairo in force at dawn of that day. We received the equivalent of an S.O.S. for more planes. A special meeting was called at 8.30 that night in the White House, and it was decided to send all available combat planes to Egypt. This included diverting a group of bombers then on their way to China. This was not pleasing to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, but it had to be done.

* * *

The idea of an invasion of Africa was not new. Roosevelt had had it in mind for a long time, and by his direction some advance preparation had been made before I returned from France. The Army was not well disposed toward the adventure, and both the west coast of Africa and the straits of Gibraltar involved many hazards, even in the eyes of those of us familiar with naval operations. It has been said that Roosevelt ordered "Operation Torch" in the face of opposition from his senior advisers. I never opposed the North African invasion. I told the President of the possibilities of trouble, but it looked to me like a feasible undertaking. Marshall did oppose it. He did not want to waste American troops in North Africa when he thought he could use them in a cross-Channel operation.

Admiral Cunningham reassured me that it was possible to take an army through the Straits. "Of course it is dangerous," the British Naval adviser said. "We may suffer a severe loss of transports by submarine and air attack, but I think we

can do it." That statement by the Allied Sea Commander best qualified by experience and talent in naval tactics in the *Mediterranean Sea* relieved my apprehension from the standpoint of the Navy's duties, and I thereupon stopped worrying. Cunningham and Field-Marshal Dill both gave their approval to this admittedly hazardous undertaking. The President was pleased.

There were other dangers. The American troops were green. They had not been tried in battle. We expected to contend with strong German air power after we landed. If General Rommel could get into French Africa before we did, it would have been practically impossible for us to establish beachheads with the forces then available. All of these were calculated risks. The decision was made and, in Navy language, the order was "Full speed ahead on Operation Torch!"

The question of the composition of the landing forces was important. From my experience in France I knew that if any British troops were included, the age-old French distrust for anything British would inflame the French North African Army and probably cause it to offer every practicable opposition to our landing and to our progress through the territory.

This point of view of mine was supported by Lieut.-Colonel William Eddy, U.S. Marine Corps, who had recently arrived from Spanish Morocco and told the Joint Chiefs on August 22 substantially the same thing. Eddy believed that the French Navy, which included the Coast Artillery, would oppose a landing by anybody, including Americans. A limited number of British troops were included finally, but their bad effect was mitigated by not announcing their presence until after the beachheads were secured.

There were indications about the middle of August that the British were growing cool to the idea of "Torch." Churchill was cabling his doubts to the President, probably influenced by the precarious position of the British Army in Egypt. These messages had no effect on Roosevelt. In fact, he felt that we could carry out the invasion even if the British didn't go along. After several conferences with his staff, the President drafted a firm cable to Churchill, which emphasized the need for aggressive action at the earliest possible moment. This important cable which was in effect a final commitment of our forces was sent on September 4.

There was some discussion in the Joint Chiefs meetings

about dressing up British soldiers in American uniforms and painting United States insignia on British planes. I do not think anyone looked with favour upon such an idea. It would have been falsifying the situation. It simply isn't done by professional soldiers. We had never put American uniforms on any foreign soldiers in so far as I knew.

While the intensive staff work was being carried forward for "Torch," I was having a private war of my own with a group from the Board of Economic Warfare. One of my first visitors after assuming my new duties was the Ambassador from France, Gaston Henri-Haye, who was not in favour with some elements of our State Department because of his anti-Gaulle attitude. He was a chunky, happy-looking diplomat, and in his relations with me was always agreeable. His constant petition was for milk and food for the children of unoccupied France. I was happy to be able to tell him that a resumption of the Red Cross shipments was being planned.

One of the first instructions I received from Roosevelt was to tell the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare to resume the shipping of supplies to French North Africa and of infant relief to occupied France. It being considered unsafe to give anybody any advance information on our military intentions to invade North Africa, some of these officials offered sharp objection. They clearly considered the President and me to be pro-Vichy. I considered them not sufficiently reliable to be trusted with vital military secrets.

I had several meetings with this group. They did not want to send anything to anybody except Russia and England. I explained that the early shipment of necessities to the African colonies was desired as a propaganda measure. They took the view that such assistance would in effect be aiding the Germans. The British objected, presumably for the same reason. The British group seemed to have more authority, because they had a committee, the British Ministry of Economics, I believe, over which even the Prime Minister did not seem to have sufficient authority to tell them to do what he wanted done.

Finally, on September 7, I had to speak very plainly. Continued objections, especially from the Board of Economic Warfare representatives, were delaying the programme. "This is an order from the President of the United States and is not a matter for discussion," I said. "The President says 'Do it.'" They did not accept this order with any grace.

Without divulging the secret of our approaching invasion of Africa I emphasized that in the near future we might have to enlarge our shipments of supplies to North Africa. I could not go any further. If I had told them we were going to invade North Africa, the secret might have leaked to Axis spies, with disastrous results. I don't think any of them knew that the decision had been made for that operation. They did not even stop offering objections then; they kept on talking, but they carried out the order.

* * *

Norman Davis, of the Red Cross, telephoned on September 12, that Premier Laval was interfering with the distribution of the few supplies we were sending to the distressed children of France. I told Davis that if news accounts of this interference with the Red Cross Relief could be thoroughly disseminated in France over the radio, Laval's action could be turned to good advantage for the Allied cause. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt also telephoned to ask my advice on transporting to the United States about 1,000 children from prison camps in France who were in acute danger of starving. I replied that humanitarian considerations make it worth while to save from starvation and distress the small children of all invaded nations.

* * *

One sign of America at war was that Labour Day, 1942, was not a holiday in any Government department in Washington. On that day we occupied our new offices in the still unfinished East Wing addition to the White House. There were two large, well-furnished rooms, the outer one of which was used for my *aide* and stenographer and as a reception-room.

Also on Labour Day, Colonel William J. Donovan, head of the Psychological Warfare Branch, discussed the practicability of his assisting in our projected North African operation. It was his opinion that continued operation of his organization there under Murphy would result in fourteen poorly equipped French and Colonial divisions coming over to our side in the event of a successful invasion. He estimated that it would not take more than two million dollars to accomplish this. Colonel Donovan did not seem to be short of money!

A few days later (September 10) Mr. Murphy discussed at length the various personalities with whom we would have

to deal. His personal opinion of some of the leaders was as follows:

General Juin, Commander of French Armies in North Africa: friendly to the Allied cause, but he cannot be expected to take any favourable action that is not authorized by the French Government.

General Barrau, commanding in West Africa: considered very friendly, and he may be of assistance.

Noguès, Resident-General in Morocco: not expected to be of any use to us and is expected to comply, in so far as he finds it possible, with orders received from Vichy.

Admiral Esteva, Resident-General in Tunisia: was hopeful of Allied success in the war, would be of value to an Allied effort if properly approached and if he was satisfied that French sovereignty in the colonies would be maintained.

Admiral Michelier, Commander-in-Chief at Casablanca: may very possibly be friendly to any American effort.

There were at that time about 110,000 French troops in Morocco, scattered in comparatively small units over a large area. With the existing lack of transport facilities, it would be exceedingly difficult to concentrate them quickly into larger groups. Our information then placed the number of Germans in Morocco at not more than 180. The French Navy, largely concentrated in Toulon, could be expected to carry out any orders received from the Minister of National Defence, Admiral Darlan.

Other information indicated that Murphy could safely approach the more trustworthy French officers and, by utilizing a skeleton organization already in existence, might align a large part of the French Army with an American effort. It would be necessary that assurances be given by competent authority that the administration of the colonies would remain *in French hands*. Murphy was allowed to go ahead with that plan, although it didn't work out as successfully as had been anticipated.

Murphy was back again on September 21 after a conference with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in England. Eisenhower had been designated Commander-in-Chief of the North African operation. There had been some discussion of Murphy's status. The President's final instructions were to designate him as Operating Executive Head of the Civil Affairs Section and Adviser for Civil Affairs to General Eisenhower, effective

upon occupation of the North African area by American military forces. Murphy left for North Africa at the end of the week.

General Mark Clark, Operations Officer for Eisenhower, came in on September 24 with the information that an invasion of Tunisia by 4,000 British troops from Malta was under consideration. Fortunately, this never materialized. General Clark brought us up to date on the state of preparations for the invasion.

Early in October, Field-Marshal Dill gave a dinner for Admiral Cunningham, who was leaving to assume command of the naval operations connected with the invasion. Lady Cunningham did not seem to be very happy at the prospect of her husband's going back to such a dangerous spot.

On October 13, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, presented the arguments of his Government for negotiating with Portugal for the use by the Allies of the Azores, strategically located islands in the Atlantic. The Allies were prepared to occupy them by force if necessary, but British diplomacy achieved this peacefully—a year later.

General John E. Hull called several days later, seeking advice on the acceptability of General Eisenhower sending some messages to French officials, undoubtedly at the suggestion of our British allies. One such message was to be sent, in the President's name, to the commander of the French squadron in the British base of Alexandria. I told General Hull that if it would be helpful to send this message, it should be in Eisenhower's name and that the President should not communicate directly with a subordinate official of the French Navy who was at that time completely under British control.

Something new in tactics was to be tried out in the North African operation. It was that element of psychological warfare involving widespread use of radio messages. Many were speeches to be broadcast by regular short-wave channels to inform both the occupied and unoccupied zones of France as to the purpose of the Allies. Others were the specific messages and patriotic songs to be beamed into Morocco and Algiers from equipment placed aboard some of the vessels that formed the protective cover for the landing forces. The most important recordings were those made at the White House sufficiently in advance to be placed on board the warships. As Chief of Staff to Roosevelt, I found myself in the midst of this new angle of fighting a war.

Murphy discussed the broadcasts with me early in September. On October 1, Eisenhower's Public Relations Officer, Colonel Julius Holmes, brought in for approval some proclamations that General Ike wished to make to those areas he expected to occupy. Then Harry Hopkins and I worked on a short address in French to be made by the President. As late as October 15, Lord Halifax asked to get the President to include in this message a reference to the common effort of the "United Nations." Roosevelt accepted the suggestion.

On October 16, I assisted the President in making the final recording of what was considered a very important statement. We were discussing some French phrase when Roosevelt turned to me and said: "Bill, your accent is useful, but your vocabulary is rotten." Actually, the President spoke French without any hesitation, which I never could do. He also had an excellent vocabulary, in French as well as in English.

The Allies badly needed some influential and respected French leader to assist us in the delicate business of avoiding, if possible, any resistance to our invasion. It had been hoped that General Maxime Weygand would assume this role, but he refused, although I was convinced that he sympathized with our side. General Henri Giraud, having escaped dramatically from a German prison in the spring of 1942, seemed to be the best we could get. He was contacted and agreed. We also had to consider the reaction of Admiral Darlan, Commander of all French forces, whom we expected would be in Vichy when the attack was launched. Darlan once had told me that if the Allies appeared with sufficient force in North Africa to be successful against the Nazis, he would not oppose us. Pétain had not given me any such assurance, direct or implied.

Accordingly, on October 17, with the President's approval, I cabled Murphy regarding his relations with Admiral Darlan and General Giraud. At the same time, instructions were sent to our people at Vichy and Berne to make no contacts and to have no discussions with Giraud. This step was taken as a safety precaution at the request of Giraud's agents in Africa. These cables and the making of the final radio discs appeared to have ended our work in Washington on "Operation Torch." The rest was up to Eisenhower, or so we thought.

During the months we were preparing for "Torch" the war had not been standing still in other theatres, including the "home front." When I joined the Chiefs of Staff in July, 1942, the J.C.S. had already authorized the desperate Solomon Islands operations to keep the thin supply line to General MacArthur in Australia from being severed.

The pre-war Navy plan did not envisage operations in the South Pacific. However, after Pearl Harbor and the conquest of the Philippines, the Japanese had driven far south. From bases captured or developed in New Britain, New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies, the enemy was making daylight raids on Northern Australia. When it appeared that the Solomon group would be used for similar purposes, it was necessary to act, regardless of risks.

The action began on August 7, and the next day I conferred with Admiral King on details of the operation. By August 10, we had landed an expeditionary force of 15,000 Marines. At a conference with the President and Secretary of State Hull on August 11, the existing military and political situation in the various theatres were canvassed, and I pointed out that we should reinforce the Solomons expedition without delay in preparation for a determined effort by Japan to regain the ground we had taken, especially on Guadalcanal, where we had made our landings.

If the Japanese could develop air bases on tiny islands whose names did not even appear in standard geographies, it apparently occurred to President Roosevelt that we could do the same. He sent Rear-Admiral Richard E. Byrd on a mission to the South Pacific to find some airfield sites. Roosevelt was fond of Byrd and knew his ability was well suited for such a task. Admiral Byrd talked to me at length on August 20, after his return, concerning the necessity of proceeding rapidly with the development of a series of mutually supporting airfields in this area. He had been to places where few had been before, and he made a very excellent report. He reinforced my opinion that existing arrangements were not adequate to hold the Solomon Islands, and he feared they would be retaken by Japan. They were vital to the enemy because their possession would cut communications between America and Australia.

The Marines had a terrible time on Guadalcanal. Both sides suffered heavy naval losses. The expected enemy reinforcements arrived constantly through September and October.

It appeared that our land and sea strength would not be sufficient to defeat a determined enemy who continued to disregard losses. Our problem in Washington would not have been difficult if we had not been required to distribute our men, ships and supplies to support Allies, who, with the exception of Russia, seemed incapable of surviving without assistance.

I had reports from many sources, among them the *New York Times* excellent correspondent, Hanson Baldwin, concerning the lack of preparation, lack of aggressive action and lack of confidence in the High Command by subordinate officers in both the Navy and Army in the South-west Pacific. On October 16, King ordered Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, in charge of our Navy in the Solomon area, relieved. He was replaced by Vice-Admiral W. F. ("Bull") Halsey, who was charged with holding the islands. I thought Ghormley had done all right with what he had, but apparently there was some objection to the speed with which he moved. The Joint Chiefs decided to add twenty ships of 7,000 tons each to aid in supplying the Pacific, and I discussed this request with Vice-Admiral Emory Land and Lewis Douglas of the War Shipping Administration. They said they could get this 140,000 tons without delay, but any additional merchant tonnage would have to come out of some other military or naval service. I obtained authority from the President on October 23 to call for the twenty ships. That same day we received news of the critical damaging of the carrier *Hornet* and serious injury to the *Enterprise*, both supporting the Solomons operation.

We now were down to our last carrier, the *Saratoga*, and it was sometimes temporarily unavailable because of damage received. We had new ones coming along rapidly, but at this moment we were skating on thin ice. Our hold on Guadalcanal was precarious. The enemy also had suffered heavily in carriers, and naval action was becoming more and more a continuing battle between surface craft. There seemed to be a conspicuous lack of air support for our ground and sea forces.

Rear-Admiral J. C. McCain, then Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, came to the office about the middle of November, complaining bitterly over the failure of Army aviation to meet the critical situation in the South Pacific. McCain said

the Air Forces did not know how to operate over the sea, that they had not been trained for this work and that, instead of admitting their failure, they were trying to discredit the performance of the Navy's air arm. Admiral McCain recommended that General Millard Harmon, then Commanding Army aviation under Admiral Halsey, should be appointed as Chief of the Army Air Force.

By now this fight had spread outside the confines of service circles, and Wayne Coy of the Budget Bureau came in to discuss the situation. He evidently had been listening to some Army Air Force objections in hearings on the 1944 Budget to the use of the shore-based aircraft by the Navy. I assured Coy that the existing military situation and future prospects for success in the Pacific demanded the maximum possible expansion of naval shore-based aviation, principally because of the Army's lack of experience in operations over the sea. The Air Force was not kicking about our carriers, but was jealous of the Navy's land-based planes.

On the morning of November 16 came the news of a great naval battle in which a major attempt by the Japanese to land a big force on Guadalcanal was repulsed, but with heavy losses to our defending fleet. Rear-Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, who flew his flag on the cruiser *San Francisco*, and practically his entire staff, had been killed. We had lost two other cruisers and seven destroyers, and several other ships were seriously damaged.

Admiral King came into the Joint Chief's meeting "with his sword in his hand." He had made concessions to give naval support to the North African operation, and to escort convoys all around the world. He now demanded ships to replace the Pacific losses. It meant taking strength away from the Atlantic Fleet that could be ill spared, but the J.C.S. agreed. The President approved. It had to be done. Orders were issued to send from the Atlantic squadrons two cruisers, two auxiliary plane-carriers, and five destroyers. More would be sent as soon as they were available.

One of the great mysteries of this period was the alleged sinking of dozens of Japanese warships—in the communiqués of the Air Force from the Pacific area. Whole squadrons would be reported sunk "or probably sunk." Navy commanders were practically certain these same "sunken" ships were turning up to support the repeated and costly Japanese efforts to

drive us off Guadalcanal. I felt that the air reports from this theatre were highly inaccurate.

Slowly the tide turned in our favour in the Solomons. We continued to take severe damage, but the Japanese losses were far greater than ours on land, sea and especially in the air. The campaign worked out. By February, 1943, the Joint Chiefs could feel that the Pacific life-line to Australia was safe from dangerous attack.

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Two admirals of the Dutch Navy were visitors in December. Rear-Admiral J. E. M. Ranneft wanted us to train a selected group of Dutch naval officers with the purpose of their being useful in the future Pacific campaigns. The Netherlands were in the war with us and we did train a lot of their Marines. Ranneft later brought Rear-Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich, who had commanded the Allied navies in the disastrous Battle of the Java Sea in February, 1942. Helfrich, a short, rotund person, seemed quite well satisfied with himself.

I was in Vichy at the time of that battle, and it had seemed then a stupid thing to allow that fleet to be split up by the Japanese. For political reasons, our own Asiatic commander, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, had been pulled out earlier and replaced by Helfrich. When the latter had completed his visit, I had an increased feeling of regret that Hart had not been left in command of those American ships. I do not believe they would then have been lost.

* * *

The problem of China was to be on my desk continuously throughout the war. It was a long-drawn-out battle of logistics that never was solved satisfactorily. China had been at war with the Japanese for years before Pearl Harbor. Generalissimo Chiang had manpower, but that was about all. His numerous armies were poorly equipped, ill trained, and generally badly led. The immediate problem at the end of July was to reopen the famous Burma Road, which had been blocked when the Japanese overran Burma.

Dr. T. V. Soong, financial agent for China in Washington, on August 8 asked my help in getting the British to undertake the recapture of Burma. Roosevelt repeatedly tried to prod the British into action, but London never showed much

enthusiasm for the project. Soong told me there were 100,000 white British troops in India, that China had four divisions on the Northern Burma border, and that there were not more than 80,000 Japanese troops defending the area. Soong was an able, intelligent man and presented his arguments well. He seemed devoted completely to the interests of his country. America was doing what it could to help Chiang by building up an air force, but on the very night of this August 8, we were forced to divert some bombers then on their way to China to throw into the critical situation in Egypt.

Chiang and General Stilwell sent Brigadier-General W. R. Gruber to America, and on August 28 he gave me a frank report. Gruber's opinion was that the Chinese Army would not undertake offensive action against the Japanese invaders without the assistance and example of the American troops. He thought they would remain on the defensive, retreating further into the mountains when necessary to avoid defeat. The General did believe that Burma could be retaken by the Chinese Army if we could reinforce it with four American divisions.

About a fortnight later, Laughlin Currie, one of the President's able special assistants, who devoted much of his time to the Chinese problem, reported on his recent visit to Chiang. In general, his conclusions paralleled those of Gruber. He told me that Chiang was insisting on the recapture of Burma and that the job could be done easily with four or five American and British divisions, about 500 planes and the Chinese troops available. Both of us felt that Great Britain would not give any useful assistance to a Burma expedition at that time. It was my further opinion that our national interest required that very high priority be given to the opening of the Burma Road and adequate support for China. Our commitments to England and Russia made it impossible to do much then, but if Japan should be allowed to consolidate her gains and induce the Asiatic people to accept Tokyo's control, the future of America in the Pacific would be hazardous at least.

Dr. Stanley Hornbeck conferred with me on September 20. He was thoroughly informed on China, and we were in agreement concerning the importance of supporting Chiang. About the same time, Generals Chu and Hsiung of the Chinese Military Mission outlined more details of a projected Burmese campaign. They told me that the Generalissimo would insist upon

unity of command under a single officer and preferred that that officer be an American. I reported these various conversations both to the President and to the Joint Chiefs. However, when General Chu came in to see me again in October, I could tell him only that the problem was under study by the Chiefs of Staff. In fact, very little was accomplished for China in 1942. On December 7, the anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the new Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-Ming, paid a courtesy call at the office. The Chinese are not easily discouraged, and Dr. Wei talked hopefully about the possibility of an early Burma campaign. He added one new angle—namely, that he thought a successful operation would have a seriously adverse effect on the morale of the Japanese troops, as yet undefeated in any major action, as well as on the civilian population of Japan.

* * *

We received repeated appeals from other sectors for help. A Colonel Hoskins, who was about to leave on an O.S.S. mission to the Near East and North Africa, informed me on September 3 that there were in and near Syria a sufficient number of unarmed Poles, Greeks and Yugoslavs to organize four divisions of troops. Hoskins said they were well trained and needed only arms to be brought into action against the Axis powers. These people would have been valuable, and later in the war we did manage to equip some Polish units and they fought well. We weren't over-supplied with equipment at that time, and had we undertaken such a task we doubtless would have heard an outcry immediately from Moscow. There was another plea from the Poles, this time from General Sikorski, Prime Minister of the exiled Polish Government in London. He told me early in December that there was a secret organization of 70,000 soldiers in Poland and an additional 105,000 were available in Scotland and Syria. They all needed equipment. He urgently requested a number of Liberator planes in order that the organization of the Polish resistance might be continued. I had to tell him that all planes available to us already had been promised to some specific theatre, but that I would refer his request to the Joint Chiefs. The President entertained Prime Minister Sikorski at luncheon on December 3. He gave me the impression of being a strong, intelligent, aggressive officer.

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Four other entries in my notes during this period illustrate the global characteristics of the struggle in which we were engaged.

On August 22, 1942, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy. Our counter-measures were driving the German submarines into the South Atlantic, and it was the sinking of Brazilian merchant ships that caused the declaration of war. This action of Brazil, while it might not provide much useful assistance in our war effort, was very likely to cause interesting and perhaps serious political controversies between some of the South American states.

In September, Senator A. B. ("Happy") Chandler of Kentucky came in to tell me about his recent inspection of the military situation in Alaska. He advocated an immediate increase in the defence forces of the Aleutian Islands, and said the defences of Alaska were in a serious and critical condition. The Senator did not have any suggestions as to how we could provide reinforcements!

On November 8, 1942, Secretary Hull protested to me that his Cabinet colleague Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was seizing some Spanish diplomatic pouches. This was an example of the many problems brought to an official who saw President Roosevelt every day.

Even neutral Sweden came into the picture. Under-Secretary Welles called me on December 1 to get Presidential approval for sending two shiploads of fuel oil to Sweden without further delay. While not familiar with the details of this commodity exchange, I passed on Welles' request and the President approved it.

* * *

The biggest question-mark in the latter half of 1942 was: Could the Russians stop the Germans, and when?

While the Joint Chiefs were completing the staff work for the North African campaign and working on blue-prints for a Second Front, the daily battle reports from Russia were studied closely. Stalin's armies were retreating steadily across the Don Basin toward the Volga. Hitler was pounding hard to reach the Near East oil-fields. We heard a discussion of the situation from Averell Harriman on September 1.

Harriman told the Chiefs of Staff that he believed that Russia would continue to fight, but the tone of his remarks left some doubt as to how long. There were many officials,

including a group in the State Department, who feared Russia would make a negotiated peace with Germany. It is hard for anybody to anticipate what a Russian is going to do at any time. However, I did not believe Stalin would sue for peace. If I had known Stalin personally at that time, as I came to know him later, my belief would have been a conviction.

Actually, the Russians' position, while bad, was far from hopeless. They had not been surrounded and they appeared to be retreating in the regular Russian fashion. The Germans might even have taken Stalingrad, but they still would have had a long way to go to knock Russia out. Hitler was being pulled further and further into the vast interior. I could not believe the Germans were winning the war by getting into the middle of Russia. They were doing the same thing Napoleon had done, but on a grander scale.

It was impossible for us to relieve the pressure with an invasion of Europe in 1942, but we were making strenuous efforts to get supplies of all kinds to Russia. The Soviets were not a maritime people, and throughout the war we never were able to drive into their heads the stupendous logistics involved in transporting men and munitions across an ocean.

The Joint Chiefs sought constantly to find shorter supply routes. There was an Army officer, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Campbell who seemed to me to have excellent ideas along this line. He also favourably impressed President Roosevelt and later President Truman, but he never seemed able to get his plans accepted by the Army. Campbell was attached to the Air Service Command.

He had lived in Russia, and laid before me on August 19 a plan to truck supplies up to Alaska and then get them across the Behring Straits by using ice-breakers. I advised him to ask the Army Service of Supply to give him a train of fifty trucks to make a demonstration, but I don't think he ever got them. In October, he urged shipments of supplies to Russia by way of the Pacific to Soviet ports which could keep open throughout the winter and I tried to interest Hopkins in this proposal, which appeared to me practicable and economical.

Brigadier-General Patrick Hurley, one-time Secretary of War in the Hoover Administration and Minister to New Zealand, came in on October 1 to inform me of a long inspection trip he was about to undertake for the President. He was

to visit the Near East, Iraq, Iran, Russia and England. He did not disclose the reason for this mission, but was determined to get as much information on Russia as he could. He had more luck than most Americans who visited the land of the Soviets. I think he saw more of Russian military operations and dispositions than anybody who had been over there up to that time. Pat was an old friend of mine and, knowing his aggressive personality and his courage, I suspect he got to many places simply by "crashing the gate."

An interesting discussion of the Russian situation took place at the residence of Dr. Hornbeck on Armistice Day. Present were two ex-Ambassadors to Russia, Mr. Joseph Davies and Mr. William C. Bullitt, Joseph Crew, ex-Ambassador to Japan, and Admiral W. H. Standley, then our Ambassador to Moscow. Bullitt usually has interesting ideas about how to solve a problem, and some of them sound excellent. It is always stimulating to listen to him. I also thought that Admiral Standley was an efficient, thoroughly American Ambassador to Russia who devoted himself exclusively to the interest of this country. He finally resigned because he didn't like the way our relations were being handled. The conversation developed into a *post-mortem* on the causes of the war. I was not interested in the slightest degree in the *cause* of the war. We were in it. I was interested only in *future* prospects.

I had several conferences with Standley. By November he thought the Russian Army would hold the Germans throughout the winter about where they were then. He could not predict what our ally might do if the war was prolonged into the next summer. Standley was convinced that the recent visit of Wendell Willkie, who included Russia in his much-publicized round-the-world tour, had been definitely detrimental to Allied prestige in Moscow, and that Mr. Willkie, by his personal attitude, had made a poor impression on all classes of Russians. This did not surprise me. My own experience had been that during the 1940 campaign I read his speeches and thought Willkie an extremely promising candidate for the Presidency. Later, in conversation with him, I lost much of my high opinion of him. The President, in our daily talks, never mentioned Willkie's trip around the world.

Standley expected to return to his post in December, and on November 14 he conferred with me on the possibility of sending back with him a military mission of high rank to be composed

of both American and British officers. I saw him again on December 9, when we discussed a practice that had grown up of establishing representatives of some war agencies, notably Lend-Lease, in various places, but without any control by, and sometimes without even the knowledge of, the Ambassador to the country in which they were working. Standley said he did not wish to return to Moscow as Ambassador unless he could exercise some control over these agencies in order to carry out his duty of being the President's representative in Russia. We talked this out with the President on December 14 and it was our understanding that the President agreed with Standley's proposal.

During the late autumn the Soviet armies finally halted the Germans at Stalingrad and launched a successful counter-offensive which administered to Hitler's armies their first major defeat of the war. It also had the effect of achieving a temporary interruption in the constant and persistent demands from Moscow for immediate assistance in the form of an invasion in Europe.

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Throughout my notes on the military phase of my first six months in the office of Chief of Staff, the insistent theme was appeals by our allies for more munitions, more food, and more supplies of all kinds. The Joint Chiefs could do nothing more than tell the civilian agencies *what* was needed. It was up to the home front to produce the materials of war in the amounts needed and on the schedules desired.

CHAPTER X

DARLAN DELIVERS

“FULL SPEED AHEAD ON ‘Torch’” would have been an empty phrase had it not been for the generally magnificent work turned in by the civilian components of our war effort. This effort also made possible the execution of our successful invasion of North Africa, which was to take an unanticipated and most unexpected turn.

World War II was the best-charted war ever fought. Everybody had charts for everything. We even had a section of the Government devoted solely to telling the rest of the Government how to make charts. Many of them were indeed useful, but I thought it was overdone. At any rate, all the diagrams on the output of war material began to show an alarming downward dip in the autumn of 1942. The experts told us that it was the strategic shift from defensive to offensive weapons *plus the shortages of certain raw materials that was causing the trouble.*

The situation was certainly worrying the military command. I had lunch with James Forrestal, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and a group of flag officers on August 3, 1942. The discussion was devoted generally to the procurement of war materials. That same week Admiral King complained to me that he was having trouble with the War Production Board in the matter of priority for materials, especially for building more ships. One of the difficulties seemed to be a lack of awareness in a large part of the public of the difficult task that confronted us. Hitler had assembled the greatest war machine in history—at least until our own effort reached its peak. Despite numerous “expert” predictions that the Germans would bog down because of lack of oil or rubber or something else, the Nazi armies actually seemed to be increasing in strength.

On August 9 the Office of War Information put on a nation-wide broadcast featuring the need for increased production of war material. Heard on the programme were General Eisenhower speaking from London, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz from somewhere in the Pacific, William Green of the American

Federation of Labour, Philip Murray of the Congress of Industrial Organization, Robert P. Patterson and Forrestal, Under-Secretaries respectively of War and Navy, Donald M. Nelson of the War Production Board, and myself. On the first anniversary of the Atlantic Charter, August 14, I made another speech with the same theme.

"This war," I said, "probably will be long. It will be the toughest, hardest, most merciless war we have ever fought. The price we will pay to redeem the future of mankind will be the highest ever paid.

"We know the Axis-conquered countries live in misery and starvation. We have watched whole populations unroofed and marched away to manufacture the munitions to enslave more countries. Not so long ago I returned from France. As Ambassador in that unhappy country, I saw the sufferings of the French people. Let me give you my assurance that, from what I have known and seen abroad, no pleasant fate awaits a beaten America."

I had consulted the President, as I always did, before making any public appearance. The newsmen and luncheon clubs soon learned that I was not available for interviews or addresses. There were two reasons for this: most of the matters under consideration by the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff were in the category of "Top Secret," and as the personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief, I did not feel it was proper for me to be "sounding off."

Aside from these broadcasts, the only speeches I recall making during the remainder of 1942 were a few brief remarks on October 17 on the occasion when Georgetown University conferred upon me the honorary degree of Doctor of Military Science, and on November 14 when I delivered a message of commendation from the President to the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers at a dinner in New York attended by 1,200 members.

I remember Mrs. Ogden Reid's asking me to appear on the *New York Herald Tribune's* annual forum. When I told her that nothing short of an order from the President could induce me to speak, this pleasant but determined lady suggested she would obtain such an order! She did not succeed.

On the afternoon of August 28 the President called a conference to discuss changes in the methods of producing our war armaments. Present were General Marshall, Admiral

King, General Arnold, Donald Nelson, Harry Hopkins, and myself. I think it was from this meeting, or from discussions that were developed, that there evolved a new system of priorities which helped break many bottlenecks in our war production. Everybody was fighting for priorities.

The next day Under-Secretary Welles conferred with me on the problem of finding some method of co-ordinating the use of available commercial aircraft. We were using every plane we could get our hands on in the war effort. The commercial lines apparently had a fear that the Army Air Force might be trying to absorb commercial aviation for use during the war and for control by the Army after the war. Already there was in effect a limitation on all commercial flying in the Atlantic coastal region.

Lieut.-General Brehon Somervell, Chief of the Army Services of Supply, told me with enthusiasm on August 29 that his organization had produced two gusher oil wells in Alaska from which it was expected to obtain 100 barrels of gasoline per day. This was the famous Canol Project, and Somervell had pushed it through because he had been told by oil experts that there was a great oilfield in Canada. The General did not know much about oil, but he thought they had made the greatest discovery in recent years. I never did learn why it didn't work, but it didn't. Somervell was a very aggressive, powerful, and able officer. He did not submit easily to discipline and direction, but he was producing things, and Marshall had the highest regard for him.

The problem of landing-craft and escort vessels was a vexing one for a long time. The latter, or D.Es. as they were called, were small-scale destroyers. They were produced eventually in great numbers. They were needed desperately at this time so that our destroyers could be released from convoy work and be used in offensive operations.

Throughout August and September various people came to my office on this problem. Admiral King naturally was pressing for as many of these useful ships as he could get. I told King the builders were doing the best they could, and said, "Ernie, there's a shortage everywhere. Eventually, if we live long enough, we will probably get all we need."

There were 670 escort vessels already authorized or under construction by the Navy. Rear-Admiral Land told me on September 3 that he feared any additional construction by

the Maritime Commission would interfere with the general Navy programme and would not increase the rate of production.

The President, at a conference with the chiefs of all of the production agencies on October 23, gave oral authority to the Commission to proceed in 1943 with the construction of seventy additional D.Es.

One interesting possibility of breaking this serious bottleneck was the proposal of Henry Kaiser to build huge cargo-carrying planes. Nelson brought Kaiser to my office on September 11 to talk about building three of these wooden airplanes at a first cost of about \$5,000,000 each. Having been forewarned by Land, I told them the project looked good if it could be accomplished without interfering with other war production. Nelson said he would get the approval of General Arnold and Admiral John H. Towers before undertaking the work. Kaiser said that he could, with existing facilities, complete one plane in about a year. This proposed wooden cargo plane would have had a radius of 3,000 miles with forty tons of cargo. None was completed during the war. Kaiser seemed to be a person completely sure of himself and gave one a feeling that he could accomplish whatever he set out to do.

That afternoon I drove up to Roosevelt's "Shangri-la," a quiet rest camp in the Catoctin Hills about six miles west of Thurmont, Maryland. Forrestal and Hopkins were there, and we discussed with the President many angles of the war situation. It may have been here or at some other conference at this time, when we were discussing landing-craft and other new types of vessels to be used in the war, that the President took a pencil and sketched out his own ideas of these craft. He would ask me what I thought of them, pointing to his crude drawings, and I would say, "I'm not a shipbuilder, Mr. President, but I'll take it up with the experts and see if they can do anything with it." He had good ideas and what he wanted was good. Whether they could be incorporated into anything that would float was another question. I did send some of them over to the Bureau of Ships, but I do not know that they ever found one that was practicable.

Another man who had some useful ideas was a Captain Swazy, who was a friend of the President. I had a very interesting lunch with him at the Metropolitan Club on

September 12, during which he gave me his suggestions about small vessels for anti-submarine use. Captain Swazy was an expert in small boat design.

Wayne Coy came into the office on September 24 with a Mr. Stein, also of the Budget Bureau, to point out that the Joint Chiefs were not utilizing the Combined Production and Resources Board, which had been established by the President in June, 1942. I thought Coy's point was well taken because, after study, it appeared that we could eliminate at least one delay being encountered in the provision of men and war material.

That same day Secretary Hull asked me to come over to see him. He was irate about the attacks by some newspapers on the State Department's foreign policy and particularly incensed at the critical articles being written by Mr. Drew Pearson. I felt that the Secretary was personally irritated by Pearson, which was probably exactly what the columnist wanted to accomplish.

We recalled the time four years before, when I had advocated blockading Japan following the bombing of the gunboat *Panay*. Hull said his failure to take aggressive action against Tokyo was due to his knowledge that popular feeling would not support any action that might cause Japan to make war on the United States at that time. I remember disagreeing with him strongly, but I believe now that his estimate of public opinion was correct. As for his sensitiveness to criticism, I never could understand why Secretary Hull should have permitted articles of opposition columnists to get under his skin. But they certainly did.

Looking forward to the time when we would be taking the offensive on all fronts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to ask that the strength of the Army and Navy be increased to 10,894,000 men. This meant practically doubling the number. When the President returned on October 1 from an inspection of war plants in the North-west, Pacific coast, and south-eastern states, I laid the J.C.S. recommendations before him. He objected to such a radical increase in the authorized strength at one time, but said he would be willing to approve limited additions from time to time. I did not insist too much on getting the 10,000,000-man authorization. We were getting along all right. Besides, it would probably have wrecked the labour market.

Roosevelt appeared to be in excellent health and spirits as a result of his somewhat strenuous journey. He was enthusiastic about the progress he noted, which, if continued, would go far to making our country, to use his phrase, the "arsenal of democracy."

In a move to co-ordinate our rapidly expanding home front effort it was announced on Sunday, October 4, that James F. Byrnes of South Carolina had resigned as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to become Roosevelt's Director of Economic Stabilization. As a Senator, Byrnes, I thought, had shown outstanding ability. Giving up his place on the Supreme Court was a real sacrifice of his personal interests, and I felt he probably was the most promising person in America to accomplish the extremely difficult task of controlling wages and prices in the interests of our war effort. The President had full confidence in his ability and integrity.

Byrnes moved into the new East Wing of the White House, where Hopkins and I already were installed. This addition to the Executive Mansion, then almost complete, could house on its two floors eight to ten offices for assistants to the President. The entrance faced East Executive Avenue and was across from the Treasury Department Building.

The new wing was fitted with a highly efficient underground bomb-proof shelter that could accommodate as many as a hundred persons during an air raid. It was protected by a thick concrete covering. The shelter was ventilated, had adequate washroom and toilet facilities, and was designed primarily for the protection of the President and his Staff. As far as I can recall, there never was an air raid drill in the White House.

One of the first callers when I assumed my new duties was Interior Secretary Ickes, who had been my "boss" when I was Governor of Puerto Rico in 1939-40. He came in again on October 23 to ask permission to discuss with the Joint Chiefs the need for priorities on steel to build the "Big Inch" pipeline to the east coast. Ickes said it was needed to provide enough fuel oil to meet military and civilian needs. The "Curmudgeon," as he was called, was an able administrator. Despite his reputation of being hard to get along with, I never had any difficulty with him.

A crucial shortage was manpower. It was the chief topic of discussion at a luncheon of the heads of the principal war agencies and the Joint Chiefs on November 3. It was clear

to me from the statements made by these informed officials that if we rushed 10,000,000 men into the armed forces, serious difficulties would arise in our production lines of war material, especially with the existing legal restrictions on the number of hours of labour per week.

I took up with the President the following day a request that machinists working on aircraft-carrier construction be deferred from the draft for six months, and he gave me instructions to inform the War Manpower Board and General Lewis Hershey, head of the Selective Service, that he approved the request. The matter had been brought to my office by J. W. Powell, an old Annapolis classmate (1897) of mine.

Captain Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Production, on November 5, discussed with me the problem of adjusting the British-American schedules for the next year so that he might allocate to the best advantage the total manpower of the United Kingdom. Lyttleton was an exceedingly attractive and plausible advocate of British interests.

Sir John Dill came in the same day to present his side of a disagreement between the British and American staff planning committees on the distribution of landing-craft under construction in America.

Nelson and his assistant, Ferdinand Eberstadt, asked me on November 23 to arrange a conference for them with the President to get Roosevelt to modify his "must" list of material. I was convinced that Nelson was making every effort to meet military and naval needs, but I could get for him very little useful assistance from the Services. In fact, the next day General Somervell protested to me that Nelson was planning to issue an administrative order that would take all control of war material away from the Army and Navy. Somervell suggested that Nelson should be fired at once and replaced by Bernard Baruch.

I had a high regard for Baruch, but the War Production Board was doing a good job, considering the difficulties it faced. I had the impression that Somervell was trying to expand his own operations radically—with the best of intentions. Two groups were mixing into war production—the Army and the W.P.B.—and that was the trouble. It was the duty of the Joint Chiefs to make war plans, and there was an appropriate agency charged with procuring the things necessary to implement the war plans. I could see no merit

in Somervell's recommendation. The High Command had been furnished with all the necessary supplies and equipment for our first major offensive—the invasion of North Africa—which was then proceeding satisfactorily.

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The first unexpected development in our plans for North Africa was a cable from Murphy (I think it was November 2), which said that General Giraud wanted to delay the date of the North African landings. While the French General was waiting in Southern France until the time for us to pick him up by submarine, he was making his own plans for military operations against Germany. These included a possible invasion through Southern France. Also, he wanted to be the supreme commander. It appeared that he was seeking delay now in order to have his own strategy considered. I discussed this immediately by telephone with Marshall and King, and we decided that no delay was possible. I cabled the decision to Murphy and sent a copy to the President, who was at Hyde Park. With 60,000 troops already at sea, it was obvious that our plans must proceed, even if it meant that Giraud would refuse to co-operate.

I personally did not expect the French North African Army to oppose the American landings with any enthusiasm. I did fear that the coast defences under the command of the Navy might offer more serious resistance. We had the good news on November 4 that the Axis Army in Egypt was in full retreat before a British offensive.

The Joint Chiefs about this time received information (which would have been disturbing if true) that some plans connected with the operation had been found on the body of a British officer who was lost in a plane accident over the British Channel. I do not remember that the report was ever accurately confirmed, and the results indicate that the enemy did not have any useful information about the plans for "Torch." Officials of the Office of War Information came in on the morning of November 7 to make final arrangements for releasing invasion news. It was decided that Stephen T. Early, able Press Secretary to the President, would supervise the detailed release, including the text of the disc record of the President's statement in French to the people of France.

"Operation Torch" went well. The radio informed us that

only one combat-loaded ship in the huge convoy *en route* to Algeria was torpedoed by the Axis before reaching the Straits of Gibraltar. Then we were informed that the Oran and Algiers operation would begin at 9 p.m., November 7, Washington time. Successful landings were made on November 8 and 9 near Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers without much loss, according to initial reports. At Vichy, Marshal Pétain had ordered the French forces to resist, and at 7 p.m., November 8, the French Government broke off diplomatic relations with the United States because of our invasion. Oran was completely occupied on the night of November 10 and Casablanca capitulated at 7 a.m., November 11, according to our radio information.

Murphy cabled me on November 6 that Admiral Darlan was in Algiers to see his son, who was ill with infantile paralysis with little prospect of recovery. When I told the President about Darlan's unexpected presence there, the first thing that impressed Roosevelt was the nature of the boy's illness. Roosevelt remembered his own illness and proposed that we send a letter to Darlan. I replied I thought it would be a very nice thing to do. Later Roosevelt sent Darlan's son to Warm Springs, Georgia, and kept him there with Mme. Darlan for a considerable time. Darlan was most grateful for the President's offer of help, and it is my belief that this thoughtfulness on the part of the President helped us in the critical situation that was developing.

When General Eisenhower produced General Giraud to take command of the French forces in North Africa, he was astonished at the cool reception accorded Giraud by the other French officers. Regardless of their personal feelings, Pétain was still the head of the legitimate government. Pétain had ordered them to resist. They didn't stop shooting until Darlan gave the order. Even Darlan had to show the French commanders some kind of secret message in French naval code that he said he had received from the Marshal at Vichy, which gave him discretion to act. Our force was sufficient to overcome the relatively weak resistance even if it had been prolonged, but the success of our first major military effort would have been compromised seriously if it had been necessary to deal with resistance from French officials and the native populations in French Morocco and Algiers. It would have been necessary to employ many troops to guard

communications and otherwise protect the security of our forces that were moved forward to meet the enemy. It is idle to speculate about what might have happened if Darlan, by chance or otherwise, had not been in Algiers at this particular moment. It is not speculation to say that "Popeye" had delivered at a crucial moment.

It was learned later that during the tense negotiations between Murphy and Darlan, the former reminded the French Admiral about a statement he had made to me in July, 1941. I was then trying to get the Pétain Government to prevent the Axis from sending a lot of people to North Africa in the guise of tourists, and Darlan was not being particularly helpful. He told me somewhat sarcastically, as I recall, that if the Americans showed up with 500,000 men his attitude would be entirely different, and if we came with enough force to give the French a reasonable prospect of holding their colonies against an Axis invasion he would join with us. He meant that in July, 1941, and that is exactly what he did in November, 1942. Murphy had to do a little bluffing about the number of people we were putting in at that moment, but his bluff worked.

Three days before the landing, Roosevelt decided to safeguard our Spanish flank. He called me on the phone and told me to have the Under-Secretary of State instruct the American Ambassador at Madrid to tell the Spanish Government that resistance by Spain to any attempt by the Axis to move troops through that country would receive every practical assistance from the United States.

We didn't think that Hitler could spare troops to come down through Spain, and it was practically certain that if he tried it Spain would resist. Had this happened, we would have had to go into Spain. We could not afford to let the Axis take Gibraltar. Fortunately, we did not have to do it, and the only advantage Germany had in Spain was to be able to observe in the narrow straits the extent of the convoys that were going through. It appeared in Washington that the enemy was not making the best use even of that information.

The Darlan situation immediately burgeoned into a controversy. Everyone, including the Joint Chiefs and many of my friends, were asking me questions about "Popeye." The President and I talked about what the anticipated reaction in

America might be. The anti-Vichy, pro-de Gaulle group in this country kicked up a terrific fuss, even though it should have been apparent that we were trying by all means to succeed in the North African campaign. Plans for the landing had been kept a complete secret from the so-called "leader of the French resistance," who at that time was a highly advertised hero in England and in this country, but who seemed to have few important friends in Africa or in France itself. According to reports, when de Gaulle read news of the invasion in the newspapers he almost had an apoplectic fit. His Gallic pride had been insulted. He was in a terrible frame of mind. Of course, we knew that his organization was impregnated with German spies, and if we had given him advance information the Germans might have known it. We just could not accept the risk of telling him.

It was no surprise when British Ambassador Halifax transmitted to me (November 14) the desire of the British Foreign office to send de Gaulle representatives to North Africa. I gave him my personal opinion that any such move at that time almost certainly would be disadvantageous to our military effort. I asked him to make it perfectly clear to his Government that this was my personal opinion, but I believed it would be concurred in by everybody interested in the success of our African expedition. I was unable to learn the real reason for British insistence upon injecting de Gaulle into that already confused and difficult problem.

That same day we received a long cable from Eisenhower explaining the details of the agreement he had reached with Darlan. Roosevelt knew that the use of Darlan at this time was correct. However, there was a demand by many Frenchmen to take over immediately the civil government of North Africa. This demand was backed by the British, and Eisenhower had shown some tendency to compromise with the British. Roosevelt sent General Eisenhower a message telling him to make no purely political agreements. It was a positive order and, in my opinion, stopped de Gaulle and Churchill from trying to take Eisenhower into their camp. I prepared a cable for the President (November 16) to be sent to Churchill, informing the British Prime Minister of the order to Eisenhower: that he was not to make any political decisions not necessitated by the military situation.

Ray Atherton of the State Department asked my advice

regarding an idea of inducing de Gaulle to send an emissary to discuss with General Giraud some means of including the "Fighting French" in the African expedition. I advised Atherton I could see no advantage to us in the suggestion, but would offer no objection providing that care was taken to avoid offending Admiral Darlan. I knew the latter was sensitive to criticism, and his adherence to our cause at that moment was of high value to our Army in Africa.

Our forces toward the end of November, 1942, were making good progress toward Tunis, but publication in this country of the Eisenhower-Darlan agreements aroused political and Press opposition to greater vehemence. Darlan had assumed the duties of High Commissioner in North Africa and had announced that he was on our side. My feeling was that he should be wholly taken into our camp—and watched carefully, not because of any objections by de Gaulle or a prejudiced Press. You simply had to keep an eye on "Popeye."

If a stupid failure by America and Britain to appreciate the importance of what Darlan had done should succeed in alienating the Admiral, it might cost the lives of thousands of our soldiers and add serious obstacles to the progress of our North African campaign. Even the President raised some objection to any agreement with Darlan.

I advocated that we should indefinitely continue to try to use everybody—good, bad, and indifferent—who promised to be of assistance in reducing the length of our casualty list. I did not believe the President's objections were based on the military point of view, but felt that he was being influenced by the public furore that was being stirred up because he was doing business with Darlan. He did not have much confidence in Darlan's reliability; nor did I. That is why I said we would have to watch him, but the British Foreign Office seemed to be doing everything possible to inject de Gaulle into the picture.

After many discussions with the President with the purpose of informing myself of his attitude toward Admiral Darlan's position in Africa, I accepted the following as his desires in the matter at that time:

The existing political controversy in French North Africa was due to competition for future political power.

De Gaulle was seeking recognition by the United States and England as the Provisional Government of France, while

Darlan could be expected to attempt to control the Government as a representative of Marshal Pétain, the regularly constituted legitimate Government.

In view of his conviction that the people of France had a right to determine for themselves by their constitutional processes and without foreign interference the kind of government they preferred, no government—provisional or otherwise—should be forced upon France by foreign influence, and no French political authority should be permitted by the Allied Powers in areas controlled by them outside of Continental France.

Admiral Darlan, with his claim to legitimacy, had succeeded in bringing the French forces in Africa to our side, a task that no other available French officer had been able to accomplish.

By so doing, many American lives had been saved and the progress of our campaign had been expedited.

To save more American lives and to speed up the advance of our troops against the Axis armies in Africa, Darlan should continue to be employed for so long as he would be helpful.

The President did not at any time wish to be party to the recognition of any government, provisional or otherwise, that was not established by the free choice of the people of France.

Darlan attempted to inform French Ambassadors and Ministers that he had assumed the defence of and the administration of the French Empire until he could return that "Sacred Trust" to Marshal Pétain. Lord Halifax notified me on November 23 that Allied Headquarters in London had stopped the message and would not release it until authorized by the President.

I took this up with Roosevelt, but he would not allow Darlan's message to be sent through our official channels, because he said the United States did not at the time recognize any French government. He had no objection to Darlan using ordinary commercial channels, and I so informed Lord Halifax. I told the President I thought he was in error on this point because it might alienate Darlan, and if that happened it could cost the lives of many Americans. I did not think it was making the best use of this new element in the invasion of Africa which had now joined with us. This was probably one of the occasions when, in going against my advice, the President would say to me, "I am a pig-headed Dutchman,

Bill, and I have made up my mind about this. We are going ahead with it, and you can't change my mind."

Darlan placed General Giraud in charge of the field operations of the French North African Army. A number of prominent Frenchmen in this country came to my office about this time to tell me they were volunteering to serve under Giraud in any capacity. Among them was Camille Chautemps, one-time Prime Minister of France. Chautemps was alarmed that we might replace Darlan with de Gaulle, and said there was a complete lack of confidence in de Gaulle by the people in both continental France and in the colonies. We also took precautions at this time to prevent any sabotage in the French island of Martinique, where the population appeared to be very anti-Vichy, but the Governor, Admiral Georges Robert, remained loyal to Pétain.

The pressure on the President by certain groups in America to receive de Gaulle for a conference continued. There were some reports that this pressure was being instigated by a group of Jews and Communists in this country who feared Darlan's "Fascist" attitude. It became so serious that the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Roosevelt that if he should confer with the General at this time, it might seriously affect our campaign. The President finally authorized a reply to these groups: that in view of unanticipated engagements, he would be unable to see de Gaulle until after the end of the New Year.

Actually the President did not want to see this self-appointed French leader. De Gaulle had no status at that time. The President did not intend to impose him on the French people.

News came on November 27 that German troops had entered the French naval base of Toulon and that part of the French squadron there had been scuttled by the French crews. This action verified what Darlan had told me repeatedly—that the ships would be sunk before they could be taken by any foreign power. We had made an effort to get the Admiral to order those ships to join the Allied fleet in the Mediterranean. They did not do so. Their commanders did not obey this order, which recalled to me that when he was Prime Minister, Darlan had said that the order to sink the French warships before permitting them to be seized was final and could not be revoked, even by Darlan himself, because of the probability that he might be under duress at the time of the attempted seizure.

Brigadier-General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, had arrived in Washington, and on December 1 he dined with the President. Others present were Mrs. Roosevelt, Mr. and Mrs. Hopkins and myself. Mrs. Roosevelt, who appeared to be opposed to Darlan's efforts in our behalf, did most of the talking at dinner.

After the dinner, the President took the General, Hopkins and me to his study, where Smith gave a detailed report on the progress and future prospects of "Operation Torch." Eisenhower's Staff Chief believed we would occupy Tunis and Bizerte in December and that we would take Tripoli by the end of January, 1943.

In less than a week following Smith's report, however, we suffered a temporary reverse, which, our command said, was due to superiority of the German air arm. It was surprising to me that the Germans should be superior in the air in the North African Area. It indicated a necessity for consolidating the Allied army and bringing up more planes before attempting further advances. Of course, this would mean more time for German reinforcements to arrive.

The question of civil government in the French colonies was to plague us for many months. Early in December the President disapproved a proposal made by General Eisenhower to establish a French civil government in North Africa. However, General Eisenhower was able to achieve a working arrangement with Governor Boisson, and a radio message on December 7 announced that Dakar had formally joined the Allied effort in Africa.

Secretary Hull and Under-Secretary Welles and I discussed on December 9 the establishment in the French colonies of a group of American and British civil officials to exercise supervision and hold a veto power over the French colonial civil administrators.

The Secretary of State was positive that the establishment of such an Allied civil authority would be fraught with the most serious consequences to both our military and political prospects in North Africa. He believed that we should use every facility to gain military advantage regardless of its effect on the political expansion aspirations of any of our allies.

The Joint Chiefs, with Hopkins present, had a long session with the President in his study on December 10. The progress of the war on all fronts was reviewed and future prospects

surveyed. As for Africa, the President accepted Under-Secretary Welles' idea to have a Joint Anglo-American civilian group supervise the civil administration. Hopkins, who had an understanding view of the whole problem, was very helpful throughout this conference.

As was so often the case, "Harry the Hop," as we called him around the White House, would remain silent for long intervals during any discussion, but he would usually be the first man to put a finger on the essential element of a problem. Churchill's jesting title, "Lord Root of the Matter," was an accurate description. Hopkins had an excellent mind. His manner of approach was direct and nobody could fool him, not even Churchill. He was never influenced by a person's rank.

Roosevelt trusted him implicitly and Hopkins never betrayed that trust. The range of his activities covered all manner of civilian affairs—politics, war production, diplomatic matters—and, on many occasions, military affairs. We saw a great deal of each other. The only previous impressions I had of Hopkins concerned his various relief activities in the first years of the Roosevelt administration, and I, perhaps, held some prejudices against him. I frequently joked with him about those days and sometimes called him "Pinko" or "Do-Goooder." He took it all in good spirit and we never had any major differences of opinion. By his brilliant mind, his loyalty, and his selfless devotion to Franklin Roosevelt in helping carry on the war, Harry Hopkins soon erased completely any previous misgivings I might have held.

When Harry moved out of the White House to his home in the Georgetown section of Washington, an occasional complication arose. A paper or a message would appear lost. We would look in the files and in the drawers of Roosevelt's desk without success. Sometimes we would find that it was Hopkins who had carried it away in his pocket and forgotten about it, so we would have to send out to his Georgetown house and bring it back to its proper file.

Admiral Darlan made an important statement of policy on December 15 which the President released in Washington the following day. I hoped this action would have the effect of mitigating in some degree the strange attitude many Americans then had toward Frenchmen who were assisting us in Africa.

The President said: "Since November 8th the people of

North Africa have accomplished much in support of the war effort of the United Nations, and in doing so have definitely allied themselves on the side of liberalism against all for which the Axis stands in government. I am informed in this connection by General Eisenhower that Admiral Darlan has made the following declaration:

“French Africa, with the assistance of the Allies, must make a military effort to the maximum extent for the defeat of Germany and Italy. . . .” (The text of the Admiral’s statement appears in the appendix.) Darlan announced that “full and complete amnesty” had been granted to all persons who had been penalized or suspended from office because of their Allied sympathies; that he was putting an end immediately to the persecution of the Jews and taking measures to restore the rights that had been taken away from any person because of race; that the only censorship of Press and radio would be that which the Allied authorities thought necessary for military security.

The Admiral praised the active participation of French forces in the military operations under General Giraud. In conclusion, he stated: “I seek no assistance or support for my personal ambitions. I have announced that my only purpose is to save French Africa and, after helping to liberate France, then retire to private life with a hope that the French people themselves may select the future leaders of France, and that they may be selected by no one else.”

A statement most interesting to me was an estimate of the entire political situation in North Africa which I received from H. Freeman Matthews who had been our excellent First Secretary of Embassy for most of the period when I was Ambassador to France. His letter, dated December 10, 1942, said, in part:

“I am sure that it is unnecessary to write in detail the reasons why it was necessary to deal with Darlan instead of throwing him in prison. You and I have no illusions about ‘Popeye,’ and it seems strange that after our many problems and unpleasant hours with him in Vichy to be cast somewhat in the role of his defender.”

Matthews had had an exciting flight to Gibraltar on November 6. “I take a lowly civilian’s pride in the fact that the Fortress in which I flew down was attacked by four Messerschmitts and brought down two of them—the first bag of the North

African operation! Our co-pilot was wounded, but we had a passenger substitute available—namely, Jimmy Doolittle.”

Matthews went on to describe that peculiar type of legalistic thinking that dominated the French armed services and the civil government, which made it necessary for any orders in North Africa to be issued in the name of and with the authority of Marshal Pétain. “However distorted this sense of duty may have been, it was very real,” he wrote. “There are still very few Frenchmen who feel what amounted to suicide missions by the French warships at Casablanca and French military resistance in the early days in North Africa could have been avoided without a complete loss of ‘honour’ and self-respect. They still argued that such useless waste of life and ships was necessary.”

Matthews had been in Africa since the beginning of the invasion. His estimates of the value of the arrangement with Darlan were in complete accord with those that I had formed in Washington, based on our knowledge of the peculiar French situation. He said: “. . . Darlan alone was able to give the order to cease fire and have it obeyed throughout North Africa; he alone, with his secret private message from Pétain, was able to swing the North African army in one week’s time from an attitude of hostility into fighting by our side; he alone could keep the civil administration and public services functioning and actively co-operating, with all that it meant in those early days.”

It was Matthews’ opinion that Dakar (French West Africa) would not have come in on our side without Darlan, and he said the statements that President Roosevelt had made to quiet public feeling in the United States, in which Roosevelt stressed the *temporary* nature of the Darlan deal, “. . . certainly gave us some difficult moments and almost resulted in the Dakar people going home and deciding not to play.”

Both of us had heard Darlan vent his spleen against anything British on numerous occasions. Concerning Darlan’s assistance in getting French merchant ships moved from North African ports, Matthews said, “. . . It didn’t come easy to ‘Popeye’ to order his ships to Gibraltar in the light of his feeling over the past two years, nor were the French entirely free of misgivings as to the attitude of their merchant crews.”

I had received from many sources information that the British might make an effort to get Darlan out of the picture and put

de Gaulle in. There were many evidences that a large segment of the British Government regarded the Mediterranean as a vital and legitimate British preserve and were most unhappy to see the United States taking the leading role in that area. The British Government long had been supporting de Gaulle, and it must have been uncomfortable for London to find Admiral Darlan using the title of "High Commissioner" in North Africa with their own favourite still on the sidelines.

On Christmas Eve there came in the mail a personal letter to me from Darlan, dated at Algiers, November 27. He expressed deep gratitude for the notes of sympathy the President and I had sent him about his son's illness. Then followed a statement of his policy and justification of the course he had taken, which had been so advantageous to our cause. He said: "If we had not promised to defend our territories against anyone who came to attack them, the Axis people would have occupied Northern Africa long ago. We have kept our word. As I was in Africa, I ordered the fighting stopped so that a ditch should not be dug to separate America and France."

He explained that when the Germans occupied all of France, thus violating the Armistice agreement, he felt, as the designated successor to Marshal Pétain, that he was free to act. In addition to the secret confidential message, he wrote that Pétain had often told him: "Darlan, we must always remain friends with the United States."

"I can assure you that the hour when the United States took action in Europe and Africa seemed very slow to come to us Frenchmen who were under the conqueror's boot. . . . By your side and with your help, we are sure that France will totally revive. If President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill trust the team that works with me, I am certain that we shall bring to your cause—which is ours—all the French subjects, especially the Mohammedans."

Some hours later that Christmas Eve I answered the special White House private telephone which had been installed in my Florida Avenue residence. I was informed by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Admiral of the Fleet François Darlan had been assassinated in Algiers.

CHAPTER XI

CASABLANCA AND WASHINGTON CONFERENCES. DISTRESS SIGNALS FROM CHINA

THE YEAR 1943 WAS a year of conferences. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and their senior military advisers met no less than five times. These war councils were: Casablanca (January 14-26); Washington (May 11-25), which had the code name of "Trident"; Quebec, Canada (August 11-24), which was called "Quadrant"; Cairo, which was attended by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his staff (November 22-6); and Teheran (November 27-December 2), which for the first time during the war brought together the leaders of the three great powers.

In the closing weeks of 1942 the necessary adjustments were made in North Africa following the assassination of Admiral Darlan. On Christmas afternoon, after conferring with the President, I sent three cablegrams for him. The first was to delay the visit of General de Gaulle to America, the second authorized General Eisenhower to appoint General Henri H. Giraud in charge of French civil and military affairs in North Africa, and the third conveyed Roosevelt's condolence to Mme. Darlan and suggested that she bring her son to Warm Springs, Georgia.

The French Mission in Washington on December 29, through General Émile-Marie Béthouart and Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, urged on me that French troops in North Africa be given a priority over our own forces in the matter of military equipment. This attitude was extremely disconcerting, in view of the fact that there was not a sufficient number of American troops in Africa to hold the French under control in that great area by force of arms. Also on December 29, in a talk I had with Secretary of State Hull, Hopkins, and General Marshall, the Tennessee diplomat lamented that he expected another Press attack in the near future by what he called the de Gaulle "Polecats." The entire North African situation was reviewed in detail when the Joint Chiefs met with the President on January 5, on the eve of our departure for Casablanca.

There was a member of the Embassy staff of the Pétain Government, Major Daru, who had been very valuable in giving us information, so the President approved the request of the Office of Strategic Services that Daru remain in America when the other members of the Embassy were sent to Vichy in exchange for our Foreign Service officers in France.

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The Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President had decided to have a conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Morocco, and considerable staff work was done in Washington in preparation for the discussions. Complete secrecy surrounded all arrangements being made, and the President and his party left at 10.30 p.m., January 10, from the special railway siding under the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in Washington. The special train included the President's new heavily armoured car equipped with glass windows designed to keep out machine-gun bullets. This car was arranged with a sitting-room, a dining-room seating ten or twelve persons, a small but well-arranged kitchen, and five staterooms. Special identification had been prepared for each member of the party that could be used, if necessary, in lieu of passports. The President's was designated "Register Number 1," and my paper bore "Register Number 2."

At Miami on January 11, we changed to sea-planes and took off at 6.30 a.m. for Trinidad in splendid flying weather. We came down in the Gulf of Paria off Port of Spain. While landing, I counted about forty-five large merchant ships anchored in the Gulf behind torpedo nets, apparently waiting for the formation of convoys. Rear-Admiral J. B. Oldendorf, Commandant of the Naval Base, met our party and took us to an officers' club that had formerly been a small beach hotel, where we had dinner. We met there Major-General Conger Pratt, Commander of the Army troops in Trinidad. Under the principle of unity of command which had been established by the Joint Chiefs, Pratt was directly under the authority of Oldendorf.

I had developed a severe case of bronchitis, and when the party left for Morocco the next morning, Dr. McIntire advised that it would be dangerous for me to make the trip. I was sadly disappointed to be eliminated from participation in this staff problem. Excellent care was provided at the Naval

Hospital in Trinidad and on January 19th I was discharged from treatment.

Rear-Admiral Clifford E. Van Hook, who was in command of the naval sea defence, was in Trinidad on an inspection visit from Panama. He told me he had only two destroyers and half a dozen motor-boats to use in protecting merchant ship convoys in the Caribbean. He had no escort vessels to cover the great number of ships leaving Panama for ports in the Pacific. Luckily for us, the Japanese submarines never attacked this end of our supply line. Because of the shortage of escort vessels at that time, these ships would sail singly and without protection. While awaiting the return of the President from Casablanca, I inspected the several bases then under construction in Trinidad.

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The President's plane, returning from the Casablanca Conference, arrived at 4.30 p.m. on January 29. It was several hours behind schedule, which caused considerable worry to those of us who were awaiting the party. Some hours before they reached Trinidad, they had encountered a spell of unusually bad weather which had delayed them.

After dinner the President showed us some gorgeous presents which had been given him by the Sultan of Morocco. These included a gold-mounted sheik's knife, two gold bracelets, and a very beautiful ancient Sultana's head-dress. These mementoes are now in the Hyde Park Museum.

I rejoined the group, and we left on the President's sixty-first birthday, January 30. At noon, when we were over the island of Haiti, we gave him a birthday lunch complete with cake, champagne, and presents. He thoroughly enjoyed the party and we all had the unique experience of having a birthday luncheon with the President of the United States in the air above the clouds and over a foreign state. We landed at Miami at 4.25 p.m. and reached Washington at 6.30 the next evening.

During the next several days the President gave me a summary of what had taken place at Casablanca. He told about the difficulty of getting de Gaulle to come to the conference. As I recall his relating it, Roosevelt said to Churchill, "Who pays for de Gaulle's food?"

Churchill shrugged and said, "Well, the British do."

Then Roosevelt said, "Why don't you stop his food and maybe he will come."

The President laughed in recounting the story and said he did not know whether or not the British did cut off de Gaulle's rations, but he eventually appeared. The President came back from Morocco feeling that this controversial Frenchman was a very difficult person to get along with and not very helpful in making satisfactory arrangements in Africa, particularly with regard to General Giraud. It was obvious to all present that de Gaulle wanted to be recognized as the supreme French officer in Africa and he did not like the idea of having Giraud there.

The results of the Combined Chiefs meeting at Casablanca were reviewed with the President on February 2, with General Marshall and Admiral King present. Their comments led me to believe that little of value toward ending the war was accomplished. It appeared that our British Allies had been forced to accept the necessity for some aggressive action against Japan in the south-west Pacific and in Burma.

The American plan to invade France by way of the Channel in 1943 was not accepted by the British, and in its place was substituted a decision for combined action against the Mediterranean islands, principally Sicily.

Some small approach was made toward getting a political agreement between Giraud, who was fighting in North Africa, and de Gaulle, who was talking in England. I was unable to see any military advantage that would be gained by the type of agreement that was proposed. The military situation in Tunisia indicated that a great cost in lives would be necessary before the Germans and Italians would be driven out of North Africa.

A surprising development of the Casablanca Conference was the announcement at the final news conference held by the President and the Prime Minister of the principle of "unconditional surrender." As far as I could learn, this policy had not been discussed with the combined Chiefs and, from a military viewpoint, its execution might add to our difficulties in succeeding campaigns, because it would mean that we would have to destroy the enemy. Later the unconditional surrender principle was also agreed to by Russia. Before the war was over, there were occasions when it might

have been advantageous to accept conditional surrender in some areas, but we were not permitted to do it.

* * *

The "Washington flank" of the North African front was relatively quiet in February and March. Misgivings about the de Gaulle-Giraud agreement continued and there were many reports of the de Gaullists trying to undermine the authority of General Giraud. Agents of the former in New York were inducing members of the crews of French warships to desert and go to Canada. Ray Atherton, head of the State Department's European Division, told me on March 30 that de Gaullists were preventing the departure of the French steamship *Jamaïque* from North Africa until it should have been manned by de Gaullist officers and crew. The ship was under charter to the U.S. War Shipping Administration.

It was certain that de Gaulle's followers were at this time interfering with our war effort, and our British ally, who was financing them, was taking no action to halt this interference. Atherton also had reports from London that de Gaulle was tied in closely with the Communists, and some people feared that the British public recently had become attached emotionally to the Communist Government of Russia.

The French Military Mission in Washington thought it would be profitable to get the still pro-Vichy Admiral Robert of Martinique to the capital for a conference. When I informed the President, he suggested that Secretary of State Hull be consulted, and the latter thought little would come from such a move. I agreed and the matter was dropped. When French Guiana broke with Laval and joined with General Giraud, there was some fear that Robert might take military action against Guiana, but the old Admiral apparently was too close to a revolution against his own control in Martinique to make any move elsewhere.

The next irritant was the action of the British in providing transportation to Trinidad for a M. Bertand, who had been named Governor of French Guiana by de Gaulle. It was a pleasure to fulfil a request of Under-Secretary of State Welles (April 6) that our Navy not give M. Bertand transportation from Trinidad to French Guiana. The British Government seemed at this time determined to exploit de Gaulle at our expense.

* * *

Colonel Julius Holmes of General Eisenhower's staff and Colonel John H. F. Haskell of the War Department on April 3 showed me a draft of a proposed military government for territory, such as Sicily, to be occupied in the future by allied troops moving from North Africa. Some time before this, Welles had insisted on the necessity of maintaining American control of enemy territory occupied by troops under American command, so that we might not be at a disadvantage in peace negotiations. Welles was right. The President approved, with some changes, of course, a message I drafted for General Eisenhower outlining American policy in this matter. (In his college days, Roosevelt had been an editor of the student newspaper at Harvard, and loved to use a blue pencil!)

The proposal presented me by Holmes did not appear to be in accord with these instructions. It provided for a British military governor of Sicily, but Holmes said it was the best agreement that could be reached with the British. I advised him to get the State Department's approval before attempting to obtain an O.K. from the President. I lost this round. On April 14, Roosevelt approved the insistent recommendation by Churchill that General Sir Harold Alexander be appointed Military Governor of Italian territory, which it was planned to occupy at an early date. I felt this was a British effort to gain position in the peace talks, whenever they might begin. The cable I sent for the President, however, made it plain that Alexander would be under the control of General Eisenhower.

* * *

A special Joint Chiefs session was held April 9 to take action on a request from the British Chiefs of Staff in London that Eisenhower take Tunis by assault without delay. The J.C.S. agreed. I was influenced to some extent by a knowledge that most of the troops then in a position to attack Tunis were British. The operation was successful, and on May 11, the day the British delegation, headed by the Prime Minister, arrived in Washington for the "Trident" Conference, reports from Tunisia told of a complete collapse of the German Army in Africa. About 50,000 prisoners already had been counted and it appeared that 60,000 still in action would retreat up the Cape Bon Peninsula—from which there was no practicable means of escape. The success of the North African campaign was made possible by the superiority in sea power and air

power of the Allies, which prevented the enemy from effectively reinforcing his forces.

* * *

Some State Department officials were disturbed by persistent reports, which did not prove correct, that Russia would fight only so long as German troops remained within the territory of the Soviet "Republics." These reports recalled the analysis given me in February by Brigadier-General Patrick Hurley after he returned from a special mission to Russia.

We had a long conference then in which Pat reported on the information that he had received from Soviet generals on his trip to the Russian front. He saw their army and what it was doing, and his conclusions were based on observations and conversations with its commanders. It may be that certain information was planted with Hurley, because later some of it turned out to be incorrect. Hurley seemed to believe that Germany's main effort in Russia was the destruction of Russia's industrial facilities and reduction of the Soviet armies by attrition.

He did not believe that Germany would suffer a serious defeat in Russia, and some of the Soviet commanders had convinced him that the German attack would be repeated in the coming summer.

Russia at that time was definitely displeased with Great Britain and also did not understand our failure to invade Europe. In fact, the Russian officials with whom he had made contact were not expecting any useful military assistance from America. Hurley saw Stalin while he was in Moscow and the Marshal told him that after Germany was defeated he would assist America in the war against Japan. At that time, I did not know the Soviet Chieftain and did not have a very high opinion of his reliability. The Army, in its planning for the defeat of Japan, was anxious to have the help of Russia. It was my opinion that we could defeat Japan without Russian assistance. I gave the President a report of General Hurley's observations, as well as my opinions. It was the first time I had an intimation that Russia wanted to get into the fight with Japan.

Also in February I attended a reception given at the Russian Embassy in celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Red Russian Army. The affair was attended by a great number of people, who were apparently much

interested in the ample supply of food and drinks provided by the Russians.

The Ambassador, Maxim Litvinoff, singled me out to have with him a glass of vodka in a toast to the Red Army. We raised our glasses. The Soviet Ambassador took his with a single swallow. Being a diplomat, I did likewise. I was unaccustomed to this fiery drink and it almost burned out my insides, but it was good training for the conference dinners that were to come later at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Litvinoff was alert, energetic and, for a Russian of the present régime, attractive.

* * *

The annual White House Correspondents Dinner for the President was given on February 12. Roosevelt made a stirring twenty-minute address devoted to our war aims and prospects. He stressed throughout a certainty of victory and a determination to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. I believed personally that he was promising more than he could deliver in the reasonably near future, but, broadcast on a world-wide network, it was effective propaganda and must have been discouraging to our enemies. The President's speech was followed by an hour of entertainment consisting of cheap vaudeville acts that provided a complete anti-climax to his thrilling address.

It was during this same week that Sumner Welles, in discussing the propaganda activities at home and overseas of the Office of War Information, informed me that Elmer Davis apparently was assuming that his office was a policy-making agency. I liked Davis and thought he had done an excellent job. I was surprised at Welles's report of his getting into policy matters, as I thought Davis did only what he was told.

* * *

Bill Bullitt, who was always well informed on European politics and who had spent much time in Russia, had me to lunch at his residence on March 4, and we discussed his ideas on problems that seemed likely to face us in the immediate post-war period. Bullitt said that America then had sufficient power to force upon the Allies a policy to govern post-war international relations in Europe similar to the power possessed

by Woodrow Wilson prior to the Armistice that ended the last war in 1918.

He was convinced that immediately upon the collapse of Germany this power would pass from America to Soviet Russia, which latter nation would impose the peace terms and the geographical distribution of territory. This would inevitably result in Soviet ascendancy throughout Europe.

He believed that the Department of State should be reorganized into a dynamic peace staff provided with a national post-war policy, and directed to work at once toward a successful accomplishment of that policy, using every power available to us, and before our influence would be destroyed by a collapse of Germany. He thought the Department at that time was completely disorganized and inefficient even in its routine peacetime activities.

During March the problem of existing and prospective shortage of civilian labour for domestic agriculture and industry became critical. The President appointed a special committee, of which I was a member, that spent many hours hearing testimony. Among the chief witnesses were President William Green of the American Federation of Labour and his assistants. His group and other labour organizations definitely were opposed to any legislation designed to control the labour market. They appeared to be actuated more by a desire to maintain control of labour than to assist in our war effort.

Agriculture Secretary Claude Wickard and several officials of the Agriculture Department were heard on March 11. Their ideas of handling manpower, especially as regards farm workers, did not impress me as sufficiently efficient to meet the existing critical condition of food shortage.

The committee was assisted in its work by Isador Lubin of the Bureau of Labour Statistics, who presented excellently prepared estimates of the labour situation and available manpower. He thought the problem could be solved with the use of voluntary labour of the available men and women in the country.

On March 14, Economic Stabilizer Byrnes, Hopkins, Barney Baruch, Judge Samuel Rosenman, and I delivered to the President a report of our investigation. It recommended 11,160,000 men for the military services, the utilization of women in industry, a drastic change in the administration of the War Manpower Commission and in the Department of

Agriculture, and a further effort to obtain labour essential to the war effort by the volunteer system.

The committee agreed that if the war did not end in the near future, a draft of manpower and capital through legislative enactment of a National Service Act was inevitable. The committee believed, however, that the people were not at that time prepared to accept a National Service Act.

The man-power crisis was reflected in the many material shortages that confronted us in the spring of 1943. One shortage was planes. Practically every theatre commander was calling for more aircraft. The President discussed this with Marshall, Arnold, Hopkins, and myself on March 26. He demanded a radical increase in the production of planes which at the time I did not believe could be met, but the planes were produced! Another shortage was ships. We were building "P.T. boats," which became excellent substitutes for destroyers in night action. I had lunch aboard one of these 70-foot craft on March 28 with Lieutenant-Commander John Harlee of Squadron Twelve, which was to be assigned to the Pacific area when all of its boats were completed.

Admiral Sir Percy Noble, who had arrived in Washington in December, 1942, to replace Sir Andrew Cunningham as the Naval Representative on the British Mission, called on April 14 to discuss the possibility of increasing the rate of production of escort vessels that were being used against German submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Barney Baruch was much concerned with the slow delivery of both planes and escort vessels. He talked to me on April 22 about his plans for speeding up the output in both categories, and was particularly interested in the rate of production of long-range aeroplanes. Although my notes at the time did not go into detail, I am certain we were discussing the famous B29s, which were just beginning to come off the assembly lines. Baruch was alert and aggressive as usual and, at the age of seventy-three, in vigorous health.

* * *

I followed a fixed policy of not becoming involved in any domestic partisan politics. However, on April 14 I heard some very interesting political discussions. During the day Constantine Brown, a columnist, related the following story: "Some days ago Alfred Landon and Herbert Hoover asked

Brown to confer with them on America's foreign policy. During the conference they asked for his opinion as to the prospects in the next national election of an anti-Roosevelt attack led by General Douglas MacArthur as candidate for the President and Senator Harry Byrd as candidate for Vice-President." This story was interesting, if it was true that Landon and Hoover were considering a political alliance of MacArthur and Byrd.

That same evening I was a guest of Senator Peter Gerry of Rhode Island, together with Senator Byrd and former Senator Frederick Hale of Maine. The three men were leaders in a growing opposition in Congress to the administration of President Roosevelt. They talked freely about the necessity for a change in our domestic political policy and asked many questions bearing on the war and foreign relations.

They were friends of mine of long standing, and for that reason probably felt no hesitation in expressing their thoughts in my presence.

When possible, I would tell Roosevelt about these and similar conversations I heard from time to time. If there was opportunity, I would tell the President in advance of my acceptance of invitations of this nature to be sure that he had no objection—not from the political angle, but because the conversation might turn to military matters. The President never objected, as he knew I wasn't going to divulge any secrets.

This same week Roosevelt gave a reception for about sixty Senators and Representatives. Short talks on the current war situation were made by Marshall, King, and Arnold. There was no politics involved, as the President really wanted the Congressional leaders to have an off-the-record account of what the Joint Chiefs were trying to do and the difficulties that were being encountered.

* * *

Late in April, 1943, the Budget Bureau was troubled by what it termed a lack of planning and by overlapping activities of civilian agencies in North Africa. The Budget officials thought the War Department Planning Board should consult the civilian departments in Washington and that the military commander should control the top civil official in occupied territory only to the extent required by military operations.

I told them that the general purpose they sought was being achieved through consultation by the Chiefs of Staff with the heads of the civil agencies.

Also during the latter part of April a situation developed in Guadeloupe that held possibilities of a revolution, with race rioting. The authorities there appealed for assistance and, after consulting Secretary of State Hull, the Navy sent Captain Magruder and Rear-Admiral Battet, a follower of General Giraud, to the island in the hopes that Guadeloupe might be induced to abandon Vichy and join the Allied efforts against the Axis powers.

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Rear-Admiral Redman complained (May 4) that Chairman Lawrence Fly of the Federal Communications Commission was interfering with war communications of the military departments. Redman also said that Fly was making public statements that might divulge valuable information to the enemy. There was no love lost between the military and Chairman Fly, who also headed the Board of War Communications, but he was in high favour with the political administration of the Government and remained at his post.

A frequent visitor in the late spring was the Australian Minister of Defence, Dr. Herbert Evatt, who wanted more planes of various types for the Australian Air Force. Evatt specifically asked me to tell the President of the political difficulties being caused by his Government's failure to obtain planes from us. I don't think I gave Dr. Evatt much encouragement. We were not giving away planes for votes, although we were providing Australia with such planes as could be spared from other areas where the demands were greater. He spoke with an Australian accent that made it difficult for me to understand, despite my having been familiar, forty years before, with the colloquial speech of uneducated inhabitants of Australia. When an ensign of one of our supply ships, I had spent a few months in the area of Sydney and Brisbane.

* * *

While Evatt was pressing for "political" planes, the Joint Chiefs had a much more serious Pacific problem to settle—that of command. Marshall, King, Hopkins, and I met with the President on February 13 in one of our frequent sessions

in which the entire military situation was surveyed. The African campaign was taking more of our limited resources than had been anticipated and the use of so much of our power in other theatres was not pleasing to our naval command in the Pacific.

By the middle of March, 1943, there was a conflict in ideas of strategy between Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur. Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles R. Browning, explained (March 17) that the General wished to extend his movement westward along the north coast of New Guinea with full naval support. Halsey, he told me, wanted a parallel naval movement through the South Pacific islands, with his force and MacArthur's army always within mutual supporting distance of each other. MacArthur, one of our ablest commanders, was making excellent use of his limited forces and was calling for reinforcements, including naval support. Halsey had been sent down to help him, but MacArthur wanted the entire command.

King was moving his forces directly across the Pacific. The Army plan was to take New Guinea, reduce the enemy base at Rabaul on nearby New Britain, strike north-west to another island (Morotai, I think), and then hit the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs called a special meeting on Sunday, March 21, to discuss the situation. Besides Browning, there were present Rear-Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Chief of Staff to Admiral Nimitz, and Major-General Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff to MacArthur.

We faced a familiar situation. Both the Army and Navy were operating in the Pacific with what they considered a deficit. The J.C.S. could not find the reinforcements needed to make the Rabaul operation feasible, so MacArthur's plan had to be modified and that Japanese base was neutralized partially by air attacks. It was to be nine months before we could mount an invasion of New Britain.

General T. T. Handy, acting Chief of Staff in Marshall's absence, came to the office on March 23, to discuss the directive the Joint Chiefs were framing to settle the command problem. The Navy was advocating the co-operative plan. Personally, I thought that MacArthur should be given full command and full responsibility for results.

During the week MacArthur's Public Relations Officer, Colonel Lloyd Lehrbas, related to me some of the General's

political difficulties in Australia. Lehrbas said the Australian regulars were excellent, but that the militia was inefficient and undisciplined.

Another special Sunday J.C.S. meeting was needed (March 28) to arrive at a final decision. Admiral King had serious apprehensions that things would not go well if command of the Navy in that area was given to an Army officer at that time. It was decided that MacArthur should have full control of operations on shore in New Guinea and the adjacent islands. Admiral Halsey was to operate along a parallel line in support of MacArthur. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz), was given full command in other Pacific areas, with full responsibility for defeating the Japanese fleet.

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Up to this point, the various aspects of the war at home and abroad with which I was called upon to deal have been covered for the period beginning with January 1, 1943, to the opening on May 12 of the "Trident" Conference in Washington. The only exception is the case of China.

It is generally accepted that the most important accomplishment of the "Trident" meeting was getting our British Allies to agree, on paper at least, to a cross-Channel invasion of France that would bring us face to face with a major part of Hitler's armies. However, I was interested equally in the plight of our far-away Asiatic ally, which had been carrying on an almost single-handed fight against the Japanese barbarians for many years. Hitler had to be defeated, and I was confident, if and when our British friends plunged wholeheartedly into that effort, that Nazism would be destroyed. The military might of Japan also had to be crushed, and I did not believe adequate attention had been given to this part of our global war, which had vital long-range aspects for the security of the United States.

Distress signals had been flying in China for some time. They became plainly visible when Mme. Chiang Kai-shek made a visit to Washington in February, 1943. President Roosevelt gave her the opportunity to present the situation in China to our country on February 19 at one of his news conferences. The White House oval room was nearly filled. Mme. Chiang Kai-shek made a short, impressive talk and then replied with quick wit and assurance to a barrage of questions.

The female reporters present in unusually large numbers appeared to be highly impressed by the appearance and manner of this great lady from China. As I watched them busily taking notes, I speculated that full accounts of Mme. Chiang's appearance and costume probably would occupy much space in our papers for the next few days. The Generalissimo's wife was fashionably attired in a Chinese costume. She appeared older than I had expected, probably due to a recent illness. She called me at noon on Sunday, February 21, to ask me to come to her apartment in the White House that afternoon.

I never was quite certain of the purpose of this interview, as Mme. Chiang talked at length on many subjects. She did point out the necessity for having some American divisions engaged in the Burma campaign, so that troops of other Allied nations might have an example to emulate. She revealed that British authorities in Hong Kong had refused an offer of assistance by Chiang Kai-shek with a statement that they were quite prepared to take care of themselves. She added that when her husband offered to send Chinese troops to Burma, before it was occupied by the Japanese, an almost identical reply was received from the British.

Mme. Chiang has much charm, high intelligence, and unusual energy. She invited me to accompany her back to China when she would return. When I told President Roosevelt about this invitation, he said: "Don't get all swelled up about this, Bill. She also asked *me* to go back with her."

Some days later I heard the following story: President Roosevelt in talking with Mme. Chiang had charged her with being a "vamp," because she had so deeply impressed Wendell Willkie on his recent visit to China as to obtain from him promises to do for China everything she asked.

Mme. Chiang replied with a smile, "Mr. President, that does not qualify me as a 'vamp,' because Mr. Willkie has all of the emotional reactions of an adolescent."

So effective was Mme. Chiang in presenting the case of China to many influential groups, including Congress, during her stay in Washington that rumours sprang up that she might even persuade Roosevelt to change the grand strategy of the war and shift emphasis to the Pacific. Such rumours were baseless, of course, and the Joint Chiefs never considered them seriously.

On the same day that Mme. Chiang met the American reporters, Sir John Dill and General Arnold returned from a visit to China. They reported to the Combined Chiefs that an agreement had been reached with Chiang on the question of supplies and munitions for the Chinese Army, and also on plans to recapture Burma. There the matter rested until April 6, when the Joint Chiefs, with Harry Hopkins, conferred with the President on the possibilities of a campaign in Burma to open a road to China.

After his arrival in Washington, Dill had an interview with Mme. Chiang, as did all the Chiefs of Staff. A story was current that after his conversation, one of his staff officers asked if he obtained anything of interest to the war situation from the Madame. Dill is reported to have replied: "I received a very definite impression that the Chinese are not lacking in 'she' power."

Great Britain apparently did not wish to undertake a campaign against the Japanese in the Burma area, and it was certain that Japan would interrupt our air transportation to China if its forces in Burma were not fully occupied in resisting Allied ground troops.

The President decided we should send twenty shiploads of military supplies from America to India in this month (April), and asked the Joint Chiefs to make a final decision on the Burma Campaign by July 1. We were in full agreement with the President on the need for assisting China. We knew the British would much rather have that material elsewhere. The President did not mention the British specifically, but he was thoroughly familiar with the situation and with the British attitude. President Roosevelt appeared determined to give such assistance as was practicable to keep China in the war against Japan.

The next day the President's Administrative Assistant, Laughlin Currie, who always had useful information on the Chinese problem, stressed to me the necessity for a positive policy in our relations with our Far Eastern ally in order to avoid always being on the defensive in our discussions with Chiang, and to mitigate attacks by the political opposition in America which at that time used our China policy as a basis for criticism of the President.

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Churchill's Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, arrived in Washington about the middle of March and held lengthy discussions with the President and many other high officials, although he did not have much contact with the military. He was an effective spokesman for the British point of view. I heard him make a speech at the National Press Club during his visit. Eden, like other British political officials of high position that I came to know, seemed to have a better understanding of the general political policy of his country than was the case with many of our own leaders. Anthony Eden knew what Britain wanted. There were times when I felt that if I could find anybody except Roosevelt who knew what America wanted, it would be an astonishing discovery.

Sir John Dill had the Joint Chiefs meet Eden at a lunch in his residence, and I was one of the twenty guests at a dinner given by Lord Halifax at the British Embassy on March 5, honouring Eden. On both occasions the British Foreign Minister talked very freely about the present war situation and prospects in Europe. It was Eden's conviction that Germany was having serious difficulties with the production of war materials and a shortage of manpower. There were some Congressional leaders at the Halifax dinner and Eden answered many questions from this group without divulging any very useful information.

* * *

The Joint Chiefs heard an interesting angle on the war with Germany when General Ira Eaker, then commanding American bombers in England, told us that if we could get enough big bombers, his force and the R.A.F. would in the next year so wreck German war production as to make an invasion of Europe not difficult. Eaker did a masterful job in presenting his thesis, pointing out specific targets on the huge maps in the J.C.S. room. My reaction was that such an effort would be highly valuable if the promised results could be attained. So far the German war machine did not appear to have been slowed appreciably by Allied air attacks.

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We received a message from Prime Minister Churchill on April 20 suggesting that he and his full military staff come to Washington for consultation early in May, or that we send to London officers competent to discuss future military plans.

It was decided to hold the meeting in Washington. On Sunday, May 2, the President had the J.C.S. and Hopkins over to the White House to discuss the impending conference, the date of which had been set for May 12.

General Marshall told the group that unless some active steps were taken in northern Burma without delay, our air-ferry service of material to the Chinese Army would be destroyed by Japanese attacks on the landing fields. It was apparent we were going to have a problem in convincing Britain of the need for aggressive action in Burma, and we knew the Chinese had no confidence in British intentions. In Churchill's defence, it should be said that recently there had been many indications of a Japanese attack on India—which might account for the reluctance of the British to engage in the Burma campaign.

It was also evident from our discussion at this White House conference that the situation of Chiang Kai-shek was critical and that there was a possibility of the collapse of his whole Government. If this should happen, it would effect seriously our prospects of success in the war against Japan.

Some of our officers expressed a fear that Great Britain wanted to confine the Allied military effort in Europe to the Mediterranean area in order that England might continue to exercise control thereof, regardless of what the terms of peace might be.

We had called Lieut.-General Joseph W. Stilwell and Major-General C. L. Chennault to Washington for a conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both of them were gaunt, browned by exposure and appeared war-worn after several years of fighting in China. In their separate fields they had been highly successful operating against the Japanese. Also at this J.C.S. meeting held on May 4 was Dr. T. V. Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister. Soong advocated the use of all transportation facilities in the following three months to provide additional air forces in China. General Stilwell asked that the limited transport available be shared by the air and ground forces. He said he had three good Chinese divisions and that a delay in providing them with equipment would make any campaign in Burma impossible until 1944. Disagreement had been developing between Chennault and Stilwell for some time.

Chennault was up in China with the Generalissimo, and

when the going got rough he would drop some bombs on the Japanese and slow them down. He had a lot of courage, was a good airman, but knew little about other types of operations. Stilwell was down in the jungles far away from Chungking. Although tactless and with a tongue too sharp for his own good, he was an excellent fighter and knew what to do on the ground. I wanted this controversy straightened out and everything feasible done to keep China in the war. I knew that was the attitude of President Roosevelt. The problem was not solved at this meeting. Dr. Soong came to my office on May 6 and made a very effective appeal for the exclusive use of transportation facilities in the next three months to support the air forces of China.

Our final conference with the President in preparation for "Trident" came on Sunday, May 8. It was determined that the principal objective of the American Government would be to pin down the British to a cross-Channel invasion of Europe at the earliest practicable date and to make full preparations for such an operation by the spring of 1944. We had heard that the British Chiefs would not agree to such an invasion until Germany had collapsed under pressure from Russia and from the Allied air attack.

I recommended to the President that he grant Chiang Kai-shek's request to use all available air transport in the next three months to send aviation material from India to China, but I had no support from the other Chiefs of Staff. The decision for the moment was to try to send essential equipment to both the air and ground forces. This, in my opinion, it was impossible to accomplish at that time.

* * *

At 6.45 p.m., May 11, the American Chiefs of Staff accompanied President Roosevelt to meet a special train bringing to Washington the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, his Chiefs of Staff, and a large party numbering approximately 100.

The British Chiefs were: General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Staff, Air Ministry. These three and the American Joint Chiefs formed the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence (Churchill) and the closest to being my opposite

in the British Staff, was with the Chiefs of Staff, although technically he was not a member.

Others in the British party included Admiral Sir James Somerville, who commanded the British Eastern Fleet, Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, India and Burma, Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierse, who commanded the British air in India, Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Cherwell, and Lord Leathers, the last-named being Minister of War Transport and British member of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

A summary of the "Trident" Conference follows:

May 12

The Combined Chiefs of Staff conferred with Churchill and Roosevelt in the President's study. The Prime Minister spoke first and addressed us as "the most powerful group of war authorities that could be assembled in any part of the world." He made a convincing argument for a strong effort during 1943 to force Italy out of the war, citing three positive advantages—namely, (1) the psychological effect of a definite break in the Axis conspiracy; (2) the effect of withdrawal of Italian troops from countries in the Near East; and (3) the influence it would have on the future alignment of Turkey.

Churchill made no mention of any British desire to control the Mediterranean regardless of how the war might end, which many persons believed to be a cardinal principle of British national policy of long standing.

As to a cross-Channel invasion in the near future, the Prime Minister said that adequate preparations could not be made for such an effort in the spring of 1944, but that an invasion of Europe must be made at some time in the future. There was no intimation that he favoured the attempt in 1944 unless Germany should collapse as a result of the Russian campaign, assisted by the intensified Allied bombing attacks.

Regarding Japan, the Prime Minister said the British intended to make every practicable effort to keep China in the war, and he made a categorical promise to direct the full military and naval power of the Empire toward a complete defeat of Japan as soon as Germany should surrender. For immediate operations, Churchill recommended for consideration a campaign against Sumatra, which he believed to be lightly garrisoned by Japanese troops.

In a brief talk following the Prime Minister, President Roosevelt advocated the Channel operation at the earliest possible date and not later than 1944. He expressed disagreement with any Italian venture beyond the seizure of Sicily and Sardinia, and reiterated his frequently expressed determination to concentrate our military effort first on destruction of Nazi military power before engaging in any collateral campaigns and before exercising our full effort against Japan.

The President stated that China must be kept in the war and that the air transport line to the Chinese must be placed in full operating condition without any delay. He directed our staff to look into the possibility, from a military point of view, of attacking Germany by way of Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey, and said he would study the political angle of such a move. This had been urged strongly by Churchill.

Both governments were agreed on the advisability of obtaining the consent of Portugal to use the Azores Islands as a base for Allied air and naval forces.

This same day (May 12) Eisenhower telegraphed that all resistance by Axis forces in Tunisia had ended; that General Von Arnheim and 160,000 prisoners had been captured and that much military equipment in serviceable condition had been surrendered. This represented the ultimate success of America's first major military effort.

May 13

I presided over the initial meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Brooke gave a talk on global strategy which indicated that the British would decline to engage in 1943 in any major military undertaking outside the Mediterranean area. This did not meet with the approval of President Roosevelt, who had directed me to press for a British-American invasion of Europe at the earliest possible date.

May 14

The Combined Chiefs met for two hours with Roosevelt and Churchill on the problem of aiding China. Field-Marshal Wavell explained all of his many objections to a Burma campaign and failed to offer any helpful advice. I asked him what the American Chiefs of Staff could do to assist in correcting the very serious difficulties he had reported. We believed this campaign necessary to support the Chinese war effort.

Wavell replied by enumerating a vast supply of war material and the assignment of American troops to his area, both impracticable at that time, which he well knew.

General Stilwell, commanding our forces in China, insisted on the necessity of building up the Chinese ground forces. General Chennault advocated giving our maximum support to the air, which also was the desire of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

The tentative decision at the end of this unsatisfactory discussion was, first, to put forth every effort to improve air transport to China, and second, to find some promising prospect of invading Burma, when and if such an expedition should be started.

Dr. Soong later addressed the Combined Chiefs and renewed his plea for the Burma operation, and insisted upon the necessity for immediate and exclusive shipment of aircraft material. After the meeting, he called at my office to discuss the prospects for favourable action, but I was unable to give him any assurance because of the then unsettled state of the Staff conversations.

May 19

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in closed session, reached a tentative agreement as to the use of available Allied forces in 1943 and 1944. The American Chiefs entertained their British colleagues at dinner at the Statler Hotel.

May 21

Dr. Soong talked to me about Burma and made a categorical statement that Chiang Kai-shek would not engage in a Burma campaign unless Rangoon were attacked.

May 23

The Combined Chiefs met with the President and the Prime Minister again to report progress to date. The grand strategy of the war was to remain fixed on achieving unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in Europe while maintaining pressure on Japan to reduce her military power and to secure positions from which her ultimate surrender could be forced. The following operations for 1943-4 were proposed by the Combined Chiefs:

Europe

1. Cross-Channel invasion from England in May, 1944, with an initial force of twenty-nine divisions.
2. Intensified combined bomber offensive against Germany and Italy.
3. Attack on Italy with army from Africa aimed at eliminating Italy from the war.
4. Destruction of the Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti.
5. Occupation of the Azores as necessary to the anti-submarine defensive effort.

Near East and Africa

Assign available military equipment to Turkey and rearm and equip French forces in North Africa, using captured German material if practicable.

Pacific and Asiatic Theatres

1. Build up the air route from India to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month.
2. Conduct an air campaign against Burma.
3. Seize the Marshall, Caroline, and Solomon Islands.
4. Seize the Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese-occupied New Guinea.
5. Take vigorous naval action against the enemy's lines of communications.
6. Remove the Japanese from the Aleutian Islands.

In the discussion which followed, President Roosevelt said that a chief purpose of this conference was to examine the India-Burma-China theatre, which presented extremely difficult problems. He emphasized that the Allied nations must not be put in the position of being responsible for the collapse of China. Any attitude that support of our Chinese ally was impossible must not be tolerated, because it was certain that something could be done.

Churchill believed that the opening of the Burma Road and the capture of Rangoon and of Bangkok were not feasible in the time available and under existing conditions. He seemed to rest his convictions on the two-year-old study of Field-Marshal Wavell, who had accomplished nothing. Churchill

said Burma should be by-passed for the immediate future.

The Prime Minister then discussed again his plan to place strong air forces on northern Sumatra, from which location attacks could be launched against Malaya, Bangkok, Singapore, the Palembang oil-fields and Japanese shipping in support of Burma.

Roosevelt, who seemed to dominate the conference, finally obtained British approval in principle of his plans, including the 1944 invasion. He also succeeded in getting agreement on a plan that was effective in keeping China in the war against Japan, which he considered so necessary to Allied success.

May 24

The British and American Chiefs of Staff presented their final report to the two Chiefs of State. Churchill refused to accept the limited Mediterranean operations, and spent an hour advocating an invasion of Italy, with possible extension of the project to Yugoslavia and Greece. This had been consistently opposed by the American staff because of a probability that American troops would be used in the Mediterranean area at the expense of direct action against Germany. Such action would, in our opinion, have prolonged the war.

May 25

In the morning the same group met again in the President's study and obtained the approval of Roosevelt and Churchill of the final staff report of the conference. The Prime Minister's contention of the preceding meeting that we must attack in the Mediterranean was not brought up again. The President gave a luncheon for the Prime Minister and our visiting colleagues. The forty-nine guests included the British Ambassador, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and members of Churchill's civil staff. I sat between Lord Halifax and Lord Cherwell. Both the President and Churchill made complimentary remarks about the work accomplished and expressed a hope that future meetings might be held to keep abreast of the changing war situation.

May 26

The Prime Minister and his staff, accompanied by General Marshall, left Washington for England, by way of North Africa.

It was my opinion that the agreements finally reached were more advantageous to the American cause than those originally proposed. This was, of course, based on the assumption that the agreements would be carried out by our allies. Roosevelt later confided to me that he felt a qualified satisfaction with the results. The 1943-4 operations as approved were not in full agreement with his own idea, particularly in regard to Burma and China, but they did promise a cross-Channel operation, which he considered essential to success against the Nazis, and it was the "best I could get at this time."

The twelve days occupied by "Trident" gave me the first opportunity to become acquainted with the British Chiefs of Staff and their advisers. General Sir Hastings Ismay became my favourite, perhaps because his position closely paralleled my own. He was thoroughly informed in detail on both the military and political phases of the problems confronting us and was completely devoted to the interests of his chief (Churchill). Ismay, by his sympathetic understanding of our common war problems, quickly acquired my acceptance of him as a friend whose advice was always available to me.

General Sir Alan Brooke (we soon were calling him "Brooky," despite a somewhat forbidding personality) brought to his job as Chief of the Imperial General Staff a record of great success as a field commander earlier in the war.

In the discussions, Brooke concentrated exclusively on the subject under consideration, presenting always in a favourable light the point of view which, in my opinion, favoured the general strategy advocated by Churchill. As is the case with many high officers of armies, he did not seem to have a full understanding of the value of sea power in overseas operations.

Sir Dudley Pound, whose post as First Sea Lord roughly corresponded to that of our Admiral King, was quiet and reserved. I did not know then that he was in poor health. Pound was an experienced sea officer, but entered the staff discussions only when they involved employment of the British Navy, about which he expressed very positive opinions. Sir Dudley Pound died in October, 1943, and was replaced by Sir Andrew Cunningham, who was taken from the command of Allied naval operations in the Mediterranean.

Sir Charles Portal, Air Chief Marshal, who was the opposite number to our General Arnold, was practically in operative control of all the British air. He had wide experience in the

war and possessed a full understanding of the value of the air arm to both land and sea forces. Portal was very co-operative in arranging detailed war plans to utilize the Royal Air Force—provided it remained under direct control of the Air Ministry.

He insisted that it was not possible to place segments of the R.A.F. under the direct command of local area commanders, which was the American practice. The R.A.F., in my opinion, had become highly efficient in its work with land forces, except for its long-drawn-out chain of command.

It was a pleasure to work with these men. We had arguments and sometimes the discussions were tedious, but the ultimate objectives of destroying Hitlerism and Japanese militarism were never obscured. Brooke, Pound, Portal, and Ismay were ably seconded by their representatives who served in Washington throughout the war and met weekly with our own J.C.S.

Led by our respective Commanders-in-Chief, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, the Combined Chiefs of Staff achieved at this conference a successful demonstration of planning for coalition warfare.

CHAPTER XII

FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE: PREPARATION FOR "OVERLORD"

PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL, in an address to the House of Commons early in June, 1943, said that "the mellow light of victory begins to play over the entire expanse of the World War." It was an accurate statement. In the interval between the close of the Anglo-American War Council in Washington late in May, 1943, and the "Quadrant" Conference in Quebec in August of the same year, the war did go well for the Allied cause.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean area, announced the victorious completion of the North African campaign while the Combined Chiefs were meeting in Washington. Before the sessions in Quebec were concluded, Sicily had been conquered, Mussolini had fallen and Italy was practically out of the war as a belligerent. The Russian summer offensive pushed the Germans back to the Dneiper River. The Japanese were expelled from their foothold on American territory in the Aleutian Islands. The parallel operations of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific proceeded slowly, but with substantial success. Even in China, where victories were few in Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's long struggle, the Japanese sustained a serious defeat in the Yangtze River Valley. In our own country, President Roosevelt's promise that America would become "the Arsenal of Democracy" was being fulfilled.

We had, at the May Conference, obtained an agreement with our British ally for a cross-Channel invasion, and the vast staff work required for that operation was being organized. As the many phases of strategy and tactics were being studied, the question of attacking Hitler through the Iberian Peninsula was given consideration. In fact, the Joint Chiefs, with Harry Hopkins present, even discussed with Roosevelt (June 23) the comparative value of an invasion through Spain instead of across the English Channel.

The idea developed from the problem of providing a defence

against the Axis for Portugal if that country should join the Allies. One angle that appealed to me was that the Iberian route might be less expensive in casualty lists as well as in material. However, the President adhered to his desire for the cross-Channel route at the earliest practicable date. This was the plan General Marshall had been backing almost from the day we entered the war. And it was at Quebec, in August, that the blue-print for "Operation Overlord" (code name for the invasion of Normandy) was drawn.

* * *

The week-end immediately following the departure from Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff (May 26), I made a trip to the University of Wisconsin at Madison, my father's Alma Mater, where, at colourful commencement exercises, I received an honorary degree as Doctor of Laws. This trip gave me a chance to inspect the greatly expanded naval activity in the Chicago area. At this time the total personnel at the Great Lakes Training Station numbered 70,000, and on May 27 I reviewed a parade of about 1,500 sailors, one battalion of which was composed of Negroes.

At the University of Wisconsin there were 1,000 men and 500 "Waves" being trained in a fifteen-week course to be naval radio operators. After the commencement exercises, a very impressive review of the Navy students and Waves was held in the stadium. Following a luncheon given by President and Mrs. Dykstra, there was a short ceremony at the State Capitol, where I formally delivered to the custody of Governor Walter S. Goodland the silver service of the old battleship *Wisconsin* for safe keeping until it would be needed for the new *Wisconsin*, then nearing completion.

The Wave unit that I saw in the training school at Madison was my first contact with this new branch of the United States Navy. I talked with the teachers of the young ladies, and was told that they were as good as anybody, except that occasionally one or two would have a nervous breakdown. The Waves acquitted themselves well in a number of places in the Navy where their particular skills could be used, especially as telegraph operators and code clerks. They were altogether reliable and have since become a permanent part of the Regular Navy. They can be just as trustworthy as the man from Annapolis for the special duties they can discharge.

On May 31 I received another Doctor of Laws Degree from Northland College of Ashland, Wisconsin. This school which was not in existence when I was a high school student at Ashland, had grown into one of the important educational institutions in Northern Wisconsin.

* * *

Upon my return to Washington, the name of Charles de Gaulle, British-sponsored leader of the Free French, appeared more often than almost any other in the dispatches and memoranda flowing across my desk. Early in June there had been formed in Algiers the "Committee of National Liberation," with General Henri Giraud and de Gaulle as co-Chairmen. Past experience indicated that de Gaulle would not long remain "co-chairman" of anything. Disputes arose almost immediately, and by June 11 there was acute disagreement. General de Gaulle had tendered his resignation as a member of this local governing committee. There was, unfortunately, no report of the acceptance of the resignation.

De Gaulle was following exactly the policy he was expected to take in order to elevate himself and his followers to the highest offices. In the opinion of President Roosevelt, he promised to be a definite drag on our war effort until he could be eliminated from the problem. His elimination might prove difficult because of past and prospective future support provided by the British Government.

The President had been very patient, almost indulgent, with the British Prime Minister in the matter of de Gaulle, but by now his patience was almost exhausted. The following is a paraphrase of a strong message sent to the Prime Minister on June 10:

"Murphy [Civilian Affairs Adviser to Eisenhower] has just cabled me that de Gaulle has demanded of Giraud that he be made Commissioner for National Defence, which would be the equivalent of a Minister of War in a national cabinet. Giraud also has told Murphy that de Gaulle wants all French forces not engaged in active operations under his command. This latter demand is contrary to his previously announced intentions.

"Giraud has refused to give up his command, but a compromise proposal seems to favour de Gaulle's proposition.

"Giraud will retire if he is out-voted by the Committee,

and asks Murphy to explain to the British and American Governments and to the French people the injustice caused by de Gaulle's ambition. Giraud has been asked to delay any action until some other members of the Committee [Committee of National Liberation] could be interviewed. Stories harmful to the Allies are being circulated by de Gaulle's friends, who claim that Giraud is letting the Allies run everything at the expense of French interests.

"According to Giraud, de Gaulle is pressing for the removal of Boisson [Governor of French West Africa]. When Giraud told him that President Roosevelt was satisfied with Boisson's co-operation with the United States, de Gaulle is said to have dismissed this argument with contempt."

Roosevelt informed Churchill that he had instructed Eisenhower to deliver a message orally to the two French generals. That message reminded them of the conversations at Casablanca the preceding January and commended "the happy announcement" of the formation of the National Liberation Committee. The President then asked for assurances from the Committee that reports of the pending removal of Governor-General Boisson were unfounded. Eisenhower was warned not to let French West Africa come under the domination of de Gaulle.

The complete text of Roosevelt's instructions to Eisenhower was included in the long cable to Churchill, to whom the President stated: "... possible de Gaulle domination of Dakar cannot be considered. Neither of us know where he will end up. If de Gaulle should attempt to move in on French West Africa, I would be impelled to consider sending naval and ground forces to Dakar. Giraud must have complete control of the French Army. I would be concerned about the safety of British and American lines of supply and the territory behind the British and American lines should control pass to de Gaulle."

The President followed up his cable to Churchill with a strong message to Eisenhower which Hopkins and I prepared. General Eisenhower was directed not to permit de Gaulle or any other agency not under the complete control of the Allied Supreme Commander to command the French Army, and not to tolerate any military or civil direction that might interfere with our military operations. This message, sent on June 17, was a reiteration of Roosevelt's estimate of de Gaulle.

The following is a paraphrase of a portion of this important cable:

"We will not continue arming any French force in which we do not have complete confidence of its co-operation in our military operations. We have no interest in any group or committee that presumes they will govern in France until the French people have the opportunity to choose their government for themselves. French sovereignty will be protected in any civil government plan the Allies may have when we get into France, but you must not forget that the operation in North and West Africa is military, and no independent civil decisions can be allowed without your approval. We want our policy of encouraging local officials to run their own affairs to be extended, but this policy must not be allowed to so endanger our military situation that it might make it necessary to keep more troops in North Africa than now is planned.

"At this time we are not going to allow de Gaulle personally or through his partisans to control the French Army in Africa. You know you are authorized to take any action you think best in behalf of the United States Government."

It was known that Eisenhower was under considerable pressure from British sources, and it was feared he might be inclined to submit to British exhortations. Another message went to Eisenhower on June 19 regarding the importance of maintaining Governor Boisson in Dakar. It was feared by me and by Secretary of State Hull, with whom I had conferred, that Eisenhower might be forced to adopt a dangerous appeasement policy in his relations with the de Gaullists in Africa. There was an unconfirmed report on the British radio on June 21 that Great Britain had lost confidence in the "Free French" leader. If true, this might cause him, for the time being, to modify his extravagant demands.

Eisenhower reported on June 23 that he had accomplished a compromise agreement which he considered satisfactory. It gave Giraud command of the land, air, and sea forces in North and West Africa and gave de Gaulle the same command in other areas occupied by the French. The Committee of National Liberation, composed of the two generals and their Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, was to have full authority over all French forces.

This appeared to me to be a complicated, two-headed arrangement that would inevitably arrive at a hopeless

disagreement. It probably was the best Eisenhower could evolve at the time as well as being a concession to the pro-de Gaulle British. Two days later came the news that Governor Boisson had tendered his resignation.

Secretary Hull telephoned me on July 2 of his apprehensions over the lack of sympathy shown by the French Committee of National Liberation toward the Allies and its leanings toward the political aspirations of de Gaulle. Hull suggested that it might be advisable to suspend delivery of arms to French forces until the situation was clarified. Ray Atherton, head of the State Department's European Affairs Division, had expressed the same opinion to me. I was in agreement with the State Department in this matter, but the Combined Chiefs of Staff, at the May Conference, had approved the arming of French troops, and that decision was adhered to.

I spent most of Sunday morning (July 4) investigating the background of one Pierre Cournarie, whom the State Department described as anti-Ally and de Gaullist. However, that afternoon the President, by telephone from Hyde Park, authorized a qualified approval of Cournarie for appointment to replace Boisson as Governor of West Africa. Churchill's next step was to start his campaign to have the Committee of National Liberation placed in charge of all territory then under French control. The Prime Minister's cable was received on July 8, and the matter was discussed with the President by Secretary Hull and myself. It was decided to tell Churchill that the United States was reluctant to permit the Committee to interfere with the Allied war effort. I began to receive reports by the end of July that de Gaulle and his followers probably would succeed in eliminating Giraud from the Governing Committee.

We had to deal briefly with the island of Martinique, near our own shores. Its Governor, Admiral E. E. Robert, on July 2 suggested a conference and asked for certain assurances from the United States. My personal reaction was to let him stew in his own troubles for a time and to make no promises whatsoever. The President had an idea of assuming a trusteeship over the French islands in the Western Hemisphere until the Government of France could be established and recognized, but this was opposed by the State Department, and it seemed to me that such a move would have been a reversal of our announced policy of maintaining French sovereignty in these

possessions. The matter ended when Henri Hoppenot was accepted by us to replace Admiral Robert.

General Giraud arrived in Washington by plane in the afternoon of July 7. The Joint Chiefs and a number of officers of the American and French armed services met him and escorted him to Blair House. That night, General Marshall was host at dinner for thirty-six at the Mayflower Hotel, the guests being U.S. and French military and naval officers, and Sir John Dill representing the British.

After the dinner, General Giraud, who does not speak English, talked to some of us in a most interesting manner about his experience as a war prisoner and his dramatic escape from the castle of Königstein in April, 1942. He eluded German secret police for a week before reaching unoccupied France. I knew at the time where he was in France, and I suppose the Germans did also, but they never picked him up.

The next day, the French chieftain made an excellent presentation before the Combined Staff of the urgent needs of the French African Army for arms, equipment, clothing, and subsistence. General Marshall and I then escorted him to the White House for lunch with the President. There the discussion was kept away from politics and confined to Giraud's military experiences and prospects.

On the morning of July 9, the President said at our regular daily conference that he was concerned for the safety of our distinguished visitor. At his direction, I informed General Marshall that the Federal Bureau of Investigation could be used in protecting Giraud if he wished to do so. Presumably there were people in the United States who would have welcomed an opportunity to remove Giraud from the scene, and if there were such, our habit of going wherever we pleased, usually undefended, might give them a chance.

The General, together with General Émile-Marie Béthouart of the French Mission in Washington, held a long conference in my office that afternoon. Giraud said certain elements surrounding de Gaulle were using propaganda to disaffect his troops, and that if he could return with an assurance that a convoy with 200,000 tons of equipment and supplies would leave America for North Africa during July, he would be able to neutralize this destructive propaganda.

He believed that an advance with thirty divisions through Italy in the autumn of 1943 would certainly succeed in defeating

Italy and occupying southern France as far west as Marseilles before winter came. I thought thirty divisions to be an insufficient force, but Giraud said our present superiority in the air would make it possible.

At a dinner that night (July 9) in the White House, the President announced that British-American-Canadian troops were at that moment invading Sicily. Our best information indicated the enemy had four to five Italian and two German divisions on the island which we should be able to defeat in a short time if the landing was successful. It was, and Sicily was ours in thirty-eight days.

In a conference on July 12, an *aide* to Giraud, Colonel de Bel, discussed details of supplies to be sent to North Africa. The Combined Chiefs had agreed to give Giraud some assistance. The General was highly pleased, and sent us a note of thanks on the eve of his departure for Africa on July 18.

* * *

Preparations were being made in July for the invasion of Italy. Mussolini's Government was not expected to hold out very long and peace terms were being discussed. At the suggestion of Mr. Myron Taylor, our representative to the Vatican, I sought information from Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn as to the current status of American prospects in Italy. He informed me that a great difficulty in handling the problem was that too many agencies were working on it without exchange of information.

One idea that came from Eisenhower's headquarters was to use a "black radio" false proclamation of an armistice in our projected offensive. Roosevelt rejected the suggestion. It would have been a dishonest kind of warfare, and I agreed with the President in believing it would not be necessary.

It was going to be necessary to bomb military installations in and around Rome, so I drafted messages for the President to send to the Pope, the Prime Minister, and to General Eisenhower regarding the purpose of our invasion of Italian territory. They were sent July 9, and, at the suggestion of Secretary Hull, Roosevelt's letter to the Pope was made public. On July 19 Eisenhower's command reported that 738 Allied planes had bombed the huge freight yards in Rome which were being used for the movement of Axis troops.

The morning of July 26 brought news of the resignation of

Benito Mussolini as Prime Minister of Italy and his replacement by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, a seventy-one-year-old soldier who had long been out of sympathy with the Fascists.

Il Duce had been Italy's absolute ruler for twenty years, and in the early part of his régime he had brought about an improvement of conditions, which previously had verged on anarchy. Mussolini made his fatal mistake by joining Hitler in 1940, when everybody in Europe believed England would be defeated in a few weeks.

It was believed that Mussolini's downfall might very possibly result in Italy's withdrawal from the Axis and mark the real beginning of the defeat of Germany. It also required a quick check on existing Allied strategy in Europe, so the Joint Chiefs met at noon on July 26 and the Combined Staff at 2.30 p.m. It was agreed to direct Eisenhower to plan an expedition against Naples, to be launched at the earliest possible date with the forces then available to him. (Landings were made at Salerno, below Naples, on September 8.)

Most of July 29 was spent preparing for the President drafts of messages for Churchill concerning the Italian situation. In one, Roosevelt insisted that Eisenhower be authorized without delay to issue general armistice terms whenever and if an armistice were requested by the Italian Government.

* * *

In the Asiatic theatre Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell was relieved in June of command of the British Army in India and designated Viceroy of India. Wavell's consistent defeatist attitude at the May conference seemed to have made the necessity for a change in command in India as apparent to everybody as it was to me.

The China command was discussed at several J.C.S. meetings during the summer of 1943 and once or twice with the President. On July 16, a compromise arrangement dividing the command between Stilwell and Chennault was worked out, and some believed it would be satisfactory to Chiang Kai-shek. The problem was not to be solved for more than a year, however, when Stilwell finally was relieved of command in October, 1944.

Dr. Evatt continued to press for additional aeroplanes for Australia, and on one occasion showed me a message purporting to be from Churchill stating that he (Churchill) and Roosevelt

were in agreement as to the necessity of reinforcing the Australian Air Force.

Early in July, after several requests, the Combined Staff heard Colonel Mitkiewicz present his case for sending equipment and transportation for a Polish Army. He said there were 90,000 Polish soldiers outside of enemy-occupied territory and a secret army of 30,000 in Poland. I do not think we were able to do anything for them at that time, although later some Polish troops were equipped and fought well.

* * *

By general agreement, certain areas of diplomatic activity were considered within the British sphere of influence. One was Ireland. David Gray, U.S. Minister to Ireland, proposed to me on June 30 that the United States obtain bases in that country either by agreement or by seizure. I advised Gray that any suggested use of Irish bases by America should be formally presented to Great Britain.

At the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt had accepted the British view that Turkey also was within the British sphere. The President had directed me not to divulge any information about the conference without his specific permission in each instance. Therefore, when (July 19) the State Department asked me for the Casablanca record on Turkey, I had to inform Secretary Hull that it would be necessary to ask the President to authorize delivery to him of extracts bearing on the Turkish situation. Hull naturally was irritated by this policy, because that kind of information certainly should have gone to his department without a necessity for any special request.

On the home front in the summer of 1943, the acrimonious public discussions between Vice-President Henry Wallace and Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones over operations of the Board of Economic Warfare ended on July 16, when the Board was abolished. Its business was entrusted to Leo Crowley of Wisconsin, of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, who organized the Foreign Economic Administration.

This was an example of positive aggressive corrective action by the President against a dissident, highly placed civil officer of his own political party. I thought it worked out very successfully, as Crowley resisted many suggestions to spend our Government's money on projects which from the point of view of legislative authority appeared to be doubtful.

Crowley was, in September, 1943, placed in charge of all U.S. foreign economic relations.

The Army and Navy, in July, clashed with Harold Ickes who, as Petroleum Administrator for War, was charged with balancing the supply of fuel oil between the armed services and civilian needs. Commodore Carter of the Joint Petroleum Board consulted me, and the matter was settled at a conference with Ickes. I thought Ickes' estimate of his duties was correct and the trouble, to be polite, was due to a misunderstanding on the part of the military branch.

* * *

The President headed a White House party that left Washington, July 30, for a fishing vacation at Birchwood Station, on the north shore of Georgian Bay in Ontario, Canada. Space in the President's armoured car was provided for me. We stopped one day at his Hyde Park residence *en route*. There I examined for the first time the Roosevelt Library, a wonderfully arranged museum of the books, papers, models, pictures, and other articles of interest collected by Franklin Roosevelt during his interesting life.

We arrived at Georgian Bay August 1 and found the U.S.S. *Wilmette* prepared with whale-boats and cutters, which took us into McGregor and Whitefish Bays on our fishing expeditions. We lived for a week in the Ten-Car train, which was parked on a siding within a few yards of the landing from which we embarked on the daily fishing trips. Our catches consisted mainly of small-mouth bass, wall-eyed pike, and a pickerel or pike that the guides called "snakes." Roosevelt and I were the winners in the pool for the biggest catch that week-end.

The days brought fresh air, sunburn, and relaxation. The nights often were taken up with handling messages to and from our British allies regarding the Italian campaign, a proposal to make Rome an open city (which military authorities did not favour), and the general war situation. My only complaint with the routine was that on a vacation to rest and relax we should have gone to bed earlier than midnight, which was the usual hour of retiring. The party, which Harry Hopkins joined on August 4, arrived back in Washington early on August 9, and we started again the usual grind of work that afflicted our several offices.

* * *

Four days later we were on our way to the first of two allied war councils held in Quebec during the war. The first one bore the code name of "Quadrant."

The Joint Chiefs met with Roosevelt on August 10 to go over the agenda for Quebec, and the next day the President left for Hyde Park, where he was to have a preliminary talk with Churchill. There had been a suggestion that the Canadian Staff be taken into the projected Combined Staff meeting, but the general attitude of the American and British Chiefs of Staff was that they should not participate.

I left Washington in the rain on an Army plane on August 13, but soon climbed above the clouds and had clear sailing. The other passengers were General Marshall and Brigadier-General J. R. Deane. The weather forced us to land at Montreal, from where we motored to Quebec. The weather there was cold and bleak and would have made any landing by a plane extremely difficult. That night Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada gave a reception at the Château Frontenac, the first of many pleasant dinners and parties given during our ten-day stay in Quebec.

August 14

The U.S. Chiefs met at 9.30 a.m., and one hour later the Combined Chiefs convened, with General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial Staff, presiding. A difference of opinion was apparent from the outset as to the value of the Italian campaign toward our common war effort against Germany. General Marshall was very positive in his attitude against a Mediterranean commitment. Admiral King was determined not to have a single additional warship so badly needed in the Pacific operations diverted to any extra operations in that area so favoured by our British allies. British insistence on expanding the Italian operations provoked King to very undiplomatic language, to use a mild term. We also received news on this date that Rome had been declared an open city.

August 16

Staff meetings were held with further discussions on the Italian campaign and on planning for the invasion of Normandy. Reliable information was received from Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Spain, that the Badoglio Government was prepared to make an unconditional surrender and

wished to join the Allies in driving the Germans from Italy.

August 17

President Roosevelt's train arrived about 6 p.m., bringing with him Prime Minister Churchill. They were met by a distinguished delegation headed by the Earl of Athlone, Governor-General of Canada, and Prime Minister King. The party went directly to the Citadel, where I was presented to Her Royal Highness Princess Alice, the Countess of Athlone. She bears a resemblance to the present King of England and has a pleasing and gracious manner, as have all of the Royal Family that I have met.

The room assigned to me at the Citadel was near the suite occupied by the President. While far less comfortable than the Château Frontenac, its location near the President was helpful in relation to the conference work. That evening the Earl of Athlone and Princess Alice gave a dinner honouring the President. My place was between Mrs. Churchill and Lord Moran. Mrs. Churchill was particularly attractive and alert. I noticed that the ladies curtsied to the Earl of Athlone, a courtesy I thought was reserved for royalty.

August 18

The staff work progressed steadily in the morning and afternoon sessions, although with some controversies. However, the differences between our Staff and our British opposites were amicably discussed. One of the most pleasing reports received by the Combined Chiefs concerned the progress of the war against German submarines in the Atlantic. This had improved gradually, and by now we had this Nazi menace pretty well under control. One of the tricks that turned the tide was the little aircraft-carrier that had been developed and that worked closely with destroyers. This and other anti-submarine measures became so effective that Hitler's once-devastating underwater arm became a relatively negligible factor until later in the war, when a new type of German submarine had been developed.

That afternoon the Combined Staff visited the battleground on the Plains of Abraham, where in 1759 both General Wolfe of the British attacking force and General Montcalm of the defenders were killed in action.

An interesting incident occurred during our visit to the battlefield in the arrival of a native priest who was thoroughly informed as to the details of the battle. Our guide had a patter suitable for the entertainment of tourists, but he knew little about the battle manoeuvres and movements. The priest explained to us all the troop movements and the progress of the action from its beginning to its end. He insisted that Montcalm was the better general and that his French army was more efficient until a part of it was ordered away by the Governor-General.

The priest's story ended with: "So by an accident the French General Montcalm with his defenders of Canada lost the battle, which accident made me a British subject, but my heart is still with France."

That night Prime Minister King gave a dinner at the Citadel in honour of President Roosevelt.

August 19

Progress of the military talks to date was reported at the first meeting of the Combined Staff with the President and the Prime Minister. Churchill strongly advocated the establishment of a base for Allied air operation from the north end of Sumatra instead of going ahead with the invasion of Burma. The Prime Minister had first advanced the Sumatra plan at the previous conference in Washington in May. It met with a cool reception from the President, who was determined to assist China by launching a combined British-American-Chinese attack in Burma, and the Joint Chiefs supported the President's contention. The Sumatra campaign was dropped.

Appointment of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander for the South-east Asia theatre was approved. Mountbatten replaced Field-Marshal Wavell, who had been relieved earlier. General Joseph W. Stilwell was named Deputy Supreme Commander in charge of the Chinese troops in Burma and of American ground and air forces in South-east Asia. Stilwell was wearing several hats by now. Since his forces were practically all Chinese, he was subject to orders from Chiang Kai-shek. Now he was also to be under Mountbatten as far as Burma operations were concerned.

I formed a very high opinion of the energy, ability, and forcefulness of Admiral Mountbatten. Later, when we were

walking together in Quebec, I asked if he thought his royal rank would assist him in correcting the military inefficiency then existing in South-east Asia. He made a modest reply: "I do not know, but I will do my best." His "best" turned out to be very good. It finally destroyed the Japanese army in Burma. Mountbatten's appointment was announced to the public on August 26.

August 21

The Combined Staff throughout the day wrestled with the problem of a Burma Campaign for 1943-4, but efforts to reach an agreement with our British colleagues were futile.

Secretary of State Hull arrived at Quebec, presumably to discuss political questions with Churchill and Foreign Minister Eden. I did not attend the political sessions.

August 22

Our Canadian hosts provided us with an interesting and restful non-stop cruise on the St. Lawrence. The weather was ideal and the entire Staff enjoyed a real Sunday of rest.

August 23

The Combined Chiefs, finally, after many compromises between the British and American points of view, brought the discussions at Quebec to a satisfactory conclusion. Discussion of the Burma problem had consumed more time than any other, but the most important work done at "Quadrant" was to prepare blue-prints for the invasion of Normandy. The President and the Prime Minister ratified the plan to make a cross-Channel invasion from England in May, 1944. It was to be the principal British-United States ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe.

Called "Operation Overlord," the blue-print specified that our forces should first secure adequate landing ports in Normandy, followed by occupation of areas in France from which to launch attacks against the occupying Axis military forces in order to destroy them or drive them back into Germany.

A balanced British and American ground force and air force, together with the landing equipment and a covering naval contingent, was to be built up in England as quickly as possible and was to be ready to launch the combined land, air, and naval attack at any favourable time, but not later

than May, 1944. It was agreed that if shortages of material or other resources needed for both "Overlord" and the Mediterranean operations should develop, available material would be used with the object of insuring the success of "Overlord." General Sir Frederick Morgan of the British Army was selected and authorized to proceed with detailed planning and full preparation for the cross-Channel attack. The Mediterranean campaign was to be continued with forces that were available without adversely affecting "Overlord."

The question of overall command came up during discussions. In view of our overwhelming superiority in numbers, most of us had assumed that the Supreme Commander would be an American. There were reports that Churchill had promised this choice assignment to his own Staff Chief, Sir Alan Brooke, although Brooke never told any of us about it. He undoubtedly would have been a good commander. I would have had no personal objection to Brooke, but if he or any other Englishman had been named to the post, there would have been a storm of criticism in our country, because once "Overlord" was under way and beach-heads were secured, the superiority in numbers of American to British in action would be built up rapidly.

As for the war with Japan, it was accepted that we should apply the maximum attrition to enemy Navy, air and shipping in all possible areas pending the defeat of Germany, at which time the vast military resources of all our Allies would become available to crush Tokyo. Specifically, a vigorous attack during 1943-4 on Japanese forces in Burma was approved by the President and the Prime Minister. It was also agreed to expand rapidly the air and land forces in China and to increase deliveries of material to the Chinese Government by enlarging the air-lift operation from India over the "Hump" to China.

Employment of artificial harbours and floating airfields to provide access to China was considered, and the Staff was instructed to make a study of their practicability. One amusing incident during the discussion of this idea was a proposal for an artificial floating landing field made of ice, called the "Habbakuk," which was the product of the imagination of some British inventor.

We had a small model brought into a Combined Staff meeting in Quebec, where it was subjected to "attack" by pistol fire. Some of our advisers were waiting outside the

conference room when the pistol firing started. According to the story, they shook their heads gravely and said, "At last, the arguments have degenerated to a point where the Combined Staff Members are shooting each other."

We held a final meeting on August 24, at which Dr. T. V. Soong presented some informative aspects of the difficult, if not critical, Chinese situation. At noon Churchill and Roosevelt met with newsmen to discuss the results of the conference. The Prime Minister was in his usual excellent form and launched into quite a speech. The President leaned over to me and said half in jest and half in admiration, "He always orates, doesn't he, Bill?"

A stop-over was made at Ottawa, on our return, where the President received an ovation from a crowd gathered in an open space in front of the Parliament Building. Roosevelt made part of his address in French, which was enthusiastically received by the French-speaking inhabitants. After a pleasant drive into the country to Mr. Mackenzie King's estate and tea at his city residence, the American party boarded our special train for Washington. I felt that the ten days at Quebec had been very useful and that the military decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were definitely advantageous to the United States.

CHAPTER XIII

THE AXIS BREAK-UP BEGINS

A DISPATCH REACHED WASHINGTON on the first day of September, 1943, informing us that accredited representatives of the new Government of Italy headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio had agreed to accept the surrender terms proposed by the Allied Nations. That same day Prime Minister Churchill arrived in Washington to discuss with President Roosevelt the Italian situation as well as other matters pertaining to the conduct of the war. The British Government had telegraphed Moscow a request for authority to sign the short terms of the Italian surrender. No reply had been received, and the British did not think that any further steps could be taken until the Soviet Government had been heard from. At the direction of the President, I conferred (September 2) with Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and an able diplomat. Personally, I saw no reason for having made such a request to the Soviets, because they already had authorized General Eisenhower to sign for them on the comprehensive surrender terms, but a Soviet signature seemed important to others.

The claims of the small nations of Europe were to present many difficulties as the various stages of peace negotiations were reached. The first indication of our troubles came on September 6, when I discussed with Roosevelt a communication from the Greek Government asking for representation in any armistice discussion with Italy. The Greeks also asked for the return of any originally Greek territory then occupied by the Axis powers, including a part of Albania. The President referred the matter to Secretary of State Hull. The Greeks had not only lost some territory to the Germans, but a number of their merchant ships had been sunk. It was certain that all of the occupied small nations would want payment of some kind for their suffering during the period of occupation.

Admiral Sakellariou, who was in Washington on Lend-Lease business for the Greek Government, came in a few days later and told me that it was essential to have American troops landed in Greece because of the general distrust of British

intentions and of Greek confidence in our integrity. Sakellariou was fearful that, after peace was made in Europe, the Soviets would obtain control of his country. He stated that all active guerrilla resistance in Greece to the Axis at that time was being financed by Russia.

On the morning of September 8, General Eisenhower notified us that the Italian Government was unable to carry through its agreement to surrender previously made by its accredited representatives. General Eisenhower said he was going ahead with his planned invasion in force and would announce publicly the terms of surrender previously signed by him and the Badoglio representatives. It seemed that German pressure was being applied to members of the Italian Government after news of the negotiations had apparently leaked out. It seemed to me that consultations with other members of the United Nations and with the French Commission in Africa had made it impossible to conceal such news from the German authorities.

However, before the day was over, the matter was straightened out and Eisenhower made a public announcement of Italy's surrender. Marshal Badoglio, the Italian Prime Minister, directed all Italian forces to cease military operations against Allied troops, stating that this order did not apply to any hostile action by any others than the United Nations.

This action definitely removed Italy from the Axis powers, leaving only German troops for us to drive out of that country. It was the beginning of the break-up of the powerful tripartite alliance of Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito. One of the main objectives set out at the May conference in Washington had been achieved. It did not mean that the end of the Axis was near, for the heaviest fighting of the war was still ahead of us. As a matter of fact, this same day, September 8, 1943, American troops landed south of Naples and immediately encountered stiff German resistance. This was an indication of the stubborn opposition the German Army was to offer throughout the Italian campaign.

The Italian situation was canvassed in detail at two meetings of the Combined Staff with Churchill and Roosevelt at the White House, the first on September 9. The Prime Minister outlined his understanding of the military situation in Italy and his ideas about our future action in that area. His desires, with which the President expressed general approval, were

to confine the German forces to northern Italy, to utilize the Italian airfields for an augmented bombing campaign against eastern Germany, and to attract German forces away from the western front in order to facilitate a cross-Channel attack in the spring.

Churchill hoped we could utilize some of the surrendered Italian warships and divert a considerable number of British warships from the Mediterranean to the Pacific Ocean.

At a second meeting (September 11) the extent of the resistance to our landing at Naples had raised immediately the necessity of rapid reinforcement of the Allied army in Italy. General Marshall expressed confidence in the ability of our forces in the Naples area to hold out until reinforcements arrived. The situation in Naples at that moment was critical, and Marshall was counting on our overwhelming air superiority to check the Germans. We also discussed the best use that could be made of the Italian merchant ships and warships which had been acquired through the surrender of Italy.

Eisenhower appealed to Washington on September 19 for authority to give some recognition to the Badoglio Government in order to obtain its active assistance in the war against Germany. He said this was absolutely necessary from a military point of view. His request was relayed to Roosevelt and Churchill and to the State Department. Churchill recommended that Italy be accepted as a co-belligerent and that it be given the right, when the war should be completed, to choose by constitutional means a democratic form of government. Churchill also asked the President to direct Eisenhower to put the fullest pressure on the King of Italy to declare war against Germany. Roosevelt accepted these suggestions, and on September 23 we sent Eisenhower a message to accept the Italian Government as a co-belligerent, provided it made a formal declaration of war. Within a week we had a letter from the King of Italy, addressed to the President, on this same subject, and I prepared for the President's signature a reply which emphasized the same points that had been included in the instructions to Eisenhower.

Edward Wilson, American Ambassador to Panama, who had been designated as the American Member of an Allied Political-Military Committee in the Mediterranean area, came in on October 1, 1943, to get background on the situation

in Africa and Italy. That same day we received the welcome news that Naples had been captured.

In the midst of the developing military operations in Italy there suddenly came from London on October 7 a request from the Prime Minister that forces and equipment assigned for use in Italy be diverted to reinforce the British Army in the eastern Mediterranean in an attempt to capture the island of Rhodes. General Maitland Wilson of the British Army, with inadequate forces, had tried to take some of the islands in the Ægean Sea and had been defeated on the island of Kos. The British naturally were prepared to delay success elsewhere in order to attain full control of the Mediterranean.

As soon as Churchill's cable was received, I held a conference in my office with King and Marshall. The President approved the reply we drafted, in which we refused to agree to any withdrawal of forces from Eisenhower's command on the ground that it would adversely affect the safety of our troops in Italy. Churchill came back the next day with an answering cable in which he expressed great concern over developments in the eastern Mediterranean, and renewed his request for a diversion of forces from our effort in Italy. Churchill was to cling to the idea of recapturing Rhodes with traditional British bulldog tenacity and we were to hear many speeches about it in conferences yet to come.

After long, tedious negotiations, the Italian Government on October 13, 1943, formally declared war against Germany. This action was accepted by the Allies as making Italy a co-belligerent with us, without any promises of political or territorial advantages.

By the end of October the question of what should be done with the surrendered Italian ships became troublesome, principally because of Soviet insistence that its share of the surrendered tonnage be delivered without further delay. The Soviet proposal did not meet with favour at the White House, and on October 30 we sent the following message to Stalin and Churchill (paraphrased):

“Naval and merchant ships of Italy now available to the Allies should be used wherever they can best serve the Allied cause at the moment, without reference to any transfer of titles. The matter of permanent ownership of ships and other material received from Italy by surrender can be adjusted at some later date. This delay will in no way prejudice the

interests of any of the Allied nations and will not adversely affect the present and prospective assistance from Italy in the war against Germany.”

This sound decision was finally accepted after considerable objection and many counter-proposals by the Soviet Government. I recall that some time later the British and United States did lend the Russians a few warships as a sort of security for their share of the Italian Navy.

The Italian question was by no means the only business occupying the President's Chief of Staff during the interval between the Quebec and the Teheran Conferences. The following is a brief summary condensed from my notes. In each account of a discussion, request, or proposal noted in the following paragraphs, it should be remembered that I would take these up with the President at my next daily conference. This was one of the important ways in which President Roosevelt and, later, President Truman were kept constantly informed of various aspects of the war.

September 6

Brigadier-General Hurley talked at length about conditions in Palestine, which he thought promised serious political complications in post-war days. Hurley also said that Iran (Persia) was ready to declare war on the Axis powers, and that support should be provided to insure such declaration at an early date.

September 8

General Béthouart of the French Mission in Washington presented his views as to the necessity for French representation on any Allied Committee charged with arranging the peace terms with Italy.

September 14

Commodore Carter, U.S. Naval Reserve, reported that difficulty was being encountered in arranging with the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey to permit the United States Government to acquire control of Saudi Arabian oil-fields. The Joint Chiefs were anxious that everything possible be done to give the U.S. access to the Saudi Arabian oil. During the summer I had delivered oral information to Secretary Hull of the President's instructions that negotiations be conducted through the American Minister to Saudi Arabia, assisted by

an oil expert who was not associated with any commercial oil company. The experience of the present war to date and the studies of the Joint Chiefs had indicated that in the unhappy event of another war in Europe possession or access to these Near-Eastern oil supplies were practically essential to any successful campaign by the Americans.

September 17

Discussed at length with Hopkins the matter of representation on a political mission scheduled to meet in Moscow early in October. Hopkins was preparing to talk by telephone with the President, who was at Hyde Park. Despite my admiration for Sumner Welles and my high regard for his ability as a statesman, it was no secret to either the Russians or the British that Welles did not have the confidence of Secretary of State Hull. Therefore, I asked Hopkins to tell the President that we did not think it would be wise to name Welles to the Mission. We then turned to discussing other possibilities.

Ambassador William H. Standley had resigned as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and Averell Harriman was slated to succeed him. It seemed to me that the best policy would be to announce his appointment and send him to the conference as the American member of the Mission, which became known as the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

September 18

The essential necessity for closer co-ordination of military and civilian economy in war production was discussed at a conference in my office with Economic Stabilizer J. F. Byrnes, General Marshall, and Admiral King. It was agreed to appoint a Joint Production Survey Committee to work closely with Byrnes' office and to keep the Chiefs of Staff advised on production problems, especially as they were affected by the changing military situation.

September 19

Brigadier-General Fellers, who had been in Egypt during 1941 and 1942, and then was assigned to Australia, gave me as his opinion that failure of the British Army to destroy Rommel's African Corps in the early campaigns was due to inefficient British leadership.

Harold Callender of the *New York Times* asked me to express

my opinion about de Gaulle. He was leaving for North Africa within a week. With a straight face, I told him merely that I had never met the gentleman and had been out of contact with France for so long a time that I could not give him any useful information. When he left I wondered if my office staff knew what he wanted, and if they did, how the correspondent ever got past my Marine orderly!

September 23

Hopkins told me that Hull wanted to go to Moscow himself. The forthcoming political mission to Russia was a matter of high interest to all of us involved in war strategy. I felt that if practicable our representative should have a status equal to that of the Secretary of State who, it was thought, was physically unable to make the trip to the Soviet capital.

America's position at this conference might be very difficult because of our reputation for reliability and our previous announcement that the sovereignty of small nations should be re-established after the war's end.

It was inconceivable to me that Stalin would submit to the re-establishment of effective sovereignty in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. It also appeared probable that the Soviet Government, with its superior military power and its possibility of making a separate compromise peace with Germany, could force acceptance of Soviet desires in this matter upon America and Great Britain.

Hopkins told me also that the President was considering detaching Admiral King from his duties as Chief of Naval Operations, but leaving him as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. This was a great surprise to me, because King had the President's approval to hold both jobs. When I was Chief of Naval Operations in 1937-9, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet was a separate position. It was my opinion then, and still is, that the responsibility for operation of our naval forces as contrasted with the administration of the naval establishment is a full-time position in itself. However, King, with his extraordinary energy and ability, had managed to combine the two with great success.

September 26

Sumner Welles was replaced as Under-Secretary of State by E. R. Stettinius of the Lend-Lease Administration. This

deprived the State Department of an able diplomat, but undoubtedly would remedy what had been a most unsatisfactory condition caused by the differences between Hull and Welles.

September 27

Averell Harriman outlined to me the policies he proposed to follow as Ambassador to Russia. He asked particularly that I keep him informed in regard to military plans and projects that would be of interest to the Soviet Government, so that he might acquire the credit for giving such information before the Moscow Government should get it from other sources. I thought he should have this information. There probably was some information going directly to the Attachés at the Embassy without the Ambassador knowing anything about it. Harriman is an attractive person and we became very good friends.

The Polish Military Attaché, Colonel Mitkiewicz, wanted to know what the Combined Chiefs of Staff policy would be regarding the use of the Polish Secret Army, which he said now numbered 200,000. This was a considerable increase over estimates previously given by our Polish friends. Poland, located between Russia and Germany and wanted by both, was in an apparently hopeless position. I advised Colonel Mitkiewicz to present his requests to the Combined Chiefs in a formal written communication.

Laurence A. Steinhardt, American Ambassador to Turkey, asked if we had anything to do in Turkey with which he could be of assistance. He had previously served three years as Ambassador to Russia. He was convinced that the Russians would continue in the war against Germany until that country was actually invaded by the Russian Army. This was in sharp disagreement with the opinion of some newspapermen, who thought the Soviets would make a separate peace.

October 4

Hurley again discussed the political and military situation in Iran, where, on a recent visit, he found a sharp clash of interest between the British and the Russians. Hurley feared that the Soviet Government would obtain a corridor to the Persian Gulf, in spite of British opposition, possibly before the end of the war with Germany. Hurley expressed a continuing

interest in the Palestine problem, and stated on this occasion that it would be impossible to deliver Palestine to the Jews except by continued use of overwhelming military force against the Arabs.

October 5

In conference most of the morning with the President and the Secretary of State in regard to the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. in Moscow. Our discussions centred on what could be done toward arrangement of a more or less stable international agreement after the Axis powers were defeated. The President was interested in a plan to break up Germany into separate states. He also insisted upon the inclusion of China in any post-war international agreement. I expected very little of value to Allied military prospects would result from the conference. I thought Russia would not make any serious commitments and that she would refrain from announcing Soviet intentions until after the collapse of Germany.

Brigadier-General John R. Deane, the efficient Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been assigned as American Military Adviser to the Conference. He was promoted to Major-General and was to remain in Russia as Chief of the American Military Mission.

October 7

I was reliably informed that Admiral Standley had told the State Department that it was his conviction that Russia would remain at war with Germany at least until the following spring, at which time, if there had not been started by the British and Americans an effective second front in Europe, the whole problem would be reconsidered by Stalin.

October 10

At a dinner honouring General Sir Frederick Morgan, British Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces in England, Lieutenant-General Carl Spaatz, Commander of the American air arm in Italy, and Major-General W. B. Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, gave interesting talks on the Italian Campaign.

With the exception of General Arnold, Spaatz impressed me as having the best grasp of the correct use of the air arm of any American air officer I had met.

October 12

A report came from Lisbon, from a source considered reasonably reliable, that some high-ranking German generals were planning a revolution in Germany with the purpose of eliminating the Nazi Government and surrendering to the Allies.

If there was any truth in this, it would mean that some of the German military officials had become convinced that they would lose the war and were trying to save Germany from destruction through revolution and Soviet penetration. A peace with Germany would have freed us to destroy Japan—a task essential to America's safety in the future.

General Hurley came in again to say he was leaving in a day or two for Iran, China, India, and possibly Russia, on another special mission for the President. Hurley had been very frank with our British Allies, who did not like him very much—and that is a definite understatement!

October 18

Ray Atherton of the State Department wanted advice on a British Government proposal that the French Committee of Liberation be authorized to issue francs for the use of Allied troops when and if they invaded continental France. The use of the American dollar was to be stopped. I told Atherton that personally I would not under any conditions recommend giving to the French Committee authority to issue money to be used by our occupying troops.

October 20

A. A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, discussed with me the desirability of assigning an American military mission to Iran to support the efforts of our Minister at Teheran. Berle seemed to have a thoroughly American point of view in regard to Iran.

Henri Hoppenot of the French Liberation Committee discussed the desirability of using French troops in any Allied effort to eject the Japanese from Indo-China. His request reminded me that I had warned Marshal Pétain at the time when Japan was first given permission to enter Indo-China that his action meant the permanent loss to France of this colonial possession.

October 27, 1943: Navy Day

I made two addresses at Richmond, Virginia, and enjoyed a pleasing visit with Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Weddell. He was American Ambassador to Spain during most of the time I was at Vichy. The Weddells lived in "Virginia House," a most attractive residence constructed of material from houses built in the twelfth and sixteenth centuries. This material was brought in a sailing ship from England in 1925 and the house was reconstructed in Richmond with as much accuracy as is consistent with modern demands for comfort. The citizens of Richmond, who are all polite, made complimentary remarks about my talks.

The several communiqués and declarations of the Conference of Foreign Ministers which had just ended at Moscow were made public. In the main, the Allied solidarity expressed in the famous United Nations Agreement signed by twenty-seven countries in Washington on January 1, 1942, was reaffirmed and a ground-work was laid for what eventually became the United Nations.

I had telegraphed Secretary Hull in Moscow on October 18 that President Roosevelt, in agreement with the British Prime Minister, would like him to secure Stalin's approval of a joint statement concerning the punishment of war criminals. This statement, signed by the Chiefs of State of Russia, Britain, and the United States, was included in the declarations made public on November 1, 1943.

The atrocities statement was a warning that any Nazi officials or German officers and men who had any connection with the executions and other barbarisms committed in countries overrun by the German forces would be taken back to those countries and tried and punished under the laws of the nation in which the crimes had occurred. With this I was in full agreement. Later, when the Allied Nations took up the question of trials of German officials not based on established judicial procedure, I was to find myself in sympathy with Churchill's objections, made first at Teheran, that such trials would be in effect *ex post facto* criminal proceedings.

November 3

George F. Kennen, Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon, brought me up-to-date on the status of our negotiations with Portugal for the use of airfield facilities in the Azores, which were

essential to the trans-Atlantic air support of our forces in Europe. Agreement eventually, after long negotiations, was made with Portugal for the use of the Azores.

General William J. Donovan, Head of the Office of Strategic Services, discussed his proposed inspection visit to Australia, India, and China. He planned to return by way of Europe and Africa in about two months. Donovan presented me with a captured German Mann pistol evidently designed for the use of assassins, which I added to my collection of small firearms.

November 4

Churchill had for some time been discussing with Roosevelt the question of utilizing the military facilities of Turkey. On this date the President informed him that he would join in demanding the use of Turkish air bases and in asking Turkey to enter the war by the end of the year. However, Roosevelt insisted that no British or American resources needed for the cross-Channel operation would be diverted to the eastern Mediterranean.

The Joint Chiefs had made a study of the possibility of Turkey as an ally. If Turkey had entered the war with us at that time, it would have been a burden to us. The facilities for getting material to the Turks were limited at best. The route was long and it would not have been easy for us to give any really valuable assistance.

The Turks were expecting assistance from England. There was a British Army in Egypt; there was a British Fleet in the Mediterranean. Britain could have aided Turkey, but the reaction of the Turks to any promises made by Britain is a part of the story of the discussions at Cairo, which were to take place in December.

Jean Monnet of the French Committee of Liberation discussed with me at length the problem of reconstructing France after the Germans were expelled. What he wanted principally was money, and he talked vaguely about a large loan to France, to be repaid in fifty years, with nominal interest. He was a brilliant advocate and spent an hour with me pleading his case.

November 9

I sat through a formal ceremony in the East Room of the White House at which forty-four associated nations signed an

agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The forty-four signatories were seated about a long table, each place being marked by the colours of its country mounted on a staff. The President's short address was broadcast and the colourful ceremony was recorded by a great number of photographers.

* * *

While Hitler's weakest major partner, Italy, was in the process of being eliminated from the war, staff work progressed steadily in Washington and London on "Operation Overlord." It had been decided at Quebec that the Supreme Commander would be an American. The question of who that American would be was a subject of much speculation in the Press and in official circles. On September 22 there was much newspaper comment on an alleged plan to give General Marshall command of American-British naval and military forces in all parts of the world.

One point apparently not noted by the public was that the assignment of so much authority to an American officer also involved assumption by America of full responsibility for the outcome of the Allied global war effort. It occurred to me that this might be entirely acceptable to our British ally.

General Sir Frederick Morgan, who carried the major burden of the planning for "Overlord" in England, was in Washington during October. We had a long talk on October 13 about the prospective western front, and I found him completely in agreement with me that the cross-Channel operation demanded a supreme commander of all Anglo-American forces in Europe. Morgan realized that he was not going to be that commander.

The British Government (October 30) made an urgent request that Roosevelt name the Supreme Commander. London said that preparations for the invasion were sufficiently advanced to require the presence of the overall commanding officer.

The President replied that he was unable to make General Marshall available at that time, and he suggested that Churchill appoint a deputy commander, possibly Field-Marshal Dill or Marshal Portal or General Brooke, any one of whom would have been satisfactory. Marshall and I, working together,

prepared the draft for this important reply to the British Prime Minister which read in part (paraphrased):

“To announce now that General Marshall will go to England to take command would give definite notice to the Germans of our plans. As to Marshall’s replacement in Washington, I have reached no final decision. Regarding Eisenhower, he may be given command of the U.S. Army group in ‘Overlord’ and not brought back to Washington at all. This command problem has many complications over here, political and otherwise. We feel, after giving much thought to your request, that many reasons, particularly those of security, make it unwise for you and me to make an official announcement at this time. Perhaps some key figures might have the situation explained informally, which would be quite different from a joint statement. I think the only practical step that can be taken now is to name a deputy to take charge in England. I know you consider this unsatisfactory, but we can discuss this better when we meet personally. I think any further action should be delayed until then.”

(The President was referring to the plans then in progress for a meeting of Churchill and himself with Stalin, and of a conference with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo.)

George Marshall possessed self-discipline to a remarkable degree. Never once while we were working on this cable, in our personal conversations, or in the many discussions in the Joint Chiefs of Staff about supreme command did he utter one word that would indicate his own desires. I believe Roosevelt wanted to give him the job. From a professional soldier’s viewpoint, it would have been considered a fitting reward for the thankless, back-breaking task of moulding a citizens’ army into a splendid fighting force that had consumed all of Marshall’s energies for three years.

The public assumed that Roosevelt would name Marshall as Supreme Commander. There was vehement objection to such a move in the Press. Opponents charged that Marshall was being given a “Dutch promotion”; that Roosevelt planned to take him out of a big job and put him in a small job; that it was a plot against Marshall. At the other extreme, there were reports that the Joint Chiefs considered the post of Supreme Command a promotion and were jealous of Marshall. That was not true. We were faced with a dilemma. None of us, least of all myself, wanted to deny to Marshall what all of us

felt was the thing he wanted most—to lead the victorious armies in the crushing blow which he himself had largely planned against the enemy. On the other hand, he was a tower of strength to Roosevelt and to the High Command, as embodied in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which up to now had planned the war with success, but which still faced many difficult problems.

I did discuss this angle with the President. It was my thought that if Marshall was taken out of his job as Chief of Staff that his successor should succeed to the command of the Army. I felt that if Marshall went over to Europe in Command of "Overlord," there should be an Army officer on the Joint Chiefs performing the same duties that Marshall had carried out as a member of the Joint Chiefs. The Army command was set up that way. The Army Chief of Staff was the Commander of the Army and directly in charge of its operations. The Joint Chiefs, as a body, had delegated to Marshall the responsibility for handling his branch of the service which, from the point of numbers and material needed, was by far the largest.

Roosevelt did not talk about the problem very much. I had a feeling that in the cable to Churchill he was stalling for time. I definitely had the impression that he was being influenced more by the adverse public reaction than by anything that took place within the military groups. Marshall and I both felt that Roosevelt's reply to Churchill was the best answer the President could make at that time. In subsequent discussions within the Chiefs of Staff, we even went so far as to be prepared, if necessary, to agree to the command of "Overlord" going to a British general. I did not favour such a move, but if it should have become expedient to follow that course, I thought Sir John Dill would have been the best man for the job. Dill and Marshall had worked as close as the proverbial peas in a pod. Dill was thoroughly familiar with the American plans and had a sympathetic understanding of our methods of handling troops. He had an equal knowledge of the principles and practices of command in the British services. The British also had an able general in Field-Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. Actually, I do not believe that Churchill ever wanted a British general in charge of a cross-Channel invasion attempt. The Prime Minister's attitude indicated, to me at least, that he always had reservations about its success. He could never forget, of course, that should it fail the British Isles—the heart and soul of his beloved Empire—lay only

twenty-two miles across the Channel from the beaches of Normandy.

While this debate over a Supreme Commander was going on in the public Press (and, in my opinion, in Roosevelt's mind as well), plans were being made for a meeting of the three Chiefs of Government. In mid-October an effort was made by the President and the Prime Minister to get Premier Stalin to agree to a meeting at some place that would be convenient to all three. Secretary Hull did the negotiating in Moscow and found that Stalin insisted that the only place outside of Russia to which he could agree was Teheran, the capital of Iran.

It was difficult for Roosevelt to accept this location, because communication facilities might easily place him beyond the ten-day limit allowed by the American Constitution to act upon Bills passed by the Congress. Roosevelt, therefore, proposed the Persian Gulf area at or near Basra, or Bagdad, Asmara, or Ankara. Stalin declined these suggestions, I was told later, because he was afraid of attempts to assassinate him if he should get separated from his Soviet police and military guards. Churchill wished to hold the meeting in North Africa. Stalin's view prevailed and Teheran was decided upon. Russia was not at war with Japan, so it was agreed to have Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek meet with Churchill and Roosevelt at Cairo before the Big Three meeting at the Iranian capital.

When we arrived at Teheran, Stalin was almost apologetic for his insistence on Teheran, but made a good case for himself. The Soviet Marshal remained in constant touch there with his staff, and the military situation then was active. He told us he just could not get away to some place where he could not keep daily control of operations at the front.

Marshall, Hopkins, and I conferred with the President on October 27 regarding both meetings. We discussed particularly the serious situation in China due to the shortage of planes and Chiang's feelings about a campaign to recapture Burma. It was finally decided that the Cairo meeting would start on November 22, and would be concluded in time to open discussions at Teheran by November 28.

Everyone knew what question was uppermost in Stalin's mind: were the Allies going to keep their word and launch their invasion of France by May, 1944? President Roosevelt

and his Chiefs of Staff were prepared to answer with an unqualified "Yes."

The question of who would command the operation was still undecided when the President and his full military staff boarded the new battleship *Iowa* in Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the evening of November 12, 1943.

CHAPTER XIV

CAIRO, TEHERAN, AND A BROKEN PROMISE

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT HAD NO superstitions about the figure "13," which many people regard as an ill omen, but he did share the sailors' superstition that Friday is an unlucky day on which to start a long voyage. So the huge U.S.S. *Iowa* remained at her berth Friday night, November 12, 1943, and did not get under way for Oran, the first leg of the trip to Cairo and Teheran, until 12.01 a.m., Saturday, November 13. We soon passed the Capes of the Chesapeake and headed toward the Straits of Gibraltar, escorted by three destroyers. Our course was 105° true, speed 25 knots.

The *Iowa* was our latest and best-armed battleship, displacing 45,000 tons. With a possible speed of 33 knots, she was expected to take us through submarine-infested waters with little danger. Every effort was made to keep the expedition secret. No communication whatever with the shore was permitted. It was hoped that the President, with his staff, could reach the port of Oran in Africa before the enemy learned of his whereabouts and his intentions. The President had with him on board the *Iowa* General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Lieutenant-General Somervell, and about fifty American staff officers of subordinate rank attached to the joint staff organization.

Roosevelt was in high spirits. He was looking forward to his first meeting with Premier Stalin. The President would use a plane when necessary, but a sea voyage was his favourite way of travelling. He had his mess in the Captain's cabin, where his personal staff—Harry Hopkins, Rear-Admiral Wilson Brown, Dr. Ross McIntire, Major-General E. M. "Pa" Watson and I—had our meals with him. We usually had an apéritif before dinner and frequently saw a moving picture in the President's quarters immediately afterward.

Roosevelt always enjoyed manœuvres, and on the second or third day out the *Iowa* put on a battery drill in which all of the anti-aircraft guns participated. The escorting destroyers were manœuvring to repel a mock air attack. The President

was on the starboard side of the deck forward of his cabin, where he frequently sat during the day. I was chatting with him, probably about some aspect of the manoeuvre, when suddenly we heard over the loud-speaker these directions to the gun batteries:

“This is *not* a drill. *Repeat*—this is *not* a drill.”

Instantly the anti-aircraft guns were deflected and started firing vigorously toward the water between us and one of the destroyers. The ship rang up full speed and as the powerful engines responded perfectly she made a radical change in course while picking up speed rapidly. We were informed almost immediately that a torpedo had been discharged accidentally from one of our escorting destroyers, which had been using the *Iowa* for a “target.”

No attempt was made to move Roosevelt. He just sat in his chair, showing no excitement, but intense interest. We watched the firing and were told by some officer of the *Iowa* that the guns were being used in an effort by the gunners to score a hit near the torpedo—which they could not see, but whose approximate location they knew. This went on for what seemed quite some time and then we heard an explosion that was unquestionably the torpedo warhead. The sound made it evident that the torpedo had exploded not very distant from the *Iowa*.

The big battleship settled down on her normal course. At the next meal most of the conversation centred on the incident, with everyone wondering how it happened. I do not know yet how that torpedo was fired from its tube. We were told that the destroyer radioed the *Iowa* the instant it was realized what had happened. Fortunately, this gave sufficient time to manoeuvre the battleship and thus reduce the potential danger to the President. I thought the *Iowa* was very smartly handled during the entire affair. She was under the command of Captain John L. McCrea, who previously had been Naval *Aide* to the President.

The torpedo “scare” recalled to me a time in February, 1939, when, as Chief of Naval Operations, I was with Roosevelt on board the cruiser *Houston* anchored off St. Thomas in the Caribbean. The *Houston* was in one of the opposing forces in the famous Fleet Problem XX then being worked out in the Caribbean area. I sat in a cabin with him interpreting the “Battle reports” being flashed to our ship. Suddenly I received

"bad news." I turned and said: "Mr. President, we have just been sunk by an enemy submarine."

Roosevelt laughed heartily.

"That is too bad, Bill," he said, and we continued right on watching the "battle" on the charts. (The *Houston* was actually sunk in the Battle of the Java Sea early in 1942.) It was on this trip that the President told me that he wished me to go to Puerto Rico as Governor when my term as Chief of Naval Operations should be completed.

Staff meetings were held on the *Iowa* almost daily during the voyage, as final preparations were made for the important conferences soon to come with the British and our Chinese Allies at Cairo and with the "Big Three" at Teheran. In previous planning we had recommended that the entire strategic air force from England be placed under the control of the officer in supreme command of the projected cross-Channel invasion of France. We had asked the British how they felt about this. On our first day out we received a reply from the British Chiefs of Staff. The latter said that it was impossible to separate any substantial part of the available British air arm from control of the Air Command Headquarters in England. The British were adhering steadfastly to their utterly inefficient manner of handling the air component of an invasion force. They said:

"When the Supreme Commander has decided in consultation with his Air Commander-in-Chief how he wishes to employ the air force, he will pass his requirements to the Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, who is then bound to meet those requirements as far as he is able with the air force that has been allotted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the support of the expedition. If the Supreme Commander wants a particular railway system disorganized, his Air Commander informs the Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, who has been told to put a certain percentage of his effort at the Supreme Commander's disposal. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bomber Command is then under orders of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to do his utmost to achieve the task given him by the Supreme Commander with the means allotted."

This completely divided control was serious enough, in my opinion, to account for most of the British air failures in the war. Unity of command of all available forces—land, sea, and air—was essential to success. It was my intention, if the

British persisted in exercising operational command of the Royal Air Force from England, to insist that our American air arm be divorced completely from the British Air Command and turned over to the Supreme Allied Commander of the area concerned.

The Joint Chiefs hammered out an agenda of subjects to be discussed by the President with Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill, and Stalin. One that required much time was a proposed sub-division of Germany into separate areas, wherein, after Germany surrendered, military control of the civil government would be exercised by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union respectively in sectors to be assigned to them.

We were prepared to hear British objections to the Burma operation, particularly its amphibious phase, but the President seemed determined that we formulate the best possible plans to support the Chinese war effort. As a possible alternative, King had an idea of going into the Malay Peninsula north of Singapore and taking Bangkok. We also were well aware that there would be a demand for more landing craft than we had available at that time for large-scale amphibious operations. While these Joint Chief Conferences were going on, the *Iowa* was steaming along at an average of 23 knots in soft, pleasant weather and smooth seas.

The danger of submarine attack was ever-present, particularly during the last half of our voyage, and that danger increased as we neared Oran. When about sixty miles off the coast of Morocco, our "squadron" was joined by the cruiser *Brooklyn* and six destroyers, providing additional protection. We also had planes patrolling the skies above the *Iowa*.

The Nazis apparently were completely unaware of the prize target now within range of their planes as well as their U-boats. Conceivably the course of the war might have been changed if the enemy could have broken through our protection and killed the President. However, this part of the trip was made without incident, and we eased inside the torpedo net at Mers-el-Kebir at 8 a.m., November 20, 1943.

General Eisenhower, smiling and pleased to see his Commander-in-Chief, greeted us, and the party was taken by auto to an airfield near Oran. The General rode in the President's plane, one of four that took the entire staff to Tunis. None of us, least of all Eisenhower, knew then that on the return flight two weeks later (December 7), the vital

question of command of "Overlord" would have been decided and Roosevelt would have some very important news for the commander who had led our forces to victory in North Africa.

Eisenhower showed no signs of worry about the success of the Italian operation, for which he had complete responsibility and for which many of us did not think he had sufficient force.

When we reached Tunis, the President was taken to General Eisenhower's villa in the town of Carthage. The rest of us were quartered in a guest house operated by the Army for distinguished visitors. This residence was purely Arabic in arrangement and decorations. All floors, walls and ceilings were covered with tiles of various colours, with different designs for each room. That afternoon I visited the remains of a Roman amphitheatre and a coliseum. We also saw some crudely excavated remains of the very ancient pre-Roman Carthage. These explorations pointed to the probability of interesting discoveries. That evening I dined with the President at a dinner of fourteen which included two of his sons, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, A.U.S., and Lieutenant Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., U.S.N.R. Also present was Air Chief Marshal Tedder of the Royal Air Force, who later was to become Eisenhower's Deputy Commander-in-Chief in "Operation Overlord."

For the first time during the war I saw the effects of aerial bombing when we spent Sunday afternoon (November 21) visiting the city of Tunis. The water front had been thoroughly destroyed by American bombers during the period when German troops were attempting to escape to Italy. Other parts of Tunis seemed to have suffered very little, indicating a high degree of accuracy for our bombardiers. The streets were crowded with soldiers and sailors of many nations and native Arabs. Bar-rooms, cinemas, and curio-shops were doing a rushing business. The very few women and children seen appeared to be Italians or Jews or a mixture of white races and Arabs. On the return trip to Carthage, we passed a number of natives ploughing their fields with oxen and the Biblical plough, consisting of a wooden blade with one handle.

After dinner with Roosevelt, the entire Presidential party boarded a four-engine transport plane and left at 10.30 p.m. for Cairo. Sleeping in the chair of a transport plane was not restful, which is a polite understatement, and I was more than pleased when we landed at 9.30 a.m., Cairo time, November 22, on a British airfield about fifteen miles from the city. We had

flown over a portion of the Sahara Desert, which gave one a picture of utter desolation and then a couple of hundred miles down the Nile Valley, where the land was green with fertility and humming with industry. My first view of the Pyramids from an altitude of 8,000 feet was disappointing, due to the reduction of their size by distance. When we reached Cairo, we found that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Mme. Chiang were already there and that the Prime Minister and his staff had been in Cairo for two days. We had no doubt that Churchill had used the two extra days to good advantage. The President and a few others of us were quartered at a villa belonging to the United States Minister, Kirk. We were looking forward to a busy and probably controversial conference.

The Prime Minister, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Hopkins, and I dined with the President the first night at Cairo. The Combined Chiefs came in after the meal and we got down to business quickly. Mountbatten outlined his plans and his needs for the Burma campaign which had been assigned to him at the Quebec Conference held in August, 1943. He made an excellent presentation of his problem, which I believed would be solved by his energy and aggressive spirit.

The next day (November 23), after a staff meeting, the Combined Chiefs met in the President's villa with Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang, and Mme. Chiang for a high-level discussion of the Burma campaign. Mountbatten went into details of a plan prepared by his staff, but not yet approved by the Combined Chiefs. The Generalissimo did not offer any objection, nor did he express his approval. He wanted to know what naval forces would be available at the time of our planned attack on Burma. The British were not able to give him that information. Chiang wanted Rangoon recaptured. The British experts pointed out the many real difficulties involved in trying to capture that Burmese port.

Chiang Kai-shek was a slight, studious-appearing man with no resemblance whatever to the bandit that he was reported to have been before the war commenced. Mme. Chiang followed the discussion intently. Several times she corrected the interpreter or amplified his translation. She wore an attractive Chinese costume and appeared to be in excellent health and spirits.

At the afternoon session the Chinese Chiefs of Staff met

with us to hear further discussion on Burma. Probably acting under instructions, they declined to make any comment or recommendation. They said they had not had time enough to make a careful study of the proposed plan. The Chinese Generals seemed to be fairly well informed on the whole situation, and they knew what they wanted—sufficient help to recapture Burma, so that supply lines to China could be reopened.

I “escaped” from the President’s small dinner for the Chiangs that night in order to be with Admiral King and General Arnold and the British Chiefs of Staff. It was an exceedingly interesting party. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, told us the history of the Knights of Malta, of which he obviously had made a study. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham told a vivid story of his experiences in command of the Mediterranean Fleet in this war. Sir Andrew and I had discussed this often when he was the British representative on the Combined Staff in Washington.

Churchill at a Combined Staff meeting on November 24 talked at length but unconvincingly about operations in the Ægean Sea and against the Island of Rhodes. The American Chiefs had rejected this idea completely weeks before, but the Prime Minister was not easily discouraged.

In the afternoon I assisted at a reception given by the President at his villa. One at a time, the following came in for a quarter-hour talk with Roosevelt:

The Turkish Prime Minister; the King of Greece, a young man with a gracious manner; the British Ambassador to Turkey; King Peter of Yugoslavia, accompanied by M. Pouritch, who had been a colleague of mine in France; and the heir-apparent of Egypt, Moballet Bey. That night at dinner we had Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt from Ankara, and Averell Harriman from Moscow as guests of the President in addition to our regular party.

November 25 was Thanksgiving Day. At the session of the Combined Chiefs, our British colleagues presented an alarming proposal to delay the cross-Channel operation in order to exert more effort in the Ægean Sea and in Turkey. The British bulldog tenacity did not like to let go of a desire to retain a controlling hold on the Mediterranean in the Near East. The American Chiefs followed their instructions from Roosevelt

not to agree to the diversion of any useful forces from "Operation Overlord." Again, no decision was reached.

British officers arranged for a Thanksgiving service in the All Saints' Cathedral in Cairo at 6 p.m. as a compliment to the Americans present. One of our sceptics called this polite gesture an example of "reverse Lend-Lease." That night the President gave a Thanksgiving dinner for twenty guests, complete with turkey and pumpkin pie. In addition to our regular group, the following were present as guests: Prime Minister Churchill with his daughter, Sarah, whose married name was Oliver; Foreign Minister Anthony Eden; American Ambassadors Winant and Steinhardt; United States Minister to Egypt Kirk; Colonel Elliott Roosevelt; Lord Leathers of England; Major Boettiger, son-in-law of the President; and two young *aides* to the Prime Minister. It was a very gay friendly dinner and certainly an unusual one for the banks of the Nile. Both the President and the Prime Minister were in excellent form.

After the morning staff meeting on November 26, I took an hour off to see the great Pyramids and the Sphinx, either of which would have provided absorbing interest for days of study. I always will regret that the pressure of war business at this Cairo conference prevented me from spending more time visiting these colossal antiquities. The face of the Sphinx had been badly damaged, according to our guide, by Napoleon's artillery.

That noon the President presented a Legion of Merit Medal to General Eisenhower, and I was particularly impressed with Eisenhower's response. He said he was more than pleased to receive the Legion of Merit decoration because it was available to every soldier in his command and was not limited to any rank.

The afternoon Combined Staff conference was given over to discussing a British proposal to abandon planned amphibious operations in the Indian Ocean in connection with the Burma campaign. The President had promised China that as a part of the drive to recapture Burma there would be an amphibious attack on the strategic Andaman Islands.

The Prime Minister seemed determined to remove his landing ships from that effort. The discussion became almost acrimonious at times. Carrying out the orders of Churchill, their Commander-in-Chief, the British staff, headed by

Brooke, insisted that the Andaman operation could not be carried out. I informed our British colleagues that the American chiefs could not recede from their present position on the Andaman attack without orders from the President. At the same time, the President, Prime Minister, and Chiang were in conference all afternoon, probably discussing the same question. We knew that Chiang would persist in his demands for the Andaman Island campaign, and we thought that the President should continue to support him, despite Churchill's objections.

The British obviously did not have the same deep interest in China that we had. They seemed to overlook the fact that the defeat of Japan would cost many more ships, lives, not to mention dollars, if Chiang's ill-equipped, ill-fed armies were not kept in the field. The Chinese were not winning many battles. Except for a few American-trained divisions, perhaps they didn't fight very well, but the fact could not be discounted that Chiang had several million men under arms and was forcing Japan to keep a large standing army in China and to keep it supplied. The American Chiefs of Staff were convinced that support of China was essential to our own safety and to the success of the Allied cause. As we closed these unproductive Combined Staff talks at Cairo on the afternoon of November 26, the question of implementing our promised support to Chiang by providing whatever was necessary to recapture Burma still was undecided. The commitment had been made months before. Chiang left Cairo for Chungking fully expecting his Allies to make good their promises.

We left Cairo at 7 a.m., November 27, after waiting more than three hours for an early fog to clear away. The air route to Teheran took us over Palestine, and the weather was excellent. The plane circled low over Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Jericho, and the River Jordan—names that had been fixed in my mind since childhood. The Holy Land, from the air, appeared desolate and unproductive. Perhaps after forty years of wandering in a desert, any place with even a little water would look like a "promised land." Somebody on the plane speculated that when Moses saw from a mountain top the end of the long journey, he committed suicide rather than face the responsibility for his "promised land" that would be found there by his travel-wearied followers.

unoccupied building on the Russian property. The Soviet Legation and its surrounding park were guarded twenty-four hours a day by a great number of especially trained agents who stopped *everybody*. We had special passes, made out in Russian, with our names being the only words I could recognize. We all were advised to stop instantly if challenged. The advice was observed meticulously and we had no "accidents."

The first plenary session of "Eureka," code for the Teheran meeting, opened at 4 p.m. (November 28). The heads of the two most powerful nations in the world had met for the first time some forty-five minutes earlier and Roosevelt and Stalin apparently had become well acquainted when the Prime Minister and the British and American Chiefs of Staff, together with Hopkins, came in. Churchill had Foreign Minister Anthony Eden with him. Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov and Marshal K. E. Voroshilov joined Stalin. Roosevelt presided and was the first to speak. (A complete list of those present is given in the Appendix.)

Briefly, the strategy that had been worked out at previous Anglo-American conferences was reviewed by our President. He said that the United States shared equally with the Soviets and the United Kingdom a desire to hurry the day of victory in Europe. In the Pacific, our country was carrying the greatest burden, with some help from the British. Our strategy was one of constant attrition of enemy forces while advancing through the Pacific islands and keeping the Japanese away from American territory. It was proving successful to date, Roosevelt emphasized, in accomplishing its designed purpose.

Turning to China, the President stressed that keeping our Eastern ally in the war was considered essential. This would be assisted shortly by a vigorous campaign led by Admiral Lord Mountbatten to recapture Burma.

In Europe, Roosevelt continued, the U.S. strategy for more than a year had been to relieve German pressure on the Russian front, but final plans to achieve this had not been possible until the conference in Quebec had agreed upon May, 1944, as the date for a cross-Channel invasion of Normandy. Doubtless having in mind the arguments the Prime Minister would make, Roosevelt added that many were in favour of further operations in the Mediterranean, but he was convinced that the vital thrust into France in May should not be delayed by any such secondary operations.

Stalin then spoke briefly, but in detail, to show that Italy was not a suitable place from which to launch an attack on Germany. However, he held that the Mediterranean Sea should be kept free for Allied shipping. Every American and British eye and ear were fixed on the Soviet leader. Most of us were hearing and seeing him for the first time. I happened to notice that Churchill did not always wait for Stalin's excellent interpreter to translate what his chief had said, but seemed to be getting the gist of Stalin's remarks. I learned later that the Prime Minister did know some Russian and was able to understand in part what Stalin was saying, although he never tried to converse in that language. The Marshal spoke quietly, without gestures and, as translated by Interpreter Pavlov, expressed himself in a convincing manner.

Churchill began his talk by saying that the United States and the United Kingdom had long been planning the Normandy invasion, that the delay had been very disappointing, but now they were determined to carry out the operation in the spring or summer of 1944. In the next breath, the Prime Minister began to talk about possible areas of operations against the Nazis from all parts of Europe, and he urged that Turkey be induced to enter the war. Churchill then asked if any of the possible operations in the Mediterranean were of sufficient interest to delay for two or three months the projected cross-Channel project.

Stalin answered quickly by questioning the wisdom of dispersing Allied forces. He did not believe the Turks could be persuaded to declare war and said that all additional Allied strength that would be available could be used to the best advantage in a flank attack in southern France, to be timed to support the Normandy attack. He considered an attack in southern France of much more value to the Allied cause than the capture of Rome. Churchill answered that with an interesting argument in favour of capturing Rome and the airfields north of Rome, which could be used to supplement the Allied air attack on Central Europe. The meeting adjourned without any major decisions being made.

The initial session had been pleasant, polite, and agreeable. The three principals stated their respective views and sounded out each other. The Soviets and Americans seemed to be nearly in agreement as to the fundamental strategic principles

that should be followed. In the hands of the three men gathered around a table in the Russian legation in Teheran rested the fate of millions of men organized into the largest armies and navies ever assembled in any war up to that time. Yet the atmosphere in this first session probably was more calm than that which might prevail at a staff meeting aboard a single ship or at some Army base.

The talk among ourselves as the meeting broke up was about Stalin. Most of us, before we met him, thought he was a bandit leader who had pushed himself up to the top of his Government. That impression was wrong. We knew at once that we were dealing with a highly intelligent man who spoke well and was determined to get what he wanted for Russia. No professional soldier or sailor could find fault with that. The Marshal's approach to our mutual problems was direct, agreeable, and considerate of the viewpoints of his two colleagues—until one of them advanced some point that Stalin thought was detrimental to Soviet interest. Then he could be brutally blunt to the point of rudeness.

The "Big Three" met again in the evening of November 28. I was not present, but the President later told me that the conversation centred around post-war treatment of France, the fate of German war criminals, and the eastern border of Poland. Stalin did most of the talking. Among other things, the Russian chief said that France, by its performance in the war, had not earned any consideration from the victorious Allies or any right to retain her former empire.

It was generally agreed that Germany must be deprived permanently of all military power. The question of post-war borders of Poland proved a touchy one, and it was decided that the matter should be studied further before reaching any conclusions.

Stalin and Churchill, the President told me, got into quite an argument about German militarism. It came up when Stalin said he had a list of 50,000 German officers who should be brought to trial. Churchill reacted violently. The Prime Minister insisted that he could not agree to any such "trials," because under British law it was not possible to obtain a conviction in English courts for alleged offences that were *not* crimes under the law at the time they were committed.

Churchill made it plain that he had no sympathy for the Nazi barbarians, but the President said the Prime Minister

pleaded eloquently for maintenance of the traditional English concept of justice, which rejected any proceedings under *ex post facto* laws.

In telling about the argument, Roosevelt recounted how he tried to quiet Stalin and Churchill with a remark he intended as a joke. Roosevelt suggested that if 50,000 German officers were too many to be tried, why not compromise on a smaller number, such as 49,000. The President smiled ruefully, and said Churchill at that moment was in no mood for jokes.

This was the night that the President suffered an acute digestive attack which alarmed us because of the possibility that poison might have been given to him. Dr. McIntire, his physician, very quickly found out that the trouble was indigestion. Rest in bed and careful dieting was prescribed for the President, and by the following morning he had entirely recovered from his indisposition.

The first business on Monday, November 29, was a small meeting attended by General Brooke, Marshal Voroshilov, Air Marshal Portal, General Marshall, and myself. It was the first time that top military advisers of the three major Allied Powers had met together for a Staff discussion. We talked about the military problems facing the conference, but little progress was made because of a British desire for postponing the cross-Channel operation.

Marshal Voroshilov, following up the good case Stalin had made the day before for a flank attack through southern France, pressed for a decision on this point. General Marshall and I were inclined to go along, but Sir Alan Brooke insisted stubbornly that all available Mediterranean forces should be used in the Italian and eastern Mediterranean campaigns, including the pet project of his Commander-in-Chief, the capture of the Island of Rhodes. Voroshilov was young and vigorous and could ask searching questions. He was probably just as inflexible as Stalin where Soviet interests were concerned, and he knew just as well as his Chief what the Russians wanted us to do in the war.

However, like all the Russians that we met, he did not understand the difficulties of transporting an army and its supplies across a 3,000-mile ocean. Navies had never played a major role in Russian history, with the possible exception of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, when such a navy as they had was sunk by the Japanese. In our conversations, the

Russians would insist that their armies could cross rivers, but they did not understand the difference between a river and an ocean. They sounded like Army or Air Force officers trying to understand naval operations.

At noon (November 29) the Prime Minister, acting for King George of England, presented a sword of honour to Marshal Stalin for the city of Stalingrad. It was a token of the appreciation of the British people for the city's heroic and successful defence against the German invaders of Russia.

After the ceremony, the camera-men made group pictures of everybody participating in the conference. Here were the "Big Three" of the coalition seeking to destroy Nazi Germany. I felt that this meeting at Teheran might be recorded in history as being comparable to the Field of the Cloth of Gold, with this difference—the surroundings offered little pageantry but, instead, much suffering and squalor.

That afternoon, at another plenary session, the dispute over timing of the invasion of Normandy was again brought up. Stalin was insisting on fixing an early date. Churchill was asking for delay. The President was favourably inclined toward the Soviet view. Becoming exasperated with Churchill's tactics, Stalin said bluntly: "Do you really believe in 'Overlord,' or are you stalling on it to make us feel better?" The sense of Churchill's reply was that he did endorse the cross-Channel operation, but he believed sincerely that the other operations he was proposing would help insure the eventual success of the invasion of France. In order to delay a final decision on the date of "Overlord," Churchill proposed that the political aspects of his Mediterranean proposals be referred to the Foreign Ministers present at Teheran for their advice. (Secretary of State Hull had cabled Roosevelt from the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in October, 1943, that his health would not permit him to make the trip to Africa and Iran. Harry Hopkins was acting informally as a sort of Secretary of State for the President, attending meetings with Molotov and Eden.)

Stalin retorted quickly and brusquely: "Why do that? We are the chiefs of government. We know what we want to do. Why turn the matter over to some subordinates to advise us?" However, Stalin apparently saw some advantages in this parliamentary manoeuvre. At subsequent "Big Three" conferences, a Committee of Foreign Ministers was established.

When some question arose about which an agreement could not be reached by the "Big Three," it was frequently referred to these same Foreign Ministers, who, in turn, were usually unable to reach an agreement.

When this happened at Yalta and Potsdam, it seems to me, in retrospect, that the result usually was unfavourable to the interests of the United States. The United States gained little or nothing from the action—or lack of action—on questions that were referred to this "subordinate" group of Ministers. So, at this afternoon session in Teheran, Churchill had introduced a very useful delaying, diplomatic manoeuvre.

The heat of argument taxed the well-known skill and diplomacy of Roosevelt, who was presiding. At this same meeting, Stalin also confronted the President with an uncomfortable question. The Soviet leader asked bluntly who was going to command "Overlord." Roosevelt said frankly he had not made up his mind. I was sitting next to the President, and he leaned over to me and whispered, "That old Bolshevik is trying to force me to give him the name of our Supreme Commander. I just can't tell him, because I have not yet made up my mind."

Stalin agreed that the appointment was the business of Roosevelt, but he added sharply that until the Commander of "Overlord" was named he would not consider that the operation was actually under way. It was evident that Stalin wanted to have that appointment announced while he was in Teheran.

The President was absolutely honest in his reply. In my opinion, he preferred to give the job to Marshall, but felt that he could not ignore the adverse reaction that the appointment would cause back in the United States. At that time, I still thought he eventually would announce that Marshall would command "Overlord."

During this session Roosevelt presented a paper to Stalin which had been prepared by the Joint Chiefs containing certain requests for co-operation and information from our Soviet ally. The first question referred to use of Soviet bases for shuttle-bombing, and Stalin readily agreed. Some of the other items pertained to possible Russian co-operation in the war against Japan. Stalin had told General Hurley as far back as January, 1943, that when Germany should be defeated the Soviets would join in crushing Japan. He had renewed that

assurance to Secretary of State Hull during the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow the preceding month.

When confronted with specific requests which were in the nature of preparations for Soviet co-operation, Stalin said he would have to wait until he returned to Moscow before giving us the answers. I think it was at this point that the Marshal said to Roosevelt: "Mr. President, you tell me you frequently have to consult with your Government before making decisions. You must remember that I also have a Government and cannot always act without reference to Moscow."

Like the one of the day before, this session ended with no final decision as to the date of the cross-Channel operation and, as a result of Stalin's frank question, the problem of who would command that operation had again been thrust to the forefront.

The British finally fell into line at the forenoon meeting of the British-American Chiefs of Staff on November 30. They agreed to launch the attack on Germany in France during the month of May, 1944, and to support the southern France invasion with such force as could be handled by the landing craft available in the Mediterranean at that time.

I never asked Brooke, Portal, or any of our British colleagues what caused their change of heart, but the American argument was so logical that I cannot but believe that as professional soldiers they knew "Overlord" was the most sensible move to bring to an end the war with Germany in the shortest possible time. We had to come to grips with a German army that would be defending its homeland as soon as we should have the force available. If we could break that army, the road to Berlin and victory in Europe would be in sight.

This is pure speculation, but I have the feeling that the British Chiefs supported the American contention in their private talks with Churchill. The Prime Minister, devoted to the preservation of the power of the British Empire, apparently gave in, perhaps with reluctance, to the arguments of his own top military advisers. Before this is read, Churchill may have told us his reasons in his own excellent memoirs.

At 4.30 p.m., Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill accepted the agreement reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the morning session and Marshal Stalin agreed to so time his attack on the Eastern Front as to make the two efforts mutually supporting.

The Second Front decision overshadowed all other accomplishments of the Teheran meeting, but this gathering of the "Big Three" was equally important for the several other major problems that were discussed, amicably for the most part, even though no agreement was reached on some of them.

Roosevelt spent much time explaining the details of his "United Nations to preserve International Peace." Stalin did not seem to be favourably impressed by the President's proposal to give the smaller nations of the world an equal position in the preservation of world peace. Stalin stated his own ideas quite simply: If Russia, Great Britain, and the United States wanted to keep the world at peace, they had the military and economic power to do so and did not need the help of anybody else to police the globe.

The problem of trusteeships came up during the United Nations discussion. Roosevelt was convinced that his proposed world organization could exercise the necessary sovereignty over such areas as the mandated Japanese islands, which Tokyo had exploited so fully while ostensibly these islands still were under the control of the League of Nations. In our own conversations, I had argued vigorously that the United States, for its own future security, should keep and exercise sovereignty over any of the Japanese mandated islands that we captured.

There was a general discussion on demilitarizing Germany. Stalin advocated the occupation of strong strategic points within Germany or on the borders or even at more distant points. No decision was reached, but there appeared to be a general agreement in principle that the war potential of Germany should be destroyed.

Stalin agreed to allow Soviet air bases to be used in setting up a shuttle-bombing operation against Germany from England. A request for use by the Army Air Force of Soviet bases in the maritime provinces of Asia to facilitate attacks on Japan was deferred. Stalin was asked to permit joint preliminary planning for the employment of Soviet forces against Japan when Germany had been eliminated from the war, but could not give an answer at Teheran.

Russia had been insisting on immediately getting her one-third share of surrendered Italian warships and merchant shipping. Roosevelt at Teheran maintained the position he had taken previously: that these ships should be used during

the war wherever they were most needed and that their disposition could wait until the peace was made. A compromise was reached under which some ships were to be turned over to the Soviet command about the end of January, 1944.

Polish boundaries caused little argument at Teheran. After a more or less general acceptance of the Curzon Line as Poland's Eastern frontier, to which Roosevelt made no specific agreement, the matter of the western border was left undecided—except that the Big Three seemed to accept as a principle that Poland should get some German territory to compensate for the area claimed by Russia on her side of the Curzon Line.

Likewise, no definite decision was reached on the dismemberment of Germany, to which Roosevelt had given much thought although his plan seemed to meet with approval—again in principle. The President's idea was to break up the Reich into five major subdivisions or states as follows: (1) Prussia, which would be reduced in area and made powerless; (2) Hanover and a north-west section of Germany; (3) Saxony and Leipzig areas; (4) Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg; and (5) Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel and an area south of the Rhine. Hamburg, the Kiel Canal and the Ruhr-Saar area were to be under some form of international control.

The President had some difficulty in persuading Stalin and Churchill to accept a "Declaration of Iran," which acknowledged that nation's contribution to the war effort. Recognizing the economic difficulties created by the war, this Declaration pledged such assistance as was practicable, and stated that the Big Powers favoured the maintenance of Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin signed this Declaration and gave it to General Hurley to take to the Shah. It apparently was not as specific as the Shah desired, but Hurley got his signature on the document and rushed back to the conference as pleased as a small boy who had just landed a big fish in the mill-pond. He saw me in the hall and fairly shouted: "Bill, I got it!"—meaning, of course, the three-power Declaration. The General felt it really was a successful ending of a difficult mission Roosevelt had assigned to him.

When the three Commanders-in-Chief accepted the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the work of the conference was completed. If the decisions made at Teheran

should be adhered to, our journey halfway round the world to get together would be fully justified. While the post-war political questions raised did not affect directly the work of our Joint Chiefs, we all recognized that the peace of the world might hinge on their amicable solution.

Churchill was sixty-nine years old on this November 30, 1943, so the day ended with the Prime Minister being host at a large dinner in the British Legation. Russian custom was followed, which meant that toasts were proposed and drunk to nearly all of the thirty-four persons at the banquet table, an exceedingly tiresome procedure. The President, Stalin, and Churchill made speeches. Our abiding friendship with the Bolsheviks and our common hopes for a new order in the world were stressed. As the party went on, the monotonous exchange of international compliments was enlivened now and then with some acid humour. Stalin particularly was quick in repartee, sometimes delivered with a sinister expression on his face.

The Prime Minister remarked that the political complexion of the British people was undergoing an orderly change, and it might now be said to have gone almost so far as to be termed "pink." Whereupon Stalin interjected: "That is an indication of improved health." Hopkins commented amusingly that England did not have any Constitution or charter, which left Churchill free to do whatever he liked at any time. Stalin proposed a toast to the miracle of American production. Indeed, at this memorable dinner, it appeared that the grand coalition had achieved a degree of harmony that should insure a speedy defeat of Nazism, and a peaceful solution of the difficult problems of a post-war world. Unfortunately, the next morning after such affairs usually brings a return to realism.

The Combined Staff left by plane for Cairo on December 1. The President asked me to remain behind with him, although I did not attend the final high-level political discussion he had with his two colleagues, which lasted until 10 p.m. Two hours later, we were bedded down in an American Army camp some distance from Teheran.

The next morning, riding in a jeep with Major-General Connolly, Roosevelt inspected camp installations, including the hospital where wide-eyed lads stared in amazement at the sight of their Commander-in-Chief from far-away Washington, D.C. The President gave a short talk to the troops, expressing

his appreciation for their important work at this isolated Army base. The sight of an American President thoughtfully taking the time between important conferences with world leaders to visit lads serving in the U.S. Army in ancient Persia was a striking example of the global nature of a war in which American supply ships plied sea lanes in the Arctic Circle and American soldiers trained for future operations in the distant "down under" country of Australia. Returning to Teheran, we left at 9.45 a.m. (December 2), and were in Cairo in time to have dinner with the Prime Minister.

During the dinner Roosevelt and Churchill compared their reactions to Stalin and reviewed the military and political discussion with our Russian ally that had just ended. The Prime Minister clearly indicated that he was inclined toward the American point of view on matters that up to then had produced much controversy between the U.S. and British staffs, particularly on the timing of the cross-Channel attack on Germany. He did not bring up the Burma campaign or his pet Rhodes project. He was well aware that at Staff talks beginning the next day his representatives were to resist stubbornly any attempt to carry out a promise made to our Far East ally—the promise Roosevelt had made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to carry out a vigorous campaign to recapture Burma with land operations in the north co-ordinated with an amphibious attack on the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal in the south.

Throughout the morning and afternoon Combined Staff sessions on December 3, the British pursued two objectives: to have the Andaman Islands project dropped and to secure American agreement to an expedition against the Island of Rhodes. That evening, we reported the impasse to President Roosevelt. He was firmly against the eastern Mediterranean project and gave us no indication that he had changed his mind about the Burma plans.

I dined with the President, the Prime Minister, and Anthony Eden. The four of us remained at the table until midnight discussing the Andaman-Rhodes controversy. Churchill used every artifice in his large repertoire to induce Roosevelt to agree to drop the amphibious expedition in the Bay of Bengal and to use those naval, air, and ground forces to seize his pet island of Rhodes. The British Minister made a good case for his side, but the President didn't budge. Roosevelt insisted

that promises made to Chiang Kai-shek be fully carried out.

Eden did not assist his chief to any extent in the Burma argument, but the two of them teamed up together in the other main topic of the evening—the prospective sectors of Germany to be occupied by British and American troops. Churchill and Eden insisted that Britain take over the northern sector. Roosevelt thought the Americans should be in that area. The British said, with logic, that this part of Germany was nearest to England, which would relieve transport difficulties. It was expected that the Russians would police the eastern end. The United States eventually took over the middle sector, between the French and the British.

The Burma *versus* Mediterranean word battle continued throughout December 4, with a Combined Staff meeting at noon with the President and Prime Minister. Neither side would yield. It was the same story up to 5 p.m. on December 6. At no time in previous or later conferences had the British shown such determined opposition to an American proposal.

When the American chiefs met with Roosevelt at five o'clock, he informed us that, in order to bring the discussions to an end, he had reluctantly agreed to abandon the Andaman plan and would propose some substitute to Chiang. He was the Commander-in-Chief, and that ended the argument. It must have been a sad disappointment to Chiang. The Chinese leader had every right to feel that we had failed to keep a promise.

There was merit in a contention advanced by the British that, if they should not be used at Rhodes, the landing craft assigned to the Andaman operation could be employed in our attack on Germany through southern France. The British may have had in mind other uses for these ships, but it was a good point to make at that time.

I felt that we were taking a grave risk. Chiang might drop out of the war. He never had indicated much faith in British intentions, but had relied on the United States. If the Chinese quit, the tasks of MacArthur and Nimitz in the Pacific, already difficult, would be much harder. Japanese manpower in great numbers would be released to oppose our advance toward the mainland of Japan. Fortunately for us, the courageous Chinese stayed in the fight.

When the American chiefs met with the British Staff on December 6, we formally agreed to the British position in

regard to the Andaman Islands, a final draft of a report of the conference was made and approved without change by our respective leaders at noon. Field-Marshal Smuts of South Africa was present at this final meeting.

The original purpose of coming back to Cairo had been to talk to the Turks about entering the war. President İnönü and some of his leading advisers arrived in response to the Allied request for a meeting, and President Roosevelt on December 4 gave a dinner in honour of the Turkish President. It was an interesting affair, all the conversation being in French, which the President spoke without hesitation.

After the dinner, the Prime Minister joined the party and promptly laid siege to President İnönü to induce him to cast the fate of his country with the Allies. Churchill did most of the talking. İnönü just listened. Later, the President told his British colleague that if he, Roosevelt, were a Turk, he would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised before abandoning neutrality and leading his nation into war.

The next night, December 5, it was Churchill's turn to entertain at dinner for İnönü. Same scene. Same cast. Almost the same lines, except that the Turkish President talked a little more freely and impressed me with his direct approach to the question. He made it clear that before Turkey could come into the war, he would have to have enough planes, tanks, guns, etc., to make a strong resistance against invasion by the Nazis.

It was most interesting to watch the dinner-table manoeuvres of the Prime Minister as he pleaded, cajoled, and almost threatened the soldier President of the once-powerful Ottoman Empire in an effort to commit him to taking his people into the war. İnönü was told he would have to come in eventually if he was to have a place at the peace table. The Americans did not urge the Turks as vehemently as did the British. I have pointed out earlier in this narrative that the U.S. Joint Chiefs felt that if the Turks were our allies and got into trouble, the task of bailing them out of a difficult situation would fall in large measure to us, and it might interfere with our major plans to defeat Germany. However, I thought that İnönü might be well advised to insure his country's participation in the peace talks, in order to protect Turkey from the avarice of the victors.

The President made another important decision while at

Cairo. He selected General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of "Operation Overlord." He told me about his decision as we were flying from Cairo to Tunis on December 7. His selection was something of a surprise. The Joint Chiefs never recommended Eisenhower or anyone else. We had thought it was going to be George Marshall. At the time it appeared to me that the failure to name Marshall was taking a chance. The complete success of "Operation Overlord" under Eisenhower's command has proved that the President's choice was a wise one. This decision, so long delayed, also meant that Marshal Stalin had his final assurance that the Second Front, which the Russians had been demanding since 1942, would materialize in the spring of 1944.

From the time we left Cairo until the *Iowa* was well out to sea, the President had particularly heavy air coverage because of the possibility of being intercepted by German planes. Shortly after leaving Tunis by air for Malta on the morning of December 8, further precautions were taken to insure his safety should the Presidential plane be shot down or forced down over the Mediterranean. Together with the rest of us riding with him, Roosevelt was instructed in the correct use of the type of life-preserver known in the service as the "Mae West." We kept our "Mae Wests" within reach throughout the trip. Although the Allies had achieved superiority in the air in the Mediterranean area, we all felt that if the Germans knew of this particular flight they would make a desperate effort to shoot down the President of the United States. The huge four-engined transport landed at Malta without incident. We were met by Field-Marshal Viscount Gort and high military and civil officials of the local Government.

Before a hollow square of British soldiers, sailors, and marines, the President formally presented to Lord Gort an illuminated scroll commemorating the heroic defence of the small island, which for two years had withstood almost constant attack by the German and Italian air and naval forces.

Our plane had developed some trouble in the landing mechanism, and we took advantage of the hour's delay to visit those parts of the island which had been most seriously damaged during the siege. The enemy had concentrated its bombs in and around the Navy Yard, and the destruction there was almost complete. The damage that I saw elsewhere on Malta did not appear to be serious.

Leaving Malta at 1.10 p.m., a short flight brought us to the Castel Ventrano Airfield in Sicily, where General George Patton was in the group of officers who met the President's plane. In conversation with the President, General Patton brought up the widely publicized incident of his indiscretion of slapping a soldier whom he believed to be a shirker. Apparently the General was still worried about possible repercussions and their effect on his own future. Roosevelt indicated that the matter was a closed incident as far as he was concerned.

The President awarded decorations to six officers who had particularly distinguished themselves in the Sicilian campaign. Then, again riding in a familiar Army jeep, he made an inspection of the troops stationed at the airfield. An hour's flight brought us back to Tunis, where all hands, including the President, went to bed early in preparation for a long flight to the west coast of Africa.

We left Tunis before sunrise on December 9, and almost immediately ran into white cloud banks. Surgeon-General McIntire did not consider it wise for the President to fly at the altitude which would have been necessary to get completely above the cloud banks. With occasional glimpses of the earth, we remained in or slightly above these clouds until noon, flying at about 8,000 feet. South of the Atlas Mountains we ran into light rain and turbulent air. Ice formed on the plexi-glass enclosing the pilot's compartment. Our Army pilot, Major Bryan, skilfully avoided the cloud banks, which now had changed to black, and navigated with such accuracy as to make his expected landfalls. He stayed on his course, and we soon left the storm behind us.

The plane following us, which was carrying some Secret Service men, was struck by lightning while passing through a rain-cloud. Neither the plane nor any of its passengers were injured, but the pilot thereafter flew above the clouds at an altitude which, without oxygen, was uncomfortable. The third plane in the Presidential group flew around the storm and was an hour late in reaching Dakar.

We landed at the Dakar Airport on schedule after a twelve-and-half-hour flight of over 2,400 miles, most of it over the Sahara Desert. The President was met by the French Governor, Cournarie, and taken to the U.S.S. *Iowa* in a French naval escort vessel.

Roosevelt was swung aboard the battleship in a bos'n's

chair, after which the *Iowa* got under way, escorted by three destroyers. She set a course of 226°. True to pass south of the Cape Verde Islands, speed 23 knots. Hopkins wrote up an amusing story of the Presidential party climbing aboard the *Iowa* at Dakar which was printed, with illustrations, in the ship's paper. The drawing showed the President in his bos'n's chair, General "Pa" Watson climbing up on his hands and knees on a board, Hopkins walking a tight rope. I was pictured jumping aboard, as any sailor would.

After a restful sea voyage, we transferred from the *Iowa* to the President's yacht, U.S.S. *Potomac*, at Hampton Roads, Virginia. At 9.15 on December 17, 1943, the long but important and interesting journey to Morocco, Egypt, Persia, Malta and Sicily ended with our arrival at the Washington Navy Yard.

During the first week after our return several conferences were held by the President and General Marshall, the Secretary of War, and others to work out details of an announcement of the selection of Eisenhower to command the invasion of France. The news was released on Christmas Eve. It was also announced that the British General Sir Henry M. Wilson would assume command of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean area.

On Christmas Eve, also, Roosevelt made an inspiring address which was broadcast all over the world to the Armed Forces of America wherever they might be.

During Christmas week we had several messages from Churchill inquiring about the possible use of landing-craft and men in the Italian campaign. To have granted them might have caused a delay in the planned landings in France. It was vexing, to say the least, to have to deal with still another attempt to extend operations in the Mediterranean, even at a cost of prolonging the war with Germany. The President replied to the Prime Minister that he would not consent to any diversion of men or landing-craft which would in any way interfere with "Overlord."

On December 28, the President took over the administration of railroads because of a threatened strike by railway employees. This was a matter of serious concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of the heavy shipping schedules required to build up our supplies in England for the invasion. However, although I discussed the problem with the President, the Joint Chiefs did not recommend any specific, drastic action. There

were other agencies of the Government charged with the shipment of equipment for the war effort. The President delegated to the Army the responsibility for operating the railroads until the strike should be settled, which it was on January 18, 1944. Another civilian problem that arose in 1943 drew to a close was a dispute between General Strong, Head of Army Intelligence, and Byron Price, Director of the Office of Censorship. Price came to the office and told me the General was sending a letter to the Joint Chiefs which would charge that the civilian censorship organization was making it impossible for Strong to carry out his duties as Chief of Military Intelligence. Strong also, according to Price, had prepared a letter addressed to the President and designed for signature by the Joint Chiefs which would, as Price put it, "put me in my place."

The Censorship Director, whose agency had made an excellent record, said he wanted no part of any censorship dominated by the military. His office was completely independent of the Armed Services and responsible directly to the President. If the Joint Chiefs and the President felt he was not doing a good job, he said he should be asked to resign, and he would willingly do so. I thought his position was absolutely correct. The source of trouble was that Strong wanted information about the confidential sources of newspaper stories.

I discussed this with the J.C.S., and the general position of the Office of Censorship was supported. We recognized that the matter was a delicate one for the Civilian Censor, and asked only that he give the Joint Chiefs, in confidence, information in specific instances where it might be requested. Price replied that if a request was made by me as the direct representative of the President, he would comply on that basis. That settled the matter, and I think there were only one or two occasions when I did ask Price for information concerning certain stories. Not long afterward, General Strong was succeeded as Chief of Military Intelligence by General Bissell.

The last day of 1943 found the World War definitely progressing in favour of the Allied nations. Russia was carrying out a vigorous and successful offensive in the Ukraine. The British-American campaign in Italy was moving forward slowly under adverse weather conditions and stubborn opposition. Preparations were being rushed for a combined British-American invasion of Normandy in the spring.

In the Pacific our naval operations were forcing the Japanese westward through their heavily fortified islands, and MacArthur's northward movement from Australia through New Guinea was gaining speed and momentum. Only in Burma, because of a disinclination on the part of both the British and the Chinese to make a vigorous military effort, and a continuing dispute between Chiang Kai-shek and the American Army Commander, General Stilwell, did the planned campaign show signs of being a failure.

Unless we should make some stupid tactical or strategical error, the Axis appeared certain to be defeated, although, with desperate enemies on both sides of the world, the cost to us in lives and treasure would be very high.

CHAPTER XV

EYES ON THE PACIFIC. INVASION OF NORMANDY

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY AND command in the Pacific became the first item on the agenda of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1944. We were waging war successfully against the two remaining partners of the Axis—Germany and Japan. Italy was not only out of the Tripartite Alliance, but was now fighting on our side.

The urgency of time was always present. The quicker your enemies are defeated, the smaller the cost in dead men, wounded men and dollars. The plan was to undertake sea, air, and land operations that would force Tokyo to surrender at the earliest possible moment and at the same time hold casualty lists to a minimum.

Public attention was riveted on the war in Europe. The world was waiting for the long-expected titanic struggle between the Allied and the German forces that was to begin on the beaches of Normandy. Before 1944 had ended, we had met Hitler's best on a battlefield that favoured the defenders and, without any superiority in manpower, were driving back the Führer's legions with a speed that amazed everyone, particularly our sensitive Russian allies.

The Joint Chiefs' work on this major effort, "Operation Overlord," was practically complete as the year began. The general directives for invading Germany had been issued. General Eisenhower had been named Supreme Commander, and the burden of American staff work had shifted from the Pentagon Building in Washington to his headquarters in London.

In the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, the odds were being reduced. Ships, guns, and material were becoming available in such quantities through the miracle of production in America that the anxieties of the Joint Chiefs over logistics lessened appreciably. Serious differences were to arise as to the best method of defeating Japan, and the President was to go out to Honolulu to talk personally with our military and naval commanders in various Pacific areas.

The terrific burden of being in effect the Commander-in-Chief of the greatest global war yet recorded in history began to tell on Franklin Roosevelt in 1944. He required more rest and it took him longer to shake off the effects of a simple cold or of the bronchitis to which he was vulnerable. His valued adviser, Harry Hopkins, who appeared to many of us to be living on borrowed time, was confined to a sick-bed for months. There was no one close to Roosevelt who could take his place. The additional work thrown upon the President's assistants, including his Chief of Staff, brought a new appreciation of the tremendous selfless contribution Hopkins had been making to his country.

I think it was during the first week in January that the President said:

"Bill, I'm going to promote you to a higher rank." He went on to outline his idea, which was to create the title of "Admiral of the Fleet." He said he was going to speak to Vinson (Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Naval Affairs Committee) about it.

After recovering from the surprise, I told Roosevelt that I thought the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were working for him exactly as I was were entitled to the same reward as he proposed to give me. I named General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold.

When Congressman Vinson first discussed the matter with me on January 10, I repeated to him my views, and related both conversations to my colleagues at the next J.C.S. meeting. The necessary legislation ran into many complications, one of them being over the title that would be given to Army and Air Force generals, who would receive the five-star rank. It finally passed the following December.

Later in January, together with many high-ranking Navy and Marine Corps officers, I attended an impressive ceremony at the Capitol, where a portrait of Vinson was hung in the committee room. In my opinion, the Georgia Representative had, in the past decade, contributed more to the national defence than any other single person in the country except the President himself. During my service as Chief of Naval Operations, 1937-9, it had been Chairman Vinson who had fought valiantly, although often in vain, to get funds to build up our defences in the Orient, particularly on the island of Guam.

There is little profit in speculating on what might have happened if Guam had been a strongly fortified base at the outbreak of the war. It was my thought back in the 1930s that this strategic Pacific island should be made strong enough to repel an enemy attack. If Guam could hold out until reinforcements could be sent, it would make a successful assault on the Philippines by the Japanese a much more hazardous undertaking. Of course, as it happened, even if Guam had been a stronghold, after December 7, 1941, there was no fleet to send there from Pearl Harbor.

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In mid-January, Mme. P. E. Flandin appealed to me in a letter from Algeria to aid her husband, former Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vichy in January and February, 1941, who was in prison charged with treason. She feared her husband would be executed without a fair hearing, a not unreasonable fear under the conditions then existing in France. I was convinced that Flandin was not a traitor in any accepted sense of the word, but there was nothing I could do to assist him.

* * *

Discussion of reorganization of the Navy had been going on for some time, and on January 15 I had lunch with Navy Under-Secretary James Forrestal, Assistant Secretary Bard, and Rear-Admiral Land. We discussed the proposal to separate the Office of Naval Operations and the office of Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, then concurrently held by Admiral King. I had always thought that the Chief of Naval Operations should be directly under the Secretary of the Navy. King was a strong and persistent advocate of the view that the C.N.O., as it is called in the Navy, should be the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

This question could have been settled quickly by a strong Secretary of the Navy, but it was a festering controversy for a long time, and was finally placed in the hands of the President. King continued to hold both jobs throughout the war.

* * *

Elmer Davis, of the Office of War Information, strongly supported by Steve Early, White House Press Secretary, had been pressing to obtain release for publication of an authentic report on Japanese atrocities committed against captured Americans. The British were afraid that its publication would stimulate the Japanese to further barbarous activity, but we succeeded on January 20 in having the British Staff in Washington agree to remove the censorship. They imposed the usual British restriction: that the story be released simultaneously in Britain and the United States. Although there was nothing the Joint Chiefs could do about it, we had protests from the American Press and radio that the British on several important occasions had not adhered to previously agreed release dates, but had given out news prematurely.

* * *

President Roosevelt was sixty-two years old Sunday, January 30. (The occasion reminded us that one year before we gave him a party in a plane while flying over Haiti *en route* from Trinidad to Miami.) A celebration of the President's birthday had been held the night before at the dinners and balls given throughout the country to raise funds to support the crippled President's campaign against infantile paralysis, of which he was the most conspicuous victim. I took my fifteen-year-old granddaughter, Louise Leahy, to the dinner at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, high-light of the birthday activities in the capital. The chief attraction was a group of motion picture actors and actresses, all of whom were completely unknown to me, but thoroughly familiar to Louise's generation.

Seeing all these "stars" from a favourable position at a table on the floor set aside for General Marshall and myself and obtaining the autographs from her heroes and heroines of the screen gave the child a thrill that cannot be expected ever to repeat itself. Some of these "notables" came to our table to sign Louise's programme, but she wanted as many as she could get, and led me by the arm around the brilliantly decorated dining-room to get more of those signatures that seemed to mean so much to her.

The following week we received the first of a long series of suggestions from Prime Minister Churchill for another Combined

Chiefs of Staff meeting with himself and the President. In his February 7 cablegram, he wanted a meeting in London in the immediate future to discuss the distribution of forces and facilities in our projected invasion of Europe. I talked it over with General Marshall and Admiral King. Marshall was not enthusiastic, and said he would want to consult Eisenhower before giving his opinion on the necessity of making the proposed trip to London. King was against the move, being convinced that the problems mentioned by Churchill could best be settled by keeping the American staff with the President and maintaining contact with the British through messages between Roosevelt and the Prime Minister.

The plain-spoken Admiral did not hide his irritation at some of the tactics of our British ally, and Admiral Sir Percy Noble, who represented Sir Andrew Cunningham on the British Staff in Washington, complained to me personally and confidentially that he was not getting "courteous cooperation" from the American Admiral. I got King in a corner soon after, passed on Sir Percy's complaint, and asked him to be more polite. King did quiet down, for a while at least. Churchill's suggestion for the London meeting was rejected.

* * *

We had pressing problems of our own. Our switch from defensive to offensive tactics in the Central Pacific area began in November, 1943, with an attack on the Japanese-held Gilbert Islands. Successful landings were made in January, 1944, by joint Army and Navy forces under Vice-Admiral Raymond A. Spruance on Kwajalein and Roi islands in the Marshall group. Two weeks later we had put a landing force on Eniwetok Atoll.

At noon of February 11, the Joint Chiefs met with the President to review plans for attacking Japan at the earliest practicable date, preferably with the support of heavy air assault from the Chinese mainland. Thousands of Chinese were engaged during the winter of 1943-4 in building huge landing fields for the great new B29 aeroplane, which by summer would be unloosing its destructive bomb load on the heart of industrial Japan. These super-bombers, half as large again as the familiar Flying Fortress (B17) were beginning to come off

the U.S. assembly lines in useful numbers. The Joint Chiefs hoped this new fighting aircraft, with its exceptionally long range, would be able to surmount the problem of distance and give material support to the offensive against Japan.

The general strategy was to go west through the Japanese-held islands until we were in a position to strike Japan proper. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was in command in the Central Pacific and was sending us his plans for taking some islands on the route and by-passing others. The J.C.S. usually approved the plans, because we felt that in Washington we were too far away to judge the details of his operations.

The next day (February 12) Major-General Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff to General Douglas MacArthur, conferred with me regarding future operations in the South-west Pacific area. It appeared that MacArthur's ideas might conflict with those of Nimitz, and the difference in the personalities of these two able commanders was going to require delicate handling. This same day we received the news that a son of Harry Hopkins had been killed in the assault on Kwajalein Island. His father was *en route* that day to enter a naval hospital in Miami, Florida.



No foreign officer in Washington was more diligent in his calls on me than Vice-Admiral Raymond Fenard, naval representative of the French Mission. Since June, 1943, he had been coming in seeking assistance for his beloved French Navy. He had been a "Darlan" man. Back in 1942, Darlan was asleep in Fenard's villa in Algiers when Eisenhower's civilian adviser, Robert D. Murphy, interrupted his rest to begin the crucial negotiations that led to Darlan's swinging most of French North Africa to the Allied cause.

Admiral Fenard particularly wanted to get planes and small ships and to have the French Navy participate in all Allied operations. It was finally decided to make him a present of a destroyer escort, and this vessel, the *Sénégalais*, was turned over to the French Navy by President Roosevelt at the Washington Navy Yard on February 12.

Fenard, who was by then serving the de Gaullist administration, wanted to have the President make the presentation to

the French Committee of Liberation. However, Roosevelt, in his address before a large crowd in the Washington Navy Yard on a bitterly cold day, gave the *Sénégalais* to the Admiral for the French *Navy*, avoiding any recognition of the de Gaulle-dominated Liberation Committee.

At a dinner given by the Fenards about two weeks before the ship presentation, Mme. Fenard spent much time telling me about the "oppression and atrocities that had been committed by the Vichy Government," but said nothing about any arbitrary and cruel activities of the de Gaullists. It was apparent that propaganda had convinced her of the virtues of de Gaulle's followers and of the villainy of all other Frenchmen.

(Fenard's pleasure over his achievement in acquiring an American warship was short-lived. Three months later, on May 18, he informed me that the *Sénégalais* had been damaged in action beyond repair. He promptly requested a replacement.)

I was back at the Washington Navy Yard a week later, this time (February 17) to inspect a new and completely modern wartime destroyer, the U.S.S. *Walke*. Rear-Admiral Louis Denfeld showed this old sailor the many marvellous improvements that had been made in destroyer design and equipment. The *Walke* had ample anti-aircraft batteries, the latest installations for finding the range and bearing of both air and surface targets, including "radar," a revolutionary aid to gunnery that I had not seen in Service use. I had commanded all the destroyers in the Navy from 1931 to 1933, and radar provided an almost miraculous improvement in gunnery and navigation over what we had on the destroyers of those earlier years.

* * *

Complaints and requests flowed into the office in their usual steady stream during February and March of 1944. A brief summary of my notes of this period illustrates the variety of matters presented, many of which I passed on to the President at our daily conferences:

February 7

H. F. Matthews, State Department, wanted Office of Naval Intelligence to withdraw objection to including a

German agent now in our custody in list of Germans to be exchanged for some American citizens then confined in Germany.

February 12

With Under-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, I prepared a message that the President sent to Ambassador Harriman at Moscow regarding possibility of surrender by Bulgaria.

Robert Murphy, now diplomatic representative with the Allied Occupation of Italy, discussed current political problems of western Europe and Africa.

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau sent assistant Secretary Pehle of the War Refugee Board to tell of efforts to rescue Jewish exiles from Germany and German-occupied areas in Europe.

February 23

Board of Economic Warfare's Captain Puleston told me that Sweden was continuing to provide war material, particularly ball bearings, to Germany, and that Great Britain was preventing our applying "corrective pressure" on the Swedes.

Stettinius discussed difficulties being encountered in getting American petroleum concessions in Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The President, to protect American interests, had taken a very strong attitude toward Britain in this matter.

February 24

Three Puerto Rican senators called to say that, in their opinion, unless a new Governor should be sent to the island to relieve Rexford Tugwell, there would be no possibility of holding a free election. They charged Tugwell with supporting the so-called Popular Party led by Muños Marín.

February 28

Mr. Byrnes, Head of the Office of War Mobilization, brought in Mr. Gibbs, a highly competent naval architect, who reported

that the French liner *Normandie* could be converted into the most efficient troop-carrier afloat in fourteen months.

March 2

Mr. Taussig of the State Department was worried over the effect on Caribbean natives of any reduction of U.S. military personnel at bases we had occupied under a lease agreement with Britain.

March 12

Dined with Senator and Mrs. Peter Gerry of Rhode Island. The one other guest being Senator Harry P. Byrd of Virginia. The Senators talked at length about prospective difficulties in winning the war, and the post-war period.

March 16

Lunched with General Patrick Hurley at the Army-Navy Club. He discussed diversion of Lend-Lease equipment by Britain to our disadvantage, and action of Russia in outfitting two Iranian divisions while still demanding much military material from us.

Hurley, a staunch Republican who disagreed violently with Roosevelt on domestic matters, said he thought the President should be re-elected to handle our international problems of the present and immediate future, and predicted he would be. The President had much confidence in Hurley's reliability in accurately carrying out the duties assigned to him in the foreign field.

March 19

State Department requested the Joint Chiefs' attitude toward a proposal made in Cairo by a Mr. Stirbei: that Rumania withdraw from the war and assume a co-belligerent status on the side of the Allies. Three days later the Press reported that elements of a German Army that had occupied Hungary were moving into Rumania.

March 22

Lewis Douglas, War Shipping Administrator, who resigned with the stated purpose of going to his Arizona home for a rest, came in to say goodbye. Douglas had handled the war

shipping problems with high efficiency and is, in my opinion, an official of exceptional ability.

Dined at the Statler Hotel with Vice-Admiral Fenard and Jean Monnet. The latter, an exceedingly clever man, discussed the merits and purposes of the de Gaulle Committee on National Liberation, of which he was the political representative in Washington. Monnet renewed his appeal for a loan to France of several million dollars at a nominal rate of interest.

March 27

Admiral Joseph M. Reeves discussed the attitude and prospective action of the Munitions Assignment Board toward the practice of some foreign nations in disposing of war materials similar to those being received from the United States under Lend-Lease.

March 30

Lunched with Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, who discussed a date for a new war loan. I think he meant new war bond drive.

Secretary of State Hull sent James Dunn to me for advice on a message received from Ambassador Harriman at Moscow regarding Russian-Finnish peace negotiations. Hitler soon would be left with only Japan as an active ally, since his "junior partners" were being eliminated rapidly by the success of the Allied Armies.

* * *

In the above account, an entry for March 4 was overlooked. On that day, correspondents from the Associated Press, *Time* Magazine, and the *Washington Star* came in at noon, seeking background on the Burma campaign and on the political and military situation and prospects in Europe. I had to tell them that I had no news that had not been published already. I wonder whether they believed me.

The three newsmen probably would have gone dashing for the nearest telephone if they had known that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were receiving the sharpest criticism yet made by naval commanders in the Pacific of the actions and operations

of General Douglas MacArthur. This was the most controversial single problem before the J.C.S. during March, 1944.

The controversy came to a head on the question of who should build and use an advance fleet base that Nimitz proposed to construct on Manus Island, one of the Admiralty group lying north of New Britain. MacArthur's forces began successful landing operations in the Admiralty Islands on February 29.

The argument over Manus Island confronted the Joint Chiefs once again with the major differences between the Army and Navy plans for the ultimate conquest of Japan. We had to decide whether or not to go directly to the large Island of Formosa, thus by-passing the Philippines entirely, or to employ a large portion of our naval forces in the Pacific to support MacArthur's determination to retake the Philippines, which his forces had so bravely defended against hopeless odds at the outbreak of the war. A glance at any map of the area shows that Formosa would place us closer to Japan and provide a springboard for launching aerial attacks on the enemy. On the other hand, we had promised the Filipinos, who were suffering cruelly under the Japanese occupation, that we would liberate them as soon as possible. From a purely strategical point of view, I was personally in favour of the Philippines operation.

This latter objective was a passion with MacArthur. Several years before the war, when he retired as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, he had gone to the Islands, at the invitation of the Philippine Government, to organize their defence. The Filipinos were then looking forward to their eventual independence from the United States. With the meagre material at hand, MacArthur had done well, as was attested by the excellent fighting qualities of the Filipino troops on Bataan. Even as the Joint Chiefs wrestled with the problem in Washington in March, 1944, courageous bands of Filipino guerrillas were operating against the Japanese on many of the islands and keeping MacArthur supplied with accurate information as to the strength and disposition of the occupying Japanese forces.

The Navy was aware of the military advantages involved and of the plight of the Filipinos, but its view was that their liberation could be accomplished more quickly if we would press our offensive closer to Japan itself. The Navy attitude was

that the sooner we could strike at the heart of Japan, the sooner Tokyo would surrender, and if we could occupy the Island of Formosa, with perhaps a subsidiary operation in the northern tip of Luzon, our powerful air forces could be used against the Japanese mainland.

The preceding paragraphs state the general background for a series of important and at times tense meetings of the Joint Chiefs held on March 11 and 12. A Navy story of the Manus Island dispute between General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey, related to me by an officer of the Pacific Fleet, and never fully confirmed in detail, was as follows:

“When Nimitz first recommended that an advance fleet base be built there by forces under the command of Admiral Halsey, it was proposed that the base should remain under Halsey. MacArthur objected strongly, and his headquarters ordered that Nimitz drop his plans, because MacArthur’s forces would build the base. Several conferences were held, including sessions between Halsey and MacArthur. MacArthur was reported to have said he would not stand for the Nimitz proposal, that the American people would not stand for it, that the Australians would not stand for it and, furthermore, that nothing was going to be allowed to interfere with his march back to the Philippines. Halsey, no shrinking violet himself, in turn charged that MacArthur was suffering from illusions of grandeur and that his staff officers were afraid to oppose any of their General’s plans, whether or not they believed in them.”

Tempers had cooled to some degree when the Joint Chiefs tackled the problem. Nimitz calmly presented the Navy point of view, stressing the value to his operations of a base on Manus Island. MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, General Sutherland, outlined the plans of his commander.

On March 11, I went with Admirals King and Nimitz to the White House to discuss the general aspect of Pacific war plans with the President. My recollection is that, in regard to Manus, Roosevelt thought the Joint Chiefs could handle that problem themselves. He was not as familiar with the geography of the Far Eastern areas as he was with Europe. He reminded us that his objective in the Pacific was to accomplish the defeat of Japan as soon as we had sufficient forces. He reiterated his determination to keep China in the war and, of course, our Pacific operations had a direct bearing on China.

I felt that Roosevelt recognized that perhaps disagreement in the Pacific grew out of a clash of personalities, and he made up his mind that he would make a personal inspection trip in the Pacific as soon as he could. He had made two trips across the Atlantic—to Casablanca and the Cairo-Teheran conferences. He had not yet visited the Pacific.

The following day, Sunday, March 12, the Joint Chiefs submitted a plan for operations against Japan during the next twelve months which I believe greatly clarified the situation. It was decided not to by-pass the Philippines, but to support MacArthur's invasion of the islands by way of the southernmost province of Mindanao. Simultaneously there was to be a vigorous advance by the Fleet toward either Formosa or the province of Luzon, which is the northernmost of the Philippine group. These plans were approved by the President and it appeared, for the time being at least, that MacArthur and the Navy would be working in harmony in the far-flung areas that constituted our Pacific battlefield.

Subsequently, after hazardous but effective submarine reconnaissance, someone—I think it was Halsey's group—came forward with the idea of separating the northernmost and southern Japanese forces in the Philippines by starting the invasion at Leyte, which is about one-third the way up the east coast of the Philippine Islands group. The Joint Chiefs were impressed and asked MacArthur's advice. He cabled back promptly that he liked the idea and would change his plans accordingly.

The same week of the Joint Chiefs' discussion of the entire Pacific problem, Washington received the news of a terrific aerial attack by the Navy on the Truk Islands. Preliminary reports claimed that nineteen Japanese vessels were sunk and 201 enemy planes destroyed, with a loss of only seventeen American aircraft. Truk was a vital enemy strongpoint, and if it should be neutralized it would appear that the Japanese would have to withdraw from the mid-Pacific to an inner defence line.

* * *

While my days were filled with work connected with the present and future military situation, hardly a week passed without some reminder of the interesting months spent at

Vichy as Ambassador to France in 1941-2. When we invaded North Africa in November of the latter year, the Pétain Government, then dominated by Pierre Laval, interned the Embassy staff. The Germans later moved them to Baden-Baden. They were returned to this country in March, 1944, sixteen months later, through a diplomatic exchange.

On March 18, Mr. and Mrs. Douglas MacArthur II entertained in their apartment some of the foreign service officers who, like themselves, had just come back. In addition to the MacArthurs, there were Colonel Schow and Tyler Thompson, who had been on my Embassy staff in Vichy. The repatriates said that they had received sufficient food and fair treatment while detained at Baden-Baden. Although kept under constant observation, they had been pretty free to do as they pleased, and were even allowed to go out in the town, but always with a guard. From their very limited point of view, no signs of an early collapse of the German people was evident.

Before the month was out I had seen nearly all of them, and it was a real pleasure to renew the associations with this group, who had served their country so loyally at the isolated diplomatic outpost in southern France. S. Pinckney Tuck, who was Chargé at Vichy after I returned to the United States, Captain Sabelot, Naval Attaché and Lieutenant-Commander Cassidy, who had been Assistant Naval Attaché, all came in to see me before the month was out.

Ralph Heinzen of the United Press, an experienced news reporter and skilful observer of European affairs, who had been interned with the diplomats, said many civilians whom he saw in Baden-Baden were anxious to have the war ended at any cost, but the military still were confident they would avoid a defeat. He also emphasized that the resistance groups in France known as Gaullists were not supporters of General de Gaulle, and that in his opinion the imposition of the latter upon the French nation would hasten an inevitable revolution in continental France.

* * *

Late in March, Churchill again suggested that a limited meeting of the Combined Staff be held, this time in Bermuda. April 5 was proposed as the date. The President directed me

to tell the Prime Minister that for various reasons he could not go to Bermuda at that time. Churchill ended the matter by saying that if the President could not come to the meeting, there was no purpose in having it.

Churchill did not state his reason for wanting the conference, but the twin questions of Polish boundaries and the Polish Government in Exile in London were threatening at this time to create a serious break between Russia and Britain. The Prime Minister had failed to recognize Soviet claims that a portion of eastern Poland to the Curzon Line was rightly Soviet territory. At Moscow, Stalin was refusing to have any relations with the Polish Government in London.

It appeared to me that Marshal Stalin very definitely intended to incorporate the so-called "Polish" territory into the Union of Soviet Republics, and that he had ample military power to do so. Stalin telegraphed Roosevelt on March 25, 1944, a copy of a message he was sending Churchill. We had observed the bluntness of the Soviet leader several times at the Teheran conference table, but this message was the strongest and most undiplomatic document I had ever seen exchanged between two ostensibly friendly governments. The paraphrased text, dated March 23, 1944, follows:

"I have recently received from you [Churchill] two messages on the Polish question and have Mr. Kerr's statement [Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in Moscow] to Mr. Molotov on the same question. I could not give you an early reply because matters at the front frequently distract me from non-military questions. Answers to your questions are given herewith.

"Your message, and particularly Kerr's statement, are interspersed with threats in regard to the Soviet Union. I should like to remind you that the method of threats is not only incorrect in the relationship of the Allies, but is harmful, as it can bring about reverse results.

"You speak of the efforts of the Soviet Union in defending the Curzon Line as a policy of force. This means that you now attempt to qualify the Curzon Line as not rightful and the fight for it unjust. I cannot agree. I must on the contrary remind you that in Teheran, you, the President [Roosevelt], and I came to an agreement regarding the rightfulness of the Curzon Line. At that time, you considered the position of the Soviet Government entirely correct, and you called the

representatives of the emigrant Polish Government insane if they should reject the Curzon Line.

"Now you are defending something entirely opposite. Does that mean that you do not recognize any longer the matters we agreed upon in Teheran and that by so doing this you are breaking the Teheran Agreement?"

"I do not doubt that if you had continued to stand firmly on your Teheran position, the conflict with the Polish emigrant Government would have already been solved. As for me and the Soviet Government, we shall stand by the Teheran position, as we consider the realization of the Curzon Line not a manifestation of a policy of force, but the re-establishment of lawful rights of the Soviet Union to those lands which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the Allied powers in 1919 recognized as non-Polish.

"In your March 7 message, you propose that the question of the Soviet-Polish border should be postponed until the peace conference. . . . The Soviet Union is not at war and does not intend to fight against Poland. The Soviet Union has no conflict with the Polish people and considers itself an ally of Poland. That is why the Soviet Union is shedding blood for the liberation of Poland from German oppression. Therefore it would be strange to talk about an armistice between the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

"But the Soviet Government does have a conflict with the emigrant Polish Government, which is not expressing the interests of the Polish people and does not express their hopes. It would be strange to identify Poland with the Government in London, which is separated from it. It is difficult for me even to point out a difference between the London Polish Government and the like emigrant Government of Yugoslavia, as well as between certain generals of the Polish emigrant and the Serbian General Mikhailovich.

"In your message of March 21, you say you intend to make a statement in the House of Commons that all questions regarding territorial changes should be postponed until peace conferences of the victorious powers are held, and that until then you cannot recognize any transference of territory *effected by force*. As I understand it, you are showing the Soviet Union as hostile to Poland and are practically renouncing the liberative character of the war of the Soviet Union against German oppression. This is ascribing to the Soviet Union

things that do not exist in reality, and thus discredit it. I do not doubt that the people of the Soviet Union and world public opinion will regard such a speech as an undeserved insult to the Soviet Union.

"You are free to make any speech in the House of Commons. That is your affair. But if you make such a speech, I shall consider that you have committed an act of injustice and unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union.

"You express the hope to me that the failure of the Polish question will not influence our co-operation in other spheres. As to me, I stood and continue to stand for co-operation. But I am afraid that the methods of threats and discreditation, if it will be used also in the future, will not favour this co-operation."

During this controversy, President Roosevelt had been steering a cautious course, seeking some basis for co-operation between Britain, Moscow, and the Polish group in London headed by Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, which refused to accept the Curzon boundary and sought to have us intercede in its behalf. The matter was handled by Secretary of State Hull and the President, but the text of the Soviet message is given here as an example of what we might expect in the future if this country should stir Stalin to anger. At this time, if the contents of the Stalin message and its implications had been known to the Germans, it would have been highly pleasing to Hitler and company.

* * *

Hitler's Japanese allies received some pleasing news at the end of March—news that marked a cruel blow to our war effort in Burma. On March 30, Field-Marshal Dill asked me to inform the American Chiefs of Staff that Churchill had received the "shattering news" that Major-General Orde C. Wingate probably had been killed in a plane accident while *en route* from Imphal to his headquarters in the jungle. The Prime Minister wanted the President to be informed at once also. London confirmed his death two days later.

We had met General Wingate at the Quebec war council in 1943. He had explained to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the details of his plans to continue effective guerrilla operations

against the Japanese in the Burma jungles. His performance up to the time of his death had been the most promising of the allied offensive efforts to relieve the pressure on China in that area. His daring initiative and imagination and superlative courage had been expected to bring continued success. His loss was a cruel blow to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Allied Commander in the Burma theatre.

* *

Of great concern to all of us as the spring of 1944 approached was the failure of our Commander-in-Chief to regain his accustomed good health. Frequent attacks of colds and of bronchitis had made it a bad winter for him. He spent a week at Hyde Park in January, in February, and later in March. When he returned to Washington on March 28, it was evident that he had not recovered from a severe bronchial attack. Dr. Ross McIntire, White House physician, decided that Roosevelt needed a long rest, so an invitation of Bernard Baruch to use his famous "Hobcaw" estate in South Carolina while recuperating was accepted.

We boarded the President's special train at 10 p.m., April 8, the party consisting of Major-General Watson, Vice-Admiral McIntire, Rear-Admiral Wilson Brown (*aide*), Lieutenant-Commander Fox (apothecary), Lieutenant William Rigdon (secretary), and the usual communication officers and Secret Service guards.

During the war days, when it was difficult to obtain any satisfactory accommodation on the railroads, it was truly travelling in luxury to have a journey in the President's private car. Mr. Baruch met us at Georgetown, South Carolina, at noon on Easter Sunday, April 9, and we drove to "Hobcaw" on the Waccamaw River, near where it flows into Wynyaw Bay. Baruch's estate, containing a baronial residence protected by thousands of acres of untouched forest, provided a luxurious and secure place for the President to rest. Its isolation also enabled him to get away from the pressure of work that is unavoidable in Washington. The temperature at "Hobcaw" averaged 68° F., and the quiet of the place was almost oppressive.

Son of a talented South Carolina physician, "Barney"

Baruch had accumulated a great fortune in New York City when he was a young man. Many years ago he purchased and fitted with all modern conveniences this beautiful estate. Baruch had now passed the age of seventy-three, but he was still a powerful influence in both the political and business life of America.

We settled down quickly to a routine that did not vary much from day to day. Following an 8 o'clock breakfast, I spent the forenoon with the dispatches from Washington and London that came every day in large and frequently annoying numbers. All of the messages that the map-room in the White House usually sent to my office in the East Wing were sent daily to "Hobcaw." At noon, the President examined the mail, went over the prepared replies, and we usually had lunch at 1 o'clock.

Every afternoon at 4 o'clock there was some kind of expedition, either by motor-boat on the rivers for fishing or by auto into the surrounding country. Dinner was served between 7 and 8 p.m. The President's absence on vacation was announced by the White House on April 11, but his whereabouts was not divulged.

On this same date, April 9, 1944, we received at "Hobcaw" the news that General de Gaulle had discharged General Henri Giraud from command of the French Army. The self-styled Provisional Governor of France announced also that France must have its share of the surrendered Italian warships and merchant vessels. This action should have caused even his British supporters to repudiate de Gaulle. Giraud's ouster was no surprise. In fact, I had been expecting it almost from the time that de Gaulle obtained control of the French Committee of Liberation. It was then my personal opinion that we, the Americans, would have constant friction with General de Gaulle until he should be eliminated from the problem of French participation in the war. However, I was in a minority.

Edward Wilson, our diplomatic representative in North Africa, discussed the matter with me several times during the winter on his visits to Washington. He was in favour of giving the Committee of Liberation as much opportunity to participate in the government of liberated France as the military situation would permit. Wilson believed that the difference between the de Gaulle group and the Allies eventually would be adjusted to our satisfaction.

Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, early in 1944, in talking with me, was of the opinion that General Eisenhower should be authorized to turn over to the de Gaulle group the civil government of areas in continental France that the Germans might be forced to evacuate.

And, of course, Winston Churchill used every opportunity to try to change Roosevelt's mind about de Gaulle. Throughout the spring, both Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff continued to press us to recognize de Gaulle and his group as the Provisional Government of France.

British persistence in pressing their desires probably has had much to do through the years in making Britain a great nation! One Sunday, as we were driving to Myrtle Beach, a summer resort some forty miles from "Hobcaw," we passed markers on the road telling of visits to this area by Lafayette, President Washington, and President Monroe. I suggested to the President that another historical marker should be placed on this highway to tell future visitors that in the year 1944 he also came to "Hobcaw" to escape from the British.

General Mark Clark, commanding the Fifth Allied Army in Italy, was a visitor on April 18. He gave the President a detailed account of the existing military situation in his area and of the usual difficulties encountered in the co-ordination of Allied forces. Clark had units from seven different countries in his command—American, English, Canadian, New Zealand, French, Italian, and Indian, many of them of inferior quality compared with the Germans. All of the different nationalities had their own ideas as to how the campaign should be conducted. Clark hoped that an attack plan for mid-May would succeed in driving back the German troops who had until then prevented an Allied advance beyond Cassino.

Lieutenant Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., U.S.N.R., was another welcome visitor. He stopped for dinner one day while *en route* from Charleston to Washington. He expressed concern about his father's health.

The best catch of fish came on April 22, when a Coast Guard patrol boat took the President and party some thirty miles into Wynyaw Bay. We trolled with three lines in the water and passed repeatedly through schools of bonito and weakfish. Roosevelt thoroughly enjoyed this sport, and I think the number of fish taken on board was about forty. I normally sat beside him on these fishing trips and felt that

the complete relaxation achieved by the President on these outings was better than any medicine the doctors could prescribe.

On April 25, Roosevelt entertained President-Elect Picardo of Costa Rica and his lady, who were *en route* to Washington. Also present were Prime Minister Curtin of Australia and Mrs. Curtin, Mrs. Roosevelt, and Mrs. Boettiger, the President's daughter. Señor Picardo, an attractive Latin-American, spoke English and French fluently. His wife spoke only Spanish, and there was no one in our party who could converse with her. Curtin belongs to the Labour Party of Australia. Both he and his wife had the strong accent of that country. They appeared to be simple, kindly people. The luncheon conversation centred about social and economic reforms in Australia and America, a topic that gave much opportunity to Mrs. Roosevelt.

At 1.30 p.m. on April 28, 1944, we heard over the radio that Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had died in Washington from a heart attack. The President called in the correspondents of the three Press associations to give them a statement of his distress at the news of the passing of Knox. The newspapermen were staying in nearby Georgetown.

General MacArthur's statement that he "does not covet and will not accept a nomination as candidate for President" appeared in the papers on April 30. The President did not show much interest in the announcement, but I commented that if General MacArthur should get the nomination he would be a very dangerous antagonist for anybody, including Roosevelt. His statement seemed to leave the Republican field open to Governor Dewey of New York.

After a restful four weeks, the President had regained his normal condition of health and was displaying some of his accustomed energy. We ended our visit in "Hobcaw" on May 6, 1944, which also happened to be my sixty-ninth birthday.

General Marshall sent a birthday message that touched me deeply. Marshall wrote: "I did not want the occasion to pass without thanking you for the many ways in which you have made my job easier during the past year. The efficient functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the results of our combined meetings are due, in an important measure, to your leadership."

Among the first callers after my return to Washington was Representative Carl Vinson, who recommended that I urge the President to appoint the Under-Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, to the Cabinet post vacated by the death of Secretary Knox. Forrestal had an excellent record in the No. 2 post and his elevation was almost a foregone conclusion. In fact, Roosevelt announced Forrestal's appointment on May 10.

* * *

Although we had not yet launched our attack against Hitler, thoughtful men in Washington were beginning to discuss seriously the difficult problems that were to arise as we progressed toward final victory.

The political situation in Europe and in Russia and the post-war business prospects in these countries were discussed in a most interesting fashion at a dinner given by Under-Secretary of State Stettinius on May 9 in his Shoreham Hotel apartment. The guests were Under-Secretary Forrestal of the Navy, Patterson and McCloy of the Army, Ambassador Harriman, Admiral King, James Dunn of the State Department, and myself.

All of these men, except King, Dunn, and myself, had been connected with great business corporations before the war, and all of them were reported to be men of great wealth.

A week later, also at dinner, William C. Bullitt made a prediction to me that it would be necessary for the United States to accept General de Gaulle. He also believed that, in our own interests, we would have to take over the task of rehabilitating France to save it from Bolshevism. Bullitt, Ambassador to France when that nation collapsed under Hitler's blows in 1940, was very anxious to get back into this problem in some way. When the American Army turned him down, he went over and actually became an officer in the French Army. When the French went across the Rhine, Bullitt was there with them. During this same week Ray Atherton, our Ambassador to Canada, discussed with me the attitude of Canada toward present British foreign policy. He reported that some of his Canadian acquaintances felt that Churchill was moving rapidly toward the age-old British foreign policy of balance of power in Europe as it had been advocated by the Tory

Party in the United Kingdom. In another conversation with Ambassador Winant, who was in Washington, our London envoy spoke at length about the British political attitude toward war problems. Their complete integration of the military and civil government in all matters that bore on the present or future interests of the British Empire impressed Winant deeply. The Britons were using all of their energies to safeguard those things considered necessary for the preservation of the British Empire. We Americans were devoting our efforts exclusively to destroying the Germans, with not too much thought about the future.

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was having difficulty in arranging the exchange rate of money in the countries to be liberated in Europe. I knew nothing about money or international finance, but it seemed to help Morgenthau to tell me his troubles over a lunch table, which he did from time to time.

I saw Harriman again before he left in May to return to Moscow and had a very interesting talk about the current situation in Russia. He requested that I transmit to him messages received by the President from Marshal Stalin.

* * *

The state of the President's health was figuring in the intermittent public discussions as to whether or not Roosevelt would seek the nomination from his party for a fourth term. Shortly after returning from his long convalescence in South Carolina, he asked me (May 15) to look into arrangements for a trans-Atlantic voyage about the middle of June and also an inspection cruise to Alaska and Honolulu. He told me he planned to leave Washington on July 23, 1944, for Seattle, thence by destroyer to Alaska, by cruiser to Pearl Harbor, and return by way of San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco, reaching Washington about August 20.

In talking with him about the continental part of this proposed tour, I brought up the matter of its bearing on the approaching political campaign. The President replied, with much feeling:

"Bill, I just hate to run for election. Perhaps the war will by that time have progressed to a point that will make it unnecessary for me to be a candidate."

While I had been sure that the President would like to retire from his present office, this was the first time he had expressed himself to me clearly regarding his attitude toward renomination. By the next morning he had abandoned the idea of a trip across the Atlantic in June, but he wanted me to go ahead with plans for the Pacific trip.

That same morning the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a closed session, spent an hour discussing the current agitation for a single department of national defence. General Marshall was in favour of a statutory J.C.S. with a single Cabinet officer in charge of all elements of national defence. General Arnold seemed to be in general agreement with Marshall.

Admiral King did not like the idea of a single defence set-up, although he considered abolition of the Navy's bureau system necessary for efficiency.

When it came my turn to speak, I told them that before making any recommendation for a unification of the armed forces or to enforce abolition of the Navy's bureau system, the subject should be given an exhaustive study. I felt that it would be a radical change in the existing method of controlling the armed forces in a war. Judging by results to date (this was May, 1944), the existing system seemed to be working very well.

There was one point on which all of us agreed. We felt the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be a permanent body *responsible only to the President*, and that the J.C.S. should advise the President on the national defence budget.

* * *

News from the war fronts was generally favourable throughout May. The Russian offensives were particularly successful. Moscow reported on May 10 that the Soviet Army had captured Sevastopol. This cleared the Axis invaders from the Crimea. No one knew on this date that nine months later the Big Three—Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin—were to converge on this war-torn area to hold the famous Yalta conferences, some ninety miles inland from Sevastopol.

I left Washington on June 3 and arrived at Mount Vernon, Iowa, the next day, where I made the Commencement Address at Cornell College and received an honorary degree

as Doctor of Laws. The next few days were spent visiting scenes of my early childhood in and around Hampton, Iowa. *En route* I stopped at Cedar Rapids to inspect the Naval Recruiting Station, and reviewed a parade of 800 Waves.

At Hampton, I was the guest of Mrs. Effie Reeve Mallory, surviving daughter of Colonel Reeve, my father's partner in the practice of law in Hampton in 1870-80. As I recall it, we were having breakfast in their home on June 6 when the radio brought to Iowa news that the invasion of France had begun. Great excitement prevailed. I suppose it was natural that they should ask me all kinds of questions. I told them as much as I could. We had been planning the invasion for many months, and this was the beginning of the long and successful campaign that was to knock Germany out of the war.

Hampton is a small town of some 2,000 inhabitants. My presence there was known, of course, and the Mallorys' telephone rang constantly all the morning, as neighbours wanted to know what their guest could tell them about the fighting then in progress on the beaches of Normandy.

During the day I visited the house in which I was born, and the farm on which it stands. Some survivors of a half-century ago assured me that the house had remained unchanged since my arrival there in 1875. I made calls on several surviving friends of my parents and upon a very aged, ill woman who acted as nurse when I was first in need of attention. That afternoon I spoke to the Ladies' Auxiliary of the American Legion and that night to a large Legion meeting at the Hampton High School. All of this made a full day and a very interesting one for the visitor.

Throughout the visit in Iowa, I was particularly impressed with its agricultural wealth, its fields all under cultivation, its attractive farmhouses, its herds of cattle and hogs, and its self-reliant, independent, prosperous inhabitants.

* * *

Back in Washington on June 9, I agreed to the request of Admiral Noble to permit the Chief of the Polish underground army, who used the assumed name of "General Tabor," to address the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Tabor and I held a long conference the next day, and he repeated his story

before the Combined Chiefs on June 12. It was a statement of the conditions and hopes of the Polish underground army.

General Tabor said that Poland was under a reign of terror, that Poles were executed in large numbers by the local German authorities without trial, and that in retaliation the Polish underground in 1943 had notified in advance and assassinated 1,700 German officials. He placed the estimated number of the underground at 250,000, and said that, if it were supplied by the Allies with equipment, clothing, and money for subsistence, this underground army could seriously interrupt communications behind the German lines and make it extremely difficult for the German armies in Poland to retreat, when and if they were unable to repel the expected attack by Russia.

The United States and Britain at this time were very desirous of giving assistance to Poland. We wanted to send in some food, which would be dropped from planes, but it was useless to take up the matter with our Russian allies. We knew they would not permit American planes to operate over Poland to aid the underground army. The Russians had other plans for Poland.

* * *

Marshall, King, and Arnold had gone to London on June 8 in order to work closely with the British Imperial General Staff during the first phase of the allied invasion in France. They returned on June 22, and a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs was held to discuss their observations.

On the whole, things were going well, but Marshall found that the handling of some of the equipment for the invasion troops had not been too good. It had been spread out in too many different places, and it was difficult to assemble it at the specific points where it was needed. The British, too, were having supply troubles, but the two staffs worked closely to institute corrective action. The slowness of the British divisions on our left flank was displeasing. They had not made the progress expected of them. Marshall appreciated the difficulties that Eisenhower faced in handling his mixed force of Allied troops. One-third of the invasion force was British under the direct command of General Sir Bernard Montgomery.

"Operation Overlord," under Eisenhower's direction, was a complete success, but I did gather from the conversations of

our chiefs on their return that there was considerably more argument and criticism of the British than has appeared in publicized accounts.

Eisenhower was having his troubles with Churchill concerning the already agreed upon supporting flank attack from southern France. By the end of June there was a definite impasse between the American and British Chiefs of Staff regarding this operation. We were insisting on an early attack in force on the Mediterranean coast of France. The British were doggedly and equally insistent on using our available forces to advance north in Italy and then project an invasion to the Balkans through the Istrian Peninsula.

The Prime Minister had opposed the southern France operation when Stalin advocated it vigorously at Teheran. It was a part of the long story of the differing attitudes of the British and Americans toward the war. We were concentrating on the early defeat of Nazi Germany. The British wished to defeat the Nazis, but at the same time to acquire for the Empire post-war advantages in the Balkan States.

I knew all the time that Roosevelt would be opposed to any diversion of force to the Balkans. The President fully sustained his American military chiefs, and on July 1 he received from Churchill a message giving agreement for the attack on southern France to be made at the earliest practicable date, using at least three divisions in the initial landing, with a rapid build up of ten divisions, to be composed largely of French Moroccan troops.

The State Department in June, 1944, was giving much thought to the political problems that would arise with the defeat of Germany. On June 19, Under-Secretary of State Stettinius presented to the President his recommendation that the problem be dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis by a Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, England, the Soviet Union, China, and France. Stettinius believed that a formal peace conference would be too slow. This recommendation was accepted later in principle by the three great powers, but it did not prove effective in reducing complications and long delays in peace negotiations.

Later in June Robert Bliss invited a small group to hear a Dr. Foerster, a prominent Bavarian professor, discuss the problem of post-war Germany. Dr. Foerster said that the Nazi philosophy was not of Prussian origin, but that it had been accepted and developed by the entire German people. His

only useful suggestion for corrective action was that there should be close Allied control of any post-war government and that Germany should be broken up into separate states. Foerster was positive that there were in Germany no political groups with which the Allies could work in establishing a friendly government, and that it would be necessary for us to impose on the defeated German people a government acceptable to us.

Roosevelt had often talked to me about the precautions it would be necessary to take to prevent German aggression in the future. He had presented his own dismemberment ideas at the Teheran Conference, which, had they been adopted and carried out, would have replaced the Germany of the Hohenzollerns and of Hitler with five separate German states corresponding roughly to the political organization of Germany before Bismarck forged them into a single nation.

At a reception given by Joseph Davies, Sir Bernard Pares, a British authority on Russian history, had pointed out Russia's need for co-operation with an industrial nation. He was convinced the Soviet would seek that co-operation either with Britain and America or with Germany.

Stalin made good on his promise to co-ordinate his spring and summer operations of 1944 with our invasion of Europe. On June 11 the Russian Army started an offensive on the Leningrad front, and two weeks later a second major attack was launched in the vicinity of Vitebsk. By midsummer the Soviet Armies were winning successes against the Germans at many points along the Russian front. The concerted Soviet attack from the east and the Anglo-American attack from the west was under way.

"Operation Overlord" was progressing favourably, and on June 27 the important port of Cherbourg surrendered to American troops commanded by General Omar Bradley. As soon as the thorough destruction carried out by the Germans at Cherbourg could be repaired, we would have a seaport through which we could reinforce and supply the Allied armies in western France.

* * *

The most interesting news from the Pacific was a report on June 16, 1944, that long-range air operations against the

Japanese mainland had begun with a B29 raid on the industrial centre of Yawata. These great planes were measurably increasing the striking power of military aircraft. Three days later, June 19, came news of the repulse of a mass Japanese air attack on our fleet in the Marianas Islands, with the probable destruction of 300 enemy planes.

This complete defeat of a large Japanese air attack by an American naval task force was a major victory in the Pacific and a full justification of our efforts through twenty years to build up and train a highly specialized naval air arm. It forced an abandonment by the Japanese Navy of its projected relief of the Island of Saipan. This same week Rear-Admiral Richard E. Byrd brought to my office for transmission to the President his survey of both military and commercial aviation possibilities in the Pacific. It was an all-inclusive document of great value in the planning of post-war defences of America and in post-war arrangements for international commercial air traffic.

* * *

On July 6, 1944, I met personally for the first time the figure who probably has occupied more space in this narrative so far than any other, with the exception of the "Big Three"—General Charles de Gaulle. He arrived by plane that day for his long-delayed visit to the American capital, and was received by the President and all members of the Cabinet in the reception-room on the ground floor of the White House. At our first meeting I found him more agreeable in manner and appearance than I had expected.

The French leader's three-day visit in Washington was filled with official entertainment. The first invitation received from him to one of the receptions was worded as follows:

"LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE
*du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française vous
prie de lui faire l'honneur, etc."*

This was generally accepted as a public announcement of his self-assumed position as Provisional President of the French Republic.

The President gave a luncheon for forty men on July 7 in de Gaulle's honour, and gave a very pleasing, friendly talk in which he skilfully avoided any political implications, confining himself to discussing the traditional friendship of America and France. On the final day of his visit, General Béthouart, who formerly had been in Washington, but was now with the French Army and a member of the de Gaulle entourage, talked to me about the intention of France to take action to recover Indo-China from the Japanese. Of course, he wanted assistance from us, and I told him that in my opinion Indo-China could not at that time be included within the sphere of interest of the American Chiefs of Staff.

Also on July 7, Assistant Secretaries John J. McCloy of the War Department and Daniel W. Bell of the Treasury brought to the office for delivery to the President a draft agreement accepting the French Committee of National Liberation as the *de facto* authority for civil government in France. This agreement also gave the Committee authority to issue supplemental French currency.

De Gaulle made a very good impression upon the people he met during his brief stay in our capital, including myself. I had a better opinion of him after talking with him. However, I remained unconvinced that he and his Committee of Liberation necessarily represented the form of Government that the people of France wished to have after their nation's liberation from the Nazis.

* * *

In preparation for the discussion that Roosevelt would hold with his Pacific Commanders, the Joint Chiefs had a special meeting on July 10 to hear details of pending Pacific operations to defeat Japan proposed by our planning staff. These plans contemplated for planning purposes an invasion of the Japanese mainland with which I was not in agreement, but the assumption that we might have to do this appeared necessary to assist in preparing alternative plans.

A large part of the Japanese Navy was already at the bottom of the sea. The same was true of Japanese merchant shipping. There was every indication that our Navy would soon have the rest of Tokyo's warships sunk or out of action. The combined Navy surface and air force action even by this

time had forced Japan into a position that made her early surrender inevitable. None of us then knew the potentialities of the atomic bomb, but it was my opinion, and I urged it strongly on the Joint Chiefs, that no major land invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary to win the war. The J.C.S. did order the preparation of plans for an invasion, but *the invasion itself was never authorized.*

Politics was to intrude frequently during the forthcoming trip of the President to Honolulu and Alaska. Two days before we left, July 11, Roosevelt announced at his news conference that he would accept the nomination to run for a fourth term. He said he told the National Democratic Committee that while all of his personal inclinations were not to serve another term, he felt that under the existing war conditions he had no more right to refuse than any soldier had to refuse duty in battle. Therefore, if he should be nominated by the party and elected by the people of the United States, he would accept the office of President and continue to serve to the best of his ability.

There was much talk at the time also about who would be Roosevelt's choice as a running mate. A number of his political advisers were trying to find a satisfactory substitute for Vice-President Wallace.

The last two days in Washington, July 12-13, were busy ones. Cheering news came that Harry Hopkins had returned to work with his health much improved, and, if he would take care to preserve his strength, he was expected to be able to continue as a valuable assistant to the President. Hopkins came into my office at noon and we had a long talk which centred around the persistent efforts of Churchill to have another Combined Staff meeting. Hopkins thought that this would be inadvisable in the near future because of the political campaign then about to get under way. Hopkins also mentioned the possible candidacy of James Byrnes for Vice-President.

Laurence Steinhardt, American Ambassador to Turkey, told me that Turkey had made a formal offer to Great Britain to break diplomatic relations with Germany at once and declare war on the Axis at any time specified by London. He said the British had not replied, and added that throughout the Balkan States there was a general distrust of the British, but that the Turks had real confidence in the integrity of the

United States. A message was received from General Giraud advocating an extension of the Italian campaign into Austria to meet a Russian advance, which he expected in the near future. Giraud's recommendation was given full consideration by both the Joint Chiefs and the President.

On July 13 we turned our eyes to the Pacific as we started on the first portion of a long but interesting journey that was to give the President an opportunity for personal contact with many of our Pacific commanders, including General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.

CHAPTER XVI

PACIFIC WAR PROBLEMS. SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE

PLANS FOR DEFEATING JAPAN were to be practically completed at conferences with our Pacific Commanders in Honolulu in July, 1944, and at the Eighth Allied War Council held in Quebec the following September—with one important exception. The exception was the role to be played by Russia, but that is the story of Yalta.

Roosevelt's trip to the Pacific began on the night of July 13, 1944, when the Presidential Special left Washington for Hyde Park. We arrived in time to breakfast with the President's family, inspect the Roosevelt Library and, after a pleasant day, board the train at 6.30 p.m., July 14, for California. Members of the President's party, in addition to myself, were: Major-General Watson, Vice-Admiral Ross McIntire, Rear-Admiral Wilson Brown, Captain Wood, U.S.N., Assistant Surgeon Bruin, U.S.N.R., Judge Rosenman, Elmer Davis, Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, Miss Tully and Mrs. Brady (confidential secretaries), and the usual communication and Secret Service personnel. We reached Chicago shortly after noon, July 15, where during a service stop some high political leaders of the Democratic Party boarded the train and conferred with the President. The Democratic National Convention was in progress at Chicago.

All on the train had assumed that Roosevelt would receive the nomination and felt that any contest at the convention would be between the various candidates for nomination as Vice-President.

Before we left Washington, Hopkins had indicated that one of the strong contenders for the Vice-Presidential post would be James F. Byrnes. I had known Mr. Byrnes when he was a Senator and at that time entertained a very high regard for him. He had an excellent record in several different tasks which the President had assigned to him in the war effort. In talking with Roosevelt, I frequently slipped in a strong recommendation for his favourable consideration of Byrnes. On the Presidential car, and in Roosevelt's presence,

we talked frequently about our preferences for the second highest post on the Democratic ticket—that is, all of us except the President himself. After we had left Chicago, he gave us the surprising information that he had recommended Senator Harry Truman of Missouri for Vice-President.

Except for the knowledge that Senator Truman had, with great skill and efficiency, handled a Senate Committee for the investigation of national defence, I knew almost nothing about him. It was at that time my opinion that the President had made a mistake in not supporting the candidacy of Byrnes. Time has proved fully that Roosevelt was right, as usual, in his choice of men and that in this instance I was wrong.

On board the train on July 16 we received an urgent request from Churchill for a Combined Staff meeting. This was the Prime Minister's third attempt, and on this occasion the President replied that he would be agreeable to a conference in Scotland about the middle of September, which was the earliest time he could make available.

We had a two-day stop-over at the huge wartime Navy and Marine Corps base at San Diego, California. During the forenoon of July 20, I accompanied the President on an inspection of the final training exercises of two combat teams of amphibious troops. We saw about 10,000 men make an actual landing through moderate surf on a beach some forty miles north of San Diego. The landing exercises called for the troops to occupy the shore for three days without contact with the transports. Amphibious tanks and landing-craft were used under simulated war conditions. It was a thrilling and informative sight. One could understand, after watching these manoeuvres, why our Marines were able to make landing after landing on strategic Japanese islands frequently against fanatical resistance. The President seemed greatly interested as he watched this mock landing operation, and congratulated the officers in charge. Amphibious training on the Pacific coast was directed by Rear-Admiral R. C. Davis.

The next afternoon Admiral Davis took me to the school where Army, Navy, and Marine personnel destined for Pacific operations were receiving special amphibious warfare training. I was particularly interested in a method for the control of aircraft, ships' gunfire and artillery, in support of ground troops, that had been used with great success at Saipan.

Amphibious warfare, of course, was not new to the Navy

and Marines. Methods of increasing our efficiency in this type of warfare were under constant study and had been developed considerably when I was in the Fleet. What we were seeing at San Diego was its development on a grand scale.

While in San Diego the Press reported (July 21) a considerable revolt in Germany, culminating in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Hitler. Despite the reported failure of the plot, it appeared that a disintegration of military morale in Germany had commenced and that a surrender of the Nazis might be expected in the reasonably near future.

On this same day the Democratic Party nominated Senator Truman of Missouri as candidate for Vice-President. In less than ten months Harry S. Truman was to become President of the United States.

At 9 p.m., July 21, 1944, the President and his party went on board the U.S.S. *Baltimore*, a heavy cruiser, Captain W. C. Calhoun commanding. The President occupied the Captain's cabin and I was quartered in the Flag Officer's cabin. The voyage to Hawaii was without incident and the weather generally pleasant. On July 23 we received a report from the Commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier that what might be an enemy task force had been reported 200 miles north of Oahu. This was such a distance from the course of the *Baltimore* as to cause us no concern. At 3 p.m., July 26, our cruiser went alongside a sea wall in Pearl Harbor.

In spite of efforts to keep the presence of the President a secret, ships outside the harbour, and apparently everybody in Honolulu, knew that he was on board the *Baltimore*. Pearl Harbor was jammed with ships of all kinds. Except for a few men-of-war, most of our fighting ships were several thousand miles west of us, successfully battling the Japanese. Here in Pearl Harbor was a vast, twenty-four-hour a day operation of reinforcement and supply.

There was no striking evidence remaining of the frightful damage inflicted in the sneak attack by the Japanese on our fleet as it rode easily at anchor on Sunday, December 7, 1941, the day so aptly termed by President Roosevelt—in his address to Congress asking for a declaration of war—as “the day of infamy.”

Immediately after mooring, Roosevelt received Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commanding naval forces in the Pacific, and a large group of flag officers of the Navy and general

officers of the Army and Marine Corps. General Douglas MacArthur, commanding allied forces in the South-west Pacific, had arrived by plane from Australia, and when the reception for all of the other ranking officers had been concluded, General MacArthur came on board the *Baltimore*. He and the President exchanged friendly greetings. It was the first time I had seen MacArthur for many years. Unlike the battle-worn Generals Chennault and Stilwell whom we had seen in Washington some months before, MacArthur showed no strain other than looking a little tired, and he seemed to be in good health and spirits. He was wearing heavy winter clothing. I said to him jokingly, "Douglas, why don't you wear the right kind of clothes when you come up here to see us?"

"Well, you haven't been where I came from, and it's cold up there in the sky," MacArthur shot back. Our friendship dated back nearly forty years—to 1905, when as young officers we had good times together in San Francisco.

The President and his party left the ship at 5 p.m. and proceeded through lines of soldiers and a cheering populace to a palatial residence on the beach near the Moana Hotel, which had been set aside for our use. From 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. the next day, July 27, the President kept to a schedule so crowded with inspections of Army and Navy activities in Oahu as to leave him not a minute to spare. We also received the distressing news that Lieutenant-General Lesley J. McNair, who was to assume command of American troops in England, had been killed while on observation at the front in Normandy. That evening, the President had MacArthur, Nimitz, Halsey, and me to dinner. After the meal, MacArthur and Nimitz met with the President and me to talk over the Pacific war situation. This discussion was not finished at midnight and was resumed the next morning (July 28), lasting until noon.

The spacious living-room of the residence in which we were quartered was used as a conference-room. Huge wall maps were hung, and MacArthur and Nimitz from time to time would illustrate their discussions with the use of a long bamboo pointer. After so much loose talk in Washington, where the mention of the name MacArthur seemed to generate more heat than light, it was both pleasant and very informative to have these two men who had been pictured as antagonists calmly present their differing views to the Commander-in-

Chief. For Roosevelt it was an excellent lesson in geography, one of his favourite subjects.

MacArthur was convinced that an occupation of the Philippines was essential before any major attack in force should be made on Japanese-held territory north of Luzon. The retaking of the Philippines seemed to be a matter of great interest to him. He said that he had sufficient ground and air forces for the operation and that his only additional needs were landing-craft and naval support.

Nimitz developed the Navy's plan of by-passing the Philippines and attacking Formosa. He did not see that Luzon, including Manila Bay, had advantages that were not possessed by other areas in the Philippines that could be taken for a base at less cost in lives and material. As the discussions progressed, however, the Navy Commander in the Pacific admitted that developments might indicate a necessity for occupation of the Manila area. Nimitz said that he had sufficient forces to carry out either operation. It was highly pleasing and unusual to find two commanders who were not demanding reinforcements.

Roosevelt was at his best as he tactfully steered the discussion from one point to another and narrowed down the area of disagreement between MacArthur and Nimitz. The discussion remained on a friendly basis the entire time, and in the end only a relatively minor difference remained—that of an operation to retake the Philippine capital, Manila. This was solved later, when the idea of beginning our Philippine invasion at Leyte was suggested, studied and adopted.

These two meetings were much more peaceful than I had expected after what I had been hearing in Washington. Here in Honolulu we were working with facts, not with the emotional reactions of politicians. MacArthur had shown exceptional ability early in his Army career, and his rise had been rapid. It was no secret that in the Pentagon Building in Washington there were men who disliked him, to state the matter mildly. The attitude of some of our naval commanders had already been shown by the events which led up to the conference at Honolulu. I personally was convinced that MacArthur and Nimitz were, together, the two best qualified officers in our service for this tremendous task. Nimitz promised that he would give the Army Commander the needed transportation and naval support. Both told the President they had what

they needed, that they were not asking for anything, and that they would work together in full agreement toward the common end of defeating Japan.

The agreement on fundamental strategy to be employed in defeating Japan and the President's familiarity with the situation acquired at this conference were to be of great value in preventing an unnecessary invasion of Japan which the planning staffs of the Joint Chiefs and the War Department were advocating, regardless of the loss of life that would result from an attack on Japan's ground forces in their own country. MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement that the Philippines should be recovered with ground and air power then available in the western Pacific, and that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air powers without an invasion of the Japanese homeland.

Nimitz and MacArthur discussed with the President the role that the British, especially the Royal Navy, would play in the final operations against Japan. This information would be useful to the President when Great Britain should come out into the open with an expression of its desires. There were reports that some elements in Churchill's Government were in favour of obtaining a controlling interest in the Dutch East Indies once they had been recaptured. It was MacArthur's contention that the British should not be allowed to assume control of any territory that we recaptured from the enemy. I suspected that the Australians, in this matter, were in complete agreement with MacArthur.

The President's party enjoyed an evening of native entertainment, consisting of an orchestra, a vocalist, and a *hula* dancer, who performed beautifully. The performance took place on a lawn between the house and the sea and under palm trees, the leaves of which were alternately black and silver in the bright light of a half-moon. It was a lovely setting and a beautiful sight.

The President carried out an arduous schedule of inspections on Saturday. As our party drove through the streets of Honolulu to visit the various naval and military establishments, Roosevelt received enthusiastic applause from the people of the different races that inhabited Oahu. The majority of these seen on the streets were patently of Japanese extraction, but their demonstrations were equal to those of the Hawaiians and the continental Americans.

We stopped at Hickam Field to observe the unloading from a plane of a group of wounded men. They had been moved in thirty-six hours from the battlefields of Guam. The President made an extended inspection of the Aiea Naval Hospital, a large facility completely equipped and staffed to care for more than 5,000 patients. Roosevelt talked with a number of the wounded men, who seemed to be making excellent progress toward recovery. Surgeon-General McIntire told me that practically all of them would be restored to health and would be able to remain useful members of their home communities.

The President drew another ovation when he spoke briefly to the civilian war workers in the administration building at the Navy Yard. He also reviewed the battle hardened troops of the Army's Seventh Division that contained veterans of operations against the Japanese on Attu in the Aleutians and on Kwajalein Island in the Pacific.

We boarded the cruiser *Baltimore* at 7.30 p.m., July 29, after a somewhat strenuous but thoroughly satisfying three days in Honolulu.

The *Baltimore* set a course of 354° True, speed 21 knots, for Adak, our first stop in Alaska. We had an anti-submarine screen of four destroyers. The *Baltimore* zigzagged as a precaution against submarines.

The death of President Manuel Quezon of the Philippine Islands was reported to us by radio on August 1, 1944. I had had many conferences with Quezon, an extremely able leader of his people, and felt it would be difficult to replace him.

After a five-day trip northward from Hawaii, we moored to a long, newly constructed dock in the harbour of Adak at 10 a.m., August 3. Leaving the ship, the President drove through the area under naval control, and we had lunch with enlisted men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, where the President gave a pleasing short talk to the men. The United States at this time had at Adak an Army force of 14,000 and a naval strength of 8,000, which was being maintained in preparation for an attack on the Japanese Kurile Islands at some future date.

A gale from the south upset our crowded schedule to the extent of cancelling a projected visit to Dutch Harbor, where the President had hoped to see the naval installations that were then of little value in our war effort against Japan. The wind moderated in the late afternoon and at 7.30 p.m.,

August 4, we left Adak for Kodiak Island. *En route* we passed Unalaska Island on the starboard beam. The weather generally was cold, with an almost constant drizzling rain—reminiscent of winter rains in Puget Sound. We reached Kodiak at noon on August 8. This island, prior to World War II, had been intended to be our principal naval base in the Aleutians. The war activity had moved further west, and I had doubts that the Kodiak base should be maintained after peace had been made. It has a splendid harbour, and for that reason a base of some kind might be kept in operating condition. After a full, busy, and interesting day, with the usual inspections, we got under way for Juneau, Alaska, on the evening of August 8.

The weather was foul. It was raining and a fog reduced the visibility to one mile. The *Baltimore*, however, held to a good speed of 20 knots as we were approaching Cape Spencer. This was intensely interesting to me, because navigation under these conditions would have been impossible when I had my last command at sea. I watched the cruiser being handled smoothly with instruments invented since then. The radar gave me an excellent picture of the narrow strait entrance some six miles distant and of the islands on both sides. An electric fathometer kept a continuous record of the changing depths of water.

In my days at sea, an approach to this coast in such visibility conditions would have been an unwarranted hazard and unsafe, but with the aids to navigation then installed in the *Baltimore* it appeared perfectly safe and easy of accomplishment.

On Wednesday, August 9, we remained anchored most of the day in Auk Bay, about twenty miles north of Juneau. Governor Ernest Gruening of Alaska conferred on board with the President, and in the afternoon Roosevelt enjoyed a fishing expedition which netted all of us some salmon. We returned to the ship at 8.30 p.m. in full daylight, although the sun had disappeared behind mountains to the west a half-hour earlier.

We transferred to the destroyer *Cummings* alongside the *Baltimore* and sailed for Bremerton by way of the Inland Passage. I believe this was the first time that the Presidential party had travelled on a destroyer. The smaller warship was used so that we could remain close to shore, and it was hoped that the President could have a good view of the scenic beauties of the Inland Passage, which are reported to be well worth the

thousand-mile journey—if it remains clear. Unfortunately, fog surrounded our entire journey. We arrived at the Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington, at 4.15 p.m., August 12, our destroyer entering No. 2 Dry-dock in the greatly expanded wartime base.

From the ship's bridge, the President addressed several thousand people crowded on both sides of the dock. His speech, which was broadcast, was intended to be a report to the American people on the inspection and conference journey then approaching its end. No very great enthusiasm was shown by the thousands gathered about the Bremerton dock. Although Roosevelt spoke well, he appeared to be fatigued.

Immediately after he completed his address, we got under way and proceeded to Seattle, where the entire party boarded the President's special train and started back to Washington.

My short stop at the Navy Yard was disappointing because I did not have a chance to look over the area which I first visited as a midshipman in 1897 and which holds so many happy memories of subsequent visits through the years.

En route to Washington on August 15, the Press reported that an invasion of the south coast of France was carried out as scheduled, with little opposition to the landings. This, together with the Allied success in Normandy, should force the Germans to withdraw from France at an early date.

The journey, long in miles and full of interest, ended with our arrival in Washington at 6 a.m. on August 16. It had given the President and me personal contact with the controlling commanders of our war efforts in the Pacific, and provided him with information upon which to base decisions on future strategy and action in that area.

Among the communications awaiting me when I returned to the office was one from MacArthur reiterating the necessity for occupying the Philippines before proceeding north toward Japan. A compelling argument was that failure to occupy the islands would leave them subject to a complete blockade by Japan, which would bring starvation conditions to the inhabitants. MacArthur said that if we failed to liberate the Filipinos, it would be a blot upon the honour of the United States.

He wrote Admiral King in the same vein, but with an interesting additional argument. He objected in his own vigorous way to a proposal that military control of the East Indies be turned over to the British after this area had been

neutralized by American forces, either by capture or in bypassing many of the islands in our steady advance toward the Philippines. The exact British intentions were not known, but past experience indicated that if they did get control of some Dutch territory, it might be difficult to pry them loose. MacArthur said they ought not to be allowed to assume control of territory we had captured from the enemy.

I believed him to be right in both his contention about invading the Philippines and his recommendation concerning the Dutch East Indies.

We had a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs in which I gave them a detailed report of the Honolulu conference. They may have been somewhat surprised to learn that Nimitz and MacArthur said they had no disagreements at the moment and that they could work out their joint plans in harmony. The J.C.S. had to know these facts in order to make their recommendations to the President. The final decision on Pacific operations, especially the matter of an assault on Japan itself, would have to be made by the Commander-in-Chief.

The final footnote on Roosevelt's Pacific trip involved his pet Scottie, Fala. The political campaign was on. In partisan debate in the Congress, it was charged that Roosevelt had used battleships and cruisers on his trip which should have been employed in the war effort. To this was added the claim that the President had sent a destroyer back to Alaska to retrieve Fala, who allegedly had been left behind at one of our several stops in the Aleutians.

On September 1, with the approval of Speaker Sam Rayburn of the House, Congressman McCormick telephoned me for information, so that he could be accurate in any reply made to these accusations. At his insistent request for assistance, I authorized the Democratic Majority Leader in the House to quote me, as Chief of Staff to the President, in saying that no battleships or cruisers accompanied the expedition except the *Baltimore*, on which Roosevelt took passage, and that the President's dog was not at any time left behind or sent for. It was one of those rare occasions when partisan politics intruded into my work.

* * *

Another chapter in the long-drawn-out feud between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph W.

Stilwell was recorded in July and August of 1944. The preceding month, Roosevelt had suggested to Chiang that Stilwell be placed in command of all Allied troops in China, with the purpose of correcting the then critical military situation. Chiang came back with a request (July 13) that the President send to him a personal representative who would be qualified to speak for Roosevelt on both political and military matters. Before we left for Honolulu, I had not been able to find a candidate to suggest to the President for the proposed assignment.

During the Pacific trip, the President again sought an answer from Chiang regarding giving Stilwell command, and also recommended to the Generalissimo that General Patrick Hurley and Mr. Donald Nelson be appointed as personal representatives to the Chinese Government. For some unexplained reason, Chiang was delaying his reply to these suggestions.

At this time, I was unaware (and I believe the President and General Marshall likewise did not know) that Stilwell was publicly referring to Chiang as "Peanut" and to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander in Burma, as the "Glamour Boy." Stilwell was under the command of both of these leaders, and neither the Navy nor the Army could have looked with favour upon this type of conduct by a subordinate toward his superior officers.

Major-General Albert C. Wedemeyer discussed at a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 18 a request from London that Mountbatten's operations in northern Burma be delayed until sufficient forces could become available to take Rangoon. The British Staff still appeared to be dragging its feet on the Burma campaign.

We informed the British that we could not agree to any such delay and felt it imperative that forces then in the theatre be used at once to occupy the Mandalay area and open the vital supply road to China as soon as possible. Stilwell was a determined fighter and did not want his troops, consisting of mostly Chinese divisions and a few Americans, to sit in their trenches. There were no British troops in northern Burma. Mountbatten proceeded with the Burma campaign. This was pleasing to the Chinese representatives in Washington. Their chief military officer in Washington, General Shang Chen, discussed the Burma situation with me on August 21,

and also requested that arrangements be started to give to his country some naval vessels.

* * *

Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria were on their way out of the war as enemies by the end of August. Rumania had withdrawn from its alliance with Germany on August 24, 1944, and Bulgaria was trying to get the Allies to meet in Ankara, Turkey, to discuss her position. When Russia declared war on her on September 5, Bulgaria asked for an armistice. This precipitate move by Moscow seemed to be pointed at getting a warm-water port in the Ægean Sea. Fighting ended on the extreme western end of the Russian front when an armistice was concluded with Finland on September 5.

While the collapse of Hitler's junior partners was advantageous politically, it did not affect military operations to any great extent within the sphere of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, there was another political development at this time that interested me greatly. It was an attempted assassination of General Henri Giraud.

The State Department informed me on August 28 that an Arab had shot the General in his residence in Mazagan, Morocco, inflicting a serious but probably not fatal wound. The French commander had been under police surveillance for some time, and had believed that an attempt would be made on his life, presumably by Frenchmen who were in disagreement with his political philosophy.

The Arab was reported to have been arrested, which in all probability meant that he would be liquidated quickly, as was the assassin who killed Admiral François Darlan. Dead men tell no tales.

A week later, September 5, Robert Murphy, who had been Eisenhower's chief civilian adviser in North Africa, and who was to occupy a similar post with Eisenhower in Germany, with the rank of Ambassador, brought me an unconfirmed report from a reliable American Consul in Africa which indicated that the assassination attempt upon General Giraud was arranged within the War Cabinet of the French Committee of Liberation. This was the same Committee that we were being asked to recognize as the Provisional Government of France. Murphy believed that General de Gaulle himself was not in sympathy with this action of his subordinates.

This completely unconfirmed report implicated a M. Felix, civilian Chief of Cabinet of the War Commissioner, and a Colonel Tamiser, Director of Personnel in the War Commissioner's office. The latter was quoted as having said: "We will kill Giraud, the traitor, either here or later in France, if it is necessary." This same report alleged that a few days before the assassination attempt twelve out of thirty guards posted at Giraud's residence had been changed. It was said that one of these new guards fired on General Giraud from behind, practically point blank. The General apparently was saved from death only by a last-minute movement of his in bending over to talk with his daughter-in-law, with whom he was walking.

* * *

The Prevention of War Conference had been meeting in Washington during August at Dumbarton Oaks. During this period I heard many private discussions of plans for an international organization to preserve the peace after the present hostilities would have ceased. On the day of our departure for the Combined Staff Conference at Quebec, September 9, information came from Moscow to the effect that the separate Soviet republics were demanding a vote in the projected United Nations Peace Organization. Insistence by Russia on sixteen votes in any international organization would probably make it unacceptable to our Congress and to every other nation having less than sixteen votes. However, at Yalta, Russia was to modify her demand to two additional votes, giving the U.S.S.R. three in all.

The Dumbarton Oaks conference proceeded slowly, with much tedious discussion of procedural points, and I heard the meeting place called "Dumbunnies Oaks." By an interesting coincidence, this same week I had taken my granddaughter, Louise, to an invitational showing of the motion picture "Wilson," which depicted the life of our World War I President from the time he became a candidate for Governor of New Jersey to the end of his second term as President. We were seated in the theatre balcony with guests of high rank in both the military and civil hierarchy of the Government.

The picture recalled sharply to memory the Washington of the last war, with personalities and incidents with which I was then associated. It left me with a more sympathetic attitude toward President Wilson, who had failed completely

to accomplish at the Versailles Peace Conference the lofty proposal that he had for a long time advocated and that had attracted to him a devoted following of a majority of the American people, including me. Prospects for the success of Franklin Roosevelt's "United Nations" were not at that time improved by reflections on the history of Wilson's "League of Nations." Both had the same high purposes.

One of the failures of the League had been that the trusteeship system had not been administered impartially. Japan had taken the Pacific islands assigned to it by the League and converted them into formidable bases which we were at this very time in the process of reducing. With this in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the President that, in the interest of national defence, the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific captured by our forces should be retained under the sovereignty of the United States and not delivered to the trusteeship of the United Nations.

The question of the trusteeship of these old League of Nations mandated territories was not brought up before the Dumbarton Oaks meeting at this time. In view, however, of the repeated and sincere announcements by President Roosevelt that the United States would seek no territorial advantage in the war, the Japanese mandated islands eventually were turned over to a trusteeship under the United Nations after the charter of the world organization, written at San Francisco in the spring of 1945, went into operation.

Fortunately, up to the time this book was written, no potential enemy had attempted to obtain from the United Nations a trusteeship over any of these islands which are and will remain necessary to the defence of America.

* * *

Insistent pleadings of Churchill for another Combined Staff meeting were rewarded finally when the President agreed to hold a conference, which took the code name of "Octagon," at Quebec, Canada. It was the second time in as many years that the Canadian city had been chosen for an Anglo-American War Council. It was obvious that discussion would centre around the closing stages of the war against Japan, with Tokyo as the ultimate target.

By the beginning of September, Japan was almost defeated through a practically complete sea and air blockade. However,

a proposal was made by the Army to force a surrender of Japan by an amphibious invasion of the main islands through the Island of Kyushu. This was discussed at length by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but final decision was not reached.

The J.C.S. did authorize the preparation of plans for an invasion, but the invasion itself was never approved. The Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan. The Army not only was planning a huge land invasion of Japan, but was convinced that we needed Russian assistance as well to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion.

It did not appear to me that under the then existing conditions there was any necessity for the great expenditure of life involved in a ground-force attack on the numerically superior Japanese Army in its home territory. My conclusion, with which the naval representatives agreed, was that America's least expensive course of action was to continue and intensify the air and sea blockade and at the same time to occupy the Philippines.

I believed that a completely blockaded Japan would then fall by its own weight. Consensus of opinion of the Chiefs of Staff supported this proposed strategy, and President Roosevelt approved.

The Presidential party arrived at Quebec Monday morning, September 11, 1944, after having spent a pleasant Sunday with the Roosevelts at Hyde Park. The Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill came in by train from Halifax a few minutes later. I was provided with quarters in the Governor-General's residence in the Citadel, together with the President and Mrs. Roosevelt. Other members of the American delegation and the American Joint Chiefs were quartered in the Hotel Château Frontenac, where the Combined Chiefs held their staff meetings. That night the Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, and his wife, Princess Alice, had a dinner for forty, which included the top-ranking members of the British and American delegations and a group of prominent Canadians headed by Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff began their session on September 12. The President and the British Prime Minister held a plenary conference the next day. Churchill said it was the desire of his Government that British ships and troops take part in the war against Japan in order to do Britain's part and

share the credit. He said also that it was considered necessary that Great Britain retake Singapore, the "impregnable" naval base which fell early in the war as the Japanese overran the Malay Peninsula.

The chief objective of this Staff meeting was to agree on the best possible plans for forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan by destroying Tokyo's will to continue the war. The discussions revolved around three methods: intensifying the allied sea and air blockade, stepping up the air bombardment, and destruction of the remaining air and naval strength of the enemy. The practicability of invading Japan also was studied. One American plan was to occupy the Formosa-Amoy area in March, 1945. Another that was favoured by General MacArthur was to occupy Luzon, the important Philippine Province, in February, 1945. The British took no particular sides in this discussion and left the matter pretty much up to the Americans. The request of Churchill for full British participation in the war against Japan was approved by the American Chiefs. However, the British Staff was not prepared to go into detail as to specific operations they might undertake other than to point out consistently their wish to retake Singapore. American members emphasised the desirability of exploiting allied superiority in naval and air power and to avoid, whenever possible, costly land campaigns. We were proceeding on an assumption that Russia would enter the war at the earliest practicable date. Stalin had given that assurance several times.

The Burma campaign received little attention. As far as the Combined Chiefs were concerned, plans for Burma had been worked out at our first meeting in Quebec.

There were the usual dinners in the evenings, and it was notable that the conversation generally was focused on post-war problems, such as economics and shipping, peace terms, punishment of Germany, rather than current military operations. The latter were proceeding satisfactorily on practically every front.

The staff discussions proceeded amicably. The final "Octagon" meeting was held in the Citadel on Saturday, September 16. The report of the Combined Chiefs recommended that the target date for the end of the war with Japan be set for eighteen months after the defeat of Germany and adjusted periodically as necessary. Once the Axis armies in Europe had

surrendered, the Combined Chiefs recommended that, in co-operation with other Pacific powers and with Russia, all available resources be thrown into the struggle to crush Japan.

General directives were drawn to redeploy forces and war material from Europe so as to reach the Japanese theatre of war at the earliest practicable date. It was agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan. Detailed arrangements for assigning tasks to the British ships were left to our Navy. It was assumed without question that the Americans would continue to exercise command in the Pacific. The British Navy had some ships operating with our task forces. The British Chiefs of Staff were to furnish as soon as possible an estimate of the contribution that could be made by the Royal Air Force.

Regarding South-east Asia, the objective of recapturing Burma at the earliest date was reaffirmed, with the proviso that this campaign would not prejudice the existing air route to China. MacArthur's plan for the reconquest of the Philippines was adopted. In the exploitation of our overwhelming naval and air power, it was agreed to press unremitting submarine action against enemy ships to the fullest extent and to step up the long-range bombing of Japan from bases in the Marianas Islands, in China, and from other bases to be established later.

The British showed great interest in our newly created 20th Air Force, not only because it was demonstrating the great striking power of the huge B29 bombers, but because of the command set-up, which in some respects resembled that of the Royal Air Force. The first strike of these planes came on the night of June 15-16, 1944, when a destructive raid was made upon the Yawata Steel Works in Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's main islands. Bases for these giant bombers had been established in China and India, and at a later date on some of the captured Japanese islands, notably Saipan, thus placing them under three separate commands.

General H. H. Arnold pointed out to the Joint Chiefs that the B29s could be used much more effectively if they were under a single command. Operations could be planned so as to bring them together from their widely scattered bases in a single attack on a specific target without having to negotiate with the several theatre commanders. Arnold's presentation of his idea for command of the B29's from Washington convinced

the American Joint Chiefs that it would be a more efficient method of handling the new planes, and the formation of the 20th Air Force was agreed to. Technically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took over the command and assigned it to Arnold as their executive agent. It proved to be an excellent arrangement under those peculiar conditions. It was a new idea in command and it violated our principle of area commanders being in full control of everything operating in their respective theatres. However, I recall little or no opposition to the development of this global air unit.

At Quebec we finally accepted the British contention that the Strategic Bomber Force in Europe could be controlled by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, and the Commanding General of the United States Air Force, acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

As for operations in Europe, the Combined Chiefs advised General Eisenhower of the possibilities of the northern line of approach into Germany and of the necessity of opening the north-west ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam before bad winter weather should set in. Eisenhower's command of the Allied forces in southern France was confirmed, and it was ordered that logistic support for this supporting operation should be supplied from the Mediterranean area. The drive through southern France had begun on August 15 and was proceeding satisfactorily, but almost up to the day it was launched there had been persistent British opposition. One time London even proposed that all available forces in the Mediterranean be taken around to the Atlantic coast of France for a secondary operation. The complete agreement of our British colleagues at Quebec, represented, we hoped, the final abandonment of the project of an early recapture of the island of Rhodes. It was decided that no major units were to be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of the present offensive of General Sir Harold Alexander was known. It was agreed that while the battle in Italy continued, no forces would be available in the Mediterranean for employment in the Balkans except two British brigades in Egypt (which were being held in readiness to occupy Athens to support the Greek Government), and small land forces in the Adriatic area, to be used primarily for commando-type operations.

One important action at "Octagon" was the drawing of rough boundaries of the American and British zones that would

be occupied upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army. Once that happy event should occur the only function of the British and American Joint Chiefs would be to deploy sufficient troops in the occupation zones to disarm all enemy units, police the terms of the armistice, and preserve order. No trouble was anticipated when the British and American armies going in from the west should meet the Russian armies coming down from the east. The following is an outline of the British and American areas of occupation as agreed upon at Quebec:

(a) The British forces, under a British commander, will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Coblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

(b) The forces of the United States, under a United States commander, will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line from Coblenz following the northern border of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

(c) Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the commander of the American zone.

(d) American area to have, in addition, access through the western and north-western seaports and passage through the British controlled area.

(e) Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date. (The problem of satisfying French pride with an occupation sector of their own did not come up at Quebec.)

All of the above recommendations of the Combined Chiefs were approved by the President and the Prime Minister at the final September 16 session.

At a joint Press conference announcing the results of "Octagon," Roosevelt and Churchill both stressed the harmony that had prevailed during the discussions. The President said the most serious difficulty had been to find "room and opportunity for marshalling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy." He pointed out that the logistics of the Pacific war represented the greatest single problem and, because of the nature of Pacific geography, there could be no single command of all the Allied forces.

Churchill emphasized that the decisions of the "Octagon" conference would be spelled out in action against the Japanese, just as those of the previous Quebec conference were then being realized on the battlefields of Europe. The Prime Minister told the more than 100 assembled correspondents that the conference had been conducted "in a blaze of friendship."

The military discussions at Quebec were conducted in an atmosphere quite different from any of the previous war councils. Operations against the enemy on all fronts had reached a point where there were no crucial questions before the Combined Chiefs. A number of important political questions were considered at this meeting, but I did not attend the political sessions. The President and the American delegation left on a special train for Hyde Park at 6 p.m., September 16.

Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill reached Hyde Park from Quebec at 11 a.m., Monday, September 18. An hour later Hopkins arrived, bringing with him the Duke of Windsor. The former King of England made an unexpectedly good appearance and talked with much interest of the problems of the small group of islands, the Bahamas, of which he was Governor. He left for New York immediately after lunch.

An incident which impressed me at the time was that the Prime Minister, one of the most powerful men of the age, bowed respectfully to the former King upon the latter's departure. Churchill treated him with the same deference he would pay to any member of the Royal Family, illustrating how thoroughly British he was in his manners and social customs. The Duke of Windsor was a man of little importance. Churchill was probably the most powerful individual that has appeared in England since Henry VIII. Yet the Prime Minister, here as always, exemplified the traditional attitude of the British toward their Royal Family.

For a long time before dinner, the President, the Prime Minister, and Hopkins discussed political questions involving Italy, Yugoslavia, and Russia. The President and Prime Minister also affixed their signatures to the completed conference report on "Octagon."

After dinner, Hopkins, Major John Boettiger, and I worked until after midnight on a draft announcement by the two chiefs of government on the British-American attitude toward

the Italian Government and the Italian people, including relief and rehabilitation.

Throughout 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill had differed sharply on many phases of the Italian question. The Prime Minister had opposed the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel. When Premier Pietro Badoglio was unable to form a Government and was succeeded by Premier Ivanoe Bonomi, a prominent anti-Fascist leader, Churchill again had protested. He objected vigorously to the inclusion of Count Carlo Sforza in the Italian Government as Foreign Minister.

On our part, although we recognized Italy as being primarily in the British sphere of influence, we had felt that several diplomatic actions taken by the British Government during this long contention were somewhat high-handed. A great many cables had been exchanged between London and Washington, some of them from Churchill being very plain-spoken. However, in the quiet study of the Roosevelt home at Hyde Park, the two men talked out their differences and finally arrived at a workable compromise aimed at stabilizing the then existing Italian Government. The paper Hopkins and I were drafting was to be a formal expression of their views.

They had decided to grant an increasing measure of control to the Italian administration and, as a symbol of the change, the Allied Control Commission would be renamed "The Allied Commission," and Britain would confer the additional title of Ambassador upon the British High Commissioner in Italy. The Italian Government would be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

Much attention was devoted to the economic rehabilitation of Italy. In deference to the Prime Minister's views, the President had agreed that the first steps to be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy would be considered primarily as military measures designed to utilize the full resources of Italy in the war on the Allied side. (Subsequently, the British Government made some changes in the language of our draft and, as finally approved, the declaration was issued September 26.)

The next day, September 19, we had a most interesting lunch at Mrs. Roosevelt's farmhouse, which lies a mile or two east of the main Hyde Park residence. Sitting at a table with Miss Delano, a cousin of the President, Mrs. Roosevelt,

and Churchill, I listened to an hour of argument by the latter two on their general attitude toward a reorganization of the world. Mrs. Roosevelt argued with conviction that peace can best be maintained by improving the living conditions of the people in all countries. Churchill, on the contrary, said that his only hope for a durable peace was an agreement between Great Britain and the United States to prevent international war by the use of their combined forces if necessary. He expressed a willingness to take Russia into the agreement if the Russians wished to join. He did not believe that China could be anything but a source of trouble if it should be permitted to join. Churchill presented his case with clarity and conviction. It was an extremely interesting and instructive hour.

That evening I sat with the Prime Minister and the President again during a long discussion of political and military matters, chief of which concerned the highly secret project known as "Tube Alloys." This was a code name for new secret-weapon experiments that were to produce the atomic bomb, in which at that time I had little confidence. The question at issue, as I recall, was whether or not we would give the British all of the information they wanted about the manufacture and use of atomic energy for *war* purposes.

The President's attitude was that the atomic military secrets should not be divulged even to our ally, but, since the British had contributed to the atomic experiments and had been working on it, Roosevelt thought they should share equally with us in its industrial use. The President had great hopes that atomic energy would be developed after the war for successful use in industrial and scientific fields. He had assumed a great risk in allocating huge sums of money—which eventually totalled more than two billion dollars—for work on the atomic experiments, although little had happened up to that time to justify his confidence. It was definitely stated there in my presence that the United States, Canada, and England would share in the *industrial* use of atomic energy when and if it should be applied to industry. To my knowledge, no agreement was made in regard to sharing its use for military purposes. There have been reports since that Roosevelt agreed to share the bomb's secret with Britain, but no such understanding was reached at this particular conference.

At 10.30 p.m. the Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill departed by train for New York to return to England by

steamer. I arrived with the President and Mrs. Boettiger in Washington on September 21. I believe that the two days of personal conferences between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park were of much value to the combined British-American war effort and to prospects of useful post-war collaboration between the two English-speaking peoples.

CHAPTER XVII

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1944. PROSPECTS OF VICTORY IN EUROPE

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE Quebec Conference in September, 1944, and the three-power conference at Yalta in February, 1945, was marked by increasing gravity of post-war problems that came to the fore as the defeat of Germany and Japan became more and more a question of time.

The matter of continuing Lend-Lease to our allies after the fighting should end was in constant controversy; the President became more and more enamoured of his idea of the United Nations Organization to preserve the peace, a working draft of which was completed at the Dumbarton Oaks conferences in Washington after many weeks of discussion; the long-drawn-out Chiang-Stilwell dispute was to reach its climax; and before we left for Yalta an organized Communist opposition to Chiang's National Government had arisen in China.

However, perhaps the most interesting experience of this period for me was to observe a small part of the complicated election machinery which enables our country to select every four years, in democratic fashion, its Chief of State. As a high-ranking member of the Armed Services, it had been my fixed policy not to participate in domestic partisan politics. This personal attitude was in no sense a disparagement of American politics, but was one generally followed by the professional leadership of the armed services, which must work in harmony with both Republican and Democratic administrations to protect at all times the security that makes our democracy possible.

World War II provided an incontestable demonstration that, at least for the United States, our democratic form of government was the best in both peace and war that the mind of man had evolved. Because of this, the happenstance in the autumn of 1944 that brought me in close contact, for the first time in my life, with a national election provided me with most interesting observations of this democratic process with which up to that time I had little intimate contact. My notes, made

at the time (November, 1944), are recorded at their proper place in this chapter.

There is a degree of intelligence and initiative bred into the American people that makes our form of government at once the envy of less successful democratic nations because of its stability, and of peoples everywhere because it grants to the individual citizen the largest area of liberty known under any form of government.

Our republican system may not be, and in many cases is not, ideally suited to many of the other nations of the world. However, one of the foundation-stones of my admiration for Franklin Roosevelt was my respect for his unswerving determination to honour all pledges made by his Government to the governments of other nations and at the same time, in the planning for post-war global adjustments, to permit liberated countries to select for themselves the form of government they desired.

While holding to a policy of strict non-intervention in partisan affairs, it always has been my conviction that in our democracy the ultimate control of all the armed services should be subordinated to civilian authority.

The operative control of our armed forces rests in the hands of the President by virtue of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. In my opinion, that principle is as sound to-day as it was in the time of George Washington, and attempts to change or dissipate it by statute should not be permitted. It succeeded in winning World War II against appalling opposition.

Army and Navy "brass" frequently are accused, particularly in times of war, of seeking to override the civilian restraints imposed by our laws and our Constitution. As this is written, I have been a part of that "brass" for many years and have found by experience that at times this accusation is justified. In most cases the stepping out of bounds arises from a zeal to prosecute a war in such a manner that our enemies may be vanquished in the shortest possible time.

This problem faced us occasionally throughout World War II. Time and again the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to consider complaints by responsible heads of various segments of our armed forces that they could accomplish their assigned task more efficiently or more quickly were it not for "civilian interference." Being aware of the intense single-mindedness

of purpose of most members of our High Command and also because of the nature of my duties as Chief of Staff to our war Presidents, I was especially careful to examine the civilian side of these occasional disputes. In a majority of cases, I found that the civilian agencies were doing an excellent job under most difficult conditions, and I doubted whether surrendering this or that function to the armed services would produce any better results. By and large, with the possible exception of the occasional irresponsibility of some few of our labour leaders, our home front performed as magnificently behind the lines as did our sailors, soldiers, and airmen at the fighting fronts.

The development of the atombomb was one of the best-kept secrets of the war, and there were many aspects of it with which I was not familiar. However, I attended several important conferences where the military and post-war use of atomic energy was under discussion. One of these was held on September 22 by the President with Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research Development, and Lord Cherwell, eminent British scientist. While Professor Bush had evidently convinced the President and the Prime Minister of the effectiveness of his project and had been given great sums of American money for its development, his presentation was not completely convincing to me.

A few days later, Lord Cherwell asked for advice in regard to seeing the "Tube Alloy" project. I suggested he talk with Bush, and if he was unable to make a satisfactory arrangement, to take the matter up with the President. Major-General Leslie Groves came to the office early in October and gave me a progress report on the "Manhattan District," which was the War Department's code name for the atomic operation. General Groves, an attractive man and thoroughly informed on his subject, made the most convincing presentation of the value of atomic energy as a destructive war weapon that I had heard up to that time, although I still did not have much confidence in the practicability of the project.

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The question of Dutch participation in the war against Japan was not discussed at Quebec, but soon after my return it was arranged for Rear-Admiral Van der Nook, Minister of Colonies in Holland, and Vice-Admiral Helfrich, commanding the Dutch Navy in the Pacific, to address the Combined

Chiefs of Staff on September 28. They advocated an early expulsion of the Japanese from Java and the Dutch East Indies, where, according to them, the inhabitants, both white and native, were in acute distress under Japanese rule. We were unable to give them much encouragement, since all our available forces were committed to fighting the Japanese elsewhere in the Pacific. Late in September, the Dutch also sought favourable action from the American Chiefs of Staff on their requests that America equip and train Dutch Marines.

* * *

Sotomayor Luna, who was Minister for Ecuador in France when I was Ambassador, called on September 25 with some interesting observations. He said that Prince Rupert of Bavaria had a great following among his people and that Bavarians would welcome his return to a position of authority. Luna also reported that President Salazar of Portugal had expressed to him a fear that the Communist element in Europe would bring about civil war in many of the countries. Luna's real purpose in seeing me, however, was to obtain money to improve the port of Guayaquil, build a road to the Ecuadorian capital, Quito, and to aid in the prevention of disease.

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Prospects for arranging a lasting peace in the Orient were discussed at a luncheon given in his residence on October 2 by Dr. H. H. Kung. The guests included Ambassador Wellington Koo from London, our former Ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph Grew, the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, Wei Tao-Ming, and A. A. Berle of the State Department. I remember this luncheon particularly because the developments in the next few months were to make prospects of an early peace in the Orient seem very dim.

On October 3, the Joint Chiefs discussed future action in the Pacific against Japan. Full agreement was reached except in regard to the command of the post-Luzon operations. Admiral King contended they should be under Navy command. General Marshall believed they should be under the Army. In view of the fact that the forces employed would be predominately Army, I was in agreement with General Marshall.

We also discussed in detail the command difficulties in the China theatre caused by the refusal of Chiang Kai-shek to

accept General Stilwell for command of all Chinese and American troops. We laid the whole problem before the President the next afternoon. It was a dispute that dragged on for many weeks.

Early in August, 1944, the Generalissimo had agreed in principle to designate Stilwell as the commander of all Chinese Army forces in China to meet the desperate situation then developing. In the long exchange of cables that followed, the Generalissimo reversed himself.

The President received on October 11 what appeared to be a final refusal of Chiang to keep Stilwell in command. The Chinese leader said he was "willing and indeed anxious" to meet Roosevelt's wishes that an American officer command all Chinese forces, but insisted that the commander "must be one in whom I can repose confidence."

"This officer must be capable of frank and sincere co-operation, and General Stilwell has shown himself conspicuously lacking in these indispensable qualifications. The fundamental approach to the problem remains unchanged, and I agree with the other proposals which you have made. Your policies will be executed without delay as soon as you relieve Stilwell and replace him with an officer better equipped to discharge his duties. I am grateful for the great aid you have given to my country and for the friendship you have shown. However, I can only confide the execution of such important policies to an American officer whom I deem to be deserving of my confidence."

Major-General Patrick Hurley, who was Roosevelt's personal representative to the Chiang Government, fully supported Chiang's view. He cabled the President that Chiang and Stilwell were fundamentally incompatible. Hurley said:

"In giving me this assignment, you told me that you had decided to uphold the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek as a part of the overall purpose to keep the Chinese Army in the war and prevent a collapse of his country. After considerable study, I believe there is no other Chinese leader available, and certainly none other is known to me who possesses so many elements of leadership as Chiang. He has agreed to every request and suggestion you have made except the Stilwell point. You are now confronted by a choice between the two. There is no other issue between you and the Chinese Generalissimo."

(The above messages from Generalissimo Chiang and General Hurley are paraphrased.)

General Marshall and I discussed the matter again with the President at noon on October 16. It appeared that the removal of Stilwell at an early date was necessary. General Marshall was strongly of the opinion that Stilwell was the only American officer who had any chance whatever of correcting the existing bad military situation in China. To remove him would necessitate a number of rearrangements. As far as United States Forces were concerned, the China-Burma-India area was divided into two theatres: one, China, and the other, India-Burma. The President decided to place General Daniel Sultan in command of the latter theatre. He requested that Chiang delegate control of a Chinese force operating in Burma known as "Ledo (X)" to Sultan. Since it was important that Sultan be completely free to handle the Ledo situation, particularly as concerned the Chinese troops, his other responsibilities were reduced to a minimum.

One of the previous objections to Stilwell as Deputy Commander of the South-east Asia Command was that he was actively conducting a fight in North Burma and therefore not able to be present with the Supreme Commander. Sultan was not designated Deputy to Admiral Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander of the South-east Asia Command area. The best solution, in our opinion, was to name Lieutenant-General Raymond Wheeler as Mountbatten's deputy.

Chiang also had requested that General Albert C. Wedemeyer command his Chinese forces. Roosevelt did not like the idea of charging an American officer at so late a date with the responsibility for an admittedly bad situation, but he did tell the Generalissimo that he would agree to Wedemeyer occupying the post of Chief of Staff. This took the American Commander away from his duties on Mountbatten's staff. That was unfortunate, but under the circumstances no other arrangement appeared possible at the time.

Throughout the period which found Chiang and Mountbatten on one side and General Stilwell on the other, the President renewed his promises of long standing to support the Chinese Government. Marshall made repeated efforts to induce the President to retain "Vinegar Joe," regardless of Chiang's objections. He believed thoroughly in Stilwell's ability and told Roosevelt in my presence that he could not

find any other Army officer who would be as good. However, the President, convinced that Chiang would not tolerate Stilwell, finally gave direct and positive orders to Marshall to remove him from China without further delay. Stilwell was recalled on October 28, 1944.

I was for a time sympathetic with Stilwell, who was faced with a most difficult task in Burma. The reasons for the Generalissimo's and Mountbatten's attitude toward him have been completely clarified by publication, in 1948, of *The Stilwell Papers*.

While the command controversy was being thrashed out, I had two other discussions on the general outlook in China. Dr. Wellington Koo, in a conversation on October 10, said that if we could provide munitions and supplies for the manpower available in China, the Japanese armies that had invaded his country could be destroyed. He agreed that it would be necessary to have a port on the coast to carry out these operations, but thought that if we could get arms to the Chinese, they could take Canton from the land side. Koo is an exceedingly intelligent and attractive Chinese.

Laughlin Currie, one of the President's special assistants who devoted most of his time to Chinese problems, asked (October 18) about the practicability of arranging to deliver Lend-Lease material to China. I pointed out to him the difficulties, particularly the lack of an available port. Currie evidently was under pressure from the Chinese to arrange in advance for Lend-Lease shipments.

Currie's discussion emphasised the growing problem of Lend-Lease arrangements in the event of a cessation of hostilities. Hopkins informed me on October 19 that Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec had agreed to refer the Lend-Lease business with England to a combined committee headed by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. It was apparent from other evidence that England was trying to build up a case for Lend-Lease assistance for her post-war industry and trade.

The British requests were considered at a closed meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 24. It was the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they were not justified at that time in recommending Lend-Lease deliveries to anybody except for material that would actually be used in the war. This was one of the many questions arising at that time which had both political and military angles. It appeared that

the Joint Chiefs should not permit themselves to become involved in the studies being made by Morgenthau except as regards material to be used in the war effort.

The British were making a skilful presentation of their view and making every effort to have the President consider favourably their request for assistance after the collapse of Germany. It was interesting to me that at a dinner given for twenty-two men by Lord Halifax at the British Embassy on October 30, all of the guests except myself were connected in some way with Lend-Lease, although the subject was *not* mentioned in my hearing.

* * *

Churchill was in Moscow conferring with Stalin in October, 1944, with Ambassador Averell Harriman sitting in as an observer for Roosevelt. Harriman kept the White House informed as to the progress of these talks. I was interested primarily in any military angle that might develop. Harriman reported on October 13 that Stalin advocated only a holding effort in North Italy, coupled with an advance toward Vienna from the head of the Adriatic Sea. The Soviet chieftain also advocated an advance through Switzerland to get in the rear of the Siegfried Line fortifications. The latter suggestion certainly did not place much value on the Allied claim that the sovereignty of small states must not be violated.

Harriman was back in Washington by October 21, and told me of the expressed desire of Stalin that Russia should participate in future operations in the Pacific. He also told me that Churchill's brief illness in Moscow was caused by a digestive disturbance and not by a recurrence of his pneumonia, as we had feared.

* * *

Charles de Gaulle achieved on October 23 the goal toward which he had long been working. On that date, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union recognized his Committee of Liberation as the Provisional Government of France. It was a logical step after the *de facto* status accorded the Committee the preceding July. Late in September, H. Freeman Matthews of the State Department, whose personal opinions of de Gaulle nearly matched my own, had advised me to urge that the President take the final step, because by then, with much of France being liberated by the Allied

armies, it would be definitely advantageous to the United States. We at that time were about to send Jefferson Caffery, formerly Ambassador to Brazil, to Paris as our representative to the *de facto* French group. The formal recognition of de Gaulle must have been a difficult decision for Roosevelt. I had by that time concluded that it would be advantageous to the Allied cause.

* * *

October saw our invasion of the Philippines begin according to plan. On October 20, 1944, General MacArthur, with strong Navy surface and air support, landed four divisions of American troops on the island of Leyte with small losses. The new Philippine President who had succeeded the late President Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, with some members of his Cabinet, accompanied MacArthur in the landing. Five days later, Admiral Halsey, commanding MacArthur's naval support, triumphantly cabled Washington: "It can be announced with assurance that the Japanese Navy has been beaten, routed, and broken by the United States fleets." Halsey was reporting the victorious conclusion of a widely dispersed battle with the enemy that had lasted three days.

This news made the annual Navy Day celebration on October 27 an unusually happy one. Admiral William Standley was the toast-master at the Washington dinner celebrating the occasion. Under-Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Grew were the speakers. The latter gave a very informative analysis of the Japanese situation and prospects, a subject on which he was undoubtedly the best-informed official of the American Government.

* * *

On the last day in October, I took my first step in assisting the President to prepare for the important Crimean conference. At his direction, I asked the State Department to obtain permission from Turkey for an American warship to pass through the Straits to the Black Sea during the month of November. The Navy communication ship, *Catoctin*, was to be moored at the recaptured Russian port of Sevastopol throughout the Yalta conference.

* * *

The President was wearing several hats as the November election approached. He was the political candidate of the Democratic Party, but he also was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. We left Washington on Friday night, November 3. In sharp contrast to the complete secrecy that had surrounded previous excursions from the capital, the Presidential Special had aboard more than fifty correspondents, radio commentators, photographers and news-reel cameramen, who were to cover his political tour of New England. His Press Secretary, Steve Early, and his two best literary assistants, Sam Rosenman and Robert Sherwood, also were with us. As usual, I had a room in Roosevelt's private car.

As we passed through New York City, our party was joined by Postmaster General Frank Walker, Ambassador John Winant, Eugene Casey, one of the President's White House assistants, and the motion-picture actor and playwright, Orson Welles.

The first stop on Saturday was at Bridgeport, Connecticut. Roosevelt spoke from the rear platform of his car to a not very numerous but enthusiastic gathering of citizens. At the next stop, Hartford, a large number of people had gathered, but they seemed more subdued. Many state Democratic officials were on board during the journey through Connecticut. Upon our arrival in Massachusetts, the Connecticut politicians disembarked and were replaced by a greater number from Massachusetts.

A great host of 30,000 highly enthusiastic natives heard the President at Springfield, Massachusetts, and at Worcester we were joined by Senator David I. Walsh, who was well known to me as Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. I sat in the President's car throughout the journey toward Boston, receiving military dispatches from the White House map-room in Washington while Roosevelt chatted gaily with the various political figures, who came in great numbers.

The climax of the day was the address of the President in the baseball park in Boston, which was packed with a thoroughly aroused audience of about 40,000. The meeting opened with the singing of "America," led by Frank Sinatra, who was said to be a great favourite on the radio at that time. Congressman John McCormick, whose home is in Boston and to whom I have given the information about the President's dog, Fala, after the Alaska trip, introduced Roosevelt. Press

accounts indicated that little Fala had played a prominent part in the political campaigning.

Upon our return to the train at 10 p.m., the entire group gathered in the President's car to discuss the results of the day's effort. Roosevelt was very much stimulated by the fine reception he had received at the Boston ball park. Everyone present expressed pleasure at the results. All of the party, with the possible exception of Robert Hannegan, National Democratic Chairman, assured Roosevelt that Massachusetts and Connecticut would give their votes to him on the next Tuesday. I was so completely lacking in political campaigning experience as to be unable to formulate any opinion. Whereupon the President said to me in jest: "Bill, politically, you belong in the Middle Ages." Perhaps he should have said the "Dark Ages"!

Orson Welles was then generally accepted as a genius in the literary and theatrical field. His ready, set laugh and unchanging smile gave me an impression of "stageiness" and artificiality. His repeated assurance of success in the election seemed from my realistic viewpoint to be something of an act. The entire group, however, expressed the opinion that the President would be re-elected to his fourth term by a landslide.

In the midst of this political excitement, I received by telegraph the news that Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Military Mission, had died in Walter Reed Hospital in Washington. This gallant gentleman and soldier, who was a tower of strength to the British-American war effort, had been ill for weeks with anæmia, and his death was not unexpected. Dill was considered by the American Chiefs of Staff as practically irreplaceable. My own opinion has been indicated earlier in this book when, during a delay over naming a Supreme Commander for the invasion of France, I was willing to accept Sir John for that post.

Our train arrived at Hyde Park on Sunday morning, November 5, where Admiral Ross McIntire, the President's personal physician, and I accompanied Roosevelt to his residence.

The preceding Saturday had given me my first experience in a political campaign of any kind. It was extremely interesting and informative to watch actual functioning of an important part of representative government as conducted in this year of A.D. 1944. All other members of the President's party were

experts of long experience, which provided me with a splendid opportunity to observe methods and procedure.

The weather turned cold and there was a slight snowfall on Monday, but it did not deter the President from making his final campaign talks to the neighbours in his own Dutchess County. I went with him on this long five-hour motor trip as he followed a custom which he had carried out six times on his campaigns since his first candidacy for election to the Senate of New York State. It was all strange to me, but Roosevelt said it was "old stuff." He expressed a belief that I had no understanding or appreciation of things political—which was a correct estimate.

During his tour of Dutchess County, the President spoke to gatherings of the populace at Newburgh, Kingston and Poughkeepsie, in all of which cities much enthusiasm was shown toward the local boy who had made good. The weather was cold and the temperature in an open car low, but we returned to Hyde Park in good spirits and none the worse for our long, cold ride.

That night, which was election eve, we listened to a radio presentation of the political situation sponsored by the Democratic National Committee with the purpose of finally influencing undecided voters. We heard an excellent last-minute political radio statement by the President that was given a nationwide broadcast, and we listened also to the final appeal for support made by Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate.

The President's address was made from his small office in the residence at Hyde Park. Those of us present were Major and Mrs. John Boettiger, Vice-Admiral McIntire, myself, and a number of radio technicians. The President was in a very happy frame of mind and without any apprehensions as to what would be the result of the election on the following day.

Election day, November 7, began in Hyde Park with bright sunshine in clear, cold weather, the temperature being about 40°. The morning Press reported that Marshal Stalin had announced in a public address that Japan, like Germany, was an aggressor nation. This was surprising, in view of the constant insistence from Moscow that Japan should not be mentioned in relation to Russia because of the latter's pre-occupation with the war against Germany. Stalin's statement

might bring about a Japanese attack on Siberia or it might result in an early request for a negotiated peace.

We began to listen to radio reports of the election returns at 9 p.m. but got no interesting data until eleven. The President and I sat at a table in the dining-room of his Hyde Park house, where the returns were being received. Over in one corner were two ticker-tape recording machines that were giving us the returns as fast as they were being compiled by the news agencies. The radio loudspeaker was kept on continuously. The President and I checked the election reports as they came in, recording them from all the states on specially prepared sheets. At one end of the room was a large board where returns were being posted. People came in from time to time. Some of them showed enthusiasm when the figures on the board looked good, and there would be considerable distress when a bad report came in. I recall that Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, a Dutchess County neighbour of the President, who came over during the evening, seemed a little worried at times.

The President never showed any apprehensions in regard to the outcome. I remember that the first reports from New York State did not look promising. Then came some returns from upstate, meaning the big cities, such as Syracuse, Rochester, Rome, and Buffalo. They didn't attract my attention very much, but after adding them up with the President he leaned over to me and said, "Bill, see those returns? Everything is all right now. We can forget about New York State." I took it for granted that his estimate was correct.

A large number of relatives and personal friends who were present in the house for this historic occasion were served a midnight supper prepared under the efficient direction of Mrs. Roosevelt. After the supper, at which all of us drank much coffee, I continued the interesting checking of election returns until 2 a.m. It appeared to me by then that the President's re-election was certain. I went upstairs to go to bed, but could not sleep, probably because of the coffee taken at the midnight supper.

The President remained in the dining-room some time, although he no longer bothered to fill out the returns himself. He said when I left, "It's all over. So what's the use of putting down the figures?" He was waiting for something from his opponent. It was not until 3.45 a.m., November 8, that

Dewey, the Republican candidate, conceded the election, whereupon the President came upstairs to retire. As he passed my room he said, "Well, at last Dewey knows he has lost the election. He should have known it hours ago, but he wouldn't say anything." The President was really an expert in this battle. I had been impressed hours earlier when, on the basis of those reports from northern New York, he had concluded, accurately, that he and his party had carried this important state.

After a sleepless night, I left Hyde Park at 10 a.m. in an Army plane, accompanied by Admiral McIntire and Major and Mrs. Boettiger, and reached Washington an hour and a half later after a pleasant ride in almost summer weather. Press reports indicated that the President had carried thirty-five states with an electoral vote of 413, that Dewey had carried thirteen states with an electoral vote of 118, and that two states credited to Dewey were still in doubt. This was an overwhelming victory for the President, and he had carried with it into office a sufficient number of Representatives to insure a Democratic Congress for the next two years.

In the afternoon I participated as an honorary pallbearer at the funeral of Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, conducted in the Episcopal Cathedral. The interment was in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honours, following British procedure.

Early Friday morning, November 10, the President arrived at Union Station where he was greeted in his private car by Cabinet officers and Congressional leaders. At 9 a.m., riding in an open automobile and accompanied by Vice-President Wallace and Vice-President-elect Truman, he led a motorcade through the heavy, warm rain to the White House. The streets were lined with thousands of people who, in spite of the rain, expressed noisy enthusiasm.

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Upon my return to Washington on November 18, after having delivered to the Annual Dinner of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers in New York City a short message from the President congratulating them on their war effort, the Lend-Lease question again occupied my attention.

Among the group of officials who descended upon my

office to discuss future Lend-Lease to Great Britain were Under-Secretary of War Patterson, Administer Leo Crowley of the Federal Economic Administration, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry White, and Navy and Air Force representatives. The business of Lend-Lease was entirely outside my cognizance, but I did what was possible to assist in the difficulty, and made an oral report to the President.

For the year 1945, Churchill had sent a high-powered committee, headed by Lord Keynes, which was asking that funds to the amount of almost eight billion dollars be allocated to Lend-Lease for Great Britain. The American Committee, headed by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, was prepared to approve five and a half billion for this purpose. I felt that the Congress and the American people would react with violent disfavour to either proposal, and so advised the President. He informed me that he wanted Lend-Lease to Great Britain to be conducted as heretofore and that *additional commitments should not be made*.

Three days later (November 21) Acting Secretary of State Stettinius, Morgenthau, and I discussed the problem with the President. I made the following recommendations:

1. That no commitments whatever be made.
2. That the American Committee inform the British Committee, headed by Lord Keynes, that it was prepared to recommend to the President for budgetary and production planning purposes listed items amounting to a total cost of 5,317 million dollars; deliveries to be subject to the needs of the war situation as it may develop and to production accomplishment; allocations to be made as heretofore by the established American Lend-Lease agencies.

White came into the office on November 24 for advice as to the wording of a proposed report to the President. I pointed out that the following paragraph, which I understood to have been approved by the President at the conference on November 21, was omitted:

"It is understood that the recommended programme does not constitute any commitment, but that all schedules, both munitions and non-munitions, are subject to the changing demands of strategy as well as to supply considerations and the usual considerations of procurement and allocation."

White said he did not know why this paragraph had been

omitted and promised to look into it. It is my understanding that it was restored.

This controversy centred around whether the President had authority to spend Lend-Lease money except for prosecution of the war. When he asked me to serve on this committee to discuss the problem and report to him my recommendations, I told him frankly:

"Mr. President, I know almost nothing about Lend-Lease and I don't want to go to jail when they begin after the war is over to investigate what has been done with this money."

Roosevelt smiled and said, "If you go to jail, I'll be going along too, and we will have good company."

The President was doubtful about his authority to spend any Lend-Lease money after the war was over. Other people differed with him and said he did have such authority. This question was argued back and forth again on November 27 at another conference in his office with representatives of the Treasury, Lend-Lease Administration, and State Department. Roosevelt did issue an order to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they were not to use Lend-Lease except to further the progress of the war. He told me that he was trying to adhere to the intent of Congress.

While these discussions were going on, the President also directed me to confer with the Secretary of State on the problems of post-war international air commerce, then under investigation by a United States-British conference in Chicago. The purpose of the Chicago meeting was to arrange rules for post-war commercial aviation. An impasse between England and the United States seemed to have been reached because, according to such information as was available to me, England, under the direction of the Prime Minister, was endeavouring to break the more or less monopolistic control of overseas commercial aviation heretofore held by American companies.

The United States, represented by Assistant Secretary of State Berle, was determined to support American interests. It seemed to me that surrendering full equality of opportunity to England, with its lower cost of production and operation, would eventually drive our foreign airborne commerce out of business. I reported all of this to the President to assist him in drafting a reply to a message from Churchill that had been received on November 28 concerning the conference.

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The President informed me on November 27 that he would accept the resignation of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State. Hull had not been in good health for some time and was then in the Bethesda Naval Hospital. Roosevelt said he was going to name Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., at that time Acting Secretary of State, to succeed Hull. A week or so later, the new Secretary of State telephoned that with the President's approval he was going to assign C. E. "Chip" Bohlen to duty as liaison officer between the White House and the State Department. This was an effort by Stettinius to get in closer contact with the President, who had been handling much foreign affairs business without consulting the Department of State. I thought it was an excellent idea.

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On November 27, also, I heard a strange story from Wing-Commander Howell of the British Air Force, who had been seriously wounded in Crete and who was in German hospitals in Athens and Salonika for a year. He related how, with divine guidance, he had escaped from a prison camp in Salonika and walked 200 miles to freedom in Turkey. Briefly, his story was that while ill from his wounds he became interested in religion and was inspired with a conviction that if he just walked out of the camp he would be given protection and guidance. He did walk out, passed the sentries without being seen, received food and directions from the inhabitants whenever he needed them, and was guided by a bright star to the shores of the Ægean Sea, where some escaping Greek officers helped him to reach Turkey by boat.

He seemed completely convinced of the accuracy of his statement and of the efficacy of the divine guidance given to him.

* * *

At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs on November 28, the then existing military situation in both the Atlantic and Pacific was canvassed. General Marshall was optimistic about our prospects during the remainder of the year in the war with Germany. The next day, Director Elmer Davis of the Office of War information came to the office to discuss a statement of Assistant Secretary of War Patterson in which the latter said that General Eisenhower was short of ammuni-

tion. Davis was worried that this information would adversely affect public confidence in the High Command.

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The first entry in my notes in December, 1944, records my attendance at the annual Army-Navy football game, played that year in Baltimore. Representing the President, I sat for the second half of the game on the Army side. Score: Army, 27; Navy, 7.

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On December 6 we had another request from Churchill for an early meeting of the Combined Staff in London. Churchill was nettled at a situation that had arisen in Burma. Japanese advances in China had, in the opinion of the American Chiefs of Staff, necessitated the withdrawal of some Chinese troops and American air forces from Burma. The J.C.S. authorized this withdrawal. The British Chiefs of Staff objected to our action, and the matter of distribution of available forces between the China and Burma theatres of war was sharply disputed. The Prime Minister thought the two staffs should get together to discuss this and other problems incident to the war in Europe. However, plans already were being made for a Big Three meeting, and the matter was dropped for the time being.

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After a tortuous legislative journey, the Senate on December 11 approved a House Bill which authorized the appointment by the President of four fleet admirals and four generals of the Army, these ranks corresponding to the British "Admiral of the Fleet" and "Field-Marshal." The Senate on December 15 confirmed the following nominations for this rank:

To be Fleet Admirals:

William D. Leahy.
Ernest J. King.
Chester W. Nimitz.

To be Generals of the Army:

George C. Marshall.
Douglas MacArthur.
Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Henry H. Arnold.

William F. Halsey's name was added later as a Fleet Admiral.

The President signed my commission as Fleet Admiral, to date from November 15, 1944. The President's commission made me the highest ranking officer on the active list in the Army and Navy of the United States, the most powerful military nation in the world, and engaged in the greatest war in history.

This seemed like a "lucky landing" after a half-century's service in the national defence.

All of us received many congratulations from our friends but one that I treasure highly come from the man who, in his lengthy correspondence with the President, usually signed himself, "Former Naval Person." The British Joint Staff mission on December 20 forwarded me the following message from Prime Minister Churchill: "Please accept my most sincere congratulations on your promotion to Fleet Admiral."

* * *

The President returned from two weeks' vacation at Warm Springs, Georgia, on December 19, the same day that first reports were received from Eisenhower telling of a vigorous counter-attack by the German Army against Allied forces approaching the Rhine River. The Nazis had succeeded in breaking through our lines and for a few days the situation was potentially very dangerous. If they had succeeded in separating our armies, undoubtedly the end of the war would have been delayed and we would have had to send in many more troops. The German objective apparently was to isolate Antwerp and wreck our stored supply system.

The Joint Chiefs studied the situation carefully each day, although there was nothing that they could do. It was apparent that the Germans had to be stopped, and we knew, as rapidly as the news could get to Washington, what was being done to halt the advance. The tactics used by Eisenhower and his Field Commander, General Omar Bradley, were correct, and they succeeded.

Twelve days later, on the last day in 1944, came reassuring reports that the German offensive in Belgium had been stopped. Throughout this interval the President had been intensely interested in the day-by-day developments and spent more time than usual with me going over the field despatches

and studying the wall charts in the White House map-room. No one was more relieved than he when this last offensive gasp of the enemy in Europe was choked off.

* * *

Late in the afternoon of Christmas Eve, Navy Secretary Forrestal called at my house to discuss his personnel problems. One of these was a plan to reduce the age of naval commanders at sea and to place on inactive duty many of the older retired officers then employed. The President had advised him to discuss the problem with me. Mr. Forrestal's principles undoubtedly were correct, but I felt he would encounter many difficulties in their execution. He was trying to get new blood into the top Navy command, and the President knew that I was well acquainted with all of those officers.

I could not agree that a blanket order retiring people at a specific age would accomplish the objective sought by Forrestal. Conceivably, such a rule might take out the one man most essential to the success of a specific Navy project just because he had passed an arbitrary retirement age. I gave Secretary Forrestal such assistance as I could, but I fear that I did not provide the help he desired. Roosevelt had not discussed with me details of the Navy high command since I left the post of Chief of Naval Operations in 1939. It was not part of my duty. As his Chief of Staff, it appeared best for me to remain as neutral as possible in matters of this nature, and it was very pleasing to me that the President did not make it a habit to discuss command assignments with me. He was himself very well informed as to the capability of all the naval officers of high rank.

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The Combined Staff held its final 1944 meeting on Saturday, December 30. It was followed by a reception, with egg-nog. Not much business was transacted.

As 1944 drew to a close there was much critical comment in the Press and on the radio concerning the attitude of the United States toward governments then in the process of development in areas recently cleared of the Nazi invaders.

As to Italy, different newspapers were protesting that America was not backing Sforza or Badoglio or the King. In Yugoslavia we were not, according to the partisan Press,

supporting their favourite Tito or Mikailovich or King Peter.

In Spain, they said we should or we should not assist the forces opposed to General Franco, who were apparently about to start a new war in an already war-crippled world. We appeared, according to some newspapers, obligated to support Mahatma Gandhi in his revolt against our principal ally, Great Britain.

There definitely was a movement in this country, assisted by a great part of the Press, to involve the United States in European politics. This was in spite of the joint British-American declaration of August, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter, which promised that America and Britain would "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

There were already too many indications to the contrary to warrant a belief that promises made in the Atlantic Charter would be kept.

Men such as Hanson Baldwin, a writer for the *New York Times*, who had a considerable following among the reading public, expressed to me a conviction that it was necessary for the United States to interest itself in the governments that were to be established in the areas from which the Nazis had been or would be expelled. I told him that, in my opinion, involvement of America in European politics would inevitably bring us into another European war. He took an exactly opposite view.

Great Britain had already taken active and aggressive action in Italy and Greece which had produced a public statement from Secretary of State Stettinius that "the position of this Government has been consistently that the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair, except in the case of appointments where important military factors are concerned."

This statement by the Secretary of State seemed in accord with the Atlantic Charter. We had taken the same attitude in regard to Greece, where a civil war between the Communists and Royalists had broken out, and where British troops were being used to put down the rebellion. There still remained a hope that we might succeed in avoiding entangling ourselves in European political difficulties.

From such information as was then available, it seemed to me that the interests and future safety of America pointed to the necessity of this Government's going on record with a

public announcement that we were committed and devoted to concerted action by the Allied Nations which would be intended to prevent international war, but that we did not intend to sacrifice American soldiers in order to impose any government on any people, or to adjust political differences in Europe or Asia, except when it should be necessary to act against an aggressor with the purpose of preventing international war.

At the time it was proclaimed, I thought the Atlantic Charter was one of the most profound political announcements made during the war. I still think that way, despite the fact that it has not been carried out. At this time, 1944-5, if its principles could have been applied to the Polish problem, it might have been easier for the Poles to get whatever kind of government they wanted. However, by December 31, 1944, there were many indications that the Soviet Government would in the immediate future formally recognize the so-called Communist Committee Government of Poland. Such action by the Soviets probably would make difficulties for the British and the United States, both of which formally recognized the Polish Government in exile in London.

* * *

The beginning of the fourth year of the war looked promising for America. We had the most powerful military-naval force ever assembled by any nation—12,000,000 war-trained men prepared to depart for overseas or already fighting overseas on two sides of the world, in Europe and in Western Pacific and Chinese areas; 8,000,000 were in the Army, 4,000,000 in the Navy.

The American General Eisenhower, commanding a predominantly American force in France and Belgium, had stopped a determined German offensive attempt to drive the Allies back from the western border of Germany; a Russian army was advancing from the south-east toward Vienna; some twenty-six divisions of Germans were contained in northern Italy by an Allied army commanded by the British General Alexander.

A great Russian army along the Vistula River in Poland was prepared for a drive toward Berlin, and it did not seem possible that Germany could, for any considerable time, resist the pressure that would be applied from all sides.

There was some suspicion that the military effort of Russia in Poland had been and was being delayed to obtain political advantage, but from confidential information in my possession it appeared practically certain that a Russian offensive in Poland would start in the very near future.

So it seemed that one was justified in believing that organized military resistance in Germany would collapse within the New Year that started on January 1, 1945. In the Pacific, Fleet Admiral Nimitz had in the past year so seriously damaged the Japanese fleet and air force as to make them no longer a menace to any of our projected operations. What was left would continue to be troublesome, but there was no longer any reasonable probability of their being able to stop our forward movement.

General MacArthur had completed the occupation of the island of Leyte by destroying four divisions of the Japanese Army. He was then preparing for an invasion of Luzon within the next few weeks.

The Japanese were facing an inevitable eventual defeat, but, because of their fanatical savage resistance until they were killed, there seemed to be little prospect of obtaining from them an unconditional surrender within the year that was before us.

One of the best evidences of the certainty of complete allied victory came on January 3, when the cautious Turkish Government voted unanimously to break off diplomatic relations with Japan. Also, a powerful Soviet offensive through Poland began on January 13 with an attack against the Vistula River front toward Crakow. The French were very anxious to participate in the war in the Pacific. Vice-Admiral Fenard had been calling on me regularly to plead his case. The French were particularly anxious to get assistance in retaking their Asiatic colonial possession of Indo-China from the Japanese. They told us that if we could get two divisions of French troops over there in addition to the 50,000 already in Indo-China and with the existing organization of secret resistance groups, Indo-China could be recaptured.

The Joint Chiefs and the Combined Staff studied this problem in January, 1945, and it was the consensus of opinion that transportation to the Pacific of such a force would involve an expenditure of money not justified by any assistance that could be expected from the French in the accomplishment of

the main Allied war objective, which was the total defeat of Japan.

I had much sympathy for Fenard, who was being pressed by his Government to get a commitment from us, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to give him favourable replies to his questions.

Senator Walsh of Massachusetts and Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairmen respectively of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees, came in on January 20 to discuss the progress of the war, particularly in the Pacific. They announced an intention of getting a joint resolution adopted which would state that the policy of the Congress was that the United States retain full sovereignty over the Japanese mandated islands. I was in complete agreement with their objective.

* * *

The Army and Navy were continuing their studies of the feasibility of a single Department of National Defence, and on January 4, Admiral J. O. Richardson discussed with me a study being made by a committee of which he was Chairman. Richardson, an exceptionally clear thinker who had wide experience, had reached a conclusion that a single Secretary of Cabinet rank for the armed forces was desirable, and that the Secretary should be assisted by a statutory Chiefs of Staff organization, with positive but limited duties under the President. The proposed Secretary would exercise authority over the administration of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Command authority was to remain in the hands of the President, and at that time there was no indication that the proposed unification would in any way infringe upon that authority.

* * *

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, whose last command was in the Mediterranean, was named by Churchill to replace the late Field-Marshal Sir John Dill as the British Staff Representative in Washington. I met him when he arrived from England on January 19. Earlier in the month, the President had formally presented to Lady Dill a Distinguished Service Medal in recognition of the services of her late husband.

* * *

The China question was on Roosevelt's mind constantly during the month preceding our departure for the Yalta meetings because of the growing seriousness of opposition to the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek. The dissident elements were said to be Communist-inspired. The President and I discussed at length the stream of reports coming from Chungking, where General Hurley was acting as the President's personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek. My views as to the necessity, from the standpoint of our own national defence, of having a strong, friendly China are now well known to the reader. I was particularly interested in this new crisis because of the difficulties facing General Hurley and the President. The Chief Executive was unwavering in his determination to support his wartime Far Eastern ally, who had fought so bravely for so long a time against great odds. Roosevelt wanted also to give every possible assistance to China to insure a free post-war democratic government in that country.

The President's instructions to Hurley were that the latter should advise him (the President) as to what actions our Government should take to support the Chiang régime and accomplish a unification of the divergent political elements in China. Hurley also was to keep Roosevelt advised of the activities of the British, French, and Dutch in South-east Asia. What follows here is a condensation of the notes of the many conversations I had with the President on this problem during January, 1945.

Hurley reported that there were in China representatives of the Supreme Commander, South-east Asia, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and at Kunming the British headed another organization known as the South-east Asia Confederacy. Neither the Embassy, other American diplomatic agencies, nor American intelligence groups were able to give the General any facts concerning the operations of these British-Dutch-French organizations.

The dispatches to Roosevelt also reported (and Hurley confirmed to me personally in conversations later) that a large number of British officers and civilians were working in Kunming for Imperial propaganda and intelligence services. The British wanted two squadrons of American planes to be maintained, with British crews, for the use of their Kunming units. These planes, with their Service jeeps, trucks, cars, and other Lend-Lease supplies, were intended to be used for

British-French-Dutch underground activities. They could have had nothing whatever to do with the war against Japan.

Hurley also reported that a British Army Aid Group, formed originally to aid British prisoners escaping from Hong Kong and other parts of China, then claimed it was rescuing American pilots forced to land in areas occupied by Japanese forces. General Chennault denied this British claim. The Aid Group was said to be headed by a Colonel Ride of the British Army.

A report of Colonel Ride came into our possession which said that America's attempts to unify Chinese forces against the Japanese was considered as "interference in the local Chinese Government." The British Ambassador to China told Hurley that the American policy to unify China was detrimental if not destructive to the position of the white man in Asia. None of the imperial nations took any interest in the war being fought by China against Japan. Hurley summarized the purpose of the British-French-Dutch propaganda at that time as follows:

1. To condemn America's effort to unite Chinese military forces as interference in the Chinese Government.
2. To keep China divided against itself.
3. To use Chinese and American forces and American Lend-Lease equipment for reconquest of their colonial empires.
4. To justify imperialism as opposed to democracy.

Hurley was able to arrange a conference between Chiang and Chou En-lai, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, at which Chiang was willing to grant the Communist demands except that he could not agree to a coalition government or a coalition military council. Obstacles to the unification of China seemed to be a stand-pat element in the Kuomintang Party, stubborn resistance of the Communists, underhand tactics of the British-French-Dutch representatives, and constant opposition from some of our own diplomatic and military officers. Dr. T. V. Soong had been won over to favouring an agreement with the Communists in order to obtain personal credit for avoiding civil war and for unifying China.

Hurley thought he had practically overcome all of these elements when the Communists refused to continue the discussions. Hurley blamed the cessation of negotiations on an

attempt by some officers of General Wedemeyer's command to by-pass Chiang's National Government and deal directly with Washington. He reported that during an absence of General Wedemeyer from Headquarters, these officers formulated a plan to put American paratroopers in the Communist-held area. These paratroopers were to be used in leading Communist bands in guerrilla warfare. American supplies were to be furnished directly to the Communists, and the dissident troops would be placed under command of an American officer. If the Communists could succeed in making such an arrangement with the United States Army, it would be futile for us to try to save Chiang's National Government.

Hurley understood that his directive was to support the National Government and sustain the leadership of Chiang. He had some inkling of this plot to by-pass the Generalissimo, but it did not become clear to him until General Wedemeyer was asked to secure passage to Washington for Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the top Chinese Communist leaders, for conferences with the President. The Communists asked Wedemeyer to keep this proposal a secret from Hurley and from the Central Government. Working with Wedemeyer, Hurley was able to thwart the plot without doing further damage to the prospects of arranging a peaceful settlement.

General Hurley suggested to Roosevelt that at the approaching conference of the Chiefs of Government (Yalta), we should get Stalin and Churchill to agree to a plan to unify immediately all military forces in China and organize a democratic government. If such an agreement could be secured, Hurley felt it would be possible to carry out the desires of Roosevelt for a strong post-war China.

Meanwhile, other preparations for the Big Three meeting were going ahead. At one time, Odessa was considered as a site but a special Navy report indicated that flying weather in winter ranged from uncertain to very bad. The code name "Argonaut" was selected, probably by Churchill, who took great delight in the choice of code words. By now we had so many code names that care had to be taken to insure that words chosen for the various meetings and projects were sufficiently dissimilar so as not to cause possible confusion.

The Prime Minister, who seemed always to be wanting a conference somewhere, took the lead in promoting the Crimea meeting. However, he did not like Yalta. He later

told the President that "if we had searched the world to find the worst meeting-place, it would not have been as bad as the Crimea." Roosevelt and Stalin exchanged a great many messages about the site, and it was finally decided that Yalta was the nearest Stalin could come to meeting the wishes of his two colleagues. The Russian Marshal never wanted to get very far away from his own front-line operations.

The Prime Minister was very insistent that the British and American military chiefs get together before going to the three-power conference, and on January 9, Roosevelt agreed to have Marshall, King, and Arnold meet with the British Chiefs of Staff at Malta on January 30. The British Staff representatives in Washington had proposed a re-study of the operation plans against Western Germany. We felt certain that they would propose that Field-Marshal Montgomery be given operative command under General Eisenhower of the American-British forces involved. This idea already had been built up by a vigorous publicity campaign in the British Press.

I remained behind when the other Joint Chiefs left by plane for Malta. Shortly before the Presidential party left, I discussed with Roosevelt the desirability of having Vice-Admiral Emory Land accompany us to Yalta. Additional cargo ships were under construction by the Maritime Commission which Land headed, and it seemed likely that the question of captured enemy merchant shipping could arise at the Conference. The President agreed it would be helpful to have him go with us.

Three days before the President left on his final and perhaps most controversial military-diplomatic mission, he took the oath of office as President of the United States for his fourth term at a quiet inauguration ceremony held on the south portico of the White House. This January 20 was another date to be remembered by my granddaughter, Louise. She was thrilled to be included on this historic occasion among the few on the portico who were present with the President.

The condition of Roosevelt's health at this time continued to be a matter of public discussion, and concern to all of us. Seeing him every day, I was not conscious of any marked deterioration. As we made the final preparation for the Crimea conference, I saw no sign of any serious weakness in the President's physical condition.

CHAPTER XVIII

YALTA

ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL, AND Stalin were having their final luncheon of the Crimean conference in the one-time Czar's billiard-room of the Livadia Palace at Yalta on Sunday, February 11, 1945. Roosevelt was impatient to get away, having made important engagements that required him to leave on this day. In nearby bedrooms and sitting-rooms that had been converted into offices, subordinates worked furiously on the final documents that were to record the agreements reached at Yalta.

At last the formal papers and official communiqués were completed and brought to the luncheon table. The Big Three pushed aside their plates and signed the documents. The Yalta Conference was ended. The American delegation, including Roosevelt and most of his staff, was weary, but in a high mood. They felt the foundations of world peace had been laid in the eight days of almost continuous meetings at this former resort of royalty beside the Black Sea.

My own feelings could not match their optimism. The reasons for my apprehensions will be recorded in their proper place in this chapter. To trace out the development of this most controversial of all of the nine Allied war councils, let us go back some nineteen days in my notes to 8.30 a.m. Tuesday, January 23, 1945, when the President gave the word for the U.S.S. *Quincy* to get under way, and the cruiser departed from Newport News, Virginia.

The *Quincy* is a sister ship of the U.S.S. *Baltimore*, on which I had made the trip with the President to Honolulu and the Aleutians in 1944. Captain E. M. Senn was commanding. The President occupied the Captain's quarters, and his daughter, Mrs. Anna Boettiger, who was of great assistance to her father throughout the trip, had the Flag Officer's quarters. I shared a double room and sitting-room with Mr. James F. Byrnes. Others in the President's immediate party were Edward J. Flynn, of the Democratic National Committee, Vice-Admiral Wilson Brown, Naval *Aide*, Admiral Ross McIntire, Surgeon-General, Major-General Edwin M.

Watson, Military *Aide*, Stephen T. 'Early, Press Secretary, and Dr. H. G. Bruenn, U.S.N.R.

We steamed from the Chesapeake capes on course 131° True, speed 22½ knots, with an escort of three destroyers and air cover from Hampton Roads. The sea was moderate, with a strong wind from the north-west. The light cruiser *Springfield* joined our escort at Bermuda. On January 27 the sea and wind moderated, bringing soft, semi-tropical weather as we set our course 90° True for Gibraltar. The next day (January 28) we picked up air cover from the Azores. The *Quincy* remained blacked out throughout the voyage on the 4,000-mile trip to the Straits, and zigzagged according to plan as a precaution against enemy submarines.

It was necessary once or twice during the crossing to send radio communications back to Washington. As a security precaution, the messages were prepared and given to one of the escorting destroyers, which then would drop out of the formation and relay the message from a position which would not in any way hint at the location of the Presidential "Task Force."

On February 1, we were steaming east in the Mediterranean, with plane and blimp air protection added to our destroyer screen. The sea was smooth and the coast of Africa, ten to twenty miles distant, clearly visible. We entered the ship-filled harbour of Valetta on the Mediterranean island of Malta on February 2 and moored alongside the quay wall.

Throughout the ten days on the Atlantic, the President held daily conferences at which we talked over the problems that would be faced at the Crimea meeting. Roosevelt had two principal objectives in mind. He wanted to complete plans for the defeat of Germany on the battlefields of Europe, and to secure Russian co-operation in his efforts to achieve a permanent world peace. The latter, in the President's mind, hinged on the formation of the United Nations Organization.

Our experience at Teheran had given ample warning that the Polish problem probably would be one of the most controversial. What Roosevelt desired was that, once the war was won, the Poles should be permitted to choose the kind of government they wanted without interference from beyond that country's borders. As we discussed the forthcoming meeting, he spoke at length about our friendship for Poland, and the large number of Poles that lived in our own country.

We knew that reparations would have to be considered. Roosevelt had said that the United States did not intend to get any reparations from Germany except possibly a relatively small amount of German property that was already in America. We talked about forming a commission that would try to find out how those countries that had been ravaged by Hitlerism could be compensated and at the same time avoid the pitfalls that made the World War I reparations actually a burden on America.

The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already in Malta, holding meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff, while we were *en route*. On the military side, the President approached the Yalta meetings in a confident mood. At Teheran the United States and Britain were somewhat on the defensive about a second front, and Stalin had been very blunt in his demands that we make good on our promises. As February, 1945, began, there were more than 1,000,000 American troops opposing the Germans on the western front. Most of France had been liberated, and the one major counter thrust attempted by the Germans had been repulsed.

Carrying out their end of the bargain, the Russians had launched their long-awaited winter offensive and were making rapid progress. The Italian front was more static, but a large number of German divisions were being pinned down by that operation. Therefore Roosevelt was supremely confident that we would succeed in destroying the German Army. He was going to be able to show Stalin that we had made good on our pledges.

As for the Far East and Pacific, the occupation of the Philippines had begun. The Burma campaign, after many discouraging delays, was finally under way. I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. The Army did not agree with me, and Roosevelt was prepared to bargain with Stalin with the two-fold objective of securing Russia's military assistance in the Japanese war and political support of the Soviet for the United Nations.

On January 29 the President received on board a long message seeking his aid in a bitter fight then being waged in the Senate over the confirmation of Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce. This message, signed by Judge Samuel Rosenman

on behalf of advocates of Wallace, including Mrs. Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau, urged the President to issue an Executive Order separating the functions of the Federal Loan Agency from the Department of Commerce. The Wallace forces believed this would tip the scales in favour of confirming the former Vice-President to the Cabinet post. It seemed strange to me that Mr. Wallace, who as Vice-President for four years had been the presiding officer of the Senate, could not obtain even from his own party a majority vote for confirmation.

It was my opinion that Roosevelt made a mistake in nominating Wallace, particularly when in those times close friendly relations between the President and the Congress were essential for the future welfare of the world. But, having made the nomination, I felt that he should permit the matter to follow constitutional procedure and accept whatever decision the Senate might make.

Two days later another message from Mrs. Roosevelt urged the President to make some kind of statement in favour of Wallace's confirmation. The idealistic attitudes of Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Wallace were at that time not very different, and appeared to me to be about equally impracticable.

The President at this moment was faced with too many difficult and vital problems to permit his getting into a bitter controversy with Congress or even to warrant his being bothered by the personal troubles of any individual. However, Roosevelt always took such matters in his stride, and this particular incident did not disturb him as far as I could observe.

The Chief Executive always enjoyed being at sea, and on this trip his sixty-third birthday was celebrated on January 30 with a gay little party in his quarters. There were no less than five birthday cakes on the table. He and Anna also watched with great interest the transfer of mail and dispatches from the *Quincy* to one of the escorting destroyers. This was effected by floating the mail in a powder-can and streaming it from the *Quincy's* stern, where it was recovered by the destroyer. This was an antiquated method of transferring mail that might have been used in the days of Columbus.

The President also had a good time on Sunday, January 28, when the crew of the *Quincy* held a field meet on the ship's fantail. At 3 a.m. on this date also we crossed the thirty-fifth

meridian, which technically put us in the European-African theatre of war.

Upon our arrival at Malta (February 2) after protocol visits had been concluded, Prime Minister Churchill came aboard just before noon and remained for lunch, bringing with him his daughter Sarah and Foreign Minister Eden. Other guests were Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Mr. Byrnes, the President's daughter, and myself. Conversation was, as usual, well monopolized by the Prime Minister, who spoke about English problems in wartime, the high purpose of the so-called Atlantic Charter, and his complete devotion to the principles enunciated in America's Declaration of Independence.

The President also met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was given a report on their acrimonious sessions with our British colleagues. Undoubtedly, at the insistence of their Commander-in-Chief, the British adhered to their proposal for a Mediterranean attack in addition to the Western front operations. This was a long-standing difference between us and our British ally, and the American Chiefs had steadfastly opposed any such diversion of strength. The President supported the Joint Chiefs of Staff completely. Churchill made one final and futile argument at the first plenary session at Yalta. The Russians commented that such an attack would be only a diversion and would have no useful effect on the outcome of the war.

The Prime Minister, with the British Chiefs, came back at 5.30 p.m. and conferred with us for two hours. Operations which had been agreed upon at the second Anglo-American meeting at Quebec the preceding September were reviewed in detail, because we planned to acquaint the Russian military staff with these decisions in the meetings at Yalta. Following this Combined Staff meeting, Churchill told the President of his wish to appoint Field-Marshal Alexander to replace Air Marshal Tedder as Deputy Supreme Commander under Eisenhower.

Churchill, his daughter Sarah, and Eden remained for dinner, after which Churchill returned to the matter of exchanging Tedder and Alexander. The Prime Minister said that our activities in Italy had become much less important than previously, and that the Yugoslav General Tito no longer needed Allied aid. Roosevelt had no strong objections,

and it was agreed to effect the proposed change within the next six weeks.

During the conversations at Malta, Roosevelt brought up the question of Palestine, outlining his hopes that an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews in that part of the world could be obtained. Churchill was better informed on this complex controversy than the President, and was somewhat doubtful that the Roosevelt goal could be achieved. At this time the British Empire had a far more vital stake in the Middle East area than did the United States.

Transporting the huge delegations numbering more than 700 persons by air to Yalta involved a major transport operation. Planes left the Malta airfield at ten-minute intervals throughout the night of February 2-3. I had to get up at some unreasonable hour in the morning, as we were scheduled to depart at 3.30 a.m. On this flight we used for the first time the new special four-motored transport plane, which subsequently was named by the Press the "Sacred Cow." It had been equipped with elevators to make it easier for the Chief Executive to get up and down. Roosevelt viewed these refinements as unnecessary.

Despite his affliction, one of the remarkable things about the President was that one seldom was aware of his actual helplessness. This made his reaction to the improvements quite typical. He had always before boarded and disembarked from planes successfully. Although the special devices made it easier, he saw no reason to go to that much trouble and expense for his personal comfort.

There was no gainsaying that travel in the "Sacred Cow" was luxurious in comparison with anything within my previous experience. However, I still continued to prefer to travel by ship, by railroad, or by foot if time were available!

I slept a good part of the way and did not learn until I was editing these notes that there had been any difficulty. I knew we were flying over some high mountains, because I saw them, but I do not believe even the President ever was told that ice formed on the wings and that at one point the Secret Service contemplated putting the "Mae West" lifebelt on him. One of the six escorting fighter planes had to turn back. The Navy also had stationed sea rescue ships at several points along the route.

During the night we set our watches ahead two hours and

at 12.15 p.m. (Crimea time) landed on a Soviet airfield at Saki, where we were received by Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, and a group of Russian military and naval officers. Sitting in an American jeep, the President inspected a Russian guard of honour. I remember particularly the Russian band that led the parade. They played excellent music and carried strange-looking banners, the meaning of which was not apparent to me.

We left at 3 p.m. for a ninety-mile drive over winding mountain roads to Yalta in cars furnished by the Soviet Government and driven by Russians. The entire route was heavily guarded, and the President and I both noted the large number of young Russian women in uniform who made up part of this guard. Roosevelt, as usual, was vastly interested in the geography, as this was a part of the world which he had not previously visited. The area did not appear to have been badly wrecked by the Germans. The many people we saw showed no signs of lack of food. At 6 p.m. we pulled up before the huge fifty-room Livadia Palace, which was to be our headquarters and in which the eight plenary sessions of the Crimean conference were held.

The enormous residence, with its spacious park, was built by the last Czar, Nicholas II, before the First World War. The royal family used it frequently before their murder by the Bolsheviks. The Soviet Government had made it a rest home for peasants and a museum.

Livadia is about five miles from Yalta in an isolated location. The British were in the Vorontsov Villa and three other buildings about twelve miles from our quarters. The Russians were at the Koreis Palace, about halfway between us and the British.

The Soviets had done an amazing job in completely renovating the Livadia Palace during the three weeks since its selection as headquarters for the U.S. delegation. The Germans not only had looted Livadia, but left it and its auxiliary buildings in complete disrepair. There were no furnishings, and the grounds were in an equally bad condition. No one coming in as we did, on the evening of February 3, could visualize fully the gigantic task the Soviets had accomplished in less than a month to accommodate the conference. Hotel staffs had been imported from Moscow and other cities. Sufficient furniture

had been provided to make the quarters habitable. The buildings, naturally, were not intended to be used as hotels, but the Soviets had done their best to adapt them to the needs of the large party we brought in.

Roosevelt was given a suite on the first floor. I had a room adjoining his. The huge ballroom where the plenary sessions were held was on this same level. Other ranking members of our party were assigned rooms on the second floor, which had been converted into bedrooms and offices for use of our delegation. General Marshall, for example, occupied the once-elegant Imperial bedroom suites. Salty Admiral King took a lot of kidding from the rest of us because at the end of his long journey he occupied the room that formerly was the boudoir of the Czarina. Harry Hopkins was a sick man at Yalta and had an upstairs bedroom. He was unable to attend any of the dinners, but remained, on doctor's orders, in his bed most of the time, except during the plenary sessions.

There were three groups of meetings held at Yalta. On the military side the American and British Chiefs usually met separately in the mornings with their respective chiefs of government. Then would follow a Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting or, on several occasions, tripartite meetings with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. Also, usually during the forenoon, the Foreign Secretaries would hold their sessions. In the afternoon, usually at four o'clock, the Big Three, accompanied by their advisers, would meet for the daily plenary sessions.

The President asked me to attend all the political conferences. He said simply one day while we were *en route*: "Bill, I wish you would attend all these political meetings in order that we may have someone in whom I have full confidence who will remember everything that we have done."

I made only pencilled notes on some specific questions that arose at the Big Three meetings, often in haste, due to the number of different daily meetings, and these notes are the basis for this chapter. James F. Byrnes, who was an accomplished stenographer, made shorthand notes when he was present which were accurate and which he later used in his book, *Speaking Frankly*. I was somewhat surprised at Roosevelt's request that I attend all the political meetings, because he possessed what was practically a photographic memory. After his sudden death it occurred to me that perhaps at Yalta he may have had a premonition that he might not be present

at the end of the war to call upon his memory for details in post-war discussions. The President trusted Harry Hopkins implicitly, but at the time of the Crimea Conference the latter's prospects of survival were not promising.

I had good reason to marvel at the memory of Franklin Roosevelt. He had a habit at our daily sessions (I frequently wondered if he was doing it on purpose!) of bringing up some matter we had not discussed for a long time, perhaps for more than a year. He would ask my opinion. Sometimes my recollection was not functioning as fast as his own, but I always gave him some kind of an answer. More than once on these occasions, he would look at me quizzically and say, "Bill, that's not what you told me a year ago." Naturally, I would be taken aback, but usually managed an answer to the effect that "Well, Mr. President, if I told you something different a year ago, that was wrong, because what I'm telling you now is right." After I had given this reply several times, the incidents assumed the nature of a little personal joke between us.

We turn now to the daily account of the Yalta meetings, which began Sunday, February 4, and continued until the following Sunday, February 11.

Sunday, February 4

The American Chiefs of Staff held their first meeting at Yalta on Sunday morning, February 4, following which we met with the President, Secretary of State Stettinius, and our Ambassador to Russia, Averell Harriman. We considered an agenda for the conference.

The Secretary of State outlined the political questions which he wished to have discussed by the three Chiefs of Government. Then two of his assistants, H. F. Matthews and Charles E. Bohlen, elaborated on several of the more acute of these problems. The first of these concerned the voting procedure in a contemplated international agreement to preserve peace, subsequently known as the United Nations Organization. The views of the Russians expressed at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington in 1944 seemed to have convinced Stettinius that if we were going to secure the political support of the Soviet for the United Nations organization, we would have to accept their proposal that any agreements to use pressure against an aggressor nation must be by unanimous consent of the great powers.

The State Department also desired to include France as one of the "great powers" members. I felt that conferring that status on defeated France was an extravagant stretch of the English language.

Another difficult problem was that of new Polish boundaries. Stettinius did not appear agreeable to the transfer of German territory to Poland in the west that would necessitate the evacuation of 9,000,000 German inhabitants across a new boundary between Poland and Germany.

Marshal Stalin, accompanied by Foreign Commissar Molotov, arrived at Livadia at 4 p.m. and conferred privately with the President, the only other American present being Bohlen, who acted as interpreter. The first session of the three Chiefs of Government began one hour later and lasted until 7 p.m.

The President had with him his Chiefs of Staff and Stettinius, with his advisers, among whom was Alger Hiss, at that time Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs. With Stalin at the round table were Molotov and the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, I. M. Maisky, who acted as interpreter, A. A. Gromyko, Russian Ambassador to the United States, and the Soviet Chiefs of Staff. Churchill had at his side Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, the British Ambassador to Moscow, Sir A. Clark Kerr, his Chiefs of Staff, and other diplomatic advisers. The Big Three and their principal aides sat at a large round table, flanked by their respective subordinates. Outside the Palace vigilant Soviet Security Police provided an impenetrable barrier for any outsider who might dare to "crash the gate."

Marshal Stalin asked the President to preside, and the meeting developed into a free and frank discussion of the present military situation on both of the German fronts, followed by a brief estimate of what might be expected in the German war within the next few months.

An assault by the Soviet armies on Germany which had started in mid-January was preceded by a redistribution of forces that had given to the Soviet a numerical superiority of more than two to one on a broad front at the point of attack. This permitted an average advance of about twenty-five miles each day.

Stalin ascribed this remarkable performance to his overwhelming artillery superiority. He claimed 300,000 Germans

killed and 100,000 prisoners since the drive began. He expressed a desire that we on the Western Front expedite our offensive with the immediate purpose of preventing an expected transfer of thirty-five divisions of German troops from elsewhere to the Soviet front.

The Russian Marshal went into some detail about the Soviet use of artillery. He said the fire power developed by their massed guns was so violent that sometimes they captured German prisoners who were so dazed and confused that they hardly knew what they were doing. He emphasized that the Soviet Army had the power to continue to use artillery in this fashion and he thought we might be well advised to follow the same tactics.

An analysis of the situation on the long Russian front was given by General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Red Army's General Staff. When he concluded, Prime Minister Churchill suggested that General Marshall describe the Allied situation, plans, and prospects on the Western Front, which he did clearly and in detail. Sir Andrew Cunningham reviewed the success of our campaign against the Nazi submarines to date, but warned of the possibilities of additional damage from a new type of German undersea craft just coming into use. This was the famous "Snorkle" type, which enabled the German submarines to remain submerged for long periods while "breathing" through the "Snorkle."

This first meeting closed with a decision to hold at noon the following day a combined meeting of the British, American, and Soviet Chiefs of Staff in the Soviet quarters. Political discussions by the three Chiefs of Government were to be resumed at 4 p.m. That evening Roosevelt gave a dinner for Stalin, Churchill, and the political officers, which I was unable to attend because of preparing for the tripartite military session of the next day.

Monday, February 5

We had our own American Chiefs of Staff meeting at 10 a.m. This session followed in general the same routine pursued at Washington. Elaborate and efficient communications facilities set up in the Crimea made it possible for us to get despatches to and from our field commanders with the same speed as if we had been in the Pentagon Building. On this particular morning, February 5, we received a highly

pleasing report from General Douglas MacArthur announcing that he had entered the capital city of Manila. MacArthur's despatch added that he had released about 4,000 Americans interned in the Philippines by the Japanese forces of occupation. I learned later that this news caused quite a celebration at a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries, which was in progress at the same time, with numerous toasts being exchanged at their luncheon.

Our first tripartite Staff meeting began at 12.30 at the Russian quarters in the Koreis Palace. A suggestion of General Antonov that Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke preside was accepted. It was a very friendly meeting in which the military situation in our respective theatres, which had been outlined before the Big Three on Sunday, was gone over in more detail. The Russians were agreeable, and attractive. They appeared to be quite happy to work with us. Our Soviet Allies were obviously pleased with our performance on the Western Front to date and expected that the war would be shortened considerably if we continued at our present rate of progress.

It was never mentioned, but we were aware that a fear the Russians always entertained was that the Germans would make a separate peace with the United States and Britain. (This deep-seated Soviet suspicion came out in the open shortly after the Yalta Conference and will appear in its proper place in this narrative.) I was highly impressed with Admiral Kuznetsov, Peoples' Commissar for the Navy. He was a great big man, dressed in a handsomely tailored Admiral's uniform. He spoke French well enough for us to talk together, and I found him thoroughly informed, although I had doubts that he was a very good sea commander. The Russians have never been good sailors.

The Big Three quickly got down to business when the second plenary session opened at 4 p.m. in the Livadia Palace ballroom. Stalin brought up the question of the dismemberment of Germany. (At Teheran, a year earlier, Roosevelt had put forth a plan for breaking Germany into five separate states, but no decision had been reached at that time.) The Prime Minister expressed agreement in principle with dismemberment and suggested a division into:

1. Northern Germany, including Prussia.
2. Southern Germany, including Austria.
3. Isolation of the Ruhr and Saar.

Churchill added that France should be consulted in the dismemberment problem.

It was agreed in principle to enter "dismemberment" in the terms of surrender, and the Foreign Ministers were directed to prepare a plan for the study of this problem.

The Prime Minister and the President favoured giving France a zone of occupation in Germany during the post-surrender period, but Marshal Stalin objected. The Marshal believed it would be better for Great Britain to obtain the help of France during the occupation period without permitting that country to take part in a Control Commission to be set up in Berlin.

Roosevelt stated that the American occupation forces could not be expected to remain in Germany for more than two years. Churchill seized upon America's short participation in the occupation as an argument, insisting that France be given a zone and that a decision to admit France into the Control Commission must be made "now or later."

Stalin, who never had evinced a very high opinion of the French, did not think they had any right to a zone, but said he would go along, provided the previously agreed-upon Soviet zone would not be affected. Zones of occupation had been agreed upon on September 12, 1944, by the European Advisory Commission, meeting in London. It was then decided to give France an area that would be carved out of the British-American zones and that French participation in the control body be decided at a later date. Roosevelt and Stalin were at this time in full agreement on the undesirability of having France as a member of the Control Commission.

Stalin then brought up the question of reparations in kind and in manpower, but said he was not ready to discuss the manpower question. The latter, of course, referred to forced labour. Since the Russians were using many thousands of prisoners in what was reported to be virtual slave camps, they had little to gain by discussing the matter. Stalin then had Deputy Foreign Commissar Maisky elaborate on the Russian view of the reparations question. The proposal in brief was:

Reparations in kind should include factories, plants, communication equipment, investments abroad, etc., and should be made over a period of ten years, at the end of which time all reparations would have been paid. The total value of the

reparations in kind asked by the Soviet was 10 billion dollars, to be spread over the ten-year period.

The German heavy industries should be cut down and 80 per cent. removed in a period of two years after the surrender.

Allied control should be established over German industry, and all German industry that could be used in the production of war material should be under international control for a long period.

Churchill objected to the 10 billion-dollar figure, and he and Roosevelt agreed that a reparations committee should be appointed to study the issue. Roosevelt made it clear that the United States would not make the financial mistakes that followed World War I. He added that America would not want any manpower, any factories, or any machinery. It might want to seize German property in the United States, which at that time was estimated not to exceed 200 million dollars. Reparations presented a very complicated problem, and the appointment of a special commission seemed to be the only possible way to arrive at any kind of recommendation that could be accepted.

This temporary disposition of the reparations issue marked the end of the business of the second plenary session on February 5.

Tuesday, February 6

The Combined Chiefs of Staff (British and American) met at 10 a.m. and the second tripartite Staff meeting began at noon. The latter was on the same friendly basis as the preceding meeting. Much time was spent bringing the Soviet Staff up to date on the plans of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for prosecuting the war against Japan. For the most part, the Russians listened without offering any comment.

The British and American Staffs had before them many requests from our smaller Allies and co-belligerents for assistance and for using their resources in the war against Germany and Japan. It was noticeable in our meeting with the Russian Staff that the latter showed no interest whatever in any use we might desire to make of the smaller Allied nations. Their mind was on a single track, and that track led straight to Berlin and the defeat of Germany. On this operation we found them completely informed.

The Russian Chiefs did confirm the actual day-to-day command exercised by Stalin as Commander-in-Chief. He was at once the Russian Chief of Staff and Supreme Theatre Commander. Thus Stalin's contention, when we were preparing for these three-power meetings, that he could not get far away from the Russian front, seemed sincere and well founded.

The first business at the third plenary session (on February 6) was approval of a report by the three Foreign Ministers which recommended that a dismemberment of Germany be added to the terms of surrender. Details, however, were not worked out.

Roosevelt then brought up his favoured project, the United Nations Organization to preserve peace. A Charter had been drafted. Up to now the most serious obstacle was the use of the veto power in the proposed Security Council. Roosevelt asked Secretary of State Stettinius to present his suggested formula for voting procedure in the Council.

This formula had been worked up early in December and sent to both Churchill and Stalin. The latter's apparent unfamiliarity with its details was disappointing to the President and to those of his advisers who had come to Yalta determined to put across the United Nations idea. Both Stettinius and Roosevelt were thoroughly informed, and the Secretary of State presented an excellent paper on which he obviously had spent many hours. In substance, the voting plan was:

1. Each member of the Security Council would have one vote.
2. The Council decisions on *procedural* matters should be made by affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Council decisions on all other matters should be made by affirmative vote of seven members including the *concurring* votes of the permanent members, with the important exception that if one of the members was a party to a dispute, it would abstain from voting.

Among the categories requiring concurring votes of the permanent Council members (or stated otherwise—in which the veto could be exercised) were: (1) all questions of membership, (2) removal of threats to peace and suppression of breaches of peace, (3) agreements for providing armed forces and facilities, and for any general system of regulation of

armaments, and (4) determination of whether the nature and activities of a regional agency were consistent with the general United Nations purposes.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlements of disputes also would require the affirmative vote of seven Council members, including *all* the permanent members, except that here also a Council member would not cast his vote in any such decision that concerned disputes to which his country was a party:

1. Whether a dispute is of such nature as likely to threaten the peace.
2. Whether the Council should call on the parties as to methods and procedure of settlement.
3. Referral of legal aspects of the situation to an international court of justice for advice.
4. Whether a regional agency, if one exists, should be asked to try to settle the controversy.

Churchill, in spite of an earlier coolness toward the United Nations idea, gave a long talk, apparently for the record, agreeing with the President's proposal. Stalin said he believed the greatest danger to the organization was differences among the three great powers, and he wished to insure that in the future the Big Three would maintain a united front.

It was obvious that the Marshal felt that the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, if they chose, could impose a peace on the world and be the policemen to see that it was enforced. Stalin said he wished to insure the preservation of peace for fifty years and wanted to establish a force powerful enough to preserve this peace in a future generation that would have forgotten the tragedy of this present war.

The Russian Chief of State was not prepared at that time to accept Roosevelt's proposal. I felt he definitely was not in favour of organizing the United Nations. Knowing Roosevelt's conviction that a world organization was necessary and that one of his chief objectives at this meeting in the Crimea was to secure Soviet support, it was difficult to foresee on what grounds an agreement could be reached.

The troublesome question of Poland next came officially before the conference. The President made a splendid presentation of the problem caused by the need of Poland for a representative government that would include all political parties.

He expressed approval in principle of the Curzon Line as an eastern boundary, but hoped the Soviet would make some concession to the Poles, such as Lvov (Lwow). Roosevelt said that world peace in the future demanded the kind of government in Poland that he was advocating. He made it plain that his chief interest was in a satisfactory Polish government and not in the establishment of particular boundaries.

Churchill approved the Curzon Line. However, the Prime Minister said he would welcome a gesture by the "powerful Soviet Government" for the modification suggested by the President.

Stalin was roused. He talked at much greater length than I had ever heard him talk before. He denied his right to establish any Polish government; said the Curzon Line had been invented by M. Clemenceau and Lord Curzon (after World War I) and not by the Soviet; that Poland should be free, independent and powerful, and that to the Soviet such a government was necessary to insure security. Stalin was contemptuous of the *émigré* Polish Government in London, with which both the United States and Britain maintained diplomatic relations. He charged that the exiled group had interfered continuously with the operations of the Red Army in Poland.

This was the blunt, stubborn Stalin we had seen at Teheran, when the Marshal was pressing us to make good on Second Front pledges. The Polish government problem was to take up more time than any other single dispute at Yalta. There was no prospect of agreement as the third Big Three meeting (February 6) ended.

Wednesday, February 7

The fourth plenary session opened with final agreement on the Foreign Secretaries' report, presented by Molotov, the sense of which was that some officials of the Allied governments would be instructed to insert the word "dismemberment" in the surrender terms for Germany.

Churchill returned to the matter of French participation on the Berlin Control Commission, and in a long talk strongly advocated settling the question at this time. It had been agreed that France might be given a zone of occupation in Germany, but no agreement could be reached at this meeting as to admitting her to the Control body.

Some progress was made on the reparations issue when it was agreed that a Commission on Reparations with membership from the three Allied powers be appointed to meet in Moscow. Details remained to be worked out.

Stalin said he had received from Roosevelt a proposed method (which I had not seen) of settling the Polish government question. Molotov then made the following Russian proposals:

1. That the eastern border should be the Curzon Line, with minor modifications in favour of Poland.
2. That the western border should reach to the Neisse River.
3. That a reorganized Polish government should be recognized by the three great Allies.
4. That the existing Provisional Government of Poland should form a new Government.
5. That the Foreign Secretaries present should study a method of enlarging the present Government and submit proposals to the conference.

Molotov stated that Polish leaders could not arrive before the conference in time to discuss the problem.

The Russian proposal was generally acceptable as far as its wording was concerned, but, as was so often the case in dealing with the Soviets, the interpretation in Washington and London on the one hand and Moscow on the other might be totally different. I had a distinct feeling that Poland was going to be treated very badly from our point of view, although Russia would be able to claim (and did) that the reorganized Polish régime was a self-formed Republican Government. The Russian proposal represented the first of many apparent concessions made by Stalin at the Yalta Conference.

Molotov next reported that the Roosevelt proposal for voting in the United Nations Organization was acceptable to the Soviets, with this important addition: Two of the component states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, White Russia and the Ukraine, were to be made original members of the proposed United Nations "Assembly." President Roosevelt originally was not in agreement with giving the Soviets two additional votes.

This would give the Soviets three votes in the Assembly. Great Britain had six because of the privilege already granted to its several Dominions. Stalin contended that these two

Soviet Republics were as independent as any member of the British Commonwealth and therefore they ought to have the same rights. The question as to why he picked White Russia and Ukraine was never mentioned, although it was known that the Ukrainians had been less amenable to Moscow control than almost any other Soviet area.

Churchill thereupon talked at length in defence of the right of the British Dominions to membership in the United Nations Organization, with the privilege of voting in the Assembly. Such long addresses were tedious because of the necessity of their being translated into Russian, if not for many other good reasons. As was usually the case when the Big Three were in disagreement, the problem was referred to the Foreign Ministers for study and report.

Despite the formal agreement regarding the sovereignty of Iran and Allied assistance to that nation which had been embodied in the Declaration of Iran signed at Teheran, difficulties had arisen in the relations of some of the Allied nations (principally Britain and Russia). These were discussed at this meeting and, on Churchill's recommendation, also referred to the Foreign Secretaries. This brought the fourth plenary session (February 7) to a close.

It seemed to me that it had been the most promising meeting so far, and that Roosevelt was handling the frequent arguments between Churchill and Stalin with great skill. I was agreeably surprised at the Russian attitude on the Polish government questions and on the United Nations Organization.

Thursday, February 8

Thursday and Friday were the two busiest days for me of the entire Crimean conference. The former began at 10 a.m. with a meeting of the American Chiefs, and it was not until after one o'clock the following morning that I finally got to bed.

The military report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was agreed upon at a meeting of the British-American Chiefs, which began at noon. The Secretariat was instructed to put this report in shape for presentation to the President and the Prime Minister.

I presided over a meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, which began at 3 p.m. For the first time we discussed information that it was necessary for us to have at the earliest

practicable date in order to proceed with detailed plans for the war against Japan, subsequent to the collapse of Germany. These plans involved a principle very important to the Soviets—namely, basing some of the American operations on Russian territory. General Antonov and his colleagues said that our plans seemed excellent and looked good to them. Although considerate and sympathetic, Antonov said he could not reply to any of our questions without getting permission from his Commander-in-Chief, Stalin.

“Well, gentlemen,” I said, “this is important. We want to get action on it at once. Will you please get the necessary authority from Stalin?” Antonov promised immediate action.

I advised the President that, to judge from the importance the Soviet military chiefs attached to our specific requests for assistance, Stalin probably would take up the matter on his level. At 3.45 our questions were discussed by Stalin and Roosevelt in the President’s study. Present also were Molotov and Ambassador Harriman. (Bohlen and Pavlov served as interpreters.) I was given a complete account of this important conference, the gist of which follows:

Roosevelt said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase, and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands, and he would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their Army, and he hoped by intensive bombing to destroy Japan and its Army without an invasion and thus save American lives.

Marshal Stalin, taking up our paper, said he did not object to the United States having bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. He said the first was on the lower reaches of the Amur River and the second at its mouth. In regard to the bases on Kamchatka, he thought we would have to leave that until a later stage, since the presence of a Japanese Consul there made it difficult at that time to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate, he added, “the other two bases in the Maritime Provinces are nearer.”

Marshal Stalin next said that a phrase in regard to “commercial routes” was not clear to him.

The President answered that what we had in mind was the

importance of supply routes across the Pacific and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet Union, and he felt that once war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union it would become very important, but also very difficult, to get supplies past the Japanese islands.

Marshal Stalin indicated that he recognized the importance of these supply routes and again repeated that he had no objection to the establishment of American bases in the Maritime Provinces.

The President then handed Stalin a paper prepared by me in which it was requested that the Soviet Staff be instructed to enter into planning talks with the United States Staff. Marshal Stalin indicated that he would give the necessary instructions.

The President then said that he had two questions of a military nature relating to Europe which he wished to take up with the Marshal. He then handed Stalin two papers in English, together with translations into Russian.

The first was a request that the United States Army Air Force be allowed to use certain airfields in the vicinity of Budapest in order to carry out bombing operations against the Germans. The President said that at that time American bombers based in Italy had to make a long and hazardous flight over the Alps in order to reach Germany.

The second paper asked that a group of United States experts be permitted to make surveys of the effects of bombing in the areas liberated or occupied by the Red Army in eastern and south-eastern Europe, similar to the surveys that had been made at Ploesti. The memorandum asked that this group be permitted to proceed at once, since it was important to examine the damage while the evidence was still fresh and the people who had been there during the bombing were still on the spot.

Marshal Stalin said he could grant both these requests and would give the necessary orders immediately.

Before we went into the main meeting, Roosevelt again reminded me to be sure to attend all of the political conferences in order that there might be an American participant in whom he had confidence who would have a continuous memory of the discussions and the decisions reached.

The fifth plenary session (February 8) opened at 4 p.m. with a report from the Foreign Secretaries recommending that the United Nations Organization to preserve peace meet in the United States at San Francisco on April 25, 1945, and that

those states which had signed the United Nations declaration originally promulgated at Washington in January, 1942, be invited to attend. The conference at San Francisco would decide which states might be admitted as original members.

An argument arose at once, with Stalin in favour of the conferees then sitting around the table deciding on who should be members of the world organization. This was resolved when the United States and Great Britain agreed, at the Marshal's request, to support at San Francisco the entry of White Russia and Ukraine as original members of the Assembly. This was formally approved.

Stalin next objected to the admission of ten states which had signed the United Nations declaration, but which had no diplomatic relations with Moscow. He withdrew this objection when the conference agreed that only those nations which had declared war on Germany prior to the first meeting of the proposed world organization should be admitted as original members.

Roosevelt brought up the Polish problem again, and said that while he had no constitutional authority to join in fixing boundaries in Europe he saw no objection to the Curzon Line for the eastern boundary. He thought, however, an extension of the western boundary beyond the Oder River would introduce great difficulties in the attendant transfer of Germans across the border.

Stalin here interjected a remark that there would be very little difficulty on that score, because very few Germans remained in the areas occupied by the Red Army!

Regarding the government of Poland, it was decided that a committee of the three Foreign Secretaries be directed to recommend a government that would be acceptable to a majority of the Polish political elements and that would eventually become a provisional government that could be recognized by the three great powers.

Molotov argued insistently for the maintenance of the Lublin Government and its inclusion therein in any reorganization.

Churchill objected violently to recognition of the Lublin régime and to abandoning the present Polish Government in London, which had been recognized by Great Britain since the beginning of the war. He wanted to settle the Polish government problem at Yalta in order that public opinion in

England might consider that the conference had solved successfully this difficult problem.

Stalin said that the entire population of liberated Poland was enthusiastic about the Soviet liberators, and disliked all Poles who had left their homeland for foreign countries during its period of distress.

At 7.30 the conference adjourned without having reached any agreement on the Polish government problem.

As soon as I could talk with the President after the plenary session closed, I warned him about the possible difficulties back in the United States that would result from his agreeing to give the Soviets more votes in the proposed United Nations Assembly than we had. I felt this would be received very badly and meet with serious objection in Congress.

Roosevelt apparently was prepared to make some concessions in order to get the machinery of the United Nations started. Therefore he had made no objections to the two extra Soviet votes. Churchill, of course, did not object, because he already had extra votes in the British Dominions.

I think the President realized the possibilities of adverse reaction back in Washington, because I learned later that he did secure from both Churchill and Stalin definite commitments that Britain and Russia would support the United States' request for two additional assembly votes if such were proposed.

Some time during this crowded day Ambassador Harriman informed me that at the private conference between Roosevelt and Stalin regarding Soviet participation in the war against Japan it was agreed there were no decisions that could not be adjusted to the satisfaction of both nations. As reported by Harriman, Stalin made the following requests:

The Soviet wanted to obtain Port Arthur under a long-term lease. Dairen was to be a free port.

The existing autonomy of Outer Mongolia would be preserved. All of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands would be returned to the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government would be granted a lease of the Chinese railroads in Manchuria such as they had prior to the present war.

The fate of Indo-China would be open to discussion.

Siam was eventually to become an independent state.

American material would be provided for the Soviet war effort against Japan.

Lines of supply from the United States would be kept open. American aeroplanes might be used from bases in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.

On Thursday night it was Stalin's turn to be host at an official dinner in honour of the President. This banquet began at 9 p.m. in the Soviet Headquarters, which at one time had been the summer palace of the Russian Prince who was alleged to have assassinated Rasputin before the Red Revolution.

The guests included Prime Minister Churchill, the Foreign Ministers of the three nations, high-ranking military and naval officers of Great Britain and Russia, the British and American Ambassadors to Russia, James Byrnes, Edward J. Flynn, Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, *née* Churchill, and Miss Harriman. I was the single representative of the American military staff.

The dinner lasted until 1 a.m., with great quantities of food, thirty-eight standing toasts, and mosquitoes under the tables that worked very successfully on my ankles. All the people who had any sense watered their liquor and managed to stay alert.

In a number of the toasts guests moved about the long table to click glasses with the person toasted.

In my own case, the toast was proposed by Foreign Minister Molotov, who came with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill to my place at the table in order to touch glasses.

With the amount of important work with which we were faced every day, such dinner celebrations were, in my opinion, an unwarranted waste of time.

We did not succeed in returning to our quarters in Livadia Palace until long after midnight.

Friday, February 9

Friday began with a Combined Staff meeting at 11 a.m., when our final military report of the Crimean Conference was examined. The British and American chiefs then met with the President and the Prime Minister, who approved the report. That action completed the work at Yalta on British-American military problems. A summary follows:

1. The overall strategic concept of the war remained unchanged. In co-operation with Russia and other allies, it was agreed to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.

2. In co-operation "with other Pacific powers concerned," it was agreed to "maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan to reduce her military power and gain positions from which her ultimate surrender could be forced."

3. Upon the defeat of Germany, in co-operation with other Pacific powers concerned *and with Russia*, to bring the full resources of the United States and Great Britain into action to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date. (At the second Quebec Conference it had been estimated that the war against Japan could be concluded in about eighteen months after Germany should be defeated.)

(I offered no objection to the decision to seek Russian assistance, although personally I believed that the United States, single-handed if necessary, could defeat Japan within the time estimated.)

4. It was agreed to provide assistance to such forces of the liberated areas in Europe as could play an active and effective role in the war against Germany and Japan. The same rule was to be applied with respect to assistance, within available resources, to other co-belligerents.

5. As soon as the German situation permitted, reorientation of forces from the European theatre to the Pacific and Far East was to have highest priority, after taking into consideration other agreed-upon or inescapable commitments.

6. Offensive operations against Japan were to be continued in order to make possible a successful invasion at the earliest practicable date.

7. In the Mediterranean Theatre it was agreed to withdraw certain forces from Italy and place them at the disposal of General Eisenhower on the Western Front. It was decided that the primary object should be to build up the maximum possible strength against Germany on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theatre. This required a redefinition of the task of Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre.

The remainder of the report was largely a restatement of the basic undertakings agreed upon at the "Octagon" conference in September, 1944, at Quebec. These included maintaining vital overseas lines of communications, disruption of enemy sea communications, and such measures as were necessary and practicable to increase the effectiveness of China as an ally and use of Chinese territory as a base for operations against

Japan. (The difficulty of finding sufficient land space to enable us to step up our air operations on Japan remained, although continued naval successes in the Western Pacific were making more airfields available from which the B29s of the 20th Air Force could operate.)

I had lunch with the President, the other guests being Prime Minister Churchill, the three ladies of our parties, and Byrnes. The conversation centred around voting procedure in the proposed assembly of the world peace organization. Churchill agreed orally to an arrangement whereby the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Republics should have equal voting power in the Assembly.

Because of Roosevelt's insistence that I attend all of the political meetings, I had to miss the last session with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. General Antonov had already informed me that, with the approval of Stalin, he was prepared to answer the questions that we had put to the Russians at our session on February 8.

General Marshall and Major-General L. S. Kuter (who represented the Air Force at Yalta, General H. H. Arnold being ill) told me that the Soviet replies to our questions were completely satisfactory. We would be given bases in the Maritime Provinces after the surrender of Germany, and such other assistance as the Soviet Government could provide.

Just before the sixth plenary session began, February 9, the Big Three and their principal advisers went out into the courtyard of the Livadia Palace, where photographers and motion picture operators made numerous pictures. When these were developed and brought to our attention, I heard the only serious comment about Roosevelt's health made by our group during the entire Yalta Conference. There was one photograph in particular in which some of our party thought he looked very ill. He did not appear that way to me. I thought it was simply a poor photograph and that members of our party were unduly alarmed.

Further discussion of the Polish problem opened the meeting. Molotov proposed acceptance of an American suggested solution, with some amendments. One was that the present Lublin régime be reorganized and broadened by the inclusion of Poles from both inside and outside of Poland. This reorganized provisional government then would arrange for a free, unfettered election at the earliest possible date. Churchill

obtained a day's delay before reaching a final agreement on this very controversial issue.

There was further discussion of the Reparations Commission, which the Conference on February 7 had agreed on in principle. Russia proposed that the total value of reparations should be estimated at 20 billion dollars, of which Russia would receive 10 billion. Britain's Foreign Minister, Eden, objected violently both to the proposed value and to the proposed distribution, whereupon the subject was laid aside for further study.

Roosevelt then brought up the system of trusteeship as proposed in the draft charter of the United Nations Organization. Churchill was on his feet immediately. The Prime Minister refused to consider permitting any agency to deal with any territory under the British flag. He said: "While there is life in my body, no transfer of British sovereignty will be permitted." I personally was highly pleased with this courageous statement by the British leader.

In that connection, I remember that when we were preparing for the Crimea meeting the President told me he hoped it could be arranged to return the great Chinese port of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the Chinese Government. When the matter of making Darien a free port came up, I leaned over to Roosevelt and said, "Mr. President, you are going to lose out on Hong Kong if you agree to give the Russians half of Dairen" (the Chinese port in Manchuria). He shook his head in resignation and said, "Well, Bill, I can't help it." Churchill was quieted when it was made plain that the trusteeships then being discussed referred to the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific.

One of Roosevelt's pet ideas which he had discussed with me on many occasions was a plan for a series of strategic bases all over the world to be controlled by the United Nations. I could never agree with him on this proposal, and always felt that any bases considered essential for the security of our own country should be under the sovereignty of the United States.

His argument, particularly in regard to strategic areas in the Japanese mandated groups which we had captured at a high cost in American lives, was that the United States did not wish to acquire any territorial gains as a result of the war. That was a fixed principle with him. Roosevelt believed that

we would get the same protection if the mandated territory was under the United Nations. I thought he was wrong then, and have not changed my mind as these notes are being compiled.

Definite disagreement developed between Great Britain and Russia regarding the establishment of a government in Yugoslavia. Although I was not familiar with this problem, basically it seemed to be another Poland on a smaller scale, and the British were trying to get the existing Tito Government reorganized along broader lines. A decision was reached to put into effect a Tito-Subasic agreement. I was not familiar with the details. It was my opinion that Churchill hoped that the inclusion of Dr. Subasic in the Yugoslav Government might prevent the establishment of a Communist dictatorship under the leadership of Tito. At this point, Roosevelt suggested a thirty-minute recess while the Foreign Ministers attempted to formulate an acceptable solution of the Polish issue.

When we resumed, Churchill made a long argument for supervision by the three great powers of a proposed early election of a representative government in Poland. Roosevelt supported his argument.

Stalin objected, saying that such a move would be "offensive" to the feelings and the *amour propre* of the Polish people.

"You cannot do that," the Marshal said. "The Poles are an independent people, and they would not want to have their election supervised by outsiders."

The Prime Minister next presented the question of war criminals. He said that the "great war criminals" should be executed without formal trials. This would obviate any necessity for bringing them before a formal court, which he at that time considered unwise.

He insisted vigorously that traditional English practice would not permit trying before any British court any person accused of an offence that was not legally a crime at the time it was committed. I was in full agreement with Churchill on this point, and felt that his contention was in accord with the long-established Anglo-Saxon understanding of justice.

I am not a lawyer, and some of our most eminent members of the Bar, including Justices of our Supreme Court, have expressed an opinion that such trials are legal. Churchill even went along finally with this point of view.

To a professional soldier, his country's appeal to the force

of arms is final. A soldier carries out the orders of his government. He defends his country to the best of his ability, and when he loses a war he must take the consequences.

As these notes are being edited in 1949, it appears that Chiang Kai-shek has lost his war to defend China against the Communists. Chiang fought as well as he could for ten long years to save his country, and one of the first announcements of the so-far victorious Communists was to brand him as a war criminal, to be tried as such, and executed. The Chinese Communists are reported to have made up a list of such "criminals." It is difficult for one who has spent his lifetime as a professional military man to square this concept of justice with the practice of American jurisprudence as I have understood it.

The last action of this sixth plenary session (February 9) was to refer the matter of trying war criminals to the three Foreign Ministers for study and report to their governments at some future date.

Saturday, February 10

The military phase of the Crimea meetings having been concluded, the principal business of Friday was the seventh plenary session, which lasted four hours. It opened with the reading by British Foreign Minister Eden of a compromise report on the new Polish Government agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers. Roosevelt handed me a copy. I saw the now-familiar phrases, such as "strong, free, independent and democratic Poland," Russia "guaranteeing" the liberated country "unfettered election," "universal suffrage," "secret ballot," and so on. I felt strongly that it was so susceptible to different interpretations as to promise little toward the establishment of a government in which all the major Polish political parties would be represented. I handed the paper back to Roosevelt and said: "Mr. President, this is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it." The President replied: "I know, Bill. I know it. But it's the best I can do for Poland at this time." The compromise report was approved.

Churchill then turned to the Polish boundary question, pointing out that no decision had been reached as to the western line. The Prime Minister was very doubtful of the

wisdom of going beyond the Oder River. He recommended that the western border be settled *at the peace conference* after consultation with the new Polish Government to be established.

Roosevelt replied that he had no authority to act, this being a question to be passed upon by the United States Senate.

Churchill then proposed that the three powers agree that Poland receive an acquisition of territory in the west and on the north, but that the final lines of demarcation be fixed at the peace table. This was agreed to, and referred to the Foreign Secretaries for phrasing. This "settlement" of the entire Polish government question appeared to me to be so loose that it could be interpreted in almost any way that pleased the Russians. I was afraid that it would not accomplish what we had hoped to do for Poland.

Eden then read a report on liberated areas which recommended that when troubles should arise therein, the three great nations would immediately consult *together* on measures to carry out their *joint responsibilities* set out in a proposed declaration. There was some discussion of the wording, but the report was approved by the three Chiefs of Government, who wrote into the draft a hope that the Provisional Government of France might be associated with them in this problem.

Roosevelt by this time had changed his mind about France having membership on the Allied Control Commission in Berlin. He supported Churchill in his belief that this recognition of France would facilitate obtaining agreement of General de Gaulle with the various actions taken at Yalta concerning France. With these amendments, the draft of the "Declaration of Liberated Areas" was approved. Likewise agreement was reached on the text of a telegram to be sent to the Tito-Subasic group in Yugoslavia.

Stalin then returned to the question of reparations, and requested that the conference agree that Germany must repay in kind the losses suffered by the Allied nations through German action during the war. The Russians persisted in their efforts to have the conference fix the total reparations at 20 billion dollars. Churchill refused flatly to accept any such valuation.

Roosevelt recommended that the amount be left to the Reparations Commission which the conference already had agreed to set up in Moscow. The Russians kept insisting on a total of 20 billions, with 10 billions for themselves. Finally,

Roosevelt suggested that the Reparations Commission consider investigating the Russian figure "as a basis for discussion" of the amount of reparations. This recommendation was approved. It was agreed also that no mention of the money value of reparations would be made in the report of this conference.

Stalin brought up the Montreux Treaty in regard to the Dardanelles. He said this treaty was out of date and should be modified to take into account the Soviet interest. The Marshal did not press the question. He said he would be satisfied if the Dardanelles matter could be investigated by the Foreign Ministers, who would make a report to their respective governments. This report would be preparatory to a settlement of the problem.

Churchill replied that he hoped to receive through the Foreign Secretaries the details of what Russia wanted in regard to an exit from the Black Sea, and he hoped that any conference concerning the Dardanelles would be held in London.

The real crux of this problem did not come out into the open at Yalta. Everyone knew that the Russians desired to get control of this vital waterway. They had been trying for 150 years to acquire such control. We knew that Moscow wanted an arrangement which would give Russia the authority to say who would use the Dardanelles. I knew that Churchill was apprehensive, but the problem was not discussed at length at the Crimea meetings.

With the possible exception of the veto and voting arrangements of the United Nations, no action taken at Yalta has caused more controversy than the understanding reached by Roosevelt with Stalin regarding Russian participation in the war with Japan. I think it wise to state a few facts which seem to have been overlooked in heated charges that our Chief Executive made "dangerous concessions" to the Soviets, or that the President "sold China down the river."

1. Russia was our ally and up to June, 1944, took the full force of the mighty German Army.

2. Fears expressed by many—some in high places—that Russia would make a separate peace with Germany, particularly when we were unable to mount a second front in 1943, had proven unfounded. Russia had kept every military agreement made before that time.

3. As for political agreements, we had reached at Yalta the first major understandings regarding the post-war world. Stalin had shown a conciliatory attitude on the United Nations, on giving France a voice in the Control Council of Germany, and in agreeing to reorganization of the Polish and Yugoslav governments. In fact, on almost every political problem, after a forceful statement of their views, the Russians had made sufficient concessions for an agreement to be reached, on paper at least. It is true that the ink was hardly dry on the Yalta Protocol before serious difficulties in interpretation arose.

4. I personally, as the reader well knows by now, did not feel that Russian participation in the Japanese war was necessary. The Army did. Roosevelt sided with the Army. After getting the "green light" from their Commander-in-Chief, Stalin, the Russian Chiefs of Staff gave every indication of co-operating fully and agreed to all the specific requests made of them.

It may come as a surprise to many to learn that the misnamed "concessions" evoked little discussion and no argument when Stalin, at this February 10 plenary session, formally announced that Russia would enter the war against Japan within two or three months with certain understandings. These understandings were substantially those that Ambassador Harriman had reported to me as agreed upon between Stalin and Roosevelt on February 8.

Briefly they were: the return of Sakhalin and the Kuriles to Russia; leasing of Port Arthur to Russia; Dairen to be a free port; the revival of the Soviet lease on Manchurian railroads; the preservation of the existing autonomy of Outer Mongolia; Russian support of Chiang's National Government of China in its war on Japan.

Stalin repeated to the conference what he had told Roosevelt privately—namely: "I only want to have returned to Russia what the Japanese have taken from my country." Roosevelt had said: "That seems like a very reasonable suggestion from our ally. They only want to get back that which has been taken from them." It seemed very reasonable to me also, and no one was more surprised than I to see these conditions agreed to at Yalta labelled as some horrendous concessions made by President Roosevelt to an enemy.

Another thing Stalin said in his frank and appealing discussion of Russia's part in the war against Japan was: "I want

no reparations from Japan." Add to that Stalin's agreement to support the Chinese Government of Chiang Kai-shek and I do not see how anybody could object to the agreements made. One thing is certain, there was no objection at Yalta by Churchill or by Roosevelt, and the entire matter consumed relatively very little time.

The actual agreement signed by the President and Stalin was entrusted to my care and kept in my secret files at the White House. No publicity could be given to the agreement at that time because officially Russia still was at peace with Japan. It was to be Roosevelt's task to acquaint Chiang Kai-shek with the agreement and get his consent to its terms.

The end of the seventh plenary session at 8 p.m. really brought the work of the Crimea Conference to a close. There remained only the business of agreeing on actual phrasing and wording of the conference communiqué.

Everyone was thoroughly tired by that time, but managed to have a fairly pleasant evening at Churchill's dinner for his colleagues and their advisers, which brought to an end the formal entertaining at Yalta.

Sunday, February 11

The Big Three and their political advisers met in the eighth and final plenary session shortly after noon on Sunday, February 11. Churchill and Stalin had wanted to continue the conference for some more days, but Roosevelt said that nothing more could be accomplished, and it was absolutely necessary that he start his long journey home on that date.

The principal business was discussion of the conclusions reached during the week and the preparation of a communiqué to be issued to the public over the signatures of the three Chiefs of Government. Churchill proposed numerous textual changes in a draft communiqué prepared by Secretary of State Stettinius. Most of the modifications were to meet his ideas of correct English. Churchill, of course, preferred "British" English! Stalin also wished to make some minor changes, and recommended that the names of the officials who participated in the conference be announced in the communiqué.

Molotov proposed that the agreement to invite two Soviet states to be members of the assembly of the proposed United Nations Organization be made public, but, upon objection

by the Prime Minister, withdrew his request. No major arguments arose as final agreement was reached on both the summary of conclusions and the draft communiqué.

While the formal papers were being prepared, the final luncheon was held in the President's dining-room of the Livadia Palace, in which these historic meetings had been held. At this last luncheon were the President, Stalin, Churchill, the three Foreign Secretaries, Stettinius, Molotov, and Eden, the ambassadors present at the conference, and the interpreters.

During the meal, the formal papers were brought in and the final report and communiqué signed by the three principals. This took some time, as it was necessary for the respective interpreters to go over both the English and Russian versions. A summary of the public announcement, signed by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, follows:

1. Plans completed for the defeat of Germany with fullest information interchanged among the three allies. Closer co-ordination of military effort of the three allies achieved which "we believe . . . will result in shortening the war."

2. *German Occupation.* Common policies adopted for enforcing unconditional surrender, but terms not to be made known until final defeat. The three powers to occupy separate zones, with administration and control co-ordinated in a Central Control Commission. France to be invited to take over an occupation zone and participate on the Commission (the communiqué did not say that the French Zone would consist of territory taken only from the British and American areas).

The harsh terms for Germany's defeat were set forth, such as de-Nazification, break-up of the German General Staff, "swift punishment" for all war criminals, reparations, demilitarization, etc.

3. *German Reparations.* Germany to be obliged to make compensation in kind to the greatest extent possible and formation of the Reparations Commission was announced. (No mention made of any specific sums to be considered or any details of transfer of property.)

4. *United Nations.* Convening of the conference on United Nations at San Francisco on April 25, 1945, announced. The communiqué said, on the important question of voting procedure, "the present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty." France and China to be invited to sponsor the

United Nations, along with the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Text of proposals on voting procedure to be made public when consultation with these two additional powers shall be completed.

5. *Declaration on Liberated Europe.* Emphasized that principles of the Atlantic Charter shall be applied in reorganization of Governments and that the three major powers would act jointly and in concert in handling all problems connected with the liberated areas. France invited to associate itself with this declaration.

6. *Poland.* Present provisional government to be reorganized on broader democratic basis, with Foreign Commissar Molotov, American Ambassador Harriman, and British Ambassador Sir A. Clark Kerr to act as a Commission in Moscow to assist in the reorganization. Britain and the United States to recognize the new Government when it has been properly formed in conformity with this agreement, and pledged to holding "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." Concerning Polish boundaries, the Curzon Line with modifications to be the eastern frontier. Western border to be fixed at the peace conference.

7. *Yugoslavia.* Recommended that the Government there be broadened according to the terms of the Tito-Subasic agreement.

8. Foreign Secretaries of the three major powers to meet as often as necessary, rotating their meetings in the three capitals, with the first meeting being held in London after the United Nations meeting in San Francisco. Reaffirmation of "common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and action which had made victory possible. . . ."

Action of the conference in keeping secret some of the decisions was later to draw wide criticism. All military plans had to be surrounded with the same security that had prevailed throughout the war. As the communiqué stated, "our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them." Therefore no hint could be given of the arrangements we had made with the Russians for their assistance in the war with Japan.

Russia was not then at war with our Far Eastern enemy, and consequently no mention could be made of the proposed

return to the Soviets of territory and privileges that had been taken from them by the Japanese.

The Yalta communiqué stated that the reason for not making public at that time the voting procedure in the proposed Security Council of the United Nations was that the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France had not been consulted. Roosevelt never told me why the agreement to support at San Francisco the request of the Soviet Union for two additional votes in the assembly of the proposed world peace organization was kept a secret. It was to leak out in Washington later under most unfavourable circumstances. No mention was made of the controversy over United Nations Trusteeships, and it was obvious that this issue was going to be difficult to resolve.

Although it was decided that Germany should be dismembered, no actual plans for accomplishing this were made at Yalta. Likewise, it was agreed to try "war criminals," but no details were agreed upon as to the basis on which the prosecution would proceed.

No action was taken to iron out the difficulties that had arisen, principally between Britain and Russia, in Iran, and the question of control of the Dardanelles, brought up by Stalin, also was left to be decided at some future meeting.

It was my feeling that Roosevelt had conducted the Crimea Conference with great skill and that his personality had dominated the discussions. Since he was the presiding officer, and most of the arguments were between Stalin and Churchill, he played the role of arbiter at many of the daily sessions. The President looked fatigued as we left, but so did we all. It was one of the most strenuous weeks I had ever had, and there were several days in which I worked almost continuously for twenty hours. This included attending the seemingly interminable formal dinners, at which an abundance and variety of rich foods were hardly an aid to the crowded working schedule.

Churchill, I thought, was at his best at Yalta. He was completely and wholeheartedly devoted to the interests of the British Empire. I could take no exception to that attitude, even when his proposals were not in full accord with what I believed to be the best interests of my own country. He was a great Englishman, as Roosevelt was a great American. He made a truly prophetic comment at one point, although I

do not remember exactly which day it occurred. He observed to Roosevelt and Stalin that he was the only Chief of Government at the table "who could be thrown out of office on any given day" by his own Government.

As for Stalin, there was a noticeable difference in his attitude at Yalta as compared with Teheran late in 1943. At Teheran he was plainly dubious of the extent of the military effort to be put forward by Great Britain and the United States. By the time he got to Yalta, he had no doubts about our military operations. His views on the many political questions were usually different from ours, but he spoke quite frankly in presenting the Russian attitude. He was friendly, and seemed in many instances willing to compromise in order to reach an agreement.

The major difference between Yalta and Teheran was, of course, that by the beginning of 1945 the Axis was on the defensive on all fronts, and the problems of a post-war world took an equal place on the agenda with military matters. It was the political discussions that consumed most of the time at Yalta, whereas at Teheran military affairs dominated.

At the conclusion of this momentous Crimea meeting of the three nations that expected to administer in the near future a total defeat to Germany, I was deeply impressed by the amicable agreements of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Marshal on the action that should be taken to destroy Germany as a military power.

These three men who together controlled the most powerful military force ever assembled, sitting with their military and political staffs at a round table in a palace that once belonged to the Czars of Russia, agreed to destroy completely the existing German Government, to disarm and dismember Germany, to destroy any of its industry capable of manufacturing war material, to transfer territory from Germany to Poland that would necessitate the deportation of between 7 million and 10 million inhabitants (if that many survived), and to exact reparations in kind and in forced labour that would practically reduce the existing highly industrialized Germany to the status of two or more agricultural states.

I felt sorry for the German people. We were planning—and we had the force to carry out the plans—to obliterate a once mighty nation. I had an uneasy feeling that those 80 million Germans somehow or other would survive to fight again.

While the German nation had in this barbarous war of conquest deserved all the punishment that could be administered, the proposed peace seemed to me a frightening "sowing of dragon's teeth" that carried germs of an appalling war of revenge at some time in the distant future.

I did not know of any other way to punish for their war crimes this nation of highly intelligent, highly reproductive, and basically military-minded people, but the prospect of some future reaction in desperation hung like a dark cloud over my thoughts.

In so far as the United States was concerned, the terms of peace would have to be approved by the United States Senate, which might cause them to be modified or mitigated. It did not seem possible that their severity could be increased.

At one time I had joined with President Roosevelt in a great hope that a projected United Nations Organization to preserve peace would be effective for a long time in maintaining agreement between the powerful nations of the world. But the agreed-upon fiction that France was a great nation, and its inclusion in the proposed Security Council with a full veto power, possibly might destroy the effectiveness of the United Nations in preventing international war.

It was difficult for me to see how this veto power, which it appeared was granted to France in the interest of Great Britain, could have any other effect than to cause discord with the other small countries, and disagreement among the three powerful nations.

There was another compelling factor that kept me from sharing in the feeling of great hope, almost exultation, that prevailed in our American delegation as we left Yalta, as to the practicability of maintaining world peace through the United Nations Organization. The essential agreement to destroy German militarism accepted at the conference would make Russia the dominant power in Europe. That in itself, in my opinion, carried a certainty of future international disagreements.

CHAPTER XIX

ILL OMENS FOR PEACE

A TIRED BUT HAPPY Franklin Roosevelt sat down to a gay steak dinner aboard the U.S.S. *Catoctin* on the evening of February 11, 1945. None of us thought at that hour that two months later almost to the day the Chief Executive would be fatally stricken with a cerebral hæmorrhage at Warm Springs, Georgia. Before we reached Washington, his Military *Aide* and lovable personal friend, Major-General Edwin M. Watson, was to die of a heart attack aboard the U.S.S. *Quincy*; the President was to say goodbye for the last time to the ailing Harry Hopkins; he was to lunch with his great colleague, Winston Churchill, at Alexandria, Egypt, at what proved also to be their final meeting; and he was to face the first ill omens for a lasting peace in Russia's becoming increasingly difficult to deal with as the day of victory over Hitlerism drew nearer.

However, there was no hint of these troubles as we boarded the *Catoctin*, moored alongside a sea wall in the harbour of devastated Sevastopol. We had left the Livadia Palace about four o'clock, and motored to Sevastopol through eighty miles of what was said to be beautiful mountain scenery.

I rode in an ancient open car tightly screened with old-fashioned curtains. We had hardly started before gasoline fumes filled the rear part of the car, apparently from a leak in the gas tank. As the fumes became not only uncomfortable but dangerous, we wrestled with the curtains and finally had to kick them out. Thereafter the automobile was liveable in, but uncomfortable.

When, after reaching Sevastopol, the President asked me what I thought of the scenery, I told him I had seen just about as much of it and had been almost as comfortable as one would be if confined in a recently emptied gasoline drum!

In going by way of the Russian Black Sea port, the President had a chance to see the famous battlefield of Balaklava, and apparently he had enjoyed every moment of the drive. It was dark when we reached Sevastopol, but the completely wrecked habitations along our road gave evidence of the truth

of a statement that only five houses in the city were habitable when it was retaken from the Germans.

That evening, aboard the *Catoctin*, General Watson suffered a heart attack which left him in a weakened condition. The next morning at seven o'clock we disembarked and, after a short drive through fertile, highly cultivated grain and fruit valleys, we reached the Russian airfield at Saki, from which we departed in the President's plane at 11 a.m. for Egypt. A pleasant thousand-mile flight across the Black Sea and Turkey brought us to an Egyptian airfield near Ismailia. The President and his party went at once on board the *Quincy*, anchored in Bitter Lake not far from the landing-field. The weather was warm, sunny, and pleasing after our stay in near-winter temperature in the Crimea.

There followed two days of pageantry in this eastern end of the Mediterranean area as the President held conferences with the King of Egypt, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and the King of Saudi Arabia. Apparently until just before we left Yalta, Churchill knew nothing about Roosevelt's plans to visit these potentates who ruled in the traditionally British sphere of influence. We soon learned that the Prime Minister had changed his plans, and, instead of returning to London, had arranged to see Haille Selassie and King Ibn Saud before they returned to their homes after visiting Roosevelt. This was assumed to be with the purpose of neutralizing any unilateral accomplishment the President might have made during his talks with the three kings.

King Farouk of Egypt was the first to arrive, and I met him at the landing on February 13. He was accompanied by several of his chief advisers and the United States Minister to Egypt, S. Pinckney Tuck, who had been my first Secretary of Embassy in France. King Farouk was a young man of twenty-five who spoke perfect English and, in the uniform of an Admiral of the Fleet, looked like an Englishman.

The President entertained the King and his party at lunch with Mrs. Anna Boettiger, Harry Hopkins, Major-General Giles, Tuck, and me. While I did not hear all of their conversation, my impression was that Roosevelt and King Farouk simply had a friendly social visit.

At 5 p.m. I met at the airport Emperor Haille Selassie and his colourful party. The "Lion of Judah" was a very dignified, small, black man who speaks and understands French and

English, but who talked with the President in Amharic through an interpreter. I was told that the ruler of Abyssinia expected to be addressed as "His Imperial Majesty." Roosevelt told me later that Haille Selassie discussed with him the possible disposition of captured territory, particularly Italian possessions in North Africa.

Early the next day the President's daughter, Anna Boettiger, was sent ashore for a shopping expedition in Cairo. It did not matter whether she wished to buy anything—but the President simply could not have her on board when the United States destroyer *Murphy*, carrying the King of Saudi Arabia with a large group of attendants, drew alongside the *Quincy*. We had been informed that the King of Arabia would not permit any women to be seen in his company.

The King, whose full name was Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman al Faisal al Saud, was a person of superior poise and great courtesy. He appeared aged and not in vigorous health, but his mind was alert, as was demonstrated in his conversations with the President regarding Palestine.

I was told that Ibn Saud had at one time announced that he had acquired his throne with a sword, and that he intended to rule his people with justice and equity—but also with his sword. His visit to our modern warship, with a large group of retainers and guards, including the Royal Fortune-teller, the Royal Food-taster, the Chief Server of the Ceremonial Coffee, the Royal Purse-bearer, and ten guards chosen from the principal tribes of Saudi Arabia and armed with sabres and daggers, was like something transported by magic from the Middle Ages.

Special arrangements had been made for luncheon which the President gave in honour of Ibn Saud on the *Quincy*. Rice, lamb stew, and grapefruit were provided, and the King took two helpings of each. He was particularly pleased with the grapefruit.

After lunch the King held a long discussion with Roosevelt about the oil properties in his country. He was very friendly, liked Americans, and wanted to continue to do business with them. Roosevelt discussed the possibilities of a vast public works programme to help raise the living standards of his Arab subjects. This part of the luncheon conversation was very pleasing to both.

However, when the President turned to the subject of

Palestine and expressed a hope that the Arabs and the Jews could get along together, Ibn Saud politely but firmly gave the President a lesson in the history of Palestine from the Arab point of view. (Later, he put it all in writing in a long letter to the White House.)

The King, with great dignity and courtesy and with a smile, said that if Jews from outside Palestine continued to be imported with their foreign financial backing and their higher standards of living, they would make trouble for the Arab inhabitants. When this happened, as a good Arab and a True Believer, he would have to take the Arab side against the Jews, and he intended to do so.

That very clear statement of the Palestine-Jewish problem in so far as King Ibn Saud was concerned should be of great value to the United States in its approach to or recession from this controversy. The King's directness was pleasing, and I hoped it might prevent our getting involved in starting a bloody war between the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine and the Arab world.

The King and his flowing-robed retinue returned to the *Murphy* at 3.30, and at 4 p.m. the *Quincy* got under way. Leaving Bitter Lake, she stood north through the Suez Canal.

Ambassador Jefferson Caffery telegraphed from Paris that General de Gaulle had declined an invitation of the President to meet us at Algiers. Caffery's message indicated that de Gaulle was peevish about something, probably because he had not been invited to the Yalta Conference. His action might have had an effect on our estimate of the French problem if the President had considered this refusal an affront. However, the Chief Executive shrugged it off saying, "Well, I just wanted to discuss some of our problems with him. If he doesn't want to, it doesn't make any difference to me."

As we entered the harbour of Alexandria, Egypt, on February 15, we found this great port full of merchant shipping and British warships. I made a note to tell Admiral Land, who had left Yalta before the conferences closed, about the great number of cargo ships tied up at Alexandria, with a thought that there might be a possibility of reducing the then acute shortage of sea transportation by putting some of them into more active employment.

Churchill came on board shortly after noon, had a half-hour private conversation with the Chief Executive, which I did

not hear, and remained for lunch. Others present at this last meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt were the former's son and daughter, Colonel Randolph Churchill and Mrs. Oliver, Anna Boettiger, our Ambassador to London, John Winant, Harry Hopkins and myself. It was a pleasant social gathering in the President's cabin, and I do not recall that affairs of state intruded into the conversation.

After farewells to our British friends, the *Quincy* left Alexandria at 4 p.m. and set a course for the Port of Algiers, which was reached on Sunday, February 18. On that date General Watson became critically ill with what appeared to be a cerebral hæmorrhage.

Hopkins, Steve Early, and Bohlen left the *Quincy* at Algiers to return to Washington by air. It was necessary for Hopkins to return to the hospital as soon as possible. Judge Sam Rosenman joined us at this point to assist the Chief Executive in preparing his important report to Congress on the Crimean Conference.

The White House correspondents of three major American Press associations, D. B. Cornell of the Associated Press, Merriman Smith of the United Press, and Robert G. Nixon of International News Service, whom Roosevelt always referred to jokingly as the "ghouls," also came aboard at Algiers. Having taken aboard a full supply of fuel, we left the dock at 4 p.m., heading for Newport News, Virginia.

General Watson died on February 20 at about 8 a.m. in latitude 30 North, longitude 12-30 West. Arrangements were made to notify Mrs. Watson, but because of the necessity for keeping the President's movements blacked-out, no public announcement could be made until we reached Washington. The President was acutely distressed by the loss of Watson, whom he held in affectionate personal regard. "Pa" was a good friend of all of us in the President's official family. We were all shocked by the tragedy.

Turkey declared war on the Axis Powers on February 24, 1945, and there were reports that Argentina was preparing to do likewise if it should be permitted to join the United Nations Organization (Argentina formally declared war against Germany and Japan on March 27).

This action by heretofore neutral states was an obvious effort to align themselves on the winning side before the opportuni-^y, 'disappeared, and to qualify for admission to the

United Nations conference, which was to open in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, and for which invitations would be issued on March 1.

The weather for most of the crossing was semi-tropical, with a light breeze. We in the Navy used to say that kind of weather would induce anybody to leave the farm and go to sea. However, between Bermuda and the Chesapeake Capes on February 27, we encountered a 25-knot wind and a rough sea that made heavy going for our destroyer escorts. On this last day at sea, the radio reported from Paris that the German front west of the Rhine had broken and that the Nazis were retreating to the east shore of that river.

We moored to the Army transport dock at Newport News at 6.30 p.m., boarded the President's special train immediately, and arrived in Washington early in the morning of February 28, 1945, having been gone from the capital for nearly five weeks. The next day I attended a Mass given in the Catholic Cathedral of St. Matthew for Major-General Watson. The services were attended by Mrs. Roosevelt and a large group of high-ranking military and political figures.

Roosevelt made his report on Yalta to Congress on March 1. We had worked on it *en route* from Algiers. I felt that the speech was too long. It was unfortunate that we did not have "Lord Root of the Matter" to assist in its preparation, but Hopkins' return to the hospital was so urgent that he had been flown back from Algiers. Judge Rosenman was handicapped because he had not been at the Crimea Conference.

The President spoke from a wheel-chair, the first time he had done so in addressing the combined sessions of the Senate and House. His confidence in the decisions reached at Yalta, especially as regards the United Nations, was illustrated when he said that the actions taken spelled the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence, balances of power, and all the other expedients which had been tried for centuries and had failed.

Even as he spoke, a crisis was in the making in our relations with Soviet Russia that was to reach dangerous proportions and require his best attention up to the actual day of his death.

The swift advance of the Russians through Poland was overrunning many Nazi prison camps where Americans had been incarcerated. By the end of February there were reports

that our soldiers were being shabbily treated, and there was sharp criticism of the Russian handling of American prisoners found in Polish territory. We asked Stalin for an explanation.

The Marshal replied that after an investigation he learned that any valid objections to the treatment of Americans applied only to those prisoners found in the zones of active operations. Stalin added that a Soviet organization had been formed to take care of foreign prisoners of war, that it had adequate transport facilities to move them, and that measures were being urgently taken for their assistance and their subsequent repatriation. He added that many of the Americans found in Polish territory had already been shipped to Odessa *en route* for home, and that those unable to travel had been hospitalized.

We had suggested that American relief planes be permitted to operate in Poland. Stalin turned down this request as "unnecessary," and promised that the Soviet Army would provide adequate care. Despite this promise, criticism persisted. There seemed no adequate excuse for Moscow's refusal to permit the United States to examine the situation and to make provision for any relief for our soldiers we should consider necessary or appropriate.

Despite the promise of joint action by the Allies in liberated areas, so recently signed at Yalta, the Soviet attitude was a definite indication that they would not want any other Allies to obtain by personal inspection accurate information of conditions in Poland.

As the messages concerning treatment of American prisoners were being exchanged between Washington and Moscow, a more serious crisis developed as a result of a reported attempt by the Germans to arrange for the surrender of the Nazi forces in Italy. It produced our first acrimonious altercation with the Russians since they had joined the Allied cause against the Nazis.

Agents of the O.S.S. in Italy on March 9 reported to Field-Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, that German General Karl Wolff, ranking S.S. officer in Italy, wanted to go to Switzerland to discuss the capitulation of German forces in northern Italy. The O.S.S. men quoted Wolff as saying that the German war situation was hopeless and that continuation of the struggle was causing needless German bloodshed.

Wolff reportedly told the O.S.S. agents that he had not yet won over to his view Major-General Albert von Kesselring, who then commanded German forces in northern Italy, nor had he told his superior, Heinrich Himmler, about his activities.

Alexander promptly reported this development to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and on March 10 asked permission to send one British and one United States Staff officer to Berne, Switzerland, to tell General Wolff that he would have to come to Allied Headquarters at Caserta, Italy, to discuss any surrender of Kesselring's forces.

Alexander emphasized in his report that Wolff was a Himmler man. This made the Allied commanders suspicious, but he wanted to be prepared if the offer turned out to be genuine. Such a surrender would be purely military and have no political basis.

The American Chiefs of Staff wanted to direct Alexander to send his officers at once to talk with Wolff. Our British colleagues felt that no action should be taken until the Soviet Government had been notified and invited to participate in the Berne meeting. We consented to the British proposal only to the extent of notifying Moscow, making it clear that the Berne contact was only to arrange a meeting to discuss a surrender in the field.

American Ambassador Harriman so informed Molotov on March 11. Molotov replied the next day that his Government thought this was important, and that it *did not object* to Anglo-American conversations with General Wolff. Molotov said, however, that his Government wanted three Soviet officers to take part in the conversation. Harriman and Major-General John R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission in Russia, urged that Molotov's request be disapproved. Deane cabled (all messages sent in code in this Washington-Moscow exchange have been paraphrased):

“. . . I make this recommendation because I feel certain . . . that approving the Soviet request will be an act of appeasement which will react against us in future negotiations.”

By March 13, a rumour that the German Army in Italy might be considering surrender had obtained fairly wide circulation. Our reply to Molotov, made by the State Department on March 15, stressed three points:

(1) The Berne meeting was only to arrange for a German

representative to go to General Alexander's Headquarters, where the possible surrender could be discussed; (2) Soviet representatives would be welcomed at Alexander's Headquarters; and (3) since the German proposal was for a surrender on an Anglo-American front, only Alexander, as Supreme Allied Commander, would be responsible for the negotiations.

Without denying the Soviet request in so many words, it was made plain that the Russian representatives would not be allowed to go to Switzerland for fear that their presence would compromise the project.

On the same day that the State Department cabled its instructions to Harriman (March 15), Alexander informed the British American Chiefs of Staff that General Kesselring had left Italy to meet Hitler in Germany. The O.S.S. agents in contact with Wolff said that he still wanted to negotiate for surrender, but would wait to see if he could win over Kesselring on the latter's return, or the German Commander's successor, if Kesselring should remain in the west.

Before there were any concrete results from Wolff's approaches, Molotov, on March 16, wrote Harriman a blunt and stern letter which said in part:

"The refusal of the Government of the United States to admit the participation of the Soviet representatives in the negotiations in Berne was for the Soviet Government utterly unexpected and incomprehensible. . . . The Soviet Government . . . insists that the negotiations already begun in Berne be broken off."

Harriman told Secretary of State Stettinius at once that Molotov's letter confirmed his impression that, since Yalta, Soviet leaders believed they could force their will on the United States on any issue. Harriman charged that Molotov was distorting the facts exactly as the Soviets were also doing in their interpretation of the Yalta agreements on Poland, Rumania, and liberated prisoners of war.

"The arrogant language of Molotov's letter, I believe," Harriman cabled, "brings out in the open a domineering attitude toward the United States which we have before only suspected. It has been my feeling that sooner or later this attitude would create a situation which would be intolerable to us.

"I therefore recommend that we face the issue now by adhering to the reasonable and generous position that we have

taken and by advising the Soviet Government in firm but friendly terms to that effect.”

Major-General John Hull discussed with me on March 17 the attitude of the War Department toward the Russian objection to the proposed surrender negotiations. Secretary of War Stimson had, in my opinion, prepared a splendid statement for the information of the State Department. To him it was apparent that whatever might develop from the Anglo-American negotiations at Berne it was strictly a military matter “in which Russia has no more business than the United States would have at Stalingrad.” Stimson said that if there was ever opportunity to take surrender in the field of a considerable part of the German Army, it should be accepted.

Alexander telegraphed that two of his officers had met Wolff at Locarno, Switzerland, on March 19. Meanwhile, Hitler had given Kesselring command of all German Armies on the Western Front, and Colonel-General Heinrich Vietinghoff took over the Italian Front. Wolff would not agree to come immediately to Allied Headquarters in Italy to discuss surrender. He said he wanted to go to Germany to see Kesselring. As a result, Alexander’s officers left Locarno without having arranged any meeting to discuss a German surrender and without having “negotiated” in any way with Wolff.

Harriman, replying on March 21 to Molotov’s blunt letter of March 16, told him about the Locarno episode, and assured the Soviet Foreign Minister that no negotiations had taken place. It looked at this point as if the incident might be closed.

Forty-eight hours later (March 23) Molotov sent an insulting letter to Harriman in which the Soviet Government openly questioned the honesty of the United States. In part, Molotov wrote:

“During the last two weeks . . . behind the back of the Soviet Government, which has been carrying on the main burden of the war against Germany, representatives of the American and British Command on the one part and representatives of the German Military Command on the other are carrying on negotiations. The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers that this is absolutely inadmissible. . . .”

In an effort to ease the growing tension and to allay the inexplicable Soviet suspicion that we were negotiating with our common enemy behind their backs, Roosevelt cabled directly to Marshal Stalin on March 24 as follows:

"I am sure that the facts of this matter, through misunderstanding, have not been correctly presented to you. . . . You will, of course, understand that my Government must give every assistance to all officers in the field in command of American forces who believe there is a possibility of forcing the surrender of enemy troops. . . . It would be completely unreasonable for me to take any other attitude or to permit any delay which might cause additional and avoidable loss of life in the American forces.

- "In such a surrender of enemy forces in the field, there can be no political implications whatever and no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender. . . . I cannot agree to suspend investigations of the possibility [of arranging a meeting to discuss surrender] because of objection on the part of Mr. Molotov for some reason that is completely beyond my understanding."

Up to this time we had been able to settle most misunderstandings between ourselves and our Soviet ally when Roosevelt and Stalin took matters in their own hands. Such was not the case on this occasion. The Marshal in a sharp answer to the President, claimed that the Germans had used their meeting in Switzerland as a "smoke screen" to confuse the Anglo-American command in Italy. He asserted that the Nazis had moved three divisions from Italy to the Eastern Front. Stalin added: "This circumstance is irritating to the Soviet Command and creates grounds for distrust."

His language was reminiscent of his blunt words to Prime Minister Churchill in March, 1944, when Britain and the Soviets were arguing over the Curzon Line.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were thoroughly alarmed at Stalin's accusation. An open break between Russia and her Anglo-Saxon allies would be the only "miracle" that would prevent the speedy collapse of the German armies. The Russians were already in eastern Germany. American troops had made a spectacular crossing of the Rhine on March 7 over the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, a situation which was being exploited to the fullest. On practically every sector in the west the Germans were retreating, in some cases almost in disorder.

Roosevelt asked General Marshall and me to prepare a reply to this crude Stalin cable. Regarding the Marshal's apprehension and distrust, the President's message categorically

assured Stalin that no negotiations for surrender had taken place and that there was absolutely no question of negotiating with the enemy in any way which would give Hitler an opportunity to move any forces out of Italy. Roosevelt realized the marvellous opportunity that would be presented to the Nazi propagandists if this dispute went any further. He said:

"This entire episode has arisen through the initiative of a German officer, reputed to be close to Himmler, and there is, of course, a strong possibility that his sole purpose is to create suspicion and distrust between the Allies. There is no reason why we should permit him to succeed in that aim."

Stalin brushed aside the President's argument. He flatly contradicted Roosevelt's assertion that no negotiations had taken place, and made the following astounding statement:

"My military colleagues . . . do not have any doubts that the negotiations have taken place and they have ended in an agreement with the Germans, on the basis of which the German Commander on the Western Front—Marshal Kesselring—has agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the east, and the Anglo-Americans have promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms.

"I think that my colleagues are close to the truth. . . . I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Berne or in some other place since the Anglo-American troops get the possibility to advance into the heart of Germany almost without resistance on the part of the Germans. . . . As a result of this, at the present moment the Germans on the Western Front in fact have ceased the war against England and the United States. At the same time, the Germans continue the war with Russia, the ally of England and the United States."

There it was, out in the open—the long-festering suspicion and fear of the Russians that the United States and Great Britain might make a separate peace with Germany. This insulting message showed clearly the Soviet distrust of our motives and our promises. It was another ill omen for any successful co-operative agreement at the approaching United Nations political conference at San Francisco, for which the President entertained such high hopes.

Again General Marshall and I worked together on the

draft of reply to Moscow which, as approved by Roosevelt, approached as closely to a rebuke as is permitted in diplomatic exchanges between friendly states. Its text was sent also to Churchill and Harriman for their information.

The President, on April 4, in firm tones, repeated to Stalin the assurances that there had been no negotiations, and expressed astonishment that the Soviet leader could or would make the assertion that his Allies had made an agreement with the Germans. The President said sharply that General Eisenhower's rapid advance was due to military victory, not to any secret arrangements with Kesselring.

"I am certain that there were no negotiations in Berne at any time," continued the Chief Executive's message, "and I feel that your information to that effect must have come from German sources, which have made persistent efforts to create dissension between us in order to escape in some measure their responsibility for the war crimes. If that was Wolff's purpose in Berne, your message proves that he has had some success. . . .

"Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates."

Churchill sent a similar strong protest to Stalin, and then advised Roosevelt as follows:

"On the whole, I incline to think it is no more than their natural expression when vexed or jealous. For that very reason, I deem it of the highest importance that a firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture by our two countries in order that the air may be cleared and they realize that there is a point beyond which we will not tolerate insult. I believe this is the best chance of saving the future. If they are convinced that we are afraid of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed I should despair of the future relations with them and much else."

The last message of the President tamed Stalin and the atmosphere of American-Soviet suspicion cleared noticeably when Soviet Russia denounced her neutrality pact with Japan on April 5. Concerning that move, it was my opinion that it could bring about an attack in the near future by either Japan or Russia against the other. On past performances, Tokyo was more likely to make the first aggressive move, but

the Soviets were well informed on Japanese history of the last century and should be adequately prepared.

While the President and the Prime Minister were standing up to Stalin, General Alexander was making no progress in the so-called negotiations that caused all the trouble. Himmler did not trust Wolff, and was keeping an eye on him. Although the latter claimed that General Vietinghoff, the new German Commander in Italy, had arranged to surrender, he could produce no tangible evidence. Alexander concluded that Wolff intended to do nothing more and was resting on his oars in the hope that he had insured his personal safety.

Alexander recalled his representatives from Switzerland on April 4 and informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he believed there was only a slight chance of a German surrender in Italy. He felt it must be clear to the enemy that we would accept only unconditional surrender, and hence surrender was unlikely. Should Wolff be able to persuade the new German Commander to surrender, however, Alexander had left a road open for him to send intermediaries to his headquarters by way of Switzerland.

Stalin assured the President on April 7 that he never doubted his honesty and dependability. Roosevelt, on April 11, thanked the Marshal and said:

"There must not, in any event, be mutual mistrust, and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future. I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a fully co-ordinated offensive, the Nazi armies will disintegrate."

On that same day Eisenhower reported that the wily Franz von Papen, recently German Ambassador to Turkey, had been captured in the Ruhr pocket. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directed Eisenhower to inform the Soviet High Command immediately through military channels in order that Russian representatives might be present when Von Papen was interrogated.

The President was anxious to minimize this unfortunate episode in our relations with Russia. In the last cable message he ever sent, he told Ambassador Harriman on April 12, the day of his death: "It is my desire to consider the Berne misunderstanding a minor incident."

The Soviet misunderstanding caused by a meeting of Allied and German Staff officers in Switzerland to arrange a surrender

conference showed the extreme sensitivity of the Soviets. In this case the misunderstanding assumed alarming and dangerous proportions. The affair showed that Allied contacts of any sort with German officials might arouse Soviet alarm and suspicion if Moscow had not been informed in advance and allowed to participate.

The Soviets' reason for their attitude was that they knew with certainty that no German officer in Italy would discuss surrender in the presence of Soviet representatives.

It was a clear demonstration of the dangerous undesirability of having unnecessary allies in war, and it reinforced my conviction that we were making a mistake to embrace the Soviet Union as a co-partner in the final stages of the war on Japan.

The Berne incident was not our only problem with Russia in the two months following the close of the Crimea conferences. The State Department was disturbed at what appeared to be violations of the Yalta declaration on liberated areas by Russia in some of the Balkan countries. Acting Secretary of State Grew asked me on March 6 to suggest to Roosevelt that he act slowly on a Russian request for the loan of some naval vessels in lieu of receiving some of the Italian warships. Grew apparently wanted to use this request to bargain with Moscow to obtain Russian co-operation in some of our European political problems, particularly in Rumania.

Lord Halifax telephoned me early on Sunday morning, March 18, asking that I urge the President to approve a message to Moscow which he and the Secretary of State had prepared in regard to the Polish problem. The Commission consisting of Molotov and the British and American Ambassadors to Moscow was having difficulty working out the reorganization of the Polish Government along the lines agreed upon at Yalta. While I did not believe this message would have any useful effect on the Soviet attitude toward Poland, I did at noon of that day obtain Roosevelt's approval of its being sent.

Of quite a different tenor was a report received from British Intelligence on March 28 which said that General William J. Donovan of the O.S.S. had recently told the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Jan Ciechenowski, not to worry about the Russians in Poland, because we would straighten out the problem at the San Francisco conference in April. Donovan seemed at that time to be an optimist.

Ciechenowski had a problem of his own. He called at my office on April 5 to ask that the Allied Army consider using the Polish troops and forced labourers that had been liberated by General Eisenhower's advance into Germany. I transmitted his requests to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for study.

* * *

Despite the secrecy, the Chinese apparently heard rumours of the actions at Yalta affecting their country. Two days after we returned, General Shang Chen, head of the Chinese Military Mission in Washington, asked me for information regarding the Crimea Conference. I could not, of course, give him any information that had not already been published, and wondered why Chen came to me. Later Dr. Wellington Koo, a personal friend of mine and Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain, told me he had heard it rumoured that Russia expected to obtain a lease on the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen. Koo said China would view with alarm occupation of these two ports by the Soviets. As in the case of General Chen, I could not tell him that the rumour was well-founded, because the President, to my knowledge, had not concluded his negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.

General Hurley, then the American Ambassador to China, was in Washington in March, and gave me details of some of his past difficulties in obtaining loyal support from members of his diplomatic staff and from some of General Stilwell's military staff who had been retained after Stilwell's recall. Hurley, who is a fighter, said he then had the situation well in hand and hoped it would not be necessary to send home any more of his Embassy staff. I got from him an impression that some of the diplomats had "ganged up" on the new Ambassador appointed from outside the regular Foreign Service.

Hurley, Lieut.-General Wedemeyer, and Commodore Miles discussed the Chinese military problems with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 27. They all were of the opinion that the rebellion in China could be put down by comparatively small assistance to Chiang's Central Government. Wedemeyer seemed then to believe that further serious advances of the Japanese in China could be prevented, but he was encountering many difficulties in controlling the Chinese war-lords and the political officers, as well as having trouble with the British

officials in Asia and with some of his own temperamental general officers. I also discussed with him what relief he could possibly provide for French resistance groups in Indo-China.

Wedemeyer is a resourceful soldier of high ability, and he should have succeeded in China if success were possible by any Occidental in that confused Oriental environment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, also in March, heard Wedemeyer and Fleet Admiral Nimitz review the existing situation in the Pacific and China. Admiral Standley had called before this meeting to ask that I try to get the Naval Command in the Pacific to take a more favourable view of the activities of the O.S.S. and General Donovan. The O.S.S. was very active in China at that time.

Navy Secretary Forrestal had returned from a trip to the Pacific, and called at my house on March 10 to discuss possible changes in the Pacific command organization, and also his ideas on a post-war Navy. That same week Elmer Davis of the Office of War Information presented some suggestions as to the conduct of radio propaganda in Japan.

The major action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific Theatre was to announce publicly on April 5 that General Douglas MacArthur had been given command of all Army forces and Admiral Nimitz command of all Naval forces in the Pacific area. This modification of the command arrangement was made in preparation for intensified operations against Japan in the future.

* * *

The French representatives in Washington resumed their frequent calls to my office after our return from the Crimea. They labelled most of their requests "Urgent." They wanted to participate in the combined intelligence group then studying German industrial and scientific secrets; to exchange information between the American command in China and the French forces in Indo-China; and to get agreement in principle to utilizing the French naval and military forces in the war against Japan (the latter would assist in returning Indo-China to French control and give France a right to participate in Lend-Lease assistance after the defeat of Germany).

Most of the time I could only tell them that I had no useful information as to when and where we might make use of French assistance in the Pacific.

However, we did attempt to give a helping hand to the French resistance groups in Indo-China. Vice-Admiral Fenard called me on March 18 to say that planes from our 14th Air Force in China were loaded with relief supplies for the undergrounders, but could not start without authority from Washington. I immediately contacted General Handy and told him of the President's agreement that American aid to the Indo-China resistance groups might be given, provided it involved no interference with our operations against Japan.

The Dutch also pressed their case to have us use their forces in the Japanese operation, and on April 10 Rear-Admiral Van der Kun renewed his previous request that we provide transport for fifteen Dutch battalions from Holland to Australia.

* * *

One of the most interesting conversations in this period was with Lieut.-General S. D. Embick, who had attended the Pan-American Conference in Mexico. He was an officer of wide experience in international affairs, highly agreeable, and of superlative integrity. It was Embick's opinion that America and Russia inevitably would be the two great powers in the post-war era and that the republics of America must remain united against an attack from overseas. Embick believed that there must be a continuous effort to hold the American nations together in one security block. The General also said he thought that no invasion of the Japanese mainland should be undertaken until every possible resource of blockade and bombing had failed to bring about the defeat of Japan. Needless to say, he got no objection from me on that point.

* * *

A letter received by way of one of our secret agents from a French official who held high positions in the Pétain Government during my service as Ambassador to France contained interesting comments on events in France since I left in 1942. It contained a confirmation that Marshal Pétain had sent the mysterious messages to Admiral Darlan in November of 1942 which enabled the Admiral to negotiate with our people in Algiers, cease the resistance to our North African landings, and permit the French Army to renew its co-operation with the Allies.

This letter revealed also that our friends in the French

Ministry of Marine tried, unsuccessfully, to send the French Fleet from Toulon to join with us.

My informant related that in November, 1943, Pétain wished to promulgate a democratic law returning his powers to the French National Assembly (and not to Premier Laval) in case of his death. When the Germans prevented him from carrying out that purpose, the letter said, Pétain, from that time on, refused to sign the nominations of collaborators the Germans tried to impose upon him or to attend the sessions of his Council of Ministers.

The letter revealed that Pétain, on August 11, 1944, entrusted to a high-ranking friend a mission to seek an agreement with General de Gaulle. According to my informant, if the latter had accepted, "the Marshal [Pétain] would have consented to pass on his powers to de Gaulle and to efface himself completely in the eyes of his country." In his opinion, de Gaulle's refusal of union and reconciliation was the principal root of the political troubles in France after that time.

Of course, this was a one-time high official of Pétain's government who was writing, but he said "the mass of French people are beaten down by the moral and physical sufferings of the occupation. France is terrorized by the Communists, who have taken over all levels of command. . . . There can never be real peace in France and in Europe until good Frenchmen of the Resistance, headed by General de Gaulle, place their hands within the hands of good Frenchmen who, under the leadership of Pétain, had the merit of watching over their soil during the occupation."

I had considerable respect for the opinions set out in this lengthy message from an official I had found during my service in Vichy to be in complete sympathy with the Allied cause.

* * *

Recollections of a more amusing nature were noted when the accustomed level of dullness of an annual business meeting of the Vestry of St. Thomas' Church was, on April 2, entertained by the presence of a partially inebriated Russian visitor and his wife.

Attracted by my uniform, he talked to me about Russia and Turkey and the Ægean Sea. He said he had once been a Captain in the Czar's Army; that he was Orthodox, which according to him was the same as Episcopalian; that his wife

was Scotch; and that he had lived in America many years.

He saluted the ladies by kissing their hands, told them that he knew how to play the piano, and after the meeting he actually did play for them with some skill. Being fairly well "illuminated," all of this seemed as amusing to him as it was to me.

It definitely was reminiscent of many years ago, when I was acquainted with Russians of his class. Perhaps he even may have been one of them.

Upon our departure he gave me a courtly Russian farewell embrace, saying in French: "*Je vous donne l'embrassement Russ, pas un embrassement des 'camarades.'*"

Years that have gone for ever were brought back in memory by this handsome, happy Russian who must have been about my age, and who, therefore, must also have been spending the evening with ghosts of his departed youth.

* * *

Justice Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, informed me on April 2 that the President had at last accepted his resignation, and that Judge Fred Vinson of Kentucky would take his place. Byrnes at that time, in my opinion, was irreplaceable because of a belief that I then had in his superlative personal character, his high courage, and his ability and experience in Government as a Senator.

My first contact with Judge Vinson in his new job came on April 12, when he called to object to the Joint Chiefs of Staff method of handling the matter of additional merchant ship construction for war purposes. Vinson said he would provide shipping needed for war at the cost of any other demand.

It was another instance of the military thinking it could do a job better than a civilian agency. Judge Vinson advocated a continued and correct use by the Joint Chiefs of our Joint Strategic Production Committee. The attitude of the new Director of War Mobilization in this matter was correct.

* * *

My only trip out of town during this period was to Bath, Maine, where, on Sunday, April 8, my granddaughter Louise christened a modern destroyer, the U.S.S. *Turner* (No. 834), as it slid down the ways of the Bath Iron Works at 9.50 a.m.

The ship was the third to bear the name Turner, in memory of an officer of Admiral Perry's squadron in the Battle of Lake Erie.

* * *

A pleasant dinner at the White House, when the President and Mrs. Roosevelt, on March 17, celebrated their fortieth wedding anniversary, will long be remembered. It was the last such anniversary they celebrated together. The eighteen guests included Juliana, Crown Princess of the Netherlands, the Dutch Ambassador, Dr. Loudon, and his wife, Madame Vantets, lady-in-waiting to the Princess, with her husband, Assistant Secretary of State Rockefeller, Miss Rockefeller, War Food Administrator Jones and Mrs. Jones, and Colonel and Mrs. Boettiger.

* * *

The five members of Congress who had been designated to represent the United States at the forthcoming United Nations conference on organization in San Francisco met with the President at noon on Friday, March 23. Also present were Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew, James Dunn and Charles Bohlen of the State Department, and myself.

Roosevelt told them in detail about the request at Yalta by Russia for two additional votes in the proposed United Nations Assembly, and that he and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed to support at San Francisco the Russian desire that the Ukraine and White Russia be admitted as original Assembly members..

The President said he would like, at a latter date, to see the United States get an equal number of votes. The Chief Executive was persistent in his determination to succeed in organizing an effective United Nations.

The Chief Executive did most of the talking, and told them that the discussion was off the record. The group sat silent throughout the meeting, and I do not remember that anyone offered a single objection to giving Russia the two extra votes. However, within a few days after this conference, news of this concession to Moscow "leaked," and a storm of criticism of the President's actions at the Crimea Conference was unleashed in full force.

The President went to Hyde Park that Friday night. It was apparent by now that he needed a longer rest than was provided by these week-ends, so he finally heeded his medical

advisers and decided to spend three weeks at his "second home" in Warm Springs, Georgia. He stopped off briefly at the White House on Thursday, March 29.

When he left to take the train for Georgia, I walked with him from the office where we had been talking to the south entrance of the White House. He was cheerful, as usual, and as he came to the door to get in his car, I remarked: "Mr. President, it's very nice that you are leaving for a vacation. It is nice for us too, because when you are away we have much more leisure than when you are here."

Roosevelt laughed and replied, "That's all right, Bill. Have a good time while I'm gone, because when I come back I'm going to unload a lot of stuff on you, and then you'll have to work very hard." That was the last time I saw Franklin Roosevelt alive.

I was sitting in the combination bedroom-office of my Florida Avenue home late in the afternoon of April 12, 1945, and, by odd chance, the radio was turned on. I heard the bulletin at 5.50 p.m. which announced that President Roosevelt had died from a cerebral hæmorrhage in Warm Springs, at 4.30 p.m. After that momentary feeling of disbelief which seems to have been common to most of us upon first hearing the tragic news, I called the White House over my private line for confirmation.

I talked with Surgeon-General Ross McIntire, who told me that the Chief Executive had had a first attack at noon of that day without any previous warning, and that he had not regained consciousness before his death. All reports up to the fatal April 12 had indicated to him that the President was recuperating satisfactorily, and that he would be able to go to San Francisco to open a meeting that meant so much to him—the first session of the United Nations Organization for the preservation of peace, scheduled for April 25.

I went to the White House immediately, and found the heads of the Executive Departments and others gathered in the Cabinet Room discussing the immediately necessary procedure. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and I went upstairs to see Mrs. Roosevelt to express our sympathy. We found her full of courage, poise, and understanding of our share in her sorrow. Outwardly, she had more control of her emotions than most of us.

Together with Surgeon-General McIntire and Steve Early,

Mrs. Roosevelt left by plane at 7 p.m. for Warm Springs. I was told that the plans were to bring the President's remains to Washington by train on Saturday, when funeral ceremonies would be conducted at the White House. The family then would leave by train for Hyde Park, where interment would take place on Sunday, April 15.

Meanwhile, the constitutional provisions for succession to the Presidency were swiftly carried out. At 7.09 p.m., April 12, in the Cabinet Room of the White House, flanked by the heads of the executive departments and offices of the Government, Vice-President Harry S. Truman of Missouri was administered the oath of office as President of the United States by Chief Justice Harlan Stone. Truman stood at the north end of the big table in the middle of the room. To me the ceremony was solemn and highly impressive. Mrs. Truman, who was present, saw her husband become the thirty-second man to hold the highest office in our land.

The Roosevelt family left the White House at 9.30 on Friday morning (April 14), to meet the train arriving with the President's remains. In the family group were Lieutenant-Colonel and Mrs. John Boettiger and Brigadier-General Elliott Roosevelt, together with younger relatives. President Truman, Cabinet officers, Supreme Court Justices, delegations from the House and Senate, diplomats with their ladies, General Marshall, Admiral King, and I, and a few other senior naval and military officers gathered at Union Station.

The funeral procession started from the station at ten o'clock with the Midshipmen's Regiment, soldier, sailor, and Marine battalions leading, followed by a caisson carrying the President's remains. Next in the procession were the Roosevelt family and President Truman.

We proceeded through streets crowded with an estimated 300,000 people, many of the women weeping (I saw one who was hysterical), and arrived at the White House at 11.10. Only the immediate personal and official family were admitted to the grounds to see the final entry of Franklin Roosevelt to the Executive Mansion he had occupied for more than twelve years, and where he would rest in the great East Room until our departure that evening for Hyde Park.

Among those reaching Washington in time for the services were Foreign Minister Anthony Eden of Great Britain, who arrived by plane from London, Barney Baruch, and Hopkins,

who had been in a hospital in Rochester, Minnesota. Harry's appearance indicated his own critical condition of health.

At 4 p.m. an impressive funeral service was held in the East Room of the White House, the officiating clergy being Bishop Angus Dunn of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington, the Reverend H. S. Wilkinson of St. Thomas's Church, and the Reverend J. G. Magee of St. John's Church. The East Room walls had been banked with floral tributes halfway to the ceiling, making a most beautiful and fitting expression of affection for our heroic dead by people of all classes and many nations.

Two hundred mourners were seated in the East Room, including the Governor-General of Canada, the Earl of Athlone, the Crown Princess Martha of Norway, Foreign Minister Eden, and a Prince from Saudi Arabia in native costume. Others attending the service were the highest officials of the judiciary and executive departments, the Chiefs of Staff, Foreign diplomats, and delegations from the Congress. Many were accompanied by their ladies.

At 10 p.m. the President's special train, carrying his remains, accompanied by his personal and official family, departed for Hyde Park. Other trains bearing President Truman and 114 others who were invited, including eighteen news reporters, left in time to arrive in Hyde Park with the President's train.

Upon our arrival, we proceeded by motor car from the President's siding to a hedge-enclosed garden between the residence and the new library, where at 10 a.m. on April 15, a simple committal service was held and all that was mortal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was buried in the lovely flower garden of the house in which he was born.

West Point cadets acted as Guard of Honour at this last parade for the President, and a squad of cadets fired a salute of three rounds, the traditional last tribute given to a soldier.

Spectators at the graveside numbered not more than 300, most of them, excepting those from Washington, unknown to me. Their sorrow was deep, and few made any effort to hide their tears. Among the familiar faces I did see some of the Delano family, who lived in the vicinity of Hyde Park, and Prime Minister MacKenzie King of Canada.

When the brief ceremonies were ended, we returned to our

trains at the Hyde Park siding and departed for Washington. On the way back I remember talking with Jimmy Byrnes about our loss, and about the new President, whom Byrnes had known better than most of us because he had been in the Senate with him. Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labour, came into my compartment and stayed there a long time talking about her friendship with Roosevelt, which dated back to his earliest days in politics.

I probably had paid my last visit to the home of my friend, who will live in history as one of our greatest Presidents. This tragedy deprived the nation of its individual, irreplaceable leader at a time when the war to preserve civilization was approaching its end with accelerated speed.

Franklin Roosevelt was a world figure of heroic proportions. He also was my friend, whom I had known and admired for thirty-six years, since we began to work together in World War I. A thousand memories crowded my mind as I sat in the compartment of the train returning to Washington.

I had seen him almost every morning since he appointed me his Military Chief of Staff late in July, 1942. The range of his mind was infinite. The official matters I had selected to bring to his attention usually were disposed of quickly, and he listened attentively as I talked. He was likely thereafter, at these daily sessions, to do most of the talking and to bring up anything he had on his mind. A flood of memories of Quebec, Cairo, Teheran, Honolulu, Alaska and the still-fresh impression of Yalta came to my mind.

I remembered partisan criticism that he had made this or that war move with an eye on the date of a national election. Franklin Roosevelt was the real Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Army, and Air Force. He had fought this war in close co-operation with his military staff. *To my knowledge, he never made a single military decision with any thought of his own personal political fortunes.*

There were many of his domestic policies which I, being of a conservative mind, had little liking for, but I admired the skill he possessed in playing the complex and to me almost inexplicable "game of politics." That skill was frequently displayed at his famous weekly conferences with the Washington newsmen, many of which I attended. He gave them all the information he could, easily and cheerfully. He even scolded them at times, but they seemed to like it. He made frequent

jests about the three "ghouls who are just waiting for me to fall out of the automobile, or get shot, or something." They were at Warm Springs when he died.

He loved the sea and ships, and in memory I could see him being lowered into a boat to board some cruiser or destroyer, or being swung aboard the battleship *Iowa* in a bos'n's chair. Roosevelt could undertake almost any physical effort except to stand up unassisted. He had the torso of a prize-fighter: His arms had grown big and hard as rocks, but whenever he had to stand up—and I recalled particularly the day in 1944 when he spoke at Bremerton, Washington—the physical strain on him was terrific.

His physical handicaps never dimmed his zest for life and living. He enjoyed the fishing trips. He enjoyed meeting people—all kinds of people. He enjoyed his family. I think Anna was his favourite, and he was proud of Jimmy—particularly of his record as a Colonel in the Marines. Anna was my favourite also, and was of tremendous assistance to her father in many ways.

He knew how to relax, and many times when I had gone up to his room at night during the war with some dispatch, I had found him working on his collection of postage stamps. He was very fond of his collection. He also enjoyed a friendly game of cards and an aperitif before dinner.

Roosevelt was the same kind of Christian that I tried to be. He believed in the precepts of our Christian philosophy and followed them as accurately as one could expect. He went to church reasonably often, although it was difficult because of the crowds—mostly tourists—that would press around to get a glimpse of the Chief Executive. We both belonged to St. Thomas Episcopal Church. As I tried to sleep that night on the train returning to Washington, these and other recollections of our long and intimate friendship pressed upon me in a far more confused fashion than they have been set down here.

One could hardly see at that time how the complicated, critical business of the war and the peace could be carried forward by a new President who was, in comparison, almost completely inexperienced in international affairs.

Franklin Roosevelt was an individual leader of men. While he constantly obtained advice from those in whom he had confidence, he did not delegate to his subordinates the business of making decisions on international problems. On the

contrary, he drew upon his own remarkable mental energy and his depleted but still remarkable physical capacity to solve the problems.

His own wide experience and exhaustive study of international politics and history facilitated his collection and evaluation of information that few single individuals in the world could have used so effectively.

His programme of daily work during the war and his constant devotion to the cause of world peace must have hastened his death. Those of us who were close to him made devoted efforts to lessen the awful burden he tried to share with us.

He was under the care of America's most competent and distinguished medical advisers, who urged on him the necessity of conserving his strength, but lifelong devotion to making individual decisions made it impossible for him adequately to distribute the load.

Sudden death overtook him in the midst of his heroic work for the welfare of all the people of the world.

We were saddened and distressed, but how could a man die better?

CHAPTER XX

TRUMAN TAKES COMMAND

HARRY S. TRUMAN HAD BEEN Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States just sixteen hours when on Friday, April 13, 1945, at 11 a.m., he met for the first time with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his White House study. War Secretary Henry L. Stimson and Navy Secretary James E. Forrestal also attended.

It was a brief meeting. Using the simple and direct language that soon was to be familiar to all of us, the new President said that he was proud of what already had been accomplished by the American Navy and Army. He expected us to keep him fully informed as to the progress of the war. He was confident that we understood the terrific burden that had been unloaded on him, and asked us to help him all we could. We were directed to adhere to the same lines of procedure we had followed with his predecessor.

I had a private conference with Truman after the meeting to discuss my own status. We talked first about the late President Roosevelt, and I told him of my distress at his death and of the close personal relations between us. Pointing out that the post of Chief of Staff to the President which Roosevelt had created was a very intimate one, I suggested that he let me go and get someone that he knew. Truman declined, saying:

“Admiral, I should like very much for you to remain in the office for so long as it is necessary for me to pick up the strands of the business of the war with which you are familiar, and with which I am not.”

I reminded Truman that when I disagreed with Roosevelt, I told him so very frankly, and that Roosevelt had seemed to like that way of doing business. “If I am to remain as your Chief of Staff,” I said, “it will be impossible for me to change. If I think you are in error, I shall say so.”

“That is exactly what I want you to do,” Truman replied. “I want you to tell me if you think I am making a mistake. Of course, I will make the decisions, and after a decision is made, I will expect you to be loyal.”

He knew that, as a good sailor, I would be loyal to my Commander-in-Chief. I went back to work, thinking he would keep me on for a few months. I remained as his Chief of Staff nearly four years. (My resignation was accepted on March 21, 1949.)

The first business I recall was helping Truman reply to the eloquent message of condolence he had received from Prime Minister Churchill. The President said, in part:

“. . . I wish to send you this personal assurance that, with God's help, I will do everything in my power to move forward the great work to which President Roosevelt gave his life. . . . The intimate, solid relations which you and the late President had forged between our countries [must] be preserved and developed. . . .

“There are . . . urgent problems requiring our immediate and joint consideration. . . . Poland and the Soviet attitude towards the Moscow negotiations [on the formation of a new Polish government]. I am, of course, familiar with the exchanges which you and President Roosevelt have had between yourselves and with Marshal Stalin. I also know in general what President Roosevelt had in mind as the next step. I shall send you immediately . . . my suggestions as to the replies that might be made to Stalin's message . . . on Poland.

“You can count on me to continue the loyal and close collaboration which, to the benefit of the entire world, existed between you and our great President.”

Truman decided to keep the same schedule for our daily meetings, so I went to his office every morning at 9.45. I soon discovered that he was amazingly well informed on military history from the campaigns of the ancients, such as Hannibal and Cæsar, down to the great global conflict into which he suddenly had been thrust in virtual supreme command. He absorbed very quickly the gist of the dispatches brought to his attention at our daily conferences, and frequently we would go into the map-room to discuss some particular development.

The sessions were somewhat more formal than those with Roosevelt. Truman always addressed me as “Admiral,” whereas the late President called me “Bill.” I also had to work harder in one sense. F.D.R. was practically a human world encyclopædia and gazetteer, and if I happened to make even an insignificant error, Roosevelt would catch it—almost gleefully. Everyone, including Truman himself, knew that in

the field of international relations he had much to learn, and I did not dare make a mistake, even a small one. I selected a number of the summary papers of Joint Chiefs of Staff for him to study. They made a sizeable stack when placed on his desk, but the new President showed in a few days that he had digested them and was rapidly catching up those "strands of the business of war." Personally, he proved to be easy to work with and, to use a trite phrase accurately, one of the nicest people I have ever known.

Exactly one week after Roosevelt died, April 17, the new President held his first news conference. It attracted a record number of newspaper, radio, and magazine correspondents, and I was told later that nearly 350 were in the throng that overflowed his office. His direct, positive way of handling the news-gatherers was very pleasing to me.

The first major event facing the new Chief Executive was a pending visit of Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov. I handed Truman the White House copy of the minutes of the Crimea conference on April 19, and from memory and these same notes that appear in this narrative, gave him as much background as I could on the Yalta meetings. The insulting language of the recent Stalin telegrams (detailed in the preceding chapter) was an affront to the solid, old-fashioned Americanism possessed by Harry Truman, and made it evident that Molotov would be in for some blunt talking from the American side. I told the President that, based on personal observation at Teheran and Yalta, I did not have a very high opinion of the Soviet Foreign Minister. Truman asked me to be present at his interview with Molotov.

Before "Molly" arrived, however, Truman had to answer questions being raised by Churchill concerning food distribution between the different zones of occupation in Germany. What Churchill was proposing was, in effect, a modification of the pre-Yalta agreement on Allied zones in order to obtain a more satisfactory arrangement for the distribution of German foodstuffs. Most of the arable land of Germany was in the Soviet area. It was obvious that the British and American zones would be short of food soon after the fighting stopped and before the control machinery would begin to function.

Truman took a firm stand that commitments already entered into must be upheld, a position he was to follow consistently in interpreting the various decisions reached by

President Roosevelt. His reply to Churchill, sent April 21, said (paraphrased):

“Zones of occupation for Germany were the subject of long and careful study and negotiation. They were formally agreed upon by the American, British, and Soviet Governments just prior to the Yalta Conference. Following a difference of opinion lasting many months, the British obtained a north-western zone, which they were so insistent upon having. The general area of the zone allotted to Russia was not in dispute and, in fact, was on general lines of a proposal informally advanced by the British as early as 1943.

“The fact that the Russian zone contained the greater portion of German food-producing areas, and that the zone sought and obtained by the British was a deficit area was well known throughout the negotiations. Formal acceptance by the three Governments of their zones of occupation was in no way made contingent upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements for an equitable distribution of German food resources.”

“A demand by our Governments for modification of agreed zone boundaries or for an agreement on more equitable food distribution might have serious consequences. The Russians could certainly consider such a bargaining position as a repudiation of our formal agreement.

“As a practical matter, any tripartite agreement for food distribution throughout Germany arrived at under such circumstances would probably prove impossible to implement in practice. Our State Department believes that every effort should be made through the Allied Control Commission to obtain a fair interzonal distribution of food produced in Germany, but does not believe that the matter of retirement of our respective troops to our zonal frontiers should be used for such bargaining purposes.

“The question of tactical deployment of American troops in Germany is a military one. It is my belief that General Eisenhower should be given certain latitude and discretion; and that where time permits he should consult the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any major withdrawal behind our zone frontiers. [U.S. troops at this time were at some points over 100 miles inside the projected Soviet zone.]

“It is my thought that you and I might send a message to Stalin urging that the date and the procedure for withdrawal

to different zones of occupation be fixed by mutual agreement between the three Governments.”

Thus, the British Prime Minister got a sample of the frank and direct manner in which the new American President would approach their joint problems.

The President's reference to General Eisenhower's discretion as to deployment of American troops was especially pertinent because of criticism that was developing over the failure of General Bradley's forces to push on to Berlin after they crossed the Elbe River, fifty miles distant, on April 12.

Eisenhower was thoroughly informed as to the boundaries of the prospective zones of Allied occupation. When Bradley told him that his units were at the end of their supply line (in fact, were being supplied largely by air) and that an advance on Berlin might cost thousands of casualties, Eisenhower did exactly as Truman indicated. He made a military decision in the field to rest on the Elbe, to which he knew he would have to withdraw, anyway, as soon as German resistance collapsed. My notes do not show that the matter came before the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Russians, after overcoming savage street-by-street resistance, announced the complete capture of Berlin on May 2, 1945.

Molotov arrived in Washington on Sunday, April 22, and on Monday afternoon, Truman summoned his principal advisers to the White House to discuss the attitude of the Soviet Government toward Poland, which we considered a violation of the Anglo-American understanding of agreements reached at the Crimea Conference in February. Present were Secretary of State Stettinius, War Secretary Stimson, Major-General John Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, Navy Secretary Forrestal, Admiral King, General Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, Charles Bohlen, myself and Ambassador Harriman. The last-named had canvassed with me on Saturday the existing poor state of political and military relations with our Russian ally.

Harriman believed that Lend-Lease aid to the Soviets should be limited exclusively to material that would assist in the common war effort in Europe and Asia. I agreed with him.

The consensus of opinion among the group Truman had called together was that the time had arrived to take a strong American attitude toward the Soviet Union, and that no

particular harm could be done to our war prospects if Russia should slow down or even stop its war effort in Europe and Asia. The Joint Chiefs were about to change our military policy, anyway, on the basis of studies made in Moscow by General Deane.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Harriman, Bohlen (who acted as interpreter), and myself remained at the White House and were with the President when Molotov arrived at 5.30 p.m. With the Russian Minister were Ambassador Gromyko and Pavlov, the brilliant Soviet interpreter. Our Chief Executive lost no time in making very plain to Molotov our displeasure at the Soviet failure to carry through the agreement made at Yalta about the character of a new Polish Government.

Using blunt language unadorned by the polite verbiage of diplomacy, Truman said that: (1) Failure to agree on the Polish problem would offend the American people and might adversely affect or prevent post-war collaboration that would be so advantageous to both nations and to the world. (2) He was determined to carry through to success the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, despite any disagreements between individual members. This was a clear intimation that he would accomplish a union of peace-loving nations whether or not Russia became a member.

Molotov began his answer by saying that his Government was desirous of solving all the problems that had arisen or might arise, and that Moscow wished to abide firmly by agreements reached at Yalta. He said it would be most unfortunate if anything should interfere with post-war collaboration.

Then he plunged into the Polish question, asserting flatly that the Government was carrying out the Crimean accord, and asking why we could not agree. The hub of the issue was refusal of Moscow to really broaden the present so-called "Lublin" or "Warsaw" Provisional Government to include substantial representation of democratic groups in Poland who might not be too enthusiastic about the Communist form of government.

Molotov implied that the Anglo-American interpretation of the language in the Yalta report was incorrect, intimating that we were to blame for the existing difficulties in "re-organizing" the Polish Government. He said the interests of

the Soviet Government in Poland were "essential," using the argument of protection of the rear of Soviet troops in Germany and the future security of the U.S.S.R.

The President ended the meeting by suggesting that Molotov endeavour to get Stalin's approval to our proposal and, in the meantime, try in San Francisco to come to a meeting of the minds with Stettinius and Anthony Eden. The Russians had indicated their lack of interest in the United Nations by at first refusing to send an official of rank equal to the heads of delegations of the other powers represented at San Francisco.

The President's strong American stand at this meeting, expressed in language that was not at all diplomatic, left to the Soviet Union only two courses of action: either to approach closely to our expressed policy in regard to Poland or drop out of the United Nations. I did not believe they would take the latter course.

Truman's attitude in dealing with Molotov was more than pleasing to me. I believed it would have a beneficial effect on the Soviet outlook on the rest of the world. The Russians had always known that we had the power, and they should know after this conversation that we had the determination to insist upon the declared right of all people to choose their own form of government.

Personally, I did not believe that the dominating Soviet influence could be excluded from Poland, but I did think it was possible to give to the reorganized Polish Government an external appearance of independence.

At Yalta, Stalin had agreed to the use of certain air bases in the Soviet Maritime Provinces by the American air forces and to co-ordination of planning looking toward the entry of Russia into the Japanese war. However, our military mission in Moscow had met only repeated frustration in trying to achieve any semblance of military co-operation with the Soviet staff, despite the most friendly talks we had had at Yalta in February. The Joint Chiefs therefore had directed General Deane to make a study of the actual strategic assistance these proposed air bases would be in our plans for defeating Japan.

Deane had reported that even the greatest number of men, planes, and supplies we could put in Siberia between May and October 1 would increase the amount of bombs that could be dropped on the Japanese mainland by only a negligible

fraction compared to the total bombardment planned from bases already in our possession. Therefore, on April 24, the Joint Chiefs decided to abandon the project of basing U.S. planes on Siberia, end the fruitless attempts to co-ordinate our military plans with the Russians, and even abandon the proposed opening of the supply line by way of the Kuriles to Russian troops facing the Japanese unless pressed by Moscow. This action fitted in well with Truman's firmness with the Russians in the political sphere. One thing was certain as the defeat of Germany became inevitable—the great single political problem the new President faced was that of getting along with the Soviets.

This problem in which were wrapped up almost all of the big issues of the moment was discussed wherever thoughtful men gathered. I recall particularly a dinner given by Lord Halifax for Britain's Foreign Minister Eden when he passed through Washington on April 16, on his way to the San Francisco meeting. Present were two Members of the British Parliament, Stimson, Justice James F. Byrnes, who had returned to Washington from South Carolina after Roosevelt's death, and myself.

There was frank talk about the prospects of the United Nations Conference, the difficulties in Poland, progress of the war in Europe, and the necessity of obtaining in the near future some agreement on reparations and peace terms. As was my habit under Roosevelt, I reported the gist of these conversations to President Truman the next day.

* * *

Bernard Baruch, recently returned from Europe, called during the week of Roosevelt's death and gave me a lengthy report on his impressions. He was convinced that, in spite of the existing condition of discouragement in Britain, the Empire could, with very little assistance, rebuild itself into a position of great power and prestige in the world. Baruch had so informed high British leaders in London, including the King.

He believed also that France could provide itself with sufficient food, and he had found farm land being cultivated vigorously in the parts of Germany he had visited.

Commander Harold Stassen, one-time Governor of Minnesota, came to the office seeking background information as he

prepared to serve as a member of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference. I got an impression that Stassen favoured the Roosevelt concept of United Nations trusteeships of mandated islands, with which I disagreed.

There was one ridiculous report circulated in Washington this same week. I was told that some Senators wished to advocate my appointment as Secretary of State. While having no idea of the accuracy of the report, I told my informant that under no foreseeable conditions would I accept that office.

One was able to forget the pressing problems of the day at a most pleasant dinner given by Navy Secretary Forrestal at the end of April in honour of three former Secretaries—Josephus Daniels, Charles F. Adams, and Charles Edison. It was an exceedingly interesting gathering of old-timers, and I was one of the oldest fossils present. We spent the evening reminiscing about difficulties (especially of the measly Navy appropriations in pre-war years) and accomplishments of other days.

* * *

An exciting sequence of events that built up to the climax of the unconditional surrender of Germany began on April 25. I was at lunch with my brother at the Army and Navy Club when a telephone call from the White House sent me hurrying to the Pentagon Building. There, at 2 p.m., I found the President, General Marshall, Admiral King, and Major-General Hull waiting for a telephone call from Prime Minister Churchill. We were gathered in the Communications Centre, a portion of the enormous Pentagon guarded even more closely, if possible, than the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was a connection on a secret line to a small switchboard in Churchill's offices at No. 10 Downing Street in London. Shortly after I arrived, the Prime Minister was on the "secret" as he called it. I listened in with the President.

Churchill said he had information from Sweden through the American Minister that Himmler had asked Count Bernadotte to make an offer to America and Britain of the surrender of all German forces on the Western Front, including those in Holland, Denmark, and Norway.

Churchill reported that Himmler said he was speaking for the German Government because of the incapacity of Hitler, who had suffered a cerebral hæmorrhage and was not expected to live for more than a few days.

Truman told the Prime Minister that America could agree only to an unconditional surrender on all fronts in agreement with Russia and Britain. Churchill was anxious to end the war. Truman said he was too, but we must stand by our commitments.

While we were in the Pentagon, Acting Secretary of State Grew (Stettinius was at San Francisco) brought in a message from Minister H. V. Johnson in Stockholm, containing the same information just given to us over the telephone by Churchill. This looked definitely like the beginning of the end of Nazism in Germany.

At the President's direction, I sent a cable to Stalin, informing him of the situation and reaffirming our intention to accept only an unconditional surrender to the three powers on all fronts, and that if the Germans would accept these terms, they should surrender at once to our local commanders in the field. Stalin was told that if he was in accord with this arrangement we would direct our Minister in Sweden to so inform Himmler. An identical message was sent to Churchill. Nothing came of this first surrender negotiation.

The next "alarm" was from San Francisco. Shortly before 9 p.m. on April 28, an Associated Press bulletin from that city said that Germany *had* accepted unconditional surrender to the Allied powers. The radio networks kept repeating the bulletin, creating much excitement throughout the country and causing a flood of telephone calls to the White House.

Truman called me at my home and told me to get in touch with General Eisenhower immediately, as there was no news of such an event from any official source. The Associated Press was carefully shielding its authority for the flash statement. Using the unparalleled and superb communications system operated by our armed forces, I got General Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, on the telephone in a few minutes and said to him:

"We have a report that the Germans have asked Eisenhower for an armistice. We have nothing official on it. What are the facts?"

Smith said they did not have any such request.

After I reported this to Truman at about 9.40 p.m., he told a great gathering of newsmen who had rushed down to the White House that the report from San Francisco was not correct.

Edwin Pauley, the American representative on the Three-Power Reparations Commission set up at the Yalta Conference, happened to be at the White House that evening, and after the excitement died down we had a long discussion on the problem of reparations. I gave him from these notes and from memory all the background I had on the discussions that took place at Yalta that led to the formation of this committee, which was to study and report on the type and amounts of reparations that might be exacted from Germany.

The next morning (April 29), Field-Marshal Alexander in Italy cabled that accredited representatives of General von Vietinghoff, commanding all German forces in Italy, had accepted terms of surrender imposed by Alexander—in the presence of Soviet representatives. It was not necessary to notify Stalin in this case, as the proposed capitulation would be what we called a “tactical surrender,” a device adopted to avoid the Soviet insistence that we could not accept any surrender without all three powers participating in the negotiations. Alexander cabled further details during the day, and hostilities in Italy were expected to cease at noon on May 2.

The following day (April 30) came the news that Benito Mussolini, with sixteen of his attendants, had been captured by a group of Italian partisans. *Il Duce*, his captured officers and an alleged mistress, had been executed immediately. This seemed to be full payment for his error in judgment in joining with Hitler at a time when, in the opinion of almost every European, Germany was certain to win the war.

Every day brought important developments or sensational rumours. It was obvious that the end was not far off. On May 1, the Hamburg radio at 4.30 p.m. broadcast an announcement that Hitler was dead and that the supreme command of Germany's armed forces had been taken over by Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz. In view of the information received from Himmler a few days earlier, I accepted as plausible the report of the Führer's death.

On May 2, Stalin announced the complete capture of Berlin, and Alexander cabled that enemy troops in Italy were being informed by the German Command that they should surrender to the American-British forces there. This included all the Nazi forces that were or had been under the command of Vietinghoff. The President immediately sent

messages of congratulations to Alexander and to General Mark Clark, who commanded the American troops in Alexander's theatre.

The capitulation in Italy should, in my opinion, be highly effective in discouraging the German armies on other fronts, where they were already isolated in separate groups and without hope of eventual success. The War Department estimated that the total number of Germans surrendering in Italy, including service troops, was about 600,000.

On May 4, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander in the South-east Asia theatre, reported the occupation of the important city of Rangoon. That practically ended the Burma campaign, which had finally gathered real momentum after nearly two years of delay and bickering.

Eisenhower reported, also on May 4, that a full tactical surrender of the German forces on General Montgomery's front would be effective at 8 a.m., May 5. There had been broadcast reports to this effect, but Eisenhower was trying to avoid a controversy with Moscow by assuming that the Germans were making only a tactical surrender. The German radio was reporting that the surrender included all Nazi forces in Holland, north-west Germany, and Denmark.

The rapid succession of events kept me on the run between my office and that of President Truman. We had everything well-organized. After I left the office, any important messages would be relayed either from the Joint Chiefs or the White House map-room to me at my home. When they were important enough, I would call the President and keep him informed.

Telegrams from General Eisenhower on May 5 reported that all German forces in Europe were making frantic efforts to surrender to the Anglo-American armies in order to avoid capture by the Soviet armies. German fear of capture by the Soviets was easily understood.

On May 6 (my seventieth birthday) General Eisenhower was continuing negotiations with representatives of Admiral Doenitz for the surrender of all German military and naval forces on all fronts.

Monday, May 7, 1945, was a day not soon to be forgotten. It began at 1.20 a.m. when the War Department called me to report that a dispatch just received from Eisenhower said that the German High Command last night (May 6) had signed the terms of unconditional surrender of its land, sea,

and air forces on all fronts. The surrender was to be effective at one minute after midnight, May 8-9.

After talking with the President, I immediately sent a message to Churchill and Stalin telling them that the President would make an official announcement of the surrender at 9 a.m. (Washington time), on Tuesday, May 8.

At that moment I speculated that this would be a thrilling occasion for all the parents and friends of our men in the European war, and an event of great historic import to the civilized nations of the world. We could hope that the German menace now was removed for a century if all the Allied nations would handle the post-war situation correctly.

However, a series of premature releases about the surrender took the edge off the official announcement and confused the situation generally. It was important, in view of the arrangements made by General Eisenhower, that the news be withheld until the time indicated by him when the surrender would be effective. It should be remembered that on a single front—in Italy—General Alexander had accepted surrender on April 29, but three days were allowed for the Germans to make the necessary arrangements along the Italian front, and the fighting did not cease officially until May 2.

In this case there was not only the much longer Western front to be considered, but the entire Russo-German front as well. Many large groups of German forces were isolated, but fighting savagely, and, as always, there was the necessity for acting in complete co-ordination with our touchy Soviet ally.

The German radio, particularly the Hamburg station, began broadcasting news of the surrender within a few hours after the famous signing of the terms at the ancient French cathedral city of Rheims. One had to consider that these broadcasts might be deliberate and desperate attempts to create difficulties for the Allies. The trouble was compounded when at about 9.30 a.m. an apparently authentic story giving the terms of the surrender and describing the scene at Rheims was released by the Associated Press. By what appeared to be some unfortunate lapse in censorship, one of the sixteen reporters who received from Eisenhower the privilege of witnessing the historic event at Rheims had been able to get his story on the radio and the cables. Obviously, it was authentic, despite the official silence that was imposed immediately.

It was a safe guess at the time that Eisenhower was annoyed

because the story had been "broken" prior to the hour set by the Supreme Allied Commander for the surrender actually to become effective. As a matter of fact, in the confused situation that then existed, the fighting continued in some sectors for several days.

German radio accounts of the surrender, while not official, were believed by the public, particularly in Britain, where the end of the war with Germany meant much more to the individual than it did to the average non-combatant American who had only read about the V-bombs.

Reports indicated that London was celebrating wildly. This posed a problem for the British Government, which, under our agreement, could not confirm the surrender story. Churchill cabled Truman, asking that this be reconsidered in view of the premature release of the authentic surrender story. The President, taking into account the natural suspicions of Moscow, felt that the surrender announcement must be withheld until 9 a.m. (Washington time) on Tuesday (May 8) unless Stalin would agree to earlier release. So far, Moscow had been silent.

Churchill was on the "secret" telephone shortly after 10 a.m. and, at the direction of the President, I talked with him from the same highly guarded room in the Pentagon Building where Truman and the Prime Minister had, on April 25, discussed the Himmler peace offer. The following is a transcription of our conversation that is substantially complete, although some sentences were not recorded well enough to be transcribed in full. The Prime Minister and I began talking at 10.10 a.m.

LEAHY: Admiral Leahy speaking.

CHURCHILL: It is me, the Prime Minister.

LEAHY: Colonel Warden. Yes, sir. [Colonel Warden was a code name for Churchill.]

CHURCHILL: You've got my telegram?

LEAHY: I have your telegram, sir. This is a message which the other Admiral asked me to convey to Colonel Warden. [The "other Admiral" was code for President Truman.]

CHURCHILL: We are on the "secret" now, so we can talk quite freely. The message that he asked you to convey to me was what?

LEAHY: I convey the following message to you: In view of

agreements already made, my Chief asks me to tell you that he cannot act without the approval of Uncle Joe. Did you understand, sir?

CHURCHILL: Will you let somebody with a younger ear listen to it. I am not quite sure I got it all down. I have got my secretary here. My ears are a bit deaf, you know.

LEAHY: I didn't know that, sir.

SECRETARY: This is the Prime Minister's secretary now.

LEAHY: This is the message. Are you ready?

SECRETARY: Yes.

LEAHY: The message follows: In view of agreements already made, my Chief asked me to tell you that he cannot act without the approval of Uncle Joe. We wish to know whether or not you have already obtained an agreement with Uncle Joe?

SECRETARY: Hold on one moment. The Prime Minister is going to talk. One moment.

CHURCHILL: Hello. The German Prime Minister has given out an hour ago on the radio . . .

LEAHY: I know that.

CHURCHILL: . . . An address stating that they have declared the unconditional surrender for German troops.

LEAHY: We know that.

CHURCHILL: What is the use of me and of the President looking to be the only two people in the world who don't know what is going on? The whole of this thing is leaking out in England and America, far more with you because you've got more time; but it is declared right out in the Press, in Government Press too—as you say. . . . All right. I feel it absolutely necessary to go off at 6 p.m., and I will telegraph to Stalin the very message that I am sending you. . . . In view of the fact that the Germans have blasted it all over the world.

LEAHY: You have not asked the approval of Uncle Joe?

CHURCHILL: I have got a telegram waiting now to be delivered to him to say that I must go off at six and that I am asking you . . . proposing the same to you, but now I have a telegram which can be delivered to say that, "Owing to what the German radio states, there is no use pretending to keep it silent, and we must go off."

LEAHY: I have [just received] another message from Eisenhower in which he says that in view of the Russian

insistence upon a further meeting in Berlin, that he alters his original recommendation in regard to the announcement.

CHURCHILL: Yes. I have that.

LEAHY: You have that?

CHURCHILL: I've got that; and I will talk to him soon. . . .

The only thing is whether we shall appear the only people who don't know about it. It is all coming out. You will find that all the American papers to-morrow will be absolutely full of it. And the British papers already are out, and the Germans have announced this matter. In my opinion, let that be, and make no point to get agreement from Uncle Joe.

LEAHY: My Chief told me that he was unable to agree to an earlier announcement without the approval of Uncle Joe, and he asked me to transmit that to you.

CHURCHILL: There is no time to get the approval.

LEAHY: We can try to get it.

CHURCHILL: There are only two and a half hours.

LEAHY: That is all.

CHURCHILL: They are very slow at transmitting here.

LEAHY: I will make an effort to get it. Did you understand?

CHURCHILL: Yes.

LEAHY: I will make an effort to get his approval by immediate communication with Deane [General Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow], and if you make an effort to get his approval, and can get it to us by 11.30—that is, two hours from now—we will go along at noon.

CHURCHILL: I am afraid that you won't get any such answer.

LEAHY: I am afraid, also. But my Chief told me that he could not make the announcement without the approval, so that is as far as I can go.

CHURCHILL: I am very sorry about it, because we fixed it all for six o'clock, and the King will go off at nine. That is all fixed, and it is impossible to stop it now that the German announcement has been on the wire. Just because the Russians have an absolute control over her papers and such under tyrannical conditions, we really can't . . . These free countries with free papers cannot be expected . . . Could you guarantee me that nothing will appear in

any American paper about it? According to that guarantee, I could be quite different, but I saw it coming out all over the world.

LEAHY: The rumours, of course, will be out in all papers, but the official announcement cannot be made here, according to my instructions, until we get the approval of the third party, and I will endeavour now, immediately, to get the approval. . . .

CHURCHILL: Of the third party?

LEAHY: Of Uncle Joe. Yes, sir.

CHURCHILL: How can you get it?

LEAHY: I have a teletype connection with General Deane, and I will start it immediately, and tell him to get it, and send it back to us; and if Uncle Joe says no, then over here we cannot go along with an earlier announcement. Those are my instructions.

CHURCHILL: Well, that only means there will be no official announcement, that all announcements will all be made in to-morrow's newspapers.

LEAHY: From what I was told to convey to you, it means that unless we get an approval for an announcement to-day, it will not be made until to-morrow morning at nine o'clock. It will be made then; but without an approval from Uncle Joe, it cannot be announced here in advance of that time.

CHURCHILL: Well, I'll be glad to know what you can get from him, but I cannot undertake not to go off before I speak to Stalin, and everything is set for it. The whole world knows it, and I do not see why we should put our news off until . . . It is an idiotic position.

LEAHY: Well, I don't see either, being right frank. Personally, I don't see. I'm only conveying to you the message which I was told to convey.

CHURCHILL: It's all right, Mac.

LEAHY: Will you also please endeavour to get something from Uncle Joe?

CHURCHILL: Yes; I will.

LEAHY: And I'll start it immediately from here.

CHURCHILL: Bravo. If I get that . . . But I cannot agree. In view of the German announcement, I've got to tell the English people whether it's true or false. I cannot agree to delay that.

LEAHY: And if you get anything from Uncle Joe, will you inform us immediately?

CHURCHILL: I sure will. I think we can speak on the open line. The whole world knows about it.

LEAHY: They know about it now. That's quite true, sir. Everybody knows it. It's a matter of the official announcement. At any rate, I'll start it immediately.

CHURCHILL: Will you go off to him immediately on the telephone, to Uncle Joe.

LEAHY: Immediately. Not telephone; teletype. I'll ask him immediately, instantly, now.

CHURCHILL: All right, so will I. I will try to ask him immediately, now. I think we can speak ourselves. That is all.

LEAHY: That is all, sir. Goodbye. We'll let you know at once, sir.

As soon as the Prime Minister hung up I teletyped Deane in Moscow to try to get to Stalin and get this matter settled. I told him how urgent it was, and the predicament the British Government faced because crowds of cheering people had gathered in the streets of London demanding a statement from the Prime Minister.

I remained at the Pentagon in the hope—a vain one, it proved—that we might get a quick reply from Moscow. But it was not Stalin that I heard from next. It was the Prime Minister again, who called at 11.10, exactly one hour after his first conversation. The Prime Minister was getting impatient. Like ourselves, he had had no success in getting any response from Moscow. The crowds in London were getting out of control. He and the King of England had no choice really but to confirm the news to their people. This conversation, tremendously interesting to me, also was recorded and is given herewith substantially complete:

LEAHY: The situation here at the moment is that we are trying to get information from Stalin. We have communicated with Eisenhower and we have talked with him. He says no announcement has been made from his headquarters, and that no announcement will be made until after the announcements are made in London and Moscow and the United States.

CHURCHILL: The fact is that the Columbia Radio has put the

whole thing out and our people read that . . . and I cannot stop the Press. The Moscow people have no public opinion—but you cannot control your Press, nor can I control mine. That's the difficulty of living in a free country! I hope the President will not be offended. . . .

LEAHY: The American newspapers will be very unhappy.

CHURCHILL: You mean to say that they will not publish it?

LEAHY: They will publish it as a rumour, but they will not publish it as a fact until it is announced. Shall I tell the President that you are going to make the announcement?

CHURCHILL: I feel I have no choice, in view of the publication and the crowds which are all gathering, and it is impossible for me to delay it any longer. The thing must go forward. There is another New York radio statement that Germany surrendered at 2.41 in Rheims. . . . The report says that there is no official announcement from the White House.

LEAHY: President Truman, in the event of information from Stalin, would make the announcement to-morrow.

CHURCHILL: Do you really mean that I am not to make the announcement? I cannot do that. You know my difficulties.

LEAHY: I know your difficulties, and I cannot say what you ought to do, but the President said that he would not make any announcement until he would hear from Stalin. If we do hear from him, we will let you know immediately. I will get it through to you as fast as possible. They tell me that they can get it through in five minutes.

CHURCHILL: Do tell the President how sorry I am. I hope we will do it at the same time.

LEAHY: I will give the President your message.

CHURCHILL: I feel I can delay no longer.

LEAHY: I am sorry about this. [Connection cut.]

I told the President about our talk, and Truman quite understood the situation—as was indicated in the cable he had me send to Churchill immediately:

“The President fully understands your difficulties, but he cannot make an official announcement before the agreed-upon hour unless Stalin approves.”

At about 2 p.m. we received the following from London:

“British Ministry of Information announced that to-morrow, Tuesday, May 8, will be V.E. Day, and a holiday throughout England. The Prime Minister will make a statement at 3 p.m.

The King will broadcast at 9 p.m., and Wednesday, May 9, will also be a holiday in England.”

This seemed to meet the publicity problem of the Prime Minister.

Throughout the day we waited futilely for some word from Moscow. It finally came shortly after midnight on this crowded Monday, May 7. It was not any acceptance of the situation. Stalin asked that the announcement be postponed for further examination of the surrender terms!

This was irritating to all concerned, and I rather imagine that the Prime Minister exploded to the limit of his great eloquence. (As a matter of record, it was not until 4.20 p.m. Washington time, May 8, that the Moscow radio announced that the Marshal had accepted the surrender terms.)

It was simply impossible to agree to any such postponement and Truman proceeded on schedule. At 8.15 a.m. on May 8, before a great host of newsmen, Truman announced that Germany had surrendered on all fronts to Anglo-American-Soviet forces. Present at that historic news conference were members of the Cabinet, House and Senate leaders, our own Chiefs of Staff, and, representing the British Chiefs, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville.

At 1 p.m., with General Marshall and Admiral King we made a brief broadcast on a hook-up of all radio networks, in celebration of the surrender. In my own talk I emphasized the necessity for prosecuting to the utmost the war against our remaining enemy, and paid tribute to our late beloved Commander-in-Chief, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Of Roosevelt I said:

“That great spirit understood the world’s peril long before it took the open form of war. He prepared his nation for it, within the limits of feasibility, and early threw our moral and material weight into the scales. At that moment, the forces of aggression were doomed, even while they were winning victories.

“When the Axis powers, in their anguish for conquest, threw caution to the winds and launched what they thought would be the final assault, our brave Commander-in-Chief addressed words of courage to the Congress—words which emboldened and refreshed all the world’s forces of resistance: ‘With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounded

determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph, so help us God!' That brave pledge is now fulfilled in part. With victory over Japan, it will be wholly accomplished.

"I may say to-day that President Roosevelt's wisdom and amazing grasp of world geography and military capacities played an all-important part in leading the forces of the coalition, and our own, to victory. We who were privileged to serve under him in high staff and command posts to-day salute this brave soldier who fell in battle, in the same sense that we salute those millions of others, of our own and of other lands, who died that this nation and its neighbours across the seas might fulfil their destinies in peace, freedom and friendship."

I also emphasized that victory had been made possible by the combined strength of the Allied coalition! "In that Allied unity we take our greatest pride. Without that unity, without the coalition of all our forces, our nation to-day would stand in dreadful peril."

Turning to the task still ahead, I concluded: "Now with the hosts of evil and barbarism vanquished in Europe, we must turn our full attention to the Far East. There we still have a powerful enemy, who boasts that he is willing and ready to fight on for 100 years if necessary. We assure him it will not take that long.

"Still, he has powerful legions of troops in his home islands and on the coast of China, perhaps seven million of them. Although the vast circumference of his empire has been shrunk by our assaults, his naval power destroyed, and his air forces crippled, we have a long road to travel before victory.

"Japan must be beaten into defeat, into unconditional surrender. The reconquest of the Philippines was a step in that direction. The remaining steps must and will be taken. We have no intention of relaxing until the eastern barbarian shares the fate of his partner.

"We have not forgotten Pearl Harbor. We know that the American people, with equal devotion and sacrifice, will support their sons and brothers, who will be fighting our savage enemies in the far Pacific until the final victory is won."

News reports indicated that the enthusiastic celebration in London and other British cities was in sharp contrast to the lack of excitement in this country. For Britain the event marked the end of a cruel, continuous attack against the cities

of England, particularly London, which had suffered severely for five years. Washington, far from the actual front, had not been attacked and had, therefore, no actual knowledge of the horrors of aerial warfare. For me personally it was quite a contrast to the end of World War I. I happened to be in New York City on that occasion. There was wild excitement in the neighbourhood of the famous Times Square.

All of us received congratulations from our friends and from Allied leaders, with whom we had worked closely. General A. Juin, who was considered by his American colleagues the most efficient and able of all the French generals who actually commanded Allied troops in combat during the war, wrote of the "strong hand with which you have aided us to come out of the abyss and take our place in the ranks."

The one that touched me most deeply came from the widow of the late President. She said:

"DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY,—My thoughts are with you to-day. I know that Franklin would want to clasp your hand and congratulate you for all you have done to make this victory possible. . . .

(Signed) ELEANOR ROOSEVELT."

Her thoughtful note served to emphasize the tragedy that had struck down Franklin Roosevelt just twenty-six days before the first major compliance with the "unconditional surrender" policy which he had set forth at the Casablanca Conference early in 1943. The Captain that forged and trained the winning team was gone, but there had stepped into his place a new leader who, in the crowded days that followed the tragic April 12, had taken firm command of the situation. His utter sincerity, his realization of the magnitude of the tasks of war and peace that lay ahead and his direct method of approach to the multitude of problems which he was expected to solve had impressed me very favourably.

The nation also had closed ranks and was marching behind Harry S. Truman. This was fortunate for our country, because at the very hour of military victory in Europe, the course of events seemed to imperil all of the hopes and ideals for which we had been fighting for more than three years.

CHAPTER XXI

ALLIED CONTROVERSIES. PREPARATIONS FOR POTSDAM

AT OUR MORNING CONFERENCE on May 14, 1945, I advised President Truman that an early meeting with Churchill and Stalin appeared necessary in an effort to settle the troublesome political difficulties in Europe, and to safeguard our plans for defeating Japan.

The misgivings I had after we left Yalta in February, just three months earlier, unfortunately were being realized to a far more dangerous degree than I had imagined in my most pessimistic moments. The great and successful coalition of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States which, with our lesser allies, had vanquished the military might of Hitlerism and Fascism, was coming apart at the seams.

Stalin was suspicious. He appeared to feel that all his allies were "ganging up" on him. Churchill was bitter. His beloved Empire was weak, not strong, in victory and he faced a domestic political crisis of his own. Chiang Kai-shek wrestled with a growing rebellion. The United Nations Conference at San Francisco was floundering on the shoals of Russian obtuseness. De Gaulle was more cantankerous than ever. And the war was not over. Japan still had to be defeated. The military power of Tokyo's war lords must be broken if the future security of our own country was to be assured.

Victory in Europe had been won, but peace seemed far away. Taking the initiative for a "Big Three" meeting would be a bold step for a new and inexperienced President, but there were too many problems that could not be solved through the usual diplomatic channels. The Polish issue had become a symbol of the deterioration of our relations with the Russians. The myriad questions involved in occupying Germany needed immediate discussion on the highest level. Her defeat had come sooner than anticipated, and the Allies were not fully prepared to cope with the political vacuum that once was a great nation.

In a proverbial Pandora's box were trouble-making items, such as reparations, Lend-Lease, post-war aid to Europe, prisoners of war, "war criminals," and political and economic

rehabilitation of liberated areas, particularly the Balkans. On the very next day following the official announcement of the Nazi surrender, the Balkan issue erupted dangerously in the disputed city of Trieste.

General Tito, the dictator of Yugoslavia, announced his intention of keeping control of Trieste and the Italian area thereabouts. Field-Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean area, seemed, from reports he had made up to May 9, to be handling the difficulty with firmness and decision.

I discussed the problem with the President on May 10, pointing out that Tito's Army and the Allied forces were in a position that might result in fighting for possession of part of the Istrian Peninsula, known as Venezia Giulia. Truman seriously contemplated taking a strong stand, even if it should result in hostilities between the Anglo-American and Yugoslav troops. We were determined to preserve the neutrality of the area.

The Allies ultimately agreed that the area was to be a free state and Trieste a free port.

Later in the day I conferred with Acting Secretary of State Grew and General Marshall. The latter believed that every effort should be made to avoid a military clash. It was decided to try, through diplomatic channels, to induce Tito to withdraw from Italy. Prime Minister Churchill was informed of the decision and asked to co-operate to see that General Alexander understood our position.

The Trieste situation remained tense and on several occasions an armed clash seemed imminent. The American Ambassador to Yugoslavia told us on May 19 that Tito declined to withdraw his troops or his Government from Venezia Giulia. This brought closer the prospect of actual fighting. Truman decided to seek the assistance of both Stalin and Churchill. I conferred with various State Department officials, and in the afternoon of May 20, with the President's approval, sent a cable to Stalin asking his assistance in negotiations with Tito and a message to Churchill telling him of our military precautions in anticipation of an attack by the Yugoslavs.

After prolonged negotiations, the Trieste affair was settled, temporarily, without bloodshed. However, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had made arrangements to get additional troops to the Trieste "front" if necessary and we could have defeated the Yugoslavs.

In Austria we were having the usual trouble with the local Soviet commander in trying to carry out previously agreed arrangements for control of Vienna. However, Stalin informed us on May 19 that he then had no objection to our sending representatives to Vienna for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with the proposed division of the Austrian capital into Allied zones of occupation. This was another problem that was to come up again at Potsdam.

On his way back to Moscow from the San Francisco Conference, Ambassador Harriman discussed with me his latest estimate of Soviet intentions regarding Japan. Harriman believed that Russia would come into the war, regardless of what we might do, and that, in the end, Moscow would exercise control over whatever government might be established in Manchuria and outer Mongolia. I had held that same opinion ever since the "conditions" for Russian participation in the Far East conflict had been accepted.

Harriman also believed that Stalin would attend a "Big Three" conference, but would not agree to a meeting outside of Soviet-controlled territory, principally because of the Marshal's fear of assassination in any area that was not covered completely by his secret police.

The afternoon of the day (May 14) that I broached to the President the desirability of a three-power meeting, he discussed the idea at a meeting with Grew, Britain's Foreign Minister Eden, and two officials from the British Embassy. This group also considered possible action in the Trieste situation and their determination to adhere to the Anglo-American stand in regard to Poland. Nothing was decided, but much interesting and informative talk ensued. I was again impressed with Eden as being a thoroughly informed, smooth, finished diplomatic officer.

Truman decided to seek a meeting of the Big Three and took two important preliminary steps during the week of May 20. He cabled Stalin on that date that he was sending Harry Hopkins to Moscow to discuss with him some of the questions that seemed to be causing misunderstanding and poor relations between our country and the Soviet Union.

Hopkins had returned to his Georgetown home from the Rochester clinic, but still was a very sick man. However, he agreed enthusiastically to attempt this delicate mission for the new President. In fact, his own published notes revealed

that once the suggestion had been made to him, his only fear was that Truman might not send him.

The Chief Executive then decided to send Joseph E. Davies to London to see Churchill and get from the Prime Minister his ideas on the same problems. There were indications from the many cables Churchill was sending to Washington that he was very bitter about the Soviet attitude and might take some precipitate action that would seriously endanger the unity of the "Big Three"—which was so necessary to the achievement of any kind of permanent peace.

Hopkins was to leave Washington, Wednesday, May 23. On the preceding Monday, General Marshall, Admiral King, and I discussed with him the Soviet problem, especially the Polish controversy and Soviet intentions in the Japanese area. Hopkins said he thought the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, together with the Chiefs of Staff, should accompany the President to the next tripartite meeting.

On Tuesday (May 22) Davies, preparing to leave for London, came to my office, and we went over the recent exchanges of messages between Churchill and Truman.

This was the beginning of the very thorough preparation for the conference which was to take place at Potsdam in July. Much depended on the outcome of the missions Truman had entrusted to these two able men. Both kept the White House fully informed of the progress of their discussions. Before proceeding to the outcome of their efforts, it will be necessary to record a number of other matters that occupied both the President and his Chief of Staff at this time.

* * *

Preparations were going forward for the final phases of the war on Japan. However, the all-out production on the home front for the global warfare in the past three years had created serious civilian shortages. Director Fred Vinson, of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion ("Reconversion" had been added to the functions of Vinson's organization on April 2), on May 15 discussed the necessity of his having early information as to the actual production needs for the Japanese campaign.

Vinson felt that he must meet at least some of the demands for the production of material for home use. I advised him to put his request in writing, but informed General Marshall immediately about Vinson's problem. I anticipated little

difficulty in getting the material we needed for the Far East operations. Our principal problem seemed to be shipping, which became acute because of the tremendous distances involved.

At about the same time Truman held a conference with President Osmeña of the Philippines, Senator Millard Tydings, and the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and myself on plans for naval and military bases in the Philippines after they should have become independent. Under existing legislation, the islands were to assume complete sovereignty in 1946.

* * *

The problem of command in the Pacific was one of those situations that would not remain quiet, despite successive "settlements" made on the highest level. During May I had two conversations with Admiral Thomas C. Kincaid, who commanded the Seventh Fleet, which was under MacArthur's command, the only naval force operating directly under MacArthur's orders. Kincaid believed that, after much adjustment, the Army and Navy had achieved a satisfactory degree of co-ordination in the Pacific. He had reservations about the Army Air Force, which, in his opinion, remained too independent of both the Army and Navy command to perform with efficiency in the support of either naval operations or Army ground forces.

Kincaid felt that, to state it simply, the best solution to this vexing problem would be that Army forces should be landed by the Navy under naval command. After the landing they should be under the Army command. The Joint Chiefs were to wrestle again with this situation in June.

Not long after talking with Kincaid, I had lunch with Navy Secretary Forrestal, at which time we discussed the Admiral's and his own ideas for command arrangements in the Pacific.

However, the Navy Secretary and I spent most of the time talking about the proposed single department of National Defence. Both he and I believed the projected unification would at that time be detrimental to our sea defences. I felt that unification of administration held promises of usefulness in economy and in many other ways. At that time I did not approve of unification of the *command* of the military services under anybody except the President. (This is the same question that was before the White House, the Congress, and the

Services as these notes were being prepared in the spring of 1949.) We were still at war, and I feared that a radical change in the handling of our so far successful military effort would be harmful to the Navy sea defences and that the Navy would suffer from the expansion of one of the other services.

I never opposed the unification of the administrative functions of the armed services, but I did at this time (and still do) believe that unification of command under anybody other than the President would be detrimental to national defence, and dangerous to the maintenance of constitutional control of the armed forces in war.

* * *

The State Department informed me on May 30 that one officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and two State Department employees had been delivering confidential information to interested persons outside the Government. I was told that the three accused persons would be brought to trial, and that evidence of their guilt was conclusive.

When I reported this to the President, he said the matter ought to be thoroughly investigated and the facts ascertained. That was his business, and I believe he told the State Department to proceed on those lines. The matter was somewhat out of my field.

* * *

There was an interesting dinner at the White House on May 25, when the President entertained in honour of Prince Abdul-Ilah, Heir Apparent to the Throne of Iraq and Regent for the child King. In the coffee-room the President asked me to be seated between him and the Prince, possibly because of the President's lack of experience with Arab potentates. The Prince's real purpose in coming to America appeared to be to attract our interest toward the petroleum production in Iraq, which was then completely controlled by British interests. Abdul-Ilah was an attractive modern successor to Haroun el Raschid of the *Arabian Nights* period.

That same week I attended an impressive presentation by the President before a Joint Senate and House Session of the one hundredth Medal of Honour to Staff-Sergeant Jake W. Lindsey, a very attractive young man from Mississippi.

* * *

The Lend-Lease problem was frequently on my desk during the interval between the German victory and the Potsdam Conference. Foreign Minister Bidault of France, accompanied by French Ambassador Bonnet and Acting Secretary of State Grew, discussed with the President on May 18 French affairs that bore directly or obliquely on Lend-Lease. I had in advance carefully briefed Truman on their probable approach, and he handled the situation very well. I got the impression that the Chief Executive did not like Bidault too well. When the latter asked for another appointment, the President replied there didn't appear to be much promise in further discussion, although he would be very pleased to see the French Minister at any time.

Both France and Britain had been making strong efforts to obtain from the United States food supplies, especially fats, for the liberated areas in Europe. They even went so far as to say Army rations should be reduced, if necessary, to provide this assistance. Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley had impressed me during these discussions as carefully guarding American interest in all Lend-Lease matters. In this instance, he said that the food fats simply were not available in this country and that the Army rations was a matter for the War Department to handle.

The French claimed that if we would use Lend-Lease supplies to support French occupation troops, the United States could more quickly withdraw American soldiers from occupied Germany. This was a specious argument, because the rate of moving American forces homeward was dependent almost entirely upon available shipping, which at that time was in short supply.

* * *

At the end of May the French-Arab crisis in Syria and Lebanon reached into the White House. At a conference with the President and Acting Secretary of State Grew on May 30, it was decided to tell Churchill that the President approved the British plan to use force if necessary to stop the hostilities that had broken out. In this area it was reported that the de Gaulle Government had used military power in an effort to maintain political advantage and had killed a large number of Syrians.

Within the next few days the British appealed for help in

the form of a request that American ships be sent to the Levant. It was plainly an effort to get America into visible support of the British effort to keep the French armed forces quiet in Syria and Lebanon. This request had come from Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. I had such confidence in this brilliant British commander that I had no hesitancy in advising that it be granted. The President directed me to inform the Navy that there was no objection to giving Cunningham such assistance by American warships as he might request and as we could spare.

* * *

During May we had disturbing reports that French forces in western Italy were refusing to evacuate certain sectors, indicating that France intended to annex this territory without waiting for the final treaty of peace with the Axis powers. By the first week in June the President had become very much annoyed at this high-handed attitude on the part of the French commander, who in one instance had threatened to take forcible action against American troops in the disputed area.

I was very much pleased with the way President Truman handled this problem. When I reported the incident to him, he said quickly, "The French are using our guns, are they not?"

I replied, "Yes, sir."

He then said, "All right. We will at once stop shipping guns, ammunition, and equipment to de Gaulle."

He thereupon, on June 7, sent a very strong message to General de Gaulle in which he informed the French leader that if he persisted in his refusal to withdraw the French troops from Italy, as ordered by the Allied High Command, the United States would stop immediately all deliveries of military equipment or munitions to the French troops.

The President's plain language had the desired effect. The State Department reported shortly thereafter that de Gaulle had begun to show signs of coming to his senses. In fact, Acting Secretary of State Grew thought that de Gaulle was likely to resign or be removed as head of the Provisional Government in France. The irascible Frenchman was so difficult to get along with that there was a possibility of this happening. Such an event would have been very pleasing to all the Allied governments.

De Gaulle's Government was proceeding also with preparations to try the aged Marshal Henri Pétain for alleged political offences that approached "treason." The Marshal had been brought from Germany to France for the trial. I received from my good friend of the Vichy days a letter asking me to testify in his behalf at the trial. Pétain wrote that in the event of my not being able to come to France, would I write him and explain my understanding of his attitude toward the Allies and toward France during the period that I was associated with him in Vichy.

It was a difficult letter to answer. However, in my reply, dated June 22, I told him that as Chief of Staff to the President I could not allow myself to become involved in any degree with the internal controversy in France in which he was enmeshed. Furthermore, I had no information as to the details and specifications of the charges that had been placed against him. I told him that I sympathized with the "sad predicament in which you find yourself as a result of the developments in Europe." Making it plain that any knowledge was strictly limited to the period of my Ambassadorship, January, 1941-April, 1942, I said:

"During that period I held your personal friendship and your devotion to the welfare of the French people in very high regard. You often expressed to me a fervent hope that the Nazi invaders would be destroyed.

"During that period you did on occasions, at my request, take action that was in opposition to the desires of the Axis and favourable to the Allied cause.

"In every instance where you failed to accept my recommendation to oppose the Axis powers by refusing their demands, your stated reason was that such positive action by you would result in additional oppression of your people by the invaders.

"I had then, and I have now, a conviction that your principal concern was the welfare and protection of the helpless people of France. It was impossible for me to believe that you had any other concern.

"However, I must, in all honesty, repeat my opinion expressed to you at the time that positive refusal to make concessions to Axis demands, while it might have brought immediately increased hardships to your people, it would, in the long view, have been advantageous to France."

I ended with a sincere wish that his actions during the

occupation period would be accurately evaluated by the people of France, regardless of the outcome of the court proceedings.

* * *

France, the Netherlands, and Australia continued to press for assistance in the Pacific and for permission to participate in the war against Japan. The French said that a reply on the question was essential to maintain the morale of the troops tentatively designated to operate with us in the Pacific. I told their representatives (June 26) that General MacArthur had been asked for a recommendation on the subject, but we had not yet seen his reply. I did not tell the Frenchmen that it was my personal opinion that MacArthur did not desire to employ any French troops. The Dutch representatives in Washington in May and June sought both air and sea transport assistance to speed the transfer of Dutch troops from Holland to Australia, where they would be trained for operations to recapture Dutch possessions in the Netherlands East Indies.

Deputy Prime Minister Francis N. Forde of Australia met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 12 and told us of his country's intention to demobilize 50,000 men then in the armed services. He also advocated the early recapture of Nauru and Ocean Islands, so that their phosphate deposits would become available to Australia and New Zealand.

Also in June the President approved the building of an airfield in Saudi Arabia. The other airfields in this area were in the possession of somebody else. I thought it a good idea for the United States to get into the picture, so that we—particularly our Navy—would have access to some of King Ibn Saud's oil.

* * *

Washington gave General Eisenhower a tumultuous welcome when the Supreme Allied Commander who had led our forces to victory over Germany returned to the capital on June 18. The crowds were said to have been the largest ever seen in Washington. Eisenhower made a very well prepared address before a joint session of the Senate and House.

Following a huge luncheon given by the city of Washington, at which 1,000 guests were present, the General and Mrs. Eisenhower went to the White House, where Truman made a formal presentation of an Army Distinguished Service Medal. That evening the President gave a dinner in his honour which

was attended by a large number of military and political officers. I was seated at a centre table with the Chief Executive, Eisenhower, Stimson, Marshall, Speaker Rayburn of the House, President McKeller of the Senate, General Eaker, and Field-Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

It was the first time in my experience that cocktails were served to guests in the East Room of the White House. A number of enlisted men, brought from Europe by Eisenhower, also attended the dinner.

The next day the President left for a short vacation in the Pacific north-west, which ended when he addressed the final session of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco on June 26. While stopping off at his home in Independence, Missouri, *en route* back to Washington, the President announced the appointment of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State. In my opinion at that time, this was the best appointment he had made since he became President. Byrnes was unanimously confirmed by the Senate on July 2. On the same day that Byrnes was confirmed, the President personally delivered to the Senate the Charter of the United Nations, hammered out after nine weeks of meetings at San Francisco, with a recommendation that it be approved.

* * *

The end of the war in Europe had brought to the fore the problem of determining the scope and status of Lend-Lease assistance, and the latent differences over interpretation of the law flared into open controversy among our own people. The American Chiefs of Staff had informed our British colleagues at a meeting on June 7 that there was then no legal authority for the further assignment of any Lend-Lease military material, except that which would be used in our war with Japan.

The subject was brought up again in a conversation with Mr. Crowley on June 29. Crowley was in full agreement with the Joint Chiefs and wanted a positive directive to that effect from the President. The State Department and the Army wanted to continue giving Lend-Lease war material to Europe, particularly to France for use by French forces of occupation in Germany. Vinson, as Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, sided with the latter group. I attended a conference of Lend-Lease enthusiasts on July 2, over which

Vinson presided. I told the meeting that the Chief Executive had declined to approve a message to Churchill promising the use of Lend-Lease funds for post-war European relief.

Vinson was openly critical of my action in advising the President in regard to this, and he asked what right I had to do so. I informed the conference that it must expect me to express my opinion as clearly as possible on any subject on which the President might ask my advice.

Many at this meeting contended that the law *did* give the President authority to use Lend-Lease money for post-war purposes. (As this is written in 1949, we are, with the approval of the Congress, doing the same thing under another name—the “Marshall Plan.”) At that time Britain was requesting about 6 billion dollars for rehabilitation of England.

The proposal under discussion seemed to me to be a plain violation of the letter and spirit of the Lend-Lease Act, and I so informed the gentlemen present. I also told them that Lend-Lease, except in its application to military equipment, was entirely outside my area. I thereupon walked out of the conference.

It was very apparent to me that a number of individuals in the Government were desirous of disbursing great sums of Lend-Lease money on projects that could have no bearing whatever on the prosecution of that part of the war which still remained.

On July 5, the day before we left for Potsdam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received from the President an order which in my opinion, should have ended the argument for all time. Truman’s directive read:

“Approval of the issue to Allied governments of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan, and it will not be issued for any other purpose.”

* * *

While the Lend-Lease controversy was important, it did not compare in gravity with the Russian situation. At this point I go back in my notes to early in June to resume discussion of the missions of Hopkins and Davies at Moscow and London respectively.

Hopkins held many long and frank sessions with Stalin between May 26 and June 6. They are completely reported,

verbatim, in many cases, in Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*. President Truman and I discussed Hopkins' voluminous daily cables at our morning sessions. The President was pleased with the progress Harry seemed to be making, and on June 1, with Acting Secretary of State Grew, we discussed suggestions received from Hopkins recommending arrangements to clear an impasse that was preventing even a start on the reorganization of the Government of Poland.

Stalin had presented a list of names to Hopkins of Poles who would be considered as candidates for inclusion in the broadened base of the existing Polish Government. The only ones known to Hopkins were Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and Professor Oscar Lange, the latter a Pole who had become a naturalized American. Hopkins sent the list to Washington and also cabled that Stalin felt it was impossible, during a time of war, to permit the political freedoms upon which the United States and Britain were insisting to be enjoyed in Poland to the full extent we desired.

Hopkins indicated that apparently we would have to go along with this view if any progress was to be made. The President telegraphed Harry approval of his recommendations and asked Churchill to agree.

* * *

We received information on June 4 that Churchill would inform Parliament shortly concerning the British warships loaned to Russia. I directed Admiral King to make public the following day the news of our loan to Russia of the cruiser U.S.S. *Milwaukee*. These British and American ships had been loaned to the Soviet Government to prevent its insistence upon being assigned Italian warships and merchant vessels that could be used to better advantage in our war effort.

* * *

Davies returned from his special mission to London, bringing much information concerning Churchill. The President had Davies and me to a dinner (June 5), at which the former Ambassador to Russia discussed in detail what had transpired in his more than eight hours of talk with the Prime Minister during the few days he was in London.

He said Churchill appeared tired, nervous, and obviously working under great stress. In their first long conversation, Churchill was extremely pessimistic.

"He was completely fed up with de Gaulle," Davies reported. Churchill felt that the Frenchman should be "brought up" sharply and made to understand that he could not act arbitrarily or refuse to submit his operations to the Supreme Allied Command. He was even more bitter toward Tito, and Davies told us that Churchill considered him thoroughly unreliable, and under the domination of Moscow. Churchill complained harshly of the Soviet unilateral tactics throughout the Balkans—particularly in Bulgaria and Rumania—and in Austria.

When they got around to discussing the Soviet Union, Davies said the British leader became vehement and violent in his criticisms. He revealed to Davies that the imposition of secret police and Gestapo methods by the Soviet in the re-occupied areas was to him "more horrible" than Communism itself. When Stalin had asked him why he feared the Soviets in Europe, Churchill told Davies that he had replied to the Marshal that it was because Moscow was sending in advance of the Red Army Communist propagandists and leaders "like locusts" to establish Communist cells. Davies quoted from his official report the following:

"I said that frankly, as I had listened to him inveigh so violently against the threat of Soviet domination and the spread of Communism in Europe, and disclose such a lack of confidence in the professions of good faith in Soviet leadership, I had wondered whether he, the Prime Minister, was now willing to declare to the world that he and Britain had made a mistake in not supporting Hitler, for as I understood him, he was now expressing the doctrine which Hitler and Goebbels had been proclaiming and reiterating for the past four years in an effort to break up allied unity and 'divide and conquer.' Exactly the same conditions which he described and the same deductions were drawn from them as he now appeared to assert.

"I simply could not bring myself to believe that his considered judgment or expressions would ultimately confirm such an interpretation.

"He heard me through, and with intentness. He said that he had been under very great pressure, that he had been just thinking out loud, and that the expressions might have been stronger than he had intended to convey."

It was obvious, Davies told the President, that Churchill was genuinely fearful of what would happen if American troops were withdrawn from Europe, saying it would be a

"terrible thing," and would leave Europe prostrate and at the mercy of the Red Army and of Communism.

The Prime Minister contended that the present lines through central Germany of the British and American armies should be maintained because the positions were strategic and could be used for bargaining purposes with the Soviets. Davies had pointed out that there was an express agreement for the respective armies to retire to the occupation zones. Churchill replied that "conditions had greatly changed." The Prime Minister was insistent that it would be tragic to permit the American forces, which had advanced many miles east of the projected boundaries of the United States zone, to retire at that time.

One of the requests that the President had asked Davies to put to Churchill was that he, Truman, would like to see Stalin alone before the tripartite conference opened. At first Churchill reacted emotionally and most unfavourably to this suggestion. He seemed surprised and hurt that Truman would want to "exclude" him from the first meeting with Stalin after victory. This seemed a betrayal of Churchill's anxiety over the forthcoming elections, because, after he had quieted down, he told Davies that what he meant was the construction that a "hostile public" would place on any hint that the British leader was not to be accepted at Potsdam as a full partner in the "Big Three." Churchill supported the general purposes and importance of the need for a tripartite conference. He apparently was disturbed by implications which his political opponents might place even on the courteous rejection by Truman of Churchill's suggestion that the President stop off in London on the way to the meeting.

In his calmer moments, Davies said, the Prime Minister recognized the gravity of the immediate situation and said: "Perhaps it would fall to a very few men to decide in the next few weeks the kind of life that would confront several generations to come."

One conclusion that Davies drew was that the Prime Minister, being "first, last and all the time" a great Englishman, was basically more concerned over preserving England's position in Europe than in preserving peace. This was consistent with our Staff estimate of Churchill's attitude throughout the war. I was certain that the Prime Minister sincerely believed that in serving England he was best serving peace.

Davies also believed that, despite the secrecy with which these talks and other conversations with Churchill by American leaders were conducted, the British leader's bitter hostility toward the Soviets was known to or at least suspected by Moscow. Davies felt that Russian knowledge of Churchill's attitude was responsible for much of the aggressiveness and unilateral action on the part of the Soviets since Yalta.

It was obvious also from Davies' statements that Churchill was resisting gallantly and vigorously the unpleasant fact that his Government no longer occupied its former degree of power and dominance in the world, and that he saw in the presence of the American Army in Europe a hope of sustaining Britain's vanishing position in Europe. He feared that America's abandonment of Europe would leave Britain "holding the bag alone."

However, Churchill told Davies in the end that he would not oppose American policy toward Russia (although he was willing to take the risk of a much "tougher" attitude), and that he was entirely in accord with the policy of trying to exhaust all means consistent with self-respect in order to resolve the difficulties between the "Big Three" so that unity might be preserved to achieve a peace after military victory.

Davies told Truman that he felt his conversations with the British Prime Minister had been successful in paving the way for Churchill's co-operation at the forthcoming meeting.

At the Prime Minister's suggestion, Truman's representative also held a lengthy conference with the Foreign Minister Eden, and brought back with him a list of matters which Eden thought should be considered at the coming meeting. This would be useful, both as to the topics listed and as to the British slant on them, as we prepared our own agenda.

I was somewhat disturbed at Davies' report. While agreeing thoroughly with his estimate that the Prime Minister thought first and primarily of the preservation of the British Empire (to which I could take no exception), he was reported by Davies to have been in a highly emotional state that did not augur well for discussion with the cool, implacable Stalin who probably would face us across the conference table.

Furthermore, how much influence the new President might be able to exert on Churchill was problematical. Roosevelt had been very successful in getting the rugged British Prime

Minister to reconcile frequently divergent views so that the final result was more nearly in accord with American policy. Churchill recently had even made speeches in Parliament about the British being "willing to go alone." His reported present attitude created uncertainty as to whether the grand coalition could operate as effectively in the political area as it had on the field of battle.

* * *

Hopkins had had a thorough discussion of the Chinese problem with Stalin in Moscow. The Soviet chieftain had reiterated his wish for a unified China, and said that he would promote Chiang Kai-shek's leadership during and after the war. Hopkins said that the Marshal told him there was no Communist leader strong enough to unify China. Stalin further told our representative that he wanted China to control all of Manchuria, that he agreed with America's open door policy, and that he would in every sense respect Chinese sovereignty. Stalin agreed further that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under the United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

The Russian leader was very anxious to have assurance of China's willingness to agree to the proposals made at Yalta, and wanted China's Foreign Minister T. V. Soong to come to Moscow not later than July 1.

Soong conferred with the President, Acting Secretary of State Grew and me at the White House on June 9. When he expressed several reservations regarding the proposed Chinese agreements, Truman told Soong that our Government would support the conditions accepted at the Crimea Conference as contingent upon the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

Soong was to leave Washington by June 15 and go to Chungking before arriving in Moscow at the end of the month.

The Chinese statesman told me privately that his country could not agree to permit Russia to exercise the degree of control in Manchuria that was possible under the Yalta Agreement. He said China would prefer to settle the controversy by military action when forces should become available.

"When do you think you would be in a position to do

that?" I asked, having in mind the existing deplorable state of Chiang's armies.

"Well," replied Soong reflectively, "that might be any time in the next 500 years." The Chinese take a long-term view of both the past and the future.

I still had no qualms about the so-called concessions to Russia. We did know by that time that the Soviets could interpret language in agreements very differently from us, but we could not perceive that the Soviet Army would loot Manchuria as it did following its invasion.

* * *

I had breakfast on the south portico of the White House with the President, Davies, and Hopkins on June 13. During the breakfast, the two men who had just returned from their important missions discussed them at length. Hopkins already had told us that Stalin would agree to hold a meeting only in the vicinity of Berlin. Davies said Churchill was insistent that it be called at the earliest possible date, although there seemed no compelling reason for haste other than the Prime Minister's domestic political problems. A General Election in England was scheduled to be held on July 5. The President at this meeting decided on July 15 as the date and accepted the vicinity of Berlin as the location.

Later that day Ambassador Winant in London cabled us that the Prime Minister had accepted Truman's decision to withdraw American troops in Germany from their present position inside the Soviet area of military control to the agreed zone of American control. Winant said this movement would be simultaneous with entry of the national garrisons into Greater Berlin, *with the provision of free access to the former German capital.*

I was not informed as to the details of any agreement with Russia covering free access to Berlin. (It did not seem too important at the time. I do not believe any of us, in the late spring of 1945, thought that three years later a state of virtual armed truce would exist in Berlin with the Russians enforcing a land blockade that made necessary the dramatic and expensive American air-lift to make life bearable in our isolated sector of Berlin.)

Churchill's action in agreeing to our withdrawal was entirely unexpected. His acceptance of the President's decision,

after repeated British insistence that we remain in the Soviet zone, indicated to me a possibility that the great Englishman was not in vigorous health. It was not in his nature or in accord with his past performance to give up so easily, even when he was plainly wrong—as he was in this matter.

Truman set in motion immediately a programme of thorough preparation for the Big Three meeting. He told me that he wished to take the offensive, and asked on June 15 that I prepare an agenda with a proposed stand on each of the questions that might arise. This was a large order, full of troubles of real magnitude.

It was apparent that Hopkins was too ill to make the trip. The very day that the President gave me the agenda assignment, I had lunch with him (Hopkins) in his Georgetown residence. We talked at length about possible methods of preparing information and draft decisions on many of the subjects that were expected to come up for discussion and decision. Although physically he was in a low state, Harry's mind was as keen as ever, and he was of great assistance in preparing an outline of Truman's statement of policy, with which the President was to open the Potsdam meeting.

The week of frank, and for the most part friendly, conversations Hopkins had just concluded in Moscow with Stalin was of great help as we attempted to formulate principles that would ensure "Big Three" unity in the preservation of the peace. Both the President and I felt that Hopkins had been very successful in allaying some of the suspicions that the Russians had about our motives and interpretations, notably of agreements made at the Crimea Conference.

There was one happy omen noted during this period. Grew telephoned me on June 22 that an agreement had been reached in Moscow to establish a provisional Government of Poland that met with the approval of Ambassador Harriman. On that day Truman was in Olympia, Washington, and I reported the development to him by telephone. The President directed me to take whatever action was necessary in regard to the agreed-upon provisional Polish Government.

Despite the tremendous increase in work connected with international political problems, the purely military phase of my duties could not be neglected. One of the major decisions to be made prior to the Big Three meeting was the final shaping of our plans to defeat Japan.

The Joint Chiefs, in meetings on June 14, 15, and 29, to which was added a long White House conference with the President on June 18, adopted basic plans that became, with some modifications, the military report of the Potsdam Conference.

It was agreed to seek at the earliest date the unconditional surrender of the Japanese. Stalin, in his talks with Hopkins, had suggested the possibility that if the words "unconditional surrender" proved an unnecessary stumbling block to capitulation by Tokyo, the same effect could be achieved by complete military occupation of the Japanese homeland.

Pending approval of the President, it was decided on June 14 that invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands would be the main effort, and that no other operations would be considered that did not contribute toward this objective. However, it was deemed advisable to liberate any Japanese-held territory that might be necessary to aid the main undertaking.

While preparing for the invasion, sea and air blockades of Japan were to be maintained, the air bombardment pressed, and the destruction of enemy air and naval forces continued with all possible vigour.

The Joint Chiefs also agreed to encourage Russian entry into the Japanese war in accordance with the contingent conditions accepted by Roosevelt at Yalta. Stalin had told Hopkins he expected the Russian forces to be in position to attack by August 8. All possible assistance was to be given China to strengthen its effectiveness, and we would help other co-belligerents to the extent that they would be able to use our assistance in fighting Japan.

The British Chiefs had presented a tentative agenda to be discussed at the forthcoming meetings which was considered by the American Joint Chiefs on June 15. It contained eleven points, with a twelfth being added later. They were: (1) Progress reports from the Pacific and South-east Asia Command; (2) military estimate of the Japanese situation; (3) development of Pacific operations; (4) British participation in the Japanese war; (5) a new directive to Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander in South-east Asia; (6) control and command problems in Japan; (7) Russian participation; (8) French, Dutch, and Portuguese participation (the last-named concerned a projected Allied operation to recapture

Timor); (9) planning data; (10) overall priorities; (11) discussion of the functions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff after the war with Japan was concluded; and (12) report on air operations against Japan.

A conference was held at the White House to primarily discuss the necessity and practicability of invading the Japanese home islands. One interesting angle was that four days before this meeting there had been rumours that some O.S.S. agents were trying to arrange for conversations with high Japanese officials regarding peace terms with Japan. (Stalin had told Hopkins of some vague peace feelers being put out from Tokyo while Harry was in Moscow.) I called in Allen Dulles, the O.S.S. representative at Berne, Switzerland, who said he had no knowledge of any such activity and did not believe the O.S.S. was involved.

At the White House session, General Marshall and Admiral King both strongly advocated an invasion of Kyushu at the earliest possible date. This was a modification of King's stand. Until then the Admiral had preferred an invasion of the coast of China, possibly in the Amoy area. King thought that would be a good place to prepare for a major operation on the Japanese mainland. He had never been as positively opposed to invasion as I had. Either operation—Kyushu or Amoy—would be difficult and hazardous, and apparently he had decided to go along with Marshall in proposing Kyushu.

General Marshall was of the opinion that such an effort would not cost us in casualties more than 63,000 of the 190,000 combatant troops estimated as necessary for the operation.

The President approved the Kyushu operation and withheld for later consideration a general invasion of Japan. The Army seemed determined to occupy and govern Japan by military government, as was being done in Germany. I was unable to see any justification, from a national defence point of view, for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan. I feared that the cost would be enormous in both lives and treasure.

It was my opinion at that time that a surrender could be arranged with terms acceptable to Japan and that would make fully satisfactory provision for America's defence against any future trans-Pacific aggression.

To some extent, I was going counter to the principle of

unconditional surrender. However, at Casablanca and subsequent meetings we had not agreed with anybody to demand an unconditional surrender of Japan. That policy had been approved only as it applied to Europe.

Naturally, I had acquainted President Truman with my own ideas about the best course to pursue in defeating Japan as fully as I had done with President Roosevelt. Truman was always a good listener, and I could not gauge exactly what his own feeling was. He did indicate in our discussion that he was completely favourable toward defeating our Far-Eastern enemy with the smallest possible loss of American lives. It wasn't a matter of dollars. It might require more time—and more dollars—if we did not invade Japan. But it would cost *fewer lives*. I had told the Joint Chiefs that before they could get me to agree on a major invasion operation they would have to get the approval of the Commander-in-Chief.

I also had told the President of my jaundiced view of Russia going into Manchuria. This also was discussed at length by the Joint Chiefs, but the Army already had won that argument, and the decision had been confirmed at Yalta.

At the June 29 Joint Chiefs meeting, November 1 was set as the invasion date for Kyushu, and it was decided to curtail operations in the Ryukyus in favour of the Kyushu operation. The Joint Chiefs insisted on stating that this operation was to get into position for the decisive invasion of industrial Japan through the Tokyo plain.

The air blockade from bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the Marianas and the Philippines was to be intensified. We also agreed to defeat the remaining enemy troops in the Philippines, allocate all forces necessary to protect sea lanes in the west Pacific, and open a sea route to the Russian Pacific ports. The last item on the June 29 agenda was to assume great importance later. It was: "Prepare for sudden collapse of Japan." The Joint Chiefs wanted to be sure that General MacArthur would be ready to move quickly should the war end sooner than could be anticipated at that time.

Eisenhower made a frank report to the Joint Chiefs on July 3 concerning Danube River shipping. The Russians were claiming that they were entitled to some of the vessels that were tied up in the American-controlled portion of that strategic waterway. Eisenhower reported that all German and

Hungarian river craft were moved into the United States zone before surrender and that he had affidavits to back that assertion. He said much of this shipping formerly belonged to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and other nations, and he did not feel that the Russian claims should be granted. This report was about the last important business of the Joint Chiefs before we left for Potsdam.

* * *

We boarded the President's train at Union Station (the security of the secret loading platform under the Bureau of Engraving and Printing was no longer necessary), and I found myself assigned to the same stateroom in the President's armoured car in which I had made many journeys with Franklin Roosevelt. The train left for Newport News, Virginia, at 11 p.m. with a total of forty-four in our party. Among those in Truman's personal working group were, besides myself, James F. Byrnes, the new Secretary of State; Charles G. Ross, White House Press Secretary; Brigadier-General H. H. Vaughan and Captain J. K. Vardaman, Jr., White House Military and Naval Aides; Benjamin V. Cohen, H. F. Matthews, and Charles E. Bohlen—all from the State Department; and Captain Alphonse McMahan, White House physician.

We boarded the cruiser *Augusta*, Captain J. H. Foskett commanding, at Newport News, and at 7 a.m., July 7, 1945, started the voyage to Antwerp. The President was quartered in the Admiral's cabin, and I was assigned to the Chief of Staff's cabin. The *Augusta*, a 10,000-ton cruiser then in service fourteen years, was the ship Roosevelt used when he met Churchill at sea off Argentia, Newfoundland, in August, 1941, a meeting that resulted in the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter.

The entire trip was a great contrast to the previous voyages to Yalta and Teheran in the relaxation of security measures. We had no air cover or destroyer escort, although the light cruiser *Philadelphia* accompanied us just in case of any emergency. There were no special precautions, such as following a zigzag course, against enemy submarine attack; ship's lights were not darkened at night, and radio communications could be used freely. In fact, a complete map-room and communications centre had been set up on the *Augusta*.

Truman's fondness for music was evidenced in the concerts

we had at dinner every night. I enjoyed them when I had nothing else to do, which wasn't very often. There was no danger of being shot at now, so the President could have all the music he wanted.

Another incident marked the difference between the two Presidents. Truman was an early riser, and he announced to his personal group that breakfast would be served at 7 a.m. The President said with a smile that that was not a command. However, I also have had a lifelong habit of early rising, so it made no change in my routine. Some of the others appeared at times as if they would have liked very much to have a couple more hours of sleep.

One was reminded of the physical disability of the late President as Truman toured the *Augusta* from the bridge to the bilges. Being an old artillery man, he took great interest in the *Augusta's* battery drills. His penchant for finding relatives developed early, as there was a seaman, Lawrence Truman, among the crew of the *Augusta*. I believe he was distantly related to the President. We also had with us the "three ghouls," representatives of the major Press associations, who had not been allowed to accompany us to the previous Big Three conferences.

As a rule there were conferences in the forenoon and afternoon held by the President, with the Secretary of State and myself. Frequently Mr. Byrnes' three assistants sat in with us. We made steady progress toward preparing for the President a written brief of his attitudes toward problems that were expected to be brought before the conference for solution.

While we were busy with these shipboard sessions, the President received on July 11, from War Secretary Stimson, a message which in effect recommended that the President modify his Lend-Lease directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide for the maintenance and military needs "for British and French occupation forces in Germany." This reopened a question I had thought had been decided with finality.

A British escort joined us on July 14 when we were south of Portland, England, and at 5.30 that afternoon, as we proceeded up the English Channel, we passed the white cliffs of Dover. I went out on the deck with the President, and through our glasses the cliffs and the green country around them presented a beautiful view.

Early Sunday morning, July 15, we entered the Scheldt

River, and the *Augusta* proceeded at slow speed to Antwerp, which was reached at 10 a.m. The day was warm with bright sunshine that gave a clear view of both Belgium and Holland on the two shores of the river. Large herds of fat cattle grazed in the green meadows on both sides. One saw very little evidence of damage caused by the war so recently ended.

At Antwerp Ambassador C. E. Sawyer, with his wife, General Eisenhower, Admiral Stark, U.S.N., and Lieutenant-General Lee, U.S.A., came on board to speak with the President.

We left the ship at 11 a.m. and drove in a motor-car caravan on roads lined with spectators to an airfield near Brussels, from which we took off in the President's plane at 12.55 p.m. We flew over Coblenz, Frankfurt, Cassell and Magdeburg to the Gatow Airfield near Potsdam.

On the last lap of this flight from Frankfurt to Potsdam our plane was following approximately one of the air corridors which later was to become famous as a part of our Berlin air-lift.

The city of Kassel, viewed from the air, appeared to be completely destroyed by air bombardment. I could not see a single house that was not completely wrecked.

Upon landing, the President was received by an Army guard of honour, which he inspected, after which we proceeded ten miles by motor car to houses prepared for us on the south shore of Grebnitz Lake. Green-capped Soviet guards lined the route. My quarters, consisting of a small well-furnished sleeping-room and a large conference-room and office on the second floor, were in the same comfortable, three-story stucco structure that housed the President and Secretary of State Byrnes.

The German countryside seemed to be under cultivation and, with its numerous black and green wooded hills it did not appear to have been seriously damaged by the war.

This ancient and highly-cultured country under occupation by foreign armies—Russian, British, French and American—with its cities almost completely destroyed and with its people displaced and in debt to the conquerors for at least a generation, was an appalling example of what may happen to nations that adopt a false philosophy and follow false leaders.

Germany which now was wrecked and enslaved had, before the Nazi régime, every prospect of a prosperous happy future in concert with the other civilized nations. Hitler's Nazi

philosophy was the single cause of the disaster that had come upon the German people. This tragic change in the status of a once mighty nation was all too evident in the Potsdam agenda which had been completed as we crossed the Atlantic.

* * *

The President was well prepared for the important days ahead. He had approved and accepted the subjects which he would propose to Churchill and Stalin, and he intended to insist on their being considered by the conference. What follows is the detailed agenda, under appropriate headings, on which the President based his hopes for sealing the cracks that had appeared in the coalition which had won the war, and for laying a firm foundation for a lasting world peace.

I. Machinery for Peace

President Truman favoured establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the preparatory work and initial drafts of the peace treaties. This was an effort to avoid some of the mistakes of the Versailles Peace Conference. It had been worked up in the great detail by the State Department.

II. Government of Germany

1. The President desired that the Control Council begin to exercise control without delay, particularly in regard to uniform policies that were essential to successful administration of all the occupied zones.

2. He believed arrangements covering the following matters in all zones were immediately urgent.

- (a) Uniformity of ration scales and allocation.
- (b) Unrestricted inter-zonal movement of goods and services and their equitable distribution.
- (c) Uniform policies in regard to agriculture and industry.
- (d) Uniform control of exports and imports.
- (e) Centralized issue and control of currency.
- (f) Centralized transportation system under the Control Council.
- (g) Agreement by the Control Council on availability of immediate exports for purposes of relief and rehabilitation of countries devastated by Germany prior to formal reparations agreements.

3. He intended to propose:

(a) The restoration throughout Germany of local self-government through elective councils. (And to put this proposal into effect in United States zone, whether or not it was accepted for other zones.)

(b) That throughout Germany non-Nazi political parties would have the rights of assembly and public discussion. (Put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.)

(c) The introduction of representative and elective principles into regional, provincial and state administration as rapidly as the results of local self-government warranted.

(d) That Germany be not partitioned along the lines of the zones of occupation. Such a division would be economically unworkable.

(e) That the Council of Foreign Ministers report to their governments a recommendation as to the dismemberment of Germany, and that the French Foreign Minister be admitted into the Council for this specific task.

4. Pending a final peace treaty, the President did not approve the establishment of a central German Government. He recommended instead the restoration of such central administrative agencies as would serve the Control Council.

III. Dismemberment of Germany

At the Yalta Conference the Three Powers agreed to such a dismemberment of Germany "as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The President believed that the separation of Germany into separate sovereign states would be advantageous to future peace and security, and that a southern German state, with its capital in Vienna, should be formed composed of Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, and Hungary.

IV. Rhineland

In consideration of a necessity that German industry be permanently made incapable of producing munitions of war, it was the President's opinion that the Rhineland, including the Ruhr and the Saar, in which are located most of the German sources of raw material for war production and most of the manufacturing facilities, should be placed under the International Control of Great Britain, the Soviet Republics,

the United States, and France, with the announced intention of granting it independence and sovereignty as a separate state at some future time when danger of its incorporation into German war economy would have been sufficiently reduced to be negligible.

V. Policy Toward Italy

It was the President's opinion that the objectives of the three governments with regard to Italy should be directed towards her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

Italy's existing status as co-belligerent and unconditionally surrendered enemy was anomalous. It hampered every effort, both by the Allies and by Italy herself, to improve Italy's economic and political situation. This anomaly could be finally solved only through the negotiation of a definitive peace treaty, which would at best require some months. The preparation of such a treaty should be one of the first tasks of the suggested Council of Foreign Ministers.

Meanwhile, it was thought that improvement in the Italian internal situation would be greatly facilitated by some immediate interim arrangement whereby the Italian Government would have some tangible recognition of Italy's contribution toward the defeat of Germany.

The Chief Executive therefore believed that the short terms of surrender and the numerous obsolete clauses of the long terms of surrender should be terminated, and replaced by certain undertakings on the part of the Italian Government to meet the requirements of the existing situation.

These undertakings should provide:

1. That the Italian Government refrain from any hostile action against any of the United Nations pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace.
2. That the Italian Government maintain no military, naval, or air forces or equipment, except as authorized by the Allies, and comply with all instructions on the subject of such forces and equipment. Under this interim arrangement, control of Italy should be retained only in so far as was necessary. To cover Allied military requirements, so long as Allied forces remained in Italy or operated therefrom, and to safeguard the equitable settlement of territorial disputes.

VI. Poland

A Provisional Government of Poland, including representatives of different political parties, having been accepted by the three Allied Nations, the remaining Polish problems seemed to be: (1) arrangements for a free, unfettered election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot, and (2) an accurate delineation of the boundaries of Poland.

At the Crimea Conference it was agreed that the opinion of the Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought on the extent of accessions of territory from Germany that Poland desired, and the final delineation of frontiers should await the Peace Conference.

Assuming that a Peace Conference with any German government would be indefinitely postponed, it would appear proper, and the President proposed to recommend that the Council of Foreign Ministers, after consultation with the Provisional Government of Poland, recommend to their respective governments an agreed delineation of the frontiers of Poland.

VII. Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary

At Yalta the Premier of the U.S.S.R., the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the President of the United States agreed in a "Declaration on Liberated Europe" to co-ordinate during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the liberated peoples to solve, by democratic means, their pressing political and economic problems, and freely to choose the form of government under which they would live.

The three governments agreed to jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state:

- (a) To establish conditions of internal peace.
- (b) To carry out emergency measures of relief.
- (c) To form interim governmental authorities representative of all democratic elements.
- (d) To facilitate the holding of free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.

The agreements contained in this "Declaration on Liberated Europe" had not been observed in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, where the conditions appeared to be in exact accord

with anticipations that produced the Declaration. The President therefore desired:

(1) That the promised three-party consultations be entered upon at once.

(2) That all restrictions upon the free entry of Allied officials into the liberated territories be immediately withdrawn.

(3) That steps be taken at once by the three Allied governments to assist the people of liberated territories and former Axis satellites to conduct free elections (supervised by numerically equal agencies of the three great powers), to choose the form of government under which they wished to live.

Upon the establishment of such governments chosen by democratic processes in free and unrestricted elections, the United States was prepared to grant to them formal recognition as Sovereign States.

VIII. Disposition of Captured German Ships

In regard to captured German merchant ships it was apparent that an acute shortage of ocean-going tonnage for redeployment of troops and their equipment against Japan necessitated temporary transfer of captured German merchant ships to the United Maritime Authority, of which the U.S.S.R. should be a member.

Upon the surrender or defeat of Japan, the President believed that the then remaining captured German merchant tonnage should be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States.

He also believed that captured German war vessels should be divided as equally as possible among the three above-enumerated powers at the earliest practicable date.

IX. Freedom of Navigation in European Waters

The President told me that he considered future free and equal rights of all nations to transport on the waterways of Europe—the Rhine, Danube, Dardanelles, and the Kiel Canal—would be advantageous if not essential to the preservation of peace in Europe.

He decided to make such a proposal to the conference.

This agenda was the product of many hours' work by

Secretary of State Byrnes, myself and many others, both in Washington and aboard the *Augusta*. It was a formidable programme to be sponsored by a new President facing his first meeting with his powerful colleagues—Stalin and Churchill. We turn now to the story of his accomplishments and disappointments at that meeting.

CHAPTER XXII

POTSDAM

THE LAST WARTIME MEETING of the chiefs of government of the three great powers at Potsdam, Germany, July 16–August 2, 1945, was the longest and covered the widest range of subjects of any of the Big Three meetings. In some respects it was also the most frustrating.

“Terminal,” the conference code name, carried more significance than most of the odd words used during the war both for security and convenience. “Terminal” embraced thirteen plenary sessions and the usual daily meetings of the military chiefs and the Foreign Secretaries. The latter bore the brunt of the work at Potsdam as Soviet haggling with the U.S. and Great Britain on almost every issue required constant redrafting and re-phrasing of the various proposals.

Potsdam also marked the exit from the centre of the world stage of the dramatic figure of Winston Churchill, who suffered an unexpected defeat at the polls in Britain when the “Terminal” conference was little more than half finished. The presence of Franklin Roosevelt was sorely missed, but, under the circumstances, it was fortunate that the new President, Harry S. Truman, had this opportunity to face personally across the conference table many of the leaders with whom he would be dealing at long range for most of his administration.

The fears of the Prime Minister, expressed to Joseph Davies in London in June, that his political detractors would interpret a pre-conference meeting between Truman and Stalin as a snub to Churchill were providentially eliminated when Stalin did not arrive at Potsdam on July 16, the day set for the first plenary session. It was Churchill instead who met Truman at Potsdam (for the first time as President) and had a lengthy two-hour session with him on that day.

Military matters occupied a relatively minor role at Potsdam. The spectacular march of events culminating in the Japanese surrender only twelve days after the final session in the Cecilienhof Palace at Potsdam was to make even those discussions largely academic.

The main purpose of the military staff talks was to reach

conclusions in regard to the best method of forcing the surrender of Japan at the earliest possible moment. This required daily sessions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which began on July 16, and two meetings with our Russian military colleagues.

Truman took advantage of the postponement of the opening plenary session to visit ruined Berlin, thirteen miles from Potsdam. As we came on the main road after leaving American quarters at No. 2 Kaiserstrasse, a most impressive sight greeted us. Lined up along the highway as far as the eye could see was the Second Armoured Division, commanded by Brigadier-General John H. Collier. Truman stood in an open Army car to take the review.

General Collier rode with us, and as I looked at those fine young men and their efficient-looking tanks, I said to him: "This is the most powerful land force I have ever seen. I do not see how anybody could stop them if they really wanted to go somewhere." The General smiled and said: "Nobody has stopped them yet!"

On the way to the city Truman remarked again, after witnessing this inspiring sight of American armed might, how distressed he had been that he had not been permitted to get into the war in uniform.

As we toured the ruins of Berlin, every building we saw was badly damaged or completely destroyed. This one-time great and beautiful metropolis, capital of a proud nation, which many times I had desired to visit, was wrecked beyond repair. One of the stops we made was before the smoked walls of the Reich Chancellery, from the balcony of which Hitler had screamed his orations to hordes of obedient Nazis. Truman at this point commented on the error of a nation turning back to barbarism and expecting to get away with it. "It is a demonstration of what can happen when a man overreaches himself," the President remarked. "I never saw such destruction. I don't know whether they learned anything from it or not." That was on my mind constantly throughout the two-hour tour. I had never seen anything like it in my long naval career.

My first experience with bombardment came in 1898, when I was a young midshipman aboard the old U.S.S. *Oregon*, which had raced around the Horn and arrived in time to take part in the Battle of Santiago. I participated in some very mild bombardments; one at Guantánamo, Cuba.

I did not like it then. We probably killed some women and children. Maybe we killed some of the enemy. The kind of destruction we saw in Berlin was against the civilized laws of war in 1898.

Much of it was caused by Russian artillery. It was not hard to distinguish between the effects of artillery and of aerial bombing. You would see a wall with a hole in it. The house behind would be wrecked. That was artillery. You would see a building shattered from the top down, sometimes almost completely flattened into rubble, such as the Adlon Hotel. That would be from bombing.

Much more distressing than the view of devastated Berlin was a long procession of old men, women, and children, presumably evacuated from their homes by their Russian conquerors. They were marching in great numbers along the country roads, carrying their pitifully small belongings and their infants, probably to an unknown destination and probably without hope. There were no young men among them. Any men we saw were old beyond military age or the crippled and lame. These helpless people seemed to be prodded only by some urge to get someplace where they could find food or shelter—anything, apparently, to get out of the Soviet-occupied territory.

We were witnessing the progress of a great world tragedy and the beginning of a disintegration of a highly cultured and proud people who are racial kinsmen of the English and the Americans, but who had followed false leaders to their destruction.

I had seen a similar exodus of displaced people on a much-reduced scale in 1920, when the Russian aristocracy was escaping from the Red Revolution on foot through Turkey and the Balkan States, carrying what remained of their personal possessions and, like the Germans of to-day, *en route* in search of safe shelter at some unknown destination.

It was an acutely distressing spectacle at that time, as it was here in Germany.

It was noticeable to me, as the President's own personal party at dinner that evening discussed scenes we had witnessed, that there was no mood of vindictiveness or revenge, but rather a realization brought home to those of us who fought the war from Washington of the horrible destructiveness of modern conflict.

Premier Stalin arrived at Potsdam and took lunch with the President. It was their first meeting. Present also were Molotov, Byrnes, and myself. Concerning Hitler, Stalin repeated what he had told Hopkins at Moscow. He believed that the Führer had escaped and was hiding somewhere. He said careful search by Soviet investigators had not found any trace of Hitler's remains or any other positive evidence of his death.

The Russian leader seemed particularly impressed with the wine served by Truman's mess. He asked one of the stewards to remove the wrapper so he could see the label. It was a California wine. Later Truman made the Generalissimo a present of a number of bottles of each brand served at the lunch.

In the afternoon the President and Byrnes gave me their impressions received in talking with Stalin during my absence before luncheon was served. They believed the Soviet Army would come into action against Japan on August 15. They sensed that Stalin was not interested in British participation in the Pacific war, and generally was opposed to British Pacific war policy. This seemed to confirm Davies' suspicion that Churchill's hostility toward the Soviet Union was no secret in Moscow.

Truman and Byrnes also felt that there would be no agreement between Russia and China unless Chiang made radical concessions, and they agreed that Stalin would enter the Japanese war whether or not such concessions were made. If China was reluctant, Soviet demands would thereafter be satisfied, regardless of what the Chinese attitude might be.

The first plenary session of "Terminal" began at 5 p.m., July 17, in a palace that had been the residence of Crown Prince Wilhelm. The Cecieliendorf, which was the name of the former Hohenzollern estate, had been used during the war as a hospital. It was a spacious, two-story brown-stone building near Grebnitz Lake. The plenary sessions were held in the former Palace reception room, which was large enough for all the principals to sit at a large round table, flanked by their advisers. A huge recessed window gave a beautiful view of the landscaped gardens. Flags of the three nations decorated the conference-room, as well as the main entrance. As at the Livadia Palace in Yalta, our Soviet hosts had done a remarkable job of refurnishing both the Palace and the residences occupied by the President and the Prime Minister, which were three miles away in the suburb of Babelsberg.

Stalin suggested that Truman act as chairman of the Conference, and Churchill approved. The President, seizing this hoped-for opportunity to take the offensive, presented at once without permitting interruption four of the major proposals that had been prepared by the American delegation:

1. To establish a Council of Foreign Ministers from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, and the United States to formulate peace terms for consideration by their governments.
2. A policy with regard to Germany.
3. To carry out at once the Yalta Declaration in regard to liberated areas.
4. Policy toward Italy, which included admission of that country, which had declared war against Japan, into the United Nations.

The Prime Minister appeared surprised at the President's forthright statement of American policy and made a long talk on the necessity for careful study of the proposals advanced. He recommended that the day's conference confine itself to the adoption of an agenda.

Truman served notice that there were other matters which he desired to have included for discussion at later meetings, and that he hoped other members would present their problems at any time. Stalin was ready with his list, and submitted the following issues:

1. Disposition of German ships.
2. Reparations.
3. Territories to be placed under the trusteeship of the Soviet Government, which would like to have some territories as much as did the other nations.
4. Satellite states.
5. The régime in Spain, which he said was imposed upon the people of Spain by Germany and Italy, and which he believed to be a danger to the United Nations.
6. The question of Tangier. (Here Churchill interrupted to say that France must be consulted in regard to Tangier.)
7. Syria and Lebanon.
8. The Polish question, with the purpose of eliminating the *émigré* Government, which in the opinion of the Soviets was still troublesome.

Churchill said the British proposals would be submitted later in writing. From this first meeting until he left for London to hear the results of the election, it was evident that Churchill had not prepared himself very thoroughly for Potsdam. Several times matters came up which revealed that he did not seem to know what was happening. In previous conferences Churchill and his delegation had their plans all thought out, and sometimes it had kept us extremely busy preparing counter-arguments to meet the British proposals. At this point in the opening meeting, the Prime Minister suggested that the three Foreign Ministers be directed to prepare an agenda before the next day's meeting. This suggestion was adopted.

Turning to the President's first proposal—the Council of Foreign Ministers—Stalin wanted to know if this Council would replace the Committee of Foreign Ministers that had been established at the Yalta Conference. Churchill's view was that the new body should be established to consider general peace terms, but should not replace either the existing Commission of the Foreign Ministers or the European Advisory Commission. The British leader also did not look with favour upon the inclusion of China in a council organized primarily to consider European problems. With these preliminaries, the meeting adjourned.

I thought Truman had handled himself very well at this first session. He was positive in his manner, clear and direct in his statements. He seemed to know exactly what he wanted to say and do. As for Stalin, nothing had occurred to ruffle the Soviet chieftain, and he was his usual courteous self. It seemed, as a result of the lunch and this meeting, that Truman and Stalin would get along well. The Chief Executive's first impression was that "Uncle Joe" personally was most affable and a pleasant companion.

That evening the President was very complimentary about Stalin as he entertained War Secretary Stimson and the American Chiefs of Staff at dinner. Also, the Truman family turned up again in the person of Sergeant Harry Truman, son of the President's brother, J. Vivian Truman of Missouri. The young soldier remained overnight and breakfasted with his uncle the next morning.

Wednesday, July 18

Truman was a well-fed man when he arrived at the

Cecilienhof Palace to preside over the second plenary session. He had walked over to Churchill's residence for lunch and then continued his stroll down to Stalin's quarters, where another elaborate meal, complete with the many usual Russian toasts, awaited him.

Churchill sprang a surprise as the session opened by suggesting that he talk to a group of some 200 Press and radio representatives in Berlin to emphasize to them the importance of protecting the secrecy of the work of the conference "at any cost." It seemed an odd move. It was decided quickly that the Press secretaries of the three powers would handle the correspondents.

The first concrete action taken at Potsdam came when it was agreed to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers that had been proposed by the United States. There was no discussion.

When the next subject, "Political Authority of the Control Council of Germany," was brought up, Churchill asked immediately, "What is Germany?" The Prime Minister said he would be satisfied if it meant the pre-war area of Germany. Stalin said the answer was, "What is left of Germany," and he thought the frontiers of Poland should be decided before accepting any area as Germany. After considerable discussion, the recommendation made by Truman that the 1937 German boundaries be used as a basis for discussion was approved.

Stalin opened the first of many discussions on Poland by demanding a transfer to the present Warsaw Government of all property, Army and Navy forces, merchant ships, etc., then under the control of the former Polish Government in Exile. Churchill replied that there was then no property of any kind in England in the possession of the former Government. The Prime Minister then made a long, valiant defence of the Polish military force which had fought shoulder to shoulder with his troops against Germans and Italians throughout the war. Churchill said British honour was involved, and that he hoped to enable Polish soldiers to return to their homeland, but that any who did not wish to do so could become British citizens and remain under the protection of the British Government.

Britain had gone to war because of its promise to Poland, and that was the Poland represented by the exiles in London.

It was natural that Britain and the Soviet Union therefore would be in complete disagreement on most Polish questions. The chief concern of Truman, as had been the case with Roosevelt, was to see that the Poles got a democratic government representing the majority of the inhabitants. Adding to the interest of America was the large and vocal group of Polish Americans, who were important politically.

When Churchill finished, Stalin said he did not wish to add to Britain's troubles, and suggested that the problem be referred to the three Foreign Ministers for study and report. This procedure, always resorted to when the Big Three were in disagreement, was to be repeated at least a dozen times before the "Terminal" conference was concluded.

After Churchill had discussed briefly the matter of arranging a uniform government in all four zones of occupied Germany, and Stalin had added that he favoured, in principle, such a policy, the second plenary conference adjourned. Progress at the first two meetings had been more rapid than at previous Big Three sessions, probably because of the President's direct methods and his thorough preparation on the subjects discussed. However, the most difficult subjects, such as reparations and Polish boundaries, had not yet been taken up.

Thursday, July 19

Truman told us at breakfast that he had called Mrs. Truman in Washington at midnight on Wednesday, using the overseas telephone, and he said he could hear her as plainly as if it had been merely a local call.

Churchill opened the third plenary meeting with a charge that the presence of military forces on the Greek Macedonian frontier was a source of probable hostilities, and that the countries involved should be notified that boundaries must be settled at the peace conference and not by military action.

This charge was directed at Bulgaria, one of Moscow's satellites, and Stalin said incisively that this was a matter to be discussed in private conversation and should not be presented to the conference. The Russians did not want any interference with their plans in the Balkans, and I assumed that they did not want the Potsdam Conference to take any action.

Scheduled for discussion at this meeting were three subjects:

(1) political principles of the Allied Control Council in Germany, (2) Poland and (3) German warships and merchant shipping.

The first provoked little discussion, and the recommendation of the Foreign Ministers was approved. It followed very closely the American paper that had been prepared on the subject. Supreme authority was to be exercised by the Control Council, acting on instructions from their respective governments. The Council was to consider as the chief purposes of the occupation: (1) complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and elimination of control of all German industries that could be used for military production; (2) to convince the German people they had suffered total military defeat and could not escape responsibility for what they had brought upon themselves by their own ruthless warfare; (3) destruction of the National Socialist Party and dissolution of all Nazi institutions; and (4) preparation for eventual revival of German political life on a democratic basis.

Other provisions called for abolition of all discriminatory Nazi laws, arrest and trial of those participating in Nazi atrocities, a ban on Nazi Party members holding public office, revision of German education and the judiciary, and the administration of the internal affairs of the defeated nation directed toward decentralization and development of local political responsibility.

The Polish issue was again laid aside for the Foreign Ministers to study.

When the shipping topic was reached, Truman asked for a definition of "war booty" and "reparations." He thought the Reparations Commission should reach an agreement on these definitions before disposition of the ships was attempted.

Stalin was quick to reply that any war material surrendered by enemy forces was war booty. We were already receiving reports that the Russian definition was very elastic, to put it mildly. As for ships, Stalin said the German Navy was booty and the merchant ships could come under either classification.

Churchill wanted to consider the German fleet as a part of a general conference agreement, but did not object, in principle, to its division among the Allies. He made the point, important to Britain, that comparative losses of warships by the Allies should be considered. This meant that Britain would like to get a greater share of the German naval and merchant ships

because Britain had suffered heavily from the Nazi submarines, whereas the Russians had lost very few ships.

Churchill wanted most of the German submarines sunk, with a few to be divided among the three powers. At this meeting everyone seemed to agree to that. Actually, Britain would have liked to see every Nazi submarine sent to the bottom. The U-boat menace was the gravest faced by the "tight little isle" throughout the war, once the British had driven the Nazis from the skies over England. During this discussion the mutual distrust between Britain and the Soviet Union was revealed when Stalin asked that Soviet officers be allowed to inspect German ships. He said Britain to date had denied them this privilege. Churchill replied sharply that this would be done when equal privileges were granted to British officers by the Soviet.

Truman, supported by Churchill, stated that the German merchant shipping was needed for use in the war against Japan and that, because of their losses of tonnage by enemy action, Norway and Sweden should have a share in the distribution. Stalin answered that he did not contemplate any action that would prejudice Allied operations against Japan, and that he only wanted an agreement that eventually would give Russia one-third of the warships and the merchant ships.

The Generalissimo then brought up the question of Spain. He proposed that the three governments break off diplomatic relations with Franco because "the Spanish government is a danger to the peace settlement." This met determined resistance from both the President and the Prime Minister. Truman said: "Spain must settle its own domestic troubles." I was in complete agreement with the Prime Minister and the President on the question. A long argument ensued.

Spain was not at war, and this would have been injecting ourselves into the internal affairs of that country and telling the Spanish people what kind of government they were to have. It would be a violation of the Atlantic Charter, and it seemed to be no business of ours whether or not the Spanish people wanted Franco.

Stalin's hatred of the Spanish Government stemmed from Franco's defeat of the Loyalist Government, which Moscow had supported. He talked at length about its "Fascist" nature, claiming it was a one-man organization. The Russian chief

said he thought the people of Spain should be permitted to choose the kind of government they wanted, and to Stalin that meant the kind of government the Loyalists wanted. It appeared that no agreement could be reached on this question.

The Foreign Ministers wanted the Big Three to discuss the problems of the liberated areas in Europe, but Stalin quickly asked for and obtained a postponement. This led to an argument between Churchill and Stalin over Yugoslavia, the former claiming that the Tito-Subasic Government had not complied with the understanding reached at Yalta.

Stalin said he had no such information and would not discuss the problem unless the Yugoslavs were present. It was obvious he did not want to talk about it and he did not want the present situation disturbed. What Churchill really was opening up was the Soviet Union's determination to establish the kind of government it wanted in all the "liberated" countries, including particularly the Balkans.

Truman took a firm stand. "I have come here to discuss matters upon which we three Chiefs of Government can agree," he said. "I have no intention of taking part in any court before which complaints of all kinds may be brought, investigated, or adjusted. If we hear Tito, we must hear Franco, de Gaulle, and so on."

Action on Yugoslavia was postponed.

Churchill next charged that the Soviet Government was tacitly backing seizure of British and American property, principally oil-well equipment and refineries, in Rumania. This was another question Stalin did not want discussed at Potsdam, and he said it could be settled through usual diplomatic channels. On this point, I thought Stalin was correct, although there was no question that the Russians had stolen some of the oil property in Ploesti—and he did not deny it. The matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers.

The third Big Three meeting had lasted only fifty minutes, but it had revealed the wide gap in the outlook on European problems by Russia on one side and Great Britain and the United States on the other. Stalin was moving fast to save his Government from getting an adverse report, and his usual manoeuvre was to get an embarrassing question shunted off to the Foreign Ministers.

That evening Truman entertained for the other two chiefs of government at a dinner of eighteen. I sat between Clement

Attlee, Churchill's opponent in the recent elections in England, and Lord Cherwell, noted British scientist. It was a gay party and Stalin made a point of being particularly polite to me as representing the American Navy. During the toasts, Foreign Commissar Molotov proposed one to me as "the permanent member of all international conferences."

Some of the guests at my end of the table were amused at my disinclination to drink what they considered an "adequate share" of vodka. Stalin asked his interpreter what was going on, and was told that some of those present were showing mock scorn because I had been putting water in my vodka glass. The Generalissimo thereupon raised his glass to me and said: "That proves that the Admiral is a very intelligent person."

Friday, July 20

Generals Eisenhower and Bradley conferred with the President in the forenoon and remained for lunch. Early in the afternoon the President went into Berlin for the official raising of the American flag at the Headquarters of the United States group on the Control Council. I did not go, but was told it was a very impressive ceremony, and that the flag used was the one that was flying over our Capitol in Washington on December 11, 1941, when Congress declared war on Germany.

First action of the Fourth Plenary Session was to approve the draft charter of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which designated London as the permanent seat of that body. Poland was on the agenda, but discussion was again postponed to permit study by British and American political staffs.

The President proposed that a treaty of peace be prepared for Italy, one of the major items on the list we had completed on the way to Potsdam. Stalin immediately sought to join this problem with that of the satellite states—Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. He wanted these four countries to be considered at the same time as Italy. We felt that Italy deserved some relaxation of the harsh armistice terms because of her later contributions to the Allied cause.

Churchill made a long and vigorous speech on the damage inflicted on the British by Italy in the first years of the war. He said no peace should be made with Rome until a democratic government was elected by the people. The Prime Minister put Bulgaria in a different category, charging, that despite

its "barbarous treatment" of the Greeks and Yugoslavs, it still was not disarmed and had paid no penalty for its crimes. Here was another impasse and the beginning of the long altercation over the satellite states. The whole question was turned over to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill next charged that the Soviets were not permitting entry of British and American officers into Vienna or their troops into the Austrian zones of occupation. Stalin was irritated. He claimed that the failure to agree was due to Field-Marshal Alexander, Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Area, who "was acting as though Soviet troops were under his command." Stalin also said he was surprised at Churchill's bringing up the matter, because an agreement *had* been reached, and troops would begin to move into their respective zones within one or two days.

Churchill evidently did not have this information, although the American Chiefs had received it and notified Truman the day before. However, I hoped that his sharp criticism of Soviet behaviour in Austria might possibly have a good effect on future relations.

Trusteeships were brought up, and Stalin and Churchill disagreed sharply. The Generalissimo said the Russians were interested in the trusteeship of foreign territory the same as other nations. I assumed they had as much right in this matter as the rest of us. The discussion centred around the Italian colonies on the African coast. The British did not want any Soviets exercising authority in the southern and eastern Mediterranean area. We on the Combined Chiefs of Staff had good reason to know British sensitiveness on this issue. If any trusteeships were involved, the British wanted them, or, failing that, they wanted United Nations supervision.

It was obvious that there was no possibility of agreement, so the trusteeship problem was laid aside for further study as the fourth plenary session ended. This continual postponement made me wonder when the "Terminal" Conference would come to grips with the real issues that it was necessary to settle if any progress toward peace in Europe was to be made.

Saturday, July 21

There was talk around the American residence about the President visiting Norway and Denmark, and some Secret Service agents left for Copenhagen. However, if Truman had

any serious ideas of making such a detour on his return to Washington, the dragging out of the Big Three discussions quickly put an end to such hopes.

The fifth plenary session opened with another issue postponed—discussion of German economic questions. It was announced and approved that the first meeting of the new Council of Foreign Ministers would open September 1 in London.

Transfer of assets from the old Polish Government which had functioned during the war in London to the new Provisional Government was approved. Stalin argued that the new régime should not be charged with the debts of the previous Government, but Truman countered by saying that any transfer in the United States could be made only after a consideration of liabilities and in accordance with law. "The United States is not going to assume any obligations of the former Government," the President said, and Churchill agreed with him.

Stalin next objected to any clear commitment to freedom of the Press in Poland. He said the "Poles were a sensitive people," so the conference accepted an innocuous reference to this basic freedom in the Potsdam report.

When liberated states and satellite nations were reached on the agenda, Stalin renewed his demand that they all be considered together. Truman insisted on two reports, one for Italy and one on the other states. The Soviet chieftain said he wouldn't object to that in principle, but the three Allied powers should accord diplomatic recognition to the present governments of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

The President made it plain that the United States had no intention of recognizing these countries until they should have a "free government established by themselves without pressure from beyond their borders."

That was talking directly to Stalin. The Soviets contended these puppet ministries were "free and democratic," but everyone knew they were controlled from Moscow.

I agreed with the American view that Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria were operating under governments imposed by Communist minorities, and was pleased to see Truman take a strong stand. Churchill backed up the President, whereupon Stalin said tartly that their attitude precluded the conference reaching any agreement.

The Big Three finally, on this fifth meeting, took up the explosive issue of the western frontier of Poland, and a long and unpromising discussion followed.

It developed that Stalin had given to the new Poland, from Russia's agreed zone of occupation, territory west of the Oder to the Neisse River. Churchill contended that this area contained one-third of the arable land in pre-war Germany plus vast treasures of mineral wealth. In fact, Stalin had concluded a treaty with the new régime on April 21, 1945, at the very time the commission set up at Yalta was trying in Moscow to agree on the reorganization of the Polish Government.

Both actions had been taken by Russia without consultation with the Allies. Stalin tried to say that he had not exactly given Poland a zone of occupation, but had permitted it to "assume the necessary functions of government therein."

This actual transfer of German property had stopped effectively any useful progress by the Tripartite Reparations Commission, which had merged its sessions into those now taking place at Potsdam. This Soviet unilateral action had precluded the possibility of the population of Germany subsisting on German agricultural and industrial effort.

The Generalissimo made no admission of error in his assignment of this German territory to Poland, although it had been repeated over and over again at Yalta and agreed in the Crimea Protocol that Poland's western borders would be settled at the peace conference. The Soviet Leader just said flatly that the arrangement he had made could not be changed.

The President made a strong statement that the territory in question must remain a part of Germany for reparations and settlement of the whole German problem, as had been agreed at Yalta. He would not recognize the Russian proposal to fix Polish boundaries at Potsdam (and had not done so up to 1949, when this was written).

It was my opinion that Russia would not take corrective action and that there was nothing we or Britain could do about it. We would have had to be prepared to take military action to overturn the Soviet *fait accompli*. As a counter-irritant, I hastily pencilled a note suggesting that we turn over the Rhineland to England, at which Truman smiled. However, tempers were getting short and the argument had been protracted for more than two hours, so the meeting ended at this point.

One would never have suspected any tensions existing at the lavish banquet served that night by Stalin, honouring Truman and Churchill. I was the only military officer among the twenty guests. It was a typical Russian state dinner, with vast quantities of rich food and drink of various kinds, accompanied by a continuous round of standing toasts to everybody.

Sunday, July 22

The President went to church twice during the forenoon. First, he attended a Protestant service and then went to a Catholic Mass celebrated by his old friend, Colonel Curtis L. Tiernan, who had been chaplain of Truman's World War I Battery "B" and now was Chief of Chaplains in the European Theatre.

Stalin opened the sixth plenary session with an announcement that Soviet troops were withdrawing to their zones in Austria and English and American forces were entering their designated areas.

Discussion was resumed on the western frontier of Poland. The Generalissimo stated that there were two possible courses of action. The conference must either accept the proposal made by the Polish Government (embracing the new boundaries) or have representatives of the Warsaw Government present their case at Potsdam. Stalin said no other action would be in agreement with the Crimean conference.

Churchill, in a long talk, opposed taking any action on the western border because (1) the Yalta Agreement specified that the matter should be settled at the peace conference; (2) it would be bad for Poland; (3) it would upset the economic possibilities of Germany; (4) data now available on the subject was not in agreement; and (5) the moral issues involved in moving so many Germans out of their homes was not acceptable to the British Government.

I was completely in agreement with the Prime Minister's belief that if the Poles were permitted to remain in that part of Germany opened up to them by the unilateral action of Russia they would remain there until ejected by force.

Each of the Big Three held to positions stated by them at the preceding meeting. Churchill was willing to agree to Polish entry up to the line of the Oder River but not west of that. The President said again that he could not approve of the occupation by Poland of any part of Germany in advance

of the peace treaty and without consultation by the three Allied chiefs of government. That was exactly what Poland was doing at the time.

It was finally agreed to permit two or three Polish representatives to testify on July 24 before the three Foreign Ministers. I think it was during this sharp argument that Churchill injected the religious issue to defend the right of the Catholics in Poland. Stalin reflected a moment, stroking his moustache, and then asked the Prime Minister in a hard, even tone: "How many divisions has the Pope?"

A lengthy discussion of trusteeships followed in which it was difficult to determine exactly the intention of the Soviets. It appeared that Russia wished to be involved, either singly or with other governments, in a trusteeship over Italy's African colonies. The Soviets also wanted a share in the redistribution of territories that had been under the Mandate of the defunct League of Nations and to exchange views on a possible trusteeship over Korea. The long Russian paper on this subject was referred to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill brought up the Turkish problem with a lengthy statement explaining the attitude of Turkey. Molotov then submitted a Soviet paper on the subject and told the meeting there were two major points: (1) restoration of territory taken by Turkey some years ago from Armenia and Georgia (these two "states" were members of the U.S.S.R.); (2) joint control by Turkey and the Soviet of the Dardanelles and its fortifications, with an agreement to prevent passage of ships that they might consider inimical to their interests.

Russia had no control over the Straits, and Turkey for years had had the final word on all shipping passing through the Bosphorus. The Russia of the Czars had coveted this strategic waterway for more than a century. What the Soviets were proposing would be in effect complete Russian control of the transit of ships through the Dardanelles. The President and I had discussed it at length on previous occasions and, personally, I expected that sooner or later Moscow would have its way. However, at this meeting it was one more problem dumped into the lap of the Foreign Ministers.

Stalin then pulled out a report which charged that a British prisoner-of-war camp in Italy had made an erroneous report on the number of prisoners confined there and, furthermore, had formed from Russian nationals in the camp a division for

active service, many of whose officers had served in the German Army. It developed that these prisoners were Ukrainians who did not want to go back to Russia, but wanted to fight the Nazis. Of course, the Soviets were doing the same thing with some German prisoners, but the inconsistency of objecting to another nation following a parallel policy never seemed to bother our Soviet allies.

Churchill said he knew nothing about the report, but would have it investigated, and with that the session adjourned.

Monday, July 23

Formulation of the military report to be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister on July 24 forced me to miss the seventh plenary session. However, at noon, Truman talked to Byrnes and me about the free waterways proposal which our Chief Executive was to present to the other two powers.

We had agreed to ask for free passage for ships of all nations, with equal rights in the Dardanelles and on the Rhine and Danube rivers. This project was close to the heart of both the President and the Secretary of State. Truman's purpose was to remove one of the persistent sources of irritation in Europe and the Near East. I felt it was a wonderful idea. However, the conference turned it down. It had no effect on the Dardanelles discussion, as the Soviets had no thought of giving free passage to everybody in the Straits, and said so. Nor did the British take much interest in the American proposal.

The major aspect of the military discussions that had been going on in the daily sessions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff since July 16 was an effort of the British to secure a greater participation in the Pacific war; to get the American chiefs to agree on Lend-Lease assistance for occupation forces and for post-war British rehabilitation projects; and to determine the place of the Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery in our military set-up after the war. When we arrived at Potsdam, we were given a British paper covering this last point.

Our English colleagues, who in the spring of 1942 had been sceptical about the practicability of the Combined Staff idea, especially having its principal activity in Washington, were pressing at Potsdam to make it a permanent feature of the military liaison between our two nations. Their paper pointed out how smoothly and effectively the C.C.S. had acted during the war and stressed that the end of the global war was to

leave the world in a troubled state, with military implications evident in many sectors.

They said continued and orderly exchange of military information was essential and wanted our two governments to agree on the framework of a post-war Combined Chiefs structure. They added that the joint effort would in no way conflict with the military staff work of the United States.

To this fundamental proposal, the American chiefs replied warily that it was too early to discuss it at that time. The Combined Staff meetings then heard complete reports from all the war fronts and began discussions of the Pacific operations. The British throughout the days that followed did most of the proposing and the Americans did most of the disposing.

In fact, we told our British colleagues that, while welcoming their co-operation, the war with Japan was pretty much of an American show. We felt the staff planning was up to the American chiefs and we turned down a suggestion for increased participation of the Combined Chiefs. There simply wasn't enough room, for example, to use large segments of the British Air Force, and General MacArthur had made it plain that he could not use any British divisions until after an assault on the Japanese mainland was under way. The offer of an Indian division was turned down because of the obvious language difficulty in an operation requiring close unit co-operation. Likewise, the command of two French divisions was left to be decided later, although they were tentatively assigned to Indo-China operations.

Agreement was reached on enlarging the boundaries of Lord Mountbatten's South-east Asia Command, and we left to the British the problem of co-ordinating operations in his area with the Australians, New Zealanders, French, and Dutch. No objection was made to a British plan to recapture Ocean and Nauru islands, which the Australians wanted. The only two conditions imposed by us were that the United States must retain control of the Admiralty Islands (with the important Manus base) and that Chiang Kai-shek should be consulted in fixing the new South-east Asia theatre boundaries in Indo-China. A directive was issued to Mountbatten to open the Straits of Malacca and to attempt to take over his enlarged command area by August 15.

We refused to permit the British to participate at the operations level in exchange of information with the Russians

because it was difficult at best, and to bring in a third party would only complicate matters. Satisfactory arrangements were made to keep the British informed of all major moves.

At the Combined Chiefs session on July 19, the target date for forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan was set for November 15, 1946. This would be eighteen months after the war in Europe had ended and had been agreed on in principle at the second Quebec Conference in 1944. The American chiefs took care to use the words "defeat of Japan" in the report rather than "end of the war," because the latter language would cause legislative difficulties for the Administration in Washington.

The British returned on July 20 to their objective of getting Lend-Lease supplies for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the United Kingdom. Their proposal also included provision for using American supplies in liberated areas. This produced the biggest controversy of the Potsdam military sessions.

The American chiefs said that occupation forces and post-war armaments were not matters on which the Combined Chiefs could make commitments, and that the United States could make no pledges for helping in any operations not bearing directly on the defeat of Japan. We told our British colleagues frankly that we did not think the entire British Empire's war-making capacity would be devoted to the remaining military objective of the armed conflict—the surrender of Tokyo.

As for the rehabilitation and reconstruction proposal, the United States chiefs said frankly they could agree to no such commitment. We still had Truman's positive order on Lend-Lease, issued to us on June 5, which ruled out consideration of the British request, although we knew the President was considering some modification. This dispute was taken up with the two chiefs of government on the next day, July 24.

Other than the Lend-Lease argument, the British accepted the American view in most of the report. We got MacArthur and Nimitz to agree to confer with a British corps commander and his staff to discuss further the matter of integrating some British forces in the assault on Japan.

Preparation of the report took up most of my day, but I did manage to have a talk with Jefferson Caffery, American Ambassador to France, and Douglas MacArthur II, now Secretary of Embassy there (MacArthur had been on my staff

in Vichy), who discussed the French political situation. That meant talking mostly about de Gaulle and the difficulties of getting along with this vain Frenchman, who suffered acutely from a blindness to the present helplessness of his country and from a severe over-supply of national pride.

It was Churchill's turn to entertain Truman and Stalin on the evening of July 23. It was another of those long official banquets with the usual interminable toasts. Music for the evening was provided by an orchestra from the Royal Air Force, which played some popular airs as well as classical music. Thereon hangs one of the most amusing aspects of the entire Potsdam Conference. In addition to the contest of wills upon which rested the future of the world, the Big Three waged a battle of music at the official dinners which caused each formal entertainment to last progressively longer into the morning.

This contest found Stalin and Truman having much fun at the expense of Churchill and me, but Churchill had the last word—or, rather, the last bar of music.

It began when Truman gave the first formal dinner on Thursday evening, July 19. The President's musical entertainment featured the talented Sergeant Eugene List. Chopin is the Chief Executive's favourite composer, and he had asked List to play his beloved waltz (Truman supplied me with the correct listing for this narrative—*Waltz in A Minor*, Opus 42). List did not know the piece or have the score, but it was obtained quickly from Paris.

Stalin shared the President's love of classical music and was much impressed by List's playing—so much so that he proposed to his host that they drink a toast to the young Army sergeant-pianist. Stalin, Churchill, and Truman got up from their places at the table, went out on the porch where List was at the piano, and drank to the health of a very much embarrassed soldier. His face was white as a sheet. The American dinner lasted until about 1 a.m.

It was the Soviets' turn to be host on Saturday night (July 21). Stalin was apparently determined to offer better music than had been provided by Truman. He had sent to Moscow for one of the prize music students of the land and another famous Russian pianist. Also, there were two excellent female violinists who made up in musical ability what they lacked in looks. The President and I estimated they weighed about 200 pounds

each. They were unattractively attired, but their performance was especially pleasing to Truman. The entertainment seemed to go on endlessly.

About 1 a.m., the Prime Minister and I had had quite enough. Churchill got up and went over to Truman, whispering in his ear: "When are you going home?"

The President replied blandly: "What's the matter? This is excellent music and I'm having a fine time. I'm going to stay until our host indicates the entertainment is over."

"Well," Churchill said grouchy, "I'm bored to tears. I do not like this music. I'm going home." Of course, he didn't. Instead, he came over to the corner where I was sitting, feeling pretty much the same as the Prime Minister. Truman told someone later that we "glowered, growled, and grumbled" and consoled each other as best we could. At any rate, we stuck it out to the end, which did not come until 1.30 a.m., a half-hour later than the American dinner.

The Prime Minister hinted to me that he would "get even" with Truman and Stalin. When he was host on the evening of July 24, he had the full orchestra of the British Royal Air Force play long and loudly throughout the dinner. And Churchill, with puckish malice, saw to it that the musicians kept going until 2 a.m. In addition to these special musical marathons, we had daily dinner concerts at the American residence on the evenings when there was no formal entertaining. The Potsdam Conference certainly set at least one record—it was the most musical of all the nine Allied war councils. Even the buglers who performed at No. 2 Kaiserstrasse seemed to fall into the musical mood, and the President one evening went out personally to congratulate the tootlers. By the end of the conference, I had had enough music of all kinds to satisfy my cultural need in that direction for a long time to come.

Tuesday, July 24

Discussion of the military report with the President and the Prime Minister began in Truman's study at 11.30 a.m. The invasion of Japan proper was approved as the major objective. All the other operations were to be considered in their relation to this main effort. Forces and resources were to be marshalled and allocated to assure that the invasion would be accomplished at the earliest practicable date, with the preliminary operation on Kyushu set for November 1. No other operations

were to be undertaken which would hazard the success of or delay the supreme invasion effort.

It was agreed that operational strategy in the Pacific theatre would remain in the hands of the American Chiefs of Staff, although the British would be consulted regularly. In the event of a disagreement, final decision would rest with the United States staff. If and when Russia entered the war, we would confer with the British on the strategy to be pursued.

British participation was to be as follows: the British fleet was to continue to be co-ordinated in the attack, as was being done at that time. Ten squadrons of long-range bombers were to be used, although it was probable that they could not be employed before December at the earliest. In principle, it was agreed to utilize an Empire land force in the assault, subject to satisfactory solution of operational problems. British staff officers were to confer with MacArthur and Nimitz and submit their plans to the Combined Chiefs.

The report stated that logistic difficulties made it impracticable to use French and Dutch aid at present, and it seemed doubtful that the two French divisions could be transported to Indo-China before the spring of 1946.

An agreement on shipping that would supply more tonnage to move American forces from Europe to the Pacific was worked out, with revision provided for as conditions might change.

Regarding the south-west Pacific, Britain was to take over this area as soon as possible and Mountbatten would command Empire and Dutch forces, in his expanded theatre. Objectives there were to be, in order: complete liberation of the Malay Peninsula, pressure on the Japanese across the Burma-Siam border; capture of key areas in Siam; bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra, and the British were to submit as soon as possible a complete programme, including plans for recapture of Singapore and other bases, needed to prosecute the war against Japan.

This "Terminal" report presumed that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland would be prerequisite to the unconditional surrender of the enemy, a premise with which I did not agree. It was estimated that once the forces in the homeland had capitulated, surrender of Japanese elements elsewhere would not be too difficult to achieve.

One feature of the discussion at Potsdam was the compara-

tively little attention given to China's part in the final phases of the war with Japan. It was agreed to give all possible support to making Chiang's effort effective, but the limitations imposed by having to bring in supplies from India over the famous "Hump" made the training and equipping of China's weary armies a long, tedious task. General Wedemeyer stressed the desirability of capturing some port on the Chinese coast to overcome the supply problem, but the Combined Chiefs did not make any plans to achieve this objective.

I presented the report at the meeting with our respective Commanders-in-Chief, going directly to the controversial occupation army and Lend-Lease dispute on which we had been unable to agree. I stated the belief of the American chiefs: that we could make no basic commitment that did not apply to the Japanese war and that the British felt that Lend-Lease could be used in the occupation of Germany and Austria.

Churchill immediately supported his staff, explaining that Britain should be free, for example, to give equipment to the Belgians. The Prime Minister said he hoped this would not "dry up equivalent supplies from the United States."

Truman asked Churchill to be patient, as he wished to avoid any embarrassment with Congress. He reminded his British colleague that, as a Senator, he had worked over the clauses of the Lend-Lease Act the last time it had been renewed. The President said, "Together with Senator George [Walter S. George of Georgia], I told the Senate that the Act was a weapon of war only." However, Truman inclined toward the view that occupying Germany and Austria was very definitely a part of the war. "After all," he said, "we technically still are at war with them." As for equipping and supplying forces of occupation other than American, the President said that would require more study, and it might be necessary to ask Congress for additional legislation. He indicated that he was in sympathy with the British proposal.

With these explanations, the report was adopted as presented by the Combined Chiefs. One matter not included in the Combined Staff report was discussed with Churchill and Truman. The military chiefs felt that internationalization of the Danube and the Rhine would be of great assistance to the occupation forces. The Rhine was being cleared, and we were willing to allow the Russians a place on a Rhine Navigation Agency, which would be under the Allied Control Council.

The Combined Staff urged formation of a similar organization to control Danube shipping. We knew that the biggest obstacle would be Russian local commanders, who would have no power to act, and we urged on the President and Prime Minister that the best time to get agreement would be at Potsdam. However, the problem was not solved as the American proposal for free waterways was not accepted by the conference.

After lunch, we had our first meeting with the Soviet military chiefs at the Cecilienhof Palace. Our purpose was to inform the Russians of our plans for attacking Japan and find out what they proposed to do when the Soviet Union came into the war. At the suggestion of the ranking Soviet representative, General A. E. Antonov, and with approval by the British, I presided.

The Russians said they intended to launch their attack late in August with the objective of destroying the Japanese armies in Manchuria and of occupying the Liaotung Peninsula, which contained Port Arthur and Dairen. They estimated the enemy force in Manchuria at thirty Japanese divisions and twenty divisions of Manchu puppet troops.

The Russian Chief of Staff said that after the defeat of Japan in combination with Allied armies, "it is the intention of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Manchuria."

Antonov wanted to know if we could prevent reinforcement of the Japanese Manchurian Army from either China or the Japanese mainland. Marshall and King were sure the enemy could not transfer any troops from the home islands because of our Air Force and naval air operations, and that only a few divisions of Japanese, if any, might be expected to arrive from China because of our land and air activities and the effective employment of guerrilla forces against the one available railroad.

Next on the Soviet list was an American operation in the Kurile Islands. King told Antonov that we could keep open a passage there, but would not attempt a landing. The Russians then asked us about invading Korea, but were told that we did not consider such an expedition practicable until after a successful landing on the main islands of Japan, particularly because the landing force would be exposed to suicide air operations from the nearby Japanese home air bases.

We in turn reminded Antonov that at Yalta the Russians

had spoken of an invasion of the southern half of the Sakhalin Island. The Soviet chief said that would be the second offensive operation of the Russian armies.

Finally, I handed Antonov a list of five questions prepared by the American staff which we were sure he would have to consult Stalin about before replying. These requests were for installation of two weather stations to be manned by U.S. Navy personnel; demarcation of definite boundaries for U.S. and Russian naval and air operations; close liaison so that every local decision might not have to be referred to Moscow; and designation by both parties of bases for repair of battle-damaged warships and aircraft.

The entire meeting was very friendly and none of the suspicion that so often frustrated our military mission in Moscow was apparent. Antonov and Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, both of whom I had met at Yalta, spoke French, which made it possible to talk with them without the delaying use of an interpreter. I arranged for the American chiefs to meet again with them on July 26, at which time Antonov said he hoped to have the answers to our specific requests for coordination of operations against the Japanese.

The eighth plenary session spent more than two hours on two questions: (1) Italy and the satellite states; (2) The Dardanelles. Just before Truman left Babelsburg for the meeting, President Bierut of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and three other Poles conferred with the President, but I gathered they did not make much headway.

Stalin made his most determined effort so far to force diplomatic recognition by the Big Three of the present governments of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Truman announced briefly but succinctly that the United States would take this step when we were satisfied that these three governments were in accord with the desires of the peoples of those nations and "not before we were so satisfied."

The result was a complete impasse and might be said to have been the beginning of the cold war between the United States and Russia. The only "solution" at the moment was to send it back to the overworked Foreign Ministers, who would attempt to patch up some kind of statement that would commit no one to anything, but have the external appearance of an agreement.

Turning to the Dardanelles, Stalin insisted on joint Soviet-

Turkish control and turned down the President's proposal that the Straits be made a free passage-way for ships of all nations under a guarantee by the United Nations. The Generalissimo was determined to press his proposal, and it appeared practically certain that the problem of free passage of the Dardanelles would be removed from the agenda of the Potsdam Conference. It was.

Wednesday, July 25 to Thursday, July 26

I flew to London on Wednesday afternoon to confer with Ambassador Winant and to visit some friends. The military work at Potsdam had been practically completed with the approval of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Harold R. Stark placed a car at my disposal, which enabled me to see the destruction accomplished in the city of London by German bombers. While considerable, the damage to the British capital appeared small in comparison with the ruins of Berlin. However, I did not have time to visit the dock area on the Thames, where I was told the destruction had been fearful.

I spent the evening with some old friends, and the conversation centred on the Election, the results of which had been announced that day. I had not discussed this political campaign with Churchill at Potsdam, but members of the British delegation had talked about it very freely. I recalled Churchill saying—I think it was to the President—that he expected the majority of his Conservative Party to be reduced, but that his group would remain in control. However, some members of his staff had told me that there was a very likely prospect that Churchill's party would lose.

It was apparent on Thursday that there had been a landslide—against Churchill. This, of course, meant that the gallant warrior would have to relinquish the reins of government to the Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee, who would become Prime Minister.

In a world not yet at peace, this was in my opinion a great tragedy, and I did not know how the Allies could succeed without the spark of genius in Churchill's leadership.

I had been closely associated with Mr. Churchill for three years during the war and had come to look upon him as a heroic leader of the British Empire in its fight to preserve England and the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of government in

Europe. His superb personal courage had inspired all of England in its hour of greatest peril. His thorough understanding of European politics, his brilliant leadership in his own country, his sympathetic belief in the reliability and power of America, and his general agreement with the policies of the late President Roosevelt contributed mightily toward the successful prosecution of the war against the Axis. In my opinion, Winston Churchill was one of the two or three great world heroes of the war period.

Ambassador Winant was surprised that Churchill's party had been so badly defeated. He asked me to inform the President that he would like to remain in London for two or three months more and then be assigned to duty with the United Nations. Truman did keep Winant in his diplomatic post for another three months, but did not appoint him to represent the United States at the United Nations.

The journey to London was profitable, if tiresome, but I missed the ninth session of the Big Three on July 25. From the reports I received upon returning to Potsdam, little progress had been made on the main issues in controversy.

I also got back too late for the second and final meeting of the American Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet military leaders. My colleagues reported that it was very successful and gave me detailed information on what had happened.

General Antonov had complete and satisfactory replies to the five requests we had made for co-ordination of U.S.-Russian military effort. He began by saying that the Soviets would prefer that the proposed weather stations to be installed at Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk be manned by Russian personnel.

Admiral King's low boiling-point was almost reached as he contemplated the difficulties of trying to get from the Soviet crews the information we wanted, but I was told that, although his face got red, then purple, he showed "admirable restraint" and calmly outlined the American point of view, whereupon the Russians withdrew their objections to using U.S. personnel.

There were no serious difficulties in reaching agreement on boundaries for air and naval operations in the Sea of Japan, mutually supporting operations in the Okhotsk and the Bering Seas, and air sectors over Manchuria and Korea.

One of the pleasant surprises came when Antonov reported that General A. M. Vasilievski and Admiral Yemashev,

Supreme Soviet Army and Navy commanders in Siberia, could settle all questions that might arise without reference to Moscow and would welcome staff liaison. The meeting—the last during the war with the Russian chiefs—closed with the Soviets expressing appreciation of the offer of General Marshall to give them a weekly report on our operations through General Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow.

There was no plenary session on July 26 because of the absence of the British Prime Minister. This unexpected interruption forced the President to arrange plans to fly from Potsdam to Plymouth, England, where he would go on board the *Augusta*. Truman spent the day visiting Frankfurt, where he inspected our Third Armoured Division.

War Secretary Stimson for some time had been urging that the President should address a strong statement to the Japanese people urging them to surrender. This suggestion took on added significance following the successful explosion of an atomic bomb in the test at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16. Also, in our Combined Staff meetings we had discussed the advisability of emphasizing “unconditional surrender,” in view of the peculiar psychology of the Japanese people. We felt it would be helpful and wise to explain to Tokyo that unconditional surrender did not mean the complete destruction of the Japanese Government. We were certain that the Mikado could stop the war with a royal word. This declaration was an attempt to get the Emperor on our side and to tell the Japanese that capitulation did not necessarily mean the destruction of their Empire.

I thought the document might be effective if it should induce the Emperor to direct the cessation of hostilities. In my opinion, it would definitely have caused us much loss in life and treasure if we had attacked the Emperor of Japan as an individual.

The draft of the declaration had been sent to Chiang Kai-shek for his approval. This was received at Potsdam late on July 26 and the proclamation signed by Truman, Churchill, and Chiang (the last-named by wire) was made public immediately. Stalin was not asked to sign the document, because Russia was not yet at war with Japan. However, he was fully informed in advance of the move.

The joint statement called upon Japan to stop fighting and gave a brief outline of what the Allies meant by the term

“unconditional surrender.” It warned the enemy that the irresistible might which had accomplished the defeat of the Nazis would converge on Japan and, if resisted further, would mean the complete destruction of Japanese armed forces and the utter devastation of their homeland.

The declaration pointed out that there was “no intention” that the Japanese people would be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but warned that justice would be meted out to war criminals.

Some of us indulged in a hope that Japan might get out of the war before the Soviet Government came in. It was also noteworthy that the message contained no hint of the projected employment against the Japanese of our recently completed atom bomb.

Friday, July 27

There was no session of the Big Three because of the absence of the British. I feared that the resignation of Churchill was going to make further progress at Potsdam difficult. The Soviets had indicated they did not like the British Labour Party and were not enthusiastic about Attlee, the new Prime Minister, who was expected to arrive the next day. Although he was their antagonist at almost every turn, Stalin and his top advisers appeared to have had a high personal regard for Churchill.

There was a noticeable coolness in their attitude after Attlee took over. This was surprising to me, because the British Labour Party obviously was far more to the “left” than Churchill’s Conservative Party. Attlee, of course, was not as forceful a leader as his predecessor, but he had been with Churchill at the Potsdam meetings and was completely informed on the status of most of the issues. That status seemed to be: “Referred to the Foreign Ministers for study and report.”

I conferred with the President and the Secretary of State at noon on our Lend-Lease policy, and the three of us attempted to devise some method of bringing the conference to an end at an early date. Secretary Byrnes was having a particularly difficult time with Molotov in the sessions of the Foreign Ministers.

Saturday, July 28

The President met with Byrnes and me again on a draft directive for the American Chiefs of Staff on Lend-Lease.

It had been prepared by Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. It was a modification of our previous instructions, to the extent of permitting American assistance to be used by the occupation forces.

Prime Minister Attlee and his newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, arrived shortly after 9 p.m. and called on the President. Byrnes and I were present and the conversation quickly centred on the possibility of settling the Polish boundary question and reparations. Bevin was gruff and tough, and in some ways not thoroughly informed. This became evident when he went to a map of Poland that hung in Truman's study to illustrate his ideas of what should be done. I later told the President, and Truman agreed, that all it illustrated was that Bevin did not know too much about Poland.

In order not to lose a whole day, the tenth plenary session was held that night, with Attlee and Bevin taking the places at the big round table in the Cecilienhof Palace that had been occupied by Churchill and Eden. Stalin enlivened the proceedings by reporting that on July 18 he had received a request from Japan to mediate for them with the Allies to end the war. He said this request included a proposal to send a Royal Prince of Japan to Moscow as chief of the mission. The Generalissimo said that his reply was that the proposal was too vague to warrant his approving a meeting with the proposed mission.

Then, Stalin continued, he had this day received another message from the Japanese Government, outlining that the duty of the proposed mission was to try to avoid more bloodshed, to inform him of the policy Japan would adopt toward Russia, and to make an offer of collaboration with Russia. Premier Stalin stated that he would make the same reply that he had made to the first message.

It was clearly evident that Stalin was at that time determined to enter the war against Japan; which plainly was to the advantage of Russia, now that Japan was certain to be defeated.

Molotov reported on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers on July 27 and 28, during which a number of questions were debated without reaching any agreement. The Big Three then turned again to Italy and the satellite states. They

had before them a draft of a statement to be included in the Potsdam communiqué. Stalin stated that the words "responsible governments" were objectionable, and he wished to substitute "recognized governments," which in his opinion had previously been agreed upon by the conference.

Byrnes stated that in this problem when the United States and the Soviet agreed, the United Kingdom disagreed; and that whenever the United States and the United Kingdom agreed, the Soviet disagreed. He indicated that the United States would approve of any arrangement that was accepted by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government.

The same long argument in regard to recognition of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania that we heard at previous meetings was repeated. No agreement being possible, the question was again shoved aside.

Stalin next insisted on obtaining reparations from Italy. Truman answered that, while he had no objection to Russia taking war plants from Italy as reparations, he could not agree to the use of American money either directly or indirectly to pay reparations from Italy or any other nation. Truman's purpose in this was to protect the American tax-payer from having to provide additional and unnecessary funds for the support of Italy.

Attlee expressed full approval of the President's stand and, it now being midnight, the conference adjourned.

Sunday, July 29

The big news of the day was that Stalin was indisposed. However, a lengthy conference was held in Truman's study by the President, the Secretary of State, myself, and Molotov. Byrnes proposed a Soviet-American agreement to permit the Poles to administer the government of a German area as far west as the Oder River and the Eastern Neisse River, but Molotov declined to consider any other arrangement than for the Poles to remain in control of the area in which they then exercised control, which reached to the Western Neisse.

The President repeated that he was unable to agree with this unilateral action taken by the Soviets.

In regard to the distribution of German warships and merchant ships, the Soviets renewed their demand for one-third of the fleet, but agreed that it might be used in the

war against Japan. It was not clear to me whether or not the Russians expected to man and operate one-third of the German ships without waiting for a surrender by Japan, but I had a feeling that the Soviet would demand delivery of their one-third without any delay.

It was agreed to appoint a committee of six to work out details of the distribution of captured German ships, and this arrangement was approved later at a plenary session.

In regard to reparations, Molotov expressed general approval of an exchange of reparations between zones, but insisted that the details must be worked out.

The Soviet expected to receive 50 per cent. of all the reparations collected from Germany, which they insisted should include two billion dollars' worth taken from the British and American zones of occupation.

Molotov brought to Truman an oral message from Stalin proposing that the United States make a public request that Russia enter the war against Japan. The President did not indicate what action he would take. I talked with the Chief Executive at length, and told him I did not believe he should place us under a permanent obligation that would be attached to such a request, and I did not think he should even consider complying. The British and ourselves were fully capable of defeating Japan without assistance.

That afternoon Truman conferred with Attlee and Bevin, doubtless giving them a report on the morning session with Molotov. I was not present. Stalin's illness cancelled the Big Three meeting scheduled for the evening.

Monday, July 30

Truman had many guests for breakfast, including Navy Secretary Forrestal and Generals Eisenhower and Clay. We received word from the Russian quarters that Stalin was still indisposed, but would be able to attend a plenary session the next day.

The Foreign Secretaries—Byrnes, Bevin, and Molotov—worked all day in an effort to reach agreements on the Polish border, reparations and the problem of the satellite states. Returning to the President's quarters about 10.30, Byrnes told us that he believed that as a result of the day's labour the Big Three might reach agreement on most issues at their next meeting.

I had no doubt that an accord could be reached if we and the British should accede to all the demands being made by the Soviets.

Tuesday, July 31

Stalin having recovered from his indisposition, the Big Three held the longest of their thirteen plenary sessions, beginning at 4 p.m. It lasted nearly four hours.

As a result of three arduous days' work with the Foreign Ministers, Secretary Byrnes presented papers on reparations, Polish frontiers, and satellite states which he said the United States was prepared to accept if the three papers were approved together, each being dependent upon the others.

Byrnes proposed that for reparations 25 per cent. of capital equipment in the Ruhr not needed for Germany's peace-time economy be exchanged with the Soviet for material needed by the Western zones, and that 12½ per cent. be transferred outright without exchange.

For a moment this appeared to be a satisfactory settlement, but suddenly Stalin asked for more. He wanted, in addition to the above, \$500 million, one-third of the stock of German industry, one-third of Germany's foreign assets, and one-third of the gold captured by the Anglo-American armies. This was a preposterous request, and it was quickly disapproved.

The final agreement on percentages of reparations to be taken from all western zones for Russia was 15 per cent. for exchange and 10 per cent. without exchange. Equipment to be removed was to be determined within six months.

The Big Three approved of France having a representative on the Reparations Commission after some grumbling by the Generalissimo. He had voiced his displeasure at the insistence of the United States on French representation when he had talked to Hopkins in Moscow in June. He stated here at Potsdam that France was the first failure on the western front, had done nothing helpful in the war against Germany, and was entitled to little, if any, consideration.

The Polish paper provoked considerable discussion, but it was agreed that Poland might continue an *interim* administration of the territory turned over to her by the Soviet, which presumably referred to the Oder and to the Western Neisse rivers. I was not clear whether Stettin was included, although later I found out it was.

It was agreed also that the *final* Polish border would be fixed in the peace treaty, but in view of the Russian attitude at Potsdam I was convinced that any final settlement would sanction Poland's land-grab. Soviet troops were to remain in the area in "sufficient number" to guard the Russian supply lines to Germany.

Then came the long paper on the satellite states. In brief, it provided that the Allied powers would at once study the matter of giving diplomatic recognition to Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland. The paper as approved did not call for recognition—it was some fancy verbiage to the effect that the "three governments agree to examine, each separately, in the near future, in the light of the conditions prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations . . . etc." There also was a weakly worded assumption that the Balkan satellites would permit freedom of Press to correspondents of all nations.

Eviction of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary threatened to impose a severe burden on the occupation zones of Germany, particularly since most of the refugees were entering the British and American areas. After lengthy discussion, the governments of those three nations were asked to suspend further expulsions until the respective Control Commission could study the matter and make recommendations.

Molotov wanted the conference to designate by name some of the principal German war criminals, but Attlee objected, and the matter was postponed until the next meeting. The Russians still had their list of 50,000 German officers about whom they had talked at Yalta, and Stalin still wanted to bring them to trial.

Truman made another effort to get the Big Three to consider the question of free and equal rights of transport on the waterways of Europe, but it was quickly referred to the Foreign Ministers.

At this session also our Chief Executive handed Stalin an unsigned letter which was in response to the Russian attempt to get the United States formally to request the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. Truman's memorandum, in effect, ignored the request. It merely pointed out the Soviet Government's duty under the Moscow and United Nations agreements to assist in preserving world peace. The President did *not* ask the Soviet to join with us in the Japanese war.

(Nevertheless, when Russia actually declared war on Japan on August 8, Moscow said the Soviet Union had "acceded to the Allied request" to join in hostilities in the Far East.)

Wednesday, August 1

I experienced a slight digestive disturbance which kept me a little below par for the kind of work we were doing. The final day of the conference was signalled by extensive photographing by many camera and newsreel operators, both outdoors and inside the Cecilienhof Palace, where the sessions were held.

As the Big Three began their twelfth meeting, the Russians were still bargaining for additional reparations. Final approval was reached to permit the Soviet Government to seize stocks in German industries east of the western boundary of their occupation zone, except in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In those two countries and in the western zones, such securities might be disposed of by the British and American governments. Stalin wanted to go back to French representation on the Reparations Commission, but after a sharp statement by Attlee the matter rested as approved the day before. With this major controversy out of the way, the Big Three proceeded to dispose of practically all of the remaining unfinished business.

Attlee wanted a Soviet agreement to provide essentials needed by the Control Council in Berlin, such as office space, quarters, etc., the cost of which would be placed against reparations from the western zones. Stalin said he would not agree until he was given more information.

The Generalissimo agreed that Austria would not be required to make reparations. I did not regard this as any Soviet concession, because the Russians already had taken over as booty much Austrian property which had been seized by the Germans. The Russians argued that this was German property. We took the attitude that such was not necessarily so. As this is written, there still is no peace treaty with Austria, and the question is still being argued.

Stalin strongly urged that some of the war criminals be designated by name in the Potsdam communiqué. The President and Attlee did not agree. It was finally decided that the first list of war criminals would be made public within a month by the War Crimes Commission that had been established.

The United States and Great Britain agreed to study the Soviet complaint about alleged Fascist activities in Germany and Austria. Like so many other words, the Russian definition of "Fascist" was elastic and could include anyone who did not support Communism.

Regarding Soviet complaints about repatriation of Soviet citizens, Attlee agreed to look into it as soon as he returned to London.

Revision of the procedure of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary was approved. This was the final watering-down of the vigorous protest of the United States and Great Britain against Soviet violations of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Areas.

The President asked that radio correspondents in Poland and the satellite states be given the same privileges accorded to other reporters, which meant, of course, allowing them to broadcast from these countries. That did not get by Stalin.

The final accord on German shipping provided that warships were to be divided into three parts—among England, the Soviet and the United States. All German submarines except thirty were to be destroyed.

Merchant ships, except coastal and inland waterways vessels, were to be used by the Allied shipping pool until the end of the war against Japan. Then they also were to be divided among the three powers. Committees were to be appointed to start work at once on methods of arriving at an equitable distribution.

Truman made one final attempt to get action on his proposal for free navigation of European rivers. Stalin objected vigorously. The President then said it would be necessary for him to make a statement about the waterways proposal when he made his report to Congress.

Stalin replied curtly, "That is your privilege."

This completed the disposition of the agenda and the conference took a recess until 9 p.m. Because of my digestive discomfort, I did not attend the thirteenth and last Big Three meeting, which did not end until after midnight. It was devoted principally to discussion and approval of the text of the lengthy final communiqué, which was to be made public at 5.30 p.m. local time, on Thursday, August 2.

During the day the staff at the American residence at No. 2 Kaiserstrasse rushed preparations and we left Babelsburg

by plane, headed for home, at 8.05, Thursday morning, August 2, 1945.

The last wartime meeting of the chiefs of government was concluded and I did not see any occasion for another one until after the defeat of Japan.

My general feeling about the Potsdam Conference was one of frustration. Both Stalin and Truman suffered defeats. Several important proposals advanced by our Chief Executive—proposals that would have measurably aided the cause of lasting peace in Europe—were either turned down, watered down or passed down to subordinate councils or commissions.

The Soviet Union emerged at this time as the unquestioned all-powerful influence in Europe. Britain and the United States had to accept at Potsdam many unilateral actions taken by Moscow since Yalta, although this acceptance was concealed in the diplomatic verbiage of the final report. This was especially true of Poland.

One effective factor was a decline of the power of the British Empire. The abrupt change in leaders during the conference served only to dramatize this reality. Actually, that was not a serious practical difficulty, for the new Prime Minister, Attlee, had been a high-ranking member of Churchill's Coalition Government that fought the war. The truth was that England in victory was prostrate economically and, compared with America, relatively impotent militarily. With France grappling for a stability that she had not achieved even before the war and the threat of a civil war hanging over China, it was inescapable that the only two major powers remaining in the world were the Soviet Union and the United States. Whether a way would be found to bridge the chasm between the ideas and policies of these two nations remained to be seen. At Potsdam the only possibility of agreement would have been to accept the Russian point of view on every issue.

Truman had stood up to Stalin in a manner calculated to warm the heart of every patriotic American. He refused to be bulldozed into any reparations agreement that would repeat the history of World War I, which found the American taxpayer paying for the German reparations. He refused to recognize the Soviet-sponsored Polish land-grab in Eastern Germany (and four years later, as this is written, still holds his ground on that point) or to sanction United States diplomatic

recognition of the puppet régimes set up from Moscow in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

Stalin was his usual courteous but plain-talking self, and we believed him to be arguing sincerely for what he thought the best interests of his Government. Had he taken a more compromising attitude, "Uncle Joe" undoubtedly would have been in trouble when he returned to Moscow.

Truman could point to three major achievements. Formation of the Council of Foreign Ministers could prevent many of the mistakes, due to lack of preparation, that were made a quarter of a century earlier at Versailles. The Council could pave the way for a final settling of accounts of World War II in the peace treaties.

By and large, the major points in the American plan for political and economic policies to govern the control of Germany during the occupation period were incorporated in the Potsdam report. It was perhaps the President's greatest success.

On the thorny and complex issue of German reparations, the Soviets finally receded from their stubborn insistence on a fixed dollar total and accepted the percentage principle. Stalin and Molotov also agreed, in theory, that Germany could not pay the Russian bill out of its current industrial production until the economy of the defeated nation was in balance. (In Paris, less than a year from the date of signing by Stalin of the Potsdam protocol, Molotov was to repudiate both of these principles.) Russia agreed also to pay Polish damage claims from its own receipts and not to exact reparations from Austria.

The agreement on merchant shipping and disposition of the German Navy also was in accord with the President's idea, although it seemed to me that there was opportunity for further "interpretation" by the Tripartite Naval Commission set up to work out an "equitable" distribution of the captured warships.

Finally, no one could foresee on the first day of August, 1945, that Japan would be out of the war in less than two weeks and that the progress toward co-ordination of our military effort in the Far East with the Russians reached a new high at "Terminal." Of course, Moscow was "on the outside looking in" in this situation and therefore much more amenable to our suggestions. Furthermore, early in July, Stalin had

driven a hard bargain with China that promised to make the excursion into Manchuria a most profitable venture for the Soviet Union.

On the liability side, our proposals for dismemberment of Germany and internationalization of the industry-rich Rhineland failed of acceptance. Truman's desire to recognize the contributions of Italy to the Allied cause and our strong indictment of Russian violations of the Yalta "Declaration on Liberated Areas" were vitiated in a declaration expressing pious hopes that peace treaties for Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania would be concluded speedily and that these countries would be given representative democratic governments so they might be admitted to the United Nations.

The official communiqué took note that "Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary have communicated . . . proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, etc." It had been these Soviet representatives who had made it impossible to carry out the tripartite armistice terms signed with each of these nations.

However, on this point, Stalin suffered his greatest defeat. It was apparent that he came to Potsdam to force Great Britain and the United States to recognize the existing Soviet-backed governments of these Balkan states. He tried every trick in the book, but did not succeed in getting the diplomatic recognition he sought.

Other problems on which no agreement could be reached were: (1) internationalization of major waterways (American proposal); (2) trusteeships of colonial possession, principally Italy's holdings in Africa (Soviet proposal); (3) Macedonian-Greek frontier (British proposal); (4) settlement of Soviet claims for Turkish territory and control of the Dardanelles; (5) Russian seizure of British and American industrial property in Rumania; (6) Italian reparations; (7) naming of "high war criminals," although it was agreed that a special commission would make its "nominations" within a month; (8) Russian attempt to force Britain and America to sever diplomatic relations with Spain (the best Stalin got on that one was language in the communiqué, which stated that Spain should not belong to the United Nations); (9) Stalin's effort to open up the question of control of Tangier and the Levant; and (10) Russian attempt to have the *status quo* in Yugoslavia accepted by the other two Allies.

Our new President, in my opinion, had handled himself extremely well at Potsdam. He had been firm where firmness was dictated by our national interests. Like myself, he was disappointed that Soviet objection prevented acceptance of many proposals that he considered highly important to the future peace of Europe. In fact, the Russian attitude left me with serious doubts that any peace treaties acceptable to our Government could be negotiated. Potsdam had brought into sharp world focus the struggle of two great ideas—the Anglo-Saxon democratic principles of government and the aggressive and expansionist police state tactics of Stalinist Russia. It was the beginning of the “cold war.”

One factor that was to change a lot of ideas, including my own, was the atom bomb, which was tested successfully in New Mexico on the day we arrived at Potsdam. At the plenary session on July 24, Truman walked around to Stalin and told him quietly that we had developed a powerful weapon, more potent than anything yet seen in war. The President said later that Stalin’s reply indicated no especial interest and that the Generalissimo did not seem to have any conception of what Truman was talking about. It was simply another weapon, and he hoped we would use it effectively.

The atom bomb is so inextricably woven into the closing days of World War II that it, together with the surrender that was signed aboard the battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945, warrants a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XXIII

ATOM BOMBS, GERMS—AND PEACE

ON AUGUST 6, 1945, the cruiser *Augusta* was speeding across the Atlantic, bringing President Truman and the delegation that had accompanied him to the Potsdam Conference back to Washington. A few minutes before noon, while the President was eating lunch with the crew, Captain Frank H. Graham, A.U.S., White House Map-room Watch Officer, handed him a brief message from the Navy Department which bore the highest priority marks.

This message told him that the Army Air Force had dropped an atom bomb on the Japanese shipbuilding centre of Hiroshima. It added that the results appeared to be more successful than had been anticipated by the scientists and engineers who had wrought this new weapon of warfare.

Truman was excited over the news. He shook Captain Graham's hand and said, according to those present, "This is the greatest thing in history."

A few minutes later a second message was received, this one from War Secretary Stimson. It was even more optimistic than the first despatch. Truman called Secretary of State Byrnes and read it to him. He then came back to the table and signalled the assembled crew in the mess-hall that he wished to say something.

When they quieted down, the President told them of the first successful employment of this terrible new weapon which used an explosive 20,000 times as powerful as 1 ton of T.N.T. The crew cheered as Truman finished his brief announcement about the atom bomb. The President then went up to the Ward Room where he informed the officers who were at lunch of what had happened.

The atomic bomb and its implications had been on the minds of all of us since we received at Potsdam on July 16 the news of the successful testing of the new weapon. From that date on, it was no longer a theory. We had the bombs. One of our last tasks before leaving Germany was the preparation of announcements the President and Secretary of State were to make when the bomb would be actually unleashed

against the Japanese. From then on, we were simply waiting for the news which came during the voyage back to Washington. The trip began early Thursday morning, August 2, 1945, when we left Babelsburg for the St. Mawgen's Airport, near Plymouth, England.

Poor visibility forced the Presidential plane to land at Harrowbeer, some ten miles short of our destination. The field was somewhat small for the great "Sacred Cow," but the President's pilot made a skilful landing. Our arrival at Harrowbeer, near Plymouth, was totally unexpected and the only persons there to greet us were three very startled English W.A.A.F.s who later had their picture taken with the President. I recognized a chaplain, Albert Stuart, from the American Navy and presented him to the Chief Executive. It took only a few minutes for the necessary arrangements to be made, and we were ferried over to the *Augusta* in the barge of Admiral Sir John Leatham.

The H.M.S. *Renown*, a battle-cruiser, was anchored near the *Augusta* off Plymouth and, with all the ceremonies befitting his rank, the President was piped aboard her, to be greeted on deck by King George VI of England, who had come down from London. A jolly, informal luncheon followed, with much joking about British politics and the Potsdam Conference. The lunch was in the Flag Officer's quarters, and the guests were, besides the President, Secretary of State Byrnes, Viscount Halifax, Lord Lascelles, Admiral Leatham, Captain Campbell and myself. His Majesty and I discussed the atomic bomb. The King asked me about its potentialities. I said, "I do not think it will be as effective as is expected. It sounds like a professor's dream to me!"

To my surprise, I found King George well informed about the project and the possible post-war uses of atomic energy. Jestingly, he said to me, "Admiral, would you like to lay a little bet on that?" I was honest when I told His Majesty that I did not have as much confidence in the new weapon as did some of the scientists, and that I knew of no explosive that would develop the power claimed for the new bomb. Events shortly were to prove that in this respect I was very much in error.

Shortly after we returned to the *Augusta*, the King came on board to pay his respects to the President. It was a brief and pleasant visit. Truman told me later that the King asked him

for some signatures, because his daughters were collecting autographs. Ambassador Winant, who also came on board to see the President, brought me a present from Churchill. It was a beautifully framed picture of the former Prime Minister and an autographed copy of one of his books, *Great Contemporaries*.

News of the death of Senator Hiram W. Johnson in Washington was received on August 5. He had been ill for a long time. The Californian once supported President Roosevelt, but in the past six years he had been a constant and violent opponent of the Administration. However, Senator Johnson had always been friendly and helpful to me in my dealings with the Senate in behalf of the Navy.

The next day, August 6, came the important news of the atom bomb previously referred to. None of the messages subsequently received that day gave us many details of the attack on Hiroshima, although all reports indicated that the results were successful in all respects. The Presidential announcement that had been prepared in Potsdam was released at once in Washington.

"We have spent \$2,000,000,000 on the greatest scientific gamble in history—and won," the President said. "We are now prepared to obliterate rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above the ground in any city. It was to spare the Japanese public from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. . . ."

The White House statement concluded: "If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air."

Only the British, the Dominion of Canada and ourselves had any information regarding details of the manufacture of this atomic weapon. The President held a news conference with the reporters on board the *Augusta*, but there was little he could add to the formal announcements.

When he had finished, one of the correspondents, Robert Nixon of the International News Service, asked me if I thought the atomic bomb would revolutionize warfare. As yet we had no report of the enormity of the damage that could be inflicted by a single A-bomb. I told Nixon that defensive ordnance had always been developed to meet new offensive weapons, and I felt that the threat of this new bomb would be met, as other threats had been in the past.

During the crossing, Secretary Byrnes and I assisted the President in preparing his radio address, which would report to the American public on the accomplishments of the Potsdam Conference. We had good weather during most of the trip, which was made at a speed of $26\frac{1}{2}$ knots. Before he disembarked, Truman congratulated the Commanders of the *Augusta* and *Philadelphia* for their fine work. The President's special train was waiting for us at Newport News, and we were back in Washington at 10.30 p.m. on the night of August 7, 1945. By direction of the President, there was no formal welcoming committee and no fanfare whatever as the new President returned from his first international conference.

Moscow announced on August 8, 1945, that a state of war existed between the Soviet Republics and Japan. We presumed that a Russian invasion of Manchuria probably was under way, and I felt that hereafter we would be required to share both the military efforts against Japan and the rewards therefrom.

More details were coming in on the atomic attack on Hiroshima. It appeared that more than half of this city of nearly 350,000 population had been destroyed by the explosion of a single relatively small bomb. The Japanese Government levelled charges of cruelty and barbarism, claiming that the attack had been effective principally against non-combatant women and children. Although Hiroshima was a naval base, it did appear probable that the destruction of civilian life had been terrific.

Some of our scientists said that the area attacked would be uninhabitable for many years, because the bomb explosion would make the ground radioactive and destructive of animal life. By August 9 the Japanese reports were claiming that 100,000 persons had been killed at Hiroshima. On this day also we had the announcement of the dropping of the second bomb—on Nagasaki, which was believed to be the headquarters of the Army defending southern Japan.

The President called a conference to discuss the release of information regarding the atomic development. Present were Secretaries Byrnes and Stimson, Major-General Leslie R. Groves, who had been in charge of the military phase of the project known as the "Manhattan District," Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and Dr. Karl Compton, of the Massachusetts Institute

of Technology, who had been associated with the development.

Truman questioned me as to whether any agreement had been made between Roosevelt and Churchill to give the British access to all details on manufacture of the bomb. I told him of my recollections of a long discussion at Hyde Park after the 1944 Quebec Conference, and that my understanding was that Roosevelt had agreed to release to our ally only information on industrial use of atomic energy.

On the advice of the scientists and with the approval of Byrnes and Stimson, the President decided to release for publication a lengthy paper known as the "Smyth Report," which had been prepared by the leading scientists involved in the development. This famous report, made public the next day (August 10), partially lifted the curtain of war secrecy which had surrounded this important scientific advance. The Smyth Report was a semi-technical explanation of the processes by which the use of atomic energy for military purposes had been achieved. It contained most of the data about the bomb that it was thought prudent to release at that time.

The long, expensive, and tedious work, involving the finest scientific brains the nation could command and tens of thousands of workers, had been the best kept secret of the entire war. Not only had the military security been most successful, but, as I told Byron Price, head of the Office of Censorship, at a party given in his honour shortly after the end of the war, it was a wonderful demonstration of the efficient operation of voluntary censorship of Press and radio.

Several times during the war there were charges made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the voluntary censorship set up by President Roosevelt when the war started was ineffective and interfering with military operations. I investigated some of these cases carefully and was convinced that the occasional lapses under the civilian code were no more serious than the leaks which came from time to time from the military establishment.

The Japanese announced over their Government radio in Tokyo early in the morning of August 10, 1945, in plain language, that they were prepared to accept the proposal of the United States, the United Kingdom and China issued at Potsdam. They were ready to surrender in accordance with the terms of that declaration on one condition: that no demand be made for the end of the authority of the Emperor to rule Japan.

Switzerland had been requested to transmit this proposal to the United States and China, and Sweden was to pass it on to Russia and Great Britain.

I attended a conference at the White House with the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy which the President called at 9 a.m. to discuss this new development. Until the official communication should arrive from Switzerland, no action could be taken other than to start work on drafting a reply. What Japan was saying in effect was that she would capitulate if we did not hang the Emperor.

I recommended accepting the Japanese proposal. This did not mean that I favoured the Emperor retaining all his prerogatives, I had no feelings about little Hirohito, but was convinced that it would be necessary to use him in effecting the surrender.

Some of those around the President wanted to demand his execution. If they had prevailed, we might still be at war with Japan. The "subjects" would probably have fought on until every loyal Japanese was dead, and at that moment there were more than 5 million Japanese soldiers in the field.

At 12.30 p.m. the Joint Chiefs met to discuss the measures that it would be necessary to take to effect an actual cessation of hostilities. It appeared certain that the great World War was about to come to an end.

I was back at the White House at about two o'clock, working with Secretary Byrnes and the President on the message to the Chiefs of Government of our Allies proposing the form of an acceptance to the Japanese offer to surrender.

This draft was to be sent to Britain, the Soviet Union and China. Obviously, the one point to be cleared up was the status of the Emperor of Japan. On that, the American position was as follows:

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

"The Emperor and the Japanese High Command will be required to sign the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam declaration, to issue orders to all the armed forces of Japan to cease hostilities and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme

Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

“Immediately upon the surrender, the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

“The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

“The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam declaration are achieved.”

Favourable replies were received the next day (August 11), so the text of our official answer to the Japanese Government was transmitted to Tokyo via the Government of Switzerland. It was also released to the American Press and radio, which would make it known to Japan hours before it was received through official channels. While waiting for the Japanese Government to make its decision, the war against Japan was pressed with all possible vigour. There were no developments on Sunday, August 12.

On Monday, August 13, the President directed General Marshall to proceed with all planned offensive operations against Japan, pending action by the Japanese Government on our demand for a surrender. The chief of these operations was preparation for the Kyushu invasion, which had been tentatively set for November 1.

Director Crowley called at my office to talk about consulting Truman as to what immediate action should be taken in regard to Lend-Lease when Japan surrendered. I agreed with his view that our assistance should be restricted to the areas where it was useful in the war, and we still needed Lend-Lease aid in China in transporting troops. It was finally decided that Lend-Lease money could be used for that purpose.

We all took time out on Monday to be present at the White House when the Chief Executive decorated Secretary of State Byrnes with an Army Distinguished Service Medal in recognition of his service as Director of War Mobilization and as adviser to the President at the tripartite conferences. Admiral King informed me at lunch that the British Chiefs of Staff—Field-Marshal Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, and Air Marshal Portal had been made barons in reward for their war services.

Early Tuesday morning, August 14, 1945, there was a radio report from Japan, unofficial, that the Allied demand for surrender had been accepted by the Japanese Government, but it was not until 3.30 p.m. that we received an intercepted message definitely informing us that the Emperor had accepted our terms.

Later in the afternoon the official reply was received by the Secretary of State as transmitted through Berne. It did accept in full the conditions imposed by the tripartite Potsdam Declaration and thus brought to an end this second phase of World War II.

Shortly before 7 p.m., Truman called me at my office to say that he was going to announce Japan's unconditional surrender shortly and would like me to be present when that historic event took place. When I arrived I found the Cabinet and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull already there. A great gathering of news correspondents filled the President's office. Hull sat on the President's left; Byrnes and I on his right. I recall that standing behind us, in addition to the Cabinet, were Crowley, Public Works Director, General Phillip B. Fleming, War Labour Board Director William Davis, and Housing Administrator John Blanford. The doors were locked and a minute or two before 7 p.m. the President stood up and read the following message of surrender that had been received from the Japanese Government:

“Communication of the Imperial Government of August 14, 1945.

“With reference to the Japanese Government's note of August 10 regarding the acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam declaration and the reply of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China sent by American Secretary of State Byrnes under the date of August 11, the Japanese Government have the honour to communicate to the governments of the four powers as follows:

“1. His Majesty the Emperor has issued an Imperial rescript regarding Japan's acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam declaration.

“2. His Majesty the Emperor is prepared to authorize and ensure the signature by his Government and the Imperial General Headquarters of the necessary terms for carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam declaration. His Majesty is

also prepared to issue his commands to all the military, naval, and air authorities of Japan and all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations, to surrender arms, and to issue such other orders as may be required by the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces for the execution of the above mentioned terms."

Truman announced also that August 15 and 16 were designated as days of celebration of our great victory that had ended the war. As the last words fell from his lips, the doors were unlocked and there was a mad scramble as the newsmen disappeared in a matter of seconds to flash the official news to the world. Unofficially, the fact that the war had ended had been known for some hours.

I returned to my office immediately to send messages in the name of the President to our Armed Forces, directing them to suspend offensive operations against Japan except as might be necessary for the protection of our forces. I also informed the Allied governments of our suspension of hostilities.

The President then called me back to his own office, where photographers made news-reels and still pictures of the ceremony and of the group present.

A noisy celebration was going on in the city with all motor cars sounding their horns, and great crowds of shouting people milling in the streets, bringing traffic to a standstill. The radio was blaring forth news of the celebration in cities from Los Angeles to Boston, in all of which the populace seemed to be celebrating the war's end with noise in crowded streets.

To me the occasion seemed appropriate for thoughtful appreciation of our good fortune in having gained the victory over fanatical enemies, but the people considered noise appropriate—and the greatest number in democracies must have their way.

What the people of the United States and of the entire world were celebrating was the definite end of a war which started in 1914, had a temporary adjournment for further preparation from 1918 to 1939, and which had been fought to this successful conclusion for the past six years.

I spent this "victory night" quietly at my Florida Avenue home, listening occasionally to the radio accounts of the demonstrations and looking back over the years of my war

service, which had begun on November 17, 1940, when Franklin Roosevelt cabled me in Puerto Rico to ask that I go to Vichy as Ambassador to France. Now, with our Allies, we had won what Roosevelt called on December 8, 1941, "the inevitable victory." The terms we laid down—unconditional surrender—had been met first by the Fascists of Italy, second by the Nazis, and finally by the conquest-mad Japanese.

This was not a war which could easily be compared to any other conflict in history. Never had so many millions on the earth been under arms. The ultimate cost in the number of dead was not yet known on this victory night.

The cost of victory to our nation could not be measured by the billions we poured out without stint, nor in terms of American lives lost or blasted. The cost would have to be computed in the years to come by historians and statisticians.

It was my conviction on this night of August 14 that we would be paying for this war in many ways long after we and our children too had passed away. It may require the better part of a century to bind up the wounds of a world torn in its physical structure by forces which were unleashed first by the aggressor nations and then by us.

It took three years, eight months and one week after the Japanese assassins took us by surprise in the midst of our efforts to keep the peace in the Pacific to accomplish their complete defeat. Germany had come to the same end a few months earlier. To prevent a realization of Axis dreams of world conquest, we were required to exert the supreme effort of our nation, the supreme intelligence of our democracy, and to preserve against tremendous difficulties our alliances with distant friends. The reader knows now from these notes that there were many difficulties in maintaining the grand coalition—difficulties which for the most part were unknown to the public at the time they occurred.

It was necessary for us to develop, especially for the Pacific, a new military organization to meet the problems of a war fought along vast distances by sea, by air, and by land. In this we succeeded beyond our fondest hopes. Through the vision of our late Commander-in-Chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the sustaining support of his successor President Truman, we formed and maintained a unified High Command. That Command was the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This organization

assumed, under the constant direction and supervision of the President of the United States, the complete strategic and operational direction of all land, sea, and air forces.

As its presiding officer from July 22, 1942, to the end of the war, I can testify that none of the many heroes—and this war produced a legion of heroes—served their Commander-in-Chief and their country with more selfless devotion than did George Catlett Marshall, our Army Chief of Staff, Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, and Henry H. Arnold, who commanded our Air Force. The Joint Chiefs were ably and efficiently assisted by a small staff of brilliant officers drawn from the three Services.

There were times when we seemed to be wasting too much time in talking and writing book-size papers to say what I thought could have been expressed in a few paragraphs. Yet this was the group that established the theatre commands on a unified command basis. Coastguard, naval forces, marines, ground forces, bomber forces, fighter forces, construction battalions, and amphibious troops were assembled under single direction to drive the enemy from his strongholds and to advance from island to island across the Pacific.

In the Pacific we gave our enemies a costly lesson in amphibious warfare, just as in Europe we, with our allies, demonstrated successful coalition warfare. The performance of all branches of the Services in Europe under General Eisenhower, in the central and southern Pacific under Admiral Nimitz, and in the south-western Pacific under General MacArthur brought glory to themselves and to their country.

Our nation had assumed heavy world responsibilities both for war and for peace. Some idea of these responsibilities has been gained from the accounts of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. The next war will be for a different and doubtless a new cause. We all hope its arrival can be long delayed by the efforts of all civilized peoples to preserve peace in the world by co-operative action. Men of good faith and goodwill have expressed these sentiments at the end of every great conflict among nations.

These sentiments had a new urgency on this August of 1945 because of the development of new and terrible weapons which could physically alter the face of the earth and wipe out whole populations. The dropping of just two atomic bombs on Japan had demonstrated the capacity to terrorize

possessed by these new offensive weapons. Fortunately, we were not forced to use the equally terrible instruments of bacteriological warfare that had been developed in our laboratories and arsenals.

A few months after I took over as Chief of Staff to the President, I became acquainted in general with the status of both of these projects. In November, 1942, at the request of Dr. Ross McIntire, I discussed with President George Merck, of the well-known chemical firm bearing his name, the possible use of bacteriological warfare. Merck was then studying, with a considerable number of scientists and in high secrecy, both offensive employment of and preventive measures against germ warfare.

At intervals this subject came up in my conversations with President Roosevelt and later with President Truman. I recall particularly that, as we were sailing for Honolulu for the MacArthur-Nimitz conferences in July of 1944, there was a spirited discussion of bacteriological warfare in the President's cabin. By that time the scientists thought, for example, that they could destroy completely the rice crop of Japan. Some of those present advocated the adoption of such measures.

Personally, I recoiled from the idea, and said to Roosevelt: "Mr. President, this [using germs and poison] would violate every Christian ethic I have ever heard of and all of the known laws of war. It would be an attack on the non-combatant population of the enemy. The reaction can be foretold: if we use it, the enemy will use it." Roosevelt remained non-committal throughout this discussion, but the United States did not resort to bacteriological warfare.

In these and other discussions I pointed out that the armed forces would be better equipped than the civilian population to deal with the horrors of bacteriological weapons. For example, should an enemy succeed in contaminating the water supply serving the millions who live in the greater New York City area, the results might be catastrophic. Any military or naval unit stationed there, with its discipline and organization, could put decontamination measures into effect quickly, although perhaps not quickly enough to avoid an epidemic. Even should a substantial portion of the military personnel be taken ill, again the armed forces would be better equipped to deal with such a situation than the helpless civilians.

In September, 1944, I visited my brother, Commander M. A. Leahy, at the Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland, where he was in charge of a naval unit of the Chemical Warfare School. This Arsenal was devoted to the production of toxic chemicals for war purposes, the study of their use, and the defence against possible use of toxic gases by our enemies. My brother took me over the extensive area, which, since colonial times, had been a peaceful, prosperous, beautiful farming country. One could not avoid a feeling of sharp regret that the barbarous necessities of a war had dispossessed its peaceful inhabitants in order that it might be used to produce a poison which might be employed in the destruction of other people.

Both sides were prepared throughout the war that had just ended to unloose deadly gases, but not even the fanatical followers of Hitler and Hirohito, who committed so many other unspeakable atrocities, dared use poison gas, for fear of retaliation.

To me, the atomic bomb belongs in exactly the same category.

I have admitted frankly in the preceding chapter that I misjudged the terrible efficiency of this entire new concept of an explosive. In the autumn of 1944 I held conferences with Professor Bush, Lord Cherwell, the British expert on atomic energy, and Major-General Groves. They had convinced President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of the potential effectiveness of atomic energy for military purposes. As a result, vast sums of money were appropriated to push the development with all possible speed.

In the spring of 1945 President Truman directed Mr. Byrnes to make a special study of the status and prospects of the new atomic explosive on which \$2 billion already had been spent. Byrnes came to my home on the evening of June 4 to discuss his findings. He was more favourably impressed than I had been up to that time with the prospects of success in the final development and use of this new weapon.

Once it had been tested, President Truman faced the decision as to whether to use it. He did not like the idea, but was persuaded that it would shorten the war against Japan and save American lives. It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese

were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

It was my reaction that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project. Truman knew that, and so did the other people involved. However, the Chief Executive made a decision to use the bomb on two cities in Japan. We had only produced two bombs at that time. We did not know which cities would be the targets, but the President specified that the bombs should be used against military facilities.

I realized that my original error in discounting the effectiveness of the atomic bomb was based on long experience with explosives in the Navy. I had specialized in gunnery, and at one time headed the Navy Department's Bureau of Ordnance. "Bomb" is the wrong word to use for this new weapon. It is not a bomb. It is not an explosive. It is a poisonous thing that kills people by its deadly radioactive reaction more than by the explosive force it develops.

The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that, in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. We were the first to have this weapon in our possession, and the first to use it. There is a practical certainty that potential enemies will develop it in the future and that atomic bombs will some time be used against us.

That is why, as a professional military man with a half-century of service to his Government, I come to the end of my war story with an apprehension about the future.

These new concepts of "total war" are basically distasteful to the soldier and sailor of my generation. Employment of the atomic bomb in war will take us back in cruelty toward non-combatants to the days of Ghengis Khan.

It will be a form of pillage and rape of a society, done impersonally by one State against another, whereas in the Dark Ages it was a result of individual greed and vandalism. These new and terrible instruments of uncivilized warfare represent a modern type of barbarism not worthy of Christian man.

One of the professors associated with the Manhattan Project

told me that he had hoped the bomb wouldn't work. I wish that he had been right.

Perhaps there is some hope that its capacity for death and terror among the defenceless may restrain nations from using the atom bomb against each other just as in the last war such fears made them avoid employment of the new and deadlier poison gases developed since World War I.

However, I am forced to a reluctant conclusion that, for the security of my own country, which has been the guiding principle in my approach to all problems faced during my career, there is but one course open to us:

Until the United Nations, or some world organization, can guarantee—and have the power to enforce that guarantee—that the world will be spared the terrors of atomic warfare, the United States must have more and better atomic bombs than any potential enemy.

APPENDICES

I

President Roosevelt's Instructions to Admiral Leahy on Assumption of the Post as Ambassador to France, December 20, 1940.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.

Strictly Confidential.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY,—As Ambassador of the United States near the French Government, you will be serving the United States at a very critical time in the relations between the United States and France. I impose entire confidence in your ability and judgment to meet all situations which may arise. Nevertheless, for your general guidance I feel that I may properly outline some of the basic principles which at present govern the relations of the United States with France.

(1) Marshal Pétain occupies a unique position both in the hearts of the French people and in the Government. Under the existing Constitution his word is law and nothing can be done against his opposition unless it is accomplished without his knowledge. In his decrees he uses the royal "we" and I have gathered that he intends to rule.

Accordingly I desire that you endeavour to cultivate as close relations with Marshal Pétain as may be possible. You should outline to him the position of the United States in the present conflict and you should stress our firm conviction that only by defeat of the powers now controlling the destiny of Germany and Italy can the world live in liberty, peace and prosperity; that civilization cannot progress with a return to totalitarianism.

I had reason to believe that Marshal Pétain was not cognizant of all of the acts of his Vice-Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Laval, in his relations with the Germans. There can be no assurance that a similar situation will not exist with the new Foreign Minister. Accordingly, you should endeavour to bring to Marshal Pétain's attention such acts done or contemplated in the name of France which you deem to be inimical to the interests of the United States.

(2) I have made it abundantly clear that the policy of this administration is to support in every way practicable those countries which are defending themselves against aggression. In harmony with this principle, this Government is affording and will continue to afford to the Government of Great Britain all possible assistance short of war. You may wish from time to time to bring to the attention of Marshal Pétain and members of the Government concrete information regarding the American programme to this end.

(3) I have been much perturbed by reports indicating that resources of France are being placed at the disposal of Germany in a measure beyond that positively required by the terms of the Armistice agreement. I have reason to believe that, aside from the selfish interests of individuals, there is unrequired governmental co-operation with Germany motivated by a belief in the inevitableness of a German victory and ultimate benefit to France. I desire that you endeavour to inform yourself with relation to this question and report fully regarding it.

You should endeavour to persuade Marshal Pétain, the members of his Government, and high-ranking officers in the military forces with whom you come into contact of the conviction of this Government that a German victory would inevitably result in the dismemberment of the French Empire and the maintenance at most of France as a vassal state.

(4) I believe that the maintenance of the French fleet free of German control is not only of prime importance to the defence of this hemisphere, but is also vital to the preservation of the French Empire and the eventual restoration of French independence and autonomy.

Accordingly, from the moment we were confronted with the imminent collapse of French resistance it has been a cardinal principle of this administration to assure that the French fleet did not fall into German hands and was not used in the furtherance of German aims. I immediately informed the French Government, therefore, that should that Government permit the French fleet to be surrendered to Germany the French Government would permanently lose the friendship and goodwill of the Government of the United States.

Since that time I have received numerous assurances from those in control of the destiny of France that the French fleet would under no circumstances be surrendered.

On June 18, 1940, M. Paul Baudoin, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured Ambassador Biddle "in the name of the French Government in the most solemn manner that the French fleet would never be surrendered to the enemy."

On July 1, 1940, President Le Brun informed Ambassador Bullitt that "France would under no conditions deliver the fleet to Germany." On the same day Marshal Pétain assured Ambassador Bullitt that orders had been issued to every captain of the French fleet to sink his ship rather than to permit it to fall into German hands, and Admiral Darlan told Ambassador Bullitt that he had "given absolute orders to the officers of his fleet to sink immediately any ship that the Germans should attempt to seize."

When Marshal Pétain came into power as Chief of the French State, I received renewed and most solemn assurances that the French fleet would not be surrendered to Germany. Vice-Premier Laval reiterated these assurances to Mr. Matthews on November 14, when he said that "the French fleet will never fall into the hands of a hostile power."

On November 16, Marshal Pétain, when the subject was again raised, told Mr. Matthews: "I have given the most solemn assurances that the French fleet, including the *Jean Bart* and the *Richelieu*, should never fall into Germany's hands. I have given these assurances to your Government. I have given them to the British Government, and even to Churchill personally. I reiterate them now. They will be used to defend French territory and possessions. They will never be used against the British, unless we are attacked by them." And most recently Marshal Pétain, in a conversation with the present Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, Mr. Murphy, said on December 12: "I hope your President understands that I have kept and will continue to keep the solemn promise I made that the French fleet will be scuttled before it is allowed to fall into German hands."

I feel most strongly that if the French Government after these repeated solemn assurances were to permit the use of the French fleet in hostile operations against the British, such action would constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith to the Government of the United States.

You will undoubtedly associate with high officers of the French Navy. I desire, therefore, that in your relations with such officers, as well as in your conversations with French officials, you endeavour to convince them that to permit the use of the French fleet or naval bases by Germany or to attain German aims, would most certainly forfeit the friendship and goodwill of the United States and result in the destruction of the French fleet, to the irreparable injury of France.

(5) You will undoubtedly be approached from numerous quarters regarding food for the French people.

There is no people on earth who have done more than the American people in relieving the suffering of humanity. The hearts of the American people go out to the people of France in their distress. As you are aware, we are continuing our efforts to arrange for the forwarding through the Red Cross of medical supplies and also tinned or powdered milk for children in the unoccupied regions of France. Nevertheless, the primary interest of the American people, and an interest which overshadows all else at the moment, is to see a British victory. The American people are therefore unwilling to take any measure which in the slightest degree will prejudice such a victory. Before the American people would be willing to have influence exerted upon the British Government to permit the shipment of food through the British blockade to France, it would be necessary that the American people be convinced beyond peradventure that such action would not in the slightest assist Germany.

(6) In your discussions regarding the French West Indies and French Guiana, you should point out that our sole desire in that region is to maintain the *status quo* and to be assured that neither those possessions nor their resources will ever be used to the detriment of the United States or the American republics. To accomplish this, we feel that it is essential that the naval vessels stationed in the ports of those islands or possessions be immobilized and that we

have adequate guarantees that the gold which is at present stored in Martinique be not used in any manner which could conceivably benefit Germany in the present struggle.

(7) I have noticed with sympathetic interest the efforts of France to maintain its authority in its North African possessions and to improve their economic status. In your discussions, you may say that your Government is prepared to assist in this regard in any appropriate way.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

II

*Letter from Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, January 25, 1941,
Vichy.*

VICHY.

January 25, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—We arrived in Vichy at midnight, January 5–6, after an exceedingly long cold journey by train and motor car from Madrid, during which there was one thirty-six-hour stretch without sleep and without any sensible heat except that which could be applied internally. The temperature throughout this part of France during our first ten days varied between—12 and —20 Centigrade, and the poorly clothed, undernourished people have suffered acutely.

On January 8 at noon in the Pavillon Sévigné I presented my credentials to the Chief of State in a ceremony of some formality that included a sailor guard of honour provided in special recognition of my naval rank. Our First Secretary, Mr. Matthews, and I had a fifteen-minute conversation with the Marshal, who was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Flandin. The Marshal, who was very alert and interested, carried the entire conversation, to the exclusion of M. Flandin, who did not say a word. The Marshal expressed high appreciation of our courtesy to him and of your friendship for France. He gave me a definite impression of vigour and strength of character, and of personal appreciation of the friendly attitude of America.

The next day, January 9, at 4 p.m., accompanied by Mr. Matthews, I presented to the Marshal, in the presence of M. Flandin, the State Department's stipulations in the matter of shipment by our Red Cross of milk, medicine and clothing for destitute French children, and obtained from him a complete agreement to all the conditions imposed. This late afternoon conference, which lasted more than an hour, was conducted almost exclusively by M. Flandin, the Marshal very different from our forenoon conference of the preceding day, giving every appearance of a tired, discouraged old man.

Foreign Minister Flandin discussed at length a very serious condition in which the Marshal's Government finds itself because of

present and prospective critical deficiencies in the food supply. He said, and the Marshal agreed, that the Germans in occupied France are conducting an active Press campaign which holds the Vichy Government responsible for the existing food shortage, and which may bring about the fall of the Government and the extension of German control to the present unoccupied area. I am inclined to doubt that the Germans will take such action.

Marshal Pétain stated that his only hope for the coming months is that the good offices of the United States will succeed in easing blockade restrictions on the import of essential foodstuffs to France, and in assistance by the American Red Cross.

My stay in France to date has been too short to permit of acquiring accurate information as to the actual need for foodstuffs, but it is plainly apparent now that many people here in the unoccupied area are in acute distress from cold and undernourishment.

It would be patently advantageous to the cultivation of friendly relations with the French people and to the stiffening of the Marshal's resistance to German demands if the American Red Cross should deliver in unoccupied France essential foods, clothing, and medicine where they are most needed, with the one and only condition that the Red Cross will exercise such supervision over the distribution as will insure that none of the supplies will either directly or indirectly be of any assistance to the aggressors.

Such single condition is essential and would be cheerfully accepted. Any additional conditions would adversely affect public reaction to our effort and public confidence in our good intentions.

I have made satisfactory contacts with the Marshal and with his inner Cabinet of three---Admiral Darlan, General Huntziger, and M. Flandin, and I am now developing contacts with the other members of the Government (Cabinet members) who just at this time seem to have little influence on matters of general policy.

They have all been exceedingly polite and agreeable to me.

I have already received the following very definite first impressions:

Marshal Pétain is remarkably capable for a man of his age, but the burden of work which he has assumed is beyond his physical capacity.

He does not appear to have complete confidence in any of his Cabinet.

He has an intense dislike for M. Laval, who is trying to displace him as actual head of the Government and relegate him to the position of a symbol.

He is very sensitive to German pressure, particularly when it is applied to the war prisoners, to the food supply, and to the authority of his Vichy Government.

He will make every effort to live up to the terms of the Armistice and to not go beyond those terms.

He will not under any conditions abandon continental France and move his Government to Africa.

He and his Cabinet are so impressed by the failure of France to

even delay the German Army that they believe that an English victory is impossible.

I am, of course, making every effort to point out the probability of a British victory.

It is highly desirable that England should accomplish some kind of a success against German forces in the near future. The capture of Tobruk and the Greek success in Albania have had some effect, but from the French point of view the "invincible" German Army was not involved in either of these campaigns.

The French people all appear to desire a British victory. Many officials of the Government also appear to hope for but not to expect a British victory.

They are therefore in a frame of mind to make almost any compromise with Berlin.

I am afraid that under German pressure the Marshal will take M. Laval back into his Government, although he believed Laval to be dishonest and unpatriotic. "A bad Frenchman."

I have been trying to stiffen his backbone in this matter by saying that Laval's return to power will be only the beginning of a series of concessions to be demanded by the Germans with exactly the same pressure methods to be used to force compliance with future demands.

General Huntziger impresses me as the strongest character in the Cabinet. I am told that Germany does not like him.

Admiral Darlan is very friendly with me and we "talk shop" easily.

He despises the British Naval Command, loves his own Navy, and insists that his ships will be scuttled if orders are received from any authority to turn them over to anybody. He is considered by many to be the most likely successor to the Marshal, should the latter drop out. Darlan is not pro-German, but like all the others he thinks the Germans will win.

M. Flandin is a compromiser and he leans pretty far over to the German side. He gives one the impression of being honest and patriotic, but not a strong character.

None of the officials with whom I have made contact have any regard whatever for the pre-war form of Government.

All of them, including the Marshal, seem to incline to something like the Fascist Government of Italy without its expansionist policy.

Many of them seem to be afraid of Communist (Red) activity in France at the first opportunity.

All of this, Mr. President, is first impressions, after a very short time in contact with the Vichy Government, and therefore likely to change.

I will endeavour to keep you informed by letter from time to time of the rapidly changing situation as it appears from this point of view.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

III

*Letter from Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, February 14, 1941,
Vichy.*

VICHY.

February 14, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—There is forwarded herewith enclosed a publication, *Images du Maréchal Pétain*, delivered to me yesterday by the author, Henry Bordeaux, with a request that it be forwarded to you.

The political situation in Vichy is at this time particularly confused because of prospective changes in the Marshal's Cabinet.

The general impression here seems to be that Admiral Darlan is much less dangerous as Vice-President of the Council and "heir apparent" than M. Laval would have been, in spite of Darlan's definite and apparently incurable dislike for the British.

The Marshal's refusal to accept Laval is certain evidence of a stiff attitude just at that time, but it is not unlikely that more pressure by the invaders exercised through war prisoners and the existing and prospective food shortage may induce him to make concessions.

It seems certain that your personal message, which I delivered orally, had an excellent effect in stiffening the Marshal's attitude toward M. Laval's demands.

There is absolutely no news yet in regard to the conferences yesterday between Franco and Mussolini and between Franco and Pétain.

We are trying to get some information from available sources and will report by cable immediately any useful results of our efforts.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

IV

*Letter from Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, February 24, 1941,
Vichy.*

VICHY.

February 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—I have this morning had my first conference with Admiral Darlan since his elevation to the position of Vice-President of the Council, heir apparent, and holder of three portfolios. He was very agreeable in his conversation with me during which he expressed his opinion that it is necessary to have friendly business relations with Germany because France and Germany are neighbours in Europe and because they must depend upon each other for their mutual prosperity.

He is very much concerned about recent British naval action in stopping ships carrying food to parts of the French Empire in which,

according to him, it could not possibly be of use to Germany, and he stated categorically that if this British action continues it will be necessary for him to announce publicly that the starvation of the French people is due to the action of the Churchill Government. He also said that it may be necessary for him to convoy ships carrying food and to sink any British ships that attempt to interfere.

At the present time the composition of the Vichy Government is so unstable, as a result of M. Laval's dismissal and the probability of future continual changes in its membership, that it is impossible to make a useful estimate of what may be its future general attitude toward problems the solution of which is essential to the preservation of a free and independent France.

As you know from our cable reports, the Marshal refused to reappoint M. Laval as Vice-President of the Council and heir apparent, and he has appointed Admiral Darlan to that office, giving him both the Foreign Office and the Department of the Interior in addition to his previous position as Minister of Marine. This combination of portfolios gives to Darlan pretty nearly complete control of the Government for so long a time as he can retain the confidence of the Marshal or for so long a time as the Marshal can successfully resist a persistent and increasing pressure from the occupied zone to replace him by M. Laval.

Admiral Darlan is believed to have the Marshal's confidence at the present time, and is also generally believed to be less dangerous than Laval, in spite of his very well-known conciliatory attitude toward the invaders, in spite of his psychopathic hatred for the British Navy, and in spite of a reputed personal ambition for political advancement.

At the present time he is not acceptable to the German-controlled Paris Press, which is conducting a vicious attack on the Vichy Government and also on the American Ambassador, who is charged with being a Freemason, a representative of Jewish bankers, an ex-British agent, and with having used ultimatum methods on the Marshal to obtain the appointment of his sailor friend, Darlan.

These Press attacks on the Ambassador probably have a good rather than a bad effect on the general situation from an American point of view.

M. Flandin, who was easy to work with as Foreign Minister and attractive, if not entirely reliable, has gone into retirement.

M. Peyrouton, ex-Minister of the Interior and Colonies, is *en route* to Argentina as Ambassador.

Both of these offices have been taken over by Admiral Darlan and, as you know, the Interior Department includes the secret police, *La Sûreté*, which agency seems to have an important influence on a Minister's prospect of retaining his portfolio.

It is expected that M. Belin, Minister for Labour, and M. Caziot, Minister for Agriculture, will be removed within the next few days and that there will also be other Cabinet changes.

M. Caziot, a real dirt farmer, has impressed me as particularly honest, capable, and devoted to his task.

The general trend now seems to be toward concentrating all of the essential power of the Government in the hands of Admiral Darlan, who will presumably exercise this power with the knowledge and approval of the Marshal. The Laval contingent does not like this prospect.

I have not yet found one Frenchman who is favourable to what we consider a representative form of government. Even the Marquis de Chambrun, who, as you know, is about nine-tenths American, and who called on me some days ago, expressed an opinion that France should retain only those fundamental principles of the old Government that were found good by experience.

His daughter is now in a German prison in Paris on some charge unknown to him.

While the political arrangement here may change overnight, the Marshal definitely does not wish to go any further with collaboration than is necessary under the exact requirements of the Armistice, and he has recently shown much courage and strength of character, but he is under very heavy pressure from the Germans and the pro-German element and he may be forced to yield, particularly if his Government is unable to provide essential foodstuffs in any other way.

Practically all the French and neutral officials with whom I make contact express a hope that England will win the war, but doubt that anything better than a compromise peace can be attained by either side. They desire an early peace at almost any price.

I have persistently expressed my expert opinion as a naval officer that the British are certain to win.

There are of late many indications that Germany is making final arrangements in the Dunkerque-Le Havre area (troop movements, removal of civilians, new airfields, etc.) to attempt an invasion of England.

Some fifty German officers and soldiers have recently arrived by aeroplane at Casablanca for the alleged purpose of replacing the previous Italian Armistice Commission, on the ground that Italy's interest is in the Mediterranean and Germany's outside the Straits of Gibraltar. The Vichy Government is helpless in this matter, but Admiral Darlan told me to-day that he believes he can induce the Germans to replace the present military personnel in the Casablanca Commission with civilians.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

V

Letter from Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, March 19, 1941, Vichy.

VICHY.

March 19, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Yesterday evening I had a very satisfactory interview with Marshal Pétain with the purpose of learning something of his reaction of your address made at the

White House correspondents' dinner. He had seen only the abbreviated reports carried in the local controlled Press, which has endeavoured to show that the principal purpose of your address was to quiet labour troubles in America's industry and to thereby speed up production for our own defence needs.

I had prepared and I gave to the Marshal textual copies in English and French, for which he expressed appreciation.

I took advantage of the opportunity to tell him that your statement is a notice to the world, in language that everybody can understand, that the Axis Powers will be defeated.

If it does not provide stiffening for wavering Gallic vertebræ, there seems to be nothing for the Marshal to do but have a house-cleaning and find substitutes for his present entourage. I think most of them will now see the light and get on the band-wagon.

The Marshal was in excellent form, alert, interested, and appreciative of what America has done and is doing to assist him.

He expressed an opinion that your announcement will force Germany to make an early attempt to invade England. He does not know whether or not such an effort could succeed, but believes that it is now the only hope Germany has of winning the war.

I told him that even a successful invasion of England, which I believe impossible, would not now win the war.

I discussed at length with the Marshal the efforts that America has made to find means of providing food for unoccupied France without being of any assistance to the aggressor nations, and pointed out to him the difficulties that had been introduced by Press statements of de Brinon and Darlan that it might be necessary to use French naval vessels to break the British blockade. He said that he had offered no objection to Darlan's publicity campaign, but that he had no intention of permitting French naval vessels to get into a combat with the British Navy.

He said that Admiral Darlan is now working pretty close to the Germans, and that he will have to keep his eye on him.

Darlan is now busily engaged in an effort to make character with the Germans, and he told me that he has succeeded to the extent of moving M. Laval a little farther into the background. He is always agreeable and apparently reasonably frank with me, but I am never sure of his motives. I know he has a fanatical dislike and disregard for the British Navy, and I believe that his ambition for high office will land him squarely on the band-wagon as soon as he thinks he can make a certain choice.

As a matter of fact, that is what practically all of them will do, and your statement at the White House correspondents' dinner should point out to them the right wagon to select.

The only two persons here who have impressed me as completely devoted to France without thought of personal advantage are Marshal Pétain and General Weygand. While they possess an astonishing vitality, both are old and both are irreplaceable.

The Marshal spoke to me yesterday at length about the de Gaulle movement, which he considers a threat to his Government by a

"group of traitors." He says that they threaten an attack on North Africa or Syria, which might bring the loyal French colonial troops into combat with the British, and that in occupied France the de Gaullists claim to have his secret approval. This makes difficulties for him with the Germans.

Mr. Churchill has informed him privately that de Gaulle has been of no assistance to the British cause, and, as he is a definite detriment to the Marshal's strict adherence to the Armistice terms, the Marshal does not understand why the British do not eliminate him from the problem.

The Marshal suggested that I bring this to the attention of my Government, and I have this date included it in a report by cable dispatch.

Yesterday evening at a late hour, after the Marshal's departure on a visit to southern France, I received by telephone from his staff information that Henri-Haye reported by cable that you had authorized the Red Cross to send two shiploads of wheat to unoccupied France. This action met with enthusiastic expressions of approval and appreciation.

I have information from good sources that 95 per cent. of the inhabitants of the unoccupied zone and 99 per cent. of the occupied territory *hope* for a British victory.

Your splendid statement at the correspondents' dinner and your invaluable assistance in providing relief for the distressed people will probably increase the much smaller percentage of those who *expect* a British victory.

Up to the present time I believe that America is holding the friendly regard of all the French people, official and otherwise, except a small group of followers of M. Laval who are subsidized by Germany.

We must, however, keep in mind the fact that France is beaten down and thoroughly sick of the war, that there are now one and a half million war-prisoner hostages, and that almost any peace proposal would appeal to most of the inhabitants.

Most respectfully,
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

VI

Letter from President Roosevelt, Washington, D.C., to Admiral Leahy, received by Admiral Leahy at Vichy, May 23, 1941.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.

DEAR BILL,—I have received your letter of March 19, 1941, concerning your very satisfactory talk with Marshal Pétain regarding my address at the White House correspondents' dinner. It was my hope that this would provide some encouragement to those elements in France which still feel that their hope of future salvation depends

upon victory of the democratic forces for which we are continuously working.

The efforts of Admiral Darlan and others of the Government to increase collaboration with Germany has definitely compromised our programme of assistance to France. The two flour shipments which go forward this week represent a certain contribution, but this cannot be continued unless we receive positive evidence not only from the Marshal, but from his Government, that our efforts to aid are creating a positive resistance to German demands for further collaboration in support of their military aims.

I greatly appreciate the full and complete way in which you have kept us informed of developments and the changing picture in France.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

VII

Letter from Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, April 18, 1941, Vichy.

VICHY.
April 18, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—There is forwarded herewith a type-written copy of an article that appeared in the Paris edition of *L'Œuvre* of April 15.

Under present restrictions on communication between occupied and unoccupied France we rarely receive copies of the German-controlled Paris Press. *L'Œuvre* of April 15 crossed the line of demarcation in the pocket of a newspaper reporter acquaintance of mine.

This article is a good example of the method of attack on your Ambassador that has consistently been followed by the controlled Paris Press. These attacks are, in my opinion, a compliment, and they do no harm to our cause except to probably make more difficult my contacts with the timid officials of the Vichy Government, who are nearly all definitely afraid of disapproval by the Axis authorities.

The attitude of these officials will undergo a complete change immediately upon the availability of acceptable evidence that the German Army has met with a defeat anywhere. I am trying to hope that Greece will prove to them that the German Army is not invincible.

Most respectfully,
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

VIII

Letter from Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, April 21, 1941, Vichy.

VICHY.

April 21, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—There has been a marked increase within the last few days in the pressure that is being applied to unoccupied France by Germany.

This is evidenced by an announcement that no more *laissez-passeurs* for the line of demarcation will be issued to any foreigners; by insisting on a right to search for arms, etc., in industrial plants, storage houses, and private residences in the unoccupied zone; by changing control of coastwise shipping on the Mediterranean coast of France from Italy to Germany; by sending 200 officers and soldiers as an "Armistice Commission" to North Africa; by sending "tourists" dressed in civilian clothing to North Africa in considerable numbers; by increased pressure to require factories in the unoccupied zone to work for a German account.

We are unable to ascertain the purpose of Germany in these new activities, and the Marshal's Government is not able to offer any effective opposition.

The Marshal, who is very friendly and who seems to have confidence in my good intentions, has asked me to see him often, and he appears, when I do see him, very pleased to have somebody to whom he can tell his manifold troubles and difficulties.

From his point of view, the essential difficulty is that he has no power with which to oppose German demands. He desires to adhere strictly to the terms of the Armistice and to keep France in an exactly neutral attitude toward the war.

He has told me that when the German demands appear to him to be outside the Armistice agreement and when he objects on that ground, the Germans claim the right to make the final interpretation, and when he disagrees they carry out their intention without regard to his attitude in the matter. It is my conviction that any demands whatever that may be made by the Germans will either be granted by the Vichy Government or permitted without active opposition.

It appears from what the Marshal tells me of German methods that the only effective opposition would be armed resistance or the use of sabotage methods, and while the people of France are almost unanimous in their hatred of Germany, they have no arms, no organization, and very little fighting spirit at the present time.

Sabotage or guerrilla warfare is discouraged by a knowledge of German methods of retaliation and by a fear of what would happen to the million and a half war-prisoner hostages in German prison camps.

I find no indication whatever of a possibility that the Marshal might move his Government to North Africa or that he might direct

General Weygand to join cause with the democracies. I believe he will remain at the head of a Continental government or that, as a last resort, he may resign. He has promised that the Fleet and the naval bases will not be turned over to Germany, and he will keep his word, but that does not give assurance that Germany will not take the ships and will not occupy the bases. There is nothing to prevent occupation of Continental ports, and nothing that can effectively interfere with taking the African bases except sea power.

The Marshal tells me he is sure that Germany in the future faces trouble in all the occupied countries because of its wide dispersion of force, and he believes also that Germany cannot avoid a clash with Russia. He says that America is the only friend now remaining to France, and is the only hope for the future of his country and of his people. This opinion seems to be shared by all Frenchmen who are not in the pay of the Axis Powers, and in order that we may retain their good will it seems to me wise to continue or expand our Red Cross relief work only to an extent that cannot be of any assistance whatever to the Axis powers.

At the present time the Red Cross relief is being distributed to under-nourished children and invalids efficiently and without leakage, and, aside from its humanitarian aspect, this distribution does give us an effective means of influencing public opinion, to which the Marshal is very sensitive, and to which his Cabinet members pay some attention.

Even in North Africa, where the natives are restless under the conditions of food shortage and German propaganda, it would appear from this point of view advantageous to America and to Great Britain to permit the importation of necessities for current needs and in sufficiently limited quantities to prevent their being of use to the Axis Powers.

I realize that this is not a very pleasing outline of conditions and prospects here at the present time, which have all been reported to the Department by cable, but I think you should know about the powerless position in which the Marshal is placed, in order that we may not indulge in expectations that cannot be accomplished.

The Marshal does not have full confidence in his Cabinet officers, particularly in Admiral Darlan, but he does not know of any other person who might be better. There is renewed gossip the last few days of M. Laval being forced back into the Government. The Marshal will strongly oppose any such move, as will also Admiral Darlan, but I am not sure that the Marshal cannot be forced to yield.

I will, of course, not fail to give him advice in the matter of M. Laval that will be useful from our point of view.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

IX

Letter from Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, May 26, 1941, Vichy.

VICHY.

May 26, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Since my last personal letter, you have been informed by our cable reports that this Vichy Government has come out into the open as an advocate of collaboration with Germany. This new attitude has been brought about by British failure to succeed in Greece and Libya and by demands, the details of which are unknown, made by Hitler at the time of his interview with Admiral Darlan at Berchtesgaden on May 11, 1941.

The Marshal has announced that the agreement made by Darlan has, in principle, received the unanimous approval of his Government, and that the French people, who cannot have the information necessary to form an opinion, should follow him without reservation (*sans arrière pensée*).

Admiral Darlan recently stated in a radio broadcast that Germany has not asked for the French fleet; has not asked that war be declared on England; has not asked for any French colonial territory, and has not asked for the surrender of any of the sovereignty of France.

Admiral Darlan failed to give any information as to what concessions are included in Hitler's demands. He did say it is the duty of the French people to follow the Marshal in his work of national renovation.

We have much evidence that public reaction to this "collaborationist" move of the Government is highly unfavourable and that the Marshal has been so informed by some of his loyal officials in the field.

Our Embassy has received an average of fifty letters a day asking that America disregard the action of the Vichy Government and continue its sympathy with and its friendship for the French people.

The Marshal, who is completely and honestly devoted to the welfare of his people, is extremely sensitive to public opinion, which points to the desirability of making a special effort through the radio to accurately inform the French people and to avoid, at least at the present time, making any criticism of the Marshal in person.

People generally hear the B.B.C. broadcasts, and some have receiving sets that get Boston. Most of them consider British news pure propaganda, but have much confidence in American news items. A completely controlled anti-American Press makes it impossible to get any accurate news to the people except by radio. Even with my excellent and very selective receiving set, interference here in Vichy almost completely blocks out the B.B.C. broadcasts in French. Broadcasts in English come through the interference very well.

There has, within the last few days, been a radical increase in the anti-American attitude of the Press in unoccupied France. In the occupied zone we have been the principal targets for a long time, but since the Hitler-Darlan agreement we get no favourable notice anywhere.

Our friends in the Government offices frankly admit being ashamed of themselves, but all news items about America or about the Ambassador have, in the last few days, been refused publication and one magazine, *Sept Jours*, which did print some photographs of the Embassy and the staff, was required to black out the whole page before issue.

Princess Antoinette of Monaco recently made arrangements to have photographs made of the distribution of American Red Cross food to infants in Monaco, in which she has been a very active and an exceedingly efficient worker. At the last minute, after all arrangements had been completed, the local censorship control refused to permit the pictures to be made.

The news of such incidents gets pretty good distribution by word of mouth and it does not improve the already low prestige of Admiral Darlan's group.

I am still of the opinion that a continued distribution of infant food through next winter will be of so much advantage to the cause of the democratic governments, by the maintenance of a smouldering if inarticulate opposition, to fully justify its cost.

In regard to all other shipments to *continental* France, it is my opinion that the present collaborationist attitude of Vichy fully justifies and points to the military advantage of clamping down tight on the blockade, whether or not so doing involves engaging escorting French naval vessels.

A number of Frenchmen who earnestly desire a German defeat have told me that the experience of Poland, Norway, and Greece has convinced them beyond the possibility of change that British promises of assistance have no value. They would have an entirely different estimate of the value of an American promise.

They believe that Germany will take Suez by a pincer movement from Syria and Libya, and will then close the Straits of Gibraltar by a move through Spain to Spanish Morocco. When once the Germans shall have reached North Africa in force, French ports and bases may be occupied with or without French consent, and control of the Mediterranean will be lost to the British Fleet.

A seriously vulnerable point to-day in the German expansion plan is North Africa, and it is my opinion that a comparatively small army of 250,000 men thoroughly equipped with modern weapons, including aircraft, could, with General Weygand's poorly equipped force, hold North Africa, insure control of the Mediterranean Sea, and shorten the duration of the war by half.

I do not know how Weygand would react to a *bona-fide* offer of adequate assistance, but at the present time at least part of his army would take sides with the assisting force.

It is discouraging to think of how easy it would be to start the

German disintegration with so small an army if it were available and free to move.

The situation is not unlike that of a soldier in the other war who said if he had some ham he would make some ham and eggs if he had any eggs.

Some day, to win the war, superior force must be applied to a weak point in the German military campaign and it is certain that weak points will develop from time to time. To-day the vulnerable spot is North Africa.

I do not know how much difficulty the current Press campaign is going to place in the way of my having any useful influence with the Marshal, but I feel that he has a friendly personal interest in me, that he is appreciative of your personal interest in his difficulties, and that he is grateful for the assistance America has already given to his distressed people. I also believe that there are many possibilities in this collaboration movement that will not meet with his willing acceptance.

At any rate, I shall make such effort as is possible through personal contact to keep him from going altogether along with the collaborators, who will, of course, do whatever they find possible to prevent my seeing the Marshal.

The Embassy is under constant surveillance, and some of our acquaintances in the Government offices have already been told that they visit the Embassy too often.

As an evidence of public reaction to "collaboration," there is enclosed a letter taken at random from the large number received within the past few days.

Most respectfully,
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

X

Letter from President Roosevelt to Admiral Leahy, June 26, 1941, Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.
June 26, 1941.

DEAR BILL,—I have written you very seldom of late because I have been more or less laid up with a low-grade infection, probably intestinal 'flu, since the first of May. The result is that my actual output of mail is about cut in half.

You have certainly been going through a life that has aspects akin to punching-bags, roller-coasters, mules, pirates, and general hell during these past months.

I think that both you and I have given up making prophecies as to what will happen in and to France to-morrow or the next day.

I feel as if every time we get some real collaboration for the good of the French (especially for the children) started, Darlan and some others say or do some stupid or not wholly above-board thing

which results in complete stoppage of all we would like to do.

Now comes this Russian diversion. If it is more than just that, it will mean the liberation of Europe from Nazi domination—and at the same time I do not think we need worry about any possibility of Russian domination. I do wish there were a nice central place in the ocean to which you and I could fly in a few hours and spend a few days together. I think of you both often.

My affectionate regards.

As ever,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Admiral William D. Leahy,
American Ambassador,
Vichy, France.

XI

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, July 28, 1941, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

July, 28, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Your notes of June 17 and 26 arrived in the last pouch, and I immediately sent by mail to the Union Fédérale des Combattants du Limousin an expression of your appreciation of the souvenir dinner set of porcelain which they sent to you some months ago.

Your recent indisposition with 'flu, or whatever it was, has been fully reported and exaggerated in the local Press, and has been a matter of real concern to all of us who appreciate the necessity for a continued understanding control of America's vital interest in the international problem.

The condition of your health has also been a matter of interest to our local "collaborationists," who undoubtedly hoped for the worst.

Recent action by the Vichy Government in giving to Japan its colonies in Asia does not to me indicate any change in its general policy, which remains committed to collaboration, in spite of indications from Russia that Hitler's prospect of winning the war has in the last month been sensibly reduced.

From a reasonably reliable source in the French War Ministry, we have an estimate that Germany has to date suffered in Russia one million casualties, killed and wounded. They should not be able to endure that rate of loss for a long time, and the few anti-Axis Frenchmen with whom I make contact hope and believe that winter will come in time to interfere with the German campaign and immobilize for months a great army in Russia. There is, of course, at least a chance of a winter collapse of the service of supply such as that which ruined the Russian campaign of Napoleon I.

Rumours are persistent here that at the end of the Russian campaign Germany will make peace proposals that it will be difficult to refuse.

The Vichy Government and the inhabitants of unoccupied France

will, in my opinion, welcome a peace at almost any price. Because of lack of communication facilities, we are not well informed as to the popular attitude in the occupied zone, but such information as we have indicates that it is highly probable that the people there who have lived for a year under direct Nazi rule would prefer a continuation of the war to permanent slavery under German masters.

Indications here point to a German move against the Mediterranean upon the completion of the Russian campaign, regardless of its outcome. It is practically certain that Germany some time ago demanded the use of French African bases, and that Darlan was unable to deliver them because of the resistance offered by General Weygand. It is generally believed here that the demand will be renewed and that Weygand will at that time not succeed in preventing use of the bases by Germany.

General Weygand may possibly resign rather than agree to give away the African Empire, but he is a thoroughly disciplined soldier, he is completely loyal to the Maréchal, and he may save his conscience with an acceptance of "orders is orders."

Now that Vichy has without objection handed Indo-China over to Japan, it will be difficult to refuse Germany a present of French Africa when a new demand, backed by threats, is made.

Admiral Darlan told me that Germany is not involved in the Indo-China affair and, in fact, knew nothing about it until after a decision was made.

In view of the certain advantage to Germany of getting us involved in the Pacific, and in consideration of the complete control of the Vichy Government heretofore exercised by Germany, that statement is difficult for me to swallow, and my personal inference in regard thereto is obvious.

It is entirely possible that Marshal Pétain was not informed until the negotiations were practically completed. He gave every appearance of being worried when I talked with him about what I termed the prospective "cession of Indo-China to Japan."

For so long as the Marshal retains the full legal authority of an absolute dictator, it is possible for him to take charge and exercise his authority, but at the age of eighty-five such action appears improbable, and it seems to me that he is surely if slowly being manœuvred into a position where his only purpose will be to hold the loyalty of the French people and to make speeches to school children and veterans.

The Marshal continues to be cordial and friendly in his personal relations with me. Admiral Darlan is also outwardly friendly, but I know that he suspects an ulterior motive in everything we undertake and that he is very successful in making it difficult for me to talk privately with the Marshal.

All of us in the Embassy are under constant police surveillance, all our telephone conversations are reported, and at least some officials of the Government have been warned to not become too friendly with any of us.

The de Gaulle movement has not the following or the strength that is indicated in British radio news and in the American Press. The Frenchmen with whom I can talk seem to have little regard for M. de Gaulle, even those who are completely desirous of a British victory and whose hopes have been stimulated by the slow progress of Germany in Russia. I have conclusive evidence that there does exist in the occupied zone an organization of de Gaullists which is devoting itself with some small success to sabotage methods of annoying the invaders, and to propagandizing the inhabitants.

The radical de Gaullists whom I have met do not seem to have the stability, intelligence, and popular standing in their communities that should be necessary to success in their announced purpose.

One of them recently told me that all the Ministers of the Vichy Government are under sentence of death, which can be carried out at any time, and which will be carried out when it suits the purpose of their organization.

The statement is probably only a sample of the propaganda that is being spread about, but there is much evidence that the Ministers are apprehensive, and at least some of them are carefully guarded by both uniformed and secret police. Both the Marshal and Admiral Darlan are constantly surrounded by both military and plain-clothes guards.

While the Marshal personally still holds the confidence of a great majority of the common people of France, it is certain that his popularity is decreasing because of recent approaches to full collaboration, the Syrian fiasco, the failure of Germany to repeat in Russia its performance of last year in France, and the turning over of Indo-China to Japan.

I am in complete agreement with you that it is impossible to guess what will happen in France to-morrow or the next day, and it is almost as difficult to point to any useful accomplishment that we have made here since my arrival six months ago.

The French people are still friendly with America and practically all of them look to you as their one and only hope for release from Nazi rule.

The French Navy has remained neutral.

The African bases have not yet been turned over to the Axis.

We continue to make every effort that is within the scope of diplomacy to hold these advantages, which include about the only assets that seem to pertain to us in the present situation; and unless the Germans continue to meet with effective opposition in Russia I venture a prophecy that the Axis will again demand and this time obtain permission to use the French African bases.

From this point of view to-day it appears that only a very apparent Axis setback somewhere will sufficiently discredit the "collaborationists" to hold France in even its present near neutral position.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XII

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, August 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

August 26, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—There appears, within the last few days, to have been a slight but promising change of attitude in this area toward the United States, resulting directly from German difficulties in the Russian campaign and a growing realization that we are really going to provide adequate assistance to the extent of entering the war if it should become necessary to do so in order to accomplish the defeat of the aggressor nations.

Your conference at sea with Mr. Churchill, the presence there of military and diplomatic officials, and the announcement that America and Great Britain have no desire for territory and no desire to interfere with the form of government that may be established by any people have all had a quieting affect on officials of the Government.

The Marshal's public statement of August 12, which I heard dramatically presented to the audience at a performance of the opera, *Boris Godounov*, was very like a committal service for the Third Republic that really passed out when the Armistice was signed a year ago.

It is discouraging, from the point of view of those of us who are confirmed believers in representative government, to see France completely in the hands of a dictator, a benevolent dictator for so long a time as the Marshal survives; but so much of a "Bill of Rights" as did previously exist in France has been abrogated, and what are in effect *lettres de cachet* are now employed to get rid of opposition.

As an example, a very attractive and perfectly inoffensive old lady acquaintance of ours, the Comtesse de Villeneuve, received last week a notice telling her that she is considered not friendly to the Government and that she must depart from Vichy this month. She has no appeal. She holds an honorary position as Lady-in-Waiting to the Duchesse de Guise, her husband was killed in the last war, and her brother is now a prisoner of war in Germany.

The Government is very much concerned about present and prospective Communist activities, particularly in the occupied area. The Communist "Party" seems to be the only organized self-styled political party and the only group with sufficient courage to act against the invaders.

Special courts, from which there is no appeal, have been established by decree to pass judgment on persons accused of Communism, and in the complete absence of a Bill of Rights it promises to be very unfortunate for anybody who may be accused of Communist activity.

Information received in conversation with members of the now

defunct Senate leads me to believe that the Marshal, if he survives the German occupation, will endeavour to establish a constitutional government, modelled to some extent on our Constitution, and giving to the Chief of State actual executive authority similar to that granted to the President of the United States. There are indications that the Marshal's idea of a satisfactory form of government for France is a combination of the best elements of the Government of the United States and of Mussolini's original proposal for Italy.

I find not one Frenchman who will say anything good about the pre-war government, which is universally believed to be responsible for the complete failure to stop the Germans.

It does appear certain that when we finally accomplish a defeat of the Axis powers there will be a demand by the French people that cannot be refused for a return of their liberties and for a representative government.

Your joint statement with Mr. Churchill to the effect that people may choose their own form of government will probably work out all right in France after the usual rioting, street barricades, etc., with which the French people are familiar and which to them appear necessary, or at least customary.

Practically the entire population of France entertains a high regard for America, looks only to America for its salvation, and hopes for a British victory, although they expect little consideration from a victorious Britain without our assistance.

Since the German invasion of Russia, with its slow progress to date, since the American occupation of Iceland, since your conference with Mr. Churchill, and with a growing realization of the power of the American industrial effort, we sense a definite softening of the attitude of even the collaborationists toward America and a revival of hope among the people for an early release from bondage.

If Russia should be forced to sue for peace and release the German Army for use elsewhere, the official attitude of Vichy toward America would, of course, change for the worse at once, and the eyes of officialdom here would turn again toward the Nazi band-wagon.

Food remains scarce in this unoccupied zone, and there is much apprehension expressed as to the availability of food and fuel for next winter, but the people are not yet on starvation rations.

Food conditions are probably worse in occupied France.

Our importation of essentials into North Africa, in agreement with General Weygand, has strengthened his position and is building prestige for America, while making it difficult for the collaborators to justify themselves in the eyes of the Arabs.

I hope the Red Cross will be permitted to continue its distribution of food and medicine for children through next winter, or at least until Vichy makes some further concessions to the Axis.

Most respectfully,
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XIII

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, October 15, 1941, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

October 15, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Since the beginning of the Russian campaign three and a half months ago there has been little change in the attitude of this Vichy Government toward the United States or the belligerents. During a large part of that time the unexpected difficulties encountered by Germany in Russia have caused French officials, including Darlan and other collaborationists, to lean over towards our side of the question, and their final attitude is dependent upon the outcome of the campaign in Russia.

At the present time the already partly successful drive on Moscow and German successes in the Ukraine have caused them to make preparations for a move toward more collaboration with the Axis powers.

We are informed by reliable sources that Germany will in the immediate future establish consulates in Vichy, Marseilles and Lyons, and that later French consulates will be opened in Germany.

My early impression that neither the Marshal nor any member of his Government has any intention of permitting the establishment of a representative government has been strengthened by time.

While it is reasonable to assume that America, at least while engaged in the task of defeating Nazism, is not particularly interested in the kind of government that is in process of formation here, the prospect may be of academic interest.

The general impression here is that active efforts are now being made to build up around the Marshal as a symbol a Government very much like, in its details and its announced purposes, that forced upon Italy by Mussolini, with Darlan or somebody else acting the part taken in the Italian tragedy by *El Duce*.

At the present time all functions of the Government, executive, legislative, and judicial are centred in the person of Marshal Pétain, who at the age of eighty-six years is not physically capable of carrying the load, and who therefore has delegated much of it to Admiral Darlan and to some other members of his Cabinet. While the Marshal himself is sensitive to public opinion and is directing such energies as remain to him toward the welfare of his people, the effort of the dominant members of his Cabinet at the present time is directed toward building up a political organization which can preserve order in the immediate future and maintain the present Government when and if the German Army withdraws from any or all of the at present occupied area.

This effort is clearly indicated by: (1) The organization, expansion and indoctrination of the Légion Française des Combattants as supporters of the Government, and by the promise of the appointment of members thereof to minor executive and police offices; (2) by the activities of M. Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior, an

open collaborationist who has control of the *Sûreté*, and who is busily engaged in building up through the Legion and the regional prefects a militant following that is very similar in its organization and its methods to the "black shirts" and "brown shirts" of other dictatorships; (3) by the delegation of much local executive authority to six carefully selected regional prefects; (4) by the establishment of regional tribunals to investigate reports of disaffection and to punish alleged Communists and other dissident elements of the population; (5) and by the recent appointment of M. de la Rocque, one-time leader of the Croix de Feu, to an office directly responsible to the Marshal as a reward for bringing his followers into line.

Present membership of the Légion des Combattants which has come under my observation is too old and flabby to be effective other than as a base upon which to build a younger more aggressive organization.

Pierre Pucheu, of whom I have no personal knowledge, is said to be young, energetic, aggressive, and ambitious. He is expected, if his present efforts meet with success, to be a contender with Darlan for the position of dictator when the Marshal passes out.

I am told that Pucheu and de la Rocque were political enemies at one time.

A. M. Picot, at one time an Ambassador of France, and whose reliability is unknown to me, told me some days ago that he had advised the Marshal to make radical changes in his Cabinet because of the public lack of confidence in Darlan and other members, and that while the Marshal is in agreement in principle, he has taken no action.

M. Picot also told me that Pucheu asked him to accept appointment as head of a Regional Tribunal in Lyons to try and award punishment to persons in that area suspected of subversive activities. M. Pucheu stated to him that the usual judicial procedure conducted by the established judiciary was too slow to be effective and that quick, drastic action is necessary to maintain discipline. M. Picot declined to accept the appointment.

The Marshal has been absent from Vichy so much in the last three weeks that I have had no conversation with him. We were told the day before yesterday by a friend of his and of ours that his recent journeys about the country have been so fatiguing as to require him to spend three or four days in bed, and that additional trips contemplated for the near future have been cancelled, with the purpose of conserving the Marshal's strength.

He is particularly, openly, and noticeably friendly with me, and at the age of eighty-six is in an astonishingly excellent physical condition, but I do not believe that he knows of everything that goes on within his own Cabinet. While I have as yet found no difficulty in seeing him, Admiral Darlan always of late manages to be present, and other Chiefs of Mission tell me they are required to deal directly with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and are unable to see the Marshal.

It does not appear possible at the present time that, without the Marshal as a popular symbol, the existing Government or its

apparent plans for the future can be maintained unless the Nazis are definitely successful in Russia and give such assistance here as is necessary to support the Vichy régime.

A number of Frenchmen have recently talked to me with the purpose of influencing you to join with the Pope in arranging a peace with the Nazis. All of the high officials here and a large majority of the people in unoccupied France seem prepared to welcome a peace at almost any price.

I have, of course, in each instance expressed a personal opinion that America will not make any effort to bring about a negotiated peace with Hitlerism.

There is little or no reason to believe that the existing Government of France or whatever may result from its present direction of development is or will be sufficiently strong to maintain itself after the Marshal disappears or after peace is made.

Most respectfully,
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XIV

Letter from President Roosevelt, Washington, November 1, 1941, to Admiral Leahy.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.
November 1, 1941.

DEAR BILL,—I have received your letter of October 15, 1941, regarding the present organization and the trends of the French Government which is now in the process of formation.

From all reports we have received, the power and position of Pucheu is apparently growing along well-recognized Gestapo lines. It would seem that he was apparently endeavouring to install his own position so firmly that he could withstand any political storms or changes of government. His methods, however, cannot make him popular.

This country was profoundly shocked by the actions of the Germans in ordering the shooting of hostages, which should have made clear to all Frenchmen the value of their "collaboration." It is also felt that the Marshal might have taken a more positive stand.

Should the Germans change the direction of their main activities from Russia to the Mediterranean, we are fearful that France will not be able to hold out much longer against increasing German demands for what would correspond to military assistance on the part of the French. Events of the next few weeks will probably give us a clearer picture in that respect.

You are quite right in expressing the opinion that this country will not join in any effort to bring about a negotiated peace with Nazism. This attitude of ours should be clear by now to all the world.

With kind regards,
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

XV

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, November 22, 1941, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

November 22, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—With the removal of General Weygand from Africa in obedience to a German *Dictat*, and the beginning of a British offensive in Cyrenaica, which two occurrences are presumably closely related, Thanksgiving Day, 1941, was far from dull in this capital of a captive nation.

Upon hearing that Weygand was to be recalled, at which time we had no information that a British offensive in Africa was about to commence, I arranged on November 19 for an interview with the Marshal, who saw me alone and discussed with me at length the matter of Weygand's removal.

I pointed out to him very clearly that the heretofore friendly and sympathetic attitude of the American Government was based on an assumption that he would not in his relations with the Axis powers go beyond the requirements of the Armistice agreement, and that a removal of General Weygand under German pressure cannot be considered by anybody to be necessitated by the Armistice Agreement.

I told him that in my opinion such an unnecessary surrender to Axis demands, particularly at a time when Germany is so thoroughly involved in Russia, would have a definitely adverse effect on the traditional amity between our two peoples, that it would probably bring about an immediate suspension of the economic assistance that is being given to the French colonies, and that it might very possibly cause America to make a complete readjustment of its attitude toward his Government of France.

I requested that his decision announced to me the preceding evening be reconsidered, in view of its certainly adverse effect on the future prospects of France and the French overseas Empire.

He replied that since last December Germany has constantly exerted increasing pressure on him to remove Weygand, that he has until now consistently refused, but that now there is nothing for him to do but yield to the demand.

In reply to a question as to how far the Germans have gone in their threats, he replied that their demands included everything, among other things the bases and the fleet, to which he refused to accede. Yesterday, however, the Germans sent him a "brutal" *Dictat*, threatening in the event of refusal to occupy all of France, to feed the army of occupation with French foodstuffs, and to permit the native population to die of hunger.

Being himself a prisoner and being concerned primarily with the fate of his people, to whom he had dedicated himself, he had found

it necessary to yield to the German threat and recall General Weygand from Africa. He went on to say that there will be no change in the situation in Africa, that no successor to Weygand will be appointed, that he remains determined to preserve the Empire, and that the general command of African forces will be administered from Vichy.

Command from Vichy to me means only command by Admiral Darlan, Minister of National Defence.

Upon inquiry as to his estimate of the reason for German objections to General Weygand, he replied that Weygand was disliked by the Germans, first, because he had communicated to them the Armistice terms in 1918, and, second, because he is "undiplomatic" and "indiscreet." In this reply I must assume the Marshal knew he was not telling the whole truth.

While the great inarticulate and leaderless mass of the French people remain hopeful of a British victory and continue to hope that America will in the end rescue them from their present predicament without their doing anything for themselves, the Government of France to-day, headed by a feeble, frightened old man surrounded by self-seeking conspirators, is altogether controlled by a group which, probably for its own safety, is devoted to the Axis philosophy.

Leaders of this group are:

Admiral Darlan, Vice-President and heir apparent;

M. Pierre Pucheu, Secretary of Interior;

M. Benoist-Mechin, Secretary of State to the Vice-President;

M. de Brinon, French Ambassador in Paris;

M. Paul Marion, Secretary of Information and Propaganda;

M. Yves Bouthillier, Secretary of Finance; and

M. François Lehideux, Secretary of Industrial Production.

Admiral Darlan, as you know, has been legally designated to succeed the eighty-six-year-old Marshal.

I am reasonably sure that Darlan some time ago promised Hitler the use of French African base facilities, but in this promise he has until now been blocked by Weygand.

M. Pucheu has recently effected a very great expansion of the secret police, which are completely under his control. He is busily engaged now in building up via the Légion des Anciens Combattants what is intended to become an effective Ku-Klux-Klan, and which is already operating as such to some extent.

Darlan and Pucheu are both said to be ambitious to succeed to the Marshal's office, and while they are at the present time working together it is reasonable to assume that they will be tearing at each other's throats in the reasonably near future.

As a pure gambling chance and in consideration of their form sheets, one should place his money on Pucheu.

Both will certainly be eliminated from the political picture, if not "liquidated," when and if Germany is defeated.

During my conference with the Marshal, he was as always agreeable and friendly, in spite of my having to point to several disagreeable prospects for France involved in his surrender to Germany in

the matter of Weygand, and upon my departure he expressed a hope that our personal regard for each other would not be injured by the action which he has been forced to take.

In view of his willingness under German and collaborationist pressure to sacrifice Weygand, who is a very close and loyal personal friend, it is not reasonable to expect him in the future to refuse under the same pressure the use of African bases, or the employment of the fleet for the Axis account, or any other demand that Germany may consider of sufficient importance to its military effort.

While one may be fully justified in looking at the difficulties of the Marshal's ending years with understanding sympathy, it seems necessary to reluctantly relinquish what was perhaps always only a faint hope that it might be possible for me through friendly personal relations and pertinent advice to give some semblance of backbone to a jellyfish.

The pro-Axis, anti-British group which surrounds the aged Marshal is responsive only to positive action. Admiral Darlan is reported by one of our friends, a subordinate in his office, to have said before the event that America would not take any positive action if Weygand should be removed.

It would appear to promise some effect in strengthening the Marshal's opposition to future demands of the Axis and its supporters within his Government if we should now seize the initiative to the extent of directing the American Ambassador to inform him that the United States is seriously concerned in regard to probable future demands of the Axis powers in Africa, and that if the Axis powers are hereafter granted in the colonies or in France any further privileges or assistance that are not specifically required by the Armistice agreement and that will be of assistance to their military effort, the United States will recall its Ambassador and will take such action in regard to French possessions in America and in Africa as is considered advantageous to our defensive preparations.

If the Ambassador should be directed to make such a statement to the Marshal, we must be prepared and determined to carry it out. To avoid a reaction contrary to our interests, it must not be a bluff.

Most respectfully,
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XVI

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, December 22, 1941, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

December 22, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Our unfortunate experience in Pearl Harbor with Japanese treachery, the detailed results of which are completely unknown here, seems to have had little influence on French opinion of the war situation or its future prospects.

I have noted in radio broadcasts your new arrangement of the high command at sea, and of all the flag officers known to me I should, given a free choice, have selected Hart, King, and Nimitz as the best. Of the three, I consider Hart the most reliable, the least likely to make a mistake, and as being physically doubtful because of his age. A sea commander in this war must be capable of taking cruel physical punishment.

One error of judgment in regard to the selection of a C.-in-C. which I made in the past should make me doubtful, but one can feel pretty sure of Hart, King, and Nimitz.

By evaluating such radio and Press news as we do manage to get here in this controlled and propaganda-flooded area it seems to be clear that Germany is suffering a major defeat in Russia and is rapidly approaching a smaller but a more complete military reverse in Cyrenaica.

The barometric French opinion has reacted to this situation with a leaning over toward our side of the question, but with reservations and with preparations to jump back on a moment's notice.

Our friends are coming out into the open a little more, and our enemies are a little less aggressive for the moment.

Your personal message to Marshal Pétain, which I delivered December 14, seems to have been perfectly timed, and according to our friends in the Vichy Government it did provide the Marshal with so much courage as was needed to tell his Minister of Foreign Affairs that no agreement with the Axis in regard to American relations should be made by any Minister without his prior approval.

That is considered here an exhibition of superlative courage.

During my interview with the Marshal, and in Admiral Darlan's presence, I took advantage of the opportunity to say that now since we are at war with the Axis powers any assistance that France might give to Germany such as use of bases or assistance by French naval vessels would in fact amount to taking military action against the United States.

The Marshal undoubtedly wishes to do everything within his power to hold the goodwill of the United States, which he very correctly believes to be the only disinterested friend that the post-war future holds for France.

While I entertain for the Marshal a very high personal regard, there is little if any reason to believe that he will do anything to help win the war or that he will offer any effective resistance to future German demands that are accompanied with the usual threats of punishment in the event of refusal to agree.

Since my last talk with the Marshal one week ago, we hear from our reliable informants in the Government offices that Germany is applying heavy pressure on Vichy to grant certain demands which have not yet been presented in the form of an ultimatum.

Some of our informants know what these demands are, but say they are not free to give us any details other than that the demands are serious and extensive and that they are so far not pointed directly at the American Embassy.

We think the demands include assistance to the Axis troops in Libya, base facilities, and probably the use of naval vessels to convoy French merchant ships in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

Yesterday, Sunday, the following officials from North Africa arrived by aeroplane without any public notice, and the Press has not been permitted to say anything whatever about their arrival:

General Juin, Commander of the Army in North Africa.

General Noguès, Resident-General of Morocco.

Admiral Esteva, Resident-General of Tunisia.

In spite of the veil of secrecy which envelops the visit of these officials we are of the opinion that they are here to discuss current demands made by Germany for assistance in North Africa.

We note that Boisson, Governor of the Dakar region, is not with the others.

The interruption of our mail service will probably make all of this ancient history before the letter reaches Washington, but it will give you a brief sketch of the local situation as we see it from here to-day.

Our friends say that public announcement in America of an agreement with Admiral Robert regarding Martinique has made difficulties with the Germans, and that it has been necessary to deny that any such agreement has been made.

Our requisitioning of the *Normandie* seems to have produced no violent reaction whatever.

So far, whether it is worth anything or not, we have succeeded in keeping the attitude of the Marshal and the French public altogether friendly toward us, in spite of continued German efforts to the contrary.

Some of our anti-Axis friends believe that, in view of German reverses in Russia, the Axis defeat in Libya, and our entry into the war, there is a possibility that the Marshal may refuse to surrender to German demands to which we take serious objection.

Judging from past performances I would think that is at best only a possibility and definitely not a probability.

It is, however, certain that the Marshal does not desire a diplomatic break with the United States.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XVII

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, January 12, 1942, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

January 12, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Your personal letters of greetings to the Marshal and to the General arrived to-day by courier from Lisbon, together with oral instructions brought by Mr. Matthews from Washington in regard to certain contingencies.

There is at the present moment no indication that any of the contingencies will arise in the immediate future, but they are a possibility at any time and a definite probability at some time before this changeable political status is stabilized.

It does not seem possible for me personally to see your friend the General without attracting unfavourable attention to him, as I am constantly under surveillance and everybody with whom I associate is suspected of something.

We will, however, arrange to deliver your message and your greetings.

I am sending this acknowledgment of receipt without waiting for any opportunity to make delivery, because the courier is leaving at once on his return journey to Lisbon.

Yesterday, at a very pleasant "tea" party with some of my Latin American colleagues, I received the following information, which may or may not have any substantial basis of truth:

(1) The Brazilian Embassy here has information (probably from the Spanish Ambassador, with whom they are on terms of intimate friendship) that General Franco has asked Germany to take no action whatever toward a movement through Spain until after the adjournment of the pending Conference in Rio de Janeiro.

(2) The Mexican Minister here, General Aguilar, who was once one of Villa's gun-men, and who has, together with some faults, the virtues of energy and determination, told me that he is not informed as to whether or not it would at the present time be advantageous to the common cause for Mexico to join us in formally declaring war on the Axis, but that if I can unofficially tell him it would be advantageous to the United States he will be happy to use his "considerable influence in Mexico" to induce his country to declare war. I do not know whether or not he has "considerable influence," but I do know that he has the courage of his convictions and more than considerable initiative.

He was one time Minister to Japan, and he said that declaring Manila an "open city" was an error, because, first, it would have no deterrent effect on Japanese barbarity and, second, Japan will use it to prevent the bombardment of Japanese cities.

He says that the manufacture of war material in Japan is largely accomplished at night in the residences of the workmen and that the destruction of almost any civilian residence in Japan will directly effect the actual production of war material. He said: "In fighting with Japanese savages, all previously accepted rules of warfare must be abandoned."

We have distributed an accurate French translation of your message to the Congress to appropriate officials and to Frenchmen who might profit therefrom. The Marshal told me that he read it with much interest.

French papers have published only extracts that are skilfully designed to conceal the certainty of victory that fills the original text. It is hoped, however, that the news will get around to a lot of people, including the Führer.

I hope to arrange to see the Marshal in the next day or two with the purpose of delivering your note addressed to him.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XVIII

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, January 25, 1942, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

January 25, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Your oral instructions in regard to the African situation brought to Europe by Mr. Matthews reached us here on January 12 by officer messenger from Lisbon, who brought also your notes addressed to Marshal Pétain and to General Weygand.

On the following day I obtained an interview with the Marshal and delivered to him your note with a French translation thereof, which he read aloud to Admiral Darlan, who was present as usual and who as usual took charge of the conversation.

The Marshal made no pertinent remark in regard to your note other than that he would bring it to the attention of his Government.

While we hear reports from many sources that Admiral Darlan is weakening in his certainty that Germany will win the war, his conversation with me gives no such indication. At this interview he said that the Libyan campaign had, from the Axis point of view, at worst only reached a stalemate, and that Mr. Churchill will in the near future be replaced as Prime Minister by Major Attlee, who is the only person in England acceptable to the Soviet and to British Labour.

On January 15 I sent Mr. Douglas MacArthur, Secretary of Embassy, with your note as an identification, to the Riviera with instructions to deliver orally the message brought from you to us by Mr. Matthews.

In view of an assumption that both the General and the American Ambassador are under constant surveillance I did not consider it feasible for me to make the contact myself.

On January 20 Mr. MacArthur, with much skill and diplomacy and presumably without attracting the attention of the *Sûreté*, succeeded in making contact with General Weygand in a hotel near Nice, where he delivered your written communication and the oral message brought by Matthews.

The General was courteous and agreeable, but declined to give any consideration to the possibility of his taking any action in the African problem. He said that he is now a private citizen with no official status, that he is completely loyal to the Marshal, and that if France should be so unfortunate as to lose the services of the Marshal, he would under the legally designated successor have no opportunity to render service to the country.

Upon being requested to consider the message from you as personal and confidential, to be not divulged to any other person, he replied that his loyalty to the Marshal would make it necessary to inform Marshal Pétain, which he could and would do without its becoming known to others.

I cannot escape from a belief that it will come to the knowledge of others and that it may be transmitted to the German authorities.

A brief of the General's attitude is that he will have nothing to do with the proposition and that he will not offer a suggestion of any other person who might be interested.

A systematic series of changes in the Army command that is being accomplished in the recent past which includes the removal from Africa of officers who held key positions under Weygand indicates to me a probability that the Army is being packed with a high command that will be amenable to any instructions issued by "Vichy," and that Admiral Darlan's statement to me of his intention to resist invasion of the African colonies by *anybody* definitely includes Americans.

It appears at the present time that Germany can accomplish its essential needs in French Africa by agreement and without an invasion in force, but there is nothing to indicate that a German military expedition into the colonies would be resisted.

If any of the "contingencies" enumerated in the oral message brought by Mr. Matthews should be accepted as sufficient cause to give the suggested aid to the colonies, it would be wise to have full advance information as to whether the proposed "aid" will be accepted or opposed, and if such aid is sent to Africa it should be in sufficient quantity and quality to accomplish its purpose.

A repetition of Dakar would be destructive of American prestige and extremely discouraging to the one remaining hope of submerged civilization in this part of the world.

The day before yesterday I received from the State Department by cable dated January 20 your message containing thoughts in regard to the Marshal and in regard to France.

I have not since been able to obtain an interview, but will do so within the next few days, and will convey to the Marshal your thoughts, which should stiffen his resistance to Axis demands if anything can have that effect. I have, as you know, expressed to him as my personal opinion most of the thoughts contained in your note, but now that they come directly from the President they certainly should carry more weight.

Your statement that resistance to Axis attack would have not only the moral support of the United States, but would also have every possible military and naval assistance we could bring to bear, should at least discourage the granting of assistance to the enemy. While practically the entire population of France outside of Vichy would look with favour on any positive action that America might take in French territory against the Axis, I wish I could indulge in a reasonable hope that your attitude might bring about effective action by the Marshal in resisting future Axis demands.

We will continue to do our best to cheer him along.

Rumours persist that within the next few weeks Germany will propose to the Marshal and insist upon a readjustment of the relations between the two countries, with concessions from both sides.

We succeeded last week, after some effort on a reliable source, in obtaining information that recent British bombings of Brest have obtained useful results, as follows:

In spite of the fact that dummies have been constructed to represent the German ships under repair in that harbour, recent bombings have more or less seriously damaged the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Prinz Eugen*.

On January 15, *Gneisenau* was out of service for a long period; *Scharnhorst* received two bomb hits forward and is unserviceable for the time being; *Prinz Eugen* received one hit that tore thirty yards of its hull plating.

This information was at once reported by cable to the Navy Department.

Hoping that you can manage to unload a sufficient part of the burden on somebody to conserve yourself for the long pull that may be necessary in order to completely destroy the Oriental menace, I remain always,

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XIX

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, February 20, 1942, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

February 20, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—On February 11 we received by cable from the State Department your message to Marshal Pétain in which you informed him of information received in Washington to the effect that an agreement had been made to transport war material to the Axis forces in Libya by the use of French merchant ships between France and Tunis, and in which you told him that unless official assurance should be given by France that no military aid will go forward to Germany, Italy and Japan, and that French ships will not be used in the furtherance of their acts of aggression in any theatre of war wherever it may be, I would be recalled for advice and counsel in a determination of American future policy with regard to the Government of Vichy.

In the forenoon of the next day, February 12, I delivered to the Marshal a written French translation of your message, which he read aloud to Admiral Darlan and M. Rochat, who were as usual present at the conference. The Marshal made no other comment than to say that he would give me a written reply.

Admiral Darlan, who had made an agreement with Italy, possibly without the knowledge of the Marshal, to send in French

ships to Tunis for Rommel's army 200 tons of foodstuffs each week and a total of 500 Italian trucks, seemed unusually disturbed by your very positive statement of your reaction thereto.

The Marshal throughout our very brief, tense interview was as friendly and considerate as always. Upon my departure, he expressed a hope that it will not be necessary for me to depart from France.

On February 16 we received and forwarded by cable to the Department of State a note signed by Darlan in reply to your message to the Marshal.

None of the assurances demanded by you in regard to giving assistance to the Axis forces or in regard to the use of French ships in the furtherance of their acts of aggression appears in the Vichy reply to your message, and I am therefore expecting a "recall for consultation."

In view of an opinion previously expressed by Admiral Darlan and entertained by other officials of the Vichy Government that the United States can be depended upon to never take any positive action, I consider it would be extremely detrimental to American prestige to fail in this instance to carry out your announced intention to recall the Ambassador for consultation in the determination of future policy with regard to the Government of Vichy.

If in the larger field of view from Washington it would appear advantageous to our war effort for me to continue in the office of Ambassador to France, it would appear from this point of view entirely practicable for me to return after a "consultation," but in my opinion Vichy should not be permitted to believe that your statement in regard to my recall for consultation in the event of failure to receive the requested assurances was a "bluff." Too large a number of the members of the Vichy Government now share a belief with Admiral Darlan that the United States may be always depended upon to take no positive action whatever.

Since receiving the Marshal's reply to your message I have seen a copy of a proposal made by Vichy in January to Japan in regard to the use by Japan of French merchant ships in the Orient. This proposal agrees to charter to Japan about 50,000 tons of the French shipping now in Chinese and Indo-Chinese ports, the ships to be operated under the Japanese flag with Japanese officers and crews, but not to be used for "war purposes." Other French ships will be used under a time charter for commercial purposes between Japanese occupied ports, but under the French flag and with French crews.

I was, in reply to a specific question, informed orally by Admiral Darlan on February 12 that arrangements for the chartering of French merchant shipping by Japan had not been completed.

I personally have no doubt that under a threat of Axis pressure Vichy will agree to any use of French shipping that may be demanded.

Since the retreat in Libya, the escape of German ships from Brest, and the fall of Singapore, British prestige has fallen to a new low level.

I am sure that French public opinion and, I believe, that the Marshal himself hopes that an Allied victory will save France from

the fate toward which it is moving, but at the present time public opinion and the Marshal have difficulty in believing that the Axis can be defeated.

The local Press yesterday reported a statement by General Smuts that there is as yet no reason for taking any action in regard to Madagascar.

This is reassuring to Vichy, where there has very naturally been a fear for some time that the Allies might anticipate Japanese action by occupying Madagascar, Mauritius, and Réunion.

From this point of view and particularly in consideration of previous action of Vichy in Indo-China, it is difficult to understand why these islands, flanking as they do the supply route from anywhere to the Red Sea and now also from Good Hope to the Dutch East Indies, have not long ago been occupied by the Allies.

There must be a sufficient force in South Africa that could be spared for that purpose before it is made difficult by previous enemy action.

While one should have great sympathy for the Marshal in his almost impossible position, and a real affection for the unorganized, inarticulate, depressed people of France, it would appear that the time has already passed when this war for the preservation of our civilization permits of giving further consideration to the pride or sensibilities of defeated France in Madagascar, in Indo-China, or elsewhere.

With one and a half million of its young men in German prison camps and with more than half of its Continental area occupied by German troops, there is not a chance that France can be of any assistance to the Allies or even be of any assistance to itself. It would therefore seem desirable, necessary, and essential that French territory be utilized by the Allies wherever it promises advantage to us in the prosecution of our war effort.

Vichy would object, of course, but much of French public opinion would cheer us on.

I am taking advantage of courier departing to-day to send this hurriedly prepared letter.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XX

Letter from President Roosevelt, Washington, D.C. (undated) to Admiral Leahy.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.

DEAR BILL,—I have given careful consideration to the thoughts expressed in your letter of February 20, particularly as regards your feeling that it would be detrimental to our policy to fail to carry out the expressed intention to recall you for consultation.

I am fully sympathetic, and understand the position in which this

has placed you. On the other hand, the timing of such a step has now become of paramount military importance. In fact, the joint staff missions have very definitely urged that we postpone as long as possible any evidence of change in our relations with France, and they consider that to hold the fort as far as you are concerned is as important a military task as any other in these days. Consequently, we decided to go ahead and to obtain from the Marshal's Government the utmost assurances possible which would preserve our fundamental objectives. Not only is our presence in France and North Africa the last bridgehead to Europe, but it likewise helps to hold the Iberian Peninsula in line.

The military developments of the next few weeks will be of such vital importance that, in the interests of the United Nations, we cannot afford to risk any possibility that an abrupt action on our part would lose ground anywhere. The impending Mediterranean drive will be one of the most important of the war, and it must be checked by all means possible until the time when the full weight of our rapidly developing production can be felt in the war effort.

I have also taken note of your statements regarding Madagascar and shall refer them to the War Council.

I want you to realize that I am fully aware of the problems with which you are confronted, but must consider that you are in a vital strategic position. In these critical days we count not only on your presence there as Ambassador, but upon your own military knowledge and experience to give us, in so far as possible, estimates of the French position from this point of view.

Should the time come, however, when the conditions of our relations with the Marshal's Government are more stable and your return for consultation would not be made an issue either here or in France, I shall telegraph you to proceed to Washington "for consultation."

With kindest regards to you both,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

XXI

Letter from Admiral Leahy, Vichy, March 10, 1942, to President Roosevelt.

VICHY.

March 10, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,—Since the receipt of requests for official assurances that in the future assistance will not be given to the enemy's military effort, the latest of which arrived by cable on March 4, the business of diplomacy has been brisk in this area.

We have as yet not received any satisfactory "assurance" in regard to either the provision of supplies to the Axis or to the status of the Caribbean colonies, and we may at best expect an effort by Vichy to evade the specific assurances demanded by America.

The bombing of automobile factories in Paris last week, Renault and Ford, which were working for Germany caused varying reactions among the French people.

Both attacks were very successful in putting the factories out of business for some months. Bombing of the Renault works caused a large number of casualties and 397 deaths among civilians who resided near the factory. Sunday's attack on the Ford factory at Poissy is admitted to have caused no casualties.

Admiral Darlan happened to be in Paris on March 3 when the Renault factory was attacked, and upon his return to Vichy with his anti-British mania highly stimulated by the bombing he was shown our latest demands for "assurances," which produced a reaction that we may consider typical under the circumstances.

The following *strictly personal* letter in Darlan's handwriting, written immediately after his return to Vichy, may be of interest as an evidence of his general attitude and as an illustration of the inadvisability of a Minister of State writing letters when stimulated by anger:

"March 8, 1942.

"MR. AMBASSADOR,—I permit myself, because of the personal ties of sympathy which exist between us and because of our naval confraternity, to write you in a *strictly private manner*.

"I wish to tell you that the recent notes from the American Government are drawn up in terms of such an unpleasant and unusual character as would justify the non-acceptance of such documents by the French Government.

"If we have, however, accepted these notes, it is because we do not wish to give any pretext for breaking off to a Government which, for the past few weeks, has given the impression of looking for a quarrel with the French Government.

"I realize that my defeated country is placed in a painful situation, but I did not believe that the Government of a nation which owes its independence in great part to it would take advantage of this fact to treat it with scorn.

"I told you a few months ago, that since June 25, 1940, the British had accumulated error upon error. They have just committed a greater one still which we shall never forgive them.

"To murder, for political motives, women, children and old people is a method of Soviet inspiration. Is England already Bolshevized?

"Fear is sometimes an ill adviser: Mers-el-Kebir and Boulogne-Billancourt demonstrate this clearly.

"I hope the American Government will not give way to fear.

"Believe me, etc.

"(Signed) F. DARLAN."

My reply (quoted herewith following), in consideration of the apparent desirability of continuing friendly relations with the

Minister of Foreign Affairs during the time that you consider it necessary for me to deal officially with him deliberately ignores the insulting inferences made in his note:

"VICHY.
"March 9, 1942.

"*Personal.*

"DEAR ADMIRAL DARLAN,—It is pleasing to receive in your personal note of yesterday a reference to our common naval traditions and the sympathetic personal understanding that have been of so much assistance in our working together for the welfare of France, and this reply is of the same strictly private character as is your note to me.

"In evaluating the attitude of my Government in the difficult situation that confronts both of our nations at the present time, we must give full consideration to the fact that the United States is now involved in a total war in defence of its existence as a free nation, and that this war will be prosecuted until the aggressor nations are completely defeated, regardless of the sacrifices that must be made in order to secure a complete victory.

"Under such conditions in a life-or-death war for survival, it seems unreasonable to expect the United States to look with complaisance upon the provision by a friendly nation of any assistance whatever to the military effort of the enemy powers.

"I am certain that President Roosevelt is desirous of doing everything that is practicable to aid in the restoration of France to its traditional position as a standard of civil liberty, civilization, and culture, and I personally shall continue to indulge in a hope that, whatever results from the present situation, it may be possible for me to have some small part in preserving France and French culture in our distressed world.

"With assurances of sympathy in your difficult problems and expressions of personal consideration,

"Most sincerely,
"(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY."

It is my personal opinion that Vichy should not be permitted to evade the assurances requested in regard to the provision of future aid to the enemy and in regard to the Caribbean islands, which Admiral Darlan will attempt to do.

He understands only positive action, and we are informed by some of his subordinates that he still believes that our proposal to recall the Ambassador is a bluff. The advisability may develop of recalling me "for consultation," even if it should be for only a temporary absence from France. It would be definitely disadvantageous to American prestige should we permit the "bluff" to be "called."

Most respectfully,
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

XXII

Letter from President Roosevelt, Washington, April 3, 1942, to Admiral Leahy.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON.

April 3, 1942.

DEAR BILL,—Yours of March tenth has just come. I am saddened by Darlan's outburst to you and I am delighted by your absolutely perfect reply to him. On the whole, I think our rather steady pressure has been successful to date, but I hope the present situation will continue to be no worse than it has been in the past.

As ever, yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

XXIII

Orders from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, July 18, 1942, to Admiral Leahy to report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy to serve as his Chief of Staff.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON:

July 18, 1942.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Washington, D.C.

Subject: To Duty.

1. You are hereby recalled to active duty.
2. You will report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States for duty as Chief of Staff to him as Commander-in-Chief.
3. This employment on shore duty is required by the public interests.

(Signed) FRANK KNOX.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 20, 1942.

Received at 12.00 noon this date.

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

First Endorsement.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 20, 1942.

From: The Commander-in-Chief.

To: Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S. Navy (Ret.).

1. Reported this date.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

XXIV

Orders from Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan to Fleet Admiral Leahy, detaching Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, endorsed by President Truman, March 21, 1949.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services.

Subject: Change of duty.

1. When directed by the President, you will regard yourself detached from duty as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services and from such other duty as may have been assigned you, and will report to the Secretary of the Navy for such duty as the President may direct.

(Signed) JOHN L. SULLIVAN.

WHITE HOUSE.
March 21, 1949.

From: The President of the United States.

To: Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services.

1. Detached this date.

(Signed) HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Third endorsement

March 21, 1949.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N.

Subject: Change of duty.

1. Reported this date.

(Signed) JOHN L. SULLIVAN.

XXV

Letter from Admiral Darlan, Algiers, November 27, 1942, to Admiral Leahy (translation).

To Admiral Leahy.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—I tell you here again how much I was moved when, some weeks ago, you were kind enough to show me your sympathy on the occasion of my son's dangerous illness.

Since then my son nearly died, and this is why I was in Africa on November 8. Is God's intervention to be seen in that? It is my deep belief.

The Commanding Officers of the United States Army in Africa and Mr. Murphy displayed the utmost delicacy towards myself

and my dear ill son. Both my wife and I feel deeply thankful to all American personalities who helped us in our sorrow.

Do you remember that, some ten months ago, as you asked me why I yielded to the Germans on some minor matters, I answered: "My only intention is to prevent them from coming to Africa and, as I am without armament and yourselves are very far, I am compelled to make concessions. If you had 500,000 men at Marseilles with 3,000 tanks and 3,000 planes, I doubtless could act otherwise."

If we had not promised to defend our territories against anyone who came to attack them, the Axis people would have occupied northern Africa long ago.

We have kept our word. As I was in Africa, I ordered to cease fighting so that a ditch should not be dug to separate America and France.

Having been disavowed by Vichy, I made myself a prisoner so that should not be resumed a fight of which I disapproved.

By that time, the Germans having breached the armistice by occupying the whole of France and Marshal Pétain having solemnly protested against that, I thought I was entitled again to act freely. I was the more sure to be on the right track that, by confidential messages passed to me in special cypher by someone at the French Admiralty, I was informed that the Marshal was in the bottom of his heart of the same opinion as me.

Moreover, he had often told me: "Darlan, we must always remain friends with the United States."

By adopting the line of conduct I am now following and by putting myself under the ægis of Marshal Pétain, whose place I was eventually to take and whose appointed successor I was until the day when the German was sovereign master in France, I had the certainty of rallying northern Africa and French West Africa, which I certainly could not have done had I been a "dissident."

I think that, when time has passed, all those differences between Frenchmen will be smoothed down, but for the time being the dissidents and ourselves must follow parallel roads, ignoring each other.

Besides, many Frenchmen were Gaullists only from hatred of the Germans and not because they felt sympathetic to that movement's leader.

Since the day when, under German pressure, Marshal Pétain was compelled to call back M. Laval to the Cabinet and give him a title and powers which I had declined in January, 1941, my personal popularity in France has considerably increased, for people understood I was not the Germans' yes-man.

In the course of purely military inspections deprived of any kind of publicity, I have been heartily cheered by numerous onlookers.

Last April, Marshal Pétain strongly insisted upon my staying as a member of the Government. I replied to him that I preferred to retire completely.

He then declared to me: "If you go, I shall also go." I answered: "Your departure would mean disaster. I shall stay then as 'dauphin'

and as military chief, but I refuse to form part of a Cabinet the ideas of which, concerning home as well as foreign policy, are not mine."

I can assure you, my dear Admiral, that the hour when the United States took action in Europe and Africa has seemed very slow to come to us Frenchmen who were under the conqueror's boot.

France is knocked down. I am just told that part of the French Fleet in Toulon has been scuttled, but fortunately the French Empire still stands and an important part of the fleet is at Dakar and Alexandria.

By your side and with your help, we are sure that France will totally revive. If President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill trust the team that work with me, I am certain that we shall bring to your cause—which is ours—the totality of French subjects, especially the Mohammedans.

Being glad to work with you for the success of the Allies' cause, among whom it can be said that now the French Empire is, I address to you the expression of my best feelings.

(Signed) F. DARLAN.

November 29.

President Roosevelt's generous offer concerning my son has been announced to me yesterday by Mr. Murphy. It deeply moved me, and I begged Mr. Murphy to convey to the President the expression of my thankfulness.

(Signed) F. D.

XXVI

Personnel of New French Government under Direction of Pierre Laval, April, 1942.

Chief of Government, Minister of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Information: Pierre Laval.

Minister of State: Lucien Romier.

Keeper of the Seals, Minister, Secretary of State for Justice: Joseph Barthélemy.

Minister Secretary of State for Finance: Pierre Cathala.

Minister Secretary of State for Agriculture and Food Supply: Jacques Leroy-Ladurie.

Minister Secretary of State for National Education: Abel Bonnard.

Secretaries of State

For War: General Bridoux.

For Navy: Admiral Auphan.

For Labour: Hubert Lagardelle.

For Transportation: Gibrat.

For Agriculture and Food Supply: Max Bonnafous.

For Colonies: Governor General Brevin.

For Family and Health: Dr. Grasset.

Attached to Chief of Government: De Brinon, Admiral Platon, Benoist-Mechin.

For Information: Paul Marion.

Secretary-General attached to Chief of Government: Jacques Guérard.

Secretary-General to Police: René Bousquet.

Secretary-General, Administration, Ministry of Interior: Georges Hilaire.

Delegate-General for Franco-German Economic Relations: Jacques Barnaud.

Commissioner-General for Sports: Pascaud.

XXVII

Statement of Policy made by Admiral Darlan in Africa, December 15, 1942.

French Africa, with the assistance of the Allies, must make a military effort to the maximum extent for the defeat of Germany and Italy. By the unity of all citizens, regardless of their political or religious opinion, will this be accomplished, in an orderly and cohesive fashion.

Liberated at last from German and Italian restrictions, the situation which has existed in accordance with French national traditions will be adjusted by the French authorities in Africa. As soon as France and the French Empire is liberated from the Axis yoke, the form of government and the national policy which they desire will be freely decided by the French people themselves.

The High Commissioner, in actual accomplishment, has already granted full and complete amnesty to all against whom any action has been taken because of sympathy to the Allies. Certain ones of these have been given important posts in the High Commissariat. All Army officers who had been suspended from office because of rendering aid to the Allies have been restored to their proper ranks and emoluments. Furthermore, the High Commissioner is now organizing among the representative private citizens a group or body to work with him in a consultative and advisory capacity in carrying on official business. Internees and prisoners of the United Nations have been promptly released and their travel to coastal ports expedited.

The High Commissioner has already begun the restoration of rights to those persons from whom, because of race, these rights had previously been taken away. Whatever persecution of the Jews may have resulted from the laws passed in France under German pressure will be immediately stopped by measures taken by him. Also he has announced that it is his purpose to give just treatment to all elements making up the complex North African population, in order that all can work together and dwell under laws insuring respect for rights and mutual tolerance.

In North Africa there is little industrial development, and Vichy laws prejudicial to labour unions had little or no application and all reports show no serious problem here. Only that censorship of the Press and radio in which Allied Authorities participate and which is necessary for the security of military operations is in force.

On the practical side, from a military point of view, the most active participation of the armed forces of North and West Africa has been conducted by General Giraud in the Allied war effort. Under his leadership, units of substantial size are fighting side by side with the United Nations in Tunisia against the Germans and Italians. General Giraud has made all post and airfield facilities, including the services of officials and technicians, freely available for the Allies' use. Already entering the services of the Allied Nations is the North African shipping, communications, motor-trucks, railroads, public and private buildings, and everything that North Africa has available to give have been freely offered to the forces of the Allies, wherever the military need exists.

I have said repeatedly and emphatically to General Eisenhower, the Commander-in-Chief, that in leading North and West Africa against Germany and Italy and into the ranks of the United Nations, I seek no assistance or support for any personal ambitions. I have announced that my only purpose is to save French Africa and, after helping to liberate France, then retire to private life with a hope that the French people themselves may select the future leaders of France, and that they may be selected by no one else.

XXVIII

A. Principal Personalities Present in Connection with "Trident" Conference, May 12-24, 1943, Washington, D.C.

Great Britain

Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
 General Sir Alan Brooke.
 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.
 Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
 Admiral Sir James Somerville.
 Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell.
 Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierse.
 General Sir Hastings Ismay.
 Lord Beaverbrook.
 Lord Cherwell.
 Lord Leathers.

China

Dr. T. V. Soong.

United States

President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
 Admiral William D. Leahy.
 General George C. Marshall.
 Admiral Ernest J. King.
 Harry L. Hopkins.
 Lieut.-General Joseph T. McNarney.
 Lieut.-General J. W. Stilwell.
 Major-General C. L. Chennault.

*B. Principal Personalities Present in Connection with "Quadrant" Conference,
 August 14-24, 1943, Quebec, Canada.*

Great Britain

Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
 Foreign Minister Anthony Eden.
 General Sir Alan Brooke.
 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.
 Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
 Field-Marshal Sir John Dill.
 Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.
 Lieut.-General Sir Hastings Ismay.

China

Dr. T. V. Soong.

United States

President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
 Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
 Secretary of Navy Knox.
 Admiral William D. Leahy.
 General George C. Marshall.
 Admiral Ernest J. King.
 General Henry H. Arnold.
 Harry L. Hopkins.
 Stephen Early.

*C. Principal Personalities Present in Connection with "Sextant" Conference,
 November 23-26, December 2-6, 1943, Cairo, Egypt.*

Great Britain

Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.
 General Sir Alan Brooke.
 Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.
 Field-Marshal Sir John Dill.

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.
Lieut.-General Sir Hastings Ismay.
Lieut.-General Carton de Wiart.

China

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Madame Chiang Kai-shek.
General Shang Chen.
Lieut.-General Lin Wei.
Lieut.-General Chu Shih Ming.

United States

President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Harry L. Hopkins.
Admiral William D. Leahy.
General G. C. Marshall.
Admiral E. J. King.
General H. H. Arnold.
Lieut.-General J. W. Stilwell.
Lieut.-General B. B. Somervell.
Major-General R. A. Wheeler.
Major-General G. E. Stratemeyer.
Major-General C. L. Chennault.
Major-General A. C. Wedemeyer.

Others

Field-Marshal Smuts, of South Africa.
President Ismet İnönü, of Turkey.
The Turkish Prime Minister.
The King of Greece.
King Peter of Yugoslavia.
The Heir Apparent of Egypt, Moballet Bey.

D. Principal Personalities Present in Connection with the "Eureka" Conference, November 28-December 1, 1943, Teheran, Iran.

Great Britain

Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.
Field-Marshal Sir John Dill.
General Sir Alan Brooke.
Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
Lieut.-General Sir Hastings Ismay.
Major Birse (interpreter).

U.S.S.R.

Marshal J. V. Stalin.
Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov.

Marshal Voroshiloff.
Mr. Pavlov (interpreter).

United States

President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Harry L. Hopkins.
Admiral William D. Leahy.
General G. C. Marshall.
Admiral E. J. King.
General H. H. Arnold.
Major-General J. R. Deane.
Brigadier-General Patrick J. Hurley.
Captain F. B. Royal.
Charles E. Bohlen (interpreter).

E. Principal Personalities Present in Connection with the "Octagon" Conference, September 11-16, 1944, Quebec, Canada.

Great Britain

Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden.
Lord Cherwell.
Lord Moran.
Lord Leathers.
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.
Field-Marshal Sir John Dill.
General Sir Hastings Ismay.
Admiral Sir Percy Noble.
Lieut.-General Sir Gordon N. Maccready.
Air Marshal Sir William Welsh.
Major-General R. E. Laycock.

United States

President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau.
Admiral William D. Leahy.
General G. C. Marshall.
Admiral E. J. King.
General H. H. Arnold.
Lieut.-General B. B. Somervell.
Vice-Admiral Emory S. Land.
Vice-Admiral R. Willson.
Rear-Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.
Rear-Admiral L. D. McCormick.
Major-General T. T. Handy.
Major-General M. S. Fairchild.
Major-General L. S. Kuter.
Stephen Early.

F. Principal Personalities Present in Connection with the "Argonaut" Conference, February 2-11, 1945, Yalta, Crimea.

United States

President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Secretary of State E. R. Stettinius.
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.
Harry L. Hopkins.
James F. Byrnes.
General of the Army George C. Marshall.
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King.
Lieut.-General Brehon B. Somervell.
Vice-Admiral Emory S. Land.
Major-General L. S. Kuter.
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
H. Freeman Matthews.
Alger Hiss.
Charles E. Bohlen.
Vice-Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.
Rear-Admiral L. D. McCormick.
Major-General J. R. Deane.
Major-General H. R. Bull.
Major-General F. L. Anderson.
Major-General J. E. Hull.

Great Britain

Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.
Lord Leathers.
Sir A. Clark Kerr (Ambassador to Moscow).
Sir Alexander Cadogan.
Sir Edward Bridges.
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.
General Sir Hastings Ismay.
Field-Marshal Sir H. Alexander.
Field-Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson.
Admiral Sir James Somerville.
Rear-Admiral E. R. Archer.
Major-General R. E. Laycock.
Major-General N. G. Holmes.

U.S.S.R.

Marshal J. V. Stalin.
Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov.
Admiral Kuznetsov.
Army General Antonov.
Andrei Y. Vyshinski.

I. M. Maiski.
 Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov.
 F. T. Gusev (Ambassador to Great Britain).
 Andrei A. Gromyko (Ambassador to U.S.A.).
 Lieut.-General Grizlov.
 Vice-Admiral Kucherov.
 Commander Kostrinski.
 Mr. Pavlov (interpreter).

G. Principal Personalities Present in Connection with the "Terminal" Conference, July 16–August 1, 1945, Potsdam, Germany.

United States

President Harry S. Truman.
 Secretary of State Byrnes.
 Secretary of War Stimson.
 Secretary of Navy Forrestal.
 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.
 General of the Army G. C. Marshall.
 Fleet Admiral E. J. King.
 General of the Army H. H. Arnold.
 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.
 Assistant Secretary of War McCloy.
 Edwin W. Pauley.
 Joseph E. Davies.
 W. Averell Harriman.
 Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton.
 Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn.
 General Omar Bradley.
 General B. B. Somervell.
 Vice-Admiral Emory S. Land.
 Lieut.-General J. E. Hull.
 Vice-Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.
 Major-General L. Norstad.
 Benjamin Cohen.
 H. Freeman Matthews.
 Charles E. Bohlen.

Great Britain

Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
 Foreign Minister Eden.
 Prime Minister Attlee.
 Foreign Minister Bevin.
 Sir Alexander Cadogan.
 Lord Leathers.
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
 Sir Walter Monckton.
 Sir William Strang.
 Sir Edward Bridges.

Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.
Field-Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.
Field-Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson.
General Sir Hastings Ismay.
Lieut.-General Sir Gordon N. Macready.
Major-General R. E. Laycock.
Major-General L. C. Hollis.

U.S.S.R.

Generalissimo J. V. Stalin.
Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov.
Andrei Y. Vyshinski.
Army General Antonov.
Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov.
Marshal of Aviation Fallalev.
F. T. Gousev.
Ivan M. Maisky.
Andrei A. Gromyko.
Lieut.-General Slavin.
Mr. Pavlov (interpreter).

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