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A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE

VOLUME I
THREE CENTURIES OF
PREDOMINANTLY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY
1500-1830




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A POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL HISTORY,
OF MODERN EUROPE

by
CARLTON J. H. HAYES,

Volume I,
Three Centuries
of Predominantly
Agricultural Society,
1500, — 1830.

New York,
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To
CAPTAIN LÉON DESSEZ, U. S. ARMY

FOREWORD

For two thousand years and more Europe has been the seat of that continuous high civilization which we call "western,"—which has come to be the distinctive civilization of the American continents as well as of Europe, and which has latterly affected the peculiar civilizations of the "east" more than these have affected the "west." From Europe have radiated the special influences which distinguish most of the world-wide culture of the present day. It is from modern Europe, primarily, that such influences have so widely radiated.

The story of modern Europe the present work aims to tell. It tells the story in two volumes. The first volume, here presented, treats of the predominantly agricultural society which, growing out of much earlier times and conditions, continued to flourish all over Europe from the sixteenth to the early part of the nineteenth century, and in the midst of which were laid the foundations for novel activities and modes of thought and for European hegemony throughout the world. The second volume will be concerned with the latest and most crucial century of industrial society, which has witnessed the erection of almost fantastic superstructures on the foundations previously laid.

The present work is based in part, but only in part, on the Political and Social History of Modern Europe which the author wrote in the four years from 1912 to 1916. The organization is considerably different. The content is considerably richer. Into the story of how modern Europe has earned a living and been ruled is now woven a story of what it has thought and achieved in science and philosophy, in literature and art. The new synthesis is intended to present not a one-sided, but the many-sided, aspect of modern Europe.

The new work, it will be noted, has certain distinctive mechanical features. With a view to supplementing the textual treatment of cultural history, much attention has been given to the selection and reproduction of initial letters, chapter tailpieces, and some sixty full-page illustrations, all by important and strictly contemporary

artists. With a view to graphic representation of parts of the world as Europeans were wont at various periods to imagine them, the trouble has been taken to reproduce on end-papers or special plates some fifteen maps from contemporary atlases, beginning with an atlas published at Venice in 1562. As special aids to the student, new tables of dynastic relationships have been executed and a new set of fifteen sketch maps has been supplied.

The author trusts that in comparison with his earlier book the present work is better written, better balanced, more accurate, more teachable, more attractive. If it proves to be so, the credit must go in very large part to the encouragement, criticism, and advice which he has received during the past twenty years from numerous scholarly colleagues and friends. Acknowledgment of his whole debt would be impossible. With the gentlemen whose names appear in the "note of acknowledgment" in the Political and Social History of Modern Europe, and with other college teachers, too many to mention by name, who since its publication have made critical and constructive suggestions, must be associated, in particular, three gentlemen who have been of signal service in the final preparation of this Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe. Its organization has been discussed at length with Professor Herbert C. Bell of Wesleyan University, Connecticut. Its text has been meticulously and brilliantly criticized and its proofs painstakingly read by Mr. Thomas H. Thomas of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Its illustrations and contemporary maps have been chosen and its expression improved through the collaboration and infectious enthusiasm of Captain Léon Dessez of the United States Army.

There is no short cut to an understanding of modern Europe, and the present work, planned mainly though not exclusively as an introductory survey for college students, is somewhat detailed and purposely long. The author is quite convinced that college students, like other mature and curious persons, should be induced to read more history, rather than less, that they should ponder on a substantial general work as well as browse freely over a wide range of monographic literature,—that is, if they are to know anything worth while about the past of their kind. The wise need not be told that man without man's past is meaningless.

C. J. H. H.

ATTON, NEW YORK,
July 18, 1932.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	vii

PART I

THE FORMING OF MODERN EUROPE

CHAPTER I. POLITICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY	3
1. Christendom and the Holy Roman Empire	3
2. Islam and the Ottoman Empire	9
3. The City States	17
4. The New National Monarchies	23
5. Rise of National Patriotism	38
CHAPTER II. ECONOMIC EXPANSION	47
1. European Agriculture at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century	47
2. European Cities and Commerce at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century	55
3. The Overseas Explorations	66
4. The New Colonial Empires	76
5. Rise of Modern Capitalism	82
CHAPTER III. THE INTELLECTUAL QUICKENING	96
1. The Invention of Printing	96
2. The Rediscovery of Classical Civilization	99
3. Renaissance Art	111
4. National Literatures	119
5. Scientific Development	122
CHAPTER IV. THE RELIGIOUS UPHEAVAL	136
1. Christianity at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century	136
2. Rise of Protestant Churches	152
(a) Lutheranism	153
(b) Calvinism	161
(c) Anglicanism	169
(d) Radical Protestantism	176
3. Reform of the Catholic Church	183

	PAGE
4. The Three Great Divisions of Christendom at the Close of the Sixteenth Century	190
5. Inter-Christian Intolerance and War	197
6. Other Effects of the Religious Upheaval	207

PART II

DYNASTIC AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

CHAPTER V. THE PREDOMINANCE OF SPAIN	223
1. The Age of Charles V	223
2. The Age of Philip II	241
3. The Age of the Thirty Years' War	260
CHAPTER VI. THE PREDOMINANCE OF FRANCE	278
1. France under Henry IV, Richelieu, and Mazarin	278
2. The Age of Louis XIV	290
3. Seeming Bourbon Ascendancy	304
CHAPTER VII. THE AUSTRIAN HABSBURGS AND THE RISE OF PRUSSIA	320
1. The Holy Roman Empire in Decay	320
2. The Dominions of the Austrian Habsburgs	324
3. The Hohenzollerns and Prussia	329
4. Minor German States	335
5. The Contest between Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs	338
6. Frederick the Great and the Age of "Enlightened" Despots	346
CHAPTER VIII. THE RISE OF RUSSIA	357
1. Russia and the Romanovs	357
2. Sweden and the Career of Charles XII	367
3. Catherine the Great: the Dismemberment of Poland and the Defeat of the Ottoman Empire	372
CHAPTER IX. THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE	384
1. Foundations of British Commerce, Colonies, and Capitalism	384
2. Britain's Rivalry with France	395
3. Britain's Triumph over France	407
4. Britain's Acquisition of India and Australia	413

PART III

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTS OF
THE MODERN WORLD

CHAPTER X. THE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS	425
1. Reaction to Absolute Monarchy	425
2. The Puritan Revolution and the Restoration	438

CONTENTS

xi

	PAGE
3. The Aristocratic "Glorious" Revolution	446
4. The Parliamentary Oligarchy and the Agricultural Revolution	453
5. The American Revolution	469
CHAPTER XI. THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION	496
1. Progress of Natural Science	497
2. The New Metaphysics: the "Enlightenment"	506
3. Pietism and Deism	512
4. Development of Social Science	532
5. Fruits of Classicism and Seeds of Romanticism	555
CHAPTER XII. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION	577
1. Antecedent Conditions and Circumstances	577
2. National and Democratic Self-Determination	601
3. End of the Monarchy and Beginning of National War	615
4. Jacobinism Triumphant	627
5. Transformation of the Republic into a Military Dictatorship	640
CHAPTER XIII. THE ERA OF NAPOLEON	647
1. Bonaparte's Heritage from the French Revolution	647
2. The French Empire and its Territorial Expansion	657
3. Tightening of Foreign Opposition to Napoleon	668
4. The Destruction of the French Territorial Empire	682
5. The Spread of the Principles of the French Revolution	696
CHAPTER XIV. THE ERA OF METTERNICH	718
1. Metternich and Divided Europe	718
2. The Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe	722
3. Rise of Romanticism	734
4. The Epidemic of Conflicts between Conservatives and Liberals	751
5. Liberal Successes in Southern Europe and America	775
6. Conservative Successes in Central and Northern Europe	790
7. The Transition from Agricultural to Industrial Society	795

APPENDIX

RULERS OF EUROPEAN STATES, 1500-1830	801
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	812
INDEX	843

ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN I, by Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528)	<i>frontispiece</i>
TITLE PAGE, design by Albrecht Dürer, lettering by Paul Domville	<i>title page</i>
INITIAL LETTERS, ALPHABET OF DEATH, by Hans Holbein (1497-1543)	
3, 47, 96, 136, 223, 278, 320, 357,	
384, 425, 496, 577, 647, 718	
SULTAN MOHAMMED II, by Gentile Bellini (1429-1507)	<i>facing</i> 16
PROCESSION IN ST. MARK'S SQUARE, VENICE, IN 1496, by Gentile Bellini	<i>facing</i> 17
RETURN OF THE HEIR TO THE ENGLISH THRONE, by Vittore Carpaccio (1455-1524)	<i>facing</i> 26
THE NEW ARTILLERY, by Hans Burgkmair (1473-1531)	<i>facing</i> 27
DEATH AND THE EMPEROR, by Hans Holbein	46
SUMMER ON THE COUNTRYSIDE, by Pieter Brueghel (1526-1569) <i>facing</i>	52
A VILLAGE DANCE, by Pieter Brueghel	<i>facing</i> 53
A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SHIP, by Pieter Brueghel	<i>facing</i> 88
A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BANKER, by Hans Holbein	<i>facing</i> 89
DEATH AND THE PEASANT, by Hans Holbein	95
THE SCHOOL OF ATHENS, by Raphael (1483-1520)	<i>facing</i> 116
A BOTANICAL SKETCH, by Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519)	<i>facing</i> 117
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY MINING, by Hans Holbein	<i>facing</i> 128
WILLIAM HARVEY, by Cornelius Jansen (1593-1660)	<i>facing</i> 129
THE LAST JUDGMENT, by Hans Holbein	135
PIETÀ, by Michelangelo (1475-1564)	<i>facing</i> 142
ECCLESIASTICAL BURIAL OF A SPANISH NOBLEMAN, by El Greco (1542- 1614)	<i>facing</i> 143
PHILIP MELANCHTHON, by Albrecht Dürer	<i>facing</i> 158
THOMAS MORE, by Hans Holbein	<i>facing</i> 159
KING HENRY VIII, by Hans Holbein	<i>facing</i> 172
POPE CLEMENT VII, by Sebastiano del Piombo (1485-1547) <i>facing</i>	173
DEATH AND THE PREACHER, by Hans Holbein	219
EMPEROR CHARLES V, by Titian (1477-1576)	<i>facing</i> 240
KING PHILIP II, by Titian	<i>facing</i> 241
SURRENDER OF BREDÁ, by Velasquez (1599-1660)	<i>facing</i> 266
KING PHILIP IV, by Velasquez	<i>facing</i> 267
DEATH AND THE SOLDIER, by Hans Holbein	277
TURENNE, by Robert Nanteuil (1623-1678)	<i>facing</i> 286

	PAGE
MISERIES OF WAR, by Jacques Callot (1592-1635)	facing 287
KING LOUIS XIV, by Robert Nanteuil	facing 294
FÊTE CHAMPÊTRE, by Antoine Watteau (1684-1721)	facing 295
DEATH AND THE KING, by Hans Holbein	319
SCHÖNBRUNN, THE PALACE OF THE AUSTRIAN HABSBURGS, by Antonio Canaletto (1697-1768)	facing 328
EMPEROR CHARLES VI, by Johann Gottfried Auerbach (1697-1753) facing	325
FREDERICK THE GREAT, by Daniel Chodowiecki (1726-1801)	facing 340
MARIA THERESA, by Johann Balzer (1738-1799)	facing 341
A PRUSSIAN ARMY OFFICER (GENERAL ZIETHEN), by Daniel Cho- dowiecki	356
RUSSIAN CAPTURE OF A SWEDISH BALTIC FORT, by Adriaen Schoone- beek (1661-1714)	facing 372
CATHERINE II, by Dmitri Gregorievitch Levitsky (1735-1822)	facing 373
CATHERINE AND FREDERICK IN HEAVEN, by Daniel Chodowiecki	383
THE SOVEREIGNE OF THE SEAS, by John Payne (1588-1641)	facing 388
A DUTCH BANKER, by Rembrandt (1606-1669)	facing 389
TASTE IN HIGH LIFE, by William Hogarth (1697-1764)	facing 418
CAPTAIN JAMES COOK, by Nathaniel Dance (1735-1811)	facing 419
JOHN BULL TAKING A LUNCHEON, by James Gillray (1757-1815)	422
KING JAMES I, by Pieter de Jode (1570-1634)	facing 436
TRIAL OF ARCHBISHOP LAUD IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, by Wenceslaus Hollar (1607-1677)	facing 437
GETTING VOTES FOR A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, by William Hogarth facing	464
THE MACNAB, AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SCOTTISH ARISTOCRAT, by Henry Raeburn (1756-1823)	facing 465
A REFORMER, by James Gillray	495
DESCARTES, by Frans Hals (1580-1666)	facing 504
BUFFON, by Jean Antoine Houdon (1740-1828)	facing 505
EDWARD GIBBON, by Henry Walton (1720-1790)	facing 536
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, by J. A. Houdon	facing 537
THE CORONATION OF VOLTAIRE, A CLASSICAL CONCEPTION, by Jean Michel Moreau (1741-1814)	facing 564
THE BASTIONS OF SONNENSTEIN, A ROMANTIC CONCEPTION, by Ber- nardo Bellotto (1720-1780)	facing 565
THE ENLIGHTENED PHILOSOPHER (VOLTAIRE), by Daniel Chodowiecki	576
MIRABEAU, by J. A. Houdon	facing 598
A SCENE AT THE BOURBON COURT AT VERSAILLES, by J. M. Moreau facing	599
ROBESPIERRE, from an anonymous bronze medal	facing 630

	PAGE
A WOMAN OF THE REVOLUTION, by Jacques Louis David (1748-1825)	631
	<i>facing</i>
QUEEN MARIE ANTOINETTE EN ROUTE TO THE GUILLOTINE, by J. L. David	646
NAPOLEON, by J. A. Houdon	<i>facing</i> 668
"THERE'S NO HELP," by Francisco Goya (1746-1828)	<i>facing</i> 669
WILLIAM PITT, by Thomas Gainsborough (1727-1788)	<i>facing</i> 712
ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON, by Francisco Goya	<i>facing</i> 713
NAPOLEON AND DEATH, by Thomas Rowlandson (1756-1827)	717
ROMANTIC NATURE: TIVOLI, by Giovanni Battista Piranesi (1727-1778)	<i>facing</i> 742
ROMANTIC NATIONALISM: LA PATRIE, by Jean François Rude (1784-1855)	<i>facing</i> 743
LIBERTY LEADING THE PEOPLE, by F. V. E. Delacroix (1798-1863)	<i>facing</i> 790
METTERNICH, by François Gérard (1770-1837)	<i>facing</i> 791
COMMERCE UNDER THE PRINCE REGENT OF BRITAIN, by James Gillray	798
THE FRUIT OF LIBERTY, by James Gillray	840

MAPS

	PAGE
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY MAP OF EUROPE, from <i>Geographiæ Universæ</i> (Venice, 1596)	front end papers
EUROPEAN NATIONALITIES, <i>sketch map</i>	39
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY MAP OF THE WORLD, from <i>Geographia Cl. Ptolemaei</i> (Venice, 1562)	between 66 and 67
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY MAP OF ASIA, from <i>Geographiæ Universæ</i> (Venice, 1596)	between 76 and 77
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY MAP OF AMERICA, from <i>Atlas Minor Ioannis Ianssonii</i> (Amsterdam, 1651)	between 80 and 81
CHRISTENDOM IN 1500 AND IN 1600, <i>sketch maps</i>	191
EUROPEAN DYNASTIC EMPIRE OF CHARLES V, <i>sketch map</i>	226
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY MAP OF GERMANY, from <i>Atlas Minor Ioannis Ianssonii</i> (Amsterdam, 1651)	between 260 and 261
CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA, <i>sketch map</i>	273
ENLARGEMENT OF FRANCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, <i>sketch map</i>	305
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF EUROPE AFTER THE TREATY OF UTRECHT, from <i>Atlas Minor</i> by H. Moll (London, 1736), <i>in color</i>	between 310 and 311
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ITALY, from <i>Atlas Minor</i> by H. Moll (London, 1736), <i>in color</i>	between 316 and 317
HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE IN 1775, <i>sketch map</i>	323
PRUSSIAN EXPANSION TO 1795, <i>sketch map</i>	345
EUROPEAN DYNASTIC EMPIRES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, <i>sketch map</i>	354
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF NORTHWESTERN EUROPE AT THE END OF THE REIGN OF PETER THE GREAT, from <i>Atlas Minor</i> by H. Moll (London, 1736), <i>in color</i>	between 368 and 369
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE PRIOR TO THE REIGN OF CATHERINE THE GREAT, from <i>Atlas Minor</i> by H. Moll (London, 1736)	between 376 and 377
EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, <i>sketch map</i>	380
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF EAST INDIES IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, from <i>Atlas Minor</i> by H. Moll (London, 1736), <i>in color</i>	between 398 and 399
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF AMERICA IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, from <i>Atlas Minor</i> by H. Moll (London, 1736), <i>in color</i>	between 404 and 405

	PAGE
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF NORTH AMERICA PRIOR TO THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR, from <i>Atlas Minor</i> by H. Moll (London, 1736)	between 408 and 409
EUROPEAN DOMINION IN THE NEW WORLD IN 1789, <i>sketch map</i>	. 486
CONTEMPORARY FRENCH MAP OF EUROPE IN 1780, from <i>Carte Générale de l'Europe</i> by M. Bonne (Paris, 1780)	. between 588 and 589
FRANCE BY PROVINCES (1789) AND BY DÉPARTEMENTS (1795), <i>sketch maps</i>	. 609
CONTEMPORARY FRENCH MAP OF EUROPE IN 1800, from <i>Atlas</i> by Edme Mentelle (Paris, 1804)	. between 650 and 651
NAPOLEONIC EUROPE IN 1810, <i>sketch map</i>	. 679
PARTITIONS OF POLAND, 1772-1815, <i>sketch maps</i>	. 701
CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, <i>sketch map</i>	. 728
BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1815, <i>sketch map</i>	. 760
CONTEMPORARY MAP OF EUROPE AT THE CLOSE OF THE ERA OF METTERNICH, from <i>Findlay Modern Atlas</i> (London, 1850)	. rear end papers

GENEALOGICAL CHARTS

HABSBURGS OF SPAIN AND AUSTRIA AND RELATED MONARCHS IN EARLY MODERN TIMES	. facing 224
BOURBONS OF FRANCE AND RELATED MONARCHS IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES	. facing 280
HOHENZOLLERN FAMILY, 1415-1840	. 332
ROMANOV SOVEREIGNS OF RUSSIA	. 361
TUDOR, STUART, AND HANOVERIAN SOVEREIGNS OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND	. facing 452
BONAPARTE FAMILY	. 664

PART I
THE FORMING OF MODERN EUROPE

- I. POLITICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
- II. ECONOMIC EXPANSION
- III. THE INTELLECTUAL QUICKENING
- IV. THE RELIGIOUS UPHEAVAL

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

I. CHRISTENDOM AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE



BY the sixteenth century Europe possessed a remarkable unity. The mass of its inhabitants from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Ocean and from the Balkan peninsula and the Ural Mountains to the islands of Ireland and Iceland thought of themselves as members of a peculiar and "chosen" people, and as associates in a commonwealth. They were "chosen" because they were Christians, and they had a name for their commonwealth. They called it "Christendom."

Christendom

Christendom had originated fifteen hundred years earlier in the Asiatic provinces of the Roman Empire and for several centuries had been almost identical with that Empire, spreading over western Asia and northern Africa as well as southern Europe. But the rise and rapid extension of the Arab empire and the Moslem religion in the seventh century had served to deprive Christendom (and the Roman Empire) of its Asiatic and African provinces and to turn its expansive efforts northward in Europe, outside of the historic confines of the Roman Empire. Christendom was extended over the Franks in the sixth century, over the Anglo-Saxons in the seventh century, over the Germans in the eighth century, over the Czechoslovaks in the ninth century, over the Poles in the tenth century, over the Magyars, Scandinavians, Finns, and Russians in the eleventh century. For four hundred years prior to 1500, Christendom had been Europe, and Europe had been Christendom.

For many centuries the idea had been prevalent in Europe that Christendom was a political as well as a cultural unit, and that its government should ultimately be directed by two great coextensive institutions, independent of each other but working in close alliance and alike

Church
and
Empire

commanding the allegiance of all Christians. One of these institutions was the church, and the other was the empire. The church was the supreme spiritual power; the empire was the supreme temporal power. In theory at least, Europeans owed obedience to both.

Between empire and church, between the temporal power and the spiritual power, the separation which existed in 1500, and which had long existed previously, was a different kind of separation from what obtains between state and church in most so-called Christian countries nowadays. Nowadays the usual arrangement is for the state to claim and to exercise supreme political authority over all its citizens, and for the church to exert authority rather narrowly restricted to spiritual and moral affairs. This authority the church usually exerts over only such citizens as voluntarily recognize and accept it. In 1500, and in earlier times, however, both the state and the church exercised real authority, political as well as moral, over all Europeans. All Europeans were subject to the state, and therefore to temporal rulers. At the same time all Europeans were subject to the church, and therefore to ecclesiastical rulers. But while everyone recognized this general principle of divided authority, there had been chronic disputes as to its specific practice, some persons maintaining that it was the church, others asserting that it was the state, which in last resort should determine the boundary between the two authorities.

Whatever might be the assertions in behalf of the state, the church possessed for centuries prior to the year 1500 an effective organization, under the supreme direction of the bishop of Rome, the pope, which acted directly upon the vast majority of Europeans and exercised, in addition to its strictly religious and moral influence, a central political sway over most of Christendom. It owned extensive lands and estates that were practically independent of temporal rulers. It levied taxes upon all its members. It had its own laws and judicial system, and in its courts were tried not only cases which affected its own officers but certain kinds of cases, notably those concerning the marriage relations and the probating of wills, which affected everyone in Christendom. Besides, it controlled in various countries and regions of Europe the schools and universities, the hospitals and asylums. The church, with its army

of officials all over Europe and with its great moral influence and its wide political powers, was the dominant unifying force in Christendom.

However much political sway the pope and other ecclesiastical rulers might exercise, they never failed to extol the divine right and the practical need of supplementary temporal rule.

In their opinion, the state was almost if not quite as essential as the church, and the ideal form of the state was an empire which should embrace all Europe. The idea of such an empire was most natural to Christians. It was part of their historical legacy. For it had been within an empire—the old Roman Empire—that Christianity had originated and had won its first successes, and for centuries, under the Christian Cæsars of that empire, the inhabitants of Egypt and Greece had joined with the citizens of Italy and Spain in dual allegiance to the emperor and to the pope. With the expansion of Christianity in later centuries, it seemed proper that the temporal rule of an emperor should accompany the spiritual rule of the pope. Christendom could and should be doubly unified by church and empire.

The
Imperial
Idea

The imperial idea, however, had not been fully realized. The original Roman Empire had fallen prey to civil war and barbarian invasion: its Asiatic and African provinces were lost to Moslem conquerors; and its western and central European provinces became seats of quarrelsome Germanic kingdoms. As it shrank to the dimensions of a "kingdom" in the Balkan peninsula, it repudiated the papacy, thereby loosing its tie with the spiritual centre of Christendom, and it degenerated into a state essentially Greek, thereby impairing its right to be considered the temporal head of Christendom. Moreover, as Christianity spread into northern Europe, it proved increasingly difficult to establish or maintain a unified temporal empire. The newer converts to Christianity were used to tribal states rather than to an empire, and while they accepted the spiritual sway of the pope, it proved well-nigh impossible to subject them to the temporal rule of an emperor. About the year 800 Charlemagne, the king of the Franks, with the sanction of the pope, temporarily united what are now France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and Belgium into a state which he called the "Roman Empire" and of which he was crowned emperor. And nearly two centuries later, Otto the

Great, a prince in Germany, again with the approval of the pope, gave other form to the same ambition and assumed the title of emperor of the "Roman Empire." This "holy" empire still endured in the year 1500.

In theory, the Holy Roman Empire claimed temporal supremacy over all Christian rulers and peoples of central and western

The Holy Roman Empire Europe, and after the final extinction of the Greek Empire in 1453 it could claim that it was the sole secular heir to the ancient Roman tradition and the paramount temporal agency of all Christendom. But the vastness of the theoretical claim of the Holy Roman Empire was matched only by the insignificance of its actual acceptance.

For centuries before 1500 the basic social and political institution in western and central Europe had been feudalism, involving the exercise, on the part of a large number of landed nobles,—dukes, counts, barons, etc.,—of direct and almost independent political power over the people on their respective estates. Against this institution, various princes or "kings" gradually made some headway, reducing the feudal nobles to royal obedience. But the more unquestioned became the authority of the kings over the feudal nobles, the less inclined were the kings to yield any obedience to the Holy Roman Emperor. The Holy Roman Emperor had been too hard pressed by struggles with the church and with his immediate feudal vassals to prevent the rise of independent national kingdoms; and at the same time the vigorous rise of these kingdoms had contributed to the political weakness of the empire.

By the year 1500 the Holy Roman Empire was virtually restricted to German-speaking peoples. The papacy and the

Germany in 1500 Italian cities had been freed from imperial control, and the Netherlands—that is, Holland and Belgium,—and likewise the Swiss cantons, were only nominally subject to it. England, France, Portugal, and Spain admitted no real dependence upon it, and it was inoperative over the Scandinavians to the north and over most of the Slavic peoples to the east—Poles, Russians, etc. By the year 1500 the words Empire and Germany had become almost interchangeable terms.

By the year 1500, moreover, the Holy Roman Empire was internally weak. It consisted of a hodgepodge of city states and feudal survivals—archduchies, such as Austria; margravates,

such as Brandenburg; duchies, like Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg; counties, like the Palatinate; and a host of free cities, baronies, and domains, some of them smaller than an American township. In all there were over three hundred states which collectively were called "the Germanies" and which were united only by the slender imperial thread. The idea of empire had not only been narrowed to one nation; it also, in its failure to overcome feudalism, had prevented the growth of a real national monarchy.

What was the nature of this slight tie that nominally held the Germanies together? There was the form of a central government with an emperor to execute laws and a diet to make them. The emperor was not necessarily hereditary but was chosen by seven "electors," who were the chief princes of the realm. These seven were the archbishops of Mainz, of Cologne, and of Trier, the king of Bohemia, the duke of Saxony, the margrave of Brandenburg, and the count palatine of the Rhine. Not infrequently the electors used their position to extort from the emperor-elect concessions which helped to destroy German unity and to promote the separate interests of the princes. The imperial diet was composed of the seven electors, the lesser princes (including the higher ecclesiastical dignitaries, such as bishops and abbots), and representatives of the free cities, grouped in three separate houses. The emperor was not supposed to perform any imperial act without the authorization of the diet, and petty jealousies between its members or houses often prevented action in the diet. The individual states, moreover, reserved to themselves the management of many affairs which in western Europe had been surrendered to the central national government. The diet, and therefore the emperor, was without a treasury or an army, unless the individual states saw fit to act favorably upon its advice and furnish the requested quotas. The diet resembled far more a congress of diplomats than a legislative body.

It will be readily perceived that under these circumstances the emperor as such could have little power. Yet the fear of impending Slavic or Turkish attacks upon the eastern frontier, or other fears, frequently operated to secure the election of some prince who had sufficient military might of his own to stay the attack or remove the fear. In this way, the custom developed

The
Emperor

in the later middle ages of choosing as Holy Roman Emperor the Habsburg archduke of Austria, the easternmost of the German states. And in the Habsburg family the headship continued until the final extinction of the empire in 1806. Several of these Habsburg emperors were influential, but it must always be remembered that they owed their power less to the empire than to their own hereditary states.

The great family fortunes of the Habsburgs had begun in the thirteenth century with Count Rudolph. He was elected to the headship of the Holy Roman Empire in 1273 and utilized this position to acquire the valuable archduchy of Austria, with its capital-city of Vienna, as an hereditary possession. Subsequently the family became related by marriage to reigning families in Hungary and in Italy, as well as in Bohemia and other states of the empire. In 1477 the Emperor Maximilian I (1493-1519) married Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold and heiress of the wealthy provinces of the Netherlands; and in 1496 his son Philip was united to Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella and heiress of the crowns of Castile and Aragon. The fortunes of the Habsburgs were decidedly auspicious. By a process of dynastic accretion they were constructing a far flung hereditary empire which would assure them, as the Holy Roman Empire could not assure them, a commanding position in Europe.

Indeed, the *dynastic* empire of the Habsburgs (as distinct from the Holy Roman Empire) was a type of political idea and institution quite prevalent throughout Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was not only the imperial family of the Habsburgs at Vienna which sought an accretion of domains by marriage alliances and other dynastic devices. The royal families of Spain, France, England, and most other kingdoms, as well as the petty princes and barons of more diminutive states, were likewise vying with one another and with the emperor to arrange such marriages and such inheritances as would redound to the wealth and prestige of their respective dynasties. Germany was especially the prey of just such rival ambitions, and these in turn militated against the solidarity of the German people and the unity of the Holy Roman Empire.

Of course, signs were not wanting of some national life in Germany. Most of the people spoke a common language; a

form of national unity existed in the diet; and many patriots raised their voice in behalf of a stronger and more centralized government. In 1495 the diet met at the city of Worms to discuss with Emperor Maximilian projects of reform. After protracted debates, it was agreed that private warfare, an attendant of feudalism, should be abolished; a perpetual internal peace should be proclaimed; and an imperial court should be established to settle all disputes between states within the empire. These efforts at reform, like many before and after, were largely unfruitful, and, despite occasional protests, political disunion and weakness continued to prevail within the Holy Roman Empire.

Projects
for Re-
forming
the Em-
pire

Yet, so obsessed were men's minds with the old Roman tradition of empire that most Europeans continued to regard the Holy Roman Empire with awe. It was thought of as venerable and therefore as natural and eternal. It was deemed worth fighting about. Its titles were coveted, even by the national monarchs of England, France, Spain, and Hungary. It long continued to evoke an interest and a fascination curiously disproportionate to its actual strength.

2. ISLAM AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The awe which Europeans felt for the old Holy Roman Empire was matched in the year 1500 by the fear and dread which they entertained of the new Ottoman Empire. In this, they were justified. For, if the Holy Roman Empire was weaker in fact than in appearance, the Ottoman Empire displayed a real vigor commensurate with its pretensions and ambitions.

In a sense the Ottoman Empire was not "new." It represented, politically and geographically, a continuation of the imperial tradition of the Near East—of the Greek (Byzantine) Empire of the middle ages, of the Roman Empire of Justinian and Constantine, and of the much earlier empire of Alexander the Great. It was built directly on the ruins of the Byzantine Empire; it embraced the same area and the same populations; and it took over, with changed names, the same institutions and practices.

The
Eastern
Empire

What was "new" about the Ottoman Empire was the shift of southeastern Europe from Christian to Moslem control, the accompanying renewal of military energy in that quarter, and

the fair promise that a large part if not all of Europe might speedily be incorporated in a vast empire which in its government and culture would be based on Islam rather than on Christianity.

Islam was, of course, the religion of Mohammed, neatly summarized in the formula, "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet." It had originated in Arabia in the seventh century; and within a hundred years, thanks to amazing proselyting zeal and astounding military conquest, it had largely supplanted Christianity in western Asia and northern Africa and had penetrated into southwestern Europe. Against southeastern Europe and Asia Minor, it had at that time beaten in vain. The Christian Roman Empire of the Byzantine Greeks had then been too strong for it. Thereafter, the huge Arab Empire had broken up into mutually warring fragments and the expansive force of Islam had seemingly been exhausted. During the middle ages Christians of western Europe as well as those of the Byzantine Empire took the offensive against the Moslems, and for a time it appeared as though the whole Near East might be wrested from Islam and restored to Christendom.

The crusades eventually failed, however. Indeed, they proved to be, from the Christian standpoint, worse than a failure. They aroused and revived the forces of Islam, while sowing new seeds of discord between Christians of the West and those of the Byzantine Empire. They evoked a second great wave of Moslem conquest, that of the Ottoman Turks, which expanded Islam and contracted Christendom.

The Turks were a tribal people whose original home was in the steppes and deserts of the Turkestan of central Asia and who had emigrated thence, during the middle ages, both as nomads and as permanent settlers, to Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, and particularly to Asia Minor. They had adopted the Moslem religion of the populations among whom they roved or settled. One of the Turkish tribes which penetrated into Asia Minor had a chieftain about the year 1300 whose name was Osman or Othman and who assumed the title of emir (prince) of the Turks. The Turks who were subject to Othman and his successors were henceforth called the Ottoman Turks.

Othman and his immediate successors were valiant warriors

and gifted statesmen. They annexed other Turkish states and incorporated other Turkish tribes, and slowly but surely they built up a powerful military state. It was this rising, growing state of the Ottoman Turks which was destined to become the outstanding champion of Islam and to renew with Christendom the struggle for mastery of the Near East and perhaps of all Europe.

In the first half of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Turks devoted their energies to the conquest of Asia Minor. They extended their sway over all the Moslem peoples in the region, and to the east they reduced the Christian Armenians. Simultaneously, to the west, they pushed the boundary of the Byzantine Empire farther and farther back, capturing one Greek city after another—Ephesus, Brusa, Nicæa, and Nicomedia. By the middle of the century they had undone the work of the crusaders and had wrested all Asia Minor from the Greeks. They made Brusa the capital of their empire, and the Ottoman emir took the title of sultan.

As the territory of the Moslem Empire grew, that of the Christian Byzantine Empire diminished. This empire—the uninterrupted continuation of the ancient Roman Empire—was now steadily declining and deteriorating. Asia Minor was finally surrendered to the Turks. Crete, the Ægean islands, and most of the Greek peninsula were occupied by the Venetians. A large part of the Balkan peninsula was in possession of Slavic peoples—Yugoslavs and Bulgarians—who maintained independent states of their own and disputed with the Greeks the control of southeastern Europe.

**Decline
and Fall
of the
Byzantine
Empire**

The Græco-Roman (Byzantine) emperors in Constantinople thus found themselves, by the middle of the fourteenth century, hemmed in on all sides. Their empire was actually restricted to the capital, to a part of Thrace, and to a narrow strip of sea-coast along the Ægean. They were confronted with foreign foes—Turks, Slavs, and Italians. They were beset with grave domestic problems: they were short of soldiers and money; they were weakened by recurring revolutions and quarrels over the imperial succession.

In the second half of the fourteenth century the Ottoman Turks transferred their military activities and successes from

Asia Minor to southeastern Europe. They crossed the straits in force in 1360, and in the following year they captured Adrianople and made it their capital. In 1387 they conquered Salonica. Two years later, on the fateful field of Kossovo, they overwhelmed the Yugoslavs.— In 1393 they decisively defeated the Bulgarians. In the meantime they were seizing islands in the Ægean and fighting the Venetians in the Greek peninsula. At the end of the century the Ottoman Turks dominated the entire Balkan peninsula except Constantinople and a few other posts still held by Greeks or Italians.

In desperation the Byzantine emperors begged aid of western Europe, and in alarm the popes preached new crusades and besought all Christians to go to the assistance of the Greeks. Some Christian princes did lead armies against the Turks; the kings of Poland and Hungary repeatedly tried to stem the tide of Moslem conquest; and the Venetians, with their commercial interests in the Near East clearly at stake, turned crusaders and fought manfully against the Turks. It was in vain. The Turks still advanced.

In 1453, after elaborate preparations, Mohammed II, the ablest and greatest of the Ottoman sultans, with an army of 150,000 men, laid siege to Constantinople. The city was defended by a pitifully small Christian army, numbering not more than 8,000, of whom half were Greek (including monks and priests) and the other half comprised detachments sent by the pope and by the city states of Venice and Genoa “for the glory of God and the safety of Christendom.” What the Christians lacked in numbers they made up in grim determination and reckless bravery, and for almost two months the little garrison held the Moslem host at bay. It was only when they were still further reduced by deaths and wounds and utterly exhausted, that the Christians gave way and the Turks poured in, and even then the gallant band of Greeks and Italians fought on until they were all killed. In their midst, fighting to the very end, perished Constantine XI, the last of the lineal cæsars and Græco-Roman emperors.

The transfer of Constantinople from the rule of the Emperor Constantine XI to that of the Sultan Mohammed II was a sensational step in the revolution which was transforming the traditional empire of the Near East from Greek and Christian

hands to hands that were Moslem and Turk. The events at Constantinople in 1453 depressed all Christendom, as they elated the Turks and all Islam. For Constantinople was viewed by both Christians and Moslems as one of the greatest and strongest cities in the whole world, embodying most perfectly the traditions of ancient Roman rule and antique Greek culture. It was *the* city. Its possession carried prestige. As Christians had held it from the time of the first Constantine in the fourth century to the days of the last Constantine in the fifteenth century, so the Moslems were determined to possess it ever after. Besides, it was naturally an imperial city, comparatively easy to defend and specially accustomed to undertake distant conquest and to exercise wide dominion. As it had been for more than a thousand years the centre of a Christian empire of the Near East, so it would be in modern times the capital of a Moslem empire of the Near East.

Indeed, Mohammed II (1451-1481) succeeded in doing what the preceding Byzantine emperors had failed to do. He not only ruled in Constantinople but he brought together within his empire many territories which had been lost to the Byzantine Empire. He reunited the whole of Asia Minor and the entire Balkan peninsula. He did more: he conquered the Rumanian lands at the mouth of the Danube and the Russian and Mongol lands north of the Black Sea.

Sultan
Mohammed II

For almost a century after the death of Mohammed II—from 1481 to 1571—the Ottoman Empire grew rapidly and flourished mightily. In large part it grew at the expense of other Moslem states. The sultans, as the champions of Moslem (Sunnite) orthodoxy, waged war against the Persians as the exponents of the principal Moslem (Shiite) heresy, and wrested from the shahs of Persia the city of Bagdad and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. One of the sultans—Selim I (1512-1520)—conquered Syria and Egypt, and obtained from the chief claimant to the old Arab Empire, then resident in Egypt, the title of caliph, that is, head of all orthodox Moslems. Thenceforth the sultans of the Ottoman Turks claimed to be successors both of the Roman emperors and of the Moslem caliphs. The sultans likewise gained recognition of Ottoman supremacy in the holy cities of Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina, and in other Arab towns. Also, by means of growing maritime power, the

sultans acquired suzerainty over all the north African coast from Egypt to Morocco, including Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria.

Under the Sultan Suleiman II (1520-1566), who was appropriately termed "the Magnificent," the Ottoman Empire comprised

**Suleiman
the Mag-
nificent**

virtually the same territory as had constituted the East Roman Empire in the time of Justinian. But

Suleiman the Magnificent would not stop here. Eager to expand his dominions in Europe, as they were already extended in Asia and Africa, he, with the main force of the Moslem world behind him, turned anew against Christendom.

In 1521 Suleiman captured Belgrade and crossed the Danube. In 1526 he defeated the king of Hungary and destroyed the flower of Hungarian chivalry in the terrible battle of Mohács, and occupied Budapest. Pushing on against Austria, which had sought to aid Hungary, he laid siege to Vienna in 1529. Though he could not take Vienna, he compelled the Holy Roman Emperor to agree to a partition of Hungary, the smaller portion going to Austria and the larger portion passing to the Ottoman Empire and becoming a Turkish province. Thereafter the Holy Roman Emperor, and the king of Poland too, made repeated and protracted attempts to drive the Turks out of Hungary and Rumania, but almost invariably they met defeat at the hands of Suleiman. As the Byzantine Empire had fallen prey to the Moslem Turks in the fifteenth century, so in the sixteenth century the weakened and distracted Holy Roman Empire appeared to be Christendom's last poor bulwark against the onrushing triumphant Moslems.

In the meantime Suleiman subdued the Caucasus and made the Black Sea a lake within the Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously his warships and pirate-ships wrought havoc in the Mediterranean; they successfully combated Venice and Genoa and terrorized the seafaring merchants from Christian countries. Christendom, in the first half of the sixteenth century, seemed to be peculiarly exposed to Moslem assault on land and on sea, at the very time when Christendom was faced internally with political rivalries of unprecedented rancor and with fundamental religious disunion. Yet so great was the external threat that rival Christian monarchs and mutually vituperative Christian clergymen could agree with pope and Holy Roman Emperor in cursing the Turk—"the infidel."

The Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century was similar to the earlier East Roman (Byzantine) Empire not only in territorial extent but also in political institutions. It was not a national state, any more than the old Roman Empire had been a national state. It was a military political union, under Turkish leadership, of many diverse peoples. Only in Asia Minor did the Turks constitute a large proportion of the total population, and even there sizable minorities of Armenians, Kurds, and Greeks persisted. In Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine, and across northern Africa, the Turks were a mere sprinkling among the mass of Arabs, Jews, Egyptians (Copts), Berbers, and Moors. In southeastern Europe the conquered nationalities remained—Greeks, Yugoslavs (Serbs), Bulgarians, Albanians, Rumanians, and Hungarians (Magyars),—and some of them, notably the Greeks, continued to furnish the Near East with its leading merchants and traders. Most of the conquered Christians, however, were reduced to a condition of serfdom and were obliged to support the Moslem Turks who came to live among them as soldiers and officials and formed a privileged upper class.

The Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth Century

The government of the Ottoman Empire was an autocracy, not unlike that of the Byzantine Empire which it supplanted. The sultan was "commander of the faithful" and master of the conquered peoples. In theory, his word was supreme; he made and enforced the laws; he appointed the local governors and army officers; he declared war and concluded peace. In practice, the sultan was often influenced or controlled by his harem, army, or officials; and local agents and tax-gatherers were frequently harsher and more despotic than the sultan.

The Ottoman Empire was a Moslem empire, as the Byzantine Empire had been a Christian empire. Only Moslems could be full-fledged "citizens"; Christians and Jews were "subjects." For "citizens," there was the closest union of church and state; the sultan was head alike of temporal and spiritual affairs; and civil law as well as religious faith and teaching was derived from Mohammed and the Koran. Moreover, the sultans supported the public worship of Islam. They transformed the venerable and historic Christian cathedral of Saint Sophia in Constantinople—one of the architectural wonders of the world—into a Moslem edifice, and wherever their

Moslems and Christians


armies marched they appropriated the principal Christian churches and converted them into mosques. The sultans set aside a share of the spoils taken from Christians for the financial support of Moslem institutions. They taxed Christians far more heavily than Moslems and excluded the former from most public offices. They did not allow Christians to bear arms or serve in the Ottoman army, but every year they conscripted a certain number of Christian boys, reared them as Moslems, and trained them as a special army—the so-called army of the Janizaries—which proved to be a peculiarly effective auxiliary to the main Turkish army.

Some Christians, especially among the Albanians, became Moslems, but the Armenians and the mass of the conquered peoples in southeastern Europe clung to Christianity. As a matter of fact, the Turks were not supremely intolerant; they did not force conversion to Islam. Indeed, as soon as the Sultan Mohammed II had captured Constantinople, he issued a famous edict of toleration, not only according religious freedom to the Greek Christians but constituting them a special “nation” (or “millet”) under their own patriarch and with their own laws and law-courts. Other sultans created similar “millets” for the Armenian Christians, the Catholic Christians, and the Jews. In this way, the sultan was enabled to hold the patriarchs and other heads of “millets” personally responsible for the good behavior of the subject Christians. At the same time the privileges accorded to the several “millets” kept alive the spirit of nationality among the conquered peoples and served to emphasize the confused and heterogeneous character of the Ottoman Empire.

Besides, beginning with the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, the sultans entered into treaties with Christian states, granting to their citizens permission of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, privileges of trade in the Near East, and the right to live under their own laws and to maintain their own law-courts while they were residing in the Ottoman Empire. The first of such treaties—or “capitulations,” as they were called—was concluded in 1535

NOTE. The portrait opposite is from the painting of the Sultan Mohammed II by Gentile Bellini (1429-1507), now in the National Gallery at London. Bellini was commissioned by the Sultan to make the trip from Venice to Constantinople and paint the portrait from life.





with the king of France. The "capitulations" added to the confusion within the Ottoman Empire, but they were a sign that Christian Europe, unable to dislodge Islam, must make terms with it and recognize it as a growing power in the midst of Christendom.

3. THE CITY STATES

Before the dawn of the Christian era, the Greeks and Phœnicians and early Romans had entertained a general idea of political organization which was quite at variance with any idea of extended empire, such as we have observed in the case of the Holy Roman Empire or the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century. It was a general idea, moreover, which would seem very strange to most of us at the present time, accustomed as we are to the idea of a fairly large national state. Those ancient peoples believed that every city with its adjacent countryside should constitute an independent state, with its own particular lawmaking and governing bodies and with distinctive army and coinage. This belief retained a tenacious hold on European minds, despite the rise of Greek and Roman empires; it was employed as a more or less reasoned justification of separatist tendencies in medieval feudal Europe; and it naturally survived as long as there were great obstacles to extensive large-scale travel and trade and to the development of acute national consciousness. It survived well into modern times.

The City-State Idea

Now it so happened, as we shall see in the following chapter, that the commerce of the middle ages rendered especially important certain towns in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands. These towns, in one way or another, managed to secure a large measure of self-government, so that by the year 1500 they had become strikingly similar to the city states of antiquity. In Germany, though they still maintained their local self-government, they were loosely attached to the Holy Roman Empire and were overshadowed in political significance by other states. In the case of Italy and in that of the Netherlands, however, they played leading rôles in the politics of the sixteenth century.

NOTE. The picture opposite is from the painting which Gentile Bellini made of a solemn procession in St. Mark's Square in Venice in the year 1496. The painting is now in the Academy of Fine Arts at Venice.

In the Italy of the year 1500 there was only an intangible tie with the Holy Roman Empire and there was not even the semblance of national political unity. Despite the ardent longings of a few Italian patriots,¹ and the development of a common language, which, under such masters as Dante and Petrarch, became a medium for great literary expression, the people of the peninsula had not built up a national monarchy like those of western Europe nor had they even preserved the form of allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire. This was due to several significant events of earlier times. In the first place, the attempt of the medieval German emperors to gain control of Italy not only had signally failed but had left behind two contending factions throughout the whole country,—one, the Ghibellines, supporting the doctrine of maintaining the traditional connection with Germany; the other, the Guelphs, rejecting that doctrine. In the second place, the pope, who exercised extensive political as well as religious power, felt that his ecclesiastical influence would be seriously impaired by the creation of political unity in the country. A strong lay monarch with a solid Italy behind him might in time reduce the sovereign pontiff to a subservient position and diminish the prestige which the head of the church enjoyed in foreign lands. The popes, therefore, participated actively in the game of Italian politics, always endeavoring to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful. Thirdly, the comparatively early commercial prominence of the Italian towns had stimulated trade rivalries which tended to make each town proud of its independence and wealth; and as the cities grew and prospered to an unwonted degree, it became increasingly difficult to join them together. Finally, the riches of Italy, and the local jealousies and strife, to say nothing of the papal policy, marked the country as natural prey for foreign interference and conquest; and the peninsula became a battleground for Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Germans.

¹Of such patriots was Machiavelli (see below, p. 27). Machiavelli wrote in *The Prince*: "Our country, left almost without life, still waits to know who it is that will heal her bruises, put an end to the devastation and plunder of Lombardy and to the exactions and imposts of Naples and Tuscany, and stanch those wounds of hers which long neglect has changed into running sores. We see how she prays God to send some one to rescue her from these barbarous cruelties and oppressions. We see too how ready and eager she is to follow any standard, were there only some person to raise it."

Before reviewing the chief city states of northern Italy, it will be well to say a word about two other political divisions of the country. The southern third of the peninsula comprised the kingdom of Naples, which had grown **Naples and Sicily** up about the city of that name, and which, together with the large island of Sicily, was later called the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. This state, having been first formed by Scandinavian adventurers in the eleventh century, had successively passed under papal suzerainty, under the domination of the German emperors, and at length in 1266 under French control. A revolt in Sicily in the year 1282, commonly called the Sicilian Vespers, had severed the relation between the island and the mainland, the former passing to the royal family of Aragon, and the latter troublously remaining in French hands until 1442. The reunion of the Two Sicilies at this date under the crown of Aragon served to keep alive the quarrel between the French and the Spaniards; and it was not until 1504 that the king of France definitely renounced his Neapolitan claims in favor of Ferdinand of Aragon.

About the city of Rome had grown up in the course of centuries the papal states, or as they were officially styled, the "Patrimony of St. Peter." It had early fallen to the lot of the bishop, as the most important person in the city, to exercise political power over Rome, when **The Papal States** barbarian invasions no longer permitted the exercise of authority by Roman emperors; and control over neighboring districts, as well as over the city, had been expressly recognized and conferred upon the bishop by Charlemagne in the eighth century. This bishop of Rome was, of course, the pope; and the pope slowly extended his territories through central Italy from the Tiber to the Adriatic, long using them merely as a bulwark to his religious and ecclesiastical prerogatives. By the year 1500, however, the popes were prone to regard themselves as Italian princes who might normally employ their states as so many pawns in the game of peninsular politics. The Italian policy of the notorious Alexander VI (1492-1503) centred in his desire to establish his son, Cæsar Borgia, as an Italian ruler; and Julius II (1503-1513) was famed more for statecraft and military prowess than for religious fervor.

North and west of the papal states were the various city

states which were so thoroughly distinctive of Italian politics at the opening of the sixteenth century. Although these towns had probably reached a higher plane both of material prosperity and of intellectual culture than was to be found at that time in any other part of Europe, nevertheless they were deeply jealous of each other and carried on an interminable series of petty wars, the brunt of which was borne by professional hired soldiers and freebooters styled "condottieri." Among the Italian city states, the most famous in the year 1500 were Milan, Venice, Genoa, and Florence.

Of these cities, Milan was still in theory a ducal fief of the Holy Roman Empire, but had long been in fact the prize of **Milan** despotic rulers who were descended from two famous families—the Visconti and the Sforza—and who combined a liberal patronage of art with the fine political subtleties of Italian tyrants. The Visconti ruled Milan from the thirteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth, when a Sforza, the son of a condottiere, established the supremacy of his own family. In 1499, however, King Louis XII of France, claiming the duchy as heir to the Visconti, seized Milan and held it until he was expelled in 1512 by the Holy League, composed of the pope, Venice, Spain, and England. A Sforza was temporarily reinstated.

As Milan was the type of Italian city ruled by a despot or tyrant, so Venice was a type of the commercial, oligarchical **Venice** city states. Venice was by far the most powerful state in the peninsula. Located on the islands and lagoons at the head of the Adriatic, she had profited greatly by the crusades to build up a maritime empire and an enviable trade in the eastern Mediterranean and had extended her sway over rich lands in the northeastern part of Italy. In the year 1500, Venice boasted 3,000 ships, 300,000 sailors, a numerous and veteran army, famous factories of plate glass, silk stuffs, and gold and silver objects, and a singularly strong government. Nominally Venice was a republic, but actually an oligarchy. Political power was entrusted jointly to several agencies: (1) a grand council controlled by the commercial magnates; (2) a centralized committee of ten; (3) an elected duke, or "doge"; and (4), after 1454, three state inquisitors, henceforth the city's real masters. The inquisitors might pronounce sentence of death, dispose of the public funds, and enact statutes; they maintained

a regular spy system; and trial, judgment, and execution were secret. The mouth of the lion of St. Mark received anonymous denunciations, and the waves which passed under the Bridge of Sighs carried away the corpses.

To this régime Venice owed an internal peace which contrasted with the endless civil wars of the other Italian cities. Till the final destruction of the state in 1797 Venice knew no political revolution. In foreign affairs, also, Venice possessed considerable influence; she was the first European state to send regular envoys, or ambassadors, to other courts. It seemed in 1500 as if she was particularly wealthy and great, but already had been sowed the seed of subsequent decline and humiliation. The advance of the Ottoman Turks threatened her position in eastern Europe. The discovery of America and of a new route to India was threatening the very basis of her commercial supremacy. And her unscrupulous policy toward her Italian rivals lost her friends to the west. So great was the enmity against Venice that the formidable League of Cambrai, entered into by the emperor, the pope, France, and Spain in 1508, wrung many concessions from her.

Second only to Venice in commercial importance, Genoa, in marked contrast with her rival, passed through all manner of political vicissitudes until in 1499 she fell prey to the invasion of King Louis XII of France. Thereafter Genoa Genoa remained some years subject to the French, but in 1528 the resolution of an able citizen, Andrea Doria, freed the state from foreign invaders and restored to Genoa her republican institutions.

The famed city state of Florence may be taken as the best type of the democratic community, controlled by a political leader. The city, as celebrated for its free institutions Florence as for its art, had come, in the first half of the fifteenth century, under the tutelage of a family of traders and bankers, the wealthy Medici, who preserved the republican forms, and for a while, under Lorenzo de' Medici (1449-1492), "the Magnificent," made Florence the leading centre of Italian culture. Soon after the death of Lorenzo, a democratic reaction took place under an enthusiastic and puritanical monk, Savonarola, who welcomed the advent of the French king, Charles VIII, in 1494,* and aided materially in the expulsion of the Medici.

Savonarola soon fell a victim to the plots of his Florentine enemies and to the vengeance of the pope, whom Charles VIII had offended, and was put to death in 1498. The democracy managed to survive until 1512 when the Medici returned. The city state of Florence subsequently became the grand-duchy of Tuscany.

Before we take leave of the Italian states of the year 1550, mention should be made of the insignificant duchy of Savoy, tucked away in the fastnesses of the north-western Alps, whose duke, after varying fortunes, was to become, in the nineteenth century, king of a united Italy.

The city state was the dominant form of political organization not only in Italy but also in the Netherlands.¹ The Netherlands, or the Low Countries, were seventeen provinces occupying the flat lowlands along the North Sea,—the Holland, Belgium, and northern France of our own day. Most of the inhabitants were Flemings or Dutch, who spoke "Nethelandish," a language akin to German; but many of them in the south—the so-called Walloons—spoke French. At first the provinces had been mere feudal states at the mercy of various warring noblemen, but gradually in the course of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, important towns had arisen so wealthy and populous that they were able to wrest charters from the lords. Thus arose a number of municipalities which were still in theory vassals of feudal nobles but which in fact were self-governing republics, and in many instances the early oligarchic systems of municipal government speedily gave way to more democratic institutions. Remarkable in industry and prosperity were Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, Liège, Utrecht, Delft, Rotterdam, and many another.

Beginning in 1384 and continuing throughout the fifteenth century, the dukes of Burgundy, who as vassals of the French king had long held the duchy and county of that name in eastern France, succeeded by marriage, purchase, intrigue, or force in bringing one by one the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands under their rule. This extension of dominion on the part of the dukes of Burgundy implied the establishment of a strong monarchical authority, which was supported by the nobility and

¹ It was also important in Germany (within the Holy Roman Empire). On the German city states—the so-called Hanseatic towns—see above, p. 7, and below, pp. 64-65.

clergy and opposed by the cities. In 1465 a common parliament, called the "states general," was constituted at Brussels, containing deputies from each of the seventeen provinces; and eight years later a grand council was organized with supreme judicial and financial functions. Charles the Bold, who died in 1477, was prevented from constructing a great central kingdom between France and Germany only by the shrewdness of his implacable foe, King Louis XI of France. On the death of Charles the Bold, Louis seized the duchy of Burgundy, thereby extending the eastern frontier of France, but the duke's inheritance in the Netherlands and in the county of Burgundy (Franche Comté) passed to his daughter Mary. In 1477 Mary's marriage with Maximilian of Austria began the long domination of the Netherlands by the house of Habsburg.

Throughout these political changes, the towns of the Netherlands maintained many of their former privileges, and their prosperity steadily increased. The country became the richest in Europe, and the splendor of the ducal court surpassed that of any contemporary sovereign. A permanent memorial of it remains in the celebrated Order of the Golden Fleece, which was instituted by the duke of Burgundy in the fifteenth century and was so named from English wool, the raw material used in the Flemish looms and the very foundation of the country's prosperity.

4. THE NEW NATIONAL MONARCHIES

A new kind of political state was coming into prominence at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was different from an extensive empire, such as the Ottoman Empire, and also from a restricted city state, such as Venice or Genoa. It was a kind of state which had hardly existed in ancient times and which had evolved only slowly and dimly during the middle ages. It was the medium sized "national" state, the political entity which was to become the unit of the modern state-system of Europe.

The New
National
State

If we look at the political map of Europe of the year 1500, we quickly perceive, in contrast with the sprawling territories strangely labelled "Ottoman Empire" and "Holy Roman Empire" and the unfamiliar petty divisions of central Europe indicative of a hodgepodge of feudal principalities and city states,

a certain number of areas which correspond in name and roughly in extent to states of the twentieth century with which we are acquainted—England, France, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania. These are the new national monarchies of the year 1500. They are independent of empires and yet they represent unifications of feudal localities—baronies and municipalities—under the direction and sway of a monarch. Each of them possesses a population the core of which is a single nationality, with distinctive language, literature, and some self-consciousness. They are national monarchies.

Just how these national monarchies had originated in the tribal states which succeeded the dissolution of the old Roman Empire and accompanied the expansion of Christendom and just how they had kept free of the Holy Roman Empire and had slowly overcome the disruptive tendencies of feudalism, is a theme for the student of medieval Europe and lies outside of the purview of modern history. Suffice it here to remark that by the year 1500 these national states had taken firm root and were undergoing a very marked and significant alteration in their government in the direction of monarchical absolutism.

The government of a twentieth-century national state is more actively and physically powerful than was the government of a sixteenth-century national state. For example, it can tax its citizens almost without limit and with slight fear of revolt, and it can compel them to endure in person the horrors of war, neither of which things a government of the sixteenth century could have done. But the government of a twentieth-century national state is not worshipped simply as government: no one has any feeling of awful sanctity about it; on the contrary, government as such is not uncommonly regarded as a little ridiculous. What men worship is the nation or the nationality, not its political governors.

In the year 1500 it was not yet the nation but the monarch—the prince—that was worshipped. Treason to the prince was deemed the most heinous crime, the crime which could excuse any punishment. The prince was becoming a sort of god.

Several factors in European history just prior to the sixteenth century had undoubtedly combined to arrest the development of medieval constitutional government, medieval magna cartas,

Factor's influencing growth of nation
 and medieval parliaments, and to give rise to monarchical absolutism. The crusades had had something to do with it. They brought Christian rulers of the West into contact with Moslem and Byzantine rule in the East; and from the East, the ancient traditional seat of absolutism, the West derived oriental notions about the scope and method of government. Then, too, the crusades stimulated trade and travel and thereby contributed to the growth, in numbers, wealth, and influence, of a middle class, which looked to strong monarchs for protection of travel and trade against fighting nobles. Moreover, the crusades diverted the attention and activity of numerous feudal lords and ambitious churchmen from the internal politics of European states to foreign affairs and distant enterprises, with the result that monarchs were less handicapped than formerly by feudalism and by the church.

→ The feudal nobles who during the middle ages had been leaders in limiting monarchy and establishing constitutional government on the basis of contract between prince and people, now lost much of their earlier influence and leadership. Some of them were killed during the crusades. Others emigrated to the Near East. Some settled in cities, engaged in commerce, and came to share the townsmen's desire for strong and stable government. Still others were forcefully subjected to the king and made into servants and supporters of royal monarchy. By the sixteenth century, feudalism was decaying, and soon the feudal lords would be in no position to oppose royal absolutism.

▷ The church had likewise been a foe of royal absolutism during the middle ages, but its energetic opposition was now changing to toleration and resignation and even aid. The church, while a foe to royal absolutism, had been no friend to the anarchy and disorder which feudal society at its height imposed upon Europe, and accordingly the church, in conjunction with the middle class, patronized early royal attempts to check private warfare and dominate feudalism. Thereby the church contributed to the growth of royal power. When the royal power turned against the church and sought to enhance itself at the expense of pope, bishops, and monks, the churchmen found themselves so weakened by the crusades, by previous political struggles, by internal abuses, and by popular criticism and dissent, that they felt it natural or expedient to acquiesce in much that the kings did,

and eventually many churchmen became convinced supporters of royal despotism.

→ The growth of the middle class and its alliance with royalty were perhaps the most significant features of the period of transition from the middle ages to modern times. This class comprised a rapidly increasing number of men of wealth and brains. The kings catered to it, and it served—and worshipped—the kings. The middle class furnished the kings with lawyers and most useful officials, with more and more money for the mounting expenses of central government, and with reliable men for national armies; and in return the kings bestowed commercial monopolies and other financial favors upon the middle class. Gradually, under middle-class influence, the institution of monarchy in the national states was transformed. The monarch, instead of being a titular suzerain of feudal landed lords, became the real head of a big national business in which the middle class was an important stockholder.

The importance of the middle class was augmented in national states in the sixteenth century, as we shall see in the following chapter, by the startling economic expansion of Europe, in the fostering of which it was kings, rather than emperors or city states, who took the lead. Simultaneously, the consciousness of nationality was stimulated, as we shall presently point out in greater detail, especially among the middle class and to the profit of the monarchs of national states. These monarchs, enriched by overseas plundering and exploitation on the part of their faithful subjects and regarded as the embodiments of national achievement and ambition, were about to eclipse in majesty and might not only feudal nobles and city states but the empire and the papacy.

To the same end contributed a change in the methods of warfare, a change which was brought about mainly in the fifteenth century. Hitherto, during the middle ages, royal armies had been composed chiefly of feudal vassals and retainers, and they had fought with spears, pikes, swords, bows and arrows. Now, with the introduction of gunpowder and firearms, a prince could maintain a standing army of hired soldiers and equip it with

NOTE. The picture opposite is from a detail of a painting by Vittore Carpaccio (1455-1524). It is supposed to depict "the return of the heir to the English throne," but it suggests the artist's familiar Venice more than faraway London.





cannon and hand-guns; and a national monarch, with larger and surer revenue, could surpass city states and Holy Roman Empire in the size and effectiveness of his military establishment. He could use it, moreover, to subdue rebellious feudal lords and to quell popular uprisings in his own realm, as well as to wage war against other princes and foreign powers. In a word, he now possessed a novel instrument of monarchical absolutism.

Predisposing men's minds to the idea of monarchical absolutism and to the veritable worship of the prince was the revived study of the old Roman law. According to a basic maxim of the ancient Roman law, as finally compiled by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, the prince or ruler of a state not only had authority to make laws but also to break them or to change them at will. This doctrine—that the prince can do no wrong, that the will of the prince is law—was absolutely contrary to the mediæval theory that the ruler is bound by feudal contract and must respect the fundamental law (or “constitution”) of the land. The kings of the later middle ages, disliking the mediæval theory, promoted the revival of Roman law; they encouraged its teaching and study; and the large lawyer-class that by the sixteenth century were trained in it naturally invoked it in behalf of the claims of the kings who employed them.

The cause of national monarchy and the conviction that national monarchs are absolutist, that they are superior to constitutions and parliaments, received classical and cogent expression in the sixteenth century in the political writings of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), an Italian scholar and statesman of the city state of Florence. In his most celebrated book, *The Prince* (1513), Machiavelli argued that national monarchy is preferable to any other form of government, that the power of a national monarch should be absolute and unhampered by religious or moral considerations, and that a prince, in order to promote the interests of his nation or to safeguard his own position, may properly employ deception or bribery or assassination. Despite protests of the pope and condemnation by the church, Machiavelli's *The Prince* was widely read and its counsels were acted upon by many ambitious rulers of the sixteenth century.

NOTE. The picture opposite, showing the “new artillery,” is from an etching by Hans Burgkmair (1473-1531), a German artist of Augsburg and probably a disciple of Albrecht Dürer.

All the factors which have just been described coöperated to produce in sixteenth-century Europe a group of powerful national states, which were politically independent of the Holy Roman Empire and of each other, and which, under ambitious and frequently unscrupulous monarchs, were uprooting feudalism, undermining the church, and paving the way for a modern political régime quite different from that of previous centuries. They foreshadowed the rise of modern nationalism and at the same time they heralded the advent of divine-right absolutist monarchy.

By the year 1500 two national monarchies had emerged on the British Isles. The more important was England, which had been a kingdom since the ninth century, but which during the middle ages had been not so much a national state as part of a dynastic dominion. Its kings had been Norman French in origin and sympathy and very ambitious to extend their sway both in France and in the British Isles. They had conquered a part of Ireland (the so-called Pale of Dublin) in the twelfth century and had subdued the principality of Wales in the thirteenth century. They had attempted repeatedly but in vain to subjugate the kingdom of Scotland. For several centuries, too, they had sought, with considerable success, to dominate a large part, if not all, of France.

The Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), beginning as a dynastic and feudal struggle between the royal families of England and France, had a significantly national outcome. The English sovereign was compelled to surrender the bulk of his domains on the Continent and to confine his ambitions to Britain. At this very time, moreover, the sense of English nationality and English patriotism was exalted; the English language acquired definite literary form, and peculiar national institutions took hardy root in England. For several years after the conclusion of the Hundred Years' War, England was harassed by bloody and confused struggles, known as the Wars of the Roses, between rival claimants to the throne, but at length, in 1485, Henry VII, the first of the Tudor dynasty, secured the crown and ushered in a new era of English history.

Henry VII (1485-1509) sought to create what has been termed a "strong monarchy." During the middle ages the power of the king had been restricted by a parliament, composed of a House

of Lords and a House of Commons, and as the former was then far more influential than the latter, supreme political control had rested practically with the king and the members of the upper house—great land-holding nobles and leading churchmen. **Henry VII** The Wars of the Roses had two effects which redounded to the advantage of the king. First, the struggle, being really a contest of two factions of nobles, destroyed many noble families and enabled the crown to seize their estates, thereby lessening the influence of an ancient class. Second, the struggle, being long and disorderly, created in the middle class or "common people" a longing for peace and a conviction that order and security could be maintained only by repression of the nobility and the strengthening of monarchy. Henry took advantage of these circumstances to fix upon his country an absolutism which was to endure throughout the sixteenth century, during the reigns of the four other members of the Tudor family, and, in fact, until a revolution in the seventeenth century

Henry VII repressed disorder with a heavy hand and secured the establishment of an extraordinary court, afterwards called the "Court of Star Chamber," to hear cases, especially those affecting the nobles, which the ordinary courts had not been able to settle. Then, too, he was very economical: by means of frugality and a foreign policy of peace, the expenditure was appreciably decreased, while the public revenue was enhanced by means of more careful attention to the cultivation of the crown lands and the collection of feudal dues, fines, benevolences,¹ import and export duties, and past parliamentary grants. Henry VII was thereby freed in large measure from dependence on parliament for grants of money, and the power of parliament naturally declined. In fact, parliament met only five times during his whole reign and only once during the last twelve years, and in all its actions was quite subservient to the royal desires.

Henry VII refrained in general from foreign war, but sought by other means to promote the international welfare of his country. He negotiated several treaties by which English traders

¹ "Benevolences" were sums of money extorted from the people in the guise of gifts. A celebrated minister of Henry VII collected a very large number of "benevolences" for his master. If a man lived economically, it was reasoned he was saving money and could afford a "present" for the king. If, on the contrary, he lived sumptuously, he was evidently wealthy and could likewise afford a "gift."

might buy and sell goods in other countries. One of the most famous of these commercial treaties was the Intercursus Magnus concluded in 1496 with the duke of Burgundy, admitting English goods into the Netherlands. He likewise encouraged English companies of merchants to engage in foreign trade and commissioned the explorations of the Cabots in the New World. Henry increased the prestige of his house by politic marital alliances. He arranged a marriage between the heir to his throne, Arthur, and Catherine, a daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Spanish sovereigns. Arthur died a few months after his wedding, but it was arranged that Catherine should remain in England as the bride of the king's second son, who subsequently became Henry VIII. The king's daughter Margaret was married to King James IV of Scotland, thereby paving the way much later for the union of the crowns of England and Scotland.

England in the year 1500 was a real national monarchy, and the power of the king appeared to be distinctly in the ascendant. Parliament was fast becoming a purely formal and perfunctory body.

Scotland in the year 1500 was also a national monarchy. But it was much weaker than England, and its monarchs, who were then of the Stuart family, had been much less successful in overcoming the clannishness of the Scottish highlanders, in disciplining the great feudal nobles, and in establishing absolutism. Besides, the Scottish monarchs, anxious to secure foreign aid against English arms, leaned heavily on France; and, in the meantime, the English language, succeeding where English arms failed, was gradually supplanting in many parts of Scotland the native Gaelic language. The Scottish national monarchy was a pawn, rather than a chief piece, in the sixteenth-century game of international politics.

On the Continent, at this time, the national monarchy of France was largely consolidated territorially and politically. It had been a slow and painful and almost accidental process, for long ago in 987, when Hugh Capet came to the throne, the France of his day was hardly more than the neighborhood of Paris. It had taken five full centuries of dynastic war and intrigue to unite the petty feudal divisions of the country into the state which we call France.

The Hundred Years' War had finally freed the western duchies

and counties from control by English sovereigns and at the same time had aroused French national feeling and created a need and desire for strong national monarchy. Just before the opening of the sixteenth century the wily and tactful Louis XI (1461-1483) had rounded out French territories: on the east he had occupied the powerful duchy of Burgundy; on the west and on the south-east he had possessed himself of most of the great inheritance of the Angevin branch of his own family, including Anjou, and Provence east of the Rhône; and on the south the French frontier had been carried to the Pyrenees. Finally, Louis's son, Charles VIII (1483-1498), by marrying the heiress of Brittany, had absorbed this western duchy into France.

Meanwhile, centralized political institutions had been taking slow but tenacious root in the country. Of course, many local institutions and customs survived in the various states which had gradually been added to France, but the king was now recognized from Flanders to Spain and from the Rhône to the ocean as the chief source of law, justice, and order. There was a uniform royal coinage and a standing army under the king's command. The monarchs had struggled valiantly against the disruptive tendencies of feudalism; they had been aided by the middle class; and the proof of their success was their comparative freedom from political checks. The estates-general, to which French commoners had been admitted in 1302, resembled in certain externals the English parliament—for example, in comprising representatives of the clergy, nobles, and commons,—but it had never had final say in levying taxes or in authorizing expenditures or in trying royal officers. And unlike England, there was in France no live tradition of popular participation in government and no written guaranty of personal liberty.

Consolidated at home in territory and in government, Frenchmen began about the year 1500 to be attracted to questions of external policy. By attempting to enforce an inherited claim to the crown of Naples, Charles VIII in 1494 started that career of foreign war and aggrandizement which was to mark the history of France throughout following centuries. His efforts in Italy were far from successful, but his heir, Louis XII (1498-1515), continued to lay claim to Naples and to the duchy of Milan as well. In 1504 Louis was obliged to resign Naples to King Ferdinand of Aragon, in whose family it remained for two centuries.

but about Milan continued a conflict which ultimately merged into the general struggle between Francis I (1515-1547) and the Emperor Charles V.¹

France in the year 1500 was a real national monarchy, with the beginnings of a national literature and with a national patriotism centring in the king. It was becoming self-conscious. Like England, France was on the road to strong centralized government.

In southwestern Europe, beyond the Pyrenees, were the two national monarchies of Spain and Portugal, which, in a long process of unification, not only had had to contend against the same disuniting tendencies as appeared in France and England, but also had been compelled to solve the problem of the existence side by side of two great rival religions—Christianity and Islam. Moslem invaders from Africa had secured political control of nearly the whole peninsula, as early as the eighth century, but in course of time several diminutive Christian states had appeared in the northern and western mountains. These states included: Barcelona, in the northeast, along the Mediterranean; Aragon, occupying the south-central portion of the Pyrenees and extending southward toward the Ebro River; Navarre, at the west of the Pyrenees, reaching northward into what is now France and southward into what is now Spain; Castile, west of Navarre, circling about the town of Burgos; Leon, in the northwestern corner of the peninsula; and Portugal, south of Leon, lying along the Atlantic coast. Little by little these Christian states had extended their southern frontiers at the expense of the Moslem power, and through intermarriages and other dynastic policies of their ruling families they were being combined and consolidated. In this way, Barcelona was united with the kingdom of Aragon in the twelfth century, and a hundred years later Castile and Leon were finally joined. Thus, by the close of the thirteenth century, there were three important states in the peninsula—Aragon on the east, Castile in the middle, and Portugal on the west—and two less important states—Christian Navarre in the extreme north, and Moslem Granada in the extreme south.

Dynastic policy was gradually constructing a united Spain, as it was building a united Britain and a united France. While

¹ For this struggle, see below, pp. 229-232.

Portugal acquired its full territorial extension in the peninsula by the year 1263, the unity of modern Spain was delayed until after the marriage of Ferdinand (1479-1516) and Isabella (1474-1504), sovereigns respectively of Aragon and Castile. Granada, the last foothold of the Moslems, fell in 1492, and in 1512 Ferdinand acquired that part of the medieval kingdom of Navarre which lay upon the southern slope of the Pyrenees. The peninsula was thenceforth divided between the two states of Spain and Portugal.

Portugal, the older and smaller of the two states, had become a conspicuous national state by the year 1500, thanks to a line of able kings and to the remarkable series of foreign discoveries that cluster about the name of Prince Henry the Navigator. Portugal possessed a distinctive language of Latin origin and already cherished a literature of no mean proportions. In harmony with the spirit of the age the monarchy was tending toward absolutism, and the parliament, called the cortes, which had played an important part in earlier times, ceased to meet regularly after 1521. The Portuguese royal family was closely related to the Castilian line, and there were people in both kingdoms who hoped that one day the whole peninsula would be united under one sovereign.

From several standpoints the Spanish monarchy was less unified in 1500 than England, France, or Portugal. The union of Castile and Aragon was, for over two centuries, hardly more than personal. Each retained its own customs, parliament (cortes), and separate administration. Each possessed a distinctive language, although Castilian gradually became the literary "Spanish," while Catalan, the speech of Aragon, was reduced to the position of an inferior. Despite the continuance of great pride in local traditions and institutions, the cause of Spanish nationality received marked impetus during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. It was under them that territorial unity was obtained. It was they who turned the attention of Spaniards to foreign and colonial enterprises.

**Ferdinand
and
Isabella**

The year that marked the fall of Granada and the final extinction of Moslem rule in Spain was likewise signaled by the first voyage of Christopher Columbus, which prefigured the establishment of a greater Spain beyond the seas. On the continent of Europe, Spain speedily acquired a commanding position in

international affairs, largely as the result of Ferdinand's ability. The royal house of Aragon had long held claims to the Neapolitan and Sicilian kingdoms and for two hundred years had freely mixed in the politics of Italy. Now, in 1504, Ferdinand definitely secured recognition from France of his claims in Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. Spain was becoming the rival of Venice for the leadership of the Mediterranean.

While interfering very little with the forms of representative government in their respective kingdoms, Ferdinand and Isabella worked ever, in fact, toward uniformity and absolutism. They sought to ingratiate themselves with the middle class, to strip the nobility of its political power, and to enlist the church in their service. The cortes were more or less regularly convened, but their functions were almost imperceptibly transferred to royal commissions and officers of state. Privileges granted to towns in earlier times were gradually revoked. The king, by becoming the head of the ancient military orders which had borne prominent part in the struggle against the Moslems, easily gained control of considerable treasure and of an effective fighting force. The sovereigns prevailed upon the pope to transfer control of the Inquisition, the medieval ecclesiastical tribunal for the trial of heretics, to the crown, so that the harsh penalties which were to be inflicted for many years upon dissenters from orthodox Christianity were due not only to religious bigotry but likewise to the desire for political uniformity.

In population and in domestic resources Spain was not so important as France, but the exploits of Ferdinand and Isabella, the great wealth which temporarily flowed to her from the colonies, the prestige which long attended her diplomacy and her arms, were to exalt Spain throughout the sixteenth century to a position quite out of keeping with her inherent national strength and resources.

In northwestern Europe, in the year 1500, were three kingdoms, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, corresponding to the present-day states of those names. They had been builded during the middle ages, when their peoples—
Denmark and Sweden the Scandinavians—were most vigorous and venturesome, when they were emigrating in all directions, raiding and settling the coasts of England, Ireland, France, and southern Italy, colonizing Iceland and Greenland, conquering Finland,

and invading Russia. The three Scandinavian countries had many racial and social characteristics in common, and they had been politically united under the king of Denmark by the union of Calmar in 1397. This union, however, was never popular among the Swedes, and after a series of revolts and disorders extending over fifty years, Sweden (with Finland) became an independent national state in the sixteenth century with Gustavus Vasa (1523-1560) as monarch. Norway (with Iceland and Greenland) remained in subjection to the national state of Denmark. The kings both of Sweden and of Denmark labored in the sixteenth century with complete success to dominate the church and with considerable success to enlarge their realms and to reduce the power of parliaments and the influence of the nobility. In the Scandinavian peninsula as in the Iberian peninsula, and in France and England, royal absolutism was arising.

In eastern Europe, that is, east of the Holy Roman Empire and north of the Ottoman Empire, were certain other national states of some importance at the beginning of the sixteenth century. However, these eastern states, with one notable exception, were not destined in modern times to exemplify such national and absolutist monarchy as was exemplified in the countries of western Europe.

Bohemia, a country at the headwaters of the Elbe and Oder rivers and the core of what is now the republic of Czechoslovakia, was peopled mainly by a Slavic nationality—the Czech nationality—with distinctive language and literature and national feeling, and she had had kings of her own continuously since the twelfth century. But the Czechs were a small island in a large German sea. Bohemia was traditionally a part of the Holy Roman Empire; her kings were electors of the empire and were often more concerned with imperial and German politics than with national Czech affairs; and the kingdom was permeated with German immigrants and German influences. Besides, the kingship in Bohemia had been elective, rather than hereditary; and Bohemian nobles frequently elected foreigners to the kingship. In this way a Polish prince became king of Bohemia in 1471; and when in 1490 this same prince was elected king of Hungary and transferred his seat of government to Budapest, Bohemia passed, to all intents and purposes, under foreign rule.

In 1526 the king of Bohemia and of Hungary perished at Mohács in battle with the Turks, and the nobles of the two countries, terrified by the rapid advance of the Ottoman power, elected as his successor the most promising prince they could think of. He was a German prince, Ferdinand of Habsburg, grandson of the Emperor Maximilian and of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, brother of the Emperor Charles V, and heir to the hereditary Habsburg archduchy of Austria. Thenceforth, for almost four centuries, Bohemia—and all the lands of the Czechs and Slovaks—were part and parcel of the Habsburg dominions; and although Bohemia retained a local parliament and some local privileges, her government was directed from Vienna, and she ceased to be, in any sense, an independent national state.

Hungary had bidden fair during the middle ages to become a national monarchy on at least an equal footing with France and England. Her territorial extent was as great, and **Hungary** her native kings, from the time of Stephen the Great (Saint Stephen) in the eleventh century, had displayed a high average of administrative ability and military prowess. Moreover, her population had originally been composed of a homogeneous nationality—the Magyar nationality,—descendants of a horde of Asiatic nomads, and they retained a considerable degree of national consciousness and pride. On the other hand, the Magyar nobles were particularly powerful and disorderly; no middle class developed in sufficient number to restrain them; they exploited their peasants most miserably; and, by placing drastic restrictions on the kingship and rendering it elective, they prevented the growth of strong and effective monarchy. At the same time the Magyar nobles, by conquering neighboring alien peoples—Slavic Croats and Slovaks and Latin Rumanians,—made Hungary less and less homogeneous and more and more difficult to govern as a centralized national state.

Eventually, the distracted country received a mortal blow from the Ottoman Turks on the battlefield of Mohács (1526), and after a protracted and terribly destructive contest between the Turks on one side and rival claimants to the Magyar throne on the other side, Hungary was partitioned by a truce in 1547. The Ottoman sultan secured the southern and central counties (including the capital city of Budapest); a native nobleman obtained a group of eastern counties (including the Rumanian-

speaking district of Transylvania) with the title of "prince"; and Ferdinand of Habsburg, already archduke of Austria and king of Bohemia and later Holy Roman Emperor, was recognized as sovereign of some thirty-five northern and western counties (including Croatia) with the title of king. Thus, in the sixteenth century, was Hungary divided into three separate states with divergent aims and interests, a condition of things which, with frequent rearrangements, endured for more than a century and a half. National monarchy seemed to be hopelessly lost to the Magyars at the very time it was being solidly acquired by Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Spaniards.

Northeast of Bohemia and the Holy Roman Empire were the independent national states of Poland and Lithuania. The former, though recognized as a "kingdom" in the year 1000, had long been the victim of internal dissensions and foreign, especially German, invasions; and it was not until the fourteenth century that she had entirely freed herself from the Holy Roman Empire and become a conspicuous state in Europe. Lithuania had emerged as a kingdom in the year 1250. Both Poles and Lithuanians were Slavic peoples, akin to Czechs, Yugoslavs, and Russians; and in 1386, by the election of the king of Lithuania as king of Poland, a political union had been effected between the two peoples. Thereafter the kings of Poland-Lithuania had extended the frontiers of their joint kingdom, so that by the year 1500 it occupied a wide stretch of territory through east-central Europe and was reckoned a great military power. Internally, however, the monarchy was faced with conditions almost as difficult and perilous as those which confronted Hungary. There was friction between Poles and Lithuanians and between each of these peoples and the aliens whom they had conquered. There was a relatively weak middle class, and a very strong nobility, which insisted upon keeping the monarchy elective and extorting an ever greater number of paralyzing concessions and privileges from the crown. There was abiding enmity on the part of Germans, and a new threat to the southern lands of the monarchy from the advancing Ottoman Empire.

Northeastern Europe—beyond the confines of Finland, Lithuania, and the Ottoman Empire—was peopled by Slavic Russians, but it had long been prey to internal tribal feuds, to Scandi-

navian raids from the west, and to Mongol conquest from the east and south, and it was a rude and backward region. At the opening of the sixteenth century the chieftain of one of the large Russian principalities, Ivan III (Ivan the Great, 1462-1505), grand-duke of Muscovy, himself of Scandinavian extraction, was just beginning to lay the foundations of national monarchy. He put an end to Mongol domination, united the numerous tribal states, conquered the important towns of Novgorod and Pskov, and extended his sway as far as the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Ivan III, moreover, married a princess who was the nearest in blood-relationship to Constantine XI, the last of the Byzantine emperors at Constantinople. Through her influence Ivan aspired to be regarded as the successor of the Græco-Roman emperors, grew more and more absolutist, and adopted for his court at Moscow the ceremonious etiquette of Constantinople along with the emblem of the imperial double-headed eagle. In 1547, Ivan IV, appropriately called "Ivan the Terrible," the grandson of Ivan III, solemnly assumed the title of tsar, or emperor, of all the Russias. A new national monarchy, and a very absolutist one, was clearly arising in northeastern Europe.

5. RISE OF NATIONAL PATRIOTISM

The rise of national monarchy in the sixteenth century was paralleled by a quickening of national consciousness—national patriotism—among European peoples. For centuries previously there had been in Europe many different nationalities, using different languages, but the masses of Europeans had been less concerned with loyalty to their respective linguistic groupings than with patriotic devotion to empire or city state, to military chieftain or local landlord, to feudal principalities or to Christendom as a whole.


In the latter part of the middle ages and at the dawn of modern times, European nationalities became more crystallized and began to command greater and more patriotic attention on the part of their members. The nationalities of Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century can be grouped principally in seven general divisions, according to the "family" of the language spoken by each. Six of these "families" were "Aryan" and distantly related to each other as well

EUROPEAN NATIONALITIES

French	
Castilians	
Catalans (and Provençals)	
Italians	
Rumanians	
Germans	
Dutch (and Flemish)	
English (and Lowland Scots)	
Scandinavians	
Russians	
Poles	
Ukrainians (Ruthenes)	
Czechs and Slovaks	
Yugoslavs, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	
Bulgars	
Irish and Scots	
Breton and Welsh	
Greeks	
Letts and Lithuanians	
Estonians and Finns	
Magyars	
Turks	

In certain areas the mixture of peoples necessitates a cantonal system. Some of these are shown thus:

MACEDONIA
 Bulgars
 Serbs
 Turks, etc



as to the Sanscrit, Persian, and Armenian languages of Asia. The six Aryan families of Europe, with their linguistic national subdivisions, may be outlined as follows:

(1) GREEK: (a) *Greeks*, in southeastern Europe, and also along the coasts of Asia Minor.

(2) LATIN OR ROMANIC: peoples speaking languages derived from Latin: (a) *Italians*, in south-central Europe; (b) *French* in western Europe; (c) *Catalans*, in eastern Spain, and their kinsfolk, *Provençals*, in southern France; (d) *Castilians*, in central Spain; (e) *Portuguese*, to the west of Spain; and (f) *Rumanians*, in the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, at the mouth of the Danube and to the west of the Black Sea.

(3) CELTIC: (a) *Gaels* of Scotland and Ireland; (b) *Welsh*; (c) *Bretons*, on the Continent, in the far west of France.

(4) GERMANIC OR TEUTONIC: (a) *Germans*, in north-central Europe; (b) *Netherlanders*,—*Flemish* or *Dutch*—along the low coasts of the North Sea; (c) *Scandinavians*, in northwestern Europe, with dialectical differences among *Danes*, *Norwegians*, and *Swedes*.

(5) SLAVIC: (a) *Czechs*, in Bohemia, and their kinsmen, *Slovaks*, to the east of them in northern Hungary; (b) *Poles*, northeast of Bohemia; (c) *Russians*, in northeastern Europe; (d) *Ukrainians*, or *Ruthenians*, southeast of the Poles and southwest of the Russians; (e) *Yugoslavs*, or "Southern Slavs," in southeastern Europe, including *Slovenes* in the Austrian province of Carniola, *Croats* in the western part of Hungary, *Serbs* to the south of Hungary, and *Bulgarians* to the east of the Serbs.

(6) BALTIC: (a) *Lithuanians*, east of the Poles; (b) *Latvians*, or *Letts*, north of the Lithuanians.

In England had arisen a distinct nationality, speaking the hybrid English language curiously compounded of Teutonic and Latin elements.

The seventh "family" of languages—the TURANIAN—differed radically from the preceding Aryan "families," and was represented in Europe by three distinct languages, spoken by as many disparate nationalities: (a) *Magyars*, or *Hungarians*, in the middle plains of the Danube River; (b) *Finns*, in northern Europe, northeast of Sweden and northwest of Russia, and their neighboring kinsmen, the *Estonians*, just south of the Gulf

of Bothnia; (c) Turks, the dominant people within the Ottoman Empire.

In addition, there were two small peculiar peoples, neither Aryan nor Turanian in speech, but retaining languages probably of very great antiquity: (a) *Basques*, in the Pyrenees, between France and Spain; and (b) *Albanians*, along the Adriatic, north of the Greeks. Besides, there were groups of *Moors* and *Arabs* in Spain, remnants of earlier Moslem invaders; and throughout Europe were settlements of Semitic *Jews*, fairly numerous in Spain, Portugal, and the Ottoman Empire, and most numerous in Poland and Lithuania.

Altogether, there were more than thirty nationalities in Europe. And by the year 1500 some of them were developing a self-consciousness and a national patriotism which boded ill both to the petty medieval divisions of feudalism and to the older unity of Christendom.

The crusades had been especially significant in stimulating national feeling. By inducing extensive travel on an unprecedented scale, they had taught many Europeans to surmount their localism and to acquire a surer knowledge not only of large aggregates of people who spoke the same language or kindred dialects but also of other large aggregates who conversed in alien tongues. Such persons grew proud of their own nationalities and scornful of others.

Stimula-
tion of
National
Feeling

The crusading spirit, moreover, had produced special national rivalries within Christendom. The major crusades, in which Frenchmen were the foremost participants, had fostered French national feeling and French rivalry with German and English participants. The so-called fourth crusade had aroused great bitterness between Frenchmen and Italians, on the one hand, and Greeks, on the other hand. From the conflict between Christians and Moslems in the Iberian peninsula had emerged a lively national consciousness among Castilians, Catalans, and Portuguese. It was the crusading efforts of a military-religious German Order—the Teutonic Knights—against pagan Slavs on the eastern Baltic which, in conjunction with commercial activities of the Hanseatic League and political endeavors of the German rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, had proudly carried German conquests and colonies eastward and had eventually stirred Slavic peoples to national resistance. The sanguinary wars

of the fifteenth century between the states of the Teutonic Knights and the Polish monarchy were at once a result and a continuing cause of national rivalry between Germans and Slavs.

Religious dissent, or heresy, had likewise become a cloak for national movements, and its suppression a means of gratifying rival national ambitions. For example, the Albigensian heresy had spread among the Provençal nationality, and the crusade which had stamped out that heresy had been undertaken by Frenchmen and had resulted in the subjugation of Provence by France and the subordination of Provençal to French. Likewise, the Hussite heresy of the fifteenth century had been adopted by Czechs, and the crusades which exterminated it were manned by Germans and followed by the national subjection of Bohemia to German nobles and German princes.

From religious crusades to national crusades was only a step. The Hundred Years' War between the kings of England and France (1337-1453), beginning as a feudal conflict, ended as a national crusade of Frenchmen, inspired by Jeanne d'Arc, against the "Goddams," that is, the English. It promoted the growth of national feeling in both countries. It united the French-speaking people under a French monarch, and it restricted the realm of the English monarch chiefly to English-speaking people. It also promoted the growth of absolutism in both countries, for henceforth the monarchs could count upon the patriotic support of their respective peoples against divisive tendencies at home as well as against threatening dangers abroad.

National patriotism before the year 1500 had been principally personal. It was directed toward a national monarch more than toward a nationality as such. It was strongest in those countries whose monarchs had succeeded in uniting a people of the same language under a common sceptre and a common law. The rise of national patriotism aided the development of national monarchy, and, in turn, the development of national monarchy stimulated the rise of national patriotism.

The monarchs themselves builded national states less by design than by chance. It was a fortune of war which obliged the English monarchs in the fifteenth century to abandon their possessions in France and to devote their main energies to Britain.

**National
Monar-
chical
Sentiment**

It was a dynastic marriage alliance which united Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella. Indeed, the national monarchs of the sixteenth century waged wars and contracted marriages for personal and dynastic purposes, rather than for nationalist ends; and they entertained no idea of confining their ambitions to lands and peoples of their own language. They frequently acquired territory inhabited by "foreigners," and they bartered their subjects as if they were sheep and cattle. They thought in terms of dynasty, not in terms of nationality.

Yet in all dynastic conflicts and family transactions, the core of each monarchy was more and more a nationality of common language and common traditions, imbued increasingly with patriotic loyalty to the monarch. Such was certainly the case in England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries. Such was at least the aspiration in Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and Russia. Such, too, was the hope of many prominent citizens in regions, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and southeastern Europe, where empires or city states existed and national monarchies were lacking.

Absolutist monarchy, it should be emphasized, played a leading rôle in exalting national consciousness at the dawn of modern times. The monarch was becoming the symbol of national unity and independence, and in him resided national sovereignty. In fact, "monarch" and "sovereign" already were interchangeable terms. It was the monarch who coined money, levied taxes, maintained the army, declared war, and made peace. It was the nation which patriotically acquiesced in these acts of its sovereign. It was around the institution of monarchy that national traditions grew up, and it was under the patronage of the new national monarchs that much national literature was produced.

The rise of national patriotism was evidenced in the rise of national absolutist monarchy. It was also evidenced at the same time in the rise of vernacular literatures.

Greek and especially Latin had been the predominant literary languages of all European nationalities during many earlier centuries. Prevailling within the old Roman Empire, they had early become the official languages of Christendom; and so long as most writing was done by Christian priests and missionaries, it was done in Greek in

eastern Europe and in Latin in central and western Europe. Of course, side by side with these written international languages persisted the variety of national languages—the so-called vernaculars—which have been outlined above and which were spoken by the vulgar people. But literary production in these vernaculars had at first been relatively slight in quantity and religious rather than national in content; even the requisite alphabets and forms of letters had been borrowed and adapted from Greek or Latin.

Throughout the middle ages and into the sixteenth century, all educated persons in central and western Europe knew Latin as well as their native tongue. They thus belonged not only to diverse nationalities but also unmistakably to the international society of Christendom. They possessed a comprehensive literary tradition, a single medium for oral and written communication, and a tool by which they could readily bridge national differences. For instance, Erasmus, the foremost scholar of Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century, was a Netherlander by birth, but his mastery of Latin made him at home in many countries: he lived among educated Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, Germans, and Flemings, with all of whom he could correspond and talk in Latin; for a time he lectured in Latin at the College of France; and by means of Latin he communicated with the pope, with the kings of England, France, and Spain, with his famous publisher at Venice, and with his numerous critics in all parts of Christendom.

Before the time of Erasmus, however, educated men were already beginning to write in the vulgar tongues and not by any means exclusively on religious subjects; and presently literary masterpieces were appearing in the vernacular languages of the masses as well as in the ancient languages of scholars. In the fourteenth century, Dante wrote in Italian and Chaucer in English. Thenceforth one vernacular after another became the vehicle of distinctive and splendid literary expression. Two developments of the fifteenth century aided the process. The one was the attempt of certain scholars—the so-called Humanists—to purify Latin of its medieval developments, which had been in the direction of greater simplicity, and to restore ancient classical Latin with its involved sentence-structure and its complicated grammar, an attempt which did much to discredit Latin

as a living literary language and to restrict its use to the classroom, to scientific treatises, and to ecclesiastical services. The other development was the invention of printing, which served to stereotype the common spoken languages, to fix for each a norm of literary usage, and to render possible the dissemination of national literature among the masses.

The rise of vernacular literatures in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries tended to emphasize nationality, for not even a well-educated person could be expected to know all the languages spoken in Europe, and the large majority of Europeans were familiar only with the language of their own nationality. English authors naturally began to write for readers in England and to stress what they thought was peculiar to England; French authors did the same for France; Italian authors for Italy; German writers for Germany; etc. Gradually, national characteristics were imaginatively depicted and national aspirations were poignantly voiced. In the sixteenth century, Machiavelli made eloquent national appeals to the Italians, Camœns celebrated glorious national exploits of the Portuguese, Luther addressed stirring patriotic letters to the Germans, Cervantes played fancifully with Spanish character, and Shakespeare glamorously penned the praises of England.

A new patriotic and political ideal was obviously possessing Europeans in the sixteenth century, the ideal of strong national monarchy backed by the firm loyalty of a national citizenry. It seems to have originated in a reaction The Idea of National Patriotism alike against the practice of anarchical feudalism and against the theory of paramount imperialism, and it appears to have been nourished by the gradual rise of national vernacular literatures and by the example of certain princes who more or less fortuitously established an absolute sway over particular linguistic nationalities.

The new ideal was menacing to old historic institutions of Europe. It threatened not only the destruction of feudalism but also the disruption of Christendom and the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire. In truth, before the sixteenth century was ended, Christianity was largely nationalized and the Holy Roman Empire was irreparably weakened, and, as we shall presently see, commerce and the rivalries of commerce took on a complexion predominantly national. National patriotism, as

exploited by ambitious national monarchs, inspired a good deal of the commercial expansion and conflict and likewise a good deal of the religious reformation and upheaval which characterized the sixteenth century; and, in turn, these events magnified national patriotism.



CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC EXPANSION

I. EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY



O SHARP change occurred in the basis of European society at the opening of the sixteenth century. That society rested, as previously it had rested for immemorial centuries, on agriculture. People still reckoned their wealth and social position not so much by the quantity of cash and paper they held as by the extent of farm land they owned. Farming was still the occupation of the vast majority of the inhabitants of every European state. The "masses" lived in the country, not, as to-day, in the city.

In certain respects a remarkable uniformity prevailed in rural districts throughout Europe. Whether one visited Germany, Hungary, Poland, France, or England, one was sure to find the agricultural population sharply divided into two social classes—nobility and peasantry. There might be varying gradations of these classes in different regions, but everywhere the two classes were clearly distinguishable.

Social
Distinctions

The nobility¹ comprised families who gained a living from the soil without manual labor. They held the land on feudal tenure, that is to say, they had a right to be supported by the peasants living on their estates, and, in return, they owed to some higher or wealthier nobleman or to the king certain duties, such as fighting for him,² attending his court at specified times, and paying him various irregular taxes

The
Nobility

¹ As a part of the nobility must be included at the beginning of the sixteenth century many of the higher clergy of the Catholic Church—archbishops, bishops, and abbots—who sometimes came by birth of peasant families (though, more often, they were younger sons of noble families), but who derived their living and wealth from large landed estates quite like the lay nobles and, like these, were addressed as "Your Lordships."

² This obligation rested only upon lay noblemen, not upon ecclesiastics.

(the feudal dues). The estate of each nobleman might embrace a single farm, or "manor" as it was called in England, enclosing a petty hamlet, or village; or it might include dozens of such manors; or, if the landlord were a particularly mighty magnate or powerful prelate, it might stretch over whole counties.

Each nobleman had his manor-house or, if he were rich enough, his castle, lording it over the humble thatch-roofed cottages of the villagers. In his stables were spirited horses and a carriage adorned with his family crest; he had servants and lackeys, a footman to open his carriage door, a game-warden to keep poachers from shooting his deer, and men-at-arms to quell disturbances, to aid him against quarrelsome neighbors, or to follow him to the wars. While he lived, he might occupy the best pew in the village church; when he died, he would be laid to rest within the church, where only noblemen were buried.

In earlier times, when feudal society was young, the nobility had performed a very real service as the defenders of the peasants against foreign enemies and likewise against marauders and bandits of whom the land had been full. Then fighting had been the profession of the nobility. And to enable them to possess the expensive accoutrements of fighting—horses, armor, swords, and lances—they had been assured of liberal incomes.

Now, however, at the opening of the sixteenth century, the palmy days of feudalism were past and gone. Later generations of noblemen, although they continued by right of inheritance to enjoy the financial income and the social prestige which their forbears had earned, no longer served king, country, or common people in the traditional manner. At least in the national monarchies the king had now undertaken the defense of the land and the preservation of peace; and the nobleman, deprived of his old occupation, had little else to do than to hunt, or quarrel with other noblemen, or engage in political intrigues. More and more the nobility were being attracted to a life of amusement and luxury in royal courts.

In striking contrast to the nobility—the small minority of land-owning aristocrats—were the peasantry—the mass of the people. They were the human beings who had to toil for their bread in the sweat of their brows and who, being of ignoble birth, were treated as social inferiors, stupid and rude. Actual farm work was "servile labor," and

**The
Peasantry**

between the man whose hands were stained by servile labor and the person of "gentle birth" a wide gulf was fixed.

During the early middle ages most of the peasants throughout Europe had been "serfs." For various reasons, which we shall presently explain, serfdom had tended gradually to die out in western Europe. On the other hand, however, serfdom was actually intensified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Prussia, Hungary, Poland, and Russia; and even in France and Spain a considerable number of serfs continued to live and work on nobles' estates in accordance with medieval customs which can be described collectively as the "manorial system."

The serf occupied a position in rural society which it is difficult for us to understand. He was not a slave, such as was usual in the southern states of the American Union before the Civil War; he was neither a hired man nor a rent-paying tenant-farmer, such as is common enough in all agricultural communities nowadays. The serf was not a slave, because he was free to work for himself at least part of the time; he could not be sold to another master; and he could not be deprived of the right to cultivate land for his own benefit. He was not a hired man, for he received no wages. And he was not a tenant-farmer, inasmuch as he was "attached to the soil," that is, he was bound to stay and work on his land, unless he succeeded in running away or in purchasing complete freedom, in which case he would cease to be a serf and would become a freeman.

∕ To the lord of the manor the serf was under many and varied obligations, the most essential of which may be grouped as follows: (1) The serf had to work without pay two or three days in each week on the strips of land and the fields whose produce belonged exclusively to the nobleman. In the harvest season extra days, known as "boon-days," were stipulated on which the serf must leave his own work in order to harvest for the lord. He also might be called upon in emergencies to supply the great manor-house with wood from the forest, or to keep the highway in repair. (2) The serf had to pay occasional dues, customarily "in kind." Thus at certain feast-days he was expected to bring a dozen fat fowls or a bushel of grain to the pantry of the manor-house. (3) Ovens, wine-presses, grist-mills, and bridges were usually owned solely by the nobleman, and each time the peasant used them he was obliged to contribute one of his loaves

of bread, a share of his wine, a bushel of his grain, or a toll-fee, as a kind of rent, or "banality" as it was euphoniously styled.

(4) If the serf died without heirs, his holdings were transferred outright to the lord, and if he left heirs, the nobleman had the right of "heriot," that is, to appropriate the best animal owned by the deceased peasant, and of "relief," that is, to oblige the designated heir to make a special payment which was equivalent to an inheritance tax.

Out of crusades and civil wars and the rise of national monarchy, and out of simultaneous pestilences destructive both to man and beast, had emerged in the later middle ages a profound agricultural change which was quite conspicuous by the year 1500, especially in western Europe, and which was destined to provide a distinctive economic foundation for modern times. Feudalism was waning. Feudal nobles, instead of farming their own demesnes by the traditional manorial services of their peasants, were becoming receivers of rent; they were beginning to view their estates as capitalistic enterprises and to expect from them not mere living but profits. This meant that a goodly number of peasants who had once been serfs were now becoming free-tenants, lessees, or hired laborers. Of course rent of farm-land in our present-day sense—each owner letting out his property to a tenant and, in return, exacting as large a monetary payment as possible—was still unknown. But there was a growing class of peasants who were spoken of as free-tenants to distinguish them from serf-tenants. These free-tenants, while paying regular dues, as did the others, were not compelled to work two or three days every week in the nobleman's fields, except occasionally in busy seasons such as harvest; they were free to leave the estate and to marry off their daughters or to sell their oxen without the consent of the lord; and they came to regard their customary payments to the lord not so much as his due for their protection as actual rent for their land.

While more prosperous peasants were becoming free-tenants, many of their poorer neighbors found it so difficult to gain a living as serfs that they were willing to surrender all claim to their own little strips of land on the manor and to devote their whole time to working for fixed wages on the fields which were cultivated for the nobleman himself. the so-called demesne

of the lord. Thus a body of hired laborers was growing up, claiming no land beyond that on which their miserable huts stood and possibly their small garden-plots.

Besides hired laborers and free-tenants, a third group of peasants was appearing in places where the noble proprietor did not care to superintend the cultivation of his own land. In this case he parcelled it out among particular peasants, furnishing each with livestock and a plough and exacting in return a fixed proportion of the crops, which in France usually amounted to one half. Peasants who made such a bargain were called in France *métayers*, and in England "stock-and-land lessees." The arrangement was not different essentially from the familiar present-day practice of working a farm "on shares."

In western Europe the serfs had mostly become hired laborers, free-tenants, or *métayers* by the sixteenth century. The old obligations of serfdom had proved too galling for the peasant and too unprofitable for the noble. It was much easier and cheaper for the latter to hire men to work just when he needed them, than to bother with serfs, who could not be discharged readily for slackness, and who naturally worked for themselves far more zealously than for him. For this reason many landlords were glad to allow their serfs to make payments in money or in grain in lieu of the performance of customary labor. In England, moreover, many nobles, finding it profitable to enclose¹ their land in order to utilize it as pasturage for sheep, voluntarily freed their serfs. The result was that serfdom had virtually disappeared in England before the sixteenth century. In France as early as the fourteenth century the majority of the serfs had purchased their liberty, although in some districts serfdom survived in its pristine vigor. In other countries, notably in Germany and the lands of eastern Europe, agricultural conditions were more backward, the eagerness for profits was less in evidence, and serfdom was still usual.

Decline of Serfdom in Western Europe

Emancipation from serfdom by no means released the peasants of western Europe from all the disabilities under which they had labored as serfs. True, the freeman no longer had week-work to do, provided he could pay for his time, and in theory at least he could marry as he chose and move freely from place

¹ There were no fences on the old manors. Enclosing a plot of ground meant fencing or hedging it in.

to place. But he might still be called upon for an occasional day's labor, he still was expected to work on the roads, and he still had to pay annoying fees for oven, mill, and wine-press. Then, too, his own crops might be eaten with impunity by doves from the noble dove-cote or trampled underfoot by a merry hunting-party from the manor-house. The peasant himself ventured not to hunt: he was precluded even from shooting the deer that devoured his garden.

In another important respect the manorial system survived long after serfdom had begun to decline. This was the method of farming. A universal and insistent tradition had fixed agricultural method on the medieval manor and tended to preserve it unaltered well into modern times. The tradition was that of the "three-field system" of agriculture. The land of the manor, which might vary in amount from a few hundred to five thousand acres, was not divided up into separate farms, as it would be now. The waste-land, which could be used only for pasture, and the woodland on the outskirts of the clearing, were treated as "commons." That is to say, each villager, as well as the lord of the manor, might freely gather fire-wood, or he might turn his swine loose to feed on the acorns in the forest and his cattle to graze over the entire pasture. The arable land was divided into several—usually three—great grain fields. Ridges or "balks" of unploughed turf divided each field into long parallel strips, which were usually forty rods or a furlong (furrow-long) in length, and from one to four rods wide. Each peasant had exclusive right to one or more of these strips in each of the three great fields, making, say, thirty acres in all;¹ the nobleman too had individual right to a number of strips in the great fields.

This so-called three-field system of agriculture was distinctly disadvantageous in many ways. Much time was wasted in going back and forth between the scattered plots of land. The individual peasant, moreover, was bound by custom to cultivate his land precisely as his ancestors had done, without attempting

¹ In some localities it was usual to redistribute these strips every year. In that way the greater part of the manor was theoretically "common" land, and no peasant had a right of private ownership to any one strip.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Summer on the Countryside," is from a painting by Pieter Brueghel (1526-1560), a celebrated artist of the Netherlands.



Trigifrus arvis fert Aestas horrida mistsis

Indus, Angustus, nec non et Iunio Aestas



to introduce improvements. He grew the same crops as his neighbors—usually wheat or rye in one field; barley, oats, beans, or peas in the second; and nothing in the third. Little was known about preserving the fertility of the soil by artificial manuring or by rotation of crops; and, although every year one third of the land was left “fallow” (uncultivated) in order to restore its fertility, the yield per acre was hardly a fourth as large as now. Farm implements were of the crudest kind; scythes and sickles did the work of mowing machines; ploughs were made of wood, occasionally shod with iron; and threshing was done with flails. After the grain had been harvested, cattle were turned out indiscriminately on the stubble, on the supposition that the fields were common property. It was useless to attempt to breed fine cattle when all were herded together. The breed deteriorated, and both cattle and sheep were undersized and poor. A full-grown ox was hardly larger than a good-sized calf of the present time. Moreover, there were no potatoes or turnips, and few farmers grew clover or other grasses for winter fodder. It was impossible, therefore, to keep many cattle through the winter; most of the animals were killed off in the autumn and salted down for the cold months when it was impossible to secure fresh meat.

Crude farm-methods and the heavy dues exacted by the lord ¹ of the manor must have left the poor man little for himself. Compared with the lot of the farmer to-day, the poverty of sixteenth-century peasants must have been inexpressibly distressful. How keenly the cold pierced the dark huts of the poorest, is hard for us to imagine.

Rural
Life in the
Sixteenth
Century

The winter diet of salt meat, the lack of vegetables, the chronic filth and squalor, and the sorry ignorance of all laws of health opened the way to contagion and disease. If crops failed, famine was added to plague.

On the other hand we must not forget that the tenement-houses of our great cities have been crowded in recent times with people almost as miserable as was the serf of the middle ages. The serf, at any rate, had the open air instead of a factory

¹ In addition to the dues paid to the lay lord, the peasants were under obligation to make to the church a regular contribution which was called the “tithes” and amounted to a share, less than a tenth, of the annual crops.

NOTE. The picture opposite, “A Village Dance,” is from a detail of a painting by Pieter Brueghel.

to work in. When times were good, he had grain and meat in plenty, and wine or ale, and he hardly envied the tapestried chambers, the bejewelled clothes, and the spiced foods of the nobility, for he looked upon them as belonging to a different world.

In one place nobleman and peasant met on a common footing—in the village church. There, on Sundays and feast-days, they came together as Christians to hear Mass; and afterwards, perhaps, holiday games and dancing on the green, benignantly patronized by the nobleman's family, helped the common folk to forget their labors. The village priest,¹ himself often of humble birth, though the most learned man on the manor, was at once the friend and benefactor of the poor and the spiritual director of the lord. Occasionally a visit of the bishop to administer confirmation to the children, afforded an opportunity for special gayety.

At other times there was little to disturb the monotony of village life and little to remind it of the outside world, except when a gossiping peddler chanced along, or when the squire rode away to court or to war. Intercourse with other villages was not vital, unless there were no blacksmith or miller on the spot, and in any case it was not easy. Europe in those days was relatively "roadless." The fine road system of the ancient Romans had disintegrated long ago; no comparable system had been developed during the middle ages; and the roads which actually existed were poor and in wet weather impassable. Long-distance communication was therefore difficult and insecure. No transportation in bulk was possible, except by water. Land travel was almost wholly on horseback, and what commodities were transported by land were carried by pack-horses. Of the inhabitants of a particular village, only a few soldiers and pilgrims, and possibly a priest, had travelled very much; they were the only geographies and the only books of travel which the village possessed, for few peasants could read or write.

Self-sufficient and secluded from the outer world, the rural village went on treasuring its traditions, keeping its old cus-

¹ Usually very different from the higher clergy, who had large landed estates of their own, the parish priests had but modest incomes from the tithes of their parishioners and frequently eked out a living by toiling on allotted patches of ground. The individual monks too were ordinarily poor, although the monastery might be wealthy, and they likewise often tilled the fields.

toms, century after century. The country instinctively distrusted all novelties; it always preferred old ways to new; it was heartily conservative. Country-folk did not open up new routes to Asia or discover America. It was the enterprise of the cities, with their growing industries and commerce, which brought about the overseas expansion of Europe; and to the development of commerce, industry, and the towns, we now must turn our attention.

2. EUROPEAN CITIES AND COMMERCE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Except for the wealthy Italian city states and certain other cities which traced their history back to ancient Roman and Greek times, most European towns, it must be remembered, dated only from the later middle ages. In the Rise of
Towns early middle ages there had been little excuse for their existence except to sell to farmers salt, fish, iron, and a few ploughs. But with the increase of commerce, which, as we shall see, especially marked the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, more merchants travelled through the country, ways of spending money multiplied, and the little agricultural villages learned to look on the town as the place wherein to buy not only luxuries but such tools, clothing, and shoes as could be manufactured more conveniently by skillful town artisans than by farm-hands. The towns, moreover, became exchanges where surplus farm products could be marketed, where wine could be bartered for wool, or wheat for flax. And as the towns grew in size, the prosperous citizens proved to be the best customers for foreign luxuries, and foreign trade grew apace. Town, trade and industry thus worked together: trade stimulated industry, industry assisted trade, and the town profited by both. By the sixteenth century many towns had grown out of their infancy and were exercising a large measure of political and economic influence.

Originally many a town had belonged to some nobleman's extensive manor, and its inhabitants had been under much the same servile obligations to the lord as were the strictly rural serfs. But with the lapse of time and the growth of the towns, the townsmen or burghers had begun a struggle for freedom from their feudal lords. They did not want to pay servile dues to a baron, but preferred to substitute a fixed annual payment for

individual obligations. They besought the right to manage their market. They wished to have cases at law tried in a court of their own rather than in the feudal court over which the nobleman presided. They demanded the right to pay all taxes in a lump sum for the town, themselves assessing and collecting the share of each citizen. These concessions they eventually had won, and each city had its charter, in which its privileges were enumerated and recognized by the authority of the nobleman, or of the king, to whom the city owed allegiance. In England these charters had been acquired generally by merchant guilds, upon payment of a substantial sum to the nobleman. In France frequently the townsmen had formed associations, called *communes*, and had rebelled successfully against their feudal lords. In Germany the cities had leagued together for mutual protection and for the acquisition of common privileges. Some towns, founded by bishops, abbots, or counts, had received charters at the very outset. In the rising national states, the monarchs had usually favored the towns in order to weaken feudalism, and the townsmen had become correspondingly devoted to the cause of strong national monarchy.

Within most European towns of the year 1500, whether those included in national monarchies or those still constituting free city states, there had long existed a typically urban organization known as the merchant guild or the merchants' company. The merchant guilds were everywhere in decline, but they still preserved many of their earlier and more glorious traditions. At the time of their greatest importance they had embraced merchants, butchers, bankers, and candlestickmakers; in fact, all who bought or sold in the town were included in the guild. And the merchant guild had then possessed the widest functions.

Merchant Guilds Its social and religious functions, inherited from much earlier bodies, consisted in paying some special honor to a patron saint, in giving aid to members in sickness or misfortune, in attending funerals, and also in the more enjoyable meetings when the freely flowing bowl enlivened the transaction of guild business.

As a protective organization, the guild had been particularly effective. Backed by the combined forces of all the guildsmen, it was able to assert itself against the nobleman who claimed manorial rights over the town, and to insist that a runaway

serf who had lived in the town for a year and a day should not be dragged back to perform his servile labor on the manor, but should be recognized as a freeman. The protection of the guild was accorded also to townsmen on their travels. In those days all strangers were regarded as suspicious persons, and not infrequently when a merchant of the guild travelled to another town he would be set upon and robbed or cast into prison. In such cases it was necessary for the guild to ransom the imprisoned "brother" and, if possible, to punish the persons who had done the injury, so that thereafter the liberties of the guild members would be respected. That the business of the guild might be increased, it was often desirable to enter into special arrangements with neighboring cities whereby the rights, lives, and properties of guildsmen were guaranteed; and the guild as a whole was responsible for the debts of any of its members.

The most important duty of the guild had been the regulation of the home market. Burdensome restrictions were laid upon the stranger who attempted to utilize the advantages of the market without sharing the expense of its maintenance. No goods were allowed to be carried away from the city if the townsmen wished to buy; and a tax, called in France the *octroi*, was levied on goods brought into the town. Moreover, a conviction prevailed that the guild was morally bound to enforce honest straightforward methods of business; and the "wardens" appointed by the guild to supervise the market endeavored to prevent, as dishonest practices, "forestalling" (buying outside of the regular market), "engrossing" (cornering the market), and "regrating" (retailing at higher than market price). The dishonest greengrocer was not allowed to use a peck-measure with false bottom, for weighing and measuring were done by officials. Cheats were fined heavily, and if they persisted in their evil ways, they might be expelled from the guild.

With the expansion of trade and industry in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the rule of the old merchant guilds, instead of keeping pace with the times, became oppressive, limited, or merely nominal. Where the merchant guilds became oppressive oligarchical associations, as they did in Germany and elsewhere on the Continent, they lost their power by the revolt of the more democratic "craft guilds." In England specialized control of industry and trade by craft guilds, journey-

men's guilds, and dealers' associations gradually took the place of the general supervision of the older merchant guild. By the sixteenth century the merchant guild was losing its vitality and being divested of its functions. It quietly succumbed, or it lived on with influence in a limited branch of trade, or it continued as an honorary organization with occasional feasts, or (and this was especially true in England) it became practically identical with the town corporation, from which originally it had been distinct.

Alongside of the merchant guilds, which had been associated with the growth of commerce and the rise of towns, were other guilds which were connected with industrial enterprise and which retained their importance long after 1500.

Craft
Guilds

These were the craft guilds.¹ Springing into prominence in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the craft guild sometimes, as in Germany, voiced a popular revolt against a corrupt and oligarchical merchant guild, and sometimes—most frequently so in England—worked quite harmoniously with the merchant guild, to which its own members belonged. In common with the merchant guild, the craft guild had religious and social aspects, and like the merchant guild it insisted on righteous dealings. But unlike the merchant guild, the craft guild was composed of men in a single industry, and it controlled in detail the manufacture as well as the marketing of commodities. There were bakers' guilds, brewers' guilds, smiths' guilds, saddlers' guilds, shoemakers' guilds, weavers' guilds, tailors' guilds, tanners' guilds, even guilds of masters of arts who constituted the teaching staff of colleges and universities.

When to-day we speak of a boy "serving his apprenticeship" in a trade, we seldom reflect that the expression is derived from a practice of the craft guilds, a practice which survived after the guilds were extinct. Apprenticeship was designed to make sure that recruits to the trade were properly trained. The apprentice was usually selected as a boy by a master-workman and indentured—that is, bound to work several years without wages, while living at the master's house. After the expiration of this period of apprenticeship, during which he had learned his trade, the youth became a "journeyman," and worked for wages, until he should finally be admitted to the guild as a master, with

¹ The craft guild was also called a company, or a mystery, or a *métier* (French), or a *Zunft* (German).

the right to set up his own little shop, with apprentices and journeymen of his own, and to sell his wares directly to those who used them.

This restriction of membership was not the only way in which the trade was supervised. The guild had rules specifying the quality of materials to be used and often the methods of manufacture; it might prohibit night-work, and it usually fixed a "fair price" at which goods were to be sold. By means of such provisions, enforced by wardens or inspectors, the guild not only perpetuated the "good old way" of doing things, but assured to the purchaser a good article at a fair price.

By the opening of the sixteenth century the craft guilds, though not so weakened as the merchant guilds, were suffering from various internal diseases which gradually sapped their vitality. They tended to become exclusive and to direct their power and affluence in hereditary grooves. They steadily raised their entrance fees and qualifications. Struggles between guilds in allied trades, such as spinning, weaving, fulling, and dyeing, often resulted in the reduction of several guilds to a dependent position. The regulation of the processes of manufacture, once designed to keep up the standard of skill, came in time to hinder technical improvements; and in the method as well as in the amount of his work, the enterprising master found himself handicapped. Even the old conscientiousness often gave way to greed, until in many places inferior workmanship received the approval of the guild.

Many craft guilds were exhibiting in the sixteenth century a tendency to split somewhat along the modern lines of capital and labor. On the one hand the old guild organization would be usurped and controlled by the wealthier master-workmen, called "livery men," because they wore rich uniforms, or a class of dealers would arise and organize a "merchants' company" to conduct a wholesale business in the products of a particular industry. Thus the rich drapers sold all the cloth, but did not help to make it. On the other hand it became increasingly difficult for journeymen and apprentices to rise to the station of masters; oftentimes they remained wage-earners for life. In order to better their condition they founded new associations, which in England were called journeymen's or yeomen's companies. These new organizations were symptomatic of injustice

but otherwise unimportant. The craft guilds, with all their imperfections, were to remain influential a while longer, slowly declining as new trades arose outside of their control, gradually succumbing in competition with capitalists who refused to be bound by guild rules and who were to evolve a new "domestic system," and, in national monarchies, slowly suffering diminution of prestige through royal interference.

It must be borne in mind that the European towns of the year 1500 were comparatively small, for the vast majority of people still lived in country villages. A town of 5,000 inhabitants was then accounted large; and even the largest places, like Paris, London, Seville, Venice, Lübeck, and Bruges, had populations of less than a hundred thousand. The approach to an ordinary city of the time lay through suburbs, farms, and garden-plots, for the townsman still supplemented industry with small-scale agriculture. Usually the town itself was enclosed by strong walls, and admission was to be gained only by passing through the gates, where one might be accosted by soldiers and forced to pay toll. Inside the walls were clustered houses of every description. Rising from the midst of tumble-down dwellings might stand a magnificent cathedral, town-hall, or guild building. Here and there a prosperous merchant would have his luxurious home, built in western Europe in what we now call the Gothic style, with pointed windows and gables, and, to save space in a walled town, with the second storey projecting out over the street.

The streets were usually in deplorable condition. One or two might be highways, but the rest were mere alleys, devious, dark, and dirty. Often their narrowness made them impassable for wagons. In places the pedestrian waded gallantly through mud and garbage; pigs grunted ponderously as he pushed them aside; chickens ran under his feet; and occasionally a dead dog obstructed the way. There were no sidewalks, and only the main thoroughfares were paved. Dirt and filth were ordinarily disposed of only when a heaven-sent rain washed them down the open gutters constructed along the middle, or on each side, of a street. Not only was there no general sewerage for the town, but there was likewise no public water supply. In many of the garden-plots at the rear of the low-roofed dwellings were dug wells which provided water for the family; and the visitor, be-

Urban
Life in the
Sixteenth
Century

fore he left the town, would be likely to encounter water-sellers calling out their ware. To guard against the danger of fires, each municipality encouraged its citizens to build their houses of stone and to keep a tub full of water before every building; and in each district a special official was equipped with a proper hook and cord for pulling down houses on fire. At night respectable town-life was almost at a standstill: the gates were shut; the curfew sounded; no street-lamps dispelled the darkness, except possibly an occasional lantern which an altruistic or festive townsman might hang in his front window; and no efficient police-force existed. A mere handful of townsmen were drafted from time to time as "watchmen" to preserve order, and the "night watch" was famed rather for its ability to sleep or to roister than to protect life or purse. Under these circumstances the citizen who would escape an assault by ruffians or thieves remained prudently indoors at night and retired early to bed. Picturesque and quaint the sixteenth-century town may have been; but it was also an uncomfortable and an unhealthful place in which to live.

Yet, despite the relative backwardness and slovenliness of European cities in the year 1500, it was their inhabitants—the bourgeoisie, or class of town dwellers,—rather than peasantry or nobility, who were already creating the economic foundations for the predominantly bourgeois society of modern times. The towns were growing, their commerce was expanding, their manufacturers were becoming more skilled and their merchants more venturesome; they were beginning to search for new and distant sources of wealth and to establish the régime of modern capitalism.

The economic revolution in evidence in the sixteenth century was not a sudden upheaval. It had been unobtrusively developing with the reviving commerce of the later middle ages within Europe and between Europe and Asia.

Trade between Europe and Asia, which had been a feature of the antique world of Greeks and Romans, had been very nearly destroyed by the barbarian invasions of the fifth century and by subsequent conflicts between Moslems and Christians, so that during several centuries the old trade routes were travelled only by a few Jews and Syrians. In the middle ages, however, a revival occurred, greatly quickened by the crusades. Venice, Genoa, and

Develop-
ment of
Commerce
between
Europe
and Asia

Pisa, on account of their convenient location, were called upon to furnish the crusaders with transportation and provisions, and their shrewd citizens made certain that such services were well rewarded. Italian ships, plying to and from the Holy Land, gradually enriched their owners. Many Italian cities profited, but Venice secured the major share. It was during the crusades that Venice gained immunities and privileges in Constantinople, and thereby laid the foundation of her maritime empire.

The crusades not only enabled Italian merchants to bring Eastern commodities to the West; they increased the demand for such commodities. Crusaders—knights, pilgrims, and adventurers—returned from the Holy Land with astonishing tales of the luxury and opulence of the East. Not infrequently they had acquired a taste for Eastern silks or spices during their stay in Asia Minor or Palestine; or they brought curious jewels stripped from fallen infidels to awaken the envy of the stay-at-homes. Wealth was increasing in Europe at this time, and the many well-to-do people who were eager to affect magnificence provided a ready market for the wares imported by Italian merchants.

It is desirable to note just what were these wares and why they were demanded so insistently. First were spices, far more important than now. The diet of those times was simple and monotonous without our variety of vegetables and sauces and sweets, and the meat, if fresh, was likely to be tough in fibre and strong in flavor. Spices were the very thing to add zest to such a diet, and without them the epicure of the sixteenth century would have been truly miserable. Ale and wine, as well as meats, were spiced, and pepper was eaten separately as a delicacy. No wonder that, although the rich alone could buy it, the Venetians were able annually to dispose of 420,000 pounds of pepper, which they purchased from the sultan of Egypt, to whom it had been brought, after a hazardous journey, from the pepper vines of Ceylon, Sumatra, or western India. From the same regions came cinnamon-bark; ginger was a product of Arabia, India, and China; and nutmegs, cloves, and allspice grew only in the far-off Spice Islands of the Malay Archipelago.) Precious stones were then, as always, in demand for personal adornment as well as for the decoration of shrines and ecclesias-

tical vestments; and in the middle ages they were thought by many to possess magical qualities which rendered them doubly valuable.¹ The supply of diamonds, rubies, pearls, and other precious stones was then almost exclusively from Persia, India, and Ceylon.

(i) Other miscellaneous products of the East were in great demand for various purposes: camphor and cubebs from Sumatra and Borneo; musk from China; cane-sugar from Arabia and Persia; indigo, sandal-wood, and aloes-wood from India; and alum from Asia Minor.

✓ The East was not only a treasure-house of spices, jewels, and medicaments, but a factory of marvellously delicate goods and wares which the West could not rival—glass, porcelain, silks, satins, rugs, tapestries, and metal-work. The tradition of Asiatic supremacy in these manufactures has been preserved to our own day in such familiar names as damask linen, china-ware, japanned ware, Persian rugs, and cashmere shawls.

In exchange for the manifold products of the East, Europe had only rough woollen cloth, arsenic, antimony, quicksilver, tin, copper, lead, and coral to give; and a balance, therefore, always existed for the European merchant to pay in gold and silver, with the result that gold and silver coins grew scarce in the West. It is hard to say what would have happened had not a new supply of the precious metals been discovered in America. But we are anticipating our story.

It is a long way from western Europe to eastern Asia, and before the advent of steamship and railway the journey was painfully slow, particularly hazardous, and quite uncertain. In the year 1500 the assembling of Asiatic commodities for export to Europe was made principally by Arabs and other Moslem traders² on the coasts of the

Difficulties of Trade

¹ Medieval literature is full of this idea. Thus we read in the book of travel which has borne the name of Sir John Maundeville: "And if you wish to know the virtues of the diamond, I shall tell you, as they that are beyond the seas say and affirm, from whom all science and philosophy comes. He who carries the diamond upon him, it gives him hardiness and manhood, and it keeps the limbs of his body whole. It gives him victory over his enemies, in court and in war, if his cause be just; and it keeps him that bears it in good wit; and it keeps him from strife and riot, from sorrows and enchantments, and from fantasies and illusions of wicked spirits. . . . It heals him that is lunatic, and those whom the fiend torments or pursues."

² In general, the journey from the Far East to the ports on the Black Sea and

Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, and their transportation thence was mainly in the hands of the Italian city states, especially Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, although the French town of Marseilles and the Spanish town of Barcelona had a small share. From Italy trade routes led through the passes of the Alps to all parts of Europe.

Within Europe, commerce still encountered extraordinary difficulties in the year 1500. The roads were so wretched that wares had to be carried on pack-horses instead of in wagons. Frequently the merchant had to risk spoiling his bales of silk in fording a stream, for bridges were few and usually in urgent need of repair. Travel not only was fraught with hardship; it was expensive. Landowners exacted tolls from the traveller on road, bridge, or river within their estates, and so heavy was the burden of tolls on commerce that transportation from Nantes to Orléans, a short distance up the River Loire, doubled the price of goods. In addition to the tolls, the merchant had to pay tariffs and *octrois* and special market fees, and frequently was seriously handicapped by regulations against "foreigners" and by unfamiliar weights, measures, and coinage. Besides, robbers beset the roads and pirates infested the seas. Needy knights did not scruple to turn highwaymen, while the black flag of piracy flew over whole fleets in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic, and the amateur pirate, if less formidable, was no less common, for many a vessel carrying brass cannon, ostensibly for protection, found it convenient to use them against merchantmen and more often "took" a cargo than purchased one.

In spite of almost insuperable obstacles, commerce was notably expanding within Europe. Its leaders at the opening of the sixteenth century were the Italian city states, preëminently Venice; the league of German cities—the so-called Hanse, or Hanseatic League—including Lübeck, Hamburg, Bremen, Danzig, Königsberg, and Cologne; and the cities of the Netherlands, especially Bruges and Antwerp. Venice was the outstanding distributing centre for Asiatic wares.

the eastern Mediterranean was made by caravans which travelled overland or by sailing vessels which skirted the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. It was made most often by Moslems, but some of the more enterprising Italian merchants pushed eastward from their settlements, or *fondachi*, in frontier ports like Cairo and Trebizond, and established *fondachi* in inland cities of Asia Minor, Persia, and Russia.

The Hanseatic trading post at Venice received metals, furs, leather goods, and woollen cloth from northern and western Europe, and sent back spices, silks, and other commodities of the Orient, together with glassware, fine textiles, weapons, and paper of Venetian manufacture. Baltic and Venetian trade routes crossed in the Netherlands, and during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Bruges was the trade metropolis of western Europe, where met the raw wool from England and Spain, the manufactured woollen cloth of Flanders, claret wine from France, sherry and port wines from the Iberian peninsula, pitch from Sweden, tallow from Norway, grain from France and Germany, and tin from England, not to mention Asiatic luxuries, Venetian manufactures, and the cunning carved-work of south-German artificers.

By the year 1500, these urban centres were beginning to show themselves unequal to the demands of expanding European trade. Venice and the other Italian city states were too quarrelsome and too much given to strife with one another to assure the needful protection of common commercial interests abroad, and the privileged position of Venice in the Mediterranean and the Near East was threatened by the advance of the Ottoman Turks. Simultaneously the Hanseatic League was weakened by internal dissensions, by the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, and by the rise of hostile Slavic states in eastern Europe. The towns of the Netherlands alone displayed enduring commercial vitality, and it was clear, as they became consolidated under the dukes of Burgundy in the fifteenth century and under the princes of the Habsburg family in the sixteenth century, that the centre of gravity in European trade and industry was gradually shifting from the Mediterranean and Baltic to the Atlantic seaboard.

Shift of
Commer-
cial
Centres
from
Mediterranean to
Atlantic

This shift was accompanied and undoubtedly hastened by the development of strong national monarchies in western Europe. The national monarchies along the Atlantic, as we have seen, were repressing feudalism and favoring the bourgeoisie, and by virtue of territorial expansion and centralized government they were in a better position than the isolated city states of Italy or the disintegrating Holy Roman Empire to protect and expand the commerce of their bourgeois citizens—to punish pirates or


highwaymen, to maintain roads, and to check the exactions of toll collectors. The national states gave promise of supplanting the city states as the guarantors and promoters of modern trade and industry.

3. THE OVERSEAS EXPLORATIONS

Throughout all recorded history down to modern times, peoples who lived in one part of the world knew comparatively little about peoples in other parts of the world. **Hitherto Separated Civilizations** Ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans were not very familiar with China or Japan and were totally ignorant of America. Ancient Chinese had only the vaguest knowledge of Europeans, and for the medieval inhabitants of America the Old World did not exist.

In time, different parts of the world became seats of separate and peculiar civilizations. (1) Europe, the so-called "West," became the home of Christian civilization, that is, "Christendom." (2) Northern Africa and western Asia, including the "Near East" and "Middle East," became the region of Moslem civilization, that is, "Islam." (3) Eastern Asia, the so-called "Far East," became the area of Confucian-Buddhist Chinese civilization. (4) India, cut off by mountain ranges and deserts from the Far East and the Middle East, evolved a distinctive Hindu civilization. (5) America, the "Far West," isolated by trackless oceans, became the seat of several cultures, ranging from that of the highly developed Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas to that of the backward Caribs and various pastoral and hunting tribes. (6) Central Asia, with its Mongol nomads, and (7) central and southern Africa, with its negro groups, and (8) the numerous islands of the Pacific, with their brown-skinned natives, remained apart and in primitive but different conditions.

Among peoples within some of these areas, particularly within each of the first four, there was a certain amount of intercourse and mutual knowledge. Between some of the areas, moreover, there were historic contacts of considerable importance. In ancient times Greek armies of Alexander the Great and Greek traders had penetrated into India, and Roman merchants had imported silk from China. Subsequently the expansion of Islam had carried Moslem conquerors into India and brought India into closer commercial relations with the Middle East and Near



THE WORLD
of the
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
according to a
VENETIAN MAP OF
1562

East. India had also had significant contacts with China: Buddhism had spread from India to China, and traders had frequently travelled between these two countries. Between the area of Islam and that of Christendom, there had been since the most ancient times an intercourse which the medieval crusades quickened rather than stopped.

Nevertheless, prior to the sixteenth century, the peoples of all these major cultural areas were essentially self-centred and exclusive; there was no such thing or thought as that of "world civilization." Each branch of the human race lived primarily to itself, more or less in ignorance of the others.

It is a curious and impressive fact that all parts of the world have been brought into close contact with one another only since the sixteenth century. It is even more curious and impressive that the great explorations and discoveries which made such wide contacts possible should have been undertaken and achieved in modern times, not by Chinese or Hindus or Moslems or Aztecs, but by Europeans. The history of the rise of a "world civilization" is the history of the modern "expansion of Europe."

Why did Europeans explore and discover? Why has the modern world been largely Europeanized, instead of being Asiaticized? No simple answers to such fundamental questions can be entirely satisfactory, but perhaps two major considerations will help to explain why the modern age of world-wide explorations and discoveries originated in Europe. One reason is economic, and the other is religious.

In the first place, Europeans went in search of other parts of the earth because, for economic purposes, they had greater need of the rest of the world than the rest of the world had of Europe. Europe is the smallest of the five great continents and has usually been dependent upon other continents for products of one kind or another. Her fertile farm-lands, to be sure, have long produced enough grain, fruit, vegetables, cattle, sheep, and poultry to feed a large population, besides flax and wool for clothing, although at present part of the food supply is imported, as it was in the days of ancient Greece and Rome. Europe, moreover, has timber and stone for building materials, and valuable mines of coal, iron, copper, silver, and tin. But for some commodities Europe has depended on other continents from very early times. Many

Economic
Aspects of
European
Expansion

articles are not produced in Europe at all—for instance, spices, certain drugs, certain woods, and cotton; and others are not produced in sufficient quantity—silk, gold, silver, and precious stones. In early times Europe obtained such commodities chiefly from Asia and Africa.

In the early middle ages, with the decay of the Roman Empire, with the coming of the Arabs in western Asia and northern Africa and of the “dark age” in western Europe, the supply of Asiatic and African luxuries had been lessened and simultaneously the demand for them in Europe had been decreased. This had been only temporary, however. The Arabs themselves were not only Moslems but also traders, and they speedily developed important commercial relations with India and the Far East. In Europe, too, the “dark age” was succeeded by the heightening culture of the later middle ages and a consequent renewal of the demand for luxury imports. Therefore, Europeans, especially Italians of Venice and Genoa, plied an ever greater and more lucrative trade with the Arabs. Not even difference of religion, not even the crusades, prevented Christian Italians from dealing with Moslem Arabs. Indeed, it was the crusades, as we have seen, which enormously increased the demand of Europeans for Asiatic commodities.

By the fifteenth century the demand was outstripping the supply. The supply was always a bit uncertain, for it depended, first on the Italians, then on the Moslems, and finally on a slow, dangerous, and expensive transit by boat and caravan from the Far East. With the advance of the Ottoman Turks and their conquest of the Near East, the Italian cities lost many of their commercial outposts, the Moslems did more fighting than trading, and the long transit by caravan and boat became doubly hazardous. As the supply of Far Eastern wares grew more uncertain and unsatisfactory, the mounting demand for them set many Europeans, especially western Europeans—Portuguese and Spaniards and Netherlanders and Frenchmen and Englishmen—to thinking how they might go direct to places where gold, spices, and silk abounded, without being obliged to employ Italians and Moslems as middlemen.

Now it so happened that these thoughts were taking shape in the minds of merchants and receiving encouragement from ambitious national monarchs of western Europe at the very time when

Christian priests and monks were ready and anxious to extend their missionary activity outside of Europe. This brings us to the second, the religious, reason why Europe discovered the world.

Christianity has always been one of the most intensely missionary religions which the world has known. In its first four hundred years it had converted the Græco-Roman Empire and transformed the civilization of southern Europe. During the next eight centuries its missionaries had converted and civilized all the barbarians in central and northern Europe and carried the gospel to Iceland and Greenland. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century thousands of peaceful monks as well as thousands of warlike crusaders had striven to wrest the Near East from Islam.

Religious
Aspects of
European
Expansion

By the fifteenth century Christian missionaries had traversed all Europe and were turning more and more toward Asia and Africa. It was the very time when merchants were doing likewise. The result was that merchants and missionaries went out from Europe together, and together they travelled to the uttermost parts of the world.

^ The demands of trade and the demands of religion, then, go far to explain why a revolutionary expansion of Europe occurred in the sixteenth century. But the necessary explorations and discoveries could be made only if Europeans possessed considerable knowledge of geography and navigation. Such knowledge they had been acquiring, in fact, during the later middle ages, partly from practical experience and partly from Arab instruction. Christian embassies had been despatched by pope or French king to the Mongol khan of central Asia in the thirteenth century (that of John of Plano Carpini and that of William of Rubruquis), and in the same century three members of a Venetian family, Polo by name, had travelled to China and one of them, the famous Marco Polo, had sojourned there some seventeen years. Besides, a zealous monk, John of Monte Corvino, after laboring among Mongols in Persia and founding Christian missions near Madras in India, had sailed to China and settled in Peking; in 1307 the pope had appointed him archbishop of the Chinese capital and supplied him with missionary assistants; and several Italian traders had speedily followed him to the Far East. All these undertakings of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had

Prepara-
tions for
European
Expansion

proved temporary, but they had produced several valuable travel-books, such as the narrative of Marco Polo which was read with unflinching interest by many later Europeans, including Christopher Columbus. In this way was spread among the peoples of Europe some fascinating information about China—which was then called “Cathay”—and also about the “Indies,” along with an ambition to see for themselves such far-off strange lands and to participate in what was represented as the fabulous wealth of the Far East. If Europeans could no longer travel thither by land in safety, then they must find new water routes to the Indies and to Cathay.

In the meantime, Europeans were gaining better knowledge of geography and surer means of navigation. Earlier popular notions that the waters of the tropics boiled, that demons and sea-monsters awaited explorers to the westward, and that the earth was a great flat disk, were not now entertained by the educated. On the contrary, learned men were asserting that the earth was spherical in shape, and were even calculating its circumference. It was asserted that the Indies formed the western coast of the Atlantic Ocean, and that consequently the Far East might be reached by sailing due west, as well as by travelling eastward, though it was usually maintained that the Atlantic was very vast and that shorter sea routes to the Indies and Cathay might be found northeast of Europe, or southward around Africa.

Moreover, European sailors of the fifteenth century had learned a good deal about navigation. The compass had been used by Italian navigators in the thirteenth century and mounted on the compass card in the fourteenth. Latitude was determined with the aid of the astrolabe, a device for measuring the elevation of the pole star above the horizon. Sailing charts and maps (*portolani*) were now available. With all these aids, seamen could lose sight of land and still feel confident of their whereabouts. Yet it undoubtedly took courage, as well as the lure of fame and fortune, for captains of that age to steer their frail sailing vessels either down the unexplored African coast or across the uncharted Atlantic Ocean.

On the eve of the sixteenth century, Europe had at last the twofold incentive of trade and religion and also the practical knowledge and instruments—and resolution—for undertaking

distant explorations and discoveries, with such permanent and astounding results as had never before been witnessed or imagined in the whole history of the world. And though it was experienced by Italian sailors who were the most conspicuous agents, it was the newer national states of western Europe, rather than the older city states of Italy, which sponsored the revolutionary exploits.

First and foremost among the sponsors of Europe's expansion was Portugal. The Portuguese, in the extreme southwestern corner of Europe, had an ambitious national monarchy. They were already crossing the straits of Gibraltar and fighting the Moslem Moors and conquering the Atlantic seaboard of Africa to the south of them.

Portu-
guese Ex-
plorations
and Dis-
coveries

Why should they not continue farther south and by water? They did not know much about the continent of Africa as a whole; they imagined it was big and dangerous; and yet they dreamed that by sailing some distance south along its western coast they could presently round its southernmost point and thence proceed eastward by an all-water route to India and China. The dream, if realized, would free them from economic subservience to Italian cities and Moslem caravans.

To carry this dream into effect was the life ambition of a prince of the Portuguese royal family—Prince Henry, commonly styled Henry the Navigator (1394-1460).

Prince Henry was not really a navigator himself, but he set his heart upon systematic testing of current geographical theories, in the hope that thereby the Christian religion might be spread and that his nation might enlarge its territories and increase its resources. He established a school for navigators in Portugal. To it he attracted the most skillful Italian sailors and the most learned geographers of the day; and from it he sent out year after year naval expeditions of fighting men and merchants and missionaries who rediscovered and colonized the Madeira and Azores Islands and crept farther and farther southward along the coast of the African continent. The continent proved to be much bigger than Prince Henry had guessed, and when he died in 1460 the Portuguese had explored only the northern half of the west coast. But the impulse given by Prince Henry produced significant results after his death.

Prince
Henry
the
Navigator

In the year 1488 a Portuguese captain, Bartholomew Diaz, reached Africa's southernmost point, which he appropriately

named the "Cape of Storms." When Diaz returned and reported his discovery, King John II of Portugal rechristened it, with even superior appropriateness, the "Cape of Good Hope." For, following in the wake of Diaz, another Portuguese captain, Vasco da Gama, rounded the Cape in 1497, and, continuing on his way, sailed north along the eastern coast to Malindi, where he found an Arab pilot who guided his course across the Indian Ocean to India. In India, at Calicut, Gama landed in May, 1498, and erected a marble pillar as a memorial of his discovery of a new route from Europe to the Far East. Incidentally, it should be remarked that this Portuguese captain sailed back from Calicut to Lisbon in 1499 with a cargo of goods worth sixty times the cost of his expedition.

From the beginning of the sixteenth century Portuguese ships sailed regularly to the Far East by way of the Cape of Good Hope and returned laden with spices, silks, and precious stones. With Portuguese merchants went out Christian missionaries, who established themselves in India, particularly at the town of Goa. Under the auspices of a royal governor, or viceroy, whom the king of Portugal despatched to India to look after the trading posts and interests of the Portuguese, both merchants and missionaries speedily extended their explorations and secured additional footholds in the Far East.

Portuguese merchants established posts in Ceylon, Sumatra, Java, and the Spice Islands; in 1517 they arrived at Canton, in China; and in 1542 they entered Japan. A celebrated missionary, Francis Xavier, followed them, preaching Christianity with considerable success in India and Japan, so that by the close of the sixteenth century there were 200,000 Christians in Japan and more in India. Though these gains to Christianity were not entirely permanent, and though Portuguese commercial supremacy proved only temporary, nevertheless since the sixteenth century contact between Europe and the Far East has been direct and unbroken.

Under the patronage of Portuguese monarchs one new and profitable route had been found to the "Indies." Under the patronage of Spanish monarchs another such route was sought. In this case, the idea was developed and pressed by an Italian captain, Christopher Columbus (1446?-1506).

Spanish
Explora-
tions and
Dis-
coveries

Columbus, a native of the city state of Genoa, was a sailor all his life and was greatly interested in the science as well as in the art of navigation, and likewise in geographical lore. He shared the conviction of learned men of his day that the world was a sphere and that Asia lay to the west of Europe. Fairly early he became obsessed with the idea that he would find a new route to India and China by sailing westward across the Atlantic. After gaining much maritime experience in the Mediterranean and in the waters around the British Isles, he entered the service of King John II of Portugal and besought this monarch to finance him in his trans-Atlantic venture. But the Portuguese were too absorbed in their rival route around Africa, and Columbus then turned to Spain for financial assistance. Here, after vexatious delays and discouragements and after preparations to present his scheme to the king of France or the king of England, he finally obtained the aid of the Spanish queen, Isabella of Castile, who at this very time, with her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon, was creating the united Spanish monarchy and subjugating the last stronghold of the Moslems in Spain (January, 1492).

In August, 1492, Columbus sailed from the Spanish port of Palos with eighty-seven men in three small ships (the largest of which weighed only a hundred tons) and with a letter of introduction to the "great khan of Cathay." Week after week he sailed westward; his men lost faith and grew mutinous; but he still persevered. At length, on 12 October, 1492, land was discovered. Columbus disembarked, gave thanks to God, and claimed the land for the crown of Castile. Had he been told that he was discovering America, a new and hitherto unknown world, he would have been vastly astonished. Little did he dream that the land on which he had disembarked was one of the Bahamas,¹ many thousands of miles from India and China. He believed he had reached an island just off the coast of Asia. After cruising about among other islands (which we now know were the Caribbean islands) and finding that they were inhabited by a strange people, he returned to Spain in 1493 and reported to Ferdinand and Isabella that he had discovered the Indies.

¹ The island on which he first landed he named San Salvador. It is generally identified with the island in the Bahamas now known as Watling Island.

Three times Columbus went back to the scene of his discoveries, carrying merchants and missionaries, adventurers and colonists, and searching ever for the realm of Japan, the empire of China, the wealth of India, and the islands where spices grow. But he found little gold and no spices or silks, and the coasts he explored were the Caribbean shores of America, rather than the eastern shores of Asia and the real Indies. The strange people whom he encountered and made friends with were primitive Caribs and not the civilized inhabitants of China and India. Yet Columbus called them "Indians," and the name "Indian" has stuck to the natives of the American continents ever since.

Columbus may not have been the first European to cross the Atlantic Ocean,¹ but he deserves full credit as the discoverer, if not of a new route to the Indies, at least of a new world. For, from the time of his first voyage, on the eve of the sixteenth century, contact between Europe and America has been constant and intimate.

Columbus's first voyage of discovery was quickly followed by famous voyages of other explorers. In 1497, for instance, John

Cabot Cabot, another Italian sailor from Genoa, was commissioned by King Henry VII of England "to seek out, discover, and find whatsoever isles, countries, regions, or provinces of the heathen and infidels, which before this time have been unknown to all Christians." Cabot crossed the Atlantic from Bristol to Cape Breton Island and reported back in the same year that he too had reached the country of the "great khan."

In 1500, to mention another instance, a Portuguese fleet, captained by Pedro Cabral and bound for India by way of the Cape of Good Hope, was driven westward by strong winds and currents across the narrowest stretch of the Atlantic to the easternmost part of South America. Cabral

¹ Scandinavians, back in the tenth and eleventh centuries, had sailed westward and had discovered and planted colonies in Greenland and in a region which they called Vinland. Vinland was almost certainly in North America, but the mass of Europeans knew nothing about it; the early Scandinavian settlement soon disappeared, and its memory was retained only in some sagas. There were medieval legends, moreover, to the effect that an Irish expedition had sailed westward and discovered a certain St. Brandon's Isle and that the ancients had known of an "Atlantis" or an "Antilia" in the western Atlantic; with these legends Columbus was familiar.

landed, named the region "Brazil," and proclaimed it a dependency of Portugal.

Gradually the truth dawned upon the peoples of Europe that the lands across the Atlantic were not Asia but a new world.

In 1503 an Italian adventurer named Amerigo (in Latin, Americus) Vespucci, a native of Florence and then sojourning in Spain and Portugal as an agent for the Medici, the Florentine bankers, wrote a widely read "letter" in which he claimed to have discovered the "new world" himself. Four years later a German professor in a geographical treatise suggested that the newly discovered "fourth part of the world" should be called "America, because Americus discovered it." The suggestion was acted upon; and thus the Far West, already mistakenly peopled with "Indians," was permanently saddled with the name "America," derived from its pretended rather than from its true discoverer.

For some time it was imagined that "America" was not far from Asia. In 1513 a Spanish explorer, Balboa, hearing from natives of Central America that a huge body of water lay to the westward, crossed the isthmus of Panama and discovered what he called the "Great South Sea" but what we know as the Pacific Ocean. In 1519 a Portuguese captain, Ferdinand Magellan, taking service under the king of Spain, left Seville with a fleet of five vessels to explore the whole western route, not only from Europe to America, but from America to Asia. Magellan crossed the Atlantic, sailed around South America and through the straits which still bear his name. Thence he ploughed a weary way across the vast expanse of the ocean to which he gave the flattering title of "Pacific," taking ninety-eight days from Tierra del Fuego to the island of Guam and another seven days to an archipelago which he named St. Lazarus but which was subsequently christened the Philippines. Magellan himself was killed in the Philippines, but one of his vessels, following the Portuguese trade route across the Indian Ocean and around Africa, arrived finally at Seville in 1522 with the tale of the marvellous voyage. It was the first circumnavigation of the globe. Columbus had discovered America, but Magellan had discovered the western sea route from Europe to Asia.

During the first half of the sixteenth century, while the Por-

tuguese were developing and exploiting their newly found eastern route to India and China and the Spice Islands, explorations and discoveries went on apace in and about the American continents. Spanish fortune-hunters, captains, and missionaries did most; they explored the Caribbean islands, Florida, Mexico, Central America, and the greater part of South America. But Frenchmen soon participated. In 1524 King Francis I of France sponsored an expedition of an Italian captain, John Verrazano, who explored the coasts of Nova Scotia and New England and may have discovered New York harbor; and ten years later the same French king sent out one of his own countrymen, Jacques Cartier, to continue the work of Verazzano and to find, if possible, a "northwest passage" to Asia around the northern shore of America. Cartier discovered no such passage but he explored the St. Lawrence River as far as the site of Montreal.

By the middle of the sixteenth century Europeans had considerable knowledge of the size and shape of the world, of the general location of the oceans and major continents, and of two great new trade routes by sea, the eastern route around Africa to Asia and the western route to America. European commerce was undergoing a veritable revolution throughout the world.

4. THE NEW COLONIAL EMPIRES

The sponsors of the world expansion of Europe were national monarchies, and foremost among these, in the second half of the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, were Portugal

**Papal Line
of Demar-
cation
between
Portugal
and Spain**

and Spain. As early as 1480 the pope as arbiter of Christendom had granted to Portugal a monopoly of trade, colonization, and political dominion in "heathen lands" from the western coast of Africa to the East Indies. Then, in 1493, immediately after Columbus's first voyage, another pope, while confirming Portugal's rights east of a "line of demarcation" drawn from the north pole to the south pole, one hundred leagues west of the Azores, had conferred upon Spain a similar monopoly west of the line.¹ Thus, in a general way, Africa and Asia and the eastern part of

¹ Portugal protested, and in 1494, by mutual agreement between Portugal and Spain, the papal line of demarcation was shifted two hundred and seventy leagues farther west.

EUROPEAN MAP of ASIA in the Sixteenth Century



South America (Brazil) were handed over to Portugal, and North America and most of South America to Spain.

The overseas empire which the Portuguese proceeded to establish within their hemisphere was more commercial than colonial. In 1505 the king of Portugal named a "viceroy" to govern the Indies, and one of the most famous of the Portuguese viceroys, Alphonso Albuquerque, taking advantage of conflicts among the natives of India, obtained and built up the city of Goa as the capital of the Portuguese empire in the East (1510). Albuquerque also appropriated Cochin and other coast towns in India and captured the strategic port of Ormuz in the Persian Gulf. Under him and his successors, a considerable number of colonists came out from Portugal, settled at Goa and along the Malabar coast of India, intermarried with the natives, and introduced Portuguese speech and customs in the Far East. Under the patronage of the viceroys, moreover, Portuguese priests and monks gained some converts to Christianity, and incidentally opened doors to Portuguese merchants, in China, Japan, and the Malay archipelago, as well as in India. In the main, however, Portugal could not colonize Asia or transform its civilization.

The Commercial Empire of Portugal

Asia was too large and too populous and too tenacious of its own cultures. Portugal was too small and its resources in men and money were limited. The Moslems in western Asia and India were consistently hostile to the Portuguese, and the size and solidity of the states in eastern Asia safeguarded them against military conquest by the Portuguese. In China, the Portuguese, arriving at Canton in 1517, were content to trade peacefully; and beyond colonizing the island of Macao, near Canton, they did not encroach upon the territory or independence of the Chinese Empire. Similarly, in Japan, the Portuguese established a trading post in 1542 and patronized the preaching of Christianity by Francis Xavier and his associates, but they did not seriously attempt the political subjugation of the island empire. It was likewise in the Malay archipelago; the Portuguese traded with the natives of Sumatra, Java, and the Spice Islands, but did not conquer or dispossess them.

During the sixteenth century the Portuguese were very active in Asia, if not in colonizing endeavor, at least in commercial enterprise. They reaped rich financial profits from their Eastern

trade, and for a time Lisbon became the commercial capital of Europe. But the Portuguese had to contend not only with latent hostility of Asiatics but also with mounting jealousy and rival ambition of other European nations. For other Europeans, envious of the wealth which was accumulating to Portugal from her monopoly of Asiatic trade, refused to respect the papal decision which had conferred that monopoly upon her. Particularly the Netherlanders began to send out expeditions to Asia, which openly attacked Portuguese merchantmen and warships and which intrigued with native rulers to undermine Portuguese influence and prestige. Even Spain did not adhere strictly to the terms of her treaty with Portugal but appropriated for herself the Philippine Islands, which actually lay within the Portuguese hemisphere.

In the meantime, the Portuguese were establishing posts on the African coast, notably at Mozambique in 1520 and at São Paulo de Loanda in 1576, and a protectorate over the inland Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. The shore posts they used as stopping and replenishing stations on their voyages between Europe and Asia and also as centres for local traffic in gold, ivory, and especially negro slaves. The Portuguese, however, never penetrated very far inland; and their holdings on the coast were gradually contracted by the conquests of Moslems and of rival Europeans. They were expelled from Abyssinia in 1663.

Only in Brazil did the Portuguese succeed in erecting a permanent colonial empire. Here they easily overcame the resistance of weak and primitive Indian tribes and managed to frustrate rival colonizing schemes of Frenchmen and Spaniards. Portuguese colonists came in considerable numbers under "captains" appointed by the king and endowed by him with grants of land and large powers. Settlements were made in the first half of the sixteenth century, including São Paulo, in the south, and Pernambuco and Bahia, in the north. With the settlers came Christian missionaries, and the first bishop of Brazil arrived in 1552. In 1549 the "captains" were subjected to a governor-general who, from the capital city of Bahia, administered the whole country in the name of the king of Portugal. Rio de Janeiro, the site of which had been discovered and named by a Portuguese explorer in 1531, was settled first by a French expedition in 1558 but was

conquered in 1567 by the Portuguese and incorporated in their Brazilian empire.

Indeed, the success of Portugal's efforts in Brazil illustrated the great superiority of America over Asia as a field of European colonization. And most of America lay, in the sixteenth century, in the hemisphere which the pope had allotted to Spain. Consequently, while Portugal's overseas empire was predominantly commercial, that of Spain was essentially colonial.

The
Colonial
Empire of
Spain

In the time of Columbus the greater part of America was sparsely inhabited by primitive tribes of "redmen" or "Indians," who were not very different in customs and manners from the primitive European tribes of an earlier day who had invaded the ancient Roman Empire and had been converted to Christianity. These Indian tribes received the European discoverers and explorers sometimes with friendliness and sometimes with hostility. Some of them were easily tamed by the more civilized invaders and immigrants, and others were warred against and subdued with mutual cruelty. But the outstanding fact about the contact of Europe with America was that discovery and exploration were quickly followed by conquest of the Indians and colonization by Europeans.

The first Spanish colony in the New World was on the island of San Domingo, called Hispaniola ("Spanish Isle"), and thence Spanish conquest and colonization were rapidly extended over the other Caribbean islands and the adjacent mainland from Florida to Venezuela. In Mexico and Peru the Spaniards encountered native states and peoples in a relatively high stage of civilization; but these, like the more primitive Caribs, were quickly subjugated.


The story of the conquest of the Mexican empire of the Aztec Indians by Cortez, for example, reads like a romance. Hernando Cortez was still a young man when he landed on the coast of Mexico in 1519 with an expedition of ten ships, six or seven hundred Spanish soldiers, eighteen horses, and a few pieces of cannon—an expedition absurdly inadequate, we might suppose, for the conquest of an extensive and seemingly powerful empire. But the natives whom Cortez first met were astounded and overawed by sound of cannon and sight of horses and ocean-going ships, all new objects to them; they thought Cortez was

a god and they offered little or no resistance to him. He himself was courageous and quite unscrupulous. He seized land and laid the foundations for the city of Vera Cruz, and then, having burned his ships in order to cut off the possibility of retreat, he marched his little army into the interior. He was aided by the internal condition of the Aztec Empire; the empire was in decline and the Emperor Montezuma was harassed by rebellious chieftains (called "caciques") who defied his authority and some of whom gave assistance to the Spaniards. After some fighting, Cortez, with his handful of Spaniards and with 6,000 native allies, reached Mexico City and was received by Montezuma with pomp and outward show of friendship. Soon, however, Montezuma ordered the killing of a few obstreperous Spaniards at Vera Cruz, and then Cortez struck. He seized and imprisoned the hapless emperor and extorted from him the recognition of the sovereignty of Spain and the payment of 600,000 marks of pure gold and a prodigious quantity of precious stones. Mexicans rose in revolt, killed Montezuma as the dupe of the Spaniards, chose a new emperor, and gave battle to Cortez in the plain of Otumba. Here the fate of the Aztec realm was sealed (1520). Cortez won an overwhelming victory, which he followed up by retaking Mexico City and establishing Spanish authority throughout the country.

What Cortez achieved in Mexico was paralleled in Peru by Francisco Pizarro, another Spanish soldier of fortune. Pizarro had accompanied Balboa in the discovery of the Pacific Ocean and had been fascinated by the tales he heard of the empire of the Indian Incas in Peru. In 1531 he set out from Panama with three ships, 180 men, and twenty-seven horses for the conquest and looting of the Inca country. And, thanks to his valor and cunning, the magnificent native town of Cuzco was captured and the Indians were subjugated. It was Pizarro who founded the city of Lima in 1535 as the capital of the Spanish Empire in South America. In Peru, as in Mexico, the conquerors enriched themselves with enormous treasures of gold and silver and jewels, with rich mines and vast estates.

The easily acquired wealth from Peru acted as an immediate lure to Spanish adventurers and colonists, who were soon appropriating other parts of South America. A nobleman, Pedro de Mendoza, obtaining from the king of Spain a grant of land

European Map of America in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century



on the southeastern coast of South America, laid the foundations of the future states of Argentina and Paraguay; he founded Buenos Aires in 1535, and Asuncion in 1536. A lieutenant of Pizarro seized the Chilean coast and in 1541 founded Santiago de Chile. Another lieutenant carved out the province of Ecuador and in 1535 founded the town of Guayaquil on the finest harbor of the Pacific coast. In 1538 the mountainous interior of north-western South America—the country of Colombia—was penetrated, and on a lofty and picturesque site the city of Bogotá was founded. Wherever the Spaniards settled, they established their language and religion, and engaged in mining, trade, cattle ranching, and extensive production of sugar and grain.

By 1575 the Spanish population in the New World was 32,000 families, or approximately 175,000 persons, of whom about five eighths were settled in the West Indies and Mexico and about three eighths in South America. Some five million Indians, 40,000 negro slaves, and a considerable number of mulattoes and half-breeds were subject to them. By this time the whole Spanish colonial empire was divided, for administrative purposes, into two viceroyalties, New Spain and Peru. The viceroy of New Spain supervised Mexico, the West Indies, Central America, northern South America, and the Philippines; the viceroy of Peru superintended Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina. By this time, too, the empire was divided for ecclesiastical purposes into dioceses, and bands of priests and monks, under official patronage, and with marked success, were preaching Christianity to the natives. Universities, after the European fashion, were established in 1551 at Lima and Mexico City. America was being Europeanized under Spanish auspices.

It was under Spanish auspices, moreover, that the archipelago off the southeast coast of Asia—that of the Philippines—was permanently Christianized and Europeanized. These islands, as we have seen, were visited by Magellan in 1521. In 1542 they were formally annexed to Spain and named the Philippine Islands in honor of the crown-prince who later became King Philip, II. In 1571 the city of Manila was founded as the capital. The native Filipinos were not so numerous or so civilized as the Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese; they submitted to Spanish governors, learned the Spanish language, and were converted to Christianity. The Christian Filipinos of the present day stand

unique as the only Asiatic nationality who have been thoroughly Europeanized.

Despite the sensational lootings of Mexico and Peru by Cortez and Pizarro, despite certain other minor findings of treasure trove, no such steady stream of wealth flowed to Spain from her colonial empire in the western hemisphere as flowed to Portugal from her commercial monopoly of the eastern hemisphere. Much greater and more lasting profits could be derived from trade in the East than from conquest in the West. Consequently it was not alone the Netherlanders but the Spaniards too who envied the Portuguese empire. And in 1580, on the death of the last male heir of the Portuguese royal family, King Philip II of Spain, as next in descent through a female line, became king of Portugal and joined with the colonial empire of the Spaniards the commercial empire of the Portuguese. Thenceforth, for sixty years, Spain, had a nominal monopoly of European trade and colonization in the non-European world.

In practice, however, the union of Spain and Portugal and their overseas dominions weakened, rather than strengthened, the monopoly. The Netherlanders, theoretically subject to the Spanish crown, were now in revolt against it, and their sailors and merchants, intent upon particular objects, while the Spanish king was endeavoring to police the whole world, were able to dispossess the Portuguese in Asia and secure for themselves the bulk of the Eastern trade. It was not long before Netherlanders, and Frenchmen and Englishmen also, were poaching on Spanish preserves and planting colonies in the New World. Thus it transpired that the expansion of Europe and the establishment of overseas colonial empires under Portuguese and Spanish auspices in the sixteenth century gave rise in the seventeenth century to acute rivalry on the part of the nations of western Europe for colonial and commercial supremacy throughout the world.¹

5. RISE OF MODERN CAPITALISM

A most significant effect of the expansion of Europe in the sixteenth century was the stimulus it gave to the rise of capitalism in Europe. For capitalism has been the economic characteristic of distinctively modern civilization.

¹ Concerning these later developments, see below, ch. ix, sec. 1.

“Capitalism” has been defined “as the organization of business upon a large scale by an employer or company of employers possessing an accumulated stock of wealth wherewith to acquire raw materials and tools, and hire labor, so as to produce an increased quantity of wealth which shall constitute profit.”¹ To some extent capitalism had existed in ancient times among Greeks and Romans, but it had disappeared with the disruption of the Roman Empire, and during the early middle ages the economy of Europe was not capitalistic. Each small community was relatively self-sufficient. There was no large-scale production of goods. What was produced was consumed and not accumulated or “saved.” Agriculture, through the manorial system, and industry and trade, through the guild system, were cooperative. There was no sharp distinction between employers and labor. “Profit” was frowned upon, and the taking of “interest” for the use of capital was condemned by the Christian church as “usury.” Economic circumstances were fortified by moral scruples, and the resulting situation was unfavorable to the rise of capitalism.

Yet, toward the close of the middle ages, a gradual and almost imperceptible change took place in Europe. The crusades, the growth and extension of commerce, the development of cities, the consolidation of national monarchy, all these, and doubtless other factors, contributed to the change. By the opening of the sixteenth century, as we have already observed, both the manorial system and the guild system were in decline. Landlords, instead of exacting personal services and payments in kind from their serfs and tenants, were beginning to receive money rents from free tenants and to hire agricultural laborers. The merchant guilds were becoming exclusive and aristocratic. The craft guilds were facing competition from manufacturers outside of the guild system, and many a journeyman, instead of rising to the status of master craftsman, was sinking into the position of hired laborer. Above all, the desire for extending financial profits was emerging with telling effect. Not alone Jews were lending money at interest—they had long done so on a small scale and had been suffered to do so as a hopelessly mean and depraved race—but Christians were beginning to do likewise and Christian theologians were arguing whether the faithful were not justified in

¹J. A. Hobson, *Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, p. 1.

charging interest (as distinguished from usury) on loans for profitable enterprises and for monarchical and papal needs.

It was in the towns that the new capitalistic spirit was most in evidence. Certain guildsmen managed to accumulate personal wealth by rendering their guilds more exclusive, by exploiting their journeymen and apprentices, and by catering to a wider market. To the towns, moreover, came persons who were not connected with the traditional guilds and who utilized their independence to amass private fortunes. Such were members of the landed nobility, who, with the growth of a softer, more luxurious habit of life, settled in the towns, bringing with them their manorial rent-rolls and buying city lands and participating in commercial enterprises. Such, too, were officials of state or church—chancellors, marshals, collectors and “farmers” of taxes, managers of lay or ecclesiastical estates—who occupied lucrative posts and invested their surplus in urban undertakings. All these groups put “savings,” that is, “capital,” in the extension of trade, and as trade extended, the cities grew. And as the cities grew, the value of city land increased, and its owners could add an “unearned increment” to their capital.

The Italian cities, as we have noticed, profited most from the expansion of commerce during and immediately following the crusades, and it was in the Italian cities that a great agency of modern capitalism, banking, was first fashioned. Especially in Florence, certain families made a regular practice of caring for the savings of their fellow townsmen and enriching themselves as well as their clients by loaning portions of the accumulation at good interest to kings and popes for the upkeep of armies, for the execution of public works, or for mere ostentation, and by lending other portions to Venetian or Genoese merchants for more solid but hardly less costly commercial ventures. The most celebrated of the Florentine banking families was the Medici, springing from an obscure fourteenth-century guildsman, and becoming in the fifteenth century wealthy and very influential. The Medici typified in the year 1500 the new capitalist class, the banking magnates who treated money as a commodity like wool or wine, who were anxiously waited upon alike by investors and borrowers, who were sought after by all manner of potentates, who patronized art and learning, and who “bossed” their communities.

Italian
Banking:
the
Medici

Florentine banking houses established branches in other parts of Europe, and independent banking developed in Venice, Genoa, and elsewhere. But the coat of arms of the Medici—red balls on a field of gold—became the general insignia of money-lenders, the badge of the new capitalism.

Nevertheless, capitalism of the Medicean variety of 1500 could hardly have evolved into the gigantic capitalism of the present day if its foundations had remained exclusively or chiefly European. Europe supplied no adequate output of gold or silver. The agricultural population of Europe afforded no increase of production in the form of rents large enough to furnish a great stream of accumulating wealth. The towns of Europe were devoid of mechanical devices for speeding up the manufacture of commodities. Europe possessed no numerous landless population exposed to the free exploitation of profit-seeking masters. In a word, Europe in 1500 lacked the factory labor-class, the industrial machinery, the natural resources, and the monetary treasures which were to be required for the later development of capitalism.

To a marked extent Europe gained from her new sixteenth-century contacts with the rest of the world what she lacked at home. It was domination of Asia, Africa, and America, which speeded and accentuated the rise of capitalism in modern Europe. The only factor in later capitalism which Europe lacked in 1500 and which she did not derive from the other continents was industrial machinery for quick mass production of commodities: this, however, was a natural outcome of other factors and was destined to develop in due course. Meanwhile Europe gained vast natural resources and vast treasures of the precious metals from Asia and America. She gained these materials of capitalism in a variety of ways: by military plunder, as in the cases of Mexico and Peru and the East Indies; by forced and unequal trade, whether conducted by Portuguese with civilized peoples in India, China, and Japan, or by Spaniards with primitive tribesmen in the New World; and by imposition of taxes and tribute and trade restrictions on both natives and colonists overseas. The profits which flowed to Europe from these sources were supplemented by the utilization, especially in America, of a labor system quite different from the traditional system of labor within Europe.

Capitalism
and
European
Expansion

The new overseas labor basis of rising European capitalism was slavery.

Slavery had long ago disappeared from Europe, and even the serfdom which had supplanted it was declining by the year 1500.

Overseas Slavery The mass of Europeans were poor, but all of them had acknowledged rights of personal liberty, and a considerable part of their work was for themselves and voluntary; their exploitation was limited. When, however, the Portuguese and Spaniards explored Asia, Africa, and America, they came in contact with peoples among whom slavery was still a recognized institution, and they soon found that they themselves could profitably utilize the institution for the operation of mines and large plantations in the New World. Portuguese and Spanish colonists in America were dispersed over vast areas; they had extensive tracts of land to bring under cultivation, dense forests to cut down, deep mine shafts to sink. buildings to rear, and highways to construct across lofty mountains and mighty rivers; they were too few to do all these things themselves, and the free agricultural labor with which they were familiar at home seemed quite unsuited to the enormous tasks confronting them abroad. Besides, in the tropics they had to face a debilitating climate to which they were unaccustomed. They obviously needed a cheap, abundant, acclimated labor supply which they could command and exploit at will. They needed non-European slaves.

In the circumstances, Spaniards and Portuguese practically enslaved the native Indians of the West Indies, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil, forced them to hard labor in field and mine, and treated them sometimes with great cruelty. In the West Indies, the Caribs were so terribly exploited by the early Spanish colonists that they were all but exterminated. Then, when the national monarchs, pressed by humanitarian priests and monks, sought to protect the Indians and to promote their Christianization rather than their extermination, the colonists sought negroes as slaves. In 1517, a famous missionary bishop, Bartolomé de las Casas, a great friend and advocate of the Indians, suggested to the king of Spain that negroes from tropical Africa were better adapted than native Americans to forced labor in the West Indies. The suggestion was adopted.

Already, since the middle of the fifteenth century, the Portu-

guese had been learning from the Moslem Moors that African negroes could be bought or captured and utilized as slaves, and they had begun to employ their African stations, especially those on the Guinea coast, as centres for the slave-trade. They believed that by enslaving negroes they could Christianize them and at the same time provide their own Far Eastern empire with cheap labor able to endure exertions that were impossible to Europeans in a torrid climate. The Portuguese transported many negro slaves from Africa to the East Indies and also to Brazil.

In 1517 the king of Spain granted a patent to one of his subjects in the Netherlands, authorizing him to supply 4,000 negroes annually to the West Indies. The subject sold his patent to some Genoese merchants for 25,000 ducats; these merchants bought the slaves from the Portuguese; and thus was first systematized the slave-trade between Portuguese Africa and Spanish America. Negro slavery, once legitimized and proven profitable, grew rapidly, and slave-catching in Africa became an indispensable adjunct to plantation-growing in America and part and parcel of big capitalistic business. Europeans were enriched by forced labor abroad as they could not have been enriched by free labor at home.

At first ~~thought, it might appear as if Spain and Portugal, as the pioneers in overseas exploration, colonization, and trade, plunder and slavery, would amass enormous stores of capital and emerge as the financial dictators of all Europe. Such was not actually the case. Though the monarchs of Portugal and Spain and some of their individual subjects drew riches from abroad, and though Lisbon and Seville supplanted Venice and Genoa as the leading commercial entrepôts for Europe, the chief profits from overseas did not remain in Spain and Portugal or inure permanently to the whole population of the peninsula. As a matter of fact, it was only a small minority of Portuguese and Spaniards, and these principally from the bourgeoisie, who concerned themselves directly with distant commercial or colonial undertakings. The masses of these nations, including noblemen and peasants, continued to devote themselves to agriculture and particularly to wool-growing. Hence, these nations produced at home hardly enough to feed and clothe themselves, and cer-~~

Failure to
Develop
Capitalism
in Spain
and
Portugal

tainly not enough to supply the many needs of their colonies, or to exchange for oriental luxuries. Hence, the monarchs and prospectors of Spain and Portugal had recourse to foreign bankers for the capital investment in overseas enterprises, and the returns from such investment accrued less to Portuguese and Spaniards than to foreigners.

Italian bankers financed, just as Italian sailors manned, some of the early expeditions from Lisbon and Seville; and we have already noted the presence of Amerigo Vespucci in Spain at the opening of the sixteenth century as the representative of the Medici. But as the century advanced, banking preëminence passed from Italians to Germans and Netherlanders, and it was capitalists in these latter nations who became the chief brokers of the economic expansion of Europe. Italian imports from the East fell off because of the hostility and conquests of the Ottoman Turks and because of the successful competition of the new trade routes of the Portuguese and Spaniards. Other European merchants went for goods to Lisbon and Seville, rather than to Venice or Genoa. With the setback to Venetian trade Venetian manufacturing suffered a decline. And thus Italian banking was deprived of adequate resources wherewith to take advantage of the rapidly augmenting opportunities for investment in overseas undertakings.


On the other hand, bankers of Germany and the Netherlands were in a position to supply the needful capital and to reap the rich rewards. The merchants of these lands were not disadvantaged by the advance of the Ottoman Turks. They could develop freely their traditional trade with Russia and Scandinavia, with England and the North Sea fisheries. They had at their disposal mineral stores of iron and copper which enabled them to improve and extend their manufactures. Nor were they rivals of the Portuguese and Spaniards; they had no trade routes of their own to the Far East; they could help themselves by taking their manufactured goods to Lisbon and Seville, as formerly they had taken them to Venice, and exchanging them there for oriental luxuries, which, in turn, they could now distribute throughout the greater part of Europe without serious

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Sixteenth-Century Ship," is from a painting by Pieter Brueghel (1526-1569).

Growth of
Capitalism
in Ger-
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competition from Italians. In other words, the Italians were being left out in the cold; while the Portuguese and Spaniards were supplanting them as importers of overseas commodities, Germans and Netherlanders were superseding them as the foremost manufacturers, traders,—and bankers,—within Europe.

Political ties, moreover, were strengthening the economic bonds between the Spanish peninsula and Germany. The grandson of Ferdinand and Isabella was not only king of Spain but also lord of the Netherlands and Holy Roman Emperor over all the German states; while promoting Spanish colonization and commerce overseas, he favored the industrial and banking interests of his German and Netherlandish subjects, and his son became king of Portugal.

The attendant growth of capitalism in Germany is illustrated by the fortunes of the Fugger family. This family was descended from a weaver of Augsburg, who became a leader of the merchant guild of the city, as well as of his craft guild, and who on his death in 1408 left savings of some three thousand gulden. During the fifteenth century the family extended their financial operations. Under the lead of Jacob Fugger, who had been trained for business in Venice, the family exploited silver mines in the Tyrol and copper mines in Hungary and traded in spices, silk, and wool in almost all countries of Europe, while their wealth enabled them to make large loans to the Holy Roman Emperor and to the pope. By 1500 the Fuggers of Augsburg had a capital of two hundred thousand gulden and were accounted the richest bankers in Europe. They began to invest money in quicksilver mines in Spain, and soon they were advancing funds for Spanish expeditions overseas and for the election of the king of Spain as Holy Roman Emperor. They are said to have made more than fifty per cent profit on their investments in Spanish shipping and colonization. In 1527 their capital amounted to two million gulden, and in 1546 to four million.¹

The
Fugger
Family

¹ The two million gulden of 1527 represent a purchasing power of some twenty million dollars in American money of 1930.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Sixteenth-Century Banker," is from a painting by Hans Holbein (1497-1543).

In the meantime, the shrewd Fuggers, aware of the shift of the commercial centre of gravity from the Mediterranean and central Europe to the Atlantic seaboard, had established a branch of their banking business at the port of Antwerp, in the Netherlands. Thither flocked other bankers and merchants,¹ attracted by its favorable location at the crossroads of the old and new trade routes. By the middle of the sixteenth century, more than a thousand foreign merchants—German, Spanish, Portuguese, English, Danish, and Italian—were residing at Antwerp. Every week, two thousand wagons came into the city, to exchange wares with the four hundred ships which daily entered its harbor. A Venetian ambassador of the time declared that as much business was done at Antwerp in a fortnight as at Venice in a year.

At Antwerp developed many institutions of modern capitalism. The first "stock exchange," or "bourse," was established here in 1531; it marketed capital, as well as commodities, so that princes or promoters who desired to borrow money, and who formerly would have applied to individual financiers like the Medici or the Fuggers, now turned to the exchange of Antwerp. At Antwerp, too, grew up the practice of "betting on the exchange," and here lotteries flourished. Life insurance came into use, limited mainly to fixed periods, such as the duration of a journey by land or sea. Insurance of ships and cargoes, already experimented with by the Italians, developed to such an extent at Antwerp that in 1564 six hundred of its inhabitants were making out of it what one writer has described as a "fat living."

If the major capitalistic profits of the economic expansion of Europe in the sixteenth century passed at once from Spain and Portugal to Germany and the Netherlands, a not inconsiderable share was soon dispersed, by means of such exchanges as that of Antwerp, among merchants, manufacturers, and money-lenders of France, England, Scandinavia, and other countries, who were not slow to catch the "capitalistic spirit" and to embody it in action. By the end of the sixteenth century, capitalism was deeply rooted in the economy of all western and central Europe.

¹ Including representatives of the Welser family, originally from Augsburg, and hardly less famous than the Fuggers as investors in overseas trade and colonization.

The rapid rise of capitalism had profound effects on the traditional social conditions and institutions of Europe. Already, prior to 1500, as we have seen, the medieval pattern of society was being gradually altered; the old systems of manor and guild were undergoing transformation. But what was merely evolutionary at the opening of the sixteenth century reached well-nigh revolutionary proportions at the close of the century.

Effects of
the Rise
of Capitalism

Capitalism dealt a body blow at medieval agriculture and the manorial system. Nobles, seeking to make their estates more profitable to themselves, tended to become "absentee landlords," that is, to take up residence in towns and to engage in commercial enterprise. In order to have ready cash, they hastened to transmute the customary services and payments in kind of their peasants into money-rents; and over their manors and tenants they placed hired agents, with instructions to exact as high rents as possible. Usually such an arrangement was unfavorable to the peasants, because many of them were forced from a partially independent position as tenants into a wholly dependent position as agricultural laborers, and because the "absentee landlord" seldom saw with his own eyes the suffering caused by his new capitalistic methods. It was the new capitalism which greatly contributed, moreover, to the "enclosure" movement in England and to similar movements in other countries, all of which were directed toward an increased production of manufacturing staples, mostly wool, for distant markets, and simultaneously toward a decreased employment of skilled farm labor.

On Agriculture

Capitalism revolutionized European industry. The medieval guilds, already in decline, now largely succumbed. They were too local and too narrow to cope with the world-supply of raw materials and the world-demand for manufactured commodities. Outside the guilds appeared a new form of productive and distributing organization—the so-called "domestic" or "putting out" system of industry—by which a capitalist "middleman" bought raw material, put it out to artisans to be worked up in their homes for wages, and sold the finished product for as much as it would fetch. Under this organization, the middleman or employer tended to spread manufacturing over a fairly wide area and

On Industry

to utilize the cheap labor of the dispossessed serfs and the wives of agricultural wage-workers. He was not handicapped, like the guildsman, by the necessity of confining production to trained workmen under one roof. Furthermore, he was soon able, by his supply of capital, to accumulate a larger stock and to buy and sell at better advantage. The new system was not without detriment to the employees: it differentiated more sharply between capital and labor, debasing the latter, and it tended to substitute for the close tie between master and apprentice an unsympathetic impersonal relationship.

Confronted with the new capitalist system of industry, the old guilds were compelled to alter their status or to yield to destructive competition. In the main they adopted one of two alternatives. They admitted capitalists to membership, and under the leadership of these transformed themselves into corporations which proceeded to extend their operations and to adopt the "domestic" system. Or, remaining purely local entities, they accepted employment from capitalist middlemen and became little cogs in the great wheel of world commerce.

As the line became more clearly marked between capital and labor, both in industry and in agriculture, and as the commercial centres of Europe shifted from the city states of the Mediterranean and Baltic seas to the national states of the Atlantic seaboard, the "wealth of nations" became increasingly an object of solicitude on the part of the monarchs of western Europe. Capitalists and laborers alike looked more and more to their respective national governments, rather than to a city or province, for protection and support, and monarchs were soon applying to national domains the mercantile policies which had long been pursued on an urban basis by the Italian city states. In other words, the expansion of trade and the rise of capitalism enormously quickened national consciousness and led to the adoption of national mercantilism.

National Mercantilism

"Mercantilism" is a modern word signifying governmental regulation of economic affairs, especially trade and industry. The thing itself was no novelty in the sixteenth century, for city governments for hundreds of years had supervised and directed the economic activities of their citizens; traditionally the merchant guild and the craft guild were agencies of urban

mercantilism, the former for commerce, and the latter for manufacturing. The novelty in sixteenth-century mercantilism was its extension from city to nation and the transfer of its chief agency from local guild to national monarch. Not the city of Lisbon but the king of Portugal tried to monopolize the trade of the Far East, and this not exclusively for the benefit of the citizens of Lisbon but for the greater prosperity and security of the whole Portuguese nation. It was not the city of Seville but the king of Spain who attempted to exploit the New World, and in such a way as to strengthen the Spanish monarchy. It was because other national monarchs had similar ambitions and similar convictions that they encouraged their seamen and merchants to break the monopolies of Portuguese and Spaniards and to establish monopolies of their own.

✓ Under mercantilism, it was a central aim of national states to attract and keep as much gold and silver as possible, both in their royal treasuries and in the hands of private subjects. Gold and silver were believed to constitute the basic wealth of a nation: they were essential to coinage and indispensable for the maintenance of armies and warships; they guaranteed national prestige and power. Hence, Portugal and Spain forbade alien exportation of the precious metals from mother country and colonial empire. Hence, too, other nations, notably the Netherlands, France, and England, resorted to smuggling, raiding, and piracy, in order to obtain a share of the precious metals.

It followed, under mercantilist practice, that national states began closely to regulate the manufacturing and commerce of their citizens with a view toward supplying themselves with an adequate stock of precious metals and making proper provision for military and naval power. Thus, heavy tariff, and sometimes complete prohibition, was imposed on the importation of manufactured articles from foreign countries, and export duties were levied on commodities deemed necessary for national defense. The shipping of one's own nation was favored, while that of foreign nations was penalized. It followed, also, that, just as Spain and Portugal endeavored to hold as large colonial empires as possible and to exclude alien colonists and merchants from them, so the Netherlands, France, and England sought to establish overseas colonies and trading posts which they

might monopolize for their economic advantage and political power.

Capitalism, with the results already mentioned, was promoted by the economic expansion of Europe in the sixteenth century, and, in turn, this expansion was speeded and magnified by the rise of capitalism. The rise of capitalism Commercial Changes enabled kings and corporations not only to promote distant exploration on a large scale and to make many overseas settlements, but also to revolutionize commerce in direction and quantity. It meant that the chief trade changed from the south and east of Europe to the west, from city states to national states, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. It meant that the vessels which sailed the Atlantic (and Pacific) at the end of the sixteenth century were larger, stronger, and far more numerous than the fragile caravels and galleys which a century before had borne Da Gama to India or Columbus to America. It meant likewise that the cargoes of the later vessels were heavier and more varied.

Under capitalistic auspices, Asiatic luxuries were poured into Europe—spices, drugs, cottons, silks, ivory, indigo, sugar, precious gems, ebony and sandal-wood, coffee and tea, carpets and rugs, wall paper, porcelains. From America came great stores of silver and gold and certain strictly indigenous products, such as tobacco, cocoa, quinine, maize (Indian corn), potatoes, lima beans, tapioca, mahogany. Into America, European colonists and investors introduced horses and cattle, donkeys, swine, sheep, poultry, garden vegetables, lemons and oranges, bananas, vines, olives, flax, grains, and sugar-cane; and in due course there was surplus of these things to ship back to Europe.¹ Over against these imports from oversea, Europe exported wheat, woollen and cotton cloth, hardware, gunpowder, and a great profusion of manufactured articles, including various trinkets which were found useful in trade with "backward" peoples.

In the midst of such a novel world-market and of such a sudden rise of capitalism, Europe experienced extraordinary

¹ Conspicuous among such things was rum, which was distilled from fermented sugar-cane. Rum-making was a major industry of the West Indies, and rum-shipping an important item of commerce, both to Europe, where rum speedily became a popular beverage, and to Africa, where its potency lured many negroes into captivity and nerved them for their dreadful voyage across the Atlantic and for their forced labor in raising sugar and making more rum!

social strains and stresses. The gulf between rich and poor widened; the rich became richer, and the poor poorer. There was an epidemic of peasant revolts against greedy landlords, and the towns suffered from growing pains. National consciousness and national competition increased; international war assumed a deadlier and costlier character. Kings intensified their absolutism and, in union with the middle classes, overawed both nobility and clergy.

Social
Strains
and
Stresses

Particularly noteworthy was the rise of well-to-do townsmen—the capitalistic bourgeoisie—to hitherto unprecedented influence and distinction. The new bourgeois—the new capitalists—were at the elbows of kings and dukes and prelates. Many an impecunious nobleman, who

The
Bour-
geoisie

needed money as well as a wife, sought the hand of some wealthy merchant's daughter. Some members of the bourgeoisie obtained admission to the ranks of the nobility by rendering capitalistic service to the monarch. And members of the nobility found it more and more profitable, if still a bit undignified, to make investments in manufacturing and trade. Capitalistic agriculture was allying itself with capitalistic commerce and industry. The basis was already laid, in the sixteenth-century expansion of Europe, for the modern supremacy of the bourgeoisie.



CHAPTER III

THE INTELLECTUAL QUICKENING



MORE important than the rise of national states and royal absolutism in the realm of politics, and hardly less significant than the expansion of Europe and the development of capitalism in the economic sphere, was the intellectual quickening which occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and which has had profound effect on modern society and civilization. This quickening was evidenced in: (1) the invention of printing and the resulting diffusion of knowledge; (2) the rediscovery of classical civilization, and the ensuing vogue of classicism and humanism; (3) the cultivation of renaissance art; (4) the flowering of national literatures; and (5) the development of natural science and historical criticism.

I. THE INVENTION OF PRINTING

The present day is notably distinguished by the prevalence of enormous numbers of printed books, periodicals, and newspapers. Yet this very printing, which seems so commonplace to us now, has had but a comparatively brief existence. From the earliest recorded history up to less than five hundred years ago every book in Europe¹ was laboriously written by hand,² and, although copyists acquired a surprising swiftness in reproducing books, libraries of any size were the property exclusively of rich institutions or wealthy individuals. It was at the beginning of modern times that the invention of printing first provided a potent means of disseminating information and opinion.

Printing is a complicated process. Among its most essential elements are *movable type*, with which the impression is made,

¹ For an account of early printing in China, see the authoritative work by T. F. Carter, *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward* (1924).

² It is interesting to note the meaning of our present word "manuscript," which is derived from the Latin—*manu scriptum* ("written by hand").

and *paper*, on which it is made. The development of paper, in particular, took a long time.

For their manuscripts the ancient Greeks and Romans had used papyrus, the prepared fibre of a tough reed which grew in the valley of the Nile River. This papyrus was very expensive and heavy, and not at all suitable for printing. Parchment, the dressed skins of certain animals, especially sheep, which became the standard material for the hand-written documents of the middle ages, was extremely durable, but like papyrus, it was costly, unwieldy, and ill adapted to printing.

Elements
of the
Invention

The forerunner of modern European paper was probably that which the Chinese made from silk as early as the second century before Christ. For silk the Moslems at Damascus in the middle of the eighth century appear to have substituted cotton, and this so-called Damascus paper was later imported into Greece and southern Italy and into Spain. In the latter country the native-grown hemp and flax were again substituted for cotton, and the resulting linen paper was used considerably in Castile in the thirteenth century and thence penetrated across the Pyrenees into France and gradually all over western and central Europe. Parchment, however, for a long time kept its preëminence over silk, cotton, or linen paper, because of its greater firmness and durability, and notaries were long forbidden to use any other substance in their official writings. Not until the second half of the fifteenth century was assured the triumph of modern paper,¹ as distinct from papyrus or parchment, when printing, then on the threshold of its career, demanded a substance of moderate price which would easily receive the impression of movable type.

Paper

The idea of movable type was derived from an older practice of carving reverse letters or even whole inscriptions upon blocks of wood so that when they were inked and applied to writing material they would leave a clear impression. Medieval kings and princes frequently had their signatures cut on these blocks of wood or metal, in order to impress them on charters, and a kind of engraving was employed to reproduce pictures or written pages as early as the twelfth century.

Movable
Type

¹ The word "paper" is derived from the ancient "papyrus."

It was a natural but slow evolution from block-impressing to the practice of casting individual letters in separate little pieces of metal, all of the same height, and then arranging them in any desired sequence for printing. The great advantage of movable type over the blocks was the infinite variety of work which could be done by simply setting and resetting the type.

The actual history of the transition from the use of blocks to movable type—the real invention of modern printing—is unknown. It has been maintained that the first European to make and use movable type was a certain Lourens Coster, a native of the town of Haarlem in the Netherlands. All we positively know, however, is that about the year 1450 a man by the name of John Gutenberg was employing movable type in a printing-shop in the German city of Mainz, and that the earliest known products of the new art were papal “letters of indulgence” and a version of the Bible, both printed at Mainz by Gutenberg in 1454.

After the middle of the fifteenth century, the marvellous art spread with almost lightning rapidity from Mainz throughout Germany, the Italian states, France, and England,—in fact, throughout all Christendom. It was welcomed by scholars and applauded by popes. Printing presses were erected at Rome in 1466, and book-publishing speedily became an honorable and lucrative business in every large city. Thus, at the opening of the sixteenth century, the scholarly Aldus Manutius was operating in Venice the famous Aldine press, whose beautiful editions of the Greek and Latin classics are still esteemed as masterpieces of the printer’s art. The first printing press in the New World was set up at Mexico City by the Spaniards in 1536.

The early printers fashioned the characters of their type after the letters which the scribes had used in long-hand writing. Different kinds of common hand-writing gave rise, therefore, to such varieties of type as the heavy black-faced “Gothic” that prevailed in Germany or the several adaptations of the clear, neat Roman characters which predominated in southern Europe and in England. The compressed “italic” type was devised in the Aldine press in Venice to enable the publisher to crowd more words upon a page.

A steady development of the new art characterized the sixteenth century, and at least four remarkable results became evident. (1) The supply of books materially increased. Results
of the
Invention Under earlier conditions, a skilled and conscientious copyist might, by prodigious toil, produce two books in a year. Now, in a single year of the sixteenth century, some 24,000 copies of one of Erasmus's books were struck off by one printing press.

(2) By lessening the expense of books and enabling at least all members of the middle class, as well as nobles and princes, to possess private libraries, printing diffused knowledge, broadened education, and increased the demand for books.

(3) A greater degree of accuracy was guaranteed by printing than by manual copying. Before the invention of printing, it was well-nigh impossible to secure two copies of any work that would be exactly alike. Now, the constant proof-reading and the fact that an entire edition was printed from the same type helped to correct the anciently recurring faults of forgery or of error.

(4) Printing made it possible and profitable to cater to the tastes and whims of the common people. Cheap pamphlets and ephemeral publications, including many controversial tracts, began to appear in large quantities, stimulating a general desire for literacy and at the same time considerable intellectual unrest.

2. THE REDISCOVERY OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION

Printing, the European invention of which at the very dawn of modern times has just been described, was a novel and useful agency for expressing the ideas of the sixteenth cen- Classicism
ture. Many of these ideas centred in an intellectual movement which is called "classicism," and which was derived from a rediscovery of the classical civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome, just as the contemporaneous expansion of Europe was an outcome of the discovery of the disparate civilizations of far-away Asia and America. European life of the sixteenth century was enriched, not only by new contacts with distant places, but also by renewed contacts with distant times.

Of course, Europeans always had retained some intellectual and cultural contact with the classical civilization of ancient Greece and Rome, just as they had always had some commercial

intercourse with Asia. They never ceased to regard the Greeks and Romans as their predecessors and forbears and as the first peoples who had been converted to Christianity. The **The Classical Heritage** ancient classical languages continued to be used in church services—Latin in the West, and Greek in the East. Ancient architecture continued to serve as a model for early Christian church buildings. Many a written word continued to survive and many a monument of stone continued to stand as constant reminders to medieval Europeans of “the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome.”

It is true that during the middle ages, under Christian auspices, much of the spirit of classical civilization was altered, and certain novel features were added to European culture. For example, such medieval achievements as Gothic architecture, rhymed poetry, “romances,” morality plays, stained glass, symbolic painting of great spiritual power, “Gregorian” music, and fantastic humor in sculpture, were radically different from anything in pagan Græco-Roman civilization. But all the distinctive achievements of the middle ages were in addition to the classical heritage which continued to exist and to influence Europe.

Certain classical writers were widely known and cherished throughout the middle ages—notably Virgil, Cæsar, and Cicero. Moreover, both a revived study of Aristotle and a renewed study of the Roman law occupied important positions in the medieval universities and helped to produce the philosophy, the theology, and the canon law which were most characteristic of the learning and higher education of Christendom. Aristotle was revered by monks and popes, almost as if he had been a Christian saint instead of a pagan philosopher. Then, too, most of the medieval ideas of astronomy, medicine, and chemistry were derived, directly or indirectly, from classical sources; and from classical sources, at least indirectly and in part, were drawn many of the medieval notions of history. The most popular “general histories” of the middle ages represented combinations of data of the Hebrew scriptures with data of ancient Greek and Roman authors. In fine, medieval Europeans were indebted in many ways to earlier classical civilization, and they were aware of their debt.

Yet, during the centuries of transition from middle ages to modern times—the centuries from the fourteenth to the seventeenth—classical Græco-Roman civilization was re-discovered by Europeans in new ways and with far-reaching consequences. Previously the inhabitants of the “West” had known something about classical literature, art, philosophy, and science, but they had applied their knowledge to practical purposes and had infused it with the spirit of Christianity. They had revered Virgil mainly because he was supposed in his *Æneid* to prefigure the Christian Church and to inculcate moral truths. They had adapted Græco-Roman architecture to the requirements of church-building. They had employed Aristotle for the construction of their own scholastic theology and philosophy. They had found in ancient Greek and Roman writers many “scientific” speculations which confirmed their own notions about the universe or which appeared to be of practical value to themselves. Now, however, by the sixteenth century, inhabitants of Christendom were reading the classics, not because they possessed religious or ethical significance and not always because they supplied useful information, but rather because they were inherently interesting and enjoyable and because their content was provocative and their form delightful.

Rediscovery of Classical Civilization

This is what is meant by the “rediscovery of ancient civilization,” or (as it is variously termed) the “classical revival” or the “renaissance.”¹ It was basically the sympathetic study of

¹ The word “renaissance,” meaning “rebirth,” has frequently but unfortunately been employed to describe the whole period of transition from middle ages to modern times. There was, of course, during this period, as is pointed out above, a “rebirth” of classical art and learning, with significant effects on the politics, the economics and even the scientific speculations of early modern Europe. But many of the most characteristic events of the period from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century proceeded from no “rebirth”; they were new-born and strictly native to the period. There was no model or inspiration in ancient Greece or Rome for the crusades, the establishment of Islam at Constantinople, the rise of national states, the discovery of America, the commercial and missionary activities of Europeans in southern Africa and the Far East, the invention of gunpowder, the mariner’s compass, and printing. Indeed, “renaissance” implies a retrograde and “reactionary” movement, which, if true in certain respects of the period of transition from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, grossly underestimates or utterly obscures the vitally “progressive” and novel developments of the time. Hence, while the word “renaissance” may properly be employed within rather strict limitations, it should not be used to denote all the beginnings of our modern civilization.

the masterpieces, the "classics," of ancient Latin and Greek literature. Whence it was, also, an appreciation, amounting at times to blind veneration, of all forms of ancient civilization, and a conscious effort to refashion fine arts and ways of life according to classical models, coupled with a pronounced reaction against everything that was deemed "medieval."

The rediscovery of ancient civilization had begun in an important way in the fourteenth century with an Italian, Francesco

**Petrarch,
and the
New
Learning
in Italy**

Petrarca (1304-1374), or, as he is known to us, Petrarch. After spending his boyhood in Tuscany and his young manhood in papal service, Petrarch devoted himself exclusively to a life of scholarship and the pursuit of literature. As an avocation he wrote some popular poems in Italian, but his vocation was the sympathetic and enthusiastic study of the Latin classics. He admired them, and in a multitude of polished Latin epistles and in numerous Latin poems of his own he strove to imitate the form and re-express the content of his cherished models. By daily example and precept he urged his contemporaries to study the classics and to perfect their Latin style. Petrarch took himself very seriously, and so, in time, did others, with the result that he exerted tremendous influence. He became famous as "the scholar." The pope supplied him with funds. Kings vied with one another in heaping benefits upon him. The Venetian senate gave him the freedom of the town. The university of Paris and the city of Rome alike crowned him with laurel.

Petrarch's enthusiasm for ancient Latin literature was fully shared by his fellow countryman, Boccaccio; and during the next century, the fifteenth, most scholars in central and western Europe, first in Italy, and later in other countries, followed in the footsteps of Boccaccio and Petrarch. Petrarch himself had been a serious Latin student, but he had had no profound knowledge of Greek. About the year 1400, however, as a consequence of Moslem Turkish pressure against the Byzantine Empire, Greek scholars and teachers in considerable numbers left Constantinople, crossed the Adriatic, and settled in Italy. One of these, a certain Chrysoloras, founded a famous school of classical Greek studies at Florence and gave lectures on Homer to crowds of students.

The zeal for Greek and Latin classics reached its highest

pitch in Italy in the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, and it was gradually communicated to other countries. Greek was first taught in England and in France about the middle of the fifteenth century. By the sixteenth century the study of pagan classics, both Greek and Latin, was being prosecuted throughout Christendom. The "new learning," as it was called, in contradistinction to the medieval scholastic learning, was in the ascendant and was already producing important results.

First of all, the "new learning" inaugurated the vogue of "classicism," the fashion of regarding the classical civilization of ancient Greece and Rome as the greatest which the world had ever known or ever could know. It was a vogue which was to endure until the nineteenth century and which in the meantime was to be the chief factor in determining the styles of literature, architecture, and most other arts prevalent in Europe. Not only was every educated European expected to know the classical tongues of Greece and Rome, but, if one aspired to write in a vernacular language, one must conform to the classical unities, employ classical names, insert classical references and quotations, and imitate the pompous phrases and elaborate metaphors of Homer or Demosthenes or Virgil or Cicero. Or, if one undertook to rear an edifice, one must construct it according to classical models, fronting it with Greek columns and pediment, topping it with Roman dome, and adorning it with sculptured or painted representations of nude Apollos and Aphrodites.¹

The
Vogue of
Classicism

Secondly, the "new learning" was attended by "humanism," the belief that the charm of the classics resides essentially in their humanness, their humanity, and that anyone who would recapture and hold the greatest charm in life must not prize the supernatural, the theological, or the ascetical above the natural, the human, and the sensual. Satisfaction is better than sacrifice, and self-gratification, than self-denial. One should not look to the gods more than to one's self and one's fellows. Indeed, one should strive sympathetically to enter into the life and enjoyment of one's contemporaries and,

Human-
ism

¹ Classicism, especially important in vernacular literature and renaissance art of the sixteenth century, is discussed more fully in sections 3 and 4 of the present chapter.

perhaps above all, into the life and enjoyment of ancient Greeks and Romans. Such studies as might promote these ends were to be encouraged as "humane letters" (*litteræ humaniores*) or "humanities"; others were to be discouraged. The exponents of humanism—the so-called humanists—recognized the classical languages and literatures and profane (as distinct from sacred) history as the outstanding "humanities." By the sixteenth century, Latin, already utilized as the medium of instruction in European universities, became a formal subject of instruction, with emphasis shifted from the language to its pagan literature. Greek was introduced into the curricula of the universities, and profane history also. Outside the universities, the "humanities" were especially fostered by a new institution—the academy—a voluntary association which arose in a particular city or locality in imitation of the ancient academy of Plato and which patronized the pursuit and publication of scholarly, literary, and, finally, scientific studies.¹

Thirdly, the "new learning" stimulated intellectual curiosity and criticism, the passion of the "collector," and what is known as "scholarly research." In order to find out as much as possible about the vaunted ancients, scholars sought forgotten or neglected manuscripts of classical writers, and by ransacking monasteries and old libraries they managed to discover such supposedly "lost" classics as Quintilian's treatise on oratory, Cicero's oration on Cæcina, the histories of Tacitus, Livy, and Ammianus Marcellinus, the mathematical work of Firmicus, the architectural writings of Vitruvius, and the agricultural essays of Columella, to say nothing of a profusion of manuscripts of classics already well known. The collecting of classical manuscripts soon became a profession or a fad, and many a rising commercial capitalist gathered together a classical library as greedily as he amassed a store of precious metals. With collecting, went buying, selling, copying, and publishing of the old manuscripts. And for purposes of publication, scholars compared variant manuscripts, applied textual criticism to them, and collated them. Whence arose a firmer grasp on history and historical method, a clearer perception of the copyist's errors which might be expected in old manuscripts, and certain rules which could be used in determining what was probably true and what was cer-

The New
Scholar-
ship

¹ Concerning these academies, see below, ch. xi, sec. 1.

tainly false in a given document. One of the Italian humanists of the fifteenth century, Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457), by means of acute historical criticism, proved that the so-called "Donation of Constantine," a document which pretended to be a grant of temporal sovereignty over Rome from the Emperor Constantine to the pope and which during the middle ages had generally been accepted as authentic, was in reality a rather clumsy forgery.

Fourthly, the "new learning," so given to classical scholarship and to enthusiastic appreciation of antiquity, tended to be contemptuous and even denunciatory of the culture of the intervening centuries between Cicero and Petrarch. Classicists and humanists began to bestow on these centuries the opprobrious term "middle ages" ^{Scorn of the Middle Ages} and to describe them collectively as "dark." The lofty architecture of these ages, with its pointed arches and flying buttresses, was styled "Gothic," a synonym for "barbarous."² Scholasticism was denounced as arid and futile; the spoken and written medieval Latin, as "monkish"; vernacular literature, as puerile; and the whole array of medieval intellectuals, as distressingly ignorant and superstitious. In this way the "new learning" turned its back on the immediately antecedent civilization of Europe, became positively reactionary, and mistakenly contended that the only worthwhile elements in European civilization were those which the humanists of early modern times were salvaging from antiquity.³

¹ One of the first inventors of the term "middle ages" was a Roman humanist and historian of the fifteenth century, in papal employ, Flavio Biondo, whose *Decades* represented an attempt to outline the "gloomy" history of Europe during the thousand years from 410 to 1410.

² This use of the term "Gothic" was popularized by Giorgio Vasari (1511-1571), a pupil of Michelangelo and author of the famous *Lives of Painters, Sculptors, and Architects*. Vasari described the monuments of the middle ages as having been built in a style originated by the Goths, "those Germanic races untutored in the classics," and defined the "Gothic style" as a "heap of spires, pinnacles, and grotesque decorations lacking in all the simple beauty of the classical orders." Such estimates of medieval art were not seriously reconsidered and revised until the nineteenth century.

³ "Really the studies of the humanists were just as bookish as those of the scholastics and were even more antiquarian, artificial, and doctrinaire, since they dealt with a culture that was dead and gone, which they could not hope to resuscitate except in ghostly form, while it put them out of touch and tune with their own immediate past. To-day we have in turn abandoned the humanities as dead languages and useless culture; the tendency is to study only subjects "of present inter-

Fifthly, the "new learning" inspired among its devotees a satisfaction with themselves and a glorying in their achievements which has been interpreted by sympathetic moderns as salutary individualism and by others as silly affectation or offensive bumptiousness. There can be no doubt that a kind of assertive individualism was admired and practiced by humanists in sharp contrast with the self-abnegation of the medieval monk, who, without personal property or family, was vowed to obedience and humility. It was of a kind, indeed, with the individualism which was contemporaneously displayed by hardy explorers and colonists, by daring pirates and freebooters, and by gambling middle-men, investors, and bankers, and which was shortly to be exemplified in a widespread repudiation of established tradition and authority. The "new learning" certainly contributed something to the vogue of individualism in modern times, though it would be a very questionable generalization to say that in all respects modern times have given greater prominence to the individual than the middle ages gave. Medieval feudalism was notoriously individualistic; the basis of the medieval state was personal, rather than territorial or national; medieval armies were composed of individual fighters rather than of a disciplined soldiery; and it has been modern times, not the middle ages, which have witnessed the subordination of the individual to mass-production, mass-education, and mass-action.

The rediscovery of classical civilization was a major element in the beginnings of modern Europe. It gave a different emphasis and a somewhat different content to European thought from what had prevailed during the middle ages. Its immediate and most obvious fruits were primarily antiquarian, and in the long run it was to prove less revolutionary than its sixteenth-century proponents anticipated. Eventually, classical antiquity would lose its hold on men's interest; even scholars would cease to know much Greek or Latin; scientific history would supplant humanist history; and, for proper background to modern development, a

est," such as sociology, psychology, political science, economics, modern languages and literatures, the modern novel, the modern drama, natural science. Perhaps it is now too late for us to reach our roots down where they belong into medieval civilization, but could we do so, we should draw strength and nourishment from knowledge of the past beneath us as well as from the intellectual atmosphere of the present about us." Lynn Thorndike, *A Short History of Civilization* (1926), p. 348.

juster view of the middle ages would be incorporated in a much vaster panorama of human history. Yet such an outcome was still in the distant future and was not suspected by the classicists and humanists of the sixteenth century. Nor should it blind our eyes to the historical fact that the rediscovery of classical civilization, with all its shortcomings and limitations, emphasized certain habits of thought and behavior which have been abiding characteristics of modern civilization, even after the decline of the classicism which first formed them.

In the meantime, especially in the sixteenth century, classicism and humanism were very much in fashion with educated Europeans. A host of scholars pursued the "new learning" individually and in academies and universities, and if some of the older universities still conservatively frowned upon it in defense of medieval scholasticism, new universities were established for its special patronage at Louvain (in the Netherlands), St. Andrews (in Scotland), Upsala (in Sweden), Freiburg, Tübingen, and Wittenberg (in Germany), and elsewhere. Merchant princes and wealthy bankers gave lavish financial support to it, and prelates and kings encouraged it, by pensions and services. The head of the banking family of the Medici, Lorenzo the Magnificent (1449-1492), subsidized humanists and renaissance artists and founded the great Florentine library of Greek and Roman classics. The French King Francis I (1515-1547) attracted Italian classical scholars and artists to his court, created the Collège de France to train native Frenchmen in the "new learning," and otherwise stimulated its vogue in France. The other European monarchs, contemporary with Francis, performed similar service for the "new learning" in their respective countries—Henry VIII of England, Charles V of Germany and Spain, Christian II of Denmark, Sigismund I of Poland. Even among the common people it became the fashion for parents to name their children, not after Christian saints, but after pagan celebrities—Cæsar, Virgil, Æneas, Plutarch, Homer, Solon, Pericles, Diana, Julia, Augusta, Lucretia, etc.

Vogue
of the
New
Learning

It may appear strange that there was not serious and sustained opposition to the "new learning" on the part of sincere Christians and ecclesiastical authorities. At first, it is true, the study of the pagan classics aroused misgiving and even hostility among some clergymen, who feared lest paganism should be revived

and the moral and dogmatic teachings of Christianity should be obscured and neglected. Gradually, however, the "new learning" came actually to be tolerated, and then accepted, and finally patronized with liberality and ardor, not only by innumerable bishops and abbots and priests, but also by popes. Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455) was himself a conspicuous classical scholar and a munificent patron of others; he hired hundreds of persons to copy old manuscripts; he awarded a handsome prize for a metrical translation of Homer; and he collected at the Vatican a large classical library. Pius II (1458-1464) acquired before his election to the papacy a European reputation, under the classical pen-name of Æneas Silvius, as a great Latinist and an indefatigable collector of manuscripts, a reputation which his pontificate enhanced. Papal patronage of the "new learning" reached its zenith early in the sixteenth century with the son of Lorenzo di Medici, Leo X (1513-1521), who combined with prodigal expenditure in aid of classicism a very real personal enjoyment of its tastes and pleasures. Leo X was fond of the masterpieces of the ancients and the creations of humanistic contemporaries, music and the theatre, art and poetry, the formal and the witty, suppers reminiscent of Lucullus and pageants worthy of Pompey.

Most Europeans could see nothing incompatible between practice of the Christian religion and the pursuit of classical studies; and it was maintained, quite plausibly, that Christian civilization was being deepened and uplifted by the rediscovery of pagan civilization. Yet there can be little doubt that the new enthusiasm for classicism and humanism was subversive of certain historical traditions and usages of the Christian religion. It was inimical to the Christian traditions of self-sacrifice and self-denial, critical of the long established Christian institution of monasticism, and scornful of the long esteemed Christian absorption in theology. In certain instances, moreover, it prompted an indifference and a tolerance in religious matters, which, if only remotely associated with our present-day ideas of religious toleration, represented at the opening of the sixteenth century a marked lessening of the fanaticism which had characterized Christianity (and most other religions) during earlier centuries.

Certain prominent exponents of the "new learning" in Europe in the first part of the sixteenth century should be noted. There were two Germans, John Reuchlin, tutor to young princes and nobles, profound student of Greek literature, and pioneer in Hebrew grammar and philology, and his nephew, Philip Melancthon, professor of Greek at the newly founded university of Wittenberg and close associate of Martin Luther. There were two Englishmen, John Colet, dean of the cathedral of St. Paul in London and famed teacher and preacher, and Sir Thomas More, chancellor of the realm under Henry VIII and author of Utopia, a celebrated modern description of an ideal state and society such as had anciently been portrayed by Plato. There was a Dane, Povl Helgesen, professor at the university of Copenhagen, historian, grammarians, and controversialist. There was a Frenchman, William Budé, expert writer of both classical Greek and classical Latin and principal agent under Francis I in the establishment of the Collège de France and likewise of a great library which later became world famous as the Bibliothèque Nationale.

Outstanding Exponents of the New Learning

Towering above all his contemporaries was Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), the foremost humanist and intellectual arbiter of the early sixteenth century. Erasmus was a native of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, but he passed most of his long and studious life in other countries—in Germany, France, England, Italy, and Switzerland. He became a priest and a doctor of sacred theology, but it was as a lover of books, a prolific writer, and a sociable being among fellow humanists that he earned his chief title to fame. Erasmus, to an even greater degree than Petrarch, might be called *the* scholar of Europe. He corresponded with almost every first-rate writer of his generation and was on terms of personal friendship with Aldus Manutius, the noted publisher of Venice, with John Colet and Budé and Sir Thomas More, with Pope Leo X, with the Holy Roman Emperor, and with the kings of England and France. For a time he presided over the new Collège de France.

Erasmus

Erasmus was a professed Christian and never questioned the ultimate authority of church or pope. But, good humanist that he was, he made light of practices which he deemed superstitious, poked fun at theologians, monks, and bigots, and was

a bitter foe of credulity and ignorance. His scholarly Greek text of the New Testament was accompanied not only with a new Latin translation but with commentary which mercilessly flayed hair-splitting theologians. In his Praise of Folly he directed all his wit and sarcasm against theologians and monks, complaining that the foolish people identified religion only with pilgrimages, the invocation of saints, and the veneration of relics. In his satirical dialogues, the Adages and the Colloquies, he assailed ignorance and superstition with quip and jest. He laughed at everyone, himself included. "Literary people," said he, "resemble the great figured tapestries of Flanders, which produce effect only when seen from a distance."

If the humanists were critical of the church and of Christianity as popularly practiced in Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century, many of them, including some of the greatest, felt little or no sympathy with the general religious upheaval which, later in the century, produced Protestantism and led to increased fanaticism and intolerance. Only Melancthon, of the leading humanists already mentioned, actually seceded from the Catholic Church, and he was a peculiarly mild and compromising Protestant. The others, typified by Erasmus, seem to have felt that the theological tempest which Martin Luther aroused all over Europe would destroy fair minded scholarship—the very essence of humanism; they desired simply a moral internal reform of the existing church, conducted not by ill-informed bigots, but by an enlightened and well-educated clergy. Reuchlin died in the habit of an Augustinian monk; Erasmus directed his last shafts against Luther; Helgesen wrote his last treatise in defense of the papacy; and Sir Thomas More is now honored as a martyr and saint of the Catholic Church.

Tolerant, half-sceptical humanism surely suffered eclipse, at least temporary, in the second half of the sixteenth century. But classicism—the first fruit of the rediscovery of ancient civilization—continued to be cultivated by European intellectuals throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And if it ceased to propagate broadmindedness in faith, it went on inspiring the form and much of the content of literature and art and influencing the formulation of some important doctrines of modern science. To these important by-products of the rediscovery of ancient civilization, we may now turn.

3. RENAISSANCE ART

It was artists as well as scholars who, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, developed a growing interest in classical civilization and derived models from it for masterpieces of their own and subsequent generations. The chief art of the middle ages had been essentially Christian. It sprang from the doctrine and devotions of the church and was inextricably bound up with Christian life. The graceful Gothic cathedrals, pointing their roofs and airy spires in heavenly aspiration, the fantastic and mysterious carvings of wood or stone, the imaginative portraiture of saintly heroes and heroines as well as of the sublime story of the fall and redemption of the human race, the richly stained glass, and the solemn organ music—all betokened the supreme thought of medieval Christendom. But humanism recalled to men's mind the existence of an earlier art, simpler and more restrained, if less deeply spiritual in its appeal. The resulting "classicism" meant esteem for pagan culture in all its aspects.

Under classicist influence, accordingly, European art underwent a transformation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While much of the distinctively medieval culture remained, European civilization was enriched by a renaissance of classical art-forms. The painters, the sculptors, and the architects now sought models not so much in their own Christian past as in the more distant past of Greece and Rome. Gradually the two lines of development were brought together, and the consequent union—the adaptation of classical art-forms to Christian uses—was marked by an outburst of artistic energy. Classicism became the fashion in all the arts—in architecture, sculpture, painting, engraving, and music.

Classicism
and Art

In architecture, the straight and severely plain line of the ancient Greek temple or the elegant gentle curve of the Roman dome was substituted for the fanciful lofty Gothic. A rounded arch replaced the pointed. Flying buttresses were discarded. And the ancient Greek orders—Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian—were dragged from oblivion to embellish sedate symmetrical structures. The resulting "classical" or "renaissance" architecture was used for all manner of buildings, reaching perhaps its most ambitious expression in the vast

Archi-
tecture ✓

basilica of St. Peter, which was erected at Rome in the sixteenth century under the direction of such great artists as Bramante, Raphael, Michelangelo, and Palladio.¹

The revival of Greek and Roman architecture, like the revival of Greek and Latin literature, had its origin in Italy; and in the cities of the peninsula, under the patronage of wealthy princes and noble families, it attained its most general acceptance. But, like literary humanism, it spread to other countries, which in turn it deeply affected. The chronic wars in which the petty Italian states were engaged throughout the sixteenth century, were attended by perpetual foreign interference. But Italy, vanquished in politics, and also in oriental trade, became the victor in art. While her towns surrendered to foreign armies, and her shippers and bankers suffered from the successful competition of western Europeans, her architects and builders subdued Christendom and brought it for a time under her artistic sway. More and more, throughout western Europe, Gothic architecture was looked upon as barbarous, and newer buildings were erected in the renaissance style.

In France, the national monarchs, especially Francis I, who led armies into Italy, took back home with them not only a great admiration for the new architecture but also a number of its Italian designers and craftsmen. Before long the renaissance style appeared in many public structures in France, among which were numerous chateaux in the valley of the Loire, and the rebuilt palace of the Louvre at Paris, begun in the last year of the reign of Francis I (1546) and to-day the home of one of the world's largest art collections.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the renaissance architecture similarly entered Spain and received encouragement from Philip II, who especially employed it for his vast new palace of the Escorial. About the same time it manifested itself, in lesser degree, in the Netherlands and in Germany.

¹ Palladio (1518-1580), a close student of ancient models, was exclusively an architect and perhaps the most influential in the subsequent "classical" development of his art. In addition to his work as consultant to Pope Paul III on St. Peter's at Rome, he built the church of St. George Major at Venice and numerous palaces and villas in northern Italy. Palladio's scholarly treatise, *Four Books of Architecture*, was translated into almost every European language and exerted commanding influence on the so-called "baroque" type of seventeenth-century architecture in Italy and throughout Europe. See below, ch. xi, sec. c

In England, its appearance was delayed until the seventeenth century.

Sculpture is usually an attendant of architecture, and it is not surprising, therefore, that transformation of the one should be connected with change in the other. The new movement showed itself in Italian sculpture as early as the Sculpture fourteenth century, owing to the influence of the ancient monuments which still abounded throughout the peninsula and to which the humanists attracted attention. In the fifteenth century archæological discoveries were made and a special interest fostered by the Florentine family of the Medici, who not only became enthusiastic collectors of ancient works of art but promoted the scientific study of sculpture. Sculptors followed more and more closely the Greek and Roman traditions in form and often in subject as well. The plastic art of Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was strikingly akin to that of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ.

The first great apostle of renaissance sculpture in the fifteenth century was Lorenzo Ghiberti (1378-1455), whose marvellous doors on the baptistry at Florence elicited the comment of Michelangelo that they were "worthy of being placed at the entrance of paradise." Slightly younger than Ghiberti was Donatello (1386-1466), who, among other triumphs, fashioned the realistic statue of St. Mark in Venice. Luca della Robbia (1400-1482), famed for his classic purity and simplicity of style, founded a school of sculptors in glazed terra-cotta. Elaborate tomb-monuments, the construction of which started in the fifteenth century, reached their highest magnificence in the gorgeous sixteenth-century tomb of the founder of the princely family of Visconti in Milan. Michelangelo himself was as celebrated for his sculpture as for his architecture or his painting; the heroic head of his "David" at Florence is a masterpiece of classical dignity.¹ The form of the new sculpture was frankly borrowed from the classical, and its subjects were increasingly inspired by pagan literature. Monuments were erected to illustrious men of ancient Rome, and Greek mythology was once more carved in stone.²

¹ For an example of Michelangelo's sculpture, see below, p. 142.

² Sculptors (and painters) of the age, in imitation of the ancients, began undressing their subjects. Medieval convention had permitted only Eve, the first

The extension of renaissance sculpture beyond Italy was even more rapid than the spread of renaissance architecture. Italian sculptors were invited to England by Henry VII, and to France by Francis I. In Spain the tomb of Ferdinand and Isabella was carved and chiselled in classical style. In Germany renaissance sculpture was prized before Luther appeared on the scene. Indeed, it was to be found everywhere in western Europe in the sixteenth century.

Painting underwent an even more significant development than sculpture. Prior to the sixteenth century, most pictures were painted directly upon the plaster walls of churches or dwellings, and were called frescoes, although some pictures were executed on wooden panels. In the sixteenth century, however, easel painting—that is, detached pictures on canvas, wood, or other material—became common, and the use of oils was mastered. With these new methods, the art of painting was perfected.

In painting, progress was not so much the result of an imitation of classical models as was the case with sculpture and architecture, for the reason that painting, being one of the most perishable of the arts, had preserved few of its ancient Greek or Roman examples. But the artists who were interested in architecture and sculpture were naturally interested also in painting; and painting, bound by fewer antique traditions, remained more distinctively Christian and reached a higher degree of perfection in the sixteenth century than did any of the allied arts.

In Italy, in the sixteenth century, flourished a galaxy of great masters of renaissance painting, of whom four are especially noteworthy—Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Raphael, and Titian. Two of these acquired as great fame in architecture and in sculpture as in painting; the other two were primarily painters.

Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), a Florentine by birth and training, was patronized in turn by the Sforza family of Milan, by the Medici of Florence, and by the French royal house. His great paintings—the *Holy Supper*, and *Mona Lisa* (also called *La Gioconda*)—were masterful in art of

legendary woman, to be portrayed in her pristine nakedness; renaissance convention, on the other hand, encouraged the general use of the nude human form. Even angels, which had previously been depicted in chaste flowing robes, were now represented as naked cherubs.

composition and in science of light and shade and color. Leonardo, in fact, was a scientific painter; he carefully studied human anatomy and the problems of perspective. He was also a remarkable sculptor, as is testified by his admirable horses in relief. As an engineer, he built a canal in northern Italy and constructed fortifications about Milan. He was a musician and a philosopher as well. This many-sided man liked to toy with mechanical devices. One day when the French king visited Milan, he was met by a large mechanical lion which roared and then reared itself upon its haunches, displaying upon its breast the coat-of-arms of France: it was the work of Leonardo da Vinci. Leonardo influenced his age perhaps more than any other artist. He wrote extensively. He gathered about himself a large group of disciples. And in his last years, which he spent in France as a pensioner of Francis I, he encouraged painting in that country as in Italy.

Michelangelo (1475-1564), a Florentine like Leonardo, was probably the most wonderful of all these artists because of his triumphs in a vast variety of endeavors. It might almost be said of him that "jack of all trades, he was master of all." He was a painter of the first rank, an incomparable sculptor, a great architect, an eminent engineer, a charming poet, and a profound student of anatomy and physiology. Dividing his time between Florence and Rome, he served the Medici family and a succession of art-loving popes. With his other qualities of genius he combined austerity in morals, uprightness of character, a lively patriotism for his native city and people, a shrewd business-sense, and a proud independence. To give any idea of his achievements is impossible here. The colossal statue of David in Florence is an example of his sculpture; the basilica of St. Peter, which he practically completed, is his most enduring monument; the ceiling frescoes in the Sistine chapel in the papal palace of the Vatican, telling on a grandiose scale the Biblical story from Creation to the Flood, are marvels of his design and execution; and his grand fresco of the Last Judgment is probably the most famous single painting in the world.

Younger than Michelangelo and living only about half as long, Raphael (1483-1520), nevertheless, surpassed him in the harmonious beauty of painting. For sheer charm, the "divine"

Raphael stands without a peer. Raphael lived the better part of his life at Rome in the service of Popes Julius II and Leo X

Raphael and spent several years in decorating the Vatican. Although he was, for a time, architect of St. Peter's basilica, and although he displayed some aptitude for sculpture and for the scholarly study of archæology, it is as the greatest of sixteenth-century painters that he earned his fame. Raphael lived fortunately, always in favor, and bearing himself like a prince.

Titian (1477-1576) was the typical representative of the Venetian school of painting, which acquired distinction in luminous coloring. Official painter for the city of Venice

Titian and patronized both by the Emperor Charles V and by Philip II of Spain, he secured considerable wealth and fame.¹ He was not a man of universal genius like Leonardo da Vinci or Michelangelo; his one great and supreme endowment was that of oil painting. In serenity of form and coloring, his work has never been surpassed.

From Italy as a centre, renaissance painting became the heritage of all western Europe. Italian painters were brought to France by Francis I, and French painters were paid to learn from them and to imitate them. Philip II of Spain subsidized

El Greco renaissance painting throughout his dominions, including the work of Theotocopuli (1542-1614), a Greek, commonly called "El Greco." El Greco, after sojourning in Italy and coming under the influence of Titian, settled at Toledo in Spain and produced a large number of religious paintings in sombre settings and with curious effects of tumult and agony.² In Germany appeared two great painters, Albrecht Dürer and Hans Holbein (the "Younger").³


¹ For illustrations, see below, pp 240, 241.

² "El Greco" founded the so-called "Spanish" school of painting, and though not popular in his own day he acquired new distinction in the latter part of the nineteenth century as an inspirer of "modernistic" art. For an example of his art, see below, p. 143.

³ The frontispiece and the design of the title page of this book are by Dürer. For other examples of his art and that of Holbein, see the list of illustrations following the Table of Contents, above

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The School of Athens," is from the painting by Raphael (1483-1520) in the palace of the Vatican at Rome.





Dürer (1471-1528), a native of Nuremberg, retained in his art many qualities which were markedly medieval, but he was influenced to some extent by contemporary Italians and received support and encouragement from patrons of the "new learning." The Holy Roman Emperor and Erasmus alike aided him, and he lived in fortune and honor. Though his paintings were strikingly beautiful, he earned an even greater reputation as an engraver and wood carver. His most famous engravings, such as *The Knight and Death* and *St. Jerome in His Study*, set a high standard for following generations.

Holbein (1497-1543), who came of a famous family of painters at Augsburg, made his headquarters for some time at Basel and spent his last years in England as a pensioner of King Henry VIII. He tempered the traditional art of Germany and the Netherlands with the spirit of Italian humanism, and was one of the first northern artists to make a great reputation exclusively as a portrait painter. He painted several portraits of Erasmus and rendered unforgettable the features of Melanchthon, Sir Thomas More, Henry VIII (and several of his wives), and innumerable English lords and gentlemen.

What we call modern music, as well as modern painting, dates from the sixteenth century. But the new music, even more than the new painting, did not represent so much a revival of ancient Greek and Latin forms as a sudden great germinating of seeds which had been planted during the later middle ages. Of course, music, like painting, was affected and stimulated by the quickened art appreciation which attended the rediscovery of classical civilization, but very little antique music could be "rediscovered," and consequently, just as medieval Christian music had originally been evolved from the music of ancient Greeks, Romans, and Hebrews, so the "classical" music of the sixteenth century was an outgrowth of medieval music. It was a departure from the medieval, but a much greater departure from the ancient.

It was in the sixteenth century that several important developments occurred in music. Earlier "modes" were systematized into our "major" and "minor." Counterpoint, the accompanying of one melody with one another, and polyphony, the com-

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Botanical Sketch," is from a drawing by Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519).

binning of several independent voice parts in simultaneous and harmonizing union, were perfected and became fashionable. Harmony, rhythm, and symmetry were stressed.

At the same time, musical instruments were much improved, and "instrumental" music, as distinct from vocal, began its career. The simple stringed rebec, to whose strains the medieval rustic had danced, was gradually transformed, by the addition of strings and certain changes of design, into the violin.

The medieval clavichord, by increase and strengthening of its strings and by the extension of its keyboard to four octaves, was converted into the spinet (virginal) or harpsichord, precursors of the modern piano. The organ was improved and so were other wind instruments, such as the flute, bassoon, and trombone.

With better instruments and new forms and ideas, musical composition flourished. Particularly popular were vocal quartets and quintets, religious hymns and motets, and secular songs (chansons and madrigals). Composers of these types were to be found in the sixteenth century throughout Europe. They predominated perhaps in Italy and the Netherlands, though they were numerous in France and Spain. They were represented in Germany by the authors of the celebrated collection of hymns published under the auspices of Martin Luther, and in England by a notable group of musicians at the royal court, including especially William Byrd (1538-1623), John Bull (1562-1628),¹ and Orlando Gibbons (1583-1625).

In Italy appeared the greatest musician of the century, Palestrina (1524-1594), papal organist and choir-master, who provided the purest and most perfect models of modern ecclesiastical music. In Italy, simultaneously, developed beautiful choral renditions of religious scenes and stories, called "oratorios" from the fact that they were first given under the auspices of the monastic community of the Oratory, founded by St. Philip Neri in 1575. Italy, too, soon became the centre of the best instrumental music. Giovanni Gabrieli (1557-1613), organist of St. Mark's cathedral at Venice, was one of the founders of modern orchestration, and, by combining numerous voices with several instruments, pointed the way to the opera. Already, in

¹ John Bull was the author of the tune to which were later set the patriotic words of "God save the King" and "My country, 'tis of Thee."

1501, had been established at Venice the first shop for the printing of music.

4. NATIONAL LITERATURES

During the middle ages, while the vernacular national languages of Europe were taking form, some great and beautiful literature had been written in Italian, Provençal, Castilian, Portuguese, German, English, and Slavic. Classicism
and
Literature But progress in that direction appeared to be halted in the fifteenth century by the rediscovery of classical civilization and the attendant enthusiasm for the literature of ancient Greece and Rome. A rapidly increasing number of scholars and literary men neglected their own national language and devoted themselves almost exclusively to composition of classical Latin and Greek. Petrarch wrote fine sonnets in Italian, but he was ashamed of them; his Latin letters were the writings on which he prided himself and for which he was chiefly esteemed by contemporary scholars. Petrarch's immediate successors spent their lives searching for ancient manuscripts, editing the classics, or inditing Latin epistles, orations, and epics in imitation of Horace, Cicero, or Virgil. They thought that classical Latin and Greek were the only respectable vehicles for literary expression and they consequently despised the vernaculars as uncouth and vulgar. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Erasmus was writing his great works in one or the other of the classical languages.

This situation could hardly endure. The sixteenth century was too full of national rivalries, far-off discoveries, capitalistic activities, and social and religious unrest. There were too many commoners, as well as upper-class persons, who wished to tell or to be told something about these things and yet who knew the classics imperfectly or not at all. The sixteenth century witnessed a rapidly widening demand for national literature in the vernacular languages, and at a time when financial profits were eagerly sought from whatever source, the supply soon corresponded with the demand.

In the sixteenth century, moreover, the newly invented printing press was of incalculable service in meeting the increased demand for national literature as well as in supplying numerous modern copies of the ancient classics. Besides, the contempo-

rary study of classical grammar aroused in some persons a curiosity about the construction of vernacular language, and grammars and dictionaries began to be published in profusion. Dictionaries appeared, in the sixteenth century, for Netherlandish, Italian, and German, and, just after the close of the century, for French, Spanish, and English. In 1553 a German humanist and scientist, Konrad von Gesner, published in Latin an account of more than a hundred spoken languages, with examples of the Lord's Prayer in twenty-two tongues; it was the first step toward comparative philology. Dictionaries and grammars, together with the printing press, helped to establish norms of literary usage for the several vernacular languages and to give truly national vogue to them.

The content of sixteenth-century national literatures was very diversified. It comprised, for the edification of the common people, many religious treatises, devotional works, prayer-books, and biblical translations. Some of these, such as Martin Luther's German translation of the Bible, Cranmer's *Book of Common Prayer* for the Church of England, the French version of Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, and the Spanish autobiography of St. Teresa and *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola, not only met immediate needs but also constituted enduring monuments in the national literatures of Germany, England, France, and Spain. Then, too, the general religious upheaval of the sixteenth century—the rise of Protestantism and the reformation of the Catholic Church—induced the publication of a vast amount of controversial literature in the vernaculars, in order to influence or inflame the common people for or (more often) against the medieval church and its practices. Although most of this writing was without high merit and quite ephemeral, it served to widen the reading public and probably to augment the demand for other and better works in the popular tongues.

A good deal of national literature was produced during the century in the fields of politics, history, and travel, much of which was intensely patriotic, and some of which was great literature. To this category belonged, for instance, in Italian, the *Prince* and the *Florentine History* by Machiavelli, the *History of Italy* by Guicciardini, and the *Lives of Italian Artists* by Vasari; in Eng-

lish, the *Utopia* by Sir Thomas More,¹ and the *Principall Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries of the English Nation* by Richard Hakluyt; in Spanish, the *History of the Indies* by Bartolomé de las Casas, and the *History of Spain* by Mariana; and in French, the masterful exposition of political philosophy by Jean Bodin.

Certain vernacular writings of the sixteenth century were conceived in the spirit of the pagan renaissance, and born of classical humanism and the new joy of living. Some of them were masterpieces of wit and sarcasm or of unblushing pride in exploits of virility and venery. Notable among such authors were two Frenchmen: the erudite, good-humored, clever Rabelais (1490–1553), whose ever memorable *Gargantua and Pantagruel* was a gigantic burlesque of all manner of things, political, social, and religious; and the self-centred, gently mocking Montaigne (1533–1592), whose *Essays* were picturesque sermons on the text that nothing counts but one's self. There was also the brilliant Spaniard, Cervantes (1547–1616), whose *Don Quixote* was a rollicking satire on medieval chivalry and on faith in race and noble blood. As a mild example of the pornography with which the century teemed in imitation of Boccaccio and Catullus, mention may be made of the racy, spicy autobiography of the egotistical Italian goldsmith, Benvenuto Cellini (1500–1571). Here, amid pages of his passions and amours, we read of the devout complacency with which Cellini could contemplate a satisfactorily achieved homicide, and of the legion of devils which he and a conjuror evoked in the Colosseum, after one of his mistresses had been spirited away from him by her mother.

Perhaps the most famous class of literary masterpieces in the sixteenth century was that of epics and dramas. Works of this class showed clearly the influence of classicism and humanism. Their forms and plots were often borrowed from the ancients; their characters frequently bore classical names; and their scenes were sometimes laid in classical surroundings. If they did not derive from the ancient Greeks and Romans, they were apt to draw on contemporary Italy, the original seat and still the home of humanism and renaissance art. Yet, in almost every instance they evinced, in large degree, a lively national patriotism.

¹ Reference is here made, of course, to the English translation, which appeared in 1551. More's *Utopia*, as first published in 1516, was in Latin.

In Italy itself, the *Orlando Furioso* of Ariosto (1474-1533) represented a fusion of ornate chivalrous romance with the style and models of classicism; and the *Jerusalem Delivered* of Tasso (1544-1595) was a bulky epic in which the manner of the pagan Virgil was adapted to a Christian crusading theme. In Portugal, the *Lusiad* of Camoëns (1524-1580) was a patriotic epic dealing with Vasco da Gama's sensational voyage to India and, as in Virgil's *Æneid*, bringing in the pagan gods as directors of the voyage. In Spain, the innumerable dramas of Lope de Vega (1562-1635) dealt with almost every national and patriotic subject in the history of the country and a wide range of manners and customs of his own day. In England, the *Faërie Queene* of Edmund Spenser (1552-1599), utilizing the model of Ariosto, the theme of Tasso, and fancied ideals of Aristotle, was a pageant of colorful, charming poetry, not the least part of whose content was the glorification of the national monarch. The immortal plays of William Shakespeare (1564-1616), at once individualist and nationalist, medieval and modern, Italian and classical and, above all, English, constituted the most perfect summary of the life and thought of the sixteenth century, the dawn of our modern age.

5. SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT

Comparable in modern significance with the discovery of new sea routes and distant continents and with the rediscovery of far-off times and classical civilization was the contemporaneous exploration of the heavens and the whole universe of matter. Indeed, sixteenth-century Europe was distinguished for its scientists as well as for its artists and humanists; its scientists revolutionized astronomy and made important contributions to mathematics, physics, medicine, biology, and the social studies.

During the middle ages, astronomers (and astrologers) had clung to the theory of a Greek philosopher of the second century A. D., named Ptolemy, that the Earth is the fixed and appointed centre of the universe, and that the Sun and the Moon and all the planets and all the stars are turned around the Earth with amazing velocity every twenty-four hours. This so-called "Ptolemaic system" of astronomy seemed to be in harmony with the cosmology of the Bible and to confirm everyday popular observations that the heavenly bodies rise and set while the Earth remains stationary. For centuries,

Astronomy

prior to the sixteenth, the Ptolemaic theory had been accepted by all Christendom as fundamental and sacred.

Nevertheless, Ptolemy's was not the only "system" which had been propounded by ancient Greek astronomers. Against the idea that the Earth is the centre of the universe (the geocentric theory) the Pythagoreans had urged the heliocentric theory, the notion that the Sun is the centre. With the rediscovery of classical civilization and the revival of Greek studies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the "system" of the Pythagoreans was brought out of obscurity and ably championed. Its foremost advocate, the true founder of modern astronomy, was Copernicus (1473-1543).

Copernicus was a Polish priest, who divided his time between ecclesiastical labor and private research in the classics, mathematics, and astronomy. It was during a ten-year sojourn in Italy at the beginning of the sixteenth century, while studying canon law and medicine, and familiarizing himself, through humanistic teachers, with ancient Greek astronomers, that he began to question the Ptolemaic system and to seek a mathematically sounder substitute. Thenceforth, for many years, he reflected and computed and made such observations of the heavens as his poor eyesight and few instruments permitted. In the year of his death (1543) the results were published in Latin to the learned world. His book—*On the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies*—was dedicated to Pope Paul III and fortified with elaborate mathematical calculations. It undertook to demonstrate the truth of the hypothesis that the Earth is not the centre of the universe but simply one of a number of planets which revolve around the Sun. In the "Copernican system," the Earth was assigned a much less important place than in the "Ptolemaic system," and man's supreme position among created things appeared to be threatened at the very time when European man was puffed up with the "new learning," the "New World," and the "new wealth." No wonder that the book of Copernicus excited lively curiosity and livelier opposition.

For purposes of combating, as well as confirming, the revolutionary hypothesis of Copernicus, European astronomers in the second half of the sixteenth century applied themselves most diligently to observation and to the improvement of physical instruments and mathematical computations which might be helpful to observation. One of the most

Copernicus

Tycho Brahe

interesting of these new scientific astronomers was Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), a Dane, who, with the encouragement and financial assistance of his national monarch, King Frederick II, established on an island in the Baltic, midway between Denmark and Sweden, an amazing laboratory—he called it Uraniborg, or “Castle of the Heavens”—comprising several observatories, a library, shops for making instruments, a paper mill, a printing press, and living quarters for the numerous staff and workmen. Here, for twenty-one years, Tycho systematically collected materials for the testing of astronomical theories. He himself was conservative and vain. He hoped to effect a compromise between Ptolemaic and Copernican systems, whereby the Earth might retain an honored central position in the heavens. His arrogance eventually cost him the patronage of the king of Denmark, and the last year of his life he spent at Prague in the employ of the Holy Roman Emperor.

So effective were the astronomical researches of the sixteenth century that just after its close two great scientists were enabled to give decisive support to the Copernican hypothesis and to make it the cornerstone of modern astronomy. One was Kepler (1571-1630), a German, and the other was Galileo (1564-1642), an Italian.

Kepler, after teaching astronomy in a German university and becoming associated at Prague with Tycho Brahe, fell heir to

Kepler Tycho's instruments and records and succeeded him as official astronomer to the Holy Roman Emperor. Kepler was perhaps not as good an observer as Tycho, but he was a better mathematician and possessed superior philosophic insight. He entertained, it is true, many fantastic and mystical theories concerning “the harmony of the spheres,” and he was willing, with tongue in his cheek, to cater to the prejudices and superstitions of the day by casting horoscopes for the emperor and other eminent gentlemen. Yet by applying his mathematical genius to Tycho's and his own observations, he was able not only to confirm the general credibility of the Copernican system but also to establish several detailed conclusions, such as those regarding the form and magnitude of the planetary orbits. Kepler made it clear that the Earth and the other planets revolve about the Sun in elliptical rather than circular paths.

Galileo was a great scientist in several fields, in mathematics,

mechanics, and optics, as well as in astronomy; he was also a learned classical scholar, a good musician, and a gifted Galileo writer. His principal contribution to astronomy was his painstaking demonstration and brilliant popularization of the Copernican hypothesis. His charming lectures at the university of Padua, where he taught from 1592 to 1610, were so largely attended that a hall seating two thousand had to be provided. In 1609 he perfected a telescope, which, although hardly more powerful than a present-day opera glass, showed unmistakably that the Sun was turning on its axis, that Jupiter was attended by revolving moons, and that, by analogy, the essential truth of the Copernican system was proved. Unfortunately for Galileo, his enthusiastic desire to convert the church immediately to the new astronomy got him into trouble with the pope and the ecclesiastical court of the Inquisition. This court in 1616 characterized the proposition that the Sun is the centre of the universe as "absurd in philosophy, and formally heretical, because expressly contrary to Holy Scripture," and the proposition that the Earth rotates every day on its axis as "open to the same censure in philosophy, and at least erroneous as to faith"; and in 1632 Galileo was tried by the court for espousing the condemned propositions and found guilty. Galileo, during the last years of his life, was kept under close ecclesiastical surveillance, but had he lived another hundred years he would have rejoiced that all learned men—popes included—had accepted the great astronomical revolution and become "Copernicans."¹

It is noteworthy that the increasing astronomical knowledge of the sixteenth century made it possible for Pope Gregory XIII in 1582 to reform the so-called Julian calendar, which had been used by Christendom since ancient Roman times. In order to maintain the exact solar year, Gregory decreed that the calendar should be moved back by ten days and that the extra leap-year day should be omitted from all centenary years (such as 1700) except those which

The
Gregorian
Calendar

¹ The condemnation of the Copernican system by the court of the Inquisition was never confirmed by the pope and was virtually repealed in 1757 under Pope Benedict XIV. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries not only many clergymen, Protestant as well as Catholic, were hostile to the Copernican system but that many intellectual laymen, including Bodin, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, Pascal, and Milton, assailed or disbelieved it.

are multiples of 400. This reformed, or "Gregorian," calendar was at once adopted by Catholic countries, and subsequently by Protestant and other nations. England, for example, accepted it in 1751, and Russia in 1922.

The "new astronomy" of the sixteenth century was inspired, as we have seen, by the rediscovery of classical civilization. Copernicus was to astronomy what Columbus was to geography, and Copernicus was peculiarly indebted to the ancient Greeks. On other scientific advances of the time, however, the influence of classicism and humanism was not so marked. Indeed, it may truthfully be said that the intellectual quickening of Europe in the sixteenth century was less a novel product of classical studies than a natural development of medieval science under the practical stimulus of contemporary happenings in geography, warfare, and finance.

This was especially true of the almost revolutionary progress of mathematics. Mathematicians of the middle ages had inherited the arithmetic and geometry of ancient Greeks and Romans and had learned from the Moslems the elements of algebra and the use of Arabic numerals. On such knowledge, mathematicians of the sixteenth century built magnificently, but they built not with old blocks quarried out of antiquity but with new materials piled up by their own era. To prove the truth or falsity of the current Copernican hypothesis, to satisfy the current demand for calendar-reform, to compute the range of fire of the new artillery, to secure the greatest effectiveness and at the same time the greatest economy of the new national fortifications and warships, and to simplify and expedite the accounts of the new bankers, merchants, and capitalists, were ends which mathematics could serve in the sixteenth century much more naturally than at any earlier time. And toward these ends, mathematicians labored quite realistically, and with amazing success, from the date of the invention of printing in the fifteenth century to the date of the invention of logarithms early in the seventeenth century.

In Italy, Tartaglia (1506-1559) and Cardan (1501-1576) vied with each other in solving cubic equations. Tartaglia, who suffered throughout life from mutilation which he received as a boy at the hands of French military invaders, wrote scientific treatises on the mathematics of gunnery and fortification, the

latter of which he dedicated to Henry VIII of England. Cardan, a physician by vocation and something of a rogue by nature, helped the pope and the king of Denmark with practical mathematical advice, cast horoscopes for a Scottish archbishop and an English monarch, and reckoned the calculus of possibilities as a support to his own propensity for gambling.

In the Netherlands, Stevinus (1548-1620), at first a merchant's clerk and later a travelling commercial agent and advisor to the Prince of Orange, wrote a classic on decimal fractions, advocated a decimal system of coinage, weights, and measures, and prepared useful studies of military science. His practical advice on ways and means of keeping detailed impersonal accounts had considerable effect on the book-keeping of the national governments of the Netherlands and France.

Simultaneously, in various European countries, mathematicians were working out a compact and adequate symbolism for arithmetical and algebraic calculation, including such signs as $+$, \div , \times , $-$, $=$, $()$, and $\sqrt{\quad}$, and the modern devices for indicating fractions and exponents. In geometry, they were carrying the computation of π to many decimals. They were also foreshadowing the integral calculus and reckoning trigonometric tables. In Scotland, John Napier (1550-1617) invented logarithms and was the first to use the decimal point.

Similar utilitarian aims actuated remarkable sixteenth-century progress in mechanics and physics. An Italian, Porta (1540-1615), devised a "magic lantern" and interspersed some acute reflections with a good deal of nonsense in his encyclopedic physical works, *On the Miracles of Nature* and *Natural Magic*. A Netherlander, Jansen, made probably the first compound microscope in 1590, and telescopes appeared shortly afterwards in Italy, the Netherlands, and England.¹ An Englishman, William Gilbert (1540-1603), experimented with magnetic bodies and noticed and named

~~Me-~~
chanics
and
Physics

¹ Galileo has often been credited with the invention of the telescope. He certainly was the first to make great practical use of it. But it appears to have been invented in the Netherlands about the year 1600, and, independently, a little earlier, by Leonard Digges in England. Its principle was known to Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century, and its theory was extensively explained by Kepler in 1611.

certain phenomena as "electric."¹ But the greatest physicist of the age was the famous Italian astronomer, Galileo.

Galileo invented the air thermometer and the hydrostatic balance and constructed an astronomical clock. He studied the phenomena of motion and sound. He recognized that sound is an undulation in the air and that its tone is due to the different length of the several waves. He demonstrated the falsity of the Aristotelian notion that heavy bodies fall with velocities proportional to their weights. In his celebrated *Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences* he summed up his achievements and speculations and laid firm foundations for the modern development of mechanics, "the science dealing with the resistance which solid bodies offer to fracture," and dynamics, "the science treating of motion."

The impetus which the contemporary rise of capitalism gave to practical, large-scale mining served likewise to give rise to the science of metallurgy. Here the pioneer was a

**Metal-
lurgy**

German known best by his latinized name of *Agricola* (1490-1555). *Agricola*, as a youthful prodigy, threw himself into pursuit of the "new learning" and at the age of twenty was teaching Greek and writing on philology. But as he grew older, he found less satisfaction in ancient classics than in modern medicine, physics, and chemistry; and, after taking a medical degree in Italy, he settled in mining communities, first in Bavaria and subsequently in Bohemia. He earned his money by the practice of medicine and spent it on researches in metallurgy. In his epochal *Twelve Books on Metals* he outlined and systematized his observations, indicated methods of estimating the amount of metal in particular kinds of ore, and first described the production of steel by the puddling process.


In medicine, there was relatively less progress during the sixteenth century, probably in part because there had been relatively greater progress during the middle ages, and probably in part because the "new learning" appealed particularly to physicians and tended to make them rely too much on what ancient Greek doctors, especially Hippocrates

¹ Gilbert's volume on magnetism was published in 1600. The word "electricity" first appeared in Sir Thomas Browne's *Pseudodoxia*, published in 1646.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Sixteenth-Century Mining," is from a drawing by Hans Holbein (1497-1543), now in the British Museum, London.



Guilielmus · Harvey · M.D.



and Galen, had said. The revived study of Galen led to some interesting observations and developments. Two Italian professors, Eustachio and Falloppio, added certain details to anatomical knowledge and bequeathed their names to modern physiology. A Spaniard, Servetus, noted and described the pulmonary circulation of the blood. An Italian, Frascatoro, advanced the theory, then incapable of demonstration without the microscope and long afterwards of little effect, that diseases are caused by living organisms endowed with the power of propagating themselves. Another Italian, Santorio, shortly after the close of the sixteenth century adapted Galileo's thermometer to the measuring of the temperature of the body and devised apparatus for comparing the rate of pulse beats.

Special fame attaches to certain medical men of the sixteenth century who reacted against contemporary classicism and repudiated the "authority" of ancient Greek physicians. One curious example of this kind was Theo-
Paracel-
sus
phrastus Bombast von Hohenheim (1493-1541), who wrote under the name of Paracelsus ("greater than Celsus"), and who wrote so pompously that his middle name "Bombast" has found its way into all modern languages as a synonym for pomposity in expression. Paracelsus was a Swiss German, the son of a poor country physician and of a hospital-superintendent. He had just enough university education to be convinced that full-fledged doctors leaned too heavily on Galen and were inferior to himself; and during an extended sojourn in the Tyrol mines owned by the Fugger family, he learned to study first-hand the diseases which attacked the miners and to gather a mass of useful and miscellaneous information. He was literally bombastic in his attacks on Galen; he was quarrelsome, superstitious, and much given to visionary philosophy; and he was denounced by the leading practitioners of the age as a "quack." But he constantly held up the great ideal of medicine as an experimental science, and he emphasized the close relationship between medicine and chemistry. He believed that the operations in the body are of a chemical character and that when disordered they are to be put right by counter operations of

NOTE. The picture opposite is a portrait of William Harvey from the painting by Cornelius Jansen (1593-1660), now in the Royal College of Physicians, London.

the same kind. He had an idea of the medicinal utility of metals and mineral springs.

Another and more esteemed medical innovator was Vesalius (1514-1564), a Netherlander, who studied medicine at the universities of Louvain, Paris, and Padua. Appointed professor at Padua, he began his teaching as a disciple of Galen, but when he came to practice dissection he noted errors in Galen's writings and decided that henceforth he would rely less upon them than upon his own observations. He denounced the time-honored custom of leaving surgery to barbers¹ and emphasized the need for the thorough study of anatomy as the basis for the scientific training of both surgeons and physicians. His own treatise on anatomy, published in the same year as Copernicus's great work on astronomy, was a significant monument in the history of medical science. It treated, in seven books, of the skeleton, cartilage and muscles, veins and arteries, digestive and reproductive systems, lungs, brain and head. Vesalius was appointed court physician to the Emperor Charles V and died on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

Towards the close of the sixteenth century appeared an English physician, William Harvey (1578-1657), who was to make a prime contribution to medical science. Harvey was educated in England at the university of Cambridge and in Italy, under the guidance of a disciple of Falloppio, at the university of Padua, whence he took his medical degree in 1602. Returning to England, he became a professor in the London College of Physicians and Surgeons and attending physician in a London hospital. He was particularly interested in studies of the heart and the blood, and in 1628 he made known to the learned world his discovery of the circulation of the blood from the heart to the arteries and thence to the veins and back to the heart.²

Contemporary with Harvey was a physician of the Nether-

¹ Yet barber-surgeons of the sixteenth century made some significant contributions of their own to modern surgical art. For example, Ambroise Paré (1510-1590), gaining much practical experience from attending soldiers in the French army, invented ingenious artificial limbs and improved the method of treating gunshot wounds.

² Harvey did not know of the capillary channels by which the blood passes from the arteries to the veins. This gap in his information was supplied in 1661 by an Italian physician, Malpighi. See below, ch. xi, sec. 1.

lands, J. B. van Helmont (1577-1644), who made some important contributions to the science of chemistry. He was the first to understand that there are gases distinct in kind from atmospheric air. He invented the word "gas." He distinguished carbon dioxide, which he called "gas sylvestre." He dimly recognized the principle of the indestructibility of matter. Following critically in the footsteps of Paracelsus, he held that undue acidity may be corrected by alkalies, and *vice versa*.

Helmont

Several physicians of the sixteenth century became interested in comparative anatomy and laid the foundations for the modern sciences of botany and zoölogy. William Turner, physician to King Edward VI of England, and Andrea Cesalpino, professor at Pisa and physician to Pope Clement VIII, studied botany and wrote treatises on plants. Pierre Belon, a French physician, examined hundreds of species of birds and fishes. The greatest naturalist of the age, however, was a Swiss German, Conrad von Gesner (1516-1565), whose name has already been noted in connection with the beginnings of comparative philology. Gesner obtained a medical degree from a French university and spent most of his life in Switzerland, practicing his profession but lecturing on physics and devoting himself chiefly to the observation and classification of local flora and fauna. His *Catalogue of Plants* was a valuable contribution to scientific botany, and the four volumes of his *History of Animals* were the starting-point for modern progress in zoölogy.

Botany
and
Zoölogy

It was not alone in the natural sciences that the sixteenth century was important. Scientific development was manifest likewise in those intellectual pursuits which nowadays we term the "social sciences." "Scientific" history began, as we have already pointed out, with the collecting, criticizing, and editing of manuscripts and source-materials, on which the classical revival put a premium. "Scientific" politics was exemplified by such incisive writings as those of Machiavelli and Bodin. "Scientific" philology was foreshadowed by Conrad von Gesner. At the very end of the century there was a quickening interest in the theory of national wealth, a faint dawn of "scientific" economics.¹

The
Social
Sciences

Of all the social sciences, it was natural, in view of the century's

¹ For later developments of social science. see below, ch. xi, sec. 4.

overwhelming interest in overseas exploration and commerce, **Geography** that geography should receive chief attention and make the greatest strides. And of the numerous "scientific" geographers of the sixteenth century, undoubtedly the foremost was Gerhard Kremer (1512-1594), a Netherlander and best known by his Latin name of Mercator. Mercator studied at the university of Louvain, and at Louvain he founded a celebrated geographical laboratory and drafting establishment. He was patronized successively by the Emperor Charles V and various German princes, for whose military campaigns he prepared maps and sketches. But his main contributions to geographical science were the freeing of Europeans from the tyranny of ancient Greek and Roman geographers, especially from Ptolemy, the manufacture of instruments and detailed maps of fine quality, and the invention of the so-called "Mercator's projection," the representation of the globe, or parts of it, on rectangular paper by drawing the parallels and meridians at right angles.

The whole intellectual quickening of the sixteenth century involved much intellectual ferment, and in the midst of this ferment, complicated as it was by the simultaneous religious upheaval in Europe, emerged new philosophies whose exponents put special emphasis on "modern" science. One preacher of peculiarly "modern" philosophy was Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), an intemperate, provocative Italian. Beginning his stormy career as a Dominican monk but speedily falling under the spell of whatever seemed novel and revolutionary in current hypothesis and criticism, Bruno fled from Rome and monastic life and sought refuge in foreign countries and intellectual radicalism. He espoused the Copernican astronomy with ardor. He assailed any kind of anthropomorphic religion. He put the Hebrew scriptures on a level with pagan myths. He jeered at miracles as nothing but magical tricks. On the other hand, he conceived of nature as embodying and expressing the divine, and the whole universe as controlled by immutable laws which are divine because they are natural.

Such an attempt to combine the "modern science" with a new religion of pantheism could hardly be popular in the sixteenth century, and Bruno led a fugitive and harassed existence. For a brief time he enjoyed the favor of the French king and lec-

tured on astronomy at Toulouse and on philosophy at Paris, and through the good offices of the French ambassador in London he was enabled to spend two years in England. But he was always restless, and both ardent Protestants and zealous Catholics made him more so. He was repelled from Geneva by the Calvinists, and the Lutherans were inhospitable to him at Wittenberg. Venturing to return to Italy, he was arrested by the Catholic Inquisition, imprisoned for seven years, and finally burned at the stake in Rome.

Another and less revolutionary effort to philosophize about natural science was made by a distinguished Englishman, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), son of a country gentleman, student at the university of Cambridge, lawyer, and lord chancellor of the realm under King James I.¹

Lord
Bacon

While studying at the university from 1573 to 1576 he developed an absorbing interest in the physical sciences and learned to despise the Aristotelian philosophy. This, in his opinion, was serviceable only for debate, and a substitute must be found which would forward natural science and real knowledge. Thenceforth, through a busy, ambitious life of self-seeking for fame, wealth, and public office, Bacon found time to produce a series of great philosophic works, including the *Essays*, the *Advancement of Learning*, the *Novum Organum*, and the *New Atlantis*, the last-named a description of an ideal commonwealth in which the principles of the "new philosophy" are carried out by political machinery and under state guidance. The "new philosophy," according to Bacon, must be inductive, experimental, and utilitarian. It must be based on the latest findings of natural science, it must be conducted and guided by observation and experiment, and its true end must be altogether practical. Science is all-important to philosophy and future well-being. Science, as Bacon said in the *Novum Organum*, will "extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man."

It must not be supposed that the scientific development of the sixteenth century was as revolutionary as Bacon and Bruno imagined or that it controlled all the thoughts and actions of its

¹ Francis Bacon is commonly called Lord Bacon. He was given the title of Baron Verulam in 1618 and that of Viscount St. Albans in 1621. In 1621 the House of Lords found him guilty of receiving bribes in judicial cases over which he presided as lord chancellor.

devotees, to say nothing of the thoughts and actions of the masses. A Bruno and a Bacon, and most of the humanistically inclined scientists of the sixteenth century, were too scornful of the middle ages to do justice to the slow gradual evolution of man's knowledge of the material universe which had been going on pretty continuously ever since the ancient days of Greece, and they jumped to conclusions—typically “modern” conclusions—that their own ideas had never previously been entertained, that their own age was far in advance of all earlier ages, and that what is latest is best.

At the same time many of these new scientists were almost if not quite as “superstitious” as any of their predecessors, or, at any rate, they were quite as willing to exploit popular superstitions for their own financial profit. Tycho Brahe was something of a charlatan. Kepler made money by practicing magic and casting horoscopes. All the mathematicians of the age and most of the physicians were credulous as well as inquisitive.

On the fringe of scientific development there continued to flourish in the sixteenth century, among kings and princes and commoners, the traditional arts of astrology and alchemy. It was still popularly believed that the baser metals could be magically transmuted into gold and that the course of human events could be directed by precious stones, and many a sixteenth-century explorer risked life and limb in search of Eldorado and the fountain of perpetual youth.¹ It was still widely held that the stars in the heavens exerted direct and arbitrary influence upon human character and events and that one should engage in no important undertaking without consulting a star-gazer.² Charles V and Francis I, great rivals in war, bid against each other for the services of the most eminent astrologers. Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth, the kings of Denmark and Spain, Catherine de Medici,

¹ A French potter and geologist, Bernard Palissy, denied the possibility of the transmutation of metals in a work which he published in 1580, and the English dramatist Ben Jonson poked fun at alchemists in a play first acted in 1610 and printed in 1612.

² Pope Sixtus V in 1586 condemned the casting of horoscopes and directed the court of the Inquisition to proceed against anyone who should practice incantations or divinations or foretell the future. A French law of 1628 forbade the insertion in almanacs of all predictions except those relating to the weather, the phases of the moon, and eclipses. For some time, these measures were honored more in the breach than in the observance.

and wealthy merchants and bold sea-captains seemed never to tire of reading horoscopes.

Besides, it was during the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, the era of scientific development, that witchcraft flourished as never before in the world's history and the hunt for witches became endemic in Europe and the New World. Even such an enlightened lawyer and philosopher as Jean Bodin argued at length for the reality of witchcraft and for the burning of witches. (More is said about this delusion on pages 210-211, below.)

After making full allowance, however, for the gullibility of human beings in the sixteenth century and throughout all our modern times, it appears to be incontestable that science has been both more objective and more practical in our age than in antiquity or in the middle ages. To this outcome the scientific development of the sixteenth century contributed, and it deserves, therefore, an honorable place among the other factors which prompted the intellectual quickening of Europe—the invention of printing, the rediscovery of classical civilization, the development of renaissance art and national literatures.



CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGIOUS UPHEAVAL

1. CHRISTIANITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY



WHEN printing was invented, America discovered, and Copernicus born, the vast mass of Europeans were Christians, and those who lived in central and western Europe were members of the Catholic Christian Church.¹ It was then generally held, just as it had been held in all earlier centuries, that a common religious faith and a common moral code were essential to civilization and that every individual should subordinate private judgment and personal wishes to the cause of religious unity. The peoples of Europe had at that time the same conviction about organized religion which we to-day have about organized politics. They believed in the necessity of the church, as we believe in the necessity of the state.

For centuries prior to the sixteenth, the Catholic Church had occupied a position in most European countries which no religious organization holds to-day. (1) Every child of Christian parents was born into the church almost as literally as he is now born into a state; every professed Christian was expected to conform, at least outwardly, to the doctrine and observances of the church. (2) The church was official and public, not private and purely voluntary; it was supported not by free-will offerings, but by compulsory taxes. (3) Each state undertook to enforce obedience on the

The
Catholic
Church
in 1500

¹ Those who lived in Russia and the majority of the inhabitants of Greece and the Balkan peninsula were members of the Orthodox Church, which, though resembling the Catholic Church in most respects, rejected the headship of the pope. Latterly, with the invasions and conquests of the Ottoman Turks, Moslems had become an influential minority in southeastern Europe, and a Moslem minority still persisted in southwestern Europe, that is, in Spain and Portugal. In these regions, and elsewhere in Europe, especially in Poland and Germany, dwelt sizeable groups of Jews. For a map of Christendom in 1500, see below, p. 191.

part of its subjects to the church; a person attacking the authority of the church was liable to punishment by the state, and this held true in England and Germany as well as in Spain or Italy.

Nowadays the word "Christian" is used in vague and loose ways. It may still denote a member of the Catholic Church, but, quite as often, it may indicate an Episcopalian, a Presbyterian, a Congregationalist, or a person who is reputed to honor in some manner the founder of Christianity but is known to adhere to no ecclesiastical organization, or merely a person who is not a Jew or a Moslem. Such a subjective or negative use of the word "Christian" would have been unthinkable at the beginning of modern times. The word then meant to everybody something positive and objective. It meant formal adherence to a recognized body of historic teachings. All over central and western Europe—from Lithuania to Ireland and from Finland to Italy—it was synonymous with "Catholic Christian."

Catholic Christianity embraced a definite faith in Jesus Christ as the Man-God, an acceptance of certain standards of personal and social behavior which had been derived from the teachings of Jesus, and a recognition of the divine origin and character of the Catholic Church. The church, it was believed, had been founded by Jesus Christ in order to teach and interpret, till the end of time, His true religion and His pure morals. By means of the church, man would know best how to order his life in this world and how to prepare his soul for everlasting happiness in the world to come.

Hence the Catholic Church was conceived of as a vast human society, resting on divine foundation and sanction, and conducting a mission greater and more lofty than that of any other society. It was a "perfect" society, whose members and officers, for its own purposes, were deemed independent of any political power. The members of the church were the sum-total of all persons who had been baptized—almost the whole population of western and central Europe—and its officers constituted a universally governing hierarchy.

At the head of the hierarchy was the bishop of Rome, styled the pope or sovereign pontiff or vicar of Christ, who for centuries had been regarded as the successor of St. Peter, the prince of the apostles. The bishop of Rome was elected for life by a

group of clergymen, called cardinals, who originally had been in direct charge of certain churches in the city of Rome but who latterly were selected by the pope from various countries because they were distinguished churchmen. The pope chose the cardinals; the cardinals elected the pope. Some of the cardinals, especially Italian cardinals, took up their residence at Rome and, in conjunction with a host of clerks, translators, lawyers, and other officials, comprised the *curia*, or papal court, which assisted the pope in the conduct of general church business.

For the local administration of church affairs, the Catholic world was divided under the pope into several territorial subdivisions. (1) The patriarchates, almost wholly honorary, were under patriarchs, who had their sees¹ in such ancient Christian centres as Rome, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople. Honorary patriarchates were established at Venice in the fifteenth century and subsequently at Lisbon and in the West Indies. (2) The provinces were divisions of the patriarchates and usually centred in the most important cities, such as Milan, Florence, Cologne, Vienna, Lyons, Seville, Upsala, Canterbury, York; the head of each was styled a metropolitan or archbishop. (3) The diocese—the most essential unit of local administration—was a subdivision of the province, commonly a city or a town, with a certain amount of surrounding country, under the immediate supervision of a bishop.² (4) Smaller divisions, particularly parishes, were to be found in every diocese, embracing a village or a section of a city, and each parish had its church building and its priest. Thus the Catholic Church possessed a veritable army of officials from pope and cardinals down through patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops, to the parish priests and their assistants, the deacons. This hierarchy, because it labored in the world (*sæcula*), was called the “secular clergy.”

Another variety of clergy—the “regulars”—supplemented the

¹ “See,” so-called from the Latin *sedes*, refers to the seat or chair of office. Similarly our word “cathedral” is derived from the Latin *cathedra*, the official chair which the bishop occupies in his own church.

² The occupant of the oldest diocese or province in a given country usually bore the honorary title of “primate,” and his see was called the “primatial see” of that country. Thus, Canterbury was the primatial see of England; Arles, of France; Armagh, of Ireland; Toledo, of Spain, etc.

work of the seculars. The regulars were monks,¹ that is, Christians who lived by a special rule (*regula*), who renounced the world, took vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience, and strove to imitate the life of Christ as literally as possible. The regular clergy were organized under their own abbots, priors, provincials, or generals, being usually exempt from secular jurisdiction, except that of the pope. The regulars were the principal missionaries of the church, and most charitable and educational institutions were in their hands.

The
"Regular"
Clergy

Among the various orders of monks which had grown up in the course of time, the following should be enumerated: (1) The monks who lived in fixed abodes, tilled the soil, copied manuscripts, and conducted local schools. Most of the monks of this kind followed a rule, or society by-laws, which had been prepared by the celebrated St. Benedict about the year 525: they were therefore called Benedictines. (2) The monks who organized crusades, often bore arms themselves, and tended the holy places connected with incidents in the life of Christ: such orders were the Knights Hospitallers of St. John and of Malta, and the Teutonic Knights who subsequently undertook the conversion of the Slavs and established themselves as military rulers of Prussia. (3) The monks who were called the begging friars or mendicants because they had no fixed abode but wandered from place to place, preaching to the common people and depending for their own living upon alms. These orders came into prominence in the thirteenth century and included, among others, the Franciscan, whose lovable founder St. Francis of Assisi had urged humility and love of the poor as its distinguishing characteristics, and the Dominican, or Order of the Preachers, devoted by the precept of its practical founder, St. Dominic, to missionary zeal. All the mendicant orders, as well as the Benedictine monasteries, became famous in the history of education, and the majority of the distinguished scholars of the middle ages were monks. It was not uncommon, moreover, for regulars to enter the secular hierarchy and thus become parish priests or bishops, or even popes.

¹ The word "monk" is applied, of course, only to men; women who followed similar rules are commonly styled nuns. All are sometimes referred to as "religious."

The clergy—bishops, priests, and deacons—constituted, in popular belief, the divinely ordained administration of the Catholic Church. The legislative authority in the church was vested in the pope and in general council, neither of which, however, might set aside a law of God, as affirmed in the gospels, or establish a doctrine at variance with the tradition of the early Christian writers. A general council was an assembly of prelates of the Catholic world, and there had been considerable discussion as to the relative authority of its decrees and the decisions and directions of the pope.¹ General church councils had been convened in eastern Europe from the fourth to the ninth century and had issued important decrees or canons defining Christian dogmas and establishing ecclesiastical discipline, which had been subsequently ratified and promulgated by the pope as by other bishops and by the emperors; and several councils had been held in western Europe from the twelfth to the fourteenth century under the direct supervision of the bishop of Rome, all the canons of which had been enacted in accordance with his wishes.

Early in the fifteenth century a movement had been inaugurated by certain bishops and scholars in favor of making the councils superior to the pope and a regular source of supreme legislation for the church. In this way, the councils of Constance (1414-1418) and Basel (1431 ff.) had endeavored to introduce representative, if not democratic, government into the church. The popes, however, objected to this "conciliar movement" and managed to have it condemned by the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1438-1442). By the year 1500 the papal theory had seemingly triumphed and the peoples of western and central Europe generally recognized that the government of the church was essentially monarchical. The laws of the Catholic Church were known as canons, and, of several codes of canon law which had been prepared, that of a monk named Gratian, compiled in the twelfth century, was the most widely used.

We are now in a position to summarize the claims and prerogatives of the bishop of Rome, or pope. (1) He was the supreme ecclesiastical lawgiver. He could issue decrees of his own, which might not be set aside by any other person. No council

¹ Papal documents have been called by various names, such as decretals, bulls, or encyclicals.

might enact canons without his approval. From any law, other than divine, he might dispense persons. (2) He was the supreme judge in Christendom. He claimed that appeals might be taken from decisions in foreign courts to his own curia, as court of last resort. He himself frequently acted as arbitrator, as, for example, in the famous dispute between Spain and Portugal concerning the boundaries of their newly discovered possessions.¹ (3) He was the supreme ecclesiastical administrator. He claimed the right to supervise the general business of the whole church. No archbishop might perform the functions of his office until he received his insignia—the pallium—from the pope. No bishop might be canonically installed until his election had been confirmed by the pope. The pope claimed the right to transfer a bishop from one diocese to another and to settle all disputed elections. He exercised immediate control over the regular clergy—the monks and nuns. He sent ambassadors, styled legates, to represent him at the various royal courts and to see that his instructions were obeyed. (4) He insisted upon certain temporal rights, as distinct from his directly spiritual prerogatives. He crowned the Holy Roman Emperor. He might depose an emperor or king and release a ruler's subjects from their oath of allegiance. He might declare null and void, and forbid the people to obey, a law of any state, if he thought it was injurious to the interests of the church. He was temporal ruler of the city of Rome and the surrounding papal states, and over these territories he exercised a power similar to that of any duke or king. (5) He claimed financial powers. In order to defray the enormous expenses of his government, he charged fees for certain services at Rome, assessed the dioceses throughout the Catholic world, and levied a small tax—Peter's pence—upon all Christian householders.

Papal
Powers

The
Mission
of the
Church

So far we have concerned ourselves with the organization of the Catholic Church—its membership, its officers, the clergy, secular and regular, all culminating in the pope, the bishop of Rome. But why did this great institution exist? Why had it long been loved, venerated, and well served? The purpose of the church, according to its own teaching, was to follow the instructions of its divine founder, Jesus Christ, in saving souls. Only the church might

¹ See above, p. 76.

interpret those instructions; the church alone might apply the means of salvation; outside the church no one could be saved.¹ The salvation of souls for eternity was thus the supreme business of the church.

This salvation of souls involved a theology and a sacramental system, which we shall briefly explain. Theology was the study of God. It sought to explain how and why man was created, what were his actual and desirable relations with God, what would be the fate of man in a future life. The most famous theologians of the Catholic Church, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), studied the teachings of Christ, the Bible, the early Christian writings, and the decrees of popes and councils, and drew therefrom elaborate explanations of Christian theology—the faith and morals of the Catholic Church.

A vital part of Catholic theology was the sacramental system, for that was the means, and essentially the only means, of saving souls. It was therefore for the purpose of the sacramental system that the church and its hierarchy existed. The sacraments were defined as “outward signs instituted by Christ to give grace.” The number generally accepted was seven: baptism, confirmation, holy eucharist, penance, extreme unction, holy orders, and matrimony. By means of the sacraments the church accompanied the faithful throughout life. (1) Baptism, the pouring of water, cleansed the child from original sin and from all previous actual sins, and made him a Christian, a child of God, and an heir of heaven. The priest was the ordinary minister of baptism, but in case of necessity anyone who had the use of reason might baptize. (2) Confirmation, conferred usually by the bishop upon young persons by the laying on of hands and the anointing with oil, gave them the Holy Ghost to render them strong and perfect Christians

¹ Catholic theologians have recognized, however, the possibility of salvation of persons outside the visible church. Thus, the catechism of Pope Pius X says: “Whoever, without any fault of his own, and in good faith, being outside the church, happens to have been baptized or to have at least an implicit desire for baptism, and, furthermore, has been sincere in seeking to find the truth, and has done his best to do the will of God, such an one, although separated from the body of the church, would still belong to her soul, and therefore be in the way of salvation.”

NOTE. The picture opposite is of the sculptured “Pietà” by Michelangelo (1475-1564), in St. Peter's basilica in Rome. On Michelangelo, see above, p. 115.





and soldiers of Jesus Christ. (3) Penance, one of the most important sacraments, was intended to forgive sins committed after baptism. To receive the sacrament of penance worthily it was necessary for the penitent (a) to examine his conscience, (b) to have sorrow for his sins, (c) to make a firm resolution never more to offend God, (d) to confess his mortal sins orally to a priest, (e) to receive absolution from the priest, and (f) to accept the particular penance—visitation of churches, saying of certain prayers, or almsgiving—which the priest might enjoin. These particular penances were termed “good works.”

(4) The holy eucharist was the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the consecration of bread and wine by priest or bishop, its miraculous transformation (transubstantiation) at his word into the very Body and Blood of Christ, and its reception by the faithful. It was around the eucharist that the elaborate ritual and ceremonies of the Mass developed, that fine vestments and candles and incense and flowers were used, and that magnificent cathedrals were erected. (5) Extreme unction was the anointing, at the hands of a priest, of the Christian who was in immediate danger of death, and it was supposed to give health and strength to the soul and sometimes to the body. (6) Holy orders—the special imposition of hands on the part of a bishop—ordained priests, bishops, and other ministers of the church and conferred upon them the power and grace to perform their sacred duties. (7) Matrimony was the sacrament, held to be indissoluble by human power, by which man and woman were united in lawful Christian marriage.

Of the seven sacraments it will be noticed that two—baptism and penance—dealt with the forgiveness of sins; that two—confirmation and holy orders—required the ministry of a bishop; and all others, except baptism and possibly matrimony, required the ministry of at least a priest. The priesthood was, therefore, absolutely indispensable for the administration of the sacramental system. It was the priesthood that absolved penitents from their sins, wrought the great daily miracle of transubstantiation, and offered to God the holy sacrifice of the Mass.

Neither the theology nor the organization of the Catholic

NOTE. The picture opposite, “Ecclesiastical Burial of a Spanish Nobleman,” is from a detail of a painting by El Greco (1542–1614), in St. Thomas's church in Toledo, Spain. On El Greco, see above, p. 116.

Church, as they existed in the year 1500, had been precisely the same in detail throughout the Christian era. While educated Catholics insisted that Christ was indirectly the source of all faith and practice, they were quite willing to admit that external changes and adaptations of institutions to varying conditions had taken place. Moreover, the eminence to which the Catholic Church had attained by the year 1500 had not been won easily nor was it at that time readily maintained. Throughout the whole course of Christian history there had been repeated objections to new definitions of dogma, and there had been likewise a good deal of opposition to the temporal claims of the church and much friction between clergy and lay rulers. In fact, it had often transpired that kings who rivalled one another in recognizing the spiritual and religious headship of the pope and in burning heretics who denied doctrines of the church, were the very kings who quarrelled with the pope concerning the latter's civil jurisdiction and directed harsh laws against its exercise.

Yet, despite age-long debates about doctrine and incessant conflicts about politics, the church appeared at the beginning of the sixteenth century to hold supreme and enduring sway over Christendom. The masses accepted it as a matter of course. Martin Luther on a pilgrimage to Rome early in the century entertained no doubt concerning it. Even those who were then most critical of abuses in it could hardly think of its destruction. To all manner of Europeans it seemed essential, not only for every individual's eternal salvation, but also for the general welfare of society at large. Anyone who might have counselled the overthrow of the church would have been viewed, precisely as a present-day advocate of the overthrow of the state is viewed, as an anarchist. For how could the authority of governments and law courts be respected, it was then argued, or how could men live peacefully together in society, or how could justice and honesty be assured in financial dealings, if there were no generally accepted standards of absolute morality? And how could there be absolute morality without divine revelation? And how could divine revelation be understood and applied in the same way by all men unless there were a single organization divinely commissioned to teach and interpret it?

All this seemed logical, and at the beginning of the sixteenth

**Popular
Belief in
Religious
Unity**

century no monarch or nobleman or clergyman or commoner was planning any real rebellion against the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, before the century was far advanced, a mighty religious upheaval was occurring throughout Christendom and actual rebellion broke out against the historic church. The explanation of such an unexpected and unpremeditated outcome lies in the paradoxical situation that religious unrest of many different sorts was as widespread in Europe in the early part of the sixteenth century as belief in religious unity, and it proved to be more deep-seated.

Religious unrest was, indeed, emphatic and extreme. On the one hand, among many Christians, was a greatly quickened religious consciousness and devotion, which found expression in the multiplication of pious writings and practices. Mysticism flourished. Crowds flocked to hear sensational preachers. There was a notable increase of pilgrimages to famous shrines. There was an exaggerated veneration of saints and relics. There was a marked accession of interest in missionary endeavor both at home and overseas. There was an obvious growth and expansion of "good works," of hospitals, asylums, and other charitable foundations. Prayer-books, translations of the gospels, and volumes of popular devotion fairly rained from the new printing presses. Only a little while before the opening of the sixteenth century an Augustinian monk, Thomas à Kempis, wrote the *Imitation of Christ*, one of the most beautifully devotional works in the history of Christianity and second only to the Bible in popularity. Many a monk and nun, many a parish priest, many a humble layman strove earnestly for personal holiness and eternal salvation.

On the other hand, among many professed Christians, was an equally apparent indifference, even repugnance, to the spirit, if not to the form, of Christianity. The pursuit of the "new learning," the absorption in classical studies, the admiration for ancient paganism tended to create dissatisfaction with purely Christian achievement and to foster ideals of pleasure and luxury radically at variance with Christian precept. Simultaneously the sudden geographical expansion of Europe, the daring discoveries, the forceful subjugation and exploitation of overseas peoples, and especially the rapid rise of capitalism afforded to some Europeans the opportunity,

Devotion
to Cath-
olic
Chris-
tianity ✓

Indiffer-
ence to
Christian
Teachings

and to others the eager desire, to amass riches of this world; and by the ensuing worship of mammon the worship of Christ was sometimes obscured or choked. It was only natural that in such circumstances some scepticism and a good deal of hypocrisy should appear.

It was not only kings and merchant-princes who at the opening of the sixteenth century were actuated by un-Christian ambition for money and power, ostentation and pleasure, but also numerous bishops and abbots and other clergymen. Many of these seemed to be more bent on patronizing the new learning and erecting magnificent architectural monuments in the renaissance manner than on promoting Christian piety; and the gulf between their public faith and their private morals was frequently abysmal and notorious.

Grave scandals were associated with the papal court at Rome toward the close of the fifteenth century and in the early part of the sixteenth. Pope Alexander VI (1492-1503) was grossly immoral and was concerned chiefly with securing estates and social position for his worthless son Cæsar Borgia and for his vicious daughter Lucrezia Borgia. Julius II (1503-1513) was abler and better, but he was primarily a military man, devoted to the task of making the papal state a compact Italian principality. Leo X (1513-1521), a son of the banker Lorenzo de' Medici, was absorbed in the "new learning" and the "new art," in architecture and the theatre; and in order to obtain money for the rebuilding of St. Peter's basilica at Rome and for other objects of his munificence and extravagance, he resorted to the most questionable financial expedients. He created new church offices and shamelessly sold them. He increased the revenue from indulgences, jubilees, and regular taxation. He pawned palace furniture, table plate, pontifical jewels, even statues of the apostles. Several banking firms and many individual creditors were ruined by the death of Leo X.

The immorality and worldliness prevailing at Rome were reflected throughout Christendom in the lives of many lesser churchmen as well as in the lives of upper-class laymen. Numerous bishops and abbots woefully neglected their ecclesiastical duties,—in some instances not going near their dioceses or monasteries,—and became famous, or infamous, as scheming politicians, as oppressive money-

Scandals
in the
Papacy

Scandals
through-
out the
Church

getters and wasteful spenders, and as sensual epicures. Already in the fifteenth century a critical cardinal reported to the pope that the disorders, consequent upon the evil lives of high-placed clergymen, "excite the hatred of the people against all ecclesiastical order; if they are not corrected, it is to be feared that the laity will attack the clergy. . . . For they will say that the clergy are incorrigible and are unwilling to apply any remedy. They will attack us when they no longer have any hope of our correction. Men's minds are waiting for what shall be done; it seems as if shortly something tragic will be brought forth. The venom which they have against us is becoming evident; soon they will believe that they are making a sacrifice agreeable to God by maltreating or despoiling the ecclesiastics as persons odious to God and man and immersed to the utmost in vice. The scant reverence still remaining for the sacred order will be destroyed utterly. Responsibility for all the disaffection will be charged upon the Roman curia, which will be regarded as the source of the evils because it has neglected to apply the needful remedy."

The very fact that there was a quickened religious consciousness at the beginning of the sixteenth century made many Christians peculiarly critical of shortcomings of clergymen and anxious to effect a reformation of the church "in head and members." Conspicuous humanist scholars of the age, including Erasmus and More, wrote eloquently and wittily in behalf of the simplicity of the original Christian gospel and against the evil lives of contemporary clergymen, their ignorance and credulity; and the criticisms of these scholars were conveyed to the masses, in plainer and coarser language, by a host of pamphleteers.

The complaint most commonly made, particularly by the pamphleteers in Germany, was that the masses of the population were being financially exploited by the papal court, that they were being taxed more and more at the very time when the service rendered them was becoming less and less. There was much justice in the complaint, and in an age of rising competitive capitalism it had telling effect.

Financial
Abuses

For a long time every clergyman, whether bishop, abbot, or priest, had usually been supported by a "benefice," that is, by the revenue of a parcel of land or an endowment attached to his post. And it had long been customary for a clergyman, when he took possession of his benefice, to pay a part of its first-year's

proceeds—its “annates,” as they were called—to his ecclesiastical superior, to his bishop or to the pope as the case might be. Now, with the growth of greed for money and of desire for ostentation, many a clergyman accumulated a number of benefices; bishops treated certain benefices in their dioceses as sinecures and awarded them to relatives and favorites, while demanding larger returns for themselves from other benefices; and the popes greatly extended the practice of “reserving” in all parts of Christendom particular benefices and of appointing to them Italians who drew revenues from them but remained in their own country. Thus it transpired that the common people often supported absentee prelates in luxury and sometimes paid a second time in order to maintain resident clergymen.

Besides, sums of money, enormous for those times, were being constantly drawn to Italy and Rome from all other regions of Catholic Christendom. There were “annates” revenues from reserved benefices, Peter’s pence, prodigal contributions from archbishops for their badges of office, remains of feudal dues, sums spent by a host of pilgrims, and fat fees charged for the grant of dispensations and for the conduct of court trials by the Roman curia. The bulk of all these financial exactions rested ultimately upon the backs of the middle class, the artisans, and the peasants. At least in northern Europe the idea became prevalent that the pope and his curia were exploiting honest Christians outside of Italy for the benefit of scandalously immoral Italians.

All over central and western Europe sincere and thoughtful Christians were demanding a religious reformation. They were demanding, however, a reformation within the Catholic Church and not a rebellion against it. Most of them were hopeful of effecting just such a reformation. They recalled how in earlier centuries—the eleventh, for example,—a group of reforming popes and energetic laymen had cleared away grave abuses and ended sorry disorders among prelates and monks, and they imagined that in due course history would repeat itself.

That at this time history did not exactly repeat itself but that, on the contrary, reformation became confused with rebellion, was due to certain novel circumstances affecting the position of Christianity at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The new circumstances were (1) political and (2) economic.

Preliminary to an understanding of the new political circumstances, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church during many centuries prior to the sixteenth had been not only a religious body, like a present-day church, but also a vast political power which readily found sources of friction with other political states. The Catholic Church, as we have seen, had its own elaborate organization in every country of central and western Europe. Its officials—popes, bishops, priests, and monks—claimed to be independent of civil governments and superior to them. It owned extensive lands, which normally were exempt from taxation by civil governments. It levied taxes directly on all its members without let or hindrance by civil governments. In its own law-courts it tried, without permitting recourse to civil tribunals, all cases involving clergymen and certain kinds of cases involving laymen. Such political jurisdiction of the church had been needful and fairly satisfactory in feudal times—from the fifth to the fourteenth century, let us say—when civil governments were weak and the church found itself the chief unifying force in Europe, the veritable heir to the universal dominion of the ancient Roman Empire.

Political
Rôle
of the
Church

By the sixteenth century the situation was greatly altered. Civil rulers were repressing feudalism. Political ambition was increasing among laymen. Local pride was being expanded into national patriotism. Strong national states were emerging in western Europe, and elsewhere the popular demand for national states was growing. National monarchs and would-be national monarchs

Sources of
Political
Conflict
between
Church
and State

were reading authors like Machiavelli and were aspiring to an absolutism and despotism for which the middle ages furnished no precedent. National sovereignty was rapidly being established in fact as well as in theory, and the one thing still needed to complete it was to bring religion under national control. National monarchs were anxious to enlist the wealth and influence of the church in their behalf; they coveted her lands, her taxes, and her courts. Patriots in countries which still lacked national states were prone to perceive in the political power of the church the principal obstacle to the attainment of their national desires.

In these circumstances kings and princes and patriots of the sixteenth century were not likely to resist encroachments on the historic rights of the church. Indeed, if they were not saints—

and saints among sixteenth-century monarchs were almost as rare as hens' teeth—they would welcome any opportunity to revolutionize the church in their own favor. A goodly number of them, like many prelates of the age, were really hostile to any religious reformation which might radically purify the church and gravely restrict their personal pleasures and political ambitions; and yet, with an unscrupulousness never surpassed, they stood ready to put themselves at the head of movements for ecclesiastical reform, or even rebellion, if thereby they could serve their own ends.

Economic circumstances of the time were similar. The same capitalistic spirit, the same eagerness for money and profits,

which was immensely aggravating the financial abuses in the church, particularly among the higher clergy, was possessing the minds of innumerable laymen.

Sources of Economic Conflict Manufacturers, merchants, and landlords were becoming capitalistic and were coveting the accumulated wealth, the princely revenues, and the large landed estates of ostentatious bishops and abbots. They were arguing that the riches of the church should be put to productive and profitable uses, and many of them, with a fine show of disinterested sympathy for religious reform, were quite willing to cooperate with kings and princes in confiscating church property, provided, of course, that they got a liberal share of it for themselves. In this way, men of means contributed to the religious and social unrest which characterized the beginning of the sixteenth century and to the eventual upheaval which brought forth not only religious rebellion and reformation but also a social revolution. This social revolution, while temporarily exalting lay monarchs at the expense of popes, was permanently to transfer economic influence from theologians to capitalists. It was at once a result and a cause of the rise of modern capitalism.

In such a setting of ambitious capitalists, lay princes, and national monarchs, the criticisms of ecclesiastical abuses by humanist scholars and the complaints of artisans and peasants were far more threatening to historic Christianity than the religious unrest of any earlier century. There had always been some religious unrest. There had always been critics of the church, and preachers who drew painful contrasts between the public tenets of Catholic Christianity and the scandalous con-

duct of some of its ministers and disciples. There had been, on occasion, movements for reform, and sometimes open rebellions had occurred. Heresy, the holding of beliefs at variance with those of the Catholic Church, and schism, the rejection of its authority and discipline, were no novelties in the sixteenth century.

A very serious and widespread heresy, that of Arianism, had greatly troubled the church in the centuries from the fourth to the seventh. Since the fifth and sixth centuries certain non-European nationalities, notably the Armenians and the Egyptians, had maintained national churches, independent of, and in schism with, the Catholic Church. From the fifth to the eleventh century had developed, moreover, a breach in Christian practice between the Catholic Church and the churches of the Greeks and other peoples of eastern Europe. Several earnest attempts had been made to heal this breach, but none had been completely successful, and at the opening of the sixteenth century it appeared to be permanent. Most of the Christian subjects of the Moslem Turks—Greeks, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, and Rumanians,—together with the Russians, thought that the pope had usurped unwarrantable prerogatives, while the Christians of central and western Europe accused the easterners of departing from their earlier loyalty to the pope and of destroying the unity of Christendom. The former claimed that they alone were Orthodox Christians; the latter insisted that they alone were Catholic Christians. By the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church of the east was deemed schismatic.

Earlier
Heresies
and
Schisms

Within the confines of Catholic Christendom, as they were in the year 1500, there had been spasmodic schism and heresy during the middle ages. On the one hand, disputes between kings and popes and quarrels between rival claimants to the papacy had produced schisms of greater or less intensity and duration. On the other hand, the rejection of certain doctrines of the church by particular clergymen or laymen had given rise to such heresies as that of the Waldenses (in Italy), that of the Albigenses (in southern France), and that of John Hus (in Bohemia) and Wycliffe (in England). But schism and heresy had seldom been joined in the middle ages. The schisms had been pretty strictly political or economic; they had involved no

basic dogmatic differences; and they had proved temporary. Some of the heresies had been more stubborn and had secured fairly large popular followings, but, as a rule, they had been frowned upon and combated as zealously by schismatical kings as by Catholic popes. French kings had suppressed the Albigenses by armed force. Holy Roman Emperors had led crusades against the Hussites, and an English king had extirpated Wycliffe's disciples by fire and sword.

By the sixteenth century the ground was prepared for a different outcome. As formerly, doctrines were now put forth which were at variance with the traditional teaching of the Catholic Church and which were formally condemned by the pope, but not only were they put forth in greater profusion than ever before; they were now, for the first time, defended and propagated by numerous kings, princes, capitalists, and patriots. Schism and heresy were now definitely to be linked, with results as fatal to the medieval unity of Catholic Christendom as they have been characteristic of our modern era.

2. RISE OF PROTESTANT CHURCHES

For the great variety of reasons which we have just indicated—political, economic, and religious—there was profound unrest in Christendom in the sixteenth century, and the unrest found its most remarkable expression in the separation, between the years 1520 and 1570, of the peoples of northern Germany, Scandinavia, the northern Netherlands, most of Switzerland, Scotland, England, and parts of France and Hungary from the great religious and political body which had been known historically for over a thousand years as the Catholic Christian Church. The name "Protestant" was first applied exclusively to the separatists under the leadership of Martin Luther who in 1529 protested against an attempt of the diet of the Holy Roman Empire to prevent the introduction of religious novelties, but subsequently the name became in common parlance the designation of all Christians who rejected the supremacy of the pope and the authority of the historic Catholic Church and yet were not in communion with the Orthodox Church of eastern Europe.

Of this Protestant Christianity, several forms appeared in the sixteenth century. At that time the main forms were Lutheran-

~~ism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism~~, but still other types were foreshadowed which, if relatively insignificant then, were later to exert very real influence.

(a) LUTHERANISM

Lutheranism takes its name from its great apostle, Martin Luther (1483-1546). Luther was born at Eisleben in Germany of a poor family whose ancestors had been peasants.

He early showed himself ambitious, headstrong, willing to pit his own opinions against those of the world, and intemperate in the use of language, but possessing much intellectual ability and an overwhelming anxiety about the salvation of his own soul. He was educated both in theology and in humanism at the university of Erfurt and in 1505 he became a member of the mendicant order of Augustinian monks. In 1508, in company with some of his fellow monks, he went to Wittenberg to teach in the university which the elector of Saxony had recently founded in that town, and a few years later he was appointed professor of theology at Wittenberg.

Martin
Luther

While lecturing and preaching at Wittenberg, where he was very popular, Luther grew more and more worried about the problem of eternal salvation, and from his reading of St. Paul and St. Augustine he derived, concerning the problem, a conviction which differed from the generally accepted teaching of the Catholic Church. The church taught, as we have seen, that she possessed the sole means of salvation, and that every Christian must perform certain "good works." Luther, on the other hand, entertained the idea that man was so depraved and corrupt, in the sight of God, as to be incapable of any good works whatsoever and that he could be saved only by faith in God's mercy. In other words, this monk was developing a doctrine of "justification by faith" in opposition to the Catholic doctrine of "justification by sacraments and works."

So far, Luther certainly had no thought of rebellion against the church of which he was a clergyman and a monk. In fact, when he visited Rome in 1511, it was as a pious pilgrim rather than as a carping critic. But a significant event in the year 1517 served to make clear the discrepancy between what he was teaching and what his church taught. In that year several agents of Pope Leo X had been sent out to dispose of indulgences

with a view to obtaining money for the rebuilding of the great basilica of St. Peter's at Rome, and one of these agents, Tetzel by name, was discharging his mission in the German archbishopric of Mainz in a manner which would be recognized in America to-day as that of high-pressure salesmanship. Luther at once

The Dis-
pute over
"Indul-
gences"

protested against what he believed was a corruption of Christian doctrine and a swindling of the poorer and more ignorant people. The form which his protest took was the posting, on the church-door at Wittenberg, of ninety-five assertions ("theses") of his own concerning indulgences, accompanied by a challenge to anyone to debate them with him.

To understand the significance of Luther's protest, it is important to know what the church meant by "indulgences." An "indulgence" was not a forgiving of sin, and it was never a permission to sin. It was (and is still in the Catholic Church) a promise of remission, in whole or in part, of the punishment to be meted out to a person after his death for sins for which he had been sincerely sorry and had done penance. The pope claimed the right to grant indulgences by virtue of the authority conferred by Christ upon Peter to hold and use the "keys of the kingdom of Heaven" and "to bind and loose" upon earth, but the grant of an indulgence was held to be without effect unless the person receiving it was in a "state of grace," that is, sorry for his sins and resolved not to sin again. To obtain an indulgence, the penitent had to say certain prayers or visit certain churches or do certain other "good works," and conspicuous among the "good works" in the time of Tetzel and Luther was the payment of money for papal purposes.

It was not simply against the money-payments for indulgences that Luther protested or merely against the objectionable methods of Tetzel, though these were assailed. The primary significance of Luther's theses was that they questioned the whole theory of "good works," of which the doctrine of indulgences was only a detail. "The Christian who has true repentance," wrote Luther, "has already received pardon from God altogether apart from an indulgence, and does not need one."

The ninety-five theses had originally been written in Latin for the educated class, but they were speedily translated into German and circulated widely among all classes in the country.

They provoked spirited discussion and aroused great excitement. Pope Leo X, who at first dismissed the matter as a mere squabble among the monks, was soon moved to summon Luther to Rome to answer for the theses, but the elector of Saxony intervened and prevailed upon the pope not to press the summons.

It was only a step from questioning the doctrine of "good works" to questioning the authority of the church, and this step Luther took in 1519. In that year at Leipzig, in the course of a debate on the theses with an eminent Catholic theologian, John Eck by name, Luther openly admitted that certain views of his, especially those concerning man's direct relation with God, without the mediation of the church, were the same as those which John Hus had held a century earlier and which had been condemned as heretical both by the pope and by the general council of Constance. Thereby Luther virtually confessed that a general council as well as a pope might err. For him, the divine authority of the Catholic Church ceased to be.

Separation from the traditional church was the only course now open to Luther and this was consummated in the year 1520. In a series of three bold pamphlets he vigorously and definitely attacked the position of the church. In the first—*An Address to the Nobility of the German Nation*—Luther's
Preaching
of Revolt Luther stated that there was nothing peculiarly sacred about the Christian priesthood and that the clergy should be deprived immediately of their special privileges; he urged the German princes to free their country from foreign control and shrewdly called their attention to the wealth and power of the church which they might justly appropriate to themselves. In the second—*On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church of God*—he assailed the papacy and the whole sacramental system. The third—*On the Freedom of a Christian Man*—contained the essence of Luther's new theology that salvation was not a painful progress toward a goal by means of sacraments and good works, but a condition "in which man found himself so soon as he despaired absolutely of his own efforts and threw himself on God's assurances."

In the midst of these attacks upon the church, the pope excommunicated Luther, and in the following year (1521) the diet of the Holy Roman Empire, assembled at Worms, pronounced him an outlaw. But the rebel calmly burned the papal bull and

from the imperial ban he was protected by the elector of Saxony. He at once devoted himself to making a new German translation of the Bible, which became very popular and is still prized as a monument in the history of German literature.¹

Within the next few years the Lutheran teachings carried everything before them throughout central and northern Germany. Nor is it difficult, in the light of what has already been said about the social and religious unrest of the time, to understand why Luther could successfully defy both pope and emperor and why his new theology was quickly and widely accepted in Germany. His rebellion was essentially popular and national. It appealed to pious persons who were shocked by the abuses in the church and longed for a Christian revival. It also appealed to more worldly persons who wished to enrich themselves by appropriating ecclesiastical lands and revenues. Above all, it appealed to German patriots who perceived in it an opportunity to put an end, to the domination and exactions of an Italian and Roman curia. Then, too, the Emperor Charles V, who remained a Catholic, was too immersed in the difficulties of foreign war and in the manifold administrative problems of his huge realm to be able to devote sustained effort to the extirpation of heresy in Germany. Finally, the character of Luther contributed to effective leadership. He was tireless in flooding the country with pamphlets, letters, and inflammatory diatribes, tactful in keeping his party together, and always bold and courageous. Princes, burghers, artisans, peasants, and many clergymen joined hands in espousing the new cause. They rebelled against the Catholic Church, confiscated its lands and revenues, and abolished Catholic worship.

But the peasants espoused the new cause in a manner altogether too logical and too violent to suit Luther or the princes and landlords. The German peasants had grievances against the old order compared with which those of the nobles and townsfolk were imaginary. For at least a century several causes had contributed to make the lot of the peasants worse and worse. While their taxes and other burdens

¹ The first edition of the Bible in German had been printed as early as 1466. At least eighteen editions in German (including four Low German versions) had appeared before Luther issued his German New Testament in 1522.

were increasing, the ability of the emperor to protect them was decreasing. They were exploited by every other class, including the higher clergy. Repeatedly, during the latter part of the fifteenth century, they had revolted against economic oppression. And now, in the sixteenth century, when Luther urged the German princes to assail ecclesiastics, to seize church lands, and to put an end to financial abuses, the peasants naturally listened to his words with open ears and proceeded with glad hearts to apply his advice in their own way.

The new Lutheran theology may have been too refined for the peasants, but they imagined they understood its purport. Spurred on by fanatics, whom the religious ferment of the time produced in large numbers, the peasants again took arms against economic oppression. That their demands were essentially moderate and involved no more than is granted everywhere to-day as a matter of course, may be inferred from their declaration of principles, the Twelve Articles, among which were: abolition of serfdom, free right of fishing and hunting, payment in wages for services rendered, and abolition of arbitrary punishment. So long as their efforts were directed against Catholic bishops, priests, and monks, Luther expressed sympathy with the peasants, but when the revolt, which broke out in 1524, became general all over central and southern Germany and was directed not only against the Catholic clergy but also against the lay lords,—many of whom were now Lutheran,—the religious leader foresaw a grave danger to his new religion in a split between peasants and nobles. Luther ended by espousing with vigor the cause of the nobles. He was shocked by the excesses of the insurrection, he said. Insisting upon toleration for his own revolt, he furiously begged the princes to put down the peasants' revolt. "Whoever can, should smite, strangle, or stab, secretly or publicly!"

The peasants' revolt was crushed in 1525 with utmost cruelty and with the slaughter of probably fifty thousand persons. One result was that the power of the lay lords became greater than ever, although in a few cases, particularly in the Tyrol and in Baden, the condition of the peasants was slightly improved. Elsewhere, however, this was not the case; and the German peasants were condemned for over two centuries to a lot worse than that of almost any people in Europe. Another result was

the decline of Luther's influence among the peasantry in southern and central Germany. They turned rapidly from one who, they believed, had betrayed them. On the other hand, many Catholic princes, who had been wavering in their religious support, now had before their eyes what they thought was an object lesson of the results of Luther's appeal to revolution, and so they cast their lot decisively with the ancient church. The peasants' revolt checked the spread of Lutheranism in Germany.

The diet of the Holy Roman Empire which assembled at Speyer in 1526 saw the German princes divided into a Lutheran and a Catholic party, but left the legal status of the new faith still in doubt, contenting itself with the vague declaration that "each prince should so conduct himself as he could answer for his behavior to God and to the emperor." But at the next diet, held at the same place in 1529, the emperor directed that the laws against heretics should be enforced and that the customary ecclesiastical revenues should not be used for the new worship. The Lutheran princes drafted a legal protest, in which they declared that they meant to abide by the law of 1526. From this protest came the name *Protestant*.

Philip Melanchthon, a prominent German humanist and a colleague of Luther's at the university of Wittenberg, attempted to conciliate the two religious parties. He prepared an orderly statement of Christian doctrine, which, while distinctly Lutheran in character, was more conservative in tone than some of Luther's preaching. Melanchthon called it the "reformed confession" and presented it to the diet of Augsburg in 1530. The diet did not adopt it, but it became the recognized creed of the Lutheran churches.

As for the emperor, he remained unconvinced of the truth or utility of the Confession of Augsburg and announced his intention of suppressing Luther's heresy by force of arms. In this predicament, the Lutheran princes formed a league at Schmalkald for mutual protection (1531); and from 1546 to 1555 a desultory civil war was waged. The Protestants received some assistance from the French king, who, for political reasons, was bent on humiliating the emperor. The end of the religious con-

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Philip Melanchthon, from an etching by Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528).



1526

VIVENTIS·POTVIT·DVRERIVS·ORA PHILIPPI
MENTEM·NON·POTVIT·PINGERE·DOCTA
MANVS





flict appeared to have been reached by the peace of Augsburg (1555), which contained the following provisions: (1) each prince was to be free to dictate the religion of his subjects;¹ (2) all church property appropriated by the Protestants before 1552 was to remain in their hands; (3) no form of Protestantism except Lutheranism was to be tolerated; (4) Lutheran subjects of ecclesiastical states were not to be obliged to renounce their faith; (5) by an "ecclesiastical reservation" any ecclesiastical prince on becoming a Protestant was to give up his see.

Thus, between 1520 and 1555, Martin Luther had preached his new theology at variance with the Catholic, and had found general acceptance for it throughout the northern half of Germany; its creed had been defined in 1530, and its official toleration had been recognized in 1555.

Lutheranism failed to conquer all Germany, but it became triumphant in the Scandinavian countries. When Martin Luther broke with the Catholic Church, Christian II (1513-1523) was reigning as electd king over Denmark and Norway and had recently subjugated Sweden. Though the king encountered political difficulties with the church, he maintained Catholic worship and doctrine and formally recognized the spiritual supremacy of the pope. But Christian II had trouble with most of his subjects, especially the Swedes, who were conscious of separate nationality and desirous of political independence; and the king eventually lost his throne in a general uprising. The definite separation of Sweden from Denmark and Norway followed immediately. The Swedes chose Gustavus Vasa (1523-1560) as their king, while the Danish and Norwegian crowns passed to the uncle of Christian II, who assumed the title of Frederick I (1523-1533).

Luther-
anism in
Denmark
and
Norway

In Denmark, King Frederick was very desirous of increasing the royal power, and the subservient ecclesiastical organization which Martin Luther was advocating seemed to him for his purposes infinitely preferable to the ancient self-willed church. But Frederick realized that the Catholic Church was deeply rooted in the affections of his people and that changes would

¹ On the principle, stated in Latin, of *cuius regio eius religio*.

have to be effected slowly and cautiously. He therefore collected around him Lutheran teachers from Germany and made his court the centre of propaganda for the new doctrine, and so well was the work of the new teachers done that the king was able in 1527 to put the two religions on an equal footing before the law. Upon Frederick's death in 1533, the Catholics made a determined effort to prevent the accession of his son, Christian III, who was not only an avowed Lutheran but was known to stand for absolutist principles in government.

The popular protest against royal despotism failed in Denmark and the triumph of Christian III in 1536 sealed the fate of Catholicism in that country and in Norway. It was promptly enacted that the Catholic bishops should forfeit their temporal and spiritual authority and that all their property should be transferred to the crown "for the good of the commonwealth." After discussions with Luther the new religion was definitely organized and declared the state religion in 1537. It might be added that Catholicism died with difficulty in Denmark. Many peasants as well as high churchmen resented the changes, and Helgesen, the foremost Scandinavian scholar and humanist of the time, protested vigorously against the new order. But the crown was growing powerful, and the crown prevailed. The enormous increase of royal revenue, consequent upon the confiscation of the property of the church, enabled the king to make Denmark the leading Scandinavian country throughout the second half of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth. In time national patriotism came to be intertwined with Lutheranism.

In Sweden the success of the new religion was due to the crown quite as much as in Denmark and Norway. Gustavus Vasa had

**Luther-
anism in
Sweden** obtained the Swedish throne through the efforts of a nationalist party, but there was still a hostile faction, headed by the chief churchman, the archbishop of Upsala, who favored the maintenance of the union with Denmark. In order to deprive the unionists of their leader, Gustavus begged the pope to remove the rebellious archbishop and to appoint one in sympathy with the nationalist cause. This the pope refused to do, and the breach with Rome began. Gustavus succeeded in suppressing the insurrection, and then began to introduce Protestantism. The introduction was very gradual,

especially among the peasantry, and its eventual success was largely the result of the work of one strong man assisted by a subservient parliament of landlords and middle class.

At first Gustavus maintained Catholic worship and doctrines, contenting himself with the suppression of the monasteries, the seizure of two thirds of the church taxes, and the circulation of a popular Swedish translation of the New Testament. In 1527 all ecclesiastical property was transferred to the crown and two Catholic bishops were put to death. Meanwhile Lutheran teachers were encouraged to take up their residence in Sweden and in 1531 a Protestant was appointed as archbishop of Upsala. Thenceforth, the progress of Lutheranism was more rapid, although a Catholic reaction was threatened several times in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Confession of Augsburg was adopted as the creed of the Swedish Church in 1593, and in 1604 Catholics were deprived of offices and estates and banished from the realm.

(b) CALVINISM

Calvin, Knox

A second general type of Protestantism which appeared in the sixteenth century was the immediate forerunner of the modern Presbyterian and Reformed Churches and at one time or another considerably affected the theology of other Protestant bodies. Taken as a group, it is usually called Calvinism. Of its rise and spread, some idea may be gained from brief accounts of the lives of two of its great apostles—Calvin and Knox. But first it will be necessary to say a few words concerning an older reformer, Zwingli by name, who prepared the way for Calvin's work in the Swiss cantons.

Switzerland comprised in the sixteenth century some thirteen cantons. All were technically under the suzerainty of the Holy Roman Empire, but they constituted in practice so many independent republics, bound together only by a number of defensive treaties. To the town of Einsiedeln in the canton of Schwyz came Huldreich Zwingli in the year 1516 as a Catholic priest. Slightly younger than Luther, he was well born, had received an excellent education in Vienna and in Basel, and had now been in holy orders about ten years. He had shown for some time more interest in humanism than in the old-fashioned theology, but hardly anyone would

Zwingli's
Pioneer
Work in
Switzer-
land

have suspected him of heresy, for it was well known that he was a regular pensioner of the pope.

Zwingli's opposition to the Catholic Church seems at first to have been based mainly on political grounds. He preached eloquently against the practice of hiring out Swiss troops to foreign rulers and abused the church for its share in this traffic in soldiers. Then he was led on to attack all manner of abuses in ecclesiastical organization, but it was not until he was installed in 1518 as preacher in the cathedral at Zürich that he clearly denied papal supremacy and proceeded to proclaim the Bible the sole guide of faith and morals. He preached against fasting, the veneration of saints, and the celibacy of the clergy. Some of his hearers began to put his teachings into practice. Church edifices were profaned, statues demolished, windows smashed, relics burned. Zwingli himself took a wife.

In 1523 a papal appeal to Zürich to abandon Zwingli was answered by the canton's formal declaration of independence from the Catholic Church. Henceforth the revolt spread rapidly throughout Switzerland, except in the five forest cantons, the very heart of the country, where the old religion was still deeply entrenched. Serious efforts were made to join the followers of Zwingli with those of Luther, and thus to present a united front to the common enemy, but there seemed to be irreconcilable differences between Lutheranism and the doctrines of Zwingli. The latter, which were succinctly expressed in sixty-seven theses published at Zürich in 1523, insisted more firmly than the former on the supreme authority of the Bible, and broke more thoroughly and radically with the traditions of the Catholic Church. Zwingli aimed at a reformation of government and discipline as well as of theology, and entertained a notion of an ideal state in which human activities, whether political or religious, would be ordered democratically. Zwingli differed essentially from Luther in never distrusting "the people." Perhaps the most distinctive mark of the Swiss reformer's theology was his idea that the Lord's Supper is not a miracle but simply a symbol and a memorial.

In 1531 Zwingli urged the Protestant Swiss to convert the five forest cantons to the new religion by force of arms. In answer to his entreaties, civil war ensued, but the Catholic mountaineers won a victory that very year and the reformer himself was killed. A truce was then arranged, the provisions of which foreshadowed

the religious settlement in Germany—each canton was to be free to determine its own religion. Switzerland has remained to this day part Catholic and part Protestant.

By the sudden death of Zwingli, Swiss Protestantism was left without a leader, but not for long, because the more celebrated Calvin took up his residence in Geneva in 1536. From that time until his death in 1564 Calvin was the centre of a movement which, starting from these small Zwinglian beginnings among the Swiss mountains, speedily spread over more countries and affected more people than did Lutheranism. In Calvinism, Catholicism was to find a most implacable foe.

John Calvin, who, next to Martin Luther, was the most conspicuous Protestant leader of the sixteenth century, was a Frenchman. Born of middle-class parentage at Noyon in the province of Picardy in 1509, he was intended from an early age for an ecclesiastical career. A pension from the Catholic Church enabled him to study at Paris, where he displayed an aptitude for theology and literature. When he was nineteen years of age, however, his father advised him to abandon the idea of entering the priesthood in favor of becoming a lawyer, and so young Calvin spent several years studying law.

John
Calvin

It was in 1529 that Calvin is said to have experienced a sudden "conversion." Although as yet there had been no organized revolt in France against the Catholic Church, that country, like many others, was teeming with religious critics. Thousands of Frenchmen were in sympathy with any attempt to improve the church by education, by purer morals, or by better preaching. Lutheranism was winning a few converts, and various other sects were appearing in divers places. It was still doubtful whether reform would be sought within the traditional church or by rebellion against it. Calvin believed that his conversion was a divine call to forsake Catholicism and to become the apostle of a purer Christianity. His heart, he said, was "so subdued and reduced to docility that in comparison with his zeal for true piety he regarded all other studies with indifference, though not entirely abandoning them. Though himself a beginner, many flocked to him to learn the pure doctrine, and he began to seek some hiding-place and means of withdrawal from people."

His search for a hiding-place was quickened by the announced determination of the French king, Francis I, to put an end to

religious dissent among his subjects. Calvin abruptly left France and found an asylum in the Swiss town of Basel, where he became acquainted at first hand with the type of reformed religion which Zwingli had propagated, and where he proceeded to write an account of the Protestant position as contrasted with the Catholic. This exposition,—*The Institutes of the Christian Religion*,—which was published in 1536, was dedicated to King Francis I and was intended to influence him in favor of Protestantism.

Although the book failed of its immediate purpose, it speedily won a deservedly great reputation. It was a statement of Calvin's views, borrowed in part from Zwingli, and in part from Luther and other reformers. It was orderly and concise, and it did for Protestant theology what medieval writers had done for Catholic theology. It contained the seed of all that subsequently developed as Calvinism.

It seemed for some time as if the *Institutes* might provide a common religious rule and guide for all Christians who rebelled against Rome. But Calvin, in mind and nature, was quite different from Luther. The latter was impetuous, excitable, and very emotional; the former was ascetic, calm, and severely logical. Then, too, Luther was quite willing to leave in the church many practices which were not directly prohibited by Scripture; Calvin insisted that nothing should remain in the church which was not expressly authorized by Scripture. The *Institutes* had a tremendous influence upon Protestantism but did not unite the followers of Calvin and Luther.

In 1536 Calvin went to Geneva, which was then in the throes of a revolution at once political and religious, for the townsfolk were freeing themselves from the feudal suzerainty of the duke of Savoy and banishing the Catholic Church, whose cause the duke championed. Calvin aided in the work and was rewarded by an appointment as chief pastor and preacher in the city. This position he continued to hold, except for a brief period when he was exiled, until his death in 1564. It proved to be a commanding position not only in ordering the affairs of the town, but also in giving form to an important branch of Protestant Christianity.

The government of Geneva under Calvin's régime was a curious theocracy of which Calvin himself was both religious leader and political governor. The minister of the reformed faith became

God's mouthpiece upon earth and inculcated an unbending puritanism in daily life. "No more festivals, no more jovial reunions, no more theatres or society; the rigid monotony of an austere rule weighed upon life. A poet was decapitated because of his verses; Calvin wished adultery to be punished by death like heresy, and he had Michael Servetus burned for not entertaining the same opinions as himself upon the mystery of the Trinity."

Under Calvin's theocratic despotism, Geneva became famous throughout Europe as the source of elaborate Protestant propaganda. Calvin, who set the example of stern simplicity and relentless activity, was sometimes styled the "Protestant pope." He not only preached every day, wrote numerous theological treatises, and issued a French translation of the Bible, but he established important Protestant schools, including the university of Geneva, which attracted students from distant lands, and he conducted a correspondence with his disciples and with would-be reformers in all parts of Europe. His letters alone would fill thirty folio volumes.

Such activities account for the wide diffusion of Calvinism. Frenchmen, Netherlanders, Germans, Magyars, Scots, and Englishmen flocked to Geneva to hear Calvin or to attend his schools, and when they returned to their own countries they were likely to be so many glowing sparks ready to start mighty conflagrations.

Wide
Diffusion
of Cal-
vinism

Calvinism was known by various names in the different countries which it entered. On the Continent of Europe it was described as the Reformed Faith. In France ~~its followers were styled Huguenots~~. In Scotland and England it was called Presbyterianism. Its essential characteristics, however, were the same wherever it took root.

We have already noticed how Switzerland, except for the five forest cantons, had been converted to Protestantism by the preaching of Zwingli. Calvin was Zwingli's real theological successor, and the majority of the Swiss, especially those in the urban cantons of Zürich and Bern as well as in that of Geneva, adopted Calvinism.

In
Switzer-
land

Calvinism also made converts in France. The doctrines and writings of Luther had there encountered small success. There appeared to be fewer abuses among the French clergy than among the ecclesiastics of northern Europe, and many French

reformers believed that greater good would eventually be achieved within the Catholic Church than without. Besides, **In France** the French sovereign was less prompted to lay his hand upon the domains of the clergy, because a special agreement with the pope in 1516 bestowed upon the king the nomination of bishops and the disposition of benefices. For these reasons the majority of the French people resisted Protestantism of every form and remained loyal to Catholicism.

What progress religious rebellion made in France was due to Calvin rather than to Luther. Calvin, as we have seen, was a Frenchman, and his teachings and logic appealed to a small but influential body of his fellow countrymen. A considerable portion of the lower nobility, some merchants and business men, and many magistrates conformed to Calvinism openly; the majority of great lawyers and men of learning adhered to it in public or in secret. Probably from a twentieth to a thirtieth of the total population embraced Calvinism. The movement was confined largely to the bourgeoisie, and almost from the outset it acquired political as well as religious significance. It represented among the lesser nobility an awakening of the aristocratic spirit and among the middle class a reaction against the growing power of the king. The financial and moneyed interests of the country were largely attracted to French Calvinism. The Huguenots, as the French Calvinists were called, were particularly strong in the law courts and in the estates-general, and these had been the main checks upon royal despotism.

The Huguenots were involved in sanguinary civil and religious wars which raged in France throughout the greater part of the sixteenth century, and only in 1598 did they receive a definite guaranty of religious toleration.¹

The Netherlands were too closely associated with Germany not to be affected by the Lutheran revolt against the Catholic Church; they soon became saturated with Lutheranism, and also with the doctrines of various radical sects that from time to time were expelled from the German states. **In the Netherlands** The Emperor Charles V by harsh action tried to stamp out heresy, but he succeeded only in changing its name and nature. Lutheranism disappeared from the Netherlands; but in its place came Calvinism, descending from Geneva through

¹ See below, pp. 204-205.

Alsace and thence down the Rhine, or entering from Great Britain by the broad commercial channels between those countries. While the southern provinces of the Netherlands were eventually recovered for Catholicism, the protracted political and economic conflict which the northern provinces waged against the Catholic king of Spain served to establish Calvinism as the national religion of a majority of Dutchmen. Calvinism in the Netherlands was known as the Dutch Reformed religion.

We have already noted that southern Germany had rejected Lutheranism, partially at least because of Luther's bitter words to the peasants. Catholicism, however, was not destined to have complete sway in that region, for Calvinism permeated Württemberg, Baden, and the Rhenish provinces and the Reformed doctrines gained numerous converts there, especially among the middle class. The growth of Calvinism in Germany was handicapped seriously by the religious settlement of Augsburg in 1555 which tolerated officially only Catholicism and Lutheranism. It was not until after the close of the direful Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century that German Calvinists obtained formal standing.

In
Germany

Both in Hungary and in Poland, Calvinism spread, especially among nobles and middle class. It seemed in the sixteenth century as if both countries would soon become wholly Calvinist. In Hungary, by the close of the century, only a hundred clergymen and not more than half a dozen noble families still clung to Catholicism, while in Poland the majority of the great landlords were quitting Catholicism and adhering to Calvinism. In Poland and Hungary, however, these gains of Calvinism, as we shall presently see, were not to be permanent.

In
Hungary
and
Poland

Scotland, like every other European country in the early part of the sixteenth century, had been the scene of protests against moral and financial abuses in the Catholic Church.

To political causes, however, must primarily be attributed the expression of that unrest in ecclesiastical rebellion. The kingdom had long been a prey to the bitter rivalry of clannish noble families, and the premature death of James V (1542), who left the throne to his infant daughter, Mary Stuart, gave free rein to a feudal reaction against the crown. In general, the Catholic clergy sided with the royal

In
Scotland

cause, while the religious reformers prevailed upon the nobles to champion Protestantism in order to deal an effective blow against the throne. Thus Cardinal Beaton, primate of the Catholic Church in Scotland, ordered numerous executions on the score of protecting religion and the authority of the queen-regent; on the other hand several noblemen, professing the new theology, assassinated the cardinal and hung his body on the battlements of the castle of St. Andrews (1546). Such was the general situation in Scotland when John Knox appeared upon the scene.

Born of peasant parents, John Knox (1515-1572) had become a Catholic priest, albeit in sympathy with many of the revolutionary ideas which were entering Scotland from the Continent and from England. In 1546 he openly rejected the authority of the church and proceeded to preach "the Gospel" and a stern puritanical morality. "Others snipped the branches," he said, "he struck at the root." But the Catholic court was able to banish Knox from Scotland. After romantic imprisonment in France, Knox spent a few years in England, preaching an extreme puritanism, holding a chaplaincy under Edward VI (1547-1553), and exerting his influence to ensure an indelibly Protestant character to the Anglican Church. Then upon the accession to the English throne of the Catholic Mary Tudor, Knox betook himself to Geneva where he made the acquaintance of Calvin and found himself in essential agreement with the teachings of the French reformer.

After a stay of some five years on the Continent, Knox returned finally to Scotland and became the organizer and director of the "Lords of the Congregation," a league of the chief Protestant noblemen for purposes of religious propaganda and political power. In 1560 he drew up the creed and discipline of the Presbyterian Church after the model of Calvin's church at Geneva; and in the same year, with the support of the "Lords of the Congregation" and the troops of Queen Elizabeth of England, Knox effected a political and religious revolution in Scotland. The queen-regent was imprisoned, and the subservient parliament decreed the abolition of papal supremacy and enacted the death penalty against anyone who should even attend Catholic worship. John Knox had carried everything before him.

Queen Mary Stuart, during her brief stay in Scotland (1561-

1567), tried in vain to stem the tide. The jealous nobles would brook no increase of royal authority. The austere Knox hounded the girl-queen in public sermons and fairly flayed her character. The queen's downfall and subsequent long imprisonment in England finally decided the ecclesiastical future of Scotland. Except in a few fastnesses in the northern highlands, where Catholicism survived among the clansmen, the whole country was committed to Calvinism.

Calvinism was not without influence in England. Introduced towards the close of the reign of Henry VIII, it inspired the theology, if not the organization, of a number of small sects which troubled the king's Anglican Church almost as much as did the Catholics. Under Edward VI (1547-1553), it influenced considerably the theology of the Anglican Church itself, but the moderate policies of Elizabeth (1558-1603) tended to fix a gulf between Anglicans and Calvinists.

(C) ANGLICANISM

Anglicanism usually designates that form of Protestantism which was adopted for the state church in England in the sixteenth century and which is now represented by the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States as well as by the Established Church of England. The Methodist churches are comparatively late off-shoots of Anglicanism.

The separation of England from the papacy was a more gradual and halting process than were the contemporary revolutions on the Continent. The new Anglicanism was correspondingly more conservative than Lutheranism or Calvinism.

At the opening of the sixteenth century, the word "Catholic" meant the same in England as in every other country of western or central Europe—belief in the seven sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, and the veneration of saints; acceptance of papal supremacy, and support of monasticism and of other institutions and practices of the medieval church. During several centuries it had been customary in legal documents to refer to the Catholic Church in England as the *Ecclesia Anglicana*, or Anglican Church, just as the popes in their letters repeatedly referred to the "Gallican Church," the "Spanish Church," the "Neapolitan Church," or the "Hungarian Church." But such phraseology did not

In
England

The
Catholic
Church in
England

imply a separation of any one national church from the common Catholic communion, and for nearly a thousand years—ever since there had been an *Ecclesia Anglicana*—the English had recognized the bishop of Rome as the centre of Catholic unity.

In the course of the sixteenth century, however, the majority of Englishmen changed their conception of the *Ecclesia Anglicana*, so that to them it continued to exist as the Church of England, but on a strictly national basis, in communion neither with the pope nor with the Orthodox Church of the East, and abandoning several doctrines which had been universally held in earlier times, while substituting in their place beliefs and customs which were distinctively Protestant. This new conception of the Anglican Church—resulting from the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century—is what we mean by Anglicanism as a form of Protestantism. It took shape in the eventful years between 1520 and 1570.

In order to understand how this religious and ecclesiastical revolution was effected in England, we must appreciate the various elements distrustful of the Catholic Church in that country about the year 1525. In the first place, the Lutheran teachings were infiltrating into the country. As early as 1521 a small group at Cambridge had become interested in the new German theology, and thence the sect spread to Oxford, London, and other intellectual centres. It found its early converts chiefly among the lower clergy and the merchants of the large towns, but for several years it was not numerous.

In the second place, there was the same feeling in England as we have already noted throughout all Europe that the clergy needed reform in morals and in manners. This view was shared not only by the comparatively insignificant group of heretical Lutherans, but likewise by a large proportion of the leading men who accounted themselves loyal members of the Catholic Church. Such humanists as Colet and More were especially eloquent in preaching reform, and the writings of Erasmus had great vogue in England.

A third source of distrust of the church was a purely political feeling against the papacy. On one hand, national patriotism was steadily growing in England, and it was at variance with the older cosmopolitan character of Catholicism. On the other hand,

royal power was increasing, particularly after the accession of the Tudor family in 1485. Henry VII (1485-1509) subordinated to the crown both the nobility and the parliament,¹ and the patriotic support of the middle class he had secured. And when his son, Henry VIII (1509-1547), came to the throne, the only serious obstacle which appeared to be left in the way of royal absolutism was the privileged independence of the Catholic Church.

Yet a number of years passed before Henry VIII laid violent hands upon the church. In the meanwhile, he proved himself a devoted Catholic. He scented the new Lutheran heresy and sought speedily to exterminate it. He even wrote in 1521 with his own royal pen a bitter arraignment of the new theology, and sent his book, which he called *The Defence of the Seven Sacraments*, with a delightful dedicatory epistle to the pope. For his prompt piety and filial orthodoxy, he received from the bishop of Rome the proud title of *Fidei Defensor*, or Defender of the Faith, a title which he jealously bore until his death, and which his successors, the sovereigns of Great Britain, have continued to bear ever since. He seemed not even to question the pope's political claims. He allied himself on several occasions with Leo X in the great game of European politics. His chief minister and adviser in England for many years was Thomas Wolsey, the most conspicuous ecclesiastic in his kingdom and a cardinal of the Roman Church.

Henry VIII
as De-
fender of
the Faith

Under these circumstances it is difficult to see how the Anglican Church would have immediately broken away from Catholic unity had it not been for the peculiar marital troubles of Henry VIII. The king had been married eighteen years to Catherine of Aragon,² and had been presented by her with six children (of whom only one daughter, the Princess Mary, had survived), when one day he informed her that they had been living all those years in mortal sin and that their union was not true marriage. The queen could hardly be expected to agree to such a conclusion, and there ensued a legal suit between the royal pair.

Henry VIII
as a Mar-
ried Man

To Henry VIII the matter was really quite simple. Henry was tired of Catherine and wanted to get rid of her. He believed

¹ See above, pp. 28-30.

² See above, p. 30, and below, p. 224.

the queen could bear him no more children and yet he ardently desired a male heir. Rumor reported that the susceptible king had recently been smitten by the brilliant black eyes of a certain Anne Boleyn, a maid-in-waiting at the court. The purpose of Henry was obvious; so was the means, he thought. For it had occurred to him that Catherine was his elder brother's widow, and, therefore, had no right, by church law, to marry him. To be sure, a papal dispensation had been obtained from Pope Julius II authorizing the marriage, but why not now obtain a revocation of that dispensation from the reigning Pope Clement VII? Thus the marriage with Catherine could be declared null and void, and Henry would be a bachelor, thirty-six years of age, free to wed some princess, or haply Anne Boleyn.

There was no doubt that Clement VII would like to have done his great English champion a favor, but two difficulties at once presented themselves. It might be a dangerous precedent for the pope to reverse the decision of one of his predecessors. Worse still, the Emperor Charles V, the nephew of Queen Catherine, took up cudgels in his aunt's behalf and threatened Clement with dire penalties if he nullified the marriage. The pope complained truthfully that he was between the anvil and the hammer. He sought to temporize and to delay decision.

The protracted delay was very irritating to the impulsive English king, who was now really in love with Anne Boleyn. Gradually Henry's former effusive loyalty to Rome gave way to a settled conviction of the tyranny of the papal power, and there rushed to his mind the recollection of efforts of earlier English rulers to restrict that power. A few salutary enactments against the church might compel a favorable decision from the pope.

Henry VIII seriously opened his campaign against the Roman Church in 1531, when he frightened the English clergy into paying a fine of over half a million dollars for violating an obsolete statute that had forbidden reception of papal legates without royal sanction, and in the same year he forced the clergy to recognize himself as supreme head of the church "as far as that is permitted by the law of Christ." His subservient parliament then em-

NOTE. The picture opposite is of King Henry VIII, from a drawing by Hans Holbein (1497-1543).

**Conflict
and
Breach
between
England
and Rome**





powered him to stop the payment of annates to the pope and to appoint bishops in England without recourse to the papacy. Without waiting longer for the decision from Rome, he had Cranmer, one of his own creatures, whom he had just named archbishop of Canterbury, declare his marriage with Catherine null and void and his union with Anne Boleyn canonical and legal. Pope Clement VII thereupon handed down his long-delayed decision, which was favorable to Queen Catherine, and excommunicated Henry VIII.

The formal breach between England and Rome occurred in 1534. Parliament passed a series of laws, one of which declared the king to be the "only supreme head in earth of the Church of England," and others cut off all communication with the pope and inflicted the penalty of treason upon anyone who should deny the king's ecclesiastical supremacy.

One step in the transition of the Church of England had now been taken. For centuries its members had recognized the pope as their ecclesiastical head; henceforth they were to own the ecclesiastical headship of their king. From the former Catholic standpoint, this might be schism but it was not necessarily heresy. Yet Henry VIII encountered considerable opposition from the higher clergy, from the monks, and from many intellectual leaders, as well as from large numbers of the lower classes. A popular uprising—the Pilgrimage of Grace—was sternly suppressed, and such men as the brilliant Sir Thomas More and John Fisher, the aged and saintly bishop of Rochester, were beheaded because they retained their former belief in papal supremacy.

The breach with Rome naturally encouraged the Lutherans and other reformers to think that England was on the point of becoming Protestant, but nothing was further from the king's mind. The assailant of Luther remained at least partially consistent. While separating England from the papacy, Henry was firmly resolved to maintain every other tenet of the Catholic faith as he had received it; and his parliament obligingly enacted a law of the "six articles" (1539), reaffirming the chief points in Catholic doctrine and practice and visiting dissenters with horrible

Henry
VIII's
Middle-
of-the-
Road
Policy

NOTE. The picture opposite is of Pope Clement VII, from a painting by Sebastiano del Piombo (1485-1547).

punishment. This middle-of-the-road policy was enforced with much bloodshed. On one side, the Catholic who denied the royal supremacy was beheaded; on the other, the Protestant who denied transubstantiation was burned! It has been estimated that during the reign of Henry VIII the number of capital condemnations for politico-religious offenses ran into the thousands.

During the reign of Henry VIII one of the most important of all earlier Christian institutions—monasticism—was forcefully uprooted from England. There were certainly grave abuses and scandals in some of the monasteries which dotted the country, and a good deal of popular sentiment had been aroused against the institution. Then, too, the monks had generally opposed the royal pretensions to religious supremacy and remained loyal to the pope. But the deciding factor in the suppression of the monasteries was undoubtedly economic. Henry, always in need of funds on account of his extravagances, appropriated part of the confiscated property for the benefit of the crown, and the rest he astutely distributed as gigantic bribes to the upper classes of the laity. The nobles who accepted the ecclesiastical property were thereby committed to the new anti-papal religious settlement in England.

The Church of England, separated from the papacy under Henry VIII, became Protestant under Edward VI (1547-1553).

The young king's guardian tolerated all manner of reforming propaganda, and Calvinists as well as Lutherans preached their doctrines freely. Official articles of religion, which were drawn up for the Anglican Church, showed unmistakably Protestant influence. The Latin service books of the Catholic Church were translated into English, under Cranmer's auspices, and the edition of the *Book of Common Prayer*, published in 1552, made clear that the eucharist was no longer to be regarded as a propitiatory sacrifice: the names "Holy Communion" and "Lord's Supper" were substituted for "Mass," while the word "altar" was replaced by "table." The old places of Catholic worship were changed to suit a new order: altars and images were taken down, the former service books destroyed, and stained-glass windows broken. Several peasant uprisings signified that the nation was not completely united upon a policy of religious

Suppression of Monasticism in England

The Protestant Church of England under Edward VI

change, but the reformers had their way, and Protestantism advanced.

A temporary setback to the progress of the new Anglicanism was afforded by the reign of Mary Tudor (1553-1558), the daughter of Catherine of Aragon, and a devout Catholic. She reinstated the bishops who had refused to take the oath of royal supremacy and punished those who had taken it. She prevailed upon parliament to repeal the ecclesiastical legislation of both her father's and her brother's reigns and to reconcile England once more with the bishop of Rome. A papal legate, in the person of Cardinal Reginald Pole, sailed up the Thames with his cross gleaming from the prow of his barge, and in full parliament administered the absolution which freed the kingdom from the guilt incurred by its schism and heresy. As an additional support to her policy of restoring the Catholic Church in England, Queen Mary married her cousin, Philip II of Spain, the outstanding champion of Catholicism upon the Continent.

Temporary
Catholic
Restora-
tion under
Mary
Tudor

But events proved that despite outward appearances even the reign of Mary registered an advance of Protestantism. The new doctrines were zealously propagated by an ever growing number of itinerant exhorters. The Spanish alliance was disastrous to English fortunes abroad and distasteful to patriotic Englishmen at home. And finally, the violent means which the queen took to stamp out heresy gave her the unenviable title of "Bloody" and reacted in the end in behalf of the views for which the victims sacrificed their lives. During her reign nearly three hundred reformers perished, many of them, including Archbishop Cranmer, by fire. The work of the queen was in vain. No heir was born to Philip and Mary, and the crown passed, therefore, to Elizabeth, the Protestant daughter of Anne Boleyn.

It was in the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603) that the Church of England assumed definitely the doctrines and practices which we now connect with the word "Anglicanism." By act of parliament, the English Church was again separated from the papacy and placed under royal authority, Elizabeth assuming the title of "supreme governor." The worship of the state church was to be in conformity with a slightly altered version of Cranmer's *Book of Common Prayer*. A uniform

Queen
Elizabeth

doctrine was likewise imposed by parliament in the form of thirty-nine articles, which set a distinctively Protestant mark upon the Anglican Church in its appeal to the Scriptures as the sole rule of faith, its insistence on justification by faith alone, its repudiation of the sacrifice of the Mass, and its definition of the church. All the bishops who had been appointed under Mary, with one exception, refused to accept the changes, and were therefore deposed and imprisoned, but new bishops, Elizabeth's own appointees, were consecrated and the "succession of bishops" thereby maintained. Outwardly, the Church of England appeared to retain a corporate continuity throughout the sixteenth century. Inwardly, a great revolution had changed it from Catholic to Protestant.

Harsh laws sought to oblige all Englishmen to conform to Elizabeth's religious settlement. Liberty of public worship was denied to any dissenter from Anglicanism. To be a "papist" or "hear Mass"—which were construed as the same thing—was punishable by death as high treason. A special ecclesiastical court—the Court of High Commission—was established under royal authority to search out heresy and to enforce uniformity; it served throughout Elizabeth's reign as a kind of Protestant Inquisition.

While the large majority of the English nation gradually conformed to the official Anglican Church, a considerable number refused their allegiance. On one hand were a number of Catholics, who still maintained the doctrine of papal supremacy and were usually derisively styled "papists," and on the other hand were various radical sects, such as Presbyterians or Independents, who went by the name of "dissenters" or "non-conformists." For a time, the number of Catholics tended to diminish, largely because, for political reasons, Protestantism in England became almost synonymous with English patriotism. On the other hand, the radical sects tended somewhat to increase their numbers, so that in the seventeenth century they were able to precipitate a great political and ecclesiastical conflict with Anglicanism.

(d) RADICAL PROTESTANTISM

Calvinism, Anglicanism, and Lutheranism were the chief but not the only forms which rebellion against Catholic Christianity

took in the sixteenth century. In the midst of the religious ferment and upheaval of the time, individuals and groups, far more radical than Luther and Cranmer, and even more radical than Calvin, raised their voices in vehement protest against traditional ecclesiastical authority and gained followings here and there throughout western Christendom. It was not only against the pope and the Catholic Church that these Radical Protestants inveighed.

Emergence of
Radical
Sects

They assailed also the efforts of reformers to establish authoritarian Protestant churches. In most instances they were hostile to any ecclesiastical organization of religion, and Christianity to them meant less a creed vouched for by theologians in a church (Catholic or Protestant) than a way of life revealed to individuals by an "inner light." As a rule they sympathized with the contention of Luther and Calvin that the Bible is the sole basis of Christian faith and morals, but they seemed to repose less confidence in the ability of educated persons like Calvin and Luther to interpret the Bible than in the infallibility of the humblest and most untutored. . . .

This anarchistic character of Radical Protestantism rendered it in the sixteenth century peculiarly repugnant, not only to Catholics, but likewise to Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anglicans; and because some of its apostles preached social revolution and the overthrow of all existing governments, it was especially feared and persecuted by kings and princes. Incidentally, it should be remarked that Radical Protestantism, on account of its anarchistic nature, cannot be treated, like Catholicism or any major form of Protestantism, as a single movement or a coherent system. It has had some continuity of principles, but not of organization. It has given rise to "sects," rather than to "churches."

Of the great variety of Radical Protestant preachers who appeared throughout western Christendom in the sixteenth century, space permits us to mention only a few. These may serve, however, as exemplars of one or another set of radical principles which have had lasting and gradually increasing influence on the modern evolution of Protestant Christianity as a whole. The principles are those of Evangelicalism, Congregationalism, and Unitarianism.

"Evangelicalism" signifies the emphasizing of the emotional,

at the expense of the rational, elements in Christianity. Its sixteenth-century exponents—so-called Evangelical Christians—
 “Evan- while distrusting historic tradition and theology, ac-
 gelical” cepted the divine inspiration of each and every word
 Sects in the Bible and believed that the way of salvation
 for each individual lay simply in feeling Christ, in experiencing
 a “conviction of sin” and a spiritual illumination or revival,
 which was reckoned as “conversion” and which made one a
 saint, and thenceforth in surrendering one’s self to Christ and
 doing whatever one’s reading of the Bible seemed to direct one
 to do.

An early exemplar of this Evangelical Protestantism was
 Thomas Münzer (1489-1525), a German, who had received a
 university education and was serving as a Catholic
 The Ana- priest at Zwickau (in Saxony) when Martin Luther
 baptists rebelled against the church. Under the excitement of
 the time, Münzer, with a number of fellow clergymen, at once
 experienced conversion, felt the direct indwelling of the Holy
 Spirit, and in 1521 hurried to Wittenberg as a “prophet” to
 convince Luther that the latter should be more radical and more
 evangelical. Denounced by Luther and expelled from Witten-
 berg, Münzer wandered for four years in Bohemia and Switzer-
 land, preaching with rude eloquence and obvious sincerity not
 only a complete religious revolution but also the overthrow of
 existing governments and the establishment of communism. Münzer
 participated prominently in the peasants’ revolt of 1525 and,
 following its forceful suppression, was put to death by the
 Lutheran prince of Hesse. Among the tenets which Münzer deduced from his reading of the Bible was the belief that baptism should not be administered to infants, as was the practice of Luther no less than of the Catholic Church, but only to adults after conversion. Hence arose the term Anabaptists—
 “re-baptizers”—to denote the followers of Münzer and similar
 evangelical sects.

The reputation of the Anabaptists suffered from their association with the peasants’ revolt, and even more so from the spectacular career of one of their number, a Netherlandish tailor, commonly known as John of Leiden (1510-1536). John of Leiden read the Bible in his own way and became a prophet; he announced that he was the successor of King David, that he re-

ceived daily revelations from heaven, that he was entitled to both royal and divine honors; he sanctioned *polygamy* and himself took four wives. The *Brigham Young of his age*, he attracted fanatical disciples and managed to seize the city of Münster and to hold it for a year as the Zion of the new dispensation. Eventually in 1536 Münster was recaptured by the Catholic bishop and John of Leiden was executed.

It must not be supposed that John of Leiden was a fair sample of all the Anabaptists or other evangelical sects. As evangelicalism spread in the Netherlands and Germany, it appealed to many good quiet people, chiefly among the lower classes but to some extent among university-trained persons, who piously tried to lead a simple and pure life in conformity with what they believed were the precepts of primitive Christianity. Such a person, for example, was Menno Simons (1492-1559), a Netherlander who had been a priest, though not a university graduate, and who renounced the Catholic Church in 1536 to become an Anabaptist exhorter. Menno set no value on learning or on dogmas; he preached the "new life" and religious simplicity; he condemned as un-Christian the waging of war, the taking of oaths, the union of church and state, and the baptizing of infants. From him sprang a special sect, known as Mennonites, which obtained adherents in the Netherlands, northwestern Germany, and Switzerland, and which has persisted to the present day.

The Mennonites

Another type of Radical Protestant of the sixteenth century was Andrew Bodenstein (1480-1541), usually called Carlstadt from the town of his birth (in Bohemia). Carlstadt had been trained in theology at various German universities and had become a professorial colleague of Luther's at Wittenberg. Here he seems to have preceded Luther in developing the idea of "justification by faith," and jointly with Luther he was excommunicated from the Catholic Church by the papal bull of 1520. For a time he was very influential in the Lutheran movement at Wittenberg, but by 1525 his views had become much more radical than Luther's and he was compelled to flee for his life from Lutheran Saxony. He resided temporarily with Anabaptists in the Netherlands and eventually found refuge with Zwingli in Switzerland, where he spent his last years as professor in the university of Basel. Carlstadt was the first of the reformers

Carlstadt

to write against celibacy as unscriptural and the first to take a wife—an example soon followed by Luther and others. He assailed, likewise as unscriptural, the Mass, confession, religious pictures and images, and all manner of traditional Christian practices. He fulminated against what he termed the compromising policy of Luther. He denied the necessity for any sacrament and for any special class of clergymen. At the same time he was something of a biblical critic, maintaining that some parts of the Scriptures were more reliable than other parts.

Another type was Robert Browne (1550–1633), an Englishman and a graduate of the university of Cambridge. He was licensed to preach as a clergyman of the Anglican Church, but, being dissatisfied with the organization and compromising spirit of Anglicanism, he formed a “congregation” of his personal disciples, under a “covenant” which refused “all godlie communion with wicked persons.” In a volume which he published in 1582,¹ Browne contended that Christianity should be organized, not under pope or bishops or priests or secular princes, but in separate and independent congregations of lay Christians, who must be both believers and saints. Each such congregation should democratically draw up (independent of other congregations and of the state) a covenant, or rule, governing the faith and discipline of its members, and should freely choose its own pastor and other officers. Browne was repeatedly jailed on complaint of Anglican clergymen, and in his later life he grew more conservative and conformed, at least outwardly, to Anglicanism. But he had already contributed greatly to the rise of the English radical sects known variously as Independents, Separatists, or Congregationalists, as well as to the Puritan movement within the Anglican Church.

Congregationalism was an ecclesiastical polity which appealed particularly to groups of Radical Protestants, and there was a marked tendency for Anabaptists (who in time were designated more simply as Baptists) and other Evangelical sects to adopt Congregationalism. It was a church organization sufficiently loose to admit of many varieties of religious experience and actually

¹ Including his previously written *Treatise of Reformation without Tarying for Anie and Booke which sheweth the Life and Manners of all True Christians.*

to foster the multiplication of sects. In other words, it was peculiarly in harmony with the anarchistic character of Radical Protestantism.

Not all Radical Protestants of the sixteenth century were "evangelical" as we have defined this word above. Some, in fact, were highly suspicious of mysticism in religion and were quite devoted to reason. These, in reading and interpreting the Bible, sought to divest it of miraculous elements and to establish a pure Christianity which should be reasonable. The result was the emergence of Unitarian sects which denied the divinity of Christ and the doctrine of the Trinity and thereby departed most radically from the teachings not only of the Catholic Church but of all other Protestant bodies.

Rationalism and Unitarianism

A celebrated Unitarian of the sixteenth century was a Spaniard, Miguel Serveto (1511-1553), commonly designated by his latinized name of Servetus. Servetus came of a middle-class family of lawyers, and, being of most curious turn of mind, he rambled for many years among several universities and a wide variety of studies, taking courses in law at Toulouse, in medicine at Paris and Montpellier, and in theology at Louvain. For a while he lectured at Paris on geometry and astronomy, endorsing the Copernican system and at the same time apologizing for astrology. For a while he practiced medicine at Avignon, and during the last twelve years of his life he was physician to the Catholic archbishop of Vienne (in southern France). In public Servetus conformed to the Catholic Church but privately he accepted the Bible as the sole guide to Christian faith and wrote out a theological treatise in defense of most Anabaptist principles though in denunciation of the generally accepted ideas of the Trinity and Christ's divinity. In a zealous attempt to convert the foremost Protestant leader of the time to his own views, Servetus corresponded with John Calvin and sent him the manuscript of the Unitarian treatise. Despite the fact that Calvin was immensely shocked and let Servetus know that he was shocked, the Unitarian physician, upon the discovery of his radical heresy by the Catholic authorities at Vienne in 1553, fled to Geneva and threw himself on the protection of Calvin. Calvin promptly had him tried for heresy and burned at the stake.

Servetus

Of more enduring significance for the development of Unitari-

anism were two members of an Italian family of merchants, bankers, and lawyers, by the name of Sozzini. The elder, Lelio Sozzini (1525-1562), was trained as a lawyer, but, being a man of means and of religious and intellectual curiosity, he spent most of his life in travel and the pursuit of theological speculation. He sojourned for a time at Wittenberg, learning from Melancthon the Lutheran teachings. Passing on to Geneva, he entered into friendly relations with Calvin and espoused Calvinism. Then, when the fate of Servetus drew his attention to doubts about the Trinity, he adopted Unitarian views, which he proceeded to spread in Germany and Switzerland. Lelio's "mission" was continued by his more famous and influential nephew, Fausto (1539-1604), who is usually cited by his latinized name of Socinus, and whose principles are generally termed "Socinian." Fausto Sozzini at first followed a mercantile career, doing business for himself at Lyons (in France) and for a princess of the Medici family at Florence (in Italy), and outwardly conforming to Catholic Christianity. Gradually, however, he came to disbelieve in the divinity of Christ and in personal immortality, and in 1575 he departed finally from Italy and broke formally with the Catholic Church. After a sojourn at Basel, then a centre of theological debates, he took up his residence in Poland, under the patronage of an Italian physician at the royal court. He wrote and preached a good deal, and it was in large part through his efforts that Unitarian sects sprang up and flourished in Poland and also in Hungary.¹ Fausto Sozzini was not as impulsive as his uncle Lelio. He put more rationalist interpretations on the Bible, and was one of the eminent forerunners of the modern "higher critics" of Christianity.²

¹ Unitarianism had first been preached in eastern Hungary (Transylvania) by Francis David (1510-1579), who was successively a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, and a Unitarian. David finally condemned all worship of Christ and died in prison. Sozzini undertook a mission to Hungary to moderate the views and influence of David, for Sozzini thought that Unitarianism did not preclude the paying of special honor and even "worship" to Christ. On the Socinian basis, a Unitarian Church, under "bishops," has had a continuous existence in Transylvania from the sixteenth century to the present day.

² Another forerunner of "liberal," if not critical, modern Protestantism was Jacob Hermansen (1560-1609), a Netherlander, commonly known by his latinized name of Arminius. He protested against the tendency of his fellow Calvinists to stress abstract dogma and argued against Calvin's doctrine of strict predestination. His disciples were persecuted and for a time banished by the severely Calvinist government of the Dutch Netherlands. but gradually Arminian prin-

Radical Protestantism, whether of the emotional Evangelical kind or of the rationalist Unitarian sort, was relatively insignificant in the sixteenth century. Its devotees were mainly of the lower classes, and it was vehemently denounced and bitterly persecuted not only by Catholics but by the major groups of Protestants—Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anglicans. Subsequently, however, the principles of Radical Protestantism exerted very real and growing influence on Protestantism as a whole. They seemed to an ever increasing number of Protestants the logical and natural outcome of the right of private judgment preached by Luther and of the dependence on Scriptural literalness emphasized by Calvin. On the one hand, Evangelical principles in time cleft Calvinism asunder, gave rise to Pietism among Lutherans and to Puritanism and Methodism among Anglicans, and provided the bases for the modern popularity of "Fundamentalism" among a great variety of sects—Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, etc. On the other hand, Unitarian principles in time contributed to the development of Deism and a critical attitude toward religious authority, including that of the Bible, and paved the way for the "Liberal Christianity" which is nowadays widespread among all Protestant bodies and which is very far removed from the dogmatic and miraculous Christianity advocated by most sixteenth-century reformers, whether Catholic or Protestant.

Later Importance of Radical Protestantism

3. REFORM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

We have now traced the Protestant revolt of the sixteenth century against the Catholic Church, and have seen how the three major forms of Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism, together with a bewildering variety of small radical sects, appeared on the scene and divided among themselves almost half of the traditionally Catholic nations of Europe. The story of how, during that critical century, the other half retained their loyalty to the Catholic Church virtually as it had existed throughout the middle ages, remains to be told. The preservation of the papal monarchy and Catholic doctrine in a large part of Europe was due alike to religious and to political circumstances.

ciplcs became influential in Holland, England, and elsewhere, among Calvinists as among Radical Protestants.

It must not be supposed that pious critics of ecclesiastical abuses were confined to Protestants. There were many persons

**Demand
for Re-
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who demanded sweeping reforms in discipline and a return of the clergy to a simple apostolic life, and yet who believed that whatever change was desirable could best be achieved by means of a reformation within the Catholic Church,—that is, without disturbing the unity of its organization or denying the validity of its dogmas. Even in countries which subsequently became Protestant, some of the foremost scholars of the period desired a moral reformation within Catholicism rather than a dogmatic rebellion against it.¹

Thus, while the religious energy of part of Europe went into the revolutionary creation of Protestant churches and sects, that of another part fashioned a reformation of the Catholic system. And this Catholic reformation, on its religious side, was brought to a successful issue by means of the improved condition in the papal court, the labors of a great church council, and the activity of new monastic orders. A few words must be said about each of these religious elements in the Catholic reformation.

Emphasis has been put on the corruption that prevailed in papal affairs in the fifteenth century, and of the Italian and family interests which obscured to the Medici pope, Leo X (1513-1521), the importance of the Lutheran movement in Germany. And Leo's nephew, who became Clement VII (1523-1534), continued to act too much as an Italian prince and too little as the moral and religious leader of Catholicism in the contest which under him was joined with Zwinglians and Anglicans as well as with

**Reforming
Popes**

Lutherans. But under Paul III (1534-1549) was inaugurated the policy of appointing to high church offices men renowned for their virtue and learning rather than for family position or financial profit. This policy was maintained by a series of upright and far-sighted popes during the second half of the sixteenth century,² so that by the year 1600 a remarkable reformation had gradually been wrought in the papacy, among the cardinals, down through the prelates, even to the parish priests and monks.

¹ See above, p. 110.

² Especially Paul IV (1555-1559), a strict disciplinarian; Pius IV (1559-1565), the uncle of St. Charles Borromeo; Pius V (1566-1572), who was canonized as a saint; Gregory XIII (1572-1585), and Sixtus V (1585-1590).

The reforming zeal of individual popes was stimulated and re-enforced by the work of the council of Trent (1545-1563). The idea of effecting a "reformation in head and members" by means of a general council of the Catholic Church had been invoked several times during the century that preceded the Protestant Revolt, but, before Luther, little had been accomplished in that way.

The
Council of
Trent

With the widening of the breach between Protestantism and the medieval church, what had formerly been desirable now became imperative. It seemed to pious Catholics that every effort should be made to reconcile differences and to restore the unity of the church. It was argued that the errors of the manifold new theologies might be refuted by a clear statement of Catholic doctrine, and a reformation of discipline and morals would deprive the innovators of one of their most telling weapons against the church.

It was no easy task, in that troublous time, to hold an ecumenical council. There was mutual distrust between Catholics and Protestants. There was uncertainty as to the relative powers and prerogatives of council and pope. There were bitter national rivalries, especially between Italians and Germans. There was actual warfare between the chief Catholic ruling families—the Habsburgs of Germany and Spain and the royal house of France.

Yet despite these difficulties, which long postponed its convocation and repeatedly interrupted its labors, the council of Trent¹ consummated a great reform in the church and contributed materially to the preservation of the Catholic faith. The Protestants, whom the pope invited to participate, absented themselves; yet such was the number and renown of the Catholic bishops who responded to the summons that the council of Trent easily ranked with the eighteen ecumenical councils which had preceded it.² The work of the council was twofold—dogmatic and reformatory.

Dogmatically, the fathers at Trent offered no compromise to the Protestants. They confirmed with inexorable frankness the main points in Catholic theology which had been worked out in

¹ Trent, in the Tyrol, was selected largely by reason of its geographical location, being situated on the boundary between the German-speaking and Italian-speaking peoples.

² Its decrees were signed at its close (1563) by 4 cardinal legates, 2 cardinals, 3 patriarchs, 25 archbishops, 167 bishops, 7 abbots, 7 generals of orders, and 19 proxies for 33 absent prelates.

the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas and which before the appearance of Protestantism had been received everywhere in central and western Europe. They declared that historic tradition as well as the Bible was to be taken as the basis of the Christian religion, and that the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures belonged exclusively to the church. The Protestant teachings about grace and justification by faith were condemned, and the seven sacraments were pronounced indispensable. The miraculous and sacrificial character of the Lord's Supper (Mass) was reaffirmed. Belief in the invocation of saints, in the veneration of images and of relics, in purgatory and indulgences was explicitly stated, but precautions were taken to clear some of the doctrines of pernicious practices which at times had been connected with them. The spiritual authority of the Roman See was confirmed over all Catholicism; the pope was recognized as supreme interpreter of the canons and incontestable chief of bishops.

A volume of disciplinary statutes constituted the second achievement of the council of Trent. The sale of church offices was forbidden. Bishops and other prelates were ordered to reside in their respective dioceses, abandon worldly pursuits, and give themselves entirely to spiritual labors. Seminaries were to be established for the proper education and training of priests. While Latin was retained as the official and liturgical language, frequent sermons were to be preached in the vernacular. Indulgences were not to be issued for money, and no charge should be made for conferring the sacraments.

The seed sown by the council bore abundant fruit during several succeeding pontificates. The central government was completely reorganized. A uniform catechism was prepared at Rome, and by means of it laymen were systematically instructed in the tenets and obligations of their religion. Revisions were made in the service books of the church, and a new standard edition of the Latin Bible, the Vulgate, was issued. A list, called the Index, was prepared of dangerous and heretical books, Index and which good Catholics were prohibited from reading. Inquisi- By these methods, discipline was in fact confirmed, tion morals purified, and the scandal of the immense riches and the worldly life of the clergy restrained. From an unusually strict law of faith and conduct, lapses were to be punishable by the medieval ecclesiastical court of the Inquisition,

which now zealously redoubled its activity, especially in Italy and in Spain.

A very important factor in the Catholic revival, not only in preserving all southern Europe to the church but also in preventing a complete triumph of Protestantism in the North, was the formation of several new religious orders, which sought to deepen the spiritual life of the people and to buttress the position of the church. The most celebrated of these orders, both for its labors in the sixteenth century and for its subsequent history, is the Society of Jesus, whose members are known commonly as Jesuits. The society was founded by Ignatius Loyola in 1534 and its constitution was formally approved by the pope six years later.¹

In his earlier years, Ignatius (1491-1556) followed the profession of arms and as a patriotic Spaniard fought valiantly in the armies of the Emperor Charles V against the French. But while he was in a hospital, suffering from a wound, he chanced to read a life of Christ and biographies of several saints, which, he tells us, worked a great change within him. From being a soldier of an earthly king, he would now become a knight of Christ and of the church. Instead of fighting for the glory of Spain and of himself, he would strive for the greater glory of God. Thus in the very year in which the German monk, Martin Luther, became the avowed and leading adversary of the Catholic Church, this Spanish soldier was starting on that remarkable career which was to make him Catholicism's chief champion.

Ignatius
Loyola

After a few years' trial of his new life and several rather footless efforts to serve the church, Ignatius determined, at the age of thirty-three, to perfect his scanty education. It was while he was studying the classics, philosophy, and theology at the university of Paris that he made the acquaintance of the group of scholarly and pious men who became the first members of the Society of Jesus. Intended at first primarily for missionary labors among the Moslems, the order was speedily turned to other ends.

The organization of the Jesuits showed the military instincts of their founder. To the three usual vows of poverty, chastity,

¹ Another new order was that of the Oratory, founded in 1575 by St Philip Neri. See above, p. 118.

and obedience, was added a fourth vow of special allegiance to the pope. The members were to be carefully trained during a long novitiate and were to be under the personal direction of a general, resident in Rome. Authority and obedience were stressed by the society. Then, too, St. Ignatius Loyola understood that the church was now confronted with conditions of war rather than of peace: accordingly he directed that his brothers should not content themselves with prayer and works of peace, with charity and local benevolence, but should adapt themselves to new circumstances and should strive in a multiplicity of ways to restore all things in the Catholic Church.

Thus it happened that the Jesuits, from the very year of their establishment, rushed to the front in the religious upheaval and conflict of the sixteenth century. In the first place, they sought to enlighten and educate the young. As schoolmasters they had no equals in Europe for many years. No less a scholar and scientist than Francis Bacon said of the Jesuit teaching that "nothing better has been put in practice." Again, by their wide learning and culture, no less than by the unimpeachable purity of their lives, they won back a considerable respect for the Catholic clergy. As preachers, too, they earned a high esteem by the clearness and simplicity of their sermons and instruction.

It was in the mission field, however, that the Jesuits achieved their most considerable results. They were mainly responsible for the recovery of Poland after that country had been seemingly lost to Calvinism and Unitarianism. They similarly conserved the Catholic faith in Bavaria and in the southern Netherlands. They aided considerably in maintaining Catholicism in Ireland. At the hourly risk of their lives, they ministered to their fellow Catholics in England under Elizabeth. In the midst of the greatest dangers and privations, they conducted missions among the teeming millions in India and China, among the Huron and Iroquois tribes of North America, and among the aborigines of Brazil and Paraguay. No means of influence, no source of power, was neglected that would win men to religion and to the authority of the bishop of Rome. Politics and agriculture were utilized, and likewise literature and science. The Jesuits were ~~confessors~~ of kings in Europe and apostles of the faith in Asia and America.

It has been pointed out already that the rapid diffusion of Protestantism was due to economic and political causes as well as to those narrowly religious. It may be said with equal truth that political and economic causes co-operated with the religious developments that we have just noted to maintain the supremacy of the Catholic Church in at least half the countries over which she had exercised her sway in 1500. For one thing, it is doubtful whether financial abuses had flourished as long or as vigorously in some countries as in others. For another, the political conditions in some states were more favorable than in others.

Maintenance of Catholic Supremacy in Certain Countries

In Italy was the pope's residence and see. He had bestowed many favors on important Italian families. He had often exploited foreign countries in behalf of Italian patronage. He had taken advantage of the political disunity of the peninsula to divide his local enemies and thereby to assure the victory of his own cause. Two popes of the sixteenth century belonged to the powerful Florentine family of the Medici; Florence remained loyal. The hearty support of the Emperor Charles V preserved the orthodoxy of Naples, and that of Philip II stamped out heresy in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

In Italy

In France, the concordat of 1516 between pope and king had peacefully secured for the French monarch appointment of bishops and control of benefices within his country. powers which the German princes and the English sovereigns secured by revolutionary change. Moreover, French Protestantism, by its political activities in behalf of effective checks upon the royal power, drove the king into Catholic arms. The cause of absolutism in France became the cause of Catholicism, and the latter was bound up with French patriotism to quite the same extent as English patriotism became linked with the fortunes of Anglicanism.

In France

In Spain and Portugal, the monarchs obtained concessions from the pope like those accorded the French sovereigns. They gained a large measure of power over the Catholic Church within their countries and found it a most valuable ally in forwarding their absolutist tendencies. Moreover, the centuries-long struggle with Islam had endeared Catholic Christianity alike to Spaniards and to Portuguese and

In Spain and Portugal

rendered it an integral part of their national life. Spain and Portugal now remained fiercely Catholic.



Somewhat similar was the case of Austria. Terrifying fear of the advancing Moslem Turk, joined with the political exigencies of the Habsburg rulers, threw that duchy with most of its dependencies into the hands of the pope. If the bishop of Rome, by favoring the Habsburgs, had lost England, he had at least saved Austria and most of central Europe.

Ireland and Poland—those two extreme outposts of Catholic Christendom—in course of time found in the Catholic faith a most effectual safeguard of nationality, a most valuable weapon against aggression or assimilation by powerful neighbors.

4. THE THREE GREAT DIVISIONS OF CHRISTENDOM AT THE CLOSE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Long before the sixteenth century Christendom had been divided into two unequal parts, the smaller adhering to the Orthodox Church and comprising eastern Europe—Greece, the Balkan peninsula, Rumania, and Russia,—and the larger part embracing central and western Europe and professing allegiance to the Catholic Church. In the course of the sixteenth century, as a result of the religious and ecclesiastical upheaval which we have been describing in the present chapter, the Catholic part of Christendom was sundered by the rise of Protestantism. By the close of the century, there were three, instead of two, great divisions of Christendom: Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant.

To Catholic Christendom now remained Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, the southern Netherlands, the forest cantons of Switzerland, southern Germany (including the Rhineland, Bavaria, and Austria), Ireland, Poland, Lithuania, Bohemia, northern Yugoslavia (Croatia), most of Hungary, and recent overseas conquests in the West Indies, South and Central America, Mexico, and the Philippine Islands. With Protestant Christendom were now ranged northern and central Germany, Scandinavia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, the northern Netherlands, most of Switzerland, Scotland, and England. In some of the areas of central and western Europe there



was a good deal of overlapping. Protestant minorities existed in France, Ireland, the Rhineland, Bohemia, and Hungary. Catholic minorities survived in Great Britain, the northern Netherlands, and the states along the eastern shore of the Baltic. In general, however, it was northern Europe which constituted Protestant Christendom, while it was southern Europe which remained within the orbit of Catholic Christendom.

Catholic and Orthodox Christendoms had each been cultural units for a very long time, enshrining for centuries, under Christian auspices, the respective heritages of ancient Rome and ancient Greece. And in their interpretation of Christianity they had always had very much in common. Both accepted the basic idea of an authoritative ecclesiastical organization, consisting of a divinely ordained clergy of bishops, priests, and deacons, interpreting the Bible and tradition, dispensing the seven sacraments, effecting the miracle of transubstantiation, adoring the Trinity, believing in the divinity of Christ, honoring saints, venerating relics, and employing elaborate rituals. There were minor differences of usage and theology between Catholic and Orthodox but the really significant contrasts were two: the Orthodox denied the Catholic faith in the divine right of the pope to govern the whole Christian Church; and the Catholic Church reprobated the dependence of the Orthodox upon secular governments.

Developments within Orthodox Christendom At the very time when the Catholic Church was losing its hold on northern Europe, the Orthodox Church of eastern Europe was experiencing a grave crisis and an internal readjustment. For centuries the Orthodox Church had centred in the patriarch of Constantinople and had been mainly an ecclesiastical adjunct to the Byzantine (Greek) Empire. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, with the capture of Constantinople by the Moslem Turks and with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the local patriarch became a political agent of the sultan, as well as the official representative of the sultan's Christian subjects.¹ One of the results was a loss of prestige to the patriarch of Constantinople at home and a demand on the part of Orthodox Christians outside of the Ottoman Empire for ecclesiastical independence. After much debate and insistence, the Russian emperor obtained the consent

¹ See above, pp. 15-16.

of the patriarch to a reorganization of the Orthodox Church in Russia, and in 1582 Moscow became the seat of an independent Russian patriarchate. Thenceforth, the Orthodox Church, while remaining doctrinally one, was divided administratively into the two national churches of Russians and Greeks, under the patriarchs of Moscow and Constantinople respectively, the former dominated by the Russian emperor and the latter by the Turkish sultan. Into Orthodox Christendom Protestantism did not penetrate.

The religious divergence between Catholic and Protestant was much greater than between Catholic and Orthodox, for Protestantism was essentially a revolt against the central idea of the church as held by Catholic and Orthodox alike. Yet at the close of the sixteenth century all three great divisions of Christendom still held to a large part of common Christianity. They could still be viewed as a unit when contrasted in social customs and institutions with the cultural areas of Islam and Buddhism. All Christians still revered Jesus as their common founder and inspirer. All magnified the Bible and cherished the memory of early apostles and martyrs. Moreover, the vast majority of Protestants retained a large part of the theology of the Catholic and Orthodox churches, including the dogmas of the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus, the fall of man and his redemption through the sacrifice of the cross, and the future life of rewards and punishments. Traditional Christian moralities and virtues continued to be preached by Protestants, as by Orthodox and Catholics.

Diver-
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between
Catholic
and
Protestant

Protestants as a whole were in agreement with the Orthodox against the Catholics on one doctrinal point, and that was the denial of the claims of the bishop of Rome and the consequent rejection of the papal government and authority. But on two fundamental points Protestants were as far removed from Orthodox as from Catholic Christians. (1) In their anxiety to purify Christianity and to restore it to its primitive character, they repudiated tradition and with it certain doctrines and practices which had gradually grown up, such as those connected with purgatory, indulgences, invocation of saints, veneration of relics, etc., and they introduced various changes in the traditional sacraments. (2) They made the Bible the supreme and sole authority for Christianity and

Diver-
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proclaimed the right and ability of each person to derive from the Bible, without help of church or clergyman, the means of salvation. Thus to the Protestant, at least theoretically, authority resided in the infallibility of every individual, while to Catholic and Orthodox it rested with an infallible institution or church.

Relatively few Protestants of the sixteenth century grasped the full significance of their theory of authority. They preached it and their leaders frequently invoked it in their own behalf, but not many of them could willingly resign themselves to the thought of allowing as many interpretations of the Christian religion as there were individual Christians. To most of them it seemed as though all good Christians must find, under divine guidance, the same truth in the same Bible and that therefore their principle of individual infallibility would produce a single kind of reformed and pure Christianity. Luther was sure that he read his Bible diligently and piously and that his form of Protestantism must therefore be the true religion. But Calvin was quite as sure that he read his Bible with the utmost piety and diligence and that consequently his type of Protestantism must be devoid of error. Henry VIII seemed to regard himself as infallible, and a like attitude was apparent in many of the sectarians whom he or Calvin or Luther banned or put to death.

In the circumstances, though not intentionally, Protestantism was no such unit of faith and conduct as Catholicism or Orthodoxy. Despite conferences and debates among Protestant theologians and the employment of compulsion on the part of Protestant kings and princes, it was obvious before the close of the sixteenth century that not only was Protestant Christendom divided into three major parts, but that each part was tending toward ever increasing subdivision and that all parts were being increasingly influenced by radical sects. The three major parts, as we have seen, were: (1) Lutheranism, dominant in the central and northern principalities of Germany and in the states of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Estonia; (2) Calvinism, supplying, under various names, common models of faith and organization to state churches of the northern Netherlands, Switzerland, and Scotland, and to minority groups in southern Germany, Hungary, France, and England; (3) Anglicanism, established as the

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state religion of England, with minority followings in Scotland and Ireland. In addition, Radical Protestantism permeated all Protestant Christendom, from Poland and Transylvania in the east to Great Britain in the west, comprising such minor sects as Baptists, Congregationalists, and Unitarians.

The principal respects in which Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans, and Radicals differed from one another may be briefly summarized under five headings:

1) *Method of Salvation.* The Lutherans held that every man may be saved by faith in Christ; the Calvinists, that only such persons can be saved as are predestined, or "elected," by God to be saved. The Anglicans appeared to accept the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith, although their official creed—the Thirty-Nine Articles—was sufficiently ambiguous to admit of a Calvinist interpretation. Most of the Radicals maintained that man is saved by an emotional experience, "conviction of sin" and "conversion," though some of the extreme Unitarians seemed doubtful of any eternal salvation for the individual and suggested that if there were such a thing it could be attained to only by the exercise of reason.

(2) *Sacraments.* Calvinists recognized only two sacraments—baptism and the Lord's Supper (eucharist). Lutherans and Anglicans retained, in addition to these two sacraments, the rite of confirmation, and Anglicans devised a special rite of holy orders. The official declaration of Anglicanism that there are "two major sacraments" made it possible for some Anglicans—the later so-called high-church party—to honor the seven sacraments of the Catholic and Orthodox churches. On the other hand, Radical Protestants as a rule rejected the whole sacramental system; they observed baptism and the Lord's Supper, but only as symbolic rites and usually only for adults.

(3) *Substitutes for Transubstantiation.* Almost all Protestants repudiated the traditionally miraculous nature of the eucharist, the doctrine of Catholics and Orthodox that by the word of the priest the bread and wine are actually changed into the Body and Blood of Christ. But they differed about substitutes. The Lutherans maintained what they called a "real presence," that Christ is *with* and *in* the bread and wine, as fire is in a hot iron, to borrow the metaphor of Luther himself. The Calvinists and all the Radical sects, on the other hand, perceived in the eucharist,

not the continuing mystical sacrifice of Christ, but a simple commemoration of the Last Supper; to them the bread and wine were mere symbols of the Body and Blood. As for the Anglicans, their position in this matter as in so many others was ambiguous; their official confession of faith declared at once that the Supper is the partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ and that the communicant receives Christ only spiritually. The mass of Anglicans undoubtedly inclined to the Calvinist and Radical interpretation, though some of the later high-church party leaned toward the Catholic explanation.

(4) *Ecclesiastical Organization.* All Protestants considerably modified the Catholic (and Orthodox) system of a divinely ordained clergy of bishops, priests, and deacons, distinct from the laity, and entrusted with the government of the church, the administration of the sacraments, and the preaching of moral and dogmatic theology. The Anglicans retained the orders of bishop, priest, and deacon and claimed that their hierarchy was continuous, through "apostolic succession," with the medieval and ancient Catholic Church. But for at least a hundred years from the time of Queen Elizabeth all Anglican priests were preachers rather than "sacramental" priests in the earlier Catholic sense, and from the beginning of Anglicanism the laity, as represented in the English parliament, were even more responsible than the clergy for determining the faith and government of the church. The Lutherans denounced the traditional distinction between clergy and laity, denied the importance of apostolic succession, and treated the office of bishop as a merely human convenience in ecclesiastical administration.¹ The Calvinists did away with bishops altogether and kept only one order of clergymen—the presbyters (or priests)—who, by means of local and periodic assemblies (or synods) were to govern the church. Most of the Radicals adopted a congregational form of church government, vesting supreme authority in the democratic decisions of a body of laymen and making the "pastor" or "preacher" or "elder" an employee of the congregation.²

¹ The office of archbishop was retained by both Anglicans and Lutherans. For example, the archbishop of Canterbury became primate of the Anglican Church, and the archbishop of Upsala became primate of the Lutheran Church in Sweden. These Protestant ecclesiastics were agents of their respective national monarchs quite as much as of their respective churches.

² The title of bishop was retained by the Unitarian Church in Hungary.

(5) *Ceremonies.* The Anglicans kept a good deal of Catholic ritual, although in the form of translation from Latin to English. Calvinists and Radicals, on the other hand, worshipped with extreme simplicity; their cult usually comprised extemporaneous prayer, Bible-reading, hymn-singing, and sermon-preaching in church buildings that were rigorously bared of superfluous ornaments. Between Anglican formalism and Calvinist austerity, the Lutherans steered a middle course; they devised no uniform liturgy, but tended to employ various forms and ceremonies.

It must be fully apparent that the unity of religious faith which had long obtained in central and western Europe was broken in the sixteenth century, not only between Protestants and Catholics, but among Protestants. A third great division of Christianity had now emerged, where formerly only the divisions of Catholic and Orthodox had existed, and this new third division, from its very nature and essence, already promised to disintegrate into innumerable sects and to substitute individualist for collective Christianity. This was one of the impressive results of the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century.

Individualist
Christianity

5. INTER-CHRISTIAN INTOLERANCE AND WAR

Another, and most distressing, result of the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century was a great access of religious intolerance. Just prior to the upheaval, almost all inhabitants of central and western Europe were Catholic Christians, living in religious peace with one another. Immediately after the upheaval, there were still Catholic Christians but there were also Lutheran Christians and Anglican Christians and Calvinist Christians and numerous little sects such as Mennonites, Baptists, and Unitarians, quarrelling and fighting with each other and either persecuting or being persecuted.

Intolerance, of course, was no novelty in the sixteenth century. It was undoubtedly as old as the human race, and it had been pretty constantly displayed throughout all human history by clan, nation, and empire, by prince and populace, and by every kind of religion from ancient Judaism to medieval Islam. Christianity in its early days had appeared to be an exception to the general rule: it was founded by a victim of religious intolerance, and it spread

Earlier
Religious
Intolerance

for three centuries without any use of force on its part and in the face of bitter persecution on the part of the pagan government of the Roman Empire.

Subsequently, when Christianity became the state religion of the *Roman Empire*, a change occurred. A Christian emperor of the fourth century excluded heretics from civil office and threatened them with fines, confiscation of property, banishment, and even death. In the year 385 seven heretics were put to death by Christian officials at Trier. Gradually, prelates of the Catholic Church acquiesced in and then applauded and finally abetted the revival of intolerance throughout Christendom.

In theory, at least, the intolerance of the Catholic Church in the middle ages was not extended to non-Christians or to members of the Orthodox Church. The latter, though accounted schismatics, were deemed good enough Christians to merit full liberty, and a great medieval pope condemned in no uncertain terms the Catholic crusaders who captured Constantinople and slew Orthodox Christians. The popes, moreover, repeatedly forbade Catholics to attempt the forceful conversion of Moslems, Jews, or other non-Christians; conversion to Christianity was to be preached but not compelled, and no pagan, infidel, or Jew was to be punished for refusing to accept Christianity.

There was great popular prejudice on the part of medieval Christians against Moslems, as there was on the part of Moslems against Christians, but while armed Moslems invaded Christendom and armed Christians engaged in crusades against Islam in the Holy Land and in Spain, leaders of the hostile religions usually treated each other with mutual courtesy and respect. In Spain, during the middle ages, there was much friendly intercourse, as well as some political fighting, between Moslems and Catholics.

There was also great popular prejudice on the part of medieval Christians against Jews, and the Jews, unlike the Mos-

Christian lems, were too few and too scattered to undertake
Prejudice any serious counter-offensive against Christendom.
against

Jews Jews were formally tolerated by the Catholic Church
and were expressly exempt from its courts and dis-

cipline; they were permitted to have their own synagogues and rabbis and to practice their religion. But the widespread prejudice against them was manifested in intolerant actions of lay

governments and lower-class mobs, in which clergymen sometimes participated. Jews were ordinarily obliged to live in a certain part of a town (the ghetto) and to wear a distinctive badge. While they were encouraged to serve as traders and bankers, most other occupations were closed to them. Often they suffered from mob violence. And occasionally a king would banish Jews from his realm; they had thus been banished from England in 1290 and from France in 1306.

However, it was not against Jews or pagans or schismatics that the Catholic Church directed intolerance; it was against its own baptized members who preached doctrines or practices incompatible with its creed and organization and who were termed heretics. Heretics were viewed as peculiarly depraved persons, and as singularly dangerous, because they might lead others into error. Heresy, indeed, was regarded as the worst kind of pestilential disease, ruining souls rather than bodies, and therefore amply warranting every effort to quarantine and stamp it out. Besides, heresy in religion was often associated with opposition to the economic system or to existing government, and its suppression was frequently demanded for political or economic reasons. It was easily confused with treason and anarchism and social revolution.

Persecution of Heretics

In the thirteenth century the Catholic Church had established a special court, the ecclesiastical court of the "Holy Office," commonly called the Inquisition, to ferret out heresy and to try heretics. Its members were monks appointed by the pope or by a bishop, and, as was usual in other courts of the period, the Inquisition conducted its proceedings in secret and used torture to extort confessions from the accused and evidence from the witnesses. Heretics adjudged guilty were sentenced to fasting and prayer, and sometimes to fines or imprisonment. The church itself formally refused to put anyone, even a heretic, to death, but the Inquisition was allowed and urged to condemn obstinate heretics to be "handed over to the secular arm," that is, to the lay government of the locality. And the lay government was expected to punish such heretics by burning them at the stake. Sometimes, pious or politic kings took it upon themselves, without any support from the papal Inquisition, to suppress heresy by fire and sword.

The Medieval Inquisition

It must now be evident that Christians of the sixteenth century had behind them a long and firmly established tradition of intolerance, especially in respect of heretics. On the other hand, signs were not lacking of a diminution of religious intolerance, or at least of a lessening of the number of capital executions for heresy, in the second half of the fifteenth century and on the eve of the Protestant revolt of the sixteenth century. Perhaps it was because no threatening heresies then appeared. Perhaps it was because the contemporary vogue of classicism and humanism lessened the zeal and mitigated the intolerance of many potentates in church and state. Perhaps it was because Christendom, then for the first time in close contact with a vast variety of dissident religions in the Far East and Far West, was becoming infected with a curious sympathy for dissent. Perhaps it was because some Catholic Christians were seriously questioning medieval practices of the church and were beginning to believe that religious intolerance and persecution were contrary to Christ's teaching and inimical to the welfare of Christian nations.¹

True it was that in Spain Ferdinand and Isabella set up in 1480 a special royal Inquisition which took energetic measures against religious dissenters in the peninsula and which extended its operations to the New World in 1516. True it was, too, that the Jews were expelled *en masse* from Spain in 1492. True it was, also, that a papal bull of 1484 identified witchcraft with heresy and urged that harsh measures be taken against witches. But the so-called "Spanish Inquisition" was intended to secure national unity as much as religious uniformity, and for some time it was frowned upon by the papacy. And when the papal Inquisition, in the sixteenth century, assumed jurisdiction over trials of alleged witches, it tended to interpret the papal condemnation of witchcraft leniently, if not sceptically. Intolerance was still the rule for religion, but there were enough exceptions to the rule at the opening of the sixteenth century to render plausible the hypothesis that, if the humanist rationalism of that time had not been suddenly halted and silenced by religious upheaval and revolution, religious toleration might

¹ Something of this idea was implicit in the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More, and in writings of other humanists of the time.

have made earlier and greater gains in Christendom than was actually the case.

The actual historical fact was, however, that in the excitement of Protestant revolt and Catholic reformation Christendom witnessed an outburst of religious intolerance and cruelty such as the world never before or since beheld.

Outburst
of Intol-
erance in
the Six-
teenth
Century

It was no time, in the midst of the great religious upheaval of the sixteenth century, for humanists to counsel compromise or for anyone to assume an attitude of indifference to religion. Catholic leaders felt that they were defending traditional Christian civilization against anarchical forces of rebellion and greed. Protestant leaders felt quite as sincerely that they were restoring the pure Gospel and safeguarding it against despotism, superstition, and corruption. To the former, Luther and Calvin and all the so-called "reformers" were possessed of devils; to the latter, the pope was the beast, the "anti-Christ." From Sweden to Italy and from England to Hungary, men grew passionate about religion, and invective became fashionable in speech and writing.

The bitterness of debate about matters of faith was rendered more bitter by the attendant scramble of ambitious, capitalistically minded ecclesiastics, lay lords, burghers, and princes to profit financially from the upheaval. Seemingly the only thing on which Catholic and Protestant leaders could agree was the necessity of restraining the peasants and artisans, among whom there was considerable response, as we have already seen, to the riotous incitement of radical preachers.

Economic
and
Political
Aspects of
Religious
Intoler-
ance

Kings and princes, intent at this time upon creating national states and strengthening monarchical authority, could hardly view with equanimity the existence of bitterly quarrelsome religious factions and divisions among their subjects, some of whom were only too willing to put loyalty to pope or Bible before loyalty to temporal sovereign. It was but natural, therefore, that the rulers of every state in central and western Europe, whether they were Catholic or Protestant, should seek to give full force to the old idea that political unity depended largely upon religious unity and that consequently each state should employ its power and influence to oblige all its Christian citizens to conform to one official kind of Christianity. Naturally, too,

Catholics applauded the king who forced his subjects to be Catholic, and Protestants praised the prince who compelled his subjects to be Protestant. In the one case he was represented as the bulwark of civilization; in the other, as the palladium of liberty and progress. All of which was highly favorable to religious (and national) bigotry.

From the time when Leo X appreciated the gravity of the Lutheran movement, he and succeeding popes of the sixteenth century banned Protestants right and left and begged secular rulers to suppress heresy by every means within their power. The more upright a pope was in private life, the more intolerant he was of public dissent. The reforming council of Trent organized a systematic censorship of heretical and anti-Catholic books, quickened the Inquisition into vigorous activity against heretics and persons suspected of heresy, and called solemnly upon all Catholic princes to enforce its decrees. On the other hand, Luther not only damned pope and urged secular rulers to use force against Catholics but also cursed Anabaptists and other Radical sects and invoked against them the aid of temporal princes. Nor was Calvin an apostle of religious toleration; he would permit neither Catholic nor dissenting Protestant to reside at Geneva, and the Unitarian Servetus who had the temerity to visit Geneva he burned at the stake.

Monarchs in Spain, Portugal, and Italy remained Catholic, and consequently they sought—with almost complete success—

to keep Protestantism out of their countries. They employed the Inquisition, the Index, spies, police, and army to get rid of religious dissent and make all their subjects conform to a peculiarly rigid type of Catholicism. Comparatively few professed Protestants were actually put to death in these countries, not because of any special tenderness for Protestantism, but because it never obtained any serious foothold in southern Europe. The several thousand victims of the Inquisition in Spain were chiefly persons of Moorish or Hebrew descent who had been converted to Catholicism and were suspected of relapsing into Islam or Judaism, or they were professed Catholics who were thought to be too mystical or too "liberal" or too tolerant. Such a famous Catholic as Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, was twice imprisoned by the Inquisition.

Almost
Universal
Intolerance
of
Catholics
and Prot-
estants

In
Southern
Europe

In the Holy Roman Empire the emperor and a majority of the electors remained Catholic, but many princes became Lutheran and some became Calvinist. Protestant princes persecuted Catholic subjects; Catholic princes persecuted Protestant subjects; and Protestant princes warred with the Catholic emperor. After a bitter struggle, a treaty—the peace of Augsburg—was signed in 1555, as we have seen, between the emperor and the princes, whereby each prince obtained the privilege of being either Lutheran or Catholic as he might desire but also the recognized right to compel all his subjects to conform to the kind of Christianity which he professed. The result was that religious intolerance continued to be the rule within each of the several German states and presently led, in the first half of the seventeenth century, to one of the longest and most destructive civil and international wars in human annals—the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648).

**In the
Holy
Roman
Empire**

In Scandinavia, Finland, and Estonia, the Lutheran kings of Denmark and Sweden destroyed Catholicism and suppressed dissent by banishments, confiscations, and executions.

In Scotland, Catholic clergymen, with the aid of the crown, at first tried to stop the preaching of Protestantism by similar means, but soon Calvinist nobles, urged on by John Knox, were deposing the Catholic queen, Mary Stuart, seizing the government, and killing Catholics. Mary Stuart was imprisoned and subsequently beheaded, for religious and political reasons, on orders of her cousin and rival, the Protestant Queen Elizabeth of England.

**In
Northern
Europe**

In England itself there was similar religious intolerance, with curiously fluctuating objectives. Henry VIII in his effort to establish and maintain a separate, middle-of-the-road Anglican Church, distinguished between Catholics who persevered in acknowledging the claims of the pope and Protestants who repudiated the seven sacraments; the latter he burned, while the former he merely beheaded. Under his sickly son and successor, Edward VI, Catholics were persecuted and Protestants were tolerated. Queen Mary Tudor, in her attempt to restore Catholicism, persecuted and burned Anglicans, Calvinists, and Radical Protestants. Queen Elizabeth, in turn, enacted drastic laws against Catholics and put many of them to death, in theory at least on charges of "treason,"

**In
England**

and at the same time she harassed and imprisoned Baptists, Congregationalists, and other Protestant dissenters from Anglicanism. Later, in the seventeenth century, when Radical Protestants obtained the upper hand for a time in England, they showed themselves not less intolerant of Catholicism and Anglicanism.

France, also, was prey to religious intolerance and war during the greater part of the sixteenth century. King Francis I and his son and grandsons, who succeeded him, adhered to Catholicism, and, though for political reasons they gave aid to Protestant princes in Germany against the Catholic emperor, they were intolerant of Protestantism within France. Despite persecution, however, Protestantism (especially Calvinism) spread in France and gave rise to a series of three-cornered civil wars among a faction of Huguenots who aspired to dominate the realm, a faction of militant Catholics who wished to destroy the Huguenots, and a faction of "political" Catholics who were less interested in the complete triumph of any particular religion than in the preservation of national unity. Sometimes the king cooperated with one faction and sometimes with another; it was while under the temporary influence of the militant Catholic faction that the youthful King Charles IX consented in 1572 to the massacre of St. Bartholomew's day, in which several thousand Huguenots were cruelly butchered. At length, the leader of the Huguenot faction, with the support of the faction of political Catholics, became king as Henry IV and proceeded to consolidate his position by two extraordinary measures: first, he conciliated the French Catholics by abjuring Protestantism and becoming a Catholic himself; second, he conciliated the French Huguenots by granting them a large degree of religious freedom.

This grant, the so-called edict of Nantes (1598), was highly significant in the modern story of the slow painful growth of religious liberty. The edict of Nantes contained the following provisions: (1) private worship and liberty of conscience were allowed to Protestants throughout France; (2) public worship was permitted to Protestants in two hundred enumerated towns and in some three thousand castles; (3) financial support was promised by the government to Protestant schools; (4) the publi-

The Edict of Nantes, an Early Step toward Religious Toleration

cation of Protestants books was legalized; (5) Protestants were accorded full civil and political rights; (6) Protestants might freely assemble and exercise certain judicial functions among themselves; and (7), as a special guaranty that the foregoing privileges would be respected, Protestants were to have complete control of two hundred fortified towns for eight years.

It has sometimes been argued that the principle of religious liberty was one of the outstanding results of the upheaval of the sixteenth century, particularly of the rise of Protestantism. Perhaps it was so, in the long run and incidentally. But almost every sincere Christian at the time of the upheaval, whether he was Catholic or Protestant, was fanatically attached to the maintenance and spread of his own ideas of Christianity and entertained no real devotion to abstract principles of general religious freedom. Henry IV of France showed himself a bad Protestant by becoming a Catholic and a bad Catholic by tolerating Protestants; his zealous Protestant subjects were not satisfied with what they had obtained, and he himself was eventually assassinated by a mad Catholic.

The edict of Nantes was dictated less by deep religious conviction than by pressing political need. After a half-century of civil war in France, Protestants appeared too strong to be exterminated and not strong enough to exterminate Catholics, and it was obvious to a statesman like Henry IV that if France was to survive as a great power, Frenchmen must be restrained from fighting one another about religion.

It was likewise with the first experiments in religious toleration outside of France. They were not made in countries pretty solidly Catholic or Protestant, nor at the behest of leaders of the majority religion, but in countries whose citizens were divided in religion and usually on the initiative of a politic, national monarch. In Poland, King Sigismund II (1548-1572), a Catholic himself who had married a Calvinist princess, pursued a tortuous but on the whole conciliatory course in dealing with religious divisions—Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Unitarian,—with such success that the Polish parliament in the year following his death, while confirming the privileged position of the Catholic Church, granted religious liberty to all non-Catholics. In Hungary, the invading Moslem Turks found it convenient to accord

Steps
toward
Religious
Toleration
outside
France

religious freedom to all kinds of Christians, and in Transylvania a Unitarian prince deemed it safer to tolerate Catholics and Calvinists than to attempt their destruction.

In fact, while the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century was immediately productive of unprecedented intolerance and bloodshed, it served to create a situation which, in the long run, was favorable to religious toleration. In the first place, it was gradually discovered in countries where political considerations dictated some accommodation among rival faiths that the toleration of religious differences was not necessarily destructive of national unity, that a state or a national monarchy might be strengthened, rather than weakened, by extending its protection to religious minorities.

Secondly, sincere Christians themselves, especially if they were of a minority group in a given country, were anxious to secure toleration for themselves and could be counted upon to second the efforts of conciliatory statesmen. In Protestant countries the Catholic minority espoused the principle of religious liberty, while in Catholic countries Protestants were natural advocates of freedom. Gradually, as the number of different churches and sects increased, various kinds of Protestants found it possible (and even desirable) to tolerate each other, particularly in order to present a united front against Catholicism. At length when Protestants had become habituated to the practice of toleration among themselves, they discovered that the heavens would not fall if they extended it to Catholics.

Finally, the terrible intolerances practiced and the deadly wars waged between one and another kind of Christians in the sixteenth century contributed to a later reaction against religious strife, a reaction which found expression at first in pietism and subsequently in rationalism. Pietism, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries affected many pious Protestants and Catholics, tended to push theological differences into the background, to emphasize the peaceful character of Christ's teachings, and to stress rivalry in good works rather than rivalry in intolerance. Rationalism, which reached formidable proportions in the eighteenth century in both Catholic and Protestant countries, questioned the commonly accepted dogmas of all existing churches and turned the attention of many an intellectual from

**Conditions
Eventually Favor-
ing Re-
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Toleration**

the supernatural to the natural, from theology to science, and from church to state. Modern religious liberty, as we shall presently see, owes vastly more to rationalists and pietists than to sixteenth-century Protestants or Catholics.¹

6. OTHER EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS UPHEAVAL

So far, we have discussed two outstanding effects of the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century. One was the creation of a Protestant division of Christendom, differing widely from the earlier ones (Catholic and Orthodox), and tending toward endless subdivision and disintegration. The other effect was the immediate stimulation of religious intolerance and inter-Christian war on an unprecedented scale.

There were other effects, however, of great importance. In the first place, the upheaval gave a marked impetus to a stressing of morals. Not only were many minds turned temporarily from other intellectual pursuits to theological controversy, but the individual Christian, whether Rise of Puritanism Catholic or Protestant, was expected to prove by external conduct that his particular religion inculcated a higher moral standard than any other. Protestant clergymen had to be models of deportment for their flocks, and Catholics looked askance, as never before, at scandalous behavior of bishops and priests. At the same time, it became the fashion of one religious group to charge the other with moral turpitude. Catholics especially assailed Protestantism for denying the sacramental character of marriage, introducing divorce, and dishonoring the Virgin Mary, thereby lowering the position of women and degrading the home. Protestants, in turn, accused Catholicism of fostering the same monstrous ends by prescribing celibacy for the clergy and by shutting women in convents. Lying was thought by many Protestants to be a monopoly of Catholics and financial dishonesty was deemed by many Catholics a specialty of Protestants.

In this environment of moral earnestness and moral recrimination, Puritanism arose and flourished. Puritanism involved tremendous devotion to a singularly straight-laced code of morals and a high degree of intolerance of persons who contravened any provision of such a code, especially of persons who appeared to get enjoyment from "worldly" pleasures. Puritanism appeared

¹ See below, ch. xi, sec. 3.

among Catholics, Lutherans, and Anglicans, but it flourished most luxuriantly among Calvinist and Radical Protestants. It was exemplified in campaigns against blasphemy, bull-fights, dancing, theatrical productions, immoral books, and profanation of the Lord's Day.

Catholics and Protestants alike invoked censorship of the press and the stage, with a view not only to suppressing heresy and dissent but also to expurgating the lewd, the lascivious, and the vicious. It was for this twofold end that Pope Paul IV, with the approval of the council of Trent, issued the first ecclesiastical "Index of Prohibited Books" in 1559. The national monarchs of England, France, and Spain, urged on by their religious advisors, had already established similar state censorships within their respective realms, and by the end of the sixteenth century almost every government in Europe, whether Protestant or Catholic, was permitting the publication of only such books and the production of only such plays as were formally "licensed" by its agents.¹

Against blasphemy Puritan Catholics and Puritan Protestants were alike arrayed. Pope Pius IV authorized in 1564 the establishment of a special society of Catholic men—the Holy Name Society—for the purpose of stamping out the practice of taking God's name in vain; and two years later Philip II of Spain prescribed for "profane swearers" ten years at hard labor in the galleys. As examples of corresponding Protestant fervor against blasphemy may be cited a succession of enactments in England and Scotland against "grievous and abominable oaths." It was the same puritanism which led popes of the century to condemn bull-fighting and caused many Protestant divines to lift up their voices against dancing.

In the observance of holy days, there was marked difference between Catholics and Protestants. For centuries it had been customary for Christians on Sundays and on a number of other special holidays during the year to attend Mass and thereafter to engage in amusements and merry-making, sometimes, too, in labor. This custom was so firmly entrenched in countries which

¹ The only exception of importance was the government of the northern (Dutch) Netherlands. Here there was a nominal censorship but it was not rigorously enforced, and for a long time books were published in the Netherlands which could not be published elsewhere.

remained Catholic that not even the most puritanically minded Catholic leaders of the sixteenth century tried very seriously to alter it, and therefore it has continued to the present day to mark the Catholic observance of Sundays and other holidays. On the other hand, the Protestants abolished most of the special holidays, partially because they repudiated the veneration of saints in whose honor such holidays had been set apart, and partially because they begrudged the economic losses resulting from idleness on so many days during the year. Besides, while Luther and his followers were willing to retain much of the Catholic custom of Sunday-observance, Calvin and particularly his disciples in Scotland and England, together with numerous Radical Protestants, revolted against it utterly. These Puritans identified the Christian Sunday with the Jewish Sabbath and believed that all the Old Testament prescriptions concerning the latter should be enforced in respect of the former. It was Puritan Calvinists who in 1571 secured the passage of a law in Scotland which prohibited on Sunday "gaming, playing, passing to taverns and ale-houses, selling of meat and drink, and wilful remaining away from Kirk in time of sermon." Thenceforth, on what had formerly been a day of gladness, a pall of gloom fell in Britain.

The religious upheaval of the sixteenth century also had significant effects on art. For a thousand years, from the time of the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, a distinctive Christian art had flourished and the best of all art in Europe had been employed in the service of the church.

Effects on
Art

As we have seen, the popes at the beginning of the sixteenth century had been the foremost patrons of architecture, sculpture, painting, and music.¹ After the upheaval, popes continued to patronize art, and much the same art-forms continued to be cherished and developed in Catholic countries. But the situation was now different in Protestant countries. Protestants, by abolishing the Mass, decrying ritual, and emphasizing the sermon, halted cathedral-building and turned from ecclesiastical architecture which was gorgeous to that which was bald and bare, from mystical fanes to plain auditoriums. At the same time, their repugnance to what they deemed superstitious or idolatrous in Catholicism, led Protestants to discountenance ecclesiastical sculpture and painting and to cause the more fanatical and puri-

¹ See above, pp. 108, 112, 115-117.

tanical among them to go about smashing religious images and pictures, altars and organs, crucifixes and stained-glass windows.¹ Only in hymnology and certain forms of music did the Protestant churches make any original contribution to art. Of course, the pictorial and plastic arts continued to exist and to develop in Protestant countries, but outside the churches rather than within them and dealing with secular, rather than with religious, subjects. The rise of Protestantism had at least temporarily a deleterious effect on the progress of art and art-appreciation.

Nor is it at all clear that the rise of Protestantism immediately promoted any considerable "enlightenment" or "progress." These somewhat intangible values of modern civilization are more plausibly attributable to the scientific advance of modern times, and if a list of great modern inventors and scientists should be compiled, it would be found to include as many Catholics as Protestants and a fairly large sprinkling of persons who were neither. It is true that the Protestants were intent upon destroying "superstition," and that the council of Trent, partially by reason of Protestant taunts, sought to eradicate "superstitious abuses" from Catholicism, but Protestants surpassed Catholics in the practice of what is nowadays universally acknowledged to have been a superstition, the very horrible superstition of witchcraft.

Witchcraft, as we have seen, had been detected and denounced by a pope in the latter part of the fifteenth century, and for a time Catholic officials were zealous in hunting and punishing witches. From the middle of the sixteenth century, however, the persecution of witchcraft rapidly abated in most Catholic countries; the Inquisition exercised a humane and restraining influence on it, particularly in Italy and Spain; and in 1623 Pope Gregory XV finally forbade the infliction of the death-penalty upon any person who was accused of witchcraft unless he had actually committed murder. Only in France, among Catholic countries, was the hunt for witches long continued and truly terrible. Here, it was fanatically urged on by the otherwise reasonable lawyer and philosopher Jean Bodin.

¹ One such iconoclast recorded with no little pride: "We went . . . with officers and souldiers and . . . we pulled down two mighty great angells with wings, and divers other angells, and the four evangelists and Peter with his Keies over the chappel door, and about a hundred Cherubims and angells and divers superstitious letters in gold."

And here its victims were numerous, one royal judge boasting that during fifteen years (1576-1591) he had sentenced nine hundred witches to death.

But at the very time when the witchcraft superstition was losing its hold in most Catholic countries, it was being eagerly accepted and widely spread in Protestant countries. Both Luther and Calvin believed in witchcraft, and Protestants generally, in their attachment to the Bible, felt themselves divinely commissioned to enforce such an Old Testament injunction as "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." John Fischart (1545-1591), a German and the most indefatigable and powerful Protestant publicist of his time, not only assailed pope and priests and particularly the Jesuits with savage fury, but also directed his picturesque vituperation against witches. He translated Bodin's work and gave it a new title indicative of his own imaginative genius: *Concerning the liberated, raging Devil's army of possessed, mad witches and wizards, spiteful conjurors, soothsayers, necromancers, poisoners, spell-weavers, traitors, night-birds, sight-destroyers, and all other kinds of magicians, and their monstrous deeds: How they can be legally recognized, apprehended, stopped, discovered, investigated, examined by torture, and punished.*

It was in Germany that trials and torturings and killings of alleged witches were most numerous, but the contagion of the dreadful superstition was soon caught by other Protestant countries. The English parliament enacted in 1563 a statute "against conjurations, enchantments, and witchcrafts"; and during the reign of Queen Elizabeth there were more than a hundred trials for witchcraft in England and about fifty executions. And, during the greater part of the seventeenth century, the craze, instead of abating, became more intense in Germany and England, and also developed alarmingly in Scotland and Scandinavia. Lutherans and Anglicans and Calvinists seemed to be equally obsessed, and perhaps the climax was reached by Radical Evangelical Protestants—Puritans and Congregationalists.

Immediately, at any rate, the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century did not promote learning and popular education any more than it got rid of superstition. Our present-day systems of universal schooling did not spring Education directly out of sixteenth-century Protestantism or Catholicism.

It is true that Protestant leaders of that time usually favored education. Luther and Melancthon talked a good deal about the need of schools. Calvin made Geneva an important educational centre. In Scotland John Knox set forth the ideal of "an elementary school for every parish, a grammar school for every market town, and a university for every city." It is likewise true that contemporary Catholic leaders favored education. Reforming popes and the council of Trent urged the multiplication of schools, and the Jesuits founded numerous educational institutions of considerable repute. Yet, in fact, the religious upheaval tended, on the whole, to interrupt and retard popular education. The confiscation of church property served to destroy or reduce endowments of previously existing schools, so that in Germany and England, and other Protestant countries, the majority of grammar schools either disappeared or continued a starved existence with diminished funds; and the doctrine of salvation by faith alone and the futility of "good works" dried up the source from which such endowments had flowed. The new schools which Protestant reformers or governments managed to establish were fewer than the old schools which decayed or were destroyed. The result was that during the century following the religious upheaval formal education was confined more exclusively to the upper classes than ever before, while the masses "sank into deeper and deeper ignorance."

Besides, the universities suffered woefully. They were frequently attacked by Protestant leaders as strongholds of the hated scholastic theology and philosophy, and such of them as escaped this charge tended to sacrifice depth of learning to the superficialities of humanism, and breadth of scholarship to narrowness of sectarian argument. The result was that attendance at universities decidedly lessened, and hostility to them increased. Catholic authorities forbade the faithful to study at Protestant universities and exercised a most rigorous supervision of what was taught in Catholic universities. In Protestant lands universities declined, and some Evangelical Protestants, convinced of the worthlessness of "carnal knowledge," sought to abolish them altogether; the Congregationalists, when they were in power in England in the middle of the seventeenth century, proposed to suppress the universities of Oxford

and Cambridge. Much later, of course, occurred throughout Europe an almost revolutionary revival and extension of education, both university and popular, but it was to be an accompaniment of modern democracy rather than of modern religion.¹

In the meantime, the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century had profound effects on politics and society, though only remotely in a democratic direction. As a matter of fact, the upheaval was caused in large part, as we have been at pains to point out, by political and social developments which had reached virtually revolutionary proportions at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and it was in speeding up these developments, in completing a revolution already well under way, that the upheaval produced its major political and social effects.

Effects on
Government and Society

First, a rising consciousness of nationality contributed to the religious upheaval, and the upheaval, in turn, promoted nationalism. The Christian religion was now largely nationalized. Protestantism everywhere involved a protest against the "foreign" and the "cosmopolitan"; it appealed to national feeling; and it adopted distinctively national forms and organizations. Lutheranism became a national Christianity for many Germans and for each of the Scandinavian peoples; Calvinism, for the Dutch and the Scots; Anglicanism, for the English. At the same time, Catholicism underwent a partially nationalizing evolution; greater emphasis was put upon the national character of the church in France, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Ireland, and elsewhere; greater concessions were made to national sovereigns in matter of patronage, taxation, and judiciary; every pope since 1523 has been of Italian nationality. The result of all this has been that continuously since the sixteenth century all the major divisions of Christianity—Protestantism and Orthodoxy preëminently, and Catholicism in a somewhat lesser degree—have tended to reënforce the linguistic differences and the national rivalries which have pushed the idea of Christendom into the background and rendered divisive nationalism a distinguishing mark of modern civilization.

Impetus
to Nationalism

Secondly, the spirit of capitalism—the yearning for quick and big financial profits—was steadily growing in the sixteenth

¹ See below, ch. xi, sec. 4.

century. It helped to produce the religious upheaval, and the upheaval greatly accelerated its growth. Princes and landlords, eager to acquire new sources of wealth, were happy to learn from Luther, Henry VIII, and other reformers that extensive landed estates of the Catholic Church might and should be confiscated. Bankers, manufacturers, and traders, intent upon the profitable conduct of their business, heard with joy the considered judgment of Calvin that the charging of interest (usury) had been unjustly condemned by the Catholic Church, that its prohibition in the Old Testament was not to be interpreted literally, and that its morality was exclusively a matter of individual conscience.¹

As the new capitalism was already most highly developed in Germany, the Netherlands, France, and England, it is not surprising that Calvinism found interested supporters among the middle classes of these countries. Nor is it surprising that wherever Lutheranism or Anglicanism was adopted, the nobility increased its wealth and strengthened its social position. In northern Germany, Scandinavia, and England, titled lords shared with their sovereigns in the confiscation of church lands and endowments, and thereby assured the economic and social supremacy of landed aristocracy in those countries for three centuries thereafter.

The rise of Protestantism not only afforded new opportunities for the enrichment of upper and middle classes, but most kinds of it, especially Calvinism and the radical evangelical sects, positively encouraged what has been termed "economic virtue," or what may as fittingly be called the "capitalistic spirit." Puritan Protestants were now taught from the Book of Proverbs and other parts of the Old Testament a gospel of financial effort and thrift which was in marked contrast with the traditional Christian eulogy of resignation and liberality and which in some instances may have verged on what medieval theologians denounced as the sin of covetousness. At any rate, they came to regard idleness as a mortal sin, and to look upon poverty as a badge of God's displeasure and prosperity as a

¹ In England, prior to Calvin's judgment, a law was enacted under Edward VI forbidding usury "as a vice most odious and detestable" and "by the word of God prohibited." Afterwards, in 1571, under Elizabeth, this law was repealed as having operated to "the utter undoing of many gentlemen, merchants, occupiers, and others," and usury up to ten per cent was pronounced not sinful but legal.

sign of God's blessing. This was the Calvinist and Puritan ethic of capitalism, and it wrought something of a social revolution in the northern Netherlands, in Scotland, and among many zealous Protestants in England. It provided a religious sanction for the advance of economic individualism.

Then, thirdly, the absolutist ambitions of princes and national monarchs, already much in evidence at the opening of the sixteenth century, were forwarded by the religious upheaval during the century. By confiscation of church lands, by appropriation of powers hitherto exercised by the pope, and by establishment of effective control over the local clergy, the Tudor sovereigns in England, the kings in Scandinavia, and the German princes were enriched in purse, exalted in public opinion, and simultaneously freed from the fear of being hampered in their absolutist policies by an independent ecclesiastical organization. In Catholic countries, also, as we have seen, the monarchs took advantage of the pope's difficulties to wring from him such concessions as resulted in shackling the church to the crown. As the divine right of the popes was denied or flouted, the divine right of kings was asserted and insisted upon. For two centuries after the sixteenth the absolutism of kings and princes was a very real fact in the political history of most countries of Europe.

**Impetus
to Monar-
chical Ab-
solutism**

It has been held by some writers that modern political democracy is a result of the rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth century. This is true only partially and indirectly.

Protestantism did emphasize, at least in theory, the individualism which is a basic element in modern democratic doctrine; and some of the Radical Protestants, notably the Congregationalists, adopted from the outset thoroughly democratic methods of church government. But these Radical Protestants were disliked and

**Connec-
tion of
Modern
Democ-
racy with
the Re-
ligious
Upheaval**

denounced almost as bitterly by the majority of sixteenth-century Protestants as by contemporary Catholics, and the original major forms of Protestantism—Lutheran, Anglican, and even Calvinist—were aristocratic, rather than democratic, in actual operation and influence. True it is that religious minorities were inclined to resist the authority of a monarch or a class that sought to impose another faith upon them; and inasmuch as Calvinists constituted just such minorities in the Spanish Netherlands, in France, in

Hungary, and in England they got the reputation, from their political agitations and revolts, of standing for the principle of democracy against that of autocracy. They did take a stand against autocracy, but whenever they succeeded in overthrowing a monarch, as in the Netherlands and Scotland (and later in England), they substituted for his régime a class government which would not nowadays be deemed democratic.

It should also be borne in mind that during the middle ages, under Catholic influence and auspices, many city states had governed themselves quite democratically, while national states had evolved institutions of representative government, and that some of the very monastic orders which Protestants suppressed in the sixteenth century were still managing their own affairs as democratically as were contemporary Congregationalists. Besides, the opposition to monarchical absolutism was no monopoly of Calvinists. It was voiced by several eminent Catholics of the time, including two Spanish Jesuits: Mariana (1536-1624), who contended that it was lawful to overthrow a tyrant; and Suarez (1548-1617), who argued against the divine right of kings on the ground that God has made all men equal and has entrusted them jointly with supreme political power.

In time, as we know, there would be a widespread reaction throughout Europe against the absolutism of kings and princes; and Protestants, especially those of Calvinist and Radical antecedents, would play an important rôle in precipitating it in Scotland, England, and America. But in Europe the first large-scale experimentation with what we now think of as political democracy would be made in France, and not by Protestants. Indeed, the rise of modern democracy was to occur too late to be attributable directly to the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century, and when it should occur it would be less a reflection of Protestantism, or of Catholicism, than a political reflex of new economic conditions and novel intellectual interests.

In the meantime, the lot of peasants—who constituted the vast majority of people in all European countries—was not a happy one, and there is reason to believe that the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century had direct and unfortunate effect upon it. What the peasants gained from the diminution of ecclesiastical dues and taxes was more than offset by the increased exactions of monarchs and

**The Lot
of the
Peasantry**

landlords. Many peasants were deprived of customary rights on their ancestral manors; the suppression of monasteries cut off the main source of charity for them; and an epidemic of state laws, enacted in the interests of the new capitalism, required them to work for regulated pittance wages, and sentenced them, if they turned "sturdy beggars," to virtual slavery. Moreover, the reduction in the number of religious holidays and the abolition of pilgrimages, while welcomed by employers, meant for employees a lengthening of the time for hard labor and a lessening of the opportunity for the recreation and quaint diversions which formerly had solaced such labor. Peasant insurrections occurred, as we have noticed, in the sixteenth century; but they were uniformly put down with great cruelty. It was apparent by the seventeenth century that, at least in Protestant countries, the peasants had exchanged oppressors and found themselves in a worse condition than before.

One very important caution must be observed in ascribing all the "effects" which have been outlined in this chapter to the purely religious upheaval of the sixteenth century. Religious upheaval was only one—and possibly a minor—phenomenon of the century. It was preceded and accompanied by revolutionary exploration of oceans, discovery of distant lands, expansion of commerce, rise of capitalism, development of national consciousness and national monarchy, revival of classical learning and paganism, advance of natural science. All these phenomena, though we have considered them separately in this book, were inextricably interwoven with the ecclesiastical revolution of the sixteenth century, and we are well aware—and would have everyone else well aware—that what, for purposes of convenience, we have described as effects of the religious upheaval, might be described as effects of the whole synthesis of sixteenth-century thought and action.

Finally, there remains to be noted one effect of the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century which, in political and social significance to our modern age, outweighs all the others. It is the impetus which the upheaval gave to "secularization," that is, to the process of transferring to lay states the direction and control of numerous activities which had previously been under the almost exclusive jurisdiction of the church. Specifically, "secularization" began to

The Complex of Sixteenth-Century Developments

Impetus to "Secularization"

be applied in the sixteenth century, particularly in Protestant countries, not only to church lands and taxes but also in the domains of charity and education. In England, for example, when the state had confiscated the wealth of the Catholic Church and had suppressed all monastic establishments, it was found that many charitable and educational institutions and the care of the poor, the infirm, and the aged could no longer be carried on in the traditional way, financed by the church, and attended to by monks. Consequently, the English state undertook to provide substitutes, and during the reign of Queen Elizabeth a series of parliamentary statutes made the state, rather than the church, the supreme arbiter of charity and education in England. It was enacted that, in place of bishops, church-wardens, and monks, lay justices of the peace and special "overseers of the poor" should dispense charity, raising funds by assessment of all householders, giving doles to the infirm, and putting the able-bodied poor to productive labor in local "work-houses."¹ By like enactment, more than a hundred schools were established and endowed under state auspices, to take the place of church schools which had been impoverished or closed. In the Lutheran states of Germany and Scandinavia, and in Calvinist Netherlands and Scotland, similar steps were taken in respect of charity and education. The first Protestant school to be set up by lay, rather than ecclesiastical, authorities was founded by the city fathers of Magdeburg in 1524; in 1528 the Lutheran elector of Saxony took over the general direction of all schools within his territories, and in 1559 the Lutheran duke of Württemberg did likewise.

In Catholic countries there was less secularization. The church here retained for at least two centuries longer the management of schools and charitable institutions. Even in Protestant countries secularization did not immediately imply a lessening of emphasis upon religion as a subject of instruction in schools or as a professed principle in the guidance of charitable institutions. Protestant states uniformly insisted, for at least two hundred years after the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century, that all teachers should be "pious and godly" communicants of their respective national churches and that the teaching of Bible and Protestant catechism was a basic function of all education.

¹ The English "Poor Law" was enacted in 1601, but many of its provisions were foreshadowed in statutes of 1563, 1572, 1576, and 1597.

Yet secularization had begun and was to continue on a scale ever more intensive and extensive. The state was increasingly to determine social and economic and educational policies, at first in Protestant lands and eventually in Catholic lands. The great wide realms of human activity lying between purely personal religion on the one hand and politics, sociology, economics, and science on the other,—realms which, though often disputed by church and state, had usually been ruled ultimately by the former—were now, in modern times, to be gradually lost to the church and appropriated by the state. For weal or for woe, the outcome has been that Christianity occupies in modern times no such superior position of social control as it held in the middle ages. The essentially secular character of modern history originated in various developments, especially in the religious upheaval, of the sixteenth century.



PART II
DYNASTIC AND ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT

- V. THE PREDOMINANCE OF SPAIN
- VI. THE PREDOMINANCE OF FRANCE
- VII. THE AUSTRIAN HABSBURGS AND THE RISE OF PRUSSIA
- VIII. THE RISE OF RUSSIA
- IX. THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

CHAPTER V

THE PREDOMINANCE OF SPAIN

I. THE AGE OF CHARLES V



CERTAIN factors conspired to make Spain the leading power in Europe during the first century of modern times. First, she possessed a goodly number of particularly brave and daring soldiers, who had just ended an age-long struggle with the Mos-

**Factors
Making
for
Spanish
Predomi-
nance**

lems by capturing Granada (1492) and subjecting the whole peninsula (except Portugal) to a single Christian state. In an era when the Moslems were universally dreaded and when Moslem Turks were seizing Constantinople and southeastern Europe, the blotting out of Moslem sway in southwestern Europe was a sensational exploit. It drew applause from all Christendom. It confirmed the pride and self-esteem of Spaniards and established their reputation abroad as redoubtable fighters and gallant champions of the cross.

Second, Spain reaped the rich first-fruits of the discovery of America (1492), the exploitation of the West Indies, and the conquest of Mexico and Peru. Her own land at home was not especially fertile; her peasants and nobles were devoted to a mediæval system of agriculture which admitted of no great access of national wealth; and her growing religious and political intolerance of Moslems and Jews threatened to paralyze the capitalistic development of her cities by depriving them of their most experienced manufacturers and business men. But these internal economic weaknesses of Spain were offset or obscured for at least a century by the vast influx of precious metals and priceless cargoes from overseas. Spanish ports soon excelled Venice and Genoa in business and bustle; and although the new wealth did not accrue permanently to Spain, temporarily it enabled the Spanish grandees and court to play a military and political rôle in Europe of extraordinary brilliance and variety.

Third, the ruling family of Spain vied with ruling families of other (and somewhat older) national states in the pursuit of the Machiavellian statecraft of the age—the employment of every means, military, financial, diplomatic, and marital, to enhance the size and prestige of the state and to exercise monarchical absolutism within it. And the Spanish royal family was astoundingly successful and easily first in its marital statecraft. By matrimony Spain became the political arbiter of Europe in the sixteenth century.

The royal family of Spain was descended from a Visigothic chieftain of the early middle ages, and various of its branches, much intermarried, reigned in the fifteenth century over the independent peninsular kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal. In the latter part of this century, as we have seen,¹ the marriage of Isabella of Castile with her kinsman Ferdinand of Aragon created the united monarchy of Spain.

Ferdinand and Isabella, the conquerors of Granada and the sponsors of the discovery of America, raised no son, but they had three daughters for whom they arranged marriages calculated to extend Spanish influence far and wide. One was married to Emmanuel I, king of Portugal (1495-1521); thereby, it was hoped, the remaining independent state in the peninsula might some day be united with Spain and the resources of the Far East be joined with the riches of the Far West. Another daughter—Catherine—was married to Henry VIII, king of England (1509-1547); England, though relatively backward and weak, was of some commercial importance, and Henry VIII was a dashing and ambitious fellow whose assistance in an emergency might be useful.

The eldest daughter, Joanna, the direct heiress of Castile and Aragon, was a bit odd and is known in history as Joanna the Mad. But she was not too insane to be married to a strikingly handsome and wealthily endowed young prince, Philip of Habsburg, and to give birth to a numerous and famous progeny. Her husband, Philip, was certainly no mean catch for his parents-in-law, the Spanish sovereigns. His own father was Maximilian I (1493-1519), archduke of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor, and his mother was Mary

Its Habsburg Connection

¹ See above, pp. 32-33.


of Burgundy, heiress of the populous and industrious Netherlands.

Philip succeeded his mother as nominal sovereign of the Netherlands in 1482—he was only four years of age at the time—and to the Netherlands he later brought his bride, Joanna. There, in the city of Ghent, in the year 1500 was ushered into the world the first-born son of Philip and Joanna. He was named Charles and was destined to impress the first half of the sixteenth century with his name and his fame.







In 1504, on the death of Isabella of Castile, Joanna became titular co-sovereign of Spain with her father Ferdinand, but she was now so far gone with insanity that her husband reigned in her stead as Philip I of Castile and the Netherlands. But Philip was short-lived, and on his death in 1506 the crowns of the Netherlands and Castile passed to his six-year-old son, Charles. On this boy crowns seemed to rain. When he was sixteen the death of Grandfather Ferdinand showered upon him the whole Spanish inheritance. When he was nineteen the death of Grandfather Maximilian poured upon him all the hereditary dominions of the Habsburgs. Thus under the youthful Charles I of Spain were fortuitously grouped in 1519 wider lands and greater populations than any Christian king had ever ruled. Seville, Madrid, Barcelona, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Brussels, Vienna, Naples—even Mexico City—owed him allegiance. His titles alone would fill several pages.

Charles of Habsburg; Charles I of Spain, and Charles V of the Empire

One more title Charles coveted—the highly ornamental title of Holy Roman Emperor which his grandfather Maximilian had borne. But this title was also coveted by the French king, Francis I (1515-1547), who feared lest the election of the master of Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands to the imperial dignity in Germany would upset the “balance of power,” endanger the independence of France, and thwart his own ambitions. Both Charles and Francis (and Henry VIII of England, who entered the contest also) resorted to prodigal bribery of the electors, but Charles’s additional appeal to the fact that he was a Habsburg and was in a peculiarly strategic position to protect Germany against the Moslem Turks at length carried the day and won him the election as Holy Roman Emperor. He was crowned at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1520, and became the Emperor Charles V.



THE EUROPEAN DYNASTIC EMPIRE OF CHARLES V, 1526

-  From Maximilian of Austria
-  From Mary of Burgundy
-  From Ferdinand of Aragon
-  From Isabella of Castile
-  The Holy Roman Empire (not otherwise marked)
-  Acquisitions of Charles V's brother, Ferdinand

Note: The greater part of Hungary including Transylvania, was in continual dispute with the Turks. The relation of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires is here shown as it stood in 1547

Never have greater difficulties confronted a sovereign than those which Charles V was obliged to face throughout his reign; never did monarch lead a more strenuous life. He was the central figure in a very critical period of history. His own character, as well as the painstaking education he had received in the Netherlands, conferred upon him a lively appreciation of his position and a dogged pertinacity in discharging its obligations. Both in administering his extensive dominions and in dealing with foreign foes, Charles was a zealous, hard-working, and calculating prince, and the lack of success which attended many of his projects was due not to want of ability in the ruler but to the multiplicity of conflicting interests among the ruled.

At the outset, we must remember the peculiar nature of the dominions of Charles V. They were a "dynastic empire." That is, they did not constitute a single centralized state, like the earlier Roman Empire or the later Russian Empire, but a congeries of states and sovereignties which had been grouped together by fortunes of marriage under a particular family—in this case, the Habsburg family—and which were united only in the sense that they all had a common personal sovereign. Charles had no "imperial" government and no common administration for all his dominions. There was the form of an "imperial" government for his German lands—the form of the "Holy Roman Empire,"—but there was not even such a form for his Netherlandish, Spanish, and Italian territories. Each of these retained its peculiar institutions, with the result that Charles V was a "pluralist" rather than a unitary ruler. He had to function in as many different capacities and in accordance with as many different customs as there were distinct sovereignties in his heterogeneous dynastic empire. He had to carry on in many different languages, with many diverse advisers, and for many disparate peoples.

The
Dynastic
"Empire"
of
Charles V

The dynastic empire of Charles V was especially difficult to manage. For every one of his major dominions lacked political unity and administrative uniformity, and each fraction had to be dealt with separately and differently. Each one of the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands—the wealthiest part of his domain, and the part which he always considered peculiarly his own—was a distinct political unit, for there existed among the seventeen provinces only the rudiments of a central ad-

ministration and a common representative system, while the affiliated county of Burgundy (Franche Comté) had a separate political organization.

The crown of Castile brought with it the recently conquered kingdom of Granada, together with the new colonies in America and scattered posts in northern Africa. The crown of Aragon comprised the four distinct states of Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, and Navarre,¹ and, in addition, the kingdoms of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, each with its own local government and customs. At least eight separate cortes or parliaments existed in this Spanish-Italian group, adding greatly to the intricacy of administration.

Much the same was true of the hereditary Habsburg group of states,—Austria, Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, the Tyrol, etc.,—but Charles soon freed himself from immediate responsibility for their government by entrusting them (1521) to his younger brother, Ferdinand, who by his own marriage and elections added the kingdoms of Bohemia² and Hungary (1526) to the Habsburg dominions. The Holy Roman Empire afforded additional problems: it made serious demands upon the time, money, and energies of its ruler; in return, it gave little but glamor.

In all the diverse regions of his "dynastic empire" Charles had to do with financial, judicial, and ecclesiastical matters. He had to reconcile conflicting interests and appeal for popularity to many varied peoples. More than once during his reign he even had to repress rebellion. In Germany, from the very first, he was face to face with rising Protestantism which seemed to him to blaspheme his altar and to assail his throne.

The emperor's overwhelming administrative difficulties were complicated at every turn by the intricacies of foreign politics. In the first place, Charles was obliged to wage war with France throughout the greater part of his reign; he had inherited a long-standing quarrel with the French kings, to which the rivalry of Francis I for the Holy Roman Empire gave a personal aspect. In the second place, and almost as formidable, was the advance of the Turks up the Danube and the increase of Moslem naval power in the Mediterranean. Against Protestant Germany a Catholic monarch might hope to rely on papal assistance, and

¹ The part south of the Pyrenees.

² Including the Bohemian crown lands of Moravia and Silesia. See above, p. 35.

English support might conceivably be enlisted against France. But the popes, who usually disliked the emperor's Italian policy, were not of great aid to him elsewhere; and the English sovereigns had domestic reasons for developing hostility to Charles. A brief sketch of the foreign affairs of Charles may make the situation clear.

Six years older than Charles, Francis I had succeeded to the French throne in 1515, irresponsible, frivolous, and vain of military reputation. The general political situation of the time,—the gradual enclosure of the French monarchy by a string of Habsburg territories,—to say nothing of the remarkable contrast between the character of Francis and that of the persevering Charles, invited a great armed conflict, and definite pretexts were not lacking for an early outbreak of hostilities. (1) Francis revived the claims of the French crown to Naples, although Louis XII had renounced them in 1504. (2) Francis, bent on regaining Milan, which his predecessor had lost in 1512, invaded the duchy and, after winning the brilliant victory of Marignano in the first year of his reign, occupied the city of Milan. Charles subsequently insisted, however, that the duchy was a fief of the Holy Roman Empire and that he was sworn by oath to recover it. (3) Francis asserted the claims of a kinsman to the little kingdom of Navarre, the greater part of which, it will be remembered, had recently¹ been forcibly annexed to Spain. (4) Francis desired to extend his sway into the rich provinces of the Netherlands, while Charles was determined not only to prevent further aggressions but to recover the duchy of Burgundy of which his grandmother had been deprived by Louis XI. (5) The outcome of the contest for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire in 1519 virtually completed the breach between the two rivals. War broke out in 1522, and with a few interruptions it outlasted the lives of both Francis and Charles.

The Contest of Charles V with Francis I of France

Italy was the main theatre of the combat. In the first stage, the imperial forces, with the aid of a papal army, speedily drove the French garrison out of Milan. The Sforza family was duly invested with the duchy as a fief of the Holy Roman Empire, and the pope was compensated by the addition of Parma and Piacenza to the states of the church. The victorious Imperialists

¹ In 1512. See above, p. 33.

then pressed across the Alps and besieged Marseilles. Francis, who had been detained by domestic troubles in France,¹ now succeeded in raising the siege and pursued the retreating enemy to Milan. But, instead of following up his advantage by promptly attacking the main army of the Imperialists, the French king despatched a part of his force to Naples, and with the other turned aside to blockade the city of Pavia. This blunder enabled the Imperialists to reform their ranks and to march towards Pavia in order to join the besieged. Here in February, 1525,—on the emperor's twenty-fifth birthday,—the army of Charles won an overwhelming victory. Eight thousand French soldiers fell on the field that day, and Francis, who had been in the thick of the fight, was compelled to surrender. "Nothing in the world is left me save my honor and my life," wrote the king to his mother. Everything seemed auspicious for the cause of Charles. Francis, after a brief captivity in Spain, was released on condition that he would surrender all claims to Burgundy, the Netherlands, and Italy, and would marry the emperor's sister.

Francis swore upon the Gospels and upon his knightly word that he would fulfill these conditions, but in his own and contemporary opinion the compulsion exercised upon him absolved him from his oath. No sooner was he back in France than he declared the treaty null and void and proceeded to form alliances with all the Italian powers that had become alarmed by the sudden strengthening of the emperor's position in the peninsula,—the pope, Venice, Florence, and even the Sforza who owed everything to Charles. Upon the resumption of hostilities the league displayed the same want of agreement and energy which characterized every coalition of Italian city states; and soon the Imperialists were able to repossess themselves of much of the country.

In 1527 occurred a famous episode, the sack of Rome. It was not displeasing to the emperor that the pope should be punished for giving aid to France, although Charles cannot be held altogether responsible for what befell. His army in Italy, composed largely of Spaniards and Germans, being short of food and money, and without orders, mutinied

¹ These troubles related to the disposition of the important landed estates of the Bourbon family. The duke of Bourbon, who was constable of France, felt himself injured by the king and accordingly deserted to the emperor.

and marched upon the Eternal City, which was soon at their mercy. About four thousand people perished in the capture. The pillage lasted nine months, and the brigands were halted only by a frightful pestilence which decimated their numbers. Convents were forced, altars stripped, tombs profaned, the library of the Vatican sacked, and works of art torn down as monuments of idolatry. Pope Clement VII (1523-1534), a cousin of the other Medici pope, Leo X, had taken refuge in the impregnable castle of St. Angelo and was now obliged to make peace with the emperor.

The sack of Rome aroused bitter feelings throughout Catholic Europe, and Henry VIII of England, at that time still loyal to the pope, ostentatiously sent aid to Francis. But although the emperor made little headway against Francis, the French king, on account of strategic blunders and the disunion of the league, was unable to maintain a sure foothold in Italy. The peace of Cambrai (1529) provided that Francis should abandon Naples, Milan, and the Netherlands, but the cession of Burgundy was no longer insisted upon. Francis proceeded to celebrate his marriage with the emperor's sister.

Peace of
Cambrai

Eight years of warfare had left Charles V and the Habsburg family unquestionable masters of Italy. Naples was under Charles's direct government. For Milan he received the homage of Sforza. The Medici pope, whose family Charles had restored in Florence, was now his ally. Charles visited Italy for the first time in 1529 to view his territories, and at Bologna (1530) received from the pope's hands the ancient iron crown of Lombard Italy and the imperial crown of Rome. It was the last papal coronation of a ruler of the Holy Roman Empire.

The peace of Cambrai proved but a truce, and war between Charles and Francis repeatedly blazed forth. In order to create all possible trouble for the emperor, Francis made alliances with Scotland, Sweden, Denmark, the Ottoman Turks, even the rebellious Protestant princes within the Holy Roman Empire. There were spas-

Continuing
Conflict with
France

modic campaigns between 1536 and 1538 and between 1542 and 1544, and after the death of Francis and the abdication of Charles, the former's son, Henry II (1547-1559), continued the conflict, newly begun in 1552, until the conclusion of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. By this treaty the Habsburgs re-

the extinction of an independent and united Hungarian state. Ferdinand of Habsburg, brother of Charles V, claimed the kingdom; Suleiman was in actual possession of fully a third of it. The sultan's army carried the war into Austria and in 1529 invested and bombarded Vienna, but so valiant was the resistance offered that after three weeks the siege was abandoned. Twelve years later the greater part of Hungary, including the city of Budapest, became a Turkish province, and in many places churches were turned into mosques. In 1547 Charles V and Ferdinand were compelled to recognize the Turkish conquests in Hungary, and the latter agreed to pay the sultan an annual tribute of 30,000 ducats. Suleiman not only thwarted every attempt of his rivals to recover the Hungarian territories, but remained throughout his life a constant menace to the security of the hereditary Austrian dominions of the Habsburgs.

At the very time when Charles V was trying to keep his eye on all his diverse hereditary possessions in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and America, and was waging almost incessant war now with the French and now with the Moslems, he had to cope with a most difficult situation within the Holy Roman Empire. Had he been able to devote all his talent and energy to the domestic affairs of the Empire, he might have transformed it into a compact German state. It should be borne in mind that when Charles V became emperor in 1520 the Holy Roman Empire was virtually restricted to German-speaking peoples,¹ and that the national unifications of England, France, and Spain, already far advanced, pointed the path to a similar political evolution for Germany. Why should not a modern German national state have been created coextensive with the medieval empire, a state which would have included not only the twentieth-century German republic, but Austria and the Netherlands, and which, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and from the English Channel to the Vistula, would have been the chief power on the continent of Europe throughout the whole modern era? There were certainly grave difficulties in the way, but grave difficulties had also been encountered in consolidating France or Spain, and the difference was rather of degree than of kind. In every other case a strong monarch

Problems
of
Charles V
in the
Holy
Roman
Empire

¹ Except for the Czechs in Bohemia.

had overcome feudal princes and ambitious nobles, had deprived cities of many of their liberties, had trampled upon or tampered with the privileges of representative assemblies, and had enforced internal order and security. In every such case the monarch had commanded the support of important popular elements and had directed his major efforts to the realization of national aims.

National patriotism was not altogether lacking among Germans of the sixteenth century. They were conscious of a common language which was already becoming a vehicle of literary expression. They were conscious of a common tradition and of a common nationality. They recognized, in many cases, the absurdly antiquated character of their political institutions and ardently longed for reforms. In fact, the trouble with the Germans was not so much the lack of thought about political reform as the actual conflicts between various groups concerning the method and goal of reform. Germans despised the Holy Roman Empire, much as Frenchmen abhorred the memory of feudal society; but there were fewer Germans than Frenchmen who advocated the establishment of strong national monarchy. In Germany were princes, free cities, and knights,—all nationalistic after a fashion, but all quarrelling with one another and with their nominal sovereign.

The emperors themselves were the only sincere and consistent champions of centralized monarchical power, but the emperors were probably less patriotic than anyone else in the Holy Roman Empire. Charles V would never abandon his pretensions to dynastic world power in order to become a strong monarch over a single nation. Early in his reign he declared that "no monarchy was comparable with the Roman Empire. This the whole world had once obeyed, and Christ Himself had paid it honor and obedience. Unfortunately it was only a shadow of what it had been, but he hoped, with the help of those powerful countries and alliances which God had granted him, to raise it to its ancient glory." Charles V labored for an increase of personal power not only in Germany but also in the Netherlands, in Spain, and in Italy; and with the vast imperial ambition of Charles the ideal of creating a national monarchy on a strictly German basis was in sharp conflict. Charles V could not, certainly would not, pose simply as a German king, a merely national leader.

In these circumstances the powerful German princes, in defying the emperor's authority and in promoting disruptive tendencies in the Holy Roman Empire, were enabled to lay the blame at the feet of their unpatriotic sovereign and thereby to arouse in their behalf a good deal of German national sentiment. In choosing Charles V to be their emperor, the princely electors in 1519 had demanded that German or Latin should be the official language of the Holy Roman Empire, that imperial offices should be open only to Germans, that the various princes should not be subject to any foreign political jurisdiction, that no foreign troops should serve in imperial wars without the approval of the diet, and that Charles should confirm the sovereign rights of all the princes and appoint from their number a Council of Regency (*Reichsregiment*) to share in his government.

In accordance with an agreement reached by the diet held at Worms in 1521, the Council of Regency was created. Most of its twenty-three members were named by, and represented the interests of, the German princes. Here might be the starting-point toward a closer political union of the German-speaking people, if only a certain amount of financial independence could be secured to the Council. The proposal on this score was a most promising one; it was to finance the new imperial administration, not, as formerly, by levying more or less voluntary contributions on the various states, but by establishing a kind of customs-union (*Zollverein*) and imposing on foreign importations a tariff for revenue. This time, however, the German burghers raised angry protests, the merchants and traders of the Hanseatic towns complained that the proposed financial burden would fall on them and destroy their business; and their protests were potent enough to bring to nought the princes' plan. Thus the government was forced again to resort to the levy of special financial contributions,—an expedient which usually put the emperor and the Council of Regency at the mercy of the most selfish and least patriotic of the German princes.

More truly patriotic as a class than German princes or German burghers were the German knights—those gentlemen of the hill-top and of the road, who, usually poor in pocket though stout of heart, looked down from their high-perched castles with thinly disguised contempt upon the vulgar tradesmen of the town or beheld with anger and jealousy the encroachments of neighbor-

ing princes, lay and ecclesiastical, more wealthy and powerful than themselves. Especially against the princes the knights contended, sometimes under the form of law, more often by force and violence and all the barbarous accompaniments of private warfare and personal feud. Some of the knights were well educated and some had literary and scholarly abilities; hardly any one of them was a friend of public order. Yet the knights as a class were intensely proud of their German nationality. It was the knights, who, under the leadership of such fiery patriots as Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen, had forcefully contributed in 1519 to the imperial election of Charles V, a German Habsburg, in preference to non-German candidates such as Francis I of France or Henry VIII of England. For a brief period Charles V leaned heavily upon the German knights for support in his struggle with princes and burghers; and at one time it looked as if the knights in union with the emperor would succeed in curbing the power of the princes and in laying the foundations of a strongly centralized national German monarchy.

But at the critical moment Protestantism arose in Germany, marking a cleavage between the knightly leaders and the emperor. To knights like Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen the final break in 1520 between Martin Luther and the pope seemed to assure a separation of Germany from Italy and the erection of a peculiar form of German Christianity about which a truly national state could be builded. As a class the knights applauded Luther and rejoiced at the rapid spread of his teachings throughout Germany. On the other hand, Charles V remained a Catholic. Not only was he loyally attached to the religion of his fathers through personal training and belief, but he felt that the maintenance of what political authority he possessed was dependent largely on the maintenance of the universal authority of the old church, and he needed papal assistance for his many foreign projects. The same reasons that led many German princes to accept the Lutheran doctrines as a means of lessening imperial control caused Charles V to reject them. At the same diet at Worms (1521), at which the Council of Regency had been created, Charles V prevailed upon the Germans present to condemn and outlaw Luther; and this action alienated the knights from the emperor

Franz von Sickingen, a Rhenish knight and the ablest of his class, speedily took advantage of the emperor's absence from Germany in 1522 to precipitate a knights' war. In supreme command of an army of fellow knights, Franz made an energetic attack upon the rich landed estates of the Catholic prince-bishop of Trier. At this point, the German princes, lay as well as ecclesiastical, forgetting their religious predilections and mindful only of their common hatred of the knights, rushed to the defense of the bishop of Trier and drove off Sickingen, who, in May, 1523, died fighting before his own castle of Ebernburg. Ulrich von Hutten fled to Switzerland and perished miserably shortly afterwards. The knights' cause collapsed, and princes and burghers remained triumphant.¹ It was the end of serious efforts in the sixteenth century to create a national German state.

The Council of Regency lasted until 1531, though its inability to preserve domestic peace discredited it, and in its later years it enjoyed little authority. Left to themselves, many of the princes espoused Protestantism. In vain Charles V combated the new religious movement. In vain he proscribed it in several diets after that of Worms. In vain he assailed its upholders in several military campaigns, such as those against the Schmalkaldic League.² But the long absences of Charles V from Germany and his absorption in a multitude of cares and worries, to say nothing of the spasmodic aid which the Catholic king of France gave to the Protestants in Germany, contributed to at least the partial triumph of Lutheranism. In the last year of Charles's rule (1555), the German princes were formally accorded the privilege of choosing whether they would be Catholic or Lutheran.³

Protestantism in Germany proved to be a disintegrating, rather than a unifying, factor of national life. It might not have been so, if it had been accepted by the emperor and all the princes, or if it had been rejected by all of them. In either of these cases, civil war would probably have been prevented, religion would have been wholly or partially nationalized, and the central states would have been strengthened. Actually, however, princes and

¹ The knights' war was soon followed by the peasants' revolt, a social rather than a political movement. For an account of the peasants' revolt, see above, pp. 156-158.

² See above, p. 158.

³ By the religious peace of Augsburg. See above, p. 159.

people in Germany were about equally divided between Catholicism and Protestantism, and the princes used religion as a cloak for opposing the Catholic emperor, for reasserting localism, and for paralyzing every movement for national unity.

The Holy Roman Empire, then, was falling mortally ill during the reign of one of its greatest emperors. But, by a curious irony of history, it was during the reign of this same Emperor Charles V and England that England was becoming more nationalist and was beginning to play a significant part in international politics. At first, Charles had regarded as a poor relation the English king Henry VIII (1509-1547), whose wife—Catherine of Aragon—was Charles's aunt. But before long, he had to take him more seriously. Henry VIII had, for several years, a very ambitious minister in the person of Thomas Wolsey (1475-1530). A self-made man and a priest of the Catholic Church, greedy of power and wealth and capable of a vast deal of hard work, Wolsey had rapidly advanced himself in the favor of ecclesiastical and temporal superiors and had been loaded with benefices and positions of dignity and responsibility. By 1515 he had become the mentor of Henry VIII, the director of his country's domestic and foreign policies, and a cardinal of the Roman Church. He aspired eagerly to be pope.

While strengthening the royal (and his own) authority in England by repressing the nobility, corrupting parliament, and establishing the arbitrary court of Star Chamber, Cardinal Wolsey perceived in the conflict between the Emperor Charles V and the French King Francis I a golden opportunity to put England (and himself) in the forefront of Continental politics. There were Englishmen at the time who thought that their country should avoid entangling alliances and distant enterprises and should go its own way as a small, second-rate nation. But Wolsey thought differently, and with the support of the impetuous young Henry VIII he overbore them. He would have England hold the "balance of power" between Charles and Francis, taking part now with the one and now with the other. Such a policy would enhance English prestige abroad and English pride at home and would make Wolsey an arbiter of Europe.

Wolsey was more inclined to side with Charles V than with Francis I. The former was Henry VIII's nephew by marriage; he was the ruler of the Netherlands, with which the economic

interests of England required close and friendly contact; and he was in a better position to forward Wolsey's personal ambitions at Rome. Yet Wolsey for a time made a great show of friendship for the French king, particularly in connection with the spectacular meeting of Henry VIII and Francis I on the "field of the cloth of gold" in 1520, with the result that Charles V felt obliged to exert special efforts (including the payment of liberal sums of money to Wolsey) to induce Henry VIII to support the empire actively against France. Henry and Wolsey did send military expeditions to the Continent to help Charles V, but they were not very effective and on one occasion, after the sack of Rome in 1527, they were suddenly transferred from the side of the emperor to that of the French king.

The marital difficulties of Henry VIII further complicated the situation. The English monarch's determination to get rid of Queen Catherine¹ was bound to strain friendly relations between him and Charles V. The emperor, as champion of his aunt, zealously besought the pope to deny Henry VIII's suit for annulment of the marriage. On the other hand, Cardinal Wolsey favored the suit because he imagined that his master, if free from the Spanish alliance, could be married to a French princess and that such a rearrangement of matrimonial alliances would better assure England's position as the holder of the "balance of power." But Henry VIII had a mind of his own about women. He was moved neither by the tears of his Spanish wife nor by the diplomatic advantages of any French princess. He was resolved to wed Anne Boleyn, a merely English woman. The upshot was that Henry married Anne, Wolsey died in disgrace, Francis I was disappointed, Charles V was scandalized, the pope was flouted, and England was cut off from the Catholic Church and deprived temporarily of a leading rôle in international politics. But English nationalism was quickened.

Towards the close of the reign of Henry VIII, when Anne Boleyn had been executed for adultery and the hapless Catherine had expired and a third wife was dead, a fourth divorced, and a fifth beheaded, and when the English king was threatening with death anyone who should discuss his matrimonial tribulations and was solacing himself with a sixth (and very discreet) wife, his relations with Charles V perceptibly improved. Eventually,

¹ See above, pp. 171-173.

when Mary Tudor ascended the English throne in 1553, really close and cordial relations were restored between the sovereigns of England and Spain. Mary was the daughter of Henry VIII by his first wife, Catherine; and hence she was a cousin of Charles V. To Mary, Charles V now married his son and successor, Philip II.

At length exhausted by all his manifold labors, Charles V decided to divide his extensive dominions between his brother Ferdinand and his son Philip and to retire from government. In the Hall of the Golden Fleece at Brussels in October, 1555, he formally abdicated the sovereignty of his beloved Netherlands. Turning to the assembled representatives of the people, he said: "Gentlemen, you must not be astonished if, old and feeble as I am in all my members, and also from the love I bear you, I shed some tears." At least in the Netherlands the love was reciprocal.

In 1556 Charles V resigned to Philip the Spanish and Italian crowns and to Ferdinand the Austrian domain and imperial authority,¹ and withdrew into a monastery in Spain to prepare himself for another world. He died in 1558.

Personally, Charles V had a prominent lower jaw and a thin pale face, relieved by a wide forehead and bright flashing eyes.

In character he was slow and at times both irresolute and obstinate, but he had a high sense of duty, honest intentions, good soldierly qualities, and a large amount of cold common sense. In culture he was at once a product and a specimen of the intellectual and economic tendencies of his age. He was a Catholic Christian, conscientious in the practice of his religion and anxious to promote conservative reform within the church. He was also a humanist, well read in the classics and a discriminating patron of renaissance art, especially painting and music. He had some appreciation of scientific developments, though, like most of his contemporaries, he was a devotee of astrology. It was Charles V, moreover, who by his economic policies enriched the great banking family of the Fuggers and contributed materially to the rise of capitalism in Germany and the Netherlands. He it was, too, who directed the overseas expansion

¹ Charles V retained the title of emperor until his death.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is from the painting of the Emperor Charles V by the great Venetian painter, Titian (1477-1576). On Titian, see above, p. 116.





of Spain and authorized the first code of laws for European settlers in the New World.

2. THE AGE OF PHILIP II

Philip II was the only son of Charles V. Born in 1527, he reached maturity in the second half of the sixteenth century. And this part of the century may justly be characterized as the Age of Philip II, just as the first half of the century may be said to constitute the Age of Charles V.

Philip II did not inherit the entire territorial domain of his father. His uncle Ferdinand, who by marriage had already become king of Bohemia and of that part of Hungary not occupied by the Turks, obtained the archduchy of Austria with its traditional dependencies; and Ferdinand was chosen to succeed Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor. Philip, however, received the remainder of the family inheritance, and an impressive remainder it was. It embraced Spain, the Netherlands, Franche Comté (the "county," or eastern part, of the old duchy of Burgundy), Milan, Naples, Sicily, and the Spanish colonies in the West Indies, America, and the Philippines. Moreover, Philip was ever tightening the family tie between himself in Spain and his uncle and cousins in Austria. Ferdinand's son and successor married Philip's sister; Philip's son and successor married Ferdinand's granddaughter.¹

The Inheritance of Philip II

Few characters in history have elicited more widely contradictory estimates than Philip II. Represented by many English writers as a villain, despot, and bigot, he has been extolled by patriotic Spaniards as Philip the Great, champion of civilization. These conflicting opinions are derived from different views which may be taken of the value and inherent worth of Philip's policies and methods, but of what those policies and methods were there can be no doubt.

The Character of Philip II

In the first place, Philip II, in marked contrast with Charles V,

¹ The continuing intermarriages of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs are outlined in the genealogical table, "The Habsburgs of Spain and Austria and Related Monarchs in Early Modern Times," between pp. 224-225.

prized Spain as his native country and his main possession. He had been born in Spain and he resided there during almost all of his life. He was patriotically devoted to the task of making Spain the greatest country in the world.

In the second place, Philip II was sincerely and piously attached to Catholicism. He abhorred Protestantism as a blasphemous rending of the seamless garment of the church and as a grave menace to Christian civilization. He set his heart upon the universal triumph of his faith. If, by any chance, a question should arise between the advantage of Spain and the best interests of the church (as he conceived them), the former must be sacrificed relentlessly to the latter. Such was the sovereign's stern ideal. No seeming failure of his policies could shake his belief in their fundamental excellence. That whatever he did was done for the greater glory of God, that success or failure depended upon the inscrutable will of the Almighty and not upon himself, were his guiding convictions, which he transmitted to his Spanish successors.

Not only was Philip a man of principles and ideals, but he was possessed of a boundless capacity for work and an indomitable will. He preferred tact and diplomacy to war and prowess of arms, though he was quite willing to order his troops to battle if the object, in his opinion, was right. He was personally less accustomed to the sword than to the pen, and no clerk ever toiled more industriously at his papers than did this king. From early morning until far into the night he bent over minutes and reports and other memoranda of kingcraft. Naturally cautious and reserved, he was dignified and princely in public. In his private life, he was orderly and extremely affectionate to his family and servants. Loyalty was Philip's best attribute.

There was a ~~less happy side to the~~ character of Philip II. He was suspicious and deceitful; he was too meticulous about details and minutiae of administration to grasp the larger problems of statesmanship; and he was so hostile to dissent in state and church that in a highly intolerant age he earned the reputation of being most intolerant. His drastic use of the Inquisition undoubtedly promoted a kind of unity within Spain, but such unity was dearly bought, and in the long run it proved deleterious to the political and economic strength of the Spanish nation.

In his efforts to make Spain the greatest power in the world

and to restore the unity of Christendom, Philip II was doomed to failure. The chief reason for the failure is simple—it was the number and variety of the problems and projects with which he was concerned. It was a case of the king putting a finger in too many pies—he was cruelly burned. Could Philip II have devoted all his energies to one thing at a time, he might conceivably have had greater success, but as it was, he had to divide his attention between supervising the complex administration of his already wide dominions and annexing in addition the monarchy and empire of Portugal, between promoting a vigorous commercial and colonial policy and suppressing a stubborn revolt in the Netherlands, between championing Catholicism in both England and France and protecting Christendom against victorious Moslems. It was this multiplicity of interests that paralyzed the might of the Spanish monarch, yet each one of his foreign activities was epochal in the history of the country affected. We shall therefore briefly review Philip's activities in order.

**Manifold
Problems
Confronting
Philip II**

As we have seen, Philip II inherited a number of states which had separate political institutions and customs. He believed in national unification, at least for Spain. National unification implied uniformity, and uniformity implied greater power of the crown. So Philip sought to further the work of his great-grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabella. Absolutism and uniformity became his watchwords in internal administration. Politically Philip made no pretense of consulting the cortes on legislation, and, although he convoked them to vote new taxes, he established the rule that the old taxes were to be considered as granted in perpetuity and as constituting the ordinary revenue of the crown. He treated the nobles as ornamental rather than useful, retiring them from royal offices in favor of lawyers and other subservient members of the middle class. In contrast with Charles V, Philip II had a "court" conception of government, that everything was to be directed by him from his court and through his secretaries. All business was thus conducted by correspondence and with a final reference to the king, and the natural result was endless red tape and delay and eventually a paralyzing of local initiative and efficient central government.

Financially and economically the period was unfortunate for Spain. The burden of the host of foreign enterprises fell with

crushing weight upon the Spanish kingdom and particularly upon Castile. Aragon, which was poor and jealous of its own rights, would give little. The income from the Netherlands, at first large, was stopped by the revolt. The Italian states barely paid expenses. The revenue from the American mines, which has been greatly exaggerated, enriched the pockets of foreign capitalists more than the treasury of the state.¹ In Spain itself, the greater part of the land was owned by the ecclesiastical corporations and the nobles, who were exempt from taxation but were intermittently fleeced. Moreover, the ten per cent tax on all sales—the *alcabala*—gradually paralyzed native industrial enterprise. And the persecution of wealthy and industrious Jews and Moors diminished the resources of the kingdom. Spain, at the close of the century, despite seeming opulence, was on the verge of bankruptcy.

In religious matters Philip II aimed at assuring uniform adherence of his subjects to the Catholic Church. He felt, like so many of his contemporaries, that disparity of belief among citizens would destroy the state. Both from political motives and from religious zeal Philip was a Catholic. He therefore advised the pope, watched with interest the proceedings of the great council of Trent which was engaged with the reformation of the church,² and labored for the triumph of his religion not only in his own dominions and in France, but also in Poland, in England, and even in Scandinavia. In Spain he strengthened the Inquisition and used it as a tool of royal despotism and religious intolerance.

Territorially Philip II desired to complete political unity in the peninsula by combining the crown of Portugal with that of Spain. He himself was closely related to the Portuguese royal family, and in 1580 he laid formal claim to its inheritance. The duke of Braganza, whose claim was better than Philip's, was bought off by immense grants, and the country was overrun by Spanish troops. Philip endeavored to placate the Portuguese by full recognition of their constitutional rights and in particular by favoring the lesser nobility or country gentry. Although the monarchies and vast colonial possessions of Spain and Portugal were thus joined for sixty years under a common king, the arrangement never commanded any affection in Por-

¹ See above, pp. 87-90.

² See above, pp. 185-187.

tugal, with the result that at the first opportunity, in 1640, Portuguese independence was restored under the leadership of the Braganza family.

The most serious domestic difficulty which Philip had to face was the revolt of the rich and populous Netherlands, which we shall discuss presently. But with other revolts the king had to contend. In his efforts to stamp out heresy and peculiar customs among the descendants of the Moors who still lived in the southern part of Spain, Philip aroused armed revolt. The Moriscos, as they were called, struggled desperately from 1568 to 1570 to reëstablish the independence of Granada; their rebellion was suppressed with great cruelty. A revolt of Aragon in 1591 was put down by a Castilian army; the constitutional rights of Aragon were diminished and the kingdom was reduced to a greater measure of submission.

The causes that led to the revolt of the Netherlands may be stated as fourfold. (1) Financial. The burdensome taxes which Charles V had laid upon the country were increased by Philip II and often applied to defray the expenses of other parts of the Spanish possessions. Furthermore, the restrictions which Philip imposed upon Dutch commerce in the interest of that of Spain threatened to interfere seriously with the wonted economic prosperity of the Netherlands. (2) Political. Philip II sought to centralize authority in the Netherlands and despotically deprived the cities and nobles of many of their traditional privileges. Philip never visited the country in person after 1559, and he entrusted its government to regents and to Spaniards rather than to native leaders. The scions of the old and proud noble families of the Netherlands naturally resented being supplanted in lucrative and honorable public offices by persons whom they could regard only as upstarts. (3) Religious. Despite the rapid spread of Calvinistic Protestantism throughout the northern provinces, Philip was resolved to force Catholicism upon all of his subjects. He increased the number of bishoprics, decreed acts of uniformity, and with vigor and cruelty utilized the Inquisition to carry his policy into effect. (4) Personal. The Netherlanders loved Charles V because he had been born and reared among them and always considered their country as his native land. Philip II was born and brought up in Spain. He spoke a language foreign

The Revolt of the Netherlands

to the Netherlands, and by their inhabitants he was thought of as an alien.

At first the opposition in the Netherlands was directed chiefly against the Inquisition and the presence of Spanish garrisons in the towns. The regent, Margaret of Parma, Philip's half-sister, endeavored to banish public discontent by a few concessions. The Spanish troops were withdrawn and certain unpopular officials were dismissed. But influential noblemen and burghers banded themselves together early in 1566 and presented to the regent Margaret a petition, in which, while protesting their loyalty, they expressed fear of a general revolt and begged that a special embassy be sent to Philip to urge upon him the necessity of abolishing the Inquisition and of redressing their other grievances. The regent, at first disquieted by the petitioners, was reassured by one of her advisers, who exclaimed, "What, Madam, is your Highness afraid of these beggars (*ces gueux*)?" Henceforth the chief opponents of Philip's policies in the Netherlands humorously labelled themselves "Beggars" and assumed the emblems of common begging, the wallet and the bowl. The fashion spread quickly, and the Beggars' insignia were everywhere to be seen, worn as trinkets, especially in the large towns. In accordance with the Beggars' petition, an embassy was despatched to Spain to lay the grievances before Philip II.

Philip II at first promised to abolish the Inquisition in the Netherlands, but soon repented of his promise. For meanwhile, excited by the king's attempt to make them conform to Catholicism, mobs of radical Protestants, far more revolutionary than the respectable Beggars, were rushing to arms, breaking into Catholic churches, wrecking the altars, smashing the images to pieces, profaning monasteries, and showing in their retaliation as much violence as the royal agents had shown cruelty in persecution. In August, 1566, this sacrilegious iconoclasm reached its climax in the irreparable ruin of the magnificent cathedral at Antwerp. Philip replied to these acts by sending (1567) his most famous general, the duke of Alva, into the Netherlands with a large army and with instructions to cow the people into submission.

Alva proved himself quite capable of understanding and executing his master's wishes. One of his first acts was the creation of a "Council of Troubles," an arbitrary tribunal which tried

cases of treason and which operated so notoriously as to merit its popular appellation of the "Council of Blood." During the duke's stay of six years, it has been estimated that eight thousand persons were executed, including the counts of Egmont and Horn, thirty thousand were despoiled of their property, and one hundred thousand quitted the country. Alva, moreover, levied an enormous tax of one tenth upon the price of merchandise sold. As the tax was collected on several distinct processes, it absorbed at least seven tenths of the value of certain goods—of cloth, for instance. The tax, together with the lawless confusion throughout the country, was a most serious blow at the economic prosperity of the Netherlands. It was quite natural, therefore, that the burgesses of the southern Netherlands, Catholic though most of them were, should unite with the nobles and with the Protestants of the north in opposing Spanish tyranny. The whole country was now called to arms.

One of the principal noblemen of the Netherlands was a German, William of Nassau, prince of Orange.¹ He had been governing the provinces of Holland and Zeeland when Alva arrived, but as he was already at the point of accepting Protestantism he had prudently retired into Germany, leaving his estates to be confiscated by the Spanish governor. Certain trifling successes of the insurgents now called William back to head the popular movement. For many years he bore the brunt of the war and proved himself not only a resourceful general, but an able diplomat and a whole-souled patriot.

William of
Orange

The first armed forces of William of Orange were easily routed by Alva, but in 1569 a far more menacing situation was presented. In that year William began to charter corsairs and privateers to prey upon Spanish shipping. These "Sea Beggars," as they were called, were mostly wild and lawless desperadoes who stopped at nothing in their hatred of Catholics and Spaniards. They early laid the foundations of Dutch maritime power and at the same time proved a constant torment to Alva. They made frequent incursions into the numerous waterways of the Netherlands

¹ William (1533-1584), now commonly called "the Silent." There appears to be no contemporaneous justification of the adjective "silent" as applied to him. He was really quite talkative, but the misnomer, once adopted by later writers, has insistently clung to him.

and perpetually fanned the embers of revolt on land. Gradually William collected new armies, which more and more successfully defied Alva.

The harsh tactics of Alva had failed to restore the Netherlands to Philip's control, and in 1573 Alva was replaced in the regency by the more politic Requesens, who continued the struggle as best he could but with even less success than Alva. Soon after Requesens's death in 1576, the Spanish army in the Netherlands, left without pay or food, mutinied and inflicted such horrible indignities upon several cities, notably Antwerp, that the savage attack is called the "Spanish Fury." Deputies of most of the provinces at once concluded an agreement, termed "the pacification of Ghent" (1576), by which they mutually guaranteed resistance to the Spaniards until the king should abolish the Inquisition and restore their old-time liberties.

Then Philip II tried a policy of concession, but the new governor, his half-brother, the dashing Don John of Austria, fresh from a great naval victory over the Turks, soon discovered that it was too late to reconcile the Protestants. William the Silent was wary of the Spanish offers, and Don John died in 1578 without having pacified the Netherlands.

But Philip was not without some success in the Netherlands. He was fortunate in having a particularly determined and tactful governor in the country from 1578 to 1592 in the person of Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma. Skillfully mingling war and diplomacy, Farnese succeeded in sowing discord between the northern and southern provinces: the former were largely Calvinist and commercial; the latter were Catholic and industrial, and partially French. The ten southern provinces might eventually have more to fear from the northern provinces than from continued union with Spain; their representatives, therefore, signed a defensive league at Arras in 1579 for the protection of the Catholic religion and with the avowed purpose of effecting a reconciliation with Philip II. In the same year the northern provinces agreed to the union of Utrecht, binding themselves together "as if they were one province" to maintain their rights and liberties "with life-blood and goods" against Spanish tyranny and to grant complete freedom of worship and of religious opinion throughout the confederation.

In this way the "pacification of Ghent" was nullified and

the Netherlands were split into two parts, each going its own way, each developing its own history. The southern portion was to remain in Habsburg hands for over two centuries, being successively termed "Spanish Netherlands" and "Austrian Netherlands"; roughly speaking, it is what to-day we call Belgium. The northern portion was to become free and independent, and, as the "United Provinces" or simply "Holland," to take its place among the nations of the world. For a considerable period of time Holland was more prosperous than Belgium. The latter suffered more grievously than the former from the actual hostilities; and the Dutch,¹ by closing the River Scheldt and dominating the adjacent seas, dealt a mortal blow at the industrial and commercial supremacy of Antwerp and transferred the chief trade and business of all the Netherlands to their own city of Amsterdam.

Division
of the
Nether-
lands

For many years the struggle dragged on in the Netherlands. At times it seemed probable that Farnese and the Spaniards would overcome the North by force as they had obtained the South by diplomacy. But a variety of reasons explain the ultimate success of the Dutch. The nature of the country rendered ordinary campaigning very difficult; the network of canals constituted natural lines of defense and the cutting of the dikes could easily imperil an invading army. Again, the seafaring propensities of the Dutch enabled them to fit out an increasing number of privateers which habitually preyed upon Spanish commerce: it was not long before this traffic grew important and legitimate, so that in the following century Amsterdam became one of the greatest cities of the world, and Holland assumed a prominent place among commercial and colonial nations.² Thirdly, the employment of foreign mercenaries in the army of defense enabled the native population to devote more time to peaceful pursuits, and, despite the persistence of war, the Dutch provinces increased steadily in wealth and prosperity. Fourthly, the cautious Fabian policy of William the Silent prevented the Dutch from staking heavily upon battles in the open

¹ "Dutch" is really synonymous with "Netherlandish," but in modern times it has been commonly used to designate the people (and language) of the northern Netherlands, that is, of Holland. The people of the southern (Belgian) Netherlands who speak Netherlandish are called Flemings, and those who speak French are called Walloons.

² See below, pp. 391-393.

field. Fifthly, the Dutch received a good deal of assistance from Protestants of Germany, England, and France. Finally, Philip II pursued too many great projects at once to be able to bring a single one to a satisfactory conclusion; his war with Queen Elizabeth of England and his interference in the affairs of France inextricably complicated his plans in the Netherlands.

In 1581 Philip II published a ban against William of Orange, proclaiming him a traitor and an outlaw and offering a reward to anyone who would take him dead or alive. William replied by his famous *Apology* to the charges against him; but his practical answer to the king was the Act of Abjuration, by which at his persuasion the representatives of the northern provinces, assembled at The Hague, solemnly proclaimed their separation from the crown of Spain, broke the royal seal of Philip II, and declared the king deprived of all authority over them. We should call this Act of 1581 the Dutch declaration of independence. It was an augury of the definitive result of the war.

—Although William the Silent was assassinated by an agent of Spain (1584), and Antwerp was captured from the Protestants in 1585, the ability and genius of Farnese did not avail to make further headway against the United Provinces. But Philip II, stubborn to the end, positively refused to recognize Dutch independence. In 1609 Philip's son and successor consented to a twelve years' truce with the states-general of the northern Netherlands. In the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) the Dutch and Spaniards again became embroiled, and the freedom of the republic was not recognized officially by Spain till the general peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The seven provinces, which had waged such long war with Spain, constituted, by mutual agreement, a confederacy, each preserving a distinct local government and administration, but all subject to a general parliament (the states-general). Besides, several provinces usually had the same stadholder (or governor), an office which became hereditary in the Orange family. Between the states-general and the stadholder, a constitutional conflict was carried on throughout the greater part of the seventeenth century. The former, supported by the well-to-do burghers, favored the loose federal oligarchy, while the latter, upheld by most of the poorer classes, labored for the development of monarchical institutions under the Orange family.

Not only his efforts in the Netherlands but many other projects of Philip II were frustrated by remarkable parallel developments in the two national monarchies of England and France. Both these countries were naturally jealous and fearful of an undue expansion of Spain, which might upset the balance of power. Both states, from their geographical locations, would normally be inimical to Philip II. England would desire, from her island position, to destroy the monopoly which Spain claimed of the carrying trade of the seas. France, still encircled by Habsburg possessions in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, would adhere to her traditional policy of allying herself with every foe of the Spanish king. Then, too, the papal authority had been rejected in England and seriously questioned in France: Philip's crusading zeal made him the champion of the church in those countries. For ecclesiastical as well as for economic and political purposes it seemed necessary to the Spanish king that he should bring France and England under his direct influence. On their side, patriotic Frenchmen and Englishmen resented such foreign interest in their domestic affairs, and the eventual failure of Philip registered a noteworthy growth of national feeling among the peoples who victoriously contended against him. The beginnings of the real modern greatness of France and England date from their struggle with Philip II.

Complications
with Eng-
land and
France

At the outset of his reign, Philip seemed quite successful in his foreign relations. As we have seen, he was in alliance with England through his marriage with Queen Mary Tudor (1553-1558). She had temporarily restored the English church to communion with the Holy See, and was conducting her foreign policy in harmony with Philip's; because of her husband she lost to the French the town of Calais, the last English possession on the Continent (1558). Likewise, as has been said, Philip II concluded with France in 1559 the advantageous treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. But during the ensuing thirty years the tables were turned. Both England and France ended by securing respite from Spanish interference.

Mary Tudor died unhappy and childless in 1558, and the succession of her half-sister Queen Elizabeth, daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, altered the relations between the English and Spanish courts. Elizabeth (1558-1603) was possessed

of an imperious, haughty, energetic character; she had remarkable intelligence and an absorbing patriotism. She inspired such confidence in her advisers and respect among her people, that she was commonly called "Good Queen Bess" despite the fact that her habits of deceit and double-dealing gave color to the French king's remark that she was the greatest liar in Christendom. This was the woman with whom Philip II had to deal. He tried many tactics in order to gain his ends. All of them were hopelessly unsuccessful.

Queen Elizabeth of England
 Philip first proposed matrimony, but Elizabeth was very careful not to give herself, or England, such a master. Then when the queen declared herself a Protestant and showed no inclination to assist Philip in any of his enterprises, and especially when she patronized raids on his overseas commerce and rebellion of his Dutch subjects, the Spanish king sought her dethronement. He encouraged sedition in England and Ireland, and plots looking to Elizabeth's assassination. Many conspiracies against the English queen centred in the person of the ill-starred Mary Stuart, queen of Scotland, who was next in line of succession to the English throne and withal a Catholic.

Queen Mary of Scotland
 Descended from the Stuart kings of Scotland and from Henry VII of England, related to the powerful family of Guise in France, Mary had been brought up at the French court and married to the short-lived French king, Francis II. Upon the death of the latter she returned in 1561 to Scotland, a young woman of but eighteen years, only to find that the government had fallen victim to the prevalent factional fights among the Scottish nobles and that in the preceding year the parliament had solemnly adopted a Calvinistic form of Protestantism.¹ By means of tact and mildness, however, Mary won the respect of the nobles and the admiration of the people, until a series of marital troubles and blunders—her marriage with a worthless cousin, Henry Darnley, and then her scandalous marriage with Darnley's profligate murderer, the earl of Bothwell—alienated the people from her and drove her into exile. She abdicated the throne of Scotland in favor of her infant son, James VI, who was reared a Protestant (and who subsequently became King James I of England), and then (1568) she threw herself upon the mercy of Elizabeth. She

¹ See above, pp. 167-169.

thought she would find in England a haven of refuge; instead she found a prison.

For the score of years during which she remained Elizabeth's prisoner, Mary Stuart was the object of many plots and conspiracies against the existing governments of both Scotland and England. In every such scheme were to be found the machinations and money of the Spanish king. In fact, as time went on, it seemed to a growing section of the English people just as certain that the cause of Elizabeth was bound up with Protestantism, with national independence and prosperity, as that the success of Mary would lead to the triumph of Catholicism, the political supremacy of Spain, and the commercial ruin of England. Under these circumstances Mary's fate was sealed. Because of a political situation over which she had slight control, the ex-queen of Scotland was beheaded by Elizabeth's orders in 1587.

Philip II had now tried and failed in every expedient but one,—the employment of sheer force. Even this he attempted in order to avenge the death of Mary Stuart and to bring England, politically, religiously, and commercially, into harmony with his Spanish policies. It has sometimes been said that the underlying cause of the conflict between England and Spain in the second half of the sixteenth century, together with its chief interest, was religious—that it was part of an epic struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism. There may be a measure of truth in such an idea, but most recent writers believe that the chief motives for the conflict, as well as its important results, were essentially economic. From the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, English sailors and freebooters, such as Hawkins and Drake, took the offensive against Spanish trade and commerce; and many ships, laden with silver and goods from the New World, and bound for Cadiz, were seized and towed into English harbors. The queen herself frequently received a share of the booty and therefore tended to encourage the practice. For nearly thirty years Philip put up with the capture of his treasure ships, the raiding of his colonies, and the open assistance rendered to his rebellious subjects.¹ Only when he reached the conclusion that his power would never be secure in the Netherlands or in America did he despatch the armada.

The story of the preparation and the fate of the "Invincible

¹ On the English freebooters of the time, see below, pp. 385-388.

Armada" is almost too well known to require repetition. In 1588 there issued from the mouth of the Tagus River the most formidable fleet which Christendom had ever beheld—130 ships, 8,000 seamen, 19,000 soldiers, the flower of the Spanish chivalry. In the Netherlands it was to be joined by Alexander Farnese with 33,000 veteran troops.

Philip II's Armada against England

But in one important respect Philip had underestimated his enemy; he had counted upon a divided country. Now the attack upon England was primarily national, rather than religious, and Catholics vied with Protestants in offering aid to the queen; it was a united rather than a divided nation which Philip faced. The English fleet, composed of comparatively small and easily manœuvred vessels, worked great havoc upon the ponderous and slow-moving Spanish galleons, and the wreck of the armada was completed by a furious gale which tossed ship after ship upon the rocks of northern Scotland. Less than a third of the original expedition ever returned to Spain. Its failure led to the freedom of Holland and marked the collapse of the Spanish monopoly upon the high seas and in the New World.

Philip II had thus failed in his herculean effort against England. He continued in small ways to annoy and to irritate Elizabeth. He tried—without serious result—to incite the Catholics of Ireland against the queen. He exhausted his arsenals and his treasures in determined attempts to equip a second and even a third armada. But he was doomed to bitterest disappointment, for two years before his death an English fleet sacked his own great port of Cadiz. The defeat of Philip's armada was England's first title to naval and commercial supremacy.

France in the Time of Philip II

Before we can appreciate the motives and results of the interference of Philip II in French affairs, a few words must be said about what had happened in France since Francis I (1515-1547) and his son, Henry II (1547-1559), exalted the royal power in their country and not only preserved French independence of the surrounding empire of Charles V but also increased French prestige by means of an aggressive policy in Italy and by the extension of frontiers toward the Rhine. Henry II had married a member of the famous Florentine family of the Medici—Catherine de' Medici—a large and ugly woman, but ambitious, resourceful, and capable. By means of trickery and deceit she took an active part in French

politics from the death of her husband, throughout the reigns of her feeble sons, Francis II (1559-1560), Charles IX (1560-1574), and Henry III (1574-1589). Catherine found her position and that of her royal children continually threatened by (1) the Protestants (Huguenots), (2) the great nobles, and (3) Philip II of Spain.

French Protestantism had grown steadily during the first half of the sixteenth century until it was estimated that from a twentieth to a thirtieth of the nation had fallen away from the Catholic Church. The influence of the advocates of the new faith was, however, much greater than their number. The Huguenots, as they were called, were recruited mainly from the prosperous, intelligent middle class,—the bourgeoisie,—who had been entrusted by preceding French kings with many important offices. The Huguenots represented, therefore, a powerful social class, and one that was opposed to the undue increase of royal power. They demanded, not only religious toleration for themselves, but also regular meetings of the estates-general and control by the nation's representatives of financial matters. The kings, on their part, felt that political solidarity and their own personal rule depended upon the maintenance of religious uniformity in the nation and the consequent defeat of the pretensions of the Huguenots. Francis I and Henry II had persecuted the Protestants with bitterness. From 1562 to 1593 a series of so-called religious wars embroiled the whole country.

French politics were further complicated during the second half of the sixteenth century by the recrudescence of the power of the nobles. The so-called religious wars were quite as much political as religious; they resulted from efforts of this or that faction of noblemen to dictate to a weak king. Two noble families particularly vied with each other for power,—the Bourbons and the Guises,—and the unqualified triumph of either would be certain to bring calamity to the sons of Catherine de' Medici. The Bourbons bore the proud title of princes of the blood because they were direct descendants of a French king. Their descent, to be sure, was from Saint Louis, king in the thirteenth century, and they were now, therefore, only distant cousins of the reigning kings, but as the latter died off, one after another, leaving no direct successors, the Bourbons by the French law of strict

The Religious Wars in France

The Bourbons

male succession became heirs to the royal family. The head of the Bourbons, a certain Anthony, had married the queen of Navarre and had become thereby king of Navarre, although the greater part of that country—the region south of the Pyrenees—had been annexed to Spain in 1512. Anthony's brother Louis, prince of Condé, had a reputation for bravery, loyalty, and ability. Both Condé and the king of Navarre were Protestants.

The Guise family was descended from a duke of Lorraine who had attached himself to the court of Francis I. Lorraine was then a dependency of the Holy Roman Empire, but its duke was French in sympathy, and he had aided the French king in securing Metz from the Emperor Charles V and in capturing Calais from the English, with a result that the Guises were popular with a goodly part of the French nation. The duke of Guise remained a staunch Catholic, and his brother, called the Cardinal of Lorraine, was head of as many as twelve bishoprics, which gave him an enormous revenue and made him the most conspicuous churchman in France. During the reign of Henry II (1547-1559) the Guises were especially influential. They fought valiantly in foreign wars. They spurred on the king to a great persecution of the Huguenots. They increased their own landed estates. And they married one of their relatives—Mary, queen of Scots—to the heir to the throne. But after the brief reign of Mary's husband, Francis II (1559-1560), the Guise family encountered not only the active opposition of their chief noble rivals, the Bourbons, with their Huguenot allies, but likewise the jealousy and crafty intrigues of Catherine de' Medici.

Catherine feared both the ambition of the powerful Guise family and the disruptive tendencies of Protestantism. The result was a long series of confused civil wars between the ardent followers, respectively Catholic and Protestant, of the Guise and Bourbon families, in which the queen-mother gave support first to one side and then to the other. There were no fewer than eight of these sanguinary conflicts, each one ending with the grant of slight concessions to the Huguenots and the maintenance of the weak kings upon the throne. The massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day (1572) was a horrible incident of Catherine's policy of trimming. Fearing the undue influence over the king of Admiral de Coligny, a respected and able Huguenot leader, the queen-mother, with the aid of the Guises, prevailed upon the

impressionable Charles IX to authorize the wholesale assassination of Protestants. The signal was given by the ringing of a Parisian church-bell at two o'clock in the morning of 24 August, 1572, and the slaughter went on throughout the day in the capital and for several weeks in the provinces. Coligny was murdered; even women and children were not spared. It is estimated that in all at least three thousand persons—perhaps ten thousand—lost their lives.

The massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day did not destroy French Protestantism or render the Huguenot leaders more timid in asserting their claims. On the other hand, it brought into clear light a noteworthy division within the ranks of their Catholic opponents in France. On one side were the rigorous followers of the Guise family, who complained only that the massacre had not been sufficiently comprehensive, and, on the other side, were a group of moderate Catholics, usually styled the *Politiques*, who, while continuing to adhere to the Roman Church, and, when called upon, bearing arms on the side of the king, were strongly opposed to the employment of force or violence or persecution in matters of religion. The "Politiques" *The Foliotiques* were particularly patriotic, and they blamed the religious wars and the intolerant policy of the Guises for the seeming weakness of the French monarchy. They thought the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day a blunder as well as a crime.

The emergence of the *Politiques* did not immediately make for peace. Rather, it substituted a three-sided for a two-sided conflict.

After many years, filled with disorder, it became apparent that the children of Catherine de' Medici would have no direct male heirs and that the crown would therefore devolve legally upon the son of Anthony of Bourbon—Henry of Bourbon, king of Navarre and a Protestant. Such an outcome was naturally distasteful to the Guises and abhorrent to Philip II of Spain. In 1585 a league was formed between Henry, duke of Guise, and the Spanish king, whereby the latter undertook by military force to aid the former's family in seizing the throne. French politics in that event would be controlled by Spain, and Philip would secure valuable assistance in crushing the Netherlands and conquering England.¹ The immediate outcome of the agreement

¹ At that very time, Mary, queen of Scots, cousin of Henry, duke of Guise, was held a prisoner in England by Queen Elizabeth.

was the war of the three *Henries*—*Henry III, son of Catherine de' Medici* and king of France; *Henry, duke of Bourbon*, king of Navarre, and heir to the French throne; and *Henry, duke of Guise*, with the foreign support of *Philip II of Spain*. *Henry of Guise* represented the extreme Catholic party; *Henry of Navarre*, the Protestant faction; and *Henry of France*, the Catholic moderates—the *Politiques*—who wanted peace and were willing to grant a measure of religious toleration. *Henry of Navarre* and *Henry of France* were upholders of French independence against the encroachments of Spain.

The king was speedily gotten into the power of the Guises. But little headway was made by the extreme Catholics against *Henry of Navarre*, who now received domestic aid from the *Politiques* and foreign assistance from *Queen Elizabeth of England*, and who benefited by the continued misfortunes of *Philip II*. At no time was the Spanish king able to devote his whole attention and energy to the French war. At length in 1588 *Henry III* caused *Henry of Guise* to be assassinated. The king never had a real chance to prove whether he could become a national leader by expelling the foreigners and putting an end to civil war, for he himself was assassinated in 1589. With his dying breath he designated the king of Navarre as his successor.

Henry of Navarre, the first of the Bourbon family upon the throne of France, took the title of *Henry IV* (1589-1610).¹ For four years after his accession, *Henry IV* was obliged to continue the civil war, but his abjuration of Protestantism and his acceptance of Catholicism in 1593 removed the chief source of opposition to him within France, and the rebellion soon collapsed. With the Spanish king, however, the struggle dragged on until the treaty of Vervins, which in the last year of *Philip's* life practically confirmed the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis.

Thus *Philip II* had failed to conquer or to dismember France. He had been unable to harmonize French policies with those of his own in the Netherlands or in England. Despite his endeavors, the French crown was now on the head of one of his enemies, who, if something of a renegade Protestant, had nevertheless granted

¹ It is a curious fact that *Henry of Navarre*, like *Henry of Guise* and *Henry of France*, died by the hand of an assassin.

**Henry IV
of France
and the
Treaty of
Vervins
with
Philip II**

qualified toleration to heretics.¹ Nor were these failures of Philip's political and religious policies mere negative results to France. The unsuccessful interference of the Spanish king contributed to the assurance of French independence, patriotism, and solidarity. France, not Spain, was to be the centre of European politics during the succeeding century.

In concluding this account of the career of Philip II, a large part of which has dealt with his manifold failures, a word should be added about one exploit that brought glory to the Spanish monarch. It was he who administered the first effective check to the advancing Ottoman Turks.

After the death of Suleiman the Magnificent (1566), the Turks continued to strengthen their hold upon Hungary and to fit out piratical expeditions in the Mediterranean. The latter repeatedly ravaged portions of Sicily, southern Italy, and even the Balearic islands, and in 1570 an Ottoman fleet captured Cyprus from the Venetians. Malta and Crete remained as the only Christian outposts in the Mediterranean. In this extremity, a league was formed to save Italy. Its inspirer and preacher was Pope Pius V, but Genoa and Venice furnished the bulk of the fleet, while Philip II supplied the necessary additional ships and the commander-in-chief in the person of his half-brother, Don John of Austria. The expedition, which comprised 208 vessels, met the Ottoman fleet of 273 ships in the gulf of Lepanto, off the coast of Greece, on 7 October, 1571, and inflicted upon it a crushing defeat. The Turkish warships were almost all sunk or driven ashore; it is estimated that 8,000 Turks lost their lives. When news of the victory reached Rome, Pope Pius intoned the famous verse, "There was a man sent from God whose name was John."

Philip II
and the
Ottoman
Turks

The battle of Lepanto was of great political importance. It gave the naval power of the Moslems a blow from which it never recovered and ended their aggressive warfare in the Mediterranean. It was, in reality, a crusade. Philip II was in his most becoming rôle as champion of church and pope. Hardly a noble family in Spain or Italy was not represented in the battle. Volunteers came from all parts of the world. The celebrated writer Cervantes lost an arm at Lepanto. Western

Battle of
Lepanto

¹ By the edict of Nantes. See above, pp. 204-205.

Europe was henceforth to be comparatively free from the Turkish peril.¹

3. THE AGE OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

For more than a half century after the death of Philip II, Spain was presided over in turn by his son and his grandson, Philip III (1598-1621) and Philip IV (1621-1665). During the greater part of this period, Spain retained the reputation of being not only a great power but the leading power in Europe.

Philip II, it is true, had failed to bring Holland, England, or France under Spanish control, but his failures, so far as Spain was concerned, were negative rather than positive; they had no immediate repercussion against the dominions or prestige of Spain and its Habsburg dynasty.


Indeed, under Philip III, the international situation seemed highly favorable to continued Spanish predominance. In England, the death of Queen Elizabeth (1603) and the accession of James I (who was the son of Mary Stuart and had been king of Scotland since 1567) led to a marked change in respect of Spain. James I was peace-loving and much impressed by Spain; he not only made formal peace with Philip III in 1604 but used his authority to restrain English pirates and freebooters from raiding Spanish colonies and robbing Spanish treasure-ships;² he even attempted to negotiate a marriage between a daughter of Philip III and his own son and heir. In France, the assassination of Henry IV (1610) and the succeeding internal troubles during the minority of Louis XIII promised the permanence of the treaty of Vervins and a surcease of the Bourbon feud with Spain. In the meantime, the Dutch agreed (1609) to a truce with Philip III, whereby, though Holland was at least temporarily lost to Spain, Spain was relieved of Dutch attacks upon her colonies and shipping and was afforded an opportunity to husband her resources for an eventual reconquest of Holland.

In the circumstances, the future seemed rosy for Spain. She was at peace. Precious metals were coming freely to her from America, and her great port of Cadiz now shared with Lisbon

¹ Not altogether, however. A century later, the Turks almost captured Vienna. See below, p. 326.

² Sir Walter Raleigh, conspicuous for his anti-Spanish words and deeds in the time of Elizabeth, was imprisoned from 1603 to 1616, and, for a new attack on Spaniards in Venezuela, was executed in 1618.

A Seventeenth-Century MAP of GERMANY



the chief carrying trade of the Portuguese East Indies. Her grandees were living in luxury, and her captains and adventurers and the surplus of her common people were finding adequate outlet for their energies in the steady development of her colonial dependencies overseas.

Spain retained, moreover, during the first half of the seventeenth century a leading position in European culture and art. The vast royal palace of the Escorial which, with its magnificent renaissance church, Philip II had reared some thirty miles from Madrid, was richly embellished in turn by Philip III and Philip IV. Under these kings, too, flourished such great painters as Velasquez, Murillo, and Rubens, such a gifted historian as the Jesuit Mariana, and such noteworthy poets and dramatists as Lope de Vega and Calderon.¹ All the fine arts—literature, painting, sculpture, architecture, and music—continued to be prized and patronized by Spanish monarchs, Spanish grandees, and Spanish churchmen.

**Greatness
of Spanish
Art**

Yet, despite all its art, despite all its seeming wealth and power, the Spanish monarchy in the seventeenth century lost its predominance in Europe. To this end, several factors contributed. One was the fact, already alluded to, that the wealth which flowed to Spain from overseas did not permanently enrich the Spanish nation.² Another was the expulsion of the Moriscos from the country in 1609; it was dictated by the desire of Philip III to assure national and religious unity in Spain, but among its results was the loss to the country of thousands of skilled industrial workmen. Probably the most important factors, however, were the character of the Spanish monarchy and the limited capacity of the Spanish sovereigns in the seventeenth century.

**Decline of
Spanish
Predominance**

The Spanish monarchy, we must emphasize, was not a highly centralized national state; it was rather a dynastic empire. Philip III, for example, was sovereign of several kingdoms and principalities—Castile, Aragon, Portugal, Sicily, Naples, Milan, Sardinia, the Netherlands, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, the Indies,—which were differently administered and which were

¹ On Velasquez, Murillo, Rubens, and Calderon, see below, pp. 561, 567. On Lope de Vega, see above, p. 122, and on Suarez (and Mariana), see below, p. 539. Rubens was Flemish rather than Spanish, but he was a subject of the Spanish monarchy and was honored and pensioned by successive governors of the Spanish Netherlands.

² See above, pp. 87-90.

united only in personal allegiance to him as head of the Habsburg dynasty. To operate such a variegated and far-flung empire required of the dynast extraordinary wit and industry, the very qualities which the Spanish successors of Philip II notably lacked. Philip III was extremely virtuous and pious, but he was temperamentally a procrastinator and mentally a sluggard. Philip IV was a fine horseman, a keen hunter, and a discriminating patron of art and letters, but he was pleasure-loving and weak of will. While insisting on the most rigorous court etiquette, both of these Spanish Habsburgs left the actual conduct of public affairs largely to fawning courtiers and unworthy favorites.

The most consistent and absorbing interest of Philip III and Philip IV was in the Habsburg family. They thought of their Spanish inheritance as so many family possessions, all redounding to the glory of the Habsburgs. Likewise, they thought of Austria and its dependencies, not as foreign countries, but as lands owned by their cousins, the Austrian Habsburgs, and therefore as objects of common family solicitude.

In fact, the ties between Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs were very intimate. In a sense, the Austrian and Spanish realms were parts of a single dynastic empire. Charles of Spain and Ferdinand of Austria had been brothers. Their successors, Philip II and Maximilian II, had been first cousins; Maximilian had married Philip's sister, and Philip had married Maximilian's daughter. Hence Philip III was a grandson of Maximilian II of Austria, as well as a son of Philip II of Spain, and he himself married a niece of Maximilian. Even more intertwined was Philip IV with his Habsburg kinsmen in Austria; his sister married Ferdinand III, and he married Ferdinand's daughter, who was his niece.¹

In view of the intricate relationships within the Habsburg family and of the dynastic concern which actuated them, it was but natural that the Spanish sovereigns should take a lively interest in whatever befell the Austrian sovereigns. Something very serious befell the Austrian Habsburgs in the seventeenth

¹ For graphic representation of these intricate relationships, see the chart, "The Habsburgs of Spain and Austria and Related Monarchs in Early Modern Times," above, between pp. 224-225.

century. It caused the Spanish Habsburgs to put forth their utmost efforts in behalf of Austria, and it resulted in the momentous decline of Spain. This very serious thing was the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).

The Austrian Habsburgs, it will be recalled, ruled over the archduchy of Austria, the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, and the Holy Roman Empire. To these territories and dignities had succeeded, after the death of Ferdinand I in 1564, his son, Maximilian II, and then, in turn, the latter's sons (uncles of Philip III of Spain), Rudolph II (1576-1612), an art-loving but unbalanced recluse, and Matthias (1612-1619), an impressionable prince whose capacity was not equal to his ambition. It was under the weak rule of Rudolph and Matthias that there developed in Germany a situation—religious, economic, and political—which led eventually to civil war and foreign intervention, to the terrible struggle known as the Thirty Years' War

The
Austrian
Habsburgs

The peace of Augsburg (1555) had been expected to settle the religious question in the Holy Roman Empire.¹ In practice, however, it had failed in two respects. In the first place, the provision forbidding further secularization of church property (the "ecclesiastical reservation") was not obeyed; Protestant princes continued to confiscate Catholic estates, and some Catholic ecclesiastics, becoming Protestant, continued to convert their church lands into private holdings. Secondly, the peace had recognized only Catholics and Lutherans, while thereafter the Calvinists came into prominence in southern and central Germany and in Bohemia and they demanded equal rights.

Causes of
the Thirty
Years' War

In order to revise the treaty of Augsburg and to extort the needful concessions from the Catholic Habsburg emperor, a union of German Protestant princes was formed in 1608, under the leadership of the zealous young Calvinist prince of the Palatinate, Frederick, commonly called the Elector Palatine of the Rhine. On the other hand, German Catholics were in an equally belligerent frame of mind. Not only were they determined to resist further secularization of church property, but, emboldened by the progress of the Catholic reformation during the second half of the sixteenth century,² they were anxious to

¹ See above, pp. 158-159, 203, 237.

² See above, pp. 188-190.

revise the earlier religious settlement in their own interest and to recover if possible the lands that had been lost to the church. In 1609, a league of Catholic princes was formed under the guidance of the able Duke Maximilian of Bavaria. Religion, coupled with economic greed and political ambition, was obviously dividing Germany into two warlike camps and threatening the Holy Roman Empire with a dreadful civil war. The Catholic league would back the Habsburg emperor against the Protestant union, but Catholic princes were hardly more anxious than Protestant princes to strengthen imperial authority at their own expense. Here was the peril to Habsburg prestige in Germany; unable to prevent civil war, the Habsburg emperor was almost certain to suffer from its outcome. The only support upon which he could surely count was Spain's.

The signal for the outbreak of hostilities in the Holy Roman Empire was a rebellion against the Austrian Habsburgs in their own kingdom of Bohemia. As the Emperor Matthias was childless, the next in succession to all his lands and titles was his cousin, Ferdinand of Styria, a man of blameless life and resolute character, devoted to the cause of absolutism and fanatically loyal to the Catholic Church. Little opposition to the prospective accession of Ferdinand was encountered in Austria or Hungary. In Bohemia, however, the Czech nobles, many of whom were Calvinists, feared that Ferdinand would deprive them of their special privileges and impede, if not forbid, the exercise of the Protestant religion on their estates. Already there had been encroachments on their political autonomy and religious liberty.

One day in 1618, a group of Czech (Bohemian) noblemen broke into the room where imperial officials were conferring and hurled them out of a window into a castle moat some sixty feet below. This so-called "defenestration" of Ferdinand's representatives was followed by the proclamation of the dethronement of the Habsburgs in Bohemia and the election to the kingship of Frederick, the Calvinistic Elector Palatine. Frederick accepted the crown at Prague and prepared to defend his new title.

At this juncture, the Emperor Matthias died, and Ferdinand of Styria, becoming Ferdinand II (1619-1637), took energetic steps to expel Frederick from Bohemia. He arranged with

Philip III for the invasion of the Palatinate by a Spanish army, and with Maximilian of Bavaria for the invasion of Bohemia by joint forces of Austria and the Catholic league under the command of a famous Bavarian general, Count Tilly. King Frederick had expected support from his father-in-law, James I of England, and from the Lutheran princes of northern Germany, but in both respects he was disappointed. What with parliamentary quarrels at home and a curious desire not to offend Spain, James confined his assistance to pompous advice. Then, too, most of the Lutheran princes, led by the tactful John George, elector of Saxony, hoped by remaining neutral to obtain special concessions from the emperor.

In 1620 Tilly won a decisive victory at White Hill in Bohemia. Frederick fled, and within a very short time the whole country was subdued and Ferdinand II was reinstated. Many rebellious Czech nobles lost their property and lives, and the practice of the Protestant religion was again forbidden in Bohemia. Nor was that all. The fugitive Frederick, now derisively dubbed the "winter king," was driven by Spanish and Bavarian troops out of his original wealthy possessions on the Rhine, into miserable exile, an outcast without land or money. The conquered Palatinate was turned over to Maximilian of Bavaria, who was further rewarded for his services by being recognized as an elector of the Holy Roman Empire in place of the deposed Frederick.

The first period of the war was thus favorable to the Habsburg and Catholic causes. Between 1618 and 1620, revolt had been suppressed in Bohemia, and in Germany an influential Rhenish electorate had been transferred from Calvinist to Catholic hands. Moreover, the Spanish as well as the Austrian Habsburgs had gained prestige, and from 1621 to 1625 Spain occupied the centre of the European stage.

When Philip IV ascended the throne in 1621, he felt that the recent success of Spanish arms in the Palatinate augured well for Spanish reconquest of Holland, and accordingly he promptly renewed the Dutch war. Both France and England espoused the cause of Holland, and the Dutch fitted out an expedition against Brazil. But the French conducted their campaign badly; the Dutch were expelled from Brazil; an English attack on Cadiz was repulsed in

Spain in
the Thirty
Years'
War

1625; and in the same year came the climax of Spanish military exploits in the capture, after a long siege, of the Dutch town of Breda, a climax which has been immortalized by the masterpiece of the great painter Velasquez.

A special effect of the cumulative successes of Catholicism and the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria was to create grave alarm among the Protestant princes of northern Germany. If these had viewed with composure the failure of Frederick's foolhardy efforts in Bohemia, they beheld with downright dismay the expansion of Bavaria and the destruction of the balance of power between Catholic and Protestant in the Holy Roman Empire, in the Netherlands, and in Europe at large. And so long as the ill-disciplined remnants of Frederick's armies were behaving like highwaymen, pillaging and burning throughout Germany, Ferdinand II declined to grant any concessions to his Protestant vassals.

At this crisis, while the German Protestant princes were wavering between obedience and rebellion, Christian IV of Denmark intervened and inaugurated the second period of the Thirty Years' War within Germany. Christian IV (1588-1648) was impulsive and ambitious. As duke of Holstein he was a member of the Holy Roman Empire and opposed to Habsburg domination. As king of Denmark and Norway he was anxious to extend his influence over the North Sea ports. As a Lutheran, he sought to champion the rights of his German co-religionists and to help them retain the rich lands which they had expropriated from the Catholic Church. In 1625, therefore, Christian invaded Germany, supported by liberal grants of money from England and by the troops of many of the German princes, both Calvinist and Lutheran.

Against the Danish invasion, Tilly unaided might have had difficulty to stand, but fortune seemed to have raised up a co-defender of the Habsburg cause in the person of an extraordinary adventurer, Wallenstein. This man had enriched himself enormously out of the recently confiscated estates of rebellious Czechs, and, in order to benefit himself still further, he secured permission from Ferdinand II to raise an independent army of

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Surrender of Breda," is from the painting by Velasquez (1599-1660).





his own to restore order in the empire and to expel the Danes. By liberal promises of pay and plunder, the soldier of fortune soon recruited an army of some 50,000 men, and what a motley collection it was! Italian, Swiss, Spaniard, German, Pole, Englishman, and Scot,—Protestant was welcomed as heartily as Catholic,—anyone who loved adventure or hoped for gain, all united by the single tie of loyalty and devotion to Wallenstein. The force was whipped into shape by the undoubted genius of its commander and at once became an effective machine of war. Yet the terrible destructiveness of the war, to which the perpetual plundering of the countryside by his soldiers and camp-followers specially contributed, was a constant source of reproach to Wallenstein.

The campaigning of the second period of the war took place in northern Germany. At Lutter (1626) King Christian IV was defeated overwhelmingly by the combined forces of Tilly and Wallenstein, and the Lutheran states were left at the mercy of the Catholic league. Brandenburg openly espoused the Habsburg cause and aided Ferdinand's generals in expelling the Danish king from German soil. Only the lack of naval control of the Baltic and North seas prevented the victors from seizing Denmark. The desperation of King Christian and the growingly suspicious activity of Sweden resulted in the peace of Lübeck (1629), by which the king of Denmark was left in possession of Jutland, Schleswig, and Holstein, but deprived of the German bishoprics which various members of his family had taken from the Catholic Church.

Following up its successes, the Catholic league prevailed upon the Emperor Ferdinand II in the same year (1629) to sign the edict of Restitution, restoring to the church all the property that had been secularized in violation of the peace of Augsburg of 1555. The edict was to be executed by imperial commissioners, all of whom were Catholics, and so well did they do their work that, within three years of the promulgation of the edict, Catholicism in Germany recovered five bishoprics, thirty Hanse towns, and nearly a hundred monasteries, to say nothing of numerous parish churches.

So far, the religious and economic grievances against the

NOTE. The picture opposite, "King Philip IV," is from a painting by Velasquez.

Austrian Habsburgs had been confined mainly to Calvinists, but now the Lutheran princes were alarmed. The enforcement of the edict of Restitution against all Protestants alike was the signal for an emphatic protest from Lutherans as well as from Calvinists. A favorable opportunity for intervention seemed to present itself to the foremost Lutheran power—Sweden. Not only were many Protestant princes in Germany in a mood to welcome foreign assistance against the Catholics, but the emperor was less able to resist invasion, since in 1630, yielding to the urgent entreaties of the Catholic league, he dismissed the plundering and ambitious Wallenstein from his service.

The king of Sweden at this time was Gustavus Adolphus (1611–1632), the grandson of that Gustavus Vasa who had established both the independence and the Lutheranism of his country.¹ Gustavus Adolphus was one of the most attractive figures of his age—in the prime of life, tall fair, and blue-eyed, well educated and versed in seven languages, fond of music and poetry, skilled and daring in war, impetuous and versatile. A rare combination of the idealist and the practical man of affairs, Gustavus Adolphus had dreamed of making Protestant Sweden the leading power in northern Europe and had vigorously set to work to achieve his ends. His determination to encircle the whole Baltic with his own territories—making it literally a Swedish lake—brought him first into conflict with Russia. Not only were Finland and Estonia confirmed to Sweden, but by a treaty of 1617 Russia was deprived of Ingria. Next a stubborn conflict with Poland (1621–1629) secured for Sweden the province of Livonia and the mouth of the Vistula River. Gustavus then turned his longing eyes to the Baltic coast of northern Germany, at the very time when the edict of Restitution promised him aggrieved allies in that quarter.

It was likewise at the very time when Cardinal Richelieu, the chief minister to Louis XIII of France, was seeking some effective means of prolonging the war in Germany to the end that the Bourbon family which he served might profit from the defeat and humiliation of the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria. Richelieu entered into definite alliance with Gustavus Adolphus and supplied him with arms

**Gustavus
Adolphus
and
Swedish
Interven-
tion**

**French
Aid to
Sweden**

¹ See above, pp. 35, 160–161.

and money, for the time asking only that the Protestant champion accord the liberty of Catholic worship in conquered districts.¹

Gustavus Adolphus landed in Pomerania in 1630 and proceeded to occupy the chief northern fortresses and to treat for alliances with the influential Protestant electors of Brandenburg and Saxony. While Gustavus tarried at Potsdam, in protracted negotiation with the elector of Brandenburg, Tilly and the imperialists succeeded, after a long siege, in capturing the Lutheran stronghold of Magdeburg (May, 1631). The fall of the city was attended by a mad massacre of the garrison, and of armed and unarmed citizens, in streets, houses, and churches; at least 20,000 perished; wholesale plundering and a general conflagration completed the havoc. The sack of Magdeburg evoked the greatest indignation from the Lutherans. Gustavus Adolphus, now joined by the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony and by many other Protestant princes of northern Germany, advanced into Saxony, where, in September, 1631, he avenged the destruction of Magdeburg by defeating decisively the smaller army of Tilly on the Breitenfeld, near Leipzig. Then Gustavus turned southwestward, making for the Rhine valley, with the idea of forming a union with the Calvinist princes. Only the prompt protest of his powerful ally, Richelieu, prevented the rich archbishops of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz from passing immediately under Swedish control. Next, Gustavus Adolphus turned east and invaded Bavaria. Tilly, who had reassembled his forces, failed to check the invasion and lost his life in a battle on the Lech (April, 1632). The victorious Swedish king then made ready to carry the war into the hereditary dominions of the Austrian Habsburgs. As a last resort to check the invader, the emperor recalled Wallenstein with full power over his free-lance army. About the same time the emperor concluded an especially close military alliance with Philip IV of Spain.

The memorable contest between the two great generals—Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein—was brought to a tragic close in the late autumn of the same year on the fateful field of Lützen. Wallenstein was defeated, but Gustavus was killed. Although the Swedes continued the struggle, they were comparatively few in numbers and possessed no such general as their fallen king. On the other side, Wallenstein's loyalty could

¹ On the policy of Cardinal Richelieu, see below, pp. 282-287.

not be depended upon; rumors reached the ear of the emperor that his foremost general was negotiating with the Protestants to make peace on his own terms; and Wallenstein was assassinated in his camp by fanatical imperialists (February, 1634). The tragic removal of both Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus, the economic exhaustion of the whole empire, and the desire on the part of many Protestant princes, as well as on the part of the Catholic emperor, to rid Germany of foreign soldiers and foreign influence—all these developments seemed to point to the possibility of concluding the third, or Swedish, period of the war, not perhaps as advantageously for the imperialist cause as the Bohemian revolt or the Danish intervention had ended, but at any rate in a spirit of reasonable compromise. In fact, in May, 1635, a treaty was signed at Prague between the emperor and such princes as were then willing to lay down their arms, whereby all the military forces in the empire were henceforth to be under the direct control of the emperor (with the exception of a contingent under the special command of the Lutheran elector of Saxony); all princely leagues within the empire were to be dissolved; mutual restoration of captured territory was to be made; and, as to the fundamental question of the ownership of ecclesiastical lands, it was settled that any such lands actually held in the year 1627, whether acquired before or after the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555, should continue so to be held for forty years or until in each case an amicable arrangement could be reached.

What wrecked the peace of Prague was not so much the disinclination of the Protestant princes of Germany to accept its terms as the policy of Cardinal Richelieu of France. **French Intervention in the Thirty Years' War** Richelieu was convinced more than ever that French greatness depended upon Habsburg defeat; he would not suffer the princes to make peace with the emperor until the latter was soundly trounced and all Germany devastated. Instead of supplying the Swedes and the German Protestants with assistance from behind the scenes, he would now come boldly upon the stage and engage the emperor and the king of Spain in open combat.

The final, or French, period of the Thirty Years' War lasted from 1635 to 1648—almost as long as the other three periods put together. Richelieu wished to humble the Austrian Habsburgs

and, if possible, to wrest Alsace from the Holy Roman Empire, but his major designs were against Austria's close ally, Philip IV of Spain. The wily French cardinal could count upon the Swedes and many of the German princes to keep up the fighting in Germany against the Habsburg emperor, while French armies attacked the encircling dominions of the Habsburg king of Spain.

Thus, from 1635 onward Philip IV had to wage a very different kind of war from what he had previously waged. Prior to 1635, he had actively supported his Austrian kinsman and conducted an offensive against Holland; after 1635 he was confronted with such violent attacks by the French in the Belgian Netherlands, in Franche Comté, in northern Italy, and in Spain itself that he had to abandon the offensive against Holland and also against the German Protestants.

At first, the Spanish armies seemed to be superior to the French. The former were composed mainly of veterans and commanded by several able generals, including Prince Piccolomini, an Italian who had served under Wallenstein and had participated in his assassination. The French armies, totalling some 200,000 men, lacked proper training and competent commanders. In 1636 a large Spanish force invaded northern France and almost captured Paris, and in 1637 another Spanish force crossed the Pyrenees and invaded southern France.

Gradually, however, the balance shifted. Spanish armies made less and less headway against the French, and as the latter acquired experience and more capable generals they began to press the Spaniards back in the Netherlands, in the Rhineland, in northern Italy, and in southern France. By 1640 Philip IV was threatened with the disintegration of his dynastic empire. In that year, not only were the Dutch cooperating with the French to end his rule in the Netherlands, but an assembly of Portuguese nobles at Lisbon proclaimed his deposition as king of Portugal and the accession of John IV, the head of the native noble family of Braganza and a relative of the king whom Philip II had succeeded in 1580 when he annexed Portugal to Spain. And shortly after 1640, revolts against Philip IV broke out in Naples and in Catalonia (Aragon). Valiantly, but hopelessly, the Spanish monarch struggled on. The Catalans were repressed, and so were the Neapolitans; Milan was successfully defended and the Belgian Netherlands were

Troubles
of
Philip IV
of Spain


grimly held. But these defensive endeavors quite exhausted the resources of Philip IV; he was unable to recover Portugal or to make headway against Holland or France. In 1643 the prestige of the Spanish infantry was ruined by a great French victory at Rocroy.

Meanwhile, the fortunes of war had been fluctuating in Germany. For a time the Habsburg emperor, with the aid of Maximilian of Bavaria and other Catholic princes, more than held his own against Protestant Germans and Swedes, but the waning strength of Spain presently enabled the French to send larger and larger forces into Germany against the emperor, with decisive results. Negotiations for a general peace were opened in 1641 by Ferdinand III (who had become emperor on the death of his father, Ferdinand II, in 1637), but they bore no fruit until after the death of Cardinal Richelieu in 1642 and the occupation of Bavaria by the French in 1646. At last, in 1648, by a series of treaties concluded at the towns of Münster and Osnabrück in Westphalia, the Thirty Years' War was terminated and peace was restored within the Holy Roman Empire.

The peace of Westphalia left the Austrian Habsburgs in undisputed possession of their hereditary dominions—Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia—but its political provisions deprived them of any effective control over the Holy Roman Empire and at the same time wrought numerous changes within the empire. (1) Practically, each prince was invested with sovereign authority in his own territory; each prince was free to make peace or war without let or hindrance by the emperor. (2) France obtained Alsace, except the free city of Strasbourg, and was confirmed in the possession of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. (3) Sweden received part of Pomerania, controlling the mouth of the Oder, and the secularized bishopric of Bremen, surrounding the city of that name and commanding the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. (4) France and Sweden, thus getting German lands of the Holy Roman Empire, were awarded votes in the imperial diet, with implied right of future intervention in German affairs. (5) Brandenburg secured eastern Pomerania and several bishoprics, including Magdeburg. (6) The Palatinate was divided between Maximilian of Bavaria and the son of the deposed Frederick, and Bavaria, as well as the

Palatinate, was henceforth to be an electorate. (7) Switzerland and the United Provinces of the Netherlands (Holland) were formally recognized as free and independent states—Holland, of the Spanish Habsburgs, and Switzerland, of the Austrian Habsburgs.

In addition to its political provisions, the peace of Westphalia contained certain stipulations concerning religion. (1) Calvinists were to share all the privileges of their Lutheran fellow Protestants. (2) Any piece of church property was to be secured to such Catholic or Protestant as held it at the beginning of the year



1624. (3) An equal number of Catholic and Protestant judges were to sit in the imperial courts. Inasmuch as there was relatively little change of religious profession in Germany after 1648, there was general acquiescence in these religious stipulations of the peace of Westphalia.

The era of the Thirty Years' War and of the peace of Westphalia is highly important in the history of modern Europe. The Thirty Years' War itself was the worst but the last of the so-called religious wars. While it began as a fight between Protestants and Catholics, its chief stakes were ever economic and political, and it closed in a major conflict between Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties, both nominally Catholic but both chiefly concerned with statecraft. That a Protestant prince of Brandenburg should

give assistance to the Catholic emperor and that a cardinal of the Roman Church should incite Catholic France to aid German Protestants were clear signs of a noteworthy transfer of interest, in the first half of the seventeenth century, from religious fanaticism to secular ambition. The Thirty Years' War paved a rocky road toward the eventual dawn of religious liberty.¹

**Emer-
gence of
Modern
State-
System of
Europe** The Thirty Years' War likewise prepared the way for the emergence of the modern state-system of Europe, with its formulated principles of international law and its definite usages of international diplomacy. Modern diplomatic usages had originated among the Italian city states in the fifteenth century and had been adopted early in the sixteenth century by the monarchs of Spain, Portugal, France, England, and other countries for the conduct of interstate business. Yet the modern state-system could not emerge so long as one European state—the Holy Roman Empire, or the dynastic empire of the Habsburgs—claimed to be, and actually was, superior in power and prestige to all other states. What the Thirty Years' War did in this respect was to reduce both the Holy Roman and the Habsburg empires to a position certainly no higher than that of the national monarchies of France, Sweden, England, and Spain, or that of the Dutch Republic. Indeed, from the negotiations and treaties of Westphalia truly emerged the modern state-system of Europe, based on the novel principle of the essential equality of independent sovereign states, though admitting of the fact that there were great powers as well as lesser powers. Henceforth the public law of Europe was to be made by diplomats and by congresses of ambassadors representing theoretically equal sovereign states. Westphalia pointed the new path.

Another aspect of international relations was emphasized in the first half of the seventeenth century. It was the Thirty Years' War, with its revolting cruelty, which turned the attention of a considerable number of scholars to the need of formulating rules for the protection of non-combatants in time of war, the treatment of the sick and wounded, the prohibition of wanton pillage and other horrors which shocked the awakening humanitarianism of seventeenth-century Europe. The foremost of such scholars was Grotius,

**Develop-
ment of
Internat-
ional Law**

¹ On this point, see below, pp. 512, 518, 527.

whose famous treatise *On the Law of War and Peace* was published in the midst of the Thirty Years' War. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a learned Dutch humanist, whose political activity against the stadholder of Holland and whose agitation for religious toleration against the dominant orthodox Calvinists of his country combined to bring upon him a sentence of life imprisonment. Immured in a Dutch fortress in 1619, he managed to escape and fled to Paris, where he prepared and in 1625 published his great work. It was one of the first of the systematic treatises on modern international law.

Of more immediate significance than the rise of the modern state-system and of modern international law was the terrible havoc—political and especially economic—which the Thirty Years' War wrought in Germany. On the political side, the already shadowy imperial power became a mere phantom, and the resulting disunity of Germany, coupled with the selfishness of her several princes, postponed indefinitely the establishment of a national German state and at the same time invited continuous encroachments by powerful neighbors, particularly Sweden and France. On the economic side, the war left Germany almost a desert. "About two thirds of the total population had disappeared; the misery of those that survived was piteous in the extreme. Five sixths of the villages in the empire had been destroyed. We read of one in the Palatinate that in two years had been plundered eight times. In Saxony packs of wolves roamed about, for in the north quite one third of the land had gone out of cultivation, and trade had drifted into the hands of the French or Dutch. Education had almost disappeared; and the moral decline of the people was seen in the coarsening of manners and the growth of superstition, as witnessed by frequent burning of witches." We shall revert to the effects of the Thirty Years' War on Germany when we later take up the history of central Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹

Havoc
Wrought
in
Germany

The sorry effects of the Thirty Years' War on Germany must not blind our eyes to its disastrous results for Spain. Spain itself, to be sure, was not the scene of major military operations during those thirty years, and hence its fields were not laid waste

¹ See below, pp. 320-324. On the witchcraft superstition, see above, pp. 210-211, and below, p. 529.

and its towns were not destroyed like Germany's. But Spanish armies bore the brunt of the fighting during all those years, in the Netherlands, in southern Germany, in northern Italy.

Disastrous Results for Spain To serve the Habsburg cause, the Spanish treasury was emptied and Spanish manhood was bled white.

What had appeared in the sixteenth century to be the wealthiest and most virile state in all Europe was now, in 1648, one of the poorest and most helpless.

And what had Philip IV, the Habsburg king of Spain, gained? Faithfully and loyally he had served his kinsmen, the Austrian Habsburgs. But these made peace in 1648 without him, and a peace fairly advantageous to themselves. Austria was less injured than the other German states by the Thirty Years' War, and with her dependencies of Bohemia and Hungary still assured to her, she could continue as a great power in Europe, regardless of what befell the Holy Roman Empire or Germany as a whole. In other words, the head of the Austrian Habsburgs, Ferdinand III, found himself in 1648 with an imperial title which no longer meant much but with a compact group of hereditary states in east-central Europe which promised an eminent position for his family in the future.

Philip IV knew that he had sacrificed a good deal in order to preserve intact the possessions of Ferdinand III, his cousin and brother-in-law. He knew also that France insisted on obtaining some of the Spanish possessions. Why should not Ferdinand prolong the war after 1648 in order that Philip might check France, recover Portugal, and maintain Habsburg prestige in the Spanish inheritance? Ferdinand cynically rejected the pleas of Philip, and Philip, unwilling to agree to the peace of Westphalia except for the recognition of Dutch independence, persevered alone in the struggle against France.

Spain had already been at war thirty years. For another eleven years—from 1648 to 1659—she remained at war. Valiantly the

Continuation of the War between Spain and France Spanish soldiers fought on; doggedly the Spanish king declined to make concessions. In time, however, the French pressure became unbearable. French generals won victories in the Belgian (Spanish) Netherlands and in northern Spain. French statesmen had an ally in Portugal and by promising to cede the fortress of Dunkirk to England they obtained another ally in Great Britain. At length,

in 1659, Philip IV bowed to the inevitable and signed with France the treaty of the Pyrenees.

The treaty of the Pyrenees formally registered the end of Spanish predominance in Europe. Its provisions were as favorable to France as they were unfavorable to Spain.

(1) Spain ceded to France the province of Roussillon at the eastern end of the Pyrenees. (2) Spain ceded to France a southern strip of the Belgian Netherlands, including the province of Artois and several fortified towns. (3) Philip IV humbled himself to agree to the marriage of his daughter Maria Theresa to the Bourbon king of France, Louis XIV, who, in consideration of the payment of a large dowry by his Habsburg wife, renounced any further claim to the Spanish dominions. The dowry, it may be noted, was never paid; Spain was too poor.

The
Treaty of
the
Pyrenees

Following the conclusion of peace with France, Philip IV made an attempt to subdue Portugal, but his army was decisively defeated by the Portuguese in 1665. In the year of this crowning defeat, Philip IV died. He left to his infant son, Charles II, an all but ruined Spain. France, not Spain, already held the predominant position among the powers of Europe.



CHAPTER VI

THE PREDOMINANCE OF FRANCE

I. FRANCE UNDER HENRY IV, RICHELIEU, AND MAZARIN



N the sixteenth century, when Spain was the foremost country of Europe, France was harassed by numerous foreign invasions and by protracted domestic disturbances. Not until 1598, the year of the death of Philip II of Spain, was there a cessation of fighting in France. In that year, the edict of Nantes,¹ by according qualified religious toleration to the Huguenots, promised to establish internal peace, while the treaty of Vervins,² concluded in the same year with Spain, freed France from immediate external danger. The French king who achieved these things was the Bourbon Henry IV, and Henry IV it was who laid the foundations for the seventeenth-century predominance of France.

Sorry, indeed, was the plight of France which Henry IV set out to remedy. A century of civil and foreign war had produced most unfortunate consequences for the French state and for the French people. The state was nearly bankrupt. Country districts lay largely uncultivated. Towns were burned or abandoned.

France under Henry IV Roads were rough and neglected, and bridges in ruins. Many of the discharged soldiers turned highwaymen, pillaged farmhouses, and robbed travellers. Trade was at a standstill and the artisans of the cities were out of work. During the wars, moreover, great noblemen had taken many rights into their own hands and had acquired a habit of not obeying the king. The French crown seemed to be in danger of losing what power it had gained in the fifteenth century.

That the seventeenth century was to witness not a diminution but a pronounced increase of royal power, not a decline but a startling rise of French prestige, was due in first instance to the

¹ See above, pp. 204-205.

² See above, p. 158.

statesmanship of Henry IV (1589-1610). Henry IV was strong and vivacious. With his high forehead, sparkling eyes, smiling mouth, and his neatly pointed beard (*Henry quatre*), he was prepossessing in looks, while his affability and simplicity and his constant expression of interest in the welfare of his subjects earned him the appellation of "Good King Henry." His closest companions knew that he was selfish and avaricious, but that his quick decisions were likely to be good and certain to be put in force. Above all, Henry had soldierly qualities and would brook no disloyalty or disobedience.

During his reign, Henry IV was well served by his chief minister, the duke of Sully, an able and loyal Huguenot, though avaricious like the king and subject to furious fits of jealousy and temper. Appointed to the general oversight of financial affairs, Sully made tours of inspection through the country and reformed the royal finances. He forbade provincial governors to raise money on their own authority, removed many abuses of tax-collecting, and by rigorous administration was able between 1600 and 1610 to save an average of a million livres a year. The king zealously upheld Sully's policy of retrenchment; he reduced the subsidies to artists and the grants to favorites, and he retained only a small part of his army, just sufficient to overawe rebellious nobles and to maintain order and security throughout the realm. To promote and preserve universal peace, he even proposed the formation of a world confederation—his so-called "grand design"—which, however, came to nought through the mutual jealousies and rival ambitions of the various European sovereigns. It proved to be much too early to talk convincingly of general pacifism and disarmament.

While domestic peace was being established and provision was being made for immediate financial contingencies, Henry IV and his great minister were both laboring to increase the resources of their country and thereby to promote the prosperity and contentment of the people. Sully believed that the true wealth of the nation lay in farming pursuits and that therefore agriculture should be encouraged, even, if necessary, to the neglect of manufacturing and trade. While the king allowed Sully to cater to the farming interests, he himself encouraged the new commercial classes.

In order to promote agriculture, Sully urged the abolition of interior customs lines and the free circulation of grain, subsidized stock-raising, forbade the destruction of the forests, drained swamps, rebuilt roads and bridges, and planned a vast system of canals. On his side, Henry IV was contributing to the wealth of the middle class. It was he who introduced silkworms and the mulberry trees, on which they feed, thereby giving impetus to an industry which was to become one of the most important in France. A marked stimulus to the economic development of Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles dates from the reign of Henry IV.

The king likewise encouraged commerce. A French merchant marine was built up by means of royal bounties. A navy was started. Little by little the French began to break in on the commercial monopoly of Spain and to compete for trade on the high seas at first with the Dutch, and subsequently with the English. French trading posts were established in India; and Champlain was despatched to the New World to lay the foundations of a French colonial empire in North America. It was fortunate for France that she had two men like Henry IV and Sully, each supplementing the work of the other.

The assassination of Henry IV by a religious maniac in 1610 threatened for a time to nullify the effects of his labors, for supreme power passed to his widow, Marie de' Medici, an ambitious but incompetent woman, who dismissed Sully and undertook to act as regent for her nine-year-old son, Louis XIII. The queen-regent was surrounded by worthless favorites and was hated by the Huguenots, who feared her rigid Catholicism, and by the great nobles, Catholic and Huguenot alike, who were determined to maintain their privileges and power.

The hard savings of Henry IV were quickly exhausted, and France once more faced a financial crisis. In this emergency **Marie de' Medici and the Estates-General** the estates-general were again convened (1614). Since the accession of Louis XI (1461), the French monarchs with their absolutist tendencies had endeavored to remove this medieval check upon their authority; they had convoked it only in times of public confusion or economic necessity. Had the estates-general really been an effective body in 1614, it might have taken a position similar to that of the seventeenth-century parliament in England and

established constitutional government in France, but its organization and personnel militated against such heroic action. (The three estates—clergy, nobles, and commoners (bourgeois)—sat separately in as many chambers; the clergy and nobles would neither tax themselves nor coöperate with the third estate; the commoners, many of whom were Huguenots, were disliked by the court, despised by the first and second estates, and quite out of sympathy with the peasants, the bulk of the French nation. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the session of 1614 lasted but three weeks and ended as a farce: the queen-regent locked up the halls and sent the representatives home—she needed the room for a dance, she said. It was not until the momentous year of 1789—after a lapse of 175 years—that the estates-general again assembled.

After the fiasco of 1614, affairs went from bad to worse. There was a renewal of internal strife and disorder. Nobles and Huguenots contended among themselves, and both against the court favorites. There was also a reversal of Henry IV's foreign policy. Henry IV had regarded Spain as the chief rival and natural enemy of France; not only had he thwarted the efforts of Philip II to meddle in French affairs,¹ but he had avoided any entangling alliances with the Spanish Habsburgs. Marie de' Medici, on the other hand, was pro-Spanish, because she was dazzled by the apparent might of Spain and because she imagined that Spain would help her to surmount her difficulties in France. She arranged in 1615 the marriage of her youthful son, Louis XIII, with Anne of Austria, the daughter of Philip III of Spain (and sister of the future Philip IV), and she sought ever to harmonize the policies of the French Bourbons with those of the Spanish Habsburgs.

The
Queen
Regent's
Pro-
Spanish
Policy

Her obsequiousness to Spain only added to Marie de' Medici's unpopularity in France and occasioned fresh revolts by nobles and Huguenots against her rule. At length, the young king broke with his mother, forced her into retirement, and himself assumed the reins of government. But Louis XIII was always far more interested in music and hunting than in affairs of state, and it is extremely doubtful whether he would have bettered matters, had he not inherited from his

Louis XIII

¹ See above, pp. 254-259.

mother a public servant, Cardinal Richelieu, who possessed the statesmanship and the capacity for hard work which he himself lacked. For eighteen years—from 1624 to 1642—the royal power in France was exercised not so much by Louis XIII as by his famous minister.

Born of a noble family of Poitou, Armand de Richelieu (1585–1642) had been trained for an ecclesiastical career and at the age of twenty-one had been appointed bishop of the small diocese of Luçon. His eloquence and sagacity as spokesman for the clergy in the fatuous estates-general of 1614 attracted the notice of Marie de' Medici, who invited him to court, gave him a seat in the royal council, and secured his nomination as a cardinal of the Roman Church. Subtle and calculating, Richelieu analyzed the evils in France and came to the conclusion that he would be the agent for eradicating them. Always subtle and calculating, he advanced himself in the graces, first of the queen-regent, then of Louis XIII. By 1624 he was the latter's chief advisor—and real master.

"I promise," Richelieu told Louis XIII in 1624, "to devote all my energy and all the authority that it may please you to place in my hands to destroying the Huguenots, abasing the pride of the great nobles, restoring all your subjects to their duty, and raising the name of your majesty among foreign nations to its rightful place." Toward the fulfillment of this promise, the cardinal toiled the next eighteen years with unswerving patriotism and imperious will, with the most delicate diplomacy and all the blandishments of court intrigue, sometimes with sternest and most merciless cruelty. Marie de' Medici opposed him, and he exiled her. Louis XIII never truly liked him, but he overawed the king, and Richelieu's basic loyalty to crown and country was the one transparent quality of a mind otherwise quite inscrutable.

The domestic trouble-makers against whom Richelieu first moved were the Huguenots. Richelieu, though a cardinal of the Roman Church, was more politician and statesman than ecclesiastic; though living in an age of religious fanaticism, he was by no means a bigot. As we have already seen,¹ this Catholic cardinal actually gave military support to Protestants in Germany—for political pur-

Richelieu
and the
Hugue-
nots

¹ See above, pp. 268–272.

poses. It was similarly for political purposes that he attacked the Protestants in France.

As has already been pointed out,¹ French Protestantism meant an influential political party as well as a religion; it meant a state within the state, a constant source of national disunity and strife. Since Henry IV had issued the edict of Nantes, the Huguenots had had their own assemblies, officers, judges, and even certain fortified towns, all of which interfered with the sovereign authority and impaired that uniformity which thoughtful royalists believed to be the very cornerstone of national monarchy. Richelieu had no desire to deprive the Huguenots of religious freedom, but he was resolved that in political matters they should obey the king. Consequently, when they revolted in 1625, he determined to crush them. In spite of the considerable aid which England endeavored to give them, the Huguenots were entirely subdued. Richelieu's long siege of La Rochelle, lasting nearly fifteen months, showed his forceful resolution. When the rebellion was put down, the edict of Alais was published (1629), leaving to the Protestants freedom of conscience and worship but depriving them of their fortifications and forbidding them to hold political assemblies. Public office was still open to them, and their representatives kept their judicial posts. "The honest Huguenot retained all that he would have been willing to protect with his life, while the factious and turbulent Huguenot was deprived of the means of embarrassing the government."

The repression of the great nobles was a more difficult task, and one which Richelieu undertook in the face of redoubtable opposition. It had long been customary to name noblemen as governors of the various provinces, but the governors had gradually become masters instead of administrators. They commanded detachments of the army; they repeatedly and openly defied the royal will. The country, moreover, was sprinkled with noblemen's castles or *châteaux*, protected by fortifications and armed retainers, standing menaces to internal peace and to the execution of the king's orders. Finally, the noblemen at court, jealous of the cardinal's advancement and spurred on by the intrigues of the disaffected Marie de' Medici or of the king's own brother, the duke of Or-

Richelieu
and the
French
Nobility

¹ See above, pp. 255-258.

leans, annoyed and hampered the minister at every turn. Of such intolerable conditions, Richelieu determined to be quit.

Into the ranks of noble courtiers, Richelieu struck terror. By means of spies and trickery, he ferreted out conspiracies and arbitrarily put their leaders to death. Every attempt at rebellion was mercilessly punished, no matter how exalted in rank the rebel might be. Richelieu was never moved by entreaties or threats; he was as inexorable as fate itself.

The cardinal did not confine his attention to noblemen at court. As early as 1626 he published an edict ordering the immediate demolition of all fortified castles not needed for defense against foreign invasion. In enforcing this edict, Richelieu found warm supporters among the peasantry and townfolk who had long suffered from the exactions and depredations of their noble but warlike neighbors. The ruins of many a *château* throughout modern France bear eloquent witness to the cardinal's activity.

Another enduring monument to Richelieu was the centralization of French administration. The great minister was tired of

the proud, independent bearing of the noble governors. Without getting rid of them altogether, he checked these proud officials by transferring most of their powers to a new kind of royal officer, the intendant.

Appointed by the crown usually from among the intelligent, loyal middle class, each intendant was given charge of a certain district, supervising therein the assessment and collection of royal taxes, the organization of local police or militia, the preservation of order, and the conduct of courts. These intendants, with their wide powers of taxation, police, and justice, were later dubbed, from their approximate number, the "thirty tyrants" of France. But they owed their positions solely to the favor of the crown; they were drawn from a class whose economic interests were long and well served by the royal power; and their loyalty to the king, therefore, could be depended upon. The intendants constantly made reports to, and received orders from, the royal minister at Paris. They were so many eyes, all over the kingdom, for an ever-watchful Richelieu. And in measure as the power of the bourgeois intendants increased, that of the noble governors diminished, until, by the eighteenth century, the offices of the latter had become largely honorary though still richly remunerative.

The Centralization of French Administration

With the exception of the intendants, Richelieu fashioned no new instruments of government. In form, at least, the French monarchy under him continued to be what it had been for a long time previously and what most other European states still were. Unlike the highly organized and broadly functioning state which is usual in the twentieth century, the French monarchy of Richelieu's day was still loosely organized. The king was "absolute" in theory, but his absolutism was exercised in restricted fields and without the aid of an elaborate impersonal "central government." Nor did Richelieu create any such central government. The central government of his time was simply Richelieu acting personally in the name of the king. And for local administration, Richelieu merely superimposed his new intendancies on the traditional provinces, municipalities, villages, parlements, bishoprics, and estates of semi-feudal and semi-royalist France.

Yet there can be no doubt that Richelieu transformed the spirit of government in France. He made it less feudal and more royalist. He adapted existing political machinery to his purpose of exalting the royal authority (as interpreted by himself, the king's agent), of uprooting "divided loyalty" from the realm, and particularly of removing local checks upon royal absolutism in the domains of finance and army. He did not formally abolish the medieval estates-general. But because they had existed primarily to vote taxes, he refused to convoke them and allowed them to become an obsolete institution. The practice of convening them, if continued, might imperil the financial absolutism of the king; and in this respect, the behavior of the English parliament was not reassuring. The local estates, which existed in certain of the French provinces, notably in Brittany, Provence, Burgundy, and Languedoc, Richelieu permitted to go on, but he saw to it that they confined their activity to the mere apportionment of the taxes which the king and he assessed. He did get rid, as we have noticed, of the divisive political power of the Huguenots and the separatist military establishments of the great nobles. He would have but one public treasury in France—the king's. He would have but one armed force in France—the king's. And there would be no accounting by the king for either.

Richelieu's internal policies promoted obedience and unity

and paved the way for the assurance of monarchical absolutism in France, at the very time when, across the Channel, England, by means of revolution and bloodshed, was establishing parliamentary government. Simultaneously, while England was precluded by domestic quarrels from taking an active part in Continental affairs, France, under the masterful guidance of Richelieu, was participating effectively in the Thirty Years' War and acquiring a vast international prestige.

Richelieu was both a French patriot and a loyal servant of the Bourbon dynasty. As a French patriot he was anxious to assure to his country an independent and honored place in Europe and especially to weaken Spain, whose dependencies in the Netherlands, in Franche Comté, and in northern Italy all but surrounded France as with a ring of iron. As a loyal servant of Louis XIII, he desired to extend the sway of the Bourbon family at the expense of its principal European rival, the Habsburg family.

It was in this twofold rôle that Cardinal Richelieu directed French foreign policy during the Thirty Years' War against the allied Habsburgs of Austria and Spain. At first he was content to give advice and money to any force that took the field against the Habsburgs—the Protestant princes in Germany, the Swedes, the Dutch. Ultimately, in 1635, when indirect aid to enemies of the Habsburgs proved unavailing, Richelieu caused France to intervene directly in the struggle, and thenceforth until his death he was organizing and despatching one French army after another, now against the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire, and now against the adjacent territories of the Habsburg king of Spain, while simultaneously he was continuing to incite Dutch and Swedes and German Protestants to fresh endeavors against the Habsburg dynasty.¹

Richelieu did not live to witness the outcome of the Thirty Years' War. He died in 1642, six years before the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia and seventeen years before the signing of the treaty of the Pyrenees with Spain. But he lived long enough to behold the turning of the tide, the passing of military

¹ On the Thirty Years' War, see above, pp. 260–277.

NOTE. The picture opposite is a portrait of Turenne, the great French general in the Thirty Years' War and in subsequent wars of Louis XIV, from an engraving by Robert Nanteuil (1623–1678).





Collet sans et fin

*A la fin
 l'heure infamée et perdue,
 l'homme, Dieu, m'illusions à cet arbre pendue*

*Moult plus l'un, je le crime (horrible et noire époque)
 Et si luy même instruit de honte & de venime*

*Et que est le Diable des hommes vicieux
 De l'œuvre soit ou pas l', justice des Cieux*

prestige from Spain to France. By 1642, thanks to his efforts and energy, France had a larger and better army than Spain, and, thanks to a group of remarkable young generals whom he had called to service—particularly Turenne and Condé¹—French forces were wresting Alsace from the Austrian Habsburgs and Roussillon from the Spanish Habsburgs. It was already apparent that whatever political advantage might be gained from the miseries of the 'Thirty Years' War must accrue primarily to France and the Bourbons—and to the fame of Cardinal Richelieu.

Such in brief was the achievement of the grim cardinal who moved across the stage at a critical period in French history. In person, Richelieu was frail and sickly. Yet his pale drawn face displayed a firm determination and an inflexible will; and when clothed in his red robes, he appeared distinguished and commanding. Unscrupulous, exacting, and without pity, he preserved to the end a proud faith in his moral strength and in his loyalty to king and country.

In 1643, very soon after Richelieu's death, the monarch whom he had served so faithfully and so gloriously followed him to the grave, leaving the Bourbon crown of France to a boy of five years—Louis XIV. Louis XIV was the son of Louis XIII and Anne of Habsburg, and the nephew of Philip IV of Spain.

The
Minority
of
Louis XIV

The minority of Louis XIV might have been disastrous to France and to the royal power, had not the strong policies of Richelieu been maintained by another remarkable minister and cardinal, Mazarin. Mazarin (1602–1661) was an Italian, born near Naples and educated for an ecclesiastical career at Rome and in Spain. In the discharge of several delicate diplomatic missions for the pope, he had acted as nuncio at Paris, where he so ingratiated himself in Richelieu's favor that

Cardinal
Mazarin

¹ Turenne (1611–1675), the son of a French nobleman and, on his mother's side, the grandson of the great Dutch leader, William the Silent, received his early military training in the Netherlands and entered French service in 1630. He commanded French armies, with noteworthy success, in Alsace, Belgium, northern Italy, and Roussillon, and was made a marshal of France in 1643. He was a Protestant until late in life. Condé (1621–1686), a prince of the royal Bourbon family and known in his youth as the duke d'Enghien, won the decisive French victory at Rocroy in 1643, when he was only twenty-two.

NOTE. The picture opposite, illustrating some of the miseries attendant upon the triumph of French arms in the seventeenth century, is from an etching by Jacques Callot (1592–1635).

he was invited to enter the service of the king of France, and in 1639 he became a naturalized Frenchman.

Despite his foreign birth and the fact that he never spoke French without a bad accent, he rose rapidly in public office in his adopted country. He was named cardinal and was recognized as Richelieu's disciple and imitator. From the death of the greater cardinal in 1642 to his own death in 1661, Mazarin actually governed France.

Against the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria, Mazarin continued the gigantic struggle which Richelieu had begun, and he brought it to a successful conclusion for France. He negotiated the peace of Westphalia with the Holy Roman Empire in 1648 and the treaty of the Pyrenees with Spain in 1659. He obtained from the former the cession of Alsace (except Strasbourg) and the recognition of French "rights" on the Rhine and in Germany; he secured from Spain the cession of Roussillon and a strip of the Spanish (Belgian) Netherlands. He thus reaped the harvest which Richelieu had sowed, and he had the satisfaction of knowing that the sun of the Bourbons was rising as that of the Habsburgs was setting. He must have felt a peculiar thrill in extracting from the proud Habsburg king of Spain the pledge that his eldest daughter should marry her hereditary foe, Mazarin's young ward and nominal master, Louis XIV.

In internal affairs, Mazarin encountered grave difficulties. The great nobles had naturally taken umbrage at the vigorous policy which Richelieu had pursued against them and from which Mazarin gave no sign of departing. They had been unable to resist Richelieu, but against Mazarin they found allies among the patriotic middle class who disliked the Italian cardinal's foreign birth and foreign accent, as well as his avarice, his plundering of the revenues of the realm for the benefit of his own family, and his tricky double-dealing ways.

The result was the Fronde,¹ the last attempt prior to the French Revolution to cast off royal absolutism in France. It represented a vague popular protest, coupled with a selfish reaction on the part of the great nobles. The pretext for it was Mazarin's interference with the par-

¹ Probably so called from the name of a street game played by Parisian children and often stopped by policemen.

ment of Paris. The Fronde lasted, in an acute form, from 1648 to 1652.

The parlements were judicial bodies¹ which tried important cases and heard appeals from lower courts. That of Paris, being the most eminent, had come, in course of time, to exercise the right of "registering" royal decrees—that is, of receiving the king's edicts in formal fashion and entering them upon the statute books so that the law of the land might be known generally. From making such a claim, it was only a step for the parlement of Paris to refuse to register certain new edicts on the ground that the king was not well informed or that they were in conflict with older and more binding enactments. If these claims were substantiated, the royal will would be subjected to revision by the parlement of Paris. To prevent their substantiation, both Louis XIII and Louis XIV held "beds of justice"—that is, appeared in person before the parlement, and from their seat of cushions and pillows declared their will regarding the new edict and directed that it be promulgated. There were amusing scenes when the boy-king, at the direction of Mazarin, gave orders in his shrill treble to the learned lawyers and grave old judges.

Spurred on by seeming popular sympathy and no doubt by the contemporaneous political revolution in England,² the parlement of Paris in 1648 defied Mazarin (and the young king). It proclaimed its immunity from royal control; declared the illegality of any public tax which it had not freely and expressly authorized; ordered the abolition of the office of intendant; and protested against arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. To these demands, the people of Paris gave support; barricades were erected in the streets, and Mazarin, whose loyal army was still fighting in Germany, was obliged temporarily to recognize the new order. Within six months, however, sufficient troops had been collected to enable him to overawe Paris and to annul his concessions.

Nevertheless, the Fronde continued for several years during the ministry of Mazarin to inspire spasmodic plots and uprisings. For a time, Turenne sympathized with the movement, though in the end he gave strong military support to Mazarin and the royal cause. On the other hand, the great Condé, who with

¹ There were thirteen in the seventeenth century.

² See below, pp. 438-446.

Turenne shared the chief glory of French arms in the Thirty Years' War, rebelled openly against the Cardinalists, as Mazarin's party was called, and joined the Spaniards in their war against France. Condé returned to French service only with the utter collapse of the Fronde and the termination of Franco-Spanish hostilities in 1659.

The upshot of the Fronde was: (1) the great nobles were more discredited than ever; (2) the parlement was forbidden to devote attention to political or financial affairs; (3) Paris was disarmed and lost the right of electing its own municipal officers; (4) the royal authority was even stronger than under Richelieu, because an unsuccessful attempt had been made to weaken it. Henry IV, Richelieu, and Mazarin had made straight the way for the royal despotism of Louis XIV.

2. THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

Upon the death of Cardinal Mazarin in 1661, the young king, Louis XIV, declared that he would assume personal charge of the domestic and foreign affairs of the French monarchy. From that date, throughout a long reign, Louis was in fact as well as in name ruler of the nation.

Louis XIV profited by the earlier work of Henry IV, Sully, Richelieu, and Mazarin. He inherited a comparatively prosperous state, the population of which was patriotic and loyal to the crown. Insurrections of Protestants and rebellions of great nobles were things of the past. The estates-general, the medieval form of representative government, had fallen into disuse and oblivion. Local administration was conducted by faithful middle-class officials, the intendants.

Abroad, the rival Habsburgs had been humbled and French boundaries had been extended and French prestige heightened. Everything was in readiness for a great king to inaugurate a new era in European history.

Louis XIV was a great king—the “grand monarch,” he was designated alike by his contemporaries and by posterity. **The Grand Monarch** endowed with a superb constitution, a fund of common sense, and a cautious judgment, and marked by suavity, dignity, and elegance in manners and speech, he looked and acted like a king. Indeed, so great was the impression which he made upon France and upon Europe that the

period of his reign—approximately the second half of the seventeenth century—has ever since been styled the “age of Louis XIV.”

The age of Louis XIV was famous, first of all, for the crystalizing of the doctrine of royal absolutism. The theory of government which Louis held and acted upon was nicely stated and brilliantly elaborated, fairly early in his personal reign, by a learned French bishop, the celebrated Bossuet (1627-1704), whom the king employed as mentor for his son and heir. Doctrine
of Royal
Absolutism Government, according to Bossuet, is divinely ordained in order that men may satisfy the God-given natural instincts of living together in organized political society. Under God, monarchy is, of all forms of government, the most usual and the most ancient, and therefore the most natural. It is likewise the strongest and most efficient, therefore the best. It is analogous to the rule of a family by the father, and, like that rule, should be hereditary. Four qualities are referred by the eloquent bishop to such an hereditary monarch. (1) He is sacred, because he is anointed at the time of coronation by the priests of the church, and hence it is blasphemy and sacrilege to assail the person of the king or to conspire against him. (2) He is, in a very real sense, the father of his people, the paternal king, and therefore it belongs to him to provide for the welfare of the nation. (3) His power is absolute and autocratic, and for its exercise he is accountable to God alone; no man on earth may rightfully resist the royal commands, and the only recourse for subjects against an evil king is to pray God that his heart be changed. (4) Greater reason is given to a king than to anyone else; the king is an earthly image of God's majesty, and it is wrong, therefore, to look upon him as a mere man. The king is a public person and in him the whole nation is embodied. “As in God are united all perfection and every virtue, so all the power of all the individuals in a community is united in the person of the king.”

Such was Louis XIV's theory of absolutist divine-right monarchy. The theory had gradually been taking shape and gaining ground during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in various countries of Europe (including England),¹ but the fact that it was exemplified in the second half of the seventeenth century

¹ See below, pp. 428-429.

by such an impressive monarch as Louis XIV served to convince the mass of Frenchmen—and other Europeans too—of the substantial truth and validity of the theory. Thanks to Louis XIV, France acquiesced in the doctrine; thanks to the new predominance of France in Europe, other Continental peoples imitated the French and endorsed the principle of divine-right monarchical absolutism. The age of Louis XIV thus sanctioned a political principle which was to dominate most of Europe for a century and until the French Revolution.

Another, and very important, political achievement of the age of Louis XIV was the inauguration of a real organized system of central government and administration. Here Louis XIV himself took the lead. Instead of entrusting sole power to a Richelieu or a Mazarin to be exercised to such an extent and through such channels as a masterful minister could personally exercise it, the king proceeded to organize a number of ministries (finance, army, navy, public works, etc.) whose heads should be his servants rather than his masters. The king would determine all policies; the ministers would simply execute his will. The ministers would function somewhat impersonally through a staff of assistants and secretaries at the capital and through the intendants, royal governors, parlements, and other officials in the provinces, but they would report regularly to the king and would take no independent action without his express approval. Local officials, whether bourgeois intendants or noble governors, would be appointed by the king and would be brought, through the central ministries, into close and direct subjection to him.

For twenty or thirty years after his assumption of personal rule, Louis XIV was busily engaged in fashioning this new system of government. It was perhaps the most distinctive achievement of his reign, and it was peculiarly his own creation. He alone had the vision, the ambition, and the energy necessary to accomplish the very arduous task of transforming his realm from a congeries of semi-feudal principalities into an orderly centralized state. He worked hard at the task. "One reigns by work and for work," he said. Day after day he reviewed the details of administration. Over all things and all officials he kept a watchful eye. Methodically he practiced what he termed the "trade of a king." By 1685 his application to his "trade" was pro-

System-
atic Organ-
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tral Gov-
ernment

ducing obvious results, one of the chief of which was the fact that the French state of 1685 was thoroughly orderly and one to which foreigners looked as a model of royal centralization. Foreign monarchs especially envied the almost godlike majesty of the French king.

For Louis XIV was not content with hard work as God's lieutenant on earth. He must have the fame, the glory, the majesty—even the temple—befitting his divinity. The temple to himself—the crowning glory of his majesty—was the palace which he erected at Versailles, in the midst of what had been a sandy waste, some twelve miles from Paris. The stately palace, with its lavish furnishings and its broad parks and great groves and myriad statues and delightful fountains, was the wonder of France and Europe; the magnificent “Hall of Mirrors” was a perfect symbol of the “Grand Monarch.”

The
Majesty of
Versailles

In and about the palace of Versailles, Louis XIV gathered the court of France—his ministers, his central officialdom, his family, his mistresses, and his pick of French nobles and French artists—and he prescribed for all these a most rigid ceremonial, as would become the worshippers of his divinity. He was particularly anxious that the nobles should pay due homage to him. He had shorn them of real political power in the provinces but he made a kind of reparation to them by summoning them to bask in the light of his presence and to play leading rôles in the social pageant at Versailles. He must have persons of noble birth as valets-de-chambre for himself and his progeny and as masters of the wardrobe, of the table, of the chase, and of the revels. Only a nobleman was worthy to comb the royal hair or to dry off the king after a bath. Only nobles could vie with the crystal chandeliers in providing decorative lustre for the palace of the “Grand Monarch.”

Louis XIV was a patron of the arts—architecture, sculpture, painting, engraving, music, literature. A galaxy of artists he patronized and subsidized, and many of them graced the court of Versailles and dedicated their talents to the beautifying of the royal setting. J. H. Mansart, the architect, built the greater part of the main palace as well as the Grand Trianon at Versailles and designed the dome of the Invalides at Paris. Girardon was official sculptor, and Le

The
Golden
Age of
French
Art

Brun official painter, to Louis XIV. Lully, official musician, composed operas and ballets for the court. Even cooking became a fine art under Louis XIV; Vatel, a master chef, committed suicide over the artistic failure of one of his dishes.

The age of Louis XIV was a golden era for French literature. Among the host of celebrated literary persons whom the king applauded and attracted to Versailles were Corneille, the father of the French theatre; Molière, the greatest of French dramatists; Racine, the author of infinitely polished plays; Madame de Sévigné, the composer of brilliant witty memoirs; La Fontaine, the rhymers of whimsical fables and teller of scandalous tales; Bossuet, the preacher, historian, and philosopher. Backed by the merit of these writers and by the international prestige of the king whom they served, the French language became, before the close of the seventeenth century, the language both of polite society and of diplomacy all over Europe. Not only French political principles and practices, but French speech and literature and French manners, dress, and art were adopted as the models and property of civilized Europe. This was a highly significant aspect of the new French predominance.

French predominance itself was the outcome in no small degree of the success which, at least until 1685, attended the domestic and foreign policies of Louis XIV. By virtue of his domestic policy, not only was France consolidated politically, but she was enriched economically and thereby enabled to give substance to the reputation of the "Grand Monarch." Simultaneously, by virtue of his foreign policy, France was not only safeguarded against invasion but exalted to a commanding position in the warfare and diplomacy of Europe.

In his domestic policy, Louis XIV had the assistance of an extraordinarily talented minister, Colbert. Colbert (1619-1683)


Colbert and Economic Policies was the son of a merchant and was intensely interested in the middle class to which he belonged. Installed in office through the favor of Mazarin, he was successively named by Louis XIV, after the cardinal's death, superintendent of public works, controller-general of finances, minister of marine, of commerce and agriculture, and of the colonies. In short, until his death in 1683, Colbert exerted power in

NOTE. The picture opposite is a portrait of Louis XIV, from an engraving by Robert Nanteuil (1623-1678).



A. Hic scriptura est de rebus bonis
 et malis quae sunt in mundo
 et de rebus quae sunt in
 celo et in terra et de rebus
 quae sunt in inferno et in
 purgatorio et de rebus quae
 sunt in paradiso et in inferno

Incumbens apud...
 Sicut tempore...
 Quod tempore...
 Quod tempore...
 Quod tempore...



every department of government except that of war. Although he never possessed the irresponsible personal authority which marked the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin, and was plainly subservient to the king's commands, nevertheless he enjoyed for many years the royal confidence and by incessant toil succeeded in accomplishing a good deal for the material well-being of France.

First, financial reform claimed the energies of Colbert. Under the government of Richelieu, and more particularly under that of Mazarin, public expenditures had been enormously increased, the noble class had been largely exempted from taxation, and the weight of the financial burden had been put upon the lower classes, while an evil system of tax-gathering, called "farming the taxes,"¹ had grown up. Colbert sternly and fearlessly set about his task. He appointed fiscal agents whose honesty he could trust and he reformed many of the abuses in tax-collecting. While he was unable to impose the direct land tax—the *taille*—upon the privileged nobility, he stoutly resisted every attempt to augment the number of exemptions, and actually lowered this direct tax upon the peasantry by substituting indirect taxes, or customs duties, which would affect nobles and clergymen as well as commoners. To lighten the burden of the country-folk, he sought to promote agriculture. He provided that no farmers' tools might be seized for debt. He encouraged the breeding of horses and cattle. He improved the roads and other means of interior communication. The great canal of Languedoc, joining the Mediterranean with the Garonne River and thence with the Atlantic, was planned and constructed under his patronage. As far as possible, the duties on the passage of agricultural produce from province to province were equalized.

In forwarding what he believed to be his own class interests, Colbert was especially zealous. Manufactures and commerce were fostered in every way he could devise. New industries were established, inventors protected, workmen invited from foreign

¹ "Farming the taxes," that is, entrusting the collection of taxes to individuals or corporations that squeezed as much money as they could from the taxpayers and kept for themselves what they collected over and above the lump sum due the government.

NOTE The picture opposite, the "Fête Champêtre," a scene from the court life at Versailles toward the close of the reign of Louis XIV, is from a painting by Antoine Watteau (1684-1721). On Watteau, see below, p. 562.

countries, native workmen forbidden to leave France. A heavy tariff was placed upon foreign imports in order to protect "infant industries" and to profit French manufacturers and traders. Liberal bounties were granted to French ships engaged in commerce, and foreign ships were compelled to pay heavy tonnage duties for using French ports. And along with the protective tariff and the subsidizing of the merchant marine went other pet policies of mercantilism,¹ such as measures to prevent the exportation of precious metals from France, to encourage corporations and monopolies, and to extend governmental supervision over the manufacture, quality, quantity, and sale of commodities.

Stimulation of industry and commerce seemed to Colbert to involve the creation of a protecting navy. He accordingly reconstructed the docks and arsenal of Toulon and established shipyards at Rochefort, Calais, Brest, and Havre. He fitted out a royal navy that in size and strength could compare favorably with the navy of Spain or England or Holland. To supply it with recruits, he drafted seamen from the maritime provinces and resorted to the use of criminals, who were often chained to the galleys like so many slaves of the new industry.

Likewise, the adoption of the mercantile policy seemed to demand the acquisition of a colonial empire, in which the mother-country should enjoy a trade-monopoly. So Colbert became a vigorous colonial minister. He purchased Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies, encouraged settlements in San Domingo, in Canada, and in Louisiana, and set up important posts in India, in Senegal, and in Madagascar. France, under Colbert, became a serious colonial competitor with her older European rivals.²

Colbert was essentially a financier and economist. But to the arts of peace, which adorned the reign of Louis XIV, he was a noteworthy contributor. He strengthened the French Academy, which had been founded by Richelieu, and himself established the Academy of Sciences, now called the Institute of France; he also built the great astronomical observatory at Paris and purchased for Louis XIV the celebrated tapestry factory of the Gobelins. He pensioned many writers, and attracted foreign

¹ On mercantilism, see above, pp. 92-94.

² On the French colonial empire, see below, pp. 390-391, 395-401.

artists and scientists to France. Many buildings and triumphal arches were erected under his auspices.

In his foreign policy, Louis XIV relied upon diplomacy and arms. He himself was not a soldier. He never appeared in military uniform or rode at the head of his troops. He knew little of military science. What he lacked, however, of technical knowledge of warfare, he compensated for in wise choice of war ministers and military commanders.

**Military
Policy,
and
Louvois**

Thus in Louvois (1641-1691) he possessed a great minister, as capable of directing military affairs as Colbert was of superintending economic matters.

Louvois was indeed one of the greatest war ministers that the world has ever seen. He recruited and supported the largest and finest standing army of his day. He introduced severe regulations and strict discipline. He prescribed a distinctive military uniform, and he inaugurated regular drill and the custom of marching in step. Under his supervision, camp life was placed upon a sanitary basis; and under his influence, promotion in the service no longer depended exclusively on social position but upon merit as well.

In addition to such an extraordinary military organizer and administrator as Louvois, Louis XIV could count upon several highly competent generals and engineers. Among his generals were Condé and Turenne, who had won deservedly high reputations in the Thirty Years' War and who were thoroughly devoted to him and his policies. Chief among the engineers was Vauban, a master of defensive warfare and the builder of superb fortifications on the northern and eastern frontiers of France.

Louis XIV was personally one of the greatest diplomats of his age, and with Colbert furnishing him with copious funds and Louvois supplying him with a redoubtable army, he was in a position to prosecute an effective foreign policy. This policy, in line with the traditional foreign

**The
Foreign
Policy of
Louis XIV**

policy of French kings since the time of Francis I, had for its goal the humiliation of the powerful Habsburgs, whether of Spain or of Austria. Although France had gained materially at their expense in the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees,¹ much remained to be done by Louis XIV. When the Grand Monarch assumed personal control of affairs in 1661, the Spanish

¹ See above, pp. 272, 277.

Habsburgs still ruled not only the peninsular kingdom south of France, but the Belgian Netherlands to the north, Franche Comté to the east, and Milan in northern Italy, while their kinsmen of Austria maintained shadowy imperial government over the rich Rhenish provinces on the northeastern boundary of France. France was still almost completely encircled by Habsburg holdings.

To justify his subsequent aggressions, Louis XIV stressed the doctrine of "natural boundaries." Every country, he maintained, should secure such frontiers as nature had obviously provided—mountains, lakes, or rivers; and France was naturally provided with the frontiers of ancient Gaul—the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine River, and the ocean. Any foreign monarch or state that claimed power within such frontiers was an interloper and should be expelled.

For many years, and in three wars, Louis XIV endeavored, with some success, to reach the Rhine. These three wars—the War of Devolution, the Dutch War, and the War of the League of Augsburg—we shall now discuss. A fourth great war, directed toward the acquisition of the Spanish throne by the Bourbon family, will be treated in the following section.

The War of Devolution was an attempt of Louis to gain the Spanish (Belgian) Netherlands. It will be remembered that in accordance with the peace of the Pyrenees, Louis had married Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV of Spain. Now Philip IV, by a subsequent marriage, had had a son, a weak-bodied, half-witted prince, who came to the Spanish throne in 1665 as Charles II. Louis XIV at once took advantage of this turn of affairs to assert in behalf of his wife a claim to a portion of the Spanish inheritance. The claim was based on a curious custom which had prevailed in the inheritance of private property in the Netherlands, to the effect that children of a first marriage should inherit to the exclusion of those of a subsequent marriage. Louis insisted that this custom, called "devolution," should be applied not only to private property but also to sovereignty and that his wife should be recognized, therefore, as sovereign of the Belgian Netherlands. In reality the claim was a pure invention, but the French king thought it would be a sufficient apology for the robbery of a weak brother-in-law.

**The War
of Devolution**

Before opening hostilities, Louis XIV made use of his diplomatic wiles in order to guard himself against assistance which other states might render to Spain. In the first place, he obtained promises of friendly neutrality from Holland, Sweden, and the Protestant states of Germany, which had been allied with France during the Thirty Years' War. In the second place, he threatened to stir up another civil war in the Holy Roman Empire if the Austrian Habsburgs should help their Spanish kinsman.¹ Finally, he had no fear of England because that country was in the midst of a peculiarly bitter trade war with the Dutch.²

The War of Devolution lasted from 1667 to 1668. The well-disciplined and splendidly generalled armies of Louis XIV had no difficulty in occupying the border fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands. The whole territory would undoubtedly have fallen to France, had not a change unexpectedly occurred in international relations. The trade war between England and Holland came to a speedy end, and the two former rivals joined with Sweden in forming a Triple Alliance to arrest the war and to put a stop to the French advance. The "balance of power" demanded, said the allies, that the other European states should combine in order to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful. This plea for the "balance of power" was the reply to the French king's plea for "natural boundaries."

The threats of the Triple Alliance caused Louis XIV to negotiate the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which Spain, while retaining the greater part of the Belgian Netherlands, surrendered to France an important section, including the fortified cities of Charleroi, Tournai, and Lille. The taste of the Grand Monarch was thereby whetted, but his appetite was hardly appeased.

Louis blamed the Dutch for his rebuff. He was thoroughly alive to the fact that Holland would never take kindly to having powerful France as a near neighbor, and that French acquisition of the Belgian Netherlands, therefore, would always be opposed by the Dutch. Nor were wounded vanity and political considerations the only motives

The
Dutch
War

¹ Leopold I had succeeded his father, Ferdinand III, as Habsburg ruler of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor in 1658. Leopold's mother was a sister of Philip IV of Spain, and his wife was a sister of Charles II of Spain. Leopold reigned from 1658 to 1705.

² See below, pp. 394-395.

for the Grand Monarch's second war, that against the Dutch. France, as well as England, was becoming a commercial and colonial rival of Holland, and it seemed both to Louis XIV and to Colbert that the French middle class would be greatly benefited by breaking the trade monopolies of the Dutch. Louis's second war was quite as much a trade war as a political conflict.

First, Louis sought to break up the Triple Alliance and isolate Holland. He took advantage of the political situation in England to arrange (1670) the secret treaty of Dover with Charles II, the king of that country and his own cousin. In return for a large pension, which should free him from reliance upon parliament, the English king undertook to declare himself a Catholic and to withdraw from the Triple Alliance. Liberal pensions likewise bought off the Swedish government. Wherefore it seemed as if Holland, alone and friendless, would have to endure a war with her powerful enemy. Nor was Holland in shape for a successful resistance. Ever since she had gained formal recognition of her independence (1648), she had been torn by civil strife. On one side, the head of the Orange family, who bore the title of stadholder, supported by the country districts, the nobles, the Calvinistic clergy, and the peasantry, hoped to consolidate the state and to establish an hereditary monarchy. On the other side, the aristocratic burghers and religious liberals, the townsfolk generally, found an able leader in the celebrated Grand Pensionary, John DeWitt (1625-1672), who sought to preserve the republic and the rights of the several provinces. For over twenty years, the latter party was in power, but as the young prince of Orange, William III, grew to maturity, signs were not lacking of a reaction in favor of his party.

Under these circumstances, Louis XIV declared war against Holland in 1672. French troops at once occupied Lorraine on the pretext that its duke was plotting with the Dutch, and proceeding down the Rhine, past Cologne, invaded Holland and threatened the prosperous city of Amsterdam. The Dutch people, in a frenzy of despair, murdered John DeWitt, whom they unjustly blamed for their reverses; and, at the order of the young William III, who assumed supreme command, they cut the dykes and flooded a large part of northern Holland. The same expedient which had enabled them to expel the Spaniards

in the War of Independence now stayed the victorious advance of the French.

The refusal of Louis XIV to accept the advantageous terms of peace offered by the Dutch aroused general apprehension throughout Europe. The Emperor Leopold and the Great Elector of Brandenburg made an offensive alliance with Holland, which subsequently was joined by Spain and several German states. The general struggle, thus precipitated, continued indeed with success for France. Turenne, by a brilliant victory, compelled the Great Elector to make peace. The emperor was defeated. The war was carried into the Spanish Netherlands and Franche Comté.

But when at length the English parliament compelled Charles II to adhere to the general anti-French alliance, Louis XIV thought it was time to make peace. As events proved, it was not Holland but Spain that had to pay the penalties of Louis's second war. By the treaty of Nimwegen, the former lost nothing, while the latter ceded to France the long-coveted province of Franche Comté and several strong fortresses in the Belgian Netherlands. France, moreover, continued to occupy the duchy of Lorraine.

Thus, if Louis XIV had failed to penalize the Dutch, he had at least succeeded in extending the French frontiers one stage nearer the Rhine. He had become the greatest and most-feared monarch in Europe. Yet for these gains France paid heavily. The border provinces had been wasted by war. The treasury was empty, and the necessity of negotiating loans and increasing taxes put Colbert in despair. Turenne, the best general, had been killed late in the contest, and Condé, on account of ill health, was obliged to withdraw from active service.

Yet at the darker side of the picture, the Grand Monarch refused to look. No sooner was the Dutch War concluded than Louis XIV set out, by a policy of trickery and diplomacy, further to augment the French territories. The cessions, which the treaties of Westphalia and Nimwegen guaranteed to France, had been made "with their dependencies." It now occurred to Louis that doubtless in the old feudal days of the middle ages or early modern times some, if not all, of his new acquisitions had possessed feudal suzerainty over other towns or territories not yet incorporated into France. Although in most cases such earlier feudal ties

The
"Cham-
bers of
Reunion"

had practically lapsed by the close of the seventeenth century, nevertheless the French king decided to reinvoke them in order, if possible, to add to his holdings. He accordingly constituted special courts, called "chambers of reunion," composed of his own obedient judges, who were to decide what districts by right of feudal usage should be annexed. So painstaking and minute were the investigations of these chambers of reunion that they adjudged to their own country, France, no less than twenty important towns of the Holy Roman Empire, including Luxembourg and Strasbourg. Nothing seemed to prevent the prompt execution of these judgments by the French king. He had kept his army on a war footing. The king of England was again in his pay and his alliance. The emperor was hard pressed by a war with the Ottoman Turks.¹ Armed imperial resistance at Strasbourg was quickly overcome (1681), and Vauban, the great engineer, proceeded to make that city the chief French fortress upon the Rhine. A weak effort of the Spanish monarch to protect Luxembourg from French aggression failed (1684).

Alarmed by the steady advance of French power, the Emperor Leopold in 1686 succeeded in forming a league (called the **The League of Augsburg**) with Spain, Sweden, and several German princes, in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the Holy Roman Empire. Nor was it long before the League of Augsburg was called upon to resist further encroachments of the French king. In 1688 Louis despatched a large army into the Rhenish Palatinate to enforce a preposterous claim which he had advanced to that valuable district. The war which resulted was Louis's third struggle, and has been variously styled the War of the League of Augsburg or the War of the Palatinate. In America, it was paralleled by a conflict between French and English colonists, known as King William's War.

In his first two wars, Louis XIV could count upon the neutrality, if not the friendly aid, of England, whose king was dependent upon him for financial support in maintaining an absolutist government, and whose influential trading classes, still suffering more from Dutch than from French rivalry, displayed no anxiety to mix unduly in the dynastic conflict on the Continent. Louis had an idea that

The Revolution in Anglo-French Relations

¹ See below, p. 326.

he could count upon the continuation of the same English policy; he was certainly on good terms with the English king, James II (1685-1688). But the deciding factor in England and in the war proved to be not the subservient James II but the implacable William III. This William III,¹ as stadholder of Holland, had long been a stubborn opponent of Louis XIV on the Continent; he had repeatedly displayed his ability as a warrior and as a cool, crafty schemer. Through his marriage with the princess Mary, elder daughter of James II, he now managed adroitly to ingratiate himself with the Protestant, parliamentary, and commercial parties in England that were opposing the Catholic and absolutist policies of James.

We shall presently see that the English Revolution of 1688, which drove James II into exile, was a decisive step in the establishment of constitutional government in England.² It was likewise of supreme importance in its effects upon the foreign policy of Louis XIV, for it called to the English throne the son-in-law of James, William III, the stadholder of Holland and arch enemy of the French king.

England, under the guidance of her new sovereign, promptly joined the League of Augsburg, and declared war against France. Trade rivalries between Holland and England were in large part composed, and the colonial empires of the two states, now united under a joint ruler, naturally came into conflict with the colonial empire of France. Thus, in addition to the difficulties which the Bourbons encountered in promoting their dynastic interests on the Continent of Europe, they were henceforth confronted by a vast colonial and commercial struggle with England. It was the beginning of a protracted struggle for the mastery of India and America.

Louis XIV never seemed to appreciate the importance of the colonial and commercial side of the contest. He was too much engrossed in his ambition of stretching French boundaries to the Rhine. So in discussing the War of the League of Augsburg as well as the subsequent War of the Spanish Succession, we shall devote our attention in this chapter primarily to the European and dynastic elements, reserving the account of the parallel colonial struggle to a later chapter.³

¹ William III (1650-1702), Dutch stadholder in 1672 and British king in 1689

² See below, pp. 452-453.

³ See below, p. 402.

The War of the League of Augsburg, Louis's third war, lasted from 1689 to 1697. Notwithstanding the loss of Turenne and Condé, the splendidly organized French armies were able to hold the allies at bay and to save their country from invasion. They even won several victories on the frontier. But on the sea, the struggle was less successful for Louis, and a French expedition to Ireland in favor of James II proved disastrous. After many years of strife, ruinous to all the combatants, the Grand Monarch sued for peace.


The War of the League of Augsburg

By the treaty of Ryswick, which concluded the War of the League of Augsburg, Louis XIV (1) surrendered nearly all the places adjudged to him by the chambers of reunion, except Strasbourg; (2) allowed the Dutch to garrison the chief fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands as a "barrier" against French aggression; (3) granted the Dutch a favorable commercial treaty; (4) restored Lorraine to its duke; (5) abandoned his claim to the Palatinate; (6) acknowledged William III as king of England and promised to support no attempt against his throne. Thus, the French king lost no territory. On the other hand, he obtained full recognition of his ownership of the whole province of Alsace. And it had required a forceful union of most of the great powers of Europe to check Louis XIV and to halt the expansion of France.

When Louis XIV signed the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, he was in his sixtieth year, and he could look back with great satisfaction upon his achievements during the thirty-six years which had elapsed since his assumption of personal rule in France. He had consolidated his country and given it an orderly, broadly functioning central government. He had extended his sway to the Pyrenees and (in Alsace) to the Rhine, and had acquired Franche Comté and important cities in the Belgian Netherlands. France had clearly supplanted Spain as the predominant power in Europe; the Bourbon family had obviously become the peer of the Habsburgs; and, thanks to the new supremacy of French art and culture, as well as of French arms, the second half of the seventeenth century was already styled, quite appropriately, the age of Louis XIV.

3. SEEMING BOURBON ASCENDANCY

As Louis XIV grew older, he grew vainer and more ambitious. He was puffed up with pride by his unquestioned authority in



France, by the majesty of his surroundings at Versailles, by the obsequious bearing of his ministers and courtiers. He was especially conceited about his successes in diplomacy and war. Like many another ambitious ruler, he forgot or obscured the economic grievances and social discontent of his subjects in a blaze of foreign glory—in the splendor of ambassadors, the glint and din of arms, the grim shedding of human blood. Having picked the sanguinary path and found pleasure therein, the Grand Monarch pursued it to an end which, while assuring temporary ascendancy to his family, wrought eventual tragedy to his people.

By 1697 Louis XIV was not content to labor for the French monarchy. He must use the strength and prestige of France for the dynastic ascendancy of the Bourbons in Europe. It was no longer a matter simply of securing the "natural frontiers" of France; it was a matter now of constructing a dynastic empire, of which France should be the core, but which should assure to the Bourbon family the direction of as many dominions as the Habsburg family had ever ruled.

Indeed, one of the main reasons which prompted Louis XIV to conclude the War of the League of Augsburg without obtaining the Rhine boundary for France was his mounting ambition to effect the transfer of the Spanish dynastic empire from the Habsburgs to the Bourbons. Spain itself was still accounted a great power, and under its Habsburg crown were gathered not only the peninsular kingdoms of Castile and Aragon but the greater part of the Belgian Netherlands, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the island of Sardinia, the duchy of Milan, and the huge colonial possessions in America and the Philippines. The sovereign of all these diverse lands, while Louis was exercising personal rule in France, had been Charles II. Charles, of course, was a Habsburg; he was the son of Philip IV of Spain, and the grandson, on his mother's side, of Ferdinand III of Austria. But he was also related to the Bourbons; his aunt was the mother of Louis XIV, and his half-sister was Louis XIV's wife.

Despite his proud ancestry, Charles II of Spain from birth had been sickly and almost imbecile, and by 1697 he was far gone in physical and mental decay. What would become of his realms?

The Con-
ceit of
Louis XIV

The
Dynastic
Interests
of
Louis XIV

The Ques-
tion of the
Spanish
Succession

He had no children and no brothers. His nearest male heir was Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor and head of the Austrian Habsburgs. But his nearest (and most mighty) neighbor was Louis XIV. And the little wit of Charles II was torn between his wish to transmit his inheritance to "the illustrious house of Austria," his own kin, and the belief instilled into him by French agents that only the power of Louis XIV could avert the dismemberment of the Spanish empire. Adding to the perplexity of the unhappy Charles, was the fact that while one of his sisters was the wife of Louis XIV, the other was married to Leopold. The question of the Spanish succession was terribly difficult, not only for Charles, but for all Europe.

It will be recalled that by the treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) Louis XIV had renounced Bourbon claims to the Spanish succession on condition that a large dowry be paid him, but the impoverished state of the Spanish exchequer had prevented the payment of the dowry. Louis, therefore, might lay claim to the whole inheritance of Charles II and entertain the hope of seeing the Bourbons supplant the Habsburgs in some of the fairest lands of Christendom. In opposition to the French contention, the Emperor Leopold was properly moved by family pride to put forth the claim of his wife and that of himself as the nearest male relative of the Spanish king. If the contention of Leopold were sustained, a single Habsburg ruler might once more unite an empire as vast as that which the Emperor Charles V had once ruled. On the other side, if the ambition of Louis XIV were realized, a new and formidable Bourbon empire would be erected. In either case the European "balance of power" would be destroyed.

Bound up with the political problem in Europe were grave commercial and colonial questions. According to the mercantilist theories that flourished throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, every country which possessed colonies should reserve trade privileges with them exclusively to its own citizens. So long as France and Spain were separate and each was only moderately powerful, their commercial rivals, notably England and Holland, might hope to gain special trading concessions from time to time in French or Spanish colonies. But once the colonial empires of France and Spain were united under a joint ruler, such a monopoly would be created as might effect-

ally prevent the expansion of English or Dutch commerce, while heightening the economic prosperity of the Bourbon subjects.

It was natural, therefore, that William III, as stadholder of Holland and king of England, should seek to preserve a balance of power between the Austrian Habsburgs and the French Bourbons. Both the claimants appreciated this fact and understood that neither would be allowed peacefully to appropriate the entire Spanish inheritance. In fact, several "partition treaties" were patched up between Louis XIV, Leopold I, and William III, with a view to maintaining the balance of power and preventing either France or Austria from unduly increasing its power. But flaws were repeatedly found in the treaties, and, as time went on, the problem grew more vexatious.

After the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick (1697), Louis XIV was absorbed in the game of dividing the property of the dying Spanish king. One of the very greatest triumphs of Louis's diplomatic art was the way in which he ingratiated himself in Spanish favor. It must be remembered that it was Spain which the Grand Monarch had attacked and despoiled in his earlier wars of aggrandizement, and neither the Spanish court nor the Spanish people could have many patriotic motives for loving him. Yet such was his tact and his finesse that within three years after the treaty of Ryswick he had secured the respect of the feeble Charles II and the gratitude of the Spanish people.

Charles II, the last of the Spanish Habsburgs, a month before his pitiful death (1700), summoned all his strength and dictated a will that awarded his whole inheritance to Philip of Anjou, a grandson of Louis XIV, with the resolute proviso that under no circumstances should the Spanish possessions be dismembered. When the news reached Versailles, the Grand Monarch hesitated. He knew that acceptance meant war at least with Austria, probably with England. Perhaps he thought of the economic burdens which his other wars had already imposed on the French people.

Hesitation was but an interlude. Ambition triumphed over fear, and the glory of the Bourbon family over the welfare of France. In the great hall of mirrors at Versailles, the Grand Monarch heralded his grandson as Philip V, the first Bourbon king of Spain. And when Philip left for Madrid, his aged grand-

**Bourbon
Ascend-
ancy in
Spain**

father proudly kissed him, and the Spanish ambassador exultantly declared that "the Pyrenees no longer exist."

Anticipating the inevitable outbreak of hostilities, Louis proceeded to violate the treaty of Ryswick by seizing the "barrier" fortresses from the Dutch and by recognizing the son of James II as king of England. He then made hasty alliances with Bavaria and Savoy, and called out the combined armies of France and Spain.

Meanwhile, William III and the Emperor Leopold formed the Grand Alliance to which at first England, Holland, Austria, and the German electors of Brandenburg-Prussia, Hanover, and the Palatinate adhered. Subsequently, Portugal, by means of a favorable commercial treaty with England,¹ was induced to join the alliance, and the duke of Savoy abandoned France in favor of Austria with the understanding that his country should be recognized as a kingdom. The allies demanded that the Spanish crown should pass to the Archduke Charles, the second son of the emperor, that Spanish trade monopolies should be broken, and that the power of the French king should be curtailed.

The War
of the
Spanish
Succession

The War of the Spanish Succession—the fourth and final war of Louis XIV—lasted from 1702 to 1713. Although William III died at its very commencement, he was certain that it would be vigorously pushed by the English government of his sister-in-law, Queen Anne (1702-1714). The bitter struggle on the high seas and in the colonies, where it was known as Queen Anne's War, will be treated in another place.² The military campaigns in Europe were on a larger scale than had hitherto been known. Fighting was carried on in the Netherlands, in southern Germany, in Italy, and in Spain.

The tide of war turned steadily for several years against the Bourbons. The allies possessed the ablest generals of the time in the duke of Marlborough (1650-1722), the conscientious self-possessed English commander, and in the skillful and daring Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736). The battle of Blenheim (1704) drove the French from the Holy Roman Empire, and the capture of Gibraltar (1704) gave England a foothold in Spain and a naval base for the Mediterranean. Prince Eugene crowded

¹ The "Methuen Treaty" (1703).

² See below, pp. 403-404.

the French out of Italy (1706); and by the victories of Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709), Marlborough cleared the Netherlands. On land and sea one Franco-Spanish reverse followed another. The allies at length were advancing on French soil. It appeared almost certain that they would dictate peace at Paris on their own terms.

Then it was that Louis XIV displayed an energy and devotion worthy of a better cause. He appealed straight to the patriotism of the French people. He set an example of untiring application to toil. Nor was he disappointed in his expectations. New recruits hurried to the front; rich and poor poured in their contributions; a supreme effort was made to stay the advancing enemy.

The fact that Louis XIV was not worse punished was due to this remarkable uprising of the French (and the Spanish) nation and likewise to dissensions among the allies. A change of ministry in England led to the disgrace and retirement of the duke of Marlborough and made that country lukewarm in prosecuting the war. Then, too, the unexpected accession of the Archduke Charles to the imperial and Austrian thrones (1711) rendered the claims of the allies' candidate for the Spanish throne as menacing to the European balance of power as would be the recognition of the French claimant, Philip of Bourbon.


These circumstances made possible the conclusion of the peace of Utrecht (1713), with the following major provisions:

(1) **Philip V**, grandson of Louis XIV, was acknowledged king of Spain and the Indies, on condition that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united.

(2) The Austrian Habsburgs were indemnified by securing Naples, Sardinia,¹ Milan, and the Belgian Netherlands. The last-named, which had been called the Spanish Netherlands since the days of Philip II, were styled from 1713 to 1797 the Austrian Netherlands.

(3) England received the lion's share of the commercial and colonial spoils. She obtained Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia), and Hudson's Bay from France, and Gibraltar and Minorca from Spain. She also secured a preferential tariff for her imports into the great port of Cadiz, the monopoly of the slave

¹ By the subsequent treaty of London (1720), Austria exchanged Sardinia for Sicily.



EUROPE
 after the
 TREATY of UTRICHT
 By
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trade, and the right of sending one ship of merchandise a year to the Spanish colonies. France promised not to assist the Stuarts in their attempts to regain the English throne.

(4) The Dutch recovered the "barrier" fortresses and for garrisoning them were promised financial aid by Austria. The Dutch were also allowed to establish a trade monopoly on the River Scheldt.

(5) The elector of Brandenburg was acknowledged king of Prussia, an important step in the fortunes of the Hohenzollern family.¹

(6) The duchy of Savoy was recognized similarly as a kingdom and was given the island of Sicily.² From the house of Savoy has descended the reigning sovereign of present-day Italy.

It will be noted that France itself gained no territory and no real advantage from the War of the Spanish Succession. Worse still, France actually lost important colonies and was saddled with a grievous load of taxation and debt.

Yet there can be no doubt that, in a Europe where nations were identified with their sovereigns, the success of Louis XIV in seating his grandson on the Spanish throne served to uphold not only his own prestige but also that of France. France still appeared to be the predominant power in Europe, and, besides, there was now a seeming ascendancy of the Bourbon dynasty.

For eighty years after the treaty of Utrecht,—through the greater part of the eighteenth century,—the Bourbon dynasty reigned in both France and Spain, with the result that the foreign and colonial policies of these countries, hitherto divergent and conflicting, were now usually conducted in harmony. To be sure, the Habsburg dynasty remained powerful in Europe; it had ceased to rule Spain, but it controlled an Austrian dominion which had been enlarged and enriched by the acquisition of traditional Spanish territories in Italy and the Belgian Netherlands. As Spain had been used by the Austrian Habsburgs against France in the seventeenth century, so in the eighteenth century Spain was employed by the French Bourbons against

¹ See below, p. 333.

² The title of king was recognized by the emperor only in 1720, when Savoy exchanged Sicily for Sardinia. Henceforth the kingdom of Savoy was usually referred to as the kingdom of Sardinia.

Continuing
Prestige
of France
and the
Bourbons

Austria—and England. And in the whirl of dynastic ambitions, France as well as Spain suffered. The new ascendancy of the Bourbons and the continuing predominance of France were more apparent than real.

In several ways, the latter years of Louis XIV—say from 1685—were unfortunate for France. In foreign policies, his rupture with England in 1689 and his subordination of French interests to Bourbon ambition in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) had fateful effects throughout the ensuing century. In domestic policies, his devotion to the court at Versailles, his autocracy in state and church, his treatment of the nobility and clergy, and his fiscal measures produced a long train of direful consequences. These domestic policies of Louis XIV merit brief explanation.

Unfortunate Latter Policies of Louis XIV (1) *Devotion to the court at Versailles.* Louis XIV, after the completion of the great palace at Versailles, was so infatuated by it and so engrossed in its ceremonial that he came to regard Versailles as France and as the Bourbon empire. His predecessors had been Frenchmen; they travelled all over France, seeing and knowing it first-hand. But he and his successors down to the French Revolution knew only Versailles; they were increasingly indifferent to anything outside and almost unconscious of its existence; they seldom travelled and when they did they took the courtiers and ceremonies of Versailles with them.

(2) *Autocracy in state and church.* Louis XIV grew ever fonder of bending all his subjects to his own will. Much of what he had done, prior to 1685, to establish an orderly central government was undoubtedly beneficial, but as time went on he was too inclined to entrust the central government to second-rate courtiers and to close his ears to complaints from the provinces. Then, too, his zeal for centralization in the state prevented him from recognizing any virtue in local autonomy or individual initiative; what was not done by him or his agents should not be done at all.

In ecclesiastical matters, Louis XIV was similarly autocratic. He insisted that the Catholic Church in France should follow his dictates rather than the pope's and, with the assistance of Bossuet, he compelled the French bishops to declare (1682) that (1) the temporal sovereignty of kings is independent of the

pope; (2) a general council is above the pope; (3) the ancient liberties of the Gallican Church are sacred; (4) the authority of the pope belongs to pope and bishops jointly. This so-called "declaration of liberties of the Gallican Church" led to a violent quarrel between Louis XIV and Pope Innocent XI, but while the king formally withdrew the declaration in 1693, he continued to encourage the teaching of its doctrines.

Against other dissent from traditional Catholic Christianity, Louis XIV in his later years was sternly forceful. He persecuted the Jansenists and other Catholic groups whom he deemed heretical.¹ He also persecuted the Protestants. In this he was moved alike by the absolutist's desire for uniformity and by the penitent's fervor to make amends for earlier scandals of his private life. For a time he sought to terrify the Huguenots into conversion by quartering licentious soldiers upon them—the so-called dragonnades—but at length in 1685 he formally revoked the edict of Nantes. Thus did Louis XIV reverse the policy which for almost a century had made France a leading country in the practice of religious toleration. Huguenots were still accorded liberty of conscience, but they were denied freedom of worship and deprived of all civil rights in the kingdom. An immediate effect of this arbitrary action was the emigration of large numbers of industrious citizens, who settled in Prussia, Holland, England, or the English colonies in America and added materially to the economic and political life of the chief Protestant rivals of France.

(3) *Treatment of nobility and clergy.* Centralization, as Louis XIV conceived and achieved it, meant taking real political functions from the nobles, turning them into a useless class socially, and leaving them without political experience or capacity. Many lesser nobles remained on their landed estates, but, shorn of political power or influence, they became more and more isolated from their peasants and other fellow citizens and more and more devoted, in a selfish way, to festive hunting or to critical philosophy. On the other hand, many great nobles were obliged to take up their residence at Versailles, away from their hereditary estates and apart from the life of the nation. At Versailles, French nobles grew wasteful and vicious—and purely ornamental—at the very time when English nobles were

¹ On the Jansenists, see below, pp. 516-517.

exercising full political sway and directing their country's foreign and domestic policies.

The French clergy continued to comprise a large number of devout and self-sacrificing priests, but the bishops and other higher clergy, with some notable exceptions, tended more and more, under Louis XIV's later rule, to be drawn from the nobility, to live in luxury apart from the common people, and to share in the pleasures and sometimes the vices of Versailles. Too few of the bishops were real religious leaders, as too few of the nobles were real political leaders. The weight of Louis XIV's government was becoming ever heavier; the persons trained to bear it were becoming ever fewer.

(4) *Fiscal measures.* Louis XIV countenanced ever increasing expenditure of money—for the building and upkeep of Versailles, for entertainment and show, for the maintenance of army and navy, for the waging of a long series of foreign wars, for the promotion of Bourbon ascendancy in Europe. Especially after the death of Colbert in 1683, the expenditure of Louis XIV became prodigal.

France was a relatively wealthy country. Its fields were fertile, its peasants were hard-working and thrifty, its artisans were acquiring an international reputation for the quality of French hand-made goods, and its middle classes were becoming more numerous and richer. France might have borne the burden of Bourbon expenditure without grave distress or popular murmur, had the burden been broadly and equitably distributed. But Louis XIV would countenance no fiscal reform in this direction. On the contrary, he persevered in exempting the nobility and clergy from taxation and in deriving state income almost wholly from the peasants and middle classes.

Thereby, the state was deprived of income from the very great wealth in the hands of nobility and clergy, and these classes felt less and less responsibility for curbing expenditure or correcting fiscal abuses. At the same time, there was no parliament or other public agency through which the peasants and middle classes could exercise any financial control. This fact, coupled with the bad technique of "farming the taxes," which Louis XIV after Colbert's time did nothing to remedy, explains why in the last years of the Grand Monarch the accu-

mulating fiscal burdens of his domestic and foreign policies fell with crushing weight particularly upon the French peasants.

In the wake of the War of the Spanish Succession came to the masses of the French nation pestilence and famine, excessive taxes and imposts, official debasement of the currency, and the threat of public bankruptcy—a dangerous array of economic and social disorders. Louis XIV survived the treaty of Utrecht but two years, and to such depths had his prestige and glory fallen among his own people that his corpse, as it passed along the royal road from the magnificent palace at Versailles to the medieval tombs of the French kings at St. Denis, “was saluted by the curses of a noisy crowd sitting in the wine-rooms, celebrating his death by drinking more than their fill as a compensation for having suffered too much from hunger during his lifetime. Such was the coarse but true epitaph which popular opinion accorded to the Grand Monarch.”

**The End
of Louis
XIV**

Nor had the immediate future much better things in store for exhausted France. The successor upon the absolutist throne was Louis XV, great-grandson of Louis XIV,¹ a boy of five years of age, who did not undertake to exercise personal power until near the middle of the eighteenth century. In the meantime the centralized government of the country was directed for about eight years by the king's uncle, the duke of Orleans, and then for twenty years by Cardinal Fleury.

**The
Minority
of Louis
XV**

Orleans² was intellectually gifted and considerably interested in natural science, but most of all he loved pleasure and gave himself to a life of debauchery. He cared little for the boy-king, whose education and training he grievously neglected. His foreign policy was weak and vacillating, and his several efforts to correct abuses in the political and economic institutions of Louis XIV invariably ended in failure. It was while experimenting with the disorganized finances that he was duped by a Scottish adventurer and capitalistic promoter,

**The Duke
of Orleans**

¹ Louis XIV's son—the dauphin—had died in 1711, and his eldest grandson, the duke of Burgundy, in 1712. Louis XV was the latter's son, and, it may be noted, the nephew of Philip V of Spain.

² Philip, duke of Orleans, was a nephew of Louis XIV, and, through marriage with a natural daughter of Louis XIV, was a great-uncle-in-law, as well as a cousin, of Louis XV.


a certain John Law (1671-1729). Law had an idea that a gigantic corporation might be formed for French colonial trade, shares might be sold widely throughout the country, and the proceeds therefrom utilized to wipe out the public debt. Orleans accepted the scheme and for a while the country went mad with the fever of speculation. In due time, however, the stock was discovered to be worthless, the bubble burst, and a terrible panic ensued.¹ The net result was increased misery for the nation.

Cardinal Fleury was naturally modest and frugal, and he was sincerely anxious to assure to France a foreign peace and an internal reform which would repair the havoc wrought by Louis XIV and Orleans. He especially husbanded the financial resources of the state; he reduced public expenditure and promoted the expansion of French manufacturing and trade, thereby managing to balance the royal budget and to benefit the middle classes. But Fleury was an old man—he was over seventy when he became chief minister, and ninety when death removed him from office in 1743—and he was not as energetic or as thorough as the situation required. He effected no fundamental internal reform, and by exacting forced labor from the peasants for the construction of a fine system of commercially valuable roads he aroused angry discontent. In foreign affairs, despite his personal eagerness for peace, he found himself a victim of Bourbon dynastic ambition.

Louis XV married in 1725 the daughter of Stanislaus Leszczyński, a Polish nobleman who had long struggled, in alliance with Sweden, to supplant the Saxon Augustus II as king of Poland. On the death of Augustus II in 1733, Stanislaus hastened to Warsaw and obtained his election to the kingship, but Russia at once interfered and prevailed upon the Polish electors to depose him and substitute the son of the late king as Augustus III. Whereupon Louis XV sent an army to the assistance of his father-in-law, and the War of the Polish Election began.

The War of the Polish Election (1733-1738) was complicated by the dynastic ambition of the Spanish Bourbon, Philip V (1700-1746). Philip V had never taken kindly to the enforced cession of Spanish possessions in Italy to the Austrian Habsburgs, and, egged on by his masterful wife, Elizabeth Farnese,

¹ Law's corporation was actually important in the development of the French colony of Louisiana.



18TH CENTURY
ITALY
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GERMANY

SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

ADRIATIC SEA

TYRRHENIAN SEA

IONIAN SEA

EUROPE

TURKEY

VENICE

VENETIAN

ROMAN

APULIAN

CALABRIAN

SICILY

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TURKEY

he devoted his chief energies after 1715 to undoing the treaty of Utrecht. At first, both Orleans and Fleury coöperated with Austria and England in holding Philip V in check, but gradually the dynastic interests of the Bourbon family outweighed the national interests of France. At length in 1733, when the Polish war was beginning and Austria was preparing to aid Russia against France, Fleury was induced to sign a treaty of alliance between France and Spain for the spoliation of Austria. The War of the Polish Election thus became a conflict between Russia and Austria on the one side and France and Spain (and Savoy) on the other.

The War
of the
Polish
Election

The war was not so costly as the wars of Louis XIV had been, and the ensuing treaty of Vienna (1738) certainly strengthened Bourbon prestige in Europe. Austria and Russia had the satisfaction, it is true, of keeping Augustus III on the throne of Poland, but Austria was compelled to guaranty the duchy of Lorraine to Stanislaus during his lifetime and, after his death, to Louis XV,¹ and to agree to the transfer of Sicily and Naples, and eventually (in 1748) of Parma from Habsburg to Bourbon control. Philip V put his son, Charles, on the throne of Naples and Sicily and another son on the throne of Parma.

In this way, the Bourbon family added to their two kingdoms of France and Spain a third kingdom of Naples and Sicily—the so-called kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Charles, the son of Philip V, proved to be an able and enlightened ruler, first as king of the Two Sicilies (1738-1759) and later as Charles III of Spain (1759-1788). He reformed the internal administration of his realms, in the direction of more efficient centralization, but always with an eye to popular welfare. He was greatly interested in art and in the scientific advance and philosophical speculation of the eighteenth century. He also gave a good deal of attention to the improvement of colonial government in Spanish America. Unfortunately, the sons who succeeded Charles III—Ferdinand I in the Two Sicilies (1759) and Charles IV in Spain (1788)—were woeful specimens

The
Bourbon
Succession
in Naples
and Sicily

¹ Lorraine was formally added to France on the death of Stanislaus in 1766. Two years later, the island of Corsica was purchased by France from Genoa. Lorraine and Corsica thus constituted the territorial acquisitions of France during the reign of Louis XV.

of the Bourbon dynasty: Ferdinand was mean and cruel; Charles was stupid and ridiculous.

The most pitiable figure in the Bourbon family, however, was Louis XV of France. After the death of Cardinal Fleury in 1743,

France Louis made a show of exercising direct personal power,
under and this show he spasmodically maintained until his
Louis XV own death in 1774. Louis XV had some good qualities

of mind and heart, and for a time his subjects delighted to call him Louis the Well Beloved. But basically he was fickle and frivolous. Easily bored by the details of statecraft and by the pompous etiquette of the Versailles court, he sought escape in hunting, supper-parties, and spicy indiscretions. Thus he sank into sensuality and into the hands of a succession of mistresses—Chateauroux, Pompadour, Barry, to mention only three. Pompadour, particularly, was not only Louis XV's mistress but also, for almost twenty years (1745-1764), his prime minister in petticoats, and a remarkably sinister work she performed for the Bourbons and for France. Nothing was done to arrest the maladies which since the latter days of the Grand Monarch had been afflicting French society and government ever more sorely. On the contrary, almost everything was done which could intensify those maladies: the gulf between Versailles and the nation was widened; the privileges—and uselessness—of the upper classes were enhanced; the central government was rendered more arbitrary and more aimless; and to cap the climax, there was a series of terribly long and disastrous wars. Of these wars, we shall have more to say in another place.¹ Here it suffices to remark that they prepared the bankruptcy which precipitated the French Revolution.

Yet throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century the internal weaknesses of the royal government and the external defeats of its armies and fleets were veiled in the appearance of continuing French predominance and Bourbon ascendancy in Europe. France was deemed a rich country. Her soldiers and sailors were reputed especially brave and daring. Her elegance was manifest at Versailles, and the brilliance of her art and science and letters was scarcely rivalled anywhere in Europe. Besides, the Bourbon dynasty was still admired and envied. A

¹ For accounts of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), see below, pp. 338-344, 406-413.

Bourbon ruled France and her overseas dependencies; a cousin of his ruled the kingdom of the Two Sicilies; another cousin ruled Spain, Mexico, Florida, the West Indies, New Granada, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. It was all quite glamorous.

As we now know, a great deluge was already preparing for France and the Bourbons. Louis XV had wit enough to guess it, but, as he cynically predicted, it would come after he was gone *Après moi, le déluge.*



CHAPTER VII

THE AUSTRIAN HABSBURGS AND THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

I. THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE IN DECAY



RADUALLY, the predominance of Spain in the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century and of France in the second half of the seventeenth century tended to reduce the prestige of the old Holy Roman Empire. Its actual power, already waning at the commencement of modern times, was greatly lessened by the multifarious difficulties of the Emperor Charles V and by the civil wars which raged intermittently from 1524 to 1648.

After 1648, and on through the eighteenth century, the Holy Roman Empire continued to exist. Though Switzerland and the Dutch Netherlands were finally and formally severed from it in 1648, and though control of some of its other territories passed at this time to France and Sweden, it continued to embrace almost all German-speaking peoples and also the Czechs of Bohemia. There was still an emperor, chosen customarily from the Habsburg descendants of Ferdinand I, the brother of Charles V. There were still electors—the number had been increased from seven to nine¹—with some influence and considerable honor. There was still a diet, composed of representatives of the princes and the free cities, meeting regularly, after 1663, at Ratisbon (or Regensburg) in Bavaria.

But diet, electors, and emperor were only nominal bonds of political union. In reality, the Holy Roman Empire was but a loose alliance of some three hundred independent and sovereign

¹ To the original seven electorates of Mainz, Trier, Cologne, Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, and the Palatinate, Bavaria was added as an eighth in 1623, and Hanover as a ninth in 1708. The union of Bavaria and the Palatinate in 1778 again reduced the number of electorates to eight.

states; its emperor and electors were titular dignitaries, and its diet was a congress of diplomats. And within the Holy Roman Empire there was now neither the popular will nor the social and economic pressure needful for its strengthening as an empire or for its transformation into a German national state.

On the one hand, the wave of national enthusiasm which Martin Luther and the German knights invoked early in the sixteenth century, had spent itself in religious wrangling and dissension, intolerance and war. Half the Germans remained Catholic; the other half became Protestant. But Protestant Germans were divided between Lutheranism and Calvinism, and the mutual intolerance of these two kinds of Protestantism was surpassed only by the mutual intolerance of Protestant and Catholic. In the circumstances, each German state was a law unto itself in religion and the population of each was more devoted to its peculiar form of Christianity than to any common sense of German patriotism.

On the other hand, the rise of capitalism and of a numerous, well-to-do middle class had not gone steadily on within the Holy Roman Empire as it had in the Netherlands, France, and England. If it had gone steadily on, it might have provided the same basis for national spirit and national monarchy in Germany as it provided in the countries of western Europe. There certainly had been a remarkable growth of capitalism in the German cities at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and during the first half of that century it seemed as if the German bourgeoisie was profiting most from Spanish and Portuguese undertakings overseas and as if the Holy Roman Empire would become the centre of European banking. But religious quarrels and destructive civil wars served to weaken the Holy Roman Empire not only politically but also economically. And in the first half of the seventeenth century, just at the time when the Netherlands, France, and England were forging ahead in economics and fortifying the position of their middle classes by overseas colonies and commerce, Germany was suffering the awful havoc of the Thirty Years' War.¹

It is not an exaggeration to say that during the Thirty Years' War, the Holy Roman Empire (that is, Germany and Bohemia) lost at least half of its population and more than two thirds of

¹ See above, pp. 263-275.

its movable property. In the middle of the seventeenth century, at about the time when Louis XIV succeeded to a fairly prosperous France, German towns and villages were in ashes, and vast districts turned into deserts. Churches and schools were closed by hundreds, and religious and intellectual torpor prevailed. Manufacturing and trade were so completely paralyzed that by 1635 the Hanseatic League was virtually abandoned, because the free commercial cities, formerly so wealthy, could not meet the necessary expenses. Economic expansion and colonial enterprise, together with the consequent upbuilding of a well-to-do middle class, were resigned to Holland, France, or England, without a protest from what had once been a proud burgher class in Germany.¹ This elimination of an influential bourgeoisie was accompanied by a sorry impoverishment and oppression of the peasantry. These native sons of the German soil had fondly hoped for better things from the religious revolution and agrarian insurrections of the sixteenth century; but they were disappointed. The peasantry were in a worse plight in the eighteenth century in Germany than in any other country of western or central Europe.

The German princes alone knew how to profit by the national prostration. Enriched by the confiscation of ecclesiastical property in the sixteenth century and relieved of political interference on the part of the emperor or the diet, they utilized the decline of the middle class and the dismal serfdom of the peasantry to exalt their personal political power. They got rid of the local assemblies or greatly curtailed their privileges, and gradually established petty tyrannies. After the Thirty Years' War, it became fashionable for the heirs of German principalities to travel abroad and especially to spend some time at the court of France. Here they imbibed the political ideas of the Grand Monarch, and in a short time nearly every petty court in Germany was a small-sized reproduction of the court of Versailles. In a silly and ridiculous way the German princes aped their great French neighbor. They too maintained armies, palaces, and swarms of household officials. Their mimic pomp imposed a crushing burden upon the people, although it was so insignificant in comparison with the real pomp of France,

¹ On the importance of German capitalism in the sixteenth century, see above, pp. 88-89. Its importance was quite gone at the end of the Thirty Years' War.

that the petty princes were the laughing-stock of Europe. Beneath an external gloss of refinement, they were, as a class, coarse and selfish, and devoid of any compensating virtue. Neither the common people, whom they had impoverished, nor the church, which they had robbed, could now resist their growing absolutism.

Certain princes took advantage of the situation to aggrandize their territories by conquest or marital alliance. They thus



secured sufficient revenues to enable them to maintain fairly large armies and to play important rôles in international affairs. In other words, while the empire as an organized whole was growing weaker, some of the states within it were becoming stronger. By the eighteenth century, as we shall presently see, Brandenburg-Prussia was a great power, Bavaria and Saxony were aspiring to be great powers, and Austria possessed dependencies outside the Holy Roman Empire which amply compensated her for loss of effective leadership within the empire.

A special source of weakness within the Holy Roman Empire

during the eighteenth century was the continuing ownership of some of its lands by princes whose major possessions were outside. This was true of Austria, not only. Alsace was held by the king of France; part of Pomerania, by the king of Sweden; and Hanover, by the king of Great Britain. These monarchs, anxious to safeguard or to extend their German lands, perpetually interfered in the domestic politics of the empire and frequently participated in wars whose principal battle-ground was Germany.

2. THE DOMINIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN HABSBURGS

The emperors of the Holy Roman Empire continued to be chosen, as we have said, from the Austrian branch of the Habsburg family. As emperors these Habsburgs had an historical title and dignified trappings, but very little power. Yet they did have power within their own hereditary dominions. And consequently it should occasion no surprise that they were far less interested, especially after the 'Thirty Years' War, in defending and consolidating the empire than in extending their own dominions and exercising absolutism within them.

In these latter respects the Austrian Habsburgs were as successful as they were unsuccessful in strengthening the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, under their auspices, there grew up, side by side with the decaying Holy Roman Empire, an Austrian "empire" which long ranked as a great power in Europe. This Austrian "empire" was not technically an empire at all; its head was properly styled emperor only if he were elected to the honorary headship of the Holy Roman Empire. On the other hand, the Austrian "empire" was not in any way a national state, like France or England or Spain; it was a union, under a common monarch, of the most diverse lands and peoples; some of its territory was within the Holy Roman Empire, and some was outside. It was a congeries of disparate dominions. Yet its government was exercised from Vienna and was far more effective than that of the Holy Roman Empire, and its sovereign could draw on economic and military resources which the essentially German Empire lacked.

The Austrian "empire" was called Austrian because its core—the territory which had been longest in the possession of its reigning family of Habsburgs—was the archduchy of Austria. The archduchy centred in Vienna, and on it had long depended the

districts of Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the Tyrol. These districts were included within the Holy Roman Empire and were peopled mainly by Germans. But from the time of Ferdinand I, in the sixteenth century, the Habsburg archdukes of Austria were kings of Bohemia and of Hungary. Bohemia, though within the Holy Roman Empire and accounted one of its "electorates," was inhabited chiefly by Czechs.¹ Hungary, entirely outside of the empire, comprised the old Magyar state on the plains of the lower Danube, centring in Budapest, and certain dependencies, such as the Yugoslav "kingdom" of Croatia, the Rumanian principality of Transylvania, and the region of Slovakia whose population was akin in speech and nationality to the Czechs of Bohemia.

Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary—these, from the sixteenth century, were the hereditary dominions—the real "empire"—of the Austrian Habsburgs. They constituted a continuous block of territory from Saxony on the northwest to the Ottoman Empire on the southeast, but at the same time a confused realm of disparate peoples and languages. Only the German archduchy of Austria was consistently and enthusiastically loyal to the common Habsburg monarch. With both Bohemia and Hungary the monarch had trouble. It was a revolt of the Czechs in Bohemia against Ferdinand II which precipitated the Thirty Years' War. The revolt was suppressed, and Ferdinand and his successors ruled Bohemia with an iron hand, impairing its parliament, stamping out Protestantism which had taken root in its soil, and, in general, favoring its German minority at the expense of its Czech majority.

In Hungary the Habsburg monarchs at the outset were confronted with the most serious difficulties. A third of the country, including the city of Budapest, was in the possession of the Moslem Turks and under the government of the sultan at Constantinople. Another third—the principality of Transylvania—was practically independent under a native Magyar prince of Protestant persuasion. In the remaining third, which was ruled by the Habsburg monarch but which had to pay annual tribute

**The
Struggle
for Hun-
gary be-
tween
Habs-
burgs and
Sultans**

¹ Silesia, one of the crown lands of Bohemia, was largely German, and there was a German minority in the other crown land of Moravia, as well as in Bohemia proper.

to the Turks, most of the nobles were Protestant and were more inclined to support the prince of Transylvania than the Catholic archduke of Austria. Gradually, toward the close of the sixteenth century, the Austrian power made headway in Hungary. There was a marked revival of Catholicism; the princes of Transylvania reverted to the older faith, and the majority of Magyar nobles abandoned Protestantism. As a result of the so-called "Long War" with the Turks (1593-1606), the Habsburg monarch was freed from the humiliating payment of tribute to the sultan. Moreover, a succession of weak and corrupt sultans in the first half of the seventeenth century prevented the Turks from taking advantage of Austria's absorption in the Thirty Years' War. And in the latter part of the seventeenth century, when the Sultan Mohammed IV (1648-1687) undertook to resume the offensive against Hungary and Austria, the Habsburg monarch, the Emperor Leopold I (1657-1705),¹ found his threatened power decisively supported by a strong coalition of Christian sovereigns.

Moslem armies of Mohammed IV had suddenly overrun Hungary in 1682, and in the following year had invaded Austria and laid siege to Vienna. Leopold was hard pressed and the fall of his capital city seemed imminent, when a valiant king of Poland—John III (Sobieski)—came to his rescue, defeated the Turks, and raised the siege of Vienna. Then, when Leopold hesitated to follow up Sobieski's victory, Pope Innocent XI preached and organized what was in reality the last of the great crusades. The pope, the republic of Venice, the king of Poland, the tsar of Russia, and, for a time, even Louis XIV of France, coöperated in furnishing generals, men, and money to the Emperor Leopold for a crusading counter-offensive against the Moslems. For sixteen years the struggle raged in Hungary and with increasing success for Christian arms. The wave of Turkish conquest recoiled and began finally to recede. The inspiration was the pope's, and the heroes were Sobieski of Poland and Prince Eugene of Savoy; but the major political advantages accrued to Austria. By the treaty of Karlowitz (1699) the Turks surrendered all their earlier conquests

The Last Crusade

¹ Leopold I was the son and successor of Ferdinand III during whose reign the Thirty Years' War had been brought to an end. See above, p. 272. Leopold was both nephew and brother-in-law of Philip IV of Spain, and uncle of Charles II of Spain. He was thus the foremost rival of Louis XIV of France for the inheritance of the Spanish Habsburgs. See above, pp. 307-309.

north of the Danube, and Hungary was reunited under the sceptre of the Austrian monarch.¹ Already in 1687, while the war was in progress, an assembly of Magyar magnates had been induced to declare the crown of Hungary hereditary in the Habsburg family, and three years later Transylvania had been formally incorporated in the Habsburg dominions.

Hardly was Hungary freed from the Turks and definitively joined with Austria and Bohemia, when the Austrian Habsburgs plunged into the War of the Spanish Succession against Louis XIV of France (1702-1713). Though they were unable to prevent the French sovereign from securing Spain and its colonial empire for the Bourbon family, they were successful in adding to the Austrian dominions a considerable number of scattered Continental lands which had previously belonged to Spain.² Thus, by the treaty of Utrecht (1713) the Emperor Charles VI obtained the Flemish and French-speaking Belgian Netherlands and the Italian-speaking duchy of Milan and kingdom of the Two Sicilies.³ Of course all these newer possessions of the Austrian Habsburgs remained outside the Holy Roman Empire.

Extension
of the
Dominions
of the
Austrian
Habs-
burgs

Among the various peoples who, by the eighteenth century, were brought under Austrian sway, the bond could not be close. They spoke a dozen different languages and presented an even greater diversity of economic interests. Their common monarch ruled them by manifold titles: he was archduke of Austria, king of Bohemia, king of Hungary, duke of Milan, and prince of the (Belgian) Netherlands; and the administration of each of these five major groups was independent of the others. Besides, he was Holy Roman Emperor.

To adopt and pursue a policy which would suit all these titles, lands, and peoples would scarcely have been possible for any mortal; it certainly surpassed the wit of the Habsburgs. They had made an attempt in the early part of the sixteenth

¹ In addition to these Austrian gains, Poland obtained territory north of the Dniester River, and Venice secured certain ports on the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

² They were also successful in suppressing an attempt which Hungarians made during the War of the Spanish Succession to free themselves from the Habsburg connection and reestablish their complete independence.

³ The kingdom of the Two Sicilies was eventually surrendered (1738) to the Bourbons. See above, pp. 316-317.

century, and again at the opening of the seventeenth century, to develop a vigorous German policy, to unify the Holy Roman Empire and to strengthen their hold upon it, but they had failed. The disasters of the Thirty Years' War, the jealousies and ambitions of the other German princes, the interested intervention of foreign powers, notably Sweden and France, made it brutally clear that Habsburg influence in Germany had already reached its highest pitch and that henceforth it would tend gradually to wane.

Blocked in Germany, the Austrian Habsburgs looked elsewhere to satisfy their aspirations. But almost equal difficulties confronted them. Extension to the southeast in the direction of the Balkan peninsula involved almost incessant warfare with the Turks. Increase of territory in Italy incited Spain, France, and Savoy to armed resistance. Development of the trade of the Belgian Netherlands aroused the hostility of the influential commercial classes in Holland, England, and France. The time and toil spent upon these non-German projects obviously could not be devoted to the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, not only was Germany a source of weakness to the Habsburgs, but the Habsburgs were a source of weakness to Germany.


In spite of these drawbacks, the Habsburg family was still powerful in the eighteenth century. The natural resources and native wealth of some of the dominions; the large, if rather cosmopolitan, armies which might be raised; the intricate marriage relationships with most of the sovereign families of Europe; the championship of Christendom against the Moslem Turks, and of Catholicism against the Protestants; the absolutist principles and practices of the dynasty; the meticulous etiquette and external pomp of the court at Vienna;—all contributed to cloak the weaknesses, under a proud name and pretentious fame, of the imperial Austrian line.

In the eighteenth century a particularly unkind fate seemed to attend the Habsburg family. We have already noticed how the extinction of the male line in the Spanish branch precipitated

NOTE. The picture opposite, showing Schönbrunn, the chief palace of the Austrian Habsburgs, is from a painting by a celebrated Italian artist, Antonio Canaletto (1697-1768).

Difficulty
of Ruling
Disparate
Domin-
ions

Continu-
ing Pres-
tige of the
Habs-
burgs





a great international war of succession. This resulted in the division of the Spanish inheritance and the cession of a large part of it to the rival Bourbon family (1713).¹ Soon, a similar situation arose in respect of the Austrian inheritance. Charles VI (1711-1740) had neither sons nor brothers, but only a daughter, Maria Theresa. Spurred on by the fate of his Spanish kinsman, Charles directed his energies toward securing a settlement of his possessions prior to his death. Early in his reign he promulgated a so-called Pragmatic Sanction which declared that the Habsburg dominions were indivisible and that, contrary to long custom, they might be inherited by female heirs in default of male. Then he subordinated his whole foreign policy to securing general European recognition of the right of Maria Theresa to succeed to all his territories. One after another of his dominions swore to observe the Pragmatic Sanction. One after another of the foreign powers—Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, Holland, the Empire, Poland, France, Spain, and Savoy, to whom liberal concessions were made—pledged their word and their honor most sacredly to respect the Pragmatic Sanction. When Charles VI died in 1740, he left his daughter a disorganized state, a bankrupt treasury, and a relatively small, ill-disciplined army, but he bequeathed her an ample number of parchment guaranties.* The cynical Prussian king of the time remarked that 200,000 fighting men would have been a more useful legacy, and, as events proved, he was right.

Question
of the
Austrian
Succession

3. THE HOHENZOLLERNS AND PRUSSIA

Next to the Habsburgs, the most renowned German family in the eighteenth century was the Hohenzollern. As far back as the tenth century, a line of counts was ruling over a castle on the hill of Zollern just north of what is now Switzerland. These counts had slowly extended their possessions and their power through the fortunes of feudal warfare and the kindly interest of Holy Roman emperors, until at length, in the twelfth century, a representative of the Hohen-

The
Hohen-
zollern
Family

¹ See above, pp. 306-311.

NOTE. The picture opposite is a portrait of Emperor Charles VI, from a painting by Johann Gottfried Auerbach (1697-1753), now in the Art Museum at Vienna.

zollerns had become by marriage burgrave of the important city of Nuremberg.

So far the Hohenzollerns had been fortunate, but as yet they were no more conspicuous than hundreds of petty potentates

The Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg

throughout the Holy Roman Empire. It was not until they were invested by a Habsburg emperor with the electorate of Brandenburg in 1415 that they became prominent. Brandenburg was a district of north-

ern Germany, centring in the town of Berlin and lying along the Oder River. As a "mark," or frontier province, it was then the northern and eastern outpost of the German language and German culture, and the exigencies of almost perpetual warfare with the neighboring Slavic peoples had given Brandenburg a good deal of military experience and prestige. As an electorate, moreover, it possessed considerable influence in the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire.

In the sixteenth century, the acceptance of Lutheranism by the Hohenzollern electors of Brandenburg enabled them, like many other princes of northern Germany, to seize valuable properties of the Catholic Church and to rid themselves of a power which had curtailed their political and social sway. Brandenburg subsequently became the chief Protestant state of Germany, just as to Austria was conceded the leadership of the Catholic states.

The period of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) was as auspicious to the Hohenzollerns as it was unlucky for the

Hohenzollern Brandenburg in the Thirty Years' War

Habsburgs. On the eve of the contest, propitious marriage alliances bestowed two important legacies upon the family—the duchy of Cleves¹ on the lower Rhine, and the duchy of East Prussia,² on the Baltic north of Poland. Henceforth the head of the Hohenzollern family could sign himself margrave and elector of Brandenburg, duke of Cleves, and duke of Prussia.

¹ Though the alliance between Brandenburg and Cleves dated from 1614, the Hohenzollerns did not reign over Cleves until 1666. With Cleves went its dependencies of Mark and Ravensberg.

² Prussia had been formed and governed from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century by the Teutonic Knights, a military, crusading order of German Catholics, who were instrumental in Christianizing and Germanizing the native Baltic population. In the sixteenth century the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights, a member of the Hohenzollern family, adopted the Lutheran faith and transformed Prussia into an hereditary duchy in his own family. In a series of wars West Prussia

In the last-named rôle, he was a vassal of the king of Poland; in the others, he owed fealty to the Holy Roman Emperor. In the course of the Thirty Years' War, the Hohenzollerns helped materially to lessen imperial control, and at the close of the struggle they secured for themselves the wealthy bishoprics of Halberstadt, Minden, and Magdeburg,¹ and the eastern half of the duchy of Pomerania.

The Acquisition of Prussia

The international reputation of the Hohenzollerns was enhanced by Frederick William, commonly styled the Great Elector (1640-1688). When he ascended the throne, the Thirty Years' War had reduced his scattered dominions to utmost misery. With resolution, however, he set out to reduce the misery, to unify his various possessions, and to make his realm a factor in general European politics. By diplomacy more than by military prowess, he obtained in the peace of Westphalia the title to the above-mentioned additions of territory. Then, taking advantage of a war between Sweden and Poland (1655-1660),² he made himself so invaluable to both sides, now helping one, now deserting to the other, that, by cunning and sometimes by unscrupulous intrigue, he induced the king of Poland to renounce suzerainty over East Prussia and to give him that duchy in full sovereignty. In the Dutch War of Louis XIV (1672-1678)³ he completely defeated the Swedes, who were in alliance with France, and, although he was not allowed by the provisions of the peace to keep what he had conquered, nevertheless the fame of his army was established and Brandenburg-Prussia took rank as the chief competitor of Sweden for the hegemony of the Baltic.

Frederick William, the Great Elector

In matters of government, the Great Elector was, like his contemporary Louis XIV, a firm believer in monarchical absolutism. At the commencement of his reign, each one of the three parts of his lands—Brandenburg, Cleves, and East Prussia


was incorporated into Poland, while East Prussia became a fief of that kingdom. It was to East Prussia only that the Hohenzollern elector of Brandenburg succeeded in 1618.

¹ The right of accession to Magdeburg was accorded the Hohenzollerns in 1648; they did not formally possess it until 1680.

² This so-called "First Northern War" was concluded by the peace of Oliva (1660), by which Poland formally relinquished Livonia to Sweden and East Prussia to Brandenburg. Sweden, nominally the victor, was greatly weakened by the struggle. The real victor was Brandenburg.

³ See above, pp. 300-301.

**THE HOHENZOLLERN FAMILY (1415-1840):
ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG AND KINGS OF PRUSSIA**



—was organized as a separate, petty state with its own diet or parliament, its own army, and its own independent administration. After a hard constitutional struggle, Frederick William deprived the several diets of their significant functions, centralized financial control in his own person, declared the local armies national, and merged the three separate administrations into one, subservient to his royal council at Berlin. Thus, the three states were amalgamated into one; and to all intents and purposes they constituted a united monarchy.

The Great Elector was a tireless worker. He encouraged industry and agriculture, drained marshes, and built the Frederick William Canal, joining the Oder with the Elbe. When the revocation of the edict of Nantes caused many Huguenots to leave France, the Great Elector's warm invitation attracted to Brandenburg some 20,000, who were settled around Berlin and who gave French genius as well as French names to their adopted country. The capital city, which at the Great Elector's accession numbered barely 8,000, counted at his death a population of over 20,000.

Brandenburg-Prussia was already an important monarchy, but its ruler was not recognized as "king" until 1701, when the Emperor Leopold I conferred upon him that title in order to enlist his support in the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1713, by the treaty of Utrecht, the other European powers acknowledged the title. It was Prussia, rather than Brandenburg, which gave its name to the new kingdom, because the former was an entirely independent state, while the latter was a member of the Holy Roman Empire. Thereafter the "kingdom of Prussia"¹ designated the combined territories of the Hohenzollern family.

The
"King-
dom" of
Prussia

Prussia rose rapidly in the eighteenth century. She shared with Austria the leadership of Germany and secured a position in Europe as a first-rate power. This rise was the result largely of the efforts of Frederick William I (1713-1740).

King Frederick William was a curious reversion to the type of his grandfather: he was the Great Elector over again with

¹ At first, the Hohenzollern monarch assumed the title of king *in* Prussia, because West Prussia was still a province of the kingdom of Poland. Gradually, however, under Frederick William I (1713-1740), the popular appellation of "king of Prussia" prevailed over the formal "king in Prussia." West Prussia was definitely acquired in 1772 (see below, p. 344).

all his practical good sense if without his taste for diplomacy. Paternal despotism was his ideal of kingship, and it was his ambition to use the limited resources of his country so effectively that Prussia would be feared and respected abroad. He felt that absolutism was the only kind of government consonant with the character of his varied and scattered dominions. He understood in a canny way the need of a strong army. He realized that only the closest economy would permit a relatively small kingdom to support a relatively large army. Under Frederick William I, financial economy, military might, and divine-right monarchy became the characteristics of Hohenzollern rule in Prussia.

By thrift that often bordered on miserliness King Frederick William I managed to increase his standing army from 38,000 to 80,000 men, bringing it up in numbers so as to rank with the regular armies of such first-rate states as France and Austria. In efficiency, it probably surpassed the others. An iron discipline molded the Prussian troops into the most precise military engine then to be found in Europe, and a staff of officers, who were not allowed to buy their commissions, as in many European states, but who were appointed on the basis of professional merit, commanded the army with skill and loyalty.

In civil administration, the king persevered in the work of centralizing the various departments. A "general directory" was entrusted with the businesslike conduct of public finances and it gradually evolved an elaborate civil service—the famous Prussian bureaucracy, which, in spite of inevitable red tape, became justly famous for its honesty and devotion to duty. The king endeavored to encourage industry and trade by enforcing up-to-date mercantilist regulations, and, although he repeatedly expressed contempt for current culture because he thought its tendencies were weakening, he nevertheless prescribed compulsory elementary education for his people.

Yet Frederick William did not spend much money on what to-day we call the "peace" activities of government. Of his modest annual budget of about seven million thalers, he spent less than one million on education, the civil service, and the court; he put a million away as a reserve-fund for emergencies, and he expended over five millions on the maintenance of his military establishment.

King Frederick William had many personal eccentricities that highly amused Europe. Imbued with patriarchal instincts, he had his eye on everybody and everything. He treated his kingdom as a schoolroom, and, like a zealous schoolmaster, flogged his naughty subjects unmercifully. If he suspected a man of possessing adequate means, he might command him to erect a fine residence so as to improve the appearance of the capital. If he met an idler in the streets, he would belabor him with his cane and perhaps put him in the army. And his craze for tall soldiers led him to create the famous Potsdam Guard of Giants, a special company whose members must measure at least six feet in height. For service in the Guard he attracted many foreigners by liberal financial offers: it was the only luxury which the parsimonious king allowed himself.

During a portion of his reign the crabbed old king feared that all his labors and savings would go for naught, for he was supremely disappointed in his son, the crown-prince Frederick. The stern father had no sympathy for the literary, musical, artistic tastes of his son, whom he thought effeminate and whom he abused roundly with a quick and violent temper. When Prince Frederick tried to run away, the king arrested him and for punishment put him through such an arduous, slave-like training in the civil and military administration, from the lowest grades upward, as perhaps no other royal personage ever received. It was this despised and misunderstood prince who as Frederick II succeeded his father on the throne of Prussia in 1740 and is known in history as Frederick the Great.

The
Youth of
Frederick
the Great

The year 1740 marked the succession of Frederick the Great to the Hohenzollern territories and of Maria Theresa to the Habsburg dominions. It also marked the outbreak of a protracted struggle within the Holy Roman Empire between the two chief German states—Austria and Prussia.

4. MINOR GERMAN STATES

Of the three hundred other German states which composed the Holy Roman Empire, few were sufficiently large or important to exert any considerable influence on the issue of the contest. A few, however, which took sides, deserve mention not only because in the eighteenth century they preserved a kind of

balance of power between the rivals but also because they have been more or less conspicuous factors in the history of modern Europe. Such are Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover.

Bavaria lay on the upper Danube to the west of Austria and in the extreme southeastern corner of what is now the German republic. For centuries it was ruled by the Wittelsbach family, whose remarkable prince, Maximilian I (1597-1651), had headed the Catholic League and loyally supported the Habsburgs in the 'Thirty Years' War. By the peace of Westphalia Maximilian had gained a part of the Palatinate¹ together with the title of "elector." His successor had labored with much credit in the second half of the seventeenth century to repair the damage caused by the war, encouraging agriculture and industries, building or restoring numerous churches and monasteries. But the Bavarian electors in the first half of the eighteenth century sacrificed a sound, vigorous policy of internal reform to a far-reaching ambition in international politics. Despite the bond of a common religion which united them to Austria, they felt that their proximity to their powerful neighbor made the Habsburgs their natural enemies. In the War of the Spanish Succession, therefore, Bavaria took the side of France against Austria, and when Maria Theresa ascended the throne in 1740, the elector of Bavaria, who had married a Habsburg princess disbarred by the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VI, immediately allied himself with Frederick of Prussia and with France in order to dismember the Austrian dominions.

The Saxony of the eighteenth century was but a very small fraction of the vast Saxon duchy which once comprised all northwestern Germany and whose people in early times had emigrated to England or had been subjugated by Charlemagne. Saxony had been restricted since the thirteenth century to a district on the upper Elbe, wedged in between Habsburg Bohemia and Hohenzollern Brandenburg. Here, however, several elements combined to give it an importance far beyond its extent or population. It was the geographical centre of Germany. It occupied a strategic position between Prussia and Austria. Its ruling family—the Wettins—were electors of the empire. It had been, moreover, after the champion-

¹ The other part of the Palatinate, under another branch of the Wittelsbachs, was reunited with Bavaria in 1779. On Maximilian I, see above, pp. 264-265.

ship of Martin Luther by one of its most notable electors,¹ a leader of the Lutheran cause, and the reformer's celebrated translation of the Bible had helped to fix the Saxon dialect as the literary language of Germany. At one time it seemed as if Saxony, rather than Brandenburg-Prussia, might become the dominant state in Protestant Germany. But the trend of events determined otherwise. A number of amiable but weak electors in the seventeenth century repeatedly allied themselves with Austria against the Hohenzollerns and thereby practically conceded to Brandenburg the leadership of the Protestant states of northern Germany.² Then, too, toward the close of the century, the elector separated himself from his people by becoming a Catholic, and, in order that he might establish himself as king of Poland, he burdened the state with continued Austrian alliance, with war, and with heavy taxes. The unnatural union of Saxony and Poland was maintained throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century: it was singularly disastrous for both parties.

A part of the original ancient territory of the Saxons in north-western Germany was included in the eighteenth century in the state of Hanover, extending between the Elbe and the **Hanover** Weser and reaching from Brandenburg down to the North Sea. Hanover was recognized as an electorate during the War of the Spanish Succession,³ but its real importance rested on the fact that its first elector, through his mother's family, became in 1714 George I of Great Britain the founder of the Hanoverian dynasty in that country. This personal union between the British kingdom and the electorate of Hanover continued for over a century, and was not without vital significance in international relations. Both George I and George II thought of themselves as German princes. They preferred Hanover to England as a place of residence and directed their primary efforts toward the protection of their German lands from Habsburg or Hohenzollern encroachments.

¹ Frederick the Wise (1486-1525).

² Another source of weakness in Saxony was the custom in the Wettin family of dividing the inheritance among members of the family. Such was the origin of the infinitesimal states of Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, and Saxe-Altenburg.

³ The emperor had given the title of elector to Ernest Augustus in 1692; the Powers recognized his son, George I, as elector in 1708.

Enough has now been said to give some idea of the distracted condition of Germany in the eighteenth century and to explain why the Holy Roman Empire was a merely nominal bond of union. Austria, traditionally the chief of the German states, was increasingly absorbed in her non-German possessions in Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. Prussia, the rising kingdom of the North, comprised a population in which Slavs constituted a large minority. Saxony was linked with Poland; Hanover, with Great Britain. Bavaria was a chronic ally of France. Add to this situation, the political domination of France or Sweden over a number of the petty states of the empire, the selfishness and jealousies of all the German rulers, the looming bitter rivalry between Prussia and Austria, and the sum-total was political chaos, bloodshed, and social oppression.

5. THE CONTEST BETWEEN HOHENZOLLERNS AND HABSBURGS

In the struggle between Prussia and Austria—between Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs—centred the European diplomacy and wars of the mid-eighteenth century. On one side was Frederick II of Prussia and Maria Theresa of Austria the young king Frederick II (1740-1786); on the other, the young queen Maria Theresa (1740-1780). Both had ability and sincere devotion to their respective states and peoples,—a high sense of royal responsibilities. Maria Theresa was beautiful, emotional, and proud; Frederick was domineering, cynical, and calculating. The Austrian princess was a firm believer in Catholic Christianity; the Prussian king, nominally a Protestant Christian, was an admirer of Voltaire and a devotee of rationalism and deism.

Frederick inherited from his father a fairly compact monarchy and a splendidly trained and equipped army of 80,000 men. He smiled at the disorganized troops, the disordered finances, the conflicting interests in the hodge-podge of dominions which his rival had inherited from her father. He also smiled at the solemn promise which Prussia had made to respect the integrity of the Austrian inheritance. No sooner was the Emperor Charles VI dead and Maria Theresa ruler in Vienna than Frederick II entered into engagements with Bavaria and France to dismember her realm. The elector of Bavaria was to be made Holy Roman Emperor as Charles VII and Prussia was to appropriate Silesia. France had designs upon the Austrian Netherlands.

Silesia thus became the bone of contention between Frederick II and Maria Theresa. Silesia covered the fertile valley of the upper Oder, separating the Slavic Czechs of Bohemia on the west from the Slavic Poles on the east. It was a fairly prosperous area, and its population, which was largely German, was as numerous as that of the whole kingdom of Prussia. If annexed to the Hohenzollern possessions it would enrich them and make them overwhelmingly German. On the other hand, the loss of Silesia would give Austria less direct influence in strictly German affairs and would deprive her of an important source of revenue and of military strength.

**Seizure of
Silesia by
Frederick II**

Trumping up an ancient family claim to the duchy, Frederick immediately marched his army into Silesia and occupied Breslau, its capital. To the west, a combined Bavarian and French army prepared to invade Austria and Bohemia. Maria Theresa, pressed on all sides, fled to Hungary and begged the Magyars to help her. The effect was electrical. Hungarians, Austrians, and Bohemians rallied to the support of the Habsburg throne; recruits were drilled and hurried to the front; the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) was soon in full swing.

A trade war had broken out between Great Britain and Spain in 1739,¹ which speedily became merged with the continental struggle. Great Britain was bent on maintaining liberal trading privileges in the Belgian Netherlands and always opposed the incorporation of those provinces into the rival and powerful monarchy of France, preferring that they should remain in the hands of some distant and less-feared, less commercial power, such as Austria. Great Britain, moreover, had fully recognized the Pragmatic Sanction and now determined that it was in accordance with her own economic interests to supply Maria Theresa with money and to despatch armies to the Continent to defend the Netherlands against France and to protect Hanover against Prussia. On the other side, the royal family of Spain now sympathized with their Bourbon kinsmen in France and hoped to recover from Austria all the Italian possessions of which Spain had been deprived by the treaty of Utrecht (1713).

**War between
Great
Britain
and Spain**

¹ Commonly called the War of Jenkins's Ear. See below, pp. 405-406.

The main parties to the War of the Austrian Succession were, therefore, on the one hand, Prussia, France, Spain, and Bavaria, and, on the other, Austria and Great Britain. To the former at first adhered the elector of Saxony, who wished to play off Prussia against Austria for the benefit of his Saxon and Polish lands, and the king of Sardinia, who was ever balancing in Italy between Habsburg and Bourbon ambitions. With Austria and Great Britain was united Holland, because of her desire to protect herself from possible French aggression.

The war was not so terrible or bloody as its duration and the number of contestants would seem to indicate. Saxony, which inclined more naturally to Austrian than to Prussian friendship, was easily persuaded by bribes to desert her allies and to make peace with Maria Theresa. Spain would fight only in Italy; and Sardinia, alarmed by the prospect of substantial Bourbon gains in that peninsula, went over to the side of Austria. The Dutch were content to defend their own territories.

Despite the greatest exertions, Maria Theresa was unable to expel Frederick from Silesia. Her generals suffered repeated reverses at his hands, and three times she was forced to recognize his occupation in order that she might employ all her forces against her western enemies. By the third treaty between the two German sovereigns, concluded at Dresden in 1745, Silesia¹ was definitely ceded by Austria to Prussia. Frederick had gained his ends: he coolly deserted his allies and withdrew from the war.

Meanwhile the Austrian arms had elsewhere been more successful. The French and Bavarians, after winning a few trifling victories in Bohemia, had been forced back to the upper Danube. Munich was occupied by the troops of Maria Theresa at the very time when the elector was being crowned at Frankfurt as Holy Roman Emperor. The whole of Bavaria was soon in Austrian possession, and the French were in retreat across the Rhine. Gradually, also, the combined forces of Austria and Sardinia made headway in Italy against the Bourbon armies of France and Spain.

¹ Except a very small district, which thereafter was known as "Austrian Silesia."

NOTE. The picture opposite is of Frederick the Great, from an engraving by a famous Polish artist at his court, Daniel Chodowiecki (1726-1801).





MARIA THERESIA
VIDVA. HUNGARIAE.
ARCHIDVX AVSTRIAE.
TRANSYLVANIAE.



ROM. IMPERATRIX
BOHEMIAE ETC. REGINA.
DVX BVRG. ETC. M. PRINC.
COMES TYROLIS ETC.

In the last years of the war, the French managed to protect Alsace and Lorraine from Austrian invasion, and, under the command of the gifted Marshal Saxe, they actually succeeded in subjugating the greater part of the Austrian Netherlands and in carrying the struggle into Holland. On the high seas and in the colonies, the conflict raged between France and Great Britain as "King George's War."¹

The treaties which ended the War of the Austrian Succession were signed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. They confirmed the acquisition of Silesia by Frederick II of Prussia and restored everything else to the situation at the opening of the conflict. The Wittelsbach family was reinstated in Bavaria and in the Palatinate, and the husband of Maria Theresa, Francis of Lorraine, succeeded Charles VII as Holy Roman Emperor. France, for all her expenditures and sacrifices, gained nothing. The War of the Austrian Succession was but a preliminary encounter in the great duel between Prussia and Austria for German leadership. It was similarly only an indecisive round in the prolonged battle between France and Great Britain for the mastery of the colonial and commercial world.

Treaties
of Aix-la-
Chapelle

In the war just closed, Austria had been the chief loser, and the resolute Maria Theresa set herself at once to the difficult task of recovering her prestige and her ceded territory. Her first efforts were directed toward internal reform--consolidating the administrations of her various dominions by the creation of a strong central council at Vienna, encouraging agriculture, equalizing and augmenting the taxes, and increasing the army. Her next step was to form a great league of rulers that would find a common interest with her in dismembering the kingdom of Frederick. She knew she could count on Saxony. She easily secured an ally in the Tsarina Elizabeth of Russia, who had been deeply offended by the caustic wit of the Prussian king. She was already united by friendly agreements with Great Britain and Holland. She had only France to win to her side, and in this policy she had the services of an invaluable agent, Count Kaunitz, the greatest diplomat of the age. Kaunitz held out

¹ See below, pp. 406-407.

to France, as the price for the abandonment of the Prussian alliance and the acceptance of that of Austria, the tempting bait of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). But Louis XV of France at first refused an Austrian alliance: it would be a departure from the traditional French and Bourbon policy of opposing the Habsburgs. Kaunitz then appealed to the king's mistress, the ambitious Madame de Pompadour, who, like the Tsarina Elizabeth, had had plenty of occasions for taking offense at the witty verses of the Prussian monarch. The favor of the Pompadour was won, and France entered the league against Prussia.

Meanwhile, however, Great Britain had entered into a special agreement with Frederick with the object of guarantying the integrity of Hanover and the general peace of Germany. When, therefore, the colonial war between Great Britain and France was renewed in 1754, it was quite natural that the former should contract a definite alliance with Prussia. Thus it befell that, whereas in the indecisive War of the Austrian Succession Prussia and France were pitted against Austria and Great Britain, in the determinant Seven Years' War, which ensued, Austria and France were in arms against Prussia and Great Britain. This overturn of traditional alliances has been commonly designated the "diplomatic revolution."

The Seven Years' War lasted in Europe from 1756 to 1763, and, as regards both the number of combatants and the brilliant generalship displayed, deserves to rank with the War of the Spanish Succession as the greatest war which the modern world had so far witnessed. In another chapter will be related the story of its maritime and colonial counterpart, which embraced the French and Indian War in America (1754-1763) and the triumphant campaigns of Clive in India, and which decisively established the supremacy of Great Britain on the seas, in the Far East, and in the New World.¹ Here is sketched its course on the European continent.

Without waiting for a formal declaration of hostilities, Frederick seized Saxony, from which he exacted large indemnities and drafted numerous recruits, and, with his well-trained veteran troops, crossed the mountains into Bohemia. He was obliged by superior Austrian forces to raise the siege of Prague and to fall

¹ See below, pp. 407-413.

back on his own kingdom. Thence converged from all sides the allied armies of his enemies. Russians moved into East Prussia, Swedes from Pomerania into northern Brandenburg, Austrians into Silesia, while the French were advancing from the west. Here it was that Frederick displayed those qualities which entitle him to rank as one of the greatest military commanders of all time and to justify his title of "the Great." Inferior in numbers to any one of his opponents, he dashed with lightning rapidity into central Germany and at Rossbach (1757) inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon the French, whose general wrote to Louis XV, "The rout of our army is complete: I cannot tell you how many of our officers have been killed, captured, or lost." No sooner was he relieved of danger in the west than he was back in Silesia. He flung himself upon the Austrians at Leuthen, took captive a third of their army, and put the rest to flight.

The victories of Frederick, however, decimated his army. He still had money, thanks to the subsidies which poured in from Great Britain, but he found it very difficult to procure men. He gathered recruits from hostile countries; he granted amnesty to deserters; he even enrolled prisoners of war. He was no longer sufficiently sure of his soldiers to take the offensive, and for five years he was reduced to defensive campaigns in Silesia. The Russians occupied East Prussia and penetrated into Brandenburg; in 1759 they captured Berlin.

The French, after suffering defeat at Rossbach, directed their energies against Hanover but encountered unexpected resistance at the hands of an army collected by British gold and commanded by the duke of Brunswick, a nephew of Frederick. Brunswick defeated them and gradually drove them out of Germany. This series of reverses, coupled with disasters that attended French armies in America and in India, caused the French king to call upon his cousin, the king of Spain, for assistance. The outcome was the formation of a close defensive alliance (1761)—the "Family Compact"—between the Bourbon states of France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, and the entrance of Spain into the war (1762).

What really saved Frederick the Great was the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth (1762) and the accession to the Russian throne of Peter III, a dangerous madman and an intense admirer of the

military prowess of the Prussian king. Peter in brusque style transferred the Russian forces from the standard of Maria Theresa to that of Frederick and restored to Prussia the conquests of his predecessor.¹ Spain entered the war too late to affect its fortunes materially. She was unable to regain what France had lost, and in fact the Bourbon states were utterly exhausted. The Austrians, after frantic but vain attempts to wrest Silesia from Frederick, finally despaired of their cause.

The treaty of Hubertusburg (1763) put an end to the Seven Years' War in Europe. Maria Theresa finally, though reluctantly, surrendered all claims to Silesia. Prussia had clearly humiliated Austria and become a first-rate power. The Hohenzollerns were henceforth the acknowledged peers of the Habsburgs. The almost synchronous treaty of Paris closed the war between Great Britain, on the one hand, and France and Spain on the other, by ceding the bulk of the French colonial empire to the British.² Thereafter, Great Britain was mistress of the seas and chief colonial power of the world.


Shortly after the close of the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great negotiated a close political alliance with the Tsarina Catherine II of Russia. He knew that Catherine had designs on Poland, and he believed that by aiding her in such designs he could procure some Polish spoils for Prussia and at the same time could be sure of Russian support against further attempts of Austria to recover Silesia. His belief proved sound. Frederick's title to Silesia was not questioned again by Maria Theresa of Austria, and in 1772, in concert with Catherine, he arranged for the seizure of Polish territories. Catherine appropriated the country east of the Duna and Dnieper rivers. Frederick annexed West Prussia, except the towns of Danzig and Thorn, thereby linking up Prussia and Brandenburg by a continuous line of territory. Maria Theresa, moved by the loss of Silesia and by fear of the undue preponderance which the partition of Poland would give to her northern rivals, thought to adjust the balance of power by sharing in the shameful transaction; she appropriated Galicia, except the important

¹ Peter III was dethroned in the same year. His wife, Catherine II, who succeeded him, was a German princess whom Frederick the Great had been largely instrumental in marrying to Peter III. She maintained, toward Frederick, a "benevolent neutrality."

² See below, pp. 411-412.

city of Cracow. Maria Theresa repeatedly expressed her abhorrence of the whole business, but, as the scoffing Frederick said, "She wept, but she kept on taking." Altogether, by this so-called "first partition" of 1772, Poland lost about a fifth of her population and a fourth of her territory.¹

The partition of Poland was more favorable to Prussia than to Austria. In the former case, the land annexed lay along the



Baltic and served to render East Prussia, Brandenburg, and Silesia a geographical and political unit. On the other hand, Austria to some extent was positively weakened by the acquisition of territory outside her natural frontiers, and the addition of a turbulent Polish people further emphasized the diversity of nationalities and the clash of interests within the Habsburg dominions.

When, a few years later, the succession to the electorate of Bavaria was in some doubt and Austria laid claims to the greater part of that state (1777-1779), Frederick again stepped in, and now by intrigue and now by threats of armed force prevented any considerable extension of Habsburg control. The last important act of his foreign policy was the formation of a league of princes to champion the lesser German states against Austria.

¹ On this and the later partitions of 1793 and 1795, see below, pp. 382-383.

6. FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE AGE OF "ENLIGHTENED" DESPOTS

Frederick the Great of Prussia was not merely a military genius and unscrupulous diplomat. He was an almost perfect example of the benevolent, "enlightened" despots who flourished on the Continent of Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century.

It was after Louis XIV of France—the Grand Monarch—that Frederick and the other despots of his age patterned their conception of politics: not only that the state should be a "Enlightened" "dynastic" state, embracing as many different lands Despotism of the Eighteenth Century and peoples as a royal family, through marriage or conquest, could bring under its sway; not only that such a dynastic state should be centralized under a monarch who would be absolute in fact as well as in name, but that the monarch should work hard, that he should conscientiously discharge the duties of his office, that he should benevolently labor for the material well-being of his subjects. But beyond the scope of Louis XIV's policies went the aims of Frederick and his fellow despots of the eighteenth century. These monarchs were "enlightened," as Louis XIV had not been; they sympathized more or less openly with the "intellectual revolution" which in their day was influencing a large number of thoughtful persons to emphasize scientific rather than religious interests and to demand rational reforms in government and society, in church and education.¹ Frederick and his fellows would be both benevolent and "enlightened."

In his youth, Frederick had imbibed a taste for the new intellectual developments—for the new physical science, for the new deistic philosophy, for the latest fads in French literature and art and criticism. Then, thanks to the dogged determination of his stern father, Frederick had become something more than a flute-playing, poetizing, sceptical philosopher; he had been forced to familiarize himself with all the dull details of statecraft and, curiously enough, had learned to like them and to attend to them most industriously.

By the time he succeeded to the Prussian throne in 1740, Frederick had a clear conviction of his duties and responsibilities.

¹ On the Intellectual Revolution, see below. ch. xi.

He would secure foreign glory for himself and for Prussia, of course, but he would also make Prussia the most governed and best governed state in Europe. His political ideals he expressed in a book which he wrote in French on the theory of government. "The prince," he said, "is to the nation he governs what the head is to the man; it is his duty to see, think, and act for the whole community, that he may procure it every advantage of which it is capable." "The monarch is not the absolute master, but only the first servant of the state."

During his long reign from 1740 to 1786, Frederick was indeed the first servant of Prussia. He usually rose before six every morning, working at official correspondence and business until eleven, with a little time off for drinking his coffee and playing his flute; then came military parade, and an hour afterwards, punctually, dinner, which continued until two, or later, if conversation happened to be interesting; after dinner he signed cabinet orders written in accordance with his morning instructions, often adding caustic marginal notes, and then amused himself with literary work until six; at seven there was a concert, and at half past eight he was ready for supper and the evening's entertainment. For years at a stretch, he was engaged in difficult and most hazardous foreign wars, as we have seen,¹ but even at these times he by no means lost zeal for internal administration or interest in internal reform. He was very meticulous about filling the public offices with faithful and capable men and assuring their good behavior by constant supervision on his part. He took his responsibilities quite seriously.

Frederick did much for the economic development of Prussia, especially its agriculture.² He encouraged the nobles and other landlords to introduce "scientific" farming, to drain marshes and enlarge the area of cultivation, to plant fruit trees and such root crops as potatoes and turnips, and to improve the breeding of domestic animals. He himself fostered immigration and built

¹ The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).

² Frederick and other "enlightened" despots of the age were greatly interested in the agricultural revolution which was occurring at that time in Great Britain—the rise of "gentleman farming" which was capitalistic and scientific, which substituted "enclosures" for open-field farming, and which promised greatly to increase the yield of crops and the wealth of the agricultural classes. See below, pp. 465-460.

canals. In accordance with his ideas of discipline, he insisted that the peasants should remain in a condition of serfdom, but he was anxious to lighten their financial burdens; he declared that a man who worked all day in the fields "should not be hounded to despair by tax-collectors."

Taxes were not light by any means, but everybody felt that the king was not squandering the public funds. Frederick was not a man to lavish fortunes on courtiers or mistresses. He diligently examined all accounts. His officials dared not be extravagant for fear of being corporally punished, or, what was worse, of being held up to ridicule by the witty tongue of their royal master.

It was Frederick's financial planning and economy which enabled him to increase his army to 200,000 men and to embark upon the foreign policy of conquest by which Silesia and a part of Poland were won. On the army alone Frederick was willing to spend freely, but even in this department he made sure that Prussia received its money's worth. Tireless drill, strict discipline, up-to-date arms, well trained officers, and, most of all, Frederick's enthusiasm and ability rendered the Prussian army the envy of Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century.

There was nothing, outside of his army, about which Frederick took so much trouble as about the administration of justice. He disliked the formalities and unreasonableness of the law, and on one occasion, when he thought injustice had been done to a poor man, he dismissed the judges, condemned them to a year's imprisonment, and compelled them to make good out of their own pockets the loss sustained by their victim. Under Frederick's "enlightened" auspices, moreover, the laws of the land were codified and simplified and were published in clear and compact form for the information of the public and the guidance of the courts. Torture was abolished in criminal investigations, and other humane reforms were decreed.

In religious matters, Frederick was devoid of the fiery Protestant zeal which had distinguished some of his Hohenzollern ancestors. It was part of his "enlightenment" to be sceptical about Christian faith and morals, to doubt the Bible and sneer at clergymen, and to affirm that "all religions must be tolerated and every person allowed to go to heaven in his own fashion." To the scandal of many of his Lutheran subjects, he welcomed

Catholics in Prussia and told them that they might build their churches "as high as they pleased and with as many towers and bells"; and he amazed all kinds of Christians by the declaration that "if Turks should come to populate the land, I myself shall build them mosques." Only against the Jews did he discriminate, and in their case not because of their religious beliefs but because of qualities which he fancied were inherent in their race. He obliged Jews to adopt surnames and to obtain special licenses to live in Prussia; he arbitrarily expelled them from this or that locality; sometimes when he thought they might be serviceable, he favored them, and at other times he imposed annoying restrictions upon them.

Into the intellectual life of his age—its science and its art—Frederick entered heart and soul. He restored and invigorated the Berlin Academy of Science. He read with avidity and appreciation the contemporary accounts of scientific advance and rationalist speculation. He established many elementary schools to spread a knowledge of reading and writing among the lower classes of his subjects. He liked to play his flute while thinking how to outwit Maria Theresa. He delighted in appending facetious comments to official reports and petitions. He enjoyed sitting at table with congenial companions and discussing poetry and the drama. True, he disliked German literature; he thought the work of Lessing and Goethe vulgar and uninspired. But he was fond of French literature. He invited literary Frenchmen to come to Berlin. He himself wrote histories, dialogues, and verses in the French language. Even Voltaire was a guest at Frederick's court, until the "prince of philosophers" went too far in correcting the amateur poems of the Prussian despot.

"Enlightened" despotism was brilliantly exemplified by Frederick the Great of Prussia, but it was at least an ideal for most of his monarchical contemporaries. In the Austrian dominions, Maria Theresa, Frederick's foe in war, was his rival in works of peace. Maria Theresa was not "enlightened" in the Frederician or Voltairean sense; she was fearful of the new critical philosophy, temperamentally averse to radical changes, and quite devoted to the Catholic religion. But she was benevolent; she thought it a religious duty, if not an evidence of philosophical "enlighten-

Austria
under
Maria
Theresa

ment," to do what she could to better the condition of her state and the lot of her subjects. At first with the aid of her husband, the Emperor Francis I (1745-1765), and thereafter with the collaboration of her son, the Emperor Joseph II (1765-1790), Maria Theresa effected some reforms in the hereditary Habsburg lands. She emphasized absolutism in government, suspended the meetings of the local diets or parliaments in most parts of her dominions, reorganized the ministries at Vienna, and otherwise promoted the centralization of the monarchy. She similarly welded the hitherto separate armies of her diverse dominions into a unified "Austrian" army. She made German the official language of military officers and began to substitute it for Latin and local dialects in the civil administration. She curtailed the privileges of religious orders in the interest of royal absolutism, and she suppressed the Jesuits. She was a liberal patroness of musicians and painters and showed her interest in education by remodelling the Austrian universities and elaborating a system of elementary and secondary schools.

Joseph II, who had been associated with his mother since 1765, became sole ruler of the Austrian empire upon her death in 1780, and thenceforth for ten years, he gave unrestrained pursuit to "enlightened" despotism. For Joseph II, unlike Maria Theresa, was thoroughly "enlightened." He admired Voltaire and Rousseau. He surpassed Frederick the Great in devotion to reason and reform. "I," he said, "have made philosophy the legislator of my empire; her logical principles shall transform Austria." In his mind, Austria was to be as completely remodelled as any Rousseau might have wished—except, of course, in respect of Rousseau's basic idea of popular sovereignty. He believed in the despotism, if not in the divine-right, of monarchs.

It is a pity that Joseph II cannot be judged simply by his good intentions, for he was quite unfitted to carry out wholesome reforms. He had derived his ideas from French philosophers rather than from actual life; he was so sure that his theories were right that he would take no advice; he was impatient and would brook no delay in the wholesale application of his theories. Regardless of tradition, regardless of opposition, regardless of every consideration of political expediency, he rushed ahead on the path of reform.

**Joseph II
of Austria**

To Joseph II it mattered not that the masses of his subjects were Catholic Christians. Catholicism, in his opinion, must be purged of superstition and unreason and must be subordinated to the state. He insisted that no papal bulls should be published in his dominions without his own authorization; he nominated the bishops; he confiscated church lands. Side altars and various emblems were removed from the churches. Customary ceremonies were altered. Many monasteries were abolished. The clergy were to be trained in state schools. And, to cap the climax, heretics and Jews were to be not only tolerated, but actually given equal rights with orthodox Catholics.

Some of these measures were no doubt desirable, and some of them might have been accomplished without causing much disturbance, but by trying to reform everything at once, Joseph only shocked and angered the clergy and such of his people as piously loved their religion.

His political policies, which were no more wisely conceived or executed, were three in number. (1) He desired to extend his possessions eastward to the Black Sea and southward along the Adriatic, while the distant Netherlands might conveniently be exchanged for near-by Bavaria. (2) He wished to get rid of all provincial assemblies and other vestiges of local independence, and to have all his territories governed uniformly by officials subject to himself. (3) He aimed to uplift the lower classes of his people, and to put down the proud nobles, so that all should be equal and all alike should look up to their benevolent, but all-powerful, ruler.

The first of these policies proved sterile. His designs on Bavaria were frustrated, as we have seen, by Frederick the Great, who posed as the protector of the smaller German states. In the Balkan peninsula he undertook a war in 1786, in alliance with Russia, against the Ottoman Empire, and his army captured Belgrade; but after his death, his successor felt obliged to conclude a peace which secured no territorial gain for Austria.¹

• Joseph II's administrative policy was as unfortunate as his territorial ambition. Maria Theresa had taken some steps to simplify the administration of her heterogeneous dominions, but she had wisely allowed Hungary, Lombardy, and the Netherlands to preserve certain of the traditions and formulas of

¹ See below, p. 280.

self-government, and she did everything to win the loyalty and confidence of her Hungarian subjects. Joseph, on the other hand, carried the sacred crown of St. Stephen—treasured by all Hungarians—to Vienna, and abolished the Hungarian diet. Then, with a stroke of the pen, he decreed a new system of local government for his empire. He divided it into thirteen provinces, each under a military commander. Each province was divided into districts or counties, and these again into townships. There would be no more local privileges, but everything was to be managed from Vienna. The army was henceforth to be on the Prussian model, and the peasants were to be forced to serve their terms in it. German was to be the official language throughout the Habsburg realm. This was all very fine on paper, but in practice it was a gigantic failure. The Austrian Netherlands rose in revolt rather than surrender their local laws; the Tyrol did likewise; and angry protests came from Hungary. Local peculiarities and traditions could not be so easily abolished.

Finally, in his attempts to reconstruct society, Joseph came to grief. He directed that all serfs should become free men. able to marry without the consent of their lord, permitted to sell their holdings, and privileged to pay a fixed rent instead of being compelled to labor four days a week for their lord. Nobles and peasants alike were to share the burdens of taxation, all paying thirteen per cent on their land. Joseph intended still further to help the peasantry, for, he said, "I could never bring myself to skin two hundred good peasants to pay one do-nothing lord more than he ought to have." He planned to give everybody a free elementary education, to encourage industry, and to make all his subjects prosperous and happy.

But the peasants disliked compulsory military service and misunderstood Joseph's efforts in their behalf; the nobles hated him for attempting to deprive them of their feudal rights; the middle classes were irritated by his autocracy and his bungling interference in industry and trade; the clergy preached against his religious policy. When Joseph II was dying (1790), he confessed that, "after all my trouble, I have made but few happy, and many ungrateful." He directed that most of his "reforms" should be cancelled, and proposed as his epitaph the gloomy sentence: "Here lies the man who, with the best intentions, never succeeded in anything."

Joseph II, archduke of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor, was at once the most enthusiastic and the least successful of all the European monarchs of the age of enlightened despotism. Yet his failure was not disastrous, and it should not obscure the substantial achievements of Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia and other less volatile but equally "enlightened" despots of the period.

Charles III of Naples (1738-1759) and Spain (1759-1788) was "enlightened," and, with the assistance of ministers as "enlightened" as himself,¹ he instituted numerous re-
 forms in his realms. He worked hard. He centralized the administration. He reduced the public debt. He patronized science and art. He encouraged "scientific" farming, constructed roads and canals, and fostered manufactures. He suppressed the Jesuits and checked the operations of the Inquisition. He reorganized the army and rebuilt the navy. He improved the administration of the colonies in America and fostered emigration to them from the n.other country. During the reign of Charles III, the revenues of Spain tripled, its population grew from seven to eleven millions, its prestige improved abroad, and an unwonted spirit of toleration appeared at home.

**Charles III
of Naples
and Spain**

Charles's neighbor, Joseph I (1750-1777) of Portugal, shone in the reflected glory of a distinguished minister, Pombal by name, who was both an "enlightened" philosopher and an active statesman. Under Pombal's administration, the royal authority was strengthened at the expense of nobility and clergy and was used to promote education and the material well-being of the middle and lower classes in Portugal.








**Joseph I
of Portugal**

Sweden had a similarly "enlightened" despot in Gustavus III (1771-1792); Sardinia, in Charles Emmanuel III (1730-1773); Tuscany, in Leopold I (1765-1790), a brother of Joseph II of Austria and his successor as Holy Roman Emperor; and, as we shall learn in the next chapter, Catherine II (1762-1796) of Russia played at being "enlightened." Only France, among the major powers of the Continent of Europe, lacked an eminent exponent of enlightened despotism, and even here Louis XVI (1774-1792) did his best to be benevolent.


**Other
"Enlightened"
Despots**

¹ Especially, the duke of Aranda.

**THE EUROPEAN DYNASTIC EMPIRES
OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1775)**

-  Habsburg Dominions
-  Bourbon Dominions
-  Hohenzollern Dominions
-  Romanov Dominions
-  Dominions of Saxon Family
-  Dominions of the Hanoverian Family
-  Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire

Note The dynastic union between Saxony and Poland, beginning in 1687, had ended in 1763



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Despite its vogue and its undoubted benefits, "enlightened" despotism as practiced by Frederick the Great and fellow monarchs in the eighteenth century, possessed certain inherent weaknesses. One such weakness was the prevailing dynastic character of the European state-system of the age. There had grown up, since at least the sixteenth century, a number of dynastic empires, sprawling over the map of Europe, and dividing or overlapping particular nationalities. This involved such a variety—usually such a conflict—of demands upon the time and attention of the presiding despots that, no matter how "enlightened" they might be, they could seldom carry any policy of reform to complete fruition.

Weak-
nesses of
"Enlight-
ened"
Despotism

Associated with this weakness of the dynastic state-system was the unwillingness of the despots to consecrate their chief energy to internal reform. All of them were ambitious to extend their territories and to gain dynastic prestige abroad, and their consequent wars and conquests often paralyzed their other efforts. No previous period in the world's history was more replete with international conflicts of a selfish and sordid sort than the age of enlightened despotism. It was "enlightened" despots who conducted such bloody wars as resulted from the seizure of Silesia by Frederick the Great and such shameful intrigues as led to the partition of Poland. And in a few intervening years of peace, not even the wisest and most benevolent despots could make good all the human and material losses of the many years of warfare.


Another grave weakness of "enlightened" despotism was the contemptuous attitude of the "enlightened" despot toward his "unenlightened" subjects. He acted on the assumption that he knew what was for the good of his people better than they themselves knew, and accordingly he was prone to force reforms on them whether the reforms were popularly desired or not. As a result, few of his changes were permanent, and popular ingratitude was frequently his reward.

A final weakness of "enlightened" despotism lay in the fact that its perpetuation depended upon every able sovereign's being succeeded by a sovereign equally able. This seldom happened. Just as Louis XIV had been succeeded in France by the incompetent Louis XV, so Charles III was followed in Spain by a half-witted boor, Joseph I in Portugal by an insane queen,

and Gustavus III in Sweden by a madman. It seemed to be the general rule that incompetence should succeed ability, that extravagance should waste the fruits of economy, and that corruption should undo reform.

Frederick the Great, who gave tone and special repute to the age of benevolent despotism, left no children. On his death in 1786, the Prussian crown passed to his nephew, Frederick William II (1786-1797), a timid creature who loved to defer to Austria, to pietistic clergymen, and to a bevy of coarse mistresses. It was this spineless prince who, only three years after Frederick's death, heard a most ominous threat against monarchical despotism of any kind; the threat was the beginning of the French Revolution.

**The
Passing of
Frederick
the Great**



CHAPTER VIII

THE RISE OF RUSSIA

I. RUSSIA AND THE ROMANOVS



UCH states in western Christendom as Spain, France, Holland, and England, were becoming strong and influential and were extending their sway over distant continents, at the very time when the leadership in eastern Christendom was passing from a Byzantine (Greek) Empire to a Russian Empire. The Byzantine Empire, the medieval continuation of the ancient Græco-Roman Empire, had long been the political expression of eastern Christendom, but in 1453, on the eve of modern times, this Byzantine Empire, as we have seen, finally fell prey to conquest by Moslem Ottoman Turks.¹ Indeed, the only state of eastern Europe and Orthodox Christianity which did not fall prey to Moslem conquest was the Russian state, then known as the grand-duchy of Muscovy.

During the century following the extinction of the Byzantine Empire, the grand-duchy of Muscovy was a relatively backward and even primitive state. Yet, under the rule of such princes as Ivan the Great and Ivan the Terrible, foundations were laid for its later fame. The Ivans regarded themselves as successors of the Christian emperors at Constantinople. Ivan the Great caused himself to be described in the ritual of the Orthodox Church as "the ruler and autocrat of all Russia, the new Tsar Constantine in the new city of Constantine, Moscow."² Each of his successors invariably had himself crowned as "tsar and autocrat of all Russia." Muscovy was thus transformed into Russia, and its

**Trans-
formation
of Mus-
covy into
Russia**

¹ See above, pp. 11-15. And on early Russia, see above, pp. 37-38.

² The first cæsar of the Græco-Roman Empire had been Constantine I, and the last had been Constantine XI. See above, p. 12. It was significant that the grand-duke of Muscovy, whose subjects owed their Christianity and such culture as they possessed to the Greeks, should now revive and continue the title of cæsar (in its Russian form, tsar or czar).

grand-duke into a tsar, or emperor. Simultaneously the Ivans freed Russia from the payment of tribute to Mongols and Tartars, and in 1582 Russia was freed from ecclesiastical dependence on the patriarch of Constantinople.¹ Thenceforth Moscow was alike the political and the religious capital of the tsars and of their expanding empire.

For two centuries after the time of Ivan the Great, however, Russia remained a distinctly backward country. Her commercial and cultural contacts with western Christendom were comparatively few and infrequent. She was untouched by the rise of capitalism, the religious upheaval, the new learning, or the scientific development, which profoundly affected the countries of western and central Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Not until the time of Peter the Great, in the eighteenth century, did Russia enter the general family of European nations and assume an important part in international relations. Nevertheless, during the two centuries which separated the reigns of Ivan the Great and Peter the Great the way was solidly paved for the subsequent, almost startling, rise of the powerful Russian Empire of northern and eastern Europe.

The most fundamental of these occurrences was the expansion of the Russian people. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the farming folk of the region about Moscow were emigrating south and east and establishing themselves in the fertile plains of the Don and the Volga.² A glance at a physical map of Russia will show how the network of rivers and the comparatively level character of the country facilitated this process of national expansion. The gentle southerly flowing Dnieper, Don, and Volga, radiating from the same central region, and connected by way of the northern Kama with the headwaters of the Dvina, which empties into the White Sea in the extreme north, became chief channels of trade and migration, and contributed much more to the elaboration of national unity than any political institutions. Boats could be conveyed over flat and easy portages from one river-basin to another, and with a relatively small amount of

**Backward-
ness of
Russia**

**Expansion
of the
Russian
People**

¹ See above, pp. 192-193.

² Armies of the tsar backed up the colonists: they occupied Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan, near the Caspian Sea, in 1554.

labor these portages were gradually changed into navigable channels, which served as highly convenient arteries of commerce.

As the emigrants threaded their way along the river courses and over the broad plains, they had to be constantly on the alert against attacks of native tribesmen, and they accordingly organized themselves in semi-military fashion. Those in the vanguard of territorial expansion constituted a peculiar class known as Cossacks, who, like frontiersmen of other times and places, for example, like those that gained for the United States its vast western domain, lived an adventurous life in which agricultural and pastoral pursuits were mingled with hunting and fighting. In the basins of the southern rivers, the Cossacks formed semi-independent military communities: those of the Volga and the Don professed allegiance to the tsar of Muscovy, while those of the Dnieper usually recognized the sovereignty of the king of Poland.

Nor was the migration of the Russian nationality restricted to Europe. The division between Europe and Asia is largely imaginary, as another glance at the map will prove. The low-lying Urals are a barrier only toward the north, while southward the plains of Russia stretch on interminably above the Caspian until they are merged in the steppes of Siberia. Across these plains moved a steady stream of Cossacks and peasants and adventurers, carrying with them the habits and traditions of their Russian homes. Ever eastward wended the emigrants. They founded Tobolsk in 1587 and Tomsk in 1604; they established Yakutsk on the Lena River in 1632, and Irkutsk on Lake Baikal in 1652; in 1638 they reached the Sea of Okhotsk, and, by the close of the seventeenth century, they occupied the peninsula of Kamchatka and looked upon the broad Pacific. Early in the eighteenth century they crossed the Bering Sea, appropriated Alaska, and penetrated southward along the American continent into what is now California. It thus transpired that at the time when the Spaniards were extending their speech and laws in South America, and the English were laying the foundations for the predominance of their institutions in North America, the Russians were appropriating northern Asia and demonstrating that, with them at least, the course of empire takes its way eastward.

Russians
in Asia

Then, too, wherever the Russians settled, they retained their

language and national customs and their loyalty to Orthodox Christianity. Expansion of the Russian people meant extension of the Russian church, and with this extension the sway of the tsars tended to keep pace. By military and ecclesiastical agents, the tsars exercised their control over widening territories of the Russian people. With national pride and religious fervor, the distant emigrants regarded their tsars at Moscow.

Yet this greater Russia remained essentially Oriental. Its form of Christianity was derived from the East rather than from the West. Its social customs savored more of Asia than of Europe. Its nobles and even its tsars were rated by western Christendom as little better than barbarians. In fact, the Russian state was looked upon in the seventeenth century in much the same way as China was regarded in the nineteenth century.

For an understanding of this relative backwardness of Russia, account should be taken of certain special circumstances. In the first place, the religion of the state was a direct heritage of the expiring Eastern Empire and was different from either the Catholicism or the Protestantism of western Europe. Secondly, long and close contact with the conquering Mongols or Tartars of Asia had saturated the Russian people with Oriental customs and habits.¹ Thirdly, the nature of the country tended to exalt agriculture and to discourage industry and foreign commerce, and at the same time to turn emigration and expansion eastward rather than westward. Finally, so long as the neighboring states of Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire remained powerful and retained the entire coast of the Baltic and Black seas, Russia was deprived of seaports that would enable her to engage in traffic with western Europe and thus to partake of the common culture of Christendom.²


Not until Russia was modernized and westernized, and had made considerable headway against one or all of her western neighbors, could she hope to become a European power. Not until the accession of the Romanov dynasty did she enter seriously upon this twofold policy.

¹ See above, p. 38.

² In the sixteenth century, the province of Karelia, on the Baltic, had been held by Russian tsars, but it was conquered for Sweden by Gustavus Adolphus (see above, p. 268) and confirmed in Swedish possession by treaties of 1617 and 1661.

The direct line of Ivan the Great had died out at the close of the sixteenth century, and there ensued what in Russian history is known as "the troublous times". Disputes over the succession led to a series of civil wars, and the consequent anarchy invited foreign intervention. For a time the Poles harassed the country and even occupied the Kremlin, or citadel, of Moscow. The Swedes, also, took advantage of the troublous times in Russia to enlarge their conquests on the eastern shore of the Baltic and to seize the important trading centre of Novgorod. In the south, the Ottoman

**The
"Trou-
blous
Times" in
Russia**



Turks warred with the Cossacks and strengthened their own hold on the Crimean principality

Under these discouraging circumstances a great national assembly convened at Moscow in 1613 to elect a tsar, and its choice fell upon one of the Russian nobles, a certain Michael Romanov, whose family had been connected by marriage ties with the medieval royal line. It is an interesting fact that the subsequent autocrats of Russia were

**Accession
of the
Romanovs**

lineal descendants of the Romanov who was thus popularly elected to supreme authority in 1613.

Michael Romanov was no genius, but with the aid of his father (who was Orthodox patriarch of Moscow) he reëstablished order and security throughout the country and successfully resisted foreign encroachments. He founded several fortified towns in the south against the Tartars and the Turks. He recovered Novgorod from the Swedes. During the reign of his son, Polish depredations were stopped and the Dnieper River was fixed upon as the general dividing line between Poland and Russia.¹

The grandson of Michael Romanov was the celebrated Peter the Great, who may rightfully be designated as the father of modern Russia. An older and half-witted brother, with whom during his youth he was nominally associated in the government, died without leaving direct male heirs, and Peter became sole ruler in 1696. From the outset he showed an insatiable curiosity about the arts and sciences of western Europe, the authority of its kings, and the organization of its armies and fleets. To an intense curiosity, Peter added an indomitable will. He was resolved to satisfy his every curiosity and to utilize whatever he learned or found.

From childhood, Peter had displayed an aptitude for mechanical tools and inventions and especially for boat-making. Ship-building and ship-sailing became his favorite pastimes. When he was barely twenty-one, he launched at Archangel, on the ice-bound White Sea, a ship which he had built with his own hands. Now in 1696, being sole tsar at the age of twenty-four, he fitted out a fleet which defeated the Turks on the Black Sea and allowed him to capture the valuable port of Azov. No other successes were gained, however, in this Turkish war; and the young tsar began to perceive that if he were to succeed in his cherished project he would have to obtain western aid. In 1697, therefore, a special commission left Moscow to solicit the coöperation of the principal powers against the Ottoman Empire, and to this commission the young tsar attached himself as a volunteer sailor, "Peter Mikhailov," in order that he might incidentally learn much about ship-building and other technical crafts.

¹ By the treaty of Andrussovo (1667), Poland ceded to Russia Kiev, Smolensk, and eastern Ukraine.

In its primary purpose, the Russian commission failed signally. Western Europe was on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession,¹ and all its sovereigns seemed to be engrossed in the distractions of dynastic politics. No help against the Turks was forthcoming. But personally Peter learned many useful things. In Holland he studied ship-building as well as anatomy and engraving. In England he investigated industry and commerce. He closely scrutinized the military establishment of Prussia. In all places which he visited he collected artisans, sailors, engineers, and other workmen, whom he sent back to Russia to instruct his people.

While he was on his way from Vienna to Venice, news reached him that the royal bodyguard, the *streltsi*, had taken advantage of his absence of a year and a half and had mutinied at Moscow. In hot haste he hurried home and wreaked characteristic vengeance upon the mutineers. Two thousand were hanged or were broken on the wheel, five thousand were beheaded, and Peter for many days amused himself and edified his court by the wonderful dexterity with which he sliced off the heads of *streltsi* with his own royal arm. The severe punishment of the rebellious *streltsi* and the immediate abolition of their military organization was clear evidence that Peter was fully determined both to break with the past traditions of his country and to compel all the Russian people to do likewise.

The reign of Peter the Great was noteworthy for the removal of serious checks upon the power of the tsar and the definitive establishment of that form of monarchical absolutism which in Russia has been called autocracy. By ambition and will-power, the tsar was qualified to play the rôle of despot, and his observation of the absolutist government of Louis XIV convinced him that that kind of government was the most suitable for Russia.

Autocracy
in State

Peter was a thoroughgoing despotic militarist, and his first care was the creation of a powerful standing army for Russia. Recruited from the Russian masses, and officered and disciplined by foreigners dependent entirely upon the tsar, the new army replaced the *streltsi* and proved a potent factor in executing the domestic and foreign policies of Peter the Great. Indeed, it was this new army which

Autocracy
and Militari-
tarism

¹ See above, pp. 306-300.

was Peter's chief concern throughout his reign and the instrument of all his "reforms."

To cover the enormous expenses of his new military establishment, Peter acquired the habit of taking money wherever he found it. Unable to obtain sufficient funds through the old agencies of local and central government in Russia, he proceeded to ignore and then to destroy all those agencies. In place of them, he merely divided his empire into a certain number of "governments" ("gubernii")—or provinces—over each of which he put an army officer with the principal duty of extorting from the inhabitants enough money to maintain their specified quota of regiments.

Peter's replacement of the independent, turbulent *streltsi* with a loyal and orderly standing army was one important step in the direction of autocracy. Another was the subordination of the church to the tsar. The tsar understood the very great influence which the Orthodox Church exerted over the Russian people and the danger to his policies which ecclesiastical opposition might create. He was naturally anxious

Autocracy in Church

that the church should become the ally, not the enemy, of autocracy. He, therefore, took such steps as would exalt the church in the opinion of his countrymen and at the same time would render it a serviceable agent of the government. On the one hand, he professed a burning enthusiasm for the tenets of the Orthodox faith and harried Russian heretics and dissenters with fire and sword.¹ On the other hand, he subjected the Orthodox Church to his own authority; he deprived the patriarch of Moscow of the headship of the ecclesiastical organization and vested all powers of church government in a body, the Holy Synod, whose members were bishops and whose chief was a layman, all chosen by the tsar himself. No appointment to ecclesiastical office could be made without the approval of the Holy Synod; no sermon could be preached and

¹ The most numerous "dissenters" in Russia were the "Old Believers," who broke away from the Orthodox Church in the second half of the seventeenth century when a patriarch of Moscow made some slight changes in the liturgy. The Old Believers were thoroughly reactionary and were as hostile to Protestantism as to any reform in the Orthodox Church. They were quite scandalized by the "reforms" of Peter the Great and became his chief political and religious adversaries; he and succeeding tsars persecuted them, but they remained fairly numerous throughout modern times. In 1905 they were said to number twelve millions.

no book could be published unless it had received the sanction of that august body. The authority which the tsar thereby obtained over the Orthodox Church in Russia was as complete and far-reaching as that which Henry VIII had acquired, two centuries earlier, over the Anglican Church. The results were in keeping with Peter's fondest expectations, for the Orthodox Church in Russia speedily became the right-hand support of the tsardom. The tsars exalted the church as the source of order and holiness; as a veritable ark of the covenant the clergy magnified and extolled the autocracy.

Under Peter the Great, Russian society was revolutionized. On the one hand, he swamped the old (and presumably independent) medieval nobility of Russia by ennobling a very large number of families which did conspicuous military service for him, with the result that a new uniform class of "gentry" appeared, possessing most of the land and devoted to the army and the autocratic tsardom.¹ On the other hand, the various kinds of free and unfree peasants—the mass of the Russian people—were put more rigorously under the domination of the gentry and were reduced to a uniform position of serfdom which was not far removed from slavery. Peter the Great, more than any other person, was responsible for the peculiar structure of society which existed in Russia from his day to the twentieth century.

Of traditional civil government, Peter the Great was a destroyer rather than a reformer. Yet he foreshadowed the kind of civil government which Russia was to have during the ensuing two centuries. At the head of the state was the tsar or emperor, possessing absolute, unlimited powers. The medieval assembly, or duma, of great nobles, which had formerly exercised some legislative rights, was practically abolished; its place was taken by an advisory council of state whose members were selected by the tsar. Most traces of local self-government were similarly swept away, and the country was administered by the tsar's personal agents. To enforce his autocratic will, he relied upon his new army and his new gentry. The tsar encountered a good deal of opposition to these,

¹ In 1700, before Peter's "reforms" there were 2,985 noble families in Russia. In 1737, after his "reforms," there were 100,000 noble families, comprising 500,000 male nobles, of whom 200,000 were officials.

as to all his other "reforms," and for a while he was obliged to depend largely on foreigners to carry them out. As soon as possible, however, Peter employed natives, especially his newly ennobled gentry, for it was a cardinal point in his policy that Russia must be managed by its own upper classes without foreign interference or help.

Like his contemporaries in western Europe, Peter gave considerable attention to the economic condition of the monarchy.

Western-izing Russia He strove, usually in a bungling manner, to promote agriculture. Moreover, he understood that Russia grievously lacked a numerous and prosperous middle class, and he aimed to create one by encouraging trade and industries. He undertook to establish some state-owned industries and to man them with serfs whom he requisitioned from the gentry. He also had an idea of introducing the guild system from Germany into Russia. Yet his almost constant preoccupation with the army and participation in wars, prevented him from bringing his economic plans to fruition.

Almost from the beginning, Peter the Great was resolved to make the Russian people look like Europeans. He at least would change their clothing and manners from Oriental to Occidental. With this end in view, edict followed edict with amazing rapidity. The chief potentates of the empire were solemnly assembled so that Peter with his own hand might shave off their long beards and flowing mustaches. A heavy tax was imposed on such as persisted in wearing beards. French or German clothes were to be substituted, under penalty of large fines, for the traditional Russian costume. The use of tobacco was made compulsory. The Oriental semi-seclusion of women was prohibited. Both sexes were to mingle freely in the festivities of the court. These innovations were largely superficial; they partially permeated the upper classes, but made little impression on the mass of the population. Peter had begun a work, however, which was to bear significant results in the future.

Internal reforms were but one half of Peter's ambitious programme. To him Russia owed not only the creation of a vast new militarism, the loss of the independence of the church, the revolutionizing of society, the Europeanization of manners and customs, and the firm establishment of autocracy, but also the development of elaborate plans of foreign aggrandize-

ment. On one hand, the tsar showed a lively interest in the exploration and colonization of Siberia and in the extension of Russian dominion around the Caspian Sea and towards Persia. On the other hand, —and this, for our present purposes, is far more important, —he was resolved to make the cultural and commercial connection between Russia and Europe strong and intimate, to open a way to the west by gaining outlets on both the Black and Baltic seas — “windows” to the west, as he termed them.

Peter's
Foreign
Policy

On the Baltic Sea, Sweden blocked him; toward the Black Sea, the Ottoman power hemmed him in. It was, therefore, against Sweden and the Ottoman Empire that Peter the Great waged war. It seemed to him a matter of dire necessity for the growth of European civilization in Russia that he should defeat one or both of these states. Against the Ottoman Turks, as the event proved, he made little headway; against the Swedes he fared better.

In order that we may understand the nature of the momentous conflict between Russia and Sweden in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, it will be necessary at this point to notice the parallel development of Sweden.

2. SWEDEN AND THE CAREER OF CHARLES XII

It will be recalled that a century before Peter the Great, the remarkable Gustavus Adolphus had aimed to make the Baltic a Swedish lake. To his own kingdom, lying along the western shore of that sea, and to the dependency of Finland, he had added by conquest the eastern provinces of Karelia, Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia,¹ and his intervention in the Thirty Years' War had given Sweden possession of western Pomerania and the mouths of the Elbe, Oder, and Weser rivers and a considerable influence in German affairs. For years after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden was the recognized leader of Continental Protestantism, and her trade on the Baltic grew and thrived. Exports of Russia and Poland found a convenient outlet through the Swedish port of Riga,

Sweden in
the Seven-
teenth
Century


¹ Livonia, occupied by Gustavus Adolphus during the Polish War of 1621-1629, was not formally relinquished by Poland until 1660. Estonia had been conquered by the Swedes in 1561, but Russia did not renounce her pretensions to this province until 1617.

and those of northern Germany were most commonly shipped on Swedish vessels from Stettin or Stralsund.

Repeated efforts were made by Denmark, Poland, and Brandenburg to break the commercial monopoly which Sweden enjoyed upon the Baltic and to deprive her of her conquests, but for a long time in vain. Victory continued to attend Swedish arms and a general treaty in 1660 confirmed her dominion. At that time Sweden was not only a military power of the first magnitude but also one of the largest states of Europe, possessing about as much area as present-day Sweden and the modern German republic combined. All the islands and the greater part of the coast of the Baltic belonged to her. Stockholm, the capital, lay in the very centre of the empire, whose second city was Riga, on the other side of the sea. In politics, in religion, and in trade, Sweden was feared and respected.

Yet the greatness of Sweden in the seventeenth century was more apparent than real. Her commerce provoked the jealousy of all her neighbors. Her dependencies across the Baltic were difficult to hold: peopled by Finns, Estonians, Letts, Russians, Poles, Germans, and Danes, their bond with Sweden was essentially artificial, and they usually sympathized, naturally enough, with their sovereign's enemies. They, therefore, imposed on the mother country the duty of remaining a military monarchy, armed from head to foot for every possible emergency. For such a tremendous destiny Sweden was quite unfitted. Her wide territory was sparsely populated, and her peasantry were very poor. Only her close alliance with France gave Sweden a solid backing in Germany, and, with the decline of the fortunes of Louis XIV and the rise of Prussia and Russia, she was bound to lose her leadership in the North.

To the fate of Sweden, her rulers in the seventeenth century contributed no small share. Nearly all of them were born fighters and nearly all of them were neglectful of home interests and of the works of peace. The military instincts of the Swedish kings not only sacrificed thousands of lives that were urgently needed in building up their country and cost the kingdom enormous sums of money but likewise impaired commerce, surrounded the empire with a broad belt of desolated territory, and implanted an ineradicable hatred in every adjacent state. Then, too, the extravagance and negligence of the sovereigns led to chaos in do-



NORTHWESTERN EUROPE
 at the end of the Reign
 of Peter the Great
 By Herman Moll Geographer

North Cape
 North Cape is the northernmost point of the continent of Europe, situated on the coast of the island of Spitzbergen, in the North Sea, between the Straits of Spitzbergen and the Gulf of Bothnia.

Greenland
 Greenland is a large island situated in the North Atlantic Ocean, north of the island of Iceland. It is the largest island in the world, with an area of 2,166,000 square miles. It is named after the Norse explorer Leif Ericson, who discovered it in 985.

Swedish
 Sweden is a country in Northern Europe, situated on the Baltic Sea coast. It is a large, sparsely populated country with a long history. It is named after the Swedes, a Germanic people who lived in the region.

German Ocean
 The German Ocean is a name used for the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Skagerrak. It is named after the German people who lived in the region.

White Sea
 The White Sea is a body of water in Northern Europe, situated between the coast of Russia and the island of Novaya Zemlya. It is named after the white sand on its shores.

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mestic government. Taxes were heavy and badly apportioned. The nobles jealously reasserted themselves and recovered many of their political privileges. The royal power steadily dwindled away at the very time when it was most needed; and a selfish, grasping aristocracy hastened the country's ruin.¹

At length, in 1697, when Charles XII, a boy of fifteen years, ascended the throne of Sweden, the neighboring powers thought the time had arrived to partition his territories among themselves. Tsar Peter, while returning home the following year from his travels abroad, discussed with Augustus II, elector of Saxony and king of Poland, a plan which the latter had formed for the dismemberment of the Swedish Empire: Poland was to recover Livonia and annex Estonia; Russia was to obtain Ingria and Karelia and thereby a port on the Baltic; Brandenburg was to occupy western Pomerania; and Denmark was to take possession of Holstein and the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Charles XII was to retain only his kingdom in the Scandinavian peninsula and the grand-duchy of Finland. At the last moment Brandenburg balked, but Saxony, Denmark, and Russia signed the menacing alliance in 1699. The allies expected quick and decisive victory. All western and southern Europe was on the verge of the great struggle for the Spanish inheritance² and would clearly be unable to prevent them from despoiling Sweden.

But the allies grossly underrated their foe. Charles XII was a mere boy, gloomy and sensitive, but precocious and endowed with all the martial determination and heroism of his ancestors. He desired nothing better than to fight against overwhelming odds, and the fury of the youthful commander soon earned him the sobriquet of the "madman of the North." The alliance of 1699 precipitated the Great Northern War which was to last until 1721 and slowly, but no less inevitably, reduce Sweden to the position of a third-rate power. It was amid the most spectacular exploits of the boy-king that the ruin of Sweden was accomplished. It was a grander but more tragic fate than in the same period befell Spain.

Charles XII did not give the allies time to unite. Hurriedly

¹ A reaction appeared under the capable Charles XI (1660-1697), but its fruits were completely lost by his son and successor, Charles XII.

² See above pp. 309-311.

Charles XII
of Sweden

The Great
Northern
War

crossing the straits, he invaded Denmark, whose terrified king promptly signed a treaty with him (1700), paying a large indemnity and engaging to keep peace in the future.

Thence Charles hastened across the Baltic to Estonia, in order to deal with the advancing Russians. At Narva he met and annihilated their army. Then he turned southward, clearing Livonia and Lithuania of Poles, Saxons, and Russians.

Into the very heart of Poland he carried the war, possessing himself of both Warsaw and Cracow. He obliged the Polish parliament to dethrone Augustus and to accept a king of his own choice in the person of Stanislaus Leszczyński (1704).¹

All these things had been done by a young man between the age of seventeen and twenty-two. It was quite natural that he should be puffed up with pride in his ability and successes. It was almost as natural that, hardened at an early age to the horrors of war, he should become increasingly callous and cruel. Many instructions the impulsive youth sent out over conquered districts in Russia, Poland, and Saxony "to slay, burn, and destroy." "Better that the innocent suffer than that the guilty escape" was his favorite adage.

Small wonder, then, that neither Peter the Great nor the Elector Augustus would abandon the struggle. While Charles was overrunning Poland, Peter was reorganizing his army and occupying Karelia and Ingria; and when the Swedish king returned to engage the Russians, Augustus drove out Stanislaus and regained the crown of Poland. Yet Charles, with an unreasoning stubbornness, would not perceive that the time had arrived for terminating the conflict with a few concessions. Russia at that time asked only a port on the Gulf of Finland as the price of an alliance with Sweden against Poland.

To all entreaties for peace, Charles XII turned a deaf ear, and pressed the war in Russia. Unable to take Moscow, he turned southward in order to effect a juncture with some rebellious Cossacks, but met the army of Peter the Great at Poltava (1709). Poltava marked the decisive triumph of Russia over Sweden. The Swedish army was destroyed, only a small number being able to accompany their king in his flight across the southern Russian frontier into Turkish territory.

Then Charles stirred up the Turks to attack the tsar, but from

¹ See above, pp. 316-317.

the new contest he was himself unable to profit. Peter bought peace with the Ottoman sultan by re-ceding to him the town of Azov, and the sultan gradually tired of his guest's continual and frantic clamor for war. After a sojourn of over five years in the Ottoman Empire, Charles suddenly and unexpectedly appeared, with but a single attendant, at Stralsund, which by that time was all that remained to him outside of Sweden and Finland.

Still, however, the war dragged on. The allies grew in numbers and in demands. Peter the Great and Augustus were again joined by the Danish king. Great Britain, Hanover, and Prussia, all covetous of Swedish trade or Swedish territory, were now members of the coalition. Charles XII stood adamant: he would retain all or he would lose all. So he stood until the last. It was while he was directing an invasion of Norway that the brilliant but ill-balanced Charles lost his life (1718); he was then but thirty-six years of age.

Peace, which had been impossible during the lifetime of Charles, became a reality soon after his death. It certainly came none too soon for the exhausted and enfeebled condition of Sweden. By the treaties of Stockholm (1719 and 1720), Sweden resigned all her German holdings except a small district of western Pomerania including the town of Stralsund. Denmark received Holstein and a money indemnity. Hanover gained the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Prussia secured the mouth of the Oder and the important city of Stettin. Augustus was formally restored to the Polish throne, though without territorial gain. Great Britain, Denmark, and Prussia became the principal commercial heirs of Sweden.

The treaty of Nystad (1721) was the turning point for Russia, for thereby she acquired from Sweden full sovereignty over Karelia and Ingria, the important Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia, and a narrow strip of southern Finland including the strong fortress of Viborg. Peter the Great had thus realized his ambition of affording his country a "window to the west." On the waste marshes of the Neva he succeeded with enormous effort and sacrifice of life in founding a great city which should be a centre of commerce and a bond of connection between Russia and the western world. He named his new city St. Peters-

Treaties
of Stock-
holm

Treaty of
Nystad

burg.¹ Here were reared palatial offices and residences in the "classical" style of western Europe, rather than after the Byzantine models of old Moscow. And from Moscow hither was transferred the government of the Russian Empire. Russia supplanted Sweden in the leadership of northern Europe and assumed a place among the powers of the world.

Peter the Great did not realize his other ambition of securing a Russian port on the Black Sea. Although he captured and held Azov for a time, he was obliged to relinquish it, as we have seen, in order to prevent the Turks from joining hands with Charles XII.

Nevertheless, when Peter died in 1725, he left his empire a compact state, with a big army and a degraded peasantry, westernized at least superficially, and ready to play a conspicuous rôle in the international politics of Europe. The man who succeeded in doing all these things has been variously estimated. By some he has been represented as a monster of cruelty and a murderer,² by others as a demon of the grossest sensuality, by still others as a great national hero. Probably he merited all such opinions. But, above all, he was a genius of fierce energy and will, who toiled always for what he considered to be the welfare of his country.

3. CATHERINE THE GREAT: THE DISMEMBERMENT OF POLAND AND THE DEFEAT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

It is hardly possible to feel much respect for the character of the Russian rulers who succeeded Peter the Great in the eighteenth century. Most of them were women with loose morals and ugly manners. But they had little to fear from Sweden, which, utterly exhausted, was now on a steady decline; and

¹ Known generally in the Teutonic form "St. Petersburg" from its foundation until the World War in 1914, when the Slavic form of "Petrograd" was substituted. Later, under Soviet auspices, it was renamed "Leningrad."

² Peter had his son and heir, the Grand-Duke Alexius, put to death because he did not sympathize with his reforms. The tsar's other punishments often assumed a most disgusting character.

NOTE. The picture opposite shows the final assault of the Russians (under Peter the Great) on a Swedish fortress near the site of the later St. Petersburg. The date is 1702, during the Great Northern War. The picture is from an engraving by Adriaen Schoonebeek (1661-1714), a Dutch artist whom Peter the Great induced to leave the Netherlands and become his official engraver in Russia.





domestic difficulties both in Poland and in the Ottoman Empire removed any apprehension of attacks from these countries. In policies of internal government, Peter had blazed a trail so clear and unmistakable that one would have difficulty in losing it.

Of those female sovereigns of the Russian Empire, the most notable was Catherine II, usually called Catherine the Great (1762-1796). By birth she was not a Russian, but a princess of Protestant Germany, whom dynastic considerations made the wife of the heir to the Russian crown.¹

Catherine
the Great

No sooner was she in her adopted country than she set to work to ingratiate herself with its people. She learned the Russian language. She outwardly conformed to the Orthodox Church. She slighted her German relatives and surrounded herself with Russians. She established a reputation for quick wit and lofty patriotism. So great was her success that when her half-insane husband ascended the throne as Peter III in 1762, the people looked to her rather than to him as the real ruler, and before the year was over she had managed to make away with him and to become sovereign in name as well as in fact. For thirty-four years Catherine was tsarina of Russia. Immoral to the last, without conscience or scruple, she ruled the country with a firm hand and consummated the work of Peter the Great.

In the administrative system Catherine reorganized the "governments" and "districts," divisions and subdivisions of Russia, over which she placed governors and vice-governors respectively, all appointed by the central authority. To the ecclesiastical alterations of Peter, she added the secularization of church property, thereby making the clergy completely dependent upon her bounty and strengthening the autocracy.

Cather-
ine's
Internal
Policy

The tsarina was certainly a despot, and she wished her contemporaries to regard her as an "enlightened" despot, like Frederick II of Prussia or Joseph II of Austria.² She took some

¹ The marriage was arranged by Frederick the Great in order to minimize Austrian influence at St. Petersburg. See above, pp. 343-344.

² See above, pp. 346-352.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Catherine the Great, from a painting, in the classical style of western Europe, by a native Russian artist at her court, Dmitri Gregorievitch Levitsky (1735-1822).

personal interest in the literary and scientific progress of the age. She wrote flattering letters to Voltaire and invited Diderot to tutor her son. She established several schools and academies and encouraged the upper classes in Russia to use French as the language of polite society. She sent Russian princes to England to observe the latest experiments with the "new agriculture."¹

At heart, however, Catherine was little moved by desire for reform or by pity for the peasants. She had the heavy whip—the knout—applied to the bare backs of earnest reformers, and she did nothing to relieve the poverty or to lessen the ignorance of the masses. To the governor of Moscow, she expounded her true thought on the subject of popular education: "My dear prince, do not complain that the Russians have no desire for instruction; if I institute schools, it is not for us,—it is for Europe, where we must keep our position in public opinion. But the day when our peasants shall wish to become enlightened, both you and I will lose our places."

Yet this obviously insincere and scandalously immoral woman pursued a strong and brilliantly successful foreign policy. She made herself (and Russia) seem "enlightened" to the statesmen and philosophers of the age, and by war and conquest she actually made Russia a great power in Europe.

Of the three foreign countries which at the beginning of the eighteenth century blocked the European expansion of Russia, Sweden had been humbled and shorn of Baltic provinces by Peter the Great in the Great Northern War and the ensuing treaty of Nystad (1721). Poland and the Ottoman Empire remained to be dealt with by Catherine the Great, and she dealt with them effectually. Let us see what had lately transpired to render her task comparatively easy.

Poland had been a large and important national state since the sixteenth century.² It represented a geographic unit, embracing the whole watershed of the Vistula (and including what is called nowadays the "Polish corridor," down to the Baltic). It represented, moreover, a union and partial fusion of three nationalities—Poles, Lithuanians, and Letts. The Letts (Latvians) of Courland had been annexed in 1561, and in 1569 the previously separate par-

¹ On the contemporary "agricultural revolution" in England, see below, pp. 466-468.

² See above, p. 37.

Catherine's
Foreign
Policy

Poland in
the
Eighteenth
Century

liaments and administrations of Poland and Lithuania had been united in much the same way as afterwards, in 1707, the governments of England and Scotland were united. During the seventeenth century, the unified Polish state played a conspicuous military rôle. It then contested Baltic ports with Sweden, interfered in Russia, helped the Austrian Habsburgs to defend Vienna against the Turks (1683), and extended its own frontiers southeastward at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.¹

With the expansion of the Polish state, the jealousy of its neighbors was aroused, and by the eighteenth century certain internal weaknesses manifested themselves. Relative to its geographical extent, its population was sparse and its public wealth slight. It encountered increasing difficulty in raising and maintaining armies of sufficient size and effectiveness to cope with the newer military establishments of Prussia, Russia, and Austria; and against attacks of these militaristic powers Poland lacked natural as well as artificial fortifications. Her land was wide and flat, unprotected by mountains and almost inviting foreign invasion.

Then, too, there were troublesome minorities within Poland. The large majority of the population was Polish in language and nationality and Catholic in religion. Part of the country, however, was peopled by Lithuanians, who, though mainly Catholic like the Poles, constituted a national minority. In many of the towns, moreover, were considerable settlements of Jews, who were treated, and wished to be treated, as a separate nation. Besides, in the southeastern districts were numerous Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and Russian Cossacks, who were non-Polish in speech and Orthodox in religion, while in the western towns and Baltic provinces was an appreciable number of Protestant Germans. A degree of religious toleration had been accorded in the sixteenth century to the "dissenters," as the Orthodox and Protestant minorities were termed,² but these were not satisfied; in the eighteenth century they demanded from the Catholic majority an equality which at the time existed in no other country of Europe, and when it was not forthcoming they appealed for assistance to foreign powers—the Protestants to the king of Prussia, the Orthodox to the tsar of Russia. A Frederick the

¹ On this "last crusade" and its Polish hero, Sobieski, see above, pp. 326-327.

² See above, p. 205.




Great and a Catherine the Great, though not famed for personal piety, were quite willing to heed such appeals.

The social and political conditions in Poland were particularly bad. By the end of the seventeenth century, Swedish commercial control of the Baltic had inflicted grave hardships on the economic life of Poland. Her cities were not growing and her middle class was declining in wealth and numbers. The one class which retained an eminent social position was the nobility, and the Polish nobles, as a class, were too much given to feuds and factional fights to present a united front to any foreign enemy. Yet the nobles owned the land, lived prodigally, looked out selfishly for their own economic advantage, and depressed the peasantry into an ever more miserable condition. With a grasping, quarrelsome nobility on one hand, and an oppressed peasantry on the other, social solidarity, the best guaranty of political independence, was notably lacking.

A strong national government might have done something to remedy the social ills, but at the very time when monarchical absolutism was being established in every other country of Continental Europe, the Polish government was becoming almost anarchical. Since the sixteenth century, the monarchy in Poland had been elective. As a result the reign of every sovereign was disfigured by foreign intrigues and domestic squabbles over the choice of his successor. The noble electors were able not only to secure liberal bribes but to wring from the elect such concessions as gradually reduced the kingship to an ornamental figure-head. Most of the later kings were foreigners who used what little power was left to them in furtherance of their native interests rather than for the welfare of Poland. Thus the kings in the first half of the eighteenth century were German electors of Saxony, who owed their new position to the interested friendship of Austria, Prussia, or Russia, and to the large sums of money which they lavished upon the Polish magnates. These same Saxon rulers cheerfully applied Polish resources to their German projects.

Another peculiarity of the Polish constitution was the famous "liberum veto," a kind of gentlemen's agreement among the magnates, that no law would be enacted by the parliament if a single member felt it was prejudicial to his interests, and objected. In the course of the seventeenth century the prin-

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
 Prior to the REIGN of CATHERINE the GREAT
 By H. Moll Geographer



Belgrade
 Belgrade, the capital of the Kingdom of Servia, is situated on the Danube River, between the confluence of the Sava and Tisza Rivers. It is a city of great importance, and its fortifications are of great strength. The city is surrounded by a high wall, and the Danube River flows through it. The city is a beautiful city, and its buildings are of great beauty. The city is a city of great importance, and its fortifications are of great strength. The city is surrounded by a high wall, and the Danube River flows through it. The city is a beautiful city, and its buildings are of great beauty.

Temeswar
 Temeswar, a city in the Banat region, is situated on the Danube River. It is a city of great importance, and its fortifications are of great strength. The city is surrounded by a high wall, and the Danube River flows through it. The city is a beautiful city, and its buildings are of great beauty. The city is a city of great importance, and its fortifications are of great strength. The city is surrounded by a high wall, and the Danube River flows through it. The city is a beautiful city, and its buildings are of great beauty.

Scale
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Miles
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Kilometers

Notes
 The map is a reproduction of a map published by H. Moll in 1811. It is a map of Southeastern Europe, and it shows the region as it was in 1811. The map is a map of Southeastern Europe, and it shows the region as it was in 1811. The map is a map of Southeastern Europe, and it shows the region as it was in 1811. The map is a map of Southeastern Europe, and it shows the region as it was in 1811.

ciple of the *liberum veto* had been so far extended as to entail the right of any one of the ten thousand noblemen of Poland to refuse to obey a law which he had not approved. This amounted to anarchism. And anarchism, however beautiful it might appear as an ideal, was hardly a trustworthy weapon with which to oppose the greedy, hard-hearted, despotic monarchs who governed the surrounding countries.

The Ottoman Empire was not in such sore straits as Poland, but its power and prestige were obviously waning. In other places we have explained how, after an amazing succession of spectacular triumphs, the tide of Moslem Turkish conquest had gradually turned; how the sea-power of the Ottoman Empire suffered a serious reverse from Spain and Venice at the battle of Lepanto (1571);¹ how, as a result of the "last crusade" and the treaty of Karlowitz (1699), the Ottoman Empire was compelled to surrender all Hungary to the Austrian Habsburgs.²

The Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century

The reasons for the waning of the Ottoman Empire are to be sought, however, less in the inherent strength of its neighbors than in its own internal weakness. Domestic, not foreign, difficulties prepared the way for its subsequent shrinkage.

It should be borne in mind that the Moslem Turks never constituted a majority of the population of their European possessions. They were essentially a body of conquerors. In frenzies of religious or martial enthusiasm, inspired with the idea that Divine Providence was using them as agents for the spread of Islam, they had fought valiantly with the sword or had taken clever advantage of their enemies' quarrels to plant over wide areas the crescent in place of the cross. In the conquered regions, the native Christian peoples were reduced to serfdom, and the Turkish conquerors became great landholders and the official class.³ To extend, even to maintain, such an artificial order of things, the Turks would be obliged to keep their military organization always at the highest pitch of excellence and to preserve their government from weakness and corruption. In neither of these respects did the Turks ultimately succeed.

The sultans of the eighteenth century were not of the stuff of which a Mohammed II or a Suleiman the Magnificent had been

¹ See above, pp. 259-260.

³ See above, pp. 15-16.

² See above, pp. 326-327.

made. To the grim risks of battle they preferred the cushioned ease of the palace, and all their powers of administration and government were quite consumed in the management of the household and the harem. Actual authority was gradually transferred to the divan, or board of ministers, whose appointments or dismissals were the results of palace intrigues, sometimes petty but more often bloody. Corruption ate its way through the entire office-holding element of the Ottoman Empire. Positions were bought and sold from the divan down to the obscure village, and office seemed to exist primarily for financial profit and secondarily as a means of oppressing the subject peoples.

The army, on which so much in the Ottoman Empire depended, naturally reflected the demoralized condition of the government. While Peter the Great was organizing a powerful army in Russia, and Frederick the Great was perfecting the Prussian military machine, the Ottoman army steadily declined. It failed to keep pace with the development of tactics and of firearms in western Europe, and fell behind the times. The all-prevalent corruption ruined its discipline, and its best organized portion—the “janizaries”—became the masters rather than the servants of the sultans and of the whole Turkish government.

It was the fortune of the Russian tsarina—Catherine the Great—to appreciate the real weakness of both the Ottoman Empire and the kingdom of Poland and to turn her neighbors' distress to the advantage of her own country.

No sooner had Catherine secured the Russian crown and by her inactivity permitted Frederick the Great to bring the Seven Years' War to a successful issue,¹ than the death of Augustus III, elector of Saxony and king of Poland, gave her an opportunity to interfere in Polish affairs. She was not content with the Saxon line which was more or less under Austrian influence. With the astute aid of Frederick, she induced the Polish nobles to elect one of her own courtiers and favorites, Stanislaus Poniatowski, who thus in 1764 became Stanislaus II, the last king of an independent Poland.

With the accession of Stanislaus II, the predominance of Russia was established in Poland. Russia entered into a sordid

**Russian
Interference
in
Poland**

¹ See above, pp. 343-344.

agreement with Prussia to uphold the anarchical constitution of the unhappy and victimized country. When patriotic Poles made efforts—as they now frequently did—to reform their government, to abolish the *liberum veto*, and to strengthen the state, they found their attempts thwarted by the allies either by force of arms or by bribes of money. Feuds among the Polish nobles, together with complaints of religious discrimination, afforded sufficient pretexts for the intervention of the neighboring powers, especially Prussia and Russia.

A popular insurrection of Polish Catholics against the intolerable meddling of foreigners was crushed by the troops of Catherine, with the single result that the Russians, in pursuing some fleeing insurgents across the southern frontier, violated Turkish territory and precipitated a war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.






This Turkish War lasted from 1768 to 1774. The Ottoman government was profoundly alarmed by the Russian foreign policy. It believed that the intrigues in Poland would end in the annexation of that state to Russia and the consequent upsetting of the balance of power in the East. Once Poland was disposed of, the turn of Turkey would come next. The Turks, moreover, were egged on by the French government, which, anxious also to preserve the balance of power and to defend the liberties of Poland, was financially too embarrassed to undertake a great war against Prussia and Russia.


Russian
War
against
the Otto-
man
Empire

The war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire fully confirmed the belief that the power of the latter was waning. The Turkish troops, badly armed and badly led, suffered a series of defeats. The Russians again occupied Azov, which Peter the Great had been compelled to relinquish; they overran the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; they seized Bucharest; and they seemed likely to cross the Danube and enter the Balkan peninsula. Catherine went so far as to fan a revolt among the Greek subjects of the sultan.

At length, in 1774, the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji was concluded between the belligerents. It was a landmark both in the expansion of the Russian Empire, and in the contraction of the Ottoman Empire. By its provisions, (1) the latter form-

EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

-  Russia in Europe at the Accession of Peter the Great
-  Acquisitions of Peter the Great
-  Acquisitions 1725-1762
-  Acquisitions of Catherine the Great
-  External Boundary of Russia in 1800



Magstrom Company Inc., N. Y. C.

ally ceded Azov and adjacent territory to Russia and renounced sovereignty over all land north of the Black Sea; (2) The Ottoman Empire retained Wallachia, Moldavia, and Greece, but promised that they should be better governed; (3) Russia obtained the right of free navigation for her merchant ships in Ottoman waters; and (4) Russia was recognized as the protector of certain churches in the city of Constantinople.

Treaty of
Kuchuk
Kainarji

Within a few years after the signature of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, Catherine established Russian control over the various Tartar principalities north of the Black Sea, whose sovereignty the sultan had renounced. By a supplementary agreement in 1792, the Dniester River was made the boundary between the Russian and Ottoman empires.¹

The policy of Catherine the Great in respect of the Ottoman Empire bore three significant results. In the first place, Russia acquired a natural boundary in southern Europe, and became the chief power on the Black Sea. Her ships might now pass freely through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles out into the Mediterranean to trade with western Europe. Russia's second "window to the west" was gained. In the second place, Russia was henceforth looked upon as the natural ally and friend of oppressed Christian nationalities within the realm of the Moslem Turks. Finally, the special clause conferring on Russia the protectorate of certain churches in Constantinople afforded her a pretext for a later claim to protect Christians throughout the Ottoman lands and consequently to interfere incessantly in Turkish affairs. After the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, the Ottoman Empire declined with ever-increasing rapidity, and Russia became an eager candidate for a liberal share of the spoils.

Even while Catherine the Great was engaged in war with the Ottoman Empire, she had not lost sight of her Polish policy. Frederick the Great had doubtless hoped that she would, in order that he might be free to direct a distribution of territory entirely satisfactory to himself and to Prussia. But the wily tsarina was never so immersed

The First
Partition
of Poland

¹ The treaty of 1792 concluded a war which Catherine, in alliance with Joseph II of Austria, waged against the Ottoman Empire. Austria got nothing from the war. See above, p. 351.

in other matters that she neglected Russian ambitions in Poland. In 1772, therefore, she joined with Frederick and with Maria Theresa of Austria in making the first partition of Poland. ~~Russia took all the country which lay east of the Duna and Dnieper rivers.~~ Prussia took West Prussia except the town of Danzig. Austria took Galicia, except the city of Cracow.¹ In all, Poland was deprived of about a fourth of her territory, a fifth of her population, and almost a half of her wealth. The Polish nationality no longer had a common state or a common sovereign.

The partition of 1772 sobered many of the Polish magnates and brought them to perceive the necessity of radical political reform. Yet every effort which they made in this direction was rendered abortive by the shameful and hypocritical attitude of the neighboring sovereigns. For another twenty-one years the wretched country struggled on, a victim of selfish foreign tutelage. Although both Frederick and Maria Theresa died in the interval, their successors proved quite as willing to cooperate with the implacable tsarina. In 1793 Russia and Prussia effected a second partition of Poland; and in 1795, following a last desperate attempt of the Poles to establish a new government, Austria joined Russia and Prussia in the third and final dismemberment of the unhappy country. Desperately did the Polish patriotic leader, Kosciuszko, try to stem the tide of invasion which poured in from all sides. His few forces, in spite of great valor, were no match for the veteran allies, and the defense was vain. "Freedom shrieked when Kosciuszko fell." King Stanislaus II resigned his crown and betook himself to St. Petersburg. Poland ceased to exist as an independent state.²

By the partitions of 1793 and 1795, Austria obtained the upper valley of the Vistula, and Prussia the lower, including the city of Warsaw, while the rest of Poland,—the major share—went to Russia. Ruthenia (or Ukraina) and almost the whole of Lithuania thus passed into the hands of the tsarina. Russia thenceforth bordered immediately on Prussia and Austria and

¹ On this "first partition" of Poland, see also above, pp. 344-345.

² The second and third partitions of Poland were effected in the midst of a European situation which was complicated by the French Revolution. For a fuller treatment of them, see below, pp. 700-703.

became geographically a vital member of the European family of nations.

Catherine the Great died in 1796. She thus survived her friend and confederate, Frederick the Great, by a decade, and the final partition of Poland by a year (If it can be said of Peter that he made Russia a European power, it can be affirmed with equal truth that Catherine made Russia a great power.) The eighteenth century had witnessed a marvellous growth of the Russian Empire in Europe. It had acquired territory and a capital on the Baltic. It had secured valuable ports on the Black Sea. Its boundaries had been extended westward into the very centre of the Continent. It now embraced, not only Russians, but Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Letts, and Poles.

The rise of Russia was at the expense of her neighbors. Sweden had surrendered her eastern provinces and lost her control of the Baltic. The Ottoman Empire had been forced to yield its monopoly of the shores and trade of the Black Sea. Poland had disappeared from the map.



CHAPTER IX

THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

I. FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH COMMERCE, COLONIES, AND CAPITALISM



VIEWING the European states of the eighteenth century, we must point out that, simultaneously with the emergence of Prussia and Russia as great military powers on the Continent, England (joined with Scotland as the kingdom of Great Britain) became the foremost commercial and colonial power in the world. For England to reach this preeminence, it had taken two centuries and successive struggles with Spain, the Netherlands, and France.

Back in the sixteenth century, England, as we have seen, was a second-rate power.¹ Its wealth was slight compared with that of the Netherlands. Its population was very much less than the population of France. Its armed forces were far fewer than those of Spain. In Europe, it appeared of less importance than Portugal or Poland. And from overseas trade and settlement it was legally debarred by the prior discoveries of Portuguese and Spaniards and by the papal decree which had divided the non-European world between Spain and Portugal.

Yet in that same sixteenth century the foundations were laid for the later economic supremacy of England. The Tudor sovereigns of the time, from Henry VII to Elizabeth, patriotically pursued national interests. The wholesale confiscation of ecclesiastical property and the accompanying process of "enclosing" landed estates and transforming them into noblemen's private property served to enrich certain Englishmen and to provide capital for foreign ventures. The introduction of Calvinistic ethics into England and Scotland stimulated the growth of a capitalistic spirit. The absence of protracted and destructive

England
in the
Sixteenth
Century

¹ See above, pp. 28-30, 224, 238-240, 251-254.

civil wars, such as troubled France and the Netherlands and almost ruined Germany, and the aloofness from dynastic struggles (unless participation was directly advantageous to economic interests) afforded England ample opportunity to devote her resources to commerce and money-making. Besides, the championship of a distinctively national type of Protestantism provided the emotional impulse and the convenient slogans for ranging the mass of Englishmen in support of their sovereigns, adventurers, and capitalists against such a power as that of Catholic Spain. Altogether, England was in a peculiarly favorable position to take advantage of the misfortunes of older and seemingly stronger colonial powers.

Though the discovery of the North American continent by Cabot toward the close of the fifteenth century had been patronized by the English King Henry VII, the English did not immediately exploit the discovery; and, for a time, they sat idly by while Spain proceeded to colonize and monopolize the trade of the greater part of America, and Portugal did likewise in Brazil, Africa, and the Far East. Before long, however, Englishmen began to perceive ways and means of deriving economic advantages from the labors of Spaniards and Portuguese.

It was during the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603) that England began her great seafaring career. And she began it with piracy, smuggling, and slave-trading. One of the pioneers was John Hawkins (1532-1595), a native of Plymouth, who in the 1560's inaugurated the daring and lucrative industry of stealing negroes from Portuguese slave-catchers on the Guinea coast of Africa, transporting them to the New World, and selling them to Spanish colonists. With Queen Elizabeth, Hawkins shared his financial profits, but he grew so wealthy himself that in the 1570's he could settle down in England as a capitalist and send out numerous expeditions to engage in the slave-trade, to prey on the overseas colonies of Spain, and to fight and rob Spanish treasure-ships on the way from America. Under royal auspices, moreover, he organized an English navy; and as rear-admiral he had a conspicuous part in the repulse of the Spanish Armada. Throughout his harsh, unscrupulous career, Hawkins professed an ardent Puritanism. On one of his voyages, when he was becalmed and his negroes were suffering and dying, he

Founda-
tion of
England's
Sea Power
in Reign
of
Elizabeth

Hawkins

could console himself with the reflection that he at least was one of the elect whom God would not suffer to perish.¹

Francis Drake (1545-1595), a cousin of Hawkins, was formally commissioned in 1570 by Elizabeth as a privateer; and with initial financial backing from her and her favorite, the earl of **Drake** Essex, he also acquired fame and wealth at Spanish expense. In 1580, he returned from a three-year trip around the world, laden with booty which he had taken from Spaniards and Portuguese; it was the second circumnavigation of the globe, and the first by an Englishman. In 1588 Drake served as English vice-admiral against the Spanish Armada.

A third freebooter and pirate was Thomas Cavendish (1555-1592), who in 1586-1587 effected the third circumnavigation of the globe in the record time of two years and fifty days. **Cavendish** Cavendish looted as he went, and it was said on his return that "his sailors were clothed in silk, his sails were damask, and his top-mast covered with cloth of gold."

Even more renowned were the adventurous exploits of two half-brothers—Humphrey Gilbert (1539-1583) and Walter **Gilbert** **and** **Raleigh** Raleigh (1552-1618). Gilbert profited from piracy and campaigned in the Netherlands against Spain, but his principal title to fame rests on two other achievements. In the first place, he developed and inspired many of his countrymen with the theory that China and India could be reached from England not only by utilizing the Portuguese and Spanish routes, but also, and more quickly, by sailing northwest or northeast over the polar seas.² He himself sought a "north passage" in 1578-1579, and a number of other English sailors, including Frobisher, Davis, Hudson, and Baffin, did likewise.³ Though all

¹ Hawkins explained to Queen Elizabeth his failure to capture a particular Spanish treasure-fleet by quoting from the Bible: "Paul doth plant, Apollo doth water, but God giveth the increase;" which exhibition of piety is said to have provoked the queen into exclaiming, "God's death! This fool went out a soldier, and has come home a divine."

² Even before the reign of Elizabeth, Sir Hugh Willoughby had attempted to sail to China by following the north shore of Europe eastward, but he had perished on the coast of Lapland in 1554. Gilbert interested himself in the "northern passage" as early as 1566, and ten years later he published an influential book on the subject.

³ Frobisher won notoriety by pretending to have discovered gold in the Arctic and he won actual wealth by freebooting, under Raleigh, on the Spanish Main. Davis and Baffin both gave names to Arctic regions which they explored; Davis, besides, discovered the Falkland Islands; and both spent their last years in the service of the English East India Company, Davis meeting death in a fight with

such efforts were doomed to failure by impassable ice, they served to increase geographical knowledge and to establish English supremacy in the rich northern fisheries, particularly in the whaling industry. In the second place, Gilbert was the pioneer English colonizer. Armed with a charter from Queen Elizabeth authorizing him to discover and occupy "any remote, barbarous, and heathen lands not actually possessed of any Christian prince or people," he founded a colony in 1583 at St. Johns, Newfoundland. The settlement was short-lived, but thenceforth the attempts of Englishmen to create an overseas colonial empire were persistent and, before long, successful.

Walter Raleigh, a handsome fellow and a bragging buccaneer, was a favorite of Queen Elizabeth and an idol of patriotic Englishmen. He gained money easily by raids on Spanish colonies and commerce, and spent it lavishly at court and in colonial undertakings. By royal favor he acquired extensive estates in Ireland and planted English settlers on them. He coöperated with his half-brother Humphrey Gilbert in the establishment of the English colony in Newfoundland. He also gave the name "Virginia" (in honor of Elizabeth, the "virgin queen") to the vast but then vague stretch of American land north of the Spanish settlements in Florida, and on Roanoke Island (in the present state of North Carolina) he founded the first English colony in what is now the United States. This colony, like that in Newfoundland, was short-lived, but it was soon followed by permanent English settlements.¹

Raleigh and Gilbert, Frobisher and Cavendish, Drake and Hawkins, these are only conspicuous examples of a large number of Englishmen who in the second half of the sixteenth century sought - and obtained - rich rewards from distant adventures. Most of the rewards were at Spanish expense, and were reaped from such questionable sources as piracy, pillage, and the slave-trade. But the means were justified on the ground that they were necessary to assure the freedom of Protestant England against the domination of Catholic Spain, and Queen Elizabeth winked at them when she did not openly abet them.

Japanese pirates off the coast of Sumatra, and Balin in a battle with the Portuguese for the possession of the Persian port of Ormuz. Henry Hudson, in repeated seekings for a northwest route to China was the explorer of the river, bay, and territory which still bear his name.

¹ On the personal fate of Raleigh, see above, p. 260, note.

From this highly irregular and practically continuous duel between England and Spain, England emerged the victor. The outcome was made possible by the daring and skill of English sailors; and it was rendered inevitable by the defeat of the Spanish Armada and by the aid which Elizabeth was enabled to despatch at critical times to Netherlanders, Frenchmen, Portuguese, or any other people who were threatening the dominion of Philip II.¹ It was England, therefore, which was a principal agent in breaking down the Spanish monopoly of world-commerce and world-empire. By the close of Elizabeth's reign, Englishmen were to be found in every quarter of the globe, following Drake's lead into the Pacific or Gilbert's into the Arctic, hunting for slaves in the wilds of Africa, journeying in caravans across the steppes of Russia into central Asia, bargaining with Turks and Greeks in the Near East, laying the foundations of the East India Company, or of the colonies of Virginia and Newfoundland. All of which meant that new wealth was pouring into England, enriching many a courtier and nobleman and many an upstart adventurer, and stimulating the growth of a numerous and influential middle class.

Following the death of Elizabeth, James VI of Scotland ascended the English throne as James I (1603-1625), and the two British kingdoms were united under a common sovereign. But under James and his Stuart successors, the advance of England as a commercial and colonial world-power continued, and with ever quickening speed. James I, it is true, formally reversed the foreign policy of Elizabeth. To the intense disgust of many of his subjects he concluded peace with Spain, tried to arrange a marriage between his son and a Spanish princess, and put Walter Raleigh to death for the same sort of piracy for which Raleigh had been honored and promoted by Elizabeth. Outside of strictly Spanish preserves, however, James I fostered commerce and colonies. He followed Elizabethan precedent by large-scale plantings of Protestant Englishmen and Scotsmen in northern Ireland (Ulster). He confirmed the charters which his predecessor had granted to English

English
Successes
against
Spain

Advance
of English
Commerce
under
James I

¹ See above, pp. 251-254.

NOTE. The picture opposite is of an English sailing ship, "The Sovereign of the Seas," early in the seventeenth century, from an engraving by John Payne (1588-1641).





trading companies and he himself chartered new ones. The Muscovy Company, the oldest of the "chartered companies," which had originated in the time of Mary Tudor and had obtained during the reign of Elizabeth exclusive trading privileges on the White Sea, was now encouraged to extend its operations throughout the expanding Russian Empire. During the seventeenth century and until the advent of Peter the Great, the foreign commerce of Russia was almost wholly in the hands of the English Muscovy Company.

An English East India Company had been chartered in 1600, in the last years of Elizabeth, for the purpose of monopolizing for fifteen years all English trading east of the Cape of Good Hope "in places not held by other Christian powers." At first, slight success had attended this company, but after 1609, when it was rechartered by James I in perpetuity, with increased capital and privileges, it became an important source of English power and wealth in India. From the city of Surat, as a centre, English fleets of the East India Company ousted the Portuguese from several towns along the west coast between Goa and Diu and seized the strategic port of Masulipatam on the eastern coast. In 1622 another fleet captured from the Portuguese the town of Ormuz on the Persian Gulf. Foundations were clearly laid for a British mercantile empire in India and Persia.

The
English
East India
Company

It was also during the reign of James I that the first permanent settlements were made by Englishmen in the New World. Under the auspices of the London Company, which he chartered, and under the able leadership of Captain John Smith, an expedition of some hundred adventurers arrived on the coast of Raleigh's "Virginia," sailed up a river which they christened the James in honor of their king, and on a low-lying peninsula founded Jamestown (1607). Five years later, under the auspices of another newly chartered company, a settlement was effected in the Bermuda Islands. In 1620, a band of English Radical Protestants—so-called "Separatists" or "Congregationalists," who had been persecuted by James I

English
Colonies
in America

NOTE. The picture opposite, of a seventeenth-century Dutch banker, is from a painting by Rembrandt (1606-1669). On the wealth of the Netherlands, see above, pp. 88-90, 249, and below, p. 391; and on Rembrandt, see below, pp. 503-504.

and other Anglican Protestants and had found temporary refuge in Holland, and who were now enlisted as overseas colonists by a branch of the London Company and led by Captain Miles Standish, established themselves at Plymouth on the coast of "New England" (1620). Thenceforth, English migration to America increased rapidly.

Under Charles I (1625-1649), the son and successor of James I, English colonization in America proceeded apace. Settlements were made in New England, at Boston (1630), Providence (1636), Hartford (1636), New Haven (1638), and elsewhere. The population of Virginia increased from two thousand to fifteen thousand. A new colony was planted on the banks of the Chesapeake by Lord Baltimore, under royal patent, and named Maryland in honor of the wife of Charles I (1634). Important footholds were obtained in the West Indies, on the islands of St. Christopher and Barbados (1625), Nevis (1628), Antigua, and Montserrat (1632).

It must be emphasized that England was only one of the European nations which between 1560 and 1650 labored, with considerable success, to destroy Spain's monopoly of overseas commerce and colonization. France, too, labored simultaneously for the same purpose and with almost equal success. Capitalism was then as much developed in France as in England; Frenchmen were as eager as Englishmen to secure a profitable share of the world's trade and dominion; and the dynastic rivalry between the French royal line and the Spanish Habsburgs was easily translated into colonial and commercial rivalry between their respective realms. French Protestants and even patriotic French Catholics vied with English Protestants in detesting Philip II of Spain and in poaching upon his distant and wide preserves.¹

Indeed the emergence of France as a commercial and colonial power curiously paralleled England's. What Cabot had originally been to England, Verrazano and Cartier were to France. Then, in the second half of the sixteenth century, there were French, as well as English, pirates, buccaneers, smugglers, and adventurers. Admiral Coligny, one of the leaders of the French Protestants, inspired many an attack on Spanish or Portuguese shipping and many an attempt to found overseas colonies for

¹ See above, pp. 254-259.

France, notably in Brazil and in Florida. These first foundations were short-lived, but they were followed, in the early part of the seventeenth century, by permanent settlements. Under King Henry IV, Samuel Champlain, a brave and sagacious French adventurer, explored the valley of the St. Lawrence and in 1608 founded Quebec. By 1650 the French were not only colonizing Canada and Acadia¹ and exploiting the furs, forests, and fisheries of northern America, but they were also engaging in commercial ventures in the Far East and in the slave-trade between Africa and America.

In the year 1650, however, the Dutch Netherlands, the so-called "United Provinces," seemed to be the outstanding successor to the maritime supremacy of Spain and Portugal. If England and France had significantly contributed to the decline of Spain, the chief profits seemed to have accrued to the Netherlands.

Commercial and Colonial Importance of the Dutch Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century

It was natural that the Netherlands should rise to commercial and colonial greatness. We have already noted how in the first half of the sixteenth century the Netherlands were the wealthiest portion of the dominions of Charles V and Netherlandish traders and bankers, supplanting Italians in capitalistic leadership, were financing and profiting from the construction of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires.² We have also noted how in the second half of the sixteenth century the Netherlanders fell out with their Spanish sovereign, Philip II, and how the northern (or Dutch) Netherlands waged a long and eventually successful struggle for national independence.³ In the circumstances, the Dutch had the reasons, the means, and the opportunities for preying most indefatigably on Spanish commerce and colonies; and when Portugal was incorporated with Spain in 1580, the Dutch were in an excellent position to extend their preying to Portuguese commerce and colonies.

In 1593 the Dutch began systematic slave-trading on the Guinea coast of Africa. In 1595 they undertook their first expedition to India and the Spice Islands. In 1602 they merged a number of earlier commercial companies into the Dutch East India Company, which proceeded to

The Dutch in the East Indies

¹ The region now known as Nova Scotia.

² See above. pp. 87-90.

³ See above, pp. 245-250.

drive the Portuguese from Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, and the Moluccas (Spice Islands). A great naval victory at Malacca in 1606 over a combined Spanish-Portuguese fleet and a decisive defeat of the remaining Spanish squadron at Gibraltar in 1607 rendered the Dutch the virtual masters of the ocean trade routes and enabled a great governor of the Dutch East India Company, John Coen, to do for Holland what Albuquerque a century earlier had done for Portugal. Coen reorganized the East Indian trading posts which had been captured from the Portuguese, made favorable treaties with native chieftains, and consolidated and extended the empire of the Dutch Netherlands in the Far East so that it eventually included not only Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, and the Moluccas but also the Malay peninsula, Formosa, Borneo, Celebes, a part of New Guinea, and a claim to the western coast of Australia (which was named New Holland). As the political and commercial capital of this huge and rich domain, Coen founded in 1619 the city of Batavia on the island of Java.

For some time after the death of Coen, the Dutch continued to expand and strengthen their monopoly of Far Eastern trade. They largely supplanted other Europeans in the commerce of Japan, China, and India. The most famous navigator in the service of the Dutch East India Company, Abel Tasman (1603-1659), sailed completely around Australia (1642-1643) and discovered Tasmania, New Zealand, and the Tonga and Fiji islands. Another Dutch navigator appropriated the island of St. Helena, in the southern Atlantic, in 1645; and the shipwreck of Dutch sailors at the Cape of Good Hope in 1648 led shortly afterwards to the founding of Cape Town and the establishment of a Dutch colony in South Africa.

In the meantime, the Dutch were laying foundations for commercial and colonial dominion in America. Like contemporary

The Dutch in America Englishmen and Frenchmen, they at first resorted to piracy, smuggling, and slave-trading within Spanish or Portuguese areas, but soon, under the auspices of chartered companies, they began to capture strategic posts from their rivals or to stake out claims to hitherto unoccupied territories. Thus, on the one hand, they invaded Portuguese Brazil (1624) and wrested from the Spaniards the West Indian islands of Tobago and Curaçao (1632-1634), and, on the other

hand, they first colonized the Hudson valley in North America. Their claim to this valley rested on its exploration in 1609 by Henry Hudson, the English navigator, who was then in Dutch service, and on its occupation by Dutch traders and colonists shortly afterwards. At the mouth of the river they founded the city of New Amsterdam, and a hundred and fifty miles up the river they built Fort Orange. They were soon extending this promising colony of New Netherland eastward toward the Connecticut River and westward to the Delaware.¹

It thus transpired that by the middle of the seventeenth century the Dutch had become the chief heir to Portugal's commercial supremacy in Asia and Africa and were threatening to become a most serious rival of England and France for the Spanish inheritance in America. The economic prosperity of the Netherlands was the envy of all Europe, and Amsterdam was the banking centre of the world.

Whence it followed that, just as Spain and Portugal had been the targets of attack by other would-be commercial powers in the sixteenth century, so the Netherlands were assailed in the seventeenth century. Dutchmen, rather than Spaniards and Portuguese, were now regarded with disfavor and even hatred by Frenchmen and especially by Englishmen. Between England and the Netherlands a series of wars ensued.

Commer-
cial Wars
between
England
and the
Nether-
lands

This, at first thought, may seem surprising. Most Englishmen and Dutchmen were alike enthusiastically Protestant. They had long made common cause against Catholic Spain. Economic as well as religious ties between them had long been intimate. But the richer grew the Netherlands, the more anxious were the Dutch government and bourgeoisie to exclude every foreigner, Protestant as well as Catholic, from their commerce and colonies. And the greater the profits which England derived from the forceful destruction of Spanish monopoly, the more determined were her sovereigns and traders and capitalists to prevent any other foreign power from establishing another monopoly. It was thanks to the marked growth of capitalism, both in the Netherlands and in England, that by the seventeenth century common religion was subordinated to national

¹ A Swedish company, patronized by King Gustavus Adolphus, had established a fort on the Delaware in 1638, this fort was captured by the Dutch in 1655.

economic interests, and wars were waged between the two countries.

Rivalry developed between England and the Netherlands early in the seventeenth century. It developed over fisheries in the north Atlantic, over commercial posts in India, over slave-trading in Africa and the West Indies, over settlements in America. In the West, the Dutch by establishing the colony of New Netherland, thrust a threatening wedge between English settlements in Virginia and New England. In the East, the English East India Company was prohibited by the Dutch East India Company from trading with the Spice Islands, and in 1623 English merchants and settlers on the island of Amboyna were massacred by a Dutch naval force.

At length, in 1651, when the English government, then headed by Oliver Cromwell, enacted a special navigation act, confining English trade to English ships and thereby forbidding the Dutch to trade direct with England, formal hostilities commenced. They were destined to continue through three wars.

In the first Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654), the English suffered several defeats at the hands of the great Dutch admirals, De Ruyter and Van Tromp, but they also won some successes; and by the treaty of Westminster (1654) they obtained from the Netherlands a trading-post in the Spice Islands and an indemnity for the "massacre of Amboyna." Indirectly, the English were aided in this war by an uprising of the Portuguese colonists in Brazil against their Dutch masters; and the Netherlands by a treaty of 1662 receded Brazil to Portugal.¹ Thereafter the Dutch retained in South America only a portion of Guiana (Surinam).²

In the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) the English were even more successful. Though a Dutch fleet under De Ruyter burned English shipping on the Thames and temporarily terrorized London, the English captured New Amsterdam, rechristened it New York in honor of the duke of York (the heir to the

¹ This treaty was favored by King Charles II of England who had just married a Portuguese princess and had obtained, as her dowry, the important city of Bombay in India. Charles II preferred that Brazil should belong to a weak Portugal rather than to the strong Netherlands.

² Just on the eve of the first Anglo-Dutch War, the South Atlantic island of St. Helena was occupied by the English. It was confirmed in their possession by an agreement of 1661.

English throne), and secured its permanent cession by the treaty of Breda (1667).

The third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-1674) was merged in the attack which Louis XIV of France made on the Netherlands and which has already been discussed.¹ The English king at the time, Charles II, was in alliance with Louis XIV, and still believed that the Netherlands constituted the chief obstacle to his own country's commercial and colonial expansion. On the other hand, the English parliament, critical of the domestic policies of Charles II and doubtless more reflective of the sentiments of English traders and capitalists, was becoming convinced that the Netherlands had already ceased to be a dangerous rival and that France was the outstanding English enemy of the future.

Consequently, through the remainder of the reign of Charles II and through that of his brother and successor, James II (1685-1688), England pursued a wavering policy between the Netherlands and France, now favoring the one and now favoring the other. By 1688, however, it was generally recognized in England that the period of active growth was past for the overseas empires not only of Portugal and Spain but also of the Netherlands and that the future race for world wealth and dominion was between England and France. As England had laid her foundations of capitalism, commerce, and colonies in a struggle with Spain in the sixteenth century and in wars with the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, so now in a vast conflict with France she would seek to crown those foundations with mastery of the seas and of all the continents beyond the seas. The Anglo-French conflict began in 1689 and raged intermittently throughout the eighteenth century.

Decline of
Anglo-
Dutch
Rivalry

2. BRITAIN'S RIVALRY WITH FRANCE

England and France had each planted overseas colonies, as we have seen, in the first half of the seventeenth century. During the second half of the century, both continued to develop and intensify colonial and commercial ambitions, so that by the year 1689 their rival dominions and trading posts faced each other in North America, in the West Indies, in Africa, and in

¹ See above, pp. 299-301.

India. Let us glance at the extent and nature of these rival empires on the eve of the long struggle between them.

In North America, England possessed in 1689 a continuous and fairly populous strip of Atlantic seacoast, comprising ten colonies. The oldest of these, Virginia, had been settled in 1607. Plymouth, founded in 1620, was about to be merged (1691) with the neighboring New England colony of Massachusetts (which then included what is now Maine). Adjoining Massachusetts, in "New England," had grown up the three separate colonies of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. Maryland had been established, in 1634, to the north of Virginia, and Carolina, in 1665, to the south. The capture of New Netherland from the Dutch in 1664 had enabled the English to form the additional colonies of New York and New Jersey. And the appropriation of the territory between New Jersey and Maryland by William Penn and fellow English Quakers had recently (1681) set Pennsylvania as the keystone in the arch of English colonies along the Atlantic. Besides, since 1623 an English settlement had existed in Newfoundland, and since 1670 an English chartered company had been active in the fur trade of Hudson's Bay.

Numerous causes had contributed to the growth of the British colonies on the North American continent. Anglican religious intolerance had driven Radical Protestants to New England and Catholics to Maryland. Subsequently, the intolerance of Radicals in England had sent Anglicans to Virginia. Thousands of others had migrated merely to acquire wealth or to escape starvation. And America seemed a place wherein to mend broken fortunes. Upon the landed estates (plantations) of gentlemen in the southern colonies, negro slaves toiled without pay in the tobacco fields.¹ New England was less fertile, but its shrewd colonists found wealth in fishing, whaling, rum-making, and shipping. By 1689 the population of the ten colonies was estimated at nearly three hundred thousand.

The French settlers were less numerous² but more widely spread. From their first posts in Quebec (1608) and Acadia, they had pushed on up the St. Lawrence. Jesuit and other

¹ Later, rice and cotton became important products of southern agriculture.

² Probably not more than 20,000 Frenchmen were residing in America in 1689. By 1750 their number had increased perhaps to 60,000.

Catholic missionaries had led the way from Montreal westward to Lake Superior and southward to the Ohio River. In 1682 La Salle, a French nobleman, after paddling down the Mississippi, laid claim to the whole basin of that mighty stream, and named the region Louisiana in honor of Louis XIV of France. Nominally, at least, this territory was claimed by the English, for in most of the colonial charters emanating from the English crown in the seventeenth century were clauses which granted lands "from sea to sea"—that is, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The heart of "New France" remained on the St. Lawrence, but, despite English claims, French forts were commencing to mark the trails of French fur-traders down into the "Louisiana," and it was clear that whenever the English colonists should cross the Appalachian Mountains to the westward they would have to fight the French. Besides, there were French, as well as English, settlers in Newfoundland, and the French in Canada resented the activities of the English Hudson's Bay Company.

French
Colonies
in America
in 1689

French and English were neighbors also in the West Indies. Martinique and Guadeloupe acknowledged French sovereignty, while Jamaica, Barbados, and the Bahamas were English.¹ These holdings in the West Indies were highly prized not only for their sugar plantations, but for their convenience as stations for trade with Mexico and South America.

In Africa the French had made settlements in Madagascar, at Gorée, and at the mouth of the Senegal River, and the English had established themselves in Gambia and on the Gold Coast, but as yet the African posts were mere stations for trade in gold-dust,² ivory, wax, and, principally, negro slaves. The real struggle for Africa was not to come until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

French
and
English in
Africa

Of even greater lure to both France and England was Asiatic India, which, unlike America or Africa, offered a field more

¹ The following West Indies were also English: Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua, Honduras, St. Lucia, Virgin Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. St. Kitts was divided between England and France; and the western part of Haiti, already visited by French buccaneers, was definitely annexed to France in 1697. The Bermudas, lying outside the "West Indies," were already English.

² Gold coins are still often called "guineas" in England, from the fact that a good deal of gold used to come from the Guinea coast of Africa.

favorable for commerce than for conquest or colonization. For it happened that the fertility and extent of India—its area was half as large as that of Europe—were taxed to their uttermost to support a population of probably two hundred millions; and all, therefore, which Europeans desired was an opportunity to buy Indian products, such as cotton, indigo, spices, dyes, drugs, silks, precious stones, and peculiar manufactures.

**India in
the Seven-
teenth
Century**

In the seventeenth century India was ruled by a dynasty of Moslem emperors called Moguls, who had entered the peninsula as conquerors in the previous century and had established a splendid court in the city of Delhi on a branch of the Ganges. The bulk of the people, however, maintained their ancient Hindu religion with their social ranks or "castes," and preserved their distinctive speech and customs. Over a country like India, broken up into many disparate regions by diverse physical features, climates, industries, and languages, the Moslem conquerors,—the "Great Mogul" and his viceroys, called nawabs,¹—found it impossible to establish more than a loose sovereignty, many of the native princes or "rajahs" still being allowed to rule with considerable independence, and the millions of Hindus feeling little love or loyalty for their emperor. It was this fatal weakness of the Great Mogul which enabled the European traders, who in the seventeenth century besought his favor and protection, to set themselves up in the eighteenth as his masters.


It will be remembered that after the voyage of Vasco da Gama the Portuguese had monopolized the trade with India and the East until they had been attacked by the Dutch toward the close of the sixteenth century. This was the very time when the English were making their first voyages² to the East and were taking advantage of their own war with Philip II of Spain to attack his Portuguese possessions. The first English trading stations were opened at Masulipatam (1611) and at Surat (1612). In the latter year and again in 1615 Portuguese fleets were defeated, and in 1622 the Portuguese were driven out of the important Persian city of Ormuz. By 1689 the English had acquired three important points in India.

**The
English
in India**

¹ More popularly, "nabobs."

² Actually the first English voyage to the East Indies was made between 1591 and 1504, almost a century after the first Portuguese voyage.

MAP of the Continent of the EAST-INDIES &c.
 Containing the Territories, Settlements, and Factories of the EUROPEANS. Explaining what belongs to ENGLAND, FRANCE, HOLLAND, DENMARK, PORTUGAL &c.
 By H. Moll Geographer, 1736



(1) Calcutta, in the delta of the Ganges (and in the province of Bengal), had been founded in 1686, but it was yet uncertain whether the English could hold it against the Mogul emperor. (2) At Madras, farther south, Sir Francis Day had built Fort St. George (1640). (3) On the western coast, the trading station of Surat was now surpassed in value by Bombay, the dowry of the Portuguese princess who had married King Charles II (1662).

The first French Company for Eastern trade had been formed only four years after the English East India Company,¹ but the first French factory in India—at Surat—was not established until 1668 and the French did not seriously compete with the English and Dutch in India until the close of the seventeenth century. However, their post at Chandarnagar (1672), in dangerous proximity to Calcutta, and their thriving station at Pondicherry (1674), within a hundred miles of Madras, augured ill for the future harmony of French and English in India

The
French
in India

From the foregoing brief review of the respective colonial possessions of Great Britain and France in the year 1689, it must be evident that although France had entered the colonial competition tardily, she had succeeded remarkably well in becoming a formidable rival of the British. The great struggle for supremacy was to be decided, nevertheless, not by priority of settlement or validity of claim, but by the fighting power of the contestants. France, a larger, more populous, and richer country than England, able then single-handed to keep the rest of Europe at bay, was to prove the weaker of the two in the struggle for world empire.

Comparative
Strength
of England
and France
in 1689

In the first place, England's maritime power was increasing more steadily than that of France. Although Richelieu had recognized the need for a French navy and had given a great impetus to ship-building, France had become inextricably entangled in European politics, and the navy was half forgotten in the ambitious land wars of Louis XIV. The English, on the other hand, were predisposed to the sea by the very fact of their insularity, and since the days of the great armada their most patriotic boast had been of the deeds of mariners. In the wars

¹ Charters to French companies had been granted in 1604 and in 1615. The *Compagnie des Indes* was formed in 1642, and reconstructed in 1664.

with the Dutch, the first great English admiral—Robert Blake—had won glorious victories.

Then, too, the Navigation Acts (1651, 1660), by excluding foreign ships from trade between Great Britain and her colonies, may have lessened the volume of trade, but they resulted in undoubted prosperity for English shippers. Whether capturing galleons off the "Spanish main" or defeating Portuguese fleets in the Far East, English pirates, slavers, and merchantmen were not to be encountered without fear or envy. English commerce and industry, springing up under the protection and encouragement of the Tudors and Stuarts, had given birth to a moneyed class powerful enough, as we shall presently see, to obtain special rights and privileges through parliament.¹

The French, on the other hand, labored under certain commercial handicaps. Local tolls and internal customs-duties hindered traffic; and the medieval guild system had retained in France its power to hamper capitalism in its pursuit of profits. The long civil and religious wars, which called workmen from their benches and endangered the property and lives of merchants, had resulted in reducing French commerce to a shadow before 1600. Under Henry IV prosperity revived, but the growth of royal power made it impossible for the Protestant merchants in France to achieve political power comparable with that which their fellows won in England. Consequently the French mercantile classes were quite unable to prevent Louis XIV from ruining their country by foreign war. They could not vote themselves privileges and bounties as in England, nor could they declare war on commercial rivals. True, Colbert, the great "mercantilist" minister of Louis XIV, did his best to encourage new industries, such as silk production, to make rules for the better conduct of old industries, and to lay taxes on such imported goods as might compete with home products, but French industry could not be made to thrive like that of England. It is often said that Colbert's careful regulations did much harm by stifling the spirit of free enterprise; but far more destructive were the wars and taxes² of the Grand Monarch. The only

¹ See below, pp. 434, 453-454.

² In order to obtain money for his court, diplomacy, and wars, Louis XIV not only increased taxes but debased the coinage. Particularly unfortunate, economically, was the revocation of the edict of Nantes (1685). See above, p. 313.

wonder is that France bore the drain of men and money as well as she did.

In general colonial policy France seemed decidedly superior. Louis XIV had taken over the whole of "New France" as a royal province, and the French could present a united front against the divided and discordant English colonies. Under Colbert the number of French colonists in America increased three hundred per cent in twenty years. Moreover the French, both in India and in America, were almost uniformly successful in gaining the friendship and trust of the natives, whereas, at least with the redmen, the English were frequently at war.

The English, however, had a great advantage in the number of colonists. The population of France, held in check by wars, did not overflow to America naturally; and the Huguenots, persecuted in the mother country, were not allowed to emigrate to New France, lest their presence might impede the missionary labors of the Jesuits among the Indians.¹ England was more fortunate in that her Puritan, Quaker, and Catholic exiles went to her colonies rather than to foreign lands. The English colonists, less under the direct protection of the mother country, learned to defend themselves and were better able to help the mother country against their common foe, the French.

Taken all in all, the situation was favorable to Great Britain. As long as French monarchs spent the resources of France in Europe, they could scarcely hope to cope with the superior navy, the thriving commerce, and the more populous colonies, of their rivals.

The Alliance of English and Dutch against the French

Colonial and commercial rivalry could hardly bring France and Great Britain to blows while the Stuart kings looked to Louis XIV for friendly aid in the erection of absolutism and the reinstatement of Catholicism in England. In 1689, however, a revolution occurred in Great Britain.² King James II was dethroned and exiled; the English parliament reasserted itself; and the British crown was bestowed

¹ The statement is frequently made that the "paternalism" or fatherly care with which Richelieu and Colbert made regulations for the colonies was responsible for the paucity of colonists and the discouragement of colonial industry. This, however, will be taken with considerable reservation when it is remembered that England, too, attempted to prevent the growth of such industries in her colonies as might compete with those at home.

² For more detailed account of the revolution, see below, pp. 440-452.

upon James II's son-in-law,—William III, prince of Orange, stadholder of the Dutch Netherlands, a sterling Protestant, and an arch-enemy of Louis XIV. The accession of William III meant a junction of England and the Netherlands against France.

In an earlier chapter ¹ we have seen how this significant juncture was merged in the League of Augsburg, which included not only England and the Netherlands, but also the Holy Roman Empire, the kings of Spain and Sweden, and the electors of Bavaria, Saxony, and the Palatinate, and how the League King William's War waged war with Louis XIV of France from 1689 to 1697. It was during this struggle, it will be remembered, that King William finally defeated James II and the latter's French and Irish allies in the battle of the Boyne (1690). It was also during this struggle that the French navy, though successful against combined Dutch and English squadrons off Beachy Head (1690), was decisively beaten by the English in a three-day battle near La Hogue (1692).

The War of the League of Augsburg had its counterpart between American colonists of England and France in the so-called "King William's War," of which two aspects should be noted. In the first place, the New England colonists aided in the capture (1690) of the French fortress of Port Royal in Acadia (Nova Scotia) and in an inconsequential attack on Quebec. In the second place, we must notice the rôle of the Indians. As early as 1670, Roger Williams, a famous New England preacher, had declared that "the French and Romish Jesuits, the firebrands of the world, for their godbelly sake, are kindling at our back in this country their hellish fires with all the natives of this country." The outbreak of King William's War was a signal for the kindling of fires more to be feared than those imagined by the good divine; the burning of Dover (N. H.), Schenectady (N. Y.), and Groton (Mass.) by the red allies of the French governor, Count Frontenac, earned the latter the lasting hatred of the "Yankees."

The contest was interrupted rather than settled by the colorless treaty of Ryswick (1697), according to which Louis XIV promised not to question William's right to the English throne, and all colonial conquests, including Port Royal, were restored.

¹ See above, pp. 302-304.

Only five years later Europe was plunged into the long War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713). King William and the Habsburg emperor with other European princes formed a Grand Alliance to prevent Louis's grandson Philip from inheriting the Spanish crowns. For if France and Spain were united under the Bourbon family, their armies would overawe Europe; their united colonial empires would surround and perhaps engulf the British colonies; their combined navies might drive the British from the seas. Furthermore, the English were angered when Louis XIV. upon the death of James II (1701), openly recognized the Catholic son of the exiled royal Stuart as "James III," king of Great Britain.

The Alliance of French and Spanish against the English

While the duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene were winning great victories in Europe,¹ the British colonists in America were fighting "Queen Anne's War" against the French. Again the French sent Indians to destroy New England villages, and again the English retaliated by attacking Port Royal and Quebec. After withstanding two unsuccessful assaults, Port Royal fell in 1710 and left Acadia open to the British. In the following year a fleet of nine war vessels and sixty transports carried twelve thousand Britishers to attack Quebec, while an army of 2,300 moved on Montreal by way of Lake Champlain; but both these expeditions failed of their objects.


Queen Anne's War

On the high seas, as well as in America and in Europe, the British won fresh laurels. It was during Queen Anne's War that the British navy, sometimes with the valuable aid of the Dutch, played an important part in defeating the French fleet in the Mediterranean and driving French privateers from the sea, in besieging and capturing Gibraltar, in seizing a rich squadron of Spanish treasure ships near Cartagena, and in terrorizing the French West Indies.

The main provisions of the treaty of Utrecht, which terminated this stage of the conflict, in so far as they affected the colonial situation,² were as follows: (1) The French Bourbons were allowed to become the reigning family in Spain, and though the proviso was inserted that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united, nevertheless so long as Bourbons reigned in both

¹ See above, pp. 300-310.

² For the European settlement, see above, pp. 310-311.



AMERICA
 in the
 FIRST HALF
 of the
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
 By H. Moll Geographer 1736

claims. From Crown Point on Lake Champlain, the line was carried westward by Fort Niagara, Fort Detroit, Sault Sainte Marie, on to Lake Winnipeg and even beyond; other forts commanded the Wabash and Illinois rivers, and followed the Mississippi down to the Gulf.¹ Settlements were made at Mobile (1702) and at New Orleans (1718), and British sailors were given to understand that the Mississippi was French property. The governors of British colonies had ample cause for envy and alarm.

In India, likewise, the French were too enterprising to be good neighbors. Under the leadership of a remarkably able governor-general, Duplex, who was appointed in 1741, they were prospering and were extending their influence in the effete empire of the Great Mogul. Duplex exhibited a restless ambition. He began to interfere in native politics and to assume the pompous bearing, gorgeous apparel, and proud titles of a native prince. He conceived the idea of augmenting his slender garrisons of Europeans with "sepoys," or carefully drilled natives, and he fortified his capital, Pondicherry, as if for war.

Franco-British Rivalry in India

To the dangerous rivalry between British and French colonists and traders in America and in India, during the thirty years which followed the treaty of Utrecht, was added the continuous bickering which grew out of the Asiento concluded in 1713 between Great Britain and Spain. Spaniards complained of British smugglers and protested with justice that the British outrageously abused their special privilege by keeping the single stipulated vessel in the harbor of Porto Bello and refilling it at night from other ships. On the other hand, British merchants resented their general exclusion from Spanish markets and recited to willing listeners at home the tales of their grievances against the Spanish authorities. Of such tales the most notorious was that of a certain Captain Robert Jenkins, who with dramatic detail told how the bloody Spaniards had attacked his good ship, plundered it, and in the fray cut off one of his ears, and to prove his story he produced a box containing what purported to be the ear in question. In the face of the popular excitement aroused in England by this and similar incidents, Sir Robert Walpole, the peace-loving prime

Commercial Rivalry of Spain and Britain

¹ By the year 1750 there were over sixty French forts between Montreal and New Orleans

minister of the time, was unable to restrain his fellow countrymen from declaring war against Spain.

It was in 1739 that the commercial and colonial warfare was thus resumed,—involving at the outset only Spain and Great Britain,—in a curious struggle commonly referred to as the War of Jenkins's Ear. A British fleet captured Porto Bello, but failed to take Cartagena. In North America the war was carried on fruitlessly by James Oglethorpe, who had recently (1733) founded the English colony of Georgia ¹ to the south of Carolina, in territory claimed by the Spanish colony of Florida.

**The
War of
Jenkins's
Ear**

The War of Jenkins's Ear proved but a prelude to the resumption of hostilities on a large scale between France and Great Britain. It has already been explained how in 1740 the War of the Austrian Succession broke out on the continent of Europe—a war stubbornly fought for eight years, and a war in which Great Britain entered the lists for Maria Theresa of Austria against France and Prussia and other states.² The European conflict was naturally reflected in "King George's War" (1744-1748) in America, and in simultaneous hostilities in India.

The only remarkable incident of King George's War was the capture of Louisburg (1745) by Colonel William Pepperell of New Hampshire with a force of British colonists, who were sorely disappointed when, in 1748, the captured fortress was returned to France by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The war in India was similarly indecisive. In 1746 a French squadron easily captured the British post at Madras; other British posts were attacked, and Dupleix defeated the nawab of the Carnatic, who would have punished him for violating Indian peace and neutrality. The tables were turned by the arrival of a British fleet in 1748, which laid siege to Dupleix in Pondicherry. At this juncture, news arrived that Great Britain and France had concluded the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), whereby all conquests, including Madras and Louisburg, were to be re-

¹ So named in honor of the then reigning King George II (1727-1760). Georgia was the last of the original thirteen English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard and was established as a camp for transported criminals. Delaware had been set off from Pennsylvania in 1701, and Carolina had been divided into the two colonies of North and South Carolina in 1713.

² See above, pp. 338-341.

stored. So far as Spain was concerned, Great Britain in 1750 renounced the privileges of the Asiento in return for a money payment of £100,000.

3. BRITAIN'S TRIUMPH OVER FRANCE

Up to this point, the wars between France and Great Britain had been generally indecisive, although Great Britain had secured title to Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia by the peace of Utrecht (1713). British naval power, too, was undoubtedly superior. But two great questions were still unanswered. Should France be allowed to make good her claim to the Mississippi valley and to confine the British in America to a narrow strip of seacoast? Should Dupleix, wily diplomat as he was, be allowed to make India a French empire? To these major disputes was added a minor quarrel over the boundary of Nova Scotia.

The decisive war was fought in the years between 1754 and 1763. France lost, and her loss was fourfold. (1) Her European armies were defeated in Germany by Frederick the Great, who was aided by English gold, in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).¹ (2) At the same time her naval power was almost annihilated by the British, whose war vessels and privateers conquered most of the French West Indies and almost swept French commerce from the seas. (3) In India, the machinations of Dupleix were foiled by the equally astute but more martial Clive. (4) In America, the "French and Indian War" (1754-1763) dispelled the dream of a New France across the Atlantic. We shall first consider the war in the New World.

The immediate cause of the French and Indian War was a contest for the possession of the Ohio valley. The English had already organized an Ohio Company (1749) for colonization of the valley, but they did not fully realize the pressing need of action until the French had begun the construction of a line of forts in western Pennsylvania—Fort Presqu'Isle (Eric), Fort Le Boeuf (Waterford), and Fort Venango (Franklin). As the most important position—the junction of the Monongahela and Allegheny rivers—was still unoccupied, the Ohio Company, early in 1754, sent a small force to seize and fortify it. The French, however, were not to be so

**The
French
and Indian
War**

¹ For the European aspects of this struggle, see above, pp. 341-344.


easily outwitted; they captured the newly built fort with its handful of defenders, enlarged it, and christened it Fort Duquesne in honor of the governor of Canada. Soon afterward a young Virginian, George Washington by name, arrived on the scene with four hundred men, too late to reënforce the English fort-builders, and he also was defeated on 4 July, 1754.

In the following year the British General Braddock arrived in America with a regular army and an ambitious plan to attack the French in three places—Crown Point (on Lake Champlain), Fort Niagara, and Fort Duquesne. But his forces were badly defeated at Fort Duquesne and he himself was killed. Repulsed at Niagara and Crown Point, the English contented themselves with building Forts Edward and William Henry on Lake George, while the French constructed the famous Fort Ticonderoga.¹

The gloom which gathered about British fortunes seemed to increase during the year 1756. Great Britain's most valuable ally, Frederick the Great of Prussia, was defeated in Europe; an English squadron was worsted in the Mediterranean; the French captured the island of Minorca; and a British attack on the French fortress of Louisburg failed. To the French in America, the year 1756 brought Montcalm and continued success. The Marquis de Montcalm (1712-1759) had learned the art of war on European battlefields, but he readily adapted himself to frontier conditions, and proved to be an able commander of the French and Indian forces in the New World. The English fort of Oswego on Lake Ontario and Fort William Henry on Lake George were captured, and all the campaigns projected by the English were foiled.

In 1757, however, new vigor was infused into the war on the part of the British, largely by reason of the entrance of William Pitt (the Elder) into the cabinet. Pitt was determined to arouse all British subjects to fight for their country. Stirred with martial enthusiasm, colonial volunteers now joined with British regulars to provide a force of about 50,000 men for simultaneous attacks on four important French posts in America—Louisburg,

¹ This same year, 1755, so unfortunate for the English, was a cruel year for the French settlers in Nova Scotia; like so many cattle, seven thousand of them were packed into English vessels and shipped to various parts of North America. The English feared their possible disloyalty.



NORTH AMERICA PRIOR TO THE FRENCH and INDIAN WAR.
 A New MAP of the North Parts of AMERICA claimed by FRANCE under the Names of LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, CANADA & NEW FRANCE, with the Adjoining Territories of England & Spain
 By H. Moll Geographer

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Parts Unknown

Upper Lake
 Broken Land
 Head of the River
 St. Lawrence
 R. de Assumpcion
 St. Charles
 St. Louis
 St. Ignace
 St. Joseph
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Parts of Mexico
 Gulf of Mexico

Florida
 Bahama Bank
 Florida Bank

WESTERN OCEAN



110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50

30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105

Ticonderoga, Niagara, and Duquesne. The success of the attack on Louisburg (1758) was ensured by the support of a strong British squadron; Fort Duquesne was taken and renamed Fort Pitt¹ (1758); Ticonderoga repulsed one expedition (1758) but surrendered in July, 1759, one day after the capture of Fort Niagara by the British.

Not content with the capture of the menacing French outposts, the British next aimed at the central strongholds of the French. While one army marched up the Hudson valley to attack Montreal, General Wolfe, in command of another army of 7,000, and accompanied by a strong fleet, moved up the St. Lawrence against Quebec. An inordinate thirst for military glory had been Wolfe's heritage from his father, himself a general. An ensign at fourteen, Wolfe had become an officer in active service while still in his teens, had commanded a detachment in the attack on Louisburg in 1758, and now at the age of thirty-three was charged with the capture of Quebec, a natural stronghold, defended by the redoubtable Montcalm. The task seemed impossible; weeks were wasted in futile efforts; sickness and apparent defeat weighed heavily on the young commander. With the energy of despair he fastened at last upon a daring idea. Thirty-six hundred of his men were ferried in the dead of night to a point above the city where his soldiers might scramble through bushes and over rocks up a precipitous path to a high plateau—the Plains of Abraham—commanding the town.

The
British
Conquest
of Canada

Wolfe's presence on the heights was revealed at daybreak on 13 September, 1759, and Montcalm hastened to repel the attack. For a time it seemed as if Wolfe's force would be overpowered, but a well-directed volley and an impetuous charge threw the French lines into disorder. In the moment of victory, General Wolfe, already twice wounded, received a musket-ball in the breast. His death was made happy by the news of success, but no such exultation filled the heart of the mortally wounded Montcalm, dying in the bitterness of defeat.

Quebec surrendered a few days later. It was the beginning of the end of the French colonial empire in America. All hope was lost when, in October, 1759, a great armada, ready to embark against England, was destroyed in Quiberon Bay by Admiral

¹ Whence the name of the modern city of Pittsburgh.

Hawke. In 1760 Montreal fell and the British completed the conquest of New France, at the very time when almost the last vestiges of French power were disappearing in India.

In his extremity, Louis XV of France secured the aid of his Bourbon kinsman, the king of Spain, against England, but Spain's assistance was unavailing, and in 1762 British squadrons captured Cuba and the Philippine Islands as well as the French possessions in the West Indies.

Let us now turn back and see how the loss of New France was paralleled by French defeat in the contest for the vastly more populous and opulent empire of India. The Mogul Empire, to which reference has already been made, had been rapidly falling to pieces during the first half of the eighteenth century. The rulers or nawabs (nabobs) of the Deccan, of Bengal, and of Oudh had become semi-independent princes. In a time when conspiracy and intrigue were common avenues to power, the French governor, Dupleix, had conceived the idea of making himself the political leader of India, and in pursuit of his goal, as we have seen, he had affected Oriental magnificence and grandiloquent titles, had formed alliances with half the neighboring native magnates, had fortified Pondicherry, and begun the enrollment and organization of his sepoy army. In 1750 he succeeded in overthrowing the nawab of the Carnatic ¹ and in establishing a pretender whom he could dominate more easily.

The hopes of the experienced and crafty Dupleix were frustrated, however, by a young man of twenty-seven—Robert Clive. At the age of eighteen, Clive had entered the employ of the English East India Company as a clerk at Madras. His restless and discontented spirit found relief, at times, in omnivorous reading; at other times he grew despondent. More than once he planned to take his own life. During the War of the Austrian Succession, he had resigned his civil post and entered the army. The hazards of military life were more to his liking, and he soon gave abundant evidence of ability. After the peace of 1748 he had returned to civil life, but in 1751 he came forward with a bold scheme for attacking Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, and overthrowing

¹ The province in India which includes Madras and Pondicherry and has its capital at Arcot.

The
Mogul
Empire in
India

British
Successes
in India
under
Clive

the upstart nawab who was supported by Dupleix. Clive could muster only some two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoy, but this slender force, infused with the daring and irresistible determination of the young leader, sufficed to seize and hold the citadel of Arcot against thousands of assailants. With the aid of native and British reinforcements, the hero of Arcot proceeded to defeat the pretender; and, in 1754, the French had to acknowledge their failure in the Carnatic and withdraw support from their vanquished protégé. Dupleix was recalled to France in disgrace; and the British were left to enjoy the favor of the nawab who owed his throne to Clive.

Clive's next work was in Bengal. In 1756 the young nawab of Bengal, Suraj-ud-Dowlah by name, seized the English fort of Calcutta and locked 146 Englishmen overnight in a stifling prison—the "Black Hole" of Calcutta—from which only twenty-three emerged alive the next morning. Clive, hastening from Madras, chastised Suraj for this atrocity, and forced him to give up Calcutta. And since by this time Great Britain and France were openly at war, Clive did not hesitate to capture the near-by French post of Chandarnagar. His next move was to give active aid to a certain Mir Jafir, a pretender to the throne of the unfriendly Suraj-ud-Dowlah. The French naturally took sides with Suraj against Clive. In 1757 Clive drew up 1,100 Europeans, 2,100 sepoy, and nine cannon in a grove of mango trees at Plassey, a few miles south of the city of Murshidabad, and there attacked Suraj, who, with an army of 68,000 native troops and with French artillerymen to work his fifty-three cannon, anticipated an easy victory. The outcome was a brilliant victory for Clive, as overwhelming as it was unexpected. The British candidate forthwith became nawab of Bengal and as token of his indebtedness he paid over £1,500,000 to the English East India Company and made Clive a rich man. The British were henceforth dominant in Bengal. The recapture of Masulipatam in 1758, the defeat of the French at Wandewash, between Madras and Pondicherry, and the successful siege of Pondicherry in 1761, finally established the British as masters of the eastern coast of India.

The fall of Quebec (1759) and of Pondicherry (1761) practically decided the issue of the colonial struggle, but the war dragged on until, in 1763, France, Spain, and Great Britain

concluded the peace of Paris. Of her American possessions France retained only two insignificant islands on the Newfoundland coast,¹ a few islands in the West Indies,² and a foothold in Guiana in South America. Great Britain received from France the whole of the St. Lawrence valley and all the territory east of the Mississippi River, together with the island of Grenada in the West Indies; and from Spain, Great Britain secured Florida. Beyond the surrender of the sparsely settled territory of Florida, Spain suffered no loss, for Cuba and the Philippines were restored to her, and France gave her western Louisiana, that is, the western half of the Mississippi valley. The French were allowed to return to their old posts in India, but were not to build forts or to maintain troops in Bengal. In other words, the French returned to India as traders but not as empire builders.³

Thus, in the eighteenth century, did France suffer even more humiliating and overwhelming defeat at the hands of the British than the Netherlands had suffered in the seventeenth century, or Spain in the sixteenth. Spain and the Netherlands had in turn been humbled and deprived of any monopoly of world-trade or world-dominion, but each still retained very valuable colonies—Spain in America and the Philippines, the Netherlands in the East Indies. France, however, was not only humbled but also shorn of almost all her overseas possessions and much of her overseas trade. It is true that France refused to regard her losses as permanent; her rivalry with Great Britain continued long after 1763. In the years immediately following the Seven Years' War, she made heroic and expensive efforts to rebuild her navy. In 1778 she undertook a war of revenge in concert with rebellious English colonies.⁴ And much later, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, she was to succeed in building a new colonial empire, which would be larger than the one she had lost and second only to Britain's in size and strength.

Yet India and America were irreticvably lost to France in the eighteenth century. Her trade in India soon dwindled into

¹ St. Pierre and Miquelon.

² Including Guadeloupe and Martinique.

³ During the war, the French posts in Africa had been taken, and now Gorée was returned while the mouth of the Senegal River was retained by the British.

⁴ See below, pp. 484-486.

insignificance before the powerful and wealthy British East India Company. "French India" to-day consists of five insignificant towns, covering 196 square miles. French empire in America is now represented only by two puny islands off the coast of Newfoundland, two small islands in the West Indies, and an unimportant tract of tropical Guiana, but historic traces of its former greatness and promise have survived alike in Canada and in Louisiana. In Canada the French population has stubbornly held itself aloof from the British in language and in religion, and even to-day over a fourth of the ten million Canadians are of French descent, quite as intent on the preservation of their distinctive nationality as upon their allegiance to the British rule. In the United States the French element is less in evidence; nevertheless in New Orleans sidewalks are called "banquettes," and embankments, "levees"; and still the names of Champlain, Detroit, Terre Haute, Des Moines, St. Louis, Baton Rouge, and Mobile perpetuate the memory of a lost French empire.

4. BRITAIN'S ACQUISITION OF INDIA AND AUSTRALIA

From two centuries of warfare with Spaniards, Dutch, and French, Great Britain emerged in 1763 as the foremost commercial and colonial power in the world. She was now mistress of all lands of the North American continent east of the Mississippi River, of valuable trading posts in the West Indies and on the western coast of Africa, and of the most promising parts of India. The actual area of her colonial empire was still somewhat less than Spain's and only slightly more than Portugal's,¹ but its population was considerably greater and its commerce was far more flourishing.

**Great
Britain,
the Mis-
tress of
the Seas**

Besides, British overseas dominion continued to grow. Though it experienced a serious set-back in the revolt of thirteen colonies

¹ Spain's colonial empire embraced, in 1763, all of South America (except Brazil and Guiana), Central America (except British Honduras), Mexico, North America west of the Mississippi, the major part of the West Indies (including Cuba, eastern Hispaniola, and Porto Rico), the Canary Islands, and the Philippine Islands. Portugal, at the same date, still retained Brazil, the Angola and Mozambique coasts of Africa, the three towns of Goa, Diu, and Daman in India, and the Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde Islands. The Netherlands, it may be added, still held Ceylon, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas (Spice Islands), western New Guinea, South Africa, a few small islands in the West Indies, and Surinam (Dutch Guiana) in South America.

on the North American coast,¹ it steadily advanced, during the latter part of the eighteenth century, in Asia and Oceania.

Especially in India did British dominion grow. Until the Seven Years' War India had been viewed by Englishmen as a field for profitable trade but not as a country to be conquered and administered by themselves. The English East India Company had built forts and established commercial posts ("factories") in particular coastal cities and had negotiated with native princes for economic advantages, but the company had not attempted to exercise any extensive political control. With the Seven Years' War, matters changed. While profitable trade continued to be the chief end of British policy in India, the means became increasingly political. More and more the officials of the English East India Company interfered in the complicated internal politics of India. More and more they brought native princes under British tutelage or sovereignty. It was a lesson which Clive had learned from Dupleix and the French.

At the close of the Seven Years' War in 1763, the British found themselves relieved of any serious competition in India, whether commercial or political, with other Europeans.² The war had seemingly settled the predominance of the British over their latest and most dangerous rivals, the French. At the same time, the war had firmly entrenched the British in certain strategic areas where they could exercise political, as well as economic, control. Clive's victory at Plassey (1757) had really inaugurated a British political empire in India; it had conferred upon the English East India Company the actual, if not the nominal, sovereignty of Bengal (around Calcutta).

Yet in 1763 the British political "empire" in India was territorially small. It comprised Calcutta and the lower Ganges basin (Bengal) in the northeast, Madras and a few scattered strips along the southeast coast, and the strongly fortified port of Bombay on the west. Besides, though they had gotten rid of the French menace, the British were now confronted with an especially chaotic internal situation in

**Disorder
in India**

¹ For the American Revolution, see below, pp. 469-490.

² France still held five commercial stations, and Portugal three, while the Dutch continued to occupy Ceylon. But the trade of all these was insignificant in comparison with the trade of the flourishing British stations.

India which threatened alike their economic prosperity and their political "empire," but which, paradoxically, might be utilized by them to expand their empire and to assure their prosperity.

During the years immediately following 1763 India was in wild turmoil. The decline of the Mogul Empire continued. Most of its viceroys and local governors, the so-called nawabs, had set themselves up as independent princes, and they now warred almost constantly against one another, without let or hindrance from the Great Mogul at Delhi, and with great destructiveness. Worst of all, a group of princes of the Mahratta people in central and western India had formed a confederacy which, holding sway over a large part of the peninsula, wrought havoc in the decaying empire and gravely menaced the English settlements on the coasts.

As Clive had been the real creator of British empire in India, so he was the formulator of the policy under which this empire was preserved and enlarged. In 1765, after a well-earned rest in England, Clive, now ennobled as Lord Clive of Plassey, returned to the governorship of Calcutta and at once adopted the policy of championing against native forces of disorder and destruction the cause of the Great Mogul and of any prince who desired peace and order. He paid ostentatious honor to the Great Mogul and posed as the special friend of such native princes as pretended to respect the sovereignty of the Mogul empire. By favoring the Mogul emperor, he obtained from him numerous favors for himself and the English East India Company, and he always kept up the pretence that favors received by the British really served the interest of the Great Mogul and his loyal nawabs. For example, in Bengal, Clive meticulously observed the form of vassalage to the native empire; he retained the local nawab as official representative of the Great Mogul and of native interests in the province; but, with the acquiescence of the nominal emperor, he saw to it that British officials, rather than the native nawab, levied the taxes in Bengal, organized and commanded the army, and in general governed the province. To Bengal, moreover, Clive added, by treaties with local nawabs or with the grateful emperor, other provinces, notably Behar (up the Ganges) and the Circars (down the east coast); and in these provinces he pursued a like policy. When Clive finally returned to England in 1767,

Clive's
Creation
of British
Empire
in India

he left behind him in India a larger and stronger British dominion.¹

Clive's policy was continued and improved upon by Warren Hastings, another extraordinary agent of the English East India Company. Hastings had first entered the employ of the Company at the age of seventeen, and an apprenticeship of over twenty years in India had browned his face and inured his lean body to the peculiarities of the climate, as well as given him a thorough insight into native politics and character. In 1772 he succeeded to the governorship of Bengal, and two years later he became the first governor-general of all the English possessions in India.² For the first time, the three hitherto separate "presidencies" of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were thus united under a common administration, of which Hastings remained the head until 1785.

*The Work
of Hastings
in India*

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Against the Mahratta Confederacy, Hastings waged war from 1774 to 1782, incessant, perilous, but on the whole advantageous to the British. First, with the support of certain nawabs whose territories were threatened, he defeated the Mahrattas in northern India and prevented them from appropriating the native states along the Ganges. Next, he successfully defended Bombay against a determined assault by the Mahrattas. Finally, after most desperate and ruthless fighting, he managed to curb the pretensions of an ambitious Moslem chieftain, Hyder Ali by name, who had made himself sultan of Mysore (in southern India) and in alliance with the Mahrattas had sought to extend his state at British expense. Mysore was held in check; the Mahrattas made peace by ceding to the British the town of Salsette

¹ Clive offended many under-officials of the English East India Company by attempting to prohibit their acceptance of bribes from natives, and on his return to England some of them pressed charges against him (doubtless true) that he had employed his powers in India to obtain illicit gains for himself. Parliament pronounced him guilty, and under stress of his disgrace his mind became partially unhinged, and in 1774 he finally did what in youth he had contemplated: he committed suicide.

² In accordance with the "Regulating Act" of 1773, whereby the British parliament enacted that there should be one governor-general for all British Indian provinces and that all officials of the East India Company should be confirmed by the king. This was the first formal recognition that India was the seat of a British empire and not merely of a private trading company. Another act of parliament, in 1785, went farther in the same direction and set up in London a governmental "Board of Control" to supervise the policies and activities of the East India Company.

(near Bombay); and the Mogul emperor gratefully suffered the inclusion of the "holy city" of Benares (on the Ganges) in the British province of Bengal.

Not only did Hastings enlarge the British empire in India. He improved and centralized its administration. He reformed the finances and police-system. He converted a primarily military occupation into a stable civil government. At the same time he was not neglectful of opportunities to secure financial profits for the stockholders of the English East India Company and for himself. Eventually Hastings was called to England to answer charges in parliament against his official conduct, and the famous Edmund Burke, with all the force of oratory and hatred, attempted to convict the redoubtable governor-general of "high crimes and misdemeanors." But the tirades of Burke proved powerless to win from a patriotic assembly the conviction of a man who had exalted his country's glory and power in India.

In the eighteenth century, after Hastings, two other great governors of the English East India Company did signal service in empire-building. One was Lord Cornwallis, who had recently surrendered a British army to British rebels in America ¹ and who was as successful in India (1786-1793) as he had been unfortunate on the other side of the world. The second was the marquess of Wellesley, who was always an ardent imperialist and proved himself in India (1798-1805) a military genius. Under these governors, Mysore and the Mahratta Confederacy were again fought and were decisively defeated; and British dominion was extended rapidly and widely. In the east, Orissa and Guntur were acquired; in the south Travancore, the Carnatic, and a large part of Mysore; in the west, Malabar and Broach. In the north, the native prince of the large state of Oude became a protégé of the British, and in 1803 Delhi, the capital of the old Mogul empire, was "rescued" from the Mahrattas and appropriated by the British, the Great Mogul being gently pushed into richly ornamental seclusion.

Cornwallis and Wellesley in India

When Lord Wellesley returned home in 1805, the greater part of the huge and varied land of India was dominated, if not actually governed, by the English East India Company and constituted a veritable British empire. The Mogul emperor was now a cringing creature, anxious only to please the British and to

¹ See below, p. 485.

retain a show of majesty. The majority of the native nawabs and princes were in pay or in awe of the British governor-general at Calcutta. British power and British trade were becoming synonymous, and they were paramount in India.¹

Outside of India, the trade and political power of the English East India Company were expanding. In the strategic straits between Sumatra and the Malay peninsula, the ocean gateway from India to China and Japan, the company acquired Penang from a native prince in 1785 and Malacca from the Dutch in 1795. These acquisitions were the beginnings of the present-day British colony of the Straits Settlements.²

Simultaneously, Ceylon was taken from the Dutch (1795), and the British increased the number of convenient stopping places and fortified stations on the long water route around Africa from England to India. Thus, they founded the colony of Sierra Leone on the west coast of Africa (1787), ostensibly as a refuge for freed slaves. They occupied several groups of islands, including the Seychelles, off the east coast (1794).³ And they wrested Cape Town and South Africa from the Dutch (1795).⁴ In South Africa the British were eventually to build an important dominion.

In the second half of the eighteenth century the British also sowed the seed for another and even more significant overseas achievement—the colonization of a whole continent. For it was then that they struck roots into Australia.

¹ British domination of India, and likewise British expansion in the Straits Settlements and in Australia (to which we shall presently refer), was rendered easier, at the close of the eighteenth century and during the first decade of the nineteenth, by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, in which Britain was victorious over France and Holland. On these wars, see below, pp. 710-714.

² The very important port of Singapore, now the capital of the Straits Settlements, was acquired by the English East India Company from a native prince in 1819. Malacca, it may be noted, was returned to the Dutch in 1818 but recovered by the British in 1824.

³ The Seychelles had been a French possession.

⁴ South Africa was restored to the Dutch in 1803 but reverted finally to the British in 1806.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Taste in High Life," is from a painting by William Hogarth (1697-1764), who was satirizing the ostentatious wealth and the "curios" which the English upper classes were deriving in the eighteenth century from India and the Far East. On Hogarth, see below, p. 564.





Ever since the sixteenth century there had been gossip among mariners and geographers about a continent in the southern Pacific, and early in the seventeenth century a Portuguese pilot, De Quiros by name, in the service of Philip III of Spain, had searched eagerly and had almost (but not quite) found the "Terra Australis." Shortly afterwards, Dutch sailors from the East Indies had actually visited and explored the west coast of the continent, had called it "New Holland," and had reported its unprofitable and forbidding appearance; and in 1642 the famous Dutch captain Tasman had charted its southern and southeastern shores and named one region of it "Van Diermen's Land" in honor of his superior at Batavia. In 1688 an English buccaneer, William Dampier, on a wild and most adventurous circumnavigation of the globe, stumbled on to "New Holland" and wrote such an interesting account of what he saw that the British government commissioned him ten years later to return and survey the country. He returned, landed at Shark's Bay (on the west coast), and did some surveying. But little came of the work of this astounding buccaneer except considerable popular interest at home in his travel-books.

**Gradual
Growth of
Knowl-
edge
about
Australia**

**"New
Holland"**

Though Australia was known in a general way to the Dutch in the seventeenth century and though it was twice visited by an Englishman at the close of that century, knowledge of it remained slight and vague. Its occupation by Europeans was delayed until after the sensational voyages of Captain James Cook in the latter part of the eighteenth century. James Cook (1728-1779), the son of an agricultural laborer in Yorkshire, was apprenticed as a boy to an English firm of shipowners and learned much about the sea from voyages he made for them to Norway and the Baltic. At the age of twenty-seven he enlisted in the royal navy and during the Seven Years' War he saw active service against the French in American waters. After a four-year employment as marine surveyor of Newfoundland, he was at length appointed to conduct a British expedition of geographical exploration in the South Seas. Three such expeditions he actually made, and his discoveries, combined with remarkable powers of leadership,

**The Ex-
plorations
of Captain
Cook**

NOTE. The picture opposite is a portrait of Captain James Cook, from a painting by Nathaniel Dance (1735-1811), now in the Gallery of Greenwich Hospital, England.

observation, and description, entitle him to rank as one of the greatest explorers of all time and incidentally as one of the master-builders of the British Empire.

On his first voyage (1768-1770), Cook visited Tahiti, explored the Friendly Islands, circumnavigated and charted the shore of New Zealand, and, proceeding to "New Holland," surveyed its whole east coast with minute care and rechristened it "New South Wales." Landing at Botany Bay (near the site of present-day Sydney), he took formal possession of it for Great Britain. On his second voyage (1772-1775), he revisited Australia and New Zealand, discovered New Caledonia, and by sailing completely around the southern hemisphere (south of Australia, Africa, and South America) convinced himself of the fact that there was no continent in the south seas—no "Terra Australis"—except that which the Dutch had called "New Holland" and which he had renamed "New South Wales." On his third voyage (1776-1779), Cook rediscovered the Hawaiian islands, which had been visited by Spaniards in the sixteenth century but which had since been forgotten; he called them the Sandwich Islands, in honor of the English nobleman who was then chief of the British navy. After cruising in the northern Pacific and exploring the straits between Siberia and Alaska, Cook returned to Hawaii and was killed in a skirmish with its natives in 1779. The British government never gave to James Cook the recognition and honor which he merited both as a man of science and as the pioneer of British imperialism in the South Seas.

The British government was not slow, however, to exploit the discoveries of Cook. In 1786 the eastern half of Australia was formally erected as the British territory of New South Wales, and in 1788 the first British settlement was made near Botany Bay at a point called Port Jackson and now known as Sydney. This first settlement was of convicts, and New South Wales served for fifty years as a kind of open-air prison for British criminals. With criminals, however, an increasing number of venturesome freemen went out from Great Britain and settled in Australia, and gradually, in the early part of the nineteenth century New South Wales was subdivided. Van Diemen's Land, originally settled at Hobart in 1803 as a subcolony of convicts, was separated from

**British
Occupation of
Australia**

New South Wales in 1825 and subsequently became the self-governing colony of Tasmania. The town of Brisbane was founded in 1825, Melbourne in 1835, and Adelaide in 1836; these towns subsequently became the respective capitals of the colonies of Queensland, Victoria, and South Australia, which in turn were detached from New South Wales. In the meantime, western Australia had been appropriated as a new British colony (1829) and settlements had been effected in it at Albany (1826) and Perth (1829). In New Zealand, English Protestant missionaries established themselves in 1814, but the immigration of British colonists and the formation of British government did not begin until about 1840.

British
Establish-
ment in
New
Zealand

At any rate, it was obvious by the close of the eighteenth century that Great Britain was gaining, while other European powers were losing, in the race for colonial dominion and commercial supremacy throughout the non-European world. Britain, if forced to part with thirteen of her oldest colonies in North America, was vigorously extending her sway in Canada, in the West Indies, in India, in South Africa, in the Straits Settlements, in Australia, and in islands scattered over the seas and oceans. Thanks to the maritime decline of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and France—a decline which Britain had materially assisted and speeded—she was already in possession of an empire wider, richer, and more diverse than that of a Cæsar or an Alexander. Already it promised to spread the English language and the English nation as no other tongue or tribe had ever spread.

Even more important than the vast land empire which Great Britain was erecting was the command of the sea which she was clearly securing against all rivals. Already her navy was the most powerful in the world. It was enabling her armed forces to seize whatever foreign coastal stations seemed to block or threaten her commercial routes. It was likewise enabling her merchant ships to supplant on the high seas many a merchantman of Spaniard, Netherlander, or Frenchman and to obtain the lion's share of the carrying trade, not only between Britain and her overseas colonies, but between Europe and the rest of the world.

With the expansion of British trade went an astounding growth

of British capitalism. By the eighteenth century London was supplanting Amsterdam as the chief banking centre of the world. The Bank of England, established originally in 1694 and re-chartered on a broader basis in 1709, speedily became the foremost financial institution. Numerous private banks were founded, including the famous Barclay's (early in the eighteenth century) and Lloyd's (in 1765). The London clearing house was organized about the middle of the century, and the London stock exchange in 1773. Some of the immediate effects of this growth of British capitalism are discussed in the following chapter. (See below, pp. 465-469.)

From her dominions beyond the seas and from her ships upon the seas Great Britain drew ever increasing power and prestige. British merchants grew wealthy, with resulting social and political significance to themselves and to their country. And British capitalism received that final stimulation which prepared the way for the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and for the evolution of our strictly contemporary civilization.



PART III
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTS
OF THE MODERN WORLD

- X. THE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS
- XI. THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION
- XII. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
- XIII. THE ERA OF NAPOLEON
- XIV. THE ERA OF METTERNICH

CHAPTER X

THE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS

I. REACTION TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY



MONARCHY was the prevalent political institution in Europe in early modern times. Profiting from the breakdown of medieval feudal institutions in the fifteenth century, it was both quickened and solidified in the sixteenth century by nationalist developments, by the vogue of such political theories as those advanced by Machiavelli, and by the immediate outcome of the economic, religious, and military upheavals in western Christendom. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was generally thought natural and desirable that each country should be ruled by a monarch possessing the right, presumably conferred upon him by God, to administer justice, command an army, wage war, make peace, levy taxes, regulate trade and industry, and determine the religion and the individual and social privileges of all his subjects.

Prevalence
of Absolute
Monarchy in
the Seventeenth
Century

Such was the meaning of absolute monarchy in France under the Bourbons, in Spain under both Habsburgs and Bourbons, in Austria and its enlarging dependencies, in the Scandinavian realms of Sweden and Denmark, in the petty principalities of Germany and Italy. It was for the firm establishment of absolute monarchy in Prussia that the Great Elector and his Hohenzollern successors labored. It was in conscious imitation of the prevalent political practice of western Europe that Peter the Great imposed absolute monarchy on Russia.

There were some protests and movements against the new political order, but in the main they were unsuccessful. One of the earliest and most famous was the rebellion of the Netherlanders in the sixteenth century against their monarch, Philip II of Spain. Even here, however, the southern Netherlanders returned fairly soon to their traditional allegiance, and

during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they submitted without serious dissent to the absolutist sovereigns, first of Spain and then of Austria. The northern Netherlanders—the Dutchmen—did obtain national independence, it is true, and during the seventeenth century they afforded to Europe the spectacle of a “republic” in which supreme political power was exercised by a parliament—the states general—and under which there was a greater degree of personal liberty and material well-being than could be found in any neighboring absolute monarchy. Nevertheless, there was chronic friction in Holland between supporters of the aristocratic parliament and advocates of a more centralized and absolutist régime under the stadholder-prince of the Orange family. The latter gradually gained ground, as the parliamentary system proved ineffectual against the aggression of foreign monarchs and the loss of overseas colonies and commerce.¹ By the latter part of the eighteenth century it seemed almost certain that the Dutch republic would finally be replaced by an absolute monarchy modelled after that of Prussia.

**Temporary
Repudia-
tion of
Absolute
Monarchy
in the
Dutch
Nether-
lands**

Early in the seventeenth century the Czechs of Bohemia undertook to depose their monarch, Ferdinand II, to reassert the authority of their parliament, and to choose their own king. The Czech rebellion, as we have seen, was promptly suppressed;² it only served to precipitate the ‘Thirty Years’ War, which in turn contributed to the strengthening of absolute monarchy in all the states of the Holy Roman Empire.

**Attempted
Repudia-
tion of
Absolute
Monarchy
in
Bohemia**

In Poland, there was steady progress during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries away from the theory of absolute

¹ The parliamentary government of the Dutch republic reached its highest development under John DeWitt, who served as “grand pensioner of the states of Holland” from 1653 to 1672. The French invasion in 1672 led to the killing of DeWitt by his infuriated compatriots and a great access of power to the stadholder, William III, great-grandson of William the Silent. See above, p. 300. After the death of William III in 1702 there was a revival of parliamentary influence, but in 1747, in the midst of new international complications, a cousin of William III was made “hereditary stadholder, captain and admiral-general” as William IV. Thereafter, in fact if not in name, Holland was a monarchy.

² See above, pp. 264–265. Immediately following the Thirty Years’ War, an attempt was made in France to limit monarchy, but the so-called Fronde was repressed by Cardinal Mazarin. On the Fronde, see above, pp. 288–290.

monarchy and toward the establishment of a political régime in which the king was an elected figure-head and the parliament a jealous custodian of the liberties of nobility, church, and towns. But, as we have pointed out elsewhere,¹ Poland presented too extreme an exception to the contemporary political tenets of Europe and she was too closely bordered by countries of exactly opposite tendencies. The outcome was the three partitions of Poland in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Polish republic ceased to be and the Polish people were distributed among the absolute monarchs of Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

Repudia-
tion of
Absolute
Monarchy
in Poland,
and Its
Fatal Con-
sequences

Thus it transpired that by the eighteenth century there remained no trace of reaction against royal absolutism in Bohemia, and what there had been in Poland and in the northern Netherlands was forcefully terminated or bade fair to disappear. In one country of Europe—in only one—was there evidence of successful and seemingly permanent reaction against the theory and practice of monarchical absolutism. This country was Great Britain. Britain, without being fully aware of it at the time, was to inaugurate, by political revolution, the whole series of revolutions that constitute the motive force of much of our present dynamic civilization.

Unique
Character
of British
Political
Develop-
ment

At the beginning of modern times, Britain gave no sign of ability or willingness to play a unique political rôle in Europe or in the world. In Scotland there were unruly nobles and in England there was a nominal parliament. But neither kingdom was unique in these respects, and both possessed monarchs who vied with monarchs on the Continent in ambitious absolutist designs. Indeed, in England absolute monarchy developed earlier than in France. In the sixteenth century—the very century in which the French sovereigns had to deal with grave civil wars and with serious checks upon their authority—the Tudor rulers of England were rapidly freeing themselves from dependence upon parliament and were commanding the united support of the English nation. From the accession of Henry VII in 1485 to the death of his granddaughter Elizabeth in 1603, the strong hand of the English monarch was laid successively

¹ See above, pp. 376-377.

upon the commerce, industry, justice, religion, and finance of the country.¹ These Tudor sovereigns subdued sedition, fostered prosperity, repelled the armada. They faithfully personified national patriotism, and the English nation, particularly its growing middle class, extolled them. •

Yet, despite this monarchical tradition of more than a century's duration, England was destined in the seventeenth century to witness a long bitter struggle between royal and parliamentary factions, the beheading of one king and the exiling of another, and in the end the irrevocable rejection of the theory and practice of absolute monarchy. This was to happen at the very time when Louis XIV was holding majestic court at Versailles and all the lesser princes on the Continent were zealously patterning their proud words and boastful deeds after the model of the Grand Monarch. In that day a mere parliament was to become dominant in England.

The death of Elizabeth, the last of the Tudors, and the accession (1603) of her cousin James, the first of the Stuarts, marked the real beginning of the struggle. When he was but a year old, this James had acquired through the deposition of his unfortunate mother, Mary Stuart, the crown of Scotland (1567), and had been proclaimed James VI in that disorderly and distracted country.² The boy who was whipped by his tutor and kidnapped by his barons and browbeaten by Presbyterian divines learned to rule Scotland with a rod of iron and incidentally acquired such astonishing erudition, especially in theology, that the clever King Henry IV of France called him "the wisest fool in Christendom." At the age of thirty-seven, this Scot succeeded to the throne of England as James I.

James was not content, like his Tudor predecessors, merely to be an absolute ruler in practice; he insisted also upon the complete theory of monarchical absolutism. Such a theory had been carefully worked out by the pedantic Stuart king eighty years before Bishop Bossuet wrote his classic treatise on divine right monarchy for the guidance of the young son of Louis XIV.³ To James it seemed quite clear that God had divinely ordained kings to rule, for had not Saul been anointed by Jehovah's

¹ See above, pp. 28-30, 170-176, 251-254.

³ See above, p. 291.

² See above, pp. 167-169, 252.

**James I
and the
Assertion
of Royal
Absolut-
ism in
Britain**

prophet, had not Peter and Paul urged Christians to obey their masters, and had not Christ Himself said, "Render unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's"? As the father corrects his children, so should the king correct his subjects. As the head directs the hands and feet, so must the king direct the members of the body politic. Royal power is thus the most natural and the most effective instrument for suppressing anarchy and rebellion. James I summarized his idea of government in the famous Latin epigram "*a deo rex, a rege lex*,"—"the king is from God, and law from the king."

It has been remarked already¹ that in one important respect the past governmental evolution of England differed from that of France. While both countries in the sixteenth century followed absolutist tendencies, in France the medieval tradition of constitutional limitations upon the power of the king was weaker than in England.

The tradition of English restrictions upon royal power centred in the old document of *Magna Carta* and in a medieval institution called parliament. *Magna Carta* dated back, almost four centuries before King James, to the year 1215 when King John had been compelled by his rebellious barons to sign a long list of promises. This list was the "long charter" or *Magna Carta*,² and it was important in three respects. (1) It served as a constant reminder that "the people" of England had once risen in arms to defend their "rights" against a despotic king, although as a matter of fact *Magna Carta* was more concerned with the rights of the feudal nobles (the *bārōns*) and of the clergy than with the rights of the common people. (2) Its most important provisions, by which the king could not levy extraordinary taxes on the nobles without the consent of the Great Council, furnished something of a basis for the idea of self-taxation. (3) Clauses such as "To no man will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice," although never strictly enforced, might be utilized as precedents for the restriction of royal power in the administration of justice. //

The English parliament was a more or less representative assembly of clergy, nobility, and commoners, claiming to have powers of taxation and legislation. There had been an advisory

¹ See above, pp. 31, 280-281.

² *Magna Carta* was many times reissued after 1215.

The English Tradition of Magna Carta

body of prelates and lords even before the Norman conquest (1066). After the conquest a somewhat similar assembly of the

**The Eng-
lish Par-
liament** king's chief feudal vassals—lay and ecclesiastical—had been called the Great Council, and its right to resist unjust taxation had been recognized by *Magna Carta*.

In 1254 the king had summoned to the Great Council, or parliament, not only the bishops, abbots, earls, and barons, but also two knights from every shire. Then, in an irregular parliament, convened in 1265 by Simon de Montfort, a great baronial leader against the king, two burgesses from each of twenty-one towns for the first time had sat with the others and helped to decide how their liberties were to be safeguarded. Similar bodies had met repeatedly in the next thirty years, and in 1295 Edward I had called a "model parliament" of archbishops, bishops, abbots, representative clergy, earls, and barons, two knights from every shire, and two citizens from each privileged city or borough,—more than four hundred in all.

For some time after 1295 the clergy, nobility, and commoners¹ may have deliberated separately much as did the three "estates" in France. At any rate, early in the fourteenth century the lesser clergy dropped out, the greater prelates and nobles were fused into one body—the House of "Lords spiritual and temporal,"—and the knights joined the burgesses to form the House of Commons. Parliament was henceforth a bicameral body, consisting of a House of Commons and a House of Lords.

The primary function of parliament was to give information to the king and to hear and grant his requests for new "subsidies" or direct taxes. The right to refuse grants was gradually assumed and legally recognized. As the taxes on the middle class soon exceeded those on the clergy and nobility, it became customary in the fifteenth century for money bills to be introduced in the Commons, approved by the Lords, and signed by the king.

The right to make laws had always been a royal prerogative, in theory at least. Parliament, however, soon utilized its financial control in order to obtain initiative in legislation. A threat of withholding subsidies had been an effective way of forcing Henry III to confirm *Magna Carta* in 1225; it proved no less effective in securing royal enactment of later "petitions" for laws. In the fifteenth century legislation by "petition" was supplanted

¹ *I.e.*, the knights of the shires and the burgesses from the towns.

by legislation by "bill," that is, by introducing in either house of parliament measures which, in form and language, were complete statutes and which became such by the united assent of Commons, Lords, and king. To this day English laws have continued to be made formally "by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same."

The right to demand an account of expenditures, to cause the removal of royal officers, to request the king to abandon unpopular policies, or otherwise to control administrative affairs, had occasionally been asserted by parliament, but not consistently maintained.

From what has been said, it will now be clear that the fulcrum of parliamentary power was control of finance. What had enabled the Tudors to incline toward absolutism was the fact that for more than a hundred years they had made themselves fairly independent of parliament in matters of finance. This they had done by means of economy, by careful collection of taxes, by irregular expedients, by confiscation of religious property, and by tampering with the currency. Parliament still met, but it met irregularly, and during Elizabeth's reign it was in session on the average only three or four weeks of the year. Parliament still transacted business, but rarely differed with the monarch on matters of importance.

At the end of the Tudor period, then, we have a medieval tradition of constitutional, parliamentary government on the one hand, and a strong, practical, royal power on the other. The conflict between parliament and king, which had been avoided by the tactful Tudors, soon began in earnest when James I ascended the throne in 1603, with his exaggerated notion of his own authority. James I was an extravagant monarch, and needed parliamentary subsidies, yet his own principles prevented him from humoring parliament in any dream of power. The inevitable result was a conflict for political supremacy between parliament and king. When parliament refused him money, James resorted to the imposition of customs duties, grants of monopolies, sale of peerages, and the solicitation of "benevolences" (forced loans). Parliament promptly protested against such practices, as well as

—The Conflict between King and Parliament

against his foreign and religious policies and against his absolute control of the appointment and operation of the judiciary. Parliament's protests only increased the wrath of the king. The noisiest parliamentarians were imprisoned or sent home with royal scoldings. In 1621 the Commons entered in their journal a "great protestation" against the king's interference with their right to discuss the affairs of the realm. This so angered the king that he tore the protestation out of the journal and presently dissolved the intractable parliament. But the quarrel continued, and James's last parliament had the audacity to impeach his lord treasurer.

The political dispute was complicated and embittered by a religious conflict. James, educated as a devout Anglican, was naturally inclined to uphold the compromise by which the Tudors had retained the episcopal organization and many of the ceremonies of the Catholic Church and yet had repudiated the papacy and subordinated the bishops to the crown. This compromise did not suit all Englishmen, however. At one extreme was a dwindling number of Catholics. At the other, was a growing number of Protestants who inclined toward the teachings of Calvin or of even more radical leaders.¹

Already, during the reign of Elizabeth, these Radical English Protestants comprised an influential part of the middle class—the townsmen especially—and many of the lower clergy. They were characterized (1) by a virulent hatred for even the most trivial forms reminiscent of "popery," as they termed the Catholic religion; and (2) by a tendency to place emphasis upon the spirit of the Old Testament quite as much as upon the precepts of the New. Along with austerity of manner, speech, dress, and fast-day observance, they revived much of the mercilessness with which the Israelites had conquered Canaan. The same men who held it a deadly sin to dance round a may-pole or to hang out holly on Christmas were later to experience a fierce and exalted pleasure in conquering New England from the heathen Indians. They knew neither self-indulgence nor tolerance for others. Little wonder that Elizabeth feared men of such mold and used the episcopal administration of the Anglican Church to restrain them. Many of these so-called Puritans remained members of

¹ See above, pp. 168, 176, 180.

The Conflict Complicated by Rise of Radical Protestantism

the Anglican Church and sought to reform it from within. But restraint only incited the more radical to condemn altogether the fabric of bishops and archbishops. Some strove to transform the Anglican Church into a Presbyterian Church similar to that in Scotland. Others went still farther and attempted to create independent religious congregations, quite separate from the Anglican Church; whence they were called Congregationalists, or Independents, or Separatists.

The
Puritans

These religious radicals, often grouped together as "Puritans," were continually working against Elizabeth's strict enforcement of Anglican orthodoxy. The accession of James was seized by them as an occasion for the presentation of a great petition for a modification of church government and ritual. The petition bore no fruit, however, and in a religious debate at Hampton Court in 1604 James made a brusque declaration that bishops like kings were set over the multitude by the hand of God, and, as for these Puritans who would do away with bishops, he would make them conform or "harry them out of the land." From this time forth he insisted on conformity, and deprived many clergymen of their offices for refusing to subscribe to the regulations framed in 1604.

The hard rule of this monarch who claimed to govern by the will of God was rendered even more abhorrent to the stern Puritan moralists by reports of "drunken orgies" and horrible vices which made his royal court appear to be a veritable den of Satan. But worst of all was his suspected leaning toward "popery." The Puritans had a passionate hatred for anything that even remotely suggested Roman Catholic Christianity. Consequently it was not with pleasure that they viewed a king whose mother had been a Catholic, whose wife was suspected of harboring a priest, a ruler who at times openly exerted himself to obtain greater toleration for Catholics and to maintain the Anglican ritual against Puritan modification. With growing alarm and resentment they learned that Catholic conspirators had plotted to blow up the houses of parliament, and that in his foreign policy James was decidedly friendly to Catholic princes.

The cardinal points of James's foreign policy,—union with Scotland, peace, and a Spanish alliance,—were all calculated to arouse antagonism. The English, having for centuries nourished

enmity toward their northern neighbors and perceiving no apparent advantage in close union, defeated the project of amalgamating the two kingdoms of England and Scotland. James's policy of non-intervention in the Bohemian revolt against Austria evoked bitter criticism; he was accused of favoring the Catholics and of deserting his son-in-law, the Protestant elector of the Palatinate.¹

The most hotly contested point was, however, the Spanish policy. Time and time again, parliament protested, but James pursued his plans, making peace with Spain, and negotiating for a marriage between his son Charles and a Spanish princess. Prince Charles actually went to Spain to court the daughter of Philip III.²

The strength of the Puritans resided in the commercial middle class. It was this class which had profited by the war with Spain in the days of "good Queen Bess" when many a Spanish prize, laden with silver and dye woods, had been towed into Plymouth harbor. Their dreams of erecting an English colonial and commercial empire on the ruins of Spain's appeared to be doomed by James. By his Spanish policy, as well as by his irregular methods of taxation, James thus touched the Puritans in their pocket-books. The Puritans were grieved to see so sinful a man sit on the throne of England, and so wasteful a man squander their money. They were even hindered in the exercise of their religious convictions. Every fibre in them rebelled.

Now it so happened that the majority of members of the House of Commons—the burgesses from the towns and some of the country squires—were of Puritan conviction or sympathy. Naturally, therefore, the mass of Puritans throughout the country supported the claims and pretensions of parliament, and the parliamentary struggle against the king became, then, not only a defense of abstract political ideals but also a bitter battle in defense of class interests and in furtherance of Puritanism. Parliamentary traditions were weapons against an oppressive monarch; religious scruples gave divine sanction to an attack on royalist bishops; consciousness of being God's elect gave confidence to the revolutionaries. Everything was in readiness for a bitter political and religious struggle in England when James I died and was succeeded by his son, Charles I (1625-1649).

¹ See above, p. 265.

² See above, pp. 260, 388.

For a time it appeared as if the second Stuart king would be very popular. Unlike his father, Charles seemed thoroughly English; and his athletic frame, his dignified manners, and his purity of life contrasted most favorably with Charles I James's deformities in character and physique. Two years before his father's death Charles had been jilted by his Spanish fiancée and had returned to England amid wild rejoicing to aid parliament in demanding war with Spain. He had again rejoiced the bulk of the English nation by solemnly assuring parliament on the occasion of his marriage contract with Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII of France (and aunt of Louis XIV), that he would grant no concessions to Catholics in England.

As a matter of fact, Charles simultaneously but secretly assured the French government not only that he would allow the queen the free exercise of her religion but that he would make general concessions to English Catholics. This duplicity on the part of the young king, which augured ill for the harmony of future relations between himself and parliament, throws a flood of light upon his character and policies. Though Charles was sincerely religious and well-intentioned, he was as devoted to the theory of absolute monarchy as his father had been; and as to the means which he might employ in order to establish absolutism upon a firm foundation he honestly believed himself responsible only to God and to his own conscience, certainly not to parliament. This fact, together with a certain inherent aptitude for shirking the settlement of difficulties, explains in large part the faults which historians have usually ascribed to him—his meanness and ingratitude toward his most devoted followers, his chronic obstinacy which only feigned compliance, and his incurable untruthfulness.

Just before Charles came to the throne, parliament granted subsidies in expectation of war against Spain, but when the king had used up the war-money without showing any serious inclination to open hostilities with Spain, and had then demanded additional grants, parliament gave evidence of its growing distrust by limiting a levy of customs duties to one year, instead of granting it as usual for the whole reign. In view of the increasingly obstinate temper manifested by the House of Commons in withholding subsidies and in assailing his worthless favorite, the duke

Contin-
uing
Conflict
between
King and
Parlia-
ment

of Buckingham, Charles angrily dissolved his first parliament.

The difficulties of the administration were augmented not only by this arbitrary treatment of parliament but also by the miserable failure of an English fleet sent against Cadiz, and by the humiliating result of an attempt to relieve the French Huguenots.¹ Meanwhile, a second parliament, more intractable even than its predecessor, had been dissolved for insisting on the impeachment of Buckingham. Attempts to raise money by forced loans in place of taxes failed to remove the financial distress into which Charles had fallen, and consequently, in 1628, he consented to summon a third parliament. In return for grants of subsidies, he signed the *Petition of Right* (1628), prepared by the two houses. By it he promised not to levy taxes without the consent of parliament, not to quarter soldiers in private houses, not to establish martial law in time of peace, not to order arbitrary imprisonment.

Even these concessions were not enough. Parliament again demanded the removal of Buckingham, and only the assassination of the unpopular minister obviated prolonged dispute on the matter. The Commons next attempted to check the unauthorized collection of customs duties, which produced as much as one fourth of the total royal revenue, and to prevent the introduction of "popish" ceremonies in the Anglican Church, but for this trouble they were sent home.

Charles was now so thoroughly disgusted with parliament that he determined to rule without it. For eleven years (1629-1640), in spite of financial and religious difficulties, he carried on a "personal" as distinct from a parliamentary government.

Without the consent of parliament, Charles was bound not to levy direct taxes. During the period of his personal rule, therefore, he was compelled to adopt all sorts of expedients to replenish his treasury. He revived old feudal laws and collected fines for their infraction. A sum of one hundred thousand pounds was gained by fines on suburban householders who had dis-

¹ See above, p. 283.

NOTE. The portrait opposite, of King James I, is from an engraving by Pieter de Jode (1570-1634), a Dutch artist who was in London at the time of James's coronation as king of England.


A^o 1603.

ÆTATIS SVÆ

37.



IACOBVS VI. SCOTLÆ REX, ET PRIMVS EO NOMINE ANGLIÆ
FRANCIÆ, ET HIBERNIÆ MAXIMO APPLAVSV ELECTVS REX &c.



obeyed a proclamation of James I forbidding the extension of London. The royal courts levied enormous fines merely for the sake of revenue. Monopolies of wine, salt, soap, and other articles were sold to companies for large sums of money; but the high prices charged by the companies caused much popular discontent.

The most obnoxious of all devices for obtaining funds was the levy of "ship-money." Claiming that it had always been the duty of seaboard towns to equip ships for the defense of the country, Charles demanded that since they no longer built ships, these towns should contribute money for the maintenance of the navy. In 1634, therefore, each seaboard town was ordered to pay a specified amount of "ship-money" into the royal treasury, and the next year the tax was extended to inland towns and counties.¹ To test the legality of this exaction, a certain John Hampden refused to pay his twenty shillings' ship-money, and took the matter to court, claiming that the tax was illegal. The majority of the judges, who held office during the king's pleasure and were therefore strictly under royal influence, upheld the legality of ship-money and even went so far as to assert that in times of emergency the king's prerogative was unlimited, but the Puritan part of the country rang with protests and Hampden was hailed as a hero.

Opposition to financial exactions continued to go hand in hand with bitter religious disputes. Charles had entrusted the conduct of religious affairs to William Laud, a high-church Anglican, whom he named archbishop of Canterbury. The laws against Catholics were relaxed, and the restrictions on Puritans increased. It seemed as if Charles and his bishops were bent upon goading the Puritans to fury, at the very time when one by one the practices, the vestments, and even the dogmas of the Catholic Church were being reintroduced into the Anglican Church, when the tyrannical King James was declared to have been divinely inspired, and when Puritan clergymen were forced to read from their pulpits a royal declaration permitting the "sin-

¹ The first writ of ship-money yielded £100,000.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Trial of Archbishop Laud in the House of Lords," is from an engraving by Wenceslaus Hollar (1607-1677), a Czech artist who settled in England and observed many of the stirring scenes of the Puritan Revolution.

ful" practices of dancing on the green or shooting at the butts (targets) on the Sabbath.¹ So hard was the lot of the Radical Protestants in England that thousands fled the country and established themselves in America.²

In his Scottish policy Charles overreached himself. With the zealous cooperation of Archbishop Laud, he imprudently attempted to transform the Calvinistic Presbyterian Church of Scotland into an Episcopal Church, patterned after the Anglican Church in organization and ritual. Thereupon the angry Scottish Presbyterians signed a great covenant, swearing to defend their religion (1638); they deposed the bishops set over them by the king and rose in revolt. Failing in a first effort to crush the rebellion in Scotland, the king summoned another English parliament in order to secure financial support for an adequate royal army. This parliament—the so-called Short Parliament—was dissolved, however, after some three weeks of bootless wrangling. Still unable to check the advance of the rebellious Scots into northern England, Charles in desperation convoked (1640) a new parliament, which, by reason of its extended duration (1640-1660), has been commonly called the Long Parliament. In England and Scotland absolute monarchy faced a crisis—and revolution. -

2. THE PURITAN REVOLUTION AND THE RESTORATION

Confident that Charles could neither fight nor buy off the Scots without parliamentary subsidies, the Long Parliament showed a decidedly stubborn spirit. Its leader, John Pym, a country gentleman already famous for his speeches against despotism, openly maintained that in the House of Commons resided supreme authority to disregard ill-advised acts of the upper house or of the king. Hardly less radical were the views of John Hampden and of Oliver Cromwell, the future dictator of England.

¹ It is an interesting if not a significant fact that the Puritans with their austere views about observance of the Sabbath not only decreased the number of holidays for workingmen, but interfered with innocent recreation on the remaining day of rest. One aspect of the resulting monotonous life of the laborer was, according to Cunningham, the remarkable increase of drunkenness in England at this period.

² In the decade 1630-1640 some 20,000 Englishmen sailed for the colonies. Most if not all of them had economic as well as religious reasons for emigrating. See above, pp. 389-390, 396.

The right of the Commons to impeach ministers of state, asserted under James I, was now used to send to the Tower both Archbishop Laud and Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, who, since 1629, had been the king's most valued and enthusiastically loyal minister.¹ The special tribunals—the Court of High Commission, the Court of Star Chamber, and others,—which had served to convict important ecclesiastical and political offenders, were abolished. No more irregular financial expedients, such as the imposition of ship-money, were to be employed, without the sanction of parliament. As if this were not enough to curb the king, the royal prerogative of dissolving parliament was abrogated, and by a “triennial act” it was provided that parliament must meet at least every three years.

All the contested points of government had been decided adversely to the king. But his position was now somewhat stronger. He had been able to raise money, the Scottish invaders had turned back, and the House of Commons had shown itself to be badly divided on the question of church reform and in its debates on the publication of a “grand remonstrance”—a document exposing the grievances of the nation and apologizing for the acts of parliament. Moreover, a rebellion had broken out in Ireland and Charles expected to be put at the head of an army for its suppression. With this much in his favor, the king in person entered the House of Commons and attempted to arrest five of its leaders. He was met with angry protests, however, and his action precipitated open hostility between him and his House of Commons. The latter now proceeded to pass ordinances without the royal seal, and to issue a call to arms. The levy of troops contrary to the king's will was a revolutionary act. Whereupon, Charles raised the royal standard at Nottingham and called his loyal subjects to suppress threatened rebellion. The issue was squarely joined between absolute monarchy and the revolutionary forces of parliament and puritanism.

The Outbreak of Civil War in England

To the king's standard rallied most of the nobles, the high-church Anglicans, the Catholics, many country “squires,” and all

¹ Strafford was accused of treason, but his execution in 1641 was in pursuance of a special “bill of attainder” enacted by parliament. Laud was put to death in 1645.

those who disliked the austere morals and pious manners of the Puritans. In opposition to him were a few great earls and a large part of the Puritan middle classes—small landholders, merchants, manufacturers, shop-keepers, especially in London and other busy towns throughout the south and east of England. The close-cropped heads of these “God-fearing” commoners won them the nickname “Round-heads,” while the royalist upper classes, not thinking it a sinful vanity to wear their hair in long curls, were called “Cavaliers.”

In the Long Parliament there was a predominance of Presbyterians—that group of Puritans midway between the reforming Episcopalians and the radical Independents. Accordingly a “solemn league and covenant” was formed (1643) with the Scottish Presbyterians for the establishment of religious uniformity on a Presbyterian basis in England and Ireland as well as in Scotland. Then the parliamentary army moved against King Charles and defeated him at Marston Moor (1644). At once the Presbyterian majority in Parliament abolished the office of bishop, decreed the removal of altars and communion rails from the churches, and tolerated the smashing of crucifixes, images, and stained-glass windows. Satisfied with their work, the Presbyterians seemed willing to make peace with the king and to restore him to his office, provided he would give permanence to their religious settlement.

The Puritan army, however, was growing restive. Oliver Cromwell, an Independent, ~~had organized~~ a cavalry regiment of “honest sober Christians” who were fined 12 pence if they swore, who charged in battle while “singing psalms,” and who went about the business of killing their enemies in a pious and prayerful manner—but highly effective withal. Indeed, so successful were Cromwell’s “Ironsides” that a considerable part of the parliamentary army was reorganized on his plan. The “New Model” army, as it was termed, was Independent in sympathy; it was almost as hostile to Presbyterianism as to high-church Anglicanism, and it would agree to no compromise between parliament and the king.

The “New Model” army, under the command of Fairfax and Cromwell, persevered in revolution and in vigorous campaigning against the royalists. It defeated Charles I decisively at Naseby

(1645) and obliged him to surrender in the following year. Then, after some hesitation, the leaders of the New Model army turned against the irresolute Presbyterian majority in parliament. A certain Colonel Pride was stationed with his soldiers at the door of the House of Commons and ordered to "purge" the House of its 143 Presbyterian members. This he did (1648) in soldierly fashion, leaving the Independent minority—some sixty members—to deliberate alone upon the nation's weal. This "rump," or sitting part of parliament, acting on its own authority, appointed a "high court of justice" by whose sentence Charles I was beheaded, 30 January, 1649. It then decreed England to be a Commonwealth with neither king nor House of Lords.¹

Execution
of
Charles I

The executive functions, hitherto exercised by the king, were vested in a Council of State, of whose forty-one members thirty were members of the House. The Rump Parliament, instead of calling for new elections, as had been expected, continued to sit as the "representatives of the people," although they represented the sentiments of only a small fraction of the people. England was in the hands of a Radical Puritan oligarchy.

The Com-
mon-
wealth

Menacing conditions confronted the revolutionary Commonwealth. In England, unrest and mutiny showed that the execution of Charles I had infused new life into the royalists. In Scotland, outraged Presbyterians joined with Anglicans in flocking to the support of Charles's son, whom they proclaimed as Charles II. In Ireland, the Catholic majority were in open and seemingly successful rebellion. Under these circumstances, the Commonwealth would have perished but for three sources of strength. (1) Its financial resources proved adequate; customs duties were collected, excise taxes on drinks and food were levied, and confiscated royalist estates were sold. (2) Its enemies had no disciplined armies. (3) Its own army was remarkably powerful.

Cromwell, with his fanatical soldiers, promptly crossed to Ireland and won a series of bloody engagements. After wreaking dire

¹ Baron Fairfax (1612-1671), a Puritan nobleman and competent soldier, was commander-in-chief of the parliamentary army until the capture of Charles I. He was opposed to the execution of the king and in 1650 was succeeded in supreme command by Cromwell.

vengeance on the defeated Irish and shipping many prisoners as slaves to Barbados, he was able to return to London in 1650, declaring, "I am persuaded that this is a righteous judgment of God upon these barbarous wretches [the Irish] who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood, and that it will tend to prevent the effusion of blood for the future." The next move of Cromwell, as parliamentary commander-in-chief, was against the Scots. He annihilated their scattered forces, and compelled Prince Charles to take refuge in France.

Meanwhile the members of the Rump, still the nominal rulers of England, finding opportunity for personal profit in the sale of royalist lands and in the administration of finance, had exasperated Cromwell by their maladministration and their neglect of the public welfare. The life of the Rump was temporarily prolonged, however, by the popularity of its legislation against the Dutch, at this time the chief rivals of England on the seas and in the colonies.¹ In 1651 the Rump passed the first Navigation Act, forbidding the importation of goods from Asia, Africa, or America, except in English or colonial ships, and providing that commodities of European production should be imported only in vessels of England or of the producing country. The framers of the Navigation Act intended thereby to exclude Dutch vessels from trading between England and other lands. The next year a commercial and naval war broke out between England and Holland, leading to no decisive result, but, on the whole, increasing the prestige of the English navy.² With renewed confidence the Rump contemplated perpetuating its narrow oligarchy, but Cromwell's patience was exhausted, and in 1653 he turned it out of doors, declaring, "Your hour is come, the Lord hath done with you!" Cromwell remained as military and religious dictator of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) is the most interesting political figure in seventeenth-century England. Belonging by birth to the class of country gentlemen, his first appearance in public life was in the parliament of 1628 as a pleader for the liberty of Puritan preaching. When the Long Parliament met in 1640, Cromwell, then forty-one years of age, assumed a conspicuous

¹ See above, pp. 393-394.

² See above, p. 394.

Reestablishment of Peace

The Military Dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell

place. His clothes were cheap and homely, "his countenance swollen and reddish, his voice sharp and untuneable," nevertheless his fervid eloquence and energy soon made him "very much hearkened unto." From the Civil War, as we know, Cromwell emerged as the chief military leader, the idol of his soldiers, fearing God but not man. His frequent use of Biblical phrases in ordinary conversation and his manifest confidence that he was performing God's work flowed from an intense religious zeal. He belonged, properly speaking, to the Independents, who believed that each local congregation of Christians should be practically free, excepting that "prelacy" (*i.e.*, the episcopal form of church government) and "popery" (*i.e.*, Catholic Christianity) were not to be tolerated. In private life Cromwell was fond of "honest sport," of music and art. It is said that his gayety when he had "drunken a cup of wine too much" and his taste in statuary shocked his more austere fellow Puritans. In public life he was a man of great forcefulness, occasionally giving way to violent temper. He was a statesman of signal ability, aiming to secure good government and economic prosperity for England and religious freedom for Protestant dissenters.

After arbitrarily dissolving the Rump of the Long Parliament (1653), Cromwell and his Council of State broke with tradition entirely by selecting 140 men on the recommendation of Independent ministers, to constitute a legislative body or convention. This body speedily received the popular appellation of "Barebone's Parliament" after one of its members, a certain leather merchant, who bore the descriptive Puritan name of Praisegod Barebone. The new legislators were good Independents—"faithful, fearing God, and hating covetousness." Their zeal for reform found expression in the reduction of public expenditure, in the equalization of taxes, and in plans for the compilation of a single code of laws; but their radical proposals for civil marriage and for the abolition of tithes startled the clergy and elicited from the larger landowners the cry of "confiscation!" Before much was accomplished, however, "Barebone's Parliament" was induced to "deliver up unto the Lord-General Cromwell the powers we received from him."

Upon the failure of this experiment, Cromwell's supporters in the army prepared an "Instrument of Government," or consti-

tution. By the Instrument of Government—the first written constitution of modern times—a “Protectorate” was established, which was a constitutional monarchy in all but name. Oliver Cromwell, who became “Lord Protector” for life, was to govern with the aid of a small Council of State. Parliaments, meeting at least every three years, were to make laws and levy taxes, the Protector possessing the right to delay, but not to veto, legislation. Puritan Congregationalism was made the state religion.

The Instrument of Government and the Protectorate

The first parliament under the Protectorate was important for three reasons. (1) It consisted of only one House. (2) It was the parliament of Great Britain and Ireland rather than of England alone. (3) Its members were elected on a reformed basis of representation,—that is, the right of representation had been taken from many small places and transferred to more important towns.

Although royalists were excluded from the polls, the Independents were unable to control a majority in the general election. for, it must be remembered, they formed a very small, though a powerful, minority of the population. The Presbyterians controlled the new parliament, and with characteristic stubbornness, they quarrelled with Cromwell, until he abruptly dismissed them (1655). Whereupon Cromwell governed simply as a military dictator, placing England under the rule of his generals, and giving orders to his parliaments. To raise money he obliged all those who had borne arms for the king to pay him ten per cent of their rentals. While permitting his office to be made hereditary, he refused to accept the title of king, but no Stuart monarch had ruled with such absolute power, nor was there much to choose between James’s “*a deo rex, a rege lex*” and Cromwell’s, “If my calling be from God and my testimony from the people, God and the people shall take it from me, else I will not part from it.”

The question is often raised, how Cromwell, representing the numerically insignificant Independents, contrived to maintain himself as absolute ruler of the British Isles. Three circumstances doubtless contributed to his strength. (1) He was the beloved leader of an army respected for its rigid discipline and feared for its mercilessness. (2) Under his strict enforcement of order,

trade and industry throve. (3) His conduct of foreign affairs was both satisfactory to English patriotism and profitable to English purses. Advantageous commercial treaties were made with the Dutch and the French. Industrious Jews were allowed to enter England. Barbary pirates were chastised. In a war against Spain, the army won Dunkirk;¹ and the navy, now becoming truly powerful, sank a Spanish fleet, wrested Jamaica from Spain, and brought home ship-loads of Spanish silver.

The death of Cromwell (1658) left the army without a master and the country without a government. True, Oliver's son, Richard Cromwell, attempted for a time to fill his father's place, but soon abdicated after having lost control of both army and parliament. Army officers restored the Rump of the Long Parliament, dissolved it, set it up again, forced it to recall the Presbyterian members who had been expelled in 1648, and ended by obliging the reconstituted Long Parliament to convoke a new and freely elected "Convention Parliament." Meanwhile, General Monck opened negotiations for the restoration of the Stuart family to the kingship.

Death of Cromwell and Collapse of the Protectorate

In 1660, King Charles II—the son and heir of the beheaded Charles I—disembarked at Dover. His entry into London was a veritable triumph, "the wayes strew'd with flowers, the bells ringing, the streets hung with tapistry, fountaines running with wine."

The Royal Restoration

The exuberant enthusiasm which greeted Charles II was not entirely without causes, social and religious, as well as political. The grievances and ideals which had inspired the Puritan Revolution were being forgotten, and a new generation was finding fault with the Protectorate. The simple country folk longed for their maypoles, their dances, and their games on the green; only fear compelled them to bear the tyranny of sanctimonious soldiers who broke the windows of their churches. Especially hard was the lot of tenants and laborers on the many estates purchased or seized by Puritans during the Revolution. Many townsmen, too, excluded from the ruling oligarchy, found the Puritan government as oppressive and arbitrary as that of Charles I.

The religious situation was especially favorable to Charles II. The outrages committed by Cromwell's soldiery had caused the

¹ See above, p. 270.

Independents to be looked upon as terrible fanatics. Even the Presbyterians were willing to yield some points to the king, if only Independency could be overthrown; and many who had been inclined to Puritanism were now unwavering in loyalty to the Anglican Church. Orthodox Anglicanism, from its origin, had been bound up with the monarchy, and it now consistently contributed to a double triumph of kings and of bishops. Most bitter of all against the Cromwellian régime were the Catholics in Ireland. Though Cromwell as Lord Protector had favored toleration for Protestants, it would be long before Irish Catholics could forget the priests whom Cromwell's soldiery had brutally knocked on the head, or the thousands of girls and boys whom Cromwell's agents had sold into slavery in the West Indies.

This strong royalist undercurrent, flowing from religious and social conditions, makes more comprehensible the ease with which England drifted back into the Stuart monarchy. The younger generation, with no memory of Stuart despotism, and with a keen dislike for the confusion in which no constitutional form was proof against military tyranny, gave ready credence to Prince Charles's promises of constitutional government. There seemed to be little probability that the young monarch would attempt that arbitrary rule which had brought his father's head to the block.

The experiment in Puritan republicanism had resulted only in convincing the majority of the people that "the government is, and ought to be, by King, Lords, and Commons." The people merely asked for some assurances against despotism,—and when a throne was thus to be purchased with promises, Charles II was a ready buyer. He swore to observe *Magna Carta* and the "Petition of Right," to respect parliament, not to interfere with its religious policy, nor to levy illegal taxes. Simultaneously, the Anglican bishops and royalist nobles resumed their offices and lands. Things seemed to slip back into the old grooves. Charles II dated his reign not from his actual accession but from his father's death, and his first parliament declared invalid all those acts and ordinances passed since 1642 which it did not specifically confirm.

3. THE ARISTOCRATIC "GLORIOUS" REVOLUTION

By 1660 one attempt to revolutionize the political system of England had been tried and rejected. Though there had

been widespread opposition in England—and in Scotland too—to absolute monarchy as practiced by James I and Charles I, the ensuing Puritan Revolution had failed to elicit general or permanent approval. The Puritan Revolution had led to a tyrannical military dictatorship which was quite contrary to national traditions. It had been allied with a Radical Protestantism whose fanaticism and sanctimoniousness were repugnant alike to the Presbyterian masses in Scotland, to the Anglican masses in England, and to the Catholic masses in Ireland. It had promoted a process of social levelling—an exalting of the obscure lower middle class—which was peculiarly distasteful not only to the upper class but also to the bulk of the nation that had long been accustomed to defer to titled aristocrats and country squires. Little wonder that the Puritan régime was short-lived and that there was a Restoration.

But what did the Restoration of 1660 restore? It obviously restored the “legitimate” king to the British thrones—though only for a brief space of twenty-eight years. It also restored the monarchy, though not the same old monarchy of pre-Puritan days; talk of “divine right” was somewhat hushed, and parliament was not subservient to king. What, however, was restored in 1660 with all its old splendor of privilege and power was the British aristocracy. The true Restoration was the restoration of the royalist nobles and squires. For nearly two centuries these aristocrats were to possess the deciding voice in British policies. So long as Britain remained largely agricultural, they were able, thanks to their economic influence and social prestige, to constitute or control both houses of parliament and to shape its policies.

**Triumph
of the
Landed
Aristoc-
racy**

The restored aristocrats of 1660 were no more anxious than were the suppressed Puritans that Britain should be an absolute divine-right monarchy. They were royalists, but they were also constitutional royalists; they would honor the king but they would make him do their will. In religious matters most of them were upholders of the established church—Anglican in England, or Presbyterian in Scotland; they were inimical to Radical Protestantism and even more so to Catholicism.

Now it so happened that neither Charles II nor his younger brother and heir, Prince James (duke of York), was in real sympathy with the prevailing political and religious tenets of the

aristocratic class in Britain. Both Stuart princes, cousins on their mother's side of Louis XIV of France, in whose court they had been reared, were more used to the practices of monarchical absolutism in France than to the peculiar developments of parliamentary government in England. And unlike their father, who had been most loyal to the Anglican Church, they had acquired from their foreign environment a strong attachment to the Catholic Church. In these later Stuarts was thus represented a fusion of absolutism with Catholicism. It was a fusion which gave rise to chronic conflict for twenty-eight years between them and their parliaments, and the conflict finally eventuated in a second—and highly successful—attempt, this time jointly by upper and middle classes, Anglicans and nonconformist Protestants, to revolutionize the political system of Britain. A national revolution was to succeed the Puritan Revolution, and it was to be labelled “glorious.” In the meantime, the Stuarts—Charles II and James II—had their innings.

That Charles II (1660-1685) was able to round out a reign of twenty-five years and die a natural death as king of England and Scotland was due not so much to his virtues as to his faults. He was so hypocritical that his real aims were usually concealed. He was so indolent that with some show of right he could blame his ministers and advisers for his own mistakes and misdeeds. He was so selfish that he would make concessions here and there rather than “embark again upon his travels.” In fact, pure selfishness was the basis of his policy in domestic and foreign affairs, but it was a selfishness veiled always in wit, good humor, and captivating affability.

At the beginning of the reign of Charles II, the country gentlemen strengthened their position by securing the parliamentary abolition of the surviving feudal rights by which the king might demand certain specified services from them and certain sums of money when an heiress married or a minor inherited an estate. This action, seemingly insignificant, was in reality of the greatest importance, for it meant the abandonment in England of the feudal theory that land was held by nobles in return for military service, and at the same time it consecrated the newer capitalist principle of private property. The extinction of feudal obligations in the early days of the

**Absolutist
and
Catholic
Ambitions
of the
Restored
Stuarts**

Charles II

**Domestic
Develop-
ments**

Stuart Restoration benefited the landlords primarily, but the annual lump sum of £100,000 which Charles II was given in return, was voted by parliament and was paid by all classes in the form of excise taxes on alcoholic drinks. Customs duties of £4 10s. on every tun of wine and five per cent *ad valorem* on other imports, hearth-money (a tax on houses), and profits on the post office contributed to make up the royal revenue of somewhat less than £1,200,000. This was intended to defray the ordinary expenses of court and government but it seemed insufficient to Charles, who was not only extravagant, but desirous of increasing his power by bribing members of parliament and by maintaining a standing army. The country squires who had sold their plate for the royalist cause back in the 'forties and were now suffering from hard times, thought the court was too extravagant. To this feeling was added fear that Charles might hire foreign soldiers to oppress Englishmen. Consequently parliament grew more parsimonious, and in 1665-1667 claimed a new and important privilege—that of devoting its grants to specific objects and demanding an account of expenditures.

Charles, however, was determined to have money by fair means or foul. A group of London goldsmiths had lent more than a million and a quarter pounds sterling to the government. In 1672 Charles announced that instead of paying the money back, he would consider it a permanent loan. Two years earlier he had signed the secret treaty of Dover (1670) with Louis XIV, by which Louis promised him an annual subsidy of £200,000 and troops in case of rebellion, while Charles was openly to join the Catholic Church and to aid Louis in his French wars against Spain and Holland.¹

In his religious policy, Charles at first had the support of his aristocratic parliament in curbing Radical Protestantism, for the vast majority of English nobles and squires reacted strongly against Puritanism. Some two thousand Puritan clergymen were deprived of their offices by an Act of Uniformity (1662), requiring their assent to the Anglican prayer-book; these dissenting clergymen might not return within five miles of their old churches unless they renounced the "solemn league and covenant" and swore loyalty to the king (Five-Mile

Religious
Policy of
Charles II

¹ Charles II gave aid to Louis XIV (see above, p. 300), but he did not formally join the Catholic Church until 1685 when he was on his death bed.

Act, 1665); for repeated attendance at their meetings (conventicles) dissenters might be condemned to penal servitude in the West Indies (Conventicle Act, 1664); and the Corporation Act of 1661 excluded dissenters from town offices.

Later, however, when Charles II showed that his hostility to Puritanism was conditioned less by love of Anglicanism than by sympathy for Catholicism, Anglicans and Radical Protestants tended to draw together against the royal policy. All Protestant

Renewed Conflict between King and Parliament Britain was scandalized in 1672 by the open conversion of Prince James to the Catholic Church and by the issuance of a "declaration of indulgence" by Charles II, suspending the laws of parliament which oppressed not only dissenters but also Catholics. At the same time it was rumored about that Charles was in the pay of Louis XIV of France, who would aid him in the subversion of Protestantism. Britain was thrown into paroxysms of fear.

The "declaration of indulgence" was denounced as a pro-Catholic document and as a serious infraction of parliamentary authority. The royal right to "suspend" laws upon occasion had undoubtedly been exercised before, but parliament was now strong enough to insist upon the binding force of its enactments and to oblige Charles to withdraw his "indulgence." The fear of Catholicism ever increased. Gentlemen who at other times were quite rational gave unhesitating credence to wild tales of a "popish plot" (1678) and countenanced rabid persecution and judicial murder of several prominent Catholics. In 1679 an Exclusion Bill was brought forward which would debar Prince James from the throne, because of his conversion to Catholicism.

In the excitement over this latest assertion of parliamentary power,¹ the governing aristocracy broke into two factions. One

Whigs and Tories faction, favoring exclusion, was backed by the Puritans and dissenters and was labelled "Whig," a popular word of derision for rebellious Protestants. The other faction, styled "Tory"—the slang word for a "popish" outlaw in Ireland—was more rigidly Anglican and at the same time more moderate in its attitude toward Prince James. The Tories were anxious to preserve the *status quo* in church and

¹ In the course of the debate over exclusion, the parliamentary party won an important concession—the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which was designed to prevent arbitrary imprisonment.

state against Puritans as well as against "papists," but most of all to prevent a recurrence of civil war. In their opinion, the best and most effective safeguard against quarrelling earls and insolent tradesmen was the hereditary monarchy. Better submit to a Catholic sovereign, they said, than invite civil war by disturbing the regular succession. In the contest over the Exclusion Bill, the Tories finally carried the day, for although the bill was passed by the Commons (1680), it was rejected by the House of Lords.

In the last few years of Charles's reign the cause of the Whigs was discredited. Rumors got abroad that they were plotting to assassinate the king and it was said that the Whig nobles who brought armed retainers to parliament were planning to use force to establish Charles's illegitimate son—the Protestant duke of Monmouth—on the throne. These and similar accusations hurt the Whigs, and help to explain the violent Tory reaction which enabled Charles to rule without parliament from 1681 to his death in 1685. As had been feared, upon the death of Charles II, the duke of Monmouth organized a revolt, but this, together with a simultaneous insurrection in Scotland, was easily crushed, and the Catholic duke of York was duly seated on the throne as James II.

In his short reign of three years James II (1685-1688) succeeded in stirring up opposition on all sides. The Tories, the party most favorable to the royal prerogative, upon whom he might have relied, were shocked by his attempts to create a standing army and officer it with Catholics, for such an army might prove as disastrous to their liberties as Cromwell's "New Model"; while the Whigs were driven from sullenness to forceful opposition by James's religious policy and despotic government. James, like his brother, claimed the right to "suspend" the laws and statutes which parliament had enacted; he issued a "declaration of indulgence" in 1687, which exempted Catholics and dissenters from punishment for infractions of these laws. Furthermore, he appointed Catholics to office in the army and in the civil government. In spite of protests, he issued a second declaration of indulgence in 1688 and ordered it to be read in all Anglican churches, and, when seven bishops remonstrated, he accused them of seditious libel. No jury would convict the

**James II
and His
Fateful
Union of
Absolutism
and
Catholicism**

seven bishops, however, and they were acquitted. The Tories were estranged by what seemed to be a deliberate attack on the Anglican Church and by fear of a standing army. The arbitrary disregard of parliamentary legislation, and the favor shown to Catholics, goaded the Whigs to fury.

So long as Whigs and Tories alike could look forward to the accession on the death of James II of his Protestant daughters, Mary and Anne, they continued to acquiesce in his arbitrary government. But the outlook became gloomier when in 1688 a son was born to James II by his second wife, a Catholic. Many Protestants averred that the prince was not really James's son; and politicians prophesied that he would be educated in his father's "popish" and absolutist doctrines, and that thus England would continue to be ruled by "papist" despots. Even those who professed to believe in the divine right of kings and had denied the right of parliament to alter the succession were dejected at this prospect, and many of them were willing to join with the Whigs in inviting a Protestant to take the throne. The next in line of succession after the infant prince was Mary, the elder of James's two daughters, wife of William of Orange,¹ and an Anglican. Upon the invitation of Whig and Tory leaders, William crossed over from Holland to England with an army and entered London without opposition (1688). Deserted even by his army, James fled to France.²

A bloodless revolution was thus accomplished and the crown was formally presented to William and Mary by an irregular parliament, which also declared that James II, having endeavored to subvert the constitution and having fled from the kingdom, had vacated the throne. In offering the crown to William and Mary, parliament was very careful to safeguard its own power and the Protestant religion by issuing a Declaration of Rights (1689), which, as the Bill of Rights, was speedily enacted into law. This act decreed that the sovereign must henceforth belong to the Anglican Church, thereby debarring the Catholic son of James II. The


¹ See above, pp. 303-304. William's mother was a sister of Charles II and James II.

² Risings in favor of James in Ireland and in Scotland were suppressed. In Ireland the famous battle of the Boyne (1690) was decisive.

**The Flight
and Depo-
sition of
James II**

**The Par-
liamentary
Settle-
ment
of 1689**

THE TUDOR, STUART, AND HANOVERIAN SOVEREIGNS OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND



act also denied the power of a king to "suspend" laws or to "dispense" subjects from obeying the laws, to levy money, or to maintain an army without consent of parliament; it asserted that neither the free election nor the free speech and proceedings of members of parliament should be interfered with; it affirmed the right of subjects to petition the sovereign; and it demanded impartial juries and frequent parliaments. The Bill of Rights, far more important in English history than the Petition of Right (1628), inasmuch as parliament was now powerful enough to maintain as well as to define its rights, was supplemented by the practice, begun in the same year, 1689, of granting taxes and making appropriations for the army for one year only. Unless parliament were called every year to pass a Mutiny Act (provision for the army), the soldiers would receive no pay and in case of mutiny would not be punishable by court-martial. At the same time, a popular settlement of the vexed religious question was reached. While existing restrictions on Catholics were tightened and extended, toleration was accorded to Protestant dissenters from Anglicanism. The Toleration Act of 1689 did not go as far as the dissenters might have desired, but it granted them freedom of conscience and the legal right to worship in public.

Here, then, were the first-fruits of the "Glorious" Revolution of 1689. Absolutist monarchy was finally overthrown in Britain. Parliament was entrenched in power. The Protestant character of the state was assured. And the influence and predominance of the British aristocracy were firmly established. A new era opened in the political history of Britain—and, incidentally, in that of the world.

4. THE PARLIAMENTARY OLIGARCHY AND THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION

For many years after 1689 the government of Great Britain was in the hands of an oligarchy—an oligarchy of landed aristocrats (titled nobles and country squires) and of commercial and banking magnates related to the aristocracy by blood or by kindred capitalistic interest. This oligarchy enjoyed social prestige and wielded very real economic and political power.

The social prestige of the parliamentary oligarchy was in part a reward for recent national service. It had long been customary

for the mass of English tenant-farmers and agricultural laborers to regard titled noblemen and country squires as superior beings and to honor and follow them accordingly. Then, too, with the rise of capitalism it had become customary for all sorts of Britishers to evince a special deference to men of wealth. Now it was precisely these categories of wealthy and titled aristocrats that constituted the parliamentary oligarchy and that took the leadership in the "Glorious" Revolution and in the championship of parliamentary traditions and popular policies against royal absolutism and an unpopular king. What could be more natural than that on the ruins of divine-right monarchy should be builded an aristocratic régime?

However much the British aristocrats employed their régime to promote their own economic interests (and we shall presently see that they did so to a startling degree), they earned and secured the reputation of forwarding policies which were patriotic and popular. To this end they were aided by their factional division into Whigs and Tories, a division which continued throughout the eighteenth century and which enabled one faction to blame the other if anything went wrong, and thereby to stave off popular criticism of the aristocracy as a whole. There were some differences of outlook between Tories and Whigs; the former were more strictly agricultural in economics, more rigidly Anglican in religion, and more zealous in honoring the trappings of royalty, while the latter catered considerably to the commercial classes and to Protestant nonconformists, and boasted particularly of the limits they set to royal pretension. In fact, however, there was little to distinguish the two factions. Both Whigs and Tories were aristocratic; both had participated in the "Glorious" Revolution; both were devoted to the maintenance of the ensuing parliamentary oligarchy. They debated and quarrelled, often with great bitterness, but their quarrels were over office-holding rather than over broad principles.

Under the auspices of the oligarchy, the authority of parliament grew ever stronger after 1689 and that of monarchy weaker.

The Reign of William III William III (1689-1702) and his sister-in-law Anne (1702-1714) were not "legitimate" hereditary monarchs; they owed the throne to parliament, which had excluded from it the son of James II. William III, more inter-

ested in getting money and soldiers to defend his native Holland against Louis XIV of France than in governing Great Britain, did pretty much as parliament directed and gave free reign to his ministers in most matters of internal administration. So long as the Whigs held a majority of seats in the House of Commons, William found that the wheels of government turned fairly smoothly if all his ministers were Whigs. On the other hand, when the Tories gained a preponderance in the House of Commons, it seemed expedient to replace Whig ministers with Tories. In this way, the king's ministers—the "cabinet," as they began to be called¹—came to depend on the majority in parliament. The parliamentary oligarchy was gaining, as the king was losing, control over the executive as well as the legislative functions of the British government.

Queen Anne was more English and more spirited in her assertion of royal authority. She vetoed acts of parliament and toward the close of her reign she chose a Tory cabinet despite the fact that the parliamentary majority was Whig. On her death, however, the crown passed by act of parliament² to her cousin, the German elector of Hanover, George I. The accession of the Hanoverians proved decisive in the history of parliamentary and cabinet government in Britain.

George I (1714-1727) and his son and successor George II (1727-1760) were quite German. They were electors of the German state of Hanover, in addition to being kings of Great Britain. George I knew no English, and George II spoke it brokenly. In Hanover they were absolutist princes and in Hanover were their hearts. From Germany they

The
Reign of
Queen
Anne

The Hano-
verian
Dynasty

¹ The word "cabinet" had been applied in the time of Charles II to an inner circle of his ministers ("privy councillors") who had met and advised with him on governmental policies in a small private room (a cabinet). It was extremely unpopular before the "Glorious" Revolution, but afterwards, when it was identified with an agency of parliamentary government, it acquired great and enduring fame.

² The Act of Settlement (1701) repeated the prohibition against the succession of the direct Catholic heirs of James II and prescribed that the crown should pass from William III to Anne and then, failing children of hers, to Sophia of Hanover and her Protestant heirs. Neither William III nor Anne left children, and Sophia predeceased Anne; hence Sophia's son became George I. Sophia was the granddaughter of James I and the daughter of that Calvinist Count Palatine of the Rhine whose election as king of Bohemia had precipitated the Thirty Years' War. Sophia had married the elector of Hanover. See above, pp. 263-265, 272, 337.

obtained their wives, their personal favorites, and their mistresses. To Britain they were foreigners, suffered to reign (but not to rule) because they represented the Protestant royal succession next in "legitimacy" to the Catholic Stuarts. The Georges enjoyed themselves in Britain after their fashion, but they were too dull-witted and too incompetent to master the intricacies of British politics. They left almost all business to the cabinet, and under George I it was usual for the king to absent himself from cabinet-meetings (it should be remembered that he could not understand what was said) and to accept every act of parliament without exercising the royal veto. All of which tended inevitably to establish the omnipotence of parliament and its cabinet.

In so far as George I and George II concerned themselves with British politics, they favored the Whigs. The Whigs, they knew, were loud-spoken apologists of the Hanoverian succession, while the Tories they suspected of desiring a second restoration of the Stuarts. Certainly, several Tory leaders had participated in a vain attempt of the son of James II in 1715 to seat himself on the British throne as James III, and again in 1745 an extreme group of Tories—the so-called Jacobites—took part in a Scottish uprising under the grandson of James II, the dashing "Prince Charlie." In these circumstances, the Whigs not only were favored by the royal Georges but also were acclaimed by the militantly Protestant populace of Britain. During the greater part of the eighteenth century the parliamentary majority and the royal ministers were alike Whig.

It was during this period of Whig ascendancy that the office of prime minister (or premier) came into existence. Sir Robert Walpole, an outstanding Whig leader, managed for twenty-one years (from 1721 to 1742) to enjoy the favor of the king and by patronage and bribery to dominate the cabinet and a majority in the House of Commons. Though he disclaimed the title, he was generally recognized as the "prime" minister—prime in importance, prime in power. Thenceforth it became a tradition under the British Constitution that the crown should appoint from the majority-party in parliament the premier—or head of the cabinet,—and that all

**The Rapid
Decline of
Royal
Power in
Britain**

**The Whigs
and the
Jacobites**

**Walpole
as Prime
Minister**

other cabinet ministers should be appointed by the crown on the nomination of the premier.

There never has been a "British Constitution" in the sense of a single written document. It has always been a set of traditions and practices of government, the resultant of the customs, laws, and usages by which government in Britain has been organized and conducted. The Constitution has developed gradually, and changed through the course of time, especially as the result of the British revolutions of the seventeenth century.

The
"British
Constitu-
tion" of
the
Eighteenth
Century

By the end of the eighteenth century, however, it had acquired certain essential characters which have since distinguished it and which merit at least a summary review.

The king was still the head of the state, and in law still the ruler of his kingdom. In his name all laws were made, treaties concluded, and officials appointed. Under him both state and church were administered. But in practice (that is, by the Constitution), most of the king's functions were delegated to his "government"—to a premier and cabinet who were not his agents but the representatives of parliament. His actual authority (that is, his influence with the cabinet) varied according to circumstances and personal factors, but the delegation of functions was fairly complete. The ministers and their subordinates carried on the real business of government. The king "reigned but did not rule."

By the eighteenth century the British Constitution clearly limited the king's power in five important respects. (1) He was deprived of the right to levy taxes. For his household expenses he was granted an allowance, called the Civil List. William III, for instance, was allowed £700,000 a year. (2) The king had no right either to make laws on his own responsibility or to prevent laws from being made against his advice. The sovereign's prerogative to veto acts of parliament still existed in theory, but was not exercised after the reign of Queen Anne. (3) The king had lost control of the judiciary: he might not remove judges from office even if they gave decisions unfavorable to him; and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 had provided that anyone who was imprisoned should be told why and given a fair legal trial. (4) The king could not maintain a standing army and hence could not wage war. (5) The

Limita-
tions on
Monarchy

king might not appoint to office or retain in office any minister who did not enjoy the confidence of the parliamentary majority. These restrictions on the royal authority rendered Great Britain a "limited," rather than an "absolute," monarchy.

The powers taken from the king were vested in parliament. The British revolutions of the seventeenth century had left parliament not only in enjoyment of freedom of speech for its members but with full power to levy taxes, to make laws, to remove or retain judges, to control the armed forces, and essentially to determine the policy of the government. Parliament had even taken upon itself to deprive a monarch of his "divine right" to rule, to establish a new sovereign, and to decree that never again should Great Britain have a king of the Catholic faith. More recently, through the elaboration of the "cabinet" and the rise of a "prime minister," parliament had assumed supreme authority in the nation.

This omnipotent parliament was supposed to represent the people of Great Britain, but it represented them very imperfectly and unfairly. As we have already noted, parliament consisted of two legislative assemblies or "Houses," neither one of which could make laws without the consent of the other. One of these houses, the House of Lords, was purely aristocratic. Its members were the "lords spiritual," designated bishops of the Anglican Church, and the "lords temporal," or peers, descendants of medieval feudal nobles or heirs of well-to-do persons recently ennobled by the king.¹ Most of the lords were owners of vast landed estates, and many of them were heavily involved in commercial and capitalistic enterprises.

As for the other house, the House of Commons, though it was more representative in appearance, it was hardly less aristocratic in fact. Part of its members, the so-called "knights of the shire," were supposed to represent all the country people, and they were elected, two for each shire or county. But a country person could not vote for them unless he had an estate worth an annual rental of forty shillings, and, since the same amount of money would then buy a good deal more than nowadays, forty shillings was a fairly large sum: it debarred all agricultural laborers and

¹ A peer was technically a titled nobleman who possessed an hereditary seat in the House of Lords. Many new peers were created after the "Glorious" Revolution

many farm tenants. Persons who were qualified to vote were often afraid to vote independently, for all elections were public and anyone might learn from the poll-book how each man had voted. Frequently the electors sold their suffrages to a rich squire or an ambitious nobleman. The result was that most "knights of the shire" were landed aristocrats or dependent upon landed aristocrats.

It was likewise with the other part of the members of the House of Commons, the so-called "burgesses," who were presumed to represent the towns, or "boroughs." Throughout the eighteenth century only such towns were represented as had been represented back in the reign of Charles II. and each of these towns, regardless of size, sent two representatives, while a goodly number of newer and rapidly growing towns sent no representatives at all.¹ For the towns that did send representatives, no method of election was prescribed by law; each borough had its own method of election. In some towns, election was in the hands of the so-called "freemen" (of course everybody was legally free,— "freeman" was a technical term for an hereditary member of the borough corporation); in one town the "freemen" might be few, and in another they might be fairly numerous. In some towns a nobleman or a clique of commercial magnates chose the burgesses without even the formality of an election. In general, the mass of artisans, journeymen, and apprentices had no say in the choice of members of parliament; aristocrats of birth and wealth, either by outright appointment or by intimidation or bribery of electors, assured the return of burgesses favorable to themselves.

Thus parliament in the eighteenth century represented neither the various classes of society nor the masses of the population. It was certainly not democratic, and it was representative only of a rather small group of noblemen and "gentlemen." Not more than three hundred sat in the House of Lords, and it has been estimated that fewer than 1,500 controlled a majority in the House of Commons. Parliament was emphatically an oligarchy, and politics under the

**Aristocratic
Character
of Parlia-
ment**

¹ Such growing industrial towns as Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield were unrepresented in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, many a decaying town, or "rotten borough," continued to be represented. Of these, the most notorious were Old Sarum and Dunwich: the latter had been washed away by the sea, and of the former only a lonely hill marked its site; yet the traditional lords of these old places still named their "representatives" in the House of Commons.

British Constitution was essentially a gentleman's game. Aristocrats or protégés of aristocrats occupied the seats in parliament. A distinguished English statesman of the eighteenth century indicated the position of an aristocratic protégé: "He is sent here by the lord of this or the duke of that, and if he does not obey the instructions which he receives, he is held to be a dishonest man." And no "gentleman" would be dishonest.

So far we have referred to the parliament and the constitution sometimes as "English" and sometimes as "British." A word of explanation is needed. The island of Great Britain had long been partitioned between two separate kingdoms—England and Scotland—each with its own king, parliament, and state church. In 1603, as we have observed, the king of Scotland succeeded by hereditary right to the throne of England, and though for some time the two kingdoms retained separate parliaments and distinct churches and laws, Scotland was joined with England under a common king and experienced during the seventeenth century much the same revolutionary vicissitudes. In 1707, during the reign of Queen Anne, the parliaments of England and Scotland passed an Act of Union, whereby the two kingdoms were finally fused into the one kingdom of Great Britain, and the English parliament at Westminster was transformed into the British parliament by inclusion of Scottish lords and commoners. Certain peculiarities of Scottish law were retained for the northern part of the consolidated realm, and it was specifically provided that the state church should remain Presbyterian in Scotland and Anglican in England.¹ After 1707 it is strictly accurate to speak of the British, rather than the English, constitution and parliament.

The parliamentary oligarchy which we have been describing, then, dominated England (and Wales) and Scotland. But in addition it claimed ultimate authority over the whole British empire—Ireland and the newer overseas colonies. For the colonies, the British government appointed governors, made laws, and levied taxes, in theory at least. Some of the dependencies, especially in America, had local parliaments (or assemblies) of

¹ Accordingly, the poor sovereigns of Great Britain, though they were at the head of the Anglican Church, had to be Presbyterian when they visited Scotland. This was not much of a strain, however. — George I or George II.

The Union of England and Scotland as the Kingdom of Great Britain

their own; none of them was even nominally represented in the British parliament at Westminster; and between some of them and the mother-country a good deal of friction developed in the eighteenth century.

As for Ireland, English kings had begun its military conquest as far back as the twelfth century, and by dint of many efforts and much bloodshed they had eventually brought it into political subjection. Nevertheless the majority of Irishmen remained Catholic in religion and "foreign" to Englishmen. Attempts to force the conversion of the mass of natives to the Anglican Church which Queen Elizabeth established as the "Church of Ireland" proved fruitless, and the natives were ever evincing sympathy for foreign foes of England—for Spain or for France. In the seventeenth century they fought for Charles I and James II against the triumphant Puritans and the champions of the "Glorious" Revolution. To curb the Catholic natives, successive British rulers—James I, Cromwell, and William III—settled Protestant Englishmen and Scots in northern Ireland (Ulster) and transferred large landed estates throughout the island to loyal Protestant noblemen. In Ireland, as well as in Scotland, there had long been an aristocratic local parliament, but since the close of the fifteenth century enactments of the Irish parliament, to be valid, had to be approved by the English Privy Council, and the disbarment of Catholics from it meant that the Irish parliament from the middle of the seventeenth century was dominated by an even narrower oligarchy of noblemen and "gentlemen" than that which dominated the British parliament.

Position
of Ireland

Thus the supreme political authority in Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas colonies in the eighteenth century was not an absolute monarch but a parliamentary oligarchy of landlords and commercial magnates. And this oligarchy used its power to increase the international importance and prestige of Britain, and incidentally to forward its own economic interests.

In domestic policies, the oligarchy (particularly its Tory element) naturally favored agriculture and the great landlords. Immediately after the "Glorious" Revolution, parliament, while increasing the tariff protection of home-grown grain, adopted a new policy of paying to landlords from the national treasury a "bounty," or money premium, for every bushel of wheat which

they exported from the country.¹ This policy was continued and developed during the eighteenth century by a series of so-called "corn laws," which were intended to stimulate the growing of grain in Britain, to raise the price of foodstuffs, and thereby to add to the riches of the rural landowners. Similar motives dictated promulgation of a rapidly increasing number of "enclosure acts," privileging this or that nobleman or squire to enlarge his private estate by depriving tenants of their customary right to common holdings. Seventy enclosure acts were passed for the benefit of landed aristocrats between 1700 and 1760, and during the first thirty-three years of the reign of George III (1760-1793) 1,355 such acts were passed.² The number of acres thus transferred in the eighteenth century from poor farmers and tenants to influential well-to-do landlords was at least three million.

At the same time, the parliamentary oligarchy pursued foreign policies which were calculated to foster British commerce and to extend British dominion overseas. The merchants and shippers who formed an important wing of the Whig party, as well as all patriots, were highly gratified by the course and outcome of the Wars of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) and of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714), in which Britain fought at once against France, her chief commercial and colonial rival, and against Louis XIV, the friend of the Catholic Stuart pretenders to the British throne. From these wars, Britain obtained not only Newfoundland and Nova Scotia and additional posts in the West Indies but also valuable privileges of trade with Spanish America.³ The Methuen Treaty (1703), whereby Portugal was closely allied to Britain, was similarly advantageous: it allowed British merchants to sell their wares in Portugal without hindrance; and in return Britain lowered the duties on Portuguese wines, so that "port" supplanted "burgundy" as the favorite stimulant of British gentlemen. Nor was the Union with Scotland (1707) unfavorable to British commerce; it permitted the adoption of uniform trade regulations, tariffs, and excise for all the British Isles.

Agricultural Policies of the Parliamentary Oligarchy

Commercial Policies of the Parliamentary Oligarchy

¹ That is, when wheat was selling for less than 6s. a bushel.

² See Oliver Goldsmith, *Deserted Village* (1770).

³ See above, pp. 330-344, 406-412.

Walpole, the great Whig prime minister from 1721 to 1742, was an apostle of peace and prosperity,¹ particularly the latter. He believed that economic prosperity was the be-all and the end-all of statesmanship and that, if British landlords and merchants were prosperous, Britain would prosper. His policy of prosperity was based on mercantilist ideas and consisted in strict attention to business methods in public finance, the removal of duties on imported raw materials and on exported manufactures, and the enlargement of the merchant marine. Because war might necessitate heavy financial expenditures which, he feared, would lessen the prosperity of the upper classes, he endeavored to keep peace with foreign powers. For his pacifism, however, he was bitterly assailed by the Tories and by groups of his fellow Whigs, and toward the end of his ministry he was driven by the patriotic clamors of William Pitt (the earl of Chatham) into war with Spain (the War of Jenkins's Ear, 1739) and resumption of hostilities with France (the War of the Austrian Succession).²

Sir
Robert
Walpole

William Pitt (1708-1778) was a most interesting type of the eighteenth-century parliamentarian. Like many others, he represented the aristocracy of new capitalism, rather than that of medieval lineage. It was his grandfather, Thomas Pitt, a vulgar and unscrupulous adventurer, known as "Diamond" Pitt, who had established the family fortunes, and he had established them in that happy hunting ground of exploitation and graft, the service of the English East India Company.³ Some of his fortune Thomas Pitt had employed to purchase one of the "rotten boroughs"—that of Old Sarum—and thereby to assure representation for his family in the parliament of "gentlemen." William Pitt had abil-

William
Pitt, Earl
of Chat-
ham

¹ Walpole was the "best master of figures of any man of his time." While he was deemed the special advocate of the commercial class, he was a great landlord and was deeply interested in the "prosperity" of his estates and his family. He enormously enriched himself from public office, and obtained in 1742 the title of earl of Oxford.

² See above, pp. 405-406.

³ Thomas Pitt had been governor of Madras and acquired his nickname of "Diamond" from the fact of his having sold a diamond of extraordinary size (which he had obtained in India by most questionable means) to the duke of Orleans, cousin of Louis XIV of France, for something like £135,000. It was mainly by this transaction that the Pitts were enabled to become "gentlemen," influential in finance and in politics.

ity. He was a brilliant politician, and as an orator he was likened to Demosthenes. He speedily won popular favor by his vehement assaults on graft in public office and by his impassioned pleas for the vigorous assertion of British power in foreign and colonial matters. It was largely due to the national enthusiasm stirred up by Pitt's militarism, imperialism, and moral disquisitions, that Sir Robert Walpole was driven from office and that Britain proceeded to renew the struggle with France and Spain for world-supremacy in commerce and colonies. It was Pitt who presided over the British cabinet during the decisive period of the Seven Years' War, who sent British gold to Frederick the Great, who directed British conquest in America and India, who ensured British supremacy on the high seas.¹ This was the climax of Pitt's career. He was acclaimed by the mass of his fellow countrymen as the personification of British patriotism, purity, and grandeur.

The accession of George III to the British throne in 1760 changed matters somewhat. This George was grandson of the **George III, the Patriot King** George II and great-grandson of the George I who had spoken English badly or not at all, who had been most unedifying in their private morals, who had distrusted the Tories, and who had left the cares and responsibilities of British government to their Whig ministers. George III was born and reared in England; he spoke good English—real king's English; his morals were as unimpeachable as Pitt's; he took very seriously the business of kingship; and he actually preferred the Tories, who were obsequious to him, to the Whigs, who tended to patronize him. In other words, George III, unlike his Hanoverian predecessors, was a pure and patriotic king, popular with the mass of Britishers; and with popular backing and with the help of bribery (the art of which had been highly developed by Walpole and other Whig ministers), he proceeded to transform the majority in parliament from the Whigs to the "king's friends," mainly Tory. George III had no open break with William Pitt; the king disliked the minister as a rival claimant to the honors of purity and patriotism but

¹ See above, pp. 408-409.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Getting Votes for a Member of Parliament," is from a painting by William Hogarth (1697-1764). For another satirical illustration of English life in the eighteenth century, by Hogarth, see above, p. 418.





was content to confer upon him the title of earl of Chatham and to promote him to the House of Lords, where he was too pompous and too much the prey of gout to retain his personal hold on the British public or on the intricate politics of the parliamentary oligarchy. Gradually George III was able to get rid of Whig ministers, to constitute Tory cabinets, and to participate in government himself. From 1770 to 1782 his prime minister was Lord North, a Tory after his own heart. George III could now preside at cabinet meetings and take a direct personal part in the conduct of government.

The
King's
Friends

It was under the régime of the parliamentary oligarchy which we have been describing that capitalism produced a noteworthy transformation in British agriculture. Thanks to the preëminence which Great Britain was gaining in world empire and world trade, greater wealth flowed into England in the eighteenth century than into any other country.¹ A large part of this new wealth — this new capital — came into the hands of landlords (nobles and country gentlemen), who had long been conspicuous in commercial companies and colonial speculation and who now naturally tended to apply their augmenting profits partly to a more ostentatious living and partly to the enlargement and more remunerative operation of their ancestral landed estates. The new British capitalism was thus evidenced by prodigal expenditure of the upper classes on the erection and upkeep of palatial country houses and sumptuous London residences, on frequent and prolonged tours of the Continent, on the collecting of "curios" of all sorts, and on an astonishing amount of hunting, gambling, eating, and drinking.² It was also evidenced by a veritable agricultural revolution in Britain.

Capital-
ism and
the Land-
ed Aris-
tocracy

¹ See above, pp. 421-422

² The heartiness of British gentlemen in the eighteenth century and their bibulousness are almost unbelievable to our more abstemious twentieth century. In those expansive days, there was prodigious drinking of port wine by the upper classes and of rum and gin by the lower classes; coffee houses were flourishing on all sides; and tea-drinking was becoming fashionable and plentiful. In more ways than one, Britain "muddled through" its great exploits of that century.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of a Scottish landed aristocrat of the eighteenth century, "The MacNab," from a painting by Henry Raeburn (1756-1823). Concerning Raeburn's art, see below, p. 562.

What inspired the agricultural revolution was a rapidly rising demand for farm produce. England's numerous wars, the swift expansion of her merchant marine, the growth of her woollen industry and other manufactures, and the remarkable increase of her population (which, exclusive of emigration to the colonies, almost doubled in the eighteenth century) naturally stimulated the production of foodstuffs and raw materials at the very time when the "corn laws" and "navigation acts" were artificially protecting the British market from foreign competition. There was every incentive, therefore, for the British farmer to increase the output of his land.

**Incentive
for Agri-
cultural
Revolution**

To increase agricultural production required the adoption of more efficient, more "scientific," methods of farming. This, however, was not easy for the ordinary small farmer or tenant farmer. It needed imagination and courage to break with centuries of deeply rooted agricultural tradition, and it needed capital. Hence the leadership in effecting the agricultural revolution was taken by "gentlemen farmers," that is, by wealthy landlords—noblemen or country squires—who possessed considerable capital, who owned large estates on which experimentation was possible, and who made a hobby of the "new farming." Among such upper-class pioneers of "scientific" agriculture, several individuals deserve special mention.

**Scientific
Gentle-
man
Farming**

One was Jethro Tull (1674-1740), the son of a Berkshire squire. After studying the classics at Oxford and law at London, and touring France and Italy, and becoming an accomplished musician, Tull settled down on his landed estate and labored systematically to increase its crops. By observation and experiment he learned the difference between good and bad seed and proved that thin sowing and constant cultivation produced the best harvest. Hitherto it had been an almost universal practice to sow grain and other crops by scattering handfuls of seed broadcast, and as a result it had been impossible to hoe the soil between the plants or keep weeds from growing amongst them. Tull, however, told his farm laborers to sow the seed in rows, leaving enough space between them so that the soil could frequently be hoed.¹ Then,

**Jethro
Tull and
Scientific
Cultiva-
tion**

¹ Tull undoubtedly got the idea from observing, during his travels on the

when his laborers protested against the additional and unusual work thus imposed upon them, he invented a "drill," which would plant the seed automatically in the way he desired, and a horse-driven hoeing machine for cultivating the soil around the plants. By these means, Tull largely increased the yield of his crops, and in 1731 he published a description of his novel methods in a famous book entitled *Horse-Hoeing Husbandry*.

Contemporary with Jethro Tull was Viscount Townshend (1674-1738), a great Whig nobleman, brother-in-law of Sir Robert Walpole. After an active political career, during which he helped to negotiate the union of Scotland with England and served as British ambassador to the Dutch Netherlands, Townshend retired to rural life and devoted himself wholly to the management of his broad acres. Not only did he exploit Tull's new methods, but he devised a novel system of crop-rotation, planting wheat, turnips, barley (or rye), and clover (or beans) in successive years. By introducing this four-year rotation and by employing better fertilizer, he more than doubled the average production of the medieval, three-field system.¹ From an acre of land he got an average yield of twenty-four bushels of wheat, as compared with the six or ten bushels of hitherto prevailing open-field farming. Incidentally, because he was so enthusiastic about the value of turnips, he was nicknamed "Turnip Townshend."

**Viscount
Townshend and
Rotation
of Crops**

Another "gentleman farmer," somewhat younger, was Robert Bakewell (1725-1795), a native of Leicestershire. Besides utilizing the devices of Townshend and Tull, Bakewell won special distinction as a pioneer in the scientific breeding of farm animals—cattle, horses, and especially sheep. A notable result of the improvements made by Bakewell (and other squires who followed his example) is indicated by the fact that the average weight of calves sold at one of England's leading market-towns (Smithfield) increased from 50 lbs. in 1710 to 148 in the year 1795; of beeves, from 370 lbs. to 800; of lambs, from 18 lbs. to 50; of sheep, from 28 lbs. to 80.

**Robert
Bakewell and Sci-
entific
Breeding**

All these experiments of Bakewell, Townshend, and Tull had a fascination for English noblemen and gentlemen in the eight-

Continent, the way in which French and Italian peasants cultivated their vineyards.

¹ See above, pp. 52-53.

eenth century. The "new agriculture" became very fashionable at court and among the parliamentary oligarchy. George II insisted that Tull's innovations be explained to him at length, and the neglected wife of George II patronized the publication of *Horse-Hoeing Husbandry*. The poet Pope loved to "play the philosopher among cabbages." Sir Robert Walpole quarrelled with Viscount Townshend about politics, but not about turnips. Later, George III delighted in being called "Farmer George"; he established a model farm at Windsor, formed a flock of merino sheep, and experimented with stock-breeding. Robert Bakewell kept open house for British peers (and French and German dukes and Russian princes) who came to see his scientific farm—his water-canal, his plough-team of cows, his irrigated meadows, his horse-hoed crops, and, above all, his live-stock—his huge black stallion, his bull "Two-penny," and his ram "Two-pounder."

The most influential popularizer of the new agriculture was Arthur Young (1741-1820), who wielded the pen rather than the hoe. Something of a fop and gallant, and quite negligent in money matters, Young was unable to make a living on his own landed estate, but he profitably used his considerable literary gifts in telling others how they could enrich themselves from farming. Young toured Britain, Ireland, and France, noting the best methods used in different regions, and then writing books about what he had seen. He lectured on the "new agriculture," urged members of parliament to forward it, and founded a monthly magazine, *Annals of Agriculture*, for the propagation of its principles. Young's *Tours* and *Annals* were subscribed to by many upper-class Englishmen and by some "gentlemen farmers" in France, Prussia, and America; George III always carried the latest volume of the *Annals* with him in his travelling carriage. It was a spirited crusade which Arthur Young waged in behalf of agricultural change. As he put the case, more produce from the land meant higher rents for the landlord, larger incomes for farmers, better wages for laborers, more home-grown food for the nation.

Young's propaganda and the exigencies of the "new agriculture" demanded not only the protection of British agriculture against foreign competition but also the transfer of agricultural land within Britain from common to private ownership, from a

Fame of
the "New
Agriculture"

Arthur
Young

large number of tenants and lower-class farmers to a small number of capitalistic upper-class nobles and gentlemen. Such demands could readily be met by these very nobles and gentlemen, for they it was who, devoted to the new agriculture and imbued with Arthur Young's convictions, could utilize their predominant position in parliament to enact the necessary "corn laws" and "enclosure laws." They did so. The process of "enclosure," to which we have already referred,¹ reached gigantic proportions in the reign of George III. It was a significant aspect of the British agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century.

Supremacy of the Landed Aristocracy in Politics and Economics

In the midst of agrarian transformation in Britain, and soon after the accession of "Farmer George" and the Tories to political power, the parliamentary oligarchy was suddenly confronted with serious problems arising from the American phase of the Seven Years' War (1763). Canada had been wrested from France, but the conquest had cost vast sums of money which someone had to pay. In attempting to solve this problem in a manner that would not put too many financial burdens upon English landowners, parliament and the king unwittingly precipitated another—a third—political revolution. This revolution, unlike the Puritan Revolution and the "Glorious" Revolution did not take place in England or Scotland. It occurred in thirteen overseas colonies and is known in history as the American Revolution. But its effects on the political evolution of modern Europe—and of the modern world—were even more direct and far-reaching than those of the "Glorious" Revolution.

The Brewing of Another Political Revolution

5. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

At the close of the Seven Years' War (1763), Great Britain was mistress of an extensive colonial empire.² To British capital-

¹ See above, pp. 461-462. Also see below, pp. 716-717.

² The empire then embraced Barbados (1605), Virginia (1607), Bermuda (1600), Gambia (1618), Massachusetts (1620), St. Christopher (1623), Nevis (1628), Montserrat (1632), Antigua (1632), Maryland (1634), Rhode Island (1636), Honduras (1638), St. Lucia (1638), Connecticut (1639), Madras (1639), Gold Coast (1650), St. Helena (1651), North Carolina (1653), Jamaica (1655), Bombay (1661), New York (1664), New Jersey (1664), Delaware (1664), Bahamas (1666), Virgin Islands (1666), South Carolina (1671), New Hampshire (1670), Pennsylvania (1681), Gibraltar (1713), Newfoundland (1713), Nova Scotia (1713), Hudson's Bay Territory (1713), Georgia (1733), Quebec, and Prince Edward Island (1763),

ists and to the British government, the best part of the empire seemed to be its semi-tropical holdings in India and the West Indies, for these supplied commodities which could not be procured in the mother-country and which could be exploited on terms most favorable to British traders and merchants and, incidentally, to the British upper classes. Yet comparatively few Britishers made permanent homes in these semi-tropical holdings; they were too hot and they had too many acclimated natives (in the case of India) or too many imported negroes (as in the case of the West Indies); they were profitable for commerce and investment but not very promising for actual colonization.

For actual colonization the most favorable part of the British empire was the strip of American seaboard in the north temperate zone, and hither had immigrated an ever increasing number of Englishmen, Scots, and Irish, together with a considerable number of French Huguenots and Dutch and German and Swedish Protestants. By the middle of the eighteenth century there was an English-speaking population of about 1,300,000 in the thirteen separate colonies from New Hampshire to Georgia.

In these thirteen colonies Englishmen predominated, and they had naturally brought with them the political ideas and institutions of seventeenth-century England. In the colonies, just as in England, the legal system was characterized by the common law and by jury-trials. In each colony was established an assembly (or legislature) patterned more or less closely after the English House of Commons; in Virginia, for example, the assembly, or "House of Burgesses," like the English lower House, comprised two burgesses from each town or borough and representatives from the counties. In most colonies, a royal governor headed the administration as a kind of viceroy of the English monarch; and the relations between royal governor and assembly in almost every colony reflected the relations between king and parliament in the mother-country.¹ A colonial assembly, like the home parliament, claimed that, without its consent, no

Dominica (1763), St. Vincent (1763), Grenada (1763), Tobago (1763), Florida (1763), and Bengal (1733-1763).

¹ Strictly speaking, this statement applies only to the nine colonies which had royal governors and the two (Pennsylvania and Maryland) which had "proprietors." Rhode Island and Connecticut possessed charters permitting them to elect their own governors.

direct tax might be imposed and no law passed. Repeatedly a colonial assembly, taking its cue from the home parliament, would hold up financial appropriations in order to compel the royal governor to accept its policies or to appoint officials in whom it had confidence. The British revolutions of the seventeenth century had their counterparts in America, so that by the eighteenth century certain classes in the colonies, as well as certain classes in Great Britain, possessed considerable rights of self-government. And in claiming and obtaining such rights of self-government the colonists justified themselves on the ground that they were claiming and obtaining the traditional "rights of Englishmen." In a word, the limitation on monarchical absolutism and the practice of representative government in the thirteen colonies were by-products of the revolutionary development of the British parliament in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

But the thirteen American colonies went farther than the mother-country in revolutionary development. Colonial conditions were more favorable than Britain's for the adoption of really radical experiments in politics.

**Political
Radical-
ism in the
British
Colonies**

(1) The religious situation in America was more favorable to political radicalism. Whereas the majority of Englishmen in the home-country were Anglican Christians, used to bishops, to ritual, and to royal headship of the church, the large majority of Englishmen (and other settlers) in the colonies were dissenters from Anglicanism. There were a few Catholics in Maryland, and a considerable number of Anglicans in Virginia, Carolina, and New York. But the Anglicans in America had no resident bishop and they tended toward "low church" Puritanism, while almost everywhere in the colonies the masses were radical Puritans: Congregational in Massachusetts and Connecticut; Baptist in Rhode Island; Quaker in Pennsylvania; and Presbyterian or Dutch Reformed or some other kind of Calvinist in the middle and southern colonies. This meant that the mass of colonists were especially intolerant of Catholicism and distrustful of episcopacy, and that they were far more sympathetic with the principles underlying the Puritan Revolution of Cromwell and his Independents than with the compromise effected by the "Glorious" Revolution of Anglican aristocrats.

(2) Economic and social conditions in America were also more favorable. In the colonies there was no powerful class of hereditary nobles, such as flourished in Great Britain. New England had been settled by people of the middle and lower classes, aristocrats being conspicuous by their absence; here the shippers and shopkeepers of the towns were influential, and each farmer was an independent landowner rather than the tenant of a feudal lord. It is true that in Virginia and Carolina, "gentlemen" of aristocratic lineage had acquired "plantations" and taken up a mode of living similar to that of English nobles and squires, but as the plantations were cultivated by negro slaves, the aristocracy of the South was based on the subjection of one race to another rather than upon the subjection of some white men to others; and here, as elsewhere in the southern and middle colonies, there was a constant influx of lower-class immigrants who became tradesmen or small-scale farmers. Besides, there was so much unoccupied land on the colonial frontiers that any white man could become an independent landowner by moving on and clearing a farm of his own. The frontiersman was a novel and very important element in British colonial life in America; he learned to be self-reliant and self-assertive; and he emphasized the tendency among colonists to brook no social superior. As William Penn once complained, the colonists seemed to "think nothing taller than themselves but the trees." In America, unlike Britain, there could be little familiarity with dukes and earls, but considerable impatience with a parliamentary oligarchy intent upon the conservation of aristocracy.

(3) Geographical conditions likewise favored political radicalism in America. The colonies were so far away from the mother-country, and communication across the Atlantic was so slow and arduous in the days of sailing vessels, that it was not easy to control the details of their government from England. Moreover, since the colonies on the North American coast were at first considered rather poor and unprofitable, it hardly seemed worth while to interfere very systematically with their local affairs. The Stuart kings were too absorbed in their effort to establish monarchical absolutism in England to pay close or continuous attention to its establishment in America. And the succeeding parliamentary oligarchy found it convenient and desirable to concentrate their thought on the promotion of

landed and commercial interests in the mother-country and for a time to be quite neglectful of the colonies. In this way the colonists grew ever more accustomed to managing their own affairs and resenting any threatened interference by the home government as tyranny.

In one very important matter—the matter of commerce—the parliamentary oligarchy in Great Britain was thoroughly committed to a policy which involved interference with the colonies. This policy was based on mercantilism, the notion that the government should regulate the commerce of its subjects in such a way as to build up the country's wealth and power. Now the colonists were obviously British subjects, and, according to mercantilist doctrine, they owed a threefold duty to the nation: (1) they should furnish the mother-country with commodities which could not be produced at home; (2) they should not injure the mother country by competing with her industries or by enriching her commercial rivals; and (3) they should help bear the burdens of the government, army, and navy. Quite logically, therefore, the British statesmen of the eighteenth century, backed by the parliamentary oligarchy, attempted to make the colonists do their duty.

**British
Interference with
Colonial
Com-
merce and
Industry**

(1) Various expedients were employed to encourage the production of particular colonial commodities which the British parliament thought desirable. The commodity might be exempted from customs duties, or parliament might forbid the importation into Great Britain of similar products from foreign countries, or might even bestow outright upon the colonial producer "bounties," or sums of money, as an incentive to persevere in the industry. Thus the cultivation of indigo in Carolina, of coffee in Jamaica, of tobacco in Virginia, was encouraged, so that the British would not have to buy these commodities from Spain. Similarly, bounties were given for tar, pitch, hemp, masts, and spars imported from America rather than from Sweden.

(2) Many regulations were adopted to prevent colonial commerce or industry from endangering the profits of manufacturers or shippers in Great Britain. Of the colonial industries which were discouraged for this reason, two or three are particularly noteworthy. Thus the hat manufacturers in America, though they could make hats cheaply, because of the plentiful

supply of fur in the New World, were forbidden to manufacture any for export, lest they should ruin the hatters of London. The weaving of cloth was likewise discouraged by a law of 1699 which prohibited the export of woollen fabrics from one colony to another. Again, it was thought necessary to protect British iron-masters by forbidding (1750) the colonists to manufacture wrought iron or its finished products. Such restrictions on manufacture were imposed, not so much for fear of actual competition in the English market, as from desire to keep the colonial markets for English manufacturers. They caused a good deal of rancor, but they were too ill enforced to bear heavily upon the colonies.

More irksome were the restrictions on commerce. As far back as 1651, when Dutch traders were bringing spices from the East and sugar from the West to sell in London at a handsome profit, parliament had passed the first famous Navigation Act, which had been successful in its general design to weaken the Dutch carrying trade and to stimulate British ship-building. In the eighteenth century a similar policy was applied to the colonies. For it was claimed that the New England traders who sold their fish and lumber for sugar, molasses, and rum in the French West Indies were enriching French planters rather than English. Consequently, a heavy tariff was laid on French sugar-products. Moreover, inasmuch as it was deemed most essential for a naval power to have many and skilled ship-builders, the Navigation Acts¹ were so developed and expanded as to include the following prescriptions. (1) In general, all import and export trade must be conducted in ships built in England, in Ireland, or in the colonies, manned and commanded by British subjects. Thus, if a French or Dutch merchantman appeared in Massachusetts Bay, offering to sell at a great bargain his cargo of spices or silks, the merchants of Boston were legally bound not to buy of him. (2) Certain "enumerated" articles such as sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and, later, rice and furs, could be exported only to England. A Virginia planter, wishing to send tobacco to a French snuff-maker, would have to ship it to London in an English ship, pay duties on it there, and then have it reshipped to Havre. (3) All goods imported into the American colonies from Europe must come by way of England

¹ Subsequent to the Act of 1651, important Navigation Acts were passed in 1660, 1663, 1672, and 1696.

and must pay duties there. Silks might be more expensive after they had paid customs duties in London and had followed a roundabout route to Virginia, but the aspiring colonial dame was supposed, in paying dearly, to rejoice that English ships and English sailors were employed in transporting her finery.

Some of the regulations of colonial industry and trade were doubtless beneficial to the colonists, but they were made by the British parliament, without sanction of the colonial legislatures, and in the main they were prejudicial to the economic interests of the colonies. Yet for some time they were tolerated by the colonists for three chief reasons.

Why
British Inter-
ference
Was Long
Tolerated
by the
Colonists

In the first place, for many years they had been very poorly enforced. During his long ministry, from 1721 to 1742, Sir Robert Walpole had winked at infractions of the law and had allowed the colonies to develop as best they might under his policy of "salutary neglect." Then, during the colonial wars, it had been inexpedient and impossible to insist upon the Navigation Acts; and smuggling had become so common that respectable merchants made no effort to conceal their traffic in goods which had been imported contrary to provisions of the law.

Secondly, the colonies would gladly endure a good deal of economic hardship in order to have the help of the mother-country against the French. So long as France was in possession of Canada and French governors at Quebec were sending their Indian allies southward and eastward to burn New England villages, it was very comforting to think that the mother-country would send armies of redcoats to conquer the savages and defeat the French.

Thirdly, the American colonists were too weak and too divided, prior to the second half of the eighteenth century, to make common and effective cause against the restrictions which the mother-country put upon their trade and industry. The thirteen colonies were distinct entities, disparate in origin, in social structure, in religious composition, and in economic activity. The southern colonies—Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia—were almost wholly agricultural, and their chief products were plantation-grown rice, indigo, and tobacco. New York and Pennsylvania produced corn and timber. In New England, although there were

many small farmers, the growing interest was in trade and manufacture. The social distinctions were equally marked. The northern colonists were middle-class traders and small farmers, with democratic town governments, and with a marked pride in education. In the South, gentlemen of good old English families lived like feudal lords among their slaves and cultivated manners quite as assiduously as morals. Of forms of the Christian religion, the Atlantic coast, as we have seen, presented a bizarre mixture. In the main, New England was emphatically Calvinist and sternly Puritan; Virginia, chiefly Episcopalian (Anglican); and Maryland, partly Roman Catholic. Plain-spoken Quakers in Pennsylvania, Presbyterians in New Jersey, Baptists in Rhode Island, elsewhere sprinklings of French Huguenots and German Lutherans and Mennonites, added to the confusion.

Between colonies so radically different in religion, manners, and industries, there could be at the outset little harmony or co-operation. It would be hard to arouse them to concerted action. Financial coöperation was impeded by the fact that the paper money issued by any one colony was not worth much in the others. Military coöperation was difficult because, while each colony might call on its farmers temporarily to join the militia in order to repel an Indian raid, the militia-men were always anxious to get back to their crops and would obey a strange commander with ill grace. The 1,300,000 colonists, even if united, could hardly be a match for the ten million inhabitants of Great Britain: and in wealth and resources they could scarcely dream of rivalling the mother-country.

With the conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763, however, conditions were materially changed. (1) The fear of the French was no longer present to bind the thirteen colonies to the mother-country. (2) During the wars the colonies had grown not only more populous (they numbered about 2,000,000 inhabitants in 1763) and more wealthy, but also more self-confident. Recruits from the northern colonies had captured Louisburg in 1745 and had helped to conquer Canada in the last French war. Virginia volunteers had seen how helpless were General Braddock's redcoats in forest-warfare. Experiences like these gave the provincial riflemen pride and confidence. Important also was the Albany Congress of 1754,

**Changed
Situation
in 1763**

in which delegates from seven colonies came together and discussed Benjamin Franklin's scheme for federating the thirteen colonies. Although the plan was not adopted, it set colonists to thinking about the advantages of confederation and so prepared the way for subsequent union.

The conclusion of the French and Indian War coincided roughly with the accession of George III to the British throne and with his determination to bring the Tories and his other "friends" to power and to prove himself an even greater patriot than William Pitt. But it coincided also with a grave financial crisis, for the expense of the recent war had been very great and the British public debt amounted in 1763 to what was then the enormous sum of £140,000,000. Consequently, when George III in 1763 called George Grenville¹ to head the cabinet, king and minister were agreed that the American colonies must shoulder part of the mother-country's burdens of finance and national defense. Great Britain, they argued, had undergone a costly war to defend the colonists on the Atlantic coast from French aggression. Moreover, the acquisition of the extensive Mississippi and St. Lawrence valleys had placed new burdens on Great Britain, for, in order to prevent renewed danger from French, Spaniards, or Indians, at least ten thousand regular soldiers would be needed at an annual expense of £300,000. What could be more natural than that the colonists, to whose benefit the war had redounded, and to whose safety the army would add, should pay at least a part of the expense?

Grenville, the new minister, accordingly proposed that the colonists should pay about £150,000 a year,—roughly a half of the estimated total amount,—and for raising the money, he championed two special finance acts in the British parliament. The first was the Sugar Act of 1764. Grenville recognized that a very high tariff on the importation of foreign sugar-products into the colonies invited smuggling on a large scale, was therefore generally evaded, and yielded little revenue to the government. As a matter of fact, in the previous year, Massachusetts merchants had smuggled 15,000 hogsheads

**Britain's
Financial
Exigencies**

**The Sugar
Act**

¹ George Grenville, prime minister from 1763 to 1765, was a Whig, but as the leader of a faction hostile to Pitt he was willing to serve the king in cooperation with the Tories.

of molasses¹ from the French West Indies. Now, in accordance with the new enactment, the duty was actually halved, but a serious attempt was made to collect what remained. For the purpose of the efficient collection of the sugar tax, the Navigation Acts were revived and enforced; British naval officers were ordered to put a peremptory stop to smuggling; and magistrates were empowered to issue "writs of assistance" enabling customs collectors to search private houses for smuggled goods. The Sugar Act was expected to yield a third of the amount demanded by the British ministry.

The other two thirds of the £150,000 were to be raised under the Stamp Act of 1765. Bills of lading, official documents, deeds, wills, mortgages, notes, newspapers, and pamphlets were to be written or printed only on special stamped paper, on which the tax had been paid. Playing cards paid a stamp tax of a shilling; dice paid ten shillings; and on a college diploma the tax amounted to £2. The Stamp Act bore heavily on newspaper-publishers, pamphleteers, lawyers, bankers, and merchants. These were influential groups in the colonies, and it was they who promptly inspired a widespread unrest throughout the colonies. A Boston lawyer, James Otis by name, created the popular slogan, "taxation without representation is tyranny."

It was argued by colonial lawyers generally that the colonists were true British subjects and that taxation without representation was a flagrant violation of the "immemorial rights of Englishmen." They might be taxed by their own colonial legislatures, in which they were represented, but not by the British parliament, in which they were not represented.

Many colonists, less learned than the lawyers, were unacquainted with the subtleties of the argument, but they were quite willing to be persuaded that in refusing to pay taxes levied by the parliamentary oligarchy in England they were contending for a great principle of liberty and self-government. Opposition to the stamp tax spread like wildfire and culminated in a Congress at New York in October, 1765, comprising delegates from nine colonies. The "Stamp Act Congress," as it was called, issued a declaration of rights--the rights of trial by

¹ Large quantities of molasses were used in New England for the manufacture of rum

jury¹ and of self-taxation—and formally protested against the Stamp Act.

Parliament might have disregarded the declaration of the Congress, but not the tidings of popular excitement, of mob violence, of stamp-collectors burned in effigy. Moreover, colonial boycotts against British goods—“non-importation agreements” —were effective in creating sentiment in England in favor of conciliation. Taking advantage of Grenville’s resignation, a new ministry under the marquess of Rockingham, a liberal Whig, procured the repeal of the obnoxious Stamp Act in March, 1766.² While the particular tax was abandoned, a Declaratory Act was issued, affirming the constitutional right of parliament to legislate for the colonies.

Colonial
Opposi-
tion

This right was asserted again in 1767 by a brilliant but reckless chancellor of the exchequer, Charles Townshend, who, without the consent of the other ministers, put through parliament the series of acts which bear his name. His intention was to raise a regular colonial revenue for the support of colonial governors, judges, and other officers as well as for the defense of the colonies. For these purposes, import duties were laid on glass, lead, painters’ colors, paper, and tea; the duties were to be collected by English commissioners resident in the American ports; and infractions of the law in America were to be tried in courts without juries.

The Towns-
hend Acts

The Townshend Acts brought forth immediate and indignant protests. Colonial merchants renewed and extended their non-importation agreements. Within a year the imports from Great Britain fell off by more than £700,000. The customs officers were unable or afraid to collect the duties strictly, and it is said that in three years the total revenue from them amounted to only £16,000. Troops were despatched to overawe Boston, but the angry Bostonians hooted and hissed the “lobsterbacks,” as the redcoats were derisively styled, and in 1770 provoked them to actual bloodshed—the so-called “Boston Massacre.”

At this crucial moment, King George III chose a new prime minister, Lord North, a Tory gentleman of ability and charm, unfailingly humorous, and unswervingly faithful to the king.

¹ The right of trial by jury had been violated by British officials in punishing smugglers.

² Rockingham retired in July, 1766.

Among his first measures was the repeal (1770) of the hated Townshend duties. Merely a tax of threepence a pound on tea was retained, in order that the colonies might not think that parliament had surrendered its right to tax them. Lord North even made an arrangement with the East India Company whereby tea was sold so cheaply that it would not pay to smuggle tea from the Dutch.

But the colonists would not now yield even the principle of parliamentary taxation.¹ They insisted that were they to pay this tax, trifling as it might be, parliament would assert that they had acknowledged its right to tax them, and would soon lay heavier burdens upon them. They, therefore, refused to buy the tea, and on a cold December night in 1773 a number of Boston citizens dressed up like Indians, boarded a British tea ship, and emptied 342 chests of tea into the harbor.

Boston's "tea-party" brought punishment swift and sure in the famous five "intolerable acts" (1774). Boston harbor was closed; Massachusetts was practically deprived of self-government; royal officers who committed capital offenses were to be tried in England or in other colonies; royal troops were quartered on the colonists; and the province of Quebec was extended south to the Ohio River, cutting off vast western territories claimed by Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia. The so-called

The Quebec Act Quebec Act, which authorized this extension of a formerly French province, was particularly important.

For in seeking to assure the loyalty of the Catholic French Canadians to Great Britain, it granted to the Catholic Church in Quebec a toleration and even a privileged position which were in sharp contrast with the harsh anti-Catholic laws in Britain and the other British possessions and which evoked special opposition from the Puritan masses in the thirteen colonies.

In the same year (1774) the first Continental Congress of delegates from all the colonies² met in Philadelphia "to deliberate and determine upon wise and proper measures, to be by them recommended to all the colonies, for the recovery and establishment of their just rights and liberties, civil and religious, and the restoration

¹ Despite the fact that the colonists had regularly been paying import duties levied by the British parliament on molasses and on foreign wine.

² Except Georgia.

of union and harmony between Great Britain and the colonies." The Congress despatched a petition to George III and urged the colonists to be faithful to the "American Association" for the non-importation of British goods.

Neither king nor colonists would yield a point. William Pitt, now earl of Chatham, spoke in the House of Lords in behalf of compromise, and Edmund Burke, another eminent Whig, urged conciliation on the House of Commons. But like the king, the majority in the British parliament were adamant; they knew that the colonial claims were novel and revolutionary and believed that firmness would lead to their withdrawal. As for the colonists, a growing faction among them—the so-called "patriots"—were already fast drifting into actual rebellion. In April, 1775, fighting took place between American colonials and English soldiers at Lexington in Massachusetts. A month later a second Continental Congress, this one representing all the thirteen colonies, addressed a final petition to George III for the redress of colonial grievances and entrusted the command of the combined colonial militias to a Virginia country gentleman, George Washington.

Impasse
between
Britain
and the
Colonies,
and Prepara-
tions
for War

Not all the American colonists were rebellious. A fairly large group, called "Loyalists," or "Tories," remained loyal to the king and did what they could to uphold the British cause in America; and probably an even larger number of colonists were at first indifferent to what went on or undecided as to which cause to espouse. The group of "Patriots," however, were energetic and were determined, if necessary, to defy the British parliament as well as the British king; and circumstances enabled them to increase in number and gain eventual control of the colonial legislatures and the continental congresses.

Division
in the
Colonies
between
"Patri-
ots" and
"Loyal-
ists"

In the excitement, "Patriots" circulated throughout the colonies many an inflammatory pamphlet. One of the most famous, entitled Common Sense, was from the pen of Thomas Paine, a radical Englishman who had emigrated to America and who sympathized with the colonists. The time had come, Paine declared, for the colonies to decide on a "final separation" from England. There was no reason for remaining loyal to the king. Monarchs, after all, had no "divine right" to rule their fellow

men. Kings were merely "crowned ruffians." If they had unlimited powers, they were despots; whereas if they were constitutional monarchs, as the king of England was supposed to be, they were useless and expensive figureheads. Paine's pamphlet was published at Philadelphia in January, 1776, just at the moment when George III, turning a deaf ear to all colonial petitions and conciliatory pleas, was calling for troops to crush the rebellion in America. In such circumstances, *Common Sense* and other similar pamphlets were bought and read by thousands of colonists, who, no longer feeling veneration for the British monarchy or empire, felt justified in fighting for complete independence. What had begun as opposition to taxes at once assumed the character of a political revolution.

On 4 July, 1776, the Continental Congress took thoroughly revolutionary action. It unanimously adopted a "declaration of independence," which had been written for the most part by a Virginia country gentleman, Thomas Jefferson, and which expressed principles utterly at variance with those not only of divine-right monarchy but also of any unpopular government. (1) All men— not merely Englishmen— are endowed by their Creator, the Declaration boldly asserted, with certain "inalienable rights," among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. (2) All governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed"—a succinct statement of the principle of popular, as opposed to aristocratic, government. (3) Hence it is perfectly justifiable to overthrow a tyrannical government and to establish a popular one, by force of arms if necessary; in other words, there is a "right of revolution."¹ On these bases of inalienable rights, popular sovereignty, and the right of revolution, the declaration solemnly concluded that "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states."

In America the declaration of independence was joyously acclaimed by all "Patriots." In New York City they pulled down the leaden statue of King George and molded it into bullets. Everywhere they exiled or silenced the "Tories," revolutionized

¹ Thomas Jefferson later went so far as to argue that frequent revolutions are a good "medicine" for democracy. "The tree of liberty," he said, "must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants."

the several colonial governments, and insisted that the "United States" were no longer a group of rebellious colonies but a belligerent nation entitled to recognition and aid from other nations.

In Great Britain, parliament and king vied with each other in denouncing the declaration as an act of treason and persisted in viewing the colonists as rebels. In vain did the revolutionary colonists seek the mediation of English Whigs and the coöperation of the French Canadians in Quebec and Nova Scotia. These latter had only recently become British subjects, and it was imagined that they would welcome the opportunity to join in a revolt against Great Britain. But the French Canadians were Catholic, and they had reason to believe that their religion and their nationality would be safer in the custody of far-away Britain than in that of the nearer and more radically Protestant United States; Quebec and Nova Scotia remained loyal.

It is possible, in the circumstances, that the thirteen colonies might have been reduced to submission within a short time, for many of the well-to-do colonists were opposed to war with England, and the French Canadians were more disposed to fight for Britain than for the British colonists. Even had the "people of the United States" supported the struggle unanimously, they were no match for Great Britain in wealth, population, or naval power. As it was, however, Great Britain allowed the revolution to get under full headway before making a serious effort to suppress it. Then, in 1776, a force of about 30,000 men, many of whom were mercenary German soldiers, commonly called "Hessians," was sent to occupy New York.

The Revolutionary War in America

Thenceforward, the British pursued aggressive tactics, and inasmuch as their armies were generally superior to those of the colonists in numbers, discipline, and equipment, and besides were supported by powerful fleets, they were able to possess themselves of the important colonial ports of New York, Philadelphia, and Charlestown,¹ and to win many victories. On the other hand, the region to be conquered was extensive and the rebel armies stubborn and elusive. Moreover, the colonists possessed a skillful leader in the person of the aristocratic Virginian planter who has already been mentioned as taking a part

¹ Name changed to Charleston in 1783.

in the French and Indian War.¹ At first, George Washington was criticized for bringing the gravity of a judge and the dignified bearing of a courtier to the battlefield, but he soon proved his ability. He was wise enough to retreat before superior forces, always keeping just out of harm's way, and occasionally catching his incautious pursuer unawares, as at Princeton or Trenton.

One of the crucial events of the war was the surrender of the British General Burgoyne with some six thousand men at Saratoga, in October, 1777, after he had invaded New York from Canada. At that very time, Benjamin Franklin, a public-spirited citizen of Philadelphia, was in Paris attempting to persuade France to ally herself with the United States. Franklin's charming personality, his "republican plainness," his shrewd common sense, as well as his knowledge of philosophy and science, made

**French
Interven-
tion in
behalf
of the
Americans**

him welcome in the "enlightened" salons of Paris; but the French government, although still smarting under the humiliating treaty of 1763, would not yield to his persuasion until the American victory at Saratoga seemed to indicate that the time had come to strike.

An alliance with the United States was concluded, and in 1778 war was declared against Great Britain.

The war now took on a larger aspect. In its scale of operations and in its immediate significance the fighting in the colonies was dwarfed by a world-wide conflict. In the attack

**Spanish
and Dutch
Inter-
vention**

upon Great Britain, France was presently joined by Spain (1779). Holland, indignant at the way in which Great Britain had tried to exclude Dutch traders from

commerce with America, joined the Bourbons (1780) against their common foe. Other nations, too, had become alarmed at the rapid growth and domineering maritime policy of Great Britain. Since the outbreak of hostilities, British captains and admirals had claimed the right to search and seize neutral vessels trading with America or bearing contraband of war. Against this dangerous practice, Catherine II of Russia protested vigorously, and in 1780 formed with Sweden and Denmark the "armed neutrality of the North" to uphold the protest with force, if necessary. Prussia, Portugal, the Two Sicilies, and the Holy Roman Empire subsequently pronounced their adherence

¹ See above, p. 408.

to the Armed Neutrality, and Great Britain was confronted by an almost unanimously hostile Europe.

In the actual operations against Great Britain only three nations figured—France, Spain, and Holland; and of the three the last named caused little trouble except in the North Sea. More to be feared were France and Spain, for by them the British Empire was attacked in all its parts. For a while in 1779 even the home country was threatened by a Franco-Spanish fleet of sixty-six sail, conveying an army of 60,000 men; but the threat was dissipated. Powerful Spanish and French forces, launched against Great Britain's Mediterranean possessions, succeeded in taking Minorca, but were repulsed by the British garrison of Gibraltar.

The
War of
American
Inde-
pendence

On the continent of North America the insurgent colonists, aided by French fleets and French soldiers, gained a signal victory. An American army under Washington, a French army under the Marquis de Lafayette, and a French fleet suddenly closed in upon the British general, Lord Cornwallis, at Yorktown, Virginia, and compelled him to surrender in October, 1781, with over 7,000 men. The capitulation of Cornwallis virtually decided the struggle in America, for all the reserve forces of Great Britain were required in Europe, in the West Indies, and in Asia.

Matters were going badly for Great Britain until a naval victory in the Caribbean Sea partially redeemed the day. For three winters an indecisive war had been carried on in the West Indies, but in 1782 thirty-six British ships, under the gallant Rodney, met the French Count de Grasse with thirty-three sail of the line near the group of islands known as "the Saints," and a great battle ensued in April, 1782. During the fight the wind suddenly veered around, making a great gap in the line of French ships, and into this gap sailed the British admiral, breaking up the French fleet, and, in the confusion, capturing six vessels.

While the battle of "the Saints" saved the British power in the West Indies, the outlook in the East became less favorable. At first the British had been successful in seizing the French forts in India (1778) and in defeating (1781) the native ally of the French, Hyder Ali, the sultan of Mysore. But in 1782 the balance was evened by victories of the French admiral Suffren.

Unsuccessful in America, inglorious in India, expelled from



Minorca, faced with revolt in Ireland, and weary of war, England was very ready for peace, but not entirely humbled. Was she not still secure in the British Channel, victorious over the Dutch, triumphant in the Caribbean, unshaken in India, and unmoved on Gibraltar? Defeat, but not humiliation, was the keynote of the treaties (1783) which Great Britain concluded, one at Paris with the United States, and one at Versailles with France and Spain.

By the treaty of Paris the former thirteen colonies were recognized as the sovereign and independent United States of America, bounded on the north by Canada and the Great Lakes, on the east by the Atlantic, on the west by the Mississippi, and on the south by Florida. Important fishing rights on the Newfoundland Banks and the privilege of navigation on the Mississippi were extended to the new nation.

The
Treaty
Paris

Had it not been for the disastrous battle of "the Saints," France might have dictated very favorable terms in the treaty of Versailles, but, as it was, she merely regained Tobago in the West Indies and Senegal in Africa, which she had lost in 1763.¹ Better than France fared Spain. By the treaty of Versailles she received the island of Minorca and the territory of Florida, which then included the southern portions of what later became the American states of Alabama and Mississippi.

The
Treaty of
Versailles

Holland, the least important participant in the war, was not a party to the treaty of Versailles, but was left to conclude a separate treaty with Great Britain in the following year (1784). The Dutch not only were deprived of commercial stations in India, but also were forced to share with British merchants the valuable trade of the Malay archipelago.

The vital significance of the War of American Independence (1776-1783) lay not, however, in territorial gains of Spain and France or in commercial losses of Holland or even in diminished dominion of Great Britain. It lay rather in the fact that the war had assured the success of the American Revolution and had thereby, perhaps indirectly but none the less really, dealt a decisive blow both at divine-right monarchy and at aristocratic privilege.

Success
of the
American
Revolution

The American Revolution carried the principles of the earlier

¹ See above, p. 412.

British Revolutions—the Puritan Revolution and the “Glorious” Revolution—to a more nearly logical conclusion. It got rid of a king not merely, but of kingship itself. It exalted parliamentary, that is representative, government, but it exalted even more the people represented. Far more clearly than the earlier revolutions, it invoked the doctrines of popular sovereignty and national self-determination. As the British revolutions of the seventeenth century had paved the way for the triumph of aristocracy in Britain, so the American revolution of the eighteenth century paved the way for the trial of democracy in the United States—and in the world.

From the American Revolution and its attendant international war emerged a new independent nation—the United States,—**Emergence of the United States of America** basing its right to existence on popular sovereignty and successful revolution. Its very origin rendered the United States a horrible example for absolute monarchs and a source of inspiration for oppressed peoples. Besides, the United States, once free, set about the task of governing itself in an ever more democratic manner.

At first the state legislatures, which supplanted the colonial assemblies, were not very democratic. The franchise was limited to males and usually to landowners and the more well-to-do classes. Often, too, there was a religious qualification, excluding all except Protestants or a particular kind of Protestants from the privilege of voting. Only men of considerable wealth were eligible for election to important offices in the several states. On the other hand, there was no hereditary aristocracy, no House of Lords, and the governors, instead of being appointed by a far-away king or minister, were elected by the people or by the legislatures. And gradually (and relatively rapidly) religious disabilities and property qualifications were done away with in one state after another of the American Union.

In the meantime, noteworthy progress was made in federating the several states into a strong republican nation. Here again, **Federating the United States** the first steps were halting. In 1777 the revolutionary Continental Congress had drafted “articles of confederation” for the United States, but, as finally ratified by the several states in 1781, they provided for hardly more than a loose permanent alliance of thirteen nations. In 1787, however, a firm step was taken. A fairly detailed written

constitution was drafted at Philadelphia, welding the thirteen nations into one. While each state was to manage its own local affairs and legislate on some matters, a strong federal government was set up, with wide but specified powers and with agencies of its own: a House of Representatives, chosen by popular vote; a Senate, representing the states; an elected President, to execute the laws; and a Supreme Court, to act as court of last resort. In 1791 this federal constitution was amended so as to guaranty personal liberties, and the extraordinary provision was inserted, doubtless because of the multiplicity of religions in America, that "congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

The Constitution of 1789

In 1789 the new constitution went into effect, and George Washington became the first president of the United States.

Under Washington's guidance and with the assistance of an able group of cooperating statesmen, the novel constitution proved practicable and gathered prestige at home and abroad. This prestige was heightened in 1797 when Washington, having served two terms of four years each without evincing the slightest inclination to make himself a dictator, voluntarily relinquished the presidency and was succeeded in strictly legal manner by a hard-working Massachusetts "patriot," John Adams. Thereafter the presidency continued to be handed on from one person to another, sometimes after most exciting electoral campaigns, but never contrary to constitutional prescription; and as a guaranty against dictatorship it became a binding custom that no president should serve for more than eight years.

The Presidency of George Washington

Here, then, as a result of the American Revolution, was a nation breaking with many political traditions of the past and exemplifying to the modern world that it could endure and prosper on hitherto untried experiments. The United States was the first nation of large extent and fairly large population to establish an enduring republic, to abolish monarchy utterly, and to ban titled aristocracy. It was the first nation to effect a federalism which would happily conserve a liberal degree of local autonomy while conferring real strength and power on the central government. It was the first nation to adopt and acquiesce in a written constitution

Novel Experiments of the United States

for its basic and permanent law. It was the first nation formally to treat religion as a purely personal matter, to entertain the idea that the state should not establish any particular religion, and to achieve an equitable and lasting separation of church and state.¹

It was impossible that these experiments in America by people of European descent should not make a profound impression on Europe. They were curious and interesting in themselves. They attracted special attention by reason of the direct participation of several European powers in the protracted War of American Independence. And they were based on ideas which had already been advanced by various European philosophers and which were therefore familiar to the more serious-minded reading public of Europe.²

In Great Britain itself the American Revolution had significant repercussions. Some British statesmen, as we have seen, had urged a policy of conciliation rather than of coercion in respect of America, and a considerable number of Britishers had felt all along that the American colonists were contending for principles which were at least implicit in the British revolutions of the preceding century. Thomas Paine was an Englishman, and he and other radical Britishers were quite convinced that the new American experiments were much more in accord with the political doctrines of such great English philosophers as Locke and Milton than was the existing British government, with its unrepresentative parliament, its privileged aristocracy, and its selfish restrictions on religion, trade, and outlying possessions. And the failure of the existing British government to put down the American Revolution, while it temporarily increased the enmity or scorn of many Englishmen for the United States and its experiments, provided ample opportunity for disgruntled politicians and popular leaders in Britain to assail the government and to demand changes in its personnel and policies.

¹ This so far as the federal government was concerned. Some of the individual states in the American Union retained an established church for some time after 1791. Connecticut, for example, maintained Congregational Protestantism as its established religion until 1818. Some of the states, too, imposed on Catholics, Jews, Unitarians, or such radical sects as that of the Quakers, restrictions which were only gradually removed.

² See below, pp. 538-543.

As a result of attacks in parliament and growing unpopularity in the country, George III was obliged in 1782 to part with the Tory cabinet of Lord North and to choose ministers who were more willing to make some concession to popular demands for reform.

Several reforms were promptly effected within the British Empire. The Irish parliament was accorded an almost independent position in 1782, and in 1793 the right to vote for members of it (though not the right to sit in it) was extended to Catholic Irishmen on the same footing as to Protestant Irishmen. Seven years later, the Irish parliament was fused with the British parliament on terms similar to those on which a century earlier the English and Scottish parliaments had been fused.¹ Thereafter, for more than a hundred years, Great Britain was officially known as the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," and Irishmen were represented, along with Englishmen and Scots, in the parliament at Westminster.

Irish Par-
liamentary
Develop-
ments

Meanwhile, in 1784, the British parliament created a "board of control" to supervise the government of India and to see that the East India Company did not abuse its privileges.² Also in 1784, the colony of New Brunswick was set off from Nova Scotia³ and granted a representative assembly. And in 1791 the Quebec Act of 1774 was amended by dividing the remaining province of Quebec into the two colonies of Upper Canada (Ontario) and Lower Canada (Quebec) and by providing in each for the sharing of government between a royal governor and an elected assembly.

Political
Changes
Elsewhere
in the
British
Empire

Within Great Britain the outstanding demand was for parliamentary reform. It was perceived, even by radical Britishers, that popular sovereignty and what amounted to republicanism could be secured in Britain without laying violent hands on the king. The king was already severely limited by the cabinet, and

¹ See below, pp. 711-712.

² See above, p. 416, note.

³ Prince Edward Island had already been detached from Nova Scotia (1769) and erected into a separate colony. The setting off of New Brunswick was a result of a very large influx of American "loyalists" from the revolting British colonies to the south. Probably 40,000 "loyalists" settled permanently in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, and a large but indeterminate number found refuge in what later was called Ontario.

the cabinet was controlled by the majority in parliament. But the parliament, as we have seen, was essentially an aristocratic oligarchy indulging in the most unclean bribery. It pretended to represent the nation. Why not purify it and make it really representative of the nation? Such action would but complete the British revolutions of the seventeenth century and bring British government into harmony with the best of the new principles exemplified by the American Revolution.

**Demand
for Par-
liamentary
Reform in
Great
Britain**

It was naturally among the Whigs that advocates of parliamentary reform appeared. They had been outdone at bribery by George III and his Tory friends; they would seek to reëstablish their influence and parliament's by championing reform. Of these Whigs, Charles James Fox (1749-1806) was at first the most prominent. Fox, the younger son of a nobleman, had been taught to gamble by his father and took to it readily. Cards and horse-racing kept him in chronic bankruptcy; many of his nights were spent in debauchery and his mornings in bed; and his close association with the rakish heir to the throne was the scandal of London. In spite of his eloquence and ability, the loose manner of his life militated against the success of Fox as a reformer. His friends knew him to be a free-hearted, impulsive sympathizer with all who were oppressed, and they entertained no doubt of his sincere wish to bring about parliamentary reform, complete religious toleration, and the abolition of the slave-trade. But strangers could not easily reconcile his private life with his public words, and were antagonized by his frequent lack of political tact.

**Charles
James
Fox**

Despite drawbacks Fox furthered the popular cause, not only by denouncing reactionary officials and policies, but also by espousing an advanced programme of parliamentary reform. This programme was to be the objective of political "radicals" in Great Britain for several generations. It comprised six demands: (1) votes for all adult males, (2) each district to have representation proportionate to its population, (3) payment of the members of parliament so as to enable poor men to accept election, (4) abolition of property qualifications for members of parliament, (5) adoption of the secret ballot, and (6) parliaments to be elected annually.

Such reform seemed less likely of accomplishment by Fox than

by a younger statesman, William Pitt (1759-1806), second son of the famous earl of Chatham. When but seven years old, Pitt had said: "I want to speak in the House of Commons like papa." Throughout his boyhood and youth he had kept this ambition constantly before him; he had studied the classics, practiced oratory, and learned the arts of debate. At the age of twenty-one, he was a tall, slender, and sickly youth, with sonorous voice, devouring ambition, and sublime self-confidence. He secured a seat in the Commons from one of the "rotten boroughs," and speedily won the respect of the House. He was the youngest and most promising of the politicians of the day. At the outset he was a Whig.¹

William
Pitt, the
Younger

By a combination of circumstances young Pitt was enabled to form an essentially new political party—the "New Tories." By his scrupulous and well-advertised honesty and especially by his earnest advocacy of parliamentary reform, he won to his side the unrepresented middle class and the opponents of corruption. On the other hand, by accepting from King George III an appointment as chief minister, and holding the position in spite of a temporarily hostile majority in the House of Commons, Pitt won the respect of the Tory country squires and the clergy, who stood for the king against the Whigs. And finally, being quite moral himself (if chronic indulgence in port wine be excepted), and supporting a notoriously virtuous king against corrupt politicians and against the gambling Fox, Pitt became an idol of all lovers of "respectability."

The "New
Tories"

In the parliamentary elections of 1784 Pitt won a great victory. In that year he was prime minister with loyal majorities in both houses of parliament, with royal favor, and with the support of popular enthusiasm. He was feasted in Grocers' Hall in London; the shopkeepers of the Strand illuminated their dwellings in his honor; and crowds cheered his carriage.

Reform seemed to be within sight. The horrors of the slave-trade were mitigated, and greater freedom was given the press. Bills were introduced to abolish the representation of "rotten" boroughs and to grant representation to the newer towns.

¹ For a picture of Pitt in his youth, see the portrait by Gainsborough, below, p. 712.

Before parliamentary reform could be effected in Great Britain, however, events occurred which transferred the centre of revolutionary interest from Britain to France and transformed English statesmen and parliamentarians from mild reformers into rabid defenders of the *status quo* in state, church, and society.¹ In 1789 popular representatives of the French nation not only disobeyed their king but confiscated the property of the church and abrogated the privileges of the upper classes.

It is, indeed, a cardinal point in modern history that France, which had been for two centuries, under the Bourbons, the leading exponent of divine-right monarchy and social inequality, should now suddenly veer about and within four years produce a political and social revolution more fundamental in character and more far-reaching in results than any or all of the British revolutions which we have sketched in this chapter.

That this was so, was due in some part to the influence of the American Revolution. France had actively aided the rebellion of the thirteen British colonies, doubtless for selfish reasons so far as her officialdom was concerned, but with mounting altruistic sympathy on the part of many of her people. The numerous young Frenchmen, some of them of noble family, who, like Lafayette, had sought romantic adventure in fighting beside Washington in the New World, returned home with equally romantic tales of the strength of republican virtue and the beauty of democratic simplicity. The truth of such tales seemed to be confirmed, moreover, by the demeanor of Benjamin Franklin, who was long the envoy of the United States at the French court and who was immensely popular with the French people. - No wonder that Frenchmen who longed for liberty followed American developments with interest and studied with care the declaration of independence and the constitution of the United States.

The French Revolution was due also, and in far greater part, to a many-sided intellectual revolution which, almost imperceptibly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had been diverting the minds of thoughtful Europeans, especially thoughtful Frenchmen, from what was old to what was new. There was now a cult of the novel, and a really burning faith that the millennium

¹ For the change in Pitt's attitude, see below, pp. 710-712.

might be achieved in this world in the very near future. At least to the political side of this intellectual revolution, the British revolutions of the seventeenth century, as well as the American revolution of the eighteenth century, had made prime contributions. We must explain in some detail what we mean by the "intellectual revolution"



CHAPTER XI

THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION



ZEALOUS revolutionaries in Britain and in British colonies effected during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as we have just seen, startling changes in political institutions and usages. But quite as zealous revolutionaries throughout Europe brought about, during those same centuries, even more startling changes in the attitude of intellectuals toward science, religion, and art. These changes we term, for lack of a better phrase, the Intellectual Revolution.

The Intellectual Revolution, concerning what men thought more than what men did, is far more difficult to describe and evaluate than are the political revolutions of British Puritans and American Patriots. It lacked precise dates and such dramatic episodes as a royal beheading, a declaration of national independence, or a military victory. It was not confined to one realm of thought, such as politics (though in a sense the thought in back of the British political revolutions was part of the Intellectual Revolution), or to one country, such as Britain (though Britain played an important rôle in the Intellectual Revolution). It was broad and involved. In origin it was broadly European, rather than narrowly British. In effect it sooner or later involved the whole world.

There can be no doubt, however, of the high significance of the Intellectual Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Reaching its climax in the "Enlightenment"—a movement more epochal than "Renaissance" or "Reformation"—it gave to natural science its modern vogue, it originated modern social science, it put forth a new metaphysics of natural law and human progress, it emphasized a new humanitarianism, it profoundly affected religion, and in art it at once plucked many fair fruits of classicism and planted the fertile seeds of romanticism.

I. PROGRESS OF NATURAL SCIENCE

Very real progress was made during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in knowledge of the natural universe. The outlines of this progress we shall presently indicate, but at the outset it should be borne in mind that the progress was not in itself revolutionary. It was primarily the testing and detailing of theories already advanced by such scientists of the preceding era as Copernicus, Galileo, and Harvey.¹ The really revolutionary aspect of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was less its content than its extension and popularization. Natural science, hitherto the avocation of relatively few intellectuals, now became the vocation of numerous curious persons; it was more rigorously separated from magical arts and superstitious practices; and large numbers of the upper and middle classes became "science-conscious." Kings and princes patronized natural science; most intellectuals or would-be intellectuals toyed with natural science. Natural science displaced theology (and even classical studies) as the centre of intellectual inquiry and interest.

The growing interest in natural science was both reflected and promoted by the rise of a new institution, the "scientific academy." At Rome, in 1603, a group of scientists and persons interested in science had founded the so-called **Scientific Academies** Academy of Lynxes, and similar scientific academies were established in the seventeenth century in other urban centres, notably in Italy and Germany. In 1662 the English "Royal Society" was chartered by Charles II "to examine all systems, theories, principles, hypotheses, elements, histories, and experiments of things natural, mathematical, and mechanical, invented, recorded, or practiced by any considerable author, ancient or modern." In 1666 an earlier French "Academy of Sciences" was reorganized, through Colbert's influence, by Louis XIV. As offshoots of the English academy, a philosophical society was organized in Massachusetts in 1683 and another at Dublin in 1684. Beginning in 1665, both the English and French academies published scientific periodicals, entitled respectively the *Philosophical Transactions* and the *Journal des Savants*; and before

¹ See above, pp. 122-131.

long. other scientific journals were emanating from Italy, Germany, Denmark, and other countries.

In addition to the academies, observatories and museums multiplied. The famous astronomical observatory of Tycho Brahe at Uraniborg¹ was surpassed in equipment by the observatories founded at Paris in 1667 and at Greenwich (in England) in 1675. To the establishment of museums an impetus was given by Robert Boyle's discovery, about 1663, that organic substances can be preserved and rendered visible in alcohol. The first great museum was built at Oxford in 1683 to house natural curiosities which a certain Dr. Ashmole had collected and presented to the university.

Natural science was certainly becoming popular. Innumerable persons dabbled in it and most statesmen patronized it. The brother of Louis XIV had a laboratory and amused himself with "curious experiments." Charles II of England sought diversion in a "chymical laboratory." John DeWitt, grand pensionary of Holland, was immensely interested in science; he himself invented chain-shot and wrote ably on statistics. Samuel Pepys, the London gossip and gad-about, obtained enough scientific reputation to be elected president of the Royal Society. And a host of publicists increased their income by writing books on science for the vulgar.

Among the large number of persons who were devoted during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the acquisition of "natural knowledge," certain first-rate investigators contributed notably to its advance. One of these was a Frenchman, René Descartes (1596-1650), a younger contemporary of Galileo,² a curious combination of sincere practicing Catholic and original daring rationalist, a man who travelled all over Europe, serving as a soldier in the Netherlands, in Bavaria, and in Hungary, living in Holland, dying in Sweden, with a mind as restless as his body. Now interested in mathematics, now in philosophy, presently absorbed in physics and in the proof of man's existence, he held fast throughout his whole career to the faith that science depends not upon the authority of books but upon the observation of facts. "Here are my books," he told a visitor, as he pointed to a basket of rabbits that he was about to dissect.

**Observa-
tories and
Museums**

**Popularity
of Natural
Science**

**Mathe-
matics and
Physics**

**René
Descartes**

¹ See above, p. 124.

² See above, pp. 124-125.

Descartes's *Discourse on Method* (1637) and *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), in conjunction with the writings of Lord Bacon¹ and the work of Galileo, were the starting point of the intellectual revolution of modern times.

Descartes laid the foundations of modern critical philosophy by distinguishing sharply between soul and body, mind and matter. Mind and soul, to him, were strictly immaterial and independent of the physical universe, but matter and body were reducible to mechanism and susceptible of mathematical and physical analysis. In his work, Descartes was not merely a theorist. By his invention of analytical geometry, the union of geometry and algebra, he provided useful new mathematical methods for physicists, and by his efforts to apply the known principles of terrestrial mechanics to celestial phenomena he stimulated the interest of scientists in the physical and mathematical aspects of astronomy.

Another first-rate physicist of the age was Christian Huygens (1629-1695), a Dutchman. In his twenties he became a European celebrity by his invention of the pendulum-clock, and his ensuing physical researches, described in his *Horologium oscillatorium* of 1673 and dedicated to Louis XIV, added much to Galileo's work in dynamics. Assuming the principle of the conservation of kinetic energy, Huygens advanced the theory of a centre of oscillation and thereby suggested a new method applicable to many mechanical and physical problems. He also determined the relation between the length of a pendulum and its time of vibration, and in his findings on circular motion he anticipated some of the conclusions of Newton. Huygens was always interested in optics: he improved the telescope, constructed an almost perfect achromatic eye-glass, and contended that light travels in waves.

Christian
Huygens

Isaac Newton (1642-1727), born in the year in which Galileo died, was undoubtedly the most illustrious scientist of the age. He profited from what Galileo, Descartes, and Huygens had done, and by his own indefatigable industry and insight he provided a synthesis which was to be widely accepted and to prove basic for physical science during the next two centuries.

Isaac
Newton

Coming from a humble family in a little English village, New-

¹ See above, p. 133.

ton at an early age gave evidence of uncommon intelligence and curiosity. His boyish ingenuity in the construction of windmills, kites, and water-clocks he soon turned to other and more serious ends. At the university of Cambridge he astonished his professors and showed such great skill in mathematics that he was given a professor's chair when he was twenty-seven. Later in life he was knighted by Queen Anne and is known in history, therefore, as Sir Isaac Newton.

As a mathematician, Newton invented the infinitesimal calculus,¹ established the binomial theorem, developed much of the theory of equations, and introduced literal indices. In mathematical physics, he calculated tables by which the future position of the moon among the stars could be predicted—an achievement of the utmost value in navigation. He created hydrodynamics, including the theory of the propagation of waves, and made many improvements in hydrostatics. In optics, he showed by long and careful experimentation that the rainbow is caused by the decomposition of white light, lights of different colors having different refrangibility, the most refrangible being violet and the least refrangible being red, and he foreshadowed the much later doctrine that the structure of light is essentially atomic.

But it was in the realm of mechanics that Newton won his greatest claim to distinction. In a very famous book, the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, commonly called the Principia, he set forth in 1687, with a wealth of mathematical evidence, the "law of gravitation," that "every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force varying inversely as the square of the distance between them and directly proportional to the product of their masses." Here was a sensational and revolutionary explanation not only of how apples fall to the ground but of how the earth and other planets are held in their orbits about the sun. It was an explanation at once universal and simple, and at the same time highly useful. Lagrange, the foremost mathematician of the eighteenth century, described the *Principia* as the greatest production of the human mind, and Newton as the greatest genius that had ever lived and likewise the most fortunate, "for there is but one

¹ The calculus was invented simultaneously and independently by the German philosopher and mathematician Leibnitz (1646-1716).

universe, and to be the interpreter of its laws can happen to but one man in the world's history."

Newton's "law of gravitation" certainly served to establish the Copernican system of astronomy on a firm basis,¹ and thenceforth the advance of astronomical science was rapid. Three English astronomers were particularly important. Edmund Halley (1656-1742), a close friend of Newton, charted a large number of fixed stars, especially in the southern hemisphere, and by calculating the orbit of a comet which he observed in 1682 he predicted its return in 1759--a prediction which was verified to the intense satisfaction of the ensuing generation. James Bradley (1693-1762), an Anglican clergyman and professor of astronomy at Oxford, discovered the aberration of light in 1729 and the nutation of the earth's axis in 1748. William Herschel (1738-1822), a musician by profession,² a self-taught mathematician, a most assiduous observer of the heavens, and a perfecter of the telescope, detected spots on the sun, mountains on the moon, and polar snow on Mars, and in 1781 discovered the planet Uranus. Herschel was made royal astronomer to King George III in 1782, and in the following year published a work, *Motion of the Solar System in Space*, which was hailed as the climax of Newton's *Principia*.

A number of useful inventions attended and aided the development of physical science. Optical instruments such as the telescope and microscope were constantly being improved. Torricelli (1608-1647), an Italian, discovered the principle of the barometer in 1643. Otto von Guericke (1602-1686), a German, invented the air-pump in 1650. Fahrenheit (1686-1736), a German who lived mainly in England and Holland, perfected the mercury thermometer and invented the system of reckoning temperature which is still in use in English-speaking countries. Some experimentation was carried on with electricity and magnetism, and in 1746 two professors of the university of Leyden

¹ John Milton was the last important celebrity to entertain serious doubt of the truth of the astronomy of Copernicus and Galileo.

² William Herschel was not an Englishman by birth. He was born in Hanover, the son of a musician in the Hanoverian Guard of George II, and it was as a military bandsman himself that he came to England in 1755. He was organist at Bath when he began his researches in astronomy. In his last years he was knighted, and he left a son, Sir John Herschel, who was one of the most celebrated scientists of the nineteenth century.

invented the so-called Leyden jar for the storage and sudden discharge of electric energy. It was from experiments with the Leyden jar that Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) identified thunderbolts with electricity and was led to invent the lightning-rod.

If Newton was the father of modern physics, the father of modern chemistry was Robert Boyle (1627-1691). Boyle, a son of an Irish nobleman, achieved special fame by discovering in 1660 the "law" that the volume of gas varies inversely with the pressure, but he did many other things for the advancement of chemical science. He distinguished a mixture from a compound; he prepared phosphorus and collected hydrogen in a vessel over water; he manufactured wood alcohol; he studied the form of crystals as a guide to chemical structure; and, most important, in his book *The Sceptical Chymist, or Chymico-Physical Doubts and Paradoxes* (1661) he protested vigorously against the traditional union of chemistry with alchemy or medicine and at the same time advanced the modern idea of chemical "elements" and even foreshadowed the atomic theory.

Despite the work of Boyle, the development of chemistry was retarded by the prevalence of misunderstanding of the phenomena of flame and combustion. When an article is burned, something seems to escape. This something, for long identified with sulphur, was imagined to be a peculiar principle of fire and early in the eighteenth century was named "phlogiston" by a German physician to the king of Prussia. The phlogiston theory dominated most chemical thought and experiment during the century.

Gradually, however, a truer and more fruitful theory was evolved. The beginning of the change appears in the work of Joseph Black, a Scot, who, about 1755, discovered that a certain gas, distinct from atmospheric air, was combined in the alkalies. This gas he named "fixed air"; it was what we nowadays call carbon dioxide or carbonic acid. About ten years later, Henry

Cavendish (1731-1810), son of an English nobleman and one of the richest men of his time, reported his discovery of "inflammable air," or hydrogen. Then in 1774 Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), an English Unitarian clergyman, discovered still another gas and showed both that it supported combustion and that it was needful for the

respiration of animals; this gas the French chemist Lavoisier (1743-1794) named oxygen. Whereupon Cavendish demonstrated that air was a compound of oxygen and nitrogen and that water was composed of oxygen and hydrogen. Finally, Lavoisier, the greatest chemist of the age, repeated the experiments and systematized the results of Black, Priestley, and Cavendish. He disposed utterly of the phlogiston theory. He also showed that, although matter may alter its state in a series of chemical actions, its quantity remains the same. This "quantitative analysis" meant that the principles which had been established by Newton in physics could be carried over into chemistry. It paved the way for a tremendous development of chemistry during the next century.¹

In mineralogy there was steady progress from the sixteenth century, and early in the eighteenth century fossils, which had long been noted and discussed, were described and classified with some fulness. But the father of modern geology, as distinct from mineralogy, was an eighteenth-century product - James Hutton (1726-1797), a Scot who was in turn lawyer, physician, scientific farmer, and student of rocks. Hutton conceived larger ideas than were entertained by the mineralogists of his day. He studied the nature and formation of various minerals and rocks with a view to grasping their origin and thus understanding the history of the earth. In 1785 he communicated a summary of his observations and theories to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in a paper entitled *Theory of the Earth, or an Investigation of the Laws Observable in the Composition, Dissolution and Restoration of Land upon the Globe*. In this remarkable work, it was maintained that past changes in the earth's crust could be explained by those which could still be seen in process, and that the changes of almost countless centuries was evidenced in contemporary geological formations. Thus, according to Hutton, the earth was not a comparatively recent creation, as was commonly inferred from the Biblical account, but the outcome of a long and gradual evolution. It was a really revolutionary doctrine, but it was

¹ In the meantime, while the phlogiston theory was being undermined by Lavoisier, a Swedish chemist, Scheele (1742-1786), was laying the foundation for nineteenth-century photography. Scheele discovered the element chlorine and was the first to prepare glycerine.

phrased in a somewhat heavy and obscure style and did not attract much attention until the nineteenth century.

There was marked development of the biological and medical sciences during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In **Medicine and Biology** medicine, considerable progress followed Harvey's significant work at the beginning of the seventeenth century.¹ Malpighi (1628-1694), a modest and industrious professor at the university of Bologna, learned much from vivisection and the microscope and confirmed Harvey's theory of the blood by actually observing capillary circulation. Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689), an eminent practitioner of London, propounded the theory that disease, and especially fever, is nature's effort to expel morbid material from the system. Morgagni (1682-1771), a brilliant Italian physician and professor, summed up his post-mortem autopsies in a work on morbid anatomy so illuminating as to win for him the title of father of pathology. Albrecht von Haller (1707-1777), Swiss anatomist and romantic poet and philosopher, earned fame as the leading physiologist of the age. Bichat (1771-1802), a very able French physician, studied tissues and founded the science of histology.

Biological science developed apace. Malpighi, famous in medicine, was one of the first, in his *Anatomy of Plants* (1671), to describe the sexuality of plants and to compare the function of vegetable leaves with that of animal lungs. Robert Hooke (1635-1703), son of an Anglican clergyman, discovered the cellular structure of plants and invented the name "cell." Anthony van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), a Dutch manufacturer of microscopes, discovered protozoa and bacteria and was the first to describe the human spermatozoon. Jan Swammerdam (1637-1680), son of a druggist at Amsterdam, wrote in 1685 a *General History of Insects*, which was later enlarged and republished after his death as *The Bible of Nature* (1737); he traced the metamorphosis from caterpillar or maggot to pupa and from pupa to the perfect form, and he compared the change of tadpole into frog with change in the human foetus.

¹ On Harvey, see above, p. 130.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Descartes, from a painting by Frans Hals (1580-1666). On Hals, see below, p. 563.



RENATUS DESCARTES NOBILIS GALLVS PERRONI DOMINVS SUMMVS MATHEMATICVS & PHILOSOPHVS

*Talis erat vultu NATVRÆ FILIVS ORAS
Qui Mente in Naturæ viscera pandit iter
Affluantq; suis quævis miracula causis.
Atque tam reliquam solus in orbe fuit.*

F. Mele pinxit I. Süsserhoff sculpsit P. Goussier incidit



In 1660 John Ray (1627-1705), son of an English blacksmith and himself an Anglican clergyman and university preacher, published the first of a series of works on systematic botany, which led to a great improvement in classification and also to progress in morphology. Subsequently Ray turned his attention to animals and made use of comparative anatomy. Here again his work marked an advance towards a natural classification of quadrupeds, birds, and insects. Botany

The most famous classifier of existing botanical knowledge, however, was a Swede, Carl von Linné (1707-1778), usually cited by his Latinized name of Linnæus. The classification of Linnæus, based on the sex organs of plants, was widely accepted and for long supplanted Ray's. It is interesting to note that Linnæus, during his wanderings among the Laplanders in search for arctic plants, was struck by the obvious differences between human races and that in his *System of Nature* he placed man with apes, lemurs, and bats in the order of "primates," and subdivided man into four groups according to color and other characteristics. Linnæus

A corresponding development in the knowledge of animals was stimulated by the accounts of numerous overseas travellers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by the collection of rare and strange beasts in various royal menageries in Europe. The summation of this knowledge was achieved by the celebrated French zoologist Buffon (1707-1788) in his encyclopedic *Natural History of Animals*. Buffon, in treating of all animal life, could not close his eyes to striking zoological resemblances between man and the lower animals, and he ventured the remark, which he afterwards withdrew, that, were it not for the express statements of the Bible, one might be tempted to seek a common origin for the horse and the ass, the monkey and the man. Zoölogy
Buffon

Buffon in zoölogy, Linnæus in botany, Haller in physiology, Hutton in geology, Lavoisier and Boyle in chemistry, and Newton in mathematics and physics—these were the high lights in the development of natural science during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. No wonder that "science" was obsessing the minds of a multitude of lesser men.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Buffon, from a sculptured bust by Jean Antoine Houdon (1740-1828). On Houdon, see below, p. 736.

2. THE NEW METAPHYSICS—THE “ENLIGHTENMENT”

“Science,” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, involved not merely an increase of detailed knowledge about the physical universe, a multiplying of laboratory experiments, a closer and wider observation of the heavens, the rocks, the insects, the birds, and the beasts. It involved also a great access of speculation about the nature of being, of first causes and of God—about that branch of philosophy which since Aristotle's time had been called metaphysics—speculation about what is beyond or above the physical.

Throughout the Christian era, prior to the seventeenth century, metaphysics had been allied with theology, and factual findings of scientists had pretty generally been related to the accepted metaphysics of Christian revelation. From the seventeenth century, however, metaphysics became allied with natural science, and the new physical knowledge was increasingly identified with a philosophy which, in its questioning of any supernatural revelation, was non-Christian if not anti-Christian. If in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries natural science itself underwent a development rather than a revolution, it was accompanied by a philosophy, a metaphysics, which was amply revolutionary.

To the new metaphysics, outstanding contributions were made by several philosophers who were intensely interested in natural science. Reference has already been made to two sixteenth-century heralds of the new movement: Lord Bacon (1561-1626) and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600).¹ The most influential philosopher during the seventeenth century was René Descartes (1596-1650), whose scientific interests and achievements have been indicated above.² Descartes was the real founder of modern critical philosophy. He showed how much unverified assumption lay beneath the earlier scholastic philosophy and he endeavored to substitute for it a philosophy which should be based entirely on human consciousness and experience and should range from the direct mental apprehension of God to observation and experiment in the physical world. He regarded mathematics as the “queen of the sciences” and its methods as

¹ See above, pp. 132-134.

² See above, pp. 498-499.

Substitution of Natural Science for Theology as Basis of Metaphysics

applicable to the others. He formulated a complete dualism, a sharp distinction between soul and body, mind and matter. Soul and mind (and God) are true, said Descartes, for "whatever I am clearly and distinctly conscious of is true," but they are fundamentally different from the phenomena of nature which are material and susceptible of direct observation. As an Anglican bishop remarked a century later: "The Cartesian [system, that is, the philosophy of Descartes] attempts to explain all the phenomena of nature by matter and motion; requiring only that God should first create a sufficient quantity of each, just enough to set Him at work, and then pretends to do the business without his further aid." Descartes was himself a professing Catholic Christian, but his philosophic system, while affirming the existence of God and the human soul, left no room for the interposition of the supernatural in the natural.

A contemporary with Descartes was Pierre Gassendi (1592-1650), a Franciscan teacher of mathematics at various French universities and a man more concerned with the "laws" of natural science than with theology. While maintaining that Catholic dogmas were true "in a higher sphere," Gassendi gave a purely naturalist interpretation to the physical universe and to bodily man. Knowledge, he said, is obtained solely from the senses, and matter, which is all-important to the senses, is atomic, uncreated, and indestructible.

Pierre
Gassendi

One of the most original philosophers of the seventeenth century was the Englishman Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Born in the year of the Spanish Armada, educated at Oxford, and travelling much on the Continent, he knew Galileo and Gassendi and read Montaigne and Descartes and he lived on to a vigorous and very pugnacious old age. An ardent royalist in politics, he took the side of Charles I in the Puritan Revolution and is most enduringly known as the author of the *Leviathan* (1651) and other writings in support of monarchical absolutism. But Hobbes liked to think of himself as the greatest mathematician of the age and he waxed especially indignant at others' doubts as to his success in squaring the circle. In all his writings he was severely logical and mathematical and provocatively cocksure. In philosophy, he was a thoroughgoing materialist; all nature, to him, was but a machine. And he was more radical—or more consistent—than Descartes. He admitted

Thomas
Hobbes

of no dualism, but insisted that in the human mind and soul, as in the physical universe, there are only matter and motion. He was one of the first to apply materialism to psychology.

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), a Jewish lens-grinder of Amsterdam and a very gentle soul, was as confident as Descartes of the power of human reason, and as sceptical as Hobbes of Descartes's dualism. Spinoza, however, did not follow Hobbes in reducing everything to matter. Rather, he advanced the notion that everything is both body and spirit; body and spirit are the same phenomena considered under different attributes of space and thought. Substance and ideas, nature and God, are identical: this was the essence of Spinoza's philosophy of pantheism, and to it was attached the corollary that free will is an illusion of consciousness. Orthodox Jews were scandalized by Spinoza; they repudiated and persecuted him; but he enjoyed the favor and patronage of John DeWitt, the grand pensionary of Holland.

Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), a German publicist and librarian and an important figure in the development of higher mathematics, was of a peculiarly conciliatory turn of mind and was ever endeavoring to effect compromises. He labored long to compose the differences between Catholics and Protestants. He labored longer to reconcile Christianity with the newer developments in natural science. In the latter rôle, he put great stress on "pure reason" and urged that by means of it man could transcend the finite, material universe. He also revived the ancient atomic theory somewhat as Spinoza had revived Greek pantheism, but in place of physical atoms he introduced the conception of spiritual atoms (which he called "monads") as the constituent elements of the universe. Thereby, instead of materializing the soul, as Hobbes had done, Leibnitz spiritualized matter.

Contemporary with Leibnitz (and Newton) was the Englishman **John Locke** (1632-1704), who was trained as a physician but is famous as a political philosopher and as a psychologist. Leaving Locke's political philosophy for later discussion, we may here indicate the metaphysical implications of his psychology, using the words of a distinguished historian of the present day: "Locke originated modern

introspective psychology. Others had looked inward, but, one and all, they had dogmatized after only a hasty glance. Locke quietly and steadily watched the operations of his own mind, just as he watched the symptoms of his patients. He came to the conclusion that knowledge is the discernment of agreement or disagreement, either of our thoughts among themselves or between our thoughts and the external phenomena independent of them. —A man is sure that he himself exists, and as he had a beginning there must, to account for it, be a First Cause, which is God the Supreme Reason. But relations between our thoughts and external things can only be established by indication from particular instances. Thus knowledge of nature can be only an affair of probability, liable to be upset by the discovery of new facts.”¹ Locke, like Newton and Leibnitz, was a professing Protestant Christian, but in his work on the *Reasonableness of Christianity* he essayed to divorce religion from the miraculous and the unknown and to base it on human experience and reason.

As the eighteenth century advanced, the new metaphysics became more and more dogmatically sceptical. George Berkeley (1684-1753), a famous Anglican bishop in Ireland and a sojourner in America, accepting the physical science of Newton as true and as governing the world, asked in effect, “What is the world of which it is true?” and pointed out that the only answer is that it is the world revealed by the senses, and it is only the senses which make it real. In a word, Bishop Berkeley held that reality exists in the realm of thought alone; outside of men’s minds there is no material universe.

Bishop
Berkeley

Then David Hume (1711-1776), a Scottish student of history and economics as well as of natural philosophy, proceeded to turn Berkeley’s arguments around and to deny the reality of mind. To Hume, all that is real is a succession of “impressions and ideas.” “Thought is merely a practical instrument for the convenient interpretation of our human experience; it has no objective or metaphysical validity of any kind.” Consequently, according to Hume, it is impossible

David
Hume

¹ W. C. D. Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion* (1931), p. 207. Locke’s psychology is set forth mainly in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690).

to establish the reasonableness of God or religion, and the proper sphere of human thought is merely human experience.

Finally, there was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant, the grandson of a Scottish immigrant in Prussia, was born at Königsberg, was educated there, was professor of philosophy there, and died there, never having travelled during his eighty years more than forty miles from Königsberg. He was always interested in natural science; he was a physicist of no little competence; and he wrote on such various topics as the causes of earthquakes, the different races of man, volcanoes in the moon, and physical geography. But it was as philosopher and moralist that Kant won lasting fame. Largely devoid of sentiment and humor, he was exceedingly conscientious and systematic, truthful, kind-hearted, and high-minded; and he ardently wished everyone to be as good as he was. But how to base moral duty on the metaphysics of natural science rather than on the metaphysics of revealed religion, that was the problem with which Kant grappled in a profusion of abstruse philosophical writings. His solution of the problem was idealism—the doctrine that while we cannot know that God exists, our moral sense requires us to recognize the transcendental existence of God and likewise the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul. If the conception of natural science in Hume's mind had meant truth without God, in Kant's mind it meant God without truth. Kant's idealism closed the eighteenth century and ushered in the nineteenth.¹

We have here touched on only a few first-rate philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. They differed, as we have seen, about details, but all of them—and the numerous other philosophers of the age whom we have not mentioned by name—were under the spell of contemporaneous development of the physical sciences. Indeed, all scientists of the time were inclined to be philosophical, and all philosophers to be “scientific.” Hence, the philosophers ignored, if they did not attack, the theological bent of their scholastic predecessors; they would have resented being called “metaphysical.” Yet they were metaphysical, in the sense that they were immensely interested in deriving “higher truths” from

¹ On subsequent developments of Kantian “idealism,” see below, pp. 739-740.

their knowledge of the material universe, and they showed in their "systems" that modern natural science can be as metaphysical as medieval Christian theology.

What the philosophers (and scientists) of the age thought themselves to be was "enlightened." There can be no doubt that they were enlightened, far more than the scholars of any earlier age, about the operations of nature, and that consequently they tended to be sceptical of previous explanations of natural phenomena. But as "enlightened" men they had to have their own explanations, and these explanations, though they may seem a bit too simple to us in the twentieth century, were part and parcel of the "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century.

The New
"Enlightenment"

It was not only first-rate philosophers and scientists who became "enlightened" in the twofold sense of knowing more about the physical universe and making novel generalizations concerning it. By the eighteenth century most intellectuals and would-be intellectuals were "enlightened." Many aristocrats and gentlemen farmers, many bankers and business men, many writers and publicists, many professors, preachers and priests prided themselves on being "enlightened." Even the divine-right monarchs, the despots of the age, were becoming "enlightened."¹

The roots of the new "enlightenment" lay in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but its greatest spread and most obvious fruitage were so characteristic of the eighteenth century that it is this century which is known as the age of the "enlightenment." To the majority of eighteenth-century thinkers, the development of natural science was associated with a new metaphysics which, as interpreted to common folks, involved four major concepts. (1) It involved the substitution of the natural for the supernatural, of science for theology, and the assumption that the whole universe of matter and mind is guided and controlled by ineluctable *natural law*. (2) It exalted and almost deified *human reason*, which could and, according to the rational moral sense, should be utilized by the individual to discover the laws of nature and to enable him to conform his life to them. (3) Assuming that man would use his reason and obey the natural law,

Eighteenth-Century Concepts of "Enlightenment"

¹ On "enlightened" despotism, see above, pp. 346-356.

it promised the speedy progress and ultimate perfectibility of the human race. (4) It included a tender regard for the natural rights of the individual and a predilection for the social blessings of an enlightened humanitarianism.

In the light of these metaphysical concepts, a good deal of criticism was indulged in, much of it destructive and some of it constructive. Institutions and practices which through age had acquired any degree of popular veneration in the domains of religion, politics, and society were ruthlessly dissected by the "enlightened" in order to discover if they were rational, if they were in harmony with natural law, if they promoted human progress, guaranteed individual rights, and conferred immediate benefits on the world. It was this acutely critical spirit which somewhat paradoxically combined with a lively faith in the new metaphysical concepts to produce the most notable features of the Intellectual Revolution.

3. PIETISM AND DEISM

Religion was particularly affected by the development of science and the rise of the new metaphysics. The effects were far more apparent, however, in the eighteenth century—in the Age of Enlightenment—than in the seventeenth century.

In the seventeenth century scientists and philosophers still professed some definite form of Christianity, and all Europe seemed to be as traditionally and fanatically Christian as it had been in the sixteenth century. Protestants and Catholics continued their mutual denunciations and persecutions.¹ Protestants continued to quarrel among themselves and to subdivide into dogmatic sects. Catholics redoubled their missionary efforts overseas, and various Protestant sects, with similar zeal, began to undertake "foreign missions."

In the second half of the seventeenth century, a new religious tendency appeared within Christendom, especially within Protestant Christendom. It was probably less the effect of the scientific spirit than the outcome of a growing popular distaste for inter-Christian warfare and for theological subtleties which, it was believed, produced such warfare. If Christians would but cease to argue about dogmas and

**Rise of
Pietism**

¹ It was in the seventeenth century, we may recall, that the Thirty Years' War was waged, in part over religion, between Protestants and Catholics in Germany;

content themselves with pious feelings and with earnest efforts to lead Christ-like lives, they would realize the true inwardness of Christianity and would behave more seemly before the world. This was the essence of the new tendency which now appeared and which is known as pietism.¹

A prominent apostle of pietism was the German Lutheran pastor, Philip Spener (1635-1705), who published in 1675 a book entitled *Heartfelt Longings for a Reform of the True Evangelical Church which will be pleasing to God*. Spener urged his fellow Lutherans to abandon debatable dogmas and fiery polemics and to become practical mystics. He minimized the importance of a visible church and insisted that religion should be highly individual, an indwelling of the Holy Ghost in each believer, a vital force moving the emotions and making for personal piety and holiness. Spener's ideas were espoused by a considerable number of Lutherans—and Calvinists too—during the ensuing generation, and throughout the eighteenth century pietism had able champions and numerous disciples on the Continent of Europe, especially in Germany. Leibnitz was something of a pietist; it was in the spirit of pietism that he sought to effect a rapprochement not only among Protestants but also between Protestants and Catholics. Kant was reared in pietist surroundings and was notably affected by pietism; he could not think that his failure to prove the reality of God militated against the reality of his inner consciousness or of his moral duties.

One of the noteworthy pietists of the Continent was Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), the gifted son of a professor of Lutheran theology at the Swedish university of Upsala. Having acquired an international reputation as an able scientist mathematician, physicist, geologist, and engineer. -Swedenborg received in 1745 a "divine revelation" and devoted himself thenceforth to the writing of that the Puritan Revolution, with its intolerances, occurred in Great Britain; that the British Parliament enacted the most drastic penal laws against Catholics; and that Louis XIV revoked the edict of Nantes which, a century before, had accorded qualified toleration to French Protestants.

¹ This tendency had been foreshadowed by some of the Radical Protestant sects of the sixteenth century, and, among Calvinists, by the Netherlander Jacob Hermansen (Arminius) and his disciple, Simon Bischof (1583-1643), who questioned Calvin's doctrine of predestination and protested against putting too much emphasis on dogmas. See above, p. 182, note.

**Philip
Spener
and the
German
Pietists**

**Sweden-
borg and
Mystic
Pietism**

a large number of mystical works on "divine love and wisdom" and the "new Jerusalem."¹

Contemporary with Spener was the Englishman George Fox (1624-1691), the founder of the sect of "Friends"—or Quakers, as they were popularly labelled. Fox possessed no such training or position as Spener or Swedenborg had; he was not an "intellectual"; he was self-taught, self-opinionated, and given to superstition. But he was sincere, earnest, and very much of a pietist. To him existing churches were despicable (he called them "steeple houses"); external observances were silly (he denounced conventional manners as "hat honor"); and war was anathema. In England, in Scotland, in America, he preached his doctrine that Christianity is purely a spirit, a strictly personal experience, an "inner light," independent of state, clergy, and temples, a matter of plain speaking and plain living, of refusing to take oaths or bear arms. The sect which Fox created was long despised, but it counted among its members such a respected aristocrat as William Penn (1644 1718),² and its basic pietism, if not its revolutionary attitude toward war and intolerance, was soon influential among Radical Protestants, such as Baptists and Congregationalists, and even among some Anglican Protestants.

At first the Anglican Church did not harbor much pietism. Indeed, throughout the eighteenth century, the established church of England was marked by a coldness and formality and by an abject dependence upon the state and the landed aristocracy, which seemed utterly at variance with pietism. Yet, as the Anglican Church became more obviously the property of the upper classes and its worship more perfunctory, the opportunity of converting its lower-class adherents to emotional pietism grew greater. The opportunity was seized by John Wesley (1703 1791).

Wesley, the son of an Anglican clergyman, while studying at Oxford University in 1729 became the leader of a small group of fellow students who called themselves the Holy Club and who

¹ After Swedenborg's death, his disciples organized the "Church of the New Jerusalem," which, commonly called the Swedenborgian Church, has subsisted to the present day as a mystically pietist Protestant sect.

² See above, p. 396, and below, p. 553.

were nicknamed "Methodists" by reason of their methodical abstinence from frivolous amusements and their methodical cultivation of fervor, piety, and charity. Leaving England a few years later as an Anglican missionary to the Indians in Georgia, Wesley was thrown in close contact with some German Protestant missionaries from whom he learned of Continental pietism, and on his return to England in 1738 he experienced an essentially pietist conversion. "I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given me that He had taken away *my* sins, even *mine*, and saved *me* from the law of sin and death." Wesley was tireless in propaganda. For fifty years he travelled an average of 5,000 miles a year, mainly on horseback, rising at four o'clock every morning, filling every moment with work, living most frugally. He preached some 40,000 sermons, and the number of hymns written by himself and his brother Charles ran into the thousands. By hymns, sermons, and "methodist rules," he was ever exhorting to personal piety. Christianity, to him, was a matter of individual feeling and experience, and anyone was a Christian who "accepted" Christ and gave evidence of living according to Christian principles.

John
Wesley
and the
Methodists

Wesley and all his early associates were Anglicans, and for a time they tried to keep Methodism within the Anglican Church. But their emotionalism, their neglect of ritual, their puritanism, and their appeal to the lower classes served gradually to make a breach between them and the established church. Gradually the followers of Wesley formed an independent body—known as Wesleyans or Methodists—governed by "conferences" of preachers and by bishops (in the Lutheran, rather than the Anglican or Catholic, sense). Methodist churches grew up rapidly in Great Britain, and in 1771 Francis Asbury (1745-1816) crossed the Atlantic and inaugurated in America that itinerant preaching and those "revival meetings" which have made the Methodists the most numerous body of Protestant Christians in the United States.

The example of Wesley, Asbury, and other Methodist leaders had significant pietist effects on most of the non-conformist sects in the English-speaking countries, and the stressing of emotion and piety at the expense of reason and dogma became

increasingly prevalent among Baptists, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians. It also had effect on the Anglican Church, for, before the end of the eighteenth century, a large number of Anglican priests and some Anglican bishops were attempting to compete with Methodists in preaching to the lower classes and in emphasizing the "evangelical" character of Christianity. The "evangelical" movement, a type of pietism prominent in Anglican and non-conformist churches in the latter part of the eighteenth century, was accompanied by the rise of "sunday-schools" and missionary enterprise.

The Evangelical Movement in the Anglican Church

Somewhat analogous to pietism among Protestants was the movement called quietism which spread in the seventeenth century in Catholic Christendom. Its foremost exponent was Miguel de Molinos (1640-1697), a Spanish priest resident in Rome; and for a time the famous French bishop Fénelon (1651-1715) actively encouraged it. The Quietists taught that while the Catholic Church could start a man on the way to salvation, true holiness depended not upon church or dogma or reason but upon a direct indwelling of God in the individual conscience and a passive acceptance by each believer of whatever befell him. For a time quietism promised to transform Catholicism, as pietism was transforming Protestantism. Bishops and cardinals and even Pope Innocent XI appeared to sympathize with the teachings of Molinos. Eventually, however, the Jesuits, backed by King Louis XIV of France, questioned the orthodoxy of quietism. Molinos was convicted of heresy in 1687 and died in prison. Fénelon was censured by the pope in 1699, and quietism, as a definite movement, died out early in the eighteenth century.

Molinos and Catholic Quietists

An even more pietist movement within the Catholic Church was Jansenism, so named from its originator, Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638). Jansen was a Catholic bishop in the Spanish Netherlands who taught that above and beyond the ministrations of the church every Christian, to be saved, must experience a "conversion" and must lead a life of holiness. After the death of Jansen a number of his French disciples possessed themselves of a sort of monastery and convent at Port-Royal in the vicinity of Paris, and from Port-Royal as a centre a famous group of brilliant and pious

Jansen, Pascal, and the Jansenists

apostles propagated Jansenism in France and the Netherlands. Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), a celebrated mathematician and physicist, was an eloquent defender of the movement. Here again, however, the Jesuits, backed by King Louis XIV, raised the question of heresy, accusing the Jansenists of adopting Protestant practices and doctrines, including Calvin's principle of predestination.¹ In 1709 Louis XIV broke up the convent and monastery at Port-Royal, and four years later the pope, by a famous document, the bull *Unigenitus*, definitively condemned Jansenism as heretical. Jansenism was thus cut off from the Catholic Church, but it continued to distinguish the sect of "Old Catholics" which under the leadership of the bishop of Utrecht repudiated the papacy and which has survived in the Dutch Netherlands to the present day.

Even in Russia, within the orbit of Orthodox Christendom, something like pietism appeared in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The attempt of the patriarch of Moscow in 1654 to revise the liturgy of the Russian Church was followed by the secession of a large number of "Old Ritualists," or "Old Believers," among whom several dissenting sects arose. All of these were hostile to religious "innovations," but as they developed fanatical opposition to the established church, some of them came in time to regard the individual conscience, rather than any ecclesiastical organization, as the supreme authority in religion and the sole guide of spiritual life. For example, in the eighteenth century appeared among dissenting peasants a sect known as the Doukhobors, who, like the English Quakers, stressed the "inner light," deprecated the state, and repudiated military service as un-Christian. The Doukhobors and similar Russian sects were persecuted alike by the tsars and by the Orthodox Church.²

At the very time when the preaching of pietism was resounding throughout Protestant Christendom and was echoing in Catholic and Orthodox lands, when Doukhobors and Jansenists and Methodists and Quakers and pietist Lutherans were minimizing dogma and reason and were emphasizing experience and emotion, many intellectuals in Europe were turning from traditional Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, in an opposite direction.

The "Old Believers" in Russia

The Doukhobors

Pietism Paralleled by Scepticism and Rationalism

¹ See above, p. 195.

² See above, p. 364.

For, especially among intellectuals and would-be intellectuals, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were characterized by an unprecedented growth of rationalistic scepticism concerning the fundamentals of "revealed" or "supernatural" religion, particularly of the Christian religion.

To the rise of such scepticism, three factors contributed. One was disgust with the endless squabbles among Christian churches and sects—the same factor which had operated in behalf of the pietist movement. A second, more peculiar to rationalist scepticism, was admiration for what was heard of non-Christian peoples and religions overseas. In the seventeenth century, and to a greater extent in the eighteenth, European intellectuals were signally impressed by reports from travellers, missionaries, and scholars of the naked savages in America who lived in simple piety, virtue, and happiness without priests, bibles, or creeds—without any knowledge of Christianity—and of the highly cultured natives of India and China whose religions were represented as being both more beneficent and more rational than Christianity. It may have been optimistic and a bit uncritical thus to attribute supreme virtue to the "noble savage" and the "Chinese sage," but these more or less hypothetical beings were invoked with telling effect as censorious critics of European faiths and morals. Finally, there can be no doubt that the contemporary development of natural science and especially the rise of the new natural philosophy promoted rationalist scepticism. If the universe was a huge machine, operating in accordance with natural law, what place was left in it for a supernatural religion? Was not religion itself, like physics, simply natural? Could not true religion, like the law of gravitation, be discovered by the human reason, without recourse to "revelation" or "authority"?

The idea of "natural religion" was not new. It had long been held by Christian theologians. The greatest Catholic theologian of the middle ages, St. Thomas Aquinas, had argued, for example, that underlying all revealed religions (Christianity included) is a natural and therefore universal religion in accordance with which rational human beings share fundamental beliefs in God, in immortality, in the moral law, and in future rewards and punishments; Christianity is a revelation, supplementary to, but

not in contradiction with, natural religion. In the seventeenth century, however, with the growing emphasis on nature and natural law, certain radical exponents of natural religion began to inveigh against Christianity. Either Christian doctrines coincide with the rational tenets of natural religion, in which case they are superfluous, or they constitute irrational additions, in which case they are superstitious.

One of the earliest and most remarkable champions of this view was an English nobleman, Baron Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648). Cherbury was educated at Oxford, and through contacts with scientists and philosophers of the age, especially the Frenchman Gassendi, he developed a critical and sceptical bent. At the same time his wealth and social position, his courtliness and poetical gifts, and his devotion to the royal pretensions of James I and Charles I protected him in the free expression of his religious opinions. In two treatises—*On Truth as it is distinguished from Revelation, from Probability, from Possibility, and from Falsehood*, printed in 1624, and *On Religion of the Heathen*, published posthumously in 1663,—Cherbury maintained that religious truth resides in the rational common sense of mankind, that natural religion, consisting of rational belief in God, in virtue, and in immortality, is all that common sense dictates, and that religious “revelations” are inventions of priests.

Herbert of
Cherbury

The scepticism of Cherbury was reënforced by the rise of biblical criticism. Hobbes, the political philosopher and materialist psychologist, not only denied the “inspiration” of the Old Testament but also questioned its historical accuracy; he insisted that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses and that other books were written long after the events which they pretended to narrate. Spinoza, the Jewish philosopher and pantheist, also applied historical criticism to the Old Testament, and, like Hobbes, maintained its late origin and its mythological nature. A French Catholic scholar, Richard Simon by name, published a *Critical History of the Old Testament* in 1680 and a *Critical History of the New Testament* in 1689. Thenceforth there was considerable scepticism among intellectuals as to the sacredness of the Scriptures and as to the truth of the wonders and miracles recorded in them. In 1790 a German scholar, Griesbach, submitted the Gospels of

Rise of
Biblical
Criticism

Matthew, Mark, and Luke—the “Synoptic Gospels,” he called them—to searching, rationalist criticism; and two years later an English scholar, Evanson, pointed to the theological character of the Fourth Gospel as proof that it could not have been written by the Apostle John.

The new sceptical attitude toward Christianity had its original seat in England, and in England it flourished among statesmen, aristocrats, and even Anglican clergymen in the latter part of the seventeenth century and during the first half of the eighteenth. It was sceptical in respect of the supernatural and miraculous elements in Christianity, but it was remarkably credulous in respect of the natural and rational elements. As a movement it did not look toward the destruction of Christianity, but rather toward a radical reformation—a revolutionized conception of Christianity. Traditional beliefs in the virgin birth, in the resurrection, in the divinity of Christ, as well as in the divine inspiration of the Bible and the divine authority of the church were to be rejected, but only to strengthen belief in the God of Nature, in natural law and natural morals, and in the authority of human reason. Christianity was to be transformed not into atheism (the creed that there is no God), but into deism (the creed that there is a God—the God of Nature).

Deism, then, was the name which Englishmen gave to this novel interpretation of natural religion. It was accepted by numerous scientists and philosophers of the age as the simplest means of reconciling traditional religion and the latest findings in natural science, and it was applauded by a considerable number of professed Christians as the best means of bringing Christianity into harmony with common sense and modern knowledge. Deism was the religious aspect of the Age of Enlightenment. As expounded by a galaxy of English philosophers and publicists (and clergymen), the faith of deism was simple and reasonable. The deistic God was merely the first cause of natural law, the original giver of reason, natural rights, and the impulse to progress. This God had once, at the very beginning, acted in the grand manner by starting things, but thereafter he was fated to be a helpless supernumerary of the physical universe, veritably enchained by the natural laws which he had decreed for human beings and for the stars, quite incapa-

ble of working miracles or heeding the prayers of puny man, and entitled only to be called creator, preferably with a small c.

Deism spread from England to France, and thence all over the Continent. As it spread, it grew more radical and sceptical and soon came, in its extreme form, to represent a complete break with historic Christianity.

- Spread of
Deism to
the Con-
tinent

One of the pioneers of this phase of deism—and an intellectual successor of Lord Cherbury—was Pierre Bayle (1647-1706). Bayle, the son of a Huguenot clergyman, was converted to Catholicism, reconverted to Protestantism, and finally became equally doubtful of all religions. Finding the condition of a relapsed heretic a dangerous one in most countries,¹ he settled in the Netherlands, where he secured a professorship of philosophy and history at the university of Rotterdam (1681). Here he showed himself not only a disciple of Descartes's rationalist philosophy but also a most clever advocate of thoroughgoing free thought and religious toleration. His arguments, however, were scarcely more pleasing to Calvinists than to Catholics. For toleration with Bayle meant the right to err and the duty to doubt, not merely the right to believe in a particular form of Christianity and the duty to reciprocate persecution if the opportunity arose. From the beginning his works were attacked by Protestants and burned by Catholics, and in 1693 he lost his university position through Calvinist animosity. But he continued to write, and his masterpiece, the *Critical and Historical Dictionary*, appeared four years later. This *Dictionary* was a landmark in the development of modern religious scepticism. With a great show of scholarship and impartiality, and with insinuating wit, it held up all manner of traditional religious beliefs and dogmas to ridicule, resolving them into myths and fairy tales which had presumably been invented to amuse or terrify children and save parents the trouble of more rational discipline.

Pierre
Bayle
and His
Dictionary

Bayle's arguments and methods were appropriated by Voltaire. Indeed, it was Voltaire who especially personified the sceptical and deistic aspects of eighteenth-century thought, and who was as much the literary arbiter of Europe in the Age of Enlightenment as Erasmus had been in the Age of Humanism.

Voltaire as
The Phi-
losopher
and Deist

¹ Bayle's brother died a victim of the persecution of Louis XIV.

François Arouet, or, as he styled himself, François de Voltaire (1694-1778), had a wonderful facility with the pen. Even in boyhood he was a clever hand at turning verses and fully appreciative of his cleverness. His businesslike father did not enjoy the boy's poetry, especially as much of it was written when young François should have been studying law. But François had a mind of his own; he liked to show his cleverness in gay society and relished making rhymes about the foibles of public ministers or the stupidity of the prince regent of France.¹ The regent struck back by imprisoning Voltaire a year in the Bastille. And a few years later, an offended nobleman had Voltaire beaten, sent again to the Bastille, and then exiled for three years in England (1726-1729).

Voltaire already admired Bayle's writings. He already admired the scientific progress of the age and discounted religious "superstition." And his exile now brought him into intimate contact with like-minded English scientists and philosophers. Full of enthusiasm for his English friends, he proceeded to write *Letters on the English*, packed with sarcastic criticisms of existing church and society and impregnated with deistic philosophy.

On his return to France, and for years afterwards, Voltaire poured out a flood of writings—tragedies and comedies, histories, essays, and letters—thereby establishing his reputation as the most versatile and accomplished writer of his age. Much of what he wrote was superficial; some of his "hundred volumes" are seldom read nowadays; and his plays, on which he particularly prided himself, are dreadfully boring to present-day readers. Yet, most of his writings, especially his letters and essays, are undoubtedly clever, witty, and graceful; and, inspired as they are with the spirit of the Enlightenment, it is easy to understand why they were immensely popular and influential in his day.

For a great part of his life, Voltaire resided at Cirey in Lorraine,—with his mistress, his books, his manuscripts, and his laboratory—for Voltaire, true son of the Enlightenment, liked to play at science. For a time he lived in Prussia as the protégé of Frederick the Great, but he treated this irascible monarch with neither tact nor deference, and soon left Berlin to escape the king's ire. He was in high favor at the court of Catherine the Great of Russia. He lived at Geneva, in Switzerland, for a while.

¹ The duke of Orleans. See above, pp. 315-316.

We may recall him at the age of eighty-four when he made a famous visit to Paris,—a sprightly old man with wrinkled face, and with sharp eyes peering out from either side of the long nose, beaming with pride at the flattery of his many admirers, sparkling with satisfaction at making a witty repartee; still clever, cynical, and amusing; still the literary arbiter of Europe.¹

Voltaire was at once a product and a popularizer of the Enlightenment—its interest in natural science, its belief in natural law, in natural rights, in human reason, and in human perfectibility—and his significance lay in his use of the philosophy of the Enlightenment as the foil for the sharp rapier which he repeatedly thrust at the “irrational” ideas and institutions of the eighteenth century. Usually his criticism was more destructive than constructive. It was doubtless easier to poke fun at existing abuses than to suggest practical means of remedying them. He wittily criticized manners and morals, society and government, professing admiration for English liberties, but never explaining just how the “liberties” of England were to be transplanted into France.

Voltaire,
Apostle of
the “En-
lighten-
ment”

Against ecclesiastical Christianity, Voltaire made peculiarly sharp thrusts. “The infamous thing” (“l’infâme”), he repeatedly called it. He had no patience with organized Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic; the only Christian body for which he expressed any sympathy was the Quakers. To him all priests were imposters, all miracles were illusions, and all revelations were human inventions. Christian churches might remain for a time to solace the ignorant and keep the lower classes in order, but for intelligent men Voltaire was sure that deism—the true religion of Nature—was sufficient. He was certain that the God of Nature who had made the myriad stars of the firmament and had promulgated eternal laws for the universe could have no concern for the petty and perhaps imaginary souls of human beings.

Voltaire’s deism represented the prevalent religious trend among a large number of middle-class and upper-class Europeans in the eighteenth century, a trend more basically revolutionary than the Protestant movement of the sixteenth century. For, whereas the Protestant movement had assailed and disrupted the historic church, deism now assailed and threatened to destroy all

¹ See the engraving by Moreau, below, p. 564.

the distinctive tenets of historic Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant. Many clergymen denounced Voltaire and undertook to refute deism. But such efforts were not very successful. There were too many influential laymen and even too many high-placed ecclesiastics who wished to be thought of as "enlightened" and who sympathized with deism and enjoyed the sallies of Voltaire; and few monarchs of the age could be relied upon for systematic or effective measures against the new scepticism.

So the light of deism radiated far and near. Hardly a literary personage of the eighteenth century failed to reflect it. It is to be seen in the poetry of Pope, in the prose of Herder, in the historical writing of Gibbon, and in the epochal encyclopedia of the Frenchmen Diderot and d'Alembert. This encyclopedia deserves special mention. It was a compilation, in seventeen volumes (with supplementary pictorial volumes), of articles by a group of distinguished mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, social scientists, and philosophers, who undertook to describe the latest progress in their respective fields. It was at once a monument of learning and a manifesto of the rationalist scepticism of the Enlightenment. It supplemented and reënforced the life-work of Voltaire.

Some of the Encyclopedists (as the editors and writers of the encyclopedia were called) were more radical than Voltaire about religion. Some, in departing from Christianity, did not stop at deism but went on to atheism. One of these, a most interesting character, was Holbach (1723-1789), a native of the German Palatinate who, brought to Paris in his youth by a suddenly wealthy and socially climbing father, was enabled by his income and his amiability to keep open house for "enlightened" philosophers and to provide them with costly wines and excellent cuisine. To Holbach's salon repaired such men as the editors Diderot and D'Alembert, the statesman Turgot, the scientist Buffon, the historian Hume, the actor Garrick, and the novelist Sterne—Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans of intellectual fame and revolutionary proclivities. Holbach himself contributed several articles to the encyclopedia and outdid his colleagues and guests in expression of anti-religious sentiments. In his *Christianity Unveiled* (1767) he assailed not only Christianity but religion in general as the source of all human

Vogue of Deism in the Eighteenth Century

The Encyclopedia

Emergence of Atheism

Holbach

evils. In his *System of Nature* (1770), in the writing of which Diderot collaborated, it was maintained that there is no God at all—not even a God of Nature,—that the universe is only matter in spontaneous movement, that what man calls the soul becomes extinct when the body dies, that self-enjoyment is the object of mankind, and that the restraints of religion should be replaced by education in enlightened self-interest.¹ The *System of Nature* was intended for intellectuals, but its principles were vulgarized by Holbach in a volume entitled *Good Sense* (1772) and in a series of declamatory brochures: *On Sacerdotal Imposture*, *Priests Unmasked*, *Critical History of Jesus Christ*, etc. Holbach's writings created a sensation. They troubled not only Christians but deists, and Frederick the Great and Voltaire, as well as Catholic priests and Protestant preachers, attempted to refute Holbach. Holbach, however, made converts, so that toward the close of the eighteenth century, while deism was contending with Christianity, atheism was emerging as a contender with deism.²

In its conflict with older conceptions of Christianity, deism was aided by the contemporary rise and spread of freemasonry. Freemasonry, as we know it, originated in England early in the eighteenth century. Previously there had been "lodges" of "free masons," local societies which preserved some of the external ceremonial of the medieval guilds of master masons that had fallen into decay or been suppressed in the sixteenth century, but these "lodges," while honorary and admitting to membership aristocrats and intellectuals who were not masons at all, had been rigidly Christian and closely affiliated with Christian churches. Now, however, as deism spread among English intellectuals and aristocrats, the lodges of "free masons" underwent a change. In the year 1717 several of them were federated in a Grand Lodge, which, with London as its headquarters, proceeded to revise and unify the "constitutions" and ritual in the spirit of the Enlightenment and to inaugurate a rapid extension of the new freemasonry.

Deism
and Free-
masonry

¹ Holbach's atheism was anticipated to some extent by Helvetius (1715-1771), who in his treatise *On the Soul* (1758) had asserted that there is no difference between man and the lower animals and no freedom of choice between good and evil. Ethics, according to Helvetius, should be purely utilitarian.

² A classic of deism was Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason* (1704), which, because of its vitriolic assaults on "superstition," was long but mistakenly regarded by Christians in English-speaking lands as a plea for atheism.

Under the auspices of the English Grand Lodge, freemasonry spread quickly throughout Great Britain and the British colonies.

Spread of Free-masonry from England Subsidiary grand lodges were organized in Ireland in 1725 and in Scotland in 1736. By the close of the eighteenth century there were 1,600 subordinate lodges in England. In the meantime, lodges were founded at Boston (1733), at Philadelphia, and at other American towns; at Calcutta (1730), Madras, and elsewhere in India; in Canada (1740) and in the West Indies (1742). Aristocrats, even princes of the royal family, flocked to freemasonry, and at far-flung military posts army officers formed lodges. The first masonic publication in America was the work of Benjamin Franklin (1734), a very "enlightened" colonial and a most enthusiastic freemason. George Washington was initiated by a lodge in Virginia in 1753.

Outside of British territory freemasonry was soon implanted. The first French lodge was chartered at Paris in 1732 by the English Grand Lodge, and before long French freemasons had a grand lodge of their own—the Grand Orient. Freemasonry was introduced into Germany in 1733, Portugal and Holland in 1735, Switzerland in 1740, Denmark in 1745, Italy in 1763, Russia in 1771, Sweden in 1773.

This ramifying freemasonry was not ostensibly anti-Christian but it was pronouncedly pro-deist. Among its founders and propagandists were Anglican clergymen,¹ and on the Continent it included at the outset a considerable number of Protestant ministers and Catholic priests, but these gentlemen, being singularly "enlightened," were more deist than Christian, and the elaborate ritual and symbolism of freemasonry betrayed the thought of the Enlightenment, including its non-Christian deism. Individual freemasons might adhere to any kind of Christianity, but they were not to defend or discuss it in the lodges. What was expected of all of them, according to Masonic teaching, was rational faith in the God of Nature—the "Great Architect of the Universe"—and in His physical and moral laws. Such continued to be the central tenet of English-speaking freemasonry, but on the Continent, in Catholic countries, the growing opposition of the pope and other ecclesiastics to the whole institution of freemasonry served to render it more radical and more re-

¹ One of the most active and zealous was the Rev. James Anderson.

ceptive to atheistic propaganda. In 1772, two years after the publication of Holbach's *System of Nature*, a schism occurred in the Grand Orient of France; one faction rejected, and the other retained, the Great Architect of the Universe.

Undoubtedly the rapid spread of freemasonry in the eighteenth century is explicable not only because it nicely reflected the widespread "enlightenment" of the time but also because it was a secret oath-bound organization, giving its members a feeling of mystery and ritual and at the same time a sense of an uplifting mission which they were to perform among their fellow men. And doubtless the same reasons explain the parallel rise of numberless other secret societies. For example, the "Order of Perfectibilists"—the "Illuminati," as its members were commonly called—was founded in 1776 by Adam Weishaupt, a German ex-Jesuit: it was very secret and mysterious and very "enlightened"; in Germany it attracted several princes and such literary men as Herder and Goethe; and for a time it had flourishing branches in other countries of the Continent.

Other
"Enlightened"
Secret
Societies

One result of the religious developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was of special significance for the succeeding age. It was the rise of religious toleration.

To the rise of religious toleration both pietism and deism contributed. Pietists, in minimizing theological differences and emphasizing that religion was a matter of inner feeling rather than of external observance, a concern of the individual conscience rather than of church or state, were naturally inclined to deprecate any attempt of ecclesiastics or statesmen to oblige people to adhere to a particular creed or to an established church. Such pietist sects as Quakers, Douk-hobors, and Swedenborgians, themselves enduring a good deal of persecution, were especially insistent on religious toleration. On the other hand, deists, convinced that all forms of supernatural religion were more or less superstitious and yet recognizing that their own "natural religion" was not shared by the masses, could hardly approve of any state action which would militate against the "enlightenment" and in favor of "superstition." It was natural, in the circumstances, that deists and pietists should make common cause against religious intolerance. A deist like Voltaire was politic, if not strictly logical, in applauding

Rise of
Religious
Toleration

Quaker pietism while damning Catholic Christianity. It was in the guise of a Quaker that Thomas Paine wrote against traditional Protestant Christianity.

However fanatical and bigoted some churchmen and many lower-class people continued to be, the progress of deism (and, to a lesser extent, the progress of pietism) combined with the growing absorption in natural science to produce in the eighteenth century among the more influential classes in European society a marked indifference, if not repugnance, to religious fanaticism. The "enlightened" classes had no enthusiasm for the forceful maintenance of any particular religion, and "enlightened" despots began to vie with one another in abrogating or disregarding earlier statutes of religious uniformity.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, anti-Protestant laws in France and anti-Catholic laws in England were less and less enforced. The last French execution for heresy occurred in 1766. The first British steps toward Catholic emancipation were the Quebec Act of 1774¹ and the enfranchisement of Irish Catholics in 1793. In Spain, under the rule of the "enlightened" King Charles III (1759-1788) and his "enlightened" philosopher-minister, the count of Aranda, the Inquisition was curbed and an unwonted religious tolerance was practically, if not theoretically, exercised. Even a pope of the period, Benedict XIV (1740-1758), was praised by many an intellectual, including Voltaire, for his tolerant spirit as well as for his unflinching wit.

The new tolerance was forwarded, in the opinion of contemporaries, by the suppression of the Jesuits. Since its foundation in the sixteenth century, the Society of Jesus had been a strong pillar of the Catholic Church; its members had played leading rôles in education, in missionary enterprise, in public affairs, and in controversy with Protestants. In the eighteenth century, however, the society incurred the dislike and hostility of professedly Catholic monarchs and statesmen, not only because it combated Jansenism and deism and the "Enlightenment" in general, but also because it became increasingly involved in economic and other temporal concerns. In 1759, Pombal, the "enlightened" chief minister to the king of Portugal, expelled the Jesuits from Portuguese territory; in 1767 they were expelled from France and Spain; and in 1773

Suppression of the Jesuits

¹ See above, p. 480.

Pope Clement XIV, yielding to pressure, formally suppressed the society throughout Catholic Christendom.

In the Austrian dominions, religious toleration found a champion in Joseph II (1765-1790). In Prussia, its outstanding exponent was Frederick II (1740-1786). Indeed, this Frederick—Frederick the Great—was the first monarch distinctly to proclaim not only that the state should tolerate all religions but also that it should favor none.¹ Catherine II of Russia (1762-1796) was likewise tolerant of religious dissent, in her fashion. While outwardly conforming with the Orthodox Church, she secularized its property and despised its clergy, and with cynical liberality she allowed Jesuits who had been expelled from other countries to settle at one end of her empire and Moslem Tartars to erect mosques at the other end.

Religious
Policy of
"Enlight-
ened"
Despots

The growth of deism and scepticism was accompanied by the decline of governmental religious intolerance not only, but of popular faith in witchcraft also. Witchcraft had had many victims, as we have seen,² in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries throughout Christendom and it had continued to be punished in the seventeenth century, especially in Protestant countries, by numerous beheadings and burnings. As time went on, however, more voices were raised against it. Frederick Spee, a German Jesuit, expressed disbelief in it in 1631; and in 1691, Balthasar Bekker, a Dutch Protestant pastor, argued against its credibility. Hobbes and Spinoza alike denounced the popular faith in witchcraft as a delusion, and by the eighteenth century almost all "intellectuals," whether deist or Christian, were influencing the civil governments to put an end to trials of "witches." The last English trial for witchcraft was in 1712, when a woman was convicted but not executed; and the last trial and execution in Scotland occurred in 1722. The last witch-trial in Spain was in 1782, and the last in Germany was in 1793.

Decline of
Witchcraft

The Age of Enlightenment witnessed another important, almost revolutionary, intellectual change. It beheld the beginning of Jewish emancipation. For centuries Jews had lived in Europe as a people distinct and apart from their Christian neigh-

¹ On the religious policies of Frederick II and Joseph II, see above, pp. 348-349, 351.

² See above, pp. 210-211.

bers and legally on a lower plane. Into some countries they had not been permitted to enter; from other countries they had been banished; and in countries where they might reside they had long been compelled to live in particular sections of specified towns and to wear a distinctive dress and were forbidden to own land, to bear arms, to attend universities, to follow the learned professions, or to proselytize. They had usually been accorded "privileges" but not "rights"; they had been members of little Jewish states within European nations, rather than being citizens of these nations. Theoretically, they had never been treated as heretics and had always enjoyed freedom of conscience and freedom of worship, but actually they had repeatedly been victimized by fanatical mobs and by bigoted churchmen and statesmen.

Responsibility for this anomalous situation rested in part with the Jews themselves and in part with their Christian neighbors. Everywhere the Jews were a minority, and they were a minority which was peculiarly clannish and traditionally reluctant to mingle with "Gentiles." Not only were their strictly religious tenets at variance with those of Christianity, but they prided themselves on being a distinctive nationality, the "chosen people" of God, and they scrupulously adhered to the Mosaic law, which sanctified social customs and observances quite different from those of Christian Europe. On the other hand, their Christian neighbors regarded them, as majority is wont to regard minority, with suspicion and aversion; Christians thought of Jews not only as stiff-necked unbelievers and descendants of them that had persecuted Christ, but also as grasping money-changers and tricky tradesmen. At least, this was the situation so long as Jews were fanatically Jewish in religion and Christians were fanatically Christian.

Certain Protestant sects, it is true, by placing special emphasis on the Old Testament (the essentially Jewish scriptures), tended to arouse among their followers a greater interest in the Jews and to inculcate a more tolerant attitude toward them. Such an attitude was made easier by the fact that these sects, like the Jews, were minorities and specially liable to persecution. It is not without significance that Jews who were driven from Spain and Portugal were welcomed and harbored in the seventeenth century by the Calvinist Dutch Netherlands, and that

it was Cromwell and his fanatically Puritan followers who re-admitted Jews to England in 1655. Cromwell encouraged them to build a synagogue in London.

Yet, despite the new toleration in the Netherlands and England, the seventeenth century was not ripe for any general emancipation of the Jews. There was still too much bigotry on the part of both Christians and Jews. It was the Jewish colony in Amsterdam, not the Christian government of the Netherlands, which persecuted Spinoza. And ample evidence of Jewish fanaticism was afforded by the enthusiasm with which Jews all over Europe acclaimed a certain Sabbatai Sebi (1626-1676), a mystic of Smyrna (in Asia Minor), who claimed to be the Messiah and promised to restore the Jewish kingdom at Jerusalem.

Terrible disillusionment awaited Jews who had put their faith in Sabbatai. For the "Messiah" proved to be an impostor; arrested by Turkish officials, he purchased his freedom by abjuring Judaism and becoming a Moslem (1666). But in the disillusionment, many European Jews grew less fanatical and turned more and more to rationalism. By the eighteenth century there were Jewish, as well as Christian, philosophers of the "Enlightenment."

The foremost Jewish philosopher of the "Enlightenment" was Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). Born in the ghetto of the German town of Dessau, Mendelssohn at an early age developed an interest in the science and philosophy of the age, an interest which was heightened by his acquaintance and intimate friendship with Lessing, the leading German playwright, art critic, and deist. Lessing did much to win for Mendelssohn a favorable hearing among non-Jews—his most famous play, *Nathan the Wise*, was a portrait of the noble Jewish philosopher—and Mendelssohn inaugurated a veritable revolution in Judaism. Mendelssohn argued with sweet reasonableness that Judaism is but one of several true religions, and that every religion must be judged pragmatically, that is, by its effects upon personal conduct. He also urged his fellow Jews, while clinging to their central faith and their high moral standards, to know and participate in the world about them, to abandon their clannishness, to cease to repine for Jerusalem, and to strive to become good citizens of the countries in which they

lived. He likewise labored for an "enlightened" reform of Jewish education, whereby the gulf between Jews and Gentiles would be lessened, and at the same time he pled for thoroughgoing religious toleration and for the admittance of Jews to full civil rights.¹

Mendelssohn's work was nicely timed. It was done just when the "Enlightenment" was at its height, when all manner of intellectuals, Protestant, Catholic, deist, and Jewish, were demanding a surcease of religious persecution, and when most European monarchs stood ready to prove their own "enlightenment" by decreeing religious toleration. Frederick the Great did not like Jews and his comments about them were especially sharp and sarcastic, but "enlightened" despot that he was, he inaugurated their emancipation in Prussia. He not only assured them toleration and protection but, by obliging them to take surnames, he removed an important distinction between them and his Christian subjects.

Farther than Frederick the Great went Joseph II of Austria. In 1781-1782 this reforming Habsburg issued a series of edicts concerning the Jews in his extensive dominions. No longer must they wear beards and distinctive dress and live in ghettos; they might freely attend the universities, learn handicrafts, and engage in the arts and sciences. Joseph repeatedly commanded that Christians should behave toward Jews "in a friendly manner." In this, as in so many other respects, Joseph II was but registering the intellectual revolution which the "Enlightenment" produced in eighteenth-century Europe.

Joseph II's
Edicts
concerning
the Jews

4. DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

The vogue of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries carried with it, as we have seen, the vogue of a new philosophy—a new metaphysics—of natural law, and this involved, in turn, the rise of rationalist scepticism about supernatural religion. But as intellectuals became more sceptical of God, they grew more dogmatic about man, which was doubtless

¹ Pleas put forth especially in the book *Jerusalem* (1783). Of this book, Kant wrote to Mendelssohn: "It is the proclamation of a great reform, which, however, will be slow in manifestation and progress, and which will affect not only your people but others as well."

quite natural. For, while they were uncertain of the reality of God, they were sure that man is as real as a star or a rabbit and as obedient to natural law. Hence, the Age of Enlightenment was characterized both by the neglect of theology and by the cultivation of the rationalist study of man—what we call social science.

**Social
Science
in the
Age of
Enlighten-
ment**

Social science developed parallel with natural science. Both betokened a novel and widespread curiosity to explore the universe with critical eyes and without religious predilection. Both were aspects of the Intellectual Revolution which was ushering in our contemporary world.

Knowledge of man's past—that is, history—would seem to be an important and fundamental part of social science. And certainly one impressive phase of the development of social science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the rise of critical historical scholarship.

**History as
a Science**

History was to be based on authentic "documents," to tell the story of the past objectively, to eschew miracles, and to be natural." Such, at any rate, were the ideals of the new "scientific" historians, and some historians of the era went farther than any of their predecessors toward the realization of these ideals.¹

Mabillon (1632-1707), a French Benedictine monk and a scholar of vast erudition, spent a long and illustrious life in the study of historical documents and in the formulation of scientific principles and rules for the study of historical documents by others. Mabillon's work gave a marked stimulus to scholarly historical research.

**Mabillon
and the
Congrega-
tion of
St. Maur**

It also gave a special incentive to the systematic collecting and critical editing of historical documents. The congregation of Benedictine monks to which Mabillon belonged—the Congregation of St. Maur—began in 1733 the publication of a monumental collection of "sources" of French history, and at about the same time a similar enterprise was undertaken for ancient and medieval Italy by a scholarly Italian priest, Muratori (1672-1750).

Simultaneously, there was a noteworthy growth of libraries for the housing of historical materials. Long established libraries were now greatly enlarged. The Vatican library was expanded

¹ For forerunners of "scientific" critical history, see above, pp. 104-105, 121.

by a series of eighteenth-century popes. The number of manuscripts and volumes in the Laurentian library at Florence and in the Ambrosian library at Milan was doubled in the eighteenth century. The royal Prussian library, founded in 1661, was reorganized and tripled in size at the end of the seventeenth century. The Royal French library (now the Bibliothèque Nationale) was richly endowed by Colbert and Louis XIV, and its present building was erected early in the eighteenth century. The British Museum was founded in 1753.

In the meantime, Vico (1668-1744), an Italian professor, was introducing a new critical attitude in narrative history. He was almost the first to subject the sources of ancient Greek and Roman history to searching criticism and to contend that many of their accounts were unreliable. He was likewise almost the first to describe political institutions and works of art as products of changing environment and circumstance. Vico's attitude was adopted by Montesquieu (1689-1755), the French political philosopher, who, in his famous *Spirit of the Laws*, traced an historical evolution of political ideas and practices and based it on differing environments, particularly on differing climates. Vico's attitude was also exemplified, to a certain extent, by Winckelmann (1717-1768), a German who lived long at Rome in the service of several cardinals and whose researches into the history of Greek art have earned him the title of "founder of scientific archæology." Incidentally, it may be remarked that Winckelmann published the first treatise on the excavated archæological treasures at Pompeii and Herculaneum (1762).

The newer historical tendencies were extolled and forwarded by Herder (1744-1803), a German Lutheran pastor, who served for many years as court-preacher to the duke of Saxe-Weimar, and who, like many other intellectuals in the Age of Enlightenment, was half pietist and half deist. Herder was not a "scientific" historian himself; he neither collected "documents" nor wrote detailed critical narratives. But he made many earnest and influential pleas for the scientific study of man's past, and in his *Ideas on the Philosophy of History* he indicated what in his opinion should be the goal and method of the "new history." History should be "a pure

**Historical
Libraries**

**Vico and
Critical
History**

**Herder
and the
"New
History"**

natural history of human powers, actions, and propensities, as modified by time and place." It should be genetic, explaining how the human race has evolved from earliest times to the present. It should be national, showing how various tribes and nationalities have been differentiated and what contributions they have respectively made to world civilization. It should be cultural, dealing not so much with politics and war as with society, art, and thought. Above all, it should be humanitarian, promoting a real understanding and appreciation of human nature and therefore promoting a wide new range of social science—anthropology, archaeology, philology, and comparative religion. Herder provided a prospectus for the development of social science not alone in his age, but in ours also.

In the eighteenth century—at the height of the "Enlightenment"—history reflected the scepticism, the rationalism, and the deism (or atheism) of contemporary philosophy. There was a pronounced tendency to belittle the middle age as an "age of faith and superstition" and at the same time to expatiate on the "enlightenment" of classical pagan Rome as well as on that of the modern "age of reason." The greatest and most typical history of the eighteenth century was the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* by Edward Gibbon (1737–1794), a well-to-do English gentleman, who, like Bayle before him, had been converted to Catholicism, reconverted to Protestantism, and eventually drawn into complete agnosticism. With devastating rhetoric and mordant wit, Gibbon contrasted pagan "civilization" with Christian "barbarism" and attributed the fall of Rome to the triumph of Christianity. Another important historical work of the century was the *History of England* by David Hume (1711–1776), the Scottish materialist philosopher; it dealt with modern Britain in a partisan manner at once pro-Tory and pro-deist and was none too accurate, but it was the first attempt to introduce the social and literary aspects of a nation's life as only second in importance to its political fortunes, and the first modern historical writing in an animated yet refined and polished style.

The histories of Hume and Gibbon enjoyed large sales and great popularity. But even more popular—and certainly more superficial—were the historical writings of Voltaire, especially his *Age of Louis XIV* and his *Life of Charles XII* (of Sweden), and the

Rationalist
History:
Gibbon
and Hume

series of histories which emanated from the pen of Raynal (1713-1796), a French ex-priest and close friend of Diderot and Holbach.

Popular History: Voltaire and Raynal Raynal's histories were far from scholarly, but they were widely read because their subjects were timely and their contents were "philosophical." Raynal's *History of the Statholderate* and *History of the Parliament of England* were political tracts, contrasting the reasonableness of Dutch and English "liberty" with the irrationality of French "despotism," and his more famous *Philosophical and Political History of European Commerce and Establishments in the two Indies* catered to the current prejudices of "enlightened" Europeans in favor of the "noble savages" of America and the "noble sages" of Asia.

The very great popularity of such histories as those of Raynal and Voltaire was striking proof that the general run of eighteenth-century intellectuals were much more interested in contemporary philosophy than in past facts. Here, indeed, is a clue to one of the most significant aspects of the development of social science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Despite advance in historical methods and historical ideals, in the collection of historical materials, and in the production of such a brilliant historical narrative as Gibbon's, the Age of Enlightenment was curiously unhistorical. Intellectuals, especially of the eighteenth century, were certain that their own age was vastly more "enlightened" than any other and consequently that they could derive little or no profit from the study of earlier ages (except possibly the pagan age of Rome and Greece), and they were too convinced of the infallible guidance of their own reason to perceive any utility in past experience or tradition. Being "enlightened," they wished to free themselves from "superstition," and to them the record of the past seemed to be mainly a record of ignorance and superstition. Being free from "superstition," they felt themselves free to evolve, not from history, but from their own inner consciousness ("reason," they termed it), the true knowledge of human nature, the real "social science." Wherefore most eighteenth-century intellectuals were contemptuous of man's past and intent only upon his present and future.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Edward Gibbon, from a painting by Henry Walton (1720-1790), now in the National Portrait Gallery, London.





What is the most rational form of political government for man? That was the question, next to the question of how religion may be rationalized, which aroused the greatest interest among the philosophers of the Enlightenment and elicited the largest number of answers. The question was raised in practical and forceful ways by the British political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and some of the most impressive (and partisan) answers were supplied by Englishmen. The answers were not limited to Englishmen, however. For, with the success of the British revolutions, English political philosophy inspired a vast deal of political discussion and criticism on the Continent, particularly in France.

Rational
Political
Science

At the outset, attempts were made to show that the prevalent practice of absolute divine-right monarchy was based on principles of sound philosophy. At the beginning of the seventeenth century King James I of England argued the case chiefly from the Bible, and so likewise did the French Bishop Bossuet in the second half of that century.¹ Another kind of argument, and one more in keeping with the dictates of the new social science, was advanced by Hobbes, the English materialist, in his famous *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes, quite sceptical of the Bible and of any supernatural religion, justified absolutist monarchy on the ground that it is the most rational means of dealing with human nature. Man, according to Hobbes, is by nature an unsocial animal, guided solely by selfishness, and instinctively hostile to every other man. But, in order to overcome the hostility of others and to achieve his own selfish ends in peace, man has naturally entered into a "social contract" with his prince, whereby the absolutist political state is established with supreme authority in all matters, including control of religion and individual conscience. Such a social contract, once made, is forever binding; to break it would remove the one effective check on civil war, barbarism, and anarchy.

Thomas
Hobbes

¹ So, too, did two Jesuits, the Flemish Lessius (1621) and the Italian Scribani (1624).

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Jean Jacques Rousseau, from a sculptured bust by Jean Antoine Houdon (1740-1828). Concerning Rousseau, see below, pp. 541-543, and concerning Houdon, see below, p. 736.

Hobbes set forth his political philosophy as a protest against the Puritan Revolution, the execution of King Charles I, and the attendant civil war in England. In its immediate purposes, it was a failure; it was too royalist to appeal to the parliamentary party or to Cromwell, and it was too irreligious to attract either Anglicans or Dissenters. Indirectly, however, it was very influential. It centred attention on the need of a strong, authoritative state. It set the fashion for "rational" speculation about government. It helped to strengthen the idea that the church should be subordinate to the state. Most important, it provoked lively debate and stimulated special interest in the "social contract."

"Social contract" found favor with certain advocates of the parliamentary and puritan cause in England. John Lilburne (1616-1657), a radical Puritan and a leader of the group known as "Levellers," declared that men are free and equal by nature, that they create government by social contract in order to preserve their natural rights of freedom and equality, and that whenever these rights are impaired they may revise their contract and create a new government. John Milton (1608-1674), in numberless pamphlets of majestic prose, argued that liberty is the real badge of natural man and the true goal of society and the state, that liberty is best assured by rational self-government, and that the rational state should guaranty to its citizens free worship,¹ free speech, free marriage and divorce, freedom from custom. Milton set forth in 1641 the ideal of "a free church in a free state" and in his celebrated *Areopagitica* he pleaded for the abolition of press censorship.

Of greater immediate influence was John Locke (1632-1704), who provided the reasoned platform and apology for the "Glorious" Revolution of 1689. His principal political writings—the *Two Treatises on Government*—were intended "to establish the throne of our great restorer, the present king William III, to make good his title in the consent of the people." Locke contended that all men possess natural rights of life, liberty, and property; that for the protection of these rights people create governments; and that if a government

¹ Except for Catholics. Milton, earnest Puritan that he was was not an advocate of complete religious toleration

fails to fulfill its task, the people may logically assert the equally natural right of revolution, the right to overthrow the government. In other words, the people are the real sovereign, the true power behind the throne. Never before had the doctrine of popular sovereignty been urged with quite such cogency,¹ and from the central doctrine Locke deduced, further, two important principles. First, since the "people" is simply a collection of individuals having equal rights, political decisions should rest with the majority of individuals. Second, since the purpose of government is to protect individual liberty, the government should not interfere with the religious convictions of its citizens. Here, however, Locke was not so thoroughgoing as might be imagined. He argued against the toleration of atheists, because without a belief in God they could not be depended upon to respect social obligations, and he argued, too, against the toleration of Catholics on the ground of their allegiance to a foreign sovereign.

Locke's political philosophy became exceedingly popular. In England it was accepted as justifying the newer political developments— the limited (as opposed to absolute) monarchy, the ascendancy of parliament (representative of the "people," in theory if not in fact), and the rise of cabinet government. In America it provided an arsenal of arguments for the "Patriots" in their revolt against king and parliament; its principles bulked large in the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and in the United States Constitution of 1787. In the meantime, it influenced a number of writers on the Continent of Europe.

Spinoza, the distinguished Jewish philosopher of the Netherlands, was personally acquainted with Locke and, while endorsing Hobbes's rather gloomy view of man's natural condition and propensities, was led to adopt Locke's version of the social contract. Like Locke, Spinoza held that the primary function of the state is to secure the good of its members and that this can be secured only by full recognition of individual liberties.

Baruch
Spinoza

French writers of the eighteenth century were particularly influenced not only by Locke's political philosophy but also by

¹ Similar doctrines had been urged by Cardinal Bellarmine (1542-1621) and by two Spanish Jesuits, Mariana (1536-1624) and Suarez (1548-1617), and likewise by Grotius (1583-1645) and Pufendorf (1632-1694).

the curious contrasts which they perceived between the government of his country and that of their own. England had a "constitution," and France lacked one. England's king was limited, while France's was absolute, and arbitrary. In England parliament was powerful and personal freedom was guaranteed and respected, while in France there was no effective participation of the people in government and there were no safeguards of individual liberty. That the English government was more "rational" than the French, that it was more in harmony with the principles of sound political science, seemed to be demonstrated in the protracted series of wars which raged between England and France from 1689 to 1763: autocratic France was uniformly vanquished and "liberal" England was uniformly victorious.

We have already noticed how Voltaire as a young man spent several years in England and how he wrote of English institutions and customs. Voltaire was not unique in his admiration of England. Most French intellectuals of the time were prone to wax enthusiastic about the constitution, the liberties, the practical political philosophy, of their island neighbors.

The greatest of these was undoubtedly Montesquieu (1689-1755), a lawyer and nobleman, a student of natural science, and an admirer of Isaac Newton and John Locke. In his *Persian Letters*, and more especially in his masterpiece, *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), Montesquieu proved himself one of the most original and brilliant political scientists that the world has ever produced. Unlike most contemporary philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment (including Hobbes and Locke), he did not think that political science should depend on pure logic or that it should be based on an hypothetical "state of nature" or an imaginary "social contract." Rather he undertook to show, from a critical study of human history, that there is no one perfect system of government for all nations but that political institutions and laws are extremely complicated and, to be successful, must be adapted to the peculiarities of particular climates and peoples. Montesquieu embodied in his masterpiece it is true, a flattering description of the British constitution, its checks and balances, and its separation of powers among executive, legislature, and judiciary, all cooperating to produce a liberty consonant with British environment and British genius.

Critical
Political
Philosophy
in France

Montesquieu

And this none too accurate description tended to obscure the main thesis of Montesquieu, while enlisting the authority of his name in support of those persons in France and America who were seeking to pattern their respective governments after British models.

Outside of his eulogy of British politics, Montesquieu was less famous in his own day than in ours. His method was too historical and his findings were not sufficiently simple. It was left for a younger Frenchman to catch the imagination of the host of eighteenth-century intellectuals and would-be intellectuals with a political philosophy at once extremely simple and quite revolutionary. This Frenchman, or French Swiss—he was born at Geneva,—was hailed as *the* political philosopher. He was Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).

Rousseau was a maladjusted person. He was everything he should not have been. He was a failure as footman, as servant, as tutor, as secretary, as music copier, as lace maker. He wandered in Geneva, Turin, Paris, Vienna, London. His immorality was notorious, and his children he put in a foundling asylum. He was dishonest, discontented, and, in his last years, demented.

Jean
Jacques
Rousseau

Yet this man, who knew so little how to order his own life, exercised an amazing influence over the lives of others. Sordid as was his career, the man himself was not without beautiful and generous impulses. He loved nature in an age when many other men merely studied nature. He liked to look at the clear blue sky, or to admire the soft green fields and shapely trees, and he was not ashamed to confess it. The philosophers who were praising the intellect were inclined to scorn the emotions; Rousseau reminded the eighteenth century that after all it may be as sane to enjoy a sunset as to solve a problem in algebra. Rousseau possessed the soul of a poet. He was a pioneer of romanticism.¹

In a romantic way Rousseau was interested in nature, not merely in natural scenery but also in natural man. To him, natural man was not the dangerous selfish brute imagined by Hobbes and many other philosophers, but a trustful and virtuous being—a truly “noble savage.” Rousseau never had personal experience with North American Indians or South Sea Islanders, but he was sure that just such “noble savages” were living specimens

¹ On romanticism, see below, pp. 565-566, 570-572, 734-751.

of a genus of "natural men" who had been the progenitors of all civilized nations. In his first significant essay, the *Discourse on Arts and Sciences* (1749), he contrasted the naturalness and inherent goodness of primitive men with the artificiality and acquired wickedness of civilized men, and pictured the delights which would attend the overthrow of "civilization" and the return to "nature." All men would be free and equal; nobody would claim to own the land which God had given to all; there would be no wars to kill, no taxes to oppress, no laws to restrict liberty, and no philosophers to deceive the people.

It was all quite appealing to a generation which was undergoing an intellectual revolution and which was cramped by outworn political institutions and social customs. Rousseau became immediately famous, and he followed up his first success with a second. In the essay on the *Origin of Inequality among Men* (1753), he sought to show how vanity, greed, and selfishness had found lodgement in the hearts of "simple savages," how the strongest had fenced off plots of land for themselves and forced the weak to acknowledge the right of private property. This, he maintained, was the real origin of inequality among men, of the tyranny of the strong over the weak; and this right of private property, "for the profit of a few ambitious men," had subjected all the human race "to labor, servitude, and misery."

There was little "science" in Rousseau's theorizing about inequality, but there was some captivating novelty about it. Not even novelty characterized his famous pamphlet on political philosophy, the *Social Contract* (1761). In this pamphlet his thesis was essentially Locke's, that all governments exercise their powers in last analysis by virtue of a contract which men in a state of nature have voluntarily made with one another and which they may change at will. But Rousseau's *Social Contract* had tremendous vogue. Men's minds were better prepared to receive the doctrine of popular sovereignty from Rousseau in 1761 than from Locke in 1691. Moreover, Rousseau's version of popular sovereignty was more romantic, more clear-cut, more incisive, and more richly stocked with memorable catch-words. Rousseau was soon acclaimed, or denounced, as the father of modern democracy and republicanism.

Rousseau's constant cry, "Back to nature," had still another significant aspect. In a romantic novel, *Émile* (1762), he cou-

elled a revolution in education. He said that children should be allowed to follow their natural inclinations, instead of being driven to artificial studies which they detested and which corrupted them. They should learn practical, useful things, not Latin and Greek. "Let them learn what they must do when they are men, and not what they must forget."

It is hard to fix limits to Rousseau's influence. True, he was condemned by many an earnest Christian and was denounced by such a rationalist and sceptic as Voltaire. But his followers were numerous, both among the upper classes and especially among the bourgeoisie. "Back to nature" speedily became a fad of the day, and the stilted courtiers at Versailles pretended to like "nature." Queen Marie Antoinette built herself a little farm-house and played the rôle of dairy-maid; her ladies-in-waiting took to fishing in the outdoor pools. And it was not alone the rattle-brained who fell under the spell of Rousseau. David Hume was fond of him and befriended him. Thomas Paine admired him and was indebted to him for a large part of the political philosophy of *Common Sense*. Herder fairly worshipped him. Kant appropriated many of his ideas, and, after clothing them in idealistic garb, spread them throughout Germany. In France thousands of "enlightened" townfolk were very shortly to precipitate a political, social, and religious revolution—the great French Revolution—of which the chief motifs were to be Rousseau's: liberty, equality, fraternity; popular sovereignty; democracy; the republic of virtue; the outlawry of aristocrats and plutocrats, of privilege and priestcraft. From the standpoint of the "old régime," France and most of Europe were to become demented, like Rousseau.

Influence
of
Rousseau

Rousseau was more romanticist than rationalist, but in common with all the other political philosophers of the age, from Hobbes to Kant, his object was to construct a system of government which, independent of religion, tradition, or external authority, should be based on knowledge of society and should serve the interests of society. In other words, the object was to make of politics a social science.

A similar object was pursued in respect of legal studies. Montesquieu not only wished to put political philosophy on a "scientific" foundation, but his *Spirit of the Laws* represented the first serious attempt at an objective and comparative study of

the legal systems of various countries. Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) devoted many years as professor at Oxford to research and lecturing on the English legal system. In his *Commentaries* (1765), a literary masterpiece and long esteemed the classic handbook for the study of English law, he maintained that the law of England could be ascertained as scientifically as the law of gravitation or any other law of nature. Beccaria (1738-1794), an Italian nobleman and professor of law and economics at Milan, was the father of modern penology; in 1761 he published a famous treatise, *On Crimes and Punishments*, which passed through six editions in eighteen months and was translated into twenty European languages. He urged, on "scientific" grounds, the prevention, rather than the punishment, of crime, and promptness in punishment where punishment was inevitable. Above all, Beccaria condemned such common current practices as confiscation, capital punishment, and torture.

Of all the "scientific" jurists of the eighteenth century, the most interesting was Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham came of a well-to-do family of London lawyers, respectably Tory in politics. He was properly educated at Oxford and duly admitted to the bar. From a conventional career he was saved, however, by the fact that he had a tough mind in a peculiarly weak body. Delicate, almost a dwarf, highly nervous and sensitive, he was a mental prodigy in boyhood, and, much stranger, he continued to be a mental prodigy during a life which extended well into the nineteenth century. In these circumstances, Bentham could afford to neglect the practice of law, which was distasteful to him, and to study and write about it, which he did with gusto and at length in typically eighteenth-century style.

Underlying all the writings of Bentham, all his researches in law as well as his multitudinous excursions into politics, economics, ethics, and religion, was a special philosophy, which has been defined as "utilitarianism." It was the idea that every individual deed should be judged by its utility in promoting the happiness, which is the "good" or the "enlightened interest," of the doer. This idea might appear to be thoroughly selfish, and Bentham frankly admitted that it was. But he argued that each man, in serving his own interests and therefore in assuring his

own happiness, will necessarily serve the best interests of his fellows and promote their greatest happiness. For, whatever acts to make one's fellows unhappy is bound eventually to react on one's self in the same manner. Hence, accordingly to utilitarianism, the aim of social science should be to promote the greatest happiness of individuals—"the greatest good of the greatest number."¹ And self-interest, Bentham was at pains to point out in true eighteenth-century manner, must be "enlightened" self-interest.

The first fruits of Bentham's studies, the *Fragment on Government*, appeared in 1776, the year of the American declaration of independence. It was mainly an attack upon Blackstone's praises of the British constitution and a plea for the reform of political institutions to the end that they might be more rational and more conducive to popular happiness. Then, after several years' cogitation in his singular secluded home, Bentham brought out in 1789 an even more impressive and celebrated volume, his *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, in which he insisted that the object of all legislation must be "the greatest good of the greatest number." He expressed immense admiration for the newly established government and laws of the United States and eagerly besought his own countrymen to imitate the overseas experiments and to adopt a simple written constitution and a logical code of laws. Thenceforth Bentham expended much time and effort on the drafting of "reasonable" constitutions and codes for England not only, but, being a good humanitarian and having a most comprehensive mind, for the whole universe likewise. Jeremy Bentham was a persistent advocate of "reform," at once logical and utilitarian. He was an outstanding pioneer of modern individualism, liberalism, and radicalism.

It was not surprising, in the new age of social speculation, when international trade was expanding, financial profits were accruing, capitalism was growing by leaps and bounds, and an agricultural revolution was taking place,² that a goodly number of "enlightened" persons should have sought rational explanations of economic phenomena and

Rational
Economic
Science

¹ This famous phrase, which has long served as an epitome of Bentham's utilitarianism, was used by Beccaria in the preface to his treatise *On Crimes and Punishments* (1761). The idea was older than Beccaria.

² See above, pp. 465-469.

that economics should have taken its place, with politics, penology, and history, among the social sciences.

The dominant economic practice of the seventeenth century was mercantilism, the meaning and significance of which have already been indicated.¹ It may here be recalled that **The Mercantilists** mercantilism was exemplified by the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch governments of the time, by the economic policies pursued in France by Richelieu and especially by Colbert, and by the navigation laws and other trade regulations enacted in England under Cromwell and Charles II. It may also be remarked that mercantilism was expounded and defended, in more or less scientific manner, by a group of seventeenth-century writers, such as the Italian Serra (1613), the Frenchman Montchrétien (1615), and the Englishman Thomas Mun (1571-1641). These were the first modern "economists." Mun, in particular, a London merchant and official of the English East India Company, wrote a *Discourse on England's Treasure by Forraigne Trade*, which, published posthumously in 1664, was a closely reasoned and seemingly authoritative exposition of the principle of the balance of trade and of the economic advantages which would accrue to the nation whose exports exceeded its imports and whose wealth in precious metals was ever increasing.

Simultaneously, the science of statistics originated. The father of this indispensable tool for the modern social sciences, **Statistics** especially for economics, was John Graunt (1620-1674), a Cockney haberdasher who rose to wealth and influence in London and who, as a pastime, busied himself with collecting statistics of deaths from various causes and reporting them in a volume of *Observations* (1662), which won him election to the Royal Society. What had been a pastime to Graunt was soon developed into a profession by William Petty (1623-1687), a well-to-do Englishman who was educated in France and the Netherlands and who conducted for King Charles II elaborate statistical surveys of Ireland and parts of England. Petty was not only a pioneer in the science of comparative statistics. He was one of the first to break away from mercantilist ideas and to suggest, in his *Treatise of Taxes*, that the price of a commodity depends, not on governmental regulation, but on the amount of labor requisite for its production.

¹ See above, pp. 92-93.

In the eighteenth century, with the advance of economic science, mercantilism appeared less and less reasonable. Beccaria, professor of economics as well as of law,¹ attacked mercantilism, insisted on the labor basis of capital, and expounded "laws" of the relation between the growth of population and subsistence. More influential than Beccaria, however, was François Quesnay (1694-1774), a bourgeois physician at the court of Louis XV of France. Quesnay was sure that he had discovered a "law" of the circulation of wealth as natural and as binding in economics as Harvey's law of the circulation of the blood in human physiology, and that, tested by his "law," mercantilism was erroneous and injurious. He was a solemn, cocksure person, and perhaps because of these qualities he acquired the reputation of being a great scientist. He became the centre of a group of scholars and publicists who with subline self-confidence styled themselves "*the economists*" and who are known in history as the "*Physiocrats*."² Quesnay and the Physiocrats taught that a nation's wealth comes from farming and mining; that manufacturers and traders do not create wealth, but merely transform or exchange it; and consequently that governmental restrictions on trade and manufacturing are unnatural and are bound to react against the highest economic interests, which are those of agriculture.³ "*Laissez-faire*"—"Let them do as they will"—became the slogan of the new economic liberty espoused by Quesnay and his disciples.

The
Economic
Liberals:
Beccaria
and the
Physio-
crats

It remained for a Scot, Adam Smith (1723-1790), to produce the great classic of eighteenth-century political economy. Smith was quite in harmony with the philosophic spirit of his age, with its "natural rights," "natural religion," and "natural

¹ Beccaria was the second person to occupy a special university chair of economics—at Milan (1768). The first was Genovesi—at Salerno (1754). Genovesi was an exponent of mercantilism.

² Prominent among their number were Dupont de Nemours, a nobleman and ancestor of the American Du Ponts; Baudeau, an "enlightened" priest; and the Comte de Mirabeau, father of the French Revolutionary leader. Turgot (1727-1781), the French statesman, accepted much of the Physiocratic doctrine.

³ It should be borne in mind that Quesnay and the Physiocrats did their work at the very time when the agricultural revolution was occurring in Great Britain (see above, pp. 465-469), when agricultural betterment was the special concern of all the "enlightened" despots on the Continent (see above, p. 347), and when Rousseau was preaching the blessedness of simple agricultural life.

laws"; and as professor of "moral philosophy" in the university of Glasgow he became absorbed in quest of the natural laws by which a nation might increase its wealth. In his quest he was aided by a sojourn in France and by personal association with Quesnay and the Physiocrats, but the findings in his classic, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), while embodying a good deal of the Physiocratic doctrine, were far more inductive in method, far richer in content, and far more convincing in argument. Smith had a fairly clear idea of the intricacies of economic phenomena. He skillfully contended that neither commerce nor agriculture, but only labor, is the source of wealth. He eloquently pleaded for an economical division of labor. And more effectively than any of his predecessors he urged that each man, each employer of labor, each seller of merchandise should follow his own economic interests without let or hindrance on the part of the state, for in so doing he is "led by an invisible hand" to promote the good of the whole nation. Let the government abolish all monopolies, all restrictions on trade, all burdens on industry. *Laissez-faire!* Such, according to Adam Smith, was the ideal toward which sound social science pointed.

"Social science" was enriched in the eighteenth century not only by masterful work in the fields of economics, politics, and history, but also by a remarkable increase of geographical knowledge and its utilization for the charting of certain novel fields of scholarly enterprise. By the eighteenth century there was a multitude of writings by European explorers, missionaries, traders, and travellers on the languages, religions, and customs of the most diverse peoples on the earth's surface: Hindus, Malays, Chinese, Paraguayans, Mexicans, Iroquois, Esquimaux. Captain Cook's voyages in the Pacific and to Australia served to give the voracious reading public of Europe especially interesting information about the most remote and last-known habitable parts of the world.¹

From this marked access of geographical knowledge (some of it pretty superficial and inaccurate) came an impetus to the comparative study of peoples. This was exemplified in the work of Montesquieu and particularly in the eloquent and oft-re-

¹ On Captain Cook, see above, pp. 410-420.

peated pleas of Herder that the time had come for first-rate scholars to undertake scientific descriptions of the "physiognomy of languages" and the "physiognomy of races." What Herder meant by such "physiognomies" was what we to-day call "philology" and "anthropology."

The main scientific development of philology and anthropology was to be an achievement of the nineteenth century, but the origin of these newer social sciences was in the eighteenth century, at the height of the "Enlightenment." In the field of philology, there appeared a profusion of dictionaries and grammars and a variety of comparative studies. The French Academy, founded by Richelieu in 1635, brought out the first edition of its famous French dictionary in 1694. The Royal Academy at Madrid began a Spanish dictionary in 1726 and published a Spanish grammar in 1771. Samuel Johnson completed his monumental English dictionary in 1755. J. C. Adelung produced a great German dictionary between 1774 and 1786. Sir William Jones (1746-1794), one of the first scientific students of comparative philology, did significant work in the 1770's in Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian, and, becoming a judge of the supreme court at Calcutta under the English East India Company in 1783, he busied himself during his last years with Sanskrit studies. It was Jones who first pointed out certain similarities of Sanskrit, in construction and root-vocabulary, to Latin, Greek, and German, and thereby provided the starting-point for later fruitful investigation of the "Aryan" or "Indo-European" languages and peoples.¹

One of the first "scientific" anthropologists was J. F. Blumenbach (1752-1840), a German physician who wrote extensively on physiology and at the same time devoted much thought to the classification of human races. The racial classification which Blumenbach adopted (1787) was based on differences in skin color and cranial features. It recognized five fundamental "races": Caucasian, or white; Mongolian, or yellow; Malay, or brown; Negro, or black; and American, or red. It was widely accepted and long remained a central thesis of anthropological study.

One conspicuous aspect of eighteenth-century thought was

¹In 1799 Gyarmathi showed similarly that Magyar was related to Finnish, thereby stimulating the study of the "Turanian" languages and peoples.

humanitarianism, an absorbing interest in humanity at large and a firm conviction that its lot could and should be bettered. Humanitarian, as well as "scientific," motives prompted many a social scientist, and the eighteenth-century development of social science was closely related to the growing vogue of humanitarianism.

Humanitarianism took many forms. It was evidenced in the widespread demand for "reform"—reform of society as preached by Rousseau, reform of economics as advocated by Adam Smith, reform of laws as demanded by Beccaria and Bentham, reform of ethics as sponsored by Kant, reform of religion as urged by Voltaire and the deists or by Wesley and the pietists. All such reform, it was contended, would make for human liberty, for human health and wealth, for human perfection. Indeed, it was assumed that the study of man, his individual and social characteristics, would but prove how perfectible man is; how, if freed from the trammels of the past and reliant only on his own reason, he would create a social, political, economic, ethical, and religious paradise on earth and would create it very soon. Humanitarianism involved optimism. And the optimistic humanitarian social scientists of the eighteenth century, starting with Alexander Pope's lines

" Know then thyself; presume not God to scan;
The proper study of mankind is man,"

went on to inspire in 1776 the *American Declaration of Independence*, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, and Bentham's *Fragment on Government*. The gloomy misgivings of a seventeenth-century Hobbes about human nature were quite dispelled by the growing faith in human nature which in 1789 the "enlightened" revolutionaries of France expressed in their *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*.

Humanitarianism was evidenced, somewhat more specifically, in the gathering momentum of movements for a more humane treatment of criminals, for the abolition of negro slavery, for popular education, and for international peace. The more humane treatment of criminals was urged, as we have seen, by Beccaria and Bentham. It was espoused by a host of eighteenth-century intellectuals, including the "enlightened" despots of the age. It bore fruit not only in

Humanitarianism of the "Enlightenment"

The Demand for Reform

Demand for Penal Reform

the growth of religious toleration but also, more gradually, in the lessening of capital punishments, in the waning of torture, and in the improvement of prison conditions.

Negro slavery, which had seemed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries an economic necessity for Europeans in the New World,¹ was now assailed on religious and humanitarian grounds. Quakers in Pennsylvania protested in 1696 against the slave trade; English Quakers in 1727 declared it to be "not a commendable or allowed" practice, and in 1761 they forbade their members to engage in it. In America a society for the abolition of slavery was founded at Philadelphia in 1774 by an "enlightened" physician, Dr. Benjamin Rush; and many "enlightened" fathers of the American Revolution, such as Washington and Jefferson, while owning slaves themselves, expressed antipathy to the institution of slavery and hope that it would soon disappear.² In England, an *Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species* by a certain Thomas Clarkson, published in 1786, attracted wide attention and led in the following year to the formation of an active anti-slavery committee under the able leadership of William Wilberforce (1759-1833), an "evangelical" Anglican, member of Parliament, and intimate friend of William Pitt. In France, a "Society of Friends of the Blacks" was inaugurated for like purposes in 1788; it counted among its members Condorcet, Lafayette, and other intellectuals of the upper and middle classes. The first country actually to prohibit commerce in slaves was Denmark (1792).

**Demand
for Abolition
of
Negro
Slavery**

Humanitarian motives were likewise in back of the eighteenth-century movements for popular education. Such "enlightened" persons as Milton and Locke had already argued in England for what might be termed a national system of popular education, and early in the eighteenth century several religious groups undertook the establishment of "charity schools" for the grounding of poor children in elementary knowledge and "sober piety." Such were the "sunday schools" set up by Methodists and evangelical Anglicans; such were the day schools founded in England by the

**Demand
for Popular
Education**

¹ See above, pp. 86-87.

² Benjamin Franklin was prominent in the humanitarian anti-slavery movement; he became president of the Philadelphia society in 1787.

Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge and in France by Jean Baptiste de la Salle and the Catholic congregation of Christian Brothers. To the efforts of pious Christians was soon added the inspiration of humanitarian deists. Rousseau in his *Émile* gave vogue, as we have seen, to claims of "natural" and popular education. Herder gave impetus to the utilitarian reformation of German schools. Pestalozzi (1746-1827), a professional Swiss educator, gave practical demonstrations of how lower-class persons might interestingly and profitably be schooled.

To the very end of the eighteenth century, the masses in all European countries remained largely illiterate. Yet, thanks to the influences which we have indicated, there was already a widespread conviction among intellectuals that schooling should not be a privilege of the few but a right of the many, and that it should be not academic or primarily religious but useful and "enlightening." Already in the eighteenth century were implanted the roots of the great national systems of education whose mighty fruitage in the nineteenth century has constituted a most conspicuous consequence of the Intellectual Revolution. The "enlightened" Frederick the Great of Prussia decreed in 1763 that all children in his kingdom must attend school. The revolutionary Americans bestirred themselves in behalf of the new education. Thomas Jefferson in 1779, only three years after the Declaration of Independence, presented to the Virginia legislature a scheme of universal state schooling. The republican constitution of Massachusetts, as ratified in 1780, prescribed that "wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties, and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them, especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns." The French revolutionaries, as we shall presently see, were well-nigh unanimous in support of the same principle; they thought themselves specially "enlightened" and certainly they were markedly humanitarian.

Humanitarianism was exemplified likewise in the simultaneous development of movements for international peace. Against the atrocities of the religious and political wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a pronounced reaction. Against the continuing destructiveness of the commercial and dynastic wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were numerous protests on the part of scholars and other "enlightened" individuals. Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist and religious liberal, penned his great treatise *On War and Peace*, the starting-point of modern international law, in the midst of the barbarities of the Thirty Years' War and in the hope that the recurrence of such barbarities might be prevented by an explicit statement of civilized usages.¹ William Penn, the English Quaker, at the height of the War of the League of Augsburg (King William's War) wrote his famous *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*, advocating the establishment of an international court of arbitration and the substitution of judicial for military procedure in the settlement of international disputes. The Abbé Saint Pierre, a French priest and member of the French Academy, put forth a *Project of Perpetual Peace* in 1713, at the conclusion of the vast War of the Spanish Succession: the project, which envisaged a kind of permanent league of nations, appealed to a considerable number of humanitarians and was followed, later in the eighteenth century, by similar projects from the pens of Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant.

**Demand
for Inter-
national
Peace**

Underlying the definite peace-projects of the eighteenth century were two particular concepts and programmes of action which, though somewhat contradictory in tendency, sprang from a common humanitarian impulse of the age. One was the stressing of the idea that man is a social animal not only within a relatively small group but also in respect of his whole kind and species, that all men are brothers, and that the welfare of each is or should be the responsibility of all. Not since the days of the early Christians and the Stoical Marcus Aurelius had there been so much preaching of the principle of cosmopolitanism, so much decrying of narrow patriotism, and so much counselling of one's fellows to transcend local and group loyalties and to become "citizens of the world,"

**The Cos-
mopolitan-
ism of the
"Enlight-
enment"**

¹ See above, pp. 274-275.

devoted to the progress and peace of humanity at large. "No more," said Rousseau, "are there Frenchmen, Spaniards, Germans, or even Englishmen; there are only Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same customs." "Love of country," said Lessing, "is at best but an heroic vice, which I am quite content to be without." "The world is my country," said Thomas Paine, "mankind are my brothers." Nor was such cosmopolitanism merely a matter of words and gestures. At the very time when France and England were fighting to the death in America and India and on the high seas, and when France was warring in Germany against Maria Theresa or against Frederick the Great, English and French intellectuals were hobnobbing with one another, Voltaire and Rousseau being lionized in London and Gibbon and Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin in Paris, and "enlightened" Germans like Frederick the Great were trying to be truly French in speech and thought.

At the same time, as immediate means to the ultimate end, a second concept and programme of action received emphatic endorsement. It was nationalism. For many eighteenth-century intellectuals were nationalist as well as humanitarian. They were enormously interested not only in humanity at large but in special "primitive" manifestations of humanity, which they perceived in the savage tribes of America, in the strange peoples of the Orient, and also in the more or less fanciful aborigines of the civilized nationalities of Europe. Whence they fell to speculating on the similarities and contrasts between "peoples" or "nationalities"; and the more they speculated, the more they convinced themselves that nationalities are fundamental units of human society and the most natural agencies for effecting needful reforms and promoting human progress and peace. And this nationalist tendency was reënforced by the contemporary vogue of classicism, which, as one of its characteristics, pointed its devotees to the "republican virtue" and altruistic patriotism of ancient Greece and Rome. Frederick the Great at one moment could boast of his cosmopolitanism, and at the next moment could indite a Greek dialogue (in the French language) in order to show his German subjects why and how they should be supremely patriotic to Prussia. Rousseau, while affirming that all men were equal, urged each nationality to cherish its peculiar traditions and to strive for an

The Nationalism of the "Enlightenment"

independent polity. Herder, one of the most enlightened and humanitarian men of the century, devoted the greater part of his voluminous writings to praise of the principle of nationality.

Some of the new nationalism was purely cultural. But some of it, and from Rousseau's time a rapidly growing proportion, was definitely political. This type of nationalism recognized the "right" of national self-determination, the "right" of individuals to determine the sovereign state to which they would belong and the form of government under which they would live. It was argued that, if this right were fully established, not only would local and group loyalties be merged in a higher, more inclusive, and more rational loyalty to the nation, but each sovereign state, becoming a truly national state, would be emancipated from the dynastic and class bonds which had hitherto weighed upon it and distressed it. It would be enabled to care equally for all its citizens and thereby to confer inestimable benefits upon mankind. To warlike rivalry among the despots would succeed a rivalry in good works among free nations. Nationalism, as well as cosmopolitanism, was to be a mark, we shall presently see, of the French Revolution at the close of the eighteenth century.

5. FRUITS OF CLASSICISM AND SEEDS OF ROMANTICISM

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while revolutionary changes were occurring in natural science and philosophy and while the development of the social sciences was stimulating a variety of "reform" movements in politics and economics, one outstanding characteristic of the intellectual life of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries remained fairly constant. This was classicism, the respect and veneration of most European intellectuals for the "classics" of ancient Rome and Greece.

Survival
of Classi-
cism

Elsewhere we have explained how these classics were revived and have pointed out what were some of the sixteenth-century effects of the classical revival, especially in education and in art and literature.¹ Here we must emphasize the fact that classicism continued to dominate education, art, and literature throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to characterize the whole "Enlightenment." Almost every "enlightened" person of the newer age entertained an excessive predilection for

¹ See above, ch. iii.

classical antiquity and, like the earlier humanists, could see no good in the culture of the middle ages. Oliver Goldsmith ascribed Dante's reputation to his obscurity and the barbarous times in which he lived. Voltaire referred to Gothic art as "what unhappily remains of the architecture of those times." Even Rousseau denounced the medieval cathedrals as "a disgrace to those who had the patience to build them."

To understand the spell which Greek and Roman antiquity cast over the men of the Enlightenment, it is necessary to remember that these men were the immediate successors of the "humanists," that they were the direct heirs of the humanist movement, which was represented as ushering the world out of the ignorance and superstition of the middle ages and into the knowledge and reason of modern times. If the men of the Enlightenment were reasonable and scientific—and they were quite sure that they were—it was because the preceding humanists had taught them valuable lessons from pre-Christian Greece and Rome.

There may be some difference of opinion about the value of so-called "classical education," but there can be no doubt that all intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had such an education. All the universities in Europe, all the secondary schools, whether conducted by disciples of John Calvin, Martin Luther, or Ignatius Loyola, regarded the Latin and Greek classics as the very core of their curricula.

Certain fruits were obvious. Anyone who aspired to be thought of as "enlightened" could and normally did interlard his writing and conversation with classical allusions. The most estimable speakers in the British parliament were those who most consciously modelled their discourses after Demosthenes or Cicero and lugged in classical phrases and elaborate metaphors reminiscent of Homer or Virgil. It was similar with preachers, with letter writers, with essayists, with scholars. Such a highly "enlightened" despot as Frederick the Great indited dialogues in form and content as he had been taught that Plato or Socrates might have indited them. On the other hand, such "enlightened" democrats as the leaders of the American and French Revolutions were prone to display their classical training by assuming

**Contempt
for Mediaevalism**

**Respect
for Classical Humanism**

**Respect
for Classical Education**

Cato-like attitudes and hurling Brutus-like anathemas against tyrants.

The influence of classicism upon art and literature was profound and abiding. Indeed, the dominant art of the seventeenth century and of the greater part of the eighteenth century was essentially a continuation of the renaissance art of the sixteenth century.

**Classicism
in the Art
of the Sev-
enteenth
and
Eighteenth
Centuries**

The word "baroque" has commonly been employed to designate the classicist architecture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Baroque architecture was patterned after that of ancient Rome, but it was far more exuberant in decoration. Its origins are traceable to such sixteenth-century Italian masters as Michelangelo and Palladio,¹ and its most renowned seventeenth-century exponent was the Italian Bernini (1598-1680). Bernini, a native of Naples, lived most of his life at Rome in the service of successive popes² and was equally distinguished in architecture and sculpture. He designed the colonnade and square in front of St. Peter's, erected the Barberini palace, and executed the celebrated statue of St. Theresa. His canopy over the high altar of St. Peter's, with its twisted and floriated columns, its crown of consoles and its bronze hangings, is a striking example of that ornate adaptation of classical models which is styled "baroque."

**Baroque
Architec-
ture**

**In Italy:
Bernini**

Taking its rise in Italy, the baroque style soon spread widely. It was employed so much for Jesuit churches that it is sometimes called the "Jesuit" style, but it was employed for other kinds of churches and for palaces too. Usually in baroque churches, spacious naves are flanked by chapels or by two narrow aisles and supported by decorative pilasters; ornamented domes or cupolas are conspicuous; walls gleam with colored marbles and altars glisten with gilt. In baroque palaces, special importance was attached to the principal doorway, entrance, and stairway, but much effort was expended on enriching the whole interior with brocades and tapestries and the splendor of metals. From palaces and churches, the baroque style was carried on and applied to theatres, colleges, tombs, and finally to vast conceptions of entire open squares and parks and the perspective of streets, with stairways, colonnades, and fountains.

¹ See above, pp. 112, 115.

² Urban VIII, Alexander VII, and Innocent XI.

In Spain baroque architecture, exemplified most perfectly perhaps by the Jesuit college and church at Salamanca, underwent an interesting development at the hands of Churriguera (1650-1725). Churriguera, while adhering to classical models, proceeded to invest his buildings with a delicate airy ornamentation reminiscent of medieval Gothic. The resulting type of baroque architecture, almost fantastically decorative--the so-called "churrigueresque"--was employed in the eighteenth century for numerous churches in Spain and in Spanish America.

In France, baroque was even more extensively used--for churches, palaces, castles, and ornamental parks--but it was more restrained, more in keeping with classical usage. Famous as monuments of French baroque are the palace of the Luxembourg, built for Queen Marie de' Medici; the palace and library of Cardinal Mazarin (now the seat of the French Academy); the Invalides, constructed with its imposing dome, under the auspices of Louis XIV, as a hospice for old soldiers; and especially the royal palace and gardens at Versailles, on the construction of which the foremost architects of the day were engaged.¹ Two of these, N. F. Mansart (1598-1666) and J. H. Mansart (1646-1708), father and son, contributed the name of "mansardes" to the sloping roofs with upright windows which they devised to interrupt the straight lines of their buildings and to make the top storeys more habitable.

Later, in the eighteenth century, during the reign of Louis XV, French baroque assumed a freer, less strictly classical form. Curves were multiplied, and the elaborate use of delicate shell-like ornamentation earned it the special designation of "rococo."

Baroque was much employed in Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland. Especially at Vienna and in the towns of southern Germany and of Poland it took a warm grandiose form, full of movement in the Roman manner. In northern Germany and the Netherlands it was more imitative of French baroque; and Frederick the Great's palace of Sans Souci at Potsdam was a rococo echo of Louis XIV's palace at Versailles. Into Russia, baroque architecture penetrated, modifying the traditional Byzantine types. Peter the Great

¹ See above, p. 293.

and his eighteenth-century successors, anxious to westernize and "enlighten" Russia, filled the newly founded city of St. Petersburg with classical domes and columns and baroque decorations.¹

In England, an early example of similar baroque adaptation of classical architecture was furnished by Inigo Jones in the royal banqueting hall which he built at Whitehall for James I in 1619. Then, after a great fire had swept London in 1666, Sir Christopher Wren (1632-1723), a distinguished mathematician and classical scholar, and a book-taught architect, replaced many a destroyed Gothic edifice with a stately classical pile. Wren designed a profusion of Anglican churches; his masterpiece was St. Paul's cathedral, constructed between 1668 and 1710. Classical baroque influences were also apparent in the work of Vanbrugh (1666-1726), dramatist and courtier as well as architect; Vanbrugh's best known buildings were the magnificent Corinthian mansion of Castle Howard and the enormous palace for the duke of Marlborough at Blenheim.

In England

Indeed, "classical" architecture was employed throughout the eighteenth century not only by British noblemen for their country seats and town residences, but also by British capitalists for banks and places of business. In America, "colonial" architecture usually displayed the simpler forms of classicism. George Washington's home at Mount Vernon and the plans which he approved for the capital city of the United States provided the foundation for what is now the dominant "classical" type of the public architecture of the American nation.

In Europe, several architects about the middle of the eighteenth century began to react against the rococo and churrigueresque developments of baroque art and to turn from the grandiose models of antiquity to simpler classical models. The inspiration was still classical, but it was of a severer, less ornamental, supposedly "truer" classicism; it involved close imitation, rather than free adaptation, of ancient monuments. Examples of this latest "pure" phase of classicism are the royal palace at Madrid, begun about 1734, and particularly, in France in the last years of Louis XV and under Louis XVI, the palaces on the Place de la Concorde

"Pure"
Classicism
in Archi-
tecture

¹ See above, pp. 371-372

(1755-1768), the Petit Trianon at Versailles (1762-1768), and Soufflot's masterly Panthéon (1757-1780).

As classicism dominated architecture, so a classically inspired elegance characterized the house furnishings and the personal adornments of polite society. Particularly in the eighteenth century, prior to the French Revolution, every lady and every gentleman strove for an environment and an appearance of studied elegance. It was the age of crystal chandeliers and flashing mirrors, of graceful mahogany furniture¹ and delicately patterned porcelain from Sèvres or Dresden or from the Wedgwood factories in England. It was the age of perfumes and laces and exquisite silks. It was the age when gentlemen wore curly wigs and silk stockings and knee breeches in sensitive pastel shades, when ladies appeared with towering wigs of powdered hair, with little patches of court plaster on cheek or forehead, with wasp waists and billowing skirts, with falling flounces and graceful high-heeled slippers. It was the age, too, when Lord Chesterfield (1694-1773) wrote the famous *Letters to his Son*, explaining with wit and polish that essential morals are identical with external graces of manner; when the rascally Italian adventurers Casanova (1725-1798) and Cagliostro (1743-1795) acquired international fame by the very elegance of their knavery; when "Beau" Brummel was becoming the prince of fops and the chum of George III's rakish son and heir. At Versailles and at all the other European courts which sedulously aped Versailles, the courtiers who danced the minuet and who accompanied their graceful bows with nicely worded compliments were surely as devoted to what they thought was classical as any architect or sculptor.

The art of painting in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was perhaps less affected by classicism than architecture and sculpture. Yet classical subjects were favorites with many a painter during the Enlightenment, and baroque classicism was as strikingly exemplified in Rubens's canvases as in Bernini's tombs and altar-pieces. Rubens

¹ The eighteenth century was a "classical" period for cabinet-makers. It gave us, in France, the "styles" of Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI, and in England the "styles" of certain master craftsmen: Thomas Chippendale (1718-1779), Robert Adam (1728-1792), George Hepplewhite (d. 1786), and Thomas Sheraton (1751-1806).

The
"Classical"
Adorn-
ments of
Polite
Society

"Classical"
Painting

(1577-1640), a native of the Spanish (Belgian) Netherlands and the most celebrated painter in the first half of the seventeenth century, developed his art as a profitable business, employing a number of student-assistants and accepting numerous commissions from such patrons as Henry IV and Marie de' Medici of France and James I of England. The 2,200 huge compositions which issued from Rubens's workshop, whether pagan or Christian or merely regal in subject, were quite baroque in manner, sensual and colorful and richly decorative. Rubens was the greatest of the "Flemish" painters.

Rubens

As Italy had been the centre of the greatest painting in the sixteenth century, so the Netherlands and Spain produced the most remarkable painters of the seventeenth century.

Among those who in some degree were under classical influence—in addition to Rubens—were Van Dyck, Velasquez, and Murillo. Van Dyck (1599-1641), a Netherlander, who loved the refinement and distinction of palaces and the doublets and satin shoes of courtiers, and who lived in England more than in his native land, painted elegant portraits of Netherlandish nobles, French princes, and especially the English monarchs James I and Charles I and their families. Velasquez (1599-1660), court painter to Philip IV of Spain, was a master of "realist" portraiture. His *Surrender of Breda*,¹ his *Equestrian Portrait of Don Carlos*, and his *Maids of Honor* are particularly celebrated, and of his numerous portraits of Philip IV twenty-six are extant. All his canvases are enveloped in soft light of exquisite delicacy. Murillo (1617-1682), at first famed for popular pictures of beggar-boys and other low-life subjects, became the exemplar of sentimental religious devotion; his *Immaculate Conception*, with its mysterious vaporous effect, and his *Saint Anthony* set the style for religious painting in many a baroque church.

In the
Nether-
lands and
Spain

Van Dyck,
Velasquez,
and
Murillo

In the eighteenth century, classical painting was chiefly exemplified in England and France. In England, it was a golden age of portrait-painters. Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792) painted portraits in the "grand manner," such as *Mrs. Siddons as the Tragic Muse* and *Miss Emily Potts as Thais*—actresses and court ladies and noblewomen of the day with a grandiose "classical" background. Thomas Gainsborough (1727-1788)

¹ See above, p. 266.

painted portraits in a lighter, airier, more vivacious manner; his *Blue Boy* and his numerous pictures of aristocratic ladies under their sweeping hats bespeak the grace and charm of that highly conventionalized society which fluttered in the eighteenth century about the parliamentary oligarchy of England as about the Bourbon court of France. Among other British portrait-painters of the age, mention should also be made of George Romney (1734-1802), whose *Lady Hamilton* (Nelson's enchantress) and *Perdita* (the actress mistress of George III's heir) are acknowledged masterpieces. Especially should mention be made of Sir Henry Raeburn (1756-1823), one of the most "realistic" artists of the age and the painter of Scottish gentlemen.¹ It may be added that two Americans who settled in London acquired enduring fame as first-rate portrait-painters: John Singleton Copley (1737-1815) and Benjamin West (1738-1820). The latter succeeded Reynolds as president of the Royal Academy.

In France the prevalent painting of the eighteenth century,² like the furniture and dances in the palace at Versailles, was graceful, elegant, and decorative. Much of it was highly sophisticated and at times betrayed boredom. Watteau (1683-1721) inaugurated this type of "French" painting—Flemish in technique and charmingly decorative in effect. Afflicted with poverty and ill health, Watteau adored elegant society and all the amenities of life, beautiful costumes, ceremonial gallantries. These things he was always portraying—in *The Conversation*, *The Concert*, *The Dance*, *Lady at her Toilet*, *Embarkation for Cythera*, etc.—becoming the unexcelled portrayer of the make-believe, the frivolous, the monotonously and rather pathetically gay.³ The decorative tradition of Watteau was continued by Boucher (1703-1770), court painter under Louis XV and portraitist of Madame de Pompadour; by Fragonard (1732-1806), a favorite with the French nobility; and by Greuze (1725-1805), whose sentimental "rustic" pictures appealed particularly to the bourgeoisie.

¹ For an example, see above, p. 465. For an illustration of Gainsborough's art, see the portrait of Pitt, below, p. 712.

² French painting of the seventeenth century had been less renowned than that of Spain and the Netherlands, but it was distinguished by such strictly "classical" painters at the court of Louis XIV as Le Brun and Rigaud. See above, pp. 293-294.

³ For an example, see above, p. 295.

"Classical"
 Portrait-Painting in
 Eighteenth-Century
 England

Watteau
 and
 French
 Painting
 of the
 Eighteenth
 Century

All the painters so far mentioned—and they were the most popular in their day—were deemed “classical.” From the baroque of Rubens to the grandiose portraits of Reynolds and the ornamental delicacy of Gainsborough and Boucher, the chief styles of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century painting bore more or less close relationship to parallel developments of “classicism” in architecture and sculpture, and in education and thought and taste. In the main, the exponents of these styles had a marked fondness for the formality and elegance which they thought were associated with ancient Greek and Roman art.

But there were other pictorial artists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who were more independent of classicism and who are more highly esteemed nowadays than they were in their own time. Among these were several “realistic” painters who flourished in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century and who were chiefly concerned with almost photographic portrayal of the life of the common people about them. Jordaens (1593-1678) and David Teniers (1610-1690) depicted and embellished the life of middle class or peasantry, the country fairs, the urban carousals, the eating and drinking, the love-making and laughter. Frans Hals (1580-1666) presented more soberly the portraits of persons and the pictures of scenes that arrested his attention during his unhappy and unfortunate career—meetings of officers, of sharpshooters, of guildsmen, performances of itinerant players and singers. There were also Jan Vermeer of Delft (1632-1675), one of the most notable colorists of the age, and Jacob van Ruisdael (1635-1681), uniting poetic fancy with prosaic realism. From our present standpoint, however, the greatest of the Netherlandish painters was Rembrandt (1607-1669). Rembrandt lived a stormy and miserable life in the towns of Leyden and Amsterdam. A Protestant, though not an orthodox or exemplary one, he stood outside of the main currents of classical art. Instead of finding conventional inspiration in pagan mythology or Christian sentimentality and employing fanciful decoration, he painted quite realistically the life of the people among whom he lived and the things which concerned them—lively portraits of contemporary burgomasters and popular amusements, delightful landscapes, and stern scenes from the Old

Non-
“Classical”
Painting

“Realistic”
Painting
in the
Netherlands

Rembrandt

Testament. His *Lesson in Anatomy* and his *Night Watch*, in their sombre settings, are wonderfully realistic products of Rembrandt's mastery of the brush.¹

Rembrandt and his Dutch contemporaries represented one significant reaction against the dominant "classicism" in painting—a reaction toward "realism." Another kind of

Satire in Pictorial Art reaction against classicism was represented in England in the eighteenth century by William Hogarth

(1697–1764), satirist and moralist and author of a treatise on art in opposition to the "classical" vogue. Hogarth's paintings

Hogarth and engravings, notably his *Rake's Progress*, *Marriage à la Mode*, and *Parliamentary Election*, expressed the growing critical spirit of the eighteenth century toward abuses in society and government. Somewhat similar satire was expressed,

Chodowiecki with finer workmanship, by Daniel Chodowiecki (1726–1801), a Polish engraver and painter who was long in the service of Frederick the Great of Prussia. But the most perfect examples of this kind of eighteenth-century art were furnished by Francisco Goya (1746–1828), a Spanish genius, at once realist and satirist, who proved to be a revolutionary—a combined Rousseau and Voltaire—in the realm of painting.²

Goya was of peasant stock, strong, handsome, and quarrelsome, a radical in thought and behavior. He despised the conventions of society, hated the aristocracy, and detested the church and its clergy. It was doubtless because of Goya's sympathy with the revolutionary philosophy of the age that the "enlightened" king of Spain, Charles III, appointed him court painter, and in this post, not only under Charles III but under his half-witted successor Charles IV, Goya made the most of the wonderful opportunity afforded him to unmask the hypocrisy of the "old régime." Superficially Goya's style was sometimes reminiscent of Watteau's (which is probably why Goya was popular), but actually there was a great difference; Watteau fancifully idealized aristocrats, while Goya,

Goya

¹ For illustration of Rembrandt's art, see above, p. 389.

² For examples of Hogarth's work, see above, pp. 418, 464; for Chodowiecki's, above, pp. 340, 356, 383, and below, p. 576; and for Goya's, below, pp. 669, 713.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Coronation of Voltaire," quite "classical" in conception, is from an engraving by Jean Michel Moreau (1741–1814).





with equal art, suggested caricature by painting them precisely as they were. His *Charles IV on Horseback* is the most impudent portrait of royalty ever painted; it is the perfect picture of the divine-right monarch who is imbecile. In other famous portraits by Goya, Charles IV's queen appears as the brazen old courtesan she was; the Crown Prince (subsequently Ferdinand VII), as the sly, spiteful meddler he was; and the prime minister Godoy, as the nincompoop and panderer that he was.

Satire and "realism" were not the only evidences of reaction against the prevailing "classicism" in the pictorial arts. In the eighteenth century "naturalism" also appeared, deriving its inspiration from idealized nature rather than from conventionalized Greek and Roman art. This idealizing of "nature" was part and parcel of the Enlightenment. It was an expression of the new faith in natural law and natural rights, a reflection of the "new agriculture,"¹ and an accompaniment of the newly discovered beauty of natural men and natural scenery. It was associated with the growing interest of European intellectuals in the forests and redmen of the New World, and, even more, with the mounting enthusiasm of European connoisseurs for the strangely "natural" art of the Chinese.² Chinese paintings, porcelains, lacquers, embroideries, wall-papers—a host of "chinoiseries"—were imported into Europe during the eighteenth century. For the housing of Chinese curiosities, Maria Theresa of Austria fitted up a "Chinese apartment" in her palace at Schönbrunn, Frederick the Great of Prussia built an "oriental pavilion" at Sans Souci, and the elector of Bavaria constructed a pagoda. Soon, European princes and nobles were laying out gardens in the "Chinese" manner and were expecting a "Chinese" touch in the works of European artists.

Much of the shell-like "rococo" art of the eighteenth century was in fact a more or less conscious imitation of Chinese art. A painter like Watteau, though belonging to the "classical" tradi-

¹ See above, pp. 465-469.

² There was also a growing fascination for Arabic culture. For example, the *Thousand and One Nights* were translated into French by Antoine Galland (1646-1715) and exerted great influence, especially on European literature.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Bastions of Sonnenstein," suggesting the new romanticism, is from a painting by Bernardo Bellotto (1720-1780).

The New
"Naturalism"
in
Painting

Chinese
Influence

tion, was obviously influenced by "Chinese" models; the gay doings of his festal figures were depicted against a fairy-story landscape which was suggestively Chinese in form and feeling. The pastoral mood, the impressionistic treatment of nature, the sophisticated "primitiveness" of Watteau and his successors were novel features of European art.

Among the "naturalist" painters, other than Watteau and his school, was Richard Wilson (1714-1782), the "father of British **"Nature"** landscape." At the very time when scientists were **in Pictorial** talking about natural laws, and philosophers were **Art:** writing about natural rights, and gentlemen farmers **Wilson** were waxing enthusiastic about the profits of nature,—**and** and when Rousseau was revelling in sunsets,—**Piranesi** and when Rousseau was revelling in sunsets,—Wilson was seeing and showing the beauties of English nature, the rivers, the trees, and the fields. At the same time, Piranesi (1720-1778), an Italian etcher and engraver, was decorating his pictorial records of classical Roman remains with symbolic representations of the groves and streams and mountain crags of his own contemporary Italy.

All this newer pictorial art of the eighteenth century, whether **Fore-** treating of nature directly or through Chinese in- **shadowing** fluence, was really revolutionary. It ushered in the **"Romantic"** romantic painting of the late eighteenth and of the **Painting** nineteenth century. It was part of the transition from "classicism" to "romanticism."

In the literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, **"classicism"** was dominant. The use of the Latin language for literary expression steadily declined, it is true, but the rising flood of vernacular literatures continued to be freighted with much of the form and content of classical Latin (and Greek) literature.

Domi- **"Classicism"** in the seventeenth century took a **nance of** baroque form in literature, as in architecture and **"Classi-** painting. At its best the literary baroque meant a studious, **cism"** decorative style of writing; at its worst it involved affecta- **in the Liter-** tion, bombast, highflown metaphors, and, in general, pov- **ature of the En-** erty of content cloaked under exuberance of forms. These **lighten-** latter qualities characterized much of the seventeenth-century lit- **ment** erature of Italy, Germany, and Spain and rendered it far less noteworthy than the sixteenth-century literature of the same countries.

The outstanding literary man of the age in Germany was Martin Opitz (1597-1639), who slavishly employed for German poetry every form of classical poetry—the ode of Horace, the drama of Seneca, and the epic and bucolic of Virgil—and whose *Book of German Poetry* (1624), with its rigid rules, consigned German literature for a century to imitative dullness and steady decay.

Opitz and
"Classical"
Literature
in
Germany

Spanish literature of the seventeenth century was better, for it included mystical writing of considerable originality, some interesting picaresque novels, and the popular dramas and allegorical poems of Calderon (1600-1681). But Spanish literature fell short of the earlier promise of Cervantes and Lope de Vega and was increasingly marred by artificiality.

Calderon
and
Spanish
Literary
"Classicism"

Italian literature, resplendent in the sixteenth century, seemed thoroughly decadent in the seventeenth. In 1690 a group of Italian writers, intent upon purifying the baroque of its artificiality and over-ornamentation, formed the "academy of Arcadia" and undertook to imitate the simplicity of classical shepherds,¹ but they succeeded only in directing the main currents of Italian literature from bombast into effeminacy, the grandiose into the petty, the turgid into the over-refined. Most Italian literature of the eighteenth century was as "precious," and as unsubstantial, as a painting by Greuze or a minuet at the court of Louis XV.

Decadence
of Italian
Literature

Baroque literature at its best flourished not in Italy, Spain, or Germany, but in France and England. In France, the best traditions of classicism were cherished and adapted by a group of geniuses and were so fostered and patronized by the Grand Monarch as to render the age of Louis XIV the golden age—the classical age—of French letters. It should be recalled² that it was the heyday of such distinguished French writers as Corneille (1606-1684); Molière (1622-1673);³ Racine (1639-1699); Madame de

The
Golden
"Classical"
Age
of French
Literature

¹ Comparable in intent, but not in achievement, with the development in painting which Watteau was then championing.

² See above, p. 204.

³ Molière was not "classicist," like Corneille and Racine; he was rather a French Shakespeare—realist and profoundly psychological. He belongs only chronologically to the "classical" age.

Sévigné (1626-1696); La Fontaine (1621-1695); and many another literary light of lasting brilliance. No wonder that, as the armies of Louis XIV fought over the Continent, the literature of France became the prized possession of all Europe and the model for a vast output of literature in divers languages. In Germany, for example, it became fashionable to use the French language and to read French literature in the original. Gottsched, the leading German writer in the first half of the eighteenth century, insisted that if there was to be any German literature, it must be in imitation of French classicism.

The richest and most perfect instance of the studious, decorative baroque was supplied in England by John Milton (1608-1674), the contemporary of Corneille. Milton, at once puritan and classicist, won a position in literature comparable with that of Shakespeare. Then, under Charles II and James II, English contacts with France served to reënforce the classicism of Milton and to inspire in England the so-called "Restoration" literature, whose foremost exponent was John Dryden (1631-1700). In Alexander Pope (1688-1744) classicism reached its acme in English poetry; the wit, point, and lucidity of his verse, combined with his powers of satire and his sympathy with the new metaphysics of natural science, made him the supreme poet of the eighteenth century.

The eighteenth century was a period of great prose, however, rather than of great poetry. It was a time when literary men, like other intellectuals, were "enlightened," when they were obsessed with natural science not only, but with social science, with humanitarianism, and with criticism of existing institutions and usages. The "enlightened" literary men found prose a more convenient and pliable medium than poetry for exposition and criticism, but the prose which they employed--the most characteristic eighteenth-century prose--showed unmistakable evidence of classical background. It was formal and elaborate, ornamented and polished, graced with flowing balanced sentences and adorned with classical allusions.

Among the masters of "classical" English prose may be mentioned several writers who have already been discussed in other connections: John Locke, the political philosopher; Edward

Great
"Classical"
Literature
in
England:
Milton,
Dryden,
and Pope

The
Eighteenth
Century a
Century of
"Classical"
Prose

Gibbon and David Hume, the historians; Samuel Johnson, the lexicographer; Adam Smith, the economist; Blackstone, the jurist; Lord Chesterfield, the moralist. To this number may be added Lord Bolingbroke, Tory politician and deist philosopher, and Edmund Burke, Whig orator and traditionalist pamphleteer. But perhaps the supreme, and certainly the most original, use of eighteenth-century English prose was for a new type of literature—the novel.

It was in the eighteenth century that the English novel arose, a new and subsequently favorite kind of literature, the long-winded description and rather chaotic analysis of human life and love and behavior (as opposed to the earlier romance of adventure). The roots of the English novel lay in the character studies of Joseph Addison (1672-1719), in the journalistic stories of Daniel Defoe (1660-1731), and in the satirical tales of Jonathan Swift (1667-1745). Whence proceeded the extraordinary work of four eighteenth-century British novelists: Samuel Richardson (1689-1761), the sentimental, "evangelical," and somewhat priggish author of *Pamela* (1740) and *Clarissa* (1748); Henry Fielding (1707-1754), the acute and tolerant delineator of contemporary manners, whose *Tom Jones* appeared in 1749; George Smollett (1721-1771), the caustic author of *Roderick Random* and *Humphrey Clinker*; and Laurence Sterne (1713-1768), antiquarian and humorist, creator of *Tristram Shandy*. All these English novelists were known and acclaimed on the Continent, as in Great Britain, and Richardson especially provided inspiration for a host of sentimental novels of which Rousseau's *Éloïse* and *Émile* and Goethe's *Werther* are famous examples.

In France, there was an outpouring of prose literature in the eighteenth century similar to that in England. Voltaire, the most celebrated French littérateur of the age, imagined that his classical dramas constituted his greatest work, and he surely labored to make them faultlessly "classical" in form and content. But the plays and poems of Voltaire now seem dreadfully stilted and boring, and it is only the prose of his essays and histories which still lives and sparkles. With the prose of Voltaire must be coupled, as best in eighteenth-century French literature, the prose of Montesquieu, Diderot, Holbach, Raynal, and Rousseau, the *Gil Blas*

The
English
Novel

French
Literature
in the
Eighteenth
Century

of Le Sage, the *Manon Lescaut* of Abbé Prévost, the *Barber of Seville* and *Figaro* of Beaumarchais.

As the eighteenth century advanced, a purer "classicism" reappeared in Germany and Italy. In Germany its protagonist was Lessing (1729-1781), who lamented the dependence of German literature on French models and urged his countrymen to go direct to ancient Greece for the canons of their art. He set the example in his drama *Nathan der Weise* (1779), an interesting utilization of pure classicism for an "enlightened" deistic discussion of the relations between Jews and Christians.¹ In Italy, Alfieri (1749-1803) penned, in terse style and with fiery ardor, highly successful tragedies, drawn from antique sources and directed against contemporary tyranny. Alfieri, like Lessing, thought himself a "pure" classicist.

In literature, as in painting, the eighteenth century witnessed not only a movement toward "pure classicism" but also a movement in the opposite direction a "romantic" tendency to ignore classicism altogether and to seek models in natural scenery, in supposedly primitive life, in folk customs. This meant, in literature as in painting, a revolt or reaction against the long dominant renaissance, against the worship of classical art. Romanticism was not to reach fruition and affect all arts until the nineteenth century,² but its seeds were implanted in the eighteenth century and already in this century its germination was clear in certain arts. Architecture and sculpture were least affected by it, but the landscapes of Wilson and Piranesi and the pastoral moods of the eighteenth-century French "school" heralded its appearance, as we have seen, in painting. It was, however, in literature that romanticism gained an even sturdier growth, and especially in English literature.

In Great Britain, romantic love of natural beauty was expressed by James Thomson in his *Seasons* (1726). Romantic predilection for lowly scenes and simple emotions was voiced in the ballads of Thomas Gray, particularly in his *Elegy* (1750). Romantic fondness for "primitive" folk-legends was stimulated by the *Reliques of Ancient English*

Emergence of "Pure Classicism" in German and Italian Literature

Lessing and Alfieri

Beginnings of "Romanticism" in Literature

In Great Britain

¹ See above, p. 531.

² For later developments, see below, pp. 738-751.

Poetry which the Anglican Bishop Thomas Percy collected and published in 1765, and by the poems of "Ossian" which the school-teacher James Macpherson invented and published, also in 1765, as translations from a pretended Scottish bard of the third century.

"Ossian," in particular, created a great sensation all over Europe, and very soon numerous literary men were seeking inspiration for their poetry and prose, not in the conventional classic qualities of civilized Greeks and Romans, but in the "naturalness" and "quaintness," the "simplicity" and "virtue," of primitive peoples and ordinary peasants. Something like a literary revolution began.

In Great Britain, romanticism inspired new types of poetry. There was the homely, dialect verse of Robert Burns (1759-1796); the strange and stirring "medieval" verse of Thomas Chatterton (1752-1770); the enthusiastically humanitarian verse of William Cowper (1731-1800). All these types were far removed from the classical poetry of Alexander Pope.

In the meantime, romanticism was entering Germany. Here, in something of a revolt against national dependence on French classicism, several writers turned to England for counter-inspiration. Shakespeare was studied; Milton was praised and imitated; and, most portentous of all, "Ossian" and Percy's *Reliques* were translated and extolled. If England could have a truly national literature and cherish her own folk poetry, why not Germany? Klopstock (1724-1803) replied that Germany could, and, to show the faith that was in him, he wrote an epic in imitation of Milton and odes in the manner of Macpherson. Lessing, too, came under the English spell and in his *Minna von Barnhelm* (1767) and *Emilia Galotti* (1772) inaugurated a national and romantic German drama. The foremost apostle of romanticism in Germany, however, was Herder (1744-1803): he knew Ossian by heart, he admired Rousseau, he combined pietism with humanitarianism in just the right proportion to make him a zealous and untiring advocate of folk lore, folk literature, and folk customs. Herder not only published German folk songs of earlier ages (1778) but exerted a decisive influence on younger literary men, notably Goethe (1749-1832) and Schiller (1759-1805). Goethe's play

Ossian

In
Germany

Klopstock

Herder

Goethe
and
Schiller

Gotz von Berlichingen (1771) and his novel *The Sorrows of Werther* (1774) were thoroughly romantic. Likewise, Schiller's first important drama, *The Robbers* (1781), was essentially romantic.

Romanticism did not completely dominate German literature. Lessing, as we have seen, soon turned from romantic English models to the "pure classicism" of the ancient Greeks. **A New Great Age of German Literature** Goethe, during a sojourn in Italy, completed *Iphigenie auf Tauris* (1787), the first masterpiece of his "Greek" period, and in the same year Schiller wrote *Don Carlos*, with due attention to classical traditions of form. Yet by the end of the eighteenth century Germany, for the first time since the middle ages, could boast of a living and really great German literature. And this fact is attributable to the seed of romanticism as well as to the fruit of classicism.

In eighteenth-century France, the dominant literary tradition remained classical. There had been too much great classical literature in the age of Louis XIV. Voltaire was now too authoritative and too classicist, the French language and traditional French literature were still too widely esteemed by foreigners, to admit of a revolution in French letters. Rousseau, it is true, was quite romantic, and so were the plays of Beaumarchais. But the Great French Revolution of 1789 was provided with a literary setting which, while very "enlightened" in outlook and very Rousseau-like in content, was heroically classical in form. The Revolutionaries, in oration and proclamation, must constantly invoke, not the romantic traditions of early Frenchmen, but the republican virtues of classical Greece and Rome. Only in the nineteenth century did the seed of romanticism take lusty root in France and other Latin countries.

Musical art developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries parallel with literature, painting, and architecture. **Music in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries** Throughout the seventeenth century Italy remained the most fashionable centre of Europe's music, and just as Italy in the sixteenth century had given vogue to polyphony,¹ so now in the seventeenth century Italy created the fashion of opera. And the new Italian opera, being the dramatic use of music for emotional tragedy, usually

¹ See above, pp. 117-118.

on a classical theme, partook of the baroque quality which characterized contemporary architecture in Italy.

The first master of tragic "classical" opera was Claudio Monteverde (1568-1643), whose *Orfeo* and *Arianna* were produced at Venice early in the seventeenth century. Quickly opera became popular throughout the peninsula. At Venice three opera-houses were opened in the decade of the 1630's, and over 350 different operas were produced between 1630 and 1700. It was similar at Bologna, at Naples, and at Rome. Operas were performed in convents, and Pope Clement IX wrote an opera. At Naples, at the close of the century, flourished Alessandro Scarlatti (1659-1725), the most esteemed composer of the age, who wrote 125 operas and 500 cantatas, besides oratorios and masses, all quite baroque.

"Classical"
Opera in
Italy

From Italy, the opera spread to France and England. Lully (1632-1687), a native of Florence, was brought to Paris in 1643. Here he coöperated with Molière and won the favor of Louis XIV, so that Lully's classical operas, together with his ballets and divertissements, constituted the musical mode at the court of the Grand Monarch. In England, Henry Purcell (1659-1695), organist of Westminster Abbey, and chief musician at the court of Charles II and James II, composed the opera of *Dido and Æneas* in 1680; six years later, he established an English opera-house, and in 1691 collaborated with Dryden in writing the opera of *King Arthur*.

Opera in
France
and
England

To Germany, too, the vogue of Italian opera spread. One of its first German exponents was George Frederick Handel (1685-1759), who, after writing operas for the Hamburg stage and sojourning for three years in Italy as court musician to the Medici of Florence, became a pensioner of the Elector George of Hanover. Then, when this prince succeeded to the throne of Great Britain as George I, Handel was established in London as successor to Purcell. He turned Covent Garden into an opera-house (which it still is), and for it he wrote extensively. In addition to operas, Handel composed sonatas, concertos, and famous oratorios, including the *Messiah*. Handel wrote always for the world, the court, or the stage; his music was brilliantly baroque; and when he died he was buried in Westminster Abbey with befitting pomp.

Opera in
Germany:
Handel

In the meantime, the seventeenth century had witnessed a marked development of oratorio music, and also of instrumental music. While the piano was developing in France, the violin was being perfected in Italy. The Amati and Stradivari, famous Italian families of violin-makers, lived in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

Early in the eighteenth century appeared one of the greatest masters of organ music which the world has known, Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750). Born of a German family of professional musicians, Bach grew up to be pious and humble, a good bourgeois and family man, the father of twenty children. As organist at Weimar and at Leipzig, he knew little of what went on in the world of affairs, but, introspective and conscientious, he turned out in the course of his every-day work a vast number of chorales and fugues, sonatas and concertos (and four masses for the elector of Saxony), all majestic and mystical, other-worldly and sublime.

It was left for subsequent generations to appreciate Bach. In his own day, he was not popular. His deeply religious feeling, his constant awareness of the supernatural were alien to the Age of Enlightenment and likewise to the frivolous courtiers who ornamented the age. Courtiers preferred the classical pomp of Handel or the graceful measures of a French contemporary of Bach, Jean-Philippe Rameau (1683-1764). Rameau was official musician at the court of Louis XV; he continued the classical tradition of Lully, but he diverted it into a kind of rococo; he affected a pastoral mood, in imitation of nature, and he composed formal dances that went well with the pictures of Greuze and the porcelains of Sèvres. Rameau was very popular in court circles and was ennobled just before his death. Like many of his patrons, he probably had more taste than genius.

Of equal taste with Rameau, but of greater genius, was Christoph Gluck (1714-1787), a native of the German Palatinate, who after sojourning successively in Vienna, Milan, and London, and being knighted by the pope, settled at Paris and enjoyed the patronage, first of Louis XV and Madame du Barry, and then of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. Gluck reformed the classical opera, which

was becoming excessively histrionic and was being threatened with extinction by the contemporaneous rise of "comic opera."¹ He made his operas, such as *Alceste*, *Orfeo*, and *Iphigénie*, quite Greek in scene and subject, and the notably lyrical quality with which he invested them represented his effort to establish a "pure classicism" in music, as Soufflot was attempting to do in architecture or Lessing and Alfieri in literature.

The supreme musician of the eighteenth century, however, was Mozart (1756-1791). Of a musically gifted family, he was a prodigy in youth and manhood; his brief life was all music. He wrote 200 works before he was eighteen, and when he died at the age of thirty-five he left more than 600 compositions. And what compositions they were! - symphonies, sonatas, quartets, chamber music, a majestic requiem Mass, and a series of world famous operas, including the *Marriage of Figaro* (1785), *Don Giovanni* (1787), and the *Magic Flute* (1791)—all imaginative, with ineffable grace and charm. Here was the finest taste combined with the highest genius.

**Mozart,
the Musical
Genius
of the
Eighteenth
Century**

In Mozart the best features of the whole musical development of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were synthesized, with consummate art and great originality. For, Mozart not only drew on the past; he was an innovator and pointed to the future. He was at once heir to the gayety of classical Italy and France and father of the profundity of the later German school. It was Mozart who really founded German opera. There had already been other great German composers, but Bach was hidden in his organ-loft, while Handel expatriated himself to England, and Gluck to France. Mozart was born and died in German Austria, and Mozart exerted decisive influence on both Haydn and Beethoven, whose principal works were to be produced in the age of the French Revolution and Napoleon and to distinguish, in the sphere of musical art, the age of full-fledged romanticism.

**A New
Great Age
of German
Music**

¹ Comic opera, as distinct from serious "grand" opera, originated in Italy early in the eighteenth century, and there, as "opera buffa," it was extremely popular throughout the century. In France, it developed at first in the provinces, notably in connection with country fairs; later, in 1752, the Opéra Comique was founded at Paris. The pretty popular music of comic opera represented a reaction against the classicism of Lully and Rameau, and, though viewed with some contempt by polite society, its popularity tended to influence the composers of grand opera.

From the high-noon of classicism to the dawn of romanticism, such is the broad generalization which can be made of the significance of the artistic developments which in music, literature, painting, and architecture attended the Intellectual Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Just as the Intellectual Revolution reached its culminating political and social expression in the French Revolution at the close of the eighteenth century, so the attendant artistic developments reached fruition in the flowering of romanticism at the beginning of the nineteenth century

To the French Revolution, and its reverberations throughout Europe and overseas, we shall now give heed.



CHAPTER XII

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

I. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES



ACTUAL social and political conditions in the eighteenth century did not square, anywhere in Europe, with the newer philosophy and science which we have just described. European intellectuals of the eighteenth century lived in an age of "enlightenment." They believed in "reason" and "progress." They looked forward, not backward, and contemned whatever seemed merely historical or traditional. They were sceptical of supernatural religion, critical of divine-right monarchy, doubtful of time-honored social institutions and customs.

Contrast between Theory and Practice in Eighteenth-Century Europe

Yet, despite this attitude of a growing number of intellectuals, the masses all over Europe continued to live within a framework of social and political and ecclesiastical usages which derived from earlier times and which were not essentially different in the eighteenth century from what they had been in the sixteenth century. Despite the development of national patriotism and the emergence of the doctrines of national unity and national self-determination, no state in Europe was as yet strictly national; the king of France still treated his realm as an agglomeration of personal and family possessions and addressed his subjects, not as the French nation, but as "my peoples." Despite the vogue of doctrines of popular sovereignty and recent political revolutions in Great Britain and America, absolute divine-right monarchy was still the rule all over the Continent, whether in the "empires" of Austria, Turkey, and Russia, or in the kingdoms of France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden, or in the petty principalities of Germany and Italy; the word of the "sovereign" was law. Despite the growth of religious scepticism and the beginnings of religious toleration, state-churches were still a well-nigh uni-

The "Old Régime" in Politics

versal institution; the Anglican church of England and the Lutheran church of Sweden, no less than the Catholic churches of France and Spain, were adjuncts of political government in their respective countries, attended by the world of fashion as well as by peasants, monopolizing public education as well as public charity, and supported by compulsory taxation. Despite the contemporaneous preaching of humanitarianism, the slave-trade still flourished under legal protection, and dynastic and commercial wars were still waged with lengthening duration and greater destructiveness.

Despite the ever louder chorus in praise of "noble savages" and "primitive" equality, the social structure of Europe still retained the class character which had marked it from time immemorial. There were still the classes of royalty, nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie, artisans, and peasants which had been established and sanctified centuries ago. Every individual was still born to a particular "class," or as the current phrase went, to "the station to which God had called him"; and the questioning of the fundamental divine nature of class distinctions, if allowable to Rousseau or some other advanced intellectual, seemed a silly or downright blasphemous occupation for common people.

In the eighteenth, as in the sixteenth century, the mass of Europeans were peasants, engaged in agriculture. Most of them lived and worked in much the same manner, and their social status was much the same. Wherever a traveller chanced to be on the Continent, in France or in Germany, he might still see the numerous little agricultural villages and manor-houses nestling among the hills or dotting the plains, surrounded by green fields and fringed with forest or waste land. The simple villagers still cultivated their strips in the common fields in the time-honored way, working hard for meagre returns. A third of the land stood idle every year. It often took a whole day merely to scratch the surface of a single acre with the rude wooden plough then in use. Cattle were killed off in the autumn for want of good hay. Fertilizers were only crudely applied, if at all. Many a humble peasant was content if his bushel of seed brought him three bushels of grain, and was proud if his fatted ox weighed over four hundred pounds.

As we have seen, there were some enterprising and prosperous

and the number of townsmen notably increased in Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, not only absolutely, but relatively to peasants and nobles and clergymen. Little villages of the year 1500 had become populous cities by 1750. London, already the largest city in Europe, now had a population of almost a million. Paris was at least half as large. Amsterdam was a great city, and so were Seville and Lisbon and Vienna. And as European cities grew, their appearance changed. They spread out beyond their cramping medieval walls. Roomy streets and pleasant squares made the newer sections more attractive. The old fortifications, no longer needed for protection, served as promenades. City thoroughfares were kept cleaner, sometimes well paved with cobbles; and at night the glow of oil street-lamps reassuringly lighted the homeward way of the burgher who had been at the theatre or the coffee-house.

The growth of towns was closely associated with the growth of industry and commerce. Industry in the eighteenth century meant far more than baking bread, making clothes, cobbling shoes, and fashioning furniture for the local market. It meant the production on a large scale of a vast range of goods to sell in distant places. Germany and Italy, it is true, were no longer such relatively important manufacturing countries as they had been in the later middle ages and early modern times. But throughout western Europe industrial development was constant and prodigious. In England in the eighteenth century a veritable industrial revolution was beginning; mechanical inventions were being applied to manufacturing and mining, production of goods was multiplying, and capitalism was growing by leaps and bounds.¹

**Growth of
Industry**

Commerce grew correspondingly. Not only was there a world market for European manufactures and sufficient capital to exploit it, but there was a lucrative carrying trade for Europeans between Asia and America. The New World supplied furs, timber, tobacco, cotton, rice, sugar, molasses, rum, coffee, dyes, gold, and silver, in return for negro slaves and Oriental wares; and the broad Atlantic highways were annually traversed by many hundreds of heavily laden sailing vessels. The spices, jewels, tea, and textiles of the Far East made rich cargoes for big fleets of stout East Indiamen.

**Growth of
Commerce**

¹ See Vol. II, ch. xv.

Important, too, was the traffic which occupied British and Dutch merchant fleets in the North and Baltic seas; and the ensigns of many sovereigns were carried by their bourgeois subjects along all the coasts of Europe. Great Britain at the opening of the eighteenth century possessed a foreign commerce estimated at \$60,000,000, and that of France was at least two thirds as great. Besides, domestic commerce was made easier, especially in national states, by the increasing attention which governments gave to police protection, to the extension of postal facilities, and to the construction of canals and good roads. During the century the volume and value of European commerce increased more than fourfold.

It is difficult to appreciate the significance of the growth of European capitalism, of which this expanding commerce was at once result and stimulant. It had already erected colonial empires, occasioned international wars, lured hundreds of thousands of peasants from their farms, and built populous cities. It was on the verge of effecting a revolution in the industrial arts the "Industrial Revolution" - which, beginning in Great Britain, should eventually spread throughout Europe and the whole world and provide the material setting for our contemporary civilization.¹ But, meanwhile, the most portentous evidence of the growth of capitalism was the waxing numbers and ambition of the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie comprised merchants, bankers, wholesalers, rich guild-masters, and even less opulent shopkeepers; and most professional men, lawyers, physicians, and professors were drawn from bourgeois families. It was an influential class. It was all-powerful in the realms of finance, industry, and trade. It was also powerful in the political domain; it was represented in the British House of Commons, and members of it were at the elbows of absolutist monarchs on the Continent, serving them as judges, local magistrates, ministers of state, intendants, tax-collectors. Moreover, it was the class which was eclipsing all others not only in wealth but in knowledge of, and devotion to, the new "enlightenment." From the bourgeoisie came the largest number of persons who read the latest books on science and philosophy, who responded sympathetically to the current pleas for

¹ On the Industrial Revolution, see Vol. II, ch. xv.

rationalism and humanitarianism, who criticized traditional religious beliefs and practices, who eagerly discussed questions of constitutional law and political economy.

As a class the bourgeoisie was ambitious. It resented its position as a middle class in European society. It aspired to the honors and privileges of the upper classes, or if it could not obtain for itself the privileges of clergy and nobility, it would combine with the lower classes in destroying such privileges. In any event, it would admit no superiors in brain and would brook no superiors in wealth.

**Ambitions
of the
Bourgeoisie**

More specifically, "enlightened" members of the bourgeoisie had immediate political ambitions. As men of means, they wished to have some direct say in the levying of taxes and the spending of public funds, and accordingly they took kindly to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. As men of learning, they desired to use this doctrine of popular sovereignty in order to direct state policies toward rational and humanitarian ends, toward freedom of conscience and worship, freedom of speech and association, freedom of trade, freedom from war, freedom from the irrational trammels of the past. They were especially fired by ambition to give effect to Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, to Jeremy Bentham's *Principles of Legislation*, to Rousseau's *Social Contract*.

All such ambition would have been natural, but hardly fruitful, if the bourgeoisie had been an isolated and static class in eighteenth-century society. But we must emphasize the fundamental fact that the bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century was neither isolated nor static. It was very dynamic; it was growing fast in numbers, wealth, and influence, as well as in ambition. In England, where its size and activity were greatest, it had already played decisive rôles in the Puritan and "Glorious" Revolutions of the seventeenth century and now, in the eighteenth century, it participated with nobility and clergy in the maintenance of limited, constitutional monarchy and the conduct of the parliamentary oligarchy. The new capitalism was legally entrenched, with the old agriculture, in England. And the American Revolution was a more recent and even more radical instance of the triumph of "enlightened" middle-class principles and ambitions. Now the lessons of British political revolution, whether in England or

**The In-
sistence
of the Bour-
geoisie on
Reform**

in America, were not lost on the growing middle class of the European Continent. Here, this class began to agitate for reform of politics not only, but of society and religion likewise.

On the Continent the bourgeoisie did not stand alone in its demand for reform. There were some nobles and clergymen who placed the claims of "enlightenment" above the claims of class and who swelled the clamor for reform. And there were "enlightened" monarchs who heard the clamor and sympathized with it and sought to accomplish reform. Indeed, as we have elsewhere pointed out,¹ the second half of the eighteenth century was full of "enlightened" reforming despots: Frederick II in Prussia (1740-1786), Joseph II in Austria (1765-1790), Catherine II in Russia (1762-1796), Charles III in Spain (1759-1788), Joseph I in Portugal (1750-1777), Gustavus III in Sweden (1771-1792). These princes worked hard. They patronized the new science as well as the new art. They accorded a large degree of religious toleration. They reformed the law courts. They built roads and canals and did much else to foster industry and commerce and to win the plaudits of the "enlightened" bourgeoisie.

With the development of the Intellectual Revolution during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and with the concurrent rise of the bourgeoisie, a profound change in European society was clearly impending. For a time, and in most lands, it seemed as if the change would be accomplished by gradual reforms, proceeding from enlightened monarchs and backed up by enlightened bourgeois and some enlightened nobles and clergymen. Only in France was there cause to suspect that "reform" might be anticipated by "revolution."

France in the eighteenth century possessed industry, commerce, capital, and a middle class, second only to Britain's among European nations, and her peasants on the whole were distinctly better off than those of other Continental countries. France, moreover, was the centre of the Continental "enlightenment." Her literature and art were universally prized and imitated. Her natural scientists and her social reformers were legion and were influential both abroad and at home. Not only her middle class, but many of her nobility and clergy and even some of her sturdy


The Central Position of France in the Eighteenth Century

¹ See above, pp. 346-356.

Longitude du Méridien de l'île de Fer.

CARTE GÉNÉRALE DE L'EUROPE.

Par M. BARRA, ingénieur Hydrographe
de la Marine.
Nap. 1840.
Avec l'avis du Roi.



Longitude du Méridien de Paris.

farmers and thrifty artisans were particularly "enlightened" and particularly clamorous for "reform."

According to the critical philosophy of the day, French society and French politics were in need of reform, though no more so than the society and politics of any other European country. In France, as elsewhere, there was much unreasonableness in existing politics and society. The government was too much the outcome of haphazard historical growth; it was both too arbitrary and too unsystematic. In the course of time, one set of institutions and officials had been superimposed on another, so that now, in the eighteenth century, while the king was supposed to be an autocrat, he was really dependent on a most complicated officialdom, with ill-defined powers and overlapping jurisdictions. The country had been divided since the middle ages into districts under bailiffs and seneschals whose offices were now purely ornamental. It had long been divided, too, into provinces, some of which had parliaments or "estates," and all of which had governors. It had been divided, moreover, since Richelieu's time, into intendancies, under intendants. It was also divided into judicial districts, each with a court or "parliament"; into ecclesiastical districts, each with a bishop or archbishop; and into educational districts, each with a university. Most towns had town councils, but no two such councils were elected in the same way or possessed the same rights. There was, thus, little system in the French government, and its abuses arose less from a constantly exerted despotism than from dilatoriness and occasional arbitrariness. Despotism in theory, it proved, after Louis XIV's time, ineffectual in practice.

Political
Confusion
in France

Confusion in administration was not the only confusion in eighteenth-century France. There was no uniformity or simplicity in standards of weight and measure, in coinage, in tolls, in internal customs-duties. Nor was there any uniformity in law or legal procedure. What was lawful in one town might be illegal in a place not five miles distant. Almost four hundred bodies of law were in force in different parts of France.

To legal and administrative confusion, must be added fiscal confusion. There was no distinction between the king's income and the national income. There was no budget. Money was spent by the king or his agents as fast as it was collected. No general

accounts were kept, and no official knew the actual condition of the finances. What has been called the tax-system of the old régime was hardly a system at all; it had grown up like the political machinery of the state, in a most haphazard manner. The king still obtained some revenue from his personally owned estates and manors, like any landlord. But most of the public revenue was gotten from various kinds of national taxation which had been established at different times in the past: a general poll or head tax; an income tax; a direct land tax; a tax on foreign imports; a tax on the transport of goods between various provinces and various towns within France; excise taxes; licensing taxes, etc. The difficulty here was not with the kinds of taxes (most of which are levied nowadays in "progressive" countries), but rather with the modes of assessing and collecting them. They were assessed mainly to the unprivileged classes of peasantry and bourgeoisie, while the privileged classes of clergy and nobility, that is, some of the wealthiest Frenchmen, were largely exempt. Furthermore, instead of collecting taxes direct from the taxpayers, the government would empower private corporations or individuals—the so-called "farmers of the taxes" to monopolize the collection of certain taxes in particular districts and to retain for themselves a liberal share of what they collected.

With all its confusion and inefficiency, the French government of the eighteenth century was provokingly arbitrary at times, and, from the standpoint of "enlightened" Frenchmen, it was too prone to take "reactionary" measures against "progressive" leaders and movements. A person who shocked the king or offended an influential nobleman or ecclesiastic might be thrown into prison by royal order (the so-called "lettre de cachet") and immured there indefinitely without trial; for example, Voltaire was jailed for a while in this manner, and so was the Count de Mirabeau. Protestants and other dissenters from the state church were now usually tolerated, but as the older laws against them still remained on the statute-books, they were subjected to repeated annoyances on the complaint of religious fanatics and also of persons who merely had a grudge against them. There were also both royal and ecclesiastical censorships, which were invoked at one time or another against almost every "enlightened" litté-

**Fiscal
Confusion
in France**

**Arbitrari-
ness and
Ineffi-
ciency in
France**

ateur in eighteenth-century France. These censorships were enforced too poorly and too spasmodically to be effective, but they were enforced enough to be galling and troublesome.

In all the foregoing respects and in general conditions, France in the eighteenth century was not very different from other European countries.¹ Her need of political and social reform was perhaps a bit greater. Her critical writers were perhaps a bit more numerous and more incisive. Her growing bourgeoisie was perhaps a bit more eager to participate in reform. Yet there were two circumstances which were peculiar to France and of ominous significance. First, the French royal family was incompetent. Second, the French state was becoming bankrupt.

Louis XIV, the Grand Monarch, had been the last of the really competent Bourbon kings of France; he had had brains and he had worked hard. And he had had the wit to perceive toward the end of his reign how very costly were his wars and his ostentation. As he lay on his deathbed, flushed with fever, he called his five-year-old great-grandson and heir, the future Louis XV, to the bedside and said: "My child, you will soon be sovereign of a great kingdom. Do not forget your obligations to God; remember that it is to Him that you owe all that you are. Endeavor to live at peace with your neighbors; do not imitate me in my fondness for war, nor in the exorbitant expenditure which I have incurred. Take counsel in all your actions. Endeavor to relieve the people at the earliest possible moment, and thus to accomplish what, unfortunately, I am unable to do myself."

Incompe-
tence of
Bourbon
Kings in
the Eight-
eenth
Century

It was good advice. But Louis XIV, having kept all the threads of government in his own hands, left no proper organization of government to conduct affairs for his grandchild. Louis XV was only a child at the time, a plaything in the hands of selfish and unprincipled ministers. In an earlier chapter we have seen how under the duke of Orleans, who was prince regent from 1715 to 1723, French finances, already disorganized, were reduced to chaos by the speculations of John Law; and how under Cardinal Fleury, who was minister from 1726 to 1743, the treasury was

¹ Except from England, in respect of the rôle of the nobility. In France the nobility was deprived of real political power, while in England the nobility (with the commercial bourgeoisie) constituted the parliamentary oligarchy. See above, pp. 447, 453-460.

further impoverished by French participation in the War of the Polish Election (1733-1738) and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).¹

In 1743 the ninety-year-old Cardinal Fleury died, and Louis XV announced that he would be his own minister. But Louis XV was not a Frederick the Great; he had neither the wit nor the inclination to be a really "enlightened" despot. At the council table he "opened his mouth, said little, and thought not at all." State business seemed terribly dull, and the king left most of it to his fawning courtiers.

But of one thing, Louis XV could not have enough, and that was pleasure. Pleasure he took, not from politics or from the "enlightenment," but from dancing, hunting, gambling, and especially a series of pretty-faced, putty-headed mistresses, prominent among whom were the duchess of Chateauroux, Madame de Pompadour, and Madame du Barry. Upon his mistresses, he lavished titles, money, and estates; he provided magnificent establishments for them at Versailles; and he allowed their whims to determine French policy in international affairs. It was mainly a whim of Madame de Pompadour which aligned France with her traditional enemy Austria in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) and cost France her political prestige in Europe and her colonial empire in America and India, and saddled her with crushing financial burdens.²

Early in his reign Louis XV had been dubbed Louis the Well Beloved, and to the end he was beloved by shallow courtiers who bled him—and the French treasury—white. Versailles remained gay. Its artificial elegance was alluringly depicted by Boucher and Fragonard. Its fountains played, its minuets were danced, its furniture was gilded. Mistresses and court ladies painted their cheeks ever more brightly, and butterfly nobles and ecclesiastics spent their fortunes ever more recklessly.

But Versailles was not France. At Paris and in the provinces there was not only literary criticism but popular grumbling, as taxes went higher and the hope of royal reform receded. Louis XV grew afraid to ride in town or country; peasants saluted him sullenly, and artisans jeered at him; he knew that he was be-

¹ See above, pp. 315-317.

² The formal annexation of Lorraine in 1766 and of Corsica in 1768 afforded some crumbs of comfort to France and temporarily bolstered her international prestige. See above, p. 317, note.

coming the Well Hated. Yet, "it will surely last as long as I," he cynically reassured himself; "my successor may take care of himself."

His successor was his grandson, Louis XVI (1774-1792), a weak-kneed prince of twenty years, very virtuous and well-meaning, but lacking in intelligence and will-power. He was too awkward and shy to preside with dignity over the ceremonious court; he was too stupid and lazy to dominate the government. He liked to shoot deer from out the palace window, or to play at lock-making in his royal carpentry shop. He would have been a good bourgeois; he could not be an enlightened despot.

At first, hopes ran high, for Turgot, friend of Voltaire and contributor to the *Encyclopedia*, was named minister of finance (1774-1776), and reform was in the air. Industry and commerce were to be unshackled; *laissez-faire* was to be the order of the day; finances were to be reformed, and taxes lowered. The clergy and nobles were no longer to escape taxation; taxes on food were to be abolished; the peasants were to be freed from forced labor on the roads. But Turgot only stirred up opposition. The nobles and clergy were not anxious to be taxed; courtiers resented any reduction of their pensions; owners of industrial monopolies were frightened; tax-farmers feared the reforming minister; the peasants misunderstood his intentions; riots broke out. Everybody seemed to be relieved when, in 1776, Turgot was dismissed.

Turgot had been a theorist; his successor was a business man. Jacques Necker was well known in Paris as a hard-headed Swiss banker, and Madame Necker's receptions were attended by the chief personages of the bourgeois society of Paris. During his five years in office (1776-1781) Necker applied business methods to the royal finances. He borrowed 400,000,000 francs from his banker friends, bettered the collection of taxes, reduced expenditures, and carefully audited the accounts. In 1781 he issued a report, or "Account Rendered of the Financial Condition." The bankers were delighted; the secrets of the royal treasury were at last common property; ¹ and Necker was praised to the skies.

¹ The *Compte Rendu*, as it was called in France, was really not accurate; Necker, in order to secure credit for his financial administration, made matters appear better than they actually were.

While Necker's Parisian friends rejoiced, his enemies at court prepared his downfall. The most powerful enemy of Necker's reforms and economies was the queen, Marie Antoinette. She was an Austrian princess, the daughter of Maria Theresa, and in the eyes of the French people she always remained a hated foreigner—"the Austrian," they called her—the living symbol of the ruinous alliance between Habsburgs and Bourbons which had been arranged by Madame de Pompadour and which had contributed to the disasters and disgrace of the Seven Years' War.¹ While ministers of finance were puzzling their heads over the deficit, Marie Antoinette was buying jewelry and making presents to her friends. The girl-queen had little serious interest in politics, but when her friends complained of Necker's miserliness, she at once demanded his dismissal.

Her demand was granted, for the kind-hearted, well-intentioned Louis XVI could not bear to deprive his pretty, irresponsible Marie Antoinette and her charming friends,—gallant nobles of France,—of their pleasures. Their pleasures were very costly; and the obsequious new finance-minister, Calonne, secured fresh loans only at high rates of interest.

From the standpoint of France, the greatest folly of Louis XVI's reign was the ruinous intervention in the War of American Independence (1778-1783).² The United States became free. Great Britain was humbled. Frenchmen proved that their valor was equal to their chivalry. But when the impulsive Marquis de Lafayette returned from assisting the Americans to win their liberty, he found the French treasury on the verge of collapse. All questions of reform were obviously centring in the single, simple question of public finance. How to balance expenditure with income? How to restrict the one and expand the other?

As a matter of fact, the expenditure, though wasteful, was not too great for a rich country like France to bear. And the tax burdens might have been eased for the lower classes if the well-to-do upper classes had been made to shoulder their proportionate share. Successive finance-ministers so advised Louis XVI. Here, however, was the crux of the situation: the upper classes were not minded to surrender any privilege, and

¹ See above, pp. 341-344, 407-413.

² See above, pp. 484-487.

the well-intentioned king was too dull to understand in the least the seriousness of the financial situation. What was the good of being a bishop or a noble, if one had no privileges and was obliged to pay taxes like the rest? What was the good of being king, if one had to pull down the traditional pillars of society? In the fateful circumstances, reform could mean in France only temporary financial palliatives, with bankruptcy (and revolution) in the offing.

In 1786 the interest-bearing debt had mounted to \$600,000,000, the government was running in debt at least \$25,000,000 a year, and the treasury-officials were experiencing the utmost difficulty in negotiating new loans. Something had to be done. In desperation the king convened (1787) an Assembly of Notables—145 of the chief nobles, bishops, and magistrates—in the vain hope that they would consent to the taxation of the privileged and unprivileged alike. **The Assembly of the Notables** The notables were not so self-sacrificing, however, and contented themselves with abolishing compulsory labor on the roads, approving the establishment of provincial assemblies, and demanding the dismissal of Calonne, the minister of finance. The question of taxation, they said, should be referred to the Estates General. All this helped the treasury in no material way.

A new minister of finance, who succeeded Calonne,—Archbishop Lomenie de Brienne,—politely thanked the notables and sent them home. He made so many fine promises that hope temporarily revived, and a new loan was raised. **The Parliament of Paris** But the parlement of Paris soon saw through the artifices of the suave minister, and positively refused to register further loans or taxes. Encouraged by popular approval, the parlement went on to draw up a declaration of rights, and to assert that subsidies could constitutionally be granted only by the nation's representatives—the Estates General. This sounded to the government like revolution, and the parlements were abolished. At once there was popular protest; soldiers refused to arrest the judges; and excited crowds assembled in Paris and other cities and clamored for the convocation of the Estates General.

Menaced with revolt, the well-intentioned Louis XVI finally yielded to the popular clamor. He and his ministers, in their

search for means of escape from financial bankruptcy, had already had recourse to every expedient consistent with the maintenance of the "old régime" save one, and this one—the convocation of the Estates General—was now to be tried. It might be that the duly elected representatives of the three chief classes of the realm would offer suggestions to the court, whereby, without impairing the divine-right monarchy or the traditional class-distinctions, the public treasury could be refilled. With this simple objective in mind, Louis XVI in 1788 summoned the Estates General to meet at Versailles the following May.

The Estates General were by no means a novel institution. Though for a hundred and seventy-five years the French monarchs had been able to do without them, they were in theory still a legitimate part of the historic French government. Summoned for the first time by King Philip the Fair as far back as 1302, they had thenceforth been convoked at irregular intervals until 1614.¹ Their organization had always been in three separate bodies, representing by election the three traditional estates, or "orders," of the realm—clergy, nobility, and commoners (Third Estate). Each estate had voted as a unit, and two out of the three estates were sufficient to carry a measure. It had usually happened that the clergy and nobility joined forces to outvote the commoners. The powers of the Estates General had always been advisory rather than legislative, and the kings had frequently ignored or violated the enactments of the Estates General. It might prove dangerous in the troubled state of affairs of 1788-1789 to convoke such a public debating body as the Estates General, but it was not revolutionary.

In the winter of 1788-1789 elections to the several estates were held throughout France in accordance with medieval usage.

Also, in accordance with old custom and royal request, the electors drafted reports on the condition of their respective localities and recommendations for their representatives and for the government. These reports and recommendations were called *cahiers*; there were many of them, for almost every local group of voters of each of the three estates prepared a *cahier*.

¹ See above, pp. 280-281.

By the time the elections were held and the *cahiers* drafted, it was apparent that the majority of the French people expected from the Estates General a greater measure of reform than their sovereign had anticipated. To be sure, the *cahiers* were not revolutionary in wording. The
Cahiers With remarkable uniformity they expressed loyalty to the monarchy and fidelity to the king. In not a single one was there a threat of violent change. But in spirit most of the *cahiers* reflected the radical political philosophy of the age, that there should be fundamental, thoroughgoing reforms in government and society. Many of the *cahiers* of the Third Estate were particularly insistent upon the removal of social inequalities and abuses long associated with the "old régime," and especially emphatic about the need of establishing national unity and solidarity. It was clear that if the elected representatives of the Third Estate carried out the instructions of their constituents, the voting of additional taxes to the government would be delayed until a thorough investigation had been made and many grievances had been redressed.

On the whole, it appeared likely that the elected representatives of the Third Estate would heed the *cahiers*. They were educated and earnest men. Two thirds of them were lawyers or judges; many, also, were scholars; only ten could possibly be considered as belonging to the lower classes. The Position of the
Third
Estate A goodly number admired the governmental system of Great Britain, in which the royal power had been reduced and the rôle of the nation had been exalted; the class interests of all of them were directly opposed to the prevailing policies of the French monarchy. The Third Estate was now too conscious of the problem confronting the French state to ignore the instructions in their *cahiers* and the reforms demanded by their provinces.

In the earliest history of the Estates General, the Third Estate had been of comparatively slight importance either in society or in politics, and Philip the Fair had proclaimed that the duty of its members was "to hear, receive, approve, and perform what should be commanded of them by the king." But between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries the relative social importance of the bourgeoisie had enormously increased. The class was more numerous, wealthier, more enlightened, and

more experienced in the conduct of business. It became clearer with the lapse of time that it, more than nobility or clergy, represented the bulk of the nation. This development Louis XVI had seemed in part to recognize by providing that the number of elected representatives of the Third Estate should equal the combined numbers of those of the First and Second Estates. The commoners naturally drew the deduction from the royal concession that they were to exercise paramount political influence in the Estates General of 1789.

The Third Estate, as elected in the winter of 1788-1789, was fortunate in possessing two very capable spokesmen, Mirabeau and Sieyes, both of whom belonged by birth or office to the upper classes, but who had gladly accepted election as deputies of the unprivileged classes. Mirabeau (1749-1791) was the son of a bluff but good-hearted old marquis who was not very successful in bringing up his family. Young Mirabeau had been so wild and unruly that his father had repeatedly obtained *lettres de cachet* from the king in order that prison bars might keep the "bad boy" out of mischief. Released several times only to fall into new excesses, Mirabeau found at last in the stirring political events of 1789 an opportunity for expressing his sincere belief in constitutional government and an outlet for his almost superhuman energy. From the convocation of the Estates General to his death in 1791, he was one of the most prominent men in France. His gigantic physique, half-broken by disease and imprisonment, his shaggy eyebrows, his heavy head, gave him an impressive, though sinister, appearance. And for quickness in perceiving at once a problem and its solution, as well as for gifts of reverberating oratory, he had no equal.

Less forceful and more doctrinaire was the priest, Sieyes (1748-1836), whose lack of devotion to Christianity and the clerical calling was matched by his zealous regard for the critical philosophy of the day and for the practical arts of politics and diplomacy. It was a pamphlet of Sieyes that, on the eve of the assembling of the Estates General, furnished the Third Estate with its platform and programme. "What is the Third Estate?" asked Sieyes. "It is everything,"

NOTE. The picture opposite is a portrait of Mirabeau, from a sculptured bust by Jean Antoine Houdon (1740-1828)





he replied. "What has it been hitherto in the political order? Nothing! What does it desire? To be something!"

If the Third Estate-- and the Estates General as a whole--were uncertain about what was expected of them, Louis XVI and his ministers seemed far more uncertain. Indeed, the most amazing and significant fact about the situation was that the royal government formulated no programme. It did not study the *cahiers* or deduce from them any proposals or recommendations to put before the Estates General. In other words, the royal government exercised no leadership, and this gave to the situation a peculiarly chaotic character.

The King
without
a Pro-
gramme

The position of the Third Estate was still officially undefined when the Estates General assembled at Versailles in May, 1789. The king received his advisers with pompous ceremony and a colorless speech. The only thing which seemed obvious was that Louis XVI intended their business to be purely financial and their organization quite traditional. He would have the three estates vote "by order," that is, as three distinct bodies, so that the doubled membership of the Third Estate would have but one vote to the privileged orders' two. With this view the great majority of the nobles and a large part of the clergy, especially the higher clergy, were in full sympathy. On the other hand, the commoners began to argue that the Estates General should organize themselves as a single assembly, in which each member should have one vote, such voting "by head" marking the establishment of true *national* representation in France, and that the assembly should forthwith concern itself with a general reformation of French society and government. With the commoners' argument a few of the liberal nobles, headed by Lafayette, and a considerable group of the clergy, particularly the parish priests, agreed; and it had the support of the bulk of public opinion outside the Estates General. Bad harvests in 1788 had been followed by an unusually severe winter. The peasantry was in an extremely wretched plight, and the cities, notably Paris, suffered from a shortage of food. The increase of popular distress, like a black cloud before a storm, gave ominous weight to the demands of the commoners.

Vote by
"Order"
or by
"Head"

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Scene at the Bourbon Court at Versailles," is from an engraving by Jean Michel Moreau (1741-1814).

Over the constitutional question, fraught as it was with the most significant consequences to politics and society, the parties wrangled for a month. The king, unwilling to offend anyone, shilly-shallied. But the uncompromising attitude of the privileged orders and the indecision of the leaders of the court at length forced the issue. On 17 June, 1789, the Third Estate solemnly proclaimed itself a "*National Assembly*" and invited the other Estates to join it in the work of national reformation. Three days later, when the deputies of the Third Estate came to the hall which had been set apart in the palace of Versailles for their use, they found its doors shut and guarded by troops and a notice to the effect that it was undergoing repairs. Apparently the king was at last preparing to intervene in the contest himself.

Then the commoners precipitated a veritable revolution. Led by Mirabeau and Sieyès, they proceeded to a great public building in the vicinity, which was variously used as a riding-hall or a tennis court. There, amidst intense excitement, with upstretched hands, they took an oath as members of the "*National Assembly*" that they would not separate until they had drawn up a constitution for France. The "*Oath of the Tennis Court*" was the true beginning of the French Revolution. Without royal sanction, in fact against the express commands of the king, the medieval feudal Estates General had been transformed, by a simple proclamation of one of the Estates, into a National Assembly, charged with the duty of establishing constitutional government in France. The "*Oath of the Tennis Court*" was the declaration of the end of absolute divine-right monarchy and of the beginning of popular national sovereignty.

What would the king do under these circumstances? The most obvious thing would be for him to overwhelm the revolutionary commoners by force of arms. But that would not solve his financial problems, nor could he expect the French nation to endure it. It would likely lead to a ruinous civil war. Another line of action appealed to the king; he would try a game of bluff. So he ignored the "*Oath of the Tennis Court*," and with majestic mien commanded the Estates to sit separately and vote "by order." But the commoners were not to be bluffed. Now joined by a considerable number of clergy and by a few nobles, they maintained their defiant attitude and declared, in

**The Oath
of the
Tennis
Court**

**Transforma-
tion of the
Es-
tates Gen-
eral into
the Na-
tional Con-
stituent
Assembly**

the words of Mirabeau, "We are here by the will of the people and we shall not leave our places except at the point of the bayonet." Whereupon, the weak-kneed, well-intentioned Louis XVI gave way. Exactly one week after the scene in the tennis court, he reversed his earlier decrees and directed the three Estates to sit together and vote "by head" as members of a National Constituent Assembly.

2. NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-DETERMINATION

By the end of June, 1789, the stage was set for a radical alteration in the traditional political institutions and social structure of France. With the consent of the king, the nobles and clergy were now meeting with the commoners. The Estates General had become the National Constituent Assembly, and its middle-class leaders were looking forward toward the goals of individual liberty, social equality, and democratic nationalism.

Yet, before the Assembly could proceed with its revolutionary labors, it had to face still another change of front on the part of the king. For, early in July, 1789, a gradual transfer of royal troops from the eastern frontier to the vicinity of Paris and Versailles indicated that Louis XVI was at last preparing to use force against the Assembly if it should prove too revolutionary. The Assembly at once requested the removal of the troops. The king responded by a peremptory refusal and by the dismissal of Necker, the popular finance-minister.¹ Then it was that Paris came to the rescue of the Assembly.

The Question of Freedom for the Assembly

The Parisian populace, goaded by real want, felt instinctively that its own interests and those of the National Assembly were identical. Fired by an eloquent harangue of a brilliant young journalist, Camille Desmoulins by name, they rushed to arms. For three days there was wild disorder in the city. Shops were looted, royal officers were expelled, business was at a standstill. On the third day—14 July, 1789—the mob surged out to the east end of Paris, where stood the frowning royal fortress and prison of the Bastille. Although since the accession of Louis XVI the Bastille no longer harbored political offenders, nevertheless it was still regarded as a symbol of Bourbon despotism, a grim threat against the liber-

Popular Uprising in Paris and Fall of the Bastille

¹ Necker had been restored to his office as director-general of the finances in 1788.

ties of Paris. The people would now take it and would appropriate its arms and ammunition for use in defense of the National Assembly. The garrison of the Bastille was small and disheartened, provisions were short, and the royal governor was irresolute. Within a few hours the mob was in possession of the Bastille, and the defenders, most of whom were Swiss mercenaries, had been slaughtered.

The fall of the Bastille was the first serious act of violence in the course of the Revolution. It was an unmistakable sign that the people were with the Assembly rather than with the king. It put force behind the Assembly's decrees. Not only that, but it rendered Paris practically independent of royal control, for, during the period of disorder, prominent citizens had taken it upon themselves to organize their own government and their own army. The new local government - the "commune," as it was called - was made up of those elected representatives of the various sections or wards of Paris who had chosen the city's delegates to the Estates General. It was itself a revolution in city government. It substituted popularly elected officials in place of royal agents and delegates of the medieval guilds. And the authority of the commune was sustained by a popularly enrolled militia, styled the National Guard, which soon numbered 48,000 champions of the new cause. It was obvious that, for the first time since the early days of Louis XIV, Paris rather than Versailles was leading France.¹

The fall of the Bastille was such a clear sign that even Louis XVI did not fail to perceive its meaning. He instantly withdrew the royal troops and recalled Necker. He recognized the new government of Paris and confirmed the appointment of the liberal Lafayette as commander of the National Guard. He visited Paris in person, praised what he could not prevent, and put on a red-white-and-blue cockade—combining the red and blue of the capital city with the white of the Bourbons—the new national tricolor of France. Frenchmen still celebrate the fourteenth of July, the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, as the independence day of the French nation.

For a while it seemed as though radical reform might proceed without further interruption. The freedom of the Assembly had

¹ See above, pp. 293, 312.

been affirmed and upheld. Paris had settled down once more into comparative repose. The king had apparently learned his lesson. But the victory of the revolutionaries had been gained too easily. Louis XVI might take solemn oaths and wear strange cockades, but he remained in character essentially weak. His very virtues—good intentions, love of wife, loyalty to friends—were continually abused. The queen was bitterly opposed to the reforming policies of the National Assembly and actively resented any diminution of royal authority. Her clique of court friends and favorites disliked the decrease of pensions and amusements to which they had long been accustomed. Court and queen made common cause in appealing to the good qualities of Louis XVI. What was the weak king to do in the circumstances? He was completely dominated by the court, and the court had no constructive plans.

The result was renewed intrigues to employ force against the obstreperous deputies and their allies, the populace of Paris. This time it was planned to bring royal troops from the garrisons in Flanders. On the night of 1 October, 1789, a supper was given by the officers of the body-guard at Versailles in honor of the arriving soldiers. Toasts were drunk liberally and royalist songs were sung. News of the "orgy," as it was termed, spread like wildfire in Paris, where hunger was more prevalent than ever. The court and army officers at Versailles appeared to be feasting while the common people of Paris were starving. The latter believed that the presence of additional troops at Versailles not only would put an end to the independence of the Assembly but would continue their own starvation. More excited grew the Parisians.

On 5 October was presented a strange and uncouth spectacle. A long line of the poorest women of Paris, including some men dressed as women, riotous with hunger and rage, armed with sticks and clubs, screaming "Bread! bread! bread!" were straggling along the twelve miles of highway from Paris to Versailles. They were going to demand bread of the king. Lafayette and his National Guardsmen, who had been unable or unwilling to allay the excitement in Paris, marched at a respectful distance behind the women out to Versailles.

**Renewed
Royal
Threats
against the
Assembly's
Freedom**

**The De
scent of the
Parisian
Women on
Versailles**

By the time Lafayette reached the royal palace, the women were surrounding it, howling and cursing, and demanding bread or blood; only the fixed bayonets of the royal troops prevented them from invading the building, and even the troops were weakening. Lafayette at once became the man of the hour. He sent the soldiers back to the barracks and with his own force undertook to guard the royal family. Despite his precautions, it was a wild night. There was continued tumult in the streets and, at one time, shortly before dawn, a gang of rioters actually broke into the palace and killed several of the queen's body-guard.

When morning came, the well-meaning king consented to do what was to prove fatal to him and fateful to the Revolution; he consented to accompany the mob back to Paris.

Transfer
of King
and As-
sembly
from Ver-
sailles to
Paris

And so on 6 October there was a procession from Versailles to Paris more curious and more significant than that of the preceding day in the opposite direction. There were still the women and a host of people from the slums, and the national guardsmen and

Lafayette on his white horse, but this time in the midst of the throng was a great lumbering coach, in which rode Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette and their children. All along the route, the mob shouted "We have the baker and the baker's wife and the little cook-boy--now we shall have bread."

To Versailles the French royal family never returned. The Parisians installed Louis XVI in the palace of the Tuileries, and thenceforth he was virtually their prisoner. Moreover, the National Assembly speedily followed the king to Paris, so that from October, 1789, not reactionary Versailles but radical Paris was the centre of the Revolution.

The "fall of the Bastille" and the "march of the women to Versailles" were the two picturesque events which in 1789 rendered the National Assembly independent of the king and dependent upon the populace of Paris. Meanwhile, the French people at large were supplying the National Assembly with the occasion and the impulse for some of its most revolutionary reforms.

Ever since the assembling of the Estates General, ordinary administration of the country had been at a standstill. The people, expecting great changes, refused to pay the customary

taxes and imposts, and the king, for fear of the National Assembly and of a popular uprising, hesitated to compel tax collection by force of arms. The local officials did not know whether they were to obey the Assembly or the king. In fact, the Assembly was for a time so busy with constitutional questions that it neglected to provide for local government, and the king was always timorous. So, during the summer of 1789, the institutions of the "old régime" disappeared throughout France, one after another, because there was no popular desire to maintain them and no competent authority to operate them. The July rioting in Paris and the fall of the Bastille were signals for similar action elsewhere; other towns substituted new elective officers for royal or guild agents and organized national guards of their own. Chaos, which had already overtaken the central government of the king, thus overtook his agencies of local government. The whole political machinery which Louis XIV had built up, now collapsed utterly under Louis XVI; and no effective, centralized authority immediately took its place.

Collapse of the Royal Government throughout France

At the same time the revolutionary action of the townspeople spread to the country districts. In many regions the oppressed peasants attacked the *châteaux* of the hated nobles, taking particular pains to destroy feudal or servile title-deeds. In some places, monasteries and residences of bishops were ransacked and pillaged. A few of the unlucky landlords were murdered, and others were driven into the towns or across the frontier. Amid the universal confusion, the old system of local government completely collapsed. The intendants and governors quitted their posts. The traditional courts of justice, whether feudal or royal, ceased to function. The summer of 1789 really ended the "old régime" in France, and the transfer of the central government from Versailles to Paris in October merely confirmed an accomplished fact.

The Peasant Uprisings in the Provinces

The End of the Old Régime

It was one thing to end the "old régime"—to wreck the authority of the king, to trample upon the time-honored privileges of the upper classes, to destroy long-existing institutions. It was another thing to begin a "new régime"—to establish a new government and a new society which should embody the enlightened aspirations of the age and at the same time bring

order out of chaos. To this great and difficult task, the National Constituent Assembly devoted its earnest attention throughout its sessions at Paris from October, 1789 to September, 1791. And, despite factional differences and disturbances within the Assembly and more or less constant pressure upon it by disorderly Parisians, it managed to achieve a high degree of success. Indeed, the work of the National Constituent Assembly from 1789 to 1791 was by far the most constructive and the most enduring of the whole revolutionary era.

Leaving out of consideration for the present the frightened royal family, the startled noblemen and clergy, the determined peasantry, and the excited townfolk, and not adhering too closely to chronological order, let us concentrate our attention upon the National Assembly and review its major acts during those momentous years, 1789-1791.

The first great achievement of the Assembly was the legal destruction of feudalism and serfdom and class privilege—a long step in the direction of social equality. We have already noticed how in July, while the Assembly was still at Versailles, the royal officers in the country districts had ceased to govern and how the peasants had destroyed many *châteaux* amid scenes of unexpected violence. News of the rioting and disorder came to the Assembly from every province and filled its members with the liveliest apprehension. A long report, submitted by a special investigating committee on 4 August, 1789, gave such harrowing details of the popular uprising that everyone was convinced that something should be done at once.

While the Assembly was debating a declaration which might calm revolt, one of the nobles—a relative of Lafayette—arose in his place and stated that if the peasants had attacked the property and privileges of the upper classes, it was because such property and privileges represented unjust inequality, that the fault lay there, and that the remedy was not to repress the peasants but to suppress inequality. It was immediately moved and carried that the Assembly should proclaim equality of taxation for all classes and the suppression of feudal and servile dues. Then followed a scene almost unprecedented in history. Noble vied with noble, and clergyman with clergyman, in re-

nouncing the vested rights of the "old régime." The game laws were repealed. The manorial courts were suppressed. Serfdom was abolished. Tithes and all sorts of ecclesiastical privilege were sacrificed. The sale of offices was discontinued. In fact, all special privileges, whether of classes, of cities, or of provinces, were swept away in one consuming burst of enthusiasm. The holocaust lasted throughout the night of the fourth of August. Within a week the various independent measures had been consolidated into an impressive decree "abolishing the feudal system" and the king had signed the decree. What many reforming ministers had vainly labored for years partially to accomplish was thus done by the National Assembly in a few days and with much thoroughness. The so-called "August Days" legalized the dissolution of the traditional class-society of France and the substitution of modern individualist society.

**Abolition
of Feudal-
ism, Serf-
dom, and
Class
Privilege**

It has been customary to refer these vast social changes to the enthusiasm, magnanimity, and self-sacrifice of the privileged orders. That there was enthusiasm is unquestionable. But it may be doubted whether the nobles and clergy were so much magnanimous as terrorized. For the first time, they were genuinely frightened by the peasants, and it is possible that the true measure of their "magnanimity" was their alarm. Then, too, if one is to sacrifice, one must have something to sacrifice. At most, the nobles had only legal claims to surrender, for the peasants had already taken forcible possession of nearly everything which the decree accorded them. In fact the decree of the Assembly constituted merely a legal and uniform recognition of accomplished facts.

The nobles may have thought, moreover, that enlightened acquiescence in the first demands of the peasantry would merit some compensatory advantages to themselves. At any rate, they zealously set to work in the Assembly to modify what had been done, to secure financial or other indemnity,¹ and to prevent the enactment of additional social legislation. Outside the Assembly few nobles took kindly to the loss of privilege and



¹ The general effect of the series of decrees of the Assembly from 5 to 11 August, 1789, was to impose some kind of financial redemption for many of the feudal dues. It was only in July, 1793, almost four years after the "August Days," that all feudal dues and rights were legally abolished without redemption or compensation.

property. The large majority protested and tried to stir up civil war; and eventually, when such attempts failed, they left France and enrolled themselves among their country's enemies.

It is not necessary for us to know precisely who were responsible for the "August Days." The fact remains that the "decree abolishing the feudal system" represented the most important achievement of the whole French Revolution. Henceforth, those who profited by the decree were loyal friends of the Revolution, while the losers were its bitter opponents.

The second great work of the Assembly was the proclamation of individual rights and liberties. The old society and government of France were disappearing. On what basis should the new be erected? Great Britain had its *Magna Carta* and its Bill of Rights; America had its Declaration of Independence. France was now given a "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen." This document, which reflected the spirit of Rousseau's philosophy, and incorporated some of the British and American provisions, became the platform of the French Revolution and tremendously influenced political thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A few of its most striking sentences were as follows: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights." The rights of man are "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." "Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate personally, or through his representative, in its formation. It must be the same for all." "No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law." Religious toleration, freedom of speech, and liberty of the press were affirmed. The people were to control the finances, and to the people all officials of the state were responsible. Finally, the influence of the propertied classes, which were overwhelmingly represented in the Assembly, showed itself in the concluding section of the Declaration: "Since private property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified."

The next great undertaking of the National Assembly was the establishment of a new and uniform administrative system



in France. The ancient and confusing "provinces," "governments," "intendancies," "*pays d'état*," "*pays d'élection*," "parlements," and "bailliages" were swept away. The country was divided anew into eighty-three départements, approximately uniform in size and population, and named after natural features, such as rivers or mountains. Each département was subdivided into districts (cantons) and communes,—divisions which have endured in France to the present day. The heads of the local government were no longer to be appointed by the crown; they were to be elected by the people, and extensive powers were granted to elective local councils. Provision was made for a new system of law courts throughout the country, and the judges, like the administrative officials, were to be elected by popular vote. Projects were likewise put forward to unify and simplify the great variety of laws which prevailed in different parts of France, but this work was not brought to completion until the time of Napoleon Bonaparte.

**Reform
of Local
Govern-
ment**

Back of all the projects and achievements of the National Assembly was an evident desire to emphasize the national unity of France as well as the popular sovereignty of Frenchmen. Indeed, the sudden rise of modern nationalism was one of the most impressive features of the French Revolution. It was at once a consequence of heightened national feeling and an incentive to the most intense national patriotism that class privileges were swept away and all Frenchmen were treated as equals; that the old provinces were abolished and the new départements set up; that the traditional Estates General were reorganized as the *National* Assembly and its protecting popular army took the name of *National* Guard; that, according to the "Declaration of the Rights of Man," "the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the *nation* — no body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the *nation*."

**The New
National-
ism**

Nationalism was further exemplified by the eagerness with which the revolutionaries sought to organize systems of national education and national military service, and, even more ostentatiously, by the fervor with which they established and celebrated patriotic rites. If 14 July, 1789, was the birthday of French liberty, then 14 July, 1790, inaugurated the formal

celebration of French nationalism. On this day some 50,000 delegates from all parts of France, including 14,000 national guardsmen, assembled on the military parade-grounds in Paris in the presence of the National Assembly, the king and queen, and a vast multitude of Parisians; two hundred priests assisted at Mass; 1,200 musicians played; forty cannon were fired; and all the delegates and all the multitude, with upraised hands, took a solemn oath of supreme loyalty and devotion to the fatherland. At this time and thereafter it became fashionable for every city and village throughout France to erect an altar "to the fatherland," to engrave upon it the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," and to conduct patriotic rites before it.

Nationalism not only actuated much of the reconstruction and consolidation within France, but also inspired the French revolutionaries with a novel doctrine in foreign relations—the doctrine of national self-determination. To the patriotic revolutionaries it seemed natural and praiseworthy that any people who wished to be "French" should be incorporated into France, regardless of the provisions of existing treaties and of the protests of nominal sovereigns. Thus, the National Assembly encouraged the people of Avignon—a city on the Rhône River which had been owned and governed by the popes since the middle ages—to claim and exercise the right of national self-determination. In 1791, under French auspices and against papal protests, a plebiscite (or popular referendum) was held in Avignon, and, the result being favorable to France, the National Assembly voted to annex the city. Here was the beginning of national plebiscites and of a foreign policy which threatened to revolutionize international relations.

In the meantime, in addition to nationalist policies, another grave matter was concerning the National Assembly. This was the regulation of public finances. It will be recalled that financial confusion had been the royal reason for the original summoning of the Estates General. Then, in the early days of the National Assembly, the confusion had become chaos: the people refused to pay the old direct taxes; the Assembly, in its passion for national unity and economic liberty, destroyed the complicated and burdensome old system of indirect taxes; and bankers could not be induced to

**National
Self-De-
termination**

**Financial
Difficulties
and Ex-
pedients**

make new loans. The Assembly, therefore, had to resort to heroic measures in order to save the state from complete bankruptcy, and the heroic measures finally decided upon were at the expense of the Catholic Church in France.

The church, as we have seen, owned about a fifth of the soil of France, and the Assembly resolved to seize these extensive church lands, and to utilize them as security for the issue of paper money—the *assignats*. As partial indemnity for such wholesale confiscation, the state was to undertake the payment of fixed salaries to the clergy. Thus by a single stroke the financial pressure was relieved, the church was deprived of an important source of its strength, and the clergy were made dependant on the new order. Of course, as often happens in similar cases, the issue of paper money was so increased that in time it exceeded the security and brought fresh financial troubles to the state, but for the moment the worst dangers were tided over.

The ecclesiastical policies and acts of the National Assembly were perhaps the least efficacious and the most fateful achievements of the Revolution. Yet it would be difficult to perceive how they could have been less radical than they were. The church appeared to be indissolubly linked with the fortunes of the "old régime"; the clergy comprised a particularly privileged class; and the leaders and great majority of the Assembly were filled with the deistic or sceptical philosophy of the "Enlightenment." In November, 1789, the church property was confiscated. In February, 1790, the monasteries and other religious communities were suppressed. In April, absolute religious toleration was proclaimed. In July, 1790, the "civil constitution of the clergy" was enacted, by which the bishops and priests, reduced in numbers, were made a civil body. They were to be elected by the people, paid by the state, and only nominally associated with the "foreign" pope. In December, the Assembly forced the reluctant king to sign a decree compelling all the Catholic clergy in France to take a solemn oath of allegiance to the "civil constitution."

Pope Pius VI, who had already protested against the seizure of church property, the suppression of the monasteries, and the interference in Avignon, now condemned the "civil constitution"

**The As-
signats**

**Ecclesias-
tical
Changes**

**The Civil
Constitu-
tion of the
Clergy**

and forbade the French clergy to take the required oath. Thus, the issue was squarely joined. Such as took the oath—the “juring” clergy—were excommunicated by the pope. Such as refused compliance—the “non-juring” clergy—were deprived of their salaries by the Assembly and threatened with imprisonment. Up to this time, the bulk of the lower clergy, poor themselves and in immediate contact with the peasants, had undoubtedly sympathized with the course of the Revolution, but henceforth their convictions and their consciences came into conflict with devotion to the Assembly. Most of them followed their conscience and either incited peasants, over whom they exercised considerable influence, to oppose further revolution, or emigrated from France to swell the number of those who, dissatisfied with the course of events in their own country, would seek the first opportunity to undo the work of the Assembly. On the other hand, a minority of the clergy, led by the bishop Talleyrand, took the oath of allegiance to the “civil constitution” and attempted to maintain the traditional Catholic worship in France, albeit a national Catholic worship in schism with the papacy. However, the most sincere Catholics could be counted with most of the hereditary nobles as opponents of the French Revolution.

Amid all these sweeping reforms and changes, the National Constituent Assembly was making steady progress in drafting a written constitution which would clearly define the agencies of government, and their respective powers, in the new limited monarchy. This constitution was completed in 1791 and signed by the king—he could do nothing else—and at once went into effect. It was the first written constitution of any importance that any European country had had, and was preceded only slightly in point of time by that of the United States.¹

The Constitution of 1791, as it was called, provided, like the American constitution, for the “separation of powers,” that is, that the law-making, law-enforcing, and law-interpreting functions of government should be kept quite distinct as the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and should each spring, in last analysis, from the will of the people. This idea had been

¹ The present American constitution was drafted in 1787 and went into effect in 1789, the year that the Estates General assembled. See above, pp. 488-489.

elaborated by Montesquieu, and affected deeply the constitution-making of the eighteenth century both in France and in the United States.

The legislative authority was vested in one chamber, styled the "Legislative Assembly," the members of which were chosen by means of a complicated system of indirect election.¹ The distrust with which the bourgeois framers of the constitution regarded the lower classes was shown not only in this check upon direct election but also in the requirements that the privilege of voting should be exercised exclusively by "active" citizens, that is, by citizens who paid taxes, and that the right to hold office should be restricted to property-holders.

Nominally the executive authority resided in the hereditary king. But, while the Constitution of 1791 accorded to the king the right to postpone for a time the execution of an act of the legislature—the so-called "suspensive veto"—it deprived him of all control over local government, over the army and navy, and over the clergy. Even his ministers were not to sit in the Assembly. Tremendous had been the decline of royal power in France during those two years, 1789-1791.

This may conclude our brief summary of the work of the National Constituent Assembly. If we review it as a whole, we are impressed by the immense destruction which it effected. No other body of legislators has ever demolished so much in the same brief period. The old form of government, the old territorial divisions, the old financial system, the old judicial and legal regulations, the old ecclesiastical arrangements, and, most significant of all, the old condition of holding land—serfdom and feudalism—all were shattered. The guilds, too, were destroyed, and combinations of workingmen were prohibited.

Yet all this destruction was not a mad whim of the moment. It had been preparing slowly and painfully for many generations. It was foreshadowed by the mass of well-considered complaints in the *cahiers*. It was achieved not only by the decrees of the Assembly, but by the forceful expression of the popular and national will. And out of the destruction was emerging the

¹That is to say, the people would vote for electors, and the electors for the members of the Assembly.

political and social form of the essentially individualist, democratic, nationalist state of a new age.

3. END OF THE MONARCHY AND BEGINNING OF NATIONAL WAR

Great public rejoicing welcomed the formal inauguration of the constitutional monarchy in 1791. Many believed that a new era of peace and prosperity was dawning for France. Yet the extravagant hopes which were widely entertained for the success of the new régime were doomed to speedy and bitter disappointment. The new government encountered all manner of difficulties, the country rapidly grew more radical in sentiment and action, and within a single year the limited monarchy gave way to a republic. The establishment of the republic was the second great phase of the Revolution. Why it was possible and even inevitable may be gathered from a survey of developments in France during 1792, when the Legislative Assembly was in session, especially the outbreak of national war and the "treason" of Louis XVI.

**Difficulties
Confronting
the
Limited
Monarchy**

By no means did all Frenchmen accept cheerfully and contentedly the work of the National Constituent Assembly. Of the numerous dissenters, some thought it went too far and some thought it did not go far enough. The former may be styled "reactionaries" and the latter "radicals."

**"Reactionaries"
and
"Radicals"**

The reactionaries embraced the bulk of the formerly privileged nobility and the non-juring clergy. The nobles had begun to leave France as soon as the first signs of violence appeared—about the time of the fall of the Bastille and the peasant uprisings in the provinces. Many of the clergy similarly departed from their homes when the anti-clerical measures of the Assembly rendered it no longer possible for them to follow the dictates of conscience. These reactionary exiles, or émigrés as they were termed, collected in force along the northern and eastern frontier, especially at Coblenz on the Rhine. They possessed an influential leader in the king's own brother, the count of Artois, and they maintained a perpetual agitation, by means of newspapers, pamphlets, and intrigues, against the new régime. They were anxious to regain their privileges and incomes, and to restore everything, as far as possible, to the position it had occupied prior to 1789.

The Reactionaries

**The
Émigrés**

Nor were the reactionaries devoid of support within France. It was believed that the royal family, now carefully watched in Paris, sympathized with their efforts. So long as Mirabeau, the ablest leader in the National Assembly, was alive, he had never ceased urging the king to accept the reforms of the Revolution and to give no countenance to agitation beyond the frontiers. In case the king should find his position in Paris intolerable, he had been advised by Mirabeau to withdraw into western or southern France and gather the loyal nation about him. But unfortunately, Mirabeau, worn out by dissipation and cares, died prematurely in April, 1791.

Only two months later the royal family attempted to follow the course against which they had been warned. Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, in an effort to rid themselves of the spying vigilance of the Parisians, disguised themselves, fled from the capital, and made straight for the eastern frontier, apparently to join the émigrés. At Varennes, near the border, the royal fugitives were recognized and turned back to Paris, which henceforth was for them rather a prison than a capital. Although Louis subsequently swore a solemn oath to uphold the constitution, his personal popularity vanished with his ill-starred flight, and his wife—the hated “Austrian woman”—was suspected with good reason of being in secret correspondence with the émigrés as well as with foreign governments. Marie Antoinette was more detested than ever. The elder of the king’s brothers, the count of Provence, was more successful than the king in the flight of June, 1791. He eluded detection and joined the count of Artois at Coblenz.

Had the reactionaries been restricted entirely to émigrés and the royal family, it is hardly possible that they would have been so troublesome as they were. They included, however, a considerable number of persons in France. A small group in the Assembly shared their views and proposed the most extravagant measures in order to embarrass the work of that body. Conservative clubs existed among the upper and well-to-do classes in the larger cities. And in certain districts of western France, especially in Brittany, Poitou (La Vendée), and Anjou, the peasants developed hostility to the course of the Revolution. Their extraordinary de-

The At-tempted Flight of the King

Reactionaries within France

votion to Catholicism placed them under the influence of the non-juring clergy, and their class feeling against townspeople induced them to believe that the Revolution, carried forward by the bourgeoisie, was essentially in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Riots occurred in La Vendée throughout 1791 and 1792 with increasing frequency until at length the district blazed into open rebellion against the radicals.

More dangerous to the political settlement of 1791 than the opposition of the reactionaries was that of the radicals—those Frenchmen who thought that the Revolution had not gone far enough. The leading radicals were drawn from the middle class (the bourgeoisie), which had done most to effect the revolutionary changes of 1789-1791 and had profited most from such changes. Elated by what they had already accomplished, they were driven on by the king's pusillanimous conduct, by the rising tide of emotional nationalism about them, and by their own idealism to aspire to giving full effect to the precepts of Rousseau and other eighteenth-century philosophers in whose writings they had been reared. Gradually they came to believe that "the people" could be trusted far more than the king, that republicanism was preferable to monarchy, even to constitutional monarchy, and that thoroughgoing democracy was the natural goal of all revolutionary effort. Some especially denounced the distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens. Some desired the rooting out of all survivals of "privilege," particularly the rights still accorded to religion, even to the "juring" clergy. Most of them demanded sterner measures against aristocrats, clergymen, and everybody suspected of sympathy with the "old régime." Many of them, in the growing enthusiasm for individual equality and national unity, began to take a lively interest in the economic lot of the mass of degraded, ignorant, and poverty-stricken working people (the proletariat) of the cities.

Among the proletariat, especially in Paris, there was as much unrest in 1791-1792 as there had been among the provincial peasantry in 1789. To be sure, the urban working class, like the peasants, had been promised by paper documents certain theoretical "rights and liberties," but, while the peasants had been freed from serfdom and enabled to appropriate land from aristocrats, what had been done for

**The
Radicals**

**The Urban
Prole-
tarians**

the material well-being of urban workers? They had obtained no property. Not even the installation of the king in Paris had given them bread. Now, in 1791, cut off by the provisions of the new constitution from all direct share in the conduct of government, they naturally felt that, so far in the Revolution, they had merely exchanged one set of masters for another, that at the expense of nobles and clergy they had exalted the bourgeoisie, and that the Revolution must go on until their own economic grievances, as well as the political grievances of the bourgeoisie, should be redressed.

In the circumstances, the radical movement in France represented, after 1791, a new alignment. Hitherto there had been a union of the "Third Estate" with "enlightened" nobles like Mirabeau and "enlightened" clergymen like Sieyes and Talleyrand for the benefit of middle class and peasantry. Henceforth there was a union of radical middle-class leaders with and for the urban proletariat. Probably in many instances it was for the selfish motive of personal ambition that this or that middle-class politician prated much about his love for "the people" and shed tears over their wretchedness and extolled their "virtue." But in many other instances the motive was undoubtedly altruistic. We can hardly overemphasize the fanatical zeal with which numerous middle-class radicals labored after 1791 to bring about a democratic, republican, nationalist millennium in France and on the earth. They would utilize any class for their unworldly ends, and they instinctively discovered that the proletariat—the common people—could so be utilized.

The radical movement centred in Paris, where now resided the royal family and where the legislature met. Its agitation made rapid headway during 1791 and 1792, by means of inflammatory newspapers, coarse pamphlets, and bitter speeches. It appealed to both middle-class reason and popular emotions. It was backed up and rendered effective by the revolutionary "clubs."

These clubs were interesting seats of political and social agitation. Their origin was traceable to the "eating clubs" which had been formed at Versailles in 1789 by various deputies of the Estates General who desired to take their meals together, but the idea progressed so far that by 1791 nearly every café in Paris was a meeting place for politicians and "patriots." Although

The Radical Clubs

some of the clubs were strictly constitutional, and even, in a few instances, professedly reactionary, nevertheless the greater number and the most influential were radical. Such were the Cordelier and Jacobin clubs. The former, organized as a "society of the friends of the rights of man and of the citizen," was very radical from its inception and enrolled in its membership some of the foremost revolutionaries of Paris. The Jacobin Club, starting out as a "society of the friends of the constitution," counted among its early members such men as Mirabeau, Sieyes, and Lafayette, but subsequently, under the leadership of Robespierre, it was transformed into an organization quite as radical as the Cordeliers. It is an interesting fact that both these radical clubs derived their popular names from monasteries, in whose confiscated buildings they customarily held their meetings.

The
Jacobins

From Paris the radical movement radiated in all directions. Pamphlets and newspapers were spread broadcast. The Jacobin Club established a regular correspondence with branch clubs or kindred societies which sprang up in other French towns. The radicals—commonly called the "Jacobins"—were everywhere inspired by the same zeal and aided by a splendid organization.

Of the chief radical leaders, it may be convenient at this point to introduce three—Marat, Danton, and Robespierre. All belonged to the bourgeoisie by birth and training, but by conviction they became the mouthpieces of the proletariat. All played important rôles in subsequent scenes of the Revolution.

Radical
Leaders

Marat (1742-1793), had he never become interested in politics and conspicuous in the Revolution, might have been remembered in history as a scientist and a man of letters. He had been a physician, and for skill in his profession, as well as for contributions to the science of physics, he had received an honorary degree from St. Andrews University in Scotland, and for a time he was in the service of the count of Artois. The convocation of the Estates General turned his attention to public affairs. In repeated and vigorous pamphlets he combated the idea then prevalent in France that his countrymen should adopt a constitution similar to that of Great Britain. During several years' sojourn in Great Britain he had observed that that country was being ruled by an aristocratic oligarchy which, while using

Marat

the forms of liberty and pretending to represent the country, was in reality using its power for the promotion of its own narrow class interests. He made up his mind that real reform must benefit all the people alike and that it could be secured only by direct popular action. This was the simple message that filled the pages of the *Ami du peuple*—the *Friend of the People*—a newspaper which he edited from 1789 to 1792. With fierce invective he assailed the court, the clergy, the nobles, even the bourgeois Assembly. Attached to no party and with no detailed policies, he sacrificed almost everything to his single mission. No poverty, misery, or persecution could keep him quiet. Forced even to hide in cellars and sewers, where he contracted a loathsome skin disease, he persevered in his frenzied appeals to the Parisian populace to take matters into their own hands. By 1792 Marat was a man feared and hated by the authorities but loved and venerated by the masses of the capital.¹

Less radical and far more statesmanlike was Danton (1759–1794), who has been called “a middle-class Mirabeau.” The son of a farmer, he had studied law, had purchased a position as advocate of the Royal Council, and, before the outbreak of the Revolution, had acquired a reputation not only as a brilliant young lawyer, but also as a man of liberal tastes, fond of books, and happy in his domestic life. Like Mirabeau, he was a person of powerful physique and of stentorian voice, a skilled debater and a convincing orator. Unlike Mirabeau, he himself remained calm and self-possessed while arousing his audiences to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. Like Mirabeau, again, he was not so primarily interested in the welfare of his own social class as in that of the class below him; what the nobleman Mirabeau was to the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois Danton was to the Parisian proletariat. Brought to the fore, through the favor of Mirabeau, in the early days of the Revolution, Danton at once showed himself a strong advocate of thoroughgoing democracy. In 1790, in conjunction with Marat and Camille Desmoulins, he founded the Cordelier Club, the activities of which he directed throughout 1791 and 1792 against the royal family and the whole cause of monarchy. An influential member of the commune of Paris, he was largely

¹ Marat was assassinated in July, 1793, by Charlotte Corday, a young woman who was fanatically attached to the Girondist faction. (See below, pp. 625, 629.)

instrumental in crystallizing public opinion in favor of republicanism. Danton was rough and courageous, but neither venal nor bloodthirsty.

Less practical than Danton and further removed from the proletariat than Marat, Maximilien Robespierre (1758-1794) yet combined such qualities as made him the most prominent exponent of democracy and republicanism.

**Robes-
pierre**

Of a middle-class family, Robespierre had been a class-mate of Camille Desmoulins in the law school of the University of Paris, and had practiced law with some success in his native town of Arras. He was appointed a criminal judge, but soon resigned that post because he could not endure to inflict the death penalty. In his immediate circle he acquired a reputation as a writer, speaker, and something of a dandy. Elected to the Third Estate in 1789, he took his place with the extreme radicals in that body—the “thirty voices,” as Mirabeau contemptuously called them. Robespierre had read Rousseau from cover to cover and believed in the philosopher’s doctrines with all his mind and heart. In the belief that they eventually would be adopted and would regenerate France and all mankind, he worked with unwearyed patience. The paucity of his followers in the National Assembly and the overpowering personality of Mirabeau prevented him from exercising much influence in framing the new constitution, and he gradually turned for support to the people of Paris. He was already a member of the Jacobin Club, which, by the withdrawal of its more conservative members in 1791, came then under his leadership. Thereafter the Jacobin Club was a most effective instrument for promoting social democracy (although it was not formally committed to republicanism until August, 1792), and Robespierre was its oracle. Robespierre was never a demagogue in the present sense of the word; he was always emphatically a gentleman and a man of culture, sincere and truthful. Although he labored strenuously for the “rights” of the proletariat, he never catered to their tastes; to the last day of his life he retained the knee-breeches and silk stockings of the old society and wore his hair powdered.

We are now in a position to understand why the constitutional monarchy floundered. It had no great leaders to strengthen it and to conduct it through the narrow strait. It was bound to strike the rocks of reaction on one side or those of radicalism on

the other. Against such fearless and determined assailants as Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, it was helpless.

The new government came into being with the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly on 1 October, 1791. Immediately its troubles began. The members of the Legislative Assembly were wholly inexperienced in parliamentary procedure, for an unfortunate self-denying ordinance¹ of the retiring Constituent Assembly had prohibited any of its members from accepting election to the new body. The Legislative Assembly contained deputies of fundamentally diverse views who quarrelled long though eloquently among themselves. Moreover, it speedily came into conflict with the king, who vainly endeavored to use his constitutional right of suspensive veto in order to check its activities. Combined with these problems was the popular agitation and excitement: a peasant revolt in La Vendée; the angry threats of émigré nobles and non-juring clergy across the eastern frontier; the loud tumults of the proletariat of Paris and of other large cities as well.

The difficulties of the limited monarchy were complicated by an embarrassing foreign situation. It will be borne in mind that all important European states still adhered rigidly to the social institutions of the "old régime" and, with the exception of Great Britain, to absolutist monarchy. Outside of France there appeared as yet no such thing as "public opinion," certainly no sign among the lower classes of any opinion favorable to revolution. In Great Britain alone was there a constitutional monarchy, and in the early days of the French Revolution, so long as British statesmen could flatter themselves that their neighbors across the Channel were striving to imitate their political system, these same public men sympathized with the course of events. But when it became evident that the Revolution was going farther, that it aimed at a great social levelling, that it was a movement of and for the masses, then even British criticism assailed it. At the close of 1790 Edmund Burke published his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, a bitter arraignment of the newer tendencies and a rhetorical panegyric of conservatism. Although Burke's sensational work was speedily answered by several forceful thinkers, including the brilliant Thomas Paine,² nevertheless it long held its place as the classical expression of

¹ Sponsored by Robespierre.

² See above, pp. 481-482.

official Britain's horror of social equality and "mob violence." Burke's book was likewise received with such approval by the monarchs of continental Europe, who interpreted it as a telling defense of their position, that Catherine II of Russia personally complimented the author and the puppet king of Poland sent him a letter of flamboyant glorification and a gold medal. The monarchs of Europe, as well as the nobles and clergy, saw in the French Revolution only a menace to their political and social privileges. Were it communicated to the lower classes, the Revolution might work the same havoc throughout the length and breadth of Europe that it was working in France. The "benevolent despots" had sincere desires to labor for the welfare of the people; they shuddered at the thought of what the people would do in laboring for their own welfare.

Growing
British
Hostility
to the
French
Revolution

Of the monarchs of Europe, several had special reasons for viewing the progress of the Revolution with misgiving. The Bourbons of Spain and of the Two Sicilies were united by blood and family compacts with the ruling dynasty of France; any belittling of the latter's power was likely to affect disastrously the domestic position and foreign prestige of the former. Then, too, the French queen, Marie Antoinette, was an Austrian Habsburg. Her family interests were in measure at stake. In the Austrian dominions, the visionary and unpractical Joseph II had died in 1790 and had been succeeded by another brother of Marie Antoinette, the gifted though unemotional Emperor Leopold II. Leopold skillfully extricated himself from the embarrassments at home and abroad bequeathed him by his predecessor and then turned his attention to French affairs. He was in receipt of constant and now frantic appeals from his sister to aid Louis XVI against the revolutionaries. He knew that the Austrian Netherlands, whose rebellion he had suppressed with difficulty,¹ were saturated with sympathy for the Revolution and that many of their inhabitants would welcome annexation to France. As chief of the Holy Roman Empire, he must keep revolutionary agitation out of Germany and protect the border provinces against French aggression. All these factors served to make the Emperor Leopold the foremost champion of the "old

Special
Concern
of the
Austrian
Habsburgs

¹ See above, p. 352.

régime" in Europe and incidentally of the royal cause in France.

Now it so happened that the emperor found an ally in Prussia. The death of Frederick the Great in 1786 had called to the throne of that country a distinctly inferior sort of potentate, Frederick William II (1786-1797),¹ who combined with a nature at once sensual and pleasure-loving a remarkable religious zeal. He neglected the splendid military machine which Frederick William I and Frederick the Great had constructed with infinite patience and thoroughness. He lavished great wealth upon art as well as upon favorites and mistresses. He tired the nation with an excessive Protestant orthodoxy. In foreign affairs he reversed the policy of his predecessor by allying himself with Austria and accepting for Prussia a secondary rôle among the German states. In August, 1791, Frederick William II joined with the Emperor Leopold in issuing the public Declaration of Pillnitz, to the effect that the two rulers considered the restoration of order and of monarchy in France an object of "common interest to all sovereigns of Europe." The declaration was hardly more than pompous bluster, for the armies of the German allies were not as yet ready for war, but its solemn expression of an intention on the part of foreign despots to interfere in the internal affairs of France aroused the most bitter feeling among the mass of Frenchmen, who were patriotic as well as revolutionary.

The prospect of war with the blustering monarchs of Austria and Prussia was quite welcome to several important factions in France. Marie Antoinette and her court clique gradually came to the conclusion that their reactionary cause would be aided by war. If the allies won, absolutism could be restored in France by force of arms. If the French won, it would redound to the prestige of the royal family and enable them by constitutional means to recover their authority. Then, too, the constitutionalists, the bourgeois party which was led by Lafayette and which loyally supported the settlement of 1791, worked for war. Military success, in their opinion, would consolidate the French people in loyalty to the constitution, and Lafayette aspired to win personal glory as a victorious commander. Finally, the overwhelming majority

**Prussian
Support of
Austria**

**French
Groups
Favorable
to War**

See above, p. 356.

of radicals cried for war. To them it seemed as if the liberal monarchy would be completely discomfited by war and that out of it would emerge a republic in France and the general triumph of democratic principles in Europe. Why not stir up all the European peoples against their monarchs? The cause of France should be the cause of Europe. France should be the missionary of the new dispensation.

The Legislative Assembly, on which depended in last instance the solution of all these vital problems, domestic and foreign, represented several diverse shades of political opinion. Of the 750 members, 350 admitted no special leadership but voted independently on every question according to individual preference or fear, while the others were divided between the camp of "Feuillants" and that of "Girondists." The Feuillants were the constitutionalists, inclined, while in general consistently championing the settlement of 1791, to strengthen the royal power,—they were the conservatives of the Assembly. The Girondists—so called because some of their conspicuous members came from the département of the Gironde—were the radicals.

The Girondists were eloquent and intensely patriotic and were filled with noble, if somewhat unpractical, "classical" ideas borrowed from the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. They were eager to discredit Louis XVI and to establish a republic in France. In Brissot (1754–1793), a Parisian lawyer, they had an admirable leader and organizer. In Vergniaud (1753–1793), they had a polished and convincing orator. In Condorcet (1743–1794), they had a brilliant scholar and philosopher. In Dumouriez (1739–1823), they possessed a military genius of the first order. And in the refined home of the talented Madame Roland (1754–1793), they had a charming salon for political discussion.

The Gi-
rondists

In internal affairs the Legislative Assembly accomplished next to nothing. Everything was subordinated to the question of foreign war. Here, Feuillants and Girondists found themselves in strange agreement. Only such extreme radicals as Marat and Robespierre, outside the Assembly, opposed a policy which they feared would give rise to a military dictatorship. Marat expressed his alarms in the *Friend of the People*: "What afflicts the friends of liberty is that we have more to fear from success than from defeat; . . . the danger is lest one of our

generals be crowned with victory and lest . . . he lead his victorious army against the capital to secure the triumph of the Despot." But the counsels of extreme radicals were unavailing.

In the excitement the Girondists obtained control of the government and demanded of the emperor that the Austrian troops be withdrawn from the frontier and that the émigrés be expelled from his territories. As no action was taken by the emperor, the Girondist ministers prevailed upon Louis XVI to declare war on 20 April, 1792. Lafayette assumed supreme command, and the French prepared for the struggle. Although Leopold had just died, his policy was followed by his son and successor, the Emperor Francis II. Francis and Frederick William II of Prussia speedily collected an army of 80,000 men at Coblenz with which to invade France. The campaign of 1792 was the first stage in a vast conflict which was destined to rage throughout Europe for twenty-three years. It was the beginning of the international contest between the forces of revolution and those of the old order.

Enthusiasm was with the French. They felt they were fighting for a cause—the cause of liberty, equality, and nationalism. Men put on red liberty caps, and such as possessed no firearms equipped themselves with pikes and hastened to the front. Troops coming up from Marseilles sang in Paris a new hymn of freedom which Rouget de Lisle had just composed at Strasbourg for the French soldiers,—the inspiring *Marseillaise* that was to become the national anthem of France. But enthusiasm was about the only asset that the French possessed. Their armies were ill-organized and ill-disciplined. Provisions were scarce, arms were inferior, and fortified places in poor repair. Lafayette had greater ambition than ability.

The war opened, therefore, with a series of French reverses. An attempted invasion of the Austrian Netherlands ended in dismal failure. On the eastern frontier the allied armies under the duke of Brunswick¹ experienced little difficulty in opening up a line of march to Paris. Intense grew the excitement in the French capital. The reverses gave color to the suspicion that the royal family were betraying military plans to the enemy. A big demonstration took place on

**French
Declara-
tion of War
against
Austria
and
Prussia**

**Initial
French
Reverses**

¹ See above, p. 343.

20 June. A crowd of market women, artisans, coal heavers, and hod carriers pushed through the royal residence, jostling and threatening the king and queen. No violence was done, but the temper of the Parisian proletariat was quite evident. Yet Louis and Marie Antoinette simply would not learn their lesson. Despite repeated and solemn assurances to the contrary, they were actually in constant secret communication with the invading forces. The king was beseeching aid from foreign rulers in order to crush his own people; the queen was supplying the generals of the allies with the French plans of campaign. The new constitutional monarchy failed in the stress of war.

4. JACOBINISM TRIUMPHANT

On 25 July, 1792, the duke of Brunswick, the old-fashioned commander-in-chief of the allied armies, issued a proclamation to the French people. He declared it his purpose "to put an end to the anarchy in the interior of France, to check the attacks upon the throne and the altar, to reëstablish the legal power, to restore to the king the security and liberty of which he is now deprived and to place him in a position to exercise once more the legitimate authority which belongs to him." The duke went boldly on to declare that French soldiers who might be captured "shall be treated as enemies and punished as rebels to their king and as disturbers of the public peace," and that, if the slightest harm befell any member of the royal family, his Austrian and Prussian troops would "inflict an ever memorable vengeance by delivering over the city of Paris to military execution and complete destruction, and the rebels guilty of such outrages to the punishment that they merit." This foolish and insolent manifesto sealed the fate of the French monarchy. It convinced the revolutionaries that French royalty and foreign armies were in formal alliance to undo what had been done.

The French reply to the duke of Brunswick was the insurrection of 9-10 August, 1792. On those days the proletariat and extreme radicals among the bourgeoisie of Paris revolted against the constitutional monarchy. They supplanted the legal commune with a radically revolutionary commune, in which Danton became the leading figure. They invaded the royal palace, massacred the Swiss

**Allied Intentions
against the
French
Revolution**

The Parisian Insurrection of August, 1792

Guards, and obliged the king and his family to flee for their lives to the Assembly. On 10 August, a remnant of terror-stricken deputies voted to suspend the king from his office and to authorize the immediate election by universal manhood suffrage of a National Convention which should prepare a new constitution for France.

From the suspension of the king on 10 August to the assembling of the National Convention on 20 September, France was practically anarchical. The royal family was incarcerated in the gloomy prison of the Temple. The regular governmental agents were paralyzed. Lafayette protested against the insurrection at Paris and surrendered himself to the allies.

Still the allies advanced into France. Fear deepened into panic. Supreme control fell into the hands of the revolutionary commune. Danton became virtual dictator. His policy was simple. The one path of safety left open to the radicals was to strike terror into the hearts of their domestic and foreign foes. "In my opinion," said Danton, "the way to stop the enemy is to terrify the royalists. Audacity, more audacity, and always greater audacity!" The news of the investment of Verdun by the allies, published at Paris on 2 September, was the signal for the beginning of a wholesale massacre of royalists in the French capital. For five long days unfortunate royalists were taken from the prisons and handed over by a self-constituted judicial body to the tender mercies of a band of hired cutthroats. Slight discrimination was made of rank, sex, or age. Men, women, and children, nobles and magistrates, priests and bishops,—all who were suspected of royalist sympathy were butchered. The number of victims of these September massacres has been variously estimated at from 1,000 to 2,000.

Meanwhile Danton was infusing new life and new spirit into the French armies. Dumouriez replaced Lafayette in supreme command. And on 20 September the allies received their first check at Valmy.

The very day on which news reached Paris that it was saved and that Brunswick was in retreat, the National Convention, amid the wildest enthusiasm, unanimously decreed "that royalty is abolished in France." Then it was resolved to date from 22 September, 1792, Year I of

The Suspension of King and Constitution

The Dictatorship of Danton

Stopping the Allies

Proclaiming the Republic

the Republic. A decree of perpetual banishment was enacted against the émigrés and it was soon determined to bring the king to trial before the Convention.

The National Convention remained in session for three years (1792-1795), and its work constituted the second great phase of the Revolution. This work was essentially twofold: (1) It secured a series of great victories in the foreign war, thereby rendering permanent the remarkable social reforms of the first period of the Revolution, that between 1789 and 1791; and (2) it constructed a republican form of government, based on the principle of democracy.

**The
National
Convention**

Perhaps no legislative body in history has been called upon to solve such knotty problems as those which confronted the National Convention at the opening of its session. At that time it was necessary (1) to decide what should be done with the deposed and imprisoned king; (2) to organize the national defense and turn back foreign invasion; (3) to suppress insurrection within France; (4) to provide a strong government for the country; (5) to complete and consolidate the social reforms of the earlier stage of the Revolution; and (6) to frame a new constitution and to establish permanent republican institutions. The Convention coped with all these questions with infinite industry and much success. And in the following pages, we shall review them in the order indicated, although it should be borne in mind that most of them were considered by the Convention simultaneously.

Before taking up the work of the Convention, a word should be said about the personnel of the body. The elections had been in theory by universal manhood suffrage, but in practice indifference or intimidation reduced the actual voters to about a tenth of the total electorate. The result was the return of a large number of determined radicals, who, while agreeing on the fundamental republican doctrines, nevertheless differed about details. On the right of the Convention sat nearly two hundred Girondists, including Brissot, Vergniaud, Condorcet, and the interesting Thomas Paine. These men represented largely the well-to-do bourgeoisie who were more radical in thought than in deed, who ardently desired a democratic republic, but who at the same time distrusted Paris and the proletariat. On the opposite side of the Convention sat nearly one hundred extreme

radicals, called "Jacobins" because they were active in the Jacobin Club, or "Mountainists" because in the Convention they occupied a "mountain" of high seats. These, including such men as Danton, Robespierre, Carnot, and St. Just, were middle-class persons, but they were militant disciples of Rousseau and strenuous champions of the Parisian proletariat.

Between the two factions of Mountainists and Girondists sat the "Plain," as it was called, the real majority of the house, which had no policies or convictions of its own, but voted usually according to the dictates of expediency. Our tactful, trimming Abbé Sieyès belonged to the Plain. At the very outset the Plain was likely to go with the Girondists, but as time went on and the Parisian populace clamored more and more loudly against anyone who opposed the action of their allies, the Mountainists, it gradually saw fit to transfer its affections to the Left.

The first serious question which faced the Convention was the disposition of the king. The discovery of an iron chest containing accounts of expenditures for bribing members of the National Constituent Assembly, coupled with the all but confirmed suspicion of Louis's double dealings with France and with foreign foes,¹ sealed the doom of that miserably weak monarch. He was brought to trial before the Convention in December, 1792, and condemned to death by a vote of 387 to 334. With the majority voted the king's own cousin, the duke of Orleans, an enthusiastic radical who had assumed the name of Citizen Philippe Égalité (Equality). On 21 January, 1793, Louis XVI was beheaded near the overthrown statue of his predecessor Louis XV in the Place de la Révolution (now called the Place de la Concorde). The unruffled dignity with which he met death was the finest behavior of his reign.

Meanwhile the tide of Austrian and Prussian invasion had been

¹ After the execution of the king, actual letters were discovered which Louis had despatched to his fellow monarchs, urging their assistance. A typical extract is given in Robinson and Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*, Vol. I, pp. 287-288.

NOTE. The picture opposite is a portrait of Robespierre, from a contemporary bronze medal by an unknown artist. The medal is now in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.





rolling away from France. After Valmy, Dumouriez had pursued the retreating foreigners across the Rhine and had carried the war into the Austrian Netherlands, where a large party regarded the French as deliverers. Dumouriez entered Brussels without serious resistance, and was speedily master of the whole country. It seemed as though the French would have an easy task in delivering the peoples of Europe from their old régime.

**French
Conquest
of Belgium**

Emboldened by the ease with which its armies were overrunning the neighboring states, the National Convention proposed to propagate liberty and reform throughout Europe and in December, 1792, issued the following significant decree: "The French nation declares that it will treat as enemies every people who, refusing liberty and equality or renouncing them, may wish to maintain, recall, or treat with a prince and the privileged classes; on the other hand, it engages not to subscribe to any treaty and not to lay down its arms until the sovereignty and independence of the people whose territory the troops of the republic shall have entered shall be established, and until the people shall have adopted the principles of equality and founded a free and democratic government."

**The
French
as Foes of
the Old
Régime
through-
out Europe**

In thus throwing down the gauntlet to all the monarchs of Europe and in putting the issue clearly between democratic nationalism and the old régime, the French revolutionaries took a most fateful step. Although some middle-class intellectuals among foreign peoples undoubtedly sympathized with the aims and achievements of the French Revolution, the rulers and privileged classes of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and even Spain and Great Britain were still deeply entrenched in the patriotism and unquestioning loyalty of the masses. Then, too, the execution of Louis XVI in January, 1793, increased the bitterness of the approaching grave struggle. A royalist reaction in France itself precipitated civil war in La Vendée. Dumouriez, the ablest general of the day, in disgust deserted to the Austrians. And at this very time, a formidable coalition of frightened and revengeful monarchs was formed to overthrow the French Republic. To Austria and Prussia, already

**Royalist
Reaction**

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Woman of the Revolution," is from a painting by Jacques Louis David (1748-1825). Concerning David, see below, p. 730.

in the field, were added Great Britain, Holland, Spain, and Sardinia.

For a brief time the allied armies threatened to overwhelm France; they reoccupied Belgium and the Rhine provinces, and took the roads toward Paris. But the republic soon proved itself a far more resourceful and efficient government than the monarchy had been. Under the determined leadership of Carnot (1753-1823) and with the enthusiastic support of his fellow Jacobins, the Convention inaugurated a militarism which was quite novel in the world's annals. In February, 1793, a compulsory levy of half a million men was decreed, and in the following August it was enacted that every Frenchman between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five might be drafted for military service. Carnot labored incessantly to render these laws effectual and to organize the new "national" army. He drafted men, silenced complaints, secured extra volunteers, drilled the troops, and hurried them to the frontiers. He prepared plans of campaign, appointed trusty officers, and infused them and their men with fighting zeal. By the end of 1793 he had 770,000 men under arms,¹ and most of them were fanatically attached to the cause of the Revolution. Bourgeois citizens, whose social and financial gains in the earlier stage of the Revolution would be threatened by French defeat, applauded the new military measures. Artisans and peasants, who had won something and hoped to win more from the success of the Revolution, were put into the new armies, singing the *Marseillaise* and displaying the banners of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

In organizing the new armies, Carnot, unhampered by tradition, made several significant innovations. He created the "division" as a military unit. He improved the mechanism of supply in order to make his forces more mobile than their opponents. He detailed members of the government as "deputies on mission" to watch the generalship and movements of the various French armies and to despatch to the guillotine any suspected or unsuccessful commander. Gradually, a new group of dashing young republican generals rose to distinction, including Moreau, Pichegru, and Jourdan.

¹The standing French army prior to 1793 usually numbered a little less than 200,000, and the armies of other European powers were proportionately small

The militarism of Carnot and the Jacobins was based on the revolutionary principle of "the nation in arms." It meant a large army of eager young conscripted citizens in place of a relatively small army of older and more easygoing professional soldiers, and a staff of officers whose position depended on merit rather than on birth. It was itself quite revolutionary. It broke utterly with the military traditions of monarchical France and all other countries of the time.

In this way France met the coalition which would have staggered a Louis XIV. The country was cleared of foreign enemies. The war was pressed in the Netherlands, along the Rhine, in Savoy, and across the Pyrenees. So successful were the French that Carnot's popular title of "organizer of defense" was justly magnified to that of "organizer of victory." Of course, it is impossible in our limited survey to do justice to these amazing campaigns of 1794 and 1795. It will suffice to point out that when the National Convention finally adjourned in 1795, the First Coalition was in reality dissolved. The pitiful Charles IV of Spain humbled himself to contract a close alliance with the republic which had put his Bourbon cousin to death. By the separate treaty of Basel (1795), Frederick William II of Prussia gave France a free hand on the left bank of the Rhine and turned his attention to the partition of Poland.¹ William V, the Orange stadholder of Holland, was deposed and his country transformed into the Batavian Republic, allied with France. French troops were in full possession of the Austrian Netherlands and all other territories up to the Rhine. The life-long ambition of Louis XIV appeared to have been realized by the new France in two brief years. Only Great Britain, Austria, and Sardinia remained in arms against the republic.

The
Treaties of
1795 with
Spain,
Prussia,
and
Holland

Yet the military successes of the republic were achieved at a terrible cost. They aroused an intolerant, militaristic spirit among large numbers of Frenchmen. They made the national army the chief concern and pride of the Revolutionaries. Public policies were more and more subordinated to the maintenance of soldiers and the assurance of military triumph. For

¹ See above, pp. 344-345, 382, and below, pp. 700-702. The absorption of Prussia (and Austria and Russia) in the partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795 seriously sapped the strength of the coalition against revolutionary France.

the recruitment of the army, more and more peasants were taken from fields and shops; and for its financial support, oppressive burdens were laid on French commerce and industry while plunderings and indemnities were ruthlessly inflicted on conquered lands. No wonder that there was some protest at home, and that abroad the masses as well as the monarchs were filled with dread.

**Militarism
and
Suppression
of
Dissent
within
France**

Within France, opposition to Carnot's drafting of soldiers was utilized by reactionary agitators to stir up an insurrection of the peasants in La Vendée in order to restore the monarchy and to reestablish the Catholic Church. Provincial and bourgeois dislike of the radicalism of the Parisian proletariat caused riots and outbreaks in such important and widely separated cities as Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux. With the same devotion and thoroughness that had characterized their foreign policy, but with even greater sternness, the officials of the National Convention utilized the new militarism to stamp out domestic riots and insurrections. By 1795 all France, except only the émigrés and secret conspirators, had seemingly accepted the republic.

The explanation of these impressive achievements, whether at home or abroad, lies in the new militarism, and also in the strong central government which the National Convention established and in the policy of terrorism which that government pursued.

In the spring of 1793 the National Convention entrusted the supreme executive authority of France to a special committee, composed of nine (later twelve) of its members, who were styled the Committee of Public Safety. This small body, which included such Jacobin leaders as Carnot, Robespierre, and St. Just, acting secretly, directed the ministers of state, appointed the local officials, and undertook the administration of the whole country. Manifold were the duties it was called upon to discharge. Among other problems, it must conduct the foreign relations, supervise the armies, and secure the active support of the French people. Diligently and effectively did it apply itself to its various activities.

**The Com-
mittee of
Public
Safety**

Terrorism has been the word usually employed to describe the

internal policy of the Committee of Public Safety, and the "Reign of Terror," the period of the Committee's chief work, from the summer of 1793 to that of 1794. So sensational and so sanguinary was the period that many writers have been prone to describe it as the principal landmark of the Revolution and to picture "liberty, equality, and fraternity" as submerged in a veritable sea of blood. As a matter of fact, however, the Reign of Terror was but an incident, though obviously an awful incident, in a great political and social revolution. It must be remembered that great principles and far-reaching reforms were endangered by a host of foreign and domestic enemies. It seemed to the nationalist republican leaders that the occasion demanded complete unanimity in France and that the only way in which France could present a united front to the world was by striking terror into the hearts of the opponents or critics of the new régime. And terror involved bloodshed.

The Reign
of Terror

The chief agencies of the Committee of Public Safety in conducting terrorism were the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal. The former was given police power in order to maintain order throughout the country. The latter was charged with trying and condemning any person suspected of disloyalty to the republic. Both were responsible to the Committee of Public Safety. A decree of the Convention, called the Law of Suspects, proclaimed as liable to arbitrary arrest every person who was of noble birth, or had held office before the Revolution, or had any relation with an émigré, or could not produce a signed certificate of citizenship.

With such instruments of despotism France became revolutionary by strokes of the guillotine.¹ It is estimated that about 5,000 persons were executed at Paris during the Reign of Terror. Among others Marie Antoinette, Philippe Égalité, and Madame Roland suffered death.²

¹ The guillotine, which is still used in France, consists of two upright posts between which a heavy knife rises and falls. The criminal is stretched upon a board and then pushed between the posts. The knife falls and instantly beheads him. The device was invented by a certain philanthropic Dr. Guillotine, who wished to substitute in capital punishment an instrument sure to produce instant death, in place of the bungling process of beheading with an axe.

² At the end of this chapter, p. 646, is reproduced a drawing which David, the artist, made of Marie Antoinette at the very time when, after fourteen months' imprisonment, she was passing by, in a cart, on the way to the guillotine. On David, see below, p. 736.

The Terror spread to the provinces. Local tribunals were everywhere established to search out and condemn suspected persons. The city of Lyons, which ventured to resist the revolutionary government, was partially demolished and hundreds of its citizens put to death. At Nantes, where echoes of the Vendée insurrection were long heard, the brutal Jacobin deputy Carrier loaded unhappy victims on old hulks which were towed out into the Loire and sunk. The total number of those who perished in the provinces is unknown, but it probably reached fifteen thousand.

In addition to the arbitrary slaughter of royalists and reactionaries, a sorry feature of the Terror was the wretched quarrelling among various factions of the radicals and the destruction of one for the benefit of another. Thus, the efforts of the Girondists to stay the execution of the king and to appeal to the provinces against the violence in Paris, coupled with the treason of Dumouriez, seemed to the Parisian proletariat to mark the alliance of the Girondists with the reactionaries. Accordingly, the workingmen of Paris, under the leadership of Marat, revolted on 31 May, 1793, and two days later obliged the Convention to expel twenty-nine Girondist members. Of these, the chief, including Brissot and Vergniaud, were brought to the guillotine in October, 1793. Next, the leaders of the Commune of Paris, who had gone to such extreme lengths as to suppress the Christian churches in that city and to proclaim atheism, were despatched in March, 1794, by a coalition of the followers of Danton and Robespierre. Then in April, when Danton at length wearied of the Terror and counselled moderation, that redoubtable genius, together with his friend, Camille Desmoulins, was guillotined. Finally, Robespierre himself, after enjoying a brief dictatorship, during which time he vainly endeavored to establish a Rousseau-like "republic of virtue" was sent, in company with St. Just, to the guillotine by the more conservative members of the National Convention in July, 1794.

The death of Robespierre ended the Reign of Terror. The purpose of the Terror, however, was already achieved. The Revolution was preserved in France, and France was victorious in Europe. The Thermidorian Reaction, as the end of the Terror was called, left the National Convention free to resume its

1 actional
Terrorism
among the
Revolutionaries

The
Downfall
of Robespierre

task of devising a permanent republican constitution for the country. A few subsequent attempts were made, now by reactionaries, now by extreme radicals, to interfere with the Convention, but they were suppressed with comparative ease. The last uprising of the Parisian populace which threatened the Convention was effectually quelled (October, 1795) by a "whiff of grape-shot," discharged at the command of a young and obscure captain of artillery, Napoleon Bonaparte by name.

In the midst of foreign war and internal dissension, even in the midst of the Terror, the National Convention found time to make many significant contributions to the fashioning of new institutions and new practices for the modern world. On all occasions, it emphasized the new gospel of nationalism. With the idea of creating a truly nationalist army, it decreed in August, 1793, as we have seen, compulsory military service for all able-bodied young Frenchmen. This decree contained the emotional instructions that "the young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to rouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic." It was a bit rhetorical, but it was the very real beginning of the general large-scale militarism with which Europe has ever since been saddled.

With the idea of establishing a nationalist school-system, the Convention elaborated plans which had been broached by the National Assembly, and it prescribed that the French language should be the sole language of national instruction throughout the "republic, one and indivisible." Likewise the Convention assumed the arduous task of preparing a single comprehensive code of law for the whole country and adopted certain basic social reforms which were to be included in the code. Imprisonment for debt was abolished. Negro slavery in the French colonies was ended. Woman's claim on property was protected in common with man's. Primogeniture was forbidden; that is, property might not be inherited exclusively by an eldest son or be willed to any one heir, but must be dis-

Achievements of the National Convention

The Nation in Arms

Projects for National Education and National Law-Code

Abolition of Primogeniture

tributed, almost equally, among all "next of kin." Besides, as a preliminary step toward the reform of commercial law, the Convention established a new and uniform system of weights and measures, the so-called metric system, which not only proved permanent in France but also, on account of its convenience, was subsequently adopted by nearly all civilized nations except the English-speaking peoples.

In matters of religion the National Convention authorized several novel experiments. From the first it attached an essentially religious significance to the principle of nationalism, and at the same time it displayed hostility to traditional Christianity. During the Terror, it not only treated clergymen as suspects but took radical steps to de-Christianize France. It adopted a revolutionary calendar, partly for "scientific" reasons and partly to do away with Sunday observance: the year was divided anew into twelve months, each containing three weeks of ten days ("décades"), every tenth day ("décadi") being for rest, and the five or six days left over at the end of the year, styled "sans-culottides," being national holidays; the names of the months were changed, and the whole calendar was dated from the establishment of the republic, 22 September, 1792. At about the same time, the Convention authorized the transformation of churches into temples of reason; several Catholic bishops and priests formally abjured Christianity; and, under the auspices of the Paris Commune, the atheistic "religion of reason" was formally inaugurated in the cathedral of Notre Dame (November, 1793). Later, under Robespierre's auspices, the deistic cult of the Supreme Being was officially substituted for the atheistic worship of reason (June, 1794). Still later, after the downfall of Robespierre, the Convention took the attitude that religion was a private, rather than a public, concern and that the state should not attempt to establish or maintain an official religion. While renewing earlier enactments against the "non-juring" clergy, the Convention in 1795 guaranteed toleration to all others and restored many of the church buildings to Christian worship.

Religious Experiments

Separation of Church and State

During the Terror, moreover, and so long as the Jacobins were in control, the National Convention pursued radical social, even socialist, policies in economic matters. The property of the émigrés was confiscated for the benefit of the state and the lower

classes. Persons of wealth, as well as clergymen and persons of noble family, were treated as suspects. Large landed estates were broken up and offered for sale in small parcels and on easy terms. Compensation which had been promised in connection with the earlier abolition of serfdom and feudalism was cancelled. "The rich," said Marat, "have so long sucked out the marrow of the people that they are now visited with a crushing retribution." At the same time, to provide public funds, the Convention authorized forced loans, or, as we would say, "capital levies"; and, to keep down the cost of living, it enacted a series of "laws of the maximum," fixing the price of grain and other commodities and likewise the rates of wages. Then, too, catering to the proletarian clamor for equality, the Convention decreed that everybody, without distinction, should be addressed as "citizen." The official record of the expense of Marie Antoinette's funeral was the simple entry, "Five francs for a coffin for the widow of Citizen Capet." Ornate clothing went out of fashion, at least for men, and the silk stockings and knee breeches (*culottes*) of the old régime were generally supplanted by the plain long trousers which had hitherto been worn only by the lowest class of workingmen (*sans-culottes*).

**Socialist
Experi-
ments**

The fall of Robespierre—the so-called Thermidorian Reaction—meant, as we have seen, the end of the Terror. It meant also the decline of the influence of the Parisian proletariat on the National Convention and the resulting ability of the bourgeois members of the Convention to direct the last stage of its activity more and more in accordance with their own economic desires. The law against suspects was repealed, and so were the "laws of the maximum." The Revolutionary Tribunal was suppressed, and the Place de la Révolution was renamed the Place de la Concorde. But while the National Convention thus showed signs of lessening fanaticism and recurring bourgeois spirit, it persevered to the end in its devotion to republicanism and in at least lip service to political democracy. By 1795 France seemed to be definitively committed to a republican form of government. This, however, would not be extremely radical, certainly not socialistic, and instead of being proletarian, it would be essentially bourgeois.

**The Ther-
midorian
Reaction:
Triumph
of Bour-
geois
Policies**

The National Convention had originally been convoked in 1792 to draw up a new constitution for France. It had actually

drawn up such a constitution in 1793,—a Rousseau-like constitution, republican and very democratic and quite Jacobin—but, by reason of the Terror and the exigencies of foreign war, this “Constitution of the Year I” was not put into effect. Then, after the Thermidorian Reaction, when the National Convention was more pronouncedly bourgeois in thought and action, it proceeded to draft still another constitution for the permanent government of the French Republic. This constitution, which went into effect in 1795 and is known, therefore, as the “Constitution of the Year III,” entrusted the legislative power to two chambers, chosen by indirect and somewhat restricted election: a lower house of 500 members, to propose laws; and a Council of Ancients, of 250 members, to examine and enact the laws. The executive authority was vested in a committee of five Directors—the Directory—who were to be elected by the legislature and who should appoint the ministers of state, or cabinet, and supervise the enforcement of the laws.

The Republican Constitution of the Year III

The Directory

5. TRANSFORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC INTO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

The French Republic, proclaimed in 1792 and provided with a “permanent” constitution in 1795, survived in name until 1804. But its actual duration was even briefer, and its government by the Directory lasted less than four years (1795-1799).

The failure of the Directory was due to two chief causes: first, the lack of efficient government; and second, the rise of militarism and the prestige of a victorious, ambitious general. To both of these causes, reference must be made. The former indicated that a stronger government was needed; the latter suggested what the nature of the stronger government would be.

To consolidate the French people after six years of radical revolutionary upheavals required hard and honest labor on the part of men of distinct genius. Yet the Directors were, almost without exception, men of mediocre talents,¹ who practiced bribery and corruption with unblushing effrontery. They preferred personal gain to the welfare of the state.

¹ Carnot, the only member of first-rate ability, was forced out of the Directory in 1797.

The period of the Directory was a time of plots and intrigues. The royalists and reactionaries who were elected in considerable numbers to the legislature were restrained from subverting the constitution only by illegal force and violence on the part of the Directors. On the other hand, the extremists in Paris found a warm-hearted leader in a certain Babeuf (1760-1797), who declared that the Revolution had been directed primarily to the advantage of the bourgeoisie, that the proletarians, despite their toil and suffering and bloodshed, were still just as poorly off as ever, and that their only salvation lay in a compulsory equalization of wealth and the abolition of poverty. An insurrection of these socialist radicals was suppressed, and Babeuf was executed in 1797.

Factional
Intrigues
under the
Directory

While sincere radicals and convinced reactionaries were uniting in common opposition to the unhappy Directory, the finances of the state were becoming more and more hopelessly involved. "Graft" flourished unbridled in the levying and collecting of the taxes and in all public expenditures. To the extravagance of the Directors in internal administration were added the financial necessities of armies aggregating a million men. Paris, still in poverty and want, had to be fed at the expense of the nation. And the issue of *assignats* by the National Constituent Assembly, intended at first only as a temporary expedient, had been continued until by the year 1796 the total face value of the *assignats* amounted to about forty billion livres, and three hundred livres in assignats were required to secure one livre in cash. In 1797 a partial bankruptcy was declared, interest payments were suspended on two thirds of the public debt, and the *assignats* were repudiated. The republic faced much the same financial crisis as had confronted the absolute monarchy in 1789.

Financial
Difficulties
under the
Directory

From but one direction did light stream in upon the Directory; the national army was functioning splendidly and the foreign war was going gloriously. When the Directory assumed office, France was still at war with Austria, Sardinia, and Great Britain. The general plan of campaign was to advance one French army across the Rhine, through southern Germany, and thence into the Austrian dominions, and to despatch another army across the Alps, through northern Italy, and thence on to Vienna. Of the

Continuing
Success in
Foreign
War

army of the Rhine such veteran generals as Pichegru, Jourdan, and Moreau were put in charge. To the command of the army operating in Italy, the youthful Bonaparte was appointed.

Napoleon Bonaparte hitherto had not been particularly conspicuous in politics or in war. He was believed to be in full sympathy with the Revolution, although he had taken pains after the downfall of Robespierre to disavow any attachment to the extreme radicals. He had acquired some popularity by his skillful expulsion of the British from Toulon in 1793, and his protection of the National Convention against the uprising of the Parisian populace in 1795 gave him reputation as a friend of law and order. Finally, his marriage in 1796 with Josephine Beauharnais, the widow of a revolutionary general and the mistress of one of the Directors, bettered his chances of indulging his fondness for politics and war.

That very year (1796), while the older and more experienced French generals were repeatedly baffled in their efforts to carry the war into southern Germany, the young commander—but twenty-seven years of age—swept the Austrians from Italy. With lightning rapidity, with infectious enthusiasm, with brilliant tactics, with great personal bravery, he crossed the Alps, humbled the Sardinians, and within a year had disposed of five Austrian armies and had occupied every fort in northern Italy. Sardinia was compelled to cede Savoy and Nice to the French Republic, and, when Bonaparte's army approached Vienna, Austria stooped to make terms with this amazing republican general. By the treaty of Campo Formio (1797), France secured the Austrian Netherlands and the Ionian Islands; Austria obtained, as partial compensation for her sacrifices, the ancient Venetian Republic, but agreed not to interfere in other parts of Italy; and a congress was to assemble at Rastatt to rearrange the map of the Holy Roman Empire with a view to compensating those German princes whose lands on the left bank of the Rhine had been appropriated by France.

The campaign of 1796-1797, known in history as the first Italian campaign, was the beginning of a long series of sensational military exploits which were to rank Napoleon Bonaparte as the foremost soldier of modern times. Its immediate effect was to complete the disso-

**Emer-
gence of
Napoleon
Bonaparte**

**Bona-
parte's
First
Italian
Campaign**

**Treaty of
Campo
Formio**

**Dissolu-
tion of the
First Coa-
lition**

lution of the First Coalition by forcing Austria and Sardinia to follow the example of Spain, Prussia, and Holland and to make a peace highly favorable to the French Republic. Great Britain alone continued the struggle against the Directory.

Another effect of the first Italian campaign, almost as immediate and certainly more portentous, was the sudden personal fame of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was the most talked-of man in France. The people applauded him. The government feared but flattered him. Schemers and plotters of every political faith sought his support. Alongside of decreasing respect for the existing government was increasing trust in Bonaparte's strength and ability.

It was undoubtedly with a sense of relief that the despised Directors in 1798 assented to a project proposed by the popular hero to transport to Egypt a French expedition with the object of interrupting communications between Great Britain and India. The ensuing Egyptian campaign of 1798 was spectacular rather than successful. Bonaparte made stirring speeches to his soldiers. He called the Pyramids to witness the valor of the French. He harangued the native Moslems upon the beautiful and truthful character of their religion and upon the advantages which they would derive from free trade with France. He encouraged the close study of Egyptian antiquities.¹ But his actual military achievements did not measure up to the excessively colored reports which he sent home. He was checked in Syria, and a great naval victory won by the celebrated English admiral, Lord Nelson, near the mouth of the Nile, left Bonaparte's army cut off and isolated in Egypt.

Bonaparte
in Egypt

General Bonaparte himself luckily eluded the British warships and returned to France. It was believed by Frenchmen that his latest expedition had been eminently successful; but that in the meantime the work of the Directory had been disastrous, no one doubted. While Bonaparte was away, affairs in France had gone from bad to worse. There were new plots, increased financial and social disorders, and finally the renewal on a large scale of foreign war.

After the treaty of Campo Formio, the Directors had prosecuted zealously the policy of surrounding France with a circle

¹ It was an army officer on this expedition who discovered the famous Rosetta Stone, by the aid of which ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics could be deciphered.

of dependent republics. Even before that treaty, Holland had been transformed into the Batavian Republic, and now pretexts of various sorts were utilized to convert the duchy of Milan, or Lombardy, into the Cisalpine Republic; the oligarchy of Genoa into the Ligurian Republic; the papal states into the Roman Republic; the kingdom of the Two Sicilies into the Parthenopæan Republic; the Swiss Confederation into the Helvetic Republic. At the same time (1798), the Directory further strengthened the French army by systematizing and extending conscription.

In view of the fact that the governments of all the neighboring republics were modelled after that of France and were allied with France, the monarchs of Europe bestirred themselves once more to get rid of the danger that threatened them. A Second Coalition was formed by Great Britain, Austria, and Russia, and, thanks to liberal sums of money supplied by William Pitt, the British minister, they were able to put larger armies in the field.

During 1799 the Second Coalition won repeated victories; the French were driven from Italy; and most of the dependent republics collapsed. It seemed as though Bonaparte's first Italian campaign had been for naught. Possibly the military hero of France had himself foreseen this very situation and had intended to exploit it to his own advantage.

At any rate, when Bonaparte had sailed for Egypt, he had left his country apparently victorious and honored. Now, when he landed at Fréjus in October, 1799, he found France defeated and disgraced. It is small wonder that his journey from Fréjus to Paris was a triumphal procession. The majority of Frenchmen were convinced that he was the man of the hour.

Within a month of his return from Egypt, public opinion enabled the young general to overthrow the government of the Directory. Skillfully intriguing with the Abbé Sieyès, who was one of the Directors, he surrounded the Assemblies with a cordon of troops loyal to himself and on 18-19 Brumaire (9-10 November, 1799) secured by show of force the downfall of the government and the appointment of himself to supreme military command. This blow at the state (*coup d'état*) was soon followed by the promulgation of a new constitution, by which General

**Creation of
Republics
Dependent
on France**

**Formation
of the
Second
Coalition
against
France**

**Bona-
parte's
Coup
d'État: the
Overthrow
of the
Directory**

Bonaparte became First Consul of the French Republic. Thus, within the space of ten and a half years from the assembling of the Estates General at Versailles, parliamentary and popular government in France fell beneath the sword. The predictions of Marat and Robespierre were realized. A military dictator had appeared on the scene.

Yet the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte, the military dictator, did not obscure the deep significance of the French Revolution. A present-day visitor in Paris may still observe on all sides the words *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. These were the words which the revolutionaries spelled out on their public buildings, and which they thought embodied the basic meaning of the Revolution. These words Napoleon Bonaparte did not erase or change. They were applauded by him, as they were detested and denounced by his foes.

**Perma-
nence of
French
Revolu-
tionary
Principles**

As to the meaning of these words, there were certainly quite contradictory views. To the royalists and rigid Catholics—to the privileged nobility and clergy—to many an ignorant peasant—to all the reactionaries, they meant everything that was hateful, blasphemous, sordid, inhuman, and unpatriotic. To the “enlightened” altruistic bourgeois—to the desperate workingman of the city—to many a dreamer and philanthropist—to all the extreme radicals, they were but a shadowy will-o’-the-wisp that glimmered briefly and perhaps indicated faintly the gorgeousness of the great day which might later break upon them. Between these extremes of reaction and radicalism fell the bulk of the bourgeoisie and of the peasantry—the bulk of the French nation—and it is their understanding of the three symbolical words which we shall try to make clear.

“Liberty” implied certain political ideals. Government should henceforth be exercised not autocratically by divine right, but constitutionally by the sovereign will of the governed. The individual citizen should no longer be subject to the arbitrary rule of a king, but should be guaranteed in possession of personal liberties which no state or society might abridge. Such were liberty of conscience, liberty of worship, liberty of speech, liberty of publication. The liberty of owning private property was proclaimed by the French Revolution to be an inherent right of man.

**The
Principle
of Liberty**

“Equality” embraced the social activities of the Revolution. It signified the abolition of privilege, the end of serfdom, the destruction of the feudal system. It meant that all men were equal before the law. It involved the aspiration of affording every man an equal chance with every other man in the pursuit of life and happiness.

The Principle of Equality.

“Fraternity” was the symbol of the idealistic brotherhood of those who sought to make the world better and happier and more just, and at the same time it was the watchword of the new French nationalism. For the sake of humanity, the French nation should be exalted; schools, armies, even religion should be nationalized. No longer should mercenaries fight at the behest of despots for dynastic aggrandizement; henceforth a nation in arms should be prepared to do battle under the glorious banner of “fraternity” in defense of whatever it believed to be the nation’s interests.

The Principle of Fraternity

Political liberty, social equality, nationalist patriotism—these three remained the ideals of all those who down to our own day have looked for inspiration to the French Revolution.



CHAPTER XIII

THE ERA OF NAPOLEON



LOCKED with the history of Europe from 1799 to 1814 was the history of France, and the history of France with the biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. So true is this that the phrase "the era of Napoleon" has been generally employed to describe the history of those years. The period certainly stands out as one of the most significant in modern times. Apart from its importance as marking a revolution in the art of war, it bore memorable results in two directions: (1) the adaptation of revolutionary theories to French practical political necessities, and the establishment of many of the enduring institutions of France; and (2) the communication of doctrines and ideals of the French Revolution far and wide throughout Europe, so that henceforth the revolutionary movement was general rather than local.

During the first five years of the era (1799-1804) France remained formally a republic. It was in these years that General Bonaparte, as First Consul, consolidated his country and preserved certain fruits of the Revolution. Thereafter, from 1804 to 1814, France was an empire, erected and maintained by military force. Then it was that the national hero—self-crowned Napoleon I, emperor of the French,—by means of war, conquest, annexation, or alliance, took up again the spread of revolutionary principles throughout Europe. Before we review the main activities of the constructive consulate or of the proselyting empire, we should have some notion of the character of the leading actor.

I. BONAPARTE'S HERITAGE FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

When General Bonaparte executed the *coup d'état* of 1799 and seized personal power in France, he was thirty years of age, short, of medium build, quiet and determined, with cold gray

eyes and rather awkward manners. He had been born at Ajaccio in Corsica on 15 August, 1769, just after the island had been purchased by France from Genoa¹ but before the French had fully succeeded in quelling a stubborn insurrection of the Corsicans. Belonging to a prominent and numerous Italian family,—at the outset his name was written Napoleone di Buonaparte,—he had been selected along with sons of other conspicuous Corsican families to be educated at public expense in France. In this way he received a good military education at Brienne and at Paris. He early displayed a marked fondness for the study of mathematics and history as well as for the science of war; and, though reserved and taciturn, he was noticeably ambitious and a keen judge of men.

During his youth Buonaparte dreamed of becoming the leader of the movement for Corsican independence, but the outbreak of the French Revolution afforded him a wider field for his enthusiasm and ambition. Already an engineer and artilleryman, he threw in his lot with the Jacobins, sympathized at least outwardly with the course of the Revolution, and was rewarded, as we have seen,² with an important place in the recapture of Toulon (1793) and in the defense of the Convention (1795). It was not, however, until his first Italian campaign,—when incidentally he altered his name to the French form, Bonaparte,—that he acquired a commanding reputation as the foremost general of the French Republic.

How Bonaparte utilized his reputation in order to make himself master of his adopted country has already been related. His success was due in large part to an extraordinary opportunity which French politics at that time offered. But it was due, likewise, to certain characteristic qualities of the young general. In the first place, he was thoroughly convinced of his own abilities. Ambitious, selfish, and egotistical, he was always thinking and planning how he might become world-famous. Fatalistic and even superstitious, he believed that an unseen power was leading him on to higher and grander honors. He convinced his associates that he was a “man of destiny.” Then, in the second place, Bonaparte possessed an effective means of satisfying his ambition. He was heir to the militarism of the French Revolution, and he made himself the idol of his conscript

**Bona-
parte's
Character**

¹ See above, p. 317, note.

² See above, pp. 637, 642.

soldiers. "He would go to sleep repeating the names of the corps, and even those of some of the individuals who composed them; he kept these names in a corner of his memory, and this habit came to his aid when he wanted to recognize a soldier and to give him a cheering word from his general. He spoke to the subalterns in a tone of good fellowship, which delighted them all, as he reminded them of their common feats of arms."

Then, in the third place, Bonaparte was a keen observer and a clever critic. Being sagacious, he knew that by 1799 the French people at large were weary of weak government and perpetual political strife and that they longed to have an orderly government headed by a practical man. Such a man he instinctively felt himself to be. In the fourth place, Bonaparte was unscrupulous. Knowing what he desired, he was ready and willing to employ any means to attain his ends. No love for theories or principles, no fear of God or man, no sentimental aversion from bloodshed, nothing could deter him from striving to realize his vaulting but self-centred ambition. Finally, there was in his nature a vein of poetry and art which made him human and often served him well. He dreamed of the forms of empire and the ceremonies of triumph. He revelled in the thought of courts and polished society. He entertained a sincere admiration for learning. His highly colored speeches to his soldiers were at once brilliant and inspiring. His fine instinct of the dramatic gave a sensational setting to all his public acts. And in the difficult arts of lying and deception, Bonaparte could hardly be surpassed.

Such was the man who effected the *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire (November, 1799). His first work in his new rôle was to devise an instrument of government to take the place of the Constitution of the Year III. It concealed his military despotism under a veil of popular forms. The document named three "consuls," the first of whom was Bonaparte himself, who were to appoint a Senate. From lists selected by general election, the Senate was to designate a Tribune and a Legislative Body. The First Consul, in addition to conducting the administration and foreign policies and having charge of the army, was to propose, through a Council of State, all the laws. The Tribune was to discuss the laws without voting on them. The Legislative Body was then to vote on the laws without discussing them. And the Senate, acting as a kind

**Bona-
parte's
Republican
Constitu-
tion of the
Year VIII:
the Con-
sulate**

of supreme court, was to decide all constitutional questions. Thus a written constitution was provided, and the democratic principle of popular sovereignty was recognized, but in last analysis the authority of the state was centred in the First Consul, who was Napoleon Bonaparte.

The document was forthwith submitted to popular vote (plébiscite), for ratification or rejection. So general was the disgust with the Directory and so unbounded was the faith of all classes in the military hero who offered it, that it was ratified by an overwhelming majority and was henceforth known in French history as the Constitution of the Year VIII.

One reason why the French nation so readily acquiesced in an obvious act of usurpation was the grave foreign danger which still threatened the country. As we have noted in another connection,¹ the armies of the Second Coalition in the course of 1799 had rapidly undone the settlement of Campo Formio, and, possessing themselves of Italy and the Rhine valley, were on the point of carrying the war into France. The first Consul perceived at a glance that he must face essentially the same situation as that which confronted France in 1796.

The Second Coalition embraced Great Britain, Austria, and Russia. Bonaparte soon succeeded by flattery and diplomacy not only in securing the withdrawal of Russia but in actuating the half-insane Tsar Paul² to revive against Great Britain an armed neutrality of the North, which included Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark. Meanwhile the First Consul prepared a second Italian campaign against Austria. Suddenly leading a French army through the rough and icy passes of the Alps, he descended into the fertile valley of the Po and at Marengo in June, 1800, inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon the enemy.

This success in Italy was supplemented a few months later by a brilliant victory of another French army, under Moreau, at Hohenlinden in southern Germany. Whereupon Austria again sued for peace, and the resulting treaty of Lunéville (1801) reaffirmed and strengthened the provisions of the peace of Campo Formio.

Meanwhile, steps were being taken to terminate the state of


**Bona-
parte's
War
against the
Second
Coalition**

**Treaty of
Lunéville
with
Austria**

¹ See above, p. 644.

² Paul, the son of Catherine the Great, reigned from 1796 to 1801.

L'EUROPE en 1800 Par Mentelle



1. L'Europe	2. L'Asie	3. L'Afrique	4. L'Amérique
5. L'Espagne	6. L'Angleterre	7. L'Autriche	8. L'Allemagne
9. L'Italie	10. L'Espagne	11. L'Angleterre	12. L'Autriche
13. L'Allemagne	14. L'Italie	15. L'Espagne	16. L'Angleterre
17. L'Autriche	18. L'Allemagne	19. L'Italie	20. L'Espagne
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61. L'Angleterre	62. L'Autriche	63. L'Allemagne	64. L'Italie
65. L'Espagne	66. L'Angleterre	67. L'Autriche	68. L'Allemagne
69. L'Italie	70. L'Espagne	71. L'Angleterre	72. L'Autriche
73. L'Allemagne	74. L'Italie	75. L'Espagne	76. L'Angleterre
77. L'Autriche	78. L'Allemagne	79. L'Italie	80. L'Espagne
81. L'Angleterre	82. L'Autriche	83. L'Allemagne	84. L'Italie
85. L'Espagne	86. L'Angleterre	87. L'Autriche	88. L'Allemagne
89. L'Italie	90. L'Espagne	91. L'Angleterre	92. L'Autriche
93. L'Allemagne	94. L'Italie	95. L'Espagne	96. L'Angleterre
97. L'Autriche	98. L'Allemagne	99. L'Italie	100. L'Espagne

Imprimé chez la Citoyenne Lesclapart, Paris.

war which had been existing between France and Great Britain since 1793. Although French arms were victorious in Europe, the British squadron of Lord Nelson (1758-1805) had managed to retain the mastery of the sea. By gaining the battle of the Nile (1 August, 1798) Nelson had cut off the supplies of the French expedition in Egypt and eventually (1801) obliged it to surrender. Now, by a furious bombardment of Copenhagen (2 April, 1801), Nelson broke up the armed neutrality of the North. But despite the naval feats of the British, republican France seemed to be unconquerable on the Continent. Under these circumstances a treaty was signed at Amiens in March, 1802, whereby Great Britain promised to restore all the colonial conquests made during the war, except Ceylon and Trinidad, and tacitly accepted the Continental settlement as defined at Lunéville. The treaty of Amiens was intended to be permanent, but it proved to be only a temporary truce in a long struggle between France and Great Britain.

Treaty of Amiens with Great Britain

So far, the Consulate had meant the establishment of an advantageous peace for France. With all foreign foes subdued, with territories extended to the Rhine, and with allies in Spain, and in the Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine republics, the First Consul was free to devote his marvellous organizing and administrative talents to the internal affairs of his country. The period of the Consulate (1799-1804) was the period of Bonaparte's greatest and most enduring contributions to the development of French institutions.

The French Republic Expanded and at Peace

Throughout his career Bonaparte professed himself to be the "son of the Revolution," the champion of the novel ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. It was to the Revolution that he owed his position in France, and it was to France that he claimed to be preserving the fruits of the Revolution. Yet, in actual practice, the First Consul trimmed the Revolution by emphasizing equality rather than liberty and by interpreting fraternity in a nationalist, rather than internationalist, sense. "What the French people want," he declared, "is equality, not liberty." In the social order, therefore, Bonaparte rigidly maintained the abolition of privilege. He would recognize no distinctions of class, and the one order of knighthood which he founded and fostered—

Bonaparte's Preservation of the Revolutionary Heritage

the Legion of Honor—was to be open to any citizen who performed meritorious service, regardless of birth, rank, or religion. Bonaparte would not think of reviving serfdom or feudalism in any respect, and he ever sought to assure to all Frenchmen equal justice, equal rights, equal opportunity of advancement. But in the political order he exercised a tyranny more complete, if less open, than that of Louis XIV.

The Constitution of the Year VIII (1799) placed in Bonaparte's hands all the legislative and executive functions of the central government, and a series of subsequent acts put the law courts under his control. In 1800 the local government of the whole country was subordinated to him. The extensive

**Centrali-
zation of
Local Gov-
ernment:
the Pre-
fects**

powers vested by the Constituent Assembly in elective bodies of the départements and smaller districts (arrondissements) were wielded by prefects and sub-prefects, appointed by the First Consul and responsible to him.

The local elective councils continued to exist, but sat only for a fortnight in the year and had to deal merely with the assessment of taxes; they might be consulted by the prefect or sub-prefect but had no serious check upon the executive. The mayor of every small commune was chosen by the prefect, while the police of all cities containing more than 100,000 inhabitants were directed by the central government, and the mayors of towns of more than 5,000 population were chosen by Bonaparte.

This highly centralized administration of the country afforded the people little direct voice in governmental matters but it possessed distinct advantages in assuring the prompt, uniform, unquestioning execution of the laws and decrees of the central government. In essence it was a revival and perfecting of the system of intendants instituted by Cardinal Richelieu and utilized by Louis XIV.¹ How conservative are the French people, at least in the institutions of local government, may be inferred from the fact that, despite many changes in France during the nineteenth century from republic to monarchy to republic again, Bonaparte's system of prefects and sub-prefects has survived to the present day.

As in administration, so in all his internal reforms, Bonaparte displayed the same fondness for nationalist centralization, with consequent thoroughness and efficiency, at the expense of polit-

¹ See above, p. 284.

ical liberty. His reforms of every description—financial, ecclesiastical, judicial, educational,—and even his public works, showed the guiding hand of the victorious general rather than that of the convinced revolutionary. They were the adaptation of the revolutionary heritage to the purposes and policies of nationalism and one-man power.

It will be remembered that financial disorders had been the immediate cause of the downfall both of the absolute monarchy in 1789 and of the Directory in 1799. From the outset, Bonaparte guarded against any such recurrence. By careful collection of taxes he increased the revenue of the state. By rigid economy, by the severe punishment of corrupt officials, and by the practice of obliging people whose lands he invaded to support his armies, he checked the public expenditures. The crowning achievement of his financial readjustments was the establishment (1800) of the Bank of France, which has been ever since one of the soundest financial institutions in the world.

Financial Reform: the Bank of France

Another grave problem which Bonaparte inherited from the Revolution was the quarrel between the state and the Catholic Church. He was determined to gain the political support of the large number of conscientious French Catholics who had been alienated by the harsh anti-clerical measures of the revolutionaries. After delicate and protracted negotiations and against the wishes of French radicals, a settlement was reached in a concordat (1801) between Pope Pius VII and the French Republic, whereby the pope, for his part, concurred in the confiscation of the property of the church and the suppression of the monasteries, and the republic undertook to pay the salaries of the clergy. The First Consul was to nominate the bishops, and the pope was to invest them with their office; the priests were to be appointed by the bishops. In this way the Catholic Church was officially restored in France, but it was tied to the national government more tightly than it had been in the time of Louis XIV.¹ So advantageous did the arrangement appear that

Reestablishment of the Catholic Church: the Concordat of 1801

¹ Catholicism was recognized by the concordat of 1801 as "the religion of the majority of Frenchmen," but its pre-revolutionary legal monopoly was not restored. Frenchmen might conform with it, or not, as they personally desired. And Bonaparte followed up his toleration and subsidizing of Catholicism by according similar favors to Protestant churches and Jewish synagogues within France.

the concordat of 1801 continued to regulate the relations of church and state in France until 1905.

One of the fondest hopes cherished by the French Revolutionaries was to clear away the confusion and discrepancies of the numerous legal systems of the old régime and to reduce the laws of the land to a simple and uniform national code, so that every person who could read would be able to know what was legal and what was illegal. The constitution of 1791 had promised such a work; the National Convention had actually begun it; but the preoccupations of the leading revolutionaries, combined with the natural caution and slowness of the lawyers to whom the task was entrusted, delayed its completion. It was not until the commanding personality of Bonaparte came into contact with it that real progress was made. Then surrounding himself with excellent legal advisers¹ whom he literally drove to labor, the First Consul brought out a great civil code (1804), which was followed by a code of civil procedure, a code of criminal procedure, a penal code, and a commercial code. These codes were of the utmost importance. The simplicity and elegance of their form commended them not only to France, but to the greater part of Continental Europe. More important, they preserved the chief social conquests of the Revolution, such as civil equality, religious toleration, equality of inheritance, emancipation of serfs, abolition of feudalism and privilege. It is true that many harsh punishments were retained and that the position of woman was made distinctly inferior to that of man, but, on the whole, the French codes long remained not only the most convenient but the most enlightened set of laws in the world. Bonaparte was rightly hailed as a second Justinian.

A similar motive and the same enthusiasm actuated the First Consul in pressing forward a nationalist scheme of education. On the foundation laid several years earlier by the revolutionaries² was now reared an imposing state system of public instruction. (1) Primary or elementary schools were to be maintained by every commune under the general supervision of the prefects or sub-prefects. (2) Secondary or grammar schools were to provide special training in French, Latin, and elementary science, and, whether supported

Legal Reform and Consolidation: the Code Napoléon

Educational Reform: the System of National Schools

¹ Chief among these legal experts was Cambacérès (1753-1824), the Second Consul.

² See above, p. 637.

by public or private enterprise, were to be subject to control by the national government. (3) *Lycées*, or high schools, were to be opened in every important town and instruction given in the higher branches of learning by teachers appointed by the state. (4) Special schools, such as technical schools, civil service schools, and military schools, were brought under public regulation. (5) The university of France was established to maintain uniformity throughout the new educational system. Its chief officials were appointed by the First Consul, and no one might open a new school or teach in public unless he was licensed by the university. (6) The recruiting station for the teaching staff of the public schools was provided in a normal school organized in Paris. All these schools were directed to take as the bases of their teaching the ethical principles of Christianity, loyalty to the head of the state, and obedience to the statutes of the university. Despite continued efforts of Bonaparte, the new system was handicapped by lack of funds and of experienced lay teachers, so that at the close of the Napoleonic era, more than half of the total number of French children still attended private schools, mostly those conducted by the Catholic Church. But in private schools, as in public schools, national patriotism was now inculcated.

Bonaparte proved himself a zealous benefactor of public works and improvements. With very moderate expenditure of French funds, for prisoners of war were obliged to do a good deal of the work, he enormously improved the means of communication and trade within the country, and promoted the economic welfare of large classes of the inhabitants. The splendid highways which modern France possesses are in large part due to Bonaparte. In 1811 he could enumerate 229 broad military roads which he had constructed, the most important of which, thirty in number, radiated from Paris to the extremities of the French territory. Two fine Alpine roads brought Paris in touch with Turin, Milan, Rome, and Naples. Numerous substantial bridges were built. The former network of canals and waterways was perfected. Marshes were drained, dikes strengthened, and sand dunes hindered from spreading along the ocean coast. The principal seaports, both naval and commercial, were enlarged and fortified, especially the harbors of Cherbourg and Toulon.

Public
Works

Along with such obviously useful labor went desirable embellishment of life.¹ State palaces were restored and enlarged. so that under Bonaparte, St. Cloud, Fontainebleau, and Rambouillet came to rank with the majesty of Versailles. The city of Paris was beautified. Broad avenues were projected. The Louvre was completed and adorned with precious works of art which Bonaparte dragged as fruits of victory from Italy, or Spain, or the Netherlands. During the Consulate, Paris was just beginning to lay claim to a position as the pleasure city of Europe. Its population almost doubled during the era of Napoleon.

The First Consul also entertained the hope of restoring the French colonial empire. In 1800 he prevailed upon the Spanish government to re-cede to France the extensive territory—called Louisiana—lying west of the Mississippi River.² Soon afterwards he despatched his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, with an army of 25,000 men, to make good the French claims to the large island of Haiti. But the colonial ventures of Napoleon ended in failure. In Haiti, Leclerc's efforts to reëstablish negro slavery encountered the stubborn resistance of the blacks, organized and led by one of their number, Toussaint L'Ouverture, a man of considerable military genius. After a determined and often ferocious struggle Leclerc proposed a compromise, and Toussaint, induced by the most solemn guaranties on the part of the French, laid down his arms. He was seized and sent to France, where he died in prison in 1803. The negroes, infuriated by this act of treachery, renewed the war with terrible barbarity. The French, further embarrassed by the appearance of a British fleet, were only too glad to relinquish the island in November, 1803. Meanwhile, expectation of war with Great Britain had induced Bonaparte in April, 1803, to sell the entire Louisiana territory to the United States.

If we except these brief and ill-starred colonial exploits, we may pronounce the First Consul's government and achievements eminently successful. Bonaparte had inspired public confidence by the honesty of his financial administration and by his choice of officials, for he was served by such a consummate diplomat as Talleyrand and by such a tireless chief of police as Fouché. His speedy and victorious termination of the War of the Second

¹ On art in the Napoleonic era, see below, pp. 735-736. ² See above, p. 412.

**Patronage
of Art**

**Bona-
parte's
Attempts
to Build a
French
Colonial
Empire**

Coalition and his subsequent apparent policy of peace had rounded to his credit. His sweeping and thorough reforms in internal affairs had attracted to his support many and varied classes in the community—the business interests, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and many sincere Catholics.

Only two groups—and these continually dwindling in size and importance—stood in the way of Bonaparte's complete mastery of France. One was the remnant of the Jacobins who would not admit that the Revolution was ended. The other was the royalist party which longed to undo all the work of the Revolution. During the Consulate, however, the efforts of both these factions were reduced to secret plots and intrigues. Attempts to assassinate the First Consul served only to increase his popularity among the masses. Early in 1804 Bonaparte unearthed a conspiracy of royalists, whom he punished with summary vengeance. General Pichegru, who was implicated in the conspiracy, was found strangled in prison soon after his arrest. Moreau, who was undoubtedly the ablest general in France next to Bonaparte, was likewise accused of complicity, although he was a staunch Jacobin, and escaped more drastic punishment only by becoming an exile in America. Not content with these advantages, Bonaparte determined thoroughly to terrorize the royalists. By military force he seized a young Bourbon prince, the duc d'Enghien, on German soil, and without a particle of proof against him put him to death.

In 1802 a plébiscite had bestowed the Consulate on Bonaparte for life. Now there was little more to do than to make the office hereditary and to change its name. This alteration was proposed in 1804 by the subservient Senate and promptly ratified by an overwhelming popular vote. On 2 December, 1804, amid imposing ceremonies in the medieval cathedral of Notre Dame, in the presence of Pope Pius VII, who had come all the way from Rome to grace the event, General Bonaparte placed a crown upon his own head and assumed the title of Napoleon I, emperor of the French.

Suppression of Domestic Dissent

Transformation of the Republic into the Empire

Coronation of Napoleon

2. THE FRENCH EMPIRE AND ITS TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

The establishment of the empire was by no means a break in French history. The principle of popular sovereignty was still

recognized. The social gains of the Revolution were still intact. The magic words "liberty, equality, fraternity" still blazed proudly forth on public buildings. The tricolor was still the flag of France.

Of course a few changes were made in externals. The title of "citizen" was again replaced by that of "monsieur." The republican calendar gradually lapsed. Napoleon's relatives became "grand dignitaries." The revolutionary generals who accepted the new régime were promoted to be "marshals of the empire." Old titles of nobility were restored, and new ones created.

The outward changes in France were reflected in the dependent surrounding states. And in effecting the foreign alterations, Napoleon took care to provide for his numerous family. For his brother Louis, the Batavian Republic was transformed into the kingdom of Holland. For his brother Jerome, estates were subsequently carved out of Hanover, Prussia, and other northwest German lands to form the kingdom of Westphalia. Brother Joseph was seated on the Bourbon throne of the Two Sicilies. The Cisalpine Republic became the kingdom of Italy with Napoleon as king, and Eugene Beauharnais, his stepson, as viceroy.¹ Both Piedmont and Genoa were incorporated into the French empire.

The Consulate, as has been explained, was characterized by a policy of peace. Sweeping reforms had been accomplished in internal affairs, so that France was consolidated and the vast majority of her citizens became devoted supporters of the emperor. What adverse criticism Frenchmen might have directed against the empire was stifled by the activity of a splendidly organized secret police and by a rigorous censorship of the press. So complete was Napoleon's control of the state that the sensational naval defeat of Trafalgar was not mentioned by a single French newspaper until after the fall of the empire. By degrees the personal power of the Corsican adventurer, though based in theory on the principle of popular sovereignty, became in fact more absolute than that of any divine-right monarchy. Indeed, Napoleon went so far as to adapt an old catechism which the celebrated Bishop Bossuet had prepared during the reign of Louis XIV and to order its

¹ For the relatives of Napoleon, see the chart below, p. 664.

use by all children. An extract from the catechism will make clear how Napoleon wished to be regarded.

“Question. What are the duties of Christians toward those who govern them, and what in particular are our duties towards Napoleon I, our Emperor?”

“Answer. Christians owe to the princes who govern them, and we in particular owe to Napoleon I, our emperor, love, respect, obedience, fidelity, military service, and the taxes levied for the preservation and defence of the empire and of his throne. We also owe him fervent prayers for his safety and for the spiritual and temporal prosperity of the state.

With opposition crushed in France, with the loyalty of the French nation secured, and with an enthusiastic nationalist army at his beck and call, Napoleon as emperor could gratify his natural instincts for foreign aggrandizement and glory. He had become all-powerful in France; he would become all-powerful in Europe. Ambitious and successful in the arts of peace, he would be more ambitious and more successful in the science of war. The empire indeed meant war more clearly than the consulate had appeared to mean peace. To speculate upon what Napoleon might have accomplished for France had he restrained his ambition and continued to apply his talents entirely to the less striking triumphs of peace, is idle, because Napoleon was not that type of man.

The
Emperor's
Military
Ambition

The ten years of the empire (1804-1814) were attended by continuous warfare. Into the intricacies of the military campaigns it is neither possible nor expedient in the compass of this chapter to enter. It is aimed, rather, to present only such features of the long struggle as are significant in the general history of Europe, for the wars of Napoleon served a purpose which their prime mover only incidentally had at heart—the transmission of the revolutionary heritage to Europe.

When the empire was established, war between France and Great Britain, interrupted by the treaty of Amiens, had already broken forth afresh. The struggle had begun in 1793 as a protest of the British monarchy against the excesses of the Revolution, especially against the French conquest of Belgium, and doubtless the masses of the English nation still fancied that they were fighting against the demon of revolution, now personified by Napoleon Bonaparte.

Renewal
of War
with Great
Britain

But to the statesmen and influential classes of Great Britain as well as of France, the conflict had assumed a deeper significance. It was an economic and commercial war. The British not only were mindful of the assistance which France had given to American rebels, but also were resolved that France should not regain the colonial empire and commercial position which she had lost in the eighteenth century.¹ The British had struggled to maintain their control of the sea and the superiority of trade and industry which attended it. Now, when Napoleon extended French influence over the Belgian and Dutch Netherlands, along the Rhine, and throughout Italy, and even succeeded in negotiating an alliance with Spain, Britain was threatened with the loss of valuable commercial privileges in all those regions, and was further alarmed by the ambitious colonial projects of Napoleon. In May, 1803, therefore, Great Britain declared war. The immediate occasion for the resumption of hostilities was Napoleon's positive refusal to cease interfering in Italy, in Switzerland, and in Holland.

Napoleon welcomed the renewal of war. He understood that until he had completely broken the power of Great Britain all his Continental designs were imperilled and his colonial and commercial projects hopeless. The humiliation of the great rival across the Channel would be the surest guaranty of the prosperity of the French bourgeoisie, and it was in last analysis from this class that his own political support was chiefly derived. The year 1803-1804 was spent by the emperor in elaborate preparations for an armed invasion of England. Along the Channel coast were gradually collected at enormous cost a host of transports and frigates, a considerable army, and an abundance of supplies. To the French armament, Spain was induced to contribute her resources.

Great Britain replied to these preparations by covering the Channel with a superior fleet, by preying upon French commerce, and by seizing Spanish treasure-ships from America. And William Pitt, the very embodiment of the Englishman's dislike for things French, headed the ministry of his country. Great Britain had no large armies to put in the field against the veterans of Napoleon, but Pitt spent liberal sums of British money in order to enable the Continental powers to combat the French emperor. Pitt was the

**The Third
Coalition
against
France**

¹ See above, pp. 411-413.

real bone and sinew of the Third Coalition, which was formed in 1805 by Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden to overthrow Napoleon.

Austria naturally smarted under the provisions of the treaty of Lunéville quite as much as under those of Campo Formio. Francis II was aroused by French predominance in Italy and now that he had added the title of "hereditary emperor of Austria" to his shadowy dignity as "Holy Roman Emperor" he was irritated by the upstart Napoleon's assumption of an imperial title.

In Russia the assassination of the Tsar Paul, the crazy admirer of Bonaparte, had called to the throne in 1801 the active though easily influenced Alexander I. In early life Alexander had acquired a smattering of the "enlightened" philosophy of the eighteenth century, its liberalism and its humanitarianism. At bottom, however, he was quite as despotic and militaristic as Peter the Great or Catherine the Great,¹ and he was peculiarly anxious to play a commanding rôle in Europe. The poverty-stricken condition of Russia made it difficult for him to finance his army, but when Pitt offered liberal subsidies, he perceived an opportunity to surmount the one obstacle to his ambition; and Pitt's assurance that Napoleon was the enemy of liberty and humanity provided Alexander with "enlightened" justification for his action. So the tsar joined his army with that of Austria, and in the autumn of 1805 the allies advanced through southern Germany toward the Rhine.

Pitt had done his best to bring Prussia into the coalition, but the Prussian king, Frederick William III (1797-1840), was timid and irresolute, and, despite the protests of his people, was cajoled by Napoleon's offer of Hanover into a declaration of neutrality. Bavaria and Württemberg, from jealousy of Austria, became open allies of the French emperor.

Before the troops of the Third Coalition could threaten the eastern frontier of France, Napoleon abandoned his projected invasion of Great Britain, broke up his huge armaments along the Atlantic coast, and, with his usual rapidity of march, hurled his finely trained army upon the Austrians near the town of Ulm in Württemberg. There, on 20 October, 1805, the Austrian commander, with some 50,000 men, surrendered, and the road to Vienna was open to the French.

¹ See above, ch. viii.

This startling military success was followed on the very next day by a naval defeat quite as sensational and, in the long run, quite as decisive. On 21 October, the allied French and Spanish fleets, issuing from the harbor of Cadiz, encountered the British fleet under Lord Nelson, and in a terrific battle off Cape Trafalgar were completely worsted. Lord Nelson lost his life in the conflict, but from that day to the close of the Napoleonic era British supremacy on the high seas was not seriously challenged.

Wasting no tears or time on the loss of sea-power, Napoleon hastened to follow up his land advantages. Occupying Vienna, he turned northward into Moravia where Francis II and Alexander I had gathered an army of Austrians and Russians. On 2 December, 1805, the anniversary of his coronation as emperor,—his “lucky” day, as he termed it,—Napoleon overwhelmed the allies at Austerlitz.

The immediate result of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz was the enforced withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition. Late in December, 1805, the Emperors Francis II and Napoleon signed the treaty of Pressburg, whereby the former ceded Venetia to the kingdom of Italy and recognized Napoleon as its king, and resigned the Tyrol to Bavaria, and outlying provinces in western Germany to Württemberg. Both Bavaria and Württemberg were converted into kingdoms. By the humiliating treaty of Pressburg, Austria thus lost 3,000,000 subjects and large revenues; was cut off from Italy, Switzerland, and the Rhine; and was reduced to the rank of a second-rate power.

For a time it seemed as if the withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition might be compensated for by the adherence of Prussia. Stung by the refusal of Napoleon to withdraw his troops from southern Germany and by the bootless haggling over the transference of Hanover, and goaded on by his patriotic and high-spirited wife, the beautiful Queen Louise, timid Frederick William III at length ventured in 1806 to declare war against France. Then, with a ridiculously misplaced confidence in the old-time reputation of Frederick the Great, without waiting for assistance from the Russians who were coming up, the Prussian army—some 150,000

The Battle of Trafalgar and the Assurance of British Supremacy at Sea

Austerlitz and the Detachment of Austria from the Third Coalition

The Treaty of Pressburg

Intervention and Humiliation of Prussia

strong, under the aged duke of Brunswick—advanced against the 200,000 veterans of Napoleon. The resulting battles of Jena and Auerstädt proved the great superiority of Napoleon's army over the Prussian; they marked not only a disastrous defeat but the total collapse of the Prussian army and the destruction of the military prestige acquired under Frederick the Great.¹ Napoleon entered Berlin in triumph and took possession of the greater part of the kingdom of Prussia.

The Russians still remained to be dealt with. Winter was a bad season for campaigning in East Prussia, and it was not until June, 1807, at Friedland, that Napoleon was able to administer to the Russians a defeat comparable with those which he had administered to the Austrians at Austerlitz and to the Prussians at Jena. The Tsar Alexander at once sued for peace. At Tilsit, on a raft moored in the middle of the River Niemen, Napoleon and Alexander met and arranged the terms of peace for France, Russia, and Prussia. The impressionable tsar was dazzled by the striking personality and the unexpected magnanimity of the emperor of the French. Hardly an inch of Russian soil was exacted, only a promise to cooperate in excluding British trade from the Continent. Alexander was given to understand that he might deal as he would with Finland and Turkey. "What is Europe?" exclaimed the emotional tsar: "Where is it, if it is not you and I?"

The Treaty of Tilsit and the Dissolution of the Third Coalition


But Prussia had to pay the price of the alliance between French and Russian emperors. From Prussia was torn the portion of Poland which was erected into the grand-duchy of Warsaw, under Napoleon's obsequious ally, the elector of Saxony. De-spoiled altogether of half of her territories, compelled to reduce her army to 42,000 men, and forced to maintain French troops on her remaining lands until a large war indemnity was paid, Prussia was reduced to the rank of a third-rate power. Tilsit destroyed the Third Coalition and made Napoleon master of the Continent. Only Great Britain and Sweden remained under arms, and against the latter country Napoleon was enabled to employ both Denmark and Russia.

Early in 1808 a Russian army crossed the Finnish border without any previous declaration of war, and simultaneously a Danish

¹ See above, pp. 334, 343, 348.

THE BONAPARTE FAMILY

Charles Buonaparte *m.* Letizia Ramolino
(1746-1785) (1750-1836)



force prepared to invade Sweden from the Norwegian frontier. The ill-starred Swedish king, Gustavus IV (1792-1809), found it was all he could do, even with British assistance, to fight off the Danes. The little Finnish army, left altogether unsupported, succumbed after an heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, and in 1809 Sweden agreed to cede Finland and the Aland Islands to Russia. Thus Sweden lost her duchy of Finland, and she was permitted to retain a small part of Pomerania only at the humiliating price of making peace with Napoleon and excluding British goods from all her ports. In the same year, Gustavus IV was compelled to abdicate in favor of his uncle, Charles XIII (1809-1818), an infirm and childless old man, who was prevailed upon to designate as his successor one of Napoleon's marshals, General Bernadotte. Surely, Napoleon might hope to dominate Sweden as he then dominated every other Continental state. Of course, Great Britain, triumphant on the seas, remained unconquered, but the British army, the laughing-stock of Europe, could expect to achieve little where Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden had failed.

Russia's
Conquest
of Finland

The year that followed Tilsit may be taken as marking the height of Napoleon's career. The Corsican adventurer was emperor of a France that extended from the Po to the North Sea, from the Pyrenees and the papal states to the Rhine, a France united, patriotic, and in enjoyment of many of the fruits of the Revolution. He was king of an Italy which embraced the fertile valley of the Po and the ancient possessions of Venice, and which was administered by a viceroy, his stepson and heir-apparent, Eugène Beauharnais. Pope Pius VII was his friend and ally. Napoleon's brother Joseph governed the kingdom of Naples. His brother Louis and his stepdaughter Hortense were king and queen of Holland. His sister Elise was princess of the diminutive state of Lucca. The kings of Spain and Denmark were his admirers, and the tsar of Russia called him friend and brother. A restored Poland was a recruiting station for his army. Prussia and Austria had become second- or third-rate powers, and French influence once more predominated in Germany.

The Napo-
leonic
Empire at
its Height

It was in Germany, in fact, that Napoleon's achievements were particularly striking. Before his iron touch many of the time-honored political and social institutions of that country crumbled

away. As early as 1801 the diminution of the number of German states had begun. The treaty of Lunéville had made imperative some action on the part of the diet of the Holy Roman Empire in order to indemnify the rulers whose lands on the left bank of the Rhine had been incorporated into France, and to grant "compensations" to the south German states. After laborious negotiations, lasting from 1801 to 1803, the diet authorized¹ the wholesale confiscation throughout southern Germany of ecclesiastical lands and of free cities. One hundred and twelve formerly independent states lying east of the Rhine were wiped out of existence and nearly one hundred others on the west bank were embodied in France. Thus the number of German states was suddenly reduced from more than three hundred to less than one hundred, and the states which mainly benefited, along with France and Prussia, were the southern states of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, which Napoleon desired to use as an equivoise against both Austria and Prussia. In this ambition he was not disappointed, for in the War of the Third Coalition (1805) he received important assistance from the three southern states, all of which were in turn liberally rewarded for their services, the rulers of Bavaria and Württemberg being proclaimed kings.²

The year 1806 was epochal in German political history. On 19 July, the Confederation of the Rhine was formally established with Napoleon as "protector." The kings of Bavaria and Württemberg, the grand-dukes of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Berg, the archbishop of Mainz, and nine minor princes virtually seceded from the Holy Roman Empire and accepted the "protection" of Napoleon, whom they pledged themselves to support with an army of 63,000 men. On 1 August, Napoleon declared that he no longer recognized the Holy Roman Empire, and on 6 August the Habsburg emperor, Francis II, resigned the crown which his ancestors for centuries had worn. The work of a long line of French kings and statesmen,—Francis I, Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin,

**The End
of the Holy
Roman
Empire**

¹ By a decree, called the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss*.

² The elector of Saxony also entered into a close alliance with Napoleon in 1806, and was rewarded with the titles of king of Saxony and grand-duke of Warsaw.

Louis XIV,—was thus consummated by Napoleon Bonaparte. The Holy Roman Empire had at last come to an inglorious end. Its last emperor had to content himself with his newly appropriated title of Francis I, Hereditary Emperor of Austria. The dignity and might of the proud Habsburgs had declined before a mere upstart of the people as never before a royal Bourbon. And this same year, 1806, witnessed, as we have seen, not only the humiliation of Austria but the deepest degradation of Prussia.

The Establishment of the Empire of Austria

By 1808 all Germany was at the mercy of Napoleon. Prussia was shorn of half her possessions and forced to obey the behest of her conqueror. The Confederation of the Rhine was enlarged and solidified. A kingdom of Westphalia was carved out of northern and western Germany at the expense of Prussia, Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, and bestowed upon Jerome, brother of Napoleon. The grand-duchy of Berg was governed by the protector's plebeian brother-in-law, Joachim Murat. And, most significant fact of all, wherever the French emperor's rule extended, there followed the abolition of feudalism and serfdom, the recognition of equality of all citizens before the law, the principles and precepts of the Code Napoléon.

The Spread of the Revolutionary Principles outside of France

This was the true apogee of Napoleon's power. From the November day in 1799 when the successful general had overthrown the corrupt Directory down to 1808, his story is a magnificent succession of the triumphs of peace and of war. Whatever be the judgment of his contemporaries or of posterity upon his motives, there can be little question that throughout these nine years he appeared to France and to Europe what he proclaimed himself—"the son of the Revolution." He it was who in the lull between the combats of the Second Coalition and those of the Third had consolidated the work of the democratic patriots from Mirabeau to Carnot and had assured to France certain permanent fruits of the Revolution in the domains of property, law, religion, education, administration, and finance. He it was who, if narrowing the concept of liberty, had broadened the significance of equality by the very lesson of his own rise to power and had deepened the meaning of fraternity by lavishing affection and devotion upon that machine of democratic nationalism—the national army—the "nation in arms." And he it was who, true to the


revolutionary tradition of striking terror into the hearts of the divine-right monarchs of Europe, had with a mighty noise shaken the whole Continent and brought down many a political and social institution of the "old régime" tumbling in ruins throughout central and southern Europe. He had made revolutionary reform too solid and too widespread to admit of its total extinction by the allied despots of Europe. The dream which a Leopold and a Frederick William had cherished in 1791 of restoring conditions in France as they had been prior to 1789, was at last dispelled. But the despots were at least to get rid of the agent of their undoing; they were to take revenge on Napoleon.

3. TIGHTENING OF FOREIGN OPPOSITION TO NAPOLEON

From 1808 to 1814—six dreadful years—Napoleon's power was constantly on the wane. Nor are the reasons for his ultimate failure difficult to perceive. Some of the very elements which had contributed most to the upbuilding of his great empire with its dependent kingdoms and duchies were in the long run elements of weakness and instability—vital causes of its eventual downfall. One trouble was the limitation of individual genius. Altogether too much depended upon the physical and mental strength of one man. Napoleon was undoubtedly a genius, but he was also human. He was growing older, more corpulent, less able to withstand exertion and fatigue, fonder of affluence and ease. On the other hand, every fresh success confirmed his belief in his own ability and whetted his appetite for power until his ambition was growing into madness and his egotism was becoming mania. His aversion from taking the advice of others increased so that even the subtle intriguers, Talleyrand and Fouché, were less and less admitted to his confidence. The emperor would brook the appearance of no actor on the French stage other than himself, although on that stage during those crowded years there was too much for a single emperor, albeit a master emperor, to do.

The second serious defect in the Napoleonic system was the fact that its very foundation was military. What had enabled the

NOTE. The portrait opposite, of Napoleon, is from a bust by Jean Antoine Houdon (1740-1828). Concerning Houdon, see below, p. 736.





National Convention in the days of the Revolution's darkest peril to roll back the tide of foreign invasion was the introduction of conscription and the other devices of the new militarism which Carnot and his fellow Jacobins had sponsored.¹ It was this new militarism of the French revolutionaries which Napoleon Bonaparte took over, extended, and perfected. He certainly labored to keep at high pitch the morale of his army. He talked much of its "mission" and its "destiny," of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and he kept alive its traditions of heroism and duty. He improved its discipline, its material well-being, its effectiveness, and its sense of "honor." But more and more Napoleon emphasized what was becoming evident in the later days of the Revolution, that the new militarism was essentially tyrannical, that it was less for "defense" than for "offense," and that its ends were glamor and glory for the victors and misery for the vanquished. And as years passed by and the deadly campaigns repeated themselves and the number of patriotic volunteers lessened, Napoleon resorted more and more to conscription—forcibly taking away thousands of young Frenchmen from peaceful and productive pursuits at home and strewing their bones throughout the length and breadth of the Continent.²

**The Meta-
morphosis
of Mili-
tarism**

Moreover, as the French empire expanded and other peoples were brought into a dependent or allied position, Napoleon drafted more and more Poles, Germans, Italians, Dutch, Spaniards, and Danes. Thereby the "Grand Army" became increasingly heterogeneous, and its loyalty to the emperor outstripped its devotion to revolutionary principles. It is true that many of the Frenchmen who composed the majority of the Grand Army still entertained the notion that they were fighting for liberty, equality, and fraternity. It is likewise true that the close contact of these Frenchmen with soldiers of other nationalities was a

¹ See above, pp. 632-634, 637, 644.

² The annual conscription rose from 60,000 in 1804 to 1,140,000 in 1813. Altogether, Napoleon conscripted 2,613,000 Frenchmen from 1800 to 1813. As he phrased it, "God marches with the biggest battalions."

NOTE. The picture opposite, entitled "There's No Help," is one of a series of etchings which the famous Spanish artist Francisco Goya (1740-1828) designed to depict the horrors of Napoleonic militarism in Spain and which helped to stir up the Spanish revolt against Napoleon. On this revolt, see below, pp. 674-677, 681-682, 688; and on Goya, see above, pp. 564-565, and below, p. 748.

most effective means of communicating the revolutionary doctrines throughout Europe. But it is also true that Napoleon's extension of the earlier policy of quartering French troops upon the lands of their enemies or of their allies, and thereby conserving the resources of their own country, operated to develop the utmost hatred for France, for the Revolution, and for Napoleon. This hatred helped to produce, particularly in Germany and in Spain, a truly nationalist feeling among the masses, so that those very peoples to whom the notions of liberty and equality had first come as a promise of deliverance from the oppression of their own divine-right rulers now used the same notions to justify them in rising as nationalists against the despotism of a foreign military oppressor.

It was thus the character of the emperor himself and his military exigencies that, taken in conjunction with the so-called 'continental system' and the nationalist uprisings, made Napoleon's empire but an episode in the story of modern times. It is now time to explain the "continental system" and then to see how it reacted throughout Europe upon the feeling of national patriotism to bring about the downfall of the Corsican adventurer.

"Continental system" is the term commonly applied to the curious character which the warfare between Napoleon and Great Britain gradually assumed. By 1806 the interesting situation had developed that Great Britain was indisputable mistress of the seas while Napoleon was no less indisputable master of the Continent. The battles of the Nile, of Copenhagen, and of Trafalgar had been to the British what those of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena had been to the French. On one hand the destruction of the French fleet, together with the Danish, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, had effectually prevented Napoleon from realizing his long-cherished dream of invading England. On the other hand, the British army was not strong enough to cope successfully with Napoleon on land, and the European powers which all along had been subsidized by Great Britain had been cowed into submission by the French emperor. Apparently neither France nor Great Britain could strike each other by ordinary military means, and yet neither would sue for peace.

The French victory at Jena in October, 1806, gave Napoleon

The "Continental System," and the Impasse between France and Britain

complete control of the continent, except for Russia. The very next month he followed up his successes by inaugurating a maritime campaign against his arch-enemy, Great Britain herself; but the campaign was to be conducted in the field of economics rather than in the purview of military science. England, it must be remembered, had become, thanks to the long series of dynastic and colonial wars that filled the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the chief commercial nation of the world: she had a larger number of citizens who made their living as ship-owners, sailors, and traders than any other country in the world. Then, too, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter,¹ it was in the England of the eighteenth century that the Industrial Revolution began,—a marvellous improvement in manufacturing, which fostered the growth of a powerful industrial class and enabled the English to make goods more cheaply and in greater profusion and to sell them more readily, at lower prices, both at home and abroad, than any other people in the world. Industry was fast becoming the basis of Great Britain's wealth, and the commercial and capitalist classes were acquiring new strength and influence. It was, therefore, against "a nation of shopkeepers," as Napoleon contemptuously dubbed the English, that he must direct his new campaign.

To Napoleon's clear and logical mind, the nature of the problem was plain. Deprived of the command of the sea, he must attack Great Britain in what appeared to be her one vulnerable spot—in her commerce and industry. If he could prevent the importation of British goods into the Continent, he would deprive his rivals of the chief markets for their products, ruin British commerce and industry, and then secure an advantageous peace. It was a most precarious gamble, for Napoleon must have perceived that the Continental peoples would be almost certain to oppose the closure of their ports to the cheaper manufactured articles of Great Britain and to the export of their own agricultural products; they would not be likely to commit economic suicide in order to hurt somebody else. But the stakes were high and the emperor of the French was a good gambler. From 1806 to 1814 the struggle between Napoleon and Great Britain was an economic endurance-test. On the one hand, the

**Napoleon's
Determination to
Hit at
Britain's
Trade and
Industry**

¹ Vol. II, ch. xv.

question was whether the British government could retain the support of the British people. On the other hand, the question was whether Napoleon could rely upon the coöperation of the whole Continent.

The "continental system" had been foreshadowed under the Directory and in the early years of the Consulate, but it was not until the Berlin Decree (November, 1806) that the first great attempt was made to define and enforce it. In this decree, Napoleon proclaimed a state of blockade against the British Isles and closed French and allied ports to ships coming from Great Britain or her colonies. The Berlin Decree was subsequently strengthened and extended by decrees at Warsaw (January, 1807), Milan (December, 1807), and Fontainebleau (October, 1810). The Milan Decree provided that even neutral vessels sailing from any British port or from countries occupied by British troops might be seized by French warships or privateers. The Fontainebleau Decree went so far as to order the confiscation and public burning of all British manufactured goods found in the Napoleonic states.

To these imperial decrees the British government replied with celebrated "orders in council" (January–November, 1807), which declared all vessels trading with France or her allies liable to capture and provided further that in certain instances neutral vessels must touch at a British port. Thus the issue was squarely joined. Napoleon would suffer no importation of British goods whether by combatants or by neutrals. The British would choke off the sea trade of France and her dependencies. In both cases the neutrals would be the worst sufferers. The effects of the conflict were destined to be far-reaching.

The British by virtue of their sea-power could come nearer to enforcing their "orders in council" than could Napoleon to giving full effect to his imperial decrees. Of course they had their troubles with neutrals. The stubborn effort of Denmark to preserve its independence of action in politics and trade was frustrated in 1807 when a British expedition bombarded Copenhagen and seized the remnant of the Danish navy. From that time until 1814 Denmark was an ally of Napoleon. Against the Americans, too, who took advantage of the "continental system" to draw into their own hands a large portion of the carrying trade, the British vigorously applied the or-

**British
Efforts to
Hit Back**

**British
Difficulties**

ders in council, and the consequent ill-feeling culminated in the War of 1812 between Great Britain and the United States. But on the whole, the British had less trouble with neutrals than did Napoleon. And compared with the prodigious hardships which the "system" imposed upon the Continental peoples and the consequent storms of popular opposition to its author, the contemporaneous distress in England was never acute. The British nation at large never seriously wavered in moral and material support of the patriotic Tory government.

Here was the failure of Napoleon. It proved physically impossible for him to apply the "continental system" widely and thoroughly enough to gain his point. In many cases, to stave off opposition, he authorized exceptions to his own decrees. If he could have prevailed upon every Continental state to close its ports to British goods simultaneously and for several successive years, and to sacrifice its own foreign trade, he would still have been confronted with a difficult task to prevent smuggling and the bribery of customs officials, which reached large proportions even in France and in the surrounding states that he had under fairly effective control. But to bring all Continental states into line with his economic campaign against Great Britain was a colossal task, to the performance of which he subordinated all his subsequent policies.

We have seen how by the treaty of Tilsit (1807) Napoleon extorted promises from the tsar of Russia and the king of Prussia to exclude British goods from their respective countries. He himself undertook to enforce the decrees in the French empire, in the kingdom of Italy, in the confederation of the Rhine, and in the grand-duchy of Warsaw. Brother Joseph did his will in Naples, Brother Jerome in Westphalia, Sister Elise in Tuscany, and Brother Louis was expected to do his will in Holland. The outcome of the war with Sweden in 1808 was the completion of the closure of all Scandinavian ports to the British. Napoleon's determination to have his decrees executed in the papal states, as well as his high-handed treatment of matters affecting the Catholic Church in France, brought him into conflict with Pope Pius VII, a gentle but courageous man, who in daring to excommunicate the European taskmaster was summarily deprived of his temporal rule and carried off a prisoner,

**Napoleon's
Greater
Difficulties**

**Subordination of
French
Foreign
Policy to
Exigencies
of the Continental
System**

first to Grenoble, then to Savona, and finally to Fontainebleau, where he resided, heaped with disgrace and insults, until 1814. In 1809 Napoleon formally incorporated the papal states into the French empire. And when in the next year Louis Bonaparte gave clear signs of an intention to promote the best interests of his Dutch subjects, even to his brother's detriment, by admitting British goods, he was peremptorily deposed, and Holland, too, was incorporated into the ever-enlarging French empire. Henceforth, the Dutch had to bear the burdens of conscription and of crushing taxation.

Meanwhile Napoleon was devoting special attention to the exclusion of British goods from Portugal and Spain, and political conditions in these countries seemed to favor his designs. For over a hundred years Portugal had been linked in close trade relations with England, ever since the Methuen Treaty of 1703,¹ which, in return for the admission of English woollens into Portugal, had granted differential duties favoring the importation of Portuguese wines into England and had thus provided a good market for an important Portuguese product to the disadvantage mainly of the French. Early in his public career Napoleon had tried, for a time successfully,² to break these commercial relations between Great Britain and Portugal, but it was not until after Tilsit that he entered seriously upon the work. He then formally demanded the adherence of Portugal to the "continental system" and the seizure of all British subjects and property within the kingdom. Prince John, the regent of the small country, protested, besought Great Britain for aid, hesitated, and finally refused. Already a Franco-Spanish army was on its way to force compliance with the emperor's demands.

In the court of the Spanish Bourbons was a situation which Napoleon could readily utilize in order to have his way both in Portugal and in Spain. On the throne of Spain was seated the aging Charles IV (1788-1808), boorish, foolish, easily duped. By his side sat his queen, a coarse sensuous woman "with a tongue

¹ See above, p. 309.

² In 1801, as First Consul, Napoleon had prevailed upon Spain to attack Portugal in order to secure the repudiation of the Methuen Treaty and the promise of hostility to Great Britain. This step had proved fatal to Portuguese trade, and in 1804 the Portuguese government had purchased from Napoleon a solemn recognition of neutrality.

like a fishwife's." Their heir was Prince Ferdinand, a conceited irresponsible young braggart in his early twenties. And their favorite, the true ruler of Spain, if Spain at this time could be said to have a ruler, was Godoy, a vain flashy adventurer, who was loved by the queen, shielded by the king, and envied by the heir. Under such a combination it is not strange that Spain from 1795 to 1808 was but a vassal state to France. Nor is it strange that Napoleon was able in 1807 to secure the approval of the Spanish king to the partition of Portugal, a liberal share of which was promised to the precious Godoy.

**Napoleon's
Interven-
tion in
Spain**

Thus French troops were suffered to pour across Spain, and, in October, 1807, to invade Portugal. On 1 December, Lisbon was occupied and the "continental system" proclaimed in force, but on the preceding day the Portuguese royal family escaped and, under convoy of the British fleet, set sail for their South American colony of Brazil.¹ Then it was that Napoleon's true intentions in regard to Spain, as well as Portugal, became evident.

French troops continued to cross the Pyrenees and to possess themselves of the whole Iberian peninsula. In Spain public opinion blamed the feeble king and the detested favorite for this invasion of the country, and in the recriminations that ensued at court Prince Ferdinand warmly espoused the popular side. Riots followed. Charles IV, to save Godoy, abdicated and announced the succession of Ferdinand VII (17 March, 1808). On the pretext of mediating between the rival factions in the Bourbon court, Napoleon lured Charles and Ferdinand and Godoy to Bayonne on the French frontier and there by threats and cajolery persuaded both king and prince to resign all claims upon their throne. Charles retired to Rome on a pension from Napoleon; Ferdinand was kept for six years under strict military guard at Talleyrand's château; the Bourbons had ceased to reign.² Brother Joseph Bonaparte was at once promoted to the throne of Spain, and Brother-in-law Joachim Murat sup-
planted him as king of Naples.

**Abdication
of the
Spanish
Bourbons**

**Joseph
Bonaparte
as King
of Spain**

¹ For a number of years, Rio de Janeiro, rather than Lisbon, was the real Portuguese capital.

² Except the Bourbon king of Naples, who continued to exercise sway under British naval protection, in the island of Sicily.

In July, 1808, under protection of French troops, Joseph Bonaparte was crowned at Madrid. Forthwith he proceeded to confer upon his new subjects the favors of the Napoleonic régime. He decreed equality before the law, individual liberties, abolition of feudalism and serfdom, educational reforms, suppression of the Inquisition, diminution of monasteries, confiscation of church property, public improvements, and, last but not least, the vigorous enforcement of the "continental system."

The comparative ease with which Napoleon had thus been able to supplant the Spanish Bourbons was equalled only by the difficulty which he and his brother experienced with the Spanish people. Until 1808 the Corsican adventurer had had to deal primarily with divine-right monarchs and their old-fashioned professional armies. Thereafter he was confronted with real nations, inspired by much the same emotional patriotism which had inspired the French and dominated by much the same revolutionary fervor. The Spanish people despised their late king as weak and traitorous; they hated their new king as a foreigner and an upstart. To Spain they were patriotically loyal to the core: priests and nobles made common cause with commoners and peasants, and all agreed that they would not brook foreign interference with their domestic concerns. Spain blazed forth in angry insurrection. Revolutionary committees, or *juntas*, were speedily organized in the provinces; troops were enrolled; and a nationalist reaction was in full swing. By August, 1808, Joseph was obliged to flee from Madrid and the French troops were in retreat toward the Pyrenees.

To add to the discomfiture of the French, George Canning, the British foreign minister, promptly promised his country's active assistance to a movement whose real significance he already clearly perceived. In defiant words he laid down the British policy which would obtain until Napoleon had been overthrown: "We shall proceed upon the principle that any nation of Europe which starts up to oppose a power which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is the common enemy of all nations, becomes instantly our ally." In August, 1808, true to this declaration, a British army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, subsequently duke of Wellington, landed

**The
National
Uprising
in Spain
against the
French**

**British
Support of
National
Uprisings**

**The Penin-
sular War**

in Portugal and proceeded to coöperate with Portuguese and Spaniards against the French. It was the beginning of the so-called Peninsular War, which, with little interruption, was to last until 1813 and to spell the first disaster for Napoleon.

Within three weeks after their landing the British were in possession of Portugal. Roused by this unexpected reverse, Napoleon assumed personal command of the French forces in the peninsula. And such was his vigor and resourcefulness that in December, 1808, he reinstated Joseph in Madrid and drove the main British army out of Spain. The success of Napoleon, however, was but temporary and illusory. Early in 1809 grave developments in another part of Europe called him away from Spain, and the marshals whom he left behind quarrelled with one another and at the same time experienced to the full the difficulties which Napoleon himself would have encountered had he remained.

The difficulties which impeded French military operations in the Iberian peninsula were well-nigh insurmountable. First, the nature of the country furnished several obstacles. Farms were poor, settlements sparse, provisions scarce; the French armies found difficulty in following their usual practice of living off the land. Secondly, the sudden alternations of heat and cold, to which the northern part of Spain is liable, coupled with the insanitary condition of many of the towns, spread disease among the French soldiery. Thirdly, the succession of fairly high and steep mountain ranges, which cross the peninsula generally in a direction of northwest to southeast, prevented any campaigning on the large scale to which Napoleonic tactics were best adapted, and put a premium upon loose, irregular guerrilla fighting, in which the Spaniards were adepts.¹ In connection with these obstacles arising from the nature of the country must be mentioned the fierce patriotic determination of the native people, and the arms and trained commanders furnished by the British.

The era of national revolts had dawned, and it was not long before Austria learned the lesson from Spain. Ever since 1792 the Austrian ruler had borne the brunt of the Continental warfare against revolutionary France. Stung by the disasters and

¹ Napoleonic tactics might have been more successful against a large, well organized Spanish army, but it should be borne in mind that with the retirement of Charles IV the regular royal army of Spain disintegrated and disappeared.

humiliations of 1797, 1801, and 1805-1806, Emperor Francis II entrusted preparations for a war of liberation to the Archduke

**Austria's
Premature
War of
Liberation** Charles and to Count Stadion, an able statesman and diplomat. The immediate results were: first, a far-reaching scheme of military reform, including the adoption of the principle of the "nation in arms" and of


the war organization and tactics in use among the French; and secondly, the awakening of a lively feeling of patriotism among the people of German Austria, especially among the Tyrolese, whom the arbitrary act of the French despot had handed over to Bavaria. The opportunity for an effective stroke appeared to be afforded by the Spanish situation, and the general result was a desperate attempt, premature as the event proved, to overthrow Napoleon. In April, 1809, Austria declared war, and immediately Archduke Charles with a splendid army advanced into Bavaria. Napoleon, who temporarily put the Spanish danger out of his mind, struck the archduke with his usual lightning rapidity, and within a week's time had forced him back upon Vienna. Before the middle of May the French emperor was once more in the Austrian capital. But the Archduke Charles remained resolute, and on 21-22 May inflicted such a reverse on Napoleon at Aspern on the Danube below Vienna, that, had there been prompt co-operation on the part of other Austrian commanders and speedy assistance from other states, the Corsican might then have been overthrown and Europe saved from a vaster deluge of blood.

**The Battle
of Wag-
ram, and
the Hu-
miliation
of the
Austrian
Habsburgs** As it was, Napoleon was allowed a breathing spell, and on 5-6 July he fought and won the hard battle of Wagram. Wagram was not a rout like Austerlitz, but it was sufficiently decisive to induce the Austrian emperor to accept an armistice, and, after the failure of a cooperating British expedition, to conclude the treaty of Vienna or Schönbrunn (October, 1809), by the terms of which he had to surrender western Galicia to the grand-duchy of Warsaw and eastern Galicia to Russia; to cede the Illyrian provinces to the French empire; and to restore the Tyrol, together with a strip of Upper Austria, to Bavaria.

This treaty cost Austria four and one-half million subjects, a heavy war indemnity, and promises not to maintain an army in excess of 150,000 men and not to have commercial dealings with Great Britain. As an additional pledge of Austria's good be-

havior, and in order to assure a direct heir to his greatness, Napoleon shortly afterwards secured an annulment of his marriage with Josephine on the ground that it had not been solemnized in the presence of a parish priest, and early in 1810 he married a young Austrian archduchess, Maria Louisa, the daughter of the Emperor Francis II. Even this venture at first seemed successful, for in the following year a son was born who received the high-sounding appellation of king of Rome. But Austria remained at heart thoroughly hostile.

Maria Louisa and the King of Rome



Meanwhile, the nationalist reaction against Napoleon grew apace. In Prussia it reached even more ominous dimensions than in Austria or in Spain. Following so closely upon the victories of Frederick the Great, the disaster of Jena and the humiliation of Tilsit had been a doubly bitter cup for the Prussian people. Prussian statesmen were not lacking who put the blame for their country's degradation upon many of the social and political conditions which had characterized the "old régime" in all European monarchies, and, as these statesmen were called in counsel by King Frederick William III (1797-1840), the years

Nationalist Awakening in Germany: the Regeneration of Prussia

from 1807 to 1813 were marked by a series of internal reforms almost as significant in the history of Germany as were those from 1789 to 1791 in the history of France.

The credit of the Prussian "regeneration" belongs mainly to a great minister, the Baron vom Stein (1757-1831), and in the second place to the Chancellor Hardenberg (1750-1822), both of whom were influenced by the humanitarian and patriotic "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. In October, 1807, Stein

**Stein and
the End of
Serfdom
in Prussia**

issued at Memel a celebrated "edict of emancipation," which abolished the institution of serfdom throughout Prussia and permitted the ownership of land by peasants and bourgeois as well as by nobles. The Prussian peasants thus became personally free, although as compensation for the land they acquired they were still bound to make fixed payments to their lords in the form of rent. At the same time, all occupations and professions were thrown open to noble, commoner, and peasant alike. Stein's second important step was to strengthen the ministry and to introduce sweeping changes in the conduct of public business, reforms too complicated and too technical to receive detailed explanation in this place. His third great measure was the establishment (November, 1808) of new agencies of local government, in the English manner. Stein undoubtedly intended this last measure to be the corner-stone of an edifice of constitutional limited monarchy in Prussia, modelled after England's, but such political intentions he was unable to realize. King Frederick William III was immovably opposed to any lessening of royal authority in Prussia.

In 1811 Hardenberg continued the Prussian social reforms by making the peasants absolute owners of part of their holdings

**Harden-
berg and
the
Peasants**

and allotting the remainder to the former landlords in lieu of other compensation for their lost feudal and servile dues. During the same period, the army was reorganized by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; compulsory universal service was extended in imitation of the example of the French Revolutionaries, while the condition imposed by

**The New
Prussian
Army**

Napoleon that the Prussian army should not exceed 42,000 men was practically evaded by replacing each body of 42,000 men by another of the same size as soon as the first had undergone military training. In this way Prussia was prepared for an expected War of Liberation.

Of course Napoleon had some idea of what was happening in Prussia. He protested, he threatened, he actually succeeded late in 1808 in securing the dismissal of Stein. But the redoubtable Prussian reformer spent the next three years in trying to fan the nationalist flame in Austria and thence betook himself to Russia to poison the ear and mind of the Tsar Alexander against the emperor of the French. In the meantime Napoleon was far too busy with other matters to give thorough attention to the continued development of national feeling in Prussia. Here, German nationalism burned ever brighter through the exertions of patriotic societies, such as the *Tugendbund*, or "League of Virtue," through the writings of men like Fichte and Arndt, and, perhaps most permanently of all, through the noteworthy educational reforms, which, associated with the name of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), gave to Prussia the basis of her later common-school system and likewise the great nationalist university of Berlin (1809).

Popular
Nationalist
Agitation
in Ger-
many

It was no longer true that the French had a monopoly of the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, for which to fight. It was no longer a fact that they were the only nation defending their homes, their lands, and their rights. By 1810 the despotism of Napoleon was more selfish and more directly galling to the Prussian people than had been the threatened tyranny of Austrian and Prussian monarchs to an emancipated French nation in the dark days of 1792. Prussia was bankrupt, shorn of half her provinces, enduring the quartering of foreign soldiers, and suffering the ruin of her crops and the paralysis of her trade. Thanks to the "continental system," which had been none of their doing, the Prussian people witnessed the decay of their seaports, the rotting of ships in their harbors, the stoppage of agricultural exports and industrial imports, and the soaring of the cost of living. They were grumbling and getting into a temper that boded ill to the author of their injuries.

Meanwhile the warfare in Spain dragged on. In 1812 Wellington with his allied British and Spanish troops won a great victory at Salamanca, captured Madrid, and drove Joseph and the French north to Valencia. In the same year radical groups of Spaniards, who had learned revolutionary doctrines from the French, assembled at Cadiz and drafted a constitution for what they hoped

would be their regenerated country. This written constitution, next in age to the American and the French, long served as a model for "liberal" constitutions throughout southern Europe. After a preamble in praise of the "old fundamental laws of this monarchy," the constitution proclaimed the basic principle of the French Revolution: "Sovereignty is vested essentially in the nation, and accordingly it is to the nation exclusively that the right of making its fundamental laws belongs." The legislative power was to be exercised by the cortes, a single-chamber parliament elected for two years by indirect suffrage. The executive power was to be exercised by the king through his ministers: he was to have only a suspensive veto on the acts of the cortes. Furthermore, the constitution proclaimed the principles of individual liberty and legal equality and sought to abolish the old régime root and branch: provision was made for a thorough reorganization of courts, local administration, taxation, the army, and public education. While the framers of the constitution affirmed that "the religion of the Spanish nation is and always will be the Apostolic Church of Rome, the only true Church," they persisted in decreeing the suppression of the Inquisition and the secularization of ecclesiastical property. That such a radical constitution would be understood and championed forthwith by the whole Spanish people, only the most confirmed and fanatical optimist could believe, but, on the other hand, it was certain that the Spaniards as a nation were resolved that the "continental system" and the Bonaparte family must go. They might sacrifice liberty and equality but not nationalism.

At last the four fateful defects in the Napoleonic empire,—the character of Napoleon himself, the nature of his army, the "continental system," and the rise of nationalism,—were painfully in evidence. The drama thenceforth led irresistibly through two terrible acts—the Russian campaign and the Battle of the Nations—to the dénouement in the emperor's abdication and to a sorry epilogue in Waterloo.

4. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH TERRITORIAL EMPIRE

It was the rupture between Napoleon and the Tsar Alexander that precipitated the final disasters. A number of events which transpired between the celebrated meeting at Tilsit in 1807 and

The
Spanish
"Liberal"
Constitu-
tion of
1812

the memorable year of 1812 made a rupture inevitable. Tilsit had purported to divide the world between the two emperors, but Alexander, as junior partner in the firm, soon found that his chief function was to assist Napoleon in bringing all western and central Europe under the domination of the French empire, while he himself was allowed by no means a free rein in dealing with his own country's historic enemies—Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire.

The
Rupture
between
Napoleon
and the
Tsar
Alexander

To be sure, Alexander had wrested Finland from Sweden (1809), but Napoleon's forcing of Sweden into a war with Great Britain (1810-1812), presumably as an ally of Russia as well as of France, had prevented him from extending his territory farther in that direction. Then, too, the revival of a Polish state under the name of the grand-duchy of Warsaw and under French protection was a thorn in his flesh, which became all the more painful, more irritating, when it was enlarged after the Austrian War of 1809. Finally, Alexander's warfare against the Ottoman Empire was constantly handicapped by French diplomacy, so that when the treaty of Bucharest was at length concluded (28 May, 1812) it was due to British rather than to French assistance that Russia extended her southern boundary to the River Pruth. Alexander was particularly piqued when Napoleon dethroned one of the tsar's relatives in Oldenburg and arbitrarily annexed that duchy to the French empire, and he was deeply chagrined when the marriage of his ally with a Habsburg archduchess seemed to cement the bonds between France and Austria.

All these political differences might conceivably have been adjusted, had it not been for the economic breach which the "continental system" ever widened. Russia, at that time almost exclusively an agricultural country, suffered greatly from the stoppage of her grain exports to Britain, and popular protests and agitation alarmed the tsar. The result was a gradual suspension of the rigors of the "continental system" in Russia and the eventual return to normal trade relations as they had existed prior to Tilsit. This simple fact Napoleon could not and would not condone. "Russia's partial abandonment of the continental system was not merely a pretext but the real ground of the war. Napoleon had no alternative between fighting for his system and

abandoning the only method open to him of carrying on war against England."

By the opening of the year 1812 Napoleon was actively preparing for war on a large scale against his recent ally. From the Austrian court, thanks to his wife, he secured assurances of sympathy and the promise of a guard of 30,000 men to protect the right wing of his projected invasion of Russia. From the trembling Prussian king he wrung, by threats, permission to lead his invaders across Prussian soil and the support of 20,000 troopers for the left of his lines. A huge expedition was then gathered together: some 250,000 French veterans; 150,000 Germans from the confederation of the Rhine; 80,000 Italians; 60,000 Poles; and detachments of Dutch, Swiss, Danes, and Yugoslavs; in all, a mighty motley host of more than 600,000 men.

Simultaneously the Tsar Alexander made counter preparations. He came to a formal understanding with Great Britain. Through British mediation he made peace with the Turks and thus removed an enemy from his flank. And a series of treaties between himself, Great Britain, and Marshal Bernadotte, who was crown-prince of Sweden and tired of Napoleonic domination, guaranteed him in possession of Finland, assured him of a supporting Swedish army, and in return promised Norway as compensation to Sweden. A Russian army of 175,000 men was put in the field.

War seemed imminent by April, 1812. After leisurely completing his preparations, Napoleon crossed the Niemen on 24 June, and his invasion of Russia began. The French forces were greatly superior to the Russian forces in numbers, organization, and equipment. But the very weakness and inefficiency of the Russians proved advantageous to their cause. They could not or would not give open battle, but kept retreating farther and farther inland. In vain did Napoleon try to trap this or that Russian division into a fight. Unable to defeat or capture his foe, he penetrated ever deeper into Russia. Only once, at Borodino, on 7 September, did one of the Russian generals, Kutusov, seriously engage a part of the invading army. Both sides lost heavily in the engagement, but the French were able to take possession of Moscow a week later.

The very night of Napoleon's triumphal entry, the city was

Preparations for War between France and Russia

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

set on fire through the carelessness of its own inhabitants. Barracks and foodstuffs were alike destroyed; the inhabitants fled; and what was left of the city was pillaged by the French troops as well as by the Russians. The lack of supplies and the impossibility of wintering in a ruined city, compelled Napoleon on 22 October, after an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the Kremlin, or citadel, to evacuate Moscow and to retrace his steps toward the Niemen. The Russian forces followed, still not risking major engagements, but continually harrassing the French rear-guard and cutting off stragglers.

The Napoleonic retreat from Moscow is one of the most horrible episodes in history. To the exasperating attacks of the pursuing Russians on the rear were added the severity of the weather and the barrenness of the country. Steady downpours of rain changed to blinding storms of sleet and snow. Swollen streams, heaps of abandoned luggage, and huge snow-drifts repeatedly blocked the line of march. The gaunt and desolate country, which the army had ravaged and pillaged during the summer's invasion, grimly mocked the retreating host. Exhaustion overcame thousands of troopers, who dropped by the wayside and beneath the snows gave their bodies to enrich the Russian soil. The retreat became a rout and all would have been lost had it not been for the almost superhuman efforts of the valiant rear-guard under Marshal Ney. As it was, a mere remnant of the *Grande Armée* recrossed the Niemen on 13 December, and, in pitiable plight, half-starved and with torn uniforms, reëntered Germany. Fully half a million lives had been sacrificed upon the fields of Russia to the ambition of one man. Yet in the face of these distressing facts, this one man felt called upon to announce to the afflicted French people that "the emperor has never been in better health!"

Napoleon's
Retreat
from
Moscow

For a moment the Tsar Alexander hesitated. Russia at least was freed from the Napoleonic peril. To make peace in this hour of triumph might be of great advantage to his country and would involve no further risks on his part. But his own dreamy longing to pose as the chief figure on the European stage, the deliverer of oppressed nationalities, coupled with the insistent promptings of Baron vom Stein, who was always at his elbow, eventually decided him to complete the overthrow of his rival. Late in De

ember he signed a convention with the Prussian commander, General Yorck, whereby the Prussian army was to coöperate with the Russian and Swedish forces, and, in return, Prussia was to be restored to the position it had enjoyed prior to Jena. On 13 January, 1813, Alexander at the head of the Russian troops crossed the Niemen and proclaimed the liberty of the European peoples. King Frederick William III, amidst the enthusiastic rejoicing of his people, soon confirmed the convention of his general, and in March declared war against Napoleon. The War of Liberation had commenced.

The events of the year 1813 were as auspicious in the history of Germany as they were disastrous for the fortunes of Napoleon. Prussia led in the movement to free all the German-speaking people from French domination. From Prussia the national enthusiasm spread to the other states. Mecklenburg, which had been the last addition to the confederation of the Rhine, was the first to secede from it. All northern and central Germany was speedily in popular revolt, and the Prussian army, swelled by many patriotic enlistments, marched southward into Saxony. Austria, divided between fear of Napoleon and jealousy of the growing power of Russia, mobilized her army and waited for events to shape her conduct. In these trying circumstances Napoleon acted with his accustomed promptness and vigor. Since his arrival in France late in 1812, he had been frantically engaged in recruiting a new army, which, with the wreck of the *Grande Armée* and the assistance that was still forthcoming from Naples and southern Germany, now numbered 200,000 men, and with which he was ready to take the offensive in Saxony. On 2 May, 1813, he fell on the allied Russians and Prussians at Lutzen and defeated them, but was unable to follow up his advantage for want of cavalry. On 20-21 May, he gained another fruitless victory at Bautzen.

At this point an armistice was arranged through the friendly mediation of Austria. Metternich, the chief minister of that country, proposed a general European peace on the basis of the reconstruction of Prussia, the re-partition of the grand-duchy of Warsaw by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the re-cession of the Illyrian provinces to Austria, the dissolution of the confederation of the Rhine, and the freedom of the German ports of Hamburg

and Lübeck. But it was a decisive victory, not peace, that Napoleon most wanted, and the only reason which had induced him to accept the armistice was to gain time in order that reinforcements from Italy and France might arrive. The delay, however, was fatal to the French emperor, for the British government utilized it to conclude new treaties with the Continental foes of Napoleon, assuring them of larger financial subsidies and thereby enabling them to strengthen their armies. The numerical balance of armed force, thus established between the allies and Napoleon, was tipped against the latter when, on 12 August, 1813, Austria, whose peace proposals Napoleon had rudely rejected, formally joined the coalition against him.

**The British
Subsidy
Treaties**

**The Allies
Joined by
Austria**

Napoleon was at Dresden in command of armies aggregating 400,000 men. Gathering against him in Bohemia, Silesia, and northern Prussia were Austrian, Prussian, and Russian forces of over 500,000 men. At Dresden, in August, he won his last great victory, against the Austrian army of General Schwarzenberg. As his marshals suffered repeated reverses, he was unable to follow up his own successes and found himself gradually hemmed in by the allies, until at Leipzig he turned at bay. There, on 16-19 October, was fought the great three-day "Battle of the Nations." Against 300,000 troops of the allies, Napoleon could use only 200,000, and of these the Saxon contingent deserted in the heat of the fray. It was by military prowess that the French empire had been reared; its doom was sealed by the battle of Leipzig. Napoleon sacrificed on that field another 40,000 lives, besides 30,000 prisoners and a large quantity of artillery and supplies. A fortnight later, with the remnant of his army, he recrossed the Rhine. Germany was freed.

**The Battle
of the
Nations**

The "Battle of the Nations," following within a year the disasters of the retreat from Moscow, marked the collapse of Napoleon's power outside of France. His empire and vassal states tumbled like a house of cards. The confederation of the Rhine dissolved, and its princes hastened, with a single exception, to throw in their lot with the victorious allies. King Jerome Bonaparte was chased out of Westphalia. Holland was liberated, and William of Orange returned to his country as king. Denmark submitted and by the

**Collapse
of the
Napoleonic
Empire**

treaty of Kiel (January, 1814) engaged to cede Norway to Sweden in return for a monetary payment and Swedish Pomerania. Austria readily recovered the Tyrol and the Illyrian provinces and occupied Venetia and Switzerland. Even Joachim Murat deserted his brother-in-law, and, in order to retain Naples, came to terms with Austria. Only Polish Warsaw and the king of Saxony¹ remained loyal to the Napoleonic alliance; the territories of both were in possession of the allies.

With the remnant of his defeated army and what young boys and old men he was able to recruit, Napoleon needlessly prolonged the struggle on French soil. At the close of 1813 Austria prevailed upon her more or less willing allies to offer him fairly favorable terms: France might retain her "natural boundaries"—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; and Napoleon might continue to rule over a region which would have gladdened the heart of a Richelieu or of a Louis XIV. But it was still victory and not peace upon which the supreme egotist had set his mind. He still dreamed of overwhelming Prussia and Russia.

Early in 1814 three large foreign armies, totalling 400,000 men, and accompanied by the emperors of Russia and Austria and the king of Prussia, invaded northern France and converged on Paris. Blücher with his German troops was advancing up the Moselle to Nancy; Schwarzenberg with the Austrians crossed the Rhine to the south at Basel and Neu Breisach; Bernadotte in the Netherlands was welding Swedes, Dutch, and Prussians into a northern army. Meanwhile, the great defeat which Wellington with his allied army of British, Spaniards, and Portuguese, had inflicted upon the French at Vittoria (21 June, 1813) had for the last time driven King Joseph from Madrid and in effect cleared the whole Iberian peninsula of Napoleon's soldiers. The British general had then gradually fought his way through the Pyrenees so that in the spring of 1814 a fourth victorious allied army in the neighborhood of Toulouse threatened Napoleon from the south. An Austrian army, which was then operating in Venetia and Lombardy, menaced France from yet a fifth direction.

Against such overwhelming odds, Napoleon displayed through-

¹ Napoleon had made Saxony a "kingdom," and its king the grand-duke of Warsaw. It was quite natural, therefore, that the king of Saxony, with Polish nationalists, should stick to Napoleon to the end.

out the desperate months of February and March, 1814, the same remarkable genius, the same indomitable will, as had characterized his earliest campaigns. If anything, his resourcefulness and his rapidity of attack were even greater. Inflicting a setback on one invader, he would turn quickly and dash against a second. Such apprehension did his tiger-like assaults excite among his opponents that as late as February he might have retained the French frontiers of 1792 if he had chosen to make peace. He would play the game to the bitter end. On 1 March, the four great powers—Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia—concluded the treaty of Chaumont, definitely cementing their alliance for a period of twenty years and mutually agreeing not to make terms without each other's consent nor to desist from war until their arch-enemy had been overthrown; each contracting party undertook to furnish 150,000 men, and Great Britain promised a special subsidy of five million pounds. The fate of Napoleon was at last settled.

Cementing the Alliance against France and Napoleon: the Treaty of Chaumont

To describe in any detail the brilliant campaign of 1814 lies outside our province. Suffice it to state that, after the most stubborn fighting, resistance was broken. Paris surrendered to the allies on 31 March, and thirteen days later Napoleon signed with the allied sovereigns the personal treaty of Fontainebleau, by which he abdicated his throne and renounced all rights to France for himself and his family, and, in return, was accorded full sovereignty of the island of Elba and an annual pension of two million francs for himself; the Italian duchy of Parma was conferred upon the Empress Maria Louisa, and pensions of two and a half million francs were promised for members of Napoleon's family. Another seven days and Napoleon bade his Old Guard an affecting farewell and departed for Elba. In his diminutive island empire, hard by the shore of Tuscany and within sight of his native Corsica, Napoleon Bonaparte lived ten months, introducing such vigor into the administration as the island had never experienced, and all the while pondering many things.

The Overthrow of Napoleon and His Exile to Elba

Meanwhile, in France, order was emerging from chaos. In 1793 European sovereigns had banded together to invade France, to restore the absolute divine-right monarchy of the Bourbons and the traditional rights of the privileged classes, and to stamp

out the troublesome principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The most noteworthy significance of the era of Napoleon was the fact that now in 1814 the monarchs of Europe, at last in possession of France, had no serious thought of restoring social or political conditions just as they had been prior to the Revolution. Their major quarrel was not with principles but with a man. The Tsar Alexander was an impressionable prince, familiar with phrases of the revolutionary philosophy, and anxious to pose as the arbiter of Europe. Talleyrand, the man of the hour among Frenchmen, who himself had played no mean rôle throughout the Revolution and under Napoleon, combined with a desire to preserve the frontiers of his country a firm conviction that the mass of his countrymen would not revert to absolute monarchy. Between Talleyrand and Alexander it was arranged, with the approval of the great powers, that in the name of "legitimacy" the Bourbons should be restored to the throne of France, but with the understanding that they should fully recognize and confirm the chief social and political reforms of the Revolution. It was likewise arranged by the treaty of Paris (30 May, 1814), also in the name of "legitimacy," that France should regain the limits of 1792 and should pay no indemnity. "Legitimacy" was a brilliant discovery of Talleyrand. It justified the preservation of France in the face of crushing defeat, and, if it restored the Bourbons, it did so as limited, not as absolute, monarchs.

Louis XVI's "legitimate" heir was his brother, the count of Provence,¹ a cynical, prosaic, and very stout old gentleman who had been quietly residing in an English country-house, and who now made a solemn, if somewhat unimpressive, state entry into Paris. The new king kept what forms of the old régime he could. He assumed the title of Louis XVIII, "king of France by the grace of God." He reckoned his reign from the death of the dauphin ("Louis XVII") in the year 1795. He replaced the revolutionary tricolor by the lily white flag of his family. Out of the fullness of his divinely bestowed royal authority he granted a "charter" to the French people. But Louis XVIII was neither so foolish nor so principled as to insist upon the substance of Bourbon autocracy. The very

The Failure to Undo the Revolution

The Restoration of the Bourbons in France

Louis XVIII and the Charter of 1814

¹ See above, p. 616.

charter, which he "graciously" promulgated, confirmed the revolutionary liberties of the individual and established a constitutional form of limited monarchy for France. It was obvious that the gouty old man had no desire to risk his head or to embark again upon his travels.

The same month that witnessed the unbecoming straddle of this French Bourbon between radicalism and reaction, beheld the restoration of another Bourbon in the person of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, and the return of Pope Pius VII, amid the enthusiastic shouts of the Romans, to the ancient see upon the Tiber. About the same time Piedmont and Savoy were restored to Victor Emmanuel I, king of Sardinia. Europe was rapidly assuming a more normal appearance. To settle the outstanding territorial questions which the overthrow of Napoleon had raised, a congress of rulers and diplomats met at Vienna in the autumn of 1814.¹

Within a few months the unusual calm was rudely broken by the sudden reappearance of Napoleon Bonaparte upon the European stage. It was hardly to be expected that he for whom the whole Continent had been too small would be content in tiny Elba. He nursed grievances, too. He could get no payment of the revenue secured him by the treaty of Fontainebleau; his letters to his wife and little son were intercepted and unanswered; he was treated as an outcast. He became aware of a situation both in France and at Vienna highly favorable to his own ambition. As he foresaw, the shrinkage of the great empire into the realm of old France filled many patriotic Frenchmen with disgust, a feeling fed every day by stories of the presumption of returning émigrés and of the tactless way in which the Bourbon princes treated veterans of the *Grande Armée*. Napoleon in time felt certain that he could count once more upon the loyalty of the French nation. That he would not be obliged to encounter again the combined forces of the European powers he inferred from his knowledge of the ever-recurring jealousies among them and from the fact that even then Russia and Prussia on one side were quarrelling with Austria and Great Britain on the other over the fate of Poland and Saxony. If some fighting were necessary, the return of French prisoners from Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain would

Other Restorations in Europe

Napoleon's Return from Elba

¹ See below, pp. 722-729.

supply him with an army far larger than that with which he had fought the brilliant campaign of 1814.

On 26 February, 1815, Napoleon slipped away from Elba with some 700 men, and, managing to elude the British guardships, disembarked at Cannes on 1 March and advanced northward. Troops sent out to arrest the arch-rebel were no proof against the familiar uniform and cocked hat; they threw their own hats in the air amid ringing shouts of *vive l'empereur*. Everywhere the adventurer received a hearty welcome, which attested at once the unpopularity of the Bourbons and the singular attractiveness of his own personality. The French people, being but human, put emotion in the place of reason. Without firing a shot in his defense, Napoleon's bodyguard swelled until it became an army. Marshal Ney, the "bravest of the brave," who had taken the oath of allegiance to the Bourbons and had promised Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon to Paris in an iron cage, deserted to him with 6,000 men, and on 20 March the emperor jauntily entered the capital. Louis XVIII, who had assured his parliament that he would die in defense of his throne, was already jogging over the Belgian frontier.

Napoleon clinched his hold upon the French people by means of an astute manifesto which he promptly published. "He had come," he declared, "to save France from the outrages of the returning nobles; to secure to the peasant the possession of his land; to uphold the rights won in 1789 against a minority which sought to reëstablish the privileges of caste and the feudal burdens of the last century; France had made trial of the Bourbons; it had done well to do so, but the experiment had failed; the Bourbon monarchy had proved incapable of detaching itself from its worst supports, the priests and nobles; only the dynasty which owed its throne to the Revolution could maintain the social work of the Revolution. . . . He renounced war and conquest . . . he would govern henceforth as a constitutional sovereign and seek to bequeath a constitutional crown to his son."

The emperor was as wrong in his judgment of what Europe would do as he was right concerning the attitude of France. The statesmen who had been haggling about treaty stipulations at Vienna speedily forgot all their differences in the face of the common danger. The four great powers solemnly renewed their

**Napoleon
Welcomed
by the
French**

treaty of-alliance, and with alacrity all joined in signing a declaration. "In violating the convention which established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte has destroyed the only legal title to his existence. By reappearing in France with projects of disorder and destruction, he has cut himself off from the protection of the law, and has shown in the face of all the world that there can be neither peace nor truce with him. Accordingly the Powers declare that Napoleon Bonaparte is excluded from civil and social relations, and as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world he has incurred public vengeance. . . ."

**Napoleon
Outlawed
by the
Allies**

In order to give force to their threats, the allies rushed troops toward France. Wellington assembled an army of more than 100,000 British, Dutch, and Germans, and planned to coöperate with 116,000 Prussians under Blücher near Brussels. The Austrian army under Schwarzenberg neared the Rhine. Russia and Germany were alive with marching columns. To oppose these forces Napoleon raised a field army of 180,000 men, and on 12 June, 1815, quitted Paris for the Belgian frontier. His plan was to separate his opponents and to overcome them singly. It would be a repetition of the campaign of 1814, though on a larger scale.

**The Last
of the
Napole-
onic Wars**

How Napoleon passed the border and forced the outposts of the enemy back to Waterloo; how there, on 18 June, he fought the final great battle of his remarkable career; how his troops were mowed down by the fearful fire of his adversaries and how even his famous Old Guard rallied gloriously but ineffectually to their last charge; how the defeat administered by Wellington was turned at the close of the day into a mad rout through the arrival of Blücher's forces: all these matters are commonplaces in the most elementary histories of military science. It has long been customary to cite the battle of Waterloo as one of the world's decisive battles. In a sense this is just, but it should be borne in mind that, in view of the firm united determination of all Europe, there was no ultimate chance for Napoleon. If he had defeated Wellington, he would still have had to deal with Blücher. If he had then defeated the Prussians, he would have to turn suddenly against Schwarzenberg and the Austrians. By that time Wellington would have been sufficiently reënforced to resume the offensive, and the war would have gone

**The Battle
of
Waterloo**

on inevitably to but a single grim conclusion. The allies could put almost limitless numbers in the field; Napoleon was at the end of his resources. For the conservation of human life, it was fortunate that Napoleon was overwhelmed at Waterloo and that the first battle of the campaign of 1815 was also its last. Waterloo added military prestige to the naval preëminence which Great Britain already enjoyed, and finally established the reputation of Wellington as the greatest general of his age next only to Napoleon.¹

On 21 June, Napoleon arrived in Paris, defeated and dejected. That very day the parliament, on the motion of Lafayette, declared itself in permanent session and took over all functions of government. The following day Napoleon abdicated the second time in favor of his son, and the provisional government of France, under the skillful trimming of the clever Fouché, reopened negotiations with the Bourbons. On 7 July the allies reoccupied Paris, bringing the flustered old Louis XVIII "in their baggage-train." The Bourbons, thus unheroically restored, were destined for fifteen years to maintain in peace their compromise between radicalism and reaction.

On 15 July, the day following the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, Napoleon, who had gone to Rochefort on the French coast, with some vague idea of taking refuge in America, delivered himself over to the commander of a British warship which was lying in the harbor. For us who live over a century after the stirring events whose narrative has filled this chapter, it is easy to perceive that the British government might safely have extended hospitality to their famous captive and might have granted him an asylum in England. He was finally discredited in the eyes not only of the European despots but also of the vast majority of the French people. No matter how much he might burn with the flame of his old ambition, he could never again be in a position to endanger the safety or prosperity of Great Britain. But in 1815 Englishmen felt differently,

¹ An interesting side issue of the Waterloo campaign was the fate of Joachim Murat. The wily king of Naples, distrustful of the allies' guaranties, threw in his lot with his brother-in-law. His forces were speedily put to rout by the Austrians and he himself fled to France and later to Corsica, and was ultimately captured and shot. His action enabled still another Bourbon, the despicable Ferdinand I, to recover the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

**Final Ab-
dication of
Napoleon
and
Second
Restora-
tion of
Louis
XVIII**

**Napoleon
in British
Hands**

and naturally so. To them Napoleon had been for years a more troublesome and dangerous enemy than a Philip II or a Louis XIV. By them he was deemed the unregenerate child of the evil spirit. And "General Bonaparte," as the British authorities persisted in calling him, was not suffered to touch foot upon the sacred soil of England, but was despatched on another British warship to the rocky island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic.

On St. Helena Napoleon lived five and a half years. He was allowed considerable freedom of movement and the society of a group of close personal friends. He spent his time walking on the lonely island or in quarrelling with his suspicious strait-laced English jailer, Sir Hudson Lowe, or in writing treatises on history and war and dictating memoirs to his companions. These memoirs, which were subsequently published, were subtly compounded of truth and falsehood. They represented Napoleon Bonaparte in the light of a true son and heir of the Revolution, who had been raised by the will of the French people to great power in order that he might substantiate the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. According to the emperor, he had always been the friend of peace and of oppressed nationalities, the author of blessings which had flowed uninterruptedly upon his people until he had been thwarted by the machinations of the British and the sheer brute force of the European despots. Napoleon shrewdly foresaw the increase of popular discontent with the repressive measures which the reactionary sovereigns and statesmen of Europe were almost certain to inaugurate, and in the resulting upheaval he thought he could perceive an opportunity for his own son to build anew an empire of the French. It could hardly have been blind chance that caused Napoleon to insert in his will the pious request that he "be buried on the banks of the Seine in the midst of the French people whom he so dearly loved." On 5 May, 1821, the greatest adventurer of modern times died on the island of St. Helena.

**Napoleon
on St.
Helena**

Already the history of the emperor was becoming the "Napoleonic legend." The more his memory was revered as the noble martyr of St. Helena, the more truth withdrew into the background and fiction stepped into the limelight. His holocausts of human life were forgotten; only the glory, the unconquerable prowess of his arms, was remembered. French cottages were

adorned with cheap likenesses of the little corporal's features; quaint, endearing nicknames for their hero were on villagers' lips; and around hearth and campfire were related apocryphal anecdotes of his exploits at Lodi, at Austerlitz, and at Wagram. From a selfish despot Napoleon was returning to his mightier, if humbler, position as a child of the people. Thus the last years at *St. Helena* were far from fruitless. They proved once more that the pen is mightier than the sword,—for one day, not by feats of arms, but by the power of the Napoleonic legend, another Bonaparte was to be seated upon an imperial throne in France.

5. THE SPREAD OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Turning now from the story of Napoleon's life to an appraisal of the whole era which fittingly bears his name, we must emphasize its revolutionary importance, not only within France, but also throughout a large part of Europe. Within France, as we have seen, it served to consolidate many of the achievements of the preceding era of National Assembly and National Convention and to enroot them in the hearts and minds of the majority of Frenchmen so tenaciously that in 1814 neither the foreign conquerors nor the restored Bourbons thought seriously of attempting to do what Louis XVI and foreign despots had planned to do in 1792. Thanks to the events of the Napoleonic era, the political and social régime which Louis XVIII inherited in 1814 was radically and irretrievably different from that over which his brother had presided at the beginning of 1789.

The new French régime which issued from the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras was basically different from anything which Europe had ever known. By revolution and war in the sixteenth century the Dutch had won their national independence. By a series of revolutions in the seventeenth century the British had curbed the power of their monarchs, asserted the principle of popular sovereignty, and established the constitutional supremacy of a representative parliament. But France had now achieved all these things and much besides; her revolution had been nationalist, as well as national, and deeply social as well as superficially political. It was France, not Britain or Holland, which inaugu-

The Novelty of the Régime Issuing from the French Revolution

rated and maintained a system of government and society in harmony with the intellectual revolution of the eighteenth century: a centralized government, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty, supported by national arms and national schools, inspired with national patriotism, capped by a parliament representing citizens rather than classes; and an even more significant individualist society, from which all special privileges were banished and in which all religions were tolerated. This was the system of government and society which France maintained with such vigor and devotion during the Napoleonic era that no restored Bourbon could subvert it. It was in France—and in Europe—to stay.

The “new régime” was in Europe to stay, not only because it was strong in France but also because, by the end of the Napoleonic era, it had become the fascinating goal of a host of revolutionaries outside of France. Thanks to events of the Napoleonic era, the Revolution which originally had been French was becoming European. To this consummation, several factors had contributed. In the first place, by means of the temporary territorial expansion of the French empire, the Netherlands, the Rhineland, and most of the Italian peninsula had been subjected to the direct sway of Paris and the immediate jurisdiction of the Code Napoléon. In these areas Dutchmen and Belgians, Germans and Italians had been accustomed to a centralized state and an individualist society, to equality and fraternity if not to liberty.

**The New
Régime
European
as well as
French
by 1815**

Secondly, the construction of a string of dependent states had involved revolutionary changes in southern and central Germany, in Naples, and in Spain. In these countries, feudalism and serfdom were abolished, religious toleration was guaranteed, and ideas of democratic government and social equality were implanted; and though the dependence of such countries on Napoleonic France was brief, it was long enough to communicate to their populations a taste for the new régime.

Thirdly, the meteoric flash of Napoleon's power had awed even his most consistent enemies; and the more thoughtful among his adversaries, such as the Baron vom Stein in Prussia, had paid him the high tribute of imitation. The social and political “regeneration” of Prussia, which we have already discussed, (and, to a lesser extent, that of Austria,) represented a conscious attempt of the old divine-right monarchies of central Europe

to win the favor and support of their peoples by adopting at least some of the reforms which the French revolutionaries had initiated and which Napoleon had consolidated and propagated.

But of all the lessons which Europe learned from France during the Napoleonic era, the most impressive was nationalism. Frenchmen who had paved the way for Napoleon's amazing career and Frenchmen who militantly bore his banners at Lodi and Marengo, at Austerlitz and Jena, at Madrid and Lisbon, at Friedland and Moscow, were effective messengers of the novel nationalist gospel. They were fanatical apostles of the idea of the *nation*—the nation one and indivisible, the nation as regenerator of human society, the nation above any class or any religion, the nation with a "mission."

The nationalist gospel of French revolutionaries and French soldiers evoked a fairly quick response throughout Europe. In part, the response was the result of independent agitation of intellectuals in various countries, who, like the French revolutionaries themselves, had been given a nationalist turn of mind by their reading of eighteenth-century philosophy and literature. In part, it was the result of sympathy with the French and imitation of them. In greatest part, no doubt, it was the result of growing antipathy to the "bumptiousness" of the French and the "despotism" of Napoleon.

All these forces were certainly evidenced in the rise of German nationalism. Herder, one of the most conspicuous heralds of German nationalism, did his chief work on the eve of the French Revolution and in the spirit of a Montesquieu and a Rousseau.¹ Fichte and Humboldt and certain other German nationalist philosophers and scholars began as admirers of the French Revolution and were distinctly tainted with Jacobism. Stein, too, was at first a sympathetic observer of nationalist experiments in France. But, as we have already observed, it was not until Napoleon's chronically high-handed interference in Germany had aroused widespread resentment and hostility that the German masses (and princes) finally rallied against the "despot" and enthusiastically waged in 1813-1814 the nationalist "War of Liberation."

It was similar with Spain and Italy. Spaniards had long had some consciousness of common nationality and proud traditions

¹ See above, pp. 534-535, 555, 571.

of an independent state and a national literature. Now, they might quarrel among themselves concerning the behavior of their traditional sovereigns and the merit of the "reforms" which Joseph Bonaparte brought them, but they were one in insisting upon the right of national self-determination. Italians were not yet so unanimous; since the days of the ancient Roman Empire, they had never had any political unity, and consciousness of common nationality was still obscured by differences and jealousies among Venetians, Lombards, Piedmontese, Tuscans, Neapolitans, and Sicilians. Yet the fame of Napoleon, a man of Italian blood, the temporary establishment of the "kingdom of Italy," the title of "king of Rome" conferred upon the infant heir to Napoleon's fortunes, and especially the revolutionary changes effected in government and society throughout the peninsula by French example or French compulsion shook many Italians out of time-honored habits of thought and infused them with nationalist ideals. At least, the foremost literary lights of Italy during this period—Alfieri and Foscolo—were pronouncedly nationalist. Alfieri, the greatest dramatist of the time, reacting against the "despotism" of the French, published a strongly nationalist book—the *Misogallo* (1799)—in which he not only proclaimed the superiority of the Italians over the French in art, manners, and morals but also urged his countrymen to unite in national hatred of the French. On the other hand, Foscolo, the chief lyric poet of the time, addressed an ode to Napoleon as the "liberator of Italy" and in a famous volume of poems (1807) invoked the memory of Italy's past greatness as inspiration for Italian nationalism in the future.¹ Foscolo and Alfieri were influential pioneers of the nationalist movement in Italy, and so too were the *Carbonari* ("charcoal burners"), members of a network of secret societies which sprang up in southern Italy during the reign of Joachim Murat (1808-1815), which comprised army officers, landlords, government officials, peasants, and even some priests, and which aimed at freeing Italy from foreign rule and obtaining constitutional liberties.

Among peoples more geographically remote from France, na-


¹ Foscolo, exiled from Italy after the downfall of Napoleon, took refuge in England and died at London in 1827. In 1871, after the political unification of Italy, his remains were brought back to Florence and interred, beside those of Alfieri (who had died in 1803), in the church of Santa Croce.

tionalism was stimulated during the Napoleonic era. This was particularly true of the Polish nation. Here, there was a basis for nationalism, and also for a marked sympathy for France, in the sorry events which had transpired in Poland at the very time when the French were successfully revolutionizing their government and society. It will be recalled that, following the first partition of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1772,¹ and in accordance with the general political philosophy of the eighteenth century and the specific advice of Rousseau, Polish patriots had undertaken to reform the institutions of their country. The outcome was a veritable revolution in Poland in 1791, and the adoption of a constitution not unlike that which emanated in the same year from the National Assembly at Paris: what remained of the old Polish state was converted into an hereditary limited monarchy, with biennial parliaments and ministerial responsibility; the "liberum veto" was abolished; class distinctions were swept away; serfdom was mitigated; and absolute religious toleration was sanctioned. At the same time, there appeared on the scene a valiant champion of the new Polish liberalism and nationalism in the person of Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746-1817). Kosciuszko had received a military training in France and like his contemporary Lafayette had served with distinction in the War of American Independence. Now in 1791 he was back in Poland, ready to battle in defense of the new order.

Not all Poles, however, any more than all Frenchmen, took kindly to the new order as outlined in the revolutionary constitution of 1791. Just as French émigrés appealed to the Habsburg emperor, so some Polish nobles applied to the Russian tsarina to help them recover the privileges which they had lost and to restore the old régime. To such a call, Catherine the Great was not deaf; nor were her Prussian and Austrian confederates in the First Partition indifferent. Austria and Prussia, it is true, were then too much engaged with France to intervene decisively in Poland, but Catherine's hands were free, and against the Polish Revolution she promptly mobilized the military might of Russia. In vain Kosciuszko defended the new constitution. In 1793 it was overthrown and Poland was subjected to a second partition by Russia and Prussia. Then Kosciuszko assumed a dictatorship

¹ See above, pp. 344-345, 381.

THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND 1772 - 1815



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and heroically led a desperate national revolt; he was overwhelmed, wounded, and taken prisoner, and in 1795 Russia, Prussia, and Austria completed their partitioning work and erased Poland from the political map of Europe. Kosciuszko, released from his Russian prison in 1796, spent the next two years in America and the remainder of his life in France. To the last he was a nationalist and a liberal, but his distrust of Napoleon kept him from any active participation in the French emperor's projects concerning Poland.

Poland might be erased from the political map of Europe, but the Polish people survived and nationalism grew among them.

Poniatowski and the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw This fact Napoleon recognized and took into account when he restored a part of Poland as the grand-duchy of Warsaw. The grand-duchy supplied money and men for Napoleon's far-flung campaigns, and its patriotic devotion was markedly exemplified by its great war-minister and general, Prince Joseph Poniatowski (1763-1813), a nephew of the last Polish king. Poniatowski had fought brilliantly under Kosciuszko in the 1790's; in 1812 he commanded the Polish forces which accompanied Napoleon's Grand Army in its tragic invasion of Russia, and the following year he died bravely in battle at the head of his troops.

Another Polish patriot of the era was Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770-1861). Of a famous and wealthy noble family, he had been tutored in his youth by the French economist and philosopher, Dupont de Nemours,¹ and had fought with Kosciuszko and Poniatowski in the nationalist struggle of 1791-1794. Sojourning for a time at St. Petersburg, he formed an intimate friendship with

Czartoryski and the Tsar's National Kingdom of Poland the Tsar Alexander I, who, like himself, had been tutored by French philosophers of the "enlightenment" and who at least pretended, in a rather romantic manner, to cherish principles of liberty and nationalism.

At length, when the great clash came between Russia and Napoleon, Czartoryski obtained from the tsar a solemn promise that, at the conclusion of peace, Russian Poland would be definitely reestablished as a national and constitutional monarchy. Throughout the warfare of 1813-1814, therefore, Polish hopes were buoyed up by the prospect of national restoration—through Poniatowski's policy, if Napoleon won, or through Czar-

¹ See above, p. 547, note.

toryski's project, if Russia won. As we know, Russia won; and in 1814 Alexander, with Czartoryski at his elbow, was trying to reconstruct a unified Poland of which the "enlightened" tsar should be the constitutional king.

Into the far north of Europe, the new nationalism penetrated. Already in 1788, on the eve of the French Revolution, the "enlightened" king of Sweden, Gustavus III,¹ had confirmed the "fundamental laws" of his grand-duchy of Finland, and now, in 1809, when Finland was conquered by Russia, the surge of patriotic feeling among the inhabitants of the grand-duchy—both Finns and Swedes—combined with the romantic benevolence of the Tsar Alexander to assure to Finland a privileged position within the Russian empire. Alexander reunited the part of Finland which Peter the Great had taken from Sweden in 1721 with the main part which he himself took in 1809; over the whole country the tsar was to be a constitutional grand-duke, governing with the aid of a national parliament of the four "orders" of nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants and in accordance with Finnish law and custom. Despite these concessions and pledges on the part of the Tsar Alexander, the people of Finland disliked their enforced union with Russia and grew ever more anxious to assert and maintain all their traditional national liberties.

With the same good intentions with which he was abetting nationalism in Finland and Poland, the Tsar Alexander planned for the Baltic provinces of his empire a social reform which provided the starting-point for the rise of nationalism among their inhabitants. His plan materialized, just after the downfall of Napoleon, in the abolition of serfdom in Estonia, Livonia, and Courland. The landlords of these provinces were mainly German, descendants of medieval German crusaders and colonists, but the peasants whom the reform benefited belonged to oppressed but indigenous nationalities: those in Estonia were Esths, a kindred folk to the Finns; those in Livonia and Courland were Letts, who spoke an old Aryan language. Eventually Esths were to aspire to an independent Estonia, and Letts to a free Latvia.

In the meantime, nationalism was appearing in Norway. This country had been united with Denmark in the middle ages, and

¹ See above, p. 353.

Nationalism in Finland

National Peasant Reforms for Esths and Letts

in early modern times had come increasingly under Danish control and influence. Following the French Revolution, however, and attending Denmark's subservience to Napoleon, **Nationalism in Norway** revolutionary principles (including nationalism) permeated Norway. Under the leadership of a patriotic nobleman, Count Wedel-Jarlsberg, Norwegians obtained from Denmark a national administration in 1807 and a national university in 1811. Then, when the treaty of Kiel early in 1814 transferred the sovereignty of Norway to Sweden as compensation for the latter's surrender of Finland, Count Wedel-Jarlsberg and his fellow Norwegian patriots proclaimed the right of national self-determination. They convened a national assembly (the "storting"), which in May declared the independence of Norway, adopted a constitution similar to the French Constitution of 1791 and the Spanish Constitution of 1812, and elected a Danish prince to the kingship. At this point Marshal Bernadotte, the king-elect of Sweden, stepped in and negotiated a treaty with the storting whereby Norway was to remain "a free, independent, and indivisible kingdom" but was to depose its Danish prince and accept the Swedish king as its own king.

In Sweden, too, the old divine-right monarchy gave way to the new constitutionalism. Immediately after the disastrous war of 1808 with Russia, the Swedish parliament (or "riksdag"), which **Constitutional Changes in Sweden** had long been chiefly ornamental, took matters into its own hands. It deposed the incompetent King Gustavus IV, put his childless uncle on the throne as Charles XIII, and adopted a constitution which entrusted financial control to the riksdag and provided that the king should be advised by ministers responsible to it. Subsequently the riksdag designated one of Napoleon's marshals, General Bernadotte, as royal successor to Charles XIII, and Bernadotte, who proved himself more Swedish than French in national loyalty, thus became king of Sweden and Norway in 1818 and founded the dynasty which ever since has reigned in Sweden.

The era of Napoleon likewise had nationalist significance in southeastern Europe, within the Ottoman Empire. It should be recalled that the Ottoman Empire had been declining in power and prestige throughout the eighteenth century, partly because of internal weakness and partly because of external pressure. The decline continued. Internally, there was a succession of weak

sultans, seemingly quite unable to prevent their provincial governors, or pashas, from establishing semi-independent states and enriching themselves through oppression of the local peasantry.¹ Externally, there were special dangers arising from the empire's embroilment in the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 was directed primarily at England's trade with India, but it was conducted on Ottoman soil and it served, not only to arouse the interest of western Europe in things Egyptian,² but also to introduce new revolutionary ideas into the Near East. Then, too, the free hand which at Tilsit Napoleon accorded to Alexander in eastern Europe was employed for open warfare between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, dragging on from 1807 to 1812 and culminating in the treaty of Bucharest and the extension of the Russian frontier to the River Pruth. And as counterweight to French or Russian pressure against the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain used her naval power throughout the period to wring concessions from the sultan and to occupy strategic posts, such as the Ionian Islands.

The Ottoman Empire in the Napoleonic Era

In the troubled circumstances of the Ottoman Empire, the subject nationalities of its Balkan provinces assumed an importance which they had never previously possessed. The overwhelming majority of them were Christians, almost fanatically attached to the Greek Orthodox Church, and for centuries they had been illiterate and despised, oppressed and exploited. In language and nationality they differed among themselves: some were Greeks, some were Rumanians (speaking a Latin dialect), some were Yugoslavs ("southern Slavs"). But hitherto, devoted to Orthodox Christianity as against Islam and unable to read or write, they had thought little of national differences. Now, however, began a movement which was destined to awaken national consciousness among them and eventually to nationalize the Balkans—and the whole Ottoman Empire.

The movement began among Greek middle-class persons and Yugoslav peasants. It owed a good deal to revolutionary precept and practice from the West, especially from France, but it would hardly have reached memorable proportions had it not profited from the embarrassments of the Ottoman government during the Napoleonic era.

¹ See above, pp. 377-378.

² See below, pp. 735-736.

The Greeks occupied, on the whole, a superior position among the Christian subjects of the sultan. Many of them, it is true, were peasants of as lowly a standing as Yugoslavs or Rumanians, but many others were merchants and traders, controlling a large part of the industrial and commercial activity of the Ottoman Empire, and some enjoyed a practical monopoly of those offices in church and state to which Christians were eligible. In other words, there was an educated middle class among the Greeks. And it was among this educated middle class that a Greek national revival began.

One of the pioneers of the new Greek nationalism was Adamantios Korais (1748-1833). The son of a merchant of Smyrna, he spent his youth as his father's agent at Amsterdam in the Netherlands and then studied medicine at Montpellier in France. Thereby he became imbued with the "enlightened" philosophy of western Europe, and then, settling at Paris, he sympathetically witnessed nationalist achievements of the French revolutionaries and Napoleon. If nationalism was good for the French, Korais thought, it must be good for the Greeks, and for years he devoted himself to nationalist propaganda among his fellow countrymen. He urged them, by numerous books and epistles, to believe that they were true descendants of the ancient Hellenes and that they had a cultural mission to perform in the modern world. Incidentally, Korais took the spoken Greek language of his day, purified it of alien words, and made of it the literary language of modern Greece.

The cultural nationalism of Korais was reinforced by the political nationalism of another middle-class Greek, Constantine Rhigas (1760-1794). Rhigas was successively secretary to Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, the sultan's Greek governor of Wallachia (Rumania), and interpreter for the French consulate at Bucharest. In the latter capacity, he acquired a knowledge of French revolutionary principles and a flaming enthusiasm for them. He composed numerous patriotic verses, including a celebrated Greek version of the *Marseillaise*. He founded secret societies and clandestine newspapers to work for Greek independence. He was setting out to enlist aid in France for a Greek uprising when he was apprehended by the Austrian government, handed over to the Turks, and shot, an early "martyr" to the cause of Greek nationalism.

Rhigas and Korais secured followers. In 1814, in the Russian city of Odessa, was formally launched a revolutionary society, the so-called *Helairia Philike*, which soon enrolled thousands of Greeks and which zealously undertook to establish a free and united Greece in the near future. This Greek society was contemporary with the Italian *Carbonari*. Both were reflections of the revolutionary and nationalist disturbances of the age.

Yugoslav Serbs in the Ottoman Empire were simultaneously moved to nationalist activity, as were their kinsfolk, the Croats and Slovenes of the Habsburg Empire. Among these latter, national sentiment was stirred by the French revolutionary wars and especially by Napoleon's creation of an "Illyrian" state (1809), embracing certain east-Adriatic provinces of Hungary and Austria which were peopled mainly by Croats and Slovenes. One of Napoleon's marshals, General Marmont, presided over "Illyria" in a most enlightened way. He introduced the Code Napoléon, equipped the country with public schools, built roads, and effected other improvements; and, in order to assure the loyalty of the natives, he encouraged them to employ the Yugoslav language, rather than Hungarian or German, for newspapers, books, and school-instruction, and to dwell on the memory of the distant times when they had been a free and independent nation.

Nationalism among the Yugoslavs

The Croats

Among the Serbs, national sentiment was stirred less by direct French example and tutelage than by native peasant leaders who were egged on by Russia to take advantage of Turkish oppression and weakness. One tiny Serb region in the western Balkans—the "Black Mountain," or Montenegro—had never been completely subjugated by the Turks, and its bishop (who was its prince) had been receiving annual subsidies from Russia since the time of Peter the Great. Now, during the Napoleonic era, the greatest of its princes, Peter Petrović, co-operated most loyally with the Russians against the Turks. Besides, a Turkish massacre in the Serb pashalik of Belgrade in 1804 served to precipitate a fairly widespread revolt of Serbs. The leader of this revolt was an extraordinary peasant, Karageorge (1766–1817), who, after tending pigs and cows in his youth, had acquired considerable military experience by serving as a volunteer in the Austrian army during its campaigns against the Ottoman Empire in 1788–1791. He was un-

The Serbs

Karageorge

lettered, but he possessed bravery and high intelligence. In 1805 Karageorge at the head of an oddly assorted peasant-army drove the Turkish pasha from Belgrade, proclaimed himself the sultan's prince and commander-in-chief for the whole pashalik, and summoned a Serb parliament (or "skupština"), which laid the foundations for an autonomous Serbia, with a national administration and a national system of schools. Like Peter of Montenegro, Karageorge of Serbia coöperated with the Russians in the war which they waged against the Ottoman Empire from 1807 to 1812, and by the resulting treaty of Bucharest (1812) the sultan, though enabled to reinstate a Turkish garrison in Serbia, was obliged to recognize Karageorge's régime and Russia's preponderant influence in Serbia. In the following year, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Balkans for use against Napoleon permitted the sultan to reconquer Serbia and drive Karageorge into exile. But the spirit of nationalist revolution was already too deeply imbedded in the Serbs to be exorcised by Ottoman decrees or Ottoman arms. It awaited only a favorable opportunity to reassert itself.

From two important countries of Europe—the huge Russian Empire and the powerful British Isles—the principles of the French Revolution, or at any rate the social principles of the French Revolution, were pretty effectually excluded during the whole Napoleonic era. Neither of these countries was subdued by Napoleon's arms or administered by Napoleon's agents; both played decisive rôles in his overthrow. The mass of British thought themselves too progressive, and the mass of Russians were generally regarded as too backward, to appreciate the egalitarian gospel of the French.

The Tsar Alexander of Russia evinced curiously diverse qualities. He was as despotic and ambitious as any of his Romanov predecessors. His word was law within his extensive empire. His appetite for the conquest of all Finland and all Poland surpassed that of Catherine the Great. His eagerness to make Russia the foremost military power in the world was more threatening than the militarism of Peter the Great. At the same time, Alexander was "enlightened" and "romantic" and easily influenced. He had been tutored in his youth by French philosophers and always retained a sentimental regard for the French people, even for

The "Enlightened" Tsar Alexander of Russia

French "radicals." For a time he had been an admirer of Napoleon. Subsequently, becoming pietist in religion and romantic in general outlook, he had thought of himself as the chief of a vast European crusade in behalf of liberty and humanity. Then, with the overthrow of Napoleon, while Alexander was hobnobbing with Talleyrand and counselling Louis XVIII to accept for France the political and social reforms of the Revolution, the tsar was maturing plans for constitutional states for Finns and Poles and for the abolition of serfdom among Esths and Letts in his own dominions.

But the Tsar Alexander was only one Russian. The vast mass of his Russian subjects were illiterate, hard-working peasants, accustomed to medieval ways of living and seemingly quite unmoved by the modern hubbub beyond their horizon. Some of them, of course, served in the armies which their tsar despatched against Sweden or Turkey or France, but they served dumbly and with the one anxiety of getting back to the familiar life of their agricultural villages. They voiced no yearning for liberty, equality, or fraternity; they demanded no change. A few intellectuals and middle-class persons and a very few nobles in Russia were more observant of the new order and more impatient with the old; like the tsar, they played with liberal and nationalist ideas; some of them went farther than the tsar and advocated a forceful transformation of Russian government and society in accordance with the latest models of western Europe. The fact remains, however, that Russia was the one country on the continent of Europe in which the "old régime" continued to function in undiminished vigor after 1815. Russia, which had been "westernized" by Peter the Great early in the eighteenth century in imitation of Louis XIV's France, was not westernized in the nineteenth century in imitation of revolutionary France. Serfdom and large estates, privileges of nobility and clergy, an intolerant state church and an absence of public schools, arbitrary government at St. Petersburg and in the provinces, these remained as the legacy of pre-revolutionary Europe to the Russia of the nineteenth century.

General
Russian
Conserva-
tism

In Great Britain, the era was marked by an intensification of nationalism, but of a nationalism which served the ends of the governing classes rather than those of the masses. It will be recalled that in the eighteenth century, though monarchy was

limited in Britain, parliament was aristocratic, not democratic; it was representative of landed nobles, country gentlemen, and some substantial towns-folk, rather than of the nation at large.¹ On the eve of the French Revolution, there had been in England, as in France, considerable "enlightened" opinion and agitation. There had been in England a fairly vigorous demand for parliamentary reform—for an enlargement of the electorate, a removal of religious disabilities, and a redistribution of seats—and also for various kinds of humane legislation. William Pitt, the Tory son of the earl of Chatham and prime minister after 1783, had vied with Charles James Fox, the Whig leader, in personal expressions of a desire for "reform."² But when Frenchmen proceeded with revolution, influential Englishmen grew timid about reform. Edmund Burke, who had sympathized with the American Revolution as a vindication of "British" principles, assailed the French Revolution as a subversion of those principles, and his arraignment of French "excesses," coupled with his eloquent praise of the existing "British Constitution," had an enormous influence on aristocratic Englishmen, including William Pitt.

Indeed Pitt, the spokesman of the House of Commons and prime minister of George III, soon took the lead in invoking traditional British patriotism against French novelties. He reminded his fellow countrymen that they owed unswerving fealty to a nation which, thanks to Divine Providence and to the enlightenment of its statesmen and the loyalty of its citizens, had grown steadily greater, more feared, and more respected, since the days of Good Queen Bess; a nation endowed with the most perfect government which the world had ever seen, a liberal, constitutional government, duly respectful of monarchy, aristocracy, and established religion; a nation in which liberty slowly broadened out from generation to generation and in which, since the "glorious" revolution of 1688, there was no need of further revolution; a nation which, through centuries of sturdy endeavor, had become the mistress of the seas and the custodian of "backward" peoples and which now bade fair to become the wealthiest nation in the whole world.

Britishers had long been patriotic; a kind of traditional nationalism in Britain had antedated the revolutionary variety in

¹ See above, pp. 457-460.

² See above, pp. 491-493.

France. Hence the appeals and reminders of Pitt and Burke bore fruit not only among the British upper classes but also among the British masses, and the war which England entered in 1793 against revolutionary France assumed, under Pitt's auspices, the character of a national crusade.

There was some domestic criticism of the teachings of Burke and some dissent from Pitt's policies. Outside of parliament, a handful of English "radicals," including Thomas Paine, Joseph Priestley, and, with certain qualifications, Jeremy Bentham, praised the French Revolution and questioned the righteousness of war, but they were denounced as unpatriotic and most of them were either exiled or clapped into prison by Pitt's nationalist government, which won additional popular support by its resolute "saving" of England from all radicals, whether foreign or domestic. Within parliament, Charles James Fox and some of his personal followers among the Whigs, while softening the expression of their pro-French sympathies and curbing their demand for reforms in England, were critical of Pitt and of the Tory conduct of the war, but Fox was known to be objectionable to George III and was increasingly distrusted by the "best patriots."

**Some
British
Dissent
from Pitt's
Policies**

**British
"Radi-
cals"**

**Fox and
the Whigs**

Then, too, a considerable number of Irishmen took issue with Pitt and Burke and looked to the political and social principles of the French Revolution and to the success of French arms to help them redress their own grievances and establish the national independence of Ireland. To this end certain Catholics and Protestants banded themselves together under the name of "United Irishmen," among whom Wolfe Tone (1763-1798) and Thomas Addis Emmet (1764-1827), two Protestant lawyers, were the chief leaders; and in 1798 they precipitated an armed insurrection. The insurrection was suppressed by English troops, the leaders were executed or exiled,¹ and, taking advantage of ensuing reaction, Pitt prevailed upon the Irish parliament to accept (1800) the Act of Union, whereby Ireland lost all trace of national autonomy and her par-

**Irish
Revolu-
tionaries**

¹ Tone committed suicide just before he was to have been executed. Thomas Emmet, after a four-years' imprisonment, was exiled. He first proceeded to the Continent, where he negotiated with the French, and then, after the failure of the insurrection of 1803, he emigrated to the United States.

liament was merged with that at Westminster, which henceforth was the parliament of the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland." Subsequently, in 1803, Robert Emmet, a younger brother of the "United Irishman," raised anew the standard of revolt in Ireland, but he was quickly overpowered, found guilty of treason, and hanged. Both the Emmets had conducted negotiations with Napoleon Bonaparte, and this fact, together with the general distrust of the Irish in Great Britain and the special fear which their insurrections engendered, served further to quicken British nationalism and British popular support of Pitt.

In the circumstances, British national energy could be, and was, mobilized by Pitt for the war which went on against France

**The British
Crusade
against
Revolutionary and
Napoleonic
France**

almost continually from 1793 to 1815. Pitt himself died early in 1806, worn out by worry and overwhelmed with grief over Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz. For a brief time in that year, Fox was prime minister, but Fox and his Whigs were unable or unwilling to effect either external peace or internal reform. On

Fox's death, the government reverted to Tory hands, and from 1807 onwards its dominant figure was Lord Castlereagh (1769-1822), an elegant and brilliant personage and a sterling British nationalist, trained under Pitt, clever in diplomacy, and thoroughly wedded to the social institutions of the old régime.

A final outcome of the Napoleonic wars was the apotheosis of British imperialism and British nationalism. The naval victories

**Intensifi-
cation of
British Na-
tionalism**


of Nelson at the Nile and at Trafalgar and the military exploits of Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo not only provided ample compensation for the reverses which Britain had suffered in the War of American

Independence. They also constituted a fitting climax to earlier exhibitions of British valor—the defeat of the Spanish Armada in the sixteenth century, the overcoming of Dutch rivalry in the seventeenth century, the successful maritime and colonial struggle with Bourbon France from 1689 to 1763.

Triumph brought to Britain national glory and to her commercial classes financial profit. For while she was "saving" herself

NOTE. The portrait of William Pitt, opposite, is from a painting by Thomas Gainsborough (1727-1788). It shows Pitt as a young man, before the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, while he was a "reformer." On Gainsborough, see above, pp. 561-562.





and Europe from the French, she was utilizing her naval superiority to wrest overseas colonies and trade from France and from any nation which might ally itself with France. From France she took Malta (1800), St. Lucia, Tobago (1803), the Ionian Islands (1809), and Mauritius (1810). From the Dutch Netherlands, whose dependence on the French was largely involuntary, she took Ceylon (1795), Guiana (1803), and South Africa (1806). From Denmark, she took Heligoland (1807). At the same time she was extending her sway in India, the Straits Settlements, and Australia ¹ and her commerce with Spanish America.

**Expansion
of the
British
Empire**

At the first Great Britain attacked Spanish trade and colonies on the ground that Spain was subservient to France, and with this justification she appropriated Trinidad (1797) and Honduras (1798) and sent raiding expeditions against Buenos Aires and Montevideo (1806-1807). Subsequently, Britain's coöperation with Spain in the Peninsular War against Napoleon precluded hostile British incursions into Spanish colonies, but it worked in another way to British economic advantage. The Spanish American colonies—Mexico, Central America, and the greater part of South America—were thrown into grave administrative perplexities by the conflict of authority in the mother-country between the two Bourbon kings, Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, and between King Joseph Bonaparte and the revolutionary juntas. The immediate result was that the colonists proceeded to disregard any authority in Spain and, despite legal prohibitions, to open their ports to non-Spanish shipping, which was usually British. Thus it happened that by 1814, when Ferdinand VII was definitely seated on the throne of Spain, his subjects in the New World, while professing allegiance to him, were willing to fight him, if necessary, to preserve their economic independence. The ensuing disruption of the Spanish colonial empire was a consequence of developments during the Napoleonic era, and, next to the colonists, the British commercial classes were the chief beneficiaries.

**Great
Britain and
Spanish
America**

¹ On the extension of British sway in these areas, see above, pp. 417-418, 420-421.

NOTE. The portrait of Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, is from a chalk drawing by Francisco Goya, done while Wellington was commanding the British and Spanish forces in the Peninsular War. On Goya, see above, pp. 564-565, and below, p. 748.

In general, the new overseas possessions which Great Britain acquired during the era were intended either, as in the case of Malta, the Ionian Islands, South Africa, Mauritius, and Ceylon, to strengthen her hold on India, or, as in the other instances (except Heligoland), to develop her trade with Spanish America.

With all these successes and with the attendant heightening of patriotic pride, it is not surprising that Great Britain remained impervious to revolutionary principles during the Napoleonic period. Indeed, it is a most significant fact of modern times that the French Revolution, which produced immediate and direct consequences on the continent of Europe, had no appreciable effect on the British Isles, save perhaps to fortify the political and social institutions of the old régime.

**Reaction
in Britain
against
Political
or Social
Reform**

No social revolution occurred in Britain. The traditional classes of nobles, clergy, country gentlemen, burgesses, artisans, and peasants remained, as did the traditional distinctions among them. The great aristocratic classes remained with extended estates and with undiminished honors and privileges; and if a great new class of industrial capitalists arose it was not in response to any French precept or in conscious furtherance of any social equality. There was no introduction of the "Rights of Man and of the Citizen" and no application of the Code Napoléon. There was only repugnance to the idea of equality, and Englishmen continued to accept with seeming satisfaction the different social lots to which their ancestors had severally predestined them.

No political revolution occurred in Britain. In fact the traditional aristocratic "constitution" continued without amendment. Perhaps a little more honor was paid to monarchy. George III was beloved because he was a patriot-king, admired because he possessed the supposedly national virtues of prejudice and stubbornness, and pitied because he suffered from spells of insanity. But supreme political power was still in the hands of parliament, and parliament remained an oligarchy of landlords, with a sprinkling of commercial magnates, and the majority of parliament (including, of course, the cabinet) was almost constantly Tory throughout the Napoleonic era.

To the British aristocracy, and especially to its Tory right wing, the advantage of contemporary developments redounded. Tory nobles, squires, and clergymen were most vocal in their

patriotism; Pitt and Nelson and Wellington and Castlereagh were Tories; it was Tories who conducted and won the greatest war in which England had ever been engaged. In the circumstances, what could be more natural than that the Tory party and the aristocratic parliament in which Tory landlords were entrenched should be acclaimed throughout the nation as the bulwarks of Britain's power and prestige? What more natural than that Tories should retain the direction of public affairs long after 1815? And what more natural than that they should use their commanding position to promote aristocratic interests?

Heightened
Prestige of
Nobility
and Tory
Party in
Britain

Accordingly, schemes of parliamentary "reform" were lightly put aside, and humanitarian legislation was indefinitely postponed.¹ Proposals for establishing a national system of education, advanced in 1807-1811 by a Quaker, Joseph Lancaster, and by an Anglican, Andrew Bell, were decisively rejected, and the movement for the removal of Catholic disabilities was halted. The press was censored, the right of habeas corpus was repeatedly suspended, and many other things were done to safeguard the principle of aristocracy and to sustain the existing régime of privilege in respect of religion, education, politics, and property.

The economic interests which the aristocratic British parliament promoted during the period were primarily those of the landlord and incidentally those of the commercial magnate. Commercial interests were represented in parliament not only by certain "commoners" who came from seaports and influential shipping families but also by a considerable number of landed nobles and gentlemen who had invested in commercial enterprise. Hence it is not surprising that parliament backed Pitt and other war ministers in combating

Promotion
of Com-
mercial
Interests

¹ The only important exception to this generalization was the abolition of British trade in negro slaves, which was enacted in 1806 during the brief ministry of Fox. It may here be noted that, despite the ultra-conservative attitude of parliament and the apparent unconcern of the country at large, certain English "radicals" continued to advocate schemes of parliamentary reform. For example, Jeremy Bentham in his *Catechism of Parliamentary Reform* (1809) urged annual elections, vote by ballot, and universal suffrage. Likewise William Cobbett (1763-1835), a pugnacious self-taught peasant, after serving in the British army and making a name for himself as a jingo journalist, turned in 1806 against the whole "Pitt system" and conducted in the lively pages of his *Political Register* a campaign for radical social reform as well as for political democracy. Cobbett was jailed from 1810 to 1812.

Napoleon's "continental system," in extending British trade in India and Latin America, and in capturing strategic commercial posts from Spain and the Netherlands as well as from France. Such activities, while firing the British masses with patriotic ardor, were financially profitable to the parliamentary classes.

It was directly in respect of agriculture, however, that the overwhelming majority of the Houses of Lords and Commons could and did pursue special economic interests most devotedly.

Promotion of Landlord Interests This majority, as we have said, was a majority of owners of landed estates; it included Whigs as well as Tories; and its most energetic members were exponents of the new capitalism in agriculture.¹ The result was a marked impetus to the process, already under way prior to 1793, of transforming English manors into capitalistic estates. In 1793 parliament created a governmental "board of agriculture," of which Arthur Young, the enthusiastic advocate of capitalistic agriculture and the "agrarian revolution," was made secretary. Thenceforth, Young was in an especially favorable position to give effect to his own ideas and to the wishes of the parliamentary landlords. Everything possible was done to increase the production of British farms and to divert the resulting profits from peasant to proprietor. On the one hand, the "corn laws"—the protective measures against the competition of foreign grain with English grain—were strengthened and rigidly enforced. On the other hand, the "enclosure acts" were multiplied,² enabling proprietors of estates to appropriate common lands and expropriate tenants and small farmers.

Large Landed Estates in Britain Contrasted with Small Holdings in France By means of these enclosure acts, parliamentary aristocrats wrought a change in British landowning diametrically opposite to that which revolutionary peasants had wrought in French landowning. While the French were breaking up large landed estates and establishing a numerous peasant proprietorship, the British were consolidating large landed estates and establishing a small aristocratic proprietorship. There is no doubt that tempo-


¹ See above, pp. 465-469.

² In the twenty years from 1793 to 1815, almost two thousand enclosure acts were passed, affecting over two and a quarter million acres in England. In Scotland, according to the census of 1811, the 25,620 square miles of soil were owned by 7,800 proprietors. In Ireland, the land monopoly of the aristocracy was even more acute and its effects on the peasantry were even more depressing.

rarily the British policy was conducive to increased production and wealth; the large farm could be operated more "scientifically," more efficiently, and more economically. But there can also be no doubt that the British policy worked untold hardships for dispossessed peasants, that it converted thousands of independent farmers into dependent agricultural laborers and thousands of sturdy yeomen into slum-dwellers of the towns, and that in the long run it spelled disaster to British agriculture.

We must not leave Great Britain at this point, however. For outside of parliament and its selfish oligarchy of landlords, was occurring in Britain, during the Napoleonic era, an industrial revolution of the utmost significance to modern Europe and the modern world. It was based on the application of capitalism to manufacturing and it called into being the machine and the factory. Its gradual beginnings are clearly discernible before 1789, but its achievements did not become impressive until the era of Napoleon. In the era of Napoleon the quickening operation of spinning frames and power looms, of blast furnaces and steam engines, in a country on which the French emperor's army never trod, provided the financial sinews for the military efforts of Britain and her allies and thereby most truly worked his downfall. Eventually, also, it was to work the downfall or landed aristocracy in Britain as elsewhere, but that is a later story.

**Emergence
of the
Industrial
Revolution
in Britain**



CHAPTER XIV

THE ERA OF METTERNICH

I. METTERNICH AND DIVIDED EUROPE



PROCEEDING from the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, certain principles of society and government were applied in France during the French Revolution and communicated to the greater part of Europe during the era of Napoleon. The ensuing period—from 1815 to 1848—was disturbing and divisive. It was characterized, in most countries of Europe, by a sharp cleavage between “radicals” or “liberals,” on the one hand, and “conservatives” or “reactionaries,” on the other; between persons who strove to establish or extend the new social and political order, and persons who labored to preserve or restore the old régime.

Throughout this period the division between liberals and conservatives was usually social and, to a lesser degree, geographical. The kings and princes whose divine authority to rule was questioned; the nobles whose lands and privileges were confiscated or threatened with confiscation; the ecclesiastics whose consciences might be violated or activities abridged: these pillars of the old régime were naturally conservative. On the other hand, most of the bourgeoisie,—the professional classes, bankers, traders, manufacturers, and shopkeepers,—whose hostility to nobles and clergymen was sharpened by an ambition to obtain control of national policies and finance; the generality of the Continental universities—professors and students—together with other “intellectuals” drawn from many walks of life, who were becoming intensely nationalist; the workingman of the town and many a day-laborer in the fields, who felt that any change might add to the contents of his dinner-pail: these groups, restless under the old régime,

were naturally liberal. The peasantry, who comprised the majority of the Continent's population, were swayed between the contending parties: still respectful of authority in state and church, sincerely religious, and innately sceptical of the fine phrases which were on liberal lips, they could at times and in places be reckoned conservative. But there was one important respect in which many peasants doggedly opposed reaction, and that was their attachment to the social achievements of the Revolution—they would be done with feudalism and serfdom, they would own their own lands. Geographically, it should be noted that on the Continent the farther west one went and the nearer to revolutionary France one came, the larger proportion of liberals one found, and that, conversely, the farther east one went and the more remote from France, the larger proportion of conservatives one encountered.

For several years after the overthrow of Napoleon the conservatives enjoyed throughout Europe an influence perhaps out of proportion to their actual numbers. There was a renewed loyalty on the part of patriots to the monarchs who had headed the great national uprisings against Napoleon. There was a marked revival of Christianity, and of special loyalty to the Catholic Church, whose supreme pontiff, the venerable Pius VII, in the face of insults and injuries from Napoleon, had set a noble example of Christian charity and fortitude. Above all, there was universal horror at the bloodshed and wretchedness which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had entailed. Thousands upon thousands of human beings, drawn from every nation and from every social class, had been butchered. Famine, pestilence, crime, and indescribable disease,—the attendant miseries of war,—had walked abroad in every land. Small wonder that prince, priest, and people united in extolling the blessings of peace! Even the liberal bourgeoisie perceived that the revival of Continental industry and trade was a concomitant of peace. With some justice Metternich could avow that "what the European peoples want is not liberty but peace." To prevent the recurrence of such insurrections as the Revolution had witnessed and of such wars as the career of Napoleon had involved,—in a word, to preserve domestic and foreign peace,—became the watchword and countersign of reactionary Europe.

Seeming
Predomi-
nance of
the Con-
servatives

Among the host of figures who crowd the European stage from 1815 to 1848, Prince Metternich stands out most prominently, not indeed in any such unique way as did Napoleon Bonaparte from 1799 to 1815, but still conspicuously enough to justify the use of his name for the era. A contrast more striking than that between Metternich and Napoleon can hardly be imagined.

Metternich's Pre-eminence among the Conservatives

Count Clemens Metternich was born at Coblenz on 15 May, 1773, of a very distinguished family which ranked high among the oldest nobility of the German Rhineland and which had furnished several electors to the great ecclesiastical sees of Trier and Cologne in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Count Metternich His father had entered the diplomatic service of the Holy Roman Empire, and in the social setting of the old régime and the aristocratic atmosphere of the punctilious Habsburg court young Clemens was reared. He was a sixteen-year-old student at the university of Strasbourg when the violence of the town mob gave him his first knowledge of, and distaste for, the French Revolution, a distaste which the seizure of his extensive family estates by Napoleon fourteen years later was not likely to counteract. Following his father's career, he soon attracted the favorable attention of the veteran Austrian chancellor, Prince Kaunitz,¹ whose granddaughter he married in 1795. This alliance not only brought him large estates in Austria, but made him heir to the prestige of the most famous diplomatist of the eighteenth century and introduced him into the most exclusive circles of Viennese society. Henceforth his rise was rapid. He served as representative of the Habsburg emperor successively at Dresden (1801), Berlin (1803), St. Petersburg (1805), and Paris (1806). Despite his country's embarrassment during the years immediately following the catastrophe of Austerlitz, and although he was now pitted against Talleyrand, in many ways as great a master of subtlety as himself, his remarkable good looks, his clever wit, and his charm of manner won him high favor at Napoleon's court, and gained for him an extraordinary diplomatic experience. Although he urged his sovereign to undertake the premature war of 1809, he was one of the first to counsel peace after the defeat of Wagram.

¹ See above, p. 341.

In 1809 Metternich became the actual head of the Austrian government, under the nominal rule of the well-intentioned but procrastinating Emperor Francis I, a position he was able to retain for nearly forty years. The statesman could not but be impressed with the need of reformation within his country, and he at once made a few proposals for national betterment. But his detestation of revolution from below made him fearful of reforms from above, and he preferred to bring honor and prestige to Austria by means of successful foreign diplomacy rather than through what always seemed to him the more uncertain means of internal changes in society and political organization.

Met-
ternich
as Chief
Minister
in Austria ✓

In foreign affairs, Metternich's hatred of Napoleon was conditioned by his fear of Russian aggrandizement in the event of the French emperor's downfall. Accordingly, from 1810 to 1813 his policy was to play off Napoleon and Alexander against each other. He pressed forward with alacrity the negotiations for the marriage of an Austrian archduchess to the Corsican adventurer. He watched with glee the herculean combat of 1812 between Napoleon and the tsar, promising to the former the assistance of an army corps of 30,000 men, while assuring the latter that the Austrian forces would not be employed on the offensive. All the time he was actually keeping the Austrian army on a war footing and maintaining an armed neutrality, ready to throw his weight upon whichever side might finally be in a position to bestow the greater benefits upon Austria. Such was the success of his well-laid plans that the intervention of Austria was the decisive factor in the battle of the Nations (October, 1813) and in the campaign of 1814.¹ Napoleon's power collapsed and Austria became the dominant power among the victorious allies. Metternich was hailed as the most astute statesman of his age. He was deferred to by the Russian and Prussian monarchs. He was fêted by Talleyrand and Louis XVIII. He was given a fulsome welcome on a visit to England. He was named a magnate of the kingdom of Hungary and a count and hereditary prince of the Austrian Empire.

Metter-
nich's Rôle
in the
Over-
throw of
Napoleon

Metternich was quite aware of the division in Europe between "revolutionaries" and "reactionaries." He was himself a "reactionary," and he was thoroughly convinced in 1814-1815 that

¹ See above, pp. 686-687.

a strong reactionary Austrian Empire was a most necessary bulwark against the divisive and disturbing forces of revolution.

Metternich's Policy

It was Austria which had directed the first external attack against the French Revolution. It was Austria which had administered the final blow to the upstart Napoleon. It was Austria which henceforth should use its increased power and prestige to prevent similar disturbances and to lead Europe back into the unity and peace which had been rudely broken by revolutionary and Napoleonic France. From 1814 to 1848, therefore, Metternich labored to make reaction effective in Austria, and Austria influential in Europe.

2. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

Metternich's first care in 1814 was to restore, as far as practicable, the political and territorial *status quo* of 1792. The treaty of Chaumont (March, 1814), which he helped to negotiate,¹ cemented the alliance of the four victorious great powers—Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain—for twenty years. In May, 1814, he signed the treaty of Paris, whereby the four great powers, together with Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, made formal peace with France, restored the French frontiers of 1792, and provided for the holding of a general congress of all the European powers in order to effect a general peace-settlement.

It was a recognition of the decisive part played by Austria and of the commanding personality of Metternich that Vienna was chosen as the scene of this international congress. And to Vienna repaired in the autumn of 1814 such an array of titled dignitaries and gold lace as Europe had never previously beheld in one place. Six sovereigns were there: Tsar Alexander of Russia, curiously mingling shrewdness with mysticism, ambition with compassion; Emperor Francis I of Austria, polite, cautious, and a bit stubborn; Frederick William III of Prussia, at once timid and obstinate, and quite fascinated by the Christian-like benevolence of the tsar; the king of Denmark; the king of Bavaria; the king of Württemberg. Great Britain was represented in turn by the sagacious Lord Castlereagh and the "iron" duke of Wellington. Alexander was attended by Capo d'Istria (a Greek), Baron vom Stein (the re-

Assembling of European Statesmen at Vienna

¹ See above, p. 689.

generator of Prussia), Count Nesselrode (of German blood), and Prince Adam Czartoryski (the Pole). Frederick William of Prussia was assisted by Hardenberg and Humboldt. Sweden, Spain, Portugal, the princes of the Netherlands and of Sardinia, and the minor potentates of Germany were all represented. France was represented by the astute and insinuating Talleyrand—ex-abbé, ex-bishop, ex-revolutionary, ex-Napoleonist, now agent of the Bourbon Louis XVIII, and French patriot always. And last but not least, Metternich was there, discharging with classic grace and dignity the obligations which devolved upon him as host of the imposing congress. With the exception of the tsar, who indulged in fine though vague words in praise of liberalism, all the authoritative spokesmen seemed to be of one general mind with Metternich: they would make of the congress a pageant in celebration of the defeat of revolution and the triumph of reaction.

The congress was a pageant. In conformity with the best usages of polite eighteenth-century society, the divine-right monarchs and their aristocratic ministers and attendants at Vienna splendidly concealed their business behind a barrage of stately banquets, elegant concerts, and formal dances.

But the Congress of Vienna was really not a "congress" at all. Metternich had had the idea that the four victorious great powers—the signatories of the treaty of Chaumont—would decide all matters among themselves and then present their decisions for merely perfunctory ratification by the other powers in congress assembled. But Talleyrand, as subtle a master of diplomacy as Metternich, was resolved that France should not be excluded from the counsels of the great powers. At first, Talleyrand threatened to nullify the programme of the "Big Four" by invoking the treaty of Paris in favor of a full and free congress of all the powers, and for this threat he knew he had the backing of Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the lesser powers. Before long, however, Talleyrand was able to take advantage of a cleavage among the "Big Four"; he played an important rôle in composing their differences, and in due course was admitted to their counsels. In the circumstances no "congress" was formally held. Informally, negotiations went on steadily at Vienna throughout the winter of 1814-1815. Sometimes the negotiations were among the "Big Four"; sometimes,

Difficulty
of Organ-
izing the
Congress
of Vienna

among the eight signatories of the treaty of Paris; sometimes, among the German princes by themselves; and most commonly toward the last, among the "Big Five"—Austria, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and France.

What caused the early cleavage among the "Big Four"—the thorniest problem with which the "congress" of Vienna was confronted—was the question of the disposition of Poland and Saxony. In 1813, before the battle of the Nations, the Tsar Alexander had promised Prussia and Austria that he would assure them the destruction of the Napoleonic grand-duchy of Warsaw and that they would share with him in the repartition of all Poland. After the battle, however, he changed his mind. Prompted by Czartoryski,¹ he decided that he wanted the whole of Poland for himself; in recognition of the principle of nationality he would reconstitute the old big state of Poland; he would grant it a liberal constitution; and he would utilize its resources for strengthening Russia's military and economic position. With this end in view, he proposed that Austria should be compensated by annexations in Italy, and Prussia by the absorption of all Saxony (whose king had been grand-duke of Warsaw and a most faithful ally of Napoleon); he overran Poland with Russian troops, and then presented his proposals to the "Big Four" at Vienna. King Frederick William III speedily assented: he liked to defer to the tsar anyway, and the bait of Saxony was most tempting. But Metternich, alarmed by the prospect of Russia's permanent intrusion into central Europe, was decidedly hostile, and Castlereagh, distrustful of Russia in general and of Alexander in particular, made common cause with Metternich. A deadlock ensued between Russia and Prussia, on one side, and Austria and Great Britain, on the other; and for a time war seemed imminent among the "Big Four." Eventually, Castlereagh with Talleyrand's support, arranged a compromise. Prussia got part but not all of Saxony, and the tsar got the greater part of Poland, though Galicia was retained by Austria, and Posen and the "corridor" by Prussia. Thus the king of Saxony was punished and Poland was repartitioned, with the largest portion—so-called "Congress Poland"—going this time to the Russian tsar.²

Difficulty
about Po-
land and
Saxony

¹ See above, pp. 702-703.

² For the map of this partition, see above, p. 701.

As a result of these and other informal negotiations at Vienna, as well as of a considerable variety of special arrangements which had been made elsewhere before the congress, a "Final Act" was signed on 9 June, 1815, embodying what is commonly called the peace settlement of the Congress of Vienna.¹

The
Final
Treaty

The general principle underlying the Viennese settlement was Metternich's. It was the restoration, so far as practicable, of the boundaries and reigning families of the several European countries as they had been prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution and the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte. It was consonant with the principle of "legitimacy" which Talleyrand was exploiting in order to save France from further territorial spoliation and to enable his vanquished country still to play an influential rôle in the counsels of Europe. In accordance with this principle of "legitimacy," the treaties of Vienna recognized the restoration of the Bourbons in Spain and in the Two Sicilies, of the house of Orange in Holland, of the house of Savoy in Sardinia and Piedmont, of the pope to his temporal possessions in central Italy, and of the various German princes whose territories had been included in the confederation of the Rhine. Likewise in the name of "legitimacy," Austria recovered the Tyrol and other lands of which she had been despoiled, and the loose Swiss confederation was restored under a guaranty of neutrality.

Metternich's
"Restoration" and
Talleyrand's
"Legitimacy"

The principle of "legitimacy" was considerably compromised by the necessity of providing more or less arbitrary "compensations." In the course of the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain, as we have already seen, appropriated, along with certain French and Spanish trading posts, the important Dutch colonies of Ceylon, South Africa, and Guiana. These colonies were confirmed to Britain.²

Practical
"Compensations"

To compensate the Dutch, and also to erect a strong state on the northern frontier of France, the southern (Austrian)

¹ The "Final Act" was signed only a few days before the battle of Waterloo. After the second overthrow of Napoleon, a second treaty of Paris, concluded in November, 1815, restricted the frontiers of France to those of 1791 and obliged her to restore the art-treasures which Napoleon had pilfered from other countries, to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and to submit for a term of five years to foreign occupation of her chief fortresses.

² A part of Guiana was retained by the Dutch.

Netherlands were joined with the northern (Dutch) Netherlands, under the rule of the restored Dutch prince of Orange, now recognized as king of the United Netherlands, despite the fact that nearly two and a half centuries of political separation had augmented the economic and religious antipathies between the two regions.

To compensate Austria for the surrender of her claims on the southern Netherlands, she was given a commanding position in Italy. The territories of the historic republic of Venice (including the Illyrian provinces along the eastern coast of the Adriatic) and the duchy of Milan were transferred outright to the Habsburg Empire, and members of the Habsburg family were seated upon the thrones of the small central states of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena.

Sweden, as compensation for the cession of Finland to Russia and of Pomerania to Prussia, secured Norway from Denmark, whose protracted alliance with Napoleon seemed to merit a severe punishment.

Prussia's gains were especially significant. She recovered all the German territories of which Napoleon had despoiled her, and in addition she acquired Swedish Pomerania, two fifths of Saxony, the whole of Westphalia, and most of the Rhineland. These cessions were intended to make her a bulwark against France, but in the long run they did more. They provided her with mineral resources of the greatest economic importance during the ensuing century, and, in conjunction with her surrender of "Congress Poland" to Russia, they tended to transform her from a half-Slavic, thoroughly agricultural state into the leading industrial state of Germany.

As Prussia and the Netherlands were enlarged and strengthened on the northeastern and northern frontiers of France, so the Viennese settlement ratified the enlargement and strengthening of the kingdom of Sardinia on the southeastern frontier of France. To the kingdom of Sardinia, Savoy and Piedmont were restored, and Genoa was added.

In the territorial and constitutional settlement of Germany neither Austria nor Prussia found it advantageous to insist too rigorously upon "legitimacy." There was no thought of reviving the two-hundred-odd ecclesiastical states and petty principalities

**Extension
of Prussia
and Sar-
dinia**

which had been suppressed in 1803. There was no serious effort to resurrect the Holy Roman Empire which had expired in 1806. There was certainly no establishment of a strongly knit national state. Baron vom Stein, it is true, proposed the unification of all Germany under the supremacy of a single power, but King Frederick William III displayed no ambition to assume the leadership, and Metternich had already promised the princes of south Germany that Austria would respect their sovereign rights. Instead of adopting a national policy, the governments of Prussia and Austria, as well as the princes of the smaller German states, were bent on safeguarding their respective interests against possible encroachment by others. The outcome of this particularist, or states-rights, feeling was the creation of the German "confederation," a loose organization of the remaining thirty-eight states, with a diet consisting of delegates of the reigning sovereigns, presided over by Austria. The members might not enter into alliance with a foreign power either against the confederation as a whole or against a fellow member. The confederation was placed nominally under the guaranty of all the European powers, but actually the attitude of the lesser German princes enabled Austria to dominate it from the outset.

The German Settlement

The German Confederation


Thus did the foremost reactionaries of Europe refashion their map. Thus in the name of legitimacy was France "restored" and at the same time hemmed in by strengthened buffer states of the Netherlands, Prussia, and Sardinia. Thus, too, were the allies rewarded who had certainly overthrown Napoleon and had possibly stayed the Revolution. Thus, finally, under Metternich, did the leadership of Europe pass from revolutionary France to reactionary Austria.

Great indeed was the power and prestige of Austria at the close of the congress of Vienna. Metternich found himself in charge of the affairs of an enormous state. With the exception of the distant Belgian Netherlands, which had always been a source of weakness, the Habsburg dominions of 1763 were again intact, and to them had been added the richest and most prosperous districts of neighboring Italy. In fact, throughout the entire Italian peninsula, French influence was replaced by Austrian. Then, too, within the diet of the new Germanic confederation the Austrian emperor, backed by the weight

Renewed Prestige of Austria

of the Habsburg power beyond the borders of Germany, exercised a greater influence than any Holy Roman Emperor of modern times.

In all these territorial readjustments there was little that was permanent and much that was temporary. The union of Holland and Belgium lasted but fifteen years. The Italian and German



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settlements survived but fifty years, and the Polish barely a century. From our present standpoint, it is easy to see that the

Disregard of Nationalism most serious mistake of the congress of Vienna was its disregard of the principle of nationality. Howsoever the reactionary monarchs and diplomats might combat

liberty and equality, they could ill afford to be oblivious of the nationalist movements that had recently stirred the French, the Poles, the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Italians, and the Germans. Yet, with the possible exception of the Tsar Alexander, they discounted the force of the new national patriotism, and, true to the international usages of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they proceeded once more to treat the European peoples as so many pawns in the game of dynastic aggrandizement.

The harking back of the plenipotentiaries at Vienna to the days of territorial rivalry among the dynastic states also prevented them from fulfilling the expectations which "liberal" public opinion had entertained of a wider and more fundamental scope for the labors of the congress. To these altruistic souls, the termination of a terrible period of revolution and warfare, of bloodshed and misery, and the rapid development of a sense of solidarity among all European princes and peoples seemed a particularly auspicious opportunity for effecting a permanent settlement of the balance of power, for the discovery of safeguards against its future disturbance, for general disarmament and assurance of international peace, for the suppression of the slave-trade and of piracy, and for the solution of social problems. Some of these subjects were broached at Vienna by the tsar, but their reception, though polite, was essentially chilly and most of them were suffered to drop quite out of sight. Alexander was himself too absorbed in the ambition of securing Poland for the Romanov dynasty. Largely through British representations, a declaration was appended to the final treaty to the effect that the slave-trade should be abolished, although each power was left free to fix such date as best suited its own convenience. Provisions respecting the free navigation of international rivers and regulating the rights of precedence among diplomatists,—minor modifications in the recognized content of international law,—were also adopted. But the more serious questions of the future were not perceived or were left unheeded.

Metternich was certainly desirous of rendering the Viennese settlement permanent. No one was more anxious or determined to maintain international peace than he. But he believed that the peace of Europe could best be maintained not by a central tribunal resting upon the consent of the European peoples, which would recognize the hateful principle of democracy and which might interfere with the hegemony of Austria, but rather by the vigilant benevolence of allied sovereigns. The treaty of Paris of November, 1815, which formally renewed the treaty of Chaumont, bound the Quadruple Alliance—Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain—to the future convocation of diplomatic congresses

Indiffer-
ence to
Liberalism

Abolition
of the
Slave-
Trade

Guaranty-
ing the
Peace
Settle-
ment

The Quad-
ruple Alli-
ance: the
Concert of
Great
Powers

for the preservation of peace and of the *status quo*, and this "Concert of Europe" was sufficient for Metternich.

But the Tsar Alexander, in his dreamy, mystical way, went farther. While adhering loyally to the Quadruple Alliance as an effective means of maintaining the treaties of Vienna by physical force, he declared that the great Christian principles of peace, forbearance, and mutual good will, solemnly subscribed to by all the European monarchs, would supply the underlying spiritual motives for preserving modern society as well as boundaries and governments. Accordingly he induced the pious king of Prussia and the obliging emperor of Austria to join with him in forming (September, 1815) the celebrated Holy Alliance, by which the

The Tsar Alexander and the Holy Alliance three sovereigns solemnly declared their "fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections." They mutually promised to "remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect religion, peace, and justice." Their Majesties consequently recommended to their people, "with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind."

Alexander was the only sovereign who took the Holy Alliance very seriously. Pope Pius VII upbraided the Catholic emperor of Austria for making a Christian declaration in union with a schismatic Russian and an heretical Protestant. A brilliant reactionary critic discovered in the document the "spirit of visionaries who opposed religiosity to religion." Emperor Francis I of

Austria frankly told Alexander that he did not know what it meant: "if it was a question of politics, he must refer it to his chancellor, if of religion, to his confessor." Metternich scornfully called it "verbiage," and Lord Castlereagh pronounced it "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." Nevertheless, with the exception of the sultan, the pope, and the prince-regent of Great Britain, all the European rulers out of deference to the tsar and doubtless influenced in many instances by the religious revival of the time, signed the treaty and were duly admitted to the Holy Alliance. The rakish British prince-regent, in his letter announcing his inability to become a signatory, hypocritically expressed his "entire concurrence with the principles laid down by the august sovereigns" and stated that it would always be his endeavor to regulate his conduct "by their sacred maxims."

To the liberals of the nineteenth century the Holy Alliance became the embodiment of a diabolical conspiracy to stamp out democracy, nationalism, and social justice. But such an estimate of its significance is derived from a confusion of terms and is quite mistaken. The eventual failure of the Holy Alliance to ameliorate political and social conditions was due not so much to a want of sincerity in its author or to any criminal character in its purposes, as to the vagueness of its terms and to the failure of its signatories to give it more than lip service. It is a fact that the political ideas of the tsar underwent a profound change, but from the outset Alexander's Holy Alliance, with its idealism, was confused in the popular mind with the actual workings of the more worldly Quadruple Alliance under the masterful direction of Metternich.

So far we have dealt with the general European situation in 1815. We have seen that immediately after the overthrow of Napoleon the population of every country was roughly divisible on political and social questions into the two camps of "liberals" and "conservatives," that territorial settlements were made at Vienna by conservatives on the basis of "legitimacy" and "compensations," representing a more or less actual return to pre-revolutionary times, and, finally, that a powerful Quadruple Alliance existed for the maintenance of treaty engagements and the preservation of peace. Incidentally, we have witnessed the exaltation of Aus-

**The Seem-
ing Tri-
umph of
Metter-
nich's
Policies**

tria paralleled by the rise of Metternich. From 1815 to 1848 this faithful chancellor of the Habsburg emperor was at once the conservative patriot of Austria and the reactionary genius of Europe. He employed the influence and might of Austria to dominate Europe; he sought to dominate Europe in order that the old régime might not be disturbed in Austria. Peace was always his goal in domestic and foreign affairs.

At first, peace was supposed to be most seriously menaced by international rivalry and the ambition of particular states. The British were especially fearful of a fresh outbreak by France. Metternich was especially distrustful of the ambitious posing of the Russian tsar and the very large army which he kept on a war footing in Poland. Consequently Metternich and Castlereagh coöperated to remove international misunderstandings and to accustom the great powers to doing things jointly as the "Concert of Europe." In 1818, for example, when France had discharged her obligations to the allies and had showed her continuing pacific intent, an international congress was held at Aix-la-Chapelle under the auspices of the Quadruple Alliance—Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain; the allied army of occupation was withdrawn from French territory, and France was practically admitted to the "Concert of Europe."¹

After 1818, however, it was by no means the rivalries of rulers that endangered the peace of Europe, but rather the unrest of liberals who threatened their reactionary sovereigns with revolution or incited oppressed nationalities to insurrection. Hence the problem ceased to be that of restraining France or Russia from international war and became one of suppressing liberalism and revolution within particular countries. On this question, Metternich and Castlereagh differed. Castlereagh was no friend of revolution or liberalism, but he thought that the general policing of Europe was beyond the scope and ability of the concert of great powers and contrary to British interests. Metternich, on the other hand, grew more and more convinced that the concert must preserve the *status quo*

¹ Thereafter, the Quadruple Alliance was usually referred to as the "Quintuple Alliance," and France participated in later international congresses on an equal footing with the other great powers.

within the several states of Europe as well as between them, by force if necessary. In this conviction, by 1820, he was supported by the Tsar Alexander, who, though formerly disposed to express sympathy with liberalism, had a large army at his command and was now most anxious to pose as the strong-fisted custodian of "law and order." In these circumstances, the subsequent international congresses of the great powers--at Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822)--were concerned with plans for suppressing revolutionary outbreaks and combating liberalism. The new principle underlying such plans was agreed to by Metternich, Alexander, and the king of Prussia, though dissented from by Great Britain, and was embodied in the protocol of Troppau (1820): "States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other states, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guaranties for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

The Inter-
national
Con-
gresses

The Pro-
tocol of
Troppau

Under Metternich and Alexander it thus became the duty of the powers to stamp out revolution, even to the extent of intervention in the domestic concerns of a friendly state. For a time this duty was duly discharged. But before long, as we shall presently see, it became necessary, through force of circumstances, to refrain from the rigorous execution of the protocol of Troppau. Not, however, until the stirring events of the year 1848 did Metternich lose his own reactionary hold on Austria and central Europe.

Presently we shall take up in some detail the epidemic of political and social conflicts between "revolutionaries" and "reactionaries" which in many lands and for many years harassed Metternich and the "concert of Europe," in time destroying the concert and eventually driving Metternich from power. In the meantime, if we would understand the era which decisively marked the decline of conservative Europe and the rise of liberal Europe, we must give some attention to the thought and culture of the early nineteenth century.

3. RISE OF ROMANTICISM

We have explained in an earlier chapter how natural science revolutionized European thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while "classicism" was continuing to influence most European arts.¹ In the early part of the nineteenth century, the advance of natural science persisted, but its influence on thought was conditioned less by the cultural vogue of "classicism" than by that of "romanticism." The rise of romanticism was almost as significant for the nineteenth century as the classical renaissance had been for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

"Romanticism" had appeared in English literature in the eighteenth century and had almost immediately inspired notable works in French and German literature and likewise in the domain of painting.² It was not until after the Napoleonic period, however, that "romanticism" became fashionable and momentous.

"Classicism" remained relatively stable, at least in France, during the eras of the French Revolution and Napoleon. It was one impressive tradition of the old régime which the political and social upheaval did not seem to disturb. The French revolutionaries were strongly under classical influence. All of them had had a classical education, and they loved to think of themselves as modern exponents of the republican virtues of ancient Greece and Rome. They believed that the art which harmonized most perfectly with their own ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity was classical art—not the decorated, elegant rococo adaptation of classical art which had flourished at the court of Louis XV, but the plainer and more rugged art of the "pure classicism" which Winckelmann³ had done much to establish and which was architecturally exemplified at Paris by the Panthéon and the Place de la Révolution (Place de la Concorde). Whatever the French revolutionaries did was provided with a setting of rugged classicism—the altars to *la patrie*, the Phrygian liberty caps, the Roman fasces, the images of fatherland or republic, the lay-out of the military parade ground (the "field of Mars"). Even the Jacobin vogue of long trousers, if no more "classical"

Abiding
Influence
of "Classicism"
on the French
Revolutionaries

¹ See above, ch. xi.

² See above, pp. 565-566, 570-572.

³ See above, p. 534.

than the knee-breeches of the preceding age, was certainly more rugged; uglier, but plainer.

To the classical predilection of the French revolutionaries was soon added that of Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon, too, liked the styles of ancient Rome and Greece, and, as we have seen, he was perpetually thinking of himself as a modern Julius Cæsar or Alexander the Great. He addressed the Pyramids as a Greek conqueror might have done, and he called his only son "king of Rome." Besides, it was Napoleon who, by means of his spectacular incursion into Egypt, contributed decisively not only to the scientific study of Egyptian antiquities but also to the infusion of a dash of Egyptian art-forms in contemporary "classicism."

The
"Classicism"
of
Napoleon,
with Egyptian
Embellishment

The result was that in France, during the Revolution and under Napoleon, the fine arts of architecture, sculpture, painting, and house-furnishing tended to be severely classical, with increasing indication of ancient Egyptian influence. With the classical republican emblems of the Jacobins, Napoleon combined, as his own devices, the Roman imperial eagle and the Egyptian scarab. The Vendôme Column and the arch of the Carrousel, which he erected at Paris to celebrate his military triumphs of 1805-1806, were modelled the one after the column of Trajan and the other after the arch of Severus. The church of the Madeleine in Paris was constructed, in the style of a Roman temple with a majestic Corinthian colonnade, as a Temple of Glory for the Grand Army; it was not put to Christian uses until the restoration of the Bourbons. For Josephine, Napoleon built the château of Malmaison, also in classical style; and the chairs and tables and other furniture with which his palaces were embellished were copied from classical models, with some regard for Egyptian peculiarities, and became fashionable as "Empire" furniture.

The "Empire"
Style

Napoleon was served by several first-rate artists. A good deal of the architecture of the period was designed by Fontaine (1762-1853), who, after studying at Rome and escaping the Revolution by a sojourn in England, had won fame by building the château of Malmaison. Fontaine constructed the arch of the Carrousel, was named "first architect" by the emperor in 1813, and continued to sponsor classical architecture under the succeeding Bourbon kings.

Fontaine
and
"Classical"
Architecture

The foremost French sculptor of the period was Houdon (1740-1828), who had been a leading exemplar of "pure classicism" before the Revolution. Indeed, Houdon had immortalized in marble

Houdon and "Classical" Sculpture the features of ever so many celebrities of the old régime—Catherine II of Russia, Diderot and D'Alembert, Gluck and Buffon, Voltaire and Rousseau, and, on a trip to America in the 1780's, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. During the French Revolution, he ingeniously transformed statues of Christian saints into representations of "Philosophy" and "Reason," and subsequently he executed famous busts of Napoleon, Josephine, and Marshal Ney. Napoleon made him an officer of the Legion of Honor.¹

The chief French painter of the revolutionary and Napoleonic age was David (1748-1825), and he nicely embodied in his can-

David and "Classical" Painting vases the classical spirit of the age. His *Brutus* was appropriately painted in 1789, at the very beginning of the Revolution, and he soon became a devoted Jacobin, painting with sympathy and "classicism" the

Oath of the Tennis Court and the *Assassination of Marat*. As a member of the National Convention, he voted for the death of Louis XVI.² Later, David passed into Napoleon's service and left us magnificent "classical" pictures of the emperor's *Coronation*, of his *Distribution of the Eagles*, and of many of his battles.

An illustrious disciple of David was Ingres (1780-1867), who painted several portraits of Napoleon, always in the classical style, and depicted many scenes from pagan mythology. His *Ædipus and the Sphinx* betrayed the current Egyptian influence, and it is not without interest that one of his last paintings, the *Apotheosis of Napoleon I*, was completed just when Napoleon III was reëstablishing the French empire (1852).

Outside of France, "classicism" continued to be exemplified by several important artists. Canova and Thorwaldsen were

"Classical" Sculpture: Canova and Thorwaldsen particularly successful in adapting "pure classicism" to sculpture. Canova, an Italian, was patronized both by Napoleon and by such popes as Clement XIV and Pius VII; he carved famous religious monuments and mythological scenes and also statues of Napoleon and

Napoleon's favorite sister, the Princess Pauline Borghese. Thor-

¹ For illustrations of Houdon's art, see pictures facing pp. 505, 537, 598, 668.

² For examples of David's Revolutionary pictures, see above, pp. 631, 646.

waldsen, a Dane, was perhaps the most successful of all the imitators of classical sculpture. Throughout the Napoleonic era, he lived in Italy, executing many statues of pagan deities as well as the celebrated tomb of Pope Pius VII in St. Peter's at Rome; afterwards, returning to Denmark, he prepared remarkable statues of Christ and the Apostles for a church in Copenhagen and designed the famous *Lion of Lucerne* as a memorial to the Swiss Guard that had perished in defense of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette.

In England, the tradition of "classical" portrait painting was maintained by Thomas Lawrence (1769-1830), who succeeded Sir Joshua Reynolds as the fashionable master of the "grand manner." Lawrence painted many of the celebrities of aristocratic Britain during the Tory régime from 1792 to 1815, and, patronized by George III and the prince-regent and favored in 1815 with a title of knighthood, he then toured the Continent and depicted, ever in the "grand manner," the leading reactionary statesmen of the era of Metternich. The collection of Lawrence's works in the Waterloo gallery of Windsor Castle is eloquent of how the dignitaries who attended the Congress of Vienna wished to be remembered, resplendent champions of antique European civilization and nobility.

Lawrence,
and Con-
tinuing
"Classi-
cism" in
Britain

"Classicism" was thus not only the cultural mode of revolutionary France but also the inspiration of several prominent artists of reactionary Europe. Especially in architecture, it continued to be influential long after 1815. In London, for example, Roman columns and arches served as models for the chief monuments in celebration of British heroes of the Napoleonic Wars—the Wellington Arch (1828),¹ the duke of York's Column² in Waterloo Place (1833), and the Nelson monument in Trafalgar Square (1829-1843).

In the United States, "classicism" inspired the plans which L'Enfant, a French architect and engineer, prepared (1789-1791) for the newly founded city of Washington, and also the designs

¹ The awful equestrian statue of Wellington, erected in 1846, was mercifully removed in 1883.

² The duke of York was not much of a "hero," but he was a son of George III and brother of the prince-regent (later George IV), and he was nominal commander-in-chief of the British army from 1798 to 1809 and again from 1811 until his death in 1827.

of its first public buildings—the Capitol and the White House. Other examples of the period's "classical" taste were the statuesque Cities of France, seated around the Place de la Concorde in Paris; the equestrian statue of Joseph II, in Vienna, by Zanner, depicting the Habsburg emperor in the armor of a Roman general; and the statue of George Washington by Greenough, representing the "father of his country," half-naked, with the pose and expression of Olympian Zeus.

We must not spend too much time on the survival of "classicism" in the early part of the nineteenth century. For the rise of **Revolutionary Rise of "Romanticism"** "romanticism" was far more characteristic of the period, and romanticism was a truly revolutionary force in European culture. The roots of romanticism were in the eighteenth century, but it was nourished by developments of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras and brought to rich fruition in the period of Metternich.

Romanticism represented a reaction against the long dominant classicism. Originally, it took its inspiration from nature rather than from ancient Greeks and Romans, and perceived beauty less in artificial domes and columns than in natural mountains and lakes, forests and waterfalls. **Reaction against "Classicism"** It also perceived a beauty in natural men, in commonplace things, in everyday happenings. Above all, it stressed feeling and emotion more than reason; sentimentalism was a synonym for romanticism.

To the rise of romanticism, several novel developments of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras contributed. One was the disillusionment of many intellectuals concerning the "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. At that time, **Disillusionment about the "Enlightenment"** all sorts of intellectuals—nobles and clergymen as well as commoners—had been sure that the modern age was infinitely more "scientific" and "enlightened" than any preceding age (with the possible exception of pagan antiquity), and that, by the use of human reason, modern men would soon banish superstition and ignorance and usher in a new glorious day of reasoned progress. But then had come the terrors of the French Revolution and the horrors of the Napoleonic Wars, and they were accompanied by a growing conviction on the part of some intellectuals, especially among noblemen and clergymen, that earlier confidence in human reason had been

misplaced. Was there not something other than reason, they argued, which should guide men and which, if followed, would guide them to a happier destiny? Had not feeling and sentiment been woefully neglected and the heart been grievously sacrificed to the head? Was the Age of Enlightenment really superior to the Age of Faith; had not the men of the eighteenth century belittled the Christian middle ages as they had magnified pagan antiquity? And did not men have "duties" as well as "rights"? Persons who answered "yes" to these questions were breaking with the "enlightenment" and preparing the way for romanticism.

Another development, likewise favorable to romanticism, was the new slant given to philosophical speculation by a famous trinity of German "idealists"—Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Kant, as we have seen, marked the climax of the "natural" metaphysics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and his political philosophy was essentially that of Rousseau and the French revolutionaries.¹ But Kant was also a pioneer in the romantic thought of the early nineteenth century; he emphasized the moral "duties" of man and he stressed the concepts of "spirit" and "will." Fichte followed in Kant's footsteps, so far as basic "idealism" was concerned, but, living in the midst of rising German nationalism, he applied "idealism" to the practical stimulation of patriotic reaction against Napoleon. Fichte was influential in the new university of Berlin and died from the cholera which he contracted while tending wounded German soldiers in 1813. Hegel (1770-1831), a native of Württemberg and successor of Fichte in the chair of philosophy at Berlin, was at once idealist and mystic. His eloquent use of semi-scientific, semi-poetic phrases, his constant reference to "spirit"—world spirit, time spirit, national spirit, etc.—his dwelling on "liberty through order," his grandiloquent surveys of history, in which he perceived three stages of human development—from the "oriental" when only the despot is free, through the "classical" when the aristocrat is free, to the medieval and modern "German" when "man as man is free"; all these stirred romantic thought and feeling in his hearers and readers during the era of Metternich. Many "liberals" took hope from Hegel's

**New Phil-
osophical
Specula-
tion**

**German
"Ideal-
ism":
Kant,
Fichte,
and Hegel**

¹ See above, pp. 510, 543. "

gospel, and many "conservatives," including King Frederick William III of Prussia, were reassured by it.

Quite different from German idealism but analogous to it in romantic effect, was Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. Bentham was, of course, no mystic; he never talked about "spirit"; he had no interest in history; and his philosophy was clearly a product of eighteenth-century rationalism and humanitarianism.¹ But Bentham distrusted the French revolutionaries almost as much as the European reactionaries; he had no use for "natural rights"; and the "liberalism" which he espoused was quite different from the compulsion which the Jacobins and Napoleon practiced. While the latter emphasized the collective power of popular sovereignty, Bentham stressed the liberty of individuals under any sovereignty. Bentham lived on after the downfall of Napoleon, foreshadowing the essentially nineteenth-century liberalism which, being a protest against tyranny whether of aristocrats or of democrats, could evoke a ready response from romantic individualists.

Still another and far more important factor contributing to the rise of romanticism was the spread of nationalism during the Napoleonic era. Nationalism then appeared, it will be recalled, in Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland, Norway, Finland, Greece, and Serbia, and was mightily quickened in France and Great Britain.² Everywhere its devotees displayed patriotic emotions and sentiments; usually they extolled the common people of their respective nationalities; and frequently they ransacked historical records to find evidence of their nations' glorious deeds in the past. All these nationalist attitudes and endeavors harmonized nicely with romanticism. Nationalists like the Greek Korais or the Pole Kosciuszko or the Italian Foscolo or the German Fichte grew more and more romantic, and their romanticism won them many disciples.

The development of nationalist history was peculiarly helpful to the rise of romanticism. In the eighteenth century the outstanding historical writing had been cosmopolitan and critical in viewpoint; the best of it had dealt with far-off times or far-off places. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, a change began. Henceforth an increasing

¹ See above, pp. 544-545.

² See above, pp. 698-708, 710-711.

number of historians were writing about the past of their own nations, and, though they talked more and more about "scientific accuracy" in their "research," they tended to present the results of such research in manner most conducive to national pride. National pride, in turn, prompted more historical research of a romantic kind. Baron vom Stein, the great German patriot, sponsored a project for collecting and publishing all the source-materials for the medieval history of Germany; and the first volume of the resulting *Monumenta Germaniæ historica* was published in 1826 under the editorship of a famous scholar, G. H. Pertz. In England, parliament in 1800 appointed a "Record Commission" to collect and publish the "chronicles and memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the middle ages." In France, Guizot, a romantic "liberal" statesman, inaugurated in 1834 a similar series for his country.¹ And paralleling all this interest and work in national history, was the intensified study of the various national languages. Philologists joined with historians to centre the attention of many intellectuals on national origins in the middle ages, and the new absorption in medieval history was itself, let us emphasize, a reaction against "classicism." It was a support for "romanticism."

Finally, we must refer to a marked revival of supernatural religion in the early part of the nineteenth century. The eighteenth century, as we have pointed out,² had been, for many intellectuals, a century of natural religion, of Religious
Revival deism and atheism, and of scepticism about supernatural Christianity, Protestant and Catholic; and many of the French revolutionaries had imagined that they could fairly easily blot out Christianity altogether. But while a considerable number of succeeding "radicals" and "liberals" retained an eighteenth-century repugnance to organized religion, and while, therefore, there could be no such universal European acceptance of supernatural Christianity in the nineteenth century as there had been in the middle ages or in early modern times, the fact

¹ This series, supported by successive French governments since 1834, is known as the *Collection de documents inédits*; it numbers more than 280 volumes. The corresponding British undertaking was in the hands of the "record commission" from 1800 to 1837 and of the "master of the rolls" thereafter; it has eventuated in the publication, to date, of 243 volumes, commonly called the "Rolls series." The German series of *Monumenta* now embraces 120 volumes.

² See above, pp. 518-525.

was obvious in the first part of the new century that a goodly number of intellectuals, as well as a preponderant part of the masses, were recovering faith in supernatural religion and returning to the practice of Christianity. The fact was also obvious that this religious revival was closely associated with the rise of romanticism.

The disillusionment about "reason" helped to create not only the romantic reaction but also the religious revival. The "idealism" of Fichte and Hegel operated somewhat to the same end. And a prime factor in the religious revival as well as in the romantic reaction was the growth of nationalism. Nationalist intellectuals, romantically admiring the "common people," observed that the common people were religious; or romantically lauding the middle age, they discovered that the middle age was the "age of faith." Fichte and Hegel maintained that Protestant Christianity was an integral part of "Germanism." Chateaubriand, a romantic French nobleman, in his brilliant and popular *Genius of Christianity* (1801), extolled Catholicism as the begetter of the highest art and the custodian of the best patriotism.

Conservatives particularly turned to Christianity as a bulwark against revolution, and throughout the era of Metternich there was much talk in reactionary circles of the union of altar and throne. In Britain, since the *Reflections* of Edmund Burke, deism had been losing and pietism had been gaining ground: the established Anglican Church was becoming less "broad" and more "evangelical"; Methodism was growing; and even a Catholic revival was imminent. On the Continent the Tsar Alexander based his Holy Alliance (1815) on the "principles" of historic Christianity, and King Frederick William III of Prussia sought to strengthen Protestant Christianity by uniting the Lutheran and Calvinist churches in his realm (1817).

Especially noteworthy was the Catholic revival of the period. Pope Pius VII (1800-1823) won general respect by his dignified resistance to Napoleon and general sympathy by the persecution to which Napoleon subjected him. During his pontificate, more-

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Tivoli," an example of naturalistic romanticism, is from an engraving by a famous eighteenth-century Italian artist, Giovanni Battista Piranesi (1727-1778). On Piranesi, see above, p. 566.





over, he was well served by an able, pious, and conciliatory secretary, Cardinal Consalvi; and he was aided in his work of reconstruction by the general religious revival of the age. In 1814 he recovered Rome and the other temporal states of the church in central Italy, and in the same year he formally reconstituted the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) throughout Christendom.¹ With the restored Bourbon king of France he continued the concordat which he had signed with Napoleon Bonaparte in 1802, and with other traditionally Catholic states he concluded similar concordats in the years following 1815. With Protestant Prussia he negotiated a friendly agreement (1821) for the regulation of Catholic affairs in that country. There were numerous conversions of intellectuals during the pontificate of Pius VII,² and he almost lived to witness the emancipation of Catholics in Great Britain (1829).

Pius VII
and the
Catholic
Restora-
tion

Of course the religious revival was only one phase of the rise of romanticism. Indeed, there were almost as many phases of this new phenomenon as there were individual romanticists. The one thing which romanticists had in common was an emotional sentimental reaction against "classicism" and against the rationalism which in the eighteenth century had been associated with "classicism." They differed about everything else. Some romanticists were ardently Catholic or Protestant; others were zealously anti-Christian. Some were absorbed in the middle ages; others, in nature. Some were reactionary or conservative; others were liberal or revolutionary. Most were nationalist, though in many different ways.

Varieties
of Roman-
ticism

A "romantic" outlook upon life and art, of course, had been foreshadowed in the eighteenth century, prior to the French Revolution. In Great Britain, the landscape painting of Wilson and the sentimental novels of Richardson, as well as the homely

¹ On the earlier suppression of the Jesuits, see above, pp. 528-529.

² In 1817 appeared a famous book in praise of the papacy by a French reactionary scholar, Count Joseph de Maistre. De Maistre argued that the pope was infallible in matters of faith and morals and that the true cure for all existing ills was the recognition of the pope as the supreme and inspired head of all Christian nations. The book created a deep impression, and those who accepted its thesis were commonly called "ultramontanes" ("persons who look beyond the mountains").

NOTE. The picture opposite, "La Patrie," an example of nationalistic romanticism, is from a group of statuary by Jean François Rude (1784-1855), on the Arch of Triumph at Paris.

dialect verse of Robert Burns and the make-believe medieval ballads of Thomas Chatterton, had been "romantic." In France, something of the same tendency had been displayed by the affected rustic background of Watteau's pictures and by the writings of Rousseau in praise of nature and liberty and common people. In Italy the engravings of Piranesi and in Germany the early literary works of Lessing and Goethe had been similarly romantic.¹

On the eve of the nineteenth century, just when Napoleon Bonaparte was establishing his military dictatorship, romanticism blossomed, suddenly and almost simultaneously, in the national literatures of England, Germany, and France. In 1798 two English poets, Coleridge and Wordsworth, published the joint volume of *Lyrical Ballads*. Coleridge sought to show that common human emotions and mystical religious feelings can provide themes for beautiful poetry, while Wordsworth endeavored to prove that commonplace subjects in nature can be used for like purpose. In the same year two Germans, the brothers Schlegel, founded at Jena a special journal, the *Athenæum*, for the propagation of romantic ideas of liberty and revolutionary forms of art. Three years later, in 1801, a disillusioned French nobleman, Chateaubriand, published the highly colored *Genius of Christianity* and the sentimental Indian tale of *Atala*. Fame speedily attached to all these pioneer romantic undertakings, and soon the number of romantic poets and novelists (and historians) was legion.

It was in English poetry that romanticism took earliest and strongest hold. In the midst of the Napoleonic wars, Coleridge was writing such mystically emotional poems as *The Ancient Mariner*, *Kubla Khan*, and *Christabel*; Wordsworth was sentimentalizing nature in such poetical descriptions as *The Prelude* and *The Excursion*; and Sir Walter Scott, aristocrat and Tory, was acquiring popularity with his long historical ballads of Scottish love and prowess—*Marmion*, *Lady of the Lake*, etc. Then, in the first years of the era of Metternich, flourished three short-lived but very famous English poets—

¹ See above. pp. 565-566, 570-572.

Byron, Shelley, and Keats. Keats wrote largely on classical themes, but his manner was romantic and his celebrated *Eve of St. Agnes* was very romantic. Shelley's romanticism was reflected in his passionate, and often unreasoning, songs against tyranny and in behalf of freedom; he was the apostle of a radical, almost anarchistic romanticism. Byron, a nobleman but a rebel against the conventions of society and morality, wrote stirring poetry which brought him wide and loud acclaim as the leading spirit of radical and revolutionary romanticism; Byron proved the faith that was in him by dying in the cause of Greek nationalism.

On a lower literary plane in Britain at this time was Thomas Moore, Irish in nationality and Whig in politics. Moore's *Lalla Rookh* (1816), being extremely sentimental, was even more popular than Coleridge's *Kubla Khan*; and his series of Irish lays and ditties, being mournfully nationalist, enraptured even English ears.

In the meantime, thanks largely to Sir Walter Scott, the English novel was becoming romantic too. Scott abandoned poetry in 1814, and thenceforth until his death in 1832 he rigorously applied himself to the production of the vast series of Waverley novels. These novels, dealing in the main with romantic episodes in the history of Scotland, were probably more widely read and more influential than any other fiction of the nineteenth century. They put a glamour on the middle ages and did for the historical romanticism of the nineteenth century what Richardson's novels had done for the pretty romanticism of the preceding century.

The
English
Romantic
Novel: Sir
Walter
Scott

Closely following Scott's work came the romantic novels of an American, James Fenimore Cooper. In 1823 Cooper inaugurated the romance of sea-adventure with his *Pilot*; and in the same year, with his *Pioneers*, he introduced the famous *Leather-stocking Tales* of frontier and Indian life in central New York. These and succeeding novels of Cooper seized the fancy of the reading public throughout Europe as well as in America and were speedily translated into most European languages.

James
Fenimore
Cooper

Simultaneously, romanticism was supplanting classicism in German literature. The Schlegels continued their propaganda

in behalf of the new literary and æsthetic vogue, and one of them, Friedrich Schlegel, was influenced by it in curious ways:

German Romantic Literature he became an enthusiastic medievalist, joined the Catholic Church, whipped up patriotic sentiment in Austria during the war of 1809, and after 1815 became a popular lecturer on history and art at Vienna and a staunch upholder of the Holy Alliance and the régime of Metternich. Meanwhile all sorts of Germans fell under the spell of romanticism. The idealist philosophy of Fichte and Hegel took on a romantic complexion. Schiller followed up his classical *Don Carlos* with his romantic historical drama of *William Tell* (1804). Goethe, who had been a herald of romanticism in the eighteenth century and had then won international fame as a classicist, lived on until 1832; his *Faust*, which he completed shortly before his death, was a romantic masterpiece and has remained Germany's most famous drama. At the same time Franz Grillparzer, the greatest dramatic poet of Austria and a chronic misanthrope, was romantically borrowing ideas and forms from Spain and was writing historical dramas and gruesome fate-tragedies. At about the same time, too, the Bavarian Richter (usually known by his Christian names "Jean Paul"), eccentric, humorous, and deeply religious, was producing voluminous novels which were so sentimental as to be mushy but which were read avidly by his generation.

In romantic vein, also, were the patriotic verses of Arndt and Körner, which during the years of "Prussian regeneration" nerved German nationalists for the War of Liberation against Napoleon. And foremost among the romantic lyric poets who arose in Germany during the era of Metternich, mention must be made of Heine and Uhland. Heine, of Jewish family, began as an admirer of the Schlegels, a hero-worshipper of Napoleon, and a disciple of Hegel, and in Germany in the decade of the 1820's he wrote his best works—delightful folk-songs and witty travel-books; subsequently he lived in exile at Paris, sickly and increasingly satirical. Uhland composed graceful ballads, the most celebrated of which were in furtherance of German patriotism and in imitation of what he thought was medieval, and in his later years he devoted himself mainly to the collecting of German folk-myths and folk-songs of earlier centuries.

The literature of Latin Europe—France, Italy, and Spain—was not so quickly or so completely dominated by romanticism as was the literature of Germany and England, perhaps because the countries of Latin Europe were too close to the source of “classical” inspiration. Romanticism did have some literary apostles in these countries, however. In Italy, Foscolo’s ode to Napoleon, his patriotic invocations of Dante and other great Italians of the past, and his translation of Sterne’s *Sentimental Journey* were quite romantic, but Foscolo was obliged to flee Italy in 1816 and spent the last years of his life in England.¹ In France, Chateaubriand’s romantic outpourings about the beauties of primitive nature and North American Indians and historic Christianity were supplemented by the sentimental novels of Madame de Staël, the daughter of the Swiss banker Necker, who had been finance-minister to Louis XVI at the beginning of the French Revolution.² Madame de Staël’s *Delphine* (1802) and *Corrine* (1807) enjoyed a wide popularity in their day, but their authoress was suspect in France. She was closely watched by Napoleon’s police and repeatedly exiled from Paris; she wrote an elaborate work in romantic praise of Germany; and her last days (1816–1817) were solaced by visits from that romantic English revolutionary, Lord Byron. It was not until the 1830’s and 1840’s—late in the era of Metternich—that romanticism was adopted by a considerable number of first-rate literary men in France and Italy.

Among intellectuals in Russia, on the other hand, romanticism penetrated soon after 1815. The outcome of the Napoleonic wars served to strengthen the cultural, as well as political, ties between Russia on one side and Germany and England on the other, and it is not surprising therefore that Russian literature, which became distinguished after 1815, should reflect the romantic spirit then rising in England and Germany. The Tsar Alexander I, brought up in the “enlightenment,” turned romantic and set the pace for other Russian intellectuals. The first great literary figure of Russia was Pushkin, a contemporary of Alexander and an admirer of both Byron and Napoleon. Pushkin’s poems were in the romantic manner. His tragedy of *Boris Godunov* (1825) was in

Halting
Develop-
ment of
Romantic
Literature
in Latin
Europe

Foscolo

Madame
de Staël

Russian
Romantic
Literature

Pushkin

¹ See above, p. 699.

² See above, pp. 593–594.

imitation of Shakespeare. And in his last years he wrote a romantic epic about the defeat of the Swedes by Peter the Great and a Byronic poem of Russian nationalism. Pushkin appropriately died in a duel.

Somewhat younger than Pushkin was Gogol, a "liberal" romanticist, who gained distinction by his tales of country life among Ukrainians and Cossacks. His masterpiece, **Gogol** *Dead Souls* (1842), comprised a series of humorous, though unfavorable, sketches of Russian provincial society. Gogol, in later life, turned to asceticism and mysticism and went on a religious pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

Painting, like literature, was affected by the rise of romanticism. At the very time when David, Ingres, and Lawrence were exemplifying the great classical tradition, certain other and **Romantic** equally great painters were repudiating it. For ex-
Painting ample, the Spaniard Goya, the greatest and most original of all eighteenth-century painters,¹ living on into the nineteenth century and sharing his countrymen's patriotic aversion to Napoleon and the French, transformed his "enlightened" anti-Bourbonism and anti-clericalism into something resembling romanticism. At least, Goya's terrible depicting of the atrocities of French soldiers in Spain appealed directly to emotion and feeling and indirectly helped to create sympathy for the victims.²

More purposefully romantic were two nature-painters of England—Constable (1776-1837) and Turner (1775-1851)—and **Nature-** the French historical painter Delacroix (1798-1863).
Painting: Constable was one of the most popular painters of
Constable nature that the world has ever known; he was the
and Wordsworth of the brush; his *Salisbury Cathedral* and
Turner *Dedham Vale*, for example, were masterpieces of romantic sentiment. Turner was more varied and more provocative in his tastes. He was interested in ancient Carthage, in modern Venice in medieval Scotland. He pictured the sea and rivers, sunsets and Venetian scenes, with curious and sometimes bizarre coloring.

Delacroix, the son of a foreign minister of the revolutionary French republic, became in the 1820's, under the influence of Constable and Byron, the pioneer of romantic painting in France.

¹ See above, pp. 564-565.

² See the picture by Goya facing p. 669.

The subjects which Delacroix treated were historical and nationalist rather than "natural": Dante and Virgil, with medieval setting; *Sardanapalus*, from Byron's poem; incidents from the contemporary struggle for Greek independence; exploits of French "liberals" or French soldiers.¹

**Patriot-
Painting:
Delacroix**

For all his paintings he employed glowing colors, in contrast with the sombre restraint of the classicists. Delacroix was commissioned in 1836 to decorate the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. He was the forerunner of the vast number of painters who during the ensuing century filled public buildings with fanciful pictures of military victories and other glorious deeds of national history.

Musical art, even more than painting, felt the influence of romanticism. For it was a romantic spirit which possessed Beethoven, and Beethoven, both in his work and in his influence, was one of the greatest musicians that ever lived. Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827) came of a family of musicians which had emigrated from the southern Netherlands to Germany, and his life, most of which was spent in Vienna, he consecrated to music. He was singularly reflective and grew more and more "other-worldly," perhaps because he was unhappy in this world; and in musical art he was undoubtedly a genius. He took some lessons from Mozart and Haydn,² and at first he was content in his compositions to preserve the classical tradition of Mozart, whom he greatly admired. Presently, however, he developed a romantic style peculiar to himself, and employed it for various romantic themes. His *Third Symphony* (Eroica), composed in 1804, was in hero worship of Napoleon. His *Fifth Symphony*, composed in 1806 and first played in 1809, was aglow with the new fires of German nationalism. His *Seventh Symphony* was written in honor of the Congress of Vienna and in celebration of the overthrow of Napoleonic despotism. In addition to his immortal

**Romantic
Music**

Beethoven

¹ For an example, see the picture facing p. 790.

² For Mozart, see above, p. 575. Haydn (1732-1809), of Yugoslav (Croatian) stock, was for many years in the musical service of a wealthy and aristocratic Hungarian family—the Esterhazys—and, with the exception of brief visits to England, lived his last years at Vienna. Haydn wrote most of his numerous masses, operas, sonatas, and quartets in the pompous classical manner of the eighteenth century. Towards the last, however, he showed nationalist and romantic tendencies, as in his *Austrian National Anthem* (1797) and in his oratorios of the *Creation* (1799) and the *Seasons* (1801).

symphonies, Beethoven wrote sonatas, concertos, masses, and an opera (*Fidelio*)—all matchless in profundity of feeling.

Romantic music based its greatness on Beethoven, but a good deal of its immediate popularity on three other Germans—Weber,

**Weber,
Schubert,
and Men-
delssohn** Schubert, and Mendelssohn. Carl Maria von Weber (1786–1826) was thoroughly romantic: he wrote music for Körner's patriotic verses, a cantata on *War and Victory* (1815), and three notable operas—*Der Frei-*

schütz, produced at Berlin in 1821 on the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo and on the occasion of the opening of King Frederick William III's new opera-house; *Euryanthe*, founded on a medieval romance; and *Oberon*, dealing with fairy-land. Franz Schubert (1797–1828), a native of Vienna and an admirer of Shakespeare and the romantic poetry of Byron and Heine, wrote songs unsurpassed in melody and beauty. Felix Mendelssohn (1809–1847), the grandson of Moses Mendelssohn,¹ was a youthful prodigy and immensely popular in his day; his overture to Shakespeare's *Midsummer Night's Dream*, his *Songs without Words*, his oratorios, and his *Reformation Symphony* were pronouncedly romantic in inspiration and appeal.

Italian opera, too, during these early years of the nineteenth century turned away from "classical" models and took for themes

**Rossini,
Bellini,
and
Donizetti** either the historical novels of contemporary romanticists or the romantic doings of common people of the time. Three Italians were particularly prominent in the new movement—Rossini, Bellini, and Donizetti.

All of them acquired distinction in Italy, and all spent their last years in Paris. The sparkle of Rossini's *Barber of Seville* (1816) and *William Tell* (1829), the melancholy sweetness of Bellini's *Norma* and *La Sonnambula* (1831), and the fluent melody of Donizetti's *Lucia di Lammermoor* (1836, based on Scott's historical novel) were very popular and quite romantic. Paris, the scene of the operatic triumphs of these Italians, became the capital of European opera, and Napoleon's nephew subscribed handsomely to the erection there of the finest opera-house in the world.

In fine, it will be noted that during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, while traditional "classicism" retained its supremacy in architecture and sculpture and a considerable hold on painting, a revolutionary "romanticism" was rising and

¹ See above, pp. 531–532.

becoming dominant in music and literature and partially so in painting. During the period Europe was the scene of many an art-bout between "classicists" and "romanticists," and of wordy quarrels among the latter as to whether they should look to nature or to history, just as it was the scene of a veritable epidemic of political conflicts between "liberals" and "conservatives." To this epidemic we may now attend.

"Romanticists" and "Classicists"

4. THE EPIDEMIC OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS

Metternich, seated in Vienna and presiding over the extensive Habsburg dominions and the peace of all Europe, might listen to the symphonies of Beethoven or the songs of Schubert and read the novels of Scott or the poems of Byron, but he was no romanticist and no nationalist. He had no sympathy with novelties. In tastes he was an old-fashioned classicist and in policies he was a reactionary.

Metternich's "Classicism" and "Conservatism"

Metternich was well aware of the unrest throughout Europe, not only in the domain of art, but in the realm of political and social thought. He understood that the principles of the French Revolution and those of English "radicals," like Jeremy Bentham and William Cobbett, had infected many of his contemporaries. He knew that a large number of intellectuals and middle-class persons and even some artisans and peasants were calling themselves "liberals" and were threatening everywhere to subvert the old régime of class-distinctions, established religion, absolute monarchy, and dynastic states, in favor of a new régime of social equality, ecclesiastical disestablishment, constitutional monarchy, and national states. He would counteract these liberals. He would conserve the old régime.

Metternich's first and greatest care was to make the Habsburg empire an example to all Europe of what a conservative state should be. He would have in his empire no nationalism and no liberalism. To check incipient nationalism among the diverse subject peoples, he jailed nationalist agitators and strategically garrisoned particular parts of the realm with Habsburg regiments of alien nationality: Hungary, with Croatian Yugoslavs; German Austria, with Czechs; Bohemia, with Germans; the Italian prov-

Metternich's Conservative Policies in the Austrian Empire

inces, with Hungarians; and Austrian Poland (Galicia), with Italians. To combat the danger of infiltration of revolutionary ideas from abroad, he erected a wall of tariffs and censors around the Habsburg lands. To prevent the rise of liberalism at home, he rigidly supervised the press, strengthened the police, and confirmed the preëminence of conservative ecclesiastics in the schools. Even the slight liberalism in Grillparzer's dramas was deleted by governmental censors, and Austria's foremost dramatist cynically ceased to write. Only music escaped Metternich's interference.

This conservative policy was accompanied by economic stagnation in the Austrian Empire. Agriculture, still by far the most important pursuit of all the Habsburg peoples, was hampered, as in France before the Revolution, by the surviving serfdom of peasants and the continuing feudal privileges of a proud landed aristocracy which no longer gave any equivalent service to the public weal. Trade languished on account of the system of high tariffs at the frontier and of special customs at interior points. And inequality of assessment, waste in collection, and extravagance in expenditure rendered the imperial taxes extremely burdensome for the common people. Liberals there were in Austria, and existing economic conditions played into their hands. Yet, it was not until 1848 that they dared to rise against Metternich and break the chains with which he had bound the Habsburg Empire to reaction.

In the meantime, next to Metternich's solicitude for the immediate dominions of the Habsburg crown, was his anxiety so to dominate Italy and Germany as to stamp out any political or social movements which might spread thence into Austria and tend to undermine the institutions which he championed. And the territorial settlements of 1815 were such as to enable him to exercise the desired domination.

In his relations with the German states, Metternich encountered little trouble. Austria possessed the presidency of the new German confederation and could always count upon the support of the princes of the smaller states who were instinctively jealous of Prussia. By this means Metternich effectually blocked repeated attempts to fulfill the promise of article XIII of the confederation's constitution that "a representative form of government shall be adopted in the federative states." In several states

**Metternich's
Support of
Conservatism
throughout
Germany**

of southern Germany, where the tradition of alliance with France kept liberalism very much alive, the princes, it is true, deemed it expedient to grant charters¹ resembling that accorded by Louis XVIII to the French people, and to retain the Napoleonic code of laws, but in almost every case harsh game-laws, restrictions on the press, and maintenance of many social abuses kept up a smoldering discontent on the part of liberals; and Metternich used his influence to prevent further reforms.

In northern and central Germany, reaction was more pronounced. Here, with the exception of the high-minded duke of Saxe-Weimar, every prince evaded whatever promises of constitutional government he had made during the patriotic period of the War of Liberation. An often-cited case was that of the old elector of Hesse-Cassel, who, after spending eight years in exile, returned with the phrase, "I have been sleeping these years," and, with the aid of his soldiers in their eighteenth-century powder and pigtails, proceeded to restore the old régime in its entirety. Perhaps King Frederick William III of Prussia had been quite sincere in his promise to grant a charter to his people, but he was a timid soul, easily frightened by the slightest difficulties, and he always considered it an honor to defer to the superior judgment of Metternich and the Austrian emperor. Besides, Prussia had immediately to deal with the task of improving her finances, bettering her military system, and welding together the new territories which the congress of Vienna had secured her. One notable economic reform was actually accomplished in 1818 by the abolition of provincial tariffs and the establishment of free trade within Prussia.

Yet, within all the German states the spirit of liberalism evoked by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic storms was still alive. The bourgeoisie desired to participate in government. The lower classes wanted social reform. Patriots in every walk of life yearned for a great and glorious, united Germany. No coercion availed to stamp out the embers of unrest. Especially in the universities liberalism thrived. Students formed secret societies, which, under the names of *Tugendbund* and *Burschenschaft*, made noisy demonstrations that caused uneasiness alike in Berlin and in Vienna. Thus the Wart-

Persistence of Liberalism in Germany

¹ Notably in Bavaria (1818), Württemberg (1817, but soon suspended), and the small Thuringian states.

burg festival in October, 1817,¹ which was attended by nothing more dangerous than undergraduate hilarity and a solemn burning, in imitation of Martin Luther, of various odd emblems of the old régime, was magnified by Metternich into a rebellion and drew down upon the grand-duke of Saxe-Weimar the joint protest of the reactionary powers. Two years later, the assassination of the dramatist Kotzebue, a prominent conservative spy in the service of Russia, by a liberal student named Karl Sand, clinched the matter. Metternich, assured of Prussian aid, convoked a special meeting of German statesmen at Carlsbad to concert action against liberalism.

The result was the promulgation of the famous Carlsbad decrees by the German federal diet (September, 1819). These
The Carlsbad Decrees against Liberalism contained detailed provisions for supervising university professors and students and muzzling the press, forbidding the grant of any constitution "inconsistent with the monarchical principle," and establishing a central committee at Mainz to investigate "the origin and manifold ramifications of the revolutionary plots and demagogical associations directed against the existing constitution and the internal peace both of the union and of the individual states."

The following years were uneventful in Germany. The Mainz committee, though hampered by the mutual jealousies of some of the princes, proved effective enough in preventing all free expression of opinion, and the official "curators" of the universities kept liberal enthusiasts in order. Metternich's conservative hold on Germany seemed complete.

Hardly less complete was Metternich's influence in the Italian states. Not only were Venetia and Lombardy administered as
Metternich's Conservative Influence in Italy integral parts of the Habsburg Empire, but Austrian princes ruled in the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena; the Austrian chancellor was on friendly terms with the papacy; and Ferdinand I, the Bourbon king of the Two Sicilies, reinstated in Naples by an Austrian army, had pledged himself by a secret article in the treaty of 1815 not to introduce methods of government incompatible with those in force in Austria's Italian possessions. In all these states, during

¹ The 300th anniversary of the publication of Luther's theses against indulgences (see above, p. 154), and the fourth anniversary of the Battle of the Nations (see above, p. 687).

the era of Metternich, the conduct of public business, thoroughly reactionary, gave full rein to the abuses of the old régime. A system which was burdensome when applied in Austria by natives to a traditionally contented populace, was worse when exercised in Italy by a foreign power over persons who had drunk deeply of an effervescent revolutionary stimulant imported from France. Victor Emmanuel I, the king of Sardinia, was the only ruler in the peninsula with exclusively Italian interests. But although he was joyfully acclaimed upon his restoration in Turin, he speedily yielded to his own inclinations and to the menacing representations of Metternich; he disavowed French reforms, and restored, as far as possible, conditions as they had been prior to 1789. Officially all Italy was reactionary.

Yet here, too, beneath the surface, liberalism seethed. The mass of peasantry, ignorant and influenced by the conservative clergy, were generally indifferent, but among the educated middle classes, the professional and business men, the double demand for constitutional government and for national independence grew ever louder. As in so many other countries, the Italian liberals employed underground means of agitation, and such secret societies as the *Carbonari* and Freemasons conducted a good deal of revolutionary propaganda. The *Carbonari* in Naples and Sicily alone numbered thousands. Against the nationalist and liberal aspirations of these Italians, Metternich was always able to use Austrian police and soldiers. The history of his Italian domination is in fact but an alternation of popular riots and military repression.

**Growth of
Liberalism
in Italy**

In 1820 there was a rebellion in Naples against the tyrannical Ferdinand I.¹ The king, deserted by his troops, subscribed to a constitution modelled after the Spanish instrument of 1812. But hardly had he taken the oath with gratuitous solemnity, when Metternich assembled the "Concert of Europe" in international congress at Troppau and proceeded with the eager support of the Prussian king and the Russian tsar to sanction the principle of intervention,² to denounce revolution, and to summon Ferdinand to appear before them. The next year, at the

**The
Neapolitan
Rebellion
of 1820
and its
Suppression**

¹ Ferdinand (1751-1825) IV of Naples, III of Sicily, I of the Two Sicilies; the third son of Charles III of Spain and, of course, a Bourbon. See the chart between pp. 280-281.

² For the Troppau protocol, see above, p. 733.

international congress of Laibach, King Ferdinand repudiated his oath and formally "invited" an Austrian army to march into Naples "to restore order." The campaign which followed was eminently satisfactory to Metternich. Neapolitan opposition collapsed; the constitution was abrogated; and Ferdinand, protected by Austrian bayonets, inaugurated an era of savage persecution. The Two Sicilies long maintained the reputation of being the worst governed state in Christendom.

Following closely upon the heels of the Neapolitan insurrection came a revolt in Piedmont. In 1821 soldiers mutinied and seized Turin; King Victor Emmanuel I abdicated in favor of his brother Charles Felix, and named Prince Charles Albert, next in line of royal succession, as regent. Charles Albert, who was in open sympathy with liberalism and a bitter opponent of Austria, at once proclaimed a constitution similar to the Spanish document of 1812,¹ but the speedy intervention of Austrian troops enabled Charles Felix to expel the liberal-minded regent and to reestablish absolutist government. Metternich proposed at the international congress of Verona (1822) to punish Charles Albert by depriving him of the right of succession to the throne of Sardinia and Piedmont, but Charles Felix successfully interposed the doctrine of "legitimacy," and Charles Albert soon manifested conversion to orthodox Metternichian conservatism by enlisting for service against liberalism in Spain. Italy, like Germany, appeared to be bound hand and foot to the triumphal reactionary chariot of Austria.

Metternich thus not only entrenched conservatism in the Austrian empire but successfully combated liberalism in Germany and Italy. By this time, too, he could count on the hearty cooperation of the Tsar Alexander, who for a time had appeared to be leaning ominously in the direction of liberalism.

The Tsar Alexander, it will be recalled, had given some evidences of a liberal disposition. He had advised the restored Bourbon king of France to issue a constitutional charter. He had confirmed the traditional national liberties and parliamentary authority of his new grand-duchy of Finland. He had taken steps to emancipate the Estonian and Latvian serfs in his Baltic provinces. He had concerted

The Piedmontese Revolt of 1821 and its Suppression

The Liberal Reputation of the Tsar Alexander

¹ See above, pp. 681-682.

with Czartoryski the reestablishment of a Polish national state with himself as king but with a liberal constitutional government. He had listened with apparent sympathy to the pleas of Baron vom Stein for the erection of a united liberal German state. For Russia proper, he had toyed with ideas of promulgating a written constitution, abolishing serfdom, and promoting popular education. He actually began the reform of governmental autocracy by creating an advisory council of the Russian Empire, and he effected educational improvement by founding some parish and normal schools, and by reorganizing the universities of Moscow, Vilna, and Dorpat and erecting new ones at St. Petersburg, Kazan, and Kharkov.

After 1815 Alexander's expressions of sympathy for liberalism grew fewer and cooler. Gradually the Russian tsar shifted his enthusiasm from political and social reform to religious revival and military show. And Metternich, while distrustful of Alexander's armaments, never neglected an opportunity to impress upon him the dangers of abetting liberalism. The more he made concessions to revolutionaries, the more they would demand. The more they were allowed to agitate, the more they would incite to disorder and violence. Consequently the only sure means of maintaining that Christian peace and charity on which the mystical Alexander had set his heart would be for Russia to join Austria in the stern, unrelenting suppression of liberalism.

Alexander's Conversion to Conservatism

A series of events confirmed the tsar's conversion: a revolutionary conspiracy among the officers of his own bodyguard (1818); the murder of the Russian agent Kotzebue by a German liberal (1819); the assassination of a nephew of Louis XVIII by a French liberal (1820); and insurrections and violences in Italy and Spain. At the international congress of Troppau (1820), Alexander confessed his earlier errors. "To-day," he told Metternich, "I deplore all that I said and did between the years 1815 and 1818. I regret the waste of time, which we must try to retrieve. You have correctly judged the state of affairs. Tell me what you desire and what you wish me to do, and I will do it."

Alexander became even more active than Metternich in devising and executing reactionary measures against the liberal movements in Germany, Italy, and Spain. The Holy Alliance

was practically transformed into an organization for policing Europe in the interest of conservatism.

Within Russia, Alexander sharply halted the reforms already begun. Nothing more was heard of constitutional government for the empire and of the abolition of serfdom. Indeed, during the last years of his reign, Alexander's chief concern was with his army, and for its recruitment and support he was as despotic over the Russian masses and as oppressive as Peter the Great. One result of this changed attitude of the tsar was a deepening disappointment among the little group of liberal intellectuals and especially among young army officers who had learned a good deal of French revolutionary doctrine during their campaigns in western Europe. Secret societies sprang up, and liberal agitation in Russia assumed a character somewhat similar to that in Italy and Spain.

When Alexander died suddenly in December, 1825, the new revolutionary societies made an attempt to check the reaction.

The Liberal "Decembrist" Mutiny in Russia Opposing the late tsar's directions that he be succeeded by his second brother Nicholas in preference to his first brother, the erratic but liberal-minded Grand-Duke Constantine, they organized a mutiny among the troops quartered in St. Petersburg. "Constantine and Constitution" became the motto of the revolt, but Constantine speedily repudiated his friends, and Nicholas encountered no great trouble in restoring order and obtaining general recognition for himself. How superficial as yet was the liberal propaganda in Russia may be inferred from the well-attested fact that many of the mutinous soldiers believed that "Constitution" was Constantine's wife! The ringleaders of this December revolt, who were subsequently known as Decembrists, were severely punished by the new tsar. Conservatism was fully triumphant in Russia, as in Austria.

In Great Britain, also, conservatism (of a rather different sort) was seemingly triumphant. Here, it is true, there was no ab-

The Height of Aristocratic Conservatism in Great Britain solutist monarch and no cessation of constitutional government; the supremacy of parliament, established in the seventeenth century, still obtained. But the British parliament was aristocratic rather than democratic, and the French Revolution was not echoed in Britain by any social or political change. The nobles


retained their honors and privileges and vast estates. The Protestant Church of England remained a state-church with rich endowments and with rights of collecting taxes (tithes) from the people, monopolizing public education, and having official representation in the House of Lords. Indeed, the long and eventually successful struggle which Britain waged against revolutionary and Napoleonic France served, as we have seen,¹ to strengthen the patriotic devotion of the English masses to the "old régime" and thereby to enable the aristocratic parliament to enact "enclosures," "corn laws," and other legislation tending to increase the economic and political influence of the privileged governing classes.

Among these classes, it was the Tory faction which had conducted and won the war with France; and so great was the prestige which consequently accrued to it, that it remained in control of the British government for some time after 1815, conserving the institutions and practices of the past and resisting demands for reform. Its outstanding leaders now were Castlereagh, Wellington, and the prince-regent. From 1811 when hopeless insanity finally overtook the narrow-minded King George III, the influence of the crown was exercised by his son, the prince-regent, an unpopular fop whose rigid support of conservatism was as unwavering as his father's, but whose cynical, sensual immorality was in glaring contrast to his father's simple domestic virtues. The accession of the prince-regent to the throne on his father's death in 1820 changed the form but not the fact: George IV remained until his death in 1830 the stout advocate of reaction. In Castlereagh and Wellington, the two Anglo-Irish noblemen and landowners, he possessed powerful allies. Castlereagh (1769-1822), though never technically prime minister, wielded from 1812 till his suicide in 1822 an influence such as few ministers have ever exercised; gifted and affable, he directed the foreign policy and controlled the House of Commons. Wellington (1769-1852), though not in conspicuous civil employment until after Castlereagh's death, contributed the renown of his military exploits and the prestige of his blunt, outspoken personality to upholding as far as possible in England the reactionary cause he had so ably headed on the Continent. Such were the men who

The
Prince-
Regent—
George IV

Castle-
reagh and
Wellington

¹ See above, pp. 710-717.



**THE BRITISH EMPIRE
IN 1815**

Hagstrom Company Inc., N. Y. C.

guided the destinies of Great Britain during the first fifteen years of the era of Metternich.

Against the continuing reaction and narrow class legislation of the Tory government, many-sided opposition arose between 1815 and 1830. The resulting conflict was the parallel in Great Britain to the struggle between liberals and conservatives on the Continent.

Rising
Liberalism
in Britain

Several factions or classes, for one reason or another, and in this or that respect, opposed the Tory régime. There was, first of all, the group of "radicals," who, like William Godwin (1756-1836),¹ entertained elaborate theories of a complete social readjustment, or, like Thomas Paine, were indoctrinated with the teaching of the French revolutionaries, or, like Jeremy Bentham, labored for a "utilitarian" liberty and democracy. This group lived on, despite governmental attempts to suppress it, recruited mainly from middle-class theorists, small shopkeepers, and self-educated artisans. At one extreme its radicalism appeared in the passionate pleas for liberty and freedom of a Shelley and a Byron, and at the other in the coarse invective of a pugnacious, egotistical pamphleteer like William Cobbett.² Of these "radicals" hardly any two were exactly agreed upon a full scheme of reform, but all were of one mind in assailing existing institutions. Many of them advocated a few simple measures in the direction of political democracy such as would seem commonplace if not antiquated to present-day Englishmen and Americans. But by the governing classes and patriotic masses of Great Britain during the era of Metternich, the radicals were deemed unpatriotic and dangerous, and radicalism became almost synonymous with treason. Radicalism is a "spirit," wrote the vicar of Harrow in 1820, "of which the first elements are a rejection of Scripture, and a contempt of all the institutions of your country; and of which the results, unless averted by a merciful Providence, must be anarchy, atheism, and universal ruin."

The
"Radicals"

¹ Godwin's chief writing—*The Inquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793)—taught the perfectibility of man, the inherent evil in every form of government, and the right of every man to the use of the soil. He has been hailed as an early socialist, and, more justly, as the father of modern anarchism. His wife was Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), one of the earliest advocates of feminism. His influence was noteworthy on such men-of-letters as Shelley, Byron, and Bulwer-Lytton.

² See above, p. 715, note.

A second British faction arrayed against the Tory régime was that of the Catholics, who for centuries had been the victims of bigotry and persecution. Reduced to a small minority in England and Scotland, they still constituted a large majority of the inhabitants of Ireland, yet throughout the kingdom they were denied political and civil rights. Few Catholics entertained sympathy for the French Revolution, but in agitating for their own emancipation they found themselves in temporary alliance with the radicals. The Protestant dissenters too, although by no means in such a plight as the Catholics, protested vigorously against a government which forced them to pay tithes for the support of the Anglican Church and which not only excluded them from public office but, always in the interests of the same Anglican Church, refused them a university education.

Thirdly, there was a criticism of the Tory government and its aristocratic policies on the part of middle-class manufacturers who at this time were beginning to use machinery and were becoming wealthy and numerous. Jeremy Bentham's political ideas, as well as Adam Smith's economic doctrines, appealed to them, and their cause was even voiced in parliament by some of the aristocratic (Whig) minority, who used it for political capital against the dominant Tories. Eventually, as we shall later discover, this class of industrialists—raised to an eminent position by the Industrial Revolution—was to supply the ablest and most influential apostles of liberalism.

Finally, among the strange allies of British liberalism, were a large number of the poorest and most ignorant urban working-men, whom the use of new industrial machinery threw out of employment. These workingmen avenged themselves by engaging in riots—the so-called Luddite¹ riots—and attempting to smash the new machines and destroy the new factories. Such riots occurred as early as 1811 and

¹ "The name [Luddite] had a curious origin. More than thirty years before there lived in Leicestershire one Ned Ludd, a man of weak intellect, the village butt. Irritated by his tormentors, the unhappy fellow one day pursued one of them into an adjoining house. He could not find the lad who had been mocking him; but in his fury he broke a couple of stocking frames which were on the premises. When frames were afterwards broken, it was the common saying that Ludd had broken them; and thus Ned Ludd, the village idiot, gave a name to one of the most formidable series of riots of the nineteenth century." (Sir Spencer Walpole.)

reached their climax in 1816; they were sternly suppressed and their leaders put to death. But some of the "radicals" appreciated and sympathized with the plight of the "Luddites," and British workingmen gave numerical strength to the radicals' demand for reform.

The reactionary Tory parliament adopted vigorous methods against radicalism. Following an attack on the prince-regent in 1817, earlier repressive measures were revived and extended. The right of habeas corpus was withdrawn; arbitrary arrest and arbitrary punishment were restored, at least temporarily. Likewise, the freedom of the press was restricted; justices of the peace were instructed to issue warrants for the arrest of any person charged on oath with publishing "blasphemous or seditious libels." Prosecutions ensued so thick and fast that Cobbett, in order to avoid arrest and imprisonment, suspended his newspaper—the fiery, twopenny *Political Register*—and, "deprived of pen, ink, and paper," sailed for America.

Tory
Measures
against
Liberalism

Then, following a series of mass meetings of protest, one of which, at Manchester, was broken up by royal troops with the killing of six bystanders and the wounding of many others, the parliament enacted in 1819 the so-called Six Acts—the capstone and crown of reaction in Great Britain. The first of these acts forbade the practice of military exercises by unauthorized persons. The second provided for the speedy trial and drastic punishment of offenders. The third empowered magistrates to issue warrants for the search of arms in private houses. The fourth authorized the seizure of seditious or blasphemous libels and the banishment of their authors. The fifth regulated and restricted the right of public meeting. The sixth subjected all publications below a certain size to the heavy stamp duty on newspapers. With the exception of the third and fifth, all these Six Acts were designed to be permanent.

The Six
Acts

Whereupon, a handful of violent radicals formed in London the "Cato Street conspiracy" (1820) to assassinate the whole Tory cabinet. The conspiracy was discovered and five of its members were hanged. Reaction was supreme. Parliamentary reform seemed dead, and individual liberties appeared to be dying.

Soon, however, liberalism and the demand for reform revived and gathered new strength in Britain. Cobbett returned and

injected new energy into the "radicals." The Catholics found an heroic and gifted champion in Daniel O'Connell. The industrial middle classes, ever growing in numbers, clamored ever more loudly for parliamentary representation and for legislation favorable to the new machine industry; and in their clamors they were backed up by the urban working classes. On the other side, the scandalous domestic difficulties, culminating in an attempted divorce, between George IV and the unhappy Queen Caroline cost the king a good deal of patriotic devotion which he might otherwise have drawn upon for support of his reactionary policy; and the death of Castlereagh in 1822 transferred the direction of the Tory régime to younger colleagues who were less adamant for the *status quo*. Some of these, notably Canning and William Huskisson and Sir Robert Peel, were more interested in commerce than in agriculture, more identified with the newer industrial interests than with the traditional landed interests of the old Tory aristocracy; they could afford to compromise with "liberal" demands.

For example, it was for commercial reasons that Canning, as foreign minister after 1822, emphasized Castlereagh's policy of not coöperating with the Quadruple Alliance and the "Concert of Europe" in international suppression of liberalism. This did not mean that Canning, any more than Castlereagh, was a liberal in the internal affairs of Great Britain. It did mean, however, that Metternich could not count on British assistance against liberalism on the Continent, and it indicated that even reactionary Tories might be pushed along on the highway of liberal reform at home. In fact, towards the close of George IV's reign, the Tory parliament adopted some measures of reform: Protestant dissenters were freed from political disabilities (1828), and Catholics were at last admitted to parliament and to most offices in the government (1829).

Metternich, of course, regretted the unwillingness of Britain to coöperate with him in fighting liberalism in Europe, but he could hardly feel that Great Britain under its Tory régime was championing liberalism at home. Britain was not setting a bad example for would-be revolutionaries in Italy or Germany or Russia; and the old régime of these countries, Metternich felt, must be conserved at any cost.

**Turn of
the Tide
in Britain
toward
Liberalism**

**Commer-
cial Con-
sidera-
tions and
British
Foreign
Policy**

France caused Metternich far greater uneasiness. He knew only too well the havoc which the Revolution had wrought in the old régime of that country and the destruction which the career of Napoleon had threatened to mete out to the old régime of all Europe. He had helped to restore Louis XVIII to the throne of France, but, in the light of what happened when Napoleon returned from Elba, Metternich had no illusions as to Louis's popularity among the French people. He recognized that Louis, to retain his throne, would have to make concessions to liberalism, and yet he dreaded the effect of such concessions on the rest of Europe.

**France,
the Centre
of Acute
Conflict
between
Conserva-
tives and
Liberals**

When Louis XVIII reëntered Paris twenty days after the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, he found a badly divided France. At one extreme were the liberals, comprising not merely revolutionary theorists but certain bourgeois who had been beneficiaries of the abolition of privilege or of the confiscation of large estates and church lands, together with numerous Napoleonic veterans who had fought gloriously under the tricolor and were now desperate in defeat. At the opposite extreme were the conservatives—the reactionaries or “ultra-royalists”—nobles and clergy and old-fashioned folks in the southern and western provinces who had opposed the Revolution and who, dispossessed of their goods and expelled from their fatherland, or silenced by oppression, were now by the turn of events brought back in victory, eager for vengeance.

Between these two extreme factions, Louis XVIII, counting on the support of the French masses, continued after his second restoration, as after his first, to steer a middle course. Although he clung tenaciously to the forms of divine-right monarchy and the lily white flag of his family, he retained Napoleon's legal and administrative reforms and the Napoleonic institutions of the Legion of Honor, the Bank of France, the concordat, and the system of state-education. He recognized the new imperial nobility as on an equal footing with that of the old régime. He took no step to restore serfdom or feudalism or to undo the nationalist achievements of the French Revolution. He confirmed the charter which he had promulgated in 1814 and which enshrined liberal

**Louis
XVIII's
Policy of
Compro-
mise**

principles of representative government, religious freedom, and civil equality.¹

A fierce complaint went up at once from the French ultra-royalists. They besought the king, now that his very clemency had proved incapable of preventing the wretched episode of the Hundred Days, to revoke the charter, and when he turned a deaf ear to them they wreaked their vengeance on what liberals they could. For several months in 1815 there was a good deal of rioting and bloodshed, which, instigated by the enraged royalists, has passed into history under the designation of the "White Terror." The reactionaries prevailed upon Louis XVIII, in spite of his promise to punish only those who were declared by the Chambers to be traitors, to proscribe nearly sixty persons who had deserted to Napoleon during the Hundred Days. It was the irony of fate that the list was drawn up by the same crafty Fouché who had voted for the death of Louis XVI and had subsequently been the right-hand man of Napoleon in ferreting out royalist conspiracies. Thirty-eight of the proscribed were banished and a few were shot, including the illustrious Marshal Ney. In southern France hundreds of liberals fell victims to reactionary mobs. At Nîmes, where Protestants had espoused the cause of Napoleon, the murders took the form of a crusade for the extirpation of heresy. The despatch of an army into the affected regions was required to reestablish order and security.

In the midst of the White Terror, elections for the new French parliament were conducted. Many terrified liberals absented themselves from the polls, and the result was the return of a parliament of ultra-royalists, more conservative than the king. The questionable Talleyrand and Fouché were at once turned out of their ministerial posts, and for a year the so-called *chambre introuvable* directed affairs of state in a bitterly reactionary spirit. Laws were passed shackling the press, excepting several classes from amnesty, creating special arbitrary courts for trying cases of treason, and repealing the divorce provisions of the *Code Napoléon*. In 1816 Louis XVIII, fearing the effect of his furious friends upon the country at large, dissolved the *chambre introuvable*, and ordered new elections. This time the majority of the representatives proved to be moderate royalists, loyal to the charter and

¹ See above, pp. 690-691, 694.

the settlement of 1815 and in full sympathy with the conciliatory efforts of the king, while ultra-royalists and liberals constituted two small but warring minorities.

The years of the moderate royalists' control, from 1816 to 1820, were marked by consistent progress. Reorganization of the public finances was effected. The preparation of an annual budget of estimated expenditure and income, which had been largely farcical under the empire, now became an important part of the routine work of the Chambers. Large loans were floated in order more rapidly to pay off the indemnity to the allied conquerors of France, with such success that, in accordance with arrangements made at the international congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the last foreign troops were withdrawn from French soil in 1818, and France was once more recognized as a great power with a stable government. A new electoral law assured the preponderance of the bourgeoisie in the Lower Chamber by instituting a comparatively simple system of elections and requiring the payment of a sum of only 500 francs a year instead of 1,000 in direct taxes as a qualification for the exercise of the suffrage. Another measure based the recruiting of the French army for the ensuing fifty years upon the principle of national conscription. Finally, a generous press law was enacted. Such legislation and the concurrent maintenance of peace were gradually winning the business classes to the support of the Bourbon dynasty.

**Moderate
Royalists
in Control**

The period of liberal legislation was rudely interrupted early in 1820 by the assassination of the king's nephew by a fanatical liberal. The ultra-royalists, who were swept into power on the wave of popular indignation at this outrage, promptly returned, as might have been expected, to a policy of reaction and repression. They suspended the charter guaranties of individual liberty. They reestablished a strict censorship of the press. They strengthened the hold of the conservative Catholic clergy on the state educational system. In order to retain their majority in the Chamber, they modified the electoral law, by introducing a highly complicated scheme of election, by giving double suffrage to citizens who paid 1,000 francs annually in direct taxes, and by lengthening the duration of a parliament to seven years. They elaborated a system of espionage and employed the army to crush opposition and to

**The Ultra-
Royalists
Again in
Control**

root out such secret revolutionary societies as that of the "Charcoal-Burners" which was spreading from Italy among French liberals. With the approval of Metternich and the Continental powers they went to the length in 1823 of sending a French military expedition into Spain under command of another nephew of Louis XVIII to restore the tyrannical government of the Bourbon king of that country. Strange irony of fate that French arms, which had so recently carried the message of liberty, equality, and fraternity to the peoples of Europe, should be the weapon of divine-right monarchs in behalf of conservatism and reaction! Yet so unreasoning was the patriotic emotion which accompanied military success that the Spanish expedition actually increased the popular prestige of the ultra-royalists in France. When Louis XVIII died in 1824 the Bourbon dynasty seemed to be firmly reëstablished, with conservatism in the ascendant.

The leader of the French ultra-royalists ever since the Bourbon restoration had been the count of Artois, the late king's brother,¹ who now, as next of kin, succeeded to the throne under the title of Charles X. No family history can be more interesting or instructive than that of the three Bourbon brothers who at different times and under varying circumstances were obliged to deal with revolutionary forces in France—Louis XVI, Louis XVIII, and Charles X. The first-named was well-intentioned, religious, but fatally weak and influenced by others, and he lost his life by the guillotine. The second was hard-hearted, unprincipled, but clever and astute, and in the midst of the struggles of irreconcilable factions he rounded out a not inglorious reign of ten years. The last-named had the political misfortune to resemble more closely the first than the second, save only that he possessed great strength of will and a dogged determination quite distinctive of himself.

It had been the count of Artois who, with Marie Antoinette, had engineered the court intrigues against the Revolution in its earliest stages. It had been he who had headed the emigration of the nobles and clergy when their privileges were threatened by the Revolution. He it was who never tired of agitation against the revolutionaries and against Napoleon; and he it was who, on the triumphant return of his family and of the émigrés, encouraged the ultra-royalists in acts of retaliation. Yet personally he

**The Con-
servative
Charles X
of France**

¹ See above, pp. 615, 616.

was courteous and kindly, a loyal friend, and sincerely devoted to the cause of religion. Principles he had and cherished: union of the altar and the throne; revival of the institutions of the old régime, political, religious, social, and intellectual; detestation of revolutionary doctrines. "It is only Lafayette and I," he said, "who have not changed since 1789."

With ostentatious pomp becoming the dignity of an absolute divine-right monarch, Charles X was solemnly crowned at Rheims. With the assistance of the ultra-royalist majority in the Chambers he set to work to achieve his purposes. Further restrictions were imposed upon the freedom of the press. Many privileges were restored to the clergy. The Jesuits were allowed to return to France. The penalties for sacrilege and blasphemy were made more severe. An indemnity amounting to a billion francs was promised to the émigrés for the confiscation of their lands and privileges during the Revolution. Even a bill tending to undermine equality of inheritance and to reestablish the practice of primogeniture was debated. Surely, Metternich at Vienna could rejoice in the 1820's that even the French, under ultra-royalist auspices, were taking long strides toward the realization of the reactionary programme which was defined by a faithful minister of Charles X as "the reorganization of society, the restoration to the clergy of their weight in state affairs, and the creation of a powerful aristocracy surrounded with privileges."

The Conservative Programme of Charles X

In Spain during the same period neither the reaction nor the opposition to it was so veiled. When Ferdinand VII was restored to his throne in 1814, not through any efforts on his part but rather through the efforts of Wellington and the British and of his own patriotic subjects, he found a robust sense of nationalism and a constitutional government. It will be recalled that in 1812 the provisional *junta*, which was directing the national revolt against Joseph Bonaparte, adopted a written constitution that resembled the French instrument of 1791 both in its limitation of the royal power and in its abolition of feudal rights and class distinctions.¹ This constitution was largely the work of middle-class persons, scholars, theorists, and army officers—persons particularly influenced by the "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century

The Conservative Régime of Ferdinand VII in Spain

¹ See above, pp. 681-682.

and by the French Revolution. It had been tolerated by most Spaniards so long as it seemed necessary for the whole nation to present a united front against the French. But as soon as peace was restored and the national independence of the country assured, the nobles and clergy protested vehemently against the constitution. Taking advantage of these protests and of the ignorance or indifference of the mass of the peasantry, Ferdinand VII immediately declared the constitution of 1812 null and void, and abolished the cortes.

Surrounding himself with advisers drawn exclusively from officials of the old régime, the king at once instituted a thoroughly reactionary policy. With him there would be no compromise with revolutionary principles. The old system of absolute government was restored with all its inequalities and injustices. The privileges of the clergy and nobility, including exemption from taxation, were reaffirmed. Monasteries were reopened. The Jesuits were allowed to return. The Inquisition was reestablished. Individual liberties were taken away, and the press was placed under the strictest censorship. Liberals who had assisted in making the royal restoration possible were arbitrarily arrested and banished or thrown into prison. That not much blood was shed was due partly to the urgent entreaties of Wellington.

In all this Spanish reaction it will be noted that Ferdinand VII pursued a policy quite different from that of his Bourbon cousin, Louis XVIII, in France. Ferdinand was no more unscrupulous than Louis, but he was more vindictive and far less gifted with prudence and foresight. Instead of steering a middle course between extremist factions and seeking to consolidate the whole nation, he threw all his weight on the side of the reactionaries, while against the liberals he took such harsh measures that even Metternich in far-away Vienna, apprehensive of consequences, urged moderation. Instead of striving to repair the injuries inflicted by the Peninsular War and to husband his country's resources, he hampered trade and industry and, in addition, squandered enormous sums of money upon himself and his favorites. Instead of adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the Spanish colonies in America, which already were maintaining governments practically of their own making, instead of redressing their grievances, and bringing them once more into the bond of a great empire, he sorely neglected them at the outset, and, when it

was too late, he endeavored to subjugate them by force of arms. The results of Ferdinand's policy were apparent within five years of his restoration: a Spain hopelessly divided into the two camps of conservatives and liberals, each with its group of irreconcilables; grave scandals and abuses in administration; an army honeycombed with disaffection; a bankrupt treasury; and the American colonies in open, and apparently successful, revolt.

Throughout these five years, liberal agitation grew apace in Spain. Deprived of a free press and of the right of public meeting, the agitators gradually gravitated to such secret societies as the Carbonari and the Freemasons. The lodges were convenient centres of revolutionary propaganda, and their close affiliation and nation-wide extent enabled the liberals, by means of signs and grips and mysterious passwords, to communicate the teachings of liberty, equality, and fraternity to all the brethren. Among the irreligious or anti-clerical element of the middle class, the movement spread,—and likewise among the army officers,—until Spain faced civil war.

**Growth of
Liberal
Agitation
in Spain**

In 1819 a mutiny in the army which the king had assembled at Cadiz for the subjugation of the American colonies was the signal for a general insurrection which in the first two months of 1820 broke out in Seville, Barcelona, Saragossa, and the Asturias. In March, 1820, Ferdinand, quaking with fear, gave his royal oath to support the constitution of 1812 and appealed to the liberals in a pompous declaration: "Let us advance frankly, myself leading the way, along the constitutional path." The insurgents took him at his word and laid down their arms.

**The
Liberal
Uprising
against
Ferdinand VII**

The king's conversion was merely the reaction of cringing fear upon a cowardly and hypocritical nature. Ferdinand had no serious intention of keeping his pledges, and, although for two years (1820-1822) he was obliged to rule in accordance with the statutes of the newly convened cortes and under the direction of liberal ministers, he was busied, almost from the outset, in countenancing reactionary revolts against the new régime and in inditing confidential letters to the great powers, especially to his Bourbon cousin, the king of France, imploring foreign aid against the very government which he had solemnly sworn to uphold. Success soon crowned his intrigues. The liberals fell to

quarrelling among themselves; the clergy and nobles resisted the execution of reform legislation; the sincere and ardent Catholics—in Spain a goodly number and well disciplined—treated as sacrilege and blasphemy the anti-clerical tendencies of the new parliament. In many districts spasmodic riots became chronic and anarchy prevailed, betokening the advent within Spain of a counter-revolution against liberalism.

In the Spanish revolt of 1820, the reactionary powers of Europe perceived the haunting spectre of revolution. Despite the fact that they had been disgusted with Ferdinand's impolitic behavior, they were terrified by the thought of what the success of the king's enemies might mean to the whole Continent. The Tsar Alexander, who had recently joined Metternich in endorsing the international suppression of liberalism, volunteered, with that sudden and quixotic zeal which characterized his attachment to every newly found principle, to lead a great Russian army across Europe in order to reinstate Bourbon absolutism in Spain. But the French king at once conceived a most violent distaste for the employment of Russian troops even in his own cousin's cause, for he rightly feared the effect on the French nation of the reappearance of foreign troops. Metternich, too, was loath to give Russian soldiers any excuse to cross Austrian territories, and he at once sought to moderate the tsar's enthusiasm. Nevertheless, something must be done. Consequently, in 1822, after protracted international negotiations, the members of the Quadruple Alliance, together with France, held the congress of Verona. It was the opportunity of the reactionaries then in power in France: they proposed that a French army, acting on a general European mandate, should intervene in Spain. Thus by a single stroke France would be spared the humiliation of seeing foreign troops cross her borders; a Bourbon king would be reinstated in absolutism; the cause of reaction would triumph in Spain; and whatever glory might attend French arms would redound to the credit of reaction in France. Metternich gladly accepted the proposal. Great Britain alone objected.

Early in 1823, acting on the recommendation of the congress of Verona, the governments of France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia presented separate notes to the liberal ministry of Spain, expostulating on the anarchical conditions, which they greatly exagger-

French Intervention in Spain

ated, and demanding the abolition of the constitution of 1812 and the liberation of the king from the restraints which had been imposed upon him. The Spanish liberals naturally refused and protested against what they deemed an unwarranted interference with the purely domestic affairs of their country; and the French army, under the duke of Angoulême, nephew of Louis XVIII, promptly crossed the Pyrenees.

The French invaders encountered no such difficulties in 1823 as had faced them in 1808. No united nation now opposed them. Indeed, the majority of the Spaniards actually abetted or applauded them, so great was the popular distrust of, or indifference toward, the liberal régime. In May, Angoulême was in possession of Madrid, and the liberal ministry and cortes had fled to Cadiz, taking Ferdinand with them as a hostage. From June to October Cadiz was closely besieged by the French. On 1 October, the liberals released the king on the understanding that he should grant a general pardon and set up a "moderate government." Of course Ferdinand promised—no man was ever more facile with promises than he—and Cadiz immediately capitulated and the liberals again laid down their arms.

No sooner was the king safe within the French lines than he characteristically annulled his promises and pronounced sentence of death upon all "constitutionalists." In vain Angoulême counselled moderation and conciliation. The representatives of Metternich, of the Tsar Alexander, and of timid Frederick William III of Prussia urged vigor to the royal arm, and in cruelty Ferdinand could always be vigorous. There followed in 1824 a reaction throughout Spain far more blind and bitter than that of 1814. Not only were the recent liberal measures abrogated and the old régime again restored in its entirety, but the revolutionaries and the sympathizers with constitutional government were sought out with cunning ingenuity. Hundreds were arbitrarily put to death; hundreds more were exiled or jailed. By the time the French expedition withdrew from the country, Ferdinand VII had broken the back of Spanish liberalism.

Restoration of Ferdinand VII

Somewhat analogous to developments in Spain during the era of Metternich were those in neighboring Portugal. Here, too, there were recurrent conflicts between liberals and conservatives.

It will be recalled that when Napoleonic soldiers invaded Portugal in 1807 the Portuguese royal family had taken refuge in their distant colonial dependency of Brazil¹ and that Great Britain, whose trade relations with Portugal had long been intimate, had then intervened, expelling the French and setting up a provisional government at Lisbon. With the reestablishment of general peace in 1815, the Portuguese royal family continued to reside in Brazil, and the British, for reasons primarily commercial, prolonged their military occupation of the mother-country. It was soon obvious that Portugal was being treated as a mere appendage to Great Britain. Patriotic conservatives, who demanded the return of the king and the expulsion of the foreigners, commenced to make common cause with the liberals, who were recruited from much the same classes as in Spain and who had learned the revolutionary doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity in much the same way. Lord Beresford, the British governor, crushed several incipient rebellions, but in 1820, during his absence from the country, the Portuguese army, following the example of their Spanish neighbors, overthrew the regency. The liberals thereupon gained the upper hand and promulgated a constitution similar in almost every respect to the Spanish constitution of 1812. The next year King John VI, entrusting the government of Brazil to his elder son, Dom Pedro, returned to Portugal and in 1822 swore obedience to the constitution.

At once the Portuguese conservatives protested and found a leader in Dom Miguel, the king's younger son. In 1823 King John, reassured by the armed support which France was giving to absolutism in Spain, revoked the constitution. Even this concession did not stay Dom Miguel's followers from attacking him, and the united action of the Concert of Europe was required to restore the king. On the death of John VI in 1826, his successor, Pedro IV, granted to the Portuguese people a charter which provided for moderate parliamentary government on the model of the French charter of 1814, and then surrendered his Portuguese crown to his daughter Maria, a little girl seven years of age, on the understanding that she should become the wife of her uncle, Dom Miguel. Accordingly Miguel swore allegiance to Pedro, to Maria,

¹ See above, pp. 674-675.

and to the constitutional charter, but on his arrival at Lisbon in 1828 he promptly repudiated his promises and, with the support of the conservative majority in the country, he reigned as sole and absolute king until 1834. Miguel's admiration for Metternich, which he had conceived during a three years' residence in Vienna, combined with his natural cruelty and his dissipated habits to render his reactionary rule in Portugal as tyrannical and mean as that of Ferdinand VII in Spain.

5. LIBERAL SUCCESSES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE AND AMERICA

From the foregoing outline of conflicts which occurred during the decade after 1815 in most European countries between liberals and conservatives, it must be apparent that conservatives were generally successful. Certainly, Metternich during that decade had conserved the old régime in the Habsburg Empire, in Prussia, and in Russia; he had used the Concert of Europe to repress liberalism in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal; he had watched with satisfaction the resurrection of conservatism in France; and, while regretting the selfish withdrawal of Great Britain from the reactionary "Concert of Europe," he had been gratified by constant evidence of the basic sound conservatism which actuated the Tory government at home.

Yet the demons of individual liberty, social equality, and nationalism were not entirely exorcised. Especially in southern Europe they were ceaselessly active. Metternich had had to use Austrian troops against them in Naples in 1820 and in Piedmont in 1821, and to employ a French army to quell them in Spain and Portugal in 1823. In these regions they were driven underground, but Metternich knew that they might reappear there at any moment. And in the meantime he saw the same demons virulently at work in southeastern Europe—among the Yugoslavs and the Greeks—and likewise in the South American colonies of Spain and Portugal; and the stories which he heard of liberal unrest in France and the southern Netherlands made him anxious about still wider activity of those very demons. Metternich recognized that the repression of revolution throughout southern Europe and America would require not only eternal vigilance on his part but also loyal coöperation on the part of the "Concert of Europe."

The "Concert of Europe" was already weakening. Great Britain, devotedly conservative at home, was becoming liberal abroad. Not even a Tory government could afford to withhold recognition from a foreign régime, liberal or even revolutionary, which promised to advance British commerce; and the British foreign secretaries—Castlereagh before 1822 and George Canning after 1822—frankly opposed Metternich's policy of intervention. To the international congress which Metternich assembled at Verona in 1822, Canning sent word that "while England was no friend to revolution, she did emphatically insist on the right of nations to set up for themselves whatever form of government they thought best, and to be left free to manage their own affairs, so long as they left other nations to manage theirs." Such an attitude on the part of the British foreign secretary meant serious weakness in the Quadruple Alliance and serious damage to Metternich's chief instrument for the suppression of liberalism.

Britain's Separation from the Concert of Europe

Despite the British attitude, Metternich, with the spiritual encouragement of Tsar Alexander of Russia and the military force of King Louis XVIII of France, succeeded, as we have seen, in stopping revolution and curbing liberalism in Spain and Portugal in 1823. But he could not stop revolution or curb liberalism in the oversea empires of Spain and Portugal. Alexander of Russia was willing, and Louis XVIII of France was not unwilling, but what could they—or Metternich—do overseas against the opposition of Canning and the British navy?

The Problem of Suppressing Liberalism in Latin America

For two decades—from 1810 to 1830—revolution was occurring in Spanish America. Its roots were fourfold. First, some of the upper-class Spanish colonists had become infected, through reading or sojourn in Europe, with the "enlightened" political philosophy of the eighteenth century and had been inspired by the successful revolt of the English colonies in North America and by the example of the French Revolution with a desire to free themselves from the mother-country and to set up independent republics in Spanish America. Second, the long latent feeling of the native peasants, Indian or half-breed, against their Spanish rulers was exploited by certain leaders among them, particularly priests, who were actuated by humanitarian or radical sentiments and

Reasons for the Revolt of the Spanish Colonies in America

who sought to effect social changes. Third, the troubled conditions in Spain during the Napoleonic era—the quarrel between Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, the conflict between Joseph Bonaparte and the revolutionary juntas, the fighting between French and English—gave rise to disputes concerning the authority of Spanish governors in America and enabled ambitious colonial leaders to direct affairs in Mexico, New Granada, Peru, and Buenos Aires without direct reference to Madrid. Fourth, the Spanish colonists, having become accustomed during the Napoleonic era to free trade with Great Britain, were not minded during the ensuing era to return to the old mercantilist system of Spain and to exclude British goods from their ports; and in such commercial disobedience they were encouraged by British traders and even by the British government.

As early as 1806 colonial patriots in the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata (Argentina), acting on their own initiative and without assistance from the nominal Spanish viceroy, had expelled from Buenos Aires an invading British expedition; while in Venezuela a patriot by the name of Francisco Miranda, who had served under Washington in the War of American Independence and under Dumouriez in the War of the French Revolution, undertook with British aid to overthrow Spanish rule and create a republic. By 1810, unrest and revolt were widespread throughout Spanish America. In the viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico), a humble Catholic priest of Indian race, Miguel Hidalgo, led thousands of peasants in an uprising against colonial landlords and Spanish government. In Argentina, the colonial patriots established a local committee (or *junta*) as a provisional government and adopted a blue and white national flag. In Chile, a similar revolutionary *junta* was set up, including an able military leader, Bernardo O'Higgins, the son of a former governor of Chile and viceroy of Peru. In Venezuela and the viceroyalty of New Granada, Miranda resumed his seditious efforts, this time with the zealous cooperation of Simon Bolivar, a young man of an aristocratic family at Caracas who as a student in Spain had imbibed revolutionary and republican doctrines and had taken an oath to "liberate" all Spanish America.

**Beginning
of the
Revolution
in Spanish
America**

These revolutionary disturbances were at first largely repressed by royalists and reactionaries among the Spanish colonists in

America. Hidalgo was captured, tried by the Inquisition, and put to death in Mexico in 1811, and another priest, Morelos, who speedily incited a similar insurrection, suffered a like fate in 1815. Miranda was taken prisoner in 1812 and perished miserably in a dungeon at Cadiz four years later. The Chilean *junta* was overthrown in 1814, and O'Higgins fled to Argentina. In the same year, Bolivar was chased out of New Granada and took refuge in Haiti.

Repression, however, only served to fan the flame of discontent and revolutionary activity. To the assistance of the *junta* at Buenos Aires came in 1812 José de San Martín, a peculiarly unselfish colonial patriot and leader, who had been educated in Spain for a military career and had acquired military experience in the Spanish national war against Napoleon. Under San Martín's guidance, Argentina was cleared of royalist opposition and in 1816 was formally proclaimed an independent republic. Whereupon, San Martín, in coöperation with O'Higgins, carried the struggle against Spain into Chile and Peru. Chile's national independence was secured in 1818. In 1821 Lima was captured by San Martín and Peru's independence was declared. In the meantime, Paraguay had asserted its national independence (1811) and had entrusted dictatorial powers to José Francia, who had been trained in law and theology but who had become anti-clerical and aspired to be a Napoleon Bonaparte in his own country.

Meanwhile, too, Bolivar returned to Venezuela (1817), and, with the support of a motley army of Spanish colonials and Indian peasants and of a daredevil "foreign legion" of English, Irish, and American adventurers and veterans of the Napoleonic wars, and by dint of the most amazing feats, he earned his title of "liberator." Bolivar was instrumental in the creation (1819) of the independent republic of Colombia, embracing New Granada, Panama, Venezuela, and Quito (Ecuador), in the completion of the work of San Martín in freeing Peru (1824), and in the erection of "Upper Peru" into still another independent republic which was named Bolivia in his own honor (1825). The "liberator" subsequently suffered grievous disappointments from quarrels among his lieutenants and ingratitude among the "liberated," and when he died in 1830 his own state of Colombia was already breaking up into the three separate and

quarrelsome republics of Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Yet his achievements against Spanish rule in America were lasting, and his tomb in his native Caracas is a shrine for all Spanish Americans and others who still cherish the principles of the French Revolution.

To the successful revolts and revolutions in South America were added those in other parts of Spanish America. Florida, a prey to domestic disturbances and to attacks by the United States or England after 1810, was ceded to the United States in 1819. Santo Domingo (the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola) rebelled against Spain in 1821 and was conquered by the negro republic of Haiti (in the western part of the island) in the following year. In Mexico, after the failure of the peasant insurrections of Hidalgo and Morelos, the conservative Spanish colonists took matters into their own hands and established in 1821 an empire, with Iturbide, an ex-officer of the Spanish army, as emperor. Simultaneously, the Spanish colony of Guatemala—then embracing all of Central America—revolted and was incorporated in Iturbide's Mexican empire. This empire, however, was short-lived. In 1823 a more radical revolution disrupted it: Iturbide was overthrown and executed; Central America seceded and formed an independent union of its own; and Mexico adopted a republican constitution.

Of course, not all Spanish colonists in America were fully in sympathy with the principles of revolution, and nowhere in Spanish America were the revolutionary achievements sufficiently radical to redress the social and economic grievances of the lower classes. Moreover, the doctrinaires and soldiers of fortune who had made the revolution quarrelled and fought with one another almost incessantly. Theoretically, several new national states were emerging with republican and democratic constitutions; actually, there was a bewildering succession of self-made dictators. Yet King Ferdinand VII of Spain could not utilize any of these circumstances to reestablish his authority in the New World. He wished to do so; and Metternich and the Tsar Alexander pressed him to do so. But the expeditionary force which he assembled at Cadiz for the reconquest of his overseas colonial empire was itself too honey-combed with liberalism. It mutinied, as we have seen, in 1819 and precipitated the revolutionary régime of 1820-1823

Iturbide

**Inability
of Spain
to Sup-
press the
Revolution**

within Spain. By the time Metternich had brought about foreign intervention and the restoration of the old régime in Spain, the way to intervention and restoration in Spanish America was effectually barred by Great Britain—and the United States.

British traders and manufacturers believed that their newly flourishing business with Spanish America would be cut off if

**Attitude
of Great
Britain
and the
United
States**

Spain should recover her political and economic control overseas, and Canning, the British foreign minister, who espoused their cause, found a valuable ally in the United States. The purpose of the United States in the matter was different from Great Britain's, for,

whereas Great Britain was motivated almost wholly by commercial considerations, the United States was chiefly impelled by apprehension lest Metternich's policy of intervention, if applied in Spanish America, might in time be extended to English America. Regardless of purpose, however, the aim of the two English-speaking countries was the same: the "liberation" of the Spanish colonies and the prevention of foreign intervention in their internal affairs. With this aim in view, and with the backing of the British government, the United States in 1822 formally recognized the national independence of Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico.

Then in December, 1823, at the very time when French troops at the behest of Metternich and the Continental European powers

**The
Monroe
Doctrine**

were in occupation of Spain, the President of the United States, James Monroe, acting with the foreknowledge and friendly assurances of George Canning, made to

the American Congress a celebrated pronouncement, which has since been known as the Monroe Doctrine. "In the wars of the European powers," he said, "in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers [Austria, Russia, and Prussia] is essentially different in this respect from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare

that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

The year following this remarkable declaration by Monroe. Great Britain formally acknowledged the independence of Mexico and Colombia; and her recognition of the independence of the other Spanish-American states was only temporarily withheld. Metternich ruefully abandoned all hope of using the Concert of Europe for the suppression of liberalism beyond the seas, and Spain made no further efforts to subdue her colonies, although she long delayed full recognition of their freedom. The example of the American and French Revolutions, the ambition of Napoleon Bonaparte, the fatuity of Ferdinand VII, the commercial interests of Great Britain, and the political principles of the United States had combined with the revolutionary efforts of such Spanish Americans as Miranda, Bolivar, and San Martin to supplant the colonial dominion of Spain on the American continents with some ten new republics.

Recognition of the Independence of Spanish-American Republics

Portuguese America, like Spanish America, underwent successful revolution in the era of Metternich, though with a somewhat different outcome. The great expanse of Brazil in South America had been a dependency of Portugal since the sixteenth century, and when Napoleon invaded the mother-country in 1807 the Portuguese royal family betook themselves to Brazil and established their court at Rio de Janeiro. John VI, who assumed the title of "king of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves" in 1816, endeavored to quiet the revolutionary unrest which was penetrating Portuguese America from adjacent Spanish America by treating Brazilians as citizens rather than as colonials, by permitting them to trade freely with foreigners, and by introducing reforms in government:

Revolution in Portuguese America

and when he returned to Portugal in 1821, he left his elder son, Dom Pedro, as regent in Brazil. Almost immediately an influential group of Brazilians, incensed by the king's departure and inspired by the contemporary erection of independent states in Spanish America, rebelled against the Portuguese government

The Independent Empire of Brazil at Lisbon, and, finding themselves supported by the regent, proclaimed him Pedro I of the independent empire of Brazil (1822). The Emperor Pedro promptly granted a liberal constitution, and in 1826 Portugal formally recognized the independence of Brazil. The Brazilian Empire lasted, under its nominally liberal constitution, from 1822 to 1889. It was another instance of revolutionary success at the expense of the reaction associated with Metternich.

At the very time when in America liberalism was being championed and national independence achieved by Spanish and Portuguese peoples whose original homes had been in southwestern Europe, two peoples of southeastern Europe—Serbs and Greeks—obtained similar successes. The Serbs, with Russian backing, had revolted against the Ottoman Empire during the

The Revolt of the Serbs against the Ottoman Empire Napoleonic era, and for a brief time in 1812 they had maintained a government of their own at Belgrade under the redoubtable Karageorge.¹ And, though the Ottoman sultan regained Belgrade while Russia was fighting Napoleon, and though Karageorge was driven into exile and killed by a Serb rival, the restored Turkish régime was so harsh and arbitrary that it speedily invited the recurrence of rebellion in Serbia. In 1815 Miloš Obrenović, a peasant who had begun life as a cattle-drover and had served under Karageorge, headed a new revolt, and two years later, having had Karageorge murdered, he won from the Turks a grudging recognition of his election as "supreme prince" of Serbia. Thenceforth, while nominally an agent of the Ottoman sultan, Prince Miloš did everything in his power to prepare the Serbian people, and to obtain Russian assistance, for a war of national liberation.

Serbian developments did not attract much attention immediately. Metternich thought them insignificant, and the Tsar Alexander perceived in them no advantage to Russia. Soon, however, there were Greek developments which troubled Alexander

¹ See above, pp. 705-708.

and disturbed Metternich. While these exponents of reaction and "legitimacy" were attending the international congress at Laibach in 1821, news came that the Greek governor of the Ottoman province of Moldavia, Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, had just raised the standard of revolt and was confidently expecting aid from Russia. Metternich, alarmed, at once made appropriate representations to the tsar, and the tsar promptly disowned Ypsilanti. The revolt in Moldavia was easily suppressed by the Turks; and Metternich had the pleasure of confining the Greek leader in an Austrian prison for seven years.

The Revolt of the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire

But this was not the end of the Greek revolt; it was only a premature beginning. Earlier agitation of such Greek patriots as Rhigas and Korais was producing more and more fruit; such a nationalist secret society as *Hetairia Philike*¹ was rapidly enrolling members; and the theatrical display by a Greek prince in Moldavia was quickly succeeded by a national uprising in the Greek peninsula and in the Greek islands of the Ægean. The Turks, this time taken unprepared and slaughtered in large numbers, had recourse to savage reprisals. The Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople was murdered, and a wholesale massacre of Christians was ordered in Macedonia and Asia Minor. The utmost ferocity marked the struggle on both sides. Yet Metternich was obdurate about helping the Greeks. In his opinion they were revolutionaries and rebels against their "legitimate" sovereign, and he cynically remarked that their revolt should be allowed "to burn itself out beyond the pale of civilization."

Nevertheless, the Greek revolt appealed to the imagination and enthusiasm of Europe as nothing else could. Classicists saw in it a revival of the ancient glories of Hellas. Romanticists perceived in it a valorous struggle for national independence. Liberals beheld in it a popular uprising for liberty and democracy. Conservatives pictured it as the climax of the long series of crusades by civilized Christians against barbarous Moslems. Youthful volunteers flocked to the Greek standard from every country of Europe. Delacroix painted sentimental pictures of Greek exploits and sufferings, and Lord Byron gave pen, fortune, and life for the cause of Greek independence.

Popular Sympathy of Europe for the Greeks

¹ See above, p. 707.

Popular sentiment, whether liberal or conservative, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Greek insurgents, not only in France and Great Britain, but, even more ominously, in Russia also. Political ambition of the tsars and a succession of wars had made Russians and Turks hereditary enemies, while community of religion and culture linked the Russian and Greek peoples together. Consequently, it was with some difficulty that Alexander, now a most faithful henchman of Metternich, restrained his own subjects from giving aid to revolutionaries and managed until his death in 1825 to steer Russia in "legitimist" channels.

Meanwhile the Greeks, contrary to foreign expectation and despite chronic domestic feuds, were more than holding their own against the Turks. But just about the time of Alexander's death, the sultan, resolving upon a final drastic effort to subjugate his rebellious subjects, called to his assistance Ibrahim Pasha, the son of his vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. Then for three years Ibrahim operated in the Greek peninsula with energy and ferocity. He easily defeated the Greeks in the open field, and, when hostile bands harassed his army, he took revenge by desolating the country and sending thousands of the Christian inhabitants into slavery in Egypt. The resulting indignation throughout Europe decided Alexander's successor, the Tsar Nicholas I, to close his ear to the counsels of Metternich. In July, 1827, representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia signed the treaty of London, agreeing to demand an armistice as preliminary to the settlement of the Greek question; and in October, after the sultan had refused to accept mediation, the combined fleets of the new allies destroyed the Turco-Egyptian squadron in the harbor of Navarino. The battle of Navarino was decisive in that it rendered hopeless any further efforts of the Turks to suppress the Greek revolt, and also in that it registered a distinct setback to Metternich's policy. Even the Russian tsar was openly backing rebels against "legitimacy."

Tsar Nicholas proceeded to give free rein to the sympathies and patriotism of his subjects. In 1828 he formally declared war against the Ottoman Empire and the next year a Russian army, with some assistance from Miloš Obrenović and his Serbs, fought its way almost to Constantinople, and obliged the sultan to sign the treaty of Adri-

**Foreign
Interven-
tion in Be-
half of the
Greeks**

**Russo-
Turkish
War**

ople—a treaty of first-rate importance in the history of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. By the settlement, the sultan virtually acknowledged the independence of Greece; granted practical autonomy to Serbia¹ and likewise to the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; surrendered claims on Georgia and other provinces of the Caucasus to Russia; and recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian consuls over Russian traders in Turkey.

**The
Treaty of
Adrianople**

An international conference in London subsequently fixed the Greek frontier at a line running from the Gulf of Volo on the east to Arta on the west,² and in 1832 Prince Otto of Bavaria became the first constitutional king of Greece. The new kingdom embraced a comparatively small minority of the Greek-speaking people, but in spite of its diminutive size and of the poverty and political feuds which long afterwards distracted it, it was a very real example of how, even despite Metternich's fulminations, nationalism and liberalism might bear fruit.

**The Inde-
pendent
Liberal
Kingdom
of Greece**

Meanwhile, there were striking liberal successes in more strategic parts of southern Europe—in France and the southern Netherlands. In France the reactionary rule of Charles X had been growing more and more unpopular. As it became increasingly obvious that the king was bent upon being an absolute sovereign in fact as well as in name and that ultra-royalist control meant additional class legislation in behalf of the clergy and the nobility, the bourgeoisie and many of the workingmen gave louder utterance to grumbling and fault-finding. The less well-to-do bourgeois were excluded from participation in government by the heavy property qualifications; the numerous irreligious bourgeois were angered by the honors shown the Catholic Church; and, to cap the climax, the wealthy bourgeois had a most galling economic grievance against the ultra-royalists. It will be recalled that the chambers had authorized in 1825 the indemnifying of the émigrés to the amount of one billion francs for the losses which they had sustained during the Revolution. The means employed for paying the indemnity were curious. Knowing that it would be impossible

**Mounting
Liberal
Opposition
in France
to
Charles X**

¹ Miloš Obrenović was recognized as "hereditary prince" of Serbia.

² In 1832 the frontier was pushed still farther south, to a line drawn from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Lamia.

to restore such a huge capital sum to the nobles, the government hit upon the plan of funding the entire public debt of the nation at a materially lower rate of interest and of paying the amount thereby saved in the form of annuities to the émigrés. In other words, the middle-class holders of government bonds suddenly found their annual income reduced by a third for the benefit of a crowd of "grasping and traitorous aristocrats." It was this financial transaction more than any other fact which sealed the doom of divine-right monarchy in France. Men of business were henceforth arrayed with Napoleonic veterans and liberal idealists against the conservative régime of Charles X.

After the elections of 1827 had reflected the public feeling by depriving the ultra-royalists of their majority in the lower chamber, the king made temporary personal concessions by appointing moderates to office. But that he was steadfast against making any concession of principle was fully apparent in 1829, when, in the face of an adverse vote of the chambers, he entrusted the premiership to Prince de Polignac, one of the former émigrés, a person as obstinate as he was reactionary.

The issue was clear. It was a conflict between the king and his conservative minister on one side, and the liberal chamber, supported by the bourgeoisie, on the other. In vain did the government endeavor to make the nation forget the domestic conflict by intervening in behalf of Greek independence and by sending an expedition to seize Algiers and to chastise the Barbary pirates. The chamber simply persisted in voting "lack of confidence" in the ministry and in referring to the rights guaranteed by the Charter of 1814. Liberal newspapers applauded the chamber and openly criticized the king.

In the spring of 1830 Charles X dissolved the chamber which still demanded the dismissal of the Polignac ministry, but the new elections returned a chamber even more hostile to reaction than its predecessor. The king replied on 26 July, 1830, with the publication of four arbitrary ordinances: (1) the rights of the press were to be most carefully restricted; (2) the newly elected chamber, which had not as yet assembled, was dissolved; (3) a new electoral law was promulgated which disfranchised at least three fourths of the electors, mostly troublesome bourgeois; and (4) new elections were called for September.

The Ordinances of Charles X

On the very day of publication of these ordinances, the liberal printers and journalists, eager to reassert the sovereignty of the people against that of the Bourbons, incited all classes of Paris to armed insurrection. After three days of street-fighting against a mere handful of royalist troops who were ill-prepared and feebly led, the Parisian workingmen, driven to the barricades by the deliberate closing of the workshops by their liberal proprietors, gained a victory. Charles X abdicated in favor of his ten-year-old grandson, the count of Chambord, and took refuge in England.

**The July
(1830)
Revolution
at Paris**

The "July Days" of 1830, with slight bloodshed, put an end to divine-right monarchy in France. What political system should take its place became at once a subject of heated debate. On the one hand there still survived a republican party, recruited chiefly among the students and the Parisian workingmen, led by God-froi Cavaignac, and desirous of reëstablishing the republic of 1795; it had small support in the country districts or among persons of prominence in Paris. On the other hand were the bourgeois liberals, admirably led by Adolphe Thiers, a journalist, and Laffitte, a great banker, and quite willing to accept royalty, provided it should be constitutional rather than absolute and should permit them actually to rule the country; they counted on the sympathy of all Frenchmen who desired "order" as well as "liberty."

An armed conflict between the two parties was at one time imminent. It was averted by the aged Lafayette, who once more appeared on the scene and exerted his influence to persuade the republicans to accept the plan already formulated by the liberal monarchists. The plan provided for the accession to the throne by popular acclaim of Louis Philippe, duke of Orleans. This prince was a member of the Bourbon family, but, being the son of that Philippe Égalité¹ who had voted in the Convention for the death of Louis XVI, he was presumed to have no sympathy for traditional Bourbon principles. Louis Philippe had taken an eager part in the Revolution of 1789. He had been present at the capture of the Bastille. He had been enrolled in the Jacobin Club and had held military office under the republic. He had fought at Valmy and in the Netherlands. He

**Deposition
of
Charles X
and Acces-
sion of
Louis
Philippe**

¹ See above, p. 630.

had learned lessons of sturdy self-reliance during a long and adventurous exile in Europe and America. More recently he had made himself popular with the middle class by sending his sons to middle-class schools and by avowing his own faith in the opinions of Voltaire and Rousseau.

Early in August, 1830, Louis Philippe accepted the invitation of the chamber to become "King of the French." The revolutionary tricolor at once replaced the white flag of the Bourbons, and the theory of popular sovereignty supplanted that of monarchical absolutism. But the most momentous result of the July Revolution in France was the triumph of the bourgeoisie. It was this class which had shaped the course of the great Revolution of 1789, which had saved its conquests from the Parisian workingmen in 1794, and which had felt itself again endangered

The Triumph of Middle-Class Liberalism in France

by the privileged orders from 1815 to 1830. It was the same class which now put a reactionary king to flight, which stilled a revolutionary proletariat, and which definitely seized the reins of government itself. To the question asked in 1814 whether French political and social institutions were to be restored as they had been before the Revolution, the movement of 1830 constituted a categorical negative.

The suddenness and success of the July Revolution in France sent an immediate tremor throughout Europe. Conservatives were alarmed, and liberals took heart. In the Netherlands, in Germany, in Italy, in Poland, and in Switzerland, the shock of the movement was felt. Confronted with such widespread disturbances, Metternich had to abandon all thought of uniting Europe and forcing "legitimacy" once more upon France.

In the southern (Belgian) Netherlands, the revolutionary disturbances produced liberal results. Friction between Belgians and Dutch had been acute since the congress of Vienna had arbitrarily joined them in one state. They had divergent interests and they were proudly conscious of separate nationality. The Dutch were traditionally hostile to the French; they were mainly Protestant; and they were largely engaged in agriculture and commerce. The Belgians, on the other hand, were French in sympathy, overwhelmingly Catholic in religion, and industrial in occupation.

Opposition of Belgian Liberals to their Conservative Dutch King

The pig-headed Dutch king, William I, contrived to annoy all classes of his Belgian subjects. He outraged their patriotism by imposing upon them Dutch law, Dutch language, and Dutch officials. He irritated Catholics by placing education under the control of Protestant inspectors. He alienated liberals by restricting the freedom of the press. He angered the business men by forcing them to contribute a disproportionately large amount of taxes towards the interest on the heavy Dutch debt.

Matters came to a crisis in Brussels when the success of the Parisian insurrection was appreciated. Barricades were thrown up in the streets, unpopular ministers were assailed, and a national guard was formed. At first the rioters demanded only a separate legislature under the common king. But when they found William stubbornly determined to subdue them, they proclaimed the complete independence of Belgium (October, 1830).

**The 1830
Revolution
at Brussels**

International politics at the time favored the Belgian cause. Lord Palmerston, the new British foreign secretary, followed in the steps of Canning as a promoter of advantageous commercial treaties (and consequently as a champion of small nationalities). He recommended to the foreign representatives in London that Belgian independence be promptly recognized. The government of Louis Philippe, itself reposing on a revolutionary basis, was naturally quite favorable to such a course. Metternich was so occupied with disorders in Italy and in Germany, and the Tsar Nicholas with a formidable Polish uprising, that neither could interpose any serious objection. The Prussian king was duly intimidated by French threats. Under these circumstances an international agreement was reached at London in 1831, whereby Belgium was erected into an independent state, with a constitutional king in the person of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. It still required a naval blockade of Dutch ports by the British fleet and the capture of Antwerp by a French military expedition before the House of Orange could be induced to evacuate Belgium, and it was not until 1839 that King William I assented to the final treaty of peace and amity. At this time the independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed by all the great powers of Europe—Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

**The Independent
Liberal
Kingdom
of Belgium**

By this time, even Metternich was resigned to the triumph of nationalism and liberalism in a large part of southern Europe: in France and Belgium, in Greece and Serbia, in the former colonial empire of Portugal and Spain. He fully recognized that the separation of Great Britain and France from his repressive Concert of Europe was final, and for countries where the interests of those powers were predominant he abandoned all hope of preserving peace and the old régime through international coöperation and force.

Only in Italy, of all southern Europe, did Metternich continue to stave off liberal successes. Here and in central and northern Europe he could still count, for some years after 1830, on the earnest collaboration of the divine-right monarchs of Austria, Russia, and Prussia in conserving the political, social, and religious institutions of the Europe which he had known in his boyhood, before the fateful French Revolution.

6. CONSERVATIVE SUCCESSES IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN EUROPE

So firm was Metternich's hold on the varied Austrian dominions that the revolutionary disturbances of 1830 at Paris and Brussels evoked no echo at Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Venice, or Milan. There was, it is true, a reverberation in parts of Germany, and in Italy outside of his immediate jurisdiction, but in these areas Austrian power and prestige were speedily employed to still the noise and safeguard conservatism.

In Germany, demonstrations and riots of liberals in 1830-1831 scared the king of Saxony, the king of Hanover,¹ and the elector of Hesse into promulgating constitutions similar to the French Charter of 1814. But before long, Metternich's assurances dispelled the alarm of these German princes: the elector of Hesse and the king of Hanover annulled the concessions which they had made,

¹ Hanover, it should be borne in mind, had been joined in a "personal" union with Great Britain since 1714; that is, the "limited" king of Great Britain had been "absolute" elector (then king) of Hanover. In 1833 King William IV of

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Liberty Leading the People," illustrative of the July (1830) Revolution at Paris, is from a painting by F. V. E. Delacroix (1798-1863). On Delacroix, see above, pp. 748-749.





and the king of Saxony, though not revoking the constitution, entrusted its execution to ministers who were staunchly conservative.

Of the Italian states, both Naples and Piedmont, which had suffered the discomfiture of Austrian intervention in 1821, now remained quiet, but liberals in the central states, counting on the support of the new French king, rebelled against their autocratic and foreign rulers. In the papal states they raised a new tricolor of Italian democracy and nationalism (the red, white, and green, which subsequently became the flag of the kingdom of Italy) and readily shook off (1831) the temporal rule of the newly elected Pope Gregory XVI, a convinced reactionary and admirer of Austria. There were similar outbreaks in Parma and Modena against the Habsburg sovereigns who, thinking discretion the better part of valor, betook themselves hurriedly to Vienna. Under Metternich's auspices Austrian troops were promptly rushed into Italy: the old governments were easily reestablished, and many revolutionaries were hanged. Louis Philippe, who had grandly declared not only that he would refrain from meddling in the affairs of other countries, but that he would not permit other powers to intervene, limited his protection of Italy against Metternich to stationing a French garrison in the papal town of Ancona.¹

Suppression of
Liberal
Uprising
in Italy

On the other side of the Austrian dominions—within the vast Russian Empire—Metternich knew that conservatism was secure.

Great Britain promulgated a constitution for Hanover in his capacity of king of this German state. On his death in 1837, however, the "personal" union between Hanover and Britain was dissolved: Victoria became queen of the latter, but, being a woman, she was precluded from succeeding to the former; her uncle became king of Hanover and utilized the occasion, and Metternich's backing, to annul the constitution which William IV had granted.

¹ This French force, which gave umbrage to the pope as well as to the liberals, was not withdrawn until 1838.

It should be noted, further, that in Switzerland the revolutionary unrest of 1830 gave a marked impetus to uprisings of small towns and villages against the oligarchical rule of head-cities and led to a civil war between conservative cantons and liberal cantons, a war which was embittered by religious quarrels and was not decided in favor of liberalism and a closer union until 1847.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Metternich, when he first took charge of the Austrian government in 1808, from a painting by François Gérard (1770-1837).

He had observed the complete conversion of the Tsar Alexander to reaction, and there was no need of any such conversion in the case of Alexander's brother and successor, Nicholas I (1825-1855). Nicholas had never entertained any sympathy for liberalism, and the Decembrist revolt against him at the time of his accession could but strengthen his horror of revolution. He did lend aid in 1827-1829, as we have seen, to the revolutionary Greeks, in coöperation with Great Britain and France and against the wishes of Metternich, but Nicholas's conduct in this matter was dictated not by any romantic feeling for liberty or any altruistic regard for the principle of nationality but simply by what he deemed the necessary purpose of traditional Russian policy—the expansion, at Turkish expense, of the influence of the autocratic tsar and the Orthodox Church.

The true attitude of the Tsar Nicholas toward liberalism and nationalism was unmistakably evidenced in 1830-1831, when the inhabitants of his constitutional kingdom of Poland took arms in behalf of those principles. It was almost inconceivable that a Russian absolutist monarch could be a Polish constitutional king, and since the accession of Nicholas I difficulties had increased. At length in November, 1830, the long existing sympathy between Poles and Frenchmen and the spread of a rumor that the tsar intended to use his Polish regiments to coerce the new liberal French king and put down the Belgian insurrection, inspired a mutiny at Warsaw. Rebellious Poles killed a number of objectionable Russian officials, expelled Nicholas's viceroy, the Grand-Duke Constantine, and proclaimed the independence of their country. Nicholas at once despatched a Russian army against Poland, and the ensuing war lasted from January to September, 1831. The Poles fought gallantly, but their defense was paralyzed by lack of munitions and by factional feuds, and they were eventually overwhelmed. In vain they appealed for foreign assistance. The fact that both Austria and Prussia had Polish subjects rendered these powers hostile to an independent Poland, and in the circumstances neither Louis Philippe of France nor the British government did anything more than to expostulate with the tsar concerning alleged "atrocities" of the Russian army.

The Conservatism of the Tsar Nicholas I

The Tsar's Suppression of the Polish Uprising of 1831

As soon as the revolt was crushed, Nicholas proceeded to inflict exemplary punishment upon the Poles. He abrogated the liberal constitution which his brother had granted in 1815 and incorporated the "kingdom of Poland" as a conquered province in the Russian Empire. He put hundreds of Poles to death and exiled other hundreds. He filled the land with Russian soldiers and sought in every way to extirpate Polish nationalism.

End of the
Constitutional
Kingdom
of Poland

Thus it transpired that in 1831, while France and England were conniving at successful rebellion in Belgium, the Tsar Nicholas of Russia, with the hearty approbation of Austria and Prussia, was mercilessly suppressing rebellion in Poland. One result was a proposal by Nicholas that Russia, Austria, and Prussia should form a close alliance for the support of divine-right absolute monarchy against the two powers, France and Great Britain, which had "the courage to profess aloud rebellion and the overthrow of all stability." The proposal was quite acceptable to Metternich and Francis I of Austria and to Frederick William III of Prussia, and it bore fruit in the secret treaty of Berlin (1833), whereby the three Great Powers of central and northern Europe declared themselves unanimously resolved to reaffirm conservatism as the unalterable basis of their policy and agreed to recognize the right of any independent sovereign to call to his aid any other independent sovereign "in cases as well of trouble within his state as of dangers threatened from without."

The Close
Conservative
Alliance of
Russia,
Austria,
and Prussia

Emperor Francis I, dying in 1835, left instructions to his son and successor, Ferdinand I, to "displace nothing of the foundations of the edifice of the Austrian state; rule, and change nothing!" Ferdinand I was weak-minded, but Metternich, though aging, was strong-minded, and so long as Ferdinand reigned and Metternich ruled, the injunctions of Francis were dutifully observed throughout the Habsburg dominions. There were, it is true, the beginnings of literary nationalist movements among Czechs, Croatian Yugoslavs, Hungarians, and Italians; even German Austrians pressed for reform—the middle classes for a share in government, and peasants for the end of serfdom. But until 1848 there were no political or social reforms, and no concessions to nationalism.

Continu-
ance of
Conserva-
tism in
Austria

The Prussian régime was similarly reactionary. King Frederick William III's only memorable novelty was his part in effecting a tariff-union (*Zollverein*) of most of the German states. Frederick William had done away with tariff barriers between the provinces of Prussia in 1818, and by 1833 agreements had been reached by him with other German rulers for the abolition of tariffs between the several states.¹ The *Zollverein* was later praised as an important economic step toward the political unification of Germany, but at the time its nationalist implications were not perceived by its Prussian author, who thought only of the financial benefits which could accrue to his conservative landowning nobility from the free circulation of agricultural products within Germany. Frederick William III was succeeded on the throne of Prussia in 1840 by his son, Frederick William IV, a romantic and histrionic Hohenzollern, whose fervent Protestantism and whose devotion to class distinctions and divine-right monarchy were matched by his peculiarly emotional hatred of France and its Revolution. Frederick William IV could carry forward the principles of conservatism with a beating of drums and a fanfare of trumpets which the more prosaic Metternich had always been chary of employing.

In northwestern Europe, conservatism appeared enduringly triumphant. Neither in Sweden, to whose throne Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals,² succeeded in 1818 as Charles XIV, nor in Denmark, whose king Frederick VI (1808-1839) had been a most loyal ally of Napoleon, did liberalism become significant during the entire era of Metternich. Charles of Sweden possessed a strong personality, but he early put aside his French and revolutionary traditions and grew increasingly distrustful of liberal ideas and apprehensive of any political or social change. He tolerated a theoretically liberal constitution in his "kingdom of Norway," but in Sweden he sedulously conserved the royal authority, the medieval four-chambered estates, the old distinctions among social classes, and the religious monopoly of the Lutheran state-church. It was likewise in Denmark until 1848.

¹ The *Zollverein* in 1833 embraced all the German states except Austria, Hanover, Oldenburg, and the three Hanseatic "free cities" of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen.

² See above, pp. 665, 704.

In the northern Netherlands (Holland), too, King William I, after the loss of Belgium, continued in the old way, stubbornly resisting demands for reform and sharing political power only with the commercial aristocrats of the pre-revolutionary states-general.

Of all opponents of revolution and reform, Nicholas I of Russia was the boldest and most determined. During the thirty years of his reign—from 1825 to 1855—he acted energetically to prevent liberal ideas from germinating spontaneously within his extensive realm or from being transplanted from abroad. He enforced an extremely strict censorship of the press. He devised an expensive system of passports, which made it very difficult for Russians to visit foreign countries or for aliens to enter Russia. He established an elaborate secret police to discover and punish sedition. While doing everything in his power to quarantine his empire against Western liberalism, he promoted the spread and intensification of what he termed Eastern conservatism by encouraging the so-called “Slavophil” intellectuals of his day to preach a peculiar form of Pan-Slavism—the doctrine that Russia is the natural leader and champion of all Slavic peoples and that Russia is different from, and superior to, the rest of Europe in that Russia is the holy land of political autocracy and religious orthodoxy.

In Russia
under
Nicholas I

So successful was the Tsar Nicholas that, when revolution again flamed in 1848 in the greater part of Europe, he could confidently command: “Submit yourselves, ye peoples, for God is with Us.” Indeed, the prophet’s mantle of ultra-conservatism which Metternich rather suddenly relinquished in 1848 was already most becoming to the Tsar Nicholas I.

7. THE TRANSITION FROM AGRICULTURAL TO INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Metternich himself fell from power in 1848, and this date may serve to mark the close of the era with which his name is usually associated. It was the era preëminently signalized by Metternich’s attempts to conserve and restore the political and social institutions which Europe had inherited or evolved in early modern times and which had been subverted in one important country by the French Revolution and threatened with subversion

all over the Continent by the career of Napoleon and the rise of liberalism and nationalism.

Yet 1848 is an arbitrary date for the ending of any era. Certainly, the reactionary principles of the "era of Metternich" continued to be cherished and practiced in central and northern Europe considerably after 1848, considerably after the disappearance of the era's namesake from the scene. They reëmerged victorious from the revolutionary storms of 1848-1849 in central Europe and remained the guiding stars of the public policy of Austria and Prussia until the 1860's, and of Russia long thereafter.

On the other hand, quite as certainly the central tenet of the "era of Metternich" was repudiated in a large part of southern Europe considerably before 1848. It was liberalism and nationalism, not conservatism and reaction, which registered enduring triumphs in the July (1830) Revolution in France, in the establishment of an independent Belgium (1831), an independent Greece (1832), and an autonomous Serbia (1829), in the loss to Spain and Portugal of their American colonies (1810-1830), in the gain of constitutional government by states of southern Germany, and in the defection of France from the police-system of the "Concert of Europe." And by 1848 it was apparent that the tide of revolution was rising and that, despite recurrent setbacks, it would eventually engulf all Europe—and probably the whole world.

What was most significant in the situation was the rapidly changing character of England. For England, aristocratic and properly Tory in the first years of Metternich's sway, was irrevocably liberal in the 1830's. A revolution had occurred in England, and a revolution much more fundamental in character and far-reaching in effect than the French Revolution or the revolutions in British politics and European thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was the Industrial Revolution.

The Puritan Revolution, the "Glorious" Revolution, the American Revolution, the Intellectual Revolution, the French Revolution, the revolutionary changes of the era of Napoleon, and the revolutionary upheavals of the era of Metternich, including the Greek Revolution and the Latin American Revolutions—all these had been wrought in a European society which was still

predominantly agricultural. It was a society in which the masses were farmers and peasants and the classes enjoyed prestige in some direct proportion to the wealth which they derived from landed estates. It was a very old and traditional society, one which still did its travelling by foot or horse and got its news from stage-coaches, and one which was relatively static.

The rise of modern capitalism, it is true, had been introducing a dynamic element into European society since at least the sixteenth century. Agriculture was gradually becoming more and more capitalistic, and its profits were being invested more and more in commercial enterprise. More and more, therefore, a commercial bourgeois class was coming to the fore. And it should be borne in mind that it was the rising bourgeoisie which tended to upset the social equilibrium of Europe and which actually provided the platforms and the most zealous leaders for all the revolutions which have been described in this volume. Being more numerous in Britain and France than in Germany or northern Europe, the middle class was more immediately successful with its revolutionary endeavors in the former countries than in the latter.

Nevertheless, in every country of the European Continent, as late as the "era of Metternich," the persons dependent on commerce and industry were greatly outnumbered by those dependent on agriculture; the bourgeoisie was but an island in a sea of peasants and landlords. So long as this situation lasted, there would be at least an even chance that the conservative principles of a Metternich could be maintained.

In England, however, during the years when Napoleon's peasant soldiers were fighting with flint-lock muskets and when Metternich was riding to international congresses in a coach pulled by four horses, an amazing revolution occurred in the industrial arts and society. Machinery was invented. Factories were built. Production of goods multiplied. Capitalism grew by leaps and bounds. Cities drew hundreds of thousands of men and women from the countryside. The era of real bourgeois supremacy dawned. On the whole, the movement was in the nature of evolution rather than revolution; it was gradual and not at all spectacular. But its political and social consequences were vastly more decisive than Napoleon or Metternich in the pending con-

test between revolution and reaction. By the 1830's, it had made England industrial and liberal.

By the 1830's, moreover, the Industrial Revolution was spreading from England to the Continent. The more it industrialized France and Belgium, the more it strengthened the liberal—and democratic—forces in those countries. The more it penetrated into central Europe, the more it contributed to the success of liberalism and nationalism in Italy and Germany. By 1848 it was binding Vienna to Paris with rails of iron, and the new railways, both literally and figuratively, were unhorsing Metternich.

Metternich was one of the last great exponents of the "old régime" of Europe—the agricultural régime—with its divine-right monarchy, its privileged landlords, its established churches, its mass of illiterate peasants, its tinsel and its gilt. He was the last great exponent of traditional society, because in his own era, unbeknown to him, the Industrial Revolution was already forming a "new régime"—an industrial régime—with its social levelling, its upstart capitalists, its urban proletariat, its individualism and liberalism and democracy, its iron and its coal. The "era of Metternich," as we have discussed it in the present chapter, may, then, fittingly close a volume. The Industrial Revolution not only developed and effected important changes in the same period of time, but it continued to develop and spread until it has fashioned the distinguishing civilization of the whole contemporary world; quite as fittingly, therefore, the detailed treatment of this epochal revolution may be left to a second volume.



APPENDIX

RULERS OF EUROPEAN STATES, 1500-1830
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

RULERS OF EUROPEAN STATES, 1500-1830

ALBANIA

To Ottoman Empire, 1478-1913

AUSTRIA

- | | |
|--|---|
| Maximilian I, <i>archduke</i> , 1403-1510 | Leopold I, 1658-1705 |
| Charles I, 1519-1520 (<i>Holy Roman Emperor as Charles V, 1519-1558; king of Spain; prince of the Netherlands</i>) | Joseph I, 1705-1711 |
| Ferdinand I, 1520-1564 | Charles II (<i>VI as Holy Roman Emperor</i>), 1711-1740 |
| Maximilian II, 1564-1576 | ✓ Maria Theresa, 1740-1780 |
| Rudolph II, 1576-1612 | ✓ Joseph II, 1780-1790 (<i>Holy Roman Emperor, 1765-1790</i>) |
| Matthias, 1612-1619 | Leopold II, 1790-1792 |
| Ferdinand II, 1619-1637 | Francis I, <i>archduke</i> , 1792-1804 (<i>Holy Roman Emperor, 1792-1806</i>); <i>emperor</i> , 1804-1835 |
| Ferdinand III, 1637-1657 | Ferdinand I, <i>emperor</i> , 1835-1848 |
-

BAVARIA

- | | |
|--|---|
| Albert IV, <i>duke</i> , 1465-1508 | Charles Albert, 1726-1745 (<i>Holy Roman Emperor as Charles VII, 1742-1745</i>) |
| William IV, 1508-1550 | Maximilian III Joseph, 1745-1777 |
| Albert V, 1550-1579 | Charles Theodore, 1778-1790 |
| William V, 1579-1598 | Maximilian IV Joseph, <i>elector</i> , 1799-1806; <i>king</i> , 1806-1825 |
| Maximilian I, <i>elector</i> , 1598-1651 | Louis I, <i>king</i> , 1825-1848 |
| Ferdinand Maria, 1651-1679 | |
| Maximilian II Emmanuel, 1670-1726 | |
-

BELGIUM

- | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>To Spain, 1504-1713</i> | <i>To France, 1797-1815</i> |
| <i>To Austria, 1713-1797</i> | <i>To Holland, 1815-1830</i> |
| Leopold I, <i>king</i> , 1831-1865 | |

BOHEMIA

Ladislaus II, *king*, 1471-1516 Louis, 1516-1526
To Austria, 1526-1918

BRANDENBURG

See Prussia

BULGARIA

To Ottoman Empire, 1393-1878

CROATIA

To Hungary, 1102-1918

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

See Bohemia; Slovakia

DENMARK

John, <i>king</i> , 1481-1513	Christian V, 1670-1699
Christian II, 1513-1523	Frederick IV, 1690-1730
Frederick I, 1523-1533	Christian VI, 1730-1746
Christian III, 1533-1559	Frederick V, 1746-1766
Frederick II, 1559-1588	Christian VII, 1766-1808
Christian IV, 1588-1648	Frederick VI, 1808-1830
Frederick III, 1648-1670	Christian VIII, 1830-1848

DUTCH NETHERLANDS

See Holland

ENGLAND

See Great Britain

ESTONIA

To Teutonic Knights, 1346-1561 To Sweden, 1561-1721
To Russian Empire, 1721-1918

FINLAND

To Sweden, 1200-1809

To Russian Empire, 1809-1918

FLORENCE

See Tuscany

FRANCE

Louis XI, *king*, 1461-1483
 Charles VIII, 1483-1498
 Louis XII, 1498-1515
 Francis I, 1515-1547
 Henry II, 1547-1559
 Francis II, 1559-1560
 Charles IX, 1560-1574
 Henry III, 1574-1589
 Henry IV, 1589-1610
 Louis XIII, 1610-1643
 Louis XIV, 1643-1715

Louis XV, 1715-1774
 Louis XVI, 1774-1792
The First Republic, 1792-1804
 The Convention, 1792-1795
 The Directory, 1795-1799
 The Consulate (Napoleon Bonaparte as *First Consul*), 1799-1804
 Napoleon I, *emperor*, 1804-1814
 Louis XVIII, *king*, 1814-1824
 Charles X, 1824-1830

Louis Philippe, 1830-1848

GERMANY

To Holy Roman Empire, to 1806
German Confederation under presidency of Austria, 1815-1866

See Austria; Bavaria; Holy Roman Empire; Prussia; Saxony

GREAT BRITAIN

Sovereigns of England and Ireland, 1485-1707

Henry VII, *king*, 1485-1509
 Henry VIII, 1509-1547
 Edward VI, 1547-1553
 Mary I, 1553-1558
 Elizabeth, 1558-1603
 James I (*VI of Scotland*), 1603-1625
 Charles I, 1625-1649

The Commonwealth, 1640-1660
 (Oliver Cromwell)

Charles II, 1660-1685
 James II (*VII of Scotland*), 1685-1688

William III and Mary II, 1689-1694
 William III, 1694-1702

Anne, 1702-1714 (*of Great Britain after 1707*)

Sovereigns of Scotland, 1488-1707

James IV, *king*, 1488-1513
 James V, 1513-1542
 Mary (Stuart), 1542-1567
 James VI, 1567-1625 (*James I of England, 1603-1625*)

[*Succession as in England and Ireland, 1603-1707, and as in Great Britain after 1707*]

Sovereigns of Great Britain

✓ Anne, <i>queen</i> , 1707-1714	George III, 1760-1820
✓ George I, <i>king</i> , 1714-1727	George IV, 1820-1830
George II, 1727-1760	William IV, 1830-1837
	Victoria, <i>queen</i> , 1837-1901

Some Prominent Ministers of Great Britain

Sir Robert Walpole, 1721-1742	George Canning, 1827
William Pitt (earl of Chatham), 1756-1761	Duke of Wellington, 1828-1830
George Grenville, 1763-1765	Earl Grey, 1830-1834 (Viscount Palmerston, <i>Foreign Secretary</i>)
William Pitt (earl of Chatham), 1766-1768	Viscount Melbourne, 1834
Lord North, 1770-1782	Sir Robert Peel, 1834-1835
Earl of Shelburne, 1782-1783	Viscount Melbourne, 1835-1841 (Viscount Palmerston, <i>Foreign Secretary</i>)
William Pitt (the younger), 1783- 1801, 1804-1806	Sir Robert Peel, 1841-1846
Earl of Liverpool, 1812-1827 (Vis- count Castlereagh, <i>Foreign Secre- tary</i> , 1812-1822; George Canning, <i>Foreign Secretary</i> , 1822-1827)	Lord John Russell (Earl Russell), 1846-1852 (Viscount Palmerston, <i>Foreign Secretary</i>)

GREECE

<i>To Ottoman Empire</i> , 1453-1829	<i>Republic</i> , 1829-1832
	Otto I, <i>king</i> , 1832-1862

HOLLAND

<i>To Spain</i> , 1504-1581	William IV, <i>nominal stadholder</i> , 1711-1747; <i>hereditary stadholder</i> , 1747-1751
William the Silent, <i>stadholder</i> , 1581- 1584	William V, 1751-1795
Maurice, 1584-1625	<i>Republic</i> , 1795-1806
Frederick Henry, 1625-1647	Louis Bonaparte, <i>king</i> , 1806-1810
William II, 1647-1650	<i>To France</i> , 1810-1813
John DeWitt, <i>grand pensionary</i> , 1650-1672	William I, <i>king</i> , 1813-1840
William III, <i>stadholder</i> , 1672-1702 (<i>king of England and Scotland</i> , 1689-1702)	William II, 1840-1849

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

Maximilian I, <i>emperor</i> , 1493-1519	Maximilian II, 1564-1576
Charles V, 1519-1558	Rudolph II, 1576-1612
Ferdinand I, 1558-1564	Matthias, 1612-1619

Ferdinand II, 1619-1637
 ✓Ferdinand III, 1637-1657
 Leopold I, 1658-1705
 Joseph I, 1705-1711
 ✓Charles VI, 1711-1740
 Charles VII, 1742-1745

Francis I, 1745-1765
 ✓Joseph II, 1765-1790
 Leopold II, 1790-1792
 Francis II, 1792-1806 (*after 1804
 as Francis I, emperor of Austria*)

HUNGARY

Ladislaus II, *king*, 1490-1516 Louis II, 1516-1526
Same rulers as Austria, 1526-1918

IRELAND

See Great Britain

ITALY

See Lombardy; Naples; Papacy; Sardinia; Savoy; Sicily; Tuscany; Venice

LATVIA (LITTLAND)

To Teutonic Knights, 1237-1540 To Sweden, 1629-1721
To Poland, 1549-1629 To Russian Empire, 1721-1918

LITHUANIA

To Poland, 1501-1793 To Russian Empire, 1793-1918

LIVONIA

See Latvia

LOMBARDY (MILAN)

Sforza family, 1450-1535 To Austria, 1714-1797
To Spain, 1535-1714 To France, 1797-1815
To Austria, 1815-1860

MONTENEGRO

- To Ottoman Empire, 1490-1696* Sava and Vasilije, 1735-1782
 Danilo, *prince-bishop*, 1696-1735 Peter I, *prince*, 1782-1830
 Peter II, 1830-1851
-

NAPLES

- To Aragon (Spain), 1443-1713* Joseph Bonaparte, 1806-1808
To Austria, 1713-1738 Joachim Murat, 1809-1815
 Charles III, *king*, 1738-1759 (*king of Spain, 1759-1788*) Ferdinand I, 1815-1825
 Francis I, 1825-1830
 Ferdinand II, 1830-1859
-

NETHERLANDS, BELGIAN

See Belgium

NETHERLANDS, DUTCH

See Holland

NORWAY

- To Denmark, 1397-1814* *To Sweden, 1814-1905*
-

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| Mohammed II, <i>sultan</i> , 1451-1481 | Mohammed IV, 1648-1687 |
| Bayezid II, 1481-1512 | Suleiman III, 1687-1691 |
| Selim I, 1512-1520 | Ahmed II, 1691-1695 |
| Suleiman II, "the Magnificent,"
1520-1566 | Mustapha II, 1695-1703 |
| Selim II, 1566-1574 | Ahmed III, 1703-1730 |
| Murad III, 1574-1595 | Mahmud I, 1730-1754 |
| Mohammed III, 1595-1603 | Othman III, 1754-1757 |
| Ahmed I, 1603-1617 | Mustapha III, 1757-1773 |
| Mustapha I, 1617-1618 | Abdul Hamid I, 1773-1789 |
| Othman II, 1618-1623 | Selim III, 1789-1807 |
| Murad IV, 1623-1640 | Mustapha IV, 1807-1808 |
| Ibrahim, 1640-1648 | Mahmud II, 1808-1839 |
| | Abdul Medjid, 1839-1861 |

PAPACY

Alexander VI, <i>pope</i> , 1492-1503	Urban VIII, 1623-1644
Pius III, 1503	Innocent X, 1644-1655
Julius II, 1503-1513	Alexander VII, 1655-1667
Leo X, 1513-1521	Clement IX, 1667-1669
Adrian VI, 1522-1523	Clement X, 1670-1676
Clement VII, 1523-1534	Innocent XI, 1676-1689
Paul III, 1534-1549	Alexander VIII, 1689-1691
Julius III, 1550-1555	Innocent XII, 1691-1700
Marcellus II, 1555	Clement XI, 1700-1721
Paul IV, 1555-1559	Innocent XIII, 1721-1724
Pius IV, 1559-1565	Benedict XIII, 1724-1730
Pius V, 1566-1572	Clement XII, 1730-1740
Gregory XIII, 1572-1585	Benedict XIV, 1740-1758
Sixtus V, 1585-1590	Clement XIII, 1758-1769
Urban VII, 1590	Clement XIV, 1769-1774
Gregory XIV, 1590-1591	Pius VI, 1775-1790
Innocent IX, 1591	Pius VII, 1800-1823
Clement VIII, 1592-1605	Leo XII, 1823-1829
Leo XI, 1605	Pius VIII, 1829-1830
Paul V, 1605-1621	Gregory XVI, 1831-1846
Gregory XV, 1621-1623	Pius IX, 1846-1878

PIEDMONT

See Savoy

POLAND

John I Albert, <i>king</i> , 1492-1501	Stanislaus I Leszczyński, 1704-1709
Alexander, 1501-1506	Augustus II (<i>restored</i>), 1709-1733
Sigismund I, 1506-1548	Stanislaus I Leszczyński (<i>restored</i>), 1733-1734
Sigismund II, 1548-1572	Augustus III, 1734-1763 (<i>elector of Saxony</i>)
Henry of Valois, 1573-1574 (<i>Henry III of France, 1574-1589</i>)	Stanislaus II Poniatowski, 1764-1795
Stephen Bathory, 1575-1586 (<i>prince of Transylvania</i>)	<i>Partitioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria, 1795-1918</i>
Sigismund III Vasa, 1587-1632	<i>Grand-Duchy of Warsaw, 1807-1815</i>
Ladislav IV, 1632-1648	<i>'Congress' Poland, 1815-1831</i>
John II Casimir, 1648-1668	Alexander I, <i>king</i> , 1815-1825
Michael Wisniowiecki, 1669-1673	Nicholas I, 1825-1831
John III Sobieski, 1674-1696	<i>To Russia, 1831-1918</i>
Augustus II, 1697-1704 (<i>elector of Saxony</i>)	

PORTUGAL

Emmanuel I, <i>king</i> , 1495-1521	Joseph, 1750-1777
John III, 1521-1557	Maria I and Peter III, 1777-1786
Sebastian, 1557-1578	Maria I, 1786-1816
Henry, 1578-1580	John VI, 1816-1826
<i>To Spain</i> , 1580-1640	Peter IV, 1826 (<i>Peter I</i> , emperor of <i>Brazil</i> , 1826-1831)
John IV, 1640-1656	Maria II, 1826-1828
Alphonso VI, 1656-1667	Miguel, 1828-1834
Peter II, 1667-1706	Maria II, 1834-1853
John V, 1706-1750	

PRUSSIA

Electors of Brandenburg

Joachim I, <i>elector</i> , 1499-1535	George William, 1610-1640
Joachim II, 1535-1571	✓ Frederick William, "The Great Elector," 1640-1688
John George, 1571-1598	Frederick III, 1688-1701 (<i>Frederick I</i> , king in Prussia, 1701-1713)
Joachim Frederick, 1598-1608	
John Sigismund, 1608-1619	

Kings of Prussia

Frederick I, <i>king</i> , 1701-1713	Frederick William II, 1786-1797
Frederick William I, 1713-1740	Frederick William III, 1797-1840
✓ Frederick II, "the Great," 1740- 1786	Frederick William IV, 1840-1861

RUMANIA

To Ottoman Empire, 1500-1856

RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Ivan III, "the Great," <i>tsar</i> , 1462- 1505	Catherine I, 1725-1727
Basil IV, 1505-1533	Peter II, 1727-1730
Ivan IV, "the Terrible," 1533-1584	Anna, 1730-1740
Theodore I, 1584-1598	Ivan VI, 1740-1741
Boris Godunov, 1598-1605	Elizabeth, 1741-1762
Michael, 1613-1645	Peter III, 1762
Alexius, 1645-1676	✓ Catherine II, "the Great," 1762- 1796
Theodore II, 1676-1682	Paul, 1796-1801
Ivan V and Peter I, 1682-1689	Alexander I, 1801-1825
✓ Peter I, "the Great," 1689-1725	Nicholas I, 1825-1855

SARDINIA

To Aragon (Spain), 1326-1713 *Savoy, who became kings of Sardinia,*
To Austria, 1713-1720 *1720*
Joined with Piedmont under dukes of *See Savoy*

SAVOY

Dukes of Savoy

Philibert II, <i>duke</i> , 1497-1504	Victor Amadeus I, 1630-1637
Charles III, 1504-1553	Charles Emmanuel II, 1638-1675
Emmanuel Philibert, 1553-1580	Victor Amadeus II, 1675-1730 (<i>king</i>
Emmanuel I, "the Great," 1580- 1630	<i>of Sardinia, 1720-1730)</i>

Kings of Sardinia

Victor Amadeus II, <i>king</i> , 1720-1730	Charles Emmanuel IV, 1796-1802
Charles Emmanuel III, 1730-1773	Victor Emmanuel I, 1802-1821
Victor Amadeus III, 1773-1796	Charles Felix, 1821-1831
	Charles Albert, 1831-1848

SAXONY

Frederick, "the Wise," <i>elector</i> , 1486- 1525	Frederick Augustus I, 1694-1733 (<i>king of Poland as Augustus II,</i> <i>1697-1704, 1709-1733)</i>
John, 1525-1532	Frederick Augustus II, 1733-1763 (<i>king of Poland as Augustus III,</i> <i>1734-1763)</i>
John Frederick, 1532-1547	Frederick Augustus III, <i>elector</i> , 1763-1806; <i>king</i> , 1806-1827
Maurice, 1547-1553	Anthony, <i>king</i> , 1827-1836
Augustus, 1553-1586	Frederick Augustus II, 1836-1854
Christian I, 1586-1591	
Christian II, 1591-1611	
John George I, 1611-1656	
John George II, III, and IV, 1656- 1694	

SCOTLAND

See Great Britain

SERBLA

<i>To Ottoman Empire, 1386-1812</i>	Milan, 1839
Karageorge, <i>prince</i> , 1812-1813	Michael, 1839-1842
Miloš, 1817-1839	Alexander, 1842-1859

SICILY

To Aragon (Spain), 1409-1713
To Savoy, 1713-1720

To Austria, 1720-1736
To Naples, 1736-1860

SLAVONIA

See Croatia

SLOVAKIA

To Hungary, 906-1918

SLOVENIA (CARNIOLA, ETC.)

To Austria, 1300-1809

To France, 1809-1813

To Austria, 1813-1918

SPAIN

Ferdinand and Isabella, *king and queen*, 1479-1504

Ferdinand and Philip I, 1504-1506

Ferdinand and Charles I, 1506-1516

Charles I, 1516-1556 (*Holy Roman Emperor as Charles V*)

Philip II, 1556-1598

Philip III, 1598-1621

Philip IV, 1621-1665

Charles II, 1665-1700

Philip V, 1700-1746

Ferdinand VI, 1746-1759

Charles III, 1759-1788

Charles IV, 1788-1808

Joseph Bonaparte, 1808-1813

Ferdinand VII, 1813-1833

Isabella II, 1833-1868

SWEDEN

To Denmark, 1397-1523

Gustavus I Vasa, *king*, 1523-1560

Eric XIV, 1560-1568

John III, 1568-1592

Sigismund, 1592-1599 (*king of Poland, 1587-1632*)

Charles IX, 1599-1611

✓ Gustavus II Adolphus, 1611-1632

Christina, 1632-1654

Charles X, 1654-1660

Charles XI, 1660-1697

Charles XII, 1697-1718

Ulrica Eleonora, 1718-1720

Frederick I, 1720-1751

Adolphus Frederick, 1751-1771

Gustavus III, 1771-1792

Gustavus IV, 1792-1809

Charles XIII, 1809-1818

Charles XIV, Bernadotte, 1818-1844

Oscar I, 1844-1859

TUSCANY

Alessandro Medici, <i>duke</i> , 1523-1537	Francis, 1737-1765 (<i>duke of Lorraine; Holy Roman Emperor, 1745-1765</i>)
Cosimo I, <i>grand-duke</i> , 1537-1574	
Francis I, 1574-1587	
Ferdinand I, 1587-1605	Leopold I, 1765-1790 (<i>Holy Roman Emperor, 1790-1792</i>)
Cosimo II, 1605-1621	Ferdinand III, 1790-1801
Ferdinand II, 1621-1670	<i>To France, 1801-1815</i>
Cosimo III, 1670-1723	Ferdinand III, 1815-1824
John Gaston, 1723-1737	Leopold II, 1824-1860

TWO SICILIES

See Naples; Sicily

VENICE

<i>Republic to 1797</i>	<i>To France, 1805-1814</i>
<i>To Austria, 1797-1805</i>	<i>To Austria, 1814-1866</i>

YUGOSLAVIA

See Croatia; Montenegro; Serbia; Slovenia

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**Fruit of
Liberty.**

INDEX

INDEX

- Abjuration (Dutch), Act of, 250.**
Absolutism, 215, 216, 291-292, 324, 331, 334, 448, 451, 453.
Academy, French, 296, 497; of Lynxes (Rome), 497; of Science (Berlin), 349, 497.
Acadia, 396, 402, 403. (See Nova Scotia.)
Acts, Six, 763.
Adam, Robert, 560 n.
Adams, John, 489.
Addison, 569.
Adelung, 549.
Adrianople, treaty of, 784-785.
Africa, Dutch in, 391-392, 713; English in, 397, 418, 713, 714, 760; French in, 296, 391, 397, 487; Portuguese in, 71-72, 78, 87.
Agricola, 128.
Agricultural revolution, 465-469.
Agriculture, in 16th century, 47-55, 91, 817; in 17th century, 279, 280, 295; in 18th century, 347-348, 353, 374, 401-462, 465-469, 578-584, 716-717; in early 19th century, 752, 794, 795-798.
Aix-la-Chapelle, 225; treaty of (1668), 299; (1748), 341, 406; congress of, 732, 767.
Alais, edict of, 283.
Albania, 41, 801.
Albany Congress, 476-477.
Albigenses, 42, 151, 152.
Albuquerque, Alphonso, 77.
Alcabala, 244.
Aldine press, 98.
Alexander I, of Russia, 661, 663, 682-686, 690, 702, 703, 709, 722, 724, 729, 730-731, 742, 747, 756-758, 772, 773, 784.
Alexander VI, Pope, 19, 146.
Alexander VII, Pope, 557 n.
Alfieri, 570, 699.
Alsace, 287, 288, 304, 341.
Alva, duke of, 246-247, 248.
America, discovery of, 21, 72-74, 75, 188, 816; Dutch in, 82, 392-393, 484, 713, 725; English in, 74, 82, 387, 389-390, 396, 404-405, 407-410, 469-487, 491, 760; French in, 76, 82, 280, 296, 390-391, 397, 401, 404-405, 407-410, 412-413, 484, 656; Portuguese in, 74-76, 78-79, 86-88, 394, 486, 781-782; Spanish in, 73-76, 79-82, 86-88, 404, 405-407, 486-487, 713, 776-781.
Amiens, treaty of, 651, 659.
Amsterdam, 249, 300.
Anabaptists, 178-179, 180, 181. (See Baptists.)
Andrussovo, treaty of, 362 n.
Anglicanism, in 16th century, 168, 169-176, 191, 194-197, 203; in 17th century, 432-433, 437-438, 446, 451-453; in 18th century, 514-516, 527-531; in early 19th century, 742, 762.
Anglo-Dutch Wars, 394-395.
Angoulême, duke of, 773.
Annates, 148, 173.
Anne, of Austria, 281, 287.
Anne, of England, 309, 455.
Anthony, of Navarre, 256.
Anthropology, 549, 813.
Antwerp, 90, 246, 248, 249, 789.
Aquinas, Thomas, 186.
Aragon, 8, 19, 32. (See Spain.)
Aranda, duke of, 354 n.
Architecture, in 16th century, 111-113; in 17th and 18th centuries, 557-560; in early 19th century, 735.
Arcot, 410, 411.
Argentina, 81, 777, 778, 780.
Arianism, 151.
Ariosto, 122.
Aristotle, 100, 101.
Armada, Spanish, 253-254, 385, 386, 712.
Armed neutrality of the North (1780), 484-485; (1800), 650-651.
Arminius, 182 n., 513 n.
Arnold, 681, 746.
Arras, treaty of, 248.
Art, in 16th century, 111-119, 209-210; in 17th and 18th centuries, 261, 293-294, 296-297, 318, 349, 353, 555-576; in early 19th century, 656, 734-757.

- Articles of confederation (American), 488.
- Artois, count of, 615, 616, 768-769. (See Charles X, of France.)
- Asia, 76, 359, 360. (See China; India; Japan; etc.)
- Asiento, 404, 405, 407.
- Aspern, 678
- Assembly, National Constituent (French), 600-615, 622, 652, 696; Legislative (French), 622, 625, 628; of Notables (French), 595.
- Assignats*, 612, 641.
- Astronomy, 122-126, 500-501.
- Atheism, 524-525.
- Atlases, 813.
- Auerbach, 329 n.
- Auerstädt, battle of, 663.
- Augsburg, 89; confession of, 158, 161; diet of, 158; league of, 302-304, 306, 402, 462; religious peace of, 159, 167, 263.
- August Days (of 1789), 606-608.
- Augustus II, of Saxony and Poland, 316, 369, 370, 371.
- Augustus III, of Saxony and Poland, 316, 317, 378.
- Austerlitz, battle of, 662, 712, 720.
- Australia, 418-422, 828.
- Austria, 8, 233, 323, 801; religion in, 190; in Thirty Years' War, 262-272, 276; in 18th century, 327-329, 338, 344, 345, 351; and Maria Theresa, 349-350; and Joseph II, 350-353; and French Revolution, 623-624, 626, 630, 631-632; and Napoleon, 650, 661, 662, 667, 677-679, 684, 686-689; and Metternich, 721-722; and Congress of Vienna; 722-729; and Concert of Europe, 729-733; in early 19th century, 751-752, 793, 796; and Quadruple Alliance, 729-730, 731, 732, 764, 772. (See Habsburg Family, Holy Roman Empire.)
- Austrian Succession, War of, 318 n., 340-341, 342.
- Avignon, 611.
- Azov, 362, 372, 379.
- Aztec Indians, 79-80.
- Babeuf, 641.
- Bach, J. S., 574.
- Bacon, Francis (Lord), 133-134, 188, 409.
- Baden, 157, 167, 666.
- Baffin, 386.
- Bakewell, Robert, 467, 468.
- Balance of power, 225, 232, 238, 239, 299, 307, 729.
- Balboa, 75, 80.
- Baltimore, Lord, 390.
- Balzer, 341 n.
- Banking, Dutch, 88, 90; English, 422; French, 653; German, 88; Italian, 84-85, 88.
- Baptism, 142.
- Baptists, 180. (See Anabaptists.)
- Barebone's Parliament, 443.
- Baroque, 557-559, 566.
- Barry, Madame du, 318, 592.
- Basel, 164, 179, 182; council of, 140; treaty of, 633.
- Basques, 41.
- Bastille, 601; fall of, 602, 604.
- Batavia Republic, 633, 658.
- Bavaria, 323, 335-336, 338, 345, 351, 662, 666, 678, 722, 801.
- Bayle, Pierre, 521.
- Beachy Head, 402.
- Beaton, Cardinal, 168.
- Beauharnais, Eugene, 658, 664-665.
- Beaumarchais, 570, 572.
- Beccaria, 544, 547.
- Beds of justice, 289.
- Beethoven, 575, 749-750.
- Beggars, of Netherlands, 246.
- Belgium, 631, 728, 788-789, 796, 798, 801. (See Netherlands, Austrian, Netherlands, Spanish.)
- Belgrade, 14, 351, 708.
- Believers, old, of Russia, 517.
- Bellarmino, Cardinal, 539 n.
- Bellini, Gentile, 16 n., 17 n.
- Bellini, Vincenzo, 750.
- Belon, Pierre, 131.
- Benedict XIV, Pope, 528.
- Benedictines, 139, 533.
- Benefices, 147-148, 166. *
- Benevolences, 29.
- Bengal, 411, 414, 415.
- Bentham, Jeremy, 544-545, 740, 761.
- Beresford, Lord, 774.
- Berkeley, Bishop, 509.
- Berlin, 663; captured by Russians, 343; Decree, 672; treaty of (1833), 793; university of, 739.

- Bernadotte, 665, 684, 688, 704, 794.
(See Charles XIV, of Sweden.)
- Bernini, 557.
- Bible, 98, 110, 156, 165, 186, 193-194, 336, 519-520.
- Bibliothèque Nationale, 109, 534.
- Bill of Rights, 452-453, 608.
- Biology, 131, 504-505.
- Black, Joseph, 502, 503.
- Black Sea, Turkish control of, 13, 14, 232; Russian control of, 381.
- Blackstone, 544.
- Blake, Robert, 400.
- Blenheim, battle of, 309.
- Blucher, 688, 693.
- Blumenbach, 549.
- Boccaccio, 102.
- Bodin, Jean, 121, 131, 135, 210, 211.
- Bohemia, 7, 35-36, 263-265, 426, 802.
(See Habsburg Family, Holy Roman Empire.)
- Boleyn, Anne, 172, 173, 175, 239.
- Bolivar, Simon, 777, 778-779, 781.
- Bolivia, 778.
- Bonaparte, family, 664; Jerome, 658, 673, 687; Joseph, 658, 665, 673, 675, 676, 677, 681, 699, 714, 717; Louis, 658, 665, 673, 674; Napoleon. (See Napoleon I.)
- Borgia, Cæsar, 19, 146; Lucrezia, 146.
- Borodino, battle of, 684.
- Bossuet, 294, 658.
- Boston, 479, 480.
- Botany, 131, 505.
- Bothwell, Earl of, 252.
- Boucher, 562, 563.
- Bourbon, family, 255-256, 280, 286, 288, 304-319, 690, 692, 694, 768.
- Bourgeoisie, or Middle Class, 95; and Calvinism, 166, 167; and Puritan Revolution in England, 432-434; in France, under Henry IV, 279, 280; in France, under Louis XIV, 204, 295, 322; decline of, in Germany, in 17th century, 321, 322; in Austria, 354; in Portugal, 354; rise of, in 18th century, 584-585, 586-588, 597; and French Revolution, 588, 591, 596, 597, 616, 617-619, 620, 632, 639; and Napoleon, 657; in early 19th century, 718-719, 761, 764, 767, 769, 785, 788, 797.
- Boyle, Robert, 502
- Boyne, battle of the, 402.
- Braddock, General, 408.
- Braganza, duke of, 244-245.
- Brahe, Tycho, 123-124, 134.
- Brandenburg, 7, 269, 301, 311, 323, 330, 331, 344, 345, 369, 802. (See Hohenzollern Family, Prussia.)
- Brazil, 75, 77, 78-79, 265, 392, 394 n., 675, 774, 781-782.
- Breitenfeld, battle of, 269.
- Brienne, Lomenie de, 595.
- Brissot, 625, 629, 636.
- Browne, Robert, 180.
- Brueghel, 52 n., 53 n., 88 n.
- Brumaire, eighteenth, 644.
- Brummel, "Beau," 560.
- Bruno, Giordano, 132-133, 134, 506.
- Brunswick, Duke of, 343, 627, 663.
- Brussels, 789.
- Bucharest, treaty of (1812), 683, 708.
- Buckingham, Duke of, 436.
- Budapest, 14, 35, 36, 233.
- Budé, William, 109.
- Buenos Aires, 81, 777, 778.
- Buffon, 505.
- Bulgaria, 12, 40, 802.
- Bull, John, 118.
- Bulls, Papal, 140 n.
- Burgoyne, General, 484.
- Burgundy, duchy of, 22-23, 30, 31, 65; county of (Franche Comté), 23, 271, 286, 298, 301.
- Burke, Edmund, 417, 481, 569, 622, 710, 711, 742.
- Burns, Robert, 571, 744.
- Burschenschaft*, 753.
- Byrd, William, 118.
- Byron, Lord, 744-745, 747, 783.
- Byzantine Empire, 6, 9, 10, 15; fall of 11-13, 14, 357.
- Cabinet (English), 455, 458.
- Cabot, John, 30, 74, 385.
- Cabral, Pedro, 74-75.
- Cadiz, 254, 310, 771, 773, 778, 779.
- Cæsar, 100; title of, 357 n.
- Cagliostro, 560.
- Cahiers*, 596-597, 599.
- Calais, 251, 256.
- Calcutta, 398, 411.
- Calderon, 261, 567.
- Calendar, 125-126, 813.
- Callot, 287 n.

- Calmar, union of, 35.
 Calonne, 595.
 Calvin, John, 20, 161, 163-166, 168, 177, 181, 182, 183, 202, 209, 820.
 Calvinism, 161-169, 174, 176, 191, 194-197, 203, 204, 206, 208, 211, 214-215, 216, 218, 245, 248, 263-265, 273, 513, 742, 820.
 Cambrai, league of, 21; peace of, 231.
 Camoëns, 45, 122.
 Campo Formio, treaty of, 642, 650, 661.
 Canada, 397, 409-410, 413, 469, 475, 476, 480, 483, 486-487, 491.
 Canning, George, 676, 764, 776, 780, 789.
 Canon Law, 140.
 Canova, 736.
 Capet, Hugh, 30.
 Capitalism, rise of modern, 82-95, 213-215, 797, 817, 828; and European expansion, 85; failure to develop, in Spain and Portugal, 87-88; growth of, in Germany and Netherlands, 88, 90, 240; in 18th century, 422, 465, 586; in agriculture, 91, 465-469, 716-717, 797.
 Capitulations, 16-17.
Carbonari, 699-700, 707, 755, 771.
 Cardan, 126-127.
 Cardinals, 137-138.
 Carlsbad decrees, 754.
 Carlstadt, 179-180.
 Carnatic, 410, 411.
 Carnot, 630, 632-633, 634, 669.
 Caroline, of Great Britain, 764.
 Carpaccio, Vittore, 26 n.
 Carrier, 636.
 Cartier, 76.
 Casanova, 560.
 Casas, Bartolomé de las, 86.
 Castile, 8, 32, 40. (*See* Spain.)
 Castlereagh, Lord, 712, 722, 724, 731, 732, 760, 764, 776.
 Cateau-Cambrésis, treaty of, 231-232, 251, 258.
 Catherine, of Aragon and England, 30, 171-172, 173, 224, 238, 239.
 Catherine de' Medici. (*See* Medici.)
 Catherine II (the Great), of Russia, 343 n., 353, 372-374, 379, 381-383.
 Catholic Church, 137, 191; at beginning of 16th century, 4-6, 136-152; in 16th century, 183-219, 244; in 17th and 18th centuries, 263-274, 312-314, 351, 433, 435, 448-453, 471, 512, 516-517, 523, 526, 528-529; and French Revolution, 612-613, 617, 634, 636, 638; and Napoleon, 653-654, 673-674, 682; in early 19th century, 719, 742-743, 762, 764, 767, 769, 772, 785.
 Catholic league, in Thirty Years' War, 267, 268.
 Cato Street conspiracy, 763.
 Cavaignac, 787.
 Cavaliers, 440.
 Cavendish, Henry, 502, 503.
 Cavendish, Thomas, 386.
 Censorship, 186, 208, 590-591, 658, 752, 754, 763, 795.
 Cervantes, 45, 259.
 Cesalpino, 131.
 Ceylon, 72, 77, 392, 418, 713.
 Chambers of Reunion, 301-302.
Chambre introuvable, 766.
 Champlain, Samuel, 280, 391.
 Charcoal-Burners, 767-768. (*See* *Carbonari*.)
 Charlemagne, 5, 19.
 Charles, archduke (of Austria), 678.
 Charles the Bold, of Burgundy, 8, 23.
 Charles V, Emperor (Charles I, of Spain), 32, 36, 107, 116, 130, 132, 135, 156, 166, 172, 187, 189, 223-241.
 Charles VI, Emperor (Archduke Charles of Austria), 280, 327, 329.
 Charles VII, Emperor (Elector of Bavaria), 338.
 Charles I, of England, 300, 435-441, 452.
 Charles II, of England, 300, 301, 395, 441, 445-451, 452.
 Charles VIII, of France, 21, 22, 31.
 Charles IX, of France, 204, 255.
 Charles X, of France, 280, 768, 785-787. (*See* Artois, Count of.)
 Charles I, of Spain. (*See* Charles V, Emperor.)
 Charles II, of Spain, 277, 280, 306-307, 308.
 Charles III, of Spain, 280, 317, 353, 355.
 Charles IV, of Spain, 280, 317, 318, 633, 674, 675, 714.
 Charles XI, of Sweden, 369 n.
 Charles XII, of Sweden, 369-371.
 Charles XIII, of Sweden, 665, 704.
 Charles XIV, of Sweden, 794. (*See* Bernadotte.)

- Charles Albert, of Sardinia, 756.
 Charles Emmanuel III, of Sardinia, 353.
 Charles Felix, of Sardinia, 756.
 Charter of 1814 (French), 690, 765-766, 786.
 Chateaubriand, 742, 744, 747.
 Chateauroux, duchess of, 318, 592.
 Chatterton, 571, 744.
 Chaucer, 44.
 Chaumont, treaty of, 689, 722, 723, 729.
 Chemistry, 128, 129, 131, 502-503.
 Chesterfield, 560, 569.
 Chile, 81, 777, 778, 780.
 China, 66-67, 69-70, 72, 74, 76, 77, 96 n., 97, 386, 392, 418, 565-566.
 Chippendale, 560 n.
 Chodowiecki, 340 n., 383, 564, 576.
 Christendom, 3-9, 190-197. (*See* Catholic Church, Orthodox Church, Protestantism.)
 Christian II, of Denmark and Norway, 107, 159.
 Christian III, of Denmark and Norway, 160.
 Christian IV, of Denmark and Norway, 266, 267.
 Christianity. (*See* Catholic Church, Orthodox Church, Protestantism.)
 Chrysoloras, 102.
 Church (*See* Catholic Church, Orthodox Church, Protestantism.)
 Church of England. (*See* Anglicanism.)
 Churriguera, 558.
 Cicero, 100, 103.
 Cisalpine Republic, 644, 658.
 Cities, in 16th century, 55-61, 84; in 18th century, 585.
 City states, 17-23, 27, 814.
 Civil constitution of the clergy (French), 612-613.
 Clarkson, Thomas, 551.
 Classicism, 99-122, 126, 555-576, 734-738, 743, 783, 818, 833.
 Clement VII, Pope, 172, 184, 231.
 Clement VIII, Pope, 131.
 Clement IX, Pope, 573.
 Clement XIV, Pope, 529.
 Clergy, secular, 138; regular, 139.
 Cleves, 330, 331.
 Clive, Robert, 342, 407, 410-411, 415.
 Coalition, First, 633, 643; Second, 644, 650, 656-657; Third, 660-663.
 Cobbett, 761, 763-764.
 Coblenz, 615, 616, 720.
 Code Napoléon, 654, 667, 707, 766.
 Coen, John, 392.
 Colbert, 294-297, 301, 314, 400, 401, 497.
 Coleridge, 744, 745.
 Colet, John, 109, 170.
 Coligny, 257, 390.
Collection de documents inédits, 741.
Collège de France, 107, 109.
 Cologne, 7.
 Colombia, 81, 778, 779, 780, 781.
 Colonization, in 16th century, 38, 76-82, 390; in 17th century, 390-401; in 18th century, 353, 414-420, 469-470; and Napoleon, 656, 690.
 Columbus, Christopher, 33, 70, 72-74, 126.
 Commerce, before 1500, 12, 18, 20, 21, 25; in 16th century, 30, 55-66, 72-73, 94-95, 217, 253, 816; as a factor in modern society, 55, 62; difficulties of, 63-64; expansion of, 60, 303; of Spain, 223, 253, 260-261; French, 280, 295, 390; British, 339, 385-389, 414, 421, 462, 487, 716, 777; of Netherlands, 391-393; growth of, in 18th century, 585; and Napoleonic Wars, 662, 683; and Russia, 367, 683; in early 19th century, 710, 764, 777, 789. (*See* Mercantilism.)
Common Prayer, Book of, 120, 174, 175.
 Commons, House of. (*See* Parliament, English.)
 Commonwealth, English, 441.
 Commune, 602, 636.
Compte Rendu, of Necker, 593.
 Concert of Europe, 720-733, 755, 764, 775, 776, 781, 790, 790.
 Concordats, 743; of 1801, 653.
 Condé, 256, 287, 290, 297.
 Condorcet, 625, 629.
 Condottieri, 20.
 Confederation of the Rhine, 666, 667, 673, 686, 687.
 Confirmation, 142.
 Congregationalism, 177, 180-181, 389-390.
 Congress, Continental (American), 480-481, 482, 488; American, 489-490, 780; international, 733. (*See* Vienna, Congress of.)
 Consalvi, Cardinal, 743.

- Conservatism, in early 19th century, 718-719, 731, 733, 751-775, 790-795.
 Constable, 748.
 Constance, council of, 140.
 Constantine I, Græco-Roman Emperor, 9, 357 n.
 Constantine XI, Græco-Roman Emperor, 1, 38, 357 n.
 Constantine, Grand-Duke of Russia, 758, 792.
 Constantinople, 11-13, 38, 62, 192-193, 381.
 Constitution, British, 429-431, 457-460; of United States, 488-489; French, of 1791, 613-614, 654; French, of Year I, 639-640; French, of Year III, 640; French, of Year VIII, 649-650, 652; Spanish, of 1812, 682, 769-770.
 Consulate, French, 645, 649-657.
 Continental Congress, American, 480-481, 482, 488.
 Continental system, 670-674, 677, 681, 682, 683.
 Conventicles, 450.
 Convention, National (French), 628-640, 696, 736.
 Convention Parliament, 445.
 Cook, Captain, 419-420.
 Cooper, J. F., 745.
 Copenhagen, battle of, 651, 670, 672.
 Copernicus, 123-124, 126, 130, 497.
 Copley, 562.
 Corday, Charlotte, 620 n.
 Cordelier Club, 619, 020.
 Corneille, 294, 567.
 Cornwallis, Lord, 417, 485.
 Corporation Act, 450.
 "Corridor," Polish, 374.
 Corsica, 317 n., 592 n., 648, 689.
 Cortes, of Portugal, 33, 774; of Spain, 33, 34, 770, 771, 773.
 Cortez, Hernando, 79-80.
Corvée, 581.
 Cossacks, 359, 361.
 Coster, Lourens, 98.
 Council of Blood, 247; Troubles, 246; Regency, in Holy Roman Empire, 235, 236, 237.
 Councils, church, 140, 184, 185. (*See* Trent, council of.)
Coup d'état, 644-645, 647, 649.
 Courland, 374, 380, 703. (*See* Latvia, Letts.)
 Court, of High Commission, 439, of star chamber, 29, 238, 439.
 Covenant (Scottish), 440, 449.
 Cowper, 571.
 Cracow, 345, 382.
 Craft Guilds, 57-60, 83.
 Cranmer, 120, 173, 175, 177.
 Croatia, 36, 40, 190, 325, 707, 751, 793, 802. (*See* Hungary.)
 Cromwell, Oliver, 394, 438, 440-445.
 Cromwell, Richard, 445.
 Crusades, 12, 25, 41, 61, 62, 68, 326.
 Cuba, 70, 81, 410, 412.
 Curia, Roman, 148, 156.
 Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 702, 723, 724, 757.
 Czechoslovakia, 802. (*See* Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia.)
 Dampier, William, 419.
 Dance, Nathaniel, 419 n.
 Dante, 18, 44.
 Danton, 620-621, 627, 628, 630, 636.
 Darnley, Henry, 252.
 David, Francis, 182 n.
 David, J. L., 631 n., 736, 748.
 Davis, 386.
 Decembrists, 758, 792.
 Declaration of Independence (United States), 482-483, 608; indulgence, 450, 451; Rights of Man, 608, 610.
 Declaratory Act, 479.
 Defender of the Faith, 171.
 Defoe, 560.
 Deism, 518-532, 741-742.
 Delacroix, 748-749, 783, 790 n.
 De Maistre, Count Joseph, 743 n.
 Demarcation, papal line of, 76, 141.
 Democracy, 215-216, 482, 490, 492, 538-539, 542-543, 617, 645-646.
 d'Enghien, duc, 657.
 Denmark, 40, 802; in 1500, 34-35; Lutheranism in, 159-160; in Thirty Years' War, 266-270; and Great Northern War, 369-371; and Napoleon, 672; loss of Norway, 687-688, 726; and Congress of Vienna, 722; in early 19th century, 794.
 De Quiros, 419.
 De Ruyter, 394.
 Descartes, 498-499, 506-507.
 Desmoulins, 601, 636.

- Despotism, "enlightened," 346-356, 529, 825.
- Devolution, War of, 298-299.
- De Witt, John, 300, 498, 508.
- Diaz, Bartholomew, 71-72.
- Dictionaries, 549, 813.
- Diderot, 374, 524, 536.
- Diet, of German Confederation, 727, 754; of Holy Roman Empire, 7, 152, 155, 320, 666; of Speyer, 158; of Worms, 9, 235, 236.
- Diocese, 138.
- Diplomacy, 21, 90, 274, 837, 838. (*See* International Law.)
- Directory, French, 640-645, 650.
- Discoveries. (*See* Explorations.)
- Dissenters, English, 176; Polish, 375.
- d'Istria, Capo, 722.
- Divine Right, theory of. (*See* Absolutism.)
- Dominicans, 139.
- Donatello, 113.
- Donizetti, 750.
- Doria, Andrea, 21.
- Doukhobors, 517.
- Dover, treaty of, 300, 449.
- Drake, Francis, 253, 386, 387.
- Dryden, 568.
- Duma, Russian, 365.
- Dumouriez, 625, 631, 636, 777.
- Dupleix, 405, 406, 407, 410, 411.
- Duquesne, Fort, 408, 409.
- Dürer, Albrecht, 116-117, 158 n.
- Dutch, 40. (*See* Netherlands, Dutch.)
- Dutch Reformed Church, 167. (*See* Calvinism.)
- Dynastic empires, 32, 43, 354. (*See* Bourbon Family, Habsburg Family.)
- East India Company, Dutch, 391-392, 394; English, 389, 394, 411, 413, 414, 417, 418, 480; French, 390.
- Ecclesiastical reservation, 159, 263.
- Eck, John, 155.
- Economics. (*See* Political Economy.)
- Ecuador, 778, 779.
- Education, in 16th century, 103-105, 165, 188, 211-212, 218; in 17th and 18th centuries, 334, 349, 374, 542-543, 551-552, 556-557; in Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, 637, 654-655, 681, 707, 715, 757, 760, 762, 767.
- Edward I, of England, 430.
- Edward VI, of England, 131, 168, 169, 174, 203.
- Egmont, count of, 247.
- Egypt, 13-14, 643, 651, 735, 784.
- Elba, 689, 691, 692, 765.
- Elector, Great. (*See* Frederick William of Brandenburg.)
- El Greco, 116, 143 n.
- Elizabeth, of England, 135, 168, 169, 175-176, 203, 211, 218, 251-252, 385, 387, 428.
- Elizabeth, of Russia, 342, 343.
- Emancipation, edict of (Prussian), 680.
- Émigrés, French, 615-616, 622, 634, 635, 769, 785-786.
- Emmanuel I, of Portugal, 224.
- Emmet, 711-712.
- Enclosures, 91, 462, 468-469, 716-717.
- Encyclopedias, 524, 813.
- England, 40, 802; in 1500, 28-30; in 16th century, 169-176, 203, 209, 211, 218, 238-240, 251-254, 384-388; in 17th century, 299-304, 388-390, 393-402, 428-455, 497-498, 499-500, 502, 507-508, 509, 519, 573; in 18th century, 309-312, 337, 339-344, 403-422, 455-488, 490-494, 501, 502-504, 514-516, 520, 522-526, 529, 535, 537-539, 544, 546, 559, 562, 568-569, 570-571; and French Revolution, 622-623, 632; and Napoleon, 650-651, 659-663, 670-673, 676-677, 684, 687-689, 693-694, 712-717; in early 19th century, 759-764, 789-790, 796-798. (*See* Great Britain.)
- Enlightened despotism. (*See* Despotism, "enlightened.")
- Enlightenment, 506-512, 518-556, 577, 680, 738-739.
- Episcopal Church. (*See* Anglicanism.)
- Erasmus, 44, 90, 109-110, 117, 119, 147, 170.
- Estates-General (French), 31, 166; (1614), 280-281, 282; decline of, 281, 290; (1789), 595-596, 597-601.
- Estonia, 40, 367, 368, 369, 371, 380, 383, 703, 802.
- Eucharist, 142, 143, 195-196.
- Eugene of Savoy, Prince, 326, 403.
- Evangelicalism, 177-179, 515-516.
- Exclusion Bill (English), 450, 451.

- Explorations, 66-82, 217, 385-387, 419-420.
- Extreme unction, 142, 143.
- Fairfax, Baron, 440.
- Family Compact, 343.
- Farming. (*See* Agriculture.)
- Farnese, Alexander, duke of Parma, 248, 249, 254.
- Ferdinand, of Aragon, 8, 19, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 43, 73, 224, 225.
- Ferdinand I, Emperor, 36, 37, 224, 233, 240, 241, 262, 263, 320.
- Ferdinand II, Emperor, 224, 264, 266, 267, 272, 280, 325, 426.
- Ferdinand III, Emperor, 224, 276, 280, 299 n., 326 n.
- Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria, 793.
- Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 675, 691, 714, 769-773, 779.
- Ferdinand I, of Two Sicilies, 317-318, 694 n., 754, 755-756.
- Feuillants*, 625.
- Fichte, 681, 698, 739, 740, 742, 746.
- Fielding, 569.
- Finland, 35, 37, 40, 191, 367, 368, 369, 371, 663, 665, 683, 684, 703, 726, 803.
- Fischart, John, 211.
- Fisher, John, 173.
- Five-Mile Act, 440-450.
- Fleury, Cardinal, 315, 316, 318, 591-592.
- Florence, 20, 21-22, 64, 84, 803. (*See* Tuscany.)
- Florida, 79, 412, 487, 779.
- Fontaine, 735.
- Fontainebleau, decree of, 672; treaty of, 689, 691.
- Foscolo, 699, 740, 747.
- Fouché, 656, 694, 766.
- Fox, Charles James, 492, 493, 710, 711, 712.
- Fox, George, 514.
- Fragonard, 562.
- France, 40, 803; in 1500, 30-32; in 16th century, 115, 165-166, 189, 220-232, 254-259, 390; in 17th century, 268-273, 275-304, 391, 395-402, 517, 558, 567-568; in 18th century, 304-319, 338-344, 403-413, 521-525, 526, 528, 540-543, 562, 569-570, 574-575, 577-600; and the Great Revolution, 600-646; and Napoleon, 647-690; under the Restoration, 690-694, 765-769, 772; and the July (1830) Revolution, 785-790.
- Franche Comté. (*See* Burgundy.)
- Francia, José, 778.
- Francis I, Emperor, 280, 350.
- Francis II, Emperor (Francis I, Emperor of Austria), 280, 661, 666, 678, 679, 721, 722, 730-731, 793.
- Francis I, of France, 32, 76, 107, 100, 112, 114, 116, 135, 163, 164, 204, 225, 228, 229-230, 231, 238, 254, 255.
- Francis II, of France, 252, 255.
- Francis Xavier, 72.
- Franciscans, 139.
- Franklin, Benjamin, 477, 484, 502.
- Frederick, elector palatine of the Rhine, 263, 264, 295, 452.
- Frederick I, of Denmark and Norway, 150, 160.
- Frederick II, of Denmark and Norway, 124.
- Frederick VI, of Denmark, 704.
- Frederick II (the Great), of Prussia, 332, 335, 338-340, 355, 356, 378, 381, 382, 532, 679.
- Frederick William (the Great Elector), of Brandenburg, 331, 333.
- Frederick William I, of Prussia, 332, 333-335.
- Frederick William II, of Prussia, 332, 356, 624, 633.
- Frederick William III, of Prussia, 332, 661, 662, 679, 680, 686, 722, 723, 724, 727, 742, 753, 794.
- Frederick William IV, of Prussia, 332, 794.
- Freemasonry, 525-527, 755, 771, 833.
- French and Indian War, 342, 407-410, 476.
- Friars, 139.
- Friedland, battle of, 663.
- Friends. (*See* Quakers.)
- Frobisher, 386, 387.
- Fronde, 288-289, 290.
- Frontenac, 402.
- Fugger Family, 89-90, 129, 240.
- Gabelle*, 581.
- Gabrieli, Giovanni, 118.
- Gainsborough, 501-562, 563, 712 n.
- Galicia, 344-345, 382, 678, 724. (*See* Poland.)

- Galileo, 124-125, 127 n., 128, 129, 497, 499.
- Gama, Vasco da, 72, 398.
- Gassendi, Pierre, 507.
- Geneva, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 181, 182.
- Genoa, 12, 14, 20, 21, 61, 64, 85, 648, 658, 726.
- Geography, 70, 131-132, 548-549, 813.
- Geology, 503-504.
- George I, of Great Britain and Hanover, 337, 452, 455-456, 573.
- George II, of Great Britain and Hanover, 337, 452, 455-456.
- George III, of Great Britain and Hanover, 452, 462, 464-465, 468, 469, 481, 491, 492, 493, 710, 714, 760.
- George IV (Prince-Regent), of Great Britain and Hanover, 452, 560, 562, 731, 759, 764.
- Gérard, F., 791 n.
- German Confederation, 727, 752-754.
- Germany, 40, 803; in 1500, 6-9, 18; in 16th century, 64-65, 88-89, 117, 152-159, 167, 203, 211, 225, 233-238; in 17th century, 263-275, 286, 301-302, 320-324; in 18th century, 327-329, 335-344, 558, 567, 570, 571, 572, 573-575; in early 19th century, 665-667, 678-681, 686-687, 698, 720-727, 741, 742, 746, 752-755, 793-794. (See Austria, Bavaria, Habsburg Family, Holy Roman Empire, Prussia, Saxony, etc.)
- Gesner, Konrad von, 120, 131.
- Ghent, pacification of, 248.
- Ghibellines, 18.
- Ghiberti, 113.
- Gibbon, Edward, 535, 536.
- Gibbons, Orlando, 118.
- Gibraltar, 309, 403, 485.
- Gilbert, Humphrey, 386, 387.
- Gilbert, William, 127-128.
- Girondists, 625-626, 629-630, 636.
- Gluck, Christoph, 574-575.
- Gneisenau, 680.
- Godoy, 675.
- Godwin, William, 761.
- Goethe, 571-572, 744, 746.
- Gogol, 748.
- Goya, 564-565, 669 n., 713 n., 748.
- Granada, 32, 33, 223.
- Grand Alliance, 309, 403.
- Grand Design, of Sully, 279.
- Grand Monarch. (See Louis XIV, of France.)
- Grasse, Count de, 485.
- Graunt, 546.
- Gray, Thomas, 570.
- Great Britain. (See England, Scotland.)
- Great Northern War, 369-371.
- Greece, 11-13, 40, 101-103, 116, 151, 192-193, 379, 381, 706-707, 783-785, 796, 804.
- Greenough, 738.
- Gregorian calendar, 125-126.
- Gregory XIII, Pope, 125, 184 n.
- Gregory XV, Pope, 210.
- Gregory XVI, Pope, 791.
- Grenville, George, 477, 479.
- Greuze, 562, 567.
- Grillparzer, 746, 752.
- Grotius, 275, 539 n.
- Guelphs, 18.
- Guilds, Craft, 57-60, 83, 614; Merchant, 50-58, 83.
- Guise Family, 252, 255, 256, 258.
- Guizot, 741.
- Gustavus I (Vasa), of Sweden, 35, 159, 160, 161, 268.
- Gustavus II (Adolphus), of Sweden, 268-270, 367.
- Gustavus III, of Sweden, 353, 355, 703.
- Gustavus IV, of Sweden, 664, 704.
- Gutenberg, John, 98.
- Habeas Corpus Act, 457.
- Habsburg Family, origin of, 7-8, 23; in 16th century, 36, 37, 65, 185, 190, 225; genealogy of, 224; in Thirty Years' War, 262-274; rivalry with Bourbon family, 268, 286, 288, 304, 307, 311; dominions of, 324-329, 726, 727, 824; contest between Hohenzollerns and, 338-345.
- Haiti, 397, 656, 778, 779. (See Hispaniola.)
- Hals, Frans, 504 n., 563.
- Hampden, John, 437, 438.
- Handel, 573, 575.
- Hanover, 336, 337, 371, 455, 790.
- Hanoverian Family, 455-456; genealogy of, 452.
- Hanseatic towns, 22 n., 235; League, 41, 64-65, 322.
- Hardenberg, 680, 723.

- Harvey, William, 129 n., 130, 497.
 Hastings, Warren, 416, 417.
 Hawke, Admiral, 409-410.
 Hawkins, John, 253, 385.
 Haydn, 575, 749 n.
 Hegel, 739-740, 742, 746.
 Heine, 746.
 Helgesen, Povel, 109, 110, 160.
 Helmont, J. B. von, 131.
 Helvetic Republic, 644.
 Henrietta Maria, 435.
 Henry III, of England, 430.
 Henry VII, of England, 28-30, 74, 114, 171, 252.
 Henry VIII, of England, 30, 107, 109, 117, 127, 135, 160, 171-174, 203, 224, 231, 238, 239.
 Henry II, of France, 231, 254, 255.
 Henry III, of France, 255.
 Henry IV, of France, 204, 205, 258, 278-279, 280, 391.
 Henry, duke of Guise, 257-258.
 Henry, Prince, the Navigator, 33, 71.
 Hepplewhite, 560 n.
 Herbert of Chisbury, 519.
 Herder, 534-535, 571, 698.
 Heresy, 151, 152, 162, 181, 199, 202, 766.
 Hermansen, Jacob, 182 n., 513 n.
Helairia Philike, 707, 783.
 Hidalgo, 777, 778, 779.
 Hierarchy, 137.
 High-church, 196.
 High Commission, Court of, 439.
 Hispaniola, 79, 779. (*See* Hayti, San Domingo.)
 History, 104-105, 131, 533-537, 740-741, 813.
 Hobbes, Thomas, 507-508, 537-538.
 Hogarth, William, 418 n., 464 n., 564.
 Hohenlinden, battle of, 650.
 Hohenzollern Family, and Prussia, 311, 329-335; genealogy of, 332; contest between Habsburgs and, 338-345.
 Holbach, 524-525.
 Holbein, Hans, 89 n., 116, 117, 128 n., 159 n., 172 n.
 Holland. (*See* Netherlands, Dutch.)
 Hollar, 437 n.
 Holy Alliance, 730-731, 742, 757-758.
 Holy League, 20.
 Holy Name Society, 208.
 Holy Orders, 142, 143.
 Holy Roman Empire, 804-805; in 16th century, 3-9, 17, 18, 23, 27, 28, 45, 65, 156-158, 203, 232-238; in 17th century, 203, 263-275, 302, 309; in 18th century, 320-324, 335-338, 345; end of, 666-667. (*See* Germany, Habsburg Family.)
 Holy Synod, in Russia, 364-365.
 Horn, count of, 247.
 Houdon, 505 n., 537 n., 598 n., 668 n., 736.
 Hubertusburg, treaty of, 344.
 Hudson, Henry, 386, 393.
 Huguenots, 165, 166, 204, 255, 256, 282, 283, 313, 333. (*See* Calvinism.)
 Humanism, 103, 107, 108, 110, 126, 161, 240, 556.
 Humanitarianism, 550-553.
 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 681, 698, 723.
 Hume, David, 509-510, 535.
 Hundred Days, 692, 765.
 Hundred Years' War, 28, 30, 42.
 Hungary, 14, 35, 36-37, 40, 167, 182, 205, 232-233, 263, 325-327, 339, 351-352, 728, 751-752, 793, 805.
 Hus, John, 151.
 Huskisson, William, 764.
 Hussites, 42, 151, 152.
 Hutten, Ulrich von, 236, 237.
 Hutton, James, 503-504.
 Huygens, Christian, 499.
 Hyder Ali, 485.
 Ibrahim Pasha, 784.
 Idealism, German, 739-740. (*See* Fichte, Hegel, Kant.)
 Illyrian provinces, 678, 688, 707, 726. (*See* Croatia.)
Imitation of Christ, 145.
 Independents (English), 440, 444, 446. (*See* Congregationalism.)
 Index of Prohibited Books, 186, 208.
 India, 20, 21, 66, 72, 73, 76, 77; Dutch in, 82, 391-392, 418-419, 487, 713; English in, 389, 398-399, 410-412, 413-418, 491, 713, 760; French in, 280, 296, 391, 399, 410-412; Portuguese in, 72, 77-78.
 Indians, American, 74, 78, 79, 80, 188, 403.
 Indulgences, 98, 153-154, 186.
 Industry, 57-60, 91-92, 295-296, 545-548, 585, 719, 762-763, 767, 795-798. (*See* Guilds, Mercantilism.)

- Ingres, 736, 748.
 Ingria, 367, 369, 371, 380.
 Innocent XI, Pope, 326, 557 n.
 Inquisition, ecclesiastical, 34, 186-187, 199, 202, 210; Spanish, 200, 202, 242, 353, 528, 676, 682, 770.
 Institute of France, 296.
Institutes, Calvin's, 120, 164.
 Instrument of Government (English), 443-444.
 Intellectual Revolution. (*See* Revolution, Intellectual.)
 Intendants, in France, 284, 652.
 Intercursus Magnus, 30.
 International law, 274-275, 553, 611, 729.
 Intolerance, religious, 197-207, 274, 348-349, 351, 353, 512-513, 518, 529-531, 636, 638.
 Ireland, 28, 40, 190, 388, 441-442, 461, 487, 491, 711-712, 762, 764, 805.
 Isabella, of Castile, 8, 30, 33, 34, 36, 43, 73, 224, 225.
 Islam (Moslems), 9-17, 32, 33, 61, 66, 68, 73, 136 n., 189, 223, 232-233, 259-260, 325-327, 381, 643, 783. (*See* Ottoman Empire.)
 Italy, in 16th century, 18-22, 31-32, 34, 40, 43, 61-65, 84-85, 88-89, 103-105, 112-116, 118-119, 124-127, 146, 189, 229-231; in 17th century, 271, 504, 534, 557, 567, 572-573; in 18th century, 310, 316-318, 327, 353, 497-498, 526, 544, 547, 566, 570, 641-642, 644; in early 19th century, 650, 658, 665, 699, 725, 726, 727-728, 754-756, 791, 798. (*See* Papal States, Sardinia, Two Sicilies, Tuscany, Venice, etc.)
 Iturbide, 779.
 Ivan III (the Great), of Russia, 38, 357, 358.
 Ivan IV (the Terrible), of Russia, 38, 357, 358.
 Jacobins (French), 619, 621, 627-640, 657, 669, 735, 736.
 Jacobites (British), 456.
 James I, of England (James VI, of Scotland), 133, 252, 265, 388-390, 428-429, 431, 433, 434, 452.
 James II, of England (James VII, of Scotland), 303, 395, 448, 451-452.
 James IV, of Scotland, 30, 452.
 James V, of Scotland, 167, 452.
 James VI, of Scotland. (*See* James I, of England.)
 Janizaries, 16, 378.
 Jansen, Cornelius (1585-1638), 516-517.
 Jansen, Cornelius (1593-1660), 129 n.
 Jansenists, 313, 516-517.
 Japan, 72, 74, 77, 188, 392, 418.
 Jeanne d'Arc, 42.
 Jefferson, Thomas, 482.
 Jena, battle of, 663, 670, 679.
 Jenkins's Ear, War of, 339 n., 406.
 Jesuits, 187-188, 202, 212, 353, 396, 528-529, 743, 769, 770.
 Jews, 198-199, 200, 223, 529-532.
 Joanna, the Mad, 8, 224, 225.
 Jode, 436 n.
 John, Don, of Austria, 248, 259.
 John George, of Saxony, 265.
 John of Leiden, 178-179.
 John of Monte Corvino, 69.
 John of Plano Carpini, 69.
 John III (Sobieski), of Poland, 326, 375 n.
 John II, of Portugal, 72, 73.
 John IV, of Portugal, 271.
 John VI, of Portugal, 774, 781-782.
 Johnson, Samuel, 549, 569.
 Jones, Inigo, 559.
 Jones, William, 549.
 Jordaens, 563.
 Joseph II, Emperor, 280, 350-353, 373, 532.
 Joseph I, of Portugal, 353, 355.
 Joseph, of Spain. (*See* Bonaparte, Joseph.)
 Josephine, French Empress, 679, 735.
 Jourdan, 632.
 Julian calendar, 125.
 Julius II, Pope, 19, 116, 146, 172.
 July Days (or July Revolution), 787, 796.
Juntas, 676, 769, 777, 778.
 Jurisprudence, 543-544.
 Justinian, Emperor, 9, 14, 27, 209.
 Kant, Immanuel, 510, 739.
 Karageorge, 708, 782.
 Karelia, 360 n., 367, 369, 371, 380.
 Karlowitz, treaty of, 326, 377.
 Kaunitz, 341-342, 720.

- Keats, 744-745.
 Kempis, Thomas à, 145.
 Kepler, 124, 134.
 Kiel, treaty of, 687-688, 704.
 King George's War, 341, 406.
 King William's War, 302, 402.
 Klopstock, 571.
 Knights Hospitallers, 139.
 Knights' War, 237.
 Knox, John, 161, 168-169, 203, 212.
 Korais, 706, 740, 783.
Koran, 15.
 Körner, 746.
 Kosciuszko, 382, 700, 740.
 Kotzebue, 754, 757.
 Kremer, Gerhard (Mercator), 132.
 Kuchuk Kainarji, treaty of, 379, 381.
 Kutusov, 684.
- Lafayette, 485, 594, 602, 603, 604, 624, 628, 787.
 Laffitte, 787.
 La Fontaine, 294.
 La Hogue, battle of, 402.
 Laibach, congress of, 733, 755-756, 783.
Laissez-faire, 593.
 La Rochelle, siege of, 283.
 La Salle, 397.
 Latvia (Letts), 40, 368, 374, 703, 805.
 (See Courland, Livonia.)
 Laud, Archbishop, 437, 438, 439.
 Lavoisier, 502-503.
 Law, international. (See International Law.)
 Law, John, 315-316, 591.
 Law of Suspects, 635.
 Lawrence, Thomas, 737, 748.
 Leclerc, General, 656.
 Legitimacy, 456, 690, 725, 726, 727, 731, 783.
 Leibnitz, 508.
 Leipzig, battle of, 687.
 L'Enfant, 737-738.
 Leo X, Pope, 108, 109, 116, 146, 153, 155, 171, 184, 202.
 Leopold I, of Belgium, 789.
 Leopold I, Emperor, 280, 301, 302, 307, 326, 333, 353.
 Leopold II, Emperor, 280, 623-624.
 Lepanto, battle of, 259-260, 377.
 Lessing, 570, 744.
 Leszczyński, Stanislaus, 316, 370.
 Lettland. (See Latvia.)
- Lettres de cachet*, 598.
 Letts (Latvians), 374, 383, 805.
 Levellers, 538.
 Levitsky, 373 n.
 Lexington, battle of, 481.
 Liberalism, 718-719, 729, 731, 732-733 751, 753-790.
 Liberation, war of, 678, 686, 699, 746.
Liberum veto, 377, 379.
 Libraries, 533-534.
 Ligurian Republic, 644. (See Genoa.)
 Linnaeus, 505.
 Literature, in 16th century, 43-45, 110-122; in 17th and 18th centuries, 294, 566-572; in early 19th century, 744-748.
 Lithuania, 37, 40, 374, 375, 380, 383, 805. (See Poland.)
 Little Russians. (See Ukrainia.)
 Livonia, 367, 369, 370, 371.
 Locke, John, 508-509, 538-539.
 Lombardy, 351, 754, 805. (See Milan.)
 London, treaty of (1720), 310 n.; treaty of (1827), 784.
 London Company, 389, 390.
 Long Parliament, 438-443, 445.
 Long War, 326.
 Lords, House of. (See Parliament, English.)
 Lords of the Congregation, 168.
 Lorraine, 256, 341.
 Louis XI, of France, 23, 31.
 Louis XII, of France, 20, 21, 31.
 Louis XIII, of France, 268, 280, 281-282, 287, 289.
 Louis XIV, of France, 280, 287-315, 331, 346, 395, 397, 449, 591, 652.
 Louis XV, of France, 280, 315, 316, 317, 318, 342, 591, 592-593.
 Louis XVI, of France, 280, 353, 593-604, 615, 616, 626, 628, 630, 690, 768.
 Louis XVII, of France, 280, 690.
 Louis XVIII, of France, 280, 690-692, 694, 721, 723, 765-768. (See Provence, Count of.)
 Louis Philippe, of France, 787-789, 791.
 Louisburg, 406, 408.
 Louisiana, 397, 412, 656.
 L'Ouverture, Toussaint, 656.
 Louvois, 297.
 Lowe, Sir Hudson, 695.
 Loyalists (American), 481.
 Loyola, Ignatius, 120, 187-188, 202.

- Lübeck, peace of, 267.
 Luddites, 762-763.
 Lully, 573, 574, 575 n.
 Lunéville, treaty of, 650, 651, 661.
 Luther, Martin, 45, 109, 110, 114, 118, 144, 152, 153-156, 158, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167, 173, 177, 178, 179, 183, 187, 202, 209, 236, 336, 820.
 Lutheranism, 153-161, 166, 167, 169, 174, 176, 194-197, 203, 218, 263-269, 273, 513, 742.
 Lutter, battle of, 267.
 Lutzen, battle of (1632), 269; (1813), 686.
 Luxembourg, 302.
 Lynxes, Academy of, 497.
- Mabillon, 533.
 Machiavelli, 18 n., 27, 45, 120, 131, 149.
 Machinery, 797, 798.
 Macpherson, 571.
 Magdeburg, 269, 332.
 Magellan, 75, 81.
 Magic, 134-135.
Magna Carta, 429-430, 608.
 Mahratta Confederacy, 415, 416, 417.
 Mainz, 7, 98, 754.
 Malplaquet, battle of, 310
 Manorial System, 48-54, 465-469.
 Mansart, 558.
 Manufacturing. (*See* Guilds, Industry, Mercantilism.)
 Manutius, Aldus, 98.
 Marat, 619-620, 625-626, 636.
 Marengo, battle of, 650.
 Margaret of Parma, 246.
 Maria Louisa, 679, 689.
 Maria Theresa, of Austria, 280, 320, 335, 338-341, 344, 345, 349-350, 351, 382, 594.
 Maria Theresa, of France, 277, 298.
 Mariana, 216, 261, 539 n.
 Marie Antoinette, 280, 594, 616, 623, 624, 635, 768.
 Marie de' Medici. (*See* Medici.)
 Marignano, battle of, 220.
 Marlborough, 309, 310, 403.
 Marmont, 707.
Marsillaise, 626, 632.
 Marston Moor, battle of, 440.
 Mary, of Burgundy, 8, 23, 224, 225.
 Mary I, of England, 168, 171, 175, 203, 240, 251, 452.
 Mary II, of England, 452.
 Mary (Stuart), Queen of Scots, 167, 203, 252-253, 452.
 Maryland, 390, 396.
 Mass, in Catholic Church, 143, 174, 176, 180, 186, 208.
 Masulipatam, 411.
 Mathematics, 126-127, 498-499, 500, 546.
 Matrimony, 142, 143.
 Matthias, Emperor, 224, 263, 264.
 Maundeville, Sir John, 63 n.
 Maximilian, of Bavaria, 264, 265.
 Maximilian I, Emperor, *frontispiece*, 8, 9, 23, 36, 224, 336.
 Maximilian II, Emperor, 262, 263.
 Mazarin, Cardinal, 287-288, 294.
 Mechanics, 127-128, 499-501.
 Medici, Family, 21-22, 84-85, 88, 113, 180; Catherine de', 135, 254-255; Lorenzo de', the Magnificent, 21, 107, 108, 146; Marie de', 280-281, 282, 283.
 Medicine, 128-129, 504.
 Melanchthon, Philip, 109, 110, 117, 158, 182.
 Mendelssohn, Felix, 750.
 Mendelssohn, Moses, 531-532, 750.
 Mendicants, 139.
 Mennonites, 179.
 Mercantilism, 92-94, 296, 473-475, 546, 777.
 Mercator's projection, 132.
 Merchant Guilds, 56-58, 83.
 Metallurgy, 128, 503.
Métayers, 51.
 Methodists, 169, 183, 514-516, 742.
 Methuen Treaty, 309 n., 462, 674.
 Metternich, 686, 718-734, 751-798.
 Metz, 232, 256, 272.
 Mexico, 79, 80, 82, 85, 223, 713, 777, 779, 780, 781.
 Michael (Romanov), of Russia, 361-362.
 Michelangelo, 113, 114, 115, 142 n.
 Middle Class. (*See* Bourgeoisie.)
 Miguel, of Portugal, 774-775.
 Milan, 20, 31, 32, 327, 726. (*See* Lombardy.)
 Milan Decree, 672.
 Militarism, New, in France, 632-634, 637, 640, 668-670.
 Millets, 16.

- Milton, 538, 568.
 Mineralogy, 128, 503.
 Minorca, 485, 487.
 Mirabeau, 598, 600, 616.
 Miranda, 777, 778, 781.
 Mir Jafr, 411.
 Modena, 426, 754, 791.
 Mogul Empire, 398.
 Mohács, battle of, 14, 36, 232.
 Mohammed, 10, 15.
 Mohammed II, Sultan, 12, 13, 16.
 Mohammed IV, Sultan, 326.
 Moldavia, 379, 381, 783, 785. (See Rumania.)
 Molière, 294, 567.
 Molinos, 516.
 Mohuccas. (See Spice Islands.)
 Monastic orders, 139, 184, 216, 770; suppression of, in England, 174; suppression of, in France, 612-613. (See Benedictines, Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, etc.)
 Monck, General, 445.
 Mongols, 38, 69, 360, 410-411, 415, 417.
 Monmouth, duke of, 451.
 Monroe Doctrine, 780-781.
 Montaigne, 121.
 Montcalm, 408, 409.
 Montenegro, 707-708, 806.
 Montesquieu, 540-541, 614.
 Monteverde, 573.
 Montezuma, 80.
 Montfort, 430.
 Montreal, 76, 397, 409, 410.
Monumenta Germaniæ historica, 741.
 Moore, Thomas, 745.
 Moors. (See Spain.)
 Moravia. (See Bohemia.)
 More, Sir Thomas, 109, 110, 117, 121, 147, 159 n., 170, 173, 200 n.
 Moreau, General, 632, 650, 657.
 Moreau, J. M., 564 n., 599 n.
 Morelos, 778, 779.
 Moriscos, 245, 261.
 Moscow, 38, 358, 684-685.
 Moslems. (See Islam.)
 Mountaineers, 630. (See Jacobins.)
 Mozart, 575, 749 n.
 Mun, 546.
 Münzer, Thomas, 178.
 Murat, Joachim, 667, 675, 688, 694 n.
 Murillo, 261, 561.
 Murshidabad, 411.
 Muscovy, 37-38, 357-358. (See Russia.)
 Muscovy Company, 389.
 Music, in 16th century, 117-119; in 17th and 18th centuries, 572-575; in early 19th century, 749-751.
 Mutiny Act, 453.
 Nantes, edict of, 204-205, 278; revocation of, 313, 333.
 Nanteuil, 286 n., 294 n.
 Napier, John, 127.
 Naples, 19, 31, 189, 353, 675, 688, 754, 755-756, 791, 806. (See Two Sicilies.)
 Napoleon I, 637, 642, 643, 647-696, 721, 735, 736, 737, 835-836.
 Naseby, battle of, 441.
 National Guard, 602, 603.
 Nationalism, 213, 839; in 16th century, 233, 234, 237, 239; in 18th century, 610, 637; in early 19th century, 679-682, 696-708, 710, 713, 728, 740, 742, 769, 774, 790.
 Nationalities of Europe, 38-41.
 Nations, battle of (1813), 682, 687, 721, 724, 754 n.
 Navarino, battle of, 784.
 Navarre, 32, 33, 228, 229, 256, 257, 258.
 Navigation Acts (English), 400, 442, 474.
 Necker, 593-594, 601, 602, 747.
 Nelson, 643, 651, 662, 713.
 Neri, Philip, 118, 187 n.
 Nesselrode, 723.
 Netherlands, 22-23, 40, 82, 88-90, 166-167, 225, 240, 245-250, 558, 561, 563; northern (Dutch, Holland, United Provinces), 166-167, 247-250, 260, 265-266, 272, 273, 299-301, 302-304, 308, 311, 341, 391-395, 401-402, 413 n., 418, 419, 426, 484-485, 487, 632, 633, 644, 658, 673-674, 713, 725-726, 728, 788-789, 795, 804; southern (Belgian, Spanish, Austrian, French, Belgium), 248-249, 298-299, 301, 304, 310, 339, 341, 351, 352, 683, 631, 642, 725-726, 728, 788-790, 801.
 New Amsterdam, 393, 394.
 New Brunswick, 491.
 New England, 390, 396, 402.
 Newfoundland, 387, 396, 487.
 New France, 390-391, 396-397, 402, 410.

- New Granada, 777, 778. (*See* Colombia.)
- New Holland, 419, 420.
- New Netherland, 393, 394, 396.
- New Scotland. (*See* Acadia, Nova Scotia.)
- New South Wales, 420.
- New Spain, 81.
- Newspapers, 763, 786.
- Newton, Isaac, 499-501.
- New York, 482, 484.
- New Zealand, 421.
- Ney, Marshal, 685, 692, 766.
- Niagara, Fort, 409.
- Nicholas I, of Russia, 361, 758, 784, 792, 793, 795.
- Nicholas V, Pope, 108.
- Nile, battle of the, 651, 713.
- Nimwegen, treaty of, 301.
- Nobility, in 16th century, 47-48; French, in 17th century, 283-284, 293, 295; in 18th century, 578, 582-584; in French Revolution, 595, 605, 607, 615-616, 631, 692; in England, 465-467, 715-717; German, in 17th century, 322-324; in early 19th century, 718-719, 760, 785, 786.
- Non-conformists, 176.
- North, Lord, 405, 479-480.
- North America. (*See* America.)
- Northern War, First, 332 n.
- Northern War, Great, 369-371.
- Northwest passage, 76.
- Norway, 34-35, 159-160, 371, 684, 703-704, 726, 806. (*See* Denmark.)
- Nova Scotia, 402, 404, 491. (*See* Acadia.)
- Novgorod, 361, 362.
- Nystad, treaty of, 371.
- Oath of the Tennis Court, 600.
- Obrenović, Miloš, 782, 784, 785 n.
- O'Connell, Daniel, 764.
- Octroi*, 57, 64.
- Oglethorpe, James, 406.
- O'Higgins, Bernardo, 777, 778.
- Ohio Company, 407.
- Opitz, Martin, 567.
- Order of the Golden Fleece, 23.
- Orders in council, 672.
- Orleans, duke of (French King). (*See* Louis Philippe, of France.)
- Orleans, duke of (Philippe Égalité), 630, 787.
- Orleans, duke of (Regent), 315-316, 591.
- Orthodox Church, 136 n., 151, 190, 192-194, 357, 364-365, 373, 375, 381, 517, 705, 783, 792.
- Ossian, 571.
- Otis, James, 478.
- Otto (the Great), Emperor, 5-6.
- Otto of Greece, 785.
- Ottoman Empire (Turkey), 41, 806; in 16th century, 9-17, 23, 36, 100, 193, 232-233, 259-260; in 17th century, 325-327, 362, 377; in 18th century, 351, 377-378, 379-381; in early 19th century, 663, 683, 684, 704-708, 782-785.
- Oudenarde, battle of, 310.
- Oxford Reformers, 170.
- Paine, Thomas, 481-482, 629, 761.
- Painting, in 16th century, 114-117; in 17th and 18th centuries, 560-566; in early 19th century, 735, 748-749.
- Palatinate, in Thirty Years' War, 263, 265, 336; War of the, 302.
- Palestrina, 118.
- Palladio, 112 n., 557.
- Palmerston, 789.
- Panama, 75, 80.
- Pan-Slavism, 795.
- Papacy, 4-6, 18, 19, 137-138, 140-141, 146-154, 155, 172-173, 175, 184-186, 189, 193, 743, 807. (*See* Catholic Church.)
- Papal states, 19, 644, 674, 691, 725, 791.
- Paper, invention of, 97.
- Paracelsus, 129-130, 131.
- Paraguay, 81, 778.
- Paris, treaty of (1763), 344, 411-412; (1783), 487; (1814), 690, 722, 723; (1815), 729.
- Parlement, of Paris, 288-289, 290, 595.
- Parliament, English, 28-29, 429-441, 450, 453-455, 458-462, 490-494, 710-717; French, *see* Estates-General; German, *see* Diet; Spanish, *see* Cortes.
- Parma, 317, 726, 754, 791.
- Parma, Duke of. (*See* Farnese, Alexander.)
- Parthenopæan Republic, 644, 658.
- Pascal, 517.

- Patriarchate, 138.
 Patrimony of St. Peter. (*See* Papal States.)
 Patriots (American), 481, 482.
 Paul I, of Russia, 650, 661.
 Paul III, Pope, 123, 184.
 Paul IV, Pope, 184 n., 208.
 Pavia, siege of, 230.
 Payne, John, 388 n.
 Peasantry, in 16th century, 48-50, 156-158; in 17th century, 216-217, 284, 295, 322; in 18th century, 365, 374, 408-409, 578-581, 590, 605, 616-617, 634, 716-717; in early 19th century, 657, 680, 692, 703-704, 719, 756, 758. (*See* Agriculture, Serfdom.)
 Peasants' Revolt, 156-158, 237 n.
 Pedro I, of Brazil, 782.
 Pedro IV, of Portugal, 774.
 Peel, Sir Robert, 764.
 Penance, 142, 143.
 Peninsular War, 676-677, 770.
 Penn, William, 396, 514, 553.
 Pennsylvania, 396.
 Pepperell, 406.
 Pertz, G. H., 741.
 Peru, 80, 82, 85, 223, 777, 778.
 Pestalozzi, 552.
 Peter I (the Great), of Russia, 358, 362-367, 758.
 Peter III, of Russia, 343-344, 373.
 Peter's Pence, 141, 148.
Petition of Rights, 436, 453.
 Petrarch, 18, 102, 110.
 Petty, William, 546.
 Philip I, of Spain, 8, 224-225.
 Philip II, of Spain, 81, 112, 116, 175, 180, 208, 224, 240, 260, 388.
 Philip III, of Spain, 224, 260-262.
 Philip IV, of Spain, 224, 260, 262, 267 n., 269, 271-272, 276, 277, 287.
 Philip V, of Spain (Philip of Anjou), 280, 308-309, 310.
 Philippines, 75, 81, 410, 412.
 Philology, 549.
 Philosophy, modern, 132-134, 490, 538-543, 739-740.
 Physics, 127-128, 498-502.
 Physiocrats, 547, 548.
 Pichgru, 632, 657.
 Piedmont, 756, 791, 807. (*See* Sardinia.)
 Pietism, 512-517, 527, 742, 832.
 Pilgrimage of Grace, 173.
 Pillnitz, Declaration of, 624.
 Piombo, Sebastiano del, 173 n.
 Piranesi, 566, 570, 742 n., 744.
 Pisa, 62, 64.
 Pitt, William (Earl of Chatham), 408, 463-464, 481.
 Pitt, William (the younger), 492-493, 660-661, 710, 711, 712.
 Pius II, Pope, 108.
 Pius IV, Pope, 184 n., 208.
 Pius V, Pope, 184 n., 250.
 Pius VI, Pope, 612-613.
 Pius VII, Pope, 653, 657, 673-674, 691, 710, 730, 742-743.
 Pius X, Pope, 142 n.
 Pizarro, 80.
 Plassey, battle of, 414.
 Plébisците, 611, 657.
 Plymouth, 390, 396.
 Poland, 37, 40, 167, 182, 190, 205, 316-317, 326-327, 331, 344-345, 369-371, 374-377, 378-379, 381-383, 426-427, 558, 633, 663, 683, 686, 700-703, 724, 757, 792-793, 807.
 Pole, Cardinal, 175.
 Polignac, 786.
 Polish corridor, 374.
 Political economy, 131, 545-548.
 Political philosophy, 27, 131, 291, 428-429, 537-545.
Politiques, 257-258.
 Polo, Marco, 69, 70.
 Poltava, battle of, 370.
 Pombal, 353.
 Pomerania, 260, 272, 323, 324, 345, 369, 371, 726.
 Pompadour, 318, 342, 592, 594.
 Pondicherry, 406, 410, 411.
 Poniatowski, Joseph, 702.
 Poniatowski, Stanislaus, 378. (*See* Stanislaus II, of Poland.)
 Pope. (*See* Papacy.)
 Pope, Alexander, 568.
 Port Royal, in America, 402, 403; in France, 516-517.
 Porta, 127.
 Portugal, 32-33, 40, 71-72, 74-79, 82, 87-88, 180, 244, 245, 272, 277, 353, 389, 674, 675, 677, 688, 722, 773-775, 781-782, 808.
 Pragmatic Sanction of Emperor Charles VI, 329, 330.
 Prague, treaty of, 270.

- Prefects, 6r2
 Presbyterians, 161, 165, 168, 438, 440.
 (See Calvinism.)
 Pressburg, treaty of, 662.
 Priestley, 502-503, 711.
 Princeton, battle of, 484.
 Printing, 96-99, 119-120.
 Protestantism, 152-183, 190-210. (See
 Anglicanism, Baptists, Calvinism,
 Congregationalism, Lutheranism,
 Methodists, Pietism, etc.)
 Provence, Count of, 616. (See Louis
 XVIII, of France.)
 Prussia, 311, 323, 330-335, 338-349,
 371, 382, 624, 626, 630, 631, 633, 662-
 663, 667, 679-681, 686-689, 693, 700-
 702, 722-724, 726-727, 729, 732, 753-
 754, 789, 793, 794, 808. (See Branden-
 burg, Hohenzollern Family.)
 Ptolemy, 122-123, 132.
 Public Safety, Committee of, 634-635.
 Pufendorf, 539 n.
 Puritanism, 180, 183, 207-209, 433,
 434-446, 449, 450.
 Pushkin, 747-748.
 Pym, John, 438.
 Pyrenees, treaty of, 277, 288, 307.

 Quadruple Alliance, 720-730, 731, 732,
 764, 772.
 Quakers, 396, 514, 528.
 Quebec, 396, 402, 403, 409, 411; Act,
 480, 491.
 Queen Anne's War, 309, 403.
 Quesnay, 547, 548.
 Quiberon Bay, battle of, 409-410.
 Quietists, 516.
 Quintuple Alliance, 732 n., 789.

 Rabelais, 221.
 Racine, 294, 567. • •
 Radical Protestantism, 176-183, 208,
 209, 215, 389, 432.
 Radicalism, political, in America, 471-
 472; in Great Britain, 490-493, 711,
 761; in France, 618-622.
 Raeburn, 465 n., 562.
 Raleigh, Walter, 386, 387, 388.
 Rameau, 574, 575 n.
 Ramillies, battle of, 310.
 Raphael, 114, 115-116.
 Rationalism, 517-518, 537. (See "En-
 lightenment.")
 Raynal, 536.
 Reactionaries. (See Conservatism.)
 Record Commission, 741.
 Reformation. (See Protestant Churches;
 Catholic, 183-190.)
 Reformed Church, 161, 165. (See
 Calvinism.)
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, 666.
 Reign of Terror, 635-636.
 Religion, supernatural and natural,
 518-519, 741-742. (See Christianity,
 Deism, Islam, etc.)
 Rembrandt, 389 n., 563-564.
 Renaissance, 101 n.; Art, 111-119.
 (See Classicism.)
 Requesens, 248.
 Restitution, Edict of, 267-268.
 Restoration, English, 445-447; Bour-
 bon, in France, 690-691, 694, 765;
 Bourbon, in Spain, 769-770.
 Reuchlin, 109, 110.
 Revolution, agricultural, 465-469, 716-
 717; American, 469-495, 587, 594,
 796, 830; Belgian, 789; Diplomatic,
 341-342; Dutch, 245-250, 822; Eng-
 lish of 1688, 303 (see "Glorious"
 revolution); French, 318, 356, 494,
 600-646, 690, 706, 834-835; "Glori-
 ous," 446-453, 488, 587, 796, 820;
 Industrial, 586, 671, 717, 796, 798;
 Intellectual, 346, 494-575, 588, 697,
 718, 796, 831-834; July, 787-788;
 Puritan, 434-446, 488, 587, 796, 829.
 Reynolds, 561, 563, 737.
 Rhigas, 706-707, 783.
 Richardson, 560, 743, 745.
 Richelieu, Cardinal, 268, 269, 270-271,
 272, 282-287, 399, 652.
 Richter, 746.
 Rights of Man, Declaration of (French),
 608, 610.
 Robbia, Luca della, 113.
 Robespierre, 621, 625, 630, 634, 636.
 Rockingham, 470
 Rococo, 558, 565.
 Rodney, 485.
 Roland, Madame, 625, 635.
 Kolls series, 741 n.
 Roman law, 27, 100.
 Romanov Family, 361-362. (See
 Russia.)
 Romanticism, 541, 565-566, 570-572,
 576, 734-751.

- Rome, 19; bishop of (*see* Papacy); sack of, 230-231, 239.
- Romney, 562.
- Roses, Wars of the, 28, 29.
- Rossbach, battle of, 343.
- Rossini, 750.
- Round-heads, 440.
- Rousseau, 350, 541-543, 630, 640, 744.
- Royal Society (English), 497.
- Rubens, 261, 561.
- Rude, J. F., 743 n.
- Rudolph I, Emperor, 8.
- Rudolph II, Emperor, 224, 263.
- Ruisdael, 563.
- Rumania, 36, 40, 190, 808. (*See* Moldavia, Transylvania, Wallachia.)
- Rump Parliament, 441-442, 445.
- Russia, in 16th century, 37-38, 40, 136 n., 192-193, 357-360; in 17th century, 361-362; in 18th century, 341-342, 343-344, 362-383, 644, 700-702; in early 19th century, 650, 661-663, 665, 682-689, 701-703, 707-709, 722-724, 730, 747-748, 756-758, 793, 795, 808.
- Ruthenians, 40, 382.
- Ryswick, treaty of, 304, 308, 402.
- Sacraments, 142-144, 195.
- St. Bartholomew's Day, massacre of, 204, 256-257.
- St. Helena, 392, 394 n., 695.
- St. Just, 630, 634.
- St. Petersburg, 371-372.
- St. Pierre, Abbé, 553.
- St. Teresa, 120.
- St. Thomas Aquinas, 142, 518.
- Saints, battle of (1782), 485, 487.
- Salamanca, battle of, 681.
- San Domingo, 79, 779. (*See* Hispaniola.)
- San Martin, 778, 781.
- Saratoga, battle of, 484.
- Sardinia, 311 n., 340, 353, 632, 723, 726, 809. (*See* Piedmont, Savoy.)
- Savonarola, 21-22.
- Savoy, 22, 311, 809.
- Savoy, Prince Eugene of, 309, 310.
- Saxe, Marshal, 341.
- Saxe-Weimar, duke of, 753, 754.
- Saxony, 7, 156, 269, 323, 336-337, 340, 686, 688, 724, 726, 790, 791, 809.
- Scandinavia. (*See* Denmark, Norway, Sweden.)
- Scarlatti, 573.
- Scepticism, 517-518, 536, 832.
- Scharnhorst, 680.
- Scheele, 503 n.
- Schiller, 571-572, 746.
- Schisms, 151, 152.
- Schlegels, the, 744, 745-746; Friedrich, 746.
- Schmalkaldic League, 237.
- Schönbrunn, treaty of, 678.
- Schoonebeek, 372 n.
- Schubert, 750.
- Schwarzenberg, General, 687, 688, 693.
- Science, natural, in 16th century, 122-131; in 17th and 18th centuries, 497-505.
- Science, social, in 16th century, 131-132; in 17th and 18th centuries, 532-555.
- Scotland, 28, 30, 40, 167-169, 203, 209, 252-253, 428, 438, 441-442, 456, 460. (*See* England.)
- Scott, Sir Walter, 744, 745.
- Sculpture, 113-114, 557, 736.
- Sea Beggars, 247-248.
- Secularization, 217-218.
- Security, Committee of General, 635.
- See, ecclesiastical, 138.
- Self-determination, national, 611.
- Selim I, Sultan, 13.
- Separatists. (*See* Congregationalism.)
- September Massacres, 628.
- Serbia (Serbs), 40, 707, 782, 784-785, 796, 809. (*See* Yugoslavia.)
- Serfdom, 49-51, 86, 348, 352, 365, 579-580, 607, 667, 676, 680, 703, 758. (*See* Peasantry.)
- Servetus, 165, 181, 182, 202.
- Settlement (British), Act of, 455 n.; of 1815, 722, 725-729.
- Seven Years' War, 318 n., 342-344, 378, 407-413.
- Sévigné, Madame de, 294, 567-568.
- Sforza Family, 20, 114, 229.
- Shakespeare, 45, 122, 571, 750.
- Shelley, 744-745.
- Sheraton, 560 n.
- Shiites, 13.
- Ship-money, 437.
- Short Parliament, 438.
- Siberia, 367.
- Sicilian Vespers, 19.
- Sicily, 19, 34, 311, 317, 755, 810.

- Sickingen, 236, 237.
 Sieyes, Abbé, 598-599, 600, 644.
 Sigismund I, of Poland, 107.
 Sigismund II, of Poland, 205.
 Silesia, 339, 340, 344, 345.
 Simons, Menno, 179.
 Six Acts, 763.
 Six Articles, 173.
 Sixtus V, Pope, 135 n., 184 n.
 Slavery (and slave-trade), 86-87, 310-311, 385, 387, 391, 404, 407, 472, 493, 551, 637, 656, 729.
 Slavonia, 810. (*See* Croatia.)
 Slavs, 40, 139. (*See* Bohemia, Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia, etc.)
 Slovakia (Slovaks), 36, 40, 325, 810. (*See* Czechoslovakia, Hungary.)
 Slovenia (Slovenes), 40, 707, 810. (*See* Yugoslavia.)
 Smith, Adam, 547-548.
 Smith, Captain John, 380.
 Smollett, 569.
 Sobieski. (*See* John III, of Poland.)
 Social sciences. (*See* Science, Social.)
 Socialism, in France, 639.
 Society of Jesus. (*See* Jesuits.)
 Socinians, 182.
 Soufflot, 560.
 Sozzini, 182.
 Spain, 40, 810; in 1500, 32-34; in 16th century, 72-77, 79-82, 86-88, 116, 189-190, 202, 223-260, 385-388; in 17th century, 260-263, 265-273, 275-277, 281, 286-287, 288, 298-304, 558, 561, 567; in 18th century, 306-312, 316-318, 330-340, 353, 403-407, 410, 412, 528, 564, 623, 632-633; in early 19th century, 674-677, 681-682, 688, 698-699, 713, 760-773, 776-781.
 Spanish Fury, 248.
 Spanish Succession, War of, 306-311, 312, 327, 333, 363, 403-404, 462.
 Spener, Philip, 513.
 Spenser, Edmund, 122.
 Speyer, diet of, 158.
 Spice Islands, 72, 74, 391, 394.
 Spinoza, 508, 539.
 Stadion, 678.
 Staël, Madame de, 747.
 Stamp Act, 478-479.
 Standish, Captain Miles, 390.
 Stanislaus I (Leszczyński), of Poland, 316, 370.
 Stanislaus II (Poniatowski), of Poland, 378, 382, 702.
 Star Chamber, Court of, 29, 238, 439.
 States-general, of Netherlands, 23, 250, 426, 795.
 State-system of Europe, 274-275.
 Statistics, 546.
 Stein, Baron von, 680, 681, 685, 697, 698, 722-723, 727, 741, 757.
 Stephen I (the Great; St. Stephen), 36.
 Sterne, 569.
 Stevinus, 127.
 Stockholm, treaties of, 371.
 Strasbourg, 302, 304, 626, 720.
 Streltsi, 363, 364.
 Stuart Family, 30, 311, 452.
 Suarez, 216, 539 n.
 Suffren, 485.
 Sugar Act, 477-478.
 Suleiman II (the Magnificent), Sultan, 14, 232, 233.
 Sully, 279-280.
 Sunnites, 13.
 Suraj-ud-Dowlah, 411.
 Sweden, 34-35, 40, 159, 160-161, 268-271, 272, 299, 302, 331, 353, 356, 361, 367-372, 650, 661, 663, 665, 673, 683, 684, 686, 688, 703, 704, 722, 726, 794, 810.
 Swedenborg, 513-514.
 Swift, 569.
 Switzerland, 161-163, 165, 644, 651, 791 n., 837.
 Taille, 295, 581.
 Talleyrand, 656, 690, 720, 721, 723, 724, 725, 766.
 Tartaglia, 126-127.
 Tartars, 360. (*See* Mongols.)
 Tasman, 392, 419.
 Tasso, 122.
 Taxes, Farming, 295, 314, 590.
 Teniers, David, 563.
 Terror, Reign of, 635-636.
 Tetzl, 154.
 Teutonic Knights, 41, 42, 139, 330 n.
 Theology, 142, 506.
 Thermidorian Reaction, 636, 639-640.
 Theses, Ninety-five, of Luther, 154-155, 754 n.
 Thiers, 787.
 Third Estate, 281, 596, 597-598, 599-601.

- Thirty-nine Articles, 176.
 Thirty Years' War, 167, 203, 250, 260-277, 286-287, 321, 426, 823.
 Thomson, James, 570.
 Thorwaldsen, 736-737.
 Three-field system of agriculture, 52-53, 467.
 Ticonderoga, Fort, 408, 409.
 Tilly, 265, 266, 269.
 Tilsit, treaty of, 663, 673, 679, 682.
 Tithe, 53 n., 607, 760, 762.
 Titian, 114, 116, 240 n., 241 n.
 Toleration, religious, 206-207, 278, 348-349, 351, 353, 453, 480, 490, 512-513, 518, 527-528, 530-532, 764, 833.
 Tone, Wolfe, 712.
 Tories, 450-455, 481, 482, 493, 712, 715, 716, 760-764, 838.
 Toul, 232, 272.
 Towns. (See Cities.)
 Townshend, Viscount, 467.
 Townshend Acts, 479, 480.
 Trade. (See Commerce.)
 Trafalgar, battle of, 658, 662, 713.
 Transubstantiation, 143, 195-196.
 Transylvania, 182 n., 206, 325, 326, 327. (See Hungary, Rumania.)
 Trent, council of, 185-186, 202, 208, 210, 212.
 Trenton, battle of, 484.
 Tribunal, Revolutionary, 635, 639.
 Triennial Act, 439.
 Trier, 7, 237.
 Triple Alliance, 299, 300.
 Troppau, protocol of, 733, 755, 757.
 Tudor Family, 28, 29, 171, 215, 452.
Tugendbund, 681, 753.
 Tull, Jethro, 466-467.
 Turenne, 286 n., 287, 289, 297, 301.
 Turgot, 547 n., 593.
 Turks, 41. (See Ottoman Empire.)
 Turner, J. M. W., 748.
 Turner, William, 131.
 Tuscany, 22, 102, 353, 726, 754, 811. (See Florence.)
 Twelve Articles, 157.
 Two Sicilies, 19, 34, 189, 317, 644, 658, 694 n., 754, 755-756, 811. (See Naples, Sicily.)
 Tyrol, 157, 324, 352, 662, 678, 688.
 Uhland, 746.
 Ukraina (Ukrainians), 40, 382.
 Ulm, battle of, 661, 662.
 Ultra-royalists (French), 766-769, 785, 786.
 Uniformity, Act of, 449.
Unigenitus, 517.
 Union (Ireland with Great Britain), Act of, 712.
 Union (Scotland with England), Act of, 460, 467.
 Unitarianism, 177, 181-182.
 United Kingdom, 491. (See England, Ireland, Scotland.)
 United Provinces. (See Netherlands, Dutch.)
 United States of America, 482-490, 559, 562, 672-673, 737-738, 745, 780-781.
 Urban VIII, Pope, 557 n.
 Utilitarianism, 740, 761.
 Utrecht, Treaty of, 310-311, 327, 333, 403-404, 407; Union of, 248.
 Valmy, 628, 631.
 Vanbrugh, 559.
 Van Dyck, 561.
 Van Tromp, 394.
 Varennes, 616.
 Vauban, 297, 302.
 Vega, Lope de, 122, 261.
 Velasquez, 261, 266, 267 n., 561.
 Vendée, La, 617, 622, 631, 634, 636.
 Venezuela, 777, 778, 779.
 Venice, 12, 14, 20-21, 34, 61-62, 64-65, 84, 88, 90, 119, 230, 232, 259, 326, 377, 642, 662, 726, 811.
 Verrazano, 76.
 Verdun, 232, 272, 628.
 Vergniaud, 625, 629, 636.
 Vermeer, Jan, 563.
 Verona, congress of, 733, 772, 776.
 Versailles, 293, 308, 312, 318, 592, 602, 603, 604; treaty of, 487.
 Vervins, treaty of, 258, 278.
 Vesalius, 130.
 Vespucci, Amerigo, 75, 88.
 Vico, 534.
 Victor Emmanuel I, of Sardinia, 691, 755, 756.
 Vienna, congress of, 722-729, 788; siege of (1529), 14, 233; siege of (1683), 326; treaty of (1738), 317; treaty of (1809), 678; treaty of (1815), 725.

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