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MODERN POLITICAL  
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MODERN  
POLITICAL  
DOCTRINES

EDITED BY

ALFRED ZIMMERN

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## INTRODUCTION

WE live in an age when political ideas and doctrines have become the staple of general conversation. Discussions which, a generation ago, went on behind closed doors, in the class-room or the country house, are now conducted from the house-tops, with the aid of loud-speakers to convey them across the frontiers of states and the boundaries of continents.

If we are democrats, we cannot altogether regret this, however unpleasing and even repugnant some of its accompanying phenomena may be : for it is an inevitable part of the process through which the common citizen, at least in countries where he recognizes his responsibility for the conduct of public business, is being enabled to exercise an increasing control over foreign affairs—that it to say, over the handling of issues in which, in contrast to the mild skirmishes of our domestic politics, a clash of political ideas and doctrines is involved.

In its present phase, however, this discussion, even when it is carried on between sincere minds on either side, is apt to end in confusion rather than enlightenment: and this is, of course, still more the case when one or more of the parties engaged in it is not aiming at enlightenment, but simply at persuasion—in other words, when the debate sinks to the level of propaganda.

The catchwords bandied about in these debates on world affairs are like cut flowers severed from their roots. They arrest the attention at first sight, but they have in them no continuing life. They cannot be transplanted from one mind to another, for they are detached from the soil which nourished them and gave them their peculiar colour and attractiveness.

True international understanding will be achieved, not through the acceptance by a bemused and unthinking



“public opinion” of catchwords which convey different meanings to different peoples, but through a real meeting of minds. And this, in its turn, will only be achieved through a clarification of the issues which form the subject of debate. At any given moment these issues will be partly theoretical and partly practical. With practical issues these pages are not concerned. But it may be remarked in passing that it is not to negligence in this field that our present distresses are due. There has been an abundance of effort, both by individual scholars and by associated groups, such as those sponsored by the International Studies Conference, the Institute of Pacific Relations and similar national bodies in numerous countries, for the analysis of particular problems, and for the suggestion of solutions which would be workable if opinion were ripe for their treatment on such lines. What holds back such solutions is disagreement on deeper issues—in other words, a clash of ideas.

Facts, we are often told, are stubborn. But ideas are more stubborn still. In all ages ideas have been forces—most of all when the so-called practical men who were impregnated by them were unaware of their motive power. This is particularly true of our own age, one of the most striking peculiarities of which is the time-lag between ideas and conditions: for the acceleration in the rhythm of outward change has not been accompanied by an equal acceleration in the pace of men’s thinking.

It is the object of this volume to promote international understanding by providing some guidance in the study of these idea-forces (*idées-forces*, as the French call them)—that is, of the ideas and doctrines which are active and combative in the contemporary world and constitute so large a part of the driving power of present-day international politics.

\* \* \*

World affairs, and the ideas behind them, form a seamless robe: at any given moment our object should be to comprehend them as a whole. For purposes of analysis, however,

some general scheme of grouping is necessary. In these pages the material has been divided under four broad headings, which, though not strictly logical in their arrangement, nevertheless correspond to four fairly distinct contemporary preoccupations.

The first is the problem of Government, or, as it is sometimes called, of the nature of the State. How should the management of the public affairs of the community be carried on: with what object in view, in what spirit and by what methods?

The second is the Economic Problem, or, to use the Greek original for "economic", the Problem of Housekeeping. What is the nature of the economic process? Its object is no doubt clear, for it is revealed in its very name: it is to supply the community with goods and services. But in what spirit and by what methods should this process be carried on? And in what spirit and by what methods is it in fact to-day being carried on?

The third heading covers a less clearly defined range. It has been entitled "Nationality, Racialism and Nationalism". It deals with one great force in contemporary civilization, the sentiment of nationality, which has only become a power in the public life of the world since the end of the eighteenth century. But it deals also with the perversion and degradation of this sentiment, in the general form of what is called "Nationalism", and in a particular form, which has become potent in Europe during the last decade, the appeal to the sentiment of race.

The fourth and last heading is devoted to what has been entitled the Problem of International Order. It might be argued that, strictly speaking, the material relating to this problem should have been included in the first and second sections: for the problem of the better ordering of the world as a whole clearly involves both a problem of government and a problem of housekeeping. If a volume similar to this one should be issued in a generation's time, it is to be hoped that the editor will find it possible to adopt such an arrangement.

But, at the present stage of political thinking, it seemed better to deal with what is often called "the problem of the League of Nations" or "the problem of peace" in a section of its own, since, for those who are preoccupied with it, it still constitutes a distinct problem—a problem which is as yet non-existent for more than one of the schools of thought represented under the first and second headings. It would, of course, have been easy to devote the whole volume to material dealing with this topic in its various forms. As it is, the extracts have been selected and arranged, with an eye to the lesson afforded by the history of the last twenty years, in order to illustrate the different schools of thought that have confronted one another, at Geneva and elsewhere, in seeking a solution, or, at the least, a means of advance towards a solution of what has become the main preoccupation of these days—how to establish a basis of order as a necessary condition for the progress, and even perhaps the survival, of our inherited civilization.

\* \* \*

The volume contains forty-four separate extracts taken from thirty-eight different sources: for in six cases (the Papal Encyclicals, Cobden, John Stuart Mill, Lenin, Herr Hitler and Dr. Max Huber) the same authority is cited twice. These thirty-eight are distributed between Great Britain (12), France (7), Germany (7), Italy (2), Russia (2), the United States (2), China (1), Czechoslovakia (1), Japan (1), Switzerland (1), leaving two (the Vatican and the Oxford Conference of the Christian Churches) that stand above any one country.<sup>1</sup>

The preponderance of Great Britain is no doubt due in part to the fact that the book has been prepared for English-speaking readers. But the principal cause is certainly the continuing momentum of British ideas. In spite of the desire to make the selection as comprehensive as possible, it proved

<sup>1</sup> In the above classification Burke is assigned to Westminster rather than to Ireland, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain to Germany, his adopted as well as his spiritual home.

impossible to avoid giving Britain the first place in a volume designed to deal with ideas and doctrines that are current coin in the world of to-day. The historian of Western political thought would no doubt contest this pre-eminence—and rightly. He would point out that every one of the British writers cited stands on the shoulders of older men, most of whom are non-British. He would trace Burke back, behind Locke and Hooker and St. Thomas Aquinas to St. Augustine and the Stoics, Mill to eighteenth century France and beyond, Carlyle to John Knox and Hildebrand—and so forth. But to trace these connections is no part of the object of this volume, though if it should set some readers on this quest it will be all to the good. It was only by stretching the original plan that two eighteenth-century extracts were included.

The volume is also open to criticism on the ground that it sets side by side writers of three very different types—firstly, pure thinkers, men of the study; secondly, men who, though primarily thinkers, played a prominent part in public affairs; and, thirdly, men prominent in public affairs who, in spite of their pronounced opinions on questions of political theory, have no claim to be classed as thinkers at all. Here again, the arrangement is due to the design of the volume. There are indeed only four authorities cited who have no claim at all to be classed as original thinkers: Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini, M. Pobyedonostzeff and Baron Makino. Each of these selections is illuminating in its own way. Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini reveal to us how, in this age of catchwords and propaganda, men of action can appropriate and vulgarize, for their own purposes, ideas that have long been in the air. Herr Hitler's indebtedness to Herder and Fichte and Signor Mussolini's to Hegel and Mazzini—not to speak of Georges Sorel—are cases in point. M. Pobyedonostzeff, who held the office of Procurator of the Holy Synod in the reign of Tsar Alexander III, of whom he was the trusted adviser, has been thought worth recalling because, as a thoughtful and observant ultra-Conservative, he put his finger on certain defects in the

working of Parliamentarism and of democracy in general, which have become more noticeable since his day, thus anticipating criticisms with which we have recently become only too familiar. As for Baron Makino, it fell to him, as a diplomat and the representative of his country and race, to make a statement at what proved to be one of the turning-points in the relationship between the Western world and the Far East.

Less explanation is required for the insertion of a number of extracts emanating from men who, though they may not eventually take high rank in the history of political thought, are important in the world of to-day as leading spokesmen of the ideas that they champion. One of these, the revered Masaryk, was Founder and President of his country, ranking with George Washington in the field of action and with Marcus Aurelius as a philosopher in the seat of power. Some pages at least of his reflections will surely live in literature beside those of his prototype. Another, Lenin, though primarily a man of action for whom ideas were swords—and what a superb swordsman he was!—cannot be denied a place, and a large place, in the history of Socialist thought. Mazzini belongs to the same class, though his period of active statesmanship, in the Roman Republic of 1849, was more short-lived. No doubt he cannot be compared with Lenin as an exact thinker: yet this volume would be sadly incomplete without some at least of his burning periods. The same may be said of the great prophet of Nationality in twentieth-century China. We may regret that Sun Yat-Sen gives us too much of the West (not always well assimilated), and too little of China—that China, which has so much to contribute to the common life and thought of the world: but, if so, the reproach falls on our own heads. No words are needed to justify the insertion of extracts from a President and a Secretary of State and Senator of the United States, of a French Premier and President of the Senate, of a President of the Permanent Court of International Justice, of a British Lord Justice, and of a British Foreign Secretary and Viceroy of India.

As we cross the frontier between the world of action and the world of pure thought, let us remember that Cobden, though a high authority<sup>1</sup> has classed him among "six Radical thinkers" of the nineteenth century, always avowed himself a "practical man", and that John Stuart Mill himself sat for three years in the House of Commons as member for Westminster. Nor should we forget the constant influence that Lord Acton exercised on public affairs, as revealed in his correspondence with Gladstone.

\*     \*     \*

Part I, dealing with Government, confronts two schools of thought—that of Liberal Democracy and that of the Authoritarianism which has found its most extreme expression in the so-called Totalitarian states of to-day.

We begin with Burke, because he is a liberal without being a democrat. He represents the period when "British Freedom" was, for the immense majority of those who possessed this "commodity of price", civil rather than political—that is to say, passive rather than active, an enjoyment of rights rather than an acceptance of responsibilities. It was upon the assured basis of civil liberty—freedom of the person from arbitrary arrest and spoliation, freedom of speech and writing, of association and public worship—that the nineteenth-century structure of political freedom and responsible democracy was reared. The arguments of Mill and Dr. Lindsay, with their emphasis on the value of an educated citizen body, trained in the handling and discussion of public affairs, like that of Dr. Huber in his account of the special characteristics of democracy in Switzerland, take civil liberty for granted. It was indeed a commonplace in the Western world until recently that democracy was a system of government for a liberal state, or, to use an expression of Montesquieu's, for "a society where there are laws".<sup>2</sup> The cardinal

<sup>1</sup> The late Professor John MacCunn, in his *Six Radical Thinkers* (1910): the others are Bentham, J. S. Mill, Carlyle, Mazzini and T. H. Green.

<sup>2</sup> *L'Esprit des Lois*, xi, 3.

distinction which runs through that writer's pages between a true state, or Realm of Law, and a lawless despotism goes back to the origins of our political thought and practice in ancient Greece. For the Greeks, as one of them put it to the despot of Persia, knew only one despot whose command was unquestioned—the Law.<sup>1</sup> For generations in the West, in Germany as elsewhere, the conception of sovereignty has been inseparable from the conception of law. The Germans indeed had put into currency a word which fuses the two conceptions—*Rechtsstaat*, a state based on law. As an American scholar has recently written, in an article which only limitations of space excluded from reproduction in these pages, "The one great issue that overshadows all others in the distracted world of to-day is the issue between constitutionalism and arbitrary government. . . . Deeper than the problem whether we shall have a capitalistic system or some other enshrined in our law lies the question whether we shall be ruled by law at all, or only by arbitrary will".<sup>2</sup>

Nineteenth century democrats, safe in the enjoyment of eighteenth century civil rights, never dreamt that the machinery of democracy could be seized upon as a convenient device by a tyrant who had destroyed the constitutional foundations of the state and perverted the normal processes of law. Thus when a party among the Russian liberals styled themselves "Constitutional Democrats" we in the West were inclined to consider the adjective superfluous. We should have remembered—as we have since been forcibly reminded—that in the theory of democracy which has come down to us on the European Continent from Roman times there has always been an absolutist strain. It peeps out, as an Italian scholar has lately recalled, in Marsilio.<sup>3</sup> It comes up to the surface in Rousseau. And it is revealed in action in the proceedings of the Committee of Public Safety and in the

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, vii, 104.

<sup>2</sup> Professor C. H. McIlwain of Harvard, in *Foreign Affairs* (New York), xiv, 2 (January, 1936).

<sup>3</sup> Professor A. P. D'Entreves, *The Mediæval Contribution to Political Thought* (Oxford, 1939), p. 85.

practice of that forerunner of the pseudo-democratic autocrats of to-day, Napoleon.

The distinction between constitutional freedom and despotism, between a genuine government and "a great band of brigands", as St. Augustine would say,<sup>1</sup> cannot be stressed too strongly at a time when we are face to face with systems whose rulers plume themselves on being democratic and make play with the apparatus of elected assemblies and popular votes, shorn of the essential guarantees of personal liberty without which Parliaments and ballot-boxes and all other manifestations of "public opinion" are meaningless.

For the Authoritarian strain we go back to Hegel. We might, as has already been said, have gone further back—to Rousseau,<sup>2</sup> who, great man of letters as he was, had such a vogue in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Germany, and indeed far beyond it.

The short passage cited from Hegel is one of the vital texts in European political thought. A commentary on these few lines would require a volume in itself. Every word in them is pregnant. "Will", "Mind", "Substantial", "Self-consciousness", "Freedom", trail with them a cloud of memories from the philosophical speculation of the past, from Plato and Aristotle onwards. For the purpose of these pages three notions may be singled out: (1) the identification of the State with "Mind *per se*"—that is, the essentially rational character of the State; (2) the conception of freedom as service to the State; (3) the conception of history as the unfolding of the reality of the Spirit. To this we may add a negative point—the repudiation of International Law, in its traditional and accepted sense, implicit in the characterization of the relationship of the state with other states as bringing into play the state's own system of "external law".

<sup>1</sup> "When Justice has been set aside, what are kingdoms but great bands of brigands?": *De Civitate Dei*, iv, 4. See Professor Ernest Barker's Introduction to the *Temple Classics* edition, p. xxviii.

<sup>2</sup> Rousseau must not be held responsible for his German disciples, who were themselves by no means all of one camp. His influence on the development of Continental liberalism will be encountered in Section IV.



This sibylline passage has, for over a century, been an armoury of weapons for authoritarian movements of many different types in many different countries, movements both of the Right and of the Left, and, in Great Britain (especially in Scotland), even for a special brand of democracy. Students who wish to watch these streams pouring down from the dark cavern in the mountain mists and spreading their tumultuous waters over the plains where common citizens have their homes must go far afield in their studies. Suffice it to say here that the passage cited occurs, not in a work on Political Theory, but in a work on Law, entitled *The Fundamental Lines of the Philosophy of Right* (*Grundlinien zur Philosophie des Rechts*). Of this book the section devoted to "the State", the opening words of which form the extract in the present volume, forms Section 3 of Part III, the headings of the three parts being, respectively, "Abstract Law", "Virtue" (*Moralität*) (which, in Hegel's sense, means Doing right with the help of Reason and Will), and "Goodness" (*Sittlichkeit*, Doing right from an acquired disposition). This arrangement in itself may help the reader to understand what Marx meant when, in his preface to *Das Kapital*, speaking from the standpoint of the materialist conception of history, he said that Hegel's dialectic was "standing on its head", and that as a "pupil of that mighty thinker" he had tried to turn it "right side up again" in order to discover "the rational kernel within the mystical shell".

Carlyle has fallen out of favour in these days—at least in his own island. Nevertheless he is an interesting link in the authoritarian chain. Had he been a German writer he might be hailed to-day as the originator, in the modern age, of the "principle of leadership".

Nietzsche, like Hegel, properly belongs rather to the general history of philosophy than to the history of political thought. But his influence on contemporary political thinking—if thinking it can be called—is considerable and the relevance, for the purpose of this volume, of his conception of the Superman, and of the pseudo-messianic manner in which he chose to present his ideas, will not be disputed.

Georges Sorel owed much to Bergson, who must not, however, be held responsible for his disciples. Nor is Sorel, the revolutionary left-winger, responsible for the use which Signor Mussolini and others have made of his rejection of constitutional methods and his deliberate appeal to violence. He remains one of the key-figures in the recent history of European political thought. Space did not permit the inclusion of a longer extract which would have introduced the reader to his doctrine of "myths" and to his materialist explanation of the rise of Christianity, with its influence upon his thinking about contemporary society.<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \*

The second section, dealing with the Economic Problem, confronts not two but three schools of thought—individualists of the Manchester School, Socialists, and those who have approached the problem from the standpoint of Christianity.

We begin with Bastiat (1801–1850), whom Marx described as "the most superficial and therefore the most successful representative of the defenders of the conventional political economy". If to be lucid is, as is held in some quarters, to be superficial, Bastiat may well plead guilty to the charge.

Cobden requires no introduction to English-speaking readers. The two passages that have been selected reveal the philosophy—not to say psychology—and the view of history that lay behind his political and other public activities.

The *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels has been reprinted in full. It is a cardinal text: there is history in every paragraph, if not in every line. The only doubt that crossed the editor's mind was whether it should be inserted in the First Section or in the Second. For it contains a doctrine of government—and indeed of society—as well as a doctrine on the economic problem. That is the real reason why the intellectual debate between individualists and Marxists, which has now gone on for close on a hundred years, has been so unsatisfactory.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Chapter VI of *Reflexions sur la Violence* (1908), with the argument of *La Ruine du Monde antique* (1901).

The two sides are not arguing on the same subject: therefore their minds cannot meet. Marxism is not an economic doctrine, in spite of the effort Marx devoted to the analysis of the economic process. It is an *economico-political* doctrine. It is even more: it is a doctrine of society, involving consequences both in the political and in the economic domain. That is only another way of saying that it is a revolutionary doctrine, the contemplated revolution being, not simply the forcible change of an economic system or the overthrow of a political regime, but the transformation, through violence, of an entire social system. Thus the gulf between Marxism and any form of socialism which accepts to work for social change within the existing constitutional framework is far wider than that which separates constitutional socialists from individualists of any political colour: the extent to which compromise—not to say harmony—between the two principles can be carried in a constitutional country like our own is illustrated by the proposals of the *Liberal Industrial Inquiry*. From this point of view the acceptance by the government of the United Socialist Soviet Republics of the principles and obligations of the League of Nations Covenant, which aims at providing a constitutional framework for the world, in so far as it was not merely dictated by opportunism, would seem to involve a radical departure from Marxist doctrine.

Side by side with the *Communist Manifesto* has been set Hubert Bland's concluding essay in the historic volume of *Fabian Essays*, not because it is the ablest, but because it is the most comprehensive in that book. In its easy, seemingly good-natured, but yet convinced and earnest way—so different from that of the foregoing piece—it throws a vivid light on the intellectual background of British politics just before the formation of what later developed into the Labour Party.

The extract from Lenin speaks for itself. It is, however, interesting to note that his argument is supported, not by reference to the text of the Master, but by extensive quotations from a book by an English non-Marxian Liberal—Mr. J. A.

Hobson. His book *Imperialism*, published in 1902, just after the close of the South African war, is well worth consulting by students, both on account of the argument which so much appealed to Lenin, and of its conclusions, so different from those of his Russian admirer.

The Papal Encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI, and the Report of the Oxford Conference of the Christian Churches (at which the Roman Catholic Church was not, however, represented), together indicate a tendency, long overdue, to enlarge the range of Christian morality and, in particular, to bring what has for too long been regarded as an independent system functioning according to its own unquestionable rules and standards before the bar of the Christian conscience. That this process has as yet been carried only a very little way and that, even in what has been done, there is evidence of a time-lag between the economic system as described, and the actual conditions of the present day, as they are known in the factory and the market-place, does not detract from the merit of the attempt, which is surely destined to be carried further.

\* \* \*

In the third Section we trace the course of the doctrine of the Nation-State which, as Lord Acton predicted, has brought so much unhappiness and conflict upon Europe.

It begins, innocently enough, with Herder (1744-1803), friend of Goethe, admirer of Lessing, writer on Ossian and on Hebrew poetry, student of old French romances and Spanish legends—in short one of the leading figures in the literary life of late eighteenth-century Germany. His *Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, from which our extract is taken, was an attempt to draw together these scattered labours, and the reflections derived from them, into a synthesis. German writers, faced with the post-war map of East Central Europe, with its galaxy of newly-formed nation-states, sometimes console themselves with the reflection that it was Germany herself, in the person of Herder, who gave the original impulsion to this outburst of national consciousness.

For to his ardent spirit, steeped in the literature of primitive peoples, the clans, or enlarged families, of that area had before them possibilities of social and political development on far happier lines than those of the highly organized states and empires of the West. In tones of romantic enthusiasm, which read strangely in the light of more recent happenings, he bade them look forward to the day when "awakened out of your long sluggard sleep, freed from your fetters of slavery, you are able to enjoy as your own your fair lands from the Adriatic to the Carpathians, from the Don to the Mulde, and to celebrate therein your ancient festivals of quiet industry and commerce".<sup>1</sup>

With Fichte we find ourselves in the atmosphere of the Napoleonic age. His *Addresses to the German Nation* were delivered at a time of extreme national depression. But this does not suffice to account either for his uncompromising dogmatism or for the curious arrogance of his tone. Nevertheless, in spite of all that grates upon the reader, Fichte holds a key-position, midway between Kant and Hegel, in the development of German philosophy, with which German political thought is so closely—too closely—connected.

Mazzini's address to the *Young Men of Italy* carries us forward another half century, to the high tide of the Nation-State movement in Central Europe. It is as thoroughly Italian as Fichte is thoroughly German. The reader of the original, of which any translation can be but a pale reflection, can see the Italian landscape—the Alps, the Plain, the Mediterranean, the Apennines—before his mind's eye, steeped in the rays of the Italian sun. But at the same time it contains the expression of the Nation-State theory in its purest form—the purest form, that is, which this confused and contradictory doctrine is capable of assuming.

<sup>1</sup> *Ideen*, xvi, 4, cited in Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (1934, p. 95), where the contrast between the actual conditions in Western and Eastern Europe is well brought out. See also the collection of essays by French, German, Norwegian, Polish and other writers entitled *La Nationalité et l'Histoire* (Paris, 1929), published under the auspices of the International Committee of Historical Studies.

Its confused and contradictory character is revealed by a masterhand in Acton's essay. Limits of space unhappily made it impossible to reproduce this in full.<sup>1</sup> It is not easy reading, for every sentence is packed with meaning, and often with concentrated learning also. But it contains one of the most strikingly successful predictions in the history of political writing—a prediction overlooked or flouted by Acton's fellow-liberals of his own generation, to be remembered ruefully by their grandchildren. That his insight into the future of the socialist movement was not equally keen only shows that, in medicine as in politics, an accurate diagnosis can only be the result both of careful study and close observation.

Renan's famous essay has been given in its entirety: for its skilful and elegant construction made curtailment impossible. Just because it is seemingly so clear, it calls for the most attentive scrutiny; for the difficulties on which Acton lays stress are all there, hidden beneath the fine gloss of the surface.

Mill's chapter on the subject in his *Representative Government* has been included in order to exhibit the orthodox view of British (as of French) nineteenth-century Liberals. His references to the Bretons and the Basques recall the attitude of Lord Durham in his Report towards the French Canadians.

Dr. Huber's analysis of the component elements of Swiss patriotism has been added as a pendant to Acton's essay. It exhibits a harmonious multi-national state in action.

With the next extract we pass to the atmosphere of the war years. For Lenin, as a recent writer<sup>2</sup> has well put it, "the European war had but one purpose—the destruction of the capitalist system and the substitution of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'." For this process of disintegration the Nation-State doctrine, as applied to Central and Eastern

<sup>1</sup> It is printed in *A History of Freedom and Other Essays*, a posthumous volume edited by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Lawrence.

<sup>2</sup> Wheeler-Bennett: *Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace*, 1938, p. 16, where a vivid account is given of Lenin's attitude at this period.

Europe, provided an almost ideal entering wedge. "Self-determination," that most delusive and dangerous of watch-words, owes its vogue to Lenin—little as most of those who have since repeated it have been aware of the fact.

The next extract carries us to the Congress of the United States. It is included as the most coherent statement of the Nation-State doctrine, or the "principle of self-determination", as Woodrow Wilson conceived it, in its application to the European situation at that time.

That this principle, the application of which had, throughout the nineteenth century, been tacitly confined to Europe, could be applied in Asia also finds its clearest demonstration in the teaching of Sun Yat-Sen. Space did not permit the inclusion of an Indian contribution to the same theme.

The four last extracts in this section are of the nature of an appendix: they have been inserted because race has of recent years—and not in Europe alone—become a subject of political discussion.

Gobineau is the spiritual father of present-day doctrines about the superiority and inferiority of certain races. The reader can trace for himself the process of degeneration through which his thought passed under the hands, first of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an author greatly admired by the Emperor William II, and then of Adolf Hitler.

The insertion of a statement of the view now held on the subject by scientists of unquestioned authority requires no explanation.

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Part IV, as distinct from its predecessors, contains no material previous to 1918. This is not because the problem of international order was non-existent before that date. The facts which constitute it were there in abundance: but circumstances conspired to prevent statesmen, and even thinkers, from realizing the nature and the urgency of the problem that they involved.

That problem may be defined in a sentence. It is the

problem of how to establish some form of *political* control in order to maintain and promote the process of world-economic interdependence to which the modern world owes so much of its material well-being. During the first century and more after the great inventions which brought about this interdependence, such a control was exercised, in fact if not in name, through the predominance of British sea-power. This predominance began to dwindle towards the turn of the century through the emergence of two new Great Powers in the overseas world and through the challenge involved in the naval ambitions of Germany. The victory of 1918 put an end to that challenge—at least for a time. But it neither restored the old British predominance nor provided the economic system of the world with a substitute for it. Thus the post-war generation found itself facing a political vacuum.

It is with the various possible means suggested for filling this vacuum that Part IV is concerned.

The theories on this subject form a confused and formless mass, as is inevitable when a large and complex problem is, as it were, thrown open for the first time for general discussion—a discussion carried on, in this case, throughout the civilized world. They can, however, be roughly divided into four groups, classified according to the angle from which the problem is approached. There are sociological theories, legal theories, political theories, and, finally, what may be called practical theories—theories, that is, evolved by those whose main concern was to find the best way of adjusting the League of Nations idea to the existing political organization of the world.

That the approaches to the problem of international order should be capable of classification along the lines of recognized academic disciplines—sociology, law, political science—is itself revealing. It goes far to explain why it was that, as has already been said, the problem was concealed during the nineteenth century not only from the statesmen but from the thinkers. Why was it that the Universities, the Academies, and other centres of thought were not preoccupied at that



time with what seems to us in retrospect a problem that should have forced itself upon the mind of everyone who reflected upon the course of civilization? The answer is to be found in one word—specialization. It is a curious coincidence—if indeed it is not susceptible of explanation on some deeper plane—that the century which linked together the peoples of the world in a network of material interdependence should have been the very time when, under the influence of scientific method, the whole group of studies concerned with the life of man in society turned away from the broad general interests so much in vogue in the eighteenth century, and attention became concentrated on extending the bounds of knowledge in a number of isolated fields. The result is that twentieth-century mankind is much better informed than its great-grandparents: its encyclopædias are much bulkier, its bibliographies much more complete, its libraries much better stocked. But the reverse side of these advantages is the chaos that has resulted from the absence of any intellectual preparation for the solution of the practical problem with which the world was suddenly confronted in 1918. The statesmen found themselves compelled to venture forth into unknown seas, since those who should long since have been charting their course and marking the reefs and the shoals themselves only entered upon their labours as the voyage was just beginning. Thus the succeeding twenty years could not fail to be a period of improvisation. The unhappy statesmen, faced with one unforeseen difficulty after another, were all the more ill at ease because of the expectations that had been awakened in the breasts of vast numbers of men and women throughout the world. Meanwhile students of the human sciences, for their part, forced by bitter experience to realize the inadequacy of schemes conceived according to the methods and based upon the data of one amongst a group of associated studies, have begun to stretch out towards a new synthesis. But a task of this magnitude, indispensable though it is, will not be accomplished in a day or a year.

The extracts selected do not conform rigidly to the

classification suggested above, since it has not been thought worth while to reproduce doctrinaire pronouncements which have already been rendered out of date by the course of events. It seemed better to direct the attention of readers to forward-looking minds whose views overleap the boundaries of academic disciplines. Nevertheless, speaking broadly, it may be said that Lord Parker and Mr. Root represent the sociological approach, M. Bourgeois, Professor Scelle and Professor Renard the legal approach, Dr. Huber the political approach, and the *British Official Commentary on the Covenant* the practical approach. The address by Lord Halifax with which the volume concludes relates the problem of international order and, in particular, the problem of the citizen's duty in regard to war, to the larger question of the nature and purpose of human life.

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The speech by Lord Parker, at that time a Lord Justice of Appeal, was delivered in the House of Lords a few months before his death in July, 1918. The debate in the course of which he spoke was concerned with the discussion of a motion, brought forward by a fellow-lawyer, Lord Parmoor, approving "the principle of a Tribunal, whose orders shall be enforced by an adequate sanction". Lord Parker rejected this scheme as premature, even in principle, arguing that, at the present stage of the political development of the world, International Law, so-called, was an illusory safeguard against violent action on the part of states.

The reason for this he saw in the fact that the community sense among the individual citizens of the so-called Family of States was at present too weak and undeveloped to form the basis of anything that could be dignified into the name of law. "Where there is a society, there there is law" (*ubi societas ibi ius*) says an old Latin adage, which has lately been much honoured in the breach. The converse is less open to contradiction. Where there is no society there is no law—whatever devices the men of the robe may adopt to conceal this unpalatable truth. Lord Parker himself was a man of

the robe: but perhaps the fact that he had spent his life in close touch with a body of law which had been intertwined for a thousand years with a system of society enabled him to approach the problem of world order with a clearer vision than is vouchsafed to many life-long students and experienced practitioners of International Law. It was evident to him, as it has become evident to many more in the intervening years, that the world as a whole, if it is not living in a state of complete anarchy, is certainly not living—and has never lived, even in the best days of the Free Trade era—under the Rule of Law. At best, as Lord Parker saw it, the condition of the civilized world could be described as a condition preceding and pointing forward towards the Rule of Law, a state of things comparable to the “hue and cry” stage in the history of individual countries and regions—of the American Far West, for example.

The most that could be hoped for at this stage, therefore, was to ensure the establishment, not of Law but of Order. He found grounds for this hope in the social sense of the common citizen in the more advanced states of the world: and it was upon this social sense that he based his outline sketch of a League of Nations. It was to be a League of states, the citizens of which recognized their responsibility for checking violence in the streets of the world in the same way as householders in a single street or city take action to deal with a public nuisance.

On the other side of the Atlantic Mr. Elihu Root had been grappling with the same problem. Mr. Root, who had been Secretary for War and then Secretary of State (the equivalent of Foreign Secretary) in the government of the United States, was at that time a Senator and acknowledged as the best political mind in the Republican Party. In April, 1918, Colonel House consulted him, on behalf of President Wilson, on the framing of a plan for a League of Nations. The extract printed in the text forms the essential part of a letter which Mr. Root later addressed to Colonel House, embodying his considered views. Though expressed in a very different form,

they correspond in a remarkable manner with those of Lord Parker, both in their theoretical approach to the subject and in their suggestions for immediate action. Mr. Root, however, presses his point home by an additional argument. He draws in President Wilson's conception of the Monroe Doctrine—a consideration which has been reinforced in the intervening years by the development of the "Good Neighbour" doctrine. A League of Good Neighbours is already far in the way to becoming a community. All that is needed is that each of the neighbours should exercise an active, and not merely a passive, virtue. Mr. Root's conception of the virtue of neighbourliness is revealed in the contrast that he draws between civil responsibility and criminal responsibility. If a state is assaulted and battered—still more if it is wiped off the map—"every neighbour" (to quote Mr. Root's words) "has an interest" in the punishment of the aggressor state "because" its "own safety requires that violence shall be restrained". "At the basis of every community," he continues, "lies the idea of organization to preserve peace." Here the decisive word has been pronounced. Mr. Root assumes the existence of an international *community*—that is, of at least a sufficient modicum of social sense amongst a sufficient number of the inhabitants of the world—not indeed a majority but an active and public-spirited minority. The first task of such a minority is to check banditry and ensure public order. The ground will then have been prepared for tasks of construction—for the drawing up of a constitution, in other words, a framework of law, for government, which includes a system of legislation (the making of new laws within the limits of the constitution) or what is sometimes called "peaceful change", and for the establishment and development of political institutions.

With the *Official British Commentary on the Covenant* we are in another world, the world of European diplomacy. Like Lord Parker and Mr. Root, Downing Street was under no illusions as to the existence of a world-community or as to the authority exercised over men's minds by International Law.

But its main concern was, not to lay down a basis for the development of the Rule of Law in the future, but to maintain, or rather to restore, the continuity of the political life of the European Continent. It saw the European system of the nineteenth century broken into pieces by the war, and it considered that the first task devolving upon the League of Nations was to rebuild it. The main agency to which it looked, in this task of reconstruction, was the Council, "the central organ of the League, and a political instrument endowed with greater authority than any the world has hitherto seen". It is clear from the context that the authors of the Commentary did not believe that this "authority" became automatically attached to the Council through the coming into force of an international Treaty. Authority is a blend of power and moral influence. Power the Council would inherit at once as the organ of a revived Concert of the Great Powers. Moral influence, it was hoped, it would acquire in the course of years, as "peaceful co-operation" became "easy and hence customary" and as custom exercised its influence to "mould opinion".

Dr. Huber's analysis of the Covenant has been inserted because, within the narrow limits of a few pages, it is the most comprehensive account of the implications of that document, doing justice, as it does, to its various and disparate elements. Dr. Huber was in a unique position to make such a conspectus. He was (and is) a lawyer who, almost alone amongst his contemporaries, had, already well before 1914, crossed over into the territory of the sociologists: his work on *The Sociological Foundations of International Law*, reprinted in 1928, when the learned world was beginning to catch up with it, appeared first in 1910. Moreover, as a Swiss, he is closer than most of his fellow-Continentalers to the thought of the English-speaking world.

M. Bourgeois, who was first Delegate of France at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, represents the school of thought which

looks forward to the establishment of what is sometimes called "an international juridical order". This order, be it noted, is to be confined to the juridical side of public affairs. It is not to extend to matters political. "We have no wish," M. Bourgeois is careful to state, "to impose upon the nations any sort of super-state that might infringe their sovereignty, or restrict their individual liberty."

The attempt to make a clean cut between the legal and the political order, and to confine the word "justice" to the former, raises difficulties not unlike those springing from the similar attempt to make a clean cut between things political and things economic.

Professor Scelle has been cited as one of the most eminent and certainly the most lucid representative of the school which maintains the doctrine of the "primacy of International Law",<sup>1</sup> or, as Professor Scelle prefers to call it—for greater clearness—"the Law of the Peoples". It would, however, be doing him an injustice to suggest that he is to be classed indiscriminately with abstract theorists of the type of Professor Kelsen. Scelle is a sociologist as well as a lawyer and, as the extract shows, he bases his theory of World Law (for such it is) on what he calls "the social fact". The "social fact" of to-day, in his view, is the social interdependence of mankind (*le milieu intersocial*). He considers that this social bond is being formed inevitably, by a kind of natural or biological process, through the conditions of modern life and that, this being so, Law, which is a social product, must, with equal inevitability, accompany it. This leads him on, in the second volume of his treatise, to what has proved to be an over-hopeful analysis of existing "international constitutional Law".

Professor Renard, equally forward-looking in his view of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, approaches the problem

<sup>1</sup> The best summary account of the teachings of the leading members of this school is to be found in Walter Schiffer, *Die Lehre vom Primat des Völkerbundes*, 1937; the writers dealt with in successive essays are Triepel, Krabbe, Duguit, Scelle, Kelsen and Verdross.

as a Catholic, from a standpoint diametrically opposed to that of Professor Scelle. He sees the world, as the prophetic eye of Vittoria saw it at the beginning of the sixteenth century, as a single Commonwealth, one "vast moral organism", and he revivifies the old medieval and indeed Stoic conception of Natural Law (a "nature" very different from Professor Scelle's) for its ordering. For him, as a neo-Thomist, the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact are emanations—however unconscious of this some of their authors may have been—of the "Christian conception of the law of nations founded on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas". Readers interested in tracing this stream back through the centuries to its origins will find abundant material in the text and bibliographies of the volume from which this extract has been taken (Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*, 1935).

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PART I  
GOVERNMENT

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BRITISH FREEDOM

My hold of the Colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties, which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the Colonists always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your Government; they will cling and grapple to you; and no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it be once understood that your Government may be one thing and their privileges another; that these two things may exist without any mutual relation; the cement is gone; the cohesion is loosened; and everything hastens to decay and dissolution. As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces towards you. The more they multiply, the more friends you will have; the more ardently they love liberty, the more perfect will be their obedience. Slavery they can have anywhere. It is a weed that grows in every soil. They may have it from Spain, they may have it from Prussia. But, until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural dignity, freedom they can have from none but you. This is the commodity of price, of which you have the monopoly. This is the true Act of Navigation, which binds to you the commerce of the Colonies, and through them secures to you the wealth of the world. Deny them this participation of freedom, and

you break that sole bond, which originally made, and must still preserve, the unity of the Empire. Do not entertain so weak an imagination, as that your registers and your bonds, your affidavits and your sufferances, your cockets and your clearances, are what form the great securities of your commerce. Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses, are the things that hold together the great contexture of the mysterious whole. These things do not make your Government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the spirit of the English Constitution, which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the Empire, even down to the minutest member.

E. BURKE.

*On Conciliation with the Colonies* (1775)

## THE IDEA OF THE STATE

THE State is embodied Morality. It is the ethical spirit which has clarified itself and has taken substantial shape as Will, a Will which is manifest before the world, which is self-conscious and knows its purposes and carries through that which it knows to the extent of its knowledge. Custom and Morality are the outward and visible form of the inner essence of the State ; the self-consciousness of the individual citizen, his knowledge and activity, are the outward and visible form of the indirect existence of the State. The self-consciousness of the individual finds the substance of its freedom in the attitude (*Gesinning*) of the citizen, which is the essence, purpose and achievement of its self-consciousness.

The State is Mind (*Vernunft*) *per se*. This is due to the fact that it is the embodiment of the substantial Will, which is nothing else than the individual self-consciousness conceived in its abstract form and raised to the universal plane. This substantial and massive unity is an absolute and fixed end in itself. In it freedom attains to the maximum of its rights : but at the same time the State, being an end in itself, is provided with the maximum of rights over against the individual citizens, whose highest duty it is to be members of the State.

The Idea of the State can be considered under three heads :

1. It is an immediate reality, exemplified in the individual State as a self-contained organism, with a Constitution and a system of domestic law.

2. It can be considered in connexion with the relationship of the individual State to other States, that is to say, with the State's system of external law. This is a transitional phase.

3. It can be considered as the idea of a Universal State—that is to say as a new political species and as an embodiment of absolute Power over against individual States, as the Spirit which is taking on the shape of reality in the course of the process of World-history.

G. W. F. HEGEL.

*The Philosophy of Law (Rechtsphilosophie) (1821)*

## DEMOCRACY AND VOLUNTARY CO-OPERATION

THE business of life is an essential part of the practical education of a people ; without which, book and school instruction, though most necessary and salutary, does not suffice to qualify them for conduct and for the adaptation of means to ends. Instruction is only one of the desiderata of mental improvement; another, almost as indispensable, is a vigorous exercise of the active energies—labour, contrivance judgment, self-control: and the natural stimulus to these is the difficulties of life. This doctrine is not to be confounded with the complacent optimism which represents the evils of life as desirable things, because they call forth qualities adapted to combat with evils. It is only because the difficulties exist that the qualities which combat with them are of any value. As practical beings it is our business to free human life from as many as possible of its difficulties, and not to keep up a stock of them as hunters preserve game, for the exercise of pursuing it. But since the need of active talent and practical judgment in the affairs of life can only be diminished, and not, even on the most favourable supposition, done away with, it is important that those endowments should be cultivated not merely in a select few, but in all, and that the cultivation should be more varied and complete than most persons are able to find in the narrow sphere of their merely individual interests. A people among whom there is no habit of spontaneous action for a collective interest—who look habitually to their government to command or prompt them in all matters of joint concern—who expect to have everything done for them, except what can be made an affair of mere habit and routine—have their faculties only half developed; their education is defective in one of its most important branches.

Not only is the cultivation of the active faculties by exercise, diffused through the whole community, in itself one of the

most valuable of national possessions: it is rendered, not less, but more, necessary, when a high degree of that indispensable culture is systematically kept up in the chiefs and functionaries of the State. There cannot be a combination of circumstances more dangerous to human welfare, than that in which intelligence and talent are maintained at a high standard within a governing corporation, but starved and discouraged outside the pale. Such a system, more completely than any other, embodies the idea of despotism, by arming with intellectual superiority, as an additional weapon, those who have already the legal power. It approaches, as nearly as the organic difference between human beings and other animals admits, to the government of sheep by their shepherd, without anything like so strong an interest as the shepherd has in the thriving condition of the flock. The only security against political slavery is the check maintained over governors by the diffusion of intelligence, activity, and public spirit among the governed. Experience proves the extreme difficulty of permanently keeping up a sufficiently high standard of those qualities; a difficulty which increases, as the advance of civilization and security removes one after another of the hardships, embarrassments, and dangers against which individuals had formerly no resource but in their own strength, skill, and courage. It is therefore of supreme importance that all classes of the community, down to the lowest, should have much to do for themselves; that as great a demand should be made upon their intelligence and virtue as it is in any respect equal to; that the government should not only leave as far as possible to their own faculties the conduct of whatever concerns themselves alone, but should suffer them, or rather encourage them, to manage as many as possible of their joint concerns by voluntary co-operation: since this discussion and management of collective interests is the great school of that public spirit, and the great source of that intelligence of public affairs, which are always regarded as the distinctive character of the public of free countries.

A democratic constitution, not supported by democratic institutions in detail, but confined to the central government, not only is not political freedom, but often creates a spirit precisely the reverse, carrying down to the lowest grade in society the desire and ambition of political domination. In some countries the desire of the people is for not being tyrannized over, but in others it is merely for an equal chance to everybody of tyrannizing. Unhappily this last state of the desires is fully as natural to mankind as the former, and in many of the conditions even of civilized humanity, is far more largely exemplified. In proportion as the people are accustomed to manage their affairs by their own active intervention, instead of leaving them to the government, their desires will turn to repelling tyranny, rather than to tyrannizing: while in proportion as all real initiative and direction reside in the government and individuals habitually feel and act as under its perpetual tutelage, popular institutions develop in them not the desire of freedom, but an unmeasured appetite for place and power, diverting the intelligence and activity of the country from its principal business to a wretched competition for the selfish prizes and the petty vanities of office.

J. S. MILL.

*Principles of Political Economy* (1848)

## THE HERO AS KING

WE come now to the last form of Heroism; that which we call Kingship. The Commander over Men; he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated, and loyally surrender themselves, and find their welfare in doing so, may be reckoned the most important of Great Men. He is practically the summary for us of *all* the various figures of Heroism; Priest, Teacher, whatsoever of earthly or of spiritual dignity we can fancy to reside in a man, embodies itself here, to *command* over us, to furnish us with constant practical teaching, to tell us for the day and hour what we are to *do*. He is called *Rex*, Regulator, *Roi*: our own name is still better; King, *Könning*, which means *Can-ning*, Able-man.

Numerous considerations, pointing towards deep, questionable, and indeed unfathomable regions, present themselves here: on the most of which we must resolutely for the present forbear to speak at all. As Burke said that perhaps fair *Trial by Jury* was the soul of Government, and that all legislation, administration, parliamentary debating, and the rest of it, went on, in 'order to bring twelve impartial men into a jury-box;'—so, by much stronger reason, may I say here, that the findings of your *Ableman* and getting him invested with the *symbols of ability*, with dignity, worship (*worth-ship*), royalty, kingdom, or whatever we call it, so that *he* may actually have room to guide according to his faculty of doing it—is the business, well or ill accomplished, of all social procedure whatsoever in this world! *Hustings-speeches*, Parliamentary motions, Reform Bills, French Revolutions, all mean at heart this; or else nothing. Find in any country the Ablest Man that exists there; raise *him* to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him: you have a perfect government for that country; no ballot-box, parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building, or other machinery whatsoever can improve it a whit. It is in the perfect state; an ideal country. The Ablest Man; he means also the truest-hearted, justest, the Noblest Man: what he *tells*



*us to do* must be precisely the wisest, fittest, that we could anywhere or anyhow learn;—the thing which it will in all ways behove us, with right loyal thankfulness, and nothing doubting, to do! Our *doing* and life were then, so far as government could regulate it, well regulated; that were the ideal of constitutions.

Alas, we know very well that Ideals can never be completely embodied in practice. Ideals must ever lie a very great way off; and we will right thankfully content ourselves with any not intolerable approximation thereto! Let no man, as Schiller says, too querulously 'measure by a scale of perfection the meagre product of reality' in this poor world of ours. We will esteem him no wise man; we will esteem him a sickly, discontented, foolish man. And yet, on the other hand, it is never to be forgotten that Ideals do exist; that if they be not approximated to at all, the whole matter goes to wreck! Infallibly. No bricklayer builds a wall *perfectly* perpendicular, mathematically this is not possible; a certain degree of perpendicularity suffices him; and he, like a good bricklayer, who must have done with his job, leaves it so. And yet if he sway *too much* from the perpendicular; above all, if he throw plummet and level quite away from him, and pile brick on brick heedless, just as it comes to hand—! Such bricklayer, I think, is in a bad way. *He* has forgotten himself: but the Law of Gravitation does not forget to act on him; he and his wall rush-down into confused welter of ruin!—

This is the history of all rebellions, French Revolutions, social explosions in ancient or modern times. You have put the too *Unable Man* at the head of affairs! The too ignoble, unvaliant, fatuous man. You have forgotten that there is any rule, or natural necessity whatever, of putting the *Able Man* there. Brick must lie on brick as it may and can. *Unable Simulacrum of Ability*, *quack*, in a word, must adjust himself with quack, in all manner of administration of human things;—which accordingly lie unadministered, fermenting into unmeasured masses of failure, of indigent misery: in the outward, and in the inward or spiritual, miserable millions stretch-out

the hand for their due supply, and it is not there. The 'law of gravitation' acts; Nature's laws do none of them forget to act. The miserable millions burst-forth into Sansculottism, or some other sort of madness: bricks and bricklayer lie as a fatal chaos!—

Much sorry stuff, written some hundred years ago or more, about the 'Divine right of Kings', moulders unread now in the Public Libraries of this country. Far be it from us to disturb the calm process by which it is disappearing harmlessly from the earth, in those repositories! At the same time, not to let the immense rubbish go without leaving us, as it ought, some soul of it behind—I will say that it did mean something; something true, which it is important for us and all men to keep in mind. To assert that in whatever man you chose to lay hold of (by this or the other plan of clutching at him); and clapt a round piece of metal on the head of, and called King,—there straightway came to reside a divine virtue, so that *he* became a kind of god, and a Divinity inspired him with faculty and right to rule over you to all lengths: this,—what can we do with this but leave it to rot silently in the Public Libraries? But I will say withal, and that is what these Divine-right men meant, That in Kings, and in all human Authorities, and relations that men god-created can form among each other, there is verily either a Divine Right or else a Diabolic Wrong; one or the other of these two! For it is false altogether, what the last Sceptical Century taught us, that this world is a steam-engine. There is a God in this world; and a God's-sanction, or else the violation of such, does look-out from all ruling and obedience, from all moral acts of men. There is no act more moral between men than that of rule and obedience. Woe to him that claims obedience when it is not due; woe to him that refuses it when it is! God's law is in that, I say, however the Parchment-laws may run: there is a Divine Right or else a Diabolic Wrong at the heart of every claim that one man makes upon another.

It can do none of us harm to reflect on this: in all the relations of life it will concern us; in Loyalty and Royalty,

the highest of these. I esteem the modern error, That all goes by self-interest and the checking and balancing of greedy knaveries, and that, in short, there is nothing divine whatever in the association of men, a still more despicable error, natural as it is to an unbelieving century, than that of a 'divine right' in people *called* Kings. I say, Find me the true *Könning*, King, or Able-man, and he *has* a divine right over me. That we knew in some tolerable measure how to find him, and that all men were ready to acknowledge his divine right when found: this is precisely the healing which a sick world is everywhere, in these ages, seeking after! The true King, as guide of the practical, has ever something of the Pontiff in him,—guide of the spiritual, from which all practice has its rise. This too is a true saying, That the *King* is head of the *Church*.—But we will leave the Polemic stuff of a dead century to lie quiet on its bookshelves.

Certainly it is a fearful business, that of having your Able-man to *seek*, and not knowing in what manner to proceed about it! That is the world's sad predicament in these times of ours. They are times of revolution, and have long been. The bricklayer with his bricks, no longer heedful of plummet or the law of gravitation, have toppled, tumbled, and it all welters as we see! But the beginning of it was not the French Revolution; that is rather the *end*, we can hope. It were truer to say, the *beginning* was three centuries farther back: in the Reformation of Luther. That the thing which still called itself Christian Church had become a Falsehood, and brazenly went about pretending to pardon men's sins for metallic coined money, and to do much else which in the everlasting truth of Nature it did *not* now do: here lay the vital malady. The inward being wrong, all outward went ever more and more wrong. Belief died away; all was Doubt, Disbelief. The builder *cast away* his plummet; said to himself, "What is gravitation? Brick lies on brick there!" Alas, does it not still sound strange to many of us, the assertion that there *is* a God's-truth in the business of god-created men; that all is not a kind of grimace, an 'expediency', diplomacy, one knows not what!—

From that first necessary assertion of Luther's, "You, self-styled *Papa*, you are no Father in God at all; you are—a Chimera, whom I know not how to name in polite language!"—from that onwards to the shout which rose round Camille Desmoulins in the Palais-Royal, "*Aux armes!*" when the people had burst-up against *all* manner of Chimeras,—I find a natural historical sequence. That shout too, so frightful, half-infernal, was a great matter. Once more the voice of awakened nations;—starting confusedly, as out of nightmare, as out of death-sleep, into some dim feeling that Life was real; that God's-world was not an expediency and diplomacy! Infernal;—yes, since they would not have it otherwise. Infernal, since not celestial or terrestrial! Hollowness, insincerity *has* to cease; sincerity of some sort *has* to begin. Cost what it may, reigns of terror, horrors of French Revolution or what else, we have to return to truth. Here is a Truth, as I said: a Truth clad in hellfire, since they would not but have it so!—

A common theory among considerable parties of men in England and elsewhere used to be, that the French Nation had, in those days, as it were gone *mad*; that the French Revolution was a general act of insanity, a temporary conversion of France and large sections of the world into a kind of Bedlam. The Event had risen and raged; but was a madness and nonentity,—gone now happily into the region of Dreams and the Picturesque!—To such comfortable philosophers, the Three Days of July 1830 must have been a surprising phenomenon. Here is the French Nation risen again, in musketry and death struggle, out shooting and being shot, to make that same mad French Revolution good! The sons and grandsons of those men, it would seem, persist in the enterprise: they do not disown it; they will have it made good; will have themselves shot, if it be not made good! To philosophers who had made-up their life-system on that 'madness' quietus, no phenomenon could be more alarming. Poor Niebuhr, they say, the Prussian Professor and Historian, fell broken-hearted in consequence; sickened, if we can believe it, and died of the Three

Days! It was surely not a very heroic death;—little better than Racine's, dying because Louis Fourteenth looked sternly on him once. The world had stood some considerable shocks, in its time; might have been expected to survive the Three Days too, and be found turning on its axis after even them! The Three Days told all mortals that the old French Revolution, mad as it might look, was not a transitory ebullition of Bedlam, but a genuine product of this Earth where we all live: that it was verily a Fact, and that the world in general would do well everywhere to regard it as such.

Truly, without the French Revolution, one would not know what to make of an age like this at all. We will hail the French Revolution, as shipwrecked mariners might the sternest rock, in a world otherwise all of baseless sea and waves. A true Apocalypse, though a terrible one, to this false withered artificial time; testifying once more that Nature is *preternatural*; if not divine, then diabolic; that Semblance is not Reality; that it has to become Reality, or the world will take-fire under it,—burn *it* into what it is, namely Nothing! Plausibility has ended; empty Routine has ended; much has ended. This, as with a Trump of Doom, has been proclaimed to all men. They are the wisest who will learn it soonest. Long confused generations before it be learned; peace impossible till it be! The earnest man, surrounded, as ever, with a world of inconsistencies, can await patiently, patiently strive to do *his* work, in the midst of that. Sentence of Death is written down in Heaven against all that; sentence of Death is now proclaimed on the Earth against it: this he with his eyes may see. And surely, I should say, considering the other side of the matter, what enormous difficulties lie there, and how fast, fearfully fast, in all countries, the inexorable demand for solution of them is pressing on,—he may easily find other work to do than labouring in the Sansculottic province at this time of day!

To me, in these circumstances, that of 'Hero-worship' becomes a fact inexpressibly precious; the most solacing fact one sees in the world at present. There is an everlasting hope

in it for the management of the world. Had all traditions, arrangements, creeds, societies that men ever instituted, sunk away, this would remain. The certainty of Heroes being sent us; our faculty, our necessity, to reverence Heroes when sent: it shines like a polestar through smoke-clouds, dust-clouds, and all manner of down-rushing and conflagration.

Hero-worship would have sounded very strange to those workers and fighters in the French Revolution. Not reverence for Great Men; not any hope or belief, or even wish, that Great Men could again appear in the world! Nature, turned into a 'Machine', was as if effete now; could not any longer produce Great Men:—I can tell her, she may give-up the trade altogether, then; we cannot do without Great Men!—But neither have I any quarrel with that of 'Liberty and Equality'; with the faith that, wise great men being impossible, a level immensity of foolish small men would suffice. It was a natural faith then and there. "Liberty and Equality; no Authority needed any longer. Hero-worship, reverence for *such* Authorities has proved false, is itself a falsehood; no more of it! We have had *such forgeries*, we will now trust nothing. So many base plated coins passing in the market, the belief has now become common that no gold any longer exists,—and even that we can do very well without gold!" I find this, among other things, in that universal cry of Liberty and Equality; and find it very natural, as matters then stood.

And yet surely it is but the *transition* from false to true. Considered as the whole truth, it is false altogether;—the product of entire sceptical blindness, as yet only *struggling* to see. Hero-worship exists forever, and everywhere: not Loyalty alone; it extends from divine adoration down to the lowest practical regions of life. 'Bending before men', if it is not to be a mere empty grimace, better dispensed with than practised, is Hero-worship,—a recognition that there does dwell in that presence of our brother something divine; that every created man, as Novalis said, is a 'revelation in the Flesh'. They were Poets too, that devised all those graceful courtesies which make life noble! Courtesy is not a falsehood or grimace; it

need not be such. And Loyalty, religious Worship itself, are still possible; nay still inevitable.

May we not say, moreover, while so many of our late Heroes have worked rather as revolutionary men, that nevertheless every Great Man, every genuine man, is by the nature of him a son of Order, not of Disorder? It is a tragical position for a true man to work in revolutions. He seems an anarchist; and indeed a painful element of anarchy does encumber him at every step,—him to whose whole soul anarchy is hostile, hateful. His mission is Order; every man's is. He is here to make what was disorderly, chaotic, into a thing ruled, regular. He is the missionary of Order. Is not all work of man in this world a *making of Order*? The carpenter finds rough trees; shapes them, constrains them into square fitness, into purpose and use. We are all born enemies of Disorder: it is tragical for us all to be concerned in image-breaking and down-pulling; for the Great Man, *more* a man than we, it is doubly tragical.

Thus too all human things, maddest French Sansculottisms, do and must work towards Order. I say, there is not a *man* in them, raging in the thickest of the madness, but is impelled withal, at all moments, towards Order. His very life means that; Disorder is dissolution, death. No chaos but it seeks a *centre* to revolve round. While man is man, some Cromwell or Napoleon is the necessary finish of a Sansculottism.—Curious: in those days when Hero-worship was the most incredible thing to every one, how it does come-out nevertheless, and assert itself practically, in a way which all have to credit. Divine *right*, take it on the great scale, is found to mean *divine might* withal! While old false Formulas are getting trampled everywhere into destruction, new genuine Substances unexpectedly unfold themselves indestructible.

T. CARLYLE.

*On Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History* (1841)

## PARLIAMENTARISM

WHAT is this freedom by which so many minds are agitated, which inspires so many insensate actions, so many wild speeches, which leads the people so often to misfortune? In the democratic sense of the word, freedom is the right of political power, or, to express it otherwise, the right to participate in the government of the State. This universal aspiration for a share in government has no constant limitations, and seeks no definite issue, but incessantly extends, so that we might apply to it the words of the ancient poet about dropsy: *crescit indulgens sibi*. For ever extending its base, the new Democracy now aspires to universal suffrage—a fatal error, and one of the most remarkable in the history of mankind. By this means, the political power so passionately demanded by Democracy would be shattered into a number of infinitesimal bits, of which each citizen acquires a single one. What will he do with it, then? how will he employ it? In the result it has undoubtedly been shown that in the attainment of this aim Democracy violates its sacred formula of “Freedom indissolubly joined with Equality”. It is shown that this apparently equal distribution of “freedom” among all involves the total destruction of equality. Each vote, representing an inconsiderable fragment of power, by itself signifies nothing; an aggregation of votes alone has a relative value. The result may be likened to the general meetings of shareholders in public companies. By themselves individuals are ineffective, but he who controls a number of these fragmentary forces is master of all power, and directs all decisions and dispositions. We may well ask in what consists the superiority of Democracy. Everywhere the strongest man becomes master of the State; sometimes a fortunate and resolute general, sometimes a monarch or administrator with knowledge, dexterity, a clear plan of action, and a determined will. In a Democracy, the real rulers are the dexterous manipulators of votes, with their place-men, the mechanics who so skilfully operate the hidden



springs which move the puppets in the arena of democratic elections. Men of this kind are ever ready with loud speeches lauding equality; in reality, they rule the people as any despot or military dictator might rule it. The extension of the right to participate in elections is regarded as progress and as the conquest of freedom by democratic theorists, who hold that the more numerous the participants in political rights, the greater is the probability that all will employ this right in the interests of the public welfare, and for the increase of the freedom of the people. Experience proves a very different thing. The history of mankind bears witness that the most necessary and fruitful reforms—the most durable measures—emanated from the supreme will of statesmen, or from a minority enlightened by lofty ideas and deep knowledge, and that, on the contrary, the extension of the representative principle is accompanied by an abasement of political ideas and the vulgarization of opinions in the mass of the electors. It shows also that this extension—in great States—was inspired by secret aims to the centralization of power, or led directly to dictatorship. In France, universal suffrage was suppressed with the end of the Terror, and was re-established twice merely to affirm the autocracy of the two Napoleons. In Germany, the establishment of universal suffrage served merely to strengthen the high authority of a famous statesman who had acquired popularity by the success of his policy. What its ultimate consequences will be, Heaven only knows!

The manipulation of votes in the game of Democracy is of the commonest occurrence in most European states, and its falsehood, it would seem, has been exposed to all; yet few dare openly to rebel against it. The unhappy people must bear the burden, while the Press, herald of a supposititious public opinion, stifles the cry of the people with its shibboleth, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians". But to an impartial mind, all this is nothing better than a struggle of parties, and a shuffling with numbers and names. The voters, by themselves inconsiderable unities, acquire a value in the hands of dexterous agents. This value is realized by many

means—mainly, by bribery in innumerable forms, from gifts of money and trifling articles, to the distribution of places in the services, the financial departments, and the administration. Little by little a class of electors has been formed which lives by the sale of votes to one or another of the political organizations. So far has this gone in France, for instance, that serious, intelligent, and industrious citizens in immense numbers abstain from voting, through the difficulty of contending with the cliques of political agents. With bribery go violence and threats, and reigns of terror are organized at elections, by the help of which the respective cliques advance their candidates; hence the stormy scenes at electoral demonstrations, in which arms have been used, and the field of battle strewn with the bodies of the killed and wounded.

Organization and bribery—these are the two mighty instruments which are employed with such success for the manipulation of the mass of electors. Such methods are in no way new. Thucydides depicts in vivid colours their employment in the ancient republics of Greece. The history of the Roman Republic presents monstrous examples of corruption as the chief instrument of factions at elections. But in our times a new means has been found of working the masses for political aims, and joining them in adventitious alliances by provoking a fictitious community of views. This is the art of rapid and dexterous generalization of ideas, the composition of phrase and formulas, disseminated with the confidence of burning conviction as the last word of science, as dogmas of politicology, as infallible appreciations of events, of men, and of institutions. At one time it was believed that the faculty of analysing facts, and deducing general principles was the privilege of a few enlightened minds and deep thinkers; now it is considered an universal attainment, and, under the name of convictions, the generalities of political science have become a sort of current money, coined by newspapers and rhetoricians.

The faculty of seizing and assimilating on faith these abstract ideas has spread among the mass, and become

infectious, more especially to men insufficiently or superficially educated, who constitute the great majority everywhere. This tendency of the people is exploited with success by politicians who seek power; the art of creating generalities serves for them as a most convenient instrument. All deduction proceeds by the path of abstraction; from a number of facts the immaterial are eliminated, the essential elements collated, classified, and general formulas deduced. It is plain that the justice and value of these formulas depend upon how many of the premisses are essential, and how many of those eliminated are irrelevant. The speed and ease with which abstract conclusions are arrived at are explained by the unceremonious methods observed in this process of selection of relevant facts and in their treatment. Hence the great success of orators, and the extraordinary effect of the abstractions which they cast to the people. The crowd is easily attracted by commonplaces and generalities invested in sonorous phrases; it cares nothing for proof which is inaccessible to it; thus is formed unanimity of thought, an unanimity fictitious and visionary, but in its consequences actual enough. This is called the "voice of the people", with the pendant, the "voice of God". It is a deplorable error.

POBYEDONOSTZEFF.

*Reflections of a Russian Statesman* (1898)

## MAN AND SUPERMAN

WHEN Zarathustra reached that city which lieth nighest to the forest, he found there many folk assembled in the market-place: for it was said they should see a Rope-dancer. And Zarathustra spake thus unto the people:

*'I teach you the Superman.* Man is a thing to be surmounted. What have ye done to surmount him?

All beings hitherto have created something above themselves. Will ye be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the beast than surmount man?

What is the ape to man? A jest or a thing of shame. So shall man be to Superman—a jest or a thing of shame.

Ye have trod the way from worm to man, and much in you is yet worm. Once were ye apes, and even yet man is more ape than any ape.

But he that is wisest amongst you is but a discord, a hybrid of plant and ghost. But do I bid you become either ghosts or plants?

Behold, I teach you the Superman!

The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the Superman *shall be* the meaning of the earth.

I conjure you, my brethren, *remain true to the earth* and believe them not which speak to you of superterrestrial hopes! Poisoners are they, whether or not they know it.

Contemners of life are they, moribund and themselves poisoned, of whom the earth is weary: away with them!

Once blasphemy against God was the greatest of blasphemies, but God died, so that these blasphemies died also. Now the most terrible of sins is to blaspheme against the earth and to rate the bowels of the Unknowable One higher than the meaning of the earth!

Once the soul looked contemptuously upon the body: in those days was this contempt the highest ideal:—the soul would have the body meagre, ugly, and starved. Thus the soul thought to escape the body and the earth.

Oh, that soul was itself meagre, hideous, and famished : and in cruelty was that soul's delight !

But ye also, my brethren, tell me : What saith your body of your soul? Is not your soul full of poverty and uncleanness and despicable ease?

Verily, a polluted stream is man. One must be a very ocean to be able to receive a polluted stream without becoming unclean.

Behold, I teach you the Superman : he is that ocean, in him can your great contempt be o'erwhelmed.

What is the greatest thing ye can experience? It is the hour of great contempt. The hour in which even your happiness is loathsome to you, and your reason and your virtue likewise.

The hour in which ye say: What is my happiness worth ! It is poverty and uncleanness and despicable ease. Yet my happiness should justify Being itself !

The hour in which ye say: What is my reason worth ! Desireth it knowledge as the lion his prey? It is poverty and uncleanness and despicable ease.

The hour in which ye say: What is my virtue worth ! Not yet hath it roused me to fury. How I weary of my good and mine evil ! It is all naught but poverty and uncleanness and despicable ease !

The hour in which ye say: What is my righteousness worth ! I perceive not that I am flame and fuel. Yet the righteous man is flame and fuel !

The hour in which ye say: What is my pity worth ! Is not pity the cross upon which he is nailed that loveth mankind? But my pity is no crucifixion.

Spake ye ever thus? Cried ye ever thus? Ah, that I had heard you cry thus !

Not your sin, but your sufficiency crieth unto heaven, your niggardliness even in sin crieth unto heaven !

Where is the lightning to lick you with its tongue? Where is the frenzy with which ye must be infected?

Behold ! I teach you the Superman : he is this lightning, he is this frenzy !'

When Zarathustra had thus spoken, one of the people cried: We have *heard* enough about this Rope-dancer; now let us *see* him! And all the people laughed at Zarathustra. The Rope-dancer, however, thought that he was called for, and set himself to his work.

## 4

But Zarathustra looking on the people wondered. Then he spake thus:

Man is a rope stretched betwixt beast and Superman—a rope over an abyss.

Perilous is the crossing, perilous the way, perilous the backward look, perilous all trembling and halting by the way.

Man is great in that he is a bridge and not a goal: man can be loved in that he is a transition and a perishing.

I love them which live not save as under-goers, for they are the over-goers.

I love them which greatly scorn because they also greatly adore; they are arrows of longing for the farther shore.

I love them which seek to reason beyond the stars wherefore they should perish, wherefore they should be sacrificed, but which sacrifice themselves to the earth that the earth hereafter may be the Superman's.

I love him which liveth that he may know, and which seeketh knowledge that hereafter the Superman may live: for thus he willeth his own down-going.

I love him which worketh and deviseth to build an house for the Superman, to prepare for him earth, beast, and plant; for thus he willeth his own down-going.

I love him which loveth his virtue: for virtue is the will to down-going, and an arrow of longing.

I love him which reserveth no share of spirit for himself, but willeth to be wholly the spirit of his virtue: thus in spirit he crosseth over the bridge.

I love him which maketh of his virtue his inclination and his destiny: for thus for his virtue's sake he willeth either to live on or to cease to live.

I love him which desireth not too many virtues. One virtue is more virtue than two, because it is so much the more a knot on which destiny hangs.

I love him whose soul lavisheth itself, that neither requireth nor returneth thanks: for he giveth ever and keepeth naught for himself.

I love him which is ashamed when the dice fall in his favour and asketh: Am I a cheating player?—for he desireth to perish.

I love him which streweth golden words before his deeds and performeth yet more than he promiseth: for he seeketh his own down-going.

I love him which justifieth future generations and redeemeth past generations: for he willeth to perish by the present generation.

I love him which chastiseth his God because he loveth his God: for he must perish by the wrath of his God.

I love him whose soul is deep even for wounding and whom a slight matter may destroy: for he gladly goeth over the bridge.

I love him whose soul is over-full so that he forgetteth himself, and all things are within him: thus all things become his downfall.

I love him which is of a free mind and of a free heart: for his head is but the bowels of his heart, but his heart driveth him to destruction.

I love all them which are as heavy rain-drops falling one by one from the dark cloud that lowereth over mankind: they herald the coming of the lightning, and they perish as heralds.

Behold, I am an herald of the lightning and an heavy rain-drop from the clouds: but that lightning is named *Superman*.—

## 5

When he had spoken these words Zarathustra looked again on the people and was silent. There they stand, he said within his heart, they laugh: they understand me not: I am not the mouth for these ears.

Must needs their ears be battered that they may learn to hear with their eyes? Must a man clamour like a kettle-drum

or like a Lenten preacher? Or will they believe only the stammerer?

They have a thing whereof they are proud. How call they that whereof they are proud? Culture they call it which distinguisheth them from the goatherds.

Wherefore they love not to hear words of contempt used of themselves. I will speak therefore to their pride.

I will speak therefore to them of the most contemptible of all things: and that is the *Last Man*.

And thus Zarathustra spake to the people:

'It is time for Man to mark his goal. It is time for man to sow the seed of his highest hope.

His soil is yet rich enough therefor. But the day cometh when that soil shall be impoverished and effete, and no tall tree shall any longer be able to grow therefrom.

Alas! the day cometh when man shall no longer shoot the arrow of his desire beyond man, when his bowstring shall have forgotten its use!

I say unto you: a man must have chaos yet within him to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: ye have chaos yet within you.

Alas! the day cometh when man shall give birth to no more stars! Alas! the day cometh of that most contemptible man which can no longer contemn himself.

Behold! I show you the *Last Man*.

What is love? What is creation? What is desire? What is a star? asketh the Last Man, and he blinketh!

Then will earth have grown small, and upon it shall hop the Last Man which maketh all things small. His kind is inexterminable like the ground-flea; the Last Man liveth longest.

'We have discovered happiness',—say the Last Men, and they blink.

They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one must have warmth. Man still loveth his neighbour and rubbeth himself against him; for one must have warmth.

Sickness and mistrust they hold sinful. They go warily. A fool is he that yet stumbleth either over stones or men!



A little poison now and then: for that causeth pleasant dreams. And much poison at the last for an easy death.

They still work, for work is a pastime. But they take heed lest the pastime harm them.

They grow no longer poor nor rich; it is too troublesome to do either. Who desireth to rule? Who to obey? Both are too troublesome.

No shepherd and but one flock! All men will alike, all are alike: he that feeleth otherwise goeth voluntarily to a mad-house.

'Once all the world was mad,' say these most refined ones, and they blink.

They are clever and know all that have come to pass, so that there is no end of mockery. They quarrel yet, but are soon reconciled—lest their stomachs turn.

They have little lusts for the day and little lusts for the night: but they have regard for health.

We have discovered happiness, say the Last Men, and they blink.'—

And here ended Zarathustra's first discourse, which is also called 'the Prologue', for at this point the clamour and mirth of the people interrupted him. Give us these Last Men, O Zarathustra, they cried, make us as these Last Men. Thou mayest keep thy Superman! And all the people cheered and clicked their tongues. But Zarathustra grieved, and said within his heart:

They understand me not: I am not the mouth for these ears.

Too long, perchance, have I dwelt in the mountains, listened too long to brooks and trees: now my speech is to them as that of goatherds.

My soul is still bright like the mountains ere midday. But they deem me cold and a mocker whose jests are terrible.

How they look on me and laugh: and while they laugh they hate me. There is ice in their laughter.

F. W. NIETZSCHE.

*Also Sprach Zarathustra* (1883-91)

## IN JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

MEN who make revolutionary speeches to the people are bound to set before themselves a high standard of sincerity, because the workers understand their words in their exact and literal sense, and never indulge in any symbolic interpretation. When in 1905 I ventured to write in some detail on proletarian violence I understood perfectly the grave responsibility I assumed in trying to show the historic bearing of actions which our Parliamentary Socialists try to dissimulate, with so much skill. To-day I do not hesitate to assert that Socialism could not continue to exist without an apology for violence.

It is in strikes that the proletariat asserts its existence. I cannot agree with the view which sees in strikes merely something analogous to the temporary rupture of commercial relations which is brought about when a grocer and the wholesale dealer from whom he buys his dried plums cannot agree about the price. The strike is a phenomenon of war. It is thus a serious misrepresentation to say that violence is an accident doomed to disappear from the strikes of the future.

The social revolution is an extension of that war in which each great strike is an episode; this is the reason why Syndicalists speak of that revolution in the language of strikes: for them Socialism is reduced to the conception, the expectation of, and the preparation for the general strike, which, like the Napoleonic battle, is to annihilate completely a condemned *régime*.

Such a conception allows none of those subtle exegeses in which Jaurès excels. It is a question here of an overthrow in the course of which both employers and the State would be set aside by the organised producers. Our Intellectuals, who hope to obtain the highest places from democracy, would be sent back to their literature; the Parliamentary Socialists, who find in the organisations created by the middle classes means

of exercising a certain amount of power, would become useless.

The analogy which exists between strikes accompanied by violence and war is prolific of consequences. No one doubts (except d'Estournelles de Constant) that it was war that provided the republics of antiquity with the ideas which form the ornament of our modern culture. The social war, for which the proletariat ceaselessly prepares itself in the syndicates, may engender the elements of a new civilisation suited to a people of producers. I continually call the attention of my young friends to the problems presented by Socialism considered from the point of view of a civilisation of producers; I assert that to-day a philosophy is being elaborated according to this plan, whose possibility even was hardly suspected a few years ago; this philosophy is closely bound up with the apology for violence.

I have never had that admiration for *creative hatred* which Jaurès has devoted to it; I do not feel the same indulgence towards the guillotiners as he does; I have a horror of any measure which strikes the vanquished under a judicial disguise. War, carried on in broad daylight, without hypocritical attenuation, for the purpose of ruining an irreconcilable enemy, excludes all the abominations which dishonoured the middle-class revolution of the eighteenth century. The apology for violence in this case is particularly easy.

It would serve no purpose to explain to the poor that they ought not to feel sentiments of jealousy and vengeance against their masters; these feelings are too powerful to be suppressed by exhortations; it is on the widespread prevalence of these feelings that democracy chiefly founds its strength. Social war, by making an appeal to the honour which develops so naturally in all organised armies, can eliminate those evil feelings against which morality would remain powerless. If this were the only reason we had for attributing a high civilising value to revolutionary Syndicalism, this reason alone would, it seems to me, be decisive in favour of the apologists for violence.

The conception of the general strike, engendered by the practice of violent strikes, admits the conception of an irrevocable overthrow. There is something terrifying in this which will appear more and more terrifying as violence takes a greater place in the mind of the proletariat. But, in undertaking a serious, formidable and sublime work, Socialists raise themselves above our frivolous society and make themselves worthy of pointing out new roads to the world.

Parliamentary Socialists may be compared to the officials whom Napoleon made into a nobility and who laboured to strengthen the State bequeathed by the Ancien Régime. Revolutionary Syndicalism corresponds well enough to the Napoleonic armies whose soldiers accomplished such heroic acts, knowing all the time that they would remain poor. What remains of the Empire? Nothing but the epic of the Grande Armée. What will remain of the present Socialist movement will be the epic of the strikes.

SOREL.

*Reflexions sur la Violence* (1908)

## REFLECTIONS OF A PRESIDENT

AT sea again, and no German submarines to fear! A last chance to rest and reflect—if I were not President! Not only on land but at sea I felt at every turn that my personal freedom and private life were gone. Now I was a public, official personage, always and everywhere official. Thus it had to be, since my fellow-citizens, and foreigners too, demanded it; and even on board ship the secret police of Governments kept watch over the new-born Head of a State.

By a happy chance I sailed on my wife's birthday. My daughter Olga and I kept it quietly, amid roses as ever, and memories—no, not memories, for the thoughts and feelings of two souls which, despite distance, cleave to each other, are something more than a memory.

The sea, the sea! Rest for nerves and brain. Nought but sea and sky by day and night. The throb of the engines and propellers goes unheeded. In my exile I had lost the habit of regular sleep. I doubt, indeed, whether I slept well for five consecutive nights during the whole four years. My brain was ever working, like a watch, considering, comparing, reckoning, estimating, judging what the next day would bring forth on the battlefields or among Governments, a constant measuring of distances and of deviations from the goal. The sea lulls. Even the life on board is soothing. I went over the "Carmania" and the officers explained to me the progress in the art of navigation. I thought of my first voyage from France to America forty years before and of the old-fashioned steamers of the time. Then I had travelled as an unknown man with no position, yet full of hope and enterprise. Now I was returning from the same New York, perhaps on the self-same course, as President of a State, and equally full of hope that my work would prosper. In America, and afterwards in England and everywhere, numbers of people asked me what it felt like to be President since I had secured independence for our people. They took it for granted that I was the happiest

man on earth. In Prague a well-known German writer visited me so that, as he said he might see with his own eyes a really happy man. Happy?

As President I thought only of going on with the task in hand, and of the responsibility which all of us who were capable of thinking politically would have to bear. I felt neither happy nor happier than before, though knowledge of the inner consistency, of the internal logic of my long life's work gladdened me. From a review of my own life and of what I had done abroad, I went on to review the world war, the political evolution of Europe since 1848, that is to say during my lifetime, and sought to trace amid a multitude of details the scarlet thread of cause and effect.

"So we are free, shall be free. We have an independent Republic! A fairy-tale," I said to myself, again and again, now unconsciously, now consciously and aloud, "that we are really f-r-e-e and have our own Re-pub-lic!"

Yet, in my mind, stillness reigned. Day after day I paced the deck, gazing across the waves; though the sense of new duties, new tasks, knocked ceaselessly at the door of my brain; anxieties about the peace negotiations and their outcome, care upon care. One thing was clear—despite science and philosophy, reason and wisdom, prudence and foresight, the lives of men and of peoples run, in large measure, otherwise than they will and wish. Still, there is in them a logic which they perceive retrospectively. The efforts and plans of the most gifted political leaders, of the men who make history, reveal themselves as *vaticinatio ex eventu*.

The whole war through I had compared the plans and efforts of each belligerent party with those of the other. On the German side there had plainly been preparedness, a thoroughly thought-out undertaking on a large scale, with bold intent to fashion the future development of Germany, of Europe and of the world; but the outcome had shown the fatal mistakes of a people undeniably great, a people of thinkers qualified in many ways to teach all nations. On the other side, the Allies had lacked unity, both singly and as a whole.

They had no positive plan—both sides wished to win, but that is no plan—they made big political and strategical blunders, and were nevertheless victorious not only by reason of their own superiority but thanks also to the errors of the foe. To me, the battle of the Marne seems an example of this human blindness on a large scale. If we assume that the French themselves did not expect to win it, as several French strategists have admitted, and that the Germans lost it only through the mistake of a subordinate officer, Colonel Hentsch, whom the literature of the Marne Battle has made notorious, does not the question “Why?” seem the more insistent? Or, to take another example: In 1917 and at the beginning of 1918 the Austrians and, perhaps, the Germans as well, could have got from the Allies peace terms under which we, and the other nations now liberated, would have won far less. The Allies were disposed to make peace; some of them too much so; a clear, honest word from Vienna about Belgium, and an open breach with Germany would have softened the hearts of England and France towards Austria-Hungary. But the insincerity of the official policy pursued in Vienna and Berlin, and their incorrigible arrogance and blindness, helped the Allies to hold out and to conquer. Who, at the beginning of the war, expected the overthrow of Russia and the establishment of a Communist Republic? Who foresaw the Revolution that came forth from the war and altered the political face of Europe and of the whole world? Shakespeare has put it very wisely:—

Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well  
When our deep plots do pall; and that should teach us  
There's a divinity that shapes our ends,  
Rough-hew them how we will.

Yet a belief that Providence watches over us and the world is no reason for fatalistic inactivity but rather for optimistic concentration of effort, for a strict injunction to work determinedly, to work for an idea.

T. G. MASARYK.

*The Making of a State* (1925)

## THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF FASCISM

WHEN, in the now distant March of 1919, I summoned a meeting at Milan through the columns of the *Popolo d'Italia* of the surviving members of the Interventionist Party who had themselves been in action, and who had followed me since the creation of the Fascist Revolutionary Party (which took place in the January of 1915), I had no specific doctrinal attitude in my mind. I had a living experience of one doctrine only—that of Socialism, from 1903-4 to the winter of 1914—that is to say, about a decade: and from Socialism itself, even though I had taken part in the movement first as a member of the rank and file and then later as a leader, yet I had no experience of its doctrine in practice. My own doctrine, even in this period, had always been a doctrine of action. A unanimous universally accepted theory of Socialism did not exist after 1905, when the revisionist movement began in Germany under the leadership of Bernstein, while under pressure of the tendencies of the time, a Left Revolutionary movement also appeared, which though never getting further than talk in Italy, in Russian Socialistic circles laid the foundations of Bolshevism. Reformation, Revolution, Centralization—already the echoes of these terms are spent—while in the great stream of Fascism are to be found ideas which began with Sorel, Peguy, with Lagardelle in the “Mouvement Socialiste”, and with the Italian trades-union movement which throughout the period 1904-14 was sounding a new note in Italian Socialist circles (already weakened by the betrayal of Giolitti) through Olivetti's *Pagine Libere*, Orano's *La Lupa*, and Enrico Leone's *Divenire Sociale*.

After the War, 1919, Socialism was already dead as a doctrine: it existed only as a hatred. There remained to it only one possibility of action, especially in Italy, reprisals against those who had desired the War and who must now be made to “expiate” its results. The *Popolo d'Italia* was then



given the sub-title of "The newspaper of ex-service men and producers", and the world producers was already the expression of a mental attitude. Fascism was not the nursling of a doctrine worked out beforehand with detailed elaboration; it was born of the need for action and it was itself from the beginning practical rather than theoretical; it was not merely another political party but, even in the first two years, in opposition to all political parties as such, and itself a living movement. The name which I then gave to the organization fixed its character. And yet, if one were to re-read, in the now dusty columns of that date, the report of the meeting in which the *Fasci Italiana di combattimento* were constituted, one would there find no ordered expression of doctrine, but a series of aphorisms, anticipations, and aspirations which, when refined by time from the original ore, were destined after some years to develop into an ordered series of doctrinal concepts, forming the Fascist political doctrine—different from all others either of the past or the present day.

"If the bourgeoisie", I said then, "think that they will find lightning-conductors in us, they are the more deceived; we must start work at once. . . . We want to accustom the working-class to real and effectual leadership, and also to convince them that it is no easy thing to direct an industry or a commercial enterprise successfully. . . . We shall combat every retrograde idea, technical or spiritual. . . . When the succession to the seat of government is open, we must not be unwilling to fight for it. We must make haste; when the present régime breaks down, we must be ready at once to take its place. It is we who have the right to the succession, because it was we who forced the country into the War, and led her to victory. The present method of political representation cannot suffice, we must have a representation direct from the individuals concerned. It may be objected against this program that it is a return to the conception of the corporation, but that is no matter. . . . Therefore, I desire that this assembly shall accept the claim of national trades-unionism from the economic point of view. . . ."

Now is it not a singular thing that even on this first day in the Piazza San Sepolcro that word "corporation" arose, which later, in the course of the Revolution, came to express one of the creations of social legislation at the very foundation of the régime?

Fascism is now a completely individual thing, not only as a régime but as a doctrine. And this means that to-day Fascism exercising its critical sense upon itself and upon others, has formed its own distinct and peculiar point of view, to which it can refer and upon which, therefore, it can act in the face of all problems, practical or intellectual, which confront the world.

And above all, Fascism, the more it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism—born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials are substitutes, which never really put men into the position where they have to make the great decision—the alternative of life or death. Thus a doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of Fascism, though accepted for what use they can be in dealing with particular political situations, are all the international leagues and societies which, as history will show, can be scattered to the winds when once strong national feeling is aroused by any motive—sentimental, ideal or practical. This anti-pacifist spirit is carried by Fascism even into the life of the individual; the proud motto of the *Squadrista*, "Me ne frego", written on the bandage of the wound, is an act of philosophy not only stoic, the summary of a doctrine not only political—it is the education to combat, the acceptance of the risks which combat implies, and a new way of life for Italy. Thus the Fascist accepts life and loves it, knowing nothing of and

despising suicide: he rather conceives of life as duty and struggle and conquest, life which should be high and full, lived for oneself, but above all for others—those are at hand and those who are far distant, contemporaries, and those who will come after.

Such a conception of life makes Fascism the complete opposite of that doctrine, the base of so-called scientific and Marxian Socialism, the materialist conception of history; according to which the history of human civilization can be explained simply through the conflict of interests among the various social groups and by the change and development in the means and instruments of production. That the changes in the economic field—new discoveries of raw materials, new methods of working them, and the inventions of science—have their importance no one can deny; but that these factors are sufficient to explain the history of humanity excluding all others is an absurd delusion. Fascism, now and always, believe in holiness and in heroism; that is to say, in actions influenced by no economic motive, direct or indirect. And if the economic conception of history be denied, according to which theory men are no more than puppets, carried to and fro by the waves of chance, while the real directing forces are quite out of their control, it follows that the existence of an unchangeable and unchanging class-war is also denied—the natural progeny of the economic conception of history. And above all Fascism denies that class-war can be the preponderant force in the transformation of society. These two fundamental concepts of Socialism being thus refuted, nothing is left of it but the sentimental aspiration—as old as humanity itself—towards a social system in which the sorrows and sufferings of the humblest shall be alleviated. But here again Fascism repudiates the conception of “economic” happiness, to be realized by Socialism and, as it were, at a given moment in economic evolution to assure to everyone the maximum of well-being. Fascism denies the materialist conception of happiness as a possibility, and abandons it to its inventors, the economists of the first half of the nineteenth century: that is to

say, Fascism denies the validity of the equation, well-being-happiness, which would reduce men to the level of animals, caring for one thing only—to be fat and well-fed—and would thus degrade humanity to a purely physical existence.

After Socialism, Fascism combats the whole complex system of democratic ideology, and repudiates it, whether in its theoretical premises or in its practical application. Fascism denies that the majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society; it denies that numbers alone can govern by means of a periodical consultation, and it affirms the immutable, beneficial, and fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently levelled through the mere operation of a mechanical process such as universal suffrage. The democratic régime may be defined as from time to time giving the people the illusion of sovereignty, while the real effective sovereignty lies in the hands of other concealed and irresponsible forces. Democracy is a régime nominally without a king, but it is ruled by many kings—more absolute, tyrannical, and ruinous than one sole king, even though a tyrant. This explains why Fascism, having first in 1922 (for reasons of expediency) assumed an attitude tending towards republicanism, renounced this point of view before the march to Rome; being convinced that the question of political form is not to-day of prime importance, and after having studied the examples of monarchies and republics past and present reach the conclusion that monarchy or republicanism are not to be judged, as it were, by an absolute standard; but that they represent forms in which the evolution—political, historical, traditional, or psychological—of a particular country has expressed itself. Fascism supersedes the antitheses monarchy or republicanism, while democracy still tarries beneath the domination of this idea, forever pointing out the insufficiency of the first and forever the praising of the second as the perfect régime. To-day, it can be seen that there are republics innately reactionary and absolutist, and also monarchies which incorporate the most ardent social and political hopes of the future.

But the Fascist negation of Socialism, Democracy, and Liberalism must not be taken to mean that Fascism desires to lead the world back to the state of affairs before 1789, the date which seems to be indicated as the opening years of the succeeding semi-Liberal century: we do not desire to turn back; Fascism has not chosen De Maistre for its high-priest. Absolute monarchy has been and can never return, any more than blind acceptance of ecclesiastical authority.

So, too, the privileges of the feudal system "have passed away", and the division of society into castes impenetrable from outside, and with no intercommunication among themselves: the Fascist conception of authority has nothing to do with such a polity. A party which entirely governs a nation is a fact entirely new to history, there are no possible references or parallels. Fascism uses in its construction whatever elements in the Liberal, Social, or Democratic doctrines still have a living value; it maintains what may be called the certainties which we owe to history, but it rejects all the rest—that is to say, the conception that there can be any doctrine of unquestioned efficacy for all times and all peoples. Given that the nineteenth century was the century of Socialism, of Liberalism, and of Democracy, it does not necessarily follow that the twentieth century must also be a century of Socialism, Liberalism, and Democracy: political doctrines pass, but humanity remains; and it may rather be expected that this will be a century of authority, a century of the Left, a century of Fascism. For if the nineteenth century was a century of individualism (Liberalism always signifying individualism) it may be expected that this will be the century of collectivism, and hence the century of the State. It is a perfectly logical deduction that a new doctrine can utilize all the still vital elements of previous doctrines.

The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its character, its duty, and its aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State. The conception of the Liberal State is not that

of a directing force, guiding the play and development, both material and spiritual, of a collective body, but merely a force limited to the function of recording results: on the other hand, the Fascist State is itself conscious, and has itself a will and a personality—thus it may be called the “ethical” State.

From 1929 until to-day, evolution, both political and economic, has everywhere gone to prove the validity of these doctrinal premises. Of such gigantic importance is the State. It is the force which alone can provide a solution to the dramatic contradiction of capitalism, and that state of affairs which we call the crisis can only be dealt with by the State, as between other States. Where is the shade of Jules Simon, who in the dawn of Liberalism proclaimed that, “The State must labour to make itself unnecessary, and prepare the way for its own dismissal”? Or of McCulloch, who, in the second half of the last century, affirmed that the State must guard against the danger of governing too much? What would the Englishman, Bentham, say to-day to the continual and inevitably-invoked intervention of the State in the sphere of economics, while according to his theories industry should ask no more of the State than to be left in peace? Or the German, Humboldt, according to whom the “lazy” State should be considered the best? It is true that the second wave of Liberal economists were less extreme than the first, and Adam Smith himself opened the door—if only very cautiously—which leads to State intervention in the economic field: but whoever says Liberalism implies individualism, and whoever says Fascism implies the State. Yet the Fascist State is unique, and an original creation. It is not reactionary, but revolutionary, in that it anticipates the solution of the universal political problems which elsewhere have to be settled in the political field by the rivalry of parties, the excessive power of the parliamentary régime and the irresponsibility of political assemblies; while it meets the problems of the economic field by a system of syndicalism which is continually increasing in importance, as much in the sphere of labour as of industry: and in the moral field enforces order, discipline, and obedience to that which

is the determined moral code of the country. Fascism desires the State to be a strong and organic body, at the same time reposing upon broad and popular support. The Fascist State has drawn into itself even the economic activities of the nation, and, through the corporative social and educational institutions created by it, its influence reaches every aspect of the national life and includes, framed in their respective organizations, all the political, economic and spiritual forces of the nation. A State which reposes upon the support of millions of individuals who recognize its authority, are continually conscious of its power and are ready at once to serve it, is not the old tyrannical State of the medieval lord nor has it anything in common with the absolute governments either before or after 1789. The individual in the Fascist State is not annulled but rather multiplied, just in the same way that a soldier in a regiment is not diminished but rather increased by the number of his comrades. The Fascist State organizes the nation, but leaves a sufficient margin of liberty to the individual; the latter is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom, but retains what is essential; the deciding power in this question cannot be the individual, but the State alone.

The Fascist State is not indifferent to the fact of religion in general, or to that particular and positive faith which is Italian Catholicism. The State professes no theology, but a morality, and in the Fascist State religion is considered as one of the deepest manifestations of the spirit of man, thus it is not only respected but defended and protected. The Fascist State has never tried to create its own God, as at one moment Robespierre and the wildest extremists of the Convention tried to do; nor does it vainly seek to obliterate religion from the hearts of men as does Bolshevism: Fascism respects the God of the ascetics, the saints and heroes, and equally, God as He is perceived and worshipped by simple people.

The Fascist State is an embodied will to power and government: the Roman tradition is here an ideal of force in action.

According to Fascism, government is not so much a thing to be expressed in territorial or military terms as in terms of morality and the spirit. It must be thought of as an empire—that is to say, a nation which directly or indirectly rules other nations, without the need for conquering a single square yard of territory. For Fascism, the growth of empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifestation of vitality, and its opposite a sign of decadence. Peoples which are rising, or rising again after a period of decadence, are always imperialist; any renunciation is a sign of decay and of death. Fascism is the doctrine best adapted to represent the tendencies and the aspirations of a people, like the people of Italy, who are rising again after many centuries of abasement and foreign servitude. But empire demands discipline, the co-ordination of all forces and a deeply felt sense of duty and sacrifice: this fact explains many aspects of the practical working of the régime, the character of many forces in the State, and the necessarily severe measures which must be taken against those who would oppose this spontaneous and inevitable movement of Italy in the twentieth century, and would oppose it by recalling the outworn ideology of the nineteenth century—repudiated wheresoever there has been the courage to undertake great experiments of social and political transformation: for never before has the nation stood more in need of authority, of direction, and of order. If every age has its own characteristic doctrine, there are a thousand signs which point to Fascism as the characteristic doctrine of our time. For if a doctrine must be a living thing, this is proved by the fact that Fascism has created a living faith; and that this faith is very powerful in the minds of men, is demonstrated by those who have suffered and died for it.

Fascism has henceforth in the world the universality of all those doctrines which, in realizing themselves, have represented a stage in the history of the human spirit.

B. MUSSOLINI.

*The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism* (1932)



## NOTE ON THE DOCTRINES OF "MEIN KAMPF"

THE clearest statement of Herr Hitler's political theory, including, as it does, his estimate of human nature, is contained in the chapter of *Mein Kampf* that is directed to "Propaganda and Organization". The central passages of this chapter are printed in spaced type, so as to attract the reader's attention. The following passages are all so printed<sup>1</sup>:

"Every movement must first proceed to divide the human material which it has captured into two large groups of supporters and members.

"It is the task of propaganda to secure supporters and the task of the organization to win members.

"Supporters of a movement are those who declare themselves in sympathy with its objects. Members are those who are willing to fight for it.

"Supporters are rendered favourable to a movement by propaganda. Members are persuaded by the organization themselves to co-operate in winning new supporters from amongst whom members may in their turn be formed.

"Since to be a supporter involves only the passive acceptance of an idea, whilst membership demands active participation and defence, the proportion of members to supporters will at the best not be more than two in ten.

"The supporter's attitude is one of intellectual acceptance, whilst the member adds to that the courage himself to stand up for that which he has accepted and to pass it on to others.

"Intellectual acceptance in its passive form is the natural attitude of the majority of mankind, who are

<sup>1</sup> *Mein Kampf* (1938 edition), pp. 651-4 and 657.

lazy and cowardly. Membership calls for an energetic temper and therefore befits only the minority of mankind.

"Propaganda must therefore be indefatigable in winning support, for an idea wins supporters, whilst the organization must devote its closest attention to ensuring that only the most valuable of the supporters are made into members. Those responsible for the propaganda need not therefore pay undue heed to the importance of each individual who listens to them, or concern themselves overmuch with his capacity, his knowledge, his intelligence or his character. The organization, on the other hand, must be most careful in collecting out of the mass of members anything that can really contribute to the victory of the movement.

"The object of propaganda is to compel the whole people to accept a doctrine. The organization only admits into its ranks those whose psychological make-up is such that they do not threaten to become an obstacle to the further spread of the idea.

"Propaganda works upon the entire population in terms of an idea, and ripens it for the victory of this idea, whilst the organization pursues victory through the continuous and organic association and training for battle of these supporters who seem capable and willing to lead the battle to victory.

"The victory of an idea will be facilitated by the degree in which propaganda has worked upon the entire population, and by the degree in which the organization that is responsible for the practical conduct of the battle is firm, rigid and exclusive.

"It follows that the number of supporters can never be too large, whilst the number of members will more easily become too great than too small.

"When the propaganda has filled a whole people with an idea, the organization can ensure the consequences with a handful of men. Propaganda and organization, supporters and members, therefore, stand in a fixed

mutual relation. The better the organization has done its work the smaller can be the organization, and the larger the number of supporters the smaller can be the number of members. Conversely, the less efficient the propaganda, the larger must be the organization, and the smaller the number of the supporters of a movement the more numerous must be its members, if it still wishes to reckon on success.

"The first task of propaganda is to secure men for the organization later on. The first task of the organization is to secure men for the continuance of propaganda. The second task of propaganda is to disintegrate the existing order and to saturate it with the new doctrine, whilst the second task of the organization is the battle for power in order by this means to attain the eventual success of the doctrine.

"The most complete success of a revolution in men's outlook (*einer weltanschaulichen Revolution*) will be ensured when the new outlook has been taught to practically the whole population, and, if necessary, afterwards forced upon them, whilst the organizers of the idea, that is to say the Movement, need only include as many individuals as are indispensable for the occupation of the nerve-centres of the country in question."

These ideas are worked out in still further detail in the next seven paragraphs, ending with this sentence:

"All great movements, whether of a religious or a political nature, cannot but attribute their powerful successes solely to the acceptance and application of these principles: lasting successes, in particular, are inconceivable if these laws are not taken into account."

A. HITLER.

*Mein Kampf* (1926)

## THE ESSENTIALS OF DEMOCRACY

I AM not sure that we always realize how much of the essence of democracy is contained in this insistence on a tolerated and official opposition. It implies that the business of representative government is to make articulate and get expressed different not consentaneous points of view—that democratic equality is not an equality of sameness but of difference—that we want everyone to have political rights, not because and in so far as they agree with other people, but because and in so far as they have each their peculiar contribution to make. But that after all is the principle behind Colonel Rainboro's 'the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the richest he'. Of course if we concentrate on such difference and uniqueness we shall get the kind of anarchy and anti-nomianism which made the early Quakers such a trouble to Cromwell and which disturbed the beginnings of Rhode Island. But democracy is based on the assumption that men can agree on common action which yet leaves each to live his own life—that if we really respect one another's personality we can find a common framework or system of rights within which the free moral life of the individual is possible.

How that can best be attained can be discovered by discussion, in which the one-sidedness of particular views can be eliminated and a principle of common action discovered which each can feel does justice to what was vital in his own contention. This is Cromwell's position—toleration and recognition of differences, based on the belief that God may speak through any member of the community, combined with insistence that individual views shall submit to the criticism of open discussion.

Now surely, if we reflect upon it, what matters most in the tiny democratic societies which we feel to be thoroughly satisfactory forms of government is what comes out of the

free give and take of discussion. When men who are serving a common purpose meet to pool their experience, to air their difficulties and even their discontents, there comes about a real process of collective thinking. The narrowness and one-sidedness of each person's point of view are corrected, and something emerges which each can recognize as embodying the truth of what he stood for, and yet (or rather therefore) is seen to serve the purpose of the society better than what any one conceived for himself. That is of course an ideal. Such perfect agreement is not often reached. But it is an ideal which is always to some extent realized when there is open and frank discussion. And any one with experience of the effectiveness of discussion in a small democratic society must recognize how valuable is the contribution of those who are not easily convinced but can stand up resolutely for their own point of view. Where discussion of that kind prevails, we recognize that democracy is not a makeshift or a compromise or a means of keeping people quiet by the production of a sham unanimity, or a process of counting heads to save the trouble of breaking them, but the ideal form of government.

Observe further that the moment we take discussion seriously, we are committed to the view that we are concerned not primarily to obtain or register consent, but to find something out. What it is that democratic discussion is trying to find out we shall discuss later. The root of the matter is that if the discussion is at all successful, we discover something from it which could have been discovered in no other way. I am only concerned now to note and insist on this fact, and to note its likeness to the discovery of truth in other spheres. Modern science is a great realm of co-operative thinking where discoveries are made originally by the work of isolated individuals, but where they are tested and enlarged by criticism and discussion. Every scientific discoverer knows that what he most wants to know is not what can be said for, but what can be said against his theory. What he most wants is an opposition. The example of

scientific co-operative thinking may remind us that democratic discussion is entirely compatible with leadership and with any amount of difference in the weight of the contributions made by different members. Democracy assumes that each member of the community has something to contribute if it can be got out of him. It does not for a moment assume that what each member contributes is of equal value.

Now if, with all this in mind, we approach the problem created by the large scale of political democracy, we shall say that what matters is not that the final decision of government should be assented to by every one, but that every one should have somehow made his contribution to that decision. There cannot possibly be one enormous discussion, but there may be smaller areas of discussion, and the results of these may be conveyed by the representative to a further discussion, and so on. If we examine the means by which non-political democratic societies which have grown beyond the area of a discussion group try to keep the society democratic, we find the process of representation at its best. A comparatively large voluntary society, with a membership running into thousands, can keep the real spirit of democracy provided that its primary units of discussion—its branches or lodges—are vigorous and alive. If that condition is fulfilled, representatives of branches may then meet by districts for common discussion, and representatives of district meetings may meet for discussion at the General Council of the whole society. The government of that most democratic of all religious societies—the Society of Friends—is an excellent example of this kind of representative democracy. Presbyterian government is another example. There the original unit of democratic church government—the congregation—is represented at the Presbyteries as Presbyteries are represented at Synod and General Assembly. What matters is that at all stages there should be effective discussion.

A. D. LINDSAY.

*The Essentials of Democracy* (1928)

PART II

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

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A CHINESE FABLE.

IN China there were once two large cities, Tchín and Tchan. A magnificent canal ran between them. The Emperor decided to place in it large blocks of rock to put it out of use. Hearing this Kouang, his first Mandarin, said to him "Son of Heaven, you are making a mistake" to which the Emperor answered "Kouang, you are talking foolishly". Of course I am only repeating here the substance of the dialogue. When three moons had passed the Celestial Emperor sent for the Mandarin and said to him "Look, Kouang", and Kouang opened his eyes and looked and he saw at some distance from the canal a multitude of men working—some excavating, some filling in, some levelling and others paving—and the Mandarin, who was a highly cultured man, said to himself "they are building a road".

At the end of three more moons, when the Emperor had sent for Kouang, he said to him, "Look", and Kouang looked, and he saw that the road was made and he noticed that inns had been built all along the road at regular intervals. A crowd of pedestrians, carriages and palanquins were coming and going and countless Chinamen, bowed down by fatigue, carried heavy loads backwards and forwards from Tchín to

and Tchan from Tchan to Tchin, and Kouang said to himself, "It is the destruction of the canal which has given work to these poor people", but it did not occur to him that this work was only diverted from other channels.

And three moons passed and the Emperor said to Kouang "Look" and Kouang looked, and he saw that the inns were always filled with travellers and that since these travellers were hungry the shops of butchers, bakers, grocers and sellers of swallows' nests were grouped round about, and that since these honest tradesmen could not go about naked, tailors, shoemakers, parasol and fan sellers had also been set up, and that since, even in the Celestial Empire, one does not sleep in the open, carpenters, masons and tilers had also come. Then there were police officers, Judges and fakirs. In other words, a town, with its suburbs, had grown up round each inn. And the Emperor said to Kouang "What do you think of it?" and Kouang answered, "I should never have thought that the destruction of a canal could furnish so much work for the people", for he did not realise that the work had not been created but only diverted; travellers had eaten just the same when they passed along the canal as when they were forced to use the road.

However, to the great surprise of the Chinese, the Emperor died and that Son of Heaven was buried. His successor called for Kouang and said to him "Clear the canal" and Kouang said to the new Emperor "Son of Heaven, you are making a mistake" and the Emperor replied, "Kouang you are talking foolishly". But Kouang insisted and said, "Sire, what is your aim". "My aim", said the Emperor, "is to facilitate the circulation of men and goods between Tchin and Tchan to make transport cheaper, so that the people may have their tea and clothes at lower prices". But Kouang was well prepared. The day before he had received some numbers of the *Industrial Monitor*, a Chinese journal. He had learned his lesson well and asked for permission to answer. When he had obtained it and had struck his forehead nine times on the floor, he said. "Sire, you are seeking by the facilitation of transport



to reduce the price of consumer goods so that they may be within the reach of the people and in order to do this you begin by taking away from them all the work which the destruction of the canal has created. Sire, in Political Economy the cheapness . . .” The Emperor: “I think you are reciting”. Kouang: “I am. It will be easier for me to read”, and having unfolded the *Esprit Publique* he read: “In political Economy the cheapness of goods is only of secondary importance. The problem lies in the balance between the price of labour and that of necessary commodities. Abundance of work makes for the prosperity of nations and the best economic system is that which affords them the greatest amount of work. Do not ask whether it is better to pay four cash or eight cash for a cup of tea or five tales or ten tales for a shirt. Those are trifles unworthy of serious thought. Nobody disagrees with your proposition. The question is whether it is better to pay more for an object and to have better means of acquiring it because of the abundance of work and high wages or whether it is not better to reduce the supply of work, diminish the volume of national production and transport goods by mechanical means so that they are cheaper, but at the same time deprive a section of our workers of the possibility of buying them even at these reduced prices”.

As the Emperor was not completely convinced Kouang said to him, “Sire, be good enough to listen. I have still *The Industrial Monitor* to quote”. But the Emperor said, “I do not need your Chinese journals to tell me that to create obstacles is to create work. But that is not my mission. Go and clear the canal. Then we will reform the Customs”. And Kouang went away tearing his beard and crying “Oh Fô! Oh Pê! Oh, Lî! and all the gods of Cathay with monosyllabic names and circumflexes, have pity on your people, for we have an Emperor of the English School and I can see that very shortly we will have nothing because we will no longer need to do anything”.

F. BASTIAT.

*Sophismes économiques* (1846)

## THE GRAND PANACEA

COMMERCE is the grand panacea, which, like a beneficent medical discovery, will serve to inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilization all the nations of the world. Not a bale of merchandise leaves our shores, but it bears the seeds of intelligence and fruitful thought to the members of some less enlightened community ; not a merchant visits our seats of manufacturing industry, but he returns to his own country the missionary of freedom, peace, and good government—whilst our steam boats, that now visit every port of Europe, and our miraculous railroads, that are the talk of all nations, are the advertisements and vouchers for the value of our enlightened institutions.

The foreign customers who visit our markets are not brought hither through fears of the power or the influence of British diplomatists : they are not captured by our fleets and armies : and as little are they attracted by feelings of love for us ; for that “there is no friendship in trade”, is a maxim equally applicable to nations and to individuals. It is solely from the promptings of self-interest, that the merchants of Europe, as of the rest of the world, send their ships to our ports to be freighted with the products of our labour. The self-same impulse drew all nations, at different periods of history, to Tyre, to Venice, and to Amsterdam ; and if, in the revolution of time and events, a country should be found (which is probable) whose cottons and woollens shall be cheaper than those of England and the rest of the world, then to that spot—even should it, by supposition, be buried in the remotest nook of the globe—will all the traders of the earth flock ; and no human power, no fleets or armies, will prevent Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds, from sharing the fate of their once proud predecessors in Holland, Italy and Phœnicia.

R. COBDEN.

*England, Ireland and America, 1835*

## FREE TRADE

I BELIEVE that, if you abolish the Corn-law honestly, and adopt Free Trade in its simplicity, there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in less than five years to follow your example . . . .

But I have been accused of looking too much to material interests. Nevertheless I can say that I have taken as large and great a view of the effects of this mighty principle as ever did any man who dreamt over it in his own study. I believe that the physical gain will be the smallest gain to humanity from the success of this principle. I look farther; I see in the Free-trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the universe,—drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language; and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace. I have looked even farther. I have speculated, and probably dreamt, in the dim future—ay, a thousand years hence—I have speculated on what the effect of the triumph of this principle may be. I believe that the effect will be to change the face of the world, so as to introduce a system of government entirely distinct from that which now prevails. I believe that the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires; for gigantic armies and great navies—for those materials which are used for the destruction of life and the desolation of the rewards of labour—will die away; I believe that such things will cease to be necessary, or to be used, when man becomes one family, and freely exchanges the fruits of his labour with his brother man. I believe that, if we could be allowed to reappear on this sublunary scene, we should see, at a far distant period, the governing system of this world revert to something like the municipal system; and I believe that the speculative philosopher of a thousand years hence will date the greatest revolution that ever happened in the world's history from the triumph of the principle which we have met here to advocate.

R. COBDEN.

*Speech of Jan. 15, 1846*

## MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A SPECTRE haunts Europe—the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance in order to lay this spectre: Pope and Tsar; Metternich and Guizot; French radicals and German police.

Where is the opposition party which has not been stigmatised as communist by those who wield power? Where is the opposition party which has not hurled back this scandalous charge of communism in the teeth of its adversaries, whether progressive or reactionary?

Two things may be deduced from this:

1. Communism is already acknowledged by all the European powers to be itself a power.

2. The moment has come for communists to make open proclamation of their outlook, their aims, their policy and to confront the old wives' tale of a communist spectre with a manifesto of their own party.

To this end, communists of various nationalities have assembled in London and have drafted the following manifesto, which will be published in English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish.

### I

#### BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS

The history of all human society, past and present, has been the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, baron and serf, guild-burgess and journeyman—in a word, oppressor and oppressed—stood in sharp opposition each to the other. They carried on perpetual warfare, sometimes masked, sometimes open and acknowledged—a warfare that invariably ended, either in a revolutionary change in the whole structure

of society, or else in the common ruin of the contending classes.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complex subdivision of society into different ranks, a manifold gradation of social positions. In ancient Rome, we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves. In the Middle Ages, we have feudal lords, vassals, guild-burgesses, journeymen, serfs; and within each of these classes there existed, in almost every instance, further gradations.

Modern bourgeois society, rising out of the ruins of feudal society, did not make an end of class antagonisms. It merely set up new classes in place of the old—new conditions of oppression, new embodiments of struggle.

Our own age, the bourgeois age, is distinguished by this—that it has simplified class antagonisms. More and more, society is splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes facing one another: bourgeoisie and proletariat.

From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the burgesses of the first towns, and from these burgesses sprang the first elements of the bourgeoisie.

The discovery of America and the circumnavigation of Africa opened up new fields to the rising bourgeoisie. The East Indian and the Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade with the colonies, the multiplication of the means of exchange and of commodities in general, gave an unprecedented impetus to commerce, navigation, and manufacturing industry, thus fostering the growth of the revolutionary element in decaying feudal society.

Hitherto industrial production had been carried on by the guilds that had grown up in feudal society; but this method could not cope with the increasing demands of the new markets. Manufacture replaced guild production. The guildsmen were elbowed out of the way by the industrial middle class; the division of labour between the various guilds or corporations was superseded by the division of labour in the individual workshop.

The expansion of the markets continued, for demand

was perpetually increasing. Even manufacture was no longer able to cope with it. Then steam and machinery revolutionised industrial production. Manufacture was replaced by modern large-scale industry (machino-facture); the place of the industrial middle class was taken by the industrial millionaires, the chiefs of fully equipped industrial armies, the modern bourgeoisie.

Large-scale industry established the world market, for which the discovery of America had paved the way. The result of the development of the world market was an immeasurable growth of commerce, navigation, and land communication. These changes reacted in their turn upon industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation and railways expanded, so did the bourgeoisie develop, increasing its capitalised resources and forcing into the background all the classes that lingered on as relics from the Middle Ages.

Thus we see that the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in methods of production and means of communication.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance. From an oppressed class under the dominion of the feudal lords, it became an armed and self-governing association in the commune; here an independent urban republic, there the taxable "third estate" under a monarchy. In the age of manufacture the bourgeoisie was the counterpoise of the nobility in the semi-feudal or in the absolute monarchy, and was in general the corner-stone of the great monarchies. Finally, it fought its way upwards, after the rise of large-scale industry and the establishment of the world market, to exclusive political hegemony in the modern representative State. The modern State authority is nothing more than a committee for the administration of the common affairs of the bourgeois class as a whole.

The bourgeoisie has played an extremely revolutionary role upon the stage of history.

· Wherever the bourgeoisie has risen to power, it has destroyed all feudal, patriarchal, and idyllic relationships. It has ruthlessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound men to their "natural superiors"; it has left no other bond betwixt man and man but crude self-interest and unfeeling cash payment. It has drowned pious zeal, chivalrous enthusiasm, and humdrum sentimentalism in the chill waters of selfish calculation. It has degraded personal dignity to the level of exchange value; and in place of countless separate chartered freedoms, it has set up one solitary unscrupulous freedom—freedom of trade. In a word, it has replaced exploitation veiled in religious and political illusions by exploitation that is open, unashamed, direct and brutal.

The bourgeoisie has robbed of their haloes occupations hitherto regarded with awe and veneration.

‡ Doctor, lawyer, priest, poet, and scientist, have all become its wage-labourers.

The bourgeoisie has torn the veil of sentiment from the family relationship, which has become an affair of money and nothing more.

The bourgeoisie has disclosed that the brute force of the Middle Ages (that brute force so greatly admired by the reactionaries) found a fitting counterpart in excessive indolence. The bourgeoisie was the first to show us what human activity is capable of achieving. It has executed works more marvellous than Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts and Gothic cathedrals; it has carried out expeditions surpassing by far the tribal migrations and the Crusades.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without incessantly revolutionising the instruments of production and, consequently, the relations of production, thus disrupting social relations as a whole. For all earlier industrial classes, the preservation of the old methods of production was the first condition of existence. That which characterizes the bourgeois epoch in contradistinction to all others is a continuous transformation of production, a perpetual disturbance of social conditions, everlasting insecurity and movement. All stable and

stereotyped relations, with their attendant train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away and what is formed in their place becomes obsolete before it can petrify. All that has been regarded as solid crumbles into fragments; all that was looked upon as holy is profaned; at long last, people are compelled to gaze open-eyed at their position in life and their social relations.

Urged onward by the need for an ever-expanding market, the bourgeoisie invades every quarter of the globe. It occupies every corner, forms settlements and sets up means of communication here, there and everywhere.

By the exploitation of the world market, the bourgeoisie has given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every land. To the despair of the reactionaries, it has deprived industry of its national foundation. Of the old-established national industries, some have already been destroyed and others are day by day undergoing destruction. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction is becoming a matter of life and death for all civilised nations—industries which no longer depend upon the homeland for their raw materials, but draw these from the remotest spots, industries whose products are consumed, not only in the country of manufacture, but the wide world over. Instead of the old wants, satisfied by the products of native industry, new wants appear, which can only be satisfied by the products of distant lands and unfamiliar climes. The old local and national self-sufficiency and isolation are replaced by a system of universal intercourse, of all-round interdependence of the nations. We see this in intellectual production no less than in material. The intellectual products of each nation are now the common property of all. National exclusiveness and particularism are fast becoming impossible. Out of the manifold national and local literatures, a world literature is arising.

By rapidly improving the means of production and by enormously facilitating communication, the bourgeoisie drags all the nations, even the most barbarous, into the orbit of civilisation. Cheap wares form the heavy artillery with which



it batters down Chinese walls and compels the most obstinate of barbarians to overcome their hatred of the foreigner. It forces all the nations, under pain of extinction, to adopt the capitalist method of production; it constrains them to accept what is called civilisation, to become bourgeois themselves. In short, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the countryside to the rule of the town. It has brought huge cities into being, vastly increasing the urban population as compared with the rural and thus removing a large proportion of the inhabitants from the seclusion and ignorance of rural life. Moreover, just as it has made the country dependent on the town, so it has made the barbarous and the semi-barbarous nations dependent upon the civilised nations, the peasant peoples upon the industrial peoples, the East upon the West.

More and ever more, the bourgeoisie puts an end to the dispersion of the means of production, of property, and of population. It has agglomerated population, centralised the means of production, and concentrated ownership into the hands of the few. Political centralisation has necessarily ensued. Independent or loosely federated provinces, with different interests, laws, governments, and customs tariffs, have been consolidated into a single nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one fiscal frontier.

During its reign of scarce a century, the bourgeoisie has created more powerful, more stupendous forces of production, than all preceding generations rolled into one. The subjugation of the forces of nature, the invention of machinery, the application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steamships, railways, electric telegraphs, the clearing of whole continents for cultivation, the making of navigable waterways, huge populations springing up as if by magic out of the earth—what earlier generations had the remotest inkling that such productive powers slumbered within the womb of associated labour?

We have seen that the means of production and communication which served as the foundation for the development of the

bourgeoisie, had been generated in feudal society. But the time came, at a certain stage in the development of these means of production and communication, when the conditions under which the production and the exchange of goods were carried on in feudal society, when the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacture, when (in a word) feudal property relations were no longer adequate for the productive forces as now developed. They hindered production instead of helping it. They had become fetters on production; they had to be broken; they were broken.

Their place was taken by free competition, in conjunction with the social and political system appropriate to free competition—the economic and political dominance of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on under our very eyes. Bourgeois conditions of production and communication, bourgeois property relations, modern bourgeois society, which has conjured up such mighty means of production and communication—these are like a magician who is no longer able to control the spirits his spells have summoned from the nether world. For decades the history of industry and commerce has been nothing but the history of the rebellion of the modern forces of production against the contemporary conditions of production, against the property relations which are essential to the life and the supremacy of the bourgeoisie. It is enough to mention the commercial crises which, in their periodic recurrence, become more and more menacing to the existence of bourgeois society. These commercial crises periodically lead to the destruction of a great part, not only of the finished products of industry, but also of the existing forces of production. During the crisis, a social epidemic breaks out, an epidemic that would have seemed absurdly paradoxical in all earlier phases of the world's history—an epidemic of over-production. Society temporarily relapses into barbarism. It is as if a famine, or a universal, devastating war, had suddenly cut off the means of subsistence. Industry and commerce have, to all seeming, been utterly destroyed.

Why is this? Because society has too much civilisation, too abundant means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of the community no longer serve to promote bourgeois property relations. Having grown too powerful for these relations, they find them a hindrance ; and when they overcome the obstacle they spread disorder throughout bourgeois society and endanger the very existence of bourgeois property. The bourgeois system is no longer able to cope with the abundance of the wealth it creates. How does the bourgeoisie overcome these crises? On the one hand by the compulsory annihilation of certain of the productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets and the more thorough exploitation of old ones. The result is that the way is paved for more widespread and more disastrous crises and that the capacity for averting such crises is lessened.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie overthrew feudalism are now being turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But the bourgeoisie has not only forged the weapons that will slay it; it has also engendered the men who will use these weapons—the modern workers, the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, that is to say capital, has developed, so also has the proletariat developed—the modern working class, the class of those who can only live so long as their work increases capital. These workers, who are forced to sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity like any other article of commerce and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition and to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the continually extended use of machinery and the division of labour, the work of these proletarians has completely lost its individual character and has thus forfeited all its charm for the workers. The worker has become a mere appendage to a machine; a person from whom nothing but the simplest, the most monotonous and the most easily acquired manipulations are expected. The cost of production of a worker, therefore, amounts to little more

than the cost of the means of subsistence he needs for his upkeep and for the propagation of his kind. Now, the price of a commodity, labour not excepted, is equal to the cost of producing it. Wages therefore decrease in proportion as the repulsiveness of the labour increases. Nay more; in proportion as the use of machinery and the division of labour increase, the burden of labour increases also—whether by the prolongation of working hours or by an increase in the amount of work exacted from the wage-earner in a given time (as by speeding up machinery, etc.).

Modern industry has transformed the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the huge factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of workers, crowded together in the factory, are organised in military fashion. As rankers in the industrial army, they are placed under the supervision of a hierarchy of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. They are not merely the slaves of the bourgeois class, of the bourgeois State; they are in daily and hourly thralldom to the machine, to the foreman, and, above all, to the individual bourgeois manufacturer. The more frankly this despotism avows gain to be its object, the more petty, odious, and galling does it become.

In proportion as manual labour needs less skill and less strength, that is to say in proportion as modern industry develops, the work of women and children tends to replace the work of men. Differences of age and sex no longer have any social significance for the working class. All are now mere instruments of labour whose price varies according to age and sex.

When the worker has been paid his wages in hard cash and has, for the time being, escaped from exploitation by the factory owner, he is promptly set upon by other members of the bourgeoisie: landlord, shopkeeper, pawn-broker, etc.

Those who have hitherto belonged to the lower middle class—small manufacturers, small traders, minor recipients of unearned income, handicraftsmen and peasants—slip down, one and all, into the proletariat. They suffer this fate, partly

because their petty capital is insufficient for the needs of large-scale industry and perishes in competition with the superior means of the great capitalists; and partly because their specialised skill is rendered valueless owing to the invention of new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

The proletariat passes through various stages of evolution, but its struggle against the bourgeoisie dates from its birth.

To begin with, the workers fight individually; then the workers in a single factory make common cause; then the workers at one trade combine throughout a whole locality against the particular bourgeois who exploits them. Their attacks are levelled not only against bourgeois conditions of production, but also against the actual instruments of production; they destroy the imported wares which compete with the products of their own labour, they break up machinery, they set factories ablaze, they strive to regain the lost position of the medieval worker.

At this stage the workers form a disunited mass, scattered throughout the country and severed into fragments by mutual competition. Such aggregation as occurs among them is not, so far, the outcome of their own inclination to unite, but is a consequence of the union of the bourgeoisie, which, for its own political purposes, must set the whole proletariat in motion, and can still do so at times. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their own enemies; they attack the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of the absolute monarchy, the landlords, the non-industrial bourgeois, and the petty bourgeois. The whole historical movement is thus concentrated into the hands of the bourgeoisie and every victory so gained is a bourgeois victory.

As industry develops, the proletariat does not merely increase in numbers; it is compacted into larger masses; its strength grows; it is more aware of that strength. Within the proletariat interests and conditions of life become ever more equalised; for machinery obliterates more and more the distinctions between the various crafts and forces wages

down almost everywhere to the same low level. As a result of increasing competition among the bourgeois themselves and of the consequent commercial crises, the workers' wages fluctuate more and more. The steadily accelerating improvement in machinery makes their livelihood increasingly precarious; more and more the collisions between individual workers and individual bourgeois tend to assume the character of collisions between the respective classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form coalitions against the bourgeois, closing their ranks in order to maintain the rate of wages. They found durable associations which will be able to give them support whenever the struggle grows acute. Here and there this struggle takes the form of riots.

From time to time the workers are victorious, though their victory is fleeting. The real fruit of their battles is not the immediate success, but their own continually increasing unification. Unity is furthered by the improvement in the means of communication which is effected by large-scale industry and brings the workers of different localities into closer contact. Nothing more is needed to centralise the manifold local contests, which are all of the same type, into a national contest, a class struggle. Every class struggle is a political struggle. The medieval burghers, whose means of communication were at best the roughest of roads, took centuries to achieve unity. Thanks to railways, the modern proletariat can join forces within a few years.

This organisation of the proletarians to form a class and therewith to form a political party is perpetually being disintegrated by competition among the workers themselves. Yet it is incessantly re-formed, becoming stronger, firmer, more aggressive. Profiting by dissensions among the bourgeoisie, it compels legislative recognition of some of the specifically working-class interests. That is how the Ten Hours Bill was secured in England.

Dissensions within the old order of society do much to promote the development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie is continually at odds—at first with the aristocracy, then with

those sections of the bourgeoisie whose interests conflict with the progress of industry and at all times with the bourgeoisie of foreign lands. In these struggles it is forced to appeal to the proletariat, to claim the help of the workers, and thus to draw them into the political arena. Consequently, the bourgeoisie provides the elements of education for the proletariat, thus supplying weapons which will be turned against itself.

Furthermore, as we have seen, the advance of industry precipitates whole sections of the ruling class into the proletariat or at least imperils their livelihood. These recruits to the proletariat also bring enlightenment into the ranks.

Finally, when the class war is about to be fought to a finish, disintegration of the ruling class and the old order of society becomes so active, so acute, that a small part of the ruling class breaks away to make common cause with the revolutionary class, the class which holds the future in its hands. Just as in former days part of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now part of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat. Especially does this happen in the case of some of the bourgeois intellectuals, who have achieved a theoretical understanding of the historical movement as a whole.

Among all the classes that confront the bourgeoisie to-day, the proletariat alone is really revolutionary. Other classes decay and perish with the rise of large-scale industry, but the proletariat is the most characteristic product of that industry.

The lower middle class—small manufacturers, small traders, handicraftsmen, peasant proprietors,—one and all fight the bourgeoisie in the hope of safeguarding their existence as sections of the middle class. They are, therefore, not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more; they are reactionary, for they are trying to make the wheels of history turn backwards. If they ever become revolutionary, it is only because they are afraid of slipping down into the ranks of the proletariat; they are then not defending their present interests, but their future interests; they are forsaking their own standpoint, in order to adopt that of the proletariat.

The slum proletariat, which is formed by the putrefaction

of the lowest strata of the old society, is to some extent entangled in the movement of a proletarian revolution. On the whole, however, thanks to their conditions of life, the members of the slum proletariat are far more apt to become the venal tools of the forces of reaction.

For the proletariat, nothing is left of the social conditions that prevailed in the old society. The proletarian has no property; his relation to wife and children is utterly different from the family relations of bourgeois life; modern industrial labour, the modern enslavement by capital (which is the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany) has despoiled him of his national characteristics. Law, morality, and religion have become for him so many bourgeois prejudices behind which bourgeois interests lurk in ambush.

The classes that have hitherto attained power have tried to safeguard their newly acquired position by subjecting society at large to the conditions by which they themselves gained their possessions. But the only way in which proletarians can secure control of the productive forces of society is by making an end of their own previous method of acquisition, and therewith of all the extant methods of acquisition. Proletarians have nothing of their own to safeguard; it is their business to destroy all existing securities and safeguards for private property.

All earlier movements have been movements of minorities or movements in the interests of minorities. The proletarian movement is an independent movement of the overwhelming majority in the interest of that majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot raise itself, cannot stand erect upon its feet, without disrupting the whole superstructure comprising the strata which make up that society.

In form, though not in substance, the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is primarily national. Of course, in any country, the proletariat has first of all to settle accounts with its own bourgeoisie.

In this outline sketch of the successive phases of proletarian development we have traced the course of the civil war latent



within the bosom of present-day society to the point at which it breaks out into open revolution, the point at which the proletariat, by forcibly overthrowing the bourgeoisie, establishes its own supremacy.

As we have seen, all human society, past and present, has been based upon the antagonism between oppressing and oppressed classes. But before a class can be oppressed it must have a modicum of security for its vital conditions, so that within these it can at least carry on its slavish existence. In the days of serfdom, the serf worked his way up to membership of the commune; similarly, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, the petty burgher became a bourgeois. But the modern worker, instead of rising as industry develops, sinks ever lower in the scale and even falls into conditions of existence below those proper to his own class. The worker is becoming a pauper, and pauperism is increasing even more rapidly than population and wealth. This plainly shows that the bourgeoisie is no longer fitted to be the ruling class in society, or to impose its own social system as the supreme law for society as a whole. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to provide security for its slaves even within the confines of their slavish existence, because it has no option but to let them lapse into a condition in which it has to feed them instead of being fed by them. Society cannot continue to live under bourgeois rule. This means that the life of the bourgeoisie has become incompatible with the life of society.

The chief requisite for the existence and the rule of the bourgeoisie is the accumulation of wealth in the hands of private individuals, the formation and increase of capital. The chief requisite for capital is wage labour. Now, wage labour depends exclusively upon competition among the workers. The progress of industry, which is promoted involuntarily and passively by the bourgeoisie, substitutes for the isolation of the workers by mutual competition their revolutionary unification by association. Thus the development of large-scale industry cuts from under the feet of the bourgeoisie the ground upon which capitalism controls production and

appropriates the products of labour. Before all, therefore, the bourgeoisie produces its own gravediggers. Its downfall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

## II

### PROLETARIANS AND COMMUNISTS

What position do communists occupy, in relation to the general body of proletarians?

Communists do not form a separate party conflicting with other working-class parties.

They have no interest apart from those of the working class as a whole.

They do not put forward any principles of their own in accordance with which they wish to mould the proletarian movement.

There are two respects only in which communists are distinguished from other proletarian parties: on the one hand, in the various national struggles of the proletarians, they emphasize and champion the interests of the proletariat as a whole, those proletarian interests that are independent of nationality; and, on the other hand, in the various phases of evolution in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie they always advocate the interests of the movement as a whole.

Thus, in actual practice, communists form the most resolute and persistently progressive section of the working class parties of all lands; whilst, as far as theory is concerned, being in advance of the general mass of the proletariat, they have come to understand the determinants of the proletarian movement and how to foresee its course and its general results.

The immediate aims of communists are identical with those of all other proletarian parties—the organization of the proletariat on a class basis, the destruction of bourgeois supremacy, and the conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The communistic theory is not in any way based upon ideas or principles discovered or formulated by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They serve merely to express in general terms the concrete circumstances of an actually existing class struggle, of a historical movement that is going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not a process exclusively characteristic of communism.

Throughout the course of history, property relations have been subject to continuous change and unceasing transformation.

For instance, the French revolution abolished the feudal system of ownership and put the bourgeois system of ownership in its place.

The distinctive feature of communism is, not the abolition of property in general, but the abolition of bourgeois property.

Modern bourgeois property is, however, the final and most perfect expression of the method of production and appropriation which is based upon class conflicts, upon the spoliation of the many by the few.

In this sense, communists can sum up their theory in the pithy phrase: the abolition of private property.

We communists have been accused of wishing to abolish the property that has been acquired by personal exertion—the property that is supposed to be the foundation of individual liberty, activity and independence.

We hear of hard-won property, acquired by work, earned property. Is this the petty-bourgeois or petty-peasant property which preceded bourgeois property? We do not need to abolish that kind of property, for industrial development has abolished it, or is doing so day by day.

Perhaps what is meant is modern bourgeois private property.

Does wage labour create property for the proletarianised worker? Not at all. It creates capital; and capital is the property which exploits wage labour, the property which

can multiply itself—provided always that it produces a fresh supply of wage labour for further exploitation. Property in its contemporary form subsists upon the antagonism between capital and wage labour. Let us examine the two terms of this opposition.

The capitalist has not merely a personal, but also a social position in the field of production. Capital is a collective product. It can only be set in motion by the joint activities of many members of society—in the last analysis, only by the joint activities of all the members of society.

Thus capital is not a personal, but a social force.

Consequently, when capital is transformed into collective property, into property that belongs to all the members of society, the change is not effected by a transformation of private property into social property. The only change is in the particular character of what is already social property.

Now let us turn to wage labour.

The average price of wage labour is the minimum wage. This means the amount of the necessaries of life requisite to keep the worker alive as a worker. Therefore all that the worker can appropriate thanks to his activity suffices merely to support his bare existence and to reproduce his kind. We have no wish to abolish this personal appropriation of the product of labour, which is indispensable for the production of the immediate necessaries of life—an appropriation which does not leave any surplus that can be used as a means for wielding power over another's labour. All that we want to abolish is the deplorable character of this appropriation and the system behind it, under which the worker lives only to increase capital, lives only in so far as his life serves the interest of the ruling class.

In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means for increasing the amount of stored labour. In communist society, stored labour is but a means for enlarging, enriching, furthering the existence of the workers.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past rules the present, but in communist society the present rules the past. In

bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, whereas the living person is dependent and lacks individuality.

Yet the bourgeoisie declares that to make an end of this state of affairs means to make an end of individuality and freedom! That is true enough. Certainly we are concerned to make an end of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence and bourgeois freedom.

Within the framework of the bourgeois system of production, freedom means free trade, free buying and selling.

Of course, when trade disappears, free trade will disappear too. Chatter about free trade, like all the rest of the talk about freedom, has a meaning only as regards the trade that was not free, as regards the enslaved burgher of the Middle Ages. It has no bearing upon the communist abolition of trade, upon the communist abolition of the bourgeois system of production and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are outraged because we wish to abolish private property. But in the existing society private property has been abolished for nine-tenths of the population; it exists only because these nine-tenths have none of it. Thus you reproach us for wanting to abolish a form of property which can only exist on condition that the immense majority of the members of the community have no property at all.

In a word, you accuse us of wanting to abolish your property. Well, we do!

Your contention is that the individual will cease to exist from the moment when labour can no longer be transformed into capital, money, land-rent; from the moment, in short, when it can no longer be transformed into a monopolisable social power; from the moment, that is to say, when individual property can no longer become bourgeois property.

You admit, therefore, that when you speak of individuals you are thinking solely of bourgeois, of the owners of bourgeois property. Certainly we wish to abolish individuals of that kind!

Communism does not deprive any one of the power of appropriating social products. It only does away with the

power of turning that appropriation to account as a means for the subjugation of another's labour.

The objection has been made that the abolition of private property will lead to the cessation of all activity and to the prevalence of universal sloth.

If this were true, bourgeois society would long since have perished of indolence; for in that society those who work do not acquire property and those who acquire property do not work. The whole criticism amounts to nothing more than the tautologous statement that when there is no more capital there will be no more wage-labour.

All the objections that have been urged against the communist method of producing and distributing material products have likewise been urged against the communist method of producing and distributing mental products. Just as for the bourgeois the disappearance of class property is tantamount to the disappearance of production, so, for him, the disappearance of class culture is identical with the disappearance of culture as a whole.

The culture whose loss he bewails is, for the overwhelming majority, a culture which makes human beings into machines.

Please do not argue with us by using your bourgeois notions of liberty, culture, right, etc., as the standards by which to judge the abolition of bourgeois property. Your ideas are themselves the outcome of bourgeois methods of production and of bourgeois property relations; just as your "right" is only the will of your class writ large as law—a will whose character and direction are determined by the material conditions under which your class lives.

Your interests lead you to think that your methods of production, your property relations, are eternal laws of nature and reason, instead of being transient outcomes of the course of production. Earlier ruling classes, now fallen from power, shared this delusion. You understand that it was a delusion as regards the property of classical days and as regards the property of feudal days; but you cannot see that it is no less a delusion as regards bourgeois property.

Abolition of the family! Even extreme radicals hold up their hands in horror when they speak of this shameful communist proposal.

On what is the family, the bourgeois family, based to-day? On capital, on private gain. In its fully developed form, it exists only for the bourgeoisie, and it has two complements: one of these is the destruction of the family life of proletarians the other is public prostitution.

Of course the bourgeois family will disappear with the disappearance of its complements, and the family and its complements will vanish when capital vanishes.

Do you reproach us for wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? We plead guilty to the charge!

Our determination to replace domestic education by social implies (you declare) a disregard of the most sacred of relationships.

But is the education you provide not socially determined? Is it not determined by the social conditions within whose framework you educate? Is it not determined directly or indirectly by society, acting through the schools, etc.? The influence of society upon education was not an original discovery of communists. They merely propose to change the character of the process by withdrawing education from the influence of the ruling class.

Bourgeois phrasemaking about the family and education, about the intimate relationships between parents and children, become more and more nauseating in proportion as the development of large-scale industry severs all the family ties of proletarians, and in proportion as proletarian children are transformed into mere articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

“But you communists want to make women common property!” shrieks the bourgeois chorus.

The bourgeois regards his wife as nothing but an instrument of production. He is told that the means of production are to be utilized in common. How can he help thinking that

this implies the communalisation of women as well as of all else?

He never dreams for a moment that our main purpose is to ensure that women shall no longer occupy the position of mere instruments of production.

Besides, nothing could be more absurd than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois about the official communalisation of women which the communists are supposed to advocate. Communists do not need to introduce community of women; it has almost invariably existed.

The members of the bourgeoisie, not content with having the wives and daughters of proletarians at their disposal (to say nothing of public prostitution) find one of their chief pleasures in seducing one another's wives!

Bourgeois marriage is in actual fact the community of wives. At worst, communists can only be charged with wanting to replace a hypocritical and latent community of women by an official and frankly acknowledged community. Moreover, it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production will lead to the disappearance of that form of the community of women which results therefrom—to the disappearance of official and unofficial prostitution.

Communists have likewise been accused of wanting to do away with country, with nationality.

The workers have no country. No one can take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all win political power, must make itself the ruling class, must raise itself to the position of a national class, must establish itself as the nation, it is, so far, still national, though by no means in the bourgeois sense of the term.

National distinctions and contrasts are already tending to disappear more and more as the bourgeoisie develops, as free trade becomes more general, as the world market grows in size and importance, as manufacturing processes and the resulting conditions of life become more uniform.

The rule of the proletariat will efface these distinctions



and contrasts even more. United action, among civilized countries at least, is one of the first of the conditions requisite for the emancipation of the workers.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another comes to an end, the exploitation of one nation by another will come to an end.

The ending of class oppositions within the nations will end the mutual hostilities of the nations.

The charges brought against communism upon religious or philosophical grounds, or (in general terms) upon ideological grounds are not worth detailed consideration.

Is much perspicacity needed to understand that when changes occur in people's mode of life, in their social relations or social system, there will also be changes in their ideas and outlooks and conceptions—in a word, that their consciousness will change?

What does the history of ideas prove, if not that mental production changes concomitantly with material production? In every epoch the ruling ideas have been the ideas of the ruling class.

It is customary to speak of ideas which revolutionize a whole society. This is only another way of saying that the elements of a new society have formed within the old one that the break-up of the old ideas has kept pace with the break-up of the old social relations.

When the classical world was in its decline, the old religions were conquered by Christianity. When Christian ideas were put to flight by eighteenth-century rationalism, it was at the time when feudal society was fighting for very existence against the bourgeoisie, which was then the revolutionary class. The abstract ideas termed "freedom of conscience" and "religious liberty" were but the expression of the supremacy of free competition within the realm of knowledge.

The objector will say:

✓ "It is true that religious, moral, philosophical, political, and legal notions have undergone changes in the course of

historical development. Nevertheless, amid these changes, religion, morality, philosophy, political science and law have persisted.

“Besides, there are eternal truths, such as liberty, justice, and the like, which are common to all social systems. But communism repudiates eternal truths, repudiates religion and morality instead of refashioning them and is thus at odds with the whole course of historical evolution.”

What does this accusation amount to? The history of all human society, past and present, has been the history of class antagonisms and these have taken different forms in different epochs.

Whatever form it may have assumed, the exploitation of one part of society by the other has been a fact common to all past ages. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of all the ages (despite manifold variations) has moved along lines of thought common to them all, along lines of thought that will necessarily persist until class opposition have vanished from the face of the earth.

The communist revolution is the most radical breach with traditional property relations. Need we be surprised that it should imply a no less radical breach with traditional ideas?

Enough of these bourgeois objections to communism!

We have already seen that the first step in the workers' revolution is to make the proletariat the ruling class, to establish democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy in order, by degrees, to wrest all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all the means of production into the hands of the State (that is to say, the proletariat organized as ruling class), and, as rapidly as possible, to increase the total mass of productive forces.

In the first instance, of course, this can only be effected by despotic inroads upon the rights of property and by despotic interference with bourgeois methods of production; that is to say, by measures which, however inadequate from

the purely economic standpoint, involve far-reaching consequences and are necessary as means for revolutionizing the whole system of production.

These measures will naturally differ from country to country.

In the most advanced countries they will, generally speaking, take the following forms:

1. Expropriation of landed property and the use of land-rents to defray State expenditure.
2. A vigorously graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of the right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all émigrés and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the State by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of transport in the hands of the State.
7. Increase of national factories and means of production, cultivation of uncultivated land and improvement of cultivated land in accordance with a general plan.
8. Universal and equal obligation to work; organization of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Agriculture and urban industry to work hand-in-hand, in such a way as, by degrees, to obliterate the distinction between town and country.
10. Public and free education of all children. Abolition of factory work for children in its present form. Education and material production to be combined.

When, in the course of social evolution, class distinctions have disappeared and when all the work of production has been concentrated into the hands of associated producers, public authority will lose its political character. Strictly speaking, political power is the organized use of force by one class in order to keep another class in subjection. When the proletariat, in the course of its fight against the bourgeoisie, necessarily consolidates itself into a class, by means of a revolution makes itself ruling class, and as such forcibly sweeps

away the old system of production, it sweeps away with it the system upon which class conflicts depend, makes an end of classes, and thus abolishes its own rule as a class.

The old bourgeois society, with its classes and class conflicts, will be replaced by an association in which the free development of each will lead to the free development of all.

### III

#### SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST LITERATURE

##### I. REACTIONARY SOCIALISM

###### (a) *Feudalistic Socialism*

By their historical situation, the aristocrats of France and England were called upon to write pamphlets against modern bourgeois society. The former in the July revolution of 1830 and the latter in the movement for parliamentary reform had once more been defeated by the hated upstart. A serious political struggle was thenceforward out of the question, and the only remaining possibility was a paper warfare. But even in the domain of literature the old cries of the Restoration period were outworn. To arouse sympathy, the aristocracy was forced to assume the mask of disinterestedness and to formulate its indictment against the bourgeoisie in terms which speciously professed the championship of working-class interests. The aristocrats were able to relieve their feelings by penning lampoons against their new masters and by uttering sinister prophecies of impending doom.

Such was the origin of feudalistic socialism; half jeremiad, half pasquinade; half an echo from the past, half a foreboding of the future; sometimes striking at the heart of the bourgeoisie with its mordant, witty, and devastating criticism; always ludicrous in its incapacity to understand the march of modern history.

As proletarian insignia these worthies brandished the mendicant's wallet, in the hope of rallying the people to

their cause. But whenever any came to follow them, these recruits observed the ancient feudalistic blazon which adorned the backs of the would-be leaders and incontinently dispersed with loud and irreverent laughter.

Some of the French legitimists and the members of the Young England group played this farce to perfection.

When the feudalists point out that the feudal method of exploitation was entirely different from bourgeois exploitation, the only thing they forget is that feudal exploitation was carried on in utterly different circumstances and under conditions that are now obsolete. When they show that in feudal days the modern proletariat did not exist, they ignore the fact that the modern bourgeoisie has been an inevitable outcome of feudal society.

Moreover, they make very little attempt to hide the reactionary trend of their criticism. Their chief grievance against the bourgeoisie is that the bourgeois system generates a class which will destroy the old social order.

They blame the bourgeoisie, not so much for having created a proletariat, as for having created a revolutionary proletariat.

In practical politics, therefore, they join in all coercive measures used against the workers. In ordinary life, despite their high-flown phrases, they stoop to pick up the golden apples; and they are always ready to barter loyalty, love, and honour, for wool, sugar-beet and distilled liquors.

In the old days priest and feudal magnate were sworn brothers; to-day, in like manner, Christian socialism marches hand-in-hand with feudalistic socialism.

What can be easier than to give Christian asceticism a socialist gloss? Has not Christianity fulminated also against private property, against marriage, and against the State? Have not charity and mendicancy, celibacy and the mortification of the flesh, monasticism and the Church, been severally extolled in place of these? Christian socialism is nothing but the Holy Water wherewith the priest sanctifies the aristocrat's discontent.

(b) *Petty-Bourgeois Socialism*

The feudal aristocracy is not the only class overthrown by the bourgeoisie; it is not the only class whose conditions of existence have atrophied and perished in modern society. The burghers of the medieval towns and the yeomen of the medieval countryside were the forerunners of the modern bourgeoisie. In lands where industry and commerce are backward this class still vegetates side by side with the evolving bourgeoisie.

In the countries where modern civilization flourishes, a new petty bourgeoisie has come into being. This class hovers between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and is perpetually being reconstituted as a supplementary component of bourgeois society. Thanks to the working of competition, the members of this intermediate stratum are being continually precipitated into the ranks of the proletariat. Indeed, with the evolution of large-scale industry, the day approaches when the petty bourgeoisie will cease to exist as an independent section of modern society. Alike in commerce and industry and agriculture its members will be replaced by overseers and underlings.

In such countries as France, where the peasantry comprises a good deal more than half the population, writers who espoused the cause of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie were naturally inclined to put a petty-bourgeois and petty-peasant gloss upon their criticisms of the bourgeoisie and to contemplate the workers' party from a petty-bourgeois outlook. That was the origin of petty-bourgeois socialism. Sismondi is the head of this school in England as well as in France.

We owe to this form of socialism a shrewd analysis of the contradictions inherent in modern methods of production. Petty-bourgeois socialism stripped the veil from the hypocritical apologies of the political economists. It gave an irrefutable demonstration of the disastrous effects of machinery

and the division of labour. It disclosed the concentration of capital and landed property; over-production; crises; the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeoisie and the yeoman class; the wretchedness of the proletariat; the anarchy of production: the flagrant inequalities in the distribution of wealth; the industrial wars the nations wage for mutual extermination: the break-up of the old manners and customs, the old family ties and the old nationalities.

But in its practical application this petty-bourgeois socialism strives towards two goals: either to bring about the re-establishment of the old methods of production and trade, and therewith the old property relationships and the old order of society; or else to cramp the modern means of production and trade within the framework of the old property relations—a framework which the new methods have perforce burst asunder by their expansion. In either case, petty-bourgeois socialism is both reactionary and Utopian.

The medieval system in manufacturing industry, and patriarchal relations in agriculture; these are its last words.

Now that stubborn historical facts have dispersed its cloudy dreams, petty-bourgeois socialism has succumbed to a fit of the blues.

(c) *German or "True Socialism"*

The socialist and communist literature of France, which originated under the tyrannical dominance of a bourgeois régime, is the literary expression of the struggle against this régime. It was introduced into Germany at a time when the bourgeoisie in that country was just beginning the fight against feudal absolutism.

German philosophers, or would-be philosophers, and men of letters greedily absorbed this literature. The only thing they overlooked was that French social conditions had not been imported into Germany side by side with French socialist literature. Confronted with German social conditions, French socialist literature had no importance in the world of practice.

Its bearing was literary and nothing more. It necessarily assumed the aspect of idle speculation concerning "the social embodiment of man's true nature". In like manner, for German philosophers at the close of the eighteenth century, the demands put forward in the first French revolution were merely the general demands of the "practical reason"; and it seemed to them that the manifestations of the will of the French bourgeois revolutionists were but the laws of the pure will, of will as it must be, of the genuine human will.

The sole contribution of German authors was that they harmonized the new French ideas with their own philosophical consciences; or, rather, that they appropriated the French ideas while retaining their own philosophical outlook.

They appropriated these ideas just as a foreign tongue is usually assimilated—by translation.

We know how the monks dealt with the manuscripts of the pagan authors of classical antiquity, writing over them absurd legends about the Catholic saints. German men of letters went the opposite way to work with the profane literature of France. They wrote their philosophical nonsense underneath the French original. For example, underneath the French criticism of money and its functions, they wrote, "alienation of the essence of mankind"; and underneath the French criticism of the bourgeois State they wrote, "overthrow of the supremacy of the abstract universal"; and so on.

They christened this interpolation of their philosophical phraseology into the French argumentation "philosophy of action", or "true socialism", or "the German science of socialism", or "the philosophical basis of socialism", or what not.

In this way, French socialist and communist literature was completely emasculated. In German hands, it ceased to be the expression of the class struggle. Consequently the Germans plumed themselves upon having transcended "French narrowness". They congratulated themselves because, instead of defending true needs, they had defended the "need for truth"; because, instead of championing the interests of the proletariat, they had championed the interests of



the essence of mankind, of that archetypal man who belongs to no class—and is therefore outside the domain of reality, and to be found only in the realm of philosophical fantasy.

This German socialism, which took its clumsy schoolboy exercises so seriously and trumpeted them in the market place as a cheapjack cries his wares, gradually lost the innocence of its early pedantry.

The struggle of the German bourgeoisie, and especially of the Prussian bourgeoisie, against the feudalists and the absolute monarchy—in other words, the liberal movement—now became something to be reckoned with.

Thus the “true” socialists were given the chance they had longed for; the chance of confronting the political movement with socialist demands; the chance of fulminating the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the Press, bourgeois law, bourgeois liberty and equality; the chance of haranguing the masses and telling them they had nothing to gain, everything to lose, from this bourgeois movement. German socialists found it convenient to forget that French criticism (of which German socialism was a futile echo) presupposed the existence of modern bourgeois society with the concrete conditions of existence corresponding thereto, and with the appropriate political constitution—the very things which had still to be fought for in Germany.

The German absolutist governments, with their train of parsons, pedagogues, country squires, and bureaucrats, found that “true” socialism was a welcome scarecrow to check the threatening advance of the bourgeoisie. It served as a welcome counterpart to the floggings and shootings with which these same governments had greeted the risings of the German workers.

Whilst in this way “true” socialism was a weapon useful to the governments in their fight against the German bourgeoisie, it also represented a directly reactionary interest, that of the German petty bourgeoisie. In Germany this class, dating from the sixteenth century and continually reappearing

in new forms, constitutes the real social foundation of the existing order.

The preservation of the petty bourgeoisie implies the maintenance of the existing order in Germany. The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens the petty bourgeoisie with destruction—on the one hand, owing to the concentration of capital, and, on the other hand, owing to the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. “True” socialism promised to kill both birds with one stone. The new doctrine spread like an epidemic.

The robe woven out of speculative cobwebs, brodered with flowers of rhetoric, steeped in a dew of sickly sentiment—this transcendental vesture in which the German socialists draped their meagre skeleton of “eternal verities”—was well designed to encourage the sale of the wares in the appropriate market.

German socialism, for its part, came more and more to recognize its mission as the grandiloquent champion of the petty bourgeoisie.

German socialists extolled Germany as the model among nations and the German petty bourgeois as the model among men. To all the meannesses of this exemplar they ascribed an esoteric, a higher, a socialist significance, so that each of them denoted its opposite. They went to the extreme of making a direct attack on communism for its “crudely destructive” trend, and of proclaiming their own unbiassed superiority to the class struggle. With trifling exceptions, all the so-called socialist and communist publications now circulating in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and enervating literature.

## 2. CONSERVATIVE OR BOURGEOIS SOCIALISM

There are certain bourgeois who desire to redress social grievances in order to safeguard bourgeois society.

To this category belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, welfare workers, charity organizers, members

of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind. This bourgeois socialism has been elaborated into vast systems.

Proudhon's *Philosophy of Poverty* is an instance.

Bourgeois socialists desire the conditions of life that characterize modern society without the struggles and the dangers which are the inevitable outcome of these conditions. They desire existing society, without its revolutionary and disintegrating elements. They desire the bourgeoisie without the proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally regards the world in which it rules as the best of all possible worlds. Bourgeois socialism elaborates this comforting notion into a partial or complete system. When it summons the workers to realize their plans and to enter the New Jerusalem, it is really doing no more than asking them to stay in society as it now is but to rid themselves of their animosity towards that society.

A second form of conservative or bourgeois socialism, less systematic than the former but more practical, is one whose adherents try to disgust the workers with every kind of revolutionary movement by proving that no political transformation can be of any use to the working class, that only a change in the material conditions of life, a change in economic conditions, can advantage the workers. When, however, socialists of this type speak of changing the material conditions of life, they have no thought of doing away with capitalist methods of production—for that can only be effected by revolution. They mean nothing more than administrative reforms within the framework of the existing methods of production, changes which would leave the existing relations between capital and wage-labour unaltered, and would (at best) help the bourgeoisie by lessening the cost and simplifying the technique of bourgeois rule.

Bourgeois socialism finds its most fitting expression in empty rhetorical flourishes.

Free trade, for the benefit of the working class; protection, for the benefit of the working class; prison reform, for the

benefit of the working class—these are the last words of bourgeois socialism, and the only ones that are seriously meant.

The essence of bourgeois socialism is the contention that the bourgeois are bourgeois for the benefit of the working class.

### 3. CRITICAL-UTOPIAN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

We are not concerned under this head with the literature which, in all great modern revolutions, has voiced the demands of the proletariat (the writings of Babeuf, etc.).

The first direct efforts made by the proletariat—in a time of general ferment, in a period when feudal society was being overthrown—to further its own interests as a class were necessarily futile, owing to the undeveloped condition of the proletariat itself, and owing to the non-existence of the material conditions requisite for the liberation of the workers (conditions which are only engendered during the bourgeois epoch). The revolutionary literature thrown up in connection with these early proletarian movements was inevitably reactionary. It preached universal asceticism and a crude egalitarianism.

Socialistic and communistic systems properly so-called, those of Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen, etc., originated during the first, comparatively undeveloped phase of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. (See above, under "Bourgeois and Proletarians".)

True, the inventors of these systems were aware of the existence of class conflicts and of disintegrating forces within the prevailing social system. But they could not discern in the proletariat the initiator either of an epoch-making change or even of an independent political movement.

Since, however, the development of class antagonisms goes hand in hand with the development of industry, these writers had no chance (in their day) of finding ready-made

the material conditions requisite for the liberation of the proletariat. They therefore tried to discover a social science, social laws, that would create these conditions.

So individual inventiveness had to take the place of social activity: imaginary conditions of liberation had to serve their turn instead of existing historical conditions: a social organization evolved out of the thinker's inner consciousness was the only available substitute for the gradual evolution of the class-organization of the proletariat. To them, the history of the future presented itself as nothing more than a record of the propagation and practical realization of their social fantasies.

Their firm conviction was, indeed, that in their schemes they were mainly representing the interests of the working class as the class that suffered most. The proletariat only existed for them in the aspect of the class that suffered most.

Owing to the undeveloped conditions of the class struggle in their day and to their own social position, they fancied themselves uplifted to a position sublimely above the class struggle. They wanted to improve the conditions of life for all members of society, even for those who were best off. They therefore continually appealed to society at large without distinction of class, or even, by preference, to the ruling class. Every one who understood their system would (so they thought) at once recognize it to be the best conceivable plan for establishing the best conceivable society.

They therefore renounced political activity and, above all, revolutionary activity. They wanted to attain their end by peaceful means; they tried, by the force of example and by small-scale experiments (foredoomed to failure) to prepare the way for the new gospel.

Such fancy pictures of the society of the future are painted at a time when the proletariat is still in a very primitive phase of development and therefore still takes a somewhat fanciful view of its own position. They give expression to the

workers' first instinctive aspirations towards a thoroughgoing transformation of society.

But these socialist and communist writings also contain critical elements. They attack all the foundations of the existing society and they therefore supply much matter which has been of great value in promoting the enlightenment of the workers. Their positive statements regarding the future society (for instance: the obliteration of the contrast between town and country; the abolition of the family, private gain, and wage-labour; the proclamation of social harmony; the transformation of the State into a mere instrument for the superintendence of production) give expression to different aspects of the disappearance of the class antagonisms which were then merely beginning to develop, and which the Utopians could as yet only discern in vague outline. That is why, as set forth by them, they still have a quite Utopian ring.

The importance of critical-Utopian socialism and communism is inversely proportional to their distance from our own time. As the modern class struggle develops and takes shape, the pose of being above the battle, the fantastic attitude of hostility to the class-war tactic, ceases to have either practical value or theoretical justification. The originators of these Utopian systems were in many respects revolutionary; but their disciples are reactionary sectarians, who cling to the obsolete formulas of the Utopian pioneers and ignore the progressive historical evolution of the proletariat. Logically enough, therefore, they try to damp down the class struggle and to mediate between the two opposing classes. They continue to dream of the experimental realization of their social Utopias—the establishment of isolated phalansteries; the founding of home colonies; the setting up of little Icarias—pocket editions of the New Jerusalem. For aid in the building of all these castles in the air they are forced to appeal to the philanthropy of bourgeois hearts and bourgeois money-bags. By degrees they join the category of the reactionary or conservative socialists described above, from whom they are

distinguished only by their more systematic pedantry and by the fanatical intensity of their superstitious belief in the miraculous efficacy of their social panacea.

That is why they are so fiercely opposed to political action on the part of the workers, for they think it cannot but be the expression of a blind lack of faith in their new gospel.

The Owenists in England oppose the Chartists, just as the Fourierists in France oppose those who give utterance to their views in the newspaper *La Réforme*.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. ATTITUDE OF COMMUNISTS TOWARDS THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION PARTIES

Section Two will have made evident the relationship between the communists and existing working-class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in the United States.

Communists fight on behalf of the immediate aims and interests of the working class, but in the movement of to-day they are also defending the movement of the future.

In France communists join forces with the social democrats against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, while reserving the right to maintain a critical attitude towards the phrasemaking and illusion that are part of the revolutionary heritage.

In Switzerland they support the radicals, without forgetting that this party is made up of conflicting elements, for some of its members are democratic socialists in the French meaning of the term, whereas others are radical bourgeois.

Among the Poles the communists support the party which considers an agrarian revolution essential to national liberation—the party which initiated the Cracow insurrection in 1846.

In Germany, whenever the bourgeoisie shows itself revolutionary, the Communist Party joins hands with it against

<sup>1</sup> A daily newspaper representing the views of Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc [ED.].

the absolutist monarchy, the feudalist squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.

The Communist Party never misses a chance of impressing upon the minds of the workers that there is an essential antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The aim is to show the German workers how the social and political conditions which the bourgeoisie inevitably establishes when it rises to power can be used as weapons against it, so that the fight against it in Germany must begin the very instant the reactionary classes have been overthrown.

Communists pay special attention to Germany. There are two reasons for this. First of all, Germany is upon the eve of a bourgeois revolution. Secondly, this revolution will take place under comparatively advanced conditions as far as the general civilization of Europe is concerned, and at a time when the German proletariat is much more highly developed than was the English proletariat in the seventeenth century or the French proletariat in the eighteenth. Consequently, in nineteenth-century Germany, the bourgeois revolution is destined to be the immediate precursor of a proletarian revolution.

In short, communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against existing social and political conditions.

In all these movements, communists bring the property question to the fore, regarding it as fundamental, no matter what phase of development it may happen to be in.

Finally, communists work everywhere to promote mutual understanding among the democratic parties of all lands and to bring about their unification.

Communists scorn to hide their views and aims. They openly declare that their purposes can only be achieved by the forcible overthrow of the whole existing social order. Let the ruling classes tremble at the prospect of a communist revolution. Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

**Proletarians of all lands unite!**

MARX AND ENGELS. (1848)



## FABIAN SOCIALISM

MR. WEBB'S historical review brought us from the "break up of the old syntheses" (his own phrase), a social system founded on a basis of religion, a common belief in a divine order, to the point where perplexed politicians, recognizing the futility of the principle of Individualism to keep the industrial machine in working order, with "freedom of contract" upon their lips, spent their nights in passing Factory Acts, and devoted their fiscal ingenuity to cutting slice after slice off incomes derived from rent and interest. His paper was an inductive demonstration of the failure of anarchy to meet the needs of real concrete men and women—a proof from history that the world moves from system, through disorder, back again to system.

Mr. Clarke showed us, also by the historic method, that given a few more years of economic progress on present lines, and we shall reach, *via* the Ring and the Trust, that period of "well defined confrontation of rich and poor" upon which German thought has settled as the brief stage of sociological evolution immediately preceding organic change.

The truth of this postulate of Teutonic philosophers and economists no one who has given to it a moment's serious thought is likely to call in question. Nor does anyone who has followed the argument developed in these lectures believe that the transition from mitigated individualism to full collectivity can be made until the capitalist system has worked itself out to its last logical expression. Till then, no political or social upheaval, however violent, nay, even though the "physical force revolutionists" should chase the Guards helter-skelter down Parliament Street and the Executive Committee of the Fabian Society hold its meetings in the Council Chamber of Windsor Castle, will be anything more than one of those "transient riots", spoken of by Mrs. Besant, which "merely

upset thrones and behead monarchs".<sup>1</sup> All sociologists I think, all Socialists I am sure, are agreed that until the economic moment has arrived, although the hungry or the ignorant may kick up a dust in Whitechapel and make a bloody puddle in Trafalgar Square, the Social Revolution is impossible. But I, for my part, do not believe in the even temporary rout of the Household Brigade, nor indeed in any popular outbreak not easily suppressible by the Metropolitan police; and I shall waste no time in discussing that solution of the social problem of which more was heard in the salad days of the English Socialist movement—in its pre-Fabian era—than now, *viz.*, physical force employed by a vigorous few. The physical force man, like the privileged Tory, has failed to take note of the flux of things, and to recognize the change brought about by the ballot. Under a lodger franchise the barricade is the last resort of a small and desperate minority, a frank confession of despair, a reduction to absurdity of the whole Socialist case. Revolutionary heroics, natural and unblameable enough in exuberant puerility, are imbecile babblement in muscular adolescence, and in manhood would be criminal folly.

Let us assume then that the present economic progress will continue on its present lines. That machinery will go on replacing hand labour; that the joint stock company will absorb the private firm, to be, in its turn, swallowed up in the Ring and the Trust. That thus the smaller producers and distributors will gradually, but at a constantly increasing pace, be squeezed out and reduced to the condition of employees of great industrial and trade corporations, managed by highly skilled captains of industry, in the interests of idle shareholders.

In a parliamentary State like ours, the economic cleavage, which divides the proprietors from the propertyless, ever growing wider and more clearly defined, must have its analogue in the world of politics. The revolution of the last century, which ended in the installation of the Grand Industry,

<sup>1</sup> It is to the half conscious recognition of this generalization that the disappearance of militant Republicanism among the English working classes is owing.

was the last of the great unconscious world changes. It was helped by legislation of course; but the help was only of the negative and destructive sort. "Break our fetters and let us alone", was the cry of the revolutionists to Parliament. The law-makers, not knowing quite what they were doing, responded, and then blithely contracted debts, and voted money for commercial wars. Such a sight will never be seen again. The repeated extension of the suffrage has done more than make the industrial masses articulate, it has given them consciousness; and for the future the echo of the voices of those who suffer from economic changes will be heard clamouring for relief within the walls of St. Stephen's and the urban guildhalls.

Thus the coming struggle between "haves" and "have nots" will be a conflict of parties each perfectly conscious of what it is fighting about and fully alive to the life and death importance of the issues at stake.

I say "will be"; for one has only to read a few speeches of political leaders or attend a discussion at a workman's club to be convinced that at present it is only the keener and more alert minds on either side which are more than semi-conscious of the true nature of the campaign of which the first shots may even now be heard at every bye-election.

But as nothing makes one so entirely aware of one's own existence as a sharp spasm of pain; so it is to the suffering—the hunger, the despair of to-morrow's dinner, the anxiety about the next new pair of trousers—wrought by the increasing economic pressure upon the enfranchised and educated proletariat that we must look to awaken that free self-consciousness which will give the economic changes political expression, and enable the worker to make practical use of the political weapon which are his.

The outlook then from the point of view of this paper is a political one—one in which we should expect to see the world political gradually becoming a reflex of the world economic. That political should be slow in coming into line with economic facts is only in accordance with all that the past

history of our country has to teach us. For years and decades the squirearchy retained an influence in the House of Commons out of all proportion to its potency as an economic force; and even at this moment the "landed interest" bears a much larger part in law-making than that to which its real importance entitles it. Therefore we must be neither surprised nor dispirited if, in a cold-blooded envisagement of the condition of English parties, the truth is borne in upon us that the pace of political progress has no proper relation to the rate at which we are travelling towards Socialism in the spheres of thought and industry.

This fact is probably—nay almost certainly—very much more patent to the socialist and the political student than to the man in the street, or even to him of the first-class railway carriage. The noisy jubilation of the Radical press over the victory of a Home Ruler at a bye-election, at a brief and vague reference to the "homes of the people" in a two hours' speech from a Liberal leader, or at the insertion of a "social" plank in a new annual programme, is well and cleverly calculated to beguile the ardent democrat, and strike cold terror to the heart of the timorous Tory. But a perfectly impartial analysis of the present state of parties will convince the most sanguine that the breath of the great economic changes dealt with in Mr. Clarke's paper has as yet scarcely ruffled the surface of the House of Commons.

When the syllabus of this course of lectures was drawn up, those who were responsible for it suggested as the first sub-heading of this paper, the well-worn phrase, "The disappearance of the Whig". It is a happy expression, and one from the contemplation of which much comfort may be derived by an optimistic and unanalytical temperament. Printed are at this disadvantage compared with spoken words, they fail to convey the nicer *nuances* of meaning bestowed by tone and emphasis; and thus the word "disappearance" meets the eye, carrying with it no slightest suggestion of irony. Yet the phrase is pointless, if not "meant surcarstic"; for so far is the Whig from "disappearing", that he is the great political fact of the day.

To persons deafened by the daily democratic shouting of the Radical newspapers this assertion may require some confirmation and support. Let us look at the facts then. The first thing which strikes us in connexion with the present Parliament is that it no longer consists of two distinct parties, *i.e.*, of two bodies of men differentiated from each other by the holding of *fundamentally* different principles. Home Rule left out,<sup>1</sup> there remains no reason whatever, except the quite minor question of Disestablishment, why even the simulacrum of party organization should be maintained, or why the structural arrangements of the House of Commons should not be so altered as to resemble those of a town hall, in which all the seats face the chair.

But fifty years ago the floor of the House was a frontier of genuine significance; and the titles "Whig" and "Tory" were word-symbols of real inward and spiritual facts. The Tory party was mostly made up of men who were conscientiously opposed to popular representation, and prepared to stand or fall by their opposition. They held, as a living political creed, that the government of men was the eternal heritage of the rich, and especially of those whose riches spelt rent. The Whigs, on the other hand, believed, or said they believed, in the aphorism "*Vox populi, vox Dei*"; and they, on the whole, consistently advocated measures designed to give that voice a distincter and louder utterance. Here, then, was one of those fundamental differences in the absence of which party nomenclature is a sham. But there was another. In the first half of this century the Tories, hidebound in historic traditions and deaf to the knell of the old *régime* tolling in the thud, thud, of the piston rods of the new steam engines, clung pathetically to the old ideas of the functions of the State and to territorial rights. The Whigs went for *laissez-faire* and the consequent supremacy of the business man. I am making a perfectly provable

<sup>1</sup> The difference of principle here is more apparent than real. The Gladstonians repudiate any desire for separation, and affirm their intention of maintaining the absolute veto of the imperial Parliament; while the Unionists avow their ultimate intention of giving to Ireland the same powers of self-government now enjoyed, or to be enjoyed by England and Scotland.

proposition when I say that all the political disputes<sup>1</sup> which arose between the Revolution of 1688 and the enfranchisement of the £10 householder by Disraeli had their common cause in one of these two root differences. But the battle has long ago been lost and won. The Whigs have triumphed all along the line. The Tories have not only been beaten, they have been absorbed. A process has gone on like that described by Macaulay as following on the Norman invasion, when men gradually ceased to call themselves Saxon and Norman and proudly boasted of being English. The difference in the case before us is that while the Tories have accepted the whole of the Whig principles they still abjure the Whig name.

No so-called Conservative to-day will venture on opposing an extension of the Franchise on the plain ground of principle. At most he will but temporise and plead for delay. No blush of conscious inconsistency suffused Mr. Ritchie's swarthy features when introducing his "frankly democratic" Local Government Bill. And rightly not; for he was doing no violence to party principles.

In the matter of the functions of the State the absorption of the Tory is not quite so obvious, because there never has been, and, as long as Society lasts, never can be, a *parti sérieux* of logical *laisser-faire*. Even in the thick of the Industrial Revolution the difference between the two great parties was mainly one of tendency—of attitude of mind. The Tory had a certain affection for the State—a natural self-love: the Whig distrusted it. This distrust is now the sentiment of the whole of our public men. They see, some of them perhaps more clearly than others, that there is much the State must do; but they all wish that much to be as little as possible. Even when, driven by an irresistible force which they feel but do not understand (which none but the Socialist does or can understand), they bring forward measures for increasing the power of the whole over the part, their arguments are always suffused in a sickly halo of apology: their gestures are always

<sup>1</sup> The battles for Catholic Emancipation and the removal of the religious disabilities were fought on sectarian rather than on political grounds.

those of timorous deprecation and fretful diffidence. They are always nervously anxious to explain that the proposal violates no principle of political economy, and with them political economy means, not Professor Sidgwick, but Adam Smith.

The reason why this unanimity of all prominent politicians on great fundamental principles is not manifest to the mind of the average man is that, although there is nothing left to get hot or even moderately warm about, the political temperature is as high as ever. It is not in the dust of the arena, but only in the repose of the auditorium that one is able to realize that men will fight as fiercely and clapper-claw each other as spitefully over a dry bone as over a living principle. One has to stand aside awhile to see that politicians are like the theological controversialists of whom Professor Seeley somewhere says that they never get so angry with each other as when their differences are almost imperceptible, except perhaps when they are quite so.

Both the efficient and the final cause of this unanimity is a sort of unconscious or semi-conscious recognition of the fact that the word "State" has taken to itself new and diverse connotations—that the State idea has changed its content. Whatever State control may have meant fifty years ago it never meant hostility to private property as such. Now, for us, and for as far ahead as we can see, it means that and little else. So long as the State interfered with the private property and powers of one set of proprietors with a view only to increasing those of another, the existence of parties for and against such interference was a necessity of the case. A duty on foreign corn meant the keeping up of incomes drawn from rent<sup>1</sup>: its abolition meant a rise on manufacturers' profits. "Free Trade," swelled the purses of the new *bourgeoisie*: the Factory Acts depleted them, and gave a sweet revenge to the rent-docked squire. But of this manipulation of the legislative

<sup>1</sup> This is perhaps not, historically, quite true; but the landlords believed that their own prosperity depended upon the exclusion of foreign corn, and that is sufficient for the purpose of my argument.

machine for proprietors' purposes we are at, or at least in sight of, the end. The State has grown bigger by an immense aggregation of units, who were once to all intents and purposes separate from it; and now its action generally points not to a readjustment of private property and privileges as between class and class, but to their complete disappearance. So then the instinct which is welding together the propertied politicians is truly self-preservative.

But, it may be asked by the bewildered Radical, by the tremulous Conservative, by the optimistic Socialist, if the political leaders are really opposed to State augmentation, how comes it that every new measure of reform introduced into the House of Commons is more or less coloured with Socialism, and that no popular speaker will venture to address a public meeting without making some reference of a socialistic sort to the social problem? Why, for instance, does that extremely well-oiled and accurately poised political weathercock, Sir William Harcourt, pointing to the dawn, crow out that "we are all Socialists now"?

To these questions (and I have not invented them) I answer: in the first place because the opposition of the political leaders is instinctive, and only, as yet, semi-conscious, even in the most hypocritical; in the second place, that a good deal of the legislative Socialism appears more in words than in deeds; in the third place that the famous flourish of Sir William Harcourt was a rhetorical falsehood; and fourthly, because, fortunately for the progress of mankind, self-preservative instincts are not peculiar to the propertied classes.

For it is largely instinctive and wholly self-preservative, this change in the position of the working people towards the State—this change by which, from fearing it as an actual enemy, they have come to look to it as a potential saviour. I know that this assertion will be violently denied by many of my Socialist brethren. The fly on the wheel, not unnaturally, feels wounded at being told that he is, after all, not the motive power; and the igniferous orators of the Socialist party are welcome, so far as I am concerned, to all the comfort they can



get from imagining that they, and not any great, blind, evolutionary forces are the dynamic of the social revolution. Besides, the metaphor of the fly really does not run on all fours (I forget, for the moment, how many legs a fly has); for the Socialist does at least know in what direction the car is going, even though he is not the driving force. Yet it seems to me that the part being, and to be played by the Socialist, is notable enough in all conscience; for it is he who is turning instinct into selfconscious reason; voicing a dumb demand; and giving intelligent direction to a thought wave of terrific potency.

There is a true cleavage being slowly driven through the body politic; but the wedge is still beneath the surface. The signs of its workings are to be found in the reactionary measures of pseudo reform advocated by many prominent politicians; in the really Socialist proposals of some of the obscurer men; in the growing distaste of the political club man for a purely political pabulum; and in the receptive attitude of a certain portion of the cultivated middle class towards the outpourings of the Fabian Society.

This conscious recognition of the meaning of modern tendencies, this defining of the new line of cleavage, while it is the well-spring of most of the Socialist hopes, is no less the source of some lively fear. At present it is only the acuter and more far-seeing of the minds amongst the propertied classes who are at all alive to the real nature of the attack. One has but to listen to the chatter of the average Liberal candidate to note how hopelessly blind the man is to the fact that the existence of private property in the means of production forms any factor at all in the social problem; and what is true of the rank and file is true only in a less degree of the chiefs themselves. Ignorance of economics and inability to shake their minds free of eighteenth century political philosophy<sup>1</sup> at present hinder the leaders of the "party of progress" from taking up a definite position either for or against the advance of the new ideas. The

<sup>1</sup> Cf. The speeches of Mr. John Morley on the eight hours' proposal and the taxation of ground rents. Also the recent writings of Mr. Bradlaugh, *passim*.

number of English statesmen who, like Prince Bismarck, see in Socialism a swelling tide whose oceanic rush must be broken by timely legislative breakwaters, is still only to be expressed by a minus quantity. But this political myopia is not destined to endure. Every additional vote cast for avowed Socialist candidates at municipal and other elections will help to bring home to the minds of the Liberals that the section of the new democracy which regards the ballot merely as a war-engine with which to attack capitalism is a growing one. At last our Liberal will be face to face with a logical but irritating choice. Either to throw over private capital or to frankly acknowledge that it is a distinction without a difference which separates him from the Conservatives against whom he has for years been fulminating.

At first sight it looks as though this political moment in the history of the Liberal party would be one eminently auspicious for the Socialist cause. But although I have a lively faith in the victory of logic in the long run, I have an equally vivid knowledge that to assure the triumph the run must be a very long one; and above all I have a profound respect for the staying powers of politicians, and their ability to play a waiting game. It is one thing to offer a statesman the choice of one of two logical courses: it is another to prevent his seeing a third, and an illogical one, and going for it. Such prevention in the present case will be so difficult as to be well nigh impossible; for the Liberal hand still holds a strong suit—the cards political.

It is quite certain that the social programme of our party will become a great fact long before all the purely political proposals of the Liberals have received the Royal assent; and the game of the politician will be to hinder the adoption of the former by noisily hustling forward the latter. Unfortunately for us it will be an easy enough game to play. The scent of the non-Socialist politician for political red herrings is keen, and his appetite for political Dead Sea fruit prodigious. The number of "blessed words", the mere sound of which carries content to his soul, would fill a whole page. In an age of self-seeking his pathetic self-abnegation would be refreshing were it not so

desperately silly. The young artizan on five-and-twenty shillings a week, who with his wife and children occupies two rooms in "a model", and who is about as likely to become a Lama as a leaseholder, will shout himself hoarse over Leaseholds' Enfranchisement, and sweat great drops of indignation at the plunder of rich West End tradesmen by rich West End landlords. The "out of work", whose last shirt is in pawn, will risk his skull's integrity in Trafalgar Square in defence of Mr. O'Brien's claim to dress in gaol like a gentleman.

Of course all this is very touching: indeed, to be quite serious, it indicates a nobility of character and breadth of human sympathy in which lies our hope of social salvation. But its infinite potentiality must not blind us to the fact that in its actuality the dodgy Liberal will see his chance of the indefinite postponement of the socializing of politics. Manhood suffrage, Female suffrage, the woes of deceased wives' sisters, the social ambition of dissenting ministers, the legal obstacles to the "free" acquirement of landed property, home rule for "dear old Scotland" and "neglected little Wales", extraordinary tithes, reform of the House of Lords: all these and any number of other obstacles may be successfully thrown in the way of the forward march of the Socialist army. And the worst of it all is that in a great part of his obstructive tactics the Liberal will have us on the hip; for to out-and-out democratization we are fully pledged, and must needs back up any attack on hereditary or class privilege, come it from what quarter it may.

But, to get back to our metaphor of the card table (a metaphor much more applicable to the games of political men), the political suit does not exhaust the Liberal hand. There still remains a card to play—a veritable trump. Sham Socialism is the name of it, and Mr. John Morley the man to plank it down.

I have said above that the trend of things to Socialism is best shown by the changed attitude of men towards State interference and control; and this is true. Still it must not be forgotten that although Socialism involves State control, State control does not imply Socialism—at least in any modern

meaning of the term. It is not so much to the thing the State does, as to the end for which it does it that we must look before we can decide whether it is a Socialist State or not. Socialism is the common holding of the means of production and exchange, and *the holding of them for the equal benefit of all*. In view of the tone now being adopted by some of us<sup>1</sup> I cannot too strongly insist upon the importance of this distinction; for the losing sight of it by friends, and its intentional obscuration by enemies, constitute a big and immediate danger. To bring forward sixpenny telegrams as an instance of State Socialism may be a very good method of scoring a point off an individualist opponent in a debate before a middle-class audience; but from the standpoint of the proletariat a piece of State management which spares the pockets only of the commercial and leisured classes is no more Socialism than were the *droits de Seigneur* of the middle ages. Yet this is the sort of sham Socialism which it is as certain as death will be doled out by the popular party in the hope that mere State action will be mistaken for really Socialist legislation. And the object of these givers of Greek gifts will most infallibly be attained if those Socialists who know what they want hesitate (from fear of losing popularity, or from any more amiable weakness) to clamour their loudest against any and every proposal whose adoption would prolong the life of private Capital a single hour.

But leaving sham Socialism altogether out of account, there are other planks in the Liberal "and Radical" programme which would make stubborn barriers in the paths of the destroyers of private capital. Should, for instance, Church disestablishment come upon us while the *personnel* of the House of Commons is at all like what it is at present, few things are more certain than that a good deal of what is now essentially collective property will pass into private hands; that the number of individuals interested in upholding ownership will be increased; and that the only feelings gratified

<sup>1</sup> One of the most indefatigable and prolific members of the Socialist party, in a widely circulated tract, has actually adduced the existence of *hawkers' licences* as an instance of the "Progress of Socialism".

will be the acquisitiveness of these persons and the envy of Little Bethel.

Again, the general state of mind of the Radical on the land question is hardly such as to make a Socialist hilarious. It is true your "progressive" will cheer Henry George, and is sympathetically inclined to nationalization (itself a "blessed word"); but he is not all sure that nationalization, free land, and peasant proprietorship, are not three names for one and the same proposal. And, so far as the effective members of the Liberal party are concerned, there is no question at all that the second and third of these "solutions" find much more favour than the first. In fact, in this matter of the land, the method of dealing with which is of the very propædeutics of Socialism, the Radical who goes for "free sale" or for peasant ownership, is a less potent revolutionary force than the Tory himself; for this latter only seeks to maintain in land the state of things which the Ring and Trust maker is working to bring about in capital<sup>1</sup>—and on the part which *he* is playing in economic evolution we are all agreed.

From such dangers as these the progress of democracy is, by itself, powerless to save us; for although always and everywhere democracy holds Socialism in its womb, the birth may be indefinitely delayed by stupidity on one side and acuteness on the other.

I have gone at some length into an analysis of the possible artificial hindrances to Socialism, because owing to the amiability and politeness shown us by the Radical left wing during the last twelve months; to the successes which Radical votes have given to some of our candidates at School Board and other elections; and to the friendly patronage bestowed upon us by certain "advanced" journals, some of our brightest, and otherwise most clear-sighted, spirits have begun to base high hopes upon what they call "the permeation" of the Liberal party. These of our brothers have a way of telling us that the

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that those organs of the Press which are devoted more particularly to the landed interest have been the first to hint at the probable desirability of dealing with great *industrial* monopolies by means of legislation.

transition to Socialism will be so gradual as to be imperceptible, and that there will never come a day when we shall be able to say "now we have a Socialist State". They are fond of likening the simpler among us who disagree with them as to the extreme protraction among us of the process, to children who having been told that when it rains a cloud falls, look disappointedly out of the window on a wet day, unconscious that the cloud is falling before their eyes in the shape of drops of water. To these cautious souls I reply that although there is much truth in their contention that the process will be gradual, we shall be able to say that we have a Socialist State on the day on which no man or group of men holds, over the means of production, property rights by which the labour of the producers can be subjected to exploitation; and that while their picturesque metaphor is a happy as well as a poetic conceit, it depends upon the political acumen of the present and next generation of Socialist men whether the "cloud" shall fall in refreshing Socialist showers or in a dreary drizzle of Radicalism, bringing with it more smuts than water, fouling everything and cleansing nowhere.

This permeation of the Radical Left, undoubted fact though it is of present day politics, is worth a little further attention; for there are two possible and tenable views as to its final outcome. One is that it will end in the slow absorption of the Socialist in the Liberal party, and that by the action of this sponge-like organism the whole of the Rent and Interest will pass into collective control without there ever having been a party definitely and openly pledged to that end. According to this theory there will come a time, and that shortly, when the avowed Socialists and the much socialized Radicals will be strong enough to hold the balance in many constituencies, and sufficiently powerful in all to drive the advanced candidate many pgs further than his own inclination would take him. Then, either by abstention or by actual support of the reactionary champion at elections, they will be able to threaten the Liberals with certain defeat. The Liberals, being traditionally squeezable folk (like all absorbent bodies), will thus be forced

to make concessions and to offer compromises; and will either adopt a certain minimum number of the *Socialistic* proposals, or allow to Socialists a share in the representation itself. Such concessions and compromises will grow in number and importance with each successive appeal to the electorate, until at last the game is won.

Now it seems to me that these hopefuls allow their desires to distort their reason. The personal equation plays too large a part in the prophecy. They are generally either not yet wholly socialized Radicals or Socialists who have quite recently broken away from mere political Radicalism and are still largely under the influence of party ties and traditions. They find it almost impossible to believe that the party with which they acted so long, so conscientiously, and with so much satisfaction to themselves, is, after all, not the party to which belongs the future. They are in many cases on terms of intimate private friendship with some of the lesser lights of Radicalism, and occasionally bask in the patronizing radiance shed by the larger luminaries. A certain portion of the "advanced" press is open to them for the expression of their views political. Of course none of these considerations are at all to their discredit, or reflect in the very least upon their motives or sincerity; but they do colour their judgment and cause them to reckon without their host. They are a little apt to forget that a good deal of the democratic programme has yet (as I have said above) to be carried. Manhood suffrage, the abolition of the Lords, disestablishment, the payment of members: all these may be, and are, quite logically desired by men who cling as pertinaciously to private capital as the doughtiest knight of the Primrose League. Such men regard the vital articles of the Socialist creed as lying altogether outside the concrete world—"the sphere of practical politics". Meanwhile the Socialist votes and voices are well within that sphere; and it is every day becoming more evident that without them the above-mentioned aspirations have a meagre chance of realization. Now, from the eminently business-like Liberal standpoint there is no reason whatever why

concessions should not be made to the Socialist at the polling booth so long as none are asked for in the House of Commons. And even when they are demanded, what easier than to make some burning political question play the part which Home Rule is playing now? Thus an endless vista of office opens before the glowing eyes of the practical politician—those short-sighted eyes which see so little beyond the nose, and which, at that distance only, enable their owner to hit the white.

The Radical is right as usual in counting on the Socialist alliance up to a certain point. For us the complete democratization of institutions is a political necessity. But long before that complete democratization has been brought about we shall have lost our patience and the Radicals their temper.

For as Mr. Hyndman tells the world with damnable (but most veracious) iteration, we are “a growing party”. We recruit by driblets; but we do recruit; and those who come to us come, like all the new American newspapers, “to stay”. Our *faith*, our reason, our knowledge, tell us that the great evolutionary forces are with us; and every addition to our ranks causes us, in geometrical proportion, to be less and less tolerant of political prevarication. Directly we feel ourselves strong enough to have the slightest chance of winning off our own bat we shall be compelled both by principle and inclination to send an eleven to the wickets. They will have to face the opposition, united or disunited, of both the orthodox parties, as did the defeated Socialist candidates at the School Board election in November, 1888. And whether our success be great or small, or even non-existent, we shall be denounced by the Radical wire-pullers and the now so complaisant and courteous Radical Press. The alliance will be at an end.

There is yet another way in which we may win the ill-will of our temporary allies and, at present, very good friends. I have spoken above of certain reactionary items of a possible Radical programme, which, although they have a grotesque resemblance to Socialism, are worlds away from being the thing itself. These proposals we not only cannot support, but



must and shall actively and fiercely oppose. At the first signs of such opposition to whoever may be the Liberal shepherd of the moment the whole flock of party sheep will be in full cry upon our track. The ferocity of the *mouton enragé* is proverbial; and we shall be treated to the same rancour, spleen, and bile which is now so plenteously meted out to the Liberal Unionists.

The immediate result of this inevitable split will be the formation of a definitely Socialist party, *i.e.*, a party pledged to the communalization of all the means of production and exchange, and prepared to subordinate every other consideration to that one end. Then the House of Commons will begin dimly to reflect the real condition of the nation outside; and in it we shall see as in a glass, darkly, or smudgedly, something of that "well-defined confrontation of rich and poor", of which all who attend Socialist lectures hear so much, and to which, *ex hypothesi*, the world, day by day, draws nearer. Then, also, will begin that process which, I submit, is more likely than either the absorption of the Socialist or the prolonged permeation of the Radical: namely, the absorption of the Radical himself into the definitely pro-private capital party on the one side, and the definitely anti-private capital party on the other.

A really homogeneous Socialist party once formed, the world political reflects the world economic, and there is no longer any room for the Radical, as we know the wonder. Each fresh Socialist victory, each outpost driven in, each entrenchment carried, will be followed by a warren-like scuttle of alarmed and well-to-do Radicals across the floor of the House of Commons, which will once more become a true frontier; and, finally, the political battle array will consist of a small opposition, fronting a great and powerful majority, made up of all those whose real or fancied interests would suffer from expropriation.

Thus far the outlook has been clear and focusable enough; and it has needed no extra-human illumination to see the details. All that has been wanted has been normal vision and a mind fairly free of the idols of the cave. But here the prospect becomes dim and uncertain; and little purpose would

be served by trying to pierce the mist which enshrouds the distant future.

Much, very much, will depend upon the courage, the magnanimity, the steadfastness, the tact, the foresight, and above all upon the incorruptibility of those whose high mission it will be to frame the policy and direct the strategy of the Socialist party in those early days of its parliamentary life. It will have sore need of a leader as able as, and more conscientious than, any of the great parliamentary figures of the past. The eye expectant searches in vain for such a man now among the younger broods of the new democracy. He is probably at this moment in his cradle or equitably sharing out toys or lollipops to his comrades of the nursery. And this is well; for he must be a man quit of all recollections of these days of *Sturm und Drang*, of petty jealousies, constant errors, and failing faith. He must bring to his task a record free from failure and without suspicion of stain.

But whatever may be the difficulties in store for us who name the name of Socialism, of one thing at least they who have followed this course of lectures may make quite sure. That, however long and wearisome the struggle, each day brings us nearer victory. Those who resist Socialism fight against principalities and powers in economic places. Every new industrial development will add point to our arguments and soldiers to our ranks. The continuous perfecting of the organization of labour will hourly quicken in the worker the consciousness that his is a collective, not an individual life. The proletariat is even now the only real class: its units are the only human beings who have nothing to hope for save from the levelling up of the aggregate of which they form a part. The intensifying of the struggle for existence, while it sets *bourgeois* at the throat of *bourgeois*, is forcing union and solidarity upon the workers. And the *bourgeois* ranks themselves are dwindling. The keenness of competition, making it every year more obviously impossible for those who are born without capital ever to achieve it, will deprive the capitalist class of the support it now receives from educated and cultivated but

impecunious young men whose material interest must finally triumph over their class sympathies; and from that section of workmen whose sole aspiration is to struggle out of the crowd. The rising generation of wage workers, instead of as now being befogged and bedevilled by the dust and smoke of mere faction fight, will be able at a glance to distinguish the uniforms of friend and foe. Despair will take sides with Hope in doing battle for the Socialist cause.

These lectures have made it plain enough to those who have hearing ears and understanding brains that mere material self-interest alone will furnish a motive strong enough to shatter monopoly; and after monopoly comes Socialism or—chaos. But the interest of the smaller self is not the only force which aids us in the present, or will guide us in the future. The angels are on our side. The constant presence of a vast mass of human misery is generating in the educated classes a deep discontent, a spiritual unrest, which drives the lower types to pessimism, the higher to enquiry. Pessimism paralyses the arms and unnerves the hearts of those who would be against us. Enquiry proves that Socialism is founded upon a triple rock, historical, ethical, and economic. It gives, to those who make it, a great hope—a hope which, once it finds entrance into the heart of man, stays to soften life and sweeten death. By the light of the Socialist Ideal he sees the evil—yet sees it pass. Then and now he begins to live in the cleaner, braver, holier life of the future; and he marches forward, steeled and stimulated, with resolute step, with steadfast eye, with equal pulse.

It is just when the storm winds blow and the clouds lour and the horizon is at its blackest that the ideal of the Socialist shines with divinest radiance, bidding him trust the inspiration of the poet rather than heed the mutterings of the perplexed politician, bidding him believe that

“For a’ that, for a’ that,  
Its coming yet for a’ that,  
That man to man the world o’er  
Shall brothers be for a’ that”.

HUBERT BLAND.

*Fabian Essays in Socialism* (1889)

## IMPERIALISM AND PARASITISM

WE must now try to draw certain conclusions, to sum up what has been said about imperialism. Imperialism emerged as a development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism became capitalist imperialism only at a definite, very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics had begun to change into their opposites, when the features of a period of transition from capitalism to a higher socio-economic system had begun to take shape and reveal themselves all along the line. Economically fundamental in this process is the replacement of capitalist free competition by *capitalist monopolies*. Free competition is the fundamental characteristic of capitalism and of commodity production generally. Monopoly is the direct opposite of free competition; but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our very eyes, creating large-scale production and squeezing out small-scale production, replacing large-scale by larger-scale production, finally leading to such a concentration of production and capital that monopoly has been and is the result: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and, merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks manipulating thousands of millions. And at the same time the monopolies, which have sprung from free competition, do not eliminate it, but exist alongside of it and over it, thereby giving rise to a number of very acute and bitter antagonisms, points of friction, and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher order.

If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism, we should have to say that *imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism*. Such a definition would include the essential point, for, on the one hand, finance capital is bank capital of the few biggest monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist combines of industrialists; on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition

from a colonial policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unoccupied by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolistic possession of the territories of the world, which has been completely divided up.

But too brief definitions, although convenient, since they sum up the main points, are nevertheless inadequate, because very fundamental features of the phenomenon to be defined must still be deduced. And so, without forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions, which can never include all the connections of a fully developed phenomenon, we must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following five essential features:

1. The concentration of production and capital, developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life.

2. The merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital", of a financial oligarchy.

3. The export of capital, as distinguished from the export of commodities, becomes of particularly great importance.

4. International monopoly combines of capitalists are formed which *divide up the world*.

5. The territorial division of the world by the greatest capitalist powers is completed.

Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the domination of monopolies and finance capital has taken shape; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world by the international trusts has begun, and in which the partition of all the territory of the earth by the greatest capitalist countries has been completed. . . .

We have now to examine another very important aspect of imperialism, to which, usually, too little attention is paid in the majority of discussions on this subject. One of the shortcomings of the Marxist, Hilferding, is that he took a step backward in comparison with the non-Marxist, Hobson. We refer to parasitism, inherent in imperialism.

As we have seen, the most deep-rooted economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is capitalist monopoly, *i.e.*, monopoly which has grown out of capitalism, and exists in the general capitalist environment of commodity production and competition, in permanent and insoluble contradiction to this general environment. Nevertheless, like any monopoly, it inevitably gives rise to a tendency towards stagnation and decay. In proportion as monopoly prices become fixed, even temporarily, so the stimulus to technical, and consequently to all other progress, to advance, tends to disappear; and to that extent also the *economic* possibility arises of artificially retarding technical progress. For instance, in America a certain Owens invented a machine which revolutionized the manufacture of bottles. The German bottle-manufacturing cartel purchased Owens's patents, but pigeon-holed them and held up their practical application. Certainly, monopoly under capitalism can never completely, and for any length of time, eliminate competition on the world market (and this is one of the reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is absurd). Of course, the possibility of reducing cost of production and increasing profits by introducing technical improvements is an influence in the direction of change. Nevertheless, the *tendency* towards stagnation and decay, inherent in monopoly, continues in turn to operate in individual branches of industry; in individual countries, for certain periods of time, it gains the upper hand.

The monopoly of ownership of very extensive, rich or well-situated colonies, works in the same direction.

Moreover, imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries, which, as we have seen, amounts to 100 to 150 billion francs in securities. Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather of a stratum, of *rentiers*, *i.e.*, persons who live by "clipping coupons," who take absolutely no part in any enterprise, and whose profession is idleness. The exportation of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still further

isolates this rentier stratum from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country living on the exploitation of the labour of several overseas countries and colonies.

In 1893—writes Hobson—the British capital invested abroad represented about 15 per cent. of the total wealth of the United Kingdom.

Let us remember that by 1915 this capital had increased about two and a half times.

Aggressive imperialism—says Hobson further on—which costs the tax-payer so dear, which is of so little value to the manufacturer and trader . . . is a source of great gain to the investor. . . . The annual income Great Britain derives from commissions on her whole foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimated by Sir R. Giffen at £18,000,000 for 1899, taken at 2½ per cent., upon a turnover of £800,000,000.

Considerable as this sum is, it cannot entirely explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain. This is explained by the 90 to 100 million pounds revenue from “invested” capital, the income of the rentier class.

The income of the rentiers is *five times* as great as the revenue obtained from the foreign trade of the greatest “trading” country in the world! This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism.

For this reason the term “rentier state” (*Rentnerstaat*) or “usurer state” is coming into general use in the economic literature on imperialism. The world has become divided into a handful of usurer states and a vast majority of debtor states.

The premier place among foreign investments—says Schulze-Gaevernitz—is taken by those invested in politically dependent, or closely allied countries. England makes loans to Egypt, Japan, China, South America.

Her war fleet plays the part of sheriff in case of necessity. England's political power protects her from the anger of her debtors. . . .

Sartorius von Waltershausen in his work, *The National Economic System of Foreign Capital Investments*, cites Holland as the model rentier state, and points out that England and France are now becoming such. Schilder believes that five industrial nations are "definitely avowed creditors nations": England, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. Holland does not appear on the list simply because it is "less industrialised". The United States is the creditor only of other American countries.

England—writes Schulze-Gaevernitz—is gradually being transformed from an industrial state into a creditor state. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in industrial production and exports, the relative importance of revenue from interest and dividends, of profits from issues, commissions and speculation is on the increase, when the whole national economy is taken into account. In my opinion it is this fact which is at the economic base of imperialist expansion. The creditor is more firmly tied to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer.

In regard to Germany, A. Lansburgh, the editor of *Die Bank*, in 1911, in an article entitled, "Germany as a Rentier State", wrote the following:

People in Germany like to sneer at the inclination observed in France for people to become rentiers. But they forget meanwhile that, as far as the middle class is concerned, the situation in Germany is becoming more and more like that in France.

The rentier state is a state of parasitic decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to be reflected in all the social-political conditions of the affected countries in general, and particularly in the two fundamental tendencies in the



working-class movement. To demonstrate this as clearly as possible, we shall let Hobson speak—a most “reliable” witness, since he cannot be suspected of partiality for “orthodox Marxism”; moreover, he is an Englishman who is very well acquainted with the situation in the country which is richest in colonies, in finance capital, and in imperialist experience.

With the Boer War fresh in his mind, Hobson describes the connection between imperialism and the interests of the financiers, their growing profits from armaments, supplies, etc., and writes as follows:

While the directors of this definitely parasitic policy are capitalists, the same motives appeal to special classes of the workers. In many towns most important trades are dependent upon government employment or contracts; the imperialism of the metal and shipbuilding centres is attributable in no small degree to this fact.

In this writer's opinion there are two circumstances which weakened the power of the ancient empires: (1) “economic parasitism” and (2) the formation of armies composed of subject peoples.

There is first the habit of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich its ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence.

And we would add that the economic possibility of such corruption, whatever its form may be, requires monopolistically high profits.

As for the second circumstance, Hobson writes:

One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism is the reckless indifference with which Great Britain, France and other imperial nations are embarking on this perilous dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting by which we have won our

Indian Empire has been done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies, are placed under British commanders; almost all the fighting associated with our African dominions except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives.

The prospect of a dismemberment of China evokes the following economic evaluation by Hobson:

The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the south of England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and persons from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen and a large body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production of the more perishable goods: all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa. . . .

We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western states, a European federation of great powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world-civilisation, might introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes drew vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they support great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social conditions of districts in Southern England to-day which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be rendered feasible

by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors, and political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex, the play of world-forces far too incalculable, to render this or any other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the imperialism of Western Europe to-day are moving in this direction, and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards some such consummation.

Hobson is quite right. If the forces of imperialism were not counteracted they would lead to just that. He correctly appraises the significance of a "United States of Europe", in the present, imperialist stage. But it must be added that *even within* the labour movement, the opportunists, who for the moment have been victorious in most countries, are working systematically and undeviatingly in this very direction. Imperialism, which means the partition of the world and the exploitation not of China alone; which means monopolistically high profits for a handful of very rich countries, creates the economic possibility of corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives form to and strengthens opportunism. However, we must not lose sight of the forces which counteract imperialism, generally and opportunism in particular, which, naturally, the social-liberal Hobson does not see.

The German opportunist, Gerhard Hildebrand, who at one time was expelled from the party for defending imperialism, but would to-day make a good leader of the so-called "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany, serves as a good supplement to Hobson by his advocacy of a "United States of Western Europe" (without Russia) for the purpose of "joint" action against . . . the African Negroes, the "great Islamic movement"; for the "maintenance of a powerful army and navy" against a "Sino-Japanese coalition", etc.

The description of "British imperialism" in Schulze-Gaevernitiz's book reveals the same parasitical traits. The national income of Great Britain approximately doubled between 1865 and 1898, while the income "from abroad" increased *ninefold* in the same period. While the "merit" of imperialism is that it "trains the Negro to work" (not without coercion, of course), the "danger" of imperialism is that Europe—

will shift the burden of physical toil—first agricultural and mining, then heavy industrial labour—on to the coloured peoples, and itself be content with the rôle of rentier, and in this way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic and later the political emancipation of the coloured races.

An increasing proportion of land in Great Britain is being taken out of cultivation and used for sport, for the diversion of the rich. It is said of Scotland—the most aristocratic region for hunting and other sport—that it "lives on its past and Mr. Carnegie" (an American billionaire). Britain annually spends £14,000,000 on horse-racing and fox-hunting alone. The number of rentiers in Great Britain is about a million. The percentage of producers among the population is becoming smaller.

Year.	Population of England and Wales (in millions).	No. of workers employed in basic industries (in millions).	Per cent. of the population.
1851 . . .	17·9	4·1	23
1901 . . .	32·5	5·0	15

And, in speaking of the British working class, the bourgeois student of "British imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century" is obliged to distinguish systematically between the "*upper stratum*" and the "*lower proletarian stratum proper*". The upper stratum furnishes the main body of

co-operators, of trade unionists, of members of sporting clubs, and of numerous religious sects. The right to vote, which in Great Britain, is still "*sufficiently restricted to exclude the lower proletarian stratum proper*", is adapted to their level. In order to present the condition of the British working class in the best light, only this upper stratum—which constitutes only a *minority* of the proletariat—is generally spoken of. For instance: "The problem of unemployment is mainly a London problem and that of the lower proletarian stratum, *with whom politicians are little concerned.*" It would be better to say: With whom the bourgeois politicians and the "Socialist" opportunists are little concerned.

Another of the peculiarities of imperialism, connected with the facts that we are describing, is the decline in emigration from imperialist countries and the increase in immigration (influx of workers and transmigration) to these countries from the more backward countries, where wages are lower. As Hobson observes, emigration from Great Britain has been declining since 1884. In that year the number of emigrants was 242,000, while in 1900 the number was 169,000. German emigration reached its highest point in the decade 1881—1890 with a total of 1,453,000 emigrants. In the following two decades it fell to 554,000 and 341,000. On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of workers entering Germany from Austria, Italy, Russia and other countries. According to the 1907 census, there were 1,342,294 foreigners in Germany, of whom 440,800 were industrial workers and 257,329 were agricultural workers. In France, the workers employed in the mining industry are "in great part" foreigners: Polish, Italian and Spanish. In the United States, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are engaged in the most poorly paid occupations, while American workers provide the highest percentage of foremen and of the better-paid workers. Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged sections even among the workers and to separate them from the main proletarian masses.

It must be observed that in Great Britain the tendency

of imperialism to split the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them, and cause temporary decay in the working-class movement, revealed itself much earlier than the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries; for two important distinguishing features of imperialism were observed in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century, viz., vast colonial possessions and a monopolist position in world markets. For several decades. Marx and Engels systematically traced this connection between opportunism in the labour movement and the imperialist features of British capitalism. For example, on October 7, 1858, Engels wrote to Marx:

The British working class is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, and it seems that this most bourgeois of all nations wants to bring matters to such a pass as to have a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat *side by side* with the bourgeoisie. Of course this is to some extent justifiable for a nation which is exploiting the whole world.

Almost a quarter of a century later, in a letter dated August 11, 1881, Engels speaks of the "very worst English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men sold to, or at least paid by the middle class". In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote:

You ask me what the English workers think of the colonial policy. The same as they think about politics in general. There is no labour party here, there are only conservatives and liberal radicals, and the workers enjoy with them the fruits of the British world market and colonial monopoly.

Here causes and effects are clearly shown. Causes: (1) Exploitation of the whole world by Great Britain; (2) its monopolistic position in the world market; (3) its colonial monopoly. Effects: (1) Bourgeoisification of a part of the British proletariat; (2) a part of the proletariat permits itself

to be led by people who are bought by the bourgeoisie, or who at least are paid by it. The imperialism of the beginning of the twentieth century completed the partition of the world by a very few states, each of which to-day exploits (in the sense of drawing super-profits from) a part of the world only a little smaller than that which England exploited in 1858. Each of them, by means of trusts, cartels, finance capital, and the relations between debtor and creditor, occupies a monopoly position on the world market. Each of them enjoys to some degree a colonial monopoly. (We have seen that out of 75 million square kilometres of *total* colonial area in the world, 65 million, or 86 per cent., is concentrated in the hands of six powers; 61 million, or 81 per cent., belongs to three powers.)

The distinctive feature of the present situation is the prevalence of economic and political conditions which could not but intensify the irreconcilability between opportunism and the general and basic interests of the labour movement. Imperialism has grown from an embryo into a dominant system; capitalist monopolies occupy first place in national economics and politics; the partition of the world has been completed. On the other hand, instead of an undivided monopoly by Britain, we see a few imperialist powers fighting among themselves for the right to share in this monopoly, and this struggle is characteristic of the whole period of the beginning of the twentieth century.

Opportunism cannot now triumph completely in the labour movement of any country for many decades as it did in England in the second half of the nineteenth century, but in several countries it has finally grown ripe, over-ripe and rotten, and has become completely merged with bourgeois policy as "social-chauvinism."

N. LENIN.

*Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917)

## TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERALISM

THE choice between "Individualism" and "Socialism" in the form in which it occupies the controversialists of the Conservative and Labour Parties is, in the main, a distorted, and indeed an obsolete, issue, based on a picture of the financial and industrial world of England as it was fifty or more years ago. As we shall attempt to show quantitatively, the evolution from these conditions is already far advanced. Change has been going on at a great rate. It is not a choice between nailing to the mast the Jolly Roger of piratical, cut-throat individualism, each man for himself and the devil take the rest, or, on the other hand, the Servile Society of a comprehensive State Socialism. Nor is the alternative between standing still and violent change. The world moves on anyhow at a smart pace; it is only the ideas of Conservatives and Socialists which remain where they were. The task is one of guiding existing tendencies into a right direction and getting the best of all worlds, harmonising individual liberty with the general good, and personal initiative with a common plan—of constructing a society where action is individual and knowledge and opportunity are general, and each is able to make his contribution to the efficiency and diversity of the whole in an atmosphere of publicity, mutual trust, and economic justice.

When we come to look at the facts of the modern world, no sensible person can doubt that in a modern community many services must be run by a Public Concern—meaning by this a form of organisation which departs in one way or another from the principles of unrestricted private profit, and is operated or regulated in the public interest. On the other hand, most people would agree that there is a wide field of business enterprise which is much better left to private



concerns and can be left to them without the least danger to the public interest.

Now in endeavouring to settle the right division between the Public Concern and the private concern respectively, the first thing to understand is the part already played by the former. We shall give below a fairly detailed statement of this, because we think that anyone who fully appreciates the existing position will be led inevitably to our conclusion that the immediate practical problem is not a great extension of the field of Public Concerns, except in one or two special cases, but a thorough overhauling of the methods of running the Public Concerns which already exist, with the object of making them lively and efficient enterprises. It is a consequence of the gradual and haphazard way in which Public Concerns have grown up in Great Britain that we have never deliberately considered the problems of managing and financing them.

Individualism has been strongest, in our opinion, and Socialism weakest, on the purely practical side, namely, in devising a satisfactory and efficient technique for the actual conduct of business.

This strength of individualism as a technique for efficient production has in the main depended on three features:

- (i) It is an unrivalled method for the decentralisation of decisions, that is, for providing that the power and responsibility should lie as near as possible to the act and not at the end of a long chain of intermediaries. By this means time and trouble are saved, the power of judgment is not submerged by the necessity for explanations and decisions can be made on a small scale and with reference to particular cases so as not to tax unduly the capacity of human wits. Moreover, the average result of decisions taken by a number of individuals, judging independently, may get nearer the truth, or at least run less risk of wide divergence from it, than one comprehensive decision, taken by a single individual, who may know more than any of the crowd and yet not so much as the average of the crowd.

(ii) It is an unrivalled method of arriving at the right result by trial or error. When a number of individuals are each attempting to solve much the same problem, independently, it may be possible to discover the solution by comparing the success of alternative methods. The mediocrity of attainment in the art of war and of government may be partly attributable not only to the complexity of the problem, but also to the absence of competition between policies as a method of discovering the most effective from amongst the possible alternatives.

(iii) It is an unrivalled method of "scoring", that is, of measuring the comparative efficiency not only of methods but of individuals. This may be as necessary for the satisfaction of the individual as for the selection of the fittest. How often must a Civil Servant, or any bureaucrat, lament the absence of an objective measure of the degree of his success if only for his own personal satisfaction, as compared with the business man, who can be judged, or thinks he can be judged, by the test of money profit! Without desiring the profit for himself, he may reasonably desire it as a test of his methods and of his capacity. Moreover, "scoring" contributes an important element of efficiency in the automatic penalty which it provides for failure and in the elimination of the unfit, though not always as quickly as is desirable, from the higher directing personnel. Human nature may require the spur of a penalty to keep effort at its highest pitch of intensity, just as much as, if not more than, the lure of exceptional rewards.

These three valuable devices for the successful attainment of our economic objects are what we are most in danger of losing whenever State action, or any form of highly centralised action, intervenes; and it is these losses which we must endeavour to minimise whenever we are impelled for other good reasons to extend the functions of the State. On the other hand, the pooling of knowledge, the elimination of the wastes of competition (which are very great), the deliberate aiming at the

general advantage, instead of trusting that the separate pursuits of private advantage will tend the right way on the whole and on the average, are real advantages in central control and ownership.

As to the necessity in all cases of the unrestricted private-profit motive, such as exists in the highest degree in a one-man business, as an incentive to effort and efficiency, we are more doubtful. The notion that the only way to get enough effort out of the brain-worker is to offer him unfettered opportunities of making an unlimited fortune is as baseless as the companion notion that the only way of getting enough effort out of the manual worker is to hold over him the perpetual threat of starvation and misery for himself and those he loves. It has never been even supposed to be true, at all events in England, of the soldier, the statesman, the civil servant, the teacher, the scientist, the technical expert. It is only the "business man" who, with a certain rather engaging cynicism, has insisted that it is and always must be true of himself. It is not certain that he was ever entirely right. Even in the old-fashioned one-man business, the efficacy of the unrestricted private-profit motive as an incentive to effort and efficiency is liable to exaggeration: for many temperaments, the "worry" involved and the too habitual presence of subconscious financial calculation may be big factors of inefficiency. A certain salary, plus the hope of promotion or of a bonus, is what the generality of mankind prefers. Indeed, it is what the vast majority of those who manage our affairs enjoy already, with varying degrees of certainty and hope. In this respect the performance of functions by Public Concerns in place of by privately owned Companies and Corporations would make but little difference to the ordinary man.

We have said enough to indicate the general point of view from which we approach these problems. We are content that the practical suggestions which follow should be judged by the above criteria. We think that the balance of advantage requires some extension of the functions of the State, but above

all a consolidation and reorganisation of those which it already performs. We appreciate the real advantages of the decentralised society of the pure Individualist's dreams; and wherever force of circumstances compels a departure from pure individualism, we have endeavoured so to frame our proposals as to retain as many as possible of its advantages.

*Report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry (1928)*

# PAPAL ENCYCLICALS

## I. *RERUM NOVARUM*

### THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASSES

*Encyclical Letter, May 15th, 1891.*

THAT the spirit of revolutionary change, which has long been disturbing the nations of the world, should have passed beyond the sphere of politics and made its influence felt in the cognate sphere of practical economics is not surprising. The elements of the conflict now raging are unmistakable, in the vast expansion of industrial pursuits and the marvellous discoveries of science; in the changed relations between masters and workmen; in the enormous fortunes of some few individuals, and the utter poverty of the masses; in the increased self-reliance and closer mutual combination of the working classes; as also, finally, in the prevailing moral degeneracy. The momentous gravity of the state of things now obtaining fills every mind with painful apprehension; wise men are discussing it; practical men are proposing schemes; popular meetings, legislatures, and rulers of nations are all busied with it—and actually there is no question which has taken a deeper hold on the public mind.

Therefore, Venerable Brethren, as on former occasions when it seemed opportune to refute false teaching, We have addressed you in the interests of the Church and of the common weal, and have issued Letters bearing on “Political Power”, “Human Liberty”, “The Christian Constitution of the State”, and like matters, so have We thought it expedient now to speak on the Condition of the Working Classes. It is a subject on which We have already touched more than once, incidentally. But in the present Letter, the responsibility of the Apostolic office urges Us to treat the question of set purpose and in detail, in order that no misapprehension may exist as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for

its settlement. The discussion is not easy, nor is it void of danger. It is no easy matter to define the relative rights and mutual duties of the rich and of the poor, of Capital and of Labour. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators are intent on making use of these differences of opinion to pervert men's judgments and to stir up the people to revolt.

#### CAUSES OF SOCIAL PROBLEM.

In any case we clearly see, and on this there is general agreement, that some opportune remedy must be found quickly for the misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working class: for the ancient working-men's guilds were abolished in the last century, and no other protective organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws set aside the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that working-men have been surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition. The mischief has been increased by rapacious usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is nevertheless, under a different guise, but with the like injustice, still practised by covetous and grasping men. To this must be added that the hiring of labour and the conduct of trade are concentrated in the hands of comparatively few; so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself.

#### THE SOCIALIST SOLUTION.

To remedy these wrongs the Socialists, working on the poor man's envy of the rich, are striving to do away with private property, and contend that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that by thus transferring property from private individuals to the community, the present mischievous state of things will be set

to rights, inasmuch as each citizen will then get his fair share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their contentions are so clearly powerless to end the controversy that were they carried into effect the working-man himself would be among the first to suffer. They are moreover emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the community.

#### THE WORKER WOULD SUFFER.

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labour, the impelling reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and thereafter to hold it as his very own. If one man hires out to another his strength or skill, he does so for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for maintenance and education; he therefore expressly intends to acquire a right, full and real, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of such remuneration, just as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and, for greater security, invests his savings in land, the land, in such case, is only his wages under another form; and, consequently, a working-man's little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his full disposal as are the wages he receives for his labour. But it is precisely in such power of disposal that ownership obtains, whether the property consist of land or chattels. Socialists, therefore, by endeavouring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community at large strike at the interests of every wage-earner, since they would deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thereby of all hope and possibility of increasing his resources and of bettering his condition in life.

#### THE RIGHT TO OWN PRIVATE PROPERTY A NATURAL RIGHT.

What is of far greater moment, however, is the fact that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. For every man has by nature the right to possess property of his

own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self-direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep his powers on the alert, impel him to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine him to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self-preservation, the other the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity's humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind, or reason, which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially from the brute. And on this very account—that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason—it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living things do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use, but those also which, though they have been reduced into use, continue for further use in after time.

#### THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY PROVED FROM THE NATURE OF MAN.

This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by his faculty of reason matters without number, linking the future with the present, and being master of his own acts, guides his ways under the eternal law and the power of God,



whose Providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice not only as to matters that regard his present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence man not only should possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he has to lay by provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but for ever recur; although satisfied to-day, they demand fresh supplies for to-morrow. Nature accordingly must have given to man a source that is stable and remaining always with him from which he might look to draw continual supplies. And this stable condition of things he finds solely in the earth and its fruits.

#### IN WHAT SENSE GOD HAS GIVEN THE EARTH TO ALL.

There is no need to bring in the State. Man precedes the State, and possesses, prior to the formation of any State, the right of providing for the sustenance of his body. The fact that God has given the earth for the use and enjoyment of the whole human race can in no way be a bar to the owning of private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general, not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they like, but rather that no part of it was assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man's own industry, and by the laws of individual races. Moreover, the earth, even though apportioned among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all, inasmuch as there is no one who does not sustain life from what the land produces. Those who do not possess the soil, contribute their labour; hence it may truly be said that all human subsistence is derived either from labour on one's own land, or from some toil, some calling which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself, or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth.

Here, again, we have further proof that private ownership is in accordance with the law of nature. Truly, that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life's well-being, is produced in great abundance from the soil, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and expended upon it his solicitude and skill. Now, when man thus turns the activity of his mind and the strength of his body towards procuring the fruits of nature, by such act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his individuality; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his very own, and have a right to hold it without any one being justified in violating that right. . . .

Hence it is clear that the main tenet of Socialism, community of goods, must be utterly rejected, since it only injures those whom it would seem meant to benefit, is directly contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonweal. The first and most fundamental principle, therefore, if one would undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property. This being established, we proceed to show where the remedy sought for must be found.

#### NO PRACTICAL SOLUTION WITHOUT RELIGION AND THE CHURCH.

We approach the subject with confidence, and in the exercise of the rights which manifestly appertain to Us, for no practical solution of this question will be found apart from the intervention of Religion and of the Church. It is We who are the chief guardian of Religion and the chief dispenser of what pertains to the Church: and by keeping silence we would seem to neglect the duty incumbent on us. Doubtless this most serious question demands the attention and the efforts of others besides ourselves—to wit, of the rulers of States, of employers of labour, of the wealthy, aye, of the

working classes themselves, for whom We are pleading. But We affirm without hesitation that all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church. It is the Church that insists, on the authority of the Gospel, upon those teachings whereby the conflict can be brought to an end, or rendered, at least, far less bitter; the Church uses her efforts not only to enlighten the mind, but to direct by her precepts the life and conduct of each and all; the Church improves and betters the condition of the working-man by means of numerous organizations; does her best to enlist the services of all classes in discussing and endeavouring to further in the most practical way, the interests of the working classes; and considers that for this purpose recourse should be had, in due measure and degree, to the intervention of the law and of State authority.

#### INEQUALITIES ARE INEVITABLE.

It must be first of all recognized that the condition of things inherent in human affairs must be borne with, for it is impossible to reduce civil society to one dead level. Socialists may in that intent do their utmost, but all striving against nature is in vain. There naturally exist among mankind manifold differences of the most important kind; people differ in capacity, skill, health, strength; and unequal fortune is a necessary result of unequal condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community. Social and public life can only be maintained by means of various kinds of capacity for business and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which suits his own peculiar domestic condition. As regards bodily labour, even had man never fallen from *the state of innocence*, he would not have remained wholly unoccupied; but that which would then have been his free choice and his delight, became afterwards compulsory, and the painful expiation for his disobedience. *Cursed be the earth in thy work; in thy labour thou shalt eat of it all the days of thy life.*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Gen. iii, 17.

## TO SUFFER AND ENDURE IS THE LOT OF MAN.

In like manner, the other pains and hardships of life will have no end or cessation on earth; for the consequences of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and they must accompany man so long as life lasts. To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity; let them strive as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hard-pressed people the boon of freedom from pain and trouble, an undisturbed repose, and constant enjoyment—they delude the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only one day bring forth evils worse than the present. Nothing is more useful than to look upon the world as it really is—and at the same time to seek elsewhere, as we have said, for the solace to its troubles.

## CLASS WAR WRONG. DUTIES OF WORKING-MAN AND EMPLOYER

The great mistake made in regard to the matter now under consideration, is to take up with the notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the working-men are intended by nature to live in mutual conflict. So irrational and so false is this view that the direct contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement, so as to maintain the balance of the body politic. Each needs the other: Capital cannot do without Labour, nor Labour without Capital. Mutual agreement results in the beauty of good order; while perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and savage barbarity. Now, in preventing such strife as this and in uprooting it, the efficacy of Christian institutions is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is

no intermediary more powerful than Religion (whereof the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing the rich and the working class together, by reminding each of its duties to the other, and especially of the obligations of justice. Thus Religion teaches the labourer and the artisan to carry out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never to resort to violence in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises of great results, and excite foolish hopes which usually end in useless regrets and grievous loss. Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer that their work-people are not to be accounted their bondsmen; that in every man they must respect his dignity and worth as a man and as a Christian; that labour for wages is not a thing to be ashamed of, if we lend ear to right reason and to Christian philosophy, but is to a man's credit, enabling him to earn his living in an honourable way; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical strength. Again the Church teaches that, in dealing with the working-man religion and the good of his soul must be kept in mind. Hence the employer is bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family, or to squander his earnings. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, or employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal duty is to give every one what is just. Doubtless before deciding whether wages are fair many things have to be considered; but wealthy owners and all masters of labour should be mindful of this—that to exercise pressure upon the indigent and the destitute for the sake of gain, and to gather one's profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine.

To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of Heaven. *Behold, the hire of the labourers . . . which by fraud has been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.*<sup>1</sup> Lastly, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workmen's earnings, whether by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing; and with all the greater reason because the labouring man is, as a rule, weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should in proportion to their scantiness be accounted sacred.

Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed out, would they not be sufficient of themselves to keep under all strife and all its causes?

#### THE CHURCH TEACHES THE TRUE VALUE OF THINGS

But the Church, with Jesus Christ as her Master and Guide, aims higher still. She lays down precepts yet more perfect, and tries to bind class to class in friendliness and good feeling. The things of earth cannot be understood or valued aright without taking into consideration the life to come, the life that will know no death. Exclude the idea of futurity, and forthwith the very notion of what is good and right would perish; nay, the whole scheme of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery. The great truth which we learn from Nature herself is also the grand Christian dogma on which Religion rests as on its foundation—that when we have given up this present life, then shall we really begin to live. God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but for things heavenly and everlasting; He has given us this world as a place of exile, and not as our abiding-place. As for riches and the other things which men call good and desirable, whether we have them in abundance, or are lacking in them—so far as eternal happiness is concerned—it makes no difference; the only important thing is to use them aright. Jesus Christ, when He redeemed us with

<sup>1</sup> James v, 4.

*plentiful redemption*, took not away the pains and sorrows which in such large proportion are woven together in the web of our mortal life. He transformed them into motives of virtue and occasions of merit: and no man can hope for eternal reward unless he follow in the blood-stained footprints of his Saviour. *If we suffer with Him, we shall also reign with Him.*<sup>1</sup> Christ's labours and sufferings, accepted of His own free will, have marvellously sweetened all suffering and all labour. And not only by His example, but by His grace and by the hope held forth of everlasting recompense, has He made pain and grief more easy to endure; *for that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh or us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.*<sup>2</sup>

## II QUADRAGESIMO ANNO

TO OUR VENERABLE BRETHREN

THE PATRIARCHS PRIMATES ARCHBISHOPS BISHOPS AND OTHER  
ORDINARIES

IN PEACE AND COMMUNION WITH THE APOSTOLIC SEE AND TO  
ALL THE FAITHFUL OF THE CATHOLIC WORLD

ON RECONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL ORDER  
AND PERFECTING IT CONFORMABLY TO THE PRECEPTS OF  
THE GOSPEL

IN COMMEMORATION OF THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE  
ENCYCLICAL "RERUM NOVARUM" OF LEO XIII

## POPE PIUS XI

VENERABLE BRETHREN AND BELOVED CHILDREN

HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION

May 15, 1931

Forty years have elapsed since the incomparable Encyclical of Leo XIII of happy memory, *Rerum Novarum*, first saw the

<sup>1</sup> II Tim. ii, 12.

<sup>2</sup> II Cor. iv, 17.

light. The whole Catholic world gratefully recalls the event, and prepares to celebrate it with befitting solemnity.

The way for this remarkable document of pastoral solicitude, it is true, had been in a measure prepared by other pronouncements of Our Predecessor. . . . *Rerum Novarum*, however, stood out in this, that it laid down for all mankind very sure guidance for the right solution of the difficult problem of human fellowship, called "the social question", at the very time when such guidance was most opportune and necessary.

#### OCCASION

For, towards the close of the nineteenth century, new economic methods and a new expansion of industry had in most countries resulted in a growing division of the population into two classes. The first, small in numbers, enjoyed practically all the advantages so plentifully supplied by modern invention; the second class, comprising the immense multitude of working-men, was made up of those who, oppressed by dire poverty, struggled in vain to escape from the difficulties which encompassed them.

This state of things was quite satisfactory to the wealthy, who looked upon it as the consequence of inevitable economic laws, and who therefore were content to leave to charity alone the full care of helping the unfortunate; as though it were the task of charity to make amends for the open violation of justice, a violation not merely tolerated, but sometimes even ratified, by legislators. On the other hand, the working classes, victims of these harsh conditions, were very restive, and refused to bear the heavy yoke any longer. Some, carried away by the heat of evil counsels, sought a general revolution. Others, whom Christian training restrained from such a perverse policy, maintained that there was much in all this that needed a radical and speedy reform.

Such also was the opinion of the many Catholics, priests and laymen, whom a really wonderful charity had long spurred



on to the relief of the undeserved indigence of the labouring classes, and who could in no way persuade themselves that so enormous and unjust a difference in the distribution of temporal goods was truly in harmony with the designs of an All-wise Creator.

There can be no doubt that these men sought in all sincerity an immediate remedy for this lamentable social disorder and a firm barrier against worse dangers. But such is the infirmity of even the best of minds, that these men, on the one hand repelled as dangerous innovators, on the other hampered by fellow-workers in the same good cause, who held different views, hesitated between various opinions and were at a loss which way to turn.

In this grave conflict of opinions, accompanied by discussions not always of a peaceful nature, the eyes of all, as often in the past, turned towards the Chair of Peter, that sacred depository of all truth, whence words of salvation are dispensed to the whole world. To the feet of Christ's Vicar on earth there came in unusual numbers sociologists, employers, working-men themselves, begging with one voice that at last a safe road might be pointed out to them.

Long did the prudent Pontiff study the matter before God, carefully considering it in all its aspects and seeking the advice of the most experienced counsellors. At last, "urged by the responsibility of the Apostolic Office",<sup>1</sup> and lest by keeping silence he should seem to neglect his duty,<sup>2</sup> he decided, in virtue of the authority to teach divinely committed to him, to address himself to the Universal Church of Christ, nay, to the whole human race.

On May 15th, 1891, therefore, the long-desired message was given to the world. Undaunted by the difficulty of the undertaking or by the weight of years, with commanding energy the venerable Pontiff taught mankind new methods of dealing with social problems.

. . . .

<sup>1</sup> *Encycl. Rerum Novarum*, May 15th, 1891, §1.

<sup>2</sup> *Encycl. Rerum Novarum*, §13.

*The Scope of the Present Encyclical*

Now, therefore, that the solemn commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum* is being enthusiastically celebrated in every country, but particularly by Catholic working-men who are gathering from all sides to the Holy City, We deem it opportune, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, first, to recall the great benefits which this Encyclical has brought to the Catholic Church and to the world at large; secondly, to vindicate the social and economic doctrine of so great a Master against certain doubts which have arisen, and to develop more fully some of its points; finally, after passing judgment on the modern economic regime and examining the position of socialism, to expose the root of the present social disorder, and at the same time to point out the only way to a salutary cure, a reform of conduct on Christian lines. Such are the three topics to the treatment of which the present Letter is dedicated.

. . . .

## (1) AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN ECONOMIC REGIME AND OF SOCIALISM

Since the time of Leo XIII important changes have taken place both in the economic regime and in socialism.

## 1. THE CHANGE IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

In the first place, it is obvious to all that the entire economic scene has greatly changed. You are aware, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, that Our Predecessor of happy memory had chiefly in mind that economic regime in which the capital and labour jointly needed for production were usually provided by different people. He described it in a happy phrase: "Capital cannot do without labour, nor labour without capital".<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Encycl. *Rerum Novarum*, §15.

To adjust this economic regime to the standards of right order was the entire preoccupation of Leo XIII; and hence it follows that it is in itself not to be condemned. And certainly it is not vicious of its very nature; but it violates right order whenever capital employs the workers or the proletariat with a view and on such terms as to direct business and economic activity entirely at its own arbitrary will and to its own advantage, without any regard to the human dignity of the workers, the social character of the economic regime, social justice and the common good.

It is true that even to-day this economic regime does not everywhere exist exclusively, for there is another regime which still embraces a very large and important group of men. There is, for instance, the agricultural class in which the larger portion of the human race provides itself with an honourable livelihood. This class too has its difficulties and problems, of which Our Predecessor spoke repeatedly in his Encyclical, and to which We Ourselves have more than once referred in the present Letter.

But it is the capitalist economic regime that, with the world-wide diffusion of industry, has spread everywhere, particularly since the publication of Leo XIII's Encyclical. It has invaded and pervaded the economic and social circumstances even of those who live outside its ambit, effectively influencing them, and to some extent imposing on them its advantages, disadvantages and vices.

When We turn our attention, therefore, to the changes which the capitalist economic regime has undergone since the days of Leo XIII, We have in view the interests, not of those only who live in countries where capital and industry prevail, but of the whole human race.

#### *Domination has Followed from Free Competition*

In the first place, then, it is patent that in our days not wealth alone is accumulated, but immense power and despotic economic domination are concentrated in the hands of a few,

who for the most part are not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds, which they administer at their own good pleasure.

This domination is most powerfully exercised by those who, because they hold and control money, also govern credit and determine its allotment, for that reason supplying, so to speak, the life-blood to the entire economic body, and grasping in their hands, as it were, the very soul of production, so that no one can breathe against their will.

This accumulation of power, the characteristic note of the modern economic order, is a natural result of limitless free competition, which permits the survival of those only who are the strongest, and this often means those who fight most relentlessly, who pay least heed to the dictates of conscience.

This concentration of power has, in its turn, led to a threefold struggle. First, there is the struggle for economic supremacy itself; then the fierce battle to acquire control of the State, so that its resources and authority may be abused in economic struggles; finally, the clash between States themselves. This latter arises from two causes: because the nations apply their power and political influence to promote the economic advantages of their citizens; and because economic forces and economic domination are used to decide political controversies between nations.

### *Disastrous Consequences*

You assuredly know, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, and you lament the ultimate consequences of this individualist spirit in economic life. Free competition has destroyed itself; economic domination has taken the place of the open market. Unbridled ambition for domination has succeeded the desire for gain; the whole economic regime has become hard, cruel and relentless in a ghastly measure. Furthermore, the intermingling and scandalous confusing of the functions and duties of civil authority and of the economic organization have produced crying evils, and have

gone so far as to degrade the majesty of the State. The State which should be the supreme arbiter, ruling in kingly fashion far above all party contention, intent only upon justice and the common good, has become instead a slave, bound over to the service of human passion and greed. As regards the relations of peoples among themselves, a double stream has issued forth from this one fountain-head; on the one hand, economic nationalism or even economic imperialism; on the other, a no less noxious and detestable internationalism or international imperialism in financial affairs, which holds that where a man's fortune is, there his country.

### *Remedies*

The remedies for these great evils We have exposed in the second part of the present Encyclical, where We explicitly dealt with the matter; it will therefore be sufficient to recall them briefly here. Since the present economic regime is based mainly upon capital and labour, it follows that the principles of right reason, or Christian social philosophy, regarding capital, labour and their mutual co-operation, must be accepted in theory and reduced to practice. In the first place, due consideration must be had for the double character, individual and social, of capital and labour, in order that the dangers of individualism and of collectivism be avoided. The mutual relations between capital and labour must be determined according to the laws of the strictest justice, called distributive justice, supported however by Christian charity. Free competition, kept within just and definite limits, and still more economic power, must be brought under the effective control of the public authority, in matters appertaining to the latter's competence. The public institutions of the nations must be such as to make the whole of human society conform to the needs of the common good, that is, to the standard of social justice. If this is done, the economic regime, that most important branch of social life, will necessarily be restored to right and healthy order.

## 2. THE CHANGES IN SOCIALISM

Since the days of Leo XIII, socialism too, the chief enemy with which his battles were waged, has, no less than the economic regime, undergone profound changes. At that time socialism could almost be termed a single system, which defended certain definite and mutually coherent doctrines. Nowadays it has in the main become divided into two opposing and often bitterly hostile camps, neither of which, however, has abandoned the anti-Christian basis which was ever characteristic of socialism.

### (a) *The More Violent Section: Communism*

One section of socialism has undergone a change somewhat analogous to that through which, as We have described, the capitalist economic regime has passed; it has degenerated into communism. Communism teaches and pursues a two-fold aim: merciless class warfare and complete abolition of private ownership; and this it does, not in secret and by hidden methods, but openly, publicly, and by every means, even the most violent. To obtain these ends, communists shrink from nothing and fear nothing; and when they have acquired power, it is monstrous beyond belief how cruel and inhuman they show themselves to be. Evidence for this is the ghastly destruction and ruin with which they have laid waste immense tracts of Eastern Europe and Asia; while their antagonism and open hostility to Holy Church and to God Himself are too well, alas, only too well proved by facts and perfectly known to all. We do not think it necessary to warn upright and faithful children of the Church against the impious and nefarious character of communism. But We cannot contemplate without sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to despise these imminent dangers, and with a sort of indolent apathy allow the propagation far and wide of those doctrines, which seek by violence and bloodshed the destruction of the whole of society. Even more severely must be

condemned the foolhardiness of those who neglect to remove or modify such conditions as exasperate the hearts of the people, and so prepare the way for the overthrow and ruin of the social order.

(b) *The More Moderate Section which has Retained the Name of Socialism*

The other section, which has retained the name of socialism, is much less radical in its views. Not only does it condemn recourse to violence; it even mitigates class warfare and the abolition of private property and qualifies them to some extent, if it does not actually reject them. It would seem as if socialism were afraid of its own principles and of the conclusions drawn therefrom by communists and in consequence were tending towards the truths which Christian tradition has always held in respect; for it cannot be denied that its opinions sometimes closely approach the just demands of Christian social reformers.

*It Recedes Somewhat from Class Warfare and the Abolition of Private Property*

For class warfare, provided it abstains from enmities and mutual hatred, changes little by little into a justifiable dispute, based upon the desire of justice. If this is by no means the happy social peace which we all long for, it can be and ought to be a point of departure for the mutual co-operation of vocational groups. The war waged against private ownership has more and more abated, and is being so limited that ultimately it is not the possession of the means of production which is attacked, but a form of social authority which property has usurped in violation of all justice. This authority in fact pertains not to individual owners, but to the State. If these changes continue, it may well come about that gradually these tenets of mitigated socialism will no longer be different from the programme of those who seek to reform human society according to Christian principles. For it is

rightly contended that certain forms of property must be reserved to the State, since they carry with them a power too great to be left to private individuals without injury to the community at large.

Just demands and desires of this kind contain nothing opposed to Christian truth; much less are they peculiar to socialism. Those therefore who look for nothing else, have no reason for becoming socialists.

### *Is a Middle Course Possible?*

It must not be imagined however that all the socialist sects or factions which are not communist have in fact or in theory, uniformly returned to this position. For the most part they do not reject class warfare or the abolition of property, but merely introduce qualifications. Now when false principles are thus mitigated and in some sense waived, the question arises, or rather is unwarrantably proposed in certain quarters, whether the principles of Christian truth also could not be somewhat moderated and attenuated, so as to meet socialism as it were halfway upon common ground. Some are enticed by the empty hope of gaining in this way the socialists to our cause. But such hope is vain. Those who wish to be apostles amongst the socialists must preach the Christian truth whole and entire, openly and sincerely, without any connivance at error. If they wish in truth to be heralds of the Gospel, let their first endeavour be to convince socialists that their demands, in so far as they are just, are defended much more cogently by the principles of Christian faith and are promoted much more efficaciously by the power of Christian charity.

But what if, in the matter of class war and private ownership, socialism is so mitigated and amended, that on these points nothing reprehensible can any longer be found in it? Has it thereby freed itself from its natural opposition to the Christian religion? This is a question which holds many minds in suspense; and many are the Catholics who, realizing clearly that Christian principles can never be either sacrificed or



minimized, seem to be raising their eyes towards the Holy See and earnestly beseeching Us to decide whether or not this form of socialism has retracted so far its false doctrines that it can now be accepted without the loss of any Christian principles, and be in a sense baptized. In Our fatherly solicitude We desire to satisfy these petitions, and Our pronouncement is as follows: Whether considered as a doctrine, or as an historical fact, or as a movement, socialism, if it really remains socialism, cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, even after it has yielded to truth and justice on the points We have mentioned; the reason being that it conceives human society in a way utterly alien to Christian truth.

*Socialism has a Concept of Society and the Social Character of Men Utterly Foreign to Christian Truth*

For according to Christian doctrine man, endowed with a social nature, is placed here on earth in order that, spending his life in society and under an authority ordained by God,<sup>1</sup> he may cultivate and evolve to the full all his faculties to the praise and glory of his Creator; and that, by fulfilling faithfully the functions of his trade or other calling, he may attain both to temporal and eternal happiness. Socialism, on the contrary, entirely ignorant of and unconcerned about this sublime end both of individuals and of society, affirms that human society was instituted merely for the sake of material well-being.

For from the fact that goods are produced more efficiently by a suitable division of labour than by the scattered efforts of individuals, socialists argue that economic activity, of which they see only the material side, must necessarily be carried on collectively, and that because of this necessity men must surrender and submit themselves wholly to society, so far as the production of wealth is concerned. Indeed, the possession of the greatest possible amount of goods which serve for the conveniences of this life is esteemed so highly that man's

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Rom., xiii, 1.

higher goods, not even excepting liberty, must they claim, be subordinated and even sacrificed to the exigencies of the most efficient production. They affirm that the loss of human dignity, resulting from these socialized methods of production, will be easily compensated for by the abundance of goods socially produced and poured forth to individuals, in order that they may be freely used at choice for the conveniences and comforts of life. Society, therefore, as socialism conceives it, is, on the one hand, impossible and unthinkable without the use of obviously excessive compulsion; on the other it no less fosters a false liberty, since in such a scheme no place is found for true social authority, which is not based on temporal and material well-being, but descends from God alone, the Creator and last end of all things.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Catholic and Socialist are Contradictory Terms*

If, like all errors, socialism contains a certain element of truth (and this the Sovereign Pontiffs have never denied), it is nevertheless founded upon a doctrine of human society peculiarly its own, which is opposed to true Christianity. Religious socialism, Christian socialism, are expressions implying a contradiction in terms. No one can be at the same time a sincere Catholic and a socialist properly so called.

#### *Cultural Socialism*

All that We have thus far renewed and confirmed by Our sovereign authority applies equally to a certain new socialist activity, hitherto little known, but nowadays common to many sections of socialism. Its chief aim is the formation of mind and character. With an appearance of friendly interest in a special way it attracts even little children and wins them over to itself, though it extends its efforts to people of all ages, in order to make of them convinced socialists who are to mould society on socialist lines.

<sup>1</sup> Encycl. *Diuturnum illud*, June 29th, 1881.

In Our Encyclical Letter *Divini illius Magistri*<sup>1</sup> We have expounded at length the principles on which Christian education rests and the end which it pursues; the contradiction between these and the activities and aims of cultural socialism, is so clear and evident as to require no comment. Nevertheless, the formidable dangers which this form of socialism brings in its train seem to be ignored or underestimated by those who are little concerned to resist it with strength and zeal, as the gravity of the situation demands. It is a duty of Our pastoral office to warn these men of the grave danger which threatens. Let all bear in mind that the parent of this cultural socialism was liberalism, and that its offspring will be bolshevism.

#### *Catholic Deserters to Socialism*

This being so, you can understand, Venerable Brethren, with what grief We perceive, in certain countries particularly, not a few of Our children, who, while still preserving, as We are convinced, their true faith and good will, have deserted the camp of the Church and passed over to the ranks of socialism. Some openly glory in the name of socialist and profess socialist doctrines; others, either through thoughtlessness, or even almost in spite of themselves, join associations which professedly or actually are socialist.

In Our paternal solicitude, therefore, We turn over in Our mind and try to understand what can have been the reason of their going so far astray; and We seem to hear what many of them allege in excuse: the Church and those professing attachment to the Church favour the rich, and neglect the workers and have no care for them; they were obliged therefore in their own interest to join the socialist ranks.

It is certainly lamentable, Venerable Brethren, that there have been, and that there are even now, some who, while professing themselves to be Catholics, are well-nigh unmindful of that sublime law of justice and charity which

<sup>1</sup> Encycl. *Divini illius Magistri*, December 31st, 1929.

bids us not only to give each man his due, but to succour our needy brethren as Christ our Lord Himself<sup>1</sup>; worse still that there are those who, out of greed for gain, do not fear to oppress the workers. Indeed there are some who even abuse religion itself, trying to cloak their own unjust impositions under its name, that they may protect themselves against the manifestly just protests of their employees. We shall never desist from gravely censuring such conduct. Such men are the cause that the Church, without deserving it, may have had the appearance and might be accused of taking sides with the wealthy, and of being unmoved by the needs and the sufferings of the disinherited. That this appearance and this accusation are undeserved and unjust, the whole history of the Church clearly shows; the very Encyclical, the anniversary of which we are celebrating, affords the clearest evidence that these calumnies and contumelies have been most unjustly cast upon the Church and upon her teaching.

*An Invitation to Return*

But We are far indeed from being exasperated by these injustices, or dejected by Our fatherly sorrow. We have no wish to drive away or repel Our children who have been so unhappily deceived, and who are wandering so far from the paths of truth and salvation. On the contrary, We invite them with all possible solicitude to return to the maternal bosom of the Church. God grant that they listen to Our voice. God grant that whence they set out, thither they may return, to their Father's house; that where their true place is, there they may remain, amongst the ranks of those who, zealously following directions promulgated by Leo XIII and solemnly repeated by Ourselves, strive to reform society according to the mind of the Church, on a firm basis of social justice and social charity. Let it be their firm persuasion that nowhere, even on earth, can they find greater happiness than in company with Him, who being rich became poor for our

<sup>1</sup> James, ii.

sakes, that through His poverty we might become rich<sup>1</sup>; who was poor and in labours from His youth; who invites to Himself all who labour and are burdened, that He may refresh them bounteously in the love of His Heart<sup>2</sup>; who, in fine, without any respect for persons, will require more of him to whom more has been given,<sup>3</sup> and will render to every man according to his works.<sup>4</sup>

## (2) THE ROOT OF SOCIAL DISORDER AND THE REMEDY MORAL RENOVATION

However, if we examine matters more diligently and more thoroughly, we shall perceive clearly that this longed-for social reconstruction must be preceded by a renewal of the Christian spirit from which so many people engaged in industry have at times lamentably departed. Otherwise, all our endeavours will be futile, and our house will be built, not upon a rock, but upon shifting sand.<sup>5</sup>

We have passed in review, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, the state of the modern economic regime, and have found very serious defects in it. We have investigated anew socialism and communism, and have found them, even in their mitigated forms, far removed from the precepts of the Gospel.

“And if society is to be healed now”—We use the words of Our Predecessor—“in no way can it be healed save by a return to Christian life and Christian institutions.”<sup>6</sup> For Christianity alone can supply an efficacious remedy for the excessive solicitude for transitory things, which is the origin of all vices. When men are fascinated by and completely absorbed in the things of the world, it alone can draw away

<sup>1</sup> II Cor., viii, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Matt., xi, 28.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Luke, xii, 48.

<sup>4</sup> Matt., xvi, 27.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Matt., vii, 24 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Encycl. *Rerum Novarum*, §22.

their attention and raise it heavenwards. And who will deny that this remedy is now urgently needed by society?

*The Chief Disorder of the Modern Regime—Ruin of Souls*

For the minds of all men are impressed almost exclusively by temporal upheavals, disasters and ruins. If we view these evils with Christian eyes, as we should, what are they in comparison with the ruin of souls? Nevertheless it is not rash to say that the present conditions of social and economic life are such as to create for vast multitudes of souls very serious obstacles in the pursuit of the one thing necessary, their eternal salvation.

Constituted Pastor and Protector of these innumerable sheep by the Prince of Pastors who redeemed them by His Blood, We can scarcely restrain our tears when we reflect upon this, the greatest of the dangers which threaten them. Our Pastoral office, moreover, reminds Us to search constantly with paternal solicitude for means of coming to their assistance, to appeal also to the unwearied zeal of others who are bound to this cause by justice and charity. For what will it profit men that a wiser employment of wealth makes it possible for them to gain even the whole world, if thereby they suffer the loss of their own souls?<sup>1</sup> What will it profit to teach them sound economic principles, if they permit themselves to be so swept away by selfishness, by unbridled and sordid greed, that "hearing the commandments of the Lord, they do all things contrary".<sup>2</sup>

*The Cause of this Loss of Souls*

The fundamental cause of this defection from the Christian law in social and economic matters, and of the apostasy of many working-men from the Catholic faith which has resulted from it, lies in the disorderly affections of the soul, a sad consequence of original sin. By original sin the marvellous

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Matt., xvi, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Judges, ii, 17.

harmony of man's faculties has been so deranged, that now he is easily led astray by evil desires, and strongly tempted to prefer the transient goods of this world to the lasting goods of heaven. Hence comes that unquenchable thirst for riches and temporal possessions, which has indeed at all times impelled men to break the law of God and trample on the rights of their neighbour, but which, owing to the condition of the economic world to-day, lays more snares than ever for human weakness. For the uncertainty of economic life and especially of the economic regime demands the keenest uninterrupted straining of energy on the part of those engaged therein; and as a result some have become so hardened against the stings of conscience as to hold all means good which enable them to increase their profits and to safeguard against sudden changes of fortune the wealth amassed by great and assiduous efforts. Easy returns, which an unregulated market offers indiscriminately, attract to the buying and selling of goods very many whose one aim is to make rapid profits with the least labour. By their unchecked dealings, prices are raised and lowered out of mere greed for gain so frequently as to frustrate the most prudent calculations of manufacturers. The laws enacted for joint-stock companies with limited liability have given occasion to abominable abuses. For responsibility thus weakened makes little impression, as is evident, upon the conscience: very serious injustices and frauds are perpetrated beneath the shelter of the company's name; boards of directors, unmindful of their trust, betray the rights of those whose savings they administer. Finally, We must not omit to mention those crafty men who, absolutely indifferent as to whether their trade provides anything really useful, do not hesitate to stimulate human desires, and, when these have been aroused, make use of them for their own profit.

A stern insistence on the moral law, enforced with vigour by civil authority, could have dispelled or even averted these enormous evils. This, however, was too often lamentably wanting. For at the time when the new economic order was

beginning, the doctrines of rationalism had already taken firm hold of large numbers, and an economic science alien to the true moral law quickly arose, and consequently free rein was given to man's inordinate desires.

As a result, a much greater number than ever before, solely concerned with adding to their wealth by any means whatsoever, sought their own selfish interests above all things; they had no scruple in committing the gravest crimes against others. Those who first entered upon this broad way which leads to destruction<sup>1</sup> easily found many imitators of iniquity because of their apparent success, their extravagant display of wealth, their derision of what they called the baseless scruples of others and the crushing of more conscientious competitors.

With the leaders of business abandoning the true path, it was easy for the working-class also to fall at times into the same abyss; all the more so, because very many employers treated their workmen as mere tools, without any concern for the welfare of their souls, indeed, without the slightest thought of spiritual things. We are appalled if we consider the frightful perils to which the morals of workers (particularly of young people) and the virtue of girls and women are exposed in modern factories; if we recall how the present economic regime and above all the disgraceful housing conditions create obstacles to the family tie and family life; if we remember the insuperable difficulties placed in the way of a proper observance of the holy days; and if we reflect on the universal weakening of that really Christian spirit which formerly produced such lofty sentiments, even in uncultured and illiterate men. In its stead, man's one solicitude is to obtain his daily bread in any way he can. And so bodily labour, which even after original sin was decreed by Providence for the good of man's body and soul, is in many instances changed into an instrument of perversion; for from the factory dead matter goes out improved, whereas men there are corrupted and degraded.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Matt., vii, 13.



*The Remedies: Must be Inspired by (a) Economic Life on Christian Principles*

For this deplorable ruin of souls, which, if it continues, will frustrate all efforts to reform society, there can be no genuine remedy other than an open and sincere return to the teaching of the Gospel. Men must observe anew the precepts of Him who alone has the words of eternal life,<sup>1</sup> words which, even when heaven and earth pass, shall not pass.<sup>2</sup> All those versed in social matters earnestly demand a rational reorganization in order to bring back economic life to sound and true order. But this order, which We Ourselves most earnestly desire and make every effort to promote, will be quite faulty and imperfect, unless all man's activities harmoniously unite to imitate and, as far as it is humanly possible, attain the marvellous unity of the Divine plan. This is the perfect order which the Church preaches with intense earnestness, and which right reason demands; which places God as the first and supreme end of all created activity, and regards all created goods as mere instruments under God, to be used only in so far as they help towards the attainment of our supreme end. Nor is it to be imagined that gainful occupations are thereby belittled or deemed less consonant with human dignity. On the contrary, we are taught to recognize and reverence in them the manifest will of God the Creator, who placed man upon earth to work it and use it in various ways, in order to supply his needs. Those who are engaged in production are not forbidden to increase their fortunes in a lawful and just manner; indeed it is right that he who renders service to society and enriches it should himself have his proportionate share of the increased social wealth, provided always that in seeking this he respects the laws of God and the rights of others, and uses his property in accord with faith and right reason. If these principles be observed by all, everywhere and at all times, not merely the production

<sup>1</sup> Cf. John, vi, 70.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Matt., xxiv, 35.

and acquisition of goods, but also the use of wealth, now often so wrongful, will within a short time be brought back again to the standards of equity and just distribution. Mere sordid selfishness, which is the disgrace and the great sin of the present age, will be opposed in very deed by the firm yet kindly law of Christian moderation, whereby man is commanded to seek first the kingdom of God and His justice, confiding in God's liberality and definite promise that temporal goods also, in so far as he has need of them, will be added unto him.<sup>1</sup>

(b) *The Law of Charity Must Operate*

Now, in effecting this reform, charity, "which is the bond of perfection",<sup>2</sup> must always play a leading part. How completely deceived are those rash reformers who, zealous only for distributive justice, proudly disdain the help of charity. Certainly charity cannot take the place of justice unfairly withheld. But, even though a state of things be pictured in which every man receives at last all that is his due, a wide field will always remain open for charity. For justice alone, however faithfully observed, though it can indeed remove the cause of social strife, can never bring about a union of hearts and minds. Yet this union, binding men together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid. In its absence, as repeated experience proves, the wisest regulations come to nothing. Then only will it be possible to unite all in harmonious striving for the common good, when all sections of society have the intimate conviction that they are members of one great family and children of the same Heavenly Father, and further, that they are "one body in Christ, and everyone members one of another",<sup>3</sup> so that "if one member suffer

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Matt., vi, 33.

<sup>2</sup> Coloss., iii, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Rom., xii, 5.

anything, all members suffer with it".<sup>1</sup> Then the rich and others in power will change their former neglect of their poorer brethren into solicitous and effective love; will listen readily to their just demands, and will willingly forgive them the faults and mistakes they may possibly make. The workers too will lay aside all feelings of hatred or envy, which the instigators of social strife exploit so skilfully. Not only will they cease to feel discontent at the position assigned them by divine Providence in human society; they will become proud of it, well aware that they are working usefully and honourably for the common good, each according to his office and function, and are following more closely in the footsteps of Him who being God, chose to become a carpenter among men, and to be known as the son of a carpenter.

#### *A Difficult Task*

Because of this new diffusion throughout the world of the Gospel spirit, which is a spirit of Christian moderation and of universal charity, We confidently look forward to that complete and much desired renewal of human society, and to "The peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ", to which We firmly resolved at the very beginning of Our Pontificate to devote all Our care and Our pastoral solicitude.<sup>2</sup> You, Venerable Brethren, who by ordinance of the Holy Spirit rule with Us the Church of God,<sup>3</sup> are labouring strenuously and with admirable zeal, in all parts of the world, including missions among pagans, towards the same end of capital importance and necessity to-day. To you be the well-deserved meed of praise; and at the same time to all those, clergy and laity, whom We rejoice to see daily taking part in this great work, and affording valuable help, Our beloved sons devoted to Catholic Action, who with extraordinary zeal aid Us in the solution of social problems, in so far as the Church in virtue

<sup>1</sup> I Cor., xii, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Encycl. *Ubi Arcano*, December 23rd, 1922.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Acts, xx, 28.

of her divine institution has the right and the duty to concern herself with them. With repeated insistence We exhort all these in the Lord to spare no labour and be overcome by no difficulty, but daily more to take courage and be valiant.<sup>1</sup> The task we propose to them is indeed difficult, for well do We know that many are the obstacles to be overcome on either side, whether amongst the higher classes of society or the lower. Still let them not lose heart. To face stern combats is the part of a Christian; and to endure severe labour is the lot of those who, as good soldiers of Christ,<sup>2</sup> follow more closely in His footsteps.

Relying therefore solely on the assistance of Him who "will have all men to be saved",<sup>3</sup> let us devote all our energies to helping those unhappy souls who are turned away from God; let us withdraw them from the temporal cares in which they are too much involved and teach them to aspire with confidence to things that are eternal. At times, indeed, this will be easier to accomplish than appears at first sight; for if in the depths of even the most abandoned hearts there lurk, like sparks beneath the ashes, spiritual forces of unexpected strength—a clear testimony of a naturally Christian soul—how much more must these abide in the hearts of the many who, largely through ignorance or external circumstances, have been led into error.

For the rest, the associations of the workers themselves provide glad signs of coming social reconstruction. To the great joy of Our heart we discern amongst them dense masses of young workers, who listen readily to the call of divine grace and strive with splendid zeal to win their fellows to Christ. No less praise is due to those leaders of working men's organizations who, sacrificing their own interests, and anxious only for the good of their companions, strive with prudence to promote their just demands and to bring them into harmony with the prosperity of their trade or profession, and who do

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Deut., xxxi, 7.

<sup>2</sup> II Tim., ii, 3.

<sup>3</sup> I Tim., ii, 4.

not permit themselves to be deterred from this noble task by any obstacle or any distrust. Further, many young men, destined soon by reason of their talents or their wealth to hold distinguished places in the foremost ranks of society, are studying social problems with growing earnestness. These youths encourage the fairest hopes that they will devote themselves wholly to social reconstruction.

### *The Course to be Followed*

Present circumstances therefore. Venerable Brethren, indicate clearly the course to be followed. Nowadays, as more than once in the history of the Church, We are confronted with a world which in large measure has almost relapsed into paganism. In order to bring back to Christ these whole classes of men who have denied Him, we must gather and train from amongst their very ranks auxiliary soldiers of the Church, men who well know their mentality and their aspirations, and who by kindly fraternal charity will be able to win their hearts. Undoubtedly the first and immediate apostles of the working-men must themselves be working-men, while the apostles of the industrial and commercial world should themselves be employers and merchants.

It is especially your duty, Venerable Brethren, and that of your clergy, to seek diligently, to select prudently, and train suitably these lay apostles, amongst working-men and amongst employers. No easy task is here imposed upon the clergy, wherefore all candidates for the sacred priesthood must be adequately prepared to meet it by intense study of social matters; but it is particularly necessary that they whom you specially select and devote to this work should show themselves endowed with a keen sense of justice, ready to oppose with manly constancy unjust claims and unjust actions; who avoid every extreme with consummate prudence and discretion; who are, above all, thoroughly imbued with the charity of Christ, which alone has power to incline men's hearts and wills firmly yet gently to the laws of equity and justice. This

course, already productive of success in the past, we must follow now with alacrity.

Further, We earnestly exhort in the Lord the beloved sons who are chosen for this task to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the formation of the men entrusted to them. In the execution of this most priestly and apostolic work, let them make opportune use of the powerful resources of Christian training, by instructing youth, by founding Christian associations, by forming study-circles on Christian lines. Above all, let them hold in high esteem and employ with diligence for the benefit of their disciples, the Spiritual Exercises, a most precious means of personal and of social reform, as We said in Our Encyclical *Mens Nostra*.<sup>1</sup> These Exercises We declared in express terms to be most useful for the laity in general and especially for the workers, and We warmly recommend them; for in that school of the spirit, not only are excellent Christians formed, but real apostles of every state of life are trained and enkindled with the fire of the Heart of Christ. From that school they will go forth, as the Apostles from the Last Supper in Jerusalem, strong in faith, unconquerable in steadfastness under trials, aflame with zeal, eager only for the spread in every way of the Kingdom of Christ.

And in truth, the world has nowadays sore need of valiant soldiers of Christ ready to work with all their strength to preserve the human family from the dire havoc which would befall it, were the teachings of the Gospel to be flouted, and a social order permitted to prevail, which spurns no less the laws of nature than those of God. For herself, the Church of Christ, built upon the solid rock, has nothing to fear, for she knows that the gates of Hell shall not prevail against her<sup>2</sup>; and the experience of centuries has taught her that storms, even the most violent, will pass away, leaving her stronger and triumphantly victorious. But her maternal heart cannot but be stirred at the thought of the countless ills which tempests of the

<sup>1</sup> Encycl. *Mens Nostra*, December 20th, 1929.

<sup>2</sup> Matt., xvi, 18.

kind would bring to so many thousands; at the thought, above all, of the immense spiritual evils which would ensue, entailing the eternal ruin of so many souls redeemed by the blood of Christ.

No stone then must be left unturned to avert these grave misfortunes from human society; towards this one aim must tend all our effort and endeavour, supported by assiduous and fervent prayers to God. For, with the assistance of Divine Grace, the destiny of the human family lies in our hands.

Let us not permit, Venerable Brethren, the children of this world to seem wiser in their generation than we, who by God's Goodness are children of Light.<sup>1</sup> We see these men most shrewdly select and train resolute disciples, who spread their false doctrines every day more widely amongst men of every station and of every clime. And when it becomes a question of attacking more vehemently the Church of Christ, we see them lay aside their internal quarrels, link up harmoniously into a single battle-line, and strive with united forces towards this common aim.

#### *Intimate Union and Harmony*

No one indeed is unaware of the many and splendid works in the social and economic field, as well as in education and religion, laboriously set in motion with indefatigable zeal by Catholics. But this admirable and self-sacrificing activity not infrequently loses some of its effectiveness by being directed into too many different channels. Let, then, all men of good stand united. Let all those who under the pastors of the Church, wish to fight this good and peaceful fight of Christ, as far as talents, powers and station allow, strive to play their part in the Christian reconstruction of human society which Leo XIII inaugurated in his immortal Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. Let them seek, not themselves and the things that are their own, but the things that are Jesus Christ's.<sup>2</sup> Let them not urge their own ideas with undue persistence,

<sup>1</sup> Luke, xvi, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Philipp., ii, 21.

but be ready to abandon them, however admirable, should the greater common good seem to require it: that in all and above all Christ may reign and rule, to whom be honour and glory and power for ever and ever.<sup>1</sup>

That this happy result may be attained, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, We impart to you all, members of the great Catholic family entrusted to Our care, but with special affection of Our heart to artisans and other workers engaged in manual labour, by divine Providence committed to Us in a particular manner, and to Christian employers and masters, with paternal affection, the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at Rome, at Saint Peter's, the fifteenth day of May, in the year 1931, the tenth of Our Pontificate.

PIUS PP. XI.

<sup>1</sup> Rev., v, 13.



# CHURCH, COMMUNITY AND STATE IN RELATION TO THE ECONOMIC ORDER

## I. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOSPEL TO THE ECONOMIC ORDER

The Christian Church approaches the problems of the social and economic order from the standpoint of her faith in the revelation of God in Christ. Through His redemptive work Christ made the whole range of human life subject to that law of love which He perfectly embodied in His own life and death. The charter of Christian practice is therefore given to us in that second commandment which Christ said to be like unto the first, and without obedience to which the first could not be obeyed—namely, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”. Obedience to this commandment of love in the economic sphere means the pursuit of justice. Christians must therefore do everything in their power to create a more just ordering of economic life, by attempting to secure for all who are their neighbours such opportunities as are necessary for their full development as persons in body, mind, and spirit. The responsibility of the Church is to insist on the true relationship of spiritual and economic goods. Our human wealth consists in fellowship with God and in Him with our brethren. To this fellowship the whole economic order must be made subservient.

## 2. THE CHIEF POINTS IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE AT WHICH THE PURPOSE OF GOD IS CHALLENGED

The subordination of God's purpose for human life to the demands of the economic process seems in practice to be a tendency common to all existing kinds of economic organization. In particular we draw attention to certain features modern life in the so-called capitalist countries of the world.

(1) The ordering of economic life has tended to enhance

acquisitiveness and to set up a false standard of economic and social success.

(2) Indefensible inequalities of opportunity in regard to education, leisure, and health continue to prevail; and the existence of economic classes presents an obstacle to human fellowship which cannot be tolerated by the Christian conscience.

(3) Centres of economic power have been formed which are not responsible to any organ of the community and which in practice constitute something in the nature of a tyranny over the lives of masses of men.

(4) The only forms of employment open to many men and women, or the fact that none is open at all, prevent them from finding a sense of Christian vocation in their daily life.

### 3. HOSTILITY TO CHRISTIANITY OF SOME MOVEMENTS WHICH HAVE ARISEN IN CONSEQUENCE OF THESE EVILS

We are witnessing new movements which have arisen in reaction to these evils but which combine with their struggle for social justice the repudiation of all religious faith. Aware of the reality of sin, the Church knows that no change in the outward ordering of life can of itself eradicate social evil. The Church, therefore, cannot surrender to the Utopian expectations of these movements, and their godlessness it must unequivocally reject, but in doing so it must recognise that Christians in their blindness to the challenging evils of the economic order have been partly responsible for the anti-religious character of these movements.

### 4. THE RESPONSE OF THE CHRISTIAN TO THESE CHALLENGES

Christians have a double duty—both to bear witness to their faith within the existing economic order, and also to test all economic institutions in the light of their understanding of God's will. The forces of evil against which Christians have

to contend are found not only in the hearts of men as individuals, but have entered into and infected the structure of society, and there also must be combated.

In spite of agreement on the necessity of effecting changes in the economic order, Christians have no reason to expect that they will always find themselves in agreement on particular issues or belonging to one political party. This is especially true of issues in which technical factors predominate concerning which honest differences of judgment must be expected. Nor do Christians escape those deeper differences of social conviction which are rooted in differing economic, geographical and historical circumstances. The very recognition of this fact by all groups within the Church might well mitigate the extremism to which each group is tempted. The Church should be a fellowship in Christ which transcends differences of judgment and divergences of action in relation to the concrete economic situation.

##### 5. CHRISTIAN TEACHING IN RELATION TO THE ECONOMIC ORDER

The Church can give guidance which is less general than the basic theological teaching emphasized above and which is less particular than advice concerning specific programmes and specific political decisions. The basis of such guidance is to be found in the affirmations of faith concerning God as creator and redeemer, the nature of man and the commandment of love. We suggest three ways in which these affirmations of faith can become the basis for the guidance concerning economic life which the Church can give to its members.

(a) The Christian message should deal with ends, in the sense of long-range goals, standards, and principles in the light of which every concrete situation, and every proposal for improving it, must be tested. Implicit in many of these principles is Christian teaching about property and this is therefore a subject to which Christians should give special attention.

(b) The Christian message should throw a searchlight on the actual facts of the existing situation, and in particular reveal the human consequences of present forms of economic behaviour. What in isolation seems to be purely destructive criticism is a necessary part of the total process by which constructive change is brought about.

(c) The Christian message should make clear the obstacles to economic justice in the human heart, and especially those that are present in the hearts of people within the Church.

*The Churches Survey their Task: Report of the Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State (1937)*

### PART III

## NATIONALITY, NATIONALISM AND RACIALISM

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### THE NATION AS AN ENLARGED FAMILY

“MAN is an animal that needs a master, and it is from a master or a combination of masters that he can expect a fortunate destiny.” It would be easy to base a philosophy of human history on this principle. But it would be wrong. Turn the sentence round. “The man who needs a master is an animal: as soon as he becomes a man, he no longer needs a master.” Nature has indeed marked out no one to be master of our race: it is only our animal vices and passions which bring about the need for such a control. Man and woman stand in a relationship of mutual need: the immature child needs the education of its parents: the sick need the doctor: disputants need the decision of the judge: the mass of the people need the initiative of a leader. These are natural conditions which arise from the circumstances themselves. The idea of manhood, in and for itself, does not carry with it the idea of a despot as indispensable to him—a despot who is also a human being. For man to need a protector he must be weak: for man to need a guardian he must be immature: for man to need a civilizer he must be savage: for man to need an executioner he must be repulsive. It is not man’s nature but men’s needs which have brought governments into existence and it is the continuance of these needs which have kept governments in being. It is a bad father whose child remains immature and in need of education throughout the whole of life. It is a bad doctor who keeps his patient in sickness so as to remain in

attendance on him to the edge of the grave. The same is true of those who educate and tend the human race, of the fathers of a country in relation to their subjects. Of two things one: either the human race is incapable of amelioration; or else the thousands of years during which men have been governed must have led to the discovery of the true line of human development and of the purpose behind this long process of education. The sequel of this work will make clear what this purpose is.

The family is a product of Nature. The most natural state is, therefore, a state composed of a single people with a single national character. A people can maintain its national character for thousands of years and, if its prince, who shares this heritage, has a concern for it, it can be developed through education along the lines most natural to it. For a people is a natural growth like a family, only spread more widely. Nothing seems, therefore, more clearly opposed to the aims which all governments should have in view than the expansion of states beyond their natural limits, the indiscriminate mingling of various nations and human types under one sceptre. The sceptre of a human ruler has neither the strength nor the range which would enable it to weld together such heterogeneous materials into a unity. So rulers are reduced to sticking them together, as it were, in order to constitute what is described as the "machine" of government—a fragile and lifeless contrivance between the separate parts of which no mutual sympathy is possible. In an empire of this kind even the best of monarchs can with difficulty regard himself as the Father of his country. Such an empire is a reproduction, on the stage of history, of the apocalyptic vision of the Great Beast with the head of a lion, the tail of a dragon, the wings of an eagle and the feet of a bear.<sup>1</sup> But a political conglomerate of this kind is in no sense a fatherland. Such artificial constructions resemble the wooden horse of Troy. They cannot move by their own impulsion. Nevertheless, they form part of a system of equilibrium in which each part guarantees the

<sup>1</sup> The reference is to Rev., xiii, 2 [ED.].

permanence of the other. Yet individually each is lifeless because it lacks a national character and personality. They are drawn together by an external force, and it is only the curse of destiny which could condemn them to immortality: for the statecraft that produced them is an art which juggles with peoples and human beings as though they were lifeless bodies. But history shows plainly enough that these products of human pride are made of clay, and that, like all earthly clay, they are doomed to be broken or washed away.

As in all human communities, there is a natural bond of association in mutual help and protection, so, too, in the case of the state, the natural order is the best—that is to say, the order in which everyone fulfils the function for which nature intended him. Whenever the ruler seeks to usurp the place of the Creator and by the exercise of his own arbitrary and passionate will to make of man what God never intended that he should be, issuing his own despotic orders, as it were, to Heaven, he at once becomes a source of disorder and a cause of inevitable disaster. Now, all social distinctions fixed by tradition are, in a sense, obstacles to the work of Nature, who distributes her gifts regardless of class or caste. It is, therefore, no reason for surprise that most peoples, when they have tested various forms of government and borne the burden of each, should have fallen back at last in despair on the form which reduces them to mere machines, namely, hereditary despotism. Like the Hebrew monarch who was given a choice between three evils, they have been inclined to say: "Let us rather fall into the hands of the Lord than into the hands of men". So, for better or for worse, they throw themselves into the arms of Providence, waiting to see who would be sent to govern them. For they have learnt, by experience, that the tyranny of an aristocracy is very hard, and that when the people are in power they are a very leviathan. All christian rulers designate themselves as exercising authority "by the grace of God". By this they recognize that they attained to power, not through their own

merits—for no man has merit before he is born—but through the disposition of Providence, which decreed that they should be born in their position. The merits required for their task they must first acquire through their own efforts, thus justifying Providence for having recognized them as worthy of their high office: for the office of Prince is nothing less than that of a god amongst men, a superior spirit in mortal shape. The few that have understood the responsibilities of their vocation shine like stars in the vast and cloudy firmament of common-place ruler, and refresh the drooping spirit of the wanderer, in his distressful journey through the political history of mankind.

O, that another Montesquieu would enable us to enter into the spirit of the many laws and governments on this round earth of ours—if only during the centuries that we know best! What he would give us would not be a bare classification of three or four forms of government, which are subject to infinite variation both in their working and in their development. Still less would it be an account based on ingenious principles of statecraft: for no state is built upon a single principle that can be laid down in black and white—quite apart from the difficulty of remaining true to such a principle in relation to all ranks of the community and in all circumstances. Nor would it be a collection of examples drawn from all nations, times and religions, out of the confusion of which genius itself could not make a synthesis. No, what we need is a living record, by a philosophic mind, of the history of each community. For history, monotonous though it often seems, never brings the same scene twice on the stage and shows us the story of the vices and virtues of mankind and its rulers as a constant variation on a single theme, with the same grim lesson always at the close.

J. G. VON HERDER.

*Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (1785)



## THE SPECIAL QUALITY OF GERMAN PEOPLE

WE have said that the means of educating a new race of men must first be applied by Germans to Germans and that it concerns our nation in a special and peculiar way. This statement also requires proof; and here, as before, we shall begin with what is highest and most general, showing what is the characteristic of the German as such, apart from the fate that has now befallen him; showing, too, that this has been his characteristic ever since he began to exist; and pointing out how this characteristic in itself gives him alone, above all other European nations, the capacity of responding to such an education.

In the first place, the German is a branch of the Teutonic race. Of the latter it is sufficient to say here that its mission was to combine the social order established in ancient Europe with the true religion preserved in ancient Asia, and in this way to develop in and by itself a new and different age in contrast with the ancient world which had perished. It is sufficient for our present purpose to distinguish the Germans from the other Teutonic peoples who came into existence with them. Other neo-European nations, as, for instance, those of Slav descent, do not seem as yet to have developed distinctly enough in comparison with the rest of Europe to make it possible to give a definite description of them; whereas others of the same Teutonic descent, as, for instance, the Scandinavians, although they lack the distinguishing quality which will be explained in what follows, are yet regarded here as indisputably German and included in all the general consequences of our observations.

. . . . .

The first and immediately obvious difference between the fortunes of the Germans and the other branches which grew from the same root is this: the former remained in the original dwelling-places of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter

emigrated to other places; the former retained and developed the original language of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter adopted a foreign language and gradually reshaped it in a way of their own. This earliest difference must be regarded as the explanation of those which came later, *e.g.*, that in the original fatherland, in accordance with Teutonic primitive custom, there continued to be a federation of States under a head with limited powers, whereas in the foreign countries the form of government was brought more in accordance with the existing Roman method, monarchies were established, etc. It is not these later differences that explain the one first mentioned.

Now, of the changes which have been indicated, the first, the change of home, is quite unimportant. Man easily makes himself at home under any sky, and the national characteristic, far from being much changed by the place of abode, dominates and changes the latter after its own pattern. Moreover, the variety of natural influences in the region inhabited by the Teutons is not very great. Just as little importance should be attached to the fact that the Teutonic race has intermingled with the former inhabitants of the countries it conquered; for, after all, the victors and masters and makers of the new people that arose from this intermingling were none but Teutons. Moreover, in the mother-country there was an intermingling with Slavs similar to that which took place abroad with Gauls, Cantabrians, etc., and perhaps of no less extent; so that it would not be easy at the present day for any one of the peoples descended from Teutons to demonstrate a greater purity of descent than the others.

More important, however, and in my opinion the cause of a complete contrast between the Germans and the other peoples of Teutonic descent, is the second change, the change of language. Here, as I wish to point out distinctly at the very beginning, it is not a question of the special quality of the language retained by the one branch or adopted by the other; on the contrary, the importance lies solely in the fact that in the one case something native is retained, while in the other

case something foreign is adopted. Nor is it a question of the previous ancestry of those who continue to speak an original language; on the contrary, the importance lies solely in the fact that this language continues to be spoken, for men are formed by language far more than language is formed by men.

A language that has become lifeless and thus essentially meaningless very easily lends itself to perversion and to misuse in glossing over every kind of human corruption, in a way that is not possible in a language which has never died. I take as my example the three notorious words Humanity, Popularity, and Liberality. When these words, are used in speaking to a German who has learnt no language but his own they are to him nothing but a meaningless noise, which has no relationship of sound to remind him of anything he knows already and so takes him completely out of his circle of observation and beyond any observation possible to him. Now, if the unknown word nevertheless attracts his attention by its foreign, distinguished and euphonious tone, and if he thinks that what sounds so lofty must also have some lofty meaning, he must have this meaning explained to him from the very beginning and as something entirely new to him, and he can only blindly accept this explanation. So he becomes tacitly accustomed to acknowledge as really existing and valuable something which, if left to himself, he would perhaps never have found worth mentioning. Let no one believe that the case is much different with the neo-Latin peoples, who utter those words as if they were words of their mother-tongue. Without a scholarly study of antiquity and of its actual language they understand the roots of those words just as little as the German does. Now, if instead of the word Humanity [*Humanität*], we had said to a German the word *Menschlichkeit*, which is its literal translation, he would have understood us without further historical explanation, but he would have said: "Well, to be a man [*Mensch*] and not a wild beast is not very much after all." Now it may be that no Roman would ever have said that;

but the German would say it, because in his language manhood [*Menschheit*] has remained an idea of the senses only and has never become a symbol of a supersensuous idea as it did among the Romans. Our ancestors had taken note of the separate human virtues and designated them symbolically in language perhaps long before it occurred to them to combine them in a single concept as contrasted with animal nature; and that is no discredit to our ancestors as compared with the Romans. Now anyone who, in spite of this, wished to introduce that foreign and Roman symbol artificially and, as it were, by a trick into the language of the Germans would obviously be lowering their ethical standard in passing on to them as distinguished and commendable something which may perhaps be so in the foreign language, but which the German, in accordance with the ineradicable nature of his national power of imagination, only regards as something already familiar that must be kept in its place. A closer examination might enable us to demonstrate that those Teutonic races which adopted the Latin language experienced, even in the beginning, similar degradations of their former ethical standard because of inappropriate foreign symbols; but on this circumstance we do not now wish to lay too great a stress.

Further, if in speaking to the German, instead of the words Popularity [*Popularität*] and Liberality [*Liberalität*], I should use the expressions, "striving for favour with the great mob", and "not having the mind of a slave", which is how they must be literally translated, he would, to begin with, not even obtain a clear and vivid sense-image such as was certainly obtained by a Roman of old. The latter saw every day with his own eyes the supple politeness of an ambitious candidate to all and sundry, and outbursts of the slave mind too; and those words vividly re-presented these things to him. Even from the Roman of a later period these sights were removed by the change in the form of government and the introduction of Christianity; and, besides, his own language was beginning to a great extent to die away in his own mouth. This was more especially due to Christianity, which was alien

to him, and which he could neither ward off nor thoroughly assimilate. How was it possible for this language, already half dead in its own home, to be transmitted alive to a foreign people? How could it now be transmitted to us Germans? Moreover, as regards to the symbolic mental content of both those expressions, there is in the word Popularity, even from its very origin, something base, which was perverted in their mouths and became a virtue, owing to the corruption of the nation and of its constitution. The German never falls into this perversion, so long as it is put before him in his own language. But when Liberty is translated by saying that a man has not the soul of a slave, or, to give it a modern rendering, has not a lackey's way of thinking, he once more replies that to say this also means very little.

Moreover, into these verbal images, which even in their pure form among the Romans arose at a low stage of ethical culture or designated something positively base, there were stealthily introduced during the development of the neo-Latin languages the idea of lack of seriousness about social relations, the idea of self-abandonment, and the idea of heartless laxity. In order to bring these things into esteem among us, use was made of the respect we have for antiquity and foreign countries to introduce the same words into the German language. It was done so quietly that no one was fully aware of what was actually intended. The purpose and the result of all admixture has always been this: first of all to deprive the hearer of the immediate comprehensibility and definiteness which are the inherent qualities of every primitive language; then, when he has been prepared to accept such words in blind faith, to supply him with the explanation that he needs: and, finally, in this explanation to mix vice and virtue together in such a way that it is no easy matter to separate them again. Now, if the true meaning of those three foreign words, assuming them to have a meaning, had been expressed to the German in his own words and within his own circle of verbal images, in this way: *Menschenfreundlichkeit* (friendliness to man), *Leutseligkeit* (condescension or affability), and *Edelmüt* (noblemindedness),

he would have understood them; but the base associations we have mentioned could never have been slipped into those designations. Within the range of German speech such a wrapping-up in incomprehensibility and darkness arises either from clumsiness or evil design; it is to be avoided, and the means always ready to hand is to translate into right and true German. But in the neo-Latin languages this incomprehensibility is of their very nature and origin, and there is no means of avoiding it, for they do not possess any living language by which they might examine the dead one; indeed, when one looks at the matter closely, they are entirely without a mother-tongue.

. . . . .

With this our immediate task is performed, which was to find the characteristic that differentiates the German from the other peoples of Teutonic descent. The difference arose at the moment of the separation of the common stock and consists in this, that the German speaks a language which has been alive ever since it first issued from the force of nature, whereas the other Teutonic races speak a language which has movement on the surface only but is dead at the root. To this circumstance alone, to life on the one hand and death on the other, we assign the difference; but we are not in any way taking up the further question of the intrinsic value of the German language. Between life and death there is no comparison; the former has infinitely more value than the latter. To make a direct comparison between German and neo-Latin languages is therefore futile; it is to discuss things which are not worth discussing. If the intrinsic value of the German language is to be discussed, at the very least a language of equal rank, a language equally primitive, as, for example, Greek, must enter the lists; but such a comparison is far beyond our present purpose.

What an immeasurable influence on the whole human development of a people the character of its language may have—its language, which accompanies the individual into the most secret depths of his mind in thought and will and

either hinders him or gives him wings, which unites within its domain the whole mass of men who speak it into one single and common understanding, which is the true point of meeting and mingling for the world of the senses and the world of spirits and fuses the ends of both in each other in such a fashion that it is impossible to tell to which of the two it belongs itself—how different the results of this influence may prove to be where the relation is as life to death, all this in general is easily perceived. In the first place, the German has a means of investigating his living language more thoroughly by comparing it with the closed Latin language, which differs very widely from his own in the development of verbal images; on the other hand, he has a means of understanding Latin more clearly in the same way. This is not possible to a member of the neo-Latin peoples, who fundamentally remains a captive in the sphere of one and the same language. Then the German, in learning the original Latin, at the same time acquires to a certain extent the derived languages also; and if he should learn the former more thoroughly than a foreigner does, which for the reason given the German will very likely be able to do, he at the same time learns to understand this foreigner's own language far more thoroughly and to possess it far more intimately than does the foreigner himself who speaks it. Hence the German, if only he makes use of all his advantages, can always be superior to the foreigner and understand him fully, even better than the foreigner understands himself, and can translate the foreigner to the fullest extent. On the other hand, the foreigner can never understand the true German without a thorough and extremely laborious study of the German language, and there is no doubt that he will leave what is genuinely German untranslated. The things in these languages which can only be learnt from the foreigner himself are mostly new fashions of speech due to boredom and caprice, and one is very modest when one consents to receive instruction of this kind. In most cases one would be able, instead, to show foreigners how they ought to speak according to the primitive language and its law of change, and to show

that the new fashion is worthless and offends against ancient and traditional good usage.

In addition to the special consequence just mentioned, the whole wealth of consequences we spoke of comes about of itself.

It is, however, our intention to treat these consequences as a whole, fundamentally and comprehensively, from the point of view of the bond that unites them, in order to give in this way a thorough description of the German in contrast to the other Teutonic races. For the present I briefly indicate these consequences thus:

(1) Where the people has a living language, mental culture influences life; where the contrary is the case, mental culture and life go their way independently of each other.

(2) For the same reason, a people of the former kind is really and truly in earnest about all mental culture and wishes it to influence life; whereas a people of the latter kind looks upon mental culture rather as an ingenious game and has no wish to make it anything more. The latter have intelligence: the former have intelligence and depth of personality (*Gemüth*).

(3) From No. 2 it follows that the former has honest diligence and earnestness in all things, and takes pains, whereas the latter is easy-going and guided by its happy nature.

(4) From all this together it follows that in a nation of the former kind the mass of the people is capable of education, and the educators of such a nation test their discoveries on the people and wish to influence it; whereas in a nation of the latter kind the educated classes separate themselves from the people and regard it as nothing more than a blind instrument of their plans.

J. G. FICHTE.

*Addresses to the German Nation* (1808)



## TO THE YOUNG MEN OF ITALY

You seek a country. An instinct implanted in your hearts by God, a voice which reaches you from the tombs of your great men, a sign which the strong Italian nature has placed on your brow and in your eyes, tell you that you are brothers, called to have one flag, one law, one temple, from whose summit shines forth, in letters visible to all men, the mission of Italy, the part committed by God to our nation for the good of humanity.

And for this reason every man among you boldly pronounces or softly murmurs that holy name of Country. For this the noblest among you have been dying for fifty years, martyrs to an *idea*, dying on the scaffold, in the cells, or in the slow agony of exile, on their faces the smile of them who glimpse the future, the word *Italy* on their lips. For this the multitude of your dead shiver from time to time and raise the cover of the tomb where popes and kings have laid them, then fall back exhausted to make the attempt again after a period of silence.

A country of his own is the dream, the palpitating, secret desire of every soul living on our lands. Like the child restlessly seeking in its sleep its mother's breast, like those flowers which in the dark of night turn towards that part of heaven where the sun will appear at dawn, so you, in the restless sleep of servitude, in the chill heavy darkness of isolation, go groping in search of the common mother whose name is Country, and anxiously scan the horizon to discover the point where the sun of your nation shows signs of rising.

But why do you seek and not find your country? Why for you alone does the long martyrdom bear no fruit of victory? And why does the stone of the sepulchre, where popes and kings have laid you, rise only halfway from time to time to fall again more heavily upon your heads? What strange fatality weighs upon you, poor Israelites among the nations, that God should

deny you the country granted centuries ago to peoples who did and suffered less than you?

The life of God pulses in your land more vigorously than elsewhere. Images of beauty and strength alternate singularly in this land, where the sun lights up volcanoes and which men greet with the name of the Garden of Europe. Nature smiles for you with a woman's smile. The sick came from the northern fogs to drink in new life from the balsam airs of your meadows, under the deep blue of your skies.

The eternal Alps look gravely down upon you from the boundaries of your lands as if to say: Be great! And at the foot of those Alps the loveliest flowers ever given to man to see, gaze at you, wherever you move, with their innocent eyes as if to say: Be good! And among those Alps and those flowers float melodies, angelic murmurs that men call music, an echo of the language spoken in heaven.

Resplendent as the stars of your firmament were the works of Genius among you: resplendent in thought and action which you alone knew how to unite in beautiful harmony.

Europe, with the exception of your sister Greece, was semi-barbarous when your eagles marched over it from triumph to triumph; and you taught the conquered peoples the wisdom of laws which are still respected, the comforts of civilized life, and that leaning towards unity which prepared the world for Christ.

Europe lay wrapped in the darkness of feudal serfdom when you, risen to a second life, affirmed in your Communes the republican liberty of the man and the citizen, and spread far and wide the benefits of civilization, of letters and of commerce.

Your priests of art wandered from land to land, scattering on every side forms of immortal beauty and teaching how to develop the ideal from the symbol.

And when ungrateful Europe laid you low and divided your spoils, Italian genius, before veiling herself for a time, revealed in the moment of her affliction, almost as a pledge of what she could do one day, a new world to Europe.

Genius, strength, nature beautiful beyond comparison

and fruitful, harmony of breezes and ineffable smile of heaven, God gave you all. Why did he not give you a Country? Why, when every inhabitant of the lands you civilized, on being asked who he is, proudly replies: I am French, I am English. I am Spanish, can you only reply as an expression of your desire: I am Italian?

Because you lacked and you still lack faith: faith in yourselves, in your Right, and in the collective life and Mission of the Nation: God visits upon you an ancient sin of your fathers which you have not yet wiped out. . . .

One's country is a Mission, a common Duty. Now how can you ever hope to win a country for yourselves if you call on others to fulfil this Mission, to carry out this Duty?

Your country is that line in God's design which He committed to you to develop and translate into visible fact. How then can you deserve a country when you call on others to develop that part of the design for you?

Your country is your collective life, the life which gathers into a tradition of tendencies and affections all the generations which were born, worked, and passed away on your soil: the life which pulses more proudly in you at the sight of a stone from the Capitol or of the Portoria stone in Genoa, than it does at the sight of the pyramids of Egypt or the Vendôme Column in Paris: the life that, when you roam through lands beyond the ocean, veils your eye with tears at the unexpected sight of a stone upon which is written an Italian name. How can you ever delude yourselves into thinking that the revelation of this life can be brought about by the work of men in whom the voice of that tradition and of those memories is silent, and within whose breast throbs the secret of another country?

And one's country, before all, is the *consciousness* of country.

For the ground on which you tread, the frontiers placed by nature between your land and the lands of others, and the musical tongue which sounds therein, are only the visible *forms* of your country; but if the *soul* of the country throbs not in that sanctuary of your life called consciousness, that form

is like a corpse, without motion or breath of life, and you are a nameless crowd, not a nation; people, but not a people. The word COUNTRY, written on your flag by the hand of the foreigner is devoid of sense, as was the word FREEDOM, written by some of your fathers on their prison doors.

One's country is *faith* in one's country. When each of you has this faith and is ready to seal it with his own blood, then alone will you have a country, not before.

. . . .

Young men of Italy, arise!

Arise on the mountains! Arise on the plains! Arise in each of your cities! Arise all and everywhere! Do you not see that a sudden and universal rising is certain victory without the sacrifices of victory?

Arise all and for all! Are you not all sons of the one and the same Italy, in search of the same country?

You who have free land and arms do not say: Why do not the men of the other provinces rise as we do? In truth, this is the word of Cain, and if you uttered it you would deserve to lose the liberty acquired and you would lose it.

There is only one Italy, and, in her, not provinces but war zones and one Italian army composed of all those in arms around the national flag. You are that army and you must move to the conquest of those zones, never resting and growing more numerous as you go.

You who are still groaning in servitude, do not say: Why do not the men of the lands that are already free come to drive out our tyrants? If you rose they would come and, together, you would more quickly drive out your masters.

Sons of the freed lands, will not the country find among you a Caesar of liberty to cross the Rubicon? Sons of the enslaved lands, will not the country find among you a single Procida who dare summon the oppressed to the Vespers against the oppressors?

Rise, oh rise! Rise to-day: to-morrow the obstacles will be greater. Because if in their councils the princes can say:

There, things are quiet, they will sanction with their pacts the duration of that quiet, and you will have them all enemies, whilst to-day it is in your power to divide them.

Rise to-day! The time is all in your favour. To-day the masses are still hoping and surging: tomorrow they will fall back incredulous, unnerved, perverted by the insidious arts of your enemies.

Rise to-day! One hour of slavery suffered with resignation when victory is possible deserves a century of tyranny and shame for the people who suffer it. And who can give you better conditions for victory than you have to-day? The thousands of your brothers in arms, the forces of your masters uncertain and divided, one foreigner exhausted by defeat, the other by victory and powerless to change camp and flag in a moment, and the councils of Europe divided, and the Nations awake at your awakening, does not all this tell you that the time has come?

Men of the Neapolitan lands! What are you waiting for? Do you know what name is given to you among the peoples of Europe who marvel at your immobility?

It is the name that a man does not hear without having recourse to arms: the name which burns the forehead of a people with the brand of shame. In the name of the honour of Italy and your own, in the name of your past, in the name of the examples of fortitude which first reached us from your part of the country, arise, and may your rising found our country with one blow!

Sons of the island who eleven years ago said to its tyrants: On such and such a day we will rise, and kept its word, are you made like boys hanging on the schoolmasters' lips? The hour of your liberty cannot come to you by secret message from Florence or Turin. The hour of your liberty will strike the day on which one of your hundred cities will repeat the word of your fathers with hands and arms crossed: *He who delays betrays the Country. Death before slavery!*

He who delays betrays his country. O young men, cast your anathema on him who speaks to you of delay and rise.

To what purpose admire the sublime impetus of France in 1792 and the fourteen armies she sent to the frontiers? France had then no more millions of men than Italy has to-day. Why call the combatants of Greece great? Can you not be as great as they? The Greeks were a million against an enemy ten times as strong; but they all flew to arms and swore to be buried under the ruins of their cities rather than bow before the Crescent; they kept their vow at Missolonghi and they won. Do as they did: you too will win.

Up, arise! Do not bow to the praises you receive from those to whose advantage it is that you should delay: in truth I tell you that those who praise you, secretly scorn and sneer at you as credulous and childish yielding. These five months of inertia should weigh on your foreheads like five years of undeserved shame. The insurrection of Italy has begun: spread it, enlarge its basis, strengthen it as it is dear to you. Insurrections which halt die. You must go on or perish.

Arise! Arise! Does not Italian blood run in your veins? Amidst the enemy's threats and the signals of the chieftain from Gaul,<sup>1</sup> do you not feel life and the pride of the free boil in your hearts? Is this land ours, or does it belong to others? Is it a fief or the property of citizens, their own masters? What is the use of arms if you do not use them? What is the use of feverishly crying: Long live Italy? Up for Perugia, Protocols will not pay you for the blood shed there. Up for Venice! From the royal councils you will get nothing but peace treaties of Campoformio or Villafranca. Up for all those who groan from the Alps to the sea. Arise like the storms of your skies, terrible and swift. Arise burning as the flames of your irresistible volcanoes! Make arms of your billhooks, of your crosses, of everything containing iron! Defy death and death will evade you. One moment of purposeful, strong life, Italian as God created it, and the country is yours.

And may God bless you, your swords, your affections and your earthly life and your souls and the very curses that sometimes came from your lips upon me who write with my heart's

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon III (Ed.).

blood and whose voice, trembling with the fever of love and desire you often mistook for the voice of a common agitator, restless and importunate. May every memory of me be obliterated if only the beautiful, the sacred, the beloved tricolour flag of Italy may wave amongst a people of free men over the land where my mother sleeps.

G. MAZZINI.

*To the Young Men of Italy* (1859)

## NATIONALISM—THE LAST PHASE OF REVOLUTION

THE combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men in society. Inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior. Exhausted and decaying nations are revived by the contact of a younger vitality. Nations in which the elements of organization and the capacity for government have been lost, either through the demoralising influence of despotism, or the disintegrating action of democracy, are restored and educated anew under the discipline of a stronger and less corrupted race. This fertilising and regenerating process can only be obtained by living under one government. It is in the cauldron of the State that the fusion takes place by which the vigour, the knowledge, and the capacity of one portion of mankind may be communicated to another. Where political and national boundaries coincide society ceases to advance, and nations relapse into a condition corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with their fellow-men. The difference between the two unites mankind not only by the benefits it confers on those who live together, but because it connects society either by a political or a national bond, gives to every people an interest in its neighbours, either because they are under the same government or because they are of the same race, and thus promotes the interests of humanity, of civilization, and of religion.

If we take the establishment of liberty for the realization of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them. Those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A State which



is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a State which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a State which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government. The theory of nationality, therefore, is a retrograde step in history. It is the most advanced form of the revolution, and must retain its power to the end of the revolutionary period, of which it announces the approach. Its great historical importance depends on two chief causes.

First, it is a chimera. The settlement at which it aims is impossible. As it can never be satisfied and exhausted, and always continues to assert itself, it prevents the government from ever relapsing into the condition which provoked its rise. The danger is too threatening, and the power over men's minds too great, to allow any system to endure which justifies the resistance of nationality. It must contribute, therefore, to obtain that which in theory it condemns—the liberty of different nationalities as members of one sovereign community. This is a service which no other force could accomplish; for it is a corrective alike of absolute monarchy, of democracy, and of constitutionalism, as well as of the centralization which is common to all three. Neither the monarchical, nor the revolutionary, nor the parliamentary system can do this; and all the ideas which have excited enthusiasm in past times are impotent for the purpose except nationality alone.

And secondly, the national theory marks the end of the revolutionary doctrine and its logical exhaustion. In proclaiming the supremacy of the rights of nationality, the system of democratic equality goes beyond its own extreme boundary, and falls into contradiction with itself. Between the democratic and the national phase of the revolution, socialism had intervened, and had already carried the consequences of the principle to an absurdity. But that phase was passed. The revolution survived its offspring, and produced another further result. Nationality is more advanced than socialism, because it is a more arbitrary system. The social theory endeavours to provide for the existence of the individual

beneath the terrible burdens which modern society heaps upon labour. It is not merely a development of the notion of equality but a refuge from real misery and starvation. However false the solution, it was a reasonable demand that the poor should be saved from destruction; and if the freedom of the State was sacrificed to the safety of the individual, the more immediate object was, at least in theory, attained. But nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle. It prevents not only the division, but the extension of the State, and forbids to terminate war by conquest, and to obtain a security for peace. Thus, after surrendering the individual to the collective will, the revolutionary system makes the collective will subject to conditions which are independent of it, and rejects all law, only to be controlled by an accident.

Although, therefore, the theory of nationality is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of socialism, it has an important mission in the world, and marks the final conflict, and therefore the end, of two forces which are the worst enemies of civil freedom—the absolute monarchy and the revolution.

LORD ACTON.

*Essay on Nationality* (1862)

## WHAT IS A NATION?

I PROPOSE to ask you to join with me in analysing an idea which, though it appears simple, yet lends itself to the most dangerous misunderstandings. Human society assumes the most varied forms, great masses of human beings, such as we see in China, in Egypt and in the older Babylonia; the tribe as exemplified by the Hebrews and Arabs; the city, as in Athens and Sparta; the unions of various countries, as in the Achaemenian, Roman and Carlovingian empires; communities having no mother country but held together by the bond of religion, as the Israelites and the Parsees; nations such as France, England and most modern European autonomous States; confederations, as in Switzerland and America; relationships, such as those set up by race, or rather by language, between the different branches of Germans or Slavs: all these various groupings exist, or have existed, and to ignore the differences between them is to create a serious confusion. At the time of the French Revolution it was believed that the institutions of small independent towns, such as Sparta and Rome, could be applied to our great nations comprising thirty or forty million inhabitants. Nowadays, we observe a graver error. The terms "race" and "nation" are confused, and we see attributed to ethnographic, or rather linguistic, groups a sovereignty analogous to that of actually existing peoples. Let us try to arrive at some degree of exactness with regard to these difficult questions in which the least confusion at the outset of the argument as to the meaning of words may lead in the end to the most fatal errors. Our task is a delicate one; it amounts almost to vivisection; and we are going to treat the living as usually we treat the dead. We shall proceed coldly and with the most complete impartiality.

## I

Since the end of the Roman Empire, or rather since the dismemberment of the empire of Charlemagne, Western Europe appears to us as divided into nations, some of which have, at certain periods, tried to establish a hegemony over others, without ever achieving any permanent success. Where Charles V, Louis XIV and Napoleon I failed, no man in the future will probably ever succeed. To set up a new Roman Empire or a new empire such as that of Charlemagne has become an impossibility. Europe is so much divided that any attempt at universal domination would immediately produce a coalition that would compel the ambitious nation to retire within its natural limits. A kind of durable balance has been established. Centuries may pass, but France, England, Germany and Russia, in spite of all their adventures, will retain their distinct historical individuality, like pieces on a draught-board, the squares of which are ever varying in size and importance, but never quite blend completely.

Nations, thus conceived, are a fairly recent phenomenon in history. Such nations were unknown in ancient times. Egypt, China and old Chaldaea were by no manner of means nations. They were flocks led by an offspring of the Sun or an offspring of Heaven. There were no Egyptian citizens, any more than there are Chinese citizens. The classical antique world had its republics and royal towns, its confederations of local republics and its empires, but it hardly had a nation in our sense of the word. Athens, Sparta, Sidon and Tyre are small centres of patriotism, however admirable; they are cities possessing relatively small territories. Gaul, Spain and Italy, before their absorption into the Roman Empire, were assemblies of tribes, often in league with one another, but without central institutions or dynasties. Nor could the empires of Assyria or Persia or that of Alexander point to any mother country. There were never any Assyrian patriots; nor was the empire of Persia anything but a vast

feudal estate. There is not a nation that traces its origin back to Alexander's colossal enterprise, which was yet so fertile in its consequences for the general history of civilisation.

The Roman Empire came much nearer to being a mother country. Roman rule, at first so hard to bear, very soon became loved in return for the immense benefit conferred by the suppression of war. It was a grand association, synonymous with order, peace and civilization. During its closing period, men of lofty mind, enlightened clerics and the educated classes had a real sense of "the Roman Peace", as opposed to the menacing chaos of barbarism. But an empire twelve times as great as France is to-day could not be termed a State in the modern sense of the word. The split between East and West was inevitable. In the third century attempts at a Gallic empire failed; and it was the Germanic invasion that ushered into the world the principle which afterwards served as a basis for the existence of nationalities.

What in fact did the Germanic peoples accomplish from the time of their great invasions in the fifth century to the last Norman conquests in the tenth? They effected little change in the essential character of races, but they imposed dynasties and a military aristocracy on more or less important areas within the former empire of the West, and these areas assumed the names of their invaders. Hence we have a France, a Burgundy, a Lombardy, and—later on—a Normandy. The rapid superiority won by the Frankish Empire renewed, for a brief period, the unity of the West. But about the middle of the ninth century this empire was shattered beyond repair. The Treaty of Verdun laid down its dividing lines, immutable in principle, and from that time France, Germany, England, Italy and Spain march forward, by ways often tortuous and beset by countless hazards, to their full national existence such as we see spread out before us to-day.

What is, in fact, the distinguishing mark of these various States? It is the fusion of the populations that compose them. There is no analogy between the countries we have

just mentioned and the state of affairs in Turkey, where Turk, Slav, Greek, Armenian, Arab, Syrian and Kurd are as distinct to-day as at the time of the conquest. Two essential circumstances contributed to this result. First, the fact that the Germanic peoples adopted Christianity as soon as they came into more or less permanent contact with the Greek and Latin peoples. When victor and vanquished have the same religion, or rather when the victor adopts the religion of the vanquished, there can be no question of the Turkish system of complete discrimination according to a man's religion. The second circumstance was that the victors forgot their own language. The grandsons of Clovis, Alaric, Gondebaud, Alboin and Rollo spoke the Roman tongue. This fact was itself the consequence of another important particular circumstance, viz., that the Franks, Burgundians, Goths, Lombards and Normans were accompanied by very few women of their own race. During several generations the chiefs married none but German wives. But their concubines and their children's nurses were Latins, and the whole tribe married Latin women, with the result that, from the time of the settlement of the Franks and Goths on Roman soil, the *lingua francica* and the *lingua gothica* had but a very short career. It was not so in England, since the Anglo-Saxon invaders doubtless brought wives with them. The British population fled before them, and furthermore, Latin was no longer, or rather had never been, the dominant language in Britain. If, in the fifth century, Old French had been the general language in Gaul, Clovis and his men would not have deserted their Germanic tongue in favour of Old French.

Hence we get the following most important result, namely that, in spite of the brutality of the invaders, the pattern laid down by them became, in the course of time, the very pattern of the nation. Quite rightly, *France* became the name of a country containing but an imperceptible minority of Franks. In the tenth century, in the early songs of Charlemagne, which perfectly reflect the spirit of the age, all the

inhabitants of France appear as Frenchmen. The idea of any difference of race in the population of France, which stands out so clearly in Gregory of Tours, does not occur at all in French writers or poets after the time of Hugh Capet. The difference between noble and serf is accentuated to the highest degree, but it is in no sort of way an ethnic difference. It is a difference in courage, custom and education, transmitted by birth. The idea that the origin of all this lies in conquest occurs to no one. Already in the thirteenth century we see established, with all the force of dogma, the spurious system according to which nobility owed its origin to a privilege conferred by the King in recognition of great services rendered to the nation, so that every noble is a man ennobled. The same thing happened after almost all the Norman conquests; after one or two generations the Norman invaders were no longer distinguishable from the rest of the population. Nevertheless, they had exercised a marked influence, having given to the conquered country a nobility, military habits and a feeling of patriotism—things which it had never known before.

To forget and—I will venture to say—to get one's history wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation; and thus the advance of historical studies is often a danger to nationality. Historical research, in fact, casts fresh light upon those deeds of violence which have marked the origin of all political formations, even of those which have been followed by the most beneficial results. Unity is always realized by brute force. The union of North and South in France was the result of a reign of terror and extermination carried on for nearly a century. The French monarchy, which is generally regarded as typifying a steady process of crystallization and as having brought about the most perfect example of national unity known to history, when studied more closely loses its glamour. It was cursed by the nation that it was engaged in moulding, and to-day it is only those who can see the past in perspective who can appreciate the value of its achievement.

These great laws in the history of Western Europe become obvious by contrast. Many countries have failed in such an enterprise as that which the king of France, partly by his tyranny and partly by his justice, brought to so admirable a conclusion. Beneath the crown of St. Stephen, Magyars and Slavs have remained as distinct as they were eight hundred years ago. The House of Habsburg, far from blending the diverse elements in its dominions, has kept them apart and often in opposition to each other. In Bohemia the Czech and German elements are superposed like oil and water in a glass. The Turkish policy of separating nationalities according to religion has had very much graver consequences, since it has entailed the ruin of the East. Take a town like Salonica or Smyrna, and you will find five or six communities, each with its own memories and almost nothing in common. Now it is of the essence of a nation that all individuals should have much in common, and further that they should all have forgotten much. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifal or a Visigoth, while every French citizen must have forgotten the massacre of St. Bartholomew's and the massacres in the South in the thirteenth century. Not ten families in France can prove their Frankish descent, and even if they could, such a proof would be inherently unsound, owing to the innumerable unknown alliances capable of upsetting all genealogical systems.

The modern nation is, therefore, the historic consequence of a series of facts converging towards the same point. Sometimes unity has been brought about by a dynasty, as in the case of France; at other times it has been brought about by the direct volition of provinces, as in the case of Holland, Switzerland and Belgium; or again, by a general sentiment, the tardy conqueror of the freaks of feudalism, as in the case of Italy and Germany. At all times such formations have been guided by the urge of some deep-seated reason. In such cases, principles burst out with the most unexpected surprises. In our own times we have seen Italy unified by its defeats and Turkey demolished by its victories. Every defeat



advanced the Italian cause, while every victory served to ruin Turkey, since Italy is a nation, and Turkey, apart from Asia Minor, is not. It is to the glory of France that, by the French Revolution, she proclaimed that a nation exists of itself. It is not for us to disapprove of imitators. The principle of nations is our principle. But what, then, is a nation? Why is Holland a nation, while Hanover and the Grand Duchy of Parma are not? How is it that France persists in being a nation, when the principle that created her has vanished? Why is Switzerland, with its three languages, its two religions and three or four races, a nation, when Tuscany, for example, which is so homogeneous, is not? Why is Austria a state and not a nation? In what does the principle of nations differ from that of races? These are points on which thoughtful men require, for their own peace of mind, to come to some conclusion. Although the affairs of the world are rarely settled by arguments of this nature, yet studious men like to bring reason to bear on these questions, and to unravel the skein of confusion that entangles the superficial mind.

## II

We are told by certain political theorists that a nation is, above all, a dynasty representing a former conquest that has been at first accepted, and then forgotten, by the mass of the people. According to these politicians, the grouping of provinces effected by a dynasty, its wars, marriages and treaties, ends with the dynasty that has formed it. It is quite true that most modern nations have been made by a family of feudal origin, which has married into the country and provided some sort of centralizing nucleus. The boundaries of France in 1789 were in no way natural or necessary. The large area that the House of Capet had added to the narrow strip accorded by the Treaty of Verdun was indeed the personal acquisition of that family. At the time when the annexations were made no one thought about natural limits,

the right of nations or the wishes of provinces. Similarly, the union of England, Ireland and Scotland was a dynastic performance. The only reason why Italy took so long to become a nation was that, until the present century, none of her numerous reigning families became a centre of union. It is an odd fact that she derives the royal<sup>1</sup> title from the obscure island of Sardinia, a land which is scarcely Italian. Holland, self-created by an act of heroic resolution, has none the less entered into a close bond of marriage with the House of Orange, and would run serious risks, should this union ever be endangered.

Is, however, such a law absolute? Doubtless, it is not. Switzerland and the United States which have been formed, like conglomerates, by successive additions, are based on no dynasty. I will not discuss the question in so far as it concerns France. One would have to be able to read the future in order to do so. Let us merely observe that this great French line of kings had become so thoroughly identified with the national life that, on the morrow of its downfall, the nation was able to subsist without it. Furthermore, the eighteenth century had entirely changed the situation. After centuries of humiliation, man had recovered his ancient spirit, his self-respect and the idea of his rights. The words "mother country" and "citizen" had regained their meaning. Thus it was possible to carry out the boldest operation ever performed in history—an operation that may be compared to what, in physiology, would be an attempt to bring back to its former life a body from which brain and heart had been removed.

It must, therefore, be admitted that a nation can exist without any dynastic principle, and even that nations formed by dynasties can be separated from them without thereby ceasing to exist. The old principle, which takes into account only the right of princes, can no longer be maintained: and, besides dynastic right, there exists also national right. On

<sup>1</sup> The House of Savoy owes its royal title solely to the possession of Sardinia (1720).

what criterion is this national right to be based? By what sign is it to be known? And from what tangible fact is it properly to be derived?

1. Many will boldly reply, from race. The artificial divisions, they say, the results of feudalism, royal marriages and diplomatic congresses, have broken down. Race is what remains stable and fixed; and this it is that constitutes a right and a lawful title. The Germanic race, for example, according to this theory, has the right to retake the scattered members of the Germanic family, even when these members do not ask for reunion. The right of the Germanic family over such-and-such a province is better than the right of its inhabitants over themselves. A sort of primordial right is thus created analogous to the divine right of kings; and the principle of ethnography is substituted for that of nations. This is a very grave error, and if it should prevail, it would spell the ruin of European civilization. The principle of the primordial right of race is as narrow and as fraught with danger for true progress as the principle of nations is just and legitimate.

We admit that, among the tribes and cities of the ancient world, the fact of race was of capital importance. The ancient tribe and city were but an extension of the family. In Sparta and Athens all citizens were related more or less closely to each other. It was the same among the Beni-Israel; and it is still so among the Arab tribes. But let us leave Athens, Sparta and the Jewish tribe and turn to the Roman Empire. Here we have quite a different state of affairs. This great agglomeration of completely diverse towns and provinces, formed in the first place by violence and then held together by common interests, cuts at the very root of the racial idea. Christianity, characteristically universal and absolute, works even more effectively in the same direction. It contracts a close alliance with the Roman Empire, and, under the influence of these two incomparable unifying agents, the ethnographic argument is for centuries dismissed from the government of human affairs.

In spite of appearances, the barbarian invasions were a step further on this road. The barbarian kingdoms which were then cut out have nothing ethnographic about them; they were decided by the forces or whims of the conquerors, who were completely indifferent with regard to the race of the peoples whom they subjugated. Charlemagne reconstructed in his own way what Rome had already built, viz., a single empire composed of the most diverse races. The authors of the Treaty of Verdun, calmly drawing their two long lines from north to south, did not pay the slightest attention to the race of the peoples to right or left of them. The frontier changes which took place in the later Middle Ages were also devoid of all ethnographic tendencies. Let it be granted that the consistent policy of the Capets managed more or less to gather together, under the name of France, the territories of ancient Gaul; yet this was by no means the consequence of any tendency on the part of their inhabitants to unite themselves with their kindred. Dauphiné, Bresse, Provence and Franche-Comté no longer remembered any common origin. The consciousness of Gallic race had been lost since the second century A.D., and it is only in modern times, and retrospectively, that the erudite have unearthed the peculiarities of the Gallic character.

Ethnographic considerations have, therefore, played no part in the formation of modern nations. France is Celtic, Iberic and Germanic. Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slav. Italy is the country in which ethnography finds its greatest difficulties. Here Gauls, Etruscans, Pelasgians and Greeks are crossed in an unintelligible medley. The British Isles, taken as a whole, exhibit a mixture of Celtic and Germanic blood, the proportions of which are particularly difficult to define.

The truth is that no race is pure, and that to base politics on ethnographic analysis is tantamount to basing it on a chimera. The noblest countries, England, France and Italy, are those where breeds are most mixed. Is Germany an exception in this respect? Is she a purely Germanic country? What a delusion to suppose it! All the South was Gallic; and all the East,

starting from the Elbe, is Slav. And as for those areas which are said to be really pure from the racial point of view, are they in fact so? Here we touch on one of those problems concerning which it is most important to have clear ideas and to prevent misunderstandings.

Discussions on race are endless, because the word "race" is taken by historians who are philologists and by anthropologists with physiological leanings in two quite different senses.<sup>1</sup> For the anthropologists race has the same meaning as it has in zoology: it connotes real descent—blood relationship. Now the study of languages and history does not lead to the same divisions as physiology. The words "brachycephalic" and "dolichocephalic" find no place either in history or philology. Within the human group that created the Aryan tongues and the Aryan rules of life there were already brachycephalics and dolichocephalics; and the same must be said of the primitive group that created the languages and institutions termed Semitic. In other words, the zoological origins of the human race are vastly anterior to the origins of culture, civilization and language. The primitive Aryan, Semitic and Turanian groups were joined in no physiological unity. These groupings are historical facts which took place at a certain period, let us say fifteen or twenty thousand years ago; whereas the zoological origin of the human race is lost in impenetrable darkness. What the sciences of philology and history call the Germanic race is assuredly a quite distinct family among human kind. But is it a family in the anthropological sense? Certainly not. The distinctive German character appears in history only a very few centuries before Jesus Christ. Obviously the Germans did not emerge from the earth at that period. Before that time, when mingled with the Slavs in the great shadowy mass of Scythians, they possessed no distinctive character. An Englishman is certainly a type in the whole sum of human kind. Now the type of what is very

<sup>1</sup> This point has been further dealt with in a lecture, a summary of which can be seen in the journal of the French Scientific Association, March 10th, 1878.

incorrectly termed the Anglo-Saxon race<sup>1</sup> is neither the Briton of the time of Caesar, nor the Anglo-Saxon of Hengist, nor the Dane of Canute, nor the Norman of William the Conqueror: it is the sum total of all these. The Frenchman is neither a Gaul, nor a Frank, nor a Burgundian. He is that which has emerged from the great cauldron in which, under the eye of the king of France, the most diverse elements have been simmering. As regards his origin, an inhabitant of Jersey or Guernsey differs in no way from the Norman population of the neighbouring coast. In the eleventh century the most piercing gaze would not have perceived the slightest difference on either side of the strait. Trifling circumstances decided Philip Augustus not to take these islands together with the rest of Normandy. Separated from each other for nearly seven hundred years, the two peoples have become not only foreign to each other, but entirely dissimilar. Race, then, as we historians understand it, is something that is made and unmade. The study of race is of prime importance for the man of learning engaged on the history of human kind. It is not applicable to politics. The instinctive consciousness which has presided over the drawing of the map of Europe has held race to be no account, and the leading nations of Europe are those of essentially mixed breed.

The fact of race, therefore, while vitally important at the outset, tends always to become less so. There is an essential difference between human history and zoology. Here race is not everything, as it is with the rodents and the cats; and one has no right to go about feeling people's heads, and then taking them by the throat and saying "You are related to us; you belong to us!" Apart from anthropological characteristics, there are such things as reason, justice, truth and beauty, which are the same for all. For another thing, this ethnographic policy is not safe. To-day you may exploit it

<sup>1</sup> Germanic elements are not much more important in the United Kingdom than they were in France at the time when she possessed Alsace and Metz. The Germanic language prevailed in the British Isles solely because Latin had not completely ousted the Celtic forms of speech there, as was the case in the Gauls.

against others; and then you see it turned against yourself. Is it certain that the Germans, who have so boldly hoisted the banner of ethnography, will not see the Slavs arrive and, in their turn, analyse village names in Saxony and Lusatia; or seek out the traces of the Wiltzes or the Obotrites; or say that they have come to settle accounts arising out of the massacres and wholesale enslavements inflicted upon their ancestors by the Ottos? It is an excellent thing for us all to know how to forget.

I like ethnography very much, and find it a peculiarly interesting science. But as I wish it to be free, I do not wish it to be applied to politics. In ethnography; as in all branches of learning, systems change. It is the law of progress. Should nations then also change together with the systems? The boundaries of states would follow the fluctuations of the science; and patriotism would depend on a more or less paradoxical dissertation. The patriot would be told: "You were mistaken: you shed your blood in such-and-such a cause; you thought you were a Celt; no, you are a German". And then, ten years later, they will come and tell you that you are a Slav. Lest we put too great a strain upon Science, let us excuse the lady from giving an opinion on problems in which so many interests are involved. For you may be sure that, if you make her the handmaid of diplomacy, you will often catch her in the very act of granting other favours. She has better things to do: so let us ask her just to tell the truth.

2. What we have said about race, applies also to language. Language invites union, without, however, compelling it. The United States and England, as also Spanish America and Spain, speak the same language without forming a single nation. Switzerland, on the contrary, whose foundations are solid because they are based on the assent of the various parties, contains three or four languages. There exists in man a something which is above language: and that is his will. The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the variety of these forms of speech, is a much more important fact than a similarity of language, often attained by vexatious measures.

It is to the honour of France that she has never tried to attain unity of language by the use of coercion. Is it impossible to cherish the same feelings and thoughts and to love the same things in different languages? We were talking just now of the objections to making international politics dependent on ethnography. It would be no less objectionable to make them depend on comparative philology. Let us allow full liberty of discussion to these interesting branches of learning, and not mix them up with what would disturb their serenity. The political importance ascribed to languages comes from regarding them as tokens of race. Nothing could be more unsound. In Prussia, where nothing but German is now spoken, Russian was spoken a few centuries ago; in Wales, English is spoken; in Gaul and Spain, the original speech of *Alba Longa*; in Egypt, Arabic; and we could cite any number of other examples. Even in the beginning of things, similarity of language did not imply that of race. Take the proto-Aryan or proto-Semitic tribe. It contained slaves speaking the same language as their masters, whereas the slave very often differed from his master in race. We must repeat that these divisions into Indo-European, Semitic and other languages, which have been laid down by comparative philologists with such admirable acumen, do not coincide with those laid down by anthropology. Languages are historical formations which afford little clue to the descent of those who speak them and which, in any case, cannot be permitted to fetter human liberty, when it is a question of deciding with what family one is to be linked for life and death.

This exclusive importance attributed to language has, like the exaggerated attention paid to race, its dangers and its objections. If you overdo it, you shut yourself up within a prescribed culture which you regard as the national culture. You are confined and immured, having left the open air of the great world outside to shut yourself up in a conventicle together with your compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind; and nothing could be more untoward for civilization. Let us not lose sight of this fundamental principle that



man, apart from being penned up within the bounds of one language or another, apart from being a member of one race or another, or the follower of one culture or another, is above all a reasonable moral being. Above French, German or Italian culture, there stands human culture. Consider the great men of the Renaissance. They were neither French, nor Italian, nor German. By their intercourse with the ancient world, they had rediscovered the secret of the true education of the human mind, and to that they devoted themselves body and soul. How well they did!

3. Nor can religion provide a satisfactory basis for a modern nationality. In its origin, religion was connected with the very existence of the social group, which itself was an extension of the family. The rites of religion were family rites. The religion of Athens was the cult of Athens itself, of its mythical founders, its laws and customs. This religion, which did not involve any dogmatic theology, was, in the full sense of the words, a state religion. Those who refused to practice it were not Athenians. At bottom it was the cult of the personified Acropolis; and to swear on the altar of Aglauros<sup>1</sup> amounted to an oath to die for one's country. This religion was the equivalent of our drawing lots for military service or of our cult of the national flag. To refuse to participate in such cult would have been tantamount to a refusal nowadays to serve in the army, and to a declaration that one was not an Athenian. On the other hand, it is clear that such a cult as this meant nothing for those who were not Athenians; so there was no proselytising to compel foreigners to accept it, and the slaves of Athens did not practice it. The same was the case in certain small republics of the Middle Ages. No man was a good Venetian if he did not swear by St. Mark; nor a good citizen of Amalfi if he did not set St. Andrew above all the other saints in Paradise. In these small societies, acts, which in later times became the grounds for persecution and tyranny, were justifiable and were as trivial as it is with us to

<sup>1</sup> Aglauros, who gave her life to save her country, represents the Acropolis itself.

wish the father of the family many happy returns of his birthday or a happy new year.

What was true of Sparta and Athens was no longer so in the kingdoms that emerged from the conquests of Alexander, and still less so in the Roman Empire. The persecutions carried out by Antiochus Epiphanes to induce the Eastern world to worship the Olympian Jove, like those of the Roman Empire to maintain the farce of a state religion, were mistaken, criminal and really absurd. Nowadays the situation is perfectly clear, since the masses no longer have any uniform belief. Every one believes and practices religion in his own way according to his capacities and wishes. State religion has ceased to exist; and a man can be a Frenchman, an Englishman or a German, and at the same time a Catholic, a Protestant or a Jew, or practice no form of worship at all. Religion has become a matter to be decided by the individual according to his conscience, and nations are no longer divided into Catholic and Protestant. Religion which, fifty two years ago, was so important a factor in the formation of Belgium, is still equally so in the heart of every man; but it is now barely to be reckoned among the reasons that determine national frontiers.

4. Community of interest is certainly a powerful bond between men. But do interests suffice to make a nation? I do not believe it. Community of interest brings about commercial treaties. Nationality, which is body and soul both together, has its sentimental side: and a Customs Union is not a country.

5. Geography, and what we call natural frontiers, certainly plays a considerable part in the division of nations. Geography is one of the essential factors of history. Rivers have guided races: mountains have impeded them. The former have favoured, while the latter have restricted, historic movements. But can one say, as some people believe, that a nation's boundaries are to be found written on the map, and that it has the right to award itself as much as is necessary to round off certain outlines, or to reach such-and-such a mountain

or river, which are regarded as in some way dispensing the frontier *à priori*? I know no doctrine more arbitrary or fatal than this, which can be used to justify all kinds of violence. In the first place, is it the mountains, or is it the rivers that constitute these alleged natural frontiers? It is indisputable that mountains separate; but rivers tend rather to bring together. Then again all mountains cannot divide states. Which are those that separate and those that do not? From Biarritz to Tornea there is not one estuary which is more like a boundary than another. If History had so decreed, then the Loire, the Seine, the Meuse, the Elbe and the Oder would have, as much as the Rhine has, this character of national frontier, which has been the cause of so many infringements of that fundamental right, which is the will of men. People talk of strategic grounds. Nothing is absolute; and it is evident that much must be conceded to necessity. But these concessions must not go too far. Otherwise, every one will demand what suits him from a military point of view and we shall have endless warfare. No; it is not the soil any more than the race which makes a nation. The soil provides the substratum, the field for struggle and labour: man provides the soul. Man is everything in the formation of this sacred thing that we call a people. Nothing that is material suffices here. A nation is a spiritual principle, the result of the intricate workings of history; a spiritual family and not a group determined by the configuration of the earth.

We have now seen those things which do not suffice to create such a spiritual principle. They are race, language, interests, religious affinity, geography and military necessity. What more then is required? In view of what I have already said, I shall not have to detain you very much longer.

### III

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which are really only one, go to make up this soul or spiritual principle. One of these things lies in the past, the other in the

present. The one is the possession in common of a rich heritage of memories; and the other is actual agreement, the desire to live together, and the will to continue to make the most of the joint inheritance. Man, gentleman, cannot be improvised. The nation, like the individual, is the fruit of a long past spent in toil, sacrifice and devotion. Ancestor-worship is of all forms the most justifiable, since our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men and glory—I mean real glory—these should be the capital of our company when we come to found a national idea. To share the glories of the past, and a common will in the present; to have done great deeds together, and to desire to do more—these are the essential conditions of a people's being. Love is in proportion to the sacrifices one has made and the evils one has borne. We love the house that we have built and that we hand down to our successors. The Spartan song "We are what ye were, and we shall be what ye are", is, in its simplicity, the abridged version of every national anthem.

In the past, a heritage of glory and of grief to be shared; in the future, one common plan to be realized; to have suffered, rejoiced and hoped together; these are things of greater value than identity of custom-houses and frontiers in accordance with strategic notions. These are things which are understood, in spite of differences in race and language. I said just now "to have suffered together", for indeed common suffering unites more strongly than common rejoicing. Among national memories, sorrows have greater value than victories; for they impose duties and demand common effort.

Thus we see that a nation is a great solid unit, formed by the realization of sacrifices in the past, as well as of those one is prepared to make in the future. A nation implies a past; while, as regards the present, it is all contained in one tangible fact, viz., the agreement and clearly expressed desire to continue a life in common. The existence of a nation is (if you will forgive me the metaphor) a daily plebiscite, just as that of the individual is a continual affirmation of life. I am quite aware that this is less metaphysical than the doctrine of divine

right, and smacks less of brute force than alleged historic right. According to the notions that I am expounding, a nation has no more right than a king to say to a province: "You belong to me; so I will take you". A province means to us its inhabitants; and if any one has a right to be consulted in the matter, it is the inhabitant. It is never to the true interest of a nation to annex or keep a country against its will. The people's wish is after all the only justifiable criterion, to which we must always come back.

We have excluded from politics the abstract principles of metaphysics and theology; and what remains? There remains man, with his desires and his needs. But you will tell me that the consequences of a system that puts these ancient fabrics at the mercy of the wishes of usually unenlightened minds, will be the secession and ultimate disintegration of nations. It is obvious that in such matters no principles should be pushed too far, and that truths of this nature are applicable only as a whole and in a very general sort of way. Human wishes change indeed: but what in this world does not? Nations are not eternal. They have had beginnings and will have ends; and will probably be replaced by a confederation of Europe. But such is not the law of the age in which we live. Nowadays it is a good, and even a necessary, thing that nations should exist. Their existence is the guarantee of liberty, which would be lost, if the world had but one law and one master.

By their various, and often contrasting, attainments, the nations serve the common task of humanity; and all play some instrument in that grand orchestral concert of mankind, which is, after all, the highest ideal reality that we attain. Taken separately, they all have their weak points; and I often tell myself that a man who should have the vices that are held to be virtues in nations, a man battering on empty glory, and so jealous, selfish and quarrelsome as to be ready to draw his sword at the slightest provocation, would be the most intolerable creature. But such discordant details vanish when all is taken together. What sufferings poor humanity has endured and what trials await it yet! May it be guided by the

spirit of wisdom and preserved from the countless dangers that beset the path!

And now, gentlemen, let me sum it all up. Man is the slave neither of his race, nor his language, nor his religion, nor of the windings of his rivers and mountain ranges. That moral consciousness which we call a nation is created by a great assemblage of men with warm hearts and healthy minds: and as long as this moral consciousness can prove its strength by the sacrifices demanded from the individual for the benefit of the community, it is justifiable and has the right to exist. If doubts arise concerning its frontiers, let the population in dispute be consulted: for surely they have a right to a say in the matter. This will bring a smile to the lips of the transcendental politicians, those infallible beings who spend their lives in self-deception and who, from the summit of their superior principles, cast a pitying eye upon our commonplaces. "Consult the population! Stuff and nonsense! This is only another of these feeble French ideas that aim at replacing diplomacy and war by methods of infantile simplicity." Well, gentlemen, let us wait a while. Let the kingdom of the transcendentalists endure for its season; and let us learn to submit to the scorn of the mighty. It may be, that after many fruitless fumbings, the world will come back to our modest empirical solutions. The art of being right in the future is, at certain times, the art of resigning oneself to being old-fashioned.

E. RENAN.

*What is a Nation?* (1882)

## NATIONALITY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

A PORTION of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances however are either indispensable, or necessarily sufficient by themselves. Switzerland has a strong sentiment of nationality, though the cantons are of different races, different languages, and different religions. Sicily has, throughout history, felt itself quite distinct in nationality from Naples, notwithstanding identity of religion, almost identity of language, and a considerable amount of common historical antecedents. The Flemish and the Walloon provinces of Belgium, notwithstanding diversity of race and language, have a much greater feeling of common nationality, than the former have with Holland, or the latter with France. Yet in general the national feeling is proportionally weakened by the failure of any of the causes which contribute to it. Identity of language, literature, and, to some extent, of race and recollections, have maintained the feeling of nationality in considerable strength among the different portions of the German name, though they have at no time been really united under

the same government; but the feeling has never reached to making the separate States desire to get rid of their autonomy. Among Italians an identity far from complete, of language and literature, combined with a geographical position which separates them by a distinct line from other countries, and, perhaps more than anything else, the possession of a common name, which makes them all glory in the past achievements in arts, arms, politics, religious primacy, science, and literature, of any who share the same designation, give rise to an amount of national feeling in the population, which, though still imperfect, has been sufficient to produce the great events now passing before us, notwithstanding a great mixture of races, and although they have never, in either ancient or modern history, been under the same government, except while that government extended or was extending itself over the greater part of the known world.

Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves. But, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still more vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. The influences which form opinions and decide political acts, are different in the different sections of the country. An altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of one part of the country and of another. The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what opinions, or what instigations, are circulating in another. The same incidents,



the same acts, the same system of government, affect them in different ways; and each fears more injury to itself from the other nationalities than from the common arbiter, the State. Their mutual antipathies are generally much stronger than jealousy of the government. That any one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the common ruler is sufficient to determine another to support that policy. Even if all are aggrieved, none feel that they can rely on the others for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is sufficient to resist alone, and each may reasonably think that it consults its own advantage most by bidding for the favour of the government against the rest. Above all, the grand and only effectual security in the last resort against the despotism of the government is in that case wanting; the sympathy of the army with the people. The military are the part of every community in whom, from the nature of the case, the distinction between their fellow countrymen and foreigners is the deepest and strongest. To the rest of the people, foreigners are merely strangers; to the soldier, they are men against whom he may be called, at a week's notice, to fight for life or death. The difference to him is that between friends and foes—we may almost say between fellow men and another kind of animals: for as respects the enemy, the only law is that of force, and the only mitigation, the same as in the case of other animals—that of simple humanity. Soldiers to whose feelings half or three-fourths of the subjects of the same government are foreigners, will have no more scruple in mowing them down, and no more desire to ask the reason why, than they would have in doing the same thing against declared enemies. An army composed of various nationalities has no other patriotism than devotion to the flag. Such armies have been the executioners of liberty through the whole duration of modern history. The sole bond which holds them together is their officers, and the government which they serve; and their only idea, if they have any, of public duty is obedience to orders. A government thus supported, by keeping its Hungarian regiments in Italy and its Italian in Hungary, can long

continue to rule in both places with the iron rod of foreign conquerors.

If it be said that so broadly marked a distinction between what is due to a fellow countryman and what is due merely to a human creature, is more worthy of savages than of civilized beings, and ought, with the utmost energy, to be contended against, no one holds that opinion more strongly than myself. But this object, one of the worthiest to which human endeavour can be directed, can never, in the present state of civilization, be promoted by keeping different nationalities of anything like equivalent strength, under the same government. In a barbarous state of society, the case is sometimes different. The government may then be interested in softening the antipathies of the races, that peace may be preserved, and the country more easily governed. But when there are either free institutions, or a desire for them, in any of the peoples artificially tied together, the interest of the government lies in an exactly opposite direction. It is then interested in keeping up and envenoming their antipathies; that they may be prevented from coalescing, and it may be enabled to use some of them as tools for the enslavement of others. The Austrian Court has now for a whole generation made these tactics its principal means of government; with what fatal success, at the time of the Vienna insurrection and the Hungarian contest, the world knows too well. Happily there are now signs that improvement is too far advanced to permit this policy to be any longer successful.

For the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationalities. But several considerations are liable to conflict in practice with this general principle. In the first place, its application is often precluded by geographical hindrances. There are parts, even of Europe, in which different nationalities are so locally intermingled that it is not practicable for them to be under separate governments. The population of Hungary is composed of Magyars, Slovacks, Croats, Serbs, Roumans, and in

some districts, Germans, so mixed up as to be incapable of local separation; and there is no course open to them but to make a virtue of necessity, and reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and laws. Their community of servitude which dates only from the destruction of Hungarian independence in 1849, seems to be ripening and disposing them for such an equal union. The German colony of East Prussia is cut off from Germany by part of the ancient Poland, and being too weak to maintain separate independence, must, if geographical continuity is to be maintained, be either under a non-German government, or the intervening Polish territory must be under a German one. Another considerable region in which the dominant element of the population is German, the provinces of Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia, is condemned by its local situation to form part of a Slavonian state. In Eastern Germany itself there is a large Slavonic population: Bohemia is principally Slavonic, Silesia and other districts partially so. The most united country in Europe, France, is far from being homogeneous: independently of the fragments of foreign nationalities at its remote extremities, it consists, as language and history prove, of two portions, one occupied almost exclusively by a Gallo-Roman population, while in the other the Frankish, Burgundian, and other Teutonic races form a considerable ingredient.

When proper allowance has been made for geographical exigencies, another more purely moral and social consideration offers itself. Experience proves, that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people—to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power—than to sulk on his own rocks,

the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander, as members of the British nation.

Whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the blending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union is a benefit to the human race. Not by extinguishing types, of which, in these cases, sufficient examples are sure to remain, but by softening their extreme forms, and filling up the intervals between them. The united people, like a crossed breed of animals (but in a still greater degree, because the influences in operation are moral as well as physical), inherits the special aptitudes and excellencies of all its progenitors, protected by the admixture from being exaggerated into the neighbouring vices. But to render this admixture possible, there must be peculiar conditions. The combinations of circumstances which occur, and which affect the result, are various.

The nationalities brought together under the same government, may be about equal in numbers and strength, or they may be very unequal. If unequal, the least numerous of the two may either be the superior in civilization, or the inferior. Supposing it to be superior, it may either, through that superiority, be able to acquire ascendancy over the other, or it may be overcome by brute strength, and reduced to subjection. This last is a sheer mischief to the human race, and one which civilized humanity with one accord should rise in arms to prevent. The absorption of Greece by Macedonia was one of the greatest misfortunes which ever happened to the world: that of any of the principal countries of Europe by Russia would be a similar one.

If the smaller nationality, supposed to be the more advanced in improvement, is able to overcome the greater as the Macedonians, reinforced by the Greeks, did Asia, and the English India, there is often a gain to civilization; but the conquerors and the conquered cannot in this case live together under the

same free institutions. The absorption of the conquerors in the less advanced people would be an evil: these must be governed as subjects, and the state of things is either a benefit or a misfortune according as the subjugated people have or have not reached the state in which it is an injury not to be under a free government, and according as the conquerors do or do not use their superiority in a manner calculated to fit the conquered for a higher stage of improvement. This topic will be particularly treated of in a subsequent chapter.

When the nationality which succeeds in overpowering the other, is both the most numerous and the most improved—and especially if the subdued nationality is small, and has no hope of reasserting its independence—then, if it is governed with any tolerable justice, and if the members of the more powerful nationality are not made odious by being invested with exclusive privileges, the smaller nationality is gradually reconciled to its position, and becomes amalgamated with the larger. No Bas-Breton, nor even any Alsatian, has the smallest wish at the present day to be separated from France. If all Irishmen have not yet arrived at the same disposition towards England it is partly because they are sufficiently numerous to be capable of constituting a respectable nationality by themselves; but principally because, until of late years, they had been so atrociously governed, that all their best feelings combined with their bad ones in rousing bitter resentment against the Saxon rule. This disgrace to England, and calamity to the whole empire, has, it may be truly said, completely ceased for nearly a generation. No Irishman is now less free than an Anglo-Saxon, nor has a less share of every benefit either to his country or to his individual fortunes, than if he were sprung from any other portion of the British dominions. The only remaining real grievance of Ireland, that of the State Church, is one which half, or nearly half, the people of the larger island have in common with them. There is now next to nothing, except the memory of the past, and the difference in the predominant religion, to keep apart two races, perhaps the most fitted of any two in the world to be the completing

counterpart of one another. The consciousness of being at last treated not only with equal justice but with equal consideration, is making such rapid way in the Irish nation, as to be wearing off all feelings that could make them insensible to the benefits which the less numerous and less wealthy people must necessarily derive from being fellow citizens instead of foreigners to those who are not only their nearest neighbours, but the wealthiest, and one of the freest, as well as most civilized and powerful, nations of the earth.

The cases in which the greatest practical obstacles exist to the blending of nationalities are when the nationalities which have been bound together are nearly equal in numbers and in the other elements of power. In such cases, each, confiding in its strength, and feeling itself capable of maintaining an equal struggle with any of the others, is unwilling to be merged in it: each cultivates with party obstinacy its distinctive peculiarities; obsolete customs, and even declining languages, are revived, to deepen the separation; each deems itself tyrannized over if any authority is exercised within itself by functionaries of a rival race; and whatever is given to one of the conflicting nationalities is considered to be taken from all the rest. When nations, thus divided, are under a despotic government which is a stranger to all of them, or which, though sprung from one, yet feeling greater interest in its own power than in any sympathies of nationality, assigns no privilege to either nation, and chooses its instruments indifferently from all; in the course of a few generations, identity of situation often produces harmony of feeling, and the different races come to feel towards each other as fellow countrymen; particularly if they are dispersed over the same tract of country. But if the era of aspiration to free government arrives before this fusion has been effected, the opportunity has gone by for effecting it. From that time, if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically separate, and especially if their local position is such that there is no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same government (as in the case of an Italian province under a French or German yoke), there is not

only an obvious propriety, but, if either freedom or concord is cared for, a necessity, for breaking the connexion altogether. There may be cases in which the provinces, after separation, might usefully remain united by a federal tie: but it generally happens that if they are willing to forgo complete independence and become members of a federation, each of them has other neighbours with whom it would prefer to connect itself, having more sympathies in common, if not also greater community of interest.

J. S. MILL.

*Representative Government* (1861)

## THE SWISS STATE

THE Swiss concept of the state is composed of two essential elements. On the one hand, we have the *democratic principle*, the idea of the people's state ; and on the other, the *idea of the political nation* supreme over nationalities. The first of these elements dominates our internal constitution and the spirit of our administration. It is an ancient heritage, to be faithfully guarded and not squandered. The second element links our national life with the nations that surround us and determines the lines of our foreign policy. The concept of the political nation, although it has been marked out for us centuries ago in our history, is an idea which we still have to make thoroughly our own.

When we speak of Swiss democracy, we think, not of a party, or a type of constitution, or a political slogan, but of an essential reality that imbues the whole of our public life. Swiss democracy is something very different from the democratic ideas of the French Revolution, and especially so from those democratic formulas used by some dozens of republics and sham monarchies in the construction of their constitutions. For us, democracy is not the mere absence of monarchical, aristocratic or plutocratic institutions; nor is it the more or less important influence exercised by the electorate, either directly or indirectly. These things are for us a matter of course. The essence of Swiss democracy is to be found in two elements among our political and social institutions. In the first place we have an extensive system of *self-government*, based on a strongly developed sense of corporate existence. In contrast to most modern democracies, Swiss democracy has grown up from its own roots and has not been bestowed by a constituent assembly. The democratic institutions of Switzerland permeate the whole fabric of the state, whereas in other states they are confined either to local administration or to the central government of the state. We do not



consider local self-government and central government as conflicting terms. Their representatives meet each other without distrust, while, in all grades of the administration, the citizen finds himself invited to co-operate directly and on equal terms with the public departments. And so it is that we consider this multi-national participation in the state as a matter of course and a part of our being. If our people found no time, or were unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices, for this active participation in the affairs of municipality, canton and federation, and if our younger generation, through indifference or ennui, were to turn away from public life, a deadly blow would be struck at the roots of our democracy, of our state-concept and so of our state itself. . . .

The other particular feature of our democracy is also of ancient origin. It consists in the *absence of a class system*. This fact finds its most striking expression in our dialect which, in contrast to almost all the dialects of the surrounding states, is really the language of the people and not that of a class. If, in a new state, there is an absence of class distinction, this is the inevitable result of an outward similarity in the conditions of life and the expression of a certain poverty in the forms of society. In an old country, such as Switzerland, there is no lack, nor has there ever been any lack, of the most varied forms of social growth. But these serve to enrich our life and not to disintegrate it.

The second characteristic which is distinctively peculiar to modern Switzerland is the concept of the *political nation*, *i.e.* of a state based, not on ethnic or, more particularly, on linguistic peculiarities or on nationalities, but solely on a common history and common political ideas. . . .

The principle of nationality has fulfilled its mission. It has swept away the worn out political forms of feudalism and absolutism. Its existence will always be justified in so far as it forms the basis of most states, and it will continue its work for the freedom of populations from the trammels of any state in which they find no room for their development. When, however, the principle of nationality ceases to connote a claim

for free development and maxims of toleration and becomes an element of hatred and of blind and reckless state egoism, it leads to self-annihilation. . . .

The free and untrammelled neighbourly existence of various nationalities and cultures was, from the outset, facilitated by our federative system and, in the mixed cantons, by our highly developed system of self-government. The close relations that had for centuries been maintained between the German localities and France and Italy excluded all ideas of the imposition of a foreign speech or culture. Intolerance in matters of culture is fundamentally foreign to our ideas.

No positive principle, however, is involved in merely living together side by side without quarrelling or oppression. Such a life may render our further political existence possible, and may furnish an interesting example to Europe of the possibility of the co-existence of nations side by side. The mixed national state can only become a source of energy and inspiration provided that this living together produces something new, the enrichment of each part by mutual comprehension, the welding of the German and Latin idiosyncrasies into the common mass of European civilization.

It is true that the appreciation of the special value of such cultural inter-penetration will always be confined to a comparatively limited circle ; but it is sufficient if such insight is possessed not simply by an intellectual *élite*, but more generally by the more highly educated section of our people.

MAX HUBER.

*The Swiss Concept of the State* (1915)

## SOCIALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

THE war has undoubtedly created the acutest crisis and has incredibly intensified the sufferings of the masses. The reactionary character of this war, the shameless lie of the bourgeoisie of *all* countries which covers its predatory aims with "national" ideology, all this inevitably creates, on the basis of an objective revolutionary situation, revolutionary sentiments in the masses. Our duty is to help make these sentiments conscious, to deepen them and give them form. The only correct expression of this task is the slogan, "Turn the imperialist war into civil war". *All* consistent class struggle in time of war, all "mass actions" earnestly conducted must inevitably lead to this. We cannot know whether in the first or in the second imperialist war between the great nations, whether during or after it, a strong revolutionary movement will flare up. Whatever the case may be, it is our absolute duty systematically and unflinchingly to work in that particular direction.

The Basle Manifesto directly refers to the example of the Paris Commune, *i.e.* to turning a war between governments into civil war. Half a century ago, the proletariat was too weak; objective conditions for Socialism had not ripened yet; a co-ordination and co-operation of the revolutionary movements in all the belligerent countries could not take place; the fact that a section of the Paris workers was captivated by "national ideology" (traditions of 1792) was its petty-bourgeois weakness noted at the time by Marx, and one of the reasons for the collapse of the Commune. Now, half a century later, all the conditions that weakened the revolution are no more. At the present time it is unforgivable for a Socialist to countenance repudiation of activities in the spirit of the Paris Communards.

## EXAMPLE OF FRATERNIZATION IN THE TRENCHES

The bourgeois papers of all the belligerent countries have quoted examples of fraternization between the soldiers of the belligerent nations, even in the trenches. The fact that the military authorities of Germany and England have issued severe orders against such fraternization proves that the government and the bourgeoisie consider it of serious importance. If at a time when opportunism among the leaders of the Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe is supreme and social-chauvinism is supported by the entire Social-Democratic press as well as by all influential figures of the Second International, such cases of fraternization are possible, how much nearer could we bring the end of this criminal, reactionary and slave-driving war and the organization of a revolutionary international movement if systematic work were conducted in this direction, at least by the Left Socialists of all the belligerent countries!

## IMPORTANCE OF ILLEGAL ORGANIZATIONS

Like the opportunists, the most eminent Anarchists of the world have covered themselves in this war with the shame of social-chauvinism in the spirit of Plekhanov and Kautsky. One of the useful results of this war, however, will undoubtedly be the death of both opportunism and Anarchism. The Social-Democratic parties, in no case and under no conditions refusing to take advantage of the slightest legal possibility for the organization of the masses and the preaching of Socialism, must do away with a servile attitude towards legalism. "Be the first to shoot, Messrs. Bourgeois!" Engels wrote in reference to civil war, pointing out the necessity for us to violate legality *after* it has been violated by the bourgeoisie. The crisis has shown that the bourgeoisie is violating legality in every country, including the freest, and that it is impossible to lead the masses towards revolution without creating an

illegal organization for preaching, discussing, analysing, preparing revolutionary means of struggle. In Germany, for instance, all *honest* activities of the Socialists are being conducted against abject opportunism and hypocritical "Kautskyism", and conducted illegally. In England, men are being sentenced to hard labour for appeals to abstain from joining the army.

To think that membership in a Social-Democratic party is compatible with repudiation of illegal methods of propaganda and the ridicule of them in the legal press is to betray Socialism.

#### DEFEAT OF "ONE'S OWN" GOVERNMENT IN IMPERIALIST WAR

The advocates of victory of "one's own" government in the present war, as well as the advocates of the slogan "Neither victory nor defeat", proceed equally from the standpoint of social-chauvinism. A revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot help wishing the defeat of its government, it cannot fail to see the connection between the government's military reverses and the increased opportunity for overthrowing it. Only a bourgeois who believes that the war started by the governments will necessarily end as a war between governments, and who wishes it to be so, finds "ridiculous" or "absurd" the idea that the Socialists of *all* the belligerent countries should express their wish that *all* "their" governments be defeated. On the contrary, such expression would coincide with the hidden thoughts of every class-conscious worker, and would lie along the line of our activity which tends to turn the imperialist war into civil war.

An earnest anti-war propaganda by a section of the English, German and Russian Socialists would undoubtedly "weaken the military strength" of the respective governments, but such propaganda would be to the credit of the Socialists. The Socialists must explain to the masses that there is no salvation for them outside of a revolutionary overthrow of their governments and that the difficulties of those governments

in the present war must be taken advantage of for just this purpose.

### PACIFISM AND THE PEACE SLOGAN

A mass sentiment for peace often expresses the beginning of a protest, an indignation and a consciousness of the reactionary nature of the war. It is the duty of all Social-Democrats to take advantage of this sentiment. They will take the most ardent part in every movement and in every demonstration made on this basis, but they will not deceive the people by assuming that in the absence of a revolutionary movement it is possible to have peace without annexations, without the oppression of nations, without robbery, without planting the seed of new wars among the present governments and the ruling classes. Such deception would only play into the hands of the secret diplomacy of the belligerent countries and their counter-revolutionary plans. Whoever wishes a durable and democratic peace must be for civil war against the governments and the bourgeoisie.

### RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The most widespread deception of the people by the bourgeoisie in the present war consists in hiding its predatory aims under an ideology of "national liberation". The English promise freedom to Belgium, the Germans to Poland, etc. As we have seen, this is in reality a war of the oppressors of the majority of the nations of the world for the deepening and widening of such oppression.

The Socialists cannot reach their great aim without fighting against every form of national oppression. They must therefore unequivocally demand that the Social-Democrats of the *oppressing* countries (of the so-called "great" nations in particular) should recognize and defend the right of the *oppressed* nations to self-determination in the political sense of the word, *i.e.* the right to political separation. A Socialist of a great

nation or a nation possessing colonies who does not defend this right is a chauvinist.

To defend this right does in no way mean to encourage the formation of small states, but, on the contrary, it leads to a freer, more fearless and therefore wider and more universal formation of larger governments and unions of governments—a phenomenon more advantageous for the masses and more in accord with economic development.

On the other hand, the Socialists of the *oppressed* nations must unequivocally fight for complete unity of the *workers* of both the oppressed and the oppressor nationalities (which also means organizational unity). The idea of a lawful separation between one nationality and the other (the so-called “national cultural autonomy” of Bauer and Renner) is a reactionary idea.

Imperialism is the period of an increasing oppression of the nations of the whole world by a handful of “great” nations; the struggle for a Socialist international revolution against imperialism is, therefore, impossible without the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination. “No people oppressing other peoples can be free” (Marx and Engels). No proletariat reconciling itself to the least violation by “its” nation of the rights of other nations can be Socialist.

N. LENIN.

*Socialism and War* (1915)

## SELF-DETERMINATION AS THE BASIS FOR PEACE

“SELF-DETERMINATION” is not a mere phase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it; because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes, She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people.

She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is intrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization.

She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered, as nearly as may be, impossible.

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must



now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost.

WOODROW WILSON.

*(February 11th, 1918)*

## NATIONALISM

THE population of the world to-day is approximately a billion and a half. One fourth of this number live in China, which means that one out of every four persons in the world is a Chinese. The total population of the white races of Europe also amounts to four hundred millions. The white division of mankind, which is now the most flourishing, includes four races: in central and northern Europe, the Teutons, who have founded many states, the largest of which is Germany, others being Austria, Sweden, Norway, Holland, and Denmark; in eastern Europe, the Slavs, who also have founded a number of states, the largest being Russia, and, after the European War, the new countries of Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia; in western Europe, the Saxons or Anglo-Saxons, who have founded two large states—England and the United States of America; in southern Europe, the Latins, who have founded several states, the largest being France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and who have migrated to South America forming states there just as the Anglo-Saxons migrated to North America and built up Canada and the United States. The white peoples of Europe, now numbering only four hundred million persons, are divided into four great stocks which have established many states. Because the national spirit of the white race was highly developed, when they had filled up the European continent they expanded to North and South America in the Western Hemisphere and to Africa and Australia in the southern and eastern parts of the Eastern Hemisphere.

The Anglo-Saxons at present occupy more space on the globe than any other race. Although this race originated in Europe, the only European soil it holds are the British Isles—England, Scotland, and Ireland—which occupy about the same position in the Atlantic that Japan occupies in the Pacific.

The Anglo-Saxons have extended their territory westward to North America, eastward to Australia and New Zealand, and southward to Africa until they possess more land and are wealthier and stronger than any other race. Before the European War the Teutons and the Slavs were the strongest races; moreover, by reason of the sagacity and ability of the Teutonic peoples, Germany was able to unite more than twenty small states into a great German confederation. At the beginning an agricultural nation, it developed into an industrial nation and through industrial prosperity its army and navy became exceedingly powerful.

Before the European War all the European nations had been poisoned by imperialism. What is imperialism? It is the policy of aggression upon other countries by means of political force, or, in the Chinese phrase, "long-range aggression". As all the peoples of Europe were imbued with this policy, wars were continually breaking out; almost every decade had at least one small war and each century one big war. The greatest of all was the recent European War, which may be called the World War because it finally involved the whole world and pulled every nation and peoples into its vortex. The causes of the European War were, first, the rivalry between the Saxon and Teutonic races for control of the sea. Germany in her rise to greatness had developed her navy until she was the second sea power in the world; Great Britain wanted her own navy to rule the seas so she tried to destroy Germany, whose sea power was next to hers. From this struggle for first place on the sea came the war.

A second cause was each nation's struggle for more territory. In eastern Europe there is a weak state called Turkey. For the past hundred years the people of the world have called it the "sick man of Europe". Because the government was unenlightened and the Sultan was despotic, it became extremely helpless and the European nations wanted to partition it. Because the Turkish question had not been solved for a century and every nation of Europe was trying to solve it, war resulted. The first cause of the European War, then, was the

struggle between white races for supremacy; the second cause was the effort to solve critical world problems. If Germany had won the war, she would have held the supreme power on the sea after the war and Great Britain would have lost all her territory, breaking into pieces like the old Roman Empire. But the result of the war was defeat for Germany and the failure of her imperialistic designs.

The recent European War was the most dreadful war in the history of the world. Forty to fifty million men were under arms for a period of four years, and near the end of the war they still could not be divided into conquerors and vanquished. One side in the war was called the Entente; the other side, the Allied Powers. The Allied Powers<sup>1</sup> at first included Germany and Austria; Turkey and Bulgaria later joined them. The Entente Powers<sup>2</sup> at first were Serbia, France, Russia, England, and Japan; Italy and the United States joined afterwards. The United States' entry into the war was due entirely to racial considerations. During the first two years of the war Germany and Austria were in the ascendency. Paris and the English Channel were almost captured by the German and Austrian armies. The Teutons thought that Great Britain was certainly done for, and the British themselves were thoroughly alarmed. Seeing that the American people are of the same race as they, the British used the plea of race relationship to stir up the people of the United States. When America realized that England, of her own race, was in danger of being destroyed by Germany, of an alien race, inevitably "the creature sorrowed for its kind" and America threw in her lot with England to defend the existence of the Anglo-Saxons. Moreover, fearing that her own strength would be insufficient, America tried with all her might to arouse all the neutral countries of the world to join in the war to defeat Germany.

During the war there was a great phrase, used by President Wilson and warmly received everywhere—"self-determination of peoples". Because Germany was striving by military force

<sup>1</sup> Central Powers.

<sup>2</sup> "Allies."

to crush the peoples of the European Entente, Wilson proposed destroying Germany's power and giving autonomy henceforth to the weaker and smaller peoples. His idea met a world welcome, and although the common people of India still opposed Great Britain, their destroyer, yet many small peoples, when they heard Wilson say that the war was for the freedom of the weak and small peoples, gladly gave aid to Great Britain. Although Annam had been subjugated by France and the common people hated the French tyranny, yet during the war they still helped France to fight, also because they had heard of Wilson's just proposition. And the reason why other small peoples of Europe, such as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania, all enlisted on the side of the Entente against the Allied Powers was because of the self-determination principle enunciated by President Wilson. China, too, under the inspiration of the United States, entered the war; although she sent no armies, yet she did contribute hundreds of thousands of labourers to dig trenches and to work behind the lines. As a result of the noble theme propounded by the Entente all the oppressed peoples of Europe and of Asia finally joined together to help them in their struggle against the Allied Powers. At the same time, Wilson proposed, to guard the future peace of the world, fourteen points, of which the most important was that each people should have the right of self-determination. When victory and defeat still hung in the balance, England and France heartily indorsed these points, but when victory was won and the Peace Conference was opened, England, France, and Italy realized that Wilson's proposal of freedom for nations conflicted too seriously with the interests of imperialism; and so, during the conference, they used all kinds of methods to explain away Wilson's principles. The result was a peace treaty with most unjust terms; the weaker, smaller nations not only did not secure self-determination and freedom but found themselves under an oppression more terrible than before. This shows that the strong states and the powerful races have already forced possession of the globe and that the

rights and privileges of other states and nations are monopolized by them. Hoping to make themselves forever secure in their exclusive position and to prevent the smaller and weaker peoples from again reviving, they sing praises to cosmopolitanism, saying that nationalism is too narrow; really their espousal of internationalism is but imperialism and aggression in another guise.

But Wilson's proposals, once set forth, could not be recalled; each one of the weaker, smaller nations who had helped the Entente to defeat the Allied Powers and had hoped to attain freedom as a fruit of the victory was doomed to bitter disappointment by the results of the Peace Conference. Then Annam, Burma, Java, India, the Malay Archipelago, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and the scores of weak nations in Europe, were stirred with a great, new consciousness; they saw how completely they had been deceived by the Great Powers' advocacy of self-determination and began independently and separately to carry out the principle of the "self-determination of peoples".

Many years of fierce warfare had not been able to destroy imperialism because this war was a conflict of imperialisms between states, not a struggle between savagery and civilization or between Might and Right. So the effect of the war was merely the overthrow of one imperialism by another imperialism; what survived was still imperialism. But from the war there was unconsciously born in the heart of mankind a great hope—the Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution had begun much earlier, as far back as 1905, but had not accomplished its purpose. Now during the European War the efforts of the revolutionists were crowned with success. The reason for the outbreak of revolution again at this time was the great awakening of the people as a result of their war experience. Russia was formerly one of the Entente nations; when the Entente Powers were fighting Germany, Russia sent over ten million soldiers into the field—not a puny force. Without Russia's part in the war, the Entente's line on the Western front would long before have been smashed by

Germany; because Russia was embarrassing the Germans on the Eastern front, the Entente Powers were able to break even with Germany for two or three years and finally turn defeat into victory. Just halfway through the war, Russia began to reflect, and she realized that in helping the Entente to fight Germany she was merely helping several brute forces to fight one brute force and that no good results would come of it in the end. A group of soldiers and citizens awoke, broke away from the Entente, and concluded a separate peace with Germany.

As far as their legitimate national interests were concerned, the German and the Russian people had absolutely no cause for quarrel; but when it came to imperialistic designs, they vied with each other in aggressions until conflict was inevitable. Moreover, Germany went so far beyond bounds that Russia, in self-protection, could not but move in accord with England, France, and the others. Later, when the Russian people awoke and saw that imperialism was wrong, they started a revolution within their own country, first overthrowing their own imperialism; at the same time, to avoid foreign embarrassments, they made peace with Germany. Before long, the Entente also signed a peace with Germany and then all sent soldiers to fight Russia. Why? Because the Russian people had awakened to the fact that their daily sufferings were due to imperialism and that, to get rid of their sufferings they must eliminate imperialism and embrace self-determination. Every other nation opposed this policy and so mobilized to fight Russia, yet Russia's proposal and Wilson's were undesignedly similar; both declared that the weaker, smaller nations had the right of self-determination and freedom. When Russia proclaimed this principle, the weaker, smaller peoples of the world gave their eager support to it and all together began to seek self-determination. The calamitous war through which Europe had passed brought, of course, no great imperialistic gain, but, because of the Russian Revolution, a great hope was born in the heart of mankind.

Of the billion and a half people in the world, the most

powerful are the four hundred million whites on the European and American Continents; from this base the white races have started out to swallow up other races. The American red aborigines are gone, the African blacks will soon be exterminated, the brown race of India is in the process of dissolution, the yellow races of Asia are now being subjected to the white man's oppression and may, before long, be wiped out.

But the one hundred and fifty million Russians, when their revolution succeeded, broke with the other white races and condemned the white man's imperialistic behaviour; now they are thinking of throwing in their lot with the weaker, smaller peoples of Asia in a struggle against tyrannical races. So only two hundred and fifty millions of tyrannical races are left, but they are still trying by inhuman methods and military force to subjugate the other twelve and hundred fifty millions. So hereafter mankind will be divided into two camps; on one side will be the twelve hundred and fifty millions; on the other side, the two hundred and fifty millions. Although the latter group are in the minority, yet they hold the most powerful positions on the globe and their political and economic strength is immense. With these two forces they are out to exploit the weaker and smaller races. If the political arm of navies and armies is not strong enough, they bear down with economic pressure. If their economic arm is at times weak, they intervene with political force of navies and armies. The way their political power co-operates with their economic power is like the way in which the left arm helps the right arm; with their two arms they have crushed most terribly the twelve hundred and fifty millions. But "Heaven does not always follow man's desires". The Slavic race of one hundred and fifty millions suddenly rose up and struck a blow at imperialism and capitalism, warring for mankind against inequality. In my last lecture I told of the Russian who said, "The reason why the Powers have so defamed Lenin is because he dared to assert that the twelve hundred and fifty millions' majority in the world were being oppressed by the two hundred and fifty millions'



minority". Lenin not only said this, but also advocated self-determination for the oppressed peoples and launched a campaign for them against injustice. The powers attacked Lenin because they wanted to destroy a prophet and a seer of mankind and obtain security for themselves. But the people of the world now have their eyes opened and know that the rumours created by the Powers are false; they will not let themselves be deceived again. The political thinking of the peoples of the world has been enlightened to this extent.

Now we want to revive China's lost nationalism and use the strength of our four hundred millions to fight for mankind against injustice; this is our divine mission. The Powers are afraid that we will have such thoughts and are setting forth a specious doctrine. They are now advocating cosmopolitanism to inflame us, declaring that, as the civilization of the world advances and as mankind's vision enlarges, nationalism becomes too narrow, unsuited to the present age, and hence that we should espouse cosmopolitanism. In recent years some of China's youth, devotees of the new culture, have been opposing nationalism, led astray by this doctrine. But it is not a doctrine which wronged races should talk about. We, the wronged races, must first recover our position of national freedom and equality before we are fit to discuss cosmopolitanism. The illustration I used in my last lecture of the coolie who won first prize in the lottery has already made this very clear. The lottery ticket represents cosmopolitanism; the bamboo pole, nationalism. The coolie, on winning first prize, immediately threw away his pole just as we, fooled by the promises of cosmopolitanism, have discarded our nationalism. We must understand that cosmopolitanism grows out of nationalism; if we want to extend cosmopolitanism we must first establish strongly our own nationalism. If nationalism cannot become strong, cosmopolitanism certainly cannot prosper. Thus we see that cosmopolitanism is hidden in the heart of nationalism just as the ticket was hidden inside the bamboo pole; if we discard nationalism and go and talk cosmopolitanism we are just like the coolie who threw his

bamboo pole into the sea. We put the cart before the horse. I said before that our position is not equal to that of the Annamese or the Koreans; they are subject peoples and slaves while we cannot even be called slaves. Yet we discourse about cosmopolitanism and say that we do not need nationalism. Gentlemen, is this reasonable?

SUN YAT-SEN.

*The Three Principles of the People* (1924)

## RACIAL EQUALITY

I HAD first on February 13th an opportunity of submitting to the Commission of the League of Nations our amendment to the Covenant, embodying the principle of equal and just treatment to be accorded to all aliens who happen to be the nationals of the States which are deemed advanced enough and fully qualified to become Members of the League, making no distinction on account of race or nationality.

On that occasion I called the attention of the Commission to the fact that the race question being a standing grievance which might become acute and dangerous at any moment, it was desirous that a provision dealing with the subject should be made in this Covenant. We did not lose sight of the many and varied difficulties standing in the way of a full realization of this principle. But they were not insurmountable, I said, if sufficient importance were attached to the consideration of serious misunderstandings between different peoples which might grow to an uncontrollable degree, and it was hoped that the matter would be taken in hand on such opportunity as the present, when what was deemed impossible before was about to be accomplished. Further, I made it unmistakably clear that, the question being of a very delicate and complicated nature, involving the play of a deep human passion, the immediate realization of the ideal equality was not proposed, but that the clause presented enunciated the principle only, and left the actual working of it in the hands of the different Governments concerned; that, in other words, the clause was intended as an invitation to the Governments and peoples concerned to examine the question more closely and seriously and to devise in a fair and accommodating spirit means to meet it.

Attention was also called to the fact that the League being, as it were, a world organization of insurance against war; that in cases of aggression nations suitably placed must be prepared to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of a fellow-member; that this meant that a national of a State Member must be ready to share military expenditure for the

common cause and, if needs be, sacrifice his own person. In view of these new duties, I remarked, arising before him as a result of his country entering the League, each national would naturally feel, and in fact demand, that he be placed on an equal footing with the people whom he undertakes to defend even with his own life. The proposed amendment, however, was not adopted by the Commission.

On the next day, that is, on February 14th, when the draft Covenant was reported at a Plenary Session of the Conference without the insertion of our amendment, I had the privilege of expressing our wholehearted sympathy and readiness to contribute our utmost to any and every attempt to found and secure an enduring peace of the world. At the same time I made a reservation that we would again submit our proposal for the consideration of the Conference at an early opportunity.

At the meeting of the commission on April 11th I proposed the insertion in the Preamble of the Covenant of a phrase endorsing the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals. But this proposal again failed to be adopted by unanimity, although it obtained, may I be permitted to say, a clear majority in its favour.

This modified form of amendment did not as I had occasion already to state at the Commission, fully meet our wishes, but it was the outcome of an attempt to conciliate the view-points of different nations.

Now that it has been decided by the Commission that our amendment, even in its modified form, would not be included in the draft Covenant, I feel constrained to revert to our original proposal and to avail myself of this occasion to declare clearly our position in regard to this matter.

The principle which we desire to see acted upon in the future relationship between nations was set forth in our original amendment as follows:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all aliens nationals of States

Members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

It is our firm conviction that the enduring success of this great undertaking will depend much more on the hearty espousal and loyal adherence that the various peoples concerned would give to the noble ideals underlying the organization, than on the acts of the respective Governments that may change from time to time. In an age of democracy, peoples themselves must feel that they are the trustees of this work and, to feel so, they must first have a sure basis of close harmony and mutual confidence.

If just and equal treatment is denied to certain nationals, it would have the significance of a certain reflection on their quality and status. Their faith in the justice and righteousness which are to be the guiding spirit of the future international intercourse between the Members of the League may be shaken, and such a frame of mind, I am afraid, would be most detrimental to that harmony and co-operation, upon which foundation alone can the League now contemplated be securely built. It was solely and purely from our desire to see the League established on a sound and firm basis of goodwill, justice, and reason that we have been compelled to make our proposal. We will not, however, press for the adoption of our proposal at this moment.

In closing, I feel it my duty to declare clearly on this occasion that the Japanese Government and people feel poignant regret at the failure of the Commission to approve of their just demand for laying down a principle aiming at the adjustment of this long-standing grievance, a demand that is based upon a deep-rooted national conviction. They will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League in future.

BARON MAKINO.

*Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Peace  
Conference of Paris (April 28, 1919)*

## RACIAL INEQUALITY

THE question of cosmic influences is one that ought to be fully cleared up, as I am confining myself to arguments based on it. The first problem with which I have to deal is the following: "How could men, whose common origin implies a single starting-point, have been exposed to such a diversity of influences from without?" After the first separation of races, the groups were already numerous enough to be found under totally different conditions of climate; how then, considering the immense difficulties they had to contend against, the vast forests and marshy plains they had to cross, the sandy or snowy deserts, the rivers, lakes, and oceans—how, with all these obstacles, did they manage to cover distances which civilized man to-day, with all his developed power, can only surmount with great toil and trouble? To answer these objections, we must try to discover where the human species had its original home.

A very ancient idea, adopted also by some great modern minds, such as Cuvier, is that the different mountain-systems must have served as the point of departure for certain races. According to this theory, the white races, and even certain African varieties whose skull is shaped like our own, had their first settlement in the Caucasus. The yellow race came down from the ice-bound heights of the Altai. Again, the tribes of prognathous negroes built their first huts on the southern slopes of Mount Atlas, and made this the starting-point of their first migrations. Thus, the frightful places of the earth, difficult of access and full of gloomy horror—torrents, caverns, icy mountains, eternal snows and impassable abysses—were actually more familiar to primitive ages than any others; while all the terrors of the unknown lurked, for our first ancestors, in the uncovered plains, on the banks of the great rivers, on the coasts of the lakes and seas.

The chief motive urging the ancient philosophers to put forward this theory, and the moderns to revive it, seems to have

been the idea that, in order to pass successfully through the great physical crises of the world, mankind must have collected on the mountain heights, where the floods and inundations could not reach them. This large and general interpretation of the tradition of Ararat may suit perhaps the later epochs, when the children of men had covered the face of the earth; but it is quite inapplicable to the time of relative calm that marked their first appearance. It is also contrary to all theories as to the unity of the species. Again, mountains from the remotest times have been the object of profound terror and religious awe. On them has been set, by all mythologies, the abode of the gods. It was on the snowy peak of Olympus, it was on Mount Meru that the Greeks and the Brahmans imagined their divine synods. It was on the summit of the Caucasus that Prometheus suffered the mysterious punishment of his still more mysterious crime. If men had begun by making their home in the remote heights, it is not likely that their imagination would have caused them to raise these to the height of heaven itself. We have a scant respect for what we have seen and known and trodden underfoot. There would have been no divinities but those of the waters and the plains. Hence I incline to the opposite belief, that the flat and uncovered regions witnessed the first steps of man. This is, by the way, the Biblical notion. After the first settlements were made in these parts, the difficulties of accounting for migrations are sensibly diminished; for flat regions are generally cut by rivers and reach down to the sea, and so there would have been no need to undertake the difficult task of crossing forests, deserts, and great marshes.

There are two kinds of migrations, the voluntary and the unexpected. The former are out of the question in very early times. The latter are more possible, and more probable too, among shiftless and unprepared savages than among civilized nations. A family huddled together on a drifting raft, a few unfortunate people surprised by an inrush of the sea, clinging to trunks of trees, and caught up by the currents—these are enough to account for a transplantation over long distances.

The weaker man is, the more is he the sport of inorganic forces. The less experience he has, the more slavishly does he respond to accidents which he can neither foresee nor avoid. There are striking examples of the ease with which men can be carried, in spite of themselves, over considerable distances. Thus, we hear that in 1696 two large canoes from Ancorso, containing about thirty savages, men and women, were caught in a storm, and after drifting aimlessly some time, finally arrived at Samal, one of the Philippine Islands, 300 leagues from their starting-point. Again, four natives of Ulea were carried out to sea in a canoe by a sudden squall. They drifted about for eight months, and reached at last one of the Radack Islands, at the eastern end of the Caroline Archipelago, after an involuntary voyage of 550 leagues. These unfortunate men lived solely on fish, and carefully collected every drop of rain they could. When rain failed them, they dived into the depths of the sea and drank the water there, which, they say, is less salt. Naturally, when they reached Radack, the travellers were in a deplorable state; but they soon rallied, and were eventually restored to health.

These two examples are a sufficient witness for the rapid diffusion of human groups in very different regions, and under the most varied local conditions. If further proofs were required, we might mention the ease with which insects, plants, and testaceans are carried all over the world; it is, of course, unnecessary to show that what happens to such things may, *a fortiori*, happen more easily to man. The land-testaceans are thrown into the sea by the destruction of the cliffs, and are then carried to distant shores by means of currents. Zoo-phytes attach themselves to the shells of molluscs or let their tentacles float on the surface of the sea, and so are driven along by the wind to form distant colonies. The very trees of unknown species, the very sculptured planks, the last of a long line, which were cast up on the Canaries in the fifteenth century, and by providing a text for the meditations of Christopher Columbus paved the way for the discovery of the New World—even these probably carried on their surface



the eggs of insects; and these eggs were hatched by the heat engendered by new sap, far from their place of origin and the land where lived the others of their kind.

Thus there is nothing against the notion that the first human families might soon have been separated, and lived under very different conditions of climate, in regions far apart from each other. But it is not necessary, even under present circumstances, for the places to be far apart, in order to ensure a variation in the temperature, and in the local conditions resulting from it. In mountainous countries like Switzerland, the distance of a few miles makes such a difference in the soil and atmosphere, that we find the flora of Lapland and Southern Italy practically side by side; similarly in Isola Madre, on Lago Maggiore, oranges, great cacti, and dwarf palms grow in the open, in full view of the Simplon. We need not confine ourselves to mountains; the temperature of Normandy is lower than that of Jersey, while in the narrow triangle formed by the North-Western coasts of France the vegetation is of the most varied character.

The contrasts must have been tremendous, even over the smallest areas, in the days that followed the first appearance of our species on the globe. The selfsame place might easily become the theatre of vast atmospheric revolutions, when the sea retreated or advanced by the inundation or drying up of the neighbouring regions; when mountains suddenly rose in enormous masses, or sank to the common level of the earth, so that the plains covered what once was their crests; and when tremors, that shook the axis of the earth, and by affecting its equilibrium and the inclination of the poles to the ecliptic, came to disturb the general economy of the planet.

We may now consider that we have met all the objections that might be urged as to the difficulty of changing one's place and climate in the early ages of the world. There is no reason why some groups of the human family should not have gone far afield, while others were huddled together in a limited area and yet were exposed to very varied influences. It is thus that the secondary types, from which are descended the existing

racés, could have come into being. As to the type of man first created, the Adamite, we will leave him out of the argument altogether; for it is impossible to know anything of his specific character, or how far each of the later families has kept or lost its likeness to him. Our investigation will not take us further back than the races of the second stage.

I find these races naturally divided into three, and three only—the white, the black, and the yellow. If I use a basis of division suggested by the colour of the skin, it is not that I consider it either correct or happy, for the three categories of which I speak are not distinguished exactly by colour, which is a very complex and variable thing; I have already said that certain facts in the conformation of the skeleton are far more important. But in default of inventing new names—which I do not consider myself justified in doing—I must make my choice from the vocabulary already in use. The terms may not be very good, but they are at any rate less open to objection than any others, especially if they are carefully defined. I certainly prefer them to all the designations taken from geography or history, for these have thrown an already confused subject into further confusion. So I may say, once for all, that I understand by *white* men the members of those races which are also called Caucasian, Semitic, or Japhetic. By *black* men I mean the Hamites; by *yellow* the Altaic, Mongol, Finnish, and Tatar branches. These are the three primitive elements of mankind. There is no more reason to admit Blumenbach's twenty-eight varieties than Prichard's seven; for both these schemes include notorious hybrids. It is probable that none of the three original types was ever found in absolute simplicity. The great cosmic agents had not merely brought into being the three clear-cut varieties; they had also, in the course of their action, caused many subspecies to appear. These were distinguished by some peculiar features, quite apart from the general character which they had in common with the whole branch. Racial crossing was not necessary to create these specific modifications; they existed before any inter-breeding took place at all. It would

be fruitless to try to identify them to-day in the hybrid agglomeration that constitutes what we call the "white race". It would be equally impossible with regard to the yellow race. Perhaps the black type has to some extent kept itself pure; at any rate it has remained nearer its original form, and thus shows at first sight what, in the case of the other great human divisions, is not given by the testimony of our senses, but may be admitted on the strength of historical proof.

The negroes have always perpetuated the original forms of their race, such as the prognathous type with woolly hair, the Hindu type of the Kamaun and the Deccan, and the Pelagian of Polynesia. New varieties have certainly been created from their intermixture; this is the origin of what we may call the "tertiary types", which are seen in the white and yellow races, as well as the black.

Much has been made of a noteworthy fact, which is used to-day as a sure criterion for determining the racial purity of a nation. This fact is the resemblance of face, shape, and general constitution, including gesture and carriage. The further these resemblances go, the less mixture of blood is there supposed to be in the whole people. On the other hand, the more crossing there has been, the greater differences we shall find in the features, stature, walk, and general appearance of the individuals. The fact is incontestable, and valuable conclusions may be drawn from it; but the conclusions are a little different from those hitherto made.

The first series of observations by which the fact was discovered was carried out on the Polynesians. Now, these are far from being of pure race; they come from mixtures, in different proportions, of yellow and black. Hence the complete transmission of the type that we see to-day among the Polynesians shows, not the purity of the race, but simply that the more or less numerous elements of which it is composed have at last been fused in a full and homogeneous unity. Each man has the same blood in his veins as his neighbour, and so there is no reason why he should differ physically from him. Just as brothers and sisters are often much alike, as being produced

from like elements, so, when two races have been so completely amalgamated that there is no group in the resulting people in which either race predominates, an artificial type is established, with a kind of factitious purity; and every new-born child bears its impress.

What I have defined as the "tertiary type" might in this way easily acquire the quality that is wrongly appropriated to a people of absolutely pure race—namely the likeness of the individual members to each other. This could be attained in a much shorter time at this stage, as the differences between two varieties of the same type are relatively slight. In a family, for example, where the father and mother belong to different nations, the children will be like one or the other, but there will be little chance of any real identity of physical characteristics between them. If, however, the parents are both from the same national stock, such an identity will be easily produced.

We must mention another law before going further. Crossing of blood does not merely imply the fusion of the two varieties, but also creates new characteristics, which henceforth furnish the most important standpoint from which to consider any particular sub-species. Examples will be given later; meanwhile I need hardly say that these new and original qualities cannot be completely developed unless there has previously been a perfect fusion of the parent-types; otherwise the tertiary race cannot be considered as really established. The larger the two nations are, the greater will naturally be the time required for their fusion. But until the process is complete, and a state of physiological identity brought about, no new sub-species will be possible, as there is no question of normal development from an original, though composite source, but merely of the confusion and disorder that are always engendered from the imperfect mixture of elements which are naturally foreign to each other.

Our actual knowledge of the life of these tertiary races is very slight. Only in the misty beginnings of human history can we catch a glimpse, in certain places, of the white race

when it was still in this stage—a stage which seems to have been everywhere short-lived. The civilizing instincts of these chosen peoples were continually forcing them to mix their blood with that of others. As for the black and yellow types, they are mere savages in the tertiary stage, and have no history at all.

To the tertiary races succeed others, which I will call “quaternary”. The Polynesians, sprung from the mixture of black and yellow, the mulattoes, a blend of white and black—these are among the peoples belonging to the quaternary type. I need hardly say, once more, that the new type brings the characteristics peculiar to itself more or less into harmony with those which recall its two-fold descent.

When a quaternary race is again modified by the intervention of a new type, the resulting mixture has great difficulty in becoming stable; its elements are brought very slowly into harmony, and are combined in very irregular proportions. The original qualities of which it is composed are already weakened to a considerable extent, and become more and more neutralized. They tend to disappear in the confusion that has grown to be the main feature of the new product. The more this product reproduces itself and crosses its blood, the more the confusion increases. It reaches infinity, when the people are too numerous for any equilibrium to have a chance of being established—at any rate, not before long ages have passed. Such a people is merely an awful example of racial anarchy. In the individuals we find, here and there, a dominant feature reminding us in no uncertain way that blood from every source runs in their veins. One man will have the negro’s hair, another the eyes of a Teuton, a third will have a Mongolian face, a fourth a Semitic figure; and yet all these will be akin! This is the state in which the great civilized nations are to-day; we may especially see proofs of it in their sea-ports, capitals, and colonies, where a fusion of blood is more easily brought about. In Paris, London, Cadiz, and Constantinople, we find traits recalling every branch of mankind, and that without going outside the circle of the

walls, or considering any but the so-called "native population". The lower classes will give us examples of all kinds, from the prognathous head of the negro to the triangular face and slanting eyes of the Chinaman; for, especially since the Roman Empire, the most remote and divergent races have contributed to the blood of the inhabitants of our great cities. Commerce, peace, and war, the founding of colonies, the succession of invasions, have all helped in their turn to increase the disorder; and if one could trace, some way back, the genealogical tree of the first man he met, he would probably be surprised at the strange company of ancestors among whom he would find himself.

We have shown that races differ physically from each other; we must now ask if they are also unequal in beauty and muscular strength. The answer cannot be long doubtful.

I have already observed that the human groups to which the European nations and their descendants belong are the most beautiful. One has only to compare the various types of men scattered over the earth's surface to be convinced of this. From the almost rudimentary face and structure of the Pelagian and the Pecheray to the tall and nobly proportioned figure of Charlemagne, the intelligent regularity of the features of Napoleon, and the imposing majesty that exhales from the royal countenance of Louis XIV, there is a series of gradations; the peoples who are not of white blood approach beauty, but do not attain it.

Those who are most akin to us come nearest to beauty; such are the degenerate Aryan stocks of India and Persia, and the Semitic peoples, who are least infected by contact with the black race. As these races recede from the white type, their features and limbs become incorrect in form; they acquire defects of proportion which, in the races that are completely foreign to us, end by producing an extreme ugliness. This is the ancient heritage and indelible mark of the greater number of human groups. We can no longer subscribe to the doctrine (reproduced by Helvetius in his book on the *Human Intellect*) which regards the idea of the beautiful as purely artificial

and variable. All who still have scruples on that point should consult the admirable "Essay on the Beautiful" of the Piedmontese philosopher, Gioberti, and their doubts will be laid to rest. Nowhere is it better brought out that beauty is an absolute and necessary idea, admitting of no arbitrary application. I take my stand on the solid principles established by Gioberti, and have no hesitation in regarding the white race as superior to all others in beauty; these, again, differ among themselves in the degree in which they approach or recede from their model. Thus the human groups are unequal in beauty; and this inequality is rational, logical, permanent, and indestructible.

Is there also an inequality in physical strength? The American savages, like the Hindus, are certainly our inferiors in this respect, as are also the Australians. The negroes, too, have less muscular power; and all these peoples are infinitely less able to bear fatigue. We must distinguish, however, between purely muscular strength, which merely needs to spend itself for a single instant of victory, and the power of keeping up a prolonged resistance. The latter is far more typical than the former, of which we may find examples even in notoriously feeble races. If we take the blow of the fist as the sole criterion of strength, we shall find, among very backward negro races, among the New Zealanders (who are usually of weak constitution), among Lascars and Malays, certain individuals who can deliver such a blow as well as any Englishman. But if we take the peoples as a whole, and judge them by the amount of labour that they can go through without flinching, we shall give the palm to those belonging to the white race.

The different groups within the white race itself are as unequal in strength as they are in beauty, though the difference is less marked. The Italians are more beautiful than the Germans or the Swiss, the French or the Spanish. Similarly the English show a higher type of physical beauty than the Slav nations.

In strength of fist, the English are superior to all the other

European races; while the French and Spanish have a greater power of resisting fatigue and privation, as well as the inclemency of extreme climates. The question is settled, so far as the French are concerned, by the terrible campaign in Russia. Nearly all the Germans and the northern troops, accustomed though they were to very low temperatures, sank down in the snow; while the French regiments, though they paid their awful tribute to the rigours of the retreat, were yet able to save most of their number. This superiority has been attributed to their better moral education and military spirit. But such an explanation is insufficient. The German officers, who perished by hundreds, had just as high a sense of honour and duty as our soldiers had; but this did not prevent them from going under. We may conclude that the French have certain physical qualities that are superior to those of the Germans, which allow them to brave with impunity the snows of Russia as well as the burning sands of Egypt.

COUNT J. A. DE GOBINEAU.

*On the Inequality of Human Races* (1853-5)



## THE GERMAN RACE IN HISTORY

THE entrance of the Jew into European history had, as Herder said, signified the entrance of an alien element—alien to that which Europe had already achieved, alien to all it was still to accomplish; but it was the very reverse with the Germanic peoples. This barbarian, who would rush naked to battle, this savage, who suddenly sprang out of woods and marshes to inspire into a civilized and cultivated world the terrors of a violent conquest won by the strong hand alone, was nevertheless the lawful heir of the Hellene and the Roman, blood of their blood and spirit of their spirit. It was his own property which he, unwitting, snatched from the alien hand. But for him the sun of the Indo-European must have set. The Asiatic and African slave had by assassination wormed his way to the very throne of the Roman Empire, the Syrian mongrel had mastered Roman jurisprudence, the Jew was using the library at Alexandria to adapt Hellenic philosophy to the Mosaic law, the Egyptian to embalm and bury for boundless ages the fresh bloom of natural science in the ostentatious pyramids of scientific systematization; soon, too, the beautiful flowers of old Aryan life—Indian thought, Indian poetry—were to be trodden under foot by the savage blood-thirsty Mongolian, and the Bedouin, with his mad delusions bred of the desert, was to reduce to an everlasting wilderness that garden of Eden, Erania,<sup>1</sup> in which for centuries all the symbolism of the world had grown; art had long since vanished; there were nothing but replicas for the rich, and for the poor the circus: accordingly, to use that expression of Schiller which I quoted at the beginning of the first chapter, there were no longer men but only creatures. It was high time for the Rescuer to appear. True he did not enter into history in the form in which logical, calculating reason, if consulted, would have chosen for the guardian angel, the har-binger of a new day of humanity; but to-day, when a glance

<sup>1</sup> Mesopotamia (Ed.).

back over past centuries teaches us wisdom, we have only one thing to regret, that the German did not destroy with more thoroughness wherever his victorious arm penetrated, and that as a consequence of his moderation the so-called "Latinising", that is, the fusion with the medley of peoples, once more gradually robbed wide districts of the uniquely quickening influence of pure blood and unbroken youthful vigour, and at the same time deprived them of the rule of those who possessed the highest talents. At any rate it is only through shameful indolence of thought, or disgraceful falsification of history that one can fail to see in the entrance of the Germans into the history of the world the rescuing of agonising humanity from the clutches of the everlasting bestial.

If I here use the word "German", I do so, as I have already remarked, for the sake of simplification—a simplification which expresses the truth, which must otherwise remain veiled. No doubt this expression whether taken in the wide or the narrow sense, seems somewhat elastic, perhaps inadmissible, particularly so because it was long before any people, at any rate we ourselves, became conscious of such a thing as the specifically "Germanic" character. There never has been a people that called itself "German", and never—from their first appearance on the stage of history to the present day—have the whole of the German peoples unitedly opposed themselves to the non-German; on the contrary, from the beginning we find them continually at feud with one another, displaying towards no one such hostility as towards their own kith and kin. During Christ's lifetime Inguiomer betrays his nearest relative, the great Hermann, to the Marcomanni, and thereby hinders the process of union among the northern tribes and the total destruction of the Roman; Tiberius already could recommend no safer policy to adopt with the Germans than to "leave them to their own internal quarrels"; all the great wars of the following age, with the exception of the Crusades, were wars between German princes; the same thing holds in the main for the nineteenth century. Nevertheless non-Germans were quick to recognize the uniformity of the various tribes, and

instead of the indistinguishable babel of names, Chatti, Chanki, Cheruski, Gambriuii, Suevi, Vendales, Goti, Marcomanni, Lugii, Langobardi, Sachsi, Frisii, Hermunduri, etc., they had designated the luxuriant offshoots of this strong race by the uniform comprehensive term "German", and that because they had at the first glance discerned their common stock. Tacitus, wearied of enumerating names, remarks that "the physical characteristics of all these men are the same"; on the basis of this sound observation he arrived at an equally sound intuitive judgment: "I am convinced that the various tribes of Germania unpolluted by marriages with alien peoples, have from time immemorial been a special, unmixed people, distinct from all others" (*Germania* 4). It is striking how much more clearly the outside observer, who is not biased by details, sees the great processes and inter-relations of history, than the man who is directly interested in them!

But to-day it is not merely bias which prevents us from using the word "German" in its geographical and racial sense in the same simple way as Tacitus. Those "various German tribes" which he regarded as an unmixed, comparatively uniform people have, since his day, like their predecessors, the Hellenes, entered into all kinds of unions among each other, and only a portion remains "unpolluted by marriages with alien peoples"; moreover, in consequence of the great migrations, they have been subjected to particular cultural influences, resulting from geography, climatic conditions, the standard of civilization among their nearest neighbours, and so forth. That alone would have sufficed to bring about disintegration. But the state of things becomes still more confused when we supplement the teaching of political history, on the one hand by more minute, comparative researches in the department of national psychology, philosophy and the history of art, and on the other by the results of the pre-historic and anthropological investigations of the last fifty years. For then we arrive at the conviction that we may and must give *a much wider meaning* to the word "German" than Tacitus did, but at the same time we notice necessary

*limitations* of which he, with the defective knowledge of his time, could not have dreamt. To understand our past and our present we must follow the example of Tacitus, and like him, collect material and sift it, but upon the broader basis of our modern knowledge. It is only by the exact definition of the new concept of what is "German" that our study of the entrance of these peoples into history acquires practical value. It is the object of this chapter to give such a descriptive definition as briefly as may be. How far does the blood-relationship extend? Where do we meet "Arya" (*i.e.*, those who belong to the friends)? Where do we first find the alien element, which, according to Goethe, we "must not tolerate"?

HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN.

*The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1898)

## THE RACIAL DOCTRINE OF *MEIN KAMPF*

THE first 300 pages of *Mein Kampf* deal with the author's life from his youth to the beginning of his political activities, interspersed with reflections on German politics. In Chapter XI he suddenly breaks away and enters upon a biological disquisition, leading up to an attack on the Jews.

The following is the opening passage of this chapter:

"These are truths that are so abundantly clear that for that very reason they are either ignored or at least not recognized by ordinary mankind. They pass blindly by the obvious and are very much astonished when someone suddenly discovers what all ought to have known. The eggs of Columbus were lying around in hundred thousands, only there are not nearly so many Columbuses.

"Thus it is that men wander about in the Garden of Nature, imagining that they know almost all that there is to be known and yet, with few exceptions, they blindly overlook one of the most striking principles underlying human power—the fact that all the various kinds of living beings on this earth are rigidly shut off from one another.

"The most superficial observation shows us that it is an almost iron law of all the innumerable forms of expression of Nature's will to life that each should reproduce itself and increase within the limits of its own kind. Every animal mates only with a partner of the same species."

He then goes on to argue that this holds good also of the different races of mankind and continues:

"Everything that we admire to-day on this earth, science and art, technology and inventions—is only the creative product of a few peoples and perhaps originally of one race. On them depends also the maintenance of

this whole culture. If they suffer decline the beauty of this earth will pass with them into the grave. . . . All the great cultures of the past only declined because the creative race which originated them died of blood-poisoning.”

This leads on to an account of the Aryan race as the “originators of culture” and of self-sacrificing idealism. “But,” continues the argument,

“since true idealism is nothing but the subordination of the interests and life of the individual to the community and this in its turn is an indispensable condition for the creation of every type and form of organization, it corresponds in the last analysis to the ultimate will of Nature. Idealism alone leads men to the voluntary recognition of the prior right of strength and force and allows them to become the tiniest part of that order which forms and moulds the whole universe.”

He then goes on to describe the Jews as “the most powerful contrast to the Aryans.”

*Mein Kampf* (1938 edition, pp. 311, 316, 328 and 329).

## THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW

OF all appeals to which human beings respond, few are as powerful as that of tribal, or—in a more advanced stage—of national feeling. Such sentiment is at the basis of modern corporate existence. This is doubtless based upon some form of the gregarious impulses, which in social animals receives satisfaction through the presence of others similar to themselves. In man, however, this impulse, like other so-called “instincts”, is not simple and straightforward in its operation. The likenesses upon which this “consciousness of kind” is based in animals are inborn: in man they are very largely the product of experience and social factors. Very many human activities, aspirations and emotions have contributed, either naturally or artificially, to build up the great synthesis that we term a nation; language, religion, art, law, even food, gesture, table manners, clothing and sport all play their part. So also does the sentiment of kinship, for the family has extended some of its age-old glamour to that wholly different and much newer aggregate, the national unit. We would stress the contrast between family and nation, since the family is an ancient biological factor, while the nation-state is a modern conception and product, the result of certain peculiar social and economic circumstances.

Before the Renaissance nations or national states in our sense of the word did not exist, though there were composite human aggregates related to the tribes of an earlier cultural stage. For the moment we will refer to the sentiment which animates tribal and national units alike, by the non-committal phrase “group sentiments”, for to call it “racial” is to beg a very important question which we shall later discuss. It is, however, clear that even in the pre-Renaissance stage, group-sentiment was a complex thing, certain elements being derived from the idea of kinship, certain others from local feeling, from economic necessity, from history, or from the prevalent form of religion.

The transference of the idea of kinship to the group-sentiment involved in national aggregates has been fateful for our civilization. For while group-sentiment is one of the most primitive emotional stimuli, it is also one of the most enduring. It is for this reason that the authors of moral and legal codes have frequently found it necessary to protect the body politic against aspects of group-sentiment which induced hostility to foreign elements. The Old Testament is full of allusions to such checks. "The stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God" (Leviticus, xix, 34). "One ordinance shall be both for you of the congregation, and also for the stranger that sojourneth with you, an ordinance for ever in your generations: as ye are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord" (Numbers, xv, 15). One of the most gracious parables of Jesus is devoted to the discussion of who is our neighbour (Luke, x, 25-37), and the very basis of Christianity is the proclamation, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians, iii, 28).

Throughout the history of civilization the establishment and regulation of group-sentiment among those who are related little, if at all, save by political bonds has been one of the main preoccupations of statecraft. To achieve this the idea of kinship has repeatedly been pressed into service, and has, as a matter of fact, become paramount among the influences which have moulded to unity the various forms of human association. It has been expanded to embrace larger and still larger groups. It has spread beyond the family, the tribe, the loosely-knit federation of tribes to the yet more extensive aggregate, the nation.

When religions claimed to be universal, and when, as in our own age, empires boast that on them the sun never sets, the idea of kinship has been extended beyond the limits of the nation or the nation-state. Prelates have been the shepherds of many flocks and commonwealths have become families



of nations. In all ages law, reason and religion alike have laid emphasis on the brotherhood of all mankind. It was an ancient philosopher-poet who said, "I am a man, and nothing that is human do I deem alien from myself"; and a murderer who yet earlier asked, "Am I my brother's keeper"?

But especially the common elements that all men share have been the theme of the great spiritual leaders. Malachi's question, "Have we not all one Father? Hath not one God created us?" and St. Paul's assertion, "He hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth", have been echoed by a myriad voices. The community of mankind is a sentiment which has particularly appealed to teachers. "The same sky covers us, the same sun and all the stars revolve about us, and light us in turn", said the great Moravian educator Comenius (1592-1671).

Of all studies the most universal is that which we call science, and with the advent of that "new philosophy" in the seventeenth century the unity of mankind became especially emphasized. Does not science deal with precisely those judgments concerning which universal assent can be obtained? Such was the principle which the great French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623-62) detected in the continuity of research in the sciences. "The whole succession of men through the ages should be considered as one man, ever living and always learning."

Mankind, however, has shown itself to be still unprepared to accept the idea of universal human brotherhood. Tribal, religious and national sentiment has time and again overruled the sentiment for humanity. In combination with the consciousness of territorial association, the idea of nationality has yielded as fruit that patriotism which has proved itself one of the strongest forces known to history, second perhaps to religion alone. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the part played by patriotic sentiment in the moulding of Europe. The passionate desire for freedom from foreign domination—which we may note, in passing, is very far from the desire for freedom itself, with which it is often confused—was one of

the preponderating factors on the European political stage of the nineteenth century. In Germany it broke the power of Napoleon and later created an Empire; it freed Italy from the rule of Austria and made her a nation; it almost drove the Turk out of Europe and provided nuclei of nationalist crystallization for Greece and for the peoples of the Balkans. It has also been the main idea in the formation of the "succession states" after the war of 1914-18.

All the movements towards national unity that were so characteristic of the nineteenth century present certain features in common. Among these we would especially note the rise of a myth, so similar in all these cases that we must suppose that it is a natural way of thinking for peoples in like circumstances. Among all the newer and almost all the older nationalities a state of freedom from external political domination has been projected into the past and associated with a hypothetical ancient unity, itself considered as derived from a common inheritance. The implications of this unity were left vague; sometimes they were conceived in a legal and historical sense, but often also they were grafted on to a conception of kinship regarded as a matter of physical transmission. "The Romans were as brothers in the brave days of old"—despite their diverse origin, actually emphasized by their own legend of the rape of the Sabine women! A "nation" has been cynically but not inaptly defined as "a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbours".

The economic movements of the nineteenth century gave rise to unparalleled social and political dislocations. The resulting conflicts have by some been interpreted as originating from a disparity of "racial" elements in the populations involved. It is however true that such disparity if it were the real cause of these struggles, must have existed for many centuries in the populations before these disturbances declared themselves. The interpretation that has been put on these phenomena must therefore inevitably lead to an inquiry as to what extent the claims to "racial unity", which

are explicit or implicit in recent nationalist controversy, have a basis in reality. . . .

The term "race" is freely employed in many kinds of literature, but investigation of the use of the word soon reveals that no exact meaning is, or perhaps can be, attached to it, as far as modern human aggregates are concerned. Even the origin of the word "race" is uncertain. Etymologists have disputed as to whether it is ultimately of Semitic or Slavonic origin. Certainly it entered the Western languages, late, reaching English from French in the sixteenth and German well on in the eighteenth century. It was originally used to denote descendants of a single person or couple, as in the phrase "the race of Abraham's" in Foxe's *Book of Martyrs* (1570 edition, the first known occurrence in English) or in a spiritual sense the "race of Satan" in Milton's *Paradise Lost* (1667). The word was not employed in the Authorized Version of the Bible, where it is represented by the words "seed" or "generation".

The word "race" soon acquired a vagueness that it has never since lost. It is probable that this vagueness, together with the occasional employment of the word by certain scientific men of a previous generation and the supposed parallel between zoological and human "races" have combined to give it a special popularity with a group of writers who deal with scientific themes without adequate scientific equipment. From them it has descended to the literature of more violent nationalism.

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A word is often none the worse for being inexact in its connotation; many words indeed are valuable for this very reason. But it is necessary in dealing with scientific themes to distinguish carefully between the terms that we use in an exact sense and those which are valuable for their very vagueness. The word "race", if it is to be used at all, should find its place in the latter class.

It has frequently been asserted that "race" is of the essence

of nationality, and sometimes "race" and "nation" have been used as almost interchangeable terms. So far has this gone that many nationals, if questioned, would reply that their compatriots were all of one "race", with a proportion, more or less insignificant, of "aliens" who, by some means or other, have acquired their national status. A very little reflection and knowledge will show that this view is untenable. The belief, however, survives in many quarters where it should have become extinct, sometimes with the idea of "stock" substituted for "race".

It is a remarkable consequence of the War, that, perhaps for the first time in history, peace treaties have been directed, not so much towards the consolidation of the territorial acquisition of victory as towards the revision of the political map on lines which aim at having a basis in so-called "ethnic realities". For this purpose the "racial" argument was constantly put forward in terms of what, in the current phrase of the time, was called "self-determination", with occasionally some regard for the rights of the so-called "racial" (usually linguistic or cultural) minorities.

In the discussion which accompanied the settlement of the peace treaties there was inevitably much confusion of thought in regard to these so-called "racial questions"—a confusion which has since been intensified rather than dissipated—for a slogan does not raise passions the less for being devoid of exact or analysable content or even for being contrary to reason and self-interest. As an illustration of the lengths to which such confusion of thought may go, it may be mentioned that in the recent discussion on the Polish corridor, it has been suggested as a means of finding out the "racial" affinities of the inhabitants of the area involved, that the question might be settled by consulting the voting lists of the last election!

Associated with the vague idea of "race" is the idea, almost equally vague, of "blood". The use of this word as equivalent to "relationship" is in itself of course based on an elementary biological error. In fact there is no continuum

of actual blood between the parent and offspring, for no blood passes from the mother to the child in her womb. The misconception is very ancient and encountered among many peoples on a low cultural level. This false conception gained scientific currency in the centuries before the nineteenth from a mistake of Aristotle, who held that the monthly periods, which do not appear during pregnancy, contribute to the substance of the child's body (Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, I, §20). The curious reader will find Aristotle's error repeated in a work in the Apocrypha, The Wisdom of Solomon (vii, 2). The modern knowledge of the physiology and anatomy of pregnancy disposes completely of the idea of a "blood-tie" in its literal sense.

Quite apart from this venerable misconception, however, it is evident from the nature of the case that the actual physical kinship, which is frequently suggested as the basis of group-consciousness, culminating in so-called "race feeling" must be fictitious. In many cases, it is, in fact, demonstratively false even in very simple forms of social organization.

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Historically all the great modern nations are known to be the resultants of amalgamations of many tribes and of many waves of immigration. There is abounding evidence that adoption of extraneous human individuals or groups of individuals, . . . has been continuous through European history and that over and over again it has profoundly modified the genetic composition of the population. This may be well seen in southern France where in Provence the Greek colonies of Marseilles and elsewhere became integral parts of the population of Gaul. More familiar examples are to be found in the population of the British Isles, which has been made up from scores of waves of immigrants. Among the more modern waves were the Huguenot refugees who fled from France to the eastern counties of England at the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the Flemish settlers who came at a somewhat earlier date to South Wales. Both have long ceased

to be separate groups and their descendants can no longer be sharply distinguished from the extremely complex mixture which forms the general population of the country.

Group-sentiment, when submitted to analysis, thus proves to be based on something much broader but less definable than physical kinship. The occupation of a country within definite geographical boundaries, climatic conditions inducing a definite mode of life, traditions that gradually come to be shared in common, social institutions and organizations, common religious practices, even common trades or occupations—these are among the factors which have contributed in greater or less degree to the formation of national sentiment. Of very great importance is a common language, strengthened by belief in a fictitious “blood-tie”.

But among all the sentiments that nurture feelings of group unity, greater even than the imaginary tie of physical or even of historic relationship, is the reaction against outside interference. That, more than anything else, has fostered the development of group-consciousness, and has made possible the isolation and growth of a common life and common institutions. Pressure from without is probably the largest single factor in the process of national evolution.

It may, perhaps, be claimed that, even admitting the incorporation into the nation of many individuals of “alien blood”, it is nevertheless possible to recognize and differentiate the true “stock” of a nation from the foreign. It is sometimes urged that the original stock represents the true national type, British, French, Italian, German and the like, and that the members of that stock may readily be distinguished from the others. The use of the word or the idea of “stock” in this connection introduces a biological fallacy which we shall presently discuss.

Certainly well-marked differences of “national type” are recognized in popular judgment. If, however, we wish to keep our view clear, steady and scientific, we must constantly recall to mind how subjective, how impressionistic, how variable and devoid of standards of reference such judgments

constantly are. Our German neighbours have ascribed to themselves a Teutonic type—that is, fair, long-headed, tall and virile. Let us make a composite picture of a typical Teuton from the most prominent of the exponents of this view. Let him be as blond as Hitler, as dolichocephalic as Rosenberg, as tall as Goebels, as slender as Goering, and as manly as Streicher. How much would he resemble the German ideal?

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When, in fact, the differences which go to make up these commonly accepted distinctions between “racial stocks” and nationalities are more strictly examined, it will usually be found that there is very little in them that has any close relation to the physical characters by which “race” in the biological sense can be distinguished. It is more than probable that, so far as European populations are concerned, nothing in the nature of “pure race” in the biological sense has any real existence.

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In considering the characters of different nationalities, it will generally be found that the distinctive qualities upon which stress is laid are cultural rather than physical, and when physical they are often influenced by climatic and cultural conditions. Stature is certainly in part a function of environment. Pigmentation—fairness or darkness—unless submitted to scientific record and analysis, is an illusory guide. How many Englishmen could give an accurate estimate of the percentage of dark-complexioned people in England?—which is in fact a country whose inhabitants are more often dark than fair. Expression must obviously be determined largely by the content and habit of thought. In point of actual fact, the most crucial factors on which most observers’ judgment will depend will be dress and behaviour. In dress, the use, degree, and contrast of colour at once attract the eye. In behaviour, facial expression, gesture and speech, especially volubility and intonation, attract much attention. These, however, are, in the main, cultural factors, the results of fashion, imitation, and

education. It is true that attitude and movement and the use of the voice have physical bases—for which, however, it is not possible in the present state of our knowledge, either to assert or to deny a biological value as criteria of descent. But it is, nevertheless, certain that in virtue of their patent transmission by imitation they must be regarded as mainly dependent upon a cultural, and not upon a biological inheritance. It is interesting to note that in Hitler's book, *Mein Kampf*, his "racial" characterizations and differentiations, more especially of the Jews, are based not on any biological concept of physical descent—as to the essential nature and meaning of which he exhibits neither knowledge nor insight—but almost entirely on social and cultural elements.

JULIAN HUXLEY and A. C. HADDON.

*We Europeans* (1935)



## PART IV

# THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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## THE HUE AND CRY STAGE

It seems to me that the only thing we have to look forward to is ultimately something in the nature of a League of Peace, and I hope to show presently that that is the natural development of International Law. One thing only I fear, and that is that the movement in favour of the League of Nations runs some risk by reason of the fact that its advocates are in somewhat too great a hurry. They are devoting their attention to the details of the superstructure rather than to the stability of the foundations. Impressed by the fact that municipal law is administered by legal tribunals based ultimately on organized force, they set themselves in the first place to evolve schemes for international tribunals and an international police force. I think they forget that every sound system of municipal law, with its tribunals and its organized police, is a creation of historical growth having its roots in the far past. It is supported in reality not so much by organized force as by that sense of mutual obligation and respect for the rights of others which lies at the root of, and forms the foundation of, those settled rules of conduct among individuals which alone make law and order in the community possible. At the present day, a law may perhaps be defined as "a rule of conduct generally observed, and exceptional deviations from it are punished by tribunals based upon force", but certainly the last part of this definition would have been inapplicable in earlier

stages of our history. And I think a little consideration will show that even at the present day, though tribunals based upon force may deal with exceptional deviations from the general rule of conduct, no tribunal and no force is of any avail at all when once the exceptions are so numerous that the rule cannot be said to be generally observed.

I should like to go to the root of this matter. What we are all aiming at is the prevention of war. According to the war philosophy current amongst some writers in Germany, it is quite impossible. War, they say, is the result of tendencies so ingrained in human nature that they may be considered as biological laws; nor in their opinion is war really contrary to the higher interests of humanity. The worthiest and most virile nation will, they say, survive each struggle, and ultimately establish a world empire in which a permanent peace, for the first time, will become possible, and in which law and order, literature and philosophy, art and science, will have their best chance, and man, the individual man, will attain his highest perfection. I believe this theory to be scientifically unsound, but it will serve no useful purpose to deny that it is mere plausibility. The tendencies on which it is based are real tendencies which have been, and are, playing a considerable part in the history of nations. In order to combat such tendencies we must know exactly what they are and how they work, and if I shall not be wearying your Lordships I should like to illustrate that point by one or two references to facts in legal history.

Social life—communal life as it is called—is obviously quite impossible unless each member of the community can count, with more or less certainty, on the actions of his fellows under circumstances of everyday occurrence. The first step, therefore, in the development of law is the establishment of “customary rules of conduct”, a breach of which will disappoint, and give rise to a grievance on the part of the person who is injured by the breach. One branch of the history of law concerns the growth and development of these customary rules of conduct, and another concerns the growth and

development of remedies for their breach. It is with the latter branch that I am now concerned.

There is no doubt that the most primitive remedy for a breach of the customary rules of conduct lay in the direction of self help. The injured party, aided perhaps by his family and his friends, exacted forcible reprisals. Those members of the community who were not immediately concerned stood aloof and observed neutrality. Public opinion, it is true, soon gave rise to certain general precepts as to how and to what extent reprisals ought to be taken. The old law of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" gave way for a customary tariff regulating the compensation which might be exacted for loss of life and limb, but behind these precepts there was nothing of public opinion. Individual force as a remedy for wrongs is of an uncertain efficacy; it may be that the wrongdoer is stronger than the party injured. This gave rise to the tendency for the weak to attach themselves to the strong, to become their retainers, surrendering a portion of their own independence for the sake of the protection the strong could afford, and increasing their lord's strength and resources. I remember in one of Stevenson's novels, the scene of which is laid in this country during the Wars of the Roses, that the advice given by an old retainer to the youth was summed up in the phrase "See you get good lordship". And we find, in fact, a number of powerful lords, each preserving peace among his own retainers and each maintaining an armed force, nominally for the purpose of defence, but which could, quite as easily, be used for aggression whenever interest or ambition might so dictate. It was only until one of these lords gained supremacy over the others that a universal peace, a universal system of law and order, became possible throughout the realm. Then the peace, theretofore maintained by each powerful lord, merged into the King's peace, and we find traces of this in the fact that in legal processes wrongs are still charged as "contrary to the peace of our lord, the King".

If you turn to international relations I think you will find precisely the same tendencies at work. Such communal life

as exists between nations is based, and must be based upon customary rules of conduct. These customary rules are dignified by the name of International Law, but there is no remedy for their breach otherwise than by war. During a war those nations not immediately concerned remain neutral. There may be general precepts—we know there are—purporting to regulate what is, or what is not, lawful to belligerents; what they can, or what they cannot, do. There is nothing of public opinion behind these precepts, and they may be easily disregarded in the stress of war. War, again, is an uncertain remedy; it inflicts as often as it redresses a wrong. Victory is generally on the side of the big battalions; hence you get international competition in armaments though they may be used for aggression as well as for defence. Hence, too, arises the growing conviction among smaller nations, that the weak nations cannot stand alone. They must get “good lordship”; they must attach themselves to the stronger, must surrender to them a portion of their independence for the sake of the protection which the stronger nation can afford them. Wars result, and on this line of development it is clear that International Law, as an instrument of peace, can have no permanency. It may bridge over the intervals during which nations are weary of war or are preparing for the fray, but when war breaks out it will be disregarded, and it will vanish altogether when one nation has attained superiority over the others, established a world empire, and founded universal peace. Such are some of the considerations which are put forward in support of the German war philosophy, and to some extent they account for the excesses of Prussian militarism. No rule of International Law, no dictates of humanity, must be allowed to stand in the way when the object is to increase the power and enlarge the borders of the German Empire. Those who submit may be spared, but those who arrogantly resist must be destroyed. Belgium is intended as an object lesson. Let the weak nations accept the German lordship; so will Germany at last attain the empire of her dreams and establish a permanent peace, a *pax Germanica*.

If we find in the history of law tendencies such as these which give plausibility to the German war philosophy, I think that we can also find tendencies, or at any rate a tendency, which points to the possibility of the development of international relations along different lines. There have been periods in the history of nations when, in the absence of legal tribunals, in the absence of any organized police force, the sense of mutual obligation, which as I have said lies at the root of every legal system, has been so strongly developed that an act of violence done to the person or property of one member of the community has been resented as a wrong to all its members. In such a case neutrality is impossible. It is a disgrace, a crime. The hand of every man is against the wrongdoer. He becomes an outlaw. No one may feed him or succour him, or assist him to escape. Every one must join in his arrest and punishment. The remedy is still force, but force administered not by an individual but by collective action. The strong sense of mutual obligation, of a wrong to one being considered as a wrong to the whole, has played a considerable part in the history of our law. To it we owed in this country what is known as the "hue and cry", long regarded as an effective deterrent against crimes of violence. From it arose on the other side of the Atlantic that system of communal justice, which, however rough and ready, contributed so largely to the establishment of law and order in the western parts of the American continent. From it legal tribunals and an organized police will readily develop. Without it no reign of law is possible.

I agree with what was said by the noble Marquess who last addressed the House, that there are abundant signs that international relations are approaching a new stage. I think that new stage is the stage of the "hue and cry" in English municipal law. The last three years have shown us that war is a danger which may well be fatal to our common civilization. Neutrality has become increasingly difficult. Those nations which at first desired to remain neutral have been one after the other dragged into the fray. The neutrality of others is

secured only by fear. If we can once make it clear that in future there will be no neutrality the danger of war will be minimised, because its risk is increased. Many think that Germany would not have embarked on the present struggle had she not counted on British neutrality, but it is almost certain that she would not have done so had she been fully convinced that both this country and the United States and others would have fought against her.

As soon as the risk of war becomes great, nations will begin to settle their differences by other means. Arbitrations may be resorted to, possibly International Councils or International Conciliation Boards may be made use of; but tribunals in the ordinary sense of the word—legal tribunals for the administration of International Law based upon an organized international force—are a very different matter, and one which must be left, in my opinion, to grow out of that sense of mutual obligation which is beginning to exist amongst nations. If we attack that part of the problem at first, I have very serious fears that the whole structure which we are trying to build may fall about our ears. Probably if any dispute now arose between ourselves and any other great nation, say the United States of America, the nations in difference would easily arrive at some means of settling the dispute otherwise than by war, whether by a tribunal *ad hoc* or in some other way. It is a very serious matter to ask great nations in the present day to agree beforehand to submit disputes of whatever nature to the arbitrament of a tribunal consisting of representatives of some two dozen or three dozen States, many of whom may be indirectly interested in casting their votes on this side or on that.

The point I really wish to emphasize is this. Hitherto the efforts of those to whom war is hateful have been directed on the one hand towards laying down rules for the conduct of belligerents in order to make war less dreadful and more humane, and on the other hand to laying down rules for the benefit and advantage of neutrals. What is the result? There is hardly a provision of The Hague Convention or of the

Convention of Geneva touching the way in which war may be properly waged which has not, so far as Germany is concerned, proved a dead letter. There is hardly a rule or precept of International Law concerning neutrality which Germany has not infringed. I venture to say that the labour which we have expended at many of The Hague Conventions in formulating such documents as the unratified Declaration of London has for the most part been labour thrown away. The true line of development lies, not in regulating the hateful thing but in bringing about conditions under which it becomes increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible, not in consulting the selfish interests of neutrals but in abolishing neutrality. Murders would increase if the murderer could count on the neutrality of bystanders, and it is the same with war. The neutral, in fact, shirks his share of the burden of humanity.

It appears to me that the first step towards the League of Nations is to recognize that it must be formed on the lines that I have suggested, and then along those lines to come to an agreement. . . . If your Lordship will allow me, I should like to call attention to the various lines on which I think such an agreement might be made.

1. First of all, it appears to me that all the members of the League should recognize that war, from whatever cause, is a danger to our common civilization, and that international disputes ought to be settled on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms.

2. Each of the members of the League ought, I think, to join in a joint and several guarantee of every other member of the League against any act of war on the part of any nation which is not a member of the League. This follows, of course, the analogy of the municipal law to which I have referred. Everybody who is a member of the community joins in pledging himself against an attack from outside.

LORD PARKER.

*House of Lords (March 19, 1918)*

## THE RULE OF LAW

THE first requisite for any durable concert of peaceable nations to prevent war is a fundamental change in the principle to be applied to international breaches of the peace.

The view now assumed and generally applied is that the use of force by one nation towards another is a matter in which only the two nations concerned are primarily interested, and if any other nation claims a right to be heard on the subject it must show some specific interest of its own in the controversy. That burden of proof rests upon any other nation which seeks to take part if it will relieve itself of the charge of impertinent interference and avoid the resentment which always meets impertinent interference in the affairs of an independent sovereign state. This view was illustrated by Germany in July, 1914, when she insisted that the invasion of Serbia by Austria-Hungary was a matter which solely concerned those two States, and upon substantially that ground refused to agree to the conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey. The requisite change is an abandonment of this view, and a universal formal and irrevocable acceptance and declaration of the view that an international breach of the peace is a matter which concerns every member of the Community of Nations—a matter in which every nation has a direct interest, and to which every nation has a right to object.

These two views correspond to the two kinds of responsibility in municipal law which we call civil responsibility and criminal responsibility. If I make a contract with you and break it, it is no business of our neighbour. You can sue me or submit, and he has nothing to say about it. On the other hand, if I assault and batter you, every neighbour has an interest in having me arrested and punished, because his own safety requires that violence shall be restrained. At the basis



of every community lies the idea of organization to preserve peace. Without that idea really active and controlling there can be no community of individuals or of nations. It is the gradual growth and substitution of this idea of community interest in preventing and punishing breaches of the peace which has done away with private war among civilized peoples.

The Monroe Doctrine asserted a specific interest on the part of the United States in preventing certain gross breaches of the peace on the American Continent; and when President Wilson suggested an enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine to take in the whole world, his proposal carried by necessary implications the change of doctrine which I am discussing. The change may seem so natural as to be unimportant, but it is really crucial, for the old doctrine is asserted and the broader doctrine is denied by approximately half the military power of the world, and the question between the two is one of the things about which this war is being fought. The change involves a limitation of sovereignty, making every sovereign state subject to the superior right of a community of sovereign states to have the peace preserved. The acceptance of any such principle would be fatal to the whole Prussian theory of the state and of government. When you have got this principle accepted openly, expressly, distinctly, unequivocally by the whole civilized world, you will for the first time have a Community of Nations, and the practical results which will naturally develop will be as different from those which have come from the old view of national responsibility as are the results which flow from the American Declaration of Independence compared with the results which flow from the Divine Right of Kings.

The second proposition which I made was that the public opinion of the free peoples of the world in favour of having peace preserved must have institutions through which it may receive effect. No lesson from history is clearer than this. Very strong public feeling may produce a mob which is simply destructive, or a multitude of expressions of opinion which get nowhere by themselves; but to accomplish anything

affirmative some particular person must have delegated to him authority to do some particular thing in behalf of the multitude. The original forms of the institutions of government have grown from very simple beginnings developing to meet requirements from generation to generation. The important thing is that there are officers who have the right to act and the duty to act in doing things which are necessary to preserve the peace.

Some rudimentary institutions have already been developed by agreement among the nations. Provision has been made by the Hague Convention for machinery making it very easy to submit questions of international rights to a tribunal for decision. It has also been made easy to determine the truth when there is a dispute about facts through a Commission of Inquiry, as in the Dogger Bank case.

International usage arising under the concert of European powers has also made it a natural and customary thing for the powers to meet in conference when any serious exigency arises for the purpose of discussing the way to avoid general injury. All of these inchoate institutions, however—the Arbitral Tribunal, the Commission of Inquiry, the Conference of Nations—depend entirely upon individual national initiative. No one has any authority to invoke them in the name or interest of the Community of Nations which is interested in the preservation of peace. The first and natural step in the development of these institutions after the adoption of the new principle of community interest in the preservation of peace will be an agreement upon someone or some group whose duty it will be to speak for the whole community in calling upon any two nations who appear to be about to fight to submit their claims to the consideration (I do not now say decision, but consideration) of the Tribunal as it is now or may hereafter be organized, or the Commission of Inquiry, or the Conference, as the case may require. It will be exceedingly difficult for any nation which has explicitly acknowledged the community interest and right, to refuse such a demand in the name of the community, and it could not do so

without clearly putting itself in the wrong in the eyes of the entire world. . . . Behind such a demand, of course, should stand also an agreement by the powers to act together in support of the demand made in their name and in dealing with the consequences of it.

The question how far the agreement should go brings me to the third proposition which I made, and that is that no agreement in the way of a league of peace, or under whatever name should be contemplated which will probably not be kept when the time comes for acting under it. Nothing can be worse in international affairs than to make agreements and break them.

ELIHU ROOT.

*Letter to Colonel House (August 16, 1918)*

## BRITISH COMMENTARY ON THE COVENANT

THE document that has emerged from these discussions is not the Constitution of a super-State, but, as its title explains, a solemn agreement between sovereign States, which consent to limit their complete freedom of action on certain points for the greater good of themselves and the world at large. Recognizing that one generation cannot hope to bind its successors by written words, the Commission has worked throughout on the assumption that the League must continue to depend on the free consent, in the last resort, of its component States; this assumption is evident in nearly every article of the Covenant, of which the ultimate and most effective sanction must be the public opinion of the civilized world. If the nations of the future are in the main selfish, grasping and warlike, no instrument or machinery will restrain them. It is only possible to establish an organization which may make peaceful co-operation easy and hence customary, and to trust in the influence of custom to mould opinion.

But while acceptance of the political facts of the present has been one of the principles on which the Commission has worked it has sought to create a framework which should make possible and encourage an indefinite development in accordance with the ideas of the future. If it has been chary of prescribing what the League shall do, it has been no less chary of prescribing what it shall not do. A number of amendments laying down the methods by which the League should work, or the action it should take in certain events, and tending to greater precision generally, have been deliberately rejected, not because the Commission was not in sympathy with the proposals, but because it was thought better to leave the hands of the statesmen of the future as free as possible, and to allow the League, as a living organism, to discover its own best lines of development.

The Assembly is the supreme organ of the League of Nations, but a body of nearly 150 members, whose decisions require the unanimous consent of some 50 States, is plainly not a practical one for the ordinary purposes of international co-operation, and still less for dealing with emergencies. A much smaller body is required, and, if it is to exercise real authority, it must be one which represents the actual distribution of the organized political power of the world.

Such a body is found in the Council, the central organ of the League, and a political instrument endowed with greater authority than any the world has hitherto seen. In form its decisions are only recommendations, but when those who recommend include the political chiefs of all the Great Powers and of four other Powers selected by the States of the world in assembly, their unanimous recommendations are likely to be irresistible.

The mere fact that these national leaders, in touch with the political situation in their respective countries, are to meet once a year, at least, in personal contact for an exchange of views, is a real advance of immense importance in international relations. Moreover, there is nothing in the Covenant to prevent their places being taken, in the intervals between the regular meetings, by representatives permanently resident at the Seat of the League, who would tend to create a common point of view, and could consult and act together in an emergency. The pressure of important matters requiring decision is likely to make some such permanent body necessary, for the next few years at least.

The fact that for the decisions of the Council, as of the Assembly, unanimity is ordinarily required is not likely to be a serious obstacle in practice. Granted the desire to agree, which the conception of the League demands, it is believed that agreement will be reached, or at least that the minority will acquiesce. There would be little practical advantage, and a good deal of danger, in allowing the majority of the Council to vote down one of the Great Powers.

In *Article X* the word "external" shows that the League cannot be used as a Holy Alliance to suppress national or other movements within the boundaries of the Member States, but only to prevent forcible annexation from without.

It is important that this article should be read with *Articles XI* and *XIX*, which make it plain that the Covenant is not intended to stamp the new territorial settlement as sacred and unalterable for all time, but, on the contrary, to provide machinery for the progressive regulation of international affairs in accordance with the needs of the future. The absence of such machinery, and the consequent survival of treaties long after they had become out of date, led to many of the quarrels of the past; so that these articles may be said to inaugurate a new international order, which should eliminate, so far as possible, one of the principal causes of war.

. . . .

The sanctions of *Article XVI*, with the exception of the last paragraph, apply only to breaches of the Covenant involving a resort to war. In the first instance, it is left to individual States to decide whether or not such a breach has occurred and an act of war against the League has been thereby committed. To wait for the pronouncement of a Court of Justice or even of the Council would mean delay, and delay at this crisis might be fatal. Any State, therefore, is justified in such a case in breaking off relations with the offending State on its own initiative, but it is probable, in fact, that the smaller States, unless directly attacked, will wait to see what decision is taken by the Great Powers or by the Council, which is bound to meet as soon as possible, and is certain to do so within a few hours. It is the duty of the Council, with the help of its military, naval and air advisers, to recommend what effective force each Member of the League shall supply; for this purpose, each Member from which a contribution is required has the right to attend the Council, with power of veto, during the consideration of its particular case. The several contingents will therefore be settled by agreement, as is

indeed necessary if the spirit of the Covenant is to be preserved, and if joint action is to be efficacious. But it is desirable at this point to meet the objection that under such conditions the League will always be late, and consequently offers no safeguard against sudden aggression.

It is true that, in default of a strong international striking force, ready for instant action in all parts of the world, the Members of the League must make their own arrangements for immediate self-defence against any force that could be suddenly concentrated against them, relying on such understandings as they have come to with their neighbours previously for this purpose. There is nothing in the Covenant (see Article XXI) to forbid defensive conventions between States, so long as they are really and solely defensive, and their contents are made public. They will, in fact, be welcomed in so far as they tend to preserve the peace of the world.

To meet the first shock of sudden aggression, therefore, States must rely on their own resistance and the aid of their neighbours. But where, as in the case of the moratorium being observed, the aggression is not sudden, it is certain that those Powers which suspect a breach of the Covenant will have consulted together unofficially to decide on precautionary measures and to concert plans to be immediately put into force if the breach of the Covenant takes place. In this event these meetings of the representatives of certain Powers will develop into the Supreme War Council of the League, advised by a joint staff.

Article XVII asserts the claim of the League that no State, whether a member of the League or not, has the right to disturb the peace of the world till peaceful methods of settlement have been tried. As in early English law any act of violence, whenever committed, came to be regarded as a breach of the King's peace, so any and every sudden act of war is henceforward a breach of the peace of the League, which will exact due reparation.

## THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS THE CODIFICATION OF PRACTICAL NEEDS

INTERNATIONAL Law has hitherto rested solely on the shoulders of the individual states, as the highest exponents of the will for law. The so-called legal association of states or peoples—the Society of Nations of yesterday, in Vattel's sense of the words—is a mere association for certain procedural purposes but without any organization to ensure respect for the law thus materially provided for. The vindication of Law depends therefore, on the one hand, upon the willingness of states to respect the law that they have thus recognized, and, on the other hand, in their power to secure their rights by their own exertions. It was a necessary consequence of this situation that the condition of International Law should have been one of permanent uncertainty. Some would conclude that, under these circumstances, it was not entitled to be considered law at all.

The Hague Convention for the peaceful settlement of disputes was based on the idea of individual obligations between states, obligations, moreover, of a very loose kind, leaving wide latitude for free *ad hoc* agreements and on important issues (such as compulsory conciliation or arbitration) providing no more than facilities of which use might or might not be made. There was a deliberate and, indeed, almost ludicrous avoidance at The Hague of anything which might even distantly suggest any right on the part of the Family of States to intervene in conflicts between state and state.

The inadequacy of this system became clear in the critical days of July and August, 1914. It is not difficult to understand why the demand arose for a fundamental reorganization of the system of interstate relationships. In place of the system of contracts beginning and ending with individual states, there was to be a co-operative organization of states for the



promotion and safeguarding of international law—that is to say a League of Nations (*Völkerbund*). It is in this sense that the notion of the Philosophy of Law (*Rechtsphilosophie*) was originated at the end of the eighteenth century by Kant and Fichte and the earlier projects for world-peace drawn up by Sully, Penn and St. Pierre were conceived along the same line of thought. It is easy to see why, in our day, with the example of the federal state before men's eyes, the project of an association of states for peace should be strongly influenced by constitutional ideas. Thus there is a demand for a World Parliament side by side with a World Court.

This more or less constitutional type of organization for peace is the antithesis of the method of safeguarding peace by means of mere contracts. Whereas the latter method, which can so easily be made compatible with the independence of states, is very weak and insufficient, the former has to contend for its realization with difficulties which are to-day unsurmountable. If in comparatively favourable circumstances, as in Switzerland, the jealous concern of the cantons for their sovereignty placed the greatest obstacles in the way of a federal solution, such difficulties are very greatly intensified in the case of a project of union embracing the whole world.

It is, therefore, no cause for astonishment that the first League of Nations that is to be a political reality should have assumed neither the contractual nor the constitutional form, but should have a character of its own, different from anything that has preceded it and shaped to the conditions of our time. One can describe it as being the outcome of a *codification of practical political needs*. It is a systematic co-ordination of all those elements in the political life of the last hundred years which are either themselves safeguards of peace or which, having originally formed part of the system of Power-politics, can now be made to serve the cause of general peace. The spirit of a new age and still more, perhaps, the need of the present moment have led to the scattered elements of the old political system being gathered together into a whole which has new possibilities of effectiveness.

These elements of an international society are derived from two different sources, of which the first lies in the period before the Great War. The most important factor here is the Concert of Great Powers, which was first organized by the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, and which was generally able either to maintain peace or to confine a war within limits or to redress an untenable state of affairs—provided it could deal with a situation in time. The meeting of the London ambassadors in 1913 shows that a state of tension, precisely similar to that of July, 1914, can be relieved by opportune and united discussion among the Great Powers.

Later on, from the middle of the nineteenth century, international conferences provided a means for the solution of questions affecting a larger number of states, and especially for the development of international law. The Second Hague Conference, the first universal congress of states, began by providing for periodical meetings. The foundations for the organization of an international tribunal are to be found in the arbitral courts, and especially in the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. The great collective treaties dealing with matters of general economic and cultural interest (organizations such as the World Postal Union, etc., some of which are represented by permanent international offices) may be regarded as the forerunners of international administration.

Perhaps, however, from a political standpoint, the experiences of the war period have been still more important: at any rate they have been more decisive as regards what is really new in the League of Nations. Above all they have afforded an insight into the tragic inadequacy of international organization—or rather into the chaotic condition of the political world—and at the same time they have brought the conviction, which is borne out by many experiences in recent diplomatic history, that the time gained by peaceful negotiations and impartial enquiries may help to smooth away the most dangerous crisis. Thus, as early as 1913, the United States had begun to conclude treaties by which states bound themselves, before entering upon any conflict, to await the

report of an impartial commission of enquiry, and to refrain, during this period, not only from all military measures but also even from the increase of their armaments. Here we see the first beginnings of that compulsory mediation which has been partly realized by the League of Nations—an idea that was regarded at The Hague in 1907 as quite undiscussable, although it already belonged to the diplomatic apparatus of the European Concert, at least in its application to minor Powers and Great Powers when exhausted by war.

Then the World War brought with it the systematic co-operation of states, especially on the side of the Entente, on the most immense scale both as to area and volume. Nor was this confined in any way to concerted military action. It was even more a co-operation of an economic character, conducted behind the front with a view to ensuring the safety of food supplies and maritime transport. These latter organizations indirectly drew the neutrals also into the sphere of their activity, while their energetic and world-wide interference was evident in all its vital significance and extreme efficiency. The commanding position of the German Empire among the Central Powers gave to the very loose organization of that group of states the clear stamp of hegemony; while the presence of several world-powers on the other side created the conditions for a type of organization of a more federal kind.

Furthermore, from a psychological point of view, there is a fundamental significance in the fact that the great majority among the Entente nations were under the impression that they were waging a war for the prevention of breaches of the peace on frivolous pretexts, a war in which most states had come in, one after another, on their side. Whatever, from an objective point of view, the motives may have been, the fact remains that the idea of the solidarity of states against one or more states, who appear as disturbers of the peace, gained an extraordinary degree of strength and circulation—more so even than at the time of the final struggle against Napoleon in 1815. It is possible that this event in the history of the nations may, as a lasting idea, prove to be a political factor

also in the future; as we see that the memory of a common danger plays an important rôle in the creation of federal states.

There should be no confusion between the use made of war experience in the interests of the League of Nations and the influences exercised by the war-spirit and by the balance of power brought about by the victory of the Allies. It is these latter impressions (the exclusion of the Central Powers, the one-sided application of the so-called mandate principle to the German colonies and the Ottoman Empire, the preferential position of the five allied and associated Great Powers) that have provoked the strongest objections to the League of Nations, especially amongst neutrals. But these circumstances have nothing to do with the general structure of the present League of Nations and therefore need not be considered in conjunction with the problem of general political foundations which is now under discussion.

M. HUBER.  
(1920)

## THE TRIUMPH OF JUSTICE

FOR centuries the world has been seeking peace, and for centuries it has always found war.

Why has this been so?

The reason is to be found in the fact that, for centuries, leaders of states, in spite of the attempts of certain thinkers to exhibit law as the foundation of peace, have never visualised this peace as anything but universal domination founded on force alone or as an equilibrium between the various forces that divide the world.

In ancient times, great empires were founded for the subjugation of all known lands, and all alike ended in ruin.

For three hundred years Rome maintained the struggle for the empire of the world. Augustus proclaimed the Roman Peace and closed the temple of Janus; but the time was near when the barbarian invasions should again plunge the world into slaughter.

In the Middle Ages the Church, in the hope of founding the unity of mankind on unity of belief, proclaimed the Peace of God: but the bond, which had provided Christendom with the first elements of a unified existence, was not long in breaking and Europe, in the throes of perpetual anguish and torn by religious and political wars, turned to alliances and coalitions in the hope of achieving that balance of power which gives to states the illusion of security.

Such has been the history of the Treaties of Westphalia, of Utrecht and of the Congress of Vienna, which led only to fresh wars and new dreams of domination such as even the genius of Napoleon was unable to realize.

In the nineteenth century political rivalries were aggravated by economic jealousies. Competition became harder and fiercer, and the consequences of each conflict were still more tragic.

Must the world, then, for ever be exposed to the same trials

and thus seek, in the methods of the past, this rest that they have never been able to provide?

Even to-day there are men who think to prove their patriotism by seeking to establish a durable peace founded solely on the ruin of their foes. For such men, strict territorial guarantees and the fortification of new military frontiers would be all that is required.

We do not deny that such guarantees are necessary. Mere justice demands that the culprit should be punished and rendered incapable of further harm.

But is that enough? And is peace ensured for the morrow?

The fact is that, while such men dream of basing peace on this very superiority in might, which has so often deluded mankind, we desire to establish it on the only common basis acceptable, without uneasiness, by all, viz., on right.

Might cannot be the basis of right; nor can the balance of power be the basis of peace. True and final peace must be born and developed in an ordered world, and order, if it is to be anything but tyranny, is the living expression of justice itself.

Peace and order reign among men only if they all feel and know in their hearts that all are equally and solely subject to the reign of right.

And how is this reign of right to be established among nations?

Must we share the easy and sceptical belief that the task is impossible, and that human passions and interests will always be stronger than feelings of equity and mutual respect, and that, to defend one's possessions, nothing is better than to keep one's powder dry and one's weapon sharp?

We are no dreamers of peace. We wish rather to bring it to pass, while fully realizing the dangers to which humanity is constantly exposed by selfishness, self-interest and covetousness and all its other passions. While we do not believe in man's perfection nor in that of societies or nations, yet we know that since the beginning of time, ideas have been engaged in a duel with the forces of might and that, from age to

age, it is always the idea that has won the victory. From the beginning of the world, the life of man has been, and always will be, threatened by material forces, just as it is threatened by his passions in the moral sphere. But human thought and science have faced these material forces, gauged their power and dominated them one by one.

In the same way, as regards the internal life of states, organized right has rendered very important services in the rule, repression and discipline of the powers of evil.

National forces can also be disciplined and, instead of being hurled against one another in mutual destruction according to the chances of conflict, can be associated together for the common weal in accordance with the higher law dictated by joint responsibility for rights and duties.

The matter at issue is not the denial of force, but to make it the servant and the guardian of justice.

I do not think it necessary that we should defend ourselves against the accusation of pacifism. People who make no distinction between those who fight in the cause of right and the peace-at-any-price party are acquainted neither with right nor with those who fight for it.

. . . .

We desire only such a peace as may ensure the complete triumph of justice: and we have no wish to impose upon the nations any sort of super-state that might infringe their sovereignty or restrict their individual liberty.

The League of Nations will not be a body endowed with political sovereignty. It has only one aim, and that is the maintenance of peace by the substitution of right for might in the settlement of conflicts; and apart from this aim, it claims no powers.

Nor will the nations abdicate one jot of their real sovereignty when granting to this international organization the powers necessary for the maintenance of peace. Do we say that a citizen parts with his liberty when he uses it to make a

contract which he deems to be favourable to his rights and interests? On the contrary, he rather exercises his liberty by determining for himself the extent of his engagements, and the other contracting party does precisely the same.

Neither sovereignty, nor liberty, are to be considered in terms of the absolute. The liberty of the individual is limited by that of his neighbours; and so also the sovereignty of a state is limited by the equal sovereignty of other states, great or small; and the contract into which they enter, provided that all parties are equally free to make it, does not entail the sacrifice of anything but that which they have mutually agreed to exchange.

LÉON BOURGEOIS.

*Address delivered on November 18, 1918*



## SUPREMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

SINCE the time of Aristotle it has been realized that man is a political animal that can only live in some form of society. Man in isolation is doomed to disappear; and the development of his faculties, as well as his material life, depends on the "social fact", the evolution of which forms the condition of his progress. The social state is for him the state of nature, while political association serves only to secure his safety and the satisfaction of his essential needs. The social fact creates joint responsibility in material concerns which becomes identified with the necessity of preserving his life. This joint responsibility, which is imposed on man and develops of itself, is desired only after having been experienced. It appears in two forms: solidarity founded on similarities, and that derived from the division of labour.

*Solidarity founded on similarities* is the result of physical resemblances, of a common origin, of similarity in needs and aptitudes, of a common language, of analogous reactions to surroundings and facts, and of agreement in opinion on these matters. It is original and primitive and is found in human groups that are nearest to the animal state, in undifferentiated societies, in which the social functions are the same for all, the only distinctions being those of sex and age. But it also exists in all, and even in the most developed forms of society; it is the common basic element and derives its strength from the habit and duration of life in common.

*The solidarity derived from the division of labour*, which is also contemporaneous with the origin of societies, but which develops more slowly, is the element that admits of differentiation, and, therefore of organization and improvement. It is this element that fashions itself according to individual aptitudes and thus entails the distribution of tasks, the specialization of labour and the enhancement of productivity, while it gives rise to new needs and welds together the total mass of

responsibility, since specialization makes individuals indispensable to each other and ends in the standardizing of efficiency. The division of labour is the law of integration and progress not only in the social, but also in the inter-social sphere, since its influence works from one group to another, as from one individual to another. While solidarity founded on similarities (which may be called the *mechanical* factor) is above all things instinctive and easily leads to the cult of resemblances, especially to those of real or supposed blood-relationship, and so tends to breed xenophobia or dislike for all that is foreign or different; the solidarity derived from the division of labour (which may be called the *organic* factor), when once it is consciously realized, leads to foreign individuals and groups being regarded in a utilitarian way and sometimes with a view to their employment. But no society is perfect without a balanced combination of both kinds of joint responsibility.

The maintenance of this balance necessarily requires *restrictions*. These flow from the natural laws to which each of the members of the group must conform, lest he endanger the efficiency, and even the existence, of the social bond, *i.e.*, the existence of the group as well as his own individual existence. All social restrictions are thus originally *of a biological kind*, since upon them depend both the cohesion of the group and the life of the individual. Thus Law which, from primitive times, embodies all these restrictions, is also of biological origin. This is our starting point, of which we must never lose sight. . . .

The origin, rise and technique of law and of political organization follow the same course in all societies, whether it be in states in which the study of the subject has been carried to its highest pitch; or in groups existing before the state and assimilated by it, which we may term sub-states; or in those arising from the coexistence of states, *i.e.*, inter-state or super-state, or, as they are called, international societies. Such societies present great diversity of form within the human society that surrounds them. They may be defined by saying

that "an international society is a group of individuals, subject to law and already belonging to national societies". Thus we take the state as our starting point, because it is for us a familiar concept and because every man necessarily belongs to a national society. On the other hand, we feel much less strongly that we belong at the same time, however, much against our will, to international societies and especially to the greatest society of all—human society. And yet this is a universal and normal fact.

It would seem to be unnecessary to announce the truism that an international society is a group of *individuals*, had the traditional science of the law of nations not proclaimed the reverse of so evident a notion by declaring that the international society is composed solely of groups or states, its sole legal subjects, to the exclusion of individuals.

Apart from the fact that this doctrine implies the existence of only *one* international society, whereas we shall see that such societies exist in unlimited numbers, it is, from the realists point of view, a kind of aberration. One might as well say that a national society is composed solely of administrative divisions and that its individuals are negligible entities. We have here a significant hypertrophy of the concept of moral personality.

It is true that one may consider every society as a complex of societies, since nowadays there no longer exist—if they ever did exist—societies which are simple, homogeneous and undifferentiated. A state presents itself as a society of societies; but if one refuses to allow oneself to be taken in by words, one perceives that these different societies or component groups are, like the complex society that incorporates them, formed of individuals and that the same individuals often form the basis of each several society. The difference lies in the social function and sphere of the legal subjects of each. However, each component group differs from its neighbours in its particular composition and organization, as it also differs from the incorporating group. French society, for example, is made up of individuals who already form

parts of other groups, among whom we see groups in the sphere of private law, such as families, commercial companies, trade unions and associations; and groups in the sphere of public law, such as communes, cantons and departments. The same individuals may be heads of families, residents of a town, members of a church congregation, shareholders in a company and citizens of the state. Should they be suppressed, then each group, and even the state itself, would disappear. The phenomenon of social organization consists in the distribution of individuals on the various bases of their habitat, interests, professions and affinities, as also in the distribution of territorial, personal or material spheres. But to consider the *phenomenon of social organization* as the sole reality is to *mistake the form for the substance*. The real component parts are the individuals and groups of individuals; and all political society is a complex of groups.

We find no society that is entirely homogeneous and undifferentiated, and similarly none that is completely water-tight and isolated. The phenomenon of solidarity overflows the bounds of state society and forms international societies. It works in both ways, by that of similarities and by that of division of labour: by similarities when community of race, culture, language and needs tends to unite individuals across dividing frontiers: but above all by division of labour, since the more the different human groups, unite and specialize, the more they feel the value of collaboration and the more they regard themselves as complementary units. They can satisfy their needs only by the continual exchange of their products, services and ideas, and any rupture of their solidarity represents for them a loss. Furthermore the astounding development of modern ways of communication shortens distances, saves time and multiplies contacts. It is the endless chain of progress, the history of which should serve as a foundation for that of international law, and which every day registers the existence of new systems promoting solidarity between individuals belonging to distinct political groups. Now *each one of these new systems* is in itself a *new society*, an *intersocial grouping* with

its own capacities for development. Such systems usually pass unperceived, since these phenomena of solidarity sometimes interest only a small number of individuals or may be no more than an ephemeral episode. But sometimes they create a durable social bond and organize themselves by the incorporation of numerous groups. Some international societies have been specialized for the satisfaction of isolated interests; others bear the stamp of general solidarity; some answer the needs of private interests; others the public interest of whole states; some are united, endowed with officials and organized as perfectly as the state societies, while many that appear vague and disorderly, and borrow their institutions and framework from other political formations.

Before we seek to classify these intersocial phenomena, we must emphasise the fact that international groups and national societies present no contrast in the processes of their formation. Like international societies, states also have their origin in an assembly of antecedent groups, which are often autonomous and independent and are then united by free association or by conquest. We need only recall the federation of the *Gentes*, from which Rome sprang, or consider the present agglomerations of Kabyle or Moorish tribes. International societies appear and in the same manner evolve towards confederation or the federal state and are finally reabsorbed into state societies. As between international societies and state societies, one cannot even attempt to discriminate in accordance with any principle of priority. From the earliest times intersocial relations have existed between rudimentary groups. The state is but a moment in evolution; and the state phenomenon and intersocial phenomenon are two concomitant aspects of human striving towards politico-judicial organization.

All these composite societies and intersocial groups, by the mere fact of their existence, *secrete* their own legal standards, in order to ensure the maintenance and development of the solidarity on which they are based. Let us insist upon this *essential basis* of international law.

Let us suppose—as a mere hypothesis—a state group, already organized, but homogeneous and isolated: the islands of Japan or the Egypt of the Pharaohs, bounded by its three deserts and two seas. One day the Egyptian sailors set out on a venture towards the Syrian coast in quest of precious woods or gold. They offer in exchange to the natives purple stuffs or glass beads. The barter is arranged. But when the goods have been stowed away, the Egyptian sailors, feeling themselves the stronger and thinking themselves the cleverer, hustle on board, together with their wares and acquisitions, the men, women and children who came out to meet them and so set sail towards the Delta, carrying their booty and their slaves. Should they, or others, return in the near future, they will doubtless be received with a flight of arrows, unless perchance the natives run away from them. They will find no market for the goods they offer, and if they really require the commodities they seek, they will have to change their tactics and re-establish confidence by paying cash. The necessity of trade will bring into existence one of the first important standards of international law—*pacta sunt servanda*—and will prove the existence of an intersocial solidarity which admits no double dealing. This will mark the birth of international law, which will emerge from the existence of the inner social relations of a first group formed by the Egyptian merchants and the Syrian traffickers. Pharaoh will be well advised if, in some edict made binding upon his sailors, he lays down the essential conditions for the maintenance of this group and of this solidarity. He will be still better advised, if he tries to get the tribal chiefs of Syria to accept these same principles, as embodied in some sort of first treaty.

This imaginary scene suggests several observations.

Our first observation is that *the source* of intersocial law is the same as that of all other legal restraint: it is a single source and lies in the “social fact”. Every social or intersocial standard is derived from a *constraint* which forces itself on the individual. If it is not respected, and if the solidarity within the group is not put into practice, the group vanishes and

disappears. The source of international law is to be found in international relations, just as that of law is to be found in individual relations. *Its binding character* is derived from the necessity of these relations, whether they be originally indispensable to the life of each group, or whether they acquire, by the division of labour, the force of a biological necessity. This consciousness of necessity may doubtless be reinforced by considerations of morality and justice, but these latter will never be more than adventitious elements.

And we must go further. These intersocial constraints which have become standards because they are consciously felt, will force themselves not only upon the individual members of the intersocial group which has now appeared, but upon *the two societies*, hitherto strangers to each other, and also upon *their rulers*. If intersocial relations become indispensable, or indeed merely useful to each of the pre-existing groups, the intersocial standards will be recognized, formulated and upheld in each of them. If the legal system previously established in one or the other group is not in accordance with the intersocial rule, *it will be necessary to adapt it*, lest the group existence be endangered. This logical, irresistible necessity allows us to lay down the fundamental rule of international legal relationship, viz., "*Every intersocial standard takes precedence of every conflicting internal standard and either modifies it or ipso facto invalidates it*". The positive legal code of a country may fail to take note of this imperative juridical necessity or may even deny it. But there must be a choice between two things: either the intersocial solidarity will be sufficiently strong and deep to force its way through, in spite of the conflict of formulas, and the internal law will fall into desuetude; or it will be superficial and transitory, and in this case it will be the intersocial phenomenon which will disappear. In any case the persistence of conflict between the two juridical spheres is *inconceivable*.

This principle of the necessary subordination of internal to international law is fundamental. Its non-recognition has been the reason why the evolution of international

societies has been so painful and so slow. Evolution has met a stumbling-block in the anti-juridical principle of sovereignty, and for centuries traditional international law has vegetated among the conflicts of the dualist doctrine which, by assigning distinct and exclusive spheres to state and international juridical systems, has rendered the problem of their necessary superposition completely insoluble.

SCELLE.

*The Law of Peoples (Le Droit des Gens) (1932)*



## THE CATHOLIC TRADITION

THERE are two basic conceptions of the law of nations. The first, inspired by Jean Jacques Rousseau and the "social contract", lays down that the state of nature among nations is independence. Being independent they then bound themselves to each other by treaties. On the one hand we have the independence and equality of states and, on the other, respect for engagements entered into by states; all international law is governed by these two theses. This is the classic conception whereby it is built up without reference to any objective principle and becomes a law not of subordination but of co-ordination only.

Four objections to this conception can be advanced:

1. The "social contract" is a vicious circle; for the contract cannot be the ultimate basis of the rule of law either between individuals or states for the simple reason that a contract presupposes itself a rule of law—the rule which establishes the binding force of contracts. Treaties do not create a community of nations but merely regulate it.

2. Treaties of peace are the most important kind of treaty: but, imposed as they are by the conqueror on the conquered, they cannot, if they are mere contracts which the latter has been forced to accept, create any legal obligation on his part or give any security to the conqueror. Neither respect for the given word nor the moral effect of victory is enough to make them binding on him who has been forced to accept them.

3. There are just and unjust treaties as there are just and unjust contracts. How can one distinguish between them save by invoking objective justice? For really it cannot be said that treaties are neither just nor unjust, that they simply exist and that there is nothing more to be done.

4. The purely contractual conception of international law springs from a system of philosophy according to which sovereignty is an absolute unlimited power which resides in its fullest development in the state. If this is so, all liberty, individual and corporate, is merely an uncertain concession which the state can revoke at any time and all authority, even that of the father of the family, is delegated by the state at its discretion. Nobody has the right to look over the wall which separates states from each other.

In actual fact, sociability is not accidental or subordinate either as between individuals or nations, and Rousseau was wrong in thinking so. There is a natural society between nations and therefore a juridical system, of which treaties are, and ought to be, only an adaptation to the infinite variety of historical conditions. It is from their conformity with the pre-existent natural law and from their fitness to make it work in harmony with the circumstances of the times that treaties derive their binding force. Treaties are not the source of international law; but it is from this law that they derive their legal validity. International law does not proceed from treaties but rules them.

Treaties are like laws. If just, they bind because of their justice, but if unjust, they do not bind at all. It must be remembered, however, that it is forbidden to rebel against them if to do so would cause serious disturbance constituting a threat to order or, as it is called, the common good of international society. The revision of treaties may therefore only be sought by means which respect the supreme requirements of international order and peace. Order and the common good are the basis of international law. To them sovereignty and freedom must not be sacrificed but subjected. This is the Christian conception of the law of nations founded on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

It is this Christian conception which recurs in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Briand-Kellogg Pact, or Pact of Paris.

1. *The Covenant of the League.*—It may be objected that it is

only a contract, implying mere co-ordination without subordination. It must be judged by its object and by its internal structure.

Its object is no doubt the individual good of each state adhering to it, but it is also the good of that state not in so far as it is opposed to that of others, but in so far as it conforms to the latter in the pool of a common good, in which all have a share. The Covenant aims at a higher interest in which each of the parties sees its own special interest—as well as that of its partners. It is even a common good which goes beyond them, since the League of Nations itself claims a universal mandate and considers itself the legal equivalent of the whole international community.

By its internal structure it is a graded and organized society divided into ranks, with founder members and invited members who are admitted as of right, and finally all the other Powers who may be admitted if they give adequate guarantees. Similarly the Council has its permanent and semi-permanent seats and its seats occupied in rotation. The Covenant of the League is a charter. It inaugurates a new order.

2. *The Briand-Kellogg Pact*.—At first sight this seems the type of a purely contractual and inorganic international act, but, considered in its relations with the Covenant of the League and that of the Pan-American Union, it reveals, in this connection, a legal and political force which, in itself, it lacks. As the states which have signed it are mostly members of the League of Nations, they have already bound themselves to submit their differences to legal process, arbitration and mediation. Moreover, the Conference of Havana imposed similar obligations on the states of the New World in 1928.

Even if it is not the charter of an organization like that of Geneva, does it not resemble a declaration of rights rather than a contract? To outlaw war is to declare that there is a law above states to which they owe allegiance; that above their will there is something besides the bond of treaties; that international law contains something more than rules made and accepted by diplomatic conferences, and that there are other

rules imposed from above to which states are not free to give or refuse their adhesion.

These rules arise from the fact that there is among nations a common good, just as health is the common good of all the members of the human body.

The organization of peace among the peoples united in a vast moral organism under the rule of justice which designs its rank to each of them—*suam cuique tribuens dignitatem*—in the common good of humanity, this is the new formula of international law, that of the Covenant of the League and the Paris Pact. Francis de Vittoria was already working it out from the beginning of the sixteenth century and it is, in fact, a Christian formula.

G. RENARD.

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## THE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE

THERE can be no one who remembers the past or whose imagination can picture the future who must not long for peace. We shrink from the horror of all the suffering that war, with the accompaniment of modern science, must involve—and from the tragedy of human lives broken and destroyed. We well know the probable consequences for civilized society of the unchaining in war of all the worst of man's disruptive passions. All these feelings are powerful, and in their place right, and we do well to give full weight to them. But for Christian people they cannot come foremost in the reckoning. For they are dictated by consideration of war from the side of man, whereas the principal endeavour of those of us who profess and call ourselves Christians must rather be to judge of peace and war in relation to what we believe is the ultimate purpose of man's existence according to the will of God.

What then ought we to think about the purpose of man's life? Man is endowed by his reason and his intellect with great power over the rest of the animal creation and over the forces of nature. Every day he is extending the boundaries of his knowledge, and of his mastery over the physical conditions of his own life and the physical world by which he is surrounded. Simultaneously he finds himself strangely involved in another and quite different world, which he terms spiritual and of which he knows much less. Of this spiritual world, an outstanding characteristic is that it is constantly confronting him with the necessity of choice between two courses of action, one of which he knows to be right and the other of which he knows to be wrong. It is this faculty of judgment between right and wrong that he calls conscience. However much he may stifle or disobey it, he is constrained to recognize its existence, and to conclude that it reflects a moral law deriving from some authority outside himself. And this authority the Christian calls God.

Moreover, in a way that we cannot exactly rationalize we become conscious of being so made that human nature at its best can never be satisfied except by something outside and greater than itself, leading to the conclusion that the purpose of man's life is to mould his nature more and more into the fashion of the Divine, in order that he may thus fulfil the end of his existence, and—whatever we exactly mean by it—make approach to union with God. This conviction comes to men in countless different ways—all mysterious: through personal experience, through the example of others, through pain, through joy, through sorrow, through art, and through appreciation of nature in all its manifold and wonderful beauty. And unless we are wholly deceiving ourselves about the existence and nature of God, we must believe that it is His purpose that all men everywhere should so come to approach and know and love Him.

If this is so, it is evident that this union with God, for which it is the duty of all human beings to strive, must, in so far as we are able to achieve it, have the effect of bringing us into the most intimate relationship with one another, and the "Body of Christ" must have a significance wider than that of our own religious society. Quite obviously this intimate union with others in the unity of all with the Divine is imperfectly realized, and frequently interrupted, by reason of the failure of individuals, and by the destructive effect of anti-social forces. In the ordinary intercourse of life, we see every day how sorely this harmony is impaired by selfishness, and everything that follows from it: and it is this interruption of God's purpose—the union of all men in Himself—that is the gravest consequence of war, and that constitutes war's real condemnation. For this reason we must, I think, feel that war (even when it is, as I believe it may be, entirely justifiable and in certain circumstances inevitable) is yet the ultimate outcome of forces opposed to the will of God, and that only through and in peace can the will of God for man be perfectly fulfilled.

Realizing this, many good people repudiate war altogether

as being, by its perversion of the powers of human nature and its degradation of human gifts, wholly and always opposed to the will of God, and would tell us that the only way to convert the world and to be faithful to God's purpose is by the refusal in all circumstances to have recourse to the instrument of war.

I respect, but I cannot take this view. There is no Christian who does not feel how great a thing it would be to abolish war and secure the world against its recurrence. But in trying to do this, we have to recognize that war is itself only a symptom of a disease deeply seated in human nature—namely, evil—and while we rightly do all in our power to treat the symptom, we must face the fact that there can be no real or permanent cure of the symptom except by eradication of the disease. We are also forced to admit that while war is the product and symptom of evil, it is plainly not the only manifestation of evil in the world, and it may well be that refusal to face war might have the consequence of encouraging in worse forms the evil of which war is the visible outcome. To Christian people, therefore, seeking to bring the world to loyalty to God, the problem must present itself in terms of a comparison of evils; of which war, however deplorable in itself, may legitimately, in my view, be felt in special circumstances not to be the greatest. It is no doubt this that has led Christian thought through the centuries to hold that in cases of resistance to the major evil it was justifiable for Christian men to take up arms.

It is also necessary to distinguish between what may be the duty of individuals and that of the organized society that we call the nation. For the latter stands in the place of trustee for all its citizens, present and future, and is responsible for their well-being. And it might well be that action justifiable in the case of an individual dealing with his own could not be justified in the case of a trustee acting on behalf of others. Thus, indeed, may we reconcile the seeming contradiction in the New Testament between the injunction to extreme self-surrender in the individual and the commendation of rulers as those entitled to use force for the restraint of evil

doers. A careful study of Our Lord's words in the New Testament suggests that he was for the most part concerned to assert principles rather than to formulate precise rules of conduct. If his followers could be faithful to the principles, they would naturally translate them into the action that they have to take upon the problems of everyday life as they arise. While warning His disciples that His Kingdom was no temporal kingdom, He expressly recognized the authority of temporal government—government indeed quite untouched by His teaching. "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." And if He thus recognized the authority of temporal government, it would seem to follow that He could scarcely have intended to condemn vindication of its authority, even in the last resort by force, for ends legitimate to the purpose for which such government exists.

In the sphere both of national as of individual action, it is always the spiritual motive on which judgment has to be passed. We are familiar with this upon the other side: "Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." It is the spirit behind the act that makes or mars its value.

So it is with the application of force. The state, for the assertion of the law and the protection of loyal citizens, enforces its will by the machinery of policemen, law courts, and, if need be, punishment. The policeman or private person who is obliged to fight a street bully who has knocked down a child, will use exactly the same method as the bully used a minute before—but, judged by their motive and spiritual value, the two actions are essentially distinct. I do not believe it possible to argue that force which is generally admitted to be legitimate in one form is always wrong in another. It is a question of degree and not of principle, and thus I do not think we can deny that cases may arise in which the use of force in the extreme form of war may be both unavoidable and right. Nor can a clear line be drawn, as some might wish



to do, between a defensive war waged for compelling reasons of national self-preservation, and war waged by international effort in pursuance of the ideals that we associate with the League of Nations. For in essence, the deciding factor—resistance to injustice—is the same in both, and what matters always is the motive on which resort to the use of force is had.

The physical consequences of resort to force, in the shape of war, are of course infinitely more serious and operate over a wider field than any other—and the motives compelling nations to take so grave a decision are certain to be confused, and therefore need more jealous scrutiny. Moreover, in every case of war there is the danger that the original motive gets overlaid by others less worthy, such as hatred and revenge, and I conceive, therefore, that, however just was the first cause, it would always be the duty of the Christian man to watch for and to check the confusion of the original issue by the emergence of evil passions—and constantly to be searching the possibilities of concluding a righteous peace.

I am therefore led to conclude that the pursuit of peace under all conceivable conditions might mean the acceptance of greater evils even than war, conducted with all the devilish resources of the twentieth century, and might therefore in itself be more reprehensible than war seriously and solemnly undertaken in defence of vital principles that would be denied and betrayed by a refusal to break the peace.

When we think and speak of peace what do we really mean? We naturally tend to think of it as something negative—not war—and for that reason to be something worthy of all we can do for its preservation. But just as I can imagine individuals confronted by a situation which Christian men and women would feel was worse than death, so I can imagine circumstances for a nation or for human civilization in which immunity from war could be too dearly purchased. The peace, therefore, for which we must work and pray is something greater and deeper than the outward avoidance of physical conflict between nations, greatly as we must long to be spared

the horrors that such clash must mean. And what I suggest we ought to mean by international peace is the establishment between nations of that relationship which ought to obtain between Christian individuals as members of Christ's body. We know on what foundations alone that kind of relationship can be established: mutual respect and mutual trust, unselfishness, the service of others which will come only as we truly love our neighbours as ourselves, and finally the subjection of every part of our being in thought and word and deed to the service of God's will, as we may be guided to apprehend it in our daily life. That, and not less, is what we must mean when we think and speak of peace.

The contrast between such an ideal and the present state of the world is the measure of man's failure to do God's will—and to fulfil His eternal purpose. And the fact that 1900 years after God's revelation of Himself in the world, war is still possible between men is the symptom of grave spiritual disease, and of disharmony between God's will and the wills of men. Man has failed to achieve that unity between God and himself which would order his life according to God's way and make war unthinkable. So great a failure constitutes for us all a constant challenge to repentance and to prayer: to repentance for our share in the responsibility for human blindness in not seeing and following God's guiding and to prayer that all men everywhere may come to make His will the touchstone of all their conduct.

We cannot all be experts in the detailed management of international affairs, and it would probably be unfortunate if we acted as if we were—for more confusion than advantage generally follows from the attempt to do other people's business. Nor is it God's way to show us easy short cuts through difficulties. But there is a great thing that the humblest of us can do, and that may achieve more than the greatest efforts of those we rank as statesmen. We all can and we all should pray for those whose business it is to take decisions, that they may seek to form their judgments in accordance with God's will, and in so doing receive the guidance of His over-ruling

wisdom. "God, who didst teach the hearts of Thy faithful people by the sending to them the light of Thy Holy Spirit grant to us and to all men to have a right judgment in all things." In particular, we may pray that they may be moved to examine in the spirit of Christian charity all questions that may from time to time appear likely to cause discord between nations, and, so far as we may, in a world not yet made perfect, deal with them in accordance with Christian principles. If all nations could be brought so to act, we should indeed have been successful in the establishment of a new and better international order. For how much of the world's disappointment and anxiety is not each one of us directly responsible by the half-heartedness and dullness of our prayer? And how different would be the prospect if all men would realize the full power and privilege of prayer, flowing from hearts filled with the faith that removes mountains, and inspired by a love strong enough to break every barrier that the forces of evil may erect.

Let us indeed resolve so to pray; for ourselves, for those in all countries who have it in their power to mould opinion, by speech or writing, that the temporal kingdoms of this world may come to be the true image of that Kingdom which is eternal and whose foundations are set in charity and peace.

LORD HALIFAX.

*Address at St. Martin-in-the-Fields (1937)*





