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# THE MUGHUL INDIAN COURT AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

A close-range survey of facts and details drawn from original Persian and contemporary European sources

BY

### ABDUL AZIZ, Barrister-at-Law

In this Series the author has attempted a study of the Mughul court and the institutions connected with it, so as to obtain a tolerably clear picture of Mughul court life, and of the actual working in practice of the administrative system. In the opinion of the writer the spirit of this civilization can be better studied in the customs and manners of the people and in the systems and institutions in which they crystallized, than in the vicissitudes of kings and peoples which too often pass for "history." The real life of a people is their social, intellectual and economic life, and this can be better studied in their manners and morals, their etiquette and procedure, their art and letters, than in the sequence of political events.

An attempt has been made to visualize the milieu which served as the cradle of Mughul thought and culture.

Books and pictures, buildings and furniture, arms, jewels and dresses, thrones and carriages, vessels and utensils—all articles of daily and occasional use in fact are passed in review, so as to give us an idea of the people's thought and life, taste and judgement, ambitions and achievements, and of public industry and royal patronage. Stirring scenes of Mughul court life—durbars and celebrations, receptions and progresses—are reproduced before the reader, and the glory of the Mughul past lives again.

Such a study of concrete facts will help us better to test the foundations of the social and administrative system of the Mughuls than theorizings and learned discussions based on conjectures and unverifiable hypotheses. We can see here how intimately pursuit of beauty and daily life were woven together in the better Mughul days, and how apparently unconnected currents of historical knowledge underlie, explain, and lead up to, the art and life of this great people.

It is expected that this series of monographs, when completed, will furnish material for a true social and economic history of Mughul India—indeed for a somewhat comprehensive history of Mughul Indian civilization.

The work is meant both for the scholar and the general reader; and an effort has been made to keep the style simple, clear and non-technical throughout; although here and there the specialized character of the subject made it a difficult task.

The Series comprises the following volumes, which are independent of one another:

(1) THE MANŞABDĀRĪ SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY.

# (2) THE IMPERIAL TREASURY OF THE INDIAN MUGHULS.

Introductory: The Imperial Household.

TREASURIES.

PART I: Cash Treasury.—Sources of Revenue.—Land Revenue, etc.

PART II: Jewel Treasury.

Introduction: Precious stones in general: Superstitions.—Scientific characteristics of stones.—Abnormally large specimens.

CHAPTER I.-Jewellers' Weights.

CHAPTER II.—Gems and Gem-stones in Mughul History (General).

CHAPTER III.—Precious stones and pearls in Mughul History (Special):—Diamonds (The Koh-i-Nūr dispute. Other diamonds. Famous diamonds of the world).—Rubies.—Sapphires.—Emeralds.—Topaz.—Pearls.—Rockcrystal.

CHAPTER IV.—Notices of semi-precious stones and other substances:—Hyacinth.—Amethyst.—Agate.—Loadstone or Magnetite.—Coral.—Lapis lazuli.—Mother-of-pearl.—Chinese Porcelain (Chinaware in Mughul India).—Ivory (Elephant ivory. Ivory and ivory work in India. Walrus ivory or the "fish-teeth").—Rhinoceros-horn.—Tortoise-shell.—Bezoar-stone.—Porcupine stone.—Snake-stone.—Yadatāsh or Rain-stone.

CHAPTER V.—The actual contents of the Jewel Treasury from the invasion of Babur to that of Nadir Shah.

### (3) ARMS AND JEWELLERY.

PART I:—Arms: Swords and sabres.—Khānda (straight sword).—Dhūp (another straight sword).—Shield.—Jamdhar (broad dagger).—Khanjar (bent dagger).—Khapwa.—Bānk (bent knife).—Janbwa.—Kaṭār (long and narrow dagger).—Knife.—Spear.—Bows and arrows.—Mace.—Guptī (sword-stick).—Walking-stick.

PART II:—The Impertal Insignia: Chatr (umbrella).—Āftābgīr.—Kaukaba.—'Aļam.—Chatr-toq, Tuman-toq and Qutās-toq (yak-tail standards).—Jhandā.—Māhī-marātib (tish ensign) and <u>Sher-marātib</u> (lion ensign).—Drum.—'Aṣā or stick (as sign of office).—Pen, Ink-stand and Pen-case (as sign of office).

#### PART III: -- Ornaments:

Head-dress: Caps and crowns.—Sar-pech, sar-band and dastār-pech.—Aigrettes and plumes (jīgha, kalgī, turra).—Sihra (bridegroom's chaplet or diadem).

Necklaces and collars (tasbiḥ, mālā, hār, lari, 'iqd, urbasi, baddhi, dhukdhuki, gulū-āwez).

Ornaments for hands and arms: Bangles and bracelets (pahunchī, kara, dast-band).—Rings.—Bāzūband (armlet).

Miscellaneous: Watches. Muakā', etc.

## (4) HORSE AND ELEPHANT TRAPPINGS AND OTHER CONVEYANCES USED BY THE INDIAN MUGHULS.

CHAPTER 1.—Horse Furniture: Silver, gilded, golden, plain gold, enamelled, and jewelled.—Furnished horses

offered to emperors. Furnished horses bestowed by emperors (from Timur to Aurangzeb).—Pictures.

CHAPTER II.—Elephant Furniture:—

SECTION I: Descriptive and illustrative:—Howdah.—
'Amārī.—Megh-dambar.—Throne on an elephant.—Saddle.
—Jhūl.—Ankus.—Miscellaneous.

SECTION II: Presentations:—Elephant furniture (talā'ir, yarāq, sāz) explained. Elephants with brass, silver, and gold trappings bestowed by emperors. Furnished elephants presented to emperors (from Akbar to Aurangzeb).—Pictures.

CHAPTER III.—Camel Furniture: Kajāwa.—Muḥāfa.
—Saddle.

CHAPTER IV .-- Conveyances :-

SECTION I: Wheeled carriages:—Bullock-driven vehicles.—Horse-driven vehicles.—Bahal or Bahlī.—Rath.—The English coach, etc.—Pictures.

SECTION II: Litters and sedans:—Doli.—Nālki.—Pālki (palanquin). — Takht-i-rawān. — Sukh-pāl. — Sukh-āsan.—Chaudol.—Pictures.

SECTION III: Boats:—The Bajra (budgerow).—War boats, etc.—Pictures.

## (5) THRONES AND FURNITURE, VESSELS AND UTENSILS.

CHAPTER I. -Thrones and Seats.

CHAPTER II.—Furniture: Table.—Chairs and stools.—Cabinet. — Bed-stead. — Looking-glasses. — Braziers.—Statuary.

CHAPFER III.—Vessels and Utensils: Plates and dishes.—Cups and goblets.—Flasks, jars and jugs.—Trays and trenchers.—Rose-water bottle or fountain.—Scent-box

('iṭi-dān).—Kāfūr-dān.—Opium-box. — Betel-box. —Chaughara and do-ghara.—Spittoon.—Ewer and basin —Sifla-dān.

The following volumes are to follow at short intervals:—

- (6) THE IMPERIAL LIBRARY OF AGRA AND DELHI.
- (7) COURT AND CAMP (including the HARAM).
- (8) ROYAL STABLES AND MENAGERIE.

For Selected Opinions see end of book.

# The Mughul Court AND And Its Institutions

by
ABDUL AZIZ, BAR.-AT-LAW

### I—STUDY OF HISTORY

History, in many respects, presents the widest field for achievement open to an author. Its scope is co-extensive with life. It covers not only the whole field of action and of thought, but also takes account of the half-conscious and subconscious tendencies and beliefs, which often more effectively mould the destiny of a nation. The history of a nation is, or ought to be, a mirror in which is reflected its temper, its characteristics, its behaviour under various conditions and at crises, its ambitions and achievement, its intellectual and moral level, its contribution towards civilization and progress.

While the historian's ambition is the highest, his limitations are the severest, for neither the speculative flight of the philosopher nor the imaginative freedom of the creative artist is open to him. There is no star to which he can hitch his wagon.

No wonder, then, that of all departments of human knowledge and inquiry, history has perhaps been worst handled. Not that it has not obtained its proportionate share of the world's talent. Perhaps it has had more than its share. The historian's handicap lies rather in the fact that the personal equation plays a larger part in history than in any other field of research; so that twenty different writers may write about the same incontestable event, with an equal degree of merit or plausibility, and yet their interpretations of the event or their standpoints may differ radically. And, what is more, instead of this being considered as a defect, a 'history' is very often judged by the value of this personal element, whether you call it the author's perspective or his art.

The explanation lies in the fact that the writing of history is a composite process. History is, on the one hand, an even and colourless narrative of events, unrelieved by perspective or personal preference, dispassionate, impersonal, mechanical; and, on the other, it is an interpretation, rather than an account, of events, phenomena and movements, a study of their inner relations and significance, an analysis of problems, situations, motives, and causes. In a manner, the former is the science, and the latter the art, of history. Which of these two factors predominates in a certain treatment depends entirely on 'the historian's temperament, training or ways of thought. The historian's art lies obviously in the harmonious reconciliation of these somewhat contradictory elements. The facts should ever be the

groundwork, and the manipulation of them should be just and fair; yet the expression of the historian's personality, principles, and ideals should find scope in his way of dealing with the characters and problems that fall under his treatment. A healthy balance should be kept between these opposite tendencies. History should not degenerate into a jejune narrative of superficial events, stodgy with dates and names, conventional, journalistic; any more than it should become purely architectonic, or evaporate into a study in principles, a theory of life—an alembic of fancy, in fact!

About the 'theoretical' part of history writing we have not much to say. As our insight into life deepens, and our outlook on it extends, the historian will naturally find new and more effective ways of studying and presenting the past history of the human race. The scope for the historian's achievement and the future possibilities of treatment and research in this field are almost infinite. It is, therefore, not only impossible but also presumptuous to prescribe the lines on which future development can proceed.

We propose, however, to make a suggestion about the method of presenting facts. Everybody agrees that the necessary details should be dressed up in a presentable form. We all know how much a story often loses in the telling.

But there is something more. It is a matter of daily experience that nothing strikes us so much as a picture, a piece acted before us, a sound actually heard, whether produced or reproduced. The impression received is vivid, and the effort it costs is minimal. An ideal 'history,' therefore, is history not written or read, but seen or heard, or both seen and heard.

This will be readily understood when we note that it is the *mise en scène* which makes a picture convincing, the background that lends it the quality of reality, and makes the illusion complete. Much of what passes as history is a catalogue of events; we are often fed on formulæ without being told what they stand for. Who can hesitate when the choice lies between *words* and *things*?

We are reminded of one of the many forecasts of future marvels of science made by Mr. H. G. Wells (When the Sleeper Wakes, pp. 60-3), which describes an instrument reducing the history of the future to a mere stage-and-screen panorama. The idea may strike the serious scholar as wild and perhaps somewhat flippant, but the possibility of the historical past being stored for the happier generations of the future not in dry-as-dust books but in a contrivance in which are synthesized the phonograph, the cinema and the stage, certainly embodies a great ambition

of cultured humanity, somewhat fantastic, perhaps, at our present stage of evolution, but by no means beyond the pale of possibility. In any case the value of such a contrivance is incontestable as an ideal.

The day is yet distant when history will be reduced to picture-play, or become a magic mirror of the kind adumbrated above. Meanwhile we can think of as close an approximation to it as is vouchsafed to us.

Pictorial representation of the past, which is the best and the easiest way to teach and learn history, is at present possible only in a partial and fragmentary sort of way, e.g., in classical paintings of historical scenes, episodes or passages from history, more or less accurately adapted and mounted on the stage or displayed on the screen, etc. The value of the histrionic and the cinematographic art (at present the monopoly of the pleasure-seeker) for the teaching of history at school, is, in the opinion of the present writer, very high indeed. But until these are so thoroughly adapted to educational needs as to become the normal and universal method of teaching history to young and old, we can only treat it as an ambition.<sup>1</sup>

¹ Of late years educational films have made some headway, and educational cinematographic institutes are to be found in various centres in Europe. But historical films of the kind advocated here still remain a thing of the future.

But we can learn a lesson from these more or less utopian ideas. Where a whole history cannot be written in a series of tableaux, it is possible to attempt approaches to it.

### II—HISTORY OF MUGHUL INDIA

What we have said of history applies with special force to Mughul. Indian history (which constitutes the subject matter of our study), partly because this section of history has not yet been fully worked, and partly because social history of the period—which is real history—is yet a thing of the future.

The reigns of the Greater Mughuls is preeminently a period of material prosperity, flourishing art and letters, a high standard of life and manners, remarkable social and intellectual progress, of production in literature, and of creation in painting and architecture. It is an era the true significance of which is to be studied not in political events or social movements, but in the use the people made of their wealth, in the way they utilized their leisure, their habits and customs, their taste and judgement, their art and literature. It is an era the achievements of which should above all be visualized to be appraised. There was so much that appealed to the eye that when we miss the visual imagery we miss everything.

Fortunately, during recent years contemporary paintings have been reproduced and published on a large scale, so that it is possible to see things as they actually existed and to witness events as they occurred. These publications, which constitute a fairly comprehensive picture gallery of Mughul Indian art and life, combine intelligent description and appreciation of the paintings with excellent reproductions of pictures and sketches taken from albums and manuscripts of the period, now available in various collections in Asia and Europe. These pictures not only portray Mughul court life and historic scenes of peace and war, and social and domestic life of the people, but cover a wide range of special studies and miscellaneous subjects besides.

An example or two will convince the reader of the very high importance of the graphic art for the student of history.

Elephant fights were a favourite pastime at the Mughul court. One such fight which Shāh Jahān witnessed has since been enshrined in art and literature. The time was towards the end of 1042 A.H.

Prince Aurangzeb, who was attacked by one of the elephants, showed considerable bravery and presence of mind in attack and defence. The Emperor appreciated it and there was general applause

'The court poet, Sa'īdā of Gilān "Be-badal Khān," sang the praises of Aurangzeb's heroism in verse. which so pleased the Emperor that he was weighed in silver, thus receiving 5000 rupees.1 And he was not the only poet who celebrated the occasion in verse. Abū Ţālib Kalīm, another court poet, wrote a masnavi on the subject, which is still extant and has been published, with translation in English, by the late Maulavī Nūr Bakhsh in Journal of the Panjab Historical Society, II, i, pp. 63-72 ...... But what is still more interesting is the fact that painters have also tried their hand at portraying the incident, which seems to have stirred the imagination of the contemporary generation. Two pictures are extant: One, probably by a contemporary artist, is in Delhi Museum of Archæology, and is well reproduced in M. Nur Bakhsh's article mentioned above (facing p. 72). .....The second picture, also referred to in M. Nur Bakhsh's article, is to be found in the Punjab Museum, and has been published in L. E. A. (pl. XXXIV (c)).'2

Thus the reader sees the Muses of History, Poetry and Painting dancing together, as it were. One is reminded of *The Parnassus* by Andrea

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> B.N., I. i. 489-93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Quoted from the author's Horse and Elephant Furniture and other Conveyances (Chapter on Horse Furniture), to which place the reader is referred for a full account of this interesting incident.

Mantegna in the Louvre (Paris), where the Muses dance in a ring to the strains of Apollo's lyre, while Mercury leans on Pegasus to listen, and of a similar subject treated in a fine picture of the same name by Raphael Mengs in Villa Albani (Rome).

A petition made to the Emperor by a needy suitor has no interest for us: but when that suitor happens to be a well-known calligraphist and his petition is transcribed in his best style, it becomes a work of art: and when on the other side of the petition there is a carefully executed picture of high artistic value, the document has made out its title to a niche in the temple of fame, and the presentation of the petition, whatever its subject or result, becomes a landmark in the history of art. The above remarks apply to a petition presented by 'Abdu'r-Rashīd, the calligraphist, to Shāh Jahān. The reader will find the picture reproduced in L. E. A. (Pl. XXXVI (b). C. 161). The original is, I believe, in the Delhi Museum of Archæology, where the petition on the other side can also be seen.

We all know how much more a miniature illustration tells us about a thing or an event than a narrative or description. By way of example, the terrible customs of jauhar<sup>1</sup> and satī,<sup>2</sup> which are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Stchoukine, La Peinture Indienne à l'époque des grands Moghols, pl. zii

<sup>\*</sup> I regret I have lost the reference.

often coldly passed over in history, can be witnessed in pictures, and realized in all their raw horror.

Now we can enumerate the more important of the picture books which have appeared during recent years: F. R. Martin, Miniature Painting and Painters of Persia, India and Turkey, Loan Exhibition of Antiquities, Coronation Durbar, 1911, Binyon and Arnold Court Painters of the Grand Moguls, Kühnel, Miniaturmalerei im islamischen Orient, Brown, Indian Painting under the Mughals, Kühnel and Goetz, Indian Book Painting, Indische Miniaturen der islamischen Zeit (Vol. VI of Orbis Pictus: Weltkunstbücherei), Stchoukine, La Peinture Indienne and Les Miniatures Indiennes, Blochet, Musulman Painting, Goetz, Bilderatlas zur Kulturgeschichte Indiens, Arnold and Wilkinson, Library of A. Chester Beatty.

To this list are to be added the pictures exhibited in the various museums and picture galleries in India and abroad, and in exhibitions held in India from time to time on various occasions, and articles and pictures reproduced and described in various illustrated Art Journals, not to speak of those in untapped private collections and other miscellaneous sources.

The accessibility to the public of these new treasures of the art-world has not unnaturally raised the ambitions both of the historian and of the reader. Who is there who has not, sometimes, felt his veins

tingle at the sight of some noble Mughul edifice, or seen some dim visions of vanished glory rise before him on witnessing a choice work of art, be it a picture, an illuminated manuscript in brilliant gold and blue, some knick-knack of rare workmanship, of a mere decorative detail? Just because these are isolated bits—we might say, cut-glass facets—of a life that once was lived, it is not possible for us easily to reconstruct the milieu in which this art flourished. and with which it was organically connected. Only bits have survived—fossils now embedded in an alien matrix. It requires an effort to inspire these dead bones of history with life. For life atmosphere is essential, and the atmosphere for art can only be re-created by reproducing the social conditions which created it: human intercourse and the culture which inspired it, houses, furniture and decoration, costumes, drapery and ornament, which surrounded it, the whole pomp and pageantry of state so interpenetrated with artistic motifs, the very etiquette and solemnities of the royal court, where the moral and æsthetic ideals of the age coalesced.

The present Series is projected as an attempt to correct the perspective of historical studies, and to place in the forefront a whole class of facts and things which have been completely ignored by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For details of contents see Notice inside the cover of this volume.

writers on Mughul history. It is possible to construct a mental picture of the life that was lived in Mughul India, but every little detail will have to be worked in before we get anything like a true and convincing likeness.

Easily the most conspicuous object in the whole range of Mughul life is the Imperial Court. One would like to have as adequate a mental picture of it as the material at our disposal would allow. But a court is composed chiefly of courtiers; and if we know nothing definite about the courtiers the picture will resemble a Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. We should begin, therefore, with the umarā and the constitution of their order. Intimately connected with the manṣabdārī system is the Mughul army. The army and the system of its recruitment will, therefore, form the subject of the first volume in the Series.

The next item to engage our attention will be the articles and equipments and all the elaborate paraphernalia used at the Mughul court. These look simple and straightforward enough, but it will be impossible to understand them until we have some idea of the Imperial Household and its working. So our next task will be a study of the Imperial Household with a short account of its various departments. This can then be followed up with a

full description of each department, or  $k\bar{a}n \underline{k}h\bar{a}na$  as it was called. The Imperial Cash and Jewel Treasury, Arms, Insignia and Jewellery, Horse and Elephant Trappings and other Conveyances, Thrones, Furniture, Vessels and Utensils will successively come up for a detailed treatment, and will each have a monograph to itself.

These preparatory details being touched in, the canvas is ready for the centre-piece—the Imperial Durbar. The historiographers and the contemporary travellers have each his own story to tell of the gorgeous spectacle. With the help of their vivid accounts we can witness the Emperor in audience, public and private, watch the full-dress celebrations of feasts and festivals, and survey the Emperor in his daily routine of private life and official work.

Behind the Court was the Haram. The Seraglio was an important and extensive department with its strict rules and procedure, and a multiplicity of picturesque details. The Emperor and princes are seen in their harams in the midst of domestic relations—in a complete undress of private life.

The glare of history does not fall on the Haram, which naturally was a privileged place, with which no Persian historian has dared to tamper. There are, however, a few prying, audacious, gossiping travellers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Already published.

who have left accounts of the Imperial Seraglio, which we propose to share with our readers, offering here and there a word of caution where the authors appear to overstep the bounds of delicacy, or else misjudge what they observe.

But the Emperor was not always in the metropolis. When he was on tour, whether it was a campaign to the Deccan or a pleasure-trip to Kashmir, he was often for long periods out of station, owing partly to defective modes of communication and conveyance of the time and partly to the luxuriously leisurely pace at which the Royal Court moved. From Akbar's time on the Imperial Camp was a marvel of the age, a model of rigid discipline and neat orderliness.

In some respects even more impressive than either the Court or the Camp is the Emperor's Progress. Luckily we possess one or two eye-witness accounts of the Emperor's march from one camp to another. The royal lashkar on the move, with its elaborate appointments and a rigid order of precedence, gives a better idea of the magnitude and of the infinite resources of the empire than even the daily pomp and pageantry at Agra or Delhi.

To a reader who can make it convenient to visit the buildings and remains of buildings still standing at Agra and Fathpur-Sikri, Delhi, Lahore, and elsewhere, and who is sufficiently interested in the subject to study carefully the pictures of Mughul Court life now available in print—to such a reader, it is expected, the descriptive accounts by contemporary observers brought together in the volume on Mughul Court and Camp and the Haram will help to give a tolerable idea of the gilded scenes of Mughul pomp and circumstance.

It is proposed, if time and leisure permit, to follow up this treatise with elaborate accounts of such institutions as the Imperial Library (a unique phenomenon in the history of culture), the Royal Stables, the Zoo, and the Culinary Department; rounding off with short notices of Stuffs, Dresses and Costumes, Amusements (especially Hunting), Seals and Farmāns, the Postal Service, Dancing and Music, Perfumery, etc.

How much of this work will be actually accomplished will of course depend partly on the time and opportunity vouchsafed to the author and partly on the recognition and appreciation his work receives.

## THE MANSABDĀRĪ SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY

by

ABDUL AZIZ

Barrister-at-Law

PRICE Rs. 6

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LAHORE

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### **PREFACE**

SOME fifteen years ago I conceived the idea of writing a history of Shāh Jahān's reign on a somewhat extensive scale, feeling that that reign had been neglected by historians, or unfairly dealt with. When I came in contact with the original sources I found that there was a great deal more that the modern historians had neglected-something that was of fundamental importance. As I followed up the clue I was more and more convinced that the customs, practices and institutions, which constituted the framework of Mughul Court life, had been systematically ignored by modern writers, who impassively confined themselves to conventional methods. I felt that an understanding of the true spirit of the civilization was a more important task than writing a glowing account of the wealth and glory, pomp and pageantry of Shah Jahan's court, although the latter would certainly appeal to the easy-chair dilettante. The Mughul Indian empire was, in many respects, a unique phenomenon in the world's history; and we could do no justice to it by showing off its external splendour or recording its feats of arms, its victories and triumphs. We could better understand the zeitgeist by studying the elements of which the Mughul court life was composed.

Thus the scope of my treatment was widened, and Shāh Jahān's reign made room for an intensive study of the Mughul empire from Bābur to Aurangzeb. The plan of research which I now placed before me is set forth in the Introduction, which follows. The result was that my history of Shāh Jahān's reign, which had proceeded no further than his Coronation, had to be shelved as a matter of secondary importance.

The Mansabdārī System and the Mughul Army were the first to claim my attention. My articles on these subjects appeared in 1930,² followed by other articles on the Mughul Treasury,³ with which we are not here concerned. Since that date several writers have written on the Mansabdārī in various periodicals. All the extant literature on the subject, that has fallen under my notice, including an article or two that appeared before I wrote, are briefed on the next page.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In J. I. H., VII, 327-44.

In J. I. H., IX, pp. 132-72, 279-305.

<sup>\*</sup> Since published with corrections, amendments and additions under the title Imperial Treasury of the Indian Mughuls.

1.	Ram Präsad Tripathi	"The Army Organization of Akbar"	Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. V, Jan., 1923, pp. 56-66.
2.	Dashrath Sharma	"Akbar's Cavalry—(1) The Zat and Sawar Ranks."	J. I. H., V, 359-66.
3.	T. W. Haig	"Military Organization of the Mughal Empire."	Encyclopædia of Islam, III, 626-29.
4.	C. S. K. Rao Sahib	" A Note on the Mughal Military Terms Zat and Sawar."	J. I. H., XIV, 205-21.
5.	W. H. Moreland	"Rank (manṣab) in the Mogul State Service."	J. R. A. S. for October, 1936, pp. 641-65.
6.	C. S. K. Rao Sahib	" Some Notes on Mughal Mansabs."	J. I. H., XVI, 50-62.
7.	Sri Ram Sharma	"The Organization of Public Services in Mughal India (1526- 1707)."	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, XXIII, 1937, Part II.

Note.—Nos. 1 and 2 preceded the publication of my articles.

Among these the place of honour belongs to Moreland, whose thesis is, within its limits, the ablest exposition of the subject so far, and constitutes a distinct advance on all its predecessors. He has made an earnest effort to understand the constitution and significance of the manṣabdārī and its historical development. Besides offering an intelligent appreciation of known facts, he has brought to light certain data which illustrate the working of the system, confirming many of my conjectures and hypotheses, and making the whole system coherent and consistent.

Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib has also done useful spade work, specially in his later article, "Some Notes on Mughal Mansabs."

During the last fifteen years I have been raking historical records and documents for facts and figures bearing on this subject, and an enormous quantity of material has come together—a great deal more than I can ever hope to use. Further, I have come to think that a difficult and obscure subject like the Mansabdārī can best be studied against its historical background, and in the light of such analogous phenomena and illustrative details as are available. Again, although I have seen no reason to modify my views on the main points, I feel that my previous treatment was inadequate. The fresh material adduced by Moreland, with his opinions and interpretation, has to be considered, a great deal of new evidence has to be incorporated, and the whole field surveyed from a comprehensive standpoint. So, I think the time is ripe for a thorough overhauling of the whole question once more, leading to a much fuller treatment of the whole subject. As a result my previous articles have had to be completely remodelled, and in the main rewritten.

This accounts for the long interval of three years that has elapsed between the publication of my Imperial Treasury of the Indian Mughuls and this monograph.

I may say in conclusion that nothing like completeness or finality is claimed for the conclusions reached; since still there are many points which can only be cleared up as evidence grows and facts gather. But I have made an effort to bring together relevant facts, and have offered my opinions, of which the reader can judge for himself from the facts and the authorities cited.

In quotations I have preserved the original spellings of the authors quoted. The present writer's approval of such spellings is not necessarily implied. The reader will also please bear in mind that many of the authors quoted from use a different system of transliteration from that adopted in this book.

Price has had to be raised considerably owing to heavy cost of material and printing, and the difficulty in getting paper.

I acknowledge the appreciation implied in the selection of this work by the Punjab University as suitable for the M.A. Course in History (Mughul Period of Indian History).

Thanks are due to the Hon'ble. Sir Azizul Huque, Commerce Member, Government of India, for his kindly registering my name as a publisher and granting me adequate supply of paper for this and other books.

LAHORE December, 1945

ABDUL AZIZ

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			ran	k, Shah Jah	an, Au	rangzeb).—C	Condi-	
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### TRANSLITERATION

In writing Arabic, Persian, Urdū and Hindī words, I have followed the system adopted and recommended by the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, with a few necessary additions and modifications. The additional signs used by me are neither original nor arbitrary. They are in fact well-established, being sanctioned by general usage in standard works. The signs are as under:—

#### Consonants

	to be omitted at beginning of words; elsewhere it is	تھ	th
	hamza, and should be re-	ٿ	ţ
	presented by an apostrophe (1); as, (Aḥmad),	گھ	ţh
	فاثده (jur'at), جرأت	ث	ş
	(fā'ida).	ج	j
Ç	b ,	•	:L
به	bh	جه	jh
پ	·	7	ķ
V	p	•	<b>l</b> -h
پھ	ph	さ	711
ت	t	ა	d

# Diacritical Marks and Vowels

— a
— i
— u

Long 
$$\begin{cases} 1-\frac{1}{a} & \frac{1}{a} \\ \frac{1}{a} & \frac{1}{a} \\ \frac{1}{a} & \frac{1}{a} \end{cases}$$
 e (as in پیش  $\frac{1}{a}$  pesh).

á (as in مرتفی Murtazá, اعلی Diphthongs

## Diphthongs

The silent, after ; is represented by w thus: خوش (khwush) خوث (khwab), خوش (khwud).

The imperceptible 8 at the end of some Persian words is not transliterated; thus is banda, not bandah; خانع is khāna, not khānah. When pronounced, it is written; as, dis (gunāh).

Geographical names, both Oriental and European, have been written in the form used in well-known Maps and Atlases; and in case of Indian place-names I have adopted more particularly the spelling in the Imperial Gazetteer of India, 26 Vols. (Oxford, 1907-09).

#### **ABBREVIATIONS**

- Ā'īn.—Abū'l-Fazl, Ā'īn-i-Akbarī (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 2 Vols.
- Ā'īn, tr.—English translation of above in 3 Vols.

  (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta). Vol.

  I by H. Blochmann and D. C. Phillott,
  Vols. II and III by H. S. Jarrett.
- Al. N.—Muhammad Kāzim bin Muhammad Amīn Munshī, 'Ālamgīr Nāma (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- A. N.—Abū'l-Fazl, Akbar Nāma (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- A. N., tr.—English translation of above by H. Beveridge (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- A. S.—Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Kambo, 'Amal-i-Ṣāliḥ or Shāh Jahān Nāma (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- Bernier.—François Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire A.D. 1656-1668; tr. Archibald Constable and Vincent A. Smith. Oxford University Press, 1916.
- B.M. MS.—British Museum Manuscript.

- B. N.—Bādshāh Nāma, Vols. I (i & ii) and II by Mulla 'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd Lāhorī (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta); and Vol. III (MS.) by Muḥammad Wāris.
- B. N. E.—The Bābur-Nāma in English (Memoirs of Bābur) by Zahīru'd-Dīn Muḥammad Bābur Pādshāh Ghāzī, tr. Annette Susannah Beveridge. London, 1921.
- Budāyūnī.—'Abdu'l-Qādir bin Mulūk <u>Sh</u>āh Budāyūnī, Munta<u>kh</u>abu't-Tawārī<u>kh</u> (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- Budāyūnī, tr.—English translation of above by G. S. A. Ranking (Vol. I), W. H. Lowe (Vol. II), and T. W. Haig (Vol. III) (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- De Laët.—The Empire of the Great Mogol. A translation of De Laët's "Description of India and Fragment of Indian History" by J. S. Hoyland, annotated by S. N. Banerjee. Bombay, 1928.
- E. & D.—Sir H. M. Elliot and Prof. John Dowson, History of India as told by its own Historians, 8 Vols. 1867-77.
- Horn.—Paul Horn, Das Heer und Kriegswesen der gross Moghuls. Leiden, 1894.

- Irvine, Army.—William Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration. London, 1903.
- J. A. S. B.—Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
- J. I. H.-Journal of Indian History, Madras.
- J. R. A. S.—Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
- L. E. A.—Loan Exhibition of Antiquities. Delhi, 1911.
- M. A.—Muḥammad Sāqī Musta'idd Khān, Ma'āşiri-'Ālamgīrī; ed. Aḥmad 'Alī (Bibliotheca
  Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Mandelslo.—The Voyages and Travels of J. Albert de Mandelslo into the East Indies. Rendered into English by John Davies of Kidwelly. Second edition. London, 1669.
- Marco Polo.—The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian; tr. and ed. Colonel Sir Henry Yule, 2 Vols. Third edition, revised by Henri Cordier. London, 1921.
- M. L.—Muḥammad Hāshim Khān, "Khāfī Khān", Muntakhabu'l-Lubāb (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta), 3 Vols.
- Monserrate's Commentary.—The Commentary of Father Monserrate, S. J., On his Journey to the Court of Akbar, tr. J. S. Hoyland,

- annot. S. N. Banerjee. Oxford University Press, 1922.
- M. U.—Nawwāb "Ṣamṣāmu'd-Daula" <u>Sh</u>āh Nawāz <u>Kh</u>ān, Ma'āṣiru'l-Umarā, 3 Vols. (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Mulakhkhas.—Muḥammad Tāhir, "Āshnā", "'Ināyat Khān", Mulakhkhas (A history of the first thirty years of Shāh Jahān's reign, condensed from Bādshāh Nāma). MS.
- Peter Mundy.—The Travels of Peter Mundy, in Europe and Asia, 1608-1667, ed. Lt.-Col. Sir Richard Carnac Temple (Issued by the Hakluyt Society). 1914. Vol. II: Travels in Asia, 1628-1634.
- Platts.—John T. Platts, A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi, and English. London, 1911.
- P. U. L.—Punjab University Library, Lahore.
- Purchas.—Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, by Samuel Purchas, 20 Vols. Glasgow, 1905.
- Roe.—The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India 1615-19; ed. Sir William Foster. London, 1926.
- R. Y.—Regnal Year.
- Steingass.—F. Steingass, A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary. London, 1930.
- Storia.—Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor, or

- Mogul India (1653-1708), tr. William Irvine, 4 Vols. London, 1907-08.
- Tabaqāt.—The Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī of Khwājah Nizāmuddīn Aḥmad, ed. B. De and M. Hidayat Hosain (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Tabaqāt, tr.—English translation of above by B. De (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta).
- Timūr's Institutes.—Institutes Political and Military, written originally in the Mogul language, by the Great Timour, improperly called Tamerlane; tr. Major Davy; pub. Joseph White. Oxford, 1783.
- Tuzuk.—Toozuk-i-Jehangeeree, ed. Syud Ahmud, Aligarh, 1864.
- Tuzuk (R. & B.).—English translation of above by Alexander Rogers and Henry Beveridge, 2 Vols. London, 1909 and 1914.
- Zafar Nāma.—Sharafu'd-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī, Zafar Nāma; ed. M. Ilāhdād (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta). 2 Vols.
- NOTE: (1)—4,000/3,000, etc.—The mansab or rank of 4,000, etc., personal and 3,000, etc., horse.
  - (2)—Titles are always given within double inverted commas, except when a man's title is better known than his name, in which case his title is freely used as a name.

#### CHRONOLOGY

In the reigns of Bābur and Humāyūn Islamic or *Hijrī* dates were observed, and no other calendar was recognized. This era may therefore be taken up first:

#### The Muslim Era

The Muslim or the  $Hijr\bar{\imath}$  era began on July 16, 622 A.C. The year, which is lunar, consists of the following twelve months, and comprises 354 days (or, in a leap year, 355 days, with 30 days to  $Z\bar{\imath}u'l-hijj$ ).

			Days
Muḥarram	••••	****	30
Şafar	••••	***	29
Rabī' I	••••	••••	30
Rabī' II	••••	••••	29
Jumādá I	••••	••••	30
Jumādá II	••••	••••	<del>2</del> 9
.Rajab	****	••••	30
<u>Sh</u> aʻbān	••••	••••	29
Ramazān	****	****	30·
<u>Sh</u> awwāl	****	****	29

		Days			
$oldsymbol{Z}ar{u}$ 'l-qa'd	****	****	30		
Zū'l-ḥijj	••••	••••	29 (or 30 in		
			leap year).		

It must be remembered, however, that the rule according to which the months have alternately 30 or 29 days, is true only approximately and in long calculations. Variation in latitude and longitude sometimes makes a difference in the number of days in a month, so that a month may begin a day earlier in one place than in another. The actual appearance of the moon plays an important part in the determination of Muslim dates. We often have two consecutive months of 30 or of 29 days in practice. Thus is explained much of the prevailing confusion about *Hijrī* dates.

It must also be noted that the day, according to the Muslim calendar, consists of the period from sunset to sunset (and neither from sunrise to sunrise, which is the Hindu practice, nor from midnight to midnight, which is the modern European method of calculation); so that 'Friday evening' or 'Friday night' in the mouth of a Muslim historian means the evening or night occurring between Thursday and Friday, and not the one between Friday and Saturday.

### Akbar's Ilāhī or Divine Era

In XXIX R. Y., Akbar introduced, with slight modifications, the Persian calendar, which was based on solar calculation, and called it  $Il\bar{a}h\bar{\imath}$  or Divine era. The order had retrospective effect, so that the era began with the year of his accession, 963 A.H. (=1556 A.C.). The Persian names of the months were retained, and the number of days in a month varied from 29 to 32:—

Farwardīn	(Māh-i-Ilāhī)	Mihr	(Māh-i-Ilāhī)
Urdībihi <u>sh</u> t	Ditto	$ar{A}bar{a}n$	Ditto
<u>Kh</u> urdād	Ditto	$ar{m{A}}$ zar	Ditto
$T\bar{\imath}r$	Ditto	Dai	Ditto
$\pmb{A}$ murd $ar{a}$ d	Ditto	Bahman	Ditto
<u>Sh</u> ahrīwar	Ditto	Isfandārmu	g Ditto

In the reign of Jahāngīr the *Ilāhī* calendar was followed, though *Hijrī* dates are often met with in the histories.

When <u>Shāh</u> Jahān came to the throne, he felt that the *Hijrī* dates had been sadly neglectéd by his predecessors, and consequently reinstated them in the official histories and in court life. Persian parallel dates are, however, occasionally mentioned by <u>Shāh</u> Jahān's historians. The *Nauroz* and the '*Id-i-Gulābī* (13 *Tīr*) as well as the Solar Weighments, which

<sup>1</sup> See below.

were calculated by the solar calendar, continued to be regularly celebrated.

In Aurangzeb's time a further change was made in the same direction; viz., even the Nauroz, a relic of the Persian calendar, was discarded, and only Hijrī dates and festivals were observed. Solar Weighments, however, were still kept, and occasionally we hear of Id-i-Gulābī (13 Tīr).

## Regnal Years

From Akbar's time on it was customary with Mughul historians to record events under regnal years, the first regnal year (I R. Y.) beginning theoretically on the Coronation day, but practically on a near date arbitrarily fixed to suit certain adjustments. When so adjusted, it was rigidly adhered to.

Akbar was enthroned on Friday, 2 Rabī II, 963 A.H. (=14 February, 1556), but his first regnal year (and consequently the Ilāhī era) began on 11 March, 1556—that being the next Nauroz—i.e., 25 days later. Jahāngīr followed the same practice and shifted the anniversary of his coronation from October 24 to March 10-12, to make it synchronize with Nauroz. The New Year Festival (1 Farwar-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See below.

<sup>\*</sup> Al. N., 404; M. A., 50,

din), to which the coronation anniversary was linked, corresponded in reality to the vernal equinox, and ought to have occurred every year on 11th March (Old Style) or 21st March (New Style). In actual practice we find that in the reigns of Akbar, Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān it fell on a date between 9th and 12th March (Old Style) or 19th and 22nd March (New Style).

Shāh Jahān's coronation took place on 8 Jumādá II, 1037. As he calculated his regnal years by the lunar calendar, 1 Jumādá II was fixed upon as the Coronation day; and the Nauroz, now automatically uncoupled from it, was independently celebrated every year.

Aurangzeb was crowned on 24 Ramazān, 1069 (second coronation), but he shifted his coronation anniversary a few days forward to make it coincide with the 'Id festival (1 Shawwāl), and to save the festivities from the fasts.

The reader should note that in 1582 the New or Gregorian Calendar was introduced in the Roman Catholic countries in Europe, and the dates were advanced by ten days; though England kept to the Old or Julian Calendar till 1752. R. & B., instead of consistently following either the Old or the New Style in their parallel Christian dates, get mixed up between the two systems and use the old dates for R. Y.'s I, II and XIII-XIX, and new dates for R. Y.'s III-XII—which is not defensible on any ground.

## Birthdays

The Mughul emperors celebrated their birth-days, both solar and lunar, by a great festival, the main feature of which was the weighment of the King's person against gold, silver and other commodities. These festivals are spoken of in these monographs as those of Solar or Lunar Weighment. Considerable latitude was observed in fixing the dates of these celebrations every year.

#### CHAPTER I

# THE MANSABDARI SYSTEM OR THE 'MILITARY ARISTOCRACY'

THE institution of the Army and the Manṣabdārī System interpenetrate each other, so that the one is unintelligible without the other. These two, again, have a far-reaching effect on the texture of Mughul Indian society, since the only aristocracy in the land was the military peerage graded according to the manṣab, and more than half the population in a court town or a camp was composed of soldiers, their dependants, and the camp-followers—i.e., the 'army'. This will go to show the great importance of the army from the political as well as the social standpoint.

Again, it is an important feature of the Mughul administration that all civil officers, high and low, were chosen from the holders of the military rank, i.e., the manṣabdārs. So we find that the manṣabdārī system is the army, the peerage and the civil administration all rolled into one. The manṣab, although primarily a military rank, really constituted the terms in which official hierarchy, and incident-

ally social status, was expressed. A manṣab did not by itself imply any particular office. Sometimes the conferment of a manṣab was equivalent to mere grant of a source of income to a person by way of recognition, it may be, of purely professional services or skill (as those of a physician or a poet).

In a sense the history of the Mughul army is the history of the mansabdārī system; and yet the latter system covers a much wider field than the army, while some portions of the army were not under mansabdārs.

Before we deal, therefore, with the composition of the army, it is necessary to form a tolerably clear idea of the graduated organization, at once military, official and aristocratic, known as the manṣabdārī system, and its incidents and implications.

The mansab is a somewhat unique institution. The idea conveyed by a mansab in Mughul times was a complex one. Generally, it defined the recipient's order of precedence, or position in society or public service—rank, in a general sense.

What adds to the difficulty is the fact that the manṣabdārī is not a stationary phenomenon, but a living growth; so that we have to study it in the course of its development, and explain its main features at each stage from Babur's reign to the end of Aurangzeb's.

In its most highly developed form—for instance, in the reign of Shah Jahan-a full mansab is expressed thus: Chahār hazārī gāt wa si hazār suwār, or more briefly, Chahār hazārī si hazār suwār, which means 4000 personal and 3000 horse rank. We will denote it thus: 4000/3000. Or, if the gat and suwar ranks were equal: (1) Chahār hazārī zāt wa chahār hazār suwār, (2) Chahār hazārī zāt wa suwār, or (3) Chahār hazārī chahār hazār suwār; i.e., 4000 personal and 4000 horse, or 4000/4000 according to our notation.

A few peculiarities may be noticed first: (1) The gāt, i.e., personal rank is always either equal to, or higher than, the suwar, i.e., horse, rank.1 (2) The order in the lists and consequently the order of precedence follows the zāt and not the suwār rank; the former being presumably more important, so that 4000/2000 was considered higher than 3000/3000.

- (1) Hasan Qilîj 300/500 (A.N., III, 826).
- (2) 'Alī Muhammad 300/400 (Tūzuk, 159; R. & B., I, 325),
- (3) Yusuf Khan 1,000/1,500 (Tuzuk, 185; R. & B., I, 375).
- (4) Sayyid Sulaiman 600/900 (B.N., II, 746).
- 5) Khan Firoz Jang 7,000/10,000 (M.A., 481).
- I have no doubt they are all errors of transcription.

In case of a du aspa si aspa rank (see below) the suwar rank is in fact doubled, and would thus sometimes exceed the Edt rank. See Mir'ātu'l-Istilāh by Rāi Anand Rām "Mukhlis" (P. U. L. MS.), f. 15a-b.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In the whole range of Mughul history I have found only five instances where the suwar rank exceeds the Edt rank. They are as follows:

Further, in some lists, such as  $Ab\bar{u}$ 'l-Fazl's in  $\bar{A}$ 'in, only the  $\underline{z}\bar{a}t$  rank is given. (3) There may be a  $\underline{z}\bar{a}t$  rank without any  $suw\bar{a}r$  rank, though it is rare; but there never is a  $suw\bar{a}r$  rank without a  $\underline{z}\bar{a}t$  rank.

Now, what exactly is meant by 4000 personal and 3000 horse rank?

I have no doubt the contemporary historians understood the theory and practice of the mansabdari system: but, much to our regret, none of them-not even Abu'l-Fazl-has cared to explain it fully. What they saw before them in actual practice seemed so obvious to them that they took the knowledge of the principles for granted, and contented themselves with a statistical account of the details. The contemporary European travellers—at least one of whom was a mansabdar himself—have not paid sufficient attention to the subject either, and some, like Manucci, only succeed in making it obscurer. Among modern writers, Blochmann (Ain, tr., I, 249-59) was the first to attempt a working solution of the system. Later William Irvine (Armv) and Dr. Paul Horn (Das Heer und Kriegswesen der gross Moghuls, Leiden, 1894) made a special study of the Mughul army. Since I wrote my original articles on the Mansabdari System and the Mughul Army in 1930, several writers have written on the

subject. Some progress has no doubt been made, but much of the ravelled skein still subsists, and the thread is far from running clear. Obscurities and difficulties remain, which require patient labour to dissolve them.

Let us take the question in its simplest form. Take 500/0, i.e., 500 zāt with no horse rank -there are only two such examples in the list of mansabdars at the end of B.N., I (which includes rank-holders down to 500  $z\bar{a}t$ ). We ask the natural question, what is the individual or the article for which the number 500 stands? It does not stand for rupees, as Manucci assumes (Storia, II, 369-74). Does it stand for horsemen, as Irvine, the editor, says, correcting him (ibid., 369, f. n. 1)?

We may begin with a rapid survey of the results obtained by previous writers. Dr. Paul Horn, presumably misled by Blochmann (who, in the list on pp. 257-58, translates dah hazārī, etc. as the 'commander' of 10,000, etc.) assumes throughout his discussion (pp. 11-21) that the gat rank, which alone is given in Abu'l-Fazl's list, is not only the same as suwar rank but represents the number of horsemen actually entertained by the officer. This misapprehension, at once so obvious and so fundamental, not only vitiates Dr. Horn's whole account

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Preface.

of the manṣabdārī system (pp. 11-21), but also renders totally invalid all the calculations by which he tries to square the rank of an officer with the unit or units found under his command in a battle-field (pp. 67-8).

Irvine corrects Blochmann's error and makes it sufficiently clear in his list on p. 8, and again on the following page, that the rank mentioned is the sāt and not the suwār rank; but goes on to say that from the cash salary of his sāt rank 'the officer had to maintain his transport, his household, and some horsemen' (italics ours). Hence Irvine, on p. 5, speaks of the suwār rank as 'a number of extra horsemen'—a phrase repeated by other writers like V. A. Smith (Akbar, p. 364).

Irvine takes no definite position, but wavers between the various hypotheses. Fairness requires that he should be quoted in extenso:

'Indeed, if the totals of all the personal (\$\overline{a}t\$) mansabs in existence at one time were added together, we should arrive at so huge an army that it would have been impossible for the country, however heavily taxed, to meet such an expense......... The inference I wish to draw is, that from the grant of rank it does not follow that the soldiers implied by such rank were really added to the army. The system required that a man's rank

should be stated in terms of so many soldiers; but there is abundant testimony in the later historians that mansab and the number of men in the ranks of the army had ceased to have any close correspondence.

Thus it seems to me a hopeless task to attempt, as Dr. Horn does, p. 39, following Blochmann  $(\bar{A}'in, I, 244-47)$ , to build up the total strength of the army from the figures giving the personal (sat) rank of the officers (mansabdars)...... If we reckoned the number of men in the suwar rank, for whom allowances at so much per man were given by the State to the mansabdar, we might obtain a safer estimate of the probable strength of the army.'1

Irvine is unable to tell us what the zāt rank really is, and what was its raison d'être. But we must remember that he was a pioneer in the field.

Another author, Hermann Goetz, just touches upon this subject in his Epochen der indischen Kultur. Nearly all the available space in his account is taken up by an unconscionably long excerpt from Bernier, for which one could have gone to Bernier himself. All that he himself has to say on this difficult and intricate subject is the following:

'Der Feudalismus weicht dem Beamtenwesen, freilich in einer eigenartigen Prägung. Die feudale

Militärverfassung bleibt als äusserer Rahmen bestehen, aber sie wird ihres Wesens entkleidet dadurch, dass Truppenstellung und Lehen ihr entzogen werden. Die bisherige Gruppierung nach der Truppenmacht der einzelnen Grossen wird zu einer leeren Rangordnung, weiterhin zu einer Gehaltsordnung und erst an letzter Stelle einer militärischen. Dass also z. B. die Stellung eines Offiziers über tausend Mann (Hazārī) nur den Rang bei Hof bezeichnet: dieser Offizier bekommt jedoch einen Gehalt, der für die Stellung von vielleicht 600 Mann berechnet ist, und de facto ist er vielleicht zur Stellung von 300 Mann wirklich verpflichtet. Ein Zivilbeamter hat dann eben auch einen solchen Hofrang und eine solche Gehaltsklasse, seine militärische Stellungspflicht sind dann daher 0 Mann. Zum anderen aber wird diesen Offizieren und Beamten die direkte Verwaltung ihrer Lehen (Dschagir) entzogen, die ihnen zwar als Bezahlung zugewiesen werden, von denen sie aber nur die Einkünfte von der Finanzverwaltung überwiesen erhalten."

In a book of such an imposing size, by an author of Goetz's position, written so late as 1929, the cursory treatment accorded to the subject is disappointing in the extreme. Apparently the author

Hermann Goetz, Epochen der indischen Kultur, Leipzig, 1927, p. 467.

has not considered the matter worth a serious inquiry. Nor does he show any acquaintance with the original authorities.

Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib, writing as late as 1935, makes the suggestion that the  $\underline{sat}$  rank represents infantry, and the  $suw\overline{a}r$  rank cavalry, to be maintained by the  $man\underline{s}abd\overline{a}r$ ! This suggestion can best be taken up when we have traced the development of the  $man\underline{s}abd\overline{a}r\overline{i}$  system, and cleared the ground for a reasonable understanding.

It must be conceded that the Persian historians' loose and inexact way of speaking is partly responsible for the confusion that prevails. For instance, while the  $\bar{A}$ 'in list of manṣabdāri purports to give the zāt rank only,2 the Tabaqāt list, which is very nearly a reproduction of it, gives mostly zāt ranks, but describes, as if inadvertently, some of the ranks as suwār.

Again, Budāyūnī speaks of aimadārs, i.e. holders of subsistence allowances, as hazārīs, pān-ṣadīs and ṣadīs.<sup>4</sup> These look like holders of the ranks of 1000, 500 and 100 respectively; but they are nothing of the sort. They mean only holders of 1000, 500 or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> J. I. H., XIV, 219-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> The reason of this will be apparent later on.

<sup>\*</sup> For a fuller notice of it see below.

<sup>4</sup> Budayuni, II, 274.

100 bighas of land respectively. Budāyūnī himself held 1000 bighas of land, and calls himself humorously a hazārī. But the only rank he ever held was of 20.

In any case, Messrs. Blochmann, Irvine and Horn having failed us, we can only fall back on the  $\bar{A}'in$ . From the  $\bar{A}$ 'in-i-mansabdar (Text, I, 179; Blochmann. 248) we know that a holder of the rank 500/0 belongs to the third class. And on reference to the list in A'in (Text, I, 180-85; Blochmann, 257-58),3 we find that such a rank-holder drew Rs. 2.100 p.m. as his cash salary and had to maintain horses, elephants, beasts of burden and carts belonging to the emperor detailed there. It should be carefully noted that this list in A'in gives only the  $z\bar{a}t$  ranks, and has nothing to do with the suwār rank. Blochmann has, by an unlucky oversight, translated dah hazārī, etc., as the 'commander of 10,000', etc. It is only an oversight, since Blochmann, we know, fully understands the distinction between the sat and suwar rank (see pp. 251 and 596). But the slip has proved rather serious, since it has misled later writers on the subject.

It follows from the above that an officer with-

<sup>1</sup> Lowe translates this passage as if these meant lands yielding income worth 1000, 500 or 100 rupees respectively. But that is not correct.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Budāyūnī, II, 342.

<sup>3</sup> Given below.

out a suwar rank would be under no obligation to maintain any horsemen. Again, it is not quite correct to describe the gat rank as a brevet rank, as Blochmann does (p. 258); since the former, although it carries no command with it, carries a fixed salary. while the brevet rank usually carries neither.

After a careful perusal of the list, however, we are not in a position to say what substantive the cardinals numeral 500, e.g., qualifies. All we know is that a man holding the zāt rank of 500 with no suwār rank draws a certain salary and has to maintain some animals and a certain amount of transport. The figure 500 is, therefore, no better than a formula, by which the salary and the obligations of the mansabdar could be definitely ascertained from the schedule.

The mansab is called zat, i.e., self, because it regulates the allowance for himself (and his household) as distinguished from that for the cavalry enlisted by him.

A zāt rank without any suwār was, however, as we have said above, exceedingly rare. Usually an officer with a personal rank had also a horse rank, equal or smaller. This brings us to the earlier question, what is meant by 4000/3000?

We know now what 4000 sat stands for. The question remains, what are we to understand by 3000 horse? Well, it means that the mansabdar with 3000 horse rank had to maintain a number of horsemen, either 3000, or a fixed proportion of it. proportion possibly varied from period to period and from occasion to occasion. In Shah Jahan's time, for instance, the usual practice was that where a mansabdar held jagir in the province in which he served he had to present for the  $d\bar{a}gh$  horsemen equivalent in number to one-third of his horse rank; e.g., an officer with the rank 3000/3000 had in such a case to brand 1000 horse. If, however, he was told off to serve in a province of the Empire other than that in which his jagir was situated, he had to present only one-fourth of his horse rank; so that a 4000/ 4000 officer branded in this case only 1000 horse. At the time of the despatch of an expedition to Balkh and Badakhshān (Rabī' II, 1056 A.H.), in view of the difficulties and of the distance of the seat of operations, a further concession was made. and it was decided that during that campaign officers need only brand one-fifth: an amir with 5000/5000 branded on that occasion only 1000 horse (B.N., II. 506).

#### SECT. I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

We have yet a great deal more to say both about the <u>sat</u> and the <u>suwar</u> rank, but before we enter into the details, we must try to understand the prin-

ciples underlying the system. In order to understand the mansabdari properly, we must study it in its historical perspective. The Mughul institutions, we must remember, had their roots deep in the customs and practices of the Mongols of Central Asia. We must go back not only to Timur, from whom the Indian Mughuls traced their descent, but as far back as Chingiz Khān, whose tūra was always considered the great norm or standard throughout' Mughul history. Facts and details, otherwise obscure, will become clear in the light of their historical antecedents, and much of the terminology used in the period will find its natural explanation in the language used by the historians of Chingiz Khan or Oublā-i-Oā'ān.

Moreland goes as far as to assert that 'Bābur brought the Timurid system to northern India.'1 We are not prepared to subscribe to this proposition, because we know that the mansabdari system was, to all appearance, of long standing in India in Sher Shāh's time,<sup>2</sup> and Budāyūnī tells us that the branding rule was as old as the reign of 'Ala'u'd-Din Khalii.8

<sup>1</sup> Article, "Rank (mansab) in the Mogul State Service" in J. R. A. S. for October, 1936, p. 649. See Sect. II below.

Budayuni, II, 190. According to Mr. Haig the dagh o mahalli originated with the Saljuks in Transoxiana and Persia (Article in Encyclopendia of Islam. III. 627 (2)); but the following instance belongs to the Ghaznavi period, and so is earlier: From the Persian poet, Farrukhi, we

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Besides Bābur had no time to study or reform the system of military organization, nor do we hear anything of it in his *Memoirs*. So we cannot say that Bābur brought itin to India. The true explanation is that the stream of Mongol inroads into Western India, which lasted from 1221 to 1327, and the slow infiltration consequent upon it, familiarized the people with the Mongol principles of recruitment and organization, and led to their gradual assimilation and final adoption. It probably received formal recognition as early as the reign of 'Alā'u'd-Dīn Khaljī (1296-1316).

The idea of a military aristocracy, which is the distinguishing feature of the Indian Manṣabdārī, is to be found in the constitution of Chingīz Khān's army. Prof. B. Ya. Vladimirtsov says in his excellent monograph, Life of Chingis-Khan: Chingīz Khān founded 'the constitution of his Empire on a strictly aristocratic basis.......In the same way as an aristocratic family or clan is the head of a tribe, so, in the system of Chingis, the "golden clan" (altan uruk),

have a qaşida on branding of the colts, written on the occasion of one of the great branding functions annually held by Amīr Abū'l-Muzaffar Chighānī at or near Chighānīan (in Transoxiana). He was said to possess 18,000 brood-mares. [Chahār Maqāla of Nizāmī (ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad, pub. Luzac & Co., London, 1910), pp. 36-37. Browne's translation (J.R.A.S. for 1899, p. 766) is defective; and I have preferred the variant (said to said to gives better sense.] This shows that branding on a very large scale was customary in Transoxiana in X-XI centuries A.C.

with its vassals and followers, is the head of all the Mongol tribes, of all the "generations living in felt tents," of all peoples, of all the world. At the head of the imperial clan is the Emperor who is the head of his own clan, and of the aristocracy that has joined him, much rather than the head of the people. or of the nation. Chingis-Khan never conceived of himself as a popular leader He was and remained the leader of an aristocratic clan, that had unified all the Mongol aristocracy. His messages, speeches, decrees and statutes are never addressed to the people, but always to the princes, novans and bagaturs' (pp. 65-66).

The simple arrangement is that a chieftain of a tribe offers the services of his men, becomes an officer in the army, and in case of victory shares the spoils.

We possess no details for this period, but at the time of the entry, there must have been a march-past, when men, mounts and equipments were examined, and if found satisfactory admitted into the army.

Sir H. H. Howorth tells us in his History of the Mongols that the Mongol 'army was composed of nomades who constantly led the lives of soldiers, carrying their hearths about with them; they could live anywhere where their horses and cattle could find pasture. To this was superadded

the discipline enforced by Jingis. Each tribe was divided into sections of ten men, each section with its commander, nine chiefs of ten men chose the tenth as a centurion, who had, besides his own command of ten, supervision of the hundred; nine centurions similarly chose a battalion commandant, and ten of these latter a divisional commander, who led a body of 10,000 men, in Mongol phrase a tuman. No man could change his section or company or regiment, and the most implicit obedience to orders was insisted upon from all, and at the command of the Khan, the most potent general at once submitted to the bastinado or to execution. This implicit obedience was the secret of many of their successes, as it was in those of Rome and in our day those of Prussia. ...... If a commander of ten was unfit for his post, Jingis removed him and put another in his place, and so through the higher ranks, and he exhorted his chief commanders to come to him once a vear to receive instruction and advice. He counselled them to instruct their children well in riding, archery, and the art of plunder, as they would have to rely on their bravery for a livelihood just as merchants rely on their merchandise. "I give," he said, "the command of troops to those who join courage to skill. To those who are active and alert I confide the

care of the baggage; to the dullards I confide a pole and make them tend the cattle. It is thus I have won my victories, and my sons will continue victorious if they follow my example." Each man beside his bow, arrows, and axe, carried a file to sharpen the points of the arrows, a sieve, an awl, needles and thread. The picked troops also carried sabres slightly recurved, and had their heads and body protected by leathern armour covered with pieces of iron."

This was the prototype on which the Mughul army was modelled, and here we have the beginnings of what later came to be known as the *manṣab*. We see here also the origin of the periodical muster of contingents, which was such a picturesque feature of the Mughul court in India.<sup>2</sup>

The decimal division of the army was probably much older than Chingīz <u>Khā</u>n's time.

The Mongol empire reached its meridian in the reigns of the two brothers, Mangū Qā'ān (1251-59 A.C.) and Qublā-i-Qā'ān (1260-94 A.C.). The latter, says Sir H. H. Howorth, 'was the sovereign of the largest empire that was ever controlled by one man.' Marco Polo, who was at the court of Qublā-i-Qā'ān in 1275-92, has the following: 'You see, when

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> H. H. Howorth, History of the Mongols, Part I, pp. 108-9.

See p. 26 et segg. below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Marco Polo, I, p. 264, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> History of the Mongols, Part I, 252.

a Tartar prince goes forth to war, he takes with him, say, 100,000 horse. Well, he appoints an officer to every ten men, one to every hundred, one to every thousand, and one to every ten thousand, so that his own orders have to be given to ten persons only, and each of these ten persons has to pass the orders only to other ten, and so on; no one having to give orders to more than ten. And every one in turn is responsible only to the officer immediately over him; and the discipline and order that comes of this method is marvellous, for they are a people very obedient to their chiefs'.1

Qublā-i-Qā'ān had, Marco Polo tells us, 'twelve great Barons to whom he hath committed all the necessary affairs of thirty-four great provinces'. They choose the governors for these provinces, and 'can dispose of the movements of the forces, and send them whither, and in such strength as they please.' They may be called 'The Supreme Court', which 'forms the highest authority at the Court of the Great Kaan.'

The next great landmark in our history is Tīmūr. Clavijo speaks of Tīmūr's army as follows: 'As regards the Tartar army which every day and all day waits on the orders of Timur following his Highness wheresoever he goes, this is organized

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Marco Polo, I, 261.

after the following fashion. The host is divided into Captaincies: and there are captains of one hundred and of one thousand and of ten thousand men. Over the whole force is a single commander-in-chief, as with us may be the Constable of Castile. When any warlike expedition is on foot those captains each are called on, and by the number sent for it is known how great the force assembled is to be.'1

But much fuller information is to be found in the *Institutes* of Timūr.

The authenticity of  $Malf \bar{u}z\bar{a}t$ -i- $Am\bar{v}$   $T\bar{v}m\bar{u}r$ , to which the Institutes ( $Tuz\bar{u}k\bar{a}t$ -i- $T\bar{v}m\bar{u}r$ ) forms an appendix, has been called in question by Rieu and others after him. In 1047 A.H. Mīr Abū Tālib al-Husainī Turbatī presented to  $Sh\bar{a}h$  Jahān a Persian translation, made by himself, of the  $Malf\bar{u}z\bar{a}t$ , which was in Turkish, and which he said he had found in the library of the ruler of Yemen. It is certainly strange that no copy of the Turkish original is found in any library in the world today, nor any notice of it in the historical literature of the period. Still I find it rather difficult to believe that a man should have coolly taken it into his head to weave such a complicated fabric as the In-stitutes (with which alone we are concerned here) out

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Embassy to Tamerlane, 300.

of his own fancy, and dared to palm it off as a Persian translation of Tīmūr's autobiography at an enlightened court like <u>Shāh</u> Jahān's, where there must have been Turkish scholars, who could have easily detected the fraud

This, however, is not the place to adjudicate finally on the merits of this vexed question. We can only say that the book, as it stands, is a repertory of the most valuable information of the first importance, and, whether Tīmūr wrote it or somebody else, no student of the period can afford to ignore it

Having cleared our conscience with these remarks, we proceed to draw on this valuable work for such information as is relevant to our subject.

Tīmūr had, we are told definitely, 313 officers, great and small, on his army list.

Under the Amīru'l-Umarā (Commander-in-Chief), who himself was the deputy of the Emperor, stood the twelfth amīr, who commanded 12,000 horse, and was, in turn, the deputy of the C.-in-C. Under him again came the eleventh amīr, who was in command of 11,000 horse, and was deputy of the twelfth amīr. Thus in descending order we have besides the C.-in-C. twelve amīrs with commands of from 12,000 to 1,000, each being the deputy of the one immediately above him.

Four of these amīrs were beglarbegīs.1

Each of these amīrs had an "expectant" amīr appointed, who was to take his place and rank if he died. He was called muntaziru'l-amārat (amīr in expectation).<sup>2</sup>

These may be considered, in modern language, to be Commissioned Officers. The N.C.O.'s consisted of the following:

Mingb $\bar{a}$ s $h\bar{i}$  or amir haz $\bar{a}$ ra (commander of 1,000) Y $\bar{u}$ zb $\bar{a}$ s $h\bar{i}$  ( ,, ,, 100)  $\bar{U}$ nb $\bar{a}$ sh $\bar{i}$  ( ,, ,, 10)<sup>8</sup>

There were 100 of each of these in the army, 300 in all. Thus the total number of officers came to 313.4

The twelve amīrs remind us of Qublā-i-Qā'ān's twelve barons mentioned above, who were probably originally military leaders or generals.

Similarly the mingbāshī, the yūzbāshī, and the ūnbāshī are also to be found in Qublā-i-Qā'ān's time, and probably originated in Chingīz Khān's army. In continuation of the passage already quoted from Marco Polo, we have the following, which we give as it stands with its lacunæ due to defective text: 'Further, they call the corps of 100,000 men a Tuc; that of 10,000 they call a Toman; the thousand they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Institutes, 270-72, <sup>2</sup> Ibid., 268. <sup>3</sup> Ibid., 228-30.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 272. So in the text and the translation. But an army 100,000 strong should have 100 mingbāshīs, 1,000 yūzbāshīs and 10,000 ūnbāshīs—which, along with the 13 amīrs, comes to 11,113 officers, and not 313.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Pp. 17-18 above.

call . . . . ; the hundred Guz; the ten . . . . ' 1

The reader, who has followed us, will readily see that Guz here stands for  $v\overline{u}z$  (which is Turkish for 100); and the words left out are respectively ming (i.e., 1,000) and  $\overline{u}n$  or on (i.e., 10). Tuc. however, is a new word, not met with elsewhere in such a context. It is the Turkish word tog or togh meaning the horse-tail or yak-tail standard which among so many Asiatic nations has marked the supreme military command. It occurs as Taka in ancient Persian, and Cosmas Indicopleustes speaks of it as The Nine Orloks or Marshals under Chinghiz were entitled to the Tuk, and theirs is probably the class of command here indicated as of 100,000, though the figure must not be strictly taken. Timur ordains that every Amir who should conquer a kingdom or command in a victory should receive a title of honour, the Tugh and the Nakkara. Baber on several occasions speaks of conferring the Tugh upon his generals for distinguished service. One of the military titles at Bokhara is still Tokhsabai, a corruption of Túgh Sáhibi (Master of the Tugh).'2 Yule goes on to say that the decimal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Marco Polo, I, 261.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Yule's note in Marco Polo (pp. 263-64), where he also gives the authorities, which I have omitted. In Mughul India we have two kinds of Toq: Chatrtoq, adorned with the tails of the Tibetan yak, and Tumantoq, which was similar, but a little longer. Both', adds Abū'l Fazl, 'are flags of the highest dignity, and the latter is bestowed upon great nobles only'

division of the army 'passed into nearly all the Musulman States of Asia, and the titles Min-bashi or Bimbashi, Yuzbashi, Onbashi, still subsist not only in Turkestan, but also in Turkey and Persia. The term Tman or Tma was, according to Herberstein, still used in Russia in his day for 10,000.'1

We see that the mingbashi and Amir I held an equal command, but the status was different, as they belonged to different categories.

Promotion from the ranks and from a lower rank to a higher rank always followed distinguished service in the field of battle, and was systematic and gradual.2 A mingbashī could be promoted to be Amīr I. so that the barrier between the N.C.O.'s and the Commissioned Officers was not insurmountable.8

Among the common troopers, again, those who distinguished themselves by bravery were known as bahādurs. While the salary of a private was fixed 'at the value of his horse'. that of the bahadur was 'estimated at the value of from two to four horses each '.4

<sup>(</sup>A'in, I, 46; Blochmann, 52). See pictures in A'in (Blochmann, pl. IX, nos. 4 and 7). These will be fully dealt with under "The Imperial Insignia" in author's Arms and Jewellery.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Marco Polo, I, 264.

Institutes, 274 and 292.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 274.

The reader will please note this, as we shall meet with similar distinctions in the Mughul Indian army.

## 24 THE MANSABDARI SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY

The salary of an  $\overline{u}nb\overline{a}\underline{s}h\overline{i}$  was ten times the salary of a trooper, that of a  $y\overline{u}zb\overline{a}\underline{s}h\overline{i}$  twice that of an  $\overline{u}nb\overline{a}\underline{s}h\overline{i}$ , and that of a  $mingb\overline{a}\underline{s}h\overline{i}$  thrice that of a  $y\overline{u}zb\overline{a}\underline{s}h\overline{i}$ .

As a practical application of this system we have the sons and other relations of Tīmūr holding the following ranks.<sup>2</sup>

Muḥammad Jahāngīr

(Heir-apparent)	••••	••••	12,000 h	orse
'Umar <u>Sh</u> ai <u>kh</u>		****	10,000	12
Mīrān <u>Sh</u> āh		••••	9,000	,,
<u>Sh</u> āh Ru <u>kh</u>	****	••••	7,000	"
Grandsons	1	From 7,000	to 3,000	**
Other relatives		Amirates	from VI	I to I

The number of horses to be kept by each should be noted in particular:<sup>3</sup>

Private	••••	••••	2
Bahādur	••••	****	Not given
Ūnbā <u>sh</u> ī	••••	• • • •	5
Yūzbā <u>sh</u> ī	••••	••••	10
Mingbā <u>sh</u> ī	••••	••••	Not given
Mingbā <u>sh</u> ī Amīr I	••••	••••	Not given 110

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Institutes, 232-33.

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid., 240-42.

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid., 292-96.

Amīr IV	••••	••••	140	
••••	••••	••••	••••	
••••	****	****	••••	
Amīru'l-Umarā			300 or m	ore

In the Mongol army 'each man had several horses,' says Howorth (Pt. I, p. 110).

But this was not all the army which fought under Timur. What we have so far dealt with is Tīmūr's own or special army. He describes the 313 officers as his naukarān-i-khāsu'l-khās,1 his special or personal servants.<sup>2</sup> They were directly under him.

Apart from these there were what we may call auxiliaries: soldiers levied from various tribes serving under their own chiefs. There was no organic connection between Timur's army and these forces. For these auxiliaries there were different rules, and the honours and distinctions their chiefs received were also different.

We are told that forty tribes submitted to Timur altogether: out of these twelve drew salary (tamgha). and received a special treatment. These tribes had their own amirs appointed by Timur, and some even had amīru'l-umarās appointed from among them:

<sup>1</sup> Note the word naukar. We meet with this word in this sense in Persian military history and in some historians of Akbar's reign. The word is freely used for a trooper elsewhere in the Institutes also, e.g., on Pp. 312-20.

Institutes, 268. Major Davy's translation, generally satisfactory, is not quite exact on this point.

for instance, he appointed four amīru'l-umarās from the Barlās tribe; and Amīr Mu'ayyid of the Arlāt tribe, who was Tīmūr's brother-in-law, was also made amīru'l-umarā.<sup>1</sup>

## Musters

Musters were very common in the reigns of the Greater Mughuls in India. The march-past of the army of a prince or of a great noble in the reign of Shāh Jahān, for instance, must have been a magnificent sight; and we should love to have an eyewitness account which could help us to visualize the picturesque ceremony. Unfortunately no such wordpicture has been vouchsafed to us.

Such parades, however, were also common outside India and before Mughul times. We must remember that the Mongol military system, which descended from ancient times, was copied in Turkestan, Persia and India—in fact in all Western Asia; so that the features of the organization and the forms and ceremonies are markedly similar.

The following are, therefore, of interest:

Tīmūr once held a big review of his army, which is described in Zafar Nāma.<sup>2</sup> We learn here, incidentally, small details of the form and ceremony observed. Princes, amīrs and nūīns brought their

<sup>₹</sup> I. 506-16.

soldiery for inspection. As each one's turn came, he alighted from his horse, went down on his knees and offered praises and prayers, making a present at the same time

The next landmark in our history is a review in Persia in 1476. We possess an 'Arz Nāma (Account of the Parade) by Jalalu'd-Din Muhammad bin As'ad Davānī (830-908 A.H. = 1427-1502 A.C.), the author of Akhlāg-i-Jalālī, the substance of which, with useful critical notes and explanations, has been given by V. Minorsky under the title "A Civil and Military Review in Fars in 881/1476" in Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies (University of London), Vol. X, Part i (1939), pp. 141-78. This is a graphic description of a review held by Prince Sultān Khalil Aq-qoyunlu near Band-i-Mīr in Fārs (a short distance to the south of the ruins of Persepolis), of which the author was an eye-witness. Sultan Khalil was governor of the province of Fars on behalf of his father. Uzun Hasan.

The army reviewed consisted of (1) the holv men, the learned, the Sayyids, the Qazis, and their following, (2) the amīrs, the courtiers, and civil and military officers of state, and their troops, and (3) Naukars of the Private Household (Naukarān-ikhāssa).

The holy and learned men received special favours, and were treated as a privileged class. They

came in their characteristic costumes, attended with banners, trumpets, etc.

The procedure was that the Sultan sat on the throne surrounded by courtiers and officers, and the musicians were in attendance. The Ṣadr, on horseback, stood below to introduce the dignitaries according to their rank. 'The tavājīs shouted in the royal camp and delivered the call.' Every noble or amīr, who was presented, dismounted, knelt down on a rug spread for him on the roadside, recited prayers and praises and presented a peshkash, usually a horse.

The numbers brought by the amīrs or officers are not usually given in this document. In the few cases where they are given we notice that there are no round numbers—hundreds or thousands - but all sorts of odd figures. We must remember that this was only a provincial review.

Further, some amīrs are described as amīr-i-a'zam, some others are amīr-i-kabīr, while some are simply amīrs. Again, some have the title nū'īn (from Mong. noyān, master, lord). M. Minorsky tells us that 'in this form the term amīr-nūyān "a full general" survived in Persia till 1920.

The following item is more important than either of the foregoing:

Before Sultān Sa'īd Khān joined battle with Mīrzā Abā Bakr at Kāshghar in 920 A.H. (=1514

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> P. 162.

A.C.), he held a review of his ormy, of which we possess a somewhat full report in Razikh-i-Rashidi.

Altogether the army of the Khan consisted of over 4.700 men, 'besides those who stayed behind with the women and children and the baggage, and those who were strong enough to guard the roads.'

Here also we find that tavājīs conducted the muster and counted the army, and scribes (bakhshīs) wrote down the numbers.

The officers consisted of three classes: (1) Amirs who were 'commanders of regiments and detachments'. They mustered contingents varying, according to their resources and influence, from 40 to 200 men each. We notice incidentally that in one case well-armed retainers are specifically so mentioned, showing that attention was paid to equipment. (2) Many Mīrzādas (sons of Amīrs), we are told, had no retinue, and 'were entered as single individuals'. (3) Other chiefs, who were neither amīrs nor amīrs' sons. had each his own tribe and following. They were experienced and trustworthy men. It is worthy of note that one of these was at one time at the head of a regiment of 3,000. chiefs are spoken of by the author as sar-khail, sardar or kalantar. All these mean a chief or leader. (4) In addition to the above there were men 'who had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tr. by Elias and Ross, 305-10.

no following, but were quite alone; yet they had distinguished themselves above the rest by their courage in many battles and engagements, and thus they had acquired the name of "heroes" [bahādur].'1

Now, in this classification of armed forces, I think, we see a close parallel to the umarā, the manṣabdārs and (possibly) the aḥadīs of the Indian system. The similarity is too close to be accidental. We must not imagine, however, that Mughul India borrowed the system, at any time, from Persia, as V. A. Smith seems to think.<sup>2</sup> As we have said before, the system originated in Central Asia, and spread to all Western Asia and India.

It is possible that in the times of ChingIz Khān and his descendants and again in Tīmūr's days the number of horsemen entertained by an officer corresponded to his nominal command. In less strenuous times that followed and under less powerful rulers, the round numbers, it appears, could not be kept, up. In the musters in Persia and Transoxiana that we have noticed, we find that the chiefs and chieftains were allowed to bring to the muster as many men as they could get or equip, so that we get all sorts of odd numbers constituting a tribal leader's regiment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See p. 23 above.

# SECT. II: THE MANSABDĀRĪ SYSTEM IN INDIA

In the reigns of Sikandar Lodi and Ibrāhīm Lodi there were officers with ranks up to 10,000 and 12.000. For instance, we read in Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī that Sikandar Lodi conferred Jaunpur on Jamal Khān 'and ordered him to keep up 12,000 horse, and to assign them jágírs. Jamál Khán, who was much pleased with Hasan Khán's good service, took him with him, and gave him in jágír the parganas of Sahsarám, Hájípur, and Tánda, near Benares, to maintain 500 horsemen.'1

Lower down we learn that 'Azīm Humāyūn Sarwānī<sup>2</sup> 'maintained a large number of followers' in the pargana of Cawnpore, and Daulat Khan, the son of Budhu (who had been brought up in his house) 'held the command of 12,000 horse, and was in great favour with Sultán Ibráhím.'4 This Daulat Khan tried to get Farid (i.e., Farid Khan, the future Sher Shāh) a command of 500 but was at first unsuccessful.

Again 'Muhammad Khán Súr Dáúd-Sháh-Khail, governor of the pargana of Chaundh', commanded 1.500 horse.5

Our history of the mansabdari system in India

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> E. & D., IV, 310.

<sup>3</sup> So written in E. & D., but in the Persian text we have A'zam Humayun Sarwani, which is also found in other histories.

<sup>\*</sup> E. & D., IV, 321.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 321.

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid., 323.

should properly begin with Bābur. Unfortunately, however, nothing definite is known of its working under Bābur and Humāyūn. Of course in the histories we come across the amīrs and manṣabdārs, and even the amīru'l-umarā; but the positive information of the kind we require is not available.

We may, however note in passing the following item of interest:

In the Qānūn-i-Humāyūnī we have a graded list of the nobles and officers of Humāyūn's court, couched in characteristically quaint language (which we may ignore): (1) The Emperor, (2) His relations and brethren, and (? foreign) princes at the court, (3) Shaikhs and Sayyids, learned and holy men, (4) The greater amīrs, (5) Intimate courtiers and īchkīs¹ who held a manṣab, (6) The other īchkīs, (7) Heads of clans and yūzbegīs, (8) Champions (or single cavaliers), (9) Taḥwīldārs (cash-keepers or treasurers), (10) Soldiers (jawānān-i-jarga), (11) Menial servants, (12) Doorkeepers, watchmen, etc.²

This list corresponds to what is called warrant of precedence in modern civil lists.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Messrs. Beveridge and Baini Prashad indulge in much speculation regarding the correct form of this word and its meaning. Guesses are useless, when definite information is available. Pavet de Courteille gives the word as *ichki*, and explains it as 'intime, intérieur.' (Dictionnaire Turc Oriental). So here it would mean 'an intimate associate', 'one belonging to the inner circle of court or family'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Qānūn-i-Humāyūnī of Khwandamīr, text, ed. M. Hidayat Hosain, pp. 43-44; tr. Baini Prashad, pp. 31-32. A.N., I, 359.

Sher Shah's reign, turbulent and stormy as it was, presents some points of interest. Here, as in the reigns of the Lodis, we read now and again of officers with military commands; e.g., Shajā'at Khān was a 'lord of 10,000'.1

Further, Sher Shah seems to have realized that the system of military recruitment, as current in his time, was rotten and required a thorough overhauling. He tried to reorganize the system of jagir on a stabler basis; and reintroduced branding<sup>2</sup> and tried to make it effective. We are told in Waai'at-i-Mushtāqī, for instance, that 'he resumed the rent-free tenures, and made new grants on his own part'.3 Again, 'he received his nobles and soldiers, and made inquiries as to the horses brought to receive their brands. Then he went out and made a personal inspection of his forces, and settled the allowances of each individual by word of mouth until all was arranged.'4 Again, 'at the branding time every man came forward and showed his horse [? equipment] and rendered his account'.5

From fugitive notices in Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi we get occasional glimpses of significant facts. The story of Shajā'at Khān, who was an amīr of 10,000, is a case in point: When assigning jagirs to his soldiery, he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> E. & D., IV, 426.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> E. & D., IV. 549.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ibid., 551.

<sup>\*</sup> See Chapter II, Sect. i.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 550.

kept a share for himself from the portion assigned to them. There was an outcry. Two thousand of them, 'men of repute, both horse and foot', decided to send their representative to <u>Sher Shāh</u>; but before he arrived at court, <u>Sher Shāh</u> had learnt of the matter through his spies. Being enraged he administered a strong rebuke to <u>Shajā'at Khān</u>, but pardoned him, treating it as his first offence. He ordered him to redress the grievance immediately, threatening him in case of disobedience with severe punishment and confiscation of his jāgīr.

From this story, of which only a summary is given here, we learn (1) that Shajā'at Khān had probably full 10,000 troopers under him, so that his command was not nominal, (2) that a manṣabdār's following consisted of both cavalry and infantry, (3) that by Sher Shāh's orders a portion of a manṣabdār's jāgīr was assigned to the soldiery, on which the manṣabdār could not lawfully encroach, (4) that the soldiers had a monthly salary, paid presumably out of the jāgīr above mentioned, (5) that Sher Shāh had enacted and promulgated regulations to the effect 'that the chief's rights and those of his soldiery might be distinct, and that the chiefs might respect the rights of the soldiers'.1

From the language used in the passages cited

above (Persian text) I am inclined to think that the full contingent signified by the command was entertained by the commander, at least when Sher Shah's reforms came into effect.

It is worthy of note that in none of these passages does the word mansab occur in the Persian text, a mansabdar being just spoken of as sahib-i-duwazda hazār suwār, sāhib-i-dah hazār suwār, etc. It appears that the word (in this sense), so common in later histories, had not yet emerged into being. The words umarā and umarā'ī, are, however, used, though somewhat naïvely—e.g., in the story of Shajā'at Khān.

The period from Babur's successful invasion of India to the early years of Akbar's reign was one of conquests and unsettled government, during which the old tradition of mansabs or commands continued to be followed in a rough and ready sort of way. Neither Babur nor Humayun had leisure to look into the basis of the military organization, or to think of reform with a view to its stability; and Sher Shah did not live long enough to make his reforms effective, or their results permanent.

For Akbar's reign we have much fuller information.

Sher Shah's rule was too short to effect a permanent change in the system. The branding practice, already a dead letter before Sher Shah's time. languished again as soon as his strong hand was no longer there to enforce it; so that by the time Akbar came to the throne the nominal command of the amīr or m insab lār had once more been reduced to a fiction, and signified nothing. In many cases, as Budāyūnī tells us, the manṣabdārs indulged in luxury and extravagance and were more intent on amassing wealth than on equipping their contingents or considering the welfare of the peasantry. The result was that efficient soldiery was non-existent.

It was to the task of ending or mending this chaotic state of things that Akbar addressed himself. Drastic reformer as he was, it was not possible even for him to cancel the whole mansabdārī at one stroke—scrap the peerage directory, that is to say—and start afresh. That would have been too violent a break with the past, and would have led to revolution and disaster. As we shall see, even the via media which he adopted was beset with difficulties, which would have proved insurmountable to a man less determined than Akbar.

In the remedy that he adopted for this difficult state of things we witness the birth of the double mansab. He converted the unitary organization of the mansab, which had descended from immemorial times, into a dual one. He let the existing mansab

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Budayunī, II, 190. Also A.N., III, 68.

stand as it was, and attached to it an obligation to maintain an establishment of horses, elephants. beasts of burden and carts, for which the mansabdar received a fixed salary. This he called the zāt rank. The officer who held this mansab alone had to entertain no cavalry. But such officers were so rare that their number was negligible. Nearly every mansabdar had in addition to the zat rank a suwar rank. This meant that he had to maintain some horsemen to fight for the emperor. The suwar rank never exceeded the zāt rank, and equalled it only in a few cases. It was generally lower, and often much lower, than the sat rank. A mansabdar, say, of 1000/500 enjoyed the sounding title of  $haz\bar{a}r\bar{i}$ , though his contingent was only half that number. The high rank flattered the vanity of the commander, and the small number of the troopers required lightened his burden. To prevent the mansab from becoming a

¹ See below. There was nothing new or original about this. 'It is the custom of Timur', says Clavijo, 'to give in charge his stud of horses and his great flocks of sheep each to someone of his nobles who must see to their wants, giving pasture in the lands they personally possess. One noble thus may have in charge a thousand head of cattle and another ten thousand. Even when the time comes for Timur to regain possession of his own it should appear that the number falls short or that their condition anywise be wanting, his Highness will seize whatsoever that lord may possess and very probably in addition but him to death, for such is his rule and ordinance' (Embassy to Tamerlane, 300). This reminds one also of the daily review of Emperor's animals, which was a feature of the Mughul Indian court.

purely honorary affair and a simple sinecure, however, an establishment of transport was attached to it as an obligation against a fixed salary. This could be easily enforced, and thus by a prudent stroke of policy transport was placed on a sound basis. After making these concessions Government felt justified in insisting on the number of horsemen each holder of suwar rank was required to maintain. Thus some order was evolved out of the chaos that existed. This was the policy underlying the double mansab; and this was the raison d'être of the zat mansab.

The reader will not find all this set out in so many words in the Persian histories. It is only by reading between the lines and by interpretation that we arrive at these results.

What the historians actually tell us is as follows:

As early as XI R.Y. (973 A.H.=1566 A.C.) Akbar found that the revenues entered in the state registers since the time of Bairam Khan were largely in excess of the real ones, which led to corruption and hardship. And the whole iagir system, and the recruitment of the army which was intimately connected with it, were correspondingly chaotic. Under royal orders. Muzaffar Khān made a new assessment according to revised estimates. As the branding department. Abu'l-Fazl goes on, 'had not then

emerged into being, at this time the number of attendants for all the officers [umara] and servants of the threshold was fixed, so that every one should keep some persons in readiness for service. There were three classes of the ordinary soldier assigned to the officers [umara]. The first class had 48,000 dams a year, the second 32,000 and the third 24,000.'1

Beveridge remarks<sup>2</sup> that this has no connection with the new revenue assessment, mentioned above, and Moreland half agrees with him.3 But a connection appears when we see that with a more correct assessment of revenues a more allocation of jagirs became possible; and when the position and resources of a jagirdar became more defined, the State could insist on the mansabdar doing service with a definite number of cavalry which had before been impossible.

We agree with Beveridge, however, that the salaries fixed here are not easy to understand. He rightly says that these cannot be the salaries of the soldiers. Nor has Blochmann<sup>4</sup> an explanation to offer. Perhaps it was only a temporary scale,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A.N., II, 270: Tr., 403.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibid., f. n. 1.

Article on "Rank (mansab) in the Mogul State Service," 651-52.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 373-74 and p. 374, f. n. 1. He is copying apparently from M.U., III. 222; and does not know that the original is in A.N.—and he misreads م قلت or قلب

which was later revised and considerably modified; so that it cannot be verified from the tables in  $\bar{A}$ 'in given below. This scale of salaries corresponds roughly to the zāt rank salary of an officer holding the rank of 10 (!)

But these measures seem not to have been effec-For in XVIII R.Y. (981 A.H. = 1573 A.C.) the branding rule was considered again. Todar Mal, we are told, approved of it, but Mun'im Khan and Muzaffar Khān (who had just been appointed vakīl or prime minister) were reluctant to carry it out under the direction of Shahbaz Khan Kanboh. Nevertheless, the branding rule was promulgated, and orders were issued appointing karoris in the whole empire, converting all lands into khālisa, and fixing the grades of all officers of state. The enforcement of these orders, it was realized, depended upon 'the steadiness, the service, the loyalty, disinterestedness and energy of the officers'.1

Still neither the revenue reforms nor the dagh system made progress. The conversion of jagir into khālisa lands was not effected. The quality of the soldier and the condition of the peasant remained what it was.

Some two years later Mīrza Koka was called from Gujarāt to help forward and popularize the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A.N., III, 68-69; Budæyūnī, Il. 173.

dāgh (XX R.Y.: 983 A.H.=1575A.C.). He, like most of the rest showed no readiness for the task. He was degraded from his amirate in consequence and placed under surveillance.1

So we see against what heavy odds Akbar carried on this uphill task. The nobility and the ministry. whose own interests were vitally affected, were bound to kick against a disciplinary measure of such far-reaching importance: as we might expect, they gave neither countenance nor co-operation Akbar's proposals. The recalcitrant ones Shajā'at Khān, Mirza 'Abdu'llāh, Mīr Mu'izzu'l-Mulk, Qāsim Khān koh-bur, Dost Muhammad Bābā Dost, and Muhammad Amin sāhib·i taujīh were sent to Bengal, where Mun'im Khan "Khan Khanan" was to find jagīrs for them.2

Budāyūnī is writing of the same occasion in the following passage: 'Shahbaz Khan, the Mir Bakhshi introduced the custom and rule of dagh u mahall [dagh o mahalli in text], which had been the rule of Sultán 'Alá-ud-din Khiljī, and afterwards the law under Sher Shah. It was settled that every Amír should commence as commander of twenty (Bisti). and be ready with his followers to mount guard, carry messages,2 etc., as had been ordered; and when

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A.N., III, 147-48. \* Thid.

The word in the text is jar o muljar. Lowe's translation is not

according to the rule he had brought the horses of his twenty troopers to be branded, he was then to be made a commander of 100 (Cadi), or of more. They were likewise to keep elephants, horses, and camels in proportion to their command (mançab), according to the same rule. When they had brought to the muster their new contingent complete, they were to be promoted according to their merits and circumstances to the post of commander of 1000 (Hazári), or 2000 (Dúhazári), or even of 5000 (Panjhazári), which is highest command; but if they did not do well at the musters they were to be degraded. But notwithstanding this new regulation

satisfactory, and Blochmann is so puzzled that he leaves a blank in his rendering of this passage on p. 252 (bottom) of his translation of  $\overline{A}$ 'in, I. The correct form of this Turkish phrase seems to be  $j\bar{a}r$  of  $bulj\bar{a}r$  (or  $bulj\bar{a}r$ );  $J\bar{a}r$ , call, proclamation;  $bulj\bar{a}r$  (or  $b\bar{u}lj\bar{a}r$ ), promise, place of refuge, rendezvous of troops, battle field. Hence the phrase  $j\bar{a}r$  o  $bulj\bar{a}r$  signifies 'call and response', 'military duties', 'active service', etc.

The words are written in various ways. The bigger dictionaries like Vullers and Farhang-i-Anandrāj have the forms I have adopted. Risāla-i-Fazlu'llāh Khān has chār instead of jār; so has A.N. (II, 268); while Jalālu'd-Dīn Muḥammad's 'Arz Nāma has jār. As for the second word, Kamālu'd-Dīn 'Abdu'r-Razzāq's Matla'-i-Sa'dain wa Majma'-i-Baḥrain (ed. Muḥammad Shafī, p. 131) has buljār; while Mrs. Beveridge (B.N.E., 599, n. 2; 636, n. 5; 638, n. 4; and 668) recognizes 'buljār, būljār and muljār, the Turkish text of Baber-Nameh (ed. Ilminski) having buljār on pp. 459 and 460, and muljār on pp. 435 and 479. A.N. (II, 268) has buljār and B.N. (I, ii, pp. 107, 108 and 109) has mulchār, which Irvine (Army, 278) understands to mean 'approach by trenches'. The compound word occurs in Tīmūr's Institutes (pp. 232 and 272), where it is written chār pulchār and chār o pulchār respectively, and hesitatingly translated by Major Davy as 'duty', 'serviçe'. The Budāyūnī text, in the passage before us, has jār o muljār.

the condition of the soldiers grew worse, because the Amírs did as they pleased. For they put most of their own servants [khāṣkhelān, special servants(?)] and mounted attendants [bārgīrān¹] into soldiers' clothes, brought them to the musters, and performed everything according to their duties.² But when they got their jágírs they gave leave to their mounted attendants [bārgīrān¹], and when a new emergency arose, they mustered as many "borrowed" soldiers as were required, and sent them away again, when they had served their purpose. Hence while the income and expenditure of the mançabdár remained in statu quo, "dust fell into the platter of the helpless soldier", so much so, that he was no longer fit for anything. But from all sides there came a

<sup>1</sup> The word in the text is bārgīr, which has a somewhat technical significance. According to Abū'l-Fazl, a bārgīr or bārgīr-suwār was a soldier who was fit for cavalry service, but could not be trusted with the keeping of a horse. He was furnished with a horse when his services were required (Ā'in, I, 144; Blochmann, 147). Irvine says, 'the recruit was supposed, at any rate so far as the State was concerned, to furnish his own horse.....Along with his horse the man brought his own arms and armour, the production of certain items of which was obligatory. In actual practice, however, the leaders often provided the recruits with their horses and equipment. When this was the case the leader drew the pay and paid the man whatever he thought fit. Such a man, who rode another's horse, was called a bārgīr (load-taker); while a man riding his own horse was in modern times called a silahdār (weapon-holder)' (Army, 47). See also the article on Bargeer in Hobson-Jobson (p. 69a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Perhaps it would be better to translate: brought them to the musters to satisfy the requirements of their mansab.

lot of low tradespeople, weavers and cotton-cleaners, carpenters, and greengrocers, both Hindú and Musalmán, and brought borrowed horses [with their equipments], got them branded, and were appointed to a command, or were made Kroris, or Ahadis, or Dákhilis to some one<sup>2</sup>: and when a few days afterwards no trace was to be found of the imaginary horse and the visionary saddle [varāq, equipment], they had to perform their duties on foot.'8

We learn incidentally from the same writer that Oaidī of Shīrāz, who had come from Mecca and found rapid favour at Akbar's court, once submitted that the branding system introduced by the emperor was very irksome to the people. From that day he fell from grace, and served no longer.4

The branding business was now vigorously pushed forward in all parts of the empire. Khwaja Ghiyasu'd-Dīn 'Alī Asaf Khan was 'sent off on 20 Bahman [end of XXIII R.Y.] to carry out the branding regulation in Malwa'.5

Next we find Muhibb 'Alī Khān 'strenuously

<sup>1</sup> The word is baggal, which, in India, means 'a grain-merchant, cornchandler' (Platts).

Here again the rendering is apt to mislead. The following would give a better sense: and having got a manşab, could become a karori, an ahadî or a dākhilī.

<sup>\*</sup> Budayūni, II, 190-91; Tr. Lowe, 193 94.

<sup>4</sup> Budāytīnī, III. 315.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> A. N., III, 264; Tr., 384.

carrying on the work of the  $d\bar{a}gh$  in Bihar (XXIV) R.Y.).1

The enforcement of the branding regulation led to rather unfortunate developments in Bengal. Budāyūnī says, 'In this year [988 A.H.] Muzaffar Khán arrived in Bengál, and began a course of great strictness in his administration, and commenced wrongdoing and oppressing the Amírs of that district [province], and confiscated many of their jágirs. He practised the dagh-u-mahall [dagh o mahalli] in the Court fashion, and the settlement of accounts in the old manner.....And Bábá Khán Qágshál, and Khálidí Khán, who were nobles of great importance, however much they tried to escape the dágh, and begged to have their jágírs confirmed, did not obtain their request. But Muzaffar Khán with a view to getting back the money from the jagir. which Khalidi Khan had acquired through neglecting the dagh-u-mahall, put him in prison and ordered him the bastinado.'2 The big jagirdars and others with them rose in open rebellion and in course of the fighting that ensued Muzaffar Khān was captured and killed with tortures.8 It may, however, be remarked that the branding regulation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A. N., III, 286; Tr., 420.

<sup>\*</sup> Budāyūnī, II. 280 : Tr., 288-89.

<sup>\*</sup> lbid., p 282; Tr., 290.

was only one of the many contributory causes of this outbreak, which are neatly summarized in Smith's Akbar (pp. 184-85).

Under the year 989 A.H. Budāyūnī records that Shahbāz Khān paid his respects to the emperor at Pānipat. He was in high feather; for he had, during the period of his absence, of his own initiative, given away all the country from Garhi (in Bengal) right up to the Punjab to people as jāgīr, and had given away manṣabs at will. On being questioned, he declared: 'If I had not thus won over the soldiery, they would have revolted with one consent. Now the empire is yours and the army is yours. You may give what you like to whom you will, and take away appointments [manṣabs] and jágīrs from whom you please.'

## SECT. III: MAIN FEATURES

Having taken a general historical survey, we are now in a position to consider the salient features presented by the mansabdārī in the several reigns, taking note of the changes which were introduced by each emperor. The <u>sat</u> and the suwār rank will have to be dealt with separately.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Budāyūnī, II, 296; Tr., 304-5.

# Zāt Rank

The main frame-work of the whole system took shape in the latter half of Akbar's reign. Much of the development took place behind the scenes, as it were; so that we only see glimpses of it wherever there is an odd mention or a casual notice. But all the time a cast-iron system was being moulded by successive efforts. We get a complete view of it in the  $\bar{A}$ 'in, as it stood in XL R.Y. (1003-4 A H.), when Book II of  $\bar{A}$ 'in was completed. There we can study the conditions and obligations of the  $\bar{z}\bar{a}t$  and the suw  $\bar{a}r$  rank.

The Zāt rank first:—All manṣabdārs at a given time fell into three classes. Thus Abū'l-Fazl:

و در خور سوار [و از کما بیشی سوار] در ماهواره دگر گونگی رفت ، هر کرا سوار موافق مذصب باشد اولین پایمداد و نیمه و زیاده را دوم و کمتر از ان را سوم بر ساخت چنانی جدول باز گوید ، (Text. I. 179).

Translation: The monthly [\$\overline{a}t\$ rank] salary of the manṣabdār varies with his suwār rank. An officer with equal \$\overline{a}t\$ and suwār rank was placed in the first class, one with a lower suwār rank down to half the \$\overline{a}t\$ rank got a second class, while another with a yet

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A in, I, 231; Blochmann, 594. There are, however, anomalies. Some of the items in it were only true in 993 A.H., as Blochmann (256, n. 1) points out.

lower suwār rank belonged to the third; as is shown in the table.

In the table on Text, I, 180-85 (Blochmann, 248-9), which follows, the manṣabdārs above 5,000 personal are not thus classified, as they all belong to the first class. For the other ranks, the monthly cash salary of each of the three classes is given. Blochmann thinks (p. 251) that the classes of salaries in the table do not refer to the three classes described in the quotation from Abū'l-Fazl given above, on the ground that the difference in the salaries of the three classes is inappreciable; and Dr. Paul Horn follows in his footsteps (p. 16). But there is no other classification to which these different salaries can correspond. Besides, the last words of the text quoted above, where the table is clearly referred to, place the matter beyond doubt.

Out of, these emoluments were to be maintained horses, elephants, beasts of burden and carts belonging to the state, the number and specification of each being given in the table. This was technically known as the <u>khurāk-i-dawābb</u>. Out of the balance the manṣabdār had to maintain his household.

This maintenance charge was calculated according to the following scale, given in  $\overline{A}$ in, Book II,

Ā'in 2 (B.I. Text, I, 177-8):-

HORSES:	Dāms
'Irāqī	680
Mujannas	560
Turkī	480
old Y ar a b ar u	400
Tāzī	320
Jangla	240
ELEPHANTS:	
<u>Sh</u> ergīr	1,100
Sāda	800
Manjhola	600
Karha	420
Phandurki ya	300
BEASTS OF BURDEN AND	CARTS:
Camels	240
Mules	240
Carts	600

It is now time to give the table so often referred to above:—

•				Ho				ELE		
No.	Zāt Rank	·Irāqi	Mujannas	Turkī	Yabū	Tāzi	Jangla	<u>Sh</u> ergir	Sāda	Manjhola
1	10000	68	68	136	136	136	136	40	60	40
2	8000	54	54	108	108	108	108	35	50	36
3	7000	49	49	98	98	98	98	30	42	29
4	5000	34	34	68	68	68	68	20	30	20
5	4900	33	33	67	67	67	67	20	30	19
6	4800	32	32	66	66	65	65	20	29	19
7	4700	31	31	65	65	63	63	19	29	19
8	4600	31	31	63	63	62	62 .	18	28	19
9	4500	31	30	61	61	61	61	18	28	19
10	4400	30	29	60	60	59	59	18	28	19
11	4300	29	28	59	59	58	58	17	27	19
12	4200	28	27	58	58	57	56	16	26	19
13	4100	27	27	56	56	56	55	16	26	18
14	4000	27	27	54	54	54	54	16	25	18
15	3900	26	26	53	53	52	52	16	24	18
16	3800	26	26	51	51	51	51	16	23	18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Steingass assigns ten camels to a qizār; but we know from A'in <sup>8</sup>That the salaries of 4900 and 4800 should be equal, class for class, is I, 27,000; II, 26,800; III, 26,700.

MANSABDĀRĪ SYSTEM OR 'MILITARY ARISTOCRACY' 51
CORRESPONDING TO THE ZĀT RANK

PHAN	rs		OF BURD	EN	MONTHL	Y SALARY	IN RUPEES	
	iya	amels	mules			Classes		
Karha	Phandurkiya	Qitārs¹of camels	Qitārs¹ of mules	Carts	I	11	111	
40	20	160	40	320	60,000		•••	
34	15	130	34	260	50,000			
27	12	110	27	220	45,000	•••		
20	10	80	20	160	30,000	29,000	28,000	
19	10	77	19‡	157	27,600	27,400	27,300	
19	9	77	195	152	27,600	27,400	27,300	
18	9	75	19‡	151	26,800	26,600	26,500	
18	9	74	18 <del>‡</del>	148	26,400	26,200	26,100	
17	8	72 3/5	18 <del>3</del>	145	26,000	25,800	25,700	
16	7	71	181	142	25,200	25,000	24,800	
16	7	69 3/5	18	139	24,400	24,200	24,000	
16	7	68	173	136	23,600	23,400	23,200	
16	6	68	17‡	133	22,800	22,600	22,400	
15	6	65	17	130	22,000	21,800	21,600	
15	6	63 3/5	16	127	21,400	21,200	21,100	
15	6	62	16‡	124	20,800	20,600	20,500	

(I, 147, top) that it contained only five. improbable. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān's edition of A'in has for 4800:

52 THE MANSABDĀRĪ SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY
ESTABLISHMENTS AND SALARIES

				Но				ELE-		
No.	Zāt Rank	'Irāqi	Mujannas	Turki	Yābū	Tāzī	Jangla	<u>Sh</u> ergir	Sāda	Manjhola
17	3700	25	25	50	50	50	49	16	23	17
18	3600	25	25	49	48	48	47	16	23	17
19	3500	24	24	47	47	47	46	16	23	17
20	3400	23	23	46	46	46	44	16	22	17
21	3300	22	22	45	45	44	43	15	22	17
22	3200	21	21	44	44	42	42	15	21	17
23	3100	20	20	43	43	41	40	15	20	17
24	3000	20	20	40	40	40	40	15	20	16
25	2900	19	19	39	39	39	39	15	19	16
26	2800	18	18	38	38	38	38	15	18	14
27	2700	17	17	37	37	37	37	14	17	13
28	2600	17	17	36	36	35	35	13	15	12
29	2500	17	17	34	34	34	34	12	14	12
30	2400	17	17	33	33	33	33	12	13	11
31	2300	16	16	33	33	32	32	12	12	10
32	2200	16	16	32	32	31	31	11	12	9
33	2100	15	15	31	31	31	-31	10	· 12	9
34	2000	15	15	30	30	30	30	10	12	
35	1900	14	14	29	29	29	30	10	12	9

MANŞABDĀRĪ SYSTEM OR 'MILITARY ARISTOCRACY'

53

#### CORRESPONDING TO THE ZAT RANK-(continued) BEASTS OF BURDEN PHANTS MONTHLY SALARY IN RUPEES AND CARTS Qitars of camels Qitars of mules Classes Phandurkiya Karha I H Ш Carts 15 6 60<sup>8</sup> 20,200 20,000 19,900 161 121 14 6 59 15‡ 118 19.600 19,400 19.300 14 5 57% 15# 115 19,000 18.800 18,700 14 5 56 112 18,600 18,400 18,300 15‡ 14 5 54% 18,200 15 109 18.000 17,900 14 5 53 143 106 17.800 17,600 17.500 14 5 51% 103 17.200 14: 17,400 17.100 14 5 50 14 100 17.000 16,800 16,700 13 4 48 131 96 16,400 16,200 16, 100 12 3 46 92 121 15,800 15,600 15,500 3 11 44 112 88 15,200 15.000 14.900 11 3 42 14,400 10# 84 14,600 14.300 10 2 40 10 80 14,000 13.800 13,700 10 2 38 9# 76 13,600 13,400 13.300 10 2 36 13.200 13,000 12,900 8\$ 72 10 2 34 68 12.800 12,600 12,500 81 . 9 2 32 12,400 7 64 12,200 12,100 2 30 7 7 60 12,000 11,900 11.800

28#

6

58

11.750

11.650

11.450

### ESTABLISHMENTS AND SALARIES

				Но	RSES				ELE		
No.	<i>zāt</i> Rank	'Irāqī	Mujannas	Turki	Yabu	Tāzī	Jangla	<u>Sh</u> ergir	Sāda	Manjhola	
36	1800	14	13	28	28	28	29.	10	11	9	
37	1700	14	13	27	27	27	27	9	11	9	
38	1600	13	13	26	26	25	25	9	10	9	
39	1500	12	12	24	24	24	24	8	10	8	
40	1400	12	12	24	24	23	23	8	10	8	
41	1300	12	12	23	23	23	22	8	10	7	
42	1200	11	11	22	22	22	22	7	9	7	
43	1100	11	11	22	22	21	21	7	9	7	
44	1000	10	10	21	21	21	21	7	8	7	
45	900	10	10	20	20	20	20	7	8	6	
46	800	10	14	17	17	9	3	7	· 8	5	
47	700	6	13	9	13	14	7	5	6	4	
48 )	600 {	5	7	11	9	4	4	4	3	5	
49∫	~~ }	4	7	8	8	4	3	4	2	4	
50	500	4	6	8	8	4		3	4	2	
51	400	3	4	5	6	2	•••	2	2	2	

<sup>1</sup>The figures I have adopted here are more suitable than those given MS. , which is supported by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān.

\*Blochmann's text gives 1,751, which is an incongruous figure. I have Sayyid Ahmad. Two MSS. in P. U. L. give 1,750

CORRESPONDING TO THE ZAT RANK-(continued)

PHANT	ANIS		OF BURD D CARTS	EN	MONTHL	SALARY I	n Rupees		
	iya	amels				Classes	Classes		
Karha	Phandurkiya	Qi <u>t</u> ars of camels	Qitars of mules	Carts	1	II	III		
7	2	27 <del>8</del>	6 <u>1</u>	56	11,400	11.350	11,300		
7	2	26}	5‡	54	11,225	11,000	10,800		
7	2	251	5	52	10,600	10,400	10,200		
7	2	24	5	50	10,000	9,800	9,700		
7	2	23 3	4 5	49	9,600	9,400	9,300		
7	2	23	45	48	9,200	9,100	9,050		
7	2	221	43	46	9,000	8,900	8,800		
7	2	22	4 3 6	44	8,700	8,500	8,400		
7	2	21	41	42	8,200	8,100	8,000		
7	2	20	4	40	7,700	7,400	7,100		
5	2	178	3#	34	5,000	4,700	4,400		
4	1	15 <del>8</del>	3	27	4,000	3,700	3,600²		
2	1	· 13	21	21	3,500	3,200	3,000		
2	1	14	2	15	2,800	2,750	2,700		
2	1	10	. 2	15	2,500	2,300	2,100		
2	1	5		12	2,000	1,700°	1,500		

in Blochmann's table. I have followed the reading in Blochmann's preferred 1,700, which is given by him as a variant, and is adopted by Sir

## ESTABLISHMENTS AND SALARIES

			1	Но			1	ELE-		
No.	Zät Rank	Irāqī.	Mujannas	Turki	Yabü	Tāzi	Jangla	<u>Sh</u> ergir	Sāda	Manjhola
52	350	3	4	4	4	2		1	1	2
53	300	3	3	3	4	2		1	1	2
54	250	3	3	3	4	1	•••	1	1	2
55	200	2	3	3	3	1		1	2	1
56	150	2	. 3	3	3			1	1	1
57	125	2	2	2	3	2			1	1
58	120	2	2	2	3	2			1	1
59	100 (Yūz- bā <u>sh</u> ī) 80	2	2	2	2	2			1	1
60	bā <u>sh</u> ī) 80	2	1	2	2	1	1		•••	1
61	60	1	1	2	2	1	1		•••	1
62	50	1	1	2	2	1	1	•••	•••	1
63	40	1	2	2	1	1			1	•••
64	30 (Tar- ka <u>sh</u> - band)		1	1	2	1	1	•••	•••	•••
65	20		1	1	1	2		•••		•••
66	10	•••		_2	2				•••	•••

Blochmann has 1,305 here (!) and no suggestion to offer. I have

as in two MSS. in P.U.L.

\*I have corrected Blochmann's 1,400 to 1,300, which is found not adopted by Sayyid Ahmad.

CORRESPONDING TO THE ZAT RANK-(continued)

PHAN	rs		S OF BURD ND CARTS	EN	MONTHLY SALARY IN RUP			
	amels		nules		Classes			
Karha	Phandurkiya	Qi <u>tā</u> rs of camels	Qitārs of mules	Carts	I	II	III	
3	1	41		11	1,450	1,3751	1,350	
2	1	4	•••	10	1,300°	1,250	1,200	
2		31		8	1,150	1,100	1,000	
2		3	•••	7	975	950	900	
···.		2	•••	6	875	850	800	
2		21		5	780	760	750	
2		21		5	745	740	730	
1		2		5	700	600	500	
2		2	•••	3	410	380	350	
1		11	•••	2	301	285	270	
1		· 1}	•••	2	250	240	230	
		18	•••	1	223	200	185	
1		11	•••	1	175	165	155	
					,			
1		13	· •••	1	135	125	115	
			•••	•••	100	82 <u>3</u>	75	

corrected it to 1,375, which I find in Sir Sayyid Ahmad's table, as well only in his own MSS. and , but also in one MS. in P.U.L., and is

#### NOTE

In the construction of this Table. I have not confined myself to the copying out of the figures accepted as correct by the editor of the Bibliotheca Indica Text. Minor improvements have appeared to me possible here and there. It is impossible, for instance, that the first class salary of a lower rank should equal or exceed the third class salary of a higher, or that the salary of a lower class should equal or exceed that of a higher one. Acting on this principle, I have allowed myself the latitude offered by the variants given in the foot-notes of the B.I. Text (I, 185-6), and have also consulted other MSS, of the work available at P.U.L., besides Sir Savvid Ahmad Khān's valuable printed edition. Some of the variants (which I have adopted) give a better sense and consistency to the whole scheme. In these cases I have not hesitated to depart from Blochmann's text readings. Of course I have refrained from needless interference.

Abū'l-Fazl has been generous enough to give us fuller information about the salary of a manṣabdār of 100 ṣāt. The monthly salary of an officer with 100/100 rank, he says (Text, I, 179), is Rs. 700, while that of a rank-holder of 100/0 (who is generally

counted as a dakhili) is Rs. 500. For every increase of 10 in the horse rank the officer gets an addition of Rs. 20 to his monthly salary. So we can construct the following scale:-

Manșab	Monthly pay in Rs.	Class
100/100	700	I
100/90	680	п
100/80	660	11
100/70	640	11
100/60	620	II
100/50	600	II
100/40	580	Ш
100/30	560	III
100/20	540	Ш
100/10	520	111
100/0	500	III

For the sake of clearness we have added the class in the third column. The reader will notice at once that this corresponds with the rule given for the classification and with the schedule on pp. 56-57 above; for the first-class officer gets Rs. 700, the second-class one from Rs. 680 to Rs. 600, and the third-class one from Rs. 580 to Rs. 500. So not only do we get yet another proof of the fact that these are the classes referred to in the table, but we get a further bit of information not given in the said

Blochmann's translation of this passage (p. 248) is defective, and has misled Horn (p. 15).

table, presumably for brevity—viz, that the salaries entered in II and III class columns in that table are the *minimum* salaries for those classes respectively.

The reader should bear carefully in mind that the salary detailed here is for the sat rank, and although it varies with change in suwār rank, is not the suwār rank pay in any sense. The caution is all the more necessary since Dr. Horn is deceived into imagining (pp. 15-16) that the increase of Rs. 20 for every 10 horses added to the horse rank is for the maintenance of the 10 horses thus added; while Rs. 500 alone throughout the ascending scale is the salary of the sat rank. The way in which our interpretation fits in with the other known facts makes it abundantly clear that his explanation is not possible. Our interpretation receives further corroboration from an unexpected quarter.

'The custome is,' says Hawkins (Purchas, III, 44-5), 'they [the mansabdārs] are allowed so much living to maintaine that Port which the King hath given them, that is to say; they are allowed twentie Rupias of everie horse by the Moneth, and two Rupias by the Moneth for every horse Fame, for the maintenance of their Table. As thus: A Captaine that hath five thousand horse to maintaine in the warres, hath likewise of Fame other five thousand, which he is not to maintaine in the warres,

but onely for his Table, allowed upon every horse by the Moneth two Rupias, and the other five thousand, twenty Rupias by the Moneth: and this is the pay which the greater part of them are allowed.'

Hawkins means to say that an increase of 10 horses to the horse rank will increase the sat rank salary of the mansabdar by 20 rupees, and will entitle him in addition to 200 rupees, monthly salary of the 10 horsemen entertained by him. 'Horse Fame' is Hawkins' picturesque translation of zāt rank. The sat rank salary agrees with the scale given by Abu'l-Fazl. It is to be noted, however, that this scale does not apply to any rank other than 100. Abu'l-Fazl, to be fair to him, makes the scale applicable to that rank only: but Hawkins seems to make it general. He seems to think that if a mansabdar of 5,000/0 gets the zāt salary, 28,000 rupees (see Table), a mansabdar of 5000/2,500 will get 33,000 rupees as his gat rank salary, and one with the rank 5,000/ 5.000 38,000 rupees—which is not the case (see Table).

To return: Dr. Horn's view of the matter lands him in the obviously absurd position that the manṣabdār with the horse rank 0 is the best off pecuniarily.

The scale of salaries given in Abū'l-Fazl's table

seems to have remained in force through Jahangir's reign. Although we possess no dasturu'l-'amal or directory of Jahangir's or Shah Jahan's time, as we do of Aurangzeb's, we learn that early in Shah Jahan's reign the scale of gat rank salaries was materially revised. For this important information we are indebted to Moreland's enterprise and research. He has done great service by bringing to light some farmans of Shah Jahan's time, which he found in the archives of Jaipur State; and we owe a debt of gratitude to him for having examined them with care and patience, and stated his results with commendable clearness and precision. His conclusions are so well worked out that we can safely transcribe them without discussion or comment. But before doing so it will be convenient to take up the schedule of Aurangzeb's reign, which we possess in its entirety. The following list is taken from a carefully transcribed copy of a carefully written book by a well-informed man:

امين الدين خان by امين الدين (P. U. L. MS.), probably written soon after Aurangzeb's death; and I have verified the results by comparison with a few other MSS, dealing indirectly with the subject.

63

64 THE MANŞABDĀRĪ SYSTEM AND THE MUGHUL ARMY
TABLE OF YEARLY SALARY OF THE ZĀT RANK—(contd.)

		YEARLY SALARY					
No. Zat Rank	First Class		Second Class		Third Class		
		Dams in thou- sands	Rupees	Dāms in thou- sands	Rupees	Dāms in thou- sands	Rupees
18	900	1,500	37,500	1,450	36, 250	1,400	35,000
19	800	1,250	31,250	1,200	30,000	1,150	28,775
20	700	1,100	27.500	1,050	26,250	1,000	25,000
21	600	950	23,750	900	22,500	850	21,250
22	500	800	20.000	750	18,750	700	17,500
23	400	500	12.500	480	12,000	460	11,500
24	300	400	10,000	380	9,500	360	9,000
25	250	350	8,750	330	8,250	310	7,750
26	200	300	7,500	280	7.000	260	6,500
27	150	250	6,250	230	5,750	210	5,250
28	100	200	5,000	180	4,500	160	4,000
29	80	140	3,500	130	3,250	120	3,000
30	60	100	2.500	95	2.375	90	2,250
31	50	<b>8</b> 5	2,125	80	2,000	75	1,875
32	40	;70	1,750	65	` 1,625	60	1,500
33	30	55	1,375	50	1,250	45	1,125
34	20	40	1,000	35	875	30	750

This list, we are glad to find, tallies completely. as far as they cover the same ground, with the one reproduced by Irvine from some dasturu'l-'amals (British Museum MSS.) on p. 8 of Army. These dasturu'l-'amals were prepared about the same time as Ma'lūmātu'l Āfāa.

Our MS, gives the salaries in dams only. We have added the equivalents in rupees to facilitate' comparison with the list on p. 8 of Army on the one hand, and with the zat rank salary table of Akbar's time given above on the other. It should be remembered that although the sat salaries for Akbar's time are given in rupees in the  $\bar{A}$ 'in list, 'all accounts of salaries', we are told, 'are made out in dams: but at the time of making out the estimate he [the soldier] receives one half in rupees, reckoned at thirty-eight dams each. Half of the remainder is paid in muhurs at nine rupees each, and the last quarter is given in dams for stores. When the value of the rupee was raised to forty  $d\bar{a}ms$ , the soldiers, through His Majesty's kindness, received dams at the same rate."

Now we can return to Moreland's documents. A farman of Shah Jahan dated 1630 contains a schedule of emoluments and assignments for eleven

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pp. 50-57 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> A'in, I. 196: Blochmann, 275.

different ranks and classes. It gives totals of the  $g\bar{a}t$  rank salary of the officer and the pay of his troopers, from which Moreland has correctly deduced the two items separately. We are here concerned with the  $g\bar{a}t$  rank salary only. The following comparative table taken from Moreland gives in  $d\bar{a}ms$  the  $g\bar{a}t$  rank salary of the mansabdars in Akbar's time (col. 1), in 1630 (col. 2), and in Aurangzeb's time (col. 3).

Comparative Table of Zāt rank salaries per annum (in thousands of dāms).

Rank and Class	Akbar's reign	1630	Aurangzeb's reign
600 II- 400 II- 400 III- 300 III 300 III 200 II	1320 840 720 600 576 456 432	862 5 478;5 462 379:5 363 313:5 280:5	900 480 460 380 360 280 260
150 III 100 II 80 III 50 III	384 288 168 110'4:	254:1 198- 122:1 75-	210 180 120 75

The differences between items in col. 2 and col. 3 are trivial and unimportant. So the new scale which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Article in J.R.A.S. for October, 19 36, p. 657.

we find in force about the time of Aurangzeb's death was introduced as early as 1630 A.C. or sometime between 1627 and 1630.

From another set of three assignment orders of Shāh Jahān in favour of Rāja Jai Singh (dated 1048 A.H., Rajab, 1060, and Ramazān, 1060, respectively) we learn that the gat salary for the rank 5,000 (I class) on those dates was one crore dams, which conforms exactly to Aurangzeb's schedule.

This is abundant proof that the new scale of salaries which is found both in Ma'lumātu'l-Āfāq and the directories consulted by Irvinel—which refer to the period round about Aurangzeb's death -was in force throughout the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, and was introduced as early as 1630 or even a year or two earlier.

On comparing the sat rank salaries of Akbar's with those of Shah Jahan's or Aurangzeb's time, the first idea that strikes us is that Akbar's mansabdars drew a much higher pay. This is of course true, but it is more than counterbalanced by the fact that while in Akbar's time a mansabdar got only 5% over the pay of his troopers, in the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb he pocketed the pay of two troopers out of every three, or three troopers out of every four; so that a

B. M. MSS. Or. 1690 and Or. 1641.

mansabdārī was a much less profitable business in Akbar's time than in the later reigns, there being practically no sat rank without a suwar rank.1 Further we must remember that in later times the mansabdārī list was much heavier, and not only included several higher ranks but contained a much larger personnel for any given rank. Besides perhaps Akbar felt that after conforming rigorously to the new rules his mansabdārs deserved a generous scale of pay.

Another misunderstanding should be cleared up.

Irvine has the following: 'When reading this table of pay, which shows the sanctioned allowances for a year of twelve months, it must be remembered that few of the officers received the whole twelvemonths' pay, the number of month's pay sanctioned per annum ranging from four to twelve.'2 As the author is talking here of the zāt rank salary, I find no authority for this statement. All that Abu'l-Fazl says is, that 'every year one month's pay is subtracted on account of the horse, the value of which is raised fifty per cent. above prime cost, and for accoutrements; but, as much care is shown in buying horses, this increase is not productive of any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For a fuller computation see p. 82 below.

<sup>2</sup> Army, 7.

loss for the soldier.'1

As we shall see,2 in Shāh Jahān's reign, the salary of suwar rank was paid for from 12 to 5 months in the year. But that has no application to the sat rank. The reason was obvious too: the pay varied with the number of horses kept. So the reader will please note that the salary in the  $\overline{A}$ 'in list was paid' for all the twelve months in the year, notwithstanding Irvine's remark.

It may be noted that the mansabdars had to maintain not only the transport indicated against each rank in our list, but also the emperor's elephants as well as various other animals kept for amusement and curiosity. Abu'l-Fazl tells us that the emperor 'put several halgas in charge of every grandee [amīr], and required him to look after them. The fodder also is now supplied by the government. A trustworthy clerk has, besides, been appionted, who is in charge of the correspondence of this branch; he looks after the receipts and expenditure and sees that the orders of His Majesty are carried Out '8

The following evidence is from European travellers: Monserrate says, 'He [the emperor]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A'in, I, 196; Blochmann, 275.

<sup>\*</sup> See pp. 84-85 below.

<sup>\* \*</sup> A'in. 1. 135; Blochmann, 133-34.

charges them with the maintenance of a certain number of elephants, horses, camels, panthers, fallowdeer and doves, which they have to produce before him on a stated day every year.'1

When travelling near Etawa, Peter Mundy saw some rhinoceroses kept and fed for the emperor. The following occurs in his itinerary under date 20th December, 1632: 'After I was past through, it was told mee the Kinge had sent thither two great Rynocerosses to bee kept and fedd, which I was then ignorant of, otherwise I had seene them, but now it was too late, it being neere night, and 5 or 6 course back.'<sup>2</sup>

### SUWĀR RANK

Towards the end of Akbar's reign we meet, for the first time, with a double rank, i.e., a sat and a suwar rank distinctly so indicated. The formal inauguration of the suwar rank is not found in any history. We see the beginning of it in the following entries:

In 993 A.H. Princes Salīm, Murād and Dāniyāl received, respectively, the mansabs of 12,000, 9,000, and 7,000.<sup>3</sup> Nine years later, Abū'l-Fazl records

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Commentary, 90. This passage will be quoted at fuller length below (Chapter II, Sect. i).

Peter Mundy, II, 186.

Budāyunī, II, 342.

under 1002 A.H. that 'on 7 Farwardin 10.000 cavalry were assigned to the Prince-Royal. Five thousand (of them) received jagirs in Bengal. Among them were......[here follows a list of names]. Four thousand (received jagirs) near Lahore the capital. Among them were...... [another list of names]. One thousand Ahadis were appointed who received pay monthly from the (imperial) treasury.'1

This means that Prince Salīm's zāt rank was increased to 12.000 on the former date, and that he received the suwar rank of 10,000 on the latter. The persons named are the smaller mansabdars who were to serve with the prince.<sup>2</sup>

This is the first place where we find the indication of a suwar rank. In fact it is only by putting the two passages together that we get the composite rank of Prince Salim, which would otherwise have passed unnoticed. Some time before this date the suwar rank must have been silently evolved, of which this is the first concrete instance.

Another peculiar feature here is that 1,000 ahadis are included in the suwar rank. This is perhaps the only instance of the kind. We must remember that the recipient was the heir-apparent.

The following regulation, promulgated in 1004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A.N., III, 649-50 : Tr., 998-99.

For the rules regarding smaller mansabdars serving under bigger ones see below: Ch. II, Sect. i. I Mansabdars and their followers.

A.H., shows that suwār rank was well established by that date: all holders of sāt rank were divided into three classes according as the suwār rank (1) equalled the sāt rank, (2) was less but not less than half the sāt rank, or (3) was less than half the sāt—and their salaries were fixed.

Obviously, it was meant as a further inducement to the mansabdārs to bring to the muster as large a contingent as possible. For an officer with a high sāt rank might be content with a low suwār rank, but with a sufficiently high suwār rank his sāt rank salary would increase, which was in addition to the percentage he got on the suwār rank pay²—and his status would be higher.

Here is the second award of a double mansab: On 29 Dai, XLI R.Y. (1005 A.H.) Mīrza Shāhrukh's rank was fixed at 5,000 sāt and half that number (i.e., 2,500) suwār; and Ujjain and some choice places of Malwa were taken from Shāh Bāz Khān and given him as iāgīr.<sup>3</sup>

On p. 721 of A.N., III, we have the rank of Sultan Daniyal clearly given as 7,000 gat and suwar—a form which was henceforward to be adopted in subsequent histories and official records.

 $<sup>^1</sup>$  A.N., III, 671. Also  $\overline{A}$ 'in, I, 179; Blochmann, 248. See pp. 47-48 above and the tables on pp. 50-57 (end columns).

See under Sect. iv: Troopers' Pay. A.N., III, 717.

During the period 1010-14 A.H. I have counted 37 bestowals of zāt and suwār rank, distinctly so mentioned, in Akbar Nāma. So towards the end of Akbar's reign it had become common form.

In all these cases we have no doubt the holders of the suwar rank had to maintain the full number of cavalry denoted by that rank. In fact, considering the enormous difficulties that had had to be overcome before this solid ground was reached, one would think the number was rigidly adhered to.

But if we study the mansabdari lists in  $\bar{A}$ in or in the Tabagāt, we find a unitary rank, which is presumably the gat mansab. Here and there, as we have said before, the author of the Tabagat speaks of an officer maintaining so many troopers. Ignoring these exceptions, the lists take no notice of suwar rank. This is intelligible: for we have seen that the suwar rank made its appearance about 1002 A.H., and the Tabagāt and  $\bar{A}$ 'īn lists were complied in 1001-2 and 1003-4 respectively, and must refer to the years preceding these dates.

## Jahāngīr

This reign started on the solid foundation laid by Akbar. But there is no evidence that Jahangir appreciated the difficulties that his father had encountered in placing the mansab on a tolerably sound basis. As it is, his reign opened with a heavy shower of mansabs on high and low, and we see that a copious stream of awards flowed throughout the reign. Nobody seems to have thought of the consequences, no minister found it to his interest to suggest a change, check or reform.

lahangir, shortly after his accession, issued a general order regarding confirmation and assignment of jagirs. Here it is in his own words, in all its graphic detail:—'As it was my desire that many of the Akbarī and Jahāngīrī officers should obtain the fruition of their wishes, I informed the bakhshis that whoever wished to have his birthplace made into his jagir should make a representation to that effect, so that in accordance with the Chingiz canon  $(t\overline{u}ra)$  the estate might be conveyed to him by  $\overline{a}l$ tamgha and become his property, and he might be secured from apprehension of change. Our ancestors and forefathers were in the habit of granting jagirs to everyone under proprietary title, and adorned the farmans for these with the al tampha seal, which is an impressed seal made in vermilion (i.e. red ink). I ordered that they should cover the place for the seal with gold-leaf (tilaposh) and impress the seal thereon, and I called this the altun1 tamgha.'2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> More correctly, altun, which I find in more carefully written MSS.

<sup>\*</sup>Tuzuk. 10; R. & B., I. 23.

The double rank is the usual form of the mansab conferred in this reign. The earliest instance of a double rank which Moreland found in Tuzub was 'between p. 60 and p. 71' of R. & B., I<sup>1</sup>—probably the 5,000/5,000 bestowed on Mirzā Ghāzī.<sup>2</sup> But I have found earlier instances: Fifteen days after his accession Jahangir appointed Sharif Khan Vakil and Grand Vizir, and bestowed on him the title "Amīru'l-Umarā", and the rank 5,000/5,000.3 And the rank of Aga Mulla, brother of Asaf Khan, was fixed at 1.000/300.4

But this is only by the way. The fact is that although up to about p. 27 of Tuzuk (i.e., during the first six months of Jahangir's reign) only the gat mansabs are usually given, we should not think that these zāt ranks have no corresponding suwār ranks, They are so given only for brevity.

The current of double mansabs was established. as we have seen, late in Akbar's reign; and from p. 27 of  $T\overline{u}zuk$  onward the double rank is usually given.

But nobody seems to have troubled about the conformity of the suwar rank of an officer to the contingent maintained by him. The number of awards recorded by Jahangir himself and his collaborators,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Moreland's article, p. 642.

ITuzuk. 6.

<sup>\*</sup> Tuzuk. 33 : R. & B., L. 71.

<sup>4</sup> Tuzuk. 27: R. & B., I. 58.

makes any reasonable conformity impossible. We have no definite data to go upon. One example is, however, available: Shāh Beg "Khān Daurān", who held the rank 6,000/5,000 (see Tūzuk, pp. 131 and 266) came from Kabul and 'passed in review a thousand Mughal cavalry, most of whom had Turkī horses, and some 'Irāq and some Mujannas horses.' Jahāngīr was much pleased that in spite of many disabilities Khān Daurān 'could show this body of well-mounted men.'

We see that the cavalry brought to the muster is just one-fifth of the horse rank. And this turn-out was considered exceptionally good. This is just about what we expected.

Towards the end of the reign the fact of the suwār manṣab must have largely drifted into fiction.

## Two- or Three-Horse Rank

In this reign another feature appeared in the mansab. Double ranks and even high double ranks had become so common that a further distinction was considered necessary in special cases.

In X R.Y. Mahābat <u>Khān</u> and <u>Khān</u> Jahān were appointed to serve in the Deccan, and these officers took their leave in the month of *Mihr*. As a mark of special distinction '1,700 horse of those under the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tūzuk, 257; R. & B., II, 61.

command of Mahābat Khān were ordered to have assignments (tankhwāh) for two or three horses given them.'1 This means that out of the total suwar rank of Mahābat Khān 1,700 became du-aspa si-aspa. This is the earliest instance of a du-aspa si-aspa suwar rank on record. And from the somewhat naïve terminology used here we can guess that the form of expression had not yet crystallized.

We may incidentally remark that Mahābat Khān did not do so well in the Deccan as was expected; and the du-aspa si-aspa distinction was withdrawn. and the additional salary, which had been paid on account of it, was ordered to be deducted from his jāgīr.<sup>2</sup> We know, however, that in XIX R.Y. Mahābat Khān received the rank of 7,000/7,000  $(2-3h.).^3$ 

A similar instance is the following, which occurs under XII R.Y.: Owing to certain misbehaviour on the part of 'Abdu'llah Khan "Firoz Jang" Jahangir 'ordered the Diwans to change one thousand of his two-horsed and three-horsed cavalry into onehorsed, and to deduct from his jagir the difference (of pay), which came to 7,000,000 dams.'4 We do not know his suwar rank, nor his du-aspa si-aspa which confirms our opinion that all conferments of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tūzuk, 147; R. & B., I. 299.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 391.

<sup>\*</sup> Tuzuk, 190.

<sup>4</sup> Tuzuk, 208; R. & B., I, 421.

the latter are not recorded. All we know is that on p. 344 of Tuzuk he receives the zāt rank of 6,000.

So we can be sure that up to the end of this reign the 2-3 horse was a special privilege, which was sparingly awarded and jealously guarded.

In the mansabdārī list for Jahāngīr's reign given in Section V the reader will notice that very few amīrs have the distinction of 2-3 horse. As none of the princes is recorded as having this distinction, the probability is that all such cases are not given in the histories. Still it must be admitted that this honour remained very select to the end of Jahāngīr's reign.

We may remark here, by way of explanation, that in 2-3 horse rank the number of men and horses were doubled.<sup>2</sup>

# Shāh Jahān'

When Shah Jahan came to the throne he found things heading the wrong way. Jahangir's administration, which had dwindled into Nur Jahan's rule, had brought confusion and chaos into the finances of the empire and the military organization, which constituted the first charge on them: If Jahangir

<sup>1</sup> See below.

<sup>\*</sup> For fuller details see pp. 85-86 below.

had just managed to keep things at the level to which Akbar's strenuous efforts had brought them. Shāh Jahān would not have been so sore bested. As it is, he found himself confronted with very nearly the same difficulties as his grandfather before him, with the difference that Jahangir's impotent policy of laissez-faire and drift had given the military aristocracy a sort of prescriptive right based on. acquiescence and established usage. The result was that Shah Jahan found it impossible to screw up the mansabdari administration again to the pitch to which Akbar had carried it. What he did under the circumstances bears witness to his statesmanship and foresight, although it must be said to the credit of Akbar's administrative capacity and strength of character that his successors could not even continue to build on the solid foundation laid by him.

On the subject of Shah Jahan's reforms the histories, official and non-official, are silent. these we find nothing but reckless awards of mansabs, which point to a continuation of his father's policy. It is true that the stream of awards flowed even more profusely in this than Jahangir's reign, and gathered momentum as it went. But Shah Jahan seems fully to have realized the gravity of the situation and adopted some important restrictive measures by way of remedy. He knew he could not start a second time with confiscation of existing manṣabs and  $j\bar{a}g\bar{i}rs$ . But with a sure hand he managed to introduce the following reforms:

We have already noted the drastic reductions in the <u>sat</u> rank salaries, which were in force in 1630 A.C. Secondly, as we shall see under Troopers' Pay,<sup>1</sup> the salary of an ordinary trooper was reduced to 8,800 dams a year in or before 1630 A.C. and to 8,000 dams a year in or before 1048 A.H.<sup>2</sup>

But he could go no further—at least, not directly. To insist on the maintenance of a full contingent corresponding to the suwār rank of an officer was beyond his power. Towards the end of Jahāngīr's reign, we guess, the strength of an average contingent must have fallen considerably below 25% of the suwār rank, while full suwār rank salary was drawn by the officer. Shāh Jahān could only save the situation by fixing a percentage and insisting on it as the irreducible minimum. He issued orders that when the mansabdār served in the province where his jāgīr was situated he must maintain a contingent corresponding to one-third of his suwār rank; and if he was posted elsewhere the strength

Sect. iv below.

<sup>\*</sup> See p. 98 below

<sup>\*</sup> See pp. 67-68 above.

of his regiment must not be less than one-quarter of his suwār rank. We learn of this rule incidentally from the passage in B.N., where the author is speaking of the expedition to Balkh and Badakhshān (XIX R.Y.), and says that although those are the rules, owing to the distance of those regions, the manṣabdārs appointed to this expedition were given the special privilege of branding only one-fifth of their horse rank.

We do not know when the \frac{1}{3}-and-\frac{1}{2} rule was promulgated. The words used by 'Abdu'l-Hamid are از ضوابط این دولت والا آنست (B.N., II, 506) which may mean 'among the rules of this empire is the following,' or 'among the rules current in this reign is the following'. Moreland, who has consulted other European scholars also, thinks that the words do not furnish conclusive proof that the regulation was made by Shāh Jahān, but it is probable that it was.1 The question turns on the meaning we attach to the word daulat here. In a similar passage (B.N., I, i, p. 113, l. 17) the author uses the word saltanat in much the same way; and there it means more clearly, I think, 'reign'. So I incline to the view that the word daulat in the passage before us means 'reign'. And all the probabilities of the case point the same

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Article, p. 655.

way. So although this rule is mentioned under XIX R.Y. (1056 A.H.), it was probably introduced quite early in the reign.

Shāh Jahān, on the occasion of his coronation (1037), bestowed the rank 8,000/8,000 (2-3h.) on Yamīnu'd-Daula Āṣaf Khān in absentia. In the following month, on the first Nauroz of the reign, he brought to the muster 5,000 well-mounted and well-equipped cavalry, and received in consequence an increase of 1,000/1,000 (2-3h.), his total rank now becoming 9,000/9,000 (2-3h.).

Under the previous rank his nominal regiment would be 16,000 strong. The 5,000, which he passed for muster, is thus just under 1/3 of his suwār rank. This seemed to qualify him for the horse rank 9,000 (2-3h.), i.e., for 18,000 horse. The quota required seems to be just between 1/3 and 1/4. Was the  $\frac{1}{3}$ -and  $\frac{1}{4}$  rule already in force?

To proceed: This rule was bowing before the inevitable. It meant that a manṣabdār who produced 25 or 33 troopers got the pay for 100 troopers, and coolly pocketed the emoluments of the remaining 75 or 67, which was over and above his gāt rank salary; whereas Akbar had insisted on full strength of the contingents and got 100 troopers when he paid for 100 troopers, allowing only 5% on the pay for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> B. N., I, i, 113 and 193.

odd expenses.1 On the face of it, it was not a favourable arrangement from the point of view of state finance; but it proves that Shah Jahan boldly faced a desperate posture of affairs, brushed away all delusions, and resolved impossible theories into solid facts.

Next Shah Jahan introduced a rule by which the salary varied with the remount. A little preliminary. explanation is necessary before this rule can be stated in an intelligible form.

The term vak-aspa is used either ambiguously or technically by the authorities; so that if we are not careful we are likely to get confused. The ordinary suwar rank with which we have so far dealt<sup>2</sup> was called yak-aspa (i.e., with one horse), as distinguished from du-aspa si-aspa (with two or three horses). This does not mean that each soldier had one horse in the former, and two or three horses in the latter, case.

We have seen that from Mongol times the horse was an extremely important factor in the efficiency of the army. The question of Remount, therefore, received full attention in the military organization

<sup>1</sup> So we can understand that the suwar rank was a much more profitable business under Shah Jahan than under Akbar.

Excepting a couple of items in Jahangir's reign (p. 77 above).

of Mughul India from the first: A trooper with two or more horses deserved and received better treatment and higher emoluments than one with only one horse. Whether a soldier could supply and keep one horse or more depended of course upon his means and resources. The rules in Akbar's time were as follows: Yak-aspa troopers, says Abū'l-Fazl, 'mustered formerly up to four horses, but now the order is not to exceed three.

\* Every Dah bāshī had to muster 2 chahār-aspa, 3 si-aspa, 3 du-aspa, and 2 yak-aspa troopers [i.e., 10 troopers with 25 horses], and the other Manṣabdārs in the same proportion. But now a Dah-bāshī's contingent consists of 3 si-aspa, 4 du-aspa, and 3 yak-aspa troopers [i.e., 10 troopers with 201 horses].'2

Shāh Jahān introduced the following rule<sup>3</sup>: The salary of yak-aspa suwār rank was to be paid not always for 12 months in the year, but for 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 or 5 months, according to the number of remounts in the contingent. In other words, while the number of horsemen remained constant, the number of horses maintained by them varied with the number of months for which the salary was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Blochmann has wrongly 18, which I have corrected to 20.

<sup>\*</sup> A'in. I. 188: Blochmann, 260-61.

<sup>\*</sup> We do not know when.

drawn. From the details given by 'Abdu'l-Hamid Lāhorī (B.N., II, 507) we have constructed the following table:—

A mansabdar with 4,000 or 3,000 suwar rank, who had to maintain, say, 1,000 horsemen, had to keep

Number of months for which salary drawn	Si-aspa	Du-aspa	Yak-ıspa	Total number of horse- men	Total number o
12 11	300 250	600 500	100 250	1,000 1,000	2,200 2,000
10 9 8		800 600 450	200 400 550	1,000 1,000 1,000	1,800 1,600 1,450
7 6		250 100	750 900	1,000 1,000 1,000	1,250 1,250 1,100
5			1,000	1,000	1,000

Now about Du-aspa si-aspa: The 2-3 horse rank, as we have seen, made its appearance towards the end of Jahangir's reign. It grew more common under Shah Jahan. 'Abdu'l-Hamid tells us, in continuation of the passage already referred to, that if the suwar rank was du-aspa si-aspa, the number both of horses and horsemen was doubled. Thus an officer with the horse rank 4,000 (2-3h.), who drew salary for 12 months, had to maintain under the 1/4 rule

600 si-aspa i.e., 2,000 horsemen 1.200 du-aspa with 4,400 horses; 200 yak-aspa

and so on with 11, 10, etc., months.

So the salary of the  $t\bar{a}b\bar{n}a\bar{n}$  in du-aspa si-aspa rank was exactly double the salary in the corresponding yak-aspa rank—a fact incidentally verified by a statement in B.N. (I, i, 113).

### Aurangzeb

In this reign no change of any importance seems to have taken place. That a statesman like Aurangzeb did not venture a single step further towards reform during his long reign of half a century shows that <u>Shāh</u> Jahān had gone as far as a prudent monarch could go.

The following rule of minor importance may, however, be noted. It was ordered in this reign that <u>sat</u>-rank-holders from 300 down should, henceforth, have no <u>suwars</u>, those on duty and <u>zamīndārs</u><sup>1</sup> excepted.<sup>2</sup> In later times no <u>suwars</u> were given to <u>mansabdārs</u> under 500.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 'There are also in this empire other lords who call themselves zamindārs—that is, "lords of land". Among them are many powerful men who could place in the field, more or less, forty thousand soldiers, matchlockmen, archers, and spearmen. Such men do not maintain cavalry: the greater number live in the midst of jungles, and these usually pay no revenue, unless it be taken by force of arms. At this day, taking the whole Mogul empire, these rajahs, great and petty, and the zamindārs, exceed five thousand in number' (Storia, II, 444).

<sup>\*</sup> M. A., 77.

<sup>\*</sup> Mir'ātu'l-Işţilāḥ by Rāi Anand Rām Mukhliş, P. U. L. MS., f. 15a.

### Conditional and Unconditional Suwar Rank

Before taking leave of suwār rank we may note the following: Rāi Anand Rām Mukhlis, who wrote about 1157 A.H., tells us that suwār rank is of two kinds, unconditional and conditional. The former is the rank conferred along with the zāt rank, and the latter goes with the post which the manṣabdār at the time holds. For instance, if he is a faujdār of a certain place, and that appointment carries 500 suwārs, he gets that suwār rank, and holds it so long as he keeps that post.

# Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib's theory

Now we are in a position to deal with the theory propounded by Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib. He makes the somewhat naïve suggestion that the zāt rank represents infantry and the suwār rank cavalry.<sup>2</sup> Such a delightfully simple explanation of such a complicated and troublesome question would indeed be most welcome, and we should be spared so much fruitless speculation and discussion—only if the contention could be proved, or at least a reasonable case made out for it.

The basis of Mr. Rao Sahib's argument is the following passage in Tuzuk: 'On this day Baqir

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mir'ātu'l-lştilāh, P.U.L. MS. f. 15b.

<sup>\*</sup> J.I.H., XIV, 219-21.

Khān [whose manṣab at this time was 1,500/5001] arrayed his men and passed them before me in order. The great Bakhshis recorded (the number as) 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot, and reported to me. Having promoted him to the mansab of 2,000 personal and 1,000 horse, I entrusted the duties of faujdar of Agra to him.'2

This passage does appear at first sight to support Mr. Rao Sahib's theory. But surely we are not justified in giving our assent to a principle of such far-reaching importance without convincing evidence and cogent proof.

We must begin by noting that the instance cited stands severely alone. I have not found a second example to support it. And the parallel of the Hyderabad State adduced by Mr. Rao Sahib is, in my opinion, beside the point.

The author of this suggestion has not thought of the consequences to which his theory would inevitably lead. If he had worked it out to its logical conclusions he would have seen the untenability of the hypothesis.

If every <u>sat</u> rank meant infantry, calculating from De Laët's list, we should arrive at infantry numbering over a million towards the end of Akbar's reign, when strict conformity was insisted upon.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tüzuk, 287; R. & B., II, 120. 
<sup>2</sup> Tüzuk, 327; R. & B., II, 199.

But, as we shall see in the next chapter, Akbar's Infantry, which constituted the fighting force, consisted of no more than 12,000 matchlock-bearers. Again, the total of zāt rank in the Mansabdārī list at the end of XX R.Y. of Shah Jahan's reign comes to about half a million, and seeing that rank-holders under 500 are not included, the figure would certainly exceed a million. But the Badshah Nama tells us clearly that the Infantry at that time comprised 40,000 tufangchis, gunners and bandars, 10,000 of which were at court, and 30,000 in the provincés and in fortresses. Where are the million odd men we have calculated?

All writers on the subject—Blochmann, Horn. Irvine, Moreland—agree that the Mughul infantry was an insignificant force; and this is supported by the figures in the Persian histories.

Again, if we study the figures for Shah Jahan's expeditions to the Deccan and Kandahar, we find that in the large army equipped for the Deccan expedition there is no infantry, or it is so insignificant that it is not considered worth a separate mention; 2 and in the case of the Kandahar expeditions. the total zat rank of the mansabdars deputed, which should be the infantry on Mr. Rao Sahib's hypothesis, amounts to a figure between three and four lakhs; while as a matter of fact we know that the foot which accompanied those expeditions numbered just 10,000, which is quite in keeping with other known facts.<sup>1</sup>

If we look at it from another point of view, the infantry corresponding to the zāt rank would in all cases be paraded at the musters along with the cavalry required. We hardly hear of any mansabdār bringing infantry to the muster.<sup>2</sup> In the few examples we have had occasion to note—and there are many more in the histories—we find that even where details of contingents are given, infantry is not mentioned.<sup>3</sup> And yet a large foot regiment often outnumbering the cavalry would be required in each case according to this theory.

In Akbar's reign we hear a great deal of the manṣabdār's inability to bring to the dāgh the cavalry corresponding to his rank, so much so that the suwār rank was created as a sort of compromise; and in later reigns the number of the cavalry fell so far below the suwār rank that in Shāh Jahān's time we find \frac{1}{3}-and-\frac{1}{4}\ rule in operation. If infantry corresponding to the zāt rank had been de rigueur, we

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The instance cited by Mr. Rao Sahib is one of the very few exceptions.

<sup>\*</sup> See the account of the contingents of Prince Salim (p. 71.), of Shah Beg "Khan Dauran" (p. 76), and of Asaf Khan (p. 82).

should hear of complaints and representations against that hardship too—and possibly consequent relaxation or reduction. But histories are silent. Besides, Mr. Rao Sahib's hypothesis is quite inconsistent with the whole theory of mansabdari, as Moreland and the present writer have tried to work it out, and the burden of finding out an alternative raison d'être of suwār rank lies heavily on Mr. Rao Sahib.

If the gat rank entailed so much infantry, such a simple thing would find prominent mention in the histories, directories, etc., of the period, notably the  $\bar{A}'in$ . Not a hint of it is to be found anywhere.

Again, if gat rank means infantry, we shall be reduced to the position that before Akbar introduced suwār rank, the whole army consisted of infantry —which is contrary to known facts.

Against all this overwhelming evidence, both direct and circumstantial, we have just one case cited by Mr. Rao Sahib. Not only does this case stand alone, but it can be rebutted by the following instance, which is equally definite and clear: 'On the 25th [Farwardin, XII R.Y.]', says Jahangir, 'the contingent of I'timadu-d-daulah passed before me in review on the plain under the iharoka. There were 2,000 cavalry well horsed, most of whom were Moghuls, 500 foot armed with bows and guns, and

fourteen elephants. The bakhshis reckoned them up and reported that this force was fully equipped and according to rule." We are not told here what I'timādu'd-Daula's rank was at this date. But we know that on X New Year's Day he got the rank 6,000/3,000<sup>2</sup> and that early in XIV R.Y. he was promoted to 7,000/7,000.3 So his personal rank on the date in question was at least 6.000, though we cannot be sure of the exact horse rank, of which there may have been silent promotions in the interval. On Mr. Rao Sahib's theory 6,000 infantry ought to have been paraded by I'timadu'd-Daula on this occasion, whereas we have only 500 foot (archers and musketeers). The fact of the matter is that in the case cited by Mr. Rao Sahib the correspondence of numbers is purely accidental: It was only an attempt on the part of Baqir Khan to outdo his compeers and make a bid for the emperor's special favour. The infantry which was not required was mustered as a coup de grace. Similarly in the instance cited above the 500 infantry was no more required by the rules than were the fourteen elephants. And no theory can be based on these appendages which were voluntary contributions, just meant for a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tūzuk, 185; R. & B., I, 374-75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Tuzuk, 137: R. & B., I, 280,

<sup>\*</sup> Tuzuk, 267; R. & B., II, 82.

flourish.

With all respect for Mr. Rao Sahib's scholarship and judgement, we must say that his contention stands unproved.

In conclusion we may quote Moreland's opinion. After discussing the idea of two contingents for the zāt and the suwār rank, and giving the views of Messrs. Horn, Irvine and Vincent Smith on the point, he writes as follows: 'An alternative account has, I understand, been current in India for some time, but the first place where I have found it in print is an article by Mr. Abdul Aziz in the Journal of Indian History for August, 1930 (pp. 138-163). According to this account, the official descriptions mean just what they say: personal rank was purely personal, and by itself involved the maintenance of no troopers, the number of which was denoted, or indicated, by the trooper rank; and an officer with "double rank" had to maintain only one contingent, not two. I do not propose to review the arguments advanced by Mr. Abdul Aziz; taking them as a whole, they seem to me to come very near to actual proof, or, at the least, make this view definitely more probable than that offered by Irvine. later number of the same Journal (August, 1935, pp. 205 ff.) Mr. C. S. K. Rao Sahib arrived independently at the same conclusion regarding trooper rank, and

proceeded to argue that personal rank denoted the strength of a contingent of infantry which every officer had to maintain out of his salary. I hope to discuss the latter contention in the journal where it appeared, and here I will say only that in my judgment the case for infantry contingents is not established."

# SECT. IV: TROOPERS' PAY

Now we can deal with the troopers and their emoluments. It is a somewhat complicated question, and should be handled with care and patience.

The rules and the scale varied in the different reigns; so that it will be convenient to treat of the subject chronologically.

It should be noted, says Moreland, that 'the ordinary trooper owned his horse (or horses) and his arms and other equipment; the pay was more than a personal wage, for it covered a complete fighting unit.'2

# Akbar

We may begin by saying that five p.c. of the troopers' pay went to the mansabdār under whom they served, which reimbursed him 'for various expenses'.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> J.R.A.S. for October, 1936, pp. 644-45, Article, p. 658.

<sup>\*</sup> A'in, I, 196; Blochmann, 275.

A yak-aspa trooper, in this reign, received the following salary according to the kind of his horse:

Kind of horse	Monthly pay of trooper in rupees
'Irāqī	30
Mujannas	25
Turki	20
$Yar{a}bar{u}$	18
Tāzī	15
Jangla	12

In 1004 A.H. a scale of salaries based on the nationality of the trooper was laid down. It may be tabulated as follows:

	Si-a:	spa	Du-a	spa	Yak-aspa		
Nationality of trooper.	Monthly	Yearly	Monthly	Yearly	Monthly	Yearly	
	Dāms	Rs.	Dāms	Rs.	Dāms	Rs.	
Mughul, Afghan and Indian	1,000	300	800	240	600	- 180	
Rājpūt	800	240	600	180	•••		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A.N., III, 672; Tr., 1032.

Ignoring the special scale for the Rājpūts, and calculating on the basis of 3 si-aspa, 4 du-aspa and 3 yak-aspa, which was the rule, we get the total salary, 2,400 rupees a year for 10 troopers with 20 horses: in other words, 240 rupees or 9,600 dāms p.a. for an average trooper. With this average we shall compare the salary during the succeeding reigns.

We have no reason to think that these salaries (after a deduction of 5 p.c. already mentioned) were not paid actually to the troopers during this reign.

# Jahāngīr

There is no evidence that any changes were introduced in this reign, as the Persian histories are silent. Presumably the same rules continued in operation, and there is nothing even to show that they were properly enforced. There is, however, testimony of European witnesses.

Hawkins, as we have seen, gives 20 rupees p.m., or 240 rupees p.a., as the salary of a trooper. Roe's statement is at variance with it:—The rank of Mīr Jamālu'd-Dīn Ḥusain Anjū, he says, 'was esteemed at 5,000 horse, the pay of everie one at 200 rupies by yeare, wherof hee keept 1500 and was alowed the surplase as dead pay' (P. 210). By this quaint

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See pp. 60-61 above.

language Roe means that the rank of Jamālu'd-Dīn was 5,000/1,500, which is not far wrong; for we know from  $T\bar{u}zuk$  (p. 156; R. & B., I, 318) that this gentleman enjoyed at this time the rank 5,000/3,500. The only definite thing that we learn from this passage, however, is that 200 rupees was the yearly salary of a trooper—as against 240 rupees given by Hawkins. The rest is all confusion, for Roe does not understand the system or its dual character.

Neither Hawkins nor Roe tells us whether the salary given by them is of a yak-aspa, a du-aspa or a si-dspa trooper, or else an average of all three. Nor can we reconcile Hawkins' statement with Roe's by assuming that the salary was 240 rupees in Hawkins' time (1609-11) and had been reduced to 200 rupees when Roe was writing this (1616); because, as we shall see, the pay was 220 rupees in 1630 A.C. and 200 rupees in 1048 A.H. The gradual reduction seems to point to Hawkins' figure being the correct one; but no corroboration is available.

In another place, Roe says that each horse is maintained 'at five and twentie pounds sterling by the yeere.' The queer language used does not enlighten us much; but since £25 p.a, cannot be the gat rank salary per horse, it can only be the trooper's

<sup>1</sup> See below.

Roe's Letters, Purchas, IV, 437.

pay. If so, we get Rs. 250 p.a., which is much nearer Hawkins' figure than his own previous one.

### Shāh Jahān

For this reign, as for the previous one, the histories are silent. But, thanks to Moreland's Jaipur documents, we know that troopers' pay engaged the attention of Shah Jahan quite early in the reign. From a farman of 1630 A.C. Moreland has correctly deduced 8.800 dams as the yearly salary of a trooper; and from another farman of 1048 A.H. he works out 8,000  $d\bar{a}ms$  as the yearly salary. We must assume that these are the average salaries of a trooper, like the one we have calculated for Akbar's time. If so, the salary was reduced from 9.600 dams p.a. to 8,800 dams quite early in the reign, and again to 8,000 dams by 1048 A.H. We see that Shah Jahān's drive for economy, where it could be effective, was persistent and determined. Sound statesman that he was, he felt his way as he went.

When comparing the salaries of Akbar's with those of Shāh Jahān's time, the reader will please remember that Akbar got the services of one trooper by paying the salary of one, while Shāh Jahān had to pay for three or four (and sometimes five) troopers to serve the same end.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Article, pp. 646 and 656.

So far things are clear. But, as we have noticed above, in this reign another rule was also in force by which the number of horses varied with the number of months for which the salary was drawn. We do not know when this rule was introduced or how long it continued to operate. But it seems to be inconsistent with the fixed 1-horse, 2-horse and 3-horse salaries which seem to have continued in force from Akbar's reign to the end of Aurangzeb's.<sup>1</sup>

One odd item may be tagged on here: We learn from Muḥammad Wāris that in 1058 A.H. Shā'ista Khān was allowed to draw 5 lakhs of rupees p.a. in cash from the Gujarat treasury as the salary of 3,000 si-bandī horsemen. It comes to Rs.  $166\frac{2}{3}$  as the yearly salary of this particular kind of trooper.<sup>2</sup>

# Aurangzeb

Here Irvine has some useful information to give. Basing his calculations on elaborate tables in some  $Dast\overline{u}ru'l$ -'Amals of Aurangzeb's later years (B.M. MSS.), he arrives at 8,000  $d\overline{a}ms$  or 200 rupees as the yearly salary of a horseman. He continues: 'Dasturul-'Aml, B.M. 6599, fol. 144b, tells us that the number of horses to men among the troopers ( $t\overline{a}b\overline{s}n\overline{a}n$ -i-

<sup>1</sup> See below.

<sup>\*</sup> B.N., III, f. 20a. For si-bandi troopers see Irvine, Army, 166, and the authorities cited there.

barādarī)<sup>1</sup> was according to the rule of dah-bist (lit. "ten-twenty"), meaning apparently that the total number of horses was double that of the number of men. The scale was as follows:—

3 three-horsed men = 9 horses 4 two-horsed men = 8 horses 3 one-horsed men = 3 horses 10 men = 20 horses

That is, with 1,000 men there would be 2,000 horses. The pay of the men with the extra horses was higher, but not in proportion. Thus, a one-horsed man received 8,000 D. or Rs. 200 a year (Rs. 16. 10a. 8p. per mensem), while the two- or three-horsed man got 11,000 D. or Rs. 275 a year (Rs. 22. 14a. 8p. per mensem)."

The horse-and-trooper scale here is the same as in  $\overline{A}$ 'in, given above. Does it mean that it continued unchanged right down to the end of Aurangzeb's time? Bernier corroborates it by saying that 'two horses are generally allowed to one trooper, in order that the service may be better performed; for in those hot countries it is usual to say that a soldier with a single horse has one foot on the ground.'8 If this rule continued, we cannot reconcile it with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Moreland says (Article, p. 661, n. 1) he has seen the MS., and the word there is not barādari, but barāwardi. It is certainly a more likely reading.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Army, 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Bernier, 212.

Shāh Jahān's 'Rule of Months', as Moreland calls it; for under this Rule the number of horses is double the number of horsemen only in the case the salary was drawn for 11 months in the year.

Further, why should a two-horsed man get the same salary as a three-horsed man, viz., Rs. 275 a year. Irvine's Dastūru'l-'Amals are not available to us, and we do not know exactly what they say. Is it permissible to guess that Rs. 275 is the average salary of two-horsed and three-horsed troopers, the actual salary of the two being something like Rs. 250 and Rs. 300 respectively?

Manucci, who belongs to Aurangzeb's reign, places the salary of a trooper at 30 rupees p.m.; and Bernier says, 'he that keeps only one horse shall not receive less than five-and-twenty roupies a month, and on that footing he [the emperor] calculates his accounts with the Omrahs.'2

The question is often asked whether the soldiers were regularly paid. In this connection the following is of interest:

'In later times,' says Irvine, 'pay due from the imperial treasury to the manṣabdārs, as well as that due from the manṣabdārs to the private soldiers, was always in arrears. In fact, we should not go far wrong, I think, if we asserted that this was the case

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Storia, II, 376.

in the very best times.' The remark, as far as it applies to the later Mughul times, is in all probability correct: but its extension to 'the very best times' is. I think, unjustified. Irvine made a special study of the later Mughul times, and all the examples cited here2 belong to that period. We have no evidence that payments were not regular in the earlier reigns. In fact it appears that even as late as the early part of Aurangzeb's reign the soldiers were paid regularly enough. From the cautious and judicious Bernier we have the following: 'It is also important to remark the absolute necessity which exists of paying the whole of this army every two months, from the omrah to the private soldier; for the King's pay is their only means of sustenance. In France, when the exigencies of the times prevent the government from immediately discharging an arrear of debt, an officer, or even a private soldier, may contrive to live for some time by means of his own private income; but in the Indies, any unusual delay in the payment of the troops is sure to be attended with fatal consequences; after selling whatever trifling articles they may possess, the soldiers disband and die of hunger. Towards the close of the late civil war, I discovered a growing disposition in the troopers to sell their horses, which they would, no

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Army, 13.

doubt, soon have done if the war had been prolonged. And no wonder; for consider, My Lord, that it is difficult to find in the Mogol's army a soldier who is not married, who has not wife, children, servants, and slaves, all depending upon him for support (Pp. 220-21).

Towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign, as we all know, things were on the down grade. The following-account from the pen of Niccolao Manucci is certainly graphic, though possibly somewhat exaggerated: 'The generals and officers keep to no fixed rules in paying their soldiers, for to some they will give twenty or thirty rupees, to others forty, fifty, or a hundred. Usually they make great promises, but not even a half is received, each one paying according to his caprice and the reputation that he is emulous of acquiring for his efficient retinue or establishments. The wretched soldiers naturally agree to anything, all the more readily since they have no other means of livelihood. All this contributes much to the bad payment of everyone that is so common; for the money they get comes to them only in driblets, and when all is said and done it does not come to a great deal. For in respect of one year's service they receive six or eight months' pay. Even that is not all in coin; they are always foisted off as respects two months' pay with clothes and

old raiment from the household. Over and above this, there is almost always due to them the pay for two or three years' service. The soldiers are obliged to borrow money at interest from the sarrāfs, or money-changers. These men lend to them, it is true, but it is hardly ever without a command from the general or officer; and these latter have an understanding with them about the profit from interest, which they share between them.

Sometimes the soldiers sell their papers to these money-changers, who for a note of hand for one hundred rupees will give them twenty or twenty-five. It is by these and such-like extortions that these generals ruin the wretched soldier, who, unable to find other means of gaining his bread, is forced to remain on in his service. Speaking generally, it is impossible for them to escape such extortions, for these disorders reign throughout all the princes' establishments. If anyone resigns service at his own request, they deduct two months' pay.'

The manṣabdar had in addition to maintain a subordinate establishment. Irvine has the following, based on a MS. written in 1118 A.H.:—

'An establishment of farriers, blacksmiths' forges, and surgeons had to be maintained by each mansabdar, according to the following scale...... The Mirāt-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Storia, II, 378-79.

i-Aḥmadī, ii, 118, states that thirty men on foot were required to be entertained for every 1000 of manṣab rank. These included water-carriers, farriers, pioneers, matchlockmen and bow-men' (Army, 52-3).

Now that we have dealt with the sat and the suwār rank salary at length, we may remark that, as regards payment of salary, manṣabdārs were of two kinds. Usually a manṣabdār was assigned a jāgīr, the assessed income of which was equivalent to the total of his sāt salary and the pay of his tābīnān. Occasionally the pay was disbursed in cash from the treasury in lieu of the income of the jāgīr. 'A certain number of officers and soldiers, chiefly those of the infantry and artillery, who were, as a rule, on the pay list of the emperor himself, were paid in cash. This seems to have been the case in all reigns up to quite the end' (Army, 14).

# SECT. V. MANŞABDĀRĪ FIGURES

We may now consider the actual number of mansabdars of each rank. This varied not only from reign to reign, but from year to year, from month to month and from day to day; for the conferment of a mansab was a daily occurrence at the Mughul court. It is obvious, therefore, that a survey of these statistics is possible only at a certain

given date, more or less arbitrarily chosen.

We propose to take up each reign in order, and take our stand in each case at a selected point (or points) of vantage.

#### Akbar

During this reign the mansabdārī, as the reader has seen, passed through vicissitudes and stages of reconstruction; so that we can only take stock of it as it stood towards the end of that reign. The following details stand out:

The  $g\bar{a}t$  ranks ranged from 12,000 down to 10. The top ranks were of course held by the princes. The maxima reached by them are as follows:

Salīm ....12,000/10,000 Budāyūnī, II, 342 and A.N., III, 649-50.

Murād .... 9,000 Budāyūnī, II, 342.

Dāniyāl .... 7,000/7,000 A.N., III, 721.

Khusrau ....10,000 , , , 839.

In these cases and those that follow it need not be supposed that these ranks were held by these princes and nobles at the same time. The apparent anomaly of a grandson enjoying a higher mansab than two sons (his uncles) is thus explained. Khusrau got this mansab a few months before Akbar's death, when both Murād and Dāniyāl had passed away.

Next to Akbar's sons and grandsons came the

very élite of the nobility, who were either the emperor's special relations or men with a particularly distinguished record.

Rāja Mān Singh
(whose sister was married to Salīm) .... 7,000/6,000 A.N., III, 839.
"Khān-i-A'zam"

Mīrzā 'Azīz Koka (Akbar's foster-

brother) .... 7,000/6,000 ,, ,, 806.

Beveridge says (A.N., Tr., III 1257, f. n. 3) that according to the I. O. MS. of A.N. Mīrzā Shāh Rukh (who, as we have seen, enjoyed the rank of 5,000/2,500) was given the rank 7,000/5,500. But this must be a mistake, for Jahāngīr says, 'I promoted Mīrzā Shāhrukh, grandson of Mīrzā Sulaimān, (once) the ruler of Badakhshan, who was nearly related to my family, and held the rank of 5,000 in my father's service, to the rank of 7,000.'1

Over thirty officers attained to the rank of 5,000 at one time or another.

Abū'l-Fazl's list, which comes down to XL R. Y. (1003-1004 A.H.), gives the following numbers for the various ranks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tūzuk, 11; R. & B., I, 26-27.

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Rank	Number of Rank-hol	ders
10,000	1 (Salim)	,
8,000	1 (Murād)	
7,000	1 (Dāniyāl)	
5,000	30	
4,500	2	
4,000	9	
3,500	2	Dead or alive in XL R. Y.
3,000	17	or a
2,500	8	live
2,000	27	₽.
1,500	7	L B
1,250	1	K
1,000	31	
900	38	
800	2	
700	25	
600	4	
	,	

Rank	Num	ber of Rank-holders
500	46	)
400	18	
350	19	
300	33	
250	12	
200	81	
150	53	Alive in XL R. Y.
120	1	in
100	250	13
80	91	
60	204	
50	16	
40	260	
30	39	
20	250	
10	224	
***************************************		J <sub>.</sub>
Total	1,803	

(Ā'īn, I, Ā'īn 30, pp. 222-32; Blochmann, 320-595).

The ranks given here, the reader is reminded, are zāt ranks in all cases. Abū'l-Fazl takes no account of suwār rank.

Next we have a manṣabdārī list in the Tabaqāt of Nizāmu'd-Dīn Aḥmad, which comes down to XXXVIII R. Y. (1001 A.H.), and which gives manṣabdārs of 500 and above. This list gives all manṣabdārs dead or alive in the regnal year above mentioned. Here in many cases the ranks of the amīrs are not given, they being only described as amīrs. İn the majority of cases the zāt rank is specifically given; and in seven cases the rank given is specified as the suwār rank.

Although both these lists refer to approximately the same time, there are irreconcilable discrepancies. The  $\bar{A}$  in list, as far as it goes, is authentic, clear and definite.

Further, important mansabs were awarded during the last decade of Akbar's reign. A list compiled by me includes over sixty conferments during this period. Probably there are more. But this is only a running record.

As in all these lists living and dead recipients are mixed up, no serviceable estimate of the *manṣabdārī* strength (at any given time) in Akbar's reign can be constructed from them.

The only mansabdari list which purports to give

the peerage figures, as they stood at one time, is the one given by De Laët. The time assigned is the end of Akbar's, or the beginning of Jahāngīr's, reign. Relevant portions of the list are as follows:

,Rank	Number of Rank-holders
5,000	8
4.500	9
4,000	25
3,500	30
3,000	36
2,500	42
2,000	45
1,500	51
1,000	55
700	58
500	80
400	73
350	58

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Rank	Number of Rank-holders
360	72
250	85
200	150
150	242
100	300
80	245
60	397
40	298
30	240
20	232
10	110
4	741
3	1,322
2	1,428
1	950

(The Empire of the Great Mogol; tr., J. S. Hoyland; annot., S. N. Banerjee; p. 113).

The last four items, as the editor points out, are Aḥadīs with 4, 3, 2, and 1 horse respectively, the total number being 4,441.

Now, in the first place, De Laët makes no distinction between zāt and suwār rank and commits the usual mistake of assuming the zāt rank to signify the contingent maintained by each mansabdār; and, multiplying each rank by the number of the rankholders and adding up the results, arrives at a total of the Mughul army, dropping a hint, however, that the contingents given are only those required in theory, and are rarely maintained in practice. As the reader knows, this assumption is unwarranted, and the proviso unnecessary. In the list given above I have refrained from giving his totals, as they are misleading and useless.

The second point is that while there is a rough sort of correspondence between the  $\overline{A}$ in and the  $Tabaq\overline{a}t$  lists, De Laët's list stands apart: while the former two give practically all conferments of manṣabs in Akbar's reign, the latter gives only the manṣabs held in or about 1605.

If we compare the  $\overline{A}$ 'in list with De Laët's, we are struck by the fact that with one important and two unimportant exceptions De Laët's figures are far in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Nor does the editor object to this unlawful procedure.

excess of Abu'l-Fazl's, the more so considering the fact that in case of ranks above 500 the  $\bar{A}$ 'in list gives all mansabdars dead or alive in XL R. Y., many of whom must have died before 1605. But we know that necessary reforms having been effected, and the mansabdārī placed on a sound footing, new mansabs were freely granted in the fifth decade. Some of these are set down in A.N., but many more, particularly the lower ranks, must have gone unrecorded. Abū'l-Fazl, writing apparently in XL R. Y., says, 'Scarcely a day passes away on which qualified and zealous men are not appointed to mansabs or promoted to higher dignities. Many Arabians and Persians also come from distant countries, and are honoured with commissions in the army, whereby they obtain the object of their desires.'1

Now for the exceptions: The important exception is the case of 5,000 rank, where the number in the  $\bar{A}'\bar{\imath}n$  list is 30, while that in De Laët's is 8. This seems out of keeping with the general position; but if we look closer, it can be explained. We learn from Blochmann's biographies and other sources that out of the 30 in the  $\bar{A}'\bar{\imath}n$  list only the following seven were living at Akbar's death:

- (1) Sultān Khusrau.
- (2) Mīrzā Shāh Rukh.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A'in, I, 232; Blochmann, 595.

- (3) Mīrzā Rustam.
  - (4) "Khān i-A'zam" Mīrzā 'Azīz Koka.
  - (5) Sa'īd Khān.
  - (6) "Khān Khānān" Mīrzā 'Abdu'r-Raḥīm.
  - (7) Rāja Mān Singh.

Out of these Nos. (1), (4) and (7), as we know, were promoted to higher ranks. This leaves four. The following received 5,000 rank in the last decade:

(1) Zain <u>Kh</u> ān Koka	A.N., III	, 701.
(2) Ṣādiq <u>Kh</u> ān	,, ,,	**
(3) Jagan Nāth	11 19	<b>7</b> 86.
/ · \		

- (4) Abū'l-Fazl " " 805. (5) <u>Sh</u>āh Beg <u>Kh</u>ān " " 815.
- (6) Qilīj Khān " " 820.
- (7) Rāja Bikramājīt (Rāi Patr

Dās) , , 826.

Out of these Nos. (1), (2) and (4) died before Akbar's death, leaving four alive. Thus we get eight manṣabdārs of 5,000, who were living in 1605. And De Laët has eight!

We have tested this case, first, because it is exceptional, and De Laët's figure prima facie seems unlikely, secondly, it relates to a high and important mansab, all conferments of which were presumably recorded in A.N. We cannot apply the same test to other mansabs, because the record of lower

mansabs in A.N. cannot be complete. De Laët having stood the test triumphantly in this case, we feel some confidence in his figures for other ranks, though we cannot verify them from any other source.

De Laët, we may remark in conclusion, does not give the ranks of the princes and nobles above 5,000. Again, the following mansabs are not in De Laët's list: 1,250, 900, 800, 600, 120 and 50. Possibly these were discontinued in the fifth decade. And 20 and 10 were presumably discouraged, so that their numbers fell. These are the two unimportant exceptions referred to above.

Writers from De Laët downwards have tried to base an estimate of the Mughul army on the manṣabdārī lists. We can now see how absurd that procedure would be.

We may presume that towards the end of Akbar's reign every manṣabdār had a zāt and a suwār rank distinctly fixed; and in all probability he entertained cavalry corresponding to his suwār rank. Our information about the suwār rank of the manṣabdārs being practically nill, however, no estimate of Akbar's army can be based on that rank.

We see that towards Aurangzeb's time the rank 10 disappeared altogether.

# Jahāngīr

The following  $\underline{sat}$  ranks of 1,000 and above are mentioned in the histories: 40,000, 30,000, 20,000, 15,000, 12,000, 10,000, 8,000, 7,000, 6,000, 5,000, 4,500, 4,000, 3,500, 3,000, 2,500, 2,000, 1,800, 1,700, 1,500, 1,400, 1,300, 1,200, 1,000.

We see that the upper limit, which had touched 12,000 in Akbar's reign, shot up to 40,000 in this.

The Persian chronicles of this reign offer no comprehensive manṣabdārī list giving the whole manṣabdārī personnel at any one time. The following facts are culled from a rather full list of manṣab awards which I have compiled from contemporary histories. In all cases in the following tables only the highest ranks reached in the reign are given:

#### **PRINCES**

No.	Rank-holder		Rank		Aut	hority
1 2 3 4	Parvez <u>Kh</u> urram <u>Sh</u> ahryār Dāwar Ba <u>khsh</u>	•••	40,000/30,000 30,000/20,000 12,000/8,000 8,000/3,000	•••	Tūzuk,	360. 195 347 361

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No.	Rank-holder		Rank	Autho	ority
1	Mīrzā <u>Sh</u> āh Ru <u>kh</u>	•••	7,000	Tūzul	k, 11
2	I'timādu'd-Daula	•••	7,000/7,000	.,	267
3	"Khān-i-A'zam" M	īrzā			
	'Azīz Koka	•••	7,000/5,000	••	355
4	Mahābat <u>Kh</u> ān				
	" Khan Khanan"		7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	,,	391
5	"Khān Khānān"				
	'Abdu'r-Raḥīm		7,900/7,000 (2-3 h.)	••	412
<b>~</b> 6	Āṣaf <u>Kh</u> ān		7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	**	414
7	Qilîj <u>Kh</u> ān		6,000/5,000	**	96
8	Murtazá <u>Kh</u> an	•••	6,000/5,000	••	117
9	Islām <u>Kh</u> ān	•••	6,000/6,000		125
10	Khān Daurān		6,000/5,000	, '*	131 &
11	Khān Jahān		6,000/6,000	,,	266 184
12	'Abdullāh <u>Kh</u> ān		6,000	, m	344
13	I'tibar Khan				
	"Mumtāz <u>Kh</u> ān "		6,000/5,000	**	359

Awards of the rank 5,000 (not counting occasions where only suwār rank was promoted with the same zāt rank) are about 50.

Just as for 1605 we had De Laët's list (dealt with above), so for 1609-11 we have Hawkins'. William Hawkins, who was at Agra from 16 April, 1609, to 2 November, 1611, is a very important eye-witness. He was a mansabdar himself, and presumably knew the working of the system from inside. Under the circumstances we should expect an authoritative statement from him. What we actually get is something different. He says: 'As Christian Princes use their degrees by titles, so they [Mughul Princes and Nobles] have their Degrees and Titles by their number of horses.'

'They that be of the fame of twelve thousand Horsemen', he continues, 'belong to the King, and his Mother, and eldest Sonne, and one more, who is of the bloud Royall of Uzbeck, named Chan Azam. Dukes be nine thousand Fame, Marquesses five thousand Fame, Earles three thousand, Viscounts two thousand, Barons a thousand, Knights foure hundred, Esquires an hundred, Gentlemen fifty, Yeomen from twentie down-wards. All they that have these numbers of Horsemen, are called Mansibdars, or men of Livings, or Lordships. Of these there be three thousand, that is to say, foure be of twelve thousand Horse a-piece, and they be the King, his Mother, Sultan Pervis, Prince, and Chan Azam. Of nine thousand Aorsemen there

be three, that is to say, Sultan Chorem, the Kings third Sonne, Chanchanna, and Kelich Chan. five thousand there bee eighteene, named Hasuff Chan, Chan Ichan, Abdula Chan, Raga Manging. Ray Durga, Raga Sursing, Ramadas Rechuva, Raga Bassu, Emirel Umera, Mahabet Chan, Chan Dowran, Sedris Chan, Hogio Bey Mirza, Mirza Cazi, Ettebar Chan, Abulfet Dekenny, Jelam Cully Chan. Sheik Ferid. Of three thousand there be two and twentie, to wit, Chan Alem, Imirza Ereg, Imirza Darab, Hogio Jahan, Hogio Abdal Hassan, Mirza Gaysbey, Mirza Shemchadin, Mirza Chadulla, Seffer Chan, Kazmy Chan, Mirza Chin Kelich, Saif Chan, Lalla Bersingdia, Mirza Zeady, Mirza Ally Ecberchuly, Terbiat Chan, Mirza Laschary, Mirza Charucogly, Mirza Rustem, Ally Merdon Badur, Tasbey Chan, Abulbey. The rest bee from two thousand downwards till you come to twentie Horses, two thousand nine hundred and fiftie. Of Horsemen, that receive pay monethly, from sixe Horse to one, there be five thousand, these bee called Haddies. Of such Officers and men as belong to the Court and Campe, there be thirtie sixe thousand, to say, Porters, Gunners, Watermen, Lackeyes, Horse-keepers, Elephant-keepers, Small shot, Frasses, or Tent men. Cookes. Light bearers, Gardiners, Keepers of all kind of Beasts. All these be payd monethly out of the Kings Treasurie, whose

Wages be from ten to three Rupias.

All his Captaines are to maintaine at a sevennights warning, from twelve thousand to twentie Horse, all Horsemen three Leckes, which is three hundred thousand Horsemen: which of the Incomes of their Lordships allowed them, they must maintayne.'1

In order to test the details here given by Hawkins I have made a rough-and-ready sort of list of mansabdārs according to the ranks they held about 1609-11; and I find that Hawkins' account, accurate in many details, is yet full of serious mistakes, especially in the upper orders.

Now for details :-

12,000: The Emperor, although at the head of the aristocracy ex officio (from the times of ChingIz Khān and Tīmūr), was never included in the manṣabdārī list, and certainly never had a manṣab. Nor was any lady given any manṣab as far as we know. Parvez probably had 12,000 rank at this date; but Mīrzā 'Azīz Koka "Khān-i-A'zam" never rose higher than 7,000; and Hawkins ought to have known that no nobles as a rule went beyond that rank. So three entries out of four are wrong.

9,000: I regret I have not found this rank men-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Purchas, III (William Hawkins), pp. 29-30.

tioned anywhere in  $T\bar{u}zuk$ , and it probably never existed in this reign. As for the names, <u>Khurram</u> was promoted from 8,000/5,000 straight to 10,000/5,000 in <u>Muharram</u>, 1020 (=March, 1611), when Hawkins was still at Agra ( $T\bar{u}zuk$ , 93), and 'Abdu'r-Raḥīm "<u>Khān Khānān</u>" got only 6,000 <u>zāt</u> in May, 1612, when Hawkins had gone (Ibid., 108); while Qilīj <u>Khān</u> barely attained to 6,000/5,000 during Hawkins' stay at Agra (Ibid., 96). So here all the three entries are fictitious.

Hawkins has altogether omitted the ranks 7,000 and 6,000; although we know definitely that "Khān-i-A'zam" Mīrzā 'Azīz Koka enjoyed the 7,000 zāt rank¹ at this date, and Qilīj Khān, to whom Hawkins assigns 9,000, got the rank 6,000/5,000 when Hawkins was staying at Agra. Again, I do not understand why he has given the rank-holders of 3,000 in full, and omitted altogether those of 4,500 and 4,000, both of which are more important, the latter carrying a large personnel besides.

Now as regards his lists for 5,000 and 3,000: The numbers in Hawkins' list are slightly in excess of those in mine in both cases—which can be explained by a likely supposition that all awards are not recorded in Tūzuk. Here the mistakes are fewer and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tüzuk, 70. R. & B. wrongly translate the rank of 7,000 as 7,000 rupees (I, 148).

not so serious. The entries under 5,000 are, I think, substantially correct, excepting one or two possible exaggerated ranks, and one or two others which cannot be verified. The list for 3.000 is not so satisfactory. The better part of it cannot be verified from  $T\bar{u}zuk$ . The rest is either correct or likely to be correct (the actual mansab not being given in the histories).

We had expected Hawkins' statement would occupy the same position for 1609-11 as the De Laët list did for 1605; but its contents do not justify that position. On the whole this document is unsatisfactory, specially in the upper ranks.

# Shāh Jahān

This is the only reign for which we possess mansabdārī tables, properly digested and classified.

'Abdu'l-Hamid, who wrote a history of the first twenty years of Shah Jahan's reign, gives a full list of awards of mansabs in each of the two decades; and Muḥammad Salih, who compiled a complete history of the reign, has a comprehensive list at the end of 'Amal-i-Sālih. All these lists give both zāt and suwār ranks.

'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd's mansabdārī lists show every sign of being carefully prepared, the mansabdars who died during the decade being clearly so mentioned, with the date or year of their death marked against

their names. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ's list, on the contrary, is often careless. Apparently it gives all  $mansabd\bar{a}rs$  of the reign whether dead or alive at the end of the reign; and, what is worse, the dead ones are not so indicated in all cases. Besides I have also noted a few omissions. So the A.S. list is not entitled to the same respect as the B.N. ones, and is not nearly as useful.

The following table, which is compiled from all the three lists, gives the mansabs of the princes and the  $umar\bar{a}$  of rank above 5,000:

				RANK	
Š	Rank-holder		I Decade <sup>1</sup>	II Decade <sup>a</sup>	III Decade³
-	Dara Shukoh	:	15,000/9,000	20,000/20,000 (10,000 2-3 h.) 60,000/40,000 (30,000 2-3 h.).	60,000/40,000 (30,000 2-3 h.).
0	Shab Shuja	•	12,000/7,000	15,000/10,000 (8,000 2-3 h.)	20,000/15,000 (2-3 h.).
, m	Aurangzeb	:	12,000/7,000	15,000/10,000 (8,000 2-3 h.)	20,000/15,000 (2-3 h. <sup>1</sup> .
4	Murad Bakhsh	:	:	12,000/9,000	15,000/12,000 (8,000 2·3 h.).
10	Sulaiman Shukoh	:	:	:	15,000/3,000.
9	Spihr Shukoh	:	:	i	8,000/3,000.
7	Zainu'd-Dîn	:	:	i	7,000/2,000.
00	Sultan Muhammad	:	:		7,000/2,000.
].	1 B.N., I, ii, 292-93.		• Ibid., II, 717-18.		* A.S., III, 448-50.

# NOBLES

2			RANK	
ó	Kank-noider	I Decade¹	II Decade*	III Decade
н	"Yaminu'd-Daula" Aşaf Khān "Khān Khanan"	9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)	9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)	:
Ñ	Mahabat Khan "Khan Khanan"	7,000/7,000 (2·3 h.)	;	:
က	Khan Jahan Lodi	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	:	:
4	Khān Daurān Bahādur "Nuṣrat Jang"	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.)	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	:
ທ	Khwaja Abu'l-Ḥasan	6,000/6,000	:	:
9	A'gam Khan	000/9/000/9	000/9/000/9	6,000/6,000.
	"Abdullah Khan Bahadur "Firoz Jang"	000'9/000'9	000/9/000/9	:
œ	Afzal Khan, Dastür-i-	6,000/4,000	7.000/4.000	:
Φ.	"Ali Merdān Khān "Amiru'i-Umarā"	:	[7,000/7,000 in A.S. list] 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.).
91	Sa'td Khan Bahadur "Zafar Jang"	:	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.).

			_		
=	11 Islam Khan "Jumdatu'l- Mulk"	:	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.).	
23	"Allami Sa'dullah Khan "Madaru'l-Mahamm"		7,000/7,000	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.).4	
13	13 Sayyid Khan Jahan	:	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.)	i	
14	14 Sayyid Jalal Bukhari, 5adru's-Şudīr	:	6,000/2,000	i	
15	Khusrau, son of Nagr Muhammad Khān		6,000/2,000	6,000/5,000.	
16	16 Mahataja Jaswant Singh	÷	:	6,000/6,000 (5,000 2-3 h.).	
17	17 Rustam Khan Bahadur "Firoz Jang"	:	:	6,000/6,000 (5,000 2-3 h.).	
8	Mu'azzam Khan	:	:	6,000/6,000	
1	1 B W T :: 202 023	01 212 21 6:11 6		00 077 AAA 0 K 8	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A.S., III, 448-50. \* Ibid., II, 717-18. <sup>1</sup> B.N., I, ii, 292-93.

<sup>•</sup> The highest rank achieved by Sa'dullah Khan was either 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.) or 7,000/7,000 See B.N., III, ff. 18b, 23a and 41b; (2-3 h.). The authorities are in conflict, and not always consistent. A.S., III, pp. 62, 69, 100, 108 and 449.

In the following table are given the numbers of mansabdārs of ranks from 5,000 to 500 in the first and the second decade of the reign respectively:

Rank	NUMBER OF RANK-HOLDERS					
Kank	I Decade¹			II Decade²		
		Dead	Alive		Dead	Alive
5,000	25	(10	15)	20	( 5	15)
4,000	30	(12	18)	20	(10	10)
3,000	38	(12	26)	44	. (10	34)
2,500	17	( 5	12)	11	(6	5)
2,000	48	(9	39)	51	(10	41)
1,500	47	(17	30)	52	(17	35)
1,000	80	(34	46)	97	(27	70)
900	19	( 5	14)	23	(5	18)
800	52	(15	37)	40	(10	30)
700	49	(13	36)	60	(8	52)
600	<sup>′</sup> 45	(14	31)	30	( 5	25)
500	134	(25	109)	114	′ (14	100)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> B.N., I, ii, 293-328.

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid., II, 719-52.

Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ's list, which stands on a different basis and applies to the whole of the reign, is summarized below as far as ranks 5,000 to 500 are concerned. This list is of doubtful utility and perhaps of impeachable authenticity. For the sake of completeness it is given here for all it is worth.

Rank	Number of Rank-holders <sup>1</sup>		
5,000	32		
4,000	31		
3,000	57		
2,500	24		
2,000	66		
1,500	72		
1,000	138 [Correct: 128] <sup>8</sup>		
900 ·	31		
800	81		
700	77 [Correct: 76] <sup>2</sup>		
600	57		
500	180 [Correct: 175]*		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A.S., III, 450-89.

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$  Where the totals given in A.S. are wrong, I have given correct ones within square brackets.

Note.—I have not distinguished the dead from the living in the above list, because Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ has not noted all the dead ones. So giving the number of those mentioned by him as dead would mislead the reader.

The reader will notice that the ranks in this reign range up to 60,000 in case of princes and to 9,000 in case of nobles. But if we look a little closer. we shall find that both these limits are extreme cases. Dārā Shukoh enjoyed the rank 30,000/20,000 (10.000 2-3 h.) up to 23 Rabī' I, 1066. Within two years from that date his rank rose by two successive strides to 60,000/40,000 (30,000 2-3 h.). This extraordinarily rapid promotion was due partly to the fact that the emperor thought the prince was practically in the act of succeeding to the throne, and partly (as was indeed actually expressed) to the emperor's appreciation of the prince's devotion and service during the former's illness, which brought revolution and struggle in its train, and which upset all the plans and calculations of the aged emperor.

Āṣaf Khān's manṣab (9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)) is equally exceptional. Āṣaf Khān's energetic and unscrupulous action at Jahāngīr's death had gone a long way towards checkmating Nūr Jahān's plans and ambitions, and securing the throne to Shāh Jahān. No wonder that Āṣaf Khān occupied a

unique position among the nobility: not only had nobody else an equal rank either with or after him, but none was considered worthy of even the next highest rank of 8,000.

As for the lower limit, no mansabdars below 500 are considered eligible for entry in these lists.

# Aurangzeb

For this reign it will be sufficient to give the holders of the higher ranks in a tabular form.

#### PRINCES

(a) SONS

No.	Rank-holder	,	Rank	Authority
1	Muhammad Mu'azzam 'Alam	<u>Sh</u> ah 	40,000/40,000	M.A., 370.
2	Muḥammad Kām Ba <u>khsh</u>	•••	40,000/40,000	., 473.
3	Muḥammad Sultān	•••	20,000/10,000	" 139.
4	Muḥammad Aʻzam		20,000/ 9.000	., 156.
5	Muḥammad Akbar	•••	10,000/ 2,0001	., 121.
Ti.	· ·			

<sup>1</sup> The text, which says 22,000/2,000, seems wrong. Reading 8,000 for 20,000 as his previous rank, I think this must be 10,000/2,000.

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#### (b) GRANDSONS

No.	Rank-holder		Rank	Authority
6	Bedär Ba <u>kh</u> t		15,000/12.000	M.A., 470.
7	Muḥammad Muʻizzuʻd-Dīn		12,000/10,000	., 470.
8	Muḥammad 'Azīm		10,000/ 2,000	347.
9	Rafīʻu'l-Qadr		8,000/ 7,000	347.
10	Muḥyīu's-Sunnat	•••	7,000/ 2,000	., 470.

#### **NOBLES**

No.	Rank-holder	Rank		Authority
1	Nijābat <u>Kh</u> ān	7,000/7,000	•••	Al. N., 54.
2	<u>Kh</u> ān Jahān "Amīru'l- Umarā"	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)		,, 130.
3	Muʻazzam <u>Kh</u> an "Mir Jumla"	7,000/7,000 '5,000 2-3	h.)	,, 741.
4	Ja'far <u>Kh</u> ān	7,000/7,000 (4,000 2-3	h.)	., 869.
5	Rāja Jai Singh	7,000/7,000 (2-3 h.)	•••	,, 907.
6	Asad <u>Kh</u> ān "Jumdatu'l- Mulk"	7,000/7,000		M.A., 302.
7	Khan Firoz Jang	7,000/7.000¹	•••	,. 302.
8	Sambhā Jī	7,000/7,000	•••	., 316.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> On p. 481 of M:A, we have it that his rank was increased to 7,000/10,000, which is absurd. I have therefore retained his lower rank.

# ${\it MANSABD\bar{A}R\bar{I}}$ SYSTEM OR 'MILITARY ARISTOCRACY' 133

## NOBLES-(Contd.)

No.	Rank-holder	Rank	Authority
9	Shaikh Nizām of Hyder- abad "Muqarrab <u>Kh</u> ān" " <u>Kh</u> ān Zamān Fath Jang"	7,000/7,000	M.A., 324.
10	Sāhu, son of Sambhā Jī	7,000/7,000	., 332.
11	<u>Sh</u> arza "Rustam <u>Kh</u> ān"	7,000/7,000 reduced to 6000/6000	., 480.
12	Daler <u>Kh</u> ān	7,000/7,000	., 481
13	Khalīlu'llāh Khān "'Umdatu'l-Mulk"	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.)	Al. N., 119.
14	Rāna Rāj Singh	6,000/6,000 (1,000 2-3 h.)	., 194.
15	Mahābat <u>Kh</u> ān	6,000/5,000 (3,000 2-3 h.)	,, 754-55.
16 17	Asad, son of Mulla Aḥmad Muḥammad Amīn <u>Kh</u> ān	6,000/6,000 6,000/5,000 reduced to 5,000/5,000	,, 925. M.A., 121.
18	Bahādur <u>Kh</u> ān " <u>Kh</u> ān Jahān Bahādur"	6,000/6,000 (5,000 or 6,000 2-3 h.)	., 124.
19	Muhammad Ibrāhīm "Mahābat <u>Kh</u> ān"	6,000/6,000	., 269.
20	Ismā'īl <u>Kh</u> ān	6,000/5,000	369.
21	Khān-i-'Ālam, son of		204
22	Khān Zamān Fath Jang Sharza "Rustam Khān"	6,000/5,000 7,000/7,000 reduced to 6,000/6,000	., 384. ,, 480 (Sec also p. 280)
23	Dā'ud <u>Kh</u> ān	6,000/6,000	,, 483.
24	Ibrāhīm <u>Kh</u> ān	6,000/6,000	., 496-97.
25	Sayyid Sar-afrāz <u>Kh</u> ān	6,000/6,000	., 513.

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# SECT. VI: ALLOWANCES, SALARIES AND IN'ĀMS

We may wind up with a rapid survey of emoluments received by the Princes and the higher nobles. Luckily some figures for the reign of Shāh Jahān are available, which will just suffice to give a general idea.

The Princes had daily allowances before they were old enough to receive a manṣab. At the time of Shāh Jahān's coronation the daily allowances of his sons were fixed as follows:

Dārā <u>Sh</u> ukoh	Rs.	1,000.
<u>Sh</u> āh <u>Sh</u> ujā'	Rs.	750.
Aurangzeb	Rs.	500.
Murād Ba <u>khsh</u>	Rs.	250.1

In the ensuing tables we give some mansabs and their corresponding salaries, and as some of the rank-holders had different ranks and salaries at different times, the period or year has also been indicated.

# PRINCES

1 5	No Book Ladder	Ë	-	c	
j L	valik-nolder		Kank	Salary p. a.	Authority
H	Dara Shukoh II Decade	II Decade	20,000/20,000 (10,000 2-3 h.) 40 crore dāms=1 rupees.	40 crore dāms=1 crore rupees	B.N., II, 715.
	.: :	1067 А.Н.	ŧ	60 crore dāms=1g crore rupees	A.S., III, 238 and B.N., III,
	; :	1068 A.H.	60,000/40,000 (30,000 2-3 h.)	83 crore dams=2,07,50,000 rupees <sup>1</sup>	121a. A.S., III, 270 71.
(1)	<u>Sh</u> āh <u>Sh</u> uja	II Decade	15,000/10,000 ( 8,000 2-3 h.)	15,000/10,000 ( 8,000 2-3 h.) 24 crore dāms=60 lakhs of rupees	B.N. 11, 715.
က	Aurangzeb	:		24 crore ddms=60 lakhs of rupees	B.N., II, 715.
4 /	4 Murad Bakhsh	£	12,000/9,000	12 crore dams=30 lakhs of rupees	B.N., II, 715.
	:	1064 A.H.	15,000/10,000 ( 5,000 2-3 h.)	15,000/10,000 ( 5,000 2-3 h.)   16 crore ddms=40 lakhs of rupees	B.N., III, 87b and A.S., III,
1					102.

<sup>1</sup> For this the Prince received jagir worth Rs. 2,57,50,000 p.a., if the Persian text has the correct figure.

o Z	Rank-holder	Time	Rank	Salary p.a.	Authority
erel	"Yaminu'd-Daula" Ā Khān	I & II Decade	I & II Decade 9,000/9,000 (2-3 h.)	16.20, crore dāms= 40.50.000 rupees <sup>1</sup>	B.N. I. i, 193 & II. 258
N	Khān Daurān Bahādur "Nuṣrat Jang"	I Decade	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.)	6,000/6,000 (2-3 h.) 10.80 crore dams=27 lakhs of rupees	
ď	" "	II Decade	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	II Decade 7,000/7,000 (5,000 12 crore dāms=30 B.N., II, 427. 2-3 h.)	B.N II, 427.
7	Amīru'i-Umarā"	II & III Decade	7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)	7.000/7,000 (5,000 12 crore dāms=30 2-3 h.) lakhs of rupees	B.N. II, 321 & III, 41b.
4	'Allami Sa'dullah Khan II Decade 7,000/7,000	II Decade	ģ	12 crore dams=30 lakhs of rupees	B.N., II, 715.
	:	1080 A.H.	•	or 7,000/7,000 12 crore ddms=30 B.N., III, 41b & (5,000 2-3 h.) <sup>2</sup> lakhs of rupees A.S., III, 108.	B.N., III, 416 & A.S., III, 108.

His jagir had the yearly income of 50 lakhs of rupees.
 See f.n. 4 on p. 127 above.

These emoluments include not only the <u>sat</u> and suwar rank salaries but also in many cases in am or gratuity, which is often distinctly stated as such. It came up to a tidy amount in many cases: in case of Prince Dārā <u>Sh</u>ukoh, for instance, it went up, towards the end, to 20 crore dāms.

In the case of the Princes, the salaries, even without the *in'ams*, are far in excess of what we can calculate for their *manṣabs*. But then this was a privileged class, and considerable latitude seems to have been allowed.

As regards the nobles, the pay corresponds fairly accurately to the mansab. We need only examine one case by way of illustration. The pay of the rank 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.), which was enjoyed by several nobles of the highest rank in the third decade, may be calculated as follows:—

Zāt rank salary 1:40 crore dāms Suwār rank salary (10,000 +2,000, i.e., 12,000 troopers at 8,000 dāms each) 9:60 crore ,,

11 crore dāms

These amīrs drew 1 crore dāms as in'ām in addition, their total emoluments becoming 12 crores.

Sa'dullāh Khān's earlier salary, however, presents some difficulty. His salary could not be 12 crores when his rank was 7,000/7,000 and 11 crores when it was 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.). We know that his rank in II decade was 7,000/7,000,1 and that he received successive promotions of rank in the succeeding years, till his rank stood at 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3 h.)2 and his salary at 11 crores. On the Nauroz falling on 18 Rabī' I, 1060, one crore dāms was sanctioned as in'ām, his total emoluments now becoming 12 crores.3 In the light of these facts the salary entry on p. 715 of B.N., II, which is apparently copied by Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, must be wrong.

In one or two instances the jāgīrs granted yielded even more than the total sanctioned emoluments. Dārā Shukoh and Āṣaf Khān are examples. But both these, as has been noted above, are exceptional cases.

Let us now realize for a moment what these figures mean, and what was the net salary of each amīr after the state obligations had been met. Taking the same example for our illustration, an officer who drew 12 crores or 30 lakhs of rupees, saved, at a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> B.N., II, 715; A.S., II, 558; B.N., III, 41b.

<sup>\*</sup> A.S., III, 62, 69, 100; B.N., III, 18b, 23a.

<sup>\*</sup> B.N., III, 41b; A.S., III, 108.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 130-31 above.

liberal estimate, half his zāt rank salary, viz., 70 lakh dāms, and at least two-thirds of his suwār rank salary, viz., 640 lakh dāms, i.e., altogether over 7 crores or 17½ lakh rupees! The Viceroy of India gets 2½ lakhs of rupees p. a. today. Add to this the fact that on Moreland's findings the purchasing power of money in the Mughul period was more than four times what it is today. The 17½ lakhs becomes 70 lakhs of modern money.

But these are only a few—the more striking—examples. Other amīrs in our table drew salaries on the same scale; so did the lower rank-holders, who are not included in our lists. As the rank decreased, the personnel of it increased. The total of salaries disbursed must have come up to a very high figure.

The third decade of Shāh Jahān's reign, we must remember, was the culminating point of Mughul Indian wealth and prosperity. I may quote the following from my Imperial Treasury of the Indian Mughuls: 'The third decade was perhaps the most prosperous in Mughul Indian history: a larger value in gems and jewels changed hands at the court of Delhi during the years 1648-58 than at any other period of Indian history before or since.

Some rough indications can be gathered from the following facts: On the first durbar held in the newly-built Delhi palace, which fell on a Nauroz (Monday, 18 Rabī I, 1060, and following days) presents worth 15 lakhs were accepted. Again, the value accepted from princes and nobles in XXVIII R.Y. totalled nearly 15 lakhs and that in XXIX R.Y. came to 20,2 while in R.Y. XXX the maximum of nearly 1 crore was reached (P. 538).

We see the aristocracy rolling in wealth, and pomp and circumstance surround the Mughul court. The Emperor is on his throne, and all seems right with the empire. The court historians consider it a breach of manners to talk of anything but power, riches and prosperity; and the superficial observer is deceived. But it does not require much acumen on our part, with subsequent history before us, to perceive that the canker of insolvency was gnawing at the heart of the empire, and the foundation of the financial fabric was sapped. This is just what we should have expected. The expenditure was rapidly outrunning the revenues, and the ageing monarch was losing control of the finances. No treasury in the world could stand this strain.

Only Shāh Jahān's kindly disposition and temperamental munificence drew a veil across the ugly situation, and the people were on the whole contented and happy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> B.N., III, f. 99a.

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid., f. 123b.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Ibid., f. 108a.

We can hear some unpalatable truths from an author, who wrote at a much later date, safely sheltered alike from public gaze and royal patronage. Khāfī Khān, summing up at the end of Shāh Jahān's reign, makes the following free and outspoken comment: After recounting the names of the highest rank-holders, and giving the numbers for some lower ranks, he says that there were no more khāliṣa or jāgīr lands to be given away, the treasury balances were at a miserable ebb, and the lists of the manṣabdārs, big and small, knew no end. The jāgīr-holders and those who drew cash salaries were alike in desperate straits, complaints were useless, and they had to content themselves with a manṣab without a revenue.

With the advent of Aurangzeb things wore a grimmer aspect. Even if this reign had been one of unbroken peace and prosperity—which it was not—the top-heavy manṣabdārī system would have come down with a crash. Nothing could be done to avert, or even delay, the impending disaster. There was no abatement in the award of fresh manṣabs, and the salaries remained on the same high level. Whether they could be paid regularly or not was another matter.

We have no historian to tell us of the exact state

of things in the early part of the reign; but we know that there were no reforms or retrenchments. As the reign wore on, military operations in all parts of the empire, notably in the Deccan, constituted an ever-increasing strain on the royal treasury. Khafi Khan, writing under 1103 A.H., says, the greater portion of the cash reserve has been depleted, and there are no balances to meet the excessive demands of the salary-holders.1 In the words of Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, 'the salaries of the soldiers and civil officers alike fell into arrears for three years......The result was that the entire land in the empire proved insufficient for the total amount of jagir needed to satisfy the dues of all the officers included in the swollen army-list......Even when the grants of land in lieu of salary were drawn up by the Pay Office, they remained for years as mere orders on paper, the actual delivery of the villages to the grantees being impossible'.2

Again, Khāfī Khān tells us that the mansabdārs, who were charged with feeding the emperor's animals, had such poor jāgīrs that they were themselves in daily fear of starvation. After much exertion and effort they obtained a small jāgīr, which was often barren, and the income from it could not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> M.L., I, 411.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> History of Aurangzib, V, 448-49.

pay more than half or a third of the cost of feeding the animals, not to speak of the maintenance of the mansabdār's family. The cost of feeding the king's animals was demanded from the mansabdār's agents, who were imprisoned, abused and insulted. Their remonstrances to the emperor were fruitless; and very often the agents had to resign their posts.

All this is about the maintenance of the king's animals, that is, about the <u>sat</u> rank salary, from which the king's transport and the <u>manṣabdār</u>'s private establishment were to be met. We are told nothing about the more important matter, the troopers' pay. Nor is there anyone to inform us whether the <u>manṣabdārs</u> maintained the full quota of cavalry required under <u>Shāh</u> Jahān's <del>3</del>-and-½ rule. From what we know of the state of things, it is more than doubtful if the state could enforce this rule or possessed sufficient funds to pay for the cavalry at that exorbitant rate. Things reverted pretty nearly to what they were before the reforms of <u>Sh</u>er <u>Shāh</u> and Akbar, with the added stigma of helpless failure.

## SECT. VII: CLASSIFICATION OF MANŞABDĀRS

The peerage consisted of a single graded list of rank-holders, in which the princes were naturally placed at the top, often by themselves. But no

division was shown in the names that followed. Yet those above a certain rank were known as umarā-i-kibār, umarā-i-'izām or nū'īnān-i-wālā tabār. Next came the umarā; and last came the manṣabdārs, who were at the bottom.

The ranks ranged from 10 to 12,000 in Akbar's time. In later reigns the rank 10 was scrapped, and the upper limit, as we have seen, rose much higher. Ranks above 7,000 were, as a rule, reserved for princes.<sup>1</sup>

I have not come across any original authority clearly indicating the lines demarcating the umarā-i'izām from the ordinary umarā, and the latter from the manṣabdārs.

We take up the latter first: The line of distinction between umarā and manṣabdārs has been drawn in a different place in the various reigns. Nizāmu'd-Dīn Aḥmad, at the end of his manṣabdārī list, remarks, that he has applied the title amīr to every officer who has 500 retainers, i.e, holds 500 rank, and that all officers mentioned in his list are amīrs.<sup>2</sup> I

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The only exception to this rule has already been noted (Pp. 130-31),

This is what I take to be the sense. As the language used is somewhat queer, and there are variants, I give the Persian text. One MS. has پوشیده نه ماند که هرکسی از ملازمان در ۱۵ که پانصد نوکردارد اطلاق امارت و امراشی برو نموده و هرکسی که مذکور شد مرتبه او از پله امارت بالاست ـ

understand in the author's opinion all rank-holders of 500 and above were amīrs.

Abū'l-Fazl's Mansabdārī list seems to imply a division of the mansabdars into three classes: (1) From top to 500 (inclusive), (2) From 400 to 200 (inclusive), and (3) From 150 to 10. Without basing too much theory on this, we can say that the first class corresponds to the class which Nizāmu'd-Din calls amīrs, the rest being all mansabdārs. So we can be sure that in Akbar's time the amīrs began at 500.

In Shāh Jahān's reign we find a different state of things; though we do not know when the change was introduced. Manucci, in his account of the Mansab (Storia, II, 369-77), applies the term umarā to rank-holders from hazārī upwards (pp. 372-74 and particularly 377). Similarly Bernier, speaking of the umarā, in the passage quoted below, begins with hazārī and goes on to duwāzda hazārī (p. 212), and, again, refers to their rank as 'from one to twelve

Another has

پوشیده نه ماند که هرکسی از ملازمان درگاه که از پانصد نوکر کمتر دارد اطلاق امارت و امراثی برو نه نموده و هر کسی که مذکور شد مرتبه او از یلم امارت بالا ست -

The sense is not much affected by the variant. In the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Tabaqat the text is sophisticated by a very small error, which has spoilt both the text and the translation, which follows it (Text. II. 456: Tr., II. 684).

thousand' (p. 213). This testimony is indirectly supported by B.N. In the list at the end of Vol. I, after the ranks of the Princes, we have the following heading!

where the list seems to include three classes: (1) Nū'īnān or Umarā-i-'izām, (2) Umarā and (3) Manṣabdārs. Now this list, as has already been mentioned in the above discussion, does not go below the zāt rank of 500. When we know from the heading that this list includes manṣabdārs also, and, further, that the line is to be drawn either at 500 or at 1,000, the inference seems justified that the officers in this list below 1,000 are manṣabdārs. From this cumulative evidence the conclusion is irresistible that amārat ranged from 1,000 upwards, at least during the reigns of Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb.

The reader no doubt remembers that in Tīmūr's army the line demarcating the "Commissioned" from the "Non-Commissioned" officers ran clear at 1,000. In fact this was the only rank where there was a duplication, the lowest amīr and the mingbāshī being both commanders of 1,000. This precedent seems to have been followed, consciously or unconsciously, in Shāh Jahān's time.

In this reign, as in Akbar's, various lines of distinction were drawn for various purposes. For position and precedence at the durbar we find that :manṣabdārs below 200 along with aḥadīs, bowmen, matchlockmen and some followers of amīrs stood in the khāṣ o 'ām courtyard, which was enclosed by a railing of painted wood, while manṣabdārs of 200, and above, umarā, ministers, Rājas, ambassadors and other officers were stationed, near or far from the throne according to their degree, in the khāṣ o 'ām hall, which was enclosed by silver rails.'

The court historian, 'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd, in his peerage list, does not go lower than 500.

In the reign of Aurangzeb things continued much the same. A few rules of procedure may be noticed. It was ordered that rank-holders from 20 to 100 should be made to stand,<sup>2</sup> and those from 200 to 900 need not attend in person.<sup>3</sup> This last rule shows at least that mansabdārs below 1,000 were treated differently from those above that line, presumably because the latter were amīrs. Again, as we have said above, rank-holders of 300 and under were given no suwār rank; later this applied to all officers under 500.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> B.N., I, i, 222; Bernier, 261.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> M.A., 83. It is not clear what is meant, since all manṣabdārs stood in court.

In this connection it is worthy of note that in the table of the  $z\bar{a}t$  rank pay based on the  $dast\bar{u}ru'l$ 'amals of Aurangzeb's time (given above) we find a jump in pay between the  $z\bar{a}t$  rank of 400 and 500, and then another between 900 and 1,000—which shows that special importance attached to the promotion to the  $z\bar{a}t$  ranks of 500 and 1,000; though it must be admitted that the promotion from 800 to 900 also carried an excessive increase which is clearly out of scale. This seems to fit in with the scheme as we have conceived it. These remarks, however, apply only to the table given on pp. 63-64 above. The table in the  $\bar{A}$ 'in furnishes no basis for any such inference.

As regards the line demarcating the amīrs from the 'great amīrs', I regret I have no evidence to build an opinion on. Blochmann seems to think that when Nizāmu'd-Dīn Aḥmad talks of umarā-i-kibār, he means 'probably' rank-holders of 5,000.¹ No authority is available.

Similarly Irvine's statement that amīrs from 3,000 to 7,000 were  $umar\tilde{a}-i-kib\bar{a}r^2$  stands without proof.

A remark on the use of the terms mansabdar and mansab may not be out of place here. 'Mansabdar', in a general sense, means simply a rank-holder, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Blochmann, 597, f.n. 2 and 598, f.n. 1.

<sup>\*</sup> Army, 9.

is often so used as to include all officers. The word in the heading in B.N., I, quoted above, shows that 'mansabd $\bar{a}r$ ' sometimes included umar $\bar{a}$ . fact we ourselves in this discussion have often used the term in the wider sense, for the sake of brevity. In a stricter sense, of course, a mansabdar stands \* lower than an amir. Conversely 'amir' is occasionally used for mansabdar in the general sense, i.e., any rank-holder; as in Budā'ūnī.

Again, the word mansab is often used specifically for mansab-i-zāt as distinguished from mansab-isuwar, as by Abū'l-Fazl in the passage quoted on p. 47 above.

Below follows an account of the mansabdari system by a careful writer who observed the actual working of it in practice.

Bernier's description of the Mughul peerage and the way in which it was created and recruited is clear: and his remarks on their condition, their number, their state and their etiquette are full of interest. Although the following passage involves some repetition of what has been said above, it deserves to be quoted in full. He begins with the umarā:

'It must not be imagined that the Omrahs or Lords of the Mogol's court are members of ancient families, as our nobility in France. The King being

proprietor of all the lands in the empire, there can exist neither Dukedoms nor Marquisates; nor can any family be found possessed of wealth arising from a domain, and living upon its own patrimony. courtiers are often not even descendants of Omrahs. because, the King being heir of all their possessions, no family can long maintain its distinction, but, after the Omrah's death, is soon extinguished, and the sons, or at least the grandsons, reduced generally, we might almost say, to beggary, and compelled to enlist as mere troopers in the cavalry of some Omrah. The King, however, usually bestows a small pension on the widow, and often on the family; and if the Omrah's life be sufficiently prolonged, he may obtain the advancement of his children by royal favour, particularly if their persons be well formed, and their complexions sufficiently fair to enable them to pass for genuine Mogols. But this advancement through special favour proceeds slowly, for it is an almost invariable custom to pass gradually from small salaries, and inconsiderable offices, to situations of greater trust and emolument. The Omrahs, therefore, mostly consist of adventurers from different nations who entice one another to the court; and are generally persons of low descent, some having been originally slaves, and the majority being destitute of education.<sup>1</sup> The Mogol raises them to dignities, or degrades them to obscurity, according to his own pleasure and caprice.

Some of the Omrahs have the title of Hazary. or lord of a thousand horse; some, of Dou Hazary, lord of two thousand horse; some, of Penge, lord of five thousand horse; some, of Hecht, lord of seven thousand horse; some, of Deh Hazary, lord of ten' thousand horse; and sometimes an Omrah has the title of Douazdeh Hazarv, lord of twelve thousand horse; as was the case with the King's eldest son. Their pay is proportionate, not to the number of men, but to the number of horses,2 and two horses are generally allowed to one trooper, in order that the service may be better performed; for in those hot countries it is usual to say that a soldier with a single horse has one foot on the ground. But let it not be supposed that an Omrah is expected to keep, or indeed that the King would pay for, such a body of horse as is implied by the titles of Douazdeh or Hecht Hazarv: high-sounding names intended to impose on the credulous, and deceive Foreigners. The King himself regulates as well the effective number that each Omrah is to maintain, as the nominal number

A rather sweeping remark, and on the whole unjust.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The pay of the suwār rank is obviously meant, and the reference seems to be to the si aspa, du aspa, and yak aspa soldiers.

which he need not keep, but which is also paid for. and usually forms the principal part of his salary. This salary is increased by the money that the Omrah retains out of every man's pay, 2 and by what accrues from his false returns of the horses he is supposed to provide: all which renders the Omrah's income very considerable, particularly when he is so fortunate as to have some good Jah-ghirs, or suitable lands. assigned to him for the payment of his salary: for I perceived that the Omrah under whom I served, a Penge-Hazary, or lord of five thousand, whose quota was fixed at five hundred horses.<sup>8</sup> had vet a balance over after the payment of all expenses, of nearly five thousand crowns a month, although, like all those who have no Jah-ghirs, he was a Nagdy, that is to sav. one who drew his pay in cash from the treasury. Notwithstanding these large incomes, I was acquainted with very few wealthy Omrahs; on the contrary, most of them are in embarrassed circumstances, and

¹ This will cause confusion, unless the reader is very careful. 'The effective number' seems to refer to the actual number of horsemen maintained, i.e., 1/3, 1/4 or 1/5 of the suwār rank according to rules; while 'the nominal number' apparently refers to the zāt rank. Bernier seems to imagine, however, that this number represents horsemen—a common mistake. But we must remember that Bernier is labouring under the difficulty of trying to explain a special system, in non-technical language, to an audience which is totally unfamiliar with it.

<sup>\*</sup> The 5% mentioned on p. 94 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Dānishmand Khān's rank was 5,000/2,000, and he had to maintain 500 horse according to the 1/4 rule.

deeply in debt; not that they are ruined, like the nobility of other countries, by the extravagance of their table, but by the costly presents made to the King at certain annual festivals, and by their large establishments of wives, servants, camels, and horses.

The Omrahs in the provinces, in the armies, and at court, are very numerous; but it was not in my power to ascertain their number, which is not fixed. I never saw less than five-and-twenty to thirty at court, all of whom were in the receipt of the large incomes already mentioned, dependent for the amount upon their number of horses, from one to twelve thousand

It is these Omrahs who attain to the highest honours and situations of the State,—at court, in the provinces, and in the armies; and who are, as they call themselves, the Pillars of the Empire. They maintain the splendour of the court, and are never seen out-of-doors but in the most superb apparel; mounted sometimes on an elephant, sometimes on horseback, and not unfrequently in a Paleky attended by many of their cavalry, and by a large body of servants on foot, who take their station in front, and at either side, of their lord, not only to clear the way, but to flap the flies and brush off the dust with tails of peacocks; to carry the picquedent or spittoon, water to allay the Omrah's thirst, and sometimes accountbooks, and other papers. Every *Omrah* at court is obliged, under a certain penalty, to repair twice a day to the assembly, for the purpose of paying his respects to the King, at ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, when he is there seated to dispense justice, and at six in the evening. An *Omrah* must also, in rotation, keep guard in the fortress once every week, during four-and-twenty hours. He sends thither his bed, carpet, and other furniture; the King supplying him with nothing but his meals. These are received with peculiar ceremony. Thrice the *Omrah* performs the *taslim*, or reverence, the face turned toward the royal apartment; first dropping the hand down to the ground, and then lifting it up to the head.

Whenever the King takes an excursion in his Paleky, on an elephant, or in a Tact-Ravan (or travelling throne, carried upon the shoulders of eight men, who are cleverly relieved from time to time when on the march by eight others), all the Omrahs who are not prevented by illness, disabled by age, or exempted by a peculiar office, are bound to accompany him on horseback, exposed to the inclemency of the weather and to suffocating clouds of dust. On every occasion the King is completely sheltered, whether taking the diversion of hunting, marching at the head of his troops, or making his progresses from one city to another. When, however, he confines

his hunting to the neighbourhood of the city, visits his country house or repairs to the mosque, he sometimes dispenses with so large a retinue, and prefers being attended by such Omrahs only as are that day on guard' (Bernier, pp. 211-15).

The author then goes on to talk of the mansabdars:

'Mansebdars are horsemen with manseb pay,' which is a peculiar pay, both honourable and considerable; not equal to that of the Omrahs, but much greater than the common pay. Hence they are looked on as petty Omrahs, and as being of the rank from which the Omrahs are taken. They acknowledge no other chief but the King, and have much the same duties imposed upon them as the Omrahs, to whom they would be equal if they had horsemen under them, as formerly was sometimes the case; but now they have only two, four, or six service horses, that is, such as bear the King's mark; and their pay is, in some instances, as low as one hundred and fifty roupies per month, and never exceeds seven hundred.1 Their number is not fixed, but they are much more numerous than the Omrahs: besides those in the provinces and armies, there are never less than two or three hundred at court ' (Ibid., 215).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Some of the statements in this sentence are either ill-informed or obscure. We find no authority for them.

We learn incidentally that the number of umarā about Aurangzeb's court at Bernier's time was about twenty-five or thirty, and that of the manṣabdārs about 200 or 300. The entire manṣabdārī personnel was divided into two classes: (1) Those present at court (ḥāzir-i-rikāb), and (2) those on duty in the provinces (ta'īnātiān). The officers were periodically transferred from one list to the other.

# SECT. VIII: THE MUGHUL ARISTOCRACY AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

The manṣabdārī system was an interesting institution socially. It was an aristocracy, but it differed from the other aristocracies in history in that the nobility and the jāgīr appertaining to it were held, both in theory and practice, at the pleasure of the emperor, and were in all cases limited to a lifetenure; and—what is even more important—all cash and valuables belonging to a manṣabdār escheated, at his death, to the crown, in theory the owner and heir of all real and personal property in the country. The descendants of the deceased manṣabdār were occasionally, however, given a small rank by way of opportunity to prove personal merit, or some cash or allowance as a means of sustenance—in both cases, a pure act of grace.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is the generally accepted opinion. But Sir Jadunath Sarkar contends with considerable show of reasoning and plausibility that in

Economically this redistribution of wealth at the end of each lifetime was something of an approach to some of the communistic ideals. Though based on the oriental theory of king as a shadow of God (Zillu'l-lāh), it was, as a factor in social and economic history, much in advance of the times. In fact the theory of divine kingship enabled the social philosophers to get over the difficulties found to be all but insurmountable by the modern socialists and communists. I

The Mughul aristocracy, whether it appears as an ornament of the imperial court, embroidering the central figure of the emperor, or, else, as itself a cynosure of dependents and admirers, is a picture without which Mughul life and art would have missed much of their colour and beauty.

Again, the Mughul nobility constituted a sort of agency through which the ideals of art and morals

reality there was no escheat in Mughul India, what is commonly known as such being only a temporary expedient to settle the outstanding accounts between the State and the deceased. The Emperor, Sir Jadunath holds, never claimed to be heir of a dead subject's property, except when he died heirless.

The point is too big to be pronounced upon lightly; and adequate discussion will take us too far afield. We, therefore, content ourselves with referring the reader to Sir J. N. Sarkar's Mughal Administration (Second Series) (Patna University, 1925), pp. 46-50.

<sup>2</sup> Sir J. N. Sarkar holds the opposite view on this point. He has a poor opinion of the Mughul nobility as a class. See Mughal Administration, pp. 52-4.

and manners, which were supposed, according to the ideas of the time, to coalesce in the personality of the emperor, were diffused among the lower classes. The court etiquette was the official code of manners, which was followed in smaller assemblies on a gradually diminishing scale down to audiences given by private men as a purely social function.<sup>1</sup>

The standard of life was set by the court and its entourage. It constituted the style. The habits and customs of the people, their ideas, tendencies and ambitions, their tastes and pleasures, were often unconsciously fashioned on this model. The peerage acted as the conduit-pipe for this stream of influence. The patronage of art and culture followed the same lines; and even where the interest was not genuine the enlightened pursuits were followed and encouraged as a dogma dictated by fashion. The current of public opinion and social conventions was set by the practice followed at the court or by the nobility.

Probably the best contemporary account of the Mughul aristocracy is Pelsaert's. There is an air of mystery and romance about his description of Mughul nobility, its life and ways. The picture is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In the old Mughul houses still surviving at Agra, Delhi, or Lahore, one sees a miniature replica of a many-columned diwānkhāna with a bijou flower-garden in front of it and many other details characteristic of the domestic architecture of the period.

in parts overdrawn, but on the whole there is something singularly well-informed about the graphic details.

Speaking of the nobles in Mughul India, he says, 'their position is as unstable as the wind, resting on no firm foundation, but rather on pillars of glass, resplendent in the eyes of the world, but collapsing under the stress of even a slight storm.

Their mahals are adorned internally with lascivious sensuality, wanton and reckless festivity, superpomp, inflated pride, and ornamental daintiness, while the servants of the lord may justly be described as a generation of iniquity, greed and oppression, for, like their masters, they make hay while the sun shines. Sometimes while they [the nobles] think they are exalted to a seat in heaven, an envious report to the King may cast them down to the depths of woe. Very few of them, however, think of the future, but they enjoy themselves to the uttermost while they can. As a rule they have three or four wives, the daughters of worthy men, but the senior wife commands most respect. live together in the enclosure surrounded by high walls, which is called the mahal, having tanks and gardens inside. Each wife has separate apartments for herself and her slaves, of whom there may be 10, or 20, or 100, according to her fortune. Each has a

regular monthly allowance for her gastos [expenditure]. Iewels and clothes are provided by the husband according to the extent of his affection. Their food comes from one kitchen, but each wife takes it in her own apartments; for they hate each other secretly, though they seldom or never allow it to be seen, because of their desire to retain the favour of their husband, whom they fear, honour, and worship, as a god rather than a man. Each night he visits a particular wife, or mahal, and receives a very warm welcome from her and from the slaves, who, dressed specially for the occasion, seem to fly, rather than run, about their duties. If it is the hot weather, they undress the husband as soon as he comes in, and rub his body with pounded sandalwood and rosewater; or some other scented and cooling oil. Fans are kept going steadily in the room, or in the open air, where they usually sit. Some of the slaves chafe the master's hands and feet. some sit and sing, or play music and dance, or provide other recreation, the wife sitting near him all the time. They study night and day how to make exciting perfumes and efficacious preserves, such as mosseri1 or faloni ['presumably named from the seed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> My friend, Principal Muhammad Shafi' of the Lahore Oriental College, makes a shrawd guess, and interprets mosseri as mufarrih (exhilarating medicine), s and f being closely alike in German text, as in old English printing.

falanja, which is used as a perfume. '—Footnote].¹ containing amber, pearls, gold, opium, and other stimulants; but these are mostly for their own use, for they eat them occasionally in the day-time, because they produce a pleasant elevation of the spirit. In the cool of the evening they drink a great deal of wine, for the women learn the habit quickly' from their husbands, and drinking has become very fashionable in the last few years. The husband sits like a golden cock among the gilded hens until midnight, or until passion, or drink, sends him to bed. Then if one of the pretty slave girls takes his fancy, he calls her to him and enjoys her, his wife not daring to show any signs of displeasure, but dissembling, though she will take it out of the slave-girl later on.

Two or three eunuchs, or more, who are merely purchased Bengali slaves, but are usually faithful to their master, are appointed for each wife, to ensure that she is seen by no man except her husband; and, if a eunuch fails in this duty, he, with everyone else to blame for the stranger's presence, is in danger of losing his life. They are thus held in high esteem by their master, but the women pay them still greater regard, for the whole management of the mahal is in their hands, and they can give or refuse whatever is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The same gentleman reads this word as philonia (L. Philonium Romanum), which Jahangir used to take (Tūzuk, 124-5; R. & B., I, 308).

wanted. Thus they can get whatever they desire fine horses to ride, servants to attend them outside, and female slaves inside the house, clothes as fine and smart as those of their master himself. The wives feel themselves bound to do all this, in order that what happens in the house may be concealed from their husband's knowledge; for many, or perhaps most of them, so far forget themselves, that, when their husband has gone away, either to Court, or to some place where he takes only his favourite wife. and leaves the rest at home, they allow the eunuch to enjoy them according to his ability, and thus gratify their burning passions when they have no opportunity of going out; but otherwise they spare no craft or trouble to enable them to enjoy themselves outside. These wretched women wear, indeed, the most expensive clothes, eat the daintiest food, and enjoy all worldly pleasures except one, and for that one they grieve, saying they would willingly give everything in exchange for a beggar's poverty.

The ladies of our country should be able to realize from this description the good fortune of their birth, and the extent of their freedom when compared with the position of ladies like them in other lands; but this topic lies outside the scope of my task, and I shall now speak of the houses which are built here. They are noble and pleasant, with

many apartments, but there is not much in the way of an upper story except a flat roof, on which to enjoy the evening air. There are usually gardens and tanks inside the house; and in the hot weather the tanks are filled daily with fresh water, drawn by oxen from wells. The water is drawn, or sometimes raised by a wheel, in such quantity that it flows through a leaden pipe and rises like a fountain; in this climate water and plants are a refreshment and recreation unknown in our cold country. These houses last for a few years only, because the walls are built with mud instead of mortar, but the white plaster of the walls is very noteworthy, and far superior to anything in our country. They use unslaked lime, which is mixed with milk, gum, and sugar into a thin paste. When the walls have been plastered with lime, they apply this paste, rubbing it with well-designed trowels until it is smooth; then they polish it steadily with agates, perhaps for a whole day, until it is dry and hard, and shines like alabaster, or can even be used as a looking-glass.

They have no furniture of the kind we delight in, such as tables, stools, benches, cupboards, bedsteads, etc.; but their cots, or sleeping places, and other furniture of kinds unknown in our country. are lavishly ornamented with gold or silver, and they use more gold and silver in serving food than we do.

though nearly all of it is used in the mahal, and is seen by scarcely anybody except women. Outside the mahal, there is only the diwan-khana, or sittingplace, which is spread with handsome carpets, and kept very clean and neat. Here the lord takes his seat in the morning to attend to his business, whatever it is, and here all his subordinates come to salaam him. This is a very humble salute, in which the body is bent forward, and the right hand is placed on the head; but persons of equal rank or position merely bend the body. If strangers desire admittance, their names are first announced, and they are then introduced. After saluting. they take seats appropriate to their position in a row on each side of their host, and that so humbly that they seem unlike themselves, for it is more like a school of wise and virtuous philosophers than a gathering of false infidels; and no one will move from his place, though they should sit the whole day. There is a certain gravity in their mode of speaking; they make no loud noise, and do not shout or use gestures. If they talk secrets, which they do not wish to be heard by everybody, they hold a handkerchief, or their girdle, before their mouths, so that neither speaker shall be touched by the other's breath. Everyone leaves as soon as he has obtained an answer to his request, but friends,

acquaintances, and persons of position remain until the lord retires into the house, or unless the audience is prolonged until meal-time, though there are no fixed hours for meals. Before eating they first wash their hands; then the table-cloth is brought and spread on the floor. The food 'consists of birinj [dressed rice], æshalia [? shulla or shu'la], pollæb [pulāo], (yellow, red, green, or black), zueyla [? thuli, spiced wheaten cakes], dupiaza [meat with onions, etc.]; also roast meats, and various other good courses, served on very large dishes, with too little butter, and too much spice for our taste. The tsaftergir [? safrachī, table-servant, or sharbatdār, butler<sup>1</sup>], or head servant, sits in the middle, and serves each guest according to his rank, the senior first. In eating, they use little in the way of spoons or knives except their five fingers, which they besinear up to the knuckles soldier-fashion, for napkins are not used, and it is very bad manners to lick the fingers. Each guest confines himself to the portion served before him: no food is touched with the left hand; and little or nothing is drunk while eating, whether water or wine, until they have said their prayer and washed their hands. Alike at midday and in the evening the guests rise and take their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Thus the Editor. Principal <u>Sh</u>aff' suggests chāshnigir as the more likely reading of this corrupt word.

leave with scanty compliments, saying merely, God grant a lasting blessing on the house! and the host then goes into his mahal to sleep until the evening, when he usually comes out again to the sitting-place. Such are the usual customs, but detailed descriptions such as this must show some discrepancies. Some rich people, and many who are economical, take their meals in the mahal in order to save the heavy cost of the outside service; and again they cannot hold their reception when they are in the King's camp, because they are on duty continuously from morning to night. Some of the nobles, again, have chaste wives, but they are too few to be worth mentioning: most of the ladies are tarred with the same brush. and when the husband is away, though he may think they are guarded quite safely by his eunuchs, they are too clever for Argus himself with his hundred eyes, and get all the pleasure they can, though not so much as they desire' (Pelsaert, Jahangir's India, 64-8).

We have placed before the reader the whole of this account, unabridged and entire; because we have wished to be fair both to the reader and to the author. The inclination to omit the more risky passages has been resisted in the belief that an author is best judged by the integral piece.

It is our duty, however, to drop a word of caution to the reader: None can deny that the spicy

scandal of the purple patches reads like a chapter from the Arabian Nights' Entertainments. There is also perhaps a conscious or sub-conscious seeking after effect in these sensational disclosures. But we have no wish to be unfair to the author.

In fact, we think, the verisimilitude which characterizes these details points to the personal experience of the author as their source. And this is supported not only by the fact that Pelsaert had effective knowledge of Persian, but also by the evidence that he, during his seven years' stay at Agra (1621-27), did not live a straight life. Mr. Moreland, the Editor, tells us that 'some years after his death, an inquiry was held into irregularities at the Dutch factory in Agra, and the report, in dealing with the immoral life of the staff, observed incidentally that Pelsaert's private life also had been open to similar censure' (Pelsaert, Introduction, xii).

In view of these revelations one is driven to conclude that Pelsaert mixed freely with certain class of womankind at Agra, and, basing his generalizations on his experience, arrived at an indiscriminate condemnation of all classes, including the highest, with which presumably he had no opportunity to associate.

Further, it is an accepted principle of the law of equity that a man who seeks equity must himself

come into court with clean hands. Obviously it is much more true that a man who occupies or appropriates the judgement-seat must himself come with clean hands This raises a presumption against the author of this diatribe.

Not prejudice or ignorance but passion is the refracting medium which distorts Pelsaert's vision of things. Making every allowance for the seducing influences of wealth and luxury, and the laxity of the moral standard sanctioned by fashion and prestige, we do not at all see our way to subscribe to the charge.

But we can find no fault with the excellent description of the houses of the nobility and their furniture. In the details of their daily life, their manners and customs, we have a fine commentary on the amenities of private and social life among the higher classes. We can judge better of the ethos of a people by these externals of social life than by setting up a school for scandal.

# SECT. IX : SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYSTEM

A few characteristics of the mansabdārī mode of recruiting the army may next be noted:

The manṣabdārī system of raising an army may be said to be a sort of compromise between the

ancient system of tribal chieftainship and the mediæval feudal system of levying forces. Certain chiefs were under certain conditions made responsible for the levy, and the force under each chieftain belonged wholly or mainly to his own clan, at any rate in the early period. It was, therefore, an advance on both those earlier systems, for it combined to a certain extent their advantages. The loyalty of the men to their chief was assured by racial kinship, and a large army became possible without a gigantic central organization for its recruitment and upkeep, while there was not much fear of the chief's revolting or assuming independence.

The system had some further advantages: The manṣabdārs holding civil or military offices in the provinces (i.e., the ta'īnātiān, as distinguished from those about court, who were called hāzir-i-rikāb) who, in many cases, held jāgīrs in their place of appointment, constituted an automatic distribution, of forces, handy for all military or administrative contingencies

Again, each unit, from its composition, could be utilized precisely for the purpose to which it was best suited: so that the best use was made of every ounce of fighting strength. This finds an apt illustration in Bernier's remarks about the Rājpūt rājas, where he describes how one unit of the Mughul

army could be, and often was, diplomatically used against one enemy, and another against another. The Rājas, he says, 'are necessary to keep in check such Rajas as are not in the Mogol's pay; to reduce to submission those who take up arms rather than pay tribute, or refuse to join the army when summoned by the *Mogol*.' 'It is the King's policy,' he goes on, 'to foment jealousy and discord amongst the Rajas, and by caressing and favouring some more than others, he often succeeds, when desirous of doing so, in kindling wars among them.' Again, 'they are always at hand to be employed against the Patans, or against any rebellious Omrah or governor.' 'Whenever the King of Golkonda,' he continues, 'withholds his tribute, or evinces an inclination to defend the King of Visapour or any neighbouring Raja whom the Mogol wishes to despoil or render tributary. Rajas are sent against him in preference to Omrahs, who being for the most part Persians, are not of the same religion as the Mogol, to wit Sounnys, but Chias, as are the Kings of Persia and Golkonda' (b. 210).

Further, 'the Mogol never finds the Rajas more useful than when he is engaged in hostility with the Persians. His Omrahs, as I have just remarked, are generally of that nation, and shudder at the idea of fighting against their natural King; especially because

they acknowledge him as their *Imam*, their *Calife* or sovereign pontiff, and the descendant of *Aly*, to bear arms against whom they therefore consider a great crime.

The Mogol is also compelled to engage Patans in his service by reasons very similar to those I have assigned for employing ragipous' (p. 211).

The policy detailed above, which would have been impossible without a clan system in the units, is not unknown to the British Indian military administration of to-day, where we find regiments recruited on the basis of castes and tribes, and somewhat similar use made of them.

From the political point of view, the manṣabdārī system, besides assuring the steady loyalty of the officer, who always felt his direct dependence on the emperor, was, in its very theory, a standing safeguard of efficiency and discipline. The very insecurity of rank and wealth acted as a powerful incentive for individual distinction: every manṣabdār knew that his promotion and reduction ever depended upon the quality of his service.

The manṣabdārī system of recruitment made a wise use of the attachment of men to their leaders: tribal patriotism occupied the place of territorial patriotism.

This system of military organization had a touch

of the Chivalrous. Just as in the machine age of industrial history we deplore lack of originality, individual initiative and pride, so in the modern armies, where perfect mechanical action constitutes the ideal of efficiency, we look in vain for an expression of personality and individual enterprise—which was a distinguishing feature of the age of chivalry. Every soldier must have realized that the honour of his division and therefore of his tribe (which constituted it) was staked on the issue of the battle. The ideal of tribal honour must have appealed where there was no national unity to look to.

There was something morally beautiful, to use a Greek expression, in the age of chivalry.

On the other hand, there were some natural disadvantages: The military organization had no organic centre, and lacked the cohesive force which we find only in a national, army. Uniformity was lacking; and efficiency must have varied from unit to unit.

The official list of the Mansabdārs resembles a modern 'Civil List', or rather the 'Army List', more closely than a 'Peerage' in a modern European country, where genealogy is the prominent feature.

A bigger peerage meant (1) a larger total of estates or  $j\bar{a}g\bar{a}rs$  assigned; or (2) a larger total of cash expenditure from the treasury; or of both; and (3) a

bigger army in case of need.

Socially it meant a bigger aristocracy, and economically a somewhat wider distribution of wealth, within the upper classes.

#### CHAPTER II

# THE MUGHUL ARMY

#### INTRODUCTORY: THE MONGOL ARMY

THE background of the Mughul Indian army is to be sought in the Mongol army of Central Asia in the twelfth century A.C. As before, we may begin with ChingIz Khān.

Prof. Vladimirstov thus describes the organization of Chingīz Khān's army: 'He [Chingīz Khān] began with the organization of his army, which by now presented a very considerable force. In accordance with an immemorial usage, he divided it into thousands, hundreds and tens. Experienced leaders, personally known to the Khan, were appointed to be commanders of the thousands and hundreds. The new post of cherbi was instituted, to look after the supplies. A Guard corps (keshik) was organized that was to be the Khan's personal guard as well as a corps d'élite. Its organization was on a strictly aristocratic basis; it was recruited from "young men, agile and well shaped, from the families of noyans, chiliarchs and centurions, as well as from

free-men (tarkat)."

The Guard included a picked thousand of "braves," bagaturs. In battle this corps was to be always in the front line; in time of peace it mounted guard. Chingis knew only too well how easy it was for nomads in the steppe to become the victims of an unexpected attack, which might at a single blow put an end to the most grandiose enterprise. This knowledge made him pay particular attention to the organization of the efficient protection of the Khan's headquarters (ordu). The institution of the aristocratic guard and the appointment of chiliarchs and centurions laid the foundations of the military organization of the steppe aristocracy. The nobles ceased to be the undisciplined heads of a disorderly militia. An iron discipline was introduced, in the guards as well as in the thousands of the line, and enforced with the same severity at his headquarters.' 1

Again, 'all the Mongols now formed one organized army. They were all divided into hundreds and into thousands which were united into groups of two, three, or five thousands and into larger units—army corps—myriads (tumen). The individual clans and tribes were grouped or divided for that purpose, forming units which could muster the requisite

number of soldiers at the shortest notice. At the head of each unit Chingis-Khan placed men he knew personally and trusted, and who were as a rule kinsmen of the men under their command. This policy preserved the clan constitution from decomposition. while giving it at the same time a regular, if rudimentary, military skeleton. In the place of men who had become chiefs by chance were placed commanders of the same aristocratic origin, but bound by their service to the Khan and by military discipline. In accordance with immemorial Mongol usage the army was divided into three sections: the Centre (köl), at the head of which was placed Naya; the Left, or Eastern, Wing (jun-gar), commanded by Mukali: and the Right, or Western, Wing (barungar) commanded by Bogurchi.'1

Chingīz Khān's personal bodyguard—the most important part of his army—is thus described: 'In the same year 1206 Chingis-Khan completed the organization of his Guard, which of course was based on strictly aristocratic principles. The end he had in view was not only to have a reliable personal guard for his movable headquarters and a picked corps of soldiers, but an institution that would, under his personal guidance and constant control, become a nursery of trusty lieutenants He knew

each man personally and could give him tasks in accordance with his individual aptitudes.

All the guardsmen (keshikten) were to be of noble blood "Now that the Sky has ordered me to govern all nations, let there be recruited from the myriads, thousands and hundreds, ten thousand men, archers and others, to be my personal guard (keshik). These men, who will be attached to my person, must be chosen from among the sons of nobles or of free men (tarkat) and must be agile, well-built and hardy......Each chiliarch, centurion or decurion who opposes this order, will be considered guilty and punished." The Guard was given special privileges and honorific distinctions. "A guardsman of my bodyguard (keshik)," it is laid down by Chingis, "is superior to an external (i.e. 'of the line') chiliarch; his family are superior to external centurions and decurions. If an external chiliarch regards himself as the equal of a keshiktu of my bodyguard, engages in a dispute or fight with him, he shall be punished." All the guardsmen were in the personal cognizance of the Emperor, who himself settled their suits. "The commanders of the bodyguard may not without my explicit permission punish their subordinates on their own account. If a misdemeanour is committed by a guardsman it must be at once reported to me, and then who deserves being beheaded, will be beheaded; who deserves being beaten, will be beaten." '1

We may incidentally remark here that myriarchs, chiliarchs, centurions and decurions, *i.e.*, the leaders of 10,000, 1,000, 100, and 10 respectively, are analogous phenomena in ancient Greek and Roman military history.

The reader is already familiar with the salient features of Tīmūr's army, which, therefore, need not detain us.

### SECT. I: THE MUGHUL INDIAN ARMY

Now we can turn to Mughul India.

When Babur came to India he found here a system of charging military levies on the basis of the revenues of a territory. We shall hear more of it under Akbar.

Sher Shāh's army is thus described in Wāqi'āt-i-Mushtāqī: 'His forces were numerous, and of every kind of horse and foot. Every man who came was entertained. 25,000 infantry and lafgandárs were attached to his person; 7,000 lafgandárs were in the fort of Handu (Mandú?); 3,000 lafgandárs were at Chitor; 1,800 at the fort of Rantambhor; 500 at the fort of Bayána; 1,000 lafgandárs at Gwaliyar (Gwálior); and 1,000 infantry at the fort of Rohtás. It

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Ibid., 66-68.

was known that a suitable garrison was maintained in every fort in the country. The force of horse under the royal command consisted of 150,000, some of whom were appointed on service, and others were sent to their own homes.' 1

But full details, as usual, are only available for Akbar's reign.

It must be understood at the outset that in theory all able-bodied citizens of the empire were potential soldiers of the imperial army. In the Account of the Twelve Provinces ( $Ahw\bar{a}l$ -i- $duw\bar{a}zda$   $S\bar{u}ba$ ) in  $\bar{A}$ 'in, I, 386-596,  $Ab\bar{u}$ 'l-Fazl, among other things, gives the number of cavalry and infantry respectively (with an occasional mention of elephants, artillery and boats in some cases) which can be raised from every  $sark\bar{a}r$  and from every province; separate figures for each mahal being also given in many cases. Naturally enough the cavalry in these estimates is vastly outnumbered by the infantry. This constituted the total effective man-power in the country, which was calculated by  $Ab\bar{u}$ 'l-Fazl as over forty-four lakhs (Text, I, 175).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> E. & D., IV. 551.

<sup>2 &#</sup>x27;The high figures for infantry in each district and province, shown in Volume II of the A'in-i-Akbari,' says Irvine, 'can only be accepted under considerable reservation. These numbers can only represent the men called on to render strictly local duty, and they must have consisted almost entirely of villagers armed with long pikes, or swords and shields, perhaps even with only an iron-bound bambu staff (läthi) '(Army, 152).

Horn's remarks on the subject are just: 'Allerdings ist eine solche Truppenmasse niemals wirklich gleichzeitig verfügbar gewesen, und andererseits wäre doch die Zahl der waffenfähigen Männer damit nicht erreicht worden, da dieselbe zweifelsohne mehrmals grösser gewesen sein muss' (p. 40).

These figures refer to a sort of military reserve corresponding roughly to militia levies in England or to landsturm in Germany.

In practice, however, the army was recruited according to well-defined rules, and the numbers of the soldiers actually enrolled were regulated by an elaborate system, a brief outline of which has already been placed before the reader.

Speaking in modern language, the Mughul army was composed of cavalry, infantry and artillery. But the importance attached to each of these arms of the service in Mughul times, and the efficiency of each were so unequal that it is better to follow Abū'l-Fazl's classification of the army into (1) Manṣab-dārs (with the horsemen under them), (2) Aḥadīs (gentlemen-troopers), and (3) Piādagān (infantry, which was a great miscellany including, among other things, artillery).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is for brevity. If we wish to be more exact, there were three other classes of cavalty also: (1) The Barāwardī troops, 'worthy but poor; they receive the means of keeping a horse, and have lands assigned to themselves, without being obliged to mark their horses with the Imperial

#### THE MUGHUL ARMY

Cavalry, which was constituted by (1) and (2), was by far the most important part of the army—the chief factor determining the fighting strength of the empire. 'Although the infantry, which has various types of arms, says Monserrate, is entirely a fighting force, yet the cavalry is regarded as in every way the flower of the army' (Commentary, 88). Irvine's remarks on the subject cannot be improved upon: 'The army was essentially an army of horsemen. The Moghuls from beyond the Oxus were accustomed to fight on horseback only; the foot-soldier they despised; and in artillery they never became very proficient. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, when the French and English had demonstrated the vast superiority of disciplined infantry, the Indian foot-soldier was little more than a nightwatchman, and guardian over baggage, either in camp or on the line of march. Under the Moghuls, as Orme justly says, "Hist. Frag.," 4to, p. 418, the strain of all war rested upon the numbers and goodness of the horse which were found in an army' (Armv. 57).

brand' (Blochmann, 241). (2) The Dakhili troops. 'Some commanders.' says Abu'l-Fazl,' who find it troublesome to furnish men, get a number of such soldiers as accept the Imperial brand. Such troops are called Dākhilis' (Blochmann, 241). 3) Kunndis. 'Some commanders also receive auxiliaries. Such reserves are called Kunndis' (Blochmann, 242).

But these three classes are so insignificant that in a general estimate like that of Shah Jahan's total forces by 'Abdu'l-Hamid Lahori (B.N., II, 715) for instance, they are not considered worthy of mention.

## I. Mansabdars and their followers.

Much the greater part of the cavalry consisted of Mansabdārs and their Tābīns.

The quality of the Mughul army, therefore, depended upon the leaders chosen under the manṣab-dārī system and the soldiers recruited and presented by them. The government, speaking generally, rested upon their loyalty and their efficiency.

The way in which the manṣabdārs were selected and promoted, and the horsemen recruited and presented is well described by Irvine:

'Single men who resorted to the Court in the hope of obtaining employment in the army, were obliged first to seek a patron. A man generally attached himself to a chief from his own country or of his own race: Mughals became the followers of Mughals, Persians of Persians, Afghāns of Afghāns, and so forth. On this point there were certain customary rules, which are thus stated by Khushhāl Chand, Berlin MS, 495, fol. 1072b. A noble from Māwarā-un-nahr recruited none but Mughals; if from Irān, he might have one-third Mughals and the remainder Sayyads and Shekhs, or if he took, Afghāns and Rājpūts, of the former he might entertain one-sixth and of the latter, one-seventh of his total number. Nobles who were Sayyads or Shekhs

might enlist their own tribe, or up to one-sixth they might take Afghāns. Afghāns themselves might have one-half Afghāns and the other half Mughals and Shekhzādahs. Rājpūts made up their whole force of Rājpūts' (Army, 36).

Again, 'according to a man's reputation or connections, or the number of his followers, would be the rank (mansab) assigned to him. As a rule, his followers brought their own horses and other equipment; but sometimes a man with a little money would buy extra horses and mount relations or dependents upon them. When this was the case, the man riding his own horse was called, in later parlance, a silahdar (literally, equipment-holder), and one riding somebody else's horse was a bargir (burdentaker). The horses and equipment were as often as not procured by borrowed money; and not unfrequently the chief himself made the advances, which were afterwards recovered from the man's pay. The candidate for employment, having found a patron, next obtained through this man's influence an introduction to the Bakhshī-ul-mamālik or Mīr Bakhshī, in whose hands lay the presentation of new men to the emperor, and on his verdict a great deal depended as to the rank (mansab) which might be accorded' (Army, 36-37).

The remarks of Bernier are equally interesting.

'It must not, however, be inferred,' he says, 'that offices of trust and dignity are exclusively held by those of the Mogol race, or that they alone obtain rank in the army. These situations are filled indifferently by them and strangers from all countries; the greater part by Persians, some by Arabs, and others by Turks. To be considered a Mogol, it is enough if a foreigner have a white face and profess Mahometanism; in contradistinction to the Christians of Europe, who are called Franguis, and to the Indous, whose complexion is brown, and who are Gentiles' (p. 3).

Again the same writer: 'These armies are composed either of natives, such as Ragipous and Patans, or of genuine Mogols and people who, though less esteemed, are called Mogols because white men, foreigners, and Mahometans. The court itself does not now consist, as originally, of real Mogols; but is a medley of Usbecs, Persians, Arabs, and Turks, or descendants from all these people; known, as I said before, by the general appellation of Mogols. It should be added, however, that children of the third and fourth generation, who have the brown complexion, and the languid manner of this country of their nativity, are held in much less respect than new comers, and are seldom invested with official situations: they consider themselves happy, if

permitted to serve as private soldiers in the infantry or cavalry '(p. 209). Yet we are told in the sequel that the Mughuls 'form the principal force of the kingdom' (p. 211).

We might go further back: The way in which candidates in general were presented to the Emperor and their appointments sanctioned is thus described in  $\bar{A}$ 'in (Text, I, 158). The procedure applies to enlistment of horsemen directly recruited, to aḥadīs, to manṣabdārs, and to officers of the imperial workshops:

Men from Tūrān, Īrān, Turkey and Europe, and from India and Kashmīr come in search of appointment. The officers fix their salary; and the Bakhshīs present them to the Emperor.

The horsemen, on joining, do not bring their own horses; the Aḥadīs being the only exception. The salary originally proposed is suitably altered and sanctioned, being often increased. A number is presented every day, sometimes more, sometimes less. On Monday the candidates left over in the preceding week are inspected.

¹ On this question of the bearing of a fair complexion on patronage and promotion, the following extract from the same author is amusing: 'The women [of Kashmīr] especially are very handsome; and it is from this country that nearly every individual, when first admitted to the court of the Great Mogol, selects wives or concubines, that his children may be whiter than the Indians and pass for genuine Mogols' (404).

It is difficult to say which class these horsemen belong to, unless they are the Barāwardi, or possibly, Dākhili; troops.

Special Bitikchīs (writers) similarly present Ahadīs.

The umarā often solicit a manṣab for some of their servants. Eligible candidates are accepted and given a suitable rank. But this applies only to those whose monthly salary is fifty rupees and above.

Employees of every workshop (karkhana) have their monthly salaries fixed in this meeting, and their duties pointed out to them.<sup>2</sup>

The bulk of the army, however, was, as we have said, recruited and presented by the mansabdars.

The delegation of the duties of recruitment and administration of the army to the manṣabdārs, while it relieved the central government of the expense and worry of a heavy establishment, offered a strong temptation to corruption and abuse. 'False musters,' says Irvine, 'were an evil from which the Moghul army suffered even in its most palmy days. Nobles would lend each other the men to make up their quota, or needy idlers from the bazaars would be mounted on the first baggage pony that came to hand and counted in with the others as efficient soldiers' (Army, 45).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For the rest about an Aḥadi's appointment both in this A'in and in A'in 4 (Book II) see elsewhere.

Blochmann's translation of this A'in (pp. 169-70) is disappointing. What we have given is a summary rather than a translation, and is drawn directly from the text.

As we have seen in the last chapter, Akbar tried hard to eradicate this evil, and succeeded to a large extent; but the efficiency of the army was on the decline in Jahāngīr's reign, though Shāh Jahān, again, introduced changes and reforms, which restored some measure of soundness and discipline to the military fabric. Thus the quality of the military organization varied from reign to reign.

The procedure adopted in Akbar's time was as follows:

When a new man was appointed to a manṣab it was his duty to enroll the number of horsemen required under the rules; and these were examined at a muster to make sure that men, horses and accourrement came up to the required standard. In strictness the recruit furnished his own horse, but in practice the manṣabdār often supplied him with horses and equipment.

For the sake of identification of the men and the horses the following rules were strictly observed:

'A Chihrah or descriptive roll of the new manṣabdār was first of all drawn up, showing his name, his father's name, his tribe or caste, his place of origin, followed by details of his personal appearance '(Army, 47-48).

The manṣabdār's chihra, however, is not mentioned in A'īn. Was it introduced later?

The troopers' roll ( $Chihra-i-T\bar{a}b\bar{i}n\bar{a}n$ ) was then prepared. The procedure is fully described in the  $\bar{A}$ ' $\bar{i}n$ . It applies apparently not only to a  $mansabd\bar{a}r$ 's, but to all, cavalry:

His Majesty 'ordered that upright Bitikchīs should make out descriptive rolls of the soldiers and write down their peculiar marks. Their ages, the names of their fathers, dwelling-places, and race, were to be registered......

Every one who wishes to join the army, is taken before His Majesty, in whose presence his rank is fixed, after which the clerks make out the Ta'līqa.

Dākhilī troops are admitted on the signature of the Mansabdārs.

His Majesty has also appointed five experienced officers who have to look after the condition of the men, their horses, and the stipulated amount of pay. His Majesty has the men assembled in an open place, and receives the several descriptive rolls, when the men with their horses are handed over to the above five officers. The amount of their pay is then entered at the bottom of the descriptive rolls, and is countersigned by those officers, which serves as a proof, and prevents fraudulent alterations. Each roll is then handed over to the inspecting Dārogha.

<sup>\*</sup>I should substitute 'sealed' for 'countersigned'; 'sikka' is the word in the text.

He takes them in the manner described above to His Majesty, who orders the pay to be increased or decreased.............When the roll is thus certified, it is also signed by the  $W\bar{a}qi'a\ Nawis$ , the  $M\bar{i}r'Arz$ , and the officer commanding the guards.\(^1\) On the strength of this certificate, the  $D\bar{a}rogha$  of the  $d\bar{a}gh$  (brand) marks the horses' (Blochmann, 265; Text, I, 190-91).

The specimen of the Chihra-i-Tabīnān copied by Irvine from a Dastūru'l-'Amal (B.M. MS. No. 6599, fol. 163a) gives the name of the soldier, his father's name, and his personal appearance; to which is appended a brief description of the horse (Army, 48). This apparently represents later practice.

Last of all came the Chihra-i-Aspān (Descriptive roll of horses). It was an elaborate description of the horse or horses, setting forth in detail the class to which the horse belonged in a highly elaborate system of classification, and describing minutely the marks on the horse's body.

But in the case of the horses the descriptive rolls were not a sufficient safeguard against fraud For horses answering the description in the rolls were even hired and substituted for the old ones' (Blochmann, 266). So the imperial brand was placed on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is not quite accurate. It appears from the text that the Wāqi'a Nawīs signed while the other two officers only affixed their seals.

the right thigh of the horse, while the manṣabdār had his own brand imprinted on the left (Storia, II, 376; Blochmann, 265-66). For a description of these brands at different periods see Blochmann, 147-48, 265-66, and Irvine, Army, 49-51.

This proceeding was known as  $D\bar{a}gh$ -o-maḥallī, or simply  $D\bar{a}gh$ .

These brands and descriptive rolls were obviously meant for reference when the same mansabdār's cavalry was presented for review a second time. There were elaborate rules for periodical musters: Every mansabdār who held a jāgīr had to present his horses after three years, failing which his jāgīr was docked to the extent of  $\frac{1}{10}$ . The officer who drew his salary in cash had to renew his dāgh every eighteen months. The umarā whose jāgīrs were situated in a remote place were given a concession: the interval between two dāghs was not to exceed twelve years in any case. Yet, after a lapse of six years they lost  $\frac{1}{10}$  of their jāgīr; so the free concession really extended to six years only.

If a man gets an increase of mansab, and three years have passed since the muster, he draws his enhanced <u>sat</u> salary from the date of increase, but his additional cavalry cannot receive any pay until it has

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Not 'every year', as Blochmann translates by a slip (p. 266), and Irvine uncritically copies (Army, p. 54).

passed through the  $d\bar{a}gh^1$  ( $\bar{A}$ 'in, Text, 191-92).

The second and later musters were technically known as  $d\bar{a}gh$ -i-mukarrar or repetition of the brand (lit. repeated brand).

The following passage from Monserrate's Commentary, although it contains a few misstatements of facts, has the merit of being an eye-witness account of the working of the mansabdari system and the entire military organization: 'Although the infantry, which has various types of arms, is entirely a fighting force, yet the cavalry is regarded as in every way the flower of the army. Hence the King spares no expense in order permanently to maintain an efficient, and, as far as possible, perfectly-equipped force of cavalry to guard the empire. There are forty-five thousand cavalry,2 five thousand elephants and many thousand infantry, paid directly from the royal treasury. In addition to these there are troops whose command is inherited by their chief officers from father to son, like an hereditary estate: 8 these troops, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and elephant detachments, are paid by their commanding officers out of the revenues of the provinces which they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For more elaborate and somewhat different rules, which prevailed in later times, the reader is referred to Army, 54.

<sup>\*</sup> These probably included the ahadis and all other horsemen who were directly recruited, mentioned in A in (I. 158). See p. 185 above.

<sup>\*</sup> This, of course, is not correct.

hold from the King. For the ancient usage and custom still obtains that territory acquired by conquest can be granted by the King to anyone he likes, not on perpetual tenure, but to be held at his pleasure. Hence the government of such territories is vested in nobles on condition that they pay some stated tribute to the royal treasury. These nobles distribute in their turn cities, townships and villages to their companions-in-arms, and pay the royal tribute either by appropriating the revenues of certain districts to this purpose, or by direct taxation. The King takes great care, in the assignment of territories, to grant each noble a district large enough to enable him to maintain due state and dignity and to support properly his share of the military forces. Thus he, for instance, who has to maintain two brigades receives a richer province than he who has to maintain only one. The Mongols retain their ancestral system of dividing their troops into regiments, each under its own hereditary chief. In Persian these regiments are called 'Lascar.' Each regiment-commander has his own bazaar: these bazaars are called in the Tartar language 'Urdu,' or as the Portuguese pronounce it 'Ordæ.' They are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Payment of cash 'tribute' of this kind by a manşabdār is not heard of elsewhere; unless a cash tribute from some semi-independent or half-subjugated chiefs is meant.

named after the regiment-commander, for example the "Urdu (Orda). i.e. regiment of Mancinus." Hence, although all the cities and lands in the empire belong to the King, and the whole army obeys him as commander-in-chief: yet most of the troops have their own generals and officers, to whom they are attached —as has already been pointed out—by an hereditary allegiance. This fact supplies constant cause and opportunity for conspiracy and treason. Wherefore, in order to prevent the great nobles becoming insolent through the unchallenged enjoyment of power, the King summons to court those whom he learns to have become enriched by the revenues of their provinces, and gives them many imperious commands, as though they were his slaves—commands, moreover, obedience to which ill suits their exalted rank and dignity. For he charges them with the maintenance of a certain number of elephants, horses, camels, panthers, fallow-deer and doves, which they have to produce before him on a stated day every year. When they are dismissed once more to take charge of their provinces, he does not allow them to reside for long in one place; and in order to prevent their abusing their power he himself appoints the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> By this Monserrate probably means the periodical musters and the officers' visits to the capital on occasions of transfer to a new appointment or dismissal to an expedition.

judges and governors of the cities and towns, who have to report to him how the great nobles behave.' 2

This survey of the subject by an outside observer from a detached point of view is refreshing, and has high corroborative value.

Within a manṣabdār's division there was no classification into regiments. All were immediately under the manṣabdār, with whom every soldier had personal relations—which formed the basis of the entire system. As Dr. Paul Horn rightly remarks, 'Nummerisch bestimmte Verbände, unseren Compagnieen, Bataillonen u.s.w. entsprechend, gabes nicht '(p. 11).

Nor was the numerical strength of each arm placed on anything like a regulated basis. The

There were fourteen of these recorders or disrists at the central court, whose duties and method of work are set out in detail in A'in 10 of Book II of A'in.

By these Monserrate apparently means the Wāqi'a-Nawis, news-writer, recorder or intelligencer. There was one appointed to each province. In Jahāngār's time the duties of the Wāqi'a-Nawis and the bakhshī were discharged in many cases by the same person. Bernier, who visited India in the first decade of Aurangzeb's reign, has the following: 'It is true that the Great Mogol sends a Vakea-Nevis to the various provinces; that is, persons whose business it is to communicate every event that takes place; but there is generally a disgraceful collusion between these officers and the governor, so that their presence seldom restrains the tyranny exercised over the unhappy people' (p. 231). In the histories of Aurangzeb's reign like M.A. and M.L. we find more often the form 'wāqi'a-nagār', which means the same thing. A wāqi'a-nawīs often accompanied an army going on an expedition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Commentary, 88-90.

numbers of archers, sabremen, etc., were not fixed. 'Für die Stärkeverhältnisse der einzelnen Waffengattungen unter einander,' says the same writer, 'waren bei Bildung einer Armee, keine Regelnvorgeschrieben' (p. 43).

It is to be noted, however, that lower manṣabdārs could serve under higher manṣabdārs. Under anṭamīr of 10,000 personal rank could serve a manṣabdār of up to 1,000 personal rank, under one of 8,000 up to 800, under one of 7,000 up to 700, under one of 5,000 up to 500, and under a manṣabdār of 500 an officer of up to 100 personal rank. In case of ranks lower than 500 such inclusion was not admissible  $(\bar{A}'\bar{\imath}n,$  text, 175). Perhaps this rule applies only to disposition of forces in the battle-field.

The manṣabdārs and their followers, looked at as a whole, were a composite body, each unit of which had certain distinguishing characteristics of its own. We have no doubt the Emperor knew well how to make appropriate use of each. We have already seen in a quotation from Bernier why and under what circumstances the Rājpūts and Paṭhāns were considered specially valuable as a source of military strength. Apart from those reasons, the Rājpūts were highly prized both for their fighting qualities and for their staunch fidelity and a delicate sense of honour.

Bābur's remarks are interesting in this connection. 'Among the Moghuls,' he says, 'the Institutions established by Chingiz Khan have continued to be strictly observed down to the present time. Every man has his appointed station; those appointed to the right wing, the left wing, or the centre, have their allotted places, which are handed down to them from father to son. Those of most trust and consequence are stationed on the extremities or flanks of the two wings' (Memoirs, Leyden, Erskine, and King, I, 165-66).

The Barha Sayyids had acquired from the time of Akbar a right to fight in the vanguard,<sup>2</sup> which they must have won by special distinction in the method of warfare peculiar to that position in the line of battle.

Monserrate, who was at Akbar's court in 1580-82, has the following: 'The methods of warfare employed by the Persians, Mongols, Chacattæi [Chaghatā'i], Osbechii [Uzbegs], and Turquimanni [Turkomans] differ very greatly from those of the Gedrosii [People of Gujarāt and part of Rājpūtānā], or again from those of the Balochii [Baluchīs], or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>M. Pavet de Courteille, who is translating from the original Chaghată'i, renders the last sentence differently: 'Les plus estimés parmi ceux de l'aile droite sont stationnés aux extrémités de Cette aile' (Mémoires de Baber, I, 218).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Blochmann, 426.

from those of the Indians. For the cavalry of the Gedrosii, who are called Rasputi [Rājpūts], and of the Indians, who are called Rati [Mahrattas], all ride on little ponies hardly as big as donkeys. Arriving in this manner at the place of battle, they dismount and await the attack of the enemy armed with short spears (or rather javelins) and light shields. The Musalmans say that these Rasputi, and Rati know how to die, but not how to fight. The Balochii ride on camels and use bows and arrows.' 1 Again, 'the Mongols, Persians, Parthians, Turks, Sogdians, Bachtræ and Scythians (or Tartars) all use the same fighting tactics. To pass over details, they are most dangerous when they seem to be flying in headlong riot. For, turning round on their horses, although they are going at full gallop, they fling their javelins with such deadly aim that they can transfix the eye of an enemy.' 2

Further, we know that different peoples not only had different ways of fighting, owing to their national peculiarities, but in some cases specialized in the use of certain arms. This must have qualified them for certain special operations, and for certain positions in the army drawn in battle-array.

The composition of a unit, i.e., of a mansabdar's regiment, differed according to the two rules known

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Commentary, 83-84.

to be in existence. Irvine, relying on Mir'āt-i-Aḥmadī, II, 118, tells us that 'the Tābīnān, if horsemen, must be one-third Mughals, one-third Afghāns, and one-third Rājpūts; if infantry, two-third archers, and one-third matchlockmen' (Army, 9).

Manucci is totally unreliable on this subject; yet the following quotation from him seems to support the above statement: 'A man getting the pay of a hazārī in the first class is obliged to keep two hundred and fifty horsemen of different races—that is to say, sixty-four Paṭhāns, sixty-four Mughals, sixty-four Rājpūts; the remainder are Saiyids, Shekhzādahs, and so forth. The regulation still observed up to this day was made by King Akbar' (Storia, II, 375).

Irvine has already<sup>1</sup> given us certain rules about the classes and respective numbers of men to be recruited by manṣabdārs of different nationalities or tribes. The authority on which he draws bears date 1161 A.H. The Mir'āt-i-Aḥmadī was written in 1174 A.H.

Another class of horsemen is to be noticed, which has had no place in our classification, but formed part of the cavalry,—viz., the Rozīnadārs, i.e., men with daily salary. 'Rouzindars,' says Bernier, 'are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See pp. 182-83 above.

also cavaliers, who receive their pay daily, as the word imports; but their pay is greater, in some instances, than that of many of the mansebdars. It is, however, of a different kind, and not thought so honourable but the Rouzindars are not subject, like the Mansebdars, to the Agenas; that is, are not bound to take, at a valuation, carpets, and other pieces of furniture, that have been used in the King's palace, and on which an unreasonable value is sometimes set. Their number is very great. They fill the inferior offices; many being clerks and under-clerks; while some are employed to affix the King's signet to Barattes, or orders for the payment of money; and they scruple not to receive bribes for the quick issuing of these documents' (pp. 215-16).

Manucci in the same strain: 'There is still another mode of payment called ruzindar (rozīnah- $d\bar{a}r$ )—that is, pay by the day given to infantry and cavalry. Yet, although they have this name, they are not thus paid: several months are allowed to elapse' (Storia, II, 377).

# II. Ahadīs,

The Aḥadīs were gentlemen troopers, a special class of horsemen, who were generally round the Emperor's person, and owed allegiance to no one else.

Probably a higher standard of efficiency and general worth was set up for an Aḥadī than for an ordinary horseman in a manṣabdār's ranks. The pay of an Aḥadī seems to have varied considerably. It appears from a passage in Budāyūnī that in the prereform days of Akbar's reign there were du-aspa, yak-aspa, and nīm-aspa aḥadīs. In the last case two aḥadīs had one horse between them, and shared the salary, which was six rupees! He cites this as an instance of a scandalous state of things.

The  $\bar{A}$ 'īn says that many aḥadīs drew more than 500 rupees per mensem.<sup>2</sup> We have it in  $T\bar{u}zuk$  (p. 5: R. & B., I, 10, top) that Jahāngīr, on his coronation, raised the salary of the aḥadīs by fifty per cent. From a passage in B.N., III (f. 24a) we calculate the salary of an aḥadī in 1059 A.H. at Rs. 50 p.m. Irvine tells us, on the authority of Dānishmand Khān, that in 1120 (=1708) Bahādur Shāh 'ordered the enlistment of 4,700 extra Aḥadīs at Rs. 40 a month.' In view of this Abū'l-Fazl's 500 could at best be the maximum.

The Aḥadī could muster up to five horses in Akbar's reign; the maximum at the beginning of Jahāngīr's reign, however, was apparently only four (De Laët, pp. 113 and 118); though Hawkins places

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Munta<u>kh</u>abu't-Tawārī<u>kh</u>, II, 191.

<sup>\*</sup> A'in. I. 187.

<sup>\*</sup> Army, 44.

the limit at six (Purchas, III, 30).

Horn is not far wrong when he describes the Ahadis as 'ein besonderes Gardecavallerie-corps' (p. 20). We agree with Irvine, however, that though this is partially true, there was not any formal recognition of them as such (Army, 43). The duties of the Ahadis were of a more miscellaneous character than those of Emperor's body-guard, properly so called. 'Most clerks of the Imperial offices,' says Blochmann (p. 20, f.n. 1), 'the painters of the court. the foremen in Akbar's workshops, etc., belonged to this corps.' 'Many of them [the Ahadis],' he says elsewhere (p. 256), 'were on staff employ in the various offices, store-houses, Imperial workshops; others were employed as adjutants and carriers of important orders.' 'Unter Akbar wurden sie,' says Dr. Horn, 'nur sehr selten in grösserer Masse im Kriege verwendet, besonders nicht, wenn der Kaiser nicht selbst mit im Felde war, und dienten gewöhnlich einzeln als Feldjäger u. dgl.' (p. 20).

Practice in this respect seems, however, to have varied, for we notice that in <u>Shāh</u> Jahān's reign Ahadīs were often sent into the fighting line, where they were well distributed over the different parts of the army. As many as 5,000 Ahadīs accompanied each one of the three expeditions sent by the Emperor to Kandahar (1649-53 A.C.). The numbers

thus contributed generally consisted of Barq-andāz and Tīr-andāz Ahadīs, half and half.

Irvine speaks of the  $Yakka-t\bar{a}z$ , which term was possibly used as an equivalent for an  $Ahad\bar{\imath}$ . Again, the body-guard, or defenders of the imperial person, he tells us, were the men called  $W\bar{a}l\bar{a}$   $Sh\bar{a}h\bar{\imath}$ , and these he further proceeds to distinguish from  $Yas\bar{a}wals$  or armed palace guards.

The household troops, he says on the authority of Siyar, amounted, towards the end of the eighteenth century, 'to 40,000 men, all cavalry, but usually serving on foot in the citadel and in the palace. They consisted then of several corps besides the Aḥadīs, such as the Surkhposh (wearers of red), the Sulţānī (Royal), the Wālā Shāhī (High Imperial); the Kamal-posh (Blanket Wearers) '(p. 44).

We do not meet with these names in histories of the earlier period. The presumption is that these bodies came into existence in the later Mughul times.

The number of Aḥadīs in Akbar's time is not known. At Jahāngīr's accession the number was, according to De Laët (Empire of the Great Mogol, 113), 4,441, and, according to Hawkins (Purchas, III, 30), 5,000.

We know from B.N. (II, 715) that the total number of Aḥadīs in Shāh Jahān's time, or rather at

the end of the 20th regnal year, was 7,000.

There was a separate establishment for the Aḥadīs, with a Dīwān, a Bakhshī, and the rest. At their head was one of the great amīrs.

The candidates were presented direct to the Emperor. In case of acceptance the usual procedure of  $y\bar{a}d-d\bar{a}\underline{s}\underline{h}t$  and  $ta'l\bar{\imath}qa$  was followed, descriptive roll was prepared, and the salary fixed. Then the security was taken; and once more the applicant was presented to the Emperor, who generally increased the salary originally fixed.

The Aḥadīs were mustered every four months.

The Aḥadī generally found his own horse at the beginning of service; but later, if a substitute became necessary, it was supplied by Government, either free or at a price. Horses of Aḥadīs who were dead¹ were often thus given away to other Aḥadīs who had lost a horse.²

## III. Piādagān or 'Infantry'

As a part of the fighting strength of the empire, this arm of the service was insignificant. But it is not really correct to render the word 'Piādagān' by 'infantry.' It is true that these Piādagān included the force called Piāda tufangchī wa bān-dār, which

<sup>1</sup> Raftagan is the word in text.

<sup>\*</sup> A'in, text, I, 158 and 187; Blochmann, 170 and 259-60.

often accompanied the rest of the army to the battle-field, and also some  $D\bar{a}\underline{k}\underline{h}il\bar{\imath}$  troops. But the  $Pi\bar{a}dag\bar{a}n$  included also many other classes of men who had no more to do with fighting than a modern civil servant. Irvine, following the historians of the later Mughul period, translates 'infantry' by ' $A\underline{h}\underline{s}\underline{h}\bar{a}m$ '—a word not used in this technical sense in the earlier period. We are following  $Ab\bar{u}$ 'l-Fazl in retaining the term  $Pi\bar{a}dag\bar{a}n$ .

We give below, in outline, Abū'l-Fazl's classified description of the *Piādagān*, drawing upon other authorities, where available, for illustration and corroboration:

# (1) Bundūqchīs (Matchlock-bearers).

A bitikchi, a treasurer, and a  $d\bar{a}rogha$  formed the establishment. The senior  $Bund\bar{u}qchis$  (Sar-guroh) got a higher pay—from 260  $d\bar{a}ms$  to 300  $d\bar{a}ms$  p.m. The salary of the rest ranged from 110 d. to 250 d. p.m. ( $\bar{A}'in$ , text, I, 188). It will be noticed that this pay, ranging between three and seven rupees a month, is miserable. See Bernier's remarks about the quality of this service quoted later.

This is practically the only class which may be described as 'infantry.'

The total number in Akbar's time was 12,000 (Ibid.).

According to B. N. (II, 715), Shah Jahan's army

included, at the end of 20th regnal year, 40,000  $tufangch\bar{\imath}s$ , gunners, and  $b\bar{a}n-d\bar{a}rs$ , 10,000 of which were at court, the remaining 30,000 being in the provinces and in fortresses.

A number of this infantry, varying from 9,000 to 10,000, accompanied each of the three expeditions to Kandahar already referred to.

Bernier has the following about the matchlockmen:

'The foot-soldiers receive the smallest pay; and, to be sure, the musketeers cut a sorry figure at the best of times, which may be said to be when squatting on the ground, and resting their muskets on a kind of wooden fork which hangs to them. Even then, they are terribly afraid of burning their eyes or their long beards, and above all lest some *Dgen [jinn]*, or evil spirit, should cause the bursting of their musket. Some have twenty roupies a month, some fifteen, some ten' (p. 217)

These salaries are much higher than the scale quoted from  $\bar{A}'\bar{i}n$  above.

Bernier, talking of the infantry, continues: 'I do not think that in the army immediately about the King, the number can exceed fifteen thousand, including musketeers, foot artillery, and generally, every person connected with that artillery. From this, an estimate may be formed of the number of

infantry in the provinces' (p. 219).

(2) Darbāns (Porters).

One thousand of these guarded the palace.

(3) Khidmatiya

One thousand <u>Khidmatiya</u> remained alert round the <u>Daulat-khāna</u>, and awaited orders. The caste to which they belonged was notorious for highway robbery and theft. They were formerly known as <u>Māwīs</u>.

Jahāngīr mentions these as Piādahā-i-khidmatiya in Tūzuk, p. 303 (R. & B., II, 152). Their chief in time of Akbar had the title "Khidmat Rāi." In Tūzuk Rāi Mān is mentioned as their head (Sardār-i-Piādahā-i-khidmatiya) [Text, p. 205 (R. & B., I, 414), p 268 (R. & B., II, 83), and p. 303 (R. & B., II, 152)].

#### (4) Mewras.

These also numbered one thousand, and came from Mewāt. They were fast runners, could fetch and carry across long distances, and were expert at detective work.

According to Khāfī Khān (M.L., I, 243) Akbar was the first to introduce a regular service of Dāk Mewras.

Couriers are thus described by Father Monserrate: 'Amongst the despatch-runners are certain couriers who in one day can run on foot as far as a horseman can ride at full speed. They are said to have their livers removed in infancy, in order to prevent their suffering from shortness of breath. They practise running in shoes made of lead, or train themselves by repeatedly lifting their feet and moving their legs (whilst remaining standing still in one place) till their heels touch their buttocks. When their leaden shoes are removed, they are seen to be magnificent runners, by the help of whose swiftness the King can very rapidly and regularly obtain news or send orders on any matter touching the peace of his realm' (Monserrate, 212).

Is Father Monserrate here referring to the  $D\overline{a}k$  Mewras we are talking of?

# (5) <u>Shamsher-bāz</u>.

Bravery and agility were their distinguishing characteristics. They could perform remarkable feats of arms. Different classes of these specialized in certain feats and tricks, and in particular ways of offence and defence.

Their skill and courage, on which Abū'l-Fazl dwells with eloquence, must have made them an acquisition to the fighting line.

Yet the <u>Shamsher-baz</u> denotes more a profession than a service; for we are told that the total number exceeded 100,000, of which a picked 1,000 was always ready for service at court.

The Ṣadī (commander of 100) of these held the rank of an Aḥadī or a still higher one. The monthly salary of a <u>shamsher-bāz</u> ranged from 80 to 600 dāms.

Sword-play continued to be a favourite profession in India down to quite recent times. For quotations from eye-witnesses of exhibitions of single-stick and sword-play in India as late as the first half of the nineteenth century, see Irvine, Army, 186.

#### (6) Wrestlers.

Persian and Tūrānī wrestlers and boxers, Indian athletes, performers of Gujarāt known as mals,¹ stone-throwers and others constituted this number. Wrestling matches were daily witnessed at court. The pay of a wrestler was between 70 and 450 dāms p.m.

## (7) Chelas (Slaves).

These were originally, apparently, prisoners of war, or children rescued from famine—in many cases Hindus converted to Islam.

We are told in  $Akbar N\bar{a}ma$  that early in XXVII R.Y. Akbar set free many thousands of slaves. They remained, however, in royal service, and were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mal is a professional wrestler or boxer (the offspring of an outcast Kshatriya by a Kshatriya woman), a pancratiast; prize-fighter; an athlete; a gymnast; a tumbler; an acrobat (Platts, 1061)

henceforth called Chelas.1

The Chelas were divided into sections, subjected to a systematic training at court, and finally brought up to a career of useful service. Many from each section were promoted to other ranks of the army, and some even attained to an amirate.

The pay of a Chela ran from a  $d\bar{a}m$  to a rupee per diem.

Is Manucci referring to these Chelas when he says? 'It is the habit of these kings to have usually in their service seven thousand slaves of different nations, and some among them are established as chiefs to govern and guide the rest. The king gives them names, and in my time these chief slaves were called as follows.' After a list of names he continues: 'These are the names of the king's principal slaves. They are all gentlemen troopers, and have good pay. Set over all the slaves are two captains, and the horsemen are three thousand in number, the foot or infantry four thousand. They have various employments, both within the household and in other duties connected with it. They are resorted to when some coup has been decided on; it is they who write about it, and execute the royal commands. In addition, they are used as spies to report what is going on, as well among the nobles as

the common people' (Storia, II, 357-58).

Monserrate has the following: 'Zelaldinus [Jalālu'd-Dīn, i.e., Akbar] maintains, and gives a liberal education to, many noble boys and youths who have lost their fathers; and in this he might well be imitated by other princes '(Commentary, 207).

It appears that the Chelas were entertained not only by the emperor but also by the princes and the nobles. 'Among the slaves of the princes are some who are gentlemen soldiers and hold good positions. Some are purchased, others offer themselves to serve in that station '(Storia, II, 412). 'As a counterpoise to the mercenaries in their employ,' says Irvine, 'over whom they had a very loose hold. commanders were in the habit of getting together, as the kernel of their force, a body of personal dependents or slaves, who had no one to look to except their master. Such troops were known by the Hindi name of chelā (a slave). They were fed, clothed, and lodged by their employer, had mostly been brought up and trained by him, and had no other home than his camp. They were recruited chiefly from children taken in war or bought from their parents during times of famine. The great majority were of Hindu origin, but all were made Mahomedans when received into the body of chelas.

These chelās were the only troops on which a man could place entire reliance as being ready to follow his fortunes in both foul and fair weather '(Army, 11).

The reader who is interested in the subject is referred to a useful collection of notes by Sir R. C. Temple (*Indian Antiquary*, XXV, pp. 199-204 and 228-31) on the various senses in which the word chela and its variants have been used, by Hindus and Muslims respectively, during the last four centuries.

## (8) Kahārs (Litter-bearers).

These bore the  $p\bar{a}lk\bar{\imath}$ , the sukhāsan, the chaudol and the dol $\bar{\imath}$ . Their special skill lay in the fact that they carried their heavy burden up hill and down dale with the utmost comfort to the rider.

The best Kahārs came from the Deccan and from Bengal.—Several thousand Kahārs were always at court.

Pay of a head  $Kah\bar{a}r: 192\ d$ . to 384 d. Pay of an ordinary  $Kah\bar{a}r: 120\ d$ . to 160 d.

Blochmann (p. 264) has wrongly singhāsan, which is a kind of throne. In another place Abū'l-Fazl, after spelling out the word with elaborate clearness, says that a sukhāsan is a crescent-shaped litter covered with camlet or scarlet cloth and the like, the two sides of which have fastenings of various metals and a pole supporting it is attached by means of iron hooks. It is conveniently adapted for sitting in, lying at full length or sleeping during travel. As a protection against sun and rain they provide a commodious covering which is removable at pleasure' (A'in, I, 389; tr., II, 122). See also Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History, 522.

## (9) Dākhilī foot-soldiers.

A number of these, though paid by the state, were handed over to the *umarā*. Though really infantry, they were classed as  $n\bar{\imath}ma-suw\bar{a}r\bar{a}n$  (half-cavalry), and their descriptive rolls kept.

One-quarter of the number were matchlock-bearers, and the rest mainly bow-men—the odd proportion being made up by such miscellany as carpenters, blacksmiths, water-carriers, and pioneers<sup>1</sup>—useful camp-followers.

A non-commissioned officer (sar-guroh) of the matchlock-men drew 160 d., and the common matchlock-men only 140 d. The  $m\bar{\imath}r$ -dahas of the archers got from 120 to 180  $d\bar{a}ms$ , and the common archers from 100 to 120.

Irvine tells us (Army, 160) that these  $d\bar{a}\underline{kh}il\bar{i}$  troops are not heard of from Aurangzeb's reign on.

# IV. Artillery

Artillery was not an important branch of the army prior to Aurangzeb's time.

Humāyūn's artillery at the battle of Kanauj (1540 A.C.) is thus described:—

Among the equipments which were in the train

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The duty of these beldārs was to sink wells for the royal camp and to dig trenches, etc. In hilly traces the beldārs were sent in advance of the rest of the army to make the way.

of the Emperor were 700 carriages (gardun), each drawn by four pairs of bullocks, and carrying a swivel (zarb-zan), which discharged a ball (kalola) of 500 mithkáls weight. I, myself, saw several times that from the top of an eminence they unfailingly (bi-khatá) struck horsemen who slightly and unsuspectingly exposed themselves. And there were twenty-one carriages, each drawn by eight pairs of bullocks. Stone balls were of no use in these, but the shots were of molten brass weighing 5,000 mithkáls, and the cost of each was 200 mithkáls of silver. They would strike anything that was visible at the distance of a parasang' (Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlát, E. D. Ross and N. Elias, London, 1895, p. 474).

In Akbar's time this arm of the service was so unimportant that  $Ab\bar{u}$ 'l-Fazl has not much to say about it in the  $\bar{A}$ 'in. The scholar-minister talks rather grandiloquently of large pieces of ordnance, which took several elephants and thousands of bullocks to transport, and the balls of which weighed twelve maunds; and speaks thus of certain inventions of Akbar: 'He made a gun which, on marches, can easily be taken to pieces, and properly put together again when required. By another invention, His Majesty joins seventeen guns in such a manner as to

<sup>1</sup> Irviné reads 60 for 8.

be able to fire them simultaneously with one match. Again, he made another kind of gun, which can easily be carried by a single elephant; such guns have the name Gajnāls. Guns which a single man may carry are called Narnāls' (Text, I, 124; Blochmann, 119). 'His Majesty has made special guns,' continues the author, 'for the siege of fortresses and for naval engagements; while those fit for the imperial camp accompany the Emperor' (Text, I, 125).

The personnel of the artillery is briefly disposed of thus: 'Amīrs and Aḥadīs are on staff employ in this branch. The pay of the foot varies from 100 to 400 d.' (Text, 125; Blochmann, 119).

It strikes one as strange, however, that the artillery and its personnel, which obviously formed part of the army, finds no place in Book II of the  $\bar{A}$ 'in, which deals with the Army. The artillery and some matchlock-men are included in Book I, while such unmilitary classes as porters, valets (footmen), runners, gladiators, wrestlers, slaves and litter-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Apparently a precursor of the Arghan or Arghūn 'which is composed of about 36 gun barrels so joined as to fire at once' (Irvine, Army, 138), cognate with the mitrailleuse (Horn, 30).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Dr. Horn is presumably quite right in holding that the Narnals waren wohl keine Kanonen sondern nur eine Art shwererer Musketen '(p. 28).

<sup>\*</sup> For this sentence I am preferring my own translation to Blochmann's, which seems to me inaccurate.

bearers, who never served in, or even behind, the fighting-line, are grouped together under *Piādagān* in Book II.

Irvine's explanation (Army, 155 and 160-1) that all officers and men borne on the books of the imperial household are included in Book I, while Book II comprises only the part of the army which was not paid direct from the imperial treasury, but through the intervention of the manṣabdār, is insufficient; since Aḥadīs and all the Piādagān were paid direct by the Emperor and yet figure in Book II. On Irvine's hypothesis only manṣabdārs and their followers should be in Book II, while Aḥadīs, artillery and Piādagān should all be included in Book I.<sup>1</sup>

Irvine's position that 'the artillery was much more perfect and numerous in 'Alamgir's reign, than it was under his great-grandfather, Akbar' (p. 116), is unassailable. There is no doubt that the development of artillery in the Mughul army, which began in Aurangzeb's reign, was due in the main to contact with the European armies and the service of Portuguese gunners.

In Jahangir's reign, we are told,2 Patr Das was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It has been suggested to me as a possible explanation that artillery was not yet recognized as a separate arm.

<sup>\*</sup> Tuzuk, 9-10. R. & B.'s translation (I, 22-23) is defective, and Blochmann's (p. 524) no better.

appointed Mīr Ātash (Master of Ordnance), and ordered to have in the Artillery of the Stirrup always ready 3,000 pieces of ordnance, with 50,000 gunners—a large number, one would think, for the Stirrup Artillery, but not impossible, since it seems to have been a special measure, and for the maintenance of it, as Shāh Nawāz Khān tells us (M.U., II, 140), the revenue of 15 parganas was assigned.

The number of guns with which Humayun and Jahangir are credited would suggest that the Mughul artillery was in a high state of efficiency, and furnished a formidable weapon. This, however, was not the case. 'Of this arm of the service,' says Irvine, 'it is doubtful whether the Moghuls knew much before they descended into the plains of India under Bābar. What they did know was probably borrowed from the Turks and from Constantinople. Nor could the art and science of gunnery have been very advanced in India itself, when the Moghuls arrived in that country in the first half of the 16th century. In the earlier Moghul period, at any rate. the emperors were dependent for their artillery on the help and instruction of Rumis, that is. Mahomedans from Constantinople, or of Farangis, principally run-away sailors from Surat, or Portuguese half-castes' (Army, 152).

Considerable bodies of the Portuguese continued

to be enlisted up to the middle of the eighteenth century.

Dr. Horn thus in similar strain: 'Das Artilleriewesen (*Tupchâne*), war unter Bâber durchaus nach türkischem Muster eingerichtet, wie denn die Türken hierin im muhammedanischen Orient überhaupt die Lehrmeister gewesen sind... Noch unter Akbar ward das Geschützwesen mit Vorliebe Türken anvertraut, bis an deren Stelle dann allmählich Europäer traten' (p. 29).

The artillerymen, says Bernier, 'receive great pay, particularly all the Franguis or Christians,—Portuguese, English, Dutch, Germans, and French; fugitives from Goa, and from the Dutch and English companies. Formerly, when the Mogols were little skilled in the management of artillery, the pay of the Europeans was more liberal, and there are still some remaining who receive two hundred roupies a month: but now the King admits them with difficulty into the service, and limits their pay to thirty-two roupies' (p. 217).

Abū'l-Fazl speaks respectfully of Turkey's artillery; and we hear a great deal of Portuguese and other European gunners in state employ throughout Mughul history.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A'in, I, 124; Blochmann, 119.

The artillery consisted of the 'heavy' and the 'light'.

The heavy artillery, early in Aurangzeb's reign, consisted, according to Bernier, of 'seventy pieces of cannon, mostly of brass' (p. 217). Under heavy artillery were also included 'from two to three hundred light camels, each of which carried a small field-piece of the size of a double musket, attached on the back of the animal, much in the same manner as swivels are fixed in our barks' (pp. 217-18). These were <u>Shutarnāls</u>. So 'heavy artillery' was only a technical term, and was not confined to the larger pieces.

'The Moghuls,' says Irvine, 'were very fond of large ordnance, but such pieces were really more for show than use; and as Fitzclarence truly says, 243, the oriental idea seems to have been "to render this destructive engine from its size more powerful than those of the Western world." In this direction they proceeded even to extravagant lengths. These huge guns made more noise than they did harm; they could not be fired many times in a day, and were very liable to burst and destroy the men in charge' (Army, 118).

The large pieces had often high-sounding, mouthfilling names, and usually bore on them inscriptions, giving the name of the founder and place and date of manufacture. See the long list of names of the principal cannon at Mughul court in Aurangzeb's time in Storia (II, 365-66). For an inscription on the gun, Jahānkushā, made at Dacca in the reign of Shāh Jahān, see 'Translation of an Inscription on a Gun at Moorshedabad with Remarks,' by Major St. G. D. Showers in J.A.S.B., XVI, 589-92.

Field-pieces were, generally speaking, heavier than fort- and siege-guns.

The Light Artillery, otherwise called Topkhanai-rikāb or Artillery of the Stirrup, is thus described by Bernier: 'The artillery of the stirrup, which also accompanied the Mogol in the journey to Lahor and Kachemire, appeared to me extremely well appointed. It consisted of fifty or sixty small field-pieces, all of brass; each piece mounted on a well-made and handsomely painted carriage, containing two ammunition chests, one behind and another in front, and ornamented with a variety of small red streamers. The carriage, with the driver, was drawn by two fine horses, and attended by a third horse, led by an assistant driver as a relay. The heavy artillery did not always follow the King, who was in the habit of diverging from the highroad, in search of huntingground, or for the purpose of keeping near the rivers and other waters. It could not move along difficult passes, or cross the bridges of boats thrown

over the rivers. But the light artillery is always intended to be near the King's person and on that account takes the name of Artillery of the Stirrup. When he resumes his journey in the morning, and is disposed to shoot or hunt in game preserves, the avenues to which are guarded, it moves straight forward, and reaches with all possible speed the next place of encampment, where the royal tents and those of the principal *Omrahs* have been pitched since the preceding day. The guns are then ranged in front of the King's quarters, and by way of signal to the army, fire a volley the moment he arrives '(p. 218).

What has happened, one might ask, to the 3,000 pieces of light ordnance, which Patr Dās had placed on a permanent footing in obedience to Jahāngīr's orders early in his reign? Was the number cut down later?

We have already noted that all the pieces included under 'heavy' artillery were not heavy. Irvine's remark, therefore, that the Artillery of the Stirrup was rather a subdivision of the light artillery than identical with it (Army, 133) is fully justified.

The artillery was one of the imperial workshops, and, as the workshops formed part of the imperial household (which was controlled by the <u>Khānsāmān</u>), the head of the artillery, i.e., the <u>Dārogha-i-</u>

Topkhāna or Mīr Ātash, was under the Khānsāmān. It is to be noted, however, that this applied only to the manufacturing department and the magazine or ordnance department. In case of the field artillery in actual use and of guns in use in fortresses the Mīr Ātash held independent charge (Army, 113). Again, 'all reserve artillery and stores were kept in certain great fortresses, such as Āgrah, Dihlī and Lāhor, in the charge of the special commandant (qila'hdār), who was an officer appointed direct from court and in no way connected with or subordinate to the provincial governor (nāzim or ṣūbahdār)' (Ibid., 156-7).

## V. War Elephants

It will not be out of place if we say something here about what may be called the Elephant arm.

The elephant was a distinguishing feature of the Mughul Indian army, and was used for several purposes in field and siege warfare. Nor was the practice confined to the Mughuls, for we find it current from ancient times, throughout the Hindu and Muslim periods.

In war the elephant was used in various ways. In the battle line he took part in offence and defence. Thus Monserrate: 'The Indians train elephants to fight, There are indeed extraordinary numbers of elephants in the royal camps and cities. They

are taught to carry baggage as well as to fight, though the baggage is mainly carried by the females. Most of the males are trained for battle and are furnished with defensive armour, which they also use for offensive purposes, though indeed they are quite as dangerous without this armour. For they catch up the enemy's soldiers with their trunks, dash them down under their feet, and trample upon them. They do not cease from crushing their wretched victims till they are ground and smashed to pieces. Others they toss up into mid-air, so that they are killed by the fall; others they split in twain by placing a foot on one of their victim's legs. seizing the other leg with their trunk and tearing it forcibly upwards. The males go so violently mad for about three months of every year that sometimes they kill even their keepers; they are most useful for fighting during this period. When the time of madness is past, if they have to be enraged again on account of an impending battle, this is effected by giving them cat's flesh to eat mixed with their other food . . . Some are trained to carry guns on their backs. When the black powder is ignited and the gun is discharged with a thunderous roar, the elephant does not become in the slightest terrified or unmanageable.' 1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Commentary, 84-85.

But the use of elephants in the fighting line involved serious disadvantages and risks. Just as an advancing line of elephants belonging to a victorious army could trample upon the retreating foe and work havoc, similarly the elephants of a defeated army would often turn round and, in a headlong, disorderly flight, crush their own soldiery. This contingency was foreseen, and partly provided against, by placing the elephants at the back.<sup>1</sup>

Generals and commanders were often mounted on elephants in the battle field by way of distinction. On the back of an elephant they could be easily seen by the rank and file; their presence inspired confidence, and was a source of strength to the troops, who fought more often for persons than for causes.

As we have seen in the last section,<sup>2</sup> guns called gajnāls were mounted on elephants. Irvine cites a case from late Mughul history where each gajnāl, elephant carried two soldiers and two pieces.<sup>3</sup>

Elephants were used in peace and war for displaying standards and ensigns—in marches and processions, and on the battle field.

Behind the fighting line the elephant was used

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See the passage quoted from Monserrate's Commentary on p. 225 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> P. 214 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Army, 175.

for purposes of transport, and especially for hauling heavy pieces of ordnance. We often find treasure and women loaded on elephants, kept behind the army under escort for safety.

Where the wives, daughters, and concubines accompany a prince in battle, they 'travel generally in the rear of the army, riding on the greatest elephants, which are followed by others bearing the gold coin and precious stones that these princes carry also with them, to be made use of in case of disgrace or misfortune' (Storia, II, 390).

'Elephants were also used to batter in the gates of fortified places. It is for this reason that such gates are generally found protected by metal plates and spikes. To counteract these, the elephant was again, in its turn, provided with a frontlet of steel.' 1

#### SECT II: ORDER OF BATTLE

This subject as well as the cognate one, Conduct of a Battle, has been treated of at sufficient length by Irvine, who follows up the account with the details of certain actual battles.<sup>2</sup> It will serve no useful purpose to repeat what has been well done already. The reader who is interested in the subject will find much useful information and graphic detail in Army, Chapters XX—XXII.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Army, 177.

A quotation or two from Monserrate's Commentary may be given as a supplement to Irvine's elaborate account:

'The Mongol |i.e., Mughul Indian | armies are arrayed for battle as follows:—The squadrons of cavalry are drawn up in the form of a half moon and are arranged in three divisions, one on the left wing, one in the centre, and one on the right. Behind the cavalry is the infantry, and behind the infantry the elephants, which are never allowed in advance of the other troops, both in order to prevent their catching sight of the enemy, and to obviate the danger of their being wounded and flying in panic: for in this case they madly attack their own troops, throwing them into confusion, and crushing many to death. On advancing to the attack Mongol generals extend one or both wings in the endeavour to outflank and encircle the enemy. The elephants terrify rather than harm the enemy; and are more useful as a spectacle than as a real agency of victory. When hurt they attack any one who comes in their path, without distinction between friend and enemy. They are easily driven off by means of fire-arms, and retreat headlong if stabbed in the trunk. If horses have been accustomed to elephants they pay no attention to them. There is a camel-corps of Balochii among the King's cavalry. If there are enough of them to form

a compact body, they are grouped closely together in some special part of the battle-line. Camels are as nimble and skilful in a battle, if I may say so, as horses. Nor are they less fierce. They fight with teeth and feet. If they catch hold of any one, they kneel upon him so hard and long, pounding and crushing him, that their wretched victim is destroyed.'

Again, in another place he says, 'the Mongols never fight a pitched battle with the whole of their forces. If they invite battle with six thousand troops, they are sure to have twenty thousand hiding in ambush; and in the rear of these again several thousands more are held in reserve, that they may support the advance-guard in case of a reverse, or rally them, if routed. Such reserves often turn defeat into sudden victory by checking the pursuit, by restoring the fight through their freshness and unimpaired vigour, and by compelling the weary enemy to retire.'2

# SECT. III: ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMY

Having surveyed the various departments constituting the Mughul army, we naturally feel inclined to ask what was the total strength of the military organization. The question has been examined by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Commentary, 139-40.

various writers such as Blochmann (pp. 254-58 and pp. 596-606), Paul Horn (pp. 39-45), and Irvine (Army, pp. 59-61).

Blochmann's conclusions about Akbar's army (pp. 256 and 258), on which both Horn and Irvine rely, are vitiated by certain fundamental misapprehensions, and seem arbitrary.

As we have said before, neither Blochmann nor later writers seem to have noticed that the  $\bar{A}$ 'in list refers only to the  $\bar{z}\bar{a}t$  rank, and is therefore utterly useless for any calculation of the strength of the army; and the same remark applies to the list in the  $Tabaq\bar{a}t$ .

De Laët's list, although it stands on a different footing, is equally useless for the same reason, and Hawkins' figures are, besides, both fragmentary and unsatisfactory.

Since we have not sufficient data to arrive at even tolerably satisfactory results regarding the reign of Akbar or of Jahāngīr, we propose to concentrate our attention on an estimate of the army during Shāh Jahān's reign.

Mullā 'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd Lāhorī, surveying the Imperial army at the end of the twentieth regnal year, informs us with business-like succinctness and precision so usual with him, that the army (excluding

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pp, 5-6 above.

the numbers appointed with faujdārs, karorīs and 'āmils to administer the parganas) amounts, under the one-fourth rule, to 200,000 horse, which comprise 8,000 Manṣabdārs, 7,000 Aḥadīs and Barqandāz horsemen, 1,85,000 horsemen (followers of Princes, Umarā and Manṣabdārs), and 40,000 infantry (tufangchī, top-andāz, gola-andāz, and bān-dār), out of which 10,000 were at court, and the rest are in the provinces and in forts (B.N., II, 715).

The carefully-prepared list of the Mansabdārs at the end of twentieth regnal year given on pp. 717-52 of B.N., II, practically constitutes the Army List of the empire for that date, and is an invaluable document. This list includes names of all officers of the rank of 500 and above, whether dead or alive at the time of its preparation, showing in each case whether the officer is alive. The list, as usual, is arranged in the order of the sāt rank; but the suwār rank is carefully given in all cases where that rank is enjoyed.

From such a list it is possible to construct the total strength of the cavalry; while it enables us to check the totals of the war effective given by 'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd Lāhorī himself in the passage quoted above.

For the purpose of estimating the cavalry we ignore the <u>sat</u> rank, and add up the <u>suwār</u> ranks of all the officers living at the time, excluding for the moment the <u>du aspa si aspa suwār</u> rank. We find

that the total of yak aspa horse rank amounts to 3,70,825.—Next we take the du aspa si aspa figures. These total 76,000. As we know, this figure has to be doubled; so that it means 1,52,000 'horse.'

The sum total of the yak aspa and du aspa si aspa ranks, therefore, is 3,70,825+1,52,000=5,22.825 'horse.' The reader knows well that this figure does not represent the number of cavalry actually entertained, but only the sum total of the horse rank. The actual number can be obtained by the one-third, one-fourth and one-fifth rule. The one-fifth rule was probably a concessionary measure; while the one-third rule applied to a small number. Calculating by the one-fourth rule, therefore, we arrive at 1,30,706 as the number of horsemen. Making allowance for the few who held appointments in the provinces where their  $j\bar{a}g\bar{a}rs$  lay, and who were governed by the one-third rule, 1,35,000 would be a safe figure for the total cavalry.

We should not forget that this is the total following of the manṣabdārs of 500 and above only. Counting up the names of those reported as alive in the list, we find that this following belonged to 445 officers. 'Abdu'l-Hamid Lāhorī has already informed us that the total number of manṣabdārs was 8,000, while their total tābīns numbered 1,85,000. We know, therefore, that the manṣabdārs under the rank

of 500 totalled 7,555, and their following approximately 50,000.

The results can now also be stated in a tabular form:—

STATEMENT SHOWING TOTAL STRENGTH OF MANŞABDĀRS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS AT END OF XX R.Y OF SHĀH JAHĀN.

	Total number of <i>Manşabdārs</i> (including Princes)	Total rank			
Zāt rank		Yak aspa	Du aspa sı aspa	Total with du aspa si aspa rank doubled	Actual number of horsemen entertained
500 and above	445	3,70,825	76,000	5,22,825	1,35,000 (approximately)
Below 500	7,555		•••	•••	50,000 (approximately)
Total	8,000		•••		1,85,000

We find that the total figures quoted from B.N. above fit in beautifully with the deductions from the  $Mansabd\bar{a}r\bar{i}$  list.

These results, again, are on all fours with the following statement in Bernier: 'Leaving out of our present calculation the infantry, which is of small amount, and the number of horses, which is merely

nominal, and is apt to deceive a superficial observer, I should think, with many persons well conversant with this matter, that the effective cavalry, commonly about the King's person, including that of the Rajas and Patans, amount to thirty-five or forty thousand; which, added to those in the provinces, forms a total of more than two hundred thousand horse' (219).

Again, talking of infantry, the author continues: 'I do not think that in the army immediately about the King, the number can exceed fifteen thousand. including musketeers, foot artillery, and generally, every person connected with that artillery. From this, an estimate may be formed of the number of infantry in the provinces. I cannot account for the prodigious amount of infantry with which some people swell the armies of the Great Mogol, otherwise than by supposing that with the fighting men, they confound servants, sutlers, tradesmen, and all those individuals belonging to bazars, or markets, who accompany the troops. Including these followers, I can well conceive that the army immediately about the King's person, particularly when it is known that he intends to absent himself for some time from his capital, may amount to two, or even three hundred thousand infantry. This will not be deemed an extravagant computation, if we bear in mind the

immense quantity of tents, kitchens, baggage, furniture, and even women, usually attendant on the army. For the conveyance of all these are again required many elephants, camels, oxen, horses, and porters' (219-20).

Another way of forming an idea of the military strength of an empire is to take measure of an effort put forth by it on an occasion sufficiently important to be considered typical. We can take <u>Shāh</u> Jahān's reign, as it was the period of the greatest prosperity and power. Luckily figures for several expeditions are available:

In 1630 (=1039) Shāh Jahān led an expedition in person to the Deccan. Mandelslo says, the whole army numbered 1,44,500 horse, including 15,000 aḥadīs and barq-andāz, and gives a long list of manṣabdārs with their respective contingents, which constituted that number.¹ On the other hand 'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd tells us that this force consisted of three armies commanded by Irādat Khān, Rāja Gaj Singh and Shā'ista Khān, numbering respectively 20,000, 15,000 and 15,000—total, 50,000, including aḥadīs and barq-andāz.² The names of the generals are correctly given by Mandelslo too; but he mentions a fourth army under the direct command of the Emperor, which 'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd ignores, presumably

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mandelslo, 39.

because it took no part in the fighting, and remained at Burhānpur all the time. Mandelslo's figures for the three armies are far in excess of those given in B.N. In spite of the former's elaborate show of detail it will not be safe to accept his estimate in view of the definite statement in B.N. and the serious disparity between the two.

In the last decade three well-equipped expeditions were sent to Kandahar. In the following table we give the details of the army (cavalry, infantry and artillery) and its equipment sent for the purpose of laying siege to that stronghold.

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#### ARMY AND EQUIPMENT SENT TO BESIEGE

Period	Manşabdārs and their followers	A ḥadis	Tufangchīs, Bān-dārs and gunners
First expedition (1059 A.H.≕1649 A.C.)	50,000 cavalry	5,000 (Tir-andāz and Barq-andāz)¹	10,000
Second expedition (1062 A.H.=1652 A.C.)	56,000 .,	7,000 (Tīr-andāz, 4,000; Barg-andāz, 3,000)	10,000
Third expedition (1063 A.H.=1653 A.C.)	57,000 ,,	5,000 (Tîr-andāz, 2,500; Bary-andāz, 2,500)	10,000

According to B.N., the Ahadis are included in the 50,000 cavalry.

<sup>3</sup> A kind of ordnance apparently mounted on a tree or other eminence,

#### KANDAHAR (1059-1063 A.H.=1649-1653 A.C.)

Artillery	Transport .	Authorities
		B.N., III. 23b- 24a; A.S., III. 71; Mulakh- khas (my MS.) Book III, 18b.
8 big siege guns. 20 smaller ordnance (which took balls weighing 2 or 2½ seers). 20 hathnāls 100 shutarnāls.	3,000 carrying treasure 500 carrying arms 2,000 carrying ammunition.	64a; A.S., III, 139 and 141.
7 big siege guns, some of which took balls of 2 maunds: (1) 'Kishwarkushā' (ball: 1 m. 8 s. Akbarī) (2) 'Garh-bhajan' (ball: 1 m. 8 s. A kbarī). (3) A big gun (ball: 1 m. 16s. Akbarī). —These three cast by Dārā Shukoh's orders. (4) 'Qal-'a-kushā.' (5) 'Maryam'—and two others sent from court.  7 top-i-hawā'i,* made to Dārā Shukoh's order.  30 smaller ordnance. 25 gajnāls. 100 shutarnāls. 3,000 cannon-balls (large and small). 5,000 maunds of gun-powder. 1,500 maunds of kead (imperial measure). 14,000 bāns. In addition to these the artillery which had been used at Kandahar in the second siege had remained at Kabul. At least five of those big guns joined the besieging army at Kandahar, reaching there under Ghairat Khān. Total number of cannon-balls discharged during the siege: 27,000.	3,000 camels for loading treasure, ammunition and arms.	B.N., III, 73a-b, A.S., III, 157- 58; Mula <u>h</u> , <u>khas</u> (my MS. Book III, 65a- b.

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### SOME SELECTED OPINIONS

Dr. Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Late High Commissioner for India in South Africa

My attention to Mr. Abdul Aziz's work was drawn by his excellent articles in the Journal of Indian History, Madras, in, I think, 1932 or 1933. I followed these articles with the greatest interest, as they dealt with an exceedingly difficult period in a style of striking lucidity and scientific precision. They contained none of the vague, obscure and inaccurate theories and facts which has sometimes impelled me to ask the author, why do you mumble? I am glad to find that Mr. Abdul Aziz has collected together these articles and intends to publish them in a book form. I think it is a wise decision, and will be welcomed by all students of Mughul India.

Mr. Abdul Aziz's monograph on "The Imperial Treasury of the Greater Mughuls" is a work of solid research, sound judgment and great industry, and he has laid all students of the period under a deep debt of gratitude by his researches Only those who have been through the novitiate of a trained historical scholar can appreciate the wealth and variety of the material he has collected together. His introductory chapter on the Imperial Household is excellent, and he has discussed the material withd iscrimination and tact. It does not pretend to be an exhaustive account, and he had perforce to content himself with the chief offices and departments...

Mr. Aziz then discusses the sources of revenue in the time of greater Mughuls and calculates their value, with his customary caution, detachment and precision.

The other articles deal with precious stones, and discuss the nature and quality of various kinds of stones, and trace the history of the Koh-i-Nur diamond... The section on Rubies is excellent while other sections that will appeal to readers are those on Ivory and Ivory Work in India..... The chapter headed Actual Contents of Jewel Treasury from the invasion of Bābur to that of Nādir Shāh is a work of rare power, and should be read by all.......

This brief analysis of a brilliant work will show at a glance how solid is Mr. Abdul Aziz's contribution to the knowledge of the Mughul India. Mr. Abdul Aziz's account of the Thrones, Chairs and Seats of the Great Mughuls makes fascinating reading, and there is a very fine account of the Peacock Throne.......

Mr. Abdul Aziz has also published articles on the Manṣabdārī System and the Mughul Army. In these articles Mr. Aziz deals with a subject which has been the focus of acute controversy, and discusses the theories of Dr. Paul Horn, Blochmann, and others on the nature and origin of Manṣabdārī.

The subject bristles with difficulties, and no writer can claim infallibility. I am, however, inclined to agree with the author that Dr. Paul Horn's whole account of the Manşabdārī System suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding. The author's explanation of the significance of Zat and Sawar ranks is plausible, as it represents a very dispassionate and thorough analysis of the works of previous writers on the subject. The reader will find Mr. Abdul Aziz's account of Mughul aristocracy as a social phenomenon interesting...

In conclusion, I may add that few works published during the last twenty years have dealt so thoroughly and ably with an extremely important aspect of Mughul administration. Mr. Abdul Aziz's work is a pioneer undertaking and he has brought to his task all the qualities which are indispensable in a historian—sound judgment, care and caution in the handling of material, thorough study of the data and a lucid style. I am sure that the work will be welcomed by all students of this period with enthusiasm.

# J. F. Bruce, Esq., University Professor of History, Punjab University, Lahore.

I have been rather closely aware, during the past eight years, of the studies of Mr. Abdul Aziz in Mughul history; and have read the published results with much interest. He is well equipped for the enquiries to which he has devoted himself for a good many years past, as he possesses not only an exact knowledge of Persian, but also a very wide and critical knowledge of the original contemporary sources from which alone a genuine understanding of that period can be derived. He has also a command of the language of French and German scholars of the subject.

Mr. Abdul Aziz is a very meticulous student, who insists upon a precise examination of the *minutiæ* of his subject, which gives his reader confidence in the originality and authenticity of his work. If he can give us a reflective summary of the result of his years of patient scholarship, he will make a valuable contribution to Indian history. He has, too, a clear and pleasant English style.

## K. B. M. Afzal Husain, Vice-Chancellor, Punjab University.

Mr. Abdul Aziz has sent me for opinion reprints of his

articles on various subjects connected with the history of the Mughul period. I have read these entertaining articles with great interest. Scientific precision regarding the authenticity of facts is the characteristic of these valuable contributions. The style is lucid and elegant. I have been struck by the extensive amount of labour which this study must have entailed and the thorough mastery of the subject which the author possesses.

So far history has been dealt with as the story of kings. Mr. Abdul Aziz has rendered valuable service to our country in dealing with the history of the people of the Mughul period. A king may be good or he may be bad, and to base the entire conception of the evolution of society on the personality of the king cannot historically yield important results. The common people are the real material of which history is built, and I congratulate Mr. Abdul Aziz that he has constructed his history from such material.

# Dewsn Bahadur Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, Editor, "Journal of Indian History," Madras.

Mr. Abdul Aziz, Bar.-at-Law, Batala, Punjab, began rather a large scale history of perhaps the most brilliant period of the Mughul Empire in India, the empire under Shah Jahan. He contributed a series of articles as a preliminary to his work on the Manṣabdārī System of the Mughuls, and the Treasury and the Jewels of the Mughuls. In both of these subjects, he made a most thorough-going study of the topics he chose for treatment. Had he had the chance of completing the work without interruption, he should have succeeded in publishing a magnificent work on the Mughul Empire.....I may say that Mr. Abdul Aziz's work as a student of history deserves all commendation. I only hope

that he will have, for this part of the work, such an encouraging reception as would stimulate him to go forward and complete the work, notwithstanding all the inconveniences, which his professional work as well as the other calls upon his time might interpose. I wish him all success in his enterprise.

The Hon'ble. Sir Azizul Huque, Commerce Member, Government of India.

I have gone through the reprints of your articles on the "Imperial Treasury and the Mughul Army" and I congratulate you on your careful collection of materials available in scattered works. I wish there were similar studies on the Mughul administration in India by other research workers.

S.' H. Hodivala, Esq., Principal and Professor of History (retired), Bahauddin College, Junagadh, author of "Historical Studies in Mughul Numismatics," "Studies in Indo-Muslim History."

I am very greatly obliged to you for letting me see an advance copy of the Table of Contents of the Series of Monographs which you have projected on the Court and Institutions of the Indian Mughuls. Your plan is an ambitious one and may take some years to complete, but it is a task well worth performing, and I devoutly hope that you will be able to complete it and get the extra treatises published, as you hope to do, during the next three years. To judge from the two dissertations which have been already printed, it is sure to be of great value for the intensive study of the subject. No one who has read those Essays on the Mansabdari System and the Imperial Treasury can fail to be most favourably impressed by your patient industry, wide know-

ledge of the original authorities, meticulous zeal and avidity for facts and the judgment and good sense you have brought to bear on the interpretation of the crabbed and frequently cryptic phraseology of the contemporary chroniclers. This is specially true of the disquisition on the Manṣabdārī System—a subject which has been greatly perplexed by the guesses and theories of previous writers. It is possible that we shall never be able to understand it completely, but your elucidations of some of the obscure and controversial points may be justly described as honest and intelligent attempts to arrive at the truth and they deserve to be carefully considered by all earnest students of the subject.

Muhammad Shafi, Esq., Principal, University Oriental College, Lahore.

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