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METHUEN'S
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL AND MODERN EUROPE

IN EIGHT VOLUMES

VOLUME V

A HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM 1494 TO 1610

METHUEN'S
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL AND MODERN EUROPE

In Eight Volumes. Demy 8vo. With Maps

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A HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM 1494 TO 1610

BY

A. J. GRANT

FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

WITH TWELVE MAPS

SECOND EDITION REVISED



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PREFACE

I HAVE tried in this volume to extend my survey over the whole of Europe instead of confining it to the great powers of the west. This course seemed to me to be recommended, not only by the fact that excellent books are already in existence which concentrate their attention on the affairs of France, Spain, and Germany; but also because the wider survey seems to me to bring out more clearly the common features and tendencies of the age. I have looked, too, beyond Europe, and have tried to bring the history of Islam and the conquests and discoveries of the European powers in the New World into relation with European affairs.

The division of the book into three parts perhaps needs a word of justification. I found when I began to write it, that while the year 1558 and the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis are a clear dividing line in the history of many European nations, there are some for whose development the treaty and date were of little importance. While, therefore, it seems well to break the story of France, Spain, and the Netherlands at that year, and 1555 is a clearly marked epoch for the history of Germany, there are lands and topics which resist this grouping, and these I have put together in Part II. Consistency, however, is difficult to maintain, and the last chapter, which is a survey of the whole century, had necessarily to come at the end of Part III.

A difficult question of nomenclature faces any one who tries to write the history of the sixteenth century. What are the religious parties and organizations to be called? It is urged by some that the

words "Catholic" and "Protestant" should be wholly omitted; because nearly all religious bodies claimed the title of Catholic and some revolvers from Rome repudiated the name of Protestant. The various religious bodies should therefore, it is urged, be called Roman, Lutheran, Anglican, Calvinist, etc. There seems to me much reason in this contention; but in practice it is very difficult to follow. When we are thinking of the two camps into which Europe was divided, it seems impossible not to employ the terms Protestant and Catholic; and the title "Roman Catholic" is so generally used that it is difficult to forgo it. It is not technically accurate, but it is descriptive and inoffensive. It is not possible always to call either churches or political parties by their own official titles. It is enough if the phrase adopted is unmistakable and not intentionally partisan.

I am aware that there is repetition in some chapters. I have tried to make each chapter intelligible in itself, and I know that I cannot assume that all readers will have gone through the earlier chapters.

I am much obliged to my old pupil and friend, Dr. Norman Sykes, Professor of History in University College, Exeter, for suggestions and for help in the examination of proof sheets.

A new edition has allowed me to correct certain mistakes, but the character of the book has been in no way altered.

December, 1937

LONDON

A. J. G.

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From drawings by W. F. Higginbottom

A HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM 1494 TO 1610

PART I (1494–1558)

CHAPTER I

EUROPE AT THE END OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

THE sixteenth century has one well-marked characteristic. At the beginning secular interests entirely dominated its politics. The ambitions of princes and the rivalries of states at first claim all our attention. The Papacy was important, but chiefly because it was itself an independent and secular power, with special skill in diplomatic finesse. International politics were governed by the motives—they cannot be called principles—which were later to be known as the Balance of Power. The princes fought for power and territory; the armies fought for pay. It seemed in the highest degree unlikely that before the century had run half its course men would begin to fight for creeds, moral codes, and systems of church government; and that the armies would contain elements in which could be discerned something of the crusading spirit. It would be untrue to say that religion at any time controlled the politics of the century; there were to the end strong secular motives in the policies of Austria, Spain, and even of the Papacy, as there were in the action of the Huguenots of France, the Dutch insurgents against Philip of Spain, and in the risings of the Anabaptists of Germany. But the emergence of religious and ecclesiastical motives along with, or to the exclusion of, political and dynastic motives is the most striking change

The great
change in
the sixteenth
century

that came over Europe during the century. We will begin by examining the condition of Europe before the Protestant revolt had broken out.

THE EMPIRE AND GERMANY

The Empire

No one questioned that the Holy Roman Empire stood at the head of the European state system. It was an institution at once pathetic and ridiculous; pathetic for the high and noble aims which it represented; ridiculous for its complete failure to realize them or even to approximate to them. It bore testimony to the unity of the human family and the need of some organization for the maintenance of peace; it was Holy by its co-operation with the Church and the coronation of the Emperor by the Pope; Roman because, though it did not include Rome within its dominions, it carried on the tradition of the Cæsars; it was an Empire because it was lifted up above the other states of the world, and because it was the successor—or believed itself to be so—of Julius and Trajan and Constantine and Theodosius and Justinian. But these majestic theories were not supported by even the shadow of reality. More than half of western Europe was not within the limits of the Empire; for the British Isles, France, Spain, and southern Italy were outside of its authority. Nor was its power much greater in the lands which were admittedly within its frontiers. These included all German lands as well as Bohemia and northern Italy. There had been a time when it seemed that the Emperors might come to rule within these territories as really as the Kings of France or England or Spain within their respective countries. But various forces had given a different turn to the destinies of Germany. The Emperors had succumbed in their contest with the Popes; the Imperial Crown had been made definitely elective and suffered from the weakness which, until modern times, has usually attached itself to elective authority. The subordinate princes and rulers of Germany, always dangerously strong, made themselves practically independent and gave neither money nor troops to the Emperor, except of their free will. The map of sixteenth-century Germany shows an amazing tangle of ecclesiastical states, free cities, and small

and large secular states culminating in the great Electorates. A century later the political units of Germany which were independent, except in the nominal recognition of the Empire, were said to exceed three hundred and fifty.

Nearly a sixth of the surface of Germany was occupied by ecclesiastical states. They were the most remarkable feature of medieval Germany, and all reflected to a greater or less degree the characteristics of the states of the Church under the Pope himself. In all the head of the state—Archbishop, Bishop, or Abbot—was not only expected to direct the affairs of the Church and perform the duties of his sacred office, but he was also a secular ruler, gathering taxes, raising troops, and conducting the ordinary secular work of a state. These ecclesiastical states owed allegiance to the Emperor; their relation to the Pope was somewhat closer; but they pursued egoistic and personal aims in a way which raised them in no way above the ordinary secular states of Germany. Three of them, Mainz (Mayence), Trier (Trèves), and Köln (Cologne), were of especial importance. Their rulers were three of the seven Electors to the Empire, and the position of their territories on the frontier between Germany and France brought them into all the contests between those two Powers.

The decisive fact in the public life of Germany in the sixteenth century was the growth in the power of the larger secular princes. The cities of Germany were prosperous and active in commerce and art; but the time of their political importance, whether as individuals or in leagues, was passing away. They were unable to resist the encroachments of the neighbouring princes. The territories of these men showed the same main features that may be observed in nearly all the great states of Europe; the central authority advanced at the expense of towns, of the nobles and of the churchmen. In all of them there was a historic constitution with its assemblies of estates, its traditional privileges, and its courts of law. But everywhere the central power of the ruler increased; the state advanced towards unity; the administrative agents of the Government took the place of the traditional feudal authorities. The need for the maintenance of order within a restricted area, since the Empire was not capable of maintaining it over the whole of Germany, accounts

for the development of the power of the princes. The increased attention given to Roman law too, is here, as in France and Spain, an important factor. The princes employed in their service trained lawyers, whose ideas of government and social order were derived from the Codes of Justinian, who cared little for the complex structure and traditions of medieval society, and who regarded the will of the prince as the sufficient basis of all law. The princes were in effect independent sovereigns; the future of Germany lay with them not with the Empire, and it is important to get some clear idea of the most important among them.

Brandenburg The Electorate of Brandenburg lay on and between the Elbe and the Oder. The great family of the Hohenzollerns—until 1918 one of the two or three greatest ruling families in the history of Europe—had been established in Brandenburg since 1417, and by a compact of 1473, known as the *dispositio Achillea*, it had been agreed that the lands of this Electorate should not be divided, according to the German custom, among all the sons, but should remain united in a single state. It was a decision which laid the foundations of the greatness of Brandenburg and of the kingdom of Prussia which grew out of it. It should be noted also that a member of the same House of Hohenzollern was head of the Teutonic Order which ruled over the Prussians to the east of the Vistula. This Order was a creation of the Crusades. It had conquered with much cruelty, and almost against its will had christianized, the heathen Slavonic Prussians. But then its power had been challenged and defeated by the neighbouring Kingdom of Poland, and its head tended in consequence to rely on the support of the neighbouring and related power of Brandenburg. We shall see how, during the convulsions which accompanied the Reformation in Germany, the lands of the Order were merged in the Electorate. Nearly two centuries later the state took from these lands its famous title of Prussia. John Cicero was Elector from 1486 to 1499, when he was succeeded by the more able Joachim I. But though the possessions and influence of the House of Hohenzollern were very great in Germany, the time was not yet come when they could take without question the second place in Germany and challenge the first.

The
Teutonic
Order

Bavaria was not yet an Electorate, but with its excellent Bavaria situation on the upper Danube was at the beginning of the century the great power in southern Germany. It had been for long in the hands of the Wittelsbach family. Albert IV was Duke from 1460 to 1508. Closely related to the Bavarian House was the Elector Palatine, the strongest of all the secular Palatinate princes of Germany, and by reason of his position on the French frontier of the utmost international importance. Philip was Elector there from 1476 to 1508.

Saxony was one of the oldest of the electorates and is Saxony particularly important for the history of the Reformation. In 1486 the lands—which no agreed constitution forbade to be divided—had been partitioned between the two brothers, Ernest and Albert. The electoral title went with the Ernestine line; but the Albertine princes regarded their cousins with jealousy, and it was their ambitious hope to transfer the electoral title to their own branch of the family. The territories of the two branches were strangely intermixed. From 1486 to 1525 the Elector was Frederick III, surnamed the Wise, whose fortunes are closely intertwined with those of the Reformation.

The confusion of German politics, and the weakness of the Imperial power, had inevitably led to the formation of Leagues among many of the smaller Powers. The Hanscatic League among the trading cities of the north still subsisted, though its importance and greatness were passing. In the north-west the seventeen states of the Netherlands—most of them, though not quite all, within the bounds of the Empire—were ruled over by the Dukes of Burgundy and took little account of the Emperor or his wishes. In the south the Helvetic Confederation had established its independent power among the Swiss mountains; though its practical independence did not prevent it still yielding a nominal allegiance to the Empire. In addition to the Burgundian group and the Helvetic Confederation a third group should be carefully noted, for it played an important part in the affairs of Germany during the early stages of the Reformation movement. The Suabian League had been formed in 1488. The powers of Suabia—its counts, cities, and knights—felt themselves endangered by the greater powers in their neighbourhood. The Swiss Confederation

threatened from the south, the Burgundian from the north and west. A more immediate threat was the power of the Wittelsbachs in Bavaria; the independence of the Suabian lands seemed likely to be merged in the power of Bavaria. The Habsburgs had possessions in the same district, and it was not in their interest that Bavaria should be increased at the expense of Suabia. They encouraged the formation of the Suabian League. Count Eberhard of Würtemberg was its chief name, but it was joined also by twenty-two towns and by the knights of the district. Its constitution was very loose; but it controlled considerable military force. And for fifty years it was an important organization standing as a rule for the maintenance of the authority of the Empire in both politics and religion.

Germany thus appears to us a strange medley of ecclesiastical and secular powers; a loose confederation rather than such a state as the word "Empire" now seems to denote. And yet the half of the confusion has not been indicated. For Germany was dotted over with free cities, free towns, even free villages; communities, that is to say, which recognized no constitutional superior except the Emperor himself; and as the Emperor's authority was wholly unreal they were, according to the terms of the constitution, uncontrolled and independent. The fact was usually different. The smaller units had in self-defence and for the promotion of peaceful intercourse to join together in Leagues or to place themselves under the protection of some strong neighbour. Special mention should be made of the Imperial Knights, small landowners, who lived in a condition of chronic war and contributed more than any other class to the anarchy of Germany.¹

Germany was thus an amazing political confusion, and there existed no force adequate to bring to it peace and order.

The
Reichstag
or Diet

There existed, indeed, one institution which was supposed to concern itself with the affairs of the whole Empire—the

¹ The states of Germany were called either *mediate* or *immediate*. The immediate powers held directly of the Empire. They recognized, that is, no authority between the Emperor and themselves: and, as his authority was merely nominal, they were in effect independent. The mediate powers were those which, in addition to their citizenship of the Empire, were also subordinated to some other of the states of Germany. "To mediatize" is therefore, in German history, a synonym for "to annex."

Reichstag or Diet. But it was utterly unequal to its task. It was divided into three chambers; the first consisting of the seven Electors; the second of the Princes; the third, since 1489, of the Imperial Towns. But if we ask what was the constitution and what the rights of this assembly, it is curiously difficult to be sure of the answer. All was doubtful and undetermined. One thing was plain; there was an absolute antithesis between the theory and the fact. In theory the Emperor was all powerful; the study of Roman law had contributed to the development of that view. But in fact the Emperor had very little power; if, says a contemporary, the Commonwealth falls into any danger of war the sovereign authority must come like a beggar before the Orders of the Diet and ask for horse and foot, for arms and money. The procedure of the Diet was traditional and unsettled. Did the decision of the majority bind the minority? Were absentees bound to accept the decision of those present? Was the Emperor bound to summon all who had the right of attendance, or could he summon whom he would? Could the Diet meet without an Imperial summons? All these questions were variously answered. The right of the majority voting to control by their decision the minority and the absentees was generally admitted, but even that was challenged during the century. The method of election to the Empire had been laid down in the Golden Bull of 1356, and the dress, the privileges, and the duties of the seven Electors were there regulated with the minutest care. But the procedure of the Diet itself was unsettled. The three chambers usually met separately, but sometimes the Electors and the Princes sat together. When the chambers had come to a decision, their wishes were communicated to the Emperor by the Archbishop of Mainz, who was the Chancellor of the Empire. There ensued then negotiations between Diet and Emperor, and the result reached was like a treaty between independent Powers. If the decisions of the Diet were accepted by the Emperor, they were known as a Recess.

Drastic changes would be necessary if such an institution were to become the representative of a united Germany or an instrument of efficient government. It was a powerful weapon for resisting the will of the Emperor and for

maintaining the divisions of the Empire, and those were the aims which appealed most strongly to the most powerful of the rulers of Germany.

Position of
the Emperor

The Empire then was a memory and a hope ; but the Emperor was a more real power. In the past the Empire had often drawn its real importance from the personal possessions—the *Hausmacht*—of the Emperor ; and it seemed not unlikely that it would do so again. The clue to much of the international history of the century is given by the Emperor Maximilian's position and aims, and even the fortunes of the Reformation were profoundly modified by them.

Maximilian
and the
House of
Habsburg

Maximilian was the son of the Emperor Frederick III and the head of the House of Habsburg. This famous House had first risen to the Imperial dignity and title in the thirteenth century, but it held up to the sixteenth century no pre-eminence in Europe. Certainly there seemed no likelihood that it would come to hold the Empire almost as a hereditary possession. It was the policy of Maximilian and the new situation created by the coming of the Reformation which brought about these unlooked-for results.

His
character
and aims

And yet Maximilian was not a great man nor was his career a success. He is a strange figure, out of harmony with the general trend of sixteenth-century policy. For the statesmen of the age were for the most part realists and little touched by imagination or Utopian dreams. But Maximilian, whose face is so well known to us from Albert Dürer's paintings and drawings, was an interesting, attractive man ; open to the appeals of the past and sensitive to the intellectual and artistic movements of his time. There was a nobility about his outlook on politics which his contemporaries usually lacked : but at the same time he was fantastic, visionary, and unstable, confusing the world as it was with the world of his desires, and in consequence grasping at shadows and the constant victim of disappointments and humiliations. Let us consider the chief problems of his reign and position.

He was chosen to be Emperor in 1493 ; but was technically only King until his assumption of the Imperial title in 1508. He never received Papal coronation. The tradition was that the King did not become Emperor until he was crowned by the Pope in Rome ; but from henceforward no Emperor was

crowned in Rome, and only Maximilian's successor and grand-son, Charles V, was crowned by the Pope at all. Let us put aside the Empire for the moment and consider the personal possessions of the new Emperor. They sufficed to make him one of the great powers of Europe. (1) First there were the original Habsburg lands near the upper Rhine, in dangerous proximity to the Swiss cantons, who had already inflicted on his House such important defeats. (2) Then came the group of states to the east of the Empire which had been acquired in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Tyrol. These were, in the main, German lands, with some admixture of Slavonic and Italian elements. Austria was originally a Mark or frontier station of the Empire, and the possessor of these lands had still to defend Germany against the enemy from the East, which was now no longer the Hun or the Avar; but was at times the Magyar or Hungarian; and was always the Turk. (3) Next Maximilian had acquired through his marriage with Mary of Burgundy (1477) the rich Burgundian inheritance. This is the most important and the most characteristic event of his life. He thus became under different titles the head of the seventeen provinces out of which Holland and Belgium have grown, with vast possibilities—though most difficult to realize—of wealth and power. The future destinies of the House of Habsburg largely depended on this marriage. Mary of Burgundy died in 1482, and Maximilian henceforth only controlled the Netherlands as Regent for his son Philip, and Philip as he grew up showed himself quite capable of a policy independent and even hostile to that of his father. But in 1496 Philip contracted a marriage almost as important as that of his father and mother, for he married Joanna, Princess of Spain. The marriage was even more important in the sequel than it seemed likely to be at first. For the male issue of the Spanish monarchs died, and the son of Philip came to succeed to the throne of Spain as Charles I, and later was elected to the Holy Roman Empire and reigned as Charles V. We shall be occupied with him for a large part of the volume. Let us note the immense change which these marriages and successions had made in the outlook of the House of Habsburg. Its interests belonged now as much to the west of Europe as

Maximilian's
Hausmacht

The
Burgundian
inheritance

Universal
claims of
the House of
Habsburg

to the East. From being merely one of the chief of German princes, the head of the House came to occupy a position which made it not absurd for him to aspire to universal sovereignty. The letters A E I O U were interpreted as an anagram in both German and Latin, declaring that it was the right of Austria to rule over the whole world.¹

The Burgundian inheritance opened up to the House of Habsburg dazzling prospects, and gave them vital interests in all that happened in Britain, Spain, France, and the west of Europe. It is quite possible that it was, however, a disadvantage to the Habsburgs themselves and to Germany and the Empire. For Austria was by origin the bulwark of central Europe against the East; it was the business of the rulers of Austria to watch with jealous care the great Danubian gate at Vienna, and to guard it against Magyars, Slavs, and Turks. This task could never be thrust aside; the danger was always there. Vienna was the real junction of east and west, and the fortunes of the Reformation are dependent, far more intimately than usually appears, on the action of the Turks and the relation of the Emperor to them.

In Maximilian's reign the Turkish danger was for a time quiescent. It was the nearer peoples which gave him most anxiety. These were Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland, with the countries or provinces which were annexed to them. To each of them we must devote a little attention. The Poles and the Czechs of Bohemia were of Slavonic stock and speech; the Hungarians or Magyars were of quite different racial origins and characteristics. But these three peoples have this in common; in all three the political development of the country was taking a turn different from that common in western Europe. In the west it was the hour of monarchical concentration; where representative or class institutions did not disappear they were swept temporarily or permanently into the background. Germany is in appearance, but only in appearance, an exception to this rule; for though the Empire was losing ground the power of the princes was generally growing. But in Hungary, Poland, and even to a large extent in Bohemia, when the monarchy weakened and assumed

Hungary,
Bohemia,
Poland

¹ Either *Austriae est imperare orbi universae* or *Alles Erdreich ist Oesterreich unterthan*.

an elective character, there was no compensating growth of strength anywhere. Power came into the hands of an aristocracy that was quarrelsome, weak and oppressive. The "decadence" of these states has been supposed to have something enigmatic about it; but all three exhibited that lack of political and social coherence which is the fundamental cause of a state's weakness. The position of the serf-peasants was such that they were not likely to make sacrifices to save their land from an invader.

The era of Hungary's greatness was only just over. Hungary Hunyadi and Corvinus had beaten the Turk in great battles, and made of Hungary the victorious champion of the Catholic faith. But the Crown was elective and in the hands of the nobles. They preferred a weak ruler to one who could make his will effective even against themselves. They chose in 1490 Ladislas, who was also made King of Bohemia; and in 1516 he was succeeded by his equally weak son, Louis II. It was he who was destined to perish on the tragic field of Mohacz in 1526, when the Hungarian monarchy perished with him. Doubtless the weakness of these rulers was a disaster to the realm which required above all things a strong ruler. But the root of the disease lay deeper. It is misleading to talk of the Parliamentary system of Hungary and to compare its institutions to those of England. The resemblance is superficial, the differences fundamental. The Diet consisted of a mass meeting of the nobles, brave but undisciplined, exempt from taxation and contemptuous of the peasants. In 1514 a crusade was preached and large forces were collected, but it turned into a horrible struggle of the peasants against the nobles, chiefly among the mountains of Transylvania. The story of massacre and terror has considerable analogy to the later Peasants' Rising in Germany, and the nobles emerged with complete victory. At a Diet held in the same year the peasants were thrust into deeper legal degradation. They were declared to be submitted to their lords "in fee simple and perpetual servitude." All land was declared to belong to the nobles, who could not be brought to justice by the peasants. We need not look farther to discover one great cause of the coming disasters of Hungary; the condition of the peasant in Hungary was worse than in western Europe.

Bohemia

Ladislav and Louis were Kings not only of Hungary but of Bohemia as well. Bohemia was within the boundaries of the Empire, and the King of Bohemia was, by the constitution, one of the seven Electors. German influence had penetrated the land deeply, and the German population was considerable. The dramatic story of the Hussite rebellion and its influence on the Empire has been told in a previous volume. The political and social condition of Bohemia had many points in common with Hungary; an elective monarchy; an exclusive and financially privileged nobility; a peasantry of serfs. There was, however, more trade and a more effective city life; German ideas and German organization had had considerable influence; and Bohemia showed much greater tenacity in defending its national existence than Hungary.

Both Bohemia and Hungary had often been uneasy neighbours of the House of Habsburg. Vienna itself had been in the possession of King Matthew Corvinus of Hungary up to his death in 1490, and the sentiment of hostility to Austria was intense and hereditary among the Hungarian nobles. In the reign of the Emperor Maximilian the hope dawned that the relation of hostility and fear might be turned into one of alliance and even of possession. The method employed was the characteristic Habsburg policy of dynastic marriage. "Let others wage war," said the old Latin verse, "but do you, more lucky Austria, marry." Marriage carried the House of Habsburg to Brussels, and to Madrid, and to Naples. A marriage was arranged which, with the assistance of military disaster and good luck, would carry the same House to Buda-Pesth and Belgrade and Prague. Ferdinand, the second grandson of Maximilian, and brother of the future Emperor Charles, was married to Anne, the daughter of Ladislav, King of Bohemia and Hungary. And Louis, the future successor of Ladislav, was married to Mary of Austria, the grand-daughter of Maximilian. No one could foresee the immense consequences of these marriages, for without the tragedy of the battle of Mohacz they would have borne little fruit, but it was the habit of the House of Habsburg to fish with the wedding ring in various waters; and within a quarter of a century Ferdinand was King at least in name of both Bohemia and Hungary.

Beyond Bohemia and Hungary lay the vast territories of Poland, which was the largest of European states, if Russia be excluded from the category. And Poland as yet hardly belonged to the European system, though a French prince mounted its throne in 1572. In social and political character, the country bore a strong resemblance to both Hungary and Bohemia. There were the same serf-peasants, the same splendid, brave, and uncontrolled nobility, the same weak and elective monarchy; and, lowering on the distant horizon, much the same threat of national extinction. The Royal House of Jagellon still held the sceptre, John Albert from 1492 to 1501, and his brother Alexander from 1501 to 1506. The monarchy had little authority. Real power lay with the Senate of administrative magnates and the Diet, where all the nobles had a right to be present. It was formally laid down that, if the King did not follow the advice of his councillors, his nobles were not bound to obey him; that the great nobles could be judged only by their own order; that no constitutional change could be made without the consent of the noble Senate. The Diet possessed great nominal power; but it consisted of the nobles only, and there was sharp division between the greater and the lesser nobility. The serf-peasants had, of course, no share in the government, and the inhabitants of the towns, often of German origin, were heavily burdened. Again it is a misnomer to call this Parliamentary government. It is not government at all, but a method whereby the establishment of government was prevented.¹

Beyond Poland lay the still huger state of Muscovy or Russia. Great things were happening there, and Ivan the Terrible would in another half-century hammer the state into some sort of unity by cruel blows. All the later history of the land down to the present time bears the traces of his work. But Russian history is reserved for continuous treatment in a subsequent chapter.

¹ A fuller sketch of Polish history will be found in chapter xvii. "It is very incorrect to call them an aristocracy. Their ideal was that of a Greek city state; a body of citizens, a small trading class, and a mass of labourers" (A. Bruce Boswell, *Poland*, p. 66).

ATTEMPTED REFORM OF THE EMPIRE

Maximilian held thus a position of immense importance in the European world. In east and west nothing could happen which might not concern him. But his position was strange and tantalizing. Everywhere there were possibilities; nowhere certain realities. A great power might perhaps be built up out of these various possessions; but the task would require an architect of the greatest skill and caution; and Maximilian brought only rash courage and an uncontrolled imagination. And, if we turn from his personal possessions to the Empire over which he nominally ruled, there was the same sense of unreality; a claim to the leadership of the civilized and Christian world, but with no foundation; great phrases and no force. Yet there had been a time when the Empire had been the greatest force in European politics. Could the days of Frederick Barbarossa, of Otto the Great, and of Charlemagne return? Could some organic life be given to the scattered members of the Holy Roman Empire? If these questions could be answered in the affirmative, Maximilian would have a position without equal in Europe. Germany would again count as a decisive influence in the affairs of Europe; and the Reformation, if it came, would run an entirely different course.

Berthold
of Mainz
and his
schemes of
reform

These questions had often been asked in the past; but they were now pressed with a new insistence, and it seemed at one time as if they could be successfully answered. The moving spirit in the reform movement was the Archbishop Elector, Berthold of Mainz. If it were possible to regard the Imperial Diet as equivalent to a Parliament, we might say that Berthold aimed at the establishment of a system of Parliamentary government for Germany. His scheme, which was begun before the accession of Maximilian, aimed at such momentous changes as the following. For the system of private war a public peace was to be established (the *Landfriede*), and this was to be enforced by an Imperial Court of Justice (the *Reichskammergericht*). This in turn was to be supported by a general Imperial tax, the so-called Common Penny, which would be in effect a rough property and income tax. Out of this tax a permanent army was to be maintained.

All was to rest on the Diet which was to meet every year, and the control and working of this strangely new system of government was to be placed in the hands of a Council of Government (*Reichsregiment*) which, if it would not be exactly dependent on the Diet, was certainly exempt from the possibility of control by the Emperor. For it was to consist of some twenty members, and of these only three were to be nominated by the Emperor. The rest were the Electors themselves, and the nominees of the princes, the ecclesiastics, the towns, and the circles into which Germany was to be divided. It was an amazing scheme going far beyond anything that England had in the sixteenth century.

Such projects were, of course, contrary to the desires of Maximilian the Emperor Maximilian. He was well aware of the need of fresh institutions to give unity and efficiency to the Empire. With the Hungarians for many years in possession of Vienna, the Turks constantly threatening to invade central Europe, and the French King challenging the possessions and prestige of the Empire in Italy, it took no deep penetration to see that "the Empire would certainly perish if a cure were not immediately found." But Maximilian, like every other crowned head in Europe, would have looked for the remedy in the strengthening of such agencies as the Imperial Government already possessed, or the creation of others which should be under Imperial control. Berthold's plan was certain to be a rival to the Imperial authority, not a support. The Empire was, however, so weak that it seemed necessary to yield.

The federal plan—for so we may call the proposals of Berthold and his associates—came nearest to being realized at the Diet of Worms, which Maximilian convoked in 1495 to meet the danger to Italy caused by the French invasion of Charles VIII. He needed money for an army, and it was necessary to grant the demands of the Diet in order to gain the necessary supplies. So a "Permanent Peace" was voted; private war was forbidden; existing confederations were to be dissolved, as the Empire itself would now undertake the task of maintaining peace. Then the tax of the Common Penny was granted and was to be universally applicable; a strange feature (explained by the almost entire absence of an Imperial Civil Service) was that the clergy were to collect

the tax and hand it over to the Emperor's agents. The chief object of the tax was to maintain a standing army. An Imperial Court was to be appointed to enforce the new regime. It was to sit permanently at Frankfort, to consist of sixteen judges, and to pronounce final decisions. Maximilian would not, however, consent to the adoption of the scheme of an Imperial Council which would have removed the policy of the Empire out of his own control.

Diet of
Augsburg,
1500

Five years later, in a Diet at Augsburg, Maximilian surrendered still more of the Imperial authority. Things had gone badly with him since the Diet of Worms. His Italian plans had failed; he could not appeal to Germany with the prestige of victory. The reforms voted at Worms had not worked well; had, indeed, hardly worked at all. The Imperial Court was unpaid, and had therefore been unable to transact any business; the Common Penny had yielded very little. No principle of united action had been found in Germany. But the Diet was as determined as ever to assert the federal as against the Imperial power. An Imperial Council (*Reichsregiment*) was demanded, and Maximilian granted it. It consisted of twenty members, all in the interest of the princes; even its president was to be independent of Imperial authority. It was to be the supreme authority for domestic and foreign affairs. The Emperor became the figure-head of an oligarchy. He could do nothing without the permission of the Council, while its decisions were valid without his approval.

Failure of
the federal
plan

And yet of all this ambitious building hardly anything was left at the death of Maximilian. Is the cause of the failure to be found in the character of Maximilian? "Such is the nature of human affairs," wrote the greatest of German historians, "that little is to be accomplished by deliberation and a nice balance of things; solid and durable foundations can only be laid by superior power and a firm will." It seems rather that even if Maximilian had been a Charlemagne, and Berthold a Simon de Montfort, the conditions of Germany made any approximation to unity and national efficiency almost impossible. The princes were strong and determined to maintain their independence. Maximilian was as little willing as Brandenburg or the Palatinate to submit the destinies of his personal possessions to any central control.

The history and constitution of the Diet were very different from those of the English Parliament; its roots were not struck deep into the life and administration of the nation. The scheme quite failed to win the loyal support of the people of Germany. Two important sections of the population were wholly hostile to the new proposals. The cities had only recently won the right of representation in the Diet. They now found that in the new organization and in the imposition of the proposed taxes, they were not considered and were unjustly burdened. The knights—a dangerous and perhaps useless, but a very powerful element—were not represented at all in the Diet and were frankly hostile. The exaction of the Common Penny was likely to lead to outbreaks among the discontented peasantry. In brief, there was no force of any real importance in favour of the new constitution when its character came to be understood. There was no German public opinion in its favour; and the Emperor regarded it as a dangerous enemy. He might yield to some parts of the proposals in his hour of weakness; but with the recovery of strength he would reject it.

In 1505 important proposals were made in a Diet held at Cologne. Maximilian found himself more successful than he had been for long. In Germany he had succeeded in settling certain cases of disputed inheritance; abroad the prospect that the whole Spanish dominions would fall to the House of Habsburg was becoming stronger. Berthold of Mainz had died in 1504, and his institutions seemed hardly likely to survive him. The time was therefore favourable for counter-proposals. Maximilian brought forward a scheme for a new Imperial Council of State (*Reichsregiment*) which should not be an anti-Imperial instrument, but should allow co-operation between the Emperor and the princes. A revised "Common Penny" tax was proposed at the same time. But the Diet would have none of the proposal. The princes valued the independent strength of their own position and cared nothing at all for Imperial unity, though they paid it at times lip-service. Germany returned to the old constitution, which meant the old anarchy. Two years later (1507) Germany was divided into ten Circles for administrative purposes, and this ultimately bore some fruit. But nothing could check the tendency of

German
individual-
ism

Germany to "individualism"; the cities, the knights, even the Leagues grew weaker. The princes were the one real factor in German political life. Germany was not a unity; the Empire was not a Government. When the Reformation began, there was no power which could enforce a common policy in religion. The princes from the first went each his own way. Their jealousy of the authority of the Emperor made them glad to adopt a line in religion different from his.

THE STATES OF ITALY

Europe was organized at the end of the fifteenth century (as it was for centuries to come) on the supposition that international war was inevitable and recurrent at short intervals. The Great Powers were all eager for fresh territories and availed themselves of trivial excuses to acquire them. The weakness of a state was a real danger to it. The small states were in process of absorption by the larger ones. Switzerland, almost alone in Europe, was able to maintain her independence against the greed of powerful neighbours; and she owed her success to her mountain fortresses and to the valour of her soldiers. Italy was rich, splendid, divided, and weak; and thus she became the prey of the most strongly organized states of the time—France and Spain—and the theatre of European wars for half a century.

Condition
of Italy

Italy was approaching the zenith of the intellectual and artistic movement which is called the Renaissance. The revival of classical knowledge was only one among the forces which were at work in that great flowering of the human mind. The greatest work in literature had been done in Italy before the revival of Greek learning; for Dante had died in 1321 and Petrarch in 1374. But the art of painting flourished as never before, and the clear and subtle Italian intellect was beginning to speculate on political and international questions, and to take up again the thread of political thought where it had been dropped by the great Greeks. Italian ideas on politics never rose beyond the problems offered by the individual state; the medieval conceptions of a universal state and church had no longer any meaning for them; they never thought in terms of humanity.

The Balance of Power, as an idea and as a phrase, belongs to the Italy of this period. There was no principle of stability or unity. The dream of a united Italy visited the minds of a few, but had no influence on the relations of states. The Papacy was merely like any other Italian state in its foreign policy. There were many sovereign states in Italy, but five stand out among them : Venice, Milan, Florence, the Papal States, Naples.

The Papal States stretched from fifty miles south of the mouth of the Tiber to the north-east across Italy as far as the mouth of the Po. Many important towns and strong fortresses were included within its dominions : Bologna, Ravenna, Urbino, Orvieto, Spoleto. But no Italian state at the end of the fifteenth century was so weakly organized. Hereditary rule had proved itself a necessary condition of efficient state organization everywhere in Europe ; and heredity was of course impossible in the Papal state. When Alexander VI became Pope in 1492 the city of Rome was kept in constant disturbance by the rivalries of its families, and especially of the Orsini and the Colonnas, while dreams of republican self-government still stirred among the people. Many towns and districts were in the hands of rulers whose subordination to the Papacy was very superficial ; it was even doubtful whether some districts really belonged to the Papal state or not. The Popes of the early sixteenth century strove to bring the whole of their territories into real subordination and were largely successful. Their work was in this point in harmony with the general tendency of the age in western Europe. In their relations with the other European Powers they pursued a policy of caution and aggrandisement. During the next century some of them—as for instance Julius II and Paul IV—use the language of Italian patriotism, but political writers of the time ascribed the divisions of Italy and the impossibility of healing them largely to the influence of Papal policy.

Venice was at the height of her wealth and power and was as yet unaware that the time of decline was near. Yet her power and commercial predominance were threatened by the Turks in the Mediterranean, who challenged her naval supremacy and barred the land routes to the East ; and still

more fatally by the explorers, who had opened up new paths to India and discovered a new world beyond the Atlantic, and thus transferred the great centres of European commerce from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic seaboard. She had owed much in earlier times to her almost unassailable position within the lagoons; but in the fifteenth century she had acquired large territories on the mainland. Her possessions now embraced Padua, Verona, and Bergamo; they gave her control over some of the passes leading through the Alps to the Habsburg territories, and brought her into touch with the Duchy of Milan. She could therefore no longer stand outside of the politics of central Europe, and in all the constantly shifting combinations of the European Powers the help of her money, of her soldiers, and of her diplomacy was eagerly sought. There was no constitution in Europe more interesting or more efficient than that of Venice. It was the most perfect specimen of an oligarchy known to history. Power was in the hands of the great commercial families, who alone could claim admission to the Great Council in whose hands lay the appointment of officials and the control of the policy of the state. The Doge was the nominal head of this commercial oligarchy; but his power was small; the real authority lay with the Senate and the Council of Ten and other officials. No European state suffered so little from party strife; and the use of the lot, which played a large part in Venetian political appointments, was partly accountable for this immunity. The Venetians were the first of European states to develop a system of diplomatic agents and reports, and the skill of their servants in foreign courts allowed them to survive many dangers.

Milan

To the west in the middle of the Lombard plain lay the great city and Duchy of Milan. Here there had at one time been a vigorous and turbulent popular Government and some traces of it still remained in political names and forms. But it had been long superseded by a personal dictatorship, which had become hereditary in the related families of the Visconti and the Sforzas. The Government was a military tyranny. It was supported by certain elements in the population, but it rested on military force. The Sforzas, who ruled in Milan, traced their origin to one of the military leaders, called con-

dottieri, and still showed traces of their origin. The present occupant of power was Lodovico, called on account of his swarthy complexion, the Moor; but he was not the titular head of the state. There was a boy, Gian Galeazo, who held the title, and Lodovico ruled in his name though contrary to his will. The boy had married Isabella, a princess of the Royal House of Naples, who desired to be not only the titular but the real duchess and resented the usurped power of Lodovico. She interested the King of Naples in her claims, and there was set up in consequence a lasting antagonism between Lodovico and the Neapolitan kingdom. The political combinations of Italy at this time are as shifting and vague as mountain mists; but this antagonism between Lodovico, the Moor, and Naples gives an element of something like permanence at the beginning of our period. It should be noted lastly that Milan, though in possession of complete independence, was in theory a fief of the Empire. The Empire was thus interested in the fate of the city. The Royal House of France—or at least the Orleans branch of it—was related to the Sforzas, and this relationship was soon to provide them with a convenient excuse for interference and annexation.

There are other powers in the north of Italy which must **Savoy** have here a passing notice. The Duchy of Savoy sat astride of the western Alps and was, by reason of its position and its hardy soldiers, an important member of any political combination. We shall return to it later. Few things would have appeared more unlikely to sixteenth-century Europe than that all the intrigues and wars of the time were preparing the way for the House of Savoy to reign over a united Italy. The Republic of Genoa had once been the rival of Venice. **Genoa** The time of her greatness was past, but she was still important; her sailors later gave the victory now to Spain and now to France in the bitter struggle between those two great Powers. She possessed, too, the island of Corsica, and found it very hard to govern. The possessions of the House of Este stretched **Este** from one sea to the other. Their lands intervened between Florence and Milan and between the Papacy and the territories of Venice. The House of Este and the city of Ferrara play a great part in the art, the religion, and the politics of the age. But the next great power of Italy was the

Republic of Florence which dominated the plains and hills of Tuscany.

Florence In Florence, as in Milan, there was a personal rule, called usually a tyranny; but the supremacy of the Medici was something very different from the brutal soldier-rule exercised by the Sforzas in Milan.

Lorenzo dei Medici, "the Magnificent," had died in 1492, and with him the great days of the Medici passed away. No political system in Europe is so hard to understand as that which prevailed in Florence. Names did not correspond to realities; lifeless and forceless institutions were in the foreground, in the background were real powers that had no recognized existence; Florence still had the name of a popular government and was contrasted with the close oligarchy of Venice, but in truth the popular element was not stronger than at Venice, and the real power lay in the hands of one man or at most of one family. The mass meeting of citizens still met, though rarely; the councils of the people and of the commune still existed; the greater and the lesser guilds were still a powerful factor in the commercial and political life of Florence, and the Executive Government nominally lay in the hands of the extremely aristocratic and exclusive "greater guilds." But all these were phantoms, or tended to become so. The real power lay with the house of Medici, who ruled Florence not by institutions but by influence; by the influence of money, of diplomacy, of the patronage of letters and of artists. Augustus in ancient Rome affords a certain parallel; a closer one might be found in the position of some modern multi-millionaire controlling the money market and the Press.


Naples The southern half of the peninsula was covered by the great Kingdom of Naples. This kingdom had at one time been joined with Sicily and, though the political union had long been broken, Naples and Sicily were ruled by branches of the same family, though each branch regarded the other as usurping a part of what should be a united kingdom. Ferdinand, King of Naples, belonged to the illegitimate branch of the House of Aragon, while Ferdinand of Aragon, the consort of Isabella of Castile and the ruler of Spain, reigned in Sicily and in Sardinia. There was a great contrast between

Naples and the rest of Italy ; so great a contrast in language, institutions, and culture that their union in one state seemed hardly possible or desirable. The great cities of the south of France—Arles and Avignon and Nîmes—seemed more akin to Florence and Milan than anything that was to be found in the Neapolitan kingdom. Nowhere else in Italy was monarchy to be found ; nowhere else was there so near an approximation to western feudalism. The great barons were unruly and recalcitrant to the Crown, which was itself nominally dependent on the Papacy ; while barons and king had between them nearly crushed out the municipal liberties of the communes, which had at one time seemed likely to follow the development of those of the north. Machiavelli, a shrewd observer, passed a very hostile verdict on the nobles of Naples. “The kingdom,” he said, “was full of them, and they contributed nothing to commerce or industry or even to the cultivation of the soil. With their castles and their retainers they were, he declared, “enemies of all culture,” so that there had never been in that part of Italy any Commonwealth or “political life.” The first condition of any progress was in his opinion to “wipe them out entirely.” With efficient organization Naples might certainly have been an important European Power, even in the changing conditions of the end of the fifteenth century. But efficiency was the last quality to be looked for in Naples ; and it was the first of the states of Italy to become the prize of the northern invaders. The throne of Naples had in the past been occupied both by French and Spanish princes, and when the opportunity came both Houses could produce specious claims to the succession.

SPAIN

The years covered by this volume are the period of Spain's greatest glory. What she was, or what she was believed to be during these years, has stamped itself on men's imaginations as the permanent characteristic of the government and people of Spain. We naturally think of Spain as the home of a strong centralized monarchy, ruling despotically and crushing all resistance whether political or religious ; as possessed of great wealth derived from the gold and silver mines of the

Spanish
character-
istics



SPAIN IN 1491 AND 1560

new world, and consequently as the scene of great luxury and display; as possessing the best army in Europe and making it the instrument of a foreign policy, that aimed at and nearly won the dominion of Europe. We think of cruel religious persecution, as well as of a glorious literature and art. Yet there is hardly one of these features which is not in conflict with much in the past or future of Spain.

The Pyrenees, the best mountain barrier to be found in Europe, had almost isolated Spain from the interests of the rest of Europe. Her people were, during the fifteenth century, possessed of liberties that were dangerously near to anarchy. The different parts of the peninsula—Castile, Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Navarre, Portugal—had so strong a sense of their separate existence that no form of government has ever been strong enough to efface it. The people were poor and practised a simplicity and almost puritanic severity of life, which contrasted with the luxury of Italy or France or the Netherlands. Even in religious matters there is no reason to think that there was any national bent in the Spanish character towards cruelty. The country was full of Jews and Moors, and they had been treated with fairness and had been allowed much liberty. Circumstances and the wills of a succession of powerful rulers were needed to give to the country the qualities which strike us in the sixteenth century; and even then some were apparent only and some transitory. Three events decisive for the future of Spain had happened just before the beginning of our period.

First, in October 1469, Isabella, the heiress of the great Kingdom of Castile, had married Ferdinand, the heir to the Crown of Aragon, which included not only Aragon itself, but Catalonia and Valencia and the Balearic Islands. It was the realization of a policy long pursued, though at one time it had seemed that the union of Castile with Portugal was more likely than with her Eastern neighbour. The greatness of Spain springs directly from the union of Aragon and Castile; but Aragon brought to Castile much of doubtful value. For Aragon was already a Mediterranean Power possessing Sicily and claiming Naples. It was the Aragonian inheritance which carried the kings of Spain into the politics of all Europe,

which gave them much glory, but contributed also to the exhaustion and decline of the country.

Columbus

Secondly, in 1492, Columbus landed in the West Indies, and Spain seemed to have in her hands the key to all the fabled wealth of Cathay. A sketch of Spain's relations with the New World will be given in a later chapter. Her position there gave her an entirely new position among the nations of Europe. The appeal to the ambition and imagination of her rulers was intoxicating; she entered at once the realm of romance and Utopia. Only later was it clear that her new possessions brought her difficulties and wars, as well as wealth and power.

Fall of
Granada

Thirdly, in the same year (1492) the armies of Isabella—for the exploit belonged almost wholly to Castile—mastered the fortress and kingdom of Granada. The end of a duel that had lasted seven centuries was reached. The quarrels among the Moors, as well as the better organization and greater numbers of the Christian kingdom, had given the final victory to the cross over the crescent. The struggle had been carried out by the Castilians with great military energy and passionate religious devotion. The result was to the devout Queen Isabella the crowning glory of her reign. The Popes recognized the immense services of the royal house of Spain to the Church by granting to it the distinctive title of "the Catholic." The whole country was naturally proud of the triumph of the century-long crusade against the infidel. But the event had its evil results. The Moors had been an industrious and useful population, and their expulsion, which followed their defeat, was a blow to Spanish agriculture and wealth. But worse still, it was now, and as a result of these events, that the regime of cruel religious coercion began; it was during the struggle that the new and Spanish form of Inquisition was introduced, an event full of significance for both the intellectual and political life of the peninsula.

The
Kingdoms
of Spain

The most essential feature in the political life of Spain was the strong local and separatist feeling of its component parts. The chief of these were Castile, the core and far the strongest of all; the Kingdom of Aragon, with which were combined the Kingdom of Valencia, the county of Catalonia, and the Kingdom of the Balearic Islands. All these were

subject to the Crown of Ferdinand and Isabella, though each maintained its own institutions. But independent of the Catholic kings were the Kingdom of Navarre, often eagerly angled for but as yet not caught, and on the west the great Kingdom of Portugal which, though nearly as close to Castile in language and in culture as the Kingdom of Aragon, was destined to remain independent except for a period of sixty years, which began in 1580.

We must confine ourselves to the lands directly subject to the rule of Ferdinand and Isabella. No single generalization about them can be satisfactory; for they differed widely. Castile was chiefly agricultural; in Catalonia there was a brisk commerce with the Mediterranean, and Barcelona had been, and still was, one of the greatest commercial cities of the Mediterranean. All the divisions had their own institutions to which they clung with affection. Everywhere, but especially in Castile, the nobles were strong, independent, and dangerous to any settled social order; the towns had their charters guaranteeing to them wide rights of self-government. Such order as there was was often maintained, especially in Castile, by spontaneous associations among the towns without the help of the monarchy. Each of the component states had its own representative assembly (*cortes*), possessed of varying powers but always capable of much resistance to the Crown. The new monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella struggled against all these independent liberties and reduced them into subordination to the monarchy, without effacing the separate institutions of the different states.¹

Let us look first at the ancient institutions of the country. The Cortes of Castile consisted of three Orders meeting in three separate chambers—the clergy, the nobility, and the commons. The commons were the representatives of the cities only; but, as the cities included in their citizenship much of the surrounding country, the peasantry were not

¹ Professor Merriman, to whose *Rise of the Spanish Empire* I am much indebted throughout, sums up the history of the reign in these words: "At the most critical stage of its existence the realm was transformed from a turbulent oligarchy, whose lawlessness was partially redeemed by a somewhat undisciplined passion for freedom, into a monarchy so omnipotent that nothing, save the national tendency towards separatism, could hold out against it" (vol. ii, p. 127).

The Cortes
of Castile
and Aragon

wholly unrepresented. The Cortes of Castile had large but rather indefinite powers in finance and legislation. Especially, no new tax could be imposed without their grant, and it is curious that this control of the purse did not bring with it a greater control of the policy of the realm. The institutions of the Kingdom of Aragon were even more independent than those of Castile. There the Cortes were divided into four chambers (the nobles being divided into the greater and the lesser). Their attitude to their kings may be judged of by the manner in which they swore allegiance: "We, who are as good as you, swear to you, who are no better than we, to accept you as our king and sovereign lord, provided you observe all our liberties and laws; but if not, not."¹

The nobles in Aragon had the admitted right of renouncing allegiance to the Sovereign. No legislation was possible without the Cortes (whereas in Castile legislation lay with the Crown). The most curious institution in Aragon was the officer called the "Justicia," whose special duty it was to guard the constitution and to prevent any infraction of it. Barcelona had the temper and the institutions of a republic.

Triumph
of the
monarchy

The monarchy triumphed over a situation which seemed at first sight so unfavourable to its claims; and it is important to see the means employed. The essential is that the monarchy represented, in Spain as elsewhere, the national self-consciousness and pride, intensified as it was by the possession of the new world and by the religious enthusiasm called forth by the defeat of the Moors, and later raised to a still greater fervency by connection with the Empire and the dream of universal sovereignty. The need for order also counted for much. The anarchy of Spain had been and still was, at the time of the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella, deplorable; in Spain, as in France and in Tudor England, the monarchy was the one hope for the common man, that he might go about his business without lawless interference.

The Council
of Castile

The chief agencies employed by the monarchs in the accomplishment of their plans for the building up of a strong monarchy are as follows: First and above all they found in the Royal Council of Castile the chief instrument of their

¹ Merriman, i, 458.

power. The sixteenth century was pre-eminently an age of "government by Councils" throughout western Europe. The Council already existed in Castile, but it had hitherto been feudal in character and largely dominated by the nobility. Now most of the nobles were eliminated; it became a manageable committee, and contained one prelate, three nobles, and eight trained lawyers. Its functions were wide and indefinite; it controlled administration, acted as a supreme court of justice and influenced legislation. Both contemporary France and England were largely governed by Councils; but neither country possessed any Council with quite the concentration of power which was vested in the Council of Castile. Its development and organization belong to a later period. It had no legal competence outside of the Kingdom of Castile, but it was the essential instrument of royal power throughout Spain.

The towns of Castile had already been brought under royal control, by the appointment of royal officials to reside in them and to supervise and control their finances and their general policy. The chief of these officials were the *corregidores* (the colleagues of the nominal rulers, the *regidores*). Their authority was accepted with amazing readiness by the cities; "the mass of the people," says a Spanish historian, "were carried away by the prestige of the royal authority and by the absolutist ideas of the epoch."¹

The *corregidores* became one of the most essential props of the Spanish monarchy. Not only did they control the towns: as the towns sent to the Cortes the representatives of the Commons, the *corregidores* controlled the most important branch of the Cortes. They were for Spain and its monarchy much what the intendants of France were at a later epoch for the Crown of that country.

The Cortes remained; and they remembered their old privileges and ambitions. But the rise of the monarchy cast a blight upon them. Legally the right of summons of all the members lay with the Crown. The spirit of the Cortes, too, was local rather than really national. They opposed little continuous resistance to the encroachments of the power of the monarchy, though they flared up in opposition to the policy of Charles I in the early years of his reign. The

¹ Altamira.

privileged Orders ceased to attend ; the numbers of the representatives of the towns were considerably reduced. There was no obligation to summon the Cortes regularly, and there were intervals of many years during which there was no assembly. The Cortes must not be regarded as either dead or dying, but their energy and importance were declining ; they were no efficient check on the royal power.

**The
Inquisition**

To the Council and the *corregidores*, as instruments of the royal power, must be added another—the Inquisition ; and the control, through it and by other means, of the Church in Spain. The essential novelty of the Spanish Inquisition was its close alliance with, if not subservience to, the monarchy ; “ its combination of the mysterious authority of the Church with the secular power of the Crown.” The appointment of all officials of the Inquisition was in the hands of the monarchs. The primary object of the Inquisition was of course the preservation of orthodoxy and the destruction of heresy, and the rulers of Spain were doubtless sincere in the pursuit of these ends ; they were Isabella’s chief passion. But orthodoxy and loyalty to the Crown, heresy and rebellion, had become so closely identified, that it was difficult to distinguish between them. The services of the Inquisition to the Crown are often clear and were always real. The Inquisition was the only institution common to all parts of Spain. But further, the Crown controlled the Church by the right of appointing the Bishops and the great ecclesiastics, which had been granted to it in 1482 and the following years. The great ecclesiastics thus became the nominees and often the agents of the Crown, and could be trusted to use their great powers in its service, or at least not to use them against it.

**Religious
Orders**

One other measure must also be mentioned as completing this close alliance of the Church and the Crown. Spain was full of monastic Orders, and no attack was made upon them. It was enough if the power of the Crown over them was maintained by means of the royal appointment of their heads. But there were certain religious Orders in Spain of an altogether peculiar kind. These were the military Orders ; the product of the crusades in the first place, but continued and expanded in Spain by the long struggle against the Moors. The Knights

Templars and the Knights of Saint John had important branches in Spain, and the Templars had not been attacked there as they had been in England and France. And Spain had certain military Orders peculiar to herself; the Orders of Calatrava, of Santiago, and of Alcantara.

There were no stranger experiments in the Middle Ages than these Orders of men half-monks and half-soldiers. The abuses that existed among them were notorious, and it was the military rather than the monastic type that dominated in them. They could form no permanent part of the life of any state; but they had served Spain well in the Moorish wars. They had provided sometimes the most numerous and valuable parts of her armies, and had obtained great wealth and wide prestige. With the ending of the Moorish struggle their usefulness was at an end, and they might easily become a dangerous force in rivalry with the Crown. That danger was avoided by a stroke of policy carried out by Isabella. She insisted that the Orders should elect her husband, King Ferdinand, to be their head, and the Pope's permission was procured for this revolutionary step.

The ecclesiastical policy of the rulers of Spain is one of the foundation-stones of royal power in the peninsula; and it had great influence on their action when the Reformation broke out in Europe. One of the great motives behind the Reformation, though not the only or the most important one, was the jealousy felt by the rulers of Europe against the Church, which seemed a rival to their authority within their own dominions. It was the aim of Protestant and Catholic kings alike to reduce the Church to subjection to the State. What was done by revolution in England and Germany, and was carried out in France by the Concordat of 1516, was accomplished in Spain by a series of measures which made the Kings of Spain almost as much masters of the Church within their dominions, as the Sovereigns of England were after the passing of Acts of Supremacy.

In spite, then, of many cross currents, in spite of independent nobles and defiant *cortes*, in spite of bitterly resentful Moors and Jews, the Crown in Spain was strong, and disposed of a population full of energy and enthusiasm and capable of military discipline.

PORTUGAL

Portugal

The great days of Spain were just beginning, but the glory of Portugal belonged chiefly to the fifteenth century and would not return. Under the leadership of Prince Henry the Navigator, her sailors had explored the coasts of Africa and laid the foundations of an Indian Empire, but of this we shall speak again in another chapter. A continuous crusade had been carried on against the Mohammedan power in Morocco with less success. The Crown of Portugal was powerful and immensely wealthy, for a great part of the profits of the Indian trade belonged to it. There had been a very powerful feudal nobility—though Portuguese feudalism was never exactly of the pattern found in France and England—but the nobles had been reduced to obedience. Portugal, too, had her Parliamentary institutions in the Cortes; formed after the Spanish pattern and containing representatives of the clergy, the nobility, and the towns. They had been constantly summoned during the fifteenth century; but were called much more rarely during the sixteenth. Despite the great possessions of Portugal and the inflow of wealth from the East, her economic situation was disquieting. The Jews had contributed much by their talents and industry, and had at one time been admitted in huge numbers into the country; 90,000 are said to have come in from the Kingdom of Castile. Then arose the friction, so constant between the Jewish and Christian peoples in Europe, and the Jews were expelled, to the great loss of Portugal.

Spanish marriages

Emmanuel I, called the Fortunate, was King of Portugal from 1495 to 1521. He received from Pope Alexander VI the title "Lord of the conquest, navigation, and commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia, and Persia," but contributed little to advance the power of Portugal. The master aim of his policy was to secure the succession to the Spanish Crown by marriage. He married three times, and all his marriages had the Spanish Crown as their object; his first wife was Isabella, the eldest daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain; his second her sister, Donna Maria; his third Eleanor, the sister of the Emperor Charles V. But these matrimonial schemes did not bring the desired gain. It was, as we have seen, the

Habsburg House that gained the dominions of Spain by their more fortunate matrimonial policy. Yet the Spanish marriages of Emmanuel were not without result, for they provided Philip II of Spain with an excuse for his annexation of Portugal in 1580. Emmanuel was succeeded by his son, John III, who reigned until 1557. He gained, after the fashion of the rulers of the sixteenth century, a great ascendancy over the Church.

FRANCE

Spain found in the monarchy of France its imitator in domestic and its rival and enemy in foreign policy, and it is to France that we must now turn. In 1492 the Hundred Years' War with England had been over for forty years, but its consequences were still visible. The constitution especially bore clear traces of that long and in the end victorious effort of the national spirit. The victory had been won not by representative institutions, local or central, but by the concentration of the whole force of the nation in the King's hands. The English victories, and especially the catastrophe of Poitiers, had for a time unloosed the tide of social revolt and given power into the hands of the representatives of the three Estates assembled in the States-General. But victory had not come through States-General or any other free agency. Charles VII was neither hero nor soldier, but the work of Joan of Arc had been performed for him; and after her death it was his agents who had triumphed. The country saw its saviour in the monarchy, and there was little inclination to limit its power or to erect a rival to it. The King had been given the right of raising the tax on the land and houses of the unprivileged classes called the *taille* and of using the proceeds of it to maintain a standing army. There was no thought at the time of making this arrangement permanent, but it became so; and the Kings of France in consequence had in their hands an all-important control of money and troops.

The King of France ruled through his Council which, though not yet so highly organized as it became later, was vigorous and efficient. It consisted of the great ministers of the State—the chancellor, the superintendent of the finances, the constable, the admiral and the four secretaries of State—along

The
Parlement

with such of the nobles as the King cared to appoint, and a large number of lawyers who were the great agents of the administration. It met frequently and was divided into (1) the secret or High Council for matters of general policy, (2) the *cour des comtes* or treasury, and (3) the Parlement of Paris. For the development of the political character of France the Parlement is of paramount importance. It had originally consisted of the princes of the blood and the great nobles of the realm, but professional lawyers had been introduced alongside of them and gradually ousted them from power in it. The institution had in its character a good deal of analogy with the Council of Castile. Its functions were primarily judicial, but it had also an important influence on administration. Its chief mission was to defend and extend the royal authority. And this it did chiefly in two directions; against the claims, namely, of the nobles and the ecclesiastics. It was always ready to withdraw from the court of any noble any process or lawsuit on the ground that it was a royal case (*cas royal*), or to encourage appeals from the ecclesiastical courts to the monarchy (*appels comme d'abus*). The time came when it grew too conscious of its services and of its power, and for a short time in the seventeenth century it attempted to put itself forward as a rival to the power of the monarchy, which it had so well served. But that was more than a century in the future, and that phase soon passed. Its fortunes were indissolubly connected with those of the monarchy. When a French historian contrasts the unity of France with the divisions of Germany and the provincial separatism of Spain, he sees the cause of the difference above all things in the activity and policy of the Parlement. There were several Parlements in France, for several provinces had such an institution to supervise the administration and act as a court of appeal. But the Parlement of Paris was by far the greatest of all. Its close contact with the King and the wide area over which its competence extended made it far more important than all the rest.

The Church
in France

The position of the Church in France demands here a short notice. All Frenchmen held strongly the conviction that the Church in France, though in loyal communion with the Church of Rome, was nevertheless in possession of rights

and liberties of its own. From laymen and ecclesiastics alike during the greater part of the century comes the declaration that the liberties of the Gallican Church are something sacred, to be defended at all costs. Yet these rights, though so strongly emphasized, were difficult to define. Or rather their champions refused to define them, preferring to leave them vague. When in the middle of the sixteenth century the Roman Church set its house in order, and reformed its government, and restated its doctrines in the Council of Trent, the admission of the Council's decrees into France was strongly opposed—and by the Parlement especially—as an infringement of Gallican liberties. The government of the Gallican Church had not fallen so completely into the hands of the King as that of the Spanish Church had done. No Inquisition had been introduced, and something like national self-government of the Church had been established by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438) which declared that Councils were superior to the Pope, placed the election to bishoprics and abbacies in the hands of the clergy themselves, and closely restricted payments and appeals to Rome. This arrangement was as unsatisfactory to the Kings of France as to the Popes; and when a chance came in 1516 of amending it, both the royal and the Papal powers were quick to avail themselves of it, as we shall see shortly.

WARFARE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

The century before us is full of wars; fighting was frequent, and there was no long interval of settled peace. War was recognized as a chief element in national policy; and, though no campaigns will be treated in detail in this book, it is well to have some idea of the general character assumed by warfare during the period. It was an age of rapid change in military methods and of much careful thought on the subject.

Two great changes strike us at once. At the beginning of ^{The} our period the mounted knight was still the most valued ^{triumph} weapon; in spite of the lessons of Courtrai, Crecy, and Poitiers ^{of} it was the cavalry to whom men looked for decision in battle. ^{infantry} During the sixteenth century, however, the infantry advanced rapidly in esteem and importance. The value of cavalry by

no means disappeared (it was the favourite arm of Henry of Navarre) : yet battles are now decided chiefly by the action of the infantry. The other most prominent feature in the development of war is the rapid advance in the use of gunpowder. Gunpowder had of course been known in Europe for more than a century and a half, and had played an important part in the last stages of the Hundred Years' War. But it was during the first half of the sixteenth century that it became of first-rate importance in every department of warfare. It was with the long pike that the infantry gained their early victories, and the pike was by no means discarded ; but the arquebus or the musket became first a subsidiary weapon, and then even the chief means of attack and defence. At first, fortresses impregnable to the old methods were driven to swift surrender by the artillery of France. But then the fortifications were constructed afresh to meet the new danger, and were manned with guns. By the middle of the century, the advantage again lay with the defence. Even the cavalry came to use gunpowder, though it had been regarded at first as ungentlemanly and contemptible.

Gunpowder

The Swiss

At first the Swiss were recognized as the greatest fighters in Christian Europe. They fought almost exclusively on foot. Their great squares of pikemen seemed at first invincible, if the ground was favourable to them ; and they were remarkable for their discipline and military morale. Yet they gained few advantages for the Confederation to which they belonged ; they served for the most part as mercenaries in the armies of other powers ; and by the middle of the century their failure to adopt new methods had taken from them the military pre-eminence which they had at first enjoyed. Spain and France possessed for military purposes certain advantages which made them the first military powers in western Europe. They were consolidated ; the monarchy controlled the action of the whole State ; and the Kings of both countries had at their disposal military resources which seemed great in that age. The Kings of France had a large income for which they needed no Parliamentary grant, and they used this for the maintenance of a standing army. In Spain there was the same unity of control and large financial resources rested in the hands of the King ; in Castile by a decree of 1496, " the State

France and Spain

claimed one man out of every twelve between the ages of twenty and forty-five to serve in the royal armies.”¹

The wars against the Moors had been a wonderful school for war. The old methods of chivalry were of little service there, and under Gonsalvo de Cordova new tactics and new methods of training were developed. The Spaniards became decidedly the first soldiers in Europe. The infantry were the chief arm; they mixed heavy pikemen with light armed and with musketeers, and they were quick to adopt new methods as they were demanded by the increase in the use of gunpowder. They had also this great advantage as compared with most other armies: they were a national force and had something of a national spirit. They mutinied when they did not get their pay, but their pay was not their only attachment to the cause for which they fought.

With the exception of the Spaniards most of the soldiers Mercenaries engaged in the campaigns of the century are mercenaries. Switzerland and Germany were the great hiring grounds for them, but Scotchmen, Italians, Englishmen, and other nationalities were also found pursuing a soldier's career merely for pay, without reference to the cause in which they fought. Machiavelli saw in this practice the ruin of his country, and never ceased to advocate a national militia as the first necessity, if Italy were to become free. Some effort was made to develop national armies. France owed some of her great victories to such a force. But mercenary armies dominate the battle-field to the end of our period. Most Governments preferred them. They feared that armed citizens might demand some share in the government and felt safer with troops that could be sent home when the war was over.

The political combinations of Europe are as difficult to follow as the movements of flies in a room. There is no guiding principle except the apparent advantage of the moment and the fear of some powerful neighbour. It is only with the advent of Charles V to power in Spain and Germany that European diplomacy gains some stability from a permanent antagonism. There are many decisive battles where the one side is undoubtedly victorious and the other as undoubtedly crushed. And yet the results of the fighting are

¹ Merriman's *Rise of the Spanish Empire*, ii, 156.

for the most part singularly indecisive. The beaten side often recovers quickly ; the victor finds victory exhausting. The armies of the time were not large enough to keep a beaten enemy in subjection. The issue of campaigns was decided more by financial strength, by public opinion, and social and political organization, than by the results even of the most important battles.

CHAPTER II

THE ITALIAN WARS—THE FIRST PHASE

THE year 1494 is sometimes taken as the dividing line between medieval and modern history. The justification of such a view is to be sought in the fact that in that year Charles VIII of France crossed the Alps and entered on the invasion of Italy. From this event sprang a new relationship between the European Powers; the motive of "Balance of Power," always operative, if unrecognized, among the states of Europe, was now consciously adopted and all-powerful; the Italian ambitions of France, moreover, led up to that antagonism between the power of France and the Austro-Spanish House of Habsburg which is a central and constant feature in the diplomacy of the next two centuries. The Italian wars, too, had their great influence in the domain of art and thought. The influence of Italy already important became more so, and the conflicts between the great Powers of Europe provoked by rivalries in Italy had a decisive influence on the fortunes of the religious struggle which was soon to break out in Germany.

The beginning of modern history?

All this is true, and yet the importance of Charles VIII's invasion of Italy has been exaggerated. Italian rivalries were rather the excuse than the real cause of the long Franco-Spanish duel. The revelation of a new world by Italian and Spanish and Portuguese explorers was a more potent influence on the future, even on the wars of the future, than the rival claims of France and Spain on Milan and Naples. Moreover, the really decisive fact which ushers in the modern world is to be found not in diplomacy, nor even in discovery, but in religion. It is the power and influence of the Catholic and Roman Church which gave to the Middle Ages their most important characteristics, so that they are best dated from

the triumph of that Church in the reign of Constantine. It is the disappearance of the religious unity of the West, through internal decay and external attack, which is the outstanding characteristic of the life of the modern world, which can therefore be best marked as beginning with the revolt of Luther in 1517.

For modern students one great interest, which contemporaries could not have guessed, attaches to the Italian wars. They allow us to understand the structure of the European world, the motives and aims of its statesmen, the forces on which their success and failure depended, just when the Reformation was about to break out. We see a Europe entirely without any principle of unity and without any means of settling international disputes; in which among statesmen material and political interests invariably take precedence of moral and religious considerations; in which, though men still talked of crusades, the crusading zeal is dead and incapable of revival. The Reformation did not improve the motives and standards of statesmen, but it did not lower them.

The invasion of Italy was no novel exploit. For most of a thousand years Italy under the guidance of Rome had been accustomed to invade Europe. But from the time of her disunion and decay in the fourth and fifth centuries, Italy had been invaded by Europe with frequency and success. The best-known invaders of the Middle Ages were of Germanic origin, but French armies had on several occasions made their way over the Alpine passes, and Charles VIII's ambitions found their excuse in previous successes of the royal house of France on Italian soil. The House of Anjou had reigned in Naples, and its failure and expulsion had not destroyed the possibility of reviving its claims. The House of Orleans had intermarried with the Visconti of Milan, and the King's cousin and successor, Louis XII, could claim the inheritance of that rich and important territory with some show of justice. But these are the excuses not the real causes of the Italian wars. France was strong and, according to the standards of that age, united and efficient. The long English wars were over. The wealth and splendour and weakness of Italy attracted the ambitions of France and offered an easy conquest. Spain—if we may employ a word which was not yet technically applicable—

had, like France, just emerged from an age-long struggle, the national and religious struggle against the Moors. She had a large measure of unity and great military strength. She had an even better claim than France to interfere in the affairs of Italy. So Italian history became a duel between these two great Powers, with generation after generation the same recurrent features. The early successes nearly always fall to France—alike in the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries; but the French could strike no durable roots in the country. It was the Habsburgs who, strongly established in Naples and Sicily, reaped the permanent advantages, and, under varying titles, dominated the fortunes of the peninsula until in the middle of the nineteenth century the Italians were ready to control their own destiny. It is proposed in this chapter to trace in brief outline the course of diplomacy and war in Italy, and then to examine a little more carefully the effects on the fortunes of the more important Italian states.

**Charles VIII
of France**

The annals of the French monarchy have hardly a more insignificant figure than Charles VIII, who presided over the first phase of the Italian wars. He was diminutive and malformed; it was the opinion of those who approached him most nearly that his intellect was not superior to his body. Yet he had stubbornness, ambition, and imagination. He thought of himself as a new Charles the Great; beyond the Italian campaign there floated some vague idea of a crusade against Constantinople, and some of his banners bore the words "*Voluntas Dei; missus a Deo.*" There were plenty of tasks at home that called for the royal attention. The consolidation of the kingdom had made great headway under Louis XI, but there was much more to be done before the will of the King would be law throughout the land. England was still a jealous and a watchful enemy; the strength of Spain was beginning to be apparent; the Rhine concerned France much more directly than the Po or the Arno or the Tiber. But the Italian adventure offered cheap success, and Italy was, to that age of classical enthusiasms, the land of history and fame. The invasion of Italy was determined on.

**The claim
to Naples**

Some sort of claim could be made out to the throne of Naples, dependent in part on descent and in part on bequest;

neither the King nor his counsellors occupied themselves much in the elaboration of it. The great thing was not to establish a claim but to win the prize. And with that object it was important that diplomacy should prepare the ground. The diplomacy of the age was not more unscrupulous than that of the next centuries, but it was lighter and more unstable. There was no enduring antagonism round which the Powers could group themselves. The European states were ready without exception to join hands with any one against any one. It was for the present a world without fixed loyalties or resentments; the supposed advantage of the moment was the inspiration of the policy of all the Powers.

The blow was known to be impending, and there were ^{Condition} movements in Italy to prepare for it. Florence, where Piero ^{of Italy} dei Medici had recently succeeded to Lorenzo the Magnificent, and the Papacy, which was occupied by Alexander VI, were both inclined to the side of Naples, but were quite unprepared to throw any energy into her defence. Milan, where Lodovico, the Moor, ruled in the name of his nephew, Giovanni Galeazzo Sforza, had a violent quarrel with his old ally the King of Naples, and threw itself on the side of France, and encouraged Charles VIII in his enterprise. Naples was in no good condition to resist. The country was torn by faction, and the monarchy was opposed by the nobles. The King held his own with difficulty and showed no ability either for peace or war. There were a few spirits in Italy who dreamed of a united Italy and desired to keep the "barbarians" out of it, but they were few and of no influence.

If Italy could not save herself, she would not be saved by ^{The Powers} outside help. The European Powers would join later to tear ^{of Europe} the prize from the hands of France, but none was anxious ^{and Italy} to prevent her from entering on the adventure. Henry VII of England was invited to interfere in Brittany; but he hated the risks of war and he loved money, and the Treaty of Étamples (1492) insured his neutrality for a large sum. Ferdinand of Aragon had a much more direct interest in Naples than the King of France, and would in the end be his most dangerous enemy. For the present, however, he was willing to profit by the French King's ambition and gained from him the extremely valuable territories of Roussillon and

Perpignan—on the eastern Pyrenees—and at this price consented to look on while Charles tried his fate in Italy (Treaty of Barcelona, January 1493). The Emperor Maximilian received back Artois and Franche Comté by the Treaty of Senlis (May 1493). It would require great gains in Italy to compensate for these assured losses !

The
invasion
of Italy

In June 1494 the expedition set off. The French treaty with the Swiss Confederation allowed Charles to raise a fine force of foot-soldiers there. The army numbered some 30,000 men, of whom 16,000 were cavalry and 14,000 foot-soldiers. It was a medieval rather than a modern army. The artillery attracted much attention and was more efficient than anything that the Italians had seen ; but it was not the decisive weapon, and hand firearms were hardly used. The King of France relied mainly on his men-at-arms clad in heavy armour and armed with lances. The lessons of Agincourt and of Castillon had not been seriously taken to heart. The King was in command himself. A naval expedition under the Duke of Orleans occupied Genoa. The King, with the bulk of the force, crossed the Alps by the pass of Mont Genève and arrived at Asti without resistance.

Italy was wholly unprepared to meet such a force. Her soldiers were skilful in the use of their weapons ; in intelligence and craftsmanship the Italians were ahead of the French. But all the military qualities were wanting to them ; discipline, loyalty, endurance, patriotism. The practice of mercenary warfare and the use of condottieri to command the forces of the different states had made Italy a helpless prey to any resolute enemy.

Early
triumph
of the
French

So Charles sauntered on in a triumphant military procession towards Naples. It was all like a scene from Ariosto or one of the chivalrous romances of the time, and the parallel was in men's minds. The Italians looked with astonishment at the artillery, so much larger than their own and so dexterously handled ; at the splendid armour and horses ; at the discipline and military spirit so different from those of their own mercenary armies. There was little fighting ; but, when there was any, these soldiers of France fought to win and to kill ; victory was followed at Monte San Giovanni and elsewhere by the indiscriminate slaughter of the garrisons ; all was in

direct contrast to the almost friendly manœuvring of the Italian condottieri. But the subtle Italians were less impressed by the forces of France than Charles and his advisers imagined. Italy could not be conquered by 30,000 men. The French were not exempt from the weakness of other armies; they, too, could be duped, outmanœuvred and beaten. So Charles in a veritable intoxication of glory passed on into the trap.

At the approach of the French Pisa rebelled against its Florentine masters and surrendered to the French King. ^{The march on Naples} Piero dei Medici had certainly inclined to the side of Naples, but he was not prepared to resist the French army, and his power was attacked by strong enemies at home. He made terms with Charles and admitted him into Florence, but even so the revolution against his power broke out. The Republic was established and Savonarola built on it his short-lived theocracy, of which we shall hear more. Then the army marched on to Rome where Pope Alexander VI was not more friendly than Piero dei Medici, but was equally unable to resist. Charles passed through Rome and entered on Neapolitan territory. But even here there was no resistance. King Ferdinand I had died in 1494. His successor Alfonso abdicated at the moment of the French attack. His son Ferdinand II (Ferrantino) had no control of the situation. Naples was occupied on February 22, 1495. The procession through Italy had taken five months. The golden fruit seemed safe in the lap of the French King.

It may almost be regarded as "a law of history" that French victories in Italy were never secure.¹ ^{Unstable situation of the French} The troops of Charles diminished through disease and the need of establishing garrisons. He was hundreds of miles from his base. Those who had welcomed the French out of hostility to the reigning House soon turned against him, for Naples was treated as a conquered country. Lands were confiscated, granted to French nobles, and by them often re-sold. Charles revelled

¹ Ariosto (Canto xxxiii, 10) sums up the history of the French invasions in a manner that has real historical truth: "All who hold the sceptre of France shall see their armies destroyed either by the sword or by famine or by pestilence. They will bring back from Italy short-lived rejoicing and enduring grief, small profit and infinite loss, for the lilies may not strike root in that soil."

in the warmth and gaiety of Naples, and was chiefly occupied in planning the gorgeous details of his triumphant entry into the city, when news reached him which showed that he was in a trap and that his only chance of escape lay in a rapid flight.

Alliance
against
France

The King was taken completely by surprise, and his surprise gives us the measure of his ignorance and incapacity for dealing with affairs of State. No power inside of Italy or outside was inclined to acquiesce in the French occupation of Naples, which might easily develop into a French supremacy in Italy. And the triumph of France concerned all Europe too. A league therefore came almost spontaneously into existence "for the maintenance of peace," or, as would have been said a little later, for the maintenance of the Balance of Power. The treaties made before the expedition set out for Italy fell like a pack of cards. Venice was the centre of the movement; there were no diplomatists so subtle as the Venetians. The Pope and the Duke of Milan (lately the chief supporter of France in Italy) joined with Venice; and outside of Italy the Emperor Maximilian came in with the rulers of Castile and Aragon, Ferdinand and Isabella. The door of the trap might snap to and King Charles find himself a prisoner. He had been proud of the pace at which he had traversed Italy on his march to Naples, but now fear gave him even stronger wings. He left a garrison in Naples and marched north. The passage of the Apennines after Pisa presented the greatest difficulty. An army of the coalition under the Marquis of Mantua lay near Fornovo, on the banks of the Taro, north of the main chain of mountains. The situation of the French army was so dangerous that the King was ready to negotiate, asking only for permission to proceed; but the battle came on while the discussions were in progress. Commines, who was the King's agent, has described the battle. It lasted only a quarter of an hour, but the fighting was fierce and deadly; the days of leisurely manœuvring were over. The French and their Swiss soldiers lost their baggage, but forced their way through the enemy. They were by no means out of danger, but by force and diplomacy they made their way out of Italy by the end of September. Savonarola had told Commines that the King would have much trouble,

Battle of
Fornovo

but that honour would rest with him ; and Commynes thought that the event justified his prediction. If honour remained with him, that was the only fruit of the campaign in Italy. Naples was swept clear of French troops. Yet Charles VIII by no means abandoned the idea of taking up again the Italian adventure. Diplomacy was preparing the way with some success when the King died in 1498.

The successor of Charles VIII was his cousin, Louis XII, ^{King} _{Louis XII} hitherto known as the Duke of Orleans, who had been at times a thorn in the side of the late King. He had a longer reign, and he has a greater reputation in French history than his predecessor. He is credited with sagacity and humanity in his domestic policy, and won for himself the title of "*pater patriae*." But to the historian he seems but a poor creature. His health was weak ; and his intelligence far from vigorous. He responded quickly to the stimulus of military glory, but he was no soldier ; his standards were not better than those of his age, but he pursued his aim with none of the subtlety and tenacity that characterized Ferdinand of Aragon and Henry VII of England. His domestic policy will be touched on later ; we need only note here that he secured Brittany which was in danger of falling away into feudal separateness by the death of Charles VIII ; for Charles' widow, Anne, was Duchess of Brittany in her own right, and Louis XII was already married to Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI of France. However, he secured a divorce on the flimsiest grounds (one ground was the ugliness of the Queen) and married Anne of Brittany. The absorption into the French kingdom of a province, rich in harbours and dangerous because of its proximity to England, was thus ultimately assured.

From the first the eyes of Louis were turned on Italy, ^{A new} _{invasion} and in Italy, on Milan, to which he had claims of a rather doubtful kind, and against which he had already conducted an expedition. He was supported in his designs by his great minister, Georges d'Amboise, soon to be made a cardinal, who hoped to win from the Italian schemes of his master the Papal tiara for himself. The way was prepared by an alliance with Pope Alexander VI, and with Venice, which had a sharp quarrel with Lodovico of Milan about the treatment and possession of Pisa ; by the renewal of a treaty with England

and with Spain ; and the signing of a truce with Maximilian.¹ It was even more important that, by dexterous intervention, he gained from the Swiss Confederation permission to levy troops in their cantons at the price of an annual subsidy to each of them.

French
occupation
of Milan

Milan fell into the hands of Louis XII even more easily than Naples into those of Charles VIII. Lodovico, the Moor, had at first faced his enemy with confidence, but he found himself without foreign support of any kind, and, betrayed by his own troops, he abandoned his territories without a struggle. The French troops entered Milan, and the great prize seemed won. But Lodovico had escaped to Germany and managed to find mercenary help there and in Switzerland. He returned into Lombardy in the spring of 1500, and the French were unprepared to resist him. They had to withdraw from Milan and from most of their conquests ; it seemed that the experience of Charles VIII in Naples was going to be repeated. But there was a difference. Charles had been completely cut off from his base of supplies, and he had had to face an Italian and European coalition. Milan was near to France, and Lodovico was left to his own resources. The French returned in greater force ; Lodovico was defeated and betrayed, and when he attempted to escape in disguise he was captured. He was sent as a prisoner into France, and died there a few years later. The hold of France on Milan seemed assured.

Treaty of
Granada

Conquests in Italy appeared very easy to make. France still maintained her claims on Naples. Why should not Louis XII reign in Naples as well as in Milan ? There was the Spanish power to be reckoned with, but diplomacy set to work again. Ferdinand proved willing to share in the plunder instead of resisting the robbery. By the Treaty of Granada (November 1500) France and Spain were to attack together, and then to partition the conquered territories.

The enterprise was undertaken with amazing levity. A rough division of the spoil was indeed agreed on. Louis XII was to be King of Naples, and was to hold the Abruzzi and the Terra di Lavoro ; Ferdinand was to be satisfied with the

¹The Emperor was friendly with Lodovico, but he was prevented from taking any active part for him by the bitter frontier struggle which broke out between the Swabian League and the Swiss Confederation.

title of Grand Duke and the possession of Apulia and Calabria. But the frontiers of these districts were uncertain, and there were large districts not even mentioned in the treaty. It needed little statecraft to foresee that victory would bring quarrels among the victors. Pope Alexander VI assented to the treaty by a formal Bull. The relations of Naples with the Turks were given as the cause for the attack. The help given by the King of Naples to the rebellious Barons of the Papal states was a more important motive, and the ambitions of the Pope's son, Cesare Borgia, counted probably for most of all.

Naples made even less resistance than Milan. King Frederick surrendered to Ferdinand, but was sent as a prisoner into France. The triumph of Louis XII was complete. He commanded Italy by the possession of Milan and Naples, and the rulers of both famous cities were prisoners in his hands. The improvement of the frontiers of France on the north and east must have seemed tame and unimportant in comparison! But the fair prospect was quickly clouded. The inevitable quarrel between the victors soon came. The Spanish commander, Gonsalvo of Cordova, already famous for his victories against the Moors and against Charles VIII, disputed the French claims and defeated the French commander, the Duke of Nemours, at Cerignola. The war was notable for a series of combats in which the knights of France and Spain exhibited all that was noble and attractive and much of what was mean and cruel in the chivalric ideal. The great Bayard, the knight "without fear or reproach," was the hero of exploits which might find a place almost without change in the Orlando Furioso. But all this represented a notion of war that was bound to pass away and was already quite out of keeping with the hard and realistic statesmanship of the period. The famous struggles of eleven against eleven, of nine against nine, and all the romantic prowess of Bayard influenced the issue in no way at all. Gonsalvo of Cordova did not treat war as a pageant. He took Naples, defeated the French on the Garigliano after a struggle extending over three months, and took Gaeta itself, their last stronghold. The Spanish victories were due to the employment of entrenchments and arquebus fire by Gonsalvo against the pikemen and heavy cavalry of France.

marriage
negotiations

During the next years Louis XII was chiefly concerned with diplomacy, which had usually in view some political marriage. We may note how lightly both friendship and enmity sat on the shoulders of the rulers of Europe. France and Spain, the bitter enemies of a year ago, proposed to establish perpetual friendship; they would be "one soul in two bodies," and found their friendship on the marriage of their nearest; and the treaty was hardly signed when they began intriguing against one another and contemplated early war. Yet, from the marriage negotiations of these years, some important results followed.

proposed
marriage of
Claude of
France with
Charles of
Spain

First there was the proposal that Claude of France, the only child of the King and the heiress of Brittany, should marry Charles of Luxemburg, son of Philip of Burgundy and Joanna, heiress of Spain, who was later to be known as the Emperor Charles V. Claude was in her second year, Charles in his first; much would happen before the babies could become man and wife; and it is doubtful whether Louis was ever quite in earnest with the treaty. Charles was to receive with his bride the Duchy of Brittany and the French claims on Milan and Naples; an extraordinary sacrifice of French interests! Ferdinand of Spain was opposed to the match, though he was grandfather of Charles, for he was anxious to secure the regency of Castile on his wife's death, and feared that the influence of France would support the claims of Joanna and her husband. So far was the Habsburg family from real union of aim and policy! Louis XII secured one much-desired result from this betrothal; Maximilian, the Emperor and the father of Philip, invested him at last with the Duchy of Milan.

Difficulties arose in the way of the marriage. The States-General petitioned against it. The French King passed from the side of Philip to that of his father-in-law, Ferdinand. When Isabella of Castile died, Ferdinand married Germaine de Foix, the French King's niece, and Louis abandoned to her his claims on Naples, which were in truth quite valueless. Then in 1506 the Princess Claude, heiress as she was to Brittany, was betrothed to her cousin, Francis of Angoulême, who, in the absence of male issue to the King, was heir to the throne of France. The betrothal corresponded to the wishes and

the interests of France, and when in due time the marriage took place, Brittany, with her all-important sea-board, was securely attached to the Crown of France. Nothing is more wearisome than these constant matrimonial negotiations, but at times results of vast importance depended on them. They never secured peace between the contracting princes, though peace was always declared to be a primary object of the arrangement; but states were built up by them and the destinies of Europe seriously influenced.

Italy was always very near to the heart of Louis XII, and in 1508 there came a fresh project for establishing the power of France in the peninsula. After Milan and Naples, it was the turn of Venice to be attacked. She was without question the most efficient, humane, and successful state in the peninsula. Her institutions were stable while everything else in Italy was in constant change, and she boasted that something of the spirit of ancient Rome guided her Councils. But she had incurred, and she had in part deserved, the hostility of powerful neighbours. Her policy had been more able than that of other Italian states, but quite as unscrupulous. She had won of late a considerable territory on the mainland, and she was therefore in occupation of lands which were claimed and coveted by the Emperor Maximilian and by the French in Milan. The Papacy had grievances against her, new and old; for she not only held territories that were in origin Papal, but she claimed certain independent powers in the management of her own church affairs, which conflicted with the ideas dominant at Rome. Even Naples had suffered from her ambition and her skill; for, while France and Spain were attacking Naples itself, Venice had used the opportunity to lay hands on important harbours on the east coast. In brief, she was rich and had powerful neighbours. She was well governed and capable of a tenacious defence. But a city state, even the strongest in Europe, could not hope to hold out against the great European coalition with which she was now threatened.

It is not possible in this book to attempt to follow the weaving and unweaving of European diplomacy; but it is well to look at the Treaty of Cambrai, for it is the best illustration of that diplomacy; of its unscrupulous falseness, its

narrow egotism, its short-sighted folly. Margaret of Austria, who governed the Low Countries for her father, the Emperor Maximilian, was a chief agent in the negotiations of the treaty, which was signed in December 1508. It had the appearance of a general crusade against the Turkish power; the Emperor and the King of France were the first signatories, and they were followed closely by the Pope and the Kings of England and Hungary. It seems a special mark of the age that men seemed to be able to believe and to follow things mutually contradictory; and it is possible that the rulers who signed this had some belief in it.

A further treaty approached nearer to reality. The Venetians had seized power in many cities belonging to the Holy See. The Emperor and the King of France, Pope Julius II, and the King of Aragon, each having his own grievances against the triumphant Republic, promised to attack her and to partition her territories. Barbarian armies prepared again to reap the easy harvests of Italy. There was likely to be considerable difficulty about the division of the sheaves; and the first-comer was likely to be the best served.

New French
invasion
of Italy

Louis XII was ready first. His army had an important new feature; a considerable proportion of the infantry were drawn from France and placed under French commanders; the days of armies consisting mainly of mercenaries whether German or Swiss were passing. The Swiss, under the influence of Schinner, Bishop of Sion, were usually hostile to France. In May 1509 the French army met the Venetian at Agnadello on the Adda and completely defeated it. What followed showed the solidity of the Venetian State, whether or not it was the work of conscious statecraft.¹ The mainland was abandoned. No effort was made to prevent the cities there from yielding to their invaders. The forces of the Republic were withdrawn within the secure defence of the lagoons. And then the coalition broke up with a completeness and suddenness which is amazing even in that age. In the first half of the sixteenth century, it was often the case that allies fell away from one who had been too successful;

The Holy
League

¹ Romanin in his *Storia Veneta* says that he can find no evidence that the abandonment of the mainland was due to any other motive than a consciousness of weakness.

the root idea of balance of power was alliance of the weak against the strong. Maximilian, Ferdinand, and above all, the eager-hearted military Pope, had no desire to see France established more firmly in the Lombard plain. The subjects of Venice found their new rulers more oppressive than their former ones. There was a scurrying of diplomatists behind the scenes, and then the Holy League was signed in October 1511.

The European kaleidoscope turned and the European powers fell into a new grouping. The chief mover in these new arrangements was the Pope Julius II. He had repented of the part he had played in introducing the French into Italy ; he now wished to expel the " barbarians," and has won thereby the gratitude of Italian patriots. But he was interested in the Papal states rather than in Italy, and while he deserves all that has been said of his energy and military ardour, his statesmanship did not rise above the ordinary standards of Italian politics. But we shall speak again of him in a later section of this chapter. He won the support of Venice and of Spain in the first instance. England soon came in. Maximilian remained outside, but did not in fact give any help to France. But there was one power more immediately important than all these, and that was the confederation of cantons which we call Switzerland. The military qualities of their people and their close vicinity to the scene of action made them of decisive importance. There were few signs of unity in the State, but all the cantons were beginning to be weary or ashamed of the trade in mercenary soldiers which they had carried on for so long, and they had their special grievances against the French King. The Pope approached them skilfully, and represented his service as a sort of crusade ; 6000 soldiers were placed at his disposal—in return for heavy payments. It was the Swiss and the Spaniards who gave the victory to Julius.

The fighting began at the end of 1511. The French armies were soon commanded by Gaston de Foix, whose early death may well have been a fact of much importance for the history of Europe in this age. For skilful soldiers, with insight into the strategy and tactics demanded by the rapidly changing conditions of warfare, are singularly lacking in the first half

of the sixteenth century. There are gallant knights like Bayard, and great leaders in irregular warfare like Gonsalvo of Cordova, but it may be questioned whether there is a commander with any touch of greatness until we come to Alexander of Parma and Henry of Navarre towards the end of the century. Gaston was the French King's nephew, and his victories could not have failed to strengthen the monarchy of France. He seems to have appreciated the importance of both infantry and artillery, and to have understood that a campaign was of more importance than a battle. He out-manceuvred the Swiss, relieved Bologna and recaptured Brescia,¹ and marched on Ravenna. A Papal Spanish army came to its relief and thus brought on the battle of Ravenna (April 1512). The French gained a complete victory, for Ravenna fell into their hands after the battle; but they had suffered heavily themselves, and their commander, Gaston de Foix, was among the fallen. "Roland at Roncesvaux had not performed such exploits" is the characteristic comment of an eye-witness. While leading an attack against a force of Spaniards, he fell pierced with fourteen wounds.

Italy lost
to France

The death of Gaston was of great importance, for no worthy successor could be found. The French were attacked seriously elsewhere; by the Swiss in the Milanese; by the English in the north of France; by the Spaniards in Navarre. They lost ground everywhere. Diplomacy began indeed to destroy the Holy League, as it had destroyed the League of Cambrai; but before anything effective could be done, the French were heavily defeated at Novara by an army mainly composed of Swiss (June 1513). Italy had to be evacuated; nothing remained of the Italian adventure but dangerous memories. The Pope recognized the services of the Swiss by giving them the title of Protectors of the Liberty of the Church. The chief actors, however, soon disappeared from the stage. Julius II died in February 1513, and was succeeded by Leo X of the Medicean House. Louis XII made peace with Henry VIII of England, and married Mary, the English

¹ The sack of Brescia, with the slaughter and outrage of many thousands of the civilian population, stands out among the military horrors of the century. Gaston de Foix was unable to stop it. He had promised his soldiers the pillage of the city, one of the richest in northern Italy.

King's sister, as part of the conditions of the treaty. The Court was full of festivity, and the resumption of the attack on Italy was talked of for the spring. But the King died on the last day of the year.

He was succeeded by his cousin, Francis of Angoulême, King who was in his twenty-first year. He can claim no place Francis I among the great statesmen of France, but he was young, ardent, and ambitious, full of the passion for glory which is a strong feature of the age, and inclined to treat politics as sport and adventure. The importance of his reign for the political development of France will be treated later. But from the beginning to the end of his reign, it was Italy which most attracted his attention; Italy, the land of romance and glory. Like his two predecessors he was determined to pluck the fruit that hung so temptingly in Milan and perhaps in Naples; and he hoped that he would be more fortunate in preserving what he won. The very recent failure of the French arms in Italy makes the triumph of Francis remarkable. But Ferdinand and Maximilian were old and weary and near their end (Ferdinand died in January 1516, and Maximilian in January 1519). The chief enemy of the French was the army of the Swiss Confederation which held Milan. The ardour and energy of Francis carried all before them. He raised an army of some 40,000 men, and a third of the infantry was French. Charles, Duke of Bourbon, the Constable, commanded under the King himself. The Swiss, who saw in the action of Francis a direct attack on their own position in Italy, blocked the ordinary approaches to Milan through Susa, and Pinerolo, and it was necessary to find another route through the Alps. Pedro Navarro, who had once been in the employ of Ferdinand, was Francis' chief engineer, and the French army passed into Italy by the middle of August by the Col d'Argentière. Francis had secured the support of the Venetians, and the enemy consisted mainly of Swiss troops under the direction of the fiery Cardinal Schinner of Sion. On his advice or insistence, the Swiss marched out of Milan to attack the French before they could effect a junction with the Venetians. So came on the famous battle of Marignano (September 13, 1515).

The battle lasted two days, and on the first the contest

attle of
arignano
id its
nsequences

was between the French army and the Swiss ; a confused and equal struggle. The armies occupied the same ground with little change for the night. Next day the Venetians under Alviano joined in the fight, and a long struggle ended in a complete French victory. Fortune had for the third time given Italian laurels to a French King soon after his accession. Milan capitulated, and the new Duke, Maximilian Sforza, surrendered his title. Neither Spain nor the Empire were for the moment in a mood to interfere. The position of Francis seemed better assured than that of Charles VIII and of Louis XII had been. He profited by his victory to make two treaties of the greatest importance for the future of France. He signed with the Pope the Concordat, which in essentials regulated the relations of France with the Papacy for the next three centuries ; but of this we shall speak elsewhere. For the immediate future, the treaty with the Swiss was of even greater importance. The Swiss had had their lesson at Marignano. The French army was not, indeed, the national force which it has sometimes been represented, but it contained a large proportion of French foot-soldiers and largely by means of its artillery it had fought down the Swiss infantry. It was very difficult to make a peace with all the cantons, for each claimed the right of deciding separately ; but at last a *Perpetual Peace* was signed at Fribourg. The Swiss made a good bargain ; they were paid for the expense which they had incurred in fighting against France. The Peace amounted in form to a defensive alliance. No Swiss soldiers were to fight for any "princes, lords, or communities that proposed any harm to the King of France in his realm or in the Duchy of Milan or in anything that belongs to him." Francis I was really in a stronger position than any that Charles VIII or Louis XII had ever occupied. But the European situation was soon to change in a manner not favourable to France or her King's dream of European supremacy.

ITALY DURING THE WARS

We have hitherto in this chapter treated Italy merely as the arena in which the great Powers of Europe contended for mastery. It is inevitable that we should do so, for the part

played by the Italians themselves in those wars, in which the destiny of their country for three centuries was largely decided, was quite secondary. But the history of Italy cannot fairly be treated merely as an appendage of the history of France, Spain, and Germany. The great future of the country makes such a treatment absurd, and the contribution of Italy to the religious and intellectual movements of the sixteenth century remained important until nearly the end; quite apart from the all-important influence exercised by the Papacy, which can never be treated as merely an Italian force.

When Charles VIII crossed the Alps and began his epoch-making invasion of Italy, the country was nearing the very zenith of that flowering of art and poetry and thought which is usually called the Renaissance. Leonardo da Vinci was forty-two years old and had yet twenty-five years to live, and he is perhaps the most typical of all the artists of the time. Raphael was in his twelfth year; Michael Angelo in his twentieth; Boiardo had already published his wild narrative of Charlemagne's paladins, and was preparing to write more when he looked up from his books and saw "all Italy in fire and flames" by reason of "these Gauls" and their unknown aims; he went to the wars and there found his death. The theme that he abandoned was carried on by Ariosto, who was twenty at the time of the French invasion and whose *Orlando* became one of the great masterpieces of Italian literature. Machiavelli was born in 1469, and his name is closely interwoven with the story of the Italian wars. It is this fact—that the French attack on Italy came just when the civilization and luxury of the country seemed at its zenith—which adds great interest to the story of the wars. Doubtless they did something to spread the influence of Italian art and culture especially in France; but the importance of this has often been much exaggerated. The influence of Italian ideas in Europe was already great and was certain to become greater in any case. Certainly the wars were no gain to European culture; for not only did they see the apparent zenith of the Italian Renaissance, but they also saw the beginning of its rapid and complete decline. They contributed little to the influence of Italy in Europe, but they were among the many causes which brought about later the

The
Renaissance
in Italy

eclipse of the intellectual and artistic influence of Italy; for the foreign dominion, under which Italy now passed, was certainly unfavourable to the growth of all the most characteristic products of the Italian genius. We will glance briefly at the development of the chief states of Italy, beginning in the south.¹

Naples

A great change passed over the Kingdom of Naples. The illegitimate line of Aragon gave place to the Spanish Royal House, and there is no reason to think that the inhabitants much regretted the change. Ferdinand (or Ferrante), who reigned from 1458 to 1494, has left a record, exaggerated by tradition, of cruelty and oppression; he is almost the typical tyrant of Greek and Italian history. He had had to struggle against a dangerous revolt of the baronage and especially against the great House of Sanseverino, which had in the past shown itself almost equal in power to royalty itself, and his victory had been won by the force and guile usual under such circumstances, and had been enforced by great cruelty. Alfonso, his son, seems to have been no better than his father, and it was upon him that the storm of the French invasion fell; we have seen how he failed to meet it and how he resigned and retired to Sicily. It was upon his son, Ferrantino, that the title and burden of the Crown fell when the French power lost its hold in Italy. He secured the throne and the liking of the Neapolitans, who had been exasperated by the oppressions of the French. His death gave the Crown to his uncle, Frederick, who reigned until the compact of Cambrai brought the French into Naples again in conjunction with the Spaniards. The quarrel that ensued between the invaders, and the complete triumph of Spain, introduce a well-marked era in Neapolitan history.

The Spaniards in Naples

The Spaniards were of course foreigners, but the Kingdom of Naples had never known a really national dynasty, and the sense of nationality was quite undeveloped among her heterogeneous population. There was some resemblance between the physical characteristics, the languages and the characters

¹ Ranke (in his *Latin and Teutonic Nations*) makes the interesting suggestion that the presence of French and Spaniards in Italy may have saved the country from a Turkish invasion, which its own military strength would have been quite unable to resist.

of the Spaniards and the Neapolitans. But the essential fact was that the authority of the royal government in Naples was now in the hands of one of the great military Powers of Europe. The frontiers were successfully defended against invasion from French or Papal attack ; feudal resistance was beaten down ; the last flickers of communal independence were extinguished. Naples and her kingdom entered on a period of tranquillity, which it would be difficult to match in her annals since the break-up of the Roman Empire, and the city of Naples itself increased immensely in population and importance.

The fate of the country was doubtless decided in Madrid ^{Life in Naples} rather than in Italy, and the country was ruled through viceroys and agents, who were usually Spaniards. But "The Kingdom" retained a great deal of independence—social and intellectual, if not political. The Neapolitans mocked the solemn Spaniards in popular comedy, and refused to allow the Spanish form of the Inquisition to be introduced, and that out of no inclination towards heresy. Naples can never be regarded as one of the great homes of the Renaissance, but Neapolitans contributed much to Italian thought in the latter half of the sixteenth century, when the impulse of the Renaissance had spent its force in most of the north. Tasso, the characteristic poet of the counter-Reformation, was born near Naples ; Campanella and Giordano Bruno, both of them rebels against the authority of the Church and its control of scientific theory, were Neapolitans. There was more intellectual activity in the country than has often been thought. But the great change that came over the Kingdom of Naples with the establishment there of the Spanish power was in the life and behaviour of the barons.

They recognized the impossibility of struggling against the might of Spain, and they became demonstratively loyal to the Spanish Kings. They followed a general tendency observable in the age in abandoning their country residences and living in Naples, where their life is described as one of idleness and show. But they served in the Spanish armies with much distinction, and their record shows that the proverbial incapacity of the Neapolitans for disciplined courage is by no means without exceptions.¹

¹ Benedetto Croce's *Storia del Regno di Napoli* throws a new and more favourable light on Neapolitan history.

The Papal
states

The Papacy and the Empire were the chief of the elective monarchies of the age, and the condition of the Papal states bore some resemblances to that of the Empire. There was the same vagueness of frontier, the same weakness in the Executive, and in consequence the same practical independence in many of the cities and nobles. There is some resemblance, too, in the destiny of their political power. In spite of the great efforts made by the Empire in this and the next centuries, its actual authority went on decreasing, until it was extinguished at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Papacy made great, and to some extent successful, efforts to consolidate and strengthen its temporal power in Italy. Yet here, too, there was failure in the end, and the temporal power disappeared in 1870 from the map of Europe. But the parallel must not be pushed too far. The temporal power of the Popes was the least source of their strength. Failure in their temporal aims went along with successful reorganization of their spiritual power. The Empire disappeared, and no prophet has foretold its resurrection. The Papacy survived and triumphed over the dangers that threatened it in the sixteenth century; and our own days have seen even the temporal power reappear.

Pope
Alexander
VI

We are mainly concerned in this chapter with three Popes: Alexander VI (1492-1503); Julius II (1503-13); and Leo X (1513-21). Alexander VI, who had to face all the problems raised by the invasion of Charles VIII, is one of the most disputed figures in the history of the Papacy. His pontificate lies near the threshold of the Reformation, and the controversies of that time, more prolific in controversy than any other period in history, have fastened on him. He has become the representative criminal of Papal annals, and his vices and crimes have been given in lurid detail to show the necessity of the Reformation. Yet there is now some approach to agreement as to his character and that of his pontificate. No one makes any attempt to defend his character or to represent him as a worthy occupant of the Papal chair. Dr. Pastor, the almost official biographer of the Popes, dismisses all efforts to defend him as "unworthy tampering with truth"; points to the effrontery of his worldliness and the utter absence of all moral sense in his

public and private life ; and declares that it is impossible to blame Alexander VI too severely ; and that his life was one of unrestrained sensuality and devotion to the interests of his family. On the other hand it is clear that the scandal of the day, eagerly accepted by Protestant writers, heaped upon him charges that are not capable of proof and are intrinsically improbable. We need not, then, attempt to disentangle truth from falsehood in the scandalous chronicle of the age. The savage invective of Dante against Rome—" the burial-place of Saint Peter has become a sewer of blood and filth "—suits much better this age than that in which it was written. Alexander VI represents better than any other Pope the view of the Papacy as a mainly secular power.

The right of the Papacy to temporal authority was, how-
 ever, unchallenged in that age ; and, that being so, it was
 necessary to reduce its territories to some better order than
 its actual condition of " feudal " anarchy. The independence
 of cities and castles had to be beaten down ; the rival families
 of the Orsinis and the Colonnas had to be reduced to impotence.
 The Pope, in fact, had to accomplish much the same task as had
 faced Henry VII in England and Louis XI in France. His
 agent in the work was his son, Cesare Borgia, first made a
 priest and cardinal, then absolved from Orders for the good
 of his soul and married into the aristocracy of France. He is
 one of the figures of the period who have attracted the attention
 of posterity ; and Machiavelli regarded him in " The Prince " as
 the type of man who might redeem Italy from serfdom to
 the barbarians into unity and freedom. His father seems to
 have feared him even more than he loved him, and was not
 responsible for the crimes of treachery and murder of which
 the son was unquestionably guilty. The Pope's policy had
 ingratiated him and his son with France, and it was with
 troops provided by France, and as a result of Louis XII's
 victory over Milan, that Cesare undertook his task. He took
 town after town in the Romagna—Imola and Forli and Rimini,
 and many others—and then he got rid of the military chiefs,
 whom he was beginning to fear, by a much-praised treacherous
 murder. Louis XI's agents had used means as immoral in
 the consolidation of the power of the French monarchy, but
 they did not act in the name of the Vicar of Christ.

The
 concentra-
 tion of
 power
 in the
 Papal states

Cesare
Borgia

The success of Cesare's policy had been made possible by the support of France; for Alexander VI, though by origin and inclination favourable to Spain, had been brought over to the side of France by the temporary victory of the French arms. When Spain drove out the French from the Kingdom of Naples and became the predominating power in Italy, that entailed the failure of Cesare's further schemes. What those schemes were is by no means certain. Did he and his father aim at the establishment of some hereditary power in the Papal states? Did they hope to win a crown for Cesare? Had the idea of some entire reconstruction of the Papacy passed through the mind of Alexander? Anything could be reported and believed in sixteenth-century Rome; but there is nothing that gives support to the idea that Pope Alexander was disloyal to the institutions of the Church. His death found Cesare unprepared and in ill-health. After the short and colourless pontificate of Pius III (it only lasted twenty-seven days), he was succeeded by Julius II, who had been for a long time past the determined antagonist of Alexander and his family, and whose adopted name suggested his secular ambition. Cesare was made a prisoner in Rome; he subsequently went to Naples and to Spain, where he was again imprisoned. He was killed later in a battle in France, but history has no further concern with him. He lives chiefly in the eulogy of Machiavelli (in "The Prince"), but the really important result of his life was the reduction of the Papal states to something like order and submission to a central authority. It was his work, says a modern writer,¹ which first "constituted the States of the Church as a European Power." It was difficult to maintain continuity of policy in the Papal states, for the principle of hereditary rule which the states of Europe had been built was there impossible; but though Venice tried to profit by the confusion at the death of Alexander, the old anarchy did not return to the Roman dominions of Italy, and Julius II profited by the work of his great enemies, the Borgias.

Julius II

Julius II's career was chiefly occupied in those international

¹ Richard Garnett in his excellent chapter on "Rome and the Temporal Power" in the *Cambridge Modern History* (vol. i, chap. 7).

and military events which have been already sketched. Raphael's portraits have made us well acquainted with this strong-faced, bearded Pope, who instructed Michael Angelo to show him in his statue "holding not books, but a sword." He was, however, genuinely interested in art. It was largely due to his energy that the idea of sweeping away the old Church of Saint Peter's and building a new church was realized. The old church was perhaps the most interesting building in Europe, and it illustrates the absence of any real historic sense in the artists and statesmen of the period that it was destroyed in spite of some protest; ¹ it was certainly in need of repair, but equally certainly it could have been repaired. The plans of Pope Julius were not carried out, for it was to have been largely a monument to his greatness, and his successors had no sympathy with that aim; but Michael Angelo's glorious dome still crowns the huge building according to the intention of Julius.

Julius profited by the work of his enemy and predecessor; he determined to rule the States of the Church with unquestioned authority, and it was this which induced him to play the prominent part that he did in the attack on Venice and in the Holy League. The Pope was, however, quite unequal to the task of expelling the barbarians, if ever he seriously entertained it. His military schemes did but fasten the power of Spain more firmly in Italy. The extension and improvement of the Papal power in Italy was insignificant in comparison with this.

Leo X, the son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, succeeded in **Leo X** 1513. He was devoted to the interests of the Medicean House, and followed the politics of Florence very closely. He was an enthusiastic patron of the fine arts, and was not likely to follow the military aims so dear to Julius II's heart. He was soon called on to face problems more serious than those which had confronted any Pope of the century. First came a new French invasion; the battle of Marignano; and the resulting Concordat of Bologna (1516). That difficulty had been

¹ The opposition to the plan was keen among the cardinals "quia (basilicam) antiquam toto terrarum orbe venerabilem, tot sanctorum sepulcris augustissimam, tot celeberrimis in ea gestis insignem, funditus deleri ingemiscant" (Ranke, *Popes*, i, 52).

skilfully and successfully dealt with. Then in the next year Luther nailed his theses to the church door at Wittenberg; and the European world was confronted with a force different in kind from anything that had occupied her statesmen for a long time.

Florence
and Tuscany

When we pass north to Florence and Tuscany we come to the most interesting of all the Italian states in the sixteenth century. The story of these years has been told in many volumes, and it is difficult to summarize it in a couple of pages.

Before the death of Lorenzo dei Medici in 1492, another and an incalculable influence had arisen in Florence. Savonarola had become Prior of San Marco in 1491, and was already exercising from the pulpit a remarkable power over the people of Florence. His career has great personal and tragic interest; but it is valuable, too, as giving us a glimpse of the forces at work in Italy and in Europe on the eve of the Reformation. Could the Church be reformed without revolution and schism? Was the rise of some new movement like that of the friars of the thirteenth century possible with the secularized Papacy? Was Rome, under Alexander VI, awake to the needs of the Church? Was the polity of the Church of Rome "the very masterpiece of human wisdom" which it has been declared to be?¹ These are questions which force themselves on us as we read the story of the great Dominican.

Savonarola

The characteristics of Savonarola's preaching are plain. He was intensely and literally biblical; no Protestant ever got more out of a text than he. He was vigorously Puritan; he denounced the immorality of his age in clergy and laity, but especially in the clergy. He implied rather than claimed supernatural powers; foretold the future; and terrified Florence with insistence on a coming doom. On Good Friday he had seen "a black cross in the midst of Rome, whereof the head touched the heavens, and the arms stretched forth over all the earth, and above it were written these words—the Cross of the wrath of God." There was no hint of heresy in his teaching, but he often alluded to the wickedness of the Roman Court and foretold that the sword of the Lord would come speedily on the land. He had, too, that power

¹ Macaulay, *Essay on Ranke's "History of the Popes."*

which has belonged to the great preachers and orators of history—the power of controlling his audiences, not only by what he said, but by a personal and “magnetic” influence that emanated from him. Men wept and fell into convulsions as he preached in the cathedral.¹

The coming of Charles VIII seemed to support all that the preacher had foretold. A desire for political independence had been stimulated by the preaching of the eloquent friar. Piero was expelled. The French were admitted, and on their departure the republic was to be restored to effective life. But the Medici had established their power alongside and through the old republican institutions; some change in the constitution was necessary if the republic was to be a reality. The new constitution was introduced under the influence of Savonarola. His aim was to introduce something durable and consistent in place of the constantly shifting councils, committees, and magistracies of the Florentine constitution. He found something like what he sought in the actual institutions of Venice, and they were with some modification introduced into Florence. Government was to be vested in the hands of a limited number of Florentine citizens (about 3000); men who had passed a certain age and had held certain offices. Appointment by lot was abolished, though that was used at Venice. It was not proposed to introduce any permanent head of the Florentine state to correspond to the Doge at Venice. Along with the constitutional changes there went a great effort of moral reform. Florence seems to us the home of all that was sweetest, noblest, and purest in the art and culture of time; but there were dark sides to the movement, and Savonarola looked at art with the eyes of Calvin in Geneva or the later English Puritans. The instruments of luxury and vice were collected and burnt, and in this “burning of vanities” some beautiful things must have perished. Gambling and blasphemy were to be punished with cruel tortures. History knows well the reaction that threatens such efforts; but a wave of enthusiasm and belief swept over Florence, and the preacher seemed the mouthpiece of a united and regenerate city.

¹ As they did when Wesley preached; the two men have many points in common.

Fall of
Savonarola

The French invasion had given Savonarola his triumph ; the failure of the French in Italy was the direct cause of his ruin. Pisa, the much-valued possession of Florence, had rebelled successfully with the help of Charles VIII. Savonarola prophesied its recovery, but this time there came no fulfilment of his words. There was distress and even famine in the city. No wonder that there came a political and social revulsion. Moreover, Savonarola came into conflict with Pope Alexander VI on both religious and political grounds, and the League which had expelled the French from Italy counted him its enemy. The friar was excommunicated but refused to recognize the validity of the ban. His followers accepted the challenge of the rival and hostile Franciscan friars to decide the matter by the ordeal of fire ; but quarrels as to detail and a violent thunderstorm prevented the carrying out of the ceremony, and the fiasco further added to the growing unpopularity of Savonarola. Then the convent of San Marco—the residence of the friar—was stormed and Savonarola surrendered. He was placed on his trial for his claim to prophecy and for his political action. Torture was used to elicit confession, and in May 1498 Savonarola was hanged, and his body was subsequently burnt.

Return
of the
Medici

The republic lasted for twelve years after the death of its founder, but though it managed to recover Pisa it showed little efficiency or vitality. The Medicean party still existed. The republic had been closely connected with the French. After the battle of Ravenna and the collapse of the French power in Italy, the enemies of France insisted on the restoration of the Medici to Florence, and in September 1512 Giuliano dei Medici and other members of the family entered the city. There was some change of institutions, but the essential force was as before the influence, personal and financial, of the Medicean family.

Venice

We come next to Venice. The sixteenth century is the zenith of her greatness. The city became a miracle of beauty, glorified by the work of some of the greatest of European artists. The wealth of the East still flowed in upon her. She was the great middleman between the East and the West, between Asia and Europe, and she profited by the heavy dues that her position allowed her to charge. She had a diplo-

matic service in advance of that possessed by any state in Europe. Her treatment of her subjects was on the whole more humane than that of any other state, and she had her reward in a comparative immunity from rebellion and treason. But the sixteenth century was also the time when those dangers began to accumulate round her, from which there was in the nature of things no escape. The power of the Turks in its advance had swept away the predominant position which she had held in the eastern Mediterranean; she fought against them tenaciously, but it was a losing struggle. The development of the great nation-states in the west of Europe was a less obvious but an even greater menace. How could Venice in the long run hope to hold her own in the struggle against France, Spain, and England? It is amazing that she held her own so well and for so long.

Her power was primarily economical and only secondarily political and military; and the changed conditions of the world were undermining its very foundations. The Turks were closing against her a whole series of markets in the Levant; the discovery of the route to India brought with it another and an equal danger. It was not merely that the products of the Far East would now come to Europe by the cheaper and safer sea route round the Cape of Good Hope; but further, this trade was in the hands of the Portuguese, and they had no intention of admitting anyone else to share in it. Vessels from any other country found on that route or in Indian waters were treated as pirates; and the goods that came by that route would come to western harbours—to Portugal, Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands; they were not likely to find their way to the hidden city of the lagoons. The Portuguese, who had found the Mohammedan Powers established on the shores of Africa and in India, attacked both the religion and the commerce of their rivals. In 1503 their strange weapons gave them a great victory at Cochin (on the south-west of India) against the much greater forces of the ruler of Calicut, and in 1505 the foundation of the Portuguese East African Empire began. The Venetians saw with great alarm these triumphs of Christian traders. Their sympathies were all with the Mohammedan rulers who would have continued to send the products of Asia to Europe by the old trade routes.

Economic
threat to
the power
of Venice

Venetian
power
on the
mainland

The dangers that threatened the Asiatic trade of the Venetians may have contributed to the policy of acquiring territory and influence on the mainland, which was opposed entirely to the early ideas of this maritime and trading state. The confusion of the time offered many opportunities. While Naples was in process of dissolution, they gained possession of cities in Apulia and the important harbour of Taranto. The French assault on Milan allowed them to occupy Cremona and other places. When the death of Alexander VI pricked the bubble of Cesare Borgia's schemes, it almost seemed as if the Republic of Venice and not Pope Julius II would be the heir of his power. Faenza, Imola, Cesena, Forli fell into their hands. They did not nominally propose to dispossess the Pope of these places, but the effective control would have been theirs. The Pope, in Machiavelli's words, would have been their chaplain.

Defeat and
recovery of
Venice

The League of Cambrai was not therefore an attack on a weak and innocent power, but a natural alliance of states, all of which felt themselves injured and threatened by the triumphant republic. And Venice faced the accumulating threats of war with confidence. She trusted in her diplomatic skill and in the influence of her wealth. She had in Alviano one of the best commanders of the time, and hardly realized how the character of armies and of warfare was changing. The battle of Agnadello was a dreadful blow, yet in the end, as we have seen, the Venetians escaped with comparatively little loss. They were saved by the preference of their subjects for their rule over that of any other, by their skilful diplomacy, and by the Italian ambitions of Julius II. They did not re-establish themselves in the Papal territories of the Romagna; but they entered again into possession of most of what they had held in the northern plain.

The Pride
of Venice

The result of the events of the first quarter of the century was rather to increase than to diminish the pride and self-confidence of the Venetians. When half a century later they entrusted to Paolo Veronese the decoration of the Doge's Palace, many of his pictures were dedicated to the military triumphs of Venice. The Lion of Saint Mark is painted trampling underfoot the League of Cambrai. On the roof is painted, in Veronese's masterpiece, the genius of Venice

enthroned. Fame blows her trumpet ; Victory crowns her with a laurel wreath ; her victories by land and sea and the triumphs of her art are indicated. And there were great successes still reserved for Venice during the century ; the battle of Lepanto in 1571 especially ; but all her skill could not prevent her from sinking from the rank of the first-rate Powers of Europe.

Milan is the last of the large Italian states to demand a ^{Milan} short notice ; and of Milan a good deal has been said in the first half of the chapter. Lodovico, the Moor, has a bad name in Italian history ; for it was he who had taken the lead in inviting the French Kings to undertake the invasion of Italy ; his death in a French prison seemed a punishment for his treason to Italy.

His statecraft was of the usual kind practised by Italians in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries ; of that kind which is called subtle and cunning, and which, if judged by its results, is pre-eminently stupid and a clear failure. His position was an equivocal one, for he was not nominal Duke until 1494, and previously to that date ruled for his nephew, Gian Galeazzo, who accepted unwillingly the control of his masterful uncle. Public opinion, so ready to believe in poisoning, charged him with having poisoned the Duke in 1494, and the charge though improbable cannot quite be set aside. Yet in Lodovico, as in so many of the tyrants of Italy, there was another side. He was a lover and a patron of art. He was intimately associated with Leonardo da Vinci, the universal genius of his age, and when his fall came he asked to be allowed to take away with him a copy of Dante.

The geographical position of Milan made her the first ^{Milan and the Swiss} victim of any invader of Italy from beyond the Alps, and it brought her, too, into important relations with the Swiss themselves. After Lodovico's fall, the fortunes of Milan depended chiefly on the action of the Swiss. The Swiss were of immense importance as the great reservoir of mercenary troops, and they believed themselves to be even more important than they really were, for the wars of the sixteenth century were to show that French and German soldiers were able to fight against them on equal terms, and Spanish troops won before the middle of the century an even higher reputation for

military qualities. It is during the period covered by this chapter that the fame and claims of the Swiss reached their highest point. Milan was of the utmost importance to them. The Lombard plain was a great market for their goods, and through it went the chief routes into Italy. To possess Bellinzona and Domodossola was a matter of life and death; and some of their leading men dreamed of adding the whole Duchy to the possession of the Confederation. Such a scheme seemed not impossible, and if carried out it would have made a profound change in the future of Italy and perhaps of more than Italy. But there was not sufficient unity in Switzerland for any consistent policy; each of the cantons was jealous of its separate independence, and intrigue was constant among them. The failure of the later Italian plans of Louis XII, the expulsion of the French from Venetian territory, and the restoration of the family of the Sforzas to the duchy in the person of Maximilian, the son of Lodovico, was the work chiefly of the Swiss. But they were as oppressive and as unpopular as the French, and it is this which partly accounts for the complete victory of Francis I at Marignano in 1515. Maximilian followed his father to France, but he was not imprisoned and was in receipt of a pension. The French administered for a time the great prize which they had won; but fortune's wheel had by no means turned for the last time. The Sforzas were to some extent popular as an Italian family, and the dominion of any foreigners always intensified that popularity. We shall see how ten years after the battle of Marignano the French were crushed in the battle of Pavia by a Spanish and German army. Even before that the last of the Sforzas, Francis, the brother of Maximilian, had been restored to Milan by German and Imperial arms. He held the ducal throne until his death in 1535; but his state fell deeper and deeper into financial exhaustion and distress. In the existing conditions of the European world the independence of Milan could not be maintained; and here, as elsewhere in Italy, it was the House of Habsburg that ultimately held the prize which had at first seemed destined for the Kings of France.

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CHAPTER III

FRANCE, SPAIN, AND THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG. THE IMPERIAL ELECTION

TWO great movements began in Europe almost simultaneously. First, the rulers of France saw the House of Habsburg rise to vast power, and still greater possibilities of power, in Spain, Germany, and the Austrian lands, and entered on a struggle against the princes of that House, which deserves to be called the Two Hundred Years' War. The occasion for this was given by the election of the head of the House of Habsburg to the Imperial dignity which took place in 1519. Next, and almost at the same time, there began that obscure ecclesiastical quarrel in Germany, which developed into the Protestant movement and which gave Europe more than a century of acute spiritual unrest and exasperated international conflict; Luther issued his famous theses in 1517. The two struggles were closely inter-linked, and the one helped the other; but for the sake of clearness they will be told separately. Here I propose to trace the development of France, Spain, and Germany down to the election of the Emperor Charles V.

FRANCE

Little need be added to what has already been said of French conditions. Great advances had been made in the territorial unity of the nation and in the development of the royal power. Brittany was the greatest of her territorial gains. That great province, so separate in character from the rest of France, so valuable by reason of its maritime population and its excellent harbours, had now become definitely a part of the royal domain through the marriage of Claude, daughter of Louis XII and Anne of Brittany, with Francis of Angoulême, the heir to

the French Crown. Even after this marriage it was long before the proud and independent spirit of the Bretons consented to welcome the King of France among them. But the road was plain now, and the complete incorporation of Brittany with France suffered no further check. Upon the north and east and south there were places in the frontiers which the rulers of France were anxious to strengthen. The northern and eastern frontier was, and always has been, dangerously near to the capital. In the south-east France looked during the period of the wars of Italy rather for a road into the peninsula than for a solid system of defence. To the south the Pyrenees were the best mountain frontier in Europe ; but French territory did not quite come up to them. To the east Roussillon and Cerdagne had been acquired by Louis XI and then surrendered by Charles VIII as the price of the neutrality of Spain in his invasion of Italy. Further west Navarre was independent and was coveted by both France and Spain. But despite these gaps there was not in Europe a more solid or naturally defensible national territory than that of France.

advance of
royal ad-
ministration

Great advances, too, were made during these reigns in the substitution for the various forms of feudalism of the uniform administration of the royal power. Feudalism was of course still strong ; but there was an irresistible tendency for the royal power to encroach on its judicial and financial functions. The House of Bourbon on the middle Loire alone could think of a struggle with the monarchy on the equal terms that had been usual a century earlier. The nobles owed their power, which still was very great, to their lands and their wealth ; no longer to their retainers, their courts, and their feudal revenues. They became a privileged class, separate from the rest of the nation ; they no longer, or rarely, represented a whole province of the nation against the King. The instruments by which this change had been effected were the royal Council, and the parlements, and the royal officials in the provinces, the *baillis*, and the *sénéchaux*. Francis I had instituted a small Council—*le conseil des affaires*—and through this could act with decisive swiftness. The country was covered with royal functionaries, in numbers beyond what any other country in Europe knew. But a source of weakness

must also be noted. Already the practice of selling offices under the Crown, whether judicial or administrative, had begun, and soon developed into one of the most characteristic features of French political life. It brought a considerable sum of money into the royal coffers, but it was a great source of weakness and inefficiency for the next two centuries and a half.

France was prosperous and the monarchy popular. In the States-General of 1506—which had no right to the name, for they rested on no basis of election—King Louis XII had been solemnly declared “father of his People” (*Pater Patriae*). It is impossible of course to tell how widely this popularity extended, but the Italian wars at first rather increased the wealth of the country than placed any intolerable burdens upon it. A new spirit in art and letters and religion—fed partly from Germany and partly from Italy—was stirring in the nation. The Kings of France were confident of their strength and full of ambition to play a great part in European affairs.

Just before the question of the Imperial election came to embitter international relationships, the Crown of France had made a great and immensely important addition to its strength by signing the Concordat of Bologna with Pope Leo X. It was the greatest French gain from the battle of Marignano, and is an event of the utmost significance and importance for the history of France and of Europe during the period of the Reformation. The document is a short one and its meaning plain. The Pragmatic sanction of Bourges (1438) had declared Councils supreme over the Popes; had suppressed certain payments hitherto made by the Church in France to Rome; and had placed the appointment of the great ecclesiastics in the hands of the clergy themselves. This arrangement was widely popular; it flattered the sentiment of national independence which was growing to be strong in France, and it was in agreement with those Gallican liberties which were so tenaciously held by churchmen and lawyers. But it offended two all-important Powers; the Papacy, from whom it took power and income; and the King, who had no direct control over ecclesiastics, with all their wealth and influence. When, therefore, Francis I met Pope Leo X at Bologna, it was not

difficult to come to an agreement. The Pragmatic was to be abolished. The great appointments in the Church in France were to be made by the King, though the Pope was still to possess the right of institution, which gave him a certain power of protest against unsuitable candidates. The payment of annates to the Pope (one year's income of all benefices), though not mentioned in the Concordat, was in effect renewed.

Results
of the
Concordat

The arrangement made at Bologna lasted down to the French Revolution, and it is important to note its effects. The Church in France remained Gallican, and semi-independent, extremely ready to take umbrage at any interference of the Papacy in the ecclesiastical affairs of France. The aristocratic self-government which had been set up by the Pragmatic gave way to direct royal control. Bishops and Archbishops were henceforward royal agents; the wealth of the Church was very largely at the disposal of the King, and was used by him without scruple; the great ecclesiastics of France became as secular in their outlook and as royalist in their loyalties as the Bishops of the English Church after the breach with Rome. And from this state of things ensued two important consequences. The Kings of France had none of the inducements which acted so powerfully on Henry VIII of England in his quarrel with the Papacy. They already controlled the Church without any Protestant Revolution. The Protestant movement in France was in its early stages a challenge to the royal authority, and Rome was not a rival but an ally. But the royal control of the Church was not favourable to purity of life or to devotion or to good discipline. Many of the worst abuses of the Church are traceable to the secularization of its government, and these abuses had much influence in promoting the growth of Protestant opinions. Further, there grew up in France a wide division between the upper clergy, who owed their appointments to the Crown, and the lower clergy, who were in closer touch with the people. This division again corresponds closely to the relations of the Bishops and the English clergy after the Revolution of 1688. It remained a feature of French society down to the Revolution.

It is important to notice that the Concordat was by no

means welcome to the clergy and lawyers of France. It was represented as a continuation of the Pragmatic; as being itself a sort of "royal pragmatic"; but it was clearly an attack on the self-government of the Church, which was the nearest approach to self-government that the nation possessed. Parlement held strongly by the Pragmatic and regarded the Concordat as an attack on the cherished privileges of "Gallicanism." It was only after a struggle that the Concordat was registered; and there were grumblings of protest against the new system right through the sixteenth century. They were bound to be ineffective, for the Concordat was a pillar of the royal power, which it would on no account abandon.

SPAIN

The accumulation of the territories belonging to the Austrian House, to the Dukes of Burgundy, and to the Spanish Crown in the hands of one individual, and that individual the head of the House of Habsburg, was the result in part of the subtle and provident matrimonial policy for which that House is so famous. But, if policy had played a large part in producing the result, accident had also had its share. The foundations of the power were laid when Maximilian married Mary, the heiress of the Burgundian lands. If their son, Philip, had survived his father, he would have inherited both the Habsburg and the Burgundian lands; of course he transmitted his claim to his son. Philip married Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, King and Queen of united Spain. It was this marriage which united the Spanish lands with those of Austria and Burgundy; but such a result was by no means certain at first; for Joanna was the second daughter and there was a son, John. But John died and Isabella, the eldest daughter, had no issue, and so Joanna was the recognized heiress of the Crown of Spain. She handed on her claims to her son, Charles, who also inherited Burgundy and Austria from his father. No man had ever claimed to rule over so vast a territory; for when the elective Empire was added to the other lands, Charles claimed sovereignty over more than half of western Europe and over the northern

and southern continents of America as well. The construction of this World-Empire was not the result of any continuous family policy. Here also accident played its part. Maximilian and his son, Philip, had not always been on good terms, and the union of the Burgundian inheritance with the Habsburg lands had been for some time doubtful. Then Joanna of Spain was afflicted with incurable mental trouble, and on the death of Philip in 1506, when Ferdinand of Aragon became Regent of Castile, he seemed inclined to support the succession of Ferdinand, the younger brother of Charles, to the Spanish Crown. But other counsels prevailed and, when King Ferdinand died in 1516, Charles was accepted as King in all parts of the now united Spanish monarchy.

Charles
I and V

The new ruler was born at Ghent in 1500, and was thus in his seventeenth year when he inherited the Spanish throne. Europe was profoundly influenced by his character and aims during more than forty years of critical religious and international conflicts. He was by no means an impressive personality. He was slight in build, with a pale complexion and prominent eyes. He had the characteristic protruding jaw of his family, which rendered both speech and mastication somewhat difficult. He spoke several languages, but all of them badly, and he had little charm or dignity of manner. But, as the future was to show, he was no commonplace character. He took his responsibilities seriously; he had patience and sound judgment, and he chose his ministers well. He was of course a Catholic, and was never attracted by the new ideas which were soon to spread over Europe: but he was far from fanaticism. In religion he was what would have been called in France at a later period a "*politique*"; he thought above all things of the bearing of religious questions on the life of the State, and he worked continuously for some settlement of religious strife.

We will briefly note the condition of the Spanish and German lands at the time when the Imperial election came to throw a new cause of discord into a Europe which was only too ready for war.

Condition
of Spain

Spain stood at the beginning of her Imperial history of which she is legitimately proud; and Charles was the ruler

during whose reign, and by reason of whose policy, she began to assume a position in Europe that challenged the first place among the nations. But at first Charles was neither Spanish in sympathy nor popular in Spain. He was a Netherlander by birth, training, and inclinations. He spoke no Spanish, and understood little of the national ways. When in 1517 he arrived in Spain to claim the throne that he had inherited, he was accompanied by Flemish councillors and ministers, and he brought with him a display of pomp and luxury which displeased the simple and in some ways puritanic tastes of the Spaniards. Nor did his behaviour in Spain improve the first impression. Cardinal Ximenes, who had done so much for the royal house and the unity of Spain, was curtly dismissed.¹ Charles' chief adviser was the Burgundian Croy, Lord of Chièvres, and with him came a crowd of place and fortune hunters from the Low Countries who settled in Spain like conquerors. Charles showed little respect for the constitutional forms of the country, and encountered sharp opposition at Valladolid in Castile; at Saragossa in Aragon; and at Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, which, more than any part of Spain, was tenacious of her privileges and liberties. While Charles was busy with his progresses through the land, the death of his grandfather, Maximilian, occurred in Germany (January 1519), and Charles was eager to leave Spain in order to be able to compete advantageously for the great prize of the Empire. That prize, as we shall see, could not be won without money, and he called the *cortes* to Santiago di Compostella in the hope of inducing them to make him a grant. He had altered the traditional procedure and the method of appointment of members; but they refused to grant money until their grievances had been considered; and in consequence he adjourned the assembly to Corunna where he proposed to embark. There, bribery and some concessions produced the promise of a substantial grant, and he left for Germany in May 1519. He had created a painful impression in Spain, by his foreign speech and ways, and his tampering with the constitution of the Cortes and the privileges of the different classes of people.

¹ Ximenes died in November 1517, and it seems probable that the letter of dismissal never reached him. See Merriman's *Spanish Empire*, iii, 30.

The rising
of the
comuneros

Hardly had he left the country when a large part of the peninsula broke out into a rebellion which seemed to threaten the very existence of the strong monarchy. It was a strange movement. Spain soon came to be regarded as of all European countries the most enthusiastically loyal to its Sovereign ; but now the whole fabric of the monarchy seemed in danger. The root of the whole trouble was that the Spaniards felt Charles to be a foreigner, and believed that he was conducting the Government in the interest of his rapacious Flemish servants. Castile was the chief centre of the rising of the *comuneros*, and here all classes of society joined in an attempt to overthrow the royal power. Nobles like la Vega and Padilla and ecclesiastics like Antonio de Acuña, Bishop of Zamora (who raised an efficient troop from among his clergy) joined with the middle classes of the towns. They swept away all opposition ; they seized the person of the poor Queen Joanna, and thus secured a semblance of constitutional authority. The King's representative was his former tutor, Bishop Adrian of Utrecht, and he was disinclined for strong measures and proved quite unequal to settling the matter by conciliation. Valladolid fell into the hands of the insurgents who established a Council there ; and there seemed no place left in Spain for a monarchy that did not take the people's wishes into consideration. Yet the King's cause triumphed in the end, and it is easier to understand the victory of the insurgents than their subsequent failure. But at this crisis, as is usual in Spanish history, the strong separatist feeling of the provinces and classes was an important factor. The South did not join heartily with the North ; there was no agreement among the leaders as to what the aims of the rising should be, and there was strong opposition of interests between the towns and the nobles. The royal armies were reinforced, and in April 1521 the insurgents were decisively routed at Villalar. The *comuneros* were suppressed without notable cruelty, though Padilla was executed, and his religious standing did not save the adventurous Bishop of Zamora from the garrote.

Rising in
Valencia

A different and interesting movement had broken out about the same time in Valencia, a separate kingdom, enriched by commerce and proud of its independence. There the

resistance to the King was maintained by a body that called itself the *Germania* or brotherhood. The nobles and the clergy had no part in the movement, which was in the hands of the workmen and guilds of the towns. The royal authority in aristocratic Spain found itself challenged by a weaver and a cloth-seller. The royal troops were at first beaten, and the Governor had to flee. But the movement was isolated, or found its only allies in the Balearic islands. No co-operation was established with the *comuneros* in Castile, and when Charles returned to Spain in 1522—Emperor as well as King—order had been restored, and it was only left to him to reward and punish.

He found himself in a far different position from that which Charles on his return to Spain he had occupied on his previous visit. He avoided his former mistakes; no longer made such prominent use of foreigners; and managed to speak the Spanish language. He had been little more than a boy when last he came; he was a man now, and already showed the qualities that were to distinguish him throughout. As his reign went on he identified himself more and more with Spain, and Spain grew to be proud of the position given her by the Imperial connection. The dangerous civil war, which was just over, had shown the needs of a strong Government for the maintenance of order and peace, and the different classes of society were too widely separated to allow them to combine in any common constitutional life. Moreover, during these years a new force had come in on the King's side. The Protestant movement had begun; and Charles was its decided antagonist. Catholicism was in Spain not only a religion, but also a symbol of her national existence, to which she had attached herself with passionate enthusiasm during the Moorish wars. In Spain the King represented Catholicism almost more than the Pope; and the rise of Protestantism, which in some countries supported Liberalism, favoured a royalist reaction in Spain.

The movement of the *comuneros* had failed through lack of unity. Province clashed with province, class with class, town with country. The insurgents drew their chief strength from the national sentiment and the pride of Spain. And yet they had forfeited their right to speak for Spain, by their

dealings with her rivals and her enemies. They had appealed for help to Portugal, but had received a steady refusal, for which Charles expressed his deep gratitude. They had appealed to France, and France had given help. If that help had been greater, it might have been decisive; but King Francis had many interests, and could not afford sufficient troops or attention for Spanish affairs. Indeed, the form taken by the help which France afforded told seriously in the end against the *comuneros*. The Kingdom of Navarre had been already overrun, and what lay south of the Pyrenees had been annexed to the Crown of Castile. Its control of the passes of the western Pyrenees made it of the utmost value to Spain. The Cortes declared it to be "the principal key to their kingdom." The aim of French intervention was not the support of the armies of the towns or of the nobles of Castile; but the reconquest of Spanish Navarre for the French House of Albret. When, in 1521, the French invasion began, it seemed at first irresistible. It passed through Navarre and entered Castile. But it had arrived too late. The rising of the *comuneros* was already broken. A royal army drove the French back, and entirely routed them at Pampeluna (June 1521).

The Spanish
monarchy.

The reign of Charles is a period of internal quiet for Spain. Her soldiers were active in many parts of the world, and their reputation rose during the century; but in Spain itself there is little that demands notice until Charles is succeeded by his son, Philip II. The great mark of the time was the growth of the royal power. The constitutional machinery of Castile and of Aragon was not entirely destroyed, and in Castile the Cortes met with unusual frequency, though the nobles were excluded from its membership. The royal authority was successfully asserted against Cortes, nobles, and ecclesiastics. Spanish life changed as a result of its contact with the wide world, and many deplored the disappearance of the old rough simple customs and the expensiveness and the luxury that had come in from beyond the Pyrenees. Spain had to support a great deal of the burden of the vast Empire, of which she came to be considered the chief part. Her soldiers were the core of Charles' armies; and she had to provide a great part of the funds for his enterprises. Charles

was threatening an attack on the Danube, and his exploits in the East showed how dangerous his attack on Europe might be. Germany would want powerful military help and guidance to meet this foe ; and, since the battle of Marignano, Francis seemed to be a great soldier and leader of men. The fact that he was King of France would prevent him taking too much interest in the domestic concerns of Germany, and that was a recommendation. It seemed possible therefore that Germany might accept him ; and he pushed his candidature with the greatest energy. He found support from the Pope, Leo X, who was chiefly interested in the scheme of a great crusade against the expanding Turkish power. Francis' imagination kindled at the idea ; if he were elected he would, he said, soon be in Constantinople. But, above all, the Imperial title appealed to his ambition as being likely to lead to great power in Europe. After Marignano nothing seemed impossible to him. Why should he not restore the power of Charlemagne and unite western Christendom under a single head ? Charles, the heir of the Habsburg power and the grandson of the Emperor Maximilian, would of course be his rival for the title. At one time Henry VIII of England proposed to seek the suffrages of the electors, but the absurd proposal was soon abandoned.

The
Electors

It will be well to glance at the seven Electors. Albert, Archbishop of Mainz, was the brother of the Margrave Joachim, Elector of Brandenburg, and both were members of the House of Hohenzollern ; these two Electors played the leading part in the sordid intrigues which followed. The Archbishop-Elector of Trier was too near to the Habsburg power in the Netherlands to desire any increase in the strength of the House. The Archbishop of Köln played a subordinate part and followed his stronger colleagues. The other Electors were the King of Bohemia, a boy of thirteen, under the guardianship of the King of Poland and of the Emperor ; the Elector Palatine, Ludwig of Bavaria, who had had a personal quarrel with Maximilian and seemed unlikely to support his grandson ; and lastly Frederick of Saxony, who alone played a fairly honest part in this ugly drama.

Bribery of
Francis I

The first moves in the game went in favour of Francis. He offered bribes in the form of money down, lands, and

marriage settlements with shameless openness, and he secured promises of support from the Archbishops of Trier and Köln, and from the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Brandenburg. If promises solemnly made and duly signed had been able to bind the action of these men, the Imperial dignity was secured to the King of France, for he had, it seemed, four votes in the Electoral College of seven. But the game had only just begun. Maximilian was determined to defend the interests of his House. Charles was informed of the dangerous movement against his candidature, and sent money from Spain (though in his grandfather's opinion a quite insufficient amount) to counteract the manœuvres of the French King.

We cannot follow the details of the struggle.¹ The strongest impression that is left by the story is the shameless corruption of nearly all the Electors (all but the Duke of Saxony and the child King of Bohemia). These princes and prelates, the greatest powers and names in Germany, showed no sense of patriotism or responsibility or honour. No unreformed borough in England before 1832, no group of voters in the worst days of Tammany in New York, were ever more determined to get the last penny out of the political power that they possessed. The noble traditions of the Empire, the elaborate ceremonial, the solemn oaths make the corruption of the Electors specially repulsive.

Bribery of the most shameless and direct kind was the chief influence in the contest, but it would be a mistake to think that it was the only one. Influences
at work

The thought of the Turkish danger was much before men's minds. Some weight attached to the advice of the Pope. German national feeling was hardly self-conscious and was only active in restricted circles, but it was not a negligible force, and it told in favour of Charles. He was indeed King of Spain, but he had been born within the limits of the Empire, and his family was one of the foremost in Germany. It is interesting to note, too, that the centralization and efficiency of the French monarchy was itself a deterrent; the Electors and princes of Germany wanted nothing of that sort. Physical

¹ It has been brilliantly and amusingly told by Mignet in chap. ii of his *Rivalité de François I et Charles V.*

force or the threat of it came to reinforce the influence of money and nationality. The effort of Maximilian to suppress private war had produced little result. Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen were in fact leaders of mercenary soldiers, and they were courted with arguments and with bribes by both sides. When at last the Electors met at Frankfort in 1519, their deliberations were threatened by armed forces in the near neighbourhood. Francis I was mobilizing his forces beyond the border ; and it was already clear that open war was likely to follow the election, however it went.

The
Emperor
Charles V

The election took place in Frankfort in June 1519 according to all the ceremonies prescribed by the Golden Bull of 1356. It was soon found that the King of France had no chance. The Elector of Saxony might perhaps have been chosen if he had consented to be a candidate. But in the end Charles I of Spain became the Emperor Charles V by an unanimous vote.

Before Charles was finally accepted, he had to sign certain conditions. He promised to abide by the privileges, laws, and customs of the Empire ; to establish no new tax, to undertake no war, to conclude no treaty, to convoke no Diet, without the approval of the Electors. No foreigners were to be employed in Germany as soldiers or as ministers. The Electors had no intention of giving Charles more than the name and ceremony of power.

The Lutheran movement had already begun, though its importance was not yet guessed. Had the Empire been a reality it would have had a decisive influence upon the religious movement. The Empire was constantly talked about, and its tradition had an appeal for the German mind ; but the story of the election of Charles V shows how utterly its machinery had fallen into decay, and how it lacked, both morally and politically, any principle of health and strength. The election of Francis I would not have mended matters. It would have probably been ruinous to France and in no way helpful to Germany. That he should have proceeded with his candidature with such determination and at such great cost gives us no favourable idea of his political capacity.

At the end of the electoral contest the relations of the two competitors were already hostile, and none doubted that war would soon follow. War was entered upon lightly in the sixteenth century, and doubtless the personal animosity between the two rivals had an important influence on their relations to the end of their lives. But it would have been difficult even for more serious statesmen to maintain the peace. The Balance of Power in Europe had been altogether upset by the events of the last few years ; first by Charles' accession to the Spanish Crown and then by his winning of the Imperial dignity. The Empire perhaps brought him no increase of power, but it was not impossible that it might lead to the consolidation of Germany in his hands and the building up of a power such as Europe had not known since the Roman Empire. The ideas of the sixteenth century—and of any century before the creation of the League of Nations—made a determined resistance to such a menace on the part of France inevitable.

There was on both sides an eager competition for alliances. The Pope and the King of England were the most important European Powers left outside of the territories of the combatants—for at first neither side thought of bringing the power of Turkey into the struggle—and Francis believed himself secure of the support of both England and the Papacy. But here, as in his calculations on the Imperial election, he showed himself a poor diplomatist, or at any rate he was faced by an antagonist more skilful in the game. The relations of the three western Powers in 1520 are an instructive example of the character of the diplomacy of the sixteenth century ; of its unscrupulousness, its falseness, and its financial dishonesty. Wolsey and his royal master were not more high principled than the agents of France and Spain. The Field of the Cloth of Gold was on both sides an elaborate deception ; the interviews of Charles with Henry in England and the conferences at Calais came nearer to reality ; and in the end the help of England was promised to Charles. Nor were the relations of the Pope Leo X with the French King more sincere. He spoke indeed of “ living and dying in a true union and perfect friendship ” with the French King. But Charles had offered him the better terms, and seemed to have

the greater power to realize them. So Leo X promised to support the Emperor and waited for a suitable opportunity to do so.

A long war was about to begin, containing great military incidents ; but, though its military and political issues were of real importance, more important was its influence on the religious struggle which had just broken out in Germany ; and to that we must now turn.

CHAPTER IV

THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY

THE decade from 1515 to 1525 is the most controversial An age of controversy in the history of Europe. Political controversies die down after a time, either because sufficient evidence is available to decide the issue, or because men are weary of the dispute or no longer interested in it. But the vitality of religions and of religious organizations prolongs the life of religious disputes from generation to generation. The schism in the western Church produced by the Protestant Revolution is still a vital fact in European life, and the causes from which it sprang are differently judged, and the difference is still maintained with almost unabated heat.

A good deal of the controversy and the most fundamental part lies outside of the scope of history, as it is ordinarily interpreted. We cannot in this book enter on the question of transubstantiation, justification by faith, predestination, or confession; nor upon the origins of the Papacy, or the comparative value of Episcopacy and Presbyterianism. We must note the dividing line between the different confessions without judging the merits of the theological dispute. Nor is it profitable to debate much on the characters of the leading figures in the struggle. Luther and Ignatius Loyola, Calvin and Cranmer will continue to be judged differently according to the value which is attached to the movements which they defended. Agreement is hardly to be expected.

But it may be possible to define, even if it is not possible The questions at issue to decide, points of a historical character round which the controversy is fought. The western Church suffered during the sixteenth century the most violent blow that it had ever received. Half of western Europe broke away from its

allegiance to Rome. And this great rebellion occurred in a world which for more than a thousand years had been under the direct and indirect influence of Catholic Christianity, so that there were few educated people outside of the ranks of the clergy. What were the causes of the great convulsion? How did it affect society and government as well as religion?

1. What was the attitude of Europe before the Reformation to the Church and to churchmen? Were men chafing under the control of thought and life by ecclesiastical authority and ready to avail themselves of the first opportunity to throw off an intolerable burden? Was the Protestant Reformation the continuation of the Albigensian, Wickliffite, and Hussite movements; the last and the most successful movement of an exasperated Europe against the doctrines and morals of the Church? Or was the authority of the Church accepted without difficulty in matters of faith and morals, and did the movement spring from social, financial, and political causes rather than from religious? The view taken in this book is that there was little open intellectual opposition to the doctrines and theology of Rome at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but that their hold on the reason and conscience of men was slight and easily shaken.

2. Then, what was the condition of the Church itself? That there were abuses is admitted on both sides. The Council of Trent is the sufficient proof that all was not well. Uncontrolled wealth and power had exercised an evil influence on their possessors, and the Church had not adapted itself to the changing conditions of the age. So much is admitted. But what was the extent of the evil? Was there a very general, an almost universal, falling away from the standards that the Church proclaimed among the secular clergy and in the monasteries; a condition of things so grave that only catastrophe and revolution could produce any remedy? Or was the evil less serious; one that would yield to Papal treatment; one which the Church was already preparing to deal with? Was the religious disruption of western Europe too heavy a price to pay for the vigour which the new movement brought and the destruction of religious

The
opposition
to the
Roman
Church

Was
internal
reform
possible?

abuses both in the churches that broke from Rome and in the Roman Church herself? No final answer can ever be given to this question, for it is a question of values as well as of evidence; and many would hold that no abuses could justify schism. But the writer of this book has been more and more struck by the accumulation of evidence of the moral, financial, and legal iniquities practised by churchmen in the hundred years before Luther; and more and more inclined to doubt the possibility of internal reform.

Was the
Reformation
a religious
movement?

3. Underneath these questions there is a deeper one. What were the motives of the actors in the great drama of the Reformation on both sides? Was the Reformation really a religious movement? Were men really in earnest about the meaning of transubstantiation and the varying interpretations of the Eucharist in the Protestant Churches, about justification by faith and predestination; or were these merely a cover, unconsciously adopted, behind which men fought for political and social and economic ends? The economic interpretation of the Reformation has been much insisted on of late; and there can be no doubt at all that questions of finance and government exercised a powerful influence on the actors on both sides. But my own conviction is that the greatest misinterpretation of the period is to mistake secondary motives for primary. Throughout history, in modern times equally with ancient, the strongest of all forces has been the conviction held by masses of men that they have found a clue to the government of the universe and that they can co-operate with it and be helped by it. It seems to me impossible to believe that the great leaders on either side or their followers were inspired, as their main motive for action, by anything else than a sense of religious obligation. Saint Ignatius and Saint Thomas More and the great Popes of the century, equally with Luther and Calvin and Cranmer, were impelled by a desire to do the will of God.¹

¹ The divergence of view may be seen by quotations from two great historians. Mr. H. C. Lea writes in the *Camb. Mod. Hist.*, i, 653: "The religious changes incident to the Reformation were not the object sought but the means of attaining that object. The existing ecclesiastical system was the practical evolution of dogma, and the overthrow of dogma was the only way to obtain permanent relief from the intolerable abuses of that system." (Yet these abuses were largely removed even in the countries which remained

It is an entire mistake to regard Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century as "sunk in medieval torpor," and only set on a course of activity and greatness by the Lutheran movement. There was on the contrary the greatest activity in all departments of life; and the Lutheran movement comes as a natural sequel to this. Germany was a very large country, and there was so little unity in it that all generalizations are apt to be misleading. But if Germany be regarded as identical with the Holy Roman Empire north of the Alps, there was eager intellectual life and speculation and much solid achievement in political, commercial, and religious matters. Of the political condition of Germany we have already spoken. Little can be said in favour of the constitution of the Empire, and the interesting efforts that had been made to reform it, whether in the direction of aristocratic control or royal concentration, had come to little or nothing. But there was change in many of the states of the Empire, and Brandenburg and Bavaria and Saxony exhibited many of the same tendencies which are to be observed in the greater states of western Europe. Commerce was making great advances. The great bankers—the Welzers and the Fuggers—were the successful rivals of the financiers of Italy. The cities were losing much of their old independence to the territorial states, but they were not becoming poorer. There was much wealth and display in them, and much devotion to art and music. The cities of the Danube and the Rhine valleys and some of the cities on the Baltic were as splendid in their architecture and as turbulent in their politics as the cities of Italy had been before the establishment of the strong rulers there. It was a great period in the history of German painting, and the artists of Germany can challenge comparison even with the great names of contemporary Italy without much fear. The greatest names of the Low Countries belong to the period that just precedes this; Memling died in 1494; but the tradition of Netherlandish art

Condition of
Germany

Art in
Germany

faithful to Rome.) Ranke had written long before of the Lutheran movement in Germany: "Not that the spiritual grounds were in any degree excited by the financial; that it would be impossible to maintain after a careful examination of the facts; on the contrary the spiritual motives were more original, powerful and independent than the temporal, though these were important." Lamprecht in his *Deutsche Geschichte* holds that the interaction of spiritual and temporal forces in history is a subject not yet sufficiently thought out.

was worthily maintained by Matsys and Lucas von Leyden. The central German school on the other hand was reaching its zenith. Dürer's career (1471-1528) coincides with that of Luther; Holbein's (1497-1543) even more closely; and these great men are typical and representative of many others. Their art is more homely, and takes more account of the life of the middle classes and even of the peasantry than the contemporary art of Italy. The least knowledge of their work serves to correct the idea of a Germany reduced to lifelessness under political and ecclesiastical tyranny.

**Education in
Germany**

The intellectual life of Germany was vigorous, and there was great interest in education. The schools of the Brethren of the Common Life had for more than a hundred years exercised a useful influence. Above all things, it was a great period for the founding of Universities; no other part of Europe showed anything like the enthusiasm for University education which Germany did. Seventeen Universities had been founded in 150 years; seven of them since 1450. Princes and cities were all eager to possess a University. On the roads travelling scholars were a common sight; a strange and often disreputable company; but their existence and the support accorded them show the estimation in which University education was held. New methods of instruction were being tried; new tendencies of thought were observable.

**The
Renaissance
in Germany**

The new intellectual currents of Europe—which are generally summed up by the word Renaissance—were vigorous on German soil. Scholars had made their way across the Alps and had brought back a keen interest in the study of classical antiquity, and a strong school of humanism sprung up in Erfurt and elsewhere. The three most typical names are Mutianus Rufus, Reuchlin, and Erasmus. Mutianus had studied at Bologna and had settled at Gotha, near the University of Erfurt, which was known as pre-eminently the humanistic University of Germany. There he was the centre of a humanist—or as a later age would have said, liberal—circle, praising the classics, and attacking with irony the clergy and their ideas, though he was himself a canon of the Church of Gotha. Reuchlin (1455-1522) was a far more important name, and marks a great achievement of the

scholarship of the time. He had studied the classics in Rome, and on his return to Germany taught Greek with great effect. But his real importance in the history of scholarship is to be found in the services he rendered to the study of Hebrew. He attached a superstitious importance to the language—it was, he believed, the language spoken by God—and he urged the study not only of the Old Testament but of other Hebrew writings also. If he had died in 1509, he would have been known as the father of Hebrew studies in modern Europe. But in that year he became involved in a dispute which has become perhaps more famous than it deserves to be. Pfefferkorn a converted Jew, was impelled by his zeal for his new religion to propose that all Hebrew books, except the Old Testament, should be confiscated and destroyed. The evil work was actually begun, and Pfefferkorn appealed to Reuchlin to help him in the work. Not only did he refuse, but he defended and praised the literature of the Jews, insisting on the help which it gave to Biblical studies, and recommending “reasonable, gentle, and kindly” discussion with the Jews. The answer provoked bitter opposition, and a fierce quarrel ensued. It was a scholars’ quarrel, and was conducted with the acrimony characteristic of learned disputes in the sixteenth century. But it became more than a scholars’ quarrel; it interested all educated men in Germany; and circles that knew nothing of the real points at issue were drawn into it. The cause of this was the publication of a book with the title, *Letters of Obscure Men*. The book was a mocking and ironic attack on Reuchlin’s enemies, suggested by one that Reuchlin himself had published, *Letters of Illustrious Men*, in which he had collected testimonies to the soundness of his own scholarship. The second book ridicules the men of the old learning, by showing them occupied with absurd, pedantic controversies, in which they exhibit vast ignorance and folly. The humour is often heavy and coarse, but there is plenty of real amusement to be found in the book. The method is clearly unfair, but the shafts stuck; and the men of the old learning were covered with ridicule. The affair has no connection with the Protestant Reformation, but it shows the wide circle to which a learned quarrel could appeal in Germany. It may be

*The Letters
of Obscure
Men*

doubted whether there would have been such wide interest shown in any other country.

Religion in
Germany

Nor was the religious life of Germany inert in the days before Luther. Visitors to Germany sometimes spoke of the devotion of the country to the Roman Church. There was a very general practice of pilgrimages, and fresh places were adopted as goals for pious pilgrims. Saint James of Compostella in Spain, St. Michael in Normandy were visited by constant streams of German pilgrims. Pilgrimage to Jerusalem was, since the coming of the Turks, dangerous and rarely undertaken, but Rome was constantly visited. German shrines, too, in the fifty years before the rise of the Lutheran movement had won a new popularity for pilgrimages; Priegnitz in Brandenburg, where the consecrated wafer was alleged to have bled, Grimmental for the picture of the Blessed Virgin, Duren for the head of Saint Anna, to whom a special cult was paid during these years.¹

A notable feature of the time was the issue of translations of the Bible. These were translations from the Vulgate, not from the original Greek or Hebrew. Fourteen of these translations of the whole Bible were printed. They show certainly a surprising interest in the Scriptures, though we have no clue to the extent of their sale. There was a real religious revival in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and one of the chief agencies in the movement was the body of the Augustinian Eremites. As their name implies, these men had at first been hermits, but they had become practically indistinguishable from ordinary monks, and were famed for the strictness of their life and their effective preaching. It was this Order that attracted Luther; it was from this that he delivered his attack on the doctrines and practices of the Roman Church.

Germany
and the
Reformation

No one foresaw the Protestant Revolution. No one seems to have thought of Germany as containing elements particularly dangerous to Rome. Why did the movement come in Germany and why was it successful there? No final answer can be given to these often-asked questions. The personality,

¹ See T. M. Lindsay's *History of the Reformation* for an interesting treatment of pre-Reformation religion in Germany.

the will power, and the attractive force of Luther himself counted for much. But if the fundamental cause escapes our analysis, it is clear that there were strong secondary causes, which favoured the Protestant movement in Germany. Its success stands in close relation to the triumph of the Papacy over the Empire in its long medieval struggle. The unity of Germany had been broken and the strength of the empire much diminished. No force had been left in Germany which could effectively resist the pressure of ecclesiastical abuses in finance and law, as they were resisted for instance in France and England. The financial burdens placed by the Church on Germany were heavier than in any other country in Europe, and as soon as an opportunity offered there was a great eagerness to get rid of them.

There were certain special causes of weakness in the Church in Germany. It was immensely rich, and the wealth was largely in the hands of the aristocracy. There was throughout Europe a tendency for the rich livings and the bishoprics and abbeys to fall into the hands of members of noble Houses, but nowhere was this evil tendency so marked as in Germany, and no House was so guilty of "pluralism" as the House of Brandenburg. There was thus a wide gulf between the upper and the ordinary clergy in Germany. The numbers of priests and of inmates of monastic institutions was very large indeed, far beyond the requirements of the spiritual life of the country. These men are described by a writer friendly to Rome as "a spiritual proletariat, which extended over a large area and formed a constant danger to the Church, being ready at any moment to attach itself to whatever movement promised to injure her."¹ The chief danger to the Roman Church came from the ranks of her own official servants. The poor clergy saw in the Protestant movement an opportunity of avenging their grievances against the higher ecclesiastics; the rich often welcomed the movement as allowing them to convert church property into their personal possession; the inmates of the monasteries showed a surprising readiness to abandon them for a secular life.

¹ Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, 300.

German
nationality

Then, too, the sentiment of nationality, in spite of the fact that it had no satisfactory channel of expression, was strong in Germany. Everywhere Protestantism was closely connected with nationality ; and it is clear that German national feeling found expression in the words and ideas of Luther. Rome and the Empire came to be regarded by many as foreign. Lutheranism was wholly German. The progress and survival of the Lutheran movement depended too very largely on the international situation. The Emperor never for a moment wavered in his devotion to Rome, though he was far from being the fanatical bigot that he has sometimes been represented. If his hands had been free he would have taken measures for the suppression of heresy. But his world-wide Empire rarely left him free to attend to the religious problems of Germany. The Turks continually threatened from the east ; France was a perpetual menace on the west. The Protestant movement in Germany, from nearly the beginning right down to the end, was closely connected with the foreign policy of France. The Kings of France were as loyal to Rome as Charles himself, and they tried to suppress heresy in their own dominions. But the master motive of their foreign policy was jealousy and fear of the Habsburg power. The religious schism made the political unity of Germany more than ever difficult. The statesmen of France, from Francis I down to Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, supported the Protestants of Germany and won Alsace and much of Lorraine by their support. It is hardly too much to say that German Protestantism owed its survival to the support of Catholic France.

France
and the
Reformation

Luther

Luther's life before 1517 is interesting, but in no way exceptional. He was born in 1483 of peasant parents. He went to school in Eisenach, and, like many other scholars in Germany, begged in the streets in order to procure his maintenance. Then he went to the University of Erfurt to study law. Erfurt University was distinguished for its humanism, and various religious tendencies fermented there. Luther became a master of the University in 1505 ; and then, acting on some sudden impulse, the exact nature of which cannot be determined, he became a monk in the convent of the Augus-

tinian Eremites.¹ He was noted for his devout observance of the rules of his establishment. There is no sign in these early days of any interest in social or political questions. His whole attention was given to religious contemplation and the "salvation of his own soul." And in pursuit of this object, he studied the Scriptures and the writings of Saint Augustine and Saint Bernard.

He was known as a man of vigorous character and intellect, and in 1508 a road opened to a rather wider influence than he could have exercised from within the walls of his convent. He went to the neighbouring University of Wittenberg to complete his studies in theology. It was the newest and the smallest of the Universities of Germany, and was very largely in the control of the Order to which Luther belonged. It had been founded in 1502 by the Elector of Saxony, whose upright conduct during the Imperial election we have already noticed. The foundation of the University illustrates the enthusiasm felt in Germany at the time for education and Universities, but the history of Wittenberg so far had not been encouraging. The town of about 3000 inhabitants was unable to provide a sufficient number of students, and at one time their numbers fell to fifty-six. Wittenberg seemed as little likely to be the origin of a world-shaking movement as Mecca in the seventh century. Luther's high character, energy, and strength of will were well adapted to give him prominence in any surroundings. He was sent in 1511 to represent his Order in Rome. He was made District Vicar over eleven convents of the Order. He became Doctor of the Faculty of Theology in 1512, and Professor of Theology in the University. It was his chief business now to teach and to preach, and he did both with success.

As this period is the most controversial in the history of Europe, so is Luther the most controversial individual in

Luther at
Witten-
berg

The
character
of Luther

¹ The Augustinian Eremites were technically friars, not monks; yet it would be pedantic not to call Luther a monk. He calls himself so—"if ever a monk reached heaven by monkish life I also resolved I would reach it." The Emperor calls him a monk in his Declaration of Policy. He is called neither monk nor friar in the Bull of excommunication; but his contemporaries in Germany usually call him a monk. The rule of these Augustinians, it appears, had closely approximated to that of the Benedictines.

it.¹ The same features are hardly recognizable in the accounts given of his character by enemies and friends. The upright, noble, deeply religious enthusiast, who, pursuing at all costs what he thought truth and right, created a free Germany and modern European civilization (for so he appears to his admirers), becomes in the eyes of others a coarse and foul-mouthed egoist, self-deceived and a deceiver of others, who broke the unity of western Europe and plunged Germany and Europe into those divisions out of which came the Thirty Years' War and a general condition of international anarchy. If we found our judgment on his letters, his table talk, and his public acts, it seems possible to affirm certain features; the intense earnestness of his quest and conviction of religious truth; a markedly poetic element in his outlook on life and a great sympathy with inanimate nature and with animals; strength and even violence of feeling, which gave rise to alternating elation and depression, and found expression in a coarseness of language, which does not however go beyond what was usually employed in the controversies of the time; and lastly an amazing energy, courage, and faith which allowed him to face all dangers, and to remain down to his death not merely a great name but a great influence in the movement that sprang from his action.

The sale of
Indulgences

In 1517 the Dominican Friar, Tetzel, undertook the recommendation and sale of Indulgences for Albert, Archbishop of Mainz. The profits of the enterprise were to go partly to the Archbishop and partly to the Pope, and the Papal income was specially reserved for the building of the new Saint Peter's. There had already been a good deal of opposition to Indulgences in Germany, and Tetzel's mission did not extend to the territories of the Elector of Saxony; but he was admitted into those of the Elector of Brandenburg—the brother of the Archbishop of Mainz—and on his arrival at Jüterbog and at Zerbst was within easy reach of Wittenberg.

Four graces were mentioned in the instructions of the Archbishop Albert to Tetzel. By the first, those who were contrite and had confessed and who made the necessary pay-

¹ "At the present day there is less agreement in the opinions formed of him than at any former period" (Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, 291).

ment (the tariff for different classes of penitents was set out at length) were to receive "full remission of all their sins" and of "the penalties to be paid in purgatory for the offence to the divine majesty." By the fourth, the payments of the living would secure the "plenary remission of all sins" for souls in purgatory, in proportion to the charity in which the deceased had departed from the world and the payment of his living friend.¹

The controversy as to the meaning and theory of Indulgences still continues. It is certain that those who sold Indulgences did not always insist on the conditions and reservations by which the theologians had surrounded them. In the official theory of Indulgences no payment removed the guilt of sin or touched the condition of souls in Hell; they affected only the censures decreed by the Church and the pains of purgatory. But to the general public it seemed that the remission of the penalty of sin could be bought for a price, and Tetzel's sermons gave colour to this supposition.² The struggle over Indulgences came on accidentally; but no controversy could go nearer the root of the Protestant movement. For Indulgences were a great and elastic source of Papal income, and they seemed to Luther to represent that external and mechanical view of the relation of man to God against which his soul was in revolt.

The action taken by Luther belongs in form to the ordinary academic proceedings of the Middle Ages. He drew up ninety-five Theses, which he was prepared to defend by argument, and he affixed them to the door of a Wittenberg church. They would be more effective to modern minds if they had been much fewer, and many deal with points of theology about which the common man would have little interest. They are not an attack on the Pope; the fiftieth runs, "Christians ought to be taught that if the Pope knew the exactions of his corrupt preachers he would rather see the cathedral of Saint Peter's burnt to ashes than built on the

¹ The text of this and other important documents is given by Dr. Kidd in his invaluable *Documents of the Continental Reformation*.

² In a specimen sermon he represents deceased relatives saying, "have pity on us for we are in most grievous pains and torments from which you may redeem us with a little alms and you will not" (Kidd, p. 18).

skin, flesh, and bones of his flock." But they are an attack on the necessity of institutional religion. Thus the thirty-sixth thesis says, "Every truly contrite Christian (*vere compunctus*) has plenary remission of sin and punishment, even without letters of pardon."

The interest in the controversy mounted with amazing rapidity. It is clear that there was a vast amount of half-conscious public opinion in Germany ready to welcome and to support any attack on the power and doctrines of the Roman Church. A strong reaction came later as men realized more fully all the implications of the revolt, and found that the triumph of Lutheranism took from them much that they valued for both spiritual and material reasons; but at first the tide seemed to set irresistibly in Luther's favour.

Two closely connected movements have to be traced; the development of the religious movement; and the protection of it by the political and international condition of Germany.

Develop-
ment of
the
Lutheran
move-
ment

The religious movement grew with wonderful rapidity and developed into more and more decided hostility to the Roman Church. The year 1518 was a period of negotiation and of attempts to win Luther back into submission to the Roman communion. The chief incident was that Luther met Cardinal Cajetan, the Papal legate, and was called on by him to confess his errors and to promise not to repeat them. Luther answered in a manner characteristic of the age by declaring himself ready to accept the judgment of one of the great Universities. An effort to secure his arrest and removal to Rome failed through the protection of the Elector of Saxony, who, though by no means in sympathy with Luther's religious views, would not allow one of his subjects to be tried in Rome. In 1519 the breach with Rome became more definite. A disputation was arranged between Luther and Eck, the champion of the old learning. The meeting was to take place in Leipzig, and the subject was to be the primacy and supremacy of the Pope. The interest in Germany was great, and at Leipzig it rose to intense excitement. Luther was driven to admit a certain resemblance between his ideas and those of John Huss, who had been condemned as a heretic by the Council of Constance. It would now be easy to secure his condemnation as a heretic.

His words had brought him under suspicion of heresy, and now his pen made that view inevitable. He wrote during 1520 what are known as the three great Reformation Treatises: (1) An Appeal to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation; (2) On the Liberty of a Christian man; and (3) On the Babylonish Captivity of the Church. All the essential Lutheran views are to be found here; the exclusive authority of the Scriptures; the direct access of the believer to God without the necessity of the intervention of the Church; the reduction of the sacraments to three; the hostility of the Roman Church to the best interests of the German people; "if the Pope acts contrary to the Scriptures we are bound to stand by the Scriptures."

The great
Reformation
Treatises

The Papal Bull of excommunication was prepared before the publication of these treatises. It was issued in Rome in June 1520, but did not appear in Wittenberg until October. Forty-one opinions were attributed to Luther and denounced as heretical. They mostly concern the theory of Indulgences, the power and functions of the Pope, and the possibility of error in the Church. One clause attracts more attention now than it did at the time. Luther was condemned for holding that "it was contrary to the will of the Holy Spirit that heretics should be burnt."¹

Bull of
excom-
munication

Order was given that Luther's books should be burnt, and that he should recant his opinions on the pain of being declared a heretic.

Luther thus found himself in the position of Huss and Wicklif; he was in open conflict with the Church. Wicklif and Huss, after notable successes, had both failed. Could Luther hope for a better fate? That would be decided at the Diet of the Empire which was to be held in Worms in April 1521. Before the meeting of that august body, Luther took a characteristic step. He solemnly burnt the Bull of excommunication along with the books of the Decretals, while the students sang the *Te Deum*. For Luther then no retreat was possible.

Burning of
the Bull

The Diet had other business before it besides the question of Luther. It was the first visit of Charles V, now just twenty

The Diet
of Worms

¹ 33. Haereticos comburi est contra voluntatem Spiritus.

years of age, to the Empire, and in spite of Maximilian's failure he hoped to arrange for some effective government of Germany and the Empire. But the religious question overshadowed everything else. Charles had not shown much statecraft in his handling of Spanish affairs, and German problems were always more difficult than any others. His religious opinions were never for a moment in doubt, and he would be undoubtedly glad to suppress all signs of heresy in Germany. Nor was the great majority of the Diet ready to declare any sympathy with heresy, and if the constitution of Germany had possessed any efficiency the Lutheran cause would have been doomed. But that constitution had been developed during three centuries as a means of resisting the action of the Emperor. Nothing could be done except by the individual princes and states. All therefore turned on Frederick the Wise, the Elector of Saxony. His career is one of the enigmas of the age; but, whatever his motives, he was determined not to sacrifice Luther; and for many years he defended him successfully in what has been called a "game of hide and seek against the Curia and the Empire."

Luther
at Worms

Luther came to Worms with a safe-conduct from the Emperor, which was honourably observed. He had already been condemned by the Church, and the ecclesiastics protested against any further trial or hearing. It was the Emperor who decided that he must be given a chance of repudiating the books and opinions attributed to him. The position was full of personal danger for him, and the subtle diplomacy and traditional majesty of the Diet may well have overawed him. He consulted earnestly with his friends as to the line which he should follow when he appeared before the Diet. He appeared twice. On the first day, April 17, when he was asked whether the books on the table were written by him and whether he wished to retract the opinions contained in them, he seemed ill at ease and asked for time to prepare his answer. He was given until next day. He then spoke in Latin with modesty and courage, and ended by declaring that he could retract nothing unless convicted "by the testimony of Scripture or evident reason."

The ban
against
Luther

Luther's appearance before the Diet and his refusal to retract the opinion expressed in his books did not bring a

decision at once. The gravity of the situation and the favour shown to Luther by great masses of the German people were apparent. A commission was held under the Archbishop of Trier to confer with Luther, but no basis of agreement could be found. The Emperor, on April 19, declared his policy in language which reflects his indignation with heresy. "A single monk, led astray by private judgment, has set himself against the faith held by all Christians for a thousand years and more, and impudently concludes that all Christians up to now have erred. I have therefore resolved to stake upon this cause all my dominions, my friends, my body and my blood, my life and my soul." Then on May 26 came the Imperial Edict of Worms. Luther was denounced as the author of a pernicious schism, as a manifest and stubborn heretic; when the time of his safe-conduct was over, all were called on to refuse him support and shelter, and if possible to arrest and hand him over to the Imperial authorities. The Edict was said to be issued with the approval and unanimous consent of the Electors and all Orders of the Empire.

Yet Luther and Lutheranism survived. The Papal and Imperial thunderbolts were splendid but ineffective. Luther was saved at this crisis by the protection of the Elector of Saxony, by the strong backing of public opinion, and also by the international entanglements of the Emperor, who had to face a dangerous war with France in this same year, and was not willing to add to his difficulties by a civil war in Germany.

Luther was in danger of arrest at Worms. The memory of John Huss was much in men's minds, and all men knew that Huss had received an Imperial safe-conduct to Constance and had been burnt in spite of it. But Charles V was determined to observe his promise, and Luther was permitted to depart from Worms. Then he disappeared from sight, and wild reports of his murder were current. He had really been carried off to the castle of Wartburg on the suggestion of the friendly Elector of Saxony. There he lived for nine months; during which he threw off the habit and dress of a monk, allowed his beard and hair to grow and was known as *Junker Georg*. They were months of intense thought and great activity. It was now that he began a translation of the New

Luther
at the
Wartburg

Testament from the Greek. This was the beginning of his translation of the whole Bible, a work which has had as great an influence on the language and thought of Germany as the English Bible of 1611 on our own country.

Luther's
return to
Wittenberg

Whilst he was thus secluded from the world, the movement which he had started had assumed forms, with some of which he had no sympathy. It was clear that his personal powerful influence was necessary, and in March 1522 he was back again in Wittenberg. This little town, on which recent events had fixed so much attention, had been agitated during Luther's absence by violent tumult. Archdeacon Carlstadt had wholly altered the character of the Mass, and had allowed laity and clergy alike to communicate in both bread and wine. The Zwickau Prophets had appeared in the town; harbingers of the Peasants' War and of Anabaptism, and preachers of ecclesiastical anarchy; denouncing ecclesiastical dignities and University degrees. Luther loved order and authority; and he would need all his strength of will and brain to control the elements that were fermenting in all parts of Germany. He had himself been a revolutionary hitherto. He had now to show of what he was capable as an architect of a new ecclesiastical Order. And political and social questions demanded attention as well as ecclesiastical.

Lutheran
theology

We cannot follow in any detail the development of Lutheran theology and ideas on Church government. He was much assisted in his elaboration of a theological system by the gentler and more learned Melancthon, whose *loci communes* of December 1521 became a standard of Lutheran orthodoxy. Here are set out in summary but striking fashion the Lutheran doctrine of faith and justification, of baptism and the Lord's Supper, of the difference between "priesthood" and the ministers of the Church. As the last point is fundamental for the understanding of Luther's position and his conflict with Rome, it is well to quote a few sentences. "All we Christians are priests, because we offer the sacrifice of our own bodies. Besides this there is no sacrifice in Christianity; and we have the right of interceding with God; yes, and of giving Him satisfaction." The doctrine of the Eucharist would have to pass through much controversy even in Luther's life-time before it was defined.

In matters of Church government and administration, the Lutheran system was curiously varied and indefinite. Luther never seems to have planned any comprehensive system, and the political condition of Germany would have prevented the application of any uniform plan. His central interest was the relation of the believer to God; he desired no revolutionary change and only introduced reforms as needs arose. He was not necessarily opposed to Bishops, though he wished to destroy many of their old powers, and believed that Episcopal ordination was unnecessary for the pastorate. The ecclesiastical ordinances of Protestant Germany were numerous and varied. But certain general principles underlie all. There is no vestige of democracy or popular government in the Church; Luther was always in favour of authority, and the tumults of Germany increased that feeling. Nor is there any independent religious community; there is no idea of a self-controlled Church, no suggestion of the spiritual power balancing the temporal. The secular government—such was Luther's belief—must take in hand the organization of religion; and the control of the government was usually exercised through "consistorial courts," which were appointed by the head of each state, and which made appointments and controlled discipline. The Elizabethan system in England, with its royal supremacy and its Court of High Commission, corresponds roughly to the underlying ideas of the Lutheran regime in most of the states of Germany.¹

The interest of German history changes now. We have hitherto been concerned with Luther's personal action and struggles. He had, like all ardent reformers, supreme confidence in his own ideas. He saw what he thought the truth so clearly and its appeal to him was so overwhelming that he could not doubt that all would see it and accept it, if only it could be made known to them. During the rest of his life, though his faith never faltered for a moment, he had to face

¹ T. M. Lindsay in his *History of the Reformation in Germany* (p. 412) defines the characteristics of Lutheran Church organization as "a desire to make full use of whatever portions of the medieval Church usages could be pressed into the service of his evangelical Church. the conception that the one supreme authority on earth was that of the secular government; the suspicion of the common man and the resolve to prevent the people from exercising any control over the arrangements of the Church."

bitter disappointment. It turned out that his ideas were not acceptable to all Germans, and that there was no chance at all of their becoming the creed of all Europe. They had influence everywhere, even within the Roman communion, but it was only the three Scandinavian kingdoms (Denmark, Sweden, and Norway) who accepted them as the national form of Christianity. In Germany Luther's ideas spread with wonderful rapidity, and it seemed at one time as if all Germany were going to break from Rome; but everywhere large elements remained either cold or actually hostile. (1) The Peasants' War made the poorest classes of Germany decidedly hostile to Luther. (2) Erasmus and the Humanists refused to associate themselves with his movement. (3) The Evangelical movement in north Switzerland was even more passionately opposed to the usages of Rome than Luther himself, but it refused to accept either the theology or the Church government that satisfied Luther. (4) Lastly, but this came after his death, the Roman Church reorganized her forces and presented her claims in new forms, and it turned out that a large part of Germany was ready to welcome again those ideas and practices which Luther had supposed to be gone for ever. We will look at each of the first three events; the fourth will be treated in a later chapter.

1. THE PEASANTS' REVOLT

he
peasants'
evolt

The Peasants' Revolt is no mere appendix to the Protestant revolution. It is in itself an important, an interesting and a puzzling movement. The question of the influence of ideas on action, and of action on ideas becomes here peculiarly difficult. It suggests certain parallels—with Wat Tyler's Rebellion in England and the Wickliffite movement, with the Taborites in Bohemia and John Huss—which, however, we must not follow up.

he
nperial
ights

Before the outbreak of the Peasants' War there was a disturbance which was only in vague relation with Luther; but it illustrates the anarchy into which the Empire was being driven. Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen belonged to that class of "Imperial knights" which it is difficult for English readers to understand, though some of the smaller

Scotch nobility would provide a fair parallel. Their practical independence—their “immediacy”—was threatened by the princes, and they saw in the general attack on the Church a chance of recovering power and wealth by seizing Church property. Sickingen and Hutten appealed to the neighbouring towns to help them in their attack on Trier, but found little response. A religious colour was given to the movement by the sacking of the churches and the defacing of pictures and church ornaments. But the class to which these men belonged was the most dangerous in Germany to the peace and commerce of the land. They lived by war and the systematic plunder of the peasantry and the trading classes. The attack on Trier failed. Sickingen was besieged in his own castle of Landstuhl and perished there; Hutten fled to Switzerland and died. The day of the knights was past. Not only were the princes too strong for them, but also the changes in warfare had made their old exploits impossible. Their castles could not resist the new cannon. But it should be noted that this victory had been won by the princes themselves; the Imperial Government had given no help; the new machine—the *Reichsregiment*—did not function at all. An effort had been made to reorganize it at the Diet of Worms, and it seemed for a time successful. But it failed through the rivalry of the towns with the princes, and through the growing confidence of the princes in their own forces which made them contemptuous of all Imperial organization.

The Peasants' Rising presents many enigmas, and the fundamental causes have been variously analysed. Three points are important. First the trouble was no new one; there had been stirrings of revolt among the peasantry for nearly fifty years. Lutheranism was therefore not the cause but at most a modifying force in the movement. Next, the rising was not merely the result of poverty and distress. Revolutions are usually the product of irritation and of hope, rather than of misery, and the Peasants' Rising in Germany was no exception. Thirdly, the divisions and the weakness of government in Germany were closely connected with the origins and the progress of the rebellion. The forces for the maintenance of order (whether for good or evil) were notoriously weak, and especially so in the districts where the

trouble broke out. It was when the victorious peasants came in contact with the larger and better organized powers of Germany that the rising collapsed.

The
German
peasants

The position of the German peasant was in essentials the same as that of the same class in other parts of western Europe. He was beginning to emerge from serfdom; but the fetters of serfdom still hung about him. He is described by some contemporaries as prosperous, even as "luxurious." Where there was any truth in this he would be all the more eager to throw off the restrictions and burdens by which his life was hampered. The peasantry of north Germany were in a condition of more complete serfdom, but did not join in the rising.

Their
burdens

The burdens that the peasants complained of were of the old feudal type. They could not be dispossessed from their land; but they paid heavy dues to their feudal lord, and had to give him their labour for certain purposes and at certain seasons of the year. To the Church the tithes had to be paid and other dues as well. The game laws pressed heavily on them; they were denied the right of fishing in the streams and hunting in the woods. The French peasant before the Revolution of 1789 was in a similar position; but he was under a strong centralized government, which both protected him against the lords and made a rising impossible.

growing
irritation

Before Luther's voice was heard in Germany the peasants' irritation had been increased by two forces. There had been a great rise of prices in Germany, and the feudal lords therefore were more inclined to insist on the payments in labour and in kind, which they had at one time been ready to change into money payments. The study of Roman Law, too, was modifying the life of Germany in many ways; and Roman Law had arisen when society was uniform and government strongly centralized, and in consequence knew nothing of all the many rights of the peasantry which rested on local customs and traditions of wide variation. The Roman lawyers were apt therefore to insist on the uniform subjection of the peasantry to their lords. Nor were the peasants the only class that found the feudal regime an intolerable burden. The towns were full of discontent and had their own grievances

against the local territorial magnates, and they seemed at one time ready to co-operate with the peasants. One of the territorial rulers was willing to take their side. The Duke of Württemberg, who had been expelled from his dominions and was eager to avail himself of any means to effect his return, for a time associated himself with the Peasants' Movement. Some men of education were attracted by the idealism of the peasants' aims. Götz von Berlichingen joined them, and the fine artist, Riemenschneider, championed their cause with enthusiasm and paid for it with his life.

The Lutheran movement produced a great effect on this mass of vague discontent. It spoke of liberty and of the equality of all men. It attacked the power of the clergy against whom the peasantry had their own bitter grievances. Even before Luther's time they had justified their demands by an appeal to "the gospel"; and now he seemed to come forward as a champion on their side. Some men, who at first seemed to be identified with Luther, were wholly on the side of the peasants. Münzer of Zwickau had already come into sharp collision with Luther, but he belonged to the anti-Papal movement. Luther had claimed the right of every man to found his belief on a study of the Scriptures. Münzer went beyond Scripture, and claimed for every man direct enlightenment from the Spirit of God Himself. He was chiefly interested in religious ideas, and preached a sort of anarchical individualism; but he supported the peasants, had great influence with them and established a communistic regime at Mühlhausen. Luther himself was by no means hostile to the peasants at first. He was proud of his peasant origin. He knew how real was the oppression exercised by the lords and princes, and at first he threw on them the responsibility for the rising, though he exhorted the peasants to patience and moderation.

The Rising spread widely and rapidly. It began in the south-west corner of the Black Forest as a protest against forced labour. Its greatest strength was to be found in the south-west of Germany, in the upper basins of the Rhine and the Danube, and on the Main; but it spread east into Tyrol and Salzburg and Carinthia, and north into the Saxon lands which had been the home of Luther and the first support of

Influence of
Lutheranism

Spread of
the Peasants'
Revolt

his movement.¹ The peasants attacked the monasteries and the castles of the nobles, and the weakness and unpopularity of the ecclesiastical establishments made them usually the first object of their attack. There were no recognized leaders, and there was no official programme of the movement. A constantly recurring phrase in their documents is "an appeal to God's justice"; and the "Twelve Articles of the Peasants" issued in March 1525 give the demands, which were generally put forward, with remarkable moderation and a pathetic appeal to religion. They supported their demands by references to the Gospel and to religion. They asked for the power of each community to choose and appoint a pastor; the limitation of tithe to the fair tithe of grain; the abolition of serfdom, "unless it should be shown us from the Gospel that we are serfs"; rights of fishing and hunting "because God gave man dominion over all the animals"; limitations of feudal services and of rents; the preservation of common lands; and the abolition of the new laws. It is a very convincing, human, and moving document. The movement was social and personal rather than political; but suggestions for the reform of the Empire were also made. The princes were felt to be the great enemy. Why should not the peasants unite with the cities and the knights, and form a great centralized Empire resting on a direct tax paid by the whole people? Such was the dream that recommended itself to some of the peasant leaders; quite impossible of realization, but interesting as showing that the movement was not wholly reactionary.

Violence
of the
movement

The actions of the peasants doubtless did not always correspond to the spirit of this declaration. But at first, though convents and castles were destroyed and many lives were lost, the peasants abstained from anything like indiscriminate slaughter. The most dangerous feature was the contemporary revolutionary movement in the towns, which was directed against ecclesiastical and feudal control, and had therefore something in common with the movements of the peasantry. There was of course a violent as well as a moderate side to the movement. Münzer in Mühlhausen (in Saxony)

¹ A valuable map (13) in the *Cambridge Modern History* illustrates the Peasant Movements in Germany.

preached a violent communism, which was to be established by force and the extermination of the lords and the clergy. The action of the peasantry, too, was by no means always defensible. One incident has impressed the imagination of posterity. When the peasants captured the castle of Weinsberg on the Neckar, which was occupied by a Count, already odious to them for his severity to captured rebels, he and some sixteen other prisoners were killed in cold blood.

The movement spread rapidly and gained some great successes. Rothenburg and Würzburg were won to the side of the peasants. The Emperor and the Imperial armies were occupied at first with the war in Italy against France, but after the battle of Pavia the troops began to return to Germany, and under George Truchsess were employed with terrible effectiveness against the peasants. The alliance between peasants and townsmen could not be made effective; there was no room in the Germany of that day for autonomous peasant communities. When the larger powers became really alarmed and joined against the rebels all was over. The rising threatened the lands of Hesse, Brunswick, and Saxony. Münzer was defeated at Frankenhausen in Saxony (May 1525), and was put to death with torture. Elsewhere the peasants were hopelessly inferior to the disciplined troops and the artillery which was brought against them. By the end of 1525 the danger had passed away.

There is no reason to rejoice in the failure of the movement. There was hardly anything in the demands of the peasantry which might not have been granted with advantage. It is of little profit to say that they were "reactionaries" and opposed "to the progressive tendencies of the time." Real progress has often been the result of a desire to return to the best features of the past. But it is true that the concentration of power in the hands of the territorial lords—the great feature of sixteenth-century Germany—made their success impossible.

It would be absurd to blame the lords, lay or ecclesiastical, for defending themselves and their property against attack. But words can hardly be found too strong to condemn the cruelty of the measures which were taken to suppress and to punish the insurgents. The killing at Weinsberg was a small matter compared with the massacre of more than 20,000

peasants by the Duke of Lorraine, and the blinding and mutilation of townsmen by the Margrave of Brandenburg. The total number of victims has been reckoned at 100,000. Where the peasants had slain their hundreds in the heat of the struggle, the princes slew their tens of thousands in the spirit of revenge.

Luther
and the
peasants

A much greater name than that of any of the princes suffered irreparable damage from these tragic incidents. Luther had protested with noble humanity against coercion in matters of religion; and there had been much that was good and conciliatory in his first manifesto on the Peasants' Rising. The change that came over him seems sudden and is not easy to explain. It is certainly not true that he waited to attack the peasants until he saw that they were going to be defeated. He saw the great danger which the Peasants' Movement brought to the Protestant Reformation—to the cause which seemed to him the holiest and the highest thing in the world. There was more of religious than of political passion in his outbreak.

“The peasants have been false to the Gospel they profess to follow. . . . Therefore strike, throttle, stab, secretly or openly, whoever can, and remember that there is nothing more poisonous, more hurtful, more devilish, than a rebellious man. . . . A rebel is not worthy to receive a reasonable answer for he will not accept it. Their ears must be opened with musket balls, so that their heads fly into the air.” This was written during the heat of the struggle, but he did not repent of it when all was over. When he looked back on the terror of those days, he accepted the responsibility without wincing. “It was I who slew all the peasants in the insurrection, for it was I who commanded them to be slaughtered; all their blood is on my head. . . . But I throw the responsibility on our Lord God who instructed me to give this order.”

Influence
of the
Peasants'
War on
Lutheranism

With the Peasants' Revolt “the spring days of the Lutheran Reformation were over.” Lutheranism was still supported by a large section of the German people, who followed where it led with undiminished faith and hope. But it had no chance after this of being a really national movement; it did not efface the antagonisms of race and class but rather accentuated them. And as Luther could no

longer expect the support of the poorer classes of Germany, he was driven to rely more and more on the princes, whose oppressions and weakness he at one time so fiercely denounced. He tended to subordinate Church government to the temporal power, not on principle but as a matter of expediency. No other course was open to him. The idea of the congregation controlling the Church or of the people controlling the State roused his indignation. "Like the drivers of donkeys . . . so must rulers do with the people."

Luther's attitude to the revolted peasants is of the utmost importance too, in considering how far he is a champion of religious toleration. On the question in its narrowest sense, his attitude is usually in accordance with modern feeling, though near the end of his career he said that it is the duty of the magistrate to use the sword to the full extent to destroy false doctrine and worship. But his treatment of the peasants was more serious than that. It is of course true that they were political rebels, but Luther's motives in his attack on them were more religious than political. There is always a political element in religious persecution; there was a very strong political element in much of the work of the Inquisition in Spain. It is not merely a false doctrine that is attacked when heresy is punished, but also a state or an institution that is defended. Lutheranism, equally with its great antagonist, was handicapped in its appeal to future generations by the memory that in the matter of humanity it had offended "*contra voluntatem Spiritus.*"

2. HUMANISM IN GERMANY

Erasmus had welcomed the first stages in Luther's protest, and had protested against the idea of condemning him at the Diet of Worms. He was so great a name in European scholarship, and had so much influence with the educated world, that his support of the Lutheran movement would have counted for much.

The relations between the Renaissance and Protestantism, between Erasmus and Luther have been the subject of much controversy. Was the Renaissance the same thing as the Reformation, which merely applied the methods of the

Renaissance to religion? Or were the two movements violently opposed? Was the Reformation in essence a protest as much against the scepticism, the loose morality, the exaltation of rationalism, which characterize the Renaissance, as against the abuses and formality of the Roman Church? Is it true that "Erasmus laid the egg and Luther hatched it?" Or would the Lutheran movement have sprung from the needs of the human soul, even if the study of Greek had never been introduced into western Europe? These are difficult questions, and some of them depend on the meaning which is attached to the elusive word Renaissance. But Lutheranism was in my judgment primarily a religious and even a theological movement. No doubt the intellectual movement of the time helped it at first, and the new study of Greek and Hebrew provided useful weapons to the Reformers; though they were weapons with a double edge. But if we judge the Renaissance by its chief representatives, by its scholars, writers, and artists, there was a wide gulf between it and Luther, and a gulf that could not be bridged.

Erasmus

Erasmus was before all things a scholar, and one of the world's very greatest scholars. He loved knowledge, erudition, books rather than abstract thought. The historic sense was weak in the sixteenth century, but Erasmus had it more than most men of his time. He went back with special love to the classical past, but he did not for that reason turn away from the great writers of the middle ages. He was far too truly a humanist to do that. The great difficulty in judging of his career is to know how strong a hold Catholic theology had upon his reason and his affections. He admitted that he was timid and was not made of the stuff of martyrs. But it seems absurd to think that he was prevented from accepting the Lutheran theology simply by fear of the consequences. He knew nothing of the torment and struggle through which Luther had passed to a sense of salvation; and Luther could not appreciate Erasmus' passion for knowledge and love of intellectual light. But the intimate friend of Saint Thomas More cannot have been devoid of religious feeling.

Luther and Erasmus had drifted apart since the Diet of Worms; but the final breach came through a theological controversy. In September 1524 Erasmus published a book

De libero arbitrio (concerning free will), in which he attacked courteously and argumentatively the central doctrine of Luther's theology. The treatise does not show Erasmus at his best. He had knowledge and a good cause; but he had no quite clear or fervid beliefs of his own. Luther felt that both the method and the conclusions of Erasmus struck at the very heart of his own system; and he answered in one of the most brilliant of his controversial writings. He made no concessions to reason or to humanity. He showed himself as fully convinced of predestination as Calvin himself, with whose name the doctrine is most usually associated. "No one will or can believe except the elect; . . . there is opened for the elect a door to righteousness, an entrance into Heaven, a way to God. . . . As applied to the words and works of God human reason is blind, deaf, impious and sacrilegious." He found in his own spiritual experiences the confirmation of this creed and a reason for rejoicing in it.¹

Melanchthon, the gentle and learned supporter of Luther, ^{Luther and} tried to heal the breach but in vain. Luther had found the ^{education} "way to God" and nothing else mattered. The quarrel had no immediate and tragic consequences, such as we have observed in telling the story of Luther's relations with the peasants; but it was of great importance for the future of Lutheranism that German humanism stood aloof from it. Yet Luther worked nobly for the spread of education in Germany, and has been recognized as indirectly one of the authors of the modern educational system of Germany. The religious changes inevitably produced great changes in University life. Most of those who had frequented them had been looking to a clerical career, and now that had lost much of its attractiveness since the seizure of ecclesiastical property. At some Universities the number of students seriously declined. Humanism lost its popularity. The University of Erfurt was almost deserted. Wittenberg naturally grew in popularity through Luther's meteoric career; but the behaviour of the students often gave Luther much cause for anxiety.

¹ Professor James Mackinnon gives an excellent account of this controversy in his *Luther and the Reformation*, vol. iii. I am much indebted to his book throughout, and have taken my quotations here directly from it.

3. LUTHER AND ZWINGLI

Luther
and
Zwingli

More important for the immediate future of Lutheranism than the rift with Erasmus was the sharp antagonism which developed against other groups of those who would a little later be called "Protestants" (the word had not yet become current). German Switzerland had shown early sympathy with the Reformation, and the leader in the movement there was Ulrich Zwingli of Zurich. There is much resemblance between the Swiss and the Saxon Reformation. Both were strongly national—Zwingli protested nobly against the trade carried on in Swiss mercenaries by the Cardinal of Sion—and both began by a protest against the practice and doctrine of Indulgences. Two influences, besides the character and convictions of Zwingli himself, tended to separate the Swiss from the German movement. First Zwingli was a humanist and a student and follower of Erasmus to an extent far greater than Luther. And secondly, the communities among whom Zwingli lived and worked had a genuine democratic and popular character. Both the theology and the Church government of the Swiss churches was in consequence much freer than was approved of by Luther and even by Melancthon. There was also a "puritanic" element in the Zwinglians that Luther did not accept. They broke windows, images, and organs as part of their propaganda. The movement began in 1521; two years later a large part of northern Switzerland had separated from the Roman communion.

Differ-
ences
between
Luther
and
Zwingli

As Luther became aware that he would find opponents in Germany, it became more and more important to secure the support of all who sympathized with him in his main contentions. But even the pressure of imminent danger could not silence theological differences. Religious and theological considerations dominate the age, not political nor even social interests. There were several points of difference between Luther and Zwingli, but the crucial question was as to the significance of the Eucharist. Luther had rejected with scorn the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation; the substance of the bread and wine were not, he held, transmuted into the body and blood of Christ; but he interpreted the words of Christ ("this is My body") literally, and explained them

by "consubstantiation". The substance of the bread and wine remained unchanged, but the body of Christ was there along with them; "as the fire enters into the iron when it is heated," he said at one time. This view had not satisfied Carlstadt, and it did not satisfy Zwingli, who said that "is" in the famous sentence was equivalent to "signifies," and who tended therefore to regard the ceremony of the Eucharist as commemorative merely. The question was clearly likely to drive a wedge between the German and the Swiss Reformers. As the conflict in Germany seemed more and more likely to lead to open strife, the Landgrave Philip of Hesse, the most active statesman on the Protestant side, urged a conference between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians. Luther consented, and the meeting took place at Marburg. A strange scene followed. Great efforts were made to bring about an agreement; and it was only the question of the Eucharist that kept the two sides apart. But on this, Luther would not give way. He chalked on the table at which they sat the words, "*Hoc est corpus meum*" (this is My body), and met every argument by pointing to these authentic words of Christ. If reason found a difficulty in accepting them, so much the worse for reason; reason was the devil's worst agent for deceit; the evidence of mathematics was as nothing compared to the Word of God. "You have a different spirit from us," he said at the last; and again "one side in the controversy must belong to the Devil and be God's enemy." He would negotiate no further. But even after the conference of Marburg there were efforts at conciliation; and some agreement could be reached on everything but the definition of the Eucharist. That was a gulf that could not be bridged. The two Churches remained separate, and their separation leaves its distinct mark even on the political and military history of Germany.

Conference
at Marburg
1520

We must look here at another chapter from the religious history of the time—the story of the Anabaptists. They are the anarchists, the Bolsheviks, of the time. Every Government and every organized Church was against them. They have found hardly any sympathetic historian to recount their sufferings, which were terrible, or their martyrdoms, which were very many. Yet they are a more important force in the history of the time than is sometimes recognized.

The
Anabaptists

Perhaps they owed little to the Lutheran movement. They do not represent any fixed system of belief, worship or church-life. Articles drawn up in 1527 contain the following: 1. Baptism is for adults not for infants; 2. The brethren have the right of expelling an unsatisfactory member; 3. The breaking of bread is in memory of the death of Christ; 4. The brethren sever themselves from the abomination of the Papists and the anti-Papists equally, since both are under the bondage of the flesh; 5. Pastors are to be chosen by the community; 6. Christians do not draw the sword, do not sit in judgment, and do not accept office or authority; 7. They abstain from all oaths. These ideas or something like them spread over a wide area. The secular powers and religious organizations vied with one another in preaching and practising cruelties on these men. There was no thought of toleration or of argument; and though some of their ideas were harmless and even attractive, they could hardly be brought into harmony with the established order in Germany. The movement was crushed in Tyrol and Switzerland. In Bavaria, those who recanted were to be beheaded and those who persisted were to be burnt. There was a violent outbreak in Strasburg. But the chief centre of the movement was Münster, which was an ecclesiastical state under the Bishop, Count Francis of Waldeck, whose interests were purely secular. Anabaptism was introduced from the Netherlands, where the movement was strong, and soon drove the adherents of the Bishop from the town. Three names are remembered among the leaders. Knipperdolling was the first; then came Jan Mathys, a baker, from Harlem; lastly, John of Leyden, who completely dominated the movement in the end. The century has hardly any more curious story than the events in Münster under John of Leyden. Adult baptism was an integral part of his creed, but he believed also (and so did his followers) in the approaching end and reconstruction of the world. He held by community of goods and by polygamy, and had sixteen wives himself. At the last he assumed royal state and ruled with arbitrary violence while famine raged in the city.

John of
Leyden at
Münster

There was no effective help to be got from the outside, and the fall of the regime of John of Leyden was certain,

But the first attack of the Bishop was repulsed ; and he had to appeal for help to the Westphalian and Rhenish " circles," and received help from the Elector of Saxony, the Duke of Cleves, and the Bishop of Cologne. The city was stormed in June 1535, and the leaders were put to death with tortures ; their bodies were long afterwards exposed in iron cages attached to a church tower in the city.

Anabaptism stands in no clear relation to the Lutheran movement, though its language is sometimes influenced by contemporary religious controversies. It seems rather to be a continuation of the social movements of the Middle Ages, which had never quite died out since the Albigensian risings in the thirteenth century.

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CHAPTER V

THE ITALIAN WARS—THE SECOND PHASE. THE RIVALRY OF FRANCIS I AND CHARLES V

THE sub-title aptly describes the international character of the thirty years that followed the Imperial election. The King of France and the Emperor were always rivals and usually enemies in every matter that concerned the states of Europe. That rivalry too, though of course it represented national passions and interests as well as personal feelings, was very largely a personal matter. Charles and Francis were, among the rulers of Europe, clearly the two most important; they were ambitious and greedy of fame; despite occasional reconciliations an intense personal antagonism influenced their actions; and the proposal, which was made more than once, that their differences should be settled by a duel to the death seemed not altogether absurd. Never, not even when William III of England opposed Louis XIV at every turn of his policy, have European politics turned on such a direct personal antagonism.

When Francis was defeated in his candidature for the Imperial title, it was assumed that war must come. Apart from personal rivalry, France really felt herself encircled by the power of Charles.¹ We must not allow the personal quarrel to obscure the real meaning of the contest that now begins. It is in truth the opening of a "Two Hundred Years' War" between the French monarchy and the House of

¹ The threat to France implied in the Empire of Charles V remained a tradition of French policy down to the nineteenth century. When in 1870 the Hohenzollern candidate seemed likely to establish himself on the throne of Spain, de Gramont, the French Foreign Minister, declared that this amounted to a "renewal of the Empire of Charles V" which must be resisted at all costs.

Habsburg for the primacy of Europe. Under changed forms the struggle has lasted down to our own times.

Early
Spanish
successes

At the beginning the advantages were greatly on the side of Charles. Everything succeeded with him. He had crushed resistance in Spain. He had won the Empire. The squandering of French money at the Field of the Cloth of Gold had been all in vain ; for Henry VIII inclined decidedly to the side of Charles and joined him in 1522. He had gained some advantages on the northern frontier, and in December 1521 had succeeded in occupying Tournai. His hold on Italy tightened. When fighting began there again in the spring of 1522 the Spanish armies were admirably handled by Prospero Colonna, while the French troops were in the weaker hands of Lautrec. Yet the French army was the larger, and Colonna risked no general engagement. But Lautrec was not master of his own troops. A great part of them were Swiss mercenaries who clamoured for their pay, and demanded a battle for the sake of the prize money, which a victory would bring. Colonna fortified himself at Bicocca a few miles from Milan, which the French were besieging. The French army, mainly composed of Swiss mercenaries, attacked him there, but was unable to make any impression on his defences. Then the Swiss fell away ; Lautrec determined to retreat into France and lost heavily on the march. The Swiss infantry never recovered the prestige that they held at the beginning of the century.

Pope
Adrian VI

The Papal elections of 1522 also had given Charles a decided advantage. On the death of Leo X the cardinals elected to succeed him Bishop Adrian of Utrecht, a Fleming, and therefore the subject of Charles, a man, moreover, who had been the Emperor's tutor and had served him as his representative in Spain. He took the title of Pope Adrian VI. He was a learned, simple, and upright man, and he desired to find the road to peace ; but all his associations and traditions drew him to the side of Charles. He soon joined the alliance against France, and there was hardly any part of Italy that was not on the same side. The Sforzas were restored to Milan, and even the Venetians came over to the Emperor. The French were hated as foreigners, and public opinion was comparatively favourable to the Germans and Spaniards.

Constable
Bourbon

A movement in France, too, seemed likely by itself to threaten the French monarchy with destruction. We come

to the great treason of the Constable Bourbon. Charles, Duke of Bourbon, was the last of those great feudal nobles, whose revenues and retainers allowed them almost to challenge the power of the King himself. He had royal blood in his veins, and his wife, Susanne, was grand-daughter of Louis XI. His chief residence was at Moulins on the Allier, where he lived in almost royal state. The great feudatories had been the worst enemies of the Crown of France for centuries, and the last reigns had seen the incorporation of Provence and Brittany in the royal domain. The position, therefore, of the House of Bourbon was all the more striking in its solitary grandeur, and the traditional policy of the Crown of France was to undermine and destroy such powers. Yet at first the Duke Charles had served the King with success and had received the royal favour. He had fought with distinction at Marignano, and had been made Lieutenant-General in Italy. But soon the royal favour was taken away, and the cause is probably to be found in the jealousy felt by Francis of so powerful a subject. Lautrec took his place in Italy. Bourbon was not given any high command in France; he was not even paid for his expenses in Italy. But it was not until his wife died in 1521 that the real trouble began. He had no surviving children. The greater part of his territories had come to him through his wife, and she had bequeathed them to him by her will. But now Louise of Savoy, the King's mother, claimed what belonged to Suzanne, while King Francis claimed the fiefs that could not be inherited by a woman. If the royal claims were substantiated, Charles of Bourbon became a poor man indeed.

The legal question is an obscure one. The contention of the King was that the Bourbon lands came under the law relating to "apanages," and that in consequence they reverted to the Crown on the failure of male heirs. But we cannot doubt that the strength of the monarchy and the interest of France were the determining considerations; and the most powerful of feudatories could hardly expect equal justice in a conflict with the Crown.¹

¹ Mignet (*Rivalité de François I et Charles V*, i, 375) examines the legal aspects of the case and decides against the King.

Bourbon's
treason

Even before the attack on his estates, Charles of Bourbon had been on intimate terms with the Emperor. The war, which had now begun, gave him the chance of playing a great part, the part that had been played by the Dukes of Burgundy during the English wars. He opened secret negotiations with Charles, and promised to raise a rebellion in France to assist the attack that her enemies were making from the outside. In return his lands were to be secured to him and increased; he was to marry the sister of the Emperor; there floated before his eyes a vague idea that he might win the Crown of France for his own brows. The situation was undoubtedly an extremely dangerous one for France; and yet in the end it is doubtful whether the treason of Constable Bourbon added much to that danger. He was a man of no conspicuous talent. His plot failed, for Francis got wind of it and did not march into Italy until the Duke was a fugitive. It is curious, too, how little sign there is of any loyalty to the House of Bourbon among the inhabitants of his vast estates. Feudalism had passed from the affections of France before it passed from her institutions. Nay, the conspiracy perhaps was a gain to the Crown of France. The Duke made no attempt to resist or to justify himself. When the King summoned him to come to Lyons and join the proposed expedition into Italy he feigned or exaggerated illness, and on a repeated summons fled; first south towards Spain, then east into Franche Comté, and so at last to Italy, where he was made commander of the Imperial armies. His guilt was manifest; the confiscation and incorporation of his lands in the royal domain followed as a matter of course, though Francis found his lawyers and Parlements less willing to take the extreme royalist view than he had hoped. The union of France was now really accomplished; and during the wars of the century she showed herself as well capable of resisting invasion as she was powerless to retain her conquests in Italy.

Threefold
invasion
of France

The partition and destruction of France did not seem at first an impossibility. A threefold invasion of the kingdom was the plan that underlay all the campaigns. The King of England was to strike from the north-east; Spanish troops were to cross the Pyrenees; the Duke of Bourbon and a Spanish army was to enter from the side of Italy. How

could France resist? She did resist successfully; partly because the military methods of the sixteenth century were more effective in defence than in attack; and still more because the disruption of France was not really desired by either Spain or England, both of which Powers would have found the problem of the division of the spoil a difficult one.

Yet the danger was really great. In 1523 the English entered through the open door of Calais. They occupied Roye and Mondidier, and Paris was threatened and in great alarm. Perhaps the city would have fallen if the attack had been pressed vigorously. But the English King was expecting help from the Duke of Bourbon, and the Duke was soon a fugitive with barely a handful of followers. The attempt of the Spaniards on the south was a more complete failure.

The year 1524 showed conspicuously the usual features of these campaigns between France and the Habsburg power. Both combatants failed in their efforts to invade the territories of the other, while the hold of the Spaniards on Italy tightened. In spite of the peril which France ran from foreign invasion, Francis still dreamed of conquests in Italy and of the renewal of his triumph at Marignano. He sent Admiral Bonnivet with a considerable force into Italy, where he was resisted by Prospero Colonna, who was however ill and soon gave way to Lannoy. The French were superior in strength at first; but disease reduced their numbers, and the expected reinforcements did not arrive. The French had to retreat and were defeated on the Sesia. The Chevalier Bayard, who was to his own day and to posterity the representative of all that was best in the ideas of chivalry, was killed during the retreat by a shot from an arquebus; gunpowder was fatal to the great cavalier as well as to the institution of chivalry.¹ It seemed as though the French defeat might be followed up by a decisive invasion of France herself, and the Constable Bourbon took charge of a large army, which was to invade Provence,

¹ Ariosto, the contemporary Italian poet, adds his lament to the many others over the invention of gunpowder. "How did you ever find, you wicked and ugly invention, any place in the mind of man. Through you the glory of war is destroyed; through you the profession of arms is left without honour; through you courage and valour are reduced to nothing, etc." (*Orlando*, xi, 27).

and which it was hoped would be supported by a rising in the centre of France in sympathy with its old feudal lord. The expedition had some early successes; and, when the invaders approached Marseilles, Bourbon anticipated that the place would be surrendered to him. But there was no sign of anything of the sort. The French fleet kept the harbour open, and reinforcements were sent in. When the breach was made and the attack was ordered, all the troops—Spanish, Italian, and German—refused what was clearly a mad attempt. No help came from Spain or England. The conquest of France had to be abandoned with much loss and some ridicule.

Pope
Clement VII

The autumn of the same year (1523) saw the election of a new Pope. Pope Adrian had been detested in Rome as a foreigner and barbarian. It was long before the new conclave could come to the necessary agreement. The cardinals were immured in the Vatican for more than two months, with much diplomatic intrigue between the French and Imperial sections, before the choice fell on a cardinal of the House of Medici who took the name of Clement VII. An immense responsibility awaited him; he would have to deal with the Protestant movement in Germany and the English breach with Rome. He has not the well-marked character of Alexander VI or of Julius II or of Leo X. He was a clever diplomatist, deficient in courage and resolution, but not inclined to make the Papacy the tool of either of the combatants. His election was acclaimed as a victory for Charles; but Clement was not anxious to see any power so predominant in Italy as to threaten the independence of the Papal See. He remained in the Imperial alliance, but waited on events.

Francis I
re-invades
Italy

In the autumn of 1524 Francis I entered Italy again; he was confident that he would triumph again on the scene where he had made himself famous ten years before. And at first things went excellently with him. The army which had retreated from Marseilles was in no condition to struggle against him. Milan fell into his hands without a struggle. Hardly anything remained to the Imperialists except Lodi on the Adda, which secured their communications with Tyrol, and Pavia on the Ticino. It was decided to attack Pavia. The decision was probably a mistake. Certainly King Francis

showed no sign of military talent. His imagination was full of the glorious victory that he was sure of winning; he thought of war like one of Charlemagne's paladins, and showed no grasp of the real situation. His counsellors for the most part only flattered him. Still, for some time his triumph seemed assured. Pavia though stubbornly defended by da Leyva was hard pressed from the east and from the west. The first attacks were repulsed, but food and gunpowder were running low. The star of France seemed clearly in the ascendant, and Pope Clement VII and the Republic of Venice showed themselves ready to pass from the side of the Emperor to that of King Francis. He was so secure of Milan that he was planning an attack on Naples, and actually detached a large force for that purpose.

But the armies of those days were small. Francis had only 30,000 men in all; it was always possible that a new force might arrive to alter the balance. And this is what happened. The Constable Bourbon had collected forces in Germany, and an Imperial army mustered at Lodi which was not inferior in size to that of France. It was commanded by two veterans of the Italian wars—Pescara and Lannoy, Viceroy of Naples, and the Constable Bourbon was with them. They advanced to raise the siege of Pavia, but Francis interpreted their movements as a proof that “they had no appetite for battle,” and was more than ever confident of victory. His headquarters were within the large park of Mirabello, lying to the east of Pavia. Inside of the park he had a strongly fortified camp, but the walls of the park were weakly defended.

When Bourbon had advanced close to the park the King's position became difficult. He was between two fires; on the one side the garrison of Pavia which might attempt a sortie, and on the other the Imperial army, which was equal to his own. Should he accept battle if it was offered to him or should he defend himself behind fortifications, either remaining in his present camp or removing elsewhere? The Imperialists were in much greater distress than the French; they were short of food and money. “We have not a morsel of food for to-morrow,” said Pescara in his address to his troops; “but bread, wine, and meat abound in the French camp. So

if you want to eat to-morrow march straight for the French camp." The waiting game would probably have paid Francis best ; but he was eager for battle, and decided not to refuse it if it were offered.

On February 24 the Imperialists entered the park of Mirabello through breaches which they had made in the walls. The French King left his entrenched camp and came down into the open. He fought literally in the front of the battle, lance in hand, and killed some of the enemy. The enemy gave way at first ; confident of victory, Francis declared that he now really felt himself Duke of Milan. Then came a sudden and complete change which it is difficult to account for ; but during the century we have often reason to believe that the fighting qualities of the Spanish infantry were superior to those of any troops in Europe, and they made great use of firearms on this occasion. The French were broken and defeated with very great loss. A great slaughter followed ; most of the great captains on the French side perished. The King himself fought recklessly and was wounded twice. At last he surrendered his sword to the Viceroy of Naples, after having refused it to an officer of the Duke of Bourbon.

Results of
the battle
of Pavia

It was probably the most famous battle of the century. The epic-romantic period of the wars of Italy comes to an end with it. The King fought like one of Ariosto's paladins, and the time was past for that. No battle could be more decisive. The French King was a prisoner ; his army had ceased to exist. And yet the battle decided in the end very little. The rivalry between the two Kings was by no means at an end. The struggle between France and the Habsburgs had yet two hundred years before it ! Charles V was destined to pass through some dark hours, though none so dark as that experienced by Francis at Pavia. For this indecisiveness of so decisive a battle there are two chief reasons. First the condition of rivalry and mistrust among the nations, which was beginning to be called the Balance of Power, made the allies of Charles far from enthusiastic about his victory. What would be the position of England, of the Italian states, of the German powers, if Charles were really to establish a universal monarchy, as seemed for a moment really possible ?

Many might rejoice at the prospect of the defeat of the Turk and the restoration of unity to Christendom, which such a power might effect, but all felt that their own independence was in danger. Alliances at this epoch were apt to cool in the hour of victory; and this tendency was illustrated after Pavia. And next, France could not really be brought to the end of her power of resistance by the loss of an army of 30,000 men. Men thought of the position after Agincourt; but France had grown richer and more united during the past century, and Agincourt had only given a temporary triumph to England soon followed by complete disaster. Lastly, the battle had brought glory to the Imperial arms, but little or no money to the Imperial coffers. The troops could not get all their pay, even after the victory; money for new enrolments was not to be had. So there was a reshuffling of alliances, and when the fighting began again it was not on conditions altogether unfavourable to France.

The greatest asset of the Emperor was the possession of the person of King Francis, who was a prisoner in his hands. Charles had received the news of his amazing victory with humility, and had abstained from all boastfulness. But he was as ambitious as Francis himself, without his rival's romantic chivalry, and he was determined to make the best possible conditions for himself and his dominions out of the helplessness of the French King. He was at first imprisoned in northern Italy; orders were then given that he should be transported to Naples. On the way, Lannoy, the Viceroy of Naples, determined on his own responsibility to take him to Spain instead. He was treated with great honour on his arrival on the Spanish coast; but when he reached Madrid he was immured in a dark room in one of the towers on the walls of the city. He was not ill-treated, but he had no liberty and was constantly watched. Francis desired above all things to have a personal interview with his captor, and hoped to win favourable terms from him by the charm of his personality. But Charles remained aloof. Then Francis fell very ill and seemed at death's door. The Emperor saw with intense alarm the prospect of all the gains of Pavia slipping through his fingers. He visited Francis now and called him "his brother and friend." The French King's sister, Margaret

King
Francis a
prisoner

of Angoulême, came to tend and cheer him. The trouble—an abscess near the brain—passed away, and Francis found that the Emperor's cordiality had passed with it.

The
situation
changes

International relations were taking a turn unfavourable to Charles. The English King, Henry VIII, made terms with the French Government, which was in the capable hands of the Queen Mother, and drove a hard bargain with her. A great anti-Spanish movement seemed likely at one time in Italy. There was to be a great alliance of Italian states against the barbarians; for the Imperialists were as much hated now as the French had formerly been. Pope Clement VII was the chief agent in these schemes. Pescara, who had his grievances against Bourbon and Lannoy and Charles himself, was to be made King of Naples; Sforza was to rule in Milan. "The world seems to me," wrote the Papal agent, "to renew itself and from the extreme of misery Italy advances to great happiness." Those plans soon failed. Pescara betrayed to the Emperor the suggestions that had been made to him. But Italy's mood of hostility to the Imperial power remained.

Alliance
between
France and
Turkey

The news of Pavia had produced of course great excitement in France, and there were great difficulties to face there, but there was no sign of the disruption of the State. The Queen Mother was made Regent. She collected the scanty remnants of the army, and got together a sum of money for immediate needs. A Council was established in Paris consisting of members of the Parlement and notables drawn from both Church and State. The country was quite capable of putting up a strenuous resistance against any attack that the Emperor could make on its integrity. Help was sought in distant quarters. The enemies of the Emperor were necessarily the friends of France. The Regent appealed to the Sultan of Turkey for help to the most Christian King, and Soliman prepared with much parade to strike a blow for his new ally. It was the beginning of a strange and important understanding between France and the head of Islam.

The dilemma
of the
Emperor

More than ever therefore Charles V had to make the most he could out of the imprisonment of Francis. Various projects passed through his mind or were suggested to him by his counsellors, of whom the chief were the Chancellor Gattinara and Lannoy, Viceroy of Naples. 1. Should he be magnani-

mous ; drive the King to no hard terms ; but make a real alliance with him, so that they might march together against the heretic in Germany and the infidel in the East ? 2. Should he crush France entirely, seizing for himself (that thought even came to him) the French Crown, and attaching the King of France as a mere dependent to his triumphal car ? 3. Should he be contented to establish his power in Italy, securing from Francis the resignation of all his claims there, but insisting on little or no concession of French territory north of the Alps ? This was the view urged on him by his minister Pescara. 4. Should he insist on the surrender of all that had belonged to the Dukes of Burgundy as being his own by right of inheritance ? That would mean the surrender of French Flanders and the Duchy of Burgundy. It would carry the arms of Spain far into the heart of France. There were also questions as to the allies of the Emperor, especially the Duke of Bourbon, who demanded the restitution of his former lands in France.

The negotiations lasted for a long time, and the outlook ^{Negotiations} continually changed. At one time Francis tried to escape, disguised as the negro who attended to his fire. Later he declared he would yield to no dishonourable terms and that he was prepared to spend his life in prison, and for this purpose prepared a list of his requirements on the assumption that Spain was to be his permanent residence. Then he proposed to abdicate and to have his son crowned as King ; but this plan, which really offered great advantages, was abandoned. At last weary with his captivity he had recourse to the well-established Italian method of "promising much and performing little," and instructed his agents to concede everything and anything. The negotiations were conducted by the Chancellor Gattinara for Spain, and by de Selve, first President of the Parlement of Paris, for France, and thus the Treaty of Madrid was prepared.

It is strange that Charles should have believed in the value ^{The Treaty of Madrid} of the document. France was in it regarded as the property of her King, and it was assumed that what Francis granted the country would ratify and execute. The defeat of the infidels and the extirpation of "the Lutheran sect" were declared to be the ultimate aims of the signatories in the

preamble to the treaty. Its fifty clauses may be easily summarized: 1. Francis surrendered the whole Burgundian inheritance of which "Madame Marie," the grandmother of Charles, had been unjustly robbed by Louis XI. The Flemish frontier and the Duchy of Burgundy were thus abandoned. 2. France renounced all her rights to Milan, Naples, and Genoa. 3. The Duke of Bourbon was to be restored to all his possessions. Charles asked that the Duke should be given independent sovereignty and the title of King, but Francis refused to make that concession, even in a treaty which he had no intention of keeping. 4. Francis was to marry Eleonora, sister of Charles, and widow of the King of Portugal. 5. The treaty was to be executed within six weeks. As a guarantee the Dauphin Francis and his brother Henry, afterwards King Henry II, were to be handed to Charles as hostages; and Francis was to promise that, if the treaty were not carried out, he would at once reconstitute himself prisoner in the hands of the Emperor.

Francis
deter-
mines to
repudiate
the treaty

The treaty was signed with every possible solemnity. Mass was celebrated in the King's prison chamber, and he swore on the Gospel to observe the treaty. Then on his faith as a gentleman and a knight, he swore again that he would return to his prison if he did not execute the treaty. We may well believe that his knightly oath weighed especially heavily upon him; for the means of releasing himself from it were not so well explored as the method of procuring dispensation from the religious oath. But he had no intention of fulfilling any line of the treaty. The night before the signature he had summoned de Selve and six other Frenchmen, who were in attendance on him, and had solemnly declared that the treaty was exacted from him "by constraint and long imprisonment and fear for the future," and that in consequence he regarded it in every detail as "null and of none effect." Charles had his doubts as to the future, but he made no attempt to change what he had done. On February 17, 1526, Francis passed the Bidassoa into freedom, while his two children took his place in the power of Charles.

No doubt the execution of the treaty was impossible; if Francis had tried to observe it resistance would have been made by his people, but he made no attempt to procure the

execution of the smallest part of it. Opinion was generally favourable to him. The Papal Nuncio declared, quoting a Latin verse, that "treaties do not hold which are made under fear." England, Venice, and the Papacy all assumed that the promise would not be kept. The glorious victory of Pavia brought then to the Emperor just nothing. The situation was less favourable to him than it had been before the battle. Yet it is impossible to justify the action of the French King. In his famous letter, written to his mother after the battle, he had declared that "his life and his honour were safe." His life had been in grievous danger in Spain, and his honour had been smirched. The romances of chivalry, with their insistence on the obligations of a knight's promise, could no longer be pleasant reading to him.

France had been shaken by the crisis; there had been signs of independence in Paris and in other cities of France. But the King's return restored the land to obedience; and foreign affairs again occupied all his attention. Charles had to face a serious movement against his power in Italy. Pope Clement VII was the chief agent. He had many good qualities, and he never quite sank in his diplomacy to the level of the secular powers; but his aims as a statesman were the same as theirs; he thought of the strength of his estates in Italy, and was little influenced in his foreign relations by his position as head of the universal Church. He built up the Holy League of Cognac; France, Rome, and Venice were the chief members. England gave it support; Florence, Sforza, Duke of Milan, who still held the citadel, and other Italian Powers joined. The real object was the expulsion or weakening of the Spanish power in Italy.

Charles had crushed the army of these Powers before and might hope to do so again. But the worst trouble was that he had no money available for the payment of his army. Strangely his enemies were better able to collect troops; for the Imperialists were even more unpopular than the French had been, and the movement against them had a national character. Da Leyva was at first in command of the Imperialists, and he was much outnumbered by the enemy. If he had been strenuously attacked, he could hardly have avoided disaster. But the Duke of Urbino, in command of

The Holy
League of
Cognac

Difficult
position of
Charles in
Italy

the allies and responsible to Venice, was cautious and despondent, and he let his opportunity slip.

Position of
the Pope

Events at Rome showed how dangerous the war might be for the Papacy. Charles had warned Clement that it might mean the advance of heresy in Germany; and in the city of Rome he had a foretaste of the great disaster that was to follow. The Colonnas, the great enemy of his House and power, had been attacking the Papal states from the Kingdom of Naples. Now they negotiated a peace with the Pope and promised to renounce all their ambitions. The Pope believed in the honesty of the arrangement and dismissed his own army, leaving Rome almost unguarded. Then the Colonnas, without the shadow of an excuse, attacked and occupied the city, inflicting on it great damage. The Pope was driven to accept a truce with the Emperor.

The Imperial
army

This remarkable incident has been forgotten, because of the tragic events which were soon to follow. Germany was trembling before the threat of a Turkish invasion, for Soliman had just won the great battle of Mohacz in Hungary; but there were always soldiers to be got in Germany, and a force of some 13,000 lanzknechts were gathered for the Imperial service under the command of the experienced and popular leader Frundsberg, himself a resolute Lutheran. They were splendid soldiers, unsurpassed by any in Europe except perhaps the Spanish *tercios*. They were like the Spaniards in their discipline, their efficiency, and their cruelty; like them in their determination to be paid the stipulated wage. The fact that the Spaniards were zealous Catholics and the lanzknechts Lutherans made no great difference in their behaviour, though it led to important quarrels in the hour of victory. The junction of the lanzknechts with the Imperial troops in Italy might perhaps have been prevented by a more skilled commander; but again the Duke of Urbino was at fault and Bourbon joined Frundsberg to the south of the Po, and the combined forces were certainly stronger than any army in Italy. There were 12,000 Germans, 4000 Spaniards, and some 7000 others.

Papal
policy

It is impossible to follow the constant changes in Papal policy during these months. The Pope was in military matters at the mercy of the last piece of news, and passed

from the Spanish alliance to the French and back again to the Spanish with baffling rapidity. In March 1527 he made a truce with the Emperor; after many changes he signed new articles with the King of France on April 25, arranging for the invasion of Spain. A fortnight later the Holy City was in the hands of the Emperor's troops and the Pope himself a prisoner.

This great event was the result of the mutiny of the Imperial armies and the strange policy of the Duke of Bourbon. The troops were at San Giovanni, near Bologna, when they were told of the first-mentioned treaty, and were informed that they would have to withdraw into the north of Italy. They were ill-fed, ill-clad, their pay was far in arrears, and they saw no prospect of it. They broke out into organized mutiny, and chose twelve men from their ranks to act as their representatives. Frundsberg was seized by apoplexy in trying to reduce them to order. Bourbon was left in command. But he was far from exercising real control over them; they wanted him and they valued his skill; but they determined their own action. They were resolved to pay themselves by the plunder of cities belonging to their enemies.¹ Their first aim was Florence, which was still under the Medicis, and therefore in alliance with the Medicean Pope; but when they had struggled into the Tuscan plain through the storms and snows of the Apennines, they found Florence protected by the presence of a French and a Venetian army. Clement VII, however, with a simple trust which seems strange in one who knew so well the character of the politics of the time, believed that he had secured the retreat of the Imperialists, and in consequence dismissed the greater part of his troops. Bourbon and his mutinous troops appeared before the walls of Rome on May 5.

The Duke of Bourbon was playing a strange part. As the agent of mutinous soldiers, it might seem that he was for the second time a traitor to his master. But, though Charles was far from ordering or even approving much that the army was about to do, he was quite willing and even anxious to

¹ Organized mutiny was a not infrequent proceeding of the armies of the sixteenth century. The events of 1527 may be compared with advantage with the action of the Spanish troops in the Netherlands in 1576.

coerce and to punish the Pope for taking sides against him. Bourbon therefore had not much doubt that if he remained in command of a victorious army, he would be able to win the favour of the Emperor once more. Rome consisted at this time of three separate divisions: the Borgo or Papal city containing the Vatican, Saint Peter's, and the impregnable castle of Saint Angelo; the Transteverine city; and the main city to the east of the Tiber. It was on the Papal city that the first attack fell. Bourbon was wounded as he mounted to the assault, and died soon afterwards. His troops, under the command of the Prince of Orange, made themselves quickly masters of the city, but the Pope had withdrawn to Saint Angelo. Then the rest of the great city fell with surprising ease into the hands of its assailants.

The eternal city had been taken many times before, but it had never suffered a worse fate than now. The Goths and Vandals, who had sacked it more than a thousand years previously, had been to some extent restrained by religious feeling. But many of the present victors were Lutherans, and found in their faith a justification for any attacks on churches, monasteries, or religious persons. For three days Rome suffered the worst horrors that can befall a captured city—murder, bestial cruelty, and pillage. Four thousand persons were reckoned to have perished; and the destruction of beautiful things must have been very great. The Spaniards were thought to have excelled in cruelty; the Germans were specially prominent in the desecration of the sacred places.

Surrender
and escape
of the Pope

The Pope was meanwhile a prisoner in the castle of Saint Angelo, and the place was so strong and the means of attack comparatively so weak, that there was no thought of reducing it except by starvation. Clement VII hoped for relief from the army of the Duke of Urbino, but that hope failed him. He opened negotiations and consented to pay the heavy ransom of 400,000 ducats, but was not able to regain his liberty; the memory of Francis' repudiation of the Treaty of Madrid made his captors unwilling to let him out of their hands until the money was in great part paid. He remained a prisoner until December 1527, and then managed to escape to Orvieto.

It was in some ways a victory as great as Pavia. First the greatest King in Europe and then the Head of the Catholic

Church had succumbed and accepted imprisonment at the hands of Charles. The spectre of universal monarchy came again menacingly before men's imaginations. The army that took the Pope prisoner had not acted on the Emperor's orders, but the gain to him was hardly less than if it had. But what had happened after Pavia was repeated now. The position of Charles frightened the other Powers of Europe, and they drew together to resist him.

France and England were his chief opponents. The Pope dare not take a part, for the Imperialists were still in possession of Rome and subjected the city and the hostages that had been given to them to every sort of indignity in their efforts to extort money. But Venice joined readily in the new attack on the power of the Emperor. And Florence which had just re-established a republican form of Government was ready to give help. Francis appealed to a gathering of Notables, men chosen from among the leaders of the Church and the nobility and including many from the Parlements. He put his cause persuasively before them and asked for financial support, which was cordially promised.

Then, though the campaign in Italy had already begun, the Kings of France and of England sent a declaration of war to the King of Spain. It was received and answered with all the usual ceremonies; but, in replying, Charles blazed out into a fierce attack on Francis. "The King has acted," he said, "like a coward and a rogue in not keeping the solemn promise which he made to me in the Treaty of Madrid; and if he maintains the contrary I will maintain my cause in person against him." It was a formal challenge to a duel, and perhaps a serious quarrel between states has never come so near to being submitted to the decision of a personal combat. For Francis accepted—how could the chivalrous King refuse?—and only asked that he might be assured of a "fair field" (*la sûreté du camp*). The visits of the heralds and the answers of the Kings might come direct from a romance; but of course no duel was fought. If it had been, it could have decided nothing. It was Francis who was responsible for the final refusal, and again his knightly honour hardly seems quite free from reproach.

New league
against the
Emperor

A duel
suggested

ar in
aly

It was in Italy as usual that the decision came. The campaign of 1528 has not caught the imagination of posterity like the battles of Marignano and Pavia and the Siege of Rome. But it is an astonishing campaign, and illustrates in the most extreme form the characteristics of the encounters between France and Spain on Italian soil. For at least the fifth time a French triumph seemed likely and assured; and again it was in the end the arms of Spain that won. Never were the French more triumphant than in the June of 1528; yet by the end of the year they had lost completely their hold on Italy. In addition to the general causes which we have noted—the remarkable fighting qualities of the Spanish soldiers and the proximity of Italy to the recruiting grounds of Germany—accident played a great part in the French collapse on this occasion.

e French
ack
ples

First, Lautrec made himself master of nearly the whole of the Duchy of Milan; indeed the city of Milan alone held out for Charles. Then it was decided to push down the peninsula and strike at Naples. No resistance was met with until Neapolitan territory was reached; the half-mutinous Imperial army was withdrawn from Rome to the defence of the city of Naples itself. Here the victory of the French seemed assured. The city was closely blockaded by land, while from the sea a fleet, commanded in part by a nephew of the great Genoese seaman, Doria, made the introduction of reinforcements and provisions exceedingly difficult. Lautrec was full of confidence; the Prince of Orange, who commanded within the city, praised the stubborn endurance of his men, but did not think that they could last beyond the end of the month.

fection
Doria

The Spanish power was saved by the defection of Doria and by the disease which attacked the assailants. For Doria's desertion the policy of Francis was to blame. The great Genoese admiral was quite willing to serve the French; but he was before all things a Genoese patriot. He complained of personal neglect and ingratitude; but especially he was angry because the French were oppressing Genoese liberties by a French garrison, and were ruining her commerce by the establishment of a rival and competitor in the neighbouring harbour of Savona. His complaints were not at-

tended to; an attempt was made to arrest him; and in consequence he transferred his services to Charles and the Prince of Orange. The withdrawal of the Genoese squadron opened the way for the introduction of food into the starving city. Then disease attacked the French army and reduced its numbers by two-thirds. Lautrec died himself; those who survived were weak and unable to resist. The siege was abandoned; the debris of the army were withdrawn to Aversa and forced to capitulate. Nor did things go better for the French in the Milanese. Da Leyva was reinforced and attacked the French. Genoa was taken from their grasp.¹ The French commander, Saint-Pol, was defeated and taken prisoner at Landriano. The iron dice of war had fallen fatally for the French. Yet the country was by no means at the end of her resources, and Francis talked of a new campaign in Italy.

But there were strong reasons for making peace. The country was suffering and the fortune of war uncertain. The little princes had been in their Spanish prison for four years, and they were badly treated. Their treatment is indeed a real slur on Charles' character. They were roughly clothed and fed; their room was bare and sunless; they had nearly forgotten their French tongue when at last they were restored to France. The negotiations were conducted at Cambrai by Louise, the Queen Mother, and Margaret, the aunt of Charles V. and governor of the Netherlands. The allies of France, England and Venice especially, protested against the idea of peace and received positive assurances that no peace was contemplated. It was concluded at the beginning of August 1529.

The Treaty of Cambrai begins by declaring that the Treaty of Madrid remains in force; but in truth it was swept away in many of its chief clauses. The Duke of Bourbon's death had made the settlement much easier. The Emperor no longer claimed the Burgundian inheritance of his grandmother, Mary. On the other hand, Francis once more renounced all his claims in Italy and his feudal rights in Flanders

¹ A lasting result of the defection of Doria from the French was the establishment of close relations between Genoa and Spain, whereby that all-important harbour was opened for the entry of Spanish troops into northern Italy: a strategic change of the utmost importance.

and Artois. The young princes were to be ransomed with the enormous sum of two million golden crowns. A royal marriage was to cement the doubtful peace. Eleonora, widow of the King of Portugal and sister of the Emperor, was to marry Francis. The fate of the Treaty of Madrid made the Spaniards suspicious, and the ratifications were carried out with elaborate precautions. But they were carried out. The money was transported to the frontier in barrels and was exchanged for the prince son the Bidassoa. Eleonora was married to Francis. France had a short peace.

Triumph
of Charles

The Emperor's triumph was complete. He had won it by counsel rather than by the sword. But west of the Rhine and south of the Alps, he had reached his chief aims. He had won Italy, which was held by the possession of Milan and Naples. The Pope was friendly. The Medicis were restored to Florence in spite of the stout resistance of the republic, for which Michael Angelo constructed fortifications. Sforza was allowed to return to Milan, but on his death the Duchy was to revert to the Emperor. Genoa was left free; and Doria established there an aristocratic Government after the fashion of Venice, which lasted until the invasion of Napoleon.

Coronation
of Charles

Charles was crowned by the Pope at Bologna, receiving the iron Crown of Lombardy and the golden Crown of the Empire. He was now in name as well as in fact Holy Roman Emperor. A little later he secured the election of his brother, Ferdinand, to succeed him in the Imperial dignity, while the Spanish possessions would fall of course to his son, Philip, by right of heredity. His tenacity of purpose and his usual soberness of judgment (though strangely at fault in the Treaty of Madrid) had given him a position not often surpassed in the whole history of Europe. Yet his great triumph has not appealed to men's imaginations, nor fixed itself in the memory of posterity. No one thinks of comparing him with Charlemagne or Napoleon or even with Louis XIV. And the reasons are plain. He was not himself a soldier of any mark; his great victories were won for him by the swords of his servants. And though his victory was not transitory--for descendants of the Habsburgs controlled Italy until the Italians were able to rule it for themselves--yet the latter part of his career was less successful than the period we have

been examining. His policy in Germany was a failure ; and he is often regarded as standing at the beginning of the great decline in the power and prestige of Spain. But, though his greatness has faded from men's memories, his great contemporary, Ariosto, has devoted to him some stanzas in the fifteenth canto of the *Orlando Furioso*, which do full justice to the position that he had won. He puts in the mouth of a prophetess the following words : " I see a Prince born on the left bank of the Rhine from the blood of Austria and Aragon, whose worth is unequalled by any that men speak of or history records. I see Justice restored by him to her throne, or rather brought back from death into life ; and all the virtues which the world banished, when it banished her, come back from exile. Wherefore the Supreme Goodness has not merely ordained that he should hold the diadem of the great Empire which was ruled by Augustus, Trajan, Marcus, and Severus ; but also that he should rule over the most remote lands to the East and to the West, and that under this Emperor there should be a single Fold and a single Shepherd." He praises then the great captains who had won his victories for him ; Cortes, Prospero Colonna, Pescara, and above all others, Andrea Doria, whose friendship it was " which had made him victorious in every war." He openly claims for him universal Empire ; the whole world, he says, is to be obedient to him. But the poet had misread the decrees of fate. Charles had now to turn from Italy to Germany, and he found the problems there more difficult, and indeed incapable of treatment by the methods which had succeeded in Italy.

Ariosto on
Charles

We will turn to Germany in a few pages but for the present we must follow the relations of Charles and Francis down to the death of the French King. Their rivalry continued to be as personal and as bitter as before. But the nature of the struggle changed greatly ; there were no more of those bold invasions of Italy, which had been so picturesque a feature of the early wars ; though at the very end France won one more battle on the old battlefield of northern Italy. New forces came into play ; two especially, the Protestants of Germany who adopted a definite political and military organization, and the great Turkish Sultan, Soliman, with whom Francis made a close and lasting alliance.

Character
of the end
of the war

Last years
of King
Francis

France was according to the standards of those times strong, united, and efficiently organised. But King Francis was no longer the paladin of his early years. He was often despondent and ill; and always incapable of continuous personal attention to affairs of State. His relations with his wife, Eleonora, were cold, and he fell under the influence of his mistress, the Duchesse d'Étampes. His eldest son died in 1536, and Henry became the Dauphin and heir. Between him and his father there was a conflict of temperament and aim. The ministers were powerful, but no one of them gained real control of the policy of France. Names appeared which were to be prominent in France for many years. Montmorency, the richest territorial lord in France, became Constable and First Minister, and used his position to maintain good relations with Spain as long as possible; he never himself left the Roman communion but was closely related to the House of Chatillon, soon destined to tragic fame in the defence of the Protestant cause in France. The greatest of Catholic families too—the Guises—appeared now at the Court of France: the chief members were Francis of Guise, the soldier, and Charles, the Cardinal of Lorraine; their sister, Mary, married James V of Scotland, and the marriage gave the family a standing among the princely Houses of Europe. The latter part of the reign is characterized by a strange lack of plan and persistence. Thus Chabot, after holding the highest office, was found guilty of financial corruption on the widest scale; he was condemned to heavy fines, to deposition from office, and to imprisonment. But he was soon pardoned by the King and restored to power. Poyet, who had held the same position, was also condemned for offences of the same kind. The controlling idea of the French King's policy was jealousy of Charles and the power of Spain, but he fluctuated and flagged in his effort to realize it. Were it not for the memory of Marignano, no one would think of placing him among the great Kings of France.

Catherine
dei Medici

The Treaty of Cambrai was in no way a permanent settlement. Diplomacy at once began to play its old game. When Catherine dei Medici married Henry, son of Francis, and subsequently the heir to the throne, that was felt to be a blow against the authority of Charles in Italy; for Catherine

was a relative of Pope Clement VII,¹ and the marriage showed that the Papacy was ready to draw near to France. Negotiations were opened with the Protestants of Germany, and these led to events of the utmost importance for all Europe, but they did not much influence either France or Germany during the life of Francis I. Of far more immediate importance was the understanding reached with the Sultan. Commercial intercourse was definitely arranged, and plans were agreed on for military co-operation. It is a significant incident, and inaugurates an *entente* between France and Turkey which lasted for nearly two centuries. The serious character of the Protestant movement was now clear; the suppression of heresy and a crusade against the infidel had been declared to be the aims of the most Catholic King of Spain and the most Christian King of France in the Treaty of Madrid and in the Peace of Cambrai. But religion did not really much influence their foreign policy—it did not even always control the foreign policy of the Papacy. Fear, ambition, and the balance of power were for the present the deciding ideas; and Francis saw in all the enemies of Charles his own allies. The English King's determination to procure a divorce from his wife, Catherine, the Spanish King's aunt, made him the enemy of Charles for the present, and in 1532 Francis made a treaty with Henry VIII.

Yet the star of Charles was still in the ascendant. In 1535 he carried out the expedition against Tunis, of which we have spoken in another chapter.² His capture of the city and the liberation of some 20,000 Christian captives seemed a triumph almost as great as Pavia.

War between Francis and Charles came again in 1536; and it was Italy again that provided the chief motive. For France had attacked and overrun Savoy and Piedmont, and this opened a dangerous gate of entry into Italy. Milan provided a more immediate cause of war. The French King had not abandoned all hopes of winning the famous duchy, and, when Francesco Sforza, the last Duke, died in 1535 and

¹ Though not his niece as she is usually called. The relationship was much more distant. Catherine was the grand-daughter of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and Lorenzo was the uncle of Clement VII.

² See p. 217.

Milan as an Imperial fief had reverted to Charles, Francis demanded the succession for his son, Henry. Charles answered by a violent attack on all the policy of the French King, and again offered to settle the matter by a duel.

Invasion of
France

The war that followed is a very drab affair compared with the great campaigns of the earlier part of the reign. Francis had been reorganizing the French armies, strengthening the infantry as compared with the cavalry, and giving the army a local and even a popular basis. But he made no effort to resist Charles when he entered France from the south-east. The country was laid waste so as to make subsistence difficult to the enemy, and battle was not accepted. Charles was with the troops himself, but though some towns were taken he had to withdraw with great loss caused chiefly by disease. The rest of the fighting was chiefly in the north, and was quite indecisive in character. But the war was very expensive; both sides were suffering heavily and a truce was arranged at Nice in 1538. It seemed as though it might be more than a truce. The two Kings met at Aigues-mortes and professed the greatest affection for one another. When in 1539 the great city of Ghent in the Netherlands revolted against the taxes imposed on it, Charles was invited to pass through France on his road to suppress the rising. The invitation was accepted with many misgivings; but all passed off well. The two Kings seemed to enjoy together the festivities which were prepared in Paris, and no obstacle was placed in the way of Charles' departure to the subjugation and punishment of Ghent. But war came again in 1542.

Truce of
Nice

France had the worst of it in the diplomacy which preceded the war. Henry of England fell away from France, and the German Protestants were for the most part kept on the Emperor's side by the imminent attack of the Turks. But France had found a new ally in the Duke of Cleves, who held large and important territories on the Rhine (Cleves, Guelders, Guelderland, and Zutphen), and the understanding with the Sultan grew more intimate. Charles bestowed the Duchy of Milan on his son, Philip, and this was a direct challenge to the French power.

France and
the Turk

The chief interest in this short and indecisive war is to see how completely France had accepted the help of the Turk.

The famous Barbarossa brought the Turkish galleys into the western Mediterranean. Toulon was handed over to them, and the French population was removed from the town. Public opinion in France and elsewhere was uneasy at the sight of the alliance between the most Christian King and the head of Islam. In 1544 France gained a last victory in Italy at Ceresole in Piedmont. The Imperialists lost heavily, and the battle might have led to a renewed invasion of Italy had it not been for the news from France. There, Charles had invaded and pushed up to the Marne, creating a panic in Paris. Henry of England, too, attacked from Calais and took Boulogne. Ceresole was more than counterbalanced by these strokes. Francis was too old and weary to struggle on, and he consented to negotiate. The Treaty of Crépy brought peace with the Emperor in September 1544. War with England went on longer, but came to an end by the Treaty of Ardres in 1546.

These treaties are of little permanent importance. Francis I had indeed fought his last war, but the rivalry with the Spanish-Imperial power would go on for twelve more years and would reach no enduring settlement before 1558. France abandoned Piedmont and Savoy with rather strange readiness, for the French armies still occupied them. Charles no longer put forward his claims to the Burgundian inheritance. The French King still cast a hopeful and envious eye on Milan; for it was stipulated that a marriage should be arranged for his son, the Duke of Orleans, either with the daughter of the Emperor, who should bring the Low Countries as her dower; or with his niece who would bring the Duchy of Milan. The death of the Duke of Orleans in the following year added this plan to the many other impracticable dreams that the French King had cherished for winning Milan, which was never destined to form a part of French territory or to come permanently under French influence. The treaty contained the stipulation—now become almost common form—that the contracting parties should join together in a struggle against the German heretic and the Turkish infidel. The treaty with England left Boulogne in English hands; the memories of the English possessions in France still exercised a dangerous fascination on the minds of English statesmen.

Treaty of
Crépy

Death of
Francis

Francis died in March 1547. The last months of his reign were darkened by ill-health and by risings in La Rochelle and in certain cities of the south and west. The future importance of La Rochelle makes it interesting to note that the city is spoken of as "a little aristocratic republic." There were troubles, too, with the Protestants of France, and Francis was quite as ready to suppress them by force as Charles of Spain; though he was shocked by the massacre of some hundreds of peasants in the Vaudois. The King had always shown a real interest in the new learning and art of his time, and this explains the favourable opinion which has often been held of him, which nothing in his policy and achievements justifies. A contemporary writes of him: "He was magnanimous and generous and a lover of good literature which, through his means, lit up the shades of ignorance which had reigned up to his time. He loved all men of learning (*gens d'esprit*), and founded at Paris colleges for Latin, Greek, and Hebrew studies. . . . He died at the age of fifty-three after having had experience of much good and much evil fortune; though of more evil than of good." ¹

¹ Martin du Bellay, *Memoires*.

CHAPTER VI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LUTHERANISM IN GERMANY

1. THE SITUATION IN 1525

WE have now to trace the fortunes of the religious movement inaugurated by Luther in 1517, and so powerfully supported by his actions and writings. It spread rapidly over a great part of Germany and became a powerful influence in other lands as well. In some, especially in the Scandinavian kingdoms of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, it found a permanent home. For a time it seemed as though there would be no limit to its advance, and that in some form it might dominate all the continent. Then there came a check to its victories. The enthusiasm that it had evoked slackened; rivals arose among those who broke away from the Roman communion; the Roman church reorganized its forces, restated its doctrines, and won the support of a great volume of loyalty and devotion. The end of the century saw the new and the old forms of Christianity—the different Protestant bodies as they came to be called and the revived power of the Church of Rome—struggling even more bitterly than before, though neither side gained any victory that was decisive for the whole field.

The causes which led to the adhesion of the different parts of Europe to the Protestant or the Roman cause have been the subject of much discussion. The explanation has been found by some in climate, and it has been contended that Protestantism by reason of its sober and intellectual character is specially adapted to the northern and temperate regions, while Roman Catholicism naturally finds its adherents in the warmer and more emotional south. But the explanation is too simple and neglects such facts as the loyalty of the

“Belgian” Netherlands and of Ireland to the Roman connection, the passionate Protestantism of much of the south of France, the failure of the Protestant faith to influence Russia. Nor is it more convincing to find the line of demarcation in race. Southern Germany became even more eager to retain Catholicism than northern Germany was to reject it; Wales and Ireland are closely allied in race but are strangely distinct in their religious history; in France we have a people divided against itself in the matter of religion. Nor does the economic interpretation of the Reformation fare any better. Protestantism has been declared to be pre-eminently an aristocratic form of religion; alien therefore from the working classes and from states where the aristocracy had been reduced to impotence by the concentration of power in the hands of the monarchy. But the movement is too manifold to admit of such a generalization; Protestantism was accepted and it was rejected by communities of very different types of political and social structure. The movement was, as has already been maintained, really a religious one and depended on the convictions and emotions of men and women. Among the secondary causes the most important was probably the existing relations between the different states of Europe and the Roman curia; those that had already won a certain measure of independence were less inclined than the others to break away entirely from Rome.

Luther's
later
career

In Germany we are for the future chiefly concerned with the action of states. Luther still was a great force to be reckoned with. After the Peasants' War he was for a time very unpopular, and he was never again the impersonation of German nationality that he seemed likely to become at first. He had believed that, if the truth, as he saw it, were boldly proclaimed, all the world would accept it; but the divisions among the reformers grew stronger as the years passed, and a new enthusiasm began to stir in the ranks of his opponents. He was in some ways disappointed and disillusioned; but he never lost courage and faith, and his pen and his voice were continuously active to the end. Among the other Lutheran theologians and propagandists, Melancthon was the chief. He had none of Luther's passion and violence;

but he was a great scholar and had much personal charm and attractiveness. He leaned always to compromise and desired to maintain the connection between things old and new. He wrote easily and persuasively, and many of the formal documents of Lutheranism are from his pen.

The theologians and scholars were now falling into the Saxony background, where they continued, however, to play a very important part. The great decisions lay with statesmen. Frederick the Wise, the Elector of Saxony, had died in 1525. But for his protection of the Lutheran movement—a protection which fell short of complete acceptance—it could hardly have survived. His successor, John, was more devoted to Lutheran doctrine; but he had none of Frederick's statecraft, and the leadership in the Protestant cause passed from his hands. At the extreme western point the strangely shaped group of the lands of Electoral Saxony touched those of the Landgraviate of Hesse, and the ruler of these lands, Philip of Hesse, the Landgrave Philip, became the most active leader on the Lutheran side. The age in Germany seems curiously lacking in statesmen of energy and insight, capable of prescient and determined action; even among the soldiers there seems to be no man of first-rate ability. But among the Reformers, Philip of Hesse came nearest to the required standard. He had little loyalty to the traditions of the Empire, and he pursued his aims with an energy that was not easily weakened. Saxony (or rather Electoral Saxony; for the related power of Ducal Saxony adhered to the old ways) and Hesse among the great states stood alone in the full welcome that they gave to Lutheranism. Brandenburg as yet remained aloof, though the wife of the Elector Joachim was an eager adherent of the evangelical movement. But in 1525 an important member of the same family, the Hohenzollerns, came over to the side of the Reformers. Albert, Margrave of Brandenburg, was Grand-Master of the Teutonic Order, and in that capacity ruled over a large part of non-German Prussia, though recent victories of the Poles had much decreased his territories. He had embraced the new ideas, and in 1525 he enforced the adoption of the Lutheran form of worship and the German liturgy, although the inhabitants were for the most part unable to understand the German tongue. The change

meant (and it is important to notice it) that Albert, hitherto Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, became Albert, first Duke of Prussia. The lands, which he had administered nominally for others, became his personal property; and ultimately, as a consequence of his act, were incorporated with the Electorate of Brandenburg; and when nearly two hundred years later the Electorate was changed into a monarchy, they supplied the Elector with his title as King of Prussia.

The
German
cities

Several other princes, smaller than these, also supported the Lutheran cause. And not only the princes, but also many of the most important Imperial cities were ready to accept the new ideas. Nürnberg, Augsburg, Ulm, and Strasburg were among the first, and a little later the city of Magdeburg, so important because of its position, came in. The cities on the shores of the Baltic were all inclined to the same cause.

Spread of
Lutheranism
in Germany

The ease and rapidity with which the Lutheran movement spread through Germany is surprising. There was not, before the challenge of Luther, any sign of widespread or determined opposition to the Roman connection; but the sense of loyalty to the Papacy must have been weak. There was far more resistance in England to the religious changes of Henry VIII, of Edward VI, and of Elizabeth than there was in most German states to the overthrow of a religious system which had been established there for seven hundred years. The agents in the conversion of Germany to the new ideas were for the most part priests, monks, and friars trained in the school of Catholic thought; there are few instances of determined resistance to the new changes. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Lutheranism only gradually assumed the character of a direct attack on the Roman type of Catholicism. Much of the old forms and ceremonies was preserved. Only slowly did men come to see that they were committed to a definite breach with Rome.

Opponents
of
Lutheranism

While Lutheranism seemed weak in secular support, its opponents seemed overwhelmingly strong. There was no doubt about the aims of the Emperor Charles; the suppression of heresy had been declared to be an object dear to his heart in many of the public treaties that he had signed. And

Charles seemed to dispose of the wealth and armies of Spain, the resources of the New World, the rich and enterprising, and as yet Catholic, population of the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands ; and he was now the master of Italy as well. But this was not all. Charles' brother, Ferdinand, had been given the German territories of the Habsburgs, and he acted in general agreement with his Imperial brother. He was as little inclined to Lutheranism as Charles himself. He had not Charles' inexhaustible patience or his soberness of judgment ; but he was eager and ambitious. And in 1526 there came to him a huge and indefinite addition to his territories and prestige. The battle of Mohacz (August 1526) had resulted in the defeat and death of Louis, King of Hungary and Bohemia by the Turks, who became more dangerous to Europe than ever before. That fact would make the Lutherans less ready to engage in a civil war which might throw open the gates of Germany to the dreaded infidel. A large part of Hungary fell into the power of the Turks, and they did not lose their hold upon it for more than two centuries. Bohemia, and what remained of free Hungary, sought for a new King. Ferdinand was recommended by his power and connections, as well as by his close relationship with the deceased King Louis. He was chosen King of Bohemia in October 1526, and a little later was recognized as King of Hungary by the Diet at Pesth ; though there was another Christian rival, John Zapolya, still in the field. An important addition was thus made to the power of the Austrian Hapsburgs. These new dominions imposed on their ruler a very heavy task, for they had to be defended and organized ; but they added greatly to his prestige and apparent power. Lutheran Germany was a small group of second-rate Powers "encircled" by the greatest Powers of Europe. The destruction of Protestantism seemed inevitable.

And yet it was not destroyed. We have seen that the hostility of King Francis to Charles was of the utmost service to the Lutherans. It saved them from annihilation. The war with France was the Emperor's greatest and most pressing danger ; it was only when a victory or a treaty of peace gave Charles security on the side of France that he was able to turn to his German enemies ; and a victory for the Emperor

Ferdinand
King of
Hungary
and Bohemia

How France
helped the
Lutherans

in Germany usually led to the renewal of his difficulties with France. The power of Charles, despite the great size and potentialities of his dominions, was curiously ineffective for aggressive warfare. The financial system of the time never gave him control of a sufficient supply of ready money. His brother, Ferdinand, was by no means willing to subordinate his own policy to that of Charles. Even the Popes could not always be relied on in the struggle against the common enemy. They were Popes, but they were temporal sovereigns too; and as such they pursued a policy which, as we have seen, often brought them into conflict with Charles and even into alliance with the Lutherans and the Turks. The machinery of the Empire too—slow moving, clumsy and elaborate—was a constant hindrance to the Emperor's schemes. The Emperor could not neglect it, could not act without it, for such a procedure would have provoked the hostility of Lutheran and Catholic princes alike; and it always opposed to him a yielding and indefinite but most effective resistance. For even the princes most devoted to Rome were as jealous of their own independence as the most determined Lutherans. Charles and his successors desired the re-establishment of the authority of both the Roman Church and the Roman Empire. Many Germans who would have welcomed the first were ready to resist the second to the death; and the union of these two aims accounts for the failure of both.

The
constitution
of the
Empire

2. THE GROWTH OF AN INDEPENDENT LUTHERAN ORGANIZATION

The real history of Germany in this period is not to be found in the deliberations of the Diets. The two decisive forces were the continuous propaganda of the new ideas by speech and writing, and the policy of the princes. The cities were falling into the background of German life. The tendency towards larger states with a central organization was as marked in Germany as elsewhere, and even the greatest of the Imperial cities were not equal to competition with the territorial princes. But, though the Diets are no longer the real fulcrum of German politics, it was in them that the religious and political controversies of the time came to light,

and the crises in the development of sixteenth-century Germany are marked by the decisions of Diets, or by their failure to arrive at a decision.

The Lutheran princes gradually became decided opponents of the traditional powers of the Empire. Luther's early loyalty to the Emperor and his insistence on passive obedience to it faded away. Philip of Hesse was the one enterprising statesman on the Lutheran side, and he was ready to secure support for himself and his allies wherever he could find it. He found it in France, in England, in the Scandinavian kingdoms, among the Hungarians, and even with the Turks. It is clear therefore that the Protestant Reformation in Germany can only be regarded as an expression of nationalist feeling with many restrictions and qualifications. Luther had appealed to German sentiment against the "foreign" power of Rome, and the Lutheran Church and creed always appealed to many as a product of the fatherland. It is, too, from the Protestant powers that the development of a victorious and united Germany came in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but in the sixteenth century the Lutheran leaders showed little regard for German tradition or for the integrity of German territory. The abandonment to France of lands in Alsace and Lorraine was part of the price that Germany paid for the Reformation.

The Diet of Speier in 1526 proved singularly ineffective. The Emperor had just won his great victory at Pavia, but the Turks were threatening the great blow which fell with such stunning force the same year on the battlefield of Mohacz. The Emperor could not yet turn his energies to Germany. His brother, Ferdinand, presided and read to the Diet an address from Charles V, expressing the hope that "the Christian faith and the well-established good Christian practice and order of the Church might be maintained"; he proposed the calling of a free Council and asked for means of punishing transgressors against the laws of the Empire. This clearly meant that if the Emperor's powers were great enough, the resolutions of the Diet of Worms were to be carried out. The cities took the lead in maintaining the impossibility of such a procedure; it could only have resulted in civil war. The moment was in many ways propitious for

a blow against the Lutherans ; but the means and the statesmanship were lacking. In the end a resolution was adopted by the unanimous Diet which was intended merely as an adjournment of the question. The hope was expressed that a Council or a National Assembly might soon meet and find a solution for the many pressing evils. Meanwhile it was unanimously resolved " that each one should so live, govern and carry himself as he hopes and trusts to answer it to God and to his Imperial Majesty."

This vague and sentimental resolution was interpreted by many of the members of the Diet as an abdication of the central Imperial Power, and as a declaration that each member of the Empire might in religious matters act independently. The definite organization of Lutheran churches and communities had already begun and now went on apace. " A German Mass and order of divine service " was issued in January 1526, in which the use of the Latin tongue and the traditional vestments were for the time permitted. A catechism was issued in July 1529. The new movement thus struck its roots much deeper into the soil of Germany.

Philip of
Hesse and
the foreign
powers

An equally important movement began in the domain of foreign relations. Philip of Hesse was informed—the news was false and the story is one of the obscure incidents of the time—that the Emperor and the Catholics were preparing a blow against the Lutherans. He determined to prepare for resistance, and in 1528 entered into relations with France and with Denmark, with Poland and with Zapolya, the nationalist King of Hungary, and prepared to build up an alliance of the evangelical powers of Germany. The movement was dropped when the danger was found to be unreal ; but it showed the direction of the thoughts of the Lutheran leaders.

Diet of
Speier, 1529

Neglect only made the situation in Germany more unfavourable to the Roman Church and Empire. A new Diet was summoned to Speier in March 1529. The Lutheran powers went to it supported by a definiteness of aim and organization hitherto unknown to them.

The Emperor's aims were plainly expounded. For the maintenance of unity, he pinned his hopes to the calling of a General Council " or at least a National Council." Until

such Council met, there were to be no further religious innovations; "no one shall use violence or force against ancient usages and customs or go over to any wrong or strange creed." Lastly the decision ("the Recess") of the last Diet of Speier—which had seemed to admit the independent action of each member of the Empire in religious matters—was to be withdrawn, and that would mean that the decisions of the Diet of Worms for the suppression of Lutheranism would become valid again.

There was much that was noble and even humane in the aims of the Emperor; it is possible that the interests of European peace and of Christianity would have been best served by their acceptance. But it was a direct challenge to the existence of the new Lutheran movement. It was bound to provoke resistance, and the Empire had no means of overcoming resistance.

The Emperor's wishes were supported by the majority of the Diet. They declared that the Edict of Worms was still in force; that the existing Lutheran churches should be allowed to remain, but that no further innovations should be allowed; that the celebration of the Mass in the old form should be allowed in Lutheran states; and that no confiscation of Church property should be allowed.

If Philip of Hesse and his allies were to accept this, they would abandon all their hopes and beliefs and schemes. Apart from the clash of policies, there were legal justifications for action. The resolution of the first Diet of Speier had been unanimous and could not be set aside by the mere command of the Emperor; the Roman rite was now to be allowed in Lutheran states without any corresponding concessions to the Lutherans in Roman states. The Lutherans determined therefore to make a formal protest; "our great and urgent needs require us openly to protest against the said resolution"; and the protest was signed by five princes, of whom the chief were Philip of Hesse, the Elector of Saxony, George of Brandenburg (not the Elector), and by fourteen cities, and among them by Strasburg, Nürnberg, Ulm, and Constance. There was nothing decisive in the act; but great attention has been paid to it because it gave to the world the word Protestant; which belongs properly only to the Lutherans, but is

"Protestantism"

conveniently applied to all who protested on whatever ground against the doctrine or the practice of the Roman Church. The famous protest at the time merely meant that the Lutherans accepted the challenge that was thrown down.¹

Diet of
Augsburg,
1530

Charles had by no means abandoned his hopes of the maintenance of religious unity through the calling of a Council, and of the establishment of some compromise between the contending parties in the meantime. In 1530—while the Treaty of Cambrai gave him a rest from his struggle with the King of France—he came in person into Germany and presided at the Diet of Augsburg. The war against the Turks and the reunion of German Christendom were declared to be the two objects of the Diet. The atmosphere was one of conciliation. Luther was under the Imperial ban and could not therefore be present; but Melancthon was at Augsburg and was full of hope that some middle way might be found. From Coburg Luther followed the proceedings with fear and indignation, and believed that all the talk of peace was “smoke and lies.” A statement of Lutheran belief was drawn up—the famous *Confessio Augustana*, which remained the official version of Lutheran doctrine. It was signed by nine of the leading Protestants (the name can now be used) among whom was the Duke of Saxony as well as the Elector. It was very moderate in tone and produced a great impression. But a *Confutatio* was drawn up and read. It was the work of Eck, Faber, Cochlaeus, and other Roman theologians, and the Emperor declared that it contained a sufficient confutation of Lutheran errors.

The
Augsburg
confession

So all the efforts to secure some basis of agreement had been of no avail. The Recess of the Diet brought the open conflict much nearer than the second Diet of Speier. In it the failure to find a means of conciliation was deplored. The Lutheran princes were called on to reconsider their position within a short and definite period. Meanwhile there was to be no propaganda nor persecution of Roman opponents. A free and general Council was again promised. The decrees of

¹ Of all the misreadings of the significance of this famous step the strangest is that which makes it a special protest against the idea of *toleration*. It was merely the declaration that the Lutherans were not going to lay down their arms without a struggle.

the Diet of Worms were still held in reserve, but it was in vain that Campeggio called on the Emperor "to take fire and sword in hand and radically extirpate these noxious and venomous weeds." He had no means of doing so. Even the princes most devoted to Rome would not have helped him in an attack on the independence of German states.

None the less the attitude of the Emperor was menacing to the Protestants. The Imperial Court was to take action against those who had become possessed of ecclesiastical property, and this touched all Protestant powers very nearly. The position of the Elector of Saxony was especially difficult, because his dignity made him the special mark of Imperial attack. Charles had decided not to press for the election of his son, Philip, as King of the Romans—a title which would secure to him the succession to the full Imperial dignity at Charles' death. Philip was too thorough-going a Spaniard and too vehement a Catholic to make his election possible. The candidature of his brother, Ferdinand, would arouse less opposition. He was German by origin and by residence, and was acquainted with the problems of Germany. The support of the other electors was secured; but the vote of Saxony remained uncertain. Alone among the Electors he was a convinced supporter of Lutheranism. It was even proposed to exclude him from the electoral college, and a Papal Bull was offered for that purpose. Such an attack on the traditional constitution of the Empire aroused the opposition of the other Electors, and the proposal was dropped.

Some alliance among the Protestant powers was clearly necessary, and the history of Germany was full of the formation of Leagues within the Empire. The new Protestant League is a continuation of the movement which had produced the Hanseatic League, the Helvetic Confederation, the Sualian League, and many others. Philip of Hesse had already taken the first steps by negotiations both within and outside of the Empire. Now, in February 1531, the formal alliance of the Protestant powers was concluded and signed at Schmalkalden—a town near the Weser in Thuringia and within the influence of Saxony.

The formation of the Schmalkaldic League is an event of decisive importance in the history of the sixteenth century.

Its objects are truly and movingly laid down in the document signed by the first members.

“Whereas it is altogether likely that those who have the pure Word of God preached in their territory are to be prevented by force from continuing this service so pleasing to God; and whereas it is the duty of every Christian Government to have the Word of God preached to its subjects . . .

“Now we, solely for the sake of our own defence and deliverance, which both by human and divine right is permitted to every one, have agreed that whenever any one of us is attacked on account of the Word of God and the doctrine of the Gospel . . . all the others shall immediately come to his assistance as best they can and help to deliver him.”¹

Constitution
of the
League

In December of the same year the constitution of the League was further defined. It was hoped to make of it an effective federation; not a loose confederation, depending on the passing inclination of the members. The votes to be accorded to the different groups in it were defined. But from the first there were signs of those bitter personal rivalries, which had been the ruin of all German attempts at unity. To meet the difficulty, it was decided that the Landgrave of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony should share the command. It was arranged to raise an army of 2000 horse and 10,000 foot. The means of paying them were also considered.

The first signatories deserve to be noted. They were (1) John, the Elector of Saxony, with his son and grandson—this house had from the beginning been most closely connected with the Lutheran movement; (2) Philip the Landgrave of Hesse; (3) The Dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg; (4) the Prince of Anhalt; (5) the Counts of Mansfeld, and (6) the cities of Strasburg, Ulm, Constance, Reutlingen, Memmingen, Lindau, Biberach, Isny, Lübeck, Magdeburg, and Bremen. It is not a very imposing assemblage of names, but it contained representatives of both north and south Germany, and of those who leaned towards the doctrines of Zwingli as well as of the Lutherans. It is the nucleus out of which Protestant Germany grew. Ranke declares that the days during which the League was discussed and accepted

¹ Kidd's *Documents of the Continental Reformation*, no. 124.

“ may be reckoned among the most important in the history of the world.” Certainly they were far more important than the deliberations of any Diet.

The Protestants had now a defined faith, a church polity, and a political organization. The membership of the League rapidly increased, and the Protestant movement seemed likely to spread over all German lands.

The Emperor made no real effort to enforce the decrees ^{Diet of Nürnberg, 1532} against the Protestants. He was by nature inclined to patience and procrastination rather than energetic decision. Any attack on the Protestants now would develop into a serious war; and a great Turkish attack on the Hungarian frontier was impending. So when a Diet was called to Nürnberg in 1532, it breathed peace and conciliation rather than war against the Protestants. In what is known as the Peace of Nürnberg it was declared that the danger from the Turks, “ the common enemy of the Christian name,” demanded an Imperial peace, and that various roads of amicable agreement had been explored; it had therefore been decided that all wars for the sake of religion within the Empire should be forbidden; and that all legal proceedings against the Elector of Saxony and his friends should be abandoned; it was hoped that a General Council would be called within six months, and, if that hope failed, a meeting of the Estates of the Empire would be summoned.

Real energy was thrown into the preparations against the Turks. An army of 80,000 men was raised. The Turkish force was not so dangerous as it had seemed. It failed to capture the Hungarian fortress of Güns and soon retired. The rumour of the preparations in Germany probably hastened its retreat.

The situation created by the Nürnberg Peace proved ^{Adhesions to Lutheranism} wholly favourable to the spread of Protestantism and the Schmalkaldic League. The number of the adhesions to Lutheranism was very great, and there was little serious resistance. The action came now from political powers, whether of the towns or the princes, and clearly the hold of the Roman Church on the affections of the population was weak. The adhesion of the cities of Augsburg, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Hanover was among the earliest results of the

Württemberg Nürnberg Peace. The accession of Würtemberg was even more important and deserves closer examination. An interesting and curious revolution had occurred there just when Luther was beginning his struggle against the Empire and the Church. Duke Ulrich, who had the reputation of a careless and extravagant prince, had been driven from his state by the united opposition of the peasants, the cities, and the nobles. The neighbouring Suabian League had also had a share in his expulsion. The Duke had been put to the ban of the Empire and lived for some years in exile—a picturesque but unsteady and worthless pretender to the Ducal power. By agreement with the Suabian League the administration of the country was put into the hands of the Emperor's brother, Ferdinand. It was the strongest foothold of the Habsburgs in the south-west of Germany. The Peasants' Revolt had been particularly violent in this part of Germany, and the suppression of the revolt had still further strengthened the power of Ferdinand. The Schmalkaldic League naturally desired to spread its power into this important region, and the circumstances were favourable. The Suabian League had been dissolved. Ferdinand's interests were chiefly in the east of Germany, and his troops were far from Würtemberg. Philip of Hesse, always the brain and the hand of the League, planned the movement. Duke Ulrich came from exile and joined him; the financial and diplomatic support of France was secured; the troops of the Schmalkaldic League were at the disposal of the Duke. The power of Ferdinand was driven out without serious fighting. He was forced to restore the country to Duke Ulrich. Ecclesiastical property was taken to pay for the war. The Lutheran Church system was introduced. The "people" were said to have welcomed the change; certainly they had no means of resisting it or of making their wishes known. A characteristic incident of the story is the occupation of Montbéliard on the Doubs by France as security for the expenses she had incurred. And all this was done without any nominal war; the Peace of Nürnberg was not technically broken. The whole affair was a notable victory for the Schmalkaldic League and its leader, and it encouraged other German states to adopt the same cause.

The Revolution in Würtemberg had been wholly political and military in its origins. But a wave of enthusiasm for the Lutheran ideas was sweeping over Germany. Especially is this noticeable in the great cities. "Things took the same course in most of the towns of northern Germany," writes Ranke. "In all of them we see preachers arise, the Lutheran hymns become popular, and the congregations take part in religious questions; the Council at first makes a greater or less resistance but at length gives way."¹ Doubtless the motives which actuated men were varied and hard to analyse; but the story is unintelligible unless a real and widespread enthusiasm for the reformation of the Church is admitted.² An illustration of the way in which the Reformation was adopted in the cities may be taken from the history of Augsburg—that great Imperial city, so rich in commerce and in the monuments of the Middle Ages. Martin Bucer of Strasburg had been active here. He had been both monk and priest; but he had followed in the steps of Luther and was one of his warmest admirers. He had urged on the Council of Augsburg the duty of abolishing the Roman and adopting the Lutheran form of worship. In 1537 the necessary steps were taken. The Protestant worship was set up; those who were not prepared to accept these new "Christian ordinances" were at liberty to leave the city; but liberty of speech, writing, and worship was not allowed. The penalty of death was possible in extreme cases. Then followed the purging of the churches and the destruction of altars and statues. There is no note of regret at the destruction of objects of so much beauty and interest. The Roman Catholics protested against the changes but in vain. The Protestants may not have been a majority of the population, but they were completely masters of the city. The main

¹ *History of the Reformation in Germany*, bk. vi, chap. 5.

² Freytag writes in his *Bilder aus dem Jahrhundert der Reformation*: "It was an age without parallel, when a great people earnestly and anxiously sought to find God. A yearning for a knowledge of the Truth and an eager struggle to win the Eternal Love—that was to be for many years the master passion of the German people." There is great exaggeration in this; but it represents a side of the truth and an important one; as important as the swift-coming disillusionment and moral decline on which Janssen insists with so much wealth of detail.

features of the story are repeated in the history of many other cities in Germany.

Brandenburg The future greatness of Brandenburg, and of the Hohenzollern family which was established in the Electoral dignity there, makes it well to note the circumstances of its acceptance of the Protestant system. The Hohenzollern family did not seem at first very likely to come forward as champions of Protestantism. They had been well provided with ecclesiastical benefices. Albert, the brother of the Elector Joachim, was Cardinal Archbishop of Mainz, and held also the Sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt. He was the chief ecclesiastical dignitary in the Empire, and the fortunes of the family might seem to be intimately connected with the defence of the Roman Church. While the Elector Joachim lived the Electorate was loyal to Rome, though Archbishop Albert of Mainz showed himself ready to make profit by concessions to the Protestants of his dominions. But the wife of the Elector had been a Lutheran and had gone into exile for her faith. When her son, Joachim II, succeeded, the situation quickly changed. It is characteristic of this state (which later came to be called Prussia) that the change was carried through by the will of the Elector alone; there is no prominent preacher or demagogue to stir up the hearts of the people. At first the external Roman ceremonial and even the name of Bishop was maintained, but only for a time. By 1540 the Mark of Brandenburg had been completely "purged from its former impurity." The Roman Catholics were allowed to retire into exile. A peculiar feature of the Reformation in Brandenburg was the annexation to the electoral family of the titles and revenues of the bishoprics.

Maurice of Saxony

Only one other step in the advance of Protestantism can be mentioned. The Ducal House of Saxony had hitherto held as stoutly to the Roman cause as the Electoral House had to the Protestant. But in 1539 Duke George died. He was succeeded by his Protestant brother, Henry, and on his death in 1541 Henry's son, the famous Maurice of Saxony, also a determined Protestant, inherited the Duchy. We shall be much occupied in the next section with this restless enterprising, unscrupulous statesman. It is enough to say now that the religious loyalty of the Duchy was forcibly brought into harmony with that of the Electorate.

3. THE OVERTHROW AND REVIVAL OF GERMAN PROTESTANTISM

The Protestant flood poured over Germany. Few monuments of the old order could be seen above it. Even Bavaria, though not Lutheran, was uncertain in its relations with Rome; 1540 may be marked as the lowest point in the fortunes of Rome in central Europe. For the next five or six years it is difficult to tell whether the tide is ebbing or flowing. There was much to encourage and to depress both parties; but a blow was being prepared which came near to destroying Protestantism in its first home.

The influence of Philip of Hesse in the Councils of the Schmalkaldic League had been so great and the Protestants were so lacking in statesmen of any distinction, that the cooling of his enthusiasm was of great importance. The origin of this change is to be found in a purely domestic concern. He was married to Christina of Saxony, daughter of Duke George, and she had borne him seven children and against her no charge of any kind could be brought. But Philip had lived a vicious and licentious life, and now desired to marry Margaret von der Saal, and justified this step as a means of escape from other and looser connections. The Protestant movement did not merely revolt against the theology and church polity of the Middle Ages, but it also criticized its moral standards. It had definitely repudiated the celibacy of the clergy and monastic vows; it was natural that it should be ready to reconsider the teachings of the medieval Church on the nature and obligations of marriage. The theologians whom Philip consulted—Bucer and Melancthon were the most prominent, but Luther concurred—declared that polygamy was allowed in the Old Testament and not forbidden in the New; they approved of Philip taking a second wife, and the marriage was celebrated in 1540, with the concurrence of his first wife and the Elector of Saxony, and in presence of Bucer and Melancthon. It had been hoped to keep the matter secret, but that proved to be impossible; and the scandal, when the facts were known, was very great; the Roman Catholics naturally did not neglect the opening it afforded them for attacking the theories

Philip of
Hesse's
marriage

of their opponents. The Landgrave Philip did not get the unqualified support from the theologians that he expected. They advised him to deny the fact of his second marriage, and even Luther recommended "a good bold lie for the good of the Christian Church." The upshot of the whole strange and sordid story was the estrangement of Philip from his colleagues in the Schmalkaldic League. He drew near to the Emperor; made a treaty with him in 1541; received later from him an assurance that he would not be prosecuted for the very serious offence of bigamy. All this did not mean that he had abandoned the Protestant cause but a very dangerous rift had been made in it.

Jülich
and
Cleves

These same years, however, opened the prospect of a great gain for the Protestant cause. William, Duke of Jülich and Cleves, had won in 1539, with the consent of the local estates, the territories of Geldern and Zutphen. These lands commanded an all-important stretch of the Rhine and extended far into the Netherlands, which were so valuable an element in the vast domains of Charles V. The new Duke was certainly inclined towards Protestantism—whether for political or religious reasons—and he entered into close relations with the Saxon Elector, with the King of France, and with Henry VIII of England, who married his sister the Princess Anne of Cleves. When war came, it was at first favourable to the Protestant cause. But then there came a disappointing change. Henry repudiated Anne of Cleves; the French King was soon weary of the war; Duke William's armies were beaten, and he had to accept terms from the Emperor Charles. He lost Zutphen and Geldern. The Duchy of Jülich and Cleves falls out of the European story for a time, but will come before us again prominently at the end of the century.

Cologne

The Protestants had entertained high hopes, too, of winning Cologne (Köln)—the great Electorate and Archbishopric. It is strange to see a great Roman ecclesiastic playing with the ideas of the Protestant Reformation; but, apart from their intellectual and moral appeal, they suggested the possibility of turning an ecclesiastical office, which was in its nature delegated and could not be hereditary, into a personal and hereditary principedom. The Elector Hermann von Wied had

shown sympathy with evangelical teaching, and had invited Bucer and Melancthon to preach in his diocese. The three great Electoral Sees—Mainz, Cologne, and Treves—were uneasy; the Protestants had some hopes of winning all three, and the gain to the cause would have been enormous.

These years too—years of balance and uncertainty—saw ^{Failure of conciliation} efforts made to find some basis for reconciliation between the two religions which divided Germany. The Emperor was anxious to find some means of reintroducing unity and religious co-operation into his German dominions. He had been trying for many years to secure the calling of a General Council of the Church, and at last a Council had been summoned by Pope Paul III in 1539. Its first meetings were unsuccessful and it was soon adjourned indefinitely, but the Emperor still had high hopes of it. In the same interest he called conferences on religious questions at Hagenau and at Worms, and himself was present at a Diet at Ratisbon, where it was hoped that some definite results might be given to the world. But all ended in smoke. There was no will to peace on either side, and with the best will in the world it would have been difficult to find any road to peace. The position of the Protestants was now so well established in Germany that they were unwilling to contemplate any reconciliation with those whom they regarded as preachers of false and dangerous doctrine. Nor was the temper of the Roman Church more conciliatory. In 1541 Ignatius Loyola became the first General of the Order of the Jesuits. The theological atmosphere was favourable not to peace but to war; and the political conditions soon pointed in the same direction.

Before war broke out the greatest figure on the Protestant side had passed away. Luther died in February 1546. He ^{Death of Luther, 1546} had not been a dictator among the German Protestants; but his influence alike in theological and political questions had always been greater than that of any other man, and his death removed a unifying influence. The violent controversies which centre round his person and character are a testimony to his importance. He was a great type of revolutionary leader; prudent and conciliatory at times but at bottom bold and even aggressive; so full of belief in his

cause that success or failure made little difference in his devotion to it. There is a great contrast between the first and the last half of his public career. His early lyrical enthusiasm and confidence had not been always maintained in face of the increasing difficulties, both inside and outside of the Protestant camp, which confronted his later years. He abounded—as is the way with great religious teachers—in denunciations of the vices of his age, and at times seemed to think that there had been no improvement in the age in consequence of the preaching of the evangelical faith. But he never doubted or repented of all that he had done. Protestant Germany is right in placing his name far above that of all the other theologians and preachers of the time.

Prince
Maurice
of Saxony

From 1545 the Emperor prepared steadily for the war which seemed inevitable. The divisions of his opponents played into his hands. Philip of Hesse had again joined the Schmalkaldic League in 1544, but the old confidential relations with the Saxon Elector had not come back. The Emperor hoped, too, for the support of the cities, irritated as they were by the increasing power of the princes. But the greatest success of the Emperor's diplomacy was with Prince Maurice of Saxony. This daring, energetic and unscrupulous prince saw in the difficulties of the time a means of increasing his personal power. He hoped for the transference of the Electoral dignity to the Albertine line, which he represented, from the Ernestine, to which the present Elector belonged. He hoped, too, for an increase of territory by the acquisition of the Bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt; perhaps he dreamed of still greater triumphs. He was a Protestant, and had no inclination to change his faith, but in him material ambitions played without question the most important part. He entered into close relations with the Emperor, and was ready to support him in the coming war. William of Bavaria, whose relations to the religious controversy had hitherto been equivocal, now came out definitely on the Imperial side. The Emperor's relations with the Popes had never been easy or simple, but now he succeeded in making a treaty with Pope Paul III, who promised a large contribution in money as well as 12,000 foot and 500 horse.

The Schmalkaldic League, on the other hand, found no effective assistance. From foreign countries, from France, Denmark, and England there came sympathy, but no money nor troops. And yet at first the game seemed in the hands of the Protestants. The Imperial troops were slow to assemble : the Protestants held a central position, and their armies were ready. It is reckoned that at one time their forces were five times larger than those of Charles, and that an energetic attack could hardly have been resisted. But the Protestant campaign (if it deserves the name) showed an amazing lack of plan, organization, and energy. Warfare in the sixteenth century was usually unscientific and inconsequent. The generals could fight battles, but it is doubtful whether any of them, except Alexander of Parma at the end of the century, had much notion of the conduct of a campaign. Lack of ready money was an important, but not the only, cause. Only slowly did the soldiers of Europe come to learn the conditions of success in war—the lesson in which Napoleon was the great teacher. But of all inconsequent campaigns the Schmalkaldic War is perhaps the weakest.

The troops that Charles employed were largely foreign—Spanish and Italian. He came rather as the King of Spain and ruler of Italy than as the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation ; and the Germans felt his conquest to be a foreign one. Charles accompanied his armies, but the Duke of Alva was the real commander. First Alva played a waiting game, with the result that the troops and the funds of the Protestants were exhausted. He then passed westward to the Rhine and the Main and re-established the Imperial authority in those parts. The cities had to pay heavy fines. Ulrich of Würtemberg and the Elector Palatine came in to the Emperor. The half-Protestant Archbishop of Cologne was forced to resign his office. Then the Imperial army struck into Saxony, and it found no stiffer resistance in the birthplace of Protestantism than elsewhere. On April 24, 1547, the Imperial troops crossed the Elbe at Mühlberg, half-way between Dresden and Wittenberg. The crossing was easily defensible ; but the Saxon Elector was taken entirely by surprise. What followed was not a battle but a rout, only explainable by the incompetence of the

Electoral and the tactical superiority of the Imperial troops. The Schmalkaldic army was annihilated. "I came; I saw; God conquered" was the summary of the battle by the Emperor himself. The Elector, John Frederick of Saxony, was taken prisoner. It seemed in its consequences as great a victory as the battle of Pavia. The Landgrave Philip had not been at Mühlberg, but he showed no inclination for a stubborn resistance, though the continuation of the struggle was by no means impossible. He was only anxious to win the best terms possible from the Emperor. Duke Maurice was his son-in-law and interceded for him. The Landgrave surrendered unconditionally ("*auf Gnade und Ungnade*"), but the Emperor promised that he should not be punished in his person nor be condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Prince Maurice had already received the Saxon Electorate. Germany seemed to lie at the Emperor's feet.

Causes
of the
Imperial
failure

The battle of Mühlberg might perhaps have been made decisive for the future of Germany and the Roman Church. In fact it brought even less profit to the victor than Pavia. The essentials of the German situation could not be changed by a single battle. Large sections of the people still clung to the faith and church system which had been established by Luther. The princes were still determined to maintain their independence. The neighbours of Germany were as anxious as ever to prevent the establishment of a strong and effective power in Germany under the control of the House of Habsburg. It required more than the dispersal of a single army and the capture of two leaders to alter these fundamental facts.

Schemes
of the
Emperor

A prominent feature of the sixteenth century is the control of religious matters by the secular state and the lay power. This tendency is specially revealed in the history of England and the organization of the Anglican Church. But it is to be found everywhere; in the relations of the monarchy of France to the Gallican Church; in the use of the Inquisition by the Spanish monarchy; in Presbyterian Scotland and in the schemes of Zwingli in Switzerland. Charles' hope for the settlement of Germany rested on the application of the same idea. The Empire should be made strong and the strengthened Empire should establish peace between the warring

creeds and parties. His scheme failed utterly and for obvious reasons. The first condition was a strong Imperial authority, and the authority of the Empire was not strong and could not be made so. Charles had many schemes in his head; the Emperor's personal power was to be increased; an Imperial League was to be formed after the model of the Suabian League, and the ceremonies and delays of the Diets were thus to be avoided; an Imperial war chest was to be established. But it all came to little or nothing. The spirit of the princes had not been broken in the least by the disaster at Mühlberg. They saw that the forces at the disposal of the Emperor were quite insufficient to coerce Germany, and they refused to bow to the Imperial will. Further, and at first sight strangely, Charles got little support from Pope Paul III. Rome was glad to hear of the rout of the Schmalkaldic League, but the Pope's ideas as to the settlement were diametrically different from those of the Emperor. The General Council had now met, first at Trent and then at Bologna, and then at Trent again; what reforms were needed must come from the Council and from the Pope himself. Emperors and Diets should leave doctrine, ceremonies, and Church discipline alone, for these were matters that did not belong to them.¹ The Pope had other grievances, too, against Charles besides those that sprang from public policy. He found Charles' power in Italy a menace and a burden to the Papal states. There was actual conflict between them in Parma and Piacenza.

A Diet was called at Augsburg. Three divines examined the points at issue between the conflicting faiths and produced a suggestion of a compromise. Joachim, the Elector

¹ Janssen writes of this crisis: "Had the two supreme chieftains of Christendom gone forward together working in intimate and unbroken harmony for the removal of the blemishes and abuses which disfigured the external life of the Church . . . there is no doubt that their combined labours would have issued in a triumphant consolidation of the ancient faith and of the imperial constitution." There is on the contrary very much doubt, for the forces of Emperor and Pope were probably quite unequal to the coercion of Germany. But the desired harmony was impossible. The Empire and the Papacy by virtue of their traditions stood for conflicting ideals. Janssen's suggestion is as impossible as Napoleon's, that Charles should have declared himself Protestant and led a united Germany to the defeat of the Turks and the hegemony of Europe.

Tension
between
Emperor
and Pope

The
Interim

of Brandenburg, was induced to recommend it to the Diet. The Mass was to be retained with the accustomed vestments and ceremonies. Images were to be retained, but not to be worshipped. The celibacy of the clergy was praised, but their marriage was allowed. Communion in one kind was declared sufficient; but the grant of the cup to the laity was allowed. The proposals satisfied very few. A century later there might have been some chance of their acceptance, but in 1548 the edge of controversy was still keen, and to yield in anything seemed to be to yield in all. There was much dispute as to whether the new arrangement—which was called the Interim because it was to hold good only until the Council of Trent had finished its sessions—applied to all Germany or only to the Protestant states. The Emperor had hoped that it would be generally accepted; but in fact it was hardly brought into use anywhere. It was condemned in Rome and derided in Wittenberg. It exercised no influence on the development of German history. But the failure of the Interim did not for a moment induce Charles to abandon his hopes of settling the German difficulty by conciliation and agreement. The Interim was only to hold until the General Council had finished its deliberations. There was some probability that that time was not far distant. The new Pope, Julius III, had been closely connected with the Council at Trent, and he called it again to that city from Bologna and announced the reopening for May 1551. It was the aim of Charles now to obtain from the German states in the Diet a promise that they would accept the decisions of the Council as a settlement of the religious controversy. When the Diet met at Augsburg it was very thinly attended, but those present reaffirmed their willingness to submit to the Council. Charles was anxious that Lutheran representatives should attend at Trent, and promised a safe-conduct.

But the Emperor's schemes—almost pathetically well-intentioned—bore no relation to the hard facts of the German situation. The princes were determined to maintain their independence, and they would use any means to secure it. The Diet was for them not a means of governing Germany but a conference of Sovereign powers. The Emperor was no longer equal to the demands of his position. His health was

rapidly declining. He was lethargic and deficient in will and imagination. He had no counsellors who could supply his lack of the qualities of youth. He moved his Court to Innsbruck in order to be near the Council at Trent.

And meanwhile the blow was preparing which was to destroy nearly all the results of the rout of Mühlberg. Its essential character is plain. It was France and her "Most Christian King"—himself a cruel persecutor of his Protestant subjects—who saved the German Princes and Protestants from any subjection to the power of the Emperor. Catholic France, the ally of the Protestants in Germany—that is the permanent feature of European diplomacy until nearly a century later all danger to the independence of the German Protestant powers was dispelled by Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin. Probably the forces of Charles were in any case unequal to the coercion of Germany, but when the armies, the money, and the influence of France were thrown into the opposite scales the cause was hopeless.

The great agent in the impending change was Prince Maurice, who had become Elector of Saxony as a result of the rout of Mühlberg. This leader and liberator of Protestant Germany comes as near to Machiavelli's ideal prince, as Cesare Borgia, the son and agent of Pope Alexander VI. He was like him in his unbridled egotism; like him in his conviction that "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when it is against his interest";¹ like him in the failure of his career. He had obtained much from Charles, and was loud in protestations of his loyalty. But he was not satisfied. He had not got all Saxony; Magdeburg was not his; his ambitions were not realized. His Protestantism was genuine, for he had resisted all temptations to abandon it. His German allies did not count for much. The chief were the Duke of Mecklenburg and the Landgrave William of Hesse, the son of the captive Philip, whose rigorous treatment by the Emperor was one of the charges made by Maurice against him. They agreed to approach the King of France with a request for help against the "brutish yoke of servitude" inflicted by the Emperor on Germany and for the recovery

¹ Machiavelli's *Prince*, chap. xviii.

of "her ancient liberties." We shall, in the next chapter, look at the story again from the side of France. Here it is enough to say that the new King Henry II had inherited all his predecessor's bitter hostility to the Emperor. A treaty was signed at Chambord in January 1552. The help of France was to take the form of money (easily convertible into soldiers in Germany), of armed intervention, and of diplomatic help. In return for his help, King Henry II was to receive the "Three Bishoprics" of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and the city of Cambrai. They were not to be technically separated from the Empire, for Henry II was to occupy them as Imperial Vicar, and the arrangement was justified on the ground that these districts did not speak German. The influence of France brought the Most Christian King's permanent ally, the Sultan of Turkey, into action. His threats on the Danube and in the Mediterranean distracted the attention of Charles and his brother, Ferdinand, and prevented the concentration of their troops. And apart from the Turkish threat, the Emperor and his brother were not on good terms. Ferdinand's succession to the Imperial title was assured, but Charles was anxious to secure the recognition of his own son, Philip, as Ferdinand's successor instead of Ferdinand's own son, Maximilian. This project had destroyed all cordiality between the brothers at this critical moment.

The Treaty
of Chambord

Turkey

Maurice
turns
against the
Emperor

The Emperor made hardly an effort to meet the attack. Maurice was in command of an army with which he had been laying siege to Magdeburg as Imperial representative. This army he now turned against the Emperor himself. His most vigorous ally was the Margrave of Brandenburg-Culmbach, a veritable robber-baron, who lived by war and plunder. When they invaded the south of Germany, few towns held out against them. The French King about the same time occupied without much difficulty the Bishoprics which had been ceded to him. So hopeless was the Emperor's position that the three Electoral Sees—Mainz, Trier, and Köln—declared themselves in favour of a National instead of a General Council. Charles risked no battle. When it was reported that the forces of Maurice, accompanied by the French ambassador, were approaching Innsbruck, the Emperor fled into Italy. He was carried over the Brenner Pass in

a litter in the driving rain. Only when he had crossed the Alps did he feel himself in safety.

The resources of the Empire were, however, untouched by the flight from Innsbruck, and Charles still hoped for a recovery of the Imperial power. Prince Maurice was by no means without his difficulties. John Frederick, the deposed Elector of Saxony, had been set at liberty, and he was Maurice's implacable enemy. Moreover, Maurice's relations with France were not easy; there had been a complete lack of honesty on both sides in their agreement. So it was not impossible to arrange a truce at Passau on the basis of the independence of the princes in both political and religious matters. But no real settlement had been reached. The Emperor was still hopeful, and the situation in Germany was as unstable as it had been in Italy earlier in the century. The chief forces in this kaleidoscopic scene are (1) the King of France anxious for the extension of French territory and for the weakening of Germany, but by no means anxious for the destruction of the Roman Catholic organization beyond the Rhine; (2) Maurice capable, unscrupulous, ambitious: fishing in all waters; ready to ally himself with Ferdinand or Charles or Henry as the interest of the moment seemed to dictate and cherishing vast indefinite dreams of power; (3) the army of the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg-Culmbach, the equal of the worst scourges of humanity known to history if half the stories told of him are true, but accepted as an ally by all parties in turn on account of the horrible efficiency of the forces at his command.

The decisive events were first the failure of the Emperor's plans for the recovery of the Three Bishopricks. Success seemed likely at one time to crown his efforts, for his enemies were quarrelling, and he had obtained reinforcements from Italy and Spain. But he failed in the siege of Metz; and his thoughts turned now decisively¹ towards abdication. Next, Prince Maurice of Saxony died. The Margrave Albert passed from one side to the other and never ceased his slaughtering and plunderings. The towns, the peasants, and the clergy suffered equally at his hands, but at first he abstained from attacking the lands of the territorial princes. But in

¹ These events are glanced at again in rather more detail in the next chapter.

July 1553 he raided Saxony, and attacked the territories of the Duke of Brunswick. He had become a nuisance to the princes of Germany, and Maurice undertook his suppression. He met him at Sievershausen in July 1553. The "Incendiary Prince" Albert was decisively beaten, but Maurice died of a wound received in the battle. Albert was shortly afterwards defeated again, and found an asylum in France.

Peace of
Augsburg,
1555

Thus the way was cleared for some attempt at settlement. The Emperor Charles handed over his power to Ferdinand, and it was he who presided at the Diet which came together at Augsburg, and which before the end of the year ratified the "Religious Peace of Augsburg," which is one of the great landmarks of European history. But the character of the peace may easily be misunderstood. It was not a settlement of the religious problems by the Diet of the Empire, but rather an intimation that the Diet could settle nothing. It is, under the disguise of the old phrases and forms, a declaration of the powerlessness of the Empire and Emperor alike. The Diet was in effect a Congress of independent powers; such promises as they made to one another had no guarantee but their own will to carry them out. The deliberations at Augsburg were not really decisive; the Diet did little more than register decisions arrived at elsewhere. Most of the Protestant princes did not go to Augsburg but met at Naumburg in Saxony, and there agreed on a course of action. They repudiated the idea of waiting for the deliberations of either a General or a National Council. They demanded an unconditional peace; that is the recognition of the independence of the princes.

Chief
clauses of
the peace

The chief clauses of the Peace of Augsburg are the following: (1) "Neither his Imperial Majesty nor the Electors, Princes and Estates shall do any violence or harm to any estate of the Empire on account of the Augsburg Confession, but let them enjoy their religious belief, liturgy and ceremonies . . . in peace. Likewise the Estates espousing the Augsburg Confession shall let all the Estates and Princes who cling to the old religion live in absolute peace" (§§ 15 and 16); (2) "all such as do not belong to the two above-named religions shall not be included in the present peace but shall be totally excluded from it" (§ 17); (3) "in case our subjects

should intend leaving their homes in order to settle in another place they shall neither be hindered in the sale of their estates nor injured in their honour" (§ 24); (4) "where an Archbishop, Bishop, or other priest of our old religion shall abandon the same, his archbishopric etc. and other benefices shall be abandoned by him. The chapters and such as are entitled to it by common law shall elect a person espousing the old religion who may enter on the possession of all the rights and incomes of the place" (§ 18). This last clause was issued "in virtue of the powers of the Roman Emperors" and was not presented to the Imperial chamber. Another clause limited the operation of this arrangement to such changes as were made after the year 1552.

This treaty has to be interpreted in the light of contemporary events. The essential is the abdication by the Emperor and the Imperial authorities of the right of interference with the members of the Empire in religious matters. Religion is henceforth an affair of the actual ruler; *cujus regio ejus religio*.¹ The treaty was in form a Recess of the Diet; it was in fact an agreement between independent powers. We must note next that it is not in any way a victory for the principle of religious freedom. The Protestants as a rule were as much convinced as their opponents that "to have two religions existing side by side with equal rights would produce nothing but contention, ill-feeling, and disturbance in the communities, and ruin of municipal life," though some of the princes allowed considerable religious freedom in their states. Lutheranism—the Augsburg Confession—had defeated the attack of its great opponent; that is all. There is not, according to the treaty, any place for the ideas of the Swiss Reformation, whether in its Zwinglian or in its Calvinist form; and both had many adherents in Germany. The nearest approach to any consideration of the rights of the individual conscience is contained in the clause which recognized the right of emigration. The many divisions of Germany made emigration less painful and difficult than in more united countries; but it was a poor attempt at the solution of a grave problem. The ecclesiastical Reservation

Character
of the
treaty


¹ These words do not occur in the document, but they are a convenient summary of its chief results.

which allowed no further secularizations of Church property after 1552 was, as we have seen above, no part of the treaty as accepted by the Diet, and was issued only under the guarantee of the Imperial authority.¹ The past had shown, and the future was to show again, that that guarantee was valueless. Secularization went on unchecked and was a chief cause of the next religious war in Germany—the Thirty Years' War.

Survival
of the
Empire

Yet the treaty gave Germany an uneasy peace of more than fifty years. It would probably have been better if the work of Napoleon could have been anticipated by 250 years and the splendid dream of the Holy Roman Empire brought clearly to an end. For it no longer controlled Germany or maintained peace or acted as an efficient court of appeal between states or individuals. It was of no real service to the Roman Church but rather the contrary. It was the identification of the Church with the Empire, the unnatural alliance of the Catholic Reaction with the attack of the Empire on the independence of the princes, which did much to ruin the chances of Roman Catholicism in the Thirty Years' War. The frank recognition that the Empire had passed away might have allowed some more efficient organization to arise in Germany. But the traditions of the Empire were too strong, its ideals too noble, to allow it to be summarily pushed aside. It was a valued possession of German patriotism. Even its most bitter enemies in fact had a sentimental loyalty to its name. Even the Prussian Kings feared to lay hands on it "being so majestic"; and when the new German Empire was founded in 1871 it pleased many to think that it was the re-establishment of the Holy Roman Empire.

¹ Ranke has pointed out that the Protestants both agreed to and protested against the declaration of the Emperor. "Their Electoral and Princely Highnesses know not how to set any bound or measure to your Majesty's Highness beyond the dutiful petitions and memorials they have already presented; but notwithstanding their Electoral Highnesses feel themselves in conscience bound to declare that they cannot agree to the article in question."



GERMANY

CHAPTER VII

THE END OF THE WAR BETWEEN FRANCE AND
SPAIN; THE ABDICATION OF CHARLES V;
NAVARRÉ AND SAVOY

THE death of King Francis I produced a great change in France. He had not of late been on good terms with his son, Henry, who now succeeded to the throne as Henry II, and the new King made a clean sweep of the ministers of the late government. Henry II was no improvement on his father in character or intelligence. France was indeed unfortunate in her Kings down to nearly the end of the century. While Spain had in Ferdinand and Isabella, in Charles V and Philip II, a series of rulers remarkable for their talents and above all for the persistence with which they pursued their aims (whatever may be thought of the wisdom of their policy), the rulers of France were mediocre in character, pursuing aims to a large extent personal, and incapable of persistent application to the business of the state. It is not until Henry of Navarre succeeded to the throne that France had a ruler who really represented the state, and who pursued with vigour a genuinely national policy.

King
Henry II
and his
agents

Henry II has left little trace in the memory of posterity. He had a strong physique and loved sport; he had the traditional passion of the French Kings for hunting. He had been married to Catherine de Médicis¹ in 1533, and after ten years of unfruitful marriage she bore him ten children. The future was to reveal her ambition for power and her talents for intrigue if not for statesmanship. But while her husband lived, she was of less importance at Court and of less influence on politics than the

¹ Her true name was Caterina dei Medici: but she was a French Queen and her name will henceforth appear in its French form.

King's mistress, Diane de Poitiers. This remarkable woman was twenty years older than the King, but retained her ascendancy over him to the end of the reign. In politics the Constable Montmorency was the King's trusted adviser. He had been dismissed and disgraced by Francis I, but was regarded by the new King with great admiration and affection. He showed no particular gifts either for statesmanship or for war. Contemporaries thought him ambitious, greedy for money, and fiercely jealous. He leaned to an understanding with Spain, and, though himself faithful to the Roman communion, was connected with the rising Protestant movement in France through his nephews, the Chatillons, of whom we shall see much in the next reign. He had great estates in the centre of France, and, since the disappearance of the Duke of Bourbon, was the greatest of the nobles of France. The time of the existing branch of the House of Bourbon had not yet arrived. Antony of Bourbon had married Jeanne d'Albret, Queen of Navarre, and thus acquired a royal title, though without any addition of power. It was his vast estates and his connection with the royal family of France which gave him importance during the next reign, but while Henry II lived the only serious rival to Montmorency and his family was to be found in the House of Guise. Their very great political importance belongs to the next reign, but the foundations of that importance were laid during the present one. They belonged to the House of Lorraine and were sometimes called by their opponents Germans and foreigners. But the chief military successes of the reign fell to Francis, Duke of Guise, and his popularity was much greater than that of Montmorency. His brother, Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine, was a great influence in the Church not only in France but at Rome. While Montmorency's religious attitude was equivocal, the Guises drew to themselves the devotion of all who valued above all things the maintenance of the Roman connection.

There was little change in the policy or in the machinery of government. The new ministers had to deal at once with a rising of a social character in the south-west of France. It is curious to note that this century, so fertile in social revolutionary movements elsewhere—in Germany, in England, and

The
House of
Bourbon

The
Guises

Rebellion
in S.W.
France

in Spain—saw little of the sort in France. When the Protestant movement became strong in France, it did not put forward any social programme. But we catch occasional glimpses of the grievances and passions, which two centuries later were to lead to the Great Revolution. Francis I had introduced into the provinces of the south-west the Government monopoly of salt, which was called the *gabelle*. The enforced sale of salt at prices fixed by the State was in itself a great financial burden, and the arbitrary way in which the price was fixed and the sale enforced added to the irritation which it produced. A peasant rising broke out in Blaye and Saintonge—the district north of the Garonne, where Protestantism was later to find strong support. It became more serious when the great city of Bordeaux joined the movement, and the President of the Parlement was forced to support the claims of the insurgents. But the success of revolutions depends not only on the strength of the passions supporting the movement, but also on the power of the Government for repression; and the armies of Henry II were quite equal to the task before them. Both Guise and Montmorency were employed in the work, and Guise was thought to be much the more humane of the two. Many were condemned to death or the galleys. The city of Bordeaux was cruelly punished and deprived of its Parlement. The movement had been a serious one, but did not disturb the action of the Government in foreign affairs, to which we must now turn.

War against
Charles V

The death of Francis I preceded by about a month the triumph of Charles V at Mühlberg. Henry II was at home not merely Catholic, but a cruel persecutor of religious dissidents. The prospect, however, of a Germany united under the control of the King of Spain was in the highest degree alarming to French statesmen. It was the persistent policy of France to maintain Germany as a *confusio divinitus ordinata*, and the fear of German union was stronger than any religious sympathies. Jealousy and fear, the real springs of the awkward European system of the Balance of Power, impelled France to a new war with Charles V, though other causes of quarrel were not wanting. Savoy and Navarre were never-failing bones of contention between the two kingdoms, and in both a critical moment had come. The

history of these two questions will, however, be given continuously a little later. We will for the present follow the main current of the quarrel with Charles.

We have seen the course of the struggle between Charles V and his German opponents, and the self-seeking but decisive action of Maurice of Saxony. Henry II had been intriguing against Charles from the time of the battle of Mühlberg. He had refused to co-operate with him in supporting the Council of Trent, and had encouraged all centres of resistance to the Imperial policy in Germany. As the renewed outbreak of Protestant and national resistance to Charles in Germany drew near, the King of France entered into closer relations with the rebels. It was a step of the greatest importance. The relations of France with Germany for the next two hundred years depend to a large extent on it. Maurice of Saxony had already been engaged in secret negotiations with the King of France. Then, in 1551, there came a large and formal embassy from the Protestant states of Germany. The Count of Nassau—who was accompanied by his son, afterwards to be known as William the Silent and the founder of the liberty of Holland—was the chief speaker. The Germans were sumptuously entertained at Fontainebleau. They asked the French King to save them from what they called the intolerable tyranny of the King of Spain; they laid stress on the “affinity” between the Germans and the French; they offered to Henry II the title and office of Protector of the Holy Roman Empire; and they offered to cede to him the great frontier cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun—usually known as the Three Bishopricks. The cession of these towns would not technically mean their separation from the Empire, for Henry would, as we have seen, be Protector of the Empire and would rule in these cities as “Imperial Vicar.” But the excuse was a thin one. France would gain a position on the frontier of immense importance for attack and defence. The dismemberment of the Empire, already begun in the north and south, advanced rapidly with this offer of old German cities to France. The treaty was signed in its final form at Chambord in January 1552.

The new war resembled closely those fought earlier in the century between Francis I and the Emperor. There was

Henry II's
support of
German
Protestants

The French
in Lorraine
and Alsace

fighting in Italy and on the northern frontier; but the new arrangements with the German Protestants made the eastern frontier more important than it had been in the earlier wars. The character of the armies was changing. Firearms were beginning to play a greater part; the French troops made use of two sorts of arquebus, the one operated by means of a match, the other by means of flint and steel. The King of France himself went with the armies. Metz was occupied in April 1552. The great city was torn by political dissensions, and the irritation of the popular party against the municipal aristocracy made the design of the French easier of accomplishment. Permission was given to certain troops to pass through the city. They seized the gates and allowed their comrades to enter. By this stratagem the French gained the city which they were to occupy until 1870. But when the French army approached Strasburg the inhabitants were aware of their danger and barred the gates against them. Moreover, a strongly nationalist feeling was beginning to show itself in Germany; the "affinity of French and Germans" was by no means a universal belief, and the dismemberment of the Empire awoke many regrets.

Despite his disasters in Germany, which we have already seen, Charles saw a chance of recovering the ground that he had lost. He brought up reinforcements from many parts of his wide dominions. Metz was in every way the most important of the Three Bishopricks ceded to the King of France, and in October 1552 the Emperor undertook its siege. Francis, Duke of Guise, commanded within the city.

Guise's
success at
Metz

The capture of the city was for some time regarded as certain, and its fall would have gone far to re-establish the Emperor's position in Germany and Europe. But he was old and very ill; the caution which had always been a prominent part of his character had now grown into something like lethargy. Money as usual was lacking to the nominal ruler of half Europe. The heavy rains made the work of the trenches very difficult; disease had reduced the Imperial armies to a dangerous extent. When Charles proposed a general assault on the city his War Council refused. At the end of December the siege was abandoned. Charles had lost

nearly 50,000 men. The Duke of Guise became the national hero for his successful and resolute conduct of the defence.

We must go back a little to understand the operations in Italy. France had by no means abandoned her ambitions there. The power of Spain was indeed permanently in the ascendant. Milan and Naples were subject to Spain; Cosimo dei Medici in Florence looked to the power of Spain for support against his political opponents; most of the other powers of Italy had been brought under the influence of Spain. But in the north, France had won a gate of entry into Italy by the occupation of Savoy and Piedmont. A series of sieges had placed many of the cities of the north-west of Italy in French hands. In 1552 a new opportunity for French interference presented itself. Siena revolted against the Spaniards and accepted French help. The event was not more than a serious embarrassment for the Spaniards. They laid siege to Siena and reduced it to submission after a long and exhausting series of operations. A little later there came another and equally futile interference of the French in Italy. Great events had happened in Europe. Charles V had decided to abdicate. Still more important for Italian affairs, the new Pope, Paul IV, was a passionate enemy of the Spanish connection. He hoped to drive the Spaniards out of the peninsula, even out of Naples, and he summoned the French to his assistance (1557). Francis of Guise, ardently Catholic and famous for his successful defence of Metz, went to his assistance. But Guise found the passionate and violent Pope difficult to work with. The necessary money and troops were not forthcoming; the projected attack on Naples was an entire failure. Guise was recalled to France. Italy had again proved the grave of French military reputations; but a great triumph for Guise in France soon made men forget his serious check in Italy.

The hopes of Spain had thus been realized in Italy while they collapsed in Germany. A great Spanish victory in the north of France came now, and made men think for a moment that Philip might succeed in humiliating France at home. Another Habsburg marriage opened up incalculable vistas for the power of Spain and the spread of the Roman Church. For Philip of Spain had married Mary Tudor, who

The French
in Italy

French
defeat at
Saint
Quentin

since 1553 reigned in England. None could calculate the result, if a son were born of that marriage ; and meanwhile the influence and power of England were thrown without reserve on to the side of Spain in her struggle against France. A Spanish army commanded by Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, entered the north of France in 1557 and laid siege to Saint Quentin. The place was defended by Coligny, nephew of the Constable Montmorency. The Constable himself came to its relief ; but he was an unsuccessful and apparently an incapable soldier. The Duke of Savoy attacked the French army, while it was divided in its efforts to introduce reinforcements into the besieged city, and almost destroyed it. Montmorency and many other French nobles were taken ; the French army ceased to exist and some thought that the road to Paris was open.

The battle of Saint Quentin, however, was as disappointing in its results as Pavia had been. The conditions of warfare in the sixteenth century made a decisive blow hardly possible. Philip II joined the army, and a triumphal entry into Paris would have delighted him. But provisions were scarce, money lacking, and in consequence the soldiers were difficult to handle. The city of Saint Quentin, moreover, still held out bravely under the leadership of Coligny, and the Spanish army was kept before its walls for fifteen days. When at last it fell into the merciless hands of the Spaniards the French had found time to reconstitute their forces, and Paris was no longer to be taken by surprise. Guise was given the command, and France was safe from irretrievable disaster.

Guise
takes
Calais

Soon Guise struck a blow at the enemy which gave him more glory than the defence of Metz. Calais had been a thorn in the side of the French for two centuries. The place had become thoroughly English, and gave to English armies a safe entry on to the soil of France. It was highly prized by the English Government, but Mary Tudor had allowed the garrison to fall even below its usual small dimensions. The origin of the idea of attacking the place has been disputed (it has been claimed for Coligny and for the King), but the execution was all Guise's own. The outlying forts were taken ; the citadel heavily bombarded ; the English re-

inforcements were held back by the weather. On January 8, 1558, the French flag flew again over the harbour and town.

The fall of Calais was followed by the capture of other strong places in the north of France; but there was nothing decisive about any of the military incidents. The war might have dragged on for years; but it came to an end in the same year that saw the fall of Calais. The reasons are not difficult to find. Both sides were exhausted; neither had avoided serious defeats; the future of the campaign, if it were continued, was dubious. Other more personal motives were operative. Montmorency wanted to escape from his prison, and Henry II wanted the help of his favourite. It appears, too, that the urgency of the religious question was beginning to be apparent to the Kings of both France and Spain; men already talked of common action against the heretics. There was a meeting of French and Spanish plenipotentiaries at Cercamp in October 1558; Montmorency and Guise, the Cardinal of Lorraine, appeared for France; the Duke of Alva, William of Nassau, and Granvella for Spain. The final treaty was signed at Cateau-Cambrésis in April 1559 on the Belgian frontier.

It is a document of the utmost importance, and yet it can be quickly summarized.

France surrendered her claims on Italy and gave back Savoy and Piedmont into the hands of Emmanuel Philibert, the victor of Saint Quentin. It is strange that the valuable and valued prize was so easily surrendered; but Turin and Casale, and some other places, were still left in the hands of the French for a time as security for the execution of the treaty.

While France lost much in the south, she gained much in the north. All conquests from Spain in the Low Countries were indeed restored. But Calais remained in her hands, though nominally for a period of years only, and with a promise of future restitution. Men must have known that France was not likely to surrender, except to overwhelming force, this most valuable of all her acquisitions.

Metz, Toul, and Verdun are not mentioned in the treaty, for the Empire was no party to it. The possession of these places by France was therefore accepted in silence, but it

must be remembered that they still were nominally parts of the Holy Roman Empire.

Two marriages, after the diplomatic fashion of the time, completed the treaty and guaranteed its execution. The death of Mary Tudor left Philip II a widower for the second time. It was arranged that he should marry Elizabeth, the daughter of Henry and Catherine de Médicis. Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, the commander of the army which had humiliated France at Saint Quentin, was to marry the French King's sister, Margaret. The diplomacy of the future was often occupied with the consequences of these marriages.

Such was the treaty which gave a long breathing space to the wars between France and Spain. The old suspicion remained; there was no community of aim or of interest between the countries in spite of the matrimonial alliance; the diplomatists of the two countries competed everywhere in Europe, but it was nearly thirty years before there was open war again between them. There was great discontent with the terms of the peace in France. "Three or four drops of ink and a stroke of the pen had abandoned everything and dishonoured all our fine victories;" so wrote Monluc, and it is probably true that the negotiations were hurried, especially by Montmorency, in his eagerness to escape from captivity, and that Spain was in no condition to continue the struggle with success. Yet Calais, Metz, Toul, and Verdun were no mean acquisition, and domestic problems were demanding the attention of the Government. The action of Henry II had saved the Protestants of Germany from grave peril, but he was bitterly persecuting the Protestants of France, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Death of Henry II

There were great festivities in Paris for the conclusion of the Peace. The Princess Elizabeth was married to the King of Spain by proxy, the Duke of Alva representing his royal master. Before the Duke of Savoy was married to the Princess Margaret, the festivities were turned into mourning by a famous tragedy. The King of France was proud of his dexterity as cavalier and arranged for a great tournament, in which he himself was one of those who "held the lists." At the very end of the contests--in which the French knights showed themselves much more skilful than the Spaniards

in this counterfeit of war—King Henry ran a course against the Count of Montgomery. He was not satisfied with the first encounter, in which both combatants had shown equal address, and insisted on a second in spite of the protests of his attendants and the unwillingness of his opponent. A splinter of the lance pierced the eye of the King. He died a few days later (July 1559).¹

The Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis marks a clear dividing line in the history of the century. From this time on, religious questions become not indeed the sole but a chief factor in determining international relations. The dynastic wars—for such was the marked character of the struggle between Charles V and Francis I—are over; the wars of religion are about to begin. It is not indeed true that dynastic rivalry and the Balance of Power ceased to influence public affairs, nor that the powers of Europe were solely concerned in advancing the interests of the religious confessions that they had espoused. Elizabeth of England and Philip of Spain and the Emperor Ferdinand never ceased to consider the material interests of their countries, and the Kings of France pursued a balancing policy between the two religious parties right to the end of the century. But religious motives predominated. Rome reorganized her forces and revised her policy. There were no more alliances between Popes and Protestants for the temporal advantage of the Papal territories in Italy. Philip inflicted a mortal blow on the prosperity of his kingdom by his efforts to extirpate heresy in the Low Countries; while in France, in spite of the efforts of the Government, the country was torn by a never-ceasing struggle between the two religious parties.

THE RESIGNATION OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES V

The Emperor, Charles V, did not live to see the signature of the Peace which marked the end—or at least an important stage—of the enterprises that he had had at heart. He died

¹ Montgomery later became a Huguenot. He found it well to withdraw from France after the King's death. Later, he was prominent in the wars of religion. The Queen Mother, Catherine de Médicis, cherished an unreasoning bitterness against him, and when he was taken prisoner in 1574 she insisted on his execution in spite of the efforts of the Catholic officers to save him.

on the 21st September 1558, in his apartments at the monastery of Yuste, which he had occupied since February 1557. His abdication of all his temporal authority and his claustral life in the solitude of Yuste form one of the most interesting personal incidents of the century. There is no mystery about the motives which impelled him to this step, nor about the kind of life which he lived at Yuste. His health had broken down completely, and he no longer felt himself equal to the strain of governing his vast and multiform dominions. His design of restoring religious unity to Germany, which he had cherished all his life, had failed. His repulse at Metz had been partly due to his own lack of energy. Religion had always been with him a real and strong force, and for many years the thought of a retreat in a monastery in order to prepare for death had strongly attracted him. He had chosen the religious Order to which he would attach himself. The Hieronymites had been founded late in the fourteenth century, and were to be found chiefly in Spain. They were particularly famous for the splendour of their religious services, and had become rich by the support of all classes in that country. It was to one of their houses at Yuste in Estremadura that Charles V had determined to retire.

Stages
in his
retirement

His abdication was carefully considered and slowly accomplished. His son's marriage to the English Queen gave immense prestige to the Spanish Crown, and encouraged the Emperor to think that he might safely withdraw from the burden of Kingship. He resigned the Government of the Low Countries in October 1556. He leaned during the ceremony on the shoulder of the Prince of Orange, soon to be the most dangerous enemy of his son and of the power of Spain. He had hoped, he said, to consecrate all his power to the war against the Turks and the destruction of heresy, and he ascribed his failure to the envy of the King of France. Then one by one he laid down the Crowns of Castile and Aragon, of Leon and Granada, of Sicily and of Sardinia. There was more difficulty in getting rid of the title of Emperor than of the real power which came to him from his various kingdoms. For the reigning Pope Paul IV—of whom we shall say more in a moment—was actuated by a passionate hatred of the Spanish power. The Crown of the Empire he

declared was given by the Pope, and it could only be laid down by his permission. The arrangements that had been made for the succession of Ferdinand were inadmissible because Ferdinand had granted peace to the Lutheran heretics. The formal renunciation of the Imperial title therefore had to follow later.

His residence at San Yuste was not the palace of an Emperor, but it was far from the austerity of a monk's cell. He had built himself a house adjoining the monastery, and from one of the rooms he could look into the monastery chapel and see the celebration of the Mass. The house had eight fair-sized rooms, richly furnished and decorated with paintings by Titian and others. The walls were hung with signs of mourning. He had an establishment of fifty persons; his appetite, always unrestrained, still demanded choice food, and in the opinion of his medical attendants he ate too much for his health. He had books and many clocks, and he occupied himself in writing his memoirs. Religion was the controlling force of his life at San Yuste, but it left him time to follow with care the development of the international situation, and to give his son advice, which was usually followed. There were rumours that he was going to leave the monastery and take again the reins of power, but these had never any foundation in the real intentions of the Emperor. The death of his sister, Eleonora, the widowed Queen of France, was a great blow to him; perhaps a greater trouble was the discovery of heresy in Spain itself. Charles was by no means a cruel man, but he regarded heresy as the supreme danger. "I have learnt by experience in Germany and in Flanders that there can be neither peace nor prosperity in a country where there is not uniformity of doctrine," he said, and few rulers in Europe would have been inclined to disagree with him. The last sacrament was given him by Caranza, Archbishop of Toledo, who lay under some suspicion of too great sympathy with certain Lutheran ideas.

He was, said Quivada, his confessor, "the greatest man that ever was or ever will be." Posterity has usually denied to him the quality of greatness, yet his career had not only its temporary triumphs, but also its permanent successes. He had won Italy for Spain; he had not been defeated by

Life at
San Yuste

Character
and work of
Charles V

the more concentrated power of France ; he had fought the Sultan of Turkey and had gained important victories. At home he had organized the Government of Spain and had made the monarchy popular with the Spanish people. But the attention of history has usually not been given to this side of his activity, but to his dealings with Germany and Lutheranism. Here his record is one of failure. Germany was more disunited than ever. Lutheranism was established in most of the states of Germany and had chiefly to fear its own weakness and divisions. The religious policy of Charles gained for him the hatred of his Protestant contemporaries, and did not win the approval of the Roman authorities. But he was far from the fanaticism which has been attributed to him by Protestants, and it is extremely doubtful if any better results for the Roman Church could have been gained by the uncompromising policy which it favoured. Charles hated heresy, but he knew the real facts of the condition of Germany as the Roman authorities did not. He tried to establish religious peace, without believing in its moral justification. He did not see far into the future ; but no contemporary European ruler saw further. It was the force of events that in the end showed the way to religious peace.

POPE PAUL IV

Cross
currents
at Rome

We have seen that among the difficulties which Philip had to struggle with and which perplexed Charles V in his retirement at San Yuste, the policy of Pope Paul IV was not the least. Though the work of this Pope will have to be reviewed again when we are dealing with the Counter-Reformation, it will be well to examine his relations with Spain and France here, for they exhibit clearly how political and religious motives pulled even the Popes in opposite directions. It was this conflict between the political and the religious aims of the Catholic states which largely accounts for the measure of success won by the Protestant movement.

Pope
Paul IV

Paul IV was not one of the great Popes of the sixteenth century, but he was one of the most interesting. He was elected in 1555, the year of the Peace of Augsburg, and he

was at the time of his election already known as a keen supporter of the cause of the reform of the morals and the discipline of the Church. Yet the contrasts in his career and policy were so great as to be grotesque. His devotion to the cause of reform was sincere and passionate. His own life was strict and simple, and he did much by his powerful will to destroy abuses in the administration. Yet nepotism—the appointment of relatives to ecclesiastical posts—came back in its worst form during his pontificate. He made his nephew, Carlo Caraffa, hitherto a soldier of fortune, with the manners and character that belonged to his class, a Cardinal, and gave him the chief share in the control of the policy of the Church. The man was wholly unworthy of the position, and his misdoings were known to most people though not to the Pope. Paul IV supported him in power until his corruption was too glaring to be concealed. Then in 1559 Carlo and the other relations who had been introduced into high posts in the Papal service were dismissed and exiled.

Again the advancement of the power and authority of ^{The} the Church was a passion with him. He loved the pomp ^{paradoxes of} and majesty that were associated with the Papal office, and ^{Paul IV's} ^{career} he adopted all the ideas of the superiority of the Church over the temporal power, which had characterized the Popes of the thirteenth century. Innocent III had not confronted the Kings of the earth with more haughtiness; he even threatened Charles V with excommunication and deposition. Yet his violent and hasty temper allowed him to gain so little knowledge of the realities of the political world of Europe that he quarrelled violently with the chief supporters of the claims of the Church. The Jesuit Order had been founded in 1540, and under the guidance of Ignatius was already showing its capacity for aggression against the triumphant forces of Protestantism; but Paul IV distrusted the Jesuits, and on the death of Ignatius tried to introduce into the rules of the Order changes which in the opinion of the leaders of the Order would have ruined its work. But for our purpose the most noticeable point is that this violent champion of the faith regarded the Spaniards with bitter hostility, denounced the policy of Charles in Germany, and gave but lukewarm help to Mary Tudor and her Spanish

husband in the difficult task of restoring the Church of Rome in England.

**The Pope's
nationalism**

The cause of the Pope's hostility to Charles V and Philip II was not mainly religious. This ardent champion of the rights of the international Church was also a violent—it is rarely possible to avoid this adjective in speaking of him—Italian patriot. Like another but much weaker Julius II, he desired to drive all foreigners from Italy, so that only Italian might be spoken there. The Emperor, he declared, was aiming at universal monarchy, and had “promoted heresy in order to crush the Papacy and make himself master of Rome, that is, master of Italy and the world.” A small event, the seizure of ships in the Papal harbour of Civita Vecchia, strained relations with Spain to the breaking-point; the Pope alleged that his life was in danger and determined on war. He negotiated an alliance with France; and Duke Francis of Guise came to represent his master and to command the troops. In September 1556 actual hostilities began. The Duke of Alva, the commander in the battle of Mühlberg and later the hammer of heretics in the Low Countries, advanced from the Kingdom of Naples against Papal territory.

**Alva
against
Rome**

At the touch of the Spanish sword all the Pope's day-dreams were dissipated. He was eighty years of age, and completely ignorant of the meaning of war. The French could give little help, and Paul IV would not place his policy in their hands. Venice stood aloof; she knew too well the strength of the Spaniards in Italy to interfere. So Alva, despite small successes for the Papal troops, advanced irresistibly on Rome. He thought of assaulting the city, and there can be no doubt that his forces would have availed to take it. Rome might have fallen a second time into the power of a Spanish army and been again the scene of plunder and massacre.

**Terms with
Rome**

But he did not attack. He had conducted the campaign with a slackness which contrasts with his reputation in Germany and the Low Countries. He was a devout adherent of the Roman Church, and shrank from all insult to the person of the Pope. He offered terms and they were accepted. The details are not important. Paul IV accepted the Spanish protectorate in Italy, gave up the French alliance, and

promised to receive the King of Spain once more "as a good and obedient son."

Thus Paul IV's dreams of playing over again the rôle of Innocent III disappeared. But to the end he showed himself wayward and headstrong in his policy. Never was there a question more fateful for the Roman Church than the reconciliation of England. If England could be kept in the Roman obedience, the power of Rome in Europe might perhaps have been reconstituted on something like its old basis. English events lie outside the scope of this volume; but it is clear that the Pope handled the English situation without tact or discrimination. He loved the Inquisition, and by its means aimed at purging Rome and the Roman Church of all traces of heresy. Cardinal Pole, the Papal Legate, who had brought about the reconciliation of England with Rome, was accused of sympathy with the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith. He was deposed from his office as legate and summoned to Rome to render an account of himself. How important might have been the result of a different line of policy in England, where there is little evidence of widespread opposition to the religious policy of Queen Mary! Paul IV died in August 1559, and his death, along with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis and the Peace of Augsburg, may be taken as marking the division between the first half of the century—chiefly occupied, in spite of the progress of Protestantism, with the Renaissance, the Balance of Power, and dynastic wars—and the second half, when the religious struggle played a decisive part in the determination of the policies of European states.

NAVARRRE AND SAVOY

Both Navarre and Savoy are intimately associated with the history of France and Spain, and it is well to examine briefly the position of both. Their destinies have a superficial resemblance. Both were "saddle" states, situated across an important mountain range; both owed their continued existence to the defensibility of their mountains, and their importance to their control of important passes through them; both in the critical years of the sixteenth century

Paul IV
and
England

Resem-
blances
and
contrasts

divided France from Spanish territory ; both gave in the end a King to the lands that lay beneath them, for Henry III, King of Navarre, became Henry IV, King of France, in 1589 ; while in the nineteenth century the Dukes of Savoy, so long the despotic rulers of a vigorous military population, came to reign as liberal and constitutional rulers over all Italy. But the parallel between them is rather external than essential. Navarre disappeared as an effective state early in the sixteenth century ; it was the championship of a French religious party and the accident of birth which brought her King to the French throne, and the Kingdom of Navarre contributed nothing to the result. Savoy, on the other hand, became in the course of the sixteenth century a well-organized and rigidly centralized state. Her importance in Italian history was derived from the skill of her diplomacy and the military efficiency of her people and rulers. It lies quite outside the scope of this book to consider how she—more French than Italian, and despotic in her methods of rule—came to be accepted as the representative of a united and liberal Italy.

Position of
Navarre

Much the larger part of the Kingdom of Navarre lay to the south of the Pyrenees. It did not touch the sea at any point. Pampeluna was its capital and the famous pass of Roncesvalles was within its territory. The population was largely Basque. The history of Navarre reached back to the time of Charlemagne, and in the Middle Ages it seemed likely to play a decisive part in the development of Spain. Portugal, Castile, and Aragon had far outstripped it in the race for power ; and Castile and Aragon both entertained the ambition of annexing it and of thus closing an all-important gate of entry to the armies of France. No Salic law excluded princesses from reigning in Navarre ; and its fortunes, as those of so many other territories in Europe, were dependent on marriage and inheritance. For several generations the Crown of Navarre was with curious frequency in the possession of a woman. The marriages of these heiresses and queens had given the Royal Houses of both France and Spain claims to the throne of Navarre. We need not go further back than Queen Eleanor, who died in 1479. She was the daughter of the King of Aragon, and, through her mother, Queen of Navarre ; and, though her hand was sought

Queens of
Navarre

by more powerful suitors, she married Gaston de Foix whose estates lay not far from Navarre on the upper waters of the Garonne. Her grandson, Francis Phœbus, succeeded to the throne, but he died without issue; and in 1483 his sister, Catherine, succeeded him as Queen of Navarre. She, too, might have found a royal husband, but married a French nobleman, John D'Albret. It was during the reign of Catherine and John that the storm broke over the little kingdom.

It was opportunity and the interest of Spain that produced the attack. But Ferdinand, the wildest and the most unscrupulous among the rulers of Europe, had certain legal claims to the Kingdom of Navarre, for, on the death of Isabella, he had married Germaine de Foix, who was closely related to the Royal House of Navarre. But the legal justification for the Spanish attack was very weak; and Ferdinand, in a manner most characteristic of himself and of his age, helped himself out of the difficulty with a forgery. He invented a treaty between the King of France and Navarre for the invasion of Spain. And by this lie he justified his own attack on Navarre, which took place in 1512 with an army of 17,000 men. Navarre was small in population and resources, and no effective help came from France. The mountain fastnesses made curiously little resistance, and Pampeluna fell. A Bull from Pope Julius II denounced the Navarrese as heretics, and granted the newly won territories to Ferdinand. It was an immensely important gain for Spain; the western Pyrenees now came into existence as a defensive barrier for Spain. The Royal House of Navarre had taken refuge in Albret, and never regained more than the small fragment of their kingdom which lay to the north of the Pyrenees.

From this time forward what was left of free Navarre drew ever nearer to France. Catherine was succeeded by her son, Henry, and he married Marguerite of Angoulême, the sister of King Francis I of France, and in the world of thought and letters a writer and an influence of importance. When Henry died in 1555, his daughter, Jeanne d'Albret, became titular Queen of Navarre. With her we come into the very whirlpool of the civil-religious wars of France, and

Jeanne,
Queen of
Navarre

the definite incorporation of Navarre north of the Pyrenees with France comes in sight. Jeanne is a delightful and attractive figure in the history of the time. She inherited from her mother an interest in literature and philosophy, and also in the religious controversies of the time. She leaned strongly from her youth towards the side of Protestantism, and protected its supporters within her kingdom and estates. But she was full of the joy of life and had little of Calvin's severity and puritanism, though her faith was a serious matter with her and had nothing to do with political advantages. "We will die rather than leave our God and our religion," she wrote. She did not join the Huguenots formally until 1560. She married Antony of Bourbon, one of the greatest of the nobles of France, a man weak of will and intelligence, of whose career we shall shortly have to see something. The first three sons born to them died; the fourth was Henry, destined to be Henry IV of France, and to enjoy an even greater reputation as Henry of Navarre. If he sometimes reflects the weaknesses of his father, we are more often reminded as we read his career of the shrewd, humorous, and witty, but at the same time practical and courageous, character of his mother.

Savoy

The greatness of the House of Savoy, writes one of its historians, was the result of three causes—"the worth of the reigning dynasty, the soundness of the population and the advantages of its situation." For more than half of the sixteenth century, however, none of these causes seemed to work in its favour. The Duke was without courage or skill, the people without patriotism or military efficiency, and the country was overrun by hostile armies as though the soil were level instead of being occupied by the highest mountains in Europe. The revival of the country in the second half of the century—which is one of the really important events of the century—may be traced in part to the memory of the disasters and sufferings which had been caused by national disunion.

The terri-
tories of
the Duke

The ducal territories consisted of elements widely different from one another and most difficult to harmonize. Its two parts—Savoy and Piedmont—were fundamentally opposed in social character; for Savoy was feudal and pastoral, while

Piedmont was a part of Italy, divided into self-governing communes and much occupied with trade. There were, too, wide differences of race ; southern French at one end, northern Italians at the other, with Alpine races and even perhaps Moorish stocks between. Yet out of this unpromising material a state was made which remained unbroken by good and evil fortune until the time came for it to assume the military and political leadership of Italy. The man chiefly responsible, Emmanuel Philibert, called Iron-head, is certainly one of the greatest figures in the history of the century. His father, Charles III, succeeded to the Ducal title in 1504 and reigned until 1553. His reign was half a century of constant and increasing weakness and misery.

When the Italian wars began the importance of Savoy was at once apparent, for it directly commanded two of the most important passes from France into Italy—the Mont Cenis and the Little Saint Bernard—while the passes of Mont Genève and Great Saint Bernard lay close at hand. It would probably have been wise military policy in the French Kings to have made themselves masters of these lands, to which they were able to advance a shadowy claim. But Duke Charles III allowed the French armies to pass through without protest, and a military occupation therefore seemed hardly necessary. The troops of the Duchy—soon to become famous—had no good reputation. The Duke relied on the feudal and communal levies, and eked these out with mercenaries drawn from the neighbouring cantons of Switzerland. So until 1535 the valleys of Savoy and Piedmont were traversed by French, Spanish, and Swiss troops, and the Duke was content to have it so, or at least had not the strength and energy necessary to struggle against it. In 1535 there came a change in the policy of France. Piedmont was occupied by the Imperialists ; the Duke of Savoy had married Beatrice, Princess of Portugal, and was thus drawn near to the Imperial and Spanish circle. Francis I therefore determined to invade, and brought various charges against the weak and submissive Duke. The wolf was able to dispose of the lamb without much difficulty. It is strange to see how little resistance was made by “ the Alpine holds of liberty.” The French troops overran the country with ease. Even Turin

Savoy
and the
Italian wars

Alliance
of Savoy
and the
Empire, and
conquest
by France

fell into their hands. Only Nice and one or two other strong places defied their efforts. The Duke was often a wanderer in Germany and the Netherlands, seeking unsuccessfully for help from the Emperor. Both Piedmont and Savoy were declared to be incorporated with the French Crown. The States-General were suppressed in both divisions of the Duchy. A Parlement was established as the supreme tribunal, and it performed the essential rôle of all Parlements in upholding the power of the Crown. The sufferings of the population were very great; greater than those of the rest of Italy. French, Spanish, and Swiss troops plundered and ravaged and murdered in the country almost at their will. The disappearance of Savoy from the state system of Europe seemed highly probable when Duke Charles III died in 1553. His weakness and the disasters of his state help to account for the survival of the Calvinist regime in neighbouring Geneva.

Emmanuel
Philibert

Emmanuel Philibert was the only survivor of nine children and he had at first been thought weakly, and had been intended for Holy Orders. When the death of his brothers brought him into the direct line of succession he turned to politics and war, and showed at an early age great courage and ambition. He was present with the Imperial armies at Mühlberg, and was in command of the Spanish and Imperial armies which inflicted the great defeat on the French at Saint Quentin. Savoy was deeply interested in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, and it is strange that France did not make more determined efforts to retain the extremely valuable lands which had been in their possession for about twenty years. But France was in urgent need of peace; the battle of Saint Quentin had raised the military prestige of the Duke of Savoy. It was arranged that Emmanuel Philibert should marry the French King's sister, and as dowry to the Princess the French promised to evacuate the country, with the exception of five places which they would continue to hold until the conditions of the treaty were carried out.

So the Prince brought back independence to Savoy and Piedmont. The country was desolate and ruined, without institutions and without national pride. It is the supreme service of Emmanuel Philibert that from these dry bones he

created a state strong, ardent, and patriotic, which henceforth through constant difficulties advanced continuously, and became first the Kingdom of Sardinia and then the Kingdom of Italy.

The memory of the French rule was detested; but it contributed very much to the new political structure. The feudal institutions of Savoy and the communal institutions of Piedmont had been swept away by the French. The Duke found the ground clear for new constructions. And it is clear that he owed much to the work of the French, and that the new institutions copied under different names those which were already vigorous and successful in France. The States-General of the two provinces were not abolished, but they were neglected and allowed to die—as happened in France half a century later. The French Parlements disappeared, but their place was taken by two Senates—one for Savoy and the other for Piedmont; and the function of the Senates was not merely to transact ordinary judicial business, but especially to maintain the rights of the central power against the claims of the Church and of the nobility. The right of legislation lay with the Duke; the Supreme Court had only the right of registering the ducal edicts. The economic needs of the new state were extremely pressing. The Duke tried to develop industry by resuming the exploitation of the mines and introducing foreign manufactures, but the low condition of education in Piedmont and still more in Savoy, made the task difficult. The needs of the state were met by taxes founded on imitation of those well known in France. A salt monopoly was introduced, which resembled the French *gabelle*; a tax on land and houses reproduced the chief features of the *taille*. In one respect the Duke of Savoy anticipated the development of France. He divided his territories into provinces and placed over each of them an officer called a Prefect, to do for Savoy much what the *intendants* later did for France.

The work of Emmanuel Philibert all aimed at concentration and at the building up of a personal rule, though for the present the state had only the title of Duchy. But one important measure made for liberty. Serfdom was to be found in both Savoy and Piedmont, in various forms, some-

The new
institutions
of Savoy

Abolition
of serfdom

times hardly distinguishable from slavery, at others mainly oppressive for its control of the property of the serf. Experience had shown it to be an uneconomical system, and the Duke was moved rather by financial needs than by humanity in his efforts to suppress it. An edict of 1561 allowed serfs to buy their liberty at a fixed tariff. The economic motive was made plain in a later edict which compelled the serf to effect the purchase of his liberty on pain of confiscation of his property. It was, however, two centuries before serfdom entirely disappeared from Savoy.

The new
army

The misery of the last reign had shown the military helplessness of the territories of the Duke of Savoy against the troops of France or Spain or even of the Swiss Confederates. All the political changes of Emmanuel Philibert had as their great aim the establishment of the military security of the country. His success was wonderful. The valleys and towns were fortified; no enemy would again make a military promenade through the country. An army large in proportion to the population—which did not amount to a million and a half—was raised by the obligation of direct military service. The feudal and communal levies were not abrogated; but the militia was drawn from the whole population. There was compulsion, but there was also inducement in the form of privileges, legal and pecuniary, for all who entered the army. The militia rose to 36,000 men.

Savoy
and the
Church

For all the strong rulers of the century the relations with the Church were critical and important. Margaret of France, the wife of Emmanuel Philibert, had been a friend and patroness of L'Hôpital. The Duke may have been tempted to throw in his lot with the Protestants by the proximity of the Protestant cantons, the strength of the Huguenots in the south of France, and the presence of a large and energetic minority of Protestants in his own dominions. These last were Waldensians, whose movement dated back into the thirteenth century. There were serious differences between them and any type of Protestantism, but they attached themselves in the end to Calvinism. Their home was in the Piedmontese valleys which stretched west from Pinerolo. But if Emmanuel Philibert was ever tempted to draw near to Protestantism, he did not yield to the temptation. He

persecuted the Waldensians, though not so severely as was desired in Rome; and he was doubtless himself a sincere adherent of the Roman Church. He did what he could, however, to reduce the Church to obedience to the Crown by means of the Senates and by procuring from the Pope on various occasions the right to tax the clergy. His relations with the Pope were at times difficult; but friendship was maintained down to his death.

He was a man of amazing and perhaps morbid energy. It is strange that, though he began his public career by a great success in battle, the rest of his life was chiefly devoted to peaceful organization of the resources and government of his country. A great part of his attention was given to diplomacy, by which he hoped to free his territory from foreign occupation. And in this aim he was largely successful. All the possessions which were left in the hands of France by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis were restored to Savoy, though France still retained the Marquisate of Saluzzo and with that the power of entering on Italian soil. The Duke had often planned to recover Geneva and the northern shores of the lake but without effect. These are, however, small deductions to make from the success of the reign. He had transformed the government from a feudal to an absolute form; he had freed the territory from foreign dominion; he had identified its interests with those of Italy; he had created a nation and given it military pride and efficiency. He is one of the most characteristic figures among the "new monarchs" of the sixteenth century, and may be compared to Gustavus Vasa of Sweden.¹

It will be well to set down here the chief facts in the Florence decline of another and more famous Italian state. None foresaw in the sixteenth century that from Savoy would come the accomplishment in part of the political dreams of the patriots and seers of Italy; and, while the foundations of the power of Savoy were being securely laid, Florence, for so long the chief representative of what was best in Italian thought and life, was dragged down to the political servitude

¹ The history of Savoy is carried on to the end of the period in chap. xxi, p. 307.

from which she only emerged when the nineteenth century brought hope to all Italy.

Relations of
Florence
with Spain
and France

The clue to the many strange revolutions of Florence in the sixteenth century is to be found in the attitude of France and Spain respectively to Florentine politics. It was through the victory of Charles VIII of France that the Florentine Republic had been established in 1494, and little as French Kings sympathized with republican ideals it was from France that the Republic received support. The cause of Spain was on the other hand usually identified with the Medici; and we have seen that, when the battle of Ravenna brought about the changes which expelled the French from Italy, the Republic which had been flagging for some time perished (1512). An attempt had been made to give the Government more solidity by appointing a dictator under the title of perpetual *gonfaloniere*; but little resistance was made. The Republic could hardly hope to hold out against the power of Spain. The city surrendered and the Medici returned. They nominally restored the old constitution, and they had the nominal support of the popular assembly (the *parlamentum*) for their rule. The Cardinal Giovanni and his brother, Giuliano, held power in the city, and governed by the methods that the Medici understood so well.

The
Republic
re-estab-
lished

So things lasted until 1527. The sack of Rome in that year brought instant revolution to Florence. It was indeed a victory for the arms of Spain, but it was a crushing blow for Clement VII, himself a member of the House of Medici and the chief prop of their power in Florence. The Medici were expelled with little resistance; the Republic was re-established. Some of the military changes recommended by Machiavelli were introduced, and Michael Angelo was given the task of reconstructing the fortifications of the city. For it was clear that the Republic would have to fight for its existence.

Fall of the
Republic

The sack of Rome had not destroyed the power and influence of Clement VII, as had appeared at first. A reconciliation with Spain had taken place, and now Florence had to pay the price for her revolt. The last struggle of Republican Florence has many heroic and interesting episodes, but no room can be found for them here. The Papal armies

were led by Philibert, Prince of Orange (his sister was aunt of William the Silent, who was for the next half-century the great champion of liberty and republican ideals), and he had under him the German soldiers who had sacked Rome. Florence was betrayed by the *condottiere* to whom she had entrusted the command of her troops. So in August 1530 the city was forced to surrender. There was some talk of establishing a constitution; but power was given into the hands of Alessandro dei Medici with the title of Duke of Florence. He was the illegitimate half-brother of the Catherine who later married Henry II of France and gained so conspicuous a name in European history during the last half of the century. When he died in 1537—killed by a cousin for personal reasons—he was succeeded by a distant relation, Cosimo, a young man of eighteen, who was given the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1569. The change of title is significant. Florence, with all its communal, republican, Italian ideals and with all its unsurpassed services to art, thought, and literature, passes away; her place is taken by a new territorial state built on the pattern of the other states of the period; centralized and efficient; not intentionally oppressive nor unjust; a state whose establishment might even be welcomed, were it not for the memories of great ideals and great men which for ever haunt the streets of Florence.


PART II (1494-1610)

CHAPTER VIII

TURKEY AND CHRISTENDOM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

WE have said that there was not at the beginning of the sixteenth century any settled antagonism among the Powers of Europe or any acknowledged pair of combatants round which they grouped themselves. That is true if we think only of the Christian powers; but a strange feature of the time is that international politics took so little account of the one all-important and most permanent antagonism; that, namely, between Islam and Christendom. For at no time—at no time at any rate since the Moors crossed the Pyrenees in the eighth century—was the supremacy of Christianity in Europe in such real peril. How different is the sixteenth century when viewed from Constantinople from what it is when considered from Rome or Vienna or Paris or London! To the western world it seems a century of achievement, progress, and triumph. The nations settle down into strong and separate independence; art and literature secure some of their greatest triumphs; science makes advances which are important in themselves and the guarantee of more that is to come; America is discovered and the Europeanization of the whole world begins. But to the statesmen of Constantinople it must have seemed that the enemies of Islam were afflicted with some strange madness. At the very moment when Islam launches its great offensive they are divided among themselves, fighting fiercely against one another about obscure points of doctrine, when the whole faith of Christendom was at stake; and not even the breaking open of the gates which protected central Europe on the

The danger
from Islam
to western
Europe



ISLAM AND CHRISTENDOM

Danube availed to effect more than a short truce. The danger was recognized and was loudly proclaimed ; the Popes tried to organize a crusade again and again. But all was unavailing. The crusading spirit was feeble or dead. Neither religion nor common interest nor fear availed to induce the Powers of Europe to join against the common foe. Yet the war was incessant ; it was interrupted by truces, but peace never came. And on both sides it was conducted with the greatest cruelty. We must remember the slowness of communication and the difficulty of bringing information to wide circles. If the statesmen of western Europe had really understood what was happening in the Danube valley, they could hardly have failed to make some great effort to avert the peril that was at their own doors.

We have no space to attempt even a short sketch of the history of Islam during our period ; but the relations of the Christian Powers with Turkey are so important, and exercise at times so great an influence on events in the West, that the attempt will be made to indicate the chief episodes in the struggle.

I

THE TURKISH POWER

The area covered by the power or influence of Islam was probably greater than that which acknowledged the Christian religion, though the indefinite boundaries of Muscovy make the calculation difficult. We need not look at central Asia or at India, but the power of Islam in the Mediterranean lands was alarmingly great. The early followers of the prophet had carried his ideas and faith not only over Syria and Asia Minor, but right along the northern coasts of Africa, sweeping away or overthrowing the rich civilization which Rome had left there ; and then passing the Straits of Gibraltar they had overcome Spain and had threatened France. This early stream had spent its energy. Spain was one of the leading Christian Powers, still showing in her life and ideas clear traces of the struggle against her age-long enemy. Neither Morocco nor Algiers nor Tunis nor Egypt possessed in

the sixteenth century the vitality and aggressive power that had once been theirs, until a new influence came upon them. That influence came from the Ottoman Turks who now gave to Islam its driving force and carried its victorious armies into the very heart of Europe. When Mohammedan armies pressed victoriously to the gates of Vienna, and a restored and reinvigorated Mohammedan power challenged Europe from the Straits of Gibraltar, it might easily seem that the western Christian world was caught between the two points of a converging attack, and that only a united resistance could save her. And instead of unity in defence the most Christian King of France was a permanent ally of the Turkish Sultan, and even the Pope himself did not disdain at times to ask for the military help of the head of Islam.

The unity
of the
Turkish
power

There was nothing essentially mysterious in the Mohammedan victories. They were the triumph of unity over dispersion. There was not, it is true, unity of faith in the Mohammedan world any more than in the Christian. There was the great antagonism between the Sunnites, at whose head stood the Sultan of Turkey, and the Shiites, who were mainly to be found in Persia, and there were other smaller divisions and heresies. But the Turks held unhesitatingly by the cognate ideas of one God, one faith, one ruler; and as a result the war against the Christian enemy was pursued with a persistence which finds no parallel at all in the resistance of the Christian Powers of Europe. The position of the Sultan was one of the most personal known to history. He was the religious as well as the secular head of the state and was recognized as Caliph in the reign of Sultan Selim.¹ All the passions and the hopes of Islam supported him in his wars against the infidel; the mosque was as useful to him as the army. As a secular prince he reigned without check or constitutional rival. The unity of the state was felt to be so all-important that measures were allowed which conflicted with the fundamental ideas of Mohammedan morality. A

¹ Sir Thomas Arnold writes: "Under the Ottomans especially after the conquest of Constantinople the 'Ulamā"—the guardians of the sacred law of Islam—"were taken into government service and the head of the whole body, on whom Muhammad II conferred the title of Shaykh ul-Islam, became one of the most powerful officers of the state" (*The Islamic Faith*, p. 46).

Sultan when he mounted the throne was allowed, and indeed advised, to put to death all relations from whom any rivalry might be expected. Nor was this a mere empty doctrine. Selim I put to death at least ten of his nearest male relations at his accession. Soliman's was a more generous and humane nature; but even he secured the throne by the same means. The chief minister was the Grand Vizir, and there is nothing stranger than the position and fate of the occupants of this office during the sixteenth century. They were more often drawn from the conquered populations than from the Turks themselves; they were often given immense power; but they were always regarded with the greatest jealousy. The Sultans had no mind to become constitutional Sovereigns, nor to hand over their power into the hands of a "mayor of the palace," though something of the sort happened in the later history of Turkey. Under Selim I it was almost a sentence of death to be appointed to the post of Grand Vizir, and even Soliman sent his trusted friend Ibrahim to the bowstring in the end. All the subordinate agents of the administration depended entirely on the Sultan.

The Turks were always in Europe a conquering garrison, and they were far outnumbered by their subjects of different race and religion. Moreover, they never ceased during the period of which we are treating to regard conquest as their chief aim and duty. All therefore depended on the army. This was drawn mainly from two sources. (1) The cavalry came mainly, but not wholly, from the holders of land as a condition of their tenure; but it is remarkable that this did not lead in Turkey, as it did so invariably in western and central Europe, to feudal independence and anarchy. The submissive fidelity of the nobles is to be traced partly to the difference in the condition of land tenure, which in Turkey was not necessarily hereditary, and to the support given to the Sultan by the whole organization of religion. (2) Even more important than the cavalry (sipahis) were the famous infantry—the Janissaries¹ upon which the fate of Turkey has very largely depended. This famous body of troops was drawn from the subject, and therefore mainly from the

¹The word is a corruption of two Turkish words meaning "the new soldiery."

Christian, population, who paid this tribute of children in addition to their money payments. All subordination to their parents was broken off; they became Mohammedans; they were trained for the service of the Sultan, and at the age of twenty-five were definitely drafted, if suitable, into the ranks of the Janissaries. They were not allowed to marry; they were rewarded with the spoils of war. The camp and the service of the Sultan took up their whole life. They have been called "the first regular standing army which Europe had known since Roman times." Their efficiency and their military morale gave Turkey her greatest victories. When these qualities declined and they became too conscious of their own power, the great days of Turkey had passed away. (3) It is strange to find that the artillery of the Turks was superior to that of the European Powers. Their navy, too, was large and efficient. They owed both their guns and their ships (mostly galleys) to the hands of artificers drawn by pay from western Europe.

Finance

The Turkish dominions were certainly not richer than those of France, Spain, Italy, or Germany; but the Turkish ruler had a greater supply of ready money than any European ruler. Soliman's revenue is given as twelve million ducats; that of Charles V as six million. All the Sultan's subjects paid him tribute in some form; though the infidel paid more than the believer.

There is nothing then mysterious about the Turkish victories. The Sultans at Constantinople possessed a military machine far superior to anything in western Europe. The armies were larger; they were better supplied and paid; they were far more easily mobilized; religion supplied them with a driving force more effective than the nationalism or patriotism of their opponents. Moreover, the Sultans were able rulers, and one at least—Soliman the Magnificent—perhaps the ablest ruler in Europe during the century.¹

¹ Busbecq, an Austrian envoy to Constantinople in 1554, writes as follows of the contrast between the troops of Turkey and of the Empire: "When I compare the difference between their soldiers and ours I stand amazed to think what will be the event. For on their side there is a mighty strong and wealthy Empire, great armies, experience in war, a veteran soldiery, a long series of victories, patience in toil, concord, order, discipline, frugality, and vigilance. On our side there is public want, private luxury, soldiers

II

SOLIMAN THE MAGNIFICENT

Mohammed the Conqueror, who had added Constantinople Selim to the territories of Turkey, died in 1481. He was succeeded by the weak Bayazid. In 1512 Bayazid was dethroned and perhaps murdered by his son, Selim I, with the assistance of the Janissaries. The reign of Selim shows us the Turkish system at its most brutal, but also at its most successful. Europe did not at first attract his attention; but he was a great conqueror, and it is estimated that he doubled the extent of the Ottoman Empire. He broke the power of Persia in a great campaign, but did not annex the country. He conquered both Syria and Egypt (1517); he annexed Syria, but was content to make Egypt tributary. This was not only an immense extension of his own power, but also a great blow to the commerce of the western Powers, who had carried on their traffic with the East through Egypt. Hitherto Selim had not attacked the Christian states; but now he prepared to do so. The island of Rhodes was one of the few traces left by the Crusades. There, in close proximity to the mainland of Asia Minor, the military Order of the Knights of Saint John still held out. Their ships terrorized the Ægean, and were not easily distinguishable from pirates. Their huge fortifications on the island had bidden defiance to all attacks. They would have been the spear-point of Christian Europe, if Europe had cared to use them for that purpose, and they were a thorn in the side of victorious Turkey which must be plucked out. Selim was preparing an expedition against the island when he died in 1520.¹

He was succeeded by his only son, Soliman—to Europeans Soliman, the Great or the Magnificent, to Mohammedans the Legislator—the Mag-
nificent

refractory, commanders covetous, a contempt of discipline, licentiousness, rashness, drunkenness, gluttony; and what is worst of all, they are used to conquer, we to be conquered." (Quoted by G. E. Hubbard in "*The Day of the Crescent*," p. 85.)

¹ It will be seen that the reign of Selim coincides with the early stages of the Lutheran movement. 1517, the attack on indulgences; 1519, the death of Maximilian and the disputation at Leipsic; 1520, the appeal to the "Christian Nobility of the German Nation."

and under him the Turkish power reached its zenith. He was a great soldier and organizer ; a lover of literature and himself a poet ; famed for his love of justice ; relatively humane though capable of using the usual methods of the Turkish, rulers, when reasons of state called for it. The civilization of western Europe has never had a more dangerous enemy.

Capture of
Belgrade and
Rhodes

In 1521 the standards of the Turkish army moved out on the great crusade, and the blow fell on the King of Hungary : only through his dominions could Soliman strike against the heart of Europe. Belgrade was the great bulwark of Hungary, and had repulsed the Turkish hosts under Mahomet II. Soliman himself superintended the siege. The place held out with the greatest gallantry. Only when the garrison had been reduced to a handful and the inhabitants mutinied against a continuation of the siege did the fortress surrender (1521). The road to Buda was open ; but Soliman with wise strategy turned next against Rhodes. The attack on the island is a real military epic, and the Knights of Saint John vied with the trained warriors of Islam in heroism. The place yielded in December 1522 after a siege of nine months, and the Knights were allowed to withdraw. They subsequently found a home in the island of Malta, and had yet an important part to play in history.

The battle
of Mohacz

The affairs of the Far East occupied the Sultan for some time ; but in 1526 he was ready to move forward again to the attack on Europe. A new and strange feature now presented itself. The Mohammedan Caliph was the ally of the most Christian King of France ; and it is possible that the coming tragedy would never have taken place without the prompting and help of King Francis I, who had recently (1525) fallen a prisoner into the power of the Emperor Charles V and was ready to take any hand that would drag him from his ignominy. Soliman left Constantinople with an army which is reckoned to have contained 100,000 men and 300 guns. On August 28, 1526, he met Louis II, King of Hungary, on the marshy plain of Mohacz. The battle that followed is perhaps the most important in the century, if judged by its consequences. The Magyar cavalry came near to snatching a victory by the audacity of their first attacks. But the Turkish artillery and the steadiness of the Janissaries turned the day in favour

of Soliman. King Louis II fell and a great number of nobles. There followed a huge massacre of prisoners, for it was the Turkish tradition to break the spirit of a conquered enemy. Soon afterwards both Buda and Pesth fell into Soliman's hands.

Hungary did not cease from her dissensions in the hour of defeat. If she had done so, there can be little doubt that the disaster of Mohacz might have been retrieved. But Hungary split into three parts. The Turks held one part; another fell to the Emperor Ferdinand; the third and most truly nationalist section accepted John Zapolya as king. Of all this we have said something when dealing with the history of Germany.

Two years later (1529) Soliman advanced again into Hungary and seemed assured of an even greater conquest. He appeared before the gates of Vienna with a host of almost fabulous size, and a flotilla of his boats covered the Danube. "If the King of Spain"—wrote Soliman—"is of a high and mighty spirit let him encounter me in the field, and that which God shall decree will then take place." But Vienna was saved. The religious dissensions were appeased for a while. If we follow the details of the siege in which a splendidly equipped army, said to amount to a quarter of a million, was resisted by a force of 16,000, we shall perhaps doubt whether the military skill of the Turks has not been over-rated, and whether even the Janissaries were quite the equals of the best European troops.¹ After a siege of three weeks the Turkish army withdrew; they had not been defeated; but the great prize had escaped them and was never destined to fall into their hands. The check to Soliman was a defeat for the King of France.

¹ It must be remembered, however, that the military art of the sixteenth century was very inefficient in the attack of strong places. Famine was usually the only means by which a well-fortified city or fortress could be reduced. Leith and Edinburgh Castle were stormed, or taken by the threat of storm, but their fortifications were not up to the European standard. Papal Rome was not really fortified or defended in 1527. In the sieges of Poitiers, Paris, and Antwerp assault was hardly tried. Ostend was forced to surrender after a siege of over three years, and the surrender was not actually due to famine. Yet the story of the siege rather emphasizes than disproves the superiority of the defence over the attack in the sixteenth century.

The Turks
in the
Mediterranean

The check of Soliman at Vienna was epoch-making for central Europe, but there was nothing in it to discourage the Turks from further attacks on the Christian Powers. He failed at Güns in 1582, and, instead of attacking Vienna again, granted a contemptuous peace to Ferdinand and Charles. He now turned his arms against the strong places of the Mediterranean and, still with the assistance of the King of France, gained victories almost as alarming for western Europe as the capture of Vienna would have been. These victories are as remarkable as those gained in Hungary, for they demanded a supreme naval power, and that the arsenals and naval yards of Constantinople were able to supply. Here as everywhere the Turk relied to a surprising extent on alien races. The architects and builders of his ships were mostly Italians. The crews of his galleys—for it was almost entirely on galleys that he relied—consisted of captured enemies who had been condemned to the living death of galley slaves. The Turkish race supplied little more than the force and the driving will. And on the sea, as in the basin of the Danube, Soliman found valuable help from the Christian Powers. Francis I of France was here, too, his determined, though rather shame-faced, ally; and he landed over Toulon to serve as a base for the Turkish fleets. Popes, in their political extremities, were not unwilling to ask the help of the great infidel. Clement VII supported the demands of the French king (who was his connection by marriage) for Turkish help. Paul IV urged the Turks to attack Philip II, who is reckoned in history to be above all things the champion of the Papacy. No alliance of the chief naval powers of the Mediterranean was to be hoped for, at any rate at first, and when such an alliance did come into being it was quickly dissolved.

Barbarossa ✓

The progress of the Turkish power under Soliman at sea had its ups and downs, but was on the whole as remarkable as the advance of his power by land. He was no sailor himself, but he found capable agents, men whose names became proverbial for adventurous courage and skill as well as for cruelty and subtlety of policy. The chief of these men was Kheireddin Barbarossa. He was of Greek origin, and was at first independent of Turkey; but, as the power of

Spain became more dangerous on the north coast of Africa, he offered his allegiance to Soliman and became his most trusted agent at sea. Like many of the Turkish chiefs he played at times with the idea of treason to his new master and carried on negotiations with the King of Spain. But it is probable that his overtures were never genuine and were undertaken to procure information and throw the enemy off his guard; certainly Barbarossa never acted treasonously against Soliman. Next in importance came Dragut. He had been taken prisoner, and for four years pulled an oar as a slave in a Spanish galley. When at last he was ransomed, he pursued his Christian opponents with the ardour of revenge. Against these men the best admiral on the Christian and Spanish side was undoubtedly the Genoese Doria. He had at first served with France; but at the siege of Naples in 1528, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, he passed over to the Spaniards. His action was of great importance in the struggle between Charles and Francis; it was of even greater importance in the struggle against the power of Islam on the waters of the Mediterranean.

The first ten years of the reign of Charles saw little but disaster in his conflicts with the Turks. The coasts of Spain were raided, and her galleys were defeated. The attempt to carry out reprisals in Africa was unsuccessful. But then Doria's accession to the Spanish side brought better prospects. Cherchell, on the African coast, was taken, and Coron in the south of Greece. As the struggle with France relaxed in intensity, Charles could devote more attention to the Turk. The ravages of the corsairs in Italy and in Spain made some counter-stroke highly desirable.

In 1534 Barbarossa had gained a great victory for his master, though at the expense of a Mohammedan power. He had taken Tunis from the Mohammedan corsair who ruled there. The strength of the place and its proximity to Sicily made the blow a serious one. In 1535 Charles sailed in person with a large expedition to seize it; the force is reckoned to have consisted of 400 vessels and 30,000 troops. The expedition was the greatest feat of arms ever carried out by Charles in person, and established his reputation for physical courage. The city was commanded by the fort Goletta at

the mouth of the harbour. This was taken after a heavy bombardment, and then the army marched along the north shore of the harbour towards the city. A difficult siege seemed in prospect; but the Christian captives, of whom there were many thousands in Tunis, rose in rebellion, and the city was forced to surrender, though Barbarossa managed to escape. It was a very great triumph for Charles; and, had his hands been free from entanglements in other parts of Europe, might have been the beginning of a Spanish and Christian conquest of northern Africa. But in fact the capture of Tunis was in its results disappointing. The place was not annexed to Spain, but was handed over to a Mohammedan ruler, who swore obedience to Charles; but this obedience proved very untrustworthy, and in 1574 the place fell again into the hands of the Turks. Moreover, Barbarossa was at large and never ceased to plunder the coasts and shipping of Spain and her allies.

Battle of
Prevesa

A much-discussed event came in 1538. Spain, Venice, and the Papacy entered into a triple alliance for action against the Turks who had recently landed in Italy, near Otranto, and done much damage. The fleets met at Prevesa to the south of Corfu. The Christian allies were at cross purposes; Barbarossa, who commanded the Turks, distracted them by proposals to negotiate; in the fighting that followed the Christian navies were repulsed, and it was felt that their repulse was a disgrace to their arms. The prestige of the Turkish navy was restored.

Charles
fails at
Algiers

In 1540 Charles tried to repeat his triumph against Tunis by an attack on the great corsair base at Algiers. Hassan Aga, an officer of Barbarossa, was in command there, and he declared himself ready for surrender if he could get his price. A large force was landed in the neighbourhood of the city on October 23, and the capture of the place seemed certain. Then there came a violent storm of wind and rain which wrecked many of the ships and made operations difficult. There was perhaps some failure of nerve, for nothing in the story seems to justify the abandonment of the enterprise. The troops were drawn off, re-embarked with great difficulty, and suffered grievous loss. It was a great triumph for Islam; nothing went really well with the Spaniards in their African enterprises.

There was no real change down to the end of the reign. Spain won victories, but could not hold them. El Mehedia was captured, but had to be abandoned. The important city of Tlemcen was in Spanish hands for a time, but was then retaken by the Turks. While the Emperor lay dying there came bad news from Oran, which his attendants dare not give him. The vast and scattered Empire of Charles had so many interests, so many problems, that he could never afford to give sufficient or continuous attention to any one of them.

Soliman's victories thus continued with few real set-backs right down to the end of his reign, though the Turkish navy suffered a severe check before Malta in 1565. Ferdinand was his tributary and almost his vassal. Had his life and vigour been prolonged, or had he found a successor capable of continuing his work, what might not have been accomplished! And yet the danger of western Christendom has perhaps been exaggerated. Soliman's victories by land had been over thinly-peopled, loosely-compacted states. If Vienna had fallen, he would have found Germany still capable of a long resistance. Turkish troops never encountered a Spanish army. The naval victories were all won by galleys and against galleys. The Turks had no experience of the open Atlantic, nor had they any craft capable of navigating it. An encounter with the ocean-going vessels of the Dutch or the English could only have had one result.

Soliman is reckoned not only the greatest of the Turkish Sultans, but also one of the most enlightened, civilized, and humane. He maintained a relatively good order among his troops and used his power to repress massacre in captured towns. The subject populations accepted his rule without complaint; partly because complaint was useless and rebellion unthinkable against so well organized a Power; but also partly because, in an age that did not know the meaning of liberty, the conditions allowed to non-Mohammedan subjects did not seem cruelly oppressive. Taxes were many and heavy; the surrender of one male child in ten to the state for the army was the heaviest of all. But there was no hope to inspire resistance, and the subjects of Turkey had little reason to envy the lot of the serfs of Hungary and Poland,

The rule of
Soliman

the peasants of Germany or the poorer classes of France or Spain. As we have seen, the Sultans depended largely on the services of men of alien and Christian stock. Conversion to Islam made all men equal; and under Soliman justice was administered with remarkable fairness.

Roxolana
and
Selim II

The age of Soliman, however, must not be idealized. The evils of the system were reduced under him, but they were there; and the last years of his reign saw the appearance of palace and harem tragedies of the traditional type, which seem traceable to the influence of Soliman's second wife, a Russian, who is usually called Roxolana. The succession seemed secure for Mustafa, the son of Soliman's first wife, who was popular with the Janissaries, and is accredited with the virtues and the qualities which might have made him a great ruler of his father's dominions. But Roxolana had a son, Selim, for whom she coveted the throne. The methods she adopted to secure it have many parallels in Turkish history. She had already used her influence to remove the great Vizir Ibrahim. The devoted friendship between this man—a Greek or Albanian by origin—and the Sultan is one of the most attractive incidents of his reign, and seemed to belie the traditional jealousy of the Sultans for their powerful agents. Perhaps the Vizir aspired to too great power; certainly he incurred the jealousy of the all-powerful wife. In 1536 he was put to death in the usual way, without trial or accusation. Seven years later Mustafa fell. He was warned, but made no effort to escape, and his father looked on while he was strangled. As was usual and inevitable this crime entailed others. A Grand Vizir was put to death. Selim had a brother who was the father of five sons; they were all strangled. Through so many intrigues and crimes did the vicious and incapable Selim II mount the throne. Turkey remained for long a powerful state and a terror to the western world, but the beginnings of the decline may be traced in the reign of Selim II.

III

THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER

The causes of the decadence of the Turkish power are Decline of the Turkish power easy to analyse. Absolute Governments which do not take the people into some sort of partnership have shown themselves the most liable to collapse; and the personal and exclusive rule of the Turkish Sultans went far beyond the Kings of France or Spain or even the Czars of Russia. There were, too, particularly dangerous features about the character of Turkish rule. They were in Europe a minority ruling large populations alien in race and religion; not with studied cruelty or injustice, but without making any attempt at conciliation. The instability of such a system is obvious. With the first stirrings of nationalism, liberty, and religious independence the Turkish system was threatened; all the more because it relied so much on agents drawn from the conquered peoples. The whole character of the state, moreover, was military and aggressive; the virtues of the Turks, which were many, were military virtues. When they ceased to conquer, when the tide of battle turned against them, they had little to fall back upon. The effort to adapt themselves to a peaceful and industrial life was too great a strain; they confronted the gradually developing modern world with the ideals of their conquering period. Moreover, the essential feature of the Turkish system was that all depended on the personal character and abilities of the Sultan. The problem of finding a method which shall secure a succession of vigorous and patriotic rulers in a hereditary monarchy is clearly insoluble. The Great Soliman was succeeded by the incapable Selim II, and there is hardly an outstanding personality among the Sultans down to modern times.

The deficiencies of Selim II were to some extent made Reign of Selim II good by the Grand Vizir, Mohammed Sokolli, whom he had inherited from Soliman; and yet the policy of the reign was adopted in spite of the Vizir's protests. For the Sultan was bent on a war with Venice. The great republic held Cyprus and other possessions in the Ægean Sea. Her diplomatists and

her sailors were alike famous. Now it seemed that she could be isolated ; and what chance had she, standing alone against the armies and navies of the Sultan ? The Grand Vizir recommended war against a more dangerous antagonist ; for Philip was occupied with a desperate rising of the Moors, and would be incapable of taking vigorous measures against a Turkish attack. But the Sultan's will was decisive, and the attack on Cyprus, the greatest of Venetian possessions, was decided on. A summons to the Venetians to surrender it provoked inevitably an answer of defiance, and a great force landed on the island in May 1570.

Conquest
of Cyprus

We approach a decisive incident in the history of the Turkish power ; an incident, too, which reflects clearly the strength and the weakness of both combatants. The importance of Cyprus was clearly felt both in Italy and Spain, and there was at once talk of a league against the Sultan ; but nothing was done in time to save Cyprus. The landing of an overwhelming force was effected without difficulty. Soon the fortified town of Famagosta alone held out against the Turks. There 7000 men under Baglione and Bragadino confronted a force which is said to have reached 100,000 men. Every means known to the Turk was employed ; but trenches, mines, and poison smoke produced no effect on the garrison. If only a relieving force arrived, the Turk would be in great danger. But no relieving force arrived ; then powder failed, and famine did its work. In August 1571 the place capitulated on a promise of safety and protection to life, liberty, and property. The horror that followed cannot be described. In a fit of passion Mustafa broke his word and put the gallant defenders to death with revolting tortures. Western warfare has nothing to show quite so bad in the Netherlands or in Ireland or in Spain.

Holy League
against the
Turks

Meanwhile a Holy League—one of the many so-called—had come into existence. The presence of the Turks in the Mediterranean was more terrifying than the conquest of Hungary or the siege of Vienna. France, indeed, maintained her good understanding, which was almost an alliance, with the Sultan ; but Charles IX was too much occupied with the civil wars to be able to render any assistance direct or indirect to the Turks. Pope Pius V was the moving spirit of

the alliance, and he brought together, though with difficulty, the King of Spain and the Republic of Venice, who were afterwards joined by Tuscany, Genoa, Savoy, and some other Italians. So was founded a "perpetual" League against the Turkish power in the Mediterranean. There were stipulations as to the ships and men and money to be provided by each of the contracting parties. Don John of Austria, the natural son of Charles V, was named Captain-General of the League. The Emperor and the Kings of France and Portugal were invited to join. These fair words covered wide divergence of aims and much jealousy among the three Powers.

But all went well at first, and an important victory was won. Don John was supported by the great Spanish admiral, Santa Cruz; Venice was represented by Barbarigo; Colonna commanded for the Pope. The Christian Armada numbered about 250 vessels. The Turkish fleet of about 300 vessels, under Ali Pacha, was encountered on October 7, 1571, in the narrowest part of the Gulf of Corinth, near to Patras and not far from Lepanto, which latter place has given its name to the battle. The battle of Lepanto, and the fight against the Spanish Armada off Calais in 1588, were the two most notable naval encounters of the century; but two battles could hardly be more different in character. The ships and the tactics seem separated by centuries. Indeed the ships on both sides in the battle of Lepanto resembled more closely the Greek triremes, which had fought in these same waters just two thousand years before, than the vessels commanded by Lord Howard and Medina Sidonia in 1588.¹ Nearly all the vessels used on both sides were oar-propelled galleys, and in the fighting the vessels grappled with one another, and the struggle was decided by the fighting of the soldiers on deck. The Armada battle was a long artillery duel in which the English never came to close quarters nor boarded a Spanish vessel unless she were disabled. In addition to the ordinary

Battle of
Lepanto

¹ Phormio had fought in these very waters in 429 B.C.—just 2000 years before. His triremes were the ancestors of the Mediterranean galleys, but he would have thought Don John's tactics clumsy; for he avoided boarding and used the vessel itself as the chief weapon of offence. The fight at Lepanto was more like the struggle in the harbour of Syracuse in which the fortunes of Athens foundered.

galleys the Christians had a few great galleasses, propelled by rowers but carrying heavy artillery and 500 soldiers. Technical superiority was all on the side of the Christians. Their artillery was better; the soldiers carried firearms and wore good defensive armour, while the Turks had bows. Enthusiasm and confidence were with the troops of Don John of Austria rather than with his opponents. The future was to bring out the importance of these essential differences. The Turks were never by instinct a sea-faring people, and they had no scientific or inventive capacity. Their courage and discipline rarely failed, but they fell behind in everything that demanded trained and progressive intelligence. The battle ended in a complete victory for Don John. (It was to him that Pope Pius V applied the words, "There was a man sent from God whose name was John.") The Turks lost many thousands in killed and prisoners, and their naval power might have been annihilated.

**Results of
Lepanto**

In one sense the results of the battle were disappointing. With the victory the danger of Turkish predominance in the Mediterranean had passed away, and with it the fear which alone was strong enough to keep the Holy and Perpetual League in being. Jealousies revived; the victory was not followed up. Nay, strange to say, two years after the battle the Turks won back Tunis from the Spaniards—Tunis, the great prize of Charles V. Venice soon made peace and consented to pay a sum of money for the possession of Zante, and thus became in fact once more a tributary of the Sultan. The connection between France and Turkey was maintained, and continued for more than a century. Christendom—even Roman Christendom—was too disunited and too little concerned with religious questions to use the great opportunity.

But in a wider sense the importance of Lepanto was immense. The legend of the invincibility of the Turks vanished and did not revive again, at least at sea. Their naval power declined rapidly. A great fear passed from the hearts of the rulers of Italy and Spain.

**Beginning
of Turkey's
decline**

From the beginning of the third quarter of the sixteenth century the influence of Turkey on the policy of the western Powers of Europe rapidly decreased. The Turkish forces were

indeed still formidable both by sea and land ; a century later a Turkish naval expedition took Crete from the Venetians ; it was more than a hundred years before a Turkish army was decisively beaten in the open field. But never again had the Turkish State the vigorous unity and persistence which it had possessed under Soliman. Nearly everything depended on the character of the ruler ; and the Court and harem of Constantinople made the rise of a great ruler almost a miracle. Turkish history exhibits the evils, moral and political, which are found in association with absolute personal rule ; and it exhibits them in an exaggerated form.

Selim II—Selim the drunkard—was succeeded by his **Murad III** son, Murad III, in 1574. He had five brothers, and he had them all strangled. The Court and the policy of the State were largely governed by the Queen Mother and the wives of the Sultan. No Grand Vizir was allowed to govern for the Sultan. The machine of government went on by virtue of the impulse given to it by earlier rulers.

Mohammed III reigned from 1595 to 1603. His mother was a Venetian, and she inclined to favour the State of her birth. The system of fratricide began to decline from the end of the century, but it flourished under this ruler. He had nineteen brothers, and all were executed ; and he put to death Vizirs who roused his suspicions or his jealousies, and soldiers who were suspected of insubordination. Ahmet I (1604-17) is the last Sultan whose name need be mentioned. His only brother was an idiot, and fratricide was therefore unnecessary. He followed the example of his predecessors in not going to war in person, but his Vizir, Murad, gained important successes against the Austrians.

The greatest of military states was thus falling into the hands of Sultans *fainéants*.¹ The harem and the character of the Court lay at the root of all or most of the evil. It is amazing to find how much the government of this proud people fell into the hands of foreigners, women, and men of servile condition and origin. The wives, the ministers, the soldiers of the Sultans were for the most part of alien and

Decline of
Turkey

¹ See the excellent analysis by M. A. Rambaud in chap. xx of vol. v of the *Histoire Générale* of Lavisse and Rambaud.

of servile origin. Had it not been for its religious organization and its national character the collapse of Turkey must have come in more sudden and complete form. The machinery of government was falling out of gear. The quasi-feudal nobility were being displaced by the agents of the Sultans, and the feudal levies in consequence diminished in numbers and deteriorated in quality. The Janissaries increased in numbers, but began to be transformed. So great were their privileges that the native Turks claimed the right of admission. It might seem to be a good change, which transformed this famous body into something that might become a national force. But the old warlike spirit also tended to pass away. The tribute of Christian children was not abandoned, but it was no longer even the main source from which the ranks of the Janissaries were filled. Men of all sorts were eager to enter now for the sake of the chances of promotion which came to the members of the corps. They were as mutinous as ever but far less efficient. The strength of the Turkish Empire rested on slavery. Political nationalism and liberty, a dangerous but essential medicine for the states of the West, were fatal here. The condition of the subjects of the Empire grew no better, as its strength declined. A Turkish writer said: "At the last judgment the Sultan and not his ministers will have to render account for the oppression of every inhabitant of the countries of Islam. He will not be able to excuse himself by saying I handed over the government to them. The sobs of those who die of hunger shake the foundations of houses; and the tears of the oppressed drown Empires in the sea of ruin."¹

Turkey
and the
western
Powers

The relations between the European Powers and the Ottomans became closer during these years. France enjoyed still a privileged position. Her traders had greater opportunities than those of other countries, and all ships except those of Venice had to fly the French flag. The French Kings still counted on the Sultan as a potential ally, and Murad III offered to send a fleet of 200 sail to help Henry IV against Philip II. Towards the end of the century both the English and the Dutch approached the Sultans and represented their Protestantism as something analogous to Islam.

¹ I take this quotation from Rambaud, p. 882.

As we look back over three hundred years the beginning of the decline of Turkey is unquestionable, but she could still do great things with her armies. We have seen how Tunis had been won back from the Spaniards even after Lepanto, and how the Christian Powers made no effort to recover Cyprus. Great Turkish victories were won against Persia, but these lie outside of the scope of this book. The armies of Turkey were still a terror in the plains of the Danube, and there was no sign of their hold relaxing on the Hungarian lands. In 1596 Mohammed III in person fought a great battle against the Austrians on the Theiss. A long struggle, for the battle lasted three days, seemed at one time to be leading up to a Turkish disaster; but the tide turned and gave the Turks a great victory not less complete than Mohacz. The war continued for long afterwards with balanced results. In 1606 a peace was signed by which the *status quo* was recognized, and the Emperor was no longer bound to pay a tribute to the Sultan. Transylvania was abandoned; for the first time the Turks withdrew from conquered territory. Turkey was still a great military Power, but western Europe went her way henceforth without much thought of her.

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CHAPTER IX

THE SPREAD OF PROTESTANTISM

I. SWITZERLAND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Advantages
and defects
of the
position of
Switzerland

HISTORIANS have sometimes wondered that Switzerland has not played a more decisive part in the international history of Europe. The country holds an unrivalled central position. Its mountains and valleys form a nearly impregnable fortress, while it has in its valleys roads that lead advantageously in all directions. Its people were at the beginning of the sixteenth century famous for their military qualities as foot-soldiers. Their courage, which often despised the use of armour, their endurance, and their discipline, when there was fighting to be done, were as well known as their eagerness for good pay, their readiness to desert if pay were not forthcoming, and their habit of paying themselves at the expense of the civil population, if pay could not be got in the ordinary way. Why should they not have made themselves masters of Germany or France, or at least of Italy, which they raided so often? The answer is to be found in their political condition. Their mountains, which had given them robust physical vigour, had divided them into many communities, which communicated with one another with difficulty. Thus the country was without political or military unity; it had no capacity for taking long views or for conducting plans that presented no prospect of immediate gain. Hence Switzerland stands apart from the main currents of European history; though probably neither to her own disadvantage nor to that of Europe.

Switzerland
and the
Empire

The Swiss cantons were still, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a part of the Holy Roman Empire. But

nowhere had the fiction of Empire worn so thin. Their victory at Morgarten in 1315, whereby they had laid the foundation of their liberties, was fought, not against the Empire, but against the House of Austria. But since the House of Austria had become possessed of the Imperial title, they had transferred their enmity to the Empire itself; and, though they were still legally within the Empire until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, neither Maximilian nor Charles V could make the slightest attempt to assert the Imperial authority within the Thirteen Cantons.

They had resisted the attempts made by Berthold of Mainz to give to Germany some form of administration and self-government. Such reforms would have strengthened the Empire, though they would have given it a more popular character; the Swiss were free from all Imperial interference and wished to remain so. The suggestion that the new system should be imposed on Switzerland led to a war between the Confederation and the Swabian League, through whose instrumentality the attempt was made to impose Imperial control on the cantons. This war was the last effort of princely and Imperial Germany to force her will upon this land of peasants who were called "the suppressors and exterminators of the nobility." The mountaineers maintained their old supremacy. The troops of the Swabian League were defeated on several occasions, and in September 1499 Maximilian accepted peace at Basel. He renounced all interference in the affairs of Switzerland henceforth. There was no legal or formal separation from the Empire, but the practical independence of the Thirteen Cantons was henceforth recognized by all.

The Cantons fall into two markedly different groups. There were six rural cantons—Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, and Appenzell. It was by them that Swiss liberty had been founded, and in them there existed an interesting and primitive form of government founded on the equality of all free men and the sovereignty of the assembly of the people. The seven town cantons were Zurich, Lucerne, Bern, Fribourg, Solothurn, Basel, and Schaffhausen. Here, there was not the same political equality; political power was in the hands of a select number, and a narrow

oligarchical Government developed later; but even here there was freedom and a measure of equality not to be surpassed in any other cities in Europe. The power of the Swiss did not end with the Thirteen Cantons. They had made perpetual Leagues with certain other districts which were not admitted into the Confederation. The chief of these were the upper valley of the Rhone, called the Valais, and the three Leagues known together as the Grisons, round the head waters of the Rhine. The Swiss Confederation was to begin with Germanic in character, but it was the ambition of its leaders to extend their power southwards, and the connection of the Valais and the Grisons with the Confederation gave them an outlook on to Italy.

Absence
of Central
authority

This variegated collection of districts and towns had no constitution or common Government. There was no capital city, no administrative system, no law-making authority. Each of the cantons was sovereign. The Diet passed resolutions, not laws; and the cantons did not follow its resolutions unless they chose. There was, however, enough common interest in the cantons to give them usually some common action in foreign affairs. But it is often very difficult to tell when we are speaking of the Confederation in its formal capacity, and when of the independent action of certain cantons.¹ Thus the Swiss soldiers that we meet with so constantly in the Italian wars are sometimes troops raised by voluntary enlistment in separate cantons; and they are sometimes the official troops of the Confederation.

The Swiss
in the
Italian
wars

Down to 1509 the Confederation had an alliance with France whereby the French Government possessed the exclusive right of recruiting mercenaries in the cantons, but on the expiry of this arrangement in 1509 the King of France did not renew it (it had to be paid for rather heavily). From that time until the battle of Marignano the Swiss Confederation, under the influence of the warlike Cardinal of Sion (Matthew Schinner), usually took sides against France, and

¹ It will be interesting to compare the character of the Helvetic Confederation in 1500 with that of the Seventeen States of the Netherlands; and still more with the approach to a constitution which was set up by the Union of Utrecht in 1579 among the Seven Protestant States. The point is suggestive for the present constitution and future development of the League of Nations.

it became the ally of Julius II, who gave to the Swiss the official title of "Protectors of the Liberty of the Church," though this by no means prevented a number of Swiss mercenaries from serving with the French. These years show the Swiss military power at its maximum. They undertook to protect the Duchy of Milan and promised to come to the aid of the Duke of Savoy. If they had possessed unity and statesmanship, they might have gone far and done much. In return for their services to the Duke of Milan, they were granted the upper valleys of the Ticino and the northern shores of Lake Maggiore. Lugano, Locarno, and Domo d'Ossola thus came into their hands.

When, therefore, King Francis marched to the reconquest of Milan in 1515, the Swiss were his chief enemies, and the battle of Marignano, in addition to its importance for Italy, is a landmark in Swiss history. The battle was no disgrace to the Swiss pikemen; the first day of the battle went rather in their favour; it was the French artillery and cavalry, and the arrival of the Venetians in the rear of the Swiss that turned the battle into a rout. But the battle was a heavy blow to the prestige of the Swiss armies, and, though they gained some success in the next year, the cantons as a whole were cured of their ambition to play a great part in European affairs. Francis I made overtures for peace; eight cantons were for acceptance; five were in favour of continuing the struggle. At last, in November 1516, came the Perpetual Peace of Fribourg. France paid heavily; a war indemnity and a good round sum to each canton and to the allied Leagues. The Swiss promised not to support the enemies of France. The arrangement was defined by another treaty in May 1521. Now the Confederation entered into a definite alliance with France; if the King of France were attacked, he was to be allowed to recruit a force up to 16,000 in Swiss territory; and he was to give help to Switzerland in case the Confederation was attacked. It is an important and a permanent arrangement. "The result of the alliance," says a Swiss historian,¹ "was to reduce Switzerland to the position of the hired fighting-serf of France." But just as the Swiss

¹ Oechsli, *History of Switzerland*, p. 62.

renounced the attempt to play a great part in the international affairs of Europe, a religious movement started within their frontiers by means of which they profoundly influenced European history.

2. ZWINGLI AND THE REFORMATION AT ZURICH

Switzerland
and Rome


The religious and ecclesiastical condition of Switzerland did not differ markedly from that of Germany. The Roman Church was said to be popular there. When the French alliance was dropped in 1509, it was in order to enter into close relations with the Papacy, and we have seen the expression of Pope Julius II's gratitude. But the country was independent both in temper and in politics. There was no strong Government through which the Roman authorities could act easily. It is curious to note how little opposition the Reformation movement in Zurich encountered.

Zwingli
and Zurich

The Protestant movement in Switzerland owed nothing to Luther in its origins; and, though it was no doubt profoundly influenced and stimulated by the great events taking place in Germany, it retained always a marked individuality. The leading part was played for many years by the city of Zurich, a flourishing commercial centre which rivalled Basel in the importance of its relations with Germany. And in Zurich the movement was largely the work of one man—Huldreich Zwingli—whose personal influence on the fortunes of Protestantism in Switzerland was not smaller than that of Luther in Germany. He came of a family that was closely connected with the religious and political life of the canton. His father had been village bailiff; his uncle, the village priest. He himself had studied at the Universities of Vienna and of Basel, where he graduated, before, in 1506, he became parish priest at Glarus.

Zwingli, the
humanist

He had thrown himself with ardour into his classical studies and was especially influenced by Erasmus, to whom he was personally known. No one was fuller of veneration for the men of Greek and Roman antiquity than Zwingli; it was said by his opponents that he had added some of the pagan writers to the "number of his saints," and he wrote an excellently clear and classical Latin. He had studied



SWISS CONFEDERATION

the Fathers of the Church as well, and was specially devoted to St. Jerome and St. Augustine. In character and outlook he was the most rationalistic and the least medieval of the reformers. The solution of all religious problems was, he thought, plain and easy; the Bible must be interpreted by the light of reason, and the result must be accepted without qualification. The idea of the universal Catholic Church and the tradition and experience of the Christian centuries made no appeal to him. Despite his fondness for the classics, he was devoid of the historic sense. He was a man of strong passions which had led him by his own admission into grave errors; he was cheerful in temperament, an admirable speaker, and an exceedingly winning personality. The movement soon took a strong "puritan" character, and tore down statues and pictures and broke organs; but this did not represent the wishes of Zwingli himself; he loved beautiful things and was fond of music; and he used his influence to check the senseless attack on beautiful objects.

Opposition
to
mercenary
service

He had visited Italy as chaplain to the Italian soldiers who were serving the Pope, and he had been present at the battle of Marignano. He had as a result conceived the strongest hatred of the system of mercenary service, and never wavered in his denunciations of it. His opposition to it was moral rather than political; the life that the Swiss soldiers lived on their foreign campaigns, and the money that they brought back with them, were, he thought, a terribly demoralizing influence, tending to the destruction of the simple life of the Swiss peasant. In December 1518 he was made "people's priest" in the Great Minster at Zurich, and with that appointment his historic importance begins. In 1519 a seller of Indulgences came to Zurich and was denounced by Zwingli; but the affair had none of the importance which belonged to Tetzels visit to Germany. The Papal agent was withdrawn by the Pope himself, and there was no breach with Rome. The moderation and almost timid conciliatoriness of the Papal policy in regard to the Swiss movement are indeed noticeable throughout. Zwingli went on with his preaching and moved slowly into a more definite opposition to Roman practice and belief. He attacked the payment of tithes and the practice of fasting; he claimed the absolute liberty to

Protestant-
ism in
Zurich

preach all that had the warrant of the Bible; he defended clerical marriages, and in 1524 himself married. By 1522, without any revolutionary or dramatic crisis, a movement markedly Protestant in character had been established in Zurich.

It is characteristic of the democratic character of Switzer-^{Zwingli's}land that the great stages in the development of the Reforma-^{articles}tion are marked by public disputations. The first of these was held in Zurich in January 1523. It was summoned by the municipal head of Zurich, and all priests and public officials were invited. Zwingli laid before it sixty-seven articles. These are a striking contrast to the ninety-five theses by which Luther opened the great struggle in Germany. There is nothing obscure or scholastic about Zwingli's articles. Even the twentieth century finds no difficulty in understanding the points at issue. Christ is the only ruler of the Church; the Gospel is the only foundation of doctrine; the approval of the Church and the inventions of men go for nothing. As to the relations between Church and State he speaks clearly, though without realizing—as no one then realized—all the difficulties which were to flow from his principles. Christ had supported the public magistracy by word and act. The jurisdiction and administration hitherto exercised by the clergy belong of right to the secular magistrate “provided he is Christian.” All Christians should obey the public magistrates “provided they order nothing against God.” Nothing is definitely said in the articles as to the form of Church government. Episcopacy is by implication condemned; presbyters and priests must preach the Word of God. There was some opposition to Zwingli in the Disputation, but he was declared to have gained the victory and the Protestant Reformation was established in Zurich.

The changes were carried out by order of the Town Council ^{Changes at Zurich} in which Zwingli had a predominating influence. The municipal government had always been a narrow one, but Zwingli later on established a still narrower form of government by introducing the Secret Council or “Privy Six” through which he worked for the great political and religious ends which occupied his later years. Within the canton of Zurich the churches were “purged”; pictures and music were banished

from them ; the monasteries were dissolved ; the sermon was substituted for the celebration of Mass as the central act of worship. Social institutions were introduced at the same time. The cathedral chapter was turned into a college ; lectures on Biblical subjects were instituted ; measures for the relief of the poor were established. The Reformation at Zurich under Zwingli has some resemblance to that of Scotland under John Knox.

Opposition
to Zwingli

But soon difficulties and even dangers began to show on the horizon. Zwingli found, as Luther had found, that the truth so plain to himself was not so evident to all. The Bible admitted of more than one interpretation. Erasmus, the hero of Zwingli's earlier years, liked Zwingli's doctrine no better than Luther's. Ulrich von Hutten had fled from Germany to Basel. Repulsed by Erasmus there, he had come to Zurich and had been welcomed by Zwingli. There soon rose up coolness and antagonism. In Switzerland, as elsewhere, the classical humanists were unwilling to ally themselves with the Protestants. Zwingli was attacked, too, from the opposite side. Anabaptism everywhere hung on the skirts of Protestantism in German lands and the movement was very strong in Zurich. A cobbler named Hottinger was the first to preach the new doctrine. Later, Münzer and Carlstadt, so well known in Germany and so troublesome to Luther, arrived in Zurich. They refused the form of service established by Zwingli, and they established religious communities of their own in town and country. It was in vain that the method of disputation was tried ; they rejected the authority of pastors and of magistrates and called Zwingli a false prophet ; they declared that the destruction of Zurich was at hand. The city authorities decreed that any one who rebaptized another (and the practice of rebaptism was the most obvious characteristic of the new sectaries) should be drowned "without mercy." Some were actually drowned, but their separate congregations persisted, and were a continual trouble to the Zwinglian Church.

The
Confeder-
ation

We have been speaking hitherto only of the canton of Zurich. But Zurich was a part of the Swiss Confederation, and the religious movement would sooner or later have to settle its relations with the larger body. The Diet as a whole

was not sympathetic, and in 1523, in a meeting at Baden, had threatened all innovators with punishment. Fortunately for Zwingli the Swiss Diet was as weak as the German, and at no time interfered with effect in the controversy. It was the cantons in Switzerland, as it was the individual powers in Germany, with whom the decision rested.

The ideas of Zwingli gained ground in many directions. He found valuable collaborators in Oecolampadius (a Greek form of the German name Hausschein) and Bullinger, his son-in-law. The new movement was preached with missionary enthusiasm; and popular debates in churches—the prophesyings—were influential in spreading knowledge and interest in the movement. Bern adopted the Reformation in 1528 (and destroyed the organ in the cathedral). Basel, after much hesitation, came in in 1529, and Erasmus had to find a new asylum for his studies. The Reformers, it is true, did not have matters all their own way. In a great disputation held at Fribourg in 1526, at which Zwingli did not think it safe to be present, the Romanists under the leadership of Eck and Faber gained an overwhelming vote in their own favour. A subsequent disputation at Bern and the adhesion of this city to the cause of the Reformation were, however, soon to remove the effect of this check. The tide seemed to be flowing strongly in favour of the Protestants.

It was all the more necessary for such cantons as still held by the old ways to think of defence. The parallel between the course of events in Germany as a whole and in Switzerland, which was still nominally a part of Germany, was close. In both the absence of any real central Government led to the formation of Leagues for the protection or advancement of the rival confessions; in both countries the Leagues sought foreign assistance; in both the fighting was both slight and decisive. The Zwinglians first formed a League called “The Christian Civic League”; Zurich, Bern, and Constance were the first members, though Constance was an Imperial city and not a member of the Swiss Confederation; the adhesion of other cantons soon followed. The Catholic cantons answered by forming “The Christian Union.” Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, and Zug, the earliest members of the Confederation to establish their independence, joined

with Lucerne and entered into an understanding with Austria, who naturally accepted a proposal which seemed to open up a chance of regaining what had for so long been lost to the Austrian House. A condition of war was actually set up in 1529, but was ended by an indecisive peace.

Union with
Lutherans
fails

Zwingli had no doubt that war must come and was anxious to strike at the most opportune moment. He had great plans in his head. The Lutheran Princes of Germany were drawing together for common action. Philip of Hesse was dreaming of a great offensive against the Roman and Imperial power. Union with the Swiss Protestants would be an immense gain. As they had the same enemies, co-operation seemed possible. But as the union was to rest on a religious basis there must be alliance between the Churches as well as between the Governments. Luther and Zwingli must be reconciled; for the sixteenth century did not understand religious compromise and mutual toleration. So came the Conference at Marburg (1529), which has been dealt with in another chapter. The two leaders were thoroughly antipathetic. When Luther said, "You have a different spirit from ours," it applied not only to the Swiss theology, but to the character of the Swiss leader as well. When Luther chalked *Hoc Est Corpus Meum* on the table and the effort at conciliation broke down, not only was the union of two Churches prevented, but a great political and military scheme was ruined. The Swiss and German Protestants had to face their difficulties alone.

The common
bailiwicks

War in Switzerland came from an important but obscure conflict. The Confederation consisted, not only of the Thirteen Cantons, but also of "common bailiwicks" and allied lands, which were ruled in a most complicated fashion by a number of different cantons. The Catholic and the Protestant cantons naturally used their influence to advance the interests of their respective confessions. The actual outbreak came from events connected with the lands of the Abbey of Saint Gall, one of the most famous of the monastic establishments of Switzerland. Zurich, Lucerne, Schwyz, and Glarus were jointly responsible for the "protection" of these lands, and each in turn appointed a captain-general for two years. When Zurich's turn came to appoint, a zealous Protestant was sent to inaugurate a decisively Protestant

policy. He refused to recognize the recently appointed abbot ; he suppressed the monastery, liberated the serfs and destroyed all traces of the old feudal relationships. A new and free community was set up, and Zurich joined with Glarus in a promise to protect the new state of things. It was a direct challenge to the constitutional rights of the other protecting powers and concerned an important territory. The relations between the Confessions were already strained almost to breaking-point ; and now open war came.

The collapse of the Protestant forces in the war that now came is very striking ; it is like the collapse of the Protestants in Germany after the battle of Mühlberg, but there came to the Zwinglians no recovery. And yet all the chances seemed on their side. They had wealth and numbers, and their population was not less military than that of the cantons of the Christian Union. The Union had a strong and central position, but economic pressure could easily be brought to bear upon its members. Not only did the Zwinglians fail, but they accepted their failure with surprising tameness. The fact seems to be that the first Protestant enthusiasm had passed. The personal influence of Zwingli was declining. The action of the " Privy Six " had irritated a good deal of opposition on political grounds. The Swiss, moreover, despite all their talent for battle, rarely showed an understanding for the conduct of a campaign. On the side of Zurich there was no general in real command. Zwingli went with the armies and was the chief influence, but his advice was not always accepted. The commander of the Zurich troops was said afterwards to be at most lukewarm in his adhesion to the Protestant movement.

The troops of the Christian Union, 8000 strong, marched on Zurich and came in touch with the enemy near Kappel. The leadership of the Catholics was not better than that of their opponents. The battle came on through the independent action of one of the Catholic captains. The men of Zurich were completely defeated. Twenty-five pastors were among the killed, and Zwingli was of the number. The body of the great heretic was quartered and burnt, and the ashes scattered. The first result of the battle was to stimulate Protestant activity. More Protestant cantons came to the help of

Defeat
of the
Zwinglians

Battle and
Treaty of
Kappel
(1531)

Zurich, and the Protestant army amounted to 24,000 men. Yet this large army was not so much defeated as cowed by the surprise of a handful of the men of the Catholic cantons at Gubel, midway between lakes Zurich and Zug. The defeat was in itself a trifling affair, and might easily have been wiped out by a little persistence. But no such quality was to be found among the Zwinglians. The League fell to pieces; Zurich itself was threatened; and the Protestant cantons made the Peace of Kappel. This Peace is the Swiss counterpart of the German Peace of Augsburg, which it precedes by a quarter of a century. It proclaims the master principle of the century, that control of religion should go with political power—*cujus regio ejus religio*—which is indeed not so much a principle as a recognition of facts. Each canton was to decide its religion, and in the “common bailiwicks” and allied states each community was to decide. The defeat of the Zurichers was shown by the stipulation that the Civic Alliance was to be abolished, and by the allusion to the faith of the Five Cantons as “the true, undoubted Christian faith.” The Reformers paid the cost of the war; the abbot of Saint Gall was restored to his territories.

The Catholic reaction gained further successes after this, but the Emperor was in no position to give them decisive help, and Protestantism was by no means crushed out. A fatal blow had been struck against the ambitions of the Confederation to play a great part in European politics. It was not until the nineteenth century that it won real political unity. But the importance of the Swiss lands was by no means at an end with the Peace of Kappel. Geneva took up the work of Zurich. Calvin won the position in Europe that Zwingli had failed to gain. And to the work of Calvin and Geneva we must now turn.

3. GENEVA AND CALVIN

Condition
of western
Switzerland

The west and south-west of modern Switzerland presented at the beginning of the sixteenth century a strange political tangle. The Helvetic Confederation had not annexed the territories; but it, or rather some of its members, regarded the influence of any other power there with suspicion and

dislike. The Duke of Savoy held an important power in his mountain fastnesses, and cast longing eyes on Swiss lands as well as on those of France and Italy. The relations between France and the Helvetic Confederation—always intimate though sometimes hostile—were specially difficult just here. Moreover, Spain in Franche Comté, where she was the inheritor of the Burgundian power which the Swiss had helped to overthrow, and the Habsburg and Imperial power, the traditional enemy of the Swiss, had claims or ambitions in these lands. Nowhere was there unity or clear sovereignty; one authority was opposed to or sometimes superimposed on another in the most bewildering manner.

We need only concern ourselves with the Lake of Geneva. Geneva There, the northern side, what is now the Canton de Vaud, was in the hands of the Duke of Savoy. But Lausanne, lying on the lake itself, was an ecclesiastical state in the hands of its Bishop. The southern shore was also Savoyard territory. Then in the extreme south-west of the lake came the city of Geneva, a vigorous and prosperous commercial community, containing, it is reckoned, not more than 13,000 inhabitants, though some twenty villages, which belonged to the city, are not included in this total. There is no more surprising feature of the sixteenth century than the European importance, which was suddenly assumed by this little city, and the way in which it maintained its independence in face of powerful neighbours, who coveted its lands and hated the form of religion established in it.

Three rival powers held authority in Geneva. There was, Rivals for
power in
Geneva firstly, the Bishop of Geneva, who exercised temporal as well as ecclesiastical power. Next, there was the popular municipal government which had risen up, as so often happened, first under the protection of, and then in opposition to, the power of the Bishop. There was a popular assembly, which all burghers had the right to attend, and two Councils of which we shall see more later. Over both Bishop and people the Duke of Savoy had asserted his actual power. The Bishopric had come to be almost the possession of the House of Savoy. The territories or possessions of Savoy stretched north and east of the city, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century it practically belonged to Savoy. The

Geneva and
her allies

first quarter of the century is filled with the struggles of the "patriots" to establish their liberties against the combined powers of Duke and Bishop. Three names stand out among them: Berthelier; Bonivard, Abbot of a neighbouring religious house; and Bezanson Hugues. But these men, courageous and capable though they were, could not have resisted their opponents by themselves. Their help came from the Swiss cantons to the East; the Duke of Savoy shrank from a conflict with the renowned soldiers of the Confederation. The Genevese allied themselves first with their nearest neighbour, Freiburg, whose territories nearly touched the Lake of Geneva on its north-east shore; but Freiburg remained Catholic, when the religious contests began, and the connection between Geneva and Protestant Bern was closer and more profitable. This alliance was completed in 1526.¹ The Confederation was not willing to accept the responsibility of admitting Geneva into their body, so that the city was defended by the individual cantons of Bern and Freiburg.

Geneva
wins her
freedom

1526 marks the beginning of free and independent Geneva. The Bishop resigned his authority into the hands of the citizens in the next year, but the Duke of Savoy was not so easily disposed of. He attacked the city and blockaded its trade routes. But he was defeated by the soldiers of Freiburg and Bern, and forced by the mediation of the other cantons to renounce his designs upon Geneva.

The influence
of Bern and
of Farel

The contest had so far been conducted for political objects and by purely secular means. But religion entered into every conflict in the sixteenth century, and it was not long in appearing in Geneva. Since the death of Zwingli and the defeat of the Reformers at Kappel, Bern was the leading Protestant canton. And Bern was anxious to extend Protestantism in western Switzerland for both religious and political motives; for the extension of Protestantism would

¹ The origin of the famous word Huguenot has been found in this alliance, for the allies were called in Swiss-German Eydgenots. It is suggested, too, that the name of Hugues, who did much to bring about the alliance, may have contributed something to the currency of the word. French etymologists are inclined to repudiate this idea, and to find the origin in a local usage of Tours, where the word Hugues was used for a "bogey." It is not impossible that something may have been contributed from both sources.

mean the extension of her own influence. An ideal agent for the work was found in the Frenchman, Farel. (French, and not German, was the tongue usually spoken in western Switzerland.) He was French by birth and training, and in France had espoused Lutheran ideas, but had later transferred his advocacy to those of Zwingli. He was an exuberant, irrepressible, violent speaker, unsparing in his denunciation of what he called the superstition and idolatry of his opponents. He had come to Geneva in 1532, but had not at first gained any great success. The favour shown to him, however, induced Fribourg to withdraw from her alliance with Geneva. Bern supported him all the more heartily. In 1535 Protestantism gained a definite victory in Geneva. There had already been much image breaking and spoiling of the churches. Farel demanded that all images should be removed and the celebration of mass forbidden. A disputation was suggested in the true Swiss manner, but no Catholic champions were forthcoming. A Protestant faith was thereupon established, and war against Savoy followed. Bern invaded and conquered the Vaud; King Francis saw his advantage in an attack on the Duke of Savoy. The Duke could not struggle against such forces and accepted peace. Thus Geneva made good her independence. Her struggle had been fought out under the inspiration of the Protestant faith, and inevitably the hold of Protestantism had been strengthened by the political victory. Calvin had not yet arrived, but already the city had some of the characteristics which are associated with his name. The people had been called by sound of trumpet into the General Assembly, which was falling into disuse and now rarely summoned, and there they passed a resolution "to live according to the Gospel and the Word of God, as has been used since the abolition of the Mass and as is now preached among us." A rigorous censorship of doctrine and manners had been set up. Schools were opened at which attendance was compulsory. But there was not much in all this to distinguish Geneva from Zurich. There was no sign as yet that Geneva was to become the headquarters of Protestantism in its struggle against Rome, and was almost to balance Rome in European importance for a century. The European importance of Geneva begins with the arrival of Calvin in 1536.

Protestant-
ism es-
tablished
in Geneva

Calvin to
Geneva

Calvin was then twenty-six years of age. He was born at Noyon in Picardy, and had studied in Paris and in Orleans. It was at first intended that he should take Orders in the Church; but then he turned at Orleans to the study of Roman law, and at Orleans he adopted Lutheran opinions from German students studying there. It has often been noted that there is not, in the case of Calvin, anything of the long painful struggle which marks the conversion of Luther. His was a severely intellectual nature, and he followed at once what seemed to him the dictates of reason. "As if by a sudden ray of light I recognized into what an abyss of errors I had hitherto been plunged. Now therefore, O Lord, I did what was my duty, and fearlessly I followed in Thy footsteps." He fled before the persecution of Francis I in 1534, and found an asylum first in Strasburg and then in Basel. It was now that he published the first draft of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. His connection with Geneva seemed accidental. He was passing through the town on his road to Basel. Farel, hearing of his presence, visited him and adjured him to join him in the work of evangelizing the place. It was not without difficulty that he gained his consent.

Character
of Calvin

Calvin's character is in its main features unmistakable; there is no room for the violent differences of judgment that we have noted concerning Luther. Reason and will make up most of Calvin. He gained the passionate support of both men and women, but the affections played a subordinate part in his life. He was in truth so sure that he was serving God, and that he had discovered His will in the Bible, that this conviction and this vision left no room for other interests. He had a profound influence on the legislation of Geneva; his scheme of Church government has been largely followed in two continents; from his work at Geneva flowed one of the strongest currents which formed later the modern ideas of liberty and democracy. But to him—and with modifications the same is true of all the religious leaders of the time—these things were secondary. The all-important thing was "the maintaining of God's glory unimpaired and the preservation of the honour of divine truth."

Calvin's
victory

Calvin had weak health, but he never faltered in his task.

He was a first-rate classical scholar and an admirable writer in both French and Latin. The lucidity of his style, the logical cogency of his arguments, above all the passionate conviction which inspired all that he wrote or said, made him irresistible both as a speaker and as a writer. He had to fight hard—a spiritual fight—against opposition in Geneva, but he won in the end and established a power over the thoughts of men, which finds some parallels in the work of both Mahomet and Ignatius Loyola. We will mark the chief events of his life after his arrival in Geneva, before analysing his ecclesiastical system.

After two years' work in Geneva Calvin and Farel were expelled, and their work there seemed at an end. It is not Calvin's expulsion but his return that needs explanation. For Calvin and Farel had come into conflict with two forces which were very strong at Geneva. First, there was the policy of the "patriots." They had expelled the Bishop and had defeated the Duke of Savoy. By their victory they had won their liberty, and they desired to enjoy it. Their Protestantism was loose and negative; it meant the rejection of Roman control, not the adoption of another and a stricter form of regulation of life. And next there was the influence of Bern, which had contributed so decisively to the emancipation of Geneva and desired to maintain some control over the city. With this aim the Bernese desired to see maintained in Geneva their own loose and Zwinglian form of Protestantism. Calvin demanded a wholly independent Church system, and the strict discipline of the life of all citizens. The evangelical orthodoxy of all inhabitants was by him assumed and insisted on; an inquisition into the life of all citizens was organized. "In every quarter of the city persons of good life and reputation and a constancy not easy to corrupt" were to have an eye on every one and report any notable vice to a minister, who would proceed against the offender by excommunication. At the same time Calvin and Farel were developing a new form of Church government, a new liturgy, and especially a form of communion service which conflicted with the forms and ideas held in Bern.

The crisis came with the elections of February 1538.

Municipal government at Geneva was usually kept in the hands of the two Councils—the Council of 200 and the Little (or Ordinary) Council of Twenty-Five—and the vacancies in these Councils were filled by co-option. But there were certain magistrates who were elected by the citizens in their General Assembly; and now in 1538 men came from this source into the Councils pledged to resist the ideas of Calvin and to support those of Bern. The decisive issue arose out of the system of excommunication on which Calvin insisted as essential. In January 1538 he desired to exclude from the first communion of the year certain men who were “out of harmony with the company of the faithful.”¹ The Council ordered the preachers to admit these men to the communion, and further, “to live in the Word of God according to the ordinances of the Lords of Berne (*Messieurs de Berne*).” Calvin and Farel refused all attempts at conciliation or compromise, and in April 1538 they were banished. “If we had served men,” they answered to the injunction, “we should think ourselves badly paid; but we serve a great Master and He will pay us.”

Recall of
the exiles

Calvin retired to Frankfort, where he ministered to a French congregation and influenced the theological controversies of Germany and England. Meanwhile things were not going well in Geneva. The discipline that Calvin insisted on had been intended solely for spiritual ends, but its removal weakened and divided the city in face of its temporal enemies. A revival of the Roman party—driven underground but not annihilated in Geneva—seemed possible; Bern was again exercising more influence in the affairs of the city than seemed to harmonize with her hardly won independence. There was even a fierce faction fight in Geneva itself. The result was that the friends of the exiled preachers gained the upper hand, and Calvin and Farel were recalled. The Little, Great, and General Councils joined in a very humble letter in which Calvin was “affectionately” invited to return, and was told that he would have every reason to be satisfied with his treatment. He had no desire to return. He spoke of Geneva

¹ “Gens dissonens à l’union des fidelles et y semans division.” Kidd’s *Documents of the Continental Reformation*, no. 200. The volume is of especial value for the Reformation in Geneva.

as "that place of torment." But he believed that it was the will of his "Great Master." "Therefore I submit my mind bound and fettered to obedience to God."¹ Calvin returned in 1541, and reigned in Geneva until his death in May 1564. So powerful was his influence on the Protestant movement in general, and so close was Geneva to the Catholic states of France and Savoy and to the Catholic part of Germany, not to mention the Catholic cantons of Switzerland itself, that it is amazing that the constant suggestions of an attack on Geneva in the interest of the religious reaction were never realized. And here again the mutual rivalries and suspicions of France and Spain were a decisive influence.

Calvin had his enemies inside as well as outside of Geneva. There was a strong party which still resented the Calvinist Inquisition and control, and against this party Calvin and his supporters fought implacably. Thus Gruet, who had attacked Calvin and had been Secretary of State, was executed in 1547 as an atheist and traitor. Perrin had supported Calvin's recall, but he represented a party that desired more individual liberty than was allowed in Geneva. He and many of his followers had to flee from the city; four of those who remained were tortured and executed. The fate of Servetus has attracted more attention than all these. He was a Spaniard of highly original ideas on medicine—in which he anticipated Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood—and in religion—in which he attacked the doctrine of the Trinity, but did not deny the divinity of Christ. He had left Spain and practised as a doctor in France under an assumed name. Calvin had had letters from him, and regarded him and his ideas with abhorrence. Servetus came to Geneva and hoped for a disputation with Calvin. But Calvin had already declared him worthy of death for his heresies. He was supported in Geneva by the Perrinist party, but on his arrival was arrested, tried by the civic authorities, and on their sentence and with the approval of the other Swiss Churches, burnt in October 1553. Even after the death of Servetus, Calvin had to fight hard against political and religious

¹ "Ergo animum meum vinctum et constrictum subigo in obedientiam Dei." All Calvin is in that sentence; which, as has been pointed out, might easily be mistaken for an utterance of Saint Ignatius.

opposition. His position was secured largely by accepting as citizens of Geneva considerable numbers of foreign exiles, whose devotion to himself was unquestionable.

The Calvinist system

The Calvinist system in Geneva, to which we must now turn, assumed that all citizens were orthodox members of the Church. All were called on to accept the confession of faith, and, in Calvin's phrase, to enrol themselves under the banner of Christ. The question therefore of religious toleration did not technically arise in Geneva.

The Church self-governed

The Church was to be independent and self-controlled. It was for the Church alone to determine its government, its liturgy, and its moral code and discipline. There were four Orders in the Church: pastors for the cure of souls and for preaching; doctors for the interpretation of Scripture; elders for moral discipline; deacons for the care of the poor. Laymen, equally with clergy, were admitted into the government of the Church, for the elders and the deacons were not in ecclesiastical Orders.

Discipline

It was, perhaps, the most distinctive characteristic of Calvinism that a strict rule of life was insisted on. When Calvin returned to Geneva it was his chief contention "that no Church could exist unless a fixed rule of life were established, such as is made known to us by the Word of God." Attendance on the sermon, which was the great feature of the Calvinist form of worship, was obligatory.¹ No utterance of heretical opinion was allowed. Private vice was sought into and punished. And not only vice; the dress of citizens, male and female, the method of dressing the hair, the dishes served on ordinary days and on festivals, the jokes in the streets, the character of private entertainments—all were enquired into, and what seemed wrong was censured and punished.

The Consistory

The authority that enforced this discipline was the Consistory. Its composition was remarkable, for it was a preponderantly lay body; there were in it twelve members of the Council who were, of course, laymen, and only six clergy. They used as methods of repression, Church penance, public

¹ There were seventeen official sermons in the week, five on Sunday, two on each week day; "so arranged that it might be possible for a man to attend all of them."

confession, and exclusion from communion. An offender would also in case of necessity be handed over to the secular authorities for trial, and for punishment, if he were found guilty.

Such was the Genevan Utopia—one of the strictest ^{The work} theocracies known to history. It was that part of it ^{of Geneva} which is most out of harmony with modern life which was most attractive to contemporaries. Some thought it even then an intolerable tyranny; but more found in it a clear road to the knowledge of God, an unmatched discipline for the struggle against the enemies of the faith, a source of joy greater than that afforded by the pleasures of the world. The cruelties of the Genevan system can be paralleled in all the religious movements of the century; what was peculiar to it was its clearness of aim, its concentration of purpose, the devotion of its followers and the steel-like temper of those who had undergone its discipline. Geneva seemed, until the end of the century, to balance Rome; and the disciples of Calvin are the counterpart of the Jesuits. In spiritual as in temporal warfare, the fiercest enemies are apt to use the same weapons and to grow into a sort of likeness to one another. Not only was Geneva the most dangerous enemy of Rome; the Genevan system had some strong resemblances to the Roman system. It was equally dogmatic; it was equally opposed to all freedom of thought and interpretation; it held that wrong opinion might in extreme cases be punished by death; and though it abolished all monasteries and convents it imposed a rule as strict as that of Saint Benedict, and imposed it not merely on those who desired to accept it but on all citizens both men and women.

The relation of Calvinism to the growth of liberty in Europe is considered in the last chapter of this book. Its services to liberty, like every other characteristic of Calvinism, spring from the passionate conviction with which it was held. Where Calvinism was triumphant, as in Geneva and later in Scotland and the Netherlands, it was in politics rather a repressive than a liberating force; but in countries where the Government was lukewarm or hostile, it inevitably drifted into opposition and antagonism. The liberty that its supporters desired was liberty to impose the Calvinist system;

but, without desiring it, they opened the gates to many other kinds of liberty. "Political liberty was the child of the Reformation, though not of the Reformers."

4. PROTESTANTISM IN FRANCE

**The French
monarchy
and Pro-
testantism**

France came to hold a middle position in the religious controversies of the century. By the Edict of Nantes (1598) she, alone among the states of Europe, gave permission to religious dissidents to worship within her boundaries and admitted them to equal civil rights with the rest of her citizens. This result was only reached after a long struggle, which was marked by great bitterness on both sides and many scenes of odious cruelty. But at first there seemed a chance that France might spontaneously adopt a freer and more humane attitude to religious controversy. The Gallican Church was, as we have seen, curiously independent and suspicious of Rome; it was her habit "to kiss the Pope's feet but to bind his hands." Nowhere had the enthusiasm for the reform of the Church through the means of Councils been stronger than in France; and, until Francis I's Concordat with the Pope in 1516, the clergy were largely independent of both Pope and King. The possibility of some reform of the Church on French soil was much increased by the attitude of the Royal family in the reign of Francis I. The King's weakness of character and intellect is as plain in the religious history of the reign as in its political and international history. But he liked to pose as a patron of the new learning, and was genuinely interested in some of the writings of the time. His sister, Margaret of Angoulême—who married, as her second husband, the King of Navarre—and thus became the grandmother of Henry of Navarre, was a real enthusiast for the new tendencies in religion, and did all she could to promote their spread and to protect their preachers. Renée, the sister of Francis' first wife, went even further in the direction of Protestantism. She was married to the Duke of Ferrara, and suffered for her advocacy of Protestantism.

**Renaissance
and reform
in France**

The environment was thus favourable to liberal ideas in religion, and they appeared even before Luther had issued his more famous challenge. The relation between the in-

tellectual and artistic movements of the time, which are conveniently summed up as "the Renaissance" and the religious Reformation, has been much debated. In France at least they were closely allied. Lefèvre d'Étaples, the first preacher of the new doctrines, was a distinguished scholar and a teacher of mathematics and physics. He had passed his fiftieth year when he turned to the study of the sacred texts in the original languages. He published translations of both the Old and the New Testaments, as well as commentaries on the Epistles of Saint Paul. He preached doctrines nearly identical with those of Luther; the comparative inefficacy of good works, and justification by faith. Lefèvre won the friendship and warm patronage of the King and his sister, Margaret; his influence, too, penetrated into the Church itself through the sympathy of Briçonnet, Bishop of Meaux. Lefèvre's friends were invited to preach there; the Gospel was read in French; many traditional ceremonies were tacitly dropped; the style of the preaching was what would be called later evangelical. Protestantism at this time did not, of course, exist, and it seemed that France might, with the King's support, show the way to a more liberal Catholicism.

This condition of things lasted from the battle of Marignano to the battle of Pavia, that is from 1515 to 1525. The King seemed triumphant and confident, and perhaps ready to lead Europe in religion as well as in war. But all altered with the battle of Pavia. The King went as a prisoner to Spain. In his absence the Parlement and the Queen Regent instituted a system of repression. It is important to notice the form taken by this repression. The direct action of the Roman authorities was not admitted in France; the secular authorities were jealous of the action of the Bishops and clergy; but the conviction was all but universal that heretical opinions must be stamped out. The chief agents in the work were: first, the Sorbonne, that is the theological faculty of the University of Paris whose authority on matters of orthodoxy stood naturally high; and second, the Parlements and especially the Parlement of Paris, which was extremely Gallican, jealous of Rome and of the clergy in France, but eager to maintain by its own authority and tribunals the

Change after
the battle of
Pavia

unity of the faith on which the unity of the realm was believed to rest. The Bishop of Meaux, who had hardly seen where his action was likely to lead him, withdrew with abject humiliation from the course on which he had entered. There were several burnings, not by order of any religious tribunal, but of the Parlement of Paris. Lefèvre fled into Germany. Another great scholar fared worse. Louis de Berquin was a friend of Erasmus, and seems to have adopted the religious opinions of Lefèvre. Parlement pursued him with special hostility. He was arrested while the King was in Spain, and was saved by his return and by the warm favour of Margaret of Navarre. But the King had no stability of opinion or character; he was alarmed and shocked by attacks on images. Berquin was arrested again, tried, condemned, and executed in great haste; in order to avoid, says a contemporary, the possible interference of the Queen Margaret.

Persecution
at the
end of
Francis I's
reign

There were many fluctuations in the King's policy after this; fluctuations which were in part dictated by the foreign relations of France, at one time with the German Protestants, and at another with the Pope. In October 1534 the King was driven to an almost insane fury by certain placards which had been affixed in Paris and elsewhere, violently attacking "the horrible abuses of the Papal Mass." He joined in a religious procession to the places where heretics were burnt; offered large rewards to those who informed against heretics and suppressed the printing press in Paris. The last years of his reign saw measures of even greater violence. The worst of all was the massacre of the Vaudois in Provence. These men stood in no relation to the Protestant movement; their faith and form of worship dated back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Earlier efforts at their extermination had been defeated by the humane action of Bishop Sadolet. In 1540 the Parlement of Aix passed a decree against the town of Merindol; but it was not until 1545 that it could be carried out. Then at last the King gave the necessary instructions, and the Baron d'Oppède, first President of the Parlement of Aix, took the matter in hand. Twenty-two villages were destroyed; 3000 people massacred; 250 put to death by form of law. The annals of religious persecution have no more terrible chapter; not

even in Germany or the Netherlands or Ireland. And the persecution raged against scholars as well as against peasants. Etienne Dolet, a great humanist hitherto protected by the King, was condemned as an "atheist" on the strength of an introduction to an edition of *Plato*. The Liberal movement was still strong at Meaux, and the last act of the reign was the burning of some thirteen persons accused of heretical opinions and practices there. The "King of the Renaissance" ended as a bitter persecutor.

It would not be true to say that the Protestant movement in France down to the death of Francis I was Lutheran in character. It was much influenced by Luther, but it was in its origins French, and it had throughout a distinctive national character. But from that time the influence of Calvinism came to dominate the whole Protestant movement in the country. And naturally so; for Calvin was a Frenchman; he wrote in excellent French, and his doctrines and policy were presented with that clarity and logical completeness which are particularly attractive to the French character. Moreover, the period of toleration was over with the death of Francis I. Henceforth the Protestants of France—the Huguenots as it is convenient to call them though the name had not yet been adopted—had to struggle against almost continual opposition and persecution; they needed the strict intellectual and moral discipline of Calvin to sustain them in that struggle.

The ideas of Calvin had begun to circulate in France before the death of the King. It is not true that Lutheranism never spread outside of Germany, for it mastered the three Scandinavian kingdoms. But it was usually an affair of Governments or of prominent ecclesiastics. States and towns usually came over to Lutheranism *en masse*. The adherents of Calvinism were usually won more quietly, and the convictions penetrated the individual conscience. Books made their way from Geneva or were written in France in sympathy with Genevan ideas; itinerant preachers passed through the country and taught the truth, as Calvin saw it, to whatever groups they could find to receive their message. The first converts were men of humble birth; artisans for the most part, rarely peasants. Priests and members of the regular

Orders sometimes came over to the new faith, but in nothing like the numbers that we have noted in Germany. Later, the groups formed themselves into definite churches; ministers were appointed in consultation with Geneva. A national Protestant Church was founded, and everywhere the personal influence of Calvin was great and decisive.

Local distribution of Protestantism in France

The spread of Calvinism in France was secret and cannot always be followed. The conversions must have been genuinely religious, for social and political influences were for the most part hostile to it. French Calvinism did not encourage social revolt, and, though in its later stages French Protestantism was sometimes made the cloak for aristocratic movements against the Royal power, this was a later development. The nobles took advantage of a movement already strong; it was not their favour that made it strong. The contagious enthusiasm of the Calvinists is shown in the many stories of martyrdom which are preserved in the record of Crispin. The local distribution of Calvinism is not easily explained. It was widespread throughout France, but it was strongest in the south and the west. There was a strong group of Protestants in Paris, and Charenton, the suburb in which the Protestants were most to be found, was known as the Geneva of France. There were Protestant groups in Normandy; the valley of the Loire had many centres. Orleans was at first one of the strongest homes of the faith, and it was at Tours that the word Huguenot was probably first used. La Rochelle was from the first a strong Huguenot centre, and the movement spread round both banks of the Garonne. In the south-east Provence was specially favourable, and there the neighbourhood of the Vaudois probably counted for something.

Organization of the Huguenots

The Genevan type was everywhere followed. Each church had its ministers, doctors, elders, and deacons. The discipline was adopted as far as the very different local circumstances allowed, and the Puritan type in all its strength and weakness was developed in France before it was known in England. The memoirs of the time show how repugnant the regulations as to dress were to some of the noble converts. The Consistory was the chief body in each church, only inevitably it was somewhat different from what it had been

at Geneva. There it was a joint organ of the Church and the municipal state. In France the state was hostile and could not be drawn into association with the Protestant Church. But the Consistory was always valuable as associating laymen with ministers in the government of the Church. In 1559 a synod of all the reformed churches was called to Paris, and it is said that seventy-two churches were represented. A Confession of Faith was drawn up, which followed very closely the documents of Geneva. The Huguenots spoke with respect of established Governments; they declared that it was the duty of all to pay taxes and to obey the laws. But in the sixteenth century such a gathering of churches, self-governed, and hostile to the Established Church, and the faith of the King, was in the highest degree alarming to the Government. There was another feature of the movement which added to the alarm which it created. The Huguenots were no longer merely artisans, ex-priests, with some lawyers and a few of the smaller gentry added. The great nobles had begun to take an interest in it. Antony of Bourbon, who had married the Queen of Navarre, was reported to be inclined to the new ideas. The three nephews of Montmorency: Cardinal Odet, D'Andelot, and Coligny, had all embraced Calvinism. The Cardinal was the first to come over, and he has been suspected of ambitious motives in his adhesion. D'Andelot had wavered in his loyalty, but in the end remained Calvinist. It was during his imprisonment after the battle of Saint Quentin that Coligny had openly embraced the Calvinist doctrines, of which he became the most capable and noblest defender.

There had never been any doubt as to the King's religious attitude. He had declared his intention to destroy heresy at the time of his coronation, and he meant it. In 1547 a new chamber was created in the Parlement to deal with the many cases of heresy and was known as the *chambre ardente* from the severity of its sentences.¹ In 1551 there came the important Edict of Chateaubriand. We must note its chief provisions, for it is the fundamental French statute

Religious
persecution

The Edict of
Chateaubriand

¹ It was suppressed in 1549, and, though subsequently revived, was in fact then merged in the Grande Chambre.

against heresy and controlled or influenced all trials down to the end of the century. The preamble speaks of the wide spread of "this contagious plague which has infected even the very children with its venom." The King had at first committed cases of heresy to the Bishops to whom of right they belong, thinking that gentleness might perhaps produce the conversion of the delinquents; but as no improvement is to be seen the cases are transferred to the secular courts, to the Parlements and the Presidial courts (which to a large extent duplicated the functions of the Parlements), though the ecclesiastical courts are still to deal with cases of minor importance.

By these secular courts heretics are to be punished as "seditious schismatics and disturbers of the public unity and quiet," and as rebels. The precise punishment is not laid down, but under these headings death and even torture could be awarded. There was to be no appeal to ecclesiastical courts, unless the accused were himself an ecclesiastic. Eighteen out of the forty-six clauses are concerned with the printing and selling of books; no books forbidden by the Sorbonne are to be sold; great watchfulness is to be exercised against travellers and hawkers from Geneva.

Informers were encouraged to bring charges against heresy in all its forms by the offer of three-quarters of the property of the condemned. Heretics were to be excluded from the service of the state and from all teaching posts. Rigorous watch was to be kept over those who held high office. Luther is not mentioned, but the name of Geneva appears again and again in the Edict. Parlement accepted the Edict gladly, and supported its policy by reference to Roman history according to the fashion of the time. They were very ready to undertake the suppression of the "pseudo Christians," provided the matter were left in their hands and did not strengthen the powers of the ecclesiastics.

King Henry II had some thoughts of introducing the Inquisition itself after the Spanish pattern; but the Parlements were ready to resist to the uttermost, and Henry did not insist. All ambiguity as to the penalty of heresy was removed by a statute which declared that the mercy of the judges was the cause of the spread of heresy, and that hence

forth in all its forms it must be punished with death, and that the judges had no power of moderating the penalty.

The last year of the reign saw a step which but for the death of the King, might have had serious consequences. This King, whose action had saved Protestantism in Germany, was as determined an enemy of heresy in his own kingdom as Philip II himself. He had removed trials for heresy from the Bishops, because they were too mild; he had declared the lay courts incapable of inflicting any penalty less than death; but still he was not satisfied. For heresy or sympathy with heresy was to be found even among the judges of Parlement. The chief of these semi-Protestants was du Bourg, who, when the King visited Parlement, declared that "it was a most serious matter to condemn those who, from the midst of the flames, called upon the name of Jesus Christ." Parlement had been the great agency by which the French monarchy had forced its authority on France, but if it became rebellious on what could he rely? He determined to "purge" Parlement, and ordered the arrest of du Bourg and three others. Du Bourg was executed, and the will of Parlement was broken. The Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis and the marriages arranged by it all seemed to point to resolute action against the Huguenots. The lance of Montgomery, when it struck down Henry II in the tournament, plunged France into frightful confusion and civil wars, but it saved French Protestantism from a great danger.

Henry II
and
du Bourg

5. PROTESTANT MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTH OF EUROPE

Protestantism gained no permanent success south of the Pyrenees and the Alps, but it was not without its adherents there, and in Italy had some particularly interesting features. In Spain there was no Protestant organization nor anything that could be called a Protestant Church, but there were numerous individual adherents. Many considerations help to explain the absence of a strong Protestant movement in Spain. The long struggle against the Moors had made Catholicism a national cause; Spanish Catholicism was, indeed, hardly less nationalistic than German Lutheranism. The monarchy and the Church were both strongly organized,

and the monarchy found in the Church its most valuable ally and instrument. The Inquisition supported equally the Royal and the Papal authority, and it was accepted by public opinion. There was, as we have seen, strong local feeling in Spain, but the opposition of Aragon or Catalonia to Castile never took a religious character. The Protestants of Spain were usually scholars and high ecclesiastics without any great following. The monasteries are said to have been tainted with heresy, but there is no sign of sympathy among the people. The chief names among the Spanish Protestants are the brothers Valdes, who had drawn their views from German mysticism as well as from Luther. Juan Valdes was established in Naples, and became the source from which much of Italian Protestantism was derived. Egidius, Bishop of Tortosa, was a friend of Charles V, but was suspected of heresy of the Lutheran type, and was imprisoned by the Inquisition. There was a Protestantizing group at Valladolid, and the last months of Charles V in Yuste were disturbed by the news that his chaplain and friend, Don Constantino Ponce de la Fuente, was arrested for heresy. He was imprisoned by the Inquisition and died in prison. Some of these figures have much interest, but Lutheranism had no chance of success in the Spanish peninsula.

Italy

It was different in Italy. There, there was no central Government; the individual states were often at war with the Papacy, and all regarded the Papal power as a rival; the evil influence of the Papacy on Italian politics was a commonplace with such men as Machiavelli and Guicciardini; there was widespread incredulity and carelessness about religious matters. Here seemed, then, to exist excellent material for the spread of a Protestant movement. On the other hand, Catholicism had entered into the life and ideas of Italy much more deeply than in Germany or even in France; Italy gained by the prestige and wealth of Rome; the Protestant movement was never built up out of religious levity, but out of an intense if narrow faith; and the action of the states of Italy was overshadowed and controlled by the preponderance of Spain in the peninsula.

Naples and
Valdes

Naples was not prominent in the movement of the Italian Renaissance, but it was in Naples that the movement for

religious reform began, and the initiator of the movement was Juan Valdes, the Spaniard of whom we have already spoken. He introduced into Naples German Protestant books. A book that made a special impression on Italy was *The Benefits of Christ's Death*, by an unknown writer, which approximated to the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith. It was widely read and much admired, but was later so completely suppressed by the Roman Inquisition that for long no copy of it could be found; one was found at last in the middle of the nineteenth century in a Cambridge library. It was from Naples that Ochino and Peter Martyr came, men who had a great influence on Protestant thought beyond the Alps and even in England.

The history of Venice and her independence, political and ^{Ferrara} religious, made her a natural centre for the new ideas; but in the first half of the century the chief cities to embrace or shelter the preachers of Protestantism were Ferrara, Lucca, and Modena. The position taken by Ferrara was entirely due to the influence of Renée, daughter of the French King, Louis XII, who had married the Duke, Ercole d'Este. She was unquestionably Calvinist, and died in the profession of that faith. She invited Calvin himself to Ferrara, and appointed men of Calvinist sympathies to preach and to teach. She had trouble with the Roman authorities and with her husband, and was for a time imprisoned, but Protestantism had no more valuable protector. In the Republic of Lucca Peter Martyr Vermiglio set up a school, and Protestantism gained the upper hand to such an extent that the magistrates ceased to attend church ceremonies and forbade the observance of holy days. In Modena the movement owed much to Ochino, who preached in the cathedral and gained great influence. The position there was very like the beginning of the Reformation in a German state; but Modena was too weak to resist the action of Rome and her supporters.

Italy, too, saw a school of thinkers devoted to Catholicism ^{Roman} and the Roman connection, who nevertheless sought for some ^{liberalism} means of reconciliation with their Protestant opponents. Contarini and Sadoleto were among the foremost, and the Englishman, Cardinal Pole, belonged to this group. They hoped at one time to find in the doctrine of justification by

faith a bridge whereby the two confessions might come together. But these ideas of conciliation were soon swept aside by the rising tide of the Catholic reaction to which we must now turn.

Books for reference :—

V. Switzerland and France :—

Kidd, Ranke, and Pastor as before.

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T. H. Dyer : *The Life of John Calvin*.

Calvin : *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (in English).

H. F. Henderson : *Calvin in his Letters*.

A. Bossert : *Calvin (Grands Écrivains Français)*.

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H. D. Foster : *Essays on Calvin's Rule in Geneva* (in his *Collected Papers*).

Guizot : *Saint Louis and Calvin*.

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Imbart de la Tour ; *Les origines de la Réforme*.

R. C. Christie : *Étienne Dolet, a Biography*.

C. T. Atkinson : *Michel de l'Hospital*.

Christoffel : *Life of Zwingli*.

H. Hauser : *Études sur la Réforme française*.

J. A. Froude : *Short Studies on Great Subjects ; Essays on Calvinism and the Influence of Calvinism on the Scottish character*.

LIST OF POPES DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS VOLUME

1492. Alexander VI (Borgia).

1503. Pius III (Piccolomini).

Julius II (Rovere).

1513. Leo X (Medici).

1522. Adrian VI (Boyers).

1523. Clement VII (Medici).

1534. Paul III (Farnese).

1550. Julius III (Monte).

1555. Marcellus II (Cervini).

Paul IV (Caraffa).

1559. Pius IV (Medici).

1565. Pius V (Ghislieri).

1572. Gregory XIII (Buoncompagni).

1585. Sixtus V (Peretti).

1590. Urban VII (Castagna).

Gregory (XIV) (Sfondrati).

1591. Innocent IX (Facchinetti).

1592. Clement VIII (Aldobandini).

1605. Leo XI (Medici).

Paul IV (Borghese).

CHAPTER X

THE COUNTER-REFORMATION; THE COUNCIL OF TRENT; THE JESUITS; THE INQUISITION

THE supreme interest of the sixteenth century is the interplay of spiritual and temporal forces, of politics and religion, of material interests and the passions which spring from belief. The reorganization of the Roman Church, which took place in the middle of the century, is an all-important fact for that and for succeeding centuries.

Men had come to accept the unity of the Church and the faith of western Christendom as a matter of course. The falling away of the eastern orthodox Church did not much influence men's imaginations, for little was known of eastern Europe, and the eastern Church was for most of its territory subject to the rule of the Turks. But soon after the Lutheran movement had begun, a great schism in the western Church was seen to be probable. The ideal of a Catholic and universal Church did not play as great a part in the controversies of the time as might perhaps have been expected. Men fought for what they believed to be demonstrable theological truths; the historic sense was weak, and the appeal to the past was rarely heard except in support of doctrine; the social and human side of the Catholic ideal had less weight than it has to-day.

The religious disruption of Europe, however, was viewed with concern from various quarters, and various proposals were made to heal the divisions or prevent them from going further. Before we deal with the development of the Counter-Reformation, which is the chief subject of this chapter, we may note the following chief forms taken by the proposals for the restoration of unity.

Attempts
at con-
ciliation

There was in the first place a proposal, represented especially by Erasmus, to lay less weight on doctrinal differences; to stress only what could be proved from the Bible. "Many problems," he wrote, "are reserved for an Ecumenical Council; but it would be better to postpone them to that further period, when the glass shall be removed and the riddle solved, and we see God face to face." This was the characteristic humanist point of view; it is in essence the view of Montaigne at the end of the century. Both in the Protestant and Catholic camps, some could be found who sympathized with such views to a greater or less extent. Melancthon went further in that direction than seemed possible to Luther. On the Roman side the names of Wizel and Cassander may be mentioned. Wizel in 1564 published a work called *Via Regia*, in which he urged wide concessions to the Protestants in doctrine and practice (the Bible and the early Fathers alone to be studied; the vulgar tongue to be allowed in worship; Indulgences to be reformed), with the hope of winning over the moderates among the Lutherans. Cassander about the same time, at the request of the Emperor Ferdinand I, put forward somewhat the same proposals. The circumstances of Germany may have suggested these ideas; but even in Italy such men as Cardinal Pole and Cardinal Contarini showed some sympathy with these tendencies. The doctrine of justification by faith, rightly and carefully interpreted, seemed to offer common ground between the contending parties. But the whole temper of the age was against reconciliation by the ignoring of differences; no one was inclined to find a road to peace "by the channel of No Meaning between the Scylla and Charybdis of Yes and No." It was not the spirit of Erasmus that triumphed, but the spirit of Calvin and of Ignatius Loyola. Men desired certainty in religion, and believed that it was obtainable.

Should
the State
settle
religious
contro-
versies?

A much more widely held view was that the secular State alone could provide the remedy for the dissensions and disruption of the Church. We have seen what a great ascendancy the State had in men's minds; everywhere it was, as a fact, exercising great control over both religious organization and belief. In England the King and Parliament were laying down the law of faith and worship. In France,

about the middle of the century, a writer declared that the priests, if left to themselves, would quarrel for ever about unessentials. The Government must step in and decide. At the end of the century, Henry of Navarre realized a great part of this suggestion. The Emperor, Charles V, has provoked the bitter criticism of Roman Catholic historians by acting on this theory after the battle of Mühlberg; and the Peace of Augsburg accepted the theory that the form of religion was everywhere an affair for the head of the State. But, as was inevitable, the stronger spirits on both sides rejected such a solution. Calvin held that it was the duty of the State to enforce religious orthodoxy, while it was for the Church to define it. The Roman Church, by all its traditions, was the enemy of nationalism in religion.

Another method often used in connection with the religious controversies was a meeting between rival champions, before either a carefully selected or a general assembly. This method was especially popular in Germany and Switzerland, but was not confined to those countries. We have seen the disputations at Leipsic and elsewhere; the conference between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians at Marburg; the frequent use of similar gatherings in the course of the Reformation in Switzerland both at Zurich and Geneva. Such gatherings, in the absence of any form of journalism, fulfilled a useful purpose in spreading a knowledge of the points at issue. They provided on several occasions an excuse for breaking from the Roman communion; more rarely the Reformers got the worst of it; but they never resulted in any measure of union or reconciliation. The attacking side almost always has the advantage on such occasions; the negative arguments are easily presented so as to be intelligible to a public audience; the affirmative is more difficult.

Not only were disputations and conferences used as a means of reaching some decision on controverted points; national assemblies were also advocated. This was the perpetual threat held over the head of the Papacy by the heads of European states. The supreme example of what such an assembly might do had been given by the English Parliament of 1529. The idea was raised again and again

in both France and Germany by those who were not prepared to break with Rome. Charles V and Francis I and Henry II played with the idea. If the Pope would not set his house in order—a process in which they were not really anxious to assist—then the individual states must undertake the task within their own dominions. The existence of the Catholic Church would have been imperilled by such a step, and it met with the strongest opposition at Rome.

Proposal for
a General
Church
Council

The plan about which there was the nearest approach to agreement was the calling of a General Council of the whole Church—an Ecumenical Council as it was officially styled. The historical argument was strong for such a procedure. The early centuries of the Church showed the great heresies defeated and unity restored to the Church by means of such Councils. The schism of the fourteenth century and the heresy of Huss seemed to have been ended by means of the Councils of Constance and Basel. It was natural to apply the same method to the present discontents. But when the question was examined more closely, difficulties appeared here also. What sort of a Council should it be? What was to be the position of the lay powers and of the states? Was Charles V to play the part that Sigismund had played in the Council of Constance? Was it to be a means of forcing the layman's view of religion on the Church? Clearly, the Papacy would give no assistance to the calling of such a Council. Constance and Basel had gone near to setting up the rule of an oligarchy in the Church; a new Council might reduce the authority of the Pope beneath that of the Kings of Europe. There were other complications. If a Council settled the convulsions of Germany, that would strengthen the hands of Charles V, and such a result was never desired in France. The King of France, therefore, sometimes resisted the calling of a Council, for fear lest it should succeed. So the pontificates of Leo X and of Clement VII came to an end, and nothing had been done for the calling of a Council.

Pope
Paul III

On the death of Clement VII Alessandro Farnese was elected rapidly and almost unanimously to the Papal throne, and took the title of Paul III. He was a subtle diplomatist who had been connected with Papal administration for forty years, and knew intimately every wheel in the machine of

government. With him the Popes of the Renaissance end, and the Popes of the Catholic revival begin. But he bears many traces of the earlier period; he showed gross favouritism to his own relations, and was curiously addicted to astrology. The importance of his pontificate is that he set to work with sincerity on the work of reforming the Church "in head and members." For the need of reform could no longer be mistaken. As the Lutheran movement grew in strength and cohesion, it became more hostile to Rome and no longer even pretended to desire reconciliation. "You have no notion," wrote a Papal ambassador from Germany, "how great is the wrath they feel against you and what a powerful force they represent."

So Rome, partly under compulsion, and partly through ^{The need for reform admitted} the genuine convictions of some prominent men, faced the task of the Reformation of the Church. Rome desired something very different from what was called Reformation north of the Alps. There it was a revolutionary movement, challenging the very foundations of the doctrine and discipline of the Church, altering the beliefs and the liturgy, and substituting for the monarchy of the Pope a number of divided churches without any principle of order or unity. The Reformation aimed at in Rome looked to a very different goal. Grave and widespread abuses were admitted. The whole machinery of administration was loose, corrupt, and inefficient; there were abuses in the Papal curia, in the priesthood, and in the monastic Orders. The occupants of the Papal See were not exempt from guilt. The Papal authority had been recklessly used in the granting of Dispensations and Indulgences, and often for the purpose of pecuniary gain. Priests lived and dressed as laymen; Bishops drew their incomes, but did not reside in their dioceses; many parishes were held by the same man; some monasteries had lost almost the appearance of the religious life; very many priests lived openly in concubinage. All this must be changed; but it must be changed not by weakening the authority of the Church and of its head, but by increasing it; there was no need of rejecting any doctrines of the Church, though there might be need of redefining them. The whole aim of the movement was conservative; it did not go much

further than a demand for honest and efficient management, and for the enforcement of the existing rules.

An Ecumenical Council summoned

Paul III took several important steps. He instituted commissions to examine into the reforms that were necessary. He appointed a number of new Cardinals who were pledged to Reform; among them Carafa, later Pope Paul IV, Pole, Contarini, and Sadoletto. Above all, in June 1586, he definitely summoned an Ecumenical Council. Difficulties began to crop up at once. Neither Mantua, which was first selected, nor Vicenza, which was next chosen, proved to be suitable places. King Francis did all he could to prevent the meeting of the Council. The German Protestants seemed favourable at first, but subsequently refused all co-operation. The Schmalkaldic League would only tolerate the idea of a mainly secular Council "deciding all controversies according to God's Word."

The Council meets at Trent, 1545

Pope Paul III was destined to have no success in his dealings with the question of the Council. Nothing at all was done until 1542, when the city of Trent was chosen for the seat of the Council. There had been much difficulty about the place. A French or north German or Spanish city was out of the question, for it would create a feeling that the Council was not independent. Trent was geographically in Italy, though politically within the bounds of the Empire. From the Papal point of view it had the advantage that it was easy of access to Italian Bishops, who could be trusted to vote in the Papal interest. But the effort to call the Council in 1542 was wrecked, especially by the jealousies of Charles and Francis. It was not until December 1545 that a real beginning was made. The Pope did not come himself, though he often talked of doing so. His legates, however, represented him and presided.

Early difficulties

The auspices for the success of the Council were not good. The attendance was very thin and made the claim that the Council "represented the Universal Church" a little ridiculous. The chief difficulty, however, lay in the political situation of Germany. A crisis there was rapidly approaching. Charles hoped to overthrow German Protestantism partly by conciliation and partly by military force; and both methods had their grave dangers in the opinion of the Pope and his

advisers. For conciliation in doctrine and Church discipline implied a repudiation of Papal authority; and, if it came to war, Rome was almost equally afraid of the Emperor's victory and of his defeat. His victory would reduce the Council still more to the condition of "a dummy to serve as a prop for his policy"; his defeat would mean the passing away of all hopes of recovering Germany for the Roman communion. The relations between the Emperor and the Pope, while the fate of the institutions over which they presided lay in the balance, could hardly be more unsatisfactory.

Under such circumstances the Council could hardly be expected to do much; and yet its decisions, even during this first stage of its long and harassed existence, were important. It decided that the consideration of dogma and of Church reform should be conducted simultaneously. That had been a subject of heated argument between the Papal and Imperial representatives, for the Emperor wanted to avoid any decision on dogma, lest it should close the road to conciliation in Germany, and the Pope held that it was the basis of all and should be taken first; the actual decision was a compromise between the two. Then there came the question of the authority of the Scriptures; it was hoped by some that a declaration that the Bible was the only basis of religious truth might act as a bridge between conservative Protestants and the Roman Church. But a quite different decision was reached in April 1546. The fountain of saving truth, it was declared, was contained not only in the Scriptures, but in the traditions of the Church which had been dictated by the Holy Spirit, and were to be regarded with as much reverence as the Scriptures themselves (*pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia*). Later, the doctrine of justification by faith was considered with much care and in a series of sessions. The Lutheran interpretation of the doctrine was decisively rejected; free-will was affirmed, predestination denied; the need and the possibility of good works was asserted. No wonder that the relations between Charles and the Council were strained; such decisions as these increased the difficulty of his task in Germany.

Trent was too near to Germany to be a comfortable seat for the Council. The Pope had already given the legates

Early
decisions
of the
Council of
Trent

Dogma and
reform

The
Scriptures

Justification

The Council
moved to
Bologna

permission to move the Council to some other town, if they thought it wise to do so. In March 1547 an outbreak of spotted fever in Trent provided an excuse, and seems really to have been a serious contributing cause. By the vote of a majority of those present, the Council was transferred to Bologna. Charles was violently angry, and the Pope seems to have thought the step precipitate.

The Council met at Bologna, but it did no serious work there. The Spanish Bishops refused to leave Trent. The crisis came in Germany. The battle of Mühlberg, in April 1547, allowed Charles to try his policy of religious conciliation and State control. Pope Paul III bitterly disliked both. He came into collision with the Emperor also over Italian politics, and was on the worst of terms with him at the time of his death (November 1549).

Conclave
for a
Papal
election

There was very great difficulty in deciding on his successor. In the conclave, which was held at once, there was sharp conflict between both religious and political parties. Reformers and Conservatives, the French party and the Imperialist, felt that everything might depend on the choice of the new Pope, and the result was that the conclave was extended over a period longer than any recorded in the recent history of the Papacy. The Cardinals entered the Vatican on November 29, 1549, and did not emerge until February 8, 1550. We get a strange picture of the proceedings within the Vatican during this period. The Cardinals ought to have been secluded from the outside world; they ought to have passed most of the time in the cells prepared for them; the style of their life should have been simple and austere. But in fact the communications with the outside world were constant, and the influence exercised by the agents of France and the Empire was constant and decisive. There were many people in the Vatican who had no right there, and many of the Cardinals escaped from their enclosure into the city for a time. We read of banquets and entertainments. Personal and national intrigues were rife throughout. The evil was so great that regulations for the better conduct of Papal elections were thought out and adopted.

Julius III

A majority of two-thirds was required for the choice of a Pope. Sixty times the ballot was taken before the necessary

majority was obtained. It seemed at first that the Englishman, Reginald Pole, would be chosen, and his votes were within one of the required number; but he was suspected as a reformer and as a supporter of the Emperor. At last Del Monte, a comparatively unknown man, was chosen, and assumed the name of Julius III.

The new Pope has found few defenders. In many respects the Papacy returned to the worst traditions of the Renaissance. Plays were performed, and women were invited to entertainments in the Vatican. The Pope, in spite of angry protests, appointed an unworthy boy of seventeen years to the Cardinalate. And though he took his duties seriously, he showed no great skill in dealing with the pressing problems of the time.

He had to steer between Henry II of France and the Emperor Charles. An appointment to the Duchy of Parma led to actual hostilities with the King of France. The Pope was drawn over to the side of the Emperor, and, partly in consequence, he summoned again the Ecumenical Council to Trent, for the Council was an essential factor in the German policy of the Emperor.

The new session of the Council, the eleventh, was opened in May 1551. The French King was furiously indignant with the Pope, and in the French Royal Council the question was discussed whether it might not be well to withdraw the allegiance of France from Rome and appoint a special patriarch for France. Perhaps the Gallican Church was never so near to imitating the example of the Anglican as at this moment. German politics controlled the life of the Council during the pontificate of Julius III. Charles was bent on conciliation with the more moderate Lutherans, and deplored any decision which widened the gap between them and the Roman Church. He insisted that Protestant princes and divines should be invited to the Council and should attend.

Before the Germans arrived, the Council had dealt with doctrinal matters of the utmost importance. They had taken up again the question of the Eucharist, and had reaffirmed and defined transubstantiation. We must not follow them in these theological subtleties, and for our purposes it is more important to note that the eight chapters,

in which the Eucharist is dealt with affirmatively, are followed by eleven anathemas in which, though without mentioning their names, the teaching of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin on the Eucharist are formally repudiated. Such action cut across the plans of the Emperor, and before they had been accepted by the Pope, to whom the decisions of the Council were always referred, the German Protestant representatives came to make their only and brief appearance at the Council.

Delegates
from
Germany

First came ambassadors from the Duke of Würtemberg ; then a representative of Strasburg and other cities ; a little later two delegates from Prince Maurice, Elector of Saxony, who was busy behind the scenes preparing the blow, which was to shatter the Emperor's schemes of conciliation. The Lutheran representatives came in no peaceful mood. They refused to pay the visit of ceremony to the Papal legates ; they asserted that the Bible and only the Bible must be taken as the criterion of orthodoxy ; they demanded the reaffirmation of the decrees of the Councils of Constance and Basel, that Popes were subject to the decisions of Councils. They urged that the Council should suspend its work until the German theologians arrived, and they demanded for them a safe-conduct couched in the fullest possible terms. In fact the time had passed when any conciliation through a Council was possible. Everywhere religious differences were being accentuated ; the Protestant groups were drawing apart from one another, and were not in the least inclined for reunion with Rome. The Pope showed much patience in dealing with these demands, but it was clear that there was no road to peace at Trent.

Suspension
of the
Council

And while the theologians quarrelled at Trent, actual war exploded north of the Alps. Prince Maurice of Saxony had, with wonderful and Machiavellian skill, matured his plans. The Most Catholic King of France, irritated, as we have seen, with the Pope, and always jealous of the Emperor, had joined hands with the Lutherans in Germany, though he was persecuting them bitterly in France. The Emperor was surprised and fled, as we have seen in Chapter VI. Trent was within the bounds of the Empire, and was, in fact, not safe from a possible attack of the troops of Maurice. The Pope suspended the sessions of the Council (1552). The suspension

was to last for two years ; it lasted in fact for ten, and when the Council met again it had a changed world to deal with.

Pope Julius III had died in 1555, and, after the very short pontificate of Marcellus II, had been succeeded by Paul IV (Caraffa), of whose character and policy we have already spoken. He was, despite his nepotism, a keen reformer in certain directions ; but he had no belief in the Council and looked mainly to the Inquisition for the suppression of heresy. When he died in 1559 there was another long conclave ; and then a member of the House of Medici (but of the Milanese, not the Florentine, Medici) was elected and reigned as Pius IV. He had none of his predecessor's antipathy to Spain, and soon spoke of the recalling of the Council. More important than the change in the Papacy was the rise of the Jesuit Society which had been constituted in 1540. It had grown with wonderful rapidity and was exercising already a great influence on the character and policy of the Church. Of this society and its founder, we shall speak in the next section.

The political situation had changed, too, in these ten years. The restoration of the power of Rome in England had proved short-lived. Queen Elizabeth had succeeded in 1558 ; and, though her religious policy remained for some time equivocal, it became clear that under her England would count again as the antagonist of Rome. In France, Henry II was dead, killed by a chance splinter in a tournament, and France was on the edge of a sea of troubles. The Queen Mother and actual regent, Catherine de Médicis, seemed to halt between the two religious parties ; the Huguenots, organized and armed, were ready for civil war. The Government were anxious to conciliate opposition, and talked seriously of summoning a National Council of clergy and laity, with Calvinists as well as Catholics present, to do the work which the Council of Trent was to have done. Nothing alarmed Rome so much as the spectre of a National Council, which might so easily have led to schism. It was this threat which made the immediate summoning of the Ecumenical Council imperative.

Difficult preliminary questions had to be settled before the Fathers could actually reassemble. There was the question of place, always a difficulty. It was decided to choose Trent

Julius III
and
Pius IV

Changed
European
situation

The Council
recalled to
Trent

again, in spite of French protests, though the suggestion was made that the Council might later be moved elsewhere (1562). A more serious and indeed all-important question was whether the Council should be a new one or a continuation of the former one. If it was a new one the questions at issue between the confessions might be reconsidered. If it were a continuation of the former one, it would perforce begin where that had left off; and would therefore start from the absolute rejection of all the most essential Protestant demands. In the end, and largely with the support of Philip of Spain, it was decided that the new Council should be a continuation of the old.

That decision was the most important fact for its last stage in the history of the Council of Trent; for it meant that no composition with the Protestants could even be considered. "The former Council," said the Pope, "will be resumed, nor may it be repudiated in any of its parts." There was to be no surrender to the enemy; and that is an epitome of the whole work of the Council. But there were many difficulties to be faced by the Fathers still, and the Pope had many anxious moments. We may summarize them without any care of chronological order.

Difficulties
and
personalities
in the new
Council

There was still great rivalry between the representatives of the different nations. The Emperor still hoped for measures which would make his relations with the German Protestants easier. The Spaniards were militant in their orthodoxy, but displayed great jealousy of the interference of the Pope in the government of the Church in Spain. The French delegates were full of the "Gallican" spirit, and therefore suspicious of the Papal authority and ready to curtail it if possible. It was only upon the Italian Bishops that the Pope could always rely; they were bound to the Roman administration by many ties and were, in many cases, financially indebted to the Roman curia. It was by Italian and in the end by Spanish votes that the decisions at Trent were carried in a sense acceptable to the Pope. Among the speakers and statesmen of the Council, two stood out with special clearness during this last stage. First the Jesuit, Lainez. He supported the claims of the Papacy with the greatest skill and eloquence, and spoke of the secular powers

with great boldness. Next to him in prominence and perhaps in influence came Guise, the Cardinal of Lorraine, a member of the family which was beginning to play a determining part in the history of France. He was not trusted as Lainez was trusted; he was thought to cherish high personal ambitions; and he sometimes took a strong Gallican and anti-Papal attitude. But in the end he came round decisively to the Pope's side.

The question of doctrine had been nearly settled in the ^{Reform} earlier sessions, and it no longer attracted the attention that it had formerly done. The great question now was Reform. The abuses and corruptions of the Church were freely admitted—though not to the extent asserted by the Protestants. How were they to be remedied? Here again the attitude of the Council was wholly conservative. There was no imitation of the Protestant position; the marriage of the priesthood was repudiated; monastic vows were declared to be binding. The administrative machine was judged to be sound in all its essential parts; but it was overhauled and readjusted. Bishops must reside in their dioceses and have only one diocese; it was for them to keep watch over the clergy and to punish those who offended against the laws of the Church or the rules of morality. Steps were taken to secure a better educated clergy by the establishment of seminaries. Protest was made against the abuses in the system of benefices which were not for the future to be bestowed on children or on laymen; monks were to be confined to their monasteries; the financial abuses connected with Indulgences were abolished. These were the resolutions of the Council. It was uncertain how far they could be enforced.

For here we touch on a great failure of the Council. Many of the worst abuses of the Church were the result not of the weakness or vice of the clergy, but of the interference of the secular powers and especially of the Kings and rulers of Europe. In Germany and in France, and to a less but real extent in Spain, the revenues and the appointments of the Church were regarded as almost belonging to the State; appointments were made without regard to personal fitness, but to provide an income for some favourite or agent of the Crown,

who was often not even in Orders. The abuse was patent ; and the churchmen desired to reform it. But when in the last sessions of the Council it was brought up for discussion, it produced a storm of indignant protest, before which the Papacy quailed. The Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain saw a very important source of revenue and power threatened by the proposal ; and it was plain that, if the examination of the question was persisted in, it might produce consequences of the most serious kind. It was said that France might follow the example of England in breaking the connection with Rome. A suspension of the Council was talked of. In the end the Council was satisfied with a pious aspiration ; and the anathemas that had been talked of were replaced by " paternal admonitions." The subject had a long future, which lies outside of our period.

Authority
of the Pope

A question of central importance throughout these closing sessions was the power and authority possessed by the Pope. The point was not directly discussed, but it was constantly implied. There was a heated and passionate debate over an apparently theoretic question. The obligation of Bishops to reside in their diocese was admitted ; but the question arose—from whom did the Bishops hold their authority ? Was episcopacy " of divine right " ? The phrase, as in " the divine right of Kings " in its first phase, implied the direct dependence of the Bishops on God, and therefore their independence of the Pope. The question generated the most violent passions, and the Spanish Bishops were foremost in claiming that they were " of divine right." The Bishop of Granada was especially violent against the Papacy, and the incident reveals the strongly nationalistic character of the Church in Spain, despite its militant orthodoxy. The question was not settled, but it was declared that " the Bishops have been set by the Holy Ghost to rule the Church of God." The question of Papal authority emerged again during the discussions on reform. Some of the worst abuses in the administration of the Church were admittedly to be found in Rome itself. While the Council was proposing reforms, should it not deal with the Curia itself ? But here the Pope, through his legates, interposed a decided veto, and the Jesuit, Lainez, maintained with great vigour that the Pope, as Head

The reform
of the
Curia

of the Church, could not be reformed by the Council. To suppose that he could, would lead to the view that Councils were superior to the Papacy, and that was a doctrine that Rome would not admit.

The end of the Council was hurried on by the great difficulties which arose when "the reform of the Princes" began to be discussed. The illness of the Pope made the Cardinals anxious to get away, lest the Council should attempt to interfere with the conclave. The last session came on December 3, 1563, in the presence of four Legates, two Cardinals, twenty-five Archbishops, a hundred and fifty Bishops, seven Abbots, seven generals of orders, and eleven envoys from the princes. From the beginning all motions had been brought before the Council on the proposal of the Papal Legates (*proponentibus legatis*), and already it had been declared that in all the decisions of the Council it was presupposed that the authority of the Pope was maintained intact. The last official words of the Council were "Illustrious Lords and most reverend Fathers, is it your will . . . that confirmation of all that has been decreed should be requested of the most blessed Roman pontiff by the mouth of the legates and presidents?" And the answer came, "It is our will," so that the Papal authority was the coping-stone of all.

The work of the Council was sharply criticized from both religious camps. The Protestants derided it. It had shown no appreciation of the doctrines which were so highly valued in Germany and in Switzerland; its moral outlook was unmodified by all the attacks made on the monastic system, the celibacy of the clergy and the ascetic view of life. There was no more talk—not at least during the sixteenth century—of reconciliation. A condition of permanent war was set up.

Many who remained in the Roman communion were also dissatisfied with the work done at Trent. The chief trouble had come throughout from the French Bishops and representatives, and Cardinal Guise, though he ended by strongly supporting the Council and the authority of the Pope, had at one time been almost in rebellion. The decrees of the Council were not accepted by the authorities in France; neither by the Sorbonne nor by the Parlements. They were

judged to be in conflict with Gallican liberties on many grounds. France claimed a large and indefinite right of managing her own ecclesiastical affairs, and the reforms of the Council encroached on this. The decrees as to the appointments of ecclesiastical and monastic dignitaries were in contradiction with the Concordat of 1516 which had given the right of appointment to the King. Above all it was the belief of the French churchmen, tenaciously held and declared a century afterwards under Louis XIV, that the authority of General Councils was superior to that of the Pope; and one chief result of the Council of Trent was to assert the monarchical authority of the Pope. The University of Paris and the Parlements of France, moreover, disliked the Jesuit Order as super-national. So there were between Rome and France abundant sources of quarrel and misunderstanding, which lasted as long as the French monarchy.

There were many discontented Catholics, too, even outside of France. Sarpi, in his nearly contemporary history of the Council, represents their views. The Papacy had, he holds, concentrated attention on dogma in order to avoid the thorny subject of real reform. Those who insisted on the calling of the Council had wished to establish the superiority of the secular powers in the Church, but the result had been the exact opposite. The Reforms were, in Sarpi's opinion, nearly valueless. "The Church was dying of consumption and the doctors at Trent had prescribed for the itch." Many, who had no sympathy with Protestantism, were of Sarpi's opinion.

The
Council
of Trent
and the
future

The majority of the Council held that the Church was not afflicted by any mortal disease, and that no revolutionary measures were necessary. The Council had rejected all novelties, but it had defined doctrine, strengthened discipline, and removed some abuses. A new spirit of enthusiasm and confidence henceforth inspired the Church in its contest with its opponents. Open and truceless war had been declared against Protestantism in all its forms and in all its aspects. The claims of the secular powers to control and to reform the Church had been almost as decisively rejected; though it would take three centuries to liberate the Church effectively from the influence and interference of the states of Europe. From the list of subjects discussed at Trent, we notice, now,

one striking omission. What a later age would call the claims of humanity were not touched on. The Roman Church had often protested nobly against cruelty in judicial procedure, against slavery, against the barbarous treatment of the native races in newly won or newly discovered lands. Even in the treatment of heretics in some countries (in France, for instance) the ecclesiastical were thought to be less severe than the secular courts. But in all these matters the Council of Trent made no sign. What it did was of great and decisive service to the Church in its struggle against its Protestant opponents. But when two centuries later the next great attack came, when the philosophers of the eighteenth century, in alliance with science and inspired by a hatred of cruelty and by a spirit of humanitarianism, began to attack and undermine the Church in all the countries of western Europe, there was nothing in the decisions of the Fathers of Trent that availed against this new assault.

THE JESUIT ORDER

The Roman Church had met the dangers which from time to time had confronted it by the foundation of new Orders. It is well known what great services had been conferred on the Church by the great monastic Orders of the Middle Ages, the Benedictines, the Cluniacs, the Cistercians and others. Nor had the work of the Friars in the thirteenth century been less important. The existing Orders seemed incapable of meeting the new needs of the Church; the corruption of the old Orders was admitted, though the extent of that corruption will always be a matter in dispute; the Friars were even more generally attacked than the monks. A new departure was necessary.

There were several efforts at reform, before the rise of the Jesuit Order. In 1524 the Theatines had been formed—so called from Theate (Chieti), the see of Caraffa the first head of the Order—and at once began a useful work. The essential object of this Order was the improvement of the character and work of the ordinary clergy, corrupted, as was admitted, “by vice and ignorance,” by bringing them under

New
Orders
in the
Roman
Church.
The
Theatines

a discipline similar to that of the regular Orders. The Theatines were not monks; their work was in the world, not within monastic walls; but they took monastic vows and practised a strict rule of poverty. An improvement in the Roman clergy, and in the estimation in which they were held, is said to have followed quickly. The Franciscans were stirred by somewhat the same spirit. A section of them, under the name of the Capuchins, returned to the strict standards of Saint Francis, and were especially active in visiting the sick and in preaching. They gained much fame, but were sorely afflicted when Ochino, one of their most impressive preachers, adopted "Lutheran" ideas and had to flee from the country. He found shelter for a time in the English Church, but subsequently espoused Socinian ideas and retired to Moravia. There were other movements. The Ursulines were a community of women, who, without founding a regular Order, devoted themselves to a strictly religious course of life; not quitting the world but trying to amend it. All these movements show the sense of the need of some new organization, but were quite unequal to the demands of the time.

The
Capuchins

The
Ursulines

Loyola

The time called for some strong man with the greatest urgency. The man appeared in Don Inigo Lopez de Recalde, of the House of Loyola; known in history as Ignatius Loyola, by which name we will speak of him. He was a native of Guipuzcoa—a part of the old Kingdom of Navarre now incorporated with the Kingdom of Spain. He had been a page at the Court of King Ferdinand, and had followed with ardent ambition a soldier's career, until in 1521 he was wounded in both legs, while defending Pampeluna against the French. The limbs were set and re-set, but he remained a cripple. A military career was no longer possible to him.

The
develop-
ment of
Loyola

Henceforward his life has a remarkable and consistent development. He by no means saw at first the goal at which he was to aim. But every year, and every incident of his life, brought him nearer to his task. There is no sudden passion in his life; no suddenly adopted resolution. Slowly, and deliberately, testing each step that he took, approaching every decision with prayer and meditation, he came, after twenty years, to a clear vision of his work, but went on correcting and improving it until his death in 1556.

Ignatius Loyola is said to have had always a strong ^{Early} interest in religion, despite the irregularities of his early life. ^{efforts of} After his maiming his thoughts took a decidedly religious ^{Loyola} turn. "What," he is reported to have said, "if I were to do the deeds of a St. Dominic or Saint Francis?" He read the *Lives of the Saints* and a *Life of Christ*. An epoch in his development was his vigil before the shrine of the Virgin at Montserrat in Catalonia, when he laid aside his knight's dress. He then devoted himself to prolonged ascetic exercises at Manresa (near Montserrat) until his health gave way. He ministered to the spiritual wants of others also; and already at Manresa we hear of those "Spiritual Exercises" which are such an essential part of the strength and work of his Order. A pilgrimage to Jerusalem was the next outstanding incident of his life; he would have willingly devoted himself to work among the Mohammedans, but was not allowed to do so. On his return to Spain he felt that he lacked the education necessary for any great religious task in the changing conditions of the world. He went to a boys' school at Barcelona and learned Latin, and then in 1528 he went to the University of Paris, the chief centre of European learning. He went through a seven years' course in philosophy and theology and took his master's degree. His long preparation was drawing to its end; but even now he did not see clearly the road before him. During his studies at Paris he had drawn round him a small group of friends and disciples; among them Faber, Xavier, Lainez, Salmeron. On August 15, 1534, he and six others took the vows of poverty and chastity, and promised to undertake the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. It was, however, two years before they set out for Venice. It turned out, however, that the pilgrimage to Jerusalem was impossible by reason of the war between the Turks and Venetians. Perhaps, too, he had a vision now of something more practical than pilgrimage. He and his comrades went to Rome, where they lived on alms and ministered to the sick and preached. The *Spiritual Exercises* were practised and their efficacy proved. He attracted popular attention and gained a few more adherents to the inner circle. He had his enemies, too, and was accused of heresy, but was acquitted by the Inquisition. Then, in 1539, he made

The Jesuit
Order
founded

application to be allowed to found a new Order, and the Society of Jesus was formally accepted on September 27, 1540.

Ignatius Loyola and Luther are the two figures in the sixteenth century about whose character there has been most discussion and most difference of opinion. Loyola has been denounced (by Carlyle) as the source of most of the evils which threaten to overwhelm the modern world; and he has been declared, not only by members of the Roman Church, to be the supreme instance of the alliance of religious fervour and practical ability. The value of his work depends clearly on first principles, which it is not the province of this book to deal with. He was himself a typical Spaniard in his devotion to the Catholic faith, in his crusading zeal, and in that romantic and adventurous spirit which makes Don Quixote so attractive a character. His self-control was without limit; the special mark of his character was the alliance of enthusiasm with prudence; but of his personality, apart from his work, it is difficult to get much idea. He lived only for his great task, and would not have wished to be remembered apart from it.

Character
of the Order

The character of his Order is clearly shown in the Bull by which it was founded in 1540. The Bull incorporates ten clauses dealing with the character and objects of the Order and drawn up by Ignatius himself. All who wish "to fight for God under the standard of the Cross and to serve only God and the Roman pontiff, his vicar upon earth" are called on to support the Society of Jesus which has been founded for that purpose. It exists for the advancement of souls in Christian life and doctrine and for the spread of the faith, and it proposes to do this by means of "public preaching and ministry of the Word of God, spiritual exercises, works of charity, and especially by the training of boys and the uneducated in Christianity." The control of the society is to be entirely in the hands of its chief, but the constitutions are to be drawn up by the members of the society. The duty of obedience to the Pope is insisted on again and again; but the members owe unquestioning obedience to their chief. They are to recognize Christ as present in him, and to pay him all suitable reverence. They are to take the vow of

poverty, but their colleges may possess property under the control of the chief. Great care is to be taken in admitting members. The aim of the society is at the end declared to be "the glory of our Lord Christ and the profit of our neighbours."

The Order spread rapidly and received, except when Paul IV was Pope, every encouragement from the Papacy. We have seen how powerfully it co-operated in the work of the Council of Trent; Lainez almost dominated the last part of its sessions. The first Jesuit settlements outside of Rome were in the north Italian towns. Soon they passed to Sicily and Spain, though they found at first much opposition in the country which may be regarded as their birthplace. They passed over to Ireland; made inroads even on Protestant Germany; and soon prepared for crusades against such Protestant countries as England and Scotland. The greatest of all their early missionary triumphs is connected with the name of Francis Xavier. He landed in India in 1542, and, after wonderful success there, went to Japan and China. The accounts of the results which attended his preaching are marvellous and almost miraculous. Before the middle of the century the Jesuits were recognized as the most powerful weapon in the hands of the Pope; they raised on the one side unbounded enthusiasm, and on the other all the hatred and suspicion which are born of fear. Their skill, courage, and duplicity became legendary.

Two documents are of first-rate importance for the character and aims of the Jesuits. First, the *Spiritual Exercises*. These were begun, as we have seen, when Ignatius was at Manresa. It is one of the most important and typical books of the century, but peculiarly difficult to appreciate.¹ Ignatius says that his object is to show how "a man may set himself free from all inordinate affections and, having done so, seek for and find the Will of God, in conformity with which to rule his life and secure the salvation of his soul." There are traces in the Exercises of the *Imitation of Christ*, which Ignatius knew well. The book is an instruction in spiritual

¹ Perhaps the most important "typical" books of the century are: Machiavelli's *Prince*; Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion*; the *Spiritual Exercises*; and the *Gargantua of Rabelais*.

gymnastics. Its object was to discipline, train, and strengthen the character by meditation on the Life of Christ and the destiny of the human soul. The Exercises are divided into four weeks, though the arrangement may be modified. The first week is concerned with sin and its punishment; with death, therefore, and with Hell. Every effort is made to bring them realistically before the imagination; all the senses are stimulated to activity, even the sense of smell; the pains of the damned are conceived as materially as in Dante. The second week is concerned with the Life of Christ and the mystery of the Incarnation; in this week comes the comparison between the two standards under which men may enlist, the standard of Lucifer and the standard of Christ. The third week is concerned with the institution of the Eucharist and the Passion of Christ; the fourth with the Resurrection. The object throughout is not merely intellectual or emotional; an amendment of life is aimed at in every detail. The religious outlook is personal; there is no mention of ecclesiastical government or of Papal authority, or of any kind of social service.

The
Constitutions

The second important document for the understanding of the Order of Jesus is the *Constitutions*. The first draft is in the Bull of 1540; but they were continually amended and added to. The amended form was confirmed by a General Chapter of the Order in 1558.

If the Exercises look inward to the soul of the individual, the Constitutions are concerned with the public work of the society. "The object of this Society is not only to pursue the salvation and perfecting of the individual soul by God's grace but . . . to seek zealously the salvation and perfecting of the soul of our neighbour." Admission to the Order was more difficult than to any of the old ones. The novices had a probationary period of two years during which they were trained in the Spiritual Exercises and in social and menial services. Then they took the "scholastic" vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Before they could take the final vows, there were one or two more years of training and study. The stages of rank in the society were "novices, scholastics, lay brothers, ecclesiastical coadjutors, and professed." The highest ranks of the society

were only open to priests. They took the additional vow not to strive for any post of dignity or pre-eminence in the Order and to be ready to "go forth into all lands, among Turks, heathens, or heretics, wherever the Pontiff might please to send them, without hesitation or delay, as without question, condition, or reward."

The vow of obedience was no new thing in the regular Orders. But it was insisted on with special urgency by the Jesuits, and became their most distinguishing characteristic. The whole Order must be absolutely obedient to the Pope, but their obedience passes through their General. They are to regard him as the representative of Christ, and to yield him obedience, prompt, unquestioning, and joyful. The Jesuit under orders is to be as a staff in a man's hand, and so entirely without will of his own that he is to resemble an inanimate corpse. The General was chosen by the General Assembly of the Order, and the government of the society lay in his hands; though the right of remonstrance was recognized and by the side of the General was an admonitor whose duty it was "to call attention to faults in his behaviour or in the conduct of his office."

The practical aim of the society necessitated certain wide variations from earlier Orders. Thus no special dress was worn. There was no common service in the choir of their churches; an omission which offended Pope Paul IV. The discipline was severe, but the excesses of asceticism were to be avoided. The society demanded the whole faculties of its members, physical and mental.

Ignatius at first designed to work on the world through preaching and confession. Gradually he came to see the importance of education for the advancement of the Glory of God—which is so constantly declared to be the aim of the society. His early educational plans did not look beyond the training of Jesuits, though in the Bull of 1540 the instruction of "boys and the unlearned" is given as one of the objects of the society. Later, schools and colleges, even for "external" scholars, were planned with an elaborate curriculum. Religion and morals were the bases of the teaching, but the intellectual outlook was comprehensive, embracing as it did Law, Medicine, the Classics, Hebrew.

Mathematics, and History. In their educational methods they showed originality and skill. It was through education that they gained their greatest influence in Catholic countries.

Ignatius was a soldier and liked to apply military terms and ideas to the work of his Order. Historically the Jesuits are the chief troops on which Rome relied in her struggle against Protestantism; troops specially devoted, disciplined, and courageous. The issue of the struggle was undecided when Ignatius died in 1556, but it was already plain that a new spirit and a new energy was to be found in the ranks of Rome. The new spirit is partly typified and partly produced by the Council of Trent and the Order of the Jesuits.¹

THE REPRESSION OF HERESY

The
Inquisition
and the
Reformation

The Inquisition is usually reckoned a part of the Counter-Reformation and Catholic revival; but it may be questioned whether this view is historically accurate. For in the first place there was little that was new in its organization or operation; principles and procedure alike belong to the central portion of the Middle Ages. The Spanish Inquisition was founded nearly half a century before the challenge of the Protestant Reformation was seriously felt at Rome; it was designed against the Jews and Moors, though it was later applied to the suppression of such Protestants as were to be found in Spain. Further the Inquisition can have contributed little if anything to the reconquest of Europe for the Roman Church. The range of its operations was narrowly limited. It could not, of course, touch the countries that actually broke away from allegiance to Rome; it was not admitted by any means into all states that retained their allegiance to Rome. France never admitted it, nor

¹ "The contest between the two parties bore some resemblance to the fencing match in Shakespeare; 'Laertes wounds Hamlet; then in scuffling they change rapiers and Hamlet wounds Laertes.' The war between Luther and Leo was a war between firm faith and unbelief . . . between a pure morality and vice. Very different was the war which degenerate Protestantism had to wage against a regenerate Catholicism. . . . The order of the Jesuits alone could show many men not inferior in sincerity, constancy, courage and austerity, of life to the apostles of the Reformation" (Macaulay, *Essay on Ranke's Popes*). Despite much exaggeration and some eccentricity the *Essay* is still full of interest.

did it ever establish itself as a permanent institution north of the Alps. Its effectiveness was greatest where the need of it from the Roman point of view was least. It provided, moreover, during the whole sixteenth century and long afterwards the strongest argument to Protestant countries for unrelenting resistance to the Roman power and faith. It seems indeed probable that it hindered rather than assisted the Catholic reaction. It suppressed all expression of heresy in Spain and Italy, where heresy was at no time really dangerous ; it embittered and stiffened resistance in northern and western Europe.

The belief that heresy was one of the greatest of evils and that it must be suppressed by force was almost universal in the sixteenth century. The words of Pope Paul IV would have been accepted in principle by both contending religious parties : “ Heresy is to be suppressed as vigorously and as sharply as the physical plague, because it is the plague of the soul. If rags and clothes infected with the plague are removed and burnt, why should we not with the same severity extirpate, annihilate, and remove heresy which is a disease of the mind, incomparably more precious than the body.” Few men in the sixteenth century saw the sophistry and fallacy implied in such a view. It is important, too, to recognize that heresy was always associated with an attack on the power and wealth of the Church, which the Church naturally resisted for much the same reasons and by much the same methods as those by which the contemporary secular states resisted treason.

There were many ways of dealing with heresy. Every priest, and still more every Bishop, was bound to be on the watch for it and to combat it. It was not only ecclesiastical tribunals that took the matter in hand. In France heresy was sometimes claimed as one of the *cas royaux*, and therefore came within the competence of Parlement. The Roman Inquisition was never admitted into France, not so much on grounds of humanity as because it conflicted with Gallican liberties. The Church was allowed to decide what was heresy, but it was in France for the civil tribunal to judge whether the accused held the opinions denounced as heretical ; and even in the definition of heresy the Gallicans only

Universal
fear of
heresy

admitted what had already been condemned by the universal Church.

The Roman
Inquisition

We have already (in Chapter I) spoken of the Spanish Inquisition and its subservience to the Crown of Spain. But it was primarily a religious tribunal, and its genuine passion for the suppression of heresy could be doubted as little as the cruelty of its methods. A new form of Inquisition was founded in 1542, when Paul III issued the Bull *Licet ab initio*. Cardinal Caraffa, afterwards Pope Paul IV, was the chief prompter of this important move; the relentless destruction of heresy called out all the enthusiasm of his violent nature. The Bull was not so much the foundation as the organization of the Roman Inquisition. The preamble declares that the Pope had hoped that the calling of a General and Ecumenical Council would bring about the reunion of Christendom, and that in that hope measures for the suppression of "heretical pravity" had been postponed. But, as the work of the Council was delayed and heresy daily increased, something must be done. He had therefore appointed six Cardinals to act as Commissaries and Inquisitors General "in all the states of the Christian Commonwealth, in all towns, lands, and places both within and beyond the mountains (the Alps) and even in Italy itself."

Powers
of the
Inquisitors

The Inquisitors General have the power of proceeding against all heretics and supporters of heretics "whatever be their state, rank, order, condition or pre-eminence." They have the right of imprisoning them before trial, of punishing them when found guilty "with such penalties as are canonically sanctioned, and of confiscating their goods."

They have the right of appealing to the secular arm and of taking all steps that they think necessary for the suppression of the errors "now thriving in the Christian Commonwealth."

The Pope reserved expressly to himself the right of absolving and reconciling such guilty persons as wish to return to the light of truth. In every other respect plenary authority is given to the inquisitors, and they are to be able to override all other authorities whatever. "And if any one shall presume to resist this decree let him know that he will incur the wrath of Almighty God and the blessed Apostles Peter and Paul."

Nothing is said in the Bull as to the procedure to be used, and the question is wrapped in some obscurity,¹ but there can be no doubt that the essentials of the medieval and Spanish Inquisitions were maintained. It did not rise above the cruelties and brutalities of the secular tribunals of the day; in some respects it fell beneath them. The accused was not told the names of his accusers, and he was not confronted with those who gave evidence against him. Torture was used to extort confession, though in a happier time the Church had protested against the use of judicial torture. The prisons of the Inquisition had a bad name even in the sixteenth century, when prisons were usually places of torment and plague. The Inquisition being an ecclesiastical tribunal did not inflict the death penalty itself, but the secular authority was expected to inflict death by burning.

As freedom of speech, worship, and preaching was nowhere admitted in the sixteenth century, the printing and publishing of books was certain also to be controlled. And in fact the control of printed books was general throughout Europe; it was practised in both religious camps; and it was a part of the activities of Rome, before the Counter-Reformation took shape. The Council of Trent had concerned itself with the subject, and had called for a severe censorship. It is, however, with the institution of the Roman Inquisition that the matter was taken seriously in hand. The categories and lists of forbidden books were drawn up slowly and with care. Before any full list was published, the works of certain authors were condemned to be burned; the great heretics, of course, are in this list, and also Machiavelli and Erasmus. In 1559 a full list of forbidden books appeared. These were divided into three categories: (1) the works of heretical authors, the whole of whose works were forbidden, and it is noticeable that Erasmus appears on this list; (2) works of authors, some of whose writings are allowed while others are forbidden; (3) anonymous works. Then, in 1564, after the

¹ Dr. Pastor deplors the refusal of the Roman authorities to throw open the records of the Inquisition to the researches of historians. "The present congregation of the Holy Office still persists in maintaining a system of absolute secrecy which has almost universally been abandoned elsewhere; and thus perpetuates belief in all the innumerable charges levelled against the Inquisition."

matter had been again handled by the Council of Trent, another list, the *Index Tridentinus*, was published. The new list contains the provision for striking out objectionable passages from certain books which may then pass into circulation; certain passages attacking the Papacy were struck out from the Divine Comedy of Dante. The punishment of excommunication was inflicted on all who read or possessed heretical books.

The task of controlling the printing press, though not the obvious impossibility that it is to-day, was difficult even in the sixteenth century. To superintend it a special committee was instituted—the Congregation of the Index of forbidden books. It drew up elaborate directions for the expurgation and publication of books.

It is not possible to attach great importance to the work of the censorship in the struggle against Protestantism. It is true that, as Ranke has pointed out, the work, *On the Benefits of Christ's Passion*, which was placed on the Index, because it advocated the doctrine of Justification by Faith, disappeared so completely that no copy was found before the nineteenth century. The character of Italian literature changed during the course of the century; the unbridled gaiety of Ariosto was replaced by the serious beauty of Tasso. But this was only an illustration of the general change which was passing over the mind of Europe and especially of Italy. Beyond the Alps the Index hardly produced appreciable results.

Books for reference :—

VI. The Counter-Reformation; The Council of Trent; The Jesuits; The Inquisition.

Ranke, Pastor, and Kidd as before.

A. W. Ward : *The Counter-Reformation*.

Paolo Sarpi : *Historia del Concilio Tridentino*.

Sacrosancti et Œcumenici Concilii Tridentini Canones et decreta.

J. A. Froude : *Lectures on the Council of Trent*.

M. Phillipson : *La Contre-Révolution religieuse du XV^eme siècle*.

Griesinger : *The Jesuits, a Complete History* (2 vols.).

Sedgwick : *Life of Ignatius Loyola*.

Paul Van Dyke : *Ignatius Loyola; Founder of Society of Jesus*.

The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius (translated into English).

H. C. Lea : *History of the Spanish Inquisition*.

J. A. Symonds : *The Catholic Reaction*.

CHAPTER XI

THE SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS, AND THE SPREAD OF LUTHERANISM OUTSIDE OF GERMANY

THE civilization of Europe has spread in the main ^{The} from the lands round the Mediterranean, and there ^{Baltic in} is a tendency to neglect the history of the north of ^{European} Europe. ^{history} Yet great scenes in the drama of European history were enacted on the shores of the Baltic, which may well be called the northern Mediterranean. The lands on both sides of its waters played an important part in the history of the Protestant Reformation. When in the next century, in the course of the Thirty Years' War, the German states were unable to defend Protestantism against the attacks of the Empire and the Catholic reaction, it was to the Scandinavian kingdoms—to Denmark first, and then to Sweden—that they looked for help. It is important, therefore, to see in what form the new religious ideas made their way to these northern lands, and how they were established there.

The Southern shores of the Baltic were held by the following ^{The Baltic} states: first the German states, Holstein (which was closely ^{states} connected with Denmark), Mecklenburg, and Pomerania: then came the lands of the Polish kingdom, which pushed themselves to the sea through what we should now call the Polish corridor: then came Eastern Prussia, formed of the old lands of the religious Teutonic order, which were secularized under Albert of Brandenburg and thus entered on the course which was soon to lead to incorporation with Brandenburg. Of the Russian lands we need not now speak, but must direct our attention to the three Kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The populations of all three were closely related, their languages mutually intelligible, their institutions almost identical. Yet they were never effectively united

The Union
of Kalmar

into a single state, and have therefore not exercised quite the influence on the course of modern European history that might have been expected. The idea of consolidation had not been absent from the minds of statesmen; and in 1397 the Union of Kalmar had been formed, whereby it was agreed that the three Kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden should have a common monarch, while retaining their own institutions and their independence. It was a position analogous to the union of the Crowns of England and Scotland on the accession of James VI of Scotland to the Crown of England in 1603; and it was hoped that the nations would grow into a closer union of institutions. The union was nominally maintained down to the end of the fifteenth century, and John (or Hans), King from 1481 to 1513, reigned nominally in Sweden as well as in Denmark and Norway. With the accession of his son, Christian II, a more important epoch of Danish and Scandinavian history begins.

1. POLITICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY OF DENMARK

Lübeck
and the
Hanseatic
League

The chief rival to Danish power in the waters of the Baltic had hitherto been the Hanseatic League—that great League of German trading towns, which played the leading part in the commercial history of northern Europe during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It had long passed the zenith of its greatness, and was now threatened with dissolution by its loose constitution, its internal quarrels, and the rise of the great European monarchies. But it had not yet passed away, and one city in the Baltic, Lübeck, was in itself a power to be reckoned with. It was rich and ambitious and saw the advance of the Danish power with alarm. Its wealth allowed it to interfere with effect in the quarrels of Denmark and Sweden.

General
character of
Scandinavian
history

The history of these Scandinavian kingdoms in the sixteenth century has many resemblances to that of the other European states. Here, too, we see a monarchy, which is a sort of dictatorship, struggling to establish national unity against the claims of nobles and clergy and municipalities. Some of the Kings—especially Christian II of Denmark and

Gustavus Vasa of Sweden—are men of the type of Henry VII of England, Louis XI of France, and Ferdinand of Aragon ; men intent on securing strength for the monarchy and unity for the nation, unscrupulous as to the means they employed, shrinking sometimes neither from fraud nor from murder. The Protestant movement meanwhile entered the country in the usual way, by means of pamphlets and preachers. The method of its acceptance depended on political and financial considerations. In both countries the royal power strengthened itself by absorbing the authority of the Church.

The career of King Christian II (1513-32) is hardly to be surpassed for romance and tragedy. The Crown was nominally elective, and the nobles and clergy (as in the elective Empire) had profited by this to win from the King dangerous privileges. It was the great effort of Christian II to make the Crown hereditary as a means to making it strong, to beat down the rival power of nobles and clergy, and to reduce Sweden into real subjection to Denmark. After coming near to a great success, his life ended in a tragic failure.

His devotion to a Dutch lady, who became his mistress, Sweden was a cause of trouble, for it induced him to give posts to foreigners, which made him unpopular ; but he married Isabella, sister of the Emperor Charles V, and this connected him with the politics of the centre and south of Europe. Sweden was the great source of difficulty to him. He claimed the throne, but the Swedes were very jealous of the Danes, and the real power was in the hands of natives. The chief of these were the Regent, Sten Sture, a young man, barely twenty years of age and the representative of the Nationalist Party, and the Archbishop of Upsala, Trolle, who was supported by the aristocracy, the Church, and the Danish interests. Both of them were young and ambitious ; and between them a fierce civil war had broken out. The Archbishop appealed to King Christian for help, and he promptly went to his relief. But twice he was defeated (1516 and 1517). On the second occasion he proposed an interview with his antagonist, and asked for hostages to ensure his own safety. The hostages were handed over, but Christian never went to the interview. With gross perfidy he carried them off to Denmark. Among them was Gustavus Vasa,

who became the founder of modern Sweden and the bitterest enemy of King Christian.

**Danish
conquest of
Sweden**

In 1520 Christian struck again after more careful preparation. His army consisted of hired soldiers, German, French, and Scotch. In the next century the peasants of Sweden became the best soldiers in Europe under the training of Gustavus Adolphus; but now they were unequal to professional soldiers drawn from other countries. Sten Sture was defeated and killed at Lake Asunden. The Council of State at Upsala surrendered to Christian and did homage to him on condition that the traditions of the Swedish kingdom should be preserved inviolate. The people of Sweden did not accept the defeat, and a large peasant army was collected under the influence of the widow of Sten Sture. A murderous battle was fought near Upsala, but again the army of the King of Denmark gained the upper hand. The surrender of Stockholm followed, after Christian had promised a full amnesty for all acts of hostility committed against him. He had won a complete triumph. Later in the year the national assembly swore fealty to him and recognized him definitely as a hereditary monarch, whereas by the tradition and law of Sweden the monarchy was elective. But no resistance was possible. Christian had triumphed as the champion of the Church and of its Archbishop Trolle; and he was solemnly crowned by Trolle in Stockholm Cathedral.

**The
massacre of
Stockholm**

But then followed a crime which Sweden has never forgotten, and which has done much to envenom the antagonism between Danes and Swedes and to prevent that union of the Scandinavian peoples, which seemed from many points of view both desirable and possible. Christian's policy was violent by temperament and theory. "The remedies that give the whole body a good shaking are the best and surest" is an opinion attributed to him. He determined to terrorize his enemies by killing his chief opponents. It did not prove possible to execute them as traitors, because their actions were covered by an act of amnesty and had been supported by the national assembly. Eighty-two persons—bishops, nobles, town-councillors, and commoners—were arrested and tried for heresy on the ground that they had resisted the

Archbishop and had been parties to his deposition in 1517. They were put to death in different ways, and, when the bodies were burnt, the bodies of Sten Sture and of his child were exhumed and burnt with them. This is known as the Stockholm Massacre. There were crimes as bad committed in several countries in the sixteenth century; but Swedish national sentiment fastened on this, and has given it a notoriety only second to the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day in France.

Retribution soon came, but Christian's plans in Denmark were for a time as successful as his foreign campaigns. He wished to make the monarchy in Denmark hereditary and the sole source of power. The privileges of the nobles were to be reduced; the power and the wealth of the clergy much diminished; the condition of the peasantry was to be improved and the worst abuses of serfdom abolished. He was interested in the new humanism. He travelled and learnt much from foreign countries, especially from the Dutch. He corresponded with Erasmus, and entertained foreign artists at his Court. If ruin had not come upon him, posterity might have thought as indulgently of him as of Louis XI of France whom he resembled in many respects.¹ But he had offended too many strong interests and had no standing army to back him. Sweden rebelled under Gustavus Vasa; we shall follow events there later. The Hansa towns were irritated by the increasing of the tolls on the Sound, and Lübeck declared war. In Denmark itself there was a general rally of revolt; nobles and clergy and towns were all against him. They renounced their allegiance and transferred the Crown to Frederick, his uncle, Duke of Holstein. The situation might have been recovered if Christian could have raised an army such as that with which he had conquered Sweden; but money failed him, and his nerve was unequal to the task. He fled from his kingdom into the Netherlands (1523).

He lived until 1559. For nine years he was in miserable exile in the Netherlands. In 1532 he attempted to recover his kingdom by an attack on Norway, but he was defeated

¹ "Consistently democratic in his domestic policy Christian had deliberately aimed at increasing the power of the unprivileged classes at the expense of the nobility" (Hollendorf and Schück, p. 114).

and forced to surrender. He was taken to Copenhagen and passed the remaining twenty-seven years of his life as a prisoner, and seven of them under cruelly rigorous conditions, for his memory was popular with the peasantry, and attacks on the new Government were made in his name. When all danger was past, he was allowed a little more liberty and comfort.

The chief interest of Scandinavian history now passes to Sweden, where Gustavus Vasa succeeded in giving to the royal power that concentrated strength which Christian had aimed at in Denmark ; but for the sake of clearness, we will follow the Danish story a little farther.

Luther-
anism in
Denmark

The overthrow of Christian II had been the work of King Frederick I, Duke of Holstein, acting in alliance with the clergy and the nobility, and supported by Sweden and Lübeck. There was no chance, therefore, of the plans of Christian II—of a strong centralized monarchy resting on the support of the common people—being taken up again. Yet the old order could not altogether be restored, and the Church settlement was tottering. The clergy had given Frederick valuable help, but their position in Denmark was being undermined during his reign. Lutheranism was beginning to penetrate the country, and, as usual, found its chief exponents among the ecclesiastics themselves. Tausen, a monk, who had studied in Wittenberg and come in contact with Luther, was one of the first preachers of the new ideas. There is no evidence of widespread opposition to the Roman Church, but the loyalty of the people was tepid. And at the same time the great wealth of the Church offered a very strong inducement to attack. Already in the reign of Frederick I the Bishops were brought into subjection to the royal power ; the Crown laid hands on certain payments hitherto made to Rome ; the nobles occupied some of the monasteries. The Roman Church found nowhere in the land any efficient defender.

Christian
III and
the
"Count's
War"

The tendency towards Protestantism became stronger during the reign of Frederick's son and successor, Christian III. He was a declared Lutheran, and his accession was therefore resisted by the clergy. A civil war broke out. The new King had to struggle against a coalition which seemed very

strong. The clergy took no prominent part ; but the towns and the peasantry rose and found a leader in Count Christopher of Oldenburg, a relative of the imprisoned Christian II, and from him the war is known as the "Count's War." Christian II was again declared King. A Revolution had taken place at Lübeck, where a democratic party had overthrown the commercial aristocracy, which for so long had ruled there, and the new Government, through sympathy with the popular aims of the insurgents, supported the opposition to Christian III and his aristocratic supporters. The war had some resemblance to the Peasants' War in Germany ; the peasants and the revolutionary party in Lübeck challenged the aristocracy and the monarchy. Gustavus Vasa of Sweden, however, came to the help of Christian III, and, after a confused struggle of two years, he became master of the two Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark.

The King and his aristocratic supporters had won. The clergy had accepted Christian III before the end of the war, but it was they who had to pay the bill. In 1536 a meeting of the Royal Council was called from which the Bishops were forcibly excluded. The lay members of the Council declared that the clerics should be expelled from the Council, and that their property should be confiscated to the Crown. Then a National Diet, consisting of 1200 representatives of nobility, burgesses, and peasantry, was called, and under the direction of the nobility—for the whole Protestant movement in Denmark is strongly aristocratic in character—declared its readiness to accept the decisions of the Council. The lightening of taxation was promised as a result of the confiscation of Church property ; but the peasantry lost rather than gained, and were submitted again to something like the restraints of serfdom. In this Diet, too, the monarchy was declared in effect to be hereditary ; the "elective" title was still maintained, but election was only to be resorted to in case the King had no male issue.

It is sometimes said that Lutheranism was not a mission-ary religion, that its influence was confined to Germany, and that it contrasts in this way very strongly with the universal outlook of Calvinism. But until the century was half run, Lutheranism was capable of winning proselytes and rousing

enthusiasm in all parts of Europe ; and it was Lutheranism which, with some modifications, came to dominate the three Scandinavian kingdoms. It was Bugenhagen, a Professor from Wittenberg, who played the leading part in organizing the Church in Denmark. The title of Bishop was not abolished ; Luther himself had had no objection to the title : but the episcopal functions were assimilated to those of Lutheran superintendents. There was little enthusiasm for the new forms, but there was little that could be called persecution of the Roman Catholics. The monarchy had gained something by the change ; the nobles more ; the commerce of Denmark advanced rapidly ; the condition of the peasantry deteriorated. From henceforward Denmark counted without question as a Protestant state, and King Christian III made alliance with the evangelical princes of Germany in 1538. The alliance did not endure, and the King complained that he had been abandoned by his German allies ; but in the era of religious wars, which was now to open, there was no doubt as to the side to which Denmark would be led by interest and sympathy.

Christian
III and
Germany

Christian III lived until 1559. The last twenty years of his life were a period of peaceful development for Denmark. The Protestant settlement, artificially imposed in the first instance, struck root and won the support of the nation. Order came back to the country which had been ravaged by the civil war and the excesses of the mercenary soldiers. Commerce developed. The King's chief attention was given to foreign affairs. Charles V and the Catholic reaction were his enemies ; and he watched with anxiety the Schmalkaldic war, and was relieved by the failure and abdication of the Emperor.

King
Frederick II

Our survey of the history of Denmark during the second half of the century must be summary. Frederick II succeeded his father and reigned until 1588. The reign is full of military incidents, most of them concerned with the war against Sweden. Frederick II held the ambition of re-establishing the Union of Kalmar and reigning over all the Scandinavian peoples. In pursuit of this aim, he plunged the two kindred peoples into a furious war which lasted for seven years. It is full of interesting military and naval

incidents, and produced soldiers and sailors of high ability such as Trolle, the admiral, and Rantzau, who has been called the Turenne of Denmark. But the "glory" of the war is less noticeable than the ferocity and bestial cruelty with which it was conducted on both sides. Perhaps King Eric XIV of Sweden, more than half a madman, must bear the chief responsibility; but the Danes were not much behind him. The conquest of Sweden was not achieved, and the Danes suffered several sharp defeats especially at sea. Yet on the whole the prestige of Denmark was increased, and these years, during which all ships were forced to salute the Danish flag, are called the Hegemony of Denmark in the Baltic. One impression left by the incidents of the reign is that there was no population with such an appetite for war or with such natural gifts for it as the peoples of the Scandinavian kingdoms.

Christian IV, the son of Frederick II, succeeded and reigned from 1588 to 1648. His reign thus saw the beginning and the end of the Thirty Years' War; it saw the rise of Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus to the position of one of the greatest military powers in Europe, and the eclipse of the Danish power in the Baltic. Yet the early years of the reign, with which we are alone concerned in this book, were occupied chiefly with the renewal of the futile and suicidal war against Sweden. Denmark gained some advantages in spite of the appearance of Gustavus on the battle-field. In 1618 peace was arranged by the mediation of England, and Denmark gained some territory and a large war indemnity. But this is of little importance compared with the events which were leading all Europe into the Thirty Years' War, which will be told in another chapter.

Denmark would never again be a great European Power, though a distinguished and honourable part still remained for her in the development of European civilization. It was not only the smallness of her population which told against her success in diplomacy and war, for Sweden was a smaller state; nor her situation, exposed as it was to an attack on the south. Denmark, though her development was to a large extent in harmony with the general tendencies of the age, had failed to win the concentration and unity which are

the mark of the successful powers in the sixteenth century. Her monarchy had indeed made a great advance towards heredity; national feeling was strong; the Church was subordinate to the State. But on the other hand the elements of election which were still attached to the Crown allowed the nobles to win a dangerous power and weakened the power of the Government. The nobles themselves were exclusive, privileged, and without public spirit except for war. Above all the peasantry were driven back into serfdom. This last fact helps very largely to account for the different rôles played by the two Scandinavian monarchies in the next two centuries; it was not only the genius of the Vasa family which gave the pre-eminence to Sweden. The social and political condition of Sweden had a solidity that Denmark lacked.

2. THE HISTORY OF SWEDEN AND ITS ADOPTION OF LUTHERANISM

Geographical
disad-
vantages of
Sweden

Of the three Scandinavian kingdoms, Denmark was much the largest. The combined population of all three is estimated at "a little over a million and a half"; and about one-half lived in Denmark; its superiority in wealth was even greater than in population. Further, its geographical situation was in almost every respect superior to that of Norway and Sweden. It had the milder climate and the more fertile land. It held Norway, where the kingdom was hereditary, and the valuable south-west of Sweden, where are the chief Swedish harbours, was also in its possession. Thus Denmark controlled without question the passages from the Baltic into the German Ocean, and could strangle the maritime trade of the Baltic lands with the world outside.

The Vasa
family

Yet Sweden has played a greater part in European history than Denmark. Twice at least her rulers and people seemed to control the balance of Europe; in the seventeenth century and at the beginning of the eighteenth. The great importance that fell to her was due partly to her position, which had many disadvantages but compensated for them by removing her from serious danger of invasion by the great European Powers; partly to the great qualities of her people; and

partly to the remarkable family which, from early in the sixteenth century, held the throne and conducted the Government. This was the Vasa family, which produced indeed some rulers of disordered brain, but none of mediocre character, and some that rivalled the greatest of European names as soldiers and statesmen.

The founder of the greatness of the family was Gustavus Vasa, who was born in 1496 and reigned from 1523 to 1560. The country was divided into two chief parties; the Nationalist anti-Danish Party, represented and led by the great family of the Stures; and the Unionists, who desired the continuance of the connection between the three Scandinavian kingdoms and supported the claims of Denmark. We have seen how Christian II had tried to force on a closer union between Denmark and Sweden, and how disastrously he had failed.

Gustavus
Vasa

Gustavus Vasa belonged to the nobility of Sweden and was a relative of Sten Sture. He was one of the hostages kidnapped to Denmark by Christian in the fraud of 1517. The young man lived some time in the Danish capital; he then escaped to Lübeck and got back to Sweden in 1520. It was while he was in Sweden that the massacre of Stockholm occurred; Gustavus' father was one of the victims, and the family estates were confiscated. His struggle against Denmark, therefore, had in it something of the quality of a personal revenge. His early efforts to raise the country against the Danish tyrant were a failure. He made his way to Dalarna, a valley fertile in land and minerals and inhabited by a race of men distinguished even in Sweden for their independence and endurance. The story of Gustavus' adventures there—the disguises he assumed, his hair-breadth escapes, the apparent complete failure of his plans—is one of the great romances of Swedish history. He was on the point of abandoning all hope of defeating the invader, when the report of fresh oppressions at last roused resistance. The rebellion flared up and spread, and was never suppressed until all connection with Denmark had been destroyed. Gustavus Vasa was throughout the soul of the movement, and without his skill, shrewdness, and unflinching courage it could hardly have succeeded. But he was favoured by fortune too.

Christian II had withdrawn to Denmark, believing that the conquest of Sweden was complete. When he was preparing to undertake an expedition against Gustavus, rebellion broke out against him in Denmark. We have seen that in 1523 he fled to the Netherlands, where he was protected by Charles V, whose sister he had married. The civil war in Denmark saved Gustavus in Sweden.

The Nationalist movement triumphed everywhere. The Danes were hated as foreigners, and all classes co-operated in attacking them. Even the Church, whose leader, Trolle, had been the mainstay of the Danish Party, declared for Gustavus with something like unanimity. By 1523 the Danes had been driven out everywhere, except from Stockholm and a few fortresses. It was necessary, therefore, to define the position of Gustavus. A national Diet (*Riksdag*) was called to Strangnäs, a cathedral city on Lake Malar opposite to Stockholm. The constitution of the *Riksdag* was by no means fixed. At Strangnäs there were members of the traditional Council (sometimes called the Cabinet) of Sweden, along with representatives of the nobility, the towns, the miners and the peasants, and there were also two delegates from the city of Lübeck, which, in its hatred and fear of Christian II, had given valuable help to Gustavus. The result of the assembly was certain from the first. Gustavus was unanimously elected to be King of Sweden, and the political connection with Denmark was thus broken for ever.

Gustavus had won a prize of very doubtful value. The country was in the very direst poverty, and was soon irritated by the inevitable disillusionment at the economic effects of Gustavus' victory. The Danes had been expelled from Swedish territory, but they still held Norway and the south-west of what is now Sweden. And though the Danes had gone, it seemed as though their place would be taken by the Hanseatic towns of Lübeck and Dantzic. These, out of rivalry against Denmark, had given Gustavus valuable assistance, but they wanted payment; and the payment they demanded took the form partly of money and partly of commercial privileges. Gustavus had to allow the commerce from the two cities to enter Sweden duty free, and

all Swedish commerce had to pass through their harbours. The country might thus easily become a dependency of the Hanseatic League. Nor was all healthy at home. The great nobles found their position threatened by the personal power of Gustavus. They had supported him against Christian II, but they found that they had established an even stronger master over themselves, and one who took the side of the peasantry against them. Lastly, a very serious and difficult Church question began to arise. The Church in Sweden was rich, powerful, and apparently not unpopular. Gustavus, like nearly every ruler in Europe, was jealous of its power and covetous of its wealth. There were many examples in Germany to show him how such a situation might be turned to the advantage of the Crown.

Defeat
of the
Hanseatic
League

It is not possible to give any details of the triumph of Gustavus over his foreign enemies. He was much helped by the civil strife in Denmark and north Germany. The democratic revolution which broke out in Lübeck proved particularly fortunate for Sweden. It involved Lübeck in the "Count's War" in Denmark. Gustavus had always feared an alliance of Lübeck and Denmark against himself; he now very gladly joined with Christian III against Lübeck. The Lübeckers were defeated both by sea and land, and in 1537 Wullenwebber was deposed and the proud city had to accept terms at Gustavus' hands. Sweden was liberated from Hanseatic control and now traded freely within and beyond the Baltic. The heavy debt of Sweden to Lübeck was wiped away at the same time.

Domestic
rebellion

Gustavus had serious difficulties to face in Sweden itself. Twice the men of Dalarna rose in rebellion. They chafed under their poverty and disliked Gustavus' religious changes; (they demanded that he should "burn, or otherwise do away with, all who ate flesh on Friday or Saturday"). The King knew what these men were capable of, and struck at their rising with vigour and cruelty (1532). Later, in 1589, there came a rising further south in Småland, known as Dacke's rebellion. It was subdued after a battle at Lake Asunden.

Protes-
tantism in
Sweden

The religious and political changes, introduced by Gustavus, demand rather closer attention. "He gave his people a Protestant Fatherland against their will." Nowhere in

Europe do the religious changes seem to spring more entirely from political and financial motives. Yet even in Sweden the ground was prepared by religious propaganda and discussion. The great preacher of Lutheranism was Olaus Petri, who had graduated at Wittenberg University and had caught fire from the teaching and preaching of Luther. On his return to Sweden, he preached the new ideas with fervour and success. His chief colleague in the work was Laurentius Andreae, who was for some time the Chancellor and trusted servant of the King. First, the New Testament and then the whole Bible were translated into Swedish. The Lutheran propaganda won considerable, but certainly not general, support.

At the very beginning of the war the Church, under the leadership of Archbishop Trolle, had taken the Danish side; but since then Gustavus had had no reason to complain of the attitude of the clergy. Especially Archbishop Brask of Linköping had given the King valuable advice and financial assistance. The King called on the Church again and again to help him to support the burdens of the State. He melted down the sacred vessels and took away one bell from every church. There was discontent at all this, but no open resistance. For the Church in Sweden was independent in its attitude to Rome. The people sometimes chose their clergy; the King had sometimes nominated Bishops. A settlement on the lines of the French Concordat might have been possible.

Gustavus decided on more drastic changes. His own convictions counted for something, probably for much. He was not a scholar, but he was deeply read in the Scriptures; and Luther's claim that they should be taken as the only authority in matters of religion seemed to him reasonable. The decisive step was taken in 1527, when the King summoned a *Riksdag* to Westerås—on the northern shore of Lake Malar. There were present members of the aristocratic Council, Lords spiritual and temporal, with representatives of the townsmen, the miners, and the peasants. The King called the *Riksdag* together that he might address it and procure its approval of his projects. The meeting was decisive for the future of Sweden. The King opened it with a speech, dwelling on the urgent needs of the Government and

Gustavus
introduces
a Protest-
ant Reform-
ation

indicating Church property as a means of satisfying both the needs of the Crown and the nobles. There was much resistance. Archbishop Brask, a noble and pathetic figure, was the spokesman for the opposition. So strong was the resistance that the King, after a violent denunciation of "the degenerate and undutiful land," withdrew and threatened resignation.

The
Westerås
Recess

Gustavus was felt to be necessary for the security and even for the existence of Sweden. The *Riksdag* capitulated to his demands. It is to be noted that the representatives of the peasants took the lead in urging him to return. The two Protestant leaders, Laurentius Andreae and Olaus Petri, were the chief agents in arranging terms. The result was the Westerås Recess, which meant much more than appeared on the surface. Most of its provisions are political and financial. Sedition was to be suppressed; the resources of the cathedrals and monasteries were to be applied (after reasonable provision had been made for the claims of religion) to the needs of the King and his nobles. At the end it was laid down that the persecution of heretics should cease, and that "the Word of God should be expounded plainly and purely."

Church
settlement

The meaning of the last clause was made clear in the ordinances subsequently issued, on which the Church settlement of Sweden henceforth rested. It had a good many points in common with the Reformation settlement of England. The connection with Rome was broken; but the Bishops and the organization of the Church were maintained. Lutheranism was followed for the most part in matters of doctrine; but old ceremonies and ornaments were kept as helps to the devout life.

Royal con-
trol of the
Church

The Church in Sweden became thus one of the many state-controlled Churches that were rising up in Europe. Some strange events, which occurred a few years later, showed how rigorous Gustavus intended that control to be. The two leading reformers incurred the wrath of the King, but it is difficult to see what exactly their offence was. But they were independent in spirit and speech; they criticized the King's financial policy; and Olaus foretold the wrath of God against the King. They were both arrested and charged with

conspiracy against the King's life, and both were found guilty and condemned to death. They were pardoned and set free after payment of a heavy fine ; but there could be no doubt henceforth that the Swedish Church was in the King's hands, and he controlled it largely by means of German agents.

Gustavus is a perfect example of the new monarchies ^{The Swedish} which were springing up in Europe in the sixteenth century. ^{monarchy} He was clearly a man of iron will, great ambition and high talents for both politics and war. Yet his own desire for power was neither the sole nor the chief cause of his rise to power. Swedish national sentiment, taking the easily understood form of hatred of the Danes, was the chief force that supported him. The conflicts between classes and districts made the existence of a strong Government desirable for the maintenance of power ; and though Gustavus had much trouble from the men of Dalarna, it was in the peasantry that he found his main support. More resources were essential to such a monarchy, and it could tolerate no rival to its own authority. And so the Church was brought into subjection and spoiled of a large part of its income. Nationalism, unity, the defence of the Commons against the privileged classes, the reduction of the Church from a position of independence to a position of subordination—these are the usual features of the strong monarchies of the century. They are to be found with modifications in the Tudor monarchs of England, in Henry IV of France, in Ferdinand of Spain, in many of the German princes, but hardly anywhere is the operation of these forces so clear as in the career of Gustavus of Sweden.

The political edifice was completed by the Pact of Succession of 1544. The Swedes had been proud of the elective ^{Heredity} character of their monarchy, and one of the charges against Christian II of Denmark was that he wanted to establish hereditary monarchy in Sweden. But it was becoming plain that the principle of election was a source of weakness in the Government, of divisions in the country, and of civil war. Now the Swedish throne was made hereditary in the House of Vasa ; and Gustavus' children were given possessions which implied princely rank.

The
younger
Vasas

The recognition of the hereditary principle was the culmination of the triumph of Gustavus Vasa, but the years after the death of Gustavus in 1560 were an ironic comment on the new system. It was clear that, if election had its dangers, so had heredity, and that the accident of birth might bring the State into most unworthy hands.

Gustavus had left four sons: Eric by his first wife; John, Charles, and Magnus by his second. The succession had been secured first to Eric and then, failing male issue to Eric, to the other brothers in order of seniority. But without question insanity showed itself in the children of both mothers. Magnus was soon removed from public life; and Eric's conduct on the throne can only be explained by mental instability, which sometimes amounted to dangerous madness.

King Eric

Eric's personal history has attracted much attention, but it must be very shortly summarized here. He showed at times real ability and political insight; but all was spoiled by a mania of jealousy and suspicion, which later developed into homicidal insanity. He put to death by a series of judicial murders many of the leading nobles, and he stabbed Nils Sture with his own hand. He had intervals of passionate repentance during which he was reconciled to his enemies. But his condition grew worse and worse. His brothers, John and Charles, took up arms against him. He was thrown into prison and probably poisoned there (1577). He had been a suitor for the hand of both Queen Elizabeth of England and Queen Mary of Scotland, as well as of other princesses; but he had married in the end the daughter of a common soldier. The son of this mother, however, was not recognized as heir to the throne.

Sweden's
possessions
south of the
Baltic

The most important events of the reign, if judged by their influence on the future, were those that marked the beginning of the Swedish possessions beyond the Baltic which gave to Sweden in the next two centuries pages of unsurpassed glory and disaster. In 1561 Reval and Esthonia, threatened by Russia and by Poland, adopted Eric as their King. This new possession gave Sweden a hold on the Gulf of Finland. Even more important in its consequences was a marriage contracted by John, Eric's brother and successor, with Catherine, the sister of Sigismund, King of

Poland, which was carried out in spite of the protests of Eric, who saw the dangers likely to arise from the entanglement of Sweden with the destinies of Poland.

John III succeeded Eric XIV in 1569, and reigned for John III twenty-four years. He was a man of much learning and of intense interest in religious questions. His reign saw a real effort at reconciliation between the Roman and the Protestant Churches in Sweden—the first of the many unsuccessful efforts at such a consummation which have been seen during the last four centuries. Among the causes which predisposed John to this policy, the rising tide of the Catholic reaction counted for something. Moreover, his wife, Catherine of Poland, was a member of the Roman Church, and his own studies and convictions inclined him to sympathize with medieval rather than with Lutheran ideals.

The King himself drew up a new Church manual and a Effort at compromise with Rome liturgy, which accepted many characteristic Roman practices, and was made legal in 1577. The new developments in Sweden were watched in Rome with eager interest, and an Italian priest was despatched to watch and co-operate. It seemed for a time that the King was actually prepared to embrace the Roman faith. He received absolution and attended High Mass. But then difficulties showed themselves. John was not willing to abandon all that had been established by Gustavus Vasa; Rome, on her side, would not make the desired concessions. A sharp division was introduced into the Swedish Church, but the reconciliation was not effected. Sigismund, the King's son, was, however, brought up in the Roman faith.

The Swedish enterprises to the south of the Baltic con- Narva tinued. John was not a soldier, but war with Russia could not be avoided. As the result of several campaigns, the Swedes were able to add Narva to Reval and thus to tighten their hold on the Gulf of Finland.

In 1586, Stephen Bathory, the King of Poland, died, and Sigismund, King of Poland John's son, Sigismund, became a candidate for the elective throne and was elected. The step raised very difficult issues, for Sigismund was heir to the Swedish throne, and the Swedes and Poles were not only widely separated by race and religion, but their commercial interests and aims to the south of the Baltic were in direct opposition.

Religious
strife

The serious nature of these difficulties was soon apparent when, on the death of John in 1592, Sigismund inherited the Swedish throne. He came to Sweden, eager to re-establish the Roman faith and worship, at any rate on a basis of toleration. It was an important move in the campaign of the Catholic reaction against triumphant Protestantism; but it encountered a dogged and well-ordered resistance. The leader of the Protestant Nationalists was the fourth of the sons of Gustavus Vasa, Duke Charles; the son of a great father, and the father of a greater son, Gustavus Adolphus. Before Sigismund had arrived, a meeting at Upsala had affirmed its determination to uphold Lutheranism as defined by Gustavus Vasa. There had been little religious coercion in Sweden up to the present, but now men's tempers grew bitter, and the partisans of Rome were subsequently treated with much barbarity.

Victory
of Protes-
tantism

Sigismund failed. The exclusive privileges of the Lutheran State-Church were defended with great energy. War came between Charles and his brother, and Sigismund, after being defeated at Strangnäs, withdrew to Poland. A *Riksdag* was called to Stockholm in 1599, and it deposed Sigismund as "Papist, oathbreaker, and enemy of the realm." His adherents were cruelly persecuted, and his son was excluded from the succession. These events were pregnant with important consequences in the near future, which Charles' son, Gustavus Adolphus, would have to deal with.

Charles
IX

Duke Charles reigned as Charles IX. The coming of the Thirty Years' War and the career of his son throw their shadows across the whole reign, so that it is difficult to think of the events of the time as they presented themselves to contemporaries. Even before his accession to the throne, Charles had been the champion of Swedish Nationalism and the Protestant Church. As the struggle with the Roman reaction drew nearer, the temper on both sides grew more exclusive and aggressive. The Swedish Diet anticipated the decisions of the English Parliament of a century later by declaring that the King and his wife must be Protestants, and that only members of the established Church could hold any office in Sweden.

A national army was organized; each district had to

provide a certain number of horse and foot. For Sweden, then, the day of mercenary armies was over, and the soldiers were being prepared which triumphed under Gustavus Adolphus at Breitenfeld and Lützen.

Foreign affairs were obscure and dangerous. Russia was passing through a period of confusion and anarchy. Poland, under Sigismund, was powerful and ambitious and permanently hostile to Sweden. King Charles therefore made alliance with Russia, and Swedish troops saved Moscow from the Poles. The rulers of both Poland and Sweden entertained hopes of placing the Russian Crown on the head of some member of their family. When Charles died in 1611 the independence of Sweden was assured, and her power of interfering in the affairs of her neighbours to the south was apparent.

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
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EASTERN EUROPE IN 1580

CHAPTER XII

A NOTE ON RUSSIAN HISTORY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

AMONG the voyages of discovery made in the sixteenth century, those which brought western Europeans into Russia were not the least important. It is of course not true that Russia was discovered in the same sense in which America or the Cape of Good Hope were discovered; for the existence of Russia was known, and some idea of her Government had filtered into the western mind. But she was no real part of Europe, and those who made their way to Moscow during the century, whether they were Germans or Italians, or English, speak of what they saw there with the same tone of amazement that we find in the recitals of the Portuguese in India or the Spaniards in Mexico or Peru. During the century western European influence began to penetrate the manners and ideas of the Russians. The "Expansion of Europe" may be observed into Russia, as well as into India or America. But there is another and an opposite side to the history of Russia at this time. She made great progress south and east; she extended her power over the Mohammedan Tartars and over the races of Siberia; and thus carried European ideas where they had hitherto had little power. The Portuguese, as we have seen, by their discoveries and conquests were attacking Islam in the south-east; Russia was striking a blow at the same enemy from the north and north-east. The future was to show how very dangerous the new movement was for the Turkish power. Thus Russia is both a field for the Expansion of Europe, and herself an important agent in that expansion.

Contrast
between
Russia and
western
Europe

The Russian peoples were Christians, and, since the fall of Constantinople, the great representatives of the Orthodox Church. Moscow claimed to be the "third Rome"; to take the place, that is to say, of Rome and Constantinople, since the first was alien from the orthodox faith and the second in the hands of the infidels. In race and language the Russians were closely akin to the Poles, and no one has ever denied to the Poles the right to call themselves Europeans. Yet Russia was a world apart, and there was very little real resemblance between the life and institutions of Russia and those of western Europe. The intellectual and artistic movement, usually summed up as the Renaissance, hardly touched Russia at all; she was entirely unmoved by the Reformation, and the chief religious movement of the time in Russia was a protest against the slightest variation from the established ritual and doctrine. Dress, behaviour, and social customs were rigidly regulated by public opinion; women were kept in seclusion; nearly all social pleasures were forbidden. There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between life in Moscow and life in Madrid, Paris, Florence, or London. Yet in one respect Russian development during the sixteenth century fell into line with that of western Europe. The monarchy grew strong and centralized; the nobles and the towns were crushed; the Czars established their power by means that may be compared with those used by Louis XI or Ferdinand of Spain. We shall consider later how far the resemblance, so striking on the surface, is really fundamental. It is to the development of the royal power that we shall devote most attention, without following in any detail the expansion of Russian territory, though that is of the greatest importance for the future.

Ivan III

Ivan III, known as Ivan the Great, held the throne of Muscovy from 1462 to 1505; and he was without question the great founder of the later Russian autocracy. He is often called by a Russian name which signifies "the gatherer in of lands," and this title was well deserved. During his long reign, he more than doubled the territories directly ruled over by the Grand Princes of Moscow, and used occasionally the title of "Sovereign by the grace of God of all Russia,"

thus preparing the way for the later title of Czar. The external expansion of Russia has so close a relation to the building up of the autocracy that it cannot altogether be omitted. The contrast between the fate of Poland and the fate of Russia is strange and puzzling. The two countries have much resemblance in language, institutions, and national characteristics. Yet during the sixteenth century the feet of Russia were placed firmly on the road which led soon to autocracy at home and vast influence abroad ; while Poland began to sink towards impotence and extinction. Among the causes which allow us to understand the contrast, the difference in the military history of the two countries is one of the most important. The Polish people and nobles had great military talents, and they gained some great military triumphs ; but on the whole they failed. The Grand Dukes of Muscovy, on the other hand, struck down their enemies in all directions, and turned to their domestic problems with all the prestige derived from foreign conquest. It is no accident that the gatherer in of lands is also the founder of the strong monarchy.

Ivan III's greatest triumphs were the following. He conquered and annexed the Republic of Great Novgorod. The ruin of its trade and the destruction of its municipal liberties were probably a grave blow to the development of Russia ; but they marked a great extension of the central power. He gained considerable successes in war against Lithuania, which was a constant danger to Russia and was disputed with Poland. Lithuania was not, indeed, annexed, and was soon united more closely to Poland, but important frontier districts were incorporated with Muscovy. The break up of the Tartar Horde was the most important step of all. This was not due to the military prowess of Ivan, but rather to the internal decay of the Tartar state and the rivalry of the neighbouring Tartar powers, especially of the Khan of the Crimea. The suzerainty of the Tartars over Moscow, which had been weakening for a long time, was now definitely repudiated.

Much would be allowed to a ruler with these triumphs to his credit, and certainly the power of the monarchy made great strides during the reign. An important influence in

Contrast
between
Poland and
Russia

Territorial
conquests
of Ivan III

Russia and
Constanti-
nople

the building up of the new monarchy was the marriage of Ivan to Sophia, the niece of Constantine Paleologus, the last Greek Emperor. It is impossible to determine the extent of the influence¹ but it certainly was important. Russia henceforth regarded herself as the heiress of Constantinople, and imitated something of its methods and aims. Greeks were introduced into the diplomatic service of Russia; and other foreigners followed them.

The nobles
of Russia

There were few, if any, constitutional barriers in Russia to the royal power. There was, indeed, the Duma or Council, which consisted of great nobles in the service of the Grand Duke; but it was wholly dependent on the Grand Duke himself, and was rather an agency of the central authority than a check on it. The municipal institutions of Russia were weak, and were destroyed by the advance of the central power. The one real rival of the monarchy was to be found in the nobility. The greatest of the nobles, the princes who held independent appanages, had indeed been reduced to obedience; but the feudal nobles, the boyars, still remained. It was upon their retainers that the King relied for his armies, and it was not possible therefore to disregard their wishes entirely. In some respects the powers of the nobles had been increased by the victories of the Grand Duke, for the conquered lands had been distributed among them. Russia knew little of the mercenary armies, which were a strong anti-feudal force in western Europe. Nor was there in Russia the educated lawyer class which contributed so much to the triumph of the central power in France, Spain, and the German states. For administration and for war the Grand Duke of Muscovy had to rely very largely on the nobles, who were his chief rivals.²

Fall of
Pskof and
Smolensk

The reign of Basil III (1505-88) was a long one, and important events occurred during it; but the memory of it

¹ Professor Bury, in his admirable chapter in the *Cambridge Modern History*, thinks that there is no evidence that his Greek wife imbued Ivan "with a new idea of Russian unity and Russian Imperial dignity."

² "Under Ivan III (John the Great) Moscow gathers into its orbit every part of the Russian stock, every region of Russian land, that has not been absorbed by the Christian, Catholic, West. Ivan is the first true founder of the Russian Empire as we know it."—Professor R. Beasley in *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks*, p. 76.

has been effaced by the reigns of the two Ivans, his father, Ivan the Great, and his son, Ivan the Terrible. The chief point to be noticed is that the advance of Russia continued during Basil's reign. The city and Republic of Pskof were defeated and annexed (1510). The fall of Pskof brought to Russia considerable extension of territory and military power, but the destruction of the city and its liberties was, like the overthrow of Novgorod, a blow to Russian trade and prosperity, and a further blow to all ideas of political liberty. It was in the cities alone that anything like constitutional government could be found in Russia; and one after the other the cities were being brought under the Grand Duke of Moscovy, and their liberties torn up by the root. The capture of Smolensk (1514) was even more important. This was an incident in the never-ceasing struggle with Poland for the possession of Lithuania. The fall of the city was due largely to internal dissensions, for the Russian army was usually inferior to the Polish and Lithuanian army. The fall of the great frontier fortress was celebrated with widespread rejoicings. Basil fought, too, against the Tartars, but without success. The Tartars invaded Russia and made their way up to Moscow, and Basil had to humiliate himself to secure their retirement. The neighbourhood of these traditional enemies to the religion and race of Russia was perhaps a strength to the monarchy, for it showed the absolute necessity of unity and concentration.

In 1538 the reign, but not the rule, of Ivan the Terrible began. Prince Ivan was only three years old, and the regency was in the hands of his mother, Helen Glinska, a powerful woman with more independence of character and ideas than was usually allowed to the women of Russia. She held her own for five years against much opposition from the Court and the nobles, and died, perhaps poisoned, in 1538. Then came five years of misery and cruel suffering for the young prince; years which perhaps give the clue to the enigma of his strange character. He was held in tutelage by the heads of two families, who plundered the Empire, broke up the machine of government, and murdered his friends. It is strange that his own life was spared, but in 1548 the boy asserted himself in a manner difficult to parallel in history.

He was only thirteen, but he had learnt that great power lay at any rate nominally in his hands. At Christmas 1548 he ordered his servants to seize Andrei Shuisky, the leader of the aristocratic clique that had been governing in his name. He was beaten to death and thrown to the dogs. The reign that began in this way is one of the strangest episodes even in Russian history, where so much is strange. The atmosphere of the palace is almost that of a madhouse. Ivan was clearly afflicted with some form of mania. At times he delighted in cruelty for its own sake, and there seems no possibility of refusing to believe the murders, torturings, and mutilations which are recorded. Sometimes his fury fell upon prominent individuals, sometimes on large groups. Yet this madman was also a cunning and even a great statesman, one of the chief founders of the power of Russia, which has never lost the impress of his work. There are, of course, plenty of horrors elsewhere in Europe during the century; the Inquisition in Spain, the cruel treatment of the Irish in Queen Elizabeth's reign, the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre in France, Cesare Borgia's exploits in the Romagna. But elsewhere the cruelties seem exceptional; they are seen against a background of civilization and growing humanity. In Russia the whole atmosphere is so barbarous, that at times we seem to be in the capital of the Aztecs of Mexico rather than of the head of one of the great Christian Churches.

Character
of Ivan

Fall of
Kazan

Under Ivan the Terrible (the Russian word seems to imply something like reverence as well as fear) the monarchy made great strides. Before we turn to what is our chief subject—the development of the monarchy—let us note the great triumphs of Russian arms. In 1552 Kazan fell after a long siege in which Ivan had shown great persistence, though little military capacity or gallantry. The fall of Kazan is really one of the great events of the century. It was a Mohammedan city, though not subject to the Turk; and the Russian conquest brought a Christian and European Power to the rear of Islam on the north, while the Portuguese were attacking it from India and the south. In the long conflict between Europe and Islam, it is an event of importance perhaps equal to the battle of Lepanto in 1571. Astrakhan fell a little

later, and the whole course of the mighty Volga was in Russian hands. Some of his counsellors wanted Ivan to undertake the conquest of the Crimea, but he refused, though there was fighting against the Khan of the Crimea; he judged, however, that the conquest was beyond his powers.

Kazan was the most important of Ivan's conquests, but by no means the only one. The Russian armies crossed the Ural mountains and carried the dominion of Russia as far as the river Obi. The colonization of Siberia was begun. A Russian embassy made its way to Canton. All this is hardly less important for the expansion of Europe than the voyages of the Portuguese and Spaniards; though contemporaries sometimes denied the right of Russia to be called a European power at all.

The rapidly expanding Empire of Russia grew more and more despotic at the centre. Despotism—or at least some form of personal government—was the only condition under which the Empire could expand or even exist. It was the most despotic state in Europe. In France and Spain there were institutions left with some constitutional powers, and the traditions of western Europe were a very real check on the actions of rulers. But in Russia there was no constitution and very weak institutions. The will of the ruler was the one great force in the state.

It was during this reign that the Grand Dukes of Muscovy first definitely assumed the title of Czar. The word is derived from the Latin Cæsar; but Augustus and not Cæsar had been in the eastern Empire the supreme title. Still there can be no doubt that the title came to imply a claim to supreme personal power.

Ivan's great rivals and enemies were the boyars or nobles, and his relations with them were peculiarly difficult. He could not dispense with them as the chief agents of his rule; and yet their feudal traditions were in conflict with the personal power which he was assuming, and which, in the interest of Russia, he was bound to assume. The first ten years of his reign were comparatively moderate and humane. He was helped and guided during this period by the monk, Silvester, and one of the lesser nobility, Alexis Adasheff. But Ivan came to suspect their fidelity; at the time of his

very serious illness in 1558, they had not supported his schemes for the succession of his son ; and on his unexpected recovery he dismissed them from his Court. Henceforth the savage man seemed to stand alone. No confidential minister was associated with his rule after the fall of Silvester and Adasheff. He had seven wives—not all of them recognized by the Church. The best known is Anastasia Romanovna ; but none of them acquired any great influence over the actions of the Czar. He killed Saint Philip, Archbishop of Moscow ; he put to death his relatives who were accused of intriguing against him ; he massacred the inhabitants of Novgorod ; and later carried out wholesale executions in Moscow. He asked on one occasion the prayers of the Church for his victims and gave the number as 8470. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity ; though many had been put to death with carefully thought-out cruelties.

**Popularity
of Ivan**

It is difficult to see on what basis his power rested. The most tyrannous rulers must have support ; no one man can really force his will upon a great state, unless his will corresponds with the wishes of large sections of his people. And there is in Ivan's reign an incident that seems to show that he also might be termed " a popular dictator " rather than, or as well as, a bloodthirsty tyrant. In January 1565, at the height of his struggle against the nobles, when he had already committed many atrocities, Ivan declared his intention of resigning. He sent a letter to the head of the Church in Moscow, in which he declared that, " unable to endure any longer the treachery and villany of the boyars, he had resolved to abdicate and seek some safe refuge abroad." The result was amazing. Instead of a cry of relief at the disappearance of the great oppressor, we are told that there was universal and passionate protest. The " people "—chiefly the people of Moscow—besought him " to rule as he pleased and take the government into his own hands, so long as he did not leave them defenceless against their enemies, like sheep without a shepherd." There may be great exaggerations in the story ; but the mass of the people seems to have felt instinctively the dangers of anarchy at home and of invasion from abroad, which would follow the disappearance of a powerful Government.

Ivan reigned again ; and made now a curious innovation ^{Russian} in the government of Russia. The country was divided into "dyarchy"^{dyarchy} two parts ; the one half was left to the old methods of administration, and the boyars still exercised in it their old powers. The other half was formally handed over to the complete and unrestricted personal rule of the Czar. This part was called the *Oprichnina* or Personal Government. It was a temporary expedient ; and the half of Russia, not nominally subject to the personal rule of the Czar, was still largely controlled by him. After a few years, Ivan resumed the control of the whole state.

Ivan introduced an institution, the *Sobor* (1550), which ^{The Sobor} showed not indeed any genuine liberal tendency, but a desire to rely on the support of the smaller nobility and the towns, rather than on the old boyars. It was a Council consisting of members of all branches of the administration, and not exclusively of the nobility. About the same time Ivan introduced the beginnings of a more popular administration of justice. The judicial authorities were to be elected by the districts in which they administered justice. All this seems in conflict with the general tendency of his reign, and has little, if any, permanent significance.

The last years of Ivan's reign were very sombre. His ^{Russia and Poland} relations with Poland and her King, Stephen Bathory, were full of difficulty and failure. The Czar was continually ill, and the question of the succession uncertain. His hopes had been placed in his son, Ivan, who seemed endowed with character and talent. But in a moment of anger he struck his son with an iron-shod staff, which he was accustomed to carry, and killed him on the spot. The storms were gathering round his work when he died in 1584.

Ivan is in every way the great forerunner of Peter the ^{Ivan and western Europe} Great, whom he resembles curiously in temper and method. Like Peter he desired to open a window on western Europe, and he established relations with some of the western Powers. With no Power were his relations so close as with England. Chancellor had reached Moscow from the White Sea in 1553. From England Ivan obtained workmen, doctors, and artisans. He made overtures for an English wife, and in 1570 asked Queen Elizabeth to promise him an asylum in England, if

he were driven from Russia. The friendly relations with England were a little clouded later, when the Queen showed herself unwilling to follow the advice of the Russian Czar ; but English trade gained advantages from the connection.

In this century of strong unconstitutional rulers, Ivan the Terrible holds a prominent and important place. He belongs to the same class as Gustavus Vasa and Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, and his work shows affinities with that of Henry of Navarre, of Ferdinand of Spain, and even of the Tudors of England. Many of the forces which we have seen making for the " new monarchy " in western Europe are clearly to be found in Russia. Here was national sentiment, strong though vague, and not yet self-conscious ; here was the need for order, which constitutional forms were unable to give ; here was the conflict with the great nobles and the support of the Commons for the Crown in the struggle. It is to be noted, however, that religious change played no part in the Russian movement towards autocracy. The organization of the Russian Church was sufficiently subservient without further changes, but it is noticeable that there was no movement for the seizure of Church funds. The sentiment of Russia, and of the Czar himself, was probably too profoundly religious to allow of anything of the sort. Moreover, the extent of the Empire of Russia gave to the monarchy there a character somewhat different from those of western Europe. In all countries the concentration of power in the hands of the monarchy was supported by the military needs of the state, but nowhere was there the constant menace which the Tartars and Poland and Sweden were to Russia.

Russian history, during the remainder of the century, can only be briefly summarized. The monarchical institutions were for a time overthrown ; the country fell into the most complete anarchy ; the jealous neighbours of Russia took advantage of her miserable plight, and it seemed by no means impossible that the end of Russia as a great Power had come. But then came a great change which illustrates in a striking manner how strong were the forces making for concentration of power in the hands of one man ; and a national and religious movement renewed the essential features of the work of Ivan the Terrible.

On the death of Ivan, Russia was ruled for eleven years by Boris Godunov. There were two surviving sons of Ivan—Theodore and his half-brother, Demetrius. Theodore was crowned, but he was inert and perhaps half-witted, and the reality of power fell into the hands of his brother-in-law, Boris Godunov. He was a strong willed, capable man, and carried on the regime of Ivan, finding support, not only in the favour of the young Czar, but also in Archbishop Job, who was made Metropolitan of Moscow. When Theodore died in 1598 (any sudden death in Russia at this period was attributed to poison), Boris was himself elected to succeed him by a large national assembly, the hereditary principle being as yet by no means firmly established.

I shall omit foreign affairs and notice only two points connected with the administration of Boris Godunov. Firstly, it was now that an important step was taken towards the full establishment of serfdom in Russia. The strong monarchies of the West were, as a rule, favourable to the rights and interests of the lower strata of society. Henry IV of France made himself the champion of the peasants. Gustavus Vasa was supported by the peasantry of the country. It was the aristocracy of Denmark that had re-established serfdom there. It marks then a great difference between the Czars of Russia and the new monarchies of western Europe that Boris Godunov, the successor to the power and title of Ivan, should have given legal force to a system by which the peasant was bound to the land; and it shows how the Czars were dependent on the smaller nobles, though the great nobility were their chief rivals and enemies. There was a strong tendency for the peasantry to desert the lands of the smaller boyars, and to take service with the monasteries or the great nobles. It was on the smaller nobles that the Czar depended mainly for his army, and it was in his interest that their lands should be inhabited by a numerous peasantry. An Edict of 1597 forbade the peasants to leave the land where they had lived, and gave the lord the power of pursuing and reclaiming them. Here was a measure of the utmost importance for the future history of Russia. Fifty years later serfdom had been completely legalized. It was also of much importance that the Church in Russia was given an independent status

by the recognition of the Metropolitan of Moscow as Patriarch. Russia was thus freed from all ecclesiastical subordination to Constantinople and to Kiev.

But, for the immediate future of Russia, there was another even more important event during the rule of Boris. Czar Theodore had, as we have seen, a half-brother, Demetrius, who clearly might be a serious rival and opponent to Boris. He and his relations had been exiled to Uglich. It was

The mystery
of the
death of
Demetrius

announced in May 1591 that he was dead. There sprang from this event the finest mystery story in history; far more elaborate than that connected with the pretenders of Henry VII's reign in England; more comparable to the wild rumours which still persist with regard to the death of the Dauphin "Louis XVII," during the Reign of Terror. Demetrius had almost certainly been murdered in the interests of Boris; but naturally the details of the incident were obscure. Boris had been popular at first, but the last years of his reign were a period of great social distress; the stories of cannibalism are persistent during this decade. In 1603 a young man appeared in Lithuania, who declared that he was the Prince Demetrius, and that he had escaped from Uglich. He seems really to have believed in his own claims and, though of unprepossessing appearance, he is credited with high ideals and considerable ability. He had the support of the peasantry and of the discontented nobles, and the Poles gave him military help, though without any public declaration in his favour. The Czar Boris died suddenly, and Demetrius made a triumphal entry into Moscow, in June 1605. But then the tide began to flow against him. He was a Catholic and thus offended the extremely powerful Orthodox Church, and he was surrounded by Polish influences. Rivals appeared among the nobles. In 1606 Demetrius was murdered in Moscow by a nobleman, who was proclaimed Czar as Basil V.

The first
false
Demetrius

Another
false
Demetrius

And now Russia plunged more and more deeply into anarchy. More pretenders appeared. There was a second "false Demetrius," who declared that the first had not really been murdered. The Cossacks and the irregular Polish troops devastated the land. Then both Poland and Sweden invaded with national armies. Smolensk was taken. It appeared quite possible that Russia might be annexed to

Poland. Probably the difference between the national religions was the chief reason which prevented the execution of this plan.

And it was from religion that the liberation came at last. ^{Russian revival} "Who was it that saved Russia in her hour of anguish? It was the people by a movement like that which in France produced Joan of Arc, it was the people in the largest sense of the word, including in it the best elements of the nobility and the patriotic clergy." The national movement comes as a surprise, for there seemed to be no channels in Russia through which national sentiment could make itself heard. Dionysius, the head of the monastery at Troitsa and the head of the Russian Church, was the chief spokesman. The basis of his appeal was religious, not nationalist. It was "the true orthodox faith" which was declared to be in danger. Prince Pozharsky was the soldier of the movement. The national enthusiasm proved irresistible. Moscow was occupied. The Poles were defeated. A great meeting was held at Moscow for the election of a new Czar. Michael Romanof, distantly connected with Ivan the Terrible—he was grand-nephew of Anastasia, the wife of Ivan—was unanimously chosen (1613). Russia had no desire for liberty. The new line of Czars, which begins with Michael, inherited the autocracy of Ivan III and of Ivan the Terrible.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW ¹

WHILE the Reformation was developing in Europe and the various states were assuming a national and monarchical form, events of immense importance were happening outside of Europe, events which were destined to have a profound influence on the character of European civilization itself. America was discovered and, if not occupied, at any rate claimed. The European invasion of Asia began.

This volume is concerned with the history of Europe, and cannot give space for a narrative of the explorations and conquests of the time for their own sake. Only so much attention can be paid to them as is necessary to understand the transformations which they brought to the social and political life of the European states.

The
"European-
ization of
the world"

The general character of the movement that now begins is plain. Europe won the control and direction of the world. Henceforth down to the twentieth century the supreme fact in world history is the "Europeanization" of the world. The social and political ideas of Europe, her religion, her science, and her philosophy, exercise a predominant influence on every part of the world. The reaction of the non-European world on Europe has also been great, but it has been secondary. Many interesting civilizations have succumbed entirely; even those, like the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese, which have been strong enough to maintain themselves, have been profoundly modified by the contact with Europe.

We are so well used to this feature of the modern world that we are apt to think of it as something constant in world

¹ I use the New World to cover both Asia and America, so far as they were revealed to Europe by the discoveries of the century.

history, but for many centuries, before the great movement of exploration and conquest in the sixteenth century, the balance had rather inclined against Europe. Ever since the breakdown of the Roman Empire, there had been a tendency for Asiatic to overflow European culture. The Europeans had been driven out of the west of Asia; the north coast of Africa, once in the front of European development, had been completely conquered by the Mohammedans; all through the sixteenth century the Turkish power was aggressive along the Danube, and seemed likely to break into central Europe.

I shall attempt to mark the chief phases through which the conquest of the new world by Europe passed during the sixteenth century, without attempting any detailed narrative of the voyages and conquests.

1. THE PORTUGUESE EMPIRE IN THE INDIES

The services of Prince Henry the Navigator will have been told in a previous volume. Diaz had already rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1486. Vasco da Gama's great journey falls within the scope of this book. He left Portugal in 1497 and returned in 1499. In those two years, he had found an open sea-passage from Europe to India and all the fabled wealth of Asia and Cathay. It is in many respects the most remarkable voyage in the great century of explorations, and has been taken by Camoens as the subject for his great and interesting epic of *The Lusiads*. The main attention of the Government and people of Portugal now turned towards Asiatic exploration and conquest. The zeal for religion, the love of adventure, intellectual curiosity, the hope of making great wealth—all these played their part in stimulating the imperial activities of Portugal. For some twenty years she was decidedly the first maritime power in the world. She turned all her energies to the further exploration and the exclusive exploitation of the world that was opened to her by the voyages of her seamen. The idea of building up a great Indian Empire presented itself to the mind of her rulers at once. It was clear from the first that

their trade would be resisted by the native powers of India and by the Arab subjects of the Sultan of Egypt, who had hitherto possessed the monopoly of maritime trade on the west coast of India. The Portuguese occupation of India (Calicut, Cananor, and Cochin) was from the first military; religion seemed to justify commercial aggression, and pilgrims to Mecca were brutally treated in the early stages of the conquest. D'Alméida was the first Viceroy appointed to "the Indies," but it is to his successor, Albuquerque, that Portugal owed the real foundation of her Indian Empire. He is one of the heroic figures of the era of the great discoveries. He first saw what opportunities the East offered to a European power. The divisions of the Indian peoples, the unmilitary character of their civilization, their ignorance of gunpowder, the inferiority of their vessels, gave the Portuguese an irresistible superiority. The Arab power of Egypt was weak and would soon fall under Turkish rule. If the Turks had occupied Egypt earlier, it might have made a great difference to the destinies of the East.

It was Albuquerque who established the supremacy of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. He had a quick sense of the most important strategic points, and occupied the island of Socotra at the mouth of the straits of Babel Mandeb in 1508; Goa in 1510, which became the centre for Portuguese rule in India; Ormuz, at the entrance to the Persian Gulf (only taken at the third attempt and after heavy fighting), in 1515. The Indian peninsula was not enough for his ambitions. Malacca was occupied in 1511; the Moluccas in the same year. He died in 1515 and was buried in Goa. His death did not check the extension and organization of the Empire of the Portuguese in the East. They explored the whole extent of the coasts of Africa and occupied the important harbours. Their seamen visited Borneo, New Guinea, and a little later, China and Japan. It is believed that they also touched the barren north coast of Australia. The seven provinces of their Eastern Empire show the extent of their ambitions. They were (1) Africa from the Cape of Good Hope to the Red Sea; (2) the coast of Arabia; (3) the Gulf of Persia as far as the Indus; (4) the west coast of India; (5) the east coast as far as the Ganges; (6) the East

Indies and Malacca ; (7) all beyond Malacca as far as China.¹ This vast world, with its hundreds of millions of population, thus came under the control of one of the smallest of European states, with a population of about a million and a half.

2. THE FIRST TRANSATLANTIC POSSESSIONS OF SPAIN

Acute controversies surround the career of Christopher Columbus, but these belong to an earlier volume of this series. Nothing can diminish the importance of the discoveries that he made. The existence of India, China, and Japan was already known when Vasco da Gama found his way thither round the Cape of Good Hope ; but the continents of America were unguessed. That lands were to be found beyond the Atlantic was very generally believed, and their existence was affirmed by legend and tradition ; but they were believed to be identical with the east coast of Asia. Columbus, to his death, believed that it was Asia that he had reached, and he never ceased to look for Japan, China, and Cathay. The first actual results, therefore, of the Spanish discoveries were disappointing, and were altogether inferior to what Portugal had achieved. Here were no teeming populations ; no silks or spices or gold ; no openings for a rich commerce ; little but backward and barbarous natives. Great islands were found and annexed, Española, Cuba, San Domingo. They were destined to be the source of great wealth ; but at first they produced little. The supply of the precious metals was very small ; the Spaniards were not willing to cultivate the lands themselves—and in any case they were insufficient in number—and the natives were difficult to manage. The disgrace and neglect of Columbus himself reflect the changed mood of the Spaniards with regard to the possessions, which they had at first acclaimed so rapturously.

3. SPAIN WINS ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC

The belief at first so tenaciously held by Columbus and the Spaniards that they had reached Eastern Asia, and that they

^{Spain in the Pacific}

¹ And this imposing list omits Brazil, which was reached by the Portuguese Cabral in 1500, and annexed to Portugal.

might find the way to China and Cathay round the next headland, gradually disappeared. With each journey of discovery the real configuration of the earth's surface grew more certain. But the most revealing of all the journeys was that undertaken by Magellan in 1519. He was a Portuguese, who had transferred his services to Spain. He set out in 1519, with instructions from the Spanish Government, to find the passage to the Indies. He tried more than one route before he arrived at the Strait, which was ever afterwards to bear his name. He made his way through that extremely difficult passage without suspecting that open water lay beyond Cape Horn, and thus entered the Pacific, the waters of which had already been seen by Balboa in 1513. In 1521 he reached and annexed the Philippines, but was there killed by the natives. Of his five vessels only one returned round the Cape of Good Hope to Europe, with only eighteen men out of the 265 who had set out. The journey dispelled many legends. The continents of America fell into their true place; the size of the globe was established; the great Antarctic continent either disappeared from men's imaginations or retired far into the dim south. But the most important result was that the Spaniards were now in contact with the Portuguese and their Eastern Empire. Spain had annexed the Philippines (they were named after the son of Charles V, the future King of Spain), and now claimed her share in the trade with the East.

4. THE SPANISH CONQUEST OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AMERICA

Central and
Southern
America

A wholly new meaning was given to the Spanish occupation of the New World when, in 1519, Cortes set out on the expedition that led to the conquest of the Aztec Empire of Mexico. The idea of a city of gold had haunted the imagination of the Spaniards from the first, and had been supported by ornaments that came into their hands through various channels. But hitherto there had been a complete absence of the precious metals in large quantities. Now all that was to be changed. With less than 700 men, but with a few cannon and horses, Cortes landed on the coast and marched

on the wonder-city of Mexico. No novelist has ever invented **Mexico** anything more strange or horrible than the scenes and events of this expedition. We cannot attempt to describe it here. The victory of Cortes is to be ascribed not merely to his arms and the belief of the natives in his supernatural powers ; but also to the eagerness of many of the tribes to throw off the yoke of the Aztecs, which pressed heavily upon them and demanded an immense toll of human victims for sacrifice. The culture of the Aztecs was in certain respects advanced, and in every way most interesting, in spite of the almost incredible brutalities with which it was associated. The Spaniards destroyed all that they could, and history is left still in the dark on many points of Mexican history and culture.

It was chiefly, though not exclusively, silver which came **Peru** from Mexico ; but, when in 1532 Pizarro and his associates attacked the Incas of Peru, gold beyond their dreams was the reward of their crimes. The Peruvian civilization was peaceful and humane. There was nothing comparable to the bloody rites of Mexico, which almost make our imagination acquiesce in the destruction of the power of the Aztecs. The Peruvians were unwarlike and disinclined to resist ; but surrender was as useless to defend them as resistance ; innocence was punished as cruelly as crime. Immense quantities of gold made their way to Spain. The Spanish forces were small, but they quarrelled furiously over the division of the spoil.

No other conquests in America have left the same impression on the memories and imaginations of mankind as those of Peru and Mexico. But they were by no means alone. New Granada, Venezuela, and Columbia yielded results only a little less remarkable than those already mentioned. De Soto, an old companion of Pizarro, between 1539 and 1548, made a wonderful series of journeys in the Mississippi valley. He had no eye for the agricultural wealth of the country, and only found backward savages without any store of precious metals.

5. OTHER NATIONS JOIN IN THE TASK OF EXPLORATION

The Spanish and Portuguese monopoly challenged

The monopoly of the Spanish peninsula in the newly discovered lands was jealously guarded and maintained for some time ; but it could not last for ever. Until the century had run half its course little was done by the British Isles, though Cabot, with a ship that sailed from Bristol, had been the first actually to touch the mainland. The German banking firm of the Welzers had played some part in the exploitation of South America, being admitted by Charles V, who was in many ways indebted to them. France showed more interest than England in the task in the early years of the century. Francis I sent out an expedition to the northern continent in 1524. In 1534 Jacques Cartier led an expedition to the Saint Lawrence. Colonists were taken out, and country of the utmost importance was discovered ; but the cold was too great a trial for the colonists, and all came home again. Still this was the beginning of a movement which took the language and culture of France to America, and made it one of the permanent elements in the life of the northern continent. When the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis was signed, neither Holland nor England, the two great sea-faring states of the next century, had contributed anything of importance to the exploration or conquest of the New World of the East or West. We shall come to their important efforts in the second half of the century from a rather different point of view.

We must not concern ourselves in this book with the history of these new-found lands and peoples ; but it is important to ask in what way the discovery of a new world, accessible to European traders and colonists, influenced the social and intellectual life of Europe during the sixteenth century, and to attempt to find an answer to this very difficult question.

The influence of the New World on the thought of the Old

(1) It has sometimes been maintained that the spectacle afforded by the newly-found lands exercised an immensely important influence on the thought and on the religious development of Europe. "The developments which culminated in the discovery of the transatlantic passage and the

lands beyond, of the way about Africa and the sources of Asiatic trade, revolutionized not merely the economic bases of European life ; *they had no less effect on the intellect,*" says an American writer. And a French historian writes, " We can never exaggerate the part played by the Spanish and Portuguese discoveries in the great emancipatory movement of the Renaissance." ¹ But it seems impossible to justify this claim in the sixteenth century. From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards the example and the thought of America, and of Asia too, have exercised an increasing influence on the life and speculation of Europe in every direction ; but there is no evidence of any such influence in the sixteenth. I do not think that there was anyone who asked what were going to be the destinies of the New World and how the life of Europe would be modified by them. No one foresaw the new " wandering of the peoples," which was destined to people the Americas. When the thoughts of men turned in the direction of the new lands, two thoughts were always uppermost : wealth and religion. The wealth of the New World was believed to be endless ; and the first thought in most men's minds was how to transfer that wealth into European hands. And next there was the thought of the heathen, who were to be converted to Christianity, and by whatever means to be " compelled to come in." All the idealism of the age was concerned with this religious problem ;

¹ *The Expansion of Europe*, by Professor W. C. Abbott, p. 109 ; who also says of the voyage of Columbus, " A thousand years of ecclesiastical conceptions of earth and man fell at a stroke." See also M. L. Gallois in *The Histoire Générale of Lavissee and Rambaud*, iv, 873. Mr. E. J. Payne accepts at least some part of these views in his fascinating chapters in the *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. i, chaps. i and ii. He thinks that the New World gave support to the idea of religious toleration and stimulated thought in every direction, and he supports his contention by an examination of the works of Sir Thomas More, Montaigne, and Bacon. There is no room in this volume to discuss the question ; but (1) More lived and died an ardent Catholic, and for his purpose the Mountains of the Moon would have done as well as the newly discovered America ; (2) for one reference to the New World in Montaigne there are a hundred to the classics ; his " cannibals " are a text for a sermon that might easily have been pronounced over foreigners of any strange nationality ; the same problem had presented itself in an intenser form to Dante ; (3) no one can deny the immense mass of new phenomena that was brought to light by the discoveries. Bacon saw their importance for physical science ; but I see no evidence that they modified men's ideas on politics and religion in the sixteenth century.

and, if there was much absurdity and cruelty in the methods used or suggested for the conversion of the heathen, there was also deep sympathy and even saintliness in some of the priests who worked among the natives of America and Asia. But I see no proof that contact with these new heathen made any of the priests inclined to criticize their own beliefs. The social and political speculations of the age came from two main sources—from the study of the Bible and the ecclesiastical problems which were connected with the Reformation, and from the study of the newly won classical authors. The Republic of Plato was a greater stimulus to speculation than both Americas and all the Indies.

**The New
World and
science**

The challenge of the new discoveries to science was very great and ultimately fruitful. There was an immediate urgent demand for more accurate methods of discovering latitude and longitude and of conducting navigation ; ships were very much improved ; unknown plants and animals demanded study and suggested new ideas ; fresh stars were seen and the motions of the heavens observed from new points of view. But the results, though ultimately of the utmost importance, were slow to show themselves. The sixteenth century saw the rise of a new astronomy which soon opened to the imagination new conceptions of the universe. But it is hard to discover any link between the exploration of the heavens and the exploration of the earth. The movement, which was soon to depose the earth from the centre of the universe and establish the sun there, was begun by Copernicus (1473-1543). He was a Pole by birth, a mathematician by training, a loyal member of the Roman Church ; there is no sign that he had any interest in geographical discovery. Nor can any influence from geographical discovery be traced in Tycho Brahé or in Kepler. If we follow the careers of Paracelsus (1473-1541), who is regarded as one of the great forerunners of chemistry ; or that of Ambrose Paré, the great doctor, we do not find them in any way preoccupied with the problems arising out of the discovery of a New World. The religious, philosophic, and scientific movements sprang from the needs of Europe itself. The newly discovered lands provided scientific enquirers with data of immense importance. None appreciated their im-

portance so clearly as Bacon. But the scientific movement had already begun before America was discovered.

(2) On the other hand the political, and still more the economic, results of the conquest were immediate and important. Both the conquering nations were determined to maintain the trade with their newly discovered lands as their own exclusive possession, and to keep the control of them in the hands of the monarchy. Neither in their form of government nor in their trade policy was there the slightest breath of liberalism; and no other European nation would have acted on different principles. Asia and America were regarded as the *possessions* of Spain and Portugal, and they were to be exploited to the utmost extent. In Portugal, there was a *Casa de India* which acted as Council to the King in Indian affairs; in India there was a Viceroy resident at Goa, who exercised supreme executive and judicial authority. The volume of trade that came to Lisbon was very large, and the city became populous and rich. The Portuguese associated with the conquered races on terms of something like equality more easily than any other European people; a large population of mixed blood was soon noticeable both in Europe and in India. Another stream of alien blood also entered the country. Slavery was an accepted institution at the time, and the African journeys of the Portuguese brought them in contact with the negroes, of all races the best adapted for slavery. They were introduced in great numbers into Portugal; ten thousand slaves a year are said to have come into Lisbon. Slavery produced its usual well-known results. Slave labour displaced free labour; the free population of the country was driven into the towns; the number of inhabitants tended to decrease. Some hold that the whole character of the Portuguese race changed through the admixture of foreign blood. Portugal gained little from her amazing conquests. In 1580 she was conquered and annexed by Spain; but before that it was clear that her great Empire had contributed nothing to the nation's strength.

Spain was from the first fully alive to the immense importance of her new possessions, and she faced the problems of their government with care and thought. They belonged technically to the Crown of Castile, and all other subjects

Political
and
economic
results of
the New
World

Spanish
administra-
tion of
colonies

of the Spanish Crown were for some time excluded from them. Charles V, however, followed a more liberal policy, and not only Aragonese, but also Italians and Germans, were engaged in the government and exploitation of the New World. There were two main agencies in Spain for the rule of the new dependencies. First, the "*Council of the Indies*," containing some ten chief officials and many minor ones. It was one of those royal Councils which were in all countries the usual means of governing in the sixteenth century, and its power was as unlimited as that of the monarchy from which it derived its powers. By its side, but inferior to it, was the "*Casa de Contratacion*" (Board of Trade), which controlled all trade and travel between the New World and Spain. There was only one port in Spain for the "Indian trade," and that was Seville, some distance up the Guadalquivir. Only later were ships allowed to load and unload at Cadiz, at the mouth of the river. Charles tried, but without much result, to open other harbours of the peninsula. In America the chief authorities were the two Viceroyes of Lima and Mexico, and they were assisted by an administrative and judicial court called an "*audiencia*." The passage from America to Spain was a dangerous one, and soon the sea was the least of the dangers. The Spanish ships were known to be carrying gold and silver, and they were often attacked by pirates. When war broke out with France, French sailors made a practice of raiding the harbours of Spain in the New World, as well as of attacking the ships on their road to Europe. Spain, therefore, adopted the practice of making the vessels sail in company under the escort and protection of a fighting fleet, but even this arrangement was by no means always successful. The fleet of Spain had no supremacy over the other fleets of Europe, and her communications with Europe were never safe.

Religion in
the New
World

The policy of Spain aimed at the winning of wealth and the spreading of the Christian religion. Her officials were from the first assisted by a number of priests, and great efforts were made to convert, to educate, and to protect the natives. The reputation of Spain has suffered in this matter an undeserved reproach. It is true that the sufferings of the native population in central America form one of the most terrible

pages in the tragic history of the relations between European and non-European races. But the Government of Spain was neither cruel in intention nor careless. Queen Isabella and Charles were full of anxiety to defend their new subjects, and they heard with indignation of their ill-treatment. But it was one thing to make laws in Spain and quite another to enforce them in America. The helpless natives possessed gold, and the mad passion for gold broke down in too many of the colonists all restraints of religion, morality, and common prudence. But what was done was contrary to the wishes of the home Government. And the clergy played on the whole an honourable part. The oppressed natives found a passionate advocate in Las Casas; and though he is much the greatest name, he is not alone. The clergy in the New World were under the direct appointment and control of the King; and, though they carried across the Atlantic the same methods of combating heresy that were in use in Spain, they stood on the whole for humanity in the treatment of the natives.

Merchandise of various sorts made its way to Seville and Cadiz; but the gold and silver contained in the Plate Fleet ^{Gold from the New World} was far more esteemed than all the rest. The quantity of bullion that poured into Spain was altogether unprecedented. The aim of the Spanish Government was to keep this mass of gold and silver in Spain, for men believed that gold and silver were the most real form of wealth. But it proved quite impossible to realize this policy. Charles V was deeply indebted to the German banking firms, the Fuggers and the Welzers, both of whom took some part in the exploitation of the New World. It was from Spain that Charles drew his chief revenues. His debts and his troops had to be paid in Spanish gold. The Spanish treasure thus passed by various channels into central Europe and into Italy, and the great increase in the circulation of the precious metals was one of the causes of the great rise in prices, so noticeable especially in the first half of the century. Thus the precious metal of Mexico and Peru contributed something to the causes of the revolutionary rising of the Peasants in Germany.

Spain's vast Empire and all the glory and prestige which ^{Commercial decline of Spain} flowed in upon her from it did not lead to prosperity at home.

It seems certain that by the middle of the century trade languished; that the population actually diminished; and that begging increased very noticeably. In the reign of Philip national bankruptcy had to be admitted. The causes of this unexpected state of things were doubtless many and complicated. Spain became very proud of her Empire, but it was an immense burden upon her resources. The economic system of Spain was bad, even for an age which had hardly begun to think seriously about economics; and it was not merely the weight of the taxes, but the way in which they were collected, that brought ruin to the country. It was probably the incessant wars which Spain waged during the century in many parts of the world that accounted for her financial collapse more than any other single cause. But it is certainly strange that the lowest point in the prosperity of the finances of Spain coincides with the influx of the greatest amount of gold and silver from the new world.

The profits
go to other
countries

Europe as a whole was of course richer for the discovery of the New World. New commodities were introduced that soon became a necessary part of the life of Europe; the potato and tobacco and tea and coffee. The stream of gold and silver assisted powerfully the economic development that had already begun. Natural was giving way to money economy; money payments were excluding barter and payments in kind. Banking was becoming an important organization; capitalism was becoming a recognizable force in the life of Europe. But these developments are not seen at their best in Portugal and Spain; they are indeed hardly seen there at all. Other countries reaped where Portugal and Spain had ploughed with such heroic success. "The permanent gain from the treasure imported into Europe went to those countries, which were able to employ it as capital for industrial or agricultural improvement, and Spain could do neither."¹ The gain went indeed chiefly to the enemies of Spain—to the Dutch and the English. At first it seemed as if the Spanish Netherlands would reap the greatest advantage. They had a vigorous commercial life already, and their connection with Spain gave them a readier

¹ Cunningham, *Cambridge Modern History*, i, 321.

access to the American lands than wholly alien nations. But the storm of war fell upon them, and it fell with the greatest violence on the southern and Catholic Netherlands. Antwerp, which had been the greatest financial and commercial centre in Europe for a great part of the first half of the century, lost its pre-eminence. The Dutch meanwhile (like the English in the eighteenth century) carried on war and commerce with equal ardour, and hardly regarded the two as distinct. If the Spanish fleet had really been supreme, the situation would have been very different, but it never was so at any time in the century. So Amsterdam and the Dutch towns took the place of Lisbon and Cadiz; and London was soon a serious competitor for the first place.¹

(3) *The Influence of the New World on the International Relations of Europe.*—The discoveries in the east and west had thrown a prize of incalculable value and great attractiveness before the nations of the world; and competition for that prize has been a fruitful cause of wars from that time to the twentieth century. But though the motive operated in the sixteenth century, it was not a very powerful one. The wars of the century would probably have been fought, and between the same combatants, if America had never been discovered.

The bitterest rivalry existed to begin with between Spain and Portugal; for Spain regarded, as we have seen, the rich prize which Portugal had won in India with natural jealousy and envy. War might easily have come between the two countries when Columbus returned from his first voyage; for the King of Portugal almost regarded him as an intruder on ground belonging to Portugal. But the strength of Spain was too great for Portugal to challenge a struggle; and the prestige of the Papacy provided useful machinery for the avoidance of war. The possession of Africa had already been granted by the Papacy in vague terms to Portugal: she had been given "all lands she should discover in Guinea and off the coast of it," and the words, to the vague geographical knowledge of that age, might seem to cover the new discoveries beyond the Atlantic. Pope Alexander VI was a

Rivalry of
Spain and
Portugal

¹ The influence of the discoveries of the age on the decline of Venice have already been noticed in the first chapter, p. 19.

Spaniard by birth and strongly attached to the cause of Spain. The whole Christian world would approve of his settling the question ; the suzerainty of the Pope over islands and newly discovered lands was acknowledged. After some negotiation a Bull was issued in July 1493, granting to Ferdinand and Isabella " all lands found to the west and to the south towards India, provided they had not been previously occupied by any other Christian Prince." A line was suggested running north and south, and all territory to the west of this was to be recognized as Spanish. So much had been done by the Pope, though probably on the prompting of the Spanish sovereigns. The final step was taken by the Portuguese and Spanish sovereigns themselves. The line suggested in the Papal Bull was indefinite and unsatisfactory. In June 1494 the two monarchs signed a Treaty at Tordesillas, fixing the line three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde islands. The world was thus divided into two halves, and all discoveries in one were to belong to Portugal, and those in the other to Spain. No one at the time saw that this arrangement gave Brazil to Portugal (for Brazil had not yet been discovered), nor did any one care to enquire where the line would fall on the other side of the world ; for the Pacific was unknown and the Portuguese hold on India seemed secure.

A dangerous question was thus settled. The position of the Papacy as umpire among the Christian nations was never more fully justified. It is curious that this great triumph of peace-making came when the western Church was on the eve of its great disruption, and was presided over by a Pope, whose character has no defenders. Later, the Protestant powers found in the Papal grant an excuse for attacking the colonial possessions of Portugal and Spain ; but this consideration had really little importance. It is, of course, true that the monopoly of the New World by two European Powers could not in the long run be maintained.

The relations of the two Powers became dangerously strained again at the time of Magellan's wonderful expedition into the Pacific in 1519. This was clearly an attack on the power and commerce of Portugal. Its whole object was to bring the Spaniards into touch with the commerce of Asia,

The New
World
divided by
Papal Bull

Treaty of
Tordesillas

Spain and
Portugal
in the
Pacific

which had hitherto been exclusively in the hands of Portugal. The Portuguese intrigued against the expedition and opposed it before it started, and there was actual fighting between Spanish and Portuguese when Magellan reached the Moluccas. Again war was possible. But the Bulls of Pope Alexander and the Treaty of Tordesillas provided a basis for negotiation. It was fortunate, too, that the Emperor Charles V had recently married the Portuguese Princess, Isabella, and was anxious to maintain friendly relations with his wife's father. The principle of a line of demarcation between the two powers running through the Pacific as well as through the Atlantic was admitted. It was agreed that what was necessary was to determine it. After much discussion the Treaty of Saragossa was signed in 1529, and a line was accepted. The Philippines lay to the west of this line and within Portuguese territory; but the waning of the power of the Portuguese, their failure to occupy the islands, and the persistence of the Spaniards brought them in the end into the possession of Spain.

We have seen that English and French ships had played an important part in the exploration of the northern continent of America. During the French wars with Spain the French corsairs preyed on Spanish commerce. An early attempt at colonization had been made by the French in Brazil, and there came in 1564 another interesting attempt. They had already reached Florida and had made a settlement there, which was subsequently abandoned. Coligny, the great Protestant leader, saw in these lands a possible asylum for his co-religionaries. A force was sent out, and Fort de la Caroline established. The first attempt was a failure, but another expedition was sent out in 1565, and a real effort at colonization made. The news of it, however, awoke the passionate resentment of Philip II. Heretics were rigorously excluded from the Spanish possessions in the New World. The thought of French Protestants establishing themselves on soil which he claimed as Spanish, was profoundly exasperating. The French colonists were attacked, and, though they were supported by Charles IX, the settlement was entirely destroyed. Again war was near, but France had too many troubles at home to take up the cudgels on

behalf of her tiny colony. In spite of the great discoveries of the French in Canada, they had no colonial possession when the century came to an end.

The relations of England with Spain are omitted, as far as possible, from this volume. But the attacks of English sailors on the possessions of Spain in the West Indies and the Pacific were among the causes which convinced Philip that war with England, which he had so long avoided, even at the risk of humiliation, could be avoided no longer. Yet the struggle that broke out in 1587 was not primarily a colonial war. It was a war for balance of power in Europe, for the security of Protestantism, for all the commercial interests that met in the Netherlands, rather than a war for colonies; though rivalry on the seas contributed much to precipitate the conflict.

At the end of the century another enemy, at first even more dangerous than England, entered the arena. The war of the Dutch against Spain has many strange features, and one of the strangest is the mercantile prosperity of the Dutch people while the country was almost destroyed by the invaders and by the "drowning of the land," which was undertaken for defence. The Dutch developed a faster type of vessel, and they constantly plundered Spanish commerce. Towards the end of the century they established a decided naval superiority over the Spaniards, created an East India Company for trading with the forbidden East, and gained vast wealth from the Indies. When the war came to an end, by the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609, the Dutch had already laid the foundation of an important East Indian Empire at the expense of Spain.

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PART III (1494-1610)

CHAPTER XIV

THE ORIGIN OF THE FRENCH WARS OF RELIGION

THE Government of France was so dependent on the Catherine de Médicis person of the monarch that the death of Henry II implied a revolution, and opened new possibilities of the most far-reaching kind. One immediate result was that Catherine de Médicis, the Queen Mother, hitherto without much influence at Court, became at once the most important political personage in France. Diane de Poitiers, the all-powerful mistress of Henry II, was dismissed. She was deprived of some of her possessions, but the Queen revealed no inclination to exact a cruel revenge. She showed herself indeed throughout her career, except when under the dominion of fear, possessed of a good deal of careless good nature. The controversies and tragedies of the next twenty-five years have made Catherine one of the most debated figures in history. She was the chief personal cause of a great crime, and both parties from different motives have exaggerated her share in it. Religious and political passions did much, even in her lifetime, to present the woman as an ogre ; and later romance and drama have deepened the colours that had been laid on by contemporaries. Certain points, however, in her character and personal career stand out unmistakably. She was an Italian and a parvenue, and it was not forgotten at Court that she was the daughter of a banker. She identified herself with the country into which she had been married ; but to the end regarded the politics of France with a certain detachment, and never hesitated to change sides if the balance of probabilities invited her to do so.

She had the Italian's delight in beautiful things, and she was a Medicean in her intelligent patronage of art. Wherever her own influence is traceable in the architecture of the time—as for instance in the palace of Chenonceaux—a delicacy and refinement of style is noticeable. She was a collector of books and well read, especially in the literature of her own country. The teaching of Machiavelli was not unknown to her. Her relationship to two Popes, and her position in France, made it certain that she would take the Roman side in the great controversy which was dividing Europe; but it is the greatest mistake to imagine that any confessional fanaticism lay at the bottom of her political action. Her devotion to astrology rests on good evidence and sometimes influenced her. She was at first on easy and familiar terms with prominent Huguenots. It would be difficult to point to any occasion when her action was influenced by a desire to advance the cause of Catholicism or to beat down its opponents. In truth it was a weakness in her policy that she was so far removed from the fanaticisms of the hour that she could not properly appreciate their hold upon the wills of others. Her own chief principle of action was the immediate advantage of the moment. Her chief motive was the desire to govern, and her husband's death gave her the opportunity at last. She pursued power with great quickness, but also with great shortness of sight, with little regard for religion and no regard for morality. She was passionately devoted to her children, and especially to her third son, Henry, later King of Poland and Henry III of France. Her policy was often swayed by family feelings; but her own desire to rule was always predominant. She was essentially what was called a little later a *politique*; that is, she looked at the world from a secular point of view, and was ready to sacrifice confessional interests to what she considered the advantage of the Crown and country.

The
position
of the
Crown

The first half of the sixteenth century had seen an almost continuous development of the authority and machinery of royal rule in France, and the gain of the Crown had been chiefly the loss of the nobility. Their power was watched and undermined by the Parlements, and challenged by the Royal Governors and by the Royal Commissioners, who were sent from

time to time to uphold the authority of the Crown in the provinces, and especially to superintend the financial administration, and who later developed into the all-important Intendants of the age of Richelieu. But, though the Crown had won great, and as the event proved, decisive victories over the nobles, the latter still retained their old ambitions and their old jealousy of the regal power, which they regarded as in no way different in kind from their own. They were ready to avail themselves of any opportunity to reassert their claims and powers; and the accession of a child to the throne, and later the occupancy of the power of the regency by a woman and a foreigner, gave them the chance that they sought.

The noble class was much larger in France than in England, ^{The nobles of France} and differed in character from what was known here. All the children of a nobleman remained noble. The nobles of France were therefore really a class, which they were not in England; and many of them were quite poor. There was no real organization among them, and they broke up into many groups. For the understanding of the next fifty years of French history, it is important to notice three families and their dependents; for their rivalries with one another and with the Crown afford the clue to much of French history down to nearly the end of the century. These groups were inter-married, the one with the other, but nevertheless their divisions were real.

First, there was the House of Bourbon. There seemed ^{The House of Bourbon} little likelihood in 1558 that this family would give a King to France before the end of the century; but its head had already won a Crown, though hardly a Kingdom. Antony of Bourbon, the head of the House, had married the Queen of Navarre, and had thus become King of that tiny Pyrenean monarchy.¹ The Kings of Navarre claimed territories which extended to the south of the Pyrenees; but those had been seized by the King of Spain in 1512. They did not cease to demand their restoration, but their actual rule was limited to the lands north of the mountains. The royal title indeed conceals the real character and position of the House of

¹ See chap. vii, p. 195.

Bourbon. Antony of Bourbon was an independent King over only a few square miles, but for much the greatest and most important part of his possessions he was a feudatory of the King of France ; and it was in France and not in Navarre that the fortunes of the House were decided. The possessions of the family extended in a rough and broken line down the west of France. Louis, Duke of Condé, the brother of the King of Navarre, was Governor of Picardy, and held large estates in Normandy and in Aquitaine. We shall soon see the great importance which he acquired as the recognized leader of the Protestants of France.

**The House
of Guise**

The great rival of the House of Bourbon was the House of Guise. The family originally belonged to Lorraine, which was beyond the boundaries of France, but the growing weakness of the Empire and the contrasting strength of France had attracted one branch of the family to follow the fortunes of the French Kings. They rose to the highest positions attainable by subjects, and at one time looked even higher. The head of the House still ruled in Lorraine with the title of Duke, but Claude of Lorraine had attached himself to the fortunes of King Francis I, and had founded the greatness of the French branch of the family with the title of Duke of Guise. In 1558 the most important members of the family were the following. The head of the French side of the House was Francis, already distinguished and famous for his services at Metz and Calais. A severe wound in the face, received from an English spear, perpetually recalled his services to France and gave him the nickname of "*le balafré*," which his son was to deserve and to carry after him. While he lived, he was the most prominent soldier in France. Two of his brothers were Cardinals ; and one, Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine, was one of the greatest forces in the Roman Church. Though he advocated certain reforms in the Church, he was himself an illustration of some of its worst abuses ; for he was a pluralist on an enormous scale. He was Archbishop of Reims at the age of fourteen, and later enjoyed the incomes of four archbishoprics, five bishoprics, and of many abbeys. A sister was destined to even greater fame than Francis or Charles. For Mary of Guise had married in 1538 James V of Scotland, and had thus won the royal title. The only

issue of the marriage was Mary Queen of Scots, of tragic memory. The clumsy efforts of the English Protector, Somerset, to secure her hand for Edward VI of England had only resulted in her flight to France and her betrothal and subsequent marriage to the dauphin, Francis II, who, by the death of Henry II, had now become King of France. Thus the Guise family had entered the royal circle. The head of the House of Guise took precedence over all the nobles of France. Their possessions, whether secular or ecclesiastical, extended roughly down the east of France as far as Switzerland.

The third noble group which it is necessary to notice was led by Anne, Duke of Montmorency. He was the one prominent exception to the rule of young men at this epoch in France. He was sixty-six years of age at the accession of Francis II, and had seen almost continuous service since the battle of Marignano in 1515. His services had been recognized by the title of Constable of France. He is described by contemporaries as "proud, parsimonious, and moderate," and had none of the power of popular appeal which was possessed by the House of Guise, and subsequently by that of Bourbon. His possessions, lay and ecclesiastical, were to be found in the centre of France. His son, Henry, soon to be known as Marshal Damville, was a great figure in both the military and the religious history of the next years; but at first his nephews attracted most attention. These were the three Chatillon brothers: Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France; Odet, Cardinal and Bishop of Beauvais; and the less-known Francis. The part played by these men in the religious struggle, which was soon to open, gives them their chief fame; but they would in any case have won by their possessions and their talents a high place in the country's history.

Catherine would have had to steer carefully in any case among these rival factions; but the situation was rendered still more difficult by the development of the organization and ambitions of the Protestants of France, whom we shall henceforth usually call by their famous nickname "Huguenots."¹

¹ See chap. ix, p. 242, for the meaning of the word.

French
Protes-
tantism

We have already seen the beginnings of this movement. The influence of Luther had been replaced by that of Calvin. The new doctrines had been disseminated in the first instance in works written either in the French or the Latin tongue, and they had been spread by French preachers, and by books and pamphlets carried round by French agents. They had found a welcome in all parts of France, and their earliest adherents were to be found chiefly in the middle classes and among the artisans of the towns. The spread of the movement had not quite corresponded to Calvin's early hopes; for he had at one time believed that the whole land and its government might be won to the new movement. It was, however, by the middle of the century a serious force; and its adherents have never been reckoned at less than a million.

Condition
of the
Gallican
Church

Nothing is so difficult to "account for" as the spread of a religious movement. The immense attractiveness of the all-embracing, luminous, rigidly logical, system of Calvin counts for much and probably for most. There were many—and these were especially to be found among the numerous adherents of noble birth—who welcomed the opportunity of union and organization independent of the all-engrossing royal power. But all contemporary observers found one great contributing cause in the character of the Gallican Church; that is the historic branch of the Catholic Church established in France. Since the Concordat of Bologna, in 1516, it had come largely under Royal control, but the Crown had enforced neither discipline nor financial purity. The Kings used the funds of the Church as if they were their own, and distributed them as rewards for political or personal service. Cases are recorded in which the Kings of France granted to some political favourite all benefices, as they fell vacant, until the income had reached a certain amount. The royal interest in the Gallican Church was indeed political and financial. They took from the Church its effective right of self-government, but did not control its life as the contemporary monarchs of England controlled their state Church. The ignorance of the clergy is admitted by friends and foes. They did little preaching or teaching; they administered little charity; the Church fabrics were falling into ruin in many places. The royal power made,

as we shall see later, any reformation from the side of Rome herself difficult and slow.

The organization of the Protestant Church in France had developed much of late. From the first their form of government had had an element of liberty. They were without support or control from the Government; they elected their own elders and deacons. They had met at first secretly and privately. As their numbers increased, they had worshipped without concealment and often under the protection of armed men. They had become aggressive in many places, and had forced their way into Catholic churches where they were often guilty of violences, breaking "idols" and doing much damage. In some places they had taken Catholic churches for their own use. But the most significant step was their new and intimate relation with certain of the great nobles. They had at first hoped for the patronage of the King; they had declared that it was the mission of the King to maintain the true faith, and had exalted the royal authority in every way. But the Kings of France showed no inclination to favour them. In the reign of Henry II the persecution had been hard; eighty-eight heretics had been burned during the twelve years of his reign. The Protestants turned next to the rival authority of the nobles, many of whom had showed sympathy with their views. Certain of them were chosen as their "protectors," and the vast wealth of the Church—as in Scotland—seemed a possible reward for adherence to the new movement. This tendency reached its culmination when the Duke of Condé, the brother of the King of Navarre, accepted the position of "Protector-General of the Churches of France." It was a most questionable step. Condé had energy and military experience; but his religious sincerity was very doubtful. The whole Protestant movement was dragged by him into an atmosphere of personal and political intrigue, which was not compensated for by any gain in security. Even among the nobles there were far finer characters than he. His brother, the King of Navarre, was vacillating, selfish, and inefficient; but the Queen of Navarre was one of the most sincere and devoted of Protestant women. Further, the three brothers of the House of Chatillon had joined the new faith. The first, the Cardinal Bishop of Beauvais, is an

Growth and
organization
of the
Huguenots

Condé as
Protector
of the
Huguenots

Coligny

enigmatic figure who finds, however, many parallels in other countries. Despite his high ecclesiastical position, he had joined the Huguenots with conviction and zeal. The second, the Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, was the most capable and the most earnest of the Huguenot leaders. In spite of his title, his chief service had been on land. He had done much to save Paris after the disastrous battle of Saint Quentin, when he had maintained the defence of the town for some time with very small resources. On the capture of the town he had become a prisoner in the hands of the Spaniards, and it was during his captivity that he had embraced the doctrines of Calvin. His conversion was clearly prejudicial to his military and political advancement under the Crown; we may well believe that it was "sincere, religious, and non-political."¹

The
situation
of France
and the
policy of the
Queen
Mother

The situation was therefore difficult when in June 1559 the boy, King Francis II, ascended the throne. He was nominally "of age," and the Guises hoped that they would govern through him and his young Queen; and they discovered with surprise that the Queen Mother was determined to keep power in her own hands. France had an unquiet peace for about two years and a half—a period full of obscure intrigue, of shifting combinations, and of constant variations in religious policy. The Huguenots faced the Catholics with a confidence founded chiefly on the strong support received from their noble "protectors." There were constant outbreaks of violence, and it is difficult to say which side showed the less regard for the law. The Huguenots talked at times of the need for toleration, but neither their beliefs nor their character were really in favour of measures of clemency. Each side demanded an exclusive victory for its creed and polity, and each side was prepared to use all measures to gain that end. Only in one place was there an overmastering desire for national unity regardless of creeds and parties; only one person really strove for a policy of conciliation, and mutual understanding. That place was the throne, and the person was the Queen Mother, Catherine de Médicis. Her motives were not of the highest; they were political and personal, not religious. But the fact remains that she

¹ Whitehead's *Life of Coligny*, p. 69.

worked persistently throughout the rest of her life for a settlement on a basis of agreement. She was closely associated in her work with L'Hôpital, who became Chancellor in 1560. His name has become proverbial for wise humanity; but the Queen Mother was the impelling force. L'Hôpital himself declared that no kinder woman (*mitior*) existed on the face of the earth.¹

The dangerous forces fermenting in France were manifested at the beginning of the reign in what is called the "Tumult of Amboise." It is an obscure affair; but subsequent events leave little doubt as to its real meaning; it was an attempt made by the more violent section of the Huguenots to seize the person of the King, and so to control the Government, which they would then have used in the interest of Protestantism and aristocracy. There were wide differences among the Huguenots. Many still opposed the idea of resistance to the King and the law under any conditions, and among these were Coligny and his brothers. He was at this time in close relations with the Queen, and co-operated with her and with L'Hôpital in their measures of conciliation. The acting leader in the "Tumult" was the Sieur de la Renaudie, but he spoke of some captain who remained for the present in the background, and there can be no doubt that this was Condé. The Court had information of the plot, and withdrew to the strong castle of Amboise on the Loire. The conspirators were struck at in detail and easily dispersed, and many were executed or drowned in the Loire. The chief effect of the "Tumult" was to render the plan of pacification, which the Queen Mother still pursued, much more difficult. But she did not abandon her aim by any means; and, until the outbreak of actual war, the chief interest of French history is to be found in her efforts to maintain peace.

At the beginning of the reign (March 1560) the Edict of Amboise had been issued deploring the harm done by the preachers from Geneva, "illiterate mechanics for the most part," but declaring that more was to be done by mercy than by cruel punishment. All prosecutions for faith and

¹ "Femina . . . qua non mitior ulla est omnibus in terris." Perhaps a better translation would be "easy going."

worship were therefore to be abandoned, though preaching was not to be allowed. Soon after the "Tumult" an amnesty was passed. Then, as soon as L'Hôpital had been advanced to the post of Chancellor, an edict was issued which in fact, though not in form, mitigated the rigour of the treatment of Huguenots. Cases arising out of religion were transferred from the more rigorous and efficient state tribunals to the cognizance of the Bishops. Some of these were notoriously in sympathy with much in the new ideas, and, in any case, the procedure would be slower (Edict of Romorantin, May 1560). Next, an assembly of Notables—prominent men in Church and State nominated by the King—was called to Fontainebleau in August. It was hoped to find some method of approach to a religious peace. The tone of the gathering was favourable to conciliation, toleration, and the calling of a Church Council for the settlement of debated points of doctrine. Bishops spoke warmly in this sense. Coligny declared that he had 50,000 supporters in Normandy alone. Finally, it was decided to call a meeting of the States-General and to urge the calling of a Church Council.

The
Notables at
Fontaine-
bleau

Arrest of
Condé

But here the course of state policy was rudely interrupted. The King of Navarre and Condé had been summoned to Fontainebleau, but had not come. Now, there were rumours of a great conspiracy in the south which would carry on the aims of the "Tumult of Amboise." Lyons was the centre of the movement. It seemed possible that the south of France would break away into semi-independence. The situation was really exceedingly menacing. A letter was sent in the King's name, ordering Navarre and Condé to come at once to Orleans, where the States-General were to be held. They came with reluctance; and on their arrival Condé was arrested, and Navarre only secured his own liberty by an abject surrender to the Crown. Condé was placed on his trial, found guilty, and condemned to death. The verdict was certainly justified, and his execution would have been no disservice to France or the Huguenots. But an acute crisis had come in the health of the King, and he died in December 1561 of an abscess in the ear.

Death of
King
Francis II

With his death the situation grew more obscure and changed rapidly. The King, Charles IX, was a minor, and

a regent was necessary. The King of Navarre had strong legal claims, but was induced to give them up in favour of the Queen Mother. Then there ensued a strange shuffling of the cards. Navarre, always unstable and irritated with the Queen Mother—though his brother, Condé, had been liberated at the beginning of the new reign—joined himself to Guise and to Montmorency. The three great aristocratic groups thus seemed united against the Crown. Catherine, on her side, was driven into still closer partnership with L'Hôpital and Coligny. She showed such favour to the Huguenots (even giving her children Huguenot tutors) that some both at home and abroad believed that she was about to join the side of the Protestants. It is more likely that she meditated a really national settlement of the religious difficulty, and was prepared to give the Huguenots some assurance of protection.

Meanwhile the States-General had met at Orleans, of all French cities at this time the most closely identified with the new ideas. L'Hôpital addressed them in speeches that breathed a noble spirit of humanity and patriotism. He urged his hearers to abandon the names of "Lutherans, Huguenots, and Papists, and to be satisfied to be called merely Christians," but he insisted on the absolute duty of all subjects to obey the Crown in all things. The three Orders presented their demands. Both the nobles and the third estate asked for reforms in the life and election of the clerics. A royal ordinance, issued in August 1561 and founded on these demands, proposed to establish a singular method of electing the high ecclesiastics by the joint action of the clergy, the laymen, and the Crown. The States-General were prorogued to Pontoise, where they were to be represented by only twenty-six of their number; an interesting constitutional experiment, which was defended on the ground of economy. The smaller assembly was probably much more under the control of the Government than the larger one, and it was certainly much more disposed to sweeping change. Its members demanded for the Estates a permanent part in the Government of the state, and especially in the grant of taxes; they proposed the confiscation of all Church property; the support of the services of the Church out of

States-
General at
Orleans

Prorogation
to Pontoise

a part of it; the payment of the needs of the state with the rest. The clergy in alarm made an alternative proposition of a large subsidy which was accepted. A royal edict at the same time renewed the former edicts that favoured the Protestants, and, while forbidding religious conventicles and assemblies, still recommended measures of clemency, pardon, and amnesty.

The
colloquy
of Poissy

A religious colloquy or assembly had been called to Poissy, and met in September 1561. This was an idea specially dear to the Queen Mother. She was herself entirely without religious passion, and could hardly realize its genuineness in others. Why should not the leaders of the different parties meet, discuss their differences, and find some basis of agreement? Efforts of the same kind were made in many European countries—especially in Germany—but nowhere with success. Religious passions were stronger than Catherine knew, and could not for the present be effaced or appeased. No way to peace was found, or much desired, by the disputants at Pontoise; but the Queen Mother was earnest and patient in her search for some common ground. The Huguenots were represented by Beza—next to Calvin probably the most prominent of Protestant controversialists at this moment. Peter Martyr, so influential in England, was also with them. The most influential spokesman of the Catholics was at first Cardinal Guise, but in the later sessions, Lainez, the new General of the Jesuit Order, was also present. Cardinal Guise spoke with moderation, and seemed to hope for concord. He praised the tone of his adversary, and emphasized skilfully the differences between the Huguenots and the Lutherans. At the end, Lainez claimed for the Church the sole right of settling points of doctrine independently of all temporal powers, and launched a bitter invective against the ideas of the Huguenots. The more the differences were considered, the wider the gulf that separated the disputants turned out to be. The members separated, and left the situation rather worse than before.

The Edict
of January

But still Catherine and L'Hôpital were far from abandoning the cause of religious peace. In January 1562 the Queen called a conference of princes, statesmen, and lawyers to Saint Germain, and again they debated the right treatment

of religious dissidents. Then a new edict—known as the Edict of January—was issued. It did not prevent the outbreak of war which followed in a few months. But it contains in germ the ideas which triumphed at the end of the century in the Edict of Nantes, and which then gave France a century of splendid unity and progress. If the name of Catherine de Médicis were not primarily associated in the minds of all men with the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day, this first attempt at genuine religious toleration would have received more general applause. The Queen Mother was without political or religious principles; she was egoistic and easily moved from her purpose; she was capable of crime both for private and public ends. But this and the following similar edicts are her work, and would not have passed without her strong support. In the edict the failure of coercion is admitted, and the turbulence of the provinces deplored. The Huguenots are ordered to restore all "temples" which they have occupied by force. But "until God of His grace allows us to unite all our subjects in one fold," the Huguenots are to be allowed to worship outside of the towns and to manage their religious affairs under the supervision of royal officials. They must not meet in arms; they must take care not to admit bad characters to their assemblies; they must admit royal officials; they must preach the pure Word of God and not admit any new heresies.¹ This was not likely to satisfy Condé and his aristocratic allies, but it gave better terms to the Huguenots than were granted to religious dissidents in most other countries. Whenever Catherine could make her voice heard among the din of arms, she proposed some such terms as these.

The country at large was fermenting with confusions which had their cause or their excuse in the religious controversies. Especially the south was full of violence, and there were frequent attacks on both priests and Calvinist preachers. The Edict of January was nearly a dead letter. The princes and great nobles withdrew from Court. There

The
massacre
of Vassy

¹ Nothing is to be preached "qui contrevienne à la pure parole de Dieu selon qu'elle est contenue au symbole du concile de Nicée et ès livres canoniques du vieil et nouveau Testament." Conciliation seemed possible on these lines until the Council of Trent had done its work.

was a general expectation of coming troubles. The so-called "massacre of Vassy" was in itself an unimportant incident, and it would not be difficult to find worse in the records of the time; but it set the match to the combustible material, which was to be found everywhere in France. The incident has been told with much variation of detail. Duke Francis of Guise had been at Zabern in Alsace, negotiating with the Duke of Würtemberg for help against the Calvinists of France. On his road to Paris he passed through the little township of Vassy, where no Huguenot service was permitted by the edict, but where the Huguenots were actually in considerable force; they had already given much trouble to the House of Guise, on whose territories the town stood. On alighting, Guise heard that a Huguenot service was actually in progress in a neighbouring barn. He sent messengers to the barn, expressing his wish to speak with some of the worshippers. The messenger was refused admission; he tried to force his way in; there were blows and shots. Perhaps sixty Huguenots were killed or mortally wounded (1 March 1562). More significant than the scuffle at Vassy was the triumphant reception of Guise in Paris. He was like his son after him, "King of Paris," and with the support of Paris he could coerce the Government. Catherine would still have liked to temporize, but the King of Navarre—a strange, unstable creature—joined Guise and abjured his Protestant errors. Together they forced the Queen on to their side; and in any conflict, which was definitely a conflict of confessions, she was bound to take the Catholic side. Coligny hesitated long, but in the end joined Condé. The Catholics held Paris without question. The Huguenots found their strategic centre in Orleans.

CHAPTER XV

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE FRENCH WARS
OF RELIGION

FRANCE was now at the threshold of one of the most miserable periods of her history. Thirty years would pass before she would again possess a settled peace. During these years her civilization and her prosperity declined. The character of her people became brutalized. Her political institutions lost their elements of self-government, and in the end the country, anxious above all things for order, acquiesced in a centralized rule which took no account of the expressed wishes of the people. Yet the age produced great men and great thinkers. Philosophers like Bodin examined the foundations of the state. A great and glorious experiment in religious toleration was made. And in Henry of Navarre France found at last one of her most popular political figures and a statesman well suited to the needs of the time.

Character
of the
Civil Wars

Seven civil wars are counted, and every one of them ended indecisively. The reason is partly to be found in the quality of sixteenth-century warfare, which was rarely decisive; but chiefly in the character of the combatants and in the nature of the country. The troops on both sides were much the same; the officers were drawn from the ranks of the nobles; the rank and file consisted partly of Frenchmen drawn to the armies by feudal obligations and voluntary enlistment, and partly of foreign mercenaries, Swiss, Scotch German, or Italian. On the royal side the troops were raised for the most part, not by the King, but by the officer themselves, and the allegiance of the men to the King was always weak. The looseness of discipline was even more evident on the side of the Huguenot rebels. At no time, no

even when Henry of Navarre had become King Henry IV, was it certain that they would obey orders. On the other hand the Huguenot troops were singularly difficult to crush. After a defeat they sometimes disbanded completely; but the influence of their aristocratic officers and their devotion to their cause quickly brought them together again. The reliance on foreign troops was great and strange on both sides. It was due partly to the superior military skill of Germans and Swiss, partly to the fear of the rulers and nobles of France of the consequences of putting arms into the hands of their own people. There was great lack of money on both sides. Artillery was little developed, though Henry of Navarre made effective use of it in his later battles. Fortified towns of any importance were never taken except by starvation, and at first many of the chief towns of France were on the side of the Huguenots, though Paris was always hotly Catholic; Orleans, Blois, Poitiers, Tours, Valence, Lyons, and all the towns of Gascony, Guienne, and Languedoc, except Toulouse and Bordeaux, were with the Huguenots. The cavalry were the most valued part of every army. They used the lance at first, but during the century and owing to the example and initiative of the German "reiters" the pistol tended to replace it. Shock tactics were usually abandoned: instead, rank after rank of horsemen rode up to the stationary ranks of the enemy and discharged their pistols at them, each giving place to the rank in the rear, while they themselves reloaded.

Even after the affair of Vassy, Catherine made overtures to Condé the Huguenot leader; but his hesitation and the presence and resolution of Guise made the Queen's nominal adhesion to the Catholic side inevitable. Both sides were successful in securing foreign help. Six thousand Spanish troops fought under Guise, though the Spanish Government remained aloof. The Huguenots were successful in procuring the alliance of the English Queen; a success more fatal to them than any defeat. Two French agents acting for Condé and Coligny signed the Treaty of Hampton Court, whereby England was to supply 8000 men and some money. In return English troops were to occupy Le Havre and to remain there until the French ceded Calais, which had been

The
Huguenots
and England

won from the English by Guise after more than 200 years of English occupation. Religious sympathy played its part in the action of Queen Elizabeth; but the traditional fear of France, concern for the balance of power, and the desire to regain Calais were her chief motives. The help from England was prejudicial to the Huguenots. The promised surrender of Guise's conquest to the "old enemy" made of them an anti-national party, quenched the wavering sympathies of the Queen, and threw her wholeheartedly into the hands of the Guises, who now became leaders of the nation and not of a party.

**The
battle of
Dreux
(1562)**

The campaign turned on two chief points; the possession of Orleans, the headquarters of the Huguenots, and the line of connections with the English in Normandy. After Condé had failed in an attempt to surprise Paris he marched off towards Normandy, but was encountered near Dreux by Montmorency and the royal army. The fortune of the battle wavered, but was decided in favour of the Crown by the Spanish reserves of Guise. A curious feature of the battle was the capture of both of the leaders. Condé fell from his horse and was made prisoner; he was treated by Guise in a way which recalled the ideals of medieval chivalry. Montmorency was also taken and carried off at once to Orleans. Guise was now in complete control of the royal forces, and was nominated Lieutenant-General; and Coligny became the recognized chief of the Huguenots. Guise moved to the siege of Orleans, and if the place fell it might perhaps be decisive of the whole war. Guise was confident of success; but in February 1568 he was assassinated by Poltrot de Méré. The complicity of Coligny in the act is still hotly disputed. He admitted that he had given money to Poltrot, and that he regarded the death of the Duke of Guise as "the greatest good to this realm and to the Church of God," but he denied any knowledge of the attempt on his life. Cardinal Guise accepted his defence, and was reconciled to him; but the murdered Duke's son, Henry, refused all overtures, and had his revenge in the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day.

**Assas-
sination
of Guise.**

**The
Peace.**

The war had been quite indecisive, and the situation was what it had been at the beginning. Whatever reasons there had been for beginning hostilities, there were stronger reasons

for continuing them now. And yet peace came at once—the Peace of Amboise (1563). Catherine had never varied in her desire for it. Guise's death removed the most bellicose personality on the Catholic side; Condé and Montmorency were anxious to escape from their captivity. The presence of the English at Le Havre was a terrible threat to the whole nation, for it looked as though the Hundred Years' War was beginning again. So the Queen opened negotiations with Condé, and they were carried to a conclusion in spite of the strong protests of Coligny and of Calvin. It is the first of seven similar attempts at settlement. The great nobles were given permission to hold religious exercises in their houses for all who like to come; the smaller nobles might only worship with their own families; one town was to be set aside in each administrative district (*bailliage or sénéchaussée*)¹ where Huguenot worship might be held in the suburbs; and where Huguenot worship was actually in existence at the time of the signing of the treaty, it was to be maintained. No one was to be molested for opinions.

The united forces of the country were now turned against the English in Le Havre. The Earl of Warwick was weakly supported by the home Government, and plague broke out in his troops. When the entrance to the harbour had been commanded by a French battery he yielded perforce. The English claim on Calais was abandoned for a money payment.

The civil war had come to an end, but the conditions were not favourable to a real peace. The conditions laid down were not observed. There were violent conflicts especially in the south, and both sides were to blame. The Council of Trent brought its sessions to an end in 1563; and, though it had been called in the hope of finding a road to peace between the religious divisions of Europe, it had resulted in a declaration of war against Protestantism. In the Netherlands Spain was persecuting the rebellious Protestants, and their sufferings created a keen sympathy in France. The Jesuits were beginning to exercise an important influence in the

Fermentation in France

¹ No distinction is to be drawn between *bailliage* and *sénéchaussée*. The words were almost interchangeable; but the term *sénéchaussée* was used for the most part in the south of France.

country; though they encountered strong resistance even among the Catholics there. France was in brief full of enthusiasm, suspicion, and hatred, which made war very probable. Catherine de Médicis with little support desired and laboured for peace: she would, she said, maintain the tranquillity of the kingdom at the risk of her own life. She undertook with her son, King Charles IX, a progress through the country. On their tour they inspected the frontiers and negotiated with the neighbouring princes, especially with the Germans on the Rhine. Everywhere they saw signs of the fierce bitterness between the parties. At Lyons they were warned that the people would turn against the Crown rather than yield to the demands of the Huguenots. Then in June 1565 Catherine and her son came to Bayonne where she met her daughter, Elizabeth, Queen of Spain. Catherine's love for her children was passionate, and she rejoiced in all the festivities which were held in their honour. When her daughter returned to Spain, she accompanied her a few miles on to Spanish soil.

The
interview
of Bayonne

Contemporary opinion refused to believe that family affection was the only or the chief reason for the meetings at Bayonne, to which the Spanish Queen had been accompanied by the great soldier minister, the Duke of Alva. Men said later that the Massacre of 1572 had been arranged there. The publication of Alva's despatches, of the Queen's letters and of other documentary evidence, has removed most of the mystery from the celebrated interview. Catherine's chief preoccupation was to secure a further tie between the French and Spanish royal houses by the marriage of Don Carlos to her daughter, Marguerite. Alva urged other considerations. His master was preparing an expedition against the rebels in the Netherlands, and he desired the co-operation of France in a great joint action against heresy. In a last interview some agreement was entered into, which Alva was to communicate orally to his master. This probably concerned the acceptance of the decrees of the Council of Trent and some joint action against heresy. But it is certain that there was no planning of massacre; and that to Catherine the one point of importance was the proposed Spanish marriages. But the interview helped to alarm public feeling,

and to increase the tension and suspicion out of which a new war was soon to rise.

The outbreak of the next war was wholly due to the Huguenots. Their suspicions were aroused by the march of Alva with a splendidly equipped army along the frontiers of France into the Netherlands. The French Crown raised a force of Swiss and accompanied his march, genuinely fearing that he might attempt something against France; but the Huguenots thought that Catherine was rather preparing to cooperate *with* him in some evil design. Condé determined to strike a sudden blow and to seize the Queen and King, who were with the Court at Meaux; there were even rumours of a design to change the dynasty. The royal party were saved by the Swiss Guards, and under cover of their "fierceness and bravery, which was so great that in many years France had not seen so remarkable a spectacle," they got safely to Paris. In the war which now began, the Huguenots had again the support of many of the great cities of France, whose adhesion sprang from aspirations to municipal independence as well as from religious sympathies. It was during this war that La Rochelle joined the Huguenot side; its position and its harbour soon made it the headquarters of the Protestant forces.

The war was soon over; it is amazing that it should have been undertaken at all, if it was to be conducted so weakly and dropped so quickly. An attempt upon Paris was quickly abandoned. A scuffle with the royal army at Saint Denis resulted in the defeat of the Huguenots and the death of the Constable Montmorency at the age of 80. Catherine made her favourite son, Henry, Lieutenant-General at the age of 16. The Huguenots then marched north-east in order to get into touch with the German "reiters" who were coming to their help. These proved unwilling to advance unless they received their pay, which was in the end supplied by contributions from the officers and soldiers of the army. The Huguenot force then marched on Rouen, which was being besieged by the Catholics. And then the war came to an end. Catherine and Condé were for peace; Coligny alone was for fighting on. The Peace of Longjumeau renewed the terms of the Peace of Amboise.

The second
Civil War

Peace of
Longjumeau
(1568)

Third Civil
War

The war was hardly ended when it began again. Indeed, it never had really ended; for there were frequent reports of faction fights, especially in the south. The new Pope Pius V represented the spirit of the Catholic Revival, and had said that quarter should not be given to the enemies of the faith. The young Prince Henry, Duke of Anjou—later so poor a creature in body and character—was now full of warlike ardour, and his mother was glad that he should have an opportunity of distinguishing himself in war. There was an interchange of demands and petitions between the Huguenot leaders and the Court. The Court made Condé personally responsible for the expenses incurred in paying off the German "reiters." Then there came an attempt to seize Condé and Coligny at Noyers. They escaped with some difficulty, and threw themselves into La Rochelle, which was henceforward their headquarters; the Government had managed to secure Orleans, Rouen, and Amiens. The Queen of Navarre brought her son, Henry, to La Rochelle. (Her husband, Antony, King of Navarre, had died during the first war.) She was a devout Calvinist, and declared that she and her son had come to make common cause with the persecuted Huguenots in everything. Neither the King nor his brothers had sons, and Henry of Navarre was the heir to the throne. His presence was clearly a valuable asset to the Huguenots.

This third war was a far more serious affair than the other two. There was some desire on both sides to let the sword, since it had been drawn, really decide. The Huguenots obtained useful help from abroad. The English Queen would never again make a formal treaty with French rebels, but she sent them secretly cannon and munitions. More important, the Duke of Zweibrücken raised an army of 14,000 men, among whom was the Prince of Orange. They managed to seize La Charité on the Loire—a place of great importance all through these civil wars, as commanding an important passage from the north and east into the centre and south of France. But before they could join themselves to the Huguenot leaders, an important battle had been fought. After prolonged manœuvring by the banks of the Charente, Henry of Anjou and the Duke of Condé came to blows at Jarnac. Condé, already wounded by the kick of a horse,

Battle of
Jarnac
(March 1569)

was forced to surrender, and after surrender was shot, though not by order of Anjou. The defeat was a serious one, but it settled nothing. Condé was a great and rich nobleman and prince of the blood, but his conduct of the Huguenot cause had lacked sincerity and good judgment. The command now nominally came into the hands of the young Henry of Navarre, but he was yet too young to count ; and the real commander of the Huguenot forces was Coligny himself, a man distinguished from among all his party by his sincerity of conviction, his tenacity, and his wide knowledge of European affairs. Thus the songs of "Te Deum," with which the Royalists welcomed the news of the victory everywhere, were premature. Coligny almost immediately achieved a success really greater than Jarnac, for, near Limoges, he effected his junction with the forces of the Duke of Zweibrücken, and was thus in possession of an army that could choose its plan of campaign. He made overtures to the King for a project that was never far from his thoughts. The war in the Netherlands was closely related to the war in France. If the Spaniards triumphed, that would be both a threat to the security of France and a crushing blow to Protestantism. Why should not France bring her civil war to an end, and throw her united forces against Philip and his religious coercion of the Netherlands ? But the Court, after Jarnac, was in no mood for an accommodation. Coligny was himself for an attack on the towns of the Loire, and after that for a blow against Paris. But few commanders in the sixteenth century were really masters of their troops. The immediate need was plunder to satisfy the demands of the "reiters," who had no interest in the French war except plunder. It was determined to lay siege to the great city of Poitiers—next to Paris the city of greatest circuit of any in the kingdom. Young Henry of Guise was in the town with a small garrison, and Coligny was confident of success. But the city, almost surrounded by the river Clain, was well fortified. Guise conducted the defence with great resolution, and became at once the hero of the Catholic side ; "all the Catholic world began to turn their eyes upon him as a pillar of the Roman religion and a worthy successor of his father's power." Anjou gave help by attacking a neighbouring town, and Coligny had to abandon the siege.

Siege of
Poitiers
(Oct. 1569)

Battle of
Moncontour

Worse was to come. The royalist army under Anjou and Tavannes caught Coligny up at Moncontour on his road to the towns of the Loire, and one of the few important battles of the civil war followed. The Royalists had some superiority in numbers and in artillery—the numbers are given by contemporaries as 28,000 Royalists and 21,000 Huguenots; but worse than the inferiority in numbers on the side of the Admiral Coligny was the indiscipline of his foreign troops. They had not received their pay, and they threatened to leave the army; they were quieted by promises and by the neighbourhood of the enemy; but their action had made rapidity of movement impossible. The battle was a really severe defeat for the Huguenots, and was decided above all by the action of the Swiss in the royal army. Coligny had received a severe wound in the face at the beginning of the battle and was nearly taken prisoner, but managed to escape south to Parthenay. The losses of the Huguenots had been very heavy, and are reckoned at about 10,000.

Coligny in
command

Never did the Royalists seem in so good a position during the whole of the civil wars. A resolute campaign, and perhaps the Huguenots might be reduced to complete surrender. The towns of the south-west surrendered to Anjou: Niort, Fontenay, Saint-Jean-d'Angély, and others. La Rochelle still held out behind its marshes, and maintained communication with Protestant England and with the Netherlands. Moreover, Coligny survived, and while he was safe all hope was not lost to the Huguenots. He was clearly recognized now by friends and enemies as the one great support of their cause. He was sentenced to be strangled and hanged before the Hotel de Ville at Paris. A reward of 50,000 crowns was offered to anyone who would kill him, with free pardon for any previous offences. The Admiral was safe among his soldiers, but he was executed in effigy; a straw-stuffed figure "with a life-like head" was dragged at the tail of a horse, and his portrait painted on wood was hung on the gallows. The Admiral himself recovered of his wound and displayed something more than his usual activity. He appealed for help to England, and was in close agreement with the Queen of Navarre. Troops came in to him in a way eminently

characteristic of the Huguenot leaders. The foreign troops saw their best hope of safety and plunder in rejoining him. With what forces he had collected, he marched to the upper waters of the Loire, and then into Gascony and Languedoc. The Huguenots were strong there, and his armies grew as he marched. Men recalled the march of Xenophon, and called Coligny's exploit "the retreat of the ten thousand"; it was certainly the greatest military achievement of his career. Let us note, too, that it was due to one other force besides his own skill, and besides the sympathy of the Huguenot population and the nature of the country that he traversed. Damville, the son of the Constable Montmorency and therefore the cousin of Coligny, was Governor of Languedoc. Like his father he already held a middle station between the rival fanaticisms, and valued the strength of the state and social order above confessional orthodoxy. Those who held these views were later known as "politiques," and Damville was the real founder of the party. When Coligny approached Toulouse, and his fate seemed likely to be decided by a battle, (January 1570), Damville negotiated a peace instead, and Coligny passed on, gaining prestige and recruits by Damville's inaction. His march was accompanied by scenes of violence, plunder, and slaughter; for his troops were not paid and could not be controlled. He reached the Loire again near to La Charité with a large force, which made it plain that the effects of the battle of Moncontour had passed away. Paris itself was threatened. Here was just that balanced situation which Catherine was always ready to use for the negotiation of a peace. Coligny was an old ally of hers, and there was some resemblance between their essential views on politics. He had negotiated with her even during his famous march. Now the pace was quickened, and soon resulted in the Peace of Saint Germain (August 1570). The Queen Mother had to face sharp criticism from her party for what seemed an unnecessary surrender. The Florentine ambassador reports a conversation with her, in which she summarized the grounds for her decision. "Money, the sinews of war, is completely lacking to us. The princes of the realm are under the influence of so many evil passions that the King's orders are only slackly executed. This is why we have to

Damville

Peace of
Saint
Germain

accept the peace and yield far more to the Huguenots than we ought to. Let us hope that God, who knows to what extremity the Crown is reduced, and that all is done with good intentions—will allow the realm to settle gradually into better conditions, and that the King's subjects will return to the Catholic faith. The country is being destroyed by war, and the innocent are suffering as well as the guilty. The number of Huguenots constantly increases during the time of war. We do not act of our own freewill ; it is necessity which compels us."

Its terms

The Peace of Saint Germain was called "lame and awkward" (*paix boiteuse et mal assise*) ; but it is an important document and marks a great advance on the two previous ones ; it is an important stage towards the Edict of Nantes. As before, the great nobles, those "with the right of high justice," could have the reformed worship in their castles for all who liked to come. The smaller nobles were restricted to their families and ten friends, but this was an enlargement of previous privileges. The Protestant form of worship was also to be maintained in all towns where it was actually practised, and in two towns in each of the chief administrative districts of France. The Huguenots were given certain judicial privileges to defend them against the prejudiced judgments which were to be feared from some of the Parlements ; they had absolute right of appeal from the Parlement of Toulouse, and the right to challenge a certain number of judges in seven other Parlements. The "loyalty" of the Huguenot chiefs and their supporters was recognized. Lastly, and most important, the Huguenot leaders were given the right of holding four towns, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty, for two years. These towns were La Rochelle, Montauban on the Garonne, Cognac on the Charente, La Charité on the Loire—all of them places of the greatest military importance.

**The position
of Catherine
de Médicis**

So the land had nominal peace for a space. The two years 1570 and 1571 mark the highest point in Catherine's public career. Her policy of balance between the religious and aristocratic parties seemed successful. The Guises fell from power ; she hoped she could choose her advisers where she liked. She gave free rein to her taste for collecting and

for building. She added to the palace of the Louvre, and to her exquisite home at Chenonceaux on the Loire. She accumulated pictures and jewels and books. She showed favour to Montaigne and Ronsard and Amyot; and was rewarded by eulogies which sometimes ring true. Had she died now, she would have left a name in history as the one persistent advocate of as much religious toleration as the temper of the age allowed. She could never have been an ideal figure to the historian; for though her life was purer than that of the Court generally, there was always something coarse about her character—she was gluttonous and violent in her manners—and her policy was often diverted by purely personal objects. But the difficulty of the problems that she had to face can hardly be exaggerated. There is truth as well as humorous bonhomie in the words of Henry of Navarre: “What could a woman have done, with her husband dead and five small children upon her hands, and two families who were scheming to seize the throne—our own and the Guises. I am astonished that she did not do even worse.” It is a real charge against her policy that she tried to do by finesse and intrigue what required a strong Government supported by a powerful army. But she had little money, and the leader of the army would have been her master, and her chief passion was power. She was not a great nor assuredly a good woman, but she inclined to a policy both patriotic and humane. The notion that she was laying far-reaching plans for the massacre of her opponents may be entirely dismissed. Her policy was in detail the product of the moment, and her enemies varied from day to day.

The condition of France and the temper of its people made a policy of conciliation very difficult. The central Government had almost ceased to function, and became weaker and weaker as time went on. Montaigne tells us later that in his district “there was neither law nor justice put in execution, nor magistrate that performed his office,” and this was true of most parts of France during the greater part of the civil wars. We have a valuable picture of France at the outbreak of the wars from the pen of Montaigne’s friend, Étienne de la Boétie, in his *Memoire Concerning the* Condition
of France

*Edict of January 1562.*¹ He saw round him universal disobedience to the Government, and he traced this to the religious controversies and separate religious organizations which abounded in France. He had no sympathy with the ideas of the Huguenots, and could see nothing but manifest ruin to the whole State in the establishment of two separate religions. Better a complete change of religion forced on all the State by a strong Government than the admission into it of the poison of religious divisions. The whole evil flowed, he thought, from the corruptions of the Church. It had been clearly proved that the Church could not or would not reform itself; it was for the State to insist on and to enforce the reform of abuses and to maintain order within the Church. The Church thus controlled by the State must introduce certain changes, not so much into the doctrine (which de la Boétie thought did not really interest the people), but into the ceremonies. There should be certain changes; some part of the service should be in French; communion in both kinds should be allowed. On Sunday there should be sermons of the old type in the morning and the strict Catholic doctrine should be maintained, but in the afternoon simple evangelical preaching should be used, and the Huguenots should not be compelled to come to the morning sermon. Then, when the State had decided on the new forms which were to be adopted, they should be rigorously enforced; "all new churches and new forms of worship should be abolished, and people should be forbidden *on pain of death* to accept the title or the duty of supervisors or ministers or any other office in the new church." None but those appointed by the Bishops should be allowed to preach or administer the sacraments. He who preached or administered the sacraments in a different form *should be punished with death.*

Thus hardly any one conceived of religious liberty as a possible basis for the State to rest upon. De la Boétie's ideal—so strange in some of its details—would almost have been met by the contemporary settlement of religion in England.

¹ Published in the "Collection des chefs-d'œuvre méconnus." The treatise is of much greater value than the better-known *Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*, which is little more than a student's exercise.

The settlement of 1570 lasted rather longer than the two previous peaces; but we have before us the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day after just about two years. That was not merely a French but a European event, and to understand it we must turn to the history of the Netherlands.

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CHAPTER XVI

SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS UNDER PHILIP II

Misrepresentation of Spanish history

SPAIN, during the reign of Philip II, has had a hard fate. The King and the country were intimately concerned with great events in the history of England, Holland, and France, which have captured the attention of posterity. In each case the King of Spain was the antagonist of one who has come to be regarded as a great hero or heroine of the people and land; of Queen Elizabeth, of Henry of Navarre, and of William the Silent. The history of Spain is known to most readers from books which have recounted the story of these events from the standpoint of England or France or Holland. The result is not only that the actions of the Government of Spain are known to us chiefly from its opponents or from the admirers of its opponents; but also they are judged almost exclusively by what it did or suffered outside of Spain. It is as though the history of Elizabethan England were only known from the narratives of Irishmen or Spaniards. Spain, during the reign of Philip II, is regarded merely as the barrier that had to be overthrown before the forces of enlightenment, science, and liberty could triumph; the great achievements of the Spaniards in this period are often unrecognized; the character of the age in Spain is misrepresented. We must try to look at the events of the reign in the first instance from Madrid, rather than from Antwerp or London or Paris.

Philip II, King of Spain

In 1559 Philip returned from the Netherlands to Spain, and did not leave the country again. He was as much German as Spaniard in blood, but he identified himself henceforth entirely with Spain and her fortunes. He had already been three times married; first to Maria of Portugal;

next to Queen Mary of England ; and by the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis he had secured the hand of Elizabeth of France, the daughter of Catherine de Médicis. His only child was Don Carlos, the son of Maria of Portugal. He was a lunatic or an imbecile, and though legend and calumny wove many stories round his name, his death, which occurred in 1558, was probably a natural one. King Philip was in his domestic life affectionate ; and the tragedy of Don Carlos must have been for him a great affliction. He was immensely industrious, and took the task of reigning very seriously ; neither religion nor pleasure distracted him from his royal duties. There was much in common between his outlook on his problems and that of any other strong ruler of the period, as there was much similarity between the instruments by which he governed and those employed by the rulers of France, of Austria, or of England. The duty of the subject was to obey, and the duty of the King was to enforce obedience—a double obedience to the commands of the King and of the Church. There is no sign that Philip II thought on the speculative problems of politics and Government ; but clearly he identified himself with the state and regarded himself as the vicegerent of God. The cruelties of which he was guilty—not greater cruelties than those of many other rulers of the time, not greater than the cruelties of the English in Ireland—were crimes prompted by what seemed the needs of the state. They correspond to the teaching of Machiavelli's *Prince* ; they are the ethic of war transplanted into politics and diplomacy. Philip was a devout and passionate Catholic, but his policy was rarely dictated by directly religious motives. Church and State were usually for him only different phases of the same cause ; but where there was a conflict, he could keep the Church in subordination. He ruled through departmental committees nominated by himself for their various tasks ; as the French King ruled through different departments of his Council, and the Tudor Kings of England through their Star Chamber and other similar courts. But he controlled them by direct and constant personal supervision ; they sent into him their reports, which he examined and often annotated. He allowed no minister to come between him and power. His

reign is the absolute rule of careful and dutiful mediocrity. He never for one moment suspected the value of liberty—but few in the sixteenth century did. He never dreamed of taking the people into partnership; it seemed to him his manifest duty to bear the vast burden of the fate of Spain on his own shoulders, though both he and she sank under it.

Spanish
civiliza-
tion

The country and the people over whom he ruled have similarly been judged as a rule from the standpoint of their enemies. They have been thought to be specially cruel both at home, in their European dependencies, and in the Americas. The shadow of the Inquisition seems to lie across a land that knew neither liberty, nor merriment, nor art, nor the joy of scientific research and discovery. And yet the reign of Philip II was "the golden age" of Spanish literature, and in every department the product of the Spanish mind went on improving down to the end of the life of this strange King. It is recognized now that Spain produced during these years work in history, geography, and the physical and mathematical sciences which can fairly be compared with that of contemporary England and France. There were twenty-nine universities, full of students, and the coming of the Jesuits stimulated still further educational activity. The greatest days of Spanish painting were not yet come when Philip died; but El Greco, whose work attracts so much attention to-day, was already active, and devoted his talents to the glorification of the King himself. The theatre—often so good an index of the character of a people—sprang to a sudden glory. Lope de Vega was producing his numberless comedies at the end of the reign; and he was soon followed by the strange and solemn art of Calderon. But the great glory of Spain in the sixteenth century was Cervantes (1547-1616), and his immortal story, *Don Quixote*, of which the first part was published in 1608. His pages are the best plea against the supposed gloomy character of the age. For we get from the story a vivid and a charming picture of Spanish life and character, jovial, friendly, and humane. This is doubtless to some extent the reflection of the character of the author, whose buoyant courage was incapable of pessimism and gloom; but it must

Cervantes

be put down also to the account of the land and people. The tragi-comic hero of the story is no bad image of the Spanish nation, courageous, adventurous, idealistic; despising nice calculation of profit and loss; preferring noble failure to commonplace success. Of course there is another side to all this. The whole feeling of the country was against hard commonplace work. The Spaniards could conquer the New World, but they were unequal to the task of making the best of the products of their own land or of the opportunities of commerce across the Atlantic. The great noble class desired wealth, but hated labour. The patient toil of the Moors and Jews was one of the qualities which made them so bitterly disliked. The country swarmed with beggars, who were sometimes hardly distinguishable from robbers. The trade with the New World was valued very highly; it was looked after by a special Board, the *casa di contratacion*, and it was believed by friends and foes to bring in endless treasure to Spain. But the American trade, and especially the arrival in Spain of the precious metals, presented economic problems that the Spanish intellect was not able to solve. The country grew ever poorer. Imperial Spain, in possession of territories many times larger than Europe itself, had to borrow from the bankers of Italy and Germany, though Italy, as we have seen, was during all this century the prey and the plaything of the great Powers of Europe; and in the end Spain had to declare herself bankrupt. Many causes contributed to the economic exhaustion of Spain, and among these doubtless the mistakes of her rulers,¹ but the importation of vast sums of bullion into the country produced an economic crisis of the gravest kind, and economic science was yet in its infancy. And, whatever the rulers of Spain did or did not do, there was always the fact that her huge Empire entailed continual expense and almost constant war, and the resources of Spain were unequal to the strain. But for her much-prized possessions in the Low Countries and in Italy, Spain might have kept almost clear of European complications. She was as nearly an island as England was, and the

The
darker
side

Effect
of her
Empire
on Spain

¹ "No country in the world has ever been so completely ruined as Spain was by the avoidable faults and follies of its governors" (*Spain*, by Martin Hume, Camb. University Press, p. 187).

Pyrenees were almost as good a barrier against invasion as the Channel. The reduction of the expenses on the army, attention to the navy, the development of her amazing opportunities beyond the Atlantic—these might have allowed her to maintain her colonial and commercial supremacy against England. But her character was against it, and her Empire became a source of great pride to both rulers and people. So her statesmen, and especially her King, faced their world-wide tasks with no thought of yielding. They toiled on through victory and defeat, and both victory and defeat brought them nearer to the abyss.

The
Spanish
army

Spain possessed two admirable instruments; first a body of diplomatists who were before those of any other European country—except Venice—in the scientific care with which they examined the problems that faced them; and secondly, a body of troops, and especially of infantry, whose superiority was generally admitted in Europe and was demonstrated by a century of victory. It was not until the battle of Rocroi (1643) that the old Spanish *tercios* were at last defeated on anything like even terms. To account for the continuous victories of the Spanish troops, we must remember that the age had few regularly trained national armies. The importance of the Turkish Janissaries was in part due to their continuous training and their identification with the state, and the *tercios* have more than a superficial resemblance to the Janissaries. They were all Spaniards and were drawn largely from the ranks of the small nobility. The army was their home and their country. Their devotion to it was very great. It would be absurd to paint them as chivalrous knights, but they had a standard of their own to which they were loyal. It has been defined as the obligation "to obey orders, to aid a comrade even when he is a personal enemy, to keep one's place unshaken, to step into the place of a dead soldier, to stand firm and to charge home."

Spanish
absolutism

Philip II ruled almost entirely by means of officials and Councils directly appointed by himself, and the Spanish people were, it seems, pleased that it should be so. The Cortes still existed and were frequently summoned; but there was no enthusiasm in or for the body, and many of the members were nominees of the Crown. The Cortes of

Aragon were more independent, but even they were no real obstacle to the royal will. The administration of the towns was brought in most instances directly under the control of the monarchy. Thus power lay almost unchallenged in the hands of the King and his agents. The chief of these were the royal secretaries. Then there was the Royal Council divided into four sections; one for general policy and the three others for the administration of justice. Various new Councils were established during this period; most important of all the Chamber of Castile (founded 1588) for ecclesiastical and legal business; but there were also chambers for finance and war. The King ruled over all or permitted no one else to rule. The absence of great names among the diplomatists and statesmen of the time is noteworthy. It was the political vice of the King that he was suspicious of ability, and thought that, if a man were powerful, he would be likely to misuse his power. He liked to set Council in opposition to Council, and minister to watch minister, so that he might himself be arbiter over them. And thus all the policy of Spain reflects his tenacious, narrow, suspicious, unimaginative character.

Of the questions that demanded attention, religion was to Philip the most important; not only because of the real devotion which he had to Catholicism, but also because of the vast importance of ecclesiastical machinery in the management of the country. The King's right of nomination to the greatest ecclesiastical positions in the state was a main support of the royal power, and the Elizabethan Bishops were hardly more subservient to the Crown than the Bishops of Spain. Philip claimed also the right of examining all Papal Bulls and missives, and of refusing their publication if they were in conflict with the traditions or the interests of Spain. The Inquisition was a tribunal of very wide powers, and by no means dealt merely with questions of heresy as ordinarily understood. If it had been a really independent Church Court, it would have challenged the royal authority in the most serious way. But it was in fact controlled by the Crown, and was an instrument in the hands of the Kings of Spain, often used by them for merely political ends. The Bishops especially complained of the

The control
of the
Church

use that was made of it to interfere with them in their Sees. But there is no reason to think it was unpopular with more than a very small section of the people of Spain. Catholicism was to Spain (among many other things) the standard and the implement of national sentiment. The Inquisition worked in Philip's reign not so much against Protestants, of whom there were very few, but against the generally hated Jews and Moriscos. The treatment of the Moriscos is a miserable tragedy. They were all nominally Christians; but no doubt their Christianity was in very many cases less than skin deep. They were forbidden to maintain their native customs. An Ordinance forbade the use of Arabic speech or dress; they might not bathe (an anti-Christian practice!) nor form any association. Their children were taken from them and sent to Christian schools. The Inquisition helped to enforce the statute. There came inevitably insurrection and civil war. The Moriscos put up a very hard fight, which is only intelligible when we realize how small a military force was kept up in Spain. Don John of Austria, soon to be famous on more honourable fields, reduced them at last in 1570. A great number of them left Spain, though they were not yet deported *en masse*. They were excellent and laborious farmers, and their fall is among the causes of the ruin of Spanish agriculture.

The
Moriscos
and Don
John of
Austria

Religion in
Spain

Nor was the religious life of Spain during these years one of mere submission to the Inquisition and the Church of Rome. The country was full of religious enthusiasm, though this enthusiasm often took the form of hatred of Jews and Moors and all other foreigners, and was compatible with gross moral disorder. The country was stirred by new religious movements. We have already spoken of the Jesuits. They always bore strong traces of their Spanish origin, and they were the greatest contribution which Spain made to the Catholic Church during this epoch. Catholic mysticism, too, is a special feature of the time in Spain. It sometimes was suspected of heresy by the agents of the Inquisition; but to this movement belongs the singularly attractive figure of Saint Theresa. She died in 1582, and before her death had founded many new convents and monasteries of the Reformed Carmelite Order. Her letters,

which have been translated into English,¹ give a most interesting picture of the religious life of Spain in this period.

We have seen, in an earlier chapter, that the Church in Spain was very largely controlled by the Crown, which appointed its chief dignitaries and controlled and limited Papal interference. The Spanish Inquisition was warmly supported by Philip, and not only out of religious motives; it was often used by him as a means of royal control of the state. He was at first jealous of the power wielded by the Jesuits, for they were outspoken in their support of the power of the Popes; but he came to find in them, too, a support in the latter part of his reign. He was so intimately identified with the cause of the Counter-Reformation in Europe that a conflict between him and the Jesuits was impossible. But with the Papal Court he was often on bad terms. We have seen how near he had come to being excommunicated in the early part of his reign. He had a sharp tussle in 1581, which turned on the rival claims of Pope and King to exercise practical control over the Church in Spain. The Bishops were appointed by the King, but the Chapters of the Cathedrals were independent, and often resented the intrusion of royal influence. The Papal Nuncio, despatched by Gregory XIII, was instructed from Rome to support the Chapters against the joint authority of the Bishops and the King. A bitter conflict raged round the Cathedrals of Calahorra and Logrono. The King's agent was excommunicated; the Bishop was dismissed; a Papal Bull was promulgated in spite of the express prohibition of the King. Conciliation was tried without avail, and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from Spain. But it was a quarrel of allies, not an incipient schism, and the quarrel was soon forgotten.

Foreign politics probably occupied the attention of King Philip more continuously than religion or finance or the "Indies." It was a great gain for Spain that the Empire and the Austrian lands were now separated from her. The Lutheran movement and the advance of the Turks up the Danube need no longer directly concern her. But the

Philip II
and the
Roman
Church

Spanish
foreign
relations

¹ *Saint Theresa: the history of her foundations*; translated from the Spanish by Sister Agnes Mason (Cambridge Press).

complications of her foreign relations were still sufficiently great. France was strong and therefore (according to the ideas of the time) threatening beyond the Pyrenees and on the frontier of Italy. She was the great rival of Spain, and her rivalry was the constant preoccupation of the policy of Philip. The death of Queen Mary of England and the accession of Queen Elizabeth had dissolved the Anglo-Spanish alliance, which seemed at one time to be so excellent a curb to the ambitions of France. So valuable was the English alliance, so serious the situation if England passed over to the side of France, that Philip made overtures for the hand of Queen Elizabeth. The failure of the project was a personal relief to the King, but it made it necessary to watch England with care throughout his whole reign. Spain and England were indeed in nominal alliance at the beginning of the new reign, and the alliance was not openly repudiated; but commercial and religious rivalry, and the operation of the balance of power drove England to the side of France. To prevent or weaken or neutralize that alliance was the constant effort of Spanish diplomacy.

England
and France

France was thus the great enemy; England the more than doubtful ally; the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands were the chief pivot of Spanish diplomacy. We have seen by what accidents of marriage and succession the Burgundian inheritance of Mary of Burgundy had been brought into the possession of the King of Spain. Hardly could any states be found in Europe with less similarity than Spain and the Low Countries. Spain was still feudal and aristocratic; the Netherlands were predominantly a country of towns and of vigorous commerce. In Spain the monarchy had succeeded in bringing the whole country into a strongly centralized system; the Netherlands consisted of seventeen independent states, each with its own constitution, and in each of these the towns were like independent republics. The struggle against Islam and the national temperament had made of Spain a devotedly loyal Catholic state and people. The Netherlands were predominantly Catholic, and perhaps the majority of the population remained so to the end of the struggle; but the atmosphere was free and progressive and cosmopolitan, and new

The
Netherlands

ideas of every kind found a ready welcome there. The relations of the two peoples therefore presented a very difficult problem; modern experience would seem to show that a solution might have been found by the grant of the largest possible form of local independence and national autonomy. But such ideas were unknown to the sixteenth century. The grant of liberty was nearly always a sign of weakness, and Philip had no notion that Spain was so weak that in the end she would be forced to make the grant. He was obstinate and proud and believed himself strong. It seemed obvious that the interest of Spain and the duty of its ruler were to establish unity in the Netherlands, instead of the existing divisions, and to found that unity on obedience to one Crown and one Church. He knew nothing of the value of conciliation. By force and by fraud and by the application of ecclesiastical influence, he was determined to reduce the provinces to absolute subordination to the King of Spain in his seclusion in the Escorial. In the end the southern provinces were maintained in connection with Spain, by the use of those methods of conciliation which Philip had refused to employ at the beginning.

Condition
of the
Netherlands

The seventeen provinces were for the most part nominally within the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire. But nowhere was the power and authority of the Empire weaker than in this its north-west corner, though the ruler of the provinces was himself Emperor. We may trace the dramatic story of their development and disruption in the sixteenth century without alluding to the fact that they were still nominally subjects of the Kaiser and members of the Reich.

Efforts
towards
unity

The tendency to the concentration of political power in the hands of the monarchy is the almost universal feature of the life of the states of Europe in the sixteenth century. The Netherlands present us with the greatest exception in western Europe, for they were never reduced to obedience to any central authority or welded into any unity. But the rulers of the provinces—Maximilian and Philip, Charles V and Philip II—all desired to concentrate and unite, and there was a general agreement in the provinces themselves that some closer union was desirable. Certain central institutions were introduced, and worked with fair efficiency.

Thus in 1581 Charles V had built on previous experiments by establishing a Council of State for the supervision of the general policy of all the Netherlands ; a Privy Council whose special duty it was to act as a supreme judicial Court and to arbitrate and to judge between the different provinces ; and a Financial Council for the superintendence of the finances of all seventeen provinces. These were all Councils of the type familiar to the century. All consisted of nominees of the sovereign, and were the instruments of his policy, though the members of the Council of State held office for life. Moreover, as far back as 1468 an institution had appeared whose mission it seemed to be to unite the provinces on a more popular basis. For in that year States-General had been introduced ; both idea and name being clearly derived from France. The States-General of the Netherlands, however, had no roots in the traditions or in the institutions of the country, and they were at first merely an agency for the easier government and taxation of the provinces. They rested on no basis of election. Above all it is clear that they were not a sovereign body. Their decisions did not necessarily bind the provinces. Their members were delegates not representatives. The decrees of the States-General were only valid when they had been accepted by the various authorities in the seventeen provinces. They had little resemblance to the States-General of France ; still less to the Parliament of England ; they were conferences of ambassadors rather than a real instrument of central government. Yet they met frequently ; more frequently than the English Parliament ; and they became later the nominal standard under which the provinces resisted the policy of the Spanish King.

The real political life of these Belgian and Dutch lands ^{The} must be sought not in the central but in the provincial ^{autonomy} institutions. There was seated " a political life incomparably ^{of the} ^{provinces} more intense than any that was to be found in Europe at this epoch." ¹ So strong, indeed, was the local patriotism that it resisted all external attacks and all the promptings of obvious self-interest. Even the crisis of a life and death

¹ Pirenne.

struggle only brought transitory union; even the seven provinces, which, under the influence of religion, commerce, and national feeling, formed the union which led to the formation of the state of Holland, declared a century and a half later that "Thank God, they were not united." Each province had its governor (stadhouder); each had its estates. And even the individual provinces were by no means centralized under a single authority. The cities had their own organizations and institutions. The need of unity was plain; there was a strong national sentiment impelling towards it; but the other forces were too strong to allow it to be realized.

**Economic
conditions**

The intense political life of the provinces was accompanied by a business life equally intense. The commercial importance of Italy was declining; the time of England was not fully come; the latest developments of commerce and finance were to be found in the Low Countries. Wealth and influence came as a result. Antwerp held a commercial supremacy such as has perhaps never belonged to any city in Europe. Yet the character of commerce and manufacture was changing rapidly. The rise of the woollen manufactures in England was a heavy blow to the old centres of the wool trade in the southern or Flemish Netherlands, and the great days of Bruges and Ypres were over. Their eclipse was due at least in part to the medieval restrictions imposed by the Guild system and the failure to adopt new methods. But if the wool trade left the old centres, it did not leave the country. It found a freer home in the districts outside of the towns; it became individual and capitalistic; and Antwerp was the great centre of trade operations which have a decidedly modern character. The old feudal aristocracy had passed away from the centre of the stage; their place was taken by the rich townsmen and by nobles to whom the migration of woollen manufacture had brought wealth. Another very modern feature may also be noted. The great development of wealth was accompanied by a great increase in pauperism and unemployment. The religious foundations for the relief of the poor were held to be in part the cause of the evil, by the encouragement which they gave to mendicancy. In no part of Europe was the problem of poverty

so carefully examined as in the Netherlands ; nowhere were there more promising schemes for reforming the systems of relief.

The intellectual and religious life of the country was Religion also very active. The religious institutions were indeed ill disciplined and corrupt. Many of the clergy had a bad name. The monasteries were said to be especially lax. The picture of the religious life of the Netherlands does not differ in essentials from that of Germany. But there was no sign of widespread opposition. Thomas à Kempis, the author of the *Imitation of Christ*, was a native of these lands. Subsequent events were to show that in a large part of the country the loyalty to the Roman Church could stand the strain of defeat and the temptation of political and financial interest. Erasmus, of whom we have said something in an earlier chapter, was born in Rotterdam ; his early activity was displayed in the Netherlands, and he had a large and enthusiastic following. Nowhere did a reform of the Church, according to the ideas of humanism and reason, seem more probable than there. Much was done for education. Printing, if it was not invented in the Netherlands, was splendidly developed there. In literature the country suffered (as it has always suffered) from the lack of a national language. The old Flemish tongue was widely known and used, but French was becoming the language of politics and literature. The claims of Latin to be retained as the language of culture were nowhere stronger than in the Low Countries. Erasmus always wrote and usually spoke in Latin. But if the contributions of the country to vernacular literature were small, the art of painting continued to flourish gloriously. The second half of the sixteenth century was not one of the greatest periods in the art of the Netherlands. The successors of the Van Eycks and of Memlinc were by no means their equals ; but the influence of Italy was a great inspiration, and Quentin Metsys, the friend of More and Erasmus, continued the great tradition.

The religious influence of Erasmus preceded, as we have seen, that of Luther. Lutheranism soon showed itself in the Low Countries, especially in Antwerp, and it is interesting to note the action of the Emperor Charles V towards it. Suppression
of heresy

For, while in Germany he was moderate and tried continually to find some road to conciliation and to the re-establishment of religious unity through some measure of agreement, in the Netherlands he was a bitter persecutor. An Inquisition was introduced, which was not precisely the Roman Inquisition nor the Spanish, but had something in common with both. The Commissioners for the suppression of heresy were appointed by the Emperor, and were only subsequently accepted by the Pope. The edicts against heresy (the so-called Placards) could not easily be surpassed in their severity. In 1529 the penalty of death was laid down for all who, not being theologians, discussed matters of religion; for all who insulted God, the Virgin, or the Saints; for all who, knowing of the existence of heretics, did not denounce them.

Lutheranism, and all movements in sympathy with it, disappeared before these savage edicts. Erasmus himself, though he was supported by the Regent Margaret, thought it best to withdraw to Basel. The religious unity of the country was not seriously broken by the spread of Anabaptism, for though its supporters were numerous they were regarded with abhorrence by Protestants as well as by Catholics. They were cruelly treated and their activities were driven underground, whence they emerged when the struggle of the nation against Philip II began.

Philip II
in the
Netherlands

When Philip II succeeded his father in the Netherlands, the prospect for a peaceful and successful reign seemed bright. The new ruler was greeted with a great show of enthusiasm. The war against France ended with two victories—Saint Quentin and Gravelines—in which soldiers and commanders from the Netherlands had played a prominent part. Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, at the time Regent of the Netherlands, commanded at Saint Quentin, and Count Egmont was present at that battle and commanded at Gravelines. The religious difficulty seemed at an end. Lutheranism and Anabaptism had nearly disappeared; the country was thoroughly Catholic, though with a Catholicism which would not quite have satisfied either Madrid or Rome. The coming struggle between Spain and the Netherlands is often spoken of as “inevitable”; but some *modus vivendi*

between the two countries, each of which had much to give to the other, did not seem beyond the reach of statesmanship. Two forces brought on the struggle. First, the character of Philip II. He was fanatical, obstinate, and stupid. It was clear to him that the duty of the subject was absolute obedience both in politics and religion; and equally it was the duty of the ruler to enforce obedience. Next, there was the clash between two contrasted types of national character. Both had many elements of real greatness; but each irritated the other beyond bearing. Spain had loathed the Flemings who followed Charles V to Spain at his accession; now the Netherlanders found the Spanish soldiers and statesmen of Philip II equally intolerable. They demanded a Government that should be wholly in the hands of natives of the seventeen provinces. The struggle in the Netherlands sprung primarily from national sentiment, and only secondarily from religious differences and commercial interests.

Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy went back to his own country after the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis. His place as Regent was taken by Margaret of Parma, an illegitimate daughter of Charles V, and the mother of Alexander of Parma, who, at the end of the century, played so great a part in the history of the provinces. She was a vigorous, capable woman, but it was not Philip's way to act openly even with his most trusted servants. Cardinal Granvella was made President of the Council, and Philip corresponded secretly with him and gave him most of his confidence.

Difficulties arose at once. The war had entailed great expense, and Spain was already on the fatal slope that led towards bankruptcy. Philip wanted the provinces to pay more than they thought their fair share, and he wanted to leave a portion of his Spanish troops in their country; partly for economic reasons and partly in order that they might support the Government against any national resistance. So strong was the opposition that Philip had to yield. He promised to withdraw the troops, and he had to be contented with a smaller sum of money than he had at first demanded.

Then there came up the question of the reorganization of the the Bishoprics of the Netherlands. There was no doubt

that some reorganization was necessary. The existing six dioceses did not correspond with the political divisions of the country, and they were subordinate to the Archbishoprics of Cologne and Reims—the one a German, the other a French city. The interdependence of religious and political organization was becoming obvious, and it was necessary to make the organization of the Church in the Netherlands correspond to its political structure. The change corresponded with the growing nationalism of the provinces, and was not altogether opposed by the national party. But there were certain features in it which roused dislike and resistance. The King was to control the appointments to the new Bishoprics, which would thus become an agency of the Spanish Government. They were to exercise a close supervision over the people, and were to be associated with the work of the Inquisition. Rich ecclesiastical stipends, which had hitherto been in the gift of the nobles and had been used by them to enrich their relatives, would now be lost to them.

Egmont and
Orange

A storm of opposition was aroused. The earliest leaders were to be found in the ranks of the high nobility and among the members of the Royal Council itself. The two most prominent men were Count Egmont and the Prince of Orange. Egmont possessed great estates and wealth; he had commanded with distinction in the armies of the King; he was generous, popular, and open. William of Orange—known to history as “the Silent,” a name in the first instance given him by his enemies and not really characteristic—had even greater estates. He drew his title from the Principality of Orange on the Rhone, and he was already Governor of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. Besides these he had close connections with Germany, and possessed estates there. There was not much as yet to distinguish him from the ordinary nobleman; nothing to indicate the consummate diplomatist and statesman, who was to wield so great influence on the destinies of the provinces. He had been a favourite of Charles V, and it was upon his arm that Charles leaned in the ceremony of abdication. His father was a Lutheran, but he himself had been brought up in the Roman faith. There was a strong religious element in his nature

but the theological disputes of the time made little appeal to him.

The opposition contrived to make the Government of the Netherlands almost unworkable. Philip was bitterly angry, but it was necessary to yield. Granvella was made a scapegoat. Margaret hoped that without him she would be able to conciliate and to govern. But now the resistance to Spain was taken up by wider circles and was inspired by a new spirit. The supremely important fact is that Calvinism began to penetrate the Netherlands and took on a fanatical, revolutionary character, which would certainly have been displeasing to Calvin. Its theological system appealed strongly to many minds, and its books were written in French, which was understood by a large proportion of the population. Moreover, its organization rested on a principle of self-government and was independent of the secular powers; and resistance to rulers who persecuted it was clearly allowed by the teachings of Calvin. It thus harmonized with the growing resistance to Spain. Few things in the century are more remarkable than the spread and influence of Calvinism in the Belgian lands. It is clear that it attracted to itself many who had hitherto been adherents of Anabaptism. It spread among the townsmen and also among the lesser nobility. These last now took the leadership in the resistance to Spain, and for a time Egmont and Orange fell into the background. They were in many ways like the Knights of Germany, whose adhesion was so questionable a force in the Lutheran movement. Louis of Nassau, the brother of William of Orange, Brederode, and Saint-Aldegonde are among their most prominent names. They formed a League or "Compromise," and declared that their chief object was to resist the Inquisition. In April 1566 they presented a petition to the Regent, and the occasion gave rise to a name almost as famous as that of "Huguenot" and of as doubtful an origin. It appears that one of the Regent's supporters had alluded to them as beggars ("Gueux"), and they adopted this title with the insignia of a professional beggar at a banquet the same evening.

The country was in confusion and uproar. The Calvinists were certainly a minority in the population, but the author-

Rise of
Calvinism

The
compro-
mise and
the
beggars

Church
wrecking

ities in town and country were bitterly irritated with the policy of the Spanish Government, and would not try to suppress the wave of anarchy which spread over the land. Calvinist consistories were established. Preachings took place openly. Then the wrecking of churches began on a scale not known elsewhere in western Europe. The concessions of the Regent were taken as proof that all was allowed. Pictures and stained glass, and carved work in wood and stone—priceless artistic treasures among them—were destroyed. The orgy culminated in an attack on the cathedral of Antwerp, which was peculiarly rich in medieval art. The Catholics were indignant, but they were powerless.

Restoration
of order

These events in the Netherlands touched Philip to the quick; but he loved to wait and conceal his purpose. So, while he was preparing to strike hard, he yielded. The Inquisition was withdrawn; the severity of the placards was moderated; an amnesty was issued. The great nobles now consented to co-operate with the Regent in the establishment of order. Egmont had been on a mission to Spain, and had been received with every sign of honour by Philip; he was convinced of the good intentions of the Spanish King, and put his services for a time at the service of the Government. Orange had seen with disgust the violence and anarchy of the church-wreckers, and he, too, was willing to help. A religious peace was established. The influence of France is clear in all these movements, and this peace is somewhat like the efforts made by Catherine de Médicis to establish a peace by conciliation in France. Protestant worship was allowed in certain districts and under certain conditions. Order and the authority of the central Government were restored.

Again the game seemed in the hands of the Spanish Government. The outbreak of violence had alienated very many from the national cause. Catholicism was decidedly in the ascendant. A wise statesmanship might have seen the opportunity for organizing the conservative forces of the land for the maintenance of order. The connection with Spain might have been maintained for some time.

The
despatch
of Alva
(Aug. 1567)

Philip's statesmanship knew nothing of such methods. He had long been preparing to strike what he hoped would

prove a decisive military blow against the unquiet spirits of the Netherlands. Now, April 1567, the blow fell.

Alva, already distinguished by long service and especially by his victory at Mühlberg, sailed from Cartagena to Genoa, and made his way by the Mont Cenis Pass through Burgundy and Lorraine and Luxemburg into the Netherlands. His army was a small one, according to modern standards; he entered Brussels with 1000 horse and 18,000 foot. But the troops were splendidly equipped, and belonged to the famous and invincible *tercios* of Spain. The Netherlanders were unprepared, and they were thought to be unmilitary in character. "I have tamed men of iron," Alva is reported to have said, "and I shall soon have done with these men of butter." His army did not deceive his confidence; but the course of the war and modern experience show that there was one great defect in his preparations. He had no fleet. The Low Countries were full of waterways, and the coasts had excellent harbours. Shipping was the life of the commerce of the people. If Spain could have attacked by sea as well as by land, if she could have closed the harbours and patrolled the waterways with her galleys, the resistance of the people could not have been prolonged. That Philip and his Generals made no attempt to do so was due partly no doubt to lack of a navy, for we have already said that the idea that Spain was the supreme naval power of the time rests on a complete misunderstanding of the situation. But it was also due to a lack of appreciation of the importance of naval power. While the rebels had command of the sea, it proved impossible either to beat them to surrender or to starve them out.

Margaret of Parma did not at all welcome the arrival of Alva, for he superseded her in all but name. She soon resigned, and Alva took her place with the double title of Regent and Governor-General. He represented much of what was most characteristic of Spain. He was wholly devoted to the King and the Church, and his mission was to make the Netherlands like Spain. He suggested that the country should be definitely annexed to Spain, and that Spanish institutions should be introduced completely. He was resolved at any rate to sweep away all checks to the ^{Alva's} policy

royal power, and to create a unified state on the basis of obedience to one Crown and one Church. In pursuit of this aim, about which he felt no scruples of conscience whatever, he flinched from no responsibility and thought all cruelties justified. The resistance which his policy encountered surprised him, for he had no understanding of the life of the country to which he had come. He understood nobles and he understood peasantry; but the capitalists and the traders, the industrial masses and the religious conventicles represented a force quite unknown to him.

Alva had nearly four years of success. Resistance was for a long time impossible. The scheme for the new Bishoprics was now carried out. The Council of State was neglected and vacancies were not filled up. A new Council called officially "The Council of Troubles," but generally known as "The Blood Council," was set up. Its duty was to assist the Governor in dealing with cases of resistance to the Government. Heresy, strictly so-called, was left to the Inquisition. The Council of Blood dealt with political offences, but interpreted them so widely that heresy was in effect punished by it. All were brought within the scope of the Council "who have asserted that the King did not possess the right to deprive all the provinces of their privileges or that the Council of Troubles was bound to respect laws or charters."

The
triumph
of Alva

A Reign of Terror spread over the land. In three months there were 1800 victims; and of them two provoked more amazed attention than all the others. Count Egmont and Admiral Hoorn were Catholics; they had served Philip with conspicuous success. They saw Alva's arrival without personal fear, and when William of Orange, characteristically well-informed of the designs of Philip, advised them to withdraw with him beyond the reach of danger, they refused. Soon after Alva's arrival they were arrested—all constitutional difficulties being overruled by the Council—and condemned to death. They were executed in the Old Market Place in Brussels in June 1568. William of Orange planned a three-fold invasion of the Netherlands with troops raised in Germany, and counted on the rising of the people. But all failed. His brother was defeated after a success in Fries-

land. William himself crossed the Meuse with a large but ill-disciplined army. Alva's Spanish forces were smaller, but much more efficient. William was beaten without anything like a battle. He fell back on to the French frontier. His banner bore the famous device, "*Pro lege rege grege,*" which his great-grandson carried when he landed in England in 1688.

Alva's triumph was complete. But financial difficulties followed this, as all other Spanish triumphs. The campaign had been costly, and the ordinary revenues from the Netherlands had dried up. It had been hoped that the occupation of the Netherlands would more than pay for itself; that it would set a river of gold flowing into the Spanish treasury. In March 1569 Alva issued certain finance edicts which it was hoped would secure this end.

There were three of them. First, a levy of 1 per cent. ^{New} (The Hundredth Penny) on all capital. Secondly, a tax of ^{taxes} 5 per cent. (The Twentieth Penny) on all sales of land and houses and real estate. Thirdly, a tax of 10 per cent. on all other sales of whatever kind (The Tenth Penny). The first levy was to be exacted once only, and could be easily borne. The second and third were adapted from the alcabala and other taxes known in Spain. They were no doubt of evil consequence there, but could be supported in a community of sluggish commercial life. But the Netherlanders were a real nation of shopkeepers; ease and cheapness of exchange were the first necessity to them; and the new taxes, especially the tax of 10 per cent. on all sales, would have been their ruin. After some negotiation, Alva consented to postpone the application of these taxes for a time on condition of an immediate grant of money. But the threat remained. Philip's temperament did not recoil before difficulties and protests; and the merchant classes knew henceforth what was in store for them.

Alva had beaten down all open resistance. He built a strong fortress to keep Antwerp in check; and he erected statues to himself with triumphant inscriptions. But he had exasperated against himself three of the strongest forces that are known to history; national feeling, religious enthusiasm, and financial interest. When an opportunity came, they would show him what they were capable of.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE EUROPEAN CRISIS AND THE MASSACRE OF SAINT BARTHOLOMEW'S DAY

THE slaughter of Protestants which took place in Paris on Saint Bartholomew's Day (August 24), 1572, is one of the incidents of the century which have fixed themselves in the memory and imagination of posterity. It is extremely difficult to be sure of the details, for passions of various kinds have been at work distorting them, exaggerating or minimizing them, inventing fantastic details to account for them, sometimes blackening the character of the victims in order to excuse the criminals, sometimes idealizing the victims and thus casting deeper infamy on those who were responsible for their death. The part played by certain individuals, and the motives which inspired the crime, will perhaps always escape scrutiny. But the massacre was closely related to a great international and diplomatic scheme. Between 1570 and 1572 it seemed as though the nations of Europe were going to arrange themselves in a new combination; as if France were going to join with England and with the Netherlands in an attack on the power of Spain, and were going to be supported by the German Protestants, by some Italian states, and even by the forces of Turkey. Such a combination would have to some extent anticipated the rôle of France in the next century, when she joined hands with Protestant Europe against the power of the Habsburgs. Its adoption in the sixteenth century would have meant an enormous change in the political and the religious condition of Europe. But the project failed. The massacre was both the sign of its failure, and a cause which made that failure more complete.

The
massacre
and inter-
national
politics

The
prestige
of Spain

The prestige of Spain in 1570 was very high in Europe. Alva's triumph in the Netherlands was apparently complete. It seemed that that rich land with all its commerce and treasure was now at the disposal of the King of Spain. All the efforts to shake off his power by external invasion or internal rebellion had been complete failures. There were no troops in western Europe that could be put in comparison with the Spanish infantry. The armies of France were admittedly far inferior; some advisers of Charles IX told him that an invading Spanish army could pass through the land without effectual resistance.

Lepanto

Next year a great naval victory added still further to the glory of the Spanish name and to the belief in the invincibility of the Spanish forces. In August 1571 a navy, in which Spanish ships were the most numerous, inflicted an overwhelming defeat on the Turkish navy. The great Sultan, Soliman, had died in 1566; he had been succeeded by Selim II, one of the weaker Turkish rulers. Turkish affairs were, however, still conducted with vigour by his Vizir, Mohammed Sokolli. In 1569 the Turks attacked the island of Cyprus, which belonged to Venice; the city of Famagosta fell, and the defenders were treated with appalling barbarity. The advance of the Turkish power during the sixteenth century had been made possible by the dissensions and rivalries of the Christian powers of the west; France had been specially prominent in her readiness to enter into alliance with the Sultans. But now the Papal throne was held by Pius V, in whom the spirit of the counter-Reformation was incarnate, and who was as determined to uphold the temporal power of the Papal See as the orthodox doctrine of the Church. He took the lead in organizing a triple alliance—of Venice, Spain, and the Papacy—against Turkey. A fleet of some 200 galleys and a few larger ships supplied by Spain, was collected and was placed under the command of Don John of Austria, the illegitimate son of Charles V. The two fleets met at Lepanto, near to the narrowest strait of the Gulf of Corinth. The Christian powers gained a complete victory, which would have been overwhelming if it had been followed up with vigour or with loyalty to a common aim. It seemed for the moment as if the Turkish sea power was

annihilated. But the rivalries of the western powers were as bitter as usual. And, in addition to the conflict of interest between Spain and Venice, Philip was suspicious and jealous of Don John's fame and position. The triumphant Captain Don John of Austria dreamed of taking Constantinople and re-establishing the Christian Empire there, but he could get no support from Philip. We shall soon meet his ambitions and talents in the theatre of the Netherlands. For the present, we need only notice that the Turks built another fleet and were soon again threatening the western powers. None the less Lepanto was an epoch-making victory. The naval power of the Turks was never again a danger to western Europe. And if we turn back our thoughts to France and the Netherlands, we note that Lepanto established for the moment the naval reputation of Spain on a level with her military reputation. The Spanish power was one that awoke the jealousy and fear of all Europe. It seemed to threaten all, and to attack it was a fearful danger.¹

France took the leading part in the movements which The situation in France seemed likely to give an altogether new turn to the international combinations of Europe. Her antagonism to the power of the Habsburgs dated back to the election of Charles V as Emperor in 1519. In spite of the separation of Spain from the Empire the Habsburg power seemed to encircle France and to threaten to strangle her. Moreover, she had coveted some portion of the Netherlands for centuries. A French ruler could never quite abandon the idea of pushing the frontier further north into the rich lands of the Walloons or Flemings. There was no strong ruler in France now, and French diplomacy followed no steady or logical course. Several different influences strove for mastery, and the tragic events of August 1572 are largely the result of weakness and inconsequence. The King, Charles IX, was now of age to rule in fact as well as name; he was an abnormal creature, as all Catherine's children were, and the chase was his chief passion. But he began to take a keen interest in politics and to desire to manage them himself. His mother saw with

¹ The battle of Lepanto and its consequences have been treated more fully in chap. viii, p. 223.

alarm this tendency to independence, and was not at all inclined to abdicate the power which she had exercised since the death of her husband. She was especially concerned with the marriage projects of her children, and here her interest was personal rather than political. Henry of Anjou was her darling child, and she wanted to procure for him a great position, and hardly considered the consequences which his marriage might have for France. The massacre was indeed partly due to her realization at last of the political and international consequences of the marriage projects that she had supported. For though she was a nimble-minded, clever woman, she had little diplomatic shrewdness or insight, and was notably inferior in this respect to Queen Elizabeth, to Margaret of Parma, and perhaps to Mary Queen of Scots. By the side of the King and the Queen Mother Coligny arose in importance; the one man in France who had a clear policy that did not aim merely at his own advancement. He never doubted that France should join with the Protestant powers in attacking Spain, and he never flinched from the consequences of that policy. He had begun, as we have seen, as a friend and protégé of Catherine's. He was now induced to come to Court at Blois (September 1571), and soon gained a remarkable ascendancy over the King's mind. The Queen Mother seemed entirely reconciled to him. He received grants of money, and the income of an abbey was given him. The Guises had retired from Court; their influence was eclipsed; the King could do nothing without Coligny's advice and approval.

The different movements at Court are inextricably mixed; they cross and sometimes contradict one another, but they must be separated for purposes of clearness. And first we will trace the matrimonial projects in which the Queen Mother was so much interested. The greatest scheme was for a marriage between the English Queen and Henry of Anjou. That would be one of the greatest matches possible in Europe at this period. Its political consequences would be of the first importance; for it would mean the close union of England and France, and between them they might defy the power of Spain. It would mean, too, security for the Huguenots in France, and might lead to some decisive

Henry of
Anjou

Coligny

Henry of
Anjou and
Queen
Elizabeth

change in the religious policy of the French Government. Catherine saw mainly the personal aspect—the eminent position which it would give her son; and she pursued the plan with eagerness, when it was suggested to her by English statesmen and Huguenot leaders. In 1570 and 1571 Elizabeth was in great difficulties with the rising of the North and the Ridolfi plot, and in times of difficulty she usually thought of marriage as a means of escape. It seemed at first as if she were sincerely inclined to marriage with the Duke of Anjou. Walsingham was able to say at one time “that the Queen accepted the offer of the Duke’s hand.” But then there came the question of conditions, especially of religious conditions. Would the Duke be able to worship freely according to the Roman rite? The question was answered with a decided negative. At most he might have the Mass in his own room. It was a surrender which neither the Duke—who was devout and even superstitious in his religious observances—nor his mother was willing to make. Charles, who was jealous of him and eager to get him out of the country, tried in vain to overcome his refusal with cajolings and threats. But the marriage project had to be dropped. The hand and Crown of the English Queen were too great a prize, however, to be readily abandoned. If for religious (and other) reasons Anjou was not available, what of Catherine’s fourth son, the Duke of Alençon? He was 18, and the English Queen was 39; but the motive of the marriage being entirely political, this disparity of age need not be an obstacle, and the young Duke’s claims and charms were earnestly pressed on Elizabeth. He was declared to be not so “obstinate or Papistical” as his brother. The project could not be realized, though it was not by any means finally abandoned. One really important result of this close intercourse between the statesmen and royal families of the two countries remained. A treaty was signed between them at Blois in April 1572, which remained the basis of the relations between the two countries down to the end of the century. It was a purely defensive treaty, in which the two countries promised mutual assistance against invasion, even if such invasion were undertaken in the name of religion. That is, France promised help to England even against an attack from the King of Spain or the Pope.

The
Treaty of
Blois

Marriage
of Henry
of Navarre

Other important marriage projects about this time did not fail. King Charles IX married Elizabeth of Austria, daughter of the Emperor. The Duke of Condé, next to Henry of Navarre the hope of the Huguenots, married Mary of Cleves, a Calvinist, and his continuance in the Protestant faith seemed assured. But the most important marriage project was for Margaret of Valois, the King's sister, and Henry of Navarre. It was by no means certain that Henry was going to inherit the French Crown; there was still hope of male issue to one of the royal princes. But clearly he was an important person as leader of the Huguenots. A marriage with the Princess would give further security to the treaty with the Huguenots which had been concluded at Saint Germain. The Princess would have, moreover, a royal title, and that was a great inducement to the Queen Mother. The religious results of the match were doubtful: some thought that Margaret would be another Saint Clotilda and would lead her husband into the Catholic fold; others that the Crown would be drawn by the match into a more genuine and friendly co-operation with the Huguenots. Henry's sternly puritan mother, Jeanne D'Albret, Queen of Navarre, came up to Court ("I knew its corruption to be great," she wrote, "but I find it greater than I thought"), and drove a hard bargain on her son's behalf. When matters had been nearly arranged, Henry came to Court. (His mother urged him to remember to speak up, to brush his hair from his forehead, and to hold fast to his faith.) There was great difficulty about securing the Papal dispensation which was wanted, both because of the religion of the bridegroom and his relationship with Margaret. The Papal dispensation did not arrive; but the marriage took place on August 18, 1572. Coligny was in the Cathedral during the ceremony, and the flags taken from the Huguenots at the battle of Jarnac hung from the roof. "We must take those down," he said to Marshal Damville, "and put up some more suitable." His dream of a Spanish war seemed close to realization; but in less than a week he and his scheme were both victims of the massacre.

Coligny's
plans

These marriage negotiations had been accompanied throughout by diplomatic intrigue of the most important

kind. War against Spain by France, in alliance with England and the rebel "Beggars" in the Netherlands, with whatever support could be obtained from the German Protestant princes, from the states of north Italy and even from the Turk—that was the scheme constantly before the mind of Coligny. The King of France was brought into almost complete sympathy with this plan; and up to the midsummer of 1572 the chances of committing France to this new line of policy seemed good. Louis of Nassau, the brother of William of Orange, was at La Rochelle, and he had an interview with the King and held up before him a brilliant prospect of glory and aggrandisement. Charles IX had many grievances against Spain; both private and public. A recent attack by the Spanish on a French settlement in Florida was bitterly resented. And Spain was trying to detach the Swiss—so valuable a source of mercenary soldiers—from their alliance with France. There was much irritation with the King of Spain and his policy; so the overtures from the Netherlands were not rejected, and French feelers were put out in other directions in Europe. There was hope of help from various quarters. Florence and Venice had their grievances against Spain and the Pope, and might be induced to assist. The German princes—and especially Brandenburg—were sympathetic. The Turk, engaged in his fierce conflict at sea with Philip and his allies, would certainly be ready to give help. Charles wrote very openly to the Sultan; all his ideas, he said, were turned towards curbing the greatness of the Spaniards. But Italy, Germany, and Turkey were secondary considerations. All turned on the action of England and the Netherlands.

The land forces of England were of little importance by reason of their small numbers, their lack of training, and their ignorance of the new methods of warfare. But the English fleet would protect the shores of the Low Countries from the Spanish fleet if it ventured to come into the northern sea, and the English army would develop into a serious fighting force, if the Government were in earnest in the matter. Coligny hoped for much from England and England's Queen. If she would only marry the Duke of Anjou and draw her sword on behalf of the Protestant cause in Europe,

France and
England

that would mean the birth of a new world. But the marriage fell through ; the Treaty of Blois was for defensive purposes only ; neither the Queen nor Burleigh were convinced of the wisdom of interference in the Netherlands at this moment. The Queen has been bitterly attacked both by French and English historians for her failure to take a strong anti-Spanish policy at this crisis ; that failure has been declared to be one of the chief causes of the massacre. But much may be said on the other side. Peace was the first necessity for England. Abstention from European wars seemed fully justified by the failure of the English campaign in France. The English religious settlement was peculiar to the nation, and Queen Elizabeth refused to accept the rôle of champion of European Protestantism. Her policy was narrowly national, egoistic, and by no means straightforward. It could not escape censure at the bar of morality or humanity. But it was certainly not worse than that of Spain or France. The heroic struggle of the Dutch has won the admiration of posterity. But France did not propose to establish their independence. A partition of the Netherlands between France, Germany, and England was plainly talked of. If England had joined in the war against Spain, and if that war had been successful, the victors would certainly have quarrelled among themselves, and it is not certain that the lot of the Dutch would have been improved. England refused to join ; and, as the probability of war between France and Spain grew greater, she drew back more resolutely, to the disgust and amazement of Coligny and William of Orange.

The
"Water
Beggars"

The Dutch Protestant leaders were, of course, not backward. The yoke of Alva lay on the country with increasing weight, and only with foreign help could it be shaken off. But in April 1572 the Dutch struck an important blow for themselves. The action of Alva had driven many thousands of them into exile. The Spaniards, as we have seen, made no effort to close the seas against them, and they had taken in large numbers to a seafaring life, partly as pirates or privateers, partly as patriots. They attacked shipping and sometimes plundered the coasts ; they had received letters of mark from William of Orange, and were in touch with the leaders of the national Protestant movement. Now

there came an inducement and an opportunity for direct interference. We have seen that Alva had accepted a compromise on his taxation projects in 1569; but Philip was never in favour of compromise. In February 1572 he sent down orders that the taxes were to be raised according to the original proposal. The trading classes were thus threatened with a scheme of taxation which meant their ruin. On April 1, 1572, a squadron of the "Water Beggars," as the seafaring exiles were called, presented itself before Brill ^{Capture of Brill} under the command of La Marck, and demanded the surrender of the place. It was almost entirely without garrison, and the population was certainly cognizant of the attack and sympathized with it. The ground had been prepared by the diplomacy of William of Orange. Brill surrendered forthwith, and the national movement spread widely throughout the north-west of the seventeen provinces. Flushing, which controlled the Scheldt and Antwerp, and the whole of Walcheren island followed the example of Brill. Soon nearly the whole of Holland, Zeeland, Gelderland, and Friesland had declared for the national and Protestant cause. The Dutch naval power, it must be remembered, was in effect unchallenged, and a large part of the revolted territory could be approached only by sea. The rising gathered strength. William of Orange was collecting an army in Germany with the connivance of the authorities there. In July 1572 he was formally declared stadhouder of Holland. The revolt had thus taken formal and official shape. No help came from England; there came, on the contrary, a clear indication that no official help was to be expected. All turned on the action of France. "My sole hope was from the side of France," said William, when the massacre had destroyed all his hopes there. The omens in France were good until nearly the end. The French Government connived at the sending of assistance to the rebels, and seemed preparing for more open interference. Louis of Nassau invaded from France and seized the city of Mons. ^{Seizure of Mons} It was a place of much strategic importance; but it was in the midst of a population favourable to the Spanish, and William seems to have disapproved of the stroke. Alva quickly made arrangements for its blockade; and its fall was certain, if

it were not relieved from outside. William advanced with an army from Germany. But before he could arrive a force had marched to the relief of the town under the Frenchman, Genlis. The Spanish ambassador called on Charles IX to prevent the march of this force, which consisted of French soldiers and had been sent with the knowledge of the French King. Under modern diplomatic conditions it would have been an act of open war, and it was difficult to see how, even according to the looser notions of the sixteenth century, war could be prevented. Genlis was not stopped; but he soon met a tragic fate. He was caught in an ambushade and completely and ignominiously defeated with heavy loss. The date was August 19.

Cross
currents
at Paris

We must return to Paris and try to understand the obscure but momentous events which were happening there. The tide had flowed pretty steadily in favour of co-operation with the Dutch "Beggars," but it had many opponents. The Guise party and all Catholics, who put the interest of their faith and Church before that of their country, necessarily saw with alarm the alliance with the Protestants of Europe, which seemed in process of completion. And Catherine de Médicis, though she may have welcomed at first a policy, which might bring the Crowns of England and Navarre to her children, found herself profoundly uneasy. Her master passion was power; her chief political aim was the maintenance of peace at home and abroad. She had a real liking for Spain, and a profound belief in its military force. She found herself in midsummer 1572 in a position which threatened all she held dearest. Coligny was the King's trusted adviser; France was making straight for a war with Spain; and in time of war her influence was always likely to be superseded by that of some soldier. She had welcomed the Peace of Saint Germain for the prospect of quiet which it brought; but the new policy of the King was leading to another war; against Catholics instead of against Huguenots; against the invincible might of Spain instead of the weak forces of the Huguenots. "Fear came upon her because of the Spanish armies," says a well-informed contemporary.¹

¹ Tavannes.

She found with alarm the plight into which she had fallen, and strove to break out of it by whatever means. At all times she was liable to quick changes of policy. Now fear made her ready for an act of brutal cruelty, which was wholly contrary to her normal character and policy.

Early in August two meetings were called; one of the ^{Signs of} Royal Council; the other of army chiefs. Coligny submitted ^{change} a memorandum asserting that victory was certain, that Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey would help; that France had gone too far to withdraw; and that a foreign war was the only way to avoid a civil war. The opposition dwelt on the strength of Spain, the unpreparedness of France, and the ease with which a Spanish army could capture the cities of France. The feeling of the Council was decidedly opposed to the war. Then it was that Coligny used words that have been variously interpreted: "The King refuses to undertake war. Please God he may not have another war on his hands from which it will be impossible for him to withdraw." It was probably a warning against civil war, which seemed to Coligny the inevitable alternative to war against Spain. But the idea of that war was by no means abandoned. Perhaps France had gone too far to withdraw. Coligny was aware of his danger, but refused to take precautions for his own safety. "His courage is invincible," wrote Walsingham.

To Catherine he seemed the main support of the war which ^{Attempted} she hated and feared. She had often thought of getting rid ^{assassina-} of him by assassination. In the sixteenth century no state ^{tion of} regarded assassination as wholly inadmissible "as an in- ^{Coligny} strument of national policy." So she renewed her relation with the Guises; an assassin was found of proved skill and success. On August 22, as Coligny was coming back to his lodging, he was fired at from a neighbouring window and wounded in the hand and arm. The wound seemed likely to heal, but it created a situation of the utmost danger. The partisan spirit ran high everywhere in France, and nowhere higher than in Paris, which was fiercely Catholic. The city was full of Huguenots who had come up for the wedding of Henry of Navarre; and many of them were nobles with bands of followers. An outbreak of violence was

The
genesis
of the
massacre

probable, and would be likely to lead to civil war. And if the situation was dangerous for France, it was much more dangerous for the Queen Mother herself. The Huguenots would demand an enquiry into the origin of the attack on their leader. If it were brought home to her, while the Huguenots still remained in favour at Court, it would mean the end of her political influence and probably exile from France. It was the failure of one crime which suggested another and a much greater one. To cover her share in the attack on Coligny, she must commit the Court and the nation to war against the Huguenots ; she must, if possible, sweep the Huguenots from her path altogether. It speaks much for her force of character that she was able to impose a policy of massacre on the King, whose real and strong inclinations were towards co-operation with the Huguenots. She allied herself with the Guise party—the young Duke Henry and the Duchess of Nevers, the widow of Francis, Duke of Guise, whom the Guises regarded as murdered by Coligny—and with her son, the Duke of Anjou. To overcome the resistance of the King, the conspirators invented a Huguenot plot against his person and liberty. So fierce was the spirit of Paris that the citizens were certain to attack the Huguenots, if the Government gave any sign of their approval. Shortly after midnight the killing began. Henry of Guise superintended the murder of Coligny ; and had the body thrown down from the bedroom that he might be sure the work was done. Henry of Navarre and the Prince of Condé were saved by abjuring their religion. For three days the Huguenots were hunted and killed everywhere in the city. An order from the King, which was withdrawn quickly, directed that similar measures should be taken in the provinces. During recent troubles the unity of France had been much weakened, and many districts were almost independent in the hands of their governors or of the municipal authorities. Thus it depended almost entirely on local circumstances whether there were Huguenot hunts or not. There were atrocious scenes in some places, as at Meaux where 200 prisoners were killed ; at Orleans, where the slaughter was by order of the officers of the city ; at Lyons, where a popular rising defeated the efforts of the Governor to save the Hugue-

The
massacre

nots. In other places, as at Montpellier, Bayonne, and Nîmes, order was kept and the Huguenots did not suffer.

The explanation of these tragic events given by the Government varied rapidly. At first, it was a faction fight between the Chatillons and the Guises; then it was the repression of a Huguenot conspiracy. But the effort to throw the responsibility on other shoulders was resented, and had to be abandoned. On August 28 the King declared in Parlement "that what had been done was by his express order and command, in order to prevent the execution of a detestable conspiracy planned by Coligny against the person of the King, the Queen Mother, the King of Navarre, and the other princes." Permission to hold Calvinist worship was at the same time withdrawn, but liberty of conscience was allowed. A little later two Huguenots who had escaped from the massacre were executed for complicity in the supposed plot. Coligny's memory was condemned, his portraits and statues destroyed, his house razed to the ground. There are no sufficient data to calculate the number of the victims; but they certainly reached several thousands.

The causes and the motives of the massacre have been a matter of keen dispute down to our own time. Above all, the question has been hotly argued whether it was premeditated or not.

It is certain that neither the assassination of Coligny nor the wholesale killing of the Huguenots were ideas that suddenly presented themselves to the Queen in 1572. De la Ferrière has found half a dozen passages in the documents of the time,¹ in which the murder of Coligny is distinctly mentioned as a possible means of meeting the difficulty of the situation; and, as has been said above, it was an age which did not regard political assassination with absolute condemnation. A general slaughter of the Huguenots had been suggested at Bayonne; and the presence of so many of them in Paris for the marriage of Navarre made the project feasible at this time. Contemporaries, especially those who were not quite close to the chief actors in the

¹ See De la Ferrière, *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vol. iv, Introd. p. xxiv.

drama, usually believed in premeditation. Davila, the Italian author of the *History of the Civil Wars*, assumes premeditation and does not condemn it. He writes: "The Peace being concluded and established, the engine framed in the mind of the King and Queen began to work, to bring the principal Huguenots into the net, and to work that by policy which so often attempted by the means of war had always proved fruitless and dangerous." The same view was held in Rome and at Madrid. It became a commonplace in the controversial literature of the time that all the policy of France from the beginning of the reign led up to this crime; that, in the Navarre marriage, Catherine had baited the trap with her own flesh; and that she was but carrying out what had been arranged at Bayonne in her interviews with Alva. On the other hand, those who were nearest to the royal criminals, even if they were unfriendly to them, rarely believed in the theory of a long preparation. The Italian, Cavalli, who was in Paris at the time, wrote, "They made so many mistakes and took so many contradictory decisions that it is easy to see that the measure was suddenly decided on and not prepared long before." The Spanish ambassador wrote, "If the musket shot aimed at the admiral was a plan arranged for several days and authorized by the King, all the rest was inspired by circumstances."

Nearly all modern historians adopt the view expressed in these last extracts with some modifications of detail. There are two considerations that seem decisive against long premeditation. First, the ignorance of both Rome and Madrid as to what was going to happen: in both places the preparations for war in the Netherlands were taken seriously. Secondly, the attempt on the life of Coligny can hardly be brought into agreement with a plot to massacre. His death would more naturally have come as a part of the general massacre; it is strange that its failure did not put the Huguenots more effectively on their guard.¹ Sully, who argues the matter from the standpoint of a contemporary in the *Economies Royales*, finds many reasons to disbelieve in premedita-

¹ See Lord Acton's *Essay*; and Whitehead's *Coligny*, chap. xvi, "The Problems of Saint Bartholomew."

tion and only one good reason to believe in it; the fact, namely, that the massacre really happened.

The results of that sudden mutation in the policy of the French Government which had partly produced, and partly ^{Results of the massacre} been produced by, the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day were curiously indecisive. It did not produce a diplomatic revolution in Europe. France did not join with Spain in a Papal and Catholic crusade against the Protestant powers. It simply prevented an anti-Spanish movement on a large scale; it did not alter the essential relations of the Great Powers. The revolution that was threatened was prevented; no other was produced. We might almost think at first that the stirring and tragic events between 1570 and August 1572 were simply wiped from men's minds. France was still jealous of Spain; she still negotiated for an English marriage and an English alliance; she still gave indirect assistance to the "Beggars" in the Low Countries; and at home her religious divisions persisted, involving her in indecisive wars and followed by peaces that were quickly broken. There was, as we shall soon see, a real change in public opinion, and a new middle party emerged. There was a new religious war at once as the result of the massacre; it is counted the fourth. The Huguenots were shaken and weakened by their losses, but they could still hold out in La Rochelle behind its marshes and the sea. Twice it seemed as if the city would fall by treachery; but the citizens were equal to all emergencies, and the attacks directed against it by Henry, Duke of Anjou, were beaten off. La Charité had fallen into the hands of the King, a serious loss to the Huguenots. It can hardly be doubted from a military point of view that it would have been wise for the Government to go on with the war. La Rochelle could have been taken with a prolonged effort; the royal cause might have definitely triumphed over its enemies. But the Queen Mother was always for peace. Her son, Henry, was a candidate for the Polish throne, and the war was prejudicial to his chances. So the Treaty of La Rochelle was patched up (June 1578). Three towns were to have the full right of Calvinist worship, and were to have no royalist garrison imposed on them. The

high nobility could have worship in their own houses for ten people outside of their own family and dependents; the rest were to have liberty of conscience without liberty of worship.

Failure and
retirement
of Alva

A strange settlement after the tragic days of August! And the course of things in the Low Countries was not more decisive. Mons fell into Alva's hands, and Charles IX urged him to put to death the French prisoners taken there—a circumstance which should be remembered when we are inclined to place him on a higher plane than the rest of his family. Alva contemptuously neglected the advice, and was pleased to show that the Spaniards could be less cruel than the French. Other important towns fell into Alva's hands; Zutphen, commanding the important passage of the Yssel; Naarden, near Amsterdam, where the whole population was put to death after surrender. The greatest Spanish victory was at Haarlem, which surrendered after a siege of epic endurance. Here Alva exacted a heavy fine from the civilians, but put the whole foreign garrison to the sword. The Dutch, on their side, gained two important successes. They prolonged the defence of the little town of Alkmaar—to the north of Amsterdam—though hopelessly outnumbered, until the Spaniards had to withdraw. It was the first nationalist victory on land. A naval success came about the same time. The Spaniards had organized a navy, which had contributed much to the capture of Haarlem. This was attacked by the Dutchman, Dirkzoon, in October 1573, and decisively defeated. William of Orange was the one pillar of the national and Protestant cause. He was by no means "silent," but cheerful, hospitable, and friendly with all classes. He checked, as far as he could, the cruelty of his followers, and worked for the union of all the provinces on a basis of religious freedom.

Alva had asked leave to retire before this; and he now repeated his request. The policy of "frightfulness" had failed. The provinces of Holland and Zeeland were nearly solid still for the national cause. A new man with a new system might have a better chance of success. So Alva was allowed to retire (December 1573).

We must, in conclusion, turn our eyes to the Far East of Europe, where the destinies of Poland were strangely bound up with those of France and Spain. Poland stood in some Poland respects in 1572 at the very summit of her power and prestige. During the reign of the last King of the Jagellon line, Sigismund Augustus (1548-72), she had extended her territories, until this state, which, in a little over two hundred years, was to disappear from the map of Europe, had a territory larger than that of any state in the west ; larger than the European lands of France or Spain or the Empire. In 1561 she had won Livonia from the Knights of the Sword—a religious military Order dating back to the Crusades—and had thus gained a valuable access to the Baltic Sea. In 1569, after long negotiations, the Duchy of Lithuania—where Sigismund reigned as Duke—was definitely incorporated and amalgamated with the Crown of Poland. It was a step as important for Poland as the union of Scotland with England in 1707. Poland had now a huge and compact territory, Extension of territory acknowledging the same Government, which would seem to guarantee her against the attacks of her dangerous neighbours ; against Turkey and Russia and Austria alike. It seems strange, too, to find that Poland was ahead of all the nations of Europe in the measures which gave religious toleration to her people. Both Lutheranism and Calvinism had won over a considerable portion of the population ; but there had been little opposition to them. Complete religious liberty prevailed in Poland by the Compact of Warsaw (1573) ; and there were no restraints on preaching. The liberty was much wider than that allowed in Germany by the Peace of Augsburg ; or in France at the end of the century by the Religious liberty Edict of Nantes. It was due, doubtless, in large part to the weakness of the Government and the lack of any machinery for administering justice over the vast plains of Poland ; but the Poles were proud of their freedom from religious persecution. This very freedom is thought to have contributed to the decline of vigour in the Protestant sects and to the successes won by the Catholic Reaction.

Poland's real strength did not correspond to the extent Death of Sigismund Augustus of her territories ; nor was her religious liberty a sign of a healthy and progressive social life. A Polish writer declared

that "the Republic was dying of two diseases, which sprang from excess of liberty and contempt of law. Is there no remedy that may heal them? Yes; loyalty and the royal power. But their hands are tied and the country is dead."¹ The monarchy of the Jagellons had not managed to develop an efficient administrative machinery; real power lay with the landed nobles and gentry; the towns were at this very period reduced to constitutional nullity, and their trade much reduced. Yet if the powerful dynasty had lasted, the future of Poland might have been a great one. But Sigismund Augustus, though three times married, left no heirs. The Jagellons had exercised the right of nominating their successors, and their choice had fallen on their own children. No arrangement had been made for the succession in 1572, and it was assumed that it would be by election and that the nobles would have the right to elect. There were several candidates in the field; the Czar and the Austrian Archduke among them. Henry, Duke of Anjou, the favourite son of Catherine de Médicis, came forward. His mother was eager to secure a Crown for him, and Monluc came as the French envoy to support his claims. A French prince had the attractiveness of the unknown; Henry was thought to be a fine soldier, for he was credited with the victory of Moncontour; and, very strangely, France, in the year of the great massacre, was still thought of as a land where religious dissidents were well treated. Forty thousand electors are said to have assembled near Warsaw. Henry was chosen amidst much enthusiasm, and was crowned in Cracow in February 1574. But he reigned only four months. He was repelled by the manners and lack of culture among the Poles, and was soon homesick.

Election of
Henry of
France

He found, moreover, that his royal authority was reduced to very little by the promises that had been made for him by Monluc, and which he had been obliged to ratify. Then came the news that Charles IX was dead, and that he himself was King of France. Without waiting to see if anything could be made out of the new situation to the advantage of Poland or of France, he decided on instant and

¹ M. L. Leger in *Lavisse and Rambaud*, iv, 642.

farcical flight. No one was ever much more eager to win a throne than he was to escape from that of Poland. He took the route by Moldavia and northern Italy, and lingered amidst the pleasures of Italy in spite of urgent messages from his mother. He turned a deaf ear to all Polish entreaties to him to return.

The Emperor Maximilian was elected by the Senate to succeed Henry ; but the nobles protested against this adoption of a King from the great rival House of Habsburg. There was actual civil war, which always broke out very easily in Poland ; but then the nobles found a candidate acceptable to nearly all in Stephen Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, who won in the end the suffrages of the whole nation.

Stephen Bathory is reckoned one of the ablest of the Kings of Poland. In 1577 he reduced the important harbour of Dantzic and thus opened a long and difficult chapter in Polish history, which has by no means ended yet. He was himself a devoted Catholic, and encouraged the Jesuits who rapidly won the bulk of the population to their cause. He planned a great attack on the Turks. But he maintained good relations with the Protestants and religious dissidents.

On his death, after the usual interval of violence, Sigismund, the Prince Royal of Sweden, was elected King as Sigismund III, and he reigned from 1588 to 1632. In him the House of Vasa, usually so determined in its Protestant sympathies, had produced an ardent champion of Rome.¹ If he could have held the Crowns of both Sweden and Poland, a change of immense importance would have been introduced into central European politics. But Sweden would have nothing to do with a Catholic prince, and at the end of the century defeated the Poles and occupied the shores of the south-east of the Baltic (1600-4). Sigismund fought, too, against Austria, and against the Turks, and his own leadership and the excellence of his armies were frequently demonstrated. The decline in the power of Turkey and the coming of the Thirty Years' War seemed to offer to Poland a chance of playing a great part in the affairs of central Europe ; but nothing great could be done while Poland suffered from the condition of political and social anarchy which is her most

¹ See p. 306.

marked characteristic. Things grew worse rather than better. The nobles again and again declared and used the right of "Insurrection," and the civil wars thus begun were often bitter and prolonged. The vast bulk and strength of Poland, the high spirits and great talents of her people, were all reduced to impotence by her lack of unity, loyalty, and persistence.

CHAPTER XVIII

FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS FROM THE MASSACRE TO THE DEATHS OF THE DUKE OF ALENÇON AND WILLIAM THE SILENT

THE interaction of France and the Netherlands during the years succeeding the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day was so close that the history of the one can hardly be understood without that of the other. We shall first, in the present chapter, trace the main features of the struggle in the Low Countries, and we shall then find ourselves in a better position for understanding the political development of France.

(1) WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE NETHERLANDS

William, Prince of Orange, best known as William the ^{William} Silent, had only undertaken the leadership of the Protestant ^{the Silent} and independent movement in the Netherlands because he believed himself assured of French help. He had had grave doubts as to the wisdom of the movement which began with the capture of Brill in 1572. The reversal of French foreign policy, which followed the massacre, was for him a staggering blow. But there was no escape from the war now, and he faced it without illusion as to its difficulties, but with perfect courage and wariness. His famous title—"The Silent"—entirely misrepresents him, for he was a ready and a lively talker, fond of the society of men and women, a thorough Dutchman of the sixteenth century in his relish for the good things of life. But it hints at a characteristic of his public life. He was a diplomatist and statesman rather than a soldier; he was wary, prudent, and subtle; and, though he stands high among the statesmen of the sixteenth century

for honesty and truthfulness, his opponents and even his friends had reason to complain that not only his conversation but his voluminous letters often left them in complete doubt as to his real meaning and aims. He knew well from his early experience the character of French, German, and Spanish diplomacy, and the motives on which it depended; he never fathomed English politics quite so thoroughly. At home his chief task was to hold together in common resistance to the Spaniard the seventeen states of the Netherlands. He hoped to bind them together in one united state, independent of local differences, of religious confession, or social character, and he saw at an early date that a large measure of religious toleration was necessary for this purpose. Before his death it was clear that he had failed in his main purpose. The narrower union of the seven northern provinces grew up almost in spite of him; but the modern Kingdom of Holland venerates his name as the real founder of their liberties as well as the ancestor of their Royal House. Subtle diplomatist though he was, there was heroic stuff in him. His position was almost one for despair. "There is no one to help me," he wrote, "but when I took in hand to defend these oppressed Christians I made an alliance with the mightiest of all potentates, the Lord of Hosts." The struggle that follows is a very strange one, full of heroic and dramatic incidents which have been made the subject of one of the most picturesque of histories,¹ but the general character of the struggle is hard to seize, and some general comments may be useful.

Character
of the
struggle

The Spaniards maintained to the end an unquestioned military superiority. Not until more than forty years after the arrival of Alva did the rebels gain an important success against Spain in the open field. The causes of the superiority of the Spanish troops have been hinted at in a previous chapter. In discipline, skill, unity, and tactics, the Spanish armies were far superior to the native troops. The Spanish commanders—Alva, Requesens, Don John, and Parma—met no antagonist in any way their equal. It is at first difficult to understand why, with such unquestioned military advantages, they did not force their opponents to surrender.

¹ Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*.

The explanation lies partly in the nature of the country. The rivers and canals which intersected it presented almost insurmountable obstacles to the military engineers of those days. Moreover, the cities were by a long tradition half independent, well fortified, and resolute and capable in self-defence. The Dutch—if we may apply that term to the whole population of the Netherlands—showed no liking nor talent for ordinary warfare; but behind the walls of their cities they fought with desperate and successful courage. The cities that lay near the coast could, moreover, in the hour of their worst need, call on a powerful ally. The land was below the level of the sea at high tide. They could and on many occasions did, cut the banks that kept the sea out, and the Spaniards had to retire before the water, shallow though it was; the cities, usually built on slightly rising ground, were safe.

Effect of
the geo-
graphy of the
Netherlands

If the Spaniards had been in possession of a commanding navy, the resistance of the rebels could without doubt have been brought to an end. The modern student of military affairs sees with amazement that they made no attempt to command the sea, and that they attacked only from the land. This is explained by the fact that the Spaniards possessed in the sixteenth century no navy that was in any way equal to their needs. They won two important naval victories during the century (Lepanto in 1571 and Terceira in 1582), but these were far from establishing any naval supremacy. The naval force of both England and the Netherlands was always dreaded. The creation of a really strong navy would have solved many of Spain's problems; but the need was not apparent to her King. The Spanish armies closed—not very successfully—the southern frontier to the Dutch, but their ships kept the rest of the world open to them.

Absence of
a Spanish
navy

And then there was the question of finance. Spain was assumed to be in possession of the unlimited wealth of the Indies. She was actually always on the verge of bankruptcy, and twice went beyond the verge. State finance was very rudimentary in the sixteenth century, and Philip could make little use of the vast potentialities of his Empire. The Dutch had no gold or silver mines, but they had trade; and that was of far greater effective value. Trade was their life

Financial
difficulties

and their main public interest. Even when the war was at its most critical point, they preferred to employ mercenary soldiers, while they themselves prosecuted their commerce. The carrying trade of Europe and the corn trade of the Baltic was in their hands. The presence of Alva and of Parma on their soil with invincible armies did not make them desist from trading expeditions to all parts of the world. They would trade with any one, and with the Spaniards as readily as with any one else. When the Earl of Leicester brought an English army to their assistance, he found to his indignation that Dutch ships carried corn for the support of the Spanish armies, and he declaimed in vain against this practice. The Dutchman would not abandon his trade even to save his country; and it was his trade which saved the country.

Requesens

Alva had retired in 1578, leaving the Spaniards in possession of the southern states. He was succeeded by Don Luis Requesens, who was anxious to settle by negotiation a struggle which was already a terrible drain on the resources of Spain. He was ready to concede much, but he was not ready to concede religious liberty to the Protestants of the Netherlands, and that was the point on which William most tenaciously insisted. It was to him more than to any other statesman of the time a matter of principle, but it was also a necessary condition for all his political schemes. In the fighting the Dutch regained the town of Middelburg, the last survival of Spanish power on Walcheren island; a clear proof of Spanish naval inferiority. But then the Spanish commander advanced to the siege of Leyden, and seemed certain of effecting its capture. William's brother, Louis of Nassau, raised an army in Germany with the help of French money, and marched to the relief of the beleaguered town. But at Mook Heath (not far from Nymegen) his army was crushed, and he was slain (Ap. 1574). Military help was now impossible. The citizens were persuaded by William to cut the dykes. Slowly the water spread over the land, and the Spaniards were obliged to withdraw from what had seemed an assured prey. Two results of this deliverance may be noted. The University of Leyden was founded to commemorate the event (the citizens preferring this to a remission of taxes), and the technical

**Siege of
Leyden
(1574)**

researches of the staff did much for the recovery of the agriculture of the "drowned land." William's wisdom, too, was recognized by the grant to him of a stronger and almost autocratic position by the Estates of Holland, and the union between Holland and Zeeland was made even closer than before. It was about this time, too, that William married his third wife, Charlotte of Bourbon, late Abbess of Jouarre. His first wife, Anna of Egmont, had died; his second, Anna of Saxony (daughter of Maurice of Saxony), was incurably insane; he had been declared by a committee of five ministers free to marry again. This third marriage (not his last) was of doubtful policy, for it offended important German interests, though it brought him into closer touch with France.

Requesens had come to the Netherlands hoping to make peace, but he had had no success. Alva recommended him "to drop all gentleness, mercy, and negotiation, and to look only to arms." But the situation was deplorable. The people of the southern states, still nominally obedient to Philip II, were suffering so terribly that Requesens himself wondered that they did not rebel. And all the time the inhabitants of the revolted north were comparatively prosperous. If agriculture was ruined there, trade flourished, and even in the south men contrasted the skill of William with the brutalities and blunders of Alva. Philip allowed Requesens to make certain concessions. The Council of Troubles (The Blood Council) was withdrawn; the obnoxious tax of the Tenth Penny was cancelled. But these concessions were met with little gratitude. The country demanded peace as the sole remedy for its misery; and Requesens obtained from Philip permission to open negotiations with the enemy. They were foredoomed to failure, for Philip would not hear of any measure of religious liberty; and the Calvinists of the north would not accept any accommodation, which did not include permission to worship as they pleased. Delegates from both sides met at Breda in February 1575. Neither side acted with perfect frankness, and no result was reached.

Requesens was weary of his task. He wanted peace and he could not get it. In March 1576 he died. Philip appointed to succeed him Charles V's illegitimate son, Don John of Austria, already famous for his victories over the Moors and

Turks. His banner declared that as he had conquered the Turks, so he would conquer the heretics. He was a man of great ambition and daring, and of considerable military skill. The rebels seemed in greater danger than ever. But Don John's ambitions reached beyond the Low Countries; his imagination conjured up a fantastic future. The Dutch were to be conquered or pacified; England invaded; Mary of Scotland liberated; perhaps the Crown of England won. These great schemes would probably have been unrealizable in any case; they were made still more so by the condition of the Spanish army, for, on the death of Requesens, it had broken out into organized mutiny. Army mutinies are a frequent feature of the sixteenth century, and they all spring from the same cause—the failure of regular payment. We have already seen the greatest of these mutinies, when the Imperial army marched on Rome in 1527, and paid itself by the plunder of the city. The Spanish armies in the Netherlands had large sums owing them; some had not touched their pay for three years; none had shorter arrears than twenty-one months. It is amazing that discipline could have been maintained and victories won under such circumstances. Now they asked either for pay or for the plunder of some captured town. Ziericksee and Alost suffered from their violence, but their worst fury was exercised against Antwerp—at that time the richest of the towns of the Netherlands and one of the foremost cities of Europe. The citizens tried in vain to organize resistance; they were attacked by the mutinous armies in the field and the mutinous garrison of the city fort. The city was mercilessly plundered, and some seven thousand citizens were slaughtered.

“The Spanish fury”

The sack of Antwerp

Pacification of Ghent

William the Silent saw in the situation an opportunity for realizing his dreams of Netherlandish unity and independence. He was already busy with negotiations for a meeting of all the provinces when the “Spanish Fury,” as the sack of Antwerp came to be called, gave extra force to his arguments. The result was the Pacification of Ghent (November 8, 1576).

There was little that was novel in the new settlement. It expressed the traditional desire of the provinces for independence from foreign rule and the management of their

affairs through their own States-General. Holland and Zeeland took the lead in the negotiations through their stadhouder, William ; the other states were induced to join in consultations at Ghent. The chief of the twenty-five clauses of the Pacification was that the Spanish troops were to be expelled from the country ; though at the same time the delegates made an empty declaration of their loyalty to the Crown of Spain. After the expulsion had been effected, the States-General were to be called and the Government placed in their hands, according to traditional forms, but with increased and sovereign powers. There was no general declaration of religious liberty, but Holland and Zeeland undertook not to interfere in any way with the Catholic religion which was established elsewhere. William's position in Holland and Zeeland was recognized, but he was given no official authority over all the states.

It was merely a first sketch of national unity, but it was full of promise, and it was received with general and hearty approval. It remained to be seen whether there was sufficient sense of unity in the land to make the Pacification a real and permanent thing, and sufficient force at its disposal to defend it in the trials that awaited it.

Don John on his arrival began at once to negotiate, and in February 1577 he arranged terms and issued "The Perpetual Edict." The Pacification was accepted ; the Spanish soldiers were to depart by land ; the native privileges were to be maintained ; the States-General were to be called. No mention was made of religious liberty, which had indeed not been mentioned, but only implied, in the Pacification. Holland and Zeeland stood aloof from the edict and from all demonstrations of welcome to the new Governor. Thus a rift in the newly won unity was already perceptible. William maintained a suspicious attitude throughout ; he refused an interview with Don John ; maintained that all Spanish fortresses should be destroyed ; and rightly believed that both the new Governor and the King of Spain had plans that they could not reveal.

These months mark the very zenith of the influence and hopes of William the Silent. He saw in the Pacification of Ghent merely the beginning of his great schemes for a national

Don John
and the
Perpetual
Edict

The
triumph
of
William
the Silent

union of all seventeen provinces. Spain and Don John were still for him dangerous enemies. The Perpetual Edict was, he believed, merely dust in the eyes of the people. He desired to create a national army and to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The provinces must learn to work together ; they must forget their rivalries and religious differences ; they must make of the States-General a real instrument of government and not merely a meeting of ambassadors. It was a great hope, and if it had been realized it would have vastly improved the political and international outlook in western Europe. And success seemed not impossible. William was very popular in the southern and Catholic states, though he had his critics and opponents. He was invited by the States-General to Brussels, and his arrival was the one great spectacular triumph of his career. He was received, said an Englishman who was present, " as though he were an angel from heaven," and women knelt as he passed " as though it were some god who passed through the city."

**Battle of
Gembloux
(1578)**

But the triumph of William did not last long. The situation was difficult and unstable. First there came military failure. The national forces organized by the States-General were numerous but ill-disciplined, lacking in unity, and badly led. Don John was at Namur, where he had seized the citadel, and thus held a strong position, which connected him with the strongly Catholic province of Luxemburg. As his hopes of some great enterprise in England and Scotland passed away, he became more eager to strike a military blow in the Netherlands. Philip refused to allow this for some time. But when the States-General began to turn to foreign powers ; when especially they invited the Archduke Matthias of Austria, the brother of the Emperor Rudolf, to be their Governor, Philip felt that the sword must be drawn again. Matthias, afterwards Emperor, was only twenty years old, ambitious and with a reputation for humanity. It was in the end William who ruled through him, though he had at first been set up as a rival to William. In February 1578 Don John struck. His army was inferior in numbers to that of the states, but the Spaniards showed their usual superiority in efficiency and inflicted on the enemy an ignominious defeat.

It was not a great battle ; but it was an important and decisive one. The mastery of Spain on land was again reasserted. Only those districts which were on the sea or had strong water defences could hope to hold out against the Spaniards. It was significant that William of Orange and the States-General immediately withdrew from Brussels to Antwerp. Still all was not lost that the Pacification of Ghent had brought to the national cause. The alliance of the seventeen provinces remained at any rate in name, and the Nationalists still held Antwerp and Ghent. Moreover, the great city of Amsterdam, which had hitherto held aloof ^{Amsterdam} from the national cause, now joined it. Her trade had suffered severely from the blockade of the "Water Beggars," and she now saw the road to safety in union with the rest of Holland and Zealand.

The military failure of the Nationalists accentuated another tendency dangerous to William's hopes of national union. After the Pacification of Ghent Calvinism had asserted itself in many cities of the south, and was associated there with ideas of political and social revolution. A body called "The Eighteen" dominated Brussels for a time ; but the movement was strongest in Ghent. Not only was this city controlled by a fierce minority of Calvinists, who wrecked churches, plundered monasteries, and put monks to death, but it also tried to establish its authority over the neighbouring towns and districts. The movement is clearly linked to the earlier Anabaptism, and was supported by memories of the part played by Ghent in past centuries. It gained much success at first ; but then it encountered resistance, and provoked a movement of the opposite kind. The future of the southern Belgian lands, especially of the French-speaking Walloon districts, was decided by the strong reaction towards Roman Catholicism which showed itself there. Many influences contributed to this movement. The richer citizens and the landed gentry were alarmed by the revolutionary ideas of the Calvinists. There was, too, a marked revival of religious enthusiasm among the Catholics. The Counter-Reformation was beginning to make itself felt. The Jesuits preached with great effect ; and the decisions of the Council of Trent removed many of the abuses from the organization of the

Church. A Catholic Confederation was formed. The Pacification of Ghent was to be maintained; but the members of the Confederation joined together to defend themselves "against the barbarous and worse than Spanish tyranny and insolence of the sectaries and their adherents, and to prevent the destruction of our holy faith and religion and of the nobility and of every order and estate." The revolutionaries were at once defeated. The Catholic movement triumphed nearly everywhere in the south. The Spaniards had taken no part in the movement, but the victory of the Catholics was bound to bring them advantage. In January 1579 was drawn up the Union of Arras which definitely aimed at "a general reconciliation with the Catholic King, our natural Lord and Prince." In May 1579 the members of the Union of Arras definitely made peace with Spain. Philip abandoned the idea of turning the Low Countries into a dependency of Spain. They were bound to him by their Catholicism and by the acceptance of him as their ruler. Henceforth the struggle in the Netherlands is unquestionably a war of religion.

Union of
Arras

This movement was a mortal blow to the schemes and hopes of William the Silent. He would not abandon them, and the next important move in the northern provinces was not wholly to his liking. The movement which led to the Union of Arras produced a similar movement in the northern and Protestant states. Here, too, the Pacification of Ghent was nominally maintained, but a smaller Union was formed inside the larger one. In January 1579, a few days after the Union of Arras, the northern provinces—Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Friesland, Groningen, and Overijssel—joined together in the "Union of Utrecht," out of which has come the later Republic of the United Provinces and the modern Kingdom of Holland. "We who love both our church and our country must draw together and become mutually helpful," says the declaration. The new Union is regarded as the first important experiment in federal government in the modern world—a form of government which has already done such great things in the United States of America, in Germany, and elsewhere, and which is probably destined to greater triumphs in the League

Union of
Utrecht

of Nations. But the beginnings were small and not too promising. The Union was "a compact not a constitution." The contracting states remained nominally independent. The unanimous consent of all the provinces within the Union was required for any decision of importance. There was no central authority which could impose either trade regulations or taxation. Its object was indeed merely self-defence; only gradually did it grow into a strong state, and even a century later its leader repudiated strongly the idea that the states were "united." Other states were to be invited to join; each state was to settle its own religious affairs.

The political confusion in the Netherlands could hardly be exaggerated. First, nearly all the provinces—not quite all—were within the frontiers of the Holy Roman Empire, and owed some shadowy allegiance to that body. Secondly, they all, even those in the Union of Utrecht, professed loyalty to the Crown of Spain. Thirdly, they still all belonged in name to the Pacification of Ghent which had been ratified by Don John's Perpetual Edict. Fourthly, each province claimed, and to a large extent maintained, its own "independence." Fifthly, there had risen up the new groupings which took their names from Utrecht and Arras. Further complications could easily be discovered. Let us add that the real forces to be reckoned with were, first, the forces of the north under the practical direction of William of Orange, and, next, the Spanish and Catholic army in the south, which, after the death of Don John in September 1578, had passed into the hands of Alexander of Parma. He has strong claims to be considered the greatest soldier of the sixteenth century, and was almost equally great as statesman and diplomatist.

The position was soon a little clarified by the publication of a "Ban" against William. Philip had long recognized him as his most dangerous enemy in the Netherlands. In June 1580 Philip offered a large sum of money and a title of nobility to any one who would "deliver William of Orange quick or dead or deprive him at once of life." He was declared at the same time to be "the enemy of the human race." William answered in a long "Apology," narrating and justifying his opposition and suspicions of Spain by a recital of all that Philip had done in the Netherlands. A

The Ban
and the
Apology

Abjuration
of Spain

little later (July 1581) the States-General, representing those states who had not been reconciled to Spain, formally abjured the sovereignty of Philip. The step was justified by an appeal to principles of which Europe had heard little for many centuries, and which seemed a "horrible impiety" to those to whom royal authority was a religious dogma. "All men know"—so ran the declaration—"that God appoints a King to cherish his people as a shepherd his flock. When he fails in this duty he is no prince but a tyrant. Then may the Estates of the land legally remove him and put another in his place." Philip was therefore no longer their King; they were fighting now for independence.

Help from
France

Before the abjuration a new feature had entered into the struggle. William had sought and found foreign help. The step was necessary, for it was plain that the military forces of the states were unequal to those commanded by the Prince of Parma. Yet the matter was very delicate and difficult. The settlement of the Netherlands touched the interests of other nations, and especially those of France and England. France had for centuries desired to extend her power northwards, and saw the presence of Spain there with unconcealed jealousy. England had, since the fourteenth century, a keen commercial interest in the Netherlands, and regarded the establishment there of one of the great Powers of Europe as a direct menace to her own safety. To Queen Elizabeth and her counsellors it was an excellent thing that Spain should be expelled; but the benefit might be bought too dearly if France were substituted for her. That result seemed now not unlikely; for William the Silent had negotiated a treaty at Plessis les Tours in October 1580, whereby Francis, Duke of Alençon and Anjou, accepted from the States-General the governorship of the provinces with the title for himself and his successors of Prince of the Low Countries. Francis was the fourth son of Catherine de Médicis, and perhaps the most repellent. But his diplomatic importance was very great. He was heir to the throne of France; it was not impossible that he might become the husband of the Queen of England; he had for a moment been the leader of the Protestants of France. His character and his ability were quite unequal to the demands of the

The Duke
of Alençon

situation, but his career was followed on all sides with great interest. It was agreed that he should bring to the help of the states a force of 12,000 men, and also that he "should submit himself to the civil government of the country in everything regarding its internal polity." He entered the provinces in August 1581, but soon passed over to England to conduct his courtship of Queen Elizabeth—that unsurpassable historical farce. He came back in February 1582, hoping that he was assured of the Queen's hand; his matrimonial as well as his political fortunes depended on his behaviour in the Netherlands, and this was a record of treachery and failure. His position was certainly difficult and even exasperating. He had responsibility without power. He found, as the Earl of Leicester was to find after him, that the states would give him no real control over the war, and resented the slightest interference in their domestic concerns, however closely they might be connected with the war. In March 1582 William had been wounded by an assassin, in search of the reward promised by Spain, and, though he made a good recovery, his hold on the policy of the states was for a time shaken. In January 1583 the Duke planned to increase his power in the states by an act of treachery. Antwerp was still, in spite of the rise of Amsterdam, the most important city of the Netherlands. Alençon instructed his troops to seize the city by a sudden attack. They rushed in with shouts of "Tue, Tue, Vive la messe!" much as the Spaniards had done in 1576. But the "French Fury," as it came to be called, was less successful than the Spanish. The inhabitants rallied, and the French troops were driven off. The Duke, in natural fear of the anger of the states, retired beyond the French frontier.

"The
French
fury"

Yet, in spite of the treason of the French Fury, William did not abandon the idea of French help. He believed the surrender of the states to Spain to be inevitable, unless foreign help was procured, and serious help could only come from France; for England had no trained army, and such soldiers as she could send would avail little against the veterans of Spain. So he reopened negotiations with the Duke of Alençon, and French help seemed possible. But the health of the Duke had been unstable for some time—the

Death of the
Duke of
Alençon.

vitality of the children of Catherine de Médicis was generally low—and he died, on June 10, 1584, at Chateau Thierry. He was of little account as a man, but his death meant a crisis in the affairs of both the Netherlands and France.

Murder of
William the
Silent

The situation in the Netherlands was soon rendered far more serious by the death of a far nobler victim. William had quite recovered from his former wound; his wife, Charlotte of Bourbon, had died of the shock, but he had found a fourth wife in Louise de Coligny, the daughter of the French Admiral, who had perished in the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day. William continued to direct the policy of the states, but he was no dictator nor was his policy always popular. He was made hereditary Count in Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht; but elsewhere his authority depended on the influence which he could from time to time exercise. In Antwerp he was held responsible for the French attack, and was considered to be too favourable to a French connection. Never had his diplomatic prudence and skill been more necessary than after the death of Alençon. There was a movement among the independent states to offer him a more personal power, when he was killed on July 10, 1584. An assassin had found entrance into his house at Delft, and shot him as he was leaving his dining-room with his wife. The future for the northern Netherlands was now darker than it had ever been since the war began. William found no successor in statecraft. But just at this time, and in part owing to the events that we have been examining, a new civil war had broken out in France, with which the fortunes of the Netherlands were closely connected. We must now turn to French affairs.

(2) FRANCE FROM THE DEATH OF CHARLES IX TO THE DEATH OF FRANCIS, DUKE OF ALENÇON

France
after the
massacre

Of the sons of Catherine de Médicis Charles IX has come most near to winning the sympathy of posterity. He was the victim rather than the author of the massacre; and the stories that ascribe to him horror and remorse after it are not without foundation. There is no sign that Catherine

was similarly troubled. She sometimes saw clearly and wisely in politics ; but she had no long views and no principles to which she was willing to sacrifice a passing advantage. Hers was essentially a vulgar nature ; her daughter tells us that when, shortly after the massacre, she saw Henry of Navarre and the Prince of Condé kneeling at Mass, to which fear of death had driven them, she broke into loud laughter. It is impossible to trace any direct influence of Machiavelli on her career ; but no words sum it up better than the famous sentence from the eighteenth chapter of the *Prince* : “ It is well to seem pious, faithful, humane, religious, sincere ; and also to be so ; but you must have the mind so watchful, that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite qualities.”

The new King Henry III was Catherine's favourite son. He had been credited with energy and courage before he came to the throne, but his conduct while he reigned showed no sign of any high qualities. The memoirs of the time are full of stories—probably exaggerated—of his wild escapades. He galloped at midnight through the narrow streets of Paris firing pistols. In the Court balls he sometimes dressed as a woman, and he fell later under the influence of questionable favourites. In his favour it may be said that he refused a politic marriage and married for affection ; that he loved animals ; and that his devotion to religion, though often shown in strange forms, was sincere. To understand the strange creature, the historian should probably seek the help of an expert in brain disease.

Both Henry of Navarre and the Duke of Alençon were kept under supervision at the Court for some time after the massacre, and history and romance have given much attention to the intrigues and adventures of the time. We need only notice that after one disastrous failure they managed to escape. Navarre abjured the Roman faith, which he had been forced to adopt on Saint Bartholomew's Day ; but he was young, and he was not as yet the heir to the throne, though, owing to the failure of male issue to the Crown, his position had become important. The King was not thought likely to live long ; Alençon was the heir and his action was therefore closely watched. War had broken out on the

Escape of
Navarre
and
Alençon

arrival of Henry III in France—this is reckoned the fifth of the seven civil-religious wars of France—and Alençon put himself forward as the leader of the new party that had risen up in France. For the situation changes now. The Huguenots fought on, but they no longer hoped for the exclusive triumph of their faith and party; they asked only for toleration and liberty. And a strong party, called the Politiques, grew up among the Catholics, who were willing in the interest of peace and security to support the demands of the Huguenots. It was a party without definite organization or leadership; but it owed much of its success to the action of Damville, the son of the late Constable Montmorency, and now the Governor of Languedoc. He had long held almost independent power there, which gained for him the title of “the uncrowned King of the South.” He now, with the support of the Estates of Languedoc, declared himself against the evil influence of foreigners within the realm (Catherine and her Italian ministers, as well as the Guises, were clearly meant); he declared himself the champion of the provinces, the cities, and the people of France; and he demanded the convocation of the States-General and the grant of religious toleration. Armies, large according to the standard of the time, were collected, partly French and partly foreign. But there was no serious fighting; a scuffle which gained for Henry of Guise a wound, which allowed him, like his father, to be called “le balafre,” may be mentioned. Catherine heartily disliked war, and her son, Henry, had lost all the martial ardour that he may have once possessed. In May 1576 the war was brought to an end by the Peace of Monsieur.¹

The
Politiques

The Peace
of Monsieur

The Peace of Monsieur is in many ways the most remarkable religious treaty of the century. It alone declares the principle of religious liberty in a way that is acceptable to our age. It is the first sketch of the Edict of Nantes which ultimately gave religious peace to France, and it is in many ways superior to the Edict of Nantes. Reason, humanity, and pure religion speak through its clauses; and they speak

¹ The Peace takes its name from the official title of “Monsieur” which was held by the Duke of Alençon.

by the mouth of Catherine de Médicis and Henry III ! There is no stranger paradox during the century than that.

The Peace is a long document of sixty-three clauses ; but it is clear, logical, and well arranged, much superior to the Edict of Nantes in these qualities. The edict is declared to be "perpetual and irrevocable" ; it grants a complete amnesty for the past, and restores the Catholic and Roman religion to a position of liberty and supremacy throughout France. But it then declares complete freedom of worship for Huguenots in all parts of the realm without restriction, "so that they shall be able to worship, administer baptism, and the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, celebrate marriages, hold schools, and enforce religious discipline." This edict does not bear the character of a compromise with the aristocracy, which is prominent in all the others. The right of Huguenot worship was not limited to the great nobles and their friends, nor to certain specified towns, but was granted to Frenchmen as such. There were two exceptions : Protestant worship was not allowed in Paris and its neighbourhood, nor at the Court ; but such exceptions were probably wise in the interest of public order. Nor did the Peace regard religious liberty as a regrettable concession to the needs of the time—as all the other edicts, even the Edict of Nantes, did—but declared the principle of religious equality, and merely expressed the hope, which would not have offended some of the Huguenots, that a General Council might find a way to establish religious uniformity. Further, civil equality was definitely and emphatically laid down. Special courts of law, consisting of Huguenot as well as of Catholic judges, were to be established to watch over the administration of the Act. Eight towns were to be garrisoned by the Huguenots and their allies, so as to avoid all possibility of surprise. The massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day was declared to have happened against the will of the Crown.¹ Lastly the States-General are to be called, that the wishes of the people may be known and acted on.

The provisions of this edict seem all the more remarkable

¹ "Les désordres et excez faits le 24 aoust et jours ensuyvans en conséquence dudit jour à Paris sont advenues à nostre très grand regret et desplaisir."

Significance
of the
Peace of
Monsieur

when we reflect on the contemporary policy of England, Germany, and other countries. It strikes directly at the most cherished principle of the time—the view, namely, that the unity of the state could only rest on uniformity of religious practice. No doubt policy played a great part in its issue. The war was dangerous; the presence of the foreign cavalry (the reiters) especially obnoxious. The presence of the Duke of Alençon in the ranks of the enemy was a new and great menace. It is probably true that the Government hoped to withdraw some of the provisions in practice. But we may note, too, the words of Sully, the great Huguenot minister of Henry of Navarre: that the Huguenots got by the Peace all that they could desire, and that it was their own fault that they did not keep it. It is absurd to regard it as a trap; it is just the sort of measure that always comes from Catherine de Médicis whenever she is free from the pressure of influence or fear. Catherine at this time wrote words, which may be taken as representing a part, but by no means the whole, of her character. “I am a Catholic and my conscience is as clear as anyone’s. I have risked my life against the Huguenots in the reign of the late King, my son. I’m not afraid of them now; and I’m ready to die, being fifty-eight years old and hoping to go to Paradise. I don’t want to gain credit with the Catholics at the price of the destruction of the Kingdom. If there are others who don’t care for the ruin of the state, provided they can say ‘I have upheld the Catholic religion,’ I have nothing to say against them, but I don’t want to resemble them.”

The
Catholic
League

The Politiques had won the Peace of Monsieur; they were almost an independent state in the Rhone valley. But what could be done on one side could be imitated on the other; and an immediate result of the Peace was the rise to power, if not the creation, of the Catholic League. The Catholic Reaction was in full progress now. The enthusiasm of the Catholics was in no way inferior to that of the Calvinists. They did not accept the idea of religious liberty, and the new settlement seemed to threaten the bases on which, in their opinion, both Church and State should rest. There had been Catholic Associations before this, but the Peace of Monsieur and the strength and independence of the Politiques

stimulated more definite and determined action. The movement had its origin in the north, where the young Duke of Condé had, by the Peace of Monsieur, been restored to his Government of Picardy; the Catholics felt themselves endangered by the presence in their midst of a man so closely identified with the Huguenot cause. The city of Péronne was the first to move. The Catholics drew up and circulated a manifesto in which they protested that their only objects were to maintain the service of God, loyalty to the King, and the safety of the state. All these objects, they declared, were threatened by the proposal of Condé to establish a centre of "the new opinions" in the city of Péronne. They did not speak of any proposal to destroy the liberties recently given to the Huguenots, but their praise of the old system obviously implied something of the sort. The circumstances of the time were clearly favourable to such an association, and under the name of "The Catholic League" it spread with great rapidity. Its manifesto was widely circulated and signed. In its first clause it declared that the object of the "confederation of Catholic Princes, Nobles, and Gentlemen" was to re-establish the law of God in its former condition and to renounce all errors contrary to it. It then promised to preserve the power and dignity of the King "according to the articles which will be presented to him in the assembly of the Estates"; to restore to the provinces of the realm such rights and liberties as they possessed in the times of King Clovis, "or even better, if better can be found"; to yield obedience to the unnamed head of the Confederation. The document ended by a very stringent oath to be taken by all members.

This Catholic League dominates the policy of Catholic France until the triumph of Henry of Navarre. It is important to notice that it is not only exclusively Catholic in its aim, but also, and decidedly, aristocratic and feudal. The mention of the States-General and of the provincial liberties of France. "as they were in the time of King Clovis," was not mere form; they show how the Catholic nobles as well as the Huguenots were ready to avail themselves of religious pretexts for undoing the work of the centralized monarchy. King Henry III—wholly Catholic though he

Its objects

Aristocratic
character
of the
League

was—was distrusted, and was almost to be displaced by the new “head,” who proved to be Henry of Guise. The League was, moreover, not merely feudal in its tendencies; it was in danger of being anti-national. The King of Spain gave ready approval of the new association and was named “Protector”; for indeed “it was a gate which not only opened unto him a passage to the security of his own estates, but also to very great hopes of acquiring more.” Spanish help was the great hope of the Leaguers; and it was Spanish help that brought them within sight of victory, and then ruined them. In France, as nearly everywhere in Europe, nationalism was a strong passion. King Henry III cannot have liked the League; but he made terms with it, signing it himself and inducing his brother, the Duke of Alençon, to do so. But the existence of the League threatened the work of pacification, which had been attempted by the Peace of Monsieur.

States-
General
at Blois

The Peace had promised a meeting of the States-General, and the Catholic League had also assumed that a meeting would be held. The representatives therefore of the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons of France met together at Blois in December 1576. It must be remembered that they occupied a very different position from the Parliament of England. They were merely a Council of advice, and the King was under no constitutional obligation to follow their suggestions. But in the confusion and weakness into which France had fallen, there was a great and new enthusiasm for the States-General. A recently published book—Hotman’s *Franco-Gallia*—had traced the States-General back to Charlemagne, and had declared their authority to be sacrosanct and perpetual. But the Estates of Blois were not genuinely representative. There was no official exclusion of Huguenots, but none actually attended, and few of the moderate politique party. In the assembly at Blois the question was raised whether the authority of the three Estates, when they were in agreement, was not superior to that of the King. The proposal was made that the King should hand over all executive authority to a small committee of their body. The States-General thus put forward claims greater than any that the contemporary English Parliament

would have dared to make to Queen Elizabeth. But religious toleration and the maintenance of the Peace of Monsieur were the most pressing issues. There is nothing to suggest that the King and Queen Mother were anxious to withdraw the Peace; on the contrary the King, in his opening speech, declared that the maintenance of the Peace was the only means of healing the troubles of the nation. But the King had gone far beyond the wishes of the Estates. Clergy and nobility asked for the enforcement of an exclusive Catholicism in France; the Commons concurred, but added that this should be accomplished "in the best and most holy way possible," and "by peaceful means and without war." It was decided to send to Navarre and Condé messengers to urge them to rejoin the Catholic Church; Navarre returned a refusal couched in conciliatory language; Condé refused more bluntly. Then the barely stifled embers of civil war glowed again into what is known as the Sixth Religious War.

The fighting that followed hardly deserves the name of Sixth Religious War war. The Huguenots and Politiques lost ground. D'Alençon returned wholly to the side of the monarchy, and, under his command, the royal troops took the important place of La Charité, which commanded a passage of the Loire. But the country was suffering; taxes grew heavier, but they produced less and less; there was widespread disorder, and some of the features of the Hundred Years' War were reproduced. The King's authority declined; and that of Guise rose. Henry III and the Queen Mother wanted peace; and so, after a few months of aimless, senseless war, a new peace—the Peace of Bergerac—reproduced some of the stipulations Peace of Bergerac of the Peace of Monsieur, but nothing of its noble and generous spirit. It was under these terms that France lived—with some modifications—from 1577 to 1584, and it is this peace which was later developed into the Edict of Nantes. Liberty of Conscience was promised. As in England, the Government "would not break a window into any man's heart"; it took cognizance only of his actions. Huguenot worship was restricted to the houses of the great nobility, and one town in every administrative division (*bailliage* or *sénéchaussée*; there were about seventy of them); tribunals containing both Catholic and Huguenot judges were to be

established in the southern Parlements ; and the Huguenots were still to be allowed to garrison certain fortresses as security for the observance of the edict.

The King
and his
"mignons"

From 1577 to 1584 France had comparative peace, but there was little real improvement in the outlook, nor was any question really settled. The authority of the Queen Mother was passing. She travelled about the country and laboured for peace. "Every one can see," she wrote, "that the sword has brought nothing but evil." She interviewed Henry of Navarre, and induced the Huguenots to evacuate certain towns which they held ; the ladies of her Court, we are told, practised the Biblical phrases so beloved of the Huguenots. The King meanwhile was living a life of sensational religious practices, and of debauchery that betrays an unsettled brain. He was breaking away from his mother's authority and surrounding himself, not by official ministers, but by personal favourites. These were the famous and detested "mignons" ; detested for their reported excesses, for the huge gifts which they received from the King, and for the influence which they exercised over him to the exclusion of his ministers and Parlements. They were jealous of one another and often in actual conflict, but they agreed in a desire to exclude the influence of the Queen Mother. The chief among them were the Duc de Joyeuse and the Duc d'Épernon ; both of them were raised from comparatively humble conditions and loaded with wealth and office. The Guises felt themselves neglected and threatened by these upstarts and withdrew from Court.

Henry of
Navarre

Henry of Navarre lived during these years on his territories in the south, sometimes at Pau, sometimes at Nérac, and for rather more than a year his wife consented to live with him. Their Court, which was visited by Catherine de Médicis, was a scene of intrigue and festivity, but during these years Henry was beginning to rank as a serious statesman, and the wild pleasures of the Court were often merely a mask behind which he pursued his serious purposes. In 1580 there came a splash of war—often known as the Seventh Civil War. It sprang from the discontent which the Huguenots were feeling with their position, and Condé in the north co-operated with the efforts of Henry of Navarre in the south. Its usual

title—"The Lovers' War"—is misleading as to its origin. It was soon over, and is chiefly remembered for Henry's stubborn courage in the attack on Cahors, which he claimed as part of his wife's unpaid dowry. The stories of the siege contributed to the growing legend of Henry of Navarre, though the slaughter which followed was grim and real. The Peace of Fleix (November 1580) reproduced the terms of Bergerac.

The eyes of European statesmen during these years were fixed, however, not so much on Navarre or the French King as on Francis, Duke of Alençon. He has left, indeed, no important trace on the history of Europe, but it seemed for a time as though a great change in European policy might be connected with his name. He was heir to the French throne, for it was plain that Henry III would have no children; and it seemed possible that he might gain the crown matrimonial of England and might win a dominating position in the Netherlands. If France, England, and the Low Countries had been joined together in a common policy, it might have been decisive for the destinies of western Europe. The plan of a French-English-Dutch war against Spain, which had appeared so prominently in 1572 and which had been crushed by the Massacre, now reappeared again. The Queen Mother liked it as little in its new form as she had done in its old one. She never quite accepted the idea of the English marriage and was still hoping for the hand of a Spanish princess.¹

Alençon went over to England three times. His longest residence there was from October 1581 to February 1582. He was fêted and flattered; shown as the Queen's accepted lover; and, if we may trust the Spanish ambassador's rather doubtful story, publicly kissed by the Queen. But at the same time he was closely watched and almost kept in restraint; Burleigh and Walsingham were determined to wring from him the utmost concessions to English interests; and the Queen certainly had no real liking for him. Nothing was

¹ She told the Venetian ambassador that she hoped to induce the Catholic King to join all his difficulties together and to bring them to a happy termination by means of a marriage (Mariéjol, *Vie de Catherine de Médicis*). A most characteristic utterance!

settled when at last he escaped to the Netherlands. If success had attended his career there, the Queen would have found it hard to escape from the marriage that she had promised. But we have already seen that Alençon showed neither skill nor honesty in the Netherlands; and that his failure in his treasonous attempt on Antwerp was soon followed by his death on French soil. His death—though he was the meanest of Catherine's unattractive family—created a situation of immense possibilities for both France and Spain.

CHAPTER XIX

A DECISION REACHED IN WESTERN EUROPE : SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE NETHERLANDS TO 1598

THE last twenty years of the century saw a decision reached with regard to many of the great questions which were agitating western Europe. The independence of the Netherlands was maintained. In France the monarchy triumphed over all forces of disruption, and by its force and authority was able to procure the adoption of a religious settlement closely resembling that which Catherine de Médicis had constantly urged on the country. Spain saw her great dreams of supremacy in western Europe fade away ; the northern Netherlands became free and aggressive ; France rejected as her King both a Spanish prince and a Spanish protégé. But meanwhile Spain had won one triumph which might have turned out a compensation for all ; the peninsula was unified by the annexation of Portugal.

(1) SPAIN FROM 1578 TO THE DEATH OF PHILIP II (1598)

We have already said that the story of Spain during this period is by no means a mere record of failure. The Inquisition has seemed to many to dominate and crush the intellectual life of the country ; the people lie in misery under a ruinous economical system ; failure attends her arms by land and sea ; the history of the country seems summed up in the life of the King—gloomy, suspicious, and incompetent, and dying at last of a long and painful disease. There is some truth in all these views. But there is also another and equally important side to the history of Spain during these years. In his domestic circle the King was affectionate

and beloved; with the people he was generally popular, and his memory is still honoured by their historians. The religious organization of Spain was what the people wished it to be in its main features; it encountered less opposition in Spain than the Elizabethan settlement did in England. Spanish soldiers maintained right down to the end of the reign their great military reputation. Above all, it is precisely during these years that the great period of Spanish literature begins to dawn. It is impossible to determine what are the social and political conditions which favour most the growth of imaginative art; but it is plain that in Spain the "Age of Gold" began to appear when failure and exhaustion were settling on the country, and it developed and shone with an ever-increasing brilliancy during the more obvious collapse of the following reign.

There runs through these last twenty years of the King's reign a historical mystery never completely solved, and a Court scandal which has rivalled in interest the story of Mary in Scotland, or her relations with Queen Elizabeth in England. It need only be told here for the light which it throws on the provincial rivalries of Spain and the political use made of the Inquisition.¹ The story is derived from the narrative of one of the chief actors in the crime—Antonio Perez.

Escovedo
and Perez

When Don John went to the Netherlands, he took with him as his friend and secretary, Escovedo. Philip was profoundly suspicious of the vaulting ambition and daring schemes of his half-brother, and his suspicions included his confidential secretary. It is possible that personal motives and jealousies contributed their share to the strange tragedy. It is alleged that Philip instructed his minister, Perez, to have Escovedo put to death on his arrival in Spain; what our century would regard as murder he would be willing to call execution, and would hardly question that such a power was included in the royal prerogative. Escovedo was killed

¹ M. Louis Bertrand (*Philippe II; une ténébreuse affaire*, 1929) has told the story over again, but given a different turn to it. Perez appears as the traitor and criminal; Philip as the conscientious defender of Catholicism, Latin civilization and the interests of the state. There is hardly anything in the story that is certain, and a great deal that seems most improbable.

in 1578—after a strange interval between the giving of the order and its accomplishment. The real puzzle is why Philip, at a later date, turned on Perez and attacked him for his share in the murder. The affair began to stir in 1579; but it was not until 1585 that Perez was condemned to two years' imprisonment and a heavy fine on the charge of tampering with State papers. New facts may have come to light; certainly the King's anger against his fallen minister grew to a passion. According to one version of the story Philip is a half-mad criminal with a love of cruelty; according to another he becomes almost the victim of the tragedy, and Perez is both a traitor to his King and the assassin of his friend. In 1588—ten years after the murder of Escovedo—Perez was definitely charged with it, and was forced by torture to confess the details. He managed, however, shortly afterwards to escape from Castile into Aragon; and now the story passed from a merely personal interest and became of public importance. For Aragon still cherished her independent institutions and felt a strong jealousy of Castile. The administration of the law in Aragon was independent of the King of Spain, for the chief justiciary was irremovable, and he refused to surrender Perez. The King sent a force to seize Perez, but the case had caught the public interest and the Aragonese saved him from capture. Philip at first prosecuted him in the Courts of Aragon, but the independence and pride of the country raised all manner of obstacles. The cause of Perez became identified with the liberties of Aragon. But there was another tribunal that might be used. At no point in the reign do we see more clearly the services which the Inquisition so often rendered to the power of the King. Perez was accused of heresy; especially he was charged with negotiations with the French Huguenots; and he was transferred to the prison of the Holy Office. Aragon was as orthodox as Castile, but here Aragonese sentiment had been touched. A popular rising in Saragossa followed; the prisons of the Inquisition were stormed; and Perez was released. A little later he escaped to France and then to England; he played a part of some importance in both countries, but we need not follow him. The consequences to the Aragonese concern us more. The challenge to the

Castile and
Aragon

Escape
of Perez
from the
Inquisition

royal power had been open, and Philip took up the challenge. He relied upon his army and on the Inquisition, and neither failed him. The Chief Justice was seized and executed; all resistance was beaten down. The chief supporters of the resistance to the King were burned in Saragossa; a large number of others suffered severely. The judicial administration of the country was brought under the control of the King, and the exclusion of all foreigners from holding office in the kingdom was abrogated. It was hoped that the Aragonese had learnt their lesson. But a hundred years later they were still ready to defy the strength of Castile.

Philip, his
own first
minister

But during these years foreign affairs claimed Philip's chief attention, and these he directed himself without the help of any confidential counsellor. He had agents but no ministers of the least independence of judgment; among his politicians, Idiaquez and Vasquez are the chief names that are remembered. He himself ruled and insisted on deciding even small details of war and policy. He disliked personal contacts, and liked to have everything submitted to him in written reports. He read these reports for long hours and wrote his comments on them. He knew that the labour of reigning was hard and he did not flinch from it. His system was the highest development of a really personal monarchy and the severest condemnation of it. Of the advantages which such a system may possess it showed two, unity and secrecy; but it most lamentably failed in both rapidity and consistency. Philip was dilatory beyond the worst Parliaments, almost as dilatory as the contemporary German Diet. He toiled on, convinced that he was God's agent for great ends, full of a sense of duty, at peace with his own conscience, while the great prizes which seemed within the grasp of Spain passed beyond her reach.

The Spanish
naval and
economic
situation

A wiser statesmanship would have found the problems of the time exceedingly difficult of solution. Spain possessed—it is necessary to emphasize it—no navy in any way equal to the demands made on it, nor was there any clear sense of the necessity of a navy. The economic situation was also constantly harassing. Despite the activities of English pirates, great quantities of gold and silver came into Spain from the new world. It is questionable whether they were

any real gain. The value of the precious metals declined ; the prices of all commodities rose rapidly. Spanish statesmanship was utterly unequal to dealing with this problem so well known in our own days. The system of Spanish taxation—especially the tax of the alcabala already mentioned—strangled commerce. There was much complaint of the languishing condition of agriculture, which was due at least in part to the expulsion of the Moors. The whole temper of Spain, especially of the upper classes, was opposed to hard work and inclined to war and adventure. The number of vagabonds was very large, and the life of a vagabond found its admirers where such admiration would not be expected. Moreover—and this is probably the point of most importance—the Spanish Empire, of which the people were so naturally proud, had entailed constant expense in many directions. Her foreign possessions were rarely self-supporting, and in Europe there were costly expeditions to Italy, the Netherlands, and to France, as well as those to the coasts of Africa. The Netherlands was the most constant and the most serious of these sources of expense. Spain fell under the weight of her Empire. The urgent need of money was the cause rather than the consequence of her wild financial expedients and the debasement of her coinage.

The foreign policy of King Philip during these years was favoured by one splendid success which might have been the beginning of a better era for the peninsula. The territories of Portugal were added to those of the Crown of Spain, and the whole peninsula came under one Government. Portugal had had a long and glorious history, and the people had been rendered during these last years the more conscious of it by the publication of *The Lusiads* of Camoens. This great poem still ranks among the Epics of European literary history. It tells of the glories of Portuguese history, and especially of the Royal House of Portugal ; but the chief praise is given to the geographical discoveries of Prince Henry the Navigator, and the great voyage to India of Vasco da Gama. We have already seen in Chapter XIII how great was the overseas Empire which Portugal had acquired. The reign of John III (1521-57) had seen the culmination of the glory of Portugal and of the strength of the Crown ; for here, as else-

Spain and
Portugal

King
John III

where in Europe, the two were most closely connected. The nobles had been beaten down with ruthless cruelty in the reigns of his predecessors, and the royal administration seems to have been really popular. The vast possessions and claims of Portugal in three continents were strangely out of proportion to the size and real resources of the country ; but they were administered with success and brought in great wealth. The commerce with these new discoveries and possessions was kept largely under the direction of the Crown, and the profits enriched the royal treasury, which was reckoned actually the richest in Europe. The position won by the little state was indeed an amazing one. Wealth and Empire, and the glory of literature and art, joined to render the Royal House of Aviz illustrious.

The collapse
of Portugal

The end of Portuguese independence and greatness was close at hand. Her internal condition, in spite of appearances, left much to be desired. Her best sons were drawn to the foreign possessions, and Portugal itself was drained of soldiers. The population is thought to have declined considerably, and agriculture to have been generally neglected for the adventure of foreign trade. Foreign slaves, often of negro blood, had been introduced into the country in thousands. Lisbon is said to have contained a majority of slaves, and this influx of a strange race is held by some to have altered the racial characteristics of the country. Moreover the Inquisition had been introduced, and worked in Portugal, as in Spain, to the suppression of intellectual initiative and energy. But these considerations are not necessary to explain the coming catastrophe. Her land frontiers were surrounded by the vastly stronger power of Spain, naturally anxious to bring all the peninsula within her grasp and possessed of a military system and a military tradition superior to anything that Portugal could claim. The connection between the two Crowns had been close for a long time ; intermarriage had been frequent ; and many statesmen on both sides regarded the union of the two Crowns as in the best interests of Portugal as well as of Spain.

King
Sebastian

When John III died in 1557 his grandson, Sebastian, succeeded him at the age of three. The first regent was his grandmother, the sister of the Emperor Charles V, and the

second the Cardinal Henry, the brother of his grandfather. As he grew up he began to exhibit the marked characteristics of the peninsula—devotion to the Church and a passionate love of adventure. The adventure that appealed specially to him was not discovery in distant lands but the crusade against the infidel nearer home. The Portuguese held possessions in Morocco: but, while they gave all their efforts to the extension of their American and Asiatic possessions, these had languished and even declined. It was the dream of Sebastian to restore the power of Portugal in Morocco; and a disputed succession to the “Empire” of Morocco gave an apparently good opportunity. The ruler, Muley Hamed, was ousted by his uncle and appealed to Sebastian, promising to hold his Empire as a vassal of the Portuguese King, if it were reconquered. The expedition was undertaken and carried out in the spirit of romance. The King of Spain would give no help; but Stukeley, an Irish adventurer on his way to raise rebellion in Ireland, was persuaded to lead his few hundred soldiers on this new crusade. In August 1578 Sebastian and his little force were surrounded and nearly destroyed by the enemy. Sebastian perished, and his body was subsequently brought home for burial; but popular legend cherished for two centuries the belief that the King had escaped from the battle.

Death of
Sebastian

The losses in the battle were very serious for Portugal; but the political outlook was more critical than the military. Nothing less than the succession to the Crown and the future existence of the country were at stake. The dead King was unmarried; the next heir was Cardinal Henry, brother of Sebastian's grandfather, sixty-six years of age and more decrepit than his years implied. His reign was not likely to be long—it lasted two years—and who was to occupy the throne after him? There were many possible claimants—Catherine de Médicis was one, though no one but herself took her claim seriously. Philip of Spain was another. His legal claims may not have been the best, but he was close at hand and had prepared the ground, and he had a strong army to back his claim. The union of the two countries was desirable for both if carried out with fairness, and the Cortes of Portugal accepted Philip. The rivalry of

The
Portuguese
succession

Portugal and Spain had, however, been as long and as keen as that between England and Scotland, and there were many who could not endure the idea of absorption by "the old enemy." A champion of national independence was found in Dom Antonio, Prior of Crato, an illegitimate descendant of the Kings of Portugal, and he gathered an army. Philip despatched Alva to Lisbon with a considerable force, and he won the capital without difficulty. The country yielded, and Philip was crowned; he promised to maintain the separateness of Portugal and to maintain all the old privileges of nobles and people.

Dom
Antonio
resists
Philip.
Battle of
Terceira

Dom Antonio, however, had found backing in England and more seriously in France. He hoped to maintain himself in the colonial possessions of Portugal. Catherine de Médicis—though France was not at war with Spain—equipped a small squadron and put it under the command of Strozzi, one of the many men of Italian origin who served France under the Valois Kings. He was joined by a few English privateers. The Azores were occupied, and Dom Antonio was declared King. But a Spanish fleet soon arrived under Santa Cruz, the real victor of Lepanto. It was hardly a battle that followed at Terceira, for few of his ships followed Strozzi into action. Strozzi was defeated and killed; the prisoners were put to death as pirates; Dom Antonio himself managed to escape.

The
Spanish
peninsula
unified

These events had a great international importance. The unity of the peninsula gave Spain a magnificent defensive position. It would perhaps have been wise statesmanship if she had abandoned her ambitions on the continent of Europe and devoted herself to the maintenance and development of her overseas Empire. Her position was in many ways more favourable than that of England; but the traditions and the pride of Spain were too strong for the adoption of such a policy. It is more important to notice that the acquisition of the Crown of Portugal seemed to add so much to the wealth and strength of Spain that it upset the Balance of Power, which governed the international relations of the sixteenth century. It tended, therefore, to strengthen the alliance of England and France. At the same time the naval victory, so easily won over French and English ships,

gave the Spanish Government more confidence in the power of their naval forces to act with success even in the northern seas.

In Portugal, then, Spain gained a great success. Elsewhere great hopes lured and betrayed her. In her relations with England, in France, and in the Netherlands, she seemed sometimes near to a triumph which would have changed the whole course of European history; but then all ended in failure. Her tasks were beyond her economic resources, and even beyond the powers of her so long invincible army.

The story of her relations with England lies outside of ^{Spain and} the scope of this book; but the general results are essential ^{England} for the understanding of the politics of Europe. Little by little Queen Elizabeth abandoned the alliance with Spain, which existed at the beginning of the reign, in favour of a close understanding with France. The motives for this policy were mainly political. For Spain was strong and apparently grew stronger. The presence of a Spanish army, victorious in the Netherlands, threatened England where she was particularly sensitive. A strong rival Power in Antwerp seemed like "a pistol aimed at the heart of England," and from that time to this the independence of the Belgian lands has seemed to be pre-eminently an English interest. The Spanish Empire was weakly defended and offered an attractive target to the attacks of English seamen, whose action stands midway between that of privateers and pirates. The Protestant sentiment of England stimulated and justified the irregular action of the sailors, who learned in their raids on the colonies of Spain the real weakness of the Spanish naval power. There can be no doubt that England was the aggressor. Her ships attacked the legitimately won possessions of Spain. Her soldiers met the armies of Spain in the Low Countries with increasing frequency. War between the two countries existed in fact before the sailing of the Armada.¹

¹ "In reality England was the aggressor and few monarchs would have borne protracted provocation with Philip II's patience" (Pollard, *Political History of England*, vi, 190). Masefield's "Philip the King" is a fine poem; but I know of no justification for the view that Philip's schemes against England had been pursued for "seventeen years." Philip's chief interest was in European affairs; only unwillingly did he come to see that the road to Amsterdam and Paris lay through London.

English money and diplomacy, English sailors and sometimes English soldiers had crossed the schemes of Spain long before she made up her mind to invade England. The despatch of the Invincible Armada was the result of exasperation and almost of despair. Its success was almost an impossibility. If Spanish troops had been landed, it is probable that they would have added enormously to the difficulties of Spain. The defeat of the Armada left the treasure ships and the foreign possessions of Spain exposed to English attacks, and encouraged the English Queen to a more direct participation in European affairs. In 1590 and in 1596 English expeditions were sent against the coasts of Spain and gained considerable successes ; but a real English invasion of Spain was unthinkable. Her real vulnerability was outside of her own peninsula ; in Italy, in France, and in the Netherlands.

We must now turn to the failures of Spain in France and the Netherlands, which must be told from the point of view of those two countries.

(2) THE DECISION IN FRANCE. THE THRONE WON BY HENRY OF NAVARRE

The
succession
to the
French
throne

The death of the Duke of Alençon opened a difficult question of succession to the throne of France. Catherine had borne ten children ; seven had survived, but though all but Alençon had married there was no heir to the throne. The legal question as to the rightful heir if the princes of the present royal family had no male issue was a difficult one. The Salic Law, which excluded women and those whose claims came through women, ruled out some candidates (including Philip of Spain) whose rights would have otherwise been indisputable. It was subsequently admitted on both sides that the House of Bourbon stood next to the House of Valois, though separated from it by a wide interval. France would have acquiesced in this view without difficulty but for one fact ; the head of the House of Bourbon was Henry, King of Navarre, and he was a Huguenot and the leader of the Protestant armies since the deaths of Condé and Coligny.¹

¹ Kitchin. *History of France*, vol. ii, p. 396, writes : " Above forty branches of the family became extinct in the male line before he (Henry of

The question of the succession was at once eagerly debated, and gave rise to interesting theories. The Catholics put forward a theory that Catholic orthodoxy was a necessary qualification for the throne of France; and that no heretic could possibly occupy the throne of Clovis and Saint Louis. This was at once a breach in the claims of absolute indefeasible heredity, and opened the way to others. The Church claimed a voice in the determination of the succession; why should not the nobility make their voice heard too? So the political attitude of the two parties changed curiously; each repudiated the doctrines which it had held at the beginning. The Huguenot nobles had been the early champions of the claims of the States-General, and had spoken of a popular basis of French institutions. Now that their leader was King by hereditary right that was no longer wise. They were ready now to accept the unrestricted claims of birth. It was the Catholics who talked of the ancient liberties of the French people. The Sorbonne—the theological faculty of the University of Paris—reflected the general feeling on the Catholic side when it declared “that it was possible to take away the government from princes who showed themselves unsuitable.”

Catherine de Médicis and the King were not able to control events. The Queen Mother was growing old, and no longer the influence that she had once been. The private life grew stranger, and was divided between religious observances, partly designed to win from heaven the birth of a son, and wild excesses. He was more than ever in the power of his “mignons.” The two chief, Joyeuse and Epernon, were given precedence over all the nobility. He did not for all his devotion to religious observances satisfy his Catholic subjects. His grants of toleration were remembered against him, and he had become Protector of Geneva in order to retain his claim to Swiss mercenary troops.

The Catholic League acquired a new vigour from the situation. The clergy were the chief driving force in the movement, not so much the ordinary secular clergy as

Navarre) became heir to the throne.” The Catholics adopted his uncle, Charles, Cardinal Bourbon, as their candidate, and thus made it impossible to challenge Henry of Navarre’s claims except on the ground of religion.

the friars and the preachers. The House of Guise provided the inevitable leaders amongst the nobility. The young Duke Henry was the hero of the party. His uncle, the Duke of Mayenne, came in unwillingly, but was destined to play a prominent part later. The decisive event was an interview held in December 1584 between Spanish representatives and the Guises at their castle of Joinville. The agents of Philip and the leaders of the League promised one another mutual support. Their aims were declared to be the extirpation of heresy in France and also in the Netherlands; the exclusion of heretics and the supporters of heretics from the throne of France; the introduction of the Decrees of the Council of Trent into France. Philip promised to support the League with an annual subsidy. The Cardinal Bourbon was declared the rightful heir to the throne in default of male issue to the King. The Cardinal shortly afterwards issued a manifesto in harmony with the newly developed principles of the League. He declared that the Huguenots were following the example "of what has been done in England"; the "mignons" were removing the King from the influence of the nobility; the popular element in the state was "born at the same time with the royal name and fundamental rules of the state of France." The Church and the aristocracy thus seemed allied for the establishment of a limited monarchy.

"The
Sixteen" at
Paris

The new developments of the Catholic League were nowhere so warmly welcomed as in Paris. The zealous and fanatical Catholicism of the great city was one of the permanent features of the time, and had been important from the very beginning of the civil wars. The growth of the Catholic revival had much stimulated it. The Jesuit preachers, such as Prevost and Boucher, were listened to eagerly, and their attacks on the Huguenots were unceasing. The city was divided into sixteen sections or wards for purposes of municipal administration, and these sixteen divisions elected a Council, which became known as the "Council of the Sixteen" or familiarly "The Sixteen." This Council became a chief agent in the violent events which soon followed. The Guise family co-operated with this popular Council, and the Duchesse de Nemours, the widow of the murdered Duke Francis, was an eager partisan.

The Politiques—well organized in the south of France—^{The Politiques} were, of course, in bitter opposition to all this ; but the main attack fell on the Huguenots. Henry of Navarre answered with a challenge to fight the matter out "in single combat, or two, ten, or twenty a side" ; an absurd proposal but one that served to strengthen the growing legend of the gallantry of Henry of Navarre. He issued a manifesto at the same time denouncing the Guises as foreigners, deploring the burdens laid on the people and the infringement of the rights of the nobility, and appealing to the States-General as alone able to settle the question of a disputed succession to the throne.

The King feared the League and had some real sympathy with the Huguenots and Politiques. He added his manifesto to the others, declaring himself a good Catholic ; deploring the intolerable evils that war would bring on all classes and especially to the poor. He held out a warning of what would happen if war came again. "It is most certain that many vagabonds who can do nothing but mischief will rise up, who, under the protection of either side, will commit infinite murders, robberies, and sacrileges"—a prophecy fulfilled to the letter. He would have liked to maintain peace, but circumstances, and especially Paris, were too strong for him. War was clearly coming, and in a war between Catholics and Protestants, Henry III must needs fight for his own faith. His mother—it is one of her last services—negotiated for him with the Guises. The result was the Treaty of Nemours (June 1585). A condition of war was set up by the revocation of all edicts of toleration. The Crown surrendered to the League, and the state was nearly dismembered ; for certain important towns (Toul, Verdun, Reims, Dijon, etc.) were handed over to the Guise family to be garrisoned and controlled by them.¹

The Pope, Sixtus V, who had recently mounted the Papal ^{The Pope and the League} throne, was ready to co-operate, though not without his suspicions of the League. On the petition of the League,

¹ In revoking the edicts Henry declared that he did it "conscientiously but unwillingly, for I know that this act will bring the ruin of my state and people." He was a poor degenerate, and had a massacre and more than one murder on his conscience ; but he stretched out his weak hands towards peace and religious conciliation.

he issued a Bull declaring that Henry of Navarre and the Duke of Condé were heretics and relapsed, and as such were incapable of occupying the throne of France. It should be noted, however, that this procedure met with decided opposition among some whose catholicism was beyond question. The Parlement of Paris was neither Huguenot nor Politique; but it was strongly Nationalist and Gallican. The publication of the Bull was declared to be a violation of Gallican liberties; Parlement demanded that it should be torn in pieces and its supporters punished. The Bull, in consequence, was never formally published, but its contents were well known (Sept. 1585).

The war
of the
League

The new war is sometimes reckoned the eighth of the Civil Wars; but it is better to regard it as opening a new struggle which does not end until Henry of Navarre reigns and makes peace with Spain. It is sometimes called the "War of the Three Henrys," a picturesque title but hardly applicable, since the war went on, when two of them, Henry of Guise and Henry the King, had been removed. It is best to call it "The War of the League." It lasts without real interruption for fourteen years.

Henry of
Navarre

The war produced incidents that attach themselves to the memory more easily than anything in the previous wars. But they must be very lightly passed over. The King counted for very little; Guise and Navarre drew all men's eyes upon themselves. It was in the opening stages of the war that Henry of Navarre made for himself a real military reputation. It was his tactic, says one who was in arms against him, to refuse a general engagement while with a small, excellently equipped force of less than 3000 men, "expert, ready, quick on all occasions, and not troubled with artillery or carriages, he ran up and down with great expedition; by his skilfulness in the ways and the unwearied patience of his soldiers he appeared and vanished like lightning, being far off in the morning from those parts where he had been seen the night before." All turned on foreign assistance, and the Huguenots—partly through the help of Queen Elizabeth who, as the crisis approached, saw the necessity of siding with them—secured the promise of a really large army, mainly consisting of Germans

and Swiss. Could they effect a junction with Henry of Navarre, whose army was faced by the royal army under the Duke of Joyeuse, among the rivers to the south of Rochelle? The two armies met on October 20, 1587, at Coutras; "the Duke of Joyeuse's army gay with gallant plumes, liveries, and other wanton devices, whereas the King of Navarre had no other show than that of iron nor other ornaments than their arms rusted with rain." Joyeuse's force was defeated with very great slaughter; it was the first victory won in the field by the Huguenots since the beginning of the troubles, and it immensely enhanced the military reputation of Navarre. But the victory was not followed up, and had little influence on the course of the campaign. Navarre did not succeed—nor even attempt—to join hands with the army from beyond the Rhine, which staggered on to a complete disaster. There was trouble in its ranks from the first; the soldiers had been told that they were not to fight against the King of France, and were uneasy when they found out the truth; moreover, there was serious disease among them. They tried in vain to cross the Loire at La Charité; they then marched almost aimlessly towards Paris and Normandy. Henry of Guise followed them and harassed them with great skill. He surprised them in a night attack at Vimory, and then crushed them at Auneau near Chartres; the survivors were only anxious to escape from France at all costs. Guise had gained a really great victory; and it was all the more popular because it was a victory of French troops over foreigners (November 24, 1587).

Guise's victory brought ecstatic joy to Paris, but it brought no comfort to the King. Many wild reports were current as to his aims and intentions; but it is certain that he would have preferred an indecisive campaign terminated by a treaty of peace of the usual kind. Only so could he hope to maintain any personal authority in France. The victory of Guise and the enthusiastic support given to him by the people of Paris were as displeasing to King Henry III as the influence of Coligny had been to his mother in the days before the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day. The King had loved Paris, and boasted that he had done more for it than any of his predecessors; the Louvre was his

favourite residence. But now the Parisians were reported to be threatening his power and even his liberty. It was told him that the revolutionary Sixteen meant to seize him and to shut him up in a monastery. He certainly already meditated some counter blow. Guise had come in his triumphal march as far as Soissons, but the King had instructed him not to enter Paris. He came, however, though with scanty following, and he denied that he had received the King's definite order to stay away. He was received with great enthusiasm, for he was the popular hero of the hour on account of his religious zeal and his great victory. He visited both the Queen and the King, and was received with suspicion by both. The King probably felt himself in real danger; he required more troops for his own defence as well as for any blow that he might be thinking of striking against his rival. He ordered Marshal Biron to bring into Paris the Swiss guards who were quartered outside of the city, and they entered before daybreak on Thursday, May 12, 1588.

Guise to
Paris

The Day
of the
Barricades

The introduction of a garrison conflicted with the time-honoured liberties of Paris. The people rose in insurrection and built barricades across the narrow streets of the medieval city. The Swiss guards were surrounded; the King himself was in effect a prisoner. Then Guise, unsolicited, went among the people and induced them to refrain from violence and to let the Swiss go free; he was, men said, like the god of the sea in Virgil, quieting the waves by a gesture. He was King of Paris, and negotiated with the King of France as an equal. Catherine was the agent in the negotiations, and Guise insisted on terms which would have made him little less than master of France. The King determined to escape from his dangerous capital, and succeeded in doing so through the one gate that had not fallen into the hands of the insurgents. "When he mounted his horse," says a contemporary, "he turned towards the city and swore that he would never re-enter it except through a breach," that is, as conqueror. In fact, he was destined never to re-enter it.

Henry III
and Henry
of Guise

Thus ended the famous "day of the barricades." It left Henry of Guise King of Paris, Henry of Navarre King of the Huguenots and Politiques, and Henry of Valois, despite

his Crown, almost powerless and unsupported. In leaving, he had dreamed of victory and revenge ; but he found them quite out of his reach. He must be reconciled with one of the parties, and the League seemed the stronger. So he had to travel the road of humiliation, and on July 11 signed the Edict of Union, which was in effect the King's capitulation to the League. By this, he promised to make no peace with the Huguenots ; to have no officials who were not Catholics ; and to recognize the Government of " The Sixteen " in Paris. A little later he appointed the Duke of Guise Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. He had almost taken the Crown from his head !

All parties expressed their belief in the efficacy of a meeting of the States-General ; and the next step in this bewildering drama was the summons of the States-General to Blois. One who was present ¹ speaks of the King's melancholy nature, and of his hope " to supply all wants by cunning." But the business of the Estates at first proceeded normally. The King, in his address, spoke of the desirability of suppressing all leagues in favour of the unity of the state, though the League made him withdraw the words. Navarre was formally excluded from the succession. But the King had other business in his mind. He had made up his mind to murder Guise, and his intention was acquiesced in by many of his advisers ; Guise was warned, but refused to take precautions ; " he will not dare," he said. But early on the morning of December 23, 1588, the King invited Guise to his private apartment, and he was murdered in the ante-chamber by men who had been placed there by the King.

The next day (December 24) the King ordered the murder of the Duke's brother, the Cardinal. The Duke of Mayenne was now the head of the Guise family, and he was beyond the King's reach. These murders were the King's work, not the Queen Mother's. She lay ill and dying, though still capable of interest in public affairs. The King is said to have announced the killing of the Guises to his mother in a tone of triumph. " I intend to be a King now and no

¹ Davila.

longer a prisoner and a slave." Catherine died on January 5, 1589.¹

Opposition to Henry III

The States-General scattered soon after the murders at Blois, but the new situation was not favourable to Henry III's design of being a King indeed. He had murdered "the King of the League" and had to reckon now with the bitter antagonism of all who valued before all things the victory of the Catholic faith. Paris took the lead. The Sorbonne at Paris declared that the King had forfeited the Crown, and that his subjects "not only might but ought to cast off his obedience." The Duchesses of Guise and Montpensier—wife and sister of the murdered Duke—stirred the fires of hate in Paris. The Parlement was purged of those members who were too royalist to accept the new policy. The Duke of Mayenne swore revenge on the murderer of his brother. Clearly the King had no hope of support from Paris. The country seemed sinking into anarchy. The authority of the central Government was reduced to nothing. Social movements of a revolutionary kind, which had been curiously absent from the struggle so far, began to appear now. In Normandy the peasantry took up arms against all soldiers who passed through their country. What order still subsisted was kept by the League and the Huguenots and Politiques.

Reconciliation of Henry III and Henry of Navarre

Yet the King's name and Crown still counted for something. He had at first—strangely and characteristically—hoped to gain the support of the League, and had promised to support the "Union" and never to make terms with the Huguenots. But no one could attach any importance to his promises now, and the League would have none of him. Then perforce he turned to the Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, who made matters easier for him by tolerating

¹ Davila, who knew her, pronounces a great eulogy on her; he admits that she was "of a most deceitful faith" and "prodigal of human blood more than became the tenderness of the female sex"; but his general verdict is nevertheless friendly. No one would have understood her difficulties and her methods more easily than Queen Elizabeth. Rathlin island and Munster are not more pleasant memories than Saint Bartholomew's Day. But the English Queen had longer views and more definite principles of action than Catherine. Mariéjol ends his analysis of her character with the words, "Elle a vécu au jour le jour"; and it is this opportunism which is the explanation and the condemnation of her policy.

Catholic worship in the districts which they controlled. Navarre knew that there was danger in association with the man who had played an important part in the great massacre. But Henry of Navarre was not a man to shrink from dangerous adventure nor to cherish lasting rancour. There were negotiations, and then the two men met at Plessis-les-Tours. The meeting passed off well, and Navarre, as usual, found the right words to flatter and please the King of France. Then came a manifesto from Navarre, pious in tone and ascribing his escape from death to God alone; appealing in religious matters to a General Council and refusing to contemplate any change in his religion "while the dagger was at his throat" (it is noticeable that a change is not regarded as absolutely impossible); promising protection to the Catholics; ending most characteristically with the declaration that his chief object was to procure by all means the relief of his poor, oppressed people, and that the road to unity in religion was "gentleness, peace, and good example."

These were noble words, and the support of force did not seem likely to fail. The knowledge that the Huguenots and their allies, the Politiques, were no longer rebels brought in a great number of supporters. The two Henrys marched on Paris and found little serious resistance. A loose blockade of the city was established, and it seemed certain that famine would, within a short time, force a surrender. Then, on August 2, 1589, a Jacobin friar, called Jacques Clément, made his way to the King's camp, where he was received as likely to be the bearer of an important message. While the King was reading the papers handed to him Jacques Clément stabbed him, and, though the wound did not at first seem serious, the King died soon afterwards.

Henry of Navarre was now King Henry IV of France. If he could have maintained the blockade of Paris, he would soon have reigned over the whole country. But this proved to be impossible. He issued a manifesto, appealing on religious matters to a genuine General Council and hinting at the possibility of a change in his own views. But this satisfied no one. The Huguenots were offended by the suggestion that he might desert their faith. The strict Catholics would

Murder of
Henry III

King
Henry IV

not serve a heretic. The French army depended on its officers, and in less than a week it had dwindled by half. The attack on Paris had to be abandoned. The League declared Henry's uncle, Cardinal Bourbon, King of France. He was a prisoner in the hands of his nephew, and exercised no influence on the course of affairs.

Henry IV
and Queen
Elizabeth

In the dark outlook of Henry, the support of the English Queen was the one bright spot. She was now at open war with the Spanish King, and must join hands with all his enemies. She sent Henry a body of 5000 English and Scotch troops, and it was to get into touch with them that Henry occupied Dieppe. Mayenne marched against him and nearly succeeded in forcing his lines; but in the battle of Arques (September 21, 1589) the forces of the League were in the end driven off with heavy loss. Then the English troops arrived, and Henry, with their help, marched on Paris. He could only hope to take it by surprise, and the alarm was given in time to save the city. He turned to Normandy and applied himself to clearing the Leaguers from that province, so useful to him as commanding the connection with England. He laid siege to Dreux; and the importance of the place made Mayenne march to its relief. Henry turned to meet the relieving force, and so came the battle of Ivry (March 1590). It was an important battle, and Henry's victory was decisive. He was greatly superior in artillery, and to this he owed much of his success. But he was himself primarily a captain of cavalry, and attention was chiefly fixed on that arm; his horsemen in the battle adopted the new German fashion of employing, not the long lance, but the pistol and the sword, and the new method proved a great success. But we must note, too, that Henry was winning over French public opinion as decisively as he conquered his enemies in the field. The legend round his name was developing rapidly; and like most legends it was composed partly of fact and partly of fable. Stories were told everywhere of his gallantry, his courage, his humanity, his success in love and war. At Ivry he had added to his battle orders that in case of doubt his men should look for his white plume "which would always be found on the road to honour and victory"; after the battle he had saved the lives of his French enemies when

Battle
of Arques

Battle of
Ivry

they fell into his hands, but had slaughtered the Germans on the ground that they had passed over to the enemy after having taken service with him. He spoke always of his sympathy with the poor people of France, and hoped that the time would come "when every peasant would have a chicken in his stew-pot." Already those qualities were attached to him which have made him the most popular ruler in all French history; and he really possessed these qualities. But he also possessed others; great prudence, a most practical political instinct, and a hard egotism when his own interests were attacked. There was a thorough realist at the heart of this most romantic of French Kings.

Ivry was so complete a victory that it was thought Paris could not have resisted, if Henry had advanced at once, and the reasons of his delay have been much discussed. The chief fact seems to be that the character of his army made rapid action after a victory almost impossible. It obeyed its officers more than its King; and the soldiers were in no mood to undertake the fatigue of a rapid march immediately after a great victory. But soon he did march on Paris, and established a loose blockade of the city in May 1590.

There were serious differences among the supporters of the League, which we must soon examine; but the presence of Henry before the walls of Paris silenced them for a time. The Parlement, indeed, was known to be opposed to the recognition of any foreign power, whether that of the Pope or of the King of Spain. But while Henry threatened, the Papal Nuncio, Gaetano, and the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, were in great authority. The Jesuits and other preachers stirred the religious enthusiasm of the people. The municipal government of the city was in the hands of "The Sixteen," and for the present the Duke of Nemours and the Duchess of Montpensier co-operated with them. But Henry's victory seemed certain. Famine was in the city and, with famine, disease. The suffering was greater than it had been when Henry III had blockaded the city; and Henry was too wary to be the victim of an assassin. Surrender seemed inevitable in spite of the endurance and enthusiasm of the Parisians. And if Paris surrendered, Henry would win the Crown of France as a Huguenot.

Paris
relieved by
Parma

The cup was dashed from his lips by the advance of Parma and a Spanish army from the Netherlands. The cause of the League was now the cause of Philip of Spain; Henry's victory would be a decisive blow to the hopes which he cherished of attaching France in some way to the interests of Spain. So Parma was ordered to advance to the relief of Paris, and most unwillingly obeyed. Parma's successful advance is a masterpiece of strategy, and shows the great superiority of the Spanish commander and even more certainly of the Spanish troops. The discipline and morale of Parma's troops allowed him to run risks which would have been fatal to Henry. He occupied Lagny, threw provisions and some reinforcements into Paris, contemptuously refused Henry's challenge to him to accept battle, and retired to the Netherlands in safety.

The
question of
succession

Paris was saved and was never again in serious danger of capture at the hands of Henry; but scarcity still prevailed, and the removal of immediate danger only accentuated the difficulties and divisions which were to be found in the ranks of the League. For the question of the succession had to be faced. The Cardinal Bourbon—always a phantom candidate—had died while Henry was before Paris. A new candidate must be selected, and the choice was a matter of the greatest difficulty. Philip put forward the claims of his family more openly than before. His daughters were the grandchildren of Henry II of France. If the Salic Law were pushed aside their claim would be overwhelmingly strong. As a step toward a settlement in his favour, he desired to be made "Protector" of France. Mayenne resisted this strongly. To make Philip Protector "would be putting the bridle into the hand of the Catholic King." He was inclined to advance his own claims more seriously, and genealogies were prepared showing his descent from Charlemagne: but these claims met with resistance, not only from the Spanish King but also from the Guise circle, where other members thought their own claims stronger than those of Mayenne. A new trouble, too, had arisen in Paris itself.

The Duke
of Mayenne

"The
Sixteen"
and the
Parlement

"The Sixteen" had begun to develop ideas of a social-revolutionary kind. They claimed independent power for themselves, and came into violent conflict with the con-

servative Parlement. Brisson, the President of the Parlement, and two other members of that body were murdered; and "The Sixteen" established a Committee of Ten which was to act as a sort of Committee of Public Safety during the emergency. But municipal revolution was not likely to please the aristocratic leaders of the League. On the appeal of the Duchess of Nemours, Mayenne entered Paris. He suppressed the power of "The Sixteen," and hanged some of their number without form of trial. The League seemed in danger of dissolution through internal dissensions. Philip's support was all the more necessary. In April 1591 Jeannin went on behalf of the League to Madrid, and found Philip determined to prosecute his claims on the French throne. The upshot of the conference was a promise that the States-General should be called to Paris to decide on the question of the succession and especially of the Spanish claims.

Henry had his own serious difficulties. His Catholic supporters called on him to fulfil his promise that he would "receive instruction" in the Catholic faith, and the Pope issued a "monitory" to all Catholics to abandon him. The Huguenots were uneasy and suspicious of his intentions. The Sorbonne declared that even if he were converted to Catholicism he could never reign in France.

His best hope lay in foreign support. Queen Elizabeth sent money and 6000 men; 12,000 men came from Germany. He gained important success; Chartres and Noyon fell to him. Then he laid siege to Rouen. If it were in his hands, it would exercise a constant pressure on Paris and it lay on the line of communication with England. Out of his army of 40,000 only 8000 were French; there were 4000 English troops under Essex; Henry found foreign soldiers easier to handle than his own countrymen. The fall of Rouen seemed nearly certain; but again Parma crossed Henry's path. He marched from the Netherlands and, refusing the battle that Henry offered, relieved the beleaguered city. Then came a famous military incident, which seemed to bring Parma to the verge of ruin, and in the end showed more plainly than ever his skill and the efficiency of his troops. For Parma occupied Caudebec to secure the full relief of Rouen. Henry saw his chance; the situation of Caudebec

Position of
Henry of
Navarre

Siege and
relief of
Rouen

made it possible to blockade it so as to make escape to the north nearly impossible, and on the south flowed the broad estuary of the Seine which was now patrolled (the fact is significant) by Dutch vessels. Even Mayenne believed his surrender certain. But by great skill and some good fortune he managed to succeed "in passing a mighty broad river swelled in that place by salt waters, with an entire army, full of baggage, hindered with ammunition and great store of cannon, a fierce and powerful army being at his back."¹ Parma went back to the Netherlands without helping the Leaguers any further. An indecisive war was in his master's interests. But it was Parma's last campaign. He had received a slight wound at Caudebec. Not serious at first, it had been neglected and caused his death (December 2).

Death of
Parma

Conversion
of
Henry IV

It was clear that the sword alone would not give Henry the throne of France without long delay. France was meanwhile falling into the extreme of misery. Her unity was in real danger. And yet it was nearly certain that what was refused to Henry the Huguenot would be within the grasp of Henry the Catholic. Fighting went on still, but the centre of interest moved from war to diplomacy. The one question was—would Henry consent to change his faith?

He took "the perilous leap"; he was instructed and declared himself a Catholic. The stages and the means by which this was done will be the subject of a subsequent chapter. We need only note here that he was received into the Church at St. Denis on July 25, 1593, and crowned soon afterwards at Chartres.

France
surrenders
to
Henry IV

The news of the event worked like a charm on the mind of France. The whole country believed in Royalty and hated the notion of a foreign dominion. Henry was widely popular even with many of those who were driven by religious scruples to fight against him. The great cities of France hastened to throw themselves at his feet; first Meaux, then Peronne, Mondidier, Roye, Pontoise; then Orleans and Bourges, and Amiens and Reims; then Lyons, where a popular rising ejected the Duke of Nemours, the brother of the Duke of Mayenne. Paris stood out for some time, and

Paris

¹ From Davila, *Civil Wars in France*, book xli.

the situation was rendered difficult there by the presence of a Spanish garrison. But de Brissac, the new Governor appointed by Mayenne, began to negotiate with Henry at once. He made good terms for himself and the city; no Huguenot worship in Paris; no confiscation of property; a complete amnesty; foreigners to depart freely; the Governor to be well paid for his services. So all was arranged. Henry presented himself at the Tuileries gate; and, though a heavy storm had made him two hours late, he found all ready to receive him. His behaviour added to his growing legend. The people crowded round him as he rode in, and he showed no fear of them. He visited the Duchesse de Nemours, and played cards with his old enemy, Madame de Montpensier. He saw the Spanish soldiers march out, and greeted their commander, De Feria, with jovial irony. We can well believe that the people were mad with joy to look again on the face of a King. Many individual noblemen still held out, and Henry was anxious to win them over individually even by heavy concessions rather than make any terms with the order as a whole. Villars was bought over at Rouen. Mayenne was among the last to come. Mayenne Henry's minister, Sully, has told with admirable vigour the story of how Henry received his surrender; how he led the fat man panting through his gardens, until at last, observing his distress, he dismissed him with words of irony and friendliness.

When in January 1595 Henry at last declared formal war against Spain, he had with him an almost united country. War against Spain
But even so the struggle was a grave one. Henry expressed loud admiration of the infantry of Spain. No other soldiers in the world, he said, were capable of what they did; if he had that infantry joined to his cavalry, he would dare to undertake a war against all the world. But in the sixteenth century the power of defence was so much greater than that of attack that the idea of the conquest of France or of any considerable part of it was quite out of the question. The Spaniards were strong in Brittany where they put forward claims independent of their general claim to the French throne. They had built there a new fortress—Croisil—but it was taken by the French forces. The chief danger was

on the northern frontier, where the Spanish armies could advance from the now obedient provinces of the southern Netherlands. Intrigue and skill brought them into possession of several towns in Picardy; La Fère which was sold to them; La Capelle and Calais which were taken; above all Amiens, where the discontent of the Huguenots with the policy of the King and the independent control of the town by the municipal authorities allowed a most daring and romantic stroke of the Spaniards to succeed. It was a dark hour for the King, but he faced the danger in his old spirit and evoked something of the old enthusiasm. Help came from England—4000 men—and Henry established a blockade. The Spanish relief force was beaten off with difficulty, and the city of Amiens fell again into the King's hands (1597).

Amiens
taken by
Spain

It was hopeless to expect a decisive end of the war. Negotiations were opened, and soon resulted in the Peace of Vervins (1598). The Queen of England protested against a peace which was made independently of her, and recalled the King's promise that he would enter into no peace negotiations without the co-operation of England and the revolted Netherlands. The needs of France were, however, too great for delay, and excuses for a separate negotiation could be found. The French, Spanish, and Papal representatives met at Vervins, near the frontier of the Netherlands, and terms were soon arranged. The changes introduced into the map of Europe were small. Spain surrendered Calais and her recent acquisitions in Picardy. The supreme fact was not to be found in the treaty; Henry IV had established in France a national monarchy, and the grandiose scheme of Philip had failed.

Peace of
Vervins

(3) THE CONTEST IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE RISE OF THE UNITED PROVINCES

The long struggle in the Netherlands did not by any means reach a lasting settlement by the end of the century. It was not until 1609 that a provisional arrangement was made; and it was not until 1648 that the independence of the United Provinces was recognized by all Europe. But the defeat of Spain in France and on the seas was of immense

importance to the Netherlands, though in the end it was the efforts of the Dutch themselves and not the help of their allies that won for them their great position.

The death of William the Silent left the rebellious provinces in great anxiety. There was no leader to take the murdered man's place. His son, Maurice—destined to a great military future—was not yet eighteen. Oldenbarneveldt was already a prominent man, but he held no position of control. The provinces were independent and jealous of one another. It hardly seemed possible that such confusion could resist the attacks of Spain.

Foreign help had to be found. The states approached France in the first place, but Henry III, engaged in the last civil war, could undertake no new responsibilities. They turned then to England, and at first the Queen was unwilling to grant help. But Parma made rapid progress. He entered Brussels in March 1585, and laid siege to Antwerp. That city had sunk far from her early greatness, but her past history and her proximity to England gave to her fate a great importance. The city was closely blockaded from the land side, and the access to the sea was prevented by a bridge of boats and a boom. The effort on the part of the besieged to break through by means of fire ships failed, and the city had to surrender in August 1585.

A strong foreign power in Antwerp was the constant nightmare of English politicians. The English Government at last consented to send help. The Queen's personal favourite, the Earl of Leicester, was to take across 5000 troops. Flushing, Brill, and the fort of Rammekens, were to be handed over to English garrisons as security for the repayment of the costs of the expedition. Thus began the long connection of England with Holland. The two nations were much alike in temperament and language; both stood on the Protestant side in the great religious struggle; both came to adopt "liberal" political ideas. Their alliance was mutually helpful in many grave crises. And yet the story of their relations is not a pleasant one; and this first chapter is far from satisfactory. The English Queen's motives were wholly national. She recognized no common interest in the religious struggle, and she was not moved by what was

Position
at the
death of
William
the Silent

Fall of
Antwerp

heroic in the action of the Dutch. The Dutch came to be as suspicious of the intentions of England as they had been of the Duke of Alençon.

The Earl of Leicester found the country in a strange condition. The interior was in great poverty and in constant danger of Spanish attacks. But the maritime provinces and the harbour towns were pursuing a thriving and lucrative trade which gave an air of prosperity to the chief cities. "Never was there people, I think, in that jollity that these be," wrote Leicester after his early receptions. The carrying trade of Europe was largely in the hands of the Dutch, and there was one branch of their trade which aroused the vehement displeasure of Leicester. For the rebel states traded with the Spanish armies that were attacking them. Leicester believed that Parma's troops would not be able to subsist if the supplies were cut off that reached them by means of Dutch vessels, which carried food round to the south Belgian harbours. His attempt to stop this trade provoked vigorous resistance and had to be dropped. His position was very difficult; he had to defend the rebel states, and yet he had altogether insufficient powers. The states offered him the position of "Governor and General absolute," and he accepted it without consulting the Queen. The result was a violent storm, for his action seemed to conflict with her declaration that she sought no aggrandisement for herself or for her subjects. It took a threat of resignation from Lord Burleigh to induce Queen Elizabeth to accept what had been done. The presence of Leicester in the Netherlands was probably of real assistance to the Dutch. "They were almost lost indeed, and I only by my labour have recovered them," he wrote, but his military achievement was small; his troops were a ragged and ill-disciplined crowd, and there were some ugly instances of treason among them. Had Parma been free to attack the northern provinces Leicester was not the man to resist him. But Parma's master was intent on the expedition against England, and Parma was instructed to have his forces ready to co-operate with the Armada when it appeared off the coast. On the eve of the arrival of the Armada, Elizabeth was far from accepting the idea of hearty co-operation with the Dutch against the power of Spain in all places. She carried on negotiations

with the Spanish in the Netherlands almost to the very last, and the Dutch believed with justice that their independence might become a pawn in the game. Leicester left the states in December 1587, and "the States used but slender entreaty for his stay and continuance." He took over the command of the English land forces against a possible Spanish invasion, and his record in the Netherlands does not inspire much confidence in his ability to have withstood Parma on English soil.

The Dutch helped the English in 1588 by blockading the mouths of the Scheldt. But for them Parma might have joined hands with Medina Sidonia. The defeat of the Armada was doubtless an immense relief to Holland as well as to England. More immediately sensible relief was given by the ambitious schemes of Philip in France, which have already been noted. When in 1590 and again in 1592 Parma was ordered to enter France, it meant the abandonment of plans which he had formed for the reduction of the rebellious provinces. His death in 1592 removed the greatest enemy that the states had to encounter.

The seven states that had joined together in the loose confederacy of the Union of Utrecht were, during this time, moving nearer to the formation of an effective state. Three men were mainly responsible for the policy and government of the states in these years. First Maurice, the second son of William the Silent (his eldest had died in Spain), and the grandson of Maurice of Saxony, whose equivocal relations with German Protestantism we have seen in a former chapter. He was growing now into ambitious manhood. He had none of his father's diplomatic skill and sureness of judgment, but he was a far greater soldier and had worked hard at the science of war, founding his study on the Greek and Roman writers. His work was ably seconded by his cousin, William Lewis of Nassau. These two had control of the military and executive side of the action of the state. For Maurice was Stadhouder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel; while William Lewis was Stadhouder of Friesland. Thus, though the independence of the individual states was still preserved in theory, in practice real unity was given to their policy by the concentration of military power in the hands of these two men,

Olden-
barneveldt

who were united by birth and by a common aim. The position of Oldenbarneveldt is more difficult to understand. His authority was nominally confined to the single province of Holland, where he was Advocate. But his tact and skill made him the accepted representative of all the provinces in political matters, and it must always be remembered that the wealth and importance of Holland was so great that she nearly carried the rest of the provinces along with her. He seemed at one time to be almost a dictator in the land, but his power rested on persuasion, not on the authority which attached to his office.¹ Between Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice and William Lewis there was for long a close and patriotic understanding. A sense of state unity thus grew up which was of permanent importance in Europe. In 1591, and again in 1592, Maurice captured important places—Zutphen, Hulst, and Nymegen and, most important of all, Gertruidenberg. In 1596 the Cardinal Archduke Albert became Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. He was King Philip's nephew, and soon obtained permission to divest himself of his Orders and to marry the Infanta Isabel. He was a man of considerable ability, but his first experiences in the Low Countries were not encouraging. In January 1597 Maurice won a surprising victory at Turnhout, a large village in Brabant. The Spanish commander tried to withdraw his army on the approach of the forces of Prince Maurice. But as the Spaniards were approaching a narrow defile they were attacked by the enemy cavalry, consisting of native and of English horse. A panic took place and the Spanish force was almost annihilated.

Battle of
Turnhout

The battle was not in any way decisive of the fate of the Netherlands. There were ten years of fighting yet before them. But it was a sign that the old predominance of the Spanish arms was passing away. The long strain of the war was producing its effect, and Spain could no longer find the requisite troops to replace her veterans. The next year saw the Peace of Vervins and the death of Philip. We must postpone to a later chapter an examination of the fate and development of the free Netherlands.

¹ "All here is directed by Holland, and Holland is carried away by Barneveldt, whose resolutions are full of self-will" (Bodley to Burleigh, 1599), (quoted by Motlev).

CHAPTER XX

SETTLEMENT OF FRANCE UNDER HENRY IV

(1) THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SETTLEMENT

THE religious settlement of France was part of a great movement for social and political reconstruction, which is the great glory of Henry's name, and which has been compared to the work done by Napoleon after his assumption of personal power. The country was much in need of both rest and change. For thirty years there had been nearly everywhere a sense of insecurity. Inevitably, therefore, commerce had languished and agriculture had suffered. In some parts there was complete catastrophe. The cultivation of the fields was abandoned and villages were deserted. Even in 1562 de la Boétie saw everywhere "murders, robberies, arson, plunderings, armed gatherings, and an infinity of pitiable sights unknown to our fathers and improper in a quiet and flourishing state. Wherever we look we see nothing but extreme desolation and the scattered limbs of a dismembered republic." Since then, things had nearly everywhere gone from bad to worse. To find a condition of society so miserable in France, it was necessary to go back to the worst periods of the Hundred Years' War.

Miserable
condition
of France

All classes were impoverished by the civil wars and the decrease in the purchasing power of money which is a common feature of the time. Both clergy and nobility had been exhausted by the expenses of the wars. When peace had come and a large number of soldiers were disbanded, they could find no honest work and in many cases took to highway robbery. Captain Guillery was the leader of a band of robbers. He terrorized the neighbourhood of Brittany and Poitou, and it took a force of nearly 5000 men to storm and take his

Social
disorder

stronghold. There were other bandit chiefs, only a little less notorious than he. All financial burdens fell more heavily on the peasantry than on any other class, and they suffered terribly from famine, from extortion, and from disease. The absence of popular revolutionary movements during the civil wars has already been commented on ; but there was suffering and protest which might easily have assumed dangerous shapes. There had been peasant movements in Dauphiné in 1580 ; Normandy had seen the Gauthiers (insurgent peasants) in 1590 ; but the most serious movement was in the south-west of France—in Quercy, Agenois, and Saintonge—in 1594. Twenty thousand peasants gathered near Bergerac and shouted for Liberty and the Third Estate. The movement was not strong enough, or the monarchy was too strong, to allow of the outbreak of a real Peasants' War ; and the movement was against the nobles rather than the King. The era of statistics had not yet come ; but all goes to show how severely France suffered from poverty and disorder. Had a man slept forty years, says a contemporary, he would think on waking that he saw, not France, but rather her corpse.¹

The
King's
agents,
Sully

The
*Economies
Royales*

Henry had useful servants ; chief among them were the Duke of Sully, Villeroy, and Jeannin. Sully was a Huguenot by birth, and he remained a Huguenot in spite of his master's change of faith. He had attached himself at an early date to Henry's fortunes, had followed him faithfully through failure and success, and was recognized by him as his most valuable supporter. The memoirs of Sully—the *Économies Royales*—are one of the strangest of historical documents. They were drawn up by his secretaries on his instructions, and are addressed to him in the second person. They contain much that is incorrect, much that is simply imaginary, and some direct falsifications of fact. But, when all deductions are made, they furnish us with a wonderful picture of the ideas and conditions of the time, and reveal the bizarre character of the Duke himself. He advised the King on all sorts of subjects, but his chief influence, especially towards the end of the reign, was in the domain of social and economic

¹ See Mariéjol in chap. i of vol. vi, 2, of Laviassé's *Histoire de France*.

affairs. Villeroy was the King's chief secretary for foreign affairs. His humbler origin and his allegiance to Rome often brought him into conflict with Sully. Jeannin was also of humble birth—the monarchy preferred such men for its servants—and like Villeroy, had been in the service of the Duke of Mayenne and the League. He shared with Villeroy the control of foreign affairs, under the direction of the King; for Henry allowed no one to take from himself the real control of the policy of France.

Few Kings have had characters so clear cut and so human as Henry. He had been for many years an adventurer fighting for the Crown, and the conventions and ceremonies with which he necessarily surrounded himself when he was King of France never extinguished the vital originality of Henry of Navarre. Sully gives us ten wishes which he tells us were drawn up by Henry during the "War of the Three Henrys," and they deserve reproduction. " (1) That God may be pleased to assist me during the present life and to show me mercy at the end of it. (2) That I may never lose the use of my limbs but always retain my vigour and health of body and mind. (3) That God may maintain in prosperity the religion and the party for which I have fought and risked my property and my life. (4) That He may be pleased to deliver me from my wife and to give me another of condition suitable to my birth, of gentle and compliant humour, who will love me and whom I may love, and who will give me an heir to the Crown. (5) That I may win the Crown of France and reign long and prosperously, so that I may give relief and happiness to its people. (6) That I may regain Navarre or reconquer Flanders and Artois. (7) That I may win a battle against the King of Spain; or against the Turk; and that I may equal the glory of Don John of Austria. (8) That I may destroy the separatist party among the Huguenots. (9) That I may carry out, before I die, certain magnificent designs that I have in my mind. (10) That I may reduce my enemies among the nobles to submission, especially Bouillon, Trémoille, and d'Épernon."

Henry
IV's
character

Some of these aspirations changed or disappeared as time passed, but the man they represent is clearly discernible even when he wore the Crown of France. Ambition for

himself and for France, and a solicitude for the condition of the common man; those were the qualities that France noted and admired in him. His dissatisfaction with his marriage—a political marriage if ever there was one—is already clearly apparent, and his efforts to find a new wife and to escape from the old one colour much of the policy of his later reign. His bonhomie and his humanity were genuine but superficial. He was a true representative of the Bourbon dynasty, which he established, in his preoccupation with war and military glory; even his economic reconstruction of France had for its immediate aim the provision of the sinews of war.

Political
ideas of the
King and of
France

The organization of the Government went along with the religious and economic settlement of France, and was a necessary condition of both. The miserable thirty years of intermittent civil war had been due above all to the weakness of the Government. Henry IV was taught by his experiences that France could not be governed by good intentions nor her wounds healed by soft words. That the state should be represented by the King alone, and that the King should exercise an unquestioned authority, were convictions shared by the King and his ministers. The rights of the nobility, the liberties of the towns, the privileges of the Parlements, the control of finance and policy by the representative assembly of the States-General—all these ideas had been strongly held by one or other of the parties during the war. But the sufferings of the people and the weakness of the State in consequence of their divisions had substituted for these earlier aspirations towards some aspect of liberty a general desire for peace, unity, and unquestioned authority. We shall see in a later chapter how strongly the current of thought ran in that direction; to Bodin, the greatest political thinker of the time, the one lesson of the civil wars was the need of undivided sovereignty. Sully in his *Memoires* throws aside all the early aspirations of his party. The King must reign without interference from Parlements or States-General or from assemblies of nominated "Notables."

The extension of the royal authority was the one idea that presided over the reconstruction of France. The King

will allow no real partnership in the State. He must govern France personally or by his agents ; he will admit of no protest ; he will accept no advice except such as comes from councillors appointed by himself. Such was the ideal though it had occasionally to be modified in practice.

Henry was commander-in-chief of the French armies, ^{The Royal Council} and he would have no first minister ; but the government required a large and increasing number of agents. Foremost among these was the Royal Council. It was historically the right arm of the Kings of France, and the Valois Kings had done something to develop and to organize it ; its numbers had been increased and its functions defined. Henry was rather inclined to restrict its numbers. He made a sharp distinction between the titular councillors—princes of the blood, cardinals, great nobles and other dignitaries—and the really effective administrators. These he reduced to twelve, all of them men chosen for their effectiveness in their different tasks without reference to birth. They were, of course, appointed solely by himself ; a proposal made by the Parlement of Paris that he should choose his councillors from a list drawn up by themselves was inevitably rejected. The Council did not yet receive the departmental organization which was elaborated in the next century, but it sat on different days for the consideration of different kinds of business ; as the Privy Council or *Conseil des parties* ; as the Council of State and finance ; as the Council for the direction of finances. And even this select Council of Twelve did not handle the most important business of the State. The King had also a still smaller and secret Council into which he admitted only his most trusted confidants : Sully, Sillery, Villeroy, and Jeannin.

The constitutional history of the reign shows us the power ^{Progress of the royal power} of the King and of his Council absorbing or destroying all rival authorities, both at the centre and in the provinces. Before the sceptre was safe in his hands, he had spoken smooth words about his willingness to take council with the States-General, and even to put himself “ under the protection of his people.” But as King he made no effort to carry out those promises and few, if any, desired that he should. Henceforth the calling of the States-General would only be a sign

The
Parlement
of Paris

of the weakness of the Government; and Henry gained constantly in consciousness of power. The States-General had no roots that ran back far and deep into the life and traditions of France. It was different with the Parlements, and especially with the Parlement of Paris. They were conscious of the great part they had played in building up the power of the French monarchy; their judicial activity was constant and important; the action of the Parlement of Paris had been somewhat equivocal during the civil wars, but they had rendered the monarchy a great service in protesting against any tampering with the Salic Law. In the absence of all other avenues through which even the murmur of public opinion could make itself heard, this body of lawyers, who owed their offices in nearly all cases to purchase, felt themselves to be almost the representatives of the people.

The
Paulette

Henry had encountered their opposition and knew that their administration of justice was often oppressive and corrupt. But he never dreamed of destroying or seriously undermining their authority. They were necessary, for they were the chief support of the monarchy against the claims of nobles and ecclesiastics. It is strange that he did not reform these great Courts, for in them a second nobility—the nobility of the gown—had their seat of strength. The future was to show that these successful servants of the Crown—like another prætorian guard—were to become a real danger to it. But not only did Henry not reform the Parlements; he introduced, or accepted, a change which increased their independence and made them both more corrupt and a greater danger to the Crown. For in 1604 he introduced the system which is known from the name of an obscure agent as “La Paulette.” Already the members of the Parlements held their offices by purchase and could sell them with little restriction. But now these restrictions on sale were removed, and if a member died without having disposed of his office, it became the free property of his widow or heir. The Parliamentarians thus became independent and hereditary, and royal control was reduced almost to nothing. In return the King obtained annually the sixtieth part of the value of the office according to an official estimate. He drew

from this source a considerable sum of money ; but the administration of justice and the royal power both received a serious blow, though the consequences to the royal power were not apparent for two generations.¹

Henry followed the same policy of royal expansion in Local government the provinces. Here the chief rivals were the power of the governors, the local Estates, the local Parlements, and the municipalities. Of the Parlements enough has already been said. With regard to the others there was no avowed declaration of any new policy, but the King's authority increased and that of all others waned. The Governors had gained almost independent power during the wars (especially Damville, the great "*politique*"), and some had ventured even to ask that their post should be made permanent. The King showed no such inclination. He reduced the functions of the Governors to purely military administration, and appointed agents of his own to exercise authority independently of the Governor. The day of the *intendants* was clearly approaching, though their name does not yet occur. The local and provincial Estates were not swept away, and some lasted down to the Revolution of 1789 ; but royal officials (strangely named *elus* ; for they are royal nominees, not elected at all) tended to override them especially for finance. Twice the King told the representatives of the Estates " your most valuable privilege is the favour of your King."

The ambitions of the towns and cities of France towards Municipal life a real communal independence had been a marked feature of the civil wars and had increased during their course. But until the nineteenth century no strong ruler has ever willingly accepted the self-government of powerful cities. Henry began the process which culminated in the total ruin of French municipal liberties in the reign of Louis XIV. He extracted money from them ; he limited their power of electing their

¹ That the King knew the character of his Parlements is plain from an address to the Parlement of Bordeaux in 1606, when it tried to refuse the registration of a finance decree. " You tell me that my people is oppressed ; who oppresses them except you and your company. Ah ! what an evil company ! Does any one ever gain his suit at Bordeaux except the man who has the longest purse ? All my Parlements are worthless, but you are the worst of all. The vine of every peasant belongs to the first president or to a councillor. A man only has to become councillor and he is rich at once."

magistrates ; he transferred many duties from municipal to royal officials.

Henry IV was not a tyrant ; his constant declaration that he desired the relief of his people was sincere. But the events of the past half-century had made men value efficiency and order above liberty, and Henry's action had probably the support of the majority of Frenchmen. If Henry could have seen the need for maintaining and increasing the liberties of the people, as well as the strength of the Crown of France, he would have been a consummate political genius, and not merely a great and popular King.

Governors and Estates, lawyers and Parlements were possible rather than actual enemies ; political lights which were to disappear now that the royal sun began to shine in its splendour. But Henry knew that the monarchy had a real enemy, and that that enemy was the nobility of France. The rivalries of the different noble families and their intrigues with and against the King, occupied much of his attention and fill up a large part of the memoirs of the time. It is here only necessary to note the chief results.

Henry IV's
second
marriage

Henry's marriage with Margaret de Valois had been from the first an arrangement of policy. No children had been born, and the royal pair had lived separate lives for many years. The King had for long thought of a divorce and a new marriage. He had hoped to marry his mistress, Gabrielle d'Estrées, and might have carried out his intention, but for her sudden death in 1599. Shortly afterwards the Pope annulled his marriage with Margaret, and Henry married Marie de Médicis, a distant relative of the famous Catherine. A son was born in 1601, and the line of succession assured. The birth of the Dauphin, however, stimulated rather than suppressed the aristocratic conspiracies. Henry lived amidst plots and intrigues. His life is said to have been attempted twelve times. His new marriage had not in any way altered the character of his domestic life. A new mistress, Henriette d'Entragues, herself played a part in the most important movement against his power.

Marshal
Biron

The chief rebel was Marshal Biron. He had followed most faithfully the fortunes of Henry of Navarre, and when his leader became King of France he was rewarded by the

title of Marshal and a Duchy, and was made Governor of Burgundy. It seems amazing that he should not have been satisfied. It was not religion that urged him on; he had passed from one communion to the other, and was said to make a parade of atheism. He was willing, however, to play the part of leader of the Catholics, and his vanity was played on by the Duke of Savoy and even by Philip of Spain, both of whom proposed to him princely marriages as the reward for his successful help. We need not follow the details of the plot, for nothing came of it. He was betrayed by his associates. He had promised, it was said, to bring the King within reach of assassination; but when the King summoned him to Court he came, was arrested, and after a trial before the Parlement of Paris was condemned and executed. He and his father had done as much as any one to win the Crown for the Huguenot leader, and his death provoked amazement and sympathy. His fall is chiefly interesting as showing the dangerous cross-currents that were agitating the religious and political life of France. There were other plots, especially one connected with the Duc de Bouillon; but the King managed to beat them all down.

The first necessity for France was a strong Government; the religious peace depended on that. Still more clearly the first condition of an economic revival was a Government which would maintain order, suppress brigandage, and give men of peace a chance of following their occupations. But more was wanted than the mere cessation of disorder. The sufferings of France during the civil war had been so great that it would require all the energy of her Government to place her on the road to prosperity. And one great mark of the regime of Henry IV is precisely this attention to the economic wants of France. Perhaps for the first time since the confusion of the Roman Empire, a great European State turned its attention to the condition of the people and considered how best it might be alleviated. "The relief of his people"—the phrase so often in the mouth of the King, was no mere hypocrisy; but more money in the coffers of the State, and therefore more wealth in the country, was necessary if the King of France was to play the great rôle in Europe

The
economic
reconstruc-
tion of
France

Sully

of which he continually dreamed. It is difficult, and indeed impossible, exactly to divide the credit for what was done. Nothing in France could be done without the approval of Henry, and little without his personal participation. But he was ably seconded by the strong will, the unyielding character, and the prodigious capacity for hard work possessed by his finance minister, Sully. Sully was vain and boastful; his memoirs are full of inaccuracies and worse; he made himself strangely rich, and has not escaped suspicion of corruption. But Henry recognized, and history has recognized, that the chief part of the work required to cleanse the accumulated confusion and corruption of the finances of France fell on his shoulders. The age of political economy had not come, and Sully was no theorist; but sometimes in opposition to the personal wishes of the King, and rarely supported by popular approval, he pushed on with his task, and at the end of the reign France found herself solvent, and—if peace could have been preserved—well on the road to prosperity. His aim was, without any material alteration in the machine of government, to make it work efficiently and honestly; to punish the worst agents of oppression and corruption; to encourage commerce by making the roads secure and improving them; and to find new sources of wealth. Neither he nor his master dreamed that to accomplish this it would be necessary to take the people or any section of them into effective partnership.

The taxes
of France

The system of taxation in France was widely different from that of England. The weight of State taxes upon the common man was much greater; the regime of privilege much more marked; and the sale of office much more frequent and important. There was no elected Parliament to criticize or control; no use was made of the landed gentry as agents of administration. The French Crown acted everywhere either through its own nominated agents or through the detested *partisans*—financiers, that is, to whom, singly or in groups, the Government sold the right of collecting the taxes or other debts to the State. The great source of revenue was the *tailles*—taxes varying slightly in character, but all taxes on the land or houses of the unprivileged classes. From this source came half the normal revenue of the State. Next

came the *gabelle*, the State monopoly of the sale of salt, which touched only the unprivileged. Then there were the aides—Customs and Excise to which the privileged classes paid something. But the *taille* balanced all the rest of the revenues together.

Sully did not propose—no one proposed—to abolish the ^{Privilege} system of privilege. The common man hardly found a ^{maintained} representative even in the States-General when they met. Sully scrutinized and reduced the list of the privileged, but he did not entirely abandon the sale of patents of privilege. His chief effort was to secure honesty and efficiency. He was concerned also to reduce the immense burden of the debt, and a series of financial measures gave some hope of liberation from it by the end of the reign. When Henry was assassinated, the State was in the possession of considerable funds; the long era of bankruptcy was over.

Sully was head of the administration of the roads, and ^{Roads and} these were wonderfully improved; they had been impassable ^{agriculture} in some parts of France at the end of the civil wars. Bridges were built, and a beginning was made of canals. But was agriculture the only possible source of the wealth of France? The Netherlands and Italy were manufacturing states; might not France also manufacture? Henry was determined that France should imitate her neighbours; Sully followed with hesitation. Agriculture was for him the one healthy and honest occupation. He distrusted the effect of sedentary occupations on the physique and military efficiency of the population.

Two Huguenots—Olivier de Serres and Barthélemy ^{The silk} Laffemas—were foremost in suggesting improvements in ^{industry} agriculture. The great aim of de Serres was to spread the culture of the silk worm, already known in the south of France, and to found the silk industry. He was also concerned with Laffemas in the advancement of agriculture, and published in 1600 a book called *The Theatre of Agriculture and the Management of Land*, which was both a technical treatise on agriculture, and a prose poem in praise of the simple life of the country in contrast to the luxury of the cities. It owes something to both Xenophon and Virgil, and corresponded so closely to the tastes and aims of the

King that it was much recommended by him. In 1601 the King established a Commission, to which some of the most important men in France were summoned, to consider the whole question of commerce and manufacture, trade and industry, the control of the means of livelihood, and the facilities of commerce both at home and abroad. Various proposals were made, some of them absurd ; but one inventor offered something which seems to have been a spinning machine.

The guild
system

On the whole, outside of the all-important economies and organization introduced by Sully, not much of permanent importance was done. The silk industry was extended especially into Poitou. Various manufactures, especially of articles of luxury, were introduced from abroad ; gold thread, and glass, as well as silk. Greater individual liberty would have enabled the merchants and workmen of France to take advantage of the new openings of the age ; but all the current of the age in France was setting against liberty. The guild system was maintained and enlarged. This, like everything else in France, had fallen into some disorder during the late troubles, and many trades had shaken themselves in practice free of guild control. By an edict of April 1597 Henry deplored the harm done by the jealousy of merchants and their refusal to admit workmen into the guilds except after long delay and with much expense. To advance, therefore, "*le bien et soulagement de notre peuple,*" Henry gave orders that admission to the guilds should be more expeditious and cheaper, and that tradesmen and artisans should be admitted without preliminary "examination" ; but there was to be no trade or industry practised without membership of a guild ; and the King did not disguise the fact that the payments made to the King for the privilege of entering a guild were among the most important considerations with him.

If peace had been maintained, all this might have been the beginning of a new economic life for France. But at the time of his death Henry was about to enter on what might have become a great European war ; and after his death France had little peace at home or abroad for fifty years. The work of Sully and his collaborators had to be taken up by Colbert at the beginning of the of Louis XIV—to

be swept away, as Sully's work was, by the strain and confusion of war.

(2) THE RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT

The French armies had repulsed the Spanish effort to conquer France, and they had prepared the way for the supremacy of France in Europe during the seventeenth century. But for the greater part of that century, France enjoyed a better claim to the leadership of Europe than her military strength. She came nearer than any other state in Europe to a settlement of the religious controversy on a basis of liberty; though the liberty that she gave was at its best far from complete. And here, too, Henry IV laid the foundation for the greatness of Richelieu and the early part of the reign of Louis XIV. The pity and the tragedy of it was that the great work was so little understood and appreciated. What was really a great advance towards a better social and religious order was regarded as a regrettable concession to necessity. No considerable religious group in Europe could be found which was ready to accept liberty as a basis of the religious life.

To understand the form which the measure took in France, and the reason why it was adopted, we must go back a little. On six different occasions the civil wars of France had been terminated by a religious peace. The general character of all these settlements was the same, though the Peace of Monsieur in 1576 was far the most complete and logical. The Huguenots were permitted to worship after their manner under certain restrictions and conditions; special religious privileges were given to the households of the aristocracy; certain towns were set aside throughout France for the holding of Huguenot services; they were defended by special legal and military arrangements against any breach of the act. This type of settlement was introduced by Catherine de Médicis and L'Hôpital, her minister; in its main features it was accepted by Henry IV and incorporated in the famous Edict of Nantes. No essentially new idea is to be found in that edict. What was new was the careful working out of

Religious
liberty in
France

Earlier
religious
edicts

practical details, and above all the existence of a really strong Government pledged to support and enforce the terms of the settlement.

Henry of
Navarre's
religion

Henry of Navarre had never repudiated as absurd the idea that he might under certain circumstances accept instruction in the Catholic faith, but he had refused to yield "with the dagger at his throat." It was his wish to conquer the throne of France without making any concessions. If he had mounted the throne as a Huguenot, he would probably have reconsidered his religious position with a free mind. For it is plain that his attachment to the faith of Calvin was traditional and superficial. On nothing did the Huguenots insist more than on the discipline of life after the fashion of the later English Puritans. Henry never accepted this discipline; his life was a scandal in the eyes of the leaders of the Huguenots, and he chafed under their censure; nor can we believe that the dogmas of Calvin's theology had more hold on his mind. He was in his outlook on religion a "politique" rather than a Huguenot; he thought rather of the social and political consequences of religion than of its abstract truth.

The States-
General of
the League

It was after Parma's relief of the last siege of Paris that ideas of some religious concession began to take more definite shape. The States-General of the League were sitting in Paris. The agents of Rome and Spain were urging the adoption of a King who would secure the triumph of the faith without regarding the tradition and sentiment of the nation. They declared that the Salic Law was an absurdity. All this roused the bitter opposition of the lawyers in the Parlement of Paris, and certainly offended a vast number even of the sincerely Catholic population of the country. The time had come when a move from the side of Henry was likely to be met by a great corresponding move from the other side.

Mayenne

The Duke of Mayenne himself, uneasy as to the designs of Spain on the Crown of France, had issued a declaration full of Catholic zeal but full also of devotion to the traditions of France, and had ended by calling to Paris an assembly of "prelates, lords, and deputies of the Parlements and towns" adhering to the Catholic League to consider the

measures best adapted to the preservation of religion and of the State. It seemed just the opening that Henry IV required. The suggestion was at once made by the Council of the King that deputies from both sides should meet together to see if some common ground could not be found on which all might co-operate in the healing of the manifold woes of France. The invitation could not be refused, and Surène was chosen as lying midway between Saint Denis, the headquarters of the King, and Paris, where the Catholic League held sway. There were thirteen spokesmen for the League and eight for the King. They had, of course, no power to decide, but only to report to the States-General, which were being held at Paris. An armistice was declared. There was a general feeling that great events were preparing. Ten meetings were held between April 29 and June 11, 1598. The Archbishop of Bourges was the chief spokesman for the King, and the Archbishop of Lyons for the League. The misery of France and the need of a speedy remedy were insisted on by both parties. But while the Archbishop of Lyons dwelt on the fatal effects of heresy and stressed the characteristic view of the sixteenth century "that no national unity can exist without religious uniformity," and that the Pope was the only authority on matters of faith and must decide on the *bona fides* of conversion, the Archbishop of Bourges, on behalf of the King, insisted on the absolute duty of obedience even to heretical Kings; declared that the King's heresy was slight and almost formal; and, while declaring his loyalty to the Papal See, deplored its subserviency to Spain and strongly maintained the separate privileges and powers of the Gallican Church. Before the end of the sittings the imminence of Henry's conversion was an open secret. Even the Archbishop of Lyons welcomed it, but insisted on the need of Papal approval before it was valid.

The King had made up his mind. He had written to his mistress, Gabrielle d'Estrées, that he was preparing to make "the perilous plunge." He declared himself ready to receive instruction, and on the 23rd of July he met the friendly Prelate of Bourges and four other Bishops. He refused to sign a document condemning in detail the doctrine

Conversion
of King
Henry IV

of the Reformers, but formally acquiesced in the Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church, and promised obedience to the Pope. On Sunday, July 25, he was admitted into the Cathedral of Saint Denis, where he handed in his signed confession of faith to the Archbishop, was heard in confession, and knelt at the celebration of High Mass. The great thing had happened; the King of France was a Catholic. His coronation soon followed; not at Reims, the traditional place for the crowning of French Kings, for that was dangerously near to the Spanish armies; but in the glorious Cathedral of Chartres. There the ceremony took place, with all the elaborate details prescribed by tradition. Henry took, too, the traditional oath, promising to rule peacefully, justly, and mercifully; promising also "from my country and from all my jurisdiction I will honestly and with all my powers try to exterminate the heretics denounced by the Church." The word "exterminate" (the oath was in Latin) means, indeed, literally to banish rather than to slay, but the words must have added to the apprehensions of his old Huguenot supporters.

Different
views of
the King's
action

Opinion on the Huguenot side had been generally opposed to the King's all-important step. To the ministers and to those who with sincerity accepted the teaching of Calvin, the King was rejecting the truth, which alone ensured salvation, and was adopting a heresy dangerous in this world and destructive beyond all powers of exaggeration in the next. They could not sympathize with his half beliefs and his acceptance of the claims of the political and social needs of France as superior to those of theology. The King's famous words that "Paris was well worth a Mass" would have for them no meaning. Among his Huguenot councillors, Sully alone could take the King's point of view. He never followed the King into the Roman camp, but he was far from sharing the fanaticisms of the Huguenots, and held that the one thing necessary for the appeasement of the bitterness of the factions was for both sides to get rid of the idea that the others "were destined to hell." He saw the many dangers that surrounded Henry, and laid great stress on the danger of assassination. He summed up his advice in the words: "You must yield to your enemies, or beat

them, or turn Catholic. As I belong to the Reformed Religion you must not expect me to advise you to go to Mass, but still I will tell you that it is the quickest and the easiest way to disperse in smoke all the evil designs of your enemies." We have seen, in a preceding chapter, how events justified the advice of Sully, and how France came in with relief and enthusiasm to the camp of the Catholic King.

There were, however, still many Catholics who hesitated about accepting as King an ex-heretic, whose motives for conversion were so open to suspicion. The Pope himself was of this opinion. "How can we believe in Navarre's conversion?" he is reported to have said. "It is a ruse suggested to him by Queen Elizabeth, who saved her own life by a like deception, and then when she came to the throne proved the source of all the ills and misfortunes that have fallen on the Catholics." The forces of the Roman Reaction were growing strong in France; the Jesuits, in all their many activities, were a force to be reckoned with. Assassination was a possibility that had to be taken into account. The Pope's approval would remove many of the dangers.

There were serious difficulties in the way. The influence of Spain was great at Rome, and the reconciliation of Henry IV with the Church of Rome would be a fatal blow to her hopes of triumph in France. The procedure of Henry IV, too, in the form of his abjuration, had offended the Pope; it had been carefully planned so as to emphasize the privileges of the Gallican Church, and Clement VIII clung to the increased power which Rome had gained from the Council of Trent and the Counter-Reformation. He refused at first to receive an ambassador from Henry IV, but admitted the Duke of Nevers to an unofficial negotiation. The news from France was alarming; with or without Papal absolution the whole country seemed likely to come into the power of Henry. The Duke of Mayenne and the representatives of the League urged that it was necessary for the Pope to act quickly in order to gain something for the Church out of the situation. Clement consented, therefore, to receive the representatives of France, the Abbé d'Ossat and Du Perron, Bishop of Evreux. Henry refused absolutely to

make any political concessions ; he would not hold his Crown by permission of the Pope, nor would he promise to adopt a foreign policy agreeable to the Holy See. His representatives, however, promised on the King's behalf that he would introduce the decrees of the Council of Trent into France, and that he would give the preference to Catholics in making state appointments. Then on September 17, 1595, D'Ossat and Du Perron knelt as penitents before the Papal throne, and received on their shoulders a stroke of the rod that was held in the Pope's hands, and thus did vicarious penance for the King.

**The Jesuits
in France**

The King's perilous leap had been successful. He had reached the further bank, and the results more than corresponded with his hopes ; but events in France had at one time threatened to wreck the success of his negotiations with the Pope. For there had broken out a sharp contest with the Jesuits in France. This great Order came into inevitable collision with some of the strongest tendencies in sixteenth-century France. For Nationalism was the triumphant sentiment there, and the Jesuits were wholly non-national. Their training made them servants of Rome, and made all patriotic feelings faint or difficult for them. They were powerful in the pulpit and the confessional ; but their activity as teachers provoked special opposition. The University of Paris found itself weak and poor as a result of thirty years of civil war. Now that order was restored in France the University authorities found that their work had been to some extent done by the Jesuits, who taught very well and taught gratuitously. They had been attacked by the advocate of the University shortly after the reduction of the capital, and had been denounced as teachers of immorality, disloyalty, and political assassination. The Parlement, before whom the charge was made, seemed rather favourable to the Order, for the bias of the attack was plain. But then there came an incident which altered the whole outlook. One man had already been put to death with horrible barbarity for an attempt on the life of the King. Now in December 1594 the King was wounded in the lip, as he went to the house of Gabrielle d'Estrées, by Jean Chastel. He had been a pupil of the Jesuits, and he asserted under torture

that he had been encouraged to kill the King by them. The affair was not ended by his barbarous execution; the Parlement was now more ready to consider the charges against the Jesuits. All members of the society were banished from France and from Paris as "corruptors of the young, disturbers of public order, and enemies of the King and of the state." The edict was never completely carried out, for the Jesuits were protected by some of the provincial Parlements. The King did his best to remove the impression, inevitably produced in Rome by the news, and in the end the Papal absolution followed without much delay.

The King had thus established good relations with his new ^{The} co-religionaries; but in doing so he had roused the suspicions ^{Huguenots} of his old comrades in arms and in worship. The settlement ^{and the} with them proved even more difficult than that with the Pope. The Huguenots had often been beaten, but they had never been crushed. Henry might perhaps have beaten them to a surrender when he had made peace with Spain; but it would have torn the state in pieces again, and certainly he never thought of it. It was necessary for him as head of a Catholic state to treat with them as with an enemy still under arms.

The Huguenots developed and strengthened their organ-^{The Edict} ization. France was divided into nine provinces; deputies ^{of Nantes} from all of them were to meet together every year in a General Assembly to consider the interests of the Protestant Church in France. This assembly met at Loudun in 1596 and sat—though not always in the same place—for nearly two years. They negotiated with the Crown almost on terms of equality. Their action, during the war with Spain, showed something like mutiny if not rebellion. Some Huguenot leaders deserted Henry at La Fère, and others refused to serve at Amiens. The edict of religious pacification, which was signed at Nantes, was the result of negotiation with both Huguenots and Catholics. Almost at the last moment serious changes were introduced owing to the protests of the Catholics and of Parlement. The long document bears many signs of compromise and contest; it has none of the logical clearness of the Peace of Monsieur of 1576; but it was put forward with the fixed intention that it should be

enforced, which cannot be said of the earlier document. The Edict of Nantes (signed April 13, 1598)¹ consists of three or more strictly of four documents. There is first the main edict of ninety-two articles. This is followed by fifty-six more articles which are called "secrets et particuliers," but which were in fact publicly registered. Then there came later two commissions (*brevets*) given under the King's hand but not registered publicly. These last documents dealt with the military guarantees. The first edict opens with a defence of the delay in producing it, which it explains by the paramount necessity of bringing the war to an end; it goes on to declare that, as religious unity in the state is *not yet* possible, it is necessary to safeguard the consciences and the property of those of the "so-called reformed religion": this was the official title of the Huguenots.

Protes-
tant
worship

Protestant services may be held—(a) in the houses of the nobility with variations in the number of attendants according to the rank of the nobles; (b) in all places where it was held in 1596, 1597, and in 1577; and (c) further, in each administrative division of France (*bailliages* and *sénéchaussées*) in two places to be chosen for that purpose.²

Guaran-
tees for
justice

Elaborate arrangements were made to ensure the fair administration of justice. These occupy a great part of the edict, and take the form principally of Courts on which both Catholic and Huguenot judges have a seat; these varied from place to place, and were generally spoken of as the divided Courts (*chambres mi-parties*).

Civil
equality

Civil equality was promised. Huguenots were to have equal rights with Catholics in schools and colleges and universities, in hospitals and almshouses; they were to be equally admissible to all guilds and employments under the Crown, or the nobles, or the towns; all professions were to be open to them.

Self-
govern-
ment for
Hugue-
nots

The edict is obscure on the question of the right of the Huguenots to self-government and the management of their

¹ There is no importance in the name; it was merely an accident that it was signed while the King was on the way to the settlement of the affairs of Brittany.

² At first it was one town in each division; but in the "secret" articles the number was raised to two.

own affairs. Clause 82 forbids all assemblies and councils and military organizations except by permission of the King. A special clause in the secret articles allows "consistories, colloquies, and national and provincial synods," but here, too, on the protest of the Roman clergy of France, the words were added "by the permission of his majesty," which went far to annul the whole clause.

In his private "commissions" above alluded to the King gave the Huguenots permission to maintain their own garrisons in nearly a hundred "places of surety," and among them were Montpellier, Montauban, and La Rochelle.¹

Henry needed all his authority and strength of will, all his bonhomie and tact, to procure the acceptance of this edict by the Parlements of France, whose registration was necessary to its validity. The King might have enforced registration by a Bed of Justice,² but he wished for at any rate the appearance of consent. He called the Parlement of Paris to meet him privately at the Louvre, and nowhere do we catch more authentically the accent and temper of the King of Navarre than in the address that he made to them there. He was successful both in Paris and the provinces. The edict became part of the public law of France. It was declared to be "perpetual and irrevocable."

It was a much more glorious achievement than contemporaries recognized, and marks an epoch in the history of civilization. France first, among the nations of Western Europe, admitted the possibility of more than one religious communion within the same state. The assumption everywhere else is that unity of religion is the great guarantee for the unity of the state. Everywhere else the state chose its faith and enforced its observance to the exclusion of all others. No variation of religion was allowed in the states of Germany; and, if the Peace of Augsburg led in practice

¹ This point came to be of such importance that it may be well to note the exact form in which the grant was made. In a *Brevet* of April 30, 1598, Henry allows the Huguenots to maintain garrisons "in all towns and castles which they held up to the end of August last" for the space of eight years. At the end of the eight years the Huguenot Governor is to be maintained, if a garrison is still kept. The *Brevet* ends with the statement that His Majesty wishes it to have the same effect "as if the contents were contained in an edict ratified by the courts of Parlement."

² A Bed of Justice was a meeting of Parlement in the presence of the King, which conditions immediate registration was obligatory.

to a considerable alleviation of the pressure of uniformity, that was due to circumstances rather than to the intention of the Act. In England, in Scotland, and in Scandinavia, as well as in Spain, Italy, and the dominions of Austria, the worship of the state, even if it were the worship of the minority, was enforced to the exclusion of all others. It was only in France that a form of religion, repudiated by the head of the state and detested by the legal organizations and the majority of the population, had a clear legal right to live and to manage its own affairs.

Success of
the edict

The experiment was as brilliantly successful as it was novel. The great century of French history begins from the end of the sixteenth century. Many concurrent causes help to explain the rise of France to a sort of primacy in Europe ; but among them the freedom allowed to the Huguenots cannot be overlooked. The Huguenots contributed more than their proportion to the development of French commerce and colonial enterprise. While they were well treated, France naturally drew to herself the alliance of the Protestant powers of Europe. Nor was the air of freedom less favourable to the Roman Church in France, which now entered on its most glorious period. Bossuet and Pascal, Fénelon and Bourdaloue were stimulated by the presence of rivals and critics ; and the end of Protestant liberties was the end also of Gallican brilliance.

Instability
of the
edict

Yet the edict was from the first unstable. It was not supported—even on the Protestant side—by any reasoned or strong belief in religious toleration. The preamble of the edict declared that it was a regrettable necessity ; and its Catholic opponents never laid down their arms or ceased from efforts to procure its withdrawal. It conflicted with the tendency to monarchical uniformity and centralization which was so strong in France, and it seemed a cause of weakness and almost an insult to the monarchy that suffered it. We must admit, too, that in its first shape, it was a real and serious danger to the monarchy. The monarchy had broken the power of the old feudal nobility ; but here was a new nobility more dangerous to the unity of the state than the old had been. The Huguenots possessed nearly a hundred towns, and the nobles had a complete control over their

forces. If it is true that the Huguenot nobles could raise 25,000 soldiers,¹ while the royal forces in time of peace only amounted to 10,000, it is clear that the French monarchy was confronted by a challenge of the most dangerous kind. The past showed instances enough of the way in which those nobles were likely to use their power. In the near future it would require the iron will and the organizing genius of Richelieu to cope with it. It is doubtful whether the Protestants of France gained or suffered more from their aristocratic champions.

¹ Lavissee's *Histoire de France*, vol. vi, by Mariéjol, p. 419.

CHAPTER XXI

THE END OF THE CENTURY: GERMANY,
FRANCE AND SPAIN

Germany
in the
sixteenth
century

THE development of Germany seems at first sight to run directly counter to the general tendencies of western Europe towards concentration of power in the hands of the monarchy. In Germany we see disruption. "France draws together, while Germany falls in pieces" is the title of a map in a German historical atlas. This contrast, however, between Germany and the rest of Europe is rather superficial than fundamental. The Empire, indeed, broke down in the Peace of Augsburg; and, as the sequel was to show, its ruin was irretrievable. But the Empire had been for two centuries a memory rather than an efficient reality; the realities of the political life of Germany were to be found in the estates of the electors and princes; and in these there was as clear a tendency to concentration and administrative unity as elsewhere in Europe.

Changes of
trade routes
in Germany

Germany had been very much influenced by the discovery of the new world and the new trade routes to the East. Her commerce had depended largely on the roads through Switzerland into Italy, and by the south of France into Spain and Portugal. As these lost importance the trade of Germany was seriously threatened. And she showed no power of adapting herself to the new conditions. There seemed, indeed, no reason why Hamburg and the cities of the north coast should not have their share of the new trade. Amsterdam and the Dutch were growing rich with it; and their situation was not much better, while they were continually harassed by the war against Spain. The Hanseatic League in the past had led the way in the building of a new type of ship for ocean travel. But nothing of the sort hap-

pened now. The days of the Hansa were nearly over. The German traders were expelled from London in 1598; a shadow of the Hanseatic League endured until the middle of the next century, but the days of its activity were past. One line of commerce after another fell from the hands of the German traders. Their Swedish rivals took from them even the trade of the Baltic. With the decay of trade the great cities of Germany decayed also. They had grown great on the trade between Italy and the rest of Europe, and on the Baltic trade of the Hansa. Poverty threatened them now. Money became scarce in Germany. It was debased and clipped, and the character of the supply of coins was regarded as one great cause of the distress of the country.¹

The economical changes brought no improvement in the condition of the peasantry. There were no more serious Peasants' Wars. The forced labour of the peasants was insisted on with greater strictness; we read of a working day of sixteen hours. They were bound to the soil and could not travel to better their condition. Where they possessed holdings of their own, they were often forced to sell. The influence of Roman law worked against them, for it tended to regard them as equal in condition to the slaves of the ancient Roman Empire.

The power that was lost by the Empire at the head and by the cities lower down in the political hierarchy went to the increase of the power of the territorial princes. This was especially true of the most powerful—of Austria and Brandenburg, and Saxony and the Palatinate—but it applied as a general rule to all the territorial chiefs of Germany. Something like what was happening in France, Spain, England, and the Italian states might be observed there. The central authority was rapidly gaining in power; it was beginning to employ, not nobles, whose position was feudal and almost hereditary, but trained officials and lawyers usually drawn from a lower social station. It was jealous of all outside interference and especially of appeals from its own to any

¹ Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, bk. xvi, ch. i, traces many of the outstanding features in the development of Germany to the lack of money and the consequent substitution of *Naturalwirtschaft* for the former flourishing *Geldwirtschaft*.

Imperial Court ; it undertook the control of every part of the state. The coming of the Reformation had brought it, as a rule, a great increase of property, for the greater part of the confiscations of Church property had fallen to the secular head of the state ; and it had also brought a great increase of duties, for the supervision of many sides of life, which had once belonged to the Church, now fell into the hands of the secular state. It is not probable that these spiritual duties were well done, but they were recognized as falling within the competence of the secular power. Medieval institutions and Estates did not disappear ; but they were rarely an important check on princely authority. We may thus see the tendencies already in existence, which later culminated in the monarchy of Frederick the Great.

Religion in
Germany

The state system of Germany, like the state system of Europe, was extremely unstable. But there was a new danger threatening in addition to that which came from the jealousies and ambitions of the princes. In Germany, as everywhere during the last half of the century, religion had a powerful influence on the action of states, and hardly anywhere did it make for peace. The Peace of Augsburg had settled nothing, and there was little expectation that it would settle anything. It was indeed chiefly a declaration that the Empire as a whole had no control over its "immediate" members, and that in religion, as in finance and in war and in jurisdiction, each state must be allowed to go its own way. It is certainly true of the Peace of Augsburg, as it was true of the Edict of Nantes, that it represented no real reconciliation of spirit. If religious opponents were tolerated, that was the result of necessity or of the policy of individual princes ; those who had caught a glimpse of religious liberty in Germany were even fewer than in France. There was no protection at all for the individual ; the right of emigration was the nearest approach to it. And the Peace of Augsburg definitely contained the seeds of future controversies and wars. The most dangerous points were these : (1) The Peace only recognized two forms of religion ; the Roman Church and Lutheranism. Calvinism was given no legal sanction, and the chief energy of Protestantism in Germany was henceforth to be found precisely in the

Calvinist churches. (2) If any Governments became Protestant in the future, were they to be allowed to lay hands on the property of the Roman Catholic Church within their borders? The question was sure to be a difficult one. (3) Then there was clause 18 which stipulated that if an ecclesiastic abandoned "the old religion," he must renounce also the "income and revenues which he had so far possessed." The extent and importance of the ecclesiastical states in Germany made this clause a very important one, and the Protestants had, from the first, protested against it. Thus the religious schism that began with the action of Luther still generated passions strong enough, and attacked interests important enough to breed another and a greater war.

The situation grew rapidly worse after 1555. At first the flowing tide was with the Protestants. Considerable concessions were made to Lutheran opinion even in states in communion with Rome; the marriage of priests was often allowed, and the cup was given to the laity in the communion. But a great antagonist was rising up against Protestantism in all its forms. The Counter-Reformation, represented especially by the capable and devoted agents of the Jesuit Order and supported by the decisions, which were being arrived at by the Council of Trent, was gaining ground rapidly, and on the Roman side was turning indifference into enthusiasm. If Lutheranism had been the sole representative of Protestant ideas, it could hardly have escaped destruction; so clearly did the aggressive pass to the Roman side. But, if the sword fell from the nerveless hands of the Lutherans, the Calvinists were ready to take it up. Their hostility to Rome was much keener; their ideas on theology and church government more definite; their organization much better. These new Protestant ideas soon rooted themselves in many states which had no idea of conciliation or surrender. But Calvinism brought not only a keener and more aggressive spirit into the ranks of the Protestants of Germany; it introduced also a sharp and bitter division among them. Few spectacles are more remarkable during the century than the furious controversy that broke out between the Lutherans and the Calvinists during its second half. The contest raged chiefly round

the doctrine of justification by faith and the meaning of the Eucharist. Writers and preachers were found who maintained that "good works were positively detrimental to salvation"; and a leader of the new thought was denounced as "Anti-Christ." Melancthon had worked all his life for peace and unity in religion; he saw with amazement the new flood of bitter religious strife pour over the country, and said that he welcomed death as a means of deliverance "from the monstrous and implacable hatreds of the theologians." For a few years after the Peace of Augsburg the tide seemed to flow strongly in favour of Protestantism. The condition of the Austrian lands was, from the Catholic and Imperial standpoint, deplorable. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Tirol were reported to be generally hostile to the Imperial connection and the Catholic faith. The churches were empty, candidates for the priesthood difficult to find. A complete overthrow of the Roman Church in Germany seemed by no means impossible at the accession of Ferdinand II.

The
coming of
the Thirty
Years' War

The years from 1555 to 1618 were a period of nominal peace for Germany, except for the never-ceasing struggle against the Turks. They are usually considered as the time during which the catastrophe of the Thirty Years' War was preparing; and there are few incidents which have attracted the attention of posterity. But was that great war really inevitable? The condition of Germany was not worse than that of contemporary France. Might not a great soldier-statesman have done something for Germany analogous to what Henry of Navarre did for France? Germany wanted a great man, but none was to be found. We will cast a glance at some of the leading personalities in the chief states.

The
machinery
of the
Empire

The Emperors had no constitutional instrument by which they could control the Empire. The Diet was dilatory and ineffective. The princes disdained to attend personally, and decisions had, with endless delay, to be referred back to them. The Emperor could not even control the foreign policy of the princes. But though the Imperial authority was almost nil, the power of the head of the Habsburg House remained great. He was titular King of Hungary (in truth of only a slip of it) and of Bohemia, and he was ruler of the five duchies (Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola).

These possessions made him one of the greatest of European powers. On such a foundation a strong ruler might perhaps have built up a power capable of dominating Germany ; and it would have found a certain Imperial sentiment there ready to co-operate with it. But in the House of Habsburg no ruler of distinguished abilities or deep insight appeared, and the insanity that was hereditary in the family laid its hand upon more than one of them. Ferdinand I, the brother of Ferdinand I Charles V, was Emperor from 1556 to 1564. Both as a man and as a statesman, he has won respect. He was a sincere Catholic, upright in his private life, peaceful and humane. In spite of his Spanish origin and training he came to identify himself thoroughly with Germany, and was popular there. Yet, even during his reign, it was becoming clear that the problems of the time were not to be settled by good and kindly intentions. For, on the one side, he made concessions to the Protestants, and to the half-Protestants ; priests were allowed to marry ; the laity partook of the cup in the communion. But, on the other hand, he sympathized with the rising tide of Catholic reaction ; the Jesuits were introduced ; the decrees of the Council of Trent were supported. This was to mix, not so much oil and vinegar, as fire and gunpowder. He was succeeded by his son, Maximilian II (1564-76), a strange, enigmatic figure. No Emperor who ever sat on the throne had so much sympathy with Protestant ideas. In his youth he associated with teachers openly or secretly Lutheran ; his approaching conversion from the Roman faith was often predicted ; on his death-bed he refused the Sacraments of the Church. But on his election to the Imperial throne, he entered into friendly relations with the Pope. The advancing power of the Counter-Reformation, and the divisions among the Protestants, must have made the profession of Lutheran opinions a questionable policy. In the politico-religious disputes of his reign, he declared himself to be " of no party." He sat on the throne " as on a fence " ; but, if he refused to take sides, the German princes were doing so with fierce energy, and he did nothing at all to secure a basis of peace or order. His son, Rudolph II succeeded him (1576-1612). Under him the German world plunged rapidly towards ruin. Yet he was an interesting

man, with much knowledge and wide interests. He had a strong sense of the dignity of the Empire and of the independence of Germany. But he had not the character to enforce his will on the German confusion, nor a very strong will on any point. Melancholy and insanity marked his later years. At last, while the ship of state was visibly driving on the rocks, the captain refused to make any effort to control it.

Saxony

The Empire, then, was not going to be saved by the Emperors nor by the Imperial machinery. Were there any among the subordinate princes equal to the tasks of the time? It is impossible to find such. Saxony was still the leading Lutheran power. Augustus held the Electorate from 1553 to 1586. He was a convinced Lutheran, and became more rigid in his orthodoxy as time went on. He came into passionate collision with the Calvinist elector of the Palatinate, but he was quite unprepared to take an energetic or decisive line in the religious politics of Germany at large. Towards the end of his reign, alarmed by the rifts which had been made in Lutheran orthodoxy, he tried to bring about some union among the Protestants of Germany by supporting a *Formula of Concord*—a new and definitely Lutheran confession. But it only made the confusion among the Protestants more apparent. The Calvinists would have none of it, and there was a strong party among the Lutherans themselves who rejected it. Moreover, he was harassed during a large part of his reign by the claims of his cousin, John Frederick of the Ernestine line, which involved him in actual fighting. In German politics he pursued a policy of concession and compromise. His successors, Christian I and Christian II (1586-1611), were less severe in their orthodoxy but not more successful. Could Brandenburg take the place of Saxony? A century later, German unity and prestige was to receive a strong impulse from the House of Brandenburg, but there was no sign of it in the sixteenth century. The Elector, Joachim II, was chiefly anxious to lay hold on the important dioceses within his boundaries, especially Magdeburg and Halberstadt. He was succeeded in 1571 by John George, who ruled until 1598 and then gave place to Joachim Frederick. The rulers of Brandenburg had many

Brandenburg

serious problems to occupy them, mostly turning on the fate of the lands adjoining the Baltic. And towards the end of the century the question of the duchies on the Rhine became a matter of urgent importance. All the electors of Brandenburg pursued a dynastic, not a national, policy; but it is important to notice that Brandenburg drew nearer to the advanced Protestant party in 1608, when Calvinism was adopted by the Elector, though it never became the official faith of the people. For the immediate future there were two other states more important than Brandenburg and Saxony, though they took diametrically opposite sides in the religious controversy. First the Palatinate, which had at first been Lutheran, became definitely Calvinist under the Elector Frederick III (1559-76). It was an event of first-rate importance for both German and European history; for with Calvinism there came to the Palatinate an aggressive and missionary spirit. We have already caught sight of the Elector's son, John Casimir, as an eager champion of his co-religionists in France and the Netherlands; and the Palatinate assumed more and more the leadership of the advanced Protestant forces in Germany. The country reverted to Lutheranism for a time on the death of Frederick III in 1576, but, thanks largely to the energy of John Casimir, it was recovered to Calvinism under Frederick IV (1583-1610), and played a leading and famous part on the Protestant side in the opening phase of the Thirty Years' War. Lastly, we must glance at Bavaria, which now begins to play an important rôle in German inter-state politics. Protestantism had made much headway there, and the corruptions of the clergy of the "old religion" were an admitted scandal, but under the Dukes Albert V and William V the Counter-Reformation made great changes. Nowhere was the preaching of the Jesuits more effective. The rôle of Catholic champions in Germany fell to the Bavarian Dukes; and the politics of Germany were often a duel between the Palatinate and Bavaria. It is characteristic of the time that the great ecclesiastical states of the west—Mainz, Trèves, Cologne, Strasburg, Liège—play a much less important part in the Catholic revival than the territorial princes of Bavaria.

The main interest of German history after 1555 is to see

how the causes which plunged Germany into the Thirty Years' War were maturing. The magnitude of the war was not foreseen, but it was clear that Protestantism was being challenged on the soil which gave birth to it with a directness hardly to be found elsewhere. And in presence of the attack the Protestant forces do begin to assume some kind of organization. We will note the chief incidents in the development of the two great antagonists.

The Jesuits
in Germany

Soon after the foundation of the Jesuit Order in 1540, the activity of the Jesuits in Germany became noticeable. In 1546 the Jesuit, Canisius, became attached to the theological faculty of the University of Ingolstadt, and he soon exercised a great influence on Roman Catholic opinion in Germany. The Jesuits gained also a similar power in the University of Vienna and the Habsburg lands; in 1562 there were eighty Jesuits there, and a separate "Austrian" province was added to the Jesuit organization. As teachers, preachers, confessors, missionaries, they began to exercise an immense influence on the population. In 1552 a special German college (*collegium Germanicum*) had been founded in Rome for the training of priests and laymen; its growth was rapid, and its pupils were among the chief agents in the winning of a large part of Germany back to communion with Rome. Pope Gregory XIII (1572-85) gave special attention to the work of propaganda in Germany; he established a special commission of cardinals to superintend the work in Germany, and sent Papal representatives to German towns.

Bavaria
and Rome

Bavaria was the first and always the most important centre of Roman hopes. Duke Albert was sincere in his devotion to Rome, though his religious enthusiasm by no means effaced his determination to advance the power and independence of Bavaria even against the Emperors themselves; and this conflict of religious with political aims was in the sequel to be of the first importance for Germany. He used his power to purge the churches of undesirable occupants, and to enforce the ideas of the Council of Trent.

The Rhine
bishops

The Counter-Reformation triumphed almost without opposition in Bavaria. But its advance in the cities of the Rhine encountered great difficulties. The district was of the utmost strategic importance. There was there a large

group of ecclesiastical states ; Mainz and Trèves and Cologne were the most important, for the heads of all three were Electors of the Empire ; but only a little behind them came Aachen, Osnabrück, Worms, and Speier ; and intermingled with them were the five duchies : Julich, Cleves, Mark, Berg, and Ravensburg. This district, moreover, almost controlled the passage from Germany into France and into the Netherlands, where the struggle between Spain and the revolted states was continuous. The district was Catholic, but there was a strong Protestant ferment. Nowhere did the influence of Rome seem quite assured. In Aachen the Protestants gained a majority on the Council, and demanded, and for a time obtained, liberty of worship ; their action was supported by the influx of refugees from the Netherlands.

Cologne was far more important than Aachen, and in Cologne 1577 it seemed as if Cologne was likely to turn Protestant. The See was vacant ; the chapter had many laymen, and the wishes of the city were uncertain. But the electors chose Count Gebhard Truchsess as Bishop, and he was accepted as satisfactory by the Roman authorities. Then there came a strange and grotesque turn in the situation. The new Archbishop was passionately devoted to the Countess Agnes of Mansfeld, and in 1580—under pressure from her relatives—he announced his intention of becoming Protestant and marrying the lady. The possibilities of the situation were for Rome very alarming ; since Henry VIII's passion for Anne Boleyn there had been nothing of the sort so important in European history. If the Archbishop became Protestant, would the See and its territories become Protestant too ? The Peace of Augsburg had, indeed, pronounced against just such a possibility, but the Protestants had not accepted the " ecclesiastical reservation," and there might be ways of eluding it. And if Cologne were to become a Protestant power, how serious would be the consequences ! An important passage over the Rhine delivered to the enemy ; the Protestant electors in a majority of four to three ; the consequent possibility of the capture of the machinery of the Empire by the enemies of Rome—here were the most obvious of the possible results. Rome was resolved not to yield. Parma from the Netherlands lent assistance, and the

effort of the Palatinate to rouse up resistance among the Protestants failed. In 1588 Gebhard was deposed by the Pope, and Ernest of Bavaria—a warm supporter of the Counter-Reformation—was chosen in his place. The Protestants were expelled from the Chapter, and Protestant worship was suppressed in the city and its territories. It was a great victory, and others came about the same time. The new Elector of Cologne was made Bishop of Münster and Liège. Würzburg joined the side of the reaction. Magdeburg was saved from the complete control of the Hohenzollerns. Even the Protestant Strasburg came over to the same side a few years later (1598). The Catholic victories naturally provoked plans for defence, but the first efforts ended in failure. In 1590 John Casimir of the Palatinate and Christian of Saxony actually drew up a scheme for a Protestant Union; but the death of the chief movers followed soon after and the union fell to the ground.

Counter-
Reforma-
tion in
Austria

If we turn from the West to the East, the situation was far less satisfactory for the Empire and the Roman Church. Yet there—in Bohemia, in Hungary, and in Austria—the Emperor's power was far more real than in the Empire at large. If he could have established his power on a solid foundation there, he might have hoped to defeat his opponents elsewhere. A certain measure of success was reached. In Austria and the "Five Duchies" the Counter-Reformation was carried forward to power. We have already seen what success attended the preaching and propaganda of the Jesuits there. But the non-German Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary were the real and critical difficulty. At one time there had seemed to be a chance that the Empire might control also the Kingdom of Poland. In 1575 the Emperor Maximilian had been a candidate for the Polish throne, and his election had been declared by one faction. But it could not be maintained, and Stephen Bathory became King of Poland. He was a sincere Catholic, but full of a sense of the greatness and independence of Poland, and not at all likely to be an instrument in the hands of the House of Habsburg. The hold of the Emperors on Bohemia and on Hungary was far stronger. The connection between the Habsburgs and Bohemia was of old standing, and the

Poland

Bohemia

religious history of the kingdom had left a broad mark on the history of Germany. The Lutheran movement had been greeted with much sympathy by the Bohemian Brethren and the Utraquists, who found in the new opinions much that was like their own aims, and there is no doubt that the great majority of the population was Protestant in sympathy. But the Emperor Rudolf chose Prague as his residence and support of the Catholic Revival was the strongest motive in his weak brain. The Jesuits worked for the extirpation of Protestantism. They succeeded in securing the expulsion of the Bohemian Brethren, but their task was difficult and met with strong opposition from the nobility whose power in Bohemia was really superior to that of the King. In 1609 during the struggle between Rudolf and his brother Matthias, the Emperor tried to win the support of the Bohemian people by issuing the "Letter of Majesty" which was a grant of wide religious toleration. But the religious and political tension remained and led directly up to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.

The position in Hungary was essentially the same as ^{Hungary} in Bohemia. Protestantism had made great progress both in its Lutheran and in its Calvinist form. The Magnates were as independent and as strong as the nobles of Bohemia and like them they had generally accepted Protestantism in some form. But the problem of the government of Hungary was further complicated by the ever present danger from the Turkish power and the not less serious menace from the independent nationalists in Transylvania under the leadership of Stephen Bocksay. The Turks allied themselves with the discontented elements in Hungary and in 1596 inflicted a severe defeat on the imperial armies. None the less Rudolf pursued his policy of bringing back the country to strict Catholic obedience. He issued an Edict in 1604 banishing all Protestant preachers and breaking up the organisation of the Protestant churches. The Edict was in conflict with the constitutional principles of the country and gave the greatest offence to the Magnates. They took up arms,

allied themselves with the Turks and with the nationalists of Transylvania. The imperial armies were again defeated and the whole position of the House of Hapsburg in its eastern possessions was in great danger.

A moody, solitude-loving, half-mad Emperor was no fit person to deal with so critical a situation. The whole House of Hapsburg felt its interests menaced, and a gathering of the family took place to meet the danger (1606). The brothers of the Emperor Rudolf determined to appoint Matthias to represent the interests of the House, and to deal with the problems that Rudolf seemed unwilling even to consider. It was understood, too, that Matthias would succeed his brother, Rudolf, on the Imperial throne. He was a man of no marked ability, nor did he possess any clear principles in politics, or in the handling of the religious problems. But he saw that concessions were necessary, and he posed as a sort of liberal. He and Rudolf were in decided, almost in armed, opposition. First Hungary, Austria, and Moravia were ceded to Matthias. Bohemia remained a little longer in Rudolf's nominal control. In 1611 even this had to be surrendered, when Matthias advanced on Prague with a large army. The victory of Matthias had been accompanied by religious concessions to the discontented elements in Hungary and Bohemia; partly a free grant, partly won by the threatened rising of the people. Rudolf died in 1612, and was succeeded by Matthias. These events are full of significance, and lead us to the threshold of the Thirty Years' War, but they belong rather to the subjects which will be treated in the next volume of this series.

Growing
tension
in
Germany

We must turn back now to German affairs and trace them up to the Jülich-Cleves question, which so nearly lit the fires of a great war. The temper of the contending parties was growing more and more bitter. Imperial unity and the common interests of Germany now counted for nothing. The Calvinist Palatinate continued to take the lead among the Protestants, and these had now found in Christian of Anhalt a capable and enterprising leader. He had seen service with Henry in France, as well as with the Emperor. He was a convinced Calvinist, with something of

the temper of Knox or Coligny ; and distrust of the political designs of the House of Habsburg strengthened his hostility to the Empire, which he pursued without scruple or remorse. He was ready to accept the help of France, and he was anxious to break up the political machinery of the Empire. The Protestant party withdrew from the Diet as a protest in 1608, and refused to accept the decisions of the Imperial Court (*Reichskammergericht*). A really small incident in the Imperial city of Donauwörth brought the conflict nearer. The population of the place was overwhelmingly Protestant, but the Catholic minority had gained confidence from the spread of the Catholic Reaction, and resumed the practice of religious processions. Thence came rioting and violence, and an appeal to the Emperor. Maximilian of Bavaria was charged to investigate ; and to execute the decision, which went against the Protestants. The ban of the Empire was laid upon the little city ; an armed force, under the Bavarian Duke, drove the Protestant preachers from the place and put the Catholics in possession.

Religious
riots at
Donauwörth

The whole religious settlement of Germany seemed at stake, for by similar methods Protestantism might be everywhere suppressed. The Union of Protestants, which had failed a few years before, now became an accomplished fact. In May 1608 the Union of Evangelical Estates was formed. It contained from the first the Palatinate, Würtemberg, and Neuburg ; and it was soon joined by John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg, and by Hesse-Cassel. It was to have an army and a treasury ; the Elector Palatine was to be its " Director." It bore some resemblance to the Schmalkaldic League and, like that League, meant war. A notable absentee was Saxony, which, as Lutheran and as a political moderate, held aloof.

The
Evangelical
Union

Organization on the Protestant side naturally called for something similar on the side of the opposition. The Catholic League was formed by Maximilian of Bavaria in 1609, and soon gained the co-operation of many other powers, including some of the Austrian Archdukes. The combatants thus took their places in the lists.

The
Catholic
League

The Jülich-Cleves question, which nearly brought them to

Jülich-
Cleves
question

blows, was in its essence—in spite of many intricate details—a simple one. It was a question of succession to the Duchies of Jülich, Cleves, Mark, Berg, and Ravenstein, whose ruler, the Duke John William, died in 1609 without children. But he had sisters, one of whom was the mother-in-law of John Sigismund, the Elector of Brandenburg. The other sister had married the Count of Neuburg of the Palatinate House, and their son was William of Neuburg. Both of these were at first Protestants and Lutherans.¹

This was just the sort of question that the Empire existed to settle, and the Emperor summoned both claimants to the Reichshofrath for the settlement of their claims, and in the meantime forbade them to enter on the disputed territories. But the prestige of the Empire had sunk so low that the claimants joined forces and entered on the duchies, postponing to a future occasion the settlement of their rival claims.

The
Empire
and the
claimants

So far it was a contest—to which parallels could be found in plenty—between the authority of the Catholic Empire and of the Protestant princes. But the rising tide of passion and the great importance of the territories at stake made the question of European and not merely of German interest. The duchies were a strategic centre of unrivalled value. Through them the Habsburg Emperors could join hands with the kindred power of Spain, which was securely established in the southern Netherlands; and if they were firmly held by the Catholics and Imperialists, they would effectually break an important connection between France and possible allies in Germany. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Jülich-Cleves question soon ceased to be a purely German affair, and came near to

¹ William V (*d.* 1592)

Duke of Jülich, Cleves, Berg, etc.

John William (Duke)
(*d.* 1609 without issue).

Maria Eleanora
= Albert, D. of Prussia

Anna = John Sigis-
mund, Elector of
Brandenburg.

Anna
= Philip Lewis
Count Palatine of
Neuburg

Wolfgang Wilhelm.

causing a great European war. To understand this, we must return to France and look at the international situation with the eyes of Henry IV of France.

THE FOREIGN POLICY AND DEATH OF KING HENRY IV OF FRANCE

The international situation was intricate and difficult ; but there were in Europe two great antagonisms round which the action of the states of Europe may be grouped. There was first the never-ceasing struggle of the Empire against the power of Turkey, which was the struggle of Christendom against Islam and of European civilization against the East. And then there was the rivalry between the French monarchy and the House of Habsburg established on the thrones of Spain and of the Empire. For close on two hundred years this was the mainspring of European diplomacy. And it is curious and instructive to notice that this rivalry of the Bourbons and the Habsburgs—a rivalry of powers professing the same religion and representing the same essential ideas in politics and social questions—had a far greater influence on European politics than the struggle against Turkey, which might have turned out to be a life and death struggle for all that western Europe most prized. There were certainly great interests at stake between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs—interests of power, prestige, and territory. But these interests were felt to be great because it was assumed that any strong power would use its strength to the detriment of its neighbours, and that the only road to security lay in a balance of power. And, apart from the genuine interests at stake, the relation of the two great powers had in it much of the duellists' attitude. An almost "sporting" desire to humiliate a great rival counted for much. Among the expressed wishes of Henry of Navarre was, as we have seen, the hope that "he might win a battle against Spain." The historian often looks for grave reasons of policy when what he has before him is really the result of personal and often mean human passions, and these certainly influenced Henry's action.

It will be convenient to survey the diplomatic situation

of Europe from the point of view of Henry's jealousy of Spain and Austria; but such a point of view is necessarily misleading. Each of the smaller powers had its own aims and ambitions which were to it as important as Henry's schemes to him; and some of them are full of importance for the future development of Europe.

Relations
of Spain and
"Austria"

As the King of France looked out with his shrewd eyes on Europe, what he saw most clearly was the danger of France being "encircled" by the two Habsburg powers and their allies. Spain and Austria were far indeed from being always in harmony. Philip II and Ferdinand had had their bitter quarrels; and it required much diplomacy, both secular and religious, to settle the disputes that had arisen between them later. Towards the end of the century, however, harmony had been restored. There had been much—too much—intermarriage between the two Houses. Two of the Austrian Archdukes (Ernest and the Cardinal Albert) had been appointed by Philip Governors of the Netherlands, and the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg cherished the ambition of making some arrangement by which the Netherlands should fall to them. In spite, then, of temporary quarrels, the Imperial and the Spanish Habsburgs counted as a single power. The statesmen of France feared and admired them. Richelieu, in the next generation, declared that it had been his object to make the Kings of France as absolute as those of Spain. Frenchmen complained of the haughtiness of Spanish diplomatists, but were not slow to imitate it. The idea of alliance and intermarriage with the Spanish House was constantly before the minds of French statesmen, but never availed to alter the really hostile character of their relationships.

Philip III
of Spain

Philip II had died in 1598 and was succeeded by his son, Philip III, whose mother was the daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II; the connection of the two branches of the Habsburg House was thus strengthened. Nothing was changed in the essential policy of Spain; but a weak, pleasure-loving, favourite-ridden King succeeded one who had been at anyrate tenacious of his purpose, devoted to his interpretation of duty and, towards the end of his reign, sparing in personal expense. The King was entirely ruled by

the Duke of Lerma, and the lavish expenditure of the Court contributed much to plunge Spain still deeper into financial difficulties. The Moriscos were expelled from Spain, and this sacrifice to the national and religious sentiment of the country cost Spain perhaps 500,000 of her most industrious citizens. Spain was still reckoned the strongest of European states; but her resources were really exhausted, and the future was to show how, in spite of the courage and endurance of her soldiers, and the tenacity of her statesmen, her forces had been exaggerated; she was soon visibly the "colossus stuffed with clouts" that she was called by an English observer in the reign of Elizabeth.

If we examine the eastern frontier of France, we must ^{Savoy} begin with the little state of Savoy; a little state but big with an important future. She sat astride of the Alps, commanding the all-important passes from France into Italy. We have already (in Chapter VII) traced in outline the development of Savoy, and its sudden rise to strength and importance under Emmanuel Philibert (1553-80). He had married Margaret, sister of Henry II, King of France, and his leanings were rather towards France than Spain. But there was no power in Europe which recognized more practically the instability of both friendships and enmities. His son and successor, Charles Emmanuel, married the daughter of Philip II of Spain, and paraded an enthusiasm for the Roman faith. He was a restless, active man, though without his father's remarkable abilities. He was intent on attacking Geneva, and actually did so with complete and ludicrous failure. He dreamed of a great future in Italy for his House, and some have thought that the movement for Italian unity under the House of Savoy may be dated from his reign. His relations with France are, for our purposes, the most important part of his reign. By the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis the French King had acquired the town and district of Saluzzo, which gave him a valuable gate of entry into Italy. It was a great aim of the Duke's reign to re-acquire this important place. He saw his chance in the civil wars which tore and weakened France, and intrigued indifferently with both parties. When in 1588 the war of the three Henrys seemed to threaten the disruption of French

Charles
Emmanuel
of Savoy

unity, he attacked and took Saluzzo. He dreamed of even larger gains at the expense of France, and hoped with the help of the Spanish King, his father-in-law, to carve out for himself a dominion in Provence and Dauphiné. But Spain gave little help, and when Henry IV was established on the throne of France, the transitory triumphs of Savoy in France had to be paid for. Savoy suffered cruelly in the long desultory war that followed, and only the fortresses built by Emmanuel Philibert allowed her to hold out against the overwhelming power of France. When the Treaty of Lyons was signed in 1601 the result was surprising. After all her defeats Savoy kept Saluzzo, and the solidity and defensibility of her territory was thereby much increased; but she surrendered to France the districts of Bresse, Bugey, Gex, and Valromey. In population, wealth, and extent the gains of France far outweighed Saluzzo. The ceded territories filled up the space between the Rhone and the Isère, and brought France up to the frontier of Franche Comté. They brought France, too, within striking distance of the route which Spanish troops were accustomed to take through Franche Comté to the Netherlands; and the connection of Spain with the Netherlands was a matter never long absent from the thoughts of both Spanish and French diplomatists.

France and
Spain in
Italy and
Switzerland

For France, the importance of Savoy lay in the fact that it was the entrance gate to Italy, and the bridge between Spain and the Habsburg possessions in Germany and the Netherlands. France had, for the time, abandoned the idea of winning great possessions in Italy, which had been such an obsession with her rulers at the beginning of the century, but her desire to break the connection between Spain and central Europe was as strong as ever. Now that the road through Savoy was in danger, the control of a route through Italy and Switzerland became more important than ever. (We have already noted as strange that Spain made so little use of the sea route, which took her to the Netherlands between the coasts of her enemies, France and England.) Italy was largely, though not completely, in the power of Spain. She ruled in Naples and in Milan; Genoa was so much subordinate to her that it differed little from a possession. Rome was by no means always pliable to Spanish

influence, and Venice was independent and jealous ; Tuscany, too, under the new Archduke Cosimo, was a flourishing and an independent state. But these facts did not much weaken the control of Italy by Spain. Through Genoa she reached the Milanese ; and in the Milanese she was at the entrance of more than one pass which led through Swiss territory into Germany. France and Spain were rivals for influence in Switzerland. The diplomatists of Henry IV and Philip II struggled for power there ; but the great importance of the Swiss "corridor" belongs to the next century and to the career of Richelieu.

If we return to the French frontier and follow it from Savoy northwards, we come first to Franche Comté, a Spanish possession and part of the Burgundian inheritance won by the Emperor Maximilian. The French Kings cast envious eyes upon it, but saw little prospect of acquiring it ; it was one of the most valuable and permanent acquisitions of Louis XIV. Next came Lorraine, still a part of the Empire, but practically in the power of France ; which—it will be remembered—had won Metz, Toul, and Verdun, the famous Three Bishopricks, as the price for help given to the Protestants of Germany against Charles V. The power of France in Lorraine made Alsace all the more important. There was a time when it seemed that Strasburg might throw in its lot with Protestantism—and therefore strangely with Catholic France—but the Counter-Reformation had ended that hope. The Cardinal Charles of Lorraine was Bishop, and he had as coadjutor and successor the Austrian Archduke, Leopold, cousin of the Emperor Rudolf. Henry had been pressed to interfere directly and indirectly ; the affair was as important as that of Jülich-Cleves ; but he had not done so ; that route into Germany would be barred against France for a long time to come.

North and west of Lorraine on the French frontier came the Spanish Netherlands ; which, throughout the century, had been so closely connected with the destinies of France. The history of these lands since 1597, when we last looked at them, must be very briefly summarized. The war had continued with notable victories on both sides, but no essential change in the situation. The seven states of the Union of

Utrecht showed themselves quite capable of maintaining their independence, and were winning for themselves during the war, and partly because of the war, great commercial prosperity. Their traders and explorers made their way in all directions, challenging the monopoly of Spain in east and west; the East India Company, the forerunner and model of the English company, was founded in 1602.¹ But, though Prince Maurice led the armies of the Dutch (they were mostly foreigners and largely English) with distinguished ability and success, there was not the least likelihood that the north would make considerable inroads on the separate standing of the southern provinces, which accepted with much real enthusiasm the Roman Catholic Reaction. Spain was not popular; and during the last years of the struggle there was a distinct tendency in the rulers of Spain to transfer, at least nominally, these troublesome states to the Austrian branch of the Habsburg House. In 1596 the Archduke Ernest had been succeeded as Governor by the Cardinal Archduke, Albert, brother of the Emperor Rudolf. He renounced his religious Orders and married Isabella Clara Eugenia, the daughter of Philip II of Spain. The southern provinces were declared an independent state, but the influence of Spain was not lessened. They found a great and successful soldier to defend them against Maurice. This was the Genoese, Spinola, a banker, without experience of war, who carried on the campaign largely out of his own private resources. The capture of Ostend in 1604, after a siege of over three years, was his great achievement. But the Spaniards had no luck at sea. In 1607 their fleet was overwhelmingly defeated by the Dutch Admiral Heemskerck in Gibraltar Bay, and this humiliation had much influence in inducing them to seek for some cessation of the exhausting struggle. Negotiations were carried on largely under the direction of the French diplomatist, Jeannin. A permanent peace proved impossible, for Spain demanded, and the Dutch

Spinola

¹ "The very burdens of the war had been productive of unexampled prosperity. Nothing in history is more remarkable than the condition of the United Provinces, and especially of Holland and Zealand, at the end of thirty years of incessant warfare" (Rev. George Edmundson in *Cambridge Modern History*, iii, 680).

absolutely refused, the exclusion of Dutch traders from the Indies and the toleration of the Roman worship in the Protestant states. In 1609, after long delays, it was decided to postpone the decision on these thorny questions by accepting a "Truce of Twelve Years." The independence of the states was recognized; but the questions of religion and trade were adjourned; the Dutch, as a matter of fact, continued to trade with the Indies, and the Roman Catholics in the northern states had little relief.

In this same year, 1609, the Jülich-Cleves question became critical through the death of the childless Duke. Henry IV was not at all inclined at first to treat the situation as one that could only be settled by war. He talked, indeed, of "putting on foot a large army" if the Emperor did not withdraw his claims. But he watched and negotiated, and late in the year believed that all was capable "of a friendly arrangement."

Then suddenly, this very serious affair of diplomacy and high politics became connected with the last and the most grotesque of the amours of the French King. In 1608, at the age of fifty-four, when his Court "already resembled the harem of the Grand Turk," he was seized by a passion for Charlotte of Montmorency, a girl in her sixteenth year. In order to keep her at Court he arranged a marriage between her and the Prince of Condé. But the prince, jealous of the attentions which his wife continued to receive from the King, carried her off to the Netherlands; and then, believing himself in danger from the designs of the King of France, he withdrew to Milan, leaving his wife in the Netherlands under the protection of the Archduke Albert.

Did this story, only the outline of which is given here, really influence the affairs of Europe? Was Charlotte of Condé likely to become a new Helen, and to plunge Europe into a war more important and enduring than that of Troy? Or has the incident been exaggerated into an importance that does not really belong to it by the lovers of scandal and personal detail? It seems clear that the affair had a decisive influence on the action of the great King. Passion, jealousy, and perhaps shame at the European celebrity of the affair, all played their part in inducing Henry to maintain the claims

of the Protestant claimants to the Five Duchies against the Empire which threatened to expel them. If war came, it would involve not only the Empire but also the Spanish power which protected the fugitive princess and her husband. The French negotiations now took a warlike tone, and they were pushed on in spite of the backwardness of the King's German allies. Henry's usual shrewdness and coolness seem to have failed him. He had no serious promise of support from England, or from the Dutch, or from the Evangelical Union. The Duke of Savoy, who had just made a marriage treaty with France, was his only serious supporter. But he continued his financial and military preparations for the war. The Queen was crowned and appointed regent in his absence. He was just ready to go with his large army to the support of the Protestant claimants to the vacant duchies when, on the 14th June, 1610, Ravailac, a religious enthusiast, who had for some time cherished the idea of striking a blow for his faith, stepped up to the royal carriage, as it was stopped by a block in the streets, and plunged a knife into the King's heart.

The King's death at the age of fifty-six meant certainly a great change in the European situation and outlook. Some have thought that if he had lived, he would have anticipated the work of Richelieu and Mazarin, and that Germany would have received from him some tolerable settlement without passing through the long agony of the Thirty Years' War. But he would have encountered the forces of both Spain and Austria, and he could count on very little support. There is nothing to show that the armies of France were equal to a victorious conflict with the veterans of Spain. Henry IV had not realized the dream of Henry of Navarre, that he might gain some signal triumph over the armies of Spain. Even when Richelieu guided the policy of France with unsurpassed skill and wisdom, the French armies were still admittedly inferior to the *tercios* of Spain. If Ravailac's dagger had missed its victim, Henry would probably have had bitter disappointments to endure.

CHAPTER XXII

CHANGES AND TENDENCIES IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

IT is now a platitude that all periods are periods of transition ; and the division of ages into those of stability and those of change has been generally abandoned. But the transformations of Europe in the sixteenth century were so many, and some of them were so puzzling, that it seems worth while to give a backward glance over the hundred and twenty years covered by this volume, and to consider the nature of the chief changes and of the chief new forces.

The first thing that we notice is that the idea of the unity of Europe has suffered almost complete eclipse. There had been little effective realization of that unity in the fifteenth century, which was as full of wars and strife as the sixteenth. But the one Catholic Church was there to represent the ideal in the spiritual domain, and the Empire still stood feebly for a kindred ideal in the political sphere. Empire and Catholic Church still remained at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Neither of them had abandoned their aspirations and their claims ; but both had become rather causes of strife than instruments of peace. The conflict between the claims of the Empire and of the princes would shortly plunge Germany and Europe into one of the longest and most terrible wars that they have known. The Reformation had seen the establishment of other churches in rivalry to the Church of Rome. The wars of Europe for the last half-century are called "religious wars," and, though their real origins are often secular, religion tended to intensify rather than to modify the contests. Internationalism as a fact, and—except in the domain of religion—as an ideal,

Machiavelli's
Prince

has passed away. The great feature of the period is the independent and self-dependent state, pursuing its own advantage only, and refusing to admit the control either of religion or morality. Machiavelli's *Prince* is therefore one of the most characteristic and illuminating books of the century. The wide celebrity of what was at first a pamphlet of a strictly practical kind for private reading only, shows how the Europe of the sixteenth century was ready to welcome its ideas. There is still keen controversy about some points in connection with *The Prince*, but its central meaning is not doubtful. The state is regarded as an end in itself; statesmanship is to be judged by success and by no other standard; the claim of religion or morals to control politics is quite definitely rejected. The book breaks away entirely from all medieval disputes about the relation of the State to the Church, the two swords of Saint Peter, and the symbolism of the sun and moon. And it is not troubled by modern ideas about internationalism and the solidarity of the different branches of the human family. It is not a treatise on political theory, for it despises theory; it is a practical manual for the statesman who wants to secure the greatness of his state. It is difficult to estimate its influence. There were unscrupulous statesmen in plenty before Machiavelli, and his work was partly a generalization from their methods. But the terseness and clarity of the treatise and its assumption that no other view of politics is possible must have helped many a statesman to dismiss his scruples and devote himself wholeheartedly to the narrowly conceived welfare of his state.

The
Balance of
Power

Italy, which produced Machiavelli, was also the original home of the idea of the Balance of Power. The idea or rather the practice soon spread over Europe, and became the master motive of the politics of the period. The sixteenth century sees it in its simplest and crudest form. It was assumed that states were dangerous to their neighbours in proportion as they were strong. The alliances of the century, therefore, were unusually transitory. Kings were almost as much afraid of the strength of their allies as of that of their enemies, and in the hour of victory allies began to turn into enemies. This is especially observable of the first half of the century but it is true of the second half too. In spite of the

common religion Henry IV and Philip II show no tendency to unite. Europe still believed in the wealth and power of Spain, and that belief drew the states of Europe together for common defence. The same thing is observable in the smaller world of Germany. There is no real union among the princes against the Empire, or among the Protestants against the new-born strength of Rome. Fear and jealousy of one another dominate their actions.

The evils of the condition that sprang from this “European anarchy” were indeed evident, and voices were raised the whole century through to deplore the results of war and to pray for peace. The saintly Sir Thomas More, near the beginning of the period, put the establishment of a European peace high among the things he most desired. At the end of the century the Italian Botero¹ deplored the havoc wrought by war and desired to see a universal monarchy established as the only way to avoid the clash of rival ambitions and fears among the statesmen of Europe. The arguments used are not unlike those by which Dante had advocated the claims of the Empire to universal dominion in the fourteenth century. But there is another and much more famous proposal which demands notice here. The Duke of Sully fell from power with the death of Henry IV, and never again had any direct influence on public affairs. He occupied his leisure time in composing his memoirs—the *Économies Royales* (see p. 468)—which were much altered by him after 1617. It is chiefly in this later revision that the proposal referred to—“The Grand Design of Henry IV”—is found.²

The Grand Design belongs rather to the history of ideas and even of romance than to history. Yet it is an amazing production and worth a little examination. If, as is probable, the story has no basis of historical fact, it remains one of the most singular historical romances in existence; for the writer, whose great influence on the history of France for a quarter of a century is unquestioned, and whose character

Suggestions for ending the European anarchy

The Grand Design of Henry IV

Nature of the Grand Design

¹ I owe my knowledge of this interesting writer entirely to Mr. J. V^W Allen's *Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*.

² Sully's *Mémoires* should always be consulted in the original edition. The edition published by the Abbé de l'Ecluse des Loges in 1747, which has been translated into English, is a réchauffé of the original, altered and falsified to suit the sentimental taste of the eighteenth century.

is described by himself as above all things "cold, cautious, and unenterprising," has taken the most amazing liberties with the statesmen and rulers of his own time. The first idea of the Grand Design is ascribed to Queen Elizabeth, and Sully says that he himself went over to England in 1601 to discuss its terms with her. James I, it is alleged, received the proposals more coldly. Pope Paul V, through his Nuncio, actually agreed (we are told) to provide troops for the support of the scheme, on condition that Protestantism was given no further advantages. There is no evidence for these incidents in the archives of the time. It is almost as incredible that Elizabeth should have approved of a scheme which gave to Spain the possession of the whole of the new world as that the Pope should be ready to sacrifice the House of Habsburg to the House of Bourbon. But even if the Grand Design is altogether the work of the imagination, even if it reflects to some extent the ideas of a rather later period than the reign of Henry IV, it has still a great interest, as the first scheme in modern times for the peaceful organization of the European world. Briefly its proposals were the following:—

Proposals
for the
House of
Habsburg

1. The House of Habsburg was to be deprived of its position in Europe, which was a menace to the independence of other powers. The Imperial title was to be taken from the Austrian branch; but the descendants of Philip II were to be left in possession of the Spanish monarchy. The Grand Design would bring to the Spanish monarchy both loss and gain. In Europe Spain was to lose her Italian possessions, and Franche Comté, and the Netherlands; but on the other hand she would be declared "sole proprietor both of what we do know and what we may hereafter discover" in the three other continents of the world. It was hoped—we are assured—that the manifest advantages of this scheme would induce the Habsburgs to accept it. (Queen Elizabeth is reported to have said that its "execution by any other means than that of arms would be very desirable as that has always something odious in it.") But, if the Habsburgs would not see reason, then all arrangements were made for the contingents to be provided by the different powers for a war "which it was supposed might last three years."

2. When the Austrian and Spanish powers had thus been

educated to compliance, the time would come for a rearrangement of the map of Europe. France, Sully says, claimed nothing for herself beyond the glory of presiding over so equitable an arrangement; though in fact he supposes certain readjustments on both her northern and southern frontiers which would bring into her hands territories which she had never succeeded in winning by force of arms. The new settlement was to be such that "no power would have cause either of envy or fear from the possessions or power of the others." The new Europe was to be constituted as follows: (a) Six great hereditary monarchies—France, Spain, Britain, Sweden, Denmark, and Lombardy (this last being Savoy with the Spanish possessions in north Italy added to it). (b) Five elective monarchies—the Empire, the Papacy, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia. The Papacy was to take the Kingdom of Naples and become "a secular prince," while remaining head of the Catholic Church; this is the strangest and most impossible of the proposed changes. (c) Four Republics: the Venetian, the Italian (under the titular presidency of the Pope), the Swiss, and the Belgic.

3. A religious settlement was to accompany the political settlement. And here the author of the plan shows a complete absence of insight into the future. The Peace of Augsburg had allowed only two religions; the Grand Design allows three, for Calvinism had made for itself a position which could not be taken away. But there were to be no new religions. The old Huguenot writes: "new sects or opinions should be carefully suppressed on their first appearance," and again, "there is nothing in all respects so pernicious as a liberty in belief." Heresy is to be eliminated from Papal territory.

4. The Government of this Christian Republic—for so it is sometimes called—is to be vested in a Council consisting of plenipotentiaries from all its Governments. Perhaps it might be well to divide it into three; but, if it is thought best to maintain it as one Council, various places are suggested for its seat on the borders of France and Germany, but Geneva is not among them. The form of procedure is left for future arrangement; but the chief object of the Council is "to prevent innovations"; and its decrees are to be final and irrevocable.

The
armed
forces of
the
League

5. There is much talk in the pages of Sully about the benefits of "an uninterrupted repose" and of "an indissoluble bond of security and friendship," yet the governing idea of the whole scheme is not so much a desire for peace, as hatred and fear of the power of Spain and of the House of Habsburg. One last war is wanted, and that is to be a war to end war in Europe. And when the Christian Republic is founded there will still be fighting to be done; a military organization will still have to be kept up. The "Grand Duke of Muscovy or Czar of Russia" is to be invited to enter the alliance; if he will not, he is to be deprived of his possessions in Europe and confined to Asia only. Against the "infidel Turk" a perpetual war is to be waged. Something of the spirit of the crusades breathes through the Grand Design.

Such is in brief outline the Grand Design. Its fantastic character is apparent. It is strange that so shrewd and experienced a man as Sully could have put some of the details down on paper without seeing their absurdity; it is impossible that they should have recommended themselves to Henry IV. There were no means for carrying the plan into effect; if it had been carried out it would have bred fresh wars—wars of religion and wars of colonial rivalry—wars of disappointment and revenge. There were forces fermenting in Europe of which Sully and his master knew nothing—nationalism and political and religious liberty. But the design is worth careful study for the light it throws on the ideas of the time, and also because it is in a very real sense the forerunner and even the begetter of the schemes which have not ceased from time to time to arise in Europe until they culminated in the League of Nations; which has very great difficulties of its own, but has at any rate avoided the pitfalls into which Sully would have led Europe if his suggested plan had caught the imagination and won the support of the great powers of his time.

Failure of
Parliaments
and
aristocracies

In the international life of Europe there was then a disappearance of any instrument or idea of unity; but the tendency in the individual states was all the other way.

Everywhere in western Europe the characteristics of the feudal and medieval state tend to disappear. The Spanish Cortes, the French States-General, the German Diet, cherished ambitions and had moments of great importance, but by the end of the century they were losing power and seemed likely to disappear. The privileges of the nobility were being generally and seriously attacked. With the Constable Bourbon the last of the really great feudatories of France was removed; even the Guises and the Condés and the Montmorencys had not the same independent standing; their hopes lay in their influence over the Crown rather than in independence of it; the Parlements watched the exercise of aristocratic power with efficient jealousy. Spain was not behind France in the assertion of the Crown against the nobles, and we have seen how the Council of Castile was especially active in the advancement of the royal rights. Germany, as we have noted before, is rather an apparent than a real exception to the general political tendency of the European states. True, the machinery of the Empire was breaking down; but the Empire stood essentially for international ideals. What the Empire lost the princes gained. The great real exceptions to this tendency towards governmental concentration were Scotland, Denmark, Poland, and the Republic of the Netherlands. In Poland, what the monarchy lost a loose feudalism gained. The landed gentry gained a dangerous anarchical power; and with every decade Poland moved nearer and nearer to dissolution, until the final blow came two centuries later and Poland disappeared from the list of European states. The state of the Netherlands, which had been brought into existence by the Union of Utrecht, was a very different matter. There was a state which stood in decided contrast to the general tendency of the time. The central authority was weak; the seven provinces were in name independent of one another; the towns were really self-governing. It was only with difficulty that any movement could be imparted to the cumbrous machine; it was only the constant presence of a great enemy that allowed it to work at all. But even in the Netherlands the House of Orange stood for the idea of concentration in the interest of the military security of the state.

Exceptions
to the
tendency
towards
central-
ization

Municipal
liberties

Municipal liberties were being threatened generally as well as aristocratic privilege. This was happening in most countries ; in France, in Spain, in Italy, in Germany. Local self-government was everywhere, in the sixteenth century, a sign of weakness in the state. Where the state was sufficiently strong to enforce its will it allowed neither rivals nor partners in its power. The cities of Europe had done an immense and valuable work for civilization. Their powers of self-government might probably have been maintained without endangering the central power. But where the Governments of Europe could, they reduced the towns within their dominions to impotence. In France, as we have seen, the tendency was for royal nominees to take the place of elected magistrates ; in some places (as at Toulouse) the local Parlement was made judge of the validity of elections, and though the Parlements had their own grievances against the Crown, they could be trusted to uphold the authority of the central government against local aspirations ; the municipal institutions of France tended to become a lifeless husk. The same movement is observable in Spain, and was there carried even further. The municipal life of the country, once so vigorous, was completely destroyed ; royal officials (*corregidores*) were substituted for elected magistrates, and the towns were brought under the control of the Council of Castile. A vigorous city life still remained in Germany, but even there the same tendency was observable. The sceptre was passing from the towns to the princes ; and, where the princes could, they controlled or destroyed the free political life of the towns.

A new race
of officials

The new Governments generally tended to dispense with the services of the old nobility for the most important administrative posts. A new race of officials grew up, men who would obey the King and the state without considering the interest of their own class, lawyers for the most part and men of the middle class, capable of handling the financial problems of the new time with more skill than the old aristocracy. In the Spanish dominions the Crown looked to the Church for support, and used the ecclesiastical machinery to advance its own political and personal interests. "The King intends," wrote Philip of Spain, "to establish obedience

to himself by means of the Inquisition." It has been called "a great political agency in the hands of the monarch working behind an ecclesiastical mask." Something of the same sort was observable in Protestant countries; the state nearly everywhere either controlled the organization of the Church or entered into a close alliance with it. Especially in Lutheran Germany the Church tended—quite contrary to the original ideas of Luther himself—to come into strict subordination to the state.

What was the relation between the Reformation and this well-marked trend towards absolutism? What influence had Protestantism and the Counter-Reformation on the political development of Europe? In many ways the Reformation strengthened and quickened the concentration of the power of the state in a single authority. Much of the wealth of the Church passed over into the hands of the head of the state; and though this is observable in both Protestant and non-Protestant countries, in France and Spain as well as in Germany and Holland, it was most open and effective in the states that broke away from Rome. Thus the central Government had funds which it had previously lacked, and with increase of wealth came increase of power. The abolition of ecclesiastical Courts brought always an extension of the competence of the state Courts. Even the old powers of censorship and moral control exercised in the past by Church authorities became annexed to the state. The theory of medieval politics was that two powers existed everywhere side by side—the one temporal, the other spiritual—and the facts had to some extent corresponded with the theory. Everywhere in the sixteenth century the spiritual power tended to lose force and independence, and much of what the spiritual power lost the secular power gained.

We have confined ourselves hitherto to material considerations, to finance, and jurisdiction, and political control. The question remains as to the influence exercised by the Reformation and its opponents on the political thought of the age. Was the Reformation, regarded as a system of faith and worship and church government, favourable to the cause of political liberty or not? And what was the

effect of the Counter-Reformation in the same sphere? Certain points are clear. First: the Reformers—Luther, Calvin, and even Zwingli—are not hostile in any way to the state. They are in favour of a settled, orderly government. They desire the favour, the support, and, if possible, the conversion of the established powers. Calvin declared that coercive government is no less necessary to man's well-being than food and water, sun and air. Luther played at first with the idea of a state without law and government; but he came to recognize the need of the power of the state even for religion, and it is often charged against him that he leaned too much upon the secular authority. And secondly: the Reformers were concerned with religion, not with politics or economics. The core of the thought of Luther and Calvin is man's relation to God, and how he can co-operate with the Divine will. The economic and the political interpretations of the Reformation are absurdly wrong, if it is meant that the Reformation was only in appearance a religious movement and was really, consciously or unconsciously, pursuing secular aims. The views of the Reformers made men good and quiet citizens so long as the state did not come into conflict with what they regarded as the will of God. But if it did come in conflict? Then, however unwillingly, religious movements inevitably grew revolutionary in proportion to the intensity of the convictions of their adherents. So Luther's early loyalty to the Empire changed into opposition, when Charles was seen to be the champion of the Roman power. And Calvin in the last chapter of the *Institutes*, while he praises civil government, justifies war, and goes near to insisting on passive obedience even to the worst of rulers, adds the significant words: "But in the obedience which we have shown to be due to the authority of governors, it is always necessary to make one exception—that it do not seduce us from our obedience to Him, to whose will the desires of all Kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to yield, to whose majesty all their majesties ought to submit." But this qualification thus introduced in the last chapter flings open a wide door to resistance. The will of God is to prevail against the will of the King; but the Church is the interpreter of the will

Resistance to
authority

of God. It is a short and necessary step to the view that the Church is really superior to the State. And it is not only the Protestant theologians who have to face this dilemma. The Jesuits were naturally supporters of the established powers; they, too, have been accused of subserviency to the secular powers. But their attitude changed, when the secular powers were enemies of the faith or doubtful in the support of it. Bellarmine and Molina were Jesuits, though they do not speak for the whole Order, and they are clear that a heretic King can be deposed. "There is no power except from God," wrote Molina; a King, therefore, who opposes the will of God has no right to reign. The Popes, moreover, claimed and used the right of deposing princes who were enemies of the Church. It was not a question of Protestantism or Romanism; but of faith. He who feels himself acquainted with the Divine will must of necessity be ready to resist human authority, if it is in conflict with the higher power. Thus the Reformation, while it tended to strengthen the power of the princes of Europe in the first instance, had in it also the possibilities of revolution.

It was, however, only on the Protestant side that the revolutionary tendency showed itself, and mainly among the Calvinists. The Presbyterian Church polity, by its introduction of laymen into the Councils of the Church and by its system of representation in the Synod, trained men in the arts of self-government. We have seen that the Huguenots began by professing doctrines of political liberalism, but afterwards accommodated themselves easily enough to monarchy when Henry of Navarre became the legitimate King. In Scotland it was necessary for the triumph of the Calvinist faith to expel Mary, and there Presbyterianism remained revolutionary to the end. In the Netherlands, too, the Calvinists were faced with the unyielding devotion of Philip II to the Roman Church, and they found it necessary to renounce his authority. We have seen that they did so in language which anticipates the great revolutionary movements of England, France, and America.

The political thought of the century, when divorced from religious controversy (the divorce is never complete), explored many roads and reached no general conclusion. There were

Calvinism
and
revolution

Political
thought
of the
century

some who held the popular origin of sovereignty ; some stressed the hereditary rights of the aristocratic class. But the usual tendency, especially towards the end of the period, was to insist on the need of a strong Government in order to maintain order among all the disruptive movements of the time. Jean Bodin's great work on politics comes to the conclusion that in every state there must be "a recognized legal sovereign with unlimited powers."¹ He is too strange a genius to be characteristic of his age, but it is the conclusion to which Montaigne comes also. When Henry IV died, no liberal political movement in Europe had secured a victory or laid the foundation for a victory in the future. If democracy was the child of the Reformation, it was a child born in the extreme old age of its parent.

Chief
religious
divisions

Religion has been so constant a subject of this book that it is not necessary to add much here by way of summary. Three religious organizations disputed the allegiance of western Europe ; the Church of Rome, the Lutheran or Evangelical Church, and the Reformed or Calvinist Church. At the end of the century the Lutheran movement had lost much of its earlier confidence and enthusiasm. The task of converting even the German world had proved very difficult ; variations of doctrine had shown themselves in its own ranks ; the secular Governments which supported and defended it had often a deadening influence. Yet the devotion of a large part of the German world and of many communities outside of Germany was still strong, and the Lutheran Church would not be destroyed even by the storms and trials which were to come upon it in the Thirty Years' War. But the aggressive powers in Germany were, as we have already noted, Rome under the various influences of the Counter-Reformation and the Reformed Church of Calvin. They were the bitterest of opponents ; to the Calvinist the Papacy was anti-Christ, while the Inquisition marked down the Calvinists as its most desired prey. Yet, as is often the way with the bitterest opponents, there is a certain resemblance between them both in their attitude to the state, and in their

¹ J. W. Allen, *Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 415.

desire to control the whole life of man. They were equally exclusive in their interpretation of orthodoxy, equally determined that heresy should be suppressed even by death.

The Lutherans had seen with alarm the rise of Calvinism. Both Lutherans and Calvinists were anxious that the process of sectarian divisions should go no further. There was no movement in Europe (and Britain is excluded from this survey) comparable in importance to the two already mentioned. But there were other religious communities claiming the right to exist, and some of them were destined to an important future. The Waldensians in France and Savoy still carried on the ideas of life, doctrine, and religious organization which had provoked so great a scandal in the thirteenth century. They naturally welcomed the Reformation and drew near to Lutheranism, and later to Calvinism, without entirely losing their separate organization. The same tendency is to be observed among the Utraquists of Bohemia and the Bohemian Brethren. Both are derived from the movement of Huss in the early fifteenth century; it was the symbolic distinction of both that they demanded communion "under both kinds," the wine, that is to say, as well as the bread, for both clergy and laity. The population of Bohemia was very largely with them; it is estimated that in the middle of the century not more than one-tenth of the population remained in communion with Rome. But the influence of Protestantism was strong upon them; first in its Lutheran and after Luther's death, in its Calvinist form. When the Thirty Years' War came, they were not readily distinguishable from the Protestants of Germany.

The Reformation then exercised rather a unifying effect in certain directions; but new movements had also arisen which would not be assimilated to the great Protestant churches. There were first the Anabaptists of whom we have already seen something in dealing with the fanatical movement at Münster in 1534. This strange event had given Germany and the world an idea of the Anabaptists, or the Baptists as they now came to be called, which was misleading. Their congregations were to be found in many parts of Germany, in Bohemia, in Tirol, in the Netherlands, and later in England. There were considerable divergencies

of doctrine amongst them. They were "opposed to all dogmatic formulation which went beyond the Scriptures." They were opposed to infant baptism, and usually adopted some distinguishing mark in their dress (as the wearing of clothes without buttons, only with hooks, and with pockets only on the inside). Then, too, especially in the east of Europe—in Poland, Bohemia, Transylvania—there had risen up groups of men formed into independent congregations who attacked the central Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The chief impulse to this movement had come from Italy, and the adherents were usually known as Socinians from the Italian Fausto Sozzini of Siena (1589-1604). They were not numerous, but they persisted in spite of attacks from all sides and later spread westward into the Netherlands and England.

The
freedom of
religion

It is important to notice that, despite these movements and others of less importance, no statesman foresaw, or if he had foreseen, would have welcomed, the modern system of entirely free organization of religious communities. A few isolated thinkers—such as Castelleo, who was at first an ardent Calvinist, and Acontius, an Italian long resident at Basel—advocated religious liberty and used in its defence many modern arguments. They held that convictions cannot in their nature be forced; that a good life is what matters, not theologic accuracy; that there is too much of uncertainty in all systems to justify any one in enforcing itself on men against their will. But such arguments carried little weight in the sixteenth century. The case against toleration was a very strong one. Men did not think that the systems, which they had adopted, admitted of doubt. Moreover, heresy always seemed, and usually was, connected with an attack on the Government that supported the faith. The belief was strongly held by nearly all statesmen that unity of religion was necessary to political unity and stability. Further, heresy, if victorious, always ended in an attack on the wealth and power of the enemy church.

Thus, quite apart from genuinely religious motives—though these were, perhaps, the most powerful—other strong motives, political and economical, prevented the adoption of any system of religious equality and liberty. There were

some efforts at religious conciliation, at finding a common basis for the conflicting views or convincing one side of its error. The early "disputations" with Luther had had this end in view. Charles V had hoped that the Council of Trent might result in concessions on the basis of which Lutherans and Romans might unite. It was the fixed idea in Catherine de Médicis' mind that the differences between the religious groups admitted of compromise. But, as the century drew to its end, we read little of these efforts. There were some signs of more conciliatory views among the Lutherans, but the Calvinists and the Church of Rome regarded one another with a passion of hatred which admitted of no successful efforts at the maintenance of peace.

There was less freedom of thought at the end of the century than there had been at the beginning. The Edict of Nantes is a splendid exception; but it had been won by the strength of the Huguenots, and its weakness was that it did not correspond to any general feeling in the country or even among the educated classes of France. In the countries where the influence of Rome was predominant, there was far greater watchfulness for heretical opinions and far greater eagerness to punish them. In the middle of the century the cruelties shown against religious opponents, in both the great camps into which Europe was divided, had usually a political or an economic object; they were measures of defence against really dangerous enemies. But towards the end of the century the Inquisition struck at false opinion, even though it had no political or practical consequences. Thus, whereas at the beginning of the century Erasmus was writing, without fear and with little opposition, his high-spirited books, in which he makes fun of scholasticism and attacks the friars and monks with biting sarcasm, nothing of the sort was possible at the end of the century. The year 1500 saw Erasmus, in happy alliance with Colet and More, studying, writing, and debating freely and enthusiastically. The year 1600 saw the burning of Giordano Bruno. This remarkable man was assuredly no Protestant. He had been a Dominican Friar, but all his interest was in speculation on the great problems of philosophy. He had fled from Italy to Geneva, but—like Servetus before him—he had found Geneva no

Contrast
between the
beginning
and the end
of the
century

Giordano
Bruno

more friendly to free speculation than Italy. We find him next at the Universities of Lyons, Toulouse, and Paris, and it is noteworthy that he was protected at Paris by King Henry III. Next he came to London and to Oxford, and published in England his *Despatch of the Triumphant Beast*, which was an attack on the Ptolemaic astronomy. Two central ideas seem to emerge from his many writings and controversies; first a belief in the new astronomy, which, through the researches of Copernicus (1473-1543), Brahé (1546-1601), and Kepler (1571-1630), was replacing the Ptolemaic system, which had been a marvellous achievement for its own age and had been almost officially accepted by the Church; and secondly a sort of Pantheism, a belief in a world soul "which pervaded all space and moulded every part to the degree of life of which it was capable." He wandered from England to France again, and then to Germany where he taught in several Universities. He was certainly not an easy man to live with; he called himself "the awakener of those that slept"; and he delighted in attacking received opinions. At last he went to Italy and Venice, where he lived for some time in peace. But then came his arrest; his seven years' imprisonment by the Inquisition; and finally, when he refused to recant his scientific theories, his death by fire. Among the very many martyrs of the century, Bruno and Servetus are in a class by themselves. They are definitely martyrs for freedom of thought and speculation.

Literature
and thought

It would be absurd to limit the history of the sixteenth century to international and domestic politics, and to ecclesiastical and religious matters, important as these were. It is necessary to add a few words about art and thought without attempting to give in any way a detailed record of such matters. The life and character of the time is so strongly mirrored in its literature and art that we shall miss an important means of interpreting the century if we take no note of them.

Decline
in the
importance
of Italy

The first noteworthy fact is the change in the position of Italy. At the beginning of our period, and for half a century afterwards, the achievements of Italian artists and thinkers gave light and warmth to all Europe. By the

beginning of the seventeenth century those beacon lights had nearly died down. In 1500 Raphael and Michael Angelo and Leonardo da Vinci were working at the height of their powers; Machiavelli was meditating on the problems of the state; Ariosto was writing his *Orlando Furioso*; and these men were only the representatives of a very large group. Important work was being done elsewhere in Europe, but nothing equal to this. The movement in art and thought, which we call the Renaissance, found its chief leaders among the Italians. But, as the century went on, the importance of Italy grew much less. There were great names down to nearly the end of the century. Tasso died in 1595; Tintoretto in 1594; but the first-rate names among Italian artists and writers in the first half of the seventeenth century are few.

This decline in Italian artistic productivity is unquestioned, ^{Its causes} but the causes of it have been differently estimated. According to one view, it was the fault of the Counter-Reformation, of the Jesuits, and of the Inquisition. Yet it is difficult to see that the Counter-Reformation could have interfered much with the work of the great Italians. Whatever their personal opinions, they were always ready to work for the patronage of the Church and very few came within its censures. Moreover, the forces of the reaction were at least as strong in Spain as in Italy, and the end of the century there saw art and letters entering on a splendid and vigorous period. Or sometimes the decline is ascribed to the influence of Spain, which established an alien power and crushed the national self-consciousness and aspirations of Italy. But no one ever gave more passionate expression to the loathing of the foreigner than Machiavelli ("The dominion of the barbarians stinks in the nostrils of every one"), and it was just at that time that the artistic and literary achievement of the century was reaching its culminating point. It is true that elsewhere—in the Netherlands, in Spain, in France—the growth of art and letters comes in very close relation to national feeling and national triumph or effort; but it seems best to admit that we cannot determine the causes of the decline of Italian art and simply to record it as a fact.

As the century goes on the early exuberance of vitality ^{General changes in the} tends to disappear. In place of the unquestioning worship ^{century}

of beauty, the belief in the sufficiency of reason, the hatred of control, the rejection of asceticism, comes something very different; the distrust of reason, the subordination of the pursuit of beauty to moral and religious control, discipline, formality, ecclesiasticism. A freer atmosphere still was to be found in the Republic of Venice, where there were still painters of note, and where Sarpi wrote his witty and biting satires on the Papal power; but elsewhere the change is generally noteworthy. It is not, indeed, peculiar to Italy. Something of the same sort may be noted in German theology if we compare the confident enthusiasms of Luther's early years with the logical rigidity of the later period; or if we compare the wide survey and unbounded hopes of Erasmus with the narrower aims of later scholars such as Casaubon. During the century the European world lost confidence; the problems of thought and life turned out to be more difficult than they had appeared at first. As the future seemed less certain, the past grew more attractive.¹

Let us glance at certain great literary products of the age, considering them above all things for the light they throw on the character of the state and age that produced them; and first at three great poets; all three sometimes called epic poets; two of them Italians, and one Portuguese; Ariosto, Tasso, and Camoens.

Ariosto

The first part of Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* was published in 1516 and the work was completed in 1532. In it he weaves stories, old and new, round the legend of Charlemagne who appears in the unhistoric rôle of champion of Christendom against the Mohammedans, who are besieging Paris. The main incident is the love of Orlando (Roland) for Angelica, Princess of Cathay, and his madness, when he is crossed and hopeless in love. It is a strange, wild, and formless romance; the many actors in the story are independent of time and space, and some of the wildest incidents take place on the borders of England and Scotland. But the poet carries his readers along with his own high spirits from adventure to adventure. If one surrenders oneself to

¹ I am thinking here of the continental states exclusively. Our island was in many ways a contrast to the course of things beyond the channel.

the poet, it is almost true to say that there is not a dull stanza in the long poem. At the end it grows more serious; the characters cease to be mere burlesque and become human, and before the poem finishes it gives us not only high romance but real tragedy. Part of its charm is that it is so full of references to the circumstances of the time, to war, and politics, and art. It was begun, it will be observed, before Luther nailed his theses to the church door at Wittenberg, and it is written without reference to religion; for even Christianity is treated rather as a romantic background. There is a eulogy upon faith (*fede*), but it is the faith that binds man to man, not the faith to which the Council of Trent was later to give its definitions. The warriors of Islam are treated with as much honour as those of Christendom. Chivalry seems a bond more important than religion. It is one of the most characteristic books of the Renaissance, untouched by the spirit of the Reformation or the Catholic Reaction.

Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered* was finished in 1574, and shows Tasso the great change that had passed over Italy under the influence of the religious and ecclesiastical struggles of the time. It is a far better constructed whole than the *Orlando*, which, indeed, has no construction at all. The harmony of the verse is an unfailling joy, and may be compared to that of Racine or Tennyson. But we are mainly concerned with the subject and the spirit of the poem. The subject is the first Crusade, the hero is Godfrey of Bouillon, the spirit is that of the Counter-Reformation, with its insistence on orthodoxy, on piety, on morality, on discipline. The poem has a true epic background of divine interposition; for as the crusaders advance to the siege of Jerusalem, and while they struggle round its walls, God and His angels take counsel for the great enterprise, and defend the soldiers of the Cross from the assaults of devils. Something of the absurdity of Ariosto's story is carried on into this Christian epic; especially in the feats of the individual champions and in the exploits of the women warriors, who hold their own with the men. But it represents the ideas of Catholic Italy almost as directly as Milton represents those of English Puritanism.

It is worth while to put Camoens' *Lusiads* by the side of Camoen

the poems of Ariosto and Tasso, if only to remind ourselves of the great achievements of the Portuguese. Camoens' poem is dedicated to the glory of the Kingdom of Portugal and especially to its crowning achievement, the discovery of India by the route of the Cape of Good Hope. It was published in 1572, and the poet died in 1580, so that he was spared the grief of seeing the humiliation of his native country at the hands of Spain and its annexation to the Spanish Crown. The immense national pride of the poem is a little strange to us, for it refers to events very little known outside Portugal, and sings the glory of a state that was shortly to fall out of the list of independent states for sixty years. But as an epic of sea travel, it is entirely successful; the poet himself was a sailor and a traveller; and his pictures of storm and peril by sea are not excelled in any poem, ancient or modern. The account of the arrival in India is a curious mixture of fact and myth, which form here a rather unsatisfactory blend; but as a whole the poem is most interesting and deserves to be more widely known. To the historian of the sixteenth century it presents some curious features. Though published more than thirty years after the foundation of the Jesuit Order, it bears no marks of the Catholic Reaction. The circumstances of the author's life may, in part, account for this, for he only returned to Lisbon in 1570 after long residence in the East. But it is certain that the poem displays certain qualities which belong to the earlier art and thought of the Renaissance, and which were decisively condemned later by both Protestantism and reformed Catholicism. It would not be quite true to say that the Gods of the Pagan Olympus are confused with the Christian Deity, but certainly they co-exist; and the Portuguese explorers, who are regarded throughout as pre-eminently crusaders, are under the protection of Jupiter and Venus as well as of Christ and the Virgin Mary. The moral standards, especially in the relations of the sexes, are lower than those of paganism, and the entertainment provided for the soldiers of the Virgin on their return from their successful adventure would have seemed repulsively coarse to the contemporaries of Virgil and of Homer. A little later the Inquisition, which placed some stanzas of Dante on

the Index, would have prevented the publication of the *Lusiads*, at any rate in the form in which we have them.

We will glance, too, at certain great names in the literature of Spain and France, always with the historical aim of understanding the national point of view and the changes in feeling as the century proceeded. In Spain the national drama is of peculiar interest, and it produces in Lope de Vega one of its most characteristic writers. But Calderon, the greatest of the dramatic poets of Spain, was only born in the last year of the century; and it is inevitable that we should select as representative of Spain Cervantes (1547-1616) and his immortal romance, *Don Quixote*. It supplies us with a ^{Don} commentary and a corrective to the political history of Spain ^{Quixote} during the reign of Philip II. Two points deserve special note. First, the book begins and nominally continues throughout as a satire on the romances of chivalry, romances similar to those which form the staple of Ariosto's *Mad Orlando*. Other satires and burlesques of these romances exist, and there is a strong spice of irony even in Ariosto. But it is in Spain, and only in Spain, that the wild romance of chivalry had taken such a hold that it was worth the while of a great writer to devote a long work to its mockery. The love of adventure, of amazing and reckless adventure, was deep seated in the heart of the people and forms a part of the peculiarly heroic character of the nation. Cortes in Mexico, Pizarro in Peru, Don John of Austria fighting against the Moors and the Turks, and dreaming of the conquest of England and the winning of the hand of Mary Queen of Scots—these are instances in real life of the love for high and dangerous adventure, the exaggeration of which is satirized in *Don Quixote*. Nay, the political schemes of Philip himself, schemes which were never sufficiently brought into touch with reality, have something in them of Quixotry. For he pushed aside the careful calculation of profit and loss, and fought a crusade against all odds for Spain and Holy Church. Nor was Cervantes himself without a strong vein of the same spirit. He had fought at Lepanto and been wounded there; he had passed some years as a prisoner at Algiers; he has more than a little sympathy with the type which he burlesques, and in the end he seems to fall in love with the figure he set out to

ridicule. And then in the second place, how great a contrast is the Spain of which we catch a glimpse in *Don Quixote* with the Spain of many histories, Inquisition-ridden, ruined by stupid taxation, the land of *autos-da-fé's*, of the cruel persecution of the Moors and Moriscoes! We are in a sunny and genial world when we set out under the guidance of Cervantes. He has much of the temper of Walter Scott; the same quick humorous sympathy with all classes, and especially with the poor. He speaks with admiration of the Mohammedans, against whom he had fought and from whom he had suffered much. We catch a glimpse of the existence of the Inquisition, and we see the living hell of the galleys; but, though Cervantes knew the reality of these things, they do not serve to destroy his joy in the pageant of life and the friendliness of human nature. A well-accredited story tells how Philip laughed loud and long at *Don Quixote*. The book presents a plea for the revision of the usual estimate of his reign.

Rabelais

Rabelais and Montaigne are writers who throw a flood of light on the character of France in the early and in the later part of the century. Rabelais (died 1553) was a monk and a priest, and also a distinguished student of medicine. His wild books—the *Gargantua* and the *Pantagruel*—are difficult to interpret, and their inner meaning has been variously understood. But it cannot be questioned that they contain, amidst all their extravagance and all their coarseness, a trenchant, humorous, and yet at times, savage onslaught on what he regarded as the abuses of his time; on Kings and wars; on Parlements and their corruption; on priests and monks; on theology and scholasticism, and on the very heart of the Papacy itself. The monstrous absurdity and coarseness in which he clothes his ideas are probably, in part, attributable to the danger which he would have run, if the authorities in Church and State had been forced to take his work seriously. The spirit of all his work is the praise of liberty. The motto over his ideal monastery, "Do what you like," seems to fit the whole book, and he held that if men did what they willed they would do what was right. He everywhere greets the unknown future with a passion of exulting hope; and in order that that ideal future may

become a real present, he desires the destruction of all discipline, all restraints on the spirit of man, all asceticism. His mood is not really sceptical or negative; rather he "belongs to the order of believers."

Montaigne (1558-92) is nearly half a century later than **Montaigne** Rabelais, and his views on life and religion reflect, not only his own temperament, but also his own experiences. The civil-religious wars scourged France for thirty years. Calvinism had become a real force there, and its general quality was known. The Jesuits had penetrated the country, and, though the decrees of the Council of Trent were not accepted in France, their influence was deeply felt in the character of the Church. Montaigne was certainly as completely detached from positive Catholic beliefs as Rabelais. It is interesting, therefore, to compare his outlook with that of his predecessor. In the first place he is really and completely sceptical; his device is the balanced scales; his motto, "Que scay-je." There is no doubt a good deal of this which is personal and a reflection of his own strong opinions. Had Montaigne been born in the Age of Faith, it is difficult to think of him as a believer. He fundamentally distrusts the powers of human reason. It seems to him a manifest absurdity that man should know anything of God; but the assumptions of philosophy, of science, of politics, even of medicine, seem to him hardly better founded. He has not adopted new beliefs to take the place of the old; he has no confidence in the future; he is as far as possible from a revolutionary, for all revolutionaries are of necessity believers.

Montaigne professed himself a Catholic, and it is impossible **Montaigne** to think that this was due to hypocrisy or affectation or **as a** cowardice. His one supreme claim in his essays is that they **Catholic** express his real opinions; and it is to misjudge him cruelly if we think that he was telling less than the truth on the most important of all subjects. Nor does his career justify us in thinking that he would have yielded to any physical fear; a calm courage is one of his most prominent characteristics. He was in no way attracted to the Huguenots; he disliked their Biblical literalism, their rigid discipline, their absence of ceremony. If reason could not justify the doctrines of Catholicism, it could not justify their rejection. Thus

scepticism performed the function of faith, and he remained in the Catholic fold. But if he was a Catholic, he was far from being a Christian. His morals and outlook on life are really stoic and drawn from the pagan classics.

Montaigne's
politics

In politics he inevitably rejected the early enthusiasm for liberty. He had seen and suffered from the ravages of the civil wars. Peace and order under an honest ruler—that was his ideal; and he saw the ruler that he sought for in Henry of Navarre. He believed in the duty of obedience to the laws, even if the laws were bad. Yet to regard Montaigne simply as a mere Conservative does him much less than justice. Even as an abstract thinker, there is much in his writings that is new; and his alliance with the established Church was of questionable help to it. The striking quality of his writings is their real humanity. Aristocrat though he was, he had the warmest sympathy with the common man; he loathed cruelty in all forms; he pointed forward to a new era in education; he had a deep sympathy for the races of the new world, whose terrible tragedy was just beginning. But, if we regard him as an index and illustration to the tendency of the age, he shows us that decline in confidence and spontaneous faith which certainly characterizes the end of the century.

Tendency
of the
century

The sixteenth century, like all other centuries, shows many characteristics. Different influences and tendencies fought for mastery, and the judgments on the century are widely various. Yet one tendency can hardly be overlooked by any observer; it underlies all others and explains some seeming paradoxes. That tendency is liberty in the negative sense of that difficult word; the tendency to reject all allegiance and loyalty to churches, societies, groups, classes, guilds; the assertion for better and for worse of the claims of the individual; so that individualism is perhaps a better label for the century than liberty. This tendency of course did not triumph everywhere, and it had its passionate and successful opponents. But it was to be found everywhere, and some of those who fought against it showed much of its spirit. We will end by pointing out some of its manifestations.

The art of the centuries that precede the Renaissance is curiously anonymous. Modern research discovers with difficulty—though it does at last discover them—the names of the great architects of the medieval cathedrals. That they delighted in their work is certain, but they had not the desire, so generally felt by the modern artist, to proclaim their names to the world and to receive its homage. Painting was from the first a more individual art than architecture; but even in the domain of painting something of the same sort is observable. The authorship of many important pictures of the fifteenth century remains doubtful and others have to be referred to some school or to some anonymous master. All that was over now. The great artists of the sixteenth century asserted their individuality by all possible means. Fame, which had always been a strong motive, became now the declared object of their efforts. The artistic world grew conscious of itself, as it had never been before, and its members delighted in personal applause. Painting began to lose its vital relation with the Church. Painting Probably the majority of pictures still dealt with religious subjects and were intended for exhibition in churches or religious buildings. But clearly a more secular spirit was making itself felt. Landscapes began to be painted for their own sake, while nothing is more characteristic of the period than the prominence of portraits; we know the personal appearance of the Popes, Kings, statesmen, and artists of this age as of no preceding one. The Church was still the great patron of the activities of painters, but it was now rivalled by the courts of Kings. King Francis I of France owes much of his undeserved reputation to the praise of artists whom he employed. And by the side of royal courts the new race of rich men began to attract the attention and pay the services of painters. The artists of Germany were especially remarkable for their secular character, even before the Reformation had changed the whole life of the country. In the early sixteenth century this secular tendency is most noticeable in Holbein and Dürer, but the great painters of the low countries exhibit it also. The long and fruitful alliance between Art and the Church was clearly losing something of its intimacy. The artists of the future found their

patrons and their customers where they could, and no longer looked exclusively or even mainly to the Church for support.

Literature

Literature can hardly exist without a strong emphasis of personality. In the annals of literature there is no more powerful or individual figure than Dante; he, if any man ever, "was himself his own party." And Petrarch, though he was a clerk in Orders, was very far from subordinating himself to the Church. But in the sixteenth century we are in a new world of literature. The religious controversy was in all men's minds, and very much of the literature has reference to it. But as a class the writers of the time escape alike from the shadow and the protection of the Church. A public had arisen interested in books and ideas, and the invention of printing allowed the writer to get into immediate touch with this public. The "man of letters" is for modern Europe almost a creation of the century (though Petrarch would have a full claim to the title). The great writers, though many of them sought and valued patronage, stood in individual isolation. Erasmus, Montaigne, Rabelais, Machiavelli, Cervantes, Ariosto—to take the great names of the century almost at random—belong to no school or group, preach no ideas but their own, and, though they are sometimes menaced by the authority of Church or State, subordinate themselves to neither. Popular drama came into an independent existence. Nowhere did it flourish so gloriously as in England, but it was full of vigour and high achievement in Spain and was by no means unknown in Italy and France. In Spain some of the most interesting dramas are religious in subject and aim; but most of the work of Lope di Vega and Calderon is definitely secular in character. Thus even Spain, which in many ways stands aside from the general development of the rest of Europe, exhibits the same tendency to disintegration.

Science

In this disintegration of the life of Europe the natural sciences emerged; though the sixteenth century is rather prophetic of what is to come than an era of great actual achievement. The supreme scientific advance of the age was the substitution of the sun for the earth as the centre of our universe. This was the work of four great men, two of

whom fall wholly within the period treated in this book, while the other two had done much of their work before the end of it. Copernicus was born in Poland in 1473 and died in 1543. Tycho Brahé lived from 1546 to 1601. He was a Dane and much of his life was passed under the rule of King Frederick II. Both of these men made fruitful astronomic discoveries without however establishing the solar system as it came soon to be accepted. Their work was carried on by Kepler, a German (1571-1630), and by Galileo (1564-1642), who established in men's minds the sun as the centre of our universe, and showed the earth to be one of the smallest of the bodies that move round it. The shock to the ideas hitherto accepted and supported by the Catholic Church was very great, though it has sometimes been exaggerated. Science had to struggle forward, sometimes opposed, never assisted, by the religious organizations of Europe. The greatest triumphs were won in astronomy, but they do not stand quite alone. Paracelsus (1493-1541) is reckoned a name of first-rate importance in the development of chemistry. Medicine was finding new and more certain paths, partly in consequence of the revived study of the great Greek physician Galen. The great French surgeon Paré was a Huguenot and was in danger of his life on Saint Bartholomew's Day. He is said to have been saved by King Charles IX himself. Francis Bacon's youth and much of his political activity belong to the period surveyed in this book. His important scientific work came later. He caught sight, as no one else before him, of the conquests that were in store for the natural sciences, and had some inkling of the roads by which they would be reached. With the rise of science a new force came into being which was quite out of harmony with the system of medieval thought, and has hardly yet come into alliance with the religion and the ethics of the modern world.

The events and forces of the century brought about a **Economics** great revolution in the economic conditions and activities of Europe, and vastly increased the pace of certain changes that had already begun. Generalizations in the sphere of economics and over so wide an area and period are peculiarly

difficult. But here, too, the general impression is of individualism and disintegration. The old organizations for direction or control were weakened when not destroyed ; and though new methods of control to some extent took their place there was a great increase in individual initiative and experiment. The new ocean routes were substituted for the old journeys by caravan across Asia and then over the Mediterranean sea ; gold and silver in unprecedented quantities came into the European markets ; the New World provided a stimulus of unparalleled potency to the imagination of the commercial classes of Europe. Economic historians have taught us to notice three main features in Sixteenth Century Europe. First the state took the place of the city as the instrument of economic advance and control. Machiavelli had insisted on the necessity of the state controlling considerable supplies of wealth, apart from the private citizens, and this teaching was very generally accepted. We have said that the attention given by Henry IV and Sully to economic questions was something new in the history of European statesmanship. The statesmen of Holland and of England, of the Italian and the German states, show something of the same aims and interests. It is the great paradox of the century that Portugal and Spain, which seemed to start with the greatest advantages, so soon fell behind in the race for national wealth. The second point that we may note is the discrediting of the guilds. They did not by any means disappear ; but they changed in character, losing their popular basis and becoming either agencies for the control of the workmen by the masters or subservient instruments in the hands of the national government. Dr. Cunningham writes : " The industrial centres where the craft guilds had been most vigorous and had retained their power most successfully, were at a positive disadvantage in entering on competition with neighbours who had imposed no such restrictions." The decline of the Southern and the rise of the Northern Netherlands is attributed partly to the strong roots which the gild system had struck in the southern states. The prodigious development of Antwerp in the middle of the century especially is traced to the fact that it had hitherto not been of great economic importance and had not therefore adopted those economic restrictions which were

1. The economic influence of the state

2. The weakening of the guilds

the very life of such towns as Bruges and Ghent, and were now their bane.¹

The third great feature in the economic life of the century is the most characteristic. It is the rise of a new race of capitalists. If a tendency in this direction is observable earlier, it is in the sixteenth century that they become a great and notable force. The German bankers—the Welzers and the Fuggers—took the lead, and Augsburg was the first great centre of the new activity. But the same tendency was soon observable all through the West. Everywhere there were to be found men with large control of capital (according to the standards of that time) who used it for the winning of further wealth without any subordination to gild or church and very little to the State. The economic progress of the age owes much to them, and their importance has grown ever since. Nothing illustrates the disintegration of the age and its tendency to individualism better than the activity and importance of the new capitalism.

The disruption of the religious unity of western Europe has already occupied so large a proportion of this book that it may be here very summarily dealt with. Luther came slowly and unwillingly to recognize that the movement which he had inaugurated led towards schism and the setting up of separate churches. The desire for unity was common to all the prominent religious leaders of the time. It was common form with them to insist on the danger of heresy and the need of religious unity both for political and religious reasons. Luther seemed indeed for a time to doubt the need of religious institutions. If the believer could find access to God through the Scriptures, what further help was needed? But his later years saw a change. He organized his church carefully and placed it under the protection of the secular power; after his death his followers pursued all divergencies of opinion with increasing bitterness. The exclusive and coercive character of the church in Geneva was never in doubt. Protestants were hardly at all behind the partisans of Rome

¹ "Antwerp—so far as its economic institutions were concerned—was not so much a city as a permanent fair; it was a money market where there was less organization and more freedom for negotiating loans" than elsewhere (Cunningham, *Cambridge Modern History*, i, 508).

in demanding the defence of the true faith and the punishment of those who rejected it. If Luther or Calvin could have seen the unchecked anarchy of religious opinion and organization in the modern world, they would have regarded it with horror. And yet it was towards that condition of things that the Protestant movement inevitably tended. However much Luther might denounce human reason he appealed to the private judgment of men to decide between him and the claims of Rome. We have seen with what rigour and severity Calvin defined and enforced the confession of his church ; and yet the whole spirit of his movement was towards independence of character and of action. Before the century had ended religious divisions had been much multiplied. Individualism and disintegration are the clear marks of the religious history of the century.

**Conservative
forces**

But if the current set strongly and almost irresistibly in that direction there were strong eddies the other way ; and one great department of human life seemed to show an opposite impulse. The Church of Rome did not for one moment accept the disruption of religious unity either as desirable or inevitable. How she redefined her faith and reorganized her forces ; how she reasserted the claims of authority in matters of faith ; how she drove back the forces of the enemy in a great portion of the field and set up higher than ever the standard of unity and tradition in religion ; this is almost the central fact of the century and has already been told at some length. Perhaps we ought to count science as another force making for European unity ; but the world was not yet conscious of this new-born force and would not be for a long time yet.

While old institutions crumbled and old traditions weakened, and the individual man stood forward asserting his right to be and to do independently of the wisdom of the past and the forces of the present, there was one great power which stood for control, order, and authority. That power was the State.

**The States
of Europe**

The development of the States of Europe in the sixteenth century has two different and even opposite aspects. We see them from one point of view exhibiting the individualism which we have taken as the mark of the century and ex-

hibiting it in an extreme degree. The superiority of the Church is repudiated with scornful emphasis. Kings soon came to claim that they too were of divine right and recognized no authority higher than their own conscience and their own power. The Empire had long ceased to be a standard round which the forces of European order might rally. The States of Europe accepted without question the doctrine of Machiavelli, that the State was an end in itself, that power was its highest good, and that in pursuit of that end it need not concern itself with religion or morals. It was a doctrine that has dominated Europe for four centuries and does not show decisive signs of passing away.

But if the European State proclaimed the most naked individualism in its relations with other states, it represented very different ideas in dealing with its own subjects. We have seen throughout this volume how nearly everywhere the State was becoming concentrated in the monarchy, in whom the people usually saw their representative with more or less of clearness ; how it overthrew representative institutions, municipal institutions and aristocratic privileges ; how it took to itself not only the wealth and power of the church but many of its functions ; determining the acceptance of doctrine, controlling the Press, turning the ministers of religion themselves into agencies of government. While society threatened to resolve itself into a mass of unrelated individuals (though it would be a gross exaggeration to say that such an end was near or dreamed of), the State held the individuals together. It held them together by force, and in few countries consulted the wishes of its people in any formal way ; but as an institution it was generally popular and the only means of counteracting the disorder which was constantly threatened by the religious convulsion of Europe.

APPENDIX I

BOOKS FOR REFERENCE

Full bibliographies will be found in the *Cambridge Modern History*, vols. i, ii, and iii, and in the *Histoire Générale* of Lavissee et Rambaud, vols. iv and v. The following lists are mainly confined to books in English and French, but a few books in other languages have been admitted. A few contemporary books or documents have been inserted as likely to be of use both to the student and general reader.

I. The following books deal with the whole period in most of its aspects :—

F. Seebohm : *The Protestant Revolution*.

Mandell Creighton : *The Age of Elizabeth*.

A. H. Johnson : *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*.

Haüsser : *History of the Age of the Reformation* (in both English and German).

Cambridge Modern History : vol. i, *The Renaissance* ; vol. ii, *The Reformation* ; vol. iii, *The Wars of Religion*.

Lavissee et Rambaud : *Histoire Générale* : vol. iv, 1492-1559 ; vol. v, 1559-1648.

Historical Atlases : *The Cambridge Modern History Atlas* ; *Historical Atlas of Modern Europe*, edited by Reginald Lane Poole ; Droysen : *Historischer Hand-Atlas* ; Schrader : *Atlas de géographie Historique* ; Ramsay Muir : *New Historical Atlas for Students*.

II. The Italian Wars to 1559. See p. 71.

III. The Reformation in Germany. See p. 121.

IV. Turkey and Christendom. See p. 227.

V. Switzerland and France. See p. 260.

VI. The Counter-Reformation ; The Council of Trent ; The Jesuits ; The Inquisition. See p. 288.

VII. Scandinavia. See p. 309.

VIII. Russia. See p. 323.

IX. The Old World and the New. See p. 340.

X. The French Wars of Religion. See p. 369.

XI. Spain and the Netherlands under Philip II. See p. 392.

APPENDIX II

THE MASSACRE OF SAINT BARTHOLOMEW'S DAY

WHEN the account of the massacre was already in print it was represented to me that an article by M. Lucien Romier was in conflict with the views expressed in this book. All that M. Romier writes on the history of France in the sixteenth century is of so much interest and value that his article deserves a notice even in such a sketch of the whole century as is attempted here. The article in question is in *La Revue du seizième siècle, Tome I, 1918*, and is entitled *La Saint Barthélemy. Les Événements de Rome et la Préméditation du Massacre*. It extends to thirty pages, and has not, I think, been reprinted. It contains new details and makes an interesting suggestion, but does not conflict in any way with what I have written in this book. I have maintained that the long preparation of the massacre by the *French Government* is in the highest degree improbable; that Catherine de Médicis was quite sincere in her desire to establish peace by some measure of religious liberty; and that the King had been won over to genuine support of Coligny's scheme of a war against Spain in the Netherlands. The massacre seems to me to spring from (1) Catherine's justifiable fear of the Spanish war; (2) her light and unscrupulous character, which was always unduly impressed by the claims of the passing moment and was incapable of long views; (3) the fanaticism and organization of the supporters of the Roman Church in Paris and in France.

M. Romier does not suggest that the King or Queen Mother were plotting against the Huguenots. The Queen Mother was regarded at Rome as "très huguenote." A papal legate was sent to Paris to restore the authority of the Guise family "in spite of the Queen Mother and in spite of Coligny." It was only later that Catherine was acclaimed as a new

Judith. Up to the time of the massacre she was regarded as anti-Roman and anti-Spanish.

The object of M. Romier's article—and its novelty—is to suggest that the massacre had been planned *by the Guise family*. It thus becomes a plot as much against the King and against Catherine de Médicis as against the Huguenots themselves. M. Romier has examined the movements of the Guise family with care during the twelve months that preceded the massacre. It is clear that they felt themselves to be threatened in all that they held dearest—their power in France, their influence with the King, their religion. They met the situation in two ways. First they withdrew most of their members from France so that they should not be under any obligation of serving under Coligny or in any force that fought against Spain and Rome. Further, says M. Romier, they planned to destroy the Protestants of France. While the other Guises left the country the Duke of Guise and the Duke of Aumale remained at the court. Why? “*Doubtless* because in the (family) council of the month of April another project had been determined on, and their presence at the court was necessary for its execution” (p. 542). And again M. Romier tells us that between April 11 and April 18 (during the Easter festival) the three heads of the House of Guise had come to two decisions—not to serve under Coligny and to kill the Protestants during the marriage of Henry of Navarre. Again (p. 538) Cardinal Lorraine declared that all that had been done in Paris had been debated and decided before he left France.

There seems to me nothing improbable in such a view. The idea of making a clean sweep of the Protestants was no new one. If the idea of the massacre had not been in the minds of many people, it could certainly never have occurred. But many questions arise. There was a wide gap between the decision of the family council of the Guises and the realization of the plan. How did the Guises propose to bridge that gap? No hint is given of any answer to this question. Was the decision more than the expression of “a pious aspiration”? If the Queen Mother had not suddenly abandoned the alliance with the Huguenots, could the project have been even attempted? M. Romier's theory rests chiefly on the statement of the Cardinal of Lorraine, a statement made at Rome, where there was the strongest inducement to exaggerate complicity in the massacre. For there is no doubt that at Rome from the first and under whatever form the massacre was presented—and it varied

rapidly from a Catholic plot against the monarchy to the defensive action of the Crown against a Protestant plot and then to a joint action of the Guises and the Crown—it was always approved and praised by Pope Gregory XIII. He declared that it was a hundred times more pleasing to him than fifty victories such as Lepanto. M. Romier gives many interesting details of the processions and jubinations in honour of the great victory over the Church's worst enemy.

The fog that covers the events of August 1572 will never be cleared away. M. Romier's "*Doubtless*" (sans doute) is a word that can hardly be applied to any statement about the massacre. Some words quoted by M. Romier from an Italian seem to me to get very near to the heart of the matter. Paolo Vitelli wrote to Pico, "On avait résolu de faire ce qui est arrivé par accident."

APPENDIX III

THE CHIEF PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE OF MONSIEUR (MAY 1576), TOGETHER WITH SOME COMPARISON WITH THOSE OF THE EDICT OF NANTES

THE great importance of this Edict (usually known as "the Peace of Monsieur") has been insisted on in this book (see p. 428). It will be useful to give its chief clauses in a little more detail and to compare them with those of Henry IV's Edict, which has entirely obscured its predecessor in the memory and gratitude of mankind. The first is always referred to as "the Peace"; the second as "the Edict."

Clause 1. In order to establish "a perfect union and concord among our subjects" we have issued this "perpetual and irrevocable edict." (The Edict of Nantes says the Edict was issued "since God has not yet been pleased to allow the union of all Frenchmen in one and the same form of religion." It, too, is called "perpetual and irrevocable.")

3. The Catholic and Roman religion was re-established everywhere and defended against all attacks and interruptions.

4. "To leave no occasion for troubles and disputes among our subjects we permit the free public and general exercise of the so-called reformed religion in all towns and places within our kingdom and in all countries within our obedience and protection without any restriction of times or persons or places . . . and everywhere those of the aforementioned religion may preach, pray, and sing psalms, administer baptism and the sacrament, hold schools and public lectures, administer correction and do all other things which belong to the free and complete exercise of their religion." (This was in great contrast to the Edict of Nantes in which freedom of religious exercises of all kinds is closely limited by place, time, and persons; for they could be held only in the

houses of the nobility, in two places in each administrative district, and in places where they had been held in certain specified years.) "They shall also be allowed to hold their consistories and synods whether provincial or general, and our officers shall be summoned to the places where these synods are held; and we order our officers or some of them to attend." (Here again the liberty granted by the Peace of Monsieur was much wider than that of the Edict of Nantes. In Clause 82 of the main Edict all assemblies and councils were to separate at once and were not to meet again without royal permission. Clause 84 of the Secret Articles gave permission to hold consistories, colloquies, and synods; but all was limited and spoiled by the addition of the simple sounding phrase "by the permission of his majesty.") Clause 4 of the Peace of Monsieur ends by imposing certain small limitations of the complete liberty which had been promised in the earlier part. No Protestant worship was to be allowed in Paris or within two leagues round; nor at the court nor within two leagues of it; nor "in our lands which are beyond the mountains" (that is in Italy). There liberty of conscience was to be allowed and a fuller harmony was to be hoped for from "a free and holy general Council"; which words contained a decided rejection of the claims of the Council of Trent.

7. Huguenots who have been forced to abjure their faith were not held to be bound by such abjuration.

8. They can build "places in which to perform their exercises" (the word "church" or "temple" is avoided); but if they have seized Catholic churches, or buildings belonging to Catholics, they must surrender them, without however, being liable to any penalties for such seizure or for damage done to Catholic buildings.

9. Priests and religious persons who had married were not to be molested for their marriage; but they were disqualified for succession to landed property.

11. "We command that no difference or distinction shall be made on the ground of religion in the reception of scholars into universities, colleges or schools; or of the sick and the poor into hospitals infirmaries and alms houses." (This is almost identical with Clause 22 in the Edict of Nantes.)

12. Huguenot officials were not to be prevented from entering on their office by the imposition of any religious ceremony or form of oath to which they might take exception. This is identical with Clause 28 of the Edict of Nantes.)

13. The Huguenots shall pay tithe. (Identical with 25 of the Edict.)

16. "In all public acts in which mention is made of the afore-mentioned religion use shall be made of these words—the so-called reformed religion (*religion prétendue réformée*)."

17. "That we may the better unite the wills of all our subjects, as is our wish, we declare that the members of the so-called reformed religion shall be capable of holding and exercising all estates, dignities, offices, and employments of whatever kind—whether royal, seigneurial, or in the cities of our realm and in the countries within our obedience—and that they shall be freely and indifferently admitted to them without being constrained to take any other oath or to undertake any other obligation except that they will well and truly exercise their offices, etc. (This is closely followed by Clause 27 of the Edict.)

18. This and the five following clauses concern the provisions to be made for the indifferent administration of justice between Catholics and Huguenots. "Inasmuch as the administration of justice is one of the principal means of keeping our subjects in peace and concord we, yielding to the demand that has been made to us both by the associated Catholics (i.e. The League) and by those of the so-called Reformed religion, have ordained that in our Court of Parlement of Paris there shall be established a chamber composed of two Presidents and sixteen councillors, half Catholics and half of the aforementioned religion." This court is to be employed where one of the parties requires it; and it is to act as a court of first instance and as a court of appeal. The Paris court is to act, when required, at Poitiers; and similar courts are to be established at Montpellier, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Aix, Dijon, Rouen, and in Brittany, (The provision of *chambres-mi-parties* was taken over from the Peace of Monsieur into the Edict of Nantes and was there worked out in much greater detail. Twenty-nine of the ninety-two clauses of the main Edict deal with the powers and organization of the chambers. In Clause 34 of the Edict there is a notable diminution of the competence of these "divided chambers." There exception is made of matters concerning benefices and ecclesiastical patronage and "all cases which deal with the rights and the duties or with the domains of the church." By this clause a very large part of the life of France was withdrawn from these courts. And in the same clause all criminal trials in which

an ecclesiastic is defendant are taken from the new chambers and submitted to one or other of the sovereign courts. At no point is the superiority of the Peace over the Edict more visible than in the regulations with regard to the *chambres-mi-parties*.)

A number of clauses dealt with offences committed in the past ; all aimed at the establishment of a complete amnesty. All sentences against Huguenots were annulled. The disinherited regained their property. All the judgments given against Coligny were of no effect, and were to be struck out from the registers. Clause 32 dealt with the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day. Different points of view had been expressed by the Government in the past with regard to that event. The words used now were curiously vague : "The disorders and excesses which occurred on August 24 and the following days in Paris and in other towns and places within our realm happened to our great regret and displeasure." The children and widows of the victims of those days were to be relieved from taxes for the space of six years. (The Edict of Nantes was also much occupied with the question of amnesty. There was naturally, in an Edict that emanated from Henry of Navarre, no apology for the Saint Bartholomew Massacre. A novel, and probably quite useless, clause was the second which forbade any one, of whatever condition or quality, to recall what had happened since 1585 or to attack or reproach any one because of those events or to enter into any debate or dispute about them.)

By Clause 58 the States-General were summoned to Blois, with what results we have seen. (The Edict gave no promise of any agency of self-government.)

Clause 59 brought forward the question of the Guarantee Towns. It must be remembered that the Peace of Monsieur concerned the Politiques almost as much as the Huguenots. "For certain good reasons we have handed over to the United Catholics and those of the Reformed Religion the following eight towns." The eight towns are Aiguesmortes and Beaucaire in Languedoc ; Perigueux and le Mas de Verdun in Guyenne ; Noyons and Serres in Dauphiné ; Issoire in Auvergne ; and Seine la Grand Tour in Provence. (The provisions of Henry IV on this point were much more elaborate and important. But they were not contained in the Edict itself. See page 487 of this book for the form which the establishment of the guarantee towns took under the Edict

of Nantes. There were nearly 100 of them which were in the hands of Huguenot garrisons.)


The last paragraph declares that those who use force or arms in contravention of the provisions of the Peace shall be punished with death without hope of favour or pardon.

It is plain that the Edict of Nantes is founded on the Peace of Monsieur; its very words are often employed. It is plain, too, that the earlier Peace is the more liberal, and especially that it provides no openings for those "interpretations" by means of which the Edict of Nantes was almost reduced to nothing before it was legally withdrawn.

(*Recueil Général des Anciennes Lois Françaises*, Vol. XIV, p. 280, and Vol. XV, p. 170.)


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
THE HOUSE OF ORANGE



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
THE HOUSE OF VASA

(The dates show the tenure of the Swedish throne)




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THE OTTOMAN SULTANS



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THE HOUSE OF BRANDENBURG



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
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- F.C. — Franche Comté
- P. — Parma
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