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# J A P A N

The Rise of a Modern Power

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# JAPAN

## The Rise of a Modern Power

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AUTHOR OF 'THE FULL RECOGNITION OF JAPAN', ETC.

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## PREFACE

My father died while this book was in an incomplete state, although the greater part of it was in type ; and it is owing to the kindness of several of his friends who have consented to put the work into final form that it has become possible to publish it.

In writing it his object was to describe, for English-speaking people, the main facts of Japanese history. Despite the efforts of numerous Orientalists to popularize knowledge of Japanese history and of Japanese political, economic, and social conditions, he felt that a great deal has yet to be done before the average British youth and adult will be as familiar with Japan as the average Japanese youth and adult are with Great Britain. As Viscount Chinda, the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of St. James, said in addressing the British present at a meeting of the Japan Society held in London on December 13, 1916, although there never had been a time when the ' bonds of fraternal feelings ' between the Japanese and the British had been so strong, ' you do not know one-tenth as much about us as we do about you '. Obviously, therefore, there is room for another—many another—book in English tracing the evolution of Japan, and pointing out the salient features of the Japanese civilization of to-day.

In the present work an endeavour is made to explain how it has come to pass that an Oriental people, isolated for several centuries from other races, and from a naval, military, and financial standpoint almost as impotent as Burmah or Siam, was able in the half-century from 1853 to 1903 to outstrip all other native Asiatic Powers and to bring into being



naval and military forces capable, in 1904 and 1905, of defeating the whole of the Russian Fleet and a large section of the Russian Army. The first part traces the course of Japanese history from 660 b. c. down to the surrender of Kiao-Chau by the Germans to the Japanese and British in November 1914, while the second contains chapters on the physical characteristics and population, the resources and industrial progress, the trade and internal communications, the development of the Army and Navy, and the literature and art of Japan.

My father was well aware that he had omitted much of great interest, and he referred any one desirous of studying Japanese history and Modern Japan in greater detail to such works as the monumental *History of the Japanese People* of Captain Brinkley and Baron Kikuchi, Marquis Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan*, Murdoch and Yamagata's *History of Japan*, the writings of Professor Longford, Sir E. Satow, Mr. B. H. Chamberlain, and Dr. W. G. Aston, and his own *Japan, the New World Power*. He wished to express his obligations, among others, to Mr. James B. Rye, who is largely responsible for the historical portions of the book; to the Proprietors of *The Times* for allowing him to use various excerpts from the *Japanese Sections* of *The Times*, including the map of Japan which appears at the beginning of Chapter I; to Professor Haga, of the Imperial University, Tokyo, who kindly read portions of the proofs; and to Mr. Honda, the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in London, for the friendly interest he has taken in the work.

Last, but not least, I must thank his friend and colleague, Mr. H. M. Ross, for his kindness in attending to the many details in connexion with seeing the book through the press.

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## INTRODUCTION

THE gigantic struggle at present proceeding in Europe and the Near East has necessarily modified the attitude of the British towards foreign races. Before August 1914 it had become the fashion to lay undue stress on such comparatively unimportant matters as the colour of human beings, the shape of their heads, and the form of their languages. Thus it was supposed, because most Germans were white-skinned, because their faces and skulls were like those of many Englishmen, because they spoke a language akin to our own, that, therefore, the Germans did not differ in essential respects from the inhabitants of the British Isles of Teutonic descent.

Asiatics, Africans, and Polynesians were regarded by many as our inferiors. Christ, it is true, was born in Palestine, Mahomet in Arabia, Buddha in India, and Confucius in China; but, though the vast majority of the inhabitants of the British Empire and the larger half of the Indian Army were Asiatics, and though from 1902 onwards we had been in alliance with the Japanese, no British statesman before August 1914 would have cared to admit that his spiritual home was in Asia.

Among the non-European races who have rallied to the cause of civilization, the most important and interesting is unquestionably the Japanese. It is difficult to over-estimate the debt which we owe them. The Japanese leaders had profoundly studied the military history and organization of Germany, and fully understood the enormous strength of

the Central European Powers, though Japan had never fought against Germany or her Allies until August 1914. Germany, indeed, had encouraged Russia and France to wrest from Japan the fruits of her victory over China in 1894-5, and the Kaiser's treacherous warning that Europeans should prepare against a 'Yellow Peril' had been an insult to Japan as well as to China. If the Japanese had been the Bulgarians or Turks of the Far East, they would surely have been discovered to be in secret alliance with the Germans. Had they taken their stand by Germany, the whole course of the war would have been changed. It is doubtful if British troops could have been safely transported from Australia, New Zealand, or India to fight in Europe. A large portion of the Allied fleets would have had to be stationed in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and the danger of naval defeats in the North Sea would have been correspondingly increased. Japanese guns and gunners would not have been before Warsaw in November 1914; and Japan, instead of being, as it happened, an arsenal and workshop for the Allies, would have been a base from which German and Japanese men-of-war would have preyed on their shipping.

It is not, however, solely or mainly because of our debt to Japan that we ought to study her history and become familiar with her civilization. Separated by a hundred or so miles of sea from Corea, by five times that distance of sea from China, and by the Pacific Ocean from America, the islands ruled over by the Mikado have been a laboratory in which a unique type of human being and a unique type of culture have been produced. The history of Japan, like the history of Ancient Greece, has for us Occidentals of the twentieth century an educational value of the highest

importance. We can measure our moral, aesthetic, and intellectual progress by the standard of Japan before she adopted Western manners and methods, and benefit greatly by observing the attitude in recent times of this highly intelligent and progressive nation towards Western civilization.



## PART I

### I

#### *From the Accession of the first Mikado to the landing of the Portuguese in Japan.*

As Voltaire long ago pointed out, while the British Isles have been more than once, the Japanese Islands in historic times have never been, subjugated by foreigners. The two attempts made to conquer Japan at the end of the thirteenth century by Kublai Khan, the Mongol conqueror of China and the employer of Marco Polo, ended in complete failure. Such influence as foreigners have had on the development of the Japanese has been as a whole the result of peaceful intercourse with them.

The Japanese Islands were originally inhabited by a race the descendants of whom are supposed to be the Ainu found to-day in the island of Hokkaido, or Yezo. At a very early date Mongolians and Malaysans<sup>1</sup> seem to have invaded the main island of Honshiu, south of Yezo, and the island of Kiushiu, south of Honshiu. A narrow strait divides Kiushiu from Honshiu, and between Corea and Kiushiu lie the islands of Tsushima and Iki, affording stepping-stones for Asiatic emigrants. Mongolians may, however, have crossed from Siberia to Sakhalien and thence by Yezo reached Honshiu, or from Kamchatka arrived in Yezo via the Kurile Islands. The Malayan ancestors in

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps also Aryans.



the Japanese population, perhaps, made their way north-eastwards from the Philippines or Borneo by Hong-Kong, Formosa, and the Loo-Choo Islands to Kiushiu. A glance at the map will explain to the reader the alternative theories. Prehistoric remains—stone, bronze and iron implements and pottery—have been found at various places in Japan, but they throw little, if any, light on the question of the origin of the people we call Japanese.

The accession of Jimmu-Tenno, in 660 B.C., as the first Mikado—the present Mikado, Yoshihito, is claimed to be the 122nd of the line—is the first date officially recognized in Japanese history. If, which is improbable, the date is correct, the Japanese royal family goes back to a period when the Assyrians were invading Egypt, the Greeks were spreading into Asia Minor, Sicily and Italy, the Romans were being ruled by kings, and our own islands and most of Europe were sunk in barbarism. Assuming the date to be right, Jimmu was a contemporary of the great Greek philosopher Thales, and lived a century before the Chinese philosopher Confucius, the Indian philosopher Buddha, and Cyrus, the founder of that Persian Empire whose contact with the Greeks was to have such momentous effects on European civilization. As the earliest extant annals of the Japanese—the *Kojiki*—were composed in A. D. 712, it is impossible to say what degree of truth there is in the traditions connected with Jimmu.

Nor are the traditions connected with Jimmu's successors up to the date when Japan is first distinctly mentioned in the Chinese annals more trustworthy. China (at the time when Hannibal was preparing to invade Italy) had been unified (221 B. C.) by Shi-huang-Ti, the builder of the Great Wall. From 145 B. C. onwards Chinese history

justly claims to be reliable. In the second century B. C. Corea was conquered by the Chinese, and it is not improbable that from Corea Chinese ideas at once began to enter Japan. It is claimed that a Corean kingdom, Mimana, in 33 B. C.—that is nearly a quarter of a century after Caesar landed in Kent and two years before Augustus defeated Antony and Cleopatra at the battle of Actium—sent tribute to the Japanese Emperor, Sujin. Be that as it may, in Chinese histories of the first century A. D.—the century of the introduction of Buddhism into China—distinct references to Japan occur. In them the Japanese are described as dwarfs (Wa).

‘The Wa,’ runs one of these accounts, ‘dwell south-east of Corea on a mountainous island in mid-ocean. Their country is divided into more than one hundred provinces. Since the time when Wu-Ti (140–86 B. C.) conquered Corea, the Wa have communicated with the Corean authorities by means of a postal service. . . . The sovereign of Great Wa resides in Yamato. . . . In the second year of Chung-Yuan (A. D. 57), in the reign of Kwang-Wu, the Ito Country sent an envoy with tribute, who styled himself Ta-Fu. He came from the most western part of the Wa country. Kwang-Wu presented him with a seal and ribbon.’ According to another Chinese annalist, the Japanese ‘have neither oxen nor wild beasts, they tattoo their faces in patterns varying with their rank, they wear garments woven in one piece, they have spears, shields, bows, and arrows tipped with stone or iron. They wear no shoes, they are addicted to strong drink, are polygamous, law abiding and long-lived.’ The degree of accuracy in these accounts is unascertainable.

Since there was considerable trade between China and

Europe from the fourth century B. C. to the second century A. D. and later, the existence of Japan may, for aught we know, have been known then in Europe. It would be wrong to conclude that all Occidentals before Marco Polo were ignorant of Japan and the Japanese, or vice versa. Writing two generations and more after Japan had been discovered by the Portuguese, Shakespeare and Bacon, judging by their works, had never even heard of Japan.

During the third century A. D., when the Roman Empire was being invaded by German tribes, it is alleged that the Semiramis of Japanese history, the Empress Jingo, conquered Corea, and that the Chinese classics—the writings of Confucius and his successors—were brought to Japan by Wani of Kudara (A. D. 285<sup>1</sup>). As the first date when the annals of Japan agree with the annals of Corea or China is A. D. 475, these statements must, however, be received with caution. Whether the Empress Jingo's expedition ever took place or not, it is certain that Japan up to A. D. 662 was in intimate relations with Corea. In Mimana, on the south coast of the peninsula, she possessed a Calais through which she could pour troops to the assistance of the kingdom of Kudara, one of the three states into which Corea was then divided. The capital of Kudara was on the site of the modern Seoul. North of Kudara was the kingdom of Koma, with its capital at Ping-Yang. East of Kudara was the kingdom of Shiragi, always menacing the Mimana enclave. In A. D. 466 the Mikado Yuryaku invaded Shiragi but met with no success. A century or so later the King of Shiragi took the offensive and seized Mimana. In A. D. 660 the T'ang Emperor of China, Kao-Sung, dispatched a large army by sea from Shantung against Kudara. The

<sup>1</sup> The date has been questioned; it may have been 404.

Chinese landed at Chemulpo and, in conjunction with the forces of Shiragi, overran Kudara. That Japan would stand aside and see her ally subjugated and Corea reduced to a Chinese dependency was not to be expected. Japanese troops were sent to the aid of the Kudarans, and the kingdom was momentarily restored. But in 662 the Chinese inflicted a severe defeat on the Japanese, and Kudara and Koma were virtually annexed by China. Henceforth up to the end of the sixteenth century the Japanese, for various reasons, ceased officially to interest themselves in Korean affairs.

A century earlier (552), when the Germans were colonizing England, Buddhism made its way into Japan from Corea. By the opening of the next century Chinese ideas had undoubtedly obtained a firm hold on the Japanese. The Chinese calendar was introduced and the Seventeen Articles of Shotoku-Taishi's Constitution, which bear traces of Chinese and Buddhistic influences, were promulgated in A. D. 604. St. Augustine was then proselytizing in England, Mahomet was over thirty years of age.

Soon after this, the Japanese government was re-organized on Chinese lines and a census taken (A. D. 652). The Taiho Code of Laws was promulgated in A. D. 701, and nine years later Nara, some twenty miles east of Osaka, in Honshiu, became the capital of the Empire. At this epoch Japanese art, institutions, and literature were in a very flourishing condition; the great image of Buddha at Nara was made, and the first histories of Japan compiled. The Chinese characters had been adapted to express the sounds of the Japanese language, which, in its present form, unlike Chinese, is polysyllabic and abounds in curious idiosyncrasies, such as polite and negative forms of verbs, postpositions instead of

prepositions, conjunctions placed at the end of sentences. The tense of a Japanese verb, too, is represented only by a single word, and there are no inflections indicating persons or numbers. With the transfer of the capital from Nara to Kyoto, about twenty miles north of it, in A. D. 794—six years before Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the West by the Pope—the Chino-Buddhistic-Imperialism in Japan began to decline.

It may not be out of place at this point broadly to consider the influence which China has exercised on the evolution of Japan. To-day Chinese is very unlike Japanese culture, but it must not be forgotten that Japan owes to China a debt comparable, perhaps, with that which Great Britain owes to the Graeco-Roman world. Apart from, directly or indirectly, introducing Buddhism and Nestorian Christianity to the notice of the islanders, it may be said that Chinese priests, Korean missionaries, and Japanese priests who had been sent to China brought from the Middle Kingdom—besides the knowledge of Chinese writing—many of the essentials of painting, sculpture, and the arts related thereto. The study of Chinese philosophy had, too, a share in the modelling of the national character, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. The doctrine of Confucius with its five relations—loyalty, filial piety, marital fidelity, brotherly order, and friendly solidarity—was the basis of a continuous system of ethics, the forms of which varied but slightly from the sixth to the twentieth centuries. As Professor Inouye Tetsujiro has written : ‘ The teaching of the great Chinese sage is so widely diffused and deeply rooted in Japan that it must be considered to be part and parcel of Japanese culture itself. Besides that, we must not forget that the Japanese spirit began in earlier times

to assimilate Confucianism to itself, that is to say to Japanize it.'

The same may be said of ceremonial, which till recently pervaded the whole of the Japanese social regulations and laws, and of the superstitions connected with geomancy. Much indeed of the folk lore can be compared or identified with Chinese, and some, through China, with Indian tales. Ceremonial division of the court and of the administration into 'left' and 'right' persisted from the sixth century right up to 1867. Even the dresses, the swords of the courtiers of 'left' and 'right', were differentiated in true Chinese style, while the ranks conferred upon nobles were imitated from Chinese prototypes, and the Imperial sacrifices to the forces of nature, although garbed in Shintoist guise and accompanied by Shinto ritual, are still reminiscent of the corresponding Chinese ceremonies.

Chinese officialdom, also largely imitated, was based upon a system of university examinations, and had a democratic character. It opened the doors of administrative careers to successful literary scholars, and it militated against the growth, indeed against the existence, of feudalism, particularly of military feudalism. Even the Son of Heaven had to 'make good', or his lack of virtue could be impeached and his occupation of the throne suddenly cut short. In Japan ceremonial crystallized in thick masses of stiff officialdom around a throne hereditary because of its traditionally divine origin, and criticism of imperial *faits et gestes* was not permitted to the masses, however learned.

The Chinese division of the people into four classes—shi or gentlemen, no or agriculturists, ko or craftsmen, and sho or merchants—was adopted in Japan, and remained in force until quite recently, though the shi were not

necessarily scholars as in China, but soldiers—samurai, bushi—who looked down upon the rest of the world.

In many ways the craze for Chinese forms of learning was unreasoning. We see instances of it in the composition of poetry encompassed within a narrow number of syllables, where subject-matter was subservient to dimension, while fine thoughts had perforce to be expressed in uncongenial forms. Running parallel with this conventional versification was a true Japanese poetry of more convenient metre and length. Again, theatrical performances, dances, and games often affected Chinese forms or followed Chinese fashion.

The introduction of Feudalism into Japan coincided with the final reduction of the aborigines—the Ainu or Yemishi. In the second century A. D. the Yemishi still retained the eastern portion of the main island of Honshiu, and, doubtless, also the island of Yezo, where their descendants are still to be met with. In A. D. 110 Prince Yamato-Takeru had conducted a more or less successful campaign against the Yemishi in eastern Honshiu. During the fourth century—in A. D. 367—the aborigines in Kazusa, the province bounded on the west by the Bay of Tokyo, had rebelled and the rebels had held their own. Another rebellion of the Yemishi in 637 had been suppressed. At the end of the eighth century they made their final bid for independence in Honshiu. From 774 to 811 the Japanese engaged in war with the Basques of Japan. The struggle ended in favour of the Japanese. Perhaps if we had particulars of the long-drawn conflict we should find that it was one of the cause of the growth of Feudalism. At any rate it is significant that the head-quarters of Feudalism in subsequent centuries were those portions of Honshiu to which the Yemishi had retired.

Fortunately for Japan the rise of Feudalism prevented the Japanese race from suffering the fate of the Coreans. From 866 onwards to our own times, the military nobility (bushi) overshadowed the Chinese-influenced Mikado and his courtiers. Between 866 and 1159 the Fujiwara, and between 1159 and 1185 the Taira clan usurped the royal authority, but the seat of the administrative power was Kyoto, and Feudalism was not firmly established until the second half of the twelfth century.

The bushi looked down on all not belonging to their own class, and they were indifferent to mere intellectual distinction. As in the West, clever men of the lower classes, instead of mounting into the military caste, had, as a rule, to exercise their talents in the numerous monasteries of Japan.

With great shortsightedness, the central government at Kyoto left the provincial nobles and the bushi to their own devices. Royal governors neglected their duties and administered the provinces through deputies. Manors paying no taxes to the Crown sprang up everywhere, and half the arable land of Japan became practically excluded from the Mikado's domain. By marriage, inheritance, purchase, gift, vast tracts of land came under the power of certain clans. The chief clans in the middle of the twelfth century were the above-mentioned Taira and their rivals, the Minamoto. The Mikados, like the Valois monarchs in the wars of the Huguenots and Catholics, vainly endeavoured to balance one party against the other. In 1159 the Taira crushed the Minamoto clan, and one of the Minamoto chieftains, Yoshitomo, was killed.

Four of Yoshitomo's sons escaped. Of these, two—the eldest, Yoritomo, and his younger brother, Yoshitsune—were



destined to overthrow the Taira, and to subjugate the three islands, Honshiu, Shikoku, and Kiushiu. It was Yoritomo who created the remarkable form of government known as the Shogunate, which lasted till 1868. He transferred the seat of power to the eastern half of Honshiu, and left the Mikado an almost functionless monarch at Kyoto. It was as if Henry II had left Stephen enthroned at London, and had governed England from York. In the summer of 1180 the head of the Taira clan had conceived a somewhat similar scheme. Three great Buddhist monasteries, crammed with the Templars and Hospitallers of Japan, existed in the vicinity of Kyoto. To remove the court out of reach of the soldier-priests, the Taira chieftain decided to shift the capital to Fukuhara (the modern Kobe), fifty miles or so south-west of Kyoto. But in September, the Minamoto clan, which had been recuperating its strength, rose, and at the end of the year the court returned to Kyoto.

The leader of the Minamoto rebels was Yoritomo, then thirty-four years old. Like Napoleon, he was a short-set man, with a large head. His voice was powerful and ringing. When he chose, his manners were extraordinarily gentle. Brave, astute, and iron-willed, he is one of the most noteworthy figures in Japanese history. Of a cold, calculating nature, he knew how to use men and women as his tools, and he stuck at nothing—not even at fratricide—to achieve his ends. Round him, in addition to the Minamoto bushi, had congregated many discontented members of the Taira and Fujiwara septs. The rising was justified by the fact that the Taira leaders had decided to exterminate the remaining members of the Minamoto clan.

At first Yoritomo was unsuccessful. His band was dispersed and he had to fly for his life. Nevertheless, his

attempt had set fire to a mass of inflammable material. Eight provinces of the Kwanto—the region of Honshiu in which the modern Tokyo is situated—were gained over by him. He fixed his head-quarters at Kamakura, a few miles south of the present Yokohama, which was afterwards for nearly two centuries the Shogun's seat of government.

By the beginning of November, Yoritomo had 27,000 troops encamped on the north bank of the Fuji river. Across the river was a Taira army nearly double its size. It seemed as if a decisive battle was about to be fought, when suddenly the Taira forces were seized with a panic, and retreated westward on Kyoto.

While Yoritomo was considering the next step to be taken, he was joined by his half-brother, the young Yoshitsune, at the head of a score of followers, among them a gigantic halberdier, Benkei, whom Yoshitsune had beaten in single combat and whose life had been spared by the chivalrous Minamoto knight. At the age of fifteen, Yoshitsune had escaped from his Taira captors and been given an asylum by the Fujiwara chieftain of Mutsu, whose fief—the largest in Japan—lay in what may be called, from its position to the rest of the island, the Highlands of Honshiu. There this well-knit, graceful youth of medium height had become one of the finest swordsmen in the north of Japan. The piercing eyes of the lad revealed his fiery soul. He was to earn the reputation of a great general and admiral, and in Japanese mediaeval annals he fills much the same place as that occupied by Richard I in English, Bruce in Scottish, and Bertrand du Guesclin or Bayard in French history. Yoritomo had never before set eyes upon his half-brother. Another soldier of ability belonging to the Minamoto clan, Yoshinaka, also rallied to Yoritomo's standard.

During 1181 and 1182, famine and pestilence in the centre and west of Honshiu prevented the Taira from mustering a large army. On the other hand, Yoshinaka and Yoritomo quarrelled, and it was not till the beginning of 1183 that a reconciliation between them was effected. In May of that year the Taira concentrated their forces, numbering, it is said, 100,000 men. Yoshinaka, with the main Minamoto army, attacked and defeated them at the battle of Tonami-yama. He won the day by the Hannibalesque manœuvre of launching at the foe a herd of oxen with lighted torches fastened to their horns. Beating the enemy again in several engagements, the Minamoto army moved on Kyoto, which was abandoned by the Taira troops. The cloistered ex-Mikado, Go-Shirakawa, placed himself under Yoshinaka's protection, but the Taira leaders carried off with them the Mikado Antoku, then six years old, and the mirror, sword, and gem which constituted the regalia of Japan. The Minamoto party, with the connivance of Go-Shirakawa, set up a rival Mikado, Go-Toba, of whom more will be heard. Meantime, Yoritomo had remained behind in the Kwanto organizing that district, the base of operations for the Minamoto army, and the Taira chieftains had consolidated their position in Honshiu, west of Kyoto, and also in the islands of Shikoku and Kiushiu.

At the beginning of 1184, Yoshinaka, now called the 'Rising Sun Shogun',<sup>1</sup> again—and finally—quarrelled with Yoritomo. He arrested Go-Shirakawa and Go-Toba, and made overtures to the enemies of his clan. At this moment, Yoshitsune, with 500 soldiers was escorting to Kyoto the Kwanto taxes, and, reinforced by Yoritomo with

<sup>1</sup> 'Shogun' is Japanese for 'General'.

50,000 troops, he surprised the capital. Yoshinaka fled, and was killed by his pursuers.

After this success, Yoshitsune, without delay, marched against the Taira army. It was 100,000 strong, and held a fortified position near Fukuhara. On the north of it was a semi-circle of reputedly inaccessible mountains; on the south lay the sea, where the Taira fleet of a thousand war vessels was at anchor. The eastern wing rested on a forest, the western was strongly entrenched.

Yoshitsune had marched out of Kyoto on March 19. His forces numbered 75,000. Among them were bodies of mounted archers, whose bows, we may surmise, were more powerful—several men were, it is said, required to bend a Japanese bow of the period—than those which the English, a century and more later, were to use with such deadly efficiency. On March 21, Yoshitsune attacked the enemy. While the Taira troops were heavily engaged on both flanks, a detachment of cavalry of the Minamoto army threaded its way across the mountains, and riding down the steep declivity charged the enemy's centre. Both of the Taira wings broke, and the battle of Ichi-No-Tani was speedily over. In the helmet of one of the slain Taira chieftains, Tadanori, was found a roll of poems, among which was the following :

Twilight upon my path,  
And for an inn to-night  
The shadow of a tree,  
And for mine host  
A flower.

These verses, so celebrated in Japan, like those attributed to the great Hideyoshi, quoted on p. 53, are, as it were,

a flash revealing one side of the Japanese character too little appreciated by matter-of-fact Occidentals.

Another illuminating incident of the battle may be related. A Taira lad of fifteen was taken prisoner. His captor tore off his helmet and saw a face recalling that of his own son. About to spare the boy's life, he suddenly remembered that, if he did, his prisoner might suffer a more cruel death than beheading. He explained to the youth that a swift would be preferable to a perhaps slow and lingering end, and the latter calmly submitted to his fate. The Minamoto soldier sent the head and a flute found on the lad's person to the boy's father, and then himself entered the priesthood and spent his remaining years praying for the soul of his victim.

The victory of Ichi-No-Tani did not terminate the war. Yoshitsune had failed to secure either the person of the Mikado or the regalia. The Taira fleet was intact and Shikoku and Kiushiu unreduced. Yoshitsune fell, too, into disgrace with Yoritomo, who envied and feared him. The former remained at Kyoto, apparently intriguing with the ex-Mikado, Go-Shirakawa.

In October a Minamoto army moved westward. Five months later, in March 1185, a portion of it was thrown across the Straits of Shimonoseki into Bungo, a province in the north-east of Kiushiu. There, threatened by the Taira troops on Hikoshima—an island west of the Straits—and by those on Shikoku, with its water communications at the mercy of the vastly superior Taira fleet, the position of the Minamoto advanced guard was precarious. Unless the Taira clan lost the command of the sea, the contest threatened to drag on for years.

Yoritomo prepared to try conclusions with his enemy on

his enemy's favourite element. A fleet had been collected at Watanabe. The ex-Mikado conferred the command of it on Yoshitsune, who ignored, without being able to dismiss, the admiral sent by Yoritomo to assist him in the fight. This admiral was of the type of the younger Byng, while Yoshitsune was a Nelson. Naturally there was great friction between them. On March 21, a tempest raged in the Inland Sea. Yoshitsune, ignoring the admiral's protests, crossed, with five war-junks, the waters dividing Honshiu from Shikoku, on whose eastern coast he landed safely. He surprised the Taira outposts, and on the 23rd was joined by thirty more war-junks. At dawn on the 24th, he boldly attacked with his squadron and put to flight the Taira fleet in Shido Bay. Shikoku was speedily conquered, and the remnants of the Taira fleet, together with the boy Mikado, sought refuge on Hikoshima.

On April 25, the Actium of the campaign was fought at Dan-No Ura, near the Straits of Shimonoseki. On this occasion Yoshitsune had a superiority in numbers, having some 800 as against 500 war-junks. The junks were propelled by oars, and the fighting was of the nature of a land-battle. As at Sluys, reliance was placed by the combatants chiefly on bows and arrows and swords. After the discharge of several flights of arrows, the fleets closed. At the height of the struggle a portion of the Taira fleet deserted to the enemy, and Yoshitsune gained a decisive victory. On one of the vessels were the little Mikado Antoku, his grandmother and mother. The grandmother with the boy in her arms, the mother with the regalia, leapt overboard. The first two were drowned, but the mother was rescued and the sacred mirror and gem, but not the sword, recovered. The battle of Dan-No-Ura settled the fate of the Taira. The island

of Kiushiu, like that of Shikoku, and also the whole of Honshiu, with the exception of the Fujiwara provinces of Mutsu and Dewa, situated in the Highlands of Honshiu, fell under the control of the Minamoto leaders. Yoshitsune returned to Kyoto with the reputation of being the foremost soldier and sailor in Japan.

After the battle of Ichi-No-Tani Yoshitsune had not repaired to Kamakura, Yoritomo's capital, but had preferred to remain at Kyoto; he had been appointed by the ex-Mikado and not by his half-brother to command the Minamoto forces, which had just gained the battle of Dan-No-Ura; and Yoritomo's plans for remodelling the Japanese government on Japanese and military as opposed to Chinese and civilian lines were endangered by Yoshitsune's dallings with the court party. When Yoshitsune set out to visit Kamakura, he was forbidden to enter the nascent city. In a pathetic letter of protest to his brother, he said that the 'bond of blood-brotherhood' had been severed. Returning to Kyoto, he increased his popularity among the inhabitants and the courtiers. To rid himself of this dangerous rival, Yoritomo descended to employing assassins. On November 10, Yoshitsune's house at Kyoto was attacked by a band of bravos. With seven faithful followers he offered a desperate resistance, and help arriving he was saved.

The ex-Mikado, Go-Shirakawa, gave Yoshitsune a mandate to crush Yoritomo, which proved to be an impossible task. By the close of November an army from Kamakura, divided into three columns, converged on the capital. Yoshitsune, unable to collect sufficient forces to meet it, decided to abandon Kyoto and make Shikoku and Kiushiu his bases. On November 29, he embarked for Kiushiu. Driven back by a gale, he landed on the Izumi coast and, changing his

plans, ultimately made his way under various disguises to the Honshiu Highlands, the scenes of his earliest exploits. The ex-Mikado, overawed by Yoritomo's troops, had already proscribed him.

The Fujiwara baron with whom Yoshitsune sought refuge early in 1187 had befriended and trained him when a youth. The baron was in his ninety-first year, and died soon after his guest's arrival. In the spring of 1188, Yoritomo and the ex-Mikado ordered the son and heir of the baron to kill Yoshitsune. To coerce the Fujiwara, a large force from Kamakura proceeded northwards. The chief of that clan in alarm sent a band to murder Yoshitsune, who killed his wife and children and then committed suicide. The giant Benkei and the exiled general's few personal attendants died to a man defending their master.

The crime committed by the Fujiwara baron was swiftly avenged—and by Yoritomo. So long as there was a quasi-independent potentate with a large army in the Honshiu Highlands, the ruler at Kamakura, if he should march the bulk of his forces to or west of Kyoto, was in danger of having his base of operations, the Kwanto, surprised. The conquest of the Highlands was needed to complete the subjugation of the islands. Three armies—one moving up the western and another up the eastern coast, while a third, under Yoritomo himself, advanced inland—left the Kwanto for the north. The Fujiwara noble's forces were overpowered. He was murdered by a vassal who, in turn, was executed by Yoritomo. From 1189 to the day of his death in 1199, Yoritomo was the *de facto* sovereign of Japan.

Generals as successful as Yoritomo had been have in most other countries converted real into nominal sovereignty, or founded a republican form of government. But neither



Yoritomo nor, in later times, Hideyoshi<sup>1</sup> and Tokugawa Iyeyasu appear to have ever contemplated ascending the throne of the Mikado. Yoritomo was content with the substance and disdained the shadow. His methods for ensuring that the executive power should remain in his own hands and in those of his successors were remarkable.

Early in his career of conquest he had established at Kamakura a capital in opposition to Kyoto. At Kamakura he set up a Bakufu ('camp office'), which was a business-like council, utterly unlike the Royal Chinese-aping camarilla at Kyoto. None of the posts in the Bakufu was to be sold and bought. In Yoritomo's intention the ministers were to be hard-working officials living a simple life. They were not to perform their duties in the midst of a host of wealthy parasites.

\* At the head of the Bakufu was the Shogun, the commander-in-chief or Grand Master of the whole order of bushi. The council was divided into three boards or committees. The first, or Samurai-dokoro, established in 1180, was a sort of general staff and war office. After Yoshinaka's occupation of Kyoto in 1184, when Yoritomo began to usurp the civil authority of the Crown, the Samurai-dokoro was supplemented by two other boards, the Man-dokoro and Monju-dokoro. The Man-dokoro superintended the civil administration, while legislative and judicial matters were entrusted to the Monju-dokoro. Careers for talented persons outside the military caste were opened by Yoritomo. Such persons might aspire to sit on two of the three boards of the Bakufu.

At the end of 1185 and at the beginning of 1186, after Yoshitsune's abortive rising against his half-brother, a

<sup>1</sup> This assertion may be doubted in the case of Hideyoshi.

radical change was introduced in the local administration of Japan. It was sanctioned with much reluctance by the Mikado, Go-Shirakawa. In each province a prefect to command the local levies and to arrest insurgents, assassins, and robbers, and a land steward, whose functions were to collect taxes and maintain peace and order in the manors entrusted to him, were appointed—not by the Crown but by the Bakufu at Kamakura.

Nor were these the only measures by which the Crown was reduced to impotence. In 1186 a prefect and a body-guard, acting in the interests of the Bakufu, were established in Kyoto itself. Some of the powers of the Kwampaku, the Mayor of the Palace, were transferred to a new official dependent on the Bakufu, and a Council of Twelve was created which, in the very court of Go-Shirakawa, discussed and decided all affairs of State. On November 2, 1190, Yoritomo set out from Kamakura to pay his first visit to the monarch whom he had deprived of all real power. At the head of a splendid retinue and a numerous army he entered Kyoto on December 5. Go-Shirakawa received his visitor with much apparent affability. Yoritomo had caused Kyoto to be cleared of the bandits infesting it, and the royal palaces, by his orders, had been repaired. For these and his other services he hoped to be appointed Seitai-shogun ('barbarian-subduing-great-general') but had to be content with the post of So-tsuihoshi ('Lord High Constable'), which, however, gave him control over the provincial prefects. It was not till after the death of Go-Shirakawa in 1192 that the other and more important office was conferred on him.

Such were the civil and military reforms effected by Yoritomo. In religious matters he proved a tolerant ruler.

Among the monuments still extant at Kamakura, which is now a village, are the Temple of Hachiman, the God of War and tutelary deity of the Minamoto clan, and a Temple of Kwannon, both erected by him. The colossal bronze image of Buddha, 47 feet high, was not cast till 1252. His own tomb—the tomb of one of the greatest statesmen in the history of the world—is a modest erection covered with creepers. The institutions founded by Yoritomo, modified by Tokugawa Iyeyasu at the beginning of the seventeenth century, lasted till 1868. Born no king, Yoritomo effected what few kings have been able to accomplish.

The Minamoto was soon in turn superseded by the Hojo clan into which Yoritomo had married. It was under the Hojo that the Mikado, Go-Toba, endeavoured from Kyoto to overthrow the Shogunate. In 1221 he outlawed Hojo Yoshitoki, who replied by sending southwards from Kamakura an army said to have numbered 190,000, commanded by his eldest son, Yasutoki. It advanced by three roads on Kyoto. To Yasutoki's question what he was to do if the Mikado himself led the Royal forces, Yoshitoki answered: 'The Sovereign cannot be opposed. If His Majesty be in personal command, then strip off your armour, cut your bow-strings and assume the mien of a low official. But if the Mikado be not in command, then fight to the death. Should you be defeated I will never see your face again.' In the thirteenth century no such attitude was adopted in Europe by rebels towards Kings or by Kings and Emperors towards Popes! Go-Toba did not himself take the field, Yasutoki defeated the Royalists, and Go-Toba was deposed but was not, as would probably have happened if he had been monarch of any other people at that date, put to death.

The Mikado had been reduced to a puppet by Yoritomo and the succeeding Shoguns. Under the Hojo régime, the Shogun, too, lost all power. Though the office was retained, the real rulers at Kamakura were the Shikken (Regent) and a small council of, as a rule, earnest and unpretentious men. In 1274, and again in 1281, this system of government, which is analogous to that in modern democratic states, where from the background bosses and wirepullers—usually very different in character from the Japanese statesmen of the thirteenth century—direct public affairs, was put to a severe test. The Mongol Alexander the Great, Gengis Khan (1162–1227), had created a gigantic empire between the Dnieper and the Pacific Ocean, and his successors extended his conquests. One of them, the celebrated Kublai Khan, a grandson of Gengis, in 1263 subjugated Corea which became his vassal kingdom. In 1264 he fixed the capital of his empire at Peking and aspired to become the master of the whole of the rest of China. The victories of the Mongols made it possible for travellers to cross in comparative safety from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, and a couple of Venetians, the Polos, father and son, proceeded to Kublai's Court. It is from the *Travels* of the son, Marco Polo, that we get our first glimpse of Japan in any document written in a European language. Marco Polo's account of Japan and the Japanese will be found in chapter ii.

As was to be the case centuries later, Japan now found herself face to face, not with pacific neighbours but with a formidable and civilized enemy whose government specialized in the art of war. Before Kublai had completed his conquest of China he had decided to drag Japan within the orbit of the Mongol Empire. Up to this date the Japanese Islands had in historic times been only once seriously invaded.

In A. D. 1019 the Sushen or Toi—ancestors of the Manchu—who in A. D. 549 had raided the island of Sado off the west coast of Honshiu, had conquered the islands of Tsushima and Iki in the Corean Straits and effected a landing on the northern shores of Kiushiu. They had been driven off, and Iki and Tsushima had been reoccupied. It is noteworthy that Kublai Khan's two invasions followed on the lines of that of the Toi.

In 1265 Kublai ordered his vassal, the Corean King of Koma, to transport his, Kublai's, envoys to Japan, where they were, in effect, to demand the submission of the Japanese. It was not, however, till 1268 that a Mongol Embassy actually reached Japan, bearing a letter from Kublai in which he styled himself 'Emperor' and the Japanese monarch merely 'King'. No answer was vouchsafed by the Japanese rulers, and Kublai during the next five years, or at the end of them, made preparations for the reduction of the Island Kingdom.

In November 1274 a fleet of 900 vessels, with 25,000 Mongol and 15,000 Corean troops, left the shores of Corea for Kiushiu. This armada, like that sent by Darius to punish the Athenians, at first met with success. The islands of Tsushima and Iki were again captured, but the Japanese garrisons on them died to a man at their posts. The Mongol leaders must, instinctively, have realized that they were entering a sphere where the ordinary Asiatic standards of conduct were not recognized. If the handfuls of Japanese on Tsushima and Iki were representative of the Japanese nation the enterprise on which the Mongols and Coreans had been sent was hopeless.

The invaders were soon to learn that they had not run up against a few exceptional individuals. On November 20

they landed at Hakozaki Bay in Kiushiu. They were at once attacked by the forces of the local chieftains, and a battle took place, the Marathon of Japanese history. The Mongol cavalry was very superior to the Japanese; the troops of Kublai possessed powerful cross-bows and tubes firing explosives; at close quarters they employed poisoned weapons; and, accustomed to fight in close order, they had a tactical advantage over the Japanese who then relied for success, not on tactical skill but on the prowess of individuals. After a desperate struggle the Japanese, undefeated, retired behind the fortifications of Mizuki.

The night threatened to be stormy. If there was a storm the only hope of safety for the Mongol-Corean fleet would be that it should meet it on the open sea. The invaders were in the position of Caesar when he landed on the Kentish coast; with this difference that the Corean Straits are five times the width of the Straits of Dover and that the Japanese of the thirteenth century were a far more dangerous enemy than the semi-barbarous Britons of the first century A. D. Like the Romans in 55 and 54 B. C., and like the Persians at Marathon, the Mongols and Coreans took to their ships. At dawn the invader's fleet, several vessels of which had foundered, was seen beating out to sea. The first Mongol invasion had failed ignominiously.

Kublai behaved as did Darius and his son Xerxes after the reverse of the Persians at Marathon. Preparations on a much larger scale were made for another expedition against Japan. Before it sailed, an embassy was again dispatched to the islands, and the Mikado was summoned by Kublai to Peking. As answer to this insult, the five leaders of the embassy were decapitated at Kamakura by the indignant islanders.

The Regent, Hojo Tokimune, had ordered that defensive works should be constructed at all points where the Mongols might land—at Hakozaki Bay, at Nagato, which is in Honshiu on the northern shores of the Straits of Shimonoseki, at Harima on the Honshiu coast of the Inland Sea, and at Tsuruga in Wakasa Bay at the base of the northern half of the main island. Tsushima and Iki which had been abandoned by the Mongols on their return to Corea had been strongly garrisoned, and a fleet which, like the English fleet in 1588, consisted of ships much smaller than the enemy's, was collected. Finally, in 1280, Tokimune issued an edict bidding the officials and vassals of the Mikado to work together whole-heartedly at this time of national crisis.

The year before (1279) Kublai had finished victoriously the Chinese War. He had acquired in Southern China a large fleet of ocean-going ships, very superior to the Mongolian and Corean vessels of the previous expedition. In the spring of 1281, when our Edward I was preparing for his second campaign in Wales and the Emperor Rudolph was laying the foundations of the power of the House of Habsburg, no fewer than 100,000 Mongols and Chinese are said to have been embarked at a port on the Chinese mainland opposite Formosa. The fleet bearing this host was directed to effect a junction in the Corean Straits with another fleet of 1,000 vessels, carrying 50,000 Mongol and 20,000 Corean soldiers.

In May the second of these fleets appeared off Tsushima. Troops were landed from it, but on this occasion the Mongols failed to overpower the garrison. While the fighting was proceeding, the fleet from China hove in sight. Leaving Tsushima un-reduced, the combined fleets made for Iki. On June 10 the garrison on Iki was exter-

minated. A fortnight later—why there was this delay has not been explained—the Mongol-Chinese-Corean army began to disembark at Hakozaki Bay and other places in Kiushiu. The island of Hirado off the north-western end of Kiushiu was seized later. With Iki and Hirado in their possession, the invaders, doubtless, hoped to effect the conquest of Kiushiu and, with Kiushiu—the Ireland of Japan—as their base, to cross the Straits of Shimonoseki and commence the more serious part of their task, the reduction of Honshiu.

The details of the struggle, as momentous in world-history as that of the Greeks with the army and navy of Xerxes, are unfortunately missing. For 53 days, on land and sea, the fighting went on, almost without intermission. The Japanese did not confine themselves to the defensive. Grappling with, they boarded the enemy's ships, and their two-handed swords wrought terrible execution among the invaders. The troops of Kublai were unable to storm the somewhat primitive fortifications on the shores of Hakozaki Bay. A turning movement from the direction of Hizen was unsuccessful. As in the struggle with the Spanish Armada, the elements finally decided the contest. On August 14 and 15 tempests shattered the Mongol fleet. What remained of Kublai's army re-embarked, and the second and last invasion of Japan was over. As we shall see, a faint echo of the Mongol disaster reached Europe through the lips of Marco Polo.<sup>1</sup>

Hojo Tokimune survived his victory only three years. His death occurred in 1284, and with it the fortunes of

<sup>1</sup> The defeat of the Mongols, like that of Xerxes, was grossly exaggerated. In the *Taibeiki* (a fourteenth-century semi-historical romance) the numbers of the Mongols are put at 3,700,000 and their ships at 70,000.



the Hojo clan began to decline. The members of it became extravagant and unpopular. In 1318 there ascended the throne an able Mikado, Go-Daigo, who determined to attempt what Go-Toba had failed to accomplish, viz. the restoration of the pristine power of the King of Japan. Since 1272 the Mikados had been chosen, more or less alternately, from two branches of the royal family. The senior branch or Jimyo-in family was wealthy and assisted the Hojo rulers; the junior or Daikaku-ji family was comparatively poor and opposed them. Go-Daigo belonged to the junior branch. He conspired to overthrow the Shogunate and the Hojo wirepullers.

About 1331 a civil war broke out. Go-Daigo, defeated, was exiled to a little island in the Sea of Japan. He escaped in 1333. Ashikaga Takauji and Nitta Yoshisada, in both of whose veins flowed Minamoto blood, deserted the Hojo. On July 5, 1333, Yoshisada stormed and set fire to Kamakura, and the leader and other members of the Hojo family with 800 followers disembowelled themselves. Twelve days later Go-Daigo entered Kyoto in triumph. It seemed as if the Shogunate would be abolished and the power of the Mikado restored as it was to be in 1868.

The ambition of the Ashikaga chieftain prevented Go-Daigo from becoming the Louis XI or Henry VII of Japan. Takauji speedily quarrelled with his monarch, and set up a rival Mikado. From 1337 to 1392 war went on between the claimants to the throne. Go-Daigo died in 1339. Finally, in 1392, the schism in the divine family from which the Mikado was chosen was ended by agreement, but the real power remained with the Ashikaga Shoguns and the feudal nobles.

One of these Shoguns, Yoshimitsu, Shogun from 1367 to

1395, entered into friendly relations with the Chinese Emperors of the Ming Dynasty who had overthrown the Mongols. Since the repulse of the Mongol invasions, Japanese pirates had preyed on Chinese commerce. Yoshimitsu issued orders for the restraint of the pirates, accepted money from the Chinese Emperor, and even allowed himself to be designated by the latter King of Japan. The friendly relations with China ended in 1419 when a Mongolian-Corean fleet attacked Tsushima and was beaten off by the Japanese. The Shogun, Yoshimochi, who had succeeded his father Yoshimitsu, treated China as responsible for the affront, and Japanese corsairs were again let loose on China's maritime trade. Under the Shogun Yoshinori (1428-41), who bestowed the kingdom of Ryukyu (the Loo-Choo Islands) on the Lord of Satsuma, commercial intercourse was resumed. In 1529 there was a fresh quarrel, and in 1531 a Chinese squadron appeared off Tsushima, only to be put to flight by the Japanese. Hostilities again commenced, and it was not till 1548 that Japan ceased for a time to be estranged from China.

During the ascendancy, such as it was, of the Ashikagas, which terminated in 1573, the arts flourished in Japan as they were doing in contemporary Italy. This period is, however, known to the Japanese by the name of 'Ashikaga Anarchy'. Towards the end of it, in 1542,<sup>1</sup> some Portuguese sailors, driven by stress of weather, were forced to land on an islet off Kiushiu. They introduced to the notice of the Japanese the potent firearms which, in the hands of Cortez, Pizarro, and their followers, had struck terror into the hearts of the Mexicans and the Peruvians. The manufacture of matchlocks in Japan began.

<sup>1</sup> The exact date is doubtful.

A new chapter in Japanese history now opened. Japan had repulsed the Mongols. She might have little to fear from the Portuguese, but would she succeed in keeping at bay the piratical subjects of the Emperor Charles V, King of Spain and Master of the Netherlands? The defeat of the Mongols had drawn Marco Polo's attention to Japan, and his *Travels* had been an indirect cause of the sudden and enormous growth of a Spanish Colonial Empire.

*The reunification of Japan in the Sixteenth Century, the Jesuit propaganda, and Hildeyoshi's invasion of Corea.*

By a curious accident the discovery of America and the circumnavigation of the globe were largely due to Marco Polo's inaccurate account of Japan, which, as has been already mentioned, was, so far as we know, the first description of the Japanese Islands and people written in a European language. The passage below translated from Polo's travels, which were originally written in Latin, contains the information on which the Florentine cosmographer and astronomer, Toscanelli, constructed part of the map (now unfortunately lost) prepared by him for the Genoese navigator, Christopher Columbus. That map has been reconstructed from a letter of Toscanelli's to Columbus, and on p. 35 the reader will see a copy of the reconstruction. Although the passage from Polo's *Travels* is of considerable length, it is so important in the history of geography and of Japan that no apology is needed for quoting it *in extenso*.

‘ Zipangu is an island in the eastern ocean, situated at the distance of about 1,500 miles from the main-land or coast of Manji. It is of considerable size ; its inhabitants have fair complexions, are well made, and are civilized in their manners. Their religion is the worship of idols. They are independent of every foreign power, and governed only by their own kings. They have gold in the greatest abundance, its sources being inexhaustible,

but as the king does not allow of its being exported, few merchants visit the country, nor is it frequented by much shipping from other parts. To this circumstance we are to attribute the extraordinary richness of the sovereign's palace, according to what we are told by those who have access to the place. The entire roof is covered with a plating of gold, in the same manner as we cover houses, or more properly churches, with lead. The ceilings of the halls are of the same precious metal; many of the apartments have small tables of pure gold, of considerable thickness; and the windows also have golden ornaments. So vast, indeed, are the riches of the palace that it is impossible to convey an idea of them. In this island there are pearls also, in large quantities, of a pink colour, round in shape, and of great size, equal in value to, or even exceeding that of the white pearls. It is customary with one part of the inhabitants to bury their dead, and with another part to burn them. The former have a practice of putting one of these pearls into the mouth of the corpse. There are also found there a number of precious stones.

'Of so great celebrity was the wealth of this island, that a desire was excited in the breast of the grand khan Kublai, now reigning, to make the conquest of it, and to annex it to his dominions. In order to effect this, he fitted out a numerous fleet, and embarked a large body of troops, under the command of two of his principal officers, one of whom was named Abbacatan, and the other Vonsancin. The expedition sailed from the ports of Zai-tun and Kin-sai, and, crossing the intermediate sea, reached the island in safety; but in consequence of a jealousy that arose between the two commanders, one of whom treated the plans of the other with contempt and resisted the execution of his orders, they were unable to gain possession of any city or fortified place, with the exception of one only, which was carried by assault, the garrison having refused to surrender. Directions were given for putting the whole to the sword, and in obedience

thereto the heads of all were cut off, excepting of eight persons, who, by the efficacy of a diabolical charm, consisting of a jewel or amulet introduced into the right arm, between the skin and the flesh, were rendered secure from the effects of iron, either to kill or wound. Upon this discovery being made, they were beaten with a heavy wooden club, and presently died.

‘It happened, after some time, that a north wind began to blow with great force, and the ships of the Tartars, which lay near the shore of the island, were driven foul of each other. It was determined thereupon, in a council of the officers on board, that they ought to disengage themselves from the land; and accordingly, as soon as the troops were re-embarked, they stood out to sea. The gale, however, increased to so violent a degree that a number of the vessels foundered. The people belonging to them, by floating upon pieces of the wreck, saved themselves upon an island lying about four miles from the coast of Zipangu. The other ships, which, not being so near to the land, did not suffer from the storm, and in which the two chiefs were embarked, together with the principal officers, or those whose rank entitled them to command a hundred thousand or ten thousand men, directed their course homewards, and returned to the grand khan. Those of the Tartars who remained upon the island where they were wrecked, and who amounted to about thirty thousand men, finding themselves left without shipping, abandoned by their leaders, and having neither arms nor provisions, expected nothing less than to become captives or to perish; especially as the island afforded no habitations where they could take shelter and refresh themselves. As soon as the gale ceased and the sea became smooth and calm, the people from the main island of Zipangu came over with a large force, in numerous boats, in order to make prisoners of these shipwrecked Tartars, and having landed, proceeded in search of them, but in a straggling, disorderly manner. The Tartars, on their part, acted with prudent circum-

spection, and, being concealed from view by some high land in the centre of the island, whilst the enemy were hurrying in pursuit of them by one road, made a circuit of the coast by another, which brought them to the place where the fleet of boats was at anchor. Finding these all abandoned, but with their colours flying, they instantly seized them, and pushing off from the island, stood for the principal city of Zipangu, into which, from the appearance of the colours, they were suffered to enter unmolested. Here they found few of the inhabitants besides women, whom they retained for their own use, and drove out all others. When the king was apprised of what had taken place, he was much afflicted, and immediately gave directions for a strict blockade of the city, which was so effectual that not any person was suffered to enter or to escape from it, during the six months that the siege continued. At the expiration of this time, the Tartars, despairing of succour, surrendered upon the condition of their lives being spared. These events took place in the course of the year 1264.

‘ In this island of Zipangu and the others in its vicinity, their idols are fashioned in a variety of shapes, some of them having the heads of oxen, some of swine, of dogs, goats, and many other animals. Some exhibit the appearance of a single head, with two countenances; others of three heads, one of them in its proper place, and one upon each shoulder. Some have four arms, others ten, and some an hundred; those which have the greatest number being regarded as the most powerful, and therefore entitled to the most particular worship. When they are asked by Christians wherefore they give to their deities these diversified forms, they answer that their fathers did so before them. “ Those who preceded us”, they say, “ left them such, and such shall we transmit them to our posterity.” The various ceremonies practised before these idols are so wicked and diabolical that it would be nothing less than impiety and an abomination to give an account of them in this our book. The reader

should, however, be informed that the idolatrous inhabitants of these islands, when they seize the person of an enemy who has not the means of effecting his ransom for money, invite to their house all their relations and friends, and putting their prisoner to death, dress and eat the body, in a convivial manner, asserting that human flesh surpasses every other in the excellence of its flavour.'<sup>1</sup>

Full of inaccuracies and absurdities as was Polo's story, based doubtless on the gossip of Mongols, Chinese, or Coreans, it revealed to the European world the existence of a large, inhabited and metalliferous island far out in the ocean, to the east of China. At the time of Our Lord the Greek geographer, Strabo, writing for some public or other in the Roman Empire, had hazarded the suggestion that in the vast expanse of sea between the west of Europe and the east of Asia there might be islands, or even continents. Polo's report and the discovery of the islands off the west coast of Africa made by Portuguese explorers in the half-century preceding the voyages of Diaz, Columbus, and Vasco di Gama were evidence that guesses like Strabo's—in themselves reasonable enough—ought not to be disregarded. Polo had stated that Zipangu was 1,500 miles from the mainland of China. If he meant Chinese miles (li) he was not far out. As, however, his *Travels* were written in Latin for Italians, it was natural that Toscanelli and others should consider that he meant not Chinese but Italian miles. On that assumption Toscanelli placed the island of Zipangu much nearer to Europe than it really was.

Scientific geography was then in its infancy. Instead of warning Columbus that Polo might be mistaken or that his,

<sup>1</sup> This passage, which should be read in its context, is extracted from the translation of Marco Polo's *Travels* published, with an introduction by Mr. John Masefield, in the 'Everyman Library'.




Toscanelli's, interpretation of Polo's words might be wrong, the Florentine cosmographer, in a letter to Columbus, emphasized the mistake.

'From the City of Lisbon due west,' he wrote, 'there are twenty-six spaces marked on the map, each of which has 250 miles, as far as the most noble city of Quinsay (Hang-Chou-Fu) . . . but from the Island Antilia known to you, to the most noble island of Cippangue (Japan) there are ten spaces. That island is most fertile in gold, pearls and precious stones, and they cover the temples and palaces with solid gold. Thus the space of sea to be crossed in the unknown parts is not great.'

On April 17, 1492, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, the rulers of the recently-united Spanish people, made an agreement with Columbus which events showed they intended to break. It was agreed that Columbus should be appointed 'Viceroy of all the continents and islands discovered by him'. The Genoese seaman set sail from Palos on the 3rd of the following August. He reached the island of San Salvador on October 12. Nine days later he was writing in his journal: 'I shall shape a course for another much larger island, which I believe to be Cipango, judging from the signs made by the Indians I bring with me. They call it Cuba.' Soon afterwards he discovered Cuba and Hayti, and the next year returned to Europe, carrying with him the news of his discoveries, and tobacco.

It was a long time before the magnitude of Toscanelli's error was ascertained. In 1497, a year before Columbus touched the continent of America, the Venetian John Cabot discovered the coast of North America. Cabot was in the service of Henry VII. On December 18, 1497, Raimondo Di Soncino—envoy of Lodovico Sforza, Duke of



TOSCANELLI'S MAP

Milan, at the court of Henry VII—writing to the Duke, tells him how ‘a certain Venetian named Zoanne Caboto (John Cabot) thinks that he will keep on his next voyage still further towards the east, where he will be opposite to an island called Cipango, situated in the equinoctial regions, where he believes that all the spices of the world, as well as the jewels, are found’. Magellan and his companions in their voyage of circumnavigation did not run across Japan, and it was not till years after the Portuguese—moving eastwards from the Cape of Good Hope and India—had reached China, which they did in the year 1519, that any accurate account of the Japanese reached Europe.

Portuguese traders landed in Japan in 1542, and were quickly followed by the Portuguese Jesuits. In 1547 one of the latter, Francis Xavier, afterwards canonized, reached Kiushiu and commenced the propaganda of the Jesuitical form of Roman Catholic Christianity. Through the Nestorian Christians of China and Corea some idea of the doctrines preached by Christ and his Apostles may have been already known to some of the Japanese. Xavier was well received by the Lord of Satsuma, who probably hoped that from Xavier he might learn how to manufacture the firearms and explosives, the efficiency of which had been already demonstrated by the Portuguese seamen, and also that trade with the Portuguese would be promoted, if he dealt courteously with their priests. Although Xavier never mastered more than a few words of the Japanese language, he and a native convert, one Anjiro, achieved some little success as proselytizers. Judging from Xavier’s eulogium of the Japanese, the Jesuit and his two Portuguese companions must have been agreeably surprised to find the islanders maligned by Marco Polo

so exceptionally civilized. 'As far as I can judge', wrote Xavier, 'the Japanese surpass in virtue and probity all peoples hitherto discovered. Their character is gentle. They are no tricksters, and they reckon honour to be superior to everything else. There is a great deal of poverty in the islands. The Japanese dislike poverty, but are not ashamed of it.'

It is significant that Xavier's views on the Japanese were substantially the same as those (see pp. 102-3) of Lord Elgin and other foreigners who visited Japan three centuries later.

Unhappily for his cause, Xavier was a bigot. He speedily made himself objectionable to the Buddhist priests in Satsuma. Nor did he lend himself to the military and commercial designs of the lord of that province, and, when the Buddhists urged the latter to stamp out Christianity, the Baron of Satsuma issued (1550) an edict making it a capital offence for any of his vassals to embrace Christianity. The edict was, however, not retrospective. Satsuma being closed to him, Xavier crossed over to the island of Hirado, where he was welcomed by the local chieftain.

From Hirado the Jesuit proceeded to Kyoto with the object of securing the Mikado's protection. He failed to obtain an audience, and returned to Yamaguchi, where he received permission to preach, and was assigned a Buddhist monastery for his residence. The Lord of Bungo—a province on the east of Kiushiu—was, like the Lord of Satsuma, anxious through Xavier to trade with the Portuguese and obtain their novel weapons. The Bungo feudatory invited Xavier to his little court. Xavier remained there four months, and in February 1552 departed for Goa. He had made 760 converts, but, dying in the December of that

year, was not destined to revisit Japan. 'If the Chinese adopt the Christian religion', he had said, 'the Japanese also will abandon the religions they have introduced from China.' This remark, unlike those of his already quoted, shows little understanding of the Japanese character. Two Japanese converts had accompanied him to Goa. One died there; the other—perhaps the first Japanese to set foot in Europe—reached Lisbon, visited Rome, became a member of the Society of Jesus, and died at Coimbra.

Xavier's successors continued to spread the Jesuit doctrines. In 1559, one of them, Vilela, was invited to Kyoto by the abbot of a Buddhist monastery. He was received by the Shogun, Ashikaga Yoshiteru, who issued a decree making it a capital offence to interfere with the Portuguese missionaries. But by this date the Ashikaga Shogunate was nearing its end, and the intrusive foreigners were confronted by a group of Japanese soldiers and statesmen quite as able as or even abler than Yoritomo and his councillors.

The persons who now reunited Japan were Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Iyeyasu. The first-named, born in 1534—a year after the birth of Queen Elizabeth—showed in his youth that he was no ordinary petty noble. Careless of etiquette, he irritated his tutor, Hirate Masahide, to such an extent that the latter committed suicide, leaving behind him a letter in which he appealed to his pupil's better instincts. This tragic event proved the turning-point in Nobunaga's career. He became wary and circumspect, though at times the impetuous nature of the man boiled over. As Captain Brinkley well observed, Nobunaga's disposition may be surmised from the verses ever on his lips :

Life is short ; the world is a mere dream to the idle.  
Only the fool fears death, for what is there of life that  
does not die once, sooner or later ?  
Man has to die once only ;  
He should make his death glorious.

Very different were the verses put into the mouths of Faustus and Hamlet by Nobunaga's younger contemporaries, Marlowe and Shakespeare !

Nobunaga was the son of a comparatively rich man. Among the servants of his father's family was a yeoman farmer, to whom was born in 1536 a boy, called in his childhood Hiyoshimaru, and afterwards Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The child was small and ugly. At the age of sixteen he became the menial of a Buddhist priest. Introduced to the commandant of the castle of Kuno, he entered the latter's service. The jealousy of his fellow retainers brought about his dismissal, and he joined Nobunaga in the humble position of sandal-bearer. Ambitious, audacious, able, he quickly won the confidence of his and his father's master.

The ancestral fief of Nobunaga—Owari—formed part of the one-hundred-mile-broad isthmus which connects the western with the eastern half of Honshiu. Its southern boundary was the Bay of Ise. To its east, in Mikawa, was a fief, the lord of which was Matsudaira Motoyasu, later to be known as Tokugawa Iyeyasu. A glance at the map will show that Nobunaga was in a central position, if he should aim at conquering the whole of Honshiu. His domain was in the Midland Counties, as it were, of the island. He was much nearer to Kyoto than Yoritomo had been when at Kamakura. In June 1560 a neighbouring baron, Imagawa Yoshimoto, accompanied by Tokugawa

Iyeyasu, invaded Owari with an army 46,000 strong. By skilful manœuvres Nobunaga, though his forces were very inferior, routed the invaders in a series of actions known as the battle of Okehazama. The result was that Nobunaga became famous throughout Japan. An alliance was contracted by him with Tokugawa Iyeyasu, whose eldest son was subsequently betrothed to Nobunaga's daughter.

For some years after the battle of Okehazama, Nobunaga with the help of Iyeyasu, now his ally, directed his attention to increasing his hold over the fiefs lying between him and the capital, Kyoto. In 1565 the Ashikaga Shogun, Yoshiteru, who, it will be remembered, favoured the Jesuits, was attacked in his palace, and committed suicide. His younger brother, Yoshiaki, escaped. In 1567 the Mikado called upon Nobunaga to restore order in Kyoto. The next year, with 30,000 men, Nobunaga marched on the capital and procured the nomination of Yoshiaki to the post of Shogun, while Hideyoshi became Prefect of Kyoto.

Yoshiaki did not long enjoy his office. In 1573 he was deposed by Nobunaga, and the Ashikaga Shogunate came to an end. During the rest of his life, which ended in 1582, when he was attacked by an enemy and committed suicide, Nobunaga was engaged with Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu in crushing the feudal barons and militant Buddhist monks of central and eastern Honshiu. In the course of his campaigns he adopted the European mediaeval system of fortification. At Azuchi a castle (completed in 1579) was begun in 1576. In the centre of it, on a stone basement, rose a wooden tower 90 feet high. Another innovation of Nobunaga's was the arming of some of his troops with

firearms. At the battle of Takinosawa (1575) his men, by their fire-tactics, gained the day.

Nobunaga had been opposed by militant Buddhists. Like the Scottish nobles who dethroned Mary Stuart and patronized John Knox, he had welcomed the antagonists of his religious enemies. 'This man', said the Jesuits, 'seems to have been chosen by God to open and prepare the way for our faith.' Nobunaga, however, had no such intention. A refractory noble had professed Christianity. In 1579 Nobunaga had seized the Jesuits in Kyoto and had threatened to prohibit the teaching of Christianity, unless they brought the rebellious baron over to his, Nobunaga's, side.

The death of Nobunaga was speedily avenged by the faithful Hideyoshi. Thirteen days after the event, the head of the man who had driven him to commit suicide was being exposed in Kyoto. At the age of forty-six Hideyoshi, ex-sandal bearer to Nobunaga, found himself one of the most powerful personages in Japan. His mind was already filled with grandiose, yet withal feasible, schemes. In 1577 he is reported to have stated that it was his intention to conquer Kiushiu, next Corea, and finally China. 'When that is effected', he is said to have told Nobunaga, 'the three countries, China, Corea, and Japan, will be one. I shall do it all as easily as a man rolls up a piece of matting and carries it under his arm.'

The words attributed to Hideyoshi may well be authentic. He believed in his exalted destiny. 'I am the only remaining scion of a humble stock', he wrote later to the King of Corea, 'but my mother once had a dream in which she saw the sun enter her bosom after which she gave birth to me. There was then a soothsayer who said: "Wherever the sun shines, there shall be no place which shall not



be subject to him”.’ The Corean ambassadors who met him described him as a mean and ignoble-looking man ‘with dark complexion and undistinguished features’. But ‘his eye-balls’, they observed, ‘sent out flashes of fire—enough to pierce one through’, and he ‘seemed to do exactly as he pleased, and was as unconcerned as if nobody else were present’. When we remember the difficulties in the way of a plebeian acquiring power in an aristocratic-theocratic society like that of Japan of the sixteenth century, and that the Japanese Cromwell conquered Kiushiu, reduced to submission all the turbulent nobles in Honshiu, and directed from Japan campaigns in Corea of a Napoleonic magnitude, the inference is that only an accident prevented him from becoming Emperor of China.

Borrowing metallurgical methods from Europe, this remarkable statesman enormously increased the output of the gold and silver mines in Sado and at Ikuno, and endowed Japan with a gold and silver coinage on a large scale, thus providing himself with the sinews for civil and foreign wars. At Osaka he built a gigantic granite fortress, surrounded by three moats, each 20 feet deep, in the centre of which was a three-storey donjon, armour-plated and coated with plaster to protect it from fire. The Buddhist monks who had given Nobunaga so much trouble were conciliated but disarmed by him. For a time he continued Nobunaga’s policy towards the Christians. Under Hideyoshi, Japan was minutely surveyed and a detailed map of the islands prepared. As legislator and patron of the arts and letters he won distinction. At Fushimi he created an art-capital, to which flocked the most skilful painters, lacquerers, metal-workers, and wood-carvers. He encouraged trade with Macao, Cambodia, and Annam.

Of Nobunaga's sons, Nobukatsu alone openly resented the ascendancy of Hideyoshi. He plotted his downfall, and at first received assistance from his father's friend, Tokugawa Iyeyasu. In March 1584 war broke out between them, but on December 11 peace was concluded between Hideyoshi and Nobukatsu. Subsequently, Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu were reconciled and the Nobunaga party again reunited.

Thenceforward to his death Hideyoshi directed the party's fortunes. In 1585 he reduced the militant Buddhist monks of Kii and threw an army across the Inland Sea into the island of Shikoku, which was rapidly brought under subjection. During 1586 he made extensive preparations for the reduction of Kiushiu, the head-quarters of Roman Catholicism in Japan. The next year, 1587, an army of 60,000 troops left Osaka and landed in Bungo on January 19. At the head of 130,000 men Hideyoshi himself in February crossed the Straits of Shimonoseki. The feudal chieftains fought desperately for their independence. In the end even the Lord of Satsuma, who had boasted that he would never kneel to a 'monkey-faced upstart', was forced to submit. The upstart, with his glorious dreams of foreign conquests floating before his mind, treated the defeated foe generously. But he obliged the Satsuma baron to abdicate in favour of a younger brother.

Hideyoshi's Kiushiu campaign was a turning-point in the history of Roman Catholicism in Japan. Up to then he had protected the Jesuit missionaries. 'He is not only not opposed to the things of God', they wrote, 'but he is entrusting to Christians his treasures, secrets, and most important fortresses.' It was averred that he had expressed an intention of Christianizing half of the islands, but in 1586 he became reconciled with the Buddhists. He was

erecting an enormous image of Buddha at Kyoto, and during the campaign he had received valuable help from a Buddhist abbot. As protector of Buddhism he was not likely to be over-friendly to Roman Catholicism. But other than religious reasons account for his change of policy. In 1580 Philip II of Spain had annexed Portugal, and Portuguese Jesuits were henceforth (up to 1640) the subjects of the King of Spain. Macao, in the Bay of Canton, was now a Spanish port. The Philippines were in the possession of the Spaniards, and the whole of the west coast of America was Spanish territory. It was natural, therefore, that Hideyoshi should be alarmed at the growing power of the Catholic priests in Japan. He had heard how the ancient civilizations of Mexico and Peru had been extinguished by the Spaniards, nominally because the Mexicans and Peruvians were heathen, but really because gold and silver were found in those countries; and he must have been aware that Portugal had been seized by the King of Spain, and that the same monarch, with the aid of the Roman Catholics, was trying to subjugate other European countries. In 1582 four Japanese converts had been conveyed to Europe, where they were received by Pope Gregory XIII in 1584, the year after William of Orange was assassinated by the orders of Philip II and Parma. As these converts did not return to Japan till 1590, they must have become acquainted with the momentous events occurring in Europe between 1584 and the latter date. Perhaps they or other Japanese sent home intelligence of the Jesuit-ridden Philip II's preparations for the conquest of England and of his intrigues with the Guises in France. As Kiushiu would be the base for a Spanish conquest of Japan, the spread of Roman Catholicism in Kiushiu had

obviously to be stopped. Hideyoshi could not afford to have Jesuits tampering with the allegiance of nobles like the Lord of Satsuma. Before he left Osaka for the Kiushiu campaign, he said in public, 'I fear much that all the virtue of the European priests is', as indeed it presumably was, 'a mask of hypocrisy and serves only to conceal pernicious designs against the kingdom'. The view of the ruined temples, overturned idols, and terrorized Christian converts in Kiushiu cannot but have filled his heart with disgust. The Japanese civilization was on as high a plane as the Spanish civilization, which was endeavouring to supplant it. On his return victorious from Satsuma, the Japanese ruler suddenly put five questions to the Vice-Provincial of the Jesuits. Why, he asked, had the Jesuits constrained Japanese to become Christians? Why had they induced their converts to destroy temples? Why did they persecute the bonzes? Why did they eat oxen and cows, animals so useful to human beings? Lastly, why did they allow Japanese to be enslaved and carried off to the Indies?

The answers given by the Vice-Provincial were unsatisfactory. Hideyoshi ordered him and his followers to retire to the island of Hirado and to quit Japan. On July 25, 1587, he issued the following edict :

'Having learned from our faithful councillors that foreign priests have come into our states where they preach a law contrary to that of Japan, and that they have had the audacity to destroy temples dedicated to our Kami and Hotoke ; although the outrage merits the most extreme punishment, wishing nevertheless to show them mercy, we order them under pain of death to quit Japan within twenty days. During that space no harm or hurt will be done to them. But at the expiration of

that term, we order that if any of them be found in our states, they should be seized and punished as the greatest criminals. As for the Portuguese merchants, we permit them to enter our ports, there to continue their accustomed trade, and to remain in our states provided our affairs need this. But we forbid them to bring any foreign priests into the country, under the penalty of the confiscation of their ships and goods.'

The above edict, very mild for the age, was not strictly enforced. Some Jesuits remained in or returned to Japan, and there they were joined by the Franciscans and Dominicans, who considered that the then newly-formed Society of Jesus was unjustifiably interfering with the vested interests which they themselves had acquired since the thirteenth century. While the Jesuits covertly, their rivals openly, preached in Japan. A church was erected by them in Kyoto, and a convent founded in Osaka. For some reason or other—probably because he was engrossed with the Chinese War—Hideyoshi did not take offence at the proceedings of the Franciscans and Dominicans until 1597, the year before his death.

Between the dates of the first and second of his persecutions of the Christians—if the term is a correct one for those measures—Hideyoshi completed his subjugation of the feudal barons of Japan and commenced to put in motion his schemes for the conquest of China. The west and centre of Honshiu, with Kiushiu and Shikoku, were now firmly in the grip of Hideyoshi and of the Mikado. But in the east the Hojo nobles of the Kwanto, from which district Yoritomo had once ruled Japan, still held out. Higher up the island, the powerful baron, Date Masamune, was practically independent.

In March 1590 an army of 200,000 troops in three columns,

one of which was commanded by Tokugawa Iyeyasu, moved into the Kwanto. For four months the Hojo family and their vassals fiercely resisted the invaders, but in July their great stronghold, Odawara, surrendered, and the head of the family was killed. During the siege Hideyoshi, who proposed to give Iyeyasu eight of the provinces of the Kwanto, pointed out to the latter the advisability of making Yedo his capital. Yedo is the modern Tokyo, the present capital of Japan.

The fall of Odawara and the ruin of the Hojo family brought Date Masamune to reason. He submitted to Hideyoshi. In the words of Captain Brinkley, 'for the first time since the middle of the fifteenth century, the whole of the Empire was pacified'. Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu had accomplished in Japan what Fairfax, Cromwell, and Monk were to accomplish in the British Isles half a century or so later. They had done their work without deposing their divine-right sovereign, and the Japanese had become a united, disciplined people.

Hideyoshi was at last free to carry out his schemes for the conquest of Corea and China. Emigrants from Kiushiu had settled in the Ningpo district of the Celestial Empire, and Japanese privateers had spread terror along the coasts of Corea and China as English privateers were then doing along the coasts of Spain and Spanish America. 'On the 23rd of the fifth month of 1553', records a Chinese annalist, 'twenty-seven Japanese vessels arrived at Lung-wang-tang. They looked like so many hills', he poetically adds, 'and their white sails were as clouds in the sky.' Again, 'on the 23rd of the second month of 1556', the same annalist records, 'pirate ships arrived at the entrance to Kinshan-hai. Their masts were like a dense forest of bamboos.' In 1556

Japanese pirates looted and burned Yang-Chou, in 1559 they attacked Chekiang, in 1560 they were off Shanghai. The vessels were low in the water and narrow; the largest carried 300 sailors. It is recorded that the Japanese were expert marksmen with firearms, and their trenchant swords inspired fear among the Celestials. 'They always advance', said a Chinese narrator, 'in single rank at a slow pace, and thus their line is miles long. . . . Against our positions they begin by sending a few men, who by swift and deceptive movements cause our troops to exhaust all their projectiles fruitlessly, and then the assault is delivered.' If Japanese buccaneers could achieve such results, what might not be expected from the huge armies of veteran soldiers which Hideyoshi was preparing to disembark in Corea? The Ming Dynasty was tottering to its fall. In 1644 it was to be overthrown by the Manchus. There was little then that was chimerical in the plans of the Japanese Cromwell. In 1572 the Japanese, who had been previously expelled from Corea, had obtained permission to settle at Fusan, a port on the Corean Straits. Japan had, therefore, already a footing in the peninsula.

As a preliminary step, Hideyoshi sought the alliance of the King of Corea. 'The Empire of Japan', he wrote to the Corean monarch, 'has of late years been brought to ruin by internal dissensions. . . . This state of things roused me to indignation and in a few years I restored peace to the country. . . . I will assemble a mighty host, and, invading the country of the great Ming, I will fill with the hoarfrost from my sword the whole sky over the four hundred provinces. Should I carry out this purpose, I hope that the Coreans will form my vanguard.' The Coreans were asked to allow the Japanese Army to march through their

territory on the way to Peking. They had permitted Kublai to invade Japan from Corea ; it was now their turn to permit the Japanese through Corea to invade China.

After considerable delay the King of Corea replied with a flat refusal. For the Japanese to attempt to conquer China, he observed, was like attempting to bail out the ocean with a cockle-shell. This stupid criticism of his plans did not deter Hideyoshi. The nobles whose fiefs were washed by the sea were ordered to provide a fleet. Crews were procured from the fishing villages, and 9,200 soldiers armed with matchlocks, bows and swords were placed on board. Unfortunately, most of the ships were, like the Viking vessels, open rowing boats. Hideyoshi had failed in his efforts to induce the Portuguese to sell him some galleons. Immense quantities of rice and other provisions were collected and an army of 300,000 concentrated in the north-west of Kiushiu. Setting aside the semi-fabulous expedition of Xerxes, no overseas expedition had ever before been prepared on so large a scale.

The plan of campaign might have been designed by Napoleon or Marshal Oyama. An army was to be disembarked at Fusan. In three columns—one moving up the east coast, another up the centre, and a third by the coast road on the west—it was to advance on Seoul, the capital of Corea. Behind—also based on Fusan—another army with the commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, was to follow, subduing the regions traversed by the first army. When Seoul had been occupied and the united forces were marching on the Yalu and the frontiers of Manchuria, a third army was to be transported by sea to the mouth of the Taitong, to assemble at Ping-yang and to act as a reserve. It was substantially the plan adopted by the



Japanese in the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5, described in chapter vi.

On May 24, 1592, the vanguard (18,700 strong) of the first army landed in Corea. The next day the castle of Fusan was stormed. A few days later, a second corps (20,800 strong) disembarked at Fusan and moved northwards up the east coast. On June 12 Seoul was entered by the Japanese. The Coreans, defeated in a number of engagements, retired on the Yalu and sent pressing messages to the Chinese, imploring them to come to their assistance.

So far all had gone well for the Japanese, and Hideyoshi in June was writing to his nephew that the Mikado would enter Peking in 1594 and distribute Chinese estates among Japanese nobles. Hideyoshi had reckoned without the Korean fleet. The Coreans possessed large ships, over the sides and decks of many of which they had nailed sheet iron. Through the loop-holes and port-holes they could pour down on the Japanese open galleys volleys of bullets and flights of arrows. *Chevaux de frise* prevented the Japanese swordsmen from boarding. While the Japanese vanguard was entering Seoul, the Korean admiral with eighty men-of-war fell upon the Japanese fleet in Fusan harbour, set twenty-six vessels on fire, and dispersed the rest. A Japanese flotilla with part of the third army bound for Ping-yang was dispersed by the Coreans, over seventy vessels being sunk. Meanwhile the Japanese lines of communication in the peninsula were cut by guerrilla bands. These untoward events upset Hideyoshi's calculations. The vanguard of the great Japanese Army could not advance beyond Ping-yang. A proposal of its commander, Konishi Yukinaga, to march into China was vetoed by the generalissimo Hideiye.

In October the Koreans received a reinforcement of 5,000 Chinese troops. These and the Koreans attacked the Japanese at Ping-yang, but were signally defeated. In February 1593 a Chinese Army, estimated at 200,000, but perhaps not more than 51,000 strong, crossed the Yalu. Its artillery was superior to the Japanese and the Japanese swords could not pierce the Chinese coats of chain-mail. After severe fighting, the Japanese evacuated Ping-yang and retreated on Seoul. Famine and pestilence forced them to abandon the Korean capital on May 9. Negotiations for peace began. While they were in progress, the Japanese stormed Chinju, reckoned the strongest of the Korean fortresses. After its fall, the bulk of the Japanese Army was withdrawn from Korea, one corps being left entrenched in twelve fortified camps along the southern coast of the peninsula.

Hideyoshi had met the first serious rebuff in the course of his long and glorious career. During the next three years negotiations with China continued and on October 21, 1596, a Chinese embassy landed in Japan. According to the story, the ambassadors presented Hideyoshi with a robe and crown, and he imagined that he was to be Emperor of China. On reading the letter which accompanied the gift, he discovered that the Chinese Emperor had affected to create him—as an earlier Ming sovereign had created Ashikaga Yoshimitsu—King of Japan. He was bidden to defend the Chinese frontiers, to be humbly guided by and always to follow the instructions of the Chinese Emperor. Again, according to the story, which is on the face of it improbable, Hideyoshi tore off the robe and flung aside the crown.

Whatever may be the real facts, in 1597 the Korean campaign was resumed and the Japanese Army in the

peninsula raised to 141,000 men. Hideyoshi in the interval had built a powerful navy. The Japanese joined battle with and destroyed the Korean fleet.

While the second of his Korean campaigns was in progress, Hideyoshi renewed his persecution of the Roman Catholics. In 1597 a richly laden Spanish galleon, the *San Felipe*, which had left Manila, the capital of the Philippines, for Acapulco in Mexico, ran aground on the Japanese coast in the Tosa province. The local officials urged Hideyoshi to confiscate the ship and its cargo. Apparently to stimulate his appetite, they at the same time pointed out that the Franciscans were flagrantly disobeying his edict of 1587. Hideyoshi had the Franciscans arrested and sent officers to seize both ship and cargo. In the hope of saving the *San Felipe* and its contents, the Spanish pilot produced a map of the world and indicated on it the vast extent of his sovereign the King of Spain's Empire. He wished to persuade Hideyoshi's agents that it would be well for him and for them not to quarrel with so mighty a monarch. The Japanese appear to have been too astute for the pilot. They innocently asked how it was that so small a country as Spain had acquired dominions so huge in extent, 'Our kings,' incautiously replied the simple seaman, 'begin by sending into the countries which they wish to conquer a number of missionaries who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest.'

The pilot's answer was reported to Hideyoshi. It confirmed his worst suspicions. He arrested the Franciscans and treated them as Anglicans, Lutherans or Calvinists

were being treated by the Spaniards. Twenty-six Christians were killed; one hundred and thirty-seven churches in Kiushiu were destroyed, and the Jesuits either were, or were ordered to be, expelled.

Meanwhile, driving before it the Chino-Corean Army, the Japanese Army was again advancing on Seoul. Early in 1598 the enemy, who had been reinforced by 40,000 troops, turned at bay. On October 30, thanks to the valour of the Satsuma samurai, the Japanese won a great victory. It was not, however, to be the prelude to the reduction or dismemberment of the Chinese Empire. The mainspring of the enterprise had snapped. On September 18, 1598, the year of the death of Philip II, Hideyoshi had died at the age of 62. On his death-bed he is said to have composed verses which may be compared with those attributed to the Roman Emperor Hadrian during his last moments :

Ah! as the dew I fall,  
As the dew I vanish.  
Even Osaka fortress  
Is a dream within a dream.

Hideyoshi's death brought the war to an end. An armistice was promptly concluded in Corea and the Mikado's forces were soon afterwards withdrawn.

The premature disappearance of Hideyoshi was an event as far-reaching in importance as the premature disappearances of Alexander the Great and Trajan. Had he lived a few more years he might have conquered Corea and China, and under him or his son the Philippines and Macao might have been snatched from the grasp of the Spaniards, the Spice Islands from the Dutch. The vast sparsely populated continents of Australia and America were also Japan's for the taking. Later the Japanese

might have interfered decisively in the struggle for the control of India between the Dutch, Portuguese, French, and British. Such projects, which may from time to time have been contemplated by the subsequent rulers of Japan, were to be resolutely set aside. Under Iyeyasu, the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns, and his successors, the Japanese again became self-centred.

*From the death of Hideyoshi to the closing of Japan to Europeans ; creation of the Tokugawa Shogunate ; relations of Japan with England and Holland.*

THE fortunes of families and larger groups of human beings constantly turn on the character of a single individual. His or her death or disappearance changes, or seems to change, the direction of currents of will-force. With the death of Philip II the Spanish Empire began to decline ; with the death of Hideyoshi the Japanese Kingdom for nearly three centuries ceased to expand. Spain was, however, like a youth who has outgrown his strength, and whose constitution has been sapped by excesses. When Hideyoshi died, this does not seem to have been the case with Japan. The civil wars and the Corean War had unquestionably drained her resources ; but, as the events about to be described will show, the nation was full of vitality, and it is possible that, if Tokugawa Iyeyasu had been another Hideyoshi, Japan in the seventeenth century would have played a part in the history of the world similar to that which under the Mikado Mutsuhito she was destined to play in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

On the death of Hideyoshi, his son and heir Hideyori, born in 1593, was only five years old. Of his father's generals who had distinguished themselves in the Corean campaigns, Kato Kiyomasa was anxious that the war should

be continued, and that the blood and treasure expended in Corea should bear other fruits than, as it happened, the transference to Japan of Corean porcelain-workers and potters and the introduction among the Japanese publishers of movable printing type. Unfortunately or fortunately for Japan, Kato could not dictate her policy. His income was but one-tenth of Tokugawa Iyeyasu's, with whom the decision mainly rested. To Iyeyasu, who had taken no active part in the Chino-Japanese War, Hideyoshi had chiefly confided the care of his son. But Iyeyasu, now in his fifty-sixth year—an age when most men are disinclined to embark on adventures—was as yet far from being a dictator. The mother of Hideyori was a niece of Nobunaga and unfriendly disposed towards the Yedo feudatory. In 1585 Hideyoshi had created a Board of Five Administrators and it was in existence when he died. Just before his death he had established two other boards. One was composed of the Elder Statesmen, Iyeyasu, Ukita Hideiye, who, it will be remembered, had been commander-in-chief in Corea, Maeda Toshiye, and two other nobles. The other, on which sat three nobles of lesser note, was in matters of dispute to arbitrate between the Five Administrators and the Elder Statesmen.

The thirteen nobles on these three boards had been made by Hideyoshi to subscribe a written oath of eight articles. Among the articles was one that 'They would serve Hideyori with the same single-minded loyalty they had shown to his father', another that 'in settling matters the opinion of the majority was usually to be followed'. It was further ordered that Iyeyasu should act as Regent until Hideyori reached the age of fifteen, but, which is a sign that Hideyoshi did not completely trust him, he

was not to be guardian of the boy. That important post was assigned to Maeda Toshiiye, the governor of Osaka Castle, then the strongest fortress in Japan.

‘If’, ran the second article of the written oath, ‘the Board of Five Administrators were unable to determine a course of action, they were to consult Hideyori through Iyeyasu and Toshiiye; or, if necessary before taking action, the Mikado was to be consulted.’

From this, the only reference to the titular sovereign of Japan, and also from the tenor of the whole document, it will be seen that Hideyoshi must have acquired a position analogous at first sight to that of Pepin, the father of Charlemagne. But the Merovingian monarchy which Pepin ultimately destroyed was one of then recent creation, and Childeric III was not revered by his Frankish subjects as a god. Despite his immense services to the Japanese people, Hideyoshi’s lowly origin had not been forgotten or forgiven by the nobles. Nor were they likely to overlook what he owed to one of their own class, Nobunaga. He had not brought China to her knees, and when he died there was little to show for the sacrifices in men and money incurred through the Korean campaigns. For all these reasons Hideyoshi can scarcely have hoped that his wishes would be respected after his death.

As it happened, the nobles immediately began to quarrel among themselves. Kato Kiyomasa, as we have seen, was opposed to the evacuation of Corea. Another of the generals who had gained successes in the war, the celebrated Konishi Yukinaga—an adherent to the party headed by Hideyoshi’s widow—no longer dreamed of entering Peking, and insisted that it had been Hideyoshi’s wish that the Japanese Army should evacuate the peninsula. Two of the Five Adminis-



trators, Ishida Katzushige and Asano Nagamasa, who had been sent to Kiushiu to superintend the evacuation, came to loggerheads. It was soon perceived that the aim of Ishida was to create enmity between Tokugawa Iyeyasu and the governor of Osaka Castle, Hideyori's guardian. Though the dead dictator had expressly forbidden intermarriages between the families of the great nobles, Iyeyasu himself proceeded to disregard his injunctions. Against Iyeyasu's conduct the Boards of Elder Statesmen and Administrators protested in writing. The next year (1599) Hideyori's guardian died, and Ishida became the leader of the party bent on ruining Iyeyasu.

The nobles, who nominally owed allegiance to the Mikado, but really ruled the islands, were then 214 in number. The wealthiest, indeed, was Iyeyasu, but the total of the incomes of two alone of the partisans of Ishida exceeded his. Ishida could rely on the support of the late commander-in-chief in Corea, of his two able lieutenants, Konishi Yukinaga and Kohayakawa, and of the Lord of Satsuma. Confident in the strength of his adherents and in the prestige which attached to the name of Hideyoshi, Ishida determined by force to overthrow his rival. His plan was to attack the Kwanto from the north and east and simultaneously to seize Kyoto and Osaka.

In the summer of 1600 civil war broke out. The struggle was decided at the battle of Sekigahara (October 21, 1600), in which the forces engaged are said to have exceeded 100,000—more than twice the size of the total forces engaged at the battle of Marston Moor. Ishida's army was completely defeated; he himself was captured and beheaded. Ukita Hideiye lost his estates and was banished. Though the battle of Sekigahara did not ruin the cause of Hideyoshi's

son, it undermined Hideyori's position. Iyeyasu redistributed the fiefs of the defeated lords in such a way as to tighten his grip on Japan. In 1603 the Mikado created him Shogun.

The attitude of Iyeyasu towards the Roman Catholics and Europeans was at first tolerant. Some weeks after the death of Hideyoshi he had had an interview with a Franciscan monk. 'I wish you well', he had said; 'as for the Christians who every year pass within sight of the Kwanto going to Mexico with their ships, I have a keen desire for them to put in at the harbours, to trade with my vassals, and to teach the latter how to develop silver mines.' The Franciscan was permitted to build a church at Yedo, and Iyeyasu sent three embassies to the Philippines. He offered to open ports to the Spaniards in the Kwanto, and he asked for the loan of naval architects. The request for shipbuilders, capable of constructing for the Japanese a navy which might be used against the Spaniards, was ignored. Instead, a number of friars were dispatched to Japan.

It was about this date that Iyeyasu sent a confidential agent to Europe, who, the better to accomplish his purpose, pretended to be a Christian. He was to report on the condition of Europe, and especially on the religious questions then exercising the minds of Europeans.

The Dutch and the English now came on the scene. Since 1568 the former had been successfully struggling with the Spaniards. By 1600 the inhabitants of the United Provinces were independent. Their merchants, like those of the newly incorporated English East India Company, were out not to proselytize but to trade. In 1602 the Dutch East India Company was formed. Two years before its incorporation, in the spring of 1600, a Dutch ship, the *Liefde*, with its crew of 110 reduced to 24, reached Japan,

where the survivors were charitably denounced as pirates by the Jesuits. On board the *Liefde* was an Englishman, one Will Adams, of Gillingham, in Kent, the pilot-major. We may surmise that echoes of the exploits of Drake, Frobisher, and Hawkins had reached the ears of Iyeyasu. He summoned Adams to Osaka. If the Spaniards refused to lend him shipbuilders, he must look elsewhere, and Adams might serve his purpose. Through Adams he could check the information brought him by his Japanese agent from Europe, if and when the latter returned. Adams, by his bluff, open manners, won Iyeyasu's heart. He was appointed master-shipbuilder. After a residence in Japan of nearly a quarter of a century he died, and his tomb is still to be seen near Yokosuka. While Bacon was dreaming of a New Atlantis, Adams had alighted on one in the Pacific Ocean. The views held by Adams of the Japanese were substantially the same as those of Francis Xavier, already quoted. 'The people of this island of Japan', wrote Adams, on October 22, 1611, 'are good of nature, courteous above measure and valiant in war; their justice is severely executed without any partiality upon transgressors of the law.' In the opinion of Adams there was 'not a land better governed in the world'.

Meantime Iyeyasu's envoy had returned from Europe and presented a report which shocked the tolerant Japanese statesman. His story was that the most repulsive fanaticism reigned in Europe—a story confirmed by Adams, by the Dutch who touched at the Japanese ports, and by Iyeyasu's own observations. Under his own eyes the Shogun could see the effects of so-called Christian teaching. The Franciscans and Dominicans quarrelled with the Jesuits; the Portuguese Jesuits intrigued for the expulsion of the

Spaniards ; the Spaniards for the expulsion of the Dutch. The Spaniards even threatened to send men-of-war to destroy Dutch ships in Japanese ports. Nor did Christian teaching seem to improve the morality of the Japanese. A native Christian official was detected perpetrating fraud and forgery on behalf of a native Christian noble.

Iyeyasu reverted to the later policy of Hideyoshi. He dismissed all Christians—or rather Roman Catholics—in his employ, banished them from Yedo, and forbade the feudal chiefs to harbour them. A Spanish envoy from Mexico obtained permission to survey the Japanese coasts. One, Sebastian, and a Franciscan friar, Sotelo, were employed on the survey. Astonished at their methods, Iyeyasu consulted Adams. The Englishman observed that in Europe the conduct of the Spaniards would be regarded as an act of hostility, especially if the surveyors were Spaniards or Portuguese, for the Spaniards and Portuguese were notoriously aggressive. ‘If the sovereigns of Europe’, remarked Iyeyasu, ‘do not tolerate Spanish and Portuguese priests, I do those priests no wrong if I, too, refuse to tolerate them.’

Nevertheless, Iyeyasu hesitated long before resorting to extreme measures. He favoured the Dutch ex-subjects of the King of Spain, who in 1605 were formally licensed to trade with Japan, and who in 1611 established a factory on the island of Hirado. Japanese became acquainted with England: In the Court Minutes of the East India Company for 1607 we find this entry under January 30: ‘The Japan boy brought home last voyage by Sir Henry Middleton is to be taken by David Middleton as his boy this voyage, and decently apparelled at the Company’s charge before his departure’. But kindness towards Dutch and English did not preclude kindness towards Spaniards. When, in

1609, Don Rodrigo Vivero, the retiring Governor of the Philippines, was driven by a storm to Japan on his way to Mexico, he was treated hospitably, and a sort of commercial treaty was concluded with him. In 1610 a Japanese ship reached Mexico.

On June 11, 1613, the *Clove*, dispatched by the English East India Company, reached Japan. The captain, one Saris, was urged by Will Adams to make Uruga, near Yedo, the centre for English trade with the Japanese. That Iyeyasu favoured the idea is proved by a clause in the charter which he granted to the English. 'Ground in Yedo', it said, 'in the place which they may desire, shall be given to the English and they may erect houses and reside and trade there.' Another clause permitted the English ships to visit any port in Japan. The captain of the *Clove*, an ignorant man, who perhaps regarded Adams as a renegade, preferred to make the island of Hirado the emporium for English goods. As Hirado was off the coast of Kiushiu and the nobles in Kiushiu were enemies of Iyeyasu, it was a bad blunder.

The year after the visit of the *Clove* the Lord of the Kwanto decided to remove the son of Hideyoshi from his path. The adherents of Hideyori had kept aloof from Iyeyasu. In 1611 the latter had remarked to a friend: 'I see that Hideyori is grown up to be a son worthy of his father. By and by it will be difficult for such a man to be subservient to another'. In 1614 Iyeyasu, with a large army, advanced on Osaka Castle, behind the entrenchments of which Hideyori and his mother had concentrated their forces. A number of violent assaults by Iyeyasu's troops were repulsed. The cunning old man then resorted to an artifice. He proposed terms of peace favourable to Hideyori.

One condition he insisted upon. A portion of the castle's defences must be destroyed. Hideyori and his mother weakly consented, and the first and second of the three moats were filled in. On May 3, 1615, Iyeyasu resumed hostilities. The castle was soon reduced, and on June 4 Hideyori killed himself. His illegitimate son was executed, and the temple erected to Hideyoshi levelled to the ground.

It was in the September of the same year that Iyeyasu promulgated the 'Laws of the Military Houses', which were designed to secure the supremacy of the Tokugawa family over the Japanese nobles, and also the 'Rules of the Imperial Court and the Court Nobles', which were intended to prevent in the future any ambitious Mikado from treading in the footsteps of Go-Toba and Go-Daigo. The policy of Yoritomo, the Hojo, Nobunaga, and Hideyoshi culminated in these remarkable enactments, which checked the expansion of Japan, but gave the Japanese a period of peaceful happiness such as has seldom, if ever, been enjoyed by any considerable section of the human race.

By the first of the 'Laws of the Military Houses' the nobles were enjoined systematically to pursue the study and practice of 'literature, arms, archery, and horsemanship'. By literature was chiefly meant the Chinese classics, which, as is well known, make for pacificism. 'Literature first', said the law, 'and arms next was the rule of the ancients. They must both be cultivated concurrently. Archery and horsemanship are the most essential for the Military Houses. . . . Dare we omit to practice our warlike exercise and drill?'

Under Nobunaga and Hideyoshi the superiority of fire-arms over bows and arrows had been demonstrated, while

cavalry could effect nothing against fortresses like that of Osaka. This law, though it did not destroy, virtually disarmed the feudal barons. They soon discovered that they were expected to prefer literature to the art of war. For example, Kato Kiyomasa, the celebrated general, was obliged to study the Chinese moralists.

Another provision in the code was that the greater and lesser barons (daimyo and shomyo) were not to receive or enrol among their vassals any samurai who had been guilty of bloodshed. Nor were they permitted to alter or enlarge their castles. Without the leave of the government at Yedo they might not even repair their fortifications or dredge their moats, and they might not 'lead about a large force of soldiery'. The retinue of the richest baron was limited to twenty horsemen.

Further, intermarriages between the families of the nobles had to be sanctioned by the Yedo Council, and all unofficial associations of individuals were as jealously regarded by Iyeyasu and his successors as by the Roman emperors. Finally, it was ordered that the distinction between lord and vassal, and between superior and inferior, was to be clearly marked by their apparel, and the use of the palanquin was limited to a small class of persons, the daimyo, their kinsfolk, doctors, astrologers, persons over sixty years of age, abbots and other ecclesiastics, invalids, and court nobles.

At the accession of each Shogun this body of laws was read out to the daimyo at the Tokugawa Palace in Yedo, the prostrate nobles listening with bowed heads.

The Pharaohs, Diocletian, the Byzantine emperors, and Louis XIV never framed more effective measures for securing their power than Iyeyasu's. It was, however, to his

credit, and to the credit of later Tokugawa Shoguns, that they did not emasculate the nobles of Japan. While the 'Laws of the Military Houses' remained in force, it was impossible for another Nobunaga or Hideyoshi to arise, but, as the history of Japan in the nineteenth century proved, the mould in which Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu himself had been cast was not destroyed.

The 'Rules of the Imperial Court and the Court Nobles' complemented the 'Laws of the Military Houses'. The Mikado was bidden to study literature. 'Not to study', he was admonished, 'is to be ignorant of the doctrines of the ancient sages, and an ignorant ruler has never governed a nation peacefully.' An erudite Mikado was not, however, a desideratum, and the titular sovereign under the Tokugawa Shogunate was usually little more than Poet Laureate of Japan.

It will be noticed that the monarch was not told to study the art of war or to learn the use of weapons. When Go-Komyo, the Mikado between 1643 and 1654, took fencing lessons, his shoshidai—the person appointed by the Yedo government to guard his palace and supervise the court officials—threatened to commit suicide. Go-Komyo, who was meditating a *coup d'état*, observed: 'I have never seen a military man kill himself, and the spectacle will be interesting. You had better have a platform erected in the palace grounds so that your exploit may be witnessed'. But Go-Komyo was the exception, not the rule. He died of small-pox in 1654, having failed even to attempt to restore the royal power. Since the Yedo camarilla appointed or could veto the appointment of all State ministers, since it also prevented princes of the royal family from holding administrative offices and subjects from



directly approaching the throne, a national crisis of the first order was needed to overthrow the system founded by Iyeyasu and restore the Mikado to the position which he had held in the Nara epoch.

Such was the strange but effective machinery of government designed by Iyeyasu. He did not long survive his victim, Hideyori. He died the next year (June 1, 1616), at the age of seventy-five years. In 1612, and again in 1613, public warnings had been addressed by him to the Roman Catholics. As these warnings had been ignored, on January 27, 1614, he had issued an edict ordering that all Christian churches should be demolished, converts compelled to abjure their faith, and the foreign priests (122 Jesuits, 14 Franciscans, 9 Dominicans, 4 Augustinians, and 7 secular priests) collected at Nagasaki for deportation. This edict was probably the result of Iyeyasu's learning that the Christians were siding with Hideyori. At the sieges of Osaka Castle in 1614 and 1615 many Christians fought for Hideyori under banners emblazoned with a cross and images of Christ and of St. James, the patron saint of the sanguinary Spanish Empire. The danger of a Spinola arriving from Spain to assist Hideyori with Spanish infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was a contingency which Iyeyasu had to take into account.

Hidetada, the third son of Iyeyasu, who had been born in 1579 and been appointed Shogun in 1605—his father, however, remaining the real director of that office—succeeded Iyeyasu. The new ruler's position resembled that of the younger Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, who never enjoyed the same consideration as his father, the great Burleigh. Hidetada was, however, an intelligent man, as may be gathered from his answer to the astrologers who regarded

or affected to regard a comet as a portent of evil for Japan. 'What can we tell', he said, 'about the situation of a solitary star in the wide universe, and how can we know that it has anything to do with this little world?' He erected, in imitation of Hideyoshi's castle at Osaka, a gigantic fortress at Yedo, the granite gates of which are 'wellnigh the most stupendous works ever undertaken, not excepting even the Pyramids of Egypt'. The blocks of stone had been brought by sea from quarries hundreds of miles distant. Of the three moats the outermost one was  $9\frac{1}{2}$ , the innermost  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles long.

In 1620, another step was taken further to fetter the Mikado. Hidetada's daughter, Kazuko, was appointed first lady-in-waiting to Go-Mizu-No-O, the 108th Mikado, to whom she was married the same year. She gave birth to two princes and five princesses. On Go-Mizu-No-O's abdication in 1629, her eldest daughter, Hidetada's granddaughter, was created Empress of Japan. For 800 years no woman had sat on the throne, though several women had wielded great influence. Go-Komyo—the recalcitrant Mikado already mentioned—who succeeded her in 1643, was her half-brother.

In 1622, Hidetada, imitating Iyeyasu, resigned the Shogunate, but continued till his death in 1632 to direct affairs from his fortress at Yedo. He was replaced as Shogun by his son Iyemitsu, born in 1603, who held the post till his death in 1651.

Iyemitsu completed the political system created by Iyeyasu and Hidetada. In 1626 he enacted that the nobles should spend a certain time at Yedo, and during their absence from the capital leave in it their wives and families as hostages. This incidentally led to the growth of Yedo,

and the subordination of Kyoto. The former became the Petrograd, the latter the Moscow of the kingdom. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Yedo was one of the most populous cities in the world.

The other important laws of Iyemitsu were, to a great extent, new departures. He required every daimyo to adhere to a definite sect of Buddhism. The custodians of the Buddhist and Shinto temples were ordered to keep an accurate register of their parishioners. These Laud-like enactments were part of Iyemitsu's plan for eradicating Christianity from Japan. Unless the whole Japanese nation was to be converted to Christianity, the existence of that religion in the islands was incompatible with the existence of the Japanese government. The Christians mocked at the divine descent of the Mikado; they worshipped, or some of them worshipped, saints not ancestors; they regarded Buddha as a false prophet, and suicide and other Japanese customs as crimes, while the Roman Catholics among them professed allegiance to the Pope.

On November 30, 1615, Paul V had received in audience the Franciscan, Sotelo, already referred to, and also a Japanese Christian, Hasekura, sent on an embassy to his Holiness by Date Masamune, lord of the Honshiu Highlands. Date had assisted Iyeyasu in his struggle with the feudal barons in the campaign of 1600, which had resulted in Iyeyasu's great victory at Sekigahara. That Date and the suspected Sotelo should open negotiations with the Pope must have appeared to Iyeyasu and Hidetada a very suspicious circumstance.

The English and Dutch traders naturally fanned the flame against the Roman Catholics. Cocks, the head of the English traders to Japan, records that he warned the

Japanese in 1616—soon after Iyeyasu's death—that two Spanish men-of-war from Mexico which had reached Kiushiu had been sent with the express intention of fostering a rising. As the island of Kiushiu, though conquered by Hideyoshi, had never been conquered by the Tokugawas, there was nothing improbable in Cocks's assertion. Hidetada had at once issued an edict, in comparison with which those of Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu were moderate. All Christian priests were banished, and Japanese who assisted them in any way were threatened with the stake and other penalties. This decree had indeed not been rigorously enforced, but many Christians, including the Vice-Provincial of the Dominicans, Navarette, who declared that he owed allegiance to the Emperor of Heaven and not to the Emperor of Japan, were put to death.

From 1616 to the closing of Japan to foreigners the persecution of the Christians continued. The latter gave—if persecution can ever be justified—justification to their persecutors. In a Portuguese ship, captured by the Dutch about this date, was found a letter instigating Japanese converts to revolt, and promising them armed assistance from Europe. Hidetada was not to be blamed if he took seriously the warning addressed to him in 1620 by the admiral of an Anglo-Batavian squadron that the King of Spain had sinister designs on Japan. Another Japanese had been dispatched in 1615 to Europe. He returned in 1622 with a report as unfavourable as that brought back by Iyeyasu's envoy. The Thirty Years' War (1618-48), one of the most hideous of quasi-religious wars, had begun, and we may be sure that the Dutch and English exaggerated the influence of the Jesuits in promoting it.

Two years after the return of his envoy from Europe—

in 1624—Hidetada refused to receive a Spanish embassy from the Philippines, and ordered all Spaniards to be expelled. At the same time it was decreed that no Japanese ex-Christian should visit the Philippines, and that no Christian Japanese should go to sea. But Hidetada and his son Iyemitsu put aside the suggestions of foreigners that the Philippines themselves should be wrested by the Japanese from the Spaniards. 'My opinion', Cocks had said to a Japanese sailor of rank, 'was that he might do better to put it into the Emperor's mind to make a conquest of the Manillas, and drive those small crew of Spaniards from thence.'

The suspicious conduct of the Spaniards and Portuguese did not tend to enhance the reputation of Europeans generally in Japan. The Dutch were busy creating a colonial empire in the archipelago between China and Australia; the English, who had the reputation of being an aggressive nation, were penetrating into the same region and were beginning to colonize North America. Will Adams had assured Iyeyasu that neither the Dutch nor the English attacked foreigners because they were heathen. But, as the Japanese were well aware, the causes of wars of aggression are not always religious. Gengis Khan, Kublai, Timour, and, more recently, their own Hideyoshi had been impelled by personal ambition or racial antipathies to invade the territories of their neighbours. Religion, personal ambition, racial antipathy were often mere cloaks for greed. The Europeans, it had been discovered, invented lethal weapons and designed ships more powerful than those of Asiatics. The wealth of Japan had been grossly exaggerated, and there was a distinct danger that, if Europeans obtained a firm footing in Japan, they might, with the aid of the feudal chieftains smarting under Iyeyasu's restrictions,

endeavour to reduce Japan to a vassal State. Iyeyasu had died in 1616; Will Adams died about 1620. Under Hidetada and Iyemitsu the obstacles placed in the way of Dutch and English traders became every year more serious. European merchants were confined to the island of Hirado and to Nagasaki in Kiushiu. The merchant princes of Osaka became their rivals for the trade of Cochin-China, Siam, Tonkin, and Cambodia. In 1620 Cocks wrote that he was 'altogether aweary of Japan'. Two years later the English East India Company closed down its factory in Hirado.

To abandon the trade of Japan to the hated Dutch, who in 1623 massacred our traders at Amboyna in the Spice Islands, appears from the records of the East India Company to have provoked energetic protests from the pioneers of English commerce in the Far East. Historians—usually conscious or unconscious agents of politicians, soldiers, or priests—are apt to overlook the services of the shrewd and hard-working men of business who have played so large a part in the creation of the British Empire. While Charles I was quarrelling with Eliot and Coke, while the expeditions to Cadiz and La Rochelle were being mismanaged by the Duke of Buckingham, and while Laud was scheming to become the Richelieu of England, the merchants of the East India Company and their agents at Batavia in Java were preparing plans for commercial campaigns in China and Japan. Had those plans been backed by the home government, Japan might never have been closed to Europeans, and, as a consequence, the history of the Middle and Far East would have read very differently to-day. To the brave and intelligent men who, separated by thousands of miles from London, acted as eyes and ears for the East India Company, a number of questions were

addressed, which showed that, while the Company possessed considerable knowledge of Japan, it was very imperfectly informed as to the condition of China. The agents, for instance, were asked whether the Emperor of China resided near the sea or within the land, and whether his residences were in houses or tents.

No such questions were addressed with regard to Japan and the Japanese. Information was required as to what was the wearing apparel of the Japanese, whence it was derived, whether there was at any time a dearth of clothing, whether English cloth was esteemed in Japan, and what were the exports from and the imports into the islands. Particulars of the coinage, plate, jewels, table utensils, and the novelties likely to attract the Japanese were to be furnished. The last question may be quoted verbatim. 'Whether', it ran, 'some of our King's captains would not be accepted if sent from our King to instruct the emperor's people in our European discipline of war, for horse and foot?'

The replies, dated June 23, 1627, to these questions and the accompanying memorandum of July 18, 1627, signed by Henry Hawley, Richard Bix, George Muschamp, and Richard Steele, are well worth perusal. To the last of the questions the answer was that nothing would be more acceptable to the Japanese Emperor than to be 'accommodated with martial men to instruct his people in the manner of our European discipline. The Japanese', it was added, 'are a people taking pleasure in nothing but magnificence in every of their courses, amongst which their chivalry is their chief and more than all the rest.' In the memorandum the point was enlarged upon. 'The Japanese', Hawley and his colleagues wrote, 'are a warlike people, and though

expert in their own arms and discipline, yet new and rare stratagems of war is their chief delight.' They urged that one or two experienced leaders should be sent from England to Japan 'to show our manner of chivalry', and one or two practical engineers 'for device of fortifications and for facility of assaults'. To the possible objection that the Japanese would not permit the instructors to return, it was answered that 'no nation under the sun observeth more humanity than doth the people of Japan. Their word', continued the authors of the memorandum, 'is a law, their country is open, they will not have it a prison but all come and go at pleasure.'<sup>1</sup>

On the advantage of England trading with Japan and China, the writers waxed eloquent. 'This trade of Japan', they said, 'is the *summum bonum* of East India', and the trade of China 'the world's treasure'. A monopoly of commercial intercourse with the Japanese was to be had by the English for the asking. 'Since the busy practices of the Jesuits', the Portuguese had all been banished. As for the Dutch, the Japanese, while considering that the English had 'a King and a country of their own', imagined that the Dutch lived upon 'spoil', and 'roamed to and again with their wives and children'—a mode of life which the Japanese 'infinitely disliked'. The English with their cloth could easily supplant the Chinese with their silk.<sup>2</sup> Silk was the material of which the clothes of the Japanese

<sup>1</sup> This does not correspond, however, with the story that Will Adams was not for a time permitted by Iyeyasu to leave Japan.

<sup>2</sup> This and some other assertions in the document were serious exaggerations. The authors of the memorandum were living in Java, and though they state that they had spoken with many Japanese on the question of the renewal of trade with England, it is likely that they often misunderstood what they were told.



were made, and this silk came from China. If, they pursued, the imports of silk from China ceased, 'silk in China in one year would be as dust or dung, and Japan would be beggared for want of clothing'.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese were 'chiefly furnished by their professed enemies, the Chinese, with all necessaries whatsoever'.

For the promotion of English commercial intercourse with Japan it was necessary, said Hawley and the other authors of the memorandum, not only that English tacticians and military engineers should be sent to Japan, but that the quality of the cloth exported to Japan should be clearly indicated, and be suitably dyed. 'The Chinans', they observed, 'wear all light colours, so the Japans will be their opposites and wear all sad, and so in all other things they will be contrary what they can and may.' The Japanese were 'generally sober and very majestic, affecting only sad colours'. Above all, if the project was to be successfully carried out, Charles I would have to lend his assistance. 'It is His Majesty That must be your Gracious Sovereign', it was urged, 'if ever you obtain the large trade of Japan, for it is the mediation of Kings that must prevail with Kings in these parts, and unexpected courtesies from a King is more than millions of treasure from commons.' The letter which Charles ought to write to the Japanese monarch should 'import a voluntary inclination in our said Sovereign as if, from a report of Japan's greatness and good affection to his subjects, His Majesty had sent his merchants with commodities fit for that climate and desires amity and continuing intercourse'. Such a letter would 'doubtless be accepted as if God Himself had sent a blessing upon that nation'. The word of the Japanese Emperor—by

<sup>1</sup> Cocks held very different views on this subject.

whom is probably meant the Shogun—‘ may make a will far more available at one instant in the great City of Yedo, than forty years managing with care and industry at the sea side’. The king’s letter should be accompanied with presents to the Japanese monarch. These presents, it was suggested, should not consist of jewels of gold or silver plate, but of fowling-pieces, snaphaunces, a suit of armour for the emperor and his horse, Venetian mirrors, clocks, and the like. ‘ It is strange’, the writers elsewhere observe, ‘ to see the earnest emulation of these princes to procure rarities that others have not.’

The above is an outline of the plan submitted by Henry Hawley, Richard Bix, George Muschamp, and Richard Steele to the Honourable Company of Merchants of London trading to East India. They ended their memorandum with an assurance that, if Charles I entertained their proposals, then ‘ will undoubtedly ensue that inestimable treasure by the trade of Japan that all the world may dread the state of Great Britain, for it is not alone the purchase of China but all India will be at the beck of England’.

Had Elizabeth or Cromwell at this moment been ruling England, the ideas of the English traders in Java might have borne fruit. As it was, nothing came of the proposals. When in 1673 the East India Company tried to resume relations with Japan, the answer came that as the King of England (Charles II) was married to a Portuguese princess, British subjects could not be permitted to visit Japan.

The Spanish had been excluded in 1624, the English in the reign of Charles I had decided to discontinue trade with Japan. Though the Portuguese at home did not shake

off their Spanish masters until 1640, for some reason or other they were still permitted to do business with the Japanese. The conditions under which they did so were humiliating. They had to sell their goods at a fixed price to a ring of Osaka merchants; if a priest were found on a galleon, he and the whole crew were liable to be executed.

In 1636 the Shogun Iyemitsu and his councillors took a decisive step. After centuries of internecine warfare a form of government had been evolved under which it might reasonably be expected that the Japanese people would be able to lead a peaceful, orderly, and prosperous life. The persons interested in the maintenance of the Tokugawa Shogunate might well argue that Japan could learn little that was useful and might learn much that was harmful from foreign nations. China and Corea were decadent; there was nothing to be envied in the Middle or Near East. The European colonies were, with rare exceptions, badly mismanaged. The peoples of Southern Europe were miserably governed; the centre of Europe was in the throes of the Thirty Years' War; and the British Isles were given over to stupid reactionaries. Where in the rest of the world could be found a wiser system of government than the Japanese? Unless foreigners, or the ideas of foreigners, disturbed the political and social equilibrium, the régime instituted by Iyeyasu and perfected by Hidetada and Iyemitsu might, so far as human foresight could tell, last for ever. The natural desire of vested interests to protect themselves added weight to such reasonings.

Accordingly Iyemitsu issued a decree making it a capital crime for a Japanese to leave, or attempt to leave, the Japanese islands. If a Japanese succeeded in escaping from them, he was, should he return to his native land, to be

executed. The kith and kin of Spaniards resident in Japan were to be expelled. No ships of ocean-going dimensions were ever again to be built in Japan.

This decree, which placed the whole Japanese people in an ethical quarantine, was justified the next year (1637) by the 'Christian Revolt of Shimabara'. The theatre of the struggle was the westerly shores of Kiushiu. The rising commenced in the island of Amakusa, at the mouth of the Bay of Nagasaki. From Amakusa the insurgents crossed to the mainland and in 1638 occupied the ruined castle of Hara on the promontory of Shimabara. There they were besieged by the Shogun's forces, and, the Japanese artillery not being sufficiently powerful, the factor of the Dutch on Hirado was requested to lend a hand in the destruction of the native supporters of their rivals, the Portuguese. He complied, and the *De Ryp* fired at the castle 426 shots from her twenty guns. On April 12, 1638, Hara was stormed, and most of the rebels killed.

The Portuguese were promptly accused of having instigated the revolt, and an edict was issued that all Portuguese ships coming to Japan should be burned and every one on board put to death. In defiance of the edict, a Portuguese ship from Macao arrived at Nagasaki in 1640. With the exception of thirteen persons, the whole crew were executed. The survivors returned to Macao carrying a written message: 'So long as the sun warms the earth, any Christian bold enough to come to Japan, even if he be King Philip himself or the God of the Christians, shall pay for it with his head.' It was in 1640 that the Portuguese under the House of Braganza revolted, and Portugal recovered her independence. But that fact did not cause the Japanese government to change its attitude

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towards the Portuguese; in 1647 another attempt by the Portuguese to re-open trade failed.

Of Europeans, the Dutch, expelled from Hirado in 1641 and confined on the island of Deshima off Nagasaki, 200 yards long by 80 yards wide, were alone permitted to meet and to do business with the Japanese. Seven to ten Dutch vessels annually entered the port of Nagasaki, carrying chiefly silk and piece-goods, which were exchanged mostly for gold and copper. In 1790, the Japanese government, which had charged five per cent. customs dues and 495 pounds of silver as a yearly rent for the island, reduced the number of Dutch ships to one a year, and forbade the Dutch to export from Japan each year more than 350 tons of copper.

*From the Closing to the Opening of Japan*

THUS Japan, a year before the death of Galileo and the birth of Newton, cut herself off from the rest of the human race. The French under Louis XIV's minister, Colbert, the English in the reign of Charles II, and the Russians in the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century vainly endeavoured to open commercial relations with the Empire of the Rising Sun. It was left to the United States to break down the wall, through the Dutch loophole by which the Japanese statesmen kept a more or less vigilant eye on the external world. In 1853 Commodore Perry, by means of threats and presents, opened Japan to American trade. During the two centuries which witnessed the unification of the British Kingdom, the conversion of the governments in it into a constitutional semi-democratic monarchy, the gigantic development of the British Empire, and the colonization of North America by the English, Dutch, and French, the Japanese lived apart from the rest of mankind. The creation of the United States, the decadence of the Spanish and Turkish Empires, the emancipation of the Spanish colonies of Mexico, Central and South America, the rise and fall of Louis XIV's Empire, the French Revolution and the meteoric career of Napoleon, the extinction of Poland, the Europeanizing of Russia and the growth of Prussia were almost unheeded by the Japanese. Nevertheless, the vast changes mainly effected

by the evolution of Occidental science from Galileo to Darwin did not pass entirely unnoticed by the Tokugawa Shoguns and their advisers.<sup>1</sup>

Under the Shogun Iyenobu (1709-12), Arai Hakuseki, the most eminent of the Japanese students of Confucianism, composed the *Sairan Igen*, the first work published in Japan dealing with the conditions of life in Occidental states. The enlightened Shogun Yoshimune, who ruled from 1716 to 1745—that is, between the death of Louis XIV and the early years of the reign of Frederick the Great—removed the veto on the importation of Occidental books, other than Christian works, and a telescope was erected at Kanda through which Yoshimune himself surveyed the heavens.

The study of Dutch, too, was taken up, and a Dutch-Japanese dictionary compiled. A *Universal Geography* and a *History of Russia* were published in Japanese. The metamorphosis of Russia under Peter the Great and his successors, and her territorial expansion eastwards had, doubtless, attracted the curiosity or alarm of Japanese statesmen. By the date when Perry forced American goods on the unwilling subjects of the Shogun and Mikado, the Japanese could read in their own language biographies of Alexander the Great, Aristotle, Peter the Great, and Napoleon, the 'Pretender Mikado of France'.

The two centuries during which the Japanese were preserved by their Shoguns from contact with Occidentals were very far from being a period of mere hibernation. Gibbon and Mommsen have belauded society under

<sup>1</sup> For the details of the careers of the Shoguns who succeeded Iyemitsu, I refer the reader to the work of Captain Brinkley and Baron Kikuchi.

the pagan Caesars, but it may fairly be argued that the Japanese between 1641 and 1853 were immeasurably happier and more civilized than the subjects of the Antonines. It should be remembered that we have no detailed description of the Roman Empire under the Antonines written by contemporary visitors to it, whereas we possess through the works of the German Kaempfer, who was in Japan in 1691 and 1692, and of the Swede Thunberg, who was there in 1775 and 1776, elaborate and critical reports on Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate. The statements of Kaempfer and Thunberg can be tested by comparing them with those of European eye-witnesses, some of whom were in Japan immediately before its closing in 1641, and others immediately after its opening in 1853. Moreover, the Japanese records and literature of the Tokugawa epoch are far more copious than the extant Graeco-Roman records and literature of the era of the Antonines. The general impression produced by an examination of the evidence supports Kaempfer's view that the Japanese under the Tokugawa Shoguns were 'united and peaceable, and taught to give due worship to the Gods, due obedience to the laws, due submission to their superiors, due love and regard to their neighbours', and that they were 'civil, obliging, dutiful, and in art and industry exceeding all other nations.' Kaempfer acutely observes that it will 'appear in ages to come that they are not wanting prudence, resolution, and conduct in war. Not even the long peace, and profound tranquillity,' he continues, 'which the Empire now enjoys, is like to breed in the natives a certain slothfulness and inactivity, which might in time degenerate into effeminacy.' Political philosophers and political economists ought to pay particular attention to the condition of the Japanese under the Tokugawa



gawa Shoguns. Socialism, or something very like Socialism, was then tested on a large scale.

There was, however, a dark side to the picture. During the period in question women were degraded and the liberty of the average individual was restricted within narrow limits. As will have been gathered, the Japanese women of earlier ages played an important part in public life, and Japan from Yoritomo to Iyeyasu had given birth to men and women of striking originality. 'I was one day,' said the late Dr. W. G. Aston, 'walking with the late Count Terashima, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in one of those beautiful creations of the landscape gardener's art which abound in Tokyo. He pointed to a grove of fir trees standing by an artificial lake, which had been trimmed and trained by generations of gardeners into quaint and not unpleasing but stunted shapes. "There," he said, "is an emblem of the Japanese nation under the Tokugawa Shogunate".' Though one may acquiesce in Count Terashima's implied condemnation of Iyeyasu's system, it must be admitted that in comparison with most other societies in which the individual has been subordinated to the State, society in Japan under the Tokugawa Shoguns was most admirably organized.

The order of things established by Iyeyasu and his successors, however, had been already undermined when it was finally attacked from without by Americans and Europeans. During the second half of the seventeenth century, Mitsukani (1628-1700), a grandson of the Shogun Iyeyasu, with the aid of numerous scholars, composed in Chinese a gigantic History of Great Japan (*Dai-Nihon-shi*) in 240 volumes. This compilation, which at once became a standard work,<sup>1</sup> revealed to the Japanese the origins of the existing form

<sup>1</sup> It was not, however, printed till 1851.

of government—how the power of the Mikado had been gradually encroached upon and reduced to insignificance between the days of Yoritomo and Mitsukani's grandfather, the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns.

Like the *Dictionary* of Pierre Bayle in the seventeenth century, the *Dai-Nihon-shi* was the precursor of a revolution in religious ideas. Before the introduction into Japan of Chinese philosophy in the third and of Buddhism in the sixth century A. D., the religion of the Japanese appears to have been Shintoism, the cardinal features of which were the worship of the spirits of ancestors and of the Mikado, who symbolized for the Japanese the spirit of their race.<sup>1</sup> Buddhism had been amalgamated with Shintoism and had ousted Chinese philosophy, but under the early Tokugawa Shoguns the ethical system of the Neo-Confucian Chu Hi (1130-1200), which was as much divorced from the supernatural as Epicureanism, had supplanted that of Buddhist Shintoism. An admirable exposition of Japanized Confucianism will be found in the samurai Ise Teijo's 'ethical bequest' to his descendants written in 1763, a work which should be studied by the side of Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son.<sup>2</sup>

Largely as a consequence of the study of the *Dai-Nihon-shi*, a reaction began against both Confucianism and Buddhism, and, with the reaction, a revival of pure Shintoism and of genuine worship of the Mikados. Kada Azumamaro

<sup>1</sup> The nature of the religion of the Japanese before they were influenced by the Chinese and the Coreans is a matter of dispute.

<sup>2</sup> See *Transactions of the Japan Society*, twenty-fifth Session, 1915-16, pp. 128-56, where a translation of Teijo's 'Ethical Bequest' will be found, with Mr. J. Carey Hall's comments on it. Mr. Hall was for many years British Consul-General at Yokohama.

(1668-1736) focussed the attention of the Japanese on the earliest records of their race—the ‘Record of Ancient Things’ (*Kojiki*), composed about A. D. 700, and the eighth-century collection of poems known as the ‘Myriad Leaves’ (*Manyo-shu*). The language of these documents was to the Japanese of the eighteenth century as archaic as that of *Beowulf* and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* to ourselves. Azumamaro made a linguistic ladder by which his countrymen could mount to them. He averred that in the *Manyo-shu*, and not in Chinese-inspired poetry, the Japanese could discover ‘the ancient principles of the divine age’. His aim was to bring back writers to the faithful representation of realities. ‘The expression of fictitious sentiment’, he said, ‘about the relations of the sexes and miscellaneous subjects is not genuine poetry.’

A younger contemporary of Azumamaro, the scholar-philosopher Kamo Mabuchi (1679-1769), was of a more practical nature. He boldly championed the Japanese ethical system and contrasted it to its advantage with that of China. The Chinese philosophy, he pointed out, had caused parricides, murders, and rebellions. ‘A philosophy which produces such effects’, he continued, ‘must be founded on a false system.’ What was evil in Japan was a consequence of the adoption of Chinese ideas and customs. It was owing to this that the Mikado, ‘while occupying a highly dignified place, had been degraded to the intellectual level of a woman’. The Chinese, being bad at heart, were only good externally, but the Japanese ‘being straightforward, could do without teaching’.

‘It had been alleged’, he observed, ‘that because the (Ancient) Japanese had no names for “benevolence”, “righteousness”, “propriety”, “sagacity”, and “truth”,

they were immoral savages. 'But these things', he said, 'exist in every country, in the same way as the four seasons.'

The reasoning of Mabuchi was developed by Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801). Japan, declared Norinaga, was the country 'which gave birth to the Goddess of the Sun'. Her grandson was the first Mikado, the eternal endurance of whose dynasty was a complete proof that Shintoism was infinitely superior to all other religions. In ancient language the Mikado, he said, was called a god, and that was his real character. Duty consisted in obeying him implicitly. It was the influence of the Chinese which had caused disobedience to the god-sovereign.

Norinaga vehemently opposed the Chinese doctrines that miracles did not happen, and that gods did not exist. Wondrous miracles surrounded us on all sides. 'According to one Chinese theory', he said, 'the earth is a globe suspended in space with the heavens revolving round it. But even if we suppose', he went on, 'that the heavens are full of air, no ordinary principles will account for the land and sea being suspended in space without moving.' If the air surrounding the earth was infinite, it could have no centre and, if it had no centre, it was impossible to understand why the earth should be at rest. If, however, the air was finite, what caused it to condense in one particular spot? The fact that many of the gods were not now and never had been visible furnished no argument against their existence. Existence could be made known to us by other senses than that of sight, while the wind, which is neither seen, heard, nor smelt, was recognized by the impression which it made upon our bodies.

Norinaga was followed by Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843). According to this philosopher, it was 'from the fact of the

divine descent of the Japanese people' that their 'immeasurable superiority in courage and intelligence to the natives of other countries' proceeded. The principles which animate the universe, he argued, were beyond the power of analysis. All that man could think and know was 'limited by the powers of sight, feeling, and calculation'.

Atsutane ridiculed Buddhism and Chinese philosophy. 'In modern times,' he observed, 'men from countries lying far off in the West have voyaged all round the seas as their inclinations prompted them, and have ascertained the actual shape of the earth. They have discovered that the earth is round and that the sun and the moon revolve round it in a vertical direction, and it may be thus conjectured how full of errors are all the Chinese accounts, and how impossible it is to believe anything that professes to be determined *a priori*.'

On ethical conduct Atsutane was sounder than on astronomy. The following passage is as fine as any to be found in the writings of Occidental moralists :

'The most fearful crimes which a man commits go unpunished by society so long as they are undiscovered, but they draw down on him the hatred of the invisible gods. The attainment of happiness by performing good acts is regulated by the same law. Even if the gods do not punish secret sins by the usual penalties of the law, they inflict diseases, misfortunes, short life, and extermination of the race. Never mind the praise or blame of fellow men, but act so that you need not be ashamed before the gods of the Unseen. If you desire to practise true virtue, learn to stand in awe of the Unseen, and that will prevent you from doing wrong. Make a vow to the god who rules over the Unseen and cultivate the conscience implanted in you, and then you will never wander from the way. You cannot hope to live more than one hundred

years in the most favourable circumstances, but as you will go to the unseen realm of *Okuninushi* after death, and be subject to his rule, learn betimes to bow down before heaven. The spirits of the dead continue to exist in the unseen world which is everywhere about us, and they all become gods of varying character and degrees of influence. Some reside in temples built in their honour; others hover near their tombs, and they continue to render service to their princes, parents, wives and children as when in their body.'

It has been seen that the philosophical and religious ideas in Japan did not remain stagnant during her two centuries of retirement from the world. In other respects the Japanese by 1853 had advanced in many of the directions taken by the European pioneers of progress. Great architectural and engineering works—e. g. the providing in 1658 of Yedo with a good supply of water brought from a distance of thirty miles—had been undertaken. About 1683 the calendar had been reformed under the Shogun Tsunayoshi (1680–1709), genre pictures had come into favour, and Chikamatsu Monzaemon of Osaka, the 'Japanese Shakespeare', had produced a number of remarkable plays.

The formal literature beloved by the samurai had also been supplemented by works written in Japanese for the common people. The credulity of Tsunayoshi caused for a time vegetarianism to flourish. Laws against taking animal life were promulgated. A dog's home covering an area of 138 acres was established at Yedo; dancing and singing were cultivated as fine arts, and the edict of Iyeyasu against the general use of palanquins repealed. At the date of the death of Tsunayoshi the martial spirit of the samurai had somewhat declined.

Japan under Tsunayoshi has been depicted as follows

by the German traveller Engelbert Kaempfer, who entered the service of the Dutch East India Company as physician, and twice (in 1691 and 1692) journeyed from Nagasaki to Yedo :

‘The country is populous beyond expression, and one would scarce think it possible that, being no greater than it is, it should nevertheless maintain and support such a vast number of inhabitants. The highways are an almost continued row of villages and boroughs. You scarce come out of one but you enter another ; and you may travel many miles, as it were, in one street, without knowing it to be composed of many villages, but by the differing names, that were formerly given them, and which they afterwards retain, though joined to one another. It has many towns, the chief of which may vie with the most considerable in the world for largeness, magnificence, and the number of inhabitants. One of the chief is called Kyoto, that is the Town or Metropolis, and is the seat of the ecclesiastical hereditary Emperor. To traverse it lengthways takes about three hours walking : to cross it, two. It is very regularly built, all the streets being cut at right angles. Yedo, properly the capital of the whole empire, and the seat of the secular monarch, is so large that I may venture to say it is the biggest town known. I can affirm this from my own certain knowledge, for we were one whole day riding at a moderate pace from Sinagawa, where the suburb begins, along the chief street, which goes across, a little irregularly indeed, to the other end of the town.’

Kaempfer’s description of the houses in Osaka may also be quoted :<sup>1</sup>

‘The houses are, according to the standing laws and custom of the country, not above two stories high, each story of one fathom and a half, or two fathoms. They are built of wood, lime, and clay. The front offers to the

<sup>1</sup> I can myself vouch for the accuracy of this description.—R. P. P.

spectator's eye the door, and a shop where the merchants sell their goods, or else an open room, where handicraftsmen and artificers, openly and in everybody's sight, exercise their trade and manufactures. From the upper end of the shop, or room, hangs down a piece of black cloth, partly for ornament, partly to defend them, in some measure, from the wind and injuries of the weather. At the same place hang some fine patterns of what is sold in the shop. The roof is flat, and in good houses covered with black tiles laid in lime. The roofs of ordinary houses are covered only with shavings of wood. All the houses are kept within doors clean and neat to admiration, though they have no tables, stools, or any other such furniture, as our European rooms are furnished with. The staircases, rails, and all the wainscoting are varnished. The floors are covered with neat mats and carpets. The rooms are separated from each other by screens, upon removal of which several small rooms may be enlarged into one, or the contrary done if needful. The walls are hung with shining paper, curiously painted with gold and silver flowers. The upper part of the wall, for some inches down from the ceiling, is commonly left empty, and only clayed with an orange-coloured clay, which is dug up about this city, and is, because of its beautiful colour, exported into several other remote provinces. The mats, doors, and screens are all of the same size, to wit, one fathom long, and half a fathom broad. The houses themselves, and their several rooms, are built proportionately according to a certain number of mats, more or less. There is commonly a curious garden behind the house, with an artificial hill and a variety of flowers, such as I have described elsewhere. Behind the garden is the bathing-stove, and sometimes a vault, or rather a small room with strong walls of clay and lime, there to preserve, in case of fire, the richest household goods and furniture.'

Yoshimune (1716-45), the eighth of the Tokugawa Shoguns, whose interest in Occidentalism has been already



noticed, perceived the danger Japan ran through the spread of pacificism. He lived simply and did all he could to resuscitate bushido. This prescient statesman revived the sport of hawking, invented a new game, 'horse hunting', and insisted on the samurai learning to swim. His Chief Justice, Ooka Tadasuke, was the Lord Eldon of Japan, and the first real Japanese code was at this epoch compiled by the jurist Norimura. Old works were collected and manuscripts ordered to be printed. The Gregorian calendar was translated into Japanese, and astronomy diligently studied.

Nor was Yoshimune neglectful of the development of Japan's natural resources. An arboriculturist, he planted several cherry and plum groves. He encouraged the cultivation of plants used for medicinal purposes, and of sugar, indigo, oranges, tobacco, and sweet potatoes. Large sums were spent on irrigation and drainage.

The successors of Yoshimune were not of his intellectual and moral calibre, and towards the end of the eighteenth century the morality of the upper classes was again on the decline. Literature and art flourished. Kioden produced the first romantic novels in Japanese literature, e. g. the *Inadzuma Bioshi*, and the Japanese Dumas, Bakin, created a number of melodramatic masterpieces. Another novelist, Ikku, gave realistic descriptions of the life of his time. In painting, Okyo, indirectly influenced by the Dutch painters, ignored the old conventions and went direct to nature for inspiration. In the period between 1760 and 1810 wonderful portraits, landscapes, and colour prints were produced by a succession of artists, the most celebrated of whom was, perhaps, Hokusai. As is usual when literature and the arts flourish, the military virtues and morals declined. The samurai began to frequent theatres, and it was no longer

considered dishonourable to be a dancing girl. From 1788 to 1793 the illustrious reformer, Sadanobu, tried to draw back his countrymen into the old paths. On his retirement there was a reaction which, if it had not been checked by the revival of Shintoism and of Mikado-worship, might have ended in leaving the Japanese morally too enfeebled to make the prodigious efforts required to save their country from being annexed by some European State.

While Hokusai was painting, an extraordinary transformation came over the Occidental world, and the Japanese, who had been provoked by the Russian occupation of Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and later by the presence of Russian colonists in Sakhalien and even Yezo, began to realize that, in face of the monstrous machinery for locomotion and destruction then recently constructed by Occidentals, courage and intelligence alone would be of little avail. Large ships driven by steam-engines had been constructed, and the artillery and small-arms of Europeans and Americans were being improved out of all knowledge. Occidentals in small numbers had conquered nearly the whole of the densely populated Indian peninsula. The same Occidentals had forced the venerable China—also densely populated—to import their Indian opium, had seized the island of Hong Kong in 1839, and obliged the Chinese in 1842 to open Canton, Amoy, Foo-chow, Ningpoo, and Shanghai to white-faced merchants. Yet the Chinese had treated the embassies of Earl Macartney in 1793 and of Lord Amherst in 1816 with contempt! In 1846 Occidentals of another race, some of whom may have served under the ‘Pretender Mikado of France’, were trying to seduce the vassal kingdom of Ryukyu (the Loo-Choo

Islands), lying between Japan and Formosa, from its allegiance to the Japanese Lord of Satsuma. The appearance in 1851 of the Chinese fanatic Tien-teh, who gave out that he was the brother of Jesus and the second son of God, the rapid spread of Tien-teh's doctrines and the revolutionary movement known as the rebellion of the Taipings (Princes of Peace), gave ample food to the Japanese for reflection. In the year of the arrival of Commodore Perry the Taipings took Nankin, the ancient capital of China.

From the Japanese standpoint the Taiping rebellion was another demonstration of the danger of permitting Christianity to be established in Japan. Moreover, if the myriads and riches of China fell under the control of a Napoleon—('Chinese' Gordon with his 'ever-victorious army' was to show that the Chinese, properly led, were formidable soldiers!)—Japan, with a population one-tenth of that of China, and with natural resources infinitely inferior to those of her giant neighbour, might find herself in extreme peril. Now the revival of Mikado-worship had rendered the Japanese less than ever inclined to become humble servants of the Manchu sovereigns.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Hayashi Shihei (who associated with the Dutch off Nagasaki) had published his *Kai-Koku Hei-dan*, in which he had advocated that the law prohibiting the building of ocean-going vessels should be repealed, and that the study of the coast defences of Japan should be at once taken in hand, so that the country should not be at the mercy of foreigners. Shihei had been thrown into prison and the type of his book destroyed; but his work had led to a survey of the coast, to sites for coast batteries being selected, and to the feudal chiefs

being warned to expect the landing of armed foreigners. In 1825 an order was issued by the Shogun that any foreign vessels coming within range of the coast batteries should be fired upon, which order was modified in 1842 to the extent that ships driven into Japanese ports by stress of weather might be given food, water, and provisions. The order of 1825 had been acted upon on more than one occasion, notably in 1837, when the U.S.A. sailing ship *Morrison* arrived with Japanese castaways on board, and was driven from Kagoshima by cannon-shot.

It was during the First Opium War that Shuhan Takashima of Nagasaki, following in the footsteps of Shihei, lodged a petition with the Shogun. He pointed out that Japan would suffer the same fate as China if she did not change her weapons and revise her theories of strategy and tactics. Should Japan neglect to reform her military system, he foretold that she would be soon invaded and conquered. Takashima obtained guns from Holland and trained his followers in European methods. He resorted to Yedo, to exhibit the new tactics and to urge the introduction of his reforms. He and his pupil Egawa cast guns and took other steps for the defence of Japan. Arrested in 1842, he was cast into prison and died, but his efforts had not been vain. Egawa, continuing his work, won the confidence of the Shogun's government, and batteries commanding the entrance to the Bay of Yedo were planned. Big-grain gunpowder had been manufactured as early as 1825, but Egawa had imported from Belgium a more effective explosive. He died two years after Commodore Perry's arrival.

Japan was thus to some extent prepared for the violent intrusion of foreigners. The Dutch had, moreover, warned the Shogun's ministers that they might at any moment

expect the visit of a British squadron, and the Netherlands government, which had taken over the now almost valueless monopoly of the Dutch East India Company, advised the Japanese voluntarily to open their ports. In 1847 the King of Holland sent to Yedo a number of books and a map of the world. Two years later he told the Japanese that an American fleet would appear within twelve months in their waters, and that refusal to trade would lead to immediate war. In 1846 Commodore Biddle, with an American ninety-gun ship of the line and a sloop, had anchored off Uraga and had applied for leave to trade. He had received a curt refusal, and the Washington government had sent a memorandum to the European States justifying an American expedition to Japan. The King of Holland enclosed a draft of the treaty which would presumably be submitted to the Shogun.

By this date the Tokugawa Shogunate was on the decline and the power of the Mikado reviving. Excellent in so many respects as had been the rule of the Shoguns from Iyeyasu to Iyeyoshi (d. 1853), they had, on the whole, been bad financiers. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the celebrated Arai Hakuseki, whose treatise on foreign states has already been referred to, had called attention to defects in the economic arrangements of Japan. He had exposed both the drain of precious metals from Japan caused by foreign commerce, and the currency problems consequent thereon. Hakuseki advised that the foreign trade of Nagasaki should be limited to thirteen Chinese junks and two Dutch vessels annually, and that smuggling at all costs should be prevented. The outflow of specie in exchange for dispensable luxuries, he considered, ought to be checked.

Hakuseki's advice had been taken and the *New Nagasaki Trade Rules* (1711-15) had been issued. They contained two hundred articles, one of which is worth quoting, because—composed some sixty years before the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*—it throws light on the capacity of the Japanese, at a date soon after the creation of the English National Debt, the establishment of the Bank of England, and Newton's reform of the coinage, to reason on economic subjects.

‘During the Jokyo era (1684-7), the trade with Chinese merchants was limited to 6,000 kwamme of silver, and that with Dutch traders to 50,000 ryo of gold, while the number of Chinese vessels was not allowed to exceed seventy per annum. After a few years, however, copper coins came into use as media of exchange in addition to silver, and moreover there was much smuggling of foreign goods. Thus, it resulted that gold, silver and copper flowed out of the country in great quantities. Comparing the aggregate thus exported during the 107 years since the Keicho era with the amount coined in Japan during the same interval, it is found that one-quarter of the gold coins and three-quarters of the silver left the country. If that state of affairs continue, it is obvious that after a hundred years from the present time one-half of the empire's gold will be carried away and there will be no silver at all left. As for copper, the sum remaining in the country is insufficient, not only for the purposes of trade but also for the needs of every-day life. It is most regrettable that the nation's treasure should thus be squandered upon foreign luxuries. The amount of currency needed at home and the amount produced by the mines should be investigated so as to obtain a basis for limiting the foreign trade at the open ports of Nagasaki, Tsushima, and Satsuma, and for fixing the maximum number of foreign vessels visiting those places.’

The currency problem was a crucial one. Japanese nobles had issued paper money as early as 1661. But about 1710 they had been strictly prohibited to do this, and thenceforward Japan, in an age of growing mercantilism, had endeavoured to transact its commercial business with a purely metallic currency.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, the gold mines in Sado and the silver mines at Ikuno, whose output in the days of Hideyoshi had enabled him to dispense largely with copper and iron coins and to place the coinage on a gold and silver basis, had begun to give out. The first two Tokugawa Shoguns, Iyeyasu and Hidetada, had been economical, but Iyemitsu was more open-handed. He spent considerable sums on building and entertainments, and constructed a huge warship. Under his successors extravagance, earthquakes, fires, and famines drained the treasury. The enormous gold reserve accumulated by Iyetsuna—Shogun from 1651 to 1680—which partly consisted of gold coins stamped ‘to be used only in cases of national emergency’, was freely drawn upon, and about the date when Sir Isaac Newton was reminting our English coins the Japanese currency was debased.

The sixth Tokugawa Shogun, Iyenobu (1709–12), and his adviser, Hakuseki, endeavoured, as we have seen, to stop the drain of specie from Japan. In 1710 they improved the quality of the coins, but decreased their weight by one-half. Yoshimune tried to restore the gold and silver coins to the quality and sizes of the Hideyoshi-Iyeyasu period, but he met with only a moderate degree of success. Towards the end of his career he had to revert to the old conditions, and

<sup>1</sup> The rule against the issue of paper money was, however, subsequently relaxed. At the fall of the Shogunate there was paper money of 1,600 different kinds.

smaller and less pure tokens were issued (1736-40). Under his successors there were further debasements of the coinage. In the first half of the nineteenth century the financial situation, says Captain Brinkley, was one of 'expenditures constantly exceeding income and of repeated recourse by the Bakufu to the fatal expedient of debasing the currency'.

Like the French monarchy under Louis XV and Louis XVI, the Shogunate in 1853 was in fact tottering to its fall. 'The priests', cynically observed Napoleon, 'were respected because they were rich.' The Shoguns were not priests (the priest-emperor of Japan was the Mikado), and when they ceased to be looked upon as sources of emolument, it was natural that even so stoical a people as the Japanese should begin to dislike and despise them.

The position of the French government in the days immediately before the Revolution had been rendered difficult by a bread famine. In 1836 and subsequent years, owing to bad harvests, the price of rice and other cereals rose in Japan to an alarming extent. A police official, Oshio Heihachiro, who had sold everything he possessed to relieve the distress of the people, raised the standard of revolt at Osaka. The revolt failed. Heihachiro, with his son, committed suicide, but left behind him a statement charging the whole body of officials with corruption. He declared that the Mikado was treated as a nonentity, and that consequently the displeasure of the gods was being visited on Japan in the shape of natural calamities. The aged Shogun Iyenari (1786-1837) had resigned in favour of his son Iyeyoshi, whose Prime Minister, Mizuno, endeavoured by a series of drastic sumptuary laws to restore the austere manners of ancient times. This, known as the 'Tempo Reformation', was a complete failure.



Meanwhile, in 1846—the year of the French encroachments in the Loo-Choo Islands—Komei, who was the 121st Mikado, had ascended the throne at Kyoto. His father, the Mikado Ninko (1817–46), had established a college for the education of the nobles of the Kyoto court. The Shogunate had unwisely consented to, and financially aided, the foundation of this college, where young Japanese were taught to regard the Shogunate with hostile eyes. Komei was profoundly alarmed by the White Peril. Soon after his coronation he departed from all recent precedent by instructing the rulers at Yedo that the traditional policy of the Empire towards foreigners must be maintained. As that policy had been inaugurated by some of the most eminent of the Tokugawa Shoguns, the action of the patriotic Komei added to the Shogun's embarrassment. Iyeyoshi and his advisers, however, gave way, and in future submitted all questions of foreign policy to the Mikado for decision.

Such was the political position in Japan when on July 7, 1853, Commodore Perry, with four men-of-war, sailed into Yedo Bay and dropped anchor off Uraga. The spirit in which the American expedition had been dispatched may be appreciated from the following note in a contemporary American journal: 'The Japan Expedition, according to a Washington correspondent', said the *New York Herald*, 'is to be merely a hydrographical survey of the Japanese coast. The 32-pounders are to be used merely as measuring instruments in the triangulations; the cannon balls are for procuring base lines. If any Japanese is foolish enough to put his head in the way of these meteorological instruments, of course nobody will be to blame but himself if he should get hurt.'

Though Perry, to gild the American pill, carried with him as presents the electric telegraph and a model railway,

it is not surprising that the representatives of one of the proudest, most civilized and warlike peoples of the world acted on the Emperor Komei's orders and bade him depart to Nagasaki. He refused, and delivered at Yedo on July 14, 1853, the American President's letter to the Mikado. He then steamed away, threatening to return for an answer in a few months.

The embarrassment of the Shogun—Iyeyoshi died during the negotiations with Perry, and was succeeded by Iyesada—and his councillors may well be imagined. They were between the deep sea of public opinion represented by the Mikado and the 32-pounders of—to use a Chinese phrase—the ‘foreign devils’. Forty-two years later, in 1895, a reformed Japan, fresh from her victories over the Chinese fleet and army, had the wisdom to capitulate before Germany, Russia, and France. In 1853 it must have seemed to enlightened Japanese statesmen suicidal not to comply with the sugared ultimatum of President Fillmore. The state of Japanese finances, the complete lack of modern ships of war, the small quantity of modern weapons in the islands, the trivial means available for manufacturing such weapons and ammunition, rendered it essential that a pacific solution to the direful problem with which they were confronted should be sought.

‘Unless I tell you frankly about the condition of the Treasury’, wrote one of the Shogun's councillors to the chief adviser of the Baron of Mito, ‘you cannot appreciate the situation. If you saw the accounts you would be startled, and would learn at a glance the hopelessness of going to war. The country could not hold out even for a twelvemonth, and there is nothing for it except that every one should join in saving money for purposes of

equipment. If we keep the peace now and toil unremittingly for ten years, we may hope to restore the situation.'

Instead of deciding for themselves, the Shogun and his ministers summoned a council of the feudal chiefs. President Fillmore's letter was circulated among them and they were invited to express their opinions. The great majority supported the Mikado's policy of maintaining Japanese isolation. The ultimate purpose of foreigners in visiting Japan, it was argued, was to reconnoitre the country. This had been proved by the action of the Russians in the north. What had been done by Western states in India and China would doubtless be done in Japan also if opportunity offered. Foreign trade impoverished the nation.

A small but influential minority of the nobles had the sense and courage to combat such views. In the absence of war-vessels, they pointed out, there were no means of defence except the coast batteries, practically non-existent. China and Holland had been left as bridges between Japan and the rest of the world. It would be wise to utilize those bridges and to gain time for preparations of defence, instead of blindly rushing into battle without any supply of effective weapons. The times had changed and the veto on foreign trade was no longer advisable. The best course would be for Japan to avail herself of the services of the Dutch middlemen, and to lose no time in furnishing herself with powerful men-of-war and with sailors and gunners capable of navigating and fighting such vessels. The strictest economy should be exercised by all classes of the people so as to provide funds for the building of a navy and for the fortification of the coasts.

The Shogun and his council sided with the minority, but stated in their decree that, if hostilities were forced on

Japan, 'all must take up arms and fight strenuously for the country'. The batteries at Shinagawa, protecting the approaches to Yedo, were strengthened. Other batteries were established along the coasts of Musashi, Sagami, Awa, and Kazusa. Further, the law prohibiting the construction of ocean-going ships was rescinded. The Dutch were asked to import a library of useful European books. Cannon were cast, troops drilled, and Japanese experts in European knowledge favoured by the government.

When Perry returned in February 1854, Japan had already entered on the path up which she was to mount to her present powerful position, and on March 31, 1854, she signed a treaty with the United States, which was speedily followed by similar treaties with Great Britain, with Russia, and with Holland. But foreigners did not actually secure the right to trade in Japan till 1858, when through the efforts chiefly of Mr. Townsend Harris, the first American Consul-General in Japan, a commercial treaty between Japan and the United States was concluded—without the Mikado's consent.

The arguments of Harris were greatly strengthened by the results of the Second Opium War (1856-60). A Chinese fleet was destroyed by Commodore Elliot on May 25, 1857, and Canton bombarded by the British and French in the December of that year. In May 1858 the Allies took the Peiho forts and reached Tientsin, within easy distance of Peking. By the Treaty of Tientsin (June) the importation of opium into China was legalized, and admission of foreign ambassadors to the Imperial court and toleration of Christianity granted. This object-lesson was not lost on the Japanese, and when, later in the year, Lord Elgin arrived at Yedo, he found the Japanese anxious and willing to negotiate in a friendly spirit. Lord Elgin's

picture of Japan at the moment when she was beginning to be Occidentalized is a pleasing one :

‘ On the whole, I consider it the most interesting expedition I ever made. The total absence of anything like want among the people ; their joyous though polite and respectful demeanour ; the combination of that sort of neatness and finish which we attain in England by the expenditure of great wealth, with tropical luxuriance, made me feel that at last I had found something which entirely surpassed all the expectations I had formed. And I am bound to say, that the social and moral condition of Japan has astonished me quite as much as its material beauty. Every man, from the Emperor (who never leaves his palace) to the humblest labourer, lives under a rigid rule, prescribed by law and custom combined ; and the Government, through its numerous agents, among whom are hosts of spies, or more properly inspectors (for there is no secrecy or concealment about this proceeding), exercises a close surveillance over the acts of each individual ; but, in so far as one can judge, this system is not felt to be burdensome by any. All seem to think it the most natural thing in the world that they should move in the orbit in which they are placed. The agents of authority wear their two swords ; but, as they never use them except for the purpose of ripping themselves up, the privilege does not seem to be felt to be invidious. My interpreter, a Dutchman, lent to me by the United States Consul-General, has been two years in the country, and he assures me that he never saw a Japanese in a passion and never saw a parent beat a child. An inexhaustible fund of good temper seems to prevail in the community. Whenever in our discussions on business we get on rough ground, I always find that a joke brings us at once upon the level again. Yesterday, at a formal audience with the Foreign Ministers (to settle about the handing over the yacht), they began to propose that, in addition to the Commissioners, I should allow

some other officers (probably spies or inspectors) to be present at our discussions on the clauses of the Treaty. After treating this seriously for some moments, without settling it to their satisfaction, I at once carried the day, by saying laughingly, that as they were six to one already, they ought not to desire to have more chances in their favour. This provoked a counter-laugh and a compliment, and no more was said about the spies. When the Commissioners came yesterday afternoon to go through the clauses of the Treaty with me, I was much pleased with the manner in which they took to their work, raising questions and objections in a most business-like manner, but without the slightest appearance of captiousness or a desire to make difficulties. . . . There is no luxury or extravagance in any class. No jewels or gold ornaments even at court; but the nobles have handsome palaces, and large bodies of retainers. A perfectly paternal government, a perfectly filial people; a community entirely self-supporting; peace within and without; no want, no ill-will between classes. This is what I find in Japan in the year 1858, after one [*sic*] hundred years' exclusion of foreign trade and foreigners. Twenty years hence what will be the contrast? . . . I feel a sort of terror when I contemplate my return to China. My trip to Japan has been a green spot in the desert of my mission to the East. . . . We are again plunging into the China Sea, and quitting the only place which I have left with any feeling of regret since I have reached this abominable East. . . . The exceeding external beauty of Japan, and its singular moral and social picturesqueness, cannot but leave a pleasing impression on the mind. One feels as if the position of a Daimyo in Japan might not be a bad one, with two or three millions of vassals; submissive, but not servile, because there is no contradiction between their sense of fitness and their position.'

The reader who has followed my brief exposition of Japanese history will not have been astonished at Lord Elgin's account of his experiences.

*The Occidentalizing of Japan from 1858 to 1894*

HISTORY contains many examples of the violent imposition on, or the peaceful absorption by, one nation of the customs, habits, institutions, laws, arts, and sciences of another. For example, the Romans forced upon the peoples south of the Danube and Rhine their composite civilization, which was introduced into our own islands during the first century A. D. Again, from the reign of Elizabeth onwards, the British and French have been carrying their culture into all corners of the globe, while, at the end of the seventeenth century, Peter the Great acquired for the Russians a large part of western knowledge. The transformation of Japan since 1853 has not, therefore, been a wholly novel phenomenon in the annals of the human race.

Nevertheless, though not wholly novel, it has been one of the most singular and memorable events ever witnessed. We have seen that the Japanese in historic times had never been conquered, and that only twice had their islands been seriously invaded. Imagine that the inhabitants of the British Isles had, after the second and final departure of Julius Caesar, been left untouched by alien enemies; that they had been permitted up to 1853 to accept or reject what they chose of European civilization; that the British Army and Navy had since 1500 engaged in but two campaigns on the continent of Europe; and that from 1641 to 1853 the British had been almost entirely isolated from other peoples.

Suppose, further, that after Great Britain's two centuries of internal peace our grandfathers and grandmothers had been living contented with their lot, and that in June 1853, when Great Britain's fleet was composed of fishing-smacks, a squadron of men-of-war, manned by sailors from a Japanized North America, had appeared in the mouth of the Thames and that its commander had ordered the British to change their manners and customs. In 1853 the most important statesman in the British Cabinet was Lord Palmerston, a nobleman whose character was not unlike that of a Japanese baron under the Tokugawa Shogunate. What would have been the sensations of Lord Palmerston on reading an ultimatum to his sovereign couched in language similar to that used by President Fillmore? By the exercise of the imagination alone can one appreciate the self-restraint of the Japanese, the tremendous difficulties with which their rulers in 1853 and after years were confronted, the no less extraordinary wisdom exercised by them in overcoming those difficulties, and the even still more extraordinary conduct of the lords and commoners of Japan who, with rare exceptions, unquestioningly obeyed the behests of their far-sighted leaders.

In 1853, from a military and naval standpoint, Japan was in the position of a naked man faced by ten armed adversaries. She had no allies. Only a handful of the samurai who formed her army possessed modern weapons. Her war-fleet was non-existent. There was little metallic money in the island and but a small quantity of the precious metals. Her exportable goods were as yet insignificant in value. She could not at once buy for herself from European or American armament firms a complete military and naval outfit, and hardly any of her citizens knew how to



construct the complicated machinery for destruction designed by Occidental scientists.

Japan was neither actually nor, it seemed, potentially in a position to resist European or American aggression. Had the Ironsides of Cromwell, convoyed by the fleet of Blake, attacked Japan, it is arguable that they would have met with a bloody reverse. A British seaman who fought with Japanese pirates near Singapore, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, made this significant remark: 'The Japanese are not allowed to land in any part of India with weapons, being a people so desperate and daring that they are feared in all places where they come.' But in 1853 the British Army, which the next year was to be disembarked in the Crimea, badly equipped and badly led as it was, would have made short work of the Japanese samurai. Compared with the tasks set to Bismarck and Cavour at the same date, those before the Japanese ministers were immeasurably the more arduous. That the Yoritomos, Nobunagas, Hideyoshis, Iyeyasus, and Yoshimunes of the nineteenth century did in fact steer safely the Japanese ship of state into harbour is among the most amazing feats of statecraft known to history.

In the last chapter we traced the progress of Japan from 1641 to the arrival of Lord Elgin at Yedo in 1858. The next ten years were the period of gestation of the Japan with which our own generation is acquainted. Already Perry's visit had borne fruit. Military instructors had been imported by the Japanese from Holland, a naval college organized at Yedo, and an iron foundry erected at Nagasaki. In 1854 Holland had presented Japan with her first steamship, the *Kanko Maru*. An attempt was being made by the Japanese to build vessels on Occidental lines. Generally

speaking, the Shogun and his advisers were in favour of, the Mikado and his courtiers opposed to, the introduction of foreign ideas.

In 1860, the Shogun's Prime Minister, the enlightened Kamon No Kami, was assassinated by reactionaries. The next year (1861) Russia seized the Island of Tsushima, in the Korean Straits. The Shogun, with the assistance of Great Britain, induced the Russians to withdraw from that most important strategical point. The action of Russia stimulated the party of progress to fresh exertions. Among the progressive leaders was one of the two chief barons of Japan, the Lord of Satsuma, in Kiushiu. An unfortunate accident in 1862 caused him to become inimical to foreigners. He was returning from Yedo when a British citizen, Mr. Richardson, two other gentlemen, and a lady tried, in their ignorance of Japanese etiquette, to ride through the Satsuma chieftain's escort. One of his samurai immediately attacked the party. Richardson was killed and two of his companions wounded. The British government promptly demanded the surrender of the samurai implicated in the affair. The demand was refused, and a British squadron in 1863 bombarded Kagoshima, the Satsuma capital.<sup>1</sup> Just previously the Mikado Komei or his advisers had issued an anti-foreign edict. May 11, 1863, was fixed for the opening of a campaign to expel Japan's undesirable aliens. Without waiting for the day to arrive, the Lord of Choshu, a province in Honshiu, bordering on the Straits of Shimonoseki, fired from his batteries on American, French, and Dutch merchantmen passing the straits. The Shogun refusing reparation, the

<sup>1</sup> The Japanese gunners fought well and inflicted damage on our ships. The bombardment took place in a typhoon. See 'The Days of Kagoshima', by James Murdoch, in *The Times Japanese Section*, October 14, 1916.

Choshu forts were demolished by a British, French, Dutch, and American fleet.

The Campbells and Grahams of Japan had been taught the efficacy of modern weapons. As the Lord of Choshu had been one of the Mikado's adherents, the monarch began to waver in his attitude towards foreigners. In 1866 Sir Harry Parkes, the British Envoy in Japan, offered to remit part of the fine which had been imposed by the Allied Powers upon Choshu, provided that the Mikado ratified the treaties signed on his behalf, but against his wishes, by the Shogun. To this Komei finally consented. It was also in 1866 that 'the last of the Shoguns', Yoshinobu (better known as Keiki), succeeded to the office which had been created by Yoritomo in the twelfth century. Keiki strongly favoured progress. He sent for French experts to remodel the army, British experts to organize the navy.

The accession of the last of the Shoguns was speedily followed by that of the greatest of the Mikados. On February 13, 1867, Komei died, and the mirror, sword, and gem passed into the hands of a youth of fifteen. Born in 1852, the year of the birth of General Joffre, the Mikado Mutsuhito, who died on July 30, 1912, lived to see his kingdom converted into an empire, and the Japanese one of the most powerful nations on the earth. Austere, upright, calm, judicious, far-sighted, and benevolent, Mutsuhito was what Plato had sighed for and Voltaire vainly sought—a philosopher on the throne. During his reign, and largely owing to his influence, the most far-reaching political and social changes were introduced.

Those changes were preceded by an act of self-abnegation. Yodo, the Lord of Tosa, in October 1867 presented the Shogun with a memorial. In it he asserted that, owing

to the dual nature of the Japanese government, the kingdom's eyes and ears were turned in opposite directions. 'You should', said Yodo, 'restore the governing power into the hands of the sovereign, and so lay a foundation on which Japan may take its stand as the equal of all other countries.' On October 14 the Shogun Keiki handed in his resignation to the Mikado. The Shogunate was at an end. Once more the government of Japan was, in fact and not in political fiction, a theocracy.<sup>1</sup>

The policy of the God-King was at once manifested, and the Meiji ('Enlightened Government') era began. On January 1, 1868, the ports of Kobe and Osaka were thrown open to foreign trade. A few weeks later—on February 3—the Mikado formally announced to the sovereigns of all nations and their subjects the news and nature of the revolution which had occurred. On March 23 he took the hitherto unprecedented step of granting an audience to the foreign representatives.

From Kyoto the Mikado transferred his throne to Yedo, the name of which was changed to Tokyo ('Eastern Capital'). In the spring of 1869 he took the famous Charter Oath, by which he promised to create a deliberative assembly, and that all the old absurd usages of former times should be disregarded, and the impartiality and justice displayed in the workings of Nature adopted as a basis of action. Most of the feudal barons had already offered to surrender to the Mikado their estates and to transfer to him the allegiance of their vassals. By the edicts of 1871, 1873, and 1875, feudalism was finally abolished, the nobles and their samurai being pensioned off or bought out.

<sup>1</sup> The next year there was an abortive rising of the ex-Shogun's followers. They were defeated at Fushimi and in other actions.

Together with the abolition of the Shogunate and of feudalism, Occidental institutions and customs were adopted. The central government was organized in seven departments—Religion, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Army and Navy, Finance, Justice, and Law. The local government was entrusted to prefects. ‘The clans’, ran the Mikado’s decree, ‘are abolished and prefectures are established in their places.’ In 1874 it was arranged that an Assembly of Prefects should meet each year to confer with the central government, and in 1875 a Senate consisting of official nominees, charged with the duty of discussing and revising laws and ordinances, came into being. It was, however, a Senate of the Napoleonic type, and had no power of initiation.

In 1873—three years after short service was introduced into the British professional army—another decree instituted universal military service in Japan, and, in effect, disestablished the samurai. The year before, in 1872, the foundations of universal compulsory education were laid. The Elementary Education Act, establishing board schools in England, had been passed in 1870.

Consequent on the visit to Europe and America, in 1871, of Prince Iwakura, of Okubo, Kido, Ito, Yamaguchi, and five Japanese ladies, one of whom, after graduating at Vassar, became later the wife of Marshal Oyama, the anti-Christian edicts were removed from the public bulletin-boards, and the Gregorian calendar introduced. A little later, each Sunday was set aside as a day of rest. The New Testament appeared in Japanese in 1880. Four years afterwards Buddhism and Shintoism were disestablished.

Coincident with these changes, Japanese economic life was revolutionized. On Ito’s return from America, banks,

based on the American plan, were created. In 1882 the Bank of Japan was founded, and thenceforward it alone was permitted to issue notes. Joint-stock companies dealing with every phase of industry were incorporated, and before Japan received a constitution she had become, to all intents and purposes, an Occidentalized country. Further particulars of the political, social, and industrial revolution in Japan will be found in part ii of this work, in Marquis Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan*, and in my *Japan, the New World-Power*. Every politician, sociologist, and economist ought to study attentively the measures of the Japanese statesmen, who did not merely imitate, but examined and often improved upon the models selected. The results of their labours represent the best and most independent practical criticism of Occidental civilization.

As the re-education of the Japanese people has been one of the principal causes of their wonderful successes in the last three decades of the nineteenth and the opening years of the twentieth century, the reader may like to take a bird's-eye view of the educational reforms of the Meiji era.

When Baron Dairoku Kikuchi, in 1907, gave, in a series of lectures delivered to the University of London, a detailed survey of the Japanese educational system, he prefaced them with a translation of the Imperial rescript on education, dated October 30, 1890, which is an exhortation to loyalty, filial piety, and the pursuit of learning as a means to perfect morality and civic behaviour. The rescript ran as follows:

‘ Know ye, Our Subjects :

‘ Our Imperial ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue ; Our Subjects ever united in

loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our Subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends, true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful Subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

‘The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and their Subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you Our Subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue.’

Long before the above rescript was issued, European systems, first the French, and later the German, had been studied and adapted to Japanese conditions with the usual division of schools into elementary, secondary and higher schools, universities, technical and special schools. Soon after 1868 many foreigners had been engaged as teachers for most of the higher schools and colleges, and the wave of ‘practical’ methods which then swamped Japan had been so powerful that the foreigners themselves had often to put a stop to the exaggerations of their pupils. People were ready to adopt foreign methods wholesale, a typical

example being that of Mori Yurei, who suggested the adoption of simplified English as the everyday language.

The first code of education (1872) followed the lines of the French scheme of public instruction ; it was rendered more elastic in 1873 and in 1879. A further change, due to Mori Yurei, took place in 1886. The universities and normal and middle schools were reformed, and at the same time a German, Hausknecht, was engaged to train teachers for the higher schools. French influence declined in the eighties, and German took the place of the French language, particularly with medical and engineering students. English, however, remained the one compulsory language for students.

The whole system of education was controlled by the Emperor, the Privy Council, and the Minister for Education, the directors of schools having only limited powers. At the present day there are four Imperial Universities, the oldest ones in Tokyo and Kyoto, one in Sendai (1911), and one in Kiushiu (1911). The students are recruited from eight 'higher schools', in which boys from the middle classes receive a preparatory training lasting three years. Besides the universities, there are six special schools of medicine, two higher schools of forestry and agriculture, a school of sericulture and filature, a school of mining, five higher commercial schools, seven higher technical schools, four higher normal schools, and fifty-five schools for the deaf and dumb (two public, two government, and fifty-one private). Elementary and higher elementary schools for boys and girls between the ages of six and fourteen educate the rank and file of the nation.

The salaries and stipends of the teachers are extremely low when judged by western standards. But the system is remarkably thorough, the schools well equipped, and the



curriculum in each case calculated to impart much practical knowledge. The great development of technical and commercial schools is an outstanding feature of Japanese education. From time to time the professors and lecturers are sent abroad or given facilities to travel with a view to ensuring that they keep abreast of Occidental research, both in science and in literature.

Physical exercises are an important item in the curriculum, the German and Swedish drill being practised side by side with the purely Japanese ju-jutsu, fencing (ken-jutsu), &c., while western games of football, baseball, and the like, have become so popular that university matches have taken place between Japanese and American teams.

Moral instruction is purely secular, inasmuch as it is free from religious teaching, but it is based upon loyalty to the Imperial house, and that may be construed as a form of religion. School teachers have been known to rescue from the flames at great personal risk the photograph of the sovereign. The lectures delivered in all schools, when the Imperial portraits are exhibited, are comments upon Mutsuhito's educational rescript, and are intended to foster loyalty, application to work and study, and general use of individual exertions for the national good.

Besides Imperial universities, there are two great institutions which have had a large part in shaping the trend of national thought and of national politics—the Keiogijuku founded at Mita by Fukuzawa Yukichi, and the Waseda University founded by Marquis Okuma.

The Keiogijuku received its present name in 1868. It was removed to the heights of Mita in 1871, and its founder is still known and revered as the 'Sage of Mita'. At first established for the teaching of Dutch and English, it has

kept well abreast of the times and takes high rank as a seat of learning. In 1890 a university department, with courses in economics, law, and literature, was established, to which seven years later a course in politics was added. The two words 'independence' and 'self-respect', embodying the moral teaching of its founder, have been chosen as the motto of the institution. Many of its students, eminent in learning and in mental endowments, now occupy important positions in the State and in society.

The Keiogijuku's aim is to make clear by precept and practice those principles which should govern the domestic, social, and national life. The institution embraces a primary boarding-school, in which 300 boys enter at the age of six; physical culture is here placed before the training of the mind, and later the boys pass on to the middle school without examination. The middle school course covers five years, and ranks on an equality with those of the government. In the university, which forms the main body of the institution, there are now 2,500 students, following a course of five years. Many of the professors are old students who have completed their specialized education abroad.

Another important feature of the Keiogijuku is the Shokogakko, a commercial and technical school, established in April 1903, the course of which covers four years, with two years of preparatory work. There is also an evening commercial school for apprentices of fifteen years of age or more. In 1909 the numbers attending the Keiogijuku were as follows: university, 2,293; middle school, 803; primary school, 384; commercial and technical school, 449; evening school, 581; making a total of 4,510. The institution is governed by a board of thirty councillors, elected by the alumni for a term of four years, with five directors

elected from among the councillors. The Keiogijuku grants degrees in political science, economic science, law, and arts.

From this brief sketch it will be gathered that the Japanese have not slavishly followed Occidental systems of education. Just as their scientists have invented new explosives and their bacteriologists have discovered micro-organisms which escaped the notice of European and American researchers, so their educationalists have not been satisfied with imitating the universities and schools of Europe and America. A British citizen reading Baron Kikuchi's illuminating lectures on Japanese education is unpleasantly reminded that in many respects Japan is ahead of Great Britain. For example, in the middle schools, which boys usually enter at the age of thirteen and leave at eighteen, scholars can learn law. It is their own fault if they choose to go out into the world ignorant of the rules which govern society and at the mercy of those who know those rules.

The reforms of the French statesmen in the period of the Great Revolution had been accompanied by violent reactions—the rising in La Vendée and the like. It was not to be expected that a metamorphosis so radical in its nature as that which had taken place under Mutsuhito would meet with no opposition. In time of peace 400,000 professional soldiers, who regarded themselves as belonging to a caste of superior beings, had been merged in a universal military service army. Of the samurai, the most discontented were those in the Satsuma province of Kiushiu. To find them employment, the government took advantage of the brutal conduct of the savages in Formosa, who in 1872 murdered the crew of a Loo-Choo junk. The Loo-

Choans were claimed to be Japanese subjects, but Formosa was nominally part of the Chinese Empire. The Japanese authorities appealed to China for redress. The Chinese refused, and a force of Satsuma samurai was in 1874 landed on the island. The samurai inflicted punishment on the natives. China protested, and a Chino-Japanese War seemed imminent. The British Minister at Peking, however, interposed, and an agreement was come to under which Japan withdrew her samurai and China consented to pay an indemnity.

The Formosan was soon followed by a Korean question. In 1868 Mutsuhito had announced to the King of Corea the abdication of the Shogun and his own resumption of full sovereignty. Five years later (1873) the Corean monarch served the Mikado with an insolent notice that he intended to cease all relations with a renegade from Oriental civilization. In Corea, as in China, the corrupt vested interests viewed with alarm the revolution in Japan. So impertinent a message was naturally resented by the Japanese statesmen, and Saigo Takamori, of Satsuma, one of the chief reforming leaders, urged the Mikado to declare war on Corea. Saigo appears to have hoped to restore the position of the samurai, who would have to bear the brunt of the campaign. On the Mikado siding with the more prudent ministers, who objected that a foreign war at this moment would be a bad blunder, Saigo resigned and retired to Satsuma, where he trained the samurai in European tactics and armed them with European weapons.

Two years later (1875) a Corean fort opened fire on a Japanese warship surveying the coast. A flotilla was promptly dispatched by the Mikado to avenge this fresh insult. The intimidated King of Corea concluded a treaty

of amity and commerce, and opened certain ports to foreign trade. Japan had accomplished in Corea what the United States in 1853 had accomplished in Japan. Still the samurai were not satisfied. In 1876 those of them who still retained their old-fashioned swords were deprived by the government of the visible insignia of their rank. As a consequence, local risings occurred, but were easily put down.

Another grievance of the samurai against the Mikado's ministers was that in 1875 they ceded to Russia the whole Island of Sakhalien in exchange for the Kurile Islands. The surrender of the Japanese portion of Sakhalien was not counterbalanced, in the eyes of the hereditary warriors, by the successful issues of the Formosan and Corean negotiations and by the strong measures taken in 1872 by the Japanese government towards Peru. A Peruvian ship had been seized at Yokohama and 200 Chinese slaves released. Nor was the recognition in 1875 by the United States of Japan's claim to the Ogasawara Archipelago, colonized by Japanese in 1592 and situated on the sea route from America to South China, sufficient to calm the feelings of the caste. The samurai—or rather the Satsuma samurai—disliked and despised the soldiers of the conscript army, and were anxious to try conclusions with them.

In January 1877 things came to a head. Satsuma rose under Saigo and pitted its 40,000 samurai, equipped with rifles and field-guns, against the Mikado's new model army. After a number of bloody battles, in which the casualties on both sides totalled 33 per cent. of the forces engaged, Saigo's troops were completely defeated by the 66,000 conscripts and ex-samurai who had been sent to subdue them. The rebellion ended on September 24. It proved conclusively that in Japan democratic were equal to aristocratic soldiers,

and that the Japanese nation-in-arms was a reality and not a sham. Japan, united under Mutsuhito as it had been under Hideyoshi, would, it was obvious, quickly insist on obtaining a place in the sun.

The year before the outbreak of the Satsuma rebellion in 1876, the Loo-Choo Islands had been annexed by Japan, the King of Ryukyu being pensioned off. China fulminated. In 1880 General Grant tried to effect a compromise under which the islands were to be divided between the two Oriental Powers. At the last moment China backed out, and the Loo-Choo archipelago remained in the possession of Japan.

The Formosan and Loo-Choo questions were not the only bones of contention between the Mikado and the Celestial Emperor. In 1880 a Japanese Legation was established at Seoul, the capital of Corea. Two years later (1882) the Legation was attacked by a mob of reactionaries, and the staff had to fight its way to Chemulpo, where it took refuge on a British gunboat. The Corean government paid an indemnity, and agreed that for the future Japanese troops might be stationed at the Legation. On December 4, 1884, there was a riot in Seoul, and Chinese troops, who had been sent into Corea to support the reactionaries, attacked and burned the Japanese Legation. China claimed to be suzerain of Corea, and war between China and Japan appeared to be inevitable. But again the Mikado and his ministers showed their wisdom, and in 1885 a treaty was concluded at Tientsin by Ito and Li Hung-Chang, under which it was arranged that China and Japan should withdraw their troops from the peninsula and not send any more to Corea without previous notification to each other. From Corea the Japanese exacted an indemnity, but from

then to 1894 (the date of the opening of the Chino-Japanese War) the Chinese resident at Seoul had the upper hand. The Russians in 1884 had concluded a commercial treaty with Corea, but neither the Russians nor the Japanese were so acceptable to the corrupt Coreans as the Celestials.

Meanwhile, the internal progress of Japan had been advancing at a geometrical ratio. There were, however, two main obstacles in her path. As already mentioned, Mutsuhito, at the beginning of his reign, found the Treasury bankrupt. To meet the heavy expenses entailed by the abolition of Feudalism and the adoption of Occidentalism, in 1870 £1,000,000 at 9 per cent., and in 1873 £2,400,000 at 7 per cent. had been borrowed in London. These small sums were, naturally, inadequate, and recourse had been had to issues of inconvertible paper money. In 1871 Japan had adopted gold monometallism, and in 1878 bi-metallism; but in 1879 the system was really one of inconvertible paper money. The over-issue of paper caused much financial distress. In June 1885 it was announced that notes would be exchangeable for silver coins, and the system became silver monometallism. Not, however, until after the Chino-Japanese War did Japan revert to gold monometallism.

The other difficulty taxed to the utmost the skill of Japan's diplomatists and jurists. By the treaties which Japan had signed with foreign Powers, aliens were exempted from the jurisdiction of the Japanese law-courts, and Japan was permitted to impose only very low duties on imports. So long as these galling restrictions remained in force, Japan was the vassal of foreign capitalists. Several attempts were made to revise the treaties, but only in 1894, on the eve of the Chino-Japanese War, did Great Britain consent

to revision. Her example was followed by other Powers, and by 1899 Japan may be said to have shaken off most of her tariff and juristic shackles. She had already codified much of her law and organized her law courts after European models. Her victory over China forcibly demonstrated that she was a progressive State, entitled fully to regulate her own fiscal affairs.

Before Lord Rosebery, in 1894, took the step of revising the British commercial treaty with Japan, the Mikado had given further proof that he had no intention of being a mere Peter the Great or Napoleon. On February 11, 1889, a Constitution defining his powers, regulating the rights of his subjects, and creating representative government had been promulgated, while on April 1 of the same year local self-government was established. Under the Constitution, with its Upper and Lower House and Ministers of State, who, however, do not form a Cabinet, the Mikado retained very large powers. In 1889, when war with China or some European Power was on the horizon, this was, of course, necessary. Whether those powers will be gradually whittled away remains to be seen. During the years which have followed Mutsuhito's grant of a Constitution the force of public opinion has grown in strength, and the Japanese Ministers of State tend more and more to become Ministers of the People. Party government under the Constitution has made its appearance, but whether it will play the part, for good or evil, which it has played in our own country, is on the knees of the gods—and the God-King of Japan.



*The Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5*

THE war between Japan and China, though the details of it attracted at the time comparatively little attention in Europe and America, was fraught with momentous consequences. Of the Far Eastern Powers which remained independent or quasi-independent, by far the most important were China and Japan. The Chinese represented the conservative and civilian, the Japanese the progressive and military forces still uncontrolled by Europeans and Americans. In China change was disliked, in Japan it was welcomed. The people ruled by the Manchu sovereign at Peking despised soldiers, whereas the subjects of the Mikado had for centuries looked up to and revered the samurai, perhaps the finest military caste that has ever existed. Their Emperor was regarded by the Chinese as the spring of some complicated machine contrived by purely human intelligence, but the Japanese considered the Mikado to be a god, and his ancestors to be disembodied divinities. If the system at the head of which was the able, astute, and corrupt Li Hung-Chang triumphed, if Mutsuhito failed in a war with China, as Hideyoshi at the end of the sixteenth century had failed, it was to be expected that the Far East would speedily be divided among European or American Powers.

The war was interesting for other reasons. Because the average Chinaman sneered at soldiers, it did not follow that the Chinese leaders were ignorant of the way of conducting

successful campaigns. Gordon had taught them the art of war as understood by Europeans, and German and British soldiers and sailors were in their service. As long before as 1882 the possibility of a war with Japan had been considered.

The synopsis of the memorial addressed to the Chinese Emperor by Chang-Pei-Lun and the Board of Censors, with Li Hung-Chang's commentary on it, which was published by *The Times* during the war, ought to be read in this connexion.

According to the memorial, China in recent years had suffered four calamities—the Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, the insurrection of the Mohammedans, and the troubles arising from foreign intercourse. All these difficulties, the memorialists reminded the Emperor, had been overcome with the exception of the last. 'Our foreign relations', they pointed out, 'are of supreme importance . . . and of all our foreign relations, those with Japan cause more trouble than all the others.'

Having noted that the two principal Japanese clans, Satsuma and Choshu, were constantly quarrelling, that there had been an over-issue of paper money in Japan, and that the people were grumbling because of the great expenditure on armaments, the memorialists fatuously observed that the military system of Japan was not well organized, and that the Japanese troops were inferior to those at the disposal of Li Hung-Chang. Nevertheless, the Japanese every year were becoming more arrogant. They had seized the Loo-Choo Islands and threatened to seize Corca; and consequently, war with Japan was to be expected. 'If we do not prepare', said the Chinese statesmen, 'then the evil day will be upon us with the swiftness of rain from the sky.'

The preparations which the Censors thought should be

made were these. The defeat of Japan could be achieved only by a 'preponderating superiority of naval forces'. China's navy should, therefore, be reorganized. Special ministers ought also to be appointed to deal with the whole question, and Li Hung-Chang should consider the Japanese affair. Meantime, the viceroys and governors of provinces should make naval and military preparations, and friendly relations with the European nations who 'consider themselves as of right qualified to decide matters, which in reality only concern ourselves' should be cultivated. Japan's strength was very inferior to China's; she had no intimate relations with foreign countries, and could not, like China, offer foreigners any advantages of commerce as a price for their assistance.

The memorial was submitted by the Emperor to the Board of Military Affairs, and the Board recommended that Li Hung-Chang, who, born about 1823, had distinguished himself in the Taiping Rebellion, and as Viceroy of Chihli had been one of the most important personages in China since 1870, should prepare a plan for the invasion of Japan and be responsible for its execution. An Imperial Edict to that effect was issued, and Li Hung-Chang's views invited. These views are deserving of examination.

Li Hung-Chang agreed that preparations for a war with Japan were necessary, and that the Chinese naval armaments ought to be developed. But he thought that a rupture with Japan should be sought not on the Korean but on the Loo-Choo question. 'We have', he said, 'an indisputable right to those islands, and every foreign Power would have to admit our claim, if we demanded the restoration of our rights over them.' He forgot that no European Power had any serious interest in depriving the Japanese of Ryukyu.

Unlike Chang-Pei-Lun and his fellow Censors, Li Hung-Chang, while agreeing with them that Japan was disunited and her army and navy weak, thought that the foreign Powers might take her side. 'Let us remember', he said, 'that the two great principles which exercise paramount influence in the world are reason and strength. . . . The former distinguishes between right and wrong, the latter makes might into right, when opposed to weakness. . . . If we only organize our resources, develop our army and navy, we shall gain the respect of even the most powerful of foreign nations, who will rank us with the Great Powers, and then Japan will not venture to carry out any hostile designs.'

The Chinese statesman conceded that the Japanese fleet was the equal of the Chinese, and that no invasion of Japan was possible until the Chinese fleet had a marked superiority. He desired that the responsibility for devising a plan and of executing it should not be placed on his shoulders alone. To carry out a plan of the kind, the viceroys and governors of all provinces would have to work together earnestly and harmoniously for many years. In justification of his contentions, Li appealed to the events of the Taiping Rebellion, and putting his finger on one of the open sores of the Chinese government, he demanded a radical reform of the examinations for the public service. Not 'great scholars' but 'capable administrators' should, he urged, be appointed to posts in the government service. He demanded an annual sum of 4,000,000 taels for the navy and coastal defence, and with it he promised in five years to endow China with a strong navy. Formosa and Shantung being the parts of the Empire most liable to be attacked, the most capable generals should be stationed

there. Li summarized his opinions in the form of three propositions.

- ' 1. It is essential to strengthen the national defences ;
- ' 2. It is essential to organize a strong navy ; and
- ' 3. There is no immediate need to attack Japan.'

As a result of the advice tendered by Li and of the defeats suffered by the Chinese in the Franco-Chinese War of 1884-5, during which Chang-Pei-Lun's squadron was signally discomfited off Foochow, a serious attempt was made to modernize the Chinese fleet. A Board of Admiralty and a Naval College, entrance to which was by a competitive examination on rational lines, were created.

The memorial of Chang-Pei-Lun, who married Li Hung-Chang's daughter in 1888, and the commentary of Li Hung-Chang himself, show the dangerous position in which Japan was placed. China could have easily purchased in Europe the units of an overwhelming navy. Had she done so, and had she re-employed Gordon or given *carte blanche* to a von der Goltz, the campaign about to be described might have taken a very different turn.

Luckily for Japan and for the cause of civilization, the Chinese ministers were too corrupt and lazy to organize the vast resources of men, money, and financial credit at their disposal. The governors of the provinces were not brought under the firm control of a central body, and when war broke out there was an almost total absence of co-ordination between the local fleets and armies. In effect, the Japanese had to deal only with the men-of-war and armed forces stationed in, around, or in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Pechili,

At the opening of hostilities the Chinese navy consisted of four squadrons, of which the one stationed in the north

was alone engaged. It consisted of two second-class battle-ships (the *Ting-Yuen* and *Chen-Yuen*), three armoured cruisers, three third-class protected cruisers, two third-class unprotected cruisers, six gunboats, two training-ships, and some thirteen torpedo-boats. The other squadrons, however, lent the northern fleet two torpedo-gunboats, one gunboat, two dispatch vessels, and two transports. The senior officers were, as a rule, very inefficient; the junior, however, were good, and the crews courageous and well disciplined.

At the fortress of Port Arthur on the tip of the Liao-Tung peninsula, which like a toe protrudes south-eastwards from Manchuria into the waters between Shantung and Corea, there was a first-rate dockyard. The approaches to Port Arthur on land were guarded by the forts of Ta-lien-wan, a few miles to its north-east. Across the sea, at the fortified port of Wei-hai-wei on the northern coast of Shantung, there were naval workshops and stores. Port Arthur guarded on the north, Wei-hei-wei on the south, the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili. A hundred miles of sea—some twenty miles less than the distance between Kiushiu and Corea—separated Shantung from Port Arthur. The Gulf of Pechili extends some two hundred miles inward and westward from the longitude of Port Arthur. Peking, the capital of the amorphous Chinese Empire, is less than a hundred miles from the western coast of the gulf. Peking had been captured in 1860 by a Franco-British force. From Taku, the port of landing for an expedition to Peking, to Nagasaki on the west coast of Kiushiu, is by sea a distance of some 900 miles. To transport on shipboard troops from Nagasaki to Taku would roughly be equivalent to transporting them from Liverpool to Oporto.

To the Chinese fleet protecting the Gulf of Pechili, Japan could oppose no battleships so powerful as the *Ting-Yuen* and *Chen-Yuen*. She possessed in 1894 only one third-class battleship, four armoured first-class cruisers, seven second-class protected cruisers, nine third-class cruisers, two sloops, eight gunboats, a dispatch vessel, and a torpedo-boat flotilla. On paper she seemed, so far as her navy was concerned, to be in the same state of inferiority as she had been when Hideyoshi commenced his invasion of Corea. But the Japanese ships were faster than the Chinese; the officers, trained by British or by British-trained instructors, were excellent, and the men were worthy of their officers. The number of disciplined sailors on whom she could count was far greater than that in the Chinese service.

While the navies of the belligerent Powers were on a fair equality, the armies were most unequally matched. A British officer, Captain Younghusband, who visited the Japanese islands not long before the war, discovered to his astonishment that the Japanese army was of European quality. Six territorial divisions, each 17,000 strong, with an Imperial Guard mustering 13,000—or a grand total of 115,000 officers and men—formed the force ready to be thrown into Corea and Manchuria.

The Guards and 4th Division were armed with magazine, the rest with Murata, rifles. Supported by an excellent and numerous artillery, led by dauntless and capable officers who had studied in Europe and America or been taught in Japan by experienced theorists like the celebrated German strategist and tactician, Meckel, the Japanese army could, probably, even then have measured itself with any European army of the same size. The Satsuma rebellion had shown

that the conscripts as soldiers were not behind the samurai in fighting qualities, and the Mikado, who was commander-in-chief, was reckoned by the rank and file to be a god. The odds on land against China were much greater than those against Persia when Alexander crossed the Hellespont.

In the first place the Chinese was not a national army. Each province in China had a separate force, which consisted of 'Banner-men', the descendants of the Manchu conquerors and of the renegade Chinamen who had rallied to their cause, of 'Green Standard' troops—what remained of the Chinese Army defeated by the Manchus—and of 'Braves', volunteers originally in Gordon's 'ever-victorious army', or those who had subsequently replaced them.

The 'Banner-men', if we except those in Manchuria, were worthless. Only the 'Braves' and a specially trained section of the 'Green Standard' men were of any account. Many of them were armed with modern weapons, but they had had little training. In 1884 a scheme had been prepared for drilling the Manchurian troops who were nearest to the probable theatre of war, Corea. In each of the three provinces of Manchuria 10,000 recruits were annually to be called up and drilled, but this ordinance had been ignored. The few Manchurians who had been trained were, however, excellent soldiers.

'Li Hung-Chang's army' had been deputed to defend the shores of the Gulf of Pechili, but the Imperial Guard and the 13,000 'Banner-men', who formed the Peking field force and were armed with modern weapons, were not under Li's command. It was calculated that in the whole Empire, with its population estimated at 400,000,000, there were but 400,000 trained soldiers. In Shantung, Chihli, and Manchuria there were not more than 125,000.



The infantry were armed with Mauser, Remington, Winchester, and other rifles, including a native-made one which had to be carried and manipulated by two men. Krupp had supplied the field-guns, but the Chinese artillerymen did not know how to use them efficiently. The common soldiers were brave enough, but most of the officers were conceited, ignorant, and corrupt. The Koreans had materially helped the Chinese against Hideyoshi's armies. In 1894 the effeminate and degenerate Koreans were valueless allies.

Corea, the Hermit Kingdom, for the control of which China and Japan were fighting, is a peninsula some 400 miles long by, on an average, 150 miles wide. Not twice the length and about the width of Scotland, it forms the western boundary of the Sea of Japan. Imagine Scotland lengthened, pointing south and attached to Manchuria, one then gets a fair idea of Corea. Along part of the base of the peninsula flows the River Yalu, entering the Yellow Sea at the eastern end of the base of the Liao-tung peninsula. Near the mouth of the Yalu and on its northern bank is the important town of Antung. The River Tumen, which rises near the head-waters of the Yalu, flows north-eastward along the remainder of the Korean frontier into the Sea of Japan at a point some seventy-five miles south-west of Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway. In February 1890 the Tsar Alexander III had issued a rescript authorizing the construction of a railway across Siberia. It was to be completed in ten years. Commenced at both ends, the eastern section had been opened in September 1893. Unless Japan speedily became the suzerain of Corea, she might see the peninsula snatched from her grasp by Russia. The Tsarevitch Nicholas (after-

wards Tsar Nicholas II), who had visited Japan in 1891, had been wounded by a Japanese fanatic, and might be expected to cherish no very kindly feelings towards the Japanese. Russia, besides, was seeking everywhere for an ice-free port.

Beyond and north of the Yalu and Tumen rivers is a range of wooded mountains crossed by several roads, of which the most important is the Imperial Peking Highway leading to Peking by way of Liao-yang. It traverses the mountains by the Motien Ling ('Heaven-reaching' Pass), 4,000 feet high. West of the Motien are several other passes.

Corea itself has been picturesquely described as being 'as plentifully sprinkled with mountains as a ploughed field with ridges'. It is an agricultural country, which was a reason why Japan could not afford to see it pass into the hands of a Power likely to prevent Corean cereals from reaching her shores. The Japanese population—now rapidly increasing—had experienced numerous famines in the nineteenth century, in consequence of the failure of home crops. Corea possesses excellent harbours, the best being on the east Gensan or Wonsan, 330 miles south-west of Vladivostok; on the south Masampo, a splendid land-locked harbour, and Fusan; on the west Mokpo, and north of it, Chemulpo, the port of Seoul. Above Chemulpo, at the mouth of the Ping-yang inlet, is Chinampo, closed two months every year by ice. There were Japanese settlements at Gensan, Fusan, Chemulpo, and Seoul. Between Corea and either Kiushiu or the south-western end of Honshiu lies the island of Tsushima, which was in the possession of Japan. The Fusan-Tsushima channel is some forty, the Tsushima-Shimonoseki channel but seventy miles

or so wide. Since with mines these two channels could be sealed up or navigation in them rendered dangerous, even if Japan were worsted at sea, it would be difficult for the Chinese to enter the Sea of Japan. The island of Iki, too, split up the Tsushima-Shimonoseki channel.

Thus Japan could safely land troops on the east or south of Corea, and if the Chinese fleet were beaten or refused to fight, also on the west coast. The west coast alone was really open to the Chinese, but they could move their armies across the Manchurian mountains and the Yalu into Corea.

Under the Convention of Tientsin it had been arranged that troops should be withdrawn from Corea by both China and Japan, and that, if their presence were again needed, contingents of equal strength should be simultaneously sent to the peninsula by the two countries. At the beginning of 1894 disturbances broke out in the southern provinces. In 1859, eight years after the appearance of Teinteh, the Mahdi of the Taipings, a Corean fanatic living near Fusan began preaching a gospel compounded of Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Christianity. He had been beheaded as a Roman Catholic in 1865, but his followers, like the Taipings, had formed themselves into a political society, the Tonghaks. The Tonghaks, mostly rustics, now rose; and the King of Corea appealed for help to his nominal suzerain, China. Chinese troops were dispatched to Asan, south of Seoul (June 8), and the Japanese landed on June 12 at Chemulpo a corresponding force, which entered the capital the next day. By the end of June the Japanese troops at Chemulpo under Major-General Oshima amounted to 8,000, while the Chinese at Asan numbered only 2,500. The Tokyo Cabinet proposed to

China that China and Japan should reform Corea. The proposal met with a supercilious refusal. Japan determined to undertake the work by herself, and notified China that the sending of reinforcements to Corea would be construed as an act of hostility. Nevertheless, 1,000 Chinese arrived at Asan, 3,500 crossed the Yalu and marched to Ping-yang, and 3,500 left Mukden, the Manchurian capital, en route for Corea.

On July 20, Japan delivered an ultimatum to the Korean government, and called on China to withdraw her troops from Corea. An unsatisfactory reply was received. Two days later, 11,000 Chinese troops from Taku and Port Arthur were on their way to Corea—3,000 for Asan, 8,000 for Ping-yang, which is on the road from Seoul to the Yalu. On July 23 the Japanese at Seoul seized the Royal Palace. The Korean government, overawed, expressed its wish that the Chinese should be expelled. General Oshima, leaving detachments in the capital and, north of it, on the road to Ping-yang, promptly moved south on Asan.

On the 24th a portion of the Chinese reinforcements arrived there by sea, and the next day three Chinese war-ships, escorting a transport to Asan with 1,200 more Chinese troops, engaged three Japanese cruisers. The result of the action was never in doubt. One Chinese man-of-war was captured, another had to be abandoned, and the third, seriously damaged, took to its heels. The transport, with Captain Galsworthy and Major von Hanneken on board, bravely refused to surrender, and was sunk. On August 1 war was formally declared.

When considering the conduct of the belligerents immediately preceding the war, it must be remembered that, while Corea was according to the Chinese contention

a vassal of China, it was only an outlying cul-de-sac and a tiny and unimportant portion of the Chinese dominions. To Japan, however, Korea was what Belgium and Holland are to ourselves. Had the Japanese been Europeans it is probable that they would not in the circumstances have waited so patiently.

Meanwhile the Chinese at Asan had marched out to meet Oshima. On the 29th they were defeated by the Japanese, and the beaten troops made their way east of Seoul to Ping-yang. Oshima returned to Seoul, and Korea, south of the capital, was clear of the Chinese. On August 6 the remainder of General Nodzu's Division (the 5th), of which Oshima's force was a detachment, landed at Fusan and marched up the peninsula to Seoul, which Nodzu reached at the end of the month. On August 10 a Japanese fleet of nineteen men-of-war was off Wei-hai-wei. A few days later, another Japanese force under General Sato was disembarked at Gensan. From that town Sato could march against the left flank and rear of the Chinese troops stationed at Ping-yang. By September 12 the 3rd Division (General Katsura) had completed its disembarkation at Chemulpo. The 3rd and 5th Divisions formed the Japanese 1st Army, commanded by Marshal Yamagata. By a series of combined movements, Nodzu, Oshima, and Sato dislodged the Chinese, 17,000 strong, from their entrenched position at Ping-yang (September 15-16). The Chinese lost in the battle some 6,000 killed and wounded, the Japanese no more than 189 killed and 516 wounded.

The naval action of July 24 and the battle of Ping-yang were symptomatic of the course which the war was to take. On September 17 the Chinese fleet (fourteen men-of-war and some torpedo-boats), which had safely convoyed trans-

ports with reinforcements to the mouth of the Yalu and was returning to its base, was intercepted by a Japanese fleet (eleven men-of-war) under Admiral Ito. The battleships, *Ting-Yuen* and *Chen-Yuen*, were each of over 7,000 tons displacement. Ito's strongest ships were belted cruisers of 4,000 tons. After fierce fighting, the second considerable naval action of the steamship era ended in four Chinese ships being sunk. The two battleships escaped.

The Japanese had obtained effective command of the sea, and the Chinese army in Corea was in full retreat towards the Yalu and the frontiers of Manchuria. General Sung, the commandant of Port Arthur, with 20,000 troops entrenched himself on the Manchurian bank of the river north of Antung. His left wing was across the Ai-ho, a tributary of the Yalu which enters it some miles above the town, and rested on Hushan Hill, in the fork of the Ai-ho and Yalu. The main Japanese body on October 23 arrived at Wiju, opposite Hushan Hill. During the night of the 24th-25th the Yalu, above its junction with the Ai-ho, was bridged by the Japanese, and at 8 a.m. on the 25th Hushan Hill was carried by assault. By 10.30 a.m. the Chinese left wing had been driven across the Ai-ho; on the next day the Japanese entered Antung. The losses on both sides were insignificant.

The victory of the Yalu completed the Japanese conquest of Corea. Sung's routed troops retired into Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula. During the winter there was fighting in the approaches to and in the passes of the Manchurian mountains, but, thanks to the naval victory of September 17, the Japanese could now turn that obstacle from the south-west.

A second Japanese Army (38,620 strong) under Marshal

Oyama had been already formed. On October 24, the day before the battle of the Yalu, part of Oyama's army landed in the Liao-tung peninsula, west of Takushan. Oyama's aim was to reduce the Chinese naval bases of Ta-lien-wan and Port Arthur. The peninsula just north of the Ta-lien bay tapers. On the land side the natural point to defend is the isthmus of Chin-chou. Six forts, armed with Krupp and Creusot guns, covered Ta-lien-wan. The Chinese fleet, instead of assisting the defenders, steamed away to Wei-hai-wei.

On November 6 the Japanese captured Chin-chou, and the Ta-lien-wan forts were evacuated by the Chinese the next day. Ta-lien-wan became the Japanese base for the siege of Port Arthur, which is at the extremity of the peninsula. An attempt of Sung moving down from Haicheng on Chin-chou to relieve Port Arthur failed (November 21). The same day Oyama, with a loss of 400 or so killed and wounded, stormed the forts of Port Arthur, armed with Krupp and other guns and defended by a garrison of some 14,000 troops. The Chinese had 2,000 killed and wounded, but most of them escaped up the western shore past Chin-chou and joined Sung.

The Japanese First Army, commanded no longer by Yamagata but by Nodzu, now moved into Manchuria from the Yalu region. On December 3 Katsura, with the Third Division from Antung, marched westward. His objective was Haicheng. On the 19th he defeated Sung in an action at Kangwangtsai, and, at the opening of 1895, Nogi—detached by Oyama to assist Katsura—captured Kaiping, forty miles south of Haicheng. The latter town was occupied by the Japanese. There, on January 17, they were feebly attacked by 15,000 Tartars and Mongolians.

The same day an expeditionary force for the capture of Wei-hai-wei assembled in Ta-lien-wan.

This force (the Second Division and part of the Sixth Division) after a feint (January 18-19) had been made west of Wei-hai-wei, sailed on January 19. It was escorted by the Japanese fleet. The next day the disembarkation began in Yungcheng Bay. A week later the march on Wei-hai-wei began. The town lies at the centre of the shores of a semicircular bay. The bay is six miles wide ; in its mouth is the considerable island of Liu-kung-tao, and south-east of it the islet of Itao. There were forts on the island and islet. The Chinese fleet under its brave admiral, Ting, had taken refuge in the harbour. Forts on both horns of the bay commanded the entrances, which were blocked by booms.

On January 30 the Japanese captured the forts round the south-eastern horn ; and on February 2 Wei-hai-wei itself was occupied. During the night of February 4-5 ten Japanese torpedo-boats slipped into the harbour round the boom blocking the south-eastern entrance. The battleship *Ting-Yuen* was torpedoed, but the Japanese lost one torpedo-boat, while two others were badly damaged. The following night five Japanese torpedo-boats entered the harbour by the north-western entrance and sank two more ships. On the 7th the fort on Itao was silenced by bombardment, and the eleven Chinese torpedo-boats, trying to escape, were either sunk or captured.

Another bombardment on the 9th resulted in the silencing of the fort on Liu-kung-tao and the destruction of a Chinese cruiser. Admiral Ting committed suicide on the 12th, and on the 16th what was left of the Chinese fleet and also the unsilenced forts surrendered. The guns on



the mainland were destroyed or removed ; a small garrison was left on Liu-kung-tao ; and the Expeditionary Force withdrew to Port Arthur.

The fortresses guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili having been reduced and the Chinese fleet having been put out of action, a blow could be struck at Peking. On February 24 the Chinese were defeated north of Kaiping, and on the 28th Katsura attacked the enemy on the road leading northward through Liao-yang to Mukden, the Manchurian capital. At the beginning of March the Japanese captured Neuchuang and advanced westward to the Liao river. On March 8 an army of 30,000 Chinese was severely defeated near the mouth of the Liao.

This defeat and the preparations of the Japanese to transport another army by sea from Port Arthur to Taku brought the Chinese to reason. On March 20 Li Hung-Chang landed at Shimonoseki, and negotiations with Count Ito commenced. Four days later Li was wounded by a Japanese fanatic. Just before, Japanese reserve troops had been landed on Fisher Island in the Pescadores, west of Formosa.

An armistice was concluded on March 30, during which the Japanese Guards and Fourth Division were dispatched to Ta-lien-wan and Oyama's Army concentrated there. Prince Komatsu was appointed commander of the land and sea forces for the Peking Expedition. The First and Third Divisions of Nodzu's Army were drawn back from their advanced position in Manchuria ; and the Fifth Division alone was left to hold the country between the Yalu and the Liao.

Although the Chinese, it was estimated, could muster 200,000 troops of sorts for the defence of Peking, the

menace of a Peking expedition was sufficient to convert the armistice into a peace. On April 17 the Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the war. By its terms the independence of Korea was recognized. The Liao-tung peninsula, together with Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan; a heavy indemnity (£25,160,256) was to be paid to Japan, and Wei-hai-wei held in pledge by her until it was paid. Various commercial advantages were also secured by Japan for herself and foreigners.

Thus Mutsuhito had succeeded where Hideyoshi had failed. The Japanese had gained useful strategical information for any future campaigns in Korea and Manchuria, and they had established a moral ascendancy in those regions which would be of immense value to them in the event of another war. From the Pescadores and Formosa the Japanese Island Empire stretched north-eastward from the latitude of Hong-Kong to above that of Vladivostok. It barred egress into the Pacific from Middle and Northern China, Korea, and Southern Siberia.

*From the Chino-Japanese War to the Russo-Japanese War*

THE Treaty of Shimonoseki was immediately followed by an incident, the circumstances surrounding which are still diplomatic secrets. In February 1895 Russia had circularized the European Powers and the U.S.A. on the question of the terms which Japan should be allowed to impose on China. In March the Japanese received a friendly warning from the German government that Russia and France would intervene if Japan acquired any portion of Manchuria. From the language in which the warning was couched the Japanese did not gather that Germany had any intention of helping Russia and France. The German warning was hardly needed. Russia and France were firm allies. Both had reason to take umbrage at the rise of Japan. Russia and France—French investors had advanced much of the money for the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway—hoped to acquire some Manchurian or Korean port free from ice all the year round as the terminus of the line. Headed off Turkey by the Teutonic Powers, and off Persia and India by Great Britain, it was natural for Russia to wish to expand into Manchuria and Corea. As for France, the French possessions in Tonking and Annam made her hostile to the growth of a progressive and militant Asiatic Power, who, for aught she could tell, might intrigue with her Oriental subjects.

Japan was prepared, therefore, to find Russia and France in her path. But since Great Britain, at that date on bad terms with both, had given before the war unmistakable proof that she was not in secret alliance with China, there was the possibility of securing her help against the northern and the southern of Japan's European neighbours.

Scarcely, however, had the Treaty of Shimonoseki been signed than Germany, which had no territorial interests in the Far East, suddenly took up a hostile attitude. The step was unexpected because, just before the war began, Germany had shown that she would not permit Corea to be converted into a Russian Protectorate; also the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Mutsu, on the conclusion of peace had received a congratulatory telegram from the German Minister at Tokyo, Baron von Gutschmid. The surprise of Count Mutsu and his subordinate, the diplomat Hayashi, may well be imagined when on April 23, 1895, after the Russian and French ambassadors had delivered to Hayashi a Note advising Japan to 'renounce the definite possession of the Liao-tung peninsula', Baron von Gutschmid called on Hayashi and handed him another and harsher Note, written in bad Japanese. This Note pointed out to Japan that she had no chance of victory in a war with Russia, Germany, and France, and that she should for her own sake give up the Liao-tung peninsula. Hayashi induced the Baron to declare that the translation of the German Note did not express the meaning of the original. It was withdrawn and another Note, identical with the comparatively polite Russian and French Note, was substituted for it.

Whatever the significance of Germany's appearance by the side of France and Russia—probably it was a plot to embroil Russia with Japan—it was hopeless after Germany's action

for Japan to expect help from Great Britain. Lord Rosebery, then British Premier, had, indeed, refused to join in the coercive measure taken by the three European Powers, but it was incredible that Great Britain, with her traditional friendship for Prussia, would quarrel with Germany as well as with Russia and France. Japan, as in 1853, recognized her material inferiority, and on May 6 abandoned her claims to Port Arthur, to Ta-lien-wan, and to the rest of the ceded continental territory. She accepted from China an additional indemnity of £4,906,250, the payment of which was secured by a loan to China guaranteed by Russia. As recompense for the services of Russia, France, and Germany, China granted to Russia the right to construct a branch of the Trans-Siberian Railway in Northern Manchuria, to France she made concessions in Yunnan and along the Yangtse, and she ceded to Germany a portion of the city of Tientsin. With the French moving up into the central regions of China, with Germans at the gates of Peking, and with the Russians descending into Manchuria and Corea, it seemed that the partition of China for the benefit of the three Powers was at hand.

That German hands had pulled the strings in these proceedings may be regarded as certain. Kaiser Wilhelm II had by 1895 commenced his propaganda for a German navy. In the January of that year he had lectured members of the Reichstag on the pressing need for a strong fleet, and had illustrated his contentions with arguments drawn from the Chino-Japanese War. The spectre of a Yellow Peril was being raised by him. It was subsequently to be visualized in the quaint cartoon presented to the Tsar Nicholas II, in which the peaceful and placid figure of Buddha, seated on a sombre cloud, threatened the cities and cathedrals of

Europe, while the German Michael called the attention of figures representing the various European States to the dangers which they were supposed to be running.

The events just described naturally caused a profound sensation in Japan. The Mikado's statesmen and soldiers had attentively studied the history and habits of the Teutonic new-comers, now knocking at the door of China. Prussianized Germany on the surface resembled Japan; in spirit it was the farthest removed of all the European Powers from her. With the high sense of honour derived from the samurai, the Japanese could not but detest the methods of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. The seizure of Silesia in 1740, the collapse of Prussia and of the rest of Germany before Napoleon, her cringeing and treacherous conduct when she emancipated herself in 1812-13, the absence of good faith exhibited by Bismarck towards Denmark, Austria, France, and Russia, were episodes calculated to disgust the islanders. 'Napoleon I', had written a Japanese historian a few years before Commodore Perry arrived, 'was, perhaps, the greatest hero ever known in the Western countries; but, if you compare him with the heroes in our own history, their deeds and morals are as wide apart as the pig and the lion.' If Napoleon appeared to the Japanese to be a pig, what were their innermost reflections on Frederick II and on Bismarck, who in 1892 had unblushingly revealed his diplomatic card-sharpping with the Ems telegram?

With Baron von Gutschmid's visit to Hayashi on April 23, 1895, a new era in Japanese diplomacy opened. Hayashi himself and other enlightened patriots perceived that the safety of their country would depend on their establishing alliances with European Powers other than Germany. The

choice lay between Russia and France on the one hand and Great Britain on the other. A party headed by Ito favoured Russia and France, a party headed by Katsura, Komura, and Kato was Anglophil. Hayashi lent his powerful support to the idea of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance. That Katsura, Komura, Kato, and Hayashi, with the support of the Mikado, carried the day was due to several causes.

Having expelled China from Corea, Japan at once discovered that the Russians intended to take China's place in the Hermit Kingdom. Under a Convention, signed at Seoul on May 13, 1896, the Russians secured the right to maintain a Legation Guard at Seoul of the same strength (800 men) as the Japanese. In 1897, without notifying the Mikado's government, Russian military advisers and a financial adviser, M. Alexeieff, who ousted the British adviser, Mr. McLeavy Browne, were attached to the Corean court. As a counterbalance, Japan obtained the right to guard the telegraph line from Fusan to Seoul, the property of Japanese capitalists, and at the end of 1897 to make a railway between the two cities. In April 1898 a Convention (the Nishi-Rosen Convention) was signed at Tokyo, under which Russia and Japan recognized the independence of Corea and promised not to send military and financial advisers to Corea except by mutual consent.

Meanwhile, Germany was again on the prowl. In the autumn of the same year (1897) two German missionaries had been murdered in Shantung. Taking advantage of these crimes, which may or may not have been incited by German agents, Germany on November 14 seized the shores round the Bay of Kiao-Chau in Shantung, south of Wei-hai-wei, and Prince Henry of Prussia, with a strong squadron, was dispatched to the Far East. He was bidden

by his brother, Wilhelm II, if need were, to strike with the 'mailed fist'.

The shores of Kiao-Chau Bay are some seventy miles from those of Lai-Chow Bay, on the northern coast of Shantung. The object of the Germans was to work north from Kiao-Chau, and ultimately cut off the peninsula, at whose north-eastern end is Wei-hai-wei, the port guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili. As the Chinese had not paid up the final instalment of the war indemnity, Wei-hai-wei was still in the possession of Japan.

Whether this, the first encroachment by Europeans on the mainland of China, was encouraged by Russia is uncertain. Count Muravieff, the Russian Foreign Minister, in answer to a question of Hayashi (then at St. Petersburg), denied it. On March 6, 1898, China granted to Germany a lease for ninety-nine years of the Kiao-Chau territory, and the Kaiser, according to a statement of Prince Henry, invited the Tsar to take Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan. The Russians fell into the trap; they procured from China a lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan for twenty-five years. The extremity of the Liao-tung peninsula was occupied by them on March 28. France, about the same time, secured (April 10) a lease of Kwang-chow-wan, between Tonking and Canton, and Great Britain, with the cordial approval of Japan, procured a lease for ninety-nine years of territory on the mainland adjacent to Hong-Kong and a lease of Wei-hai-wei, terminable only when the Russians evacuated Port Arthur and its vicinity. The Japanese thereupon handed over Wei-hai-wei to Great Britain.

After events have revealed the secret objects of the Kaiser and the German diplomatists. So long as the Russian Army was intact and undefeated, there was little chance



that Germany and Austria-Hungary would be able to conquer Europe and the world. If, however, the Russians could be tempted into a disastrous Asiatic enterprise which would lower their prestige, disorganize their army and finances, and produce internal disturbances in European Russia, Germany and her ally might be able to crush France. From the German standpoint, neither a Russo-Turkish nor an Anglo-Russian war promised such excellent results as a Russo-Japanese one. The German government, through Meckel and other officers employed in Japan, was well aware of the great strength of the Japanese army. It knew that the Russian navy, then honeycombed with corruption, would stand little chance in a war with the Japanese. If Russia acquired Port Arthur and extended the Trans-Siberian line through Manchuria into the Liaotung peninsula, a Russo-Japanese war was almost inevitable. The absorption of Manchuria and the peninsula by Russia must, sooner or later, mean that Corea would become a Russian dependency, and Corea was to Japan what Belgium and Holland are to ourselves.

In the spring of 1899 the Russians began to connect with Port Arthur the Trans-Siberian Railway which, apart from the section round Lake Baikal, was to be completed by the end of the year. The Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway Company) had enabled the Russian engineers to avoid the long *détour* to Vladivostok by the banks of the Amur.<sup>1</sup> From Harbin on the Manchurian Railway, a railway through Mukden and Liao-yang to Port Arthur had been designed. This was now put in hand and

<sup>1</sup> In 1896 China had entered into a contract with the Russo-Chinese Bank for the construction of this railway, which was virtually part of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

rapidly built. At the same time, Port Arthur was re-fortified, and a magnificent modern city at lavish expense laid out at Dalny on the southern promontory of the Bay of Ta-lien. Such encroachments on China were calculated to make the Chinese and Coreans consider that the ultimate victory of Russia over any competitor in the Far East was a foregone conclusion. But for the moment Corea was neglected by the Tsar's advisers.

While these events were occurring in Manchuria and the Liao-tung peninsula, the Sudan had been conquered by Kitchener, and the military prestige of British arms, lowered by the reverse at Majuba and by our failure in 1884 to save 'Chinese' Gordon, revived. Immediately afterwards, at the end of 1899, we were involved in the South African War, a war entered on by the Boers largely because they had been promised German support. The defeats suffered by us at the opening of the campaign again lowered our prestige, but the victories of Roberts and Kitchener in the first half of 1900 once more raised it.

Simultaneously with the South African War, an anti-Christian movement in China, known as the 'Boxer rising', broke out. The movement had started in Shantung where, it will be remembered, the Germans had planted themselves in Kiao-Chau. The Governor of the province had not looked askance at the Boxers, but had enrolled them as militia. To canalize the fanaticism of Shantung and direct it against the 'foreign devils' seemed to him and his superiors to be a statesmanlike proceeding. That the Boxer movement was favoured by the court at Peking is unquestionable.

In 1898 the Dowager Empress, Tzu Hsi, who had ceased to be Regent in 1889, had resumed control of the Chinese government. Her nephew, the Emperor Kuang-Hsu,

enlightened by the results of the Chino-Japanese War, had vainly attempted in the summer of 1898 to effect in China what Mutsuhito had effected in Japan. He had issued a series of decrees which, if carried out, would have modernized his country. 'If we continue', he said, in the first of them, 'to drift with our army untrained, our revenues disorganized, our scholars ignorant, and our artisans without technical training, how can we possibly hope to hold our own among the nations and to cross the gulf which divides the weak from the strong? . . . What we desire to attain is the elimination of useless things and the advancement of learning which, while based on ancient principles, shall yet move in harmony with the times.'<sup>1</sup> The absurd system of examinations for entrance into the public service was abolished, and candidates were henceforth expected to show a knowledge of the history of foreign countries and contemporary politics. The Emperor announced that he and Tzu Hsi would travel to Tientsin by train—a step shocking to orthodox Chinese. A number of lucrative sinecures were abolished. It was even suggested by the Secretary, Wang Chao, that the Emperor and the Dowager Empress should visit Japan and Europe.

Wang Chao's memorial was suppressed by the Board of Rites, and the Emperor, on discovering that the Board had done so, cashiered the high officials of that venerable branch of the bureaucracy. Other Imperial edicts ordered the macadamizing of the streets of Peking, and the enrolment of a national militia. In the last of the important decrees which the Emperor was to issue, he pointed out that Europe was ahead of China in most essential matters, and that,

<sup>1</sup> *China under the Empress Dowager*, by J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse (Heinemann), pp. 106-7.

unless the Chinese imitated the Europeans, they must perforce fall a prey to the latter. He commanded that the whole of his reform decrees should be printed on yellow paper and distributed, and that his edict should be exhibited in the front hall of every public office.

Like Joseph II of Austria in the eighteenth century, the Chinese Emperor had grievously miscalculated the strength of the forces of reaction. He had, it is true, the support of many sensible men, but the vast majority of his subjects—and of course the eunuchs and other parasites who lived by plundering the people—remained of the opinions expressed in 1873 by the Censor, Wu K'o-tu, in his memorial to Tzu Hsi. The philosopher Mencius, Wu had recalled to the Empress, had asked, 'Why should the Superior Man engage in altercation with birds and beasts?' The Europeans were, so the Censor considered, on the level of dogs, horses, goats, and pigs. 'I have heard and believe', he said, 'that the rulers of foreign nations are deposed by their subjects for all the world like pawns on a chess board'; and that, 'in their dispatches and treaties, the puny hobgoblin or petty monsters whom they have the audacity to call "Emperors" are placed on an equality with His Sacred Majesty!'

The Dowager Empress, or the 'Old Buddha', as she was styled, had found Wu K'o-tu's memorial 'not lacking in point'. She now, in 1898, placed herself at the head of the reactionaries. The Emperor, attempting to forestall her meditated *coup d'état*, was betrayed and deposed by Jung Lu, the 'Old Buddha's' favourite. China was not yet to be awakened. 'The ancient system' of examinations, which the Empress falsely asserted had 'worked most satisfactorily for two centuries', was restored.

Though the 'Old Buddha' had cut short her nephew's career as a reformer, she was too wise not to perceive that certain changes must be made, if the 'foreign devils' were to be excluded from the Celestial Empire. She and Jung Lu hoped, with the aid of the gentry, to create and arm train-bands, so that finally she would be able to oppose to the intrusive aliens a huge nation in arms. If we can rely on the statements of Jung Lu in a letter written to the Viceroy of Fukien in July 1900, the Boxers, who were fanatics and believed that they were invulnerable, were to be utilized. As a fighting force, said Jung Lu, the Boxers were 'absolutely useless', but they were 'ready to fight and to face death'. It was, he added, a very gratifying surprise to see any Chinese display courage. The 'Old Buddha' does not appear to have shared her favourite's scepticism. According to Ching Shan, who was attached to the court, and whose diary has been published, she learned by heart a Boxer incantation, and every time she repeated it aloud, the chief eunuch shouted, 'There goes one more foreign devil'.<sup>1</sup>

Under the Empress's patronage the movement spread throughout Northern China. At the beginning of 1900 it had assumed alarming proportions. The Imperial troops sent to suppress the revolt fraternized with the Boxers. In June the Chancellor of the Japanese Legation and the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, were murdered and the foreign legations attacked. At the same time a wave of fanaticism spread over Manchuria. Reckless of consequences, the people there rose against the Russians, and the half-completed railway from Harbin to Port Arthur was cut. For the moment troops could not be hurried

<sup>1</sup> *China under the Empress Dowager*, p. 279.

from Siberia to the rescue of the legations. The 'Old Buddha' openly sided with the Boxers and recognized them as her allies. If Ching Shan is to be believed, on June 21 she distributed largesse to a detachment of them, and said to Prince Tuan, 'The foreigners are like fish in the stew-pan. . . . If only the country will stand together, their defeat is certain'.

To save the legations, the Japanese were both ready and willing. With the war indemnity exacted from China, Japan had been able enormously to increase the strength of her navy and army. Foreseeing the probability of a war with Russia in the near future, her statesmen had been bringing the Japanese forces up to the level of those of a first-class European Power. Hence, in 1900, China was at Japan's mercy. But fearing that independent action on her part might result in another Russo-Franco-German coalition, and realizing that Great Britain, then in the throes of the South African War, was less likely than ever to help her, Japan waited for a European and American mandate to intervene. It was not long in coming. In July 3,000 troops were mobilized for the International Peking Relief Expedition, and the Japanese Fifth Division, with additional troops—in all some 22,000 men—was ultimately transported to Taku. Together with the European and American contingents, the Japanese speedily relieved the legations and forced the 'Old Buddha' to fly from the capital.

The conduct of the Japanese troops elicited the admiration of their European colleagues. General Kuropatkin, then Russian Minister of War, in his Memoirs states that he formed at the time a high opinion of their fighting qualities. The behaviour of the Japanese towards the defeated Chinese

contrasted most favourably with that of the Germans under Count Waldersee, the generalissimo of the international force. On July 27, the Kaiser at Bremerhaven had delivered his 'Hun' speech, and had commanded his troops embarking for China to emulate the savages, who under Attila had devastated Southern Europe in the fifth century A. D. The Imperial orders had been obeyed, and the hereditary taste of the Germans for murder, outrage, and looting had been powerfully stimulated.

The share of the Japanese in the suppression of the Boxer Rising enhanced Japan's reputation. But the Rising also led to the Russians obtaining a firmer hold on Manchuria. By the autumn of 1900, Russia had collected in Manchuria and for the Peking Expedition an army of 100,000 men. The Manchurian guerrilla bands were swiftly dispersed and the damage done to the railway between Harbin and Port Arthur repaired. As the Russians showed no serious intention of abandoning Manchuria and the Liao-tung peninsula, and it was to be presumed that they would endeavour to reduce Corea to vassalage, the Japanese had no option but to push on with their naval and military preparations.

It was now that Germany, which had commenced the partition of China and had disgraced Europeans in the Far East, adopted another measure calculated to promote war between Russia and Japan. The latter was not strong enough single-handed to fight both Russia and France. If, however, France could be immobilized, there could be little doubt that the Mikado would throw down the gauntlet to the Tsar. The Kaiser's problem was how to keep France from assisting Russia. If Great Britain could be induced to make an alliance with Japan, the French fleet would have to remain in European waters, and France, still irritated

by the Fashoda affair (1898), would be more than ever indignant with her neighbour across the Channel, while Russia might be expected—especially if she were defeated in a Russo-Japanese war—to be estranged permanently from Great Britain.

Accordingly, in the spring of 1901, Baron von Eckardstein, the German Chargé d'Affaires in London, a confidant of the Kaiser, suggested to Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador in London, that an alliance between Japan, Great Britain, and Germany should be concluded for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. The Baron added that many of the British Ministers were favourable to the idea. As long before as March 1898, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain had mentioned to Baron Kato, then Japanese Ambassador in London, that an Anglo-Japanese Alliance was desirable.

Having obtained permission from his government, Hayashi on April 17 called on Lord Lansdowne and opened negotiations. During the course of them von Eckardstein visited the British Foreign Office and warned Lord Lansdowne that Japan might make an alliance with Russia. As it happened, there was a strong party in Japan, headed by Ito and Inouye, anxious to arrange matters with the Russians. Ito was in fact preparing to visit St. Petersburg, where he would find in General Kuropatkin and others strong advocates for a peaceable solution.

The negotiations dragged on till the end of the year, when, thanks to the efforts of Hayashi, Katsura, and Komura, and to the personal predilections of the Mikado, the advice of Ito and Inouye was rejected. On January 30, 1902, at a date when Kitchener was on the point of concluding the South African War, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. By Articles II and III it was in effect provided that neither



Great Britain nor Japan should, in the event of a Far Eastern War, be obliged to fight single-handed against a combination of Powers. If either Great Britain or Japan were opposed by two or more belligerent Powers, the other of them would come to the aid of the Power attacked.

Germany was notified of the treaty, and very naturally showed no inclination to join the Alliance. Had she done so, Russia would have abandoned her designs on Manchuria and Corea, and concentrated all her available forces in Europe.

The lists were now cleared for the duel between Russia and Japan. On April 8, 1902, Russia indeed made a treaty with China, by which it was agreed that Manchuria (apart from the Russian possessions in the Liao-tung peninsula) should be evacuated, and in October the south-west portion of the Mukden province was restored to the Chinese. From General Kuropatkin's Memoirs one gathers that both he and the Tsar were anxious to avoid a Far Eastern war. In 1900 Kuropatkin had written in a memoir for his sovereign's guidance, 'Our western frontier has never in the whole history of Russia been exposed to such danger in the event of a European War as it is now'.

Nevertheless, Kuropatkin was unable to save Russia from a war with Japan. In 1898 a merchant of the name of Briner had obtained from the Korean government a concession for a timber company to exploit the forest wealth of the Upper Yalu. Four years later he sold his concession to a Russian bureaucrat, Bezobrazoff. The last-named interested various magnates, among them von Plehve, Minister of the Interior, and Admiral Alexeieff, in his scheme. As Bezobrazoff desired that his concessions on the Korean frontiers should be defended by force of arms

against the Japanese, he was naturally opposed to the evacuation of Mukden and Southern Manchuria. In the spring of 1903, Kuropatkin himself was sent to Port Arthur and Japan. He returned in the summer and embodied his ideas in a special report to the Tsar. On June 26, when on his way to Nagasaki, he had made a note in his diary to the effect that Russian interests in Corea and Manchuria were vastly less important than the 'maintenance of the territorial integrity of Russia against the Powers of the Triple Alliance'.


Kuropatkin's report was an amplification of these views. But suddenly Admiral Alexeieff was appointed Viceroy of the Far East. Kuropatkin offered his resignation on August 15. It was not accepted. Three days before (August 13) the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg had presented the draft of a treaty, the gist of which was that Japan was to dominate in Corea, Russia in Manchuria. The counter-proposals of Russia were submitted on October 3. While stipulating that the Japanese should not use any part of Corea for 'strategic purposes' or erect any military works capable of menacing freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits, also that there should be a neutral zone in Northern Corea, Russia demanded that she should have a free hand in Manchuria.

To these proposals Japan demurred. On December 6, Kuropatkin in a memorandum to the Tsar proposed that Port Arthur and the Kuan-tung peninsula should be restored to China, and that Russia should confine her activities in the Far East to Northern Manchuria. The economic interests of Russia in the Far East, he urged, were negligible; the revolutionary movement in Russia rendered it undesirable for her to engage in a foreign war. Kuropatkin

had no illusions as to the character of the Japanese army. In the report submitted after his return from Japan he had stated that the Japanese army was in his opinion 'fully equal to a European army'. Kuropatkin failed to convince his superiors. On January 13, 1904, Japan proposed that Manchuria should be outside Japan's and Corea outside Russia's sphere of influence. She requested an early reply to her proposal. No answer was received, and on February 6 the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg asked for his passports. Russia had collided with Japan. The Kaiser's diplomacy had so far been successful.



# Map of the area of the RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.



Map showing the positions of the Japanese & Russian Forces at the beginning of Feb. 1904.

**JAPANESE** — **MILITARY** **NAVAL**

**RUSSIAN** —

— *Rlys. completed, in Feb.*  
 - - - *" " projected, 1904.*  
 - - - *Boundaries of States*  
 ..... *Japanese light Railway constructed during the War.*

Scale of Miles.  
 0 50 100 200 300 400

N.B. Only the Railway Lines connecting the Head-Quarters of the Divisions are shown in Japan



*The Russo-Japanese War : from the opening  
of hostilities to the Battle of the Yalu*

THE Mikado was now about to engage himself and his army and navy in a struggle with the Power to prepare against whose advance on India Lord Roberts had devoted, and Lord Kitchener was then devoting, all their talents, time, and energy. The result to most Occidentals seemed a foregone conclusion. Russia, however, was the neighbour of Sweden, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, and could, therefore, with safety employ only a fraction of her forces in the Far East. The whole of her fleet was not stationed in the Pacific. Her armies in the event of a Manchurian campaign would hang at the end of a single line of railway running from the Ural Mountains across the sparsely populated steppes of Siberia. That railway would be exposed to the attacks of hostile Chinese and Manchurians. But the Russians were not the Chinese of Europe. Ere the Japanese, if they should succeed in defeating the Russian men-of-war and torpedo-boats, or in evading the Russian mine-fields, could conquer Corea or disembark an army in the Liao-tung peninsula, overwhelming forces, accustomed to rout Asiatics and led by scientific soldiers, would be concentrated south of Mukden. The Japanese, compared with the Russians, were, in appearance, dwarfs, and if the infantrymen of the Tsar, acting on the principles taught by a succession of tacticians

from Souvaroff to Dragomiroff, once crossed bayonets with their puny enemies, they might be expected to carry all before them. The Russian artillery was at least the equal of, and the Russian cavalry was far superior to, that of the Japanese. The huge Russian gold reserve, and the credit extended to a nation which in the Crimean War had not repudiated its debts, would enable the Tsar to purchase enormous quantities of weapons and munitions from Europe and America. Above all the Japanese were Asiatics.

Such were the calculations of those who prophesied the ultimate, if not necessarily rapid, success of Russia. It was overlooked that the Turks at Plevna and elsewhere had proved in 1877-8 that Asiatics, competently armed and led, could hold at bay the Muscovite soldiery; and that the Japanese were a scientifically trained nation-in-arms inspired by the loftiest patriotism, and fighting at their own doors for their very existence. The war, unpopular in Russia, then seething with discontent, would arouse the utmost enthusiasm in the temperate, frugal, intelligent, and now Occidentally-educated population of Japan. The Japanese were small, but they were tough and wiry men, and in the days of low-trajectory rifles, great height of body was a disadvantage. Accustomed to wrestle and practise ju-jutsu, and enamoured of cold steel, it was by no means certain that the Japanese would be worsted in fighting at close quarters. At sea the contest would be decided by explosives and not with cutlasses and marline-spike, and the islanders had learnt naval warfare from the British. Russia, besides, was at that date governed largely by a corrupt body of bureaucrats eager to accumulate wealth, whereas the Japanese rulers, with their samurai ideals, despised money and the luxuries which money buys.



Other advantages were possessed by Japan. While the Japanese realized to the full the strength and the weakness of their adversaries, the Russians, with few exceptions, looked down upon their opponents and underestimated both their intelligence and their moral and physical qualities. The Mikado, as General Kuropatkin subsequently pointed out, had hundreds of avowed and secret agents studying the Russian forces in the Far East ; on the other hand, the Russians had only a few experts investigating the Japanese military resources. One of these experts, according to Kuropatkin, 'declared in Vladivostok before the war that we [the Russians] might count one Russian soldier as being as good as three Japanese.'

The comments of the Russian Head-quarters Staff on the Japanese peace manœuvres in the year preceding the war were inept. The Japanese 'technical services were', it was admitted, 'excellent', and the junior officers displayed considerable initiative. But the senior officers of the Japanese army were incompetent ; vanguards moved too far in advance of the main bodies ; the flanks on the march and in action were unprotected, and operations at night were discountenanced. In attacks there was an absence of any definite objective, and the inelastic Japanese formations took no account of local conditions. Frontal assaults without turning movements were preferred, and advances in enclosed or hilly ground were avoided. There was a disbelief in the value of cold steel ; the reserves were used up too quickly, and there was a complete absence of any idea of pursuit. On the defensive, the Japanese, it seemed to their critics, took up positions too extensive, they neglected field fortifications, except of the simplest character, and they were apt to retire too rapidly.

Whether or not the deductions of the Russian Headquarters Staff were made from actual incidents accurately observed at the Japanese manœuvres, they certainly betrayed a woeful ignorance of Japanese history and psychology. The battle of the Yalu in the Chino-Japanese War had, as we have seen, been gained by a turning movement ; the favourite weapon of the samurai was the two-handed sword, and the favourite form of committing suicide in Japan self-disembowelment or 'hari-kari'. It was unreasonable to suppose that the Japanese generals were incapable of mastering that art of barbarians, as Napoleon called the art of war, the essence of which consists in being stronger at a given point. How mistaken were the Russian observers responsible for the document above analysed was soon apparent.

If the Russian Staff had badly miscalculated the quality of the Japanese army, far worse were the mistakes which it made with respect to the numbers of the enemy. The warnings of Colonel Adabash and Captain Rusin that Japan had reserve units were ignored. General Kuropatkin states that Japan was expected to be able to put in the field at the outset of the war some 125,000 men, and that the 'available supply of men for the permanent and territorial armies and for the dépôt troops amounted only to a little over 400,000'. Very different were the real figures. It seems that Japan in February 1904 possessed 850,000 trained soldiers, and that the untrained men available were, approximately, 4,250,000. If General Kuropatkin is correct, the Russians in Manchuria were opposed during the war by something like 1,500,000 armed men, or roughly by three armies, each numerically equal to that led by Napoleon against Russia in 1812.

The most fatal, however, of the mistakes made by the Russian military and naval advisers was their conclusion in 1903 that their plan of operations against the Japanese should be based on the assumption that it was 'impossible for the Russian fleet to be beaten', and that a Japanese landing at Neuchuang or in the Gulf of Corea was 'impracticable'.<sup>1</sup> Such assumptions were quite unwarranted. Russia had only one naval base in the Yellow Sea, and only one in the Sea of Japan. Port Arthur, the former of these bases, was strongly fortified, and the workshops there were excellent. But the only dock yet constructed at Port Arthur was too small to receive a battleship. At Vladivostok, the other of the bases, there was a dry dock capable of receiving a battleship, but the workshops were indifferent. The ice-free Port Arthur was divided from the, in winter, ice-bound Vladivostok by 1,300 miles of sea, and athwart the communications between the two harbours lay the islands of Japan with four strongly fortified naval bases. The first—Yokosuka, in the Bay of Tokyo—looked out on the Pacific. About 500 miles west in the Inland Sea was Kure, where were the most important naval establishments of Japan. Between Kure and the Pacific lay the island of Shikoku. On the northern coast of Honshiu, in the same latitude as Yokosuka, was Maidzuru, facing the Sea of Japan. The fourth naval base was Sasebo, north of Nagasaki, on the western coast of Kiushiu. Screened by islets, Sasebo was at the western mouth of the Straits of Corea. There were also permanent stations for torpedo craft. Almost opposite Vladivostok, in a bay off the southern

<sup>1</sup> *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, by General Kuropatkin, translated by Captain A. B. Lindsey, and edited by Major E. D. Swinton, D.S.O. (Murray), vol. i, p. 224.

shore of the narrow Tsugaru Straits which divide Honshiu from Yezo, was Ominato. In the island of Tsushima at Takeshiki was another base for torpedo-boats in the very centre of the Korean Straits. Far away at the south-western extremity of the Japanese Empire was a third at Makyu, in the Pescadores, on the flank of the sea route between Formosa and the Chinese coast.

There were large docks and yards at Yokosuka, Kure, Maidzuru, and Sasebo. In an age of steamships, of fixed and floating mines, of torpedoes and of high-explosive shells, places where damaged ships might be quickly coaled and repaired were essentials for naval warfare.

Japan had, therefore, in the matter of naval bases, an enormous advantage, and that advantage was not counter-balanced by any superiority of the Russian navy in Far Eastern waters. In February 1904 Russia had seven battleships, which varied in speed, armament, and tactical qualities, against Japan's six first-class battleships of British design. To the four armoured cruisers of Russia, Japan could oppose eight first-class vessels of the same kind. The five first-class and the two third-class Russian were confronted by Japan's twelve second-class, four armoured third-class, and four slow third-class protected cruisers, also by two fast and seven slow unprotected cruisers. The twenty or so destroyers of Russian, French, German, and British design possessed by Russia were of inferior value when compared with the nineteen Japanese destroyers of the British thirty-knot type. Lastly, the seventeen Russian were completely outnumbered and outclassed by the eighty-five Japanese torpedo-boats. If the reader will turn to p. 128, he will see how great was the difference between the Japanese navy of 1894 and that of 1904. A large

portion of the war indemnity exacted from China had been wisely spent by the Mikado and his ministers on procuring the machinery which alone could protect Japan from invasion and enable her successfully to struggle against the Russians for the possession of Corea and Manchuria.

The two weak spots in the Japanese navy were that there were no reserve ships, and that at that date Japan could not herself build men-of-war. Russia had a fleet in European waters, and during the war could construct or complete battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo-boats. The difficulties, however, of moving the Russian fleet from European waters into the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan would, if not insurmountable, be considerable. With regard to personnel, the Russian sailors were very brave, but so were the Japanese, and were better trained, and, as a rule, better commanded than their rivals. 'Every Japanese', with pardonable exaggeration, observed a German critic, 'is a born sailor and, thanks to his intelligence and the practice he gets, handles the most modern ships admirably.'

That the Japanese admirals were superior in intelligence to the Russian—with the possible exception of the unfortunate Admiral Makharoff—was apparent immediately before and at the beginning of the war. Taking into account the unequal strength of the two fleets in the Far East, it seemed obvious that Russia's sole chance of securing the command of the sea lay in concentrating the whole of her naval forces and destroying the enemy's fleets in detail. Admiral Alexeieff and his colleagues were distinctly to blame for precipitating war when, as was the case, three armoured cruisers, one protected cruiser and an auxiliary cruiser, and seventeen torpedo-boats under Rear-Admiral Baron Stakel-

berg were at Vladivostok, the protected cruiser *Varyag* with the gunboat *Koreetz* was at Chemulpo, and the rest of the fleet under Vice-Admiral Starck (with the exception of two gunboats) was at Port Arthur. The over-confidence displayed by the Russians may be gathered from Starck's order that the *Varyag* was 'on no account to leave Chemulpo without instructions'.

In striking contrast with the position of the Russian was the position of the Japanese fleet on February 5, 1904. A protected cruiser, the *Chiyoda*, near Chemulpo was watching the *Varyag*; the main or 'combined' fleet, under Vice-Admiral Togo, was at Sasebo; and the remaining vessels, under Vice-Admiral Kataoka, were behind and east of Togo's ships, off the island of Tsushima, in the Korean Straits. The whole of the Japanese naval forces lay between the Russian squadrons at Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The moment for breaking off negotiations had been cleverly chosen by the Japanese. In February the port of Vladivostok was closed, and egress and ingress would be delayed by the time it would take for the ice-breakers there to clear the passage for Stakelberg's vessels.

The Japanese plan of campaign in its opening stages was to seize Seoul, and simultaneously to defeat Starck's fleet at Port Arthur. On February 6, at 2 p.m., Rear-Admiral Uriu, with one first-class and three second-class cruisers, escorting three transports, on which were four battalions of infantry, left Sasebo for Chemulpo, the port of Seoul. Uriu was joined on his way by the third-class cruiser *Akashi* and by two torpedo-boat flotillas. On the 8th he met the *Chiyoda*, which had been cruising off Chemulpo. The port was speedily reached, and at 6.15 p.m. the Japanese troops began to disembark from the transports. Before dawn

(February 9) all the troops were on shore. They were at once sent on by rail to Seoul. On the third day of the war, the Corean capital passed once again into Japanese hands.

While Seoul was being occupied by the Mikado's soldiers, the captain of the *Varyag* had been warned by Uriu to leave Chemulpo before noon. If he did not do so, he was told that he would be attacked in the harbour itself. The captain bravely decided to face the Japanese squadron. In similar circumstances, the *Alabama* had steamed out of Cherbourg to her doom on June 19, 1864. After a plucky fight, the two Russian vessels—the *Varyag* badly damaged—returned to Chemulpo, where the crews were disembarked, the *Varyag* sunk and the *Koreetz* blown up.

In the meantime Togo had delivered a torpedo attack on Starck's fleet at Port Arthur. By 6 p.m. on February 8 the Japanese fleet was off Round Island, some sixty miles east of its destination. Three flotillas of torpedo-boat destroyers proceeded at 7 p.m. for Port Arthur, two other flotillas for Dalny, where, however, no Russian men-of-war were at anchor. In the dead of night an attack by ten destroyers on the ships outside Port Arthur was delivered. The cruiser *Pallada*, the battleships *Retvizan* and *Tzesarevitch*, were torpedoed. The first ran aground near the lighthouse; the others, trying to get back into harbour, grounded in the gullet. Next morning (February 9) Togo's fleet appeared off Port Arthur, which was in a state of great confusion. For forty minutes the Japanese ships, fired at by the powerful coast batteries, engaged the Russian vessels which were still in the offing. Little damage was inflicted by either party, but as the Russians refused to accept Togo's challenge and to leave the shelter of the coast batteries,

a bad effect was produced both in the Far East and in Europe. For the first time since the sea-power of the Turks was broken at Lepanto in 1571, an Asiatic had shown itself superior to a European fleet. On the 11th the *Yenisei*, a Russian mining transport, and, shortly afterwards, the third-class cruiser *Boyarin*, struck mines and were blown up. On the night of the 13-14th another attempt was made by Togo to torpedo the Russian ships in Port Arthur. Owing to the bad weather it was not successful. A sortie of the Russian cruiser squadron from Vladivostok (February 11-14) effected nothing of the least importance.

After his victory of February 8-9 Togo steamed across to Corea. His object was to cover the disembarkation at Chemulpo of the Japanese twelfth division and units of the second and fourth divisions. So long as the Russian ships could issue from Port Arthur, the landing of Japanese troops on the west coast of Corea remained a hazardous operation. Accordingly, Togo endeavoured to seal up the entrance to Port Arthur. On February 23 a gallant attempt to do this failed. Two days later Togo bombarded the harbour, but the damage done was trivial. At the end of the month, and during the first fortnight of March, he detached Admiral Kaimamura with five armoured and two unarmoured cruisers to bombard Vladivostok, replacing this squadron with that of Kataoka, which had been guarding the Corean Straits. The bombardment of Vladivostok, though a failure, resulted in Admiral Alexeieff forbidding the Russian squadron there to go farther than one day's run from the port. As a consequence, the Japanese were able without interference to land troops at Gensan and the Corean harbours south of it.

On March 8 Admiral Makharoff, the most capable of



the Russian admirals, arrived at Port Arthur and took over the command from Starck. The Russian fleet at once showed greater enterprise, and it was more than ever necessary for the Japanese to seal up the entrance to Port Arthur. The attempt was again made (March 27), and failed.

Togo now adopted another course of action. During the night of April 12-13 mines were laid in front of Port Arthur. The next morning a Russian destroyer was sunk by gunfire, and at 8 a.m. the enemy fleet was enticed into the open. Attacked by the Japanese, it sought shelter under the coast batteries, and ran into the mines laid the night before. The battleship *Petropavlovsk*, with Makharoff himself on board, struck a mine and was blown up. He was killed or drowned, as was also the Russian painter, Verestchagin, who, like Tolstoi, had devoted his talents to, among other things, exposing the sordid side of Napoleon's career. Another battleship, the *Pobyeda*, was damaged by the explosion of a mine, and something resembling a panic set in. The fleet took refuge in the harbour, where it was again bombarded on the 15th. A third and more elaborate effort to block the entrance to Port Arthur was made on May 3. The Japanese displayed extraordinary heroism, but once more failed to achieve their object. In the meantime Admiral Jessen had taken command of the Vladivostok squadron, and, as he exhibited more activity than his predecessor, Kaimamura with his ships steamed northward to hold him in check. Jessen sunk near Gensan a Japanese transport, the *Kinsbu Maru*, with troops on board; and Kaimamura, to interfere with Jessen's movements, laid mines outside Vladivostok.

On land, too, the contest during February, March, and April had gone in favour of the Japanese. Since the Chino-

Japanese War the army of Japan had been gradually increased, until in February 1904 the troops and guns which were almost immediately available amounted to 257,700 infantry, 13,130 cavalry, 13,430 engineers, and 870 guns, behind whom were reserves of 400,000 trained men. Their equipment and training were, generally speaking, up to European standards, and the lessons of the South African War had been carefully considered with a view to campaigns in Corea and Manchuria. Two-thirds of the troops carried an entrenching tool strapped to the knapsack; earthworks were ordered to be made and guns to be concealed whenever and wherever possible. Contrary to what the Russian Staff believed, the difficulty of crossing a fire-swept zone had been fully recognized, and the Japanese infantry had been constantly exercised during peace-time in the making of night attacks. The foot-soldiers were taught that the main object was to obtain a superiority of rifle-fire, and a blue cloth hold-all—a sack 6 feet 6 inches long by 8½ inches wide—attached to the upper part of the body was used for carrying, besides emergency rations, extra rounds of ammunition. The Japanese did not, however, make the mistake of supposing that rifle-fire had rendered bayonet charges obsolete. The troops were instructed to press swiftly forward regardless of loss, and the distinguishing feature of a Japanese assault was the deliberate rapidity with which the men moved from point to point. The medical department of the army was wonderfully efficient, and the losses from disease during the war were so small as to excite the astonishment and envy of the Occidental world.

To this tremendous machine for destruction the Russians could on paper oppose an active army of 1,100,000, a reserve

of the active army numbering 2,400,000, Cossacks and Caucasians totalling 345,000 and 12,000 respectively, and a national militia of 684,000. But of these 4,541,000 men, only a comparatively small fraction could be allocated to the war in the Far East. It was notorious that Moltke and his successors had made elaborate plans for the invasion of Russia. In 1904, Germany was in alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy; her agents were at work in the Balkan States; for years she had been courting Turkey. Though Great Britain and France in 1903 had become more friendly, relations between Great Britain and Russia were still strained. No reliance could be placed on the promises of Persians and Afghans. Sweden had not forgotten that Finland had been wrested from her by the Tsar Alexander I. The Chinese, for what they were worth, were waiting their opportunity to avenge the defeats inflicted on them by the Russians in 1900.

Consequently, from the shores of the Baltic to those of the Black Sea, from the Caucasus to the Pamirs, and from the Pamirs to the Amur, the Russians were in a perilous situation. To transport the bulk of their army along a single-line railway to Manchuria and Corea would have been an act of madness. Russia had to depend for her weapons and munitions on her own armament firms or on those of her western neighbours—and potential enemies. If Germany, Austria-Hungary, and, perhaps, Sweden were to attack her, she would be left to her own resources—the arsenals and munition works in European Russia. As these would be within reach of a victorious Teutonic army, it was plain that the best part of the Russian forces must be left in European Russia to protect them. For in modern warfare the question of armament, as was demonstrated

at Omdurman in 1898, has assumed overwhelming importance.

Owing to these circumstances, Russia at no time during the campaign about to be described had more than 1,000,000 men or so east of Lake Baikal, and in February 1904 she had—exclusive of garrisons in fortresses and technical troops in Eastern Siberia and Manchuria—only some 83,350 combatants, of whom 70,000 were infantry and 4,200 cavalry, with 196 guns.

The bulk of this garrison, rather than army, was, like the fleet, divided into two main groups. One group was in or round Port Arthur; the other in or round Vladivostok. A third, and much smaller, body of troops distributed over Southern Manchuria and along the Harbin-Port Arthur railway, connected the two groups. The centre of the zone of concentration of the army destined to fight pitched battles was fixed at Liao-yang, south of Mukden, on the railway, at the junction of the main roads which from the Liao-tung peninsula and Corea lead to Mukden. From Liao-yang the forces in the peninsula could be reinforced and assistance sent to the troops guarding the line of the Yalu and the passes in the Manchurian mountains north-west of that river.

Seeing the small size of the Russian Army in the theatre of war at the opening of hostilities, and the fact that from Moscow to Port Arthur is a distance of some 5,500 miles, the Russians were, perforce, obliged to abandon Corea, south of the Yalu, and to remain for several months on the defensive. The line round the south of Lake Baikal was not completed. According to the able and energetic Prince Khilkoff, the Russian Minister of Ways and Communications, who had reported on the matter four days before the

fighting began, the Siberian line could run only six pairs of through trains, of which four alone could be used for the transport of soldiers and war material. This estimate was a maximum, since the military transport officer averred that, beyond Lake Baikal, only three trains, whether carrying troops or goods, were available. The workshops on the eastern Chinese line were poorly equipped, and there was a shortage of rolling-stock. Three military trains in every twenty-four hours was at first apparently the utmost carrying capacity of the railways to the east of the lake.

Of the splendid fighting material in the Russian army it is almost unnecessary to speak, but the Russian infantryman in peace and war carried his bayonet fixed, and had been trained to despise fire and to pin his faith to shock tactics. The musketry training of the cavalry, which consisted mostly of Cossacks, was defective, while the artillery was in course of re-armament, and many of the gunners did not know how to use the new 3-inch quick-firing guns, with which about a third of the Russian batteries had been supplied. The moral factor must not be overlooked. Unlike the German, neither the Russian nor the Japanese soldiers, taken as a whole, were materialists. The Russians, apart from the considerable number of revolutionaries in the ranks, looked up to their Little Father, the Tsar, with a reverence not unlike that displayed by the Japanese for the Mikado. They were a simple, religious, and patriotic folk, but there was this distinction between them and the Japanese. The Russians—at all events those whose homes were west of Lake Baikal—had little liking for the war, which appeared to them to be unnecessary. Never having been in contact with the Japanese, they had naturally no very keen racial antipathy for the enemy. A war with the

Germans, who exploited and despised them, would have been popular, one with the Japanese was the reverse. That was not so with the Japanese. They felt that they were fighting for the future of their race against a powerful and ambitious Empire, whose peoples differed from them in religion, language, and intellectual and moral culture. It was the war of 1812 reversed. At Borodino the Russians, at Mukden the Japanese, were in a state of heroic exaltation.

We have seen that Seoul, the capital of Corea, was seized by the Japanese troops on February 9. The victory of Togo off Port Arthur rendered it unnecessary to march any large bodies of troops from Fusan up the peninsula. Chemulpo first, and, in March, Chinampo (north of Chemulpo), at the mouth of the Taitong river, were selected as the ports for the disembarkation of the Japanese First Army, under General Kuroki. During the last week of February, Ping-yang, on the Taitong—150 miles north of Seoul, and the most considerable city in Northern Corea—was occupied, and a small body of Cossacks driven off. Major-General Mishchenko, with three regiments of Trans-Baikal Cossacks, had moved to the Yalu, which had been crossed on February 14. On March 10, Japanese cavalry entered Anju, near the mouth of the Chechen river, along which were the outposts of the Russian forces in Corea. Seven days later, Kuroki and his staff reached Chinampo, and Kuroki learnt that there were no Russian infantry and not more than 2,000 Russian cavalry south of the Yalu.

On March 12, General Kuropatkin, who had been appointed generalissimo of the Russian army in the Far East, left St. Petersburg for Harbin, where he arrived on the 27th. That day the Taing river, which flows through the country between the Chechen and the Yalu, was bridged by the

Japanese. On April 4 the Japanese cavalry entered Wiju, which, it will be remembered, was the head-quarters of the Japanese in the battle of the Yalu in 1894, and also Yon-gampo, at the mouth of that river. But the bad weather and roads delayed the concentration of Kuroki's Army on the south bank of the Yalu. Mishchenko had fallen back across it on April 3, and on the north bank the Russian 'Eastern Force', commanded by Lieutenant-General Zasu-lich, was being reinforced from Liao-yang by troops dispatched over the Motienling via Feng-huang-cheng, some forty miles north-west of Antung.

On April 17 Kuroki was instructed that the Japanese Second Army would land on May 1 at the base of the Kuan-tung peninsula, which is the name given to the tongue of the Liao-tung peninsula. It was to cut the Russian communications with Port Arthur. Kuroki was also told that the disembarkation would take about forty-five days. He was ordered to force the passage of the Yalu, and then to entrench himself midway between Antung and Feng-huang-cheng, and wait till the Second Army had disembarked. After that the two armies were to co-operate. Unless, as Kuropatkin appears to have contemplated, Zasu-lich—confining himself to fighting a rearguard action—retreated on Feng-huang-cheng, a pitched battle was inevitable.

After elaborate preparations—the erection of screens on high ground to conceal the advance of his troops, and so forth, Kuroki, at the end of April, was in a position to strike Zasu-lich's force of 20,000 men, 48 field, 8 machine, and 6 horse-artillery guns. The Japanese leader had at his disposal, perhaps, 40,000 troops and 128 guns, but the advantage in numbers and artillery possessed by Kuroki

was, to a considerable extent, counterbalanced by the strength of the Russian position. Zasluch's left wing was protected by the Ai-ho, detachments being east of that tributary of the Yalu, one in the fork of the two rivers, the other higher up the Yalu itself. The Ai-ho is 90 yards broad and some 4 feet deep. The Russian centre and right wing were covered by the two unfordable streams of the Yalu below its junction with the Ai-ho. The southern stream was 230 yards, the northern 380 yards wide. But deceived by Japanese naval feints near the mouth of the river, the Russian general kept the mass of his forces at and behind Antung, where the Yalu becomes a single stream. Through Antung ran the road to Feng-huang-cheng, Zasluch's line of retreat. Kuroki decided to turn Zasluch's left.

On April 25, two of the islands in the Yalu, the western called Kintei and the eastern Kyuri, were occupied by the Japanese, the Russian outposts being dislodged. Oseki Island was captured, and the Japanese seized Tiger Hill, in the fork of the Ai-ho and Yalu. On the morning of the 30th the Japanese Twelfth Division crossed the Yalu eight miles north-east of Wiju, and began to move on the Ai-ho. The Second Division, followed by the Guard, proceeded late in the day to Oseki Island, and passed thence into Chukodai Island, west of Tiger Hill. Nearly the whole of the Japanese army, at daybreak of May 1, was facing the Russian left wing (7 battalions and 16 guns) entrenched behind the Ai-ho. A Japanese flotilla was ascending the Yalu to shell the Russian right at Antung.

At 7 a.m. Kuroki gave the order for a general advance. The Japanese infantry forded the Ai-ho and, after some severe fighting, drove the Russian left on its centre and



right. At 9.35 a.m. the troops in Antung were ordered to withdraw. The Japanese tried to cut the Russian line of retreat on Feng-huang-cheng, but the spirited resistance of some troops north of Antung saved Zasulich. The casualties of the Russians amounted to over 3,000, three times those of the Japanese; 21 field-guns, 8 machine-guns, and 19 ammunition-wagons were among the spoils of the victors. Four days later the Japanese Second Army, under General Oku, began to disembark at Pitzuwo, on the eastern coast of the Kuan-tung peninsula, within 60 miles of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. The Japanese fleet, with the Elliot Islands for its base, covered Oku's disembarkation.

*The Russo-Japanese War (concluded)*

THE European and American publics had been startled by the exploits of Togo off Port Arthur, and of Kuroki on the Yalu. The victory of Kuroki, however, produced less impression than Togo's successes, for the Russians, in their last war with Turkey, had on occasion met with heavy reverses. It was only a postulate that white men could defeat Asiatics on land, but it had become an axiom with Occidentals that sea power belonged as of right to Europeans or Americans. Considerably over three centuries had elapsed since an Asiatic Power—Turkey—had possessed a fleet capable of contending successfully with Occidentals. The Turkish navy had never recovered from the blow inflicted on it by Don John at Lepanto, seventeen years before the Spanish Armada sailed up the English Channel. Egypt, under the intelligent Mehemet Ali and his son, had had, it is true, a fleet superior to that of Mehemet's suzerain, the Sultan, but it had been easily destroyed by an Anglo-Franco-Russian squadron at Navarino. The news of Togo's achievements was a rude shock to Occidental complacency. That the Japanese had obtained command of the Yellow Sea there could be little doubt, since Kuroki's army had been disembarked at Chemulpo and Chinampo. Now, at the beginning of May 1904, another Japanese army from Chinampo had been landed east of Port Arthur. This, the Army of Oku, like Kuroki's, consisted of three divisions.

Oku's disembarkation was, though it should not have been, a complete surprise to the Russians. It was unopposed. General Stoessel at Port Arthur hesitated to engage his 30,000 troops far from their base, and the 'Southern Force', under Lieutenant-General Stakelberg, which was intended to keep up communications between Liao-yang and Port Arthur, exhibited little enterprise. Oku at once cut the Liao-yang-Port Arthur railway, and so alarming did the situation seem to the Russians that Kuropatkin at first contemplated the evacuation of Liao-yang itself; but his plan of concentrating at Harbin appears to have been overruled by Admiral Alexeieff, and it was decided by the Russian generalissimo to retain Liao-yang.

So far all had gone well for the Japanese, but in May Togo's fleet met with several disasters. A small ship, the *Miyako*, was blown up by a mine, as were two battleships, the *Hatsuse* and *Yashima*, while a second-class cruiser, the *Yoshino*, was rammed by the *Kasuga*, and sank the same day.<sup>1</sup> The full extent of these losses was concealed until the last months of the war. In view of the fact that Japan in those days could not build warships, these untoward events greatly embarrassed the Japanese. If a Russian fleet from Europe appeared in Far Eastern waters and managed to join up with the men-of-war in Port Arthur and Vladivostok, the command of the sea might be lost and the Japanese armies forced to retire from the Liao-tung peninsula and Manchuria into Corea, or even Japan. A Japanese squadron, too, which on the 16th-17th had arrived off the western coast of the peninsula, with a view to threatening the Russian communications from Chin-chou to Kaiping, lost

<sup>1</sup> These losses occurred on May 14 and 15.

a gunboat, and on the 17th the destroyer *Akatsuki* was blown up by a mine.

A glance at the map on p. 195 shows that there was a great gap between Oku's and Kuroki's armies. To fill it the Japanese Tenth Division, under Lieutenant-General Kawamura, destined to form the nucleus of another army under General Nodzu, was landed on and after May 19 near Takushan, forty-five miles or so west of the mouth of the Yalu, and some seventy miles east of Pitzuwo. The Tenth Division prolonged Kuroki's left and menaced the communications of Russian forces moving from the base of the Liao-tung peninsula to relieve Port Arthur.

While Kawamura was concentrating his forces round Takushan against Mishchenko's Cossacks at Hsiuyen, the Japanese Second Army (Oku) moved nearer to Port Arthur. Oku's objective was Ta-lien-wan and the harbour of Dalny, which had been selected as a base for the projected siege of Port Arthur. To reach Ta-lien-wan and Dalny he had to drive the Russians from a very strongly fortified position on the Chin-chou isthmus, which is thirty-five miles from Port Arthur. This obstacle, known as the Nan-shan position, at high-water mark was 3,500 yards long. The hills on it from shore to shore rose in the centre to a height of 350 feet, but the ground at both ends near the sea was low.

For several weeks the Russian engineers had been hard at work making the position, as they supposed, impregnable. Barbed-wire entanglements, on an average from 17 to 21 feet in width, land-mines, tiers of trenches, rifle-pits, and numerous redoubts had been constructed. Sixty-six siege-guns and old field-guns, 48 quick-firing guns, and 16 machine-guns, with a gunboat and two destroyers in

Ta-lien Bay, the entrance to which had been mined, assisted the 16,000 or so troops of the garrison. The slopes of the hills were mostly bare and glacia-like. Search-lights played on the front between sunset and sunrise. Only on the left or western face was the position difficult to defend, for there it could be shelled by Japanese vessels in Chin-chou Bay. The town of Chin-chou was occupied by a Russian detachment.

It is clear that the test set Oku was very different from that set Kuroki on the Yalu. Oku's success or failure would decide whether the theory of Bloch and his school was correct, that modern warfare, owing to the improved weapons and methods of defence, must in nine cases out of ten result in stalemate. About midnight on May 25-26 the battle began in a heavy thunderstorm, with an attack on Chin-chou. At 5.20 a.m. the town was captured. Simultaneously the Japanese bombardment of the lines—aided after 6 a.m. by the guns of a flotilla in Chin-chou Bay—opened. Up to mid-day the Japanese assaults failed, and the artillery ammunition on both sides was running low. Eleven Russian companies had repulsed for seven hours three Japanese divisions! At 3.30 p.m. Oku ordered a general attack, which was unsuccessful. At the west end of the lines alone was progress being made. Here, towards sunset, Japanese troops, wading breast-high through the sea, forced back the Russian left. At the same time another frontal attack was delivered, and at 7.20 p.m. the Nan-shan hills were stormed. The Russians, of whom only 3,500 were engaged, had been badly commanded; they lost 1,416 killed, wounded, and missing, but the Japanese had no fewer than 4,885 officers and men put *hors de combat*. They had, however, captured 82 guns and 10 machine-guns.

During the night the Russians evacuated Dalny. The Japanese, with the odds at 2 to 1, had outmanœuvred and defeated a small Russian army on the Yalu; in greatly superior numbers they had just stormed the very strong position at Nan-shan. It remained to be seen whether they could capture a fortress like Port Arthur or defeat a large European army on equal terms in a pitched battle. Another army (the Third) under General Nogi had been assembled for the reduction of the Manchurian Sebastopol.<sup>1</sup> The Army of Oku was to protect the rear of Nogi and to cover the siege.

At the beginning of June the positions of the Russians and Japanese in the theatre of war were as follows. Oku's Army (the Second) was opposed by Stakelberg with 30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 100 guns. Stakelberg's advanced cavalry was in the region of Telissu, some fifty miles south of Kaiping; the remainder of his force was north-west of Kaiping, between the latter town and Neuchuang, at the mouth of the Liao-ho. Telissu is roughly half-way between Nan-shan and Kaiping. The troops of Stakelberg, south of Kaiping, were in hilly country, with their backs to a sea of which the Japanese had secured the command.

The main road and the railway from Port Arthur leave the vicinity of the coast near Kaiping and proceed north-eastwards along the eastern edge of the great plains between the Mongolian and Manchurian mountains. At Liao-yang, the Russian advanced base in Manchuria, the road and railway cross the Tai-tzu, and traverse the plain and the Sha-ho, a northern tributary of the Tai-tzu, on their way to Mukden, the capital of Manchuria. Mukden is

<sup>1</sup> Nogi assumed command of this army, which consisted of two divisions, on June 6.

just north of the Hun-ho, another tributary of the Liao-ho. Kuropatkin, with approximately 36,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 120 guns, was in the area Liao-yang-Mukden. His army and the troops disposed along the line Kaiping-Liao-yang were on the western fringe of the Manchurian mountains. Through these miniature Alps were advancing from Takushan the advanced guard of Nodzu's Army (the Fourth), and, north-east of it, from the Yalu, Kuroki with the First Army. Ensnconced in the mountains, Mishchenko, with 3,000 cavalry and two infantry regiments, opposed Nodzu's vanguard, and on Mishchenko's left, Lieutenant-General Count Keller and Major-General Rennenkampf with 23,000 infantry, 3,600 cavalry, and 90 guns, south of the Motienling faced Kuroki.

The aim of the Japanese staff was to bring Oku's Army to Kaiping, and pivoting on Kaiping, to strike with Nodzu and Kuroki the main line of the Russian communications, the railway and road from Kaiping to Mukden. If we imagine that an Austrian army had obtained possession of the plain of Lombardy, and that it was about to be attacked by Italian armies through the Alpine passes traversed by Bonaparte in 1796, and through the passes of the Apennines between Genoa and Bologna, we have a fair idea of the problem set to the Japanese generalissimo, Marshal Oyama. The problem was easier in one respect, more difficult in others. Our imaginary Austrian army would have several lines of retreat north and south of the Po on Trieste and Vienna, but Kuropatkin's main communications with Mukden and Harbin were between the Liao-ho and the Manchurian mountains. On the other hand, the Japanese in June 1904 had still to drive the Russians from the passes, and the roads up which they were moving were bad. The best consisted

of the road from Chin-chou through Kaiping to Liao-yang, that from Takushan through Hsiuyen to Haicheng—a town between Kaiping and Liao-yang—and the highway from Antung on the Yalu through Feng-huang-cheng over the Motienling to Liao-yang. Lateral communications between the three roads were poor in the extreme. Further, the mountain passes were open only in summer, but then the flooded valley of the Liao-ho, Oku's objective, was a morass.

Kuropatkin's plan was to remain on the defensive, to leave Port Arthur isolated and to await the arrival of the large reinforcements being sent along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Liao-yang. Unfortunately for him and the Russians, the Viceroy of the Far East was persuaded that Port Arthur must at all costs be relieved. The loss of the Russian fleet interned in the harbour would mean that the war could not be brought to a victorious issue, and Admiral Alexeieff over-estimated the power of the Japanese speedily to reduce the fortress. A council of war at St. Petersburg supported Alexeieff, and Kuropatkin was ordered at once to relieve Port Arthur.

He proceeded to do so with a force very insufficient for the purpose. Stakelberg, with 35,000 men and 94 guns, was sent down the Kaiping-Port Arthur railway. He was headed and decisively beaten by Oku at the battle of Telissu on June 14. The Russians lost 3,772 men killed, wounded, and missing, and 16 quick-firing guns, the Japanese only 1,064 killed and wounded. Oku pursued Stakelberg, and on July 9 drove him from Kaiping. The Russians retired to a strong position on the edge of the Manchurian plain at Ta-shih-chiao, twenty miles or so north of Kaiping, covering the main road and railway.



Oku with the Second Japanese Army had entered the Manchurian plain between the lower Liao and the western spurs of the Manchurian mountains. In the meantime, on June 8, the advance guard of Nodzu's (the Fourth) Army, consisting of the Tenth Division under General Kawamura, with the assistance of a detachment from Kuroki's army, dislodged Mishchenko from Hsiuyen. The Russians retreated and prepared to defend the crest of the Fen-shui range, the main watershed between the Bay of Corea and the Gulf of Liao-tung, into which latter the Liao flows. Until Mishchenko was dislodged, the Fourth Army could not join hands with Oku. On the 24th Kawamura received the following order from Tokyo: 'The fact has been proved that the Russian fleet is able to issue from the harbour of Port Arthur. . . . It is not advisable for the Second Army (Oku) to advance farther north than Kaiping for the present. The battle of Liao-yang, which it was anticipated would be fought before the rainy season, will be postponed till after it. Arrange your operations accordingly.' At this moment Oku was only thirteen miles north of Telissu, but Kawamura decided to storm the Fen-shui position. On June 26th-27, again with the aid of the detachment from Kuroki's army, he effected his purpose at a loss of scarcely 200 killed and wounded. The Russians withdrew to Hsi-mu-cheng. On July 5 Oku informed Kawamura that he was resuming his advance, and expected to attack the enemy at Kaiping between the 9th and 12th. He proposed to effect a junction of his right with Kawamura's left wing. In view of the strength of the Russians about Hsi-mu-cheng, now estimated at some 25,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 60 guns, Kawamura sent only a small portion of his division towards Kaiping,

and, on the news that Kaiping had been occupied by Oku, suspended his advance. Reinforcements had been disembarked at Takushan, and on July 16 Nodzu arrived at Hsiuyen and took over the command of the Fourth Army. Six days later (July 22) the detachment from Kuroki's Army—a mixed brigade of the Guard Division—marched eastward to rejoin Kuroki. Before describing the movements of Kuroki and the right wing of the Japanese forces, we must return to Port Arthur, where, as the message received by Kawamura on June 24 showed, events most disconcerting to the Japanese staff had occurred.

While Oku was advancing northwards on Telissu and Kaiping, the two divisions which formed the Japanese Third Army under Nogi moved westwards on Port Arthur. The port of Dalny was occupied and Ta-lien Bay cleared of mines. In a direct line Dalny is some twenty-three miles from Port Arthur, but the intervening country is mountainous, and, thanks to the activity and talents of Major-General Kondratenko—the very competent subordinate of the incompetent Russian commandant of Port Arthur—the works of and in front of the fortress were becoming each day more formidable. In 1894 Port Arthur had been captured in less than twelve hours at a trifling loss; in 1904 it was to stand a siege of six months, and to cost the Japanese 60,000 killed and wounded. Across the Kuan-tung peninsula, west of Dalny, a position known as the 'Position of the Passes', somewhat similar to that at Nan-shan, had been entrenched by the Russians. Mechanics had arrived from Russia and were busy repairing the damaged battleships. On June 23, to the great surprise of Admiral Togo, the Russian fleet, under Admiral Vitgeft, steamed out of Port Arthur, and it was perceived that, with the exception

of the lost *Petropavlovsk* and *Boyarin*, it was almost as strong as it had been at the beginning of the war. The losses which Togo's fleet had sustained through mines, and the absence of Kaimamura's squadron guarding the Korean Straits, gave Vitgeft the chance of fighting a battle on equal terms. Togo accepted the challenge, and the fate of the war seemed to hang on the balance. It was now that the loss of Makharoff was severely felt by the Russians. Vitgeft was deficient in moral courage. He returned to Port Arthur, where during the night of June 23-4 he was attacked by the Japanese torpedo-boat flotillas.

The failure of Vitgeft was followed by a successful attack by Nogi on Chien-shan, an important link in the 'Position of the Passes'. On June 26 it was taken by the Japanese. An attempt to retake it on July 4 failed, and on July 26-8 the 'Position of the Passes' was carried by the Japanese, the Russians losing 47 officers and 2,066 men, killed and wounded, the Japanese nearly 4,000. The Russians fell back to their last line of defence outside the permanent fortifications.

Port Arthur is the eastern of three inlets at the extremity of the Kuan-tung promontory. North-westward, across a neck of land some six miles wide, is Louisa Bay, and south of it, as one proceeds round the coast to Port Arthur, is Pigeon Bay, separated from Port Arthur by a neck of land four miles wide. From the northern shore of Louisa Bay the new line taken up by the Russians ran eastward along the heights to Feng-huang-shan (Wolf Hills), it then turned south, and by Ta-ku-shan and Hsiao-ku-shan ended on the shores of Ta-ho Bay, another inlet of the sea, east of and under four miles from Port Arthur. The position was very weakly fortified; the trenches had no overhead

cover; and the tall millet in front of them had not been cut. On the 30th the Japanese captured the Wolf Hills and the Russians abandoned the whole line, with the exception of Ta-ku-shan and Hsiao-ku-shan, at the south-eastern extremity. By the evening of July 31 the Japanese were entrenched on the captured heights, and the siege of Port Arthur may be said to have begun.

To relieve Port Arthur it was necessary for Kuropatkin to break through the armies of Oku and Nodzu. If they had alone stood in his path, he would have probably marched to recover the Liao-tung peninsula. What immobilized him was the menacing advance of Kuroki through the Manchurian mountains in the direction of Liao-yang.

Nine days after the battle of the Yalu, on May 10, Kuroki had taken up a position in and in front of Feng-huang-cheng, which had been occupied by his cavalry on the 6th. Feng-huang-cheng had a population of 20,000 inhabitants; it was the only important town on the main road from Corea by the Motien Pass to Liao-yang and Mukden. East of that road another road ran from the Yalu at Ch-hang-song, forty miles north-east of Wiju, through the mountains by Saimachi to Mukden. From Saimachi a route went westwards to the Motien Pass. On May 7 Rennenkampf, with a brigade of Cossacks, had reached Saimachi to guard against a turning movement from that direction. During the next days his patrols reported that Japanese troops were approaching from Ch-hang-song. On the 10th Colonel Madritoff, with some 500 Cossacks and mounted scouts, appeared south of the Yalu at Anju, but was beaten off. A week later, Count Keller took over the command of the Russian left wing from Zasulich.

Through the remainder of May, *Rennenkampf* manœuvred round and in front of *Saimachi*, while *Kuroki* made preparations for the advance of one of his divisions to that place, of another to the foot of the *Motien Pass*, and of the third, forming his left wing, to a point south-west of it. On June 24 *Kuroki's* preparations were complete, when he, too, received news of the sortie of the Russian fleet from *Port Arthur*, and that the anticipated battle near *Liao-yang* was to be postponed till after the rainy season.

Like *Kawamura*, *Kuroki* had already set his columns in motion, and he obtained permission to seize the *Motien Pass*. This, in spite of deluges of rain which fell between June 27 and July 5, proved an easier task than was expected. *Keller* abandoned the pass, the Japanese advance guards secured the summit at the end of June, and *Kuroki* was now within forty miles of *Liao-yang*. On July 4 a feeble attempt was made by the Russians to recover the pass; on July 17 *Keller* made a more vigorous assault on it, which was repulsed. North-east of the pass at *Chiao-tou*, on the road from *Saimachi* to *Mukden*, there was a brisk action on July 19-21, in which the Russians were beaten. The three divisions of *Kuroki* were now in a position to move on *Liao-yang*.

Two days after the action at *Chiao-tou*, on July 23, *Oku*, in the plain between the *Liao-ho* and the western fringe of the *Manchurian Mountains*, with *Nodzu* on his right in the mountains, resumed his movement on *Liao-yang*. *Oku's* Army consisted at this moment of four divisions and a cavalry brigade. A Russian force of 48 battalions, 54 squadrons, and 112 guns, commanded by *General Zarubaieff*, with *Stakelberg* serving under him, held a strongly entrenched position at *Ta-shih-chiao*, selected by

Kuropatkin himself. The Russian guns, which at Nan-shan and Telissu had been too much exposed, were skilfully concealed, but were greatly outnumbered by the 252 guns of Oku. The opposing infantry were, however, about equal in numbers, and the Russian cavalry more than twice as numerous as the Japanese. After severe fighting on July 23, 24, and 25, Zarubieff was driven back on Haicheng. He had lost, perhaps, 2,000 killed, wounded, and missing; Oku's losses aggregated 1,054. During the battle, at midnight on July 24, the Russian garrison of Neuchuang, at the mouth of the Liao-ho, retired towards Liao-yang, and the port was occupied by the Japanese the next day.

On July 28 Oku dispatched a division to join Nodzu, who had moved up along the Takushan-Hsiuyen road against the Russian position at Hsi-mu-cheng, which covered Haicheng on the south-east. Zasulich and Mishchenko, with 36½ battalions, 36 squadrons, and 86 guns, were posted there. Assisted by Oku's Fifth Division, Nodzu, with the Tenth Division and a brigade of reserve troops—a force in all of 33 battalions, over 6 squadrons, and 84 guns—forced Zasulich back on Haicheng (July 31 to August 2). Kuroki, west and north of the Motienling, had on July 31 again beaten the Russians, who had lost over 2,400 men and the gallant Count Keller.<sup>1</sup> Kuroki had advanced twelve miles on the road to Liao-yang and gained possession of the valley of the Lan-ho, which enters the Tai-tzu-ho above Liao-yang.

On August 3 Oku occupied Haicheng. His and Nodzu's forces were united, and separated by less than forty miles of, it is true, very mountainous country from Kuroki's. With the exception of Port Arthur the Russians had no longer

<sup>1</sup> The Japanese losses in this action were under 1,000.

any harbour in the Yellow Sea. Corea, the Liao-tung peninsula, and the passes leading to the Tai-tzu river were in the hands of the Japanese. 'As the result of the successes,' observes the British Official History of the War, 'which had been gained all along the Japanese line, the front of the three Japanese armies had been reduced from 150 to 45 miles.'

Nevertheless, though the Japanese had been victorious on land and sea, the struggle still remained undecided. The Russian men-of-war in Vladivostok and Port Arthur might be reinforced by the Russian fleet which was in European waters. Port Arthur was untaken, and Kuropatkin himself had not been defeated. The Vladivostok squadron had shown enterprise. On June 15, in the Korean Straits, it had sunk the transports *Izumi Maru* and *Hitachi Maru*, the latter with 2,000 troops and siege-guns destined for Port Arthur on board. Another transport, the *Sado Maru*, had been seriously damaged. The Russians eluded the pursuit of Kaimamura's squadron, and on the 20th re-entered Vladivostok. During the same period Russian torpedo-boats captured the *Hatsuku Maru* and burned two junks. From the 20th to the 30th of July Admiral Jessen passed through the Tsugaru Straits and preyed on Japanese and neutral shipping approaching or leaving the eastern coast of Honshiu. The termination of Jessen's activities was close at hand, but, before describing the battle in which his squadron was put out of action, it is necessary to return to Port Arthur.

It will be remembered that the Russians under General Stoessel (who had deliberately disobeyed an order of Kuropatkin to leave Port Arthur and to hand over the command to Lieutenant-General Smirnoff) had been driven into the

fortress by Nogi on July 31. Except for its hold on Ta-ku-shan and Hsiao-tu-shan, the garrison was confined to the permanent works. Because it put up such a splendid defence, the reader must not imagine that Port Arthur at the opening of the war was a Metz. As at Sebastopol when the Allies landed in the Crimea, the permanent works, though commenced in 1898, were far from complete. Had it not been for the 'Chinese Wall', a rampart of mud and stones about 10 feet high and at its base 12 feet thick, which ran from Fort Sung-shu on the north-west to Pai-yin North Battery on the south-east, it is possible that the fortress might have fallen to the first assaults of the Japanese in August. The defences, as a whole, were not of a then modern type. The forts were unarmoured, the concrete was not strong enough to resist the shells discharged by the Japanese 11-inch howitzers, and there was an insufficient supply of barbed wire. But by August 1904 the efforts chiefly of Kondratenko, the Todleben of Port Arthur, had secured the fortress from immediate capture.

The Japanese bombardment commenced on August 7. On the 8th Ta-ku-shan and on the 9th Hsiao-ku-shan were captured by the Japanese. After the loss of these hills the position of the Russian fleet in the harbour was precarious, and Admiral Vitgeft had to contemplate the possibility of his fleet being sunk at anchor by the enemy's batteries. On August 7 he had received a telegram from Alexeieff that he was to take the squadron out of Port Arthur, and a direct order from the Tsar to break through to Vladivostok. Two days later Japanese shells inflicted damage on the *Retvizan* and the *Peresvyet*. The time for hesitation was over. On August 10 Vitgeft, with 6 battleships, 3 protected cruisers, the *Novik*, and 14 torpedo-boat



destroyers steamed out of the harbour. He was met by Togo with 5 battleships, 4 armoured cruisers, 9 protected cruisers, 17 destroyers, and 29 torpedo-boats. The Russians had 15 as against 20 12-inch, 8 as against 2 10-inch, 88 as against 120 6-inch, 6 as against 77 4-inch guns. They had no 8-inch guns to oppose to the 20 of that calibre possessed by Togo. From the point of view of weapons they were at a hopeless disadvantage.

Vitgeft's aim was to reach Vladivostok, overpowering or avoiding Kaimamura's squadron in the Korean Straits. At first it looked as if he might succeed. At 12.10 p.m. the battle commenced, but it was not till 5.45 p.m., when a shell, bursting on the *Tzesarevitch* and killing Vitgeft, threw the Russians into confusion, that Togo began to get the upper hand. Gradually the majority of the Russian ships were headed and driven back to Port Arthur. They arrived there severely damaged, with only three destroyers accompanying them. The *Askold* escaped to Shanghai, where she was disarmed by the Chinese, the *Novik* reached the German port of Kiao-chau, coaled, steamed round the east of Japan and entered Korsakovsk Bay, at the south of the island of Sakhalien. She was engaged there on the 20th by the *Tsushima*, and so seriously injured that the captain decided to submerge her. The *Diana*, on the 25th, reached the French port of Saigon and was disarmed; the *Tzesarevitch* had been disarmed and interned at Kiao-chau on the 11th. The Japanese fleet had not escaped unscathed, and the losses on the *Mikasa* had been very heavy.

The victory of Togo on August 10 was speedily followed by a victory won by Kaimamura over Jessen. On the 12th Jessen had left Vladivostok to join the Port Arthur squadron. Just before dawn on the 14th he reached the latitude of

Fusan. He was that day engaged by Kaimamura with a superior force. The Russians fought magnificently, but unavailingly. The *Rurik* was voluntarily sunk by its commander, to prevent its falling into the hands of the Japanese, and the *Rossiya* and *Gromoboi* limped back to Vladivostok. They played no further part in the war.<sup>1</sup>

The battles of August 10 and 14, known as the battles of the Yellow Sea and Ulsan, gave the Japanese command of the sea. But the capture of Port Arthur and the defeat of Kuropatkin's great army at Liao-yang, which was being daily reinforced from Europe and Siberia, had yet to be accomplished. Unless Nogi's Army could be thrown into the scale, the result of a battle near Liao-yang would be uncertain. Every effort was, therefore, made to finish the siege of Port Arthur in the shortest possible time. From the 19th to the 24th of August, Nogi flung his heroic infantry against the fortress. He captured two redoubts, but lost 15,000 to the 3,000 Russian killed and wounded. Marshal Oyama had to abandon any hope of help from Nogi in the battle which already on the 23rd he was delivering against Kuropatkin.

Heavy rain had delayed Oyama's forward movements and had given the Russians time to strengthen still further the formidable positions in which they had decided to await the thrusts of their enemy. It was not until the evening of August 22 that Oyama ordered the advance and transferred his head-quarters from Kaiping to Haicheng. He had under his hands 125,000 troops and 470 field-guns,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Japanese saved 625 officers and men of the *Rurik* from drowning.

<sup>2</sup> According to the British Official History these figures are only approximate.

and he was about to attack lines defended by 158,000 infantry and cavalry, 609 guns, 36 howitzers, and 28 siege-guns. Kuropatkin had 149 squadrons of cavalry, Oyama but 33, and, in the event of a bad defeat, the Japanese would be in danger of having their communications cut by the Russian horsemen.

The Japanese First Army (Kuroki), forming the right wing, numbered 46,000, the Fourth Army (Nodzu) in the centre, 31,000, and the Second Army (Oku), forming the left wing, 48,000. It was not possible with these forces seriously to operate against the Russian communications. If Kuroki advanced further north the gap between him and Nodzu would become dangerously wide; if Oku tried to turn Kuropatkin's right wing there was the probability that the Russian commander would with his reserves reinforce his left or centre and overpower either Kuroki or Nodzu. The Russians had entrenched themselves on a curved line of forty miles from the region of An-shan-chan on the Kaiping-Liao-yang railway to the Tai-tzu, east of Liao-yang. Behind was what was known as the 'advanced position', much more elaborately fortified, with a 15½ miles frontage from Ku-chia-tzu on the railway to Hsia-pu on the Tai-tzu, east of Liao-yang; and still farther back was the 'main position', strengthened by a triple row of fortifications, of which the principal feature was a chain of seven redoubts. The 'main position' rested at each end on the river and protected Liao-yang (which is on the south bank of the Tai-tzu) from attack from the west or south. The Tai-tzu, from 70 to 600 yards in width, was swollen with rain, and in case of a reverse, Kuropatkin could place it between him and his pursuers. Detachments on the right bank guarded the crossings above and


below Liao-yang. To the north of the river and behind the city were twenty-eight siege guns, which were, however, not used. Troops were disposed along the road and railway back to and beyond Mukden.

With inferior numbers and artillery it was, indeed, audacious for Oyama, in such circumstances, to hope to gain a victory.

The battle of Liao-yang, the greatest pitched battle since the Franco-German War, was the first of those prolonged contests which have become so familiar to the public of the twentieth century. If we include the battle of Mars-la-Tour in it, the battle of Gravelotte lasted but three days, the battle of Sadowa, which had decided the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, only a single day. The battle of Liao-yang, though the forces engaged were approximately equal to those at Gravelotte, extended from August 23 to September 3.

The struggle resolved itself into three phases. Between August 23 and August 26 the Russians maintained their position on the outer line. They then retired to the 'advanced position'. On August 30 the battle was renewed. At nightfall part of Kuroki's right wing crossed the Tai-tzu, a brigade of the Guard Reserve under General Umezawa making a wide *détour* further to the east, with the object of ultimately reaching the Yen-tai coal mine region, from which a railway ran west to the Liao-yang-Mukden line.

Kuropatkin at this moment decided to take the offensive. He had two alternatives. One was to leave a containing force to hold Kuroki's troops north of the river and with the remainder of his army to fall on Oku and Nodzu south of it. The other was to withdraw from the 'advanced' to the 'main' position, and, trusting that a comparatively



small force in the redoubts and entrenchments would keep at bay Oku and Nodzu, overwhelm Kuroki's wing north of the river.

He chose the latter alternative. 'My General Reserve', he telegraphed afterwards to St. Petersburg, 'was no longer strong enough to ensure a counter-stroke in a southerly direction being successful. There was undoubtedly a danger of Kuroki cutting our communications, and the most pressing duty of the army seemed to be to guard them.' The 'advanced position' in which the Russian right and centre had successfully repulsed Oku and Nodzu was vacated, and Kuropatkin transferred his reserves to the north of the river.

The Russian offensive north of the Tai-tzu ended in a failure. At 3 a.m. on September 3, Kuropatkin, who had fought with Kuroki an indecisive action on the 1st and 2nd of September, learned that the ammunition of the Russian right wing defending the 'main position' was running low, and that reinforcements there were needed. A little later he heard that the portion of his left wing astride the Yen-tai railway was retreating towards the Liao-yang-Mukden railway. At 6 a.m. came the news that Kuroki's forces just north of the Tai-tzu had regained the ground previously recovered from them. Finally, north of the Yen-tai coal mines, Umezawa was threatening the Russian line of retreat on Mukden.

The immense length of his communications with his base, European Russia, made Kuropatkin hesitate. Like Napoleon at Borodino, he decided not to throw all his reserves into the battle. At 6 a.m. he issued orders for the retirement of the whole army on Mukden. The retreat was skilfully conducted, and so exhausted and depleted were

the Japanese forces that the Russians were practically unmolested. By the 10th the Russian army was concentrated on the banks of the Hun-ho, above and below Mukden. A cavalry screen remained south of the Sha-ho.

At a cost of 5,537 killed and 18,063 wounded, Oyama had extricated himself from a very difficult strategical position, and inflicted on the enemy heavy losses. The Russian casualties amounted to over 575 officers and 17,337 men killed, wounded, or missing. Nogi's bloody repulse at Port Arthur was forgotten. That the Japanese were as capable as European generals of manœuvring large armies had been established beyond dispute.

On September 3, when Kuropatkin gave the order to retreat on Mukden, a Japanese destroyer off Port Arthur had been broken in halves by the explosion of a Russian mine. It was another warning to the Japanese, and forcibly reminded them that they had no yards for the building of men-of-war. They could not afford to reduce Port Arthur by blockade. Russia was purchasing submarines, and her considerable fleet in the Baltic might at any moment sail for the Pacific. The siege of the fortress was, therefore, pressed on.

Port Arthur depended for its main supply of water on a reservoir, north of Fort Erh-lung and outside the perimeter of the permanent fortifications. The reservoir was protected by a redoubt. On September 19 and 20 this redoubt was captured and the water cut off. Another source had, however, been tapped, and the garrison suffered little inconvenience. The Railway Redoubt, just south of the Waterworks Redoubt, was abandoned by the Russians, and the Temple Redoubts to its west were stormed, also on September 19-20. On the 20th the Russian works on

Namako Yama, a hill farther west and just north of 203 Metre Hill, which was the key to the fortress—or at least to the harbour—was captured. From Namako Yama a portion of the harbour was visible, and as a result of the capture, serious damage was inflicted before the end of the month on the *Sevastopol*, *Pobyeda*, and *Peresvyet*. If 203 Metre Hill also fell, the ships would be at the mercy of the Japanese heavy artillery; that hill consisted of two well-defined peaks, 140 yards apart, connected by a jagged, razor-like ridge. The first attack on it (September 19–22) was bloodily repulsed by the Russians. The Japanese lost 2,500, the Russians in the sector from the hill to the Waterworks Redoubt, 1,221 killed, wounded, and missing. Several 11-inch howitzers were, however, arriving from Japan. The days of the fortress and of the fleet in the harbour were numbered, if Kuropatkin did not crumple up Oyama's Army, or force Oyama to draw to him the greater part of Nogi's investing forces.

The Russian generalissimo had now been heavily reinforced, though the whole of the reinforcements were not at his disposal, a second Manchurian Army, under separate command, being in process of formation. He decided to take the offensive. On September 28 he issued secret orders for an advance, 'having as the initial object, to gain possession of the right bank of the River Tai-tzu'.

Kuropatkin's Army numbered close upon 200,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry. With 760 guns and a large body of engineers, such a force would before the war have been deemed amply sufficient to overpower the numerically smaller army of Oyama. But the succession of reverses from the Yalu to Liao-yang had made Kuropatkin over-cautious; he had an exaggerated idea of the strength of



the Japanese ; his maps, excellent for the country between Liao-yang and Port Arthur, were bad for that between Liao-yang and Mukden ; and the mounted Manchurian brigands, acting with the Japanese, threatened his communications, which had, however, been greatly improved by the completion, on September 20, of the Circum-Baikal railway. Interfered with by Admiral Alexeieff, and holding the opinions which we have seen that he held on the dangers run by Russia in Europe, Kuropatkin, even to relieve Port Arthur, was not inclined to stake his last gun, squadron, and battalion.

As in most campaigns, the moves open to him were, in their broad outlines, simple. The Russian commander-in-chief was not strong enough simultaneously to turn both flanks of the enemy. A parallel battle against foes so determined as the Japanese would be a costly and speculative adventure. To turn one of Oyama's flanks, promised the best results. For reasons imperfectly known, Kuropatkin selected Oyama's right. On the face of it this was bad strategy. The march of the Russian columns would be through mountainous country, and it was most unlikely that they would be able to reach the main communications of the Japanese army, the Kaiping-Liao-yang railway. The Russian army was divided into three parts—a 'Western Force' under General Bilderling, an 'Eastern Force' under Lieutenant-General Stakelberg, and a 'General Reserve'. Behind the 'General Reserve' was General Soboleff with the Sixth Siberian Corps, north of Mukden. While Bilderling moved southward astride the Mukden-Liao-yang railway, fortifying positions as he advanced, Stakelberg was to crush the Umezawa Brigade and Kuroki.

From the 5th to the 8th of October the advance on the

forty-mile front was successful. Bilderling crossed, and Stakelberg reached, the Sha-ho, which has given the name to the battle, while the cavalry of Samsonoff and Rennenkampf, and the Third Siberian Corps under Lieut.-General Ivanoff, moved towards or to the Upper Tai-tzu.<sup>1</sup> On the 9th, however, the Umezawa Brigade round Pen-hsi-hu on the Tai-tzu, and Kuroki to its left, held up the Russian 'Eastern Force' and Rennenkampf.

The next day the Russians halted, and Oyama decided to take the offensive with Nodzu and Oku. He hoped to drive Bilderling east of the Liao-yang-Mukden railway. During the next two days Stakelberg made no progress and Bilderling was pushed back. On the 13th, Kuropatkin ordered Stakelberg to retreat; by the 14th, Bilderling was back on the Sha-ho. With the exception of their recapture, on the 16th and 17th, of Putiloff Hill and 'One Tree Hill', near the point where the Liao-yang-Mukden railway crosses the Sha-ho, the Russians had got much the worse of the exchanges. Their losses were 41,351, those of the Japanese about half that number. Winter—very severe in those regions—set in, and, before Kuropatkin was again able to move, Port Arthur had fallen. His only consolation for his failure on the Sha-ho was that on October 25 he was freed from the control of Alexeieff. As Kitchener about this period was contending, the dual control of an army almost inevitably leads to disaster.

On October 15, when the Russians were retiring behind the Sha-ho, Admiral Rozhestvenski, with a fleet of forty ships, left Libau on the Baltic for the Far East. The news of his departure stimulated Nogi to fresh exertions. From

<sup>1</sup> Ivanoff's and Samsonoff's troops were part of the 'Eastern Force'; Rennenkampf had an independent command.

October 26 to October 31 the second general assault on the fortifications of Port Arthur was delivered. It was a failure, the Japanese losing nearly 4,000 men. A month later (November 26-7) the third assault was made, equally ineffective. The Japanese had little to show for a loss of over 5,500, as against 1,500 Russian casualties. On December 5, however, 203 Metre Hill was stormed. The Japanese had lost some 10,000, the Russians, in the nine days' fighting for 203 Metre Hill and its environs, 3,000.

The price paid by Nogi was not excessive. An observation station commanding the whole harbour was promptly established on 203 Metre Hill. The *Poltava* had been already destroyed by the Japanese heavy howitzers. On the 6th the *Retvizan*, on the 7th the *Pobyeda*, *Peresvyet*, and *Pallada*, on the 8th the *Gilyak*, and on the 9th the *Bayan* were sunk by Japanese shells. The *Sevastopol*, after desperate efforts to save her, was voluntarily sunk on January 1, the day before the surrender of Port Arthur.

Before that date, General Kondratenko, the soul of the defence, had been killed (December 15). On January 2 General Stoessel surrendered. He had not by any means exhausted his resources in men and munitions, and was subsequently condemned to be shot, though the sentence was commuted to ten years' imprisonment. Kaiser Wilhelm II bestowed a decoration on him and on Nogi.

Thus ended the siege of Port Arthur, one of the most memorable in history. Both Russians and Japanese had exhibited marvellous courage and resourcefulness. If Kondratenko had not been killed, the siege might have been prolonged for some days or even weeks. In the course of the fighting, it may be mentioned, hand grenades and even portable shields had made their appearance.

Scarcely had Port Arthur fallen than Kuropatkin—probably incited by the home government, anxious to redeem its credit—renewed the offensive. On January 8, Mishchenko, with 6,000 cavalry and 6 batteries, crossed the Hun-ho and attacked the Japanese main line of communications. He did some slight damage to the railway north of Haicheng, but otherwise effected little. His aim had been to interfere with the transport of Nogi's Army to the Sha-ho and to induce Oyama to denude of troops his front which was then about to be attacked by the Russians.

Kuropatkin on this occasion proposed to operate against Oyama's left, which rested on the Hun-ho, and, as before, consisted of Oku's Army. According to the measure of success attendant on the attack, subsidiary efforts were to be made against Nodzu and Kuroki. The Russian army totalled close on 300,000. On January 25 the advance began, the weather being bitterly cold. Heikoutai, on the Hun-ho, was captured; but the success was not followed up, and by the end of the month the Russians, having lost between 10,000 and 20,000 troops, again retreated.

The two great offensives of Kuropatkin had failed, but, owing largely to the energy of Prince Khilkoff, a constant stream of reinforcements from Europe was flowing into Manchuria, and Kuropatkin would soon have on the Sha-ho an army of half a million men. If Oyama delayed his attack till April, the break-up of winter, by rendering the ground impassable, would enable the Russians to complete their entrenchments round Mukden. The Baltic Fleet was slowly approaching Far Eastern waters, and if, though this was very improbable, Togo's fleet were beaten, the position

of Oyama in front of an undefeated Kuropatkin would be peculiarly hazardous.

Oyama proposed, before the roads became impassable, to strike at the Russians, and the Mikado and his ministers responded energetically to his requests. Reserve brigades were added to the divisions of Oku, Nodzu, and Kuroki. A new army (the Fifth) under General Kawamura, formed of reservists, was secretly brought up and placed on the Japanese right wing, and Nogi's victorious forces from Port Arthur were with equal secrecy sent to reinforce Oyama's left. They were kept well in the rear of Oku and Nodzu until Kawamura's turning movement had produced the desired psychological effect on Kuropatkin's mind. To deceive the latter, a portion of Nogi's troops operated with Kuroki, and he was led to believe that the Japanese army from Port Arthur was trying to turn his lines on the east, when, in fact, it was about to turn them on the west. Of the existence of Kawamura's Army, Kuropatkin appears to have had little or no suspicion.

The Japanese army numbered some 400,000. According to Japanese calculations, Kuropatkin had 300,000 infantry, 26,000 cavalry, and 1,368 guns with which to parry Oyama's blows. The Russians were divided into four armies. The Second, under General Kaulbars, was on the right wing, occupying a line sixteen miles long. Cavalry detachments prolonged Kaulbars's right across the Liao-ho. East of Kaulbars was Bilderling with the Third Army astride the Liao-yang-Mukden railway. The left wing was formed by the First Army under General Linievitch, disposed along a thirty-mile front, reaching to the head waters of the Sha-ho. South and east of the Upper Sha-ho were detached bodies operating in the mountainous region between the Sha-ho

and the Tai-tzu-ho. The Fourth Army, known as the 'General Reserve', was south of Mukden.

To mystify Kuropatkin and to weaken the forces holding this fifty-seven mile long line between the Liao-ho on the west and the headwaters of the Sha-ho on the east, the Japanese commander-in-chief employed two devices. The activities of the mounted brigands in Mongolia were stimulated, raids in February being made against the Harbin-Mukden railway. Reports reached Kuropatkin that a force of over 10,000 troops was in Mongolia preparing to cut the line on which the safety of his whole army depended. Alarmed for his rear, he weakened his field army to strengthen the line-of-communication troops. The second device consisted in the landing of Japanese troops in Northern Corea who might attack Vladivostok. As Vladivostok was the bourne of the approaching Baltic Fleet, it could not be left to its fate. Kuropatkin strengthened its garrison with a mixed brigade. These feints of Oyama exercised considerable influence on the series of battles known as 'the Battle of Mukden', which began on February 23.

Between the last-mentioned date and February 28 the left wing of the Russian army-in the mountainous region between the Tai-tzu-ho and the Sha-ho was attacked by unexpectedly large bodies of the enemy, including troops from Nogi's Army. It was Kawamura's Army, driving Rennenkampf's detachment before him, and turning Linievitch's left. Believing that the Japanese were about to repeat their manœuvre at Liao-yang, Kuropatkin heavily reinforced Linievitch and Rennenkampf. On the 28th he learnt, however, that masses of infantry and cavalry, afterwards ascertained to be Nogi's Army, were marching

between the Liao-ho and the Hun-ho towards the west of Mukden. The objective of Nogi was the Russian communications between Mukden and Harbin. To counter him, reinforcements of more than fifty battalions were added to Kaulbars's Army, and Kaulbars was ordered to take the offensive. In the fighting that ensued Kaulbars was generally unsuccessful, and Nogi's turning movement each day became more menacing. On March 7 Kuropatkin drew back Bilderling and Linievitch to the fortified positions south of Mukden. From March 9 to March 16 a desperate battle raged round the capital of Manchuria. With the greatest difficulty Kuropatkin extricated himself from his perilous position and effected his retreat on Tiehling, whence he retired to a position between Tiehling and the River Sungari. The Russians had lost, according to Oyama's reports, 27,700 killed, 110,000 wounded, and a vast quantity of war material; the Japanese losses up to March 12 were estimated at 41,222. Kuropatkin, who in his report to the Tsar very honourably stated that he considered himself 'the person principally responsible' for the defeat, was superseded by Linievitch on the 20th. A single-minded patriot, Kuropatkin consented to serve under his erstwhile subordinate.

The news of the battle of Mukden, perhaps the greatest battle that the world had yet seen, reverberated round the world.<sup>1</sup> It was the cause of universal rejoicing in Germany, and the Kaiser at once unmistakably showed his real aims. On March 31 he visited Tangier, and the Germano-Franco-

<sup>1</sup> At Wagram the forces engaged numbered 310,300; at Leipzig, 472,500; at Sadowa, 436,110 and at Gravelotte, 300,500. At Mukden 700,000 troops were fighting on a line which at one time was eighty miles long.

Moroccan question was opened. Russia, weakened by the war, was not in a condition to help France effectively. Another result of the Japanese victory was to strengthen Kitchener in his controversy with Lord Curzon over the dual control of the Indian army. The conqueror of the Sudan had already reminded the Cabinet that it was their duty to regard war as the Japanese regarded it. Lord Curzon resigned in August, and Kitchener obtained control of the Indian army. One of his first steps was to send officers to Japan to study the Japanese language and institutions.

On May 8 Wilhelm II had told some of his officers at Strassburg that 'the Russian Army at Mukden was enfeebled by drunkenness and immorality'. This and other characteristic utterances of the Kaiser, taken in connexion with his policy towards France, opened the eyes of Russian statesmen, and made them more inclined to come to terms with Japan. But, ere peace was concluded, Russia was to suffer a last disaster. Her Baltic fleet, trying to reach Vladivostok by way of the Korean Straits, was destroyed (May 27-8) by Togo off the island of Tsushima. Only two of Rozhstvenski's ships escaped destruction, capture, or internment. The Japanese losses were three torpedo-boats. A little over a week later, on June 6, M. Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was forced by German threats to resign his post, and the same day Count von Bülow was created a prince by Wilhelm II.

It was high time that Russia closed her Manchurian adventure. On June 9 President Roosevelt urged Russia and Japan to make peace. Both were agreeable. The negotiations commenced on August 10 at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and on September 5 a treaty of peace was



signed by which Japan was recognized as suzerain of Corea, the southern half of Sakhalien was ceded by Russia to Japan, and Japan took the place previously held by Russia in the Liao-tung peninsula. No war indemnity was paid by Russia to Japan, though the latter received £4,000,000 or so as reimbursement for the maintenance of the Russian prisoners, who had been very well treated by the Japanese during the war.

*From the Treaty of Portsmouth to the opening  
of the Great War*

THE Russo-Japanese War, unlike the Chino-Japanese War, had drained the financial resources of the Japanese people, and Japan had received no war indemnity. Like Great Britain after Waterloo, she had immensely improved her status, but large sections of her population had not benefited pecuniarily by the struggle. The discontented elements, as in England between 1815 and 1832, manifested their irritation by rioting. In September 1905 Tokyo had to be placed under martial law.

The position was further complicated by failures of crops. A famine threatened in the north-eastern section of Honshiu. In December the Katsura ministry which had conducted the war was forced to resign. Before Prince Katsura went out of office, he had concluded, on August 12, 1905, negotiations which resulted in the extension of the scope of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The new alliance was for ten years, and under it Great Britain and Japan pledged themselves, not only to maintain peace in India and the Far East, but to preserve the independence and integrity of China.

The Entente Cordiale (concluded on April 8, 1904) enabled Great Britain to act as mediator between Japan and Russia. On June 10, 1907, a Franco-Japanese, and in the July of the same year a Russo-Japanese agreement, were signed. An Anglo-Russian agreement was also concluded on

August 31, regulating the differences between Russia and Great Britain in the Middle East. The next year (1908) friendly Notes were exchanged between Japan and the United States. Free and peaceful development of Japanese and American commerce in the Pacific Ocean and equal opportunity for foreign commerce and industry in China were the principles affirmed by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington and Mr. Elihu Root. How different were the conditions under which these Notes were penned from those existing in 1853 when Commodore Perry delivered his ultimatum to the Shogun!

In 1909 the Manchurian battle-fields and Japan were visited by Lord Kitchener. At Port Arthur on October 23, the Japanese Admiral Tomioka, speaking in English, said that he 'could not help admiring such a distinguished guest as one of the type of Japanese bushido'. Kitchener replied that he was confident that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be long maintained. On October 27 he sent from Mukden to the Mikado a telegram of condolence on the assassination of Prince Ito, who had been murdered at Harbin by a Korean fanatic. Limitations of space have prevented details of the lives of the great men who helped Mutsuhito in his stupendous task from being given in this book, but an exception must be made in the case of Ito.

Ito has been wrongly compared with Bismarck—how wrongly may be gathered from his own words. 'Our work', he said, 'we take it, is this: to do battle for the right and uphold the good, and to help make the world clean and fair, so that none may ever have cause to regret that Japan has taken her rightful place among the nations of the world.' His attitude towards his sovereign was far more loyal than Bismarck's towards his masters. 'The

Imperial will', wrote Ito, 'has ever been the guiding star of the nation. Whatever', he continued, 'may have been the work done by those who, like myself, tried to assist him in his enlightened government, it could not have achieved such wonderful results had it not been for the great, progressive, and wise influence of His Majesty the Emperor, ever behind each new measure of reform. From the Emperor Japan has learned that lesson which has made her what she is at present.' The reader who has perused Busch's works and Bismarck's own *Reminiscences* will note the gulf between the soul of Ito and that of the Man of Blood and Iron.

Ito was born on September 2, 1841. He was the only son of a petty samurai of the Choshu clan. Through the celebrated Yoshida Torajiro (better known as Shoin), who was his schoolmaster, he early became interested in Occidentalism. At the age of sixteen he entered the service of Kuruhara, a prominent adviser of the Choshu baron. This important personage was strongly impressed by the danger Japan ran from being isolated, and he studied Western tactics at Nagasaki under Dutch instructors. By Kuruhara the young Ito, then eighteen years old, was introduced to Koin Kido, another progressive leader in the, generally speaking, retrograde Choshu clan.

Koin Kido, recognizing the transcendent abilities of the youth, decided secretly to send Ito and three others—including him who was afterwards to be the Marquis Inouye—to Europe. The little party of adventurers at great danger to themselves embarked in 1863 at Yokohama on a British steamer, and reached London four months later. Lord Elgin, Kaempfer, and Will Adams had been astonished at what they saw in Japan, Marco Polo at what he saw in

China. No less great was the astonishment of the Japanese strangers suddenly immersed in the atmosphere of Occidentalism at its central point. Our language, handwriting, printed characters, dress, religion, institutions, customs, laws, and ideas were almost wholly unfamiliar to them. Whether the Japanese brain could assimilate the Occidentalism of the nineteenth century had yet to be ascertained. Ito and his companions settled down to their colossal tasks with energy like that exhibited by Peter the Great when, in disguise, he worked in the Dutch shipyards. The future prince at once started to learn English and to study modern science.

One day he read in the columns of *The Times* a statement that the allied squadrons were about to bombard (as related in chapter 5) the batteries of the Lord of Choshu commanding the Shimonoseki Straits. With Inouye he immediately took ship for Japan. The two patriots landed at Yokohama and found the country in a ferment. Hastening to Yedo, they called at the British Legation and begged Sir Rutherford Alcock to let them see if they could persuade the Choshu baron and his vassals to submit. Sir Rutherford agreed to the proposition. The daring couple were taken on a British ship to Shimonoseki, and running the greatest dangers—Inouye was wounded—argued with the heads of the clan. The latter were not amenable to reason; the bombardment took place, and, at last convinced of the efficacy of modern weapons, the Japanese reactionaries were glad to avail themselves of the services of Ito. He negotiated for his lord, and the matter was, more or less, satisfactorily settled. Soon after, Ito was instrumental in reconciling the Satsuma and Choshu clans. Out of that reconciliation and the character of Mutsuhito sprang the Restoration of

the Mikado. In 1868 Ito was appointed Councillor of State and interpreted for Mutsuhito at the first audience granted by the Emperor to the foreign representatives.

Henceforth Ito's life, up to his death; was interwoven with the main events of Japanese history. It was he who concluded the Treaties of Tientsin and Shimonoseki, and prevented Japan from throwing down the glove to Russia in 1895. Although opposed to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, once it was concluded he gave it his loyal support. The Constitution of Japan and a remarkable commentary on it were among the products of his sane and fertile intellect. For a time he acted as leader of one of the political parties which came into existence after the granting of the Constitution.

On the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Ito was appointed Resident-General in Corea, and, as will be related, performed there work analogous to that of Cromer and Kitchener in Egypt. His observations on Wilhelm II's hollow call to arms against a 'Yellow Peril' are worth quoting. 'If', he said, 'there be a Yellow Peril to be feared in China, then Europe should reckon upon Japan as their first outpost, since Japan would suffer first from such a peril.' As mentioned, by a curious accident Lord Kitchener, the European who, perhaps, most nearly resembled Ito, was in Manchuria at the moment when, as Ito was conversing with the Russian Minister of Finance, six shots from a Browning pistol were fired at him. The first three struck, and mortally wounded the prince. 'I am done for', he said, 'three bullets have hit me.'

Half an hour later he expired. He had obeyed the Japanese commandments 'to do nothing that is shameful, to live so as to become a good ancestor, and in nothing to degrade in any way the good name of one's ancestors'.

From Mukden Kitchener proceeded to Corea and thence to Japan itself. On November 2 he arrived at Tokyo, where his reception was almost regal. His carriage was escorted by troops of cavalry, crowds of citizens greeting its passage with enthusiastic cheers. The Shiba Palace was placed at his disposal. On November 10 he was present with the Mikado at the Japanese manœuvres, and on the 19th he sailed from Kobe for Shanghai *en route* for Australia and New Zealand, whose governments had asked him to advise them on military matters.

The hostile intentions of the Teutonic Powers and their allies being obvious, Japan began to prepare to take her part in the struggle. Though now she built men-of-war for herself, and her army did not need to go to Europe for its weapons and munitions, her position in 1910 was not over-satisfactory. Against Germany's fleet of thirty-two battleships and cruisers she could oppose only twenty-five. The German intrigues in England, on the European Continent, in China and America, were well known. It might be the Kaiser's plan to pick a quarrel with the Japanese alone, before he embarked on his more grandiose undertakings. The Mikado's ministers increased expenditure on the navy. In 1909 Japan had commenced to build submarines. Closer relations with Russia 'in view of the consolidation of peace in the Far East' and for the improvement of the Manchurian railways, were entered into in 1910.

At home Japanese statesmen were faced with serious troubles. In 1910 an attempt was even made to murder the Mikado, to whom the Japanese people owed so largely their high position in the councils of the world. Several of the culprits were executed, and others imprisoned. The


plot was one of a number of ugly symptoms pointing to the fact that the Japanese leaders, so wise and discriminating in other respects, had failed to solve many of the economic problems connected with the welfare of wage-earners.

To get rich quickly had been a necessity for Japan, if she was to remain independent, but in the haste to acquire wealth, many of the evils which disfigure Europe and America had made their appearance in her manufacturing centres.

To understand the situation it is necessary to have a clear idea of the radical changes in Japanese urban life effected by Occidentalism. The reader who has studied the descriptions of Japan written by foreigners who visited the islands soon after their opening in 1853 must not imagine that the Japan of 1910 answered to those descriptions. In some rural districts and old-world towns the transformation that had come over the face of the country might not be apparent. Elsewhere either everything was new or the new jostled with the old, as it does in London, Bristol, Norwich, and York. The writer's impressions of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Osaka, and Kyoto in 1910 may help to explain the economic situation.

To begin with the capital: Tokyo, the ancient seat of the Tokugawa Shogunate bore as little resemblance in 1910 to the Yedo of the Shoguns as the Rome of to-day does to the Rome of Pio Nono. With the fall of the Shogunate and the disappearance of the fiefs, the mansions erected by the feudatories in Yedo had been demolished, and the noble parks in which they stood—parks created by the combined efforts of art and nature working through three centuries—had, according to one observer, been, with very few exceptions, 'literally torn to pieces, so that the places they adorned





A BUSINESS QUARTER OF TOKYO

became vacant and desolate regions: blots breaking the continuity of the populous city'. All this destruction, says Captain Brinkley, who visited Tokyo in 1867, had been wrought with lightning rapidity. Captain Brinkley then found a metropolis thickly packed with buildings and parks, its streets resonant with the tramp of armed samurai entering or emerging from long low lines of solid barracks that flanked the gates of the feudal yashiki, and its markets thronged with busy tradesmen. Any one visiting it five years later would have received the impression of a town much too spacious for its citizens, 'a town populous in spots and desolate in spots, but wearing altogether an aspect of obvious decadence'. This apparent desolation had been but a temporary feature in Tokyo. The municipal census of 1908 gave the settled population of the city as 1,622,856. Tokyo in 1910, owing to its teeming streets and to the fact that most of its population lived in the streets, gave the impression of being an even greater city than it really was. The houses and shops were at the most but two storeys in height, and hence spread over a good deal of space. The majority of the streets were still narrow and without sidewalks. Parks and bathing-places and spacious drilling-grounds afforded elbow-room. The planting of cherry-trees along the streets and the river banks, in the parks and squares, embellished the thoroughfares and gave an attractiveness to their appearance during the cherry-blossom season in April which could be found in no other large city of the world.

Yet much remained to be done before Tokyo could rank as a modern city. Perhaps nowhere else in Japan was the old life and the new to be seen in such close juxtaposition. In one street were visible only 'wooden houses of immemorial


style, lowly, sombre, and unattractive, annexes of unshapely fireproof warehouses'; in the next 'handsome lofty edifices of brick and stone, such as would be called imposing anywhere'. Along the sides of one thoroughfare the shops had the open front and unalluring arrangement of mediaeval fashions; those in the adjoining street were resplendent with plate-glass windows and glittering displays of foreign wares or native works of art. The factory chimney had begun 'to stain the crystalline purity of the atmosphere that enfolded Yedo in pre-Meiji times'. The town, excellently policed and fairly well lighted, had a sufficient water-supply, and a public school system that ranked with those of most European cities. Three essentials, however, were still wanted: a good drainage system to fulfil the aim of its comprehensive sanitary regulations, a commodious station, better streets and side-walks. The surface tramways were admirable and the fares remarkably low. The new methods of travel had reduced the work of the jinrikishas during the last ten years. No one seemed to be idle in Tokyo. The general impression was that of a hive of busy humanity living in houses that looked into the street where most of the business seemed to be transacted. Moreover, Tokyo was a city of a single European hotel.

From Tokyo to its port, Yokohama, is but a distance of some eighteen miles. Until 1859 Yokohama was a fishing village, but in 1910 its population amounted to 400,000. At the latter date it presented most of the features we are accustomed to associate with a rising and important city—modern stores wherein the American window-dressing system prevailed, though modified fortunately by a leavening of Japanese taste, electric tramways, imposing government and public offices, which were situated in the lower

town adjoining the harbour, an energetic and progressive municipal council, whose attention was never distracted from the mainspring of Yokohama's prosperity, the organization of her commerce and the necessity of adapting her harbours to the ever-growing maritime trade. The approaching opening of the Panama Canal made dredging operations for the accommodation of larger vessels, additional quay accommodation, and other equipment of the port matters of most urgent necessity. These had been in progress for some time past.

In the export trade, Yokohama was likely to retain her position as principal port of Japan, but Kobe had become in recent years, especially in regard to her imports, perhaps the most important shipping and distributing centre of the Empire, and the increasing importance of Osaka was rapidly winning for Kobe the same position as Yokohama had held relative to Tokyo. The trade at Kobe in 1910 amounted to £36,124,382, not far short of that of Yokohama, and her imports exceeded those of Yokohama by about £8,000,000.

Kobe's proximity by rail to Tsuruga, and the position acquired by the latter since the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway, brought Kobe within fifteen or sixteen days of London. As regards sea communication with Europe and North and South America, there was very little to choose between Yokohama and Kobe, and the latter was also as much a port of call as the former for large and small sailing and coasting vessels. Its vicinity, too, to Kyoto, Kure, Himeji, Okayama, and Hiroshima, and many small but thriving towns in the Sanyo district, was an important feature of its position. Kobe's modern history only started from the opening to foreign trade in 1867 of Hyogo, her neighbour across the harbour, but she had been




YOKOHAMA BAY FROM KANAGAWA

an important centre of distribution since the middle of the sixteenth century, when Hideyoshi built Osaka Castle. The growth of her modern trade is shown by the following table, which sets out the figures for every tenth year from 1878 to 1908 and those for 1909 and 1910:—

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Value of exports and imports.</i>	<i>Increase compared with previous year quoted.</i>	<i>Percentage of increase.</i>
1878	£1,253,150	—	—
1888	4,297,200	£3,044,050	23
1898	19,825,300	15,528,100	31
1908	24,505,200	4,679,900	24
1909	28,484,133	3,978,933	16
1910	36,124,382	7,640,249	27

Between the trade of Yokohama and that of Kobe there were certain differences, the chief being, in Kobe's case, the preponderance of imports over exports and the varied character of both, while the bulk of Yokohama's export trade was silk. A similar feature of both ports was the extent to which the import and the export trade was in foreign hands, British firms leading the way. Native feeling against such a condition of affairs was beginning to show itself.

Kobe, too, was unlike Yokohama, in that she was a manufacturing centre of some importance as well as a seaport and a centre of distribution. Her shipbuilding and repairing dockyards employed some 3,000 hands, and in the case of the Mitsubishi firm, was in connexion with shipbuilding establishments at Nagasaki. The Kanegafuchi spinning-works, boasting the most model organization in Japan, were here, also the Kobe steel-works and a variety of other important manufacturing and industrial under-



*Elizabeth Keefe*


A BIT OF KOBE HARBOUR

takings. As in the case of Yokohama, the great expansion in Kobe's trade of recent years had necessitated the provision of extra harbour accommodation, and the reclamation scheme to effect this had been put in hand and was approaching completion.

Less modern than Yokohama, more modern than Tokyo, was the Cottonopolis of Japan, Osaka, which had been 'the kitchen' of Yedo under the Tokugawa Shogunate. In 1661, when the population of London was under 200,000, that of Osaka is said to have been twice as large. In 1910 the inhabitants numbered 1,250,000.

In appearance Osaka presented some striking contrasts. From the windows of the railway carriage it might be regarded as a foreign Manchester. Its innumerable tall chimneys sent forth the blackest of smoke, and its factories and mills were built of red brick after the plan of our own—except that, on account of earthquakes, they were not more than one or two storeys high. The immediately surrounding country was flat for miles, affording ample room for a city of five millions. It was on account of this open situation, and because all the roads of the Empire naturally extended to Osaka, that Hideyoshi built his castle there, and determined to make it the national capital. While the factories and mills suggested some of our own cities, the several branches of the river and the innumerable canals called to mind Amsterdam and Venice, and had obtained for it the name of the 'City of Water'. The canals, some of great width, ran through the busiest districts, and were interwoven among its streets. From the bay and river eastward there were at least ten of them, all communicating with the central one, which ran north and south through the heart of the city, and formed the boundary between





Elizabeth Keith.

OSAKA

the west and east end. The eastern district was again divided by a canal from the branch of the river running through the northern district of Osaka, and was connected by two arms with the north and south branch. This network of canals, laden with barges and boats of every sort and kind, relieved the streets of the pressure caused by the traffic, and transported the fabrics of the mills, shops, and factories, together with the provisions for the millions of people depending for their supplies upon the Osaka district. It was a city of boats and bridges, the latter numbering 444 in all, not little wooden structures, but many of them well-built, substantial erections of iron, stone, or timber. Projecting over the canals were thousands of closely packed dwelling-houses.

The streets and canals of Osaka were thronged with busy multitudes of people. The stores and shops were also workshops and warehouses. Clerks, designers, artisans, packers, carters, sellers, and buyers were so mixed up that the wonder was how they managed to unravel themselves and evolve order out of the chaos which seemed to reign supreme. In this respect one was reminded of the descriptions of the cities of the ancient world before the days of capitalization and centralization of industrial energy, when every man had a handicraft of his own. The inhabitants plied their various trades alongside the avenues of traffic, and even in boats on the canals. Now you passed through a long street given over to pottery and porcelain, next through one devoted to umbrellas and fans. Methods and implements were as varied as were the occupations. Here were men with their bronze skin bare, save for a breechcloth round their loins, pounding rice with a long wooden pole. Next door a dozen operatives were making garments with

the latest American sewing-machines. Over the Rice Exchange they were waving the quotations from hill to hill and peak to peak by means of flags. Within a stone's throw in the imposing modern post-office building might be heard the click of the telegraph instrument, and the 'Are you there?' of the telephone. You might within a few minutes view in operation the oldest and most primitive spinning-wheel and the most intricate modern Jacquard machine.


A delirium of work seemed to pervade the people. In their eagerness to take part in the conflict, the Osaka industrial army had simply caught up every implement at hand, and with surprising deftness was producing an infinite variety of excellent articles. Poorly equipped some of the labourers might be, but nevertheless they worked. The industrial army was not waiting for the last man to be fully furnished with the latest modern device, but it was pushing to the front with what it had, discarding the old implements only when better were obtainable. Those who have gazed at the Pyramids and wondered how they were built without modern appliances should walk the streets of Osaka and see the obstacles encountered and overcome by hand labour. A few ancient-looking bulls with great rings in their noses were the only beasts of burden visible here. All else was moved by human muscle, except, of course, the machinery of the cotton mills, and the recently installed electric tramways, which were taking the place of thousands of jinrikishas.

Before resuming the narrative, let us glance at a very different place—Kyoto, the Mecca of Japan. It would be difficult to imagine a more superbly situated city. Guarded on three sides by well-wooded mountains, one range of which separates it from the famous Lake Biwa, it is built

upon a fertile plain, which, beginning with Kyoto, extends southwards to the Bay of Osaka.

A glance at an illuminated map of Kyoto suggested that fully half of the area occupied by the city was given over to palaces, pleasure-grounds, and temples of all-kinds. The Japanese delight to build their temples in the groves and clumps of trees on the hill-sides, and in the nooks and corners of mountain ranges. Upon the scene of busy commercial and industrial life in Kyoto these red, gold, copper, and burnished temples and shrines, surrounded by the dark green cryptomerias, and enlivened with rich foliage of flowering shrubs, looked down with contempt. A statistician could hardly pursue his studies in the mountain-side hotel of Kyoto. From its bridges, lantern-hung verandahs, and sliding windows, the outlook was indescribably lovely. Below the gables and spires and corrugated roofs of the oriental city, the swift-running silvery waters of the Kamo, the canal from Lake Biwa, and the numerous picturesque bridges were discernible. Then the palace grounds, the once powerful Shogun's palace, the temple, the castle, and the foliage met the view. Beyond all these the mighty walls of well-wooded mountains, decked with gay shrines and temple gates, closed in the scene. The Kamo river, running from north to south at the base of a chain of hills studded with temples, passed through the city. On the west ran the Katsura, while the Takase river flowed between.

There was in 1910 a population within the city of 440,000, the number having nearly doubled in the last quarter of a century. Kyoto retained its former delightful attractions, not even marred by hotels on 'the European plan'. The old and picturesque Yaami Hotel had been partially destroyed by fire, but the Miyako Hotel, similarly situated on hilly



ground in a park of 25 acres and surrounded by a tastefully arranged Japanese garden, had taken its place. The style of architecture was Japanese, and lent itself agreeably to the surrounding scenery as well as to Kyoto itself. There was another good hotel—the Kyoto Hotel—in the centre of the town. ‘This is Japan at last!’ was the expression heard on reaching Kyoto, when it was found that Japanese girls in their native costume were employed as waiters and attendants, instead of Japanese men, as in the hotels of other large cities. Kyoto was practically unchanged. The railway station was still on the outskirts of the town, and it took forty minutes in a jinrikisha to climb the hill to the hotel.

It was not, however, with cities like the old capital of Japan that Mutsuhito and his ministers had now to reckon. They had principally to busy themselves with the regulation of industrial centres such as Osaka, Kobe, and Yokohama. On July 30, 1912, the remarkable monarch, during whose lifetime Yokohama and so many other cities had sprung up, passed away. The scenes which attended his death and funeral were, perhaps, unparalleled in human history. No Pharaoh, Caesar, or Caliph was ever so sincerely lamented. General Nogi, the captor of Port Arthur, and his wife committed suicide on the day of the funeral. Nogi had predicted the Great War of 1914. His death and the death of his wife were protests against the tendency in Japan slavishly to imitate European and American customs.

During the later years of Mutsuhito's reign and the first years of his successor, the present Mikado, two other matters of external policy (besides the Teutonic Peril question) had greatly exercised the minds of Japanese statesmen. One was the problem how to protect Japanese

immigrants in America ; the other concerned the administration of Formosa, Corea, the Liao-tung peninsula, and Sakhalien.

The former problem, which has not yet been entirely solved, produced serious friction between Japan and the Pacific States of the great North American Republic. The Americans, despite Japan's giant strides since 1853, were still inclined to patronize or coerce such of the Mikado's subjects as landed, chiefly from Hawaii, on their shores.

In his illuminating work, *When I was a Child*, the distinguished Japanese artist and writer, Yoshio Markino, has graphically described his experiences on landing at San Francisco in July 1893, and his subsequent adventures in America. The stories told by Markino, by birth a samurai, help one to understand the bitter feelings of resentment felt by the Japanese towards certain Occidentals. 'I went', he writes, 'to the Golden Gate Park with another Japanese. Whenever we passed before the crowds, they shouted "Jap!" and "Sukebei!" (the latter word is too rude to translate). Then some of them even spat on us. When we came out to the corner of Geary Street, pebbles were showered upon us.'

Fortunately the government at Washington contains highly cultivated gentlemen. By their tact and the efforts of President Roosevelt, war between Japan and the United States over the immigration question was never imminent.

It remains to be considered how Japan has administered the provinces acquired by her as a result of the Chino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. The events attending the expansion of Japan have taken place concurrently with her elevation to the status of a world-Power ; it has, therefore, been rapid, and geographical conditions have compelled

each successive step to be enacted in full view of a critical audience. There had been no new continents for Japan to occupy; she has had to extend her Empire over lands immediately adjacent and already populated. These have presented widely divergent problems in colonization, which might well have taxed the capacity of a more experienced nation.

As the necessity of expansion is accepted in the case of other countries, there is no call to labour it here on behalf of Japan. But a special factor inherent in the situation in the Far East was also present to force her hand. It was the ultra-conservatism of China, who made a point of asserting herself in a particularly aggressive manner as though in protest against the progressive ideas which Japan had adopted. The latter embarked upon a career of progress on Occidental lines from a deliberate conviction of its utility and advantages. It was not to be expected, therefore, that she would prove more tolerant of disorder and unrest on her borders than a European Power. The Chinese government, however, had always been handicapped by the weakness of its control over the outlying portions of the vast territories nominally under its sway, and this weakness was the circumstance that provided the immediate cause of Japan's expansion.

As the growth of Japan has had to take place at the expense of her neighbours, it is inevitable that it should be resented in many quarters. When to this circumstance have to be added mistakes such as no country has been able to avoid entirely in its colonial history, we need not be surprised that criticism, by laying emphasis on details, has been able to create considerable prejudice against the Japanese. The verdict of history will accord to these



considerations their true value, and its estimate of Japan as a colonizing power will be largely guided by the use to which she has put her opportunities—in other words, by the fruits of her expansion. This is the standard by which Japan would elect to be judged, and the one to which consciously she adjusts her policy. Whatever may have been the shortcomings which have evoked criticism, there can be no doubt that alike in Formosa and Corea the advent of Japanese rule has made for order and progress. These two experiments in colonization—the first made since centuries by an independent Asiatic race—are of peculiar interest to the historian and sociologist. Though Japanese immigrants were in Corea long before any Japanese settled in Formosa, the island of Formosa was the first to come under Japanese rule.

When the Japanese proposed to include the cession of Formosa in the terms of peace to be imposed upon China by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 1895), the Chinese plenipotentiary was mildly surprised. Immigration from the mainland had extended Chinese sovereignty over the island, but China had consistently evaded the task of governing the rebellious inhabitants; consequently the Peking authorities experienced little or no regret in seeing their difficulties in regard to Formosa transferred to the Japanese.

The action of the French in storming and occupying Keelung in 1884-5 had served to remind the Japanese of the possibility of Formosa falling into the hands of another Power. Fear of such an eventuality, as well as the natural desire for expansion, prompted Japan to claim Formosa at the first opportunity. There was little to attract her in the actual conditions of the island, and she lacked the stimulus of any close commercial relationship.

Twenty years' government has wrought striking changes in Taiwan (the Japanese name of the island). The pacification of the aborigines has been completed, conditions of life have become normal, and the productive capacity of the island has been increased until it has been launched on its career as a profitable colony, independent of the Imperial exchequer.

The Japanese have been accused of ruthlessness in overcoming the opposition of the aborigines. The latter were not, however, an amiable and peaceful folk, but a race whose favourite pursuit was the collection of human skulls. It is not very likely that the Formosan head-hunters brought into contact with the Chinese had become less cruel than they naturally were. The hideous tortures inflicted by the Chinese on native and foreign victims are notorious. If the Japanese had at first to be severe, that severity was, doubtless, necessary. At first the Japanese Formosan government, at the instance, it is said, of the Emperor himself, refrained from any aggressive policy directed to bringing about the wholesale submission of the aborigines. Japanese rule was extended gradually over the island; a cordon of troops or gendarmes virtually indicated the limits of the new jurisdiction. In 1910 it was decided that the time had arrived for the systematic subjugation of the whole island. The undertaking was to be spread over a period of five years, and a certain sum was set aside to defray the cost. It was actually completed in 1914, a feature of the campaign being the surrounding of the region occupied by the aborigines with electrically charged wire entanglements, which were pushed forward until the savages were completely caged. The Japanese were too business-like to leave the natives, even when they had finally subjugated

them by force, without an opportunity to make themselves useful citizens. Means of earning a legitimate livelihood were put in their way, and special attention given to the work of educating and civilizing the rising generation.

One of the earliest problems confronting the Japanese was the sanitary condition of the island, the climate of which is hot, damp, and malarious; for, until the evils of long years of Chinese neglect and to some extent the natural drawbacks had been remedied, there could be no question of encouraging immigration. As a preliminary measure artesian wells were sunk in enormous numbers to procure an untainted water-supply; the capital Taihoku (Taipeh) received a drainage system, and, subsequently, waterworks; sewers and conduits were built in the chief towns. Nearly 4,000 miles of roads have been reconstructed or built. A railway line (247 miles), running down the western side of the island, now connects the two ports of Keelung in the extreme north and Takao on the south-west coast. Branch lines bring the total mileage to 320 miles on the State system. The sugar industry has given rise to a number of private light railways, no fewer than 929 miles of lines being used for this purpose. A special feature of Taiwan is the tracks for hand-pushed cars; some 485 miles of these tracks have been constructed. Harbour works were also undertaken on a large scale, nearly £1,000,000 being spent on those at Keelung. Takao has become a good second-class port, and Tamsui, handicapped by a bar at the river's mouth, has been improved.

There had been little commercial contact between Japan and Formosa before the cession took place, and settlement by Japanese progressed slowly at first. The Taiwan government, under the direction of a governor-general, found

itself, therefore, compelled to adopt an extremely parental and protectionist policy towards trade and industry. Government monopolies, the encouragement of industries by means of subsidies, and the establishment of model industrial institutions, have formed the key-note of Japanese policy in Taiwan.

As among the habits introduced by the Chinese into Formosa was that of the smoking and eating of opium—vices strictly prohibited in Japan—the first monopoly to be started was that of opium ; the system was subsequently extended to salt, camphor, and tobacco. It was decided that in view of the hold which the first-named drug had obtained in Formosa under the Chinese administration, absolute prohibition could not be enforced at once, and that a system of gradual prohibition would have to be introduced. Unofficial importation of opium was forbidden in February 1896, and in April 1897 the production, sale, and smoking of opium were all subjected to government regulations. Licences to smoke were to be issued only to those who were regarded as confirmed smokers. Whether these measures will prove effective, time alone will show. The habits sought to be eradicated are far more tenacious than the habits of drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco, and the efforts of the Japanese in the comparatively short space of twenty years should be compared with those of the legislators and administrators of States where attempts have been made to stamp out drunkenness.

In regard to both salt and camphor the monopoly system has been attended by marked progress in the industries. A salt monopoly existed under the Chinese régime, but was abandoned when the island was ceded to Japan. Four years later the unsatisfactory condition of the trade and the

fluctuations in price caused a monopoly to be proclaimed. To-day Taiwan is not only able to supply its own salt needs, dispensing with imports from China, but it exports salt to other parts of the Japanese Empire and to Asiatic Russia. But for the intervention of the government it is probable that the camphor industry would have shared the fate that bids fair to overtake it on the Chinese mainland, where reckless felling of trees must sooner or later drive it out of existence. The production of camphor and camphor-oil fluctuates from year to year ; but the industry has made considerable strides, and is now in a flourishing condition. Tobacco forms a fourth monopoly, established chiefly for the purpose of raising revenue. The plant is grown in the island, but neither in quantity nor in quality is the local product sufficient to meet the demands. Greater attention, however, is now being given to methods of cultivation, with a view to reducing the importation.

Nothing is more typical of the thoroughness with which Japan approached her first effort at colonization than the minute trigonometrical survey of the island that was among the earliest undertakings of the colonial government. Such a survey not only enabled the resources of the island to be ascertained and benefited the revenue, but it was a service rendered to agriculture, as it prepared the way for the settlement of the question of land-ownership. Minerals are found in Taiwan, and mining has been considerably developed. But agriculture is the chief asset, and it is to the development of this and the attendant industries that the efforts of the authorities have been mainly directed. To this end an extensive programme of irrigation has been carried out. Rice, the most valuable product in the time of the Chinese, has accordingly become less dependent on weather con-

ditions, and the Japanese, finding sugar more profitable, now aim at regulating the cultivation of rice to the needs of the population, in order to be able to increase the area under sugar.

The sugar industry has been the object of the government's special solicitude. New factories fitted with American machinery were erected and experiments made in introducing new cane shoots from abroad. The formation of companies who undertake the cultivation of sugar-cane on a large scale was encouraged, with the result that within five years the acreage was quadrupled. Tea is another product that enjoys the active support of the government, which has its own experimental plantation and a model tea factory. Closer attention to the conditions of cultivation has been the means of increasing the popularity of what are still known as Formosa teas.

The material result of Japan's stewardship over Taiwan is shown in the financial position of the island. Two years after the Japanese took possession, the revenue was in the neighbourhood of £1,000,000, and the Imperial government was called upon to grant an annual subsidy of about £700,000 to meet the balance of the expenditure. By 1909 the need for a subvention had ceased to exist, and Taiwan is now financially independent, with a revenue amounting to between four and five millions sterling. That the Japanese have at the same time improved the condition of the inhabitants is beyond dispute. The island presented special difficulties to its new rulers; but a policy of moderation allowed time for the marked efficiency of the government to become appreciated, and simplified the task of taming the wilder section of the population.

In their dealings with Corea (Chosen) the Japanese were

confronted with a different problem from that presented by Formosa. Here an ancient people, rendered effete by centuries of incompetent and corrupt administration, was a prey to every form of unrest. Unable to govern herself, Corea could not hope to escape the intervention of a more powerful State. China claimed to supply what the Koreans needed, but had conspicuously failed in the task of rehabilitating the peninsula. Japan, the new power in the Far East, was constrained to try her hand.

Japan went to war with China for the purpose of eliminating Chinese interference with Corea. Her victory was followed by an attempt to maintain the independence of the latter country, while effecting its reformation. Russia, however, in her steady expansion eastwards, had by this time appeared on the scene, and took up the rôle that China had been forced to abandon. A fresh era of intrigue and counter-intrigue ensued. But Japan had not fought China in order to prepare the way for the domination over Corea of a far more dangerous rival. When the Russians obtained the lease of the Liao-tung peninsula from China, the Japanese decided that the steady encroachment of the northern Power had to be resisted, at whatever cost. The Russo-Japanese War (1904) followed, and, as we have seen, Russia, by the Treaty of Portsmouth, acknowledged that Japan possessed in Corea paramount political, military, and economic interests, and engaged neither to obstruct nor to interfere with the measures of guidance, protection, and control which Japan might find it necessary to take.

Japan was at last left with a free hand in Corea. She was content at first to establish a protectorate over the country. By the agreement of November 17, 1905, the Japanese government, through the Foreign Office at Tokyo,

assumed control and directed the foreign relations and affairs of Corea, while undertaking to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Corean Imperial house. Prince Ito became the Resident-General at Seoul.

The dual administration thus initiated continued until 1910, with a notable modification in 1907, when a new treaty (July 24) transferred administrative authority to Japan. The Corean government, by this agreement, undertook, in effecting administrative reforms, to follow the guidance of the Japanese Resident-General, who was to appoint and dismiss high officials, and whose sanction had first to be obtained for all laws and important administrative measures.

In 1910 Japan formally annexed Corea. The Imperial Rescript stated that the efforts of the Japanese government to promote reforms in the administration of Corea had in a degree been attended with success. But the existing government in that country had shown itself hardly effective to preserve peace and stability, and in addition a spirit of suspicion and misgiving dominated the whole peninsula. The office of Governor-General of Corea was therefore to be established. The Governor-General would, under the direction of the Emperor of Japan, exercise the command of the Army and Navy as well as the general control over all administrative functions in Corea.

From the time when China renounced her claims over the country and the Japanese government made itself responsible for the work of reform, events in Corea had until this moment followed a course of normal and inevitable development. With unworthier motives impelling her, Japan might well have accelerated the absorption of the Hermit Kingdom ; but officially she showed the same degree



of restraint in dealing with Corean incompetence and recalcitrancy up to the time of annexation as she had shown in challenging the intervention in turn of China and Russia. The fact that the direction of Corean affairs was placed in the hands of Ito was an earnest of Japan's beneficent intentions. Unfortunately, the unofficial acts of Japan in Corea did not always reflect the attitude of the government. There is no need to go beyond the Resident-General's own statement: 'There has been much to censure in the conduct of our nationals hitherto in Corea,' Prince Ito declared on a public occasion in Tokyo.<sup>1</sup> 'The greatest indignities have been put upon the Coreans, and they have been obliged to suffer them with tears in their eyes. Now that this Empire has taken upon itself the protection of Corea, this improper behaviour calls for the utmost correction.'

Both Corea and Manchuria have supplied instances of Japan's expansion failing to live up to the high purposes of the government. Prince Ito's words constitute an admission of grave Japanese excesses in Corea. Part of the trouble was due to a conflict of opinion between the military and the civil authorities. After two successful wars waged for the sake of Corea there was little inclination on the part of the military to be long-suffering towards Corean intransigence. Their attitude was reflected in the conduct of many of the provincial officials and of the Japanese rank and file who overran the country. Outside the Residency-General in Seoul there was little of the *suaviter in modo* in Japan's dealings with the Coreans.

As in Taiwan so in Chosen (as Corea was named after 1910) Japan's administrative activities have been supple-

<sup>1</sup> *A Wandering Student in the Far East*. The Earl of Ronaldshay, M.P.

mented by practical steps for the promotion of the material well-being of her new charge. It is unnecessary to enumerate here the measures taken to place the country on a sound footing. They include all the preliminary work required to open it up for a satisfactory development of its resources—the reorganization of the whole financial system, the suppression of brigandage, the building of roads and railways. In this connexion mention must be made of the widening of the Antung-Mukden line, which has made the Chosen main railway part of the trunk line from Europe to the Far East, and allows well-appointed express trains of the South Manchuria railway to perform the journey from Fusan to the Russian system<sup>1</sup> without a break.

In spite of the presence of a settled Korean population, the actual methods employed by the Japanese government in promoting the welfare of the peninsula have not differed greatly from those adopted in Formosa. The Koreans have proved amenable to Japan's rule, but their attitude has been essentially a passive one; they were not conscious of any need for reforms and have shown no alacrity to assimilate those that the Japanese have introduced. While willing to help the Koreans to help themselves, the Tokyo government has not been slow to realize that the future of the country depends largely on Japanese immigration. Hence the efforts, but little successful at first, to encourage settlement. Such immigrants as went were not always of the right type. If the Korean showed little ability to understand the Japanese point of view, it has to be admitted that the Japanese, whether military, civilian, or subordinate

<sup>1</sup> i. e. at Changchun until 1916. By an agreement ratified early in that year, Russia disposed of the sixty miles of railway between Changchun and Harbin to Japan.

official, took no pains to explain it to him. Since 1910 the population of Chosen has shown a steady annual increase of 5.49 per cent. (compared with 1.93 in the case of Taiwan)—an indication that the government's methods are meeting with success as far as the quantity of the immigration is concerned.

In so far as Chosen and Taiwan presented the same conditions of industrial and commercial backwardness, it was to be expected that there would be little difference in the principles of colonial policy applied by the Japanese government. There has been the same careful fostering of all enterprise, the same attention to improved methods of cultivation, particularly in regard to cotton and sericulture; agricultural and industrial model institutions have been established, afforestation has been taken in hand. The monopoly system is repeated in the case of ginseng and salt, and a company—the Oriental Development Company—in which the government holds shares, is charged with the interests of settlers. Such industries as there are, apart from peasant handiwork, are in Japanese hands. Much remains to be done before Japan can feel recouped for an outlay which was for some years between two and three millions sterling annually, and for 1915-16 was still £800,000. The racial antipathy between Koreans and Japanese, as well as the ignorance of the former, must retard the work of reform in Chosen.

From Formosa and Corea we move to Manchuria, most of which since the Russo-Japanese War has been within Japan's sphere of influence. Japan contends that the position she holds in Manchuria has been acquired for her own preservation and in the interests of peace in the Far East. She disclaims any desire

for territorial expansion. Her point of view will, perhaps, be better understood if it is realized that for some time to come Japan's aim must be the possession of a commercial and industrial empire rather than mere territorial conquest. If she were to indulge in the latter at China's expense—both Formosa and Corea were too lightly attached to the Chinese Empire to affect the argument—she would run the risk of bringing about the international partition of China. Whatever might be her share in that eventuality (and no doubt she would be able to help herself liberally), the rest of China—that is to say, by far the greater part—would fall into other hands and be largely, if not entirely, closed to Japanese commercial penetration. The maintenance of the existing system in China affords Japan the best opportunities for the trade and industry upon which her future depends. Her peculiar position in Manchuria is the outcome of special circumstances. It is true that the cession of the Liaotung peninsula, stipulated for by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, possibly with a premonition of what the future had in store, contradicted this principle of territorial expansion. The slip, if so it may be regarded, was promptly atoned for, on the 'advice' of Russia, France, and Germany. But the appearance of Russia at Port Arthur and Dairen (Dalny) opened up visions not only of a closed Manchuria, but also of other portions of China sharing the same fate. Japan, therefore, resolved to put the issue to the arbitrament of the sword. She gained her point. Manchuria, however, was not annexed, as Corea had been. *Amour propre* demanded a lease of the territory which had once been Japanese for a few months and had been surrendered in the face of Russian pressure, but for the rest the necessary commercial and industrial expansion was to be secured by other means.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia handed over to Japan the section of the Manchurian railways south of Kuangchengtze (Changchun). The Japanese government, having in December 1905 obtained the formal assent of China to its new position in Manchuria, at once set to work to carry out the exploitation of this sphere of interest by the agency of a railway system. While the Kuan-tung Administration Office took charge of the government of the leased territory, as well as of the protection and control of the districts adjacent to the railway lines, the South Manchuria Railway Company was formed under an Imperial ordinance to operate the railways. At the same time the company—with a share capital of £20,000,000, half of which was subscribed by the government—undertook a number of subsidiary enterprises, such as the management of Dairen harbour, the working of the Fushun collieries, the laying out of new towns, the establishment of hotels, and the development of local resources, whether agricultural, industrial, or commercial. Japanese consuls in South Manchuria act as commissioners for the Kuan-tung government, and the responsibilities of the latter have grown until they comprise in separate departments all the affairs of an ordinary State, e. g. Communications, Justice, Education, Public Health, and Marine Affairs. Under the direction of Baron Goto the railway administration has been able to surmount the many difficulties incidental to such an undertaking in its early stages. As a result of the purchase, under an agreement with Russia in July 1916, of the sixty miles of line north of Changchun, the South Manchuria railway now controls a system reaching from Fusan to Harbin, which stands comparison with European lines. An excellent train-service is supplemented by a number of first-class

hotels, and both have done much to revolutionize travel in these parts.

At the conclusion of the war with Russia, Japanese interests in Manchuria were in the hands of the military, whose general bearing and actions were largely responsible for the ill-will engendered against Japan. An undesirable class of Japanese immigrant overran the country and lent itself in a variety of ways to conflicts with the Chinese authorities and populace. Without doubt there was often provocation on the other side; but the fact remains that the peaceful intentions of the Japanese government and the solicitude it protested for good relations with China found little or no echo in the dealings of the Japanese army of occupation or of the civilian element in Manchuria.

That Japan remained dissatisfied with her position in Manchuria was shown by the demands which she presented to the Chinese government in December 1914, when, after the elimination of Germany from Shantung, she sought a comprehensive readjustment of her relations with China. It is unnecessary to enter here into the details of the controversy. The original demands were certainly stiffer than the terms which Japan ultimately accepted, and in this connexion it may be noted in passing that a jingoistic school of expansionists is gradually acquiring more weight in the Empire's councils. China agreed to extend to ninety-nine years the terms of the lease of Kuan-tung peninsula and of the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden railway concessions. The whole of South Manchuria was thrown open to Japanese residence, travel, and business enterprise, whether agricultural or industrial, and permission to lease land for any of these purposes was granted.

Russian action in Outer Mongolia had caused Japan to

consider the situation in Inner Mongolia, which borders on her sphere of interest in Manchuria. Her first instinct was to demand the same privileges in Inner Mongolia as she insisted upon in Manchuria, but these claims were waived, and she contented herself, in the treaty of May 1915, with China's undertaking to open in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners certain suitable places in eastern Inner Mongolia. The whole treaty, which incorporated also an exchange of Notes regarding the non-alienation by China of territory in Fukien for military or naval purposes, was intended to obtain for Japan further freedom for commercial and industrial expansion. Her disclaimer against territorial aggrandizement thus holds good.

Sakhalien, the last of the Japanese outliers, has yet to be considered. In Karafuto, the portion of the island of Sakhalien lying south of the 50th degree of latitude ceded by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan has a task more straightforward than that offered by either Taiwan or Chosen. Few aliens are present to cause complications. At the time of the cession Japanese constituted the bulk of the inhabitants, and since 1910 others have migrated to the territory at the rate of from 5,000 to 6,000 annually. The same systematic efforts to promote industry and agriculture have been introduced. Fishery is the most important pursuit; but tracts of land suitable for cultivation and pasturage have been placed under settlement; mining, particularly coal, is being developed, and considerable wealth is likely to accrue from the forests, which cover an area of over 8,000,000 acres.

Karafuto appropriately rounds off the story of Japan's expansion. Even if it be not true that the Japanese elected to stop at the 50th parallel because the cherry-tree does

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not blossom north of that degree, the idea is worthy of the national instinct. It serves to remind us that the people whose valour and materialism have stood them in such good stead are also poetical and artistic, and to suggest that when the stress of the 'growing pains' has in part subsided these other characteristics may come into their own and remove many of the anomalies that have attended Japan's earlier efforts in expansion.



## II

### *The Great War*

It was in August 1914 that the German and Austro-Hungarian War Lords let loose their enormous armed forces on Serbia, Belgium, France, and Russia. Great Britain—on land hopelessly unprepared for the struggle—took the part of the outraged peoples, and asked the Japanese government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The moment had come when the value of another scrap of paper was in the balance. Germany, we may be sure, offered inducements to Japan to remain neutral, if not to join her in her piratical enterprise. The sequel will show what a contrast there was between the action taken in the Great War by Japan and that taken almost immediately afterwards by Turkey, and, later, by Bulgaria and Greece.

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia on July 23; Great Britain delivered hers to Germany on August 4. On August 15 Japan, in a document modelled on the one presented to her by Germany after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, requested Germany to withdraw all warships from Chinese and Japanese waters and to surrender by September 15, 1914, the leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to its eventual restoration to China. While Germany and Austria-Hungary fixed hours for the consideration of their ultimata, Japan gave the Kaiser a week in which to make up his mind. Germany returned no answer, and on August 23 the Mikado declared war on

her. 'We hereby', the rescript ran, 'declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength and We also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations.'

The Japanese fulfilled the spirit and the letter of this declaration. With the British, French, and Russian squadrons in the Pacific, the Japanese navy materially assisted in the destruction of the German men-of-war roving between the east coast of Africa and the western shores of America. It helped to convoy the Anzacs on their way to Egypt and the Gallipoli Peninsula; and, in 1916, the Russian contingents to Toulon. The presence of an Anglo-Japanese squadron off the coast of South America was one of the causes why von Spee left the Pacific for the Atlantic, where off the Falkland Isles he was to meet his doom at the hands of Admiral Sturdee.

On land, a Japanese army, assisted by a small British force, uprooted the German settlement in the Shantung peninsula, destroyed the great German naval base in the Pacific, and prevented Germans from organizing risings in China and Manchuria, which might have resulted in the destruction of the Trans-Siberian railway, over which Russia was drawing arms and munitions of war purchased in Japan and the United States of America, and by which Russia in 1916 sent powerful reinforcements to France. Further, Japanese guns and gunners, in the November of 1915, were present at Warsaw when von Hindenburg attacked that city for the first time, and Japanese sailors took part in the suppression of the abortive mutiny at Singapore.

When the Mikado declared war on the Kaiser the main body of the German-Austrian fleet not in the Atlantic, Baltic, or Mediterranean, was 'playing hide-and-peek', as the Japanese Admiralty has picturesquely phrased it, 'among the South Sea islands'. The remaining vessels, including the Austro-Hungarian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, had taken refuge under the guns of Tsing-tao, the Port Arthur of Kiao-chau, on the southern shore of the Shantung peninsula. The aims of the German naval commanders were—first, to prevent any portion of our Indian army, the French garrisons in the East, or Russian troops, from arriving in Africa or Western Europe; secondly, by demonstrations off the coasts of India, Ceylon, Burmah, the Straits Settlements, and the French possessions in the Cochin-China peninsula, to fan into a flame the discontent (to a large extent secretly engendered by German gold and agents) of the native populations; thirdly, to sink any transports conveying Australian or New Zealand contingents on their way to India, Egypt, East Africa, or Europe; and fourthly, to prey upon the sea-borne commerce of the Allies.

To baffle these aims Japan possessed 1 battleship, the *Fusoh*, of 30,600 tons, 2 battleships (the *Kawachi* and *Settsu*) of the Dreadnought class, 2 Dreadnought battle-cruisers (the *Kongo* and *Hiyei*), 2 semi-Dreadnought battleships (the *Aki* and *Satsuma*), 4 first-class battle-cruisers, 6 other battleships, 9 first-class cruisers, 13 second-class cruisers, and a number of coast-defence vessels, destroyers, torpedo-boats, submarines, and sea-planes. On the Japanese yards, in process of completion, were another gigantic battleship of 30,600 tons, 2 great battle-cruisers, and other men-of-war, while other formidable vessels had been laid down. The table on the next page, furnished for *The Times* by

the Japanese Admiralty, shows the strength of the Japanese fleet in April 1916:

## TOTAL NUMBER OF WARSHIPS IN APRIL 1916

## BATTLESHIPS

Name.	Place of construction.	Date of launching.	Displacement.	Horse-power.
<i>Fusob</i> .	Kure . . . .	Mar. 1914	30,600	40,000
<i>Yamasbiri</i> .	Yokosuka . . . .	Nov. 1915	30,600	40,000
<i>Kawacbi</i> .	" . . . .	Oct. 1910	20,800	25,000
<i>Settsu</i> .	Kure . . . .	Mar. 1911	20,800	25,000
<i>Aki</i> .	" . . . .	Apr. 1907	19,800	24,000
<i>Satsuma</i> .	Yokosuka . . . .	Nov. 1906	19,350	17,300
<i>Kasbima</i> .	England . . . .	Mar. 1905	16,400	15,600
<i>Katori</i> .	" . . . .	July 1905	15,950	16,000
<i>Mikasa</i> .	" . . . .	Nov. 1900	15,362	15,207
<i>Asabi</i> .	" . . . .	Mar. 1899	14,765	15,207
<i>Sbikisbima</i> .	" . . . .	Nov. 1898	14,580	14,700
<i>Higen</i> .	America . . . .	1900	12,700	16,000

## BATTLE CRUISERS

<i>Kongo</i> .	England . . . .	May 1912	27,500	64,000
<i>Hiyei</i> .	Yokosuka . . . .	Nov. 1912	27,500	64,000
<i>Kirisbima</i> .	Mitsubishi Dockyard	Dec. 1913	27,500	64,000
<i>Haiana</i> .	Kawasaki Dockyard	Dec. 1913	27,500	64,000
<i>Kurama</i> .	Yokosuka . . . .	Oct. 1911	14,600	22,500
<i>Ibuki</i> .	Kure . . . .	Nov. 1911	14,600	24,000
<i>Tsukuba</i> .	" . . . .	Dec. 1905	13,750	20,500
<i>Ikoma</i> .	" . . . .	Apr. 1906	13,750	20,500

## FIRST-CLASS CRUISERS

<i>Asama</i> .	England . . . .	Mar. 1898	9,885	18,248
<i>Tokwa</i> .	" . . . .	July 1898	9,885	18,248
<i>Izumo</i> .	" . . . .	Sept. 1899	9,826	14,700
<i>Iwate</i> .	" . . . .	Mar. 1900	9,826	14,700
<i>Yakumo</i> .	Germany . . . .	July 1899	9,735	15,500
<i>Azuma</i> .	France . . . .	June 1899	9,426	16,600
<i>Aso</i> .	" . . . .	1900	7,800	17,000
<i>Kasuga</i> .	Italy . . . .	Oct. 1902	7,700	14,696
<i>Nissbin</i> .	" . . . .	Feb. 1903	7,700	14,696

SECOND-CLASS CRUISERS

Name.	Place of construction.	Date of launching.	Displacement.	Horse-power.
<i>Tsugaru</i>	Russia . . . .	1899	6,630	11,600
<i>Kasagi</i>	America . . . .	Jan. 1898	5,503	17,235
<i>Chiosé</i>	" . . . .	Jan. 1898	4,992	15,714
<i>Cbikuma</i>	Sasebo . . . .	Apr. 1911	4,950	22,500
<i>Hirado</i>	Kawasaki Dockyard	June 1911	4,950	22,500
<i>Yabuki</i>	Mitsubishi Dockyard	Oct. 1911	4,950	22,500
<i>Tone</i>	Sasebo . . . .	Oct. 1907	4,100	15,000
<i>Niitaka</i>	Yokosuka . . . .	Nov. 1902	3,420	9,400
<i>Tsusbima</i>	Kure . . . .	Dec. 1902	3,420	9,400
<i>Oiowa</i>	Yokosuka . . . .	Nov. 1903	3,000	10,000
<i>Akasi</i>	" . . . .	Nov. 1897	2,800	8,000
<i>Suma</i>	" . . . .	Mar. 1895	2,700	8,500

FIRST-CLASS COAST-DEFENCE BOATS

<i>Iwami</i>	Russia . . . .	1902	13,516	16,500
<i>Suwob</i>	" . . . .	1900	12,674	14,500
<i>Fuji</i>	England . . . .	Mar. 1896	12,649	13,678

SECOND-CLASS COAST-DEFENCE BOATS

<i>Kanzaki</i>	England . . . .	1896	10,500	2,300
<i>Wakamiya</i>	" . . . .	1901	7,600	1,600
<i>Minoshima</i>	Russia . . . .	1894	4,960	6,000
<i>Itsukusbima</i>	France . . . .	July 1889	4,278	5,400
<i>Hasidate</i>	Yokosuka . . . .	Mar. 1891	4,278	5,400
<i>Okinoshima</i>	Russia . . . .	1896	4,126	6,000
<i>Mansbü</i>	Austria . . . .	1901	3,916	5,000
<i>Akitsusbima</i>	Yokosuka . . . .	July 1892	3,172	8,516
<i>Matsuyé</i>	Kinghorn . . . .	1898	2,550	1,500
<i>Chiyoda</i>	England . . . .	June 1890	2,439	5,678
<i>Tamato</i>	Onohama <sup>1</sup> . . . .	May 1885	1,502	1,622
<i>Musasi</i>	Yokosuka <sup>1</sup> . . . .	Mar. 1886	1,502	1,622
<i>Komabasi</i>	Sasebo . . . .	May 1913	1,230	1,824

FIRST-CLASS GUNBOATS

<i>Mogami</i>	Mitsubishi Dockyard	Mar. 1908	1,350	8,000
<i>Cbibaba</i>	Yokosuka . . . .	May 1900	1,263	6,000
<i>Todo</i>	Kawasaki Dockyard	Nov. 1907	1,250	6,500

<sup>1</sup> Wood with iron keel.

## SECOND-CLASS GUNBOAT

Name.	Place of construction.	Date of launching.	Displacement.	Horse-power.
<i>Saga</i> . . .	Sasebo . . . . .	Sept. 1912	785	1,600
<i>Uji</i> . . . .	Kure . . . . .	Mar. 1903	620	1,000
<i>Toba</i> . . .	Sasebo . . . . .	Nov. 1911	250	1,400
<i>Fushimi</i> .	England. . . . .	Aug. 1906	180	800
<i>Sumida</i> .	„ . . . . .	Dec. 1903	126	680
Total . . .	65 ships		628,321	1,047,371

The above figures and facts should be attentively studied, because they show how vastly superior was the naval position of Japan in 1914 to what it had been in 1904, when, it will be remembered, Japan had been unable to build men-of-war for herself. The reader may imagine for himself what would have happened if that tremendous naval machine for destruction had been, together with the army which was authoritatively stated some years before the Great War to be twice as powerful as when it fought with the Russians in Manchuria, had been lent to the Kaiser. It is not merely by what they have done, but by what they have not done, that the services of the Japanese in this world-contest should be estimated.

What was accomplished must now be related. Besides at once blockading Tsing-tao, and convoying the troops and guns detailed for the reduction of that fortress, the Japanese naval authorities detailed a squadron—at first under Rear-Admiral Tsuchiya, and later under Vice-Admiral Kaimamura—to protect the shipping of the Allies in the Chinese Seas. This squadron, cruising as far afield as Singapore and the east of the Philippines, turned the Chinese Seas into a *mare clausum* for Germans. The fall of Tsing-tao on November 7

—two days before the *Sydney* put the *Emden* out of action—rendered Tsuchiya's task unnecessary. In February 1915 some marines were disembarked by him at Singapore who, with troops landed from the French warship *Montcalm* and the Russian converted cruiser *Ariol*, helped the British to put down the mutiny of the Indian troops stationed there.

Meanwhile another Japanese squadron, under Captain Kwanji Kato, on the battle-cruiser *Ibuki*, had on August 26 proceeded to Singapore and joined the British Eastern Squadron. On September 10 the *Emden* appeared in the Bay of Bengal. A part of Kato's squadron hunted for the *Emden* and any other German war-vessels; another part helped to convoy the transports carrying Australian and New Zealand troops. On October 15 Vice-Admiral Tochinai joined Kato with reinforcements and took over the command. The *Ibuki* accompanied the Anzacs from Wellington and Perth to Aden.

Equally signal were the services rendered by the Japanese navy east of the area Japan-Australia. The moment war was declared the Mikado dispatched four battle-cruisers, including the *Kongo* and *Hiyei*, under the above-mentioned Rear-Admiral Tsuchiya, towards North America, with a view to safeguarding the international trade routes from the German Pacific Squadron and from the German and Austrian warships which had escaped from Tsing-tao before Japan declared war. Later Rear-Admiral Matsumura with another squadron (including the *Satsuma*) departed for the South Seas. The enemy cleverly evaded both squadrons, but one by one all their naval bases in those regions were captured.

At the end of 1913—in consequence of the disturbed

state of Mexico and for the protection of the Japanese there—the first-class cruiser *Izumo*, under Captain Moriyama, had been sent across the Pacific. At the outbreak of the war Moriyama was ordered to safeguard the Allied shipping along the western coast of North America. The first-class cruiser *Asama* and the *Higen* were promptly sent to join him, and the British warship *Newcastle*, with the Canadian warship *Rainbow*, was attached to his command. On October 15 the *Gaiel*, a German warship, and some transports, were located in Honolulu harbour, Hawaii. On November 7 they were interned by the American authorities.

Before, however, that event occurred, an inadequate British squadron, under Rear-Admiral Cradock, had on November 1 been badly defeated off the coast of Chile by von Spee, who had skilfully succeeded in uniting most of the German men-of-war in the Pacific, including the *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, and *Nürnberg*. In the battle off Coronel the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* were sunk. Moriyama's squadron and the British Australian squadron were deputed to deal with the serious situation created by the defeat. Together they descended the South American coast, while Rear-Admiral Sturdee with the battle-cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, five cruisers, one armed liner, and the old battleship *Canopus*, waited in the Falkland Islands for von Spee, if he should venture into the Atlantic.

The Germans fell into the trap, and on December 8 von Spee's squadron, with the exception of the *Dresden* was destroyed.

Also to deal with the German fleet in the Pacific, Vice-Admiral Tochinai with the *Tokiwa* and *Chitose* left Japan.





On March 10, 1915, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, which had escaped to a port of the United States of America, was disarmed, and on March 14 the *Dresden* was destroyed by British men-of-war off Juan Fernandez. The Kaiser's dream of dominating the Pacific was over. His last ship in those waters had foundered within sight of the island of Alexander Selkirk! Five months or so before this, the end of German ambitions east of Suez had been foreshadowed by the capture of Tsing-tao.

Tsing-tao, the capital of the German colony (200 square miles in extent) of Kiao-chau in the Shantung peninsula, was as strongly fortified as Liège, Namur, and Antwerp had been supposed to be. No less than £20,000,000 had been spent on it. If there was one thing the Germans knew, it was the power of the most up-to-date howitzers and naval guns. The fortifications on the land and sea fronts had been designed with characteristic foresight and thoroughness. The town was situated on a sheltered bay, and the colony was surrounded by neutral territory. A railway from Tsing-tao crossed the Chinese frontier, and at Tsi-nan-fu joined the Great Eastern line to Peking. From the borders of Kiao-chau to those of the British colony of Wei-hai-wei at the northern tip of the peninsula was a distance of some eighty miles.

The Japanese had captured Port Arthur, but the fortifications of Port Arthur in 1904 were only completed during the siege. Would Japan be able speedily to reduce Tsing-tao? The Krupp firm had cheated the Belgian, but was not likely to have cheated the German government. With a garrison of 5,000 troops, Admiral Meyer Waldeck, the Governor, had been ordered by the Kaiser to defend the fortress to the last man.

Immediately after the declaration of war, a Japanese fleet under Vice-Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, which included the battleship *Kawachi*, had been dispatched to ward off any attack by the German ships in the Yellow Sea. Another fleet, with which were H.M.S. *Triumph* and *Usk*, proceeded under Vice-Admiral Sadakichi Kato for Tsing-tao itself. Islands adjacent to the port were seized on August 27, and the blockade of Tsing-tao was declared the same day. Simultaneously the first transports of the Japanese besieging army were being loaded with men, guns, and munitions.

Covered by the two fleets, the transports began to arrive in the vicinity of the fortress. Mine-sweepers were busy at work off the coast, and the crew of the *Takachibo*, afterwards destroyed by a mine, were seeking and cutting the German maritime cables.

On September 2 the first Japanese troops landed at the western base of the peninsula, at whose extremity is Tsing-tao. The besieging army was commanded by Lieutenant-General Kamio. It comprised a division of infantry, plus three brigades, a corps of siege artillery (140 guns, including six 11-in. howitzers), a flying squadron, a regiment of cavalry, and detachments of engineers and marine artillery. The task before Kamio was rendered especially difficult by the heavy storms, which converted the ground before him into swamps and lagoons.

Kamio at first contented himself with sending aeroplanes over the fortress, which bombed the wireless and electric power stations and the ships in the port. These latter had been driven up the harbour by the Japanese men-of-war. On September 13 Kamio seized the railway station of Kiao-chau, twenty-two miles from Tsing-tao. Ten days later, Brigadier-General Barnardiston, with a battalion of

the South Wales Borderers and half a battalion of Sikhs from Wei-hai-wei, landed at Laoshan Bay, on the eastern side of the Tsing-tao peninsula. On September 27 and 28 the Japanese reached the outer defences of the fortress and took Prinz Heinrich Hill, from which they dominated the inner forts. The Germans feebly counter-attacked on the 30th. At the beginning of the next month Kamio took over from the Chinese the Shantung railway from Tsi-nan-fu eastwards.

Meanwhile the heavy artillery was being disembarked. Some of the heavy guns were mounted on Prinz Heinrich Hill. On October 15—the first day of the battle of Ypres—an opportunity, gladly taken, was given to non-combatants to leave the fortress. The next day a general bombardment from the sea began, chiefly directed against the ships in the harbour and against the Kaiser and Iltis forts. On October 31, the Mikado's birthday, the bombardment from the land side began.

The final scenes were described by the Japanese military authorities as follows, in *The Times Japanese Section* of December 16, 1916:

‘The preparations of the invading army having been thoroughly completed, the most auspicious day was chosen—October 31—in honour of the celebration of the Mikado's birthday, to commence the bombardment by the siege artillery. At the hour when the summit of Mount Fusan was just dimly tinged with the first pale light of the dawn our siege artillery gunners began their simultaneous cannonade. Hundreds of thousands of deafening thunderbolts seemed simultaneously to shake the earth amidst the glare of terrific lightning flashes. Volume after volume of the darkening shell-smoke spread densely over each of the enemy forts a deadly pall which

was well-nigh heartrending even for mere spectators. Indeed, the intensity of horror that formed the atmosphere of the whole scene of tremendous and destructive violence baffles expression.

‘Suddenly, at 7 a.m., an immensely thick column of black smoke rose like a huge tower into the mid-sky from the great port of Tsing-tao. The enormous oil stores of the German dockyard had exploded! On the Iltis Fortress not only the heavy guns of our army but also the severe cannonade from the Japanese fleet concentrated their combined fire, so that by noon of the same day it was irretrievably damaged, as was also the Tohsan Fortress. The enemy fire in response to ours was quite feeble.

‘The first day of November opened with the steady maintenance of our terrific bombardment. The fire concentrated both on the Fort of Daitohchin and the Central Fortress proved exceptionally effective. On the same evening an Austrian warship emerged at a point some 7,000 metres off the west of the huge mole of Tsing-tao and bombarded our right flank, only to be driven off by the Japanese Heavy Artillery Regiment. The whole day of November 2 saw again the continuation of severe bombardment by our army, which succeeded in occupying almost all the front lines extending from the neighbourhood of Sihoh to that of Fusansho.

‘There was again a tremendous storm on November 3 with the resultant inundation of all the attacking camps. Many landslips occurred, causing great difficulties to the offensive operations. To make the matter worse, moreover, the lowering dense clouds completely overshadowed the whole of the forts in Tsing-tao. The bombardment was seriously hampered. On the same night one of our lines approached close to the enemy and succeeded, by dawn of the following day, in occupying the German positions for a length of 500 metres, west of Fusansho, after carrying the heights from Pompusho as far as those east of Yuhkasho. On November 5 the enemy’s resistance grew extremely active; but all the forces of our first line pressed the enemy

more and more, so that the same night saw nearly all the offensive camps of our army advanced to the wire entanglements, right before his outer trenches in front of the forts. There we entrenched.

‘The right front of the Second Central Force, which was commissioned to attack the enemy Central Fort, found that, on the night of November 6, his defensive fighting was not as energetic as it used to be. Especially his outposts had shown perceptible weakness. Our brigade started at once for the destruction of the first German trench before the Central Fortress. Without meeting any particular resistance on the part of the enemy, we succeeded in destroying three lines of barbed wire entanglement one after another; and at half-past one in the morning of November 7 the Japanese army captured the fort, together with 200 prisoners.

‘The moment the German Central Fortress was captured by the Japanese all other forts, which hitherto maintained strict silence, opened fire simultaneously, concentrating their bombardment upon the newly captured fort. The Japanese detachment which occupied it had therefore sustained a loss of a few dozen men killed and wounded. The right wing of our Second Central Force advanced furiously against the eastern Fortress of Daitohchin amid the showers of shells and bullets from the enemy and thus sustained a number of losses in killed and wounded. Nothing could however, stop the onrush of our men, nor daunt their reckless valour. The fortress fell into our hands at 5 o’clock on the morning of the 7th.

‘Before this our left wing under General Horiuchi, whose task was to capture the Northern Fort of Shoh-Tohsan, seized the well-timed opportunity as the fight of our Second Central Force developed; and carried out the onrush at about 5 a.m. of the 7th and captured it at once.

‘Our right wing, which advanced against the Coastal Fortress of the enemy’s extreme left flank, met with a most

stubborn resistance from the Germans, sustaining serious losses. Assisted by our artillery regiment, it was just about to commence its well-known charge against the enemy when, at 7 a.m., the Germans hoisted a white flag and surrendered.

'The British force continued its attack. A section of its troops rushed into the Fort of Daitohchin at about 6.30 a.m. and was followed by its main force soon afterwards.

'Such was the progress of the Tsing-tao battles : during half an hour from 7 o'clock in the morning of November 7 all the forts of Kiao-chau fell one after the other in quick succession, and we saw a white flag flying high above the Observation Tower. Subsequently the enemy's military envoy appeared with his suite at the north-eastern end of Tsing-tao town. The Japanese envoy, Major Kashii, interviewed him at Toh-Gogason at 9.20 a.m., when he received a letter of surrender from the German Governor-General, Waldeck.

'On the evening of the same day Major-General Yamanashi and Commander Takahashi, the Japanese Envoys Plenipotentiary, proceeded to the Moltke Barrack and interviewed the German Envoy Plenipotentiary, Colonel Zacksell. At 7 p.m. the capitulation of Tsing-tao was signed and sealed between them. Before the bombardment, however, a special message was sent through the wireless to the German Head-quarters in Tsing-tao conveying the Mikado's will to save and succour non-combatants.'

The Japanese had lost—besides the *Takachiho*, a destroyer, a torpedo-boat, and three mine-sweepers—416 killed and 1,542 wounded ; and the British 12 killed and 61 wounded. The German casualties are said to have been under 1,000.

A few days later the first batches of German prisoners arrived at Tokyo. As they stepped out of the train, each one was presented by a Japanese lady with a chrysanthemum and an address of welcome in German. The Kaiser and his

fellow conspirators had warned Europe and America of the 'Yellow Peril', and had denounced in terms of hatred and contempt the Japanese for not breaking their word.

With this incident, so charming and yet so subtly ironical, the history of one of the most extraordinary races of human beings may be fitly terminated. The Japanese have learned much from Occidentals; the latter in their turn have still much to learn from the Japanese.



## PART II

12

### *Physical Characteristics and Population*

THE Japanese Empire consists geographically of a long chain of islands, with six large and innumerable smaller units, lying in the Pacific Ocean between  $156^{\circ} 32'$  east and  $119^{\circ} 18'$  west longitude, and  $21^{\circ} 45'$  south and  $50^{\circ} 56'$  north latitude. In a shorter sentence than this, giving merely the longitudinal and latitudinal position, the compilers of the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1768) disposed of Japan, or the islands of Japan! No more significant way of emphasizing how, during the succeeding century, Japan emerged from the nebulous state implied by that short paragraph to her present position can be found than by pointing to the contrast between the amounts of space afforded her in the first and eleventh editions of the *Encyclopaedia*.

In the north Japanese territory commences, at a short distance from the coast of Russian Siberia, in the island of Sakhalien, the southern half of which, i. e. from  $50^{\circ}$  north, was ceded to Japan by Russia in 1905, and is called Karafuto by the Japanese. Due south of this fish-shaped strip of land is the roughly quadrangular Hokkaido (Yezo), and south of Hokkaido is the largest link of the island chain, Honshiu, the mainland, curving like a bow from northwards to westwards, and having close under its western portion the island

of Shikoku. West of Shikoku is Kiushiu ; south and west of this, and connected by a string of islets known as Riukiu, are Taiwan, the one-time Formosa, and the Pescadores islands. From east of Hokkaido the 'Myriad isles' (Chishima), also known as the Kurile islands, straggle like stepping-stones north and east to the peninsula of Kamchatka. In all, there are more than 3,000 islands, large and small.

The total area of the Empire, excluding the recently annexed Corea (Chosen), and disregarding islands with a coast-line of less than one ri (about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles), is 174,690 square miles. Chosen has an area of 84,102 square miles.

The Sea of Japan, broadest where the northern half of Honshiu faces the centre of Chosen, and narrowing sharply into the Korean Straits in the south and the Mamiya Strait in the north, separates Japan from the Asiatic Continent, and is connected with the Pacific Ocean by the straits which part the various islands of Japan. The coast which it washes is comparatively little indented, and affords few harbours or safe roadsteads.

The celebrated Inland Sea, separating Shikoku from Kiushiu and both from Honshiu, is connected with the Sea of Japan by one channel, and with the Pacific by three narrow channels. It is sown with numerous islands of great and diversified scenic beauty, and, almost land-locked as it is, suffers little from storms.

Mountain and valley together constitute about seven-eighths of the area of Japan, though there are some broad plains in Hokkaido, Honshiu, and Kiushiu. The Kwanto plain, wherein are situated Tokyo and Yokohama, is the largest, and the cities of Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe are all contained within the Kinai plain. Again, the chief coal-field of Japan is the Tsukushi plain. A large and well-

defined range of mountains traverses Karafuto and Hokkaido from north to south, and continues through the centre of Honshiu, sending out many lateral branches. One range runs south through Kiushiu, Shikoku, and the Kii peninsula, and another north past Lake Biwa, finally joining the Karafuto range. Most of the high peaks are volcanic cones superimposed on mountains of more ancient origin; indeed, Japan stands over the most extensive system of volcanic veins in the world, and has still many active volcanoes which erupt disastrously from time to time. There are few volcanoes in the part of the country which faces the Pacific, but the western side abounds in them. One volcanic chain, the Fuji range, crosses Honshiu in a north-westerly direction. Another, the Kurile range, runs along Chishima and through Hokkaido to Honshiu, and a third, the Kirishima range, begins in Formosa and enters Kiushiu by way of the Riukiu islands. There is also the Midland range, which connects the Kurile and the Kirishima ranges. Hardly any of the mountains of Japan proper reach the perpetual-snow line. The highest peak, Niitakayama (14,270 feet), and the second highest, Mount Sylvia, are both in Formosa, the former in the centre of the island and the latter in the north. They are summits of the chief range which traverses the island from north to south, leaving the eastern side hilly and the western half with a gentle slope seawards. The most famous of all Japanese mountains is of course Fuji-yama (yama or san = mountain) in the Fuji range, which rises in almost perfect symmetry to a height of 12,395 feet, with eight lakes at its foot formed of rivers dammed by comparatively recent outbursts of ashes and lava.

To compensate Japan for the peril which attends their

restless presence, volcanoes have bequeathed her a priceless legacy in the form of her numberless hot springs. Of these there are more than a hundred known and reputed for their medicinal value—acid, saline, sulphurous, chalybeate, or carbonic, as the case may be.

Japan also suffers frequently from earthquakes, usually accompanied, when they visit the Pacific coast, by tidal waves in which thousands perish. Mild shocks, passing unnoticed except by the seismograph, occur two or three times daily; but of really serious disturbances there are all too many.

Geologically, Japan consists largely of igneous rocks in the Kurile islands, Kiushiu, and the northern half of Honshiu. The mountain system consists of three main lines, and the rocks fall also into three groups: (*a*) plutonic rocks, particularly granite; (*b*) volcanic rocks, chiefly trachyte and dolerite; (*c*) palaeozoic schists.

The soil, generally speaking, is moderately prolific, the tertiary and alluvial deposits forming a deep and friable mould, easily worked. This is the chief agricultural soil. The Quaternary argillaceous alluvial soils which occur along the banks of rivers and on the coasts are still more fertile. Lying low, they are well adapted to irrigation, and are, in consequence, chiefly used for rice culture.

The climate of Japan varies considerably, not only from north to south, as, from the length of the territory in this direction, might be expected, but also from east to west. Equatorial currents wash the Pacific shores of the islands, and mountain ranges intercept the cold winds, whereas the land facing the Japan Sea lies open to the north-west winds which blow over the cold Siberian plains. The cold is severe throughout the winter, and especially

in January, in Sakhalien, Hokkaido, and the northern part of the mainland. The yearly mean temperature noted at the meteorological station at Sapporo in Hokkaido is  $44^{\circ}$  F. On the other hand, the winter lasts but two months in the southern half of the mainland and in Shikoku and Kiushiu, January and February alone being recognized months of frost and snow, though these phenomena may occur also in the beginning of March. Tokyo and Kyoto have a mean annual temperature of  $57^{\circ}$  F.; Nagoya, Sakai, and Okayama, also in Honshiu,  $58^{\circ}$  F.; Osaka and Kobe,  $59^{\circ}$  F., and Nagasaki,  $60^{\circ}$  F.; but farther north in the main island the yearly average is lower, being  $52^{\circ}$  F. at Ishinomaki, and  $50^{\circ}$  F. at Aomori. Formosa, of course, with its southern half in the torrid zone, is much warmer, and Taihoku has a mean annual temperature of  $71^{\circ}$  F.

Most of the rivers of Japan are short and rapid, characteristics imposed upon them by the fact that the islands are narrow and heaped towards the centre with mountain ranges. Their beds are wide in comparison to their length, but it is only in the summer rainy season and in spring when the snows are melting that they carry any great volume of water. At these seasons, indeed, they overflow their banks, causing heavy floods, but at other times of the year only a small portion of the bed is covered. Thus the rivers of Japan are poor from the standpoint of navigability, though such as are practicable are utilized to the full for transport purposes; but a number of them are made to furnish electric energy for lighting, traction, and other purposes, and power-stations are numerous. Many mines are worked entirely by hydro-electric power, and it is only lack of capital that limits the application of this force.

Many, in fact most, of the lakes of Japan are noted for their extraordinary beauty. The largest is Lake Biwa, in the Omi province in the centre of Honshiu, which has a circumference of about 180 miles.

Other moderately extensive lakes are Towada, in Mutsu (37 miles), and Inawashiro, in Inawashiro (33 miles). The eight lakes of Fuji are popular resorts, both of foreign tourists and of the Japanese, and Lake Ashi at Hakone, Lake Chuzenji at Uikko, and Lake Suwa at Shinano, are celebrated beauty spots. In Hokkaido the largest lake is Saruma, with a circumference of nearly 50 miles, and there are two other large lakes—Doya and Onuma—whose scenery is equally charming.

The growth of the population of Japan has been fairly regular during a sufficiently long period of years to make it possible to form a reasonably accurate estimate, especially when we have the actual reckoning of 1913 as a guide. Excluding Corea, Formosa, and Sakhalien, it was then 53,000,000, which would bring up the population of the Empire to 70,000,000 at the close of 1916.

Japanese children are as numerous and apparently as healthy, happy, and contented as ever. Ex-President Roosevelt's remarks upon 'the crime of sterility' cannot be applied to the Japanese. In spite of the more strenuous demands due to the introduction of Occidental civilization, children in Japan occupy the same important place in the family and absorb the same amount of attention from their parents as they did in those days when European and American travellers in Japan wrote volumes about 'The Paradise of Children' and the joyousness of child life in Japan.

Although the growth of cities and towns in Japan of late

years has been remarkable, the bulk of the population reside in the rural districts, and Japan is essentially an agricultural country—that is to say, agriculture is her paramount industry and the industry which gives employment to the largest proportion of her population. Considering her resources and bearing in mind the fact that only about one-sixth of her area is arable, it is not a matter of surprise to find Japan looking to sources and lands outside her own boundaries to supplement her own resources and furnish employment for her constantly increasing population. More than 80 per cent. of the whole area of Japan proper still remains unutilized for purposes of tillage, and a large proportion must be regarded as uncultivable. There has been little change in the agricultural districts, and hand cultivation still predominates. Nevertheless, by intensive farming, the Japanese succeed in producing astonishingly large crops on small areas of arable land.

Whilst stock-farming, dairying, and meat-preserving form insignificant branches of Japanese farming, sericulture and the cultivation of the tea plant give additional and profitable occupation to hundreds of thousands, nearly all of whom are drawn from the agricultural population, and many of whom combine the occupations of farming with the preparation of tea for the market, or the filature industry with the manufacture of silk. In short, more than 60 per cent. of the population of the Empire are engaged in the pursuit of agriculture.

There are no complete returns of occupations for Japan, but an estimate may be arrived at by combining the special reports of specific industries. These figures may overlap, but after making allowance for such errors it is possible to obtain an idea of the relative importance of the different

industries. A total of something over  $3\frac{3}{4}$  millions are engaged exclusively in farming, whilst nearly  $1\frac{3}{4}$  millions combine farming with some other industry. Nearly  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million households pursue sericulture, but of course this work occupies only a part of the time of some of the members of the family. There are 890,000 manufacturers of tea, but it is not probable that this number of people give their entire time to the occupation. It is quite possible that an accurate enumeration would report that nearly all of these persons are engaged in agriculture and allied industries. In mining of all kinds, including coal, copper, and non-metallic mines, the numbers employed can be ascertained with a greater degree of accuracy, and probably represent a total of about 250,000. Fishing is an important occupation in Japan, and 1,000,000 are exclusively engaged in the fisheries, whilst  $1\frac{1}{2}$  millions combine fishing with some other occupation. The forests cover some 60 per cent. of the area of Japan, and as the value of the annual yield in timber and faggots is about £7,000,000 sterling, a good many persons must find employment during a part of the year as woodcutters, but apparently there are no returns from which estimates can be framed.

Turning to manufacturing industries conducted in factories and workshops, the latest returns give 307,139 men employed, and 493,498 women, totalling 800,637, or nearly double the number returned as employed in factories in 1896. These include textile industries, machinery, chemical factories, the manufacture of food and beverages, miscellaneous trades, and special workshops, such as those for electricity and metallurgy, but are, however, exclusive of weaving carried on outside the factories. This work is still largely conducted as a home industry, distributed through-



out the towns and villages in nearly 500,000 'weaving-houses', with approximately 800,000 looms, only 30,000 of which are worked as power-looms. There are over three-quarters of a million operatives.

Paper-making is also carried on in a similar way, and there are 60,000 small establishments and households with about three times as many operatives employed in producing Japanese paper. At the same time, a foreign paper industry has been started, and in ten years has doubled in importance, employing 15,000 hands.

The matting industry has remained stationary, and employs something over 100,000 hands. This is largely a family trade, the factories as a rule being nothing more than additions to the operatives' houses. Even more so is the straw and chip braid industry, in which the government reports 250,000 persons or more as being employed in producing articles which barely reach £500,000 in value. These occupations are therefore largely in the nature of home industries, carried on by women at times when they are free from household duties. For this reason it is extremely difficult to tabulate occupations in Japan, and to give complete returns such as those published by the British census or by the census of the United States.

Everybody works in Japan, including the children, whose tiny fingers paste match-boxes, put on labels, and help in sericulture, tea-picking, and various other ways. In the aggregate these minor industries bring in a steady, though in many cases a slight, revenue. Small as it is, however, it helps to swell the household purse, and aids in defraying the family expenses. Whilst Japan has made a good start in manufacturing operations, in factories and workshops, some of her leading industries are still conducted in the

household, and in small shops and houses scattered throughout the agricultural districts, often far away from the large manufacturing centres.

According to the census of 1913 the population of Japan proper, excluding Corea, Formosa, and Sakhalien, was 52,911,800, or 387 per square mile, a density more than equal to that of Great Britain; and the annual increase is 34.2 per thousand, 40 per cent. higher than that of her ally. It is no wonder that this ever-increasing population has sent out streams of emigrants to different parts of the world, especially to new countries which are sparsely inhabited, and where economic opportunities for newcomers are abundant. The figures for 1914 show that the Japanese population abroad is distributed as follows :

Asia . . . . .	134,498
America . . . . .	117,122
Oceania . . . . .	106,865
Europe . . . . .	1,231
Total . . . . .	<u>359,716</u>

The countries which contain a Japanese population of over 10,000 are :

China . . . . .	121,716
United States (excluding Hawaii)	79,642
Hawaii . . . . .	90,808
Brazil . . . . .	15,462
Canada . . . . .	11,959

That Europe is no field for Japanese emigrants is shown by the above figures.

No revival of emigration after the war to places outside Asia is probable, excepting, perhaps, to some South American states, which welcome the Japanese for developing their resources, and with which no friction is considered possible.

The policy of the Japanese government after the war will be the same as that pursued before and during the war. As to the contention of Japan that the small number of her people already living within the jurisdiction of the United States should be accorded the same treatment and protection as that accorded to citizens of other nations, and that any legislation calculated to injure the prestige and honour of Japan ought to be avoided (now that the same aim in regard to emigration has been practically achieved by an international arrangement), the intelligent public of the West are gradually realizing its justice as well as its wisdom. In these circumstances, it is hardly possible that the question will give rise to any serious international friction, though it may continue to offer a congenial theme for the outcries of some demagogic labour leaders and politicians of the cheaper sort.

The health and physique of the Japanese people has since the Restoration been improved by the introduction of European games and sports.

The rising generation has already begun to respond to its inspiration in the region of active sports and outdoor recreations. In feudal Japan comparatively few pursuits were followed for the sake of sport as such: they were mainly practised as a means to a definite end. They were chiefly confined to the samurai class, and were known as *Bugei* (military accomplishments), i. e. fencing, swimming, archery, riding, &c., being intended to prepare men for effective service in the internecine wars of the time.

Since the dawning, however, of the Meiji era, the outlook has somewhat altered. The Japanese, intensely practical though they are, are now growing more disposed to adopt sports and active recreations for their own sake, and not

merely as a means to physical ends. Owing to the climatic difficulties in the way of making suitable grounds for cricket, football, and tennis, these games are comparatively little played by the Japanese—indeed cricket is entirely confined to ‘treaty-port’ Englishmen. A few of the middle schools have tried football, and the Keio University of Tokyo has been able to put into the field a team more than once victorious over the Yokohama Club, under the Rugby Union rules. Lawn tennis is growing in popularity, even amongst girl students, and the Tokyo Club numbers some unusually adept exponents of the game. A recent champion has crossed the Pacific and met with success both in the Philippines and in the United States.

Boating has for years been popular among students of the Imperial University, and also the Waseda and several of the larger schools of Tokyo; here, again, the representatives of the Yokohama Rowing Club have had to acknowledge defeat on the broad waters of the Sumida river.

But of all the strictly exotic sports that the West has brought to the youth of the East, it is baseball that has made the most successful bid for popular favour.

The first organized club was formed about the year 1886, by some of the officials of the Shimbashi railway station in Tokyo; but it was not until ten years later that the victory of the First High School of Tokyo over the Yokohama (European) Club created an enthusiasm that speedily helped to popularize the game far and wide. Since then it has become the most universally favourite outdoor game among students of all classes, from primary schools to the various universities of the capital and elsewhere. The foremost of these have not only frequently outplayed their European antagonists in Japan itself, but they have also gained a fair

measure of success outside. The Keio University some years ago journeyed to Hawaii and beat the American champions there, while on its return to Japan it also defeated the team sent over from the University of Washington itself. Later on, in 1909, the Wisconsin University 'nine' on a visit to Japan met a similar fate.

During recent years, skating and ski-ing have been introduced with a certain measure of success. For the former of these the lake of Suwa, in mid-Japan, has been the chief venue, while the latter has not only been tried on the lower slopes of Fuji-yama, but regular 'meets' have been held in the hills of Echigo for some winters past. Ski-ing seems to have become a recognized part of the military training of the troops of some of the northern provinces.

But perhaps the most remarkable developments in the world of 'sport' are to be found in the appreciation of mountaineering, in the European sense, as distinct from those semi-religious, semi-social pilgrimages to famous sacred peaks which have had a vogue in Japan for a thousand years and more. The publication of *Mountaineering in the Japanese Alps*, in 1896, by the Rev. Walter Weston (a member of the English Alpine Club), helped greatly to stimulate the interest and enthusiasm of the more active younger members of the educated classes for mountain-climbing as a recreation for its own sake. In growing numbers they began to travel in the great and unfamiliar mountain ranges of Hida-Shinshu and Shinshu-Koshu, to which one or two English explorers had been the first to direct serious attention. In 1906 the Japanese Alpine Club (Nihon Sangaku-kai) was formed, largely owing to the influence of the gifted writer, Usui Kojima, who became

the first editor of the journal of the society. This publication, thrice yearly, is a remarkable testimony to the wide and varied interests represented by the seven to eight hundred members of the club, who visit the great mountain district known as the Japanese Alps for the purposes of scientific research, and for active exercise in the grandest and most romantic regions of the Empire. Although the parent club has been in existence for only a decade, it has found worthy followers in some of the provinces bordering on the 'Alps' themselves, and in various of the larger boys' schools in Tokyo and elsewhere. In this sense mountaineering is a modern pursuit, and, as such, quite distinct from the old pilgrimages performed by the gyoja (ascetics) belonging to the Koju (associations), who sought in worship the mountain shrines of divinities to whom certain sacred summits were severally consecrated.

Japan is essentially a land of mountains, for not less than three-quarters of its area rises in rolling hills and in lofty peaks of over 10,000 feet in height. It is only reasonable, therefore, to expect that, with a people so deeply imbued with a love of nature and with a desire for fresh knowledge, increasing numbers of young Japanese will find their highest pleasure in searching out the 'deep things of the everlasting hills'.

Of all the *native* forms of physical recreation practised by the Japanese, fencing (ken-jutsu) and wrestling (ju-jutsu, or judo, as its more modern form is termed) are the most popular.

During the feudal days swordsmanship was regarded as an essential part of the training of every samurai, and proficiency in the art was a surer means of promotion even than personal ability. The two swords of the samurai were

his most precious possession, and a well-known saying tells us that 'the sword of the samurai is his soul'. Until the end of the feudal age, some fifty years ago, fencing was practised as both the favourite national sport and the chief physical training, and in a general way combined the main features of our old English single-stick and quarter-staff play. It was regarded also as a means of inspiring and strengthening the mental faculties of calmness, courage, and self-control. But it has largely lost its vogue, except amongst the police, prison-warders, and at the universities and some of the high schools and secondary schools. It is usually carried on in sheds called *dojo*, where a special costume is worn; the swords used are made of split bamboo with handles about a foot long, so that both hands can be employed. The hits which count are on the head, the right hand and side, and a thrust at the throat. The intense alertness, the quick movements, and the sharp wild ejaculations of the contestants are an exceedingly interesting and un-Occidental combination to the European spectator.

When the wearing of the two swords was prohibited in 1871 the necessity of other means of self-defence became more pressing, and the vogue of *ju-jutsu* increased. At first it was used for both offensive and defensive purposes, its main object being so to strike the opponent's body or limbs as entirely to put him out of action for the time being, but not necessarily to kill or injure him permanently. Special attention was given to falling in such a way as to avoid injury, this being usually done by striking the ground sharply with the forearm and lessening the force of the fall by the rebound so caused. Of late years, however, *ju-jutsu* has been considerably modified by Mr. Jigoro Kano, a famous educationist and advocate of physical

training, and principal of the Tokyo Higher Normal School, who has renamed it judo and transformed it into a method of physical culture. As such it is now widely practised in most of the schools and colleges of the Empire. At the same time there are a number of private institutions where the active form of ju-jutsu itself is practised on lines differing from the judo of Mr. Kano. Attempts, more or less successful, have been made to introduce the art of ju-jutsu into some of the English schools and universities, and also in connexion with the training of the London Metropolitan Police.

Swimming was another of the samurai accomplishments, and was practised according to the rules of varying 'schools'. On the whole, it is endurance rather than speed that is most cultivated, although, especially amongst military students, certain 'trick' competitions are used for the encouragement of training soldiers in exhibitions of skill of a practical kind. For instance, the accomplished swimmer is expected to be able, while 'treading water', to hold an open fan in one hand and write on it a poem with the other. Or again, he may have to load, aim, and fire his rifle at a fixed target, in a similar way. He will then dive, reload, and suddenly reappear in quite a different spot, to repeat the operation.

Archery is now little practised seriously, except in some of the larger schools, and as a pastime among some of the veteran survivors from the feudal days. Here and there small ranges are to be seen where blunt-headed arrows are fired at drum-faced targets, but the once favourite pursuit has long since had its day.

The popular form of wrestling known as sumo is more of an entertainment than a sport. It is practised by men



specially chosen for size, weight, and strength, and their combined obesity and sensuality, both of appearance and of habits, differentiate them from all other Japanese. The men are formed into different 'camps', whose champions usually engage in a final struggle. The contests take place in a small 'arena' of sand, sheltered by an awning and encircled by bales of rice-straw, and are presided over by an umpire in the ring, clad in traditional costume holding a fan and seeing fair play.

The wrestlers themselves wear no costume at all beyond an exiguous coloured apron, and have the old-fashioned 'top-knot' of well-greased hair. The combats are governed by the strictest rules, and the new wrestling amphitheatre in Tokyo is filled with many thousands of excited spectators at the annual displays at the beginning of the year. The shop windows at that time are full of photographs of the public favourites, whose attractiveness, however, can scarcely be said to be of a kind that appeals to ordinary European tastes.

*Resources and Industrial Progress*

It is curious that in Japan, which has a smaller proportion of agricultural land than any other civilized country in the world, agriculture should have attained a position of such supreme importance. Yet, despite many handicaps which might have thwarted a less resolute and resourceful people, more than three-fifths of the population are dependent on the land, compelled to the hard lot and the plain and clean living which must be the part of all who till a somewhat unkindly soil. These dominant facts must be ever in the mind of the student of Japan, since they reveal a condition of affairs which has had a marked effect in directing the currents of past and recent history. Soil-poverty was the root cause of Japan's entry into the three great wars of modern years, and it is no exaggeration to say that the Chino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were won on the rice-fields from which the legions of Japan were mainly drawn.

In the old days, when a far larger population was fed with ease from local supplies, the tiller of the soil ranked high in the social scale, and was a man of means; in later years the farmer has stood in a quagmire of abject poverty. This condition of affairs is not a case of individual or even collective misfortune; it arises from basic conditions, and is the poverty of a race. The result has been exhibited in a tendency during recent years for the young farmer to forsake the country and join the industrial wage-earning

class in the cities. To raise the status of the farming population is the problem which has been set modern Japan.

From many aspects the conditions which confront the agriculturist are abnormal. Japan is a land of small holdings; it was well said by Uchimura, 'there are no farms; there are only gardens'. Only three farmers in a hundred cultivate as much as 8 acres each, and 70 per cent. of the whole class must subsist on holdings of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres. The percentage of land under cultivation in Japan proper is only about one-sixth of the total area, and in spite of highly intensive cultivation, rigid frugality, and in most cases skilful husbandry, the vast majority of the agricultural class cannot live by the land alone. Consequently, every member of a household employs his or her enforced leisure from farming in some occupation whereby the joint income may be augmented. Chief among these are sericulture and filature; others are various manufactures from straw, and forestry and fishing.

The agricultural class is divided into jinushi (landowners), jisaku (farmers or peasant-proprietors), and kosaku (farmers or tenants pure and simple). The last-named comprise about 50 per cent. of the farming population. The jinushi are capitalists, very few farming their own lands; the peasant-proprietors, who often cultivate portions of land for the larger proprietors, make a fair living; but for the tenant farmers a life of privation is the only outlook.

Rice, besides being the staple food of the people, is the basis of the national drink, sake, and its importance is equal to that of all other products combined. It is grown in two varieties, glutinous and non-glutinous, and it is from the latter variety, which forms about one-tenth of the crop, that sake is brewed. The area under rice has

increased 80 per cent. in the last thirty-five years, and is believed by many to have reached its maximum. Irrigation, chiefly from rivers and reservoirs, but also from lakes, wells, and springs, is universal in the cultivation of paddy-fields, and farming communities frequently combine to install mechanical pumping-plant. Good paddy-fields can be made to bear rice crops in summer and barley and other crops in winter. The upland fields, being unirrigable, are only to a very limited extent used for the cultivation of rice. Rotation crops are, however, raised twice a year, usually barley and wheat as winter crops, and soya, sweet potatoes, and millet as summer crops. The ordinary potato was brought into Japan soon after the Restoration, and its cultivation has made such rapid progress that there is now a considerable export trade to Russia, Siberia, and the Philippines. Tea flourishes exceedingly in the warm and humid climate of Japan. Introduced from China in A. D. 805, it became rapidly an indispensable item in the diet of all classes.

The cotton-growing industry has been almost entirely swamped by imports from America, China, and India, and its present position is hopeless. Moreover, the fibre of native cotton is much shorter than that of foreign species.

Hemp, as a material for cloth, has been supplanted by cotton, and is now chiefly used in the manufacture of fishing-nets and ropes. Its production is still, however, considerable. It is grown chiefly in Hokkaido. Tobacco, on the other hand, is cultivated everywhere save in Hokkaido. The manufacture of tobacco is a government monopoly, and growers must sell all their produce to the authorities. It follows that the State has full control over the cultivation of the plant, and of late years it has used its powers to restrict

the area planted in order that more attention may be paid to the improvement of the quality.

Sugar-cane was grown in Oshima and Okinawa (in the Riukiu islands) as long ago as A. D. 1600, and until recently Sanuki, in the Kagawa prefecture, was the centre of a considerable refining industry. But it is Formosa which is destined to render sugar-cane growing really important in the economy of Japan.

A comparison of the relative positions of human and animal labour in paddy-fields and upland farms shows that the area tilled exclusively by human labour still forms a large proportion of the total, though it tends steadily to decrease. The draught animals used by farmers are oxen and horses, and the proportion of animals employed up to a recent date worked out at little better than one animal to each two households.

Such a condition of affairs naturally raises the question of stock-breeding. The wars with China and Russia emphasized the scarcity and poor quality of the native stock, and in 1906 the authorities established a horse administration bureau. The breeds imported are mostly British, and they are gradually replacing the native stock. In much the same way the native breeds of horned cattle, strong and hardy beasts of burden, though ill-looking through neglect in breeding, are disappearing in favour of imported or cross-breeds. By precept and example, and by means of prizes, the government of Japan fosters and promotes stock-breeding to the limit of its resources, and when the difficulty of extending and developing the industry is considered, its improvement under State encouragement is highly satisfactory.

Generally speaking the education of the agriculturist to

a better knowledge of the science of his industry is steadily extending, and has undoubtedly contributed to the improvement of yield of crop per unit of area. Hundreds of thousands of farmers have now completed their courses of instruction at the schools, and a knowledge of the more productive methods of agriculture is being widely spread.

Silk is of first-rate importance; ten million bushels of cocoons are treated annually, satisfying the large home demand and providing for a considerable export trade, mainly with the United States. Authentic records show that the silkworm was first introduced into Japan by a Chinese royal prince, A. D. 195, and that the first knowledge of the art of silk-weaving was imparted to the Japanese by emigrants who, in A. D. 283, accompanied another Chinese prince to Japan, became naturalized and were settled in various districts as instructors to the inhabitants. From the very beginning the industry was encouraged by the court, which set the example of planting mulberry trees and rearing the worms, and stimulated production by enacting that some of the taxes paid in kind should be paid in silk fabrics. The opening of the country to foreign trade was, however, in conjunction with the subsequent epidemic of silkworm disease in Europe, the starting-point of the present immense importance of sericulture in Japan.

Silkworm-rearing and raw silk manufacture seem almost as if they had been specially designed for the benefit of small farmers. Conducted on a large scale, sericulture has never been successful, but in the hands of nearly 1,500,000 families scattered throughout the Empire from Hokkaido to Formosa it thrives admirably. It cannot be doubted that the outlook for sericulture in Japan is most favourable.

The State is watching carefully over the future of agri-

culture in all its phases, educational, financial, and the rest. Probably no government in the world gives so much attention to the promotion, encouragement, and protection of industrial enterprise as does the government of Japan.

The Hypothec Bank of Japan, which was founded with the object of facilitating the supply of capital for agricultural purposes, has lent large sums. Moreover, the Co-operative Societies Law has done good work in promoting the formation of credit, purchase, sale, and productive societies. The agricultural and the horticultural experimental stations now established in nearly every prefecture have also been of incalculable service to the industry; the silk conditioning house has had the effect of rehabilitating the silk producers in the eyes of the traders; and few of the government's many other measures for the improvement of Japan's chief industry have failed in their object.

Given this parental care, the assiduity and inherited aptitude of the Japanese agriculturist, and a soil which, while not prolific, has always responded to the farmer's wooing, it would seem justifiable to regard the position of agriculture in Japan as assured for many years to come.

In the forests, which cover 60 per cent. of her total area, Japan has entailed inheritance from the remote past. The entail is still respected; in recent years, however, the property has been cautiously developed and exploited, and the yield increased to an extent and with a rapidity which indicates great resources. Forestry and reforestation are applied sciences which are far from having reached their final phase of application in Japan. It surprises those who are familiar only with European practice to find for what a variety of purposes trees are planted—including the prevention of soil-denudation, as a protection against flood,

wind, tide, and other elemental dangers, for improving the public health, and with other and what to Western eyes would appear to be fantastic objects.

Forests clothe the slopes of most of the mountains of Japan, but abound particularly in the northern island and in the northern districts of the centre of Honshiu. Of the total area of forest and wild land in Japan proper alone, some 55,000,000 acres, roughly one-third, are State-owned. The State forests represent those which the feudal princes, at the time of the Restoration, surrendered to the government, a certain proportion of these being handed over to the Crown.

Of the forests in the frigid zone, which comprises the Kuriles and most of the northern half of Hokkaido, many are not yet explored, though they are known to contain an abundance of conifers.

In the temperate forests, which extend over the southern part of Hokkaido and the northern part of Honshiu, the species number over sixty. The peculiarly scented fir, Hinoki, is the best of Japan's timber trees, being tough, strong, and close-grained; it is used for building, ship-building, and bridge-work. The Sugi (*Cryptomeria japonica*) is one of the commonest conifers; in the Akita district it grows to perfection. The wood is largely used for the manufacture of tools and utensils. The Momi (*Abies firma*) is very widely distributed, and the wood is used almost exclusively for the manufacture of paper pulp, and for tea-chests and the cases and boxes which are an item of Japan's export trade.

Among the broad-leaved trees of the temperate forest zone, the Keyaki (*Zelkova Keaki*, Sieb.) is supreme in respect of utility and value. It is in great demand for building,



carving, ship-building, and for the manufacture of costly furniture, some of the sub-species having a beautiful grain. The Buna, a variety of beech (*Fagus sylvatica Sieboldi*), is a very widely distributed species, used mainly for firewood and charcoal. It was of this tree that the Ainu of Old Japan made their log boats. The sub-tropical area contains many species, some of which are particularly valuable. The most important is the camphor-tree, which is sometimes found forming large forests. The Akamatsu, or Red Pine (*Pinus densiflora*), is perhaps the most widely distributed of all the coniferous trees.

In addition to these timber trees there are groves of bamboos of many varieties, splendid specimens of which are found in the neighbourhood of Kyoto and elsewhere.

The mushroom-growing industry of Japan deserves mention no less on account of the methods employed than because the annual production exceeds 5,000 tons. There are ten or eleven chief species of edible fungi.

A glance at Japan's coast-line, with its long reach north and south, from the frigid to the tropical zone, and its innumerable bays, gulfs, and river-mouths, will make it clear that many of the inhabitants of this densely-populated string of islands could and must rely upon the sea for sustenance. Daily fare of rice and vegetables needs to be supplemented by some more invigorating food, and as the Japanese ate, and eat, but little flesh, the obvious deduction is that fish has always entered to a large extent into the diet of those who could obtain it. There is ample evidence as to the antiquity of the fishing industry in Japan. To-day the industry finds either constant or partial employment for between one and a half and two million people; but, like the small farmer, the fisherman receives an almost incredibly

meagre return for his hard and perilous toil, and the number of regular fishermen is decreasing.

For this unsatisfactory state of affairs there are several reasons. It is true that Japan is excellently placed in respect of natural conditions which should ensure that the fishing industry, conducted in the scientific and methodical manner which one has learned to associate with government-encouraged industries as a whole, should be at least moderately lucrative. At the Marine Biological Station in Sagami over four hundred species of marine products have been classified which are of importance either as food or as fertilizer, or as providing material for various industries. The species chiefly fished for are the bonito, sardine, tunny, tai, anchovy, mackerel, and yellow-tail, and of shell-fish the sea-ear and oyster. But the vast majority of Japanese fishermen, with their unseaworthy craft that can barely sail against the wind, must confine their operations to within a very short distance of land, and the effect of many years of reckless and improvident fishing is now being felt, some species having become almost extinct. Modern methods are adopted but slowly; the curing business is still in its infancy, and, finally, lack of capital makes speedy and effectual reform impossible.

The herring fishery is at present restricted to the western shores of Hokkaido and the north of the main island (Aomori and Akita), and to the months from March to May. Sardines and anchovies are caught off nearly the entire coast of Japan, with seines and purse-seines. Most are used as fertilizer, though some are boiled and dried for food. A little canning and sauce-making are done. The bonito is a favourite fish with the Japanese, especially when dried and smoked. It is taken chiefly with rod and line and a bait

of live sardine, and as it haunts warm currents it is found nearly everywhere in the south and often in the north.

The tai (*pagrus*) is caught for the most part during spring and summer in the Inland Sea. It is very seldom salted or otherwise cured. Tunny-fish are found everywhere, and taken with drift-nets and long lines. Mostly eaten fresh, they are occasionally cured in the same way as the bonito. The yellow-tail (*Seriola quinqueradiata*) is taken in the Sea of Japan and the south-western seas with lines, grill-nets, and otherwise. It is used either fresh or salted. The mackerel is also a very ubiquitous fish, and is caught everywhere with spread-nets and seines.

Salmon ascend many of the rivers flowing into the Sea of Japan or the northern part of the Pacific, especially in Hokkaido and the head of the main island. Trout are found in company with salmon, and are both taken and used in much the same fashion.

Of shell-fish, the sea-ear or ear-shell is valuable both for its flesh and for the mother-of-pearl contained in its shell. The flesh is largely exported to China. The oyster is next in importance, and there is a growing demand for this bivalve.

An industry of great antiquity and some importance in Japan is that of salt-refining. Rock-salt being practically absent from the mineral list of Japan, most of the salt used is extracted from sea-water. The methods in vogue have remained unaltered for ages, and consist of the building at ebb-tide of a low circular wall on the foreshore, in which sea-water is half evaporated. The mixture of brine and sand is then removed, and the evaporation process is completed, in Japan proper, in pans or other receptacles over a fire of faggots.

The salt-refining industry is now a government monopoly,

and a somewhat unpopular one; but it is well that a mineral of such importance in all countries should be exploited to its best advantage, and this could not be expected from the crude, slow methods of thousands of small manufacturers in every part of the Empire. Several model salt-refineries have been established by the government, in Chiba, Hiroshima, and other prefectures. The main sources of supply in Japan proper are the coasts of the Inland Sea, but a great quantity is imported from Formosa.

The mining industry of Japan dates to an early era. In the case of oil there are records which carry the story back to the seventh century, while gold and silver mining is known to have been practised in the eighth. Marco Polo reported that gold ores were plentiful in Japan, and there is some ground for the belief that the primary object of Columbus in sailing westward was to prospect for the precious metals of Japan. Progress in mining was slow; for centuries there was a persistent reliance on old methods, and even to-day, although important developments are foreshadowed, the place won by the mining industry is not a high one. The hopes for the future lie in the variety of the deposits available, the new recognition of the importance of the industry in the national life, the acceptance of the new methods of mining which have won success elsewhere, and the determination to find the capital necessary for development.

Coal and copper occupy, and have long held, the first and second places in the output list, followed by iron, petroleum, gold, and silver in the order named. The tonnage of coal mined represents about half the total mineral output, the main seat of production being the Kiushiu district, which possesses advantages over other coal-

mining areas in regard to transport facilities. The output of this field, about 17,000,000 tons a year, represents about 75 per cent. of the total, and the district is not likely to be ousted for many years to come from the place it has won as the chief centre of production.

Copper is widely distributed in Japan, but the output is mainly derived from the Honshiu and Shikoku districts. Some large and well-developed mines, notably the Ashio and Kosaka, are in operation. Many of the copper ores are argentiferous, and a high percentage of gold is present in some of the deposits worked.

The gold-mining industry depends almost entirely on lode working, although placer-mining is practised to a small extent. The feature of recent developments has been the adoption of modern plants complete with cyaniding machinery and other accessories, and the output, which is now about 400,000 ounces a year, is steadily increasing. The production of both gold and silver has been stimulated by the needs of the European War. Nearly all the large silver-producing mines are in Honshiu, more than half the total output of 5,000,000 ounces being derived from argentiferous lead ores, and about one-fourth from the silver copper ores.

Real progress in the production of petroleum commenced when the aid of American geologists and engineers was first sought forty years ago. The oilfields are mainly situated in the inner zone of North Japan. Until the early 90's shallow hand-dug wells were the usual feature, but American methods have since been more generally adopted, and wells have been sunk to depths of 230 fathoms. There are now 3,000 producing wells on the Echigo field alone, and some remarkable gushers have been tapped.

Iron mining is still in its infancy. The ore deposits are fairly widely distributed, but only a very few mines are in operation, and in comparison with her needs, Japan is poor in iron. The ore deposits include magnetite, hematite, and brown ore. A small industry, the revival of ancient practice, has been established in Izumo, Hoki, Bizen, and other provinces for the production of iron from magnetite sands. The establishment under government auspices of modern ironworks has recently given a great impetus to the manufacturing side of the industry.

Zinc, which in earlier years was exported in considerable quantities, is now being used in manufacturing operations at new works, and the industry promises to be an important one.

Progress in mining is at least unhampered by labour problems; the Japanese miner is a willing and contented worker, and the fraternal spirit which appears to animate the men engaged in the extraction of minerals is reflected in the mutual aid associations, of which many now exist, and which are supported by the mine owners as well as the workers. The mining laws, which at a period not so very remote shut the foreigner out from all participation in Japanese mining, have been amended, and foreign companies now enjoy equal rights with native owners.

The manufacturing industries have continued soberly prosperous for the last twenty years. The important industries are in a stronger position than they were in 1896. The number of mills, factories, and plants, and the capital invested in industrial enterprises, have probably increased two- in some industries three-fold; there has been a large increase in the number of hands, and official reports show that the wages of the workers in nearly all branches of

industry have doubled. Speaking generally, the industrial districts of Japan have little reason to complain of the manner in which they have progressed, and there are signs of increased prosperity in the large centres of industrial activity. It is impossible in a work dealing with the history of Japan to trace the history of the particular industries which now form the basis of her strength as a manufacturing nation. It may be said that those which did exist before the Restoration have been born again, and that whilst the introduction of new methods may in some cases have sacrificed the artistic side of Japanese manufacture, it has made it possible for the Empire to enter into competition with the other great manufacturing nations of the world.

In the course of her rise as an industrial nation Japan discovered that the profits from the minor arts and crafts, for which she was so rightly celebrated, were insufficient to support modern armies and build modern navies, and that only by manufacturing staple commodities on a large scale could she hope to become a first-class Power. Hence she went shrewdly to work establishing filature plant, building spinning-mills, introducing Jacquard looms, improving her methods of dyeing, building plants for the manufacture of iron and steel, and shipyards to construct a navy and a merchant marine. It was impossible to initiate and carry on these modern industries without some deterioration of those arts and crafts for which Japan, in common with other Eastern countries, had been famous for so many centuries. When she thus began to build factories, import filature plant and spinning and weaving machinery, equip and instal machine-shops, and operate railways, the European world looked askance, and suggested that Japan should stick to her handicrafts, in the skilful conduct of which she

stood unrivalled. The fact is that the pressure of outside events compelled both the creation of the Army and the navy and the establishment of industries on a modern basis. The great military and naval organizations which have been called into existence since the war with China, and their effective qualities in the field and on the high seas, have established the reputation of Japan as a first-class fighting nation—a courageous as well as a humane people. The ability and the skill in organization which can successfully bring the machinery for modern military and naval operations into existence can surely be turned to the task of manufacturing machinery with which to accomplish peaceful conquests in the markets of the world. In the manufacturing industries Japan has been successful—more successful than some thought possible. If there had ever existed any doubt on this point it has been removed by the rapidity and organizing ability displayed in the manufacture of munitions of war for her Allies in the Great War.

During the last ten years there has been a decided improvement in the quality of workmanship and in the business methods in vogue. Technical knowledge has increased during this period, and the wages paid for nearly all kinds of manufacturing labour are more than twice what they were when the writer first visited Japan in 1896. With increased wages comes a higher standard of living, and a greater efficiency in workmanship should follow. There is no reason why Japan should not produce in those departments of industry suited to her labour a superior quality of manufactures. A better educated and more thoroughly equipped merchant is entering the fields of trade and manufacture in Japan. In the early days merchants and manufacturers were looked down upon, and were almost



regarded as inferior beings—certainly inferior to the old samurai class. The development of modern industry or commerce and the increasing requirements of modern life have made it necessary for the better classes to enter these occupations. Great business enterprises are, therefore, no longer conducted by men who have little or no standing in their own country, but are in the hands of men who rank in education and social standing on an equality with the governmental class, and who, by reason of the increasing intercourse with Western nations, are themselves becoming persons of importance, equally anxious to obtain a high character for probity abroad and to maintain their position as honourable merchants and manufacturers at home. In other words, the Japanese manufacturers and the Japanese merchants are rapidly assuming positions similar to those occupied by their contemporaries in Europe and America. Other countries have lived down their reputation for cheap and inferior goods, and there is no reason why, with proper care in the selection of raw material, the systematic use of the best machinery, and the employment of better trained and better paid labour, Japan should not, so far as quality is concerned, produce manufactured articles that will rank in the world's markets on a level with those of any other nation.

*Finance, Trade, and Internal Communications*

THE sagacious men who from the dry bones of a currency which had survived from mediaeval days succeeded in creating a sound currency system are typical of the class to whom the destinies of modern Japan have been entrusted. It was an extraordinary achievement, and the wonder of it was increased by the fact that those responsible for this reform lacked the business training and banking knowledge which it might have been imagined were essential to the task. Nor was the handicap made lighter by the repugnance with which association with commercial matters was regarded by the men to whom was assigned the charge of the financial reform movement.

It is worth while to recall the conditions with which the reform party had to grapple. For a period of two hundred and fifty years the system established in the sixth year of Keicho had persisted. Banks, as the word is understood to-day, were non-existent in pre-Meiji times. The attempt to place currency affairs on a sound basis was, in plain words, the evolution of order out of chaos; and if what happened between 1871 and the closing years of the nineteenth century looks a little like kaleidoscopic finance, that must be attributed, first, to the lack of expert knowledge in those responsible for the measures taken, and secondly, to the courage with which mistakes were recognized and efforts made to retrieve them.

To the gold monometallism of the early 70's succeeded

the gold and silver bimetallism of 1878, followed in turn by a system of inconvertible paper-money, afterwards redeemed in silver, the final phase being the establishment in the year 1897 of a gold standard. The latter achievement was not an easy one, but it was necessary in the national interest that the silver régime should be terminated. The effect on foreign trade of the want of stable standards of value was debasing commerce to the level of mere monetary speculation. What stood in the way of the adoption of a gold standard was the difficulty of accumulating the necessary gold reserve. An arrangement by which the Chinese War indemnity was paid in pounds sterling instead of Kuping taels saved the situation, and the Bill creating the gold standard, which obtained approval in the early months of 1897, became operative in the autumn of that year. The old lyen standard silver coin remained in circulation as legal tender until the year 1908. The loss on the calling in, itself a comparatively small percentage, was fully covered by the manufacturing profit of the mint.

The change in methods of taxation resembled the reform in the currency system, in that it went through many phases. It was evident to the leaders of the Restoration that a system was necessary by which taxation should be rendered uniform throughout the country. A reduction of the land and other direct taxes prefaced the introduction of indirect taxation. The first result was a marked development of agricultural enterprise, and further reforms in the land tax, basing the assessment on the value of the produce, were made. The wars in which Japan subsequently became engaged led to the imposition of many new taxes, but industrial development had more than kept pace with the growth in the financial burden which had to be borne.

Income tax was first levied in the early 80's, and was accompanied by indirect imposts on soy and tobacco, and an increased tax on sake, the last tax augmenting the revenue to an extent which justified a fresh reduction of the land tax. The war with Russia led to the introduction of the Extraordinary Special Tax law, and the creation of the tobacco manufacturing monopoly.

The needs of the European War have so far been met without the necessity of floating loans, or making any increase in taxation. The principal sources of revenue from taxation are the liquor, land, income, and business taxes; indeed, outside these four items, the revenue from taxation, with the exception of the consumption tax on textiles, is insignificant.

The early history of the National Debt is bound up with railway construction and the capitalization of hereditary pensions. The Industrial Works loan issued in 1877 deserves mention as being the first domestic loan. Japan showed great restraint in her resort to foreign loans. After the issues on the London market in 1870 and 1877, representing a total of under  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling, a period of twenty-four years elapsed before further indebtedness was incurred abroad. Since that time considerable recourse has been had to foreign markets for loan issues. The war of 1904-5 forced Japan into debt abroad to the extent of 1,100 million yen, most of which was expended within two years, yet the financial credit gained by scrupulous attention to the service of the various loans was not affected even by these large borrowings.

The redemption scheme carried out in 1906, by which low-interest loans replaced earlier issues made at higher rates, put much of the foreign indebtedness on a 4 per cent.

basis, and gave testimony to the wisdom and thrift which had governed Japanese financial dealings.

In the establishment of national banks, American practice was mainly adopted. At first these banks possessed powers of note issue, but when the Bank of Japan was formed in the year 1882, note issue was vested solely in the new institution, and most of the national banks assumed a private form. No restrictions on the formation of such banks was made until the year 1893, when their number had become so large as to make government control desirable. It was at the same time laid down that savings banks must be joint-stock companies, and that the directors of such institutions must bear unlimited liability.

Of far greater importance than the ordinary and savings banks are the financial institutions created by special law and with special objects. These include the Bank of Japan, the central bank of the country; the Yokohama Specie Bank, created to act as financial sponsor for those engaged in foreign trade, and possessing branches all over the world; the Hypothec Bank, associated with the development of the agricultural, manufacturing, and marine products industries; and the Industrial Bank of Japan, created with the special purpose of facilitating industrial enterprise. An interesting recent development is the closer financial connexion through this bank between France and Japan. These institutions are all under government protection and control.

The one defect of the existing banking system is the lack of an adequate institution to afford financial facilities to people of the lower and poorer class. Pawnbrokers, it is regrettable to say, flourish in Japan.

There are some who believe that the government has

gone too far in throwing safeguards around the financial institutions, thus displacing private capital by the absorption into governmentally protected concerns of the safest risks, leaving the inferior ones to private capitalists. There is some truth in this charge, but on the other hand the government has been determined to establish the credit of Japan, especially with the foreign investor. Many appeals to capitalists abroad have been made through such institutions as the Industrial Bank, and it is claimed that under existing conditions foreign investments are as safe in Japan as they are in any country. The legal status of foreigners is practically the same as that of natives.

On the general question it has been shown that the currency system is sound and that the finances of the country have been admirably managed. The financial position has improved since the outbreak of war owing to the rapid growth of the export trade, and the government has taken the opportunity provided by the continued accumulation of gold abroad, and the abundance of cheap money available to float a domestic loan, the proceeds of which are being utilized for the conversion of foreign obligations.

The distribution of industry upon which the commerce of Japan is based has remained substantially the same for many years. A great focus of the manufacturing activities of the Empire is the district around the Bay of Osaka, and from this area the great city at the head of the Inland Sea is able to draw its supply of cheap labour. Within a hundred miles, north and south, Osaka and the great commercial port of Kobe have a population of over 16,000,000, and within this radius, with the exception of Tokyo and Yokohama, lie all the large cities of Japan. Across the bay

is the island of Shikoku with 3,000,000 more people. Here is a tributary population greater than that around London, which in comparison makes New York and its environments appear to be only normally populated. From this centre of industrial energy Japan has a splendid outlet through the Inland Sea to maintain and increase her hold on foreign trade.

The Japanese of to-day are ambitious to be the controlling industrial and commercial, as well as the commanding political, nation of the Far East. They are hopeful of becoming a great maritime and commercial power—the Great Britain of the Pacific—and recent events have gone far to encourage this hope.

The alliance with Great Britain and the conclusion of commercial treaties with other important Powers set commercial Japan on her feet, and the progress made in foreign trade has over a series of years been quite satisfactory. Thirty years ago the total value was the insignificant figure of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling; to-day, when the total values are well over the round hundred millions which used to be the goal of the prophets, it is difficult to set limits to the process of expansion. Until the year 1913, with the one exception of 1910, the annual balance of trade was against Japan. This tendency, which was redressed before the war, was naturally assisted by the trading conditions which followed the outbreak of hostilities, and there was a large balance of exports over imports for the year 1915.

The distribution of the trade varies, but disregarding the currents created by the World War, the changes which have taken place are such as might have been predicted by an intelligent observer. Trade with the Far East increases at a greater rate than that with Europe and America, and is

increasing at the expense of Great Britain and other competitors. Exports are increasing at a more rapid rate than imports, and the United States is Japan's best customer, China ranking next, and British possessions occupying third place. Great Britain and her Overseas Dominions dominate the import trade, supplying nearly one-half of Japan's purchases from abroad. Although during recent years the export trade with Germany and Italy has shown a marked increase, competition is too strong for Japan at present to make much headway under normal conditions in the European markets. The advances made have been mainly in the markets of Asia and America. An analysis of the figures shows that nearly half the foreign trade of Japan has been with Asia, Australia, Egypt, and Hawaii. In this respect history is likely to be repeated. One of the results of the European War has been the considerable increase in Japan's trade with China, India, and Australasia, in addition to large orders for war materials from the Allies.

At the same time it cannot be overlooked that the United States remains the best customer of Japan, and, where price is not a bar to reciprocal trading, there is a natural tendency for orders to flow into the American market. Of the effect of new commercial treaties arising out of the war, nothing can now be predicted, except that they should promote closer relations with the allied nations, and may for a time at least divert trade currents out of their natural channels. A feature of the situation which should be put on record is the considerable extent to which the Japanese control their own trade and commerce both in the export and import branches, and it is a subject of congratulation that the German element is not so largely represented in merchant circles as in other countries.



Behind the trade ambitions of the Japanese is the mercantile marine, a potent and growing force in unlocking the doors of overseas markets. Like the British, the Japanese have the maritime instinct, and the efficiency of their seamanship is recognized by all who care to probe beneath the surface. While in the year 1871 the tonnage of the Japanese mercantile marine was less than 20,000, nearly one hundred times that tonnage now flies the Japan merchant flag. The Empire has aimed at securing the supremacy of her own flag in her own seas, and her ships traverse all the great ocean highways. Twenty years ago Japan carried only one-fifth of her imports and one-seventh of her exports in her own ships ; she will carry half her trade in Japanese bottoms in the near future.

The modern era was initiated in the year 1885 by the formation of the Japan Mail Steamship Company, which finally, on a tonnage comparison, ranked higher than the Cunard Line. Expansion has been stimulated by the payment of subsidies on shipbuilding and on shipping, and the Far Eastern services have been supplemented by services to Europe and to America, North and South. The largest and fastest boats are those running to San Francisco, and they compare favourably with any ships afloat save the mammoth liners which in normal times maintain communication between European and North American ports. Since the war the shipping business of Japan has made great strides. Her mercantile marine has become a factor in the world's markets, and Japanese ships are seeking cargo in all parts of the world. To-day very large additions to the merchant fleet of Japan are projected ; the programme suggests its reinforcement at no distant date by another 500,000 tons. The depletion of the world's shipping by

the ravages of war is the opportunity of this ambitious aspirant for a leading place in the shipping industry, and through that to a fresh extension of her foreign commerce.

It should not be overlooked that no country, except perhaps the United States, will receive more benefit from the opening of the Panama Canal than Japan, and hopes have been kindled that traffic through the new waterway may, like that on the European, North and South American, and Australian open sea routes, be encouraged by a subsidy. The way is clearly pointed to a period of rapid expansion in trade and shipping. The present opportunity is unique, and Japan may be trusted not to fritter away the chance of a generation by incapacity or neglect.

Down to the end of the Tokugawa period the internal communications of Japan were of an extremely primitive character, and the policy which the Shogunate maintained, as we have shown, for more than two centuries of isolating the country from foreign influences found a counterpart in the restrictions, artificial as well as natural, which prevented the people from moving freely about their own land. There were indeed three great highways, one of which, the Tokaido, connecting Kyoto and Osaka with Tokyo, was of great antiquity; but even these were interrupted by rivers which, in the absence of bridges, travellers had to cross in ferry-boats or even on the backs of porters. Such wheeled vehicles as existed were only for persons of exalted rank, and ordinary people who were unwilling or unable to use their own legs had to fall back on pack-horses or the kago, a kind of very uncomfortable palanquin. Japanese ingenuity about 1870 effected some improvement by the invention of the jinrikisha, a two-wheeled vehicle, which one or two men can draw at remarkable speed over

considerable distances, but the usefulness of this device was evidently limited by the lack of a good road system. However, elaborate measures were taken in 1875 for the construction and maintenance of roads at the expense partly of the government and partly of the local authorities.

But even before the fall of the Shogunate certain far-seeing statesmen had realized the need for the introduction of railways if the internal transport of the country was to be put on a sound footing. An object-lesson of the advantages they would bestow was given in 1869, when the rice which was abundant in some districts could not be used to relieve the famine which prevailed in other parts because there was no way of transporting it by land. Sir Harry Parkes, the British representative at Tokyo, made effective use of this incident as an argument to rouse the government to action, and finally it was decided to raise the necessary money by means of a loan in England and to make a start with the aid of English engineers. The first line to be taken in hand was one eighteen miles long, between Tokyo and Yokohama, and this was quickly followed by a second, twenty miles in length, between Osaka and Kobe. The former was completed in the autumn of 1872, and its formal opening by the Emperor put an end to the opposition to railways which had been offered in some quarters. The Osaka-Kobe line was opened in 1874, and that from Osaka to Kyoto three years later, so that in eight years about seventy-one miles of line were constructed. The next section to be undertaken, that between Kyoto and Otsu, was remarkable for the fact that it was built entirely by Japanese labour, the assistance of foreign engineers being utilized only as regards the plans for the tunnels and bridges.

So far all railway construction had been carried out by the State at its own expense, but about 1880, when difficulties of finance began to obtrude themselves, the plan was conceived by Prince Iwakura of persuading the nobles, who had been given State loan bonds in commutation of the revenues they formerly enjoyed from their fiefs, to apply a portion of their capital to the construction of railways. The outcome was the formation of the Nippon Railway Company, the first private railway company in Japan, in which the nobles held shares. This company was authorized to build a line from Tokyo to Aomori in the north of the main island, but it found itself unable to tackle the actual work of construction, which in consequence was undertaken by the Railway Board, under Viscount Masaru Inouye, and completed in 1891. About 1884 another private company, the Sanyo, was organized to build a railway to Shimonoseki in the extreme south-west, and thus, with a central section built by the State between Tokyo and Kobe, a trunk line, 1,153 miles long, was completed for the whole length of the main island.

Private enterprise, at first rather shy, gradually became bolder, and in course of time the mileage in the hands of companies far outstripped that possessed by the State. The multiplication of these companies was one of the reasons that decided the Diet to adopt a policy of nationalization in 1906. At that period out of a total of 4,746 miles of line the State owned only 1,470 miles, and the remainder was shared among thirty-six companies, which thus possessed an average length of ninety-one miles each, though in fact a large proportion of them were much smaller concerns than these figures would indicate. With such a division of interests, efficient and co-ordinated working was impossible,

and the government, preferring State ownership to the policy of consolidation that was adopted in Great Britain, decided to buy up seventeen of the principal lines. On the date of purchase these had an aggregate mileage of 2,823 miles, and the purchase-money, amounting to some £49,000,000, was completely paid by July 1909, the former owners receiving 5 per cent. bonds repayable out of the profits of the lines. In the financial year 1908-9 the 4,512 miles owned by the State cost in working expenses (the yen being taken as worth 2s.) about £4,400,000, and in interest and other charges about £180,000, and the net profit was £3,500,000. In the following year, when the mileage was somewhat greater and the working expenses a little less, the interest charges had apparently risen to £3,000,000, and the profits dwindled to £1,000,000. The difference, however, is mainly accounted for by the fact that in 1909 a railway special account, independent of the general account, was established for the capital, revenue, and expenditure of the Imperial railways, and to this the interest on loans raised for railway purposes was charged in 1909-10 and subsequent years, whereas previously it had not been shown as being paid out of the railway receipts. In March 1916 the government lines had a length of 5,758 miles, an increase of 1,387 miles since nationalization, and in the Budget estimates for 1916-17 the income was put down as £13,100,000 and the disbursements, including £3,900,000 for interest, at £11,400,000, the profit thus being £1,700,000. In addition to its lines in Japan proper the State has a predominant interest in the South Manchuria railway, which has a length of 697 miles, and under Baron Goto's light railways legislation, which came into force in 1911, it grants assistance to the construction by private enterprise of

subsidiary lines to feed the main lines and open up fresh country where the building of ordinary lines would not be justified. In March 1916 over 1,400 miles of these light railways, some of which are 2 ft. or 2 ft. 6 in. wide, though one at least is of the full standard European gauge, were in operation, and about half as many miles were under construction. There were also eight lines, of the normal Japanese gauge, owned by private companies, with a total length of 272 miles.

Electric tramways, often worked by hydro-electric power, have come into great favour of recent years, and at the end of the year 1914-15 there were seventy-one such undertakings, with 822 miles open to traffic. Most of them were private companies, which in a number of cases also supply electricity for lighting and power, but 123 miles were owned by the municipalities of Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto.

The railways of Japan—on mistaken grounds of economy, as the event has proved—were originally constructed on the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, but for many years their conversion to the standard 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge has been advocated. It is estimated that the outside cost for all the railways of the main island (the South Manchuria Railway is already of standard gauge) would be £89,000,000, or for the trunk line between Tokyo and Shimonoseki alone £29,000,000, while the annual saving in working expenses would be over £300,000 for the latter line, or £500,000 for the whole island. On the other hand, it is computed that, were the narrow gauge retained, the demands of the ever-increasing traffic would entail the expenditure within the next twenty-five years of £28,000,000 on the trunk line and of £37,000,000 on the rest of the lines. Hence the government appears to be faced with the necessity for a heavy outlay, the

amount of which will not be very seriously affected whichever course is ultimately adopted. A commission was appointed in the early part of 1916 to decide the question.

Although in the early days of the Shogunate a number of merchants had banded themselves together to establish a courier system for the transmission of letters and parcels between Kyoto, Osaka, and Tokyo, a postal service, as understood in Europe, was not introduced until after the fall of the Tokugawa. A beginning was made in 1868 between Tokyo and Kyoto, and in 1873 the government assumed a monopoly of the carriage of letters, and established uniform charges, irrespective of distance. Four years later Japan joined the Postal Union, and the post offices which Great Britain and other countries maintained in her chief cities were all withdrawn by 1880. The extent to which the organization has developed may be judged from the fact that there are now more than 7,000 post offices scattered all over the country. In Tokyo there are twelve deliveries daily, and even in the third-class offices of the villages the normal number is three.

In the seventeenth century the Japanese had a system of signalling by flags by which the price of rice was telegraphed from Osaka to various outlying towns, but it was not till 1854 that they were introduced to the electric telegraph by Commodore Perry. Regulations for the telegraph service were first issued in 1872, and the postal and telegraph offices were combined in 1886. At present there are nearly 5,000 telegraph offices open to the public, and over 100,000 miles of telegraph wires. There are nine wireless stations on shore, exclusive of the naval station at Funabashi, which can be used by private persons for communication with Hawaii and one or two other places.

### 310 *Trade and Internal Communications*

Though introduced for official purposes in 1877, the telephone did not become available to the public till 1890, when a service was started in Tokyo and Yokohama, to be followed seven years later by one between Tokyo and Osaka. At first it met with a lukewarm reception, but afterwards there was such a change in public feeling that the authorities could not cope with the demand, and it became a lucrative business for those who had been lucky enough to secure the right to a service to sell their privilege to others who were prepared to pay more for it. There are now well over 200,000 subscribers, and about a quarter of a million miles of wire are employed. A considerable number of 'automatic' telephones are installed.



*Evolution of the Army and Navy*

FOR many centuries the outstanding feature of Japanese military history was the existence of a hereditary class of professional soldiers who came to be known as samurai, in contradistinction to heimin, the common folk or civilians, who had not the right to bear arms. This class gradually grew up during the Fujiwara era, which lasted for about four hundred years from towards the close of the seventh century A. D., and it exercised a potent influence on the fortunes of the country down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The Empress Jito, about A. D. 690, established a definite military organization, with commissioned officers and an army which consisted of a quarter or a third of the able-bodied male population, and to which recruits were readily attracted by the special privileges that were granted them. A century later a closer approach to universal military service was made under the Emperor Konin, all the able-bodied men being trained to fight, while the weaklings were left for agriculture and other civil pursuits, and were somewhat looked down upon in consequence.

During the Fujiwara era Chinese methods of administration were introduced, according to which the Emperor exercised his civil power, not directly but through a bureaucracy, and similarly his military power through the soldier class which clustered round the great families. The

Fujiwara clan got the civil power into their hands. Gradually, however, three other clans, the Taira, the Minamoto, and the Tokugawa, the last a branch of the second, by dint of military strength established their supremacy, and further, while the Fujiwara gave themselves over to luxury and effeminacy, gained possession of the material resources of the country. But in the middle of the twelfth century, as already related, the Taira and the Minamoto quarrelled, and though for a few years the former held the ascendancy, the latter ultimately prevailed. Yoritomo, establishing himself at Kamakura, founded a system of military feudalism, to which Japan owes much of her renowned 'Yamato' (the classical name of Japan) spirit. He assumed the office of Shogun (generalissimo), which became hereditary in his family, and put the provinces under the control of military governors appointed by himself, though a show continued to be made of respecting the authority of the court at Kyoto. There followed some four hundred years of almost perpetual strife, during which the country was continuously disturbed by the conflicts between the different chiefs and their warriors, until in the latter part of the sixteenth century an era of settled peace was inaugurated by the efforts of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi, Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Iyeyasu. By force of arms Hideyoshi reduced the various warring chiefs to submission. After his death in 1598, civil war again broke out, and Tokugawa Iyeyasu, who except for a brief interval had consistently co-operated with him, found himself called upon to deal with the intrigues of Ishida Mitsunari. The battle of Sekigahara in 1600, though it was not the end of the fighting, was decisive for his cause, and ushered in a period of peace that lasted for 250 years.

The long peace of the Tokugawa era brought with it the seeds of decadence, and the samurai, who at its beginning had an exalted code of morals and behaviour (bushido) which has become famous all over the world, became to a large extent demoralized through lack of fighting. Nor could the policy of seclusion adopted by the Tokugawa prevent the outside world from moving, and, however unwillingly, the Shogunate had to take cognizance of what was being done by other countries and to realize that Japan was being left behind in the arts of warfare. Even before the appearance of American ships of war in Tokyo Bay in 1853, Takashima, Shuhan of Nagasaki, had seen the need for Japan to improve her military system if she was to be able to repel attacks from outside, but imprisonment was the only reward he received for obtaining guns from Holland and endeavouring to induce the Shogunate to pay some attention to the methods of war practised in Europe. The American ships, however, provided an argument too persuasive to be ignored, and their visit resulted in the construction of a couple of forts, the purchase of rifles and guns in Europe and the introduction of their manufacture into Japan, and the erection of a gunpowder factory. Finally, the government took the plunge in 1862, and definitely adopted the European military system by forming an army consisting of 8,306 infantry, 1,068 cavalry, 800 field artillery, and 2,045 garrison artillery, with 1,406 officers, making a total of 13,625.

Though this force was disbanded at the fall of the Tokugawa in 1867, the Imperial government did not disregard the precedent which it set, while the principal fiefs also turned to European models of training, Satsuma, for example, seeking instruction from the British, Kii from the

Germans, and other clans from the Dutch. In 1868 Omura Masujiro, Under-Secretary for War in the new Imperial government, started a military college at Kyoto (removed to Osaka in the following year and subsequently to Tokyo), and despite opposition from the samurai, of which he himself was one, attempted to establish a system of recruiting from all classes of the community, but was assassinated before he could bring his ideas to fruition. Later generations, however, fully recognize the merits of his work, which was continued by Yamagata Aritomo (afterwards Field-Marshal Prince Yamagata) and Saigo Tsugumichi (afterwards Field-Marshal Marquis Saigo). Returning in 1870 from a visit to Europe, undertaken for the purpose of investigating Western methods, these two administrators organized a corps of Imperial Guards, and established garrisons in Tokyo, Sendai, Osaka, Nagoya and Kumamoto. In 1872 the Departments of the Army and Navy were separated, and in the following year an Imperial Edict instituted universal conscription. The samurai thus lost their monopoly of military service, and fears were at first entertained that they might be too proud to serve in the ranks along with common civilians or to obey the orders of officers not drawn from their own class, but these difficulties were soon overcome. The period of active service was fixed at three years, with two years in the first reserve and two in the second. The country, except Hokkaido, where a colonial militia was instituted, was divided into six districts, each with its garrison, the head-quarters being at Tokyo, Sendai, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto; and the whole force comprised 14 infantry regiments, 3 cavalry squadrons, 18 artillery batteries, 10 sapper sections, 6 commissariat sections, and 9 coast artillery companies, the

strength being 31,680 in peace and 46,350 on a war footing. In spite of troubles connected with obtaining a sufficient supply of competent officers, this army proved its worth in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. The reserves not being sufficient to make up the wastage of war, volunteers were called for, and were drawn largely from among samurai who had taken up other occupations. But in the field the latter showed no superiority to the conscripts, and experience in fact proved that efficiency as a soldier depended entirely on adequate military training and not on any martial spirit or instinct supposed to be inherited by the samurai but not by the heimin.

After the rebellion the military control was divided into three principal branches—the Army Department, the General Staff Office, and the Army Inspection Department. In 1879 the total term of service was increased to ten years instead of seven (three with the colours, three with the first reserve, and four with the second reserve), and there was a further revision in 1883, when the total term was extended to twelve years, the periods being three, four, and five years respectively; exemptions from service on payment of money were also abolished. From this time vigorous measures were taken for the improvement of military education and for the co-ordination of the offensive and defensive forces of the Empire, both naval and military. In 1888 the garrisons, now designated ‘Head-quarters of Divisions’, were organized as units complete with infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, and commissariat, and the Imperial Army came to consist of a field force of seven divisions, fortress artillery, railway corps, and colonial militia, ready if need be for service beyond the seas. The net result of all these efforts was that in 1894 Japan was able to oppose

China with an army of more than 240,000 trained men, in addition to 6,495 irregulars and 100,000 coolies.

Japan was not slow to profit by the lessons of that campaign, and after it was over she did not slacken her endeavours to bring her fighting forces to the highest pitch of efficiency. The term of service required from her conscripts was slightly extended, and in 1896 the colonial militia of Hokkaido was formed into a division, and five new divisions were added, making the total thirteen. A little later the cavalry and artillery, which had previously belonged to the divisions, were converted into independent brigades, with the object of increasing their freedom of action, and the efficiency of the coast defence was improved by the addition of new troops to the fortress artillery. Great attention was paid to the medical service, nor was the importance of good *matériel* overlooked. Better rifles were provided for the infantry, the artillery were armed with quick-firing guns, and with the introduction of the manufacture of guns of the largest calibres in 1902, Japan's domestic resources became equal to the task of supplying nearly all the armament required by her army.

These various preparations were put to the test in the conflict with Russia in 1904, and Japan emerged successfully from the ordeal. But even so she was not content to rest on her oars. The personnel was increased by six more divisions, bringing up the total to nineteen, a system of two (instead of three) years' conscription was adopted, and within the division the artillery, cavalry, and sappers were all improved and increased, while new branches of service were added to them. In the result the effective fighting power of the Army was approximately doubled. The following table, taken from the chapter on the Japanese

Army contributed by Prince Yamagata to Marquis Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan*, will give an idea of the different stages of progress :

	<i>Generals and corresponding officers.</i>	<i>Higher officers and officers.</i>	<i>Petty officers.</i>	<i>Men.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Before C.-J. War	36	4,235	8,970	65,241	78,482
Before R.-J. War	94	8,480	11,865	132,348	152,787
After R.-J. War	125	14,388	24,066	211,396	249,975

But there can be no doubt that Japan's military strength has by no means yet reached its zenith, and though no precise figures can be put forward, it has been computed that by 1930 the first line will be 740,000 strong, the second line 780,000, and the third line 3,850,000 (3,000,000 untrained and 850,000 partly trained). Employed, as it has been in the past, with statesmanlike wisdom, this force should prove a sure guarantee for the future stability of the Far East.

The Japanese Navy is of comparatively recent growth, its beginnings dating only from the middle of last century. The stimulus to its development came from outside. Early in the seventeenth century the Tokugawa government had stifled the maritime progress that was being made by forbidding the building of large ships in the country and the undertaking of foreign voyages by Japanese bottoms, and this policy of isolation was maintained for more than two hundred years, until it was broken down by the two visits paid to Tokyo Bay in 1853 and 1854 by United States warships under Commodore Perry. These proved the forerunners of the opening of commercial relations with foreign

countries. On the advice of the Dutch, who enjoyed commercial privileges denied to all other nations except the Chinese, the Shōgunate thereupon resolved to develop a Navy on the European model. A training school for seamen, opened at Nagasaki in 1855 under Dutch instructors, was soon followed by a naval school at Tokyo; and two ships obtained from the Dutch, together with one presented by Queen Victoria, formed the nucleus of a fleet. A Japanese warship crossed the Pacific for the first time in 1860, and the first steam vessel of war built in Japan—a gunboat of 138 tons—was launched in 1866. Young officers were sent to Holland for naval instruction, French aid was enlisted for the planning and construction of a dockyard at Yokosuka, and the services of a British naval officer—Captain, afterwards Admiral Sir, Richard Tracey—were secured to organize the naval school at Tokyo, though owing to the fall of the Shogunate in 1867, he returned to England without taking up his position.

The expansion of the Navy began in earnest in 1871, when the Imperial government found itself able to muster seventeen ships, mostly of wood. Two years later a second naval mission came out from England under Commander, afterwards Vice-Admiral Sir, Archibald L. Douglas, and in 1875 and 1876 two vessels of 896 and 1,450 tons respectively were launched from Japanese yards. In 1875 the *Fusoh*, an ironclad of 3,717 tons, and the *Kongo* and *Hiyei*, cruisers of 2,248 tons, were ordered from Great Britain, and in 1878 the *Seiki*, a cruiser of 1897 tons, built in Japan and manned solely by Japanese, for the first time carried the Japanese flag into European waters. A large naval programme was introduced in 1882 and extended in 1886, and at the outbreak of the war with China, in 1894, the



fleet included twenty-eight ships with a displacement of 57,600 tons, besides twenty-four torpedo-boats. The expenditure on naval construction from 1871 to 1893 amounted to £24,000,000.

The result of the Chino-Japanese War vindicated the efficiency of the Japanese Navy, which increased its strength by seventeen vessels captured from its opponents. But its controllers were not content to rest on their laurels, and in the following years many new ships were ordered, until in 1904, when the conflict with Russia came, the fleet comprised six battleships of 84,652 tons, eight armoured cruisers of 73,982 tons, and forty-four other cruisers of 111,470 tons, with nineteen destroyers and eighty torpedo-boats. After the war a naval programme was adopted which involved the expenditure of some £35,000,000 by the end of 1916 on constructing new ships, on repairing and refitting existing ships and those captured from Russia, and on making good the tonnage removed from the list through obsolescence. The result was that the Japanese Navy in 1916 possessed twelve battleships, exclusive of two (*Ise* and *Hiuga*, 30,800 tons and 45,000 h.p.) under construction, and one, the *Nagato* (32,000 tons, to be armed, it was said, with twelve 15-in. guns), to be laid down; eight battle-cruisers, of which the *Kongo* and her three sister ships were of 27,000 tons and 64,000 h.p.; nine first-class and thirteen second-class cruisers; three first-class and thirteen second-class coast-defence boats; and three first-class and five second-class gunboats. In addition, there were sixty destroyers, with nine others building, twenty-seven torpedo-boats and seventeen submarines. Of the battleships, six, apart from the *Nagato*, must be accounted Dreadnoughts, two (*Settsu* and *Kawachi*) mounting twelve

12-in. guns, and four (*Fusoh*, *Yamashiro*, *Ise*, and *Hiuga*), twelve 14-in. guns. The battle-cruisers fall into two groups of four each. The *Tsukuba*, the first of the earlier group, which was launched in 1905, was designed by Vice-Admiral Kondo, and claims the honour of being the pioneer of the battle-cruiser type—that is, the first cruiser in the world to carry battleship armament. The *Kongo*, the first of the second group, was designed and built by Messrs. Vickers at Barrow, and served as the model for her three sisters which were built in Japan, though the machinery and guns for one of them were obtained from England.

Although Japan has from time to time had to have recourse to European shipbuilders, the rule is that every part of the structure and equipment of her Navy ships must, if possible, come from within the limits of her Empire, and in fact since 1903 only three of her large vessels—the *Kashima*, *Katori*, and *Kongo*, with an aggregate displacement of 59,850 tons—have not been launched from her own yards, having been obtained from England. Structural material comes mainly from Wakamatsu, guns from Kure and Muroran, and armour-plate from Kure. Not all the auxiliary machinery can be made in the country, yet the principal shipyards and engine works have acquired licences to manufacture some of the more important items, and can thus supply the requirements of the Imperial dockyards.

Of the four Navy yards, the oldest, at Yokosuka, dates back to 1864. To begin with, it was used principally for general shipbuilding, but in 1872 it became the chief shipbuilding establishment for the Navy. Down to 1885 it seems to have limited itself to wooden vessels, but in that year the composite ship *Katsuragi* was launched, followed by an iron vessel, the *Atago*, in 1887. In 1906 it was responsible for

the *Satsuma* (19,350 tons), the first battleship built in Japan, for which it furnished the engines, water-tube boilers, and most of the auxiliary machinery. It possesses the largest dry-dock in the Empire, and also a second one capable of taking a modern ship of the largest displacement. The Kure yard, established in 1889, built the first armoured vessel of Japan, and launched the *Ibuki* in six months after the keel was laid. It also turned out the battleship *Fusob*, the first ship to be built in Japan in a dry-dock specially constructed for the purpose, with a bottom floor length of 698 feet. It undertook the manufacture of armour-plate in 1902, and it possesses plant for making guns and mountings of the largest size. The Sasebo yard, in the island of Kiushiu, near Nagasaki, which, like the Kure yard, became of importance just before the China War of 1894, was originally intended for repair work; it is very extensive, and contains two large graving-docks. The newest yard is that at Maidzuru in the Sea of Japan. So far it has been used only for the construction of destroyers, but it possesses a dry-dock able to accommodate ships of the largest size. There are auxiliary naval stations at Ominato, Takeshiki, and Bako, where minor repairs can be undertaken.

Private shipbuilding yards contribute in a notable degree to Japan's capacity for naval construction. The two most important from this point of view are the Mitsubishi yard at Nagasaki and the Kawasaki yard at Kobe. Both have proved their ability to produce large ships by each building complete a battle-cruiser of the *Kongo* class, and they have been entrusted with the new battleships *Ise* and *Hiuga*. The Mitsubishi Company possesses at Nagasaki one of the two experimental tanks in Japan, the other being at Tokyo and owned by the Navy Department. There are other

private firms, such as the Osaka Ironworks and the Uraga Shipbuilding Company, that are able to turn out destroyers.

In regard to merchant shipbuilding Japan has been steadily increasing her domestic capacity, and every year sees her less dependent on vessels imported from other countries. Apart from junks, which are built in large if somewhat diminishing numbers, and also sailing vessels of modern type, which are all of comparatively small size, the following figures for steamers over 100 tons gross register will give an idea of the progress she has made. In 1900 she built fifty-three vessels of 15,308 tons, and purchased from abroad thirteen of 28,492 tons. In 1904, the time of the war with Russia, her home production consisted of 114 vessels of 27,500 tons, and she purchased seventy-two of 177,298 tons; and three years later she built seventy-nine of 29,898 tons, and purchased thirty-four of 32,009 tons. In 1911 the figures were 137 of 43,817 tons and forty-nine of 129,454 tons, and in 1915 they were seventy-three of 78,918 tons and eleven of 28,081 tons. At the present time home construction is exceedingly active, and about the middle of 1916 it was calculated that 132 steamers, aggregating 593,000 tons, were on the stocks or had been ordered. To judge by the figures for that period the Osaka Ironworks were the largest builders, having orders for forty-four vessels of 201,000 tons. The next place was taken by the Kawasaki Dockyard which at Kure had twenty-four ships of 139,000 tons. The Mitsubishi Dockyard was responsible for eighteen vessels, of which twelve of 70,000 tons were at Nagasaki and six of 24,000 tons at Kobe. The Uraga Company had fifteen of 61,000 tons, the Fujinagata Shipyard, Osaka, for seven of 15,000 tons, the Ishikawajima Yard at Tokyo for six of 13,000 tons, and the Ono Yard at

Osaka for five of 9,000 tons. The Yokohama Shipbuilding Company had orders for six ships of 47,000 tons, to be built at a yard which Mr. Asano, the head of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, was establishing at Yokohama. This scheme is distinct from another on which the same shipowner has been engaged for some years, for starting a yard on an area of land to be reclaimed from the sea some three miles north of Yokohama.

One obstacle to the rapid completion of this ambitious programme of shipbuilding is to be found in the difficulty of obtaining sufficient supplies of iron and steel for structural purposes. The main source of such material is the government steel works at Wakamatsu, in Kiushiu. In 1915 these produced 250,000 tons of structural steel, mostly for ships, and their capacity is to be increased immediately to 350,000 tons, and by 1922 to 650,000 tons. But the government has first call upon their output for warship construction, and thus the merchant shipbuilder has to depend largely on foreign sources of supply, the yield of which is seriously restricted by the European War. Whether if material were abundant, sufficient supplies of labour would be forthcoming, is a question that is somewhat problematical, in spite of the advances that have been made in the direction of providing labour-saving devices.

The growth of merchant shipbuilding in Japan has been greatly assisted by the Shipbuilding Encouragement Act passed in 1896, which as last amended in 1910, remains in effect until 1920. It provided a direct subsidy as regards both the hulls and the machinery of iron or steel ships of not less than 700 tons gross register, and was designed to give such financial assistance as would about cover the difference in cost of material in Japan as compared with Europe.

Stringent regulations govern the granting of the subsidy, which may be said to amount to from about 22*s.* to 44*s.* per gross ton, according to the character of the ship, and to 10*s.* per indicated horse-power developed on trial. Down to the end of 1915 advantage had been taken of this legislation by 143 steamers, with an aggregate of nearly half a million tons gross. In addition to these subsidies on shipbuilding, navigation is also subsidized. The amounts paid depend on the mileage travelled, tonnage, speed, and age. The vessels must be on the Japanese register, must be owned by companies whose shareholders are all Japanese subjects, and must be of steel, with a tonnage not less than 3,000, a speed not less than 12 knots, and an age not exceeding fifteen years.

In 1915 the number of steamers on the Japanese register with a tonnage exceeding 100 tons was 1,056, with an aggregate of 1,557,757 tons, of which 667 of 600,182 tons were built in Japan. Six of the vessels had a gross tonnage over 10,000 tons, and 66 exceeded 5,000 tons. The twenty-two largest ships were all the product of Japanese yards.

By far the largest shipowning company in Japan is the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the history of which indirectly goes back to the days of the Shogunate. When the Tokugawa government fell in 1867 a considerable number of ocean-going vessels were in the possession of it and its feudatories, and in a few years the Imperial government handed them all over to a company, the Nippon Koku Yubin Jokisen Kaisha (Mail Steamship Company of Japan), to which a substantial subsidy was granted. Little success attended the venture, which lasted only four years, but before it came to an end in 1875 a new and independent shipping company, the Mitsubishi Kaisha, had been established under the

enterprising direction of Iwasaki Yataro. It was not long before the ships of the old company were transferred to this new undertaking, and it rapidly grew until in 1880 it possessed four-fifths of the steam tonnage of the country. But still the government realized that the development of the mercantile marine was not so great as was desirable, and therefore in 1881 it established the Kyodo Unyu Kaisha (Union Transport Company) with a capital of £1,000,000 and gave it a large subsidy. For four years the two companies, both subsidized, worked in rivalry, but in 1885 they joined forces as the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, which has a fleet of over 100 ships, representing about half a million tons, and maintains services to Europe, India, Australia, and both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of North America.

The second place as regards tonnage is taken by the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, which has over 150,000 tons, and the third by the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, with nearly 50,000 tons in ten ships. There are about half a dozen other owners possessing fleets with aggregate tonnages exceeding 20,000 tons, one of them, Kishimoto Shokwa, having more than double that figure.

*Literature and Art*

THE earliest Japanese book extant is a kind of saga relating the heavenly origins of the Japanese race, the story of the creation of the Japanese Islands, and the reigns of the early rulers, interspersed with songs, some of which may date from the fourth century or even the third. It is called the *Kojiki* ('Record of Ancient Matters'), and it was written in 712 by Yasumaro under the auspices of the Empress Gemmyo, to fulfil the intentions of the previous Emperor Temmu (673-86), under whose reign the records of the past remained committed to the memory of a court official, Hiyeda no Aré. The *Kojiki* has been translated by Professor B. H. Chamberlain, and published in volume x of the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*. It is composed in archaic Japanese.

In 720 the *Nihongi* ('Chronicles of Japan') superseded it, but being written in Chinese, it is almost disqualified from a place in Japanese literature. It has been translated by the late Dr. W. G. Aston, and published by the Japan Society of London; in its pages, as in the *Kojiki*, the chronology is open to criticism, but it is interesting to record the mention of court historiographers in 403, although their work is now lost. The *Kojiki* was first printed from wood blocks in 1644, and its publication brought forth a renaissance of Japanese traditions; its pages were explained by many scholars, among whom Motoori



Nobunaga devoted the forty-four volumes of his *Kojikiden* to its elucidation with amazing erudition. The result of his work was a revival of the pure Shinto ceremonial, eclipsed since 810 by the Ryobu Shinto ritual of Kukai, in which Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism were amalgamated under the plea that the Shinto deities were transmigrations of the Buddhist divinities—an opportunistic dogma not unknown in other religions.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries and the wars which desolated Japan in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, literature was almost at a standstill; a few historical works remain, the *Jinkoshotoki* of Kitabatake Chikafusa (1340), written to support the claims of the deposed Emperor Go-Daigo Tenno to the throne against the usurpation of the feudal chiefs, and the *Taiheiki*, written by Kojimahoshi in 1370, which influenced the literary style of the following generations towards simplification of syntax and copious use of Chinese idioms. Another work of the same period, the *Tsurezuregusa* ('Materials to Dispel Boredom'), by Kenko-Hoshi, consists of personal jottings and has been repeatedly translated. The founder of the Tokugawa house, Iyeyasu, bequeathed his Chinese library to his eighth son, Daimyo of Owari, and the Japanese section to his ninth son, Daimyo of Kishu, who caused a supplement to the *Nibongi* to be compiled; Iyeyasu's grandson, Mitsukuni, popularly known as Mito Komon (1662-1700), collected a vast library, and under his auspices were published the largest books of Japanese history: *Dai-Nihon-shi* in 240 volumes, and the *Reigi Ruiten* ('Rules of Ceremonials') in 500 volumes, with which may be mentioned the large work of Rai Sanyo, *Nihon Gwaishi* ('History of Japan outside the Court', 22 volumes, 1827). Large

numbers of historical works on a smaller scale were published during the Tokugawa period.

Since the Meiji era the Imperial University of Tokyo has undertaken the publication of material critically edited as a foundation for a history of Japan on modern lines.

From the earliest times Japanese poetry has been made up of alternate lines of 5 and 7 syllables. Down to the end of the Nara period (eighth century) comparatively long poems (naga-uta) were produced in this measure, with an extra seven-syllable line to mark the conclusion; but the form which subsequently became standard was the tanka, a five-line verse of 31 syllables, in lines of 5, 7, 5, 7, 7, constituting a complete poem. As an example the following well-known tanka by Minamoto Sanetomo, the second son of Yoritomo, may be quoted; it was composed in 1219, on the morning of the day on which he was murdered

Idete inaba<sup>1</sup>  
Nushinaki yado to  
Narinu tomo  
Nokiba no ume yo  
Haru wo wasuruna.

The English translation given by Mr. W. N. Porter in *A Hundred Verses from Old Japan* (Clarendon Press, 1909) is:

Though masterless my home appear,  
When I have gone away,  
Oh plum tree growing by the caves,  
Forget not to display  
Thy buds in spring, I pray.

The first real anthology of Japanese poetry, the *Manyōshū*

<sup>1</sup> In the first line the *i* of inaba is elided, so that in effect there are only five syllables.

(‘Collection of a Myriad Leaves’), was compiled in the eighth century, and contains over 4,000 pieces, the majority of which are tanka, though there are also a number of ‘long poems’. It includes many specimens of the work of Hitomaro and Akahito, who are accounted the greatest poets of Japan. Another famous anthology, the *Kokinshū* (‘Collection of Odes Ancient and Modern’), compiled by Tsurayuki in 905, consists entirely of tanka, and in the succeeding five centuries no fewer than twenty similar anthologies were issued by Imperial command, the best known being the *Hyaku-nin-isshū* (‘Single Verses by a Hundred Poets’), collected by Fujiwara Sadaiye in 1235.

In view of the limitations imposed by the shortness of the tanka, it is not surprising that Japanese poetry is suggestive rather than descriptive. But later, in the epigrams (hokku or haikai), consisting of only 17 syllables in three lines of 5, 7, 5, brevity was pushed still further, and conciseness frequently verged on obscurity. Basho (1643-94) was the chief exponent of this kind of composition, a characteristic specimen of which is the following :

Asagao ni  
Tsurube torarete,  
Morai-mizu.

Professor Chamberlain gives the literal translation as ‘Having had well-bucket taken away by convolvuli—gift-water!’ and he explains the meaning to be that the authoress, Chiyo, having gone to the well to draw water, found that convolvulus had twined itself round the rope, and, loth to disturb the blossoms, went and begged water of a neighbour.

The influence exercised by the Empresses Suiko and Gemmyo upon Japanese thought is equalled only by that

of Court ladies on literature, especially on poetry from the eighth century onwards. They wrote in pure Japanese without admixture of Chinese words, and to their brush we owe the *Genji Monogatari*, a lengthy novel reciting the adventures of Prince Genji, and giving a valuable picture of Kyoto life about 1004, written under the pseudonym of Murasaki no Shikibu. Another Court lady, Sei Shonagon, wrote in chatty, spontaneous style the *Makura no Soshi* ('Pillow Sketches'). Both works are of the greatest value, and considerably above the level of the fairy tales or semi-historical *Monogatari* which preceded them.

Although a Chinese dictionary was printed in Japan from wood-blocks in 1306, manuscript copies of other books were alone available until much later, but several of the *Monogatari*, the *Taiheiki*, *Gempei Seisuiiki*, and other historical romances were recited by itinerant raconteurs, often blind men affiliated to the Buddhist priesthood, who sang poetry to the accompaniment of the biwa. These recitals and the sacred Kagura pantomimes being in favour during the mediaeval wars, Buddhist authors set themselves to write libretti of a semi-historical, semi-religious character to be recited in stately performances by one or several performers to an accompaniment of flutes and drums; this new form of sacred dance is called No (or No Uta). Whereas in the Kagura, and in the dances called Bugaku, Gagaku, &c., the subjects were chiefly of foreign origin, the No are almost entirely based upon Japanese stories; the performers, richly clad in brocade robes, wear masks of painted wood, of which about one hundred types are recognized, their carving ranking amongst the finest accomplishments of Japanese glyptic art.

The collection of No drama, *Yokyoku Tsukai*, contains

235 libretti, but of these only 150 are now taught in Kyoto, and performed in various ways by artists of five different 'schools'.

No and Bugaku were occasionally performed by nobles, but during the early years of Meiji even the aristocracy deserted their stages, and No artists had to sell their costumes and masks to buy food. Now, however, the nationalist movement has brought about a revival.

The Buddhistic pessimism and gloom of the No are relieved by comic interludes called Kyogen ('Mad Words'), entirely free from vulgarity, but otherwise comparable with the farces and sotties which accompanied in mediaeval Europe the performances of religious mystery-plays.

While the No monopolized the attention of the higher classes, the man in the street was catered for by ballad singers (Joruri) and puppet performers (Kwairaiishi), the combination of which with the modified forms of Kabuki and other dances introduced by a woman, O Kuni, c. 1596-1600, crystallized into theatrical plays. Chikamatsu Monzayemon (1653-1724) wrote puppet plays which have earned for him the reputation of being the Shakespeare of Japan, skilful musicians like Takemoto Gidayu and others followed him from Osaka to Yedo (now Tokyo), and their works were performed by actors of both sexes, until the government interfered on the score of morality, and women parts had to be rendered by men, such as Iwai Hanshiro, who acted so skilfully as to earn the jealousy of women. Finally, historical plays (Jidaimono, Aragoto) and domestic drama (Wagoto, Sewamono) brought to the front generations of artists such as Sakata Tojuro and Ichikawa Danjuro (1660-1784), whose line endured until recent years. The military class, whose overbearing ways proved irksome to theatre

proprietors, were forbidden, in 1681, at the latter's request, to attend theatres with their swords, so that they could not frequent them at all; the level of the performances may have become lower to suit the populace. Revolving stages and mechanical contrivances were highly developed, but during the later part of the nineteenth century, after the Emperor had witnessed a private theatrical performance (1887), European methods were introduced, without, however, drying up the dramatic wit of Japanese playwrights.

With the transfer of the shogunal administration to Yedo, the military classes, now reduced to inaction, followed the philosophers in the study of ancient Japanese literature and of Chinese ethics; Chinese idioms were adopted to express new thoughts. Amongst Chinese scholars (Kangakusha), Fujiwara Seikwa (1560-1619) and Muro Kiuso (1653-1734) led the Confucianist followers of Chu Hi; others, like Ito Jinsai, Ito Togai, and Ogiu Sorai, advocated the direct study of Confucius; others still followed Wang-Yang-Ming; and all wrangled with the Buddhist and the pure Japanese scholars. Hayashi Razan (1583-1657), with 170 scholastic works, Kaibara Yekken, a teacher of ethics, and Arai Hakuseki (1657-1725), historian, archaeologist, financier, who cross-examined the Jesuit Sidotti and left numerous works, are the most prominent names of the period.

Works of fiction and historical novels abound during the Tokugawa era, and after 1608 were often copiously illustrated with colour-prints, which cause the volumes to be eagerly sought after by collectors. Popular drama and romances were devoured by the shopkeepers of Osaka and Yedo, though the writers who coveted such vulgar glory were despised by the educated and checked by the government. The main ingredients of their works are erudition, prodigal invention,

lavish bloodshed, bombast and improbability. Graft the extravagances of Marlowe on the prolixity of Dumas and imagine a public that will spend all day in feasting on the horrible and the incredible, and you will understand both the contempt of Japanese scholars for such productions and the reluctance of Europeans to rifle treasures which would shrivel in the cold light of those who judge by the tame standards of Fielding or Defoe.

Yet between abstruse Chinese or Shinto disputants like Hakuseki or Motoori and these purveyors of marvels for the multitude, there existed some keen-witted observers whom Japanese novelists of to-day delight to honour. Among the best-known writers were Ibara Saikaku (1641-93) in Osaka; Jisho (1675-1745) and Kiseki (1666-1716), of Kyoto, owners of the Hachimonjiya publishing house, which specialized in fiction; Santo Kioden (1761-1816), Tanchiko, Ikku, Shunsui, and the prolific Bakin (1767-1848), by many accounted the greatest novelist of Japan. Saikaku and Kiseki depicted the gay life and free manners of their day in humorous and realistic sketches which are unsurpassed for graphic satire and invaluable as witnesses to the state of the Tokugawa underworld. Ikku, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, wrote a rollicking masterpiece, *Hizakurige*, which has been eulogized as the 'most humorous and most entertaining book in the Japanese language'. Owing to the pornographic tendencies of many of these authors (Bakin was a notable exception) their work is to a large extent unsuitable for translation into English, and indeed in some cases was suppressed in their own country.

Original work in literature was violently arrested by the Restoration of 1867 and by the simultaneous inrush of exotic ideas. Thus for about fifteen years most literary

men of influence were occupied with the task of translating and explaining. Though Dutch had been the first medium through which a knowledge of medicine, astronomy, and geography was acquired, the English tongue held a predominant place. Professor Toyama, a graduate of Michigan University, and Professor (later Baron) Kikuchi, a graduate of Cambridge University, laid the foundations of Tokyo official teaching on an Anglo-American basis. As a private schoolmaster, the far-seeing pioneer, the great Fukuzawa Yukichi, having recorded in *Seiyo Jijo* ('Condition of Western Countries') his frank impressions of America and Europe, began to exercise enormous influence. Indifferent to political questions, he believed profoundly in the wisdom of the West. His school (the *Keiogijuku*), his newspaper (the *Jiji* or *Times*), his lectures and public speeches (the last proceeding was a bold innovation for men accustomed to Tokugawa restraint) wielded the powers of Luther or Voltaire. The main trend of his teaching was utilitarian: the writers with whom he felt most sympathy were Hume, Buckle, Bentham, Mill, and Gibbon. The name of Marquis Okuma, the founder of the Waseda University, may be linked with that of Professor Tsubouchi, the author of an able *History of English Literature*, who adapted Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* into Japanese in 1882, and as leader of the naturalistic school of novelists brought out the first literary periodical, the *Waseda Bungaku*. Another influential teacher was Keiwu Nakamura, who translated Mill's *On Liberty* and Smiles's *Self-Help*. The philosophy of Spencer and Darwin was entrenched in the Tokyo Imperial University, for evolution seemed exactly suited as a creed to a time of rapid growth. France, about this time, enjoyed a brief period of popularity. Tokusuke Nakai's transla-



tion of Rousseau's *Contrat Social* is said to have given such impetus to the demand for democratic rights that the Imperial Rescript, which promised a Constitution within ten years, was partly ascribed to its success. Voltaire and Montesquieu found translators. Novels with a political tendency held the field. Lytton and Disraeli were draped in the kimono of a loose rendering, while Yano Fumio wrote *A Model for Statesmen*, choosing as his hero Epaminondas of Thebes, and reminding one of the chlamys-and-toga hero-worship of the French Revolution. The wild aspirations of those early years, whether derived from English or French sources, have long ago been pruned to the type of German statecraft. In local government, in the science of pedagogy, in Prince Ito's constitution itself, choice was finally made of German models, as being more in harmony with the oligarchic spirit and semi-divine monarchy of old Japan.

By 1885 a generation was growing up, which had attained the position not only of reading, but also of assimilating European literature. In that year Professor Tsubouchi issued his much-discussed *Principles of Fiction*, a manifesto as important in its way as Hugo's trumpet-call to young France in the preface to *Hernani*. The period of absorption had passed; it was time to create. Moreover, a counter-movement towards national ideas was setting in. The old-fashioned romance must be superseded by the novel, with the definite aim of portraying Japanese life in its essential truth. As models were recommended the works of Samba and Shunsui, realistic observers of Yedo society between 1810 and 1830, while the professor himself, to illustrate his principles, published *Shosei Katagi* ('Sketches of Student Life'), which speedily bore fruit. An association was

formed of Friends of the Ink Slab (Ken-yu-sha), and a magazine appeared, the *Garakuta Bunko*, in which, after the manner of Paris, a literary coterie shouted its war-cry and hoisted its flag.

The leader of this school, 'Koyo' Ozaki (1820-1904), seems to have aimed at aesthetic realism. His novels were chiefly concerned with womanhood, from *The Love-confessions of Two Nuns* (1899) to the unfinished *Golden Hag* (1905), which has been partially translated by the late Rev. Arthur Lloyd. Another member of the school, 'Bimyosai' Yamada, whose best-known stories are *Kocho* ('Butterfly') and *Wakashiraga* ('Grey-haired Youth'), was the first to dilute conventional 'fine writing' with colloquial idiom.

Three authors stand by themselves in niches of unique personality. 'Roban' Koda is an idealist of lofty imaginative power, whose books are leavened with Buddhist reflections and poetic passages. 'Futabei' Hasegawa (1863-1909) lived in Petrograd for many years as correspondent of the *Asabi*; he was the first to imbue Japanese fiction with Russian sadness and intensity. An exceptional position is held by Surgeon-General 'Ogai' Mori, Chief of the Medical Bureau of the Army, who brought home from four years' study in Germany a deep enthusiasm for German writers. He made translations of Heine, Goethe, and other German authors, while two original stories, *The Dream* and *The Dancing-Girl*, were inspired by memories of Germany. A tale which he wrote about the storming of Port Arthur had immense vogue. Both he and 'Roban' were appointed by the government to serve on the Board of Literary Censors established for the purpose of encouraging healthy fiction, and of bridging the gulf which existed for some time

between the harassed civil authorities and extremists of the Fleshly School.

Moral earnestness was the prevailing feature of the *Katei-Shosetsu* ('Family Novels') which appeared at the time of the war with China (1894). New names and new reputations sprang to light. 'Rokwa' Tokutomi took the first place with *Hototogisu* ('The Nightingale'), better known by the name of the heroine, Namiko, in its American version. The story ran through sixty-four editions, and owed some of its success to the report that it was partly a *roman à clef*.

Second in popularity may be named 'Shun-u' Nakamura, whose successful *Ichijiku* ('The Fig') raises the problem of Christianity in a non-Christian community. Gloomy pessimism and black despair are seldom absent from the family novels, which, none the less, enjoyed great vogue for a time. 'Ryuro' Hirotsu, a very prolific and realistic writer, passed from the aesthetic realism of such tales as *Zangiku* ('Chrysanthemums after Autumn') to the sordid misery of *The Double Suicide at Imado* and *The House of Kachiwa* (a Japanese *Maison Tellier*).

To Nietzsche is assigned the credit of dominating the Naturalist group of artists, who next won public favour. His philosophy had been heard of in 1897, but obtained no hold on the Intellectuals until 1900, when Professor Rinjiro Takayama devoted himself, with Mr. Tobar, to the promulgation of Nietzscheism. The result naturally took the form of confident individualism, of defiant self-assertion, which dismayed patriarchal officialdom. Prosecutions, fines, suppressions of journals followed. At the same time Russia began to gain in literary influence what she was soon to lose in political prestige. Tolstoy and Turgenieff and

Dostoieffsky had already conquered. Now came Gorky, Andrieff, Garshin, Tchekoff.

The leader of this school, 'Doppo' Kunikida (1872-1908), was a master of the short story. 'Katai' Tayama, the acknowledged leader of the group, won sensational notoriety with *Futon* ('The Counterpane'), the confessions of a middle-aged Don Juan, and with *Sei* ('Life'). He is editor of the *Bunsho-Sekai*.

Some of the rebellious Naturalists have been tamed by time and official pressure, others by a change of popular taste. Tired of stormy sensations, readers welcomed the Yoyu-ha School, which promised them tranquillity. Professor 'Soseki' Natsume, who spent some years in England, and was a lecturer on English literature at the Imperial University, Tokyo, before joining the staff of the *Tokyo Asahi*, is the inventor and chief practitioner of the 'tranquil' novel, first illustrated by the delightful *I am a Cat* (1905), which exhibited the traits and habits of a Tokyo household from the household pet's point of view, much as Riki was accustomed to sit in judgement on Anatole France's amiable M. Bergeret.

It may be remarked in passing, that the influence of Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904) does not seem to have played any part in shaping the form of Japanese literature, though his lectures on art and poetry broke down many barriers which prevent one hemisphere from sharing the sensibilities of the other, and the publication of his lectures on literature is a monument to his powers of analysis and to the devoted attention of the pupils who collected them.

It is plain from the type and trend of school after school that the Japanese of to-day is no more prudish than his forefathers. Realism, whether of Zola or Tolstoy, is con-

genial to the frank common sense of a nation that is yet second to none in fine delicacy. Nothing is held too common or unclean for fancy to gild with its refining art. That the novelists feel this affinity with continental writers need not hinder an English critic from laying aside his moral prejudice, which is probably more conventional than moral, and expressing admiration of art taken thus seriously.

Poetry has been as radically affected as prose by the study of Western models, but in an opposite way. Whereas the story-teller had to compress and concentrate for the purpose of presenting his matter within more artistic compass, the verse-maker strove to lengthen and elaborate a train of thought or feeling by means of linked stanzas. This, of course, is contrary to the traditions for many centuries of Japanese verse. As Lafcadio Hearn in more than one sensitive interpretation has pointed out, both the aristocratic *tanka* of thirty-one syllables and the agile *hokku* of seventeen have been polished into perfect instruments of nearly national use.

It is not for a foreigner to balance the merits of the new verse against the old. The movement dates from 1882. In that year a collection of nineteen poems, of which fifteen were translations and four original, was issued under the title of *Shintaishi Sho* ('New Style Poems'), by Professors Toyama, Inouye, and Yatabe. Tennyson's 'Charge of the Light Brigade', Bloomfield's 'Soldier's Return', Gray's 'Elegy', and Longfellow's 'Psalm of Life' were the best-known gems, while an original 'Ode to the Seasons', 'Verses to the Daibutsu of Kamakura', and a 'War-Song', displayed more good intention than good craftsmanship. The stanzas were in lines of five and seven syllables alternately, but in colloquial phrases without ornamentation.

The choice of military and religious themes excited remark. Some years later, Dr. 'Ogai' Mori bound together under the title of *Omokage* ('Fancy' or 'Children of Imagination') selected poems of Goethe, Heine, and Byron. He even attempted rhyme and lines of ten syllables, which were not thought effective. Native poetry of the new school may really be said to have begun in 1895, when the *Imperial Literature Magazine* was brought out by members of Tokyo University. In 1900 Tekkan started a monthly magazine called *Venus*, which lived for seven years, and formed a rallying-point for such writers as Ariake Kambare, whose literary god was Rossetti, and Kyukin, who professed allegiance to Keats. His wife, Akiko, wrote some beautiful poems, usually in the old metres, which won high praise.

Probably the boldest and finest innovator, whether in subject or style, is Mr. Tsuchii Bansui. By welding a five-syllabled and seven-syllabled line into one he forged a species of alexandrine, which had a familiar rhythm to the ears of his compatriots and lent itself to the structure of sustained narrative.

Ambitious rivals have since gone to greater lengths. Mr. Homei, for instance, wrote an epic in 360 lines on Hideyoshi, the great Taiko, and an unfinished *Lady of Naruto* (too closely akin to Scott's *Lady of the Lake*) in 3,000 lines, but by general admission Tsuchii Bansui holds the first place among poets of constructive imagination. It certainly needed a poet of much patience to complete such a faithful prose version as he published of Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*. On the other hand, by the use of Chinese words and expressions, by reviving the lost art of suggestion, and by the choice of serious subjects, a group of poets, whose 'organ' was the *Hototogisu* ('The Nightingale'),

aimed at restoring prestige to the once famous seventeen-syllabled hokku.

Such are glimpses of the forces at work on the transformation of Japanese poetry—on the one hand, hints caught and eagerly followed from whatever language the poet knew best after his own; on the other, attempts to preserve old forms, while striking off conventional fetters. It is too early to pronounce what results and reputations will survive from the swiftly changing fashions.

In theatrical matters Japan has imported from Europe, in more or less modified forms, in adaptations, plays ranging from Shakespeare to Ibsen, and although a patriarchal censorship entrusted to the police has banned Molière, after driving some German plays off the stage, a fair number of Western plays and of Japanese dramas in Western shape have been performed of late years by artists trained in the Western way. Japanese critics emulating Professor Tsubouchi, the first enthusiastic leader of the Europeanized stage movement, look upon their national stage as far behind that of the West, and yearn for more reform. But side by side with them the Naturalist school clings with all its might to the older forms, particularly to the No. This archaic form of drama, with its ancient language, its masks, its primitive orchestra, played on a tiny platform of twenty-five feet square, represents the heritage of ages. The No *répertoire* was once the delight of the courtiers and of the samurai class, though the latter now and then found pleasure in mixing with the *canaille* in Joruri halls and in listening to the interminable melodrama with which the European has become acquainted through endless colour-prints. It must not be supposed that the No and the older plays, Jidaimono, Sewamono, &c., are likely to die out under

pressure of modernism ; on the contrary, they are strongly supported. As we write we have before us two magazines, beautifully set up and illustrated, entirely devoted to the No, and a large recent book, expensively got up, as a record of No performances and of No masks. It must also be remembered that Japanese music in the old days was confined to the accompaniment of No Utaï, Joruri, and other poetical recitations. Not that music had been neglected in the administrative scheme, for there was a Bureau of Music in existence in 649; but musical skill, being retained merely as an adjunct to religious or semi-religious performances, soon became crystallized into a mechanical form. The koto was the only instrument played by ladies ; the biwa was the appanage of blind men ; the sho, a Chinese flute, with various flutes and drums, belonged to the No and Bugaku orchestras. Later the samisen became the geisha's instrument *par excellence*.

Orchestral music as understood in the West was unknown until the Meiji era, and its development was brought about by English and French teachers, soon to be superseded by German bandmasters, with but little result outside official bands. There is an Academy of Music in Tokyo, which had its origin in a Bureau for the Investigation of Music established in 1879, and the government has been at pains to keep alive the national tradition whilst giving tuition in European music to those who desire it.

Journalism in ancient days was unknown : here and there a diarist recorded the gossip of court and town, and the tales brought by travellers from the provinces ; later, during the Yedo Shogunate, an official gazette was introduced, but of newspapers none existed until just before the Meiji era. They began in a humble fashion in 1861, as can be read in



a paper by Mr. S. Sawada in the *Transactions of the Japan Society* (vol. xi), and did not assume any importance for some years; indeed one Japanese paper only, the *Koko Shimbun* of Fukuchi Genichiro, has survived the drastic treatment meted out to opposition writers by the administration and the censor, besides the English *Japan Mail*, founded in 1865. The first daily paper, the *Yokohama Mainichi Shimbun*, appeared in 1871, followed by the *Nichinichi*, the *Hochi*, and the literary *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Fukuzawa Yukichi, the founder of the Keiogijuku University, leader in politics as he was leader in education, in starting the *Fiji Shimpō* gave it the tone and dignity of a great European newspaper, but the *Fiji* was distinctly a Tokyo paper with a somewhat academic gait. To Osaka, the Manchester of Japan, belongs the honour of having given birth to the first newspaper published as a business proposition, the *Osaka Asabi Shimbun*, floated by Murayama Riuhei; this paper still holds the field. Its Tokyo edition, the *Tokyo Asabi*, likewise leads in the capital, and both are closely followed by the *Osaka Mainichi* and the *Fiji Shimpō*. Periodicals on economics, politics, science, literature, fine arts, drama, indeed almost every conceivable subject, abound in Japan. Their circulation is fairly large, and when one considers the stupendous labour entailed in the composition of a Japanese newspaper in the vernacular, one cannot but wonder at the amazing energy and strength of purpose which has made journalism a success in Japan.

Both the political and the religious evolution of a country have a manifest influence upon its art, and one may wonder whether Japan would have developed any form of the arts but for the introduction of Buddhism. The original Shinto religion and the Confucian philosophy appealed to the

reason but not to the senses ; the Taoist tales and superstitions might have brought a few subjects for painters and sculptors ; but Buddhism gave the major arts their first impetus. Frescoes in temples, shrines decorated with paintings, replaced without known transition the rough red daubs of the Chikugo tombs. Already in the sixth century, dried lacquer images, carvings in wood and metal, sculptures of heroic size vied with smaller religious figures, but some modern critics, wont to follow fashion, have been known to ascribe a Chinese origin to those majestic primitives which the Japanese rank amongst the earliest and most treasured manifestations of their arts. The rulers of that period and of the Nara era encouraged artists and craftsmen in many ways, and were we bent on recording in detail the names alone of the best-known relics, pages would be needed where lines only are available. Let it suffice here to say that from China came a constant flow of inspiration, first purely religious, then of a secular nature. The great painter, Kose no Kanaoka, is probably better known to most Western readers through his daring landscape of the Nachi waterfall than through the Buddhistic pictures in which he excelled. Landscape painting, as well as portrait painting, had come to stay in the ninth century. Buddhistic images, whether painted or carved, were perforce subjected to the narrow lines of a canon proper to each sect, and the evolution of religious art is entirely dependent upon the rigid observance of, or the divergence from, these rules. Secular painting and sculpture, on the contrary, might have assumed a freedom from fetters fertile in novelties in an imaginative nation but for two causes : the dependence upon Chinese inspiration which caused changes in fashion as well as in administration, and the respect for order and precedence which charac-

terizes the Japanese. Let us take, for instance, any book dealing with the arts, major or minor, pure or applied, and at almost every turn we find the Japanese critic, even in the nineteenth century, deprecating the innovations, the individual touches which pupils put in their work, or again seeing in pupils' work a lack of dignity or of strength due to the mere slavish copy of their masters. Such a criticism we hear constantly in reference to Western collections of Japanese paintings in particular: the Western buyers have secured specimens which pleased their fancy, or they have sought to grab for the price of a crust the works of old masters. In both cases the tale is almost always one of dismal failure; the arts of the Middle Ages were at first ignored, and then, when too late in the day, bargain-hunters gave Japan a sorry insight into human nature.

Sculpture, being chiefly religious in character, except when sparingly applied to architectural decoration, followed a downward grade in the course of centuries; whatever may be one's personal opinions of the gigantic Daibutsu of Nara, of Kamakura, or of the Ni O attributed to Unkei, they have the merit of having been in many respects inspired work, whereas in the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries Buddhist sculpture became a mere trade comparable with the manufacture 'in series' of plaster saints and alabaster 'sculpture' in Europe. In vain shall we seek for originality after the sixteenth century, if we except a few portraits, all but too scarce, and some of the smaller pieces of applied art, netsuke and the like, so extensively imitated since they became articles of export.

Painting has been with the Japanese the art chiefly recognized in literature; the ancient works on sculpture or lacquer, printed before 1868, can be counted on the fingers

of one hand, but those relating to painting are legion. They follow the same trend as in China, and in fact they give greater prominence, as a rule, to the so-called Chinese schools of paintings than to the purely Japanese ones.

The Chinese schools were those of the Kano family and of the Shubun-Sesshu group, figure painters and landscape artists respectively, originating in the fourteenth century; they had been preceded by the school of Kose no Kanaoka, of Takuma, and by the purely Japanese Tosa school, this latter especially well known, because of the numberless 'pages d'album' and illuminations which proceeded from its ateliers down to a late date. Other schools followed, purely decorative in the rich treatment of subjects, like that of Koyetsu-Korin, or the flowers and birds of Sotatsu and Jakuchu. The vogue of rich decorative paintings began in the Ashikaga period, and reached its zenith in the early and middle part of the seventeenth century. During the Tokugawa period we see a decline of the old schools, and a renewal of Chinese methods by the Bunjingwa painters, side by side with the purely Naturalistic school of Maruyama Okyo, the Shijo school, and the Ukiyoye painters, whose work has chiefly reached us in the shape of colour-prints. Book illustration in black and in colour was fully developed, and draughtsmen of amazing powers and enormous production came to the fore—men like Hokusai and Hiroshige, whom the West worshipped long before it knew Motonobu, Shubun, or even Ganku and Kiosai. Indeed the West was taken by surprise by the colour-prints, and ignored the real paintings until comparatively recent years; few are the collectors who in the eighties gathered kakemono in Japan. There was Fenollosa, then acting as a government official, who led the way unfettered by any

ethical scruples as to the propriety of the art adviser to the Japanese government making a personal collection; Chiosone, an Italian engraver, whose collection is in Genoa; Anderson, whose pictures remain in the British Museum, and some others. But how far were they successful? Japanese critics will whisper: hardly at all. They garnered a few good pieces, many copies of varying merit, and an untold amount of rubbish with false signatures added thereto. A somewhat similar process took place in Japanese collecting of European works. But European influence began in the eighteenth century, when Dutch engravings and paintings gave Shiba Kokan and others hints of a modelled treatment of figures and of perspective as understood in Europe; neither method found much favour except as a curiosity to be met in some prints and book illustrations. But after the Restoration, when students from Japan sat in European studios, a wave of Westernism swept the ateliers; hitherto water-colours had been the sole medium, if one excepts lacquer, but now oil-colours took the field; the nude, which had never made any great impression on the Japanese mind, fought for recognition. Worse still, various schools of impressionists took root in Japan.

But luckily most of the modern artists have had the good sense to avoid extremes. The yearly exhibitions held at Uyeno Park show now and then interesting work in which European methods have been used in treating Japanese subjects. There is no doubt that, given the temperament of the race, the arts will incorporate only that which is assimilable in European methods, and we may look forward to a renaissance of the 'Japanese feeling' in painting or in sculpture, expressed in novel ways or with new media. The way towards this has been paved by the Tokyo Art School with

teachers such as the late Kano Hogai, Hashimoto Gaho, and Okakura Kakuzo; Kano Natsuo, the prince of nineteenth-century metal-workers, was once a lecturer in that school, and other specialists have given to students the best that was in them. The publication by the Kokkwa Company and by the Shimbi Shoin of masterpieces of olden arts from Japan and from China has done much to enlighten Western students, and at the same time to familiarize the Japanese themselves with the art treasures of their country. Government publications issued in 1900 and 1910 have had the same result. Indeed the Japanese government has shown an enlightened regard for fine arts and archaeology; the official publications dealing with the forbidden city of Peking, with Corean antiquities, are works of permanent value of which any nation might be proud. They could not have been produced but for the photo-mechanical processes originated in the West, which have been improved upon and combined with purely Japanese methods for the production of masterpieces.

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