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AMERICA OUR ALLY

by

HENRY NOEL BRAILSFORD

Author of "Property or Peace?"
"Shelley, Godwin and Their Circle," "Voltaire"

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE ALOOF REPUBLIC

SOME EXPERTS TELL us that we shall win this war when we achieve mastery in the air. They exaggerate. Germany has had numerical superiority in the air for more than a year and though it has brought her dazzling successes, it has not given her the decision. There is a subtler element than the air which the victor in this war must first conquer. He must win leadership over men's minds.

The singularity of this war is that while it will decide the future of mankind for generations to come, only three great nations are actively conducting it. It will settle the pattern of the civilisation in which our children will grow up: it will banish liberty from the Old World, or enthrone it. Into Hitler's hands, if he can triumph, will pass the keys of the oceans and the resources of two continents. From this struggle, three Great Powers still stand aloof. Is it credible that they can remain to the end passive spectators? Even if they take no part in the military contest, can they avoid participation in the settlement that will end it?

It matters, then, what view their statesmen and their citizens form of our conduct, our intentions and our prospects. The play of thought that links London with Washington may be in the end more decisive than the flight

of the planes that carry ruin to and fro between London and Berlin. It is true that none of these three Powers is any longer a neutral. Russia is bound to Germany by obligations that have a plain meaning on paper. Japan is now the military ally of the Axis. America is our intimate and helpful friend. But none of the three is as yet a belligerent in this war and the help which each will accord to the side it favours admits of many degrees. Russia's future behaviour is for most of us an enigma. America's friendship may grow warmer, but it might cool. The problem of that relationship is, therefore, as delicate and all-important as it was on the day we declared war. But this survey is far from exhausting the influence of opinion on our destinies. It matters hardly less what view men take of us in the subjugated lands of Europe and in Germany itself. Will the French welcome us as liberators; will the German workers believe in our goodwill? The victor in this war must win mastery over men's minds.

The problem that concerns us most nearly at this stage of the war is the evolution of American opinion. Against propaganda Americans were rendered immune by their experience of Lord Northcliffe's methods: we are wise to use it with discretion. They will judge us by our acts. We should do more to win them by liberating India, than we shall ever achieve by the most eloquent broadcasts. They came of age since the last war. But we shall do well to consider closely what we hope from them. Are we content that they should manufacture planes for us, or do we need, not today but tomorrow, the right arm of their manhood? We must see clearly where in this choice our own good lies—and theirs. The answer to these

questions depends on our conception of the strategy, political as well as military, on which we rely for victory.

The first step is to ascertain the present attitude of American opinion and the influences that shaped it. It has evolved with startling rapidity. America's reaction towards the Nazi regime and its career of aggression had been more nearly unanimous than our own, and very much more outspoken. The President had led it in some pronouncements that moved Hitler to fury, and such popular figures as Mayor la Guardia of New York had expressed it dramatically, in ways that were only possible because three thousand miles of salt water separated the Nazis from their transatlantic critics. The trade policy of the United States reflected the exasperation of public opinion, for the most-favoured-nation clause in her treaty of commerce with Germany had been abrogated and the Reich had been deprived of the benefits of the lower tariff rates enjoyed by other States. But it is equally true that British policy was regarded with deep suspicion. The betrayal of Munich was condemned with anger and contempt and so long as Mr. Chamberlain was premier, American sympathy for our cause was chilly and estrained. Americans had reasons of their own for condemning his policy of appeasement, to which we in this island have paid too little attention. They do not forget that while the men around him were discussing how to buy Nazi friendship with colonies and a colossal loan, the Federation of British Industries visited Germany and there negotiated a commercial agreement for the amicable partition of the world's markets. Across the Atlantic it was widely believed that it included a plan for combined

Anglo-German operations in the republics of the South directed against the trade of North America. This commercial alliance had been smoothly concluded and was on the point of ratification, when Hitler marched into Prague. That put an end to appeasement, but the memory clung to Mr. Chamberlain's name in the mind of well-informed Americans. Our inaction under his leadership during the first eight months of the war exposed us to grave misunderstanding. Few were sure that we meant to fight. It was only after Mr. Churchill came to the helm, and above all, after we stood alone, battling for survival, that America became our whole-hearted partisan.

In the first phases of the war, American thinking was concerned almost exclusively with the problem of how to keep out of it. As our own soldiers made ready to fight the last war over again, so Americans set themselves the task of avoiding it. This time there should be no *Lusitania* incident. They believed that on the last occasion it was ultimately the bankers who dragged them in, because they feared that if the Allies were defeated, the millions lent to them would become a dead loss. That must not happen again. The long controversy between Congress and the President over the definition of neutrality ended in a drastic series of ordinances. American citizens must not travel in ships of the belligerents. No American vessel may enter the war-zones, a term which now covers all the waters of Europe and Africa. Loans to States that defaulted on their debts in the last war were already forbidden by the Johnson Act, and now credits for the purchase of munitions or raw materials were banned. The phrase "cash and carry" summed up what was

permitted: we might buy what we wanted for cash down, provided we carried it in our own ships. This definition was a conscious and kindly act of partiality, for in fact, though not in form, it cut off our enemies from access to American resources. But the amount of help we actually drew from America during this period was disappointing. Six months were wasted in discussing with the leaders of the airplane industry who should pay for the expansion of their plants.

The change in America's attitude began with the disaster in Norway. With the obliteration of Scandinavian freedom, an alarmed nation perceived that German air-power might one day establish itself in Iceland or Greenland. The capitulation of France opened up a still more terrifying prospect. If we in turn went under, an unarmed and unready America would face a hostile totalitarian world alone. Congress voted, almost without discussion, astronomical estimates for all the defence services. The navy was to be doubled and over 600 war-vessels built within five years. Mr. Roosevelt aimed at manufacturing 50,000 warplanes annually. Finally, for the first time in history, Congress was persuaded to adopt conscription in a period of nominal peace. These were long-term preparations. But as Americans perceived the rise of a new England under Mr. Churchill's leadership, resolved to fight to the last extremity, the accent changed in all they thought and did. Their first concern was no longer how to keep out of the war, but how to aid our defence. Much was conceded that had at first seemed difficult. Airplane types that had been reserved for the American army were made available and assembled ready for

service, though by an amusing legal pedantry they had still to be dragged, not flown, across the Canadian borderline. The army's reserve stocks of rifles were put at our disposal, and at an anxious moment were promptly shipped to arm the Home Guard. The Secretary for War who had obstructed these somewhat irregular acts of helpfulness was dismissed, and Mr. Roosevelt recognised the national emergency by bringing two leading Republicans, Mr. Stimson and Colonel Knox, into his Cabinet. The administration now undertook in earnest the organization of the armaments industry and more especially the production of planes. The knot of difficulties, chiefly fiscal, that stood in the way of its expansion was disentangled. The pacifists and isolationists failed to dam or even to slow down the mounting tide of sympathy and a nearly unanimous nation adopted the watchword "the utmost help, short of war."

The final phase lives in our memories as the most startling new departure in Anglo-American relations since Woodrow-Wilson entered the last war. The United States has handed over to us from her reserve of destroyers, as a free gift, fifty of her older but still serviceable vessels, the type of craft of which we stood in urgent need. In return we place at her disposal, without so much as a peppercorn rent, such land as she may require for naval bases and air-ports in our colonies on the islands and shores of the Caribbean Sea. Parallel with this exchange of good services, military conversations have been held between the authorities of Canada and the United States

to arrange for mutual defence. This vast reservoir of human energy that we call America moves swiftly when it moves at all. Hardly were these provisions made for the joint defence of the Atlantic sea-board, British and American, than negotiations were opened for a similar arrangement in the Pacific Ocean. Again we may expect that sites will be provided for America's air-ports and naval bases. Australia shared in these conversations.

To treat these arrangements as a friendly act of barter—destroyers for bases—is to show poverty of imagination. Regarded in that light, it would have been an unequal bargain. The destroyers can have only a few years of active service in them, but the bases will be leased to America for ninety-nine years. This was one of those daring improvisations in which the English-speaking peoples excel. We have the art of composing Treaties-without-Words. For this gift of bases implies a silent pact of friendship and mutual aid that will bind us for a century. In Europe such pacts are commonly limited to ten or fifteen years and broken before their term expires. The assumption that underlay this dower was on our side that it is unthinkable that America will ever use these bases for ends that we might disapprove. But this amazing trust is mutual. Each side assumes that for three generations to come any enemy of either will be the common enemy of both. This is more than a sentimental commentary, though sentiment in such matters has its importance. It would be legally impossible after this arrangement for either party to engage in active war in the waters round these bases without involving the other.

If America did it, she would expose what is still at law British territory to attack: if we did it, we should endanger America's bases. We may assume that the Foreign Office and the State Department incurred these risks with open eyes. There was, so far as we know, no attempt to define this unusual and far-reaching relationship in lawyer's language. If any memorandum was drawn up, which is unlikely, it would have no validity without the ratification of Congress and Parliament. Americans have a virginal dread of "entangling alliances." This alliance is unwritten, but in effect it binds the two democracies to a common policy round two oceans throughout our own lifetime and that of our children. We both know, without formal definitions, what we had in mind when we concluded it—the threat to our common civilization from three barbaric Powers.

The record of these developments would be incomplete without a reminder that they took place while the two major parties were ordering their ranks for a presidential election. Commonly the last year in a president's term is blank. He has exhausted the impetus that carried him into office and no one is sure that his power of patronage will be renewed. Congress grows jealous and self-assertive and is apt to postpone or mangle the President's measures. Congressmen, if they seek re-election, play for safety and avoid any act or word that may expose them to attack. It is normally a year of reticence, ambiguity and inertia: political America marks time. Yet in this year, a President who was already defying tradition by seeking re-election for a third term, defied it again by adopting a bold external policy.

He read the mind of his countrymen aright. It is no sham fight in which he is engaged. Propertied America hates the New Deal and its author with a violence unparalleled in our generation. It has chosen in Mr. Wendell Willkie an able and popular candidate, who has behind him all the forces of Big Business and Wall Street. In a merciless campaign, the Republican candidate has assailed almost every act and achievement in Mr. Roosevelt's record. Yet he has gone out of his way to support all that the President has done to further our cause. He approved the gift of the destroyers: he welcomed the leasing of the bases: he supported the effort to supply us with planes, though he believed that he could have done it better: he even rebuked those of his own party who had tried to delay the Conscription Bill during its passage through Congress. It would be rash to conclude that Wall Street sees the problem of America's future relations with the Dictatorships as Mr. Roosevelt sees it. Wall Street may in its heart cherish illusions about appeasement, as the City of London did and may again do. But its candidate, for the purposes of this election, was at pains to support the policy of his rival. We feel on this side of the Atlantic a deep gratitude and admiration for the courage of this President, who understood what our nation is fighting to preserve before our own ruling class perceived that our heritage is in danger. But on this issue his opponents do not challenge him, and would have the electorate believe that if Mr. Willkie reaches the White House, he will continue Mr. Roosevelt's policy of active aid without so much as a change of emphasis. We could ask for no more convincing evidence that

America stands solidly behind the programme of "the utmost support, short of war."

The effort to base neutrality on the experience of the last war has failed. This is a different war. Every vestige of neutral conduct, every pretence of impartiality vanished from America's policy long ago. She is in our camp, bound to us by an unwritten alliance. She is our non-belligerent ally in a relationship more genuine, more cordial and more widely approved than that which bound Italy to Germany before the Duce declared war. But while we congratulate ourselves upon this swift and far-reaching evolution of opinion, we cannot disregard its limits. They have been defined with the same precision as the promises of help. Each party entered the election with an undertaking in its "platform," phrased in almost identical terms, to keep America out of this war. Each has given, to the mothers and wives who may vote for it, the pledge that it will not send America's manhood to Europe. The Conscription Act limited the service of the drafted men to the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Roosevelt, by his last message to Congress, is bound by a personal undertaking. He made, indeed, a qualification that was absent from Mr. Willkie's formula: he will not send troops to Europe, *unless America is attacked.*

These are formidable commitments; to treat them as negligible would be a stupid and inexcusable cynicism. If, none the less, we still hope from America what these pledges seem to forbid, it will not be enough to discover an honourable road of escape. The rushing stream of history and the imperative logic of self-preservation will have to sweep this nation across these barriers.

The barriers that deter Americans from entry into this war have deeper foundations than any electioneering pledge. That variety of promise is regarded even more lightly across the Atlantic than among ourselves. Mr. Wilson won his second term election as the man who kept America out of the war: within six months he brought her in. Some of these barriers are recent. America staggered out of the last war more deeply disillusioned than any of the European combatants. She had plunged into it "to make democracy secure," only to discover that we had made a tool of her to serve the short-sighted ends of British and French Imperialism. She was ready, somewhat timidly perhaps, to emerge from her long isolation in 1931, when Japan opened the epoch of aggression by her occupation of Manchuria. But Mr. Stimson's concern for China was rebuffed by the pro-Japanese Sir John Simon. Our default on our war-debt shook our prestige severely. It was, I think, justifiable and inevitable, but between them Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Chamberlain managed the whole business of our indebtedness with consummate clumsiness. For an instant America recovered her faith in the idealism of the League of Nations, when Sir Samuel Hoare thundered against Italy at Geneva. She had made all her preliminary arrangements to place an embargo for Abyssinia's benefit on the export of oil to the aggressor, when the Hoare-Laval agreement shattered her reviving trust in European honour. I happened to be in New York at that moment: it was not easy for an Englishman to carry his head high.

Was there anything in our record, from that day down to the outbreak of this war, to stir American admiration? We were willing dupes in Spain, and at Munich we failed to deceive even ourselves. The England Americans admire came to life on the beach of Dunkirk.

No subtle analysis is required to explain the prevailing tradition of "isolation" from the affairs of Europe that with rare exceptions has always dominated American politics. Twenty miles of salt water sufficed for our Victorian fathers, but Americans could point to a moat three thousand miles broad. But geography supplies only part of the explanation. This Republic began its career as an independent Power with a modest sense of its own inexperience and inadequacy, when it faced the ancient empires of Britain and France. It had no leisured class, nor any aristocracy apprenticed from early manhood in the art of government. What George Washington meant when he warned his fellow-citizens against "entangling alliances," was that he shrank from their entry as a minor Power into any close and lasting relationship with greater Powers. In this surprisingly traditional country, that advice, sagacious when the first of America's Presidents gave it, is still regarded with docile veneration, although the revolted Colony of his day is now beyond comparison the greatest of the Great Powers. Something of the colonial attitude still lingers, and Americans have built up a legend of European subtlety in all the arts of politics and diplomacy, which makes them needlessly distrustful of themselves and shy of venturing into partnership with statesmen from the Old World. The complexity and diversity of European life baffle the average American, as well

they may. The human scene he knows is the most uniform on this earth. Nature, indeed, has been lavish in the variety, as in the splendour, of her gifts, but man has standardised his inventions and himself. The same machines, the same architectural types, the same rectangular city plan, the same clothes, the same language prevail over the whole vast area between two oceans. English is spoken with several sorts of accent and intonation, and enriched with a constantly changing profusion of slang, but there are no dialects. Everywhere the wireless advertises the same cereals and the same cosmetics between the same news bulletins and most of the local newspapers belong to a nation-wide chain. This continent escapes uniformity only in its churches. The perverse variety of Europe intimidates the American explorer, and he inclines to leave the puzzle to solve itself.

History, all the while, was digging a deeper chasm than the ocean. The *Mayflower* carried the first ship-load of refugees to this continent. Through each succeeding generation the steerage bunks of every transatlantic ship have been crowded with men and women who fled from the oppressions of the Old World—Irishmen who left famine behind them, Germans of the years round '48 who had made their bid for freedom in vain, Jews who escaped from Russian pogroms. To all these immigrants, Europe meant some form of tyranny, feudal, racial or religious. They brought with them memories of a continent cursed with a faulty political structure. This vague tradition, excessively naive and antiquated, of something radically amiss forms the half-conscious, emotional foundation on which the average American

builds his picture of contemporary events in Europe. Not much can be usefully done, save in the way of charity, to help this benighted region: the fathers turned their backs upon it: the children tend to leave it alone.

But the most influential of several reasons for the American rule of non-intervention and "non-involvement" in the affairs of the Old World has its roots in the political heritage of this Republic. Until the New Deal challenged its tradition, it was content to remain the ideally negative State of the eighteenth-century philosophers. It clung to *laissez-faire*, and regarded government as an evil, albeit a necessary one, which a vigilant Constitution restrained within the narrowest limits. The State, which was forbidden to "meddle" with the lives of its own citizens at home, was ill-equipped for the risky and needless business of "meddling" abroad. The intricate checks and balances of a cast-iron Constitution were designed to chain the hands of the Executive at home: they reinforce the jealousy of the Senate to render action even more difficult abroad. It would not be a serious exaggeration to say that save under an exceptionally strong President, and then only in periods of excitement and crisis, the United States can have no positive and continuous foreign policy. Even the Monroe Doctrine is a negative policy, which slumbers until it is challenged. In practice, the range of positive action rarely stretches far beyond Central America and the Caribbean Sea. There is, however, a big and significant exception to America's practice of *laissez-faire*: in the making of tariffs the State awakens to lively activity. It has even begun of late to use the

tariff as an instrument of political policy, notably in its dealings with Germany and Japan.

It may seem a paradox that in this capitalist Republic Big Business has so seldom used the State to serve its positive interests abroad. Certainly it has swung "the big stick" fairly often round the Caribbean Sea, but the essay in imperialism that led to the annexation of the Philippine Islands was soon regretted for economic reasons. To say that mass opinion detests imperialism and that it includes a well-organized pacifist group would be unconvincing. Big Business usually gets its way in home affairs against the resistance of mass opinion, and until the other day, if it failed in Congress, it could still govern through the Supreme Court. In no other civilized land is it so ruthless and so nearly omnipotent. Why, then, has it failed to do in America what it has done in every other State with an advanced industrial civilization? Why has it not sought in imperialism the customary solution for the failure of the home market to keep pace with the progress of production?

One might give several answers based on peculiar American conditions. In the early age of American capitalism the aggressive Great Power was the railways: today the most eminent of the robber barons are the magnates of electrical supply: neither of these can export its services. But the real reason is that up to the last war America was not a creditor but a debtor country, which imported capital. In the modern world imperialism is the policy of an owning class that must export capital. It would also be relevant to note that Americans do not emigrate: on the contrary, they suffer immigration, if not

gladly. They do not yet seek places in the sun, where middle class persons may pose as aristocrats. Finally, the outward thrust of manufacturers' surplus production has not yet become explosive. In our epoch of imperial expansion our exports were in value one-fourth of our total production: in some estimates they approached one-third. America's exports are not yet one-tenth of her total production, and since they come largely from the farm, they do not interest Big Business. America's empire has hitherto lain between two oceans in her own Continent. There she scattered her pioneers: there she settled her younger sons and there Big Business found a constantly expanding market. The development of this vast and opulent estate is not yet near its end. American capital has permeated Canada and begun to enter Australia, but before it turns to the Old World, it is likely to complete the exploitation of its own hemisphere. It will warn off intruders from the Latin South and fence its sphere of interest with the barbed wire President Monroe invented. It will not follow the obsolete technique of annexation. With a few naval bases and air-ports, it can escape the worries and burdens of sovereignty. Until he defaults, a debtor is commonly more profitable than a subject. But the motive that makes for this relatively innocent type of imperialism—"the good neighbour policy", as the euphemists of Washington call it—is as much strategical as economic. Its conscious aim is safety rather than wealth. These, then, are the reasons why Americans shun an active foreign policy, resist temptations to intervene in the doings of the Old World and tenaciously cling to neutrality when the spectacle of war

confronts them. In spite of them all they have advanced from neutrality to non-belligerency and concluded with one of the belligerents an unwritten alliance that runs for ninety-nine years.

Will they go further? Is it in their interest or in ours that they should go further? These questions we may postpone to later chapters. Before we face them we may note that American opinion has begun to prepare itself for a still bolder advance. In a recent Gallup poll (22 September), in reply to the question:

> Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to do—Keep out of war ourselves or help England win, even at the risk of getting into war?

one person in twenty was undecided. Of those who had a clear opinion, 48 per cent were still for keeping out of war as before, but 52 per cent were for helping England even at the risk of war. In May the cautious minority of today was a majority of 64 per cent. Opinion moves in this republic.

CHAPTER II

ISLAND AGAINST CONTINENT

FROM THE SECURITY of a fortunate continent American citizens have watched with growing horror and alarm the course of this European war. In a few weeks Hitler's warplanes and tanks achieved triumphs that would have cost Napoleon's trudging infantry as many years of toilsome marching. Feudal Poland, a stranger to this hurrying century, was crushed and partitioned in a month. Then, after a puzzling pause, the hurricane broke upon the countries in which our Western civilization has reached its highest development. Denmark went under without resistance; Norway was conquered by a combination of treachery with military efficiency. A few days sufficed to obliterate freedom in the Low Countries.

These were puny victims who could hope at best only to delay the conqueror, while they made a stand for honour. The shattering catastrophe was the collapse of France. Soldiers had looked upon her army as the first in Europe, but its best achievements were but rear-guard actions. Across deep rivers, round the impregnable Maginot Line and through it, the remorseless machine swept on to Paris and beyond it. Overwhelmed by an enemy whose offensive power surpassed the defence in the ratio of four to one, their army lost its cohesion and its unworthy leaders capitulated.

An entire continent lies at Hitler's mercy, and freedom herself is a refugee in the British Isles. Startled into a belated perception of its danger, many years behind the enemy in its equipment and training, this nation defends its fortress alone. It knows that it is fighting, as it never fought before, not for world power nor for empire, but for actual survival. Amid this ordeal, while it guards its threatened coasts and defends its battered cities, it cherishes the faith that shall redeem the future. It has not despaired of the Continent in which our common civilization grew to maturity. In the hour when it stood alone, it renewed its vows to rescue from oppression its friends of Scandinavia and the Low Countries. The French it hailed, in the hour of their defeat, as its fellow citizens.

Beyond the drama of this island and its garrison, let us try to grasp the significance of this war. Englishmen may talk of survival, as their captain, Mr. Churchill, did when he took command at the onset of this disaster, but they understand full well that they cannot survive alone. That was possible in the centuries when man had not yet mastered the air. Victorian Englishmen used to boast of their "splendid isolation." Their grandsons know better.

Let us assume that these islanders can, during the months ahead, beat off invasion, defy the submarine blockade and defend themselves in some measure against aerial bombardment; they could not on the basis of this relative success contemplate peace. Honour and humanity would bid them fight on to rescue their friends and neighbours, but even more imperatively a regard for their

own safety would give them the same advice. Isolation, on the fringe of a continent organized for war by this ruthless and lawless power, would mean a life of peril so incessant that no free nation would choose it while it had breath to fight on. The epoch of isolation is ended, even for the greater of the Great Powers.

It is easy to say such things in rhetorical and emotional words, but the reader may ask for a cool and detailed demonstration. Was there really no possibility of a compromise open to an isolated England? It is widely believed that the Germans, through neutral intermediaries, did make an unofficial approach to the British Government after the capitulation of the French. Whether this be true or false, the rumoured offer was interesting. This proposal would have left us in possession of most of our empire, though we would have had to surrender two African colonies of no great value, together with Gibraltar. Germany would satisfy her desire for colonies by acquiring for the European Empire, which she will unify and dominate, the overseas possessions of Belgium and Holland. Further, she once more offered to the British Empire her patronage and alliance, as Hitler did in his talks with Sir Nevile Henderson on the eve of the war. This may be an incomplete version of the terms, but, without endorsing it, we may accept it for the purposes of this argument.

In estimating the effect of these apparently generous terms, the first thing to bear in mind is that England would have found herself in a position of permanent and hopeless inferiority in relation to the German victor. He would control the entire resources, in man power,

air power, sea power and manufacturing capacity, of the entire European continent, with all its strategic keys and bases in several oceans. To this colossal empire, tightly organized with German efficiency, no resistance would be thinkable.

The Germans on their side recognize neither international law nor any process of arbitration, and it has been Hitler's invariable practice on manufactured pretexts to break his pledged word, to raise his terms and sweep even the most recent treaties aside in his dealings with a weaker State. If England were to enter into this relationship, the best for which she could hope would be that she might enjoy peace with humiliation at the price of invariable conformity to Hitler's will. The "alliance" would be a far from plausible disguise for complete subjection.

The first consequence would be that all statesmen and parties who failed to merit Hitler's confidence would be debarred for all time from office—the Tories of Mr. Churchill's school, the Labour Party and the Liberals. It would next be necessary to muzzle the press, since the Nazis tolerate no reflections on their leader or on themselves. Since only one party, the more reactionary Tory group, devoted to the interests of property, would be eligible for office, the next step would be to bring the Constitution into conformity with the reality. Many survivals of the past, some vestiges of civil right and law, with some traces of the workers' right of combination, might linger for a time; but in fact, if not in form, England would be a totalitarian State, and a dependent province of Hitler's empire. Whether this defeated empire

would imitate the brutalities of its victor would depend on the sturdiness or recklessness of the workers and the progressives in defending their ancient rights: if they showed courage, they would have to be crushed by the native reaction, lest Hitler should step in to vindicate the principle of authority.

If this should seem an exaggerated forecast, the reader is invited to glance at the record of the defeated French and the protected Czechs. Englishmen may be tougher, but they also would be outnumbered and outgunned. It is the peculiarity of the totalitarian system that, where its shadow falls, it cannot leave democracy intact. We may conclude, then, that a free England could not survive in isolation, on the fringe of an expanded German Reich. This nation fights on for the right to exist.

In this analysis of the fate that confronts England, the fact that calls for our close attention is that Hitler proposes to organize the continent of Europe, in war and in peace, as a solid unit. One may even say that he has done it already: from Narvik to Brindisi, from Brussels to Warsaw, it obeys his will. Was it the whim or ambition of one abnormal man of genius, backed by a brave, numerous and capable people, that brought this about? Genius labours in vain when it swims against the stream of history. The new characteristic that governs the life of our generation is that the national State our fathers knew has ceased to be a possible political unit. The future belongs, not even to great empires, but to continents organized as single wholes.

Destiny spoke clearly enough when Hitler destroyed the Czech republic. This capable people had a first-rate modern army and a highly developed industry, but, because its small population stood alone, it had to capitulate without striking a blow, when Hitler threatened to blot out Prague by bombardment from the air. The fate of the Baltic republics repeated that lesson. Through twenty years these backward little communities had been able to pose as independent, sovereign States, because they traded on the enmity that separated their great neighbours. As soon as Stalin came to terms with Hitler, it was possible for him to wipe out this pathetic illusion of independence.

The case of much bigger national units is hardly better. The Jugoslavs, for example, are a brave people with a proud military record, but they are relatively backward and poor, so that they cannot from their own financial and industrial resources furnish the inordinate quantities of costly and complicated mechanical arms, more especially planes, tanks and guns, that modern warfare exacts. Such a State may, indeed, supply its own deficiencies by buying abroad on credit, but in that case it infallibly becomes dependent, in a greater or less degree, upon the creditor Power.

In the present century, in Europe, bankers have lost the liberty to conduct such transactions on a commercial basis. They are always the subject of political bargaining, and they are usually incidental to the conclusion or prolongation of a pact or alliance. That holds true of the whole period from the first alliance between Tzarist Russia and the French Republic down to the lavish

loans with which Britain and France secured their alliance with Turkey. A weak debtor State can in this way buy a measure of safety, but only at the cost of its own independence. It must adjust its own external policy to that of its creditor, and it is usually required to bestow favours and concessions on his financiers and to deflect its trade to his markets. National independence in this century has become an obsolescent fiction: in Europe there remain only Great Powers and client States.

The new fact in this process of evolution is the omnipotence of the air arm. In the old days even a little people, if it had gallant sons and spirited captains, could make use of its mountains or its dikes to defy a Great Power. The Dutch, the Swiss and the Tyrolese made a legend of resistance that will never be repeated. When the bombers of a Great Power can, after a flight reckoned in minutes, blot out the capital of a little State, as the Germans destroyed Rotterdam, defence becomes a form of suicide.

A power that possesses the industrial resources and the central position of Germany can achieve command of the air over an entire continent. If neither law nor mercy restrains her, then her writ will run as far as her bombers can fly. An attempt may be made to check her by pacts of mutual assistance, alliances and leagues. The fate of the Chinese, the Abyssinians, the Spaniards and the Czechs records the verdict of history on these expedients. They are no match for the concentrated strength of a Great Power under a determined and unscrupulous leader. Technique has won where the art of politics

failed. As the steam engine made the industrial revolution, so the airplane has ushered in the epoch of continental unity.

Because of the hardness of men's hearts and the slowness of men's minds, it has been left to military power to bring about the unity that economics and politics failed to win. During the early decades of this century the case for unity, which liberals and socialists based on economic arguments, had become a commonplace. Few opposed it, but no one carried it into action.

The development of communications had made us all interdependent. In the eighteenth century the price of wheat was fixed in England by a magistrate, who would ride into the market place of a country town, gossip with the farmers and then name a just price. Today not merely wheat but every staple article of commerce is subject to a world price. A disturbance in Wall Street can make or mar the fortunes of millions of men as far away as Sweden or Australia. A slump in agricultural prices that starts in Chicago may end by exciting rebellion, active or passive, among the ruined peasants of Burma and India. The superfluous capital of Manhattan and the City of London builds power stations in the heart of Africa, railways across the Andes and air-ports in China.

That may serve as a picture of our earth in the relatively happy years before the Great Depression. Slowly, under feeble leadership, within this economic framework of interdependence, the Old World at least was moving under the Genevan League toward a very loose form of political unity. In retrospect we can all see the

inadequacy, even at the height of its influence, of the League of Nations. It left intact the antiquated tradition of the sovereign independence of its member States. It could not by legislation effect peaceful change, because it was bound by the rule that exacted for any binding decision unanimous consent. It could not even require its members to limit or regulate their armaments, save in so far as they might freely choose, after negotiation, to do so.

The stream of history flowed on, hardly affected for good or ill by its existence. Germany, on the pretext of reparation, was looted, and the Ruhr invaded; the gold of the Old World flowed in a steady flood to the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank in Kentucky; the Great Depression shook the capitalist system, put an end to the very idea of a world market and the relatively free flow of goods, capital and labour across frontiers, drove Europe to default on its debts and compelled it to revert to the barbarous ideal of self-sufficiency.

All this could happen, and the League merely looked on. It could not prevent war because it was impotent to modify the drive of forces and the trend of history that lead to war. The League conferred on its members benefits too slight to win their loyalty. The Great Powers were too proud, the little Powers too prudent to trust their safety to it. In a series of tests, first in Manchuria, then in Abyssinia and finally in Spain, it proved its own nullity. It has been left to another power, its enemy and antithesis, to unify Europe by the brutal use of its armies. The bombing plane is doing what the gentle liberalism of Mr. Wilson was impotent to achieve.

Through seven years we have all been watching the rise and triumph of this amazing Power that is now consolidating Europe by conquest. It rose by reaction, first against the mild liberalism of the Weimar republic and then against the ascendancy of the victors of Versailles. As it disclosed its true character in action, we had to realize that it is based on a revolutionary principle which threatens all the values of Western civilization.

The passionate explosive force that has given it the strength to master Europe sprang at the start from a furious resentment against the losses and humiliations inflicted on Germany after her defeat. The young men of the upper and middle class were a potentially revolutionary force, because the peace settlement had barred them from the careers the empire had offered them. The army had been reduced; the navy was only a nucleus; the air force was abolished and the colonies ceded. This once wealthy and privileged class had, moreover, lost its fortunes and its savings in the ruinous period of inflation that culminated during the French occupation of the Ruhr.

Himself a man who had reached middle age without winning either position or respect in the society around him, Hitler gathered a staff of adventurers who organized the discontent of this disinherited generation. Their own private resentments and their personal sense of inferiority fused in their minds with their patriotic indignation against the inferior status that Versailles had imposed on their country. They drew from anger and pride, humiliation

and ambition, the mad force that enabled them to overthrow, first the feeble democratic republic and then the unstable structure of Europe.

They were only a minority of extremists until the Great Depression gave them their chance. They used it to proclaim the bankruptcy of a society that could guarantee neither work nor bread. The capitalist civilization of the past had broken down, while socialists and communists, absorbed in their bitter family feud, were impotent to construct a better order. Driven to terror, as the tornado of the depression struck them, hoping nothing from a democratic republic which could win from its neighbours neither sympathy nor respect, half the German electorate gave the Nazis their opportunity. With the help of the senile President von Hindenburg, of some Prussian Junkers and some industrial magnates at the top and of the disinherited younger generation and the unemployed from below, the Nazis won by an adroit mixture of terrorism and propaganda the dictatorship they have retained unchallenged for seven years.

That they have kept it implies no mystery. Their opponents were disunited and had neither credit nor faith. The few who had the courage to resist were beaten, mutilated or murdered: the fortunate among them were those who fled abroad before a concentration camp engulfed them. On the minds of the leaderless masses, with no rival organization, no party, no trade union, not even a free Church to hamper them, unchallenged on the printed page and on the air, the Nazis could play as athletes in the art of lying.

But much truth was on their side. They gave careers

to the desperate young men who followed them. Their vast programme of rearmament soon absorbed Germany's six million unemployed. If the workers had lost political freedom, they had gained economic security. A hopeless and disunited nation had won unity. Within a year, under its fearless leader, it broke the chains of Versailles, asserted its equality with its victors and became a Great Power which some courted and others feared. Then, as it built up its armaments on land, at sea and in the air, began the breathless series of conquests, at regular intervals of six months, that paved the way for its subjugation of Europe. It is not surprising that this leader has followers.

As we look back on this page of history, so crowded yet so brief, it is easy to see in retrospect that the whole equipment of the Nazi party, its doctrines and its discipline, its hates and its enthusiasms were perfectly adapted to the lust for power and to nothing else on earth. It was the first party that ever organized itself as an army and repudiated, even in its own ranks, every trace of democracy and popular rule. If the Italian Fascists supplied the model, they were Latins, with a tradition of moderation. Starting within their party, the Nazis promptly turned all Germany into an army, mobilized for perpetual war, even when it traded.

Because the Nazis crushed socialists, communists and even liberals, conservatives in Europe and America believed until the other day—some even believe it still—that the central purpose of the Nazis is to destroy the reds and defend the capitalist system. This is a complete mistake. The Nazis had many reasons for their furious

hostility against "Marxists"—a term they applied to radicals of all schools, and even to liberals. They had to destroy the communist party, for it was their only rival in the field of revolution. They were fiercely opposed to socialists, as they were to Catholics, and largely for the same reason. Both took their stand on an international ideal, and both condemned the racial egoism that was for the Nazis the first of all the virtues. Each in his own way sought peace among the nations and worked for disarmament and the creation of an international society subject to law.

It is true that Hitler destroyed all the organizations of the working class, their parties, their unions and even their cultural associations. This class was disarmed by the loss of the right to strike. But to draw the conclusion that the Nazi regime was, therefore, capitalistic would be erroneous. The economic life of Germany was from top to bottom rigidly controlled by the authoritarian state. The capitalist might retain ownership over his plant and business, but all the rights that ownership formerly conferred were taken from the captain of industry. His dividends were limited to 6 per cent, and if a company still had a surplus, it was required to invest it under official direction in concerns presumed to be public utilities. The owner lost his right to "hire and fire," and not only might he be forbidden to dismiss employees, he could be and often was ordered to engage large additional numbers. Every detail of manufacture and sale was regulated, from the nature of the raw material that might be used up to the market that might be served. Doubtless a good deal of profiteering and exploitation still

went on, for the Nazi bureaucracy was much addicted to graft, but the right of the owner to do what he willed with his own vanished completely.

Hitler's Germany was no longer a capitalistic state: its purpose was not to further the accumulation of wealth by an owning class. As little did it aim at the economic advancement of the workers. The central truth about it is that it had ceased to pursue economic ends. What it sought was not welfare at all, either for the privileged few, or for the forgotten man, or even for the community as a whole. Its sole end was power for the German Reich, and the German race. There lay its originality and its menace. It treated German industry as a branch of its war machine. It could be as ruthless to a millionaire steel king as it was to the workers it conscripted to build its fortifications. It would trade abroad at a heavy loss in order to make a strategic gain. From the elementary school to the central bank, every activity of German life was subordinated, through six years of preparation, to the claims of the military machine. Since Sparta, no state in history, not even the Prussia of Frederick the Great, has ever done this with the same singleness of aim.

Civilized men will not gladly abandon themselves to the pursuit of power as an end. It was necessary, therefore, to decivilize the Germans. The process began with a stunning blow on this nation's head. Its intellectual life was lamed, brutalized and enslaved. The universities were so terrorized by the dismissal in the mass of liberal professors, that they became little more than a department of the Nazi propaganda service. Books that served the

cause of humanity, liberty and peace were burned in public bonfires and placed upon the index. Einstein and Freud were driven into exile, and the paths they had blazed for mankind were barred to Germans. Science itself became the handmaid of this barbaric party. There vanished from German life the very ideal of intellectual integrity. Truth, even in the realm of philosophy and science, was what would serve the German race in its pursuit of power.

The conception of law fared no better. The Führer's will was law, and a loyal German asked for no other. Scruples, restraints and safeguards for justice that it had cost civilized men long centuries to create vanished in a night from German courts. An arbitrary police, subject only to a party that cared neither for mercy nor principle, disposed as it pleased of every German's life and liberty.

The last victim in this return to barbarism was humanity itself. Those who have read the Führer's speeches and the book that is now the Koran of the German people will have realized that, in his use of words, "brutal" and "ruthless" signify the highest virtues. His party and his propaganda have trained German youth to despise mercy and idealize brutality. By the constant public exhibition of every species of revolting cruelty, mental as well as physical, at the expense chiefly of the Jews but by no means only of the Jews, a whole generation has been deliberately brutalized by the leaders it was taught to venerate. This also was a preparation for the ruthless conquest of power.

Germans will speculate, even when they are lapsing

into savagery. A whole library of bastard philosophy has grown up, which erects a system upon the hints and intuitions contained in *Mein Kampf*. Germans, we are told, have discarded forever that outlook on life, that Atlantic civilization, which won its first victories in the English Civil War, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution. The Nazis have revolted, first of all, against its rationalism. They have fallen back on instinct as their guide: they trust to the inspiration of their blood and the soil in which they are rooted. It is the peculiar function of the Führer to voice these racial instincts with the unfaltering certainty of a sleepwalker.

With this rejection of reason is linked their contempt for intellectual integrity and their denial of free discussion. They do not arrive at their decisions for action by a process of open debate: it is for the Führer's instincts to dictate action to this race, which then moves with the automatic precision of a community of ants. It has thrown away the respect of the West for human personality: the whole duty of man is to identify himself, body and soul, with the ant heap that reared him to serve the ends of his particular race.

What are these ends? Reason may define them as the welfare of the community, including in that term its culture and the self-respect that freedom fosters and the reign of law protects, as well as its physical well-being and its enjoyment of wealth. The instincts of the proud Nordic race dismiss this rationalism as decadence. It lives for struggle and not for well-being, and it values only the qualities, above all discipline and ruthlessness,

that promise victory. It does not aim, even in its conquests, at economic satisfaction.

Nothing is more striking in Hitler's self-revelation in *Mein Kampf* than his contempt for economics and the pursuit of economic ends. That shouts to the reader in raucous slogans and bitter gibes on page after page throughout the book.[1] The aim of his statecraft is not to make Germans happy; still less is it to give them a high standard of life. These are the miserable ambitions of liberals and Marxists, who have succumbed to Jewish corruption. "The epoch of personal happiness is over" is a phrase that one of his former lieutenants attributes to him: it is certainly in the spirit of his book.

The one end he pursues, for himself, for his race and for the German Reich, is power. This he desires not at all for the sake of the satisfactions it may bring with it—wealth, leisure, and the opportunity to organize a happy social life. Power for him is an end in itself; it is desirable for the emotional elation it brings with it and the sense it confers of superiority over others.

This lust after power, for himself and the Reich that obeys him, sprang in him from a tortured sense of inferiority. Germans accepted his leadership because their racial pride after the humiliation of Versailles had suffered a wound that festered. It is characteristic of this abnormality that it is insatiable. Hitler will never settle down to enjoy the economic fruits of his victory in peace. What he desires is not fruits but victory itself, and ever more victory. He must continue to dominate

[1] The curious reader may consult pages 17, 137, 138, 139, 194, 325 and 365 of Hurst and Blackett's unexpurgated translation.

and conquer, even if his superiority in arms should exempt him from the necessity of waging another war.

One man alone, even if his abnormality verges on genius, cannot make history. But this man's singularity exaggerated what in some degree even civilized Germans felt and were bound to feel. By his skill in propaganda, during seven years of a dictatorship that silenced every questioning and dissenting voice, he has made the younger generation in his own image. It too has turned its back on reason: it too despises mercy, honours brutality and bows to no law save instinct. It too subordinates every other impulse to the lust for power.

At the moment when the development of technique made the unification of the European continent inevitable, this revolutionary force was begotten by Versailles on the world depression to perform the feat that had baffled the liberal West. We do not yet know what the bounds and the structure of Hitler's European empire will be, but two predictions we may safely make. It will be based on the principle of authority; and that authority will be wielded by the Führer of the German race, for its power and its glory, by means of its command of the air.

Some of its gains it will share with the lesser dictators who have served it, notably with Mussolini and Franco. It is possible that other branches of the more or less imaginary Nordic race, the Scandinavians and the Dutch, will enjoy the smiles of the victor if they display a becoming submission. Other Europeans must expect the lot that befits their congenital inferiority. The Führer entertains the singular belief that the French are more

or less negroid. The Poles he classes as sub-human. If his empire reaches to Africa, its inhabitants must await the treatment suitable to "ape-like" beings who are only caricatures of men.

The unification of Europe on the German pattern will mean the lordship of a master race, that knows no bridle of law or scruple of mercy, over the subjugated minds and bludgeoned bodies of many helot peoples. In this unhappy empire, the masters will themselves be slaves.

CHAPTER III

THE UNREADY WEST

THE OTHER SIDE of this page of history is not so easy to write. The record of European statesmanship, as it faced this Nazi menace, is not inspiring. The historian of these years will have to indict for their blindness not only the men who directed British and French policy; he will have to include most of the soldiers in his criticism, and with them the governing class whose outlook they reflected. Rarely have two great peoples endured so tamely a leadership so inadequate.

But that is not the whole of the story. If the Western democracies were unprepared for war with this mighty antagonist, if their diplomacy had succeeded only in isolating them, when bolder and more far-seeing leadership could have rallied all Europe behind them, the ultimate explanation of their conduct was not discreditable. They hated the very thought of war. They found it so monstrous that they dismissed it as incredible. They could not believe that any people which once was civilized could be insensible to the economic advantages they were ready to offer it. And so they appeased, when they ought to have armed and rallied a whole continent for resistance.

In so far as they did prepare for war, their plans were based chiefly on passive defence, and for the rest they

relied on the fleet to do once more what it had done in the past. But their chief weakness was that they faced this aggressive, dynamic, revolutionary movement with nothing more inspiring than a determination to defend things as they are. They held in their hands no key to the future. If they were too inert for this ordeal, they were also too civilized.

To some of these reproaches the progressive Opposition, in England at least, is not exposed. It had no illusions about appeasement. It called steadily for resistance. It stood for "collective security," and it would have included Russia in its defensive combination while it was still possible to do so. But it, too, shrank from a difficult sacrifice for which the hour imperatively called. It also hated war and loved personal freedom so deeply that even after the fall of Prague it opposed the introduction of compulsory military service, though it applied only to two age classes. It also was too civilized. It forgot the bitterness of our French comrades, who felt that we were casting on their manhood an unequal burden. It could not and would not think in military terms. It had repressed the very idea of military power almost as successfully as puritans repress the idea of sex.

But the real case against the Labour party was that it lacked ambition and faith in itself. It shrank from power and even from a share in power. It knew that resistance, prompt, spirited and concerted, was necessary to save democracy in Europe. It knew that Mr. Chamberlain, even if public opinion drove him into resistance, would never struggle with a whole heart. It could overthrow him only by making a working alliance with the

Churchillian Tories and the Liberals. Through year after year of disasters and retreats it delayed, and brought itself to consent only after Norway was destroyed and the Low Countries invaded. It also rose too slowly to the height of this great argument.

It would be out of place in this little book to tell this story at any length. If I touch on some aspects of it, I will confess my purpose. The attitude of the two English-speaking peoples to military power is curiously similar. It springs in both cases from a sense of security that is part of our tradition. Englishmen in their island, Americans between two oceans were immune from the worst that war can threaten; they need not dread invasion.

Each maintained a great navy which insured them adequately, or so they believed until the other day, against this negligible risk. The result was that in their minds war and the preparation for war is always on the first view something unnecessary, something avoidable, something which only a wholly exceptional situation, that makes its call to our sense of humanity or international duty, can ever justify. It promises us nothing that we value on a narrow view of our own interests. It is not what we want to do. If we do it, we know very well that we shall have to abandon or postpone other positive purposes on which our ambition as citizens is bent.

The result is that our repression of the unpleasant fact of military power may actually help to promote war. Each of us has immense resources, but they are

never available at the critical moment. An aggressive Power, who knows much but not quite everything about our mental habits, our humanity, our aversion to the whole brutal business of warfare, tends to omit us from his calculations.

The Kaiser in 1914 gambled on the probability that England would not fight, and then repeated his mistake by ignoring the rising tide of feeling in the United States. It seems probable that Hitler, on the eve of the present war, in spite of the most explicit warnings from Downing Street, believed the too cynical von Ribbentrop and supposed that England would not honour her pledge to Poland. The consequence is that our strength fails to exert its due weight on the side of world peace. Ruthless Powers, with some justification, suppose that we are too civilized or, as President Wilson once put it, "too proud" to fight.

This attitude that we hold in common is in advance of our time. Unless we repudiate the duty to mankind that our strength lays upon us, we have no right to indulge it until we have built on this earth an organization strong enough to banish war by ensuring the means for peaceful change, when change is due. Our too scrupulous civilization is premature. We have not earned our title to it in a world so ill-organized that Nazis can be bred within it. For we are part of the environment that begat them. We British and French, with Mr. Wilson's help, made the Versailles peace. We all tolerated, Americans no less than Europeans, the economic anarchy that shocked us in the world depression. Against these conditions that we had made or endured, the Nazi hurricane gathered

its impetus to sweep our world away in a revolutionary assault.

On a closer view, we shall have to look at the work of the Tory administrations which, in a succession broken only by the two brief intervals when Labour held office without a majority, governed England from the end of the World War down to the opening of Hitler's offensive in May. If they failed in war as in peace, it is not democracy that bears the discredit. With all the forms of representative government and free discussion, property during this period was always in the saddle.

The Tory party had its aristocratic wing and its group of intellectuals, men of a bolder and more farsighted outlook; but they exerted no influence and were jealously excluded from office. The dominant group of the party, with the wealthy but undistinguished herd, represented Big Business and the City of London. In its keeping lay the victory that the youth of two continents, dead and alive, had won for it. It used omnipotence to consolidate its privileges and secure its tribute. No creative ambition inspired it. Its aim, at home and abroad, was to maintain things as they are, and even this it did timidly and without imagination. Always its inertia was overtaken by events.

Of the instrument that Mr. Wilson's liberalism had placed in its hands it would make no worthy use: it first neglected, then betrayed and finally destroyed the League of Nations. But even from the start the League was compromised by the fact that the satisfied empires held the balance of power within it: they used it to maintain the *status quo*, until it was too weak even for that negative purpose. In France the Left enjoyed office for

longer periods, and for a brief term under Léon Blum used its power to some effect, but only in home affairs. During the decisive final years, the French in their European policy were content to follow Tory England.

The record of the early post-war period is a story of lost chances. It was in vain that successive democratic governments of the German republic demonstrated the sincerity of their will to peace: there came from London and Paris no spontaneous revision of the burdens and humiliations of Versailles, save that the occupation of the Rhineland was shortened, and reparations were put on a business footing. The republic could win no success, and it stood discredited with its own people.

The last chance to save it was lost when the Western powers vetoed Dr. Brüning's harmless customs union with Austria. It had already collapsed when they did for the Junker and militarist Chancellor von Papen what they had refused to his republican predecessors: they made an end of reparations. The lesson was learned: only violence succeeds. It was the West that nominated Adolf Hitler to be Germany's dictator.

The fatal choice came when the disarmament conference met at the summons of the League in 1932. The League was already a moral wreck. It had flinched before the aggression of the Japanese in Manchuria, and now it wrangled over disarmament while Shanghai blazed. The Western powers would pay no heed to the plea of the last republican Chancellor for equality of status in the matter of arms. But Hitler had seized power when Sir John Simon made it finally clear that, within any period of time that could be called the present, the

West would neither disarm itself down to the level imposed on Germany, nor allow her to rearm. With that folly the new epoch began. Hitler left the League, defied the victor powers and rearmed.

The West had still in 1933 every card in its hands—prestige, the confidence of the lesser Powers, and an overwhelming superiority of armed strength. Why, through the next six years, did it never resist the acts of defiance that grew in a steady progression, ever more daring and more menacing?

Part of the answer is relatively creditable. Each in its way and for its own reasons, the various strata of Western society were profoundly pacific. The workers and the Left hated the cruelty and futility of war: they would have no more massacres of their youth. They came, it may be, near to forgetting that there are some things for which men must fight, if they would escape slavery. The men of property, on their side, had lost the spirit of adventure; the fruits of the past sufficed. It was obvious, at the end of this period, that in his own pedestrian way Mr. Chamberlain hated the waste of war as much as any man: it meant the interruption of trade, for him the one reality of international life.

Again, but too late, all the criticisms of Versailles had done their work. England had a guilty, if sluggish, conscience. The Tories now denounced the settlement they had hitherto admired, and prepared to concede to the Nazis what they had refused to the democratic republic.

For this change of heart the explanation lay in our class society. The Tories believed that Hitler had seized

power in the interests of property and was the tool of the millionaire steel kings who had helped him. They regarded him as on the whole a sound fellow, rough in his language and infected with an unfortunate anti-Semitic prejudice, but a man whose real aim was to destroy Bolshevism.

For that reason the Nazis were welcomed, with some qualifications, by the wealthier and less intelligent part of the governing class, as a salutary force in European life, which should be encouraged by a policy of concessions. These people sleepily watched the headlong course of rearmament and militarization, without a suspicion that their own island would ever see a German warplane. They held two alternative beliefs, and with either they were content. Either Hitler was sincere in his frequent and passionate confessions that he was a man of peace, or else his mighty war machine would be turned against Russia. That, as they saw the flattering future, would mean not merely the destruction of its communistic republic, but the discomfiture of every form of radicalism and labour unrest in the West as well.

Two concessions to this Nazi power, which had meanwhile displayed its brutality to the world by its persecution of the Jews, by the bloody purge of its own ranks and by the murder of the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, defined the early attitude of the English Tories. They condoned Hitler's defiance and permitted him to rearm at sea, by the London naval treaty. This allowed him to build up to 35 per cent of the British naval tonnage, while in submarines he might have 45 per cent, and was permitted, at his own discretion, to exceed for these deadly

craft even this limit. Since England must disperse her fleet over the seven seas, while Germany has only the North Sea and the Baltic to consider, the ratio allotted to her was in effect much higher than it looks. This agreement could have only one meaning. The Foreign Office and the Admiralty must have acted under the conviction that England would never again have to meet a German fleet as its enemy.

The parallel concession on land was more fatal and even less excusable. When Hitler, by a sudden stroke, sent his armies into the demilitarized Rhineland, he gave the first startling demonstration of the tactics that have since made him Europe's master: he soothes; he strikes; and then he holds on. This move transformed the whole military balance of power in Europe. Before it, the French had their formidable defensive line, but they were still free to strike eastward at will. After it, so soon as Hitler had built the Siegfried Line, he had the whole of central and eastern Europe at his mercy, immune from attack or interference.

The British Government, when it decided that it would back French protests with nothing stronger than words, was influenced by its annoyance over the conduct of the French during the Abyssinian affair. That was no justification for this surrender of military power to the arch-aggressor. First the Czechs and then the Poles paid for this complacency.

Mussolini, meanwhile, had triumphed over England and the League in Abyssinia. Mr. Baldwin could have checked him at the start, probably by an embargo on his imports of oil, certainly by using the fleet to close

the Suez Canal to him. But that might have led to the fall of the Fascist dictatorship in Italy and a return to popular government.

This weakness was the prelude to the two betrayals that leave the deepest stain on the Tory record. The policy of "non-intervention" in Spain permitted the Germans and Italians to conquer the peninsula for the ends of the Axis and for the Spanish reaction. It dealt, by its one-sided embargo on the supply of arms to the legitimate government that was the Spanish people's choice, a blow to the cause of democracy throughout Europe. In this way England and France sacrificed a republic that would have been their ally in the present war. They handed to the enemy mineral resources and strategic positions that are of the first advantage to him today.

Wellington understood what Mr. Chamberlain forgot, that the safety of England and its communications with the pastures and wheat fields of far continents cannot be assured if this peninsula falls under an enemy's control. Spain was the ideal ground for a stand against the aggressions of the Axis. It raised none of the problems of conscience that were the legacy of Versailles: moreover, the British and French fleets could together have held off the German and Italian invaders with ease.

Two familiar reasons explained the weakness of British policy. The republic was unpopular in high society and with Big Business, because it represented the cause of the masses and the workers. On the other hand, the Labour party was timid and overcautious because it saw in front of it some risk of war, if England and France

had boldly thwarted the will of the dictators. By his complacency towards Italy, in tolerating her invasion of Spain, Mr. Chamberlain expected to win the lasting friendship of that power, and to detach it from its alliance with Germany. Mussolini rewarded him for his gentleman's agreement by a declaration of war.

I have not the heart to write more than a brief page about the surrender at Munich and the abandonment of the Czechs, who were the allies of France and the clients of England. American opinion passed its crushing verdict on this affair. Once more, the Western Powers sacrificed a friendly democracy, with its fortified rampart of mountains, its well-equipped army and the famous munitions plant at Skoda. What can be said in excuse?

It is true that the Sudeten Germans had some grievances, which the Czechs were willing to remedy by far-reaching reforms. It is also true that at Munich Englishmen had to realize that, in spite of lavish expenditure, they were wholly unprepared to meet a German attack in the air; London could not have been defended. This omission was, like the naval agreement, one more proof that up to now, after Hitler's strokes in the Rhineland, Spain and Austria, the possibility of war with this habitual aggressor had not entered the government's mind.

Finally, Mr. Chamberlain made on all close observers during this crisis an impression of intellectual inadequacy. Knowing little of history or of Europe, he none the less possessed great self-confidence, and, with the aid of an adviser from the Treasury who was himself no better

equipped, took over personally the management of this affair. I do not think he realized that he had destroyed the national existence of the Czechs at Munich: in any case, for him, as he said in a broadcast, theirs was a remote country "of which we know little." Apparently he trusted Hitler's paper promise of friendship and believed that he had won "peace in our time."

The root of Mr. Chamberlain's delusion was that this unimaginative man could not grasp the revolutionary character of the Nazi movement and its insatiable lust for power. Himself a business-man, with an old-fashioned Victorian outlook, he believes instinctively that nations live for trade and for nothing else. Politics, in his interpretation, serve economic ends, and he has difficulty in conceiving any others.

The men round the Prime Minister who stood for the policy of "appeasement" meant by it mainly two things. First, they stood aside, acquiescent and even helpful, while Germany gained her ends in the Rhineland, Austria, Spain, the Sudetenland and Memel. Secondly, they believed they could tame her by economic concessions. A big colony might be carved out for her in West Africa. Again, the scheme of the Anglophile banker, Van Zeeland, proposed to offer her a share in the profitable development and exploitation of tropical Africa as a whole. A suggestion had been discussed between agents of the two governments for a colossal loan to Germany, after the adoption of some project for the limitation of armaments. With official backing, a delegation from the Federation of British Industries had all but concluded an alliance between the exporters of the two countries

for concerted action in foreign markets, when Hitler's armies marched into Prague. Similar approaches, again with the prospect of a loan, were made to Rome.

This whole conception of economic appeasement was both mischievous and irrelevant. It aroused the contempt of the dictators. It suggested to them that England was a decadent plutocracy, which would never resist an aggressor, if it could buy him off. It made no impression, for the simple reason that Nazidom does not pursue economic ends. It aims not at welfare but at power. Moreover, even if a bargain had been struck, the record of Hitler's promises and treaties is proof enough that no agreement binds him, however recent, however voluntary and however favourable it may be. With this dictator no negotiation is possible.

The brutal capture of Prague ended the epoch of appeasement. Even to this outrage Mr. Chamberlain reacted slowly. In his first statement in the Commons he refrained from any condemnation, but in a later speech at Birmingham he changed his tone and delivered an unmistakable warning. The revolt of public opinion, especially in his own party, had convinced him at length that he must resist.

He did it maladroitly. To Poland, an ill-armed and ill-governed state, so situated that neither England nor France could give it any direct aid, he gave his ill-judged guarantee. The consequences of the remilitarization of the Rhineland were now apparent: the Siegfried Line fended off any help by land. One power alone, the Soviet Union, was in a geographical position to help Poland directly. It is obvious that, if Mr. Chamberlain proposed

to guarantee Poland, he ought first to have consulted Moscow and secured its collaboration in advance.

But it had been his practice to ignore Russia. Though she was, with France, the joint ally of the Czechs, London and Paris cold-shouldered her throughout the Czech crisis, held no diplomatic or military consultations with her, and went to Munich without her. In vain through several years the Labour party, the Liberals and the Churchillian Tories had advocated a triple alliance of England and France with Russia to check further Nazi aggression. Two invitations from Mr. Litvinov to confer for this end were ignored.

After Stalin had dismissed Mr. Litvinov in May, 1939, as a minister whose policy of collaboration with the West had manifestly failed, it is possible that the approach to Moscow, which English public opinion and French pressure at last imposed on Downing Street, came too late. Stalin was already secretly negotiating with Berlin, which was ready enough to buy his benevolent neutrality with the Baltic states and a handsome slice of Poland. But on their side London and Paris had shown little eagerness to come to terms. An invitation to Lord Halifax to come in person to Moscow was ignored. Minor agents were sent; the negotiations were subject to long delays; and in the end it appeared that the infatuated Poles would accept no Russian aid, save in munitions and perhaps in warplanes.

History must judge the two sides in this affair. Between them, London and Moscow lost the last chance of averting this war. Hitler and the German staff had one fear only that might have deterred them—their dread, born of

experience, of a war on two fronts. The class enmity of the English Tories forbade any fruitful understanding with Russia until too late. Their record of complicity in Spain and at Munich had forced on Stalin the conclusion that safety lay in isolation. Unfortunately, he went beyond a policy of abstention and concluded with Hitler a "friendship cemented with blood."

The military part of our story tells itself. The record lies on the battlefields of Norway, Belgium and France. A government of elderly men, rich, comfortable and unimaginative, faced the youth of Germany under the leadership of an adventurer who had never owned a bed until he stormed his way to power. His party of young men linked in one organization, gangsters with idealists, audacity with vision. Mellow property was no match for it.

The soldiers, both in England and France, were in the professional sense conservatives. They would not grasp the importance of the new air arm. Their planes were excellent and their pilots daring and well trained. But in numbers they were hopelessly out-matched, nor had they at the start any conception of the use of the air arm as flying artillery and the spearhead of an offensive. They had some mechanized units, again good in quality but wholly inadequate in quantity. The French had three mechanized Divisions, when the Germans attacked with ten. We had only one, and only a part of it reached France—after Dunkirk. The German idea of mechanizing the entire army lay beyond the mental horizon of these soldiers.

The British relied on a small, highly trained professional army, felt some surprise when Hitler reverted to conscription, but never attempted to face the problem of numbers. They relied in the main on the Fleet and believed that in a war of three years Germany could be reduced by its blockade. The Norwegian campaign taught an alarming lesson. In narrow waters air power may turn out to be a match for sea power. The British navy throughout this war has proved both its daring and its technical competence, but to reduce an entire continent by slow blockade may be a task beyond naval power. In so far as the plans of the High Command were based on that expedient alone, they may have been unduly sanguine.

The French are exposed to the same criticisms. They too were conservatives, who neglected the air and only toyed with mechanization. Their entire strategy had become defensive. Sheltered behind the Maginot Line, they believed that they could avoid the massacre of youth that bled France white in the last war. It was a humane thought, worthy of a civilized people. But it was an impossible military conception. In every war, at some point, victory can be won only by an offensive that destroys the enemy's forces. But the strange thing was that this too famous Maginot Line covered only half the frontier. Where it stopped, the enemy broke through.

It then appeared that Gamelin and his staff had worked out no tactics with which to oppose the new offensive technique of the Germans, although it had been exhibited in action, first in the Ebro Valley during the invasion

of Spain, then at manœuvres, and finally in Poland. The defensive mentality was so firmly fixed in these soldiers' minds that they seem to have believed that the stalemate on the Western Front would last forever. That disastrous delusion may explain the failure, under Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier, to use the relative calm of the first eight months to better purpose.

This chapter in English history is over. In Mr. Churchill, England has chosen a worthy captain. He had foresight when the men of Munich were blind. He had warned a Government that would not heed him against its neglect of the air, against its ignoring of Russia, against the whole folly of appeasement. He has the audacity, the imagination, the magnanimity that the other lacked. The epoch when property ruled is ended. Labour has its full share in the new administration. Alone but undismayed, it is at last the English nation that fights for survival.

I have told this story in outline as a reminder that our American kinsmen have still to live through the temperamental shortcomings that Englishmen rue. I would not press the parallel too far. The United States has had through these years in Mr. Roosevelt a leader as dynamic as the Baldwins and Chamberlains were inert. Again, it would be grossly unfair to suggest that across three thousand miles of ocean the United States can ever have, in the same degree, the ties of interest and duty that bind us to Europe. Isolation is materially impossible, and the ethics of isolation involve a denial that mankind is a family linked by sympathy and the goal of a common destiny.

But how close and constant and intimate the association of America with Europe and Asia must in future become—that is the vexed question, which history is deciding for us. The hope of any worthy human civilization turns, it may be, on the answer.

To that problem we shall return, as the argument leads us. At this stage I will venture to ask some questions that arise directly from our analysis of the conduct of European democracy in face of the Nazi challenge.

Americans are well aware that their own defensive arrangements reveal the same miscalculations as those of England and France. The United States also neglected air power. Its warplanes, however good in quality, were relatively negligible in quantity, and its vast potential capacity for manufacture was unorganized. The same thing may be said about other requirements of a modern mechanized army. Did this mean, as it meant in England and France, that the outlook of the staff was, in the professional sense, inexcusably conservative? Does this bias persist, in spite of the present colossal expenditure?

Like England, America has long been content to leave its young manhood, in an even higher percentage, untrained for war.

Like England, and for similar reasons, the United States has been unwilling to count the Soviet Union among the Powers with which it might confer with a view to common action in a sufficiently grave emergency. If a new order of peace and freedom is ever to be established in Further Asia and the North Pacific, it is impossible to ignore the Soviet Union. Washington has in this respect behaved with no greater wisdom than Downing Street.

Americans have realized in recent months that they, too, are in danger and, on a great scale and at a great cost, they have begun to rearm. So did England, after Munich, only to realize that it had lost, in Spain and Czechoslovakia, allies and strategic positions vital for its own defence. To force that parallel would be ungrateful and unjust, for France and England have received America's material help. But if England, like France, should go under, are not America's defences compromised in much the same way? Strategically may not England be America's Spain—only more so?

In all that I read in the abler American periodicals, I encounter as yet only the same defensive strategic thinking that ruined the French. Americans will fortify and arm their continent, its shores, its seas, its atmosphere. That may be necessary. But passive defence never yet destroyed an enemy. Where and how will Americans do that? Must it not be done in Europe?

Some influential Americans have learned exactly nothing from our experience in Europe. Mr. Hoover's remarkable speech at the Republican Convention might have been delivered by Mr. Chamberlain at any moment up to the fall of Prague in March, 1939. He would arm, and then he would negotiate with the Nazis. The same vision of "peace in our time" beckoned him, the same naive conviction that Hitler might break his word to everyone else, but not to him. One may read in periodicals that reflect the mind of Wall Street comforting speculations that stress America's economic power. When we are crushed, the Nazis will have to sue for the support of New York. Where else could they raise a loan? This is

the sordid and obsolete world that stands behind Mr. Wendell Willkie.[1] In Europe such illusions are extinct.

Finally, in the present attitude, which will grant to England for its defence every aid save men, is there not the same disabling humanity that misled both the British and the French? So scrupulous, so careful of life, have we in the long run saved it?

[1] The magazine, *Fortune*, addressed questions to 15,000 leading "executives" of the American business world. On tabulating their replies it found that 69.6 per cent of Mr. Wilkie's supporters wished, after the war, to do as much trade as possible with a Europe dominated by Hitler, while only 9.2 of Mr. Roosevelt's supporters were of this mind.

CHAPTER IV

IF HITLER WINS——

THE READER MAY wince at the title of this chapter. Hitler, indeed, may believe that he has won this war already. I shrink from writing out a list of the lands he has subjugated. The last fortress of freedom holds out in this island. We can imagine the ordeals we have still to surmount: we are prepared for prolonged aerial bombardment, for a difficult struggle in the Mediterranean, and for attempts at invasion that will doubtless display the daring and ingenuity in which our enemy is never lacking. We know that in narrow waters air power may achieve, as it did in the Skagerrak, at least a local ascendancy over sea power. But we have faith in our sailors, in our airmen and in the new leaders whom Mr. Churchill has gathered round him. We are resolute to defend this island to the last,' and we are confident that we shall survive unbroken.

But Americans are less confident. Then let us face the other alternative and consider what prospect would confront the United States if England were crushed, as France was crushed. I will suppose that our defences may collapse as theirs did and that any further resistance in this island may become impossible. Should we find a Pétain and a Laval who would sign away our freedom and flatter the conqueror by adopting Fascism? I hope not, but I will not speculate.

All that is certain is that this enemy, who knows nothing of magnanimity or of moderation, would tolerate no effectively independent government in this country. It is equally certain that it would be disarmed to the last ship and the last airplane. That is what Hitler did to all his adversaries, beginning with the Czechs and ending with the French. He demanded that the French fleet should be placed under his keeping. If he did not get it, the credit belongs to Mr. Churchill and our sailors.

What, then, would become of the British navy? That is, as Americans already realize, much more than a European question: it is a domestic American issue. As Mr. Stimson frankly argued, the British navy is America's defence against the Nazi empire. That is not rhetoric. The American battle fleet remains in the Pacific, and there, as far as we can see into the future, it is likely to remain.

Japan has proclaimed her Monroe Doctrine over all Further Asia and the Pacific. Nothing but the presence of the American fleet forbids this enterprising power to seize the Dutch East Indies. So long as Japanese militarism retains its imperial ambitions undefeated, it would be a perilous experiment to bring these battleships into the Atlantic. They are not needed in that ocean. The British fleet can hold the Nazis at bay. While it keeps the command of this ocean, it is in effect defending both the North American coast and the sea roads to Latin America. Dare I say what is obvious? The British fleet ranks among the defences that keep the American continent inviolate.

What happens to the British fleet, if England should go under, is, therefore, a primary interest of the United

States. If it were to be surrendered intact to the victorious Nazi empire, the problem of American defence would be for several years barely capable of solution. The command of the Atlantic Ocean, from Greenland to Patagonia, would pass at once to Hitler's empire, which could blockade its coasts at will and keep its sea roads open for the passage of a German expeditionary force to any point it might select for conquest or penetration.

This may seem an inconceivable calamity. Yet the French surrendered their fleet. Circumstances are conceivable in which it might be difficult to avoid. Or what if it had to be scuttled? There would then ensue an anxious race in building to win the command of the Atlantic. The quicker and more numerous building yards would win, and Hitler would compel every yard in subject Europe to build for him, the British, French and Italian yards as well as the German.

"But we may dismiss these fears," the reader will object. "In reply to a significant enquiry from Washington the British Government has promised that it will neither surrender nor scuttle the fleet. In a superb speech of defiance, Mr. Churchill declared that if he were defeated in England, he would withdraw to the New World, and there continue the fight." It was a spirited declaration, which recalls the plan that William of Orange once entertained in the darkest hour of his country's fortunes: he thought of transferring the Dutch Government to Batavia in the East Indies, and fighting the King of Spain from that distant base.

I am not sure that the plan would be workable. Hitler would hold England as his hostage. Would he feed it,

while the war dragged on? And would the British fleet blockade the wives and children of its own crews in the subjugated homeland? It is easy in a moment of warlike exaltation to talk of transferring the British Government and the fleet to Canada. But every man aboard its ships has his ties and his affections. Even if wife and children could follow him to the New World—and Hitler would not aid their flight—mothers and sisters and intimate friends would inevitably be left behind. That was the plea of the affections that kept most of the French sailors, together with the men and officers of the armies in Syria and North Africa, loyal to the Pétain-Laval Government. Whatever they may have thought of its policy of surrender and its adoption of a Fascist constitution, they could not make war on France, nor could the individual soldier or sailor separate himself for an indefinite time from the Breton or Provençal village where an ageing father sailed the family's fishing smack and a wife cultivated the small holding. It would be no easier for British sailors to forget the land that cradled them. Could they prolong the war, knowing very well that, behind their blockade, the population of the British Isles faced extinction by hunger?

There are other difficulties in this plan. A great fleet requires at its base roomy harbours, graving docks and an immense arsenal equipped for repairs. The facilities available at Halifax are wholly inadequate. How, again, would the British navy be financed? The resources of Canada, even if she taxed herself to the bone, would not suffice to pay its crews, or to furnish its costly munitions.

A fleet, in short, is more than an armada of steel ships. It is history. It is tradition. It is part of a nation's life.

It depends on a great merchant marine, on the fishing villages of the Scottish coasts, on the families of workers and aristocrats whose pride is to send a son, as seaman or officer, into its service in every generation. It must have behind it the great shipbuilding yards of Clyde, Mersey and Thames, and the forges and arsenals that make its guns. For men age aboard these ships, and guns have a brief life of service. This navy is not a thing of yesterday: it dates from Drake and its home is Plymouth Hoe. It would not be easy to uproot it. It could find in Canada no adequate base, no natural foundation broad enough to sustain its life.

Here, then, is the first practical problem that will confront Americans, if England goes under in her lonely struggle with the Nazi power. It raises no issue of sentiment or of principle. It is a question of ensuring that the command of the Atlantic Ocean and its vital sea roads shall remain in the hands of a friendly, pacific and civilized power.

An emergency, then, looms ahead in the far from distant future that calls for American action. Seen from this angle of naval security, the United States cannot separate her own destiny from that of England. She can, of course, provide against the worst, as she is doing, by at once laying down to the full extent of her capacity the keels of a new fleet destined to hold the command of the Atlantic. That is a costly countermeasure and it is slow: a capital ship takes several years to build. Again, if the British fleet should escape to Canada, the United States might meet some of the difficulties we have foreseen. She might provide dockyards, recruit men and officers for

its crews, and cover its costs from her own revenues. That would involve a protectorate over Canada, or some form of union, or at least an alliance so "entangling" that it would involve a startling departure from American tradition. Similar problems would arise over Australia, New Zealand, India, and any other portions of the British, French and Dutch empires that survived the crash in Europe.

At this stage I will pursue this line of thought no further. What is clear is that the British fleet is so much a pillar of the ordered world Americans inhabit, that any change in its ownership or its location would force on Washington problems of an infinite range, and with them perils wholly new in American experience. British sea power is a fact in our universe so familiar that we are apt to ignore its influence. Only when we imagine its disappearance do we realize its place in the structure of civilization. If it breaks, America will have to replace it.

Let us continue our exploration of the future that will confront the United States if Hitler wins—if, that is to say, he can destroy his last enemy in the island fortress. What concerns the world outside the European continent is not so much the territorial losses that France, Roumania and other states may suffer, as the nature of the structure that will be imposed on Europe and the purpose it will serve. We may expect considerable changes in the map, both in Europe and in the colonies. Some populations may be uprooted, and carried into a Babylonian captivity. We may assume that peoples who have not already adopted a Fascist system, as the French have

done, will be assisted to do so. Save for purposes of parade, we need not suppose that this unified Europe will enjoy any form of representative council or congress, though Nazi nominees may occasionally be summoned to click their heels and shout "Heil!" This will be an empire and not a federation. It will be based—so much is said, with frank brutality—on the authoritarian principle. The French, indeed, have been warned that they must not expect to rank in it as the equals of the victors. Authority will reside in the hands of its Führer, who will rule by his monopoly of power.

This continent, in short, will obey the master of the bombing squadrons that will dominate it from the centre. The few available hints suggest that the Nazis are conscious that, given their numbers and their capacity for organization, their authority as the master race rests on their industrial supremacy—their ability, that is to say, to manufacture by the processes of mass production warplanes, tanks, and guns, which in these days confer the right to rule one's fellow men. The tendency will be to concentrate on German soil, if not the whole manufacturing activity of the Continent, at all events its heavy industries. The French have already understood that for the future they must devote themselves mainly to agriculture, with certain industries that serve luxury as a permitted but secondary field of work. It is possible, indeed, that they may lose their coal and iron mines. The East of Europe, from what is left of Poland down to the Balkan peninsula, will be the farm and plantation of the industrial centre, and it will be organized to furnish food and raw materials.

This is the typical imperial structure. The race that makes the machines exploits the races that drive the plough. Through the whole plan of organization and the subdivision of labour will run the motive of power, and the overruling needs of war.

Where will this empire have its confines? It could not, if it wished, limit itself to Europe. With the conquest of France, Holland, and Belgium, the empire has already acquired immense colonial territories. Though we know nothing of Hitler's plans, which may indeed exist only in the vaguest outline, it seems that in some sense these colonies are to be pooled as the collective estate of Europe —which is, doubtless, a way of saying that they will be under the supreme direction of Europe's master. Germany's empire will reach out, therefore, not only over much of Africa, but into Asia as well.

There is a pregnant passage in *Mein Kampf* which seems to forecast this dazzling future (Vol. II, Chap. XIII). Hitler is discussing the policy that imperial Germany ought to have followed in the pursuit of world power. She should first have acquired "new territory in Europe." Only thereafter would it be wise to aim at "the subsequent acquisition of colonial territory." This might have involved "devoting such abnormal efforts to the increase of military force and armament that, for forty or fifty years, all cultural undertakings would have been relegated to the background." He then argues that "this responsibility might very well have been undertaken" and in cold blood he gives his reasons. But, as he very truly says, this is the kind of thing that "our absurd parliamentary democracy with the Jewish hall-mark" would never dare to do.

Few men have pursued as steadily as Hitler, after power had come within their grasp, the designs they formed in impotence and obscurity. This passage was written in prison. Today it defines the policy of a world-power. Hitler has followed it. First he added new territories in Europe to his empire. Now he will extend it overseas. Only in one detail has he improved on his early essay. The tempo has quickened. He will triumph or crash in much less than forty years.

Hitler certainly has in mind the restoration of the ancient Holy Roman Empire, which from Charlemagne onward gave to German princes a rather shadowy suzerainty over half of Europe. I remember listening over the air to his speech to his party at Nuremburg after his annexation of Austria. The opening was in his usual raucous style. Suddenly his whole manner changed: the harsh voice turned gentle, and one imagined at the microphone a dreaming adolescent. He grew sentimental over his transfer from Vienna to Nuremburg of the legendary iron crown of the medieval empire. There lurks a romantic in this conqueror whose legions are machines. But let no one suppose that the medieval boundaries of the First Reich will satisfy the Third. The prophecy that closes the epilogue to *Mein Kampf* is still his inspiration:

> "A State which in an epoch of racial adulteration, devotes itself to the duty of protecting the best elements of its racial stock, must one day become ruler of the earth."

Here is a programme that concerns the New World no less than the Old.

It may be well, at this stage, to sketch in outline the strategic picture that will confront the United States, if Hitler wins. I need not enlarge on the immediate risk that would arise if, as the overlord of Scandinavia, he could acquire military control over Iceland and Greenland in the north, or over Dutch, French or British possessions in the Caribbean area. Assuredly, Washington would veto that, and back its prohibition by arms.

The more probable line of expansion is down the west coast of Africa. It matters very little what precise relationship its various colonies would bear to the Reich. Some it may annex. Some may fall to the European empire as a whole. Some may be left nominally in the possession of their present owners. But these owners, one and all, will be the feudatories of the German overlord, subject to his military power and bound to aid his military designs. A Fascist France may lend herself to this purpose with a trace of reluctance and shame. A Fascist Spain will do it with enthusiasm.

In this military pattern we must reckon not only continental Africa with the human cannon fodder of its manhood, but its coasts, harbours and islands, notably Dakar, the Azores and the Canaries. On the assumption we are considering, that England has been crushed and her sea power broken, this entire Atlantic coast line from Narvik in Norway to Angola in Portuguese Africa will be within the German system. British South Africa, with its mixed population and meagre industrial resources, could not hold out for long.

On all or any of the harbours and air-ports of this eastern Atlantic coast, the warplanes and submarines of the

European empire might be based. They would from these vantage points threaten, if they did not command, every route by sea and air that leads to the eastern frontage of Latin America.

This military framework is only the beginning of our problem. The ends that Hitler pursues may not be economic, but the Nazis are masters in the use of economic means for the acquisition of military power. Precisely what economic organization they will give to a subject Europe we may not be able to guess in any detail. But we may be sure that it will be unified and controlled for German ends.

In plain words, all the economic dealings of Europe, as consumer, financier, exporter and carrier, with Latin America will obey a German direction. To a unified Europe, Latin America will have to sell her coffee, oil, wheat, maize, sugar and tin. From a European industry, unified and as far as possible monopolized by German cartels, she will have to draw her machinery, to say nothing of manufactured goods. England, after the catastrophe, is hardly likely to retain much of her considerable investment in the Argentine and elsewhere. The competition for this market will lie between German Europe and the United States.

It is unnecessary to remind the reader of the considerable advantage the Germans enjoy, thanks to their big resident population, which settles, mixes and intermarries with the inhabitants and yet retains, with a tight and quasi-military organization, its loyalty to the Reich. The Italians, numerous if less influential, are now an allied force. A new asset of the Axis in the Spanish-American world is its

acquisition of metropolitan Spain. The intellect of Spain was the devoted partisan of the republic: it is scattered and exiled. But the mere possession of Madrid confers on Franco's *régime* a prestige that South America concedes. In the cultural sense, this continent is only beginning to emerge from the colonial phase.

On the air, and in the press, the Germans and Spaniards will together know how to use this advantage. There is no need to insist that the Nazi technique of penetration will be used with equal skill and daring. Few days pass without some reminder in the news of Nazi activity, now in Uraguay, again in Brazil, and above all in Mexico. It is astounding that so much can be attempted, in spite of the severing of communications, in the midst of a major war at the farthest extremity of the German radius of influence. It is not pleasant to speculate on what may be attempted, if and when this restless Power has its hands free, with a legend of omnipotence to aid it. If it could gain a footing, let us say in Mexico, the possibility of an attack by air upon the United States is open.

That is, however, a somewhat crude way of envisaging this Latin-American problem. The theme of our century, as we have seen, is continental unity. Backward though South America may be, it cannot escape the logic of technology. Infallibly that will drive to its conclusion, in this great area as in Europe. The airplane is the fated instrument of unification, and this the Germans, more promptly than any other people, have grasped. On the day when any one of these States, under an enterprising dictator, acquires as the ally of the Germans an adequate armada of bombers with a mechanized army

behind its aerial artillery, this continent can be unified under German leadership .

The thing will not be done by mere force. The resources of economic permeation, political organization and cultural propaganda will all be used simultaneously. If the Nazis inject into this continent a deadly dose of moral and intellectual poison, they will also bring with them some material and visible benefits—here a motor road across the pampas, there a power station, elsewhere some new process that may transform sub-tropical agriculture or cope with some of the pests of this climate—the gifts, in short, of intelligent organization and applied science. The unification of this continent, with an increase in its sparse population and the lifting of the level of its material development, would be in itself an immense gain, even if the work were done with Nazi brutality and in the last resort by the use of force.

What will be the American reply? To attempt by political persuasion and leadership the unification of twenty Latin-American States is a nearly impossible task. Their levels of culture are too various, their jealousies too intense. Are they to be rallied to the democratic idea? But most of them are congenitally and by tradition dictatorships. Their dread of "Yankee imperialism" is a formidable obstacle, which is one of several reasons that account for the disappointing record of the Pan-American Union. The two cultures do not blend easily. I recollect some frank talks with the many Spanish-American students who attended Columbia University. They acknowledged the care and kindness they received, but they felt themselves strangers in an uncongenial civilization.

The expedient which Washington has devised for the unification of this continent on an economic footing is a bold conception, drafted in the grand manner. If the whole export trade of the two Americas could be brought under a single selling agency, with Northern leadership and financial backing, it would be difficult for a Nazified Europe to use economic means for its political ends.

One need not stress the difficulties, which are generally recognized. The chief of them is, of course, that the two Americas are not in the economic sense complementary. The North can offer no market to the wheat, maize, meat and sugar of the South, which must, with much of the coffee and oil, flow to Europe. Again, the South must export perhaps a third of its produce, the North only 8 or 9 per cent. This politico-economic pattern does not make naturally for unification under Northern leadership. One need not be a defeatist, if one is doubtful of the success of this plan, however much one may wish it to succeed.

To a European observer, however, this plan is exposed to a more fundamental objection. It dates from a rapidly vanishing epoch in which economics were supreme. Until the other day we all of us assumed, liberals no less than Marxists, socialists as well as the adherents of capitalism, that society is governed by economic motives and serves economic ends. This whole assumption the Nazis have challenged. They see in power and not in welfare the end that an uncorrupted society pursues. They have deposed economic man with his calculating rationalism, to set instinctive man in his place. That is the significance of their counter-revolution. This Englishmen have been

slow to grasp: Americans have not yet begun to understand it. Nowhere is the economic viewpoint, with all the apparatus of the universities and all the assurance of the statisticians, accepted so uncritically.

This windscreen against the Nazi tornado is not a new device. It is, one may concede, bigger and bolder than anything Europeans attempted: Americans think and act on a bigger scale. But history will record, with a wry smile, that more especially after Munich, Mr. Chamberlain and his advisers from the Treasury lit on the same strategy. To the German war machine they opposed their economic schemes. In plain words, they tried to buy the trembling, weaker neutrals. Loans were offered and capital invested with a lavish hand. One happy inspiration was to buy up the Roumanian wheat crop and the Greek tobacco crop. Economists, and lecturers toured the Balkans. In the early months of the war, there emerged from much intensive study a trading corporation with impressive official backing, designed to develop and unify British commercial relations with eastern Europe on a permanent footing. Nothing came of it all, save the waste of a good deal of money. The rush of the German dive bomber swept it away. It is impossible to buy men, however eager they may be to sell themselves, if an enemy's warplanes are hovering over their cities.

One lesson stands out in letters of flame from the experience of Europe in the past seven years. Military power is, today, the superior of economic power. It is an unpleasant lesson. It offends the habits of thought fixed in our institutions through many generations. From a sordid world we must jolt with a shock into a brutal world.

Let us by all means resolve by international organization to tame and domesticate military power. Let us, by all means, search for a new dynamic that will build a society subject neither to the dollar nor to the incendiary bomb. That is the task for tomorrow. But we court disaster if we fail to recognize the lord of our contemporary earth. Military power, if it can win command of the air, can mock economics when a master wields it, who cares neither for mercy nor law.

The conclusion is, then, that whatever auxiliary use may be made of economic organization or of cultural influences, the New World will have to be protected by military power from the unadulterated race that aspires to rule the earth. It may be said that the American fleet always did stand behind the Monroe Doctrine. In the new conditions, on the hypothesis that British sea power has been broken, it will have to be doubled, since it will have to outbuild both the European and the Japanese navies, and dominate unaided both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

But against the Nazi technique of penetration can sea power alone guarantee South America? That would be a comfortable delusion worthy of the conservative strategists who misled the British and the French. When the Nazis make a serious bid for the mastery of Latin America, they will use both the air arm and land forces. If the United States has to encounter them in the air, it must have its bases scattered over South America, and it also must be ready to fight there on land. Part of this requirement has been met by the lease of sites on British territory but this is only a beginning. The United States

must become a military power as formidable as the Nazi empire, always ready at short notice for the ordeal of battle. It must acquire over the Latin republics an ascendancy, a quasi-imperial leadership equally repugnant to the idealism of the North and the independence of the South. The North must either contrive to give to the South a solid defensive structure, such as the democracies failed to evolve in Europe, or else it must face a future in which it alone will have to stand guard over both Americas, always armed, always on the alert, and always liable to be surprised by some sudden stroke that will convert one or more of these States into an ally and outpost of its adversary.

The problem in short is to unify this continent. Can it be done without the instrument of military power? Does it mean a second and longer Civil War for unity, waged over a vaster theatre, against a Power that is at once a political principle and a terrific concentration of intelligent but unscrupulous force?

Americans have been sharply reminded by the expansion of the Axis to include Japan that they are now encircled on two fronts. The new Triple Alliance conforms to logic. It is a grouping of the dissatisfied to despoil the sated Powers. It has, however, a more immediate purpose. It is designed to intimidate the United States and prevent her eventual entry into the war as a belligerent. Should she come in, it binds Japan to fight in the ranks of the Axis. The gain to Germany in that event would be appreciable. The Japanese Fleet would prey on British

commerce and might find in Hong Kong an easy prize. Our strength would have to be diverted to the defence of Malaya, the Dutch Indies and British Borneo. Distance might be at first a sufficient protection for the two Dominions of the Pacific. What Germany and Italy could do for Japan is not obvious, save to mobilize their Fifth Columns in the United States. On the other hand, Japan would have to face the American Fleet, operating no longer from its distant base in Hawaii, but from Singapore as well as Manila. Japanese shipping would be exposed in every sea and the island metropolis of the New Order subjected to a long-distance blockade.

We need not guess what would happen, if and when the stronger American Fleet with some British and possibly Dutch backing met Japan's warships in the open. A decision in this struggle, if it comes, could be reached by other means. Japan's strength is already taxed beyond her resources by the dragging land-war in China. That indomitable republic would become, in fact and perhaps in name, the ally of the two Western Democracies, which would, of course, assist it with money, arms, 'planes and, perhaps, with technicians also. But even without direct aid to China, the United States and the British Empire have it in their power, if the Dutch colonies joined them, to cripple Japan within a few months by the passive use of the economic weapon. She depends on them for 85 per cent of her supplies of oil, for all her rubber, tin, nickel and aluminium, most of her copper and scrap-iron, and about half her supplies of iron ore. From them also she draws her cotton and wool. An embargo on oil alone would bring her

to her knees as soon as her reserves were exhausted. That is, indeed, so obvious that one asks whether the treaty, in so far as it is aimed at America, is much more than clumsy bluff.

The problem that now faces Americans is perhaps the gravest in their history. They will not be in a hurry to decide it. If they take up this challenge eventually and enter the war as our ally, they may reckon on ending the peril that threatens them both in Latin America and in the Pacific from the united forces of the Axis. They would have to endure two anxious years of war; they would have to risk some of their ships, and it might be part of their contribution to send an expeditionary force to Europe. But their own soil would not be exposed and the brunt of the battle in the air and at sea would fall on us and on land upon the Chinese. With their aid it is reasonable to hope that the war would end in the capitulation of their enemies, the collapse of the Axis and the end of the totalitarian threat of encirclement. If, on the other hand, they temporise and retain their non-belligerent status, they must face the risk that both we in Europe and the Chinese in Asia may be crushed. In that event they would have to confront the wrath and greed of three enemies without an ally. Their chance of using the economic weapon would have vanished, for Japan could draw from the subjugated colonies of the Western Powers all the material resources she required.

For this struggle on two fronts Americans are preparing. That is the meaning of the staggering appropriations

for defence that Congress has adopted almost without debate. No one looks out into a tranquil and unclouded future. If Americans avoid participation in this European war, that does not mean that they count on the enjoyment of peace. There can be no peace on this earth while the sinister principle of Nazi Imperialism governs even one of its continents.

Men of foresight understand that the conduct of this struggle will involve profound changes in "the American way of life"—a phrase that means the competitive pursuit of profit, without regard to the general good or the safety of the State. A constitution of checks and balances, designed to hamper bold action by the executive, is not the best equipment for a long struggle with a mobile enemy. The jealousy of any far-reaching controls that characterises American business cannot be reconciled with the needs of total war.

Through six years the German mind was drilled to prepare it for victory. Englishmen and Frenchmen realized too late that they had shirked the necessary discipline for defence. They ought to have suspended, not democracy indeed, but rather the customary working of their economic life: the whole fabric of production, transport and trade should have been subjected to a single over-riding military purpose.

The longer the period of struggle lasts without a decision, the graver is the danger that it will distort the development of American society, and starve the purposes to which civilized men wish to devote their resources. When this war broke over Europe, Americans justified their abstention by embracing a new ideal. They hoped

to preserve in the United States a secure and tranquil haven for the menaced values of Western civilization, its humanity, its respect for the individual, its care for intellectual integrity. These are incompatible with the long-range preparations of total war. That haven America has offered to mercy and integrity will become a drill ground. Americans must harden their minds and coarsen their values if they propose unaided, during a prolonged period of tension, to defend on two fronts a stricken civilization against this enemy who has banished liberty and pity from Europe. In her fortified refuge she would pine and perish.

These, it may be, are vain regrets. But how, in the long struggle for which they have begun to arm, do Americans envisage the decision? Much has been written in cold blood that reaches us in England while the enemy bombards our cities. These speculations are often able and ingenious, but, so far as they have come my way, they are all inspired by a defensive strategy. They foresee the gradual approach of the Nazi power, its penetration here, its establishment there. The American answer is always conceived in terms of local defence. Some believe that all Latin America can be held. Others would be content to fend off the enemy from the shores and islands of the Caribbean Sea. The picture presented is of a slow siege. Step by step, on two fronts, the enemy encroaches. Japan establishes herself in China, and the Nazi empire acquires Africa. Always the initiative is conceded to the enemy, and the American reply consists in warding off the blow when the peril draws too near.

Such is always the first attitude of civilized men in

such a situation. This is not military thinking. This defensive psychology surrendered Europe to men who understood the art of war. The struggle might, indeed, begin in this way. But if it is ever to end, if the siege is ever to be raised, if American civilization is ever to be delivered from this barbarian challenge, then sooner or later the struggle must be pressed to a decision.

That means something wholly different from passive and local defence. It means the destruction of the enemy's forces. Where are they? Not around the Caribbean, though he might get there. Not in Uruguay or Brazil, though he might establish himself there. Not in Africa, though he may make its harbours and air-ports his outlying bases. The power of the arch-enemy lies in Europe. From its workshops he draws his command of the air, his submarines and his tanks. The defence of the Americas cannot be secured until his power is shattered at its centre. The struggle would be unending and undecided, so long as the Nazi empire could control all the resources of Europe.

This may be sound military theory. But how in practice could it be followed? A decision could be reached only if there were, in Europe or within easy reach of it, a friendly and adequate base from which American air power could strike, and in which America's land forces could be assembled. Failing such a base, the final blow could never be delivered.

That base exists, as yet intact, held by a garrison determined to defend it. While England holds out, America can shorten and anticipate her own struggle by utilizing this island as the key to her own defence.

CHAPTER V

THE CASE FOR ACTION

WE HAVE TRAVERSED, in our exploration of the future, only a short distance, but our journey has taken us through difficult country. It may be well to look back before we try to go forward.

Hitler, we assumed for argument's sake, has won his war. He has crushed England as he crushed France. Either British sea power is broken, or it is exiled and cut off in Canada from the national resources on which it depends. Hitler has unified the continent of Europe, but he has done it by the brutal use of military force, and he will organize all its resources, natural and human, to serve the lust of power which the Nazi empire embodies. The German master race will use its quasi-monopoly of industry and its command of the air to organize and exploit the helot peoples for its own ends. It cannot avoid pushing its rule into Africa and Asia. From these continents, with the assistance of Japan, it will threaten the New World on two fronts.

That is the menace which the defeat of England would make for the two Americas. With her fleet engaged in two oceans, the United States would have to protect Latin America against the subtle and audacious Nazi technique of penetration. Sea power would not suffice; the attack would go forward both in the air and on land.

Could South America be promptly unified for its defence? Necessary though that may be, it could not be an easy undertaking. We assumed a long period of struggle, involving many unwelcome changes in the American way of life. When at last open war came between the United States and Nazi Europe, it would seem that America could follow only a defensive strategy. The initiative would lie with the enemy. His power could be destroyed only at its centre, yet for lack of a suitable base on the farther shores of the Atlantic, a counter-offensive could never be directed against the Nazi empire in Europe. The British Isles would be the ideal base, but our argument started with the assumption that they had already been lost. At this point, if we could talk face to face with our American friends, we might venture to put a blunt question to them. If this forecast, with its picture of a repugnant and alarming future, is in any degree probable, might not the United States best secure her own safety by a bolder policy? If she were to become a belligerent, and wage this war to a decision with England as her ally, would she not avoid the longer, more difficult and more costly struggle which, at no distant date, she would have to wage alone? England can offer for the defence of American civilization not merely her manhood, her navy, her air arm and her industries, but also her own island as the base indispensable to final victory. Together and now, while England survives, our two countries could end the rebellion of the barbarians. Alone, if she postpones the struggle, America might, indeed, repulse the enemy but could not destroy him. By entering the battle today she would free the whole earth.

So far we have discussed the case for America's entry into this war from the angle of her interests. Then do we desire it? We have been very careful to give no hint of this aspiration, if we do entertain it. It is time to face this question frankly. I will brush aside some of the objections that might deter us. A section of commercial opinion in England has never been friendly to America, because it saw in her its most formidable rival in the fields of industry and finance. Again, experience has warned us that America is a difficult ally, because the division of power under her constitution between President and Senate forbids us to rely on a continuous policy at Washington. But these are trifles if, in a doubtful war for survival, we can hope for a decisive victory only with America's support as a belligerent. Fortunately, we are not likely to find ourselves in serious disagreement over war aims and the peace settlement. In the Old World America wants nothing and would accept nothing for herself. In the New World what she seeks is security: she would reach it by measures in which we are already co-operating. What we have to consider, then, is the military problem. What kind and degree of help do we need?

It may be argued that America is doing all she can at this stage. If she were to enter the war as a belligerent, the result for many a month to come would be rather to starve and hamper the British effort than to aid it. England, as Mr. Churchill has told us, has in the field already 1,500,000 troops, with a Home Guard of older men a

million strong. For the defence of this little island that should suffice. Behind this army there are some reserves of men as yet untrained, nor have the Dominions as yet sent their full quota. What this English army wants is not reinforcements, but material help—airplanes, tanks, guns, rifles and ever more airplanes. The fleet has gratefully accepted the fifty American destroyers. The air-arm envies the marvellous sighting apparatus of the American bombers. But of men, in this defensive phase of the war, England has enough.

If that is our case, what more could we gain by American belligerency? On the contrary, we should lose. The United States is already mobilizing to the full her aircraft and armament industries for England's service. What these can yet produce falls far behind our needs. If the United States were also to raise a big army and air force for service in Europe, she would have to monopolize her own industries to equip her own forces. The flow of airplanes and munitions to England would cease abruptly.

This argument certainly has much force, though it may be overstated. But though England does not, in this defensive phase of the war, require more men, she certainly will require them, if ever she is able to pass to the offensive. Together, Germany and Italy have nearly three times our population. Though we may, greatly daring, venture today to raise the issue of American participation, we do not press for an immediate answer.

But if we take a longer view, the argument of the previous page was surely exaggerated. It may be that the aircraft and armaments industries are working to

full capacity. But if the United States "came in," her Government would do what the British Government has done in its island. It would assume additional powers that would enable it to co-ordinate and speed up the entire war-effort. It would take over Mr. Henry Ford's works, where at present it encounters a blunt refusal to supply either its needs or ours. It would require every industry to adapt its machinery for the needs of the war. It would limit or even forbid the production of such things as motor-cars for civilian use, in order to harness for victory all the vast resources that American manufacturers possess. With intelligent organization in the several fields of work, America would shortly be able both to supply her own army and to continue her help to England.

We may postpone to a later page the thorny question of the raising of an army for service in Europe. But it would be difficult to exaggerate what an American declaration of war would mean to Europe, even if no army crossed the ocean.

Americans are not often credited, as a people, with an excess of modesty. To me it seems, on the contrary, that among their amiable failings is a needless, even a culpable, modesty. They do not realize the place in the world that belongs by right to the giant their nation is. This immense population with its trained intelligence, its energy, its optimism, and its pre-eminence in applied science, commands wealth and natural resources that raise it high above every rival on this planet. It has never grasped the responsibility that belongs to these powers, nor the leadership to which destiny beckons it. Sometimes

it has missed the call because it had in the White House a timid or pedestrian captain. That is not its case today. It faces the eyes of mankind under one of the few men alive on our earth who are of a stature to lead.

A declaration of war from this republic would transform the history of civilization, and this we should all in a flash understand. To England, battered, bloodstained and tempted in her darkest hour to think that she might be fighting a losing battle for honour, it would bring the assurance of victory. To the enslaved and silent peoples of Europe it would spell liberation. For the Nazis, even while the church bells tolled in triumph, it would sound the knell of defeat. The cause that has America behind it cannot be lost. So much we all realize, we British and the Germans, our lost comrades of vanquished France, the Norwegians and the Czechs.

We should expect no prompt succour. We know that this irresistible mass moves slowly. But we should fight on, with our backs to the wall, confident that beyond the death and ruin that surround us there shone the promise of liberty with peace.

With more confidence than Americans themselves, we have sensed their greatness and generosity. When their declaration rang out, we should know, and the enemy would know, which principle, in this battle over the foundations of human society, must win this war. The brave would feel their strength redoubled; the doubters would falter no longer; even the beaten masses in Europe, who had bowed their heads to fate, would hope again and steel their wills to renew the struggle. By her declaration of war, even if she raised no army on her own soil,

America would rally to the cause of liberation, in the submerged nations of Europe, millions of brave men. They would face the enemy who holds them down with a new defiance and a resolve to find, in strikes or passive resistance or guerilla tactics, the road to a revolutionary victory.

From another school of thought among Americans, there comes a different objection, depressing, indeed, but not in intention unfriendly. It is, they think, too late to render effective help. While England fights on, she shall have all the airplanes and munitions she can buy with cash and carry in her own ships: no pedantry of neutrality shall impede her. But it would be a mistake for America to link her fate further, save by way of charity, with a beaten cause. Hitler's success in overthrowing, one by one, every nation that barred his way has bred, not in Germans alone, but in friendly onlookers also, a fatalistic belief in his star.

It is difficult for any Englishman, however objective he may strive to be, to combat this pessimism dispassionately. It would be stupid and dishonest to minimize the dangers that face our island. We began our preparations in earnest far too late. We were unfortunate in retaining the late administration so long. We have to face in Ireland, divided by the accursed feud between North and South, a baffling problem, both military and political. The collapse of all our friends and allies has given the enemy control of the whole Atlantic coast of Europe. What

may await us in the Mediterranean we cannot yet foresee. We do not underestimate this enemy's talent in organization, and he has behind him a vast continent to organize for our destruction. His airplanes still outnumber our defenders, and he is still building them more rapidly than we are, even with American help. All this we know. We are prepared to face some months of bloodshed and devastation, and to live through a peril that our island in its long history has never yet known. Mr. Churchill, in those stately periods that reveal a generous and intrepid mind, has declared our confidence. I will not try to repeat tamely what he has said nobly.

Our belief in our ability to survive is founded on reason. Late in the day we have chosen an inspiring leader. Our nation is united as it never before was in its history, and its workers are the most resolute section of our population. We know what air power can now do at sea, and yet, on the balance, we retain our faith in our navy, in its technical mastery no less than its daring. We have no doubt about the individual superiority both of our airplanes and of their skilful and audacious pilots. Our army, like our air fleet, is heavily outnumbered, yet in the battle for this island it will have, in any conditions we can foresee, a local superiority.

On a longer view, if England can survive the first onslaught, the outlook is less uncertain. Our navy is able to enclose the masters of Europe within that continent; Africa, Asia and the New World, with all their resources, are barred to Germany. It still confines the less respected of our two enemies within the Mediterranean.

Few of us are now disposed to exaggerate the effects

of a naval blockade, as the late administration did. On that subject its propaganda indulged in illusions that dismayed better informed observers. The enemy had made his preparations and he had his reserves. But it would be equally mistaken to ignore, even in the new circumstances, the long-range effect of a blockade in a protracted war. Those reserves will not last for ever. It is not easy to be sure what precisely the relations of Germany with Russia are, or to foresee what they will become. There is no cordiality and there is no trust; it is doubtful whether Germany has drawn, or hereafter will draw, any great volume of supplies from this source, whether of oil or of food.

Not at once or very early, yet certainly in the long run, Germany must experience some shortage in her supplies of oil, rubber, nickel, copper and certain rare but essential minerals. The problem of food supply is now continental in its range. A shortage, more or less acute, is inevitable over a vast region which always as a whole, in normal times, depended on imports. The enemy may always have a bare sufficiency of food for himself, but in the occupied lands he will have to hold down a hostile population which, under the pressure of want and unemployment, will grow, as the winter deepens, ever more restive and rebellious.

In our island, on the other hand, if in the main we succeed in defending our industrial centres from the enemy's attack, our organization, which has improved with startling rapidity since, under Mr. Churchill, more resolute and trusted leaders—Mr. Morrison, Mr. Bevin and Lord Beaverbrook—took charge, will be lessening

our early inferiority in airplanes and tanks. In the new year we may hope to profit to the full from the mighty American effort.

These are sound reasons for a measure of confidence, but stress them as one may, they do not promise victory. They may justify the hope that we shall hold our island physically intact. That is not victory. England would not enjoy her freedom for long, if only twenty miles of salt water separated her from the armed slavery of Hitler's European empire.

Sooner or later, in 1941 or in 1942, this free island must dare to take the offensive, and contemplate the invasion of a continent solidly organized by its German masters. Such an undertaking may seem at first sight too audacious even for Marlborough's descendant. England has performed this feat before, but never alone; we do not forget that the German Reich has nearly twice our population, nor that it can harness for its own military ends all the industries of subjugated Europe. But should we be alone?

Beyond the Channel, if once we could win a footing on continental soil, are the millions of all the nations Germany has enslaved. At our doors are the French, Belgians and Dutch. Farther afield, if ever we can reach them, are the Czechs, Norwegians and Poles. They need no training. All their young men can handle arms, and millions of them are veterans who faced the German tornado without discredit, though they suffered defeat. Must we persuade them to back us? The Germans will

have spared us that trouble, and their own unworthy rulers as well..

The French face dismemberment, with the loss of every relic of self-respect. Their workers have watched a reaction that returns for its pattern to the Bourbon model and robs them of every right, industrial and political, that they and their fathers won in a hundred years. The Belgians, under a similar social tyranny, expect the extinction of their national existence. Need we recall the proud memories of the Dutch.

The liberation of Europe in these conditions will be no classical campaign, in which victory will go to the general staff that manœuvres best, according to the rules, the larger number of divisions equipped with the more formidable armada of airplanes and tanks. This will be a revolutionary struggle, and victory will go to the leader who knows how to rally the nations and the masses. To the submerged peoples and the crushed workers he must offer a new life in a braver future—no mere return to the anarchy and inertia of the years that led up to this war.

The adventure can succeed only if the masses of the French, Belgian and Dutch nations rally promptly to the standard of their liberators and fall into line behind it. If that is to happen, it will be necessary to gather first of all a group of popular leaders who have not bowed to the Nazi conquerors or joined the corrupt conspirators of the native reaction. Many of them will have to be rescued from prison. But nationalism is not enough. The programme of the army of liberation must promise to unify the nations of Europe, not as helots under a master race, but as equals in a democratic federation.

It must open the way to social reconstruction on such lines, however bold, as the liberated peoples may demand. The old order in this war has crashed, and men will demand something more inspiring than a replica of the dead past. Lastly, half Europe will be unemployed. The army of rescue must bring with it a plan of work drawn on a continental scale.

It is easier to imagine in outline what the political appeal might be than to face the immense material difficulties. We may hope to rally a great army from the conquered peoples, but its vanguard must be a powerful striking force of shock troops, landed from the British Isles at one or several points on the coasts of France or the Low Countries. Before it can receive much help from the local populations, it will have to win a spacious bridgehead against the most formidable German opposition. Before this enterprise can begin, we must have won ascendancy in the air, while we retain the command of the sea.

How great an army will be necessary? That is a question for soldiers, but any civilian can foresee some of the difficulties. England could not send her whole army, for she must keep at home a force sufficient to fend off attempts at invasion. The Axis can muster, even after it has provided garrisons to hold down its numerous victims, opposing armies of several millions, which might converge from many directions. But it is fallacious to think in terms of millions of men. The striking force in modern warfare consists of a number of mechanised Divisions. The rest of the army plods behind them and occupies the ground they have won. In their decisive offensive of May and June the Germans used only ten of these mechanised

Divisions. Their dive-bombers acted as an aerial artillery: their tank corps rushed upon the positions it had battered: their motor-cyclists served as cavalry and the motorized infantry dug itself in along the edges of the conquered salient. For our offensive we must have a superiority in aircraft, tanks and mobile infantry, but not necessarily in the total numbers of our army. Let us assume that we might reckon, perhaps, on six mechanized Divisions. That is not enough. For the forces that will hold the country behind us, as our shock troops advance, we may rely on the corps we hope to raise among the French, Belgians and Dutch. Our European Legion drawn from the foreign contingents already serving with us, should be trained for tasks which it alone can carry out, and it should include German and Austrian battalions which we entrust with arms. This Legion should furnish air-borne pioneers, who will rally the subject peoples behind the German armies.

Allow what you please for the promising political conditions and assume that Germany's reserves of oil have run low: the fact remains that only a powerful army, perfectly equipped in the air and on land, could make this attempt without disaster. How many mechanized Divisions must it possess? I shrink from naming a figure, but any guess that I dare make is well above the total that England alone could furnish, even with the help of the Dominions.

Secondly, it would be necessary to have ready, for the use of the volunteers who would rally to our standard from France and the Low Countries, a complete modern equipment. The cost would be formidable.

Again, the success of the plan would depend, in some degree, on the ability of the army of liberation to feed the civilian population as it advanced. It may be marching into a land stricken by famine and epidemics. If it can bring food and healing with it, its path will be the smoother. That may be true, also, when it is able to force a breach in the defences of the Reich. There also the way may be opened for it by daring political pioneers, and there also a hungry nation might be disposed to welcome it. But again the cost would be formidable.

Here, then, is a rough sketch, capable of many improvements and variations, that may suffice to answer those who despair of victory. It can be won if England has survived the threatened *Blitzkrieg*, if we know how to combine military daring and efficiency with bold political leadership and a generous use of economic resources. But to do it on an adequate scale seems to be beyond the means of England fighting alone. Our population is too small; our wealth, deeply drained already, insufficient. The stake is not merely our survival, but the liberation of Europe and the peace of the Americas. Then, may we hope for the comradely aid, in men and money, of the United States?

Men? In 1940 both major political parties took their stand against the sending of men to Europe, and the President's message to Congress reinforced this view. I do not know how absolute and final such undertakings are. Men rarely intend in such matters to bind themselves under all circumstances and for all time: no statesman

in this changing world ought to give an eternal pledge. Europeans have listened to these deliberations and negations from across the Atlantic with sinking hearts. They seemed to doom the Continent that cradled our common civilization to an eternity of degradation.

A way out of this difficulty occurs to me. If America has forbidden the sending to Europe of drafted men, and also of enlisted men from the regular army, would it equally forbid the raising for this express purpose of an army of volunteers? In plain words, if there are young men who will freely offer themselves to fight the battle of civilization in Europe, would Congress remove any legal obstacles in their way? Would it go further, and bear the cost of their equipment, pay and maintenance? Would it permit officers and men of the regular army to join such a force?

Certainly, there must be many young men from families of recent British origin who feel this love for the land from which their fathers came. Certainly, there must be men of Czech, Scandinavian and Polish stock who would obey the call of their blood. Certainly, there are Jews, who would fight to free their tortured race. Two thousand American volunteers joined the Lincoln Brigade and fought gallantly for Spain. That was a noble cause. But is not the liberation of all Europe a cause as worthy, with an even wider appeal? An American volunteer army of half a million eager and resolute men, equipped with all that mechanized war demands, would turn the scales for victory and ward off for ever, by its achievements in Europe, the threat that darkens America's future. What we need is not millions of men, but fully mechanized Divisions.

On the question of money, we need make no express appeal. To escape slavery England is ready to face financial ruin. She will pour out what she has to free her neighbours and friends. But there are limits to her means, nor has she in her granaries an embarrassing surplus of food. She can do much, but she lacks the wealth to rearm a vanquished Europe and carry the needs of all its stricken peoples upon her shoulders. But if Americans have settled in principle the main question of their duty in this struggle, they will give, as a grateful continent remembers that they gave before.

Such is the case we might present to our kinsmen across the ocean. It may be that what reasoning cannot effect will be achieved by example. Fate has willed that the storm shall fall first upon this island, and fall upon it while it stands alone. If we survive, there will be generous American voices to summon a great nation to be worthy of its stature. On the day that it declares war upon this malignant principle, and sends out its volunteers to fight shoulder to shoulder with our young men, civilization has a future and mankind may dare to hope.

A NOTE ON STRATEGY

WE ARE AS unready in face of the political problems of this war of liberation as were our soldiers and the French when they met Hitler's offensive. The German and Austrian refugees who should be its pioneers in a European Legion are still imprisoned in our concentration camps. Our Minister of Propaganda startled America by proposing the restoration of the Hohenzollerns and

Habsburgs. In Spain Lord Halifax appeases the bloodstained tyranny of General Franco. We ought long ago to have come to terms with the Republican movement, gathered from North Africa and Mexico what is left of its veteran army and offered it Gibraltar as a base from which to liberate the Peninsula. Mr. Churchill may have the temperament that could grasp the political strategy of such a war as this, but his powerful mind is not yet busy upon it. Until in outline we define our aims and reassure the German masses, they will remain solidly behind Hitler, since they fear a repetition of the humiliations and sufferings that followed the Versailles Peace. The thinking of our governing class is still moving on a nationalist plane. This is not a war of nations. In France and Spain, as in Germany, there is a cleavage between classes and ideas that cuts across nationality. Against us are ranged both the Catholic and the propertied reactions, which in France and Spain coalesce. These we must defeat no less than the German armies. We can do it only by mobilising the forces that demand a new social order.

It is a handicap that we face the European masses under a mixed Administration, which still includes ministers of Mr. Chamberlain's school. We could do much to make our leadership in a war of liberation more plausible and more acceptable, if the Labour Party would work out with the Tory Democrats a programme of social advance to be realised, as an instalment, now. A long step might be taken to lift the curse of class privilege from the next generation; (*a*) by a truly national scheme of education based, in country and town alike, on equal opportunity for all, from primary school to university, and (*b*) by a system of family allowances financed from the national exchequer. The rebuilding of the devastated areas, notably East London and Merseyside, should be boldly planned and carried out directly under public ownership. The motive that will carry us in this direction and one may hope far beyond such suggestions as these,

will be, of course, the determination to give, not to the army alone, but to the whole population which has endured the strain of this war, a sense that they are defending a society that is not indifferent to their welfare. Anything we can do in this way will seem to Socialists superficial and inadequate, but that is no reason for rejecting an opportunity made for us by a pause in the class struggle. An additional reason for doing it without delay is that if we do it boldly and with a touch of imagination, it may enhance our claim to leadership in Europe. That will be affected, however, even more by what we do in the empire, and above all in India, than by what we do at home.

It is when we face this political task of tomorrow that our failure to compose our feud with Moscow confronts us as the disaster it is. The Soviet Union, under Stalin's leadership, may have forfeited the confidence of Western Socialists and the trust of our own working class. Is her policy guided by any wider consideration than the aggrandisement of Russia as a Great Power? Be this as it may, she still retains on the continent, through the Communist Parties, an influence over youth, the workers and a section of the more radical intellectuals that it would be folly to ignore. Such is the discipline and devotion of these parties that they contrive to survive underground under conditions fatal to every other advanced party. They are an inaudible but still living force in Hitler's Germany, in Pétain's France and also in the Balkans and in Bohemia, where they are reinforced by the Panslavist tradition.

If we attempt our revolutionary offensive with Russia still unreconciled, how will these parties respond? It is probable that they will be hostile. They will continue their denunciations of the "imperialist war-mongers"; they will attribute to us the vilest and most perfidious intentions, and they may succeed in checking any disposition among the working masses to welcome our army of liberation. Where they are strong, they may

even oppose us with arms. It is conceivable that a hostile Russia, using the European Communist Parties, might by such tactics thwart our offensive. She could certainly raise serious obstacles to its success, and create a chaos that would compel us to protect ourselves and our partisans by police measures that would render us odious to the masses. To avoid this danger a prior understanding with Moscow is indispensable.

The political and economic problems of this offensive are so complex and unfamiliar that a General Staff, including men of the Left who know Europe, should be empowered to over-ride the men of tradition and routine.

CHAPTER VI

IF ENGLAND WINS——

THERE IS STILL a question which any advocate of American action has to answer. The last occasion left its legacy of disillusion on both sides of the Atlantic. Englishmen, after the slaughter and the disappointment, reacted with the motto, No more war. Americans voiced the same mood in the slogan, No more Europe. Their criticisms of the Versailles settlement were, in the main, well founded: some of us in Europe shared them at the time and many of us have since been converted.

There is, however, another side of the story that Americans are apt to ignore. Mr. Wilson may have been a great but he was also a fallible statesman, and it is on record that he supported some of the worst chapters in the Treaty. The effect of America's withdrawal of the guarantee he gave was to confirm in the French a militant anxiety for their own safety, as pardonable as it was unwise. The League was lamed at the start by the absence of the only Power great enough and sufficiently remote to guide it in a spirit of disinterested justice. All of us had our share, some by omission and some by commission, in the making of the anarchy that now threatens us with ruin and destruction.

The first answer to the fear that history will repeat itself is an appeal to American pride. The balance of power

is overwhelmingly in favour of the United States. If, in her relative security, with her vastly superior resources in population and wealth, she were to come to the aid of this isolated and stricken island, she might name her own terms. She has the ability and she would have the right to veto in advance, as a condition of her intervention, any anti-social, or self-seeking, or imperialistic aims that may lurk in British policy. She is strong enough to insist, within reasonable limits, on any conditions of a wise and constructive peace that seem to her essential. Which of the homeless Governments, penniless and unarmed as they are, could drive a bargain with its saviour? Americans might more reasonably shrink from the burden of omnipotence than doubt their influence.

The reader will not suspect the writer of an uncritical attitude toward British policy. Yet he dares to say that, in so far as it is conscious and articulate, it shows none of these self-seeking aims. The statesmen, like the nation, resolved on resistance reluctantly and far too late. They have no aim save self-preservation. Experience taught them that none of us is safe within range of this lawless Power. We are fighting for survival, for freedom and self-respect and the right to lead a life true to the ideals of Western civilization. Our aim is to end this menace of habitual aggression, and to restore their liberties to the subjugated nations. That is the only pledge that binds us. On this occasion we bought no huckstering allies: Italy sold herself in the other market.

For the rest, if I know my own countrymen, it may still be said with truth that they are free, strangely free, of any vindictive anger against the German people:

may that mood of charity continue. Something they have learned from past mistakes: there will be no indemnities this time. The pedantic exaggeration of nationalism that helped to mar the last settlement, because it ignored economics, is out of fashion today. We are not thinking in terms of territorial rearrangements.

There is a widespread conviction that the armistice terms should be sharply distinguished from the constructive settlement. The first will have to provide for the restoration of the submerged nations and the demobilization of the enemy's forces: everything in it should be provisional. Some time should then elapse, an interval for reflection, before we attempt the permanent work of reorganization. All of us, including the Germans, will require some time to find our feet after the earthquake and to choose governments that represent us. They will not be led in either camp by the men of yesterday. To the final treaty free peoples must set their seal by consent.

Can we even dimly forecast the outline of the future reorganization? It is, I think, a mistake to regard it as a war aim. We do not propose to dictate, even to the enemy, any form of reconstruction, however reasonable. What force must achieve is to batter down the obstacle to ordered freedom. But force cannot create. As little should we conceive of the new order as a boon we shall owe to the enlightened will of statesmen. They may shape its details well or ill: they may draw boldly or timidly. But the nature of the solution itself is dictated by technology. Air power has made inevitable the unification of continents.

National independence is today a function of industrial and financial power. It is a luxury only the greatest dare indulge, a dignity only the mightiest can defend. The problem of today and tomorrow is whether the continents shall be organized as slave empires or free federations. That is the key to the coming settlement of Europe.

The same problem may be stated in another way. Men of good will have tried through two generations to find a way of escape from war. They would arbitrate their disputes: they would outlaw the aggressor, bind themselves by a covenant and organize sanctions against the law-breakers: they would limit their armaments by agreement. All this proved futile, and the last disarmament conference ended in a twilight sleep but without a birth.

Today we see our task with an approach to realism. What we have to decide is the ownership of military power. If we leave it in the hands of national States, it will infallibly be used for national ends. If its purpose be defence, then let us organize co-operative defence. What is used for the common good must be the property of the whole community. The unit that decides to banish war within it must possess all that there is within it of armed force, in the air, on land and at sea, the arsenals that store it, the industries that make it and the strategic points vital for its effective use.

That is the broad principle. We may postpone questions of detail—the size of our political unit and what armed force, whether militia or police, it might leave in the control of its component members. Whatever compromise one might tolerate, it is clear that none of the parts

can be allowed to own military force of a kind or on a scale that would allow it to oppose the continental unit conceived as a whole.

This question of the ownership of military power is settled. The drift of history and the advance of technical science have decided it. What remains to be determined is the nature of the control to which military power within each continental unit shall be subject. Shall a dictator launch its terrors, or a propertied class, or can we devise for our great continental units, embracing it may be many nations, a workable form of democracy?

The power these nations own in common will be used not only for the defence of the whole territory: it will protect the citizens in their dealings abroad and guard any dependent territories or colonies the continental unit holds in trust. The common ownership of military power involves, therefore, a common external policy, and that in the modern world carries us at once into the field of economics, and raises, above all in the dependent territories, class issues and problems of humanity.

There are, broadly, two ways in which nations that have linked their destinies may determine their common external policy. The old way was to bind their Governments to some form of consultation. This was always the method followed by allies, and on a bigger scale it was adopted by the League of Nations. The fiction was that all sovereign, independent States are equals, and moreover that they are single, solid entities which think and act as units. Consequently, on the League's Council each member State had an equal vote, and in the Assembly national delegations each cast a single, equal vote.

Reality mocked this fiction of the jurists: Guatemala was not noticeably the equal of Great Britain, nor Albania of France. The result was that voting became a meaningless parade. The real decision lay with the Great Powers: the lesser States were grouped around them by veiled intimidation, by crumbs from the rich man's table and by intrigue. Latterly, what really voted at Geneva was the British navy, the Bank of England and the French army. The vote in any event was meaningless, because unanimity was required for action. In other words, a Great Power would be bound only by its own consent. No majority, however impressive, based on opinion beyond its borders, could overrule the will of its Government.

On this model there is no future for international democracy. The first step in any advance is that we must go behind the myth of sovereignty and call up the peoples to abolish the supremacy of power. Governments alone were considered, on the old plan, because they owned and controlled military power. Of that, in fact and in our thinking, we must make an end.

The first step, in any congress that replaces the League's Assembly, is that delegates shall vote no longer as solid national blocks, but as individuals responsible to the masses behind them. The instant this were done, a vote would cease to be a contest between rival Powers and national interests. It would be no longer some mythical France, England or Sweden that voted, but rather the millions of Frenchmen, Englishmen and Swedes, workers, peasants, and middle class, with all their varied opinions and interests. The delegates in such a congress would soon group themselves across frontiers, and the policy of

the continental unit would be decided by the customary democratic interaction on each other of international parties and groups—conservatives, liberals, socialists, agrarians, advocates of state rights and the rest. In no other way can nationalism be circumvented.

The delegates might be directly elected, as some propose, by territorial constituencies, each containing (say) a million inhabitants. My own suggestion is that, at least in the early years, it would be better to elect them indirectly. The popular House of each national Parliament would elect by proportional representation a delegation, whose numbers would correspond to total populations. An abler body of men would probably be chosen by these expert electorates, and the balance of parties would be roughly reproduced on a small scale. As the reader will have perceived, this argument means (1) that our continental units must be federations, (2) that they must monopolize the ownership of military power and (3) that they must entrust the ultimate direction of policy to a representative and democratic congress.

The continent that urgently calls for such an organization is Europe. The Americas may later form such a unit. Asia presents problems for which no solution is in sight. Most of Africa is, in fact, a dependency of Europe.

This is no Utopian speculation. In the darkest hour of this war, Mr. Churchill, by one of the boldest acts of statesmanship in English history, made an offer to France that ended the epoch of nationalism in Europe and opened the road to federation. To strengthen the

flagging courage of the French and to give their hopes of victory and survival a broader foundation, he proposed nothing less than a permanent union between the two nations, political, economic and military. The reader will recollect the terms of this offer. Here are the two opening clauses of the draft declaration offered to France on June 16th:

> At this most fateful moment in the history of the modern world, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic make this declaration of indissoluble union and unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice and freedom, against subjection to a system which reduces mankind to a life of robots and slaves.
>
> The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union. The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will enjoy citizenship of France.

The declaration went on to provide for the creation of "a single War Cabinet" during the war, and for a formal "association" of the two Parliaments. This was not a draft of a constitution and it leaves many details undefined, but it is as a statement of principle as final and uncompromising as it well could be. It means federal union based on common citizenship.

Bold as this offer was, the reader may remind me, it fell far short of the federation of Europe. That was no hour for a project so ambitious: the moment for that will arrive when an offensive for the liberation of Europe is in sight. But can we doubt that what Mr. Churchill offered to France he would have offered as gladly to the

Low Countries, to Norway and to any of our neighbours of equal civilization?

That this was the beginning of a broad policy of federalism was assumed by the whole British press, including the conservative *Times*. As for the Labour party, it issued a manifesto several months earlier with the motto: "Europe must federate or perish." Nothing else is settled, nor at this stage can it be, but the discussion is already active. The future must answer innumerable questions about the geographical limits, the scope and the constitution of the European federation that will in some form arise, if this war ends in victory for Britain and her submerged allies.

We shall have to improvise and experiment; for no thinker with any sense for history and any familiarity with contemporary Europe would propose to adopt the American constitution as his model. The scheme put forward by Mr. Clarence Streit seems to me unsuited to serve even as a rough, preliminary draft. We do not know whether a democratic Germany will come into being, which could enter our federation. Might backward States enter it for a time as "territories"? Most of us are determined that no Fascist State shall qualify for membership. It must debate its common affairs with the aid of a free press and free speech.

As little can we lay down in advance the scope or direction of its economic policy. The ultimate aim, however gradually it may be reached, should be to abolish frontiers within Europe, save as the boundaries of administrative areas that enjoy wide but not absolute autonomy. Tariffs could not be abolished at once, though

they might be lowered. The effect of a sudden adoption of Free Trade would be to enable the industries of the more advanced countries to exploit the backward countries, which would remain primary producers for ever, condemned to a low standard of life. The ideal should be rather planned production than free, competitive trade. From the start, with the aid of a central bank and federal control over credit and interstate and foreign investment, the federation should begin to establish a general economic plan for the welfare of the continent and its dependencies, conceived as an organized whole. Through federal organs, the richer and more advanced States ought to aid the development of the backward States, until a common standard of culture and well-being is attained.[1]

The reader may remind me that, in this mention of dependencies and backward States within a future

[1] In an earlier book, *Property or Peace?* (1934) I argued that only Socialist States could form such a federation as this. It was not by accident that the ruling class in capitalist States retained military power as an exclusive national possession, which it controlled for its own economic ends. That it would ever, in a competitive world, voluntarily hand over this power to a super-national authority seemed to me an illusion. I could not imagine a Labour Ministry daring to internationalise the British Navy, and I foresaw Civil War if it did.

This was too pessimistic. Sentiment will fight hard to retain the Navy as an exclusively national force. But in the six years since this book appeared, the idea of an international air force has made progress, even among conservatives, and one must presume that Mr. Churchill himself supports it, since he accepted the presidency of the New Commonwealth League, formed to advocate this and even more radical proposals for the international ownership of military power. Technical changes, as I have argued throughout the present book, may explain this development of opinion. Air-power has demonstrated the necessity for the unification of Europe. Since no one would propose to unify it under British rule, the alternative would seem to be some form of federation. Technology, not for the first time, is the motive power in history.

federation, I have raised the issue of imperialism, which is not a project or a vision of a bright tomorrow but a grim and present reality. Is that not an issue in this war? In a sense it surely is. The fate of Africans and Asiatics will be harder and more hopeless if that empire wins which denies to "inferior" races, even of the favoured colour, an equality on the plane of right, and mocks at the idea of any right at all, unless it be that of the strong man armed.

The reader need expect from me no apology for the record of imperialism, whether British or French. The slums and the unfree plantations, the illiteracy and the shortened lives, the hookworm and malaria, the sense of impotence and frustration—all this is part of the sub-tropical scene today, even under these democracies. But it is also true that under the more civilized West imperialism is in retreat, and that the tendency is toward self-government, better education and hygiene, however slowly it moves against the impediments of property and indifference.

One at least of our major imperial problems we must contrive to solve before Mr. Churchill's Administration is much older. Few Englishmen realise how prominently India figures in the portrait that Europeans and Americans have drawn of us in their minds. The shadow John Bull casts is shaped like this peninsula. If one were to apply to the average man, whether in New York or Paris, in Berlin or Moscow, the familiar test that psychologists call "free association," the idea of England would suggest

this response: the Fleet, the Bank and India; some might add fogs. Little is known, either in America or on the Continent, about our African colonies, but India has been part of our legend since the close of the eighteenth century. The more liberal and intelligent strata of American opinion follow our Indian record closely and critically, and tend to accept the Congress view of our conduct. Mr. Gandhi is venerated in the United States and in Europe as no man on this earth has been venerated since Tolstoy died. The stain of Munich has now been obliterated; but the unsolved problem of India is still an influence in shaping the view Americans form of us. Stupidly, clumsily, as a matter of routine, Mr. Chamberlain's Government swept three hundred millions of Indians as belligerents into this war, without troubling to seek their consent. The arrogance of this action, all the worse because it sprang from habit, compelled Indians to remind us of their claim to be a nation, with a nation's right to self-determination. To dwell in detail on this controversy would involve too lengthy a digression. It must suffice to say that our too cautious promise of a constitution to be framed by Indians after the war, burdened as it was by qualifications that destroy our concessions, has done nothing to satisfy the Indian National Congress, which speaks for about 70 per cent of the Electorate. Indians hesitate to obstruct us in our conduct of this war, since a Nazi victory would wreck their hopes of freedom. But the Governments of eight of the eleven provinces resigned as a protest against our treatment of India as a passive pawn in the game of power-politics: in only one of them has it been possible

to form a coalition to carry on. As yet Congress has refrained from any form of mass revolt. Our reputation as liberators would suffer some damage, if events should compel us to demonstrate our zeal for democracy with the *lathis* of our police upon the persons of our Indian subjects. But the positive case for the prompt reconciliation of India should suffice. At a moment when the war threatens to spread to Eastern Asia the trust of this nation is more than ever worth winning. The effect would be felt far beyond the shores of this Peninsula: Americans and the European masses would see us in a wholly new context. On the day that we can bring Mr. Gandhi to the microphone to broadcast his faith in our intention to grant national self-government to India, we shall have won our title to liberate the Continent at our door.

In several ways the populations of backward States and dependent territories would gain by coming within a federation. In Hitler's empire, for example, the relationship between industrial Germany and agricultural Roumania, imperialistic in its nature, would never come under the scrutiny of public opinion or the review of an elected congress in which the weaker party could vote and speak. It would be settled by a Führer in Berlin who would dictate to a helpless king in Bucharest. Again, the propertied interests concerned, shall we say, with Jamaica or Nigeria, which wield considerable power in London, would be very much weaker at the federal centre.

Finally, if colonies, to use the phrase of the British

Labour party, were "pooled," there would vanish the whole conception of a national monopoly, which favours the traders and middle class of the imperial power, whose sons, as officers, officials, merchants or engineers, enjoy privileged careers at the expense of the native population. When the idea of ownership disappears, trusteeship may become something better than cant.

This imperialistic relationship is at bottom wider than most of us realize. It is not confined to the dealings of a Great Power with its conquered possessions overseas. It exists between the backward agricultural States of eastern Europe and the industrial centre and west. The Balkan peninsula is such a colonial region: tomorrow, if Hitler wins, it will be as much a German colony as ever Togoland was. In essence this imperialistic relationship may exist even within a democratic republic. The sharecroppers of the Southern States of America, the inhabitants of *Tobacco Road*, have suffered under it, for all that their skins are white and their origin English.

It is, in its roots, economic. It lies between the power of finance that rests on modern, large-scale industry and the impotence of the individualistic farmer, peasant or agricultural labourer. The former is capitalist, money-lender and banker. The latter is the helpless debtor. The former with his trusts and cartels can rationalize industry, reap wealth from scarcity, and maintain the price of his products relatively high in relation to the labour that enters into them. The latter combines with the utmost difficulty, and can rationalize his output and control the prices of his produce, if at all, only with state aid.

There results the painful disparity between the standards of life of the industrial peoples and the primary producers, which in vast regions of the earth is perennial tragedy. It condemns untold millions of Indians, Chinese and Africans to a sub-human existence. The rural labourer of Poland or Roumania stands only a few steps higher in the scale. To remove this disparity, to raise the standards of the primary producers to the level of the industrial populations, is perhaps the biggest and most urgent task that confronts mankind.

With continental unity, the possibility of a solution comes into sight. Much can be done for the backward within a federation which they cannot do for themselves. The useless burden of defence is lifted from their shoulders. The federation, drawing on the resources of its richer members, may furnish credit without usury, and make its grant towards education, hygiene and public works. It may organize the marketing of primary products on a disinterested, co-operative plan. It can foster industries in the backward area and turn the flow of credit and capital thither for social ends. Finally, more easily than any national State, it may collaborate with other great units to rationalize the output and regulate the world price of primary products.

There is, as yet, no solution here, but there is for the first time in world history the politico-economic framework within which a solution may be found. A democratic federation can do it. A Fascist empire would deliberately aggravate the evil.

This is a question not for the distant future but for tomorrow. It may offer us the key to the colossal problem, economic and social, that will confront us when Europe is liberated. With empty larders, the workers of Europe, English, French and German, will stand beside cold forges and silent guns, peering with terror into the future. The device that kept unemployment at bay, by setting them to make the tools for mutual murder, can busy them no longer. With peace we ought to be able to offer work. Above all, the German workers, if they have first seen the Nazi tyranny crashing on the battlefield, would turn against it in the workshop and behind the barricades the more readily, if we could offer them, not the democratic idea only, but freedom with work.

The future would smile for veterans and workers alike, if we could promise to all the belligerent peoples security and employment. Could we even now, in Washington and London, begin to work upon this problem? The ideal plan would turn our industries back from tanks to tractors, from machine guns to irrigation pumps, from bayonets to spades. But it must be carried out on a continental scale.

If it arranged to bestow the tractors, pumps and spades on the primary producers of Africa, Poland and India, we should have taken, by equipping them, a slight first step toward raising their level of life. We should at the same time have made from the wages of the industrial workers a market, to replace the armies, for the products of the peasants. We should also have eased our military and political problems. The Labour party has already drawn attention to this necessary provision for the future.

But how much to meet it could an exhausted England do alone?

There is a vista before our two democracies, American and British, of collaboration for great ends. Together we might give to the Western Hemisphere security, and to Europe peace, freedom and work. But these are ironical dreams if the despot can conquer this island and silence the last fortress of democracy in the Old World. If that should happen, there would face a United States, isolated between two aggressive empires, not peace but a protracted struggle to which there could be no clean and final decision. This menaced island is the indispensable outwork of her defences.

As much for Americans as for Europeans, the future turns on the answer that trans-Atlantic democracy will give to the plea for aid. England is grateful for arms, but as its own ranks grow thinner, it calls to American gallantry for an army of volunteers. Above all, it prays that it may hear from a free continent a declaration of war upon the principle both hate. Not with steel alone, nor yet with mechanical wings, can freedom be restored. She calls, as she has always called, to the right hands of brave men. Not till these fail her will she desert our kind.