THE CHALLENGE OF ASIA

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By STANLEY RICE

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

First Edition . . . 1975

Made and Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., *Frome and London*

PREFACE

THE ferment now working in the chief countries of Asia is a phenomenon too obvious to have been overlooked. It has sometimes been called a Revolt and sometimes an Awakening, but neither of these terms conveys quite the correct impression, though each can be justified. A revolt suggests the existence of a dominant Power and an uprising against it, more or less conscious, more or less violent and more or less sudden. In the more limited sense this is true of India alone among Asiatic countries; in the more extended sense it might be applied to such countries as Persia and China, who are seeking to get rid of European influence; but it is only by a straining of language that it can be applied to the politically most important nation in Asia. Similarly an awakening presupposes an antecedent sleep. But Asia has never been asleep, though it pleases Europeans to think so who hold their civilisation the

only real one in the world. Asia has not been asleep; she is merely turning her eyes in a new direction towards the ideals of Power and Freedom. The countries are looking beyond their own borders; they have enlarged their horizon. That which at one time did not seem worth having now appears of inestimable value. The process has been long because it is neither physical nor political but psychologic. She now imagines that she has torn the secret from Europe and can stand forth at no distant date as her rival and perhaps her mistress. She is throwing down a challenge, and it is in this sense that the title of this book must be taken.

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CHAPTER I

Introductory

A HUNDRED years ago it would have seemed grotesquely incredible that Asia should ever dare to challenge Europe, at any rate on those lines in which European supremacy seemed to be firmly established. Wherever Europe had gone she had succeeded in remaining. The Dutch were in the Spice Islands; the early Portuguese settlements in India, though they had dwindled, were still in being; the French had likewise a foothold there, and that they were not masters of India was due in no sense to native prowess, but directly to the opposition of England and indirectly to the hereditary rivalry of the two countries in Europe. The ridiculous ease with which Russia had advanced to the shores of the Pacific showed that the more backward Asiatic tribes could not for a moment stand up against organised Europeans. Persia was

of no account politically, while the Turkish Empire in Asia was allowed to linger on partly because nobody wanted it since the Crusading spirit was exhausted, but chiefly perhaps because of the Eastern Question and the fear that any weakening of Turkey would arouse the ambition of Russia and bring into play the vast forces of that enormous Empire, the internal affairs of which were but little understood.

It had not always been so. Europe and Asia are more closely connected than any other two continents in the world. The vast mass which extends eastwards and westwards from Portugal to Korea forms in fact a single unit, and the sharp boundary which geographers have created along the line of the Urals and so by way of the Black Sea and the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean is really a very blurred line. It was natural therefore that Asia should overflow into Europe by way of the land, and the Greeks to this day are said to talk of a journey to 'Europe' when they mean to travel west. For centuries Asia dominated the greater part of Spain, for as Asia is joined to Europe, so also is she joined to Africa, and if the conquering Moors were African by race they had adopted an Asiatic religion and an

Asiatic civilisation. Constantinople fell in 1453 and has remained ever since under an Asiatic people which threatened to engulf Europe until they were stayed by the ramparts of Vienna and the legions of Sobieski. Russia is and for centuries has been more than half Asiatic; the Asiatic strain betrays itself in the visions of a Tolstoi, in the gloomy outlook of a Dostoevsky, in the melancholy of the music, and in the barbaric fancies of the theatre.

But if the door was open to Asia it was also open to Europe; why then was it that there were no similar irruptions from the West? The Greeks no doubt had crossed the frontier, but except under Alexander had never penetrated far from the European shores. The Romans, for all their claim to universal empire, never went beyond the regions of what we now call the Near East. The answer seems to be that Europe was in the transitional stage after the break-up of Rome and at the time when the Asiatic flood was at its highest. The principal countries which had shown signs of consolidation, France and England, were too far away to undertake the 'enterprise of Asia,' to adapt Don John's phrase, and Spain was fighting for her life against the

dominant Moors. All Europe east of France was fluid. Germany and Italy, except for a brief period under the Hohenstaufen, were parcels of insignificant States. The glory of Greece had long departed; the Balkans were and still are in a condition of unstable equilibrium, and Byzantium, growing ever weaker with her fluctuating fortunes, had enough to hold her own against the peoples which attacked her. Europe in short was preoccupied with her own affairs. She was torn by dynastic ambitions and dynastic quarrels: the ecclesiastical hand lay heavy upon her and kings and emperors chafed under its weight. Impelled by ecclesiastical fervour, Europe made one onslaught upon Asia, and after a fierce struggle at last succeeded in planting the Cross in the place which Christians and Moslems alike hold sacred, only to be eventually driven out, because when the impulse was exhausted Europe was too preoccupied or too unimaginative to support her feeble outpost. The kingdom of Jerusalem, because it had no roots, withered away.

The Turks had not long been established in Constantinople before Europe began to take her revenge. In 1492 Granada fell, and only seven years later Europe took the royal

road to discovery, the way of the sea, which seems to be her peculiar heritage. Vasco da Gama began that wonderful voyage of his, thus opening up the long train of events which led to the establishment of European supremacy almost throughout the continent of Asia. Imagination had already been stimulated by the accounts of a few sporadic travellers of whom Marco Polo was the most distinguished, but it was left to the Jesuit missionaries to open the new crusades and to make an organised attack upon Asia. They set out with the preconceived idea that their religion was beyond all question superior and that their civilisation was at least preferable to that of the East. Fired with the single and honest design of working in the Master's cause, they were oblivious or regardless of the political difficulties which their zeal was certain to bring about, and they knew, or should have known, that they were armed, if not with the visible sword in one hand and the Bible in the other, yet with all that the sword implies behind them. It lay in the scabbard among the Bibles and the rosaries and the crucifixes which formed the essential part of their equipment. For they must have known that if they were missionaries of the Church they were

also citizens of the State and that insults and dishonour, outrage, and even death, which might be their lot at the hands of an exasperated people, would speedily be avenged by the State to which they owed allegiance. They were not wanted anywhere, but Eastern peoples are tolerant and so they were tolerated. Trade was attracted to these outlying markets and the hope of gain, and as each successive wave of the European attack fell upon Asia the inherent superiority of the white race crystallised first into a dogma and then into an axiom. The Japanese seemed to Europeans, even towards the close of the nineteenth century, little more than grown-up children. Mr. Percival Lowell, writing in 1888, discovered that " these people are human beings; with all their eccentricities they are men. . . . To say that the Japanese are not a savage tribe is of course unnecessary; to repeat the remark anything but superfluous, on the principle that what is a matter of common notoriety is very apt to prove a matter about which very little is known. At present we go half-way in recognition of these people by bestowing upon them a demi-diploma of mental development called semi-civilisation." The Chinese with their ridiculous

pretensions were put down as intensely ignorant, intensely arrogant because they were ignorant, and intensely childish in their mental outlook.

It was, however, in India that the claim to European superiority was most marked. By 1833, when the charter of the East India Company came up for revision and the whole subject of the Indian Government came before Parliament, the English dominion in India had made gigantic strides, though Dalhousie was yet to come, and it was consolidated as it advanced. The question before Parliament was in effect whether the destinies of India should be entrusted any longer to a trading company which had succeeded to an Empire. The superiority of the European was already assumed as an axiom. "I see," said Macaulay, "toleration strictly maintained; yet I see bloody and degrading superstitions gradually losing their power. I see the morality, the philosophy, the taste of Europe beginning to produce a salutary effect on the hearts and understandings of our subjects. I see the public mind of India, that public mind which we found debased and contracted by the worst forms of political and religious tyranny, expanding itself to just and noble views of

the ends of government and of the social duties of man." Or again, in a passage that leaves nothing to inference, "Consider . . . how much attention is already paid by the higher classes of the natives to those intellectual pursuits on the cultivation of which the superiority of the European race to the rest of mankind principally depends."

Macaulay may not have been the best possible authority on India, but his words are typical of the attitude of mind at that period. There was much that was true in this conception of European superiority and a good deal that was not. England had succeeded to chaotic conditions which showed Indian administration in its most unfavourable light. Corruption and intrigue were rampant. "Every adventurer who could muster a troop of horse might aspire to a throne. Every palace was every year the scene of conspiracies, treasons, revolutions, parricides. . . . The people were ground down to the dust by the oppressor within, by the robber from whom the Nabob was unable to protect them, by the Nabob who took whatever the robber had left to them. All the evils of despotism and all the evils of anarchy pressed at once on that miserable

race. They knew nothing of government but its exactions." But admittedly it had not always been so. The Land Revenue system was inherited, as apologists are never weary of reminding us, from the Moghuls, and the system which was introduced by Sivaji and upon which he worked was not unlike the present one—or at least the one in vogue before the reforms—in essential features. Both under Akbar and under the early Marathas the people seemed to have lived contented lives, in spite of the Maratha *chauth* exactions, for it is notorious that amid all the wars and tumults and raids that have vexed India the placid life of the peasant farmer has pursued its way.

That the judgment of Europe was false in certain respects was due mainly to ignorance, but also to the habit of appraising everything by European standards. There are many amiable people to-day who think of Hinduism as nothing but a gross form of idolatry. They have persuaded themselves, or have been persuaded by others, generally of the partisan type, that the mainspring of the religion is the worship of a hideous idol, usually bloodthirsty, which is often accompanied by dense superstition

and by licentious rites. They have accepted the picture presented to them by perfectly honest and truthful men whose vision has been so distorted by the conviction of their own superiority that they have failed to see the good and the deeply thoughtful side of Hinduism and have concentrated all their attention on the vulgar and the gross. They have been told a great deal about Kali, but they have never heard of Kalidasa, and they would look blankly at you if you spoke of the Dvaita and Advaita systems of philosophy, or quoted the Bhagavatgita.

On the æsthetic side there was more excuse. The very existence of the Sanskrit drama was not known except to a microscopic number of savants. The great epics, in so far as they were known at all, were probably looked upon as something barbaric, monstrous, even ridiculous, to be compared with the masterpieces of Greece and Rome as a satyr to Hyperion. Music a hundred years ago was at its zenith in Europe. Beethoven had succeeded Mozart and was about to hand on the torch to Schubert, Schumann, and Brahms. Oriental music was contemptuously disregarded as mere noise: no more striking instance can be found of applying

Western criteria to the appreciation of an Eastern art. In the minor arts of producing delicate porcelain, exquisite carvings and fine textiles, the dexterity and genius both of India and China were acknowledged. But painting and sculpture were thought to be grotesque, and nobody looked behind the visible object to seek for the imaginative idea because the art of Europe had sought the beautiful in realistic representation. Nobody looked because nobody cared. With the realisation that wealth and power came not through territorial aggrandisement but by the road of commerce the East was chiefly regarded as a market for the expansion of trade.

All this, however, does not excuse Macaulay's arrogant and self-sufficient assertion, made not with the irresponsibility of the author, but with the considered judgment of the statesman, that the whole literature of Asia was only fit for the rubbish heap. As an argument it perhaps served its purpose, since those whom he was addressing knew no better, but to us to whom a knowledge of Asia is vouchsafed in larger measure the remark only shows that Macaulay knew nothing whatever of the subject of which he talked so confidently. By an irony of

Fate it has served to illustrate not the poverty of Asia but the ignorance of Europe.

By degrees practically the whole of Asia fell under European influence, and the consciousness of superiority, now fully established, was displayed in various ways according to the characteristics of the nations. The Germans when they arrived on the scene introduced the methods of the drill-sergeant and the native inhabitants were dragooned and kept in order in accordance with the Prussian system. The Dutch treated their subjects as so much potential labour, never rising much above the purely commercial outlook. The French, on the other hand, have always shown more consideration for races of another colour; it is perhaps strange that so imperious a race should have had less trouble than any other with its coloured subjects; but diplomacy is in the French blood, and it is certainly a fact that of all the European nations the French have displayed the least colour prejudice. England again doled out her gifts with the patronising air of a benefactor: she was inspired by the highest motives and she offered the most superb gifts, but she could never quite conceal the national characteristic of regarding herself as superior to every nation on

the earth. It is a characteristic that has brought us no love on the Continent, which at one time made the English tourist the most unpopular of travellers, and which has not wholly disappeared under the chastening influences of greater knowledge and of long adversity. It is a characteristic too that has pulled England out of many a tight corner. John Bull, says the proverb, never knows when he is beaten, and that is largely because to an Englishman it is simply inconceivable that he should have to acknowledge a superior of any kind. It is something of that feeling that in the lesser sphere of sport causes an Englishman to blush when the championships are taken by France or America, or finds excuse when Norway or Finland are the prize-winners in their own national sports. Other nations call the feeling arrogance; we recognise the substance but refuse to admit the term, preferring rather 'insular pride' as being capable of a less sinister meaning.

As an indication of this assumption of superiority, consider the connotation of the word 'native.' When used by itself without the qualifying adjective which denotes the nationality, the word has come to mean in ordinary language an individual of the

coloured races and, in England, more especially of India. If an Englishman is travelling in France or Scotland he does not speak of the inhabitants as the 'natives,' though in literary language he might have occasion to refer to them as natives of France or Scotland as the case might be, just as the word 'female' may be used scientifically with none of the contemptuous significance which it ordinarily carries in conversation. There is a story told of an Englishman who, returning to settle at home, went back to India "because he could not stand the natives." The bare idea that Englishmen could be called 'natives' *tout court* gives the ludicrous point to the quip. If an Englishman chooses to live in India no one would smile if he said that he lived among natives. So deeply rooted in the language is this connotation of the word that old Anglo-Indians will still use it to describe Indian settlers in Africa and Indian residents in England, quite unaware that in such circumstances it is both illogical and ridiculous. And since it denoted a coloured man it suggested inferiority. That this is really the fact and no fanciful fabrication to prove a point is proved (the word is used literally) by the fact that quite recently,

that is to say some fifteen years ago, orders were sent round by the authorities in India that the word ' native ' was not to be used in speaking of an Indian, since it hurt his susceptibilities. It is rare now to hear the word used in any such connection by any Government servant, or indeed by any responsible non-official. It lingers on in the speech of women, of irresponsible boys, and of the veterans for whom habit is too strong.

To do the Englishman justice, he was not alone to blame. Even if he did not wish to assert himself, his European superiority was thrust upon him by a race which, having no national consciousness, had no national pride. In all honesty he told his Indian friends how much better everything was done in Europe than could be hoped for in India, and as Europe was seen six thousand miles away in a rosy haze, there was no uncomfortable experience to bring disillusionment. The Indian believed him implicitly and flattered him by obsequious talk of the benevolence of Government, of the wonderful things Government had done, of the blessings of the Pax Britannica, and so on through the whole gamut of eulogy. In short, India acquiesced in this claim of superiority up to a certain limit, and she

was justified in doing so. For there can be no doubt that in all material things and in some ethical the English connection has been of the greatest advantage. Nor is it fair, as the Indian fashion to-day is, to decry these material gifts simply because they are material. No one should know better than India, if she cared to study her own history, that the intellectual life, the spiritual civilisation on which she prides herself, depends in no uncertain measure upon her material prosperity. Good order, a stable government, assured crops, so far as man can assure them, and easy communications have made possible the great intellectual advance of the last century, whereas the opposite conditions which followed upon the first Mussulman invasions ruined her art, sterilised her æsthetic life, and killed intellectual progress for centuries. But she never admitted that Europe was her superior in matters of religion, and she tacitly rejected the claim to social superiority by clinging tenaciously to her ancient customs and by continuing to regard the Brahman as the crown of humanity.

Things were different in China. The Chinese never admitted—possibly do not even now admit—the superiority of Europe

in any direction, but the logic of facts was too strong for them. They struggled in vain against overwhelming force which made their struggles at once pathetic and ridiculous. Knowing nothing whatever about Western science they still flattered themselves that they kept the keys of learning and continued to maintain the pleasing fiction that the 'Son of Heaven' was the Lord of the Universe and that emperors and kings of other states were so only at his pleasure and as his vassals. Blow after blow had fallen, but they still clung to their fantastic ideas, and being conquered again and again imagined themselves unconquerable.

And at last the dream was shattered. The three great landmarks which are set up as milestones on the road of Asia towards self-realisation are the Chino-Japanese war, the Russo-Japanese war, and the Great War. There is no need to speak of the two former here; the last quickened the national consciousness, not by prowess of arms but by the political doctrines which it called forth, and especially by the doctrine of self-determination.

This doctrine was specially enunciated for the benefit of Europe and was clearly opportunist. It was particularly meant to

apply to Alsace-Lorraine, to Poland, to Hungary, Bohemia and Silesia, all of which, except perhaps the last, could be confidently expected to vote as the authors intended, so that the forcible deprivation of Germany and Austria might appear as the beneficent action of the liberal powers who were freeing the peoples subject against their will. But it was not a new doctrine. It had been acted upon throughout the history of the world and it was implicitly fenced round with many limitations. Every nation has been allowed to determine for itself what form of government it would adopt, and whether it proposed to be independent or to be incorporated with another State, just in so far as its decision did not conflict with the interests or the security of another Power which was strong enough to have its way. So it was and so it always will be. Specious excuses can always be found to refuse self-determination, but in the end it will invariably be found that the real reason is, as it always has been, that the grant of it clashes with the interests of others.

But there were certain peoples to whom the doctrine obviously could not be applied, and for these another doctrine, the doctrine

of Mandates, was invented. This is a perfectly just and reasonable idea in itself, and in the case of savage tribes it is difficult to suggest a better. But when the doctrines are read together, a debatable line will emerge over which there is bound to be controversy. For if every nation is to be master of its own fate, at what point does any given nation sink from the independent class to the class in tutelage? For if Alsace-Lorraine can vote herself free or linked to France, how can the right be denied to Palestine or Syria? And if Syria, why not Egypt? And if Egypt, why not India?

Such was the argument, and it was very difficult to meet. To reply that Asia is not as Europe, and that Asiatic countries must remain in tutelage in their own interests, was simply to beg the question and to extend, quite unjustifiably in Asiatic eyes, the principle of the mandatory system. Self-determination obviously included the right of every nation to govern itself, if it were capable of expressing its wishes, and to rule that it was incapable was to shift the decision from the nation in question to the stronger Power. The true answer was that no such thing as absolute self-determination ever

has existed, or ever can exist, because there are higher considerations than national desire. A qualified self-determination there always has been; but political unity and international relations have always had the prior claim and have always intervened to prevent the doctrine from being carried out to its logical conclusion. The utmost therefore that could be attempted was to give the newly enunciated principle a more liberal interpretation than before.

Unfortunately, this answer was never given, though probably it would have had little effect on peoples intoxicated with the vision of their own national aspirations. The weaker line was taken of regarding each Asiatic country from the point of view solely of its own internal affairs. To grant self-determination to India, it was said, was to abandon the masses to an untried and possibly incompetent administration, to rivet the chains of Brahman ascendancy upon the people and to open the way to internal chaos, anarchy and civil war such as the world has never known. In all the long controversy it has never been hinted that England has also international obligations, and that the grant of self-determination to India until she is ready to undertake

the burden would upset the whole equilibrium in Asia, if not in the world.

Not unnaturally the phrase caught the imagination of Eastern peoples for whom it seemed specially to have been coined, though probably Asia was never in the thoughts of the august authors at the time of the mintage. It gave a rallying cry to the nations which had been dimly seeking after self-expression. There had been other forces at work which all tended towards the same goal of nationality and independence, but hitherto they had failed because Asia had had to approach European masters as a suppliant. The supremacy of Europe supposed to have been shattered by the Japanese guns had proved after all to be very much in being, but Europe had now presented a weapon forged in her own armoury, and she could not refuse a plea based upon her own plighted word on the keeping of which she had always prided herself. India redoubled her efforts, China clamoured to be mistress in her own house. Persia indignantly threw off the double yoke of Britain and Russia. Egypt, African in name but Asiatic in sentiment, fought to put an end to the ambiguous occupation. Palestine refused to accept the dictation of Europe,

and Irak chafed under the British protection. Afghanistan, waging an unsuccessful war, received the spoils of it in her independence. She used it promptly to conclude a treaty with Republican Turkey to establish " solidement les principes de la liberté de tous les peuples asiatiques sur la base du droit des nations à disposer d'elles-memes," and engaged " à ne reconnaître l'autorité ou le contrôle d'aucune puissance étrangère sur les affaires intérieures ou extérieures des dits peuples." In all Asia, French India and Siberia alone were quiescent, and the coupling of the two names forbids any deduction from a more generous or a more astute administration and bids us seek the causes elsewhere.

The Russo-Japanese war destroyed in Asiatic eyes the tradition of European invincibility. A pæan of triumph arose. Asia jumped to the conclusion that to copy European models in certain directions would make her at least the rival of Europe, while in others she still maintained that she was already superior. Japan had given the example of military equality and it became increasingly apparent that her strength lay, not only in her armies and navies, but in her reconstructed government, in her expand-

ing trade, in her progressive science, and in her splendid organisation—ideas borrowed one and all from Europe and even imported wholesale. Let Asia do as Japan has done, was the cry, and she will be the equal, perhaps by reason of her greater numbers and her nimbler wits the superior, of Europe. But the thing could not be done. China remodelled her armies on the European plan, but she has not succeeded in turning her ploughshares into swords; she cast out her divine Emperor and has substituted a mere travesty of a Republic. India, unable to control her armies, organised revolutionary bands; she clamoured for education, for technical schools, for industrial expansion; she professed herself ready for a national democratic constitution and strove by all the means in her power to obtain it. The ferment is working in Persia, in Irak, in Palestine, in Syria. Turkey, essentially Asiatic, has expelled her Sultan, and lest religious fanaticism or fervour should oppose her advance towards the European example she has dethroned her Khalif.

But what Asia has not yet realised is that to do as Japan has done you must have the Japanese spirit. It is useless to adopt the European systems unless you

have imbibed all that underlies them. Democracy remains a catchword, if you merely set up Parliaments and do not believe in government by the people. Armaments are futile unless you have men endowed with the spirit of patriotism and with the courage that accepts death. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—all these are catchwords so long as the people have not been steeped in the conditions that make them a living possibility. Commerce itself must be withered and stunted unless strict honesty—a quality perhaps less highly valued in the Eastern than in the Western code—be practised in all commercial dealings. In a word, the change must be organic and not mechanical; the imitation must be adapted, not merely adopted.

But this new uprising of Asia is natural. Men admire power. Unquestionably the attitude of Europe towards Japan has undergone a remarkable change since she stood forth as the leader of Asia, and took her place at the Council table of the world's great Powers. Her customs were once recorded with a kind of patronising curiosity; now they are found to be worthy of more careful analysis, if not of modified imitation; faults once freely laid to her charge are now

indignantly denied. She has won the world's respect, none the less genuinely perhaps because she has won it by reforming herself upon the Western model. But she has won it chiefly because she is powerful. China looks sadly on and wonders if she too can ever realise the vision. India indignantly exclaims that given the opportunity she could do all and more than all that Japan has done. Asia is beginning to conquer Europe by ideas; time alone will show whether she will ever rival her in military power, in capacity for government and in scientific achievement.

CHAPTER II

The Invasion of Asia

WHEN the sentimental enthusiasm had spent itself which had impelled the Crusaders to attempt the redemption of the Christian Holy Places from the defiling hands of the infidel Turk, Europe turned her attention to the more practical business of commerce. But hand in hand with the desire for gain went the zeal of the missionary, which burned to bring the light of Christianity into the dark places of the earth. In the early days all who did not profess Christianity were 'infidels' or 'heathen'; infidels if they professed a theistic or iconoclastic faith such as Islam, and heathen if they bowed down to idols like the Hindu or worshipped ancestors like the Chinese. It did not matter to these zealots that the civilisations of Oriental peoples were in many respects not inferior to, and in many cases older than, their own; nor did it concern them that

vice was as rampant in Europe as in Asia. In both continents there were shining examples of virtue; in both there were equally detestable examples of vice. What did matter was that these peoples had not found salvation through Jesus Christ, and in the eyes of early missionaries this amounted to the certainty of eternal damnation; there were souls to save and they must save them.

As early as the beginning of the twelfth century the prospects of trade had attracted Venice to the East, but by acquiring what was practically a monopoly on the Syrian coast and in Asia Minor she only touched the fringe of the Asiatic continent. With the fall of the Latin empire all prospects of European supremacy even there had vanished, though the Venetians went to great lengths to preserve their trade, even to the limit of scandalising Europe by her treaty with the infidels. But with the decline of Venice all attempts of Europe to establish herself in that part of Asia ceased until 1914, when the precipitate action of Turkey in joining the Central Powers ended by establishing England in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and France in Syria, under the newly enunciated doctrine known as Mandates, which, theoretically at any rate,

connotes responsibility to the world's opinion for the good government of the states or territories so entrusted to the mandatory.

While Venice was thus making her first attempts to establish herself commercially on the Asiatic coast, India and the Far East were almost unknown. Travellers' tales brought to Europe dazzling accounts of the unexampled splendour which they saw at the Courts of these distant countries, but they did not see or did not reveal the persistent poverty and the intense ignorance of the masses. It has been said that Wordsworth's 'gorgeous East' is a fiction; he should have said the 'squalid East,' but that is merely the exaggeration of epigram. The merchandise of the East was at any rate sufficiently dazzling to attract the cupidity or the enterprise of the European. It is remarkable that neither in India nor in China was there any opposition to the invasion of Europe. This was directly due to two causes. When Vasco da Gama anchored in Calicut in 1498 he was kindly received by the Zamorin, doubtless because he came as an adventurer with no force behind him. It probably never entered the heads of the people of Malabar that there

was anything to fear from the visit, or if it did they felt themselves strong enough to resist any show of force. Moreover, the coming of Europeans was something entirely new in their experience. They knew nothing of the restless ambitions of the West, of its spirit of enterprise, of its political structures, of its wars, its quarrels, its beliefs and its culture. To them it must have seemed but the visit of men of strange colour, strange speech and strange customs. In India the country had not even reached the imperfect state of consolidation under the Moghuls. The House of Lodi was seated on the throne of Delhi and the Zamorin of Calicut was but a petty prince, cut off from communication with Eastern India by the range of the Western Ghats. Missionaries had no doubt penetrated to the borders of China as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, but they accomplished little of their object and may be regarded rather as travellers, the precursors of Marco Polo. Even when the seventeenth century was far advanced we find the Emperor K'ang Hsi according to the missionaries a contemptuous tolerance. Himself indifferent to the message of Christianity, he seems to have allowed his family to receive baptism.

Meanwhile visions of political power and magnificent wealth had fired the imagination of the Portuguese upon the return of da Gama to Portugal. The same motives which had impelled Asia to descend upon Europe when the Tatars burst into Russia, the Bulgars were swarming round Constantinople and the Huns left behind them a track of desolation and fire, now impelled Europe to retaliate upon Asia with a moderation in method which is attributable to the lapse of centuries rather than to any inherent excellence or superiority of civilisation. Those motives were gain and power. The Asiatic hordes had put the first before the second; having achieved their object by the sledgehammer blows of giant force, they often retired with their booty or moved to fresh harvests, leaving the desolated and murdered country to restore itself as best it could. By the end of the fifteenth century Europe had learned better. She saw that the more calculated methods paid. Once given the spirit of enterprise, of which there was no lack and which might or might not follow in the wake of religious fervour, the procedure was plain; so plain that it has passed into a proverb. If the missionary were first in the field, he was soon followed

by the trader, and in the long run some European flag or other was sure to fly over a portion at least of the invaded territory. This modified formula is necessary when we are stating the general proposition, for it was by no means the first nation that arrived which eventually came to possess the greatest power. The Portuguese empire in India came to nothing; the little European country was overweighted by the undertaking. The Portuguese settlement in China never emerged from its commercial character. Neither was any country annexed in its entirety, unless India be an exception, seeing that the Princes owe their position there to-day to the forbearance of the British, which may itself be ascribed partly to the accident that a trading company was called to imperial duties, and partly to the prevalence of new ideas arising to a great extent out of the French Revolution. The fact remains that in India the flags of Portugal and France float beside that of Britain, that the French flag flies over a southern province of China and the English over Hong Kong, while the elimination of the Dutch, the Russians and the Germans was brought about not by the efforts of the people whose territory they had appro-

priated, but by Powers outside the continent of Asia.

There was also another motive in those mediaeval times. The spirit which the Song of Roland breathes of Christian triumph over the pagan and which was in the early Crusaders had persisted, though it had taken on a new orientation. It was thought no shame to 'spoil the Egyptians,' for was it not the mission of all Christian countries who chose to put a perverted interpretation upon the words of the Master to go into all the world and to preach the Gospel, by peaceful means if such would serve, and if not by the more persuasive eloquence of the sword. To the Pope as vicegerent of Christ upon earth belonged the right of disposing of other people's lands to pious adventurers, so long at any rate as those lands belonged to the heathen. Armed with his authority as with the sword of the Spirit the nations might annex continents in the hope that other things would be added unto them. The only question was who got there first, and the point which the Pope was called upon to decide was not the ethical principle involved in seizing upon the lands of others, but merely which of two European claimants should be recog-

nised. Obviously if St. Peter had received the keys of Heaven, his successor might claim the infinitely lesser power of disposing of the earth.

To these excellent people the inhabitants of Asiatic countries were very much like the wild beasts. In later times we have seen the jungle driven back by the superior intellect of man, and the flag has been planted in the inaccessible regions of the Poles. But where Nature has proved herself too strong man has given way. Nobody cares very much whose flag flies at the South Pole and nobody particularly covets those disease-infected swamps where only the desire to heap up riches can tempt the white man to settle. Only one man has ever been found who wished to claim the Sahara and the world wrote him down mad. And so it was open to the white adventurer to dispossess the natives if he could; if he did, the Pope would intervene; if he could not, the question simply did not arise. It was in some such spirit as this that da Gama on his return to Calicut proceeded to use all the weight of his European knowledge and power against the very prince without whose friendly offices the first famous voyage would have ended in very little.

It was in some such spirit as this that the first Portuguese traders, having obtained from the Emperor of China the grant of Macao as a settlement, had as we are told "rapidly filled up a large cup of iniquity." "They had," this authority goes on to say, "been guilty of every form of outrage . . . and it cannot be denied that the history of the early Portuguese settlement in China is stained by every form of iniquity."

No very long time elapsed before Russia began to move eastwards across the Urals. The conquest of Siberia, which added enormously to the area of the Russian Empire without bringing with it any commensurate advantages, was effected in small stages and apparently without any very definite idea of Imperial or national aggrandisement. The causes of it were economic and political rather than military. The emancipation of the serfs induced, and religious persecution impelled, many of the peasantry to seek their fortunes beyond the bounds of Holy Russia, and traders in seeking to obtain control of the fur trade found but a feeble opposition from the sparse population. Superior as the Portuguese may have counted their own civilisation when brought into

contact with the ancient systems of India and China, the contrast between the Russians, backward though they were in comparison with Western Europe, and the semi-savage tribes of the northern half of Asia was even more marked. In less than a century they had forced back the indigenous people into the more inaccessible forests or towards the shores of the Arctic ocean and had reached the confines of China. Nowhere in Asia has the displacement of the aborigines been more complete; indeed it would be more accurate to say that nowhere else in Asia since the coming of the Aryans can it be said that there was any displacement at all. In Siberia, on the other hand, the Russians form four-fifths of the population, but Siberia has followed the law. A sparse population in European Russia, ill equipped by education to overcome the hostility of a not too lavish Nature, found plenty of room and plenty of occupation without wandering into unknown and possibly more inhospitable lands. The fittest remained behind. The genius of the people does not lie in colonisation, and the Government gave a sinister connotation to its new possessions by turning them into a penal settlement. Those who fear the 'Asiatic peril' may take comfort from the

history of Siberia, for the country remains undeveloped though the immigrants, largely like the Asiatic immigrants drawn from the peasantry, had to encounter, not the vigorous opposition of white races but the feeble resistance of unorganised tribes.

On the other hand, much as there was to deplore in the conduct of the early European adventurers in Asia, the blame was not entirely theirs; nor were their motives by any means always self-seeking. Many of the early missionaries were sincerely anxious only to preach the gospel of Christ and to spread the light of what they at least called the truth by peaceful and legitimate means. Although we have to-day a far more extensive knowledge of the religious systems of India and the Far East, of the ethical principles attached to or arising from them, and of the great conceptions upon which they are based, the majority even of educated people are still content to take their views, if they have any, from those who prefer to see only the excrescences and the degenerations of the ancient faiths. And since religion in the East is so bound up with everyday life, the manners, the customs, the institutions and the civilisations are judged by the same standard. If such

notions can prevail in the present state of knowledge, we are the more surprised to find enlightenment among the adventurers of the sixteenth century when, like the great Ricci in China and Xavier in India, they seized upon and acknowledged what was good, tried to understand the people and moulded their conduct accordingly. Reprisals, such as the murder of d'Andrade in China, for the misdoings of men for whom he was in no way responsible, only served to exasperate national feeling, to encourage the preconceived idea that the East was barbaric, and to emphasise the feeling of superiority which was already being entertained. The individuals who came in contact with power and authority were no doubt deferential because they had no force to back them, but it is incorrect to argue, as Mr. Hyndman has argued, that "there was none of that arrogant confidence in the superiority of the white race over all races of a different colour, which became so marked a feature in the attitude of Europe towards the Eastern peoples." On the contrary, the sense of superiority was constantly at work, even to the detriment of obvious material interests. Superiority is inherent in the very rôle of teacher, and it was in that

capacity that the missionaries invaded the Far East and India. Had the merchants been anxious to trade as equals with equals, we should hear less of various massacres and other enormities committed upon the harmless people, nor would there have been any serious objection to adopting the customary national obeisance to the Emperor of China.

Lastly and most important of all, the vision of a great Oriental empire, distant some thousands of miles from the Imperial country, could never have entered the heads of a small and militarily undistinguished nation such as the Portuguese. We shall do well to remember that the age of da Gama's famous voyage is also the age of the conquest of Peru and Mexico, whereby the other kingdom of the Iberian peninsula had acquired an empire rich, in report at any rate, beyond the most fantastic dreams, and boasting as ancient and as well developed a civilisation as that with which they were willing to credit the Orientals. A handful of determined Spaniards had overthrown the hosts of Montezuma and of Atahuallpa, why should not a handful of determined Portuguese achieve the same feat in India?

For the time, however, prudence demanded

that this sense of superiority should remain latent. And when the Maratha armies began to raise their heads in the eighteenth century against the distracted and overbusy empire of Aurangzib, the Portuguese empire on the western littoral was already doomed. They had however shown the way. In India they were quickly followed by the Dutch, the French and the English. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the fate of India and of the islands of the Indian archipelago was decided by the wars and the politics of Europe; the peoples had no hand in shaping their own destinies. The Portuguese vision of an Oriental empire was revived by Dupleix, and doubtless the great name of France, which was then without a rival in Europe, justified him in assuming that his countrymen were equal to any enterprise however vast. The Dutch and the English came purely as traders; we do not find them willingly taking part in any of the wars which occupied the reign of Aurangzib. The Dutch, in fact, never attempted any real colonisation or conquest on the continent of Asia; they were tolerated in Japan as traders, and indeed for a time they held a commercial monopoly there. They never made much headway in China

and their Indian establishments never passed beyond the stage of factories. We have now reached the stage at which England came to the front. It has often been remarked that her possession of India was the result of accident and not of design, for, far from wishing to embark upon any scheme of conquest, the East India Company never ceased to enjoin on their employees the paramount necessity of restricting the bounds of the territories which they controlled, and of avoiding all entanglements in the native wars. There were, however, two factors in the situation which completely upset this cautious programme. The first was the national rivalry with France, which not only could not endure to witness tamely the expansion of French power in the East but which not unnaturally looked with alarm at such an evident menace to their trade. The second was the need for self-defence.

If the English had been deliberately waiting for an opportunity to found an empire in India, they could hardly have chosen a more auspicious moment. The Moghul empire had collapsed in startling fashion under the strain of distant wars and the incessant blows of the Marathas. The great empire which Babar founded was dissolving

into various kingdoms and principalities ruled by the erstwhile Viceroys and Satraps of the Great Moghul. The hardy troops of Central Asia had become enervated by luxury and the climate, and the flower of them had withered under the blight of Aurangzib's devastating wars. Had there been an Akbar or a Babar to contend with instead of the puppet Emperor whose name is barely mentioned in history; had the troops been of the quality that followed the Moghul standard from Kabul, there might have been a different story to tell and perhaps Plassey might never have been fought. Fortune directed otherwise. The Maratha Empire arose in the West, where English factories at Bombay and Surat barely held their own by cultivating friendship with the new power and by studiously avoiding, as they were enjoined to do, every semblance of quarrel that might lead to serious war. And so the ship of the Company was steered through the rocks and shoals, not without grazing the former and temporarily running aground on the latter; and when Panipat arrived, and Ahmed Shah gave the Maratha power a death wound, the English traders were still pursuing their difficult course and earning dividends for their masters in London.

Meanwhile it was not so much the hostility of native princes as jealousy of the hereditary European enemy that drove the English into war against their will on the other side of India. The Company's orders were strict; their goal was single. They were in India to trade and to trade only, and nothing was to be done that could and would interfere with that object. But the servants of the Company naturally argued that nothing should be left undone to prevent injury to the trade, and in the predominance of the French and the manifest ambitions of Dupleix they scented not merely danger but extermination. The English domination in India sprang out of a dual self-preservation, the physical defence of life and liberty and the economic defence of commerce. There is nothing in the early days of British history in India to show that anyone had so much as contemplated an Oriental empire such as the Portuguese had conceived in the sixteenth century. On the contrary everything pointed the other way. There is evidence that the Company, true to its declared policy of non-intervention, was seriously alarmed as its territories began to grow, and was sincerely and even nervously anxious to put a period to this expansion.

The Portuguese had tried to establish an empire and had failed; the Dutch had made no headway, and though the French threat was serious, the issue was doubtful when they were pitted against the hardier and better disciplined troops of Western and Northern India. Clear though it may be to us viewing events as we do through the perspective of centuries, it could not have been clear to the handful of men in India, that the clay feet of the golden Moghul image were already so cracked that the image itself would soon lie prostrate, or that the span of life granted to the empire that was rising upon the ruins was to be so short. It is a travesty of history to insinuate as Mr. Hyndman has done that the English were supported from home with the conscious idea of conquest, or that they "played upon the differences between the Indian Courts" with a consummate intrigue which had for its object the establishment of an empire.

Meanwhile the Roman Catholics in China had exhibited their latent sense of superiority as the Portuguese had done in India, but with less circumspection. For while the Portuguese set out to conquer the land by force of arms, the Jesuit and other missionaries seem to have behaved almost as

if the country were already theirs. In this attitude they were perhaps encouraged by the favour of the Emperor K'ang Hsi, who, however, could not brook the presence of a Papal Legate and the consequent transference of his own authority to Rome. The general state of affairs was well depicted by the speech which K'ang Hsi's successor Yung Cheng is said to have delivered to a deputation of missionaries. "What would you say," he said, "if I were to send a troop of bonzes and lamas into your country in order to preach their doctrines? How would you receive them? You wish that all the Chinese should become Christians, and indeed your creed commands it. I am well aware of this, but in that event what would become of us? Should we not soon be merely the subjects of your kings? The converts you have made already recognise nobody but you, and in a time of trouble they would listen to no voice but yours. I will have none of you in the provinces," and if they wished to remain in Canton and Pekin they must not give cause for complaint.

This speech shows very clearly that while the Chinese resented the interference with their national faith, more perhaps as a piece

of bad manners than because of any dogmatic belief, what they most feared was the political influence of the Jesuits. There is no hint anywhere that they were afraid of invasion by any European country. Their own ignorance of Europe, the immense distance of China from any maritime nation of the West, and their simple faith in the 'Son of Heaven' as the most powerful monarch on earth, precluded any such fear. The secular forces of Europe were as yet confined to a small island off the south coast, and no advance from there by the Portuguese was anticipated or indeed possible so long as the Imperial servants were ordinarily vigilant. But insurrection was not an uncommon thing in the scattered provinces of the Celestial Empire, and Yung Cheng spoke as became any prudent monarch when he alluded to the danger of allowing a political 'imperium in imperio' to be established under the guise of religious doctrine.

So far then the European had developed a sense of superiority more or less latent, for which on analysis there seemed to be little justification. In their own eyes no doubt they had two valuable assets. The first of these was religion, for wherever Christians have gone, at any rate since the Roman

Empire adopted Christianity and probably for that very reason, because the Imperial religion was backed by the Imperial power and was synonymous with the Imperial civilisation, they have looked upon the professors of other faiths as inferiors. Islam has done much the same, because Islam like Christianity is a militant religion; but the manifestation of its superiority has been different. Christianity has sought and still seeks to convert by precept and example and argument; Islam offered the alternative of conversion or the sword. And therefore Christianity looked and still looks upon those who decline its teaching with a kind of contemptuous pity, and is ever hoping that Divine grace may some day raise the ignorant and the obstinate from darkness into light. Islam, on the other hand, would exterminate the unbelievers in the assured faith that they would thereby please Allah. It is true that Christianity, chiefly at one time and in one place, took on the warlike character of Islam; but although all are agreed that the Conquistadores in America were ruthless and unprincipled, it is doubtful whether their conduct can fairly be charged to militant Christianity; for the impelling motive in Peru and in Mexico was the acqui-

sition of wealth, and the Spanish Inquisition probably behaved no more harshly towards the unbelieving Aztecs and Incas than towards the heretic Christians of Europe. It was doubtless the example and influence of the Inquisition which were largely responsible for Portuguese atrocities in India and to a certain extent in China. If the Church could torture and burn the bodies of white men, of men of the same race and fundamentally of the same belief as their persecutors, it was small wonder that the layman should have taken little account of the bodies of men of an alien race, an alien civilisation and a misguided faith.

The second asset which the European had was maritime enterprise, and here the claim assuredly stood on firmer ground. In the face of the great invasions of countries, both European and Asiatic, it would be idle to deny the spirit of enterprise to Asiatics, nor was it entirely quenched by the time Vasco da Gama reached Malabar, for only twenty-eight years later Babar, inspired as he himself tells us by nothing else than ambition, led his Central Asian legions to the last and most successful experiment in Hindustan: and the great and tragic migration of the Kalmucks, so vividly

described by De Quincey, still breathed the same spirit. Nevertheless the magnificent progresses of Timur and Genghis Khan were only an extension of the Assyrian and Arab conquests; they were undertaken for the sake of plunder, of ambition or of religious propaganda. The maritime enterprise of Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries differed in kind as well as in motive. It marks as great an epoch as does the Renaissance in Europe in the history of art. The natives of the Iberian peninsula to whom the credit is largely due, must have been looked upon by their contemporaries much as the Phœnicians of old were regarded by the less daring nations of Asia Minor. To sail into unknown seas, wholly ignorant what land they might find, what civilisations might resist their coming, what storms they might encounter—prepared for a voyage that must last months and might last years, venturing out of sight of land to an unheard-of extent—these were all achievements which justly evoked the pride of their countrymen and commanded the admiration of foreigners.

Neither of the assets which thus stimulated the European sense of superiority appealed to the people thus for the first time brought

into contact with the West. The religion might pass; Hinduism was good enough for Hindus; the teachings of Confucius and Buddha served the Chinese, and if Western missionaries liked to preach a new creed in countries where many creeds had found a home, and into which others had been imported, they were welcome to do so, so long as they did not meddle with politics or disturb the loyalty of the people. The few strangers were welcomed, in India because they offered good prospects of a market, for the Zamorin was long sighted enough to see that his country would gain by exchanging the pepper and cinnamon of Malabar against the products of the West; in China, because of their skill in making ingenious toys, in astronomical calculations and in other matters unconnected with politics or with religion. Hinduism was strong enough to hold its own against the new doctrines, as indeed it has proved itself to be ever since. Buddhism and the teaching of Kung-fu-tse were too deeply rooted to be disturbed by any outside influence. As for Islam, the religion of the predominant rulers in India, that was itself a militant and proselytising faith, and far from submitting to conversion was itself ever ready to convert. Christianity

might be a nuisance, but it could not be a danger: as a religious cult it had nothing special to recommend it. The spectacle of priests quarrelling in China over theological details, and of innocent people oppressed and hunted down in India, was not calculated to commend the faith to the inhabitants nor to demonstrate its superiority as a system; and the arrogance of the priests in China was well rebuked by K'ang Hsi, who remarked of Bishop Maigrot that he should not presume to criticise that which he could not possibly understand.

Nor was the East greatly impressed by Western enterprise. To nations which, in spite of extensive seaboards, never showed any love for the sea and never ventured far outside their own territorial waters, the magnitude of the undertaking was not apparent. They accepted the fact without question, and if they wondered at all the wonder was of that kind which the uninstructed listener-in at a broadcasting performance displays to-day, a wonder at the result without seeking to understand the causes or to realise the labour and the thought and the science that produced it. They were wholly ignorant of the geography of Europe. Their imagination was no more struck by the infor-

mation that these strangers had come some thousands of miles over the sea than is ours by the unrealisable distance of the sun from the earth. They knew perhaps that these foreign countries were a long way off and that was enough for them. That this is no fanciful picture we can test even in these days of enlightened knowledge, when everything is catalogued for us in books of reference. How many of us have the slightest conception of the distance of New York from San Francisco, or can say offhand how far Moscow is from Vladivostok? Has not many a traveller to India received messages to be delivered to a beloved son from a mother ignorant of the fact that Bombay and Calcutta are some 1,800 miles apart?

And, again, neither party had any knowledge of the civilisation of the other. It is one of the curious features of present-day Indian politics that only the most far-seeing and broad-minded Indians can view their country in its proper perspective towards the rest of the world. To the majority among them the importance of their own interests is so paramount that they seem unable to realise that it may not appear so to others. A recent example of this one-

sided view was the proposal put forward, doubtless in good faith, in the Indian Legislative Assembly that England should hire out her armies to an Indian government, having otherwise completely divested herself of all authority in and all responsibility for the country. If such views can find advocates among Indians to-day when their horizon has been so enlarged by education, by foreign travel and by continual contact with the West, it is hardly a matter for surprise that the Indian of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, unable to see beyond the bounds of his own country, regarded it as the most powerful, the most prosperous and the most enlightened in the world.

But if Indians thus saw no signs of the superiority upon which the Europeans prided themselves in secret, much less did the Chinese. To them the Emperor was not merely the most potent monarch in the world, but the incarnation of God upon earth, from whom, it would seem, the subordinate officials also inherited some spark of divinity. The Emperor did not die: he became a 'guest on high.' He was the 'Son of Heaven' whose empire was celestial, and when once Fate compelled one of these divinities to commit suicide, the tree on which he hanged

himself was loaded with chains. He did not say with Vespasian, 'Ut puto, Deus fio'; rather he would have said, 'Deus sum,' stating the fact without any suggestion of doubt or opinion. The common people saw the strangers tolerated, but no more than tolerated in the land. They saw them admitted in due form to the presence of the Emperor, and doubtless thought that they were compelled to offer to the 'Son of Heaven' the same divine honours which he exacted from themselves. They also saw that the Portuguese merchants were banished to an island and that the missionaries were only allowed in certain specified places, and for the rest they were content to put up with the foreigners so long as they could do good business with them.

Nor could Europe effectively boast of her superiority in the arts. The embroideries and textiles of India, the ivory and lacquer work of China, these and similar elegances of the minor arts were obvious to the artistic as well as to the commercial eye of Europe, but the products of the nobler arts were not yet revealed to the strangers, nor did they make any serious attempt to discover them. The very existence of the ancient

Indian drama was as yet unsuspected. The glories of Moghul architecture, not long given to the world, were hidden from European eyes in the interior of India, and the indigenous arts of the Hindus, as manifested in their elaborately decorated temples, probably appeared grotesque to the adventurers as they often do to to-day's tourists, while the idolatry which they symbolised shocked their religious susceptibilities and roused a fanatic rather than an æsthetic fervour. Of music and literature, whether in China or India, they knew nothing, and perhaps cared less; indeed, great as has been the expansion of our knowledge of the literature and arts of the East, very little progress has been made towards the due appreciation either of the science or the art of Oriental music. And if Europe was thus ignorant of Eastern culture, Asia was even more ignorant of Western, for neither India nor China, nor indeed any country east of Persia, had had the opportunity or the inclination to become acquainted with it. It is an amusing pastime to compare the writings of Europeans, even of only fifty years ago, with the records of travellers at the present time, and to observe how the attitude has changed with the growth

of knowledge, and how with better acquaintance respect has deepened. It is an interesting reflection that whereas in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries English was hardly known in India, it is now the lingua franca of the country, and that not only Milton and Shakespeare and Shelley but Herbert Spencer and Mill and Hobbes are household words, and are as well appreciated as in England; that China is at last abandoning her well-loved system of a purely religious and literary education in favour of European models, and that Japan, the latest of the three great Asiatic peoples to enter the lists of Western intimacy, has adopted European music and European painting, builds upon the European plan, and publishes books and papers in the English language.

And then came Plassey. For the first time since Alexander, Europe was pitted against Asia with the dice enormously loaded in favour of the latter. But the Asiatic host was scattered like chaff and Clive marched triumphantly upon Calcutta. From that time forwards Europe never looked back. So decisive was European supremacy in the field that the battle of Chillianwala would have resulted in the recall of the Commander-in-chief, merely because it was

indecisive, had he not in the meantime finally defeated the Sikhs at Gujerat. The tradition of European invincibility became firmly established in Asia, mainly through British victories in India, and lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century. Because certain nations, especially England and France, had proved that certain Asiatic troops were no match for them, Asia, arguing from the particular to the general, jumped to the conclusion that no Asiatic troops anywhere could stand up against any European army; and Europe, arguing in much the same fashion, was equally convinced of her own superiority. When the Japanese, fighting under favourable conditions, at no great distance from their base, a maritime people against an almost landlocked country, overcame the Russians as well by sea as by land, Asia at once swung to the opposite extreme and announced loudly that the European tradition was shattered for ever.

But this is to anticipate. By the end of the eighteenth century European superiority had only been definitely demonstrated to the conviction of Asiatics in one country and in one respect. The British power, by a series of successful military actions

not willingly undertaken, but each, as so often happens, necessitated by the evolution of events, was becoming more and more firmly established in India; in China, on the other hand, Europe had made no attempt at conquest or annexation under any disguise whatever, unless the Portuguese occupation of Macao, permitted by the Chinese Government of its own free will, can be so called. Russia had expanded almost up to the shores of the Pacific by sweeping aside in bloodless stages of her advance the feeble resistance of unorganised and backward tribes. The Turkish Empire was untouched: Persia and Afghanistan were wholly independent, and except for the invasion of Japan by a few missionaries, Europe had been content to leave severely alone both that country and Tibet.

The nineteenth century was to see vast changes in the situation. But before proceeding to these it will be well to take a rapid glance at the condition of Europe as compared with these Asiatic countries, with their splendid Courts, their haughty traditions, and with one exception their native governments, to all appearances firmly established upon enduring foundations. It is only by this means that we shall obtain a

true perspective and realise how it came about that by the close of the nineteenth century Europe had so completely established her ascendancy.

By the middle of the eighteenth century Europe was with one or two important exceptions definitely taking on the shape which she wore until 1914. There was as yet no unified Germany and no unified Italy, but Prussia and Russia had emerged as first-class powers rivalling the Western Powers of France and Spain. Poland was soon to be swallowed up and to disappear from the map temporarily. Austria was still predominant in South Central Europe, and Sweden had sunk to the position of a third-rate Power. But the wars of religion were over. They had ceased in France with the accession of Henri IV, in Spain when the Netherlands made good their revolt, and Germany after her thirty years' experience of the seventeenth century had had enough. New political ideas were coming into prominence, especially the doctrine of the Balance of Power and the conception that states should be governed, if not by the people, at any rate for them. Political economy had already taken definite shape, and men had begun to see that the true

wealth of a nation lies, not in territorial aggrandisement, but in the expansion of commerce. It was especially this conviction that turned the eyes of the century overseas, for except for the fleeting Portuguese dream in India and the establishment of Spain in America there was no definite thought of conquest. Enterprise in unknown lands was most marked in those nations which had apparently a well-consolidated form of government and whose frontiers were incapable of any appreciable expansion in Europe. England, France, Holland and the Peninsula (which, however, was hampered by the gradual decline after the Armada) stood out in sharp contrast with the still fluid states of Prussia, burning to consolidate her scattered territories and to absorb Poland, Austria confronted with the challenge of Prussian aggression, and Italy, still divided into petty principalities and cut in two by the states of the Church. Russia had newly emerged as a European Power: she had already expanded eastward and was eager to share in the Polish feast.

At the same time Europe had not much to teach Asia in the art of government. The peculiar division of Europe into a number of states, none of them large as compared

with India, China, or Persia, and many of them ranking little if at all higher than petty principalities—a division which to this day is the cause of endless quarrels and of diplomatic crises—was aggravated by the idea that a country was the legitimate prey of dynastic ambition or the rightful dowry of a fortunate princess. Wars were incessant. Politicians were unscrupulous, and if Frederick William and the Great Frederick stand out as extreme examples, they were still only the products of the age. Feudal custom and social privileges pressed upon the people as hardly as did the caste system upon the masses of India, the privileged position of the Samurai in Japan and the special order of the Mandarins and other officials in China. Louis XIV and Catherine II could no more claim to be the 'fathers of the people' than could the Emperor of China or the Great Moghul: perhaps the nascent idea of nationality in the West identified more closely the glory of the ruler with the glory of the nation. But that was all.

The art of war, however, had been highly developed. Marlborough, Condé, Turenne and Frederick form such a group as perhaps no single century can show, and even their

fame was eclipsed by the supreme genius who for a brief space revived the dynastic idea. But when the convulsions of the Revolution had subsided and France had settled down once more into her proper place in Europe, new ideas gradually became established which were destined to have a momentous effect upon the fortunes of Europe in Asia.

CHAPTER III

The Supremacy of Europe

THE genius of the East, led by India, has always gravitated towards speculation in metaphysics. India, for ever prying behind the veil of the Unknowable, busied herself with the Why of the phenomenal Universe, and finding the problem insoluble named it Maya and confined herself to the Absolute. The West, " seeing God in clouds and hearing Him in the wind," sought out the path to the Absolute by dragging her secrets from Nature, and having discovered some of the mysteries of the phenomenal world she applied her knowledge to practical matters. Nor did she rest there. Not content with enlarging the bounds of her physical knowledge, she set herself to analyse and to collate the springs of human action, and in doing so she founded theories of Political Science and Political Economy and again applied them to practical commerce. It is true that the Mahabharata

contains excellent advice to kings on government and on the trust which is committed to them; even the ancient fables of India contain Machiavellian morals, and explain how a king should conduct himself towards friends and foes. But the priestly counsel of the Epic and the fancies of the fabulist do not deserve to be ranked as science, and when the Hindu religion, following the example of St. Teresa rather than that of St. Paul, deserted philosophy for ecstasy, such science as there was was relegated to the domain of poetry and fable. The Mussulmans had their own ideas and naturally took little note of Hindu advice.

India was the lure that tempted the early adventurers. The travellers' tales of a splendid country where wealth was to be had for the asking aroused their curiosity, and it must be added excited their cupidity. In seeking for India they stumbled upon more than India, and the way once pointed out, the stream that began in a trickle grew ever stronger until it became a mighty flood.

If we except the Swiss republic, to which nobody paid much attention, there was not much encouragement in the appearance of democracy upon the stage of Europe. The

new ideas of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity were expressed in such tyranny and such bloodshed as the world has rarely seen, and in a very few years democracy went down in tumult, to be succeeded by an autocracy which differed from that of Louis XIV only in that its aims were more extensive. In England, however, the democratic idea had gradually been gaining ground in a less spectacular fashion, and with it the sense of responsibility for the welfare of the people which it connoted. All through the eighteenth century England had shown a stability of government which contrasted favourably with those of states still dependent for their prosperity upon the personality of the monarch. In the East, India and China had both shown startling examples of autocratic influence. Barely half a century had intervened between the death of Akbar and the accession of Aurangzib, but the bigotry and ambition of the latter, by alienating the Hindus and by incessant wars, paved the way for the virtual extinction of the Empire early in the eighteenth century. The strong hand of Sivaji upheld the Maratha empire for a time, but had it not been for the Peishwas, the Chilperics and Childerics of Western India would soon have made

an end of it. In China the admirable Chien Lung was succeeded by the dissolute and incapable Chia-ching, and the empire began to deteriorate so rapidly that Chia-ching's successor Tao Kwang had a hard task to restore order. Imperfect as has been the realisation of the dream of democracy, especially in its later manifestations, Asia as well as Europe can show that the ideal of a benevolent despotism is always too dependent upon the personality of the individual.

If England, as we have seen already, was fortunate in the psychologic moment at which she was called upon, however reluctantly, to intervene, India was no less fortunate that the European nation called to the heritage of the Moghuls was one which had developed a stable system of government. This can be said quite dispassionately, though at first sight it may seem to be inspired by patriotic sentiment. The great colonising nations were not fitted to the task. Holland would have treated India as a mere market for the development of commerce; Spain as a field for unrestrained missionary zeal. The previous history of Portuguese effort is not encouraging, and France, great and powerful as she was, was undergoing violent

revolutions from autocracy to mob-rule, and from bourgeois government back to empire.

There was, however, not much at first to encourage the hope that England would show herself a competent ruler of Eastern lands. The company whose object was trade began to govern with both eyes on the dividend and only an occasional glance at the welfare of the people. By the end of the eighteenth century its rule was established in Bengal and in a strip of the East Coast, with a few settlements dotted here and there as the French settlements now are. But when the nineteenth century opened, and the limited jurisdiction extended over the greater part of the peninsula (Mysore and Travancore then as now excepted), the company of traders began to realise that they had shouldered political responsibility, and the traditions which had been gathering strength in England began to come into play. The fiery Bernhardi, writing with a purpose, declared that Germany was no whit behind England in the capacity for governing subject races ; but Professor Wegener, with the more sober recollections of a successful tour and of kindly hospitality received, judged that whatever rivals England might have in the fields of war or of com-

merce, her genius for government was unrivalled by any nation in the world. It was not, however, by a mere change of government, founded upon a political theory, that the further step in the establishment of European superiority was achieved. The leaven of the new ideas was beginning to work. Whatever a Roi Soleil or a Russian Czar might think of their possessions, England had determined that she would never be regarded as an appanage of the monarch. As the eighteenth century advanced it became more and more apparent that the prosperity of a kingdom depended upon the prosperity of its people, and that the first requisites were a stable government and the maintenance of order. Liberty, but not licence, was the privilege of all. But if even the power of a benevolent despot should be curtailed in the interests of the people, much less could an empire be entrusted to an uncontrolled trading company, for it was becoming manifest that good government could only be obtained when the interests of the sovereign and the people were one. That the interests of the trading East India Company were not identical with those of the people had already been ominously shown in the period of confusion that

elapsed between Clive's first and second administration. The Regulating Act of 1773 was the first step towards the assumption of responsibility by the people. Important as were its provisions for control and organisation, perhaps its most significant reforms were those which established a Supreme Court, free from any suspicion of self-interest, and the suppression of private gain, whether by the acceptance of presents or by the prosecution of trade, by the servants of the Company. The rulers became identified with the people instead of being antagonistic to them, and the foundations were laid for that devotion to duty which has always been the pride and the boast of the Indian Civil Service.

As each successive step was taken towards the gradual assumption of control over the whole country, organisation and consolidation were at once undertaken. Districts were formed; divisions and subdivisions were placed under different grades of the civil service for purposes of administration; the police were improved and the currency reformed; law and order began to take the place of chaos and anarchy. But the early British administration had the wisdom to see that peace and contentment must

rest upon the customs of the country, and not upon any political theory, however ideal, imported direct from Europe. The civil and criminal law was accepted with such modifications as European science judged to be necessary, and later on were codified when experiment had crystallised into a system. The foundations of the revenue system were adopted from the Moghuls and the Marathas, but taxation became less fluctuating because less dependent upon the seasons. Revenue in kind was displaced by fixed cash values, which if often too rigid had at least the merit that the taxpayer knew where he stood and what he was to expect.

We have often been inclined to plume ourselves upon the beneficence of our rule in India, and we were fortified in our belief by the acquiescence, if not the positive eulogy of Indians. The picture just drawn may appear too highly coloured. There were in fact many faults and much of which an Englishman has no reason to be proud. Nor can it be said that the Indians showed any great anxiety to profit by the English administration. The early period of English rule was marked by a series of wars almost as continuous as those of the time immedi-

ately preceding it. The difference was that the English wars were localised: they were conducted upon a settled plan of campaign, and none of them lasted very long. For a century—that is to say, from the date of the accession of Aurangzib in 1658 to the battle of Panipat in 1761—there had been almost continuously confused and desultory warfare, generally in Western and Central India, but occasionally extending far to the east and far even to the south. In the next century, from 1761 to the Mutiny in 1857, the English were called upon to wage at least thirteen wars, excluding those which ended in the final retirement of the French and those which originated in Burma. In no case were they fought with any serious combination. The Maratha wars were waged against the Marathas only; the Rohilla war against the Rohillas. The wars with Haidar and Tipu were fought either in the peninsula or in Mysore; the Sikh wars were confined roughly to the Sikh country and Bombay Presidency. It was not really until the collapse of the Mutiny that the land had peace, and the Pax Britannica its true beginning. From 1857 onwards there has been only one war of first-class importance, and that was not fought in

India. It is, however, characteristic of the British temperament and of the sense of European superiority that the least check to our arms was looked upon as a disaster, and the defeat of Maiwand, retrieved though it was, has always been regarded as a stain upon the English record.

The acquiescence of Indians in British rule was founded mainly upon the acknowledged military superiority which had thus been vindicated again and again, and upon a more slowly recognised administrative efficiency. In other respects save one (for we have got a little out of our chronological order) the general claim to European superiority was not admitted, or was simply ignored. The educated classes no doubt began to copy certain European customs, particularly in dress and domestic furniture, but it is probable that this fashion was largely created by official example. The English are conservative in such matters, and they do not easily adapt themselves to foreign ideas. Just as the missionary has a passion for clothing naked tribes generally in garments of European pattern, to suit European notions of decency and morality, so Englishmen introduced the shirt and coat because it shocked their notions of propriety that an

Indian clerk should appear before his master half-naked, though it must be added that these upper garments were already familiarised by the Mohammedans. So necessary are chairs and tables to European custom that to this day they are furnished to schools, though in after life nine-tenths of the pupils will never use them again : it was, however, considered necessary to efficient work in offices that such things should be supplied, and though he is quite ready to work at a desk adapted to sitting on the ground, almost every educated Indian will supply himself with them. But such things did not penetrate to the masses, and even the educated man, while acknowledging their convenience, goes no farther in the use of European manners. Christianity he left to the lowest of the people, with whom it has naturally become identified, so that in large measure it has taken on the appearance of a social rather than a religious distinction. Music touched no responsive chord in him ; he has always maintained, and still maintains, that his own is the higher art and the more scientific system. If in a few externals he has copied Europe, in all that concerns daily life, in births, in marriages, in funerals, in his land tenures and his legal system, he

has steadily refused to part with his own customs, even while he acknowledges their defects. Nor have the lower classes come any nearer, if as near, to any imitation of Europe; where they can see a material advantage they have no doubt modified their ancient methods, but that is all. Even the dregs of the people when they become Christians often do so not from any conviction of dogmatic truth, but because the protection of the white man is worth having and can be played off against the tyranny of the unconverted. It is better to have no caste in a society where caste means nothing, than in a society which is founded upon it.

But, it may be asked, what does the argument amount to? Are we to understand that, except that she has bowed to military force and has submitted to a superimposed foreign domination, the India of to-day is what India was before the British conquest? Not at all. In art, in literature, in commerce, in political organisation and outlook, in science—in all, in a word, that concerns public life—she has undergone immense changes, but in social life hardly any. In art and literature she has been brought into contact with Western ideas and she has experienced the inevitable conse-

quence of environment. Of this more will be said later. It must suffice for the present to point out that the adaptation of foreign artistic canons, and even the introduction of foreign artistic forms, does not necessarily imply the acknowledgment of foreign superiority. It is only when new conceptions, new inventions, new discoveries, impossible, so far as can be judged, of realisation by an Eastern people, have been welcomed and incorporated into the national life that such an acknowledgment can be postulated. It can be postulated of the art of war, of the science of politics, of administrative ability, and of scientific discovery. Above all, it can be postulated of science as applied to commerce. In these directions, and in no others, India admits the superiority of Europe.

India naturally stands in the foreground of the picture, because it is in India that the opportunity for making European influence felt has been the greatest; but before we consider the commercial aspect of the inquiry it is time to take a glance at China. If we analyse closely the attitude of the Chinese towards the foreigner we shall find that the dominant note was fear. The Oriental is fond of forms and ceremonies, and he places what seems to us an inordinate

value on dignity. It is a quality that seems to bear to the Eastern code something of the relation that honour does to ours; for we use, or have used, the word 'honour' in a sense that often seems far from honourable. We no longer think a hot word used in a drunken brawl sufficient excuse for an 'affair of honour,' nor indeed do we regard the duel of to-day as much more than an affair for ridicule; to us 'the debt of honour' is the wager made on the turf, or it may be over the champagne. In just such a way the Chinese misused, as it seems to us, the conception of dignity. The ridiculous pretensions made in proclamations and decrees and commands probably did not seem to them at all ridiculous; the childish insistence on ceremonial prostrations and other observances, which are so humiliating to the European, were to them vital. The inscription on the flag which described England's ambassador as a Tribute-bearer to the Emperor was, we may suppose, no gratuitous insult, but only another way of vindicating the dignity of the Son of Heaven. If it had not been so, if the Chinese had had any real conception of the incalculable importance of international trade, and if the European too had been able properly to appreciate

the immense value ascribed to dignity, the friction which so frequently arose out of these rites might have been avoided. But these were in fact only the trappings of majesty; behind them all there lay a very real fear which was always latent even when the sun of the Imperial favour let occasional and fitful rays fall upon the foreigner. The Chinese, in fact, more far-seeing perhaps, or perhaps more simple, than the Indians, distrusted the foreigner from the first. The missionaries were tolerated because they could make clocks and mend toys; they were even allowed to preach their faith so long as no harm came of it. The moment that the propagation of Christianity threatened to become interwoven with internal politics, the moment that there was the slightest sign of the formation of an independent party in the State, the sun of Imperial favour suffered an eclipse. Missionaries might work in specified places where they could be adequately supervised; they could not run wild in the country so that nobody could tell what might happen. The Portuguese traders were banished to Macao; the English traders were confined so far as might be to Canton. This fear was greatly intensified when the English

Crown felt called upon to take matters into its own hands and to appoint a representative. China began to struggle more and more ineffectively as she found herself more securely enmeshed. Lord Napier's entry into Canton without Imperial permission was more than a breach of etiquette; it was a defiance, and it was a defiance which could and would be made good as they very well knew, however much proclamations might bluster and foreign trade might be hindered. The departure from Canton owing to ill-health may have been hailed outwardly as a triumph; inwardly we may be sure it was hailed with a sigh of relief. The proof of this is that while the entry was visited with an embargo on foreign trade, the departure was signalised by its removal. Foreign trade was all very well at a distance; too near the centre of things it was dangerous. But, as Lord Napier said, you might as well try to stop the current of the Canton River as to prevent the expansion of European trade when Europe was determined to have it. The exasperation against the foreign devils broke out in riots and in cruel indignities to the traders. As the tigress is a harmless beast so long as you let her alone, but will fight to the death

for her young with such weapons as God has given her, so the peaceful Chinese were turned into roaring mobs by the instinct of self-preservation. The European was their master and in spite of the Son of Heaven and his satellites they knew it.

This vague indefinite fear which might be called foreboding was soon to be translated into very definite alarm. We are not now concerned with either the details or the morality of the opium wars, but with the psychology which led up to them. It may be doubted whether the arguments used on either side were quite sincere. " The Opium Question," it has been said, " was, as events fully demonstrated, only used by the officials as a convenient weapon with which to attack the foreigner." This is probably a correct estimate. It was notorious that the very officials who were so loudly condemning the opium traffic were themselves making fortunes by smuggling. That the foreigner was hated all events combined to show, but it was a hatred begotten of fear. No man loves those he is afraid of, and national hatred is the exaggeration of individual. The hatred of France towards Germany is based upon her dread of her; Germany hated England because she was

afraid of the English fleet. The weaker and the oppressed will always hate the stronger and the oppressor; the tyrant does not hate, he despises. England was determined to have her way. The opium trade was too valuable to lose; the dangers of the drug were and are very imperfectly known, and she was not impressed by the Chinese arguments because they were evidently insincere, and insincerity is to an Englishman the worst of vices. But their own counter-arguments were not much better. Since you cannot stop smuggling, they said, the traffic should be legalised. That is exactly the argument which is used in the controversy over contagious diseases and over the taxation of betting. Since you cannot stop sexual immorality, it is better to control it; since you cannot prevent betting, it is better to make a revenue out of it, and thereby perhaps to discourage it. The opposite view—and it is a view which Indians have taken in respect of the liquor revenue—is that it is politically wrong to sanction what is admittedly immoral. That is just what the Chinese said in the Opium Controversy, and they can hardly be blamed for saying it; the real blame lies in not acting up to their professed convictions.

The situation was mishandled. With the impotent violence of the weak the Chinese added insult to outrage in the vain struggle to make the foreigner go. The English, on their part, conscious of their superiority, seemed unable fully to appreciate the subtleties of the Oriental character. They were inclined to apply European standards to their own treatment and to disregard them in their own behaviour. So things drifted from bad to worse until at last the situation became intolerable. The war broke out. European supremacy asserted itself at once. Fort after fort, city after city, was taken as easily as a boy takes a bird's nest. Hong-Kong was ceded in perpetuity, with the less reluctance, perhaps, because it is an island, and the superiority of the European was more firmly established than ever. But the Chinese had not learned the lesson; and when in later times blows fell upon them from Asiatic as well as from European enemies, they were found to be as weak as ever, since they had not learned that the strength of Europe lay primarily in her art of war. It was not for need of instruction. In 1857 and 1860 the lesson was repeated, each time with results that were foregone conclusions. The foreigner had

come to stay; he meant to stay, and all the Celestial hosts were powerless to prevent him.

Rarely has a single decade been so rich in momentous events as was the decade 1850–60 to the continent of Asia. In 1857, when English rule seemed to have been firmly established in India, and the supremacy of the European to have been unquestioningly acknowledged, the storm of the Mutiny swept the country and shook the foundations of the Government. But in the result the Mutiny indicated European superiority in a manner not to be mistaken. For had such a hurricane burst upon any native or Mohammedan government it is inconceivable that, given conditions as similar as circumstances would have allowed, it would not have been swept off its feet. Nor were the British confronted by undisciplined and demoralised troops such as those which faced Clive at Plassey. The Bengal army had been drilled and armed upon the European pattern, and assuredly the soldiers had no lack of bravery. But they wanted leaders of consummate rank: European organisation and European determination triumphed in the end. The fabric of government was shaken but not cracked,

and the subsequent transference of India to the Crown further consolidated it and brought the country within the orbit of the British Empire. The Mutiny was succeeded by a period of peace and prosperity, which lasted uninterruptedly until the revolutionary outburst of 1907 again challenged the British power.

In spite of the disasters in the two wars against England, the Chinese still struggled against the inevitable. They prevaricated, they did their utmost to evade the provisions of the later treaty of 1858, they barred the way of the English ambassador to Pekin, and at last it was decided to go thither by force. This time England was joined by France, and the Chinese enjoyed, if that word expresses their feelings, the spectacle of another nation combining to throw down the walls of their cherished seclusion, and showing that the military supremacy of the European was not confined to the soldiers and sailors of Britain. The Summer Palace was looted and destroyed, and the last year of the fateful decade witnessed the establishment of the hated foreigner in the sacred capital of China. Meantime in Canton justice was being administered by Europeans, and we are credibly informed that the native

population welcomed the change from capricious tyranny to orderly government. The military efficiency of Europe had been written in letters of fire plain for all but the blind to see; her administrative capacity had not been so thoroughly tested, but at least a beginning had been made and was sufficiently demonstrated to the understanding of the wise.

It was in the same decade that Russia, the undisputed mistress of Siberia, restlessly seeking for an outlet to the sea, acquired the basin of the Amur by a so-called concession from China, which was more easily granted because it concerned the Northern Province, a part less sacred to the Chinese heart than the provinces of the Middle kingdom. It was a peaceful business: it in no way clashed with the interests of Great Britain and France; Germany had not yet appeared upon the scene, and Japan was still shrouded in the mystery of her self-chosen hermit-life. But history pays no attention to the plans of men, and this unnoticed concession was big with destiny. The suppression of the Mutiny consolidated England's power in India; the wars in China demonstrated the superiority of Europe and opened the country to trade, whether

the Chinese would or no; but the cession of the Amur basin to Russia was the first link in the long chain that led to European rivalry in Northern China, and eventually to the challenge of Asia which we are witnessing to-day.

And yet the tale of this wonderful decade is not complete. There yet remain two other stupendous events that have had an influence on the fortunes of Asia, perhaps more important than any hitherto recorded. The one was as a seed sown from which has grown a mighty tree; the other was but the symbol, the outward expression of a revolution at least as mighty. In 1853 Commander Perry of the American Navy sailed into the harbour of Uraga, and in the same year Dalhousie sent home his famous minute advocating the making of railways in India. It is difficult to imagine any two events, simple enough to all outward seeming, which have so decisively demonstrated the superiority of Europe and have so decisively vindicated her claim to it.

If no European knew much about Japan, it is equally true that Japan knew next to nothing of Europe. The missionary fervour of the sixteenth century had no doubt sent out apostles thither, and in a country which

had already adopted one religion from India by way of China, and was therefore ready to make experiments with another, they had had a considerable measure of success. But as usual the mediæval Christian missionaries were unable to keep their fingers out of the political pie, or perhaps it would be truer to say that the zealous propagation of Christianity combined with arrogant pretensions inevitably invaded the social and political order of the country. Here as everywhere else the European missionary claimed superiority by reason of his religion alone, but was unable to make the claim good without popular support. Fear of the European was justified by popular uprisings, and there seems to have been truth in the remark attributed to Hideyoshi, the great Emperor, that "he feared much that all the virtue of the European priests served only to conceal pernicious designs against the Empire," so that a choice might have to be made "between the independence of Japan and the yoke of the great Christian States of Europe." Drastic measures were taken which increased in severity as each successive decree only served to stiffen the determination of the fathers to seek the crown of martyrdom after the fashion of

the early Christians. But toleration has its limits; if order was to be maintained, no government could be expected to look on while its laws were openly defied, and since nothing else would suffice, in 1638 Japan resolutely shut and barred her doors against all foreign intercourse, religious or commercial.

It is very probable that this step was not taken without a full appreciation of its consequences. It is not unlikely that the Japanese had heard of the doings of Europeans in China, and even of the conduct of the Portuguese in India. Spanish visitors were not reticent about the greatness of their country, and probably told with gusto the stories of Mexico and Peru, while the Philippine Islands were an example of Spanish aggression at the gates of Japan. But national character is not formed in a day, and the nation whose energy and enterprise were the wonder of the world when they stood revealed in 1904, was fully alive to the advantages of foreign intercourse and foreign trade. By their policy of strict seclusion they cut themselves off voluntarily from the vitalising influences of international intercourse, and condemned themselves to national stagnation. But in their judgment

they chose the lesser of two evils. How much they knew of the outer world it is difficult to determine, but had they been vouchsafed a vision of Europe, that which would have been in the foreground of the picture was civil wars, religious dissensions, dynastic ambitions. They would have seen one king bartering for a capital the faith for which he fought, and another flying for his life to the sworn enemies of Christendom. They would have seen yet another struggling to quench the liberty of his subjects in blood and a people in arms against their king. They would have seen luxury and licence rampant, and the humbler folk the slaves and vassals of the rich. It would have needed a far closer inspection to discern the progress of letters and of science, to watch political theory developing into political stability, to trace the advance of commerce, and to observe the prosperity and the power which slowly grew with the growth of wealth. There was little in such a vision to suggest imitation, but it was not given to them to see more than a portion. What was before their eyes was religious intolerance, backed by a defiance that seemed at any rate to be confident in the support of armed force. The one thing in which they might be com-

pelled to admit European superiority was military excellence, if not in men, at least in material. That was a danger which they dared not face, and rather than run the risk of becoming one more of the spoils of Europe, they took the one prudent course which seemed open to them and expelled the foreigner root and branch.

But when Commander Perry knocked at the door in the name of white civilisation they knew that the game was up. If the door was kept shut the white man could and would force it open. They made a virtue of necessity and opened it themselves with what outward grace they could muster, with what inward misgivings perhaps we shall never know. But though it pleases their admirers to-day to contend that the Japanese are not imitators, the facts are against them. The Japanese borrowed their language from China and their religion from India; but it is hardly less to their credit that what they borrow they use with discrimination, here rejecting what is unsuitable, there improving, or again adapting to the national needs and grafting on the national stock. They now set themselves to resist European aggression by other means. If European supremacy was such that even

the policy of seclusion had broken down before it, what was the cause of that supremacy? Could not Japan learn of Europe to fight her with her own weapons? The men were there; the knowledge and material were wanting. She soon learned that the strength of Europe lay first in her armies and navies, and she set herself to obtain European teachers from the best models. A Frenchman first and then a German were employed to reorganise the army, an Englishman the navy. The next foundation of European power was her political stability. The day of absolute monarchy was over in Europe, and Japan would follow in the wake of advancing democracy. She swept away her feudal aristocracy; the Shogun Mayors of the Palace, by a self-denying ordinance which has been acclaimed unique, renounced their authority, and little by little a constitutional monarchy was evolved which was adapted to the national needs and approved by the national temperament.

It was the greatest tribute that Asia had yet paid to European superiority. The transformation of Japan into a modern State has been described as a miracle. Observers to whom a hundred years ago the Japanese would have been the 'yellow monkeys'

they were to the Russians of 1904, hold up astonished hands at the thought that Japan accomplished in fifty years what it had taken Europe centuries to evolve. The thing itself was no miracle. Every doctor and every student can master in a few years the discoveries which centuries of patient scientific work have made available to industry. All that the Japanese did was to adapt the discoveries of Europe to her own needs. The miracle lay in the discernment which enabled a hermit nation, cut off from foreign intercourse for two hundred years, to see wherein lay their best chance of national independence; or perhaps it was their very seclusion which gave them a clearer vision of the progress of the world, as a father, coming home after long years of separation, sees changes in the boy which are not apparent to the mother who has lived with him all along. It was in truth something of a marvel that an Eastern people should be able to break so quickly from their old traditions and to put into execution theories and practices so entirely foreign to anything they had known before. It was more especially to their credit that they did not allow themselves to be dazzled by the new experiment; they had none

of that idealistic enthusiasm which has so often wrecked a promising movement in India, because enthusiasm dies down when the prosaic practical details are required for execution. On the contrary, they worked to build on solid foundations; they chose carefully each stone of the edifice they wished to erect, and their success was the more astonishing because so little was known of them. They were judged by the usual Oriental standards, and no one suspected their latent capacities.

But if the rise of Japan was a revolution which sprang directly from her contact with the West and was a tribute to it, Dalhousie's minute on railways effected a revolution almost more stupendous. The one has changed completely the attitude of Europe towards Asia; the other has metamorphosed the whole Asiatic outlook. It was as we have already seen but a symbol. Doubtless railways would have come to India in good time as to other parts of the world: Dalhousie's minute of 1853 was, in fact, the point from which they started. In comparing European music with their own Indians are fond of assigning the day to the former and the night to the latter; the comparison is not unapt. Europe is full

of the bustling activity of the daylight, when all men are at work; she looks at life as a practical proposition to be faced in a practical way, and she has applied herself with a joyous energy to work out her destiny in her own way. It is this daylight view of life which drives her sons to seek out the abodes of ice, the summits of the loftiest mountains and the depths of a tropical forest. It is, in a word, the spirit of scientific endeavour. Asia, on the other hand, preferred the mystery and stillness of the night when a man can commune with his own soul and when the immensity of space seems to attract the thought into speculation upon the mysteries of the universe. Pushed to their logical extremes, which in fact they never reach, the two attitudes represent what are called the materialist and the spiritual civilisations. The East has given religion to the West; the West has given science to the East. Both have worked in awe and reverence of the Unknowable Spirit, hidden behind a veil or manifested in Nature. One might almost reverse the traditional standpoint and declare that it is the East which is monotheistic and the West pantheistic, since the East has dwelt so continuously upon the Oneness

of God and the West has seen Him in all His works, in the bird's nest, in the lightning, in the vapour and in the magic of man's body.

In pursuance of this line of thought the West discovered the properties of steam, and at once put them to practical application. Commerce multiplied and increased production sought new markets. The journey to the East was no longer the perilous adventure of the bold: it became the ordinary voyage of common men. In 1859 the first sod of the Suez Canal was turned, and ten years later the Eastern adventure became an affair of weeks instead of months. Factories were started; tea was introduced into India from China by European enterprise and soon outstripped its Chinese rival almost to the point of extermination. The demand for cotton and jute created a new industry for thousands of peasant agriculturists. The railways began to spread over the land, not only carrying goods but thousands, and even millions, of the people who found in them a convenient, cheap and expeditious substitute for the springless cart that carried them to a wedding and for the weary march on foot to the sacred places of pilgrimage.

By the end of the nineteenth century the supremacy of Europe had reached its zenith. She had firmly established herself in India; she had forced the gates of China and had taken possession of Hong-Kong; Java, Sumatra, Ceylon, the Philippines were all hers: Siberia had long been a province of Russia, who was now encroaching on China in the north as France had done in the south. Persia was regarded as a sphere for European diplomats to quarrel over, and if Tibet, Afghanistan and Asiatic Turkey were left to themselves, it was either because it was not worth while to attempt the invasion of inhospitable and probably unproductive countries, or because it was convenient to cultivate friendships against the predominance of Russia, or, again, because interference with Arabia would have roused the resentment of the Mussulman world. Japan had resisted European encroachment, but not by force of arms. She too had opened the barred gates and had acknowledged the supremacy of Europe by the flattery of imitation. By her military ascendancy, by her organising capacity, by her genius for government, by her tremendous commercial energy, above all by her scientific discoveries, Europe had conquered Asia.

No one disputed her conquest. She had introduced a new ideal into the East, the ideal of national power founded upon national wealth. Hitherto the idea of power in Asia had been associated with the individual. Great kings such as Kublai Khan in China, Hideyoshi in Japan, Asoka and Babar and Akbar in India, had loved power after the fashion of a Charles XII or a Louis XIV; great conquerors had swept across the continent, but the idea of nationality which was beginning to take such a hold upon Europe had not yet dawned upon the Asiatic mind. To the European the love of power was expressed in pride in one's country and in the desire to see her great; to him, when once the colonising spirit had taken hold of him, the greatness of a country was bound up in expansion beyond her own limits. To the Asiatic no such idea had yet occurred. The most that any Indian Emperor wished for was to be master of India; the most that the mediæval Chinese Emperors attempted was the conquest and settlement of the northern provinces. The most that Japan ever undertook was an expedition to the neighbouring Korea. And so it came about that the European expected as of right to be treated as a superior. The forces were

active and reactive; the more he asserted himself, the more were the Asiatics inclined to acknowledge his claim; the more they flattered and acquiesced the more was he inclined to accept the adulation and to exact a fuller measure of servility.

CHAPTER IV

The Turn of the Tide

IN 1894 Japan put her experiment to the test. When she declared war on China the result was a foregone conclusion, but none the less it took Europe by surprise. Europeans had grown so conscious of their superiority that it had become an axiom, and since very little was known either of the capabilities of the Japanese or of the steady preparations they had been making, the prophets had estimated the rival chances by the simple arithmetic of counting heads. The Chinese, they knew, were incapable, and they knew too that history had many examples of the downfall of the huge flabby unwarlike nation at the hands of the alert sinewy martial one. But Asiatics were Asiatics, and what could you expect? Given equal conditions (and what was there to show that they were not equal?) a nation of 400,000,000 ought to be able to beat

a nation of 40,000,000, as the Lion beat the Unicorn, all round the town. For the moment the surprise was a shock. The Anglo-Saxon, at any rate, with his proverbial partiality for pluck and the weaker cause, rejoiced at the victory of the Japanese. Europe contented itself with reflections that though Japan had shown unexpected strength anyone could thrash the Chinese and she ought to have known it all along. No one saw, unless very dimly, what the result of the war really portended.

The lesson was, however, not entirely lost upon India. She did not move at once. For three years after the treaty of Shimonoseki, Tilak brooded over the fancied wrongs of his country and then published the famous articles in the *Kesari*, which were followed by the murder of Europeans at Ganeshkind, and by the revolutionary outbreak of 1897. It cannot be said that there was any direct connection between the Chinese war and the outbreak; indeed, it may be regarded as fanciful that they should be coupled at all. The immediate cause was the unfortunate attempt at plague administration by British soldiers unacquainted with the native susceptibilities and ready, like most Europeans, to impose their superior will upon

the people; the immediate opportunity was the revival of the memory of Sivaji as a national hero of the Maratha country, if not of all Hindu India. It is, however, very unlikely that the result of the Chinese war was lost on so astute a thinker as Tilak. If an Asiatic power could overwhelm another Asiatic people ten times its numerical strength, it was quite clear that resolution and discipline might achieve wonders. If there were parts of India which were unwarlike, there were other parts which furnished by common consent some of the finest fighting material in the world. India, roused to national consciousness, disciplined in soul and body, inspired with resolution, could surely sweep away the few hundred thousand Europeans that dwelt among her millions. "God," said the *Kesari*, "has not given the empire of India to the English inscribed on a copperplate." Of all the virtues with which the Oriental is endowed an infinite patience is among the most eminent. It is true that the events of recent years have rather reversed the positions; in political matters it is now the Indian that is impatient and it is the European who preaches patience, but that must be reserved for the proper place. In 1894 there was no movement

towards independence. It had never entered the heads of any Indian to question European supremacy, at any rate openly, and there was neither cause nor opportunity to rouse the resentment or to fan the enthusiasm of the people. An article which suggested the overthrow of British rule then would probably have fallen flat. 1897 brought both. The people were dying in shoals; they feared the plague, and sinister rumours got about that the English were fostering a spread of the disease for their own purposes. And more than death and the plague they feared and resented any interference with their customs. The English, conscious of the rectitude of their own motives, went calmly on their way; they did their utmost to grapple with the disease, but inevitably the battle brought them into conflict with some of the most cherished customs of the people and to flinch because of that was to own defeat. The country was inflammable; the time was ripe and so the *Kesari* articles appeared.

But if Tilak was inspired by the Chinese war and had correctly gauged the situation, he was lamentably wrong in the methods he advocated. The one great lesson of the war was the amazing advantage, till

then unsuspected, which the adoption of European methods of warfare had given the Japanese. Tilak preached the exact contrary. His doctrine was based on the assumption that Asiatics, if only they could rouse themselves to the requisite pitch of determination, were in every respect equal to Europeans, that they had no need of the West, but could, if they would, work out their own salvation on their own lines. He condemned railways because they gave opportunities for insults to women, and by implication therefore such other European importations whose advantages were less obvious or whose disadvantages were more glaring. He held up Sivaji to the admiration of the people, the great Maratha leader who by his own methods had created an army out of nothing and in his own native way had defied a mighty empire and had successfully fought what seemed to be a hopeless cause. He admitted reluctantly that for the moment Europe held the winning hand, but, denying her superiority in those things where it was most manifest, he also denied that she had the advantage of character, for his whole argument rested upon the assumption that there was latent in the Asiatic a force of character in no

degree inferior. Europe had deliberately emasculated Asia. She had exercised a kind of magic spell over her which produced torpor. It was for Asia to rouse herself from this torpor and to resume again the virility which she had put off.

Tilak's adventure miscarried, partly because it appeared to be a sudden ebullition in respect of a specific grievance the cause of which could be removed by more judicious handling, partly because it was so soon followed by the enlargement of the Legislative Councils which purported to, but did not in fact, confer upon Indians a larger share of responsibility in the government. It must be admitted too that the aims of Japan and of India were quite different. Japan was aspiring to be great; her independence was already secure, but she wished to obtain not only a permanent and well-defined footing on the Asiatic continent, but to prove to the world that she was the first and not the second Power in the Far East. India was aspiring to be free; her aim was to drive out the foreigner, and like all peoples similarly circumstanced she started with the handicap that the foreigner was in power and, as any Government naturally would, took measures to stay there.

Moreover the foreigner's rule was not oppressive; the vast majority of the people were content with it, and the manifestation of good will in the promulgation of reforms satisfied the more moderate section of the educated classes. For all that the attempt marks an epoch in India. There had been articles before which gave expression in varying degrees of ill-temper to the actions or the policy of the British Government, but which, making allowances for a certain crudity of utterance, could hardly be described as seditious, except in a country where the alien rulers were somewhat impatient of violent criticism. But this was a direct challenge. It called in question not merely the right of the English to be in India but the entire supremacy of Europe. It contained the germ of an idea which was so new to the ordinary Indian consciousness that it could only be expressed in ill-organised effort and in a good deal of frothy writing and speaking. Tilak had accomplished this much, that he had placed the Government of India in the usual awkward dilemma of submitting to defiance or of creating a national martyr. They chose the latter course, and when the consequent effervescence had subsided the country once more

settled down to try the experiment of the enlarged councils.

China meanwhile had been going from bad to worse. The consciousness of her own weakness and the fear of the destruction of her national institutions had shown itself from time to time in impotent outbursts against the foreigner; she was like some wild animal which, helpless in the grasp of stronger man, bites and scratches in the vain hope of freeing itself. Such outbursts had but one ending. But the defeat by the despised Japan opened her eyes to the necessity of drastic reform, and she began to realise that the European eagles were gathering together to feast upon her carcass. Russia pressed from the north; England was established at Hong-Kong and elsewhere. France had wrung concessions from her helplessness, and Germany had extorted Kiao Chao as reparation for the murder of two missionaries. The Japanese were after all Asiatic, and though they had been unexpectedly victorious, a little patience, a little care, a little more discipline in army and navy, and the tables might be turned. For Japan herself had had to yield the spoils of victory at the bidding of the great continental powers of Europe; she

evidently was not in a position to resist the dictation of Europe, and if not she, much less China who had been beaten in the war; had had to pay a large indemnity; whose *moral* was shaken and whose weakness was patent to the world. In a panic Kwang-Hsu set to work to put his house in order; if the Japanese had profited by copying the European, China must do so too. It rained reform edicts. But the country was not prepared for this hurricane legislation. The Dowager Empress and the Conservative party had their way and the Boxer rebellion was the result. The Great Powers of the West, together with such Eastern countries as could furnish troops drilled and armed upon the European pattern, descended upon unhappy China, and as usual China had no chance.

It is a commonplace that the historian has to make his choice between being impartial and dull, and being partial and picturesque. Most choose the latter alternative lest they should never be read at all. Consequently in dealing with China those whose outlook is wholly European dwell upon Chinese treachery, Chinese brutality, Chinese imbecility and unreasonableness. Their blood was upon their own heads; the

foreigner was doing no harm and only wanted to trade peacefully. The Chinese were at perfect liberty to manage things in their own way, so long as that way was reasonable and orderly. But continued insults are not reasonable, and periodical riots and murders are not orderly. It was therefore imperative that Europe should vindicate herself, and China was to blame for her own misfortunes. Those who espouse the cause of the Oriental attribute baser motives to the European. In his land-hunger and in his greed for gain he forced himself into countries where he was not wanted. He exasperated the people, interfered with their customs, with their religion and with their internal government. He tried to set up a State within a State, and as far as he was able to pose as a dictator. And when the people were goaded beyond endurance he used his superior power to steal their land, to carry off their treasure and to exploit his invariable victory in every possible way. Neither view tells the whole truth. The key to the whole history is fear of European supremacy. Once this is grasped, everything falls naturally into place and one step follows inevitably upon another. When the European first went to China he honestly

meant to do no more than open up new markets for his trade, thereby conferring, as he supposed, a reciprocal benefit upon China. In propagating the Christian religion he honestly meant to obey the commands of his Master, and as he believed to bring the Chinese out of the darkness of error into the light of truth. But such things as these cannot wholly be divorced from politics. Collisions and disputes were bound to occur over customs duties or trade policies. A tactless missionary, blinded by his own zeal or prepossessed by the organisation of his own Church and by its claims to supremacy, was sure to give offence sooner or later, especially in those matters in which national customs could not be reconciled with Christian doctrine. The moment these things occurred the latent fear of the people was aroused. The mandarins took refuge in the devices of the weak. They put obstacles in the way when they could, they offered insults when they dared, not perhaps so much with the intention of insulting as with the desire of flattering themselves that they were asserting their authority and vindicating the honour of China. Their spirit was communicated to the people and riot and murder ensued.

This is not to say that other factors did not contribute to the result, but broadly speaking each separate outburst may be described in a single sentence. Honest dealing was met by suspicion, suspicion grew into dislike, dislike was fostered by both sides by what seemed to each arrogant behaviour; dislike became hatred which boiled over into insult and outrage, and a war ensued in which the superiority of Europe was always demonstrated and the Chinese fear of it was intensified.

The contrast between China and Japan was more pronounced than ever. On the one hand were the Japanese, associated with the Great Powers of Europe, admitted as a partner, if still somewhat of a junior partner, to their councils and sharing in their triumphs. On the other hand were the Chinese, beaten everywhere, forced to admit the invader into their capital, humiliated as a beaten hound is humiliated under the lash of the whip. Wherein did this contrast reside? Not certainly in religion, for the Chinese and Japanese were both preponderantly Buddhist. Not in art or civilised culture: whatever faults the Chinese may have had no one has despised their art and no one has denied their culture.

Not altogether in national character, for observers writing within twenty years of Perry's voyage have described the Japanese as grown-up children, though in this respect estimates may have been at fault, seeing that the Japanese were an unsolved riddle and perhaps had latent forces which nobody had suspected. Not in the social system, for Japan and China having kindred civilisations had very similar institutions, and though Japan had abolished the feudal system in 1868 mechanical changes of this sort do not completely alter the life of a nation in thirty years. In the last analysis it will be found that the contrast lay in the difference between efficiency and ineptitude. Japan had taken the lesson of 1853 to heart and the wisdom of her rulers had received the whole-hearted support of the people with singularly little opposition from reactionaries. China had entered upon the same task half-heartedly; her councils were divided, her reformers were in a minority, of power if not of numbers, and her people were still animated by the same spirit as before of hostility to the foreigner. Japan, in a word, was turning European, China remained Asiatic; the one was earning the respect of European nations, the other

continued to merit their contempt. Had European troops conducted in Japan and at the same time such another war as the First Chinese War of 1840 the Japanese soldier might have shown a braver front than the Chinese, but the Japanese equipment would have been as markedly inferior to the European as the Chinese.

Europe has had many ideals. Truth, mercy, justice, liberty, equality, and the brotherhood of mankind, scientific knowledge and humility—these are amongst them, but pre-eminent and persistent has been the ideal of Power and of the wealth that brings power. It cannot be charged to her disparagement, for it is inherent in human nature. It drove Alexander to India and Timur to the shores of Europe. It sent the Athenian fleet to Sicily and Babar to India. It was the ruling passion of the Roi Soleil and it made Frederick break his word to Austria. It was the vision which dazzled the eyes of Christ at that ecstatic moment in the wilderness when for a brief instant the thought of it obscured the greater vision of humanity and its needs.

At no period of the world's history did this ideal of power loom larger than in the nineteenth century when the expansion of

Europe was leading her to all parts of the world, and when her manifest superiority in science had made travel so easy to her, and war against the less advanced peoples had become a foregone conclusion. The weak of the earth she despised; the strong she respected if she did not fear, for that is the way of the world. It was only natural that exactly to the extent that the Japanese proved their power and their ability to maintain at least their own independence they should advance in the respect paid to them by Europeans. The one was, however, strictly the measure of the other. For Asiatics the Japanese were doing quite well; they had beaten the Chinese and they had also shown that any invasion of Japan with all the advantage of base and of what may be called interior lines on her side would be a formidable proposition—something altogether different from the same proposition in 1850. Her prestige was somewhat enhanced by contrast with the conditions in India and China, while in the rest of Asia—in Siberia, in Persia, in Malaya, in Tonkin, and in the islands—European supremacy was so pronounced that nobody ever gave it a thought or regarded it as a proposition at all. It was simply an axiom.

The general attitude towards the early Indian attempts at defiance were looked upon rather with irritation than alarm; they had a good government, they had much to be thankful for and they had no business to call in question this divinely ordered state of affairs. "They did it to only annoy," but then of course the Indian, it was said, is incapable of gratitude. At any rate they had no power, so what was the use of talking? If that was roughly the attitude towards India, the attitude towards China was rather one of indignation, mingled of course with fears for the safety of individuals. It was presumptuous of the Chinese to challenge Europe in this way, and of course they would have to pay; no one doubted the ultimate result for a moment, and here and there there was a certain note of compassion for the misguided fanatics who were rushing upon their fate.

When Japan declared war on Russia, Europe, holding fast to the tradition of her own invincibility, waited for the inevitable; but the inevitable did not happen. That the Treaty of Portsmouth signalised the military victory of Asiatics over Europeans was not the only, nor perhaps the greatest, consequence of the war. It could in fact

be explained away. Russia, men said, would have won had she held on a little longer. She was distracted at home; she was fighting thousands of miles from Petrograd and along a single line of railway; she was not a maritime nation, her admirals did not know their business and fought at sea under grave disadvantages. A French writer, M. Grousset, has gone so far as to argue that Europe had in fact triumphed as usual because the whole outlook of the Japanese is European and that of the Russians is Asiatic. We may dismiss this as an ingenious sophism. However soothing such reflections might be to the ruffled superiority of Europe—and there were those even in England who would prefer to have seen a formidable potential foe victorious over an actual ally rather than that any branch of the Yellow Race should defeat a White people—what could not be explained away was the tactical skill, the organising capacity and the national consciousness which the war revealed. Wars are not won merely by brave men with modern weapons in their hands. It was realised now as it had not been realised in the Chinese War, that Japan had long been preparing for the contingency, that she had succeeded in welding together

a nation which was as united as Russia was distracted, that she had thought out each move with the minutest care and had left nothing to chance. Her supply organisation was admirable; her field hospitals were excellent; her transports worked without a hitch. She was blamed for overcaution, but if this was due to the gravity of the crisis, seeing that never before had she engaged a European antagonist of unknown calibre and reputed to be almost the strongest military power in the world, or if, again, it was because she had never yet tested her new experiment upon such a scale, it was the more creditable to her that she was not puffed up by vanity but frankly and wisely recognised her own limitations. All this was no doubt only realised as the smoke of battle gradually cleared away. For the moment one patent fact stood out. The unheard-of had happened. Asia had beaten Europe.

Asia had beaten Europe and at once a new hope was born, especially in India. In order to realise properly the events that took place there very soon after the close of the Russo-Japanese War we must go back for a while to the first half of the nineteenth century. When after a long and

heated controversy Lord William Bentinck's Government decided in 1835 on giving to India an English rather than a vernacular education they could not have foreseen the momentous results that were to flow from their decision. The more obvious ones we may ignore as not relevant to our present purpose. But naturally the Brahmans, who through a long-continued system of hereditary occupation were the best fitted for such education and were the most eager to seize upon it, were those who profited most. Moreover, as the legal system gradually came to be codified, and as, following the English custom, the decisions of the various courts on the complicated questions involved in the Hindu and Mussulman systems, in the commercial and criminal laws introduced by England and in the highly elaborate codes of evidence and procedure, were reported as binding precedents there was much scope for the legal acumen which appealed so strongly to the Hindu, and especially to the Brahman, and since the judges were English it became necessary to plead in English and so to become masters according to ability of English forensic oratory. It is certain, too, that until quite recent years in which the highly skilled

medical man has made his appearance, the lawyer was the only professional man whose services commanded a European scale of remuneration. It was in some such way as this that the powerful middle class of lawyers arose. The landholders had no need of the English language; they managed their lands in their own immemorial fashion, kept their accounts according to the time-honoured native method, and dealt exclusively with peasant tenantry who knew no other language than their own. To them the knowledge of English was a luxury; many of them could speak it haltingly as most Englishmen speak French, but the man who knew it as the lawyers knew it was very rare. In the same way a certain small class acted as intermediaries and interpreters between the English firms and their Indian customers, and the name 'dubash,' or 'double-tongued,' which still survives, indicates their origin. But no very high standard was needed to enable these men to make themselves understood by their employers, and the range of their knowledge was more or less limited to business conversation. Thus a monopoly of the English language was held by three classes: the lawyers, the schoolmasters who were required

to teach English to those in need of it, and the journalists who gradually gained influence as the practice spread of publishing newspapers in English. There was, of course, a fourth class, the servants of Government, but as they were precluded from taking any part in politics, though they had a large share in district administration, they cannot be said to have added anything to the situation to-day. It is often said that the Brahman seeks to exploit politics for his own selfish ends, and that he is especially angry with the British for having to some extent deprived him of his supreme position in the land. It is doubtful whether this view is correct. The fact seems rather to be that the three professions just named were the best equipped for political agitation, or—shall we say?—controversy, that they alone produced the men who were capable of reading and digesting the political, politico-economic and politico-scientific literature of England, and that they alone produced the men who were capable of giving expression to their views. And since we have already seen that the Brahman was fitted *par excellence* for such professions, it was inevitable that the great majority of politicians should be Brahmans. It is true that

very few of the Hindu leaders have been non-Brahmans: Gandhi is the most notable instance. But it is no less true that there is not one political leader who has not at some time or other been a lawyer, a journalist, or a schoolmaster. Side by side with the growth of the lawyer-politician class went the depression of the army. This was due to a variety of causes, but the Education Resolution of 1835 was not the least of them. Many of the best soldiers were and are Mohammedans, who as a whole are as indifferent linguists as the Hindus are excellent. The United Provinces and the Punjab, which furnish the greatest and best part of the Army material, are notoriously more backward than the Provinces of Bengal and Madras, whose unwarlike character has passed into a proverb. The soldier, in short, had no aptitude for book learning; as a class he has never troubled to learn English, and his bluff temperament does not consort with the tortuous ways and the subtle arguments of the politician. And, again, the Mutiny put a check upon military advancement from which it has probably never recovered. There was no incentive to learn because there were no prizes to be gained. Whereas the lawyer could rise to the dignity

of the High Court, if indeed he thought it worth his while to sacrifice cash for dignity, the soldier could look forward to nothing higher than non-commissioned rank with an adequate but not a princely salary. The consequence is that the men who count are the civilians and not the soldiers; the Provinces that count are too often those that breed lawyers and not warriors. It would perhaps not be unfair to say that the contempt of the Prussian officer for the civilian is matched in India by the contempt of the civilian for the soldier, though it may be convenient for diplomatic reasons to lay stress on the splendid sacrifices of Indian soldiers for the Empire and to pretend that they saved Europe.

It was upon a society so constituted that the news of the Japanese victory burst with all the force of a revelation. It was characteristic of the Indian mind, which loves abstractions and ideals but abhors the details of ways and means, that very little account was taken of the various implications of that astounding event. The main thing was that for the first time since the coming of da Gama, Asiatics had come out of a war victorious over Europeans. Indians were inclined to brush aside the obvious reflec-

tions that the Japanese were not Indians, that the Russians were not English, that the conditions of all four countries were entirely different, and that, startling as the result was, the Japanese were fighting at a relative advantage. What Japan had done, India could do, for was not Asia Asia, and was not Europe Europe? Being quite unmilitary themselves, they not unnaturally gave the whole affair a political complexion and overlooked the obvious consideration that viewed superficially—and there had hardly been time to look below the surface—the victory was a military victory and that military and naval power do not necessarily connote a stable government and an efficient administration. The outburst of 1907 was therefore on the whole a failure. The activities of young enthusiasts armed with bombs and revolvers might be distressing, and the number of murders of individuals might be deplorable, but the organisation of revolutionary bands of youths, entirely unsupported by military force, could not possibly shake the fabric of government or constitute any serious menace to European superiority even if that superiority had rested on force alone. But it did not. It rested upon a stable political system which had been built up

carefully from the foundations, upon a highly educated and efficient band of administrators, sedulously indoctrinated with the idea that they were there for India's welfare alone, and upon scientific methods which India as yet only dimly understood. It is significant that the hero of the young enthusiasts was not Cavour the statesman, or Garibaldi the soldier, but Mazzini the fiery apostle of an ideal. The early attacks on the economic system showed how little the causes of European supremacy had been grasped. It was childish to the degree of becoming pathetic to imagine that the laws of political economy could be defied by the burning of heaps of cloth caps imported from Europe, or to set up mushroom companies financed by amateurs to compete with the firmly established British companies managed by experts. The attempt was made, and of course it failed.

Psychologically, however, the movement was not without effect. Taken together, the Russo-Japanese War and the Partition of Bengal produced the expression of a feeling that had long been latent. The Japanese War brought the seething pot to the boil and the Partition of Bengal as the immediate grievance caused it to boil over. Indians were now asking themselves what

was the validity of the European claim to superiority. Englishmen were really rather stupid people. They boasted that the education of a gentleman was not to have learned Greek and Latin but to have forgotten them. Not one in a hundred tried to learn Sanskrit, and very few cared even to study the manners and customs or the literature of the country which they were ruling. The Civil Service was all very well, but the Civil Service was fast becoming a machine, tied to its office desk and fit for nothing but report-writing. Any well-educated Indian could beat the Englishman, not only in general knowledge, but in competitive examinations prescribed by him and conducted in a country of his own choosing. The Indian could even prove his superiority in the Englishman's own native tongue; he could be fluent where the Englishman was halting; he could quote books which the Englishman had never read. He had become 'learned in the learning of the Egyptians,' for had he not imbibed political economy from Mill and sociology from Herbert Spencer? He might not at present be able to compete in the practical affairs of administration, but that was because he never had the chance. If the chance were given him he would prove himself as

superior there as he had proved himself in other fields.

How different this attitude was from the former passive acquiescence in the superiority of Europe was shown by the passionate appeals to the people to shake themselves free from this pernicious spell of the past, a spell which had numbed them into torpor, had emasculated them, had made them tamely recognise that the European was their superior merely because he said so. The Englishman was afraid, though he pretended that he was not; he was afraid that if the Indian were once more emancipated, if he were admitted to equality of rights, if he were granted free education, the imposing statue of European superiority would be seen to be the unreal bogy it actually was and the European domination of India must come to an end. And so the bogy must continue to be made to look like an idol, the pretence of superiority must be kept up at all costs, and the Indian must be kept at a distance to prevent him from discovering the truth.

All this might have been true, much of it was true to the extent that it could be supported by facts, but it did not go to the root of the matter. It was commonly

admitted that Indians made excellent judges, and with capable European subordinates and an adequate Indian clerical staff could administer a district on the approved lines, so long as all went smoothly. It was, however, alleged that they failed when called upon to face an emergency, and in those departments in which they had a freer hand there was too often a failure to grasp essentials, to let things drift on or to waste time in hair-splitting arguments. The maladministration of temples was notorious; the municipalities showed instances of all kinds—good, bad, and indifferent. In technical matters such as the department of medicine, finance, the development of industries, or the management of railways, their incompetence was patent, and yet in many of these there was no ground for accusing the European 'oppressor.' Above all, being who they were, they ignored the very vital question of National Defence. The Army was still kept as a thing apart, as something in which the politician took but a languid interest, and even the suggestion that India should pay a contribution to the Navy, since she could not have one of her own, was scouted. In other words, it was still just in those matters, in technical arts and

crafts as understood by the modern world of the West, in military science, and to a less degree perhaps in the art of administration and in the science of politics—it was just in those matters wherein the European excelled that the Indian failed. If Japan was the model, it might be pointed out that she had proved her power to fight both by land and sea, she had a stable government, she could produce capable administrators, and, finally, that she had made such progress economically that she bid fair to be a serious competitor in the world's markets.

But, as we have seen, the agitation accomplished something. More perhaps because of sedulous propaganda than from any national feeling about a question that was purely provincial, the Partition of Bengal roused a general protest throughout the country to a degree that had not been known before, and the announcement of its revocation was very naturally regarded as a victory for the Nationalist party, as it had now come to be called. The Morley-Minto reforms which followed upon the heels of the outbreak, as the previous reform had followed the outbreak of 1897, were also taken as a sign that the voice of the educated classes, the only articulate fraction of the

people, could command attention. Nobody believed the protestations of the English Cabinet that they were entirely unmoved by the popular demand and that the reforms were introduced irrespective of it. The national consciousness was felt to be awakening and it was about this time that the claim, hotly argued on both sides, to nationhood was put forward. Each successive outburst showed in increasing degree this new sense of solidarity. The Partition of Bengal was a provincial crisis and the public conscience had been factitiously aroused; but the treatment of oversea Indians in South Africa stirred a general indignation throughout the country, which, however, was not manifested by hostility to the Government because the Government and the people this time thought alike. India was in fact beginning to learn the lesson of Japan. She could not, of course, copy the Japanese in the matter of National Defence because she had no voice in the administration of the army and she did not possess any kind of a navy. Nor did it seem to be of any importance. The army was certainly efficient and it was equipped on the best approved modern lines, and the British Navy was there to guard the coasts.

The only question that might have arisen but was never seriously raised was whether if Indians were given the chance they could not produce generals equal in ability to Oyama, Kuroki, and the other heroes of the Russian War. It was from the Indian point of view a serious and even a fatal omission thus to have neglected this vital question of Defence; to have gained everything except this is to have gained nothing. It was the unexpected strength that Japan revealed in her ability to defend herself that first won her the respect of European nations, and except for which she might have reformed her constitution, improved her trade, set her people upon the modern road of science and of wealth and yet have gained little respect from abroad, or only achieved it after many years of painful struggle, for it is due to the knowledge that Japan has the means of enforcing her demands that when she speaks she must be listened to. We have seen why India overlooked this vital point, and it must be added that her aim, being national rather than international independence, she thought of the army when she thought of it at all, not in terms of national defence, but as a political revolutionary machine. It is this

problem that clogs her further advance to-day. It is not without substantial grounds for the charge that Indian leaders accuse England of reluctance to put into practice the theoretical promises which she has made, for surely the lamentations over a 'lost Dominion,' over the 'peril that threatens our rule in India,' and the 'surrender to the native,' connote simply the dread of losing power and prestige, and the passionate appeals on behalf of the dumb masses to be abandoned to misgovernment and anarchy must sound slightly hypocritical in the ears of the leaders who, in their own estimation at any rate, are as fit to govern as any British bureaucrat. But the problem of National Defence is in the last analysis the dissolvent which prevents any forward policy, whether desired by the British Government in power or formulated as a definite national demand, from taking practical shape.

In other respects the manifestations of national feeling have undoubtedly been built upon more substantial foundations. In 1897 the trumpet call of Tilak degenerated into a rather pitiful wail. In 1907 there was some attempt at organisation, but the main features of that period of unrest were the fiery denunciations of orators, the organised

murder by educated youths, and the formation of secret revolutionary societies. The aim was said to be self-government 'on Colonial lines,' but it was very difficult to obtain any clear-cut views on that rather nebulous expression, or any definite programme of the means by which that object was to be achieved. We may put aside the unfortunate events of 1918 as of no value. The policy of non-violence invented by a saintly visionary only led to violence, as we know, and the more far-seeing of the Indian leaders recognised that violence led in the end nowhere. But through all that stormy period more definite parties were forming themselves, organisation was being perfected, and the long training which the Indian had had in the art of government by example and precept, if not by actual practice, was beginning to be turned to account. Whatever we may think of India's ability to govern herself absolutely, relatively she has made a great advance upon the crude idea of 1907. In this direction she has learned the secret of European strength and she challenges Europe to put her to the test.

Even clearer, however, is her realisation of the fact that the gateway to power is wealth and that the key to that gateway is

industrial expansion. It was seen that European trade could not be seriously injured, much less destroyed, by the methods of burning clothes and floating mushroom companies. The only way to compete was to learn European methods and European finance, to float enterprises which would really stand some chance against their European rivals, to wrest the banking monopoly from English hands, and to set up new industries which would make the country more independent of foreign imports. At first the experiment was tried with the valour and enthusiasm of ignorance. A few students were sent to Japan and elsewhere to learn to make candles, matches, what not; several banks were founded, some of which disappointed their admirers. These things, however, could do no good, and the cry which was raised for technical education as loudly as in a previous generation for literary education was a sign that India was beginning to realise upon what foundations economic prosperity is built, and her insistent demand that young industries in an undeveloped country must be protected by tariffs was inspired by the same motive rather than by any hostility towards Lancashire or British industries generally.

India, of course, had not the same chance of asserting herself as Japan, but she has throughout shown a lamentable inability to grasp essentials. She is trying to build from the top downwards. It is true that Japan has been accused of doing the same thing, but the people of Japan have shown much more adaptability to the new conditions, and if the masses are still politically backward they have made great advances in other directions. For this result the national character is perhaps responsible and to some extent the national institutions, but national character takes on the impress of its environment, and apart from climatic influences there were two factors which had a large share in producing the plain differences which we see to-day. In the first place, Japan had to rely on herself, whereas India in those halcyon days that succeeded the Mutiny grew more and more accustomed to rely on other people. The constant cry was that the Government should do this or that; the engineers were Government officials, the private practitioners never put up their plates where a Government doctor could be had; agricultural improvements came for the most part from the Government; mining, railway enterprise, and tea

planting were left to the Englishman, and even trade and finance on the great scale, except when a Parsi intervened, were neglected. The last twenty years have shown that the country is beginning to realise the mistakes of the past, but there is still much leeway to make up. And in the second place, India lacked the stimulus of danger. The rude shock of Perry's visit revealed her weakness to Japan. She had the example of China before her eyes, and determined that she too would not come under the domination of the foreigner; she set herself to forge weapons copied from his armoury. India had already submitted to the foreigner. Long immunity from invasion, and even from the fear of it, had almost made her forget that there was such a thing as an army; and as for the navy, that was a mere expression which comprised, or was said to comprise, all sorts of craft, all of them of about equal value. At any rate, neither was any business of hers and she could safely leave the whole matter in other hands, with the result that now, when she is striving for complete independence, the spectre of her own helplessness rises up to confront and to thwart her at every step.

The Chinese, on the other hand, took a

course midway between that taken by Japan and India. They did not adopt the Japanese policy of rigorous exclusion of the foreigner, neither did they follow the Indian method of a generous toleration. Foreigners were admitted, but they were kept at arm's length. It is perhaps worthy of remark that the expansion of Europe which followed upon the great discoveries, and secondly upon the scientific inventions, was hardly ever achieved by the method of deliberate conquest. With the exception of the Spanish adventures in Mexico and Peru, and possibly of the Russian advance into Siberia, all the great European movements were simply migrations which were followed in most cases by measures of self-defence against the inhabitants, whereby the superior organisation, superior science and superior military art of the white man triumphed in every instance. In China with its immense population there was no incentive to extended conquest, and there the superiority of the European was manifested in punitive undertakings and was confined to forcing open the gate of China to foreign trade. This policy developed or drifted into the demand for forced concessions and so into the lopping off of various outlying districts, less on the

pretext of Chinese antagonism than from fear of European rivalry. But China did not learn the lesson of Japan until it was too late. She clung to her antiquated methods, to her conservative education and to her primitive military ideas, and affected to despise the learning and the methods of Europe. Japan, with the example of China before her, had bowed to the inevitable ; China, with the example of Japan before her, thought it sufficient to buy a few battleships and to introduce a few other superficial reforms. Behind the Japanese Government was the Japanese people ; behind the Chinese Government, itself divided, was a rebellious people who were all on the side of reaction. And thus it has come about that while the one nation is a recognised world Power, the struggles of China to free herself, first from the outworn monarchy and secondly from her financial difficulties, have moved the world to pity rather than to contempt, but not yet to respect.

CHAPTER V

The Expansion of Asia

LESS than a century ago Asia was markedly apathetic to what was going on in the world. It is true that both Japan and India were alive to the advantages of the European trade, but on the whole they made no great effort to secure it: or rather it would be more accurate to say that they were content to let it come to them rather than go abroad to seek it. But Japan, long before the nineteenth century opened, had so cut herself off from commerce with the foreigner that even trade, conducted on conditions of repression, was bound to languish; and in India the indigenous systems still flourished, the European trader on the grand scale being then, as he is now, a convenient channel for the raw material of the country and also for the distribution of manufactured goods, especially of æsthetic products. China had admitted the foreigner

to her trade very reluctantly and, as it were, at the point of the bayonet, and if she recognised the benefit to herself, there came moments of reaction when she would willingly have sacrificed the market as Japan had done to be rid of the hated foreigner. But to allow a man to come and offer his goods for sale on your shores without so much as caring how they were produced or how transported, what manner of men they were who produced them and what kind of country they inhabited, is after all to take but a limited, not to say languid, interest in his affairs. As for the wars that had distracted Europe until 1815, for the revolution of 1848, and for the struggle for Italian liberty, they knew nothing of them and cared less. To Asiatics of those days it is probable that a first-class war in Europe made less stir than would a fight between the Kavirondo and the Masai to us to-day, for, whereas such an event might react upon European settlers in East Africa and upon their trade, there were no Asiatics, at any rate east of the Turkish Empire, upon whom to the limited vision of those times a European quarrel could have any influence whatsoever.

Little by little, as contact with the West

grew stronger, the Oriental peoples became emancipated from this indifference. It seems to be more than a coincidence that the rise of modern journalism in India and in Japan is almost contemporaneous with the first mutterings of discontent at the influx of Asiatics into countries which the white man regarded as peculiarly his own by right of colonisation and conquest, or in more general language by right of the enterprise which was the outcome of his superiority in science and in character. It was in 1860 that indentured Indian labour was first imported into Natal; it was in or about 1860 that Australian gold diggers began to protest against the immigration of the Chinese; it was also about that time that white labour in California began to feel the effects of similar Asiatic competition. Now it was in 1863 that the Indian *Daily Mirror*, the first daily in English to be edited by Indians, made its appearance, and it was in 1861 that the first real Japanese newspaper was published. In both countries the Press movement was inaugurated by Europeans. In Japan the Dutch had made a practice of sending extracts from Dutch newspapers to Yedo, where they were translated into Japanese, and this tentative begin-

ning was followed by other abortive attempts which collapsed when left to native management. In India the principal newspapers were owned and edited by Englishmen, though there were a few vernacular journals, doubtless imitations of European contemporaries, as early as 1832. It is significant that one of the early Japanese papers, which devoted itself to foreign news alone, was a complete failure and lasted only a few months.

One must, of course, be careful not to overrate the influence of these early newspapers. The circulation was very small; they were not intended for the masses, who, moreover, were illiterate, and even the educated seem to have taken but a very languid interest in them. They could not possibly have been supposed to influence directly the coolie class which went abroad to seek their living, and it does not appear that news was disseminated at all in China by means of the Press. On the other hand, it is notorious that news is carried by word of mouth in the East in a manner that seems to the Western mind almost miraculous. Even now, when journalism is fully established in the country and education has advanced, there is many an Indian village in which

the one literate man reads out the news to the assembled villagers. Nothing was more likely than that the tales told by foreigners of the wonders of their country and that the scraps of foreign news to be gleaned from news-sheets should filter down to the lower classes of the people and should fire their imagination, which a complete ignorance of geography prevented them from sobering by calculation and reflection. We must add to this the recruitment of lascars and ships' cooks, who no doubt brought back with them tales of high wages and prosperity, and these tales we may be sure lost nothing in the telling. The return of some of the emigrants with earnings which probably seemed fabulous to the villager accustomed to live on the margin of subsistence would induce others to try their luck, and petty traders would follow in their wake to minister to the wants of their countrymen, which the white people did not understand and could not satisfy. We have it on the authority of numerous witnesses that the Oriental is by nature astonishingly credulous. Only recently the false prophets prophesied fortune to many poor Mussulmans who should leave India, groaning as she was under the iron rule of the oppressor and

seek a sure refuge in the country of the Faithful. Thousands obeyed the call without reflection, only to find destitution, misery, and death.

It was, however, only a minute fraction of the 700,000,000 of Indians and Chinese who thus strayed so far into unknown countries. The white man himself created the Asiatic question in South and East Africa, as well as in Guiana, Fiji, and Jamaica. As the necessity for cheap labour led the Southern States of America first into slavery and then into civil war until finally the whole United States was saddled with the Negro Question, so the necessity for cheap labour led the Crown Colonies and Dominions into the difficult entanglements of the Asiatic Question. Indians were imported into Natal in 1860, that same year that had witnessed so much else of the kind, on a system of indentured labour when, as Gandhi says, quoting a member of the Natal Parliament, "the existence of the Colony hung in the balance," and were set to work at sugar, tea, and fisheries. Indians have been imported into Fiji, Jamaica, and British Guiana on much the same terms and for much the same purposes. Chinese were imported into South Africa after the close

of the Boer War in 1900 to supply the labour market which had been depleted by the war and its consequences. Lastly Indians were imported into East Africa to make the Uganda railway because the native labour was incompetent and white labour was too expensive, besides being unsuited to the climate. There was, however, a noteworthy difference in East Africa. There Mohammedan and Arab traders had penetrated for some centuries before the arrival of the white man, but they had clung to the coast; they thronged Mombasa and the immediate hinterland, but they had not reached Nairobi, much less the Victoria Nyanza, or if they had, had done so in such sparse numbers that their influence as a community was negligible.

There is a striking contrast between the pioneers of European and of Asiatic expansion which emphasised, if it did not exaggerate, the superiority of the European. On his own initiative the European had ventured into unknown seas in quest of unknown lands; he staked his life upon the enterprise, not knowing what manner of men he should find, and he staked his fortune also when, having discovered the lands, he set to work to cultivate, to mine and to

explore in conditions wholly foreign to him. He had stumbled upon vast continents whose only inhabitants were primitive savages, and the farther he penetrated the more formidable became his task against inhospitable Nature. He had landed upon shores peopled by warlike and organised but still savage tribes, whose notions of war were ferocious and who estimated human life very lightly. He had reached countries where a civilisation, perhaps equal to, though differing from, his own, had been established for centuries and where the rude methods of force were out of place. Such enterprises as these demanded a high degree of courage, of skill, of resource, of authority, which could not be expected of the lower strata of the population, accustomed as they were merely to obey and to follow.

The Asiatic, on the other hand, was attracted by no such romantic adventure. He sailed away in ships ready made and manned for him to lands already prepared for his reception. He was in most cases assured of a living wage and might look forward to no hardships greater than those incidental to all manual labour. He was going to work for white masters of whose honesty of purpose he had no doubt and

whose character, if he could judge by those in his own country, he had had opportunities of observing. If he did not like what he had seen at least he was making his venture with his eyes open. The European had set out from love of adventure and the desire to make a fortune; the Asiatic had no other motive than to earn his daily bread. There was, however, a spice of adventure in his undertaking. To a people ignorant of geography and quite unaccustomed to a voyage by sea, except perhaps to places not far removed from their own country, it may well have seemed an act of incredible daring to venture into lands where the inhabitants were strange, the climate might be entirely unsuitable, and the manners and customs were probably very different from their own. Be this as it may, the fact is indisputable that the expansion of Europe originated with the masters, the expansion of Asia with the men.

In thus making use of coloured labour the white man was perfectly honest. He was obsessed by the vital importance of the prosperity of the colony, or in other words of the success of his own trade, and standing together as colonists do, especially in tropical countries where there are but few

white men, he persuaded himself that he was working for the good of the community and so of the world, and not for the good of the individuals of which that community was composed. He viewed the whole matter very much as the Southern States approached the question of negro slavery. But slavery itself he abhorred. The coolies he imported were free men, bound only by a contract, perfectly fair in itself and open to the coolies to accept or to refuse. He offered what he considered to be a fair wage and provided huts and such material comforts as he thought were suitable for the people with whom he had to deal. These were conditions which would be fair enough if offered to a white labourer, and though he might have recognised that the Asiatic was a different creature, he did not for the life of him see why they should not be equally fair to the coloured man. But there the comparison ended. The European generally, and the Englishman in particular, is so thoroughly convinced that his point of view is the right one that any dissatisfaction with his ordinances is merely contumacy. For he belongs clearly to the chosen race, and God in His infinite wisdom has made the coloured man for his benefit: a human being, no doubt,

but something only a little, if at all, better than his dog, and nothing like so dear as his horse. A certain class even invented the complacent theory that the coloured man did not understand any argument but that which was applied to his person. Nowhere did this theory find greater favour than amongst the Boer population of South Africa. The activities of the missionaries there roused England to a storm of indignation, for the English people have always been quick to resent the wrongs done by others and to disregard economic losses that do not fall upon themselves.

To do the colonists justice they had not the remotest idea with what they were dealing. Sugar or tea was their preoccupation, and they had neither time nor inclination to study the civilisations which, as far as they could judge, were represented by the coolies. They did not know, or if they did they shut their eyes to, the tricks which recruiters play to inveigle coolies into their spider's web. They did not realise that the coolie did not understand what he was doing or had any conception of the life to which he was devoting himself. Still less did they perceive that when you bring over men in large numbers without a correspond-

ing number of women to a place where the blending of races was disliked an appalling immorality was bound to be the result. And least of all, until they began to see that the emancipated coolie, having on the whole received kind treatment and made money, began to settle in the place and to set up on his own account, did they conceive it possible that one day European superiority might be challenged. The sight of these coolies who were little better than bondmen was surely visible proof of that superiority. They saw an ignorant, dirty, but at the same time quiet and docile set of men who were cheap, and they apparently did not realise that their very dirt and ignorance were the result of a stern social system which kept them apart from those whose prerogative was cleanliness and knowledge. The very fact of docility, convenient as it was, showed that they were to be classed with sheep and not with lions, and the Anglo-Saxon has more respect for the lion than for the sheep. Nor can they be seriously blamed because, as time went on and the white labourer began to protest against the competition of those whose wants were few and whose life was simple, laws were enacted to keep down the number of immigrants.

From their own point of view the coolies had come to fulfil specified tasks for definite periods and for definite wages, but when those periods were over they must, if they chose to settle, submit to any laws which the owners of the country, however the ownership was acquired, chose to pass. They had no cause for special gratitude, as one has no special gratitude towards the carpenter who makes one a box except to the extent that he has served the purpose. That at any rate was the view of strict business.

The Asiatic being thus represented by the coolie, it is hardly a matter for surprise that when he was followed by the merchant, the trader, and the lawyer, these became identified with him. The same process is discernible in India, where the missionary, acting upon the doctrine of the equality of souls, is content to allow Christianity to be identified with the lowest of the people, so that when one sees a Christian convert the first thought is that he must have been a pariah. The Indian in South Africa was rather like the rabbit in Australia. Imported for a beneficent purpose, he was all very well as long as he was kept under control, but when that control was relaxed he

increased and multiplied until he became a nuisance, and particularly as he threatened to be a nuisance in that specially sensitive part of an Englishman's constitution, he, being what he was, was branded with names nearly akin to that which is applied to the Australian rabbit. And when the other rabbits appeared, however superior to the original rabbits they might be or thought they were, they were clearly rabbits. You can make laws for men but not effectively for rabbits, and if men do not obey your laws you can more easily catch them. True, you can use a gun against any individual rabbit with impunity, but even that doctrine can at times be applied to men, especially if the men show fight.

Mr. Gandhi, whose honesty no one has questioned, complained bitterly of the contemptuous habit of classing all Indians, whatever their position, indiscriminately as coolies. In a speech at Madras in 1896 he said: "Every Indian without distinction is contemptuously called a coolie. He is also called 'Sammy,' 'Ramasawmy,' anything but Indian. Indian schoolmasters are called 'coolie schoolmasters,' Indian storekeepers are 'coolie storekeepers.' . . . A respectable firm in Durban are the 'coolie

owners ' of a ' coolie stores.' . . . We are the ' Asian dirt ' ; we are ' chokeful of vice ' ; we are ' stinking coolies ' living on the ' smell of an oiled rag,' " and perhaps unkindest cut of all, " we are described in the statute books as ' semi-barbarous Asiatics or persons belonging to the uncivilised races of Asia.' "

This passage is not cited to prove the existence of the dogma of European superiority, for that needs no further demonstration. It suggests other reflections of deeper import. The ' smell of an oiled rag ' hints at the fear of economic competition which we are so often told is at the bottom of most of the European dislike of Asiatic immigrants. But the masters of labour cannot suppose that ' Sammy ' is ever going to be a menace to them ; on the contrary, it is the desire for cheap labour, and therefore for large profits, which induced the importation of any Asiatics at all. Enemies label the attitude greed. You may call it so if you will, but it is a vice which the South African shares with the rest of the world ; to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market is a law which is obeyed by Bombay and Tokio as well as by London and Paris. But imagination has never been one of the Anglo-Saxon virtues ; his whole field of vision

was occupied by commercial advantages to the exclusion of everything else, and thus he did not see that he was raising up competition in the labour market as well as in petty trade. Still less did he contemplate the possibility of complications arising from the admission of such harmless, poor-spirited and servile creatures as the Indian coolies. Quite evidently then the opposition to the Indian on the economic ground came from the class with whom he was in competition.

Now just as India contains a diversity of climate, from the snows of the Himalayas to the scorching furnace of the Deccan, just as she ranges from the most subtle intellects to the grossest ignorance, so her domestic habits vary from scrupulous cleanliness to incredible squalor, and her character from the intensely martial to the intensely unwarlike. But even notions of cleanliness may differ, for there are many customs which are matters of course to the white man and utterly abhorrent to the Indian. But the latter is especially careless in things that meet the eye. Refuse is thrown into the street. The sitting-room may be hung with clothes not always clean, the walls may be stained and badly in need of whitewash or distemper, and yet, as the saying is, you

might eat your dinner off the kitchen floor. If these things can be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry? The poorer classes exhibit all the visible signs of uncleanliness without the saving grace of the clean kitchen. Their notions too of sanitation, derived from a country mainly agricultural and blessed or cursed with a powerful sun, are of the most primitive. In a thousand ways their ingrained habits offend the susceptibilities of the European, though in this respect it is doubtful whether they are really any worse than the Chinese, of whom it has been written: "The odour of hot humanity, the smoke and the smell of opium resulted in a most repugnant mixture. . . . Against the walls stood dirty wooden bedsteads, shiny with perspiration, with pillows lying on them that once, perhaps, had been white. The whole room was in a disgusting state." Yet the writer, having survived this experience of a Chinese opium den in Calcutta, was able to add of a Chinese restaurant: "Nowhere have I seen such perfect cleanliness in the kitchens as in those of the poorest Chinese restaurants in Calcutta's China-town or the cities of Southern China."

It is easy to see then that the 'stinking coolie,' the 'Asian dirt,' unless these were

purely figurative terms, expressed the white man's detestation of the conditions under which the Indians were living. Conversely it is easy to see why the Indian resented them. Speaking broadly there was a clash of two civilisations, the one not necessarily superior to the other, as the European champions admitted, at any rate for the sake of argument, in the case of East Africa, but entirely different. Even supposing that the people of South Africa were as conversant with Indian civilisation as they manifestly were ignorant of it, the result would in all probability have been the same. The Western civilisation was in their view immeasurably superior to the Eastern, and when the representatives of the East were predominatingly coolies there could be no question. Had the immigrants from the East been princes, or even of the class from which the Legislative Assembly is drawn, there might have been a different tale to tell; they would have been treated with some respect, although surprise, and even a measure of contemptuous amusement, might have been caused, as derogatory to the citizens as it would have been irritating to the immigrants. But let that pass. There might indeed have been excuses for the pro-

letariat who saw their very bread threatened, and many of whom had been brought up in the tradition of the Grondwet that there neither is nor ever can be equality between black and white. Far less excuse, if any, was there for a Government which, with all the pompous dignity of official utterance, branded Indians as a semi-barbarous race. Such a judgment betrayed either an abysmal ignorance of, or a callous indifference to, Indian history and to the testimony of numerous travellers. It took no account of diversity of race or religion, which is so prominent a feature in India, and it judged the whole country by the possibly disagreeable, but in any case minute, fraction of the population which had crossed the sea. It lumped Oxford and Cambridge with the slums of London and Manchester and branded the whole with a proletarian designation. Such a judgment would, however, have mattered little if it had been academic, but clearly it was not. It showed that the Government itself sympathised entirely with the protests of the white proletariat, that it resented the invasion of Asia, and that its proceedings were likely to be based on a false conception. As the better class of Indians arrived in Africa they not unnaturally resented this

slur upon their civilisation; for while they did their best to conform to European ideas, they despised them in their hearts, holding their own to be superior.

The European, and especially the Englishman, has been brought into contact with many coloured races all over the world, but it is significant that, except in India itself, of all these races Indians are the most despised, and even disliked. In India it is very rare that any Englishman either dislikes or despises the village farmer, the village artisan, or even the village field labourer. Such feelings as dislike and contempt, where they exist, are reserved for the literate classes, the journalists, the pleaders, and the half-educated crowd of nondescript seekers for employment, and then not for the individual, but for classes in the abstract. The man from Bombay likes the independent manliness of the Maratha; the man from Northern India takes a pride in the martial races from the Punjab and the United Provinces. In Madras and Bengal there is perhaps a feeling of patronage rather than of sympathy; it is the feeling of the stronger to the weaker, the feeling rather of a father to children than of a man to men. Hence it is that the average Anglo-Indian looks

with something like indignation upon the treatment of Indians in the Dominions; his attitude, if the metaphor is not made to bear a deeper interpretation than that of mere analogy, is akin to that of the owner of a dog to whom you may abuse all other dogs, or dogs in general, so long as you respect his own.

On the other hand, the colonial has had other coloured races to deal with, and regards them on the whole with a far more favourable eye. There are several reasons why this should be so. In the first place, the natives of the country were obviously there first and the colonist is quite willing to recognise the law of possession. The immigrant is as clearly an interloper, except in so far as he has been imported with the consent of the master. He has done nothing for the country. He has not attempted to organise or develop it. He has never ruled it. If the colonists themselves may be regarded logically as interlopers, if there be any fanatics who carry the principle of self-determination so far as to demand that the United States should be abandoned to the Red Indians, Australia to the Bushmen, and South Africa to Hottentots and other tribes, the white man may fairly claim that he has

improved the country to the benefit of native tribes, that he has raised it to a self-respecting and even to a commanding position in the world, that he has introduced a civilisation unquestionably and immeasurably superior to that of any primitive tribe, and that he has done all this at the cost of his own industry and treasure and sometimes at the cost of his life. The Asiatic has done none of these things. He merely comes to share the profits. The lion has done the hunting, he has brought down the quarry, and no doubt he has taken the best of it, as lions do ; but the Asiatic is merely the jackal, skulking round to pick up what fragments he can without difficulty or danger to himself.

But it may be said it is not true that the colonists have everywhere recognised possession. The Red Indians both in Canada and in the States were ruthlessly hunted until they became degenerate and were contemptuously allotted reservations where they could still exist in harmless insignificance. The Bushmen retreated into the wilds before the advancing Australian, and the coloured man of South Africa, though his rights to individual possessions have been recognised, was treated, especially in the Transvaal, as

something very like a slave. The doctrine that a colony should be administered primarily in the interests of the native inhabitants has lately been enunciated as something new. It has not been everywhere applied, and in fact it cannot be applied to large and well-established States where the white man is no longer a sojourner but claims the privileges of a separate nationality. We must therefore look elsewhere for a solution of the phenomenon of special opposition to Asiatics. Now the Nordic races, and especially the Anglo-Saxon, respect manliness, and there is a certain manliness about the 'noble savage' which attracts them. They admire the man who will stand up to them with nothing better to oppose than his naked body and an assegai. Their firmest friends have been their most redoubtable enemies. In South Africa the Zulus are more to the taste of the white man than the Hottentots; in New Zealand the Maoris are welcome companions; in India, until the virus of a perverted politics turned them from loyal soldiers into religious fanatics, the Sikhs were respected comrades, far removed in estimation from the unwarlike Bengali, whose principal weapon Macaulay declared to be duplicity, to the bitter resent-

ment of the politicians of to-day. Madras gained, and perhaps deserved, the contemptuous title of the Benighted Presidency, not certainly because she was backward in administration or civilisation, for the rulers were of the same stock and calibre as those in other parts of India, and her sons have lately shown that they are the equals of any Indians in intellect, but simply because her races do not like fighting and are not afraid to be frightened. Now practically all the immigrants, whether they be imported coolies, free traders, clerks, or lawyers, come from those three Presidencies where the fighting races, with the exception of the Marathas, do not exist. Even the Mohammedans, professors of a militant religion, are drawn from the trading class and are neither Pathans nor Ghazis. There is nothing more contemptible in India to the white man's thinking than the pitiful whine of the beggar, the outcaste, and the coolie of a certain type. He who respects himself will win the respect of others, and such as these, whether from long centuries of social custom or for other reasons, have no self-respect.

But at least it may be said that the harmless docile coolie, secure in his own insignificance, might excite the negative quality

of indifference, if not a more positive pity, rather than active hatred. But all the Asiatic races—Chinese, Japanese, Indians (for at present the expansion of Asia is confined to these)[1]—have brought with them their own civilisations and insist upon their own customs, and to some extent upon their own laws. This is especially the case with Indians to whom, far more than to the Japanese and probably more than to the Chinese, custom and law have a religious significance. They have brought these things ready made with them, and they would as soon give up life itself as consent to alter them at the bidding of others. They have, it is true, been compelled to modify them to suit the conditions—social, climatic, geographical—in which they find themselves, for clearly you cannot make a pilgrimage to Benares when there is no Benares to go to. But these modifications come gradually. There is a world of difference between a voluntary adjustment to circumstances and involuntary compulsion by the State. In India the Government is often faced with the alternative of doing what is felt to be right and of offending long-cherished susceptibilities,

[1] That is speaking generally. There are others but they are negligible.

and many a measure has had to be postponed, or even abandoned, for fear of hurting religious or quasi-religious feelings. How much more then is there a natural irritation in a country where the immigrants are of no consequence and must take the laws as they find them, as a Polish Jew in the East End of London must accept the laws of England! The primitive races of Africa and Polynesia have no civilisation to speak of. The European has a clean slate to write upon, and since the only civilisation that comes within his barbarian knowledge is the Western one offered to him, the savage more readily approximates to the European, just as you can mould the habits of a child when you cannot alter those of the grown man.

The antipathies of the Anglo-Indian are at bottom the same as those of the colonist. We have already seen that the class he dislikes are the vakils and the journalists. These are the men who are challenging the superiority of Europe, and they are doing it in a way little to the European liking. The political ferment for which they are largely responsible has spread to such colonial dominions as South and East Africa and to other countries, such as Egypt, Irak, and Persia, which, though not a part of the British Empire,

have been under European, and for the most part British, influence. It is mainly on account of that political ferment that the hatred of the Indian has come about. This menace—for in the earlier days there was no question of a challenge—to the European superiority induced the authorities of Natal to pass a disfranchisement Act in 1894, but it is clear that their action was in no sense due then or after to the result of the Chino-Japanese war. It was induced by the fear of being swamped by the rising flood of Asiatics, mingled as in India with a certain indignation that the brown man should have the boldness to assert himself and, also as in India, with not a little irritation that the challenge should be expressed in so insolent a manner. For the more clamant section of Indians follow the law; having for a long time acquiesced in the dogma of European superiority and having discovered the secret of it, as they at any rate thought, they proclaimed with such insolence of vituperation as they could command that beside the majestic figure of India, the idol which Europe had set up was but a poor shoddy affair, and by degrees they found that what they had taken for a healing drug was really poison, and what they had in their delusion

hailed as beneficence was really the insidious wiles of a worse than Machiavelli. It is the way with weaker nations who make a discovery.

Against this flood of Asiatic immigration, the rising tide of colour, as Mr. Lothrop Stoddard has called it, the nations are imposing the barrier of legislation, which has effectively put a stop to it so far as new immigrants are concerned. But the world is not prepared for a new Revocation. Forcible repatriation is out of the question, and so long as the prolific Asiatic remains upon the soil so long will he be a menace by sheer force of multiplied numbers. If that were all, however, the danger, if it be a danger, would not be great. Mr. Stoddard has suggested that Europe ought to concentrate upon the ' inner dykes ' of white civilisation ; that we should strengthen the barriers in those countries where white civilisation is manifestly predominant, and as compensation for this complete exclusion should abandon the coloured man's country to the coloured man. This sounds like a counsel of perfection, but it is worth while to examine it as the vision of a possible future. To an American it doubtless sounds attractive. In order to preserve the United States uncon-

taminated by colour except for the negroes who could not now be repatriated, and for the Red Indians who are indigenous, the Americans would but have to abandon the Philippines. To France, England, and Russia the problem is far graver. The predominantly white countries outside Europe and America are the British Dominions, and of these the case of South Africa is perhaps debatable. The French Colonial Empire, which is a source of such pride to the Republic, and which France is endeavouring to make a source of strength also, is entirely made up of coloured races; and a withdrawal from Siberia, thereby opening the door to the establishment of a huge Japanese Empire on the continent of Asia, is a step which no Russian Government, Czarist or Soviet, is likely to contemplate. Such a proposal as Mr. Stoddard's seems therefore Utopian. It involves a measure of altruism of which no nation has hitherto shown itself capable, and if it is ever to be accepted, even in principle, it can only be so accepted in presence of a danger immediate and obvious, for, large as is the vision which would recognise the importance of consolidating the 'white man's countries' against the Asiatic flood and which would sacrifice

the immediate and definite for the distant and indefinite, the sacrifice of national colonies for the good of the whole Nordic race, the clash of the national and international ideas which has hitherto proved the main stumbling-block in the way of the realisation of the brotherhood of man is bound to intervene.

It is indeed more than doubtful whether the fear of an overwhelming Asiatic flood is really justified. It is not that way that revolutions and conquests have come about. It is true that the commotion in India in favour of self-determination has spread to the great Dominions, but the demand for equality depends upon circumstances peculiar to the British Empire. It has been definitely established that the Dominions have a right to deal with the Immigration Question without interference by the Imperial Government, and though strenuous efforts are being made in South Africa to obtain at least a larger measure of political power, they are being as strenuously resisted. In other countries, such as the United States, the sovereign power of the State is only limited by the fear of political complications. On the other hand, there are more ominous signs of Asiatic self-assertion. India, under

the unfortunate lead given by the suggestion of a prominent Englishman, began to whisper of Indian colonies in Africa with special intention towards East Africa, and though the idea seems to have withered as soon as born, a seed has been sown which may one day bear fruit. But if this idea is Utopian the frugality of the Eastern races is a solid and a living fact. The legend of profuse and imprudent squandering, even on the part of princes, is dissipated. Every one knows that the Indian is well-to-do on an income which hardly suffices a European to live at all, and the frugality of Far Eastern Asiatics is so notorious that their competition in the labour market is one of the most serious aspects of immigration. This disparity in habits is euphemistically called the standard of comfort, and in so far as it is confined to the needs of everyday life, which must and should include recreation, amongst a working people (for we know what all work makes of Jack), there is little to be said against it. At any rate it is there and it would be mere waste of breath to declaim against it. Unfortunately there are signs of luxury, of an unbridled desire for amusement and pleasure under the influence of which Europe may degenerate into

decadence. It will then be the old story of the small and hardy races against the once powerful but now flabby and lethargic. The Medes went down before Cyrus; Xerxes before Themistocles and Eurybiades; Greece succumbed to Rome, and Rome to the Goths. Vitellius cannot remain Emperor while there is a Vespasian in the field. The Great War showed that the fibre of the nations is still sound, in Germany and Austria as well as in France and England. But did we not hope that the war would prove the refining fire by which the dross of our modern civilisation would be purged? And is it purged? Already upon the horizon has appeared the rising sun of Japan. No whit behind India and China in frugality, she is firmly establishing her colonies upon the European pattern in Formosa and the islands close to her and she has planted a firm foot upon the continent of Asia. It has been said that every nation which finds itself tends to become aggressive immediately; it is hardly less true that every nation of consequence has at the zenith of its prosperity either felt the need of expansion or has been impressed by the glory and majesty of an extended empire. Athens indulged this fancy to her own undoing, but Rome founded the most

solid colonial empire of modern times. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were the most glorious period of Spanish history. Holland, emancipated from Spanish thraldom, acquired the Spice Islands ; and Russia, when she had emerged from a semi-barbaric state, overflowed into Siberia. France is perhaps the exception that proves the rule, but her dreams of Empire were only shattered because she came into collision with another Power to whom the gods granted the victory. There is no nation more likely to profit by the lessons of history than the Japanese. The patience and the thoroughness which they have exhibited in adapting their country to the European model have been the admiration of observers. They are ready to bide their time, but in the meanwhile they are restive over the assumption of European superiority. " Nobody can say," cries a Japanese writer, comparing the European with the African negro, " that under scientific civilisation their intellects and abilities may not improve and become as developed as those of the Europeans, to say nothing of outstripping the Europeans in their fine physique." There is nothing in the Japanese view which prevents Asiatics from rivalling Europe in every way. " The ascendancy of

the white races," it is suggested, "is due to the fact that they came into possession of material civilisation a little earlier than their non-white brothers," for the superiority of the white race "is based neither on science nor upon any positive experience. It is a mere superstition backed by historical prejudices."

It is in this spirit that the most formidable expansion of Asia is now taking place. The emigration of coolies from the Far East and from India can never of itself prove a serious menace. The foundation of colonies is at present limited to the islands of the Pacific or to the immediate vicinity of the colonising people, for the white man is everywhere and the coloured man has retreated before him, so that America and Australia are already the property of white races and the Dark Continent is parcelled out among the nations of Europe. If Japan, like Germany, wants her place in the sun she must appropriate Asia by following the line of least resistance; she must develop her hold upon Korea and strengthen her influence in China, for if she aspires to wrest the supremacy from white colonies she runs the risk of involving the world in another conflagration. It would then be for the white races to decide whether

they would put aside their jealousies and fight together for the very existence of white civilisation. Towards this Armageddon it may be that the Asiatic races are moving by their invasion of Europe, for it is here if anywhere that the real menace lies. The change which has come over the Oriental mind in respect of foreign travel is portentous. Where one stray individual arrived, a stranger in a strange land aghast at his own daring, hundreds now come to well-ordered dwellings and comfortable clubs. When once at Oxford the Japanese or Indian student was almost as rare a bird as the swallow in winter, now dark faces seem to alternate with white in the High. Indians especially made it a grievance that after the war, when the resources of the University were severely taxed, they were shut out in favour of the white man, for whose benefit, after all, it was founded. These young men are now scattered over the world—in New York, Berlin, Paris, London. The secrets of Western civilisation are no longer secrets. "Omne ignotum pro mirifico," says the old Latin tag, and perhaps there was a time when imagination was dazzled by the thought of the splendours of Europe. But a nearer acquaintance dispelled the dream. Let us

not imagine that what the Oriental sees when he comes to London or Paris is the might and majesty of a great Empire. His curiosity may at first be stimulated by splendid buildings and magnificent bridges; his imagination may at first be fired by the immense and orderly traffic of the streets. He no doubt finds transport convenient, lodging sufficient, and food passable. But the Oriental is introspective. He prides himself that he looks deeper than the surface and that he despises material things as compared with spiritual. In his own country he has met a select band of white men who are there because they are select, be they rulers and officials as in India or traders and missionaries as in China and Japan. They bring with them the best traditions of the West; there is, in fact, taken in the large, a certain feeling that the honour of the West is entrusted to them; that they are the representatives of a higher civilisation, and that of all virtues to keep your plighted word is the highest. But in England itself or in France they see all and sundry. The flaming advertisements only serve to emphasise the material nature, perhaps even the vulgarity, of Western civilisation, the talk which they hear on tram or bus is mainly

of money or of fashion. Being themselves of moderate means they see rather the genteel drabness of Bloomsbury than the elegance of Carlton House Terrace; or if they are in France, they see not the beauties of the Champs Élysées and the Place de la Concorde, but the squalor of Saint Antoine and the garish invitation of Montmartre. They profit by the strength of the West, for they have come to learn her science; but they observe the weakness and they treasure up their knowledge against the day when Asia will once more prove herself the rival—perhaps the mistress, who knows?—of Europe.

That this is no fairy tale, no flight of romantic fancy, let one of their number testify. After a boyhood spent in the glamour of the East amid reverential awe for the mother, in the sanctified atmosphere of holy men, and in the ecstatic observance of pilgrimage, Mr. D. G. Mukerji decided to try his fortunes in America. "The reverence that I felt for this country," he says, "was so great that nothing short of falling on my knees and kissing its soil would have sufficed to express my feelings." He was quickly disillusioned. "No sooner did they see that I had such feelings for their country

than they began to knock it out of me in a very unceremonious fashion." The glamour of the sunset is over the West until the enthusiast gets there with too little money in his pocket; the washing of dishes and making of beds in a cheap boarding-house in order to make enough to live is a discouraging introduction for a University student for whom Burke's *French Revolution* is "a very tame book." So divorced from the principles of the Founder does Western Christianity appear to such a man, that on the authority of a friend he believes that Jesus Christ would not know a church for His own house. The environment into which the Oriental is cast soon shows him the seamy side of Western life; he sees brutal men and bedizened women in the streets of the less exalted quarters, and when he gets back to his lodging it is of the smug respectability that Thackeray called shabby genteel. On the eve of a great crisis, when to his mind the very air ought to be tense with expectation, he hears the newsboys crying, not the downfall of empires, but the latest racing, and having none of the Anglo-Saxon passion for sport to read about if not to see, unable to grasp a temperament that is capable of following a football into battle, he declines

to believe that these people are serious, or that their horizon is bounded by anything more substantial than the passing show.

The aims of the students may be individual; their cumulative effect is national. They are like some field of flowers where each plant is itself insignificant and yet becomes imposing in the mass. We need not assume that each boy comes to Europe with some carefully planned Machiavellian policy to contribute towards the shattering of European supremacy, nor need we imagine that he is the innocent emissary of a like-intentioned band in his own country. If the Indian student indulges at times in wild talk of a seditious kind and welcomes with enthusiasm those who are openly challenging the right of England to govern his country, that is not a matter to make a pother about. The Japanese, Chinese, Persians—subjects of independent States—have nothing to excite sedition. But all alike are in Europe to wrest from her the secrets of her supremacy. All alike are there to study the methods of a stable government, to learn something of at least the machinery of democracy, to absorb something of her mechanical science, her medical triumphs, her financial and economic power: for it is remarkable how

many of these boys are taking up mechanical engineering and economics, medicine and chemistry, where once philosophy and the law seemed alone worthy of their notice. It is here that the expansion of Asia becomes formidable. The coolies have overcome or are overcoming their reluctance to travel overseas; the conditions of their life abroad are breaking down the barriers of caste and the walls of an age-long seclusion. Contact with the outer world has modified the exaggerated and ignorant opinion of the supreme greatness of their own country among the better educated. But without leaders the masses are helpless, and the leaders of the future are those who are gradually acquiring the knowledge which Europe has to bestow. For Western civilisation they care nothing; for Western philosophy very little except as a means to an end and an academic study. If some day Europe is to yield her pride of place the material for the cataclysm is in the making. Cataclysm is perhaps the wrong word; the conquest of Europe will not be accomplished by the violence of the storm; if there be any truth in the metaphor of the flood the process is rather that of the waves upon the cliff. But the end is not yet. Asiatics are as yet only learners. They

imitate, they absorb, and they adapt, but hitherto they have not created. A time may come when the mere pressure of numbers, adequately equipped and under intelligent leadership, may be irresistible, but their power will not be that of Timur or Attila; once more they will copy Europe and accomplish the mastery by peaceful penetration.

CHAPTER VI

Cultural Influences—Eastern and Western

WE have travelled far since those days when Macaulay in his narrow, self-complacent ignorance asserted ex cathedra that one shelf of Europe was worth all the libraries of Asia. The opening up of Asiatic literature and art has revealed a new world; we have become the heirs of a larger inheritance. We may learn that the foundations of all ethics are the same in all civilised lands, and at the same time the difference in moral values. Truth, honour, justice, chivalry of men towards women and constancy of women towards men—all these and more are written in the literature of India, plain to read, especially in the epics. But to these ancient Indians piety in the Virgilian sense is the crown of all virtues and perhaps too the strict ceremonial worship of the gods. If through Christianity we have

learned to recognise the gospel of love, we are enabled to see through the teaching of Buddha another doctrine, the doctrine of salvation by suffering and renunciation, while Islam in its truest sense inculcates the submission of the Will to a higher Power. The Western doctrine of individualism gives rise to comparisons if not to questionings when contrasted with the Eastern conception of monism, and the Hindu ideas of Karma and reincarnation have suggested new solutions of the eternal question: 'Whence came we? Whither bound? What is the reward of virtue? And what the punishment of vice?' In the revolt of a weary world against what seems to be the failure of Christianity, some have turned for comfort to the East and have found their expression in such systems as Theosophy and Christian Science.

Europe, in fact, has enlarged her horizon. It is no longer possible to speak in unconscious arrogance as though she alone had the monopoly of all the arts. Her music ranges from the sublimity of the mountains and the storm to the quiet delicacy of rivulets and flowers, but there is another art but little known as subtle and airy as a gossamer web, yet as luxuriant as the undergrowth

of the jungle. That is in keeping with all Eastern art. The cameos of Japanese poetry are at one with the tracery of Indian design, and the contours of the lighter Eastern architecture contrast with the sterner if sublimer structures of Europe.

The arts and the literature are thus complementary to those of Europe, but they cannot take their place. If the world cannot do without Homer, it is the poorer by leaving out the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Each is characteristic of its own age and its own civilisation; we cannot weigh one against the other because they belong to different categories. The philosophy of ancient Greece stands for all time, yet India too has her ancient philosophy, and we cannot afford to neglect the great ethical teaching of Confucius and Buddha. But this does not mean that we are to indulge in extravagant imitation or to overshoot the mark in hyperbolic eulogy. To approach the East in the spirit of intelligent criticism and detached admiration is to enrich our knowledge; to approach it in the spirit of servile adoption is to sell the soul for a passing fashion. Each nation must develop its own art in accordance with national traditions and must stamp it with the stamp

of its own national character. The arts may be correlated or traced back to the common ancestry of a distant past, but men do not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles. Thus it is that in the 'Mikado' the art is none the less English because the actors happen to be dressed in kimonos; there is nothing Japanese about the work, and the scene might just as well have been laid in Sancho Panza's island. Nor is there any reason why Mr. Holst should not select 'Savitri' as the subject of an opera (albeit that the libretto does not do justice to the legend), and although the music seems to betray Oriental influence it is suggested rather by the atmosphere and by the thinness of the orchestra than by any daring Oriental innovations. Best of all is the famous Khayyam, which, while preserving the original, has yet risen above the level of translation proper to the position of an English classic.

There are, however, indications that the craving for novelty, for something original, has turned men's thoughts towards the East, particularly since the cult began of Russian music, Russian dancing, and Russian literature. Writers have of course turned often to the East for themes, as Johnson did in

'Rasselas,' Voltaire in 'Zaire,' and Byron in many poems. These were food for the thoughtful; to-day we have 'Chu Chin Chow' and 'East of Suez' served up to attract the millions. In Tagore England discovered a star that shone direct from the East, but would he have won that high praise that was showered on him if he had not been a Bengali? An ecstatic admirer writes of him:

"The beauty of his religious lyrics is adequately presented . . . in such a sublime turn of imagination as 'Thou didst not turn in contempt from my childish play among dust, and the steps that I have heard in my playroom are the same that are echoing from star to star.'"

One feels that the glamour of the East has got hold of the critic.

A certain English poet sang in a more formal age:

"And now a bubble bursts and now a world."

And another Eastern has spoken to us of the Almighty's care of the sparrows. This is praise run riot.

And like Tagore the Russian dancing is a phase, a vogue. The conception is admirable, so long as it is adapted to European

notions; as a naked importation from the East it is an exotic and should so remain. These things are no doubt only externals; yet the mind cannot be concentrated upon externals without taking on something of the spirit, and conversely the "intending of the mind" will show itself in externals. If a Holst presents 'Savitri,' as he must do, in Eastern dress, his mind must be in tune with Eastern harmonies; but when a Gilbert writes the 'Mikado' he is frankly European in his outlook. For the subtler influences of the Orient others have looked towards Russia—that Janus door which opens upon Asia towards the East and on Europe towards the West. But here there is a danger of hysterical exaggeration. There has been, it is true, a half-justified enthusiasm for Russian literature ever since the influence of Tolstoi began to be felt; not to know Turgenev and Dostoevsky and Tchehov was to abandon all claim to be literary. The influence of Tolstoi spread both West and East; we may trace it to-day in the grotesque form of Bolshevism and in the fantastic campaign of Gandhi, who boasted himself to be a Tolstoyan disciple. But when we are told that the gospel of Dostoevsky is destined to become the faith

of Europe, we begin to open our eyes. With the specific arguments for this contention we have here no concern; it would moreover be presumptuous to deny the assertion that the influence of Dostoevsky is becoming supreme on the Continent, since that would argue such intimate acquaintance with the whole Continental mind as falls to the lot of no man to achieve. But what is this gospel? It is "the Asiatic Ideal" which is defined to be "the rejection of every strongly held Ethic and Moral in favour of a comprehensive *laissez-faire*." It is an ideal which is "primeval, Asiatic, and occult," a "return home to the Mother," "a turning back to Asia." Now there are certain unwholesome influences in Asia to which these definitions correctly apply; the Tantric rites of India, beginning in a kind of mysticism, developed, in their worst form, into a gross licentiousness which writers refrain from presenting in naked print. Here perhaps we may truly discover the rejection of the Ethical and Moral, and we may find further traces of it in the sensuousness of Persian poetry, the reputed immorality of the baser Japanese nature, the opiate abandonment of the Chinese masses. But let us do justice to Asia. If condemnation is not based upon such

countries as these, on what is it based? Asia acknowledges these things and deplores them as much as ever Europe can. India glories, not in the Tantric rites, but in her epics, in her ancient dramas, in the Bhagavadgita, in the wisdom of her old philosophers and modern poets. China, at any rate until Western influence began to take hold upon her, taught her young men the principles of Confucius; the pride of Japan is in her artistry. Why then should we seize upon all that is bad and meretricious and unwholesome and label it the Asiatic Ideal? Are we really to believe that this is what Dostoevsky was trying to inculcate, that this is what Europe is seizing upon to the destruction of its own ideals? We may well believe better of Dostoevsky, and may hope that Continental Europe is too sane to rush headlong on the wings of such ideas as this to the chaos predicted for her.

The fatalism of Asia seems indeed to have taken strong hold upon the Russian artists, the melancholy of her minor keys to become more melancholy in their hands. And those who believe in the joy of life and in the great harmonies that flow from the orchestra of Nature cannot but scent danger in the extravagant praise which is

lavished upon the great Russians—a danger all the greater when the critic speaks, as it were, *ex cathedra* and so draws to his side those who from modesty or perhaps from indolence are content to accept his dogmas without demur. In such a class is a recent appreciation of Tchehov by one who is an ardent lover of his hero. We are warned that he is inimitable, yet we are urged as far as in us lies to imitate. He is the heir of Tolstoi and Dostoevsky, but he is said to arouse such personal feelings in us that "we take him into ourselves and he is part of our lives." If this means anything, it means that Tchehov has imbibed a portion at least of that Asiatic spirit which, as we have seen in the case of Dostoevsky, is not the most admirable part of Asia's bequest to our culture and to our outlook on life. Enthusiasm of this sort among the elect is apt to become a cult, and a cult, if it be deep rooted enough, tends to crystallise into a faith. That is why at the outset it was suggested that we should do well to enlarge our vision by a certain detached knowledge of Asia's culture, but to avoid fusing it with our own ideals lest it eventually destroy their special identity. We do not want to exchange the more direct methods

of European thought for the "bewildering mystical perception" which is characteristic of modern Asia and which the writer already quoted declares can only be safely used by a Tchehov.

The influence of the Orient is becoming increasingly apparent in that art where one would least expect to find it. In poetry, in philosophy and in painting the Oriental type of thought has diverged very greatly from the Western, but in the fundamentals of each there is at least common ground. But the language of music differs so totally that the East is wholly unintelligible to the West and the West to the East. So far apart are they that the instruments, the production of sound, the structure of the composition, and even the very notes themselves, hardly admit of comparison. There has, however, been a marked movement in Europe towards a return to the more ancient modes or scales. In France its high priests were Debussy and Ravel, who might have claimed to be the prophets of the Future as Wagner had claimed to be at the end of the nineteenth century. It is, however, likely that the French masters were not consciously adopting an Oriental style; probably they would prefer to acknowledge the

influence of the ancient Greeks, but it is significant that the modern Hindu modes are the living survival of the Greek music and to us the key to the understanding of it.

But it is not in technique that the greatest influence of the Oriental art is to be found. It has crept into Europe very largely through the Janus doors of Russia. Those composers who, like Tchaikowsky, turned both hands and faces to the West remained entirely European; but there were others who, if their hands worked by Western methods, set their faces towards the East. Their hands were the hands of Esau, but their voices were the voice of Yakub. The vogue of this school is, partly at any rate, responsible for the creation of atmosphere which is a definite attribute of Indian music. Programme music is well known in Europe, neither is it new. Handel deliberately employs it in 'Israel,' and there are traces of it in the 'Messiah.' Beethoven gives it to us throughout the 'Pastoral' symphony, and of course Wagner uses it frequently. One need only mention such familiar examples as the Feuerzauber and the Walkürenritt from 'Die Walküre.' All these instances—and there are many more—are definite

attempts to reproduce the phases of Nature in terms of sound. But Wagner went farther. He adopted the Leitmotif upon the principle of the association of ideas, and the extension of this conception has perhaps led to the more atmospheric effects of Scriabin and his followers of the modern school. In France, perhaps following a different line, Debussy struck this atmospheric note in such Nocturnes of the Whistler type as " La Lune descend sur le temple qui fut," or in the more familiar " L'après-midi d'un Faune," the joy of which lies in the shimmering heat of a summer afternoon. Now this idea of atmosphere is definitely recognised by Indian music. The ragam, that elusive term which has hitherto defied definition but which a French student has called ' L'approfondissement de l'idée d'une mode,' is supposed to express each its particular emotion, and these emotions are so specially appropriated to times and seasons that to an Indian it is an artistic crime to use a morning ragam in the evening or a spring ragam in the autumn. So carefully is the day analysed that there are special forms applicable only to early twilight, to late twilight, to the forenoon and the afternoon, to the early night and the small hours.

A curious use of music was exhibited not very long ago at Queen's Hall in the shape of a colour symphony. Needless to say it did not conform to the old ideas of the division of a symphony, but tried to express tonally in four movements the four colours, purple, green, yellow, and red. Each colour had its special attributes—majesty for purple, restless passion for red. This idea seems to be derived from the East, though it is probably not directly attributable to Oriental influence, for attempts have been made both in Manchester and in London to establish a connection between colour and music. In India various ragams are actually exhibited pictorially. Thus the midday ragam called Todi ragini is represented by the picture of a nymph "standing in an open landscape in the brilliant noonday sun, clothed in a white sari and perfumed with the camphor of Kashmir. In her hands she holds the vina," most typical of Indian instruments, "and all the deer in the neighbouring pastures stand entranced as she plays." Or, again, the Saranga melody is represented by the "glare of the desert and the heat waves rising and falling with the mirage of the cool refreshing stream in the distance and the thirsty black buck galloping towards

the oasis or sobbing out its wrath on the burning sand as it realises the hopelessness of the search." Other pictures somewhat similar to these have a more definite suggestion of colour. The Vasanta ragam, the ragam of Spring, is represented by a youth of golden hue, dressed in yellow robes with eyes of the colour of the rising sun, that is, in India golden. The Megha or Cloud ragam has blue for the prevailing colour. The main figure is a young king in blue robes, sometimes of a blue countenance after the manner in which Krishna is usually depicted, and his eyes are violet.

If in the instances just given there seems to be a definite connection between the ideas common to-day and the Oriental style coming to us through such Russians as Moussorgsky, Scriabin and Stravinsky, there seems also to be more than a trace of it in the formlessness of modern compositions. The expert critics no doubt may be able to detect a more definite shape, and the musical analyst may explain phrases and transitions, but to the ordinary listener, the amateur *par excellence*, the music is like an impressionist picture with this difference, that while the eye can gaze in the effort to discover the meaning, the ear cannot capture

the fleeting musical phrase. Now if anyone will take a piece of music of the classico-romantic school—Beethoven, let us say, or Schumann—he will find that in all probability the phrase rhythm (not the bar rhythm which is normally in multiples of 2 or 3) runs in ' stanzas ' of 4 or 8 ; a good instance is the last movement of Beethoven's violin sonata in G major, or Schumann's Nachtstück No. 1. Even Tchaikowsky, using a Russian bar rhythm of 5/4, falls into the same phrase rhythm. The ear that has grown accustomed to such measures finds it difficult to appreciate any others ; there seems to be little but an unmeaning concatenation of sound. And that is precisely the impression that Indian music leaves, probably, though not wholly, for the same reason that its bar rhythms are both quite unlike the normal Western types. So Europe in turning for her novelties to the East has extended the theory of bizarre time until Schönberg has discarded it altogether, and can write without any time signature at all.

That such a result is due to Asiatic influence most modern composers would probably deny. The West, they would argue, knows very little of Eastern music. The music of to-day, with

its new rhythms and its strange cadences, is but the evolution of the art which has proceeded steadily from Mozart through Beethoven and Wagner on to the 'whole-tone scale' masters and the symphonic poets of to-day. The so-called 'formlessness' of modern music only betrays the inability to appreciate, and when *The Times* critic accuses Franz Schreker of "a certain lack of form," he may be qualifying for immortality as the slayer of a musical Keats. But when we remember the geographical position of Russia, the Asiatic tinge of her art and even of her folk-song, and the vogue which her music has enjoyed, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that Asia is largely influencing the modern music of Europe, even though the machinery, the notation, the instruments, the harmony and the scales may be European. If, as has been said, "our acquaintance with Oriental art has made us revise all our theories of æsthetic," there is nothing extravagant in attributing so imponderable a thing as Oriental influence to music also.

And this is the more probable because in another respect there is even clearer contact. There is no doubt that the drama of India began with the dance, the invention

of which is attributed to Heaven, so that Siva is frequently represented under the form of Nataraja, or the Dancing God, and the very word for dancing, familiar to us in the debased 'nautch,' is akin to the word for the highest type of drama. In its more primitive form the drama is even to-day expressed by the dance, and the spoken word plays little or no part. Similarly in Japan the Noh dances are an expression of the older culture, and according to a recent writer who had exceptional opportunities for study, "the point of each play is some emotional crisis which is expressed in a long slow dance." There have been many kinds of dances in Europe: all of them fall into three categories. The rustic dances may be either (1) the exuberant expression of animal spirits such as is common to all nations, even the most primitive, or (2) the observance of an ancient ritual of which Sir James Frazer gives many examples. The ceremonial dance is familiar to every ball-room, and though fashions have changed from time to time, the broad features of an entertainment for both sexes to the accompaniment of music has persisted throughout. The stage ballet is no doubt "a theatrical representation in which a story is told by

gesture accompanied by music," but after its development from a courtly entertainment into a real dramatic performance, chiefly owing to the influence of Noverre, it degenerated into a mere spectacular show; the music, at the highest period an equal, if not a predominant partner, became a mere accompaniment to which little attention was paid. It provided the rhythm, but had, so to speak, no separate meaning or existence of its own. Dancing as an interpretation of music and of high-class music is an invention, or at least a revival, of modern times; it differs from the ballet d'action in that whereas in the latter there seems to have been the distinct conception of a story to be told in music and in dancing, the present performance takes music which was composed without thought of the dance, and even without any conscious idea of a story, and interprets it through gesture. This kind of dancing we owe to the Russians —it is always the Russians—here as elsewhere open to the influences of Asia. Here again it is impossible to speak with that mathematical certainty which is the happy privilege of philologists when dealing with words obviously of Asiatic origin. We can but point to certain facts and suggest reason-

able inferences. We may not be able to ascribe directly to India those phenomena in Europe which we have just been considering, but we shall do well to remember that India is the focus from which a great part of Asiatic culture radiates and that it has often reached Europe through the medium of the various nations and civilisations that intervene. Other continents are self-contained. But the border line between Europe and Asia is blurred and the peoples of South-Eastern Europe are more akin to the Asiatic than, let us say, to the Nordic peoples that lie upon the northern frontier. We have already seen the acknowledged affinity between the Greek and the Hindu modes of music, and the German scholar Weber has elaborated the theory that the classical Indian drama owes much to Greek influence, though this has been challenged by M. Lévi in France and by Signor Nitti in Italy.

But if the influence of Asia upon Europe is for the most part a matter of inference —and perhaps we should more readily admit it but for a certain traditional pride—the influence of Europe upon Asia is too obvious to be controversial. It was inevitable that contact with the West would have a very

marked influence on those countries where the Western nations were favourably received, but although both converged to the same end the motives which actuated India and Japan were very different. The Indian nature is receptive. It has been said of Hinduism that it is at once the most rigid and the most elastic religious system in the world—rigid because owing to the institution of caste no one can become a Hindu who is not so born, and yet elastic because many cults have by a sort of legal fiction been included within its orbit. If a great deal has been said and written about the constant rivalry and occasional battle between Hinduism and Islam, we ought to remember that there is no other country in the world where the four great religions exist side by side, each differing fundamentally from the other in its conceptions and its ideals. Consequently a people who to-day can revere equally Iqbal and Tagore, and who look back with equal pride upon Kabir and Tulsi Dass, were eager to learn what the West had to teach. They did not draw around them the Pharisaical robes of the Chinese, or the Arab who treated with haughty disdain all that did not emanate from themselves or was in some way related to the

ancient religious teaching. As English became better known—and especially when it became the door into Government service—students devoured the best of English literature, and though the peculiar cast of the introspective Hindu mind gave utterance to its thoughts in philosophical poetry or contemplative prose, the influence of the West is not hard to discover. Of all forms of literature the most nationally characteristic is the drama; the classical style was elaborated to a degree probably unknown elsewhere. The rules were rigid. The emotions were classified and subdivided. Certain passions were allowed; others were prohibited, and above all the happy ending was essential. The themes were generally heroic, of the Greek type. Now the classical tradition has been discarded in favour of the problem play on social or political lines, even where an heroic theme is chosen, the old rules are no longer observed, and what that means to the conservative Hindu we, conservative though we are, cannot fully conceive. Some writers have gone to the length of imitating the manner and even of adopting the words of Shakespeare, but the best is but bad imitation, and national literature can never develop on such artificial lines.

But even more apparent than in the drama is the influence of Christian doctrine, though not of Christian dogma. Modern Indian philosophy is full of Western conceptions, no writer on the subject would feel adequately equipped without a course of Western thinking. The conception of the Fatherhood of God and of Love as the central idea is constantly showing itself, and the ethical notions of social service and of humanitarianism are reconciled with the ancient precepts. Hence has arisen a new-born solicitude for the outcaste, the welfare of the working poor and the prisoner in the jail. This kind of reconciliation is not always satisfactory; organised charity, which is a product of Western efficiency, not of Christianity as such, has never gained much ground, and the social service referred to is very often a lip-service only. To feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to befriend the poor—these things have their place in the Hindu ethics, but they have hitherto developed or been practised upon the national lines. It may well be that new wine is being put into old bottles. The reverence for the ancient precepts and the pride in their profundity are being blended with respect for great Western thought, and in a nation of philo-

sophers the result is too often an emasculated philosophy.

In Japan, on the other hand, Western influence rode on a rising tide of Western innovation. With the enthusiasm of the convert the Japanese—or a section of them—adopted all that they could from the West. "They were mainly influenced by French poets such as Paul Fort," says a recent writer of the aspiring Japanese *littérateurs*, "but they had a wide knowledge of the work of other moderns. . . . Their work was derivative in style and substance. If a French writer published Pictures of Paris in verse, a young Japanese poet published Pictures of Yokohama in verse." The indigenous drama seems to be giving way there to the modern European style in which the men wear European dress and the women the national costume with an effect not unlike that of Pinkerton and Butterfly in the opera. In painting also, both in India and in Japan, a modern school is springing up which in its tendencies towards realism is evidently inspired by Western art. But it is in music that the West has made a conquest of the Japanese. "There is no use denying," says the author just quoted, "the musical conquest of Japan by Europe

and America. . . . Japan is not only listening to foreign musicians, but is playing, singing and composing in the Western modes." In this respect the Japanese are as the poles asunder from the Indians. The music of India is a highly developed art so precious to the native mind that it has almost attained divine honours. Western music moves them not at all, partly no doubt because they never hear the best; they have, however, adopted the violin, and there is a movement to introduce European notation.

The influence of the West has thus worked in two distinct ways in India and in Japan; in India by absorption, in Japan by imitation. The result of this process is that while India is adapting her old arts to meet the new conditions, so that the new is gradually superseding the old by evolution, Japan has set up a brand-new set of idols to worship, with the result that the old ones still remain untouched, if for the moment in the twilight. The new school of art in India as represented by the downright realism of Ravi Varma's Ramayana in the Mysore Palace, or by the more characteristic suggestiveness of Abinindranath Tagore and his followers, has practically ousted the

cruder or more formal paintings of an earlier age, though the delicacy of touch still persists. In Japan we may still see the national art in the exquisite tracery of trees beside a waterfall and thin tinkling music of the Japanese instruments side by side with the more modern portraits and the full orchestral performance of a Wagner society.

Let us not, however, take it for granted that all Western influence must be good. Art, if it is to be convincing, must develop on national lines, and the realism of Europe is by no means always suited to the idealistic Oriental temperament. The national spirit is an elusive thing, and when we attempt an analysis there is always the fear lest we are reading into particular expressions of culture preconceived notions of national character. But that the distinction is there whatever it may portend is beyond question. There was at one time a danger lest the baneful influence of Macaulay upon the system of education would so divert Indian thought into European channels that characteristic literature would be drowned in the flood of imitation. Happily the inevitable reaction came in time to avert disaster, and to-day there are novelists, poets and painters

in India who, while they would be the first to acknowledge Western influence, are still evolving their arts in accordance with national tradition. In one respect, at any rate, Western influence has been entirely beneficent: it has evoked a critical spirit that was formerly wanting, and the logical treatment of history and of philosophy, backed by a research that will not be satisfied with anything short of accuracy, has given immensely greater weight to the Indian output on these subjects whereby ever-increasing attention will be paid by the West to Indian contributions in spheres that are peculiarly their own. The contrast between scholarly productions of this kind and the shrieking claptrap of the newspapers, which seeks to prove by mere vehement assertion and reiteration—a contrast not unknown in the West—only throws the former into the higher relief.

The danger in Japan is that the wave of Western enthusiasm which had its origin in the desire for political power will so overwhelm indigenous culture as to leave nothing but imitation. Nature, however, is sure to reassert herself in time; whatever craze may take the popular fancy, *tamen usque recurret.*

That happily is the salvation of all national character. The artificiality of imitation carries within it the seeds of its own death: the hysteria which seizes undiscriminatingly upon a fashion generally chooses the more undesirable elements, and these persist until saner influences make themselves felt and culture emerges the richer for a new contact. The more we know of Oriental literature, of Oriental art, and of Oriental music, the larger is our knowledge of the best that the world has to offer. Sanskrit scholars are an eclectic body, pursuing their quiet way without attracting much attention. Sooner or later the contribution they are making will make itself felt, not by deflecting the genius of Europe from its natural, its traditional course, but by illuminating our heritage from Greece, from Rome, and from mediæval Italy. We shall learn that in music and in painting and in sculpture there exist systems at which only the ignorant can scoff. And in the East too Japan and India will profit by contact with the West, not by debased imitation, but by incorporating new ideas. For art of all kinds must be progressive if it is not to die, and East and West can be richer if, knowing one another better and each

delving in the other's mines, they can learn to choose the gold and to reject the dross with caution and with discrimination.

CHAPTER VII

Prophetic

IF prophecy meant the foretelling of the future by the light of intuition without any grounds upon which to base conclusions, and in a manner somewhat enigmatic and poetical, needs must that such an attempt would fall under condemnation. But if, on the other hand, it is the legitimate task of the historian and the essayist to seek to read the signs of the times by the light of the past and the present, the attempt must be made if all that has been written is to have any value. For we are not dealing with a phenomenon that is episodic or cataclysmic; the progress of Asia is slow, but it is a world movement, and its advance is like that of a glacier, hardly perhaps, except in the case of Japan, perceptible, but ever moving forward. It is the very slowness of its advance that has earned for Asia the epithet of 'unchanging,' for

of course it is not and cannot be literally true. No nation that has not changed, however slowly, could have survived the centuries as the three great peoples of Asia have done. The restless West changes as rapidly as the trees change from spring to autumn and back again to spring; the fashions, the manners, the very beliefs of our grandparents survive only as curiosities, and the discoveries of to-day relegate those of yesterday to the undisturbed dust of remote shelves. Compared with such speed the East may well seem to be unchanging. Yet all along there has been change and a continuity in change; it is only since her contact with the West that the pace has increased, and it has increased in those very directions which we have been studying. In Japan the old conception of the Divine Emperor with a proud nobility ranking next below him on a system which recalls the feudal days of England has given way to a political system modelled upon, though not copied from, the West and differing from the Western plan in important particulars. In China the Son of Heaven has departed and in his place is set up a hideous idol which masquerades as democracy. In India the restraining hand of the West has held

the too impetuous in check and has so far prevented a catastrophe. Politically all three countries are advancing towards the democracy of the West, but as yet it is only Japan that has shown any real conception of that which underlies true democracy.

Political theory, administrative practice, commercial success, and above all efficient national defence—these are the things which seem to the Asiatic mind to hold the secret of European predominance. And behind all the spirit of research which is always trying to conquer Nature in her most minute as in her most gigantic manifestations. For the Asiatic is quick to recognise that he cannot be content to borrow; the imitator, be he never so skilful, can never be as the master. Hence he is invading Europe and America in quest of the master-key, and that once obtained he imagines that he can unlock the innermost chambers. And when that is accomplished he will no longer be the servant of Europe, chafing at the sense of inferiority, for he is confident that in all other respects he is her equal and in some respects her master. If that were all, his aspirations might well be fulfilled, for he has the nimbler brains, he has the infinite capacity for taking pains and the quality

of infinite patience. Not in this generation nor in the next does he look for fulfilment; perhaps not even in the one after that, but perhaps—perhaps in the fourth generation his desires will be consummated and Asia will again lead the world as once she did, in ideas and in culture, having built her house foursquare upon those solid pillars which she has adapted from European quarries, and having furnished it throughout with the science of the West, no longer borrowed but applied by her own sons.

But it is not all. Christianity as it spread developed the doctrine of individuality, which was inherent in the primitive religion and found in the Roman Empire a congenial soil wherein to plant it. God was conceived of as the Father to whom all men and women stood in the relation of sons and daughters. The Almighty was the arbiter of their destinies and might be moved by prayer and intercession to rule the individual in a manner favourable to him. The individual was indeed a part of the State and the social system under which he lived, but though his duties in such a relation bound him to render all the services he might, the paramount consideration was his sonship to the Almighty. The law was for the

individual, but the Divine law superseded all human laws. Death was simply the freeing of the individual soul and the individuality remained in an after life. It was fortunate for the establishment of such doctrines that the religion travelled West where it encountered a dying and discredited Paganism, instead of East where it would have been opposed to more conservative peoples and more static creeds.

The East was governed by totally different conceptions. To the orthodox Hindu God was an impersonal Omnipotence, the Creator of all things, the Upholder of the Good and the Destroyer of the Evil. The spirit of man emanated from this Power. It was and it remained a portion of the Divine Essence. Man on earth became a unit with a measure of free will, the use or abuse of which determined his reappearance in a new birth, and these births continued until such time as the soul, being purged of all impurities gathered in the course of its various sojourns, was once more fit to be absorbed. The goal of every Hindu who accepted this philosophy was therefore impersonality. His desire was release from the earthly bonds of individuality so that he might lose himself in the Divine as the single

drop of water loses its identity in the sea. Nor do the conceptions of Buddhism differ materially in this respect. Nirvana is not, as some would have it, mere annihilation, but the attainment of that condition which fits the soul for absorption into the Divine. For like Jesus Christ, Buddha did not invent a new religion. He was a reformer, a Protestant against the formalism of his day—against the attitude which observed the letter while ignoring the spirit of the law and overlooked or neglected its ethical principles. It is not surprising therefore that Buddha accepted all that could be accepted from Hinduism, but he taught that the state of Nirvana was to be reached through suffering by the repression of all desires. Impersonality follows upon this teaching, for it inculcates the destruction of all human incentives and leaves a man with the purity of a white and therefore colourless existence.

From this conception of impersonality was derived the notion that the unit is the family and not the person. The phrase has often been used, but generally without much explanation of all that is implied by it. It finds its full expression in the Hindu joint family system. The eldest or most capable male is the head of the clan

and he is the manager of the family property. All the males are co-sharers, but are only entitled to a vague fractional share in the profits: that is to say, they do not own any given piece of land, nor can they lay claim to any specific crop, but each participates in the whole. The females have their rights also, but these are not relevant at present to the argument. The system is not unlike that of the Roman *patria potestas*, but differs from it in important respects. The position of the sons is altered neither by marriage nor by age. They go out into the world and earn their living, but in theory they add to the common stock and are not entitled to call the fruits of their industry their own. The manifest injustice of this arrangement by which the idle are supported by the industrious is corrected in two ways, either by a claim for partition or by an extension of the doctrine of self-acquired property, by which a man is permitted to enjoy that which he has earned. But the joint system is presumed unless there be evidence to the contrary, and forms the basic idea of the community. It is evident, therefore, that it is the law, and not the evasions of the law, that must have all the influence on the mental attitude of the people. China and

Japan have both borrowed largely from India, and especially the religion of Buddhism, which, as we have already seen, was in fact an iconoclastic form of Hinduism adopting very largely its fundamental conceptions though giving them a new orientation and leading them into channels which eventually transformed the whole into quite a different system. But in the matter of impersonality China and Japan have followed the Brahmanical rule. "Upon the conception of the family as the social and political unit," says an observer of the 'eighties, "depends the whole constitution of China."

Now this kind of patriarchal system, out of which Western Europe has grown long ago, is, if persisted in, fatal to the national idea. For the family tends to become the tribe and so undergoes expansion and with it some approach to individuality. The tribe when it has settled down into cities, has appropriated land and has regular and well-marked occupations, tends to become the nation, and the nation is made up of individuals who are bound together by no other tie than common participation in nationality. What exactly constitutes nationality, what are the factors that go to make a nation, has been hotly disputed,

but one of the greatest of these factors is undoubtedly allegiance to a common government. Thus with each successive step the scope is enlarged. The allegiance to the family becomes divided with allegiance to the tribe, and as we progress towards the nation the family community tends to dissolve into the units composing the nation. Whether the family tie, which of course never entirely disappears, or the national tie is the stronger depends upon the conceptions which underlie it, and national consciousness demands that the family shall be entirely subordinated to the nation. So long as the family is preferred before the nation there can be no true patriotism. In the West the unit is the individual. The son, emancipated from the parental control, begins a new and separate life. He is under no obligation except that of filial affection to support father or mother, brother or sister. But he has substituted the State as the claimant upon him; he goes cheerfully to fight for 'King and country,' knowing that his death may bring sorrow upon his parents and yet not grieving because he also knows that to remain behind would cause the greater sorrow. Both in the parents and in the son the national idea has

become paramount, and the duty of the latter becomes the pride of the former.

In the East it would appear that the remoteness of the government and its widely extended authority have subordinated the national to the family tie. It is difficult to speak of Japan, because she guarded herself in close walled seclusion right up to the time when she emerged with aspirations to become as Western nations are. But the continuous rebellions in China show that at no time was the nation so welded that the 'Son of Heaven,' in spite of his divinity or because of it, ever inspired that enthusiasm that was manifested by Western nations towards their monarchs. For the monarch stood for the nation and in serving him the individual conceived that he was serving the nation. In India too the very conception of nationhood is of recent origin, attributable directly to the influence of the West. All sorts of reasons have been adduced to account for her want of cohesion in the past. We have been told so often that we begin to doubt the validity of the assertion that she is a sub-continent, composed of warring castes, creeds and races, and that never before has she achieved, and therefore never hereafter

can she expect to achieve, nationhood. The most that she can hope for is federation under the British flag. The facts are there beyond peradventure; the question is whether the deductions are sound. Difficulties of language have been overcome before; differences of creed are not insuperable, although religious passions still burn in the East, with a glow more intense than anything known in Europe since the Thirty Years War. Geographical position, an exclusive social system, a common government, Asiatic race, emphasised by the presence of the European foreigner—these are all factors which favour the growth of nationality. It may, however, prove that after all the insurmountable obstacle will be that patriarchal conception which, having grown with the growth of centuries, has so become a part of the people's lives that to eradicate it is like tearing up a tree by the roots.

But the foundations of democracy rest upon individuality. The whole conception depends upon the personal relations to the State of the unit working in co-operation with his fellow units. It is the counterpart of the cricket field, where each man is an integral part of the game but agrees to work under a chosen leader who is not an autocrat but

primus inter pares. But the eleven is complete in itself: no one interferes with it. Neither the umpire who stands impartially above and outside the game nor the small boy who throws up the ball that is out of play can be said to be a part of the match, nor would the small boys be any more a part of it if they were hired to stand round the ground and stop the balls as they passed over the boundary line. The industrial system of the workshop is, on the other hand, essentially an oligarchy. Each man has his allotted task, but he has no share in the direction or in the profits unless the concern be on the lines of co-operation and subject to such freedom of individual or corporate action as he may have reserved to himself; he must be content with the wages offered to him. In other words, while the cricketer is an individual unit the worker is the subordinate and powerless member of a family. But round every religion, or rather out of it, has grown a code of ethics, and from this code of ethics are formed largely, though not entirely, the ideals of a people. And the virtue of all others which has impressed itself upon the Oriental mind is the virtue of filial piety. It need not necessarily take the form of dutiful

obedience to parents; the Jewish commandment with promise received a more extended and intensive application farther East. In the ancient Epic of India, the Mahabharata, this duty is strongly inculcated. Yudishtira, the somewhat colourless leader of the host, the Agamemnon of the Epic, is outshone by more than one of the heroes on either side, but he remains the pattern of virtue because in him is illustrated the supreme quality of reverence. He carries his piety to such a length that before the battle he goes out alone before the armies in order to invoke the blessing of his former tutor and his chief opponent whom it is his business to slay with as many of his followers as he can. It is the same idea of piety as manifested in obedience which has served commentators to explain the polyandry of the Pandavas because, they say, their mother, not knowing that a woman was the prize, told the brothers to share it and the sin, if sin it was, against chastity was less than the sin against parental authority. Nor does Rama hesitate to obey the decree which banished him for twelve years and condemned his bride to a rough forest life, though he knew that it had been wrongfully obtained by the jealousy of a scheming

woman. These are but random examples taken from ancient writings, but the fact that the idea still persists in the East to this day shows how deeply ingrained it is in Eastern thought. The literature of China tells the same tale, and until the aspiration to advance upon modern Western lines introduced the foreign learning and a more liberal education it was the most sedulously inculcated ethic in the whole curriculum. "In the instructive anecdotes," we are told, "every other form of merit is depicted as second to that of being a dutiful son," for "an undutiful son is a monstrosity, a case of moral deformity." And since the Japanese borrowed their religion from India and their learning from China we need not be surprised that they accepted the same idea, so that Togo in his despatch on Tsu-shima gives credit quaintly for the victory to the divine Emperor and the divine ancestors.

The key-note then of Asiatic ethics may be said to be reverence, which in the shape of ancestor-worship finds its expression not only in relation to the living but to the dead also. For although ancestor-worship is most pronounced in China, it is also the foundation of Shintoism, the national religion of Japan, and is apparent in India, where

the celebration of the father's or mother's 'annual ceremony' is as strictly observed among Hindus as are the more distinctively religious festivals such as the birth of Krishna, the difference being that the latter are public and social and the former domestic and private. But reverence implies a relationship of domination and servitude between the worshipper and the worshipped. Carried to an extreme, it may be said to transfer all individuality from the servant to the master, for in the latter reside all the springs of action, so that the servant appears as simply the instrument for consummating perfection in his lord. How intensely this quality has permeated the people is noticeable in the affairs of everyday life; it is the common experience of every Englishman in India. Being himself in a position of authority, he knows instinctively that he can treat an Indian coolie as he would never dare to treat an English workman. That which the former meekly accepts the latter would resent in language which in the Indian would be insolent, possibly even with blows; we call the attitude independence in the West, and the word implies more than appears upon the surface, for it suggests the existence of a separate

unit with separate aims and a direct relation to the State of which the Eastern coolie is quite innocent. It may be confidently asserted that the Panchama, or fifth caste in the Indian social system, who have passed into recent English literature under the rather clumsy name of the 'untouchables,' would have been perfectly content to go on in their oppressed or depressed condition but for the example and precept of Englishmen, conveyed chiefly by the mouth of missionaries and through the channel of the Press. The reverence which has induced such abject and uncomplaining submission is born of obedience through the centuries to those who in early times were constituted their masters and their betters, and of a deep respect for tradition which is inherent in the conservatism of the people. And conversely the submission of the worshipper breeds, humanly speaking, arrogance in the worshipped. That is why it is commonly said that caste is a tyranny and that the Brahman is the worst of the tyrants, for it is inconceivable to the Western mind that amongst a people calling themselves civilised there should be a section of the community who are regarded as polluting their fellowmen by their very shadow. It is not at all

inconceivable to the Eastern mind. It is probable that there is no conscious cruelty, no conscious arrogance in this assumption of immeasurable superiority. It is in fact the everyday custom to which both sides cling and which both sides regard as natural. The breach of that custom would shock the superior castes in the same way as, though perhaps in a higher degree than, a gentleman in England is shocked by the undue familiarity of his social inferiors. As the son in China, and to a lesser extent in Japan, is or was taught that reverence to his parents was the first of all virtues, so the caste system in India has extended the reverence to all those of higher rank. And as the Emperor of China and the Mikado of Japan were exalted more than other kings to a position of divinity, so in India the Brahman has been looked upon as the highest embodiment of the human race. This feeling of reverence is very largely responsible for the arrogance of which the Englishman is accused, though in his case it arose not through the sanction of tradition, but from the consciousness of race superiority.

On the other hand, the key-note of Western ethics is truth. In its cruder forms it appears

as the detestation of a lie. "Tell truth and shame the devil" is a proverb which is ingrained in Western civilisation, and it is the first lesson in ethics which we learn at our mother's knee. The Fifth Commandment which, it may be observed in passing, stands at the head of those which relate to our duty to our neighbour, and was therefore perhaps regarded by the Asiatic authors of the Decalogue as of special importance, is not emphasised so much as the Ninth, which is the extension to social life of the habit of telling the truth in the family circle. But truth as an ideal is at the bottom of much else. The whole fabric of society rests upon confidence. All commerce is carried on on the principle that you get what you pay for, or in the case of the creditor that debts will be honoured. All justice is founded upon the same ideal. To give false evidence in a Court of Justice is looked upon by all thinking men as one of the gravest offences since it cuts at the very root of all order and good government. Such things as these are mere commonplaces in the West, so common that they seem hardly worth saying. But they are not so regarded in the East. Petty shopkeepers think it no shame to provide false bottoms to their measures

or so to tamper with them as to reduce their capacity in order to deceive the childlike folk whom they serve. A prospective purchaser of goods will examine the prospective purchase with a minuteness that outdoes the most careful English housewife, even though the seller may be a man above suspicion. It is one of the hardest tasks of the magistracy to sift the true evidence from the false, for the witness seems to regard a Court as a kind of playground and a case as a game wherein his brains are pitted against the judge's. If you have a good case by all means tell the truth: you have everything to gain and nothing to lose. But if you have a bad case, or one which though true is weak, the best course is to make up a plausible story or to bolster up your weakness with false witnesses and try to deceive the Court. If you win, you have gained your point; if you lose, well, that is the fortune of war and is exactly comparable to a loss on the Derby or a Stock Exchange speculation. Even a member of the Indian Bar has been heard to say that if a false charge were brought against his client he would not hesitate to meet it by a false defence. It is a characteristic which impresses all Englishmen who have travelled

in the East, all the more because of the extreme importance which is laid upon honesty in the West. As was said earlier, in a much resented passage Macaulay has in his vivid way attributed deceit to a section of the Indian people, and in an equally famous one he has exalted the virtue of truth as the foundation of our Government in India and the secret of its success. It is fair to add that the Chinese have the reputation of being strictly honest in their commercial dealings, but the history of Chinese negotiations and wars, both those against Europeans and those against Asiatics, are full of allegations of treachery which, if the evidence can be trusted, must be taken for facts. British envoys trusting to the Chinese word of honour have been kidnapped and put in grave peril of death. Rebel chiefs have surrendered, trusting again to the Chinese word of honour, only to be led immediately to execution. Many instances could be given of similar breaches of good faith, if it were worth while, but these must suffice.

It is only too true that the pages of European history are stained with many a deed of perfidy. It is, however, usually recognised and branded as such; the epithet of

the Great has been given to Frederick in spite and not because of his perfidy to Maria Theresa. The difference is one of ideals and not of instances; the point sought to be made is that truth which stands at the pinnacle of the European code is not so highly prized in Asia. Not perhaps in theory, but in practice there is a tendency to regard the end as justifying the means. Consider for a moment an instance of the predominance of reverence over truth. A certain man was going on pilgrimage to Benares and on the way he was devising and actually carrying out an elaborate scheme for defrauding his uncle. Such an instance is not typical, but such things can be done.

Europe has had many ideals. The ideal of freedom, which has loomed so large since the French Revolution, is itself based on mistrust of the arbitrary ruler. It is the commonest of all arguments against benevolent despotism that you can never be sure of the benevolence. It is against freedom of thought that the Church of Rome has struggled so long and on the whole so successfully, not only because in heresy it was concerned for the souls of Christians, but because in defection it saw a transference of its own power to others and because in

schism it discerned the beginnings of a fatal weakness to Christendom. The ideal of Freedom can only be realised in the people themselves, for it is only by what we call public opinion that the truth can be reached and errors corrected, and it is only the laws which the people have made through their own representatives that they are content to obey. Even so the ideal is only capable of realisation in a limited sense; if public opinion is obtained by the method of counting heads there is always the danger that intelligence will be swamped by ignorance; but if intelligence be given too great a preponderance, there is an equal fear that the whole system—whether it be of Government or of the Church or of some commercial company—will develop into an oligarchy and the truth will by the law of averages have less chance of prevailing.

Of the many other ideals which have arisen out of Christianity—of mercy, of humility, of social service and the like—it is unnecessary to speak. But there is one ideal already alluded to which Europe has proposed to herself and which cannot reasonably be ascribed to any ethical code or to any religious doctrine. The ideal of power has been the principal cause which has led

to Oriental accusations that the civilisation of the West is pure materialism. To be powerful, to possess the hegemony of Europe, if not of the world, has been the desire of many nations, a desire which has been realised by a few. They have succumbed to the Temptation of the Wilderness, to the most alluring of the Tempter's promises. But to be powerful connotes the acquisition of riches, and since it has been realised that the royal road to national wealth lies in commerce, in the expansion of markets, and in the multiplication of production, it has been the aim of every powerful European nation to encroach upon and gradually to annex the countries of other and weaker races. Spain and Portugal led the way, to be followed by England, Holland, and France, and in later days by Germany, Italy, and America. And because it has been the aim of all great nations to prevent any one of them from becoming predominant, there arose out of this ideal first the doctrine of the Balance of Power and later, when it was more clearly seen that wealth was the means to power, the competition for markets and the scramble for territory. Hence it is that Europe, divided as she is into small States incomparably greater in number than are

to be found in any other continent save South America, has fought more international wars than any other continent can show. It is significant that Japan, who, beyond a few expeditions such as that under Hideyoshi, hardly fought a single war of importance in all her long history, has, since she adopted Western institutions, entered upon at least three wars of first-class calibre. She has entered the lists and must take the consequences.

Now the ideal of reverence which, if there is substance in the argument, we have credited to Asia is compatible only with the monarchical system. The submission to which for centuries the principal nations of Asia have been accustomed is not that submission which obeys the laws fashioned and the orders issued by those to whom it has delegated power and who therefore retain that power on sufferance. It is the submission of the servant to the master, a submission under which the servant takes no responsibility and desires to take none. It is the kind of submission which the Fourth Estate rendered to the *ancien régime* before the French Revolution, and the moujiks to the Czars and the boyars before the Russian. That is what makes the Japanese Meiji Era

so remarkable. For a people who had been inured to submission of this kind must do one of two things: they must either be content with their lot, content that as things are so they shall remain, or they must rise and through a welter of chaos and anarchy and bloodshed they must win their way to power. That has always been the experience of history when the revolutions have proceeded from the people and have been resisted by the overlords. But the Japanese aristocrats had the wisdom to resign power before it was wrested from them, and by once more investing the sovereign with the reality of those attributes of which for long he had only been permitted to wear the shadow, they succeeded in avoiding that shock to public sentiment that might otherwise have been experienced. It is true that the Japanese revolution was not accomplished without resistance; but that resistance was more easily overcome and with less dislocation to the country and its affairs than any other of like magnitude.

In China the attempt to break away from tradition has not been so successful. We have seen that the counterpart of submission by the worshipper is a certain arrogance in the worshipped, and this schism between

the sections of the people is still apparent. Those in authority do not regard themselves as one with the people; with a weak Central Government every man plays for his own hand and corruption and peculation are rampant. Now it is evident that, politically speaking, the ideal of truth is specially applicable to democratic government. The ancient books of India no doubt inculcate the doctrine that the chief concern of a prince and the source of his strength are the welfare of his people; but in practice there are no bounds set to the caprice of a tyrant (in the Greek sense) except his own conscience. In other words, in Eastern countries as in Western the advantages and disadvantages of benevolent despotism exactly apply. But the moment that democratic institutions are introduced the authorities hold their power in trust, and they succeed or fail according to the measure in which they respect that trust. It may be argued that under an elective system the untrustworthy can be replaced by others, but so long as truth is not recognised as the foremost of ideals there can be no security that those others will honour the trust to any larger degree, or will not succumb to the many temptations by which they are

surrounded. The result would be a constant transference of power and a resulting instability which would in the end prove as disastrous as corruption or schism.

It has been argued time and again that India is not yet fit for self-government. "She has never known anything," say these critics of the Reform scheme, "but autocracy, or at most oligarchy as represented by the British Government; she persists in her caste system and treats the lower classes of her people worse—far worse—than the dumb cattle." "Let India put her own house in order" is the cry of those who criticise and condemn Indian aspirations in the colonies. Very often these are but parrot cries, or at most they express in dogmatic fashion the ideas of men who would find it difficult if pressed to translate those ideas into a reasoned statement. Ultimately it will be found that at bottom it is the exaltation of the ideal of reverence at the expense of the ideal of truth which leads to these conclusions. The Indian aspirations are divided into two classes. The first is the replacement of British officers by Indians, that is to say, it is claimed that the country must be Indian-governed; and the second is the replacement of an oligarchy by a

democracy, that is to say, it is claimed that the country must be people-governed. To the first of these claims it is argued that the new rulers have never had experience of responsibility, but the fear is not so much that they will make mistakes, for all governments do that, but that the ideal of reverence, reacting on the rulers, will generate an arrogance and an oppression which England could not stand by and contemplate with equanimity. That is why it is so often said, and never more convincingly than in 'Al. Carthill's' *Lost Dominion*, that the subtle Brahman is working for the removal of the British that he may again establish his own complete ascendancy. In like manner it is the conviction that the ideal of truth in the larger sense is not sufficiently regarded which induces the doubt whether India is really in earnest in asking for a democracy, and secondly whether if she obtained the machinery for it she would breathe the true democratic spirit into it.

The idea of submission is inherent also in Islam, but it is a submission to the will of God and not to any man. On the contrary, this very idea has led in a temporal sense to the exact opposite, for the justi-

fication of Moslem militancy is domination over others so that they may be forced to bow to the Will of God as conceived by the religion. Dwellers in Northern India have often observed the sturdiness and independence of the Mussulman as contrasted with the more yielding nature of the Hindu and have consequently formed comparative estimates unfavourable to the latter, since the ideals of the Mussulman are in this respect more consonant with their own. But the Mohammedan States are as yet negligible, for though they too are showing an impatience of European control, we are considering not a revolt but a challenge. Not only do the three countries with which we have been most concerned absorb nine-tenths of the whole population of Asia, but the Mohammedans clinging strictly to religion and all that it implies have fallen far behind in the cultural race and are notoriously backward. Possibly also the very fanaticism of their religion has taught them to scorn the learning of the Giaour. Brave they are, as England found in the Soudan, but battles are not won by bravery though heaven may be; independent they are, but independence alone will not help those who do not understand the machinery of government; indus-

trious they may be, but industry will not conquer the markets of the world without organisation and machinery.

And so after all we are driven back to the three great countries that really count. It is only from these that any menace to white supremacy can arise. But in their haste to copy Europe they have placed before them the ideal of democracy, and apparently have no other. Autocracy is dead in Europe. Germany, Russia, and Austria, once called the reactionary States, have gone the way of France and America, and the few kings that remain are kings by the will of the people and hold their crowns on sufferance. But Asia, especially China and India, make the mistake of looking upon democracy as a mechanical system instead of a spiritual conception. They have not yet recognised that in order to profit by the political wisdom of Europe there must be a change of ideal. Even in Japan, which has come nearest to the European doctrines, some of the most important subjects are withheld from the national vote, and the common folk are still very far from realising the power and the meaning of the suffrage. Such a change of ideal must come very slowly; and it can only come by sacrifice,

a sacrifice comparable to that of many a man who in his adult years rejects at the bidding of reason the intuitive religion of his childhood. Every observer has borne witness to the immense superiority of Asia over Europe in reverence; every observer has noticed the decline of that quality in Europe since power was extended to the people. The sacrifice may not be worth while; if the ideal of power is worth striving for, if in the long run it is to transcend all other ideals, the sacrifice will have to be made. Efficiently trained armies you may have, and efficient navies; a well-organised commerce too may come, but if the government of the country is unstable and inefficient all the rest will be of no avail. You cannot put the new wine of democracy into the old bottles of the traditional ideals without risking a catastrophe. Is Asia capable of the sacrifice? and will she think it worth while?

In a military sense Europe is in no danger. Neither China nor India has ever shown the slightest sign of aggression; Japan only since she has taken on the new spirit. The days of Central Asian ambition are long past. It is only by a continental combination that Asia could ever hope to be formid-

able, but all the signs point, as indeed might be expected, to a consciousness of separate nationality rather than towards the realisation of a continental internationality. There has, it is true, been some talk of an Asiatic League of Nations, but it seems to have been inspired by the creation of an All-World League in which Europe from her present position of world hegemony necessarily takes the foremost place. The conception of an Asiatic League—a copy, be it noted, of the European idea—seems to have sprung from a spirit of rivalry, if not of jealousy, not from any real desire to achieve the goal of the international idea. If the British were to leave India, the signal might be given for a general white expulsion, but it would be under Japanese lead, a lead so pronounced that Japan would be to the rest as Jupiter to his satellites. The military challenge which was thrown down by a combined Asia would almost certainly provoke an answering challenge from the entire white world. Under such a menace as this we should find Frenchmen and Germans, Poles and Russians, Rumanians and Bulgars, Austrians and Italians fighting under the same banner, drawn closer together by the common bond of danger than by any other

conceivable. That the whole of Anglo-Saxondom would rally to the defence of the white race goes without saying. It would need no Peter the Hermit to preach such a crusade.

Many gloomy things have been said about the economic future of Europe in competition with Asia. The white man, it is alleged, and probably with truth, cannot live with the Asiatic, who is a better workman and a hardier, can live cheaply, and can better endure the extremes of temperature. The white man will be crushed out of existence, or more usually drowned in the advancing Asiatic flood. This is the view of such writers as Mr. Lothrop Stoddard, Mr. Meredith Townsend, and following them of Dean Inge, whose great reputation has not been built up upon a cheery optimism. But this metaphor of the flood is apt, like all metaphors, to mislead if carried too far. The white races at present dominate three continents completely, and the greater part of South America and of Asia into the bargain. We are told that there is cause for alarm because the Japanese have overrun Hawaii and Asia is gradually exterminating both white and black in Polynesia, because Mauritius " is becoming a bit of Hindustan

with a Chinese fringe," and because Natal "is a country of white landlords and supervisors controlling hordes of Asiatics." It is not much, but it is contended that it is the beginning of the end. But until very recently Hindus have not left Hindustan in any large numbers, and the Chinese have chiefly been confined to the lands round about China. Immigration laws are in the hands of all sovereign countries, and, as has been already argued, a flood of Asiatics, if such a term can fairly be used, is not very formidable from an imperial point of view unless and until they are better organised and can produce leaders capable of making themselves felt. Asiatic lands are not fully developed. It is admitted by everyone that the resources of India and China are still practically unlimited, and those of Siberia are undoubtedly large though the accounts of them are rather vague. There seems to be no escape from this dilemma. If the peoples of Asia can learn the material wisdom of Europe, apply her science and set up stable government upon the European model, the first outlet for their activities will be the intensive development of their own countries and the multiplication of their own trade, for which they possess such vast

storehouses of raw material. If, on the other hand, their governments remain unstable and unsuitable, if the science of Europe be not steadily applied, or remain a science only in theory, the immigrants, so long as the dykes set up as barriers do not wholly exclude them, will continue to be of the poor and, owing to their traditional ideals, of the servile classes. Those who have issued their grave warnings of the Asiatic peril have generally viewed the subject from the economic aspect of the trade union or from the statistical aspect of the eugenist. They are entitled to their views, but that is not the challenge of Asia. That challenge is political. Asia is awake to the fact that the predominance of Europe is due to her material prosperity, which itself is based upon applied science. The great countries of Asia wish to stand forth as the equals of Europe; they desire that their voices shall count in the world's councils. What they are concerned with is dignity, which all Asiatics hold so dear, and it is a ludicrous mistake, born wholly from the European point of view, that Asia is deliberately making a bid for world supremacy by a policy of squeezing out the working classes. If that is the result it is but a by-product.

That which has offended the Japanese is not the curtailment of trade by the American restrictions, but the humiliation of being treated as an undesirable people. "Although," says a Japanese writer, "most Asiatic nations are fully peers of European nations, yet they are discriminated against because of the colour of their skin. The root of it lies in the perverted feeling of racial superiority entertained by the whites." That which has offended the Indians in South and East Africa is not that obstacles are placed in the way of legitimate trade expansion, but the humiliation of being treated as helots of the Empire, not worthy so much as to ride on a tramcar by the side of the white man.

Asia has set a great goal before her and there are signs that she is dazzled by the blinding light of the vision. That she has capacity, no one doubts, least of all she herself; that she has infinite patience is too notorious to need demonstration. The phenomenal success of Japan has made her conscious of powers hitherto unsuspected and she has set to work to analyse and examine. But secure in her own estimate of herself she has forgotten the all-important factor of character, and character is in large

measure the outcome of environment and the result of tradition. European character, otherwise so unimpressionable, has shown itself extraordinarily plastic in yielding to new ideas and in embracing new ideals. Asiatic character, otherwise so pliant, has generally shown itself remarkably tenacious of tradition. In speaking thus of Asia we must guard against too hasty a generalisation. The Japanese have made good their claim to the respect of the world; it is for China and India, and later perhaps for Persia, Irak, Arabia, to show that they are equally adaptable, for then only can they enjoy the fruits of democracy, if democracy they are determined to have. In that way only can they hope to rival Europe, and if they shut their eyes to this indispensable condition in blind self-sufficiency, the whole vision is in danger of becoming a nightmare and the dazzling dream will melt in the clouds of disillusionment.

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