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**P O L I T I C S I N
P R E - M U G H A L T I M E S**

P O L I T I C S I N P R E - M U G H A L T I M E S

A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
TURKISH KINGS OF DEHLI UP TO *circa* 1400 A. D.

By

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WITH A FOREWORD

By

The Rt. Hon'ble Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU

K I T A B I S T A N
ALLAHABAD & LONDON

By the author

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
THOUGHT IN INDIA, (Friederichsen, de
Gruyter & Co., Hamburg, 1930)

SIDELIGHTS ON THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
NATIONALITY, (Kitabistan, Allahabad,
1933)

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FOREWORD

It is a happy sign of the times that Indian scholars have begun to realise their responsibility for presenting to the world their interpretation of Indian history. In this field, in which the most pre-eminent position is occupied at present by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, the work of some of our contemporary Indian writers on different epochs of Indian history has already attracted considerable attention in foreign countries. This is as it should be. Without attributing any prejudice to foreign writers I cannot help feeling that there are some phases of Indian history which have been presented by them in a light which it is difficult for Indians to accept as true light. This is not to suggest that my conception of history is "nationalistic." I do not believe that the true interests of scholarship are served by an Indian writer who considers it a part of his duty to pander to our national pride any more than they are served by a writer who makes it a point to exaggerate or unduly emphasise our deficiencies in social, political or other spheres of life. History must present facts as they are, or, as they are ascertained to be without any reference to our sentiment, pride, or prejudice. Judged by

this standard I feel—though I am hardly competent to express any opinion on the question—that the work of our Indian writers has been on the whole one of high merit.

Into this band of modern writers Dr. Ishwara Topa of the Osmania University, Hyderabad has already entered and this book, the proofs of which I have been privileged to read, is, I think, certain to add to his reputation as a careful researcher and scholar. It is not a book of the ordinary type, dealing with the rise and fall of dynasties, or this battle or that battle. Its subject is far more permanent. He deals in this book with the theory of politics and kingship in pre-Moghal times, in times, for instance, of Balban, Allauddin Khilji, Ghiasuddin, Mohammad Tughlak and some other kings. To a student of political theory, and particularly of the growth and development of the idea of sovereignty in the East and the West, Dr. Topa's statement of the varying phases of kingship in pre-Moghal times must be a topic of absorbing interest. His description of the views of Khusro and of the reign of Allauddin should, in relation to politics, be particularly interesting and informative.

There is a considerable amount of material which Dr. Topa has compressed with great ability, discrimination and clearness in the 245 pages of his book and I have no doubt that it will be a very

valuable addition to our information on the history of pre-Moghal times.

Dr. Topa is still young and he has the advantage of being connected with a University where he can make a special study of Persian books dealing with the Muslim period of Indian history and it may be hoped that he may follow this book by another dealing with the same subject in Moghal times.

Altogether it is a production which reflects great credit on his scholarship and should appeal to all those who are interested in the subject.

TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU

Allahabad

September 18, 1938

PREFACE

The present book discusses the problems of kingship and politics in the 'Muslim' India. In it an attempt is made to estimate the political psychology of the Turkish kings of Dehli and to depict the influence of political environment and condition on the development of essentials of statecraft.

The Indo-Turkish kingship faced issues—political, social, economic, and religious—in the light of the medieval political phraseology and ideology.

Of late some Indian scholars of the 'Muslim' India have broken new ground in the field of research and have thrown new light on the knotty problem of statecraft. But no attempt has been so far made by scholars of our country at the study of the Indo-Turkish kingship and its influence on politics and state on the basis of historical data.

History books on the early Muslim period are conspicuously wanting in the appreciation of the political psychology of the Indo-Turkish rulers and in the estimation of the interrelational aspect of kingship and politics. Lifeless exposition of political happenings, spiritless content, dried-up form are their salient features. Their insidious insinuation has warped the verdict of history. The

delineation of the moving time-spirit, working behind the political drama of the 'Muslim' India, is also lacking in them. In the historical evolution of our country it was a potent factor in impressing its stamp on the mind and soul of the people. This fact is hardly suggested by our historians. The *leitmotif* in the Indo-Turkish kingship is a subject of scientific investigation which our historians do not consider worth their thought. It has been consciously or unconsciously substituted by an interpretation of history based on the religio-racial bias. It is unhistorical and unscientific and creates communal mindedness. It also has disintegrated the sense of belonging to a common country and a common historical heritage. That the partisan's spirit has blurred historical perspective and resulted in distortion of facts cannot be denied. Even the new apologetic school in Indian history has too weak a foundation to stand the neologic interpretation. It is bound to collapse despite its adoption of modern phraseology and 'scientific' method.

My idea in taking up the study of the Indo-Turkish kingship is to decipher the laws of personality-forces of those Muslim rulers in order to comprehend the significance of the working of their mind and their reaction leading to the solution of political problems. To understand them is to become aware of the medieval time-spirit that

stirred political forces, coloured their political psychology and shaped the Indo-Turkish kingship. As they were the real makers of the medieval history of our country, they tackled the problems of kingship, statecraft, and politics of their times as live problems. Their success or failure cannot be judged by our modern conception of the state, politics, and government. The only criterion that can be applied to them and their work is the age and its standards and values in which they lived and thrived. As replica of their times they were constantly engrossed with living and ever-arising problems which they approached and solved in an art and manner of their own. The conqueror in them metamorphosed into the conquered. Their idea of sheer domination transmuted into a sense of goodwill and well-being. The prime duty of the state—the welfare of the people—possessed them completely. The most interesting feature of their long reign is the imperceptible change from the adventurer's mentality into a real ruler's.

I wish to note that the present book is thoroughly based on historical sources. In order to avoid its cumbersome reading I have purposely omitted from the footnotes the copious references of historical works in support of my theme. I have elsewhere given a select bibliography without which the completion of the book would have been impossible. Moreover, I am under a debt of

gratitude to authors, medieval and modern (whose works are cited in the bibliography) for the help rendered by them in the supply of historical data. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Beni Prasad of the University of Allahabad for the pains he had taken in going through the typed manuscript and for offering suggestions.

I am also greatly indebted to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru for writing a Foreword to the book. My warmest thanks are due to Mr. Ramnath Dar for correcting the proofs.

Allahabad
October 15, 1938

I. TOPA

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CHAPTER I

ARAB RAIDS ON THE FRONTIER OF INDIA

It was in the nature of the general scheme of the Arab political domination to hazard attempts at the subjugation of India. Within twenty years of the Great Arabian's death, the Arabs made themselves master of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Persia. The conquest of Persia showed them new vistas for further political extension in the East as 'a mere prelude' to domination. India 'offered so tempting a bait as to excite their cupidity and zeal.' They schemed her conquest. Continual attempts were made to achieve their political end which betrayed 'the settled purpose of the Arabs to obtain a footing in India.' In order to understand the full significance of political onslaughts of the Arabs it is but essential to depict the political history of the north-western frontier of India before the rise of Islamic political power.

The rise of the Bhairasivas disrupted the Kushan Empire. They ousted the Kushans from India. But the Kushan power continued to rule in the Kabul Valley and the border-land of India up to the fourth century A. D. The Sassanids of Persia also exerted influence on the Kushans during the third and fourth centuries. Hormazd II (301-10 A. D.), the Sassanian king, contracted

matrimonial relation with the daughter of a Kushan king. Authorities differ in the interpretation of the Sassanid-Kushan affair. Edward Thomas views it as the conquest of the Kabul valley by the Sassanian king. Cunningham considers it as a Kushan alliance, which the Kushan king initiated 'by giving a daughter and ceding the province of Balkh to the north of Hindukush.' During the reign of Sapur II (310-79 A. D.) Grumbates, a Kushan prince, seems to have given help to the Sassanian king against the Romans in the siege of Amida. To determine the exact political relationship of the Sassanids and the Kushans is difficult. But it can be asserted safely that the Sassanids ruled for some time in the Indus valley and the power of the Sassanids swayed the Kushans. With the rise of the Guptas in India the Kushans had to suffer from political repercussions due to the Gupta politics. They had to forgo political power and the 'Daivaputra Sâhi Sâhanusâhi' had to recognize the Gupta supremacy in the fourth century A. D. The inscriptional evidence proves conclusively that Samudra Gupta claimed 'acts of respectful service,' from the Sâhi Sâhanusâhis of Afghanistan and the Punjab.

In the fourth century A. D. the Hunic avalanche threatened the Sassanids as well as the Kushans. The Sassanian Firoz I (459-484 A. D.) battled against the Hunic forces in vain. The Huns came out

victorious and threaded their way through Hindu-kush into Afghanistan and India. The Hunic domination thus extended from the borders of Persia and Khotan to Central India. Song-Yun, the Chinese pilgrim and ambassador of the Wei dynasty (386-556 A. D.), described the political domination of the Huns. He recorded that Ephthalites received tributes from the forty neighbouring countries. In 520 A. D. Song-Yun visited Gandhara which was devastated by the Huns and their representative ruled over the country. The Kushan Sâhi also must have suffered at the hands of the Huns. About the middle of the sixth century A. D. forces of reaction against the Hunic rule were evidenced. The Western Turks, the Sassanids, and the Guptas rose against them and destroyed their rule and saved the countries from chaos and decay. The Sassanids re-established their power over the borders of India. Even an attempt at political conquest of Indian territories was made during the reign of Khusrau I. It is stated but not proved that Kabul, Zabul, and Zabulistan were included in the empire of Khusrau.

After the decline of the Sassanid power a new nomadic racial element—the Turks—came to the forefront and influenced the trend of events. From the Chinese borders to the Oxus valley the Turks reigned supreme. Even the Sassanid power utilized the forces of the Turks in undermining the

Hunic rule. In the last decades of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh centuries the Turks were holding the master-key to the political situation. They exploited the Sassanids for their own political end. The year 618 A. D. marked the establishment of the Chinese T'ang dynasty which was instrumental in giving a crushing blow to the rising power of the Turks. The cause of the Turkish defeat was their internal feuds. The Chinese power broke the backbone of the Turks—the Western and the Northern—in 630 A. D. and 658-59 A. D. The Chinese had no bigger rivals to encounter after the defeat of the Turks. Their suzerainty extended from Turkistan and the Oxus valley to the territories south of Hindukush. In 670 A. D. the Chinese lost the day against the Arabs as the conquest of Central Asia was undertaken by Qutaibah (705-715 A. D.).

In the middle of the seventh century A. D. the Arabs entered the political arena. As we are only concerned with the Arab raids on the north-western frontier of India, we may state that in their general political scheme the conquest of India was an item of no minor importance.

The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Yuan Chwang who came to India in the seventh century A. D. bears testimony to the fact that before the Arab impact the western border-land of India, comprising the kingdoms of Kabul (Kapisa), Zabul,

and Sind was Indian in character and feature. Indian culture had stamped its genius on its population which also had a strong dash of Turkish element, due to the racial influence of the Sakas, Kushans, and Huns. Culturally and politically, these kingdoms belonged to India. Even the early Muslim writers, al-Masudi, Baladhuri, Ibn Haukal, and Alberuni endorse the view that Kabul (Kapisa), Zabul, and Sind formed the western boundary of India, extending up to Makran and Khurasan.

The first Arab attempt at the conquest of India was made during the caliphate of 'Umar (634-643 A. D.) when a military expedition set out from 'Uman to pillage the coasts of India and appeared to have proceeded as far as Tana in Bombay. The Caliph was not consulted in the matter. When he came to know about it he forbade by peremptory orders 'to enter a holy war with that country.' As 'Umar had 'a particular horror of naval expeditions,' he dropped the scheme of political conquest of India by sea. Under the caliphate of 'Usman an emissary was sent with a view 'to explore the provinces of Hind.' The exploration scheme proved abortive and was abandoned. It was an attempt at reconnoitring in order to effect conquest. But the failure of the scheme was mainly due to its inadequate execution.

In the year 650 A. D. the conquest of Sijistan was undertaken by Ar-Rabî 'ibn Ziyad. Zaranj,

the capital of the country, was besieged. The people of the city 'made a sortie against him and opposed him fiercely.' 'A number of Muslims were wounded,' but the Muslims were successful in routing, killing, and defeating the inhabitants. Ar-Rabî's success in his political venture culminated in the subjugation of Abarwîz, the satrap, who sent word to him 'as king for safe-conduct in order to treat with him for peace.' 'One thousand slaves, each slave with a cup of gold' were the conditions of peace-treaty which was accepted by the satrap.¹

Baladhuri makes the point clear to us that though the Arabs were victorious and successful in dictating terms of peace, their control over the conquered area was not complete. Within a couple of years the germs of discontent sprouted up and the inhabitants 'closed up the city to the Muslims.' In order to promote and safeguard the Arab interest 'Abd-ar-Rahman ibn Samurah was appointed as governor of Sijistan. The Arab governor was compelled to march on Zaranj and 'surrounded its satrap in his castle on one of their festal days.' The satrap surrendered and made

¹ The satrap was an officer of the line of Indian princes, who ruled in the Kabul and Helmand valleys and was known to the Arabs as Rutbîl, Rantbîl, or Zunbîl. Baladhuri makes no mention of the name of the overlord of this satrap.

peace with him for 2,000,000 *dirhams* and 2,000 slaves. Ibn Samurah did not rest satisfied with the acceptance of tribute. But 'he established his rule over everything between Zaranj and Kishsh of the land of al-Hind and over that part of the region of the road of ar-Rukkhaj, which is between it and the province of ad-Dawar.' He crossed the mountain of az-Zur¹ where he surrounded the enemy who soon surrendered. He also obtained control of Bust and Zabul by covenant ('*abd*'). Ibn Samurah did not want to take prisoners from Zabul, saying that 'Uthman had made a compact (*walth*) with them or an agreement ('*abd*') with them on the basis of *wakî*. Apparent peace and order were maintained by the stern hand of Ibn Samurah, but was short-lived. When Umair ibn-Ahmar al-Yashkuri succeeded him, political dis-temper raised its head. 'The people of Zaranj expelled Umair and closed the town.' In the time of 'Ali ibn-abu-Tâlib forces were again mobilized to recapture Zaranj. Submission as well as opposition and resistance characterized the interplay of political forces. The order of the day was: Zaranj submitted and Zaranj revolted. It was

¹ Ibn Samurah went into the temple of az-Zur, which had an idol of gold with two rubies for eyes, and cut off a hand and took out the rubies. Then he said to the satrap, "keep the gold and the gems. I only wanted to show you that it had no power to harm or help."

the powerful personality of Ribî ibn-al-kâs al-'Anbari who 'established order in the country.' On the basis of Baladhuri's statement we can assert that before the reign of Mu-âwiyah ibn-abu-Sufyân the Arab control over Sijistan became lax. Political circumstances compelled Mu-âwiyah to take drastic step for crushing the insurgents in the conquered territories of Sijistan. This political drive necessitated the reappointment of Ibn Samurah as governor of Sijistan. Ibn Samurah, who was a man of iron will and indomitable courage, was faced with an arduous task. Baladhuri remarks that the people of Sijistan had apostatized and the treaties had been broken by the people of Zabulistan and Kabul. Ibn Samurah raided the country whose people had apostatized and subdued it either by force or by making treaties with its people, advancing as far as Kabul.¹

Ibn Samurah died in 670 A. D. Ar-Rabî 'ibn Ziyâd, who succeeded him before his death could not suppress revolts in Kabul and Dhâbulistan. Baladhuri observes: "Kâbul-Shah assembled a force to oppose the Muslims and drove out all of them that were in Kâbul. And Ratbîl came and

¹ Ibn Samurah raided many places: Khuwâsh, Kûzân, Bust, Razân, Khushshak, ar-Rukkhaj, Dhâbulistan, and Kabul. These were all political raids. He met with opposition in nearly all the places, but he succeeded in subjugating them. The causes of raids were that treaties were broken and the people shook off the Arab allegiance and domination.

gained control of Dhâbulistan and ar-Rukhkhaj as far as Bust." Ar-Rabî attacked Ratbîl at Bust and subdued him at ar-Rukhkhaj and captured the city of ad-Dâwar. The trend of Arab politics was to tighten the meshes of political forces in order to secure complete control and mastery over Sijistan and Kabul for the perpetuation of Arab rule. Need was felt for a strong hand that could guide and keep intact the political prestige and power of the Arabs in these territories. Hence ar-Rabî was removed and 'Ubaidullah ibn-abu-Bakrah superseded him as governor of Sijistan. He also had no smooth sailing as he had to continue hostilities. When he reached Razân, Ratbîl sent word to him, asking for peace for his own country and the land of Kabul in return for 1,200,000 *dirhams*. 'Ubaidullâh consented to this, but Ratbîl asked him if he would remit 200,000. The Arab governor agreed and the peace was established on the payment of 1,000,000 *dirhams*. The treaty between the Shah of Kabul and the Arabs was ratified and confirmed by Ziyâd ibn-abu-Sufyân. The affairs of Sijistan and Kabul appeared to have taken a peaceful turn, but peaceful conditions did not last long. Towards the end of the reign of Caliph Yazîd (683 A. D.) the people of Kabul treacherously broke the compact and imprisoned abu-'Ubaidah ibn-Ziyâd. Baladhuri does not give any definite reason for the breaking of political relation with

the Arabs. We are in the absolute dark as to the real motive which led to a political tension and estrangement between the Shah of Kabul and the Arabs. We do not know for certain how far the revolt was due to the excessive demand of tribute by the Arabs. That the Arab rule was resented by the people of Kabul is substantiated by historical data. Dr. Müller states that the Turks of Kabul threw off the yoke of Arab domination. The tribal disorders, observes Wellhausen, contributed to the revolt of the Shah against the Arabs. The governor of Sijistan, Yazîd ibn-Ziyâd, proceeded against Kabul and attacked them in Junzah. But the Arabs were routed and defeated. Even the Arabs had to ransom abu-'Ubaidah for 50,000 *dirhams*. After such a defeat the Arab political sovereignty dwindled down to *wâlîship*. The cities of Sijistan were 'aided and abetted' by Ratbîl who fomented rebellion in the Arab domain of Sijistan with the result that the people expelled the Arab governor. Ratbîl soon declared war against the Arabs. But there could be no abiding peace for Ratbîl as the Arabs were mobilizing to counter-effect the political forces of the Shah. It was a political respite of a very short duration for Ratbîl.

Baladhuri informs us that when 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn-'Abdullâh ibn 'Amir arrived as *wâlî* over Sijistan in the time of az-Zubair, he was compelled to stop in the city of Zaranj, because Ratbîl was at

war with him. This shows that hostility continued between the Shah of Kabul and the Arabs. But in 685 A. D. abu-'Afrâ 'Umair al-Mâzini killed Ratbîl and the polytheists were put to rout. If the statement of Baladhuri is correct, it means that there had been a fight going on between the people of Kabul and the Arabs in which the Shah of Kabul was victimized, but with the death of Ratbîl the war did not end. In the year 692 A. D. 'Abdullâh ibn-'Umayyah as governor of Sijistan had declared war upon the successor of the Shah of Kabul, who stood in awe of the Muslims and was willing to make peace with him for 1,000,000 *dirhams*. But for 'Abdullâh the sum offered was not tempting enough to conclude peace-treaty. He refused to accept saying, "If he fill me this tent with gold, well; but if not, then no treaty between me and him." Peace pourparlers ended in smoke. 'Abdallâh resumed fight. But Ratbîl did not put up a counter-attack nor opposed his adversary, with the result that 'Abdullâh penetrated into the country. The Shah of Kabul once again beseeched 'Abdallâh to 'cease hostilities and refrain from despoiling them.' This request also was refused. At last Ratbîl said: "Well, then, take 300,000 *dirhams* for a treaty, and put it in writing for me, agreeing not to raid our land while you are *wâli*, nor to burn, nor lay waste." 'Abdallâh agreed to the proposal, but Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik ibn-Marwan

did not approve of the condition of the treaty and dismissed him. Later, al-Hajjâj ibn-Yusuf (c. 694-713 A. D.), the governor of al-'Irâk, sent 'Ubaidallâh ibn-abu-Bakrah to Sijistan to supervise over the Kabul affair. In the meanwhile political atmosphere in Kabul and its neighbourhood became tense. 'Ubaidallâh was constrained to make peace with the Kabulis on condition that they should give him 500,000 *dirhams* and he should send Ratbîl three of his sons, Nahar, al-Hajjâj, and Abu Bakrh as hostages and he should make a treaty with them that he would not fight as long as he was governor.

The condition of the existing treaty was a direct insult to the Arab political authority as it undermined the Arab prestige. The caustic remarks of Shuriah ibn-Hâni al-Harithi reflect the intensity of the Arab humiliation and smart under which they groaned. The treaty itself signified to Shuriah the end of Arab rule, and the future likelihood of further advance on the Indian frontier was a past dream. Shuriah, while admonishing 'Ubaidallâh, remarked that "Fear Allah and fight this people, for if thou doest what thou art about to do, thou wilt weaken Islam on this frontier." He was not a man who could be swayed by political obligations. He prepared the Arabs for war and launched forth a campaign without realizing its untoward consequences. He stood no doubt for

the Arab honour and authority. The Arabs declared war and met with a dismal defeat. The result was that they were no more in an enviable position to dictate terms, but had to submit to the verdict of the victor. The *Tarikh-i-Alfi* depicts the humiliation of the Arabs who were compelled to purchase their liberation for a ransom of seven hundred thousand *dirhams*. The Arab defeat spurred the nation to effect a new mobilization on efficient and disciplinary basis in order to avenge political humiliation and disgrace. The 'peacock army' was its result and it was equipped at great cost. In 699 A. D. the avengeful 'peacock army' under the command of 'Abd-ar-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn-al-Ash 'ath marched against Ratbîl, who could not withstand the Arabs. He took to flight and his country was plundered. But the difference of opinion in regard to the conducting of warfare between al-Hajjâj, the governor, and 'Abd-ar-Rahman, the commander of the 'peacock army', resulted in open hostilities, and led to the internal split in the Muslim world, which was taken advantage of by Ratbîl. The political situation was saved by the political sagacity and prudence of al-Hajjâj who was instrumental in bringing about peace conditions. He 'made peace with Ratbîl, agreeing not to make war upon him for seven years, (others say nine years) on condition that he pays thereafter every year 9,00,000 *dirhams* in kind.'

Terms of peace-treaty were most scrupulously respected by al-Hajjāj. During the caliphate of al-Walīd ibn-‘Abd-al-Malik (705-715 A. D.) ‘Amir ibn Muslim, governor of Sijistan, demanded tribute from Ratbīl in coined money. This demand was resented by Ratbīl as the payment of tribute in the ‘coined money’ was not a specified condition in the original treaty of al-Hajjāj. The Arab political point of view was stressed and Qutaibah bin Muslim, the governor of Khurasan, was ordered to realize tribute which the Shah had refused. Qutaibah went to Sijistan for its realization. Ratbīl intimated him saying: “We are not lacking a bit in obedience, but we agreed upon payment in kind. Do not deal harshly with us.” Qutaibah gauging the political situation consented to the collection of tribute in kind from him. During the caliphate of Sulaimān ibn-‘Abd-al-Malik (717 A. D.) Ratbīl’s political attitude towards the Arabs changed owing to the disruptive tendencies in the Muslim world during the last days of the Umayyids. Politically, he felt more secure and did not care to recognize the political mastery of the Arabs. His absolute refusal of payment of tribute is indicative of the political weakness in the Muslim world. For more than forty years the Arabs could not exact any tribute from him. Baladhuri observes that ‘thereafter he did not pay any tribute to any of the *‘āmil*s of the Umayyads or of

abu-Muslim over Sijistân.' With the rise of the Abbasids the Arab politics was engrossed with the Kabul affair. It was eventually during the caliphate of al-Mansur (754-775 A. D.) that the matter regarding the abeyance in payment of tribute by Ratbîl was taken up again by the Arab government. The demand for tribute from the Shah of Kabul as 'al-Hajjâj has stipulated' was stressed. Ratbîl did not pay the tribute, but sent 'camels, Turkish tents, and slaves, reckoning each at double its value.' Ma'n ibn-Zâ'idh ash-Shaibani, the governor of Sijistân, was enraged at the idea of circumvention and trickery on the part of the Shah. It was considered that the governor was duped and camouflaged. For the materialization of the Arab demand Ma'n opened hostilities and declared war upon Ratbîl. He was successful in taking possession of ar-Rukhkhaj and capturing 30,000 slaves but the success was nominal from the political standpoint and did not effect any substantial change in the political status of the Shah. It is stated that during the caliphate of al-Mahdî (775-785 A. D.) as well as ar-Rashîd (786-90 A. D.), the 'âmils continued to collect tribute from Ratbîl of Sijistan as well as they could, and kept appointing their agents to rule over the regions to which Islam had reached.' Sijistan was never completely subjugated by the Arabs. Baladhuri states that when al-Ma'mûn, son of ar-Rashîd

(808-818 A.D.), was in Khurasan 'double tribute' was paid to him by Ratbil. Al-Ma'mun also subdued Kabul whose king professed Islam and promised obedience. But he regained independence and apostatized almost immediately after.

Yakub bin Laith, the Saffarid of Sijistan, subjugated Kabul and Zabulistan about 870 A. D. The king of Zabulistan was killed and its inhabitants embraced Islam. After the conquest Zabulistan became a part of the Islamic world. The victory over Kabul, the *Jamiu-l-Hikayat* observes, was due to treachery and deception. Kabul revolted against the domination and regained its independence. It did not cease to belong to India, either politically or culturally, till its complete subjugation by the Ghaznavides. The early Muslim writers throw ample light on the nature of the political status of Kabul after its independence.

Before the Ghaznavide domination the rulers of Kabul were Brahmans, says Alberuni. It has been observed aptly by Elliot that 'we are able to trace Brahman kings of Kabul to the beginning of the tenth century, about 920 A. D.' But Masudi, who visited the valley of Indus in 915 A. D., had nothing to say about the political and religious revolution by which Brahman had been substituted for Buddhist Turks. On the contrary, the prince ruled at Kabul by the same titles as he held when the Arabs penetrated for the first time into those

regions. Istakhri who wrote his 'Mesalik wa Memalik' six years after Masudi's visit to India, remarks that 'Kabul is a town with a very strong castle, accessible only by one road: this is in the hands of the Mussulmans, but the town belongs to the infidel Indians.' Ibn Haukal, while dilating on the occupancy of the town and castle, writes that 'Kabul is in the jurisdiction of Bamian and in it are Moslems and infidel Hindus. The Hindus are of opinion that the king, who is the Shah, is not entitled to the dignity of Shah, unless the sovereignty be covenanted to him in Kabul. It is said in the Kanun (Alberuni) that the castle of Kabul was the residence of the princes of the Turks, then of the Brahmans.' From the statements of these Muslim writers it becomes but clear that the kings of Kabul were not Muslim, but the old title of Shah was used by different non-Muslim dynasties of Kabul. On the basis of Ibn Haukal and Alberuni Kabul overthrew the Arab domination. Edward Thomas sums up in his 'Coins of the kings of Ghazni' the Kabuli rule: 'Kabul, having once been subdued by the Moslems, was recovered by the indigenous rulers some time after the visit of Istakhri. This may have been effected by the Turks; but it was probable that the Brahmans recaptured the city, attaining supremacy and speedily becoming a powerful and conquering dynasty and having in view the prestige attaching to the ancient

metropolis, which has formed the subject of remark of the Mohammadan authors.’

Modern historical research proves conclusively that after the middle of the ninth century A. D. the political existence the Turki Shahi of the Kabul valley had been threatened by the rise of the Karkotas of Kashmir and the adverse influences of the Arab-Kashmir politics. ‘The position of the Sâhis during this period, threatened as they were by powerful enemies from the north and the south, was critical’ and ‘the necessity of this two-fold struggle must have been a terrible strain on the Sâhis, and probably largely contributed to bring about the revolution which is described by Alberuni.’ The Brahman Vazir, Kallar, brought about *coup d'état* and founded an independent Brahman dynasty, known as the Hindu Shahi. The Samanids of Transoxiana, succeeding the Saffarids, did not appear to have any aggressive policy towards the Hindu Shahi. In 933 A. D. when the Samanid power was declining the *wâli* of Zabulistan, Abu Bakr-i-Lawik, was ruling at Ghazna. The Samanid governor, Alptigin, drove him out of Ghazni and founded an independent power. The rise of the Turkish power at Ghazni, in fact, led to the extinction of the Hindu Shahi. Its aggressive policy of conquest compelled the Shahi to shift its political centre more and more towards the Punjab and forego all claims to the kingdom of Kabul.

CHAPTER II
FROM RAIDS TO KINGSHIP

The advent of the tenth century saw the rise of a Muslim power beyond the north-western boundaries of India. Saman, a Muslim Persian chieftain of Balkh, was the man who made himself sovereign and his successors were successful in extending their rule over Transoxiana, Persia, and the greater portion of Afghanistan. The rise of the Samanids was phenomenal. Their political power waxed as rapidly as it waned. It underwent a process of political disintegration. Ultimately the political power passed into the hands of the Turks who were the most trusted officials of the Samanid government. They became the real masters of the country and the actual Samanid rulers were tools in their hands. Alptigin, the Turk, raised the banner of revolt against the Samanid rule and established himself at Ghazna where he began to reign as an independent sovereign. He could not free himself from the Samanid paramountcy. But 'all acknowledged the supremacy of the Samani emperors and duly inscribed on the currency struck by them as local governors, the name of the lord paramount, under whom they held dominions. It was not until 389 A. H. that the house of Ghazni assumed

independence as sovereign princes.’

In 963 A. D. Alptigin was succeeded by his son, Is-haq, who reigned for three years. Balkatigin was recognized by the Samanid Mansûr I of Bukhara as the legal heir to the throne of Ghazni. Piritigin (Pirai) succeeded him in 972 A. D. As he was a great villain, his rule sowed seeds of unpopularity and unrest. The people of Ghazni were dissatisfied with him. They plotted for his dethronement. They wrote to Abu Ali Anwak, requesting him to render help to the son of the Shah of Kabul so that their concerted action might lead to the very end of Piritigin’s rule. The whole scheme took shape and ripened. The Shah of Kabul and his ally marched towards Ghazni. When Abu Ali Anwak reached the vicinity of Charkh, Sabuktigin with a body of 500 Turks fell upon his adversary and defeated him and killed a large number of his people. Piritigin fought a battle with the Hindus of Kabul who were advancing under the Shah for the purpose of seizing Ghazni. He overthrew and despoiled them. It is correctly remarked that it was ‘the first conflict in this region between Hindus and Muslims, the former being the aggressors.’¹

Piritigin was deposed by the nobles and

¹ It may be mentioned here that at this time the country west of the Indus between Safid-Koh West and the Salt-Range on the East and Hindukush extending as far west as Kabul was still under Hindu raj.

officials and Sabuktigin ascended the throne of Ghazni in 977 A. D. After his accession to the throne Sabuktigin began to mobilize his forces. His political activities were concentrated on the formation of alliances with the Afghan tribes in order to strengthen his position on the Indian frontier.¹ He had several times raided the confines

¹ It will not be out of place to describe briefly the history of the Afghans in regard to Ghazni. Alptigin's political ventures had indirectly effected the situation on Indian frontier. In 143 A.H. the Afghan tribes after settling down in Kohistan (Afghanistan) were compelled under the pressure of increase in population to colonize the Indian territory, i. e., Kurmaj, Peshawar, and Shnuran. The Afghan colonization was resented by the Raja of Lahore who not only scented mischief and danger from the side of Afghans, but was determined to fight them. It was a political move which the Raja had to undertake in order to save his country from predatory raids. In the *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* it is stated that the Indians had to fight the Afghans in a number of battles. Sometimes the victory came to the Indians and sometimes the Afghans were victorious. But the battles could not decide the fate of either party. In the meanwhile the political relations between the Hindu Khakkar tribe and the Raja of Lahore became strained. The Khakkars formed friendship with their neighbours—the Afghans—in order to make their position secure. This agreement of the Khakkars with the Afghans changed the mentality of the Raja who gave up the idea of waging war on the Afghans and sued for peace, and made a free gift of a number of towns from Lamghan to Afghanistan to the Afghans and the Khiljis for their colonization under the specific condition that both these tribes—the Afghans and the Khiljis—should protect the frontier against the Muslim incursions. The result was that the Afghans fortified the country in order to ward off any invasion from the side of the Muslim power. Even the attacks of the Samanids for Indian booty were repelled by the Afghan

of Hindustan and obtained booty from the Hindus. 'Utbi remarked that those were the storehouses of wealth and Sabuktigin took possession of them. Sabuktigin also contemplated to extend his

forces. Thus Indian territory remained untouched and unmolested by the Muslim power. With the rise of the Ghaznavide power under Alptigin there had also been encounters with the Afghans, who were still the protectors of Indian territory. But the Afghans were so much harassed by the Ghaznavides that they could not safeguard the Indian interest. The Raja of Lahore was informed about the actual affair by the Afghans and help was sought by them to fight the Ghaznavides. It was decided after due consideration that the territories inhabited by the Afghans should be handed over to them so that they should have their own rule there. This was the first time when the Afghans established their government in the country. Whether help was given to the Afghans by the Raja, we do not know. But this is certain that the Raja did not want to meddle in the politics of the frontier. He kept himself aloof and showed indifference to the affairs of the frontier, as it was the concern of the Afghans to look after the management of their country. Shaik Hameed, the Afghan ruler, was aware of the weakness in the Afghan politics and to continue hostilities against the Ghaznavide power without the support of the Indian rajas would be fatal and detrimental to the Afghan interest. Peace with Sabuktigin was the political objective he had in view. In this way the Afghans could be free from the Ghaznavide molestation and inroads. He was successful in concluding peace with the Ghaznavide power. No religious motivation but the spirit of expediency guided Sabuktigin in welcoming an idea of neutrality on the basis of political rapprochement. From the Ghaznavide standpoint Sabuktigin scored a brilliant point in having an easy and unchecked approach to India. The Afghan blockade would no more impede his political movements. As the Afghans could not afford continuous encounters with the Ghaznavides, their political existence became secure

activities to the Indian boundaries which were the territories of the Hindus and no Islamic king had yet intruded on them. A rival political power on the Indian frontier created misgivings and apprehensions in the heart of the 'Badshah' of Hind—Jaipal.

He became suspicious of the motives of Sabuktigin and scented danger from the side of the Ghaznavides. His unchallenged and independent rule was a stumbling block in the way of the Ghaznavide politics. Sabuktigin was aware of it. For Raja Jaipal the establishment of a rival political power was a source of constant trouble and danger. To acknowledge its political existence would lead to the negation of his political supremacy and prestige and to a clash between two political powers. It was a life-and-death question for the further survival of the Indian power. Either to check the rise of the Ghaznavide power or to be prepared to forgo the claims for political supremacy was the perplexing problem before the Raja. The law of political expediency goaded him to an encounter with the Ghaznavide power.

by contracting political alliance. As protectors of India's interest they had nothing to bother. During the reign of Sabuktigin their rights were safeguarded. Some portion of Multan was conceded to them for their support and sustenance. Conditions changed in the time of Mahmud who had no such regard for them. The Afghans were exploited and crushed. He broke their political backbone. This may be due to the political solidarity they were trying to establish.

In 979 A. D. he made preparations for war despite the opposition and protestation of 'the whole council, both Brahmans and Kshatris' in order 'to wreak revenge upon Sabuktigin.' Jaipal marched on with his army through Lamghan to Ghazni. But the hostilities did not end in actual fighting. Terms of peace were settled.¹ 'Utbi says that the initiative in the conclusion of the peace-treaty was taken by Raja Jaipal. This does not stand to reason as it was against the war-waging mentality of the Raja. But it is stated that there had been no actual fight on either side. What was the reason for the prevention of fight we do not know. The Raja went fully prepared for war. From the terms of peace it becomes clear to us that he had to pay a big sum of money and to submit himself to obey any order he might receive from Sabuktigin regarding his elephants and his country.'² 'Utbi remarked that 'the Amir

¹ The later Muslim historians say that the battle was fought. How far they are correct in their statement we do not know.

² Raja Jaipal agreed to the following conditions of peace-treaty:—

- (1) One lac *dirhams* to be paid to the Ghaznavide treasury.
- (2) Fifty elephants to be delivered.
- (3) Certain number of fortresses and towns, belonging to the Raja, to be ceded to the Ghaznavides.
- (4) The appointment of a trusted officer by the Ghaznavides.

Sabuktigin consented on account of the mercy he felt towards those who were his vassals or some other reason which seemed expedient to him.' If such were the underlying motives of the terms of peace-treaty there would be no shadow of a doubt that the political power of the Raja was not at par with that of Sabuktigin. But the Raja, from the Indian standpoint, had a reputation for political eminence; he was considered to be one of the leading rajas of India; he could not possibly succumb to the dictates of Sabuktigin without having contested for victory. His march on Ghazni proves his political determination and his will to fight. The scenes suddenly changed at Ghazni. He became the conquered and the subdued without fighting for the honour of his country. This could only have happened in case of a real defeat or signs of a defeat. The Muslim historians gloated upon the fact in order to bolster up Sabuktigin. The real facts seem to have been burked.

After the peace-treaty was concluded between

- (5) The Raja's relations to be kept with Sabuktigin as hostages until the money was paid.

The Raja had given a portion of the amount to Sabuktigin and it was agreed that after some days Sabuktigin would take possession of those fortresses and towns as agreed upon in the peace-treaty. Jaipal returned with the trusted officers of the Ghaznavides in order to hand over the fortresses and towns to them.

Raja Jaipal and Sabuktigin, the Raja retired to his country under the specific condition that he would abide by the agreement. But he did not care to keep his promise. Most probably he thought that he was safe in his own kingdom and the political obligations imposed on him could be annulled at his own sweet whim. He was out of danger and the Ghaznavide power could not compel him in his country to concede to the wishes of Sabuktigin. From the attitude of the Raja it becomes quite clear that while at Ghazni he was compelled to sign the treaty most unwillingly. He had to accept conditions of peace-treaty as he was so politically circumstanced. This gave him freedom to return to his land. The political obligation was binding on him as he had agreed to abide by the agreement, but he repudiated it. The Raja behaved in a Kautilyan fashion and considered the terms of treaty as a scrap of paper to be torn up. He regarded the treaty as null and void and kept Sabuktigin's officers under custody.

The news of the Raja's political betrayal reached Sabuktigin who would not believe it. He had implicit faith in the Raja whom he expected to behave royally and expressed his views that it was opposed to the usual habit of Jaipal. 'Utbi remarks that Sabuktigin did not take any action in the matter until he was convinced by the 'repeated accounts' that he had been defrauded, bamboozled,

and befooled. Sabuktigin could not brook effrontery and insult from the Raja and made up his mind to punish him for his 'wickedness' and 'infidelity.' He invaded the Raja's territory. He was successful in his raid ; he levied tribute and obtained immense booty, but the Raja's life was spared.

From the political affairs of Ghazni-Hind it can clearly be seen that political forces were at work and the Muslim state had no other objective before it than the establishment of political power, control, and influence. It had been remarked that 'these expeditions were undertaken rather as measures of reprisal and for the purpose of securing his dominions than with any other intention of propagating the faith.'

The Ghaznavide political power had begun to assert itself about the end of the tenth century. In the name of the Samanid this new state waged wars on the neighbouring territories with mixed motives—political and economic. Actual regard for the Samanid political prestige and authority the Ghaznavides had none. The pretentious use of the Samanid name and authority served a crafty purpose for the Ghaznavide political exploitation and domination. It was under such a political cloak that the Ghaznavide power expanded its political influence and control. All this was done with a definite purpose in view. The aim of the nascent Ghaznavide state was to cement its foundation with a view

to consolidate its position and develop it into a real and effective political power. Political principles actually shaped it into a power-state. From the diplomatic standpoint it willy-nilly recognized the sovereignty of the Samanid rule but it befreed itself from the clutches of political tutelage, the moment it transformed itself into a real '*Machtstaat*.'

It is a fact that Sultan Mahmud, the successor of Sabuktigin, was the real maker of the Ghaznavide state. It became a living symbol of political authority, power, and stability. Its spirit of conquest and its urge for political supremacy were reflected in the raids of Mahmud. Under the dictatorship of Mahmud the state of Ghazni rose from a semi-independent power into a fully developed independent political state. We need not go at length into the evolution of political history of Ghazni. The only aspect of its history dealing with the political attitude of Sultan Mahmud towards India and her people concerns us. It is a well-known fact that he invaded India times without number. But we shall not deal here with the descriptive side of his Indian invasions. Only the *leitmotifs* in his Indian raids will arrest our attention. We shall thus be able to gauge and understand better in the light of his political ventures the mentality of Mahmud.

We have already made the point clear that since the rise of the Ghaznavide state political

repercussions on the border-land of India were due to the politics of Ghazni. It also created in India an atmosphere of political uneasiness and constant worry. . The political impact of Mahmud against India was in no way a disconnected and erratic phenomenon, but it was, in fact, due to the non-fulfilment of political conditions of peace-treaty between the Sultan of Ghazni and Raja Jaipal of 'Hind.' Mahmud's first campaign against India was undertaken in order to effect the recognition of political obligations and to enforce the political supremacy with a view to raising the status and prestige of the Ghaznavide power in the eyes of the Indian raja. It was a grave question of politics for the Ghaznavide state and Mahmud had to square his actions with the principles of politics.

His first contact thus was the direct result of a political issue. The nature of his other raids can easily be estimated, if one dives deep into their causes. On the basis of the contemporary as well as the later historical sources, it can safely be asserted that the causes of his invasions can be attributed to factors: political, economic, and pseudo-religious. Sometimes Mahmud contracted friendly relations with Indian states, binding them under political obligations. When those were deliberately broken, he invaded the country in order to punish his allies who betrayed him. During his raids Indian states owed allegiance to

him and agreed to pay tribute. But after some time these showed signs of revolt by stopping tribute and by severing political connections. Under such circumstances Mahmud was constrained to punish the subversive by invading their kingdom. Political betrayal in the form of help rendered to the enemy was also a cause for revenge which spurred Mahmud to pounce upon India. In order to come to the succour of his Indian ally in case of war he showed readiness and promptness. He had to raid in such a capacity because political obligations compelled him to abide by them. At times revolts against the Ghaznavide power were powerful factors in calling him to India as a dictator. 'Utbi remarks that one of his raids was due to the fact that he had to keep his armies in form. The same author also observes that after being recognized by the Caliph of Baghdad in 999 A. D. as an independent sovereign, Mahmud made it obligatory on himself to undertake every year an expedition to Hind.

The modern historians have given a new colour to the interpretation of 'Utbi's statement. They have tried in their interpretation to impute religious motivation to the political actions of the 'conqueror.' So far as Mahmud's views on the inter-relation of religion and politics are concerned, we shall deal with them later. If religious motives are attributed to 'Utbi's statement, Mahmud's

committal to the Caliph must have been due to please him. But as it is not substantiated by historical evidence, his 'vow' to the Caliph does not seem to be the only *leitmotif* in his raids. It would be more correct to say that the political idea behind the 'vow' could be one among the contributing political causes for his invasions.¹

Last but not the least of all the factors that eventually attracted him to India was his acquisitive instinct for the capture and possession of wealth. Even the early history of Ghazni has conspicuously shown its inherent weakness for wealth. Since the rise of the Ghaznavide power the wealth of India had enticed its rulers. To put it in a nut-shell, Indian wealth was a live bait that was constantly drawing Ghazni towards India. After its possession the Ghaznavides became conscious of its power in the real development of their political status and strength. Mahmud also was brought up in the political tradition of the Ghaznavides. He came to know of the importance of wealth as a power in the sphere of politics. Of all the rulers of Ghazni Mahmud was the most avaricious and his wealth-mania was an ever-tormenting craze and craving with him. The mere possession of

¹ Political ruses and considerations always swayed his judgment and action. It is pointedly suggested that "his aim, with but scant affectation of the Muslim cry of a 'Holy war,' was in truth mere plunder".

enormous wealth had not been a source of personal satisfaction to him but it had also produced a psychological effect on the ruler in Mahmud who began to realize the real value of wealth as a potent factor in the political and cultural advancement of the state. The enormous booty in the form of solid gold, silver, precious and invaluable jewels from India changed his mental perspective and outlook. His victories in India and elsewhere brought in train the continual downpour of wealth into the Ghaznavide treasury. This made him not only realize his superiority over the kings of Islamic as well as Indian world, but also enhanced the status of Ghazni as a political power and a centre of culture. In other words, it was especially the wealth of India that contributed to the real greatness and glamour of Ghazni.

Though Mahmud carried away with him untold wealth from India, his objective was to utilize it for a higher ideal—the glorification of Ghazni. As the warrior in Mahmud had steeled his heart against all human compassion, he had no compunction in looting India and other countries. The idea of exploitation of countries—Muslim and non-Muslim—was no stumbling block in the headway of his politics. He was always adamant in his determination to pursue his policy. In his own eyes the ideal justified his actions. He was a real national hero for the Ghaznavides, but Mahmud

could not win the hearts of the people of those countries which he raided as a 'conqueror.' His was no doubt a devastating force that the conquered felt and they groaned under the heavy liabilities imposed by him. His political instinct guided and controlled his actions. It is fair to state that Mahmud at Ghazni was a cementing force, when out of Ghazni he was surcharged with destructive power. The Ghaznavide architect and creator in the personality of Mahmud was prone to subject himself to cultural forces, but elsewhere the very man as dictator and master was a law unto himself. He had the conqueror's ambition, but he was, at the same time, no real conqueror. From the conquered mere acknowledgment of the Ghaznavide political supremacy was his aim. To rule countries after conquering them was not a passion with him. Political expansion at all costs as the true life mission of the state was no objective before him. He symbolized a virulent political force, but he did not care to develop it in harmonization with the principles of Machiavellism.

Mahmud seemed to have been devoid of a higher conception of politics. He was no political thinker who could conceive great and grand schemes. His political vision was parochial and limited. The unfoldment of potentialities of the Ghaznavide state in all its aspects was his ideal and he did not think beyond it. His whole life

was devoted to political exploits, indicative of territorial aggrandizement beyond the borders of Ghazni, but he did not seem to transform the small, though strong and stable, state of Ghazni into a bigger and mightier state that could wield influence and control as a centralized authority on the politics of the conquered kingdoms. He could have easily achieved phenomenal success in such political ventures, but as he had no political conception of a higher order, he achieved nothing in the way of extra-territorial importance of permanent value. There can be no doubt that he failed as a politician and statesman, but as a generalissimo his achievement was great and astounding. He was, in fact, a Ghaznavide Napoleon minus his vision and spirit. 'He obtained the gold and the prestige he needed and he aspired for nothing else' is the verdict of history.

We have been so far able to estimate the conduct of Mahmud in his capacity as a 'conqueror.' We shall be doing him injustice, if we leave undiscussed his conception of politics as religion. This feature of his character will place us in a better position to evaluate his whole personality and will also give us some clue to the appreciation of his behaviour and action as a 'conqueror.' In order to understand politics as religion in the time of the Ghaznavides it will be appropriate to trace in broad outlines the evolution of the Islamic political thought so that

we may form some idea how the interplay of political and religious forces was responsible for the reactions that shifted the Islamic political ideal from its fulcrum to ever-changing political gravitation.

The Prophet of Islam founded a theocratic state. It was a system of political and social control, based on divine sanctions. It reflected the will of God in its movements and activities. Its desire was to Islamize life in accordance with the law of God. Its dictates were divine laws to be imposed on human beings for their guidance. The aim of the Prophet was to organize and discipline people into a nation in which religious diversities, social inequality, political disunity, and economic exploitation should not exist. The ideal set before the Islamic state was to Islamize the *Weltanschauung*. The socialistic tendency in the movement of Islam was systematized by the dominant personality of 'Umar and the Islamization of politics became all the more pronounced. The law of Islam was the law of the Islamic state. The idea of Islam was put into practice by him. Inspired as he was by the spirit of Islam 'Umar wielded enormous power and influence in Islamizing society and the state. During the lifetime of the Prophet and 'Umar the Islamic ideas permeated the then Islamic world. The spirit of Islam made itself felt and controlled life—political, social, and economic—wherever it spread.

After 'Umar a perceptible change came over the Islamic world. The Islamic harmony and solidarity was disturbed. Political clashes due to Islamic domination in the provinces, separatist religious tendencies in the fold of Islam resulting from clan-feeling and animosity, greed for and possession of wealth, and the discriminative treatment between the Muslims and the neo-Muslims in Persia changed the face of Islam beyond recognition.

Islam was thrown into the cauldron of political distemper. In the Islamic world forces were generated not towards unification, but disruption and diversification. Even the sponsors and stalwarts of Islam no longer cared to safeguard and promote the essentials of Islam. The political ideal of Islam was at stake. This was due to the unchecked and uncontrolled play of political forces which were undermining the ideal of Islam by setting precedents of un-Islamic nature. The Islamic theocratic tendency was sacrificed at the altar of the blind power of political authority. The humanizing force of Islam in the creation of a new brotherhood was a past dream. The militarist tendencies in the Islamic world, nurtured by the centralized authority of the caliphate, culminated in the glorification of the Islamic political domination. But even the supreme power of the caliphate could not counterblast and neutralize the effect of

disruptive political forces, though the political figurehead of Islam was recognized by the Islamic world. The fate of the caliphate rested on the nature of political forces. At times these political forces became so powerful and virulent that little regard was shown to the Islamic political ideas.

With the strides of time a marked tendency towards the formation of new nationalist states in the Islamic world was perceptible. These Muslim states began to thrive on political principles of self-development, became self-centred in their activities, did not concern themselves with the general welfare of the Islamic world, did not even sponsor the Islamic cause for the sake of the religion of Islam, were politically independent though the recognition of the Caliph by these was a religious formality, and had the sagaciousness to advance their political interests under the cloak of religiousness.

We have thus seen that Islam had drifted afar from its ideal. The religion of Islam no doubt made progress with its innumerable sects in Islamizing the human heart, not on the strength of brute force—the sword and its rattle—but on its humanizing and socializing power and amalgam. But Islam, as a unifying political force, did not succeed in achieving the ideal. Men of action in the sphere of state-making did not realize the value of Islam as a great power for the uplift of

ances. They could not be called the real upholders and interpreters of Islam, though in their heart of hearts they desired to aspire to the actuality of the militant Islam, because political power and authority signified to them the creation of the state. In other words, their emergence to political power synchronized with the creation of the state. They were, in fact, the creators, the builders, and the makers of states, but no more the preachers of the law of Islam. Its spirit they could not understand and appreciate. In vain they tried to live Islamically or to Islamize their political outlook, but they could not succeed in infusing life into the religion of the Prophet by shedding the blood of the innocent. Their own lives were the battlefields on which religion and politics fought. They knew that they owed their political existence to politics and its laws, but they could not be unheedful to the call of Islam. It was this clash between head and heart that was responsible for their deeds which could be justified politically and unjustified Islamically. Their was a political state, but they could not rest contented unless it was denominated as Islamic.

There can be no doubt that the political forces of Islam were dead, still an interinfluence of religious and political forces reacted on the life of the state. Religion in the domain of politics could not bear the brunt of political forces. Politics ignored the importance of religion as a power in the

political schemes and affairs. The moving spirit of statecraft was governed by political considerations.

Even the Ghaznavides were brought up in the Islamic political traditions of the early medieval age. It appears from the statements of 'Utbi and Alberuni that they both stood for throne and altar. 'Utbi considers religion and state as twins, but the seat of eminence belonged to religion which formed the basis of society, while the state should serve the purpose of a watchman. What 'Utbi desires to convey is that religion should retain its pre-eminent position and the state should be made subservient to religious laws. In the same though different strain Alberuni remarks: 'If a new form of state or society rests in some degree on religion, these twins, state and religion, are in perfect harmony and their union represents the highest development of human society, all that men can easily desire.' It seems that he was after a complete union between religion and state. To him it was an ideal on which depended the welfare of society. Not the supremacy of religion over state or *vice versa*, but harmonization of forces—religious and political—was the idea of Alberuni. Both these personalities—one a panegyric historian of Mahmud and the other a real scientific scholar—believed in the institutions of monarchy and religion. But both, 'Utbi and Alberuni, did not interpret the Islamic political

ideal in the phraseology of the theocracy of Islam. 'Utbi did not describe the Islamic political reality. Alberuni upheld an ideal which was no distinctive feature of the Ghaznavide state. He would have certainly mentioned it in explicit terms in case the Ghaznavide state approached the political ideal of his heart.

Having become conversant with the general development of the Ghaznavide state we can hazard an opinion that religion played no important rôle in its political make-up. The state was under no religious surveillance. Mahmud, the 'conqueror,' could not be victimized by the sham sentimentality of religion in the realization of his political aims. Endowed with a robust political instinct he exploited the 'ecclesiastics' as long as they remained the obedient tools of his policy. To show off as the 'hero' of Islam he buttered up the Caliph who instigated him to indulge in the ruthless persecution of the Islamic sects.¹ His religious

¹ Mahmud formed loyal relations with the Caliph on political grounds. Religious fervour did not influence his decision in the matter. Dr. Sachau elaborates the point by remarking that 'he (Mahmud) tried to cover the illegitimate, revolutionary origin of his dynasty, which was still fresh in memory of the men of time; he maintained the most loyal relations with the spiritual head of Islam, the Khalif of Bagdad, Alkâdar (381-422 A. H.), who had clad the usurpation of his family with the mantle of legitimacy; and in order to please him, he hunted down the heretics in his realm in Khurasan and in Multan, impaling or stoning them. He tried

persecution was, in truth, a pretext for political exploitation. The so-called religious wars of Mahmud were actuated by economic motives and there are no grounds for regarding them as due to religious fanaticism. He always was suspicious of the rise of the religious power within the state and had to deal with it in a political fashion in order to curb its influence. Mahmud's actions were guided and directed by policy without reference to religion. During his raids on India he did not enact the rôle of a fanatic propagandist or a pious missionary, nor did he care to proselytize. 'Mahmud was no missionary ; conversion was not his object' writes a modern critic of Mahmud. Elphinstone assures us that 'we do not hear that in his long residence in Gujarat or his occupation of Lahore, he ever made a convert at all'. It was no concern of Mahmud to force the conversion of the Hindus. The religious policy of Mahmud was characterized by toleration and 'he is not said to have forced any Hindu to abjure his religion or to have put any person to death for the sake of his conscience.' It is also said of him that 'it is nowhere asserted that he even put a Hindu to death except in battle, or in the storm of a fort.' The Hindus enjoyed full religious freedom under

to rid the Khalif of the real or suspected votaries of his opponent, the Anti-Khalif in Egypt, the famous Hakim'.

the reign of Mahmud. They were not only employed in the civil administration, but also their services were recruited in the army 'without considering their religion as an objection' like the Arabs, Afghans, Dailamiks, Khurasanis, and Ghoris. The Hindu soldiers fought for their master and the Ghaznavide state in Karman, Khwarizm, and Merw. In the military history of Ghazni among the prominent Hindu generals the names of Tilak, Sondi Rai Hindu, and Hajrai stand out as conspicuous. These generals held a very high position in the Ghaznavide state. They were considered the most trusted officers and their loyalty and devotion to the Ghaznavides was exemplary.

It is alleged that Mahmud demolished innumerable temples of India for the sake of Islam. The later historians had tried to depict him as the real hero of Islam. Different concocted stories were made current in order to hallow his name. But the contemporaneous historical literature does not make a secret of the mundane motives of his raids. It is stated in plain terms that these had nothing to do with religion or the promulgation of Islam. It may also be observed that the temples of India which Mahmud raided were the storehouses of enormous and untold wealth and also some of these were political centres. The temples were, in fact, broken during the campaigns for reasons other than religious, but in time of peace Mahmud never

demolished a single temple.

Sir Wolseley Haig remarks: 'How far his Indian raids and massacres were inspired by a desire of propagating his faith, for which they were ill-adapted, and how far by avarice must remain uncertain, for Mahmud's character was complex.' The personality of Mahmud was characteristic of the age he was born in, but for the historians a most baffling one. Historians pass different verdicts on him. Some praise him and some condemn him. Elphinstone, summing up the chief characteristics of Mahmud, observes that 'as avarice is the great imputation against Mahmud in the East, so is bigotry among European writers. The first of these charges is established by facts: the other seems the result of a misconception. Mahmud carried on war with the infidels because it was a source of gain, and in his day, the greatest source of glory. He professed, and probably felt, like other Mussulmans, an ardent wish for the propagation of his faith; but he never sacrificed the least of his interests for the accomplishment of that object; and he even seems to have been perfectly indifferent to it when he might have attained it without loss.' Dr. Nazim depicts the mentality of the Hero of Ghazni thus: 'If he harassed the Hindu rajas of India, he did not spare the Muslim sovereigns of Iran and Transoxiana. The drama of plunder and bloodshed that was enacted in the sacred Ganges

Doab was repeated with no less virulence on the slopes of the Mount Damawand and the banks of the river Oxus. Religious considerations rarely carried weight with a conqueror and the Sultan does not appear to have been influenced by them in his schemes of conquest.'

Mahmud never dreamt of an Indian Empire. His conquest of India was no real conquest. He was not a conqueror but a great raider to the people of India. The only part of India—the Punjab—was under the Ghaznavide government. After the death of Mahmud the Ghaznavide representative in the Punjab schemed against the central authority. Drastic action was taken to end revolt against the Ghaznavide power. Even the ultimate aim of the successors of Mahmud was not the real conquest of India. Sporadic efforts to safeguard the vested interests of the Ghaznavides were made. The Ghaznavide politics in the Punjab exploited the political situation for its own end. In the meanwhile the Ghaznavide kingship itself passed through crises one after another. About 1160 A.D. it was reduced to a phantom. Khusrau Shah was compelled by the rising tide of the Ghuzz tribe of Turkmāns to abandon Ghazni for good. He fled to Lahore. Sir Wolseley Haig so aptly remarks that 'the Punjab was all that now remained to the descendants of Sabuktigin of the wide domains of their ancestors.' It may also be mentioned here

in connection with the last phase of the Ghaznavide power that after Mahmud the political status and position in the Punjab could not be maintained by the strength of the Ghaznavide rulers. The Ghaznavides had to play diplomatic game for the achievement of political alliances with Indian powers in order to stabilize their own government against political forces in the country. The rise of the Ghoris at Ghazni as a political power after the Ghaznavides was a landmark in the history of our country. Muhammad Bin Sām of Ghori, unlike Mahmud, was no raider but a real conqueror of India. The aims and ideals of both Mahmud and Muhammad differed vastly. Mahmud only raided, while Muhammad was after domination. Mahmud's presence in India was like a whirlwind. Muhammad generated political forces that led to the establishment of a Muslim rule in India. Raids stopped with the Ghaznavides and signs of political domination in India appeared on the horizon with the Ghoris.

After consolidating their political position at Ghazni, the Ghoris advanced towards India in order to extend their political boundaries. The mentality of the Ghoris also was political. They acted and behaved politically in their dealing with political affairs. As they were the outcome of political forces the political stamp on their genius was a permanent feature in the shaping of their

political existence. The author of the *Tabakat-i-Nasiri* depicts the salient characteristic of Muhammad Ghori that the 'infidels' were the whole of those who opposed him. But, while substantiating the author, Raverty describes the mentality of the Ghoris by remarking that the fact is 'all are infidels who are opposed to Ghuris.' The Ghori politics in India as well as elsewhere was governed by laws of political expediency. The cry of 'holy war' as a political slogan was raised by the Ghoris in order to achieve their political end. To Muhammad religion served as a political cloak and he exploited the religious sentiments of his people with a view to gaining political success.

The Ghoris waged many wars on India. To describe the invasions of the Ghoris is not our concern. Books on Indian history are full of elaborate description on the subject. We are, in fact, interested in the underlying motives which led to the Ghorian wars.

While invading India, Muhammad was at times guided by economic motive, i.e., the possession of wealth. Pretence of holy war was also a helpful factor in the recruitment of armies which he mobilized for Indian front. It is stated that he was in the habit of utilizing the weapon of 'holy war' as a political expedient, which must have instilled fresh life into his own fighting men, but the ulterior motive was political and economic. Revolt against

the Ghorian political authority also instigated him to take immediate political action to end disruptive forces and establish the political *status quo* in India. Sheer political invasions were undertaken with a view to establish political authority and domination. To abide by political obligations war was declared for the protection of his political allies. Due to internal dissensions and conflicts Muhammad also was invited to invade India. Infringement of political treaties led to political clashes between the Indian and the Ghorian powers. In order to achieve political mastery matrimonial alliances with the Hindu states were formed. His attitude towards the Hindu allies was friendly and he honoured the political traditions of 'the ancient times' and 'the dignities of the past days.' Among the conditions of peace treaties the '*Malguzari*' and the 'usages of service' were the chief items.

Muhammad's political victories paved the way to the establishment of a new Muslim rule in India. With the conquest of territories the work of consolidation was also taken up by the Ghoris. It was the political ambition of Muhammad that assisted in the permanent colouring of the Indo-Muslim domination. From Ghazni to Bengal the Ghorian political authority was recognized. But the establishment of the Ghorian rule in India led to the expansion of the empire of Ghazni. Ghazni, as a political centre, began to rule

India. Edward Thomas remarks that 'Muhammed bin Sām, though he adopted the titles of the Khalifs on his coins, did so probably not so much with reference to his Indian kingdom as on the strength of being the successor to the throne of Guzni.' The Ghorian political domination in India was a continuation of the Ghorian rule at Ghazni. There was yet no separate Muslim kingdom in India. The Indian conquered territory formed politically an integral part of the Ghorian kingdom. During the lifetime of Muhammad the political affinities between India and Ghazni were intact.

After Muhammad's death the Ghorian Empire crashed in no time. Qutbuddin Aibek—the most trusted and loyal lieutenant of Muhammad—succeeded the master. Muhammad left behind no male heir to succeed him. The question of succession also was broached to him by his courtiers while he was alive. He was aware of the difficulties after him, but he faced the issue like a man. Muhammad solved the succession problem by remarking that 'other monarchs may have one son or two sons ; I have so many thousand sons, namely, my Turki slaves, who will be the heirs of my dominions, and who after me, will take care to preserve my name in the *khutba* throughout those territories.' He did not feel perturbed at the idea of being heirless, as he had implicit faith in his Turki slaves who would

shoulder the political responsibilities. But he was unaware of the fact that his political legacy would create disturbance, leading to the ruination of the Ghorian state.

After the death of his master Qutbuddin Aibek—the gallantest and the fittest among the Turki slaves—was elected by the Turki nobles and the military officers as their Sultan.¹ He followed in the

¹ Qutbuddin's attempt at the succession after his master's death as the Ghorian Sultan proved abortive. The Ghorian party politics made it difficult for him to stabilize his untenable position at Ghazni. Political circumstances dragooned him and he had to quit Ghazni at the risk of his life. His aspirations for the Ghorian throne were smashed to pieces but he succeeded in procuring a letter of manumission in order to rule legitimately over Hindustan. An authorization was essential to establish claim for kingship, to end rivalries in political parties of the Turki slaves and to harness the moral support and sanction of the religious world. Qutbuddin formally proclaimed himself as an independent Sultan.

His coins and *Khutba* as emblems of kingship mentioned by the historians are still subject to doubt as they are not corroborated by the numismatic data. Ibn Batoutah, the Moorish traveller, did not regard Qutbuddin as the first independent Muslim king of India, but only considered him as a conqueror. Even the pious Firoz Shah Tughluq gave no place in his *khutbas* to Qutbuddin.

It becomes but clear on the basis of historical data that Qutbuddin's suzerainty was not recognized on all hands, though he was proclaimed as a king. His political status was a half-way house between kingship and dictatorship. This is attested by the political happening after his death. The colossal failure of the supporters of his son, Aramshah, is a signal proof of a partial recognition of Qutbuddin's kingship.

footsteps of his master and kept the torch burning. It was, in fact, Qutbuddin who was instrumental to a great extent during and after the life-time of his master in expansion of the Muslim power in India. Without him Muhammad could never have achieved what he achieved in the political domain in India. With the 'kingship' of Qutbuddin the position of the Muslim kingdom of India took a new turn. It was the master-stroke of Qutbuddin that was directly responsible for an abrupt change from the Ghorian political dependence into an independent Indo-Muslim kingdom. The new 'kingship' of Qutbuddin was moulded by Indian conditions and interests. The political centre automatically shifted from Ghazni to India. Be it mentioned here that in the evolution of the Indo-Muslim kingship India captivated the heart, mind, and soul of the Muslim rulers. Their problems were not the problems of the Islamic countries. India was their political, social, and religious problem. She engrossed their whole attention and thought with the result that they lost their active interest in the Islamic countries. They were cut asunder from their source of political inspiration. They began to identify themselves wholly with Indian interests which were their own as they Indianized themselves in the course of time.

The 'kingship' of Qutbuddin was seething with political ideas. Conquest was its life-infusing

political force, but not at the expense of domination. What he conquered had to be retained and absorbed for strengthening the political fabric. His spirit of conquest was not blind to political reality. His was a calculative move in the sphere of 'kingdom-taking' rather than a haphazard plunge into the political uncertainties. A political realist Qutbuddin was no less aware of the significance of the principles of statecraft. The author of the *Taju-l Ma-asir* is all praise for Qutbuddin. Sense of justice and idea of protection characterized his 'kingship.' Hasan Nizami observes in the *Taju-l Ma-asir* that during Aibek's reign the wolf and the sheep drank water out of the same pond. Qutbuddin also was a well-wisher of the people. Promotion of peace and prosperity engaged his thoughts as well. Historians call him a '*lakh-bakhsha*' (Giver of lacs). The people were benefited by his unbounded generosity. It is said of him that his liberality was conducive to the life-promoting elements of the state and his sword discarded the vicious influences from the domain of politics.

In the eventful struggle Iltutmish outdistanced Qutbuddin by establishing an independent but real kingship in India. It has been aptly remarked that 'the history of Muslim sovereignty in India begins properly speaking with Iltutmish.' The Iltutmishian kingship was a product of political

forces and it ruled with the support of the Turkish traditions for 'the best interests of the infant empire.' It was no usurped kingship in the sense that it was wrested from a real sovereign. The Indo-Muslim rule had not yet marked the establishment of Islamic political ideal, but with the rise of the Turkish domination the beginnings of Islamic political philosophy, thought, and tradition became perceptible. Things political—ideals and institutions—were in their inception, taking shape and form under Indian influences. The kingship of Iltutmish was conditioned more by the reactions of political forces of India and less by its own laws of development. It had to pass through trials in order to justify its political existence. Its triumph silenced opposition. The sanction of the caliphate of Baghdad empowered it all the more to legitimize kingship and rule independently. That the recognition of the Iltutmishian kingship by the caliphate was a forced necessity, or an acquiescence in the wishes of Iltutmish is still a moot point. But the fact remains that the legal recognition of the Iltutmishian kingship by the caliphate raised it to a real and independent status. It had the sanction to rule, to conquer, and to enforce political obedience. Politically, Iltutmish ruled as a king. Temperamentally, he was a real Turk. It was impossible for him to pose as a king before his Turkish officers whom he treated as his equals.

His shyness to sit on the throne before the Turkish officials and his refusal to overlord them were due to his Turkish feelings of equality and comradeship. Though Iltutmish was raised to a kingly position, he was, in fact, one among the elated Turks. His was a Turkish kingship, supported by the Turkish elements and thrived on the Turkish spirit. The power of the Forty served the purpose of a fulcrum in the Iltutmishian kingship.

Iltutmish had set a new precedent for the Indo-Muslim rule. Kingship connoted to him a burden of responsibilities to be shouldered by the fittest. With this idea in his mind he trained his children, sons and daughter, all for the office of kingship. His sons had betrayed him. They could not be allowed to succeed him as they possessed no fitness to rule after him. The choice of succession fell on his daughter, Raziya, who also was trained in statecraft. The idea of the fitness to rule in the selection of Raziya as the successor of Iltutmish was a potent factor in silencing opposition of the Turks.

But after the death of Iltutmish the kingship was threatened with internal decay, as the male successor of the late king was not worthy and competent to look after the affairs of statecraft. Discontent became rampant. Revolts against the central authority sprouted up. In the interest of the Iltutmishian state the Turkish officials placed

the daughter of Iltutmish, Raziya Sultana, on the throne. She reigned for three and a half years ; she had all the qualifications of a ruler ; she was, in fact, a great queen as well as a woman ; she was most fit for the office of kingship, but the queen and the woman in the personality of the Sultana could not go well together. The queen was admired and loved by the Turkish officials but the woman in Raziya was hated by them. Her immense fondness for an Abyssinian slave, Jamaluddin Yaqut, was not criminal in itself, but in the sphere of politics it resulted in the estrangement of feelings between the queenship and the Turkish party. The woman-Raziya defied the sentiments of the Turks. Her injudicious acts undermined the status of the Turkish party and were instrumental in poisoning the mind of her ardent supporters and well-wishers. The Raziya-Yaqut affair was too much for the Forty, who had to smart under the Raziyan insult and indifference and hastened the catastrophic end of her reign. Her fall synchronized with the rise of the Forty as a controlling power in the shaping and unshaping of kingship. They were not after the usurpation of kingship ; they could have usurped it, but the power of the Forty was a hindrance in the way of kingship ; they succeeded in toning down the autocratic kingship ; they applied full brakes to curb the free play of kingly power ; they also were able to restrict its

activities within constitutional limits. During the control of the Forty the kingship was nothing more or less than a shuttle-cock at their mercy. But they did not end the institution of kingship. It had to be retained in the family of Iltutmish. The fiction of legal succession to the throne in the Iltutmishian family was kept up by them.

After Raziya the successors were not capable to enhance the status of the Iltutmishian kingship. Their rule or misrule lowered its prestige. It was but for the Forty that the kingship escaped its perdition. The last of the Iltutmishian ruler—Nasiruddin—was more of a saintly personality than a real ruler. Before and during his reign the king was only an emblem of political sovereignty, but no actual dictator or ruler. Political power passed out of his hands into the ministerial body which began to wield political power in the name of kingship.

After Nasiruddin an absence of an heir in the line of Iltutmish aggravated the political situation. The Iltutmishian family became extinct. Balban, who had conducted the affairs of government during the reign of Nasiruddin, was one of the Forty. He considered the perpetuation of the clash between kingship and the Forty as impolitic and detrimental to the interest of the state. The Iltutmishian state was drifting towards a precipice. To save it from dissolution Balban rose to the occasion. It was in the fitness of things that the

up-coming of a dictator with absolute powers at his disposal to end anarchic tendencies in the domain of politics was welcomed. Balban, the dictator, came on the scene. He broke the political backbone of the Forty and established kingship on firm foundation.

CHAPTER III

**BALBAN'S CONCEPTION OF KINGSHIP AND
GOVERNMENT**

Balban ascended the throne in 1266 A. D. His prime concern was the stabilization of government on the political principles and traditions of the Islamized Persian kingship. He appointed famous and reliable men of the country as his state officials, so that the affairs of the state should be properly conducted and managed. Balban had to resort to such a political step as, before his accession to the throne, the authority of the state had been undermined by disruptive forces and the financial condition of the state was deplorably bad. His immediate drive was towards the resuscitation of the state.

Political expediency had forced Balban to tackle in all earnestness the problems of government. Authority of the state was re-established and recognized by infusing fresh life into statecraft. Stern and rigorous enforcement of law worked like a counterblast to the undermining political forces. The lost prestige of government was restored in no time. The whole country was governed with much deliberation. Despite restraining influence of the royal dread and awe on the general life of the people, the dispensation of justice and the introduction of protective laws

attached them to the kingship of Balban.

Within the first year of his accession political conditions impelled Balban to reorganize the whole army with a view to bring about peace, order, and stability in the state. His political experience had taught him that the reorganization of the army should be preferred to all other items in matters of statecraft, as it was the mainstay of government. He knew what the state needed for its survival. This was due to the fact that he had seen the rise and fall of the Iltutmishian state and was thoroughly conversant with the political principles of the age of Iltutmish, that had taught him many a political lesson for the healthy development of the state. Those political ideals and ideas had made such a deep impression on him that he was never able to shake them off even in his later life. The impressions were so indelible on the man that they coloured his whole political outlook. More so the principles of politics, especially of Sultan Sanjar as well as Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah, appealed to his heart as the ideal for his political guidance. He was so much fascinated by them that he tried his utmost to live up to that ideal.

As a firm, staunch, and ardent believer in the institution of kingship Balban maintained that royal dignity, awe, and prestige could only become real and effective, if the ruler enforced the court-decorum as observed by the famous Naushervan.

To him royal words, deeds, activities and movements seemed to bear a semblance to royal dignity. If kingship failed to create a sense of admiration and respect for royal dignity and lacked the power to instil dread and fear into the heart of the people for the court and state processions, its prestige and grandeur would be lowered. Even the state functionaries would fail to run the government.

Balban was of the firm conviction that even acts of generosity as well as oppression could never be instrumental in changing the behaviour and attitude of the public in regard to royalty. So long as kingship did not exert itself to infuse awe, dignity, and dread into the heart of the people in general, no real justice could be done to matters of statecraft and problems of government. By undermining royal prestige, showing indifference to the very spirit of statecraft, and shunning oppression because of fear, the affairs of the country would go wrong, resulting in the revolt of the people. The after-math would betray the general causes of weakness in the body politic.

Balban's unshakable faith in the ideal and greatness of kingship made him alive to its problematic treatment. Essentials for the survival of the institution of royalty had not only his unflinching support, but also made him all the more serious and keen in enlivening them on the basis of royal dignity, honour, splendour, and

etiquette. In order to make the very institution of kingship a live institution he believed in creating and maintaining a 'distance' between royalty and the people. To his mind there could be no possibility of a coming closer and nearer to each other, nor could in any way the attempt at identifying the status of kingship with that of the public be justified. This would end kingship if it condescended to the life of the people, and the very thought that the public could aspire to royalty with a view to bridge the gulf of such a 'distance' of feeling and status would lead to the very ruination of the institution of royalty. Hence Balban never allowed that his kingship should be influenced by or come in contact with the life of the people. He was convinced of the fact that kingship signified prestige, dignity, and greatness only. The moment such royal traits were to disappear from the private as well as public life of a ruler, he would not be in a position to give protective support to the essentials of royalty. It would then lose its discriminative and differentiative characteristic. No marked difference would be left between royalty and the people. The status of kingship would be liable to risk and attack. Any one could usurp it. In this way the glorified institution of kingship would be destroyed by the very hands of royalty and the laws of the state set at naught. The people would also become disobedient and disloyal. Balban

was too well aware of the fact that popular obedience to royalty, as one of the duties of a king to enforce, would cease, if royal dread and fear played no part in politics. It would be futile to expect kingship to maintain itself, if it derogated and disgraced itself in the eyes of the people.

Balban's conception of kingship was not narrow, materialistic, and pragmatic. But its ethical value in the Balbanite political scheme was no less emphasized by him. This was done with a view to strengthen the basis of kingship and to lessen chances of whimsicality and capriciousness of the ruler to a minimum. Acts of irresponsibility committed by him could not in any way be justified. Balban's belief was that a king who in his act and behaviour adopted the policy of a tyrant, had committed infidelity to God and acted against the behests of the Prophet. He thus wished to impose moral limitations on kingship in order to curb its absolutism. In other words, it was due to the presence of inherent divine element in the institution of kingship that was operative in making the range of kingly power and authority less autocratic in effectiveness and more responsible to its office. Kingship ought to be considered sacred as well as a trust, as it was a divine vice-regency. To Balban it did not signify a man-made institution of political control and guidance. It had the manifestation of the divine will that caused

its existence.

While sermonizing his son, Shahzada Muhammad Shah, on politics Balban brought forth in colourful setting the idea of the pre-eminence of kingly power emanating directly from the divine source. He made the Shahzada realize the importance of the superiority of royalty over human beings because of its close semblance to the divine traits. Kingship could not be classed with other human institutions. Balban believed that it was the will of God that the heart of a king was made not only superior to and different from the heart of the people, but there could be, at the same time, no comparison to the king's heart which was to be looked upon as the abode of God in contradiction to the absence of divine refraction in the people's heart. So long as God cared to bestow favour on king's heart, the importance for the general welfare of the people would be realized by the ruler, as the initiative in the improvement of the affairs of the people depended on the royal head and heart. In case the king's heart was denied this divine favour, he would be incapacitated to discharge such a public duty. In other words, the presence of the divine guidance and benevolence would be an influential and decisive factor in the rightful discharge of royal duties. The institution of kingship, if it worked in harmony with the divine will, would exert sobering and salubrious influence on

the irrationality of politics. Balban's great emphasis was that kingship should be considered a service of a highest order.

If the grand status of kingship, that God had bestowed on the ruler with a view to look after the welfare of the people (who should feel grateful to royalty for their protection and well-being), was not upheld in the right spirit and royal dignity and prestige was made to besmirch and tarnish itself by worst acts and deeds, then on the Day of Judgment the ruler would have to face penalty of worst nature for misdeeds and crimes committed during his reign. Because firstly, for a king there could be nothing higher and nobler in this world than the status of kingship (which he had failed to maintain) and secondly, the policy of government as executed by him was against the law of God.

We have so far seen that even in the medieval age of absolutism when the sword was a decisive factor in the usurpation of political power and supremacy and in the making and unmaking of the state, a mightier power than the sword itself crept up in order to justify the very existence of the state, based not on the principles of brute force, usurpation, and exploitation but on a stable, vitalizing, and humane force. It was the fear of the Day of Judgment and the sanctimonious aspect of the divine will in kingship which were instrumental in crushing the brute in the kings of

the medieval age and in letting loose forces of humanizing tendencies which succeeded, to a great extent, in culturalizing the institution of kingship. The effect of such a cultural force was that kingship became less absolutist in practice and more limited in its authoritative range and scope. Culturalization of politics was perceptible during the reign of Balban.¹

If we have appreciably grasped Balban's line of thought we can safely infer that his search for a true base of the state was in the attempt to establish a triple relationship, i.e., God, king, and the people. Such an interdependence of relationship between God, king, and the people from the monarchic point of view as emphasized by Balban could not be ignored and denied. Hence the welfare of the people as a practical ideal was put before the government by him so that it could exist not for its own end, but also for the good of the people. How far the Balbanite state was successful in achieving that ideal we shall see in the course of our narrative.

Balban's conception of kingship was a composite one. As a Muslim he had his own ideal of kingship; as a politician and statesman his stand-

¹ Balban endeavoured to effect a change in the ideas of kingship by making royalty more responsible to God and less to the brute in man. This was the work of the idealistic Balban, whose success was nominal.

point in kingship was different. But he was governed by the ideal as well as the worldly forces. He differentiated between the various types of kingship. To him a real kingship should be bequeathed as a legacy and the very fact of its being a legacy justified the existence of a real kingship.

The kingly grandeur and dignity of a legitimized form of real legacy would capture the heart of the people who would, of their own accord, adorn and honour it. Even if such a kingship were to indulge in acts of oppression and cruelty, and in irrationality of politics, it would be not surprising to find that the people showed loyalty to it and obeyed its laws. But even the grandeur and sobriety of an uninherited kingship, lacking in the royal character and trait, would not be in a position to win over the heart of the people. It would only deteriorate into an aristocratic status. Its defeat in purpose would result in the loss of public morale and in moral decrepitude. Such a type of kingship would be short-lived, leading to a muddle from the Islamic standpoint.

As Balban's kingship was 'unreal,' he desired to Islamize it in order to transform the 'unreal' into a 'real' Islamic kingship. He expressed his ideas in the following succinct manner :

(A) *Idealistic View*

A ruler should have a right belief and be a

protector of Islam. Use of coercion as well as parade of royal dignity and splendour should only be allowed for the honour and protection of Islam. Acts of government should compel the people to follow the way of God. Thus extirpation of heresy and polytheism could be possible. In this way service to religion could aptly be rendered.

(B) *Realistic View*

I. If it was not possible to destroy '*shirk*' and '*kufir*' root and branch, it should be borne in mind that at least for the sake and protection of Islam the idol-worshippers (the worst enemies of God and Muhammad) should be kept under restraint so that they dared not strut in the Muslim society and should be debarred from all government services. Only the bare necessities of life should be left to them, so that they could exist.

II. Despotism as well as oppression of every form should be disallowed and put a stop to by the ruler. This could be achieved by acts of government.

III. The pious, the religious-minded, and the God-fearing individuals should be given the power to protect the *Shariat* and the reins of government be handed over to them. All those who were vicious, mean, and irreligious should be deprived of political and civic rights and privileges and be humbled. Not one among these individuals should be employed in the offices of trust in the

government.

IV. The ruler should be a personification of justice. Only through its dispensation he would not only achieve his own salvation, but would also protect religion and discharge royal duties. Unless his acts, governmental or otherwise, were based on the conception of justice ; unless his royal dignity and splendour was instrumental in banishing oppression and cruelty from his country, the ruler would be a complete failure as a king. He would be doomed for ever, though he might say his prayers thousand times, spend his whole life in fasting, avoid crime, and utilize his royal treasury in the way of God ; he would go to hell.

After evaluating kingship as such Balban gave expression to his ideas about the form of government which he aspired to establish in the country. Politically he was influenced by the sermons of Syed Nuruddin Mubarak Ghaznavi and was deeply touched by them. These religio-political sermons had left such a lasting impression on him that he used to weep bitterly, because he did not possess real power to translate into action his political ideas or ideal.

Balban used to tell his sons as well as his state officials that the political attitude and mentality of those kings who followed in every way the pre-Islamic Persian ideal of and practice in government was anti-Islamic and un-Islamic. Blindly

initiated into the principles of Persian politics, they had not only been found guilty in going against the wish of God and violating the law of the *Shariat*, but they would also have to face and bear the punishment of Hell for their gross negligence of the Islamic injunctions. Their redemption only lay in the change of their political outlook, ideas, and principles (i.e., to Islamize their *Weltanschauung*).

Too plain and explicit in his exposition of political principles, Balban had in view ideas in regard to various forms of government. As a Muslim he differentiated the Islamic from the non-Islamic types of government. To him it was the Koranic law that should form the basis not only for the structure of a government, but also for its inner working. What was not sanctioned in the law could not be accepted as a legalized form of government. Ideals and forms of government, Islamic and the pre-Islamic Persian, were antithetic. No compromise between such types of government could be possible. Balban carped at and criticized the mentality of those Muslim kings who had departed from the Islamic political tradition, but followed in the footsteps of the Persian kingship of the pre-Islamic days.

We can safely infer from the political principles of Balban that the '*staatsraison*' only ought to thrive on religious laws. The state should be under the guidance of religious dictates. This was how

the idealistic Balban thought. But in a country, like India, which was then the least Islamic, his attitude of mind underwent a change owing to peculiarity of circumstances. The force underlying the law of adaptability made the man in Balban change his political ideas. His political instinct compromised with the realities of the day. His realism smoothed matters to as much a limit as his emotional and mental make-up allowed him to concede. This led to his failure as an Islamic political thinker. Solidarity and harmony in statecraft could have been possible if the Indian element had been introduced into it. Even the question of the real base of the state had thus been left unsolved by Balban the man. But despite his affinities for his own religious and cultural values Balban tried, not to solve the Indian political problem but to justify the existence of the state on the basis of impartial justice, suppression of despotic mode of administration and bestowal of power on the wise, the God-fearing, the honest, and the meritorious for the working of the institution of government. The idealistic activity of the state was thus sacrificed for the practice of government, which was then the only problem of politics. In this way the realistic tendency in politics overshadowed his idealistic purpose of government. Balban successfully attempted to make acts of government effective in their range and execution.

His policy became conducive to the welfare of the people by acts of justice and by suppression of despotism. In other words, the state indirectly became broadbased in order to stabilize itself. The practice of such a form of government must have been instrumental in bringing the people closer to government as justice and protection would have meant to them peace, order, safety of life, and security of property. It would have indirectly appealed to the people in general, though their participation in the working of government was not insisted upon as a right, which conception is of a recent date. They were ruled by a type of class which tried to look after them to the best of their ability and capacity.

We have so far seen the real struggle of Balban's mind. He had identified himself in his heart of hearts with the ideal he had in view, but Balban at the same time knew his own limitations. Though in his utterances there was always a note of idealization, yet the sighs of repentance also were heard as to his incapacity to live up to that ideal which he had so fondly cherished. In spite of this weakness he justified his position by comparing himself with the other kings who could not even achieve that ideal, though they were superior to him. He did not fight shy of reality, when he confessed his inability in comparison to those kings who had lived that ideal. But his commonsense in prac-

tical politics gave him peace of mind. He became contented as a king when he laid down the principle that his sympathetic and helping hand would always be stretched out to the needy and the oppressed and while administering justice he would not be guided by motives of racial discrimination. By serving a warning to his high state officials and sons, he made the point clear to them that he would not even pardon them in case they were found wanting in the dispensation of impartial justice. Balban remained throughout true to this principle.

Having realized the importance of the essential elements in statecraft for the practice of government, Balban also brought forth the significance of the interrelation of kingship with its functionaries. He attached great importance to the actual function of statecraft. The functionaries should not only be aware of the true spirit of kingship, but they should be men of such high and loving qualities that the people of their own accord would not only imitate them but look up to them as their ideal. Balban was indirectly trying to let loose cultural forces in the state. Attempt at establishing points of contact between the people and government was hazarded by initiating such a policy. This led to the harmonization of political relations, indirectly nullifying the effect of the jarring elements in the life of the state. To be more explicit, the stability of the

institution of kingship was to be cemented by a sense of loyalty, attachment, and faithfulness.

Balban had dived deep into the political problems of his day. To him it appeared that the prestige of the state was in the hands of the ruler as well as of his officers and in the practice of government their actions and deeds had a bearing on public life. Their honesty, their sense of even-handed justice, and their religiousness should be an assurance to the effect that the public would be secure and free from tyranny, injustice, fraud, and exploitation. Balban went a step further in the enunciation of his political ideas and remarked that the people were in the habit of imitating and following in every way their king. His behaviour would lead to the infiltration of the characteristic of royal temperament and attitude in public life. His line of thought indicated that indirect attempts at the amelioration of the lives of the people would not only stabilize government but also uplift the people. His spirit of government seemed well-nigh progressive.

Having thrown light on the essentials and intricacies of government he could not even out-balban Balban. As a true replica of his age he could not acclimatize himself completely to Indian atmosphere and conditions. His government still retained its instable position. Though he was conversant with the art of government, he could

not succeed in changing the established form of government in accordance with the laws of political expediency for the salvation of royalty, and the progressive welfare of the people. What he thought best for the immediate stability of his government, he did with all his might. He was successful in it. Balban was politically so circumstanced that he had no other course but to maintain and keep intact, at all costs, the stabilization of government.

Balban struck a note of reality in his advice to the Shahzada Muhammad Shah by making a very sane suggestion, that justice, prestige, authority, treasury, *raiyat*, the people and the select state officials were to be considered the pillars of the state. If any one of these pillars were to become shaky, the kingship would topple over. Balban's shrewdness became too conspicuous in the domain of practical politics. The Shahzada was made to realize the importance of the type of individuals to be selected for the offices of trust and responsibility. Regard and honour ought to be shown to them and they should enjoy the ruler's complete confidence, otherwise the people would lose faith in the government. One very cogent point in regard to practical politics was that the affairs of government should be conducted with much deliberation. And it was to be borne in mind that without the consultation and co-operation of the reliable and honest state officials nothing of real

importance in matters of statecraft should be undertaken. The ruler should not act on his own initiative. Things beyond his reach, control, and power should not be attempted by him, because failure in the attempts would lead to the disgrace of the very institution of kingship.

Balban was too clever to be deluded by the sham realities of politics. He knew that kingship and ignorance of the affairs of the state could not go well together. Balban advocated a policy in order to win the heart of the people. It was to be neither too severe nor too lenient. The golden mean should be a rule with the king. Meanness in the sphere of politics should not be allowed to make itself felt.

Balban was too conscious of the fact that the problems of government were complicated and difficult and required deep thought and consideration. Due to the serious nature of such problems there might have been a complete change in Balban the man after his accession to the throne. Though he was a man of good disposition, yet he was impetuous and gallant. It can safely be asserted that his impetuous nature could only be responsible for such paradoxical acts, as kindness and cruelty as well as mercy and despotism towards his people. In matters of political exigency he stuck to the principle of blood and iron. Even religion could not control and tone down his unchecked

instinct for political power. He brushed aside all religious scruples in order to achieve his political aim. Politics then became his guiding spirit. It mattered nothing to him whether or not his political moves or acts were to be justified religiously. He did what he thought best for the life-promoting elements of the state.

Ambition was the chief characteristic feature of the man in Balban. Like Sultan Mahmud and Sultan Sanjar he had an innate desire to conquer kingdoms. But, as he knew his own limitations, he could not dare follow in the footsteps of the great conquerors. His officers always tickled his ambitious vanity and compelled him to conquer countries as Aibek and Altutmish conquered kingdoms. But it was a big 'if' that prevented him from conquering. Being in close touch with political realities of the day, he remarked to his officers that to conquer a country would not be difficult, but to govern it afterwards would be a herculian task. Firstly, he would not like to launch an expedition owing to the danger from the side of the Mughals ; secondly, if one were to conquer a country, an enormous number of individuals for its proper control and management would be required to take charge and then there was always a probability that they might revolt against him after being vested with power or authority. In that case, he had to resort to measures such as,

shedding of blood, in order to teach them that revolt and disloyalty were crimes for the committal of which they had to be punished. Such grave and painful forethoughts deterred him from conquest expeditions. Unless he was definite about the success and the practicability of his political schemes, he never attempted to take a plunge in the dark deep of uncertainties. He was a *Realpolitiker*. Not only was he well-grounded in the art of politics, but he was also a man of sound commonsense. Balban was, in fact, great in his political realism and abhorred to indulge in politics of an ethereal nature. The idealism in Balban had to be sacrificed at the altar of the reality of realities. In politics he behaved and acted as a politician and his point of view was always mundane. For his age he had all the qualities of a real statesmanship. The most fascinating feature in his personality was the incessant struggle between the realist and the idealist Balban. The victory of the realist over the idealist was due to Balban the man.

CHAPTER IV

**KINGSHIP IN TRANSITION IN THE REIGN
OF KAIQUBAD**

After the death of Balban his grandson Sultan Muizzuddin Kaiqubad ascended the throne in 1287 A.D. Kaiqubad was a young man of fine qualities. He was partly trained by Balban himself and partly by the puritan type of teachers. It was the ardent wish of Balban that the young prince should be kept aloof from the gaiety of life. Intellectual and military pursuits would bring about the desired end. Though such a type of education effected him superficially, it did him a lot of good in polishing his manners and culturalizing his heart. The puritanic upbringing was bound to set reaction in him and it did upset his balance of mind after he became the Sultan. Life of gaiety and pleasure as his immediate objective after ascending the throne had also exerted enormous influence on the general public life. The people (Hindus and Muslims) were so much influenced by the royal mode of life and habit that they followed in every way their king. The actual life of the people as well as of the nobles during the reign of Kaiqubad was a picture in contrast as compared to the Balbanite life. It came to such a pass that the old Balbanite order of things gave place to a new order in which pleasure-seeking tendencies predominated.

As the ultimate purpose of Kaiqubad's education was the cultivation of refined taste as well as of a disciplined sense of life, it failed to ingrain on his mind the importance of statecraft. It was indirectly instrumental in repressing the youth in Kaiqubad. Lastly, he was too young to manage the affairs of the state, so he fell an easy prey to all sorts of temptations which could befall a youth. Ziauddin Barni's indictment against the Sultan cannot hold good when he remarks that Kaiqubad was ignorant of the principles of statecraft. He was never trained for the management of the affairs of the state, nor did he know what life and the world meant, nor did he win the kingdom by risking his life, nor was this youth ever acquainted with the vicissitudes of life. This clearly shows that he was too innocent of the ways of the world and unacquainted with the chicanery of politics. He, therefore, could not shoulder the burden of the state responsibilities alone.¹

¹ Ziauddin Barni made a mess in the delineation of Kaiqubad. His indictment against Kaiqubad as to his indifference to and his negligence of the affairs of the state seems to be a figment of his own imagination, or a concoction of a vicious mind. Ziauddin Barni contradicts himself by making an unconscious statement that the Sultan was incapacitated only after his illness to look after the affairs of the state. It means that Kaiqubad had not neglected the work of his government in spite of his frivolities. His activities, frivolous as well as sober, must have gone hand in hand. This makes us realize that he had not shirked the responsibility of the

It would be more correct to say that despite his lack of right training in statecraft, his inexperience in politics and diffidence in conducting the affairs of government, his humaneness and generosity and his devotion to pleasure, he did not shirk the grave responsibilities of the state. It is true that he entrusted the affairs of the government to Malik Nizamuddin, but still he was a guiding spirit in statecraft. Hence the kingship of Kaiqubad was not *de jure* and nominal as it is alleged. It is an admitted fact that it resulted in no time in undermining the firm foundation of the politics of Balban. His outlook on life and his ideas about the welfare of the people were diametrically opposite to Balban's. Kaiqubad, as a ruler, was good-natured, refined, lenient, and forgiving. To be cruel and oppressive was not his nature. Throughout his reign he stuck to the policy of leniency and he did not wish to do harm to any one, not even to an ant, nor did he desire that the people should be put to trouble, or be made to suffer. His desire was to see people as gay and happy as he himself was in the quest of his pleasures.¹

state, but was managing the affairs of his government to the best of his ability and capacity with the help of his state ministers.

¹ It would be interesting to throw more light on different aspects of such a peculiar type of personality as that of Kaiqubad who, in spite of his gay life, cared for the welfare of the people. Historians have pronounced a very harsh

Ziauddin Barni remarked that Kaiqubad was unaware of the fact that kingship was an emblem of a combination of oppression, dignity, and kindness. It could only be maintained by these qualitative

judgment on him and dubbed him as a mere worshipper of the god of pleasure and love. It cannot be denied that there is a lot of truth in this historical verdict. But a deep study of the man in Kaiqubad convinces us that he was not only a 'debauchee' but also had some very sterling qualities which had to do more with the power of heart and its rôle in humanizing man and society. His desire to see his people gay and happy is a conclusive proof of the fact that he had a noble and generous heart. He felt for the people in the same way as he craved for his emotional and artistic outpourings.

Having a dignified, privileged, and royal heart in contrast to the undignified and unprivileged heart of the people, Kaiqubad did not consider it human and wise to deprive the people of their right to live according to their heart's desire. Such an injustice to the people, if done, could not be tolerated by him. The result of such an attitude of mind was that his heart condescended to uphold the right of the people to enjoy life in all its aspects. By doing so he indirectly raised their status. In other words, he departed from the ethico-political philosophy of Balban by bringing the people closer and nearer to kingship than was ever attempted before him. He demolished the artificial barriers between royalty and the people in order to create a new sense of attachment to the throne in the people, by banishing dread and fear of kingship, based on sheer royal prestige, dignity, and authority, from the heart of the people. The religio-ethical basis of the society, which was considered by Balban to have a bedrock firmness, was destroyed by Kaiqubad and it was replaced by a new basis which had a more humanizing and culturalizing force in it.

The kingship of Kaiqubad created a new social order in which racial discrimination had no place or influence.

forces ; it could never exist on acts of kindness without being oppressive at the same time. Not sympathizing with the general policy of leniency and kindness as advocated by Kaiqubad, he criticized the Sultan in the following manner : The worldly and religious people of the olden times maintained that kingship was really a *Khilafat* of God and its status served as a means for the

It started a new tendency towards the harmonization of different cultures of this country. The artistic and cultural force of the kingship of Kaiqubad permeated the whole of the social fabric without any reservation or restriction. In this way the birth of a new India on the basis of fusion of cultures, Hindu and Islamic, was witnessed. Though Kaiqubad did not take keen interest in the actual functioning of the state and did not even tackle the problems of politics, as Balban had so eagerly and whole-heartedly wished to solve, yet the artistic and cultural aspect of Kaiqubad's reign must have wielded great influence in counteracting the effect of the Balbanite political school of thought by culturalizing the base of politics and government. Such a culturalized kingship would have eliminated the element of foreignness from kingship itself which foreign element was so clear and evident in the time of Balban. By sympathizing with the actual life of the people, Kaiqubad's influence would have been instrumental in solidifying the basis of government by a fusion of cultures, both Hindu and Islamic, which phase became so glaring in the reign of later kings, who found the key to their power and progress in the assimilation of Hindu element into their body politic and social life. And the position of the Muslims as a distinctive class by itself, constituting then the real base of government, could not be sanctioned to hold such a privileged position in the Indian society. The Hindus and the Muslims formed only one big society before the state. This meant that the state had freed itself from its discriminative motive. It became broadbased.

enforcement of the law of God and the Prophet. Such a grand work could not be done without kindness and oppression, favour and punishment, forgiveness and diplomacy, clemency and violence and expropriation and benevolence. So long as the subdued and the faithful were not peaceful and orderly; so long as the refractory and the subversive were not crushed and oppressed, the dignity of kingship and the splendour of its rule could not be maintained. In case kingship were to be bereft of such a glamour the law of the *Shariat* could not be enforced. In this way the status of Islam would be lowered. So long as the different religions were not treated differently, the affairs of the state would become crooked and kingship would become baseless. Even the affairs of the world could not be managed exclusively by acts of kindness or oppression and cruelty alone. As oppression in its own sphere played a part in politics, so it was with acts of kindness.

It becomes but clear from the severe criticism of the Sultan that Kaiqubad did not follow such political principles as could be sanctioned and justified Islamically. But even in spite of his denunciation an enigma was left unsolved by Ziauddin Barni. It was to this effect that if the whole reign of Kaiqubad had sanctioned a free license for the exercise of voluptuousness and had been a continual perpetuation of debauchery, it

would seem paradoxical and absurd to find that, even according to Ziauddin Barni, the people in Kaiqubad's reign did not know what sorrow and distress meant to them. They were safe from calamity and misfortune. His reign was never menaced by famine, or visited by epidemics. In other words, it brings home one cogent fact that, despite his too free and fast life, the very kingship was in no way a stumbling block in the progressive welfare of the people. On the contrary, it was too beneficial and too good.¹ Hence his was a remarkably happy and prosperous reign.

Kaiqubad's reign was unjustifiably anathematized by historians of the prejudicial and puritan type of mind, because he transgressed the limits of orthodoxy. His activities, frivolous as well as sober, were judged as Satanic and against the law of God. But, in spite of being Satanic from the orthodox point of view, he succeeded in establishing a new type of kingship which differed radically from the previous types. He was thus great in his generosity and warmth of heart as well as great in his frivolities and revelries. Kaiqubad's greatest weak-

¹ It is mentioned by Ibn Batoutah that he had met people who lived in the time of Kaiqubad and who praised the Sultan for his benevolence and regard for public welfare. The characteristic features of his kingship were large-heartedness and generosity. Cheapness of the necessities of life was a peculiarity of his reign.

ness was his too humanly humaneness which was grossly misunderstood and misjudged.

So far we have dealt with a certain aspect of the kingship of Kaiqubad. Now we would try to show how new tendencies towards a change in the institution of kingship were manifesting themselves in the time of Kaiqubad. Kingship, as an institution of governance and political control, was checked in its absolutist activity. The exercise of unlimited power and authority at the disposal of kingship was grudged. Limitations of political nature and restrictions of high magnitude were imposed on it, so that the import of such an institution should be understood in the right spirit.

Sultan Nasiruddin (Bughra Khan), while advising his son—Kaiqubad, defended the institution of kingship by explaining that kingship meant grave and unshirkable responsibilities. The political sermon of Sultan Nasiruddin was replete with suggestions on the acute problems of politics during the reign of Kaiqubad. The son understood such problems so imperfectly, but the father seemed to have thoroughly grasped the seriousness of the problems of kingship. Nasiruddin, in the course of his advice, raised the importance of the utilization of state-money as a power in relieving the people of their need and distress and in warding off the invasions of the enemy. The validity

of a claim to kingship could only be justified, if there was no scarcity of money in the state treasury. In other words, Sultan Nasiruddin made it too clear to Kaiqubad, that a ruler, who took money from the people, but failed to come to their rescue in time of need and suffering, could ill-deserve the title and dignity of rulership. And a ruler, who considered and called himself the protector, the guardian, and the master of the people, should know it for a fact that it was his bounden duty to redress the woes and sorrows of the people. If kingship did not rise to the occasion and the people were made to suffer death on account of their helplessness and starvation, it could not be entitled to its status. Sultan Nasiruddin further remarked that, according to the conception of justice, he would be a true king in whose reign every one was properly fed and clothed, and it should be his duty to enforce such laws that the people should not fall an easy prey to distress and calamity.

From the above-mentioned advice of Sultan Nasiruddin we can gather that the rigidity of the Balbanite political ideas and ideals was fast breaking. The importance of the Balbanite religious values in regard to politics was not emphasized in the time of Kaiqubad. There was a very marked tendency towards secularization in kingship, though it had not freed itself from

all religious influence.¹ But it cannot be denied that the Balbanite conception of the welfare of the people was further developed, though it was secularized to a great extent by the father of Kaiqubad. The problem of the welfare of the people and of the state was not tackled from a

¹ As religion and state were supposed to be twins, a necessity arose in the time of Kaiqubad to re-evaluate the nature of religiousness. The 'ulama, as a distinctive religious group, were exerting enormous influence on statecraft because of the importance they attached to the Koranic law in matters of statecraft. But it is interesting to note that this religious group was becoming too worldly in its *Weltanschauung* in spite of its too religious-mindedness. The spirit of the Koranic law which ought to guide them in their actual life as well as in matters of the state was fast losing hold on them. The 'ulama were identifying themselves with the crooked ways of kingship and were justifying the chicanery of politics which could not be sanctioned Islamically. During the kingship of Kaiqubad, Sultan Nasiruddin had drawn a line of demarcation between the religious and the worldly types of 'ulama. The latter were doing great harm to kingship by giving up their high ideals for the worldly good and materialistic prosperity. This type of 'ulama could be no guide to kingship and their moral influence could in no way be exercised in curbing the absolutist tendency in kingship. Hence his strict advocacy for the pious and religious type which detested worldly pleasure, honour, and money as poison. We are in the dark as to the actual influence exercised by the religious and the worldly types of the 'ulama on the state, politics, and kingship. But it is too evident that the sinister influence of the worldly type was conspicuous. It was then one of the problems of politics to lessen, or rather to destroy their influence on the state, politics, and kingship. An attempt was thus hazarded to let kingship thrive under a more salubrious influence and to make it answerable to God and the people.

religious point of view as in Balban's time, but from a political standpoint. Hence it would be no exaggeration to say that kingship depended for its existence on the welfare of the people. In other words, it meant that it could only justify its existence by developing a sense of responsibility and obligation to the people. Kingship would be deprived of its absolutist and despotic tendency which would result in changing the old Balbanite type of kingship into a new type. In this way the kingship of medieval India was coming closer and closer to the people. The general welfare of the people became its chief concern.

Sultan Nasiruddin understood the age and its problems and he knew what kingship needed most for its stability. He was also aware of the fact that it was in human nature to usurp power and authority and that in this world there was nothing pleasanter and sweeter than the intoxication of political authority which smothered all kinds of human sentiments. But in spite of his being well-versed in the art of politics, he did not even approve of absolute despotism. He, on the contrary, favoured a type of kingship which should be liberal but not despotic. While advising Kaiqubad, Sultan Nasiruddin, though not following implicitly the Balbanite trend of thought, suggested that the affairs of the state could only be best managed by a council of four ministers in consultation with the

king. Neither diplomatic secrecy nor preferential treatment among the ministers should be encouraged by the ruler. Any attempt at the complete domination of any of those officials over kingship should be checked, as that would lead to political dislocation and distress of the people.

It becomes now quite clear that during the reign of Kaiqubad kingship as an institution of governmental control was undergoing changes with the strides of time in order to adjust itself to the ever-changing environment and was trying to unravel the skein of politics. These changes on the surface of politics were hardly perceptible but powerful forces—social and political—were working underground to bring about something new.

CHAPTER V
KINGSHIP AND ITS PROBLEMS IN THE
TIME OF JALALUDDIN KHILJI

The protracted illness of Kaiqubad had disabled him to look after the affairs of statecraft with the result that the machinery of government was dislocated. High state officials devised ways and means to usurp political power, but could not succeed in the attempt as the power among them was equally distributed. To elect a rightful successor to the Sultan was the only course left open to them. It was unanimously decided to enthrone the son of Kaiqubad so that the influence of the Turks could be maintained and royalty be retained intact in the family of Balban. The party politics was responsible for the fall of the Balbanites. The Khilji party won the day. The whole people of Delhi sided with their king against the Khiljis and resented their usurpation of government, no less than they disliked the enthronement of Jalaluddin. Even after ascending the throne Jalaluddin dared not enter Delhi on account of the dread of the people, nor did the people go to Kilughari to wish him felicitations (*mubarakbadi*). Jalaluddin had to remain in Kilughari as the people detested the rule of the Khiljis.

If we have properly grasped the significance of the trend of events during the early struggle of the

kingship of Jalaluddin, we can safely say that the very kingship was established in the teeth of opposition, resentment, and hatred, and was bereft of all sympathy of the people. In the struggle for establishment of a kingship Jalaluddin had to contend against the tremendous force of public opinion. The general attitude of mind and behaviour of the people had to be taken into consideration in order to legitimize its usurpation in the eyes of the people for their whole-hearted support.

For the very existence of his kingship Jalaluddin had to tackle a difficult problem. Its basis was to be nowhere found except by making it popular and acceptable to the people. In other words, an attempt was made to effect harmony in the relationship between the throne and the people. That was Jalaluddin's foremost wish and he succeeded well in transforming opposition, resentment, and hatred of the people into their goodwill and support by his loving qualities, his dispensation of even-handed justice and his religiousness. The result was that peace and order were established in the country. He showed great concern for the comfort and convenience of the people.

After making them happy and contented he entered Delhi with great pomp and show and stayed in the Daulatkhana, where he gave expression to his most profound feelings regarding the change in his positions in life and thanked God

whole-heartedly. Kingship did not make him overhappy, as he was beginning to realize its serious and burdensome responsibilities. The approach to kingship by Jalaluddin had a peculiarity of its own. It gives us not an estimation of the man in him, but mirrors to us the real struggle of the man with the kingship in the personality of Jalaluddin. Kingship as such (having lost its aggressive spirit) could not justify usurpation of power and authority, as it was sustained by a new feeling for the old loyalties. Jalaluddin never forgot his own real position or status in life and it seemed strange to him as a king to reconcile his two positions.

The mind of Jalaluddin was surcharged with feelings of gratitude, loyalty, and regard for his past masters and he was also alive to the dignity of the Balbanite throne before his accession to it. A peculiar type of kingship, surpassing the previous types in its strangeness and uniqueness, found its full expression in the genuine personality of Jalaluddin. The incident at the Koshak-i-Lal was indicative of the fact that the kingship of Jalaluddin could not deteriorate and debase the man in him by obliterating all sense of profound loyalty to the deceased royal family of Balban. The right of kingship to all property, personal or impersonal, necessitated an exchange of words between Jalaluddin and Ahmad Chap, a leading light of his court. Whether kingship should be bothered by the legality

or illegality of confiscation of property, or should do what behoved it, was an open question of politics of the day. The principles of political expediency as advocated by Ahmad Chap were insisted upon in order to influence kingship to confiscate impersonal property. But Jalaluddin could not appreciate Ahmad Chap's standpoint and refused to be guided by the basic ideas of *Realpolitik* on moral grounds.

The kingship of Jalaluddin had freed itself from all influence of the Balbanite school of thought. Jalaluddin defined his own position with a view to accentuate the difference in points of view regarding his conception of politics and the art of politics as advocated by Ahmad Chap. He did not think it desirable to identify his kingship with the prevalent political precepts, as that would make him forego Islam and would lead to the establishment of a faith in him which could not be sanctioned by the law of the *Shariat*. Jalaluddin pooh-poohed expediency which was then considered the essence of politics and was attempting to cement the base of kingship by reinforcement of the Koranic law. He was also too well acquainted with the fact that kingship, as an institution of political control, was in reality nothing more than shallowness. Jalaluddin gave expression to his innermost thought by holding that kingship was but a farce and show and that, though its outward

appearance seemed to have glamour and charm, its heart was really rotten.

It was for the first time in the history of medieval India that a severe and scathing criticism was made on kingship and that too by a king himself. The Balbanite ideas of royal prestige, awe, and dignity as *leitmotifs* in kingship were put on the anvil. They were found wanting in substance and essence. To be more correct, Jalaluddin stripped kingship of its superficiality, its outward lustre, its grandeur, and its awe. A new attempt was made to spiritualize it in the broadest sense of the term. In other words, new and powerful forces were at work in rehumanizing kingship. A great urge was felt and greater was the attempt to bring about its complete transformation.

Jalaluddin's interpretation of kingship was not appreciated by that political group whose chief representative was Ahmad Chap, but it had, at the same time, a profound influence on the experienced *amirs* of his court. The representatives of the Balbanite school of political thought in the court of Jalaluddin were still obdurate in the exposition of their ideas to such an extent that to them kingship signified oppression and cruelty; they conveyed the view that it should be understood as nothing more and nothing less than absolutism. Ideas were harboured by the representatives of this school of politics that Jalaluddin would be a great failure,

if he were to stick to his concepts of morality in politics. But even the Balbanite political philosophy could in no way unhinge the man in Jalaluddin. His convictions were too deep-rooted to be challenged and changed by the mere enunciation of the Balbanite political doctrine.

It will become clear to us in the course of our narrative that Jalaluddin had whole-heartedly identified himself with his convictions. They were gospel truth to him and he could not be untrue to them. To be more explicit, he was trying to live up to that ideal which had revolutionized his whole being. It was a matter of principle with him, and he could not sacrifice it even for the sake of worldly fame. This shows that Jalaluddin's personality was not only of a genuine type, but was also unique. Though he belonged to the medieval age, his spirit and vision were not medieval. He was far too enlightened and ahead of his times.

His treatment of the rebel prisoners of war in connection with the revolt of Malik Chajju is a conclusive proof of the fact that the spirit of kingship had undergone a complete change in the sense that need was felt for a new line of action in a new direction.¹ New tactics were employed

¹ In this connection it ought to be mentioned that many a time Jalaluddin even abstained from punishing thieves. After taking vows from them that they would not commit such crimes in future, he let them off. He did not allow his

in order to introduce a new code of morality in politics. If judged from the medieval political point of view Jalaluddin's treatment of the rebel prisoners, intriguing nobles, and thieves was impolitic, but nevertheless from a humanitarian standpoint it was humane.

After giving them a grand reception Jalaluddin consoled them by saying that their inspirited actions,

sword to intervene in order to punish them. But he believed that his faith in the power and superiority of moral force would exercise such a profound influence on their nature that they would change for the better. In the same way aspersions, vituperations, and slander were heaped on Jalaluddin by his nobles. But in spite of the fact that he was in the know of their mind he had given proof of his magnanimity and generosity of heart in his treatment towards them. His outspokenness was too heart-rending when he gave a bit of his mind to them by refuting the charge levelled against him that he was not a fit person to rule. He remarked that he could act in a despotic manner like kings and he could cut their bodies into pieces if he wanted to. But he brought home to them that he did not like to indulge in such methods. If kingship only functioned in order to imprison and murder; to humiliate and demoralize, then he could not indulge in such acts. On the sheer charge of nonsensical talk or slander he could not kill. According to the *Shariat* of the Prophet he explained his position further: Only on the basis of three charges—murder, heresy, and adultery—could life be taken. Hence he was religiously bound to reject the inhuman principles of governance on which kingship depended in the past for its existence. The rule of sword in matters political ceased. A new power which could appeal to human heart was wielded for the good of human beings. It was a question of revaluation of values with Jalaluddin's kingship. For his age he might be a failure as a king, but he touched the most fundamental of human problems.

which were motivated by a sense of loyalty to their deceased king, could not be condemned for their revolt against him. No mean motives could be attributed to them even if they had refused to recognize him as their king. There was no reason for them to be ashamed of their revolt against him.¹ He could have easily put them all to sword, but he detested to shed their blood as they were human beings. He, therefore, adopted a new behaviour, a new attitude and an absolutely new line of action as he had no faith in the sword as a benevolent power, nor did he consider that it possessed inherent power to change the human heart. Jalaluddin's advocacy of his viewpoint fell flat and was not appreciated by his very men.

He was ardent in his belief in the utilization of the motoric force of human emotions—sympathy and kindness—for crushing the brute in the state rebels, criminals and the ordinary people. Conscious of the efficacy of human forces in changing radically human character he manipulated the force of human power with the conviction that his humaneness towards the state rebels, criminal and others would bring about a change in them and they would feel grateful to him for his utmost humanism. Jalaluddin's belief in the superiority of

¹ Jalaluddin's speech had a psychological effect on them. They became all the more ashamed of their misdeeds. This was all due to his kindness and politeness.

moral law can be illustrated from a verse which he recited thus, while remonstrating the rebel prisoners: 'Evil for evil is easily returned, but he only is great who returns good for evil.'

It was quite natural that the ethico-political philosophy of Jalaluddin could not be appreciated by his Khilji *amirs*. It upset them. Ahmad Chap could not restrain himself and had a talk with his master with a definite purpose in view. He told Jalaluddin frankly that the Sultan should rule in a likewise manner as the kings of the world had ruled. Their political principles at least would enable him to maintain intact his kingship. It was suicidal to statecraft, in his opinion, to have bestowed benevolence and kindness on those rebels who, as a rule, ought to be killed. He further reminded Jalaluddin that even Balban would have not only punished them, but would have spilt their blood. Jalaluddin replied that he knew what Ahmad Chap meant. He had also seen the kings of the past who had severely punished rebels, but he could not act against the dictates of his conscience. He had grown old as a Muslim and was not accustomed to shed the blood of the Muslims.¹ Though he had

¹ It would be appropriate to mention in this connection that Jalaluddin's strict adherence to the *Shariat* as his guiding principle was stressed by him when he remarked that the punishment for the crimes of murder,

attained the age of seventy he had not in his whole life killed any *mumabid*. In his old age he would not like to dethrone Islam from his heart by indulgence in blood-shedding for the sake of a kingdom which had the germs of transitoriness and changeability.

He was adamant in regard to his principles in life and stuck to them as he was sure of the fact that at the Day of Judgment he had to be answerable for his irreligious acts, if indulged in, and for that he could not face God and justify his actions before Him. As every individual was to be held responsible for his own acts before God, so Jalaluddin made it clear to Ahmad Chap that he could not be held responsible for the actions and deeds of others. If the rebels were to catch hold of him and kill him, then they would be judged by their deeds and he by his own. It was impossible for him to follow in their footsteps and let himself be guided by their ideas.

heresy, and adultery was nothing but death, but the penalty of death for the punishment of other crimes could in no way be sanctioned in the law. Hence it was impossible for him to act contrary to the Koranic law. Jalaluddin made it very clear that he was not used to oppression and cruelty and it was not in his nature to imprison and kill people and to demoralize and humiliate them. His principles were not only meant to have protective effectiveness for a certain group of people (Muslims), but they were also to protect and guard the lives of the people in general without showing in actuality any racial prejudice. It ought to be stated here that during his reign there was no persecution of his Hindu subjects as Hindus.

From Jalaluddin's point of view the release of the rebel prisoners, instead of killing them, was the only rightful course open to him because it had a divine sanction behind it. In other words, it was God who made him victorious over them and in order to offer gratitude for the heavenly victory, it but behoved him that he should set them free and abstain from killing.¹

The principles of politics, as advocated by

¹ It is interesting to trace how his mind worked out the principle of non-killing. Jalaluddin seemed to have advocated *Abimsa* for the general guidance of life, but in war he flouted it as a useless principle. But when there was no war, he greatly realized its importance in actual life and modelled his own life on the principle of *Abimsa*. It is a well-known fact that he spent nearly his whole life in war but in spite of it he stood for non-killing as a higher code of morality for human progress. Jalaluddin knew it well that there was a great difference between times of war and peace. The war psychology has its own laws which cannot be applicable and enforced for the good of the people in time of peace. Though in state of war he had no scruples to shed human blood, yet he could not, in time of peace, order a man, who had been seized and brought before him, to be slain. This brings to us a very cogent fact regarding Jalaluddin that he had a natural disinclination to cause pain to human beings in time of peace. Jalaluddin gave vent to his innermost feelings in this manner: How anyone had the heart to slaughter human beings who had been brought up with all tenderness and affection from their childhood to manhood! Such an explicit exposition of his inner self is thought-provoking and full of significance. Jalaluddin's heart revolted at the idea of taking human life in time of peace. Such an attitude of mind must have been due to his conception of life as something sacred and good in itself.

Ahmad Chap in order to strengthen the reins of government, were condemned by Jalaluddin but not refuted by him as they were the essentials of politics which could not be sanctioned Islamically. If he were to translate them into action, he would have to go against his religion and would become notorious for his despotism which he dreaded as a Muslim. Jalaluddin had no faith in the institution of kingship, because it became the maker of its own law or followed the crooked ways that were not sanctioned in the *Shariat*. He was no believer in the political doctrine—‘kingship knows no kingship.’ Kingship had to be subservient to the *Shariat* in order to justify its *esprit de corps* and also its existence. If it defied the *Shariat*, it was then no kingship in the true sense of the term and it should be discarded.

In the course of his talk with Ahmad Chap, Jalaluddin had made it plain to him that he would be willing to abdicate his throne in favour of any one among his nobles who longed for a kingship that should be oppressive and despotic and thus after taking the reins of government he could imbrue his hand with the blood of the innocents. If it were not possible to rule without shedding blood of the people, then such a kingship had no utilitarian value for Jalaluddin. The curse of God would descend upon him if he were to become despotic but he had not the strength to bear it.

From the elucidation of his ideas it is clear

to us that Jalaluddin considered Islam and politics as antithesis of each other. To effect compromise would be impossible. Either Islam or politics should reign supreme. So politics without the Islamic basis would be despotism or absolutism which form of government could never be good for the people. Hence his willingness to renounce kingship and his insistence on dissociation of his name from despotism. So far we have come to know about Jalaluddin's inborn hatred for rank despotism and contempt for the shallowness of the institution of kingship. In this connection the mention of the siege of Ranthumbhor will not be out of place. It will, on the contrary, make us more acquainted with the ideas of Jalaluddin. His order to retreat without conquering the fort of Ranthumbhor gave rise to a hot discussion on the principles of politics between Ahmad Chap and himself. Such a political discussion deserves our attention as it throws fresh light on the real working of the mind of the kings of the world. It is no exaggeration to say that it also gives us an insight into the psychological study of kingship. As Jalaluddin and Ahmad Chap belonged to two different schools of political thought, the views expressed by them were so divergent that an understanding between them seemed well-nigh impossible. There was a clash between two rival political schools.

According to Jalaluddin the cause of retreat

was that the victory would entail immense sacrifice for which the fort was not worth it. To the politically-minded Ahmad Chap retreat meant defeatism and negation of all royal authority and prestige. He approached Jalaluddin with a definite view to explain to him how disastrous the consequences of such a retreat would be. In matters of conquest, Ahmad Chap remarked, the kings of the world were never deterred by any thought and knew no scruples that could be considered a stumbling block in their way to conquest. Jalaluddin was not the man who could easily be swayed by the argument of Ahmad Chap. He became all the more adamant in his convictions. To him the spirit of conquest, as shown by the kings and the conquerors, was nothing more than the satisfaction of their heart's desire and the proclamation of their conquest far and wide indicated the establishment of their political authority. Infliction of misery, distress, and discomfort on the people by thousands never upset them in the materialization of their political aim. Their enterprise was inspired with conquest motives. Even the idea of the ruination of the people could not stop them from their conquest.

To accept the philosophy of conquest as a guiding motive in life and to think and act in the manner of the kings was a thing which nauseated Jalaluddin. He absolutely disapproved of their political philosophy and told Ahmad Chap frankly that it ought to

be borne in mind that the laws of God and the Prophet were different from the laws of the despots and tyrants.¹ They had incurred the punishment of Hell by taking pride in their enterprise. What such despots and tyrants did for their transitory honour and prestige had no substance and value. Their art of politics was anti-Islamic, as it aimed at the ruination of the people. The tyrant 'conquerors' and despot 'kings' had dethroned Islam by anti-Islamic actions. Jalaluddin remarked that his criterion was Islamic and his thoughts and actions were actuated by Islamic precepts. The point of view of Ahmad Chap was based on the words and deeds of the despots. Jalaluddin reminded Ahmad Chap of the Day of Judgment which was to come and for every act, good or bad, one had to be answerable before God. Jalaluddin could not justify Islamically the ways of the despots.

But the most interesting part of the political discussion was how the ingenious-minded Ahmad Chap twisted his own words into an interpretation of an absolutely new import in order to justify his political philosophy and to fillip Jalaluddin into activity. He thus wanted to explain his position to his master with a view to dispel misinterpretation of kingship from Jalaluddin's mind and requested him to follow the examples of Sultan

¹ It seems that kings appeared to Jalaluddin as despots and tyrants.

Mahmud and Sultan Sanjar who were the protectors of Islam as well as the conquerors of the world. Most probably the idea at the back of his mind was to harmonize the spirit of conquest with the Islamic law. It was his last finesse against the good-natured and religious-minded Jalaluddin. But even this could not disturb the latter's belief in the rightness of religious as well as moral law. Jalaluddin was quite well aware of the fact that there was a great difference in his position and the positions of Mahmud and Sanjar. They ruled Islamic countries in accordance with the *Sbariat* and could, therefore, be called the real Islamic rulers. There could be no comparison between Jalaluddin's government and theirs. He himself made a frank confession of it. He was made to rule a country which could not be denominated as Islamic. He, therefore, derided the idea expressed by Ahmad Chap regarding the advisability of following the examples of Sultan Mahmud and Sultan Sanjar. Jalaluddin remarked that even their '*Sulabadaran*' and '*Rikabdarán*' were better than and far superior to him. And how during his temporary government he could harbour such thoughts in order to act in a manner as to achieve what had already been attained by them. To him those Sultans were the protectors and patrons of Islam. Jalaluddin, in order to convince Ahmad Chap who was labouring under a delusion as to the actual state of affairs in

India, remarked that the non-Islamic institutions were flourishing unhampered in his reign and he even could not suppress the pagan rites of the unbelievers and interfere with the ways of life the infidels were living. If he had been an Islamic king or a real king or at least had the dignity and power in him like the Islamic kings to protect Islam, he would not allow the worst enemies of the religion of the Prophet to live a life of ease, comfort, and contentedness, and let them strut before the Muslims with gusto and pomp. But the controlled and well-balanced mind of the 'believer' made him tolerate such things and practices under his very nose for reasons of his weak position and low status. In his heart of hearts he did not wish to have the perpetuation of the un-Islamic institutions, but his circumstances compelled him to see all things un-Islamic and anti-Islamic flourish.

Jalaluddin bravely faced the problem of the day by making his own position clear. To him his form of government was not really in conformity with the *Shariat* though he yearned to have it established as a reality, nor could he afford to establish government on the religio-political principles of Mahmud and Sanjar. He realized the awkwardness of his own position and was also conscious of the deplorable status of his kingship; he confessed that the *khatibs* in their sermons (*kutbas*) falsely proclaimed him as an Islamic ruler

which he eventually found to be untrue. Being thoroughly convinced of his own faith as a Muslim and of the importance of the law of the *Shariat* for the establishment of political power, it was repugnant to him to hear such allegations as were propounded in the sermons (*kutbas*) that he was a Muslim ruler while his kingship was not what it ought to be. The kingship of Jalaluddin was only in name and nothing more did it convey to him, though it was his ardent wish to Islamize it.

Having so far dealt with his ideas on kingship and his ethics of politics, we will now try to show how far he was successful in translating his ideas into action. We would thus be able to estimate not only the man in Jalaluddin but also the kingship in actuality. Its success or failure in the political domain does not concern us, but what it strove for in theory and practice will deserve our attention.

Jalaluddin never insulted his *maliks*, *amirs*, functionaries of government and those whom he had elevated and dignified. He did them no harm but bestowed utmost care in not inconveniencing them, nor punished them for their committal of crimes. He treated them with all kindness and goodwill as parents treat their children. From the days of *malikship* to his kingship he was never known to have laid hands on their wealth and property, nor dismissed

those whom he had once taken in his service. The author of the *Tabakat-i-Akbari* remarks that 'fining and amercing and imprisonment and torture and greed for other people's wealth which were characteristic of despots and tyrants, were never perpetrated during the whole time of his sovereignty.'

Jalaluddin also tried to remove a 'distance' of feeling between himself and his courtiers and officers. His royal status was no obstacle in the way of social intercourse. He mixed with them too freely and open-heartedly. It meant that the kingship of Jalaluddin had totally destroyed the Balbanite ideas of awe and prestige and was instrumental in developing the ideal of Kaiqubad. An attempt was thus made at linking kingship with its functionaries. Jalaluddin's actual social behaviour must have vitalized those humanizing forces, that were let loose during the regime of Kaiqubad. The absolutist tendency in kingship was curbed and smothered. Kingship, in toto, was humanized. Jalaluddin completed the work of Kaiqubad. It is alleged that the kingship of Jalaluddin became unpopular on account of his queer ideas of government.¹ But if we dive a bit

¹ There was an unbridgeable difference between the political ideas of the Balbanite school of thought and Jalaluddin's. The promulgation of new ideas by Jalaluddin was abhorrent to his *maliks* who belonged to the old Balbanite school of politics. These *maliks* were trying to make him unpopular by attributing all sorts of mean motives.

deep into the actual working of his government we find that his kingship had most sobering effect on the officials. Ziauddin Barni had committed himself to a statement that during the reign of Jalaluddin no official could take mean advantage of his position while administering affairs of the people and act contrary to the law of the *Shariat* in matters concerning public welfare. If he did, he became unpopular and the people lost all faith and confidence in him. It was due to the salutary influence of the

There was a clash between two worlds of thought. The resentment of the *maliks* was due to the fact that, in the defeat of their political ideas, they had no hope of political ascendancy, political power, and political influence. To them India was a country to be exploited for the good of a certain group of people. In other words, to rule and conquer India was foremost in their minds but the welfare of the country was never their concern. The how and why of things never bothered them. They had the adventurer's spirit, but did not know how to rule for the good of a country. They had still the foreigner's mentality. They thought that lavish expense of money and wealth could win people for ever and make them happy; oppression and cruelty, punishment and severity could crush rebels and would create dread in the heart of the people. Kingship should take all these factors into consideration. But they did not know that there were other essential factors contributing to the formation of a real, solid, and permanent base for the complete solidarity of the state. Though they were following the political philosophy of Balban, they could not catch his spirit of government underlying his political ideal. In the practice of government India was in need of a new political outlook and force. Kaiqubad and Jalaluddin knew the political essentials which were utilized by their governments.

kingship of Jalaluddin that the state officials always tried to be on their guard and discharged public duty in conformity with the law of the *Shariat*.

Jalaluddin was a keen well-wisher of his people. He took the greatest care in sorting the right type of officials for functioning government and never trusted the mean and the vicious, nor vested them with power and authority. Thus attempts were made to free the institution of government from the malevolent influences of politics which he abhorred from the core of his heart. As a ruler Jalaluddin took the greatest care and interest in the general discharge of governmental duties and must have succeeded in bringing the people nearer to the government by raising their status or position in life. The public was no more considered as a chattel to be driven by the dictates of officials. The people were given scope for their development and were made to sense and feel their own individuality. Here too Kaiqubad's influence was utilized by Jalaluddin for humanizing the societal forces and the state activity.

CHAPTER VI

**PROBLEMS OF POLITICS, GOVERNMENT,
AND KINGSHIP IN THE TIME OF
ALAUDDIN KHILJI**

Sultan Jalaluddin conferred the fief of Karah on Alauddin who employed in his service a large group of officials and courtiers of Malik Chajju. These had been released from imprisonment by Jalaluddin.¹ Within the first year of his *subbadari*, Alauddin was initiated into the chicanery of the Karah politics by his very newly appointed officials with a view to make him realize the importance of

¹ It is interesting to note that such a refractory group was not disqualified from the state service, but, on the contrary, was given power and authority for the management of the affairs of the estate. Our historian, Ziauddin Barni, has left us in the lurch as to the real motive for their appointment. Being in the know of the real nature of Jalaluddin, it becomes but obvious that either such a move on the part of Alauddin must have been sanctioned by Jalaluddin, or it could have been but due to the magnanimous, generous, and forgiving nature of Jalaluddin himself. The Balbanite political school of thought could never have tolerated politics of such a nature. It would have considered the bestowal of authority on such a rebellious group as suicidal to statecraft, because politics and treason were antithesis of each other. To Balban and his political school the employment of such a refractory people into the service would mean complete defeatism of the real spirit in politics. It clearly shows that Jalaluddin had drifted away from the old political mooring and had succeeded in laying the foundation of a new politics, based on a force, moral as well as humane. His was a new approach to political problem, a new behaviour in human understanding and interpretation, and a new trend in political domain.

the rôle of wealth in the usurpation of kingship, which was beyond the achievement of Malik Chajju as he had no wealth in his possession.¹ Alauddin

¹ These officials and courtiers of the 'Alai court brought home to Alauddin that the secret of the failure of Malik Chajju was due to the fact that he had no wealth. A well-equipped and powerful army could be recruited at Karah, but there was no money in the treasury of the fief of Karah. If Alauddin could get money and wealth, it would not be difficult to conquer Delhi and to become king.

Alauddin was the son-in-law as well as the nephew of Jalaluddin and he was not on good terms with his wife and mother-in-law. An obvious reason for such a strained relation was that he was oppressed and tyrannized by his wife as well as his mother-in-law. The tyrannical behaviour of these ladies towards him was an indirect cause for his revolt against Jalaluddin. Family relationship had made him disgusted and sore, as he was hampered in the vicious enterprise. In order to free himself from the thralldom of such a relationship, he contemplated to sever his connections from the family and to live a life of recluse.

The author of the *Muntakhab-ul-Tarikh* suggests that he used to show signs of revolt and was always nursing in his breast sinister intentions. Even the author of the *Tabakat-i-Akbari* remarks that Alauddin was thinking of a pretext or other in order to go away to some place outside the Sultan's dominions and take possession of some country and live there.

Alauddin was passing through a great crisis in life, when the advice of his courtiers seemed to convey him a new message of relief and hope. Only in the usurpation of kingship he could have seen his redemption. This may be the master-motif in his struggle for the achievement of kingship. His attempt at tapping travellers for information regarding condition of countries is a clear proof of the fact that he was becoming too inquisitive to know the whereabouts of the 'El Dorado'. Ziauddin Barni's statement in connection with the internal struggle of the man in Alauddin is too suggestive

was fascinated by the idea of kingship and thought of acquiring wealth at all costs. He devised means for the materialization of his immediate aim. He raided Bhilsa,¹ Chanderi,² and Deogir.³ In all

of the real motive that was goading him on to acquire wealth by all possible means. This brings us to a very cogent factor in the further development of the personality of Alauddin that in the struggle for power and authority he was actuated by the same *leitmotif* that egged him on the road to kingship. In this way he became conscious of the inherent power of wealth in regard to his future happiness, prosperity, and grandeur.

¹ As Alauddin was after the acquisition of wealth by means, fair or foul, he must have been informed that Bhilsa was one of the centres of wealth. He raided the town and brought with him enormous booty. It is also interesting to notice that it was at Bhilsa that he came to know about the wealth of Deogir. While returning to Delhi he made up his mind to equip secretly an army with a view to launch an expedition against Deogir. Jalaluddin was greatly pleased at the success and conferred the fief of Oudh on Alauddin as a reward.

² Having reached Delhi he submitted a petition to the Sultan asking permission for the postponement of payment of revenue, due on the fiefs of Karah and Oudh, to the royal treasury so that he could recruit additional infantry and cavalry and be allowed to invade Chanderi and its adjoining territories where ease and indifference prevailed, or which were, according to Ferishta, ruled by a few wealthy rajas who had shown signs of insubordination. Permission was granted him by the Sultan. Ferishta informs us that Alauddin appointed again those unemployed officers who had served Balban and Malik Chajju. The proposed raid on Chanderi was utilized as a pretext for some other immediate objective in view, i.e., expedition to Deogir, which was kept a strict secret. He eventually equipped his army for the expedition to Deogir, but he made it known that he was going to raid Chanderi.

these raids his efforts were crowned with success. These successful raids gave him an insight into the psychology of human action and behaviour, more courage and will to do things at the risk of life for something higher, and made him more hopeful of the attempt at the usurpation of kingship. Enormous wealth and well-equipped and disciplined armies at his disposal assured him of his success. Wide experience in warfare as well as in political chicanery transformed his indecisive and wavering nature into an over-confident, self-conscious, and autocratic one.

It was a travesty of reality that, despite Alauddin's strict secrecy of the expedition to Deogir, not only the people but also Jalaluddin

³ The whole expedition to Deogir seemed to have been wonderfully planned by Alauddin and his men. It seems strange that his march to Deogir was nothing but smooth sailing. Shaik Ainuddin Bijapuri, the author of the *Mulhik-kat-i-Tabakat-i-Nasiri*, remarked that all those small Hindu kingdoms which were on the way were left unmolested by him. His chief activity *en route* to Deogir was hunting. Historians are silent as to such a general behaviour of Alauddin. After two months of strenuous march he reached Ellichpur, a famous Deccan city. The same author informs us that Alauddin made it known there that a discontented noble—Alauddin—had left off the service of Sultan Jalaluddin for some reasons and desired to present himself before Raja Manderi of Tilangana in order to seek employment. We are in the dark as to the real cause of his announcement as such at Ellichpur. It is surprising to find that those officers of Malik Chajju who were kept by Alauddin were instrumental in giving a lead to Alauddin in the expedition to Deogir.

and his court came to know after some time about the operations at Deogir. The untold wealth of Deogir, as a booty in possession of Alauddin, created a sort of pleasant disturbance in the mind of Jalaluddin who began to identify himself with the vested interests of Alauddin. Such an attitude of mind on the part of the Sultan led to a discussion on politics. The subject was broached by Jalaluddin to his courtiers. He asked them what his behaviour should be in regard to Alauddin. Ahmad Chap, the leading light of the Jalali court as well as a past-master in politics, knew it for a fact that enormous wealth and paraphernalia of warfare at the disposal of any one would breed mischief and sedition, as the intoxication of power was always instrumental in completely unhinging an individual. He made it quite plain to Jalaluddin that even the kings of the olden times considered wealth and sedition as correlative. To put the political discussion in a nutshell, Ahmad Chap warned his master of the evil intentions of Alauddin and requested him to take at once precautionary measures before it was too late to off-set Alauddin's machinations. Being a realist in politics he emphasized the fact that it would be a grave folly to expect loyalty from one who had grievance at heart. But as the good-natured Jalaluddin was too favourably disposed towards Alauddin, it was impossible for him to imagine that Alauddin

would ever harbour any evil designs against him. The apprehensions of Ahmad Chap appeared to him quite baseless.

After returning to Karah from Deogir, Alaud-din was confronted with a new difficult problem. How to justify his action and behaviour before Jalaluddin was a question that demanded immediate solution. He knew already what the Jalali court thought about his projects and how ill-disposed towards and suspicious of him the officials and courtiers of Jalaluddin were. The truth was out and it could not be burked unless craft and cunning were employed with finesse and artfulness.

In order to guage the real situation at the Jalali court he most tactfully duped Jalaluddin by sending a petition with a view to explaining his conduct that he was willing to present in person the booty obtained from Deogir to the Sultan. As he had grave misapprehensions he desired an assurance for his safe-conduct at the court from Jalaluddin if he were to pay homage in person to the Sultan. But, on the other hand, he made hasty preparations to start for Lakhnauti. His letter to the court might have been written either to win Jalaluddin's favour and esteem or to bribe him with a promise of wealth in order to achieve his aim, or to minimize the would-be chances of misapprehension from Jalaluddin's mind regarding

his rumoured evil intentions. What his real motive in such a move was, it is difficult to know. Even Ziauddin Barni had skipped over this delicate point. But it is clear that Alauddin had made up his mind not to present himself before the Sultan. The Jalali officials and the saner element of the city knew about his intentions, that he was planning and scheming in order to free himself. In spite of an 'affectionate letter' from Jalaluddin assuring him and his companions complete safety, Alauddin became altogether hostile to the Sultan and he kept his plans secret. After Jalaluddin's assurance he drafted a letter to his brother, Ilmas Beg. This move of his throws ample light on the working of his mind. Alauddin tricked his brother by playing on his finer emotions into a belief about his innocence of heart and brought home to him that he harboured fear and anxiety in his heart because of the committal of 'many unwarranted acts without taking the orders of the Sultan.' That was the reason why the Sultan's mind was turned against him and for such unpardonable acts he had resolved to put an end to his life.

The letter had the desired effect on Ilmas Beg who put it before the Sultan for his kind perusal and consideration. The good-natured Jalaluddin was deeply moved by it. Ilmas Beg was ordered to proceed to Karah as quickly as possible with the royal message of reassurance. It was written with

a view to relieve Alauddin of his perturbed state of mind and to assure him of good intentions on the part of the Sultan who had resolved to see him personally. Such news were communicated to Alauddin through Ilmas Beg as ordered. After the arrival of Ilmas Beg at Karah matters took a serious turn. It was considered high time to take to drastic measures. Either to launch forth an expedition to Lakhnauti or to remain at Karah with a view to murder Jalaluddin was a burning question of politics that was discussed by Alauddin with his courtiers. Though Alauddin favoured the idea of an expedition to Lakhnauti, yet he changed his mind in favour of the murder-scheme as proposed by his intimate, wise, and far-sighted men. Jalaluddin's murder was planned by them with all craft, cunning, and ingenuity. The Sultan was treacherously murdered in 1295 A. D.

Alauddin's struggle for power, authority, and kingship was at last crowned with success. With the help of his comrades in arms Alauddin made his way to kingship, though the journey was beset with crooked roads and precipitous turnings. The advice given to him by his courtiers turned out to be a prophecy. Human sentiments were butchered by Alauddin and his party for the usurpation of kingship.

Alauddin without his Karah clique would never have immortalized his kingship in the

history of our country. His Karah associates were the real makers of Alauddin—the man and diplomat in him. They inspired him with the idea of kingship; they showed him the way to the city of ‘El Dorado’—Deogir’s wealth; they were also indirectly responsible for the murder of Jalaluddin, but directly succeeded in preparing him for the murder of the Sultan. It is a fact that Alauddin was a discontented soul; he felt helpless and forlorn; he had an ambitious heart. But it was eventually the guiding spirit of the Karah clique which guided and controlled his actions before his kingship. Enormous influence of this Karah group was instrumental in creating in Alauddin callousness, unbridled ambition, devilish daring, and too self-conscious an individuality.

The murder of Jalaluddin was signalized by Alauddin’s accession to the royal throne. Having proclaimed himself the Sultan of Delhi, Alauddin still had to face grave problems. The first problem was to justify his usurped kingship in the eyes of the public so that it could be brought on a par with a real kingship for which the people had natural affection, attachment, and loyalty. In the time of Alauddin the theory of kingship was recast. He had no liking for the progressive type of royalty as advocated by Kaiqubad and Jalaluddin. The humanizing tendency in kingship had to be curbed and crushed. Kingship was seen drifting

towards absolutism and could not tolerate to be subjected to the divine surveillance ; it evolved its own peculiar law, but ignored the supremacy of the divine law over it ; it needed no such sanction.* Its very existence was enough to prove its justification and its will-to-live without being at the mercy of the divine power. Kingship thus became supreme and enforced its laws for the good and the welfare of the people.

The theory of kingship, as expounded by one of the greatest intellectualists of the age—Hazrat Amir Khusrau—for his master Alauddin, will throw ample light on the subject under our scrutiny. It was most probably propounded with a view to justify and enhance the status of the kingship of Alauddin who had established his fame as a conqueror before his usurped kingship.

To Amir Khusrau the title of the conqueror could not legitimately be used except by the kings of the world. The aim of the conqueror was the conquest of the world with the object of retaining it. In case the conqueror could not retain it he became himself conquered. This meant that he had been defeated on his own ground and in his own purpose. His position then would be 'like a flash of lightning, disappearing immediately after his conquest. But a true conqueror was he who seized 'the whole world,' with the result that 'the world should seize him also.' The conqueror

as a reality as well as a living force was differentiated from a mere raider. As a ruler of the world he was, in fact, raised to a much higher status and real position. One without the other could not afford to live and prosper. Amir Khusrau remarked that 'this, too, is clear as day to all men that the conquering and keeping of the world is a quality of the sword of the sun : For from east to west the sun brings the earth under the rays of his sword and keeps it.' It would be to the point to mention that Alauddin's conquests before his kingship were no real conquests in the sense of Amir Khusrau. But his very usurped kingship changed these into real conquests. Thus in the eyes of Amir Khusrau Alauddin was a real conqueror as well.

If we have so far understood Amir Khusrau properly, we can safely assert that king and conqueror were not contradiction in terms, though 'the mere conqueror' did not enjoy the status of kingship. But he did not feel satisfied by elaborating the spirit of the conqueror. He was after something higher and nobler. It was the establishment of the dignity of a 'ruler' which he considered as superior to the conqueror. To him the actual term 'ruler' was in reality applicable to the Almighty God. He wanted to sanctify the kingship of Alauddin. This he did in his own unique manner by giving expression to his ideas that "the 'conqueror'

of this age (Alauddin) so highly excels in the qualities of resemblance of the 'ruler' as well as the 'conqueror' that neither the pen nor the tongue can describe his powers."

This brings us to a very important fact that the kingship of Alauddin was raised to a godly status as it appeared to bear divine resemblance. Though Amir Khusrau attributed the divine qualities in the kingship of Alauddin, yet it was different from the Islamic concept of the divine right of kingship. In this way it was considered as the 'shadow of God.' It was not a handmaid of the *Shariat*, though its divine quality was emphasized. It became a law unto itself. All this was due to Amir Khusrau's masterful stroke of genius so far as the intellectual interpretation of Alauddin's theory of kingship was concerned.

Alauddin, having become experienced in the art of politics, had no difficulty in solving the problem of kingship. He knew the importance of the rôle of wealth in politics and was also too well aware of the fact that wealth was a power—a formidable power—not to be easily resisted. As he had untold wealth at his disposal, he could use it as means to an end. He utilized it for winning the heart of the people. The ulterior motive behind his 'boundless munificence' was to secure and solidify the base of kingship.

It is said that "he so enamoured the hearts of

the people with his gold and riches, that every one became favourably inclined towards him ; and the hostility which had taken possession of their hearts on account of the assassination of Sultan Jalaluddin became completely obliterated." He 'delighted the hearts of the *amirs* and all classes of his subjects by his boundless munificence.' The effect of such a *démarche* was that 'he made the people loyal and attached them to his throne by his great largesses and gifts. Ease and happiness made their appearance among all classes of people.'

The indiscriminate and lavish distribution of wealth to all did its work. Even the kingship of Alauddin could not do without the affection and loyalty of the people. It also needed public sympathy and moral support for its existence in order to sanctify and legitimatize it in the eyes of the people. Indirectly it meant that without the public recognition of the institution of kingship, as a legitimized form of royalty, kingship as such dreaded its stability and survival.

If we have properly followed the general trend of political thought in medieval India, it becomes quite clear to us that kingship and the people were not contradiction in terms but were interdependent of each other. If kingship did not take cognizance of the force of public opinion, its stabilization seemed well-nigh impossible. It is true that the people were not organized as a

political body. But despite their lack of political consciousness and awakening the interaction of human forces, engendered by close association of the people with royalty, was responsible for creating indirect popular pressure and influence on the development of the institution of kingship. It became restricted in its play of autocratic and absolute power. If it did transgress its limitations, it did harm to itself. As an institution of political control it was created by human hands; it recognized no other power as superior to it; it was a law unto itself. But the preponderating influence of religion succumbed it to religious dictates. Before the divine will and law it flouted its own sovereignty and tried, directly or indirectly, to conform the institution of kingship to the divine law and to forego its claim to absolutist and despotic form. It was really due to the influence of religious force, that compelled kingship to recognize the welfare of the people as its real basis. Though attempts were made in the medieval age, especially in India, to liberate kingship from all religious influence and motivation, it never hazarded to reconstruct its superstructure without dragging in somehow or other the people who formed its real base. The importance of the people as a political force for the stabilization of kingship could in no way be minimized and discarded. This was due to the spirit of religion alone which effected recognition

of the status of the people as an indispensable factor in kingship. It cannot be denied that kingship tried many a time to politicize religion but never did it question the validity of the welfare of the people, which conception to the medieval age was religious. Thus the spirit of kingship was not anti-popular and adverse to the idea of the welfare of the people. We shall see in the course of our narrative that Alauddin attempted to completely secularize kingship by stripping it off its religious features. But in spite of his 'politico-mania,' he was a keen well-wisher of his people from the medieval point of view. His public acts could only be appreciated in the light of his own limitations and circumstances.

Having stabilized his kingship with an amalgam of public affection, he turned his attention to the solution of a problem—the effacement of all traces of rival claimants of the Jalali family to the royal throne. The political instinct of Alauddin goaded him to act in a manner by which he could proclaim himself an undisputed ruler. The internal danger to the throne was removed. And then after stopping the onslaughts of the Mughals, which had endangered the life of the state, his power became supreme and unchallenged. After such successful enterprises he began to live a life of gaiety and enjoyment (for three long years) which period also synchronized with a succession of victories.

These victories were signalized by great rejoicings. It was a period in his kingship when the political problems were solved in accordance with his wishes. Victories, accumulation of enormous wealth in the royal treasury, and well-equipped armies psychologically affected Alauddin. He became so much intoxicated with power and success that he began to harbour such grand thoughts and designs that even kings greater than him dared not think of them. It had been remarked by Ziauddin Barni in a pertinent manner that immense wantonness of thought, indifference to religious traditions, arrogance against the religious class, and idiosyncrasies took possession of him to such a great extent that he began to fondle with improbabilities and impossibilities.

Alauddin's mind was engrossed with problems that concerned his personality as well as his name for posterity. As he was a man of action without having intellectual attainments to his credit, he could not solve them intellectually all by himself. The inner struggle of his mind was there because of his ambitious nature. He broached the subject of his heart to his *amirs* and courtiers so that they might show him the way to their solution. The problems that were put before them for their earnest thought and consideration, were regarding two enterprises which he had a mind to undertake.

The first problem of adventure was the creation of a new religion and creed for the immortalization of his name. Alauddin explained his position thus: God Almighty gave the blessed Prophet four companions, through whose power and dignity, the law and religion were established and by the establishment of the law and religion, the name of the Prophet will endure till the Day of Judgment. And after the Prophet he who professes and calls himself Mussalman, belongs to his community. In the same way God gave him four companions who had power and dignity like those of the kings. If he willed, he could also create on the strength of sword a new creed and a new religion, and the people could be compelled to follow his chalked-out religious mode of life. Thus his name and his companions' names would remain among men till the Day of Judgment like the names of the Prophet and his companions.

Alauddin was in the habit of harping on the same theme in his bout-parties and used to discuss it individually without any hitch or scruple with his officials. He also invited suggestions for the realization of his religious scheme. He was under the impression that after his death the people would follow his newly set up religion and his name could be remembered till doomsday.

From the above elucidation of his ideas a lot of light can be thrown on the inner working of

his mind. As state and religion were considered twins, so Alauddin might have thought that, without having full and complete mastery over both—the world as well as the spiritual—he could not consider himself to have achieved his mission in life. Being famous in the worldly sense but not in the spiritual, this would have meant to him incomplete victory. But according to the Islamic law religion could neither be moulded, nor be made subservient to the state; politics could not master and control religion. A balance of power, i.e., the harmony of relationship between religion and the state, was to be kept up.

Alauddin also tried to effect such harmonization between religion and the state. As he was the maker of the state, so he also wanted to be the creator of a religion above which he could stand undisputed, unchallenged, and uncriticized. Born and bred as a Muslim, he ought to have known that his idea of the creation of a new religion and creed was a rank heresy. His religious innovation could not be tolerated by Islam as it implied the usurpation of prophethood. Such an attempt would have gone against the very spirit of Islam, if he were to indulge in it. As a matter of fact, he had indirectly denied Islam. We are in the utter dark as to the influences that were responsible for such a religious shaking in him, as the creation of a new creed and religion signified an

absolute denial of Islam. Despite his intoxication of political power, he could never have dreamt of such a blasphemous act, if he had been a true Muslim at heart. The very thought of a new religion is suggestive of the fact, that he had been cut adrift from Islam. But the spirit of the mission of the Prophet of Islam still infused inspiration in him to such an extent that he wished to act up to it, though his mission was of a different nature. It was the sentimental wish for the immortalization of his name and for its glorification that he defied Islam and the world. He was instinctively a '*Herrscher*,' blind and ignorant.¹

It required a master mind to harness him and bridle his restless and heretic thoughts. Among his *amirs* and courtiers Alaul Mulk, the *kotwal* of

¹ Alauddin was in no way conversant with the history of the spread of Islam. In his subconscious mind religion and state symbolized a unified potential power. In practical politics he eliminated the religious influence. He had none of the peaceful missionary's spirit nor any genuine appreciation for it. In his political scheme religion and religious power were meant to be exploited for the sake of the state. State-in-religion was his objective. As the laws of the state regulated human affairs, so his idea of the creation and spread of a new religion was also impregnated with the political philosophy of the state. In the name of religion he was prepared to persecute people in order to realize his ideal of religion as politics. The spread of religion by sword as an idea must have instigated him to the formation of his conception of religion. As he was no real student of history, he confused the issues—religion and politics. He was a man of the world with an ambitious heart.

Delhi, was the only one who could not swallow down the religious innovation of Alauddin. When asked to give his candid opinion, Alaul Mulk warned Alauddin against discussing the creed (the *Shariat*) and religion, as it was the work of the prophets and not of the kings. He also made the matter too plain to Alauddin that the creed (the *Shariat*) had to do with the divine revelation. Man's opinions and human designs could not establish it. Since the days of Adam to the foundation of the *Shariat*, the religion was preached by the prophets. The kings had only ruled ; they never did the work of the prophets, though some prophets had ruled. The religious work ended with 'our prophet.' In this way Alaul Mulk tried to uphold the dignity of religion by depriving royalty of its dictation in religious matters. He smashed the idea of the sovereignty of the state over religion. In other words, kingship should never aspire to prophethood. If kingship were to meddle with prophethood or to identify with it, its result would be calamitous. The most trenchant argument that could have appealed and silenced Alauddin for ever was, that, if such ideas of the new creed and religion were to reach the ears of the public,¹ they would revolt against him.

¹ His talks were not restricted within the confines of his court, but also reached the ears of the public. Ziauddin Barni remarked that the courtiers, knowing his irritable and

Even the Muslims would sever all connections with Alauddin. Alaul Mulk, knowing Alauddin too well, especially his weakness for the love of worldly power which he had attained after such fighting and risking, got round him by giving the example of Chingiz Khan, who by shedding the Muslim blood, could not succeed in establishing the Mughal institutions and religion among the people. Many Mughals accepted Islam, but no Muslim ever became a Mughal nor accepted the Mughal religion. The advice of the *kotwal* of Delhi had the desired effect in the sense, that it created a dread in the heart of Alauddin for the propagation of his newly fangled religion and creed. Alauddin realized his folly and determined to give up such a mode of thinking. The author of the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* had observed strict silence on this point. Whether it was due to the fear of revolt

bad temper, had not the courage to oppose the Sultan in the exposition of his ideas, but, on the contrary, tried to support him by speechifying for his cause. The elderly people derided such ideas because to them the king's ideas were based on ignorance and stupidity ; but the saner element got frightened and began to talk among themselves to the effect that Alauddin seemed to be despotic in nature and if the Satan instigated him against the religious injunctions and dissuaded him, then sixty and seventy thousand people would be massacred and after them what the fate of the Muslims would be God only knew. What would happen to Islam ? This shows that it was not only a freak which upset the public but Alauddin's intentions had depth and seriousness. Otherwise it would have left the public cold and uneffected.

or the advice regarding religious interdiction to discuss Islam as a Muslim that made Alauddin see eye to eye with Alaul Mulk, it is difficult to state the last word on the point. This much we know that Ziauddin Barni did not state the truth which he burked for reasons unknown to us.

The second problem was the conquest of the whole world as aimed by Alexander the Great. Alauddin had all paraphernalia of warfare at his disposal and that too in great abundance. He expressed his wish to conquer countries in an Alexandrian fashion after entrusting the throne of Delhi to someone else. In order to have such a grave and important question of politics discussed, he sought the candid opinion of Alaul Mulk in whom he had complete faith. The shrewd and cool-headed Alaul Mulk looked at the question of the world conquest from an expedient and political point of view. As a matter of principle he had no objection to the conquest scheme. He considered it as a work worthy of great and ambitious monarchs and approved of the spirit of conquest as such. He also made explicitly clear to the Sultan that as the requisites of warfare were found in plenty in his state the expedition of conquest could easily be undertaken. But it was the spirit of expediency in politics which compelled him to reject the whole scheme of Alauddin. He made Alauddin

realize the fact that the capture of Delhi and its adjoining countries had already entailed immense cost and sacrifice (money and men). If the scheme of conquest were to be executed, the question remained unsolved as to whom the kingdom should be entrusted ; what the strength of the army would be for its protection as well as for the conquest. The *kotwal* of Delhi further remarked that during the absence of Alexander there had been neither revolts nor disturbances in his country because the people of his times were honest, dutiful, and loyal. And Alexander had Aristotle as his Vazir, who, being at the helm of the state affairs, kept intact the Alexandrian government. How to find another Aristotle to whom the management and control of the state could safely be entrusted was a question that awaited solution. Alexander belonged to an age which was different from the 'Alai. The *kotwal* doubted whether the government of the Sultan would enjoy the same peace and order as the government of Alexander did enjoy during his absence, if Alauddin were to undertake the world conquest. The Sultan's absence would create a stir in the mind of the people and they would revolt against him, and could not be trusted in regard to their sense of loyalty, integrity, and faithfulness.

Alauddin was an ambitious man. He was, in fact, a ruler of a small kingdom. He had equipped

the state with all paraphernalia of warfare for the purpose of world conquest. The very idea to confine the state activities to a small territorial limit was revolting to his nature, after he had dreamt of world conquest. His inward urge was driving him to fame and to immortalization of his name in the annals of kings of the world. Being under the hypnotic spell of a 'fixed idea' he could not possibly sit idle and mope like a philosopher. It was the spirit of conquest that made him restless and restive and goaded him to play the rôle of a world conqueror. This ideal tantalized him. He began to hatch schemes.

It is true that Alauddin was after the lordship of the whole world. But it was the intoxication of power that made him forgetful of the fact that before undertaking an expedition of world conquest he had to do the spade-work and to cement the foundation of the state more thoroughly and completely. There was nothing wrong in the idea of conquest because the great kings always stood for domination of the world. But these domineering realist personalities are unaware of the curse that hangs on them the moment they begin to see visions and live with visions. They think that these are actualities and it is in their power and easy reach to control them and to make them alive. To play with self-destructive and self-elusive powers of imagination is their tragedy.

Alauddin appeared to have also suffered from such mental aberrations. His conquest scheme was premature and inopportune. He lacked vision to see its futility, as he had not yet fully acquainted himself with the political reality. That the state was in an instable equilibrium and was exposed to dangers of a serious nature was no known fact to him.

The sagacious Alaul Mulk was the only person among his courtiers who tore off the veil of delusion from Alauddin's face and made him see with his own eyes the realities of politics. Being in touch with the working of his master's mind, he did not like to damp Alauddin's exuberance of spirit which, he thought, could be directed into a useful channel by enlightening the Sultan on the knotty problem. In this way the Sultan would give a new colour and direction to statecraft. A realist of the first water Alaul Mulk detested to see his master dabble in the art of politics which would prove most fatal to kingship and the state. He knew the actual political condition of the state. He was also conscious of the fact that Alauddin had no complete control over India and as an emperor of India his position was nil. Alaul Mulk suggested, when asked by Alauddin as to the line of action he ought to adopt for the materialization of his political scheme, that the chief concern of the Sultan should be to mobilize forces for the

conquest of the whole of India and to bring her under his sway. And the onslaughts of the Mughals should be put an end to as they endangered the life of the state. Alaul further remarked that after the achievement of these political objectives the Sultan should conduct the affairs of the state in accordance with the best principles of politics. The government should be manned by the best and choicest officials, and the most apt laws should be framed for the better steering of statecraft.

As regards his domination over Indian territories after their conquest Alaul Mulk proposed that those conquered countries should be returned to their real rulers under the specific condition that they paid tribute unflinchingly and regularly in lieu of obedience and recognition of political authority. He also brought home to the Sultan that as the royal mode of life had a direct effect on the life of the public, he should change his gaiety of life into sobriety. In other words, he should give up drinking as it tended not only to lower the prestige and dignity of kingship in the eyes of the people, but was also a great stumbling block in the rightful discharge of the responsibilities of statecraft. And without the consultation and guidance of the saner elements in the state, he should not rule. Only the adoption of such behaviour, attitude of mind, and action would lead to his success as a

king. Alaul Mulk's advice proved effective. The Sultan was so deeply moved and touched by it that he praised the *kotwal* for his honest and frank outspokenness and made up his mind to act up to it.

The all-powerful state of Alauddin was exposed to a danger from the Mughals. Their inroads were a continual menace for the peaceful existence of the 'Alai state. He could not tolerate to see his own creation—the state wrecked and foundered by newly accumulated, though disruptive, forces of the Mughals. Ways and methods were contrived to face the difficulty. A plan of temporary make-shift would not do to combat them. The only way seemed to lie in the complete mobilization of all forces. But the general militarist reorganization and recruitment would heavily tax the sources of income of the state. This would lead to a financial collapse of the state itself. It was thought proper to mobilize on an economic basis. The question of reorganization of the army was discussed in the light of the control of economic sources of the state. A feasible and practical solution was found out after long deliberation. Economic laws were enforced with a view to minimize the standard of living. The state began to control the economic life. Though laws, it may be observed, were enforced for the militaristic purpose, their effect on the general life of the

people was such that the necessities of life became cheap and were available at very low price. But the whole scheme of economic planning brought about a complete, though an artificial, readjustment in the economic life. It is true that Alauddin's economic scheme was the outcome of a political necessity and urgency. His economic measures achieved the end, but at the expense of the principles of economic development. Laws adopted by the 'Alai state for the complete control of the economic life—collective as well as individual—were artificial and state-ridden and thwarted the interaction of economic forces on the general life of the people. The economic policy was exploited by the state for a militaristic purpose.

As Alauddin concentrated his attention on strengthening the foundation of the state, a new problem in politics cropped up. It upset him immensely. He eventually stood before a sphinx of difficulties which made him all the more anxious about the future existence of the state. But he was not disheartened, nor did he lose courage and presence of mind in facing it. Though he could not tackle and solve the problem himself, yet his time was spent in brooding upon its real nature. He tried his utmost with the help of his most reliable, intimate, and wisest officials to find out a feasible solution. The most vexing problem before the state was signs of revolt. To delve deep into

the causes of revolt was his occupation and topic. His ardent desire was that, if he were to fathom the depth, he could be in a position to crush revolt and the future of the state would be precluded from political upheavals.

After long and protracted discussions with officials, the decision was arrived at that there were four causes of revolts. The first cause was that the king had been ignorant of, indifferent to, and disregarding of the affairs of the people. The second cause was that the Sultan gave expression to views and opinions, without considering their propriety, in the royal drinking parties, and considered the participants as his well-wishers. While they posed as friends of royalty they were actually the mischief-makers, the disturbers of peace, and the creators of revolt. The third cause was that the king was in the habit of meeting anybody and treating him kindly and politely and it resulted in the formation of a social link with royalty. Even among the nobles and the high officials of the state cliques on the basis of relational ties were instrumental in coalescing them into a common cause and a common interest. The fourth cause was the wealth. It was a great factor in creating mischief and sedition. It instigated the people to engage themselves in practices of unlawful nature. If they had no wealth at their disposal they would be busy in their callings and professions and be free from harbouring vicious

devices and be bereft of creating mischief and revolt.

To Alauddin wealth connoted power that was no easy matter to resist, as it had also played a very prominent part for him in the usurpation of kingship. He knew its intrinsic value from his own experience. Alauddin was too conscious of the fact that possession of wealth was synonymous with sedition. This idea possessed him and he could not live in peace unless he found out a solution to the political problem. He was made to realize that the people could be incapacitated to wield the power of wealth which indirectly conveyed him the idea of the power to revolt. Great and drastic steps should be taken to end that power and to neutralize the psychological effect of wealth on the mind of the people. Hence all possibly effective and preventive measures were engineered for the stabilization of the state. Alauddin and his party at last formulated some drastic laws in order to put down rebellions which were appearing on the political horizon. It may safely be asserted that while enforcing such preventive measures Alauddin was not guided by the spirit of inquisition, but was actuated by political exigency, nor was religious motivation a factor in the punishment of political crimes. An emergence of a rival and refractory power within the state was a political phenomenon which Alauddin could not tolerate for

a moment. He was forced to crush it. To him it was a question of life and death for the state and he was compelled to mobilize forces of the state against the political disorders of the day. His kingship would be a phantom, if he hesitated to plunge into action.

Alauddin's first ordinance was that the wealth as such should be confiscated from the rich and the poor, from every Muslim and non-Muslim, by every kind of method—persuasive or coercive—and be deposited in the state treasury. This measure was not restricted to the metropolitan population, but its range of effectiveness and its repercussions were felt all over the kingdom. Its dire result was that the people not only sought service and employment to keep themselves afloat, but they never dared to think in terms of mischief, sedition, and rebellion. For the suppression of political cliques and parties he posted sharp-eyed sleuths from his state secret-service to pry into and report to the Sultan the doings, good or bad, of the nobles, the officials, and the people, so that he should be in the know of their mind, their way of life, and their actual affairs. This measure that brought him in direct touch with social realities—behaviour, attitude, outlook, opinions of the people, hot-beds of intrigues and breeding-places of mischief and sedition—did its work in destroying interconnections between

parties and parties, cliques and cliques, in terrorizing intriguers, plotters, and mischief-mongers into silence and inactivity and in controlling the social life of the nobles and the officials. The next drive was against drinking on the part of the people and the manufacture of drinks. Alauddin showed the same sternness in putting a stop to the evil of drinking, but he had to make concessions in limiting its manufacture for purely private consumption as he was not successful in completely abolishing it. It becomes obvious from the enforcement of this measure that drinking was prevalent not only among the people, but that the better strata of society were also addicted to it. Drinking was playing havoc in the society with all its ferocity and that was the reason why Alauddin failed in the full eradication of the drinking evil.

Having enforced such ordinances Alauddin thought that his work of reform would remain incomplete, if some rigorous steps were not taken towards the agrarian readjustment in the light of those preventive measures of socio-political significance. Politics of the day demanded their enforcement, otherwise his whole scheme would shatter by his irresolute behaviour, attitude, and fickle-mindedness. It was in the fitness of things that Alauddin directed his attention to the agrarian problem also. The scheme of agrarian readjustment

was a crying need because he had sensed danger in the unchecked and uncontrolled privileges of the land-owning groups and their rights in landed-property. He saw evil in the vested interests and inherent rights of the big landlords ('*mukbias*,' '*chawdbris*' and '*muqqadams*') who had, so to say, become real autocrats. They were living a luxurious life; they became so powerful and aggressive that they defied the law of the state by ignoring it altogether and refused to pay taxes to the state, though they were asked to comply to government orders; they frequently took the law in their own hands, and considered themselves as undisputed and absolute rulers. Taking mean advantage of their unbridled power and prerogatives and of the power of wealth, they indulged in oppressing, tyrannizing, and exploiting the peasantry. The condition of the agricultural community was such that they were ruthlessly squeezed out. Their oppressive acts were instrumental in breeding revolt¹ in the peasantry. Alauddin's main purpose

¹ Modern Indian historians have grossly misunderstood the whole situation arising out of tyrannical acts on the part of the landlords, the majority of whom were Hindus. These historians have in vain blamed Alauddin for crushing the Hindus and making them paupers. His drastic action was, in fact, actuated by political motives. Religious scruples had no say in the matter. It was a political affair and it mattered nothing to Alauddin what class or group of people came under the rigours of law. Hindu refractory group was severely dealt with as criminals, because it was involved

in effecting regulations of politico-economic nature in regard to the agrarian problem was that rural disturbances and upheavals, exploitation of and injustice to the peasantry should be stopped, as these abnormalities in the domain of politics generated chaos and anarchy.

The author of the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* remarks that Alauddin wanted to humble those stubborn and haughty Hindus who had enormous wealth and utilized it as a means to disobedience and revolt. They rode on horseback, used weapons, wore fine clothes and lived a life of ease and comfort. In the same book of reference it is also stated in clear terms that these wealthy Hindus were no other than the *kbutas*, the *balahars*, and the *muqqadams*. There is no reference or indication in the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* to the effect that Alauddin's economic regulations were directed only against the general Hindus in order to bolster up the Muslims. Even in the talk of Alauddin with Kazi Mughisuddin which we shall deal later, the only reference was of those wealthy and refractory Hindus whom he called as the *kbutas*, the *balahars* and the *muqqadams* who

in treason and defiance of state authority. There is no historical evidence to prove that there had been a general persecution of the Hindus as a race. If Alauddin's measures effected the lives of the general Hindu population, these also at the same time touched the Muslims as a whole. For him there could be no distinction between a Hindu and a Muslim before the state authority.

were a menace to the state.

Alauddin was compelled to enforce the following regulations for the better and smooth working of the government and stabilization of the state :

I. Every village which might belong to an individual as a religious endowment, or as a service-grant, or as an estate should become crown property.

II. For amelioration of the actual condition of the peasantry the domination of the strong over the weak could not cease, unless economic pressure was exerted on landlordism by the state. It was enacted that one-half of the produce of the soil should go to the state as dues without exception. And the perquisites of the *chawdhris* and the *muq-qadams* should be collected and paid to the treasury. In this way the land-owning community was compelled to forego its privileges in order to be placed on the same footing with the peasantry. Thus the burden of the strong would not be thrown on the weak. The strong were debarred from the exercise of all rights for the exploitation of the weak.

III. All cultivation had to be valued by measurement.

IV. For buffaloes, goats and other animals from which milk was obtained a tax per pasturage was levied and a tax was also demanded for every house.

In the payment of revenues there should be no delay and it should be a rule that the poor

peasantry should not be made to undergo suffering for the sake of the privileged and autocratic landlords. The law of the state did not recognize the discriminative treatment between the poor (the weak) and the rich (the powerful). Stern rules, applicable to all alike, were enacted for the collection of revenues. Punishment was imposed on defaulters and those who digressed from rules. These enactments proved so effective that it became impossible for the *chawdbris*, the *muqqadams*, and the *kbutas* to raise the banner of revolt and insubordination. They were reduced to such straits that they had to live a hand-to-mouth existence. The people (Hindus and Muslims) ultimately realized the importance of the state laws and became convinced that the state dues were state dues which had to be paid without any hitch. The state scrutiny into the conduct of the ministerial officers and scribes was carried to such an extreme that they could not even possibly misappropriate one *jital* from either any Hindu or a Muslim.

Though Alauddin was a man of no learning and never associated with the learned, he had a good store of sound commonsense and a robust sense of understanding the ways of the world in the light of human behaviour and reflexes. He had none of the traits of a spoilt child of the theocracy and never appreciated the theologian's point of view, nor approved of their methods in regard

to political issues and problems. When he ascended the throne, he thought it desirable to give expression to his political notions. He opined that religion and politics belonged to two distinct and diametrically opposite spheres of activity and influence. Forces of political control and domination and rules of government in contradiction to religion were subjected to their own political laws. Religion and religious commandments had nothing to do with politics and its laws and were to be considered as laws unto themselves. Thus politics had its own world to move in and about and religion and its injunctions were to exercise influence in a different world. No compromise or union between them could be effected to the advantage of either of the worlds. Alauddin laid down in explicit terms that rules of government and the welfare of the country were the exclusive privilege, right, and duty of royalty while the religious injunctions rested on the judgments of the Kazis and the *Muftis*.

He stuck to this principle and administered the affairs of the state in the light of his political ideas. He never cared to bother about religious sanctions for his acts; he did what he thought best for the country. The idea of public weal always spurred him to action. Its religious justification was immaterial to him. It is a historical fact that he absolutely ignored religious sanctions

in the field of politics. His conviction was that religion and politics could not make a harmonious blending and the intrusion of religion into statecraft could not prove conducive to the general working of government. That was the main reason why he separated it from politics. He was not against religion, but he wanted to restrict it to its own sphere, where it could wield an influence in its own way. Religion, as a force in the spiritualization of politics, had no place in his political plans and schemes. He did not seem to be a believer in the Islamic political theory, nor did he feel the inner craving for cementing the basis of the state with Islamic amalgam.¹ Alauddin was free from

¹ Alauddin did not care to bring his governmental acts in alignment with the Islamic political ideal. But his curiosity goaded him to know how his political acts and behaviour could be estimated in the light of the Islamic law. The question was whether the whole wealth of Deogir belonged to him or the public treasury. Kazi Mughisuddin elaborated the Islamic theory that the king had no sole claim to it, as it involved sacrifice and suffering of fighting men besides him. In principle the king and soldier stood on equal footing and had an equal right of share. From political point of view the king could claim only so much as to maintain dignity of royalty because exaltation of the king's dignity was a requirement of good policy. This viewpoint was not appreciated by the Sultan but was rejected by him as it did not stand to laws of politics which nullified in theory and practice the Islamic political principles. This gives us a clear indication of the political instinct and behaviour of Alauddin. It seems that he was far from the Islamic ideal and his politics had nothing to do with the Islamic ideas.

all religious scruples and bias. As regards actual statecraft his whole outlook was coloured by political thoughts and ideas. He behaved and acted politically; he estimated and valued things around him in a political manner. Politics was the thing with him. It was the pivot of his state activities. Alauddin was an embodiment of the spirit of politics, though it manifested itself in its nudity. His stern repressive measures show clearly that he was compelled to enforce them for the survival of the state, but he could have tackled the same problem in a more refined way. As he was a true replica of his age, so he employed methods of that age. His crude, unchiselled, and untutored intellect was also responsible for political repressions. But he was successful, in spite of intellectual handicaps, in bringing about peace and order in the state. It can safely be asserted that his sharp and unmitigated political instinct contributed to his nominal success also. There can be no doubt that he formulated political principles and laws despite his intellectual shortcomings and shallowness. He was really great in his own way. His inborn capacity for understanding and valuing human actions directed him on the path to political greatness. He diagnosed the political distemper, but his treatment of the political disease was primitive and radical. Wealth as a power had left a deep impression on Alauddin and had made him so

susceptible to its influence and reaction that what he thought and did was in some way or other linked with the wealth-idea. He was, in fact, obsessed with it and could not remedy the political ills without being influenced by his ever-haunting obsession—the power of wealth and its reactions. He fell an easy prey to it though he was a man of good parts.

Alauddin's utter disregard for religious sanctions is nowhere so glaringly depicted as in his talk with Kazi Mughisuddin of Bayanah. He was once discussing with his high officials the severity of his measures in regard to the method of realization of land-tax. In the course of such a discussion he wanted the Kazi to express his frank opinion from the viewpoint of the *Shariat*. It is still a matter of doubt whether Alauddin wished to abide by the decision of the Kazi after becoming conversant with the Islamic legal injunctions, or it was the sheer inquisitiveness of his mind to know how far his measures were in accordance with the *Shariat*, or it was due to his subconscious urge to draw a comparison between the *Shariat* of the Prophet and his own laws. It may be mentioned here that Alauddin was not in the habit of seeking advice of the religious people who used to sit before him dumbfounded. They dared not inflict their uninvited opinion on him. This shows that he ignored them completely. His question to the

Kazi might have struck him without any forethought.

Before actually wording the question of Alauddin which was put to the Kazi, we are faced with a difficulty. The chief historical sources—*Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, *Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, and *Tabakat-i-Akbari*—give different versions. In the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* it is written: “What position have the Hindus as ‘*kharaj-guzar*’ and ‘*kharaj-dih*’ in the *Shariat*?” *Ferishta* formulates it thus: “Which Hindu is a ‘*zimmi*’ as well as a ‘*kharaj-guzar*’ in the *Shariat* of the Prophet?” The *Tabakat-i-Akbari* puts it in this manner: “Whether a Hindu should, in accordance with the *Shariat*, be described as pure, or as a heathen, who is allowed to practise his religion on condition of his paying the poll-tax, or as an ordinary tax-payer?” The *Tabakat-i-Akbari* and *Ferishta* agree in two things: (1) the status of *zimmiship* and (2) ‘*kharaj-guzar*.’ In the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* which is a contemporary work no mention is made of the ‘*zimmi*.’ But in Alauddin’s retort to the Kazi after hearing him the word ‘*jizyah*’ was used which undoubtedly proves that there was some sort of suggestion of *zimmiship* implied in the original question which had been misunderstood or distorted by Ziauddin Barni. Now the real question which was actually put to the Kazi by the Sultan would be: “How are the Hindus designated in the *Shariat* of the Prophet as

zimmi and *kharaj-guzar*?

The mention of the word 'Hindus' in the question shows Alauddin's ignorance of the Islamic law in which no such word is to be found. The Kazi, without correcting the Sultan's statement, dilated on the point that the non-Muslims had to pay *jizyah*. His reply did not end with this remark. But considering himself to be a sincere expounder of the Islamic law, he thought that in the enunciation of the Islamic political practice he would be instrumental in convincing the Sultan of the necessity for Islamization in politics. The Kazi made Alauddin realize the Islamic standpoint that humiliation of the Hindus was tantamount to the glorification of Islam, as they were the worst enemies of the Prophet who had enjoined their killing and the loot of their property and wealth, and ultimately their services had to be requisitioned for the Muslims. He opined that they should either embrace Islam or be compelled to work for the Muslim community. Even their country was to be exploited. The Kazi went a step further and remarked that Imam Abu Hanifa, whose follower he was, had only permitted the Hindus to pay *jizyah* in order to escape death. With the other interpreters of Islamic law no such concession was allowed and the Hindus had only two alternatives: Either to embrace Islam or be condemned to death.

After hearing the frantic ebullitions of the Kazi Alauddin laughed him out and told him that what the Kazi said he did not know. He did not even appreciate nor approve of it. What Alauddin meant to retort was that he knew this much only that the *kbutas* and the *muggadams* rode on horseback, wore elegant dresses, indulged in archery with Persian bows, waged wars among themselves and busied themselves in hunting, never used to pay *kharaj*, *jizyah* and other taxes, expropriated the state revenues due from the villages, lived luxurious lives, and especially some of them would not even care to attend royal court when called upon to do so, and refused to pay tribute. Alauddin frankly confessed that he flared up because of their objectionable behaviour. He knew too well that disloyalty and disobedience would be harmful to the state and lead to further mischief and sedition. That was the reason, he opined, why he had to resort to drastic, severe, and repressive measures and to make his subjects law-abiding and loyal to the throne. He would actually like to teach them a lesson for being treacherous and seditious. He gave the Kazi a bit of his mind by saying that the Kazi, being only a learned man, had no experience of the world which he had, though he was not learned. Alauddin further remarked that Hindus and Muslims could never become loyal and be subjugated unless they

were deprived of their wealth. Only so much should be left to them that they might not hoard wealth and hence cause revolt. His desire was that the people should live a life of peace and contentment.

While summing up his speech Alauddin observed that he was convinced of the fact that the affairs of the world in general and those of Hindustan in particular could never be controlled and promoted by following the *Sbariat*. Unless the people were severely dealt with, there could be no peace and order in the country. Mere sermonization had no effect on them. It was the rigorous enforcement of exacting and repressive measures that could make them sensible and sober. In the end he told the Kazi that his aim was to work for the welfare of the people and he was always actuated by that motive.

CHAPTER VII

**POLITICS IN THE CRUCIBLE AND
THE KINGSHIP OF GHIASUDDIN
TUGHLUQ SHAH**

Alauddin's political efforts were crowned with success, but he had failed in his political objective. He could not eventually succeed in cementing the foundation of the state, though he was always after its solidarity. It is a fact that his attempts at the actual functioning of the state were in no way less laudable and disappointing, but the real problem of the state was left untouched as the importance of the constitutive factors in the fundamental of the state did not dawn upon him. To end detrimental influences undermining the existence of the state was his chief concern. His laws of socio-economic significance were enforced with a view to strengthen the hands of government and to guard the vulnerable points of the institution of political control. In other words, politically circumstanced as he was Alauddin's enactments, in abnormal times like his own, were primarily engineered for the safety of the state. What he actually strove to bring into existence in the domain of statecraft was an emergence of a dictatorial power on the strength of a militarist state. His own dictatorial-militarist creation was bound to show signs of weakness the moment it had outlived its militaristic purpose. While maintaining 'pent up' peace and

order at the point of sword and improving the general condition of the people by rigid and drastic enforcement of 'inelastic' laws, his policy was no doubt to a considerable extent a seeming success. But the social, economic, and political life of the 'Alai state was deprived of its healthy development and manifestation. The country was passing through a period of 'lawless lawfulness.' Under the utmost rigours of the law of political expediency his planned scheme, as a drive towards the general betterment of the people, was too mechanized and crude in its operative domain and soulless in its moral aspect. It tended, in fact, to thwart growth. So poignant and slashing a criticism on the reign of Alauddin is nowhere so pointedly expressed as in the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* that it had no foundation.

In the last years of his reign Alauddin had acted against the very principles of politics which let loose forces of 'anarchic tendencies. A new social element in statecraft was introduced. This gave rise to the formation of party politics and resulted in class-war, leading to the complete disintegration of the state. After him the constant struggle between the old-dethroned aristocracy and the new-privileged social group became more acute and fierce. The status of the 'Alai state was lowered and it was determined by the interplay of party politics influences.

The whole reign of Alauddin was a lesson in politics. It taught that kingship did not mean a legal inheritance and could be usurped without compunction. Its usurpation justified the opprobrious act as its sanctity had already been cast to the wind. The people judged kingship in the light of their vested interests. Public sympathy, attachment, and loyalty was wanting in the kingship of Alauddin. He had himself destroyed the vitalizing force of public opinion and sentiment which had always wielded influence on kingship. The 'Alai state drenched as it was in the philosophy of sword as an antidote to public opinion could not keep its balance. It toppled over and crashed after the ruler's death.

The self-willed and all-in-all Alauddin was so much intoxicated with power that he never thought what the future of the state would be after his death. He did not train in politics any successor who could shoulder the grave responsibility of the state, nor could he sense the presence of ministerial cliques aiming at political power. He had an inherent weakness for perpetuating nepotism. The question of a legal heir was an issue of conflicting interest of rival parties at the court. After Alauddin's death the state suffered from severe reverses and staggering shocks due to the coming-in of political parties in the domain of politics. Their rise as well as fall was phenomenal. Essentials

of the state were sacrificed and principles unhinged.

From Malik Kafur to Khusrau Khan, (a period of nearly five years after the death of Alauddin) the problems of politics were most complicated. It was a period of trial for the institution of kingship. Principles of politics were put on the anvil. It was also a period of stock-taking, readjustment, and reorientation. The 'Alai principles of government were scrutinized and rejected. An attempt was made at the inauguration of a new order and system more humane in its scope and influence. Need was felt for changing values and recasting the whole system of government on lines conducive to the real welfare of the people. The state was drifting towards humanism and was considerably humanized. It rediscovered the value of an objective before a government and seemed to align itself to the Jalali political ideal. These forces came out of the cauldron of political distemper. The other side of the political picture is dark and dismal. One sees in it painted murder and bloodshed, lust for power and wealth, and fierce struggle between kingship and party politics. Havoc in its dehumanized form and Machiavellism in its nudity prevailed. But the duration of these disruptive and corroding tendencies was short.

Let us now turn our attention to the realities of politics. In his short reign Sultan Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah Khilji effected a very perceptible

change in the attitude of the state towards the people. It negated the importance of the political principles of the 'Alai state by the introduction of new principles into statecraft based on human sympathy and understanding. As a prince he had suffered much and endured suffering for being a prince. Trials, tribulations, and miseries worked him up to such a pitch that he visualized the gross callousness of political laws and forces to human life. Endowed with philosophic bent of mind, sympathetic nature, generous heart and spiritedness of youth he felt for the human waste in suffering and realized the value of human life. Its protection and development engaged his thought and attention. As a Sultan he discarded the old 'Alai ways and methods of politics which had degraded and dislocated the whole life—social, economic, and political—of the people. His scheme for human welfare was embarked upon. This improved beyond recognition the general tone and condition of the people.

Broad in vision as Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah was in some respects he was a true replica of his father, Alauddin. His weakness, like that of his father, was that he never sought advice in matters of statecraft. He was, in fact, a swelled head and self-willed in his ventures. He was also a man of extreme likes and dislikes. As he was too idealistic, inexperienced, and a spoilt child of

Fate; he eventually underestimated the vicious and evil influences of politics. He could not foresee chicanery as politics and was duped into it by his own men. His fall was due to his own shortsightedness and egotism. He had implicit faith in the dispensation of God. It was his firm conviction that God had bestowed kingship on him. No earthly power could snatch it away from him unless the time for its confiscation arrived. He considered that as a ruler he was an agent of God whom alone he recognized as his superior. Mubarak Shah did not even care to follow the Islamic political tradition by recognizing the authority of the Caliph. Edward Thomas in his brilliant monograph on 'The Coins of the Pathan Sultans of Hindustan' remarks: 'Whatever Alaud-din's designs in regard to new systems of religion may have amounted to, it remained to his son to disavow entirely the spiritual supremacy of all other Khalifs and successors of Khalifs, and to appropriate that title to himself.' In his sphere of religiosity he had outdistanced his father who had politically no religion, though he let it thrive as a decorum in public life.

The Sultan was murdered by Khusrau Khan and his Parwari satellites. Kingship was usurped by him. The Parwari group directly influenced politics and monopolized statecraft. Though Khusrau Khan was absolute in the execution of his political

scheme after effecting a complete *coup d'état*, he could not afford to ignore the influence of the public opinion and of the nobles. The former he won over by lavishing gold and the latter by conferring honours and titles and by raising their status and position. Some of them who were hostile towards him were ensnared in his subterfuges and were killed. Even all the male members of the royal family were exterminated so that he could have smooth sailing in statecraft.

The Parwaris' apparent mastery and success signalized the victory of a new-favoured group over the old aristocracy and nobility. It is true that the Parwaris belonged to the lowest strata of Hindu society and Khusrau Khan,¹ a neo-Muslim, was one of them. The new-privileged non-Muslim group was no talismanic phenomenon in politics. Its influential existence antedated the reign of Alauddin. With the strides of time it gained in strength and number. Even during and after the reign of Alauddin its influence was preponderous and deep. So the rise of the Parwarian group was a natural outcome of sociological forces.

As the political emergence of the Parwaris was in the fitness of things, there was no sign of

¹ He was more of a Hindu than Muslim in his *Weltanschauung*. It may be remarked that the Hindus of low caste, whose conversion to Islam was due to economic and political 'bait' rather than to their religious fervour were recruited into the services of the state. They retained their Hindu culture.

general revolt against them in the country. Despite their low birth the people did not react to oust them, and organize a movement against their overthrow. Historical sources of the medieval times are full of disgust and hatred against the Parwarian domination. But at the same time they throw ample light on the mentality of the people in regard to the Parwaris. Historical data conclusively prove that the overwhelming majority profited by the Parwarian rule and supported it. But an infinitesimal minority only was smarting under the Parwarian patronage as well as scourge. It resented and planned to end their regime.

The spirit of politics was Parwarian. Its activity was confined to the Parwarian interest. It followed the political traditions of the age in the hideous and the atrocious ensuing the political débâcle. The court atmosphere and life was permeated with the Parwarian ideas. The introduction of the 'infidel rites' in the royal palace and the establishment of the 'Hindu' raj were considered by the Muslim historians of medieval India as the end of the Muslim power. The reality lay in the fact that the Parwarian state did not indulge in the active and aggressive dissemination of Hindu faith throughout the country, nor launch forth a political programme for the effacement of Islam. As regards the establishment of the 'Hindu' raj we have absolutely no historical data

as to the obvious change in the form of government which could be differentiated from the established one. Even the principles and ideals of Hindu statecraft were not discussed, nor put into practice. The Muslim historians lead us into the labyrinth of uncertainty and not to clarity of thought. These misstatements in history were due to their agitated state of mind and their hysterical outburst of emotionalism in rank hatred. The religious 'innovation' at the palace was not in defiance of Islam, as the life of the Parwaris necessitated the introduction of their religion as well as their manners and customs. Historians have painted the Parwaris in lurid colours by stating that they desecrated mosques and showed disregard to the Koran. In the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*, a more reliable work than the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, there is no mention of such indulgences on the part of the Parwaris. In the revolt against the Parwarian rule, which we shall deal in the course of our narrative, the Hindus and Muslims fought shoulder to shoulder for their Sultan Khusrau Khan. If it had been anti-Muslim in its policy, the provincial governments could not have been entrusted to the Muslim governors. During the revolt these governors, barring a few, stuck in loyalty to the Parwarian rule. It can now safely be asserted that the Parwarian domination was neither Hindu nor Muslim,

but Parwarian in spirit. It had no ulterior object and plan, and was after the materialization of its own vested interests and ideas. It did not aim at the general welfare of the people. It was, in fact, a party government and it ruled from the party standpoint. Its politics was self-centred. The Parwarian party did not actually reckon with the force of Ghazi Malik whose staunch loyalty to the 'Alai family was beyond doubt and well-known. Though Khusrau Khan tried his utmost to please the son of Ghazi Malik, Malik Juna (who was at his court) in order to bait the father, yet Malik Juna did not fall into the trap. He also had sympathy and affection for the 'Alai family and was deeply touched to see its degradation at the hands of the Parwaris. This was the cause of his hatred against the Parwarian rule. Juna was instrumental in sowing the seeds of sedition in the mind of his father who started an anti-propaganda against the regime of Khusrau Khan. Ghazi Malik succeeded in harnessing forces of discontent and revolt.

The Ghazi-mobilization was actuated by the spirit of vengeance and religion-in-danger was its war-cry. Encounters between the forces of Ghazi Malik and Khusrau Khan ended the Parwarian sway. The Ghazi brought about the complete destruction of the Parwaris and their politics

ceased to influence political forces.¹

On the second day after the victory he proceeded to the palace of Siri and seated himself in the Hazár-Sutún where he addressed the assembled nobles thus: 'I am one of those who have been brought up under Alauddin and Qutbuddin, and the loyalty of my nature has roused me up against their enemies and destroyers. I have drawn my sword and have taken revenge to the best of my power. Ye are the nobles of the state! If ye know of any son of our patrons' blood, bring him forth immediately, and I will seat him on the throne, and will be the first to tender him my service and devotion. If the whole stock has been clean cut off, then do ye bring forward some worthy and proper person and raise him to the throne; I will pay my allegiance to him. I have drawn my sword to avenge my patrons, not to gain power and ascend a throne.'

The Ghazi's speech was saturated with fine emotions and noble sentiments and was clear as crystal and lucid in its motivation. He refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the power of party politics but that of kingship. To him the king symbolized the highest principle in statecraft. It is true that he fought for the restoration of the 'Alai

¹ It is most interesting to note that the Ghazi, who destroyed the Parwaris, did not persecute the general population of the Hindus.

dynasty. But to his utter remorse and sorrow the whole 'Alai family was made extinct. The 'Alai kingship was dead for ever. He pleaded an elective principle in kingship. The fitness-to-rule as a qualification for kingship was the keynote of his political philosophy. Kingship was a real power that protected people and promoted their well-being.

The idea of political exploitation by an oligarchic group found no place in his political scheme and thinking. He was an upholder of a new type of kingship more advanced than the 'Alai. Personally he did not like to usurp kingship for himself. He held out an open invitation to the nobles to effect selection of kingship on the condition that the best and most fitted was to be their king. The problem of election was solved by the nobles who unanimously selected the Ghazi as their king¹, who is known in history as Sultan Ghiasuddin Tughluq Shah.

Ghiasuddin Tughluq was a man of sound parts and had at his back the experience of men and things. He was kind and generous by nature. Sobriety was one of his characteristics. He was

¹ Ghiasuddin Tughluq Shah had Hindu blood in his veins. His Hindu extraction did not anathematize him, nor was it considered objectionable for his selection as king. The real cause against the Parwarian domination lay in political factors and not in the alleged establishment of Hindu raj and religion. Historians have played a foul game in this respect.

also endowed with flashes of ingenuity. He was more moral than religious in his outlook and mode of life. He had at heart the welfare of the people. He was a prototype of Jalaluddin. The glaring feature of his personality was that he was a man of action. Before his kingship he had risked life many a time for the protection of the state. Ghiasuddin had seen the rise and fall of many kingships and had lived through political periods of peace and contentment as well as turmoil and discontent. He had always given exemplary proof of his loyalty and devotion to royalty.

The kingship of Ghiasuddin bore the stamp of his genius. His life-experience taught him to deal in a synthetical manner with problems of practical politics. The despotic kingship he abhorred to establish as it did more harm than good to the people. The indifferent and dissipated kingship was an evil in itself. To Ghiasuddin kingship signified an active but benevolent power. He worked it in alignment with the public opinion. Its power was also employed as a lever for the general uplift. As a principle it abstained from all acts of injury and trouble to the people. Justice and beneficence were the watchwords of his kingship. In matters of government he stuck to the principle of moderation and refrained from all kinds of excesses. He believed in the political maxim that the office of kingship

is a joint responsibility. Success in the affairs of statecraft depended more on its consultative and deliberative aspect than on the sole initiative of kingship. Having such ideas in view, he studied laws and rules of governments. Before enforcement of laws for the stability of the state and regulating the affairs of the people he discussed and deliberated with the best responsible heads.

Ghiasuddin's conception of kingship was not a reasoned-out product of his mind. The ideal of kingship was soul-inspiring for him. By instinct and temperament he believed in the institution of kingship. It appeared to him as human and needed life-promoting forces to enliven it. Kingship could only thrive and survive on human sentiment and affection. Loyalty and devotion to the king he prized most as political virtues. Ghiasuddin thus wished to infuse patriotic idea and fervour into the life of the people for the well-being of kingship. It may be mentioned in this connection that he did not merely theorize by harping on the importance of such political virtues, but their transmutation in the actual life of the people was immensely appreciated and rewarded by him.

The kingship of Ghiasuddin was permeated with progressive ideas. Efficiency in the working of statecraft it aimed at. It rejected nepotism as a principle in statecraft and introduced a new principle of qualified skill and technical knowledge

for all offices, high or low, of government. The condition for appointments was qualification. In actual practice offices were filled in the light of the qualification-principle, which, according to historians, was carried out with such a disciplinary force and strictness that the services of the able and the deserved were recruited and no unemployment was found among them. Hence Ghiasuddin's government was manned on lines of efficient working and proficiency.

The economic policy of the state was also guided by principles of moderation and foresight. Though in the realization of state-dues strictness and severity were observed, the state protected the people and the working-class of the poor from the highhandedness of the officials and the exploitation of the rich. Measures were also adopted to relieve the people of their suffering and privation. Last but not least, Ghiasuddin's foreign policy was imperialistic. Political and economic factors swayed his spirit of conquest.

CHAPTER VIII

**NEW VENTURES IN KINGSHIP AND POLITICS
IN THE REIGN OF MUHAMMAD
TUGHLUQ SHAH**

The kingship of Ghiasuddin liberalized the laws and forces of politics. The objective before it was the protection and welfare of the people. It is no exaggeration to remark that his progressive kingship had shattered the 'Alai ideals of politics. He was directly responsible for generating new forces in politics. A new spirit and a new vision characterized his reign. He tabooed politics as a political game for the satisfaction of whims and fancies of kingship. Sense of responsibility and obligation took the place of the irresponsible and the irrational. Statecraft and politics were subject to factors of human well-being and progress. The kingship of Ghiasuddin exhibited a tendency towards identification of interests, kingly and popular.

Since the 'Alai politics the power of *'ulama* came down to its lowest watermark. This religious group as a political body was dethroned from its privileged position and reduced to a political nonentity. Its political existence was in a state of spasm. Its political rebirth synchronized with the rise of Ghiasuddin to political power. It was, in fact, the Tughluq power which gave it a new chance for its up-coming. In other words, the

religious war-cry of the Tughluqs reinstated it in its old position. The 'ulama began to find their place in the scheme of things. Despite secularization their weak influence in the sphere of politics made itself felt. During the reign of Ghiasuddin the religious world was rift by jealousy and hatred among its groups—the *sufees* and the 'ulama. There was no love lost between them. The *sufees*, as the torch-bearers of spirituality, were head and shoulder above the 'ulama. They wielded enormous influence on the hearts of the people and also predominated the political forces of the day. The secret of their power was in the full self-surrender to the idea of human service and uplift of man, irrespective of race and colour, caste and creed. They were the cynosures of their times. Kings and plebeians, the rich and the poor, men and women flocked to them for advice, succour, and benediction. They swayed all and sundry; they actually ruled over the hearts of the people.

Their activity was essentially confined to the spiritual. Some time they were dragged into the quagmire of politics by unavoidable forces, though they detested to be in the welter of politics. In the clash of forces—the secular and the spiritual—they had to suffer tribulation or death for their participation and interference in practical politics. Even before and after the reign of Ghiasuddin some *sufees* had to undergo suffering and execution for

their political convictions or their involvement in the affairs of kingship.

Though the '*ulama* were religious and dogmatic in their outlook, they were a storehouse of Islamic knowledge. Their point of view was Islamic and they were considered as expounders of Islamic precepts and laws. By sheer intellectual exposition of Islamic facts, as applied to statecraft and politics, they dominated kingship whenever they could. Their sphere of influence in comparison to the *sufees* was restricted and narrow. They had also basked under the patronage of those kings who had appreciation and regard for them. But in the evolution of kingship and its eventful struggle for political domination they were at times purposely thrown overboard. Their deprivation was due to their incapacity for adjustment to the ever-changing political problems which demanded immediate solution from the political standpoint and not from the Islamic. They were also ignorant of the trend of political forces which kingship for its own stability had to take cognizance of in matters of politics. Even the Islamization of kingship due to the force of the '*ulama* was found wanting in principles of politics and statecraft. It went against the kingship itself. For kingship it was ultimately a question of politics to discard the element of the '*ulama*. It may be observed in this connection that the majority of the '*ulama*

understand him as a man, we can never be able to comprehend the significance of the forces in the kingship of Muhammad of which he was the spirit incarnate.

Muhammad seemed to have been a daring and ambitious lad. He used to visualize the lofty ideals of Solomon and Alexander the Great. His youth was moulded by personality-forces of Sād, the irreligious and the logician, Ubaid, the 'poet' or the 'heretic', Najma Intishar, the philosopher, and Aleemuddin, the master-philosopher. These Muslim teachers made out of him a free-thinker within the precincts of Islam. They revolutionized his whole being to such an extent that his conception of Islam was contradistinguished from the religious dogmas of the *'ulama*. He discarded the doctrine of *taqlid* as it did not satisfy his emotional and intellectual life. He believed that blind submission to dictates of religion would defeat human purpose and crush the spirit of man. Religion then would be passive and negative in its aspect. It would be bereft of its active and vitalizing force. Soulless and spiritless religion would degenerate into a ritualistic and dead form without having the inherent power to develop the human faculties to the fullest. His viewpoint was that man, though in arch need of religious development, had an inborn right to understand the laws of religion before accepting them as an article of faith. A

thorough intellectual sifting and comprehension were essential for the appreciation of the spirit of religion. In order to infuse and actualize its spirit in human life clarification of religious issues and ideas was mostly needed for a healthy and normal religious development. Religion was an intellectual experience, not a superimposition of sanctions and taboos. What religion ordained, he thought, did not presuppose its implicit acceptance and acquiescence, as much rested on the satisfaction of intellectuality. The religious truth had got to be tested in the intellectual furnace before final acceptance. For him even the commands of God could be questioned and could not escape intellectual hair-splitting.

Muhammad was a pure intellectualist in religion. There was scope for freedom of thought in his conception of Islam. It conveyed him an active and energizing principle of life. He was most religious in outlook and ideas in his own way, but to the orthodox religious mind of his times he was a religious enigma. Historians of medieval India stood before a sphinx-like Muhammad in awe and disgust. They found it hard to interpret the meaning of his religiousness. Even Ziauddin Barni made an open confession that the Sultan baffled him in estimating his religious mind and it was beyond him to comprehend forces that shaped the personality of Muhammad. He charged

him for his irreligious-religiousness and for his refusal to recognize the standpoint of the orthodox to which Ziauddin Barni belonged. That the essentials of Islam were rejected by Muhammad as non-essentials sums up the author of the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*. Other contemporary historical sources are full of praise and admiration for his religious devoutness and sincerity. It may suffice here to mention *en passant* that scandalous slurs were heaped on Muhammad because of his ruthless persecution of the 'ulama, the *sufees*, and the Muslim aristocracy. Muhammad was no respecter of men or creeds, when the laws of the state were infringed. But the Muslim historians had always a soft corner for the privileged class, comprising the 'ulama, the nobility, the aristocracy, the *syeds*, and the Muslims whose persecution, if undertaken, within the law made their blood boil. It was the sentimental affection for such groups of people that was responsible for the outburst of severest criticism on the part of the Muslim historians. In the course of our narrative we shall deal later with the theme.

We have so far described the religious make-up of Muhammad. The other potent factors that were instrumental in the shaping of his kingship will deserve our attention. Historians depicted him as 'one of the wonders of creation.' He was surcharged with unbridled ambition. Sense of

unrivalled leadership took possession of him. Zeal for conquest permeated his whole being. His mentality was to aspire for great ventures as the greatest kings of the world did. His restless mind was engrossed with the problems of conquest, not of the world alone, but also of the forces behind the world. Achievement of greatness was an ever-recoiling idea with him that goaded him into active planning of schemes for materialization of his feigned end. The ideal set before him was high and noble. Missions of the prophets and deeds of the kings inspired him. Muhammad was after their actualization in his own self. He wanted to rule over the secular as well as the temporal world. He eclipsed the pretentious claims of Pharaoh and Nimrod. It had been so aptly observed by Ziauddin Barni that Nature had created him for the leadership of men.

His creative faculty was so subtle and highly developed that he realized the dire need for a change in the laws of government. New principles in statecraft were introduced. The old laws were abrogated. This was done with the best of motives. His objective was to infuse progressive ideas into the state. Both later sources—the *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* and the *Tabakati-i-Akbari*—agree in the remark that he outrivalled the kings of the past in prescribing rules for government and the working of statecraft. Even Ziauddin Barni had all praise for his original

ways and methods of approach to political principles which would confound the political theorists like Aristotle, Ahmad Hasan, Nizam-ul Mulk. He was an inventive genius in politics. His own ideas guided him in statecraft. He ruled in accordance with his ideal without caring to consult and seek advice. He disallowed interference in his political scheme.

Muhammad's acts, though apparently inspirational, were the result of his intellectual sifting in order to get to the bottom of truth—the whole truth. He also possessed enormous powers to discriminate between men and men, between things and things; he was invariably correct in his judgment of men and things. His politeness of speech was proverbially unsurpassable. He was one of the most bewitching conversationalists of his age. His power of writing had a charm of its own and it wielded influence on minds of scholars and *literati*. He was a deep scholar of history, medicine, philosophy, logic, religion, and science. His most receptive memory stood him in good stead in the study of all sciences. He was an adept in the science of war and his proficiency in the military was beyond doubt. Last but not the least, his generosity was more than kingly in its scope. He was the spirit of justice in person.

Muhammad was actuated by mixed motives in the materialization of kingship. Some historians

held him culpable for the death of his father; some tried to whitewash the guilt. It is still wrapped in a shroud of mystery. But on the basis of historical data he cannot be absolved and get off scot-free. It is most interesting to know that the unusual death of Ghiasuddin, 'al Sultan ul Ghazi', was not lamented, not even by the religious world. Nizamuddin Awliya, the greatest living *sufee*, shed no tears for the deceased king who championed the cause of religion. The Tughluq slogan of religion-in-danger was only an instrument of politics. It signified nothing else than the spirit of revenge against the enemies of the Khiljis.

First acts of the kingship of Muhammad like his father 'kept up the fiction in full force'. His 'stepping into the shoes of Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah' was 'only a continuation of the Khilji sovereignty in the Tughluqs'. Indiscriminate, though lavish, distribution of wealth did its work in capturing the heart of the people and in neutralizing the effect of the 'guilt-sense'. It was a well-planned move towards the achievement of popularity and the Tughluq advertisement; it was a political make-shift to counteract unfavourable influences.

The main idea in Muhammad's kingship can be gleaned from his inscribed coins. The political Khilji ghost, that haunted and kept under its sway his kingship, was not exorcized by him. But as

he was his own master-spirit, he impregnated it with moral qualities which, in the course of time, nullified the Khilji morbidity. The Khilji kingship, except Jalaluddin's, was political in instinct and action as well as political throughout. It was most antipathetic to religious influences in the domain of politics. Politics was its religion. It was anti-and-un-Islamic and non-religious. Muhammad, though religious by temperament and instinct, was a political head. His intellectual breadth of vision revolutionized the conception of kingship. As a free-thinker in Islam he gave a new colour and import to it. Mere political manifestations in the expression of kingship did not satisfy him and left him cold. Not to Islamize but to culturalize kingship with the idea to retain its political entity and authority, unchallenged and unquestioned, was his aim. The spirit of culturalization in Islam he appreciated and utilized it in the propagation of his political philosophy. Political problems of authority and sovereignty were solved in a manner most characteristic of the man in the kingship of Muhammad. In the attempt to culturalize kingship he generated religious forces of dynamic nature to work up its complete transformation. He did not like to evolve a new type of kingship in a vacuum, but in a world of human forces. He wanted to restrengthen the new, though weak, contact between kingship and the people; but did

not desire the people to influence kingship, either in its development or in its functioning. Like his father he needed patriotic affection and sentiment for its well-being. But he expounded the idea of patriotism in an art of his own. He taught the people through the powerful agency of his inscribed currency to realize that 'sovereignty is not conferred upon every man (but) some (are placed over) others', and 'obey God and obey the Prophet and those (who are) in authority among you'. Sovereignty and political authority were no matters of public doings, but rested on the absolute will of the supreme power beyond human control and interference. The divine act made it real and binding. 'He who obeys the king, truly obeys the Merciful (God)' was his religio-intellectual conviction. To him obedience to God also implied political obedience. Principles of kingship and laws of statecraft reflected the laws of God. Kingship was of God, in God, and for God. To defy it was to defy God, and to obey it was to obey God. As 'the labourer in the road of God' he politicized the ideal of 'dominion and greatness are of God.' Politically he was a 'viceregent of God' and 'the shadow of God' as a king. Thus Muhammad exploited the theory of the divine right of kingship for his own political end. To have an absolute authority and control over the political world, like the power of God

over human beings, he longed to rule undisputed like God. Implicit obedience of the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the nobles and the officials to all political laws and acts was as essential and imperative as obedience of the people to the laws of God. Politically he had no religion. Laws of religion were no laws for politics. He disregarded to the utmost the Islamic political traditions till his failure as a king came to broad daylight. He ruled according to his lights and judgments. He politicized religious forces for some higher purpose.

The basic idea in the theory of '*L' état c'est moi*' found its culmination in the kingship of Muhammad, though it was tintured with his own Islamic concept. He was after full political power, undefined and unlimited. His kingship was to resemble the absolute and indivisible rule of God. As God is Supreme in His own kingdom, so the sovereignty of Muhammad also aspired to be supreme in his kingdom. Muhammad strove for absolutism of a higher type. The despotic and barbaric kingship he abhorred to establish. The idea of human service infiltrated his kingship. Through the political agency he aimed at doing good to the people. It was to be a benevolent power, generating human forces—sympathy, generosity, and justice. As God looks after the well-being of His creation, so Muhammad's kingship

was surcharged with the idea of the well-being of his people. The will of God creates and destroys. In the same way Muhammad willed, created, and destroyed. His spirit of destruction only manifested against the defiance and interference on the part of the people. He was as callous as the divine scourge and wrath in the persecution of the guilty—irrespective of race or creed. His God-like kingship was meant to be respected and honoured. To question its authority, or to defy its laws was enough to change the humblest-human Muhammad into a wildest exasperated Satan.

The key-note of his kingship was not destruction, but creation of new ideals and institutions. His experiments in the domain of politics were the most marked feature of his kingship. Success or failure in novel experiments determined his attitude towards the people. Muhammad introduced a new human element in statecraft and recognized its political existence. The 'non-privileged' classes of people, which imperceptibly made their existence felt long before the Tughluqs in the domain of politics, were raised to the status of the 'privileged'. Historians were fierce at Muhammad for his colossal neglect of the old aristocracy and his encouragement of the up-coming of the low. They could not understand the Sultan and the time-spirit. To them the aristocracy, the nobility, the *élite* were the custodians of statecraft. It did not strike them

whether or not the 'privileged' group was endowed with ability and capacity to manage the affairs of the state in accordance with the ideals of the aristocracy. The age had degenerated aristocracy into an autocratic class. The real aristocratic culture—high aspirations and noble actions—was no more the criterion of the 'privileged.' It was the namesake and fossilized aristocracy that the Sultan disregarded, but could not extirpate. He reared up a new human type from the lowest rung of humanity. To be born low was no bar and disqualification, nor did it stigmatize an individual as mean and vicious. Muhammad realized the futility of utilizing the spent-force of aristocracy for the realization of his ideals. In the 'low' he must have found a more pliable and efficient human material. It was not the bestowal of favouratism on the 'low' in general without discrimination, but the favoured 'low' were selected on the merit for the highest offices of trust and responsibility. But it cannot be denied that he gave indirectly a new lease of life to the 'low' and the 'non-privileged' and opened new vistas for their future development. They were given freedom for their uplift. The policy of the state put no obstacles in their headway. The 'high' and the 'low,' the 'privileged' and the 'non-privileged' did not symbolize any principle of politics. The touchstone was the sterling human quality. It made and unmade the human element;

it shaped and unshaped classes and groups. The kingship of Muhammad took a right step in a direction that was unique for his age. He tackled the problem of government and of the people with humaneness of spirit. But in the India of his times the 'innovation' was bound to produce forces that weakened the foundation of the state. The blending of the old with the new was not a happy idea. It was a futile effort to harmonize human forces opposite in character and nature. During his reign the clash between social ideals and rights became evident.

The kingship of Muhammad gave ample proof of generous instincts to the utmost. There was no limit to his generosity and charities. As an unrivalled giver of wealth his fame spread far and wide. It so happened that during his reign princes, nobles, wealthy merchants, scholars, men, and women came from foreign countries in enormous numbers to seek his patronage, protection, and help. Muhammad had an inherent weakness for foreigners. He bestowed wealth, honour, and utmost kindness on them. To call them foreigners was painful for him. His people were forbidden to address them as foreigners. His treatment towards them was preferential. He wanted them to settle down in his country. He tempted them with the grants of *jaghirs*, gifts, and high posts. He was successful in the attempt, as the

'bait' was too tempting. Thus many foreigners came at the helm of statecraft. What the underlying idea in the appointment of foreigners to high offices of responsibility was, we have not been able to fathom. But we know this much with certainty that the foreign element in statecraft worked havoc and was ultimately instrumental in creating political upheavals. It could not check disruptive forces, but led to intensify rivalry and competition in the economic life and cleavages in the body politic.

He bestowed wealth and honour on the people as well. His generosity towards the true teachers of religion was also marked and showed great fondness for securing their services. Among the religious teachers the Hindus also enjoyed the Sultan's confidence. Thus we see that his generosity was not confined to the distribution of wealth and bestowal of honour, but it had an intellectually liberal aspect also. His sense of generosity was the outcome of his breadth of intellectuality and vision. As an intellectualist he was ever eager to know points of view and to see things from different angles of vision in order to synthesize. For him the religious as well as the emotional harmonized with the pure intellectual pursuit or craving for higher knowledge. It was, in fact, due to his liberality of thought that he became a respecter of all real religious types as well as the

true teachers of thought.

The conception of justice formed the basic idea in the kingship of Muhammad. The great Moorish traveller, Ibn Batoutah characterized the Sultan by remarking that he had not seen a person who could surpass Muhammad in generosity of instinct and in dispensation of justice. He was, in fact, justice personified. His sense of justice was based on the concept that before the Law the rich and poor, the privileged and the exploited, the king and the commoner stood on the same platform. The Law was law for one and all. It destroyed all discriminations—political, social, and economic. ‘The king is above the law’ was no exception. The plebeian could haul up the king in the court of law. Muhammad was no theorizer of the conception of perfect justice, but he transformed his concept of perfect justice into a living law. Ibn Batoutah had cited a number of civil and criminal suits filed against the Sultan, who had to appear before the court of law.¹ Muhammad ordered the judges to conduct the cases in accordance with the principles of law. The court of law was to administer impartial justice not to show even any respect to the king in a ‘dock.’ Before the seat of justice a king was no king; he was only a culprit. Such was Muhammad as the

¹ It may interest us to know that those who filed lawsuits against the Sultan were not only Muslims, but also Hindus.

true upholder of law and justice. His general proclamation was that the court of law was the custodian of the individual rights of the people. All had access to it in order to lodge any complaints. The house of appeal was the king. The whole procedure was so simplified that it was impossible for any one not to be heard in the court of law. Even the king was on the bench. The people were given freedom to bask under the shelter of law and justice. Historians have played a foul game with Muhammad. Their depiction of him is most lurid. They accused him for the thirst of human blood. Their loose statement is most general and slipshod. They did not care to read and study the most ingenious mind of Muhammad. Some had no capacity for it; some tried to understand it but in vain; some could not grasp its evasiveness; some confessed that it was beyond their understanding and comprehension. They judged the Sultan by the heaps of corpses. But they did not know that his acts of blood-shedding were motivated by a higher sense of justice and fairplay than the 'bloody' instinct in him.

But even the contemporary sources of history, if seriously probed into, give us an absolutely different picture of the man in Muhammad. The 'bloody acts' of Muhammad were in no way 'fitful' as he had no inherent desire to shed human

blood for the sake of blood. He had no blood-phobia. He always judged people in the scales of justice and politics. Violation of laws was a direct cause of punishment and none could evade it. The motive of punishment or execution was in the nature of the crime as such that goaded him into retributive activity. The king punished, says Ibn Batoutah, because of crimes, small or grave. The guilty, whoever he or she be, was a guilty before the Law and must undergo punishment for the committal of crime. The nature of punishment depended on the nature of crime. Some were executed, observes Ibn Batoutah, some were punished and some were admonished. General persecution was never a policy with him, nor did he indulge in it. Crime was punished wherever it raised its head. Punishment was for all crimes and was meted out to the high and the low without the least scruple and hitch. Charges against the Sultan for intentional murder of the *'ulama*, the nobles, the *sufees*, and the other prominent personalities of his times were baseless and fictitious.¹ He

¹ The following factual evidence necessitated their murder:—

1. Interference in statecraft.
2. Mean and baseless imputations against the king.
3. Betrayal of public trust and responsibility.
4. Mismanagement and misappropriation of public money.

undoubtedly had them executed. Principle of statecraft, not his blood-thirsty caprice, was involved in the question of their execution. He had to uphold its dignity. The 'privileged' were found guilty of political offence. The Law took their lives, but not Muhammad, the humblest and pious of men. The Law was considered supreme. It could and did not concede to the erratic 'lawlessness' of the privileged and sanctimonious class. The Law was law for one and all without creed and class discrimination. The kingship of Muhammad was most strict in the enforcement of law. Equity and justice were the strongest pillars of the state. To set at naught their principles was crime against the state. And the crime was combated by the enforcement of the laws of punishment.

It is a fact that with the rise of the Tughluqs the *'ulama* came to power. But during the regime of Muhammad they could not have smooth sailing, as he was not an 'orthodox'. They failed to realize that their Sultan was most religious in his own way and for their religious viewpoint he had no appreciation and liking. He belonged to a world of his own—a

5. Involvement in sedition.
6. Desertion of the king.
7. Miscarriage of justice.
8. Neglect of public responsibility.
9. Treason and revolt.

living reality which the *'ulama* ignored. Their emergence to political power blinded them to the political reality of Muhammad. Their sense of superiority complex and their exclusive enjoyment of prerogatives as a distinct class made their position untenable and shaky. Though Muhammad gave them a fair trial to prove their worth in the discharge of state duties, he discovered that they were found wanting in them. They were no more men of calibre and integrity; they betrayed him; they foiled him. They had to be taken to task as he was no respecter of caste or class, creed or religion in the domain of politics and the affairs of statecraft. Ideas and ideals clashed. The *'ulama* had to go to the wall. They were punished as well as executed for the violation of the Law. Muhammad showed them no mercy and clemency as he never recognized their existence as an exclusive and superior class. They were weighed with the ordinary guilty against the state crime. They heavily paid for their 'rebirth' during the kingship of Muhammad.

The chief characteristic of the kingship of Muhammad was its experimentation in the sphere of statecraft. It ventured on new ways in order to create something new and novel. It experimented not for the sake of experiments. With a view to make the state progressive and 'modern' experiments were undertaken. During the early years of

his reign the problem of taxation was taken up to reorganize government on sound and efficient basis. It was 'a general scheme of resettlement of the revenue system which the Sultan enforced as soon as his authority was established over the different parts of the empire.' The revision of taxation of the Doab was an item in the taxation scheme. Historians deal with it in different aspects. Some are of the opinion that it was undertaken to punish the refractory inhabitants of the Doab; some think that it was considered as a means of replenishing the empty treasury; some make us believe that the enhancement of assessment in the Doab was both. Gardner Brown in his monograph on Muhammad Tughluq advances the standpoint that the fresh imposition of a higher tax-rate in the Doab, which was the most prosperous part of the empire, was not against the laws of statecraft, but was an adequate measure. An analytical study of historical data convinces us that bankruptcy was no factor in the problem of new taxation of the Doab. Historians, again, differ in their estimation of the revised tax in the Doab. But it was not 'fundamentally excessive' and its introduction was at least 'at a very unfavourable moment.' At that time the Doab was visited by famine¹

¹ Muhammad was, in fact, a well-wisher of his people. Relief measures in organized form were undertaken by his government when a similar calamity befell the country. It

(not officially recognized or declared as it was in its initial stage). But the severity and venality of the state officials in the realization of cesses heightened the gravity of the pitiable plight of the inhabitants of the Doab. Anarchy and rebellion became rampant. Misery and distress were their lot. This measure, though 'an ill-devised expedient' was not the outcome of 'a freak of disordered fancy.' Calamitous, indeed, was its result, but the

seems that he was kept ignorant of the Doab famine by his officials, as it just touched the people and its havoc and ferocity was mild. Otherwise he would have taken immediate but drastic steps to fight famine in order to relieve the people of their suffering and distress, as he did later. The author of *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* charged the Sultan with a heinous allegation that he purposely organized 'man-hunts' while the famine stalked in the country. But the fact is that the state came to the succour of the people. Remedial measures were adopted to relieve the distress of the famine-stricken areas and state-loans were advanced to the peasantry to promote agriculture. As the peasantry was too much distressed and famine-stricken, it could not derive much benefit from relief measures. Famine had not only decimated, but also generated disruptive and chaotic forces. His 'man-hunts' policy was not enforced to persecute the already grounded-down and starving people, but to stop the violent onslaught of peace disturbing elements in the life of the state. He persecuted most ruthlessly the creators of mischief and sedition. Even his own officers who were appointed to look after the deplorable condition, the dire need, and the distress of the people not only peculated, but exploited and oppressed them. They left the people alone to their cruel fate. The state-law avenged such officials for their gross negligence of public duty and responsibility. The 'man-hunts' were organized for defaulters and mischief-mongers.

administrators rather than Muhammad were responsible for the infliction of ruination on the people. The whole affair was, in fact, a sore experience in the kingship of Muhammad.

The spirit of conquest was an aggressive aspect of his kingship. Countries were subjugated and brought under political authority. His ardent desire was to rule as a real king. To have full and complete mastery and control over those conquered territories was his political ambition. In order to achieve the political objective in view, the problem of the correct location of a political centre engaged his attention from where political affairs could be controlled and regulated with the least amount of bother to the central government. The state had developed into unwieldy dimensions and an all-India importance. Delhi, as the capital, did not enjoy an 'equi-distance' position and to retain it was considered impolitic. The question of transfer of the capital was discussed and thrashed out. Devagiri (Daulatabad) was selected as the place for a new capital. Orders were issued for the transfer of the capital. The whole scheme was well-planned.

The transfer of the capital did not mean the actual transfer of a 'political' capital. It was, in fact, a transfer of the whole city of Delhi to Daulatabad, which had to be populated and colonized. It signified *en masse* emigration of the

people of Delhi. The transfer scheme was manoeuvred in a most systematic manner. Thorough arrangements for board and lodging were made by the government to facilitate easy migration. Even rows of trees were planted on both sides of the road *en route* to Daulatabad so that the journey should be pleasant and the people might not be inconvenienced. The *Tarikh-i-Mubarakshahi* describes different stages in the scheme of migration. First, the political centre shifted to Daulatabad, i.e., the royal family, the *amirs*, the *maliks*, the notables, attendants, slaves and the treasury. In the second shift came the princes, the prelates, and the chiefs of Delhi who were so handsomely remunerated, that the government incurred all their expenses and constructed for them new houses at Daulatabad. Royal mandate enjoining upon the people to move off *en masse* to Daulatabad was the third of its kind. Houses of the city people were bought off and owners were paid in cash from the treasury. Thus the city population evacuated and left for the new capital. The people obeyed the royal decree, but the riff-raffs and the ruffians remained in the city. They started plundering. From historical sources it is also evidenced that the old royal mint and its department functioned at the old capital. Muhammad is said to have used coercive methods in the evacuation of Delhi. This fact is not amply corroborated by

sources.

The whole scheme of emigration crashed in no time. The depopulated Delhi was again repopulated by the inhabitants of Daulatabad. It was a dismal failure. For the medieval age it was a novel experiment. It was undertaken with the best intentions but resulted in a huge fiasco. People suffered immensely despite governmental financial aid. It tended to lower the prestige of the state in the eyes of the people. Failures in experiments irritated the king but made him more and more obdurate and unflinching in his political ventures.

Muhammad had an originality of his own. He tackled the problems of statecraft in his own way. It was the idea to create rather than to destroy that guided his actions. His initial step toward a change in the established order of things was conditioned by an urge for the better. For him reshaping and readjustment were conditional. It was not the wanton and playful mood, but the idea of reform and improvement that actuated him to launch forth schemes. To renew the old was the key-note of activity. In the same spirit the problem of currency engaged his attention. As it was left unsolved by his father he took it up in great hope to solve economic problems. It was in his general scheme of statecraft. Historians have misunderstood and condemned Muhammad for the

introduction of a token currency.¹

Historians ascribe different motives for the introduction of a token currency during the kingship of Muhammad. There had been a continual drain on the treasury in the form of largesses to all and sundry; suppression of rebellions told heavily upon the resources of the state; the failure of the taxation policy in the Doab owing to the prevalency of famine undermined the income of the state; the new scheme of mobilization for political ends also contributed to the drainage of the treasury; the Daulatabad scheme was saddled on the exchequer. The author of the *Tabakat-i-Akbari* views the introduction of a token currency differently. He attributes political motives to it. For the achievement of success in the world conquest scheme Muhammad was guided by political instinct

¹ It may be interesting to learn that some radical changes in the form of currency also were effected elsewhere. In 1260 A.D. Qubla Khan, the Mongol emperor of China, introduced a paper currency in his kingdom. It was called the *chāo*. It was a state monopoly and the experiment was a great success. Marco Polo gives an elaborate account of the ways and means adopted by the Mongol emperor to enforce its recognition as well as its acceptance by the people. Immense care was taken to prevent forgery. In 1294 A.D. Kai Khatou Khan, the Mughal emperor of Persia, undertook a similar experiment, but his currency experiment failed and he was compelled to cancel it. To meet the ever-increasing extravagance of the Khan and his courtiers the *chāo* had to be introduced. The experiment was short-lived as the people refused to accept the new token, and resulted in riots and outbreaks throughout the empire.

and foresight in the effected change in the currency in order to keep gold in reserve. His idea was to accumulate gold for the realization of his political objectives. Dr. Ishwari Prasad in his scholarly book on the 'History of the Qaraunah Turks in India' remarks that 'the Sultan was compelled to have recourse to this expedient by the shortage in the world's supply of silver.' This was also one of the contributing factors towards the emergency of such a currency measure. Besides, the Sultan had been unjustifiably accused of dishonesty, avarice, and greed for money. He was far from it. His unbounded generosity towards the people after the failure of the token currency can only absolve him of such mean motivations and intentions. The fact is that he took back the token currency and also an enormous amount of the 'forged' and 'counterfeit' from the people and paid them in exchange at its face value silver and gold. If emptiness of the treasury had been the cause for its introduction, it would have been an impossibility to meet the public demand after its withdrawal. A financial crisis in the state was bound to arise, but nothing untoward happened either in form of popular discontent and revolt, or in financing schemes—agricultural, political, and relief measures in the famine stricken areas. Edward Thomas observes on the basis of the numismatic data that the token currency lasted

only for three short years. Its after-effect was not deleterious. This experiment failed too. The Sultan was ever eager to reform the currency, but the cause of failure lay not in the conception of the coinage-scheme, but in the lack of state control and supervision. The people, undoubtedly, profited by the experiment at the expense of the state. It was well-conceived, but executed deplorably. The medieval age wrecked the sanguinary hopes and pious intentions of the ill-starred Muhammad. Even a 'prince of Moneyers' was betrayed and exploited. As a king he behaved too humanely towards the people.

The kingship of Muhammad failed in experiments. Its morale was lowered in the eyes of the people, though the state retained its equilibrium. The king was embittered but not discouraged to undertake the execution of new schemes. He planned more in order to forget his discomfiture. His indefatigable energy fed his originality of ideas. Scheme was the man in the kingship of Muhammad. Failure was no impediment in the headway of his politics, but it egged him on the way of hatching new and novel schemes. Creative activity marked his kingship. His urge towards achievement of ideas and ideals did not stop him to look backwards. His gaze was at the horizon and beyond. His was a forward policy. New thought, new ambition, and new zeal

inspired him with unceasing work.

Muhammad was surcharged with the world conquest ideas. Like Alauddin political circumstances also forced him to give up his foreign expedition scheme. His claim to the world conquest was pretentious and preposterous. His unabated ambitious mind was worked up by influences to such an extent that he began to realize the practicability of the scheme. It was, in fact, foggy. If it were to see the light of day, it would have hastened the catastrophic end of the state much earlier. The general scheme of foreign expedition was shelved. Only the Qarajal expedition was undertaken. It met with a nominal success, but entailed huge sacrifice and expense. It effected the militaristic resources beyond repairs and remedy.

The year 1325 A. D. was a turning point in the kingship of Muhammad. It was an anticlimax for the state. Forces of disorder and disruption were set in motion. The state showed signs of decay and dissolution. Precipitous drift of political events anticipated the complete collapse of the governmental machinery. Revolts and rebellions broke out in succession. The whole country was seething with political discontent. It may be mentioned in this connection that the 'foreign' *amirs* who were elated to the highest posts of responsibility and trust by Muhammad, were among the arch intriguers against the state. They were, in

fact, to a considerable extent responsible for its fall. When the country was in the grip of political travail, Muhammad combated the forces of sedition and anarchy with all his might. He did his level best to arrest the progress of anarchic political tendencies. The gravity of the political situation confounded him so much that he did not know what methods to adopt and what methods not to adopt for quelling revolts. He tried what expediency demanded.

His talk with Ziauddin Barni in regard to the actual political affairs throws profuse light on the mental uneasiness and anxiety of the Sultan who said: 'Thou seest how many revolts spring up. I have no pleasure in them, although men will say that they have all been caused by my excessive severity. But I am not to be turned aside from punishment by observations and by revolts. You have read many histories; hast thou found that kings inflict punishments under certain circumstances.' Ziauddin replied: 'I have read in royal histories that a king cannot carry on his government without punishment, for if he were not an avenger God knows what evils would arise from the insurrections of the disaffected, and how many thousand crimes would be committed by his subjects. Jamshid was asked under what circumstances punishment is approved. He replied, 'under seven circumstances, and whatever goes beyond

or in excess of these causes, produces disturbance, trouble, and insurrections, and inflicts injury on the country : (1) Apostasy from the true religion, and persistence therein ; (2) Wilful murder ; (3) Adultery of a married man with another's wife ; (4) Conspiracy against the king ; (5) Heading a revolt, or assisting rebels ; (6) Joining the enemies or rivals of the king, conveying news to them or aiding and abetting them in any way ; (7) Disobedience, productive of injury to the state. But for no other disobedience, as detriment to the realm is an essential. The servants of God are disobedient to him when they are disobedient to the king, who is his vicegerent ; and the state would go to ruin, if the king were to refrain from inflicting punishment in such cases of disobedience as are injurious to the realm'." Muhammad was not satisfied with the answer of Ziauddin, who had already endorsed the viewpoint of the Sultan. What he meant to enquire was how far his political actions and behaviour were in accordance with the *Shariat*.¹ He put the question bluntly to the

¹ Since political upheavals there had been a change in the mental outlook of Muhammad. He had ruled the country according to political concepts before the revolts actually cropped up. He did not care, like Alauddin, to Islamize politics. Doubts and suspicions crept in his mind that the cause of political turmoil in the state was due to the colossal neglect and disregard of the caliphate. Till then he ignored the existence of the caliphate and ruled as a supreme sovereign without its protective sacrosanctity. Signs of

historian whether or not 'the Prophet had said anything about these seven offences in respect of their punishment by kings.' Ziauddin observed that 'the Prophet had declared his opinion upon three offences out of these seven—viz., apostasy, murder of a Mussulman, and adultery with a married woman. The punishment of the other four offences is a matter rather of policy and good government. Referring to the benefits derivable from the punishments prescribed by Jamshid, it has been remarked that kings appoint *wazirs*, advance them to high dignity, and place the management of their kingdoms in their hands in order that these *wazirs* may frame regulations and keep the country in such good order that the king may be saved from having to stain himself with the blood of any mortal.' The answer was still inapt. Islamic precepts could be no guide to statecraft and politics. Muhammad was duped by Ziauddin Barni who beggared the question. The Sultan was still unsatisfied and did not appreciate the standpoint that the king should be deprived of political power by entrusting the state affairs to the Vazirs. He replied that 'those punishments which Jamshid prescribed were suited to the early ages of the world, but in these days many wicked and turbulent men are to be found. I visit

revolts swung the pendulum to the recognition and patronage of the caliphate. But it remained only a pious wish. Laws of politics governed him in statecraft.

them with chastisement upon the suspicions or presumption of their rebellious and treacherous designs, and I punish the most trifling acts of contumacy with death. This I will do until I die, or until the people act honestly, and give up rebellion and contumacy. I have no such *wazirs* as will make rules to obviate my shedding blood. I punish the people because they have all at once become my enemies and opponents. I have dispensed great wealth among them, but they have not become friendly and loyal. Their temper is well-known to me and I see that they are disaffected and inimical to me.' Muhammad made the point so clear that the people had got to be persecuted because of their revolt. Disloyalty was the greatest conceivable crime for him. He had also given expression to thoughts that despite his unbounded generosity and munificence the people made capital out of it, exploited his goodness and kindness and misbehaved atrociously towards him. 'My kingdom', the Sultan remarked, 'is diseased, and no treatment cures it. The physician cures the headache, and fever follows; he strives to allay the fever, and something else supervenes. So in my kingdom disorders have broken out; if I suppress them in one place they appear in another; if I allay them in one district another becomes disturbed'. Ziauddin Barni again harped on the same theme: 'Some kings, when they have perceived that they do not

retain the confidence of their people, and have become the objects of general dislike, have abdicated their thrones and have given over the government to the most worthy of their sons. Retiring into privacy and occupying themselves in innocent pursuits, they have passed their time in the society of sympathizing friends, without troubling themselves about matters of government. Other kings, when have found themselves the objects of general aversions, have taken to hunting, pleasure, and wine, leaving all business of the state to their *wazirs* and officers, and throwing off all concern in them. If this course seems good to the people, and the king is not given to revenge, the disorders of the state may be cured. Of all political ills, the greatest and most dire is a general feeling of aversion and a want of confidence among all ranks of the people.' This impressed the Sultan considerably, but to abdicate all at once was an impossibility. For him it could be conditional. Muhammad frankly stated that 'if I can settle the affairs of my kingdom according to my wish, I will consign my realm of Delhi to three persons, Firoz Shah, Malik Kabir and Ahmad Ayyaz. At present I am angry with my subjects; and they are aggrieved with me. The people are acquainted with my feelings, and I am aware of their misery and wretchedness. No treatment that I employ is of any benefit. My remedy for rebels, insurgents,

opponents and disaffected people is the sword. I employ punishment and use the sword, so that a cure may be effected by suffering. The more the people resist, the more I inflict chastisement.' Muhammad was as firm and adamant as bedrock. If it was a question of resistance to political authority on the part of insurgents, he, as king, would not budge an inch in resisting force with force. He vindicated to the last the honour of kingship; he stood for it undaunted; he accepted the popular challenge and fought like a king for the prestige and dignity of kingship. His reign culminated in the clash between the ideals of kingship and the world of political forces. His victimization was due to the age and its time-spirit. In 1350 A. D. Muhammad died of fish-poisoning while encamping near Thatta.

CHAPTER IX

**ISLAMIZATION OF KINGSHIP AND
STATECRAFT IN THE REIGN OF
FIROZ SHAH TUGHLUQ**

The death of Muhammad was sudden and unexpected. Moreover, he left behind no son to succeed him. The country had no king to proclaim and to show allegiance. The Mughal inroads were devastating it. The political crisis necessitated an immediate election of a king in order to save the country from anarchy. The highest and noblest men of the state assembled in council to discuss the political situation. After long and anxious deliberation, the nobles and the administrative officers agreed that the proper course was to place the reins of government in the hands of Firoz Shah. They addressed Firoz thus : 'Thou art the heir-apparent and legatee of the late Sultan; he had no son, and thou art his brother's son; there is no one in the city or in the army enjoying the confidence of the people, or possessing the ability to reign. For God's sake save these wretched people, ascend the throne, and deliver us and many thousand other miserable men. Redeem the women and children of the soldiers from the hands of the Mughals and purchase the prayers of two lacs of people.' Their imploration fell flat, as he had no desire to take upon himself the responsibility of royalty. Then 'all ranks, young and

old, Mussulmans and Hindus, horse and foot, women and children, assembled and with one acclaim declared that Firoz Shah alone was worthy of the crown'.

Even the '*ulama* exerted their influence by propounding the doctrine of the divine right of kingship. They pleaded for the succession of Firoz Shah to the royal throne as the 'divine approval' was behind it. They argued that 'sometimes when an elder is about to quit the world, he authoritatively places one of his disciples in his place, and hands over to him his prayer-carpet, although the disciple may be reluctant to undertake the serious charge.' Firoz Shah, who was not even willing to shoulder 'the weight of responsibility to God,' was made to realize that he was fit to carry 'the burden of royalty'. The '*ulama* stretched the point further by remarking that a feeling of diffidence and reluctance for the acceptance of royalty could only be allowed to saints, for whom it would be arduous. The 'authorization by investiture' of Firoz Shah had not only a popular support but was also approved by divine sanctions. At last he accepted the office of kingship. With tearful eyes he poured forth his supplications to the Almighty, saying, "O Lord! the stability of states, the peace, regulation, and occupations of governments do not depend upon men. Permanence of dominion depends upon Thy behests.

Oh God, Thou art my refuge and my strength.”

Firoz Shah's political teachers were Ghiasuddin and Muhammad who trained him in the principles of statecraft. He also was given practical training in politics and in the affairs of the state. The object of Muhammad in training him was to make him an adept in all political matters and thoroughly made him versed in the duties of royalty. This was probably done with a view to succeed Muhammad. Firoz Shah had a great regard for Muhammad whom he considered as his lord, his teacher, and his guide. Though he was brought up in the Tughluq school of politics, Firoz Shah still retained his own individuality. He had seen both the strong and weak points in the regimes of Ghiasuddin and Muhammad; he had practical knowledge of the affairs of government; he had his personal experiences of politics and statecraft; he had his own ideals of politics and kingship; he nearly actualized the ideals of Muhammad; he saw the futility of the supreme power of sword in politics; he generated a more powerful and abiding force in order to replace it by humanizing and culturalizing the institution of kingship; he synthesized, in fact, the forces of the kingships of Ghiasuddin and Muhammad.

The kingship of Firoz Shah in its very inception was faced with a political problem. As he was being proclaimed king, Delhi became a centre of

political disaffection. A supposititious son of Muhammad as a claimant was raised to royal dignity and recognized as the rightful ruler. Historians plead that after the death of Muhammad rumours reached the capital that Tatar Khan and Firoz Shah were missing and the country was being plundered by the Mughals. Khwaja-i-Jahan who manipulated the whole affair, took the golden opportunity by the forelock and acted as he thought best for the public welfare and the safety of the country. 'The cries and pressure of the people on all sides' compelled him to take such a step. Though the whole affair of pseudo-kingship fizzled out, it led to a discussion on politics, which depicts the political mentality of Firoz. To let go Khwaja-i-Jahan unpunished, or to ignore political offences against the spirit of statecraft was a political question that had to be solved politically. The nobles and officials in a body resented and approached Firoz with a view to convince him of his improper act. But the Sultan told them that 'it was a high duty of kings to overlook any irregular acts of their officers'. They retorted that 'the offences of royal servants were of two classes—one small, the other great. The venal offences were those against property, the graver, those against authority; the former might be excused, but the latter ought not to be forgiven. Clemency, in such cases, was sure to be followed by repentance.'

Even his later political expeditions also show a tendency towards non-aggressive spirit in politics. This was more an attempt in the form of rehabilitating and renewing political authority with humanizing force. His was not the thirst for acquiring new lands and countries that expeditions were undertaken. The main motive was not political but moral in order to redeem and rectify. Political domination receded into the furthest background of his politics. More to right the political wrong rather than to avenge was the impulse that guided him in his political undertakings. Modern historians charge him with weakness and senility of character. He could have been a great political success if he had wished it. But his ideals were responsible for unmaking of the political man in Firoz and it was not due to his inherent weakness with which he is charged. All this was due to his conception of politics and kingship. He differed in his way of thinking from men of his age. To rule did not signify to him usurpation and conquest but a higher purpose than mere political domination. It was, in fact, his whole mental outlook that made him act unkingly from the political standpoint, but most kingly from his own angle of vision. He firmly believed in the divine precept that 'peace is good' than war.

Firoz had thus betrayed himself to the political world and men of his times. He refused to follow

the political principles and traditions of the kings, who valued above all the dignity of the institution of kingship. Its authority they upheld at all costs. Even Muhammad fought and died for it. Firoz was different from his predecessors. His ideal of politics and statecraft was also different. He recast the old theory of kingship in the light of his religious ideas. He was a living reaction against the political philosophy of Muhammad; he was dead against it; he uprooted it. Firoz inaugurated a new mentality in politics. It was the re-emergence of the religious spirit that pervaded and prevailed upon politics, kingship, and statecraft during his reign. Principles of politics were scrutinized; they were found shallow and superficial; they were rejected. In the domain of practical politics higher laws effected radical changes. The spirit of political conquest withered and whittled away giving birth to a new spirit of political ethics. The political state transformed itself into a new ethico-Islamic state. Its basis was Islamic as well as cultural. Promotion of Islamic and cultural values was its chief objective. It depoliticized itself by Islamizing and culturalizing its foundation; it negated the A B C of politics and devalued political laws. Kingship was eventually humanized, as it discarded elements of fear and dread that were considered as un-Islamic and let loose forces of humanizing tendencies in order to bring about its complete culturalization.

The 'scrap-heap policy' of Firoz was responsible for the change in the features of the political state beyond recognition because of his religious convictions. Kingship alone was not religionized and culturalized, but also the state. As he was a grateful servant of God, he laboured in the way of Islamization of the whole state. Firoz remarked in his political testament—the *Futuhāt-i-Firozshahi*—that 'Irreligion and sin opposed to the law prevailed in Hindustan and men's habits and dispositions were inclined towards them and were averse to the restraints of religion. He (God) inspired me his humble servant with an earnest desire to repress irreligion and wickedness so that I was able to labour diligently until with His blessing the vanities of the world and things repugnant to religion, were set aside and the true was distinguished from the false'. Firoz's 'impulse for the maintenance of the laws of His religion, for the repression of heresy, the prevention of crime, and the prohibition of things forbidden' was the natural outcome of his religious emotions and created in him 'a disposition for discharging my lawful duties and my moral obligations'.

The kingship of Firoz had a mission of a high order. It was also seething with the zeal of a missionary, while the kingship of Muhammad was in no way less zealous to achieve its ideal. But both differed radically from each other. The former

executed the high commands of God and aimed at establishing kingdom of God on earth. The latter had lofty ideals and vied with the laws of God and strove for the fullest freedom within the fold of Islam. Firoz was an executor of the will of God, while Muhammad was a ruler in the name of God. Firoz and Muhammad were poles asunder in their instinct and behaviour, outlook and conviction. Political, social, and religious forces that were liberated during the past regimes were not only corrosive and detrimental but un-and-anti-Islamic from the standpoint of Firoz. An unprecedented change in the concept and structure of the state during the kingship of Firoz was partly the result of the religious influence in the make-up of the man in Firoz and partly due to the bankruptcy of the political philosophy in theory and practice of the times. The political power was irresponsible and absolute. The rule of the naked sword failed to cement the foundation of the state. It lacked the power and strength to establish a natural relationship between the people and the state; it always was instrumental in ousting the amalgamative force of public affection, sympathy, and loyalty; it was directly responsible for the creation of an artificial atmosphere in the state; it tried to brush aside popular opinion at its own risk; it undermined in the long run the basis of the state and kingship.

Before the Firozian reign the country had witnessed many a time the inevitable struggle between the rule of sword and the humanizing principles of politics. The cruel law of sword had been weighed and found wanting. Its inhumaneness and brutality worked like a blast to popular goodwill and affection and aroused the interplay of brutal human instincts. Principles of oppression and torture were adopted as palliative remedial measures for the enforcement of political laws, but as they lacked reformatory power their purpose was defeated. Direct degradation and demoralization of human beings were due to their sinister influences and repercussions. The basic idea in the doctrine of punishment failed in the forced attempt to change for the good the heart of man. Even in matters of statecraft it manifested no inherent healing power to ameliorate the nature of man, but drove fear and dread deep into the heart of the people, resulting in their inhibited reactions and reflexes.

Firoz adopted the Asokan principles of statecraft to negate the evil influences of politics in order to establish a new social and political order for the real well-being of the people. The basis of the state was humanized. The Firozian state utilized human forces—tenderness, kindness, and mercy—for its functioning. To outlaw penalization and unlawful killing of human beings became

the prime duty of the kingship of Firoz. His reign signalized the victory of the power of humanization over the brute force. He fought for man against the irrationality and lawlessness of politics, and safeguarded his inborn right to live humanly. Thus Firoz became the real protector of his people. The Firozian state put into practice the ideal of human service and betterment that Muhammad so eagerly cherished. Though his whole-hearted attempt was towards Islamization, yet the ethico-cultural aspect of the state was nevertheless emphasized by him. The Firozian state was Islamic in its ideal and practice, but the welfare of the people was its prime concern. It regulated the affairs of the people from the Islamic standpoint and abrogated all despotic laws under which the people groaned. These were deemed un-and-anti-Islamic. Its Islamic laws were inspired with ideas of the general welfare. Politics also was ethico-Islamic in spirit. The underlying motive in the enforcement of punishment was to keep intact the laws of Islam. It was proclaimed by the Firozian state that 'whoever transgressed the law should receive punishment prescribed by the book and decrees of judges'.

To effect alignment with Islamic sanctions Firoz had to adopt the policy of cuts in the sources of income of the state. 'Frivolous', 'unlawful', and 'unjust' revenues in the form of taxes and cesses, which were considered 'lawful' in the former

reigns of kings, were abolished. The public treasury was only entitled to revenues that were recognized by the sacred law and approved by books of authority. It was impossible to raise or collect many an unauthorized tax or cess, as its realization was liable to punishment. Thus the new Islamic state of Firoz had only four lawful sources of income: (1) the *kharaj*; (2) the *zakat*; (3) the *jizyah*; (4) the *khams*.¹

¹ The *kharaj* was a tax on land or a land-rent which was realized from all owners, Muslim and Hindu alike, of the cultivated lands by the state. The ratio was fixed at one-tenth of the produce. The *zakat* was confined to the Muslim population only. It was an alm-tax on the income of the Muslim, which he had to contribute to the welfare of the community.

Before defining *jizyah* it seems proper to trace its history in order to understand its full significance. The word *jizyah* is derived from the Aramaic of the Iraq in the Aramaic form 'gazita'. In its Aramaic form it occurs in Dionysius Tem in Assemani. Later Syriac authors often made use of it. The 'gazita' was used in the sense of a poll-tax. Even the Persians retained intact the poll-tax after their conquest of Mesopotamia. In the old Persian books we also come across the word 'gazita'. Firdausi in his epic poem—the *Shahnama*—speaks of 'gazita' and says that very few Persians were exempt from it. Ibn-ul Asir observes that Anushervan, the King of Persia, 'got the whole land surveyed and imposed *jizyah* on every one with the exception of the army and government officials.'

In the history of Islam the *jizyah* had played a prominent rôle, though there is only one single reference to it in the Koran (Chap. IX, Verse 29). It passed through two marked phases in Islamic practice. It was primarily used in the sense of a collective tribute which was levied on conquered lands. The Arab practice in the early Islam was that after conquering countries they left the admin-

The kingship of Firoz was protective. To look after the welfare of the subjects became its chief concern. The fostering care of the people is

istration in the hands of the conquered and only received revenues of the provinces as their *jizyah*. It is also a fact that in the early Islam no marked distinction was ever made between *jizyah* as a poll-tax and *kharaj* as a land-tax. The 'kharaj from a poll-tax' and 'a *jizyah* from land' were interchangeable terms, which were in usage during the early days of Islam. Wellhausen holds that *jizyah* and *kharaj* were originally equally considered as a tribute to be paid by the subdued to the citizens of Islamic theocracy. Both terms connoted the same idea of tribute, either in the form of '*jizyah* of the land', or '*kharaj* of a person.'

It was first during the caliphate of 'Umar II that 'there was in fact a distinction drawn between *kharaj* and *jizyah* which had not existed before. The *jizyah*, according to this, rested on the person and only affected the non-Muslim. The *kharaj*, on the contrary, rested on the land and did not degrade the person; it was and had to be paid even by the Muslims owning tribute land'. The fiscal policy of 'Umar II was given a finishing stroke by the noted tax-reformer—Nasr b. Saiyar—the last Umayyid Stattholder of Khurasan, who was instrumental in the final separation of *jizyah* from the *kharaj* sense. Raising tribute in a fixed amount solely from the land-tax levied on the individual taxable districts was his work. 'All land proprietors, Muslims or non-Muslims, Arabs or Iranians', observes Wellhausen, 'had to contribute to it in proportion to their property. But the poll-tax was separate from it and contributed only by Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians, not by Muslims, not even by newly converted ones.'

We have thus seen that the *jizyah* was originally not a poll-tax. 'The explanation of *jizyah* as capitation', elucidates Caetani in his *Annali dell' Islam*, 'is an invention of later jurists, ignorant of the true condition of affairs in the early days of Islam.' The connotation of *jizyah* in the political sense of a tribute changed under later developments

nowhere so glaringly manifested than in the cancellation of remission of arrears of two crores of *tankas*. It was during the reign of Muhammad

in Islamic conditions into its old Sassasian sense as a poll-tax to be paid by the non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state. On the basis of the Papyri evidence, dated 80 to 90 Hijra it appears that 'the *jizyah* was intended for the payment of the army.' The *jizyah* was therefore the protection-money which the Islamic state demanded from the non-Muslims, who came under its protection without losing their rights—political, social, economic, and religious—as *zimmis*. In other words, the status of *zimmiship* entitled them to specific rights: (1) Security from molestation; (2) protection. By virtue of the first they became safe (*amin*), and by the second, protégés (*mabrūs*).

As *zimmis* they were also entitled to the government services and allowed to observe their social and religious rites and ceremonies. Their temples were protected by the law of Islam. The Islamic state undertook the sole responsibility of protection and safety of the *zimmis*. On the 'army of Islam' devolved the religious duty to protect them in time of warfare and need. The *zar-i-zimmiya* as a protection-money compensated for the sacrifice of the Muslim blood which had to be shed for their protection. In case the Islamic state failed to protect them, it could not claim *jizyah*. In Islamic countries historical evidence shows amply that the *jizyah* was returned when the Islamic state failed to shoulder the responsibility of protection. As regards joining the military the *zimmis* were not debarred but they could not be forced to join it as they enjoyed the status of *zimmiship*. If they joined it of their own accord, they were exempt from the payment of *jizyah*.

The *jizyah* was imposed only on those adult male *zimmis* who were 'in full possession of their physical and mental faculties and having the means to pay' either by agreement and treaty, or by the Imam after the conquest of their lands by the force of arms. In either case it was a yearly payment made by the *zimmis* to the Islamic state. The yearly rate was

that a state loan worth two crores of *tankas* was advanced to the people for the purpose of restoring

as follows : (1) 48 *dirhams* from the rich ; (2) 24 *dirhams* from the middle class ; (3) 12 *dirhams* from the poor. Children, women, the imbecile, the insane, the old people, persons not possessing legal responsibility, the beggars, the blind, the cripple and the monks (living a life of retirement) did not pay the *jizyah*. If the blind, the cripple and the monk were rich, they were liable to payment of *jizyah*. Slaves were also exempt. The *jizyah* was realized either in money or in kind.

The Muslim jurists adjudged and adumbrated the meaning and implication of *jizyah* in accordance with the political conditions. They twisted its significance to suit the political purpose of the Muslim state by keeping the subjugated more under their thumb and domination. Scholars hold that the jurists had played mischief with the word *jizyah*.

Qasim-al-Ghazzi (a Muslim Scholar) criticized ruthlessly the violent effusions of some of the commentators on the Koranic verse (IX, 29) and protested against the 'fanatical glosses' on the Koranic words. The words 'being subdued' (*Wahum ṣāghirūn*), according to Ibn Qasim, did not imply an abject condition of complete subjugation—political, economic, religious, and moral—of the *ḥimmis*. Its 'offensive' implication was not sanctioned in the law of Islam. For its usage the jurists of Islam were responsible.

In medieval India the services of the Hindus were recruited just like the Muslims in the government and the military. Before the reign of Firoz it is doubtful whether the *jizyah* was imposed on the Hindu population. Mention of the word *jizyah* in the historical works of medieval India is rare. If it were in force, it could not have been in accordance with the Islamic law, as we nowhere find that the state was Islamized in toto. From the *Fatuhāt-i-Firozshahi*, it becomes but clear that the former kings had no regard for and did not follow the Islamic precedents and sanctions. The whole country was ruled without caring much for Islamic factors. The kings were no doubt Muslim, but their state was un-Islamic in theory and

their lands, villages, and quarters, fallen into ruin in the time of famine. This loan-question was discussed by Firoz with his ministers and it was decided that its realization would aggravate all the more the plight and penury of the people, resulting in their utter helplessness and ruin, and not one jot of debt should be realized from them. In

practice. It was a composite institution of political control but not wholly Islamic. It had been the pious wish of a few Muslim kings to Islamize the state, but they failed in the attempt as they themselves had no clear-cut ideas about the Islamic political ideal and practice. Besides, they were product of political forces. It was, in fact, the nature of Indian political conditions and problems that baffled them. They had to leave them unsolved from the Islamic standpoint.

It was for the first time in the history of medieval India that Firoz attempted to Islamize completely the state and kingship. His criterion was Islamic. It was under the Firozian kingship that the *jizyah* as an Islamic ordinance was introduced. It is mentioned in the *Fatuh-i-Firozshahi* that the Hindus and idol-worshippers had agreed to accept the status of *zimmi*ship by paying the *zar-i-zimmiya* and the new state undertook the responsibility of their security, safety, and protection and granted them free exercise of their religious beliefs, rites, and ceremonies. According to Shams-i-Siraj 'Afif, the author of the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, the *jizyah*, as rated during the reign of Firoz Shah, was of three grades: (1) Forty *tankas*, (2) Twenty *tankas*, (3) Ten *tankas*. It was later reduced to ten *tankas* and fifty *jitals*.

As regards the *khams* the Islamic law entitled the state to one-fifth of the spoils acquired in and during the conquest of countries and four-fifth to the 'army of Islam'. This practice as an Islamic injunction was not recognized by the Muslim kings of India. Firoz, while introducing the Islamic practice, observed that 'the provisions of the law had thus been entirely subverted', and decreed that only one-fifth of the spoils should be taken by the state.

order to pacify the agitated public it was proposed to destroy the records of debts in the presence of the people. They were, in fact, publicly cancelled. It was really a novel but human way of dealing with the public affairs and showed immense regard and consideration for making the life of the people happy and care-free. Such a royal gesture was bound to produce feelings of gratitude and loyalty in the people and it contributed to the strengthening of bonds between the kingship and populace.

The same spirit of generosity and humaneness was exhibited in the Firozian kingship while tackling the problem of land and its revenue. As it was a major problem, its solution was urgent and had far-reaching effect on the peasantry which formed the backbone of the state. 'Unwise regulations' of the former times were annulled in order to relieve the rural population of its misery and dearth. The criterion for the fixation of revenue was in proportion to the produce of land and the paying capacity of the peasantry. It was considered impolitic to tax them beyond their power to cope with the demands of the state. Hence the cancellation of all enhancements and cesses. 'The practice to leave one cow and take away the rest' was no more in force during the kingship of Firoz. New laws were enforced with a view to cause the 'extension of cultivation' and the

'happiness of *rai'yats* and subjects' and to safeguard the public interest so that 'no demand in excess of the regular government dues was to be made.' Breaches of law in the realization of revenues necessitated a 'full reparation.' The Firozian state succeeded in establishing 'the rules of equity and justice' and 'no single person had any power of harassment and oppression.' 'Perfect peace and security' prevailed throughout the country. People began to live in life-promoting conditions.¹ All this achievement which Firoz had to his credit was due to the 'laws of the Prophet' which he adopted for the guidance of statecraft and kingship.

Though the peace-loving Firoz was a protector as well as a well-wisher of the people, he was a rank reactionary in religion. He had no breadth of vision and spirit of toleration like his guide-philosopher Muhammad; he represented and tolerated only the orthodox school of thought in Islam. Freedom in Islam and liberality of thought were inconceivable to him. We are still in the dark, whether the reactionary religious element in Firoz was the result of his religious convictions, or it was due to the predominating influence of

¹ It is observed by Shams-i-Siraj 'Afif that all men, high and low, bound and free, lived happily and were free from care throughout the dominions of Firoz Shah. The plenty and cheapness were the marked features of his reign with the result that the *rai'yats* grew rich and contentment prevailed among them.

the 'ulama. We can only say so much with certainty that the 'ulama made not only their position and status secure, but also controlled and guided Firoz throughout his whole reign in matters of statecraft. They actually dominated the Firozian kingship.

During the kingship of Muhammad the 'ulama were dethroned and held in check. Their political existence was set at naught. Their religious influence was counteracted. They were deprived of their rights and privileges and had to forego their social and religious status as a class. An Islamic free-thinker in the personality of Muhammad was also instrumental in liberating forces of freedom of thought in the religious world of his times. Religious cross-and-under-currents manifested themselves in the lives of the people. There was no attempt at a standardized form of religion, nor persecution for holding different religious views. The religious leaders of thought preached and proclaimed from pulpits doctrines ranging from pure pantheism to atheism. Even the philosophy of *Ana-l-Hakk* (I am God) was propounded. The doctrine of the Coming of the Messiah (the Imam Mehdi) also was promulgated. Such heretic tendencies and movements were commonplace in the time of Muhammad.

A strong persecutive reaction against the 'irreligion' and 'irreligiousness' of the people set

in with the advent of the Firozian kingship. As Firoz was after the complete Islamization of the state, he needed Islamic sanctions for the desired end. He, therefore, recruited the services of the *'ulama* who could show him the way to Islamization. They were considered the custodians of Islamic knowledge as well as the interpreters of Islamic law and tradition. Hence the pre-eminent place was given to the *'ulama* in the Firozian scheme of things. The pivot of the Firozian activity was the *'ulama*. Firoz was the spirit and the *'ulama* its feeder. To rule in accordance with the laws of Islam the *'ulama* became his political and spiritual guide and executor. It cannot be denied that though they usurped the powers of the Firozian kingship in actuality, it could not be denuded of the Firozian traits. We may be allowed here to express an opinion that Firoz as a persecutor was the result of the master-stroke of the *'ulama* policy.

During the kingship of Firoz the Islamic heretic sects were persecuted as they undermined the Islamic belief from the *'ulama's* standpoint. Some were convicted of 'errors' and 'perversions'; some were charged for labouring 'to seduce the people into heresy and schism, as well as, abominable practices'; some were found guilty of wearing 'the garment of atheism'; some culpable for the

preposterous claims to prophethood and godhood.¹ Religious practices and customs, unauthorized by the law of Islam, were stopped 'under pain of exemplary punishment.'²

The amelioration of the religious life of the Muslims was undertaken from the standpoint of the Firozian state. It indirectly touched the life of the Hindus as well. As *zimmis* the state had no right to interfere with their religious life. Their rights were safeguarded and protected. But according to the Islamic tradition the non-Muslims were not allowed to build new temples in the colonized Muslim towns. In Tughlikpur, Salihpur, and Kohana which were founded by Firoz, new temples were erected by the Hindus. These were destroyed by the orders of Firoz, as they were a

¹ All these Muslim heretic movements were stopped. Their religious leaders were either punished severely, or banished, or put to death as adjudged by the '*ulama*. The heretic literature was burnt and destroyed. The followers of the heretic leaders were not persecuted but admonished and warned to recast their religious views and to dissociate themselves from them.

² It is stated in the *Fatuh-at-i-Firozshahi* that 'on holy days women riding in palanquins, or carts, or litters, or mounted on horses or mules, or in large parties on foot went out of the city to the tombs. Rakes and wild fellows of unbridled passions and loose habits took the opportunity which this practice afforded for improper riotous action'. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Hindu and Muslim women, high and low, used to go out on pilgrimage to tombs. This practice was entirely stopped by Firoz.

menace to public morality.¹ In all three newly erected temples were demolished and the ring-leaders were killed. Infliction of any severe punishment on the Hindus in general was forbidden by Firoz himself.

¹ The *Futuh-at-i-Firozshahi* gives an elaborate account of these temples. Hindus and Mussulmans used to visit the festivals in connection with these temples. Women folk also frequented these places of worship. Promiscuous meetings of men and women led to public scandal and depravity of morals. Gratification of sexual lust, remarks Firoz in his *Futuh-at-i-Firozshahi*, characterized the life of the people (Hindu and Muslim) during the temple festivals. These temples were no real centres of devoutness and religiousness but houses of Satan. Motives which spurred Firoz to action were mixed—Islamic and public decency or decorum. Was Firoz justified in putting a stop to such public corruption as a man? This question has to be decided in the light of the idea of public welfare. As facts were, he did not give vent to frantic outbursts of a fanatic, but his controlled behaviour and action proved the ulterior motive in the suppression of public vice. The Firozian India did not see a general demolition of temples, which were protected under the status of *zimmiship*.

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