

Birla Central Library

PILANI (Jaipur State)

Class No :- 327.40

Book No :- 5241E

Accession No :- 13855

EUROPE ON THE EVE

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

AUTHOR OF *Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship*

EUROPE
ON THE EVE

The Crises of Diplomacy

1933-1939

LONDON

ROBERT HALE LIMITED

102 GREAT RUSSELL STREET, W.C.1

1939

Printed in the United States of America

TO
MY STUDENTS

PREFACE

SIN is often the handmaiden of statecraft. While none but cynics or anarchists would contend that all politicians are sinners, all observers from the dawn of recorded time attest that virtuous men frequently become knaves (and wise men fools) when they serve The State. In no realm of political action are vice and folly more constant counselors than in the realm of diplomacy. In the not inelegant words of the aged King Ferdinand of Melphé, as quoted by Branch Cabell: "It would be more pleasant, as beyond doubt it would be more edifying, if all kingdoms did not remain dependent upon the wise dishonesties and the thrifty crimes of their overlords; but, thus far, mankind has not invented any more efficient method of restraining its own fond imbecilities."

This volume is regrettably replete with imbecilities, crimes, and dishonesties. It is a book of record and a book of judgment. Although the deeds herein recorded and judged have in no sense been selected to exemplify the seven deadly sins, many of them flow from pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, and sloth. Here, as always, those who perpetrate public outrages against common decency and common sense usually sanctify their errors through appeals to collective abstractions—God or Humanity, Church or State, Race or Empire, Glory or Peace or a Place in the Sun—which lend respectability to hypocrisy, violence, or stupidity in the name of the General Good. Lest it be thought that ethical ugliness, like beauty, is all in the eye of the observer, the practitioners of evil and ignorance who move through these pages have largely been permitted to speak for themselves. Their deeds, moreover, have been documented with care, lest they be deemed imaginative fiction rather than fantastic fact. If the chronicle is dominated by vice and not by virtue, the fault lies not with those who write history but with those who make it. The written result of the inquiry is scarcely cheerful, but I would fain believe

that it exhibits those elements of suspense and horror displayed in most murder mysteries and in other narratives of human depravity and weakness.

Acts of villainy, shrewdly planned and skillfully executed, usually elicit grudging admiration even from honest burghers. It is still true that pirates, brigands, and bandits are secretly beloved figures among those who itch to break the irksome fetters of morality and to scorn the stuffiness of the status quo and yet lack the will to defy the codes which bind them. This chronicle might have been treated in a picaresque vein of æsthetic appreciation for the cleverness of the organizers of crime and the fabricators of fraud. That it has not been so treated is less a result of my personal predilection for moral indignation than of certain sinister peculiarities of the record itself. These peculiarities are fraught with portentous consequences for all who prefer honesty, freedom, and fellowship to skulduggery, despotism, and intolerance and who still cherish the Liberal dream of extending the precepts of private ethics to the field of public affairs.

What is weird and curious in these annals has to do with ends rather than means. Whether ends ever justify means I do not pretend to know. That virtue is its own reward and the wages of sin is death are propositions forever debatable. But in politics and diplomacy immoral means have often been held to be justified when they serve moral ends. They have been deemed legitimate (or at least rational) when they serve ends dictated by personal ambition, national power, or social well-being. But here the ends which the actors serve, when stripped of deceptive verbiage and weighed in the scales hitherto deemed true in Western culture, are products neither of transcendent moral exigencies nor yet of unscrupulous and calculated selfishness. By the unmoral criteria of *Realpolitik* diplomatic decisions are judged good or bad as they strengthen or weaken the power of the State. By this standard the major decisions of the past six years in Paris, London, and Geneva have not merely exhibited a callous indifference to the imperatives of ethics and law, but have disclosed a seemingly incomprehensible determination to achieve collective self-destruction—both for the Western democratic Powers and for the world community of which the Covenant of Woodrow Wilson was intended to be a new charter of peace and freedom. The equally lawless and immoral decisions reached at Rome and Berlin have, to be sure, served the tribal god of Power. But a close scrutiny of this deity in his present incarnation reveals that he has a hollow head and feet of clay.

The political immoralities here recorded are not in the august tradition of the original Cæsars nor in the style of the Tudors, the Medicis, the Bourbons, or the Habsburgs, nor yet in the school of Wallenstein, Mazarin, Bonaparte, or Bismarck. The present chronicle is not a tale of thrust-and-parry among rival practitioners of *Machtpolitik*. It is rather a narrative of madmen and morons engaged co-operatively in demolishing the ruins of European civilization.

This phenomenon is not unique to the present age. It reappears with dismal regularity in every epoch of cultural decadence. In such eras Destiny rewards blackguards and psychopaths with power and riches and punishes sane and honest men with disgrace and death. With few exceptions the figures of truth and honor who inhabit these chapters meet with horrible ends. With few exceptions the disciples of corruption, falsehood, and treachery achieve success and the plaudits of the multitude. The times, in short, are out of joint. Societies which spit upon honorable men and women and hail traitors and neurotics as heroes and saviors are already rotten with approaching death. Whether sin and stupidity beget decadence, or decadence in some strange fashion drives men willy-nilly to stupidity and sin, I am unable to say. I know only that the Great Society of the twentieth century and the creed of Liberalism which has inspired its most significant achievements and aspirations cannot long survive the assaults of lunatics and gangsters if its defenses continue to be entrusted to criminals and idiots. If such epithets seem too harsh, the reader may supply his own. The facts and events, if called by gentler names, will not smell sweeter.

As a "social scientist," however, I have striven in these pages for analysis, not indictment. Sparing use is made of words of praise or blame. This is not a treatise on ethics. It is an essay on politics in a generation in which political power has become all-pervasive and "totalitarian" in proportion as those who wield it have become perverted and irresponsible. If the objection be made that hindsight is easier than foresight and that academic judgments are irrelevant to the difficulties which confront those in public office, the answer resides in the record and in the accurate prognostications of consequences made by numerous journalists and scholars since the fatal days of 1933. Where the will to believe falsehood is more potent than the evidence of the senses, there is little likelihood that truth will promote salvation. But America is not yet doomed and may still be saved by facing the record of facts, however unflattering that record may

be to Europe's empty idols. My purpose is not denunciation but exposition and explanation.

"Who understands all forgives all," says an old French proverb. The quality of forgiveness is perhaps out of place among those who are about to be drawn and quartered. But I have endeavored to practice charity and to observe those canons of accuracy and honesty which are current in my profession and not yet wholly outmoded on the American continents. The result I trust will be judged not in terms of preferences expressed or admonitions addressed to posterity but in terms of the contributions of these pages to analysis and comprehension and to the solution of the many mysteries presented by the record of a mad and tragic epoch.

This book, it is scarcely needful to say, is neither complete nor definitive. Attention is concentrated on the relations among the four Western European Great Powers, with only incidental treatment of the Soviet colossus and of the Baltic, Danubian, and Balkan nations. The States of Scandinavia ("Happy the people whose annals are brief!") as well as the communities of the Near and Middle East and the martyred millions of Eastern Asia are scarcely touched upon. Even within its limited scope, the volume leaves many more questions of fact and motive unanswered than answered. In olden times the diplomatic historian waited to tell all until the archives were opened. When contemporary archives are made accessible to scholars, some mysteries will be solved. But the suggestion may be ventured that most problems now unsolved will remain unsolved. In a period in which diplomacy, like other arts, has degenerated into formlessness, most crucial actions are dealt with by word of mouth and through secret emissaries. The filed dispatches at Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, should they be spared from the burning to come, will tell little of the great decisions and indecisions of the 1930's. Even if they promised to tell much, however, this anticipation would not justify postponement. Enough is known to permit the dissection of totalitarian *Schrecklichkeit* and of democratic defeatism, in broad outline if not always in minute detail. Memories are short in an age of decay. It is imperative that the record be set forth promptly. It is above all imperative that Americans take the advice of their British cousins to face facts frankly, however unsavory their taste. Hence I feel justified in submitting forthwith this attempt at a reckoning, whatever its limitations and imperfections.

To the many friends and fellow students who have in one fashion

or another had a hand in this enterprise I am deeply grateful. My appreciation is first of all due to the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago, which, three years ago, helped me to finance a research project of which this volume is a segment. I am likewise indebted to the donors and administrators of the "Class of 1900 Fund" at Williams College for assistance in defraying secretarial and stenographic expenses. I am grateful to the staff members of the Stetson Library at Williams and of the Widener Library at Harvard for unfailing courtesy and co-operation. My wife's patience and helpfulness have been of immense aid in my labors. My special thanks are due to Miss Sally Carlton of Williamstown for ever efficient and faithful service as researcher, typist, editorial assistant, indexer, and general godsend; to Mr. Emil Lang, now of Washington, for helpful suggestions and aid in research; to Mrs. J. S. Bain, Jr., of Cambridge for valued research aid during the 1938 term of the Harvard Summer School; to Dr. Spencer Brodney of New York, Mr. Meredith Gilpatrick of Beloit, Mr. Lewis Dexter of Belmont, Dr. Saul Padover of Washington, and Drs. Robert Rafuse and Enrique de Lozada of Williamstown for sundry historical and literary suggestions; to EVENTS Publishing Company and *The New Republic* for permission to reproduce certain passages already published in these journals; to Harcourt, Brace & Company for permission to reprint a portion of T. S. Eliot's verse; and to various other publishers, named in the notes, for consent to quote from their publications.

Like all students of contemporary world affairs, I feel an immeasurable debt of gratitude to Arnold J. Toynbee, John W. Wheeler-Bennett, and their able collaborators in the Royal Institute of International Affairs for their invaluable annual *Surveys* and *Documents*. All Americans concerned with the quest for truth owe a debt equally immeasurable to those who have kept the press and the radio of the United States free from political censorship. The able correspondents of the Associated Press and the United Press and of such journals of information as the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Chicago Daily News*, and the *Christian Science Monitor* have, with unflagging industry and accuracy, supplied much of the factual material upon which every observer of the diplomatic drama must draw for information and guidance. To those, here and abroad, who prefer that their contributions remain anonymous my appreciation is no less profound. Other and more specific acknowledgments are made in appropriate places in the text. Last, but far from least, my

colleagues and students in Chicago, Cambridge, and Williamstown have contributed collectively to this study much more than any one of them can possibly be aware of.

None of the individuals or organizations mentioned is in any way answerable for any errors of fact or for any of the interpretations or conclusions, right or wrong, set forth in these pages. For these the responsibility is mine alone. Since I have no love for darkness I shall be pleased if others can show that I have painted the picture of Europe's descent into night in too somber tones. But the opiates of ignorant optimism have no proper place among possible remedies for the sickness of a disordered civilization. Freedom can be served only by truth. It has no justification save as it makes possible the discovery and application of truth. In this faith these pages have been written.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Williamstown, Mass., January 15, 1939

CONTENTS

I · ARMS AND THE MAN	3
1. After January	3
2. The Cult of Annihilation	15
3. Volk and Völkerbund	21
4. Words over Weapons	28
5. Disarmament † October 14, 1933	42
II · SWORDS OVER AUSTRIA	55
1. Schicklgruber vs. Schmutz	55
2. Massacre in February	69
3. Dollfuss † July 25, 1934	76
III · VICTORY TO THE VANQUISHED	92
1. Barthou	92
2. Murder in Marseille	104
3. Versailles † March 16, 1935	109
IV · PACT COUNTER-PACT	128
1. Isola Bella	128
2. Defense against Berlin	137
3. Simon to Hoare	141
V · CÆSAR AFRICANUS	153
1. Duce's Dilemma	153
2. Rescue by Laval	163
3. Fraud and Force	173
4. Hoare to Eden	186

VI · WATCH ON THE RHINE	202
1. Locarno † March 7, 1936	202
2. Ethiopia † May 9, 1936	220
3. Geneva † July 4, 1936	230
4. East of Rome and Berlin	239
5. Moscow	253
VII · CAMPAIGN IN IBERIA	263
1. Death at Madrid	263
2. Rescue by Blum	273
3. Comedy in London	283
VIII · MARCH DOWN THE DANUBE	297
1. Vienna's last Chancellor	297
2. Eden to Halifax	304
3. Austria † March 12, 1938	321
IX · PEACE BY PURCHASE	332
1. Rescue by Chamberlain	332
2. Circus in Rome	346
3. Death over Praha	358
X · DESIGN FOR GIVING	375
1. Rescue by Runciman	375
2. Thunder in Nürnberg	391
3. The Home of the Evil Fairy	406
4. The Hill of the Pagan Gods	424
5. In Hitler's House	442
XI · TORY TRIUMPH	451
1. Czechoslovakia † October 1, 1938	451
2. France in the Shadows	456
3. Dusk over Westminster	465
4. Nightfall	477

Contents

xv

XII · DEFEAT	490
1. The Hollow Men	490
2. The Lost Souls	504
3. The Kingdom of Death	512
NOTES	523
DOCUMENTS	559
French-Italian agreements of January 7, 1935	559
Treaty of mutual assistance between France and USSR, May 7, 1936	561
Treaty of mutual assistance between Czecho- slovakia and USSR, May 16, 1936	564
British-Italian accord of April 16, 1938	565
INDEX	<i>follows page 573</i>

MAPS

87,545,000 Germans in Europe

between pages 330 and 331

Europe, January 1, 1933

front endleaf

Europe, January 1, 1939

back endleaf

[The maps of Europe were drawn by Emil Herlin]

EUROPE ON THE EVE

THE HOLLOW MEN

We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas! . . .

Shape without form, shade without color,
Paralyzed force, gesture without motion.

Those who have crossed
With direct eyes, to death's other Kingdom
Remember us—if at all—not as lost
Violent souls, but only
As the hollow men
The stuffed men. . . .

The eyes are not here
There are no eyes here
In this valley of dying stars
In this hollow valley
This broken jaw of our lost kingdoms. . . .

Sightless, unless
The eyes reappear
As the perpetual star
Multifoliate rose
Of death's twilight kingdom
The hope only
Of empty men. . . .

This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.

T. S. ELIOT, 1925

ARMS AND THE MAN

I. AFTER JANUARY

"TREASON! TREASON!" The little man scribbled in his diary. Date: December 8, 1932. Place: Berlin. Mood: Despair. "Severe depression prevails. . . . Financial troubles make all organized work impossible. . . . The danger now exists of the whole Party's going to pieces." A life-work which was at once a career and a crusade faced ruin. Dr. Paul Joseph Göbbels, the Bitter One, was doubly embittered—not by disillusionment, for his was too cynical a mind to cherish illusions, but by the threatened disintegration of the movement in which he had found surcease from his frustrations.

He was thirty-five. His club-foot and his dwarfish stature had kept him out of the First World War. His subsequent hopes of becoming a successful dramatist and poet had long since waned. In 1924 he had joined the "Nationalsocialist German Workers' Party" (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* or NSDAP). He had become a journalist and agitator in the Rhineland and an ardent "socialist" colleague of Gregor Strasser. In 1926 he had deserted Strasser to support the "conservative" wing of the Party which enjoyed Der Führer's favor. Thereafter his rise was rapid. He became *Gauleiter* for "Red Berlin," founder and editor of *Der Angriff* ("The Attack"), member of the Nazi delegation in the Reichstag in 1928, and, in the following year, Reich Propaganda Leader of the NSDAP and one of Der Führer's right-hand men. He was lame, lop-eared, loose-mouthed. But his very grotesqueness was somehow a political asset in a movement in which madmen and mediocrities achieved sanity and self-importance by following mediocrities and madmen. He had found wealth and fame by shouting "Out with the Jews!" and "Germany, awake!"

More was promised. Victory after victory brought the Party 13,754,000 votes (out of 37,162,000) and 230 deputies (out of 608) in the Reichstag election of July 31, 1932.

But December brought a threat of disaster. Hitler the All-Highest was plunged in deepest gloom at his Berlin headquarters in the Kaiserhof Hotel. "For hours on end," wrote Paul Joseph, "Der Führer walks up and down the hotel room. . . . Once he stops and says: 'If the Party should ever break up, I'll make an end of things in three minutes with a revolver.'" ¹

Threats of suicide were not new with Der Führer. His anxiety recalled another moment of near-victory followed by despair: the evening of November 8, 1923, in Munich where, revolver in hand, he had led his Stormtroopers into a great mass meeting in the Bürgerbrau. His "friend" and patron, Generalstaatskommissar Gustav von Kahr, was speaking. On the platform sat General von Lossow, Reichswehr commander in Bavaria, and Lieutenant von Seisser, Munich police chief. Hitler leaped to a table and fired two shots at the ceiling. He proclaimed the "national revolution" and the "deposition" of the governments of Bavaria and of the Reich. He ordered the three officials to join him in a near-by room, where he pleaded with them to support his putsch. When they hesitated, he brandished his weapon and declared that he had four bullets left—one for each of them and one for himself. They agreed to support him. He orated to the multitude: "Morning will find either a national government in Germany or us dead!"

With Hitler, however, inconvenient promises were always forgotten. Morning brought catastrophe. The dream dissolved. Kahr, Lossow, and Seisser "deserted" and ordered out the police and the army to suppress the Nazi paraders. Eighteen marchers died before the guns on the Odeonplatz. Hitler threw himself down, wrenched his shoulder, and fled to "Putzi" Hanfstätgl's country home at Uffing. Putzi's sister Erna nursed and consoled him. "The mere presence of a woman," he said, "may have kept me from the thought of ending my life." ² He was arrested two days later. A lenient court sentenced him to comfortable confinement at Landsberg-am-Lech.

The Party was suppressed. The cause was lost. And Hitler still lived—in misery. Perhaps suicide was best. He recalled painfully his first love, Geli Raubal, daughter of his half-sister. She had taken her life. Why not follow? But loyal, idolizing Rudolf Hess dissuaded him. He began writing *Mein Kampf* instead. And, in the end, he was

rescued by his enemies. Before Christmas of 1924 he was released from prison. He soon reorganized the Party and set it on the road toward power. The road became broad and easy after universal impoverishment at the turn of the decade drove millions of lesser burghers into his ranks and brought money and support from the rich and well born.³

The débâcle of December 1932, however, had about it a melancholy air of finality. "The Old Man," Field Marshal Paul von Benckendorff und von Hindenburg, Chief Executive of the Republic since 1925, had defeated Hitler for the Presidency on the 10th of April. Worse, he had spurned Der Führer as an irresponsible fanatic. At the end of May the President had dismissed Heinrich Brüning, Centrist leader and last democratic Chancellor of the Republic, and had appointed a reactionary "Barons' Cabinet," headed by smiling Franz von Papen, with General Kurt von Schleicher as Minister of Defense. Papen had the support of scarcely 5% of the deputies. The 230 Nazis opposed him no less vigorously than the 133 Social Democrats, the 89 Communists, and the 75 Centrists. Corpulent and brutal Hermann Göring, President of the Reichstag and Nazi leader in parliament, quarreled violently with the new Chancellor. After the Reichstag election of November 6, clever Franz was still without popular or parliamentary support. Hindenburg forced Papen out, but for Hitler he still had only contempt. He offered Der Führer the Chancellorship on November 19 on condition that he secure a majority and rule "constitutionally." Hitler could not. He refused. Papen intrigued to frustrate the negotiations. Schleicher was made Chancellor on December 2.

The NSDAP lost 2,000,000 votes and 34 deputies in the election of November 6. It now had only 32% of the electorate behind it, compared to 37% in July. Hitler had predicted 40%. But business was improving slightly. Desperation was decreasing. Hope was returning. The tides of gloom and madness among the masses were beginning to ebb. The Party was therefore ruined. Contributions from industrialists fell off. Huge bills were unpaid. The treasury, said Göbbels, was in a state of "financial calamity." In Berlin "dejected-looking young men in brown shirts rattled money-boxes timidly, and without response, in the face of unheeding passers-by."⁴ In local elections in Thuringia on December 4 the Nazi vote fell 20% below the level reached a month before. Schleicher contemplated four years in office. Gregor Strasser, who had once negotiated with Brüning behind Hit-

ler's back, now deserted Der Führer and negotiated with the Chancellor for a post in the Cabinet. Gottfried Feder, crack-pot economist who had written the Nazi Program, asked for three weeks' leave from Party work. Not without cause did Göbbels cry: "Treason!" Hitler walked the floor in the Kaiserhof.

His bitterness was felt the more keenly because he had long ago taken to heart the lessons of the Beer Hall putsch and had thereafter followed consistently an adroit political strategy which he felt would insure ultimate success. Hitler's political science was simple. Never use force against those with superior force unless you are certain that they will not employ their weapons. Terrorize the weak and timid among your foes by unrelenting pressure, but eschew open violence until you have overwhelming means of violence in your own hands. Apply the motto of the hated Habsburgs: Divide and Rule. Compromise with those who have money and might. Serve their interests so they will serve yours. Hypnotize the multitude with promises and pageantry. "The primitive simplicity of the minds of the masses renders them a more easy prey to a big lie than a small one, for they themselves often tell little lies, but would be ashamed to tell big ones. They would never credit to others the possibility of such great impudence as the complete reversal of facts."⁵

Promise everything. When your enemies have believed you and surrendered the means of their own defense, destroy them ruthlessly. Follow each repudiation of a promise with a new promise and keep each promise only so long as it is expedient to do so. Repeat the process as often as necessary. Above all, practice politics as if it were war. Insist upon military discipline and unquestioning obedience from your followers. Inspire them with mock heroism and give meaning to their empty lives by military comradeship and a martial mission. Punish treason and desertion with death. Compromise only when you can thereby trick or betray your collaborators. Never lose sight of the objective. The ultimate objective is the destruction of the enemy.

These simple and well-worn maxims of the game of power were long ago familiar to Cæsar, Machiavelli, Frederick, and Napoleon. They insure victory when the enemy is lacking in will or wit. But only a "miracle" could save the NSDAP at the close of the year 1932. The miracle came to pass. Here, as in the past, the "Savior" was saved by his enemies. In encompassing his salvation they insured their own destruction, always under the delusion that they were thereby outwitting their destroyer and purchasing their own security. This Nemesis

is also old—as old as the Trojan horse and the reliance of decadent Rome upon barbarians for defense against barbarians. The “miracle” of Nemesis was realized in Germany in 1933. On a vaster stage it was realized throughout Europe after 1933. The political technique which Hitler perfected within the Reich in the year of victory became the technique of international diplomacy and war in the succeeding years, with results seemingly miraculous to those ignorant of the instrument. The initial pattern within Germany, already foreshadowed by Mussolini, supplies the clue to the mystery of Europe’s diplomatic débâcle during the years of aftermath.

The German miracle-maker of 1933 was the ever clever and never wise Franz von Papen: gentleman officer, vain dilettante, clumsy diplomat, and saboteur under Wilhelm II.⁶ His conceit rebelled at Schleicher’s assumption of the Chancellorship. He schemed to unseat his former colleague and in his scheming he hoped that his cleverness would achieve several objectives with one blow. He would recover high office for himself; he would oust Schleicher; he would use Hitler, and at the same time he would neutralize or “MacDonaldize” Der Führer, after the manner of the British Tories in 1931.

Papen’s plan was reasonable and “realistic.” It was as clever (and as short-sighted) as the many plans of international appeasement which were to emanate from Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay after January. His proposed Cabinet would require Nazi collaboration since it was clear, despite the paralysis of the defenders of the Republic, that reaction must have a façade of mass support. The NSDAP must therefore be rescued before it disintegrated utterly. Hitler might even be given the long-coveted Chancellorship, providing that the non-Nazi reactionaries in the Ministry should outnumber the Nazis by a safe margin. To this end Papen would assume the Vice-Chancellorship and build his regime out of the timber of the Barons’ Cabinet over which Schleicher still presided. Industrialist support was essential, for money would be needed. Junker support was essential, for the Junkers had purchased Hindenburg with the gift of the Neudeck estate (1927)⁷ and had brought the Old Man to a point at which he made most of his political decisions on the basis of the interest of Junker agriculture. The key men among the industrialists were two: Fritz Thyssen, Ruhr steel magnate and president of the *Reichsverband der Industrie*, and Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the Nationalist Party as well as the Hearst-Beaverbrook-Rothermere of the Reich, with many newspapers and the Ufa Film Company under his control. The

key men among the Junkers were son Oskar von Hindenburg; Baron von Oldenburg-Januschau, donor of Neudeck; and Count Eberhard von Kalkreuth, president of the East Prussian Landbund. With these as his strands, Papen spun his web.

On Wednesday evening, January 4, 1933, a dinner party was held at the Cologne home of Baron von Schroeder, banker and friend of Thyssen. It was not reported in the society columns nor announced in the political news, although the last Chancellor and the next Chancellor of the Reich were present. It had been arranged by a nobody on the road to becoming a somebody: champagne salesman Joachim von Ribbentrop. The host-once-removed was Papen. The guest was Hitler. Despite elaborate secrecy, Schleicher's efficient agents uncovered the event and informed the press without ascertaining what took place. Hitler apparently agreed to co-operate with Papen on two conditions: money and the Chancellorship. Papen assented. Some four million marks were collected from Thyssen and other industrialists and poured into the empty Nazi treasury. The other items of the "plan" were doubtless discussed in some detail. But Papen reassured his "friend," the Chancellor in office. "Kurt," he declared a few days later in answer to a suspicious query, "in the name of our old friendship and on my word of honor as an officer and as a man, I swear to you that I will never undertake nor sanction any move whatever against you or against a government of which you are the head." Schleicher later declared: "He proved to be the kind of traitor beside whom Judas Iscariot is a saint."⁸

On January 11th Count von Kalkreuth, without consulting the Chancellor, issued a statement to the press denouncing Schleicher bitterly for failing to "protect" agriculture. Hindenburg received Schleicher and the Landbund leaders on the 12th and promised to do all he could to "rouse agriculture to new life." A banquet followed. Kalkreuth was cordial toward the Chancellor. During the meal, however, someone handed Schleicher a copy of the Count's statement. He left the table in anger and declared he would never again receive the Landbund's representatives. The Junkers now attacked him viciously and appealed to Hindenburg against him. They feared that he might fail to suppress the pending report of the Reichstag committee investigating the *Ost-Hilfe* scandal. They feared with cause that the report would reveal that public funds "in aid of agriculture" had been used by Junker families to renovate broken-down estates, to acquire new lands, and even to pay gambling debts at Monte Carlo. They feared

with cause that the name of Hindenburg himself might be besmirched. They denounced their critics as preachers of "agrarian Bolshevism." Oskar and Papen, along with Secretary Otto Meissner, had the Old Man's ear and were not averse to making suggestions.

Hitler was meanwhile engaged in recouping his political fortunes by a concentrated campaign in the little state of Lippe. A new Diet was to be elected. Der Führer spoke at no less than eighteen meetings and lavishly dispensed his newly found funds in intensive electioneering. More important, he resumed contacts with Hugenberg. Against the advice of Ernst Oberfohren, parliamentary leader of the Nationalists, the walrus-faced press magnate made a secret deal with Der Führer. Hitler would be Chancellor, Papen Vice-Chancellor, and Hugenberg Minister of Economics. A majority of the new Cabinet must be non-Nazi, but Hugenberg agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the Reichstag and a new national election. Hindenburg received Hugenberg cordially on Sunday the 15th. The polling in Lippe on the same day was gratifying. The NSDAP won over 40% of the votes. The Old Man at Neudeck could be won by playing upon his fears of "agrarian Bolshevism." General Werner von Blomberg, East Prussian commander of the Reichswehr, was converted by the promise of a Cabinet post and the gift of an estate near Königsberg, donated by Junker landowners with Nazi sympathies. On the 18th Schleicher was compelled to accept an emergency decree forbidding the forced sale of bankrupt estates east of the Elbe until October 31.

Schleicher now asked Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag. Another electoral rebuff might well liquidate the brown menace for all time, since Hitler lived on the illusion of inevitable victory. The President refused and asked Schleicher to refrain from making a statement before parliament on the *Ost-Hilfe*. Schleicher refused unless the Reichstag should be dissolved. On Saturday morning, January 28, 1933, Hindenburg asked Schleicher to resign. As the Chancellor departed by one door, Papen entered by another and was at once entrusted with the task of forming a new Cabinet. Papen "negotiated." Hitler wondered whether he had again been betrayed. Schleicher cast about for support. He conferred in the afternoon with trade union leaders and apparently discussed the possibility of a putsch, supported by the Reichswehr and a general strike, to keep Papen and Hitler from power. But Theodore Leipert, leader of the Social Democratic unions, had as many scruples about offering "unconstitutional" resistance to a Presidential violation of the Constitution as his fellow Socialists, Otto

Braun and Karl Severing, had displayed the preceding July when Papen suppressed the Socialist Cabinet of Prussia. The commanders of the Potsdam garrison were favorable. The leaders of the Catholic trade unions were favorable. The Communist Party would support such a move. Doubtless many of the Socialist rank and file would approve. But the leaders shrank from action. . . .

On Sunday January 29 a hundred thousand workers demonstrated against Hitler and Fascism in Berlin's Lustgarten. But the *Frankfurter Zeitung* echoed the hollow voice of German liberalism with the suggestion that a Hitler Cabinet might "tame" the Nazis. Schleicher hesitated until it was too late. Hitler kept silent. Papen negotiated. On Monday morning January 30 at eleven o'clock Hindenburg named the new Cabinet: Hitler, *Reichskanzler*; Papen, Vice-Chancellor; Hugenberg, Minister of Economics; Franz Seldte (Stahlhelm leader), Minister of Labor; Blomberg, Minister of Defense; and the remnants of the Barons' Cabinet in other posts—Lutz von Schwerin-Krosigk, Minister of Finance; Franz Gürtner, Minister of Justice; Baron von Eltz-Rübenach, Minister of Posts and Transports; Günther Gerecke, Minister of Employment; Baron Konstantin von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Two other Nazis obtained Cabinet positions: Göring, Minister without portfolio (he became Premier of Prussia on March 11 and Reich Minister of Air on March 28), and Wilhelm Frick Minister of the Interior. "And now, gentlemen," muttered the Old Man, "forward with God!"

To Göbbels it was "like a dream."⁹ The Party had the Chancellorship at last and control of the police as well. The nine non-Nazis in the Cabinet, however, were certain that they could "tame" Hitler, Göring, and Frick. Schleicher abdicated. The Socialist leaders said they would do nothing until the new Government acted "illegally." On Monday evening Hitler, Göring, and Hindenburg stood in the Chancellery windows on Wilhelmstrasse and reviewed a torchlight parade of the S.A. and the Stahlhelm. Seven hundred thousand people marched by. Delirious enthusiasm boiled and bubbled through the capital. On the following morning the Catholic Labor Federation and the General Federation of Labor issued a joint denunciation of the new Cabinet. But they proposed no action. A Communist call for a general strike evoked no response. On Wednesday, despite doubts on the part of Hugenberg, the President dissolved the Reichstag and ordered new elections for March 5.

The farce now unrolled swiftly. Hitler denounced Bolshevism and

promised bread, work, honor, and freedom along with the protection of Christianity, the family, and the hallowed traditions of the great German past. He demanded the suppression of the Communist Party, all of whose meetings were banned by a decree of February 2. Papen and Hugenberg, who had put Hitler in the Chancellorship in the name of "saving the Fatherland from Communism," opposed the dissolution of the Communist Party, since this step might well give the NSDAP a majority in the election. Had they not planned carefully to keep the Nazis in a minority? Hitler had other plans. On February 10 in the Sportpalast he hinted at the future: "Our program? . . . We will not lie and we will not swindle! . . . In us alone lies the future of the German people. . . . If the German people should desert us, that will not restrain us. We will take the course that is necessary to save Germany from ruin!"¹⁰ Papen, Hugenberg, and Seldte began to wonder. Newspapers, meetings, and organizations were being suppressed on every hand, while Communist and Socialist leaders were being hunted down and arrested by scores. On the 20th Göring ordered the police to shoot "Communist terrorists" on sight or face punishment for failing to act. Göbbels hinted at an impending Communist revolution. He issued documents to demonstrate the reality of the Red peril from which only the NSDAP could save Germany. If the wavering electorate could be herded into the Nazi camp through fear or belated conversion, Hitler's clever rescuers and allies would be undone.

The trick was neatly turned. The inspiration came from Göbbels. The execution was apparently entrusted to a group of Stormtroopers directed by Röhm, Heines, Killinger, and Helldorf.¹¹ The technique was implicit in the very *raison d'être* of the NSDAP, but to Papen, Hugenberg, and the "respectables" it was so shocking as to be entirely unanticipated and incredible. On Monday evening February 27, six days before the election, the interior of the Reichstag building was destroyed by a terrific conflagration of chemical origin. A Dutch half-wit and ex-Communist, Marinus Van der Lubbe, was arrested in the burning building. He was later tried before the Reich Supreme Court (another concession to "legality") along with Ernst Torgler, Communist parliamentary leader, and three Bulgarian Communists: Wassil Tanev, Blagoi Popov, and Georgi Dimitrov. On December 23, 1933, the court acquitted Torgler and the three Bulgarians and found Van der Lubbe guilty of high treason and insurrectionary arson, committed in "deliberate co-operation with others" who were "unknown." The luckless Dutchman was beheaded on January 10, 1934.

Dimitrov, who had aroused world-wide admiration by his taunting defiance of Göring, went to Moscow and was elected Secretary-General of the Communist International on August 21, 1935.

At the time of the fire Göring and Hitler at once announced that the outrage was the work of the Communist Party and constituted a signal for bloody proletarian revolt. By prearranged plan, hundreds of Communist and Socialist leaders were at once pounced upon and jailed. Hitler persuaded Hindenburg the next morning to suppress all civil liberties and to authorize Stormtroopers to arrest suspects "for the protection of the nation from the Communist menace."¹² All Marxist activities and publications were stamped out. All Centrists and liberals who complained were accused of sympathy for "Bolshevist terrorists." The election campaign swept to its climax in a frenzy of apprehension.

On Sunday March 5 the terrified German electorate expressed its preferences for the last time. The NSDAP won 17,277,000 votes (43.9% of the total) and 288 seats. Almost unbelievably the Socialists retained 120 seats and the Communists 81, with the Centrum in fourth place with 74 and the Hugenberg-Seldte "Fighting Front" a poor fifth with 52. The Nazis still lacked a majority and were in theory dependent upon the Fighting Front deputies. Papen and Hugenberg were momentarily relieved. But Nationalist theory gave way to Nazi practice. The 81 Communist deputies were excluded and arrested. The NSDAP thus had a clear majority. The Party was in undisputed power—and by "legal" means!

The comedy of legality was played out to its end with a delicate irony paralleling the savage sadism of the brown terror which simultaneously swept through the Reich. On March 21 the new Reichstag met. Two days later Hitler appealed for the passage of an "Enabling Act" giving the Cabinet dictatorial powers. But Der Führer was reassuring, despite talk of "barbaric ruthlessness" against treason and threats of "war" against his critics. The law itself¹³ specified that the positions of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, as well as the powers of the President, would remain undisturbed and that the extraordinary authority conferred would expire April 1, 1937, or whenever the "present national Cabinet is replaced by another." In economic policy, said Hitler in his plea for support, "the strongest support of private initiative and recognition of property" would be assured. Taxes would be lightened and public expenditures reduced. The government must "protect and further the millions of German workers in

their struggle for the right to live. As Chancellor and National-socialist, I feel myself bound to them as companions of my youth." Autarchy was unthinkable. No one need fear abuse of power. "The government will make use of these powers only in so far as they are essential for carrying out the vitally necessary measures. Neither the existence of the Reichstag nor that of the Reichsrat is menaced. The position and rights of the President remain unaffected. . . . The separate existence of the federal states will not be done away with. The rights of the churches will not be diminished and their relationship to the State will not be modified."¹⁴ Only the Social Democrats voted against the act. The vote was 94 to 441. Centrists, Nationalists, Bavarian People's Party, State Party—all gave approval and thereby dug their graves.

This blunder of misplaced confidence was irretrievably fatal. On May 2, 1933, all the trade unions were abolished, their leaders arrested, and their funds confiscated. The Socialist Party, which had bowed, scraped, licked the dust, and even voted "confidence" in Hitler after his foreign-policy speech of May 17, was dissolved on June 22. The Nationalist Party suffered a like fate "voluntarily" on June 27 and the State Party on June 28. The Centrum, the Bavarian People's Party, and the German People's Party were suppressed on July 4 and 5. A decree of July 14, 1933, made the NSDAP the "only political party in Germany."¹⁵ All monarchist organizations were dissolved on February 1, 1934. As for the "present national Cabinet," the nine non-Nazis had been reduced to six by June 30, 1933, while the three Nazis had been increased to eight. Göbbels became Minister of Folk Enlightenment and Propaganda on March 15; Walter Darré became Minister of Agriculture; Hugenberg's successor, Kurt Schmitt, joined the Party, as did Seldte; Rudolf Hess joined the Cabinet without portfolio on June 29. These changes, along with the expiration date of April 1, 1937, were conveniently ignored by *Der Führer*. Property rights and private initiative became memories. Autarchy was the order of the day. Taxes soared and public expenditures climbed still higher. The systematic persecution of the Catholic and Protestant churches was well advanced by the summer of 1933. The Reichstag was reduced, with its own "consent," to an all-Nazi assembly devoid of all authority. The Reichsrat, also with its "consent," was abolished by the "Reich Reform Law" of February 1, 1934, which likewise abolished the federal states.¹⁶ Following the death of Hindenburg, on August 2, 1934, Hitler combined the powers of the Presidency and the Chan-

cellorship into a *Reichsführerschaft*, which he assumed at once, almost three weeks before the referendum of August 19 which "ratified" this change.

No less droll was the destiny of the well-publicized Nazi Program of February 24, 1920. Its slogan "The Common Weal before Self" remained a platitude. Its second slogan, "Break the Bonds of Interest Slavery," never became more than a monument of words to Gottfried Feder's weird economics. Among the 25 points¹⁷ those which promised Pan-Germanism (1), abolition of the peace treaties (2), territorial expansion (3), discrimination against the Jews (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 23), the formation of a national army (22), censorship of the press (23), and governmental centralization (25) were indeed carried out as rapidly as circumstances permitted. But those which promised "socialism" were promptly relegated to limbo, thanks to Hitler's bargain with the industrialists and the Junkers who placed him in power. These planks were embalmed in the museum of political curiosities: "abolition of incomes unearned by work" (11), "ruthless confiscation of all war profits" (12), "nationalization of trusts" (13), "profit-sharing in wholesale trade" (14), "extensive development of provision for old age" (15), "municipalization of department stores and their lease at a cheap rate to small traders" (16), "confiscation without compensation of land for common purposes; abolition of interest on land loans, and prevention of all speculation in land" (17), death for "usurers, profiteers, etc." (18), enlargement of opportunities for higher education (20), and religious liberty coupled with "positive Christianity" (24).

The fate of those who made possible the German Fascist revolution is equally instructive. Hugenberg's friend and Hindenburg's campaign manager, Günther Gerecke, was arrested for embezzlement on March 23, 1933. Hugenberg's parliamentary leader, Ernst Oberfohren, was accused of plotting against Hugenberg on March 29. He was found shot to death in his home on May 7. Hugenberg was forced to resign from the Cabinet on June 27, 1933. On "Bloody Saturday," June 30, 1934, Schleicher and his wife were slain, along with Gregor Strasser, Gustav von Kahr, Ernst Röhm, Edmund Heines, Karl Ernst, and hundreds of other victims of the "purge." Papen was assaulted, arrested, and barely escaped with his life. His friend Edgar Jung; his aide, Herbert von Bose; his collaborator in Catholic Action, Erich Klausener; his protégé, Adelbert Probst, leader of the Catholic youth—were all killed by the henchmen of Himmler and Göring with Hit-

ler's approval. The Vice-Chancellor resigned. After Hindenburg died in his dotage, Papen was sent to Vienna to restore "friendly relations" with an Austria whose Chancellor had been slain by the Nazis on July 25. His new aide and attaché at the Vienna legation, Baron Wilhelm von Kettler, disappeared on March 12, 1938. The body was later found in the Danube. Thyssen and Kalkreuth, along with the plutocrats and aristocrats whom they represented, had less to complain of, but they found no joy in the totalitarian tyranny of the new Nazi élite. The "realists" thus drank deeply of the bitter wine they had themselves prepared for others.

2 . THE CULT OF ANNIHILATION

The ever lengthening shadow of the swastika was less the shade of a man or a cult or a country writ large than the projection of a new political technique on an ever larger screen. In politics, as in other arts, there is perhaps nothing wholly new under the sun. Inventiveness and artistry consist in combining familiar elements into new patterns and in adapting them to new media and new purposes. Hitler's high-pressure campaigning achieved phenomenal results because a potential market for the advertised product already existed and because his competitors were blundering drummers incapable of making their wares appear attractive. But his sales technique was a work of genius. Der Führer and his aides won a mass following through an adroit combination of the skills of the religious revivalist, the commercial advertiser, the grand master of the secret society, the stage manager, the ballet director, and the recruiting officer. After victory was won, these techniques were extended and perfected to mobilize mass enthusiasm, convert doubters, and silence critics.

Victory itself, however, was not a direct consequence of these devices, for they never won a majority of the German electorate to the cause nor did they suffice to put the NSDAP in power. They created and inspired the Nazi army. The staff plan by which that army was enabled to storm the ramparts of the Weimar Republic was distinct from the institutional and psychological mechanisms which brought the army together, maintained it intact, and kept its morale high. Here, as in war, the art of strategy is different from the science of administration. Nazi administrative skill could have only a limited application outside the borders of the Reich. But Nazi political strategy

had possibilities in the realm of diplomacy quite undreamed of at the outset and quite as miraculous in ultimate results in the sphere of international politics as it had been in the sphere of German domestic affairs. Upon the success or failure of this strategy depended the final verdict of events upon the proud boast of the Nazi youth: "Today we have conquered Germany! Tomorrow the world is ours!"

The key to the new dispensation lay in a social process of which Hitler was not cause but merely product and beneficiary. That process reflected the material and spiritual decadence of the lower middle class—a decadence manifesting itself in militarism and mass heroics throughout Central Europe and in paralyzed bewilderment in the democracies of the West. Behind the fanfare of the *Führerprinzip*, behind the terror and exaltation of the "national awakening," behind the new state-form and the new science of propaganda lay a vast and slowly maturing transformation of attitudes and values, having its origin in the Central-European *Kleinbürgertum* and spreading from its focal point upward and downward into higher and lower social strata and outward into peripheral areas. The end result of this transformation in Germany was the militarization of the *petite bourgeoisie*—i.e. the conversion of stolid, peaceable, money-minded burghers into fanatic fighters dedicated to totalitarian victory in a totalitarian war. Fascist diplomacy, like Fascist economics, art, and philosophy, is unintelligible save in terms of this mass transformation of shopkeepers into warriors.

The vocation of arms in the Western world was for centuries a traditional prerogative of the landed aristocracy. In the feudal age gentlemen were fighters and little else. War and diplomacy in the late medieval period, the Renaissance, and the early modern age reflected the ideals of chivalry and the stylistic formalism of the landed nobility. At the end of the eighteenth century this nobility gave way to the bourgeoisie at the top of the social hierarchy. The small, mercenary standing armies, officered by aristocrats, gave way to the mass army, officered by a new élite of military experts. These captains of peoples-in-arms became in most European States a professional officers' corps which was bureaucratic rather than aristocratic in its attitudes, even where the highest posts were still monopolized by those with blue-blooded ancestry. Here too, in a different setting, there developed forms, styles, and standards of ethics and honor which stamped themselves upon diplomatic practice and international law.¹⁸

This professional military caste, along with its aristocratic forebears, suffered an all but fatal eclipse in the outcome of the First World War. In Russia it was utterly destroyed. In Germany and the Habsburg succession States it was discredited. Its counterparts in France, Italy, Britain, and America knew victory without glory and honor without influence. In the decade of the 1920's the militarism of the nineteenth century was almost as dead as the chivalry of the thirteenth, not only because a new international concert of power offered little scope for the profession of the warrior, but because plutocrats, peasants, proletarians, and petty burghers alike held professional soldiers in small esteem and sneered at gentlemen whose only vocation was arms.

The new militarism of Fascismo and National-socialism was neither aristocratic nor bureaucratic, but bourgeois. In its decay the least militant and war-minded of social classes became militarized and war-mad, like rabbits turned terrifyingly into wolves or hyenas. The militarization of the *Kleinbürgertum* stemmed from sources as deep-seated as those of the sickness of late capitalism and as complex as those of the Great Depression. The post-war inflation and the primary post-war deflation brought impoverishment and degradation to millions of little men. The far more severe and prolonged secondary post-war deflation reduced more millions to misery. These multitudes in Central Europe were for the most part solid citizens who had grown to maturity under relatively undemocratic but quasi-liberal political regimes which they respected. They had fought and bled for their fatherlands and had known the bitterness of defeat. During four years of hostilities they had tasted forbidden fruits of martial indulgence and had relished them the more for the sin and suffering which accompanied them. They were patriots and they were veterans. But their homelands were lost in helpless disgrace. Their sacrifices seemed vain. They had obeyed their officers, respected their "betters," and worshipped their kings. All these idols were now broken.

After the *débâcle* many of them embraced a new liberalism and a new pacifism, only to find no economic security and no hope in these alien faiths. They asked, burgher-like, for a chance to trade and grow rich or at least "comfortable." The chance was held out briefly and then denied them by the far-reaching frustrations of a maladjusted world economy of which they knew little and understood less. A new generation of ever more faithless and hopeless youth swelled the ranks

of despair and cried aloud against the reactionary profiteers above them in the social scale and against the radicalized proletarians to whose level they felt themselves degraded.

From these insecurities and tribulations came a widespread cry for revolt and retribution. Most of the phenomena of middle-class madness which swept the Continent after 1929 are explicable in terms of the tensions and aggressions of an inchoate, ambivalent, and ambiguous social stratum which had long been socially and economically insecure and had lost its faith in liberty and reason. "Order, hierarchy, discipline," in the words of Mussolini, were the demands of the new day. North of the Alps and east of the Rhine, anti-Semitism was an exciting and satisfying mode of discharge for hatreds against rich and radicals alike. Anti-Marxism marched side by side with anti-capitalism. Butchers and bakers and candlestick-makers could not be capitalists and would not be proletarians. They therefore damned both. Little men in misery sought bigness in pride of blood and race. Their frustrated patriotism begot a hotter and more passionate patriotism. Their frustrated hopes of wealth begot a bourgeois "socialism" or "syndicalism." Their weariness of responsibility, their fatigue with empty talk, begot a desire for an end of thinking and talking and a deep longing for an all-embracing Faith which would answer all questions and an all-knowing Savior who would ask of them only obedience.¹⁹

The common denominator of this awakening was mass militarism. Its prototype was no longer the armed and armored baron, swelled with pride of power, nor yet the decorated staff officer of a later age, charged with operating a great military machine. The apostle of the new militarism was plain John Everyman, fresh from his grocery counter, where business was poor, or his accountant's office, where life was dull, or his university, where learning brought no reward save truth that had somehow become empty. He found meaning in life once more by donning a colored shirt, marching behind a band, cheering a Messiah who reassured him as to his own importance and promised salvation and glory for himself and his fatherland. This new army with banners, marching as to war, recaptured the faded exaltation of the trenches with little of its stench and horror. Wagnerian pageantry bewitched eye and ear. Street fights, riots, and assaults upon Jews and "Reds" furnished danger and excitement. All for one and one for all! The Leader is always right! Believe, obey, fight! Blood and soil! Bread and honor! Germany awake!

Raise high the flags! Stand rank on rank together.
Stormtroopers march with steady, quiet tread.
Our comrades brave, shot down by Red Front and Reaction,
In spirit march before the ranks they led.

Make free the street for brown battalions marching!
Make free the streets! Stormtroopers stride ahead.
Already millions gaze with hope upon our banner.
The day now dawns for Freedom and for Bread.²⁰

These private armies of rebellion—black shirts in Italy, brown shirts in Germany, other shirts elsewhere—were subsidized by industrialists and aristocrats for ends of their own. Only in this fashion were they enabled to storm the citadels of government. The price of power was high. Everyman found himself betrayed and his hopes of liquidating capitalists and nobles, along with Marxists, Jews, and liberals, forever deferred. But this was of small consequence to Everyman, for the ends of the movement in which he had submerged himself had ceased to be important save as verbiage and millennial vision. The play was all. Obedience, self-sacrifice, martial fervor were good in themselves. In his heart he could echo Nietzsche: say not that a good cause justifies any war, but that a good war sanctifies any cause. Prussianism and Romanticism here met and were wed.²¹ Means had become ends. And, as in all militarism, the part swallowed the whole, the organ absorbed the organism, the fighter who rose to defend the State became master of a State which now existed only to exalt fighters and fighting.

The militarization of the *Kleinbürgertum* begot the militarization of the party of revolt, and this in turn, once victorious, begot the militarization of politics and of the State on a scale beyond all imagining by the militarists of old. Everyman herein found escape from his anxieties. His Leader found an instrument of power which cut to shreds the ranks of those still addicted to free speech and compromise and the shabby devices of pacifism and parliamentarianism. His new rulers forged a weapon which could confound and defeat foreign foes no less readily than enemies at home. The men of money and the men of title had hired the new men of shirt and bludgeon to protect their privileges and save them from the threats of the sweaty men with hammers and sickles. But the new men of might outgrew their masters. They were content to protect money and titles and the preroga-

tives thereof, but the lords of the realm were now the leaders of the gunmen of the lesser bourgeoisie. The genii summoned from darkness to save Property not only demolished the Liberal State of merchants and masses, but erected a Garrison State of warriors dedicated to the cult of Mars. Here Power was a higher imperative than Property. Violence became a creed and a way of life.²²

The new practitioners of violence were neither knights nor gentlemen nor bureaucrats of war. They were Little Cæsars. They were captains of the colored shirts. They were gang-leaders and commanders of private armies recruited from the ranks of the desperate and hopeless. They were John Everyman exalted—pygmies elevated abruptly to the seats of the mighty, tortured and twisted by past deprivations and consumed with envy, malice, and ambition. They lacked polish, form, style. They had no standards save those of their own making, conceived in the desperation of want and born in the fury of battle. They were cruder, more violent, more unscrupulous, and therefore more dangerous than the *condottieri* of the Renaissance or the Prætorian Guards of the Cæsars of old. By every criterion of decency and honor hitherto prevalent in Western culture, they were blackguards and barbarians—with their barbarism turned to frenzy by hysterical devotion to a cause and their criminality turned to statecraft by political inventiveness and organizing genius. Book-burning, Jew-baiting, the stab-in-the-back, and the shot-in-the-night were their stock in trade.

This new political force, for all its fierceness, was in no sense irresistible. In Italy, Germany and Japan, however, and in other States as well, those who were doomed to subordination and enslavement by the victory of the new aspirants for power were consistently incapable of offering any effective resistance. Aristocrats and plutocrats subsidized political gangsterism. That portion of the lesser bourgeoisie which remained faithful to liberalism fought intolerance with tolerance, aggression with acquiescence, fanaticism with compromise, brutality with verbiage. The proletariat, often enough noisily militant and revolutionary in fantasy and posture, offered no militant opposition to the new militarists bent upon smashing its organizations and reducing it to serfdom. The domestic foes which were conquered by the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, and the Japanese war lords were already self-defeated by their own confusion and impotence in the face of the unreserved recklessness and unscrupulous will-to-power of their destroyers.

But mere passivity in the face of attack was insufficient to produce so utter a débâcle for the enemies of Fascism and so overwhelming a victory for the would-be Cæsars. The victors were actively helped to victory by the vanquished. Time after time the cause was rescued from ruin by its enemies. Each group of foes permitted itself to be persuaded that Fascist victory would save it from imaginary terrors and would enable it to gain a victory of its own over some rival group. The landed gentry and the capitalistic élite rallied to the support of the gangster-militias in order to buy protection from "Bolshevism" and to achieve the disintegration of peasant and proletarian organizations disposed to challenge the social status quo. The unconverted portion of the *Kleimbürgertum* was paralyzed by doubts, fears, and hopes. Even if promises were myths, they still were good. In a faithless age, one must believe in something. Among the workers, Communists saw in Fascist victory the undoing of the Social Democrats and the certain precursor of proletarian revolution. Social Democrats welcomed the liquidation of their Communist rivals for leadership of the masses. Fascism's will-to-power was matched by its foes' collective will-to-suicide.²³ Those whom Fascism could not destroy encompassed voluntarily their own destruction.

This disposition of Fascism's enemies and victims to purchase peace by surrender was also duplicated on the larger stage of European diplomacy. The tragedy of national politics was to be replayed in international politics. Victory followed the shirted legions of the Little Cæsars in the arena of *Weltpolitik*. Nemesis pursued their opponents. Here, as in every theater of combat, cowardice and stupidity are inevitably beaten by fanaticism. When madmen and paralytics strive for the mastery of the world, the conclusion is foregone.

3 *VOLK AND VÖLKERBUND*

In the life cycle of individuals senility is often a caricature of childhood. In the evolution of civilizations decay and approaching death are often accompanied by a morbid reversion toward primitivism. Early societies are "folk cultures," bound together by ties of fellow-feeling which are naïve, almost unconscious, and frequently creative of great art through the media of folk-lore and folk religion. The transition from "culture" to "civilization" in the Spenglerian sense is, among other things, a transition from folk society, dedicated to paro-

chial gods and to the vehement assertion of the ethnic solidarity of the tribe, to the Great Society dedicated to rationalism, cosmopolitanism, and world organization.

In their decadence the successive Great Societies which have nurtured the world civilizations of the past have commonly disintegrated into disjointed fragments. In each broken valley the twilight men who live in fear of night have sought solace in fearful attempts to return to the gods and to the ways of life of some remote and never-to-be-recaptured dawn. The attempt is always caricature, for the stream of time flows forward and there is no way by which a people can go back to its childhood. But in the effort a people can readily enough revert to savagery, superstition, and pagan religiosity.

A century ago Heinrich Heine predicted the retrogression of his fatherland toward the barbarism of the ancient Germans:

The philosopher of Nature will be terrible because he will appear in alliance with the primitive powers of Nature, able to evoke the demoniac energies of old Germanic Pantheism—doing which there will awake in him that battle-madness which we find among the ancient Teutonic races who fought neither to kill nor to conquer, but for the very love of fighting itself. It is the fairest merit of Christianity that it somewhat mitigated that brutal German *gaudium certaminis* or joy in battle, but it could not destroy it. And should that subduing talisman, the Cross, break, then will come crashing and roaring forth the wild madness of the old champions, the insane Berserker rage, of which the Northern poets say and sing. That talisman is brittle, and the day will come when it will pitifully break. The old stone gods will rise from long-forgotten ruin and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes, and Thor, leaping to life with his giant hammer, will crush the Gothic cathedrals!

[*The Works of Heinrich Heine*, translated by Charles Godfrey Leland. New York: Dutton; 1906. Vol. V, pp. 207f.]

Heine's prophecy has come to pass. "Nationalsocialism" is thus far the most complete expression in the twentieth century of the cultural arteriosclerosis of European civilization. The central purpose of its devotees is to combine the technology of the machine age with the primitive simplicity and unchallenged regimentation of a folk society. The word most frequently on their lips is "*Volk*." Fichte assured his countrymen in 1808 that they were an *Urvolk* (a primeval people)

speaking an *Ursprache*. This *motif* of atavism runs uninterruptedly through Hegel, Schlegel, Paul de la Garde, List, Lang, Treitschke, Nietzsche, Wagner, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain to Volkführer Hitler, where it rises to full crescendo.²⁴ The Third Reich is a "*Völkischer Staat*." The leading paper of the NSDAP is the "*Völkischer Beobachter*." The car for the masses is the "*Volkswagen*." Coarse bread for the hungry is "*Volksbrot*." Cheap sausage for the poor is "*Volkswurst*." A folk culture must somehow be reconstituted. Its ideals must be anti-rational, anti-liberal, anti-cosmopolitan. Its way of life, dominated by jealous provincial deities, must be narrow and parochial, fanatical and intolerant. The racial myth of Nordicism, Aryanism, and anti-Semitism is but an aspect of this disinterment of the putrid remains of Hermann the Teuton, Alaric the Goth, and Attila the Hun. The swastika is the symbol of the primitive. On its banners the Third Reich inscribes: *In Hoc Signo Vinco*.

This new faith dug up from the dead is incompatible with the Great Society of the contemporary age. One will prevail. The other will perish. The two cannot coexist. The most significant effort thus far made to give the Great Society a framework of political organization commensurate with the world-wide technological and economic interdependence of modern mankind is embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The dream of Wilson caught the imagination of German Liberalism. The German Republic under Stresemann's leadership joined the "*Völkerbund*" at Geneva in 1926. But the *Völkerbund* of Wilson and the *Völkischer Staat* of Hitler are antithetical. The Third Reich left Geneva in October of 1933. Berlin subsequently made various offers to return—always for a price—but following the withdrawal of Fascist Italy on December 11, 1937, the German Government declared that "nothing will change the conviction which it shares with the Italian Government that the Geneva political system is pernicious. The return of Germany to the League, therefore, will never again be considered." The very name was forbidden. Henceforth the League would be referred to in the Reich merely as "The Geneva Entente." Thus was *Völkerbund* expunged from the vocabulary of *Völkischer Deutschland*.²⁵

This act symbolized more than Nazi contempt for democratic Powers which had shrunk in fear from using the League to penalize German treaty-breaking or to thwart Fascist aggression in Asia, Africa, and Europe. It symbolized a parting of the ways fraught with incalculably tragic consequences for the whole of Western civiliza-

tion. The way of Wilson, in aspiration if not in performance, was a way toward order and justice in a Great Society of interdependent States bound, for the sake of their own salvation, to act together in fulfillment of their common purposes. The way of Hitler, in performance if not in aspiration, was the way toward anarchy and violence in a lawless jungle of warring sovereignties competing by trickery and force for the mastery of a ruined world. This conception is implicit in all the preachings of Der Führer. And for all his followers Der Führer can say and do no wrong:

We believe on this earth solely in Adolf Hitler. We believe that Nationalsocialism is the sole faith and salvation of our people. We believe there is a God in heaven who has created us, led us, and publicly laid His blessing upon us. We believe that God has sent us Adolf Hitler so that Germany may receive a foundation for its existence through all eternity. Adolf Hitler, hail victory! ²⁶

The diplomatic objectives of the Third Reich were long ago stated by the Nazi Messiah with a clarity which admits of no misunderstanding. The statement, moreover, was initially made in the Koran of the movement: Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, which was declared by the *Völkischer Beobachter* of December 11, 1933, to contain "for the present and for the future the final principles of Nationalsocialism. It should become the Bible of the German people." Since May 1, 1936, it has been presented by the Ministry of the Interior to all newly married couples—provided that the husband is of German nationality and that both partners are non-Jewish. Over four million copies of this Holy Writ have been distributed. Quite apart from other sources of income the author has become a millionaire: ³ from the royalties of this, his only book.

Hitler's basic assumptions regarding international relations are simple and brutal: ²⁷

The ideas of pacifism and humanity may be quite good after the supreme race has conquered and subdued the world in such a measure as makes him its exclusive master. . . . Therefore, first fight, and then, perhaps—pacifism (pp. 315-16).

If the German people had possessed that safe herd instinct based on blood . . . the German Reich would probably today be mistress of the globe. . . . Then perhaps we could have

attained what today so many misled pacifists hope to get by whining and blubbering: Peace . . . upheld not by the olive branches of lacrimonious hired female mourners, but established by the victorious sword of a master nation which leads the world to serve a higher culture (pp. 437-8).

State boundaries are created by men and altered by men. The fact of success by a people in excessive acquisition of territory carries no higher guarantee of eternal approval. It proves at the most the power of the conqueror and the weakness of the victim. It is from this power alone that right is derived. If the German people today are cramped in impossible space and look to a wretched future, this is no decree of destiny, but is simply a refusal to stand and offer challenge (pp. 740-1).

Germany will become a World Power, or it will not be at all. To be a World Power, however, it needs a territory which in the present age would give it the necessary importance, and to its citizens the means of life (p. 742).

Never allow two Continental Powers in Europe to arise. Look upon every attempt to organize a second military Power on the frontiers of Germany—even though it be only in the form of a State susceptible of military development—as an attack upon Germany, and think it not alone a right but a duty to prevent such a State from arising, or to smash it if it has arisen, by every means, including armed force. Have a care that the strength of our people should be founded not upon colonies but upon the soil of the European home. Never deem the Reich assured if it cannot give all the offspring of our people a bit of land of their own for centuries to come. Never forget that the most sacred right in this world is the right to the soil which one may till for oneself, and that the holiest sacrifice is the blood shed for this soil (p. 754).

Hitler is no less explicit as to the methods which must be employed to realize these objectives:

Oppressed lands will not be led back into the bosom of the common Reich through flaming protests, but through a mighty sword. To forge this sword is the task of the internal political leadership of a people; to protect the forging and to seek allies in arms are the task of foreign policy (p. 689).

One must be perfectly clear that the recovery of lost provinces is not achieved by solemn invocations of the beloved Lord,

nor through pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only through armed violence (p. 708).

As to the direction of his struggle, Hitler early committed himself to an "East Orientation" in foreign policy. Here as in other things he was much influenced by one of his earliest colleagues, Alfred Rosenberg, who later became editor of the *Völkischer Beobachter* (1921), head of the Foreign Policy Bureau of the NSDAP (1933), Kultur-Leader and "Director of Weltanschauung for the Reich," and author of *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930), second only in sacredness to Hitler's autobiography. Rosenberg was born in Reval on January 12, 1893, of an old family of Baltic Germans. In the Russian revolution he became a violent anti-Bolshevik and fled ultimately to Munich, where he engaged in anti-Semitic and anti-Marxist propaganda. He met Hitler and joined the Party in 1919. This scowling, pasty-faced fanatic was from his youth imbued with hatred for Russia, Slavdom, Communism, Catholicism, Freemasonry, and Liberalism. He is an apostle of Nietzsche and Chamberlain and a preacher of Nordic superiority and Teutonic supremacy.²⁸ Rosenberg fully accepted Hitler's contention (he may indeed have converted Der Führer to this view) that France was a monstrous citadel of Negro-Jewish militarism and Freemasonry, used by the Israelites to oppress the Reich and bastardize the white race.²⁹ He agreed that France must be crushed. "Other continents have their apes, Europe has its Frenchmen!"³⁰ That 36,000,000 French apes should have more land than 70,000,000 German heroes was intolerable.³¹

But Rosenberg envisaged the annihilation of France merely as a means to an end. The end was a free hand for the Reich in the East. Germany must crush Slavdom, destroy Bolshevism, and carve out a new empire on the steppes. This dream had once achieved brief reality in the conqueror's peace of Brest-Litovsk imposed by the Second Reich upon a prostrate Russia in 1918. This mirage so fascinated Rosenberg and Hitler in post-War Munich that Der Führer's first great political oration in the Eberlbraukeller in October 1919 was devoted to an indictment of Versailles and a eulogy of Brest-Litovsk. He recurred again and again to this theme in later years and made it a *Leitmotiv* of his book. Since the theme was Rosenberg's, though the words were Hitler's, the Baltic anti-Bolshevik could say with pride that the Holy Scripture "represents for all future days the unshakable basis of Nationalsocialist feeling and thought: for today, tomorrow,

and the days beyond.”³² Der Führer’s conversion to the new *Drang nach Osten* was complete. Behold the Book:

We must take up an active policy and throw ourselves into a final and decisive fight with France, with the greatest of German aims at stake. Only then will the eternal and unfruitful struggle between us and France be brought to a conclusion; on condition that the annihilation of France be looked upon solely as a means of gaining finally the possibility of expansion for our people. Today there are 80,000,000 Germans in Europe! The justification of this foreign policy will be acknowledged when after a hundred years 250,000,000 Germans will be living on this continent (pp. 766-7).

Although we realize the necessity of a settlement with France . . . this could not exhaust the aims of our foreign policy. Its only means could and will be to protect our rear so as to get more living-room for our people in Europe (p. 741).

To crush or immobilize France, Germany must seek Italy and Britain as allies (pp. 704-5, 697, 699, 720-1). But the goal is expansion toward the East:

We start anew where we terminated six centuries ago. We reverse the eternal Germanic migration to the South and to the West of Europe and look Eastwards. In this way we bring to an end the colonial and trade policies of pre-War times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future. If we speak of new soil we can but think first of Russia and her subject border States (p. 742).

The whole political leadership of the [Second] Reich should have dedicated itself to this exclusive aim. . . . Only with England to cover our rear would it have been possible to begin the new Teutonic march. Its justification would have been no less valid than was that of our ancestors. None of our pacifists refuses to eat the corn of the East, although the first plow was called “sword”! To gain England’s favor no sacrifice should have been too great. We should have denied ourselves colonies and sea-power, and have spared British industry from our competition (pp. 153-4).

Fortunately, concluded Der Führer in 1926, Germany’s opportunity would soon present itself. Under Bolshevism the Jewish “ferment

of decomposition" would presently lead to the collapse of the Soviets and the Reich could then march on Moscow. But it must first crush France and for this it must have allies. "An alliance which does not lead to war is senseless and worthless. Alliances are made only for conflict" (p. 749). Britain and Italy are the only possible allies for the destruction of French hegemony on the Continent. No sacrifices are too great, no renunciations too painful, if they enable the Reich to overthrow France and thus march eastward in safety.³³

These bloody visions of war and empire were at first regarded in France and Britain by the few who were acquainted with them as the idle ravings of an irresponsible madman. When the dreamer became dictator of the Reich, they were dismissed as youthful fantasies or as harmless propaganda for home consumption. In reality Hitler meant all that he wrote and would achieve most of what he meant. But first a mighty sword must be forged and protection for the forging must be won.

4. WORDS OVER WEAPONS

During the winter months the waters of Lac Lemman in western Switzerland are often covered with fog. The remote snowy peak of Mont Blanc is usually hidden. Even the Grand Salève is sometimes covered with mist. At the southwest tip of the lake the blue-green waters cascade around Rousseau's Island to form the Rhone. Along both banks of the lake and river sprawls Geneva: city of Calvin and Rousseau, city of hotel-keepers and tourists, city of the League of Nations. After weeks of fog, a few rays of sunshine filtered through the clouds on the 2nd of February 1932. In the dreary Bâtiment Electorale, which then housed the League Assembly, 232 delegates from 57 countries gathered for a momentous meeting—the opening session of the General Disarmament Conference. After seven sessions of the Preparatory Commission (May 18, 1926–December 9, 1930), there had emerged a draft convention of sixty articles. It was a document of blank spaces to be filled in and a record of disagreements to be composed. In January of the preceding year the League Council had fixed the opening date, despite German pleas for November. In May the Council had named Arthur Henderson, then British Foreign Minister, as President of the Conference. The great day had arrived.³⁴

Despite the feeble sun the delegates were glum and cynical. Not

even Swiss hospitality and thoughtfulness in importing prostitutes from Paris served to cheer them.⁸⁵ Far away at Shanghai the Japanese navy was subjecting the native city to the most savage bombardment seen anywhere on land or sea since the guns on the Western Front were silenced in 1918. The opening of the Conference was postponed for an hour while the League Council grappled timidly with the Far Eastern conflict. None of the delegates expected any disarmament to be achieved. Litvinov's proposal of 1927 for immediate and complete disarmament had been rejected. His plan of 1929 for gradual disarmament had been rejected. He had expected as much. The German delegation was bitter. For years it had insisted that the heavily armed States must fulfill their promise of 1919 to disarm down to the level of the Reich. They would not. What hope?

"Uncle Arthur" Henderson, erstwhile poor boy of Glasgow and iron-founder of Newcastle-on-Tyne, was scarcely in a mood to dispel the gloom. He was sixty-nine years old, failing in health and broken by the betrayal and collapse of the Labor Cabinet in which he had been Foreign Minister. MacDonald, Thomas, and Snowden had deserted their colleague in September 1931 to join the Tory-controlled "National Government." Henderson became leader of the Opposition. But in the subsequent election on October 27 Henderson and his two sons were defeated in the débâcle of the Labor Party which suffered a loss of 213 seats. His career in the old cause to which he had devoted his life was ruined. Perhaps the new cause of disarmament could be somehow salvaged. But his opening address was spiritless. His illness obliged him to remain seated during its delivery.⁸⁶

Four days later the diplomats sat silent while women, students, peace-seekers, labor leaders spoke earnestly and passionately in support of their petition for actual disarmament signed by more than eight million people all over the globe. Thereafter some five thousand war veterans paraded through Geneva for peace, many of them blind, on crutches, or in wheel-chairs, broken by the horror which the Conference was met to banish. Henderson's heart went out to them. They were his people. His eldest son David had been killed on the Somme. For years he had carried about in his pocket a clipping with a little verse on it: "O mothers with little sons, who stand with lifted faces, all of earth's helpless ones cry from lonely places: . . . 'Go fashion the future laws that war shall be no more.'" But what hope?⁸⁷

Henderson's fellow countryman, Sir John Simon, British Foreign Minister in the "National Government," offered little cheer despite a

certain elusive joviality in his apple-cheeks, his bushy black brows, and his bald head fringed with white. His opening speech to the Conference was a dash of cold water. This tall son of a Congregational clergyman brought to diplomacy no warmth of religion and little of the "Liberalism" which he had served in the House of Commons for a quarter of a century. He was above all an attorney. At the age of thirty-seven he had become Solicitor-General in the Asquith Cabinet and won a knighthood. He was cold and rational, though these qualities disguised a certain shyness and diffidence. He avoided strong sympathies and noble sentiments and had a genius for "missing the point." He dismissed the General Strike of 1926 as "illegal." He was chairman of the commission which, after three years of labor, reported in 1930 on a new constitution for India. The report ignored Gandhi and became waste paper. In the MacDonald Cabinet of November 6, 1931, he and Walter Runciman were the "National Liberals" of protectionist persuasion. His ability was undisputed. But he always had a "bad press" and not without reason, for most of his political enterprises ended in ruin. The Disarmament Conference was to be no exception. His own responsibility for its failure was not negligible.

What was of vastly greater moment in February of 1932, however, was Sir John's policy toward the Sino-Japanese conflict. Disarmament, as the Quai d'Orsay had reiterated *ad nauseam*, depended upon security, which depended upon the League of Nations. The efficacy of the League depended upon the willingness of the Western Powers to defend League members against aggression in accordance with Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant. Action in restraint of Japanese aggression against China depended upon British leadership. This time Downing Street could not plead that it could do nothing because of American indifference. The United States had assumed membership in the League Council in October 1931 for purposes of considering the conflict. Secretary of State Henry Stimson had promulgated his non-recognition doctrine on January 7. On February 8, 1932, less than a week after the General Disarmament Conference convened, President Hoover approved Stimson's proposal that the Nine-Power Pact of 1922 be invoked against Japan. On the following day the Secretary approached the British Ambassador in Washington. The United States was prepared not merely to support collective pressure upon the aggressor but to take the lead in organizing such pressure.

On February 11, 1932, Secretary Stimson, at President Hoover's suggestion, called Sir John Simon in Geneva by transatlantic phone

to urge a joint statement under the Nine-Power Pact—to be followed presumably by consultation on means of bringing Japan to terms. Although guns were blazing at Shanghai, Sir John was wary and evasive. He wanted to say “no” but dared not. He never informed the Cabinet of the full scope of the American proposals. Stimson phoned again on February 12. Stimson sent cables. Stimson phoned Sir John in London on the 13th and the 15th. At last a light dawned. “While no explicit refusal to my suggestion was ever made,” wrote the Secretary of State later, “I finally became convinced from his attitude in these conversations that for reasons satisfactory to it, and which I certainly had no desire to inquire into or criticize, the British government felt reluctant to join in such a demarche. I therefore pressed it no further. The British nonjoinder obviously killed the possibility of any such demarche. . . . My plan was therefore blocked. . . . For several days I was deeply discouraged at my inability to carry out the co-operative plan which we had suggested. I seemed doomed to inaction, while a great tragedy was following its predestined course.”³⁸

The scope of this tragedy was far greater than either Stimson or Simon could then foresee. It transcended the failure of the Disarmament Conference. It eventuated in the acquiescence of the Western Powers in Japanese aggression against China. It led to the breakdown of collective security at Geneva. The lesson was not lost upon Mussolini or upon Hitler. The doom of Ethiopia, Austria, Spain, China, and Czechoslovakia; the repudiation of the treaties of Versailles, Locarno, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly; the betrayal of the League; the re-establishment of a balance of power between armed coalitions; new preparations for Armageddon—all were implicit in Sir John Simon’s rejection of the American proposals of February 1932. Years later, as Home Secretary, Sir John was to add to his unpopularity by issuing the first hand-books regarding civilian defense in Britain against gas attacks from the air. This too was the fruit of Simon’s February folly. In diplomacy, as in other human affairs, incalculably great results often flow from apparently small decisions. Such was the decision of Sir John in fog-bound Geneva.

The irresponsible are fertile in excuses. Simon, MacDonald, and Baldwin opposed League sanctions and Anglo-American co-operation against Japan in the hope that a free hand in Manchuria for the Tokio militarists would cause them to turn northward against the Soviet Union and to respect British interests in the Far East—and in the fear

that opposition would cause them to turn southward to the injury of those interests. This futile calculus was to be oft repeated in the years to come. Invariably it was wrong. But there are none so unteachable as those who refuse to learn. Sir John expressed sympathy with Japan's aspirations and even doubted the wisdom of the Assembly's non-recognition resolution of March 11.³⁹ He told reporters, though he denied it later, that China was after all only "a geographical expression."⁴⁰ In December, following the establishment of "Manchukuo" and the publication of the Lytton Report, Simon echoed Italian, German, and even French pleas for "flexibility" and "realism" in the application of the Covenant. He presented the Japanese case so ably that Mr. Matsuoka declared that his British friend "had said in half an hour, in a few well-chosen phrases, what he—the Japanese delegate—had been trying to say in his bad English for the last ten days."⁴¹ On February 27, 1933, Sir John told Commons that the Government was imposing an arms embargo against both China and Japan; i.e. against the aggressor, who had little need of British arms, and also against his victim, who needed them desperately. This anticipation of the American "neutrality" legislation of 1935-7, equally gratifying to aggressors, was short-lived, for no other States followed suit. Downing Street lifted the ban on March 14.⁴² The "National Government" thus preserved cordial relations with Tokio at the expense of China and Geneva. It therewith inaugurated a long process of undermining the foundation of Anglo-American collaboration, of collective security, and of any hope of disarmament or organized peace.

To return to the Disarmament Conference: its first steps were to appoint committees and listen to proposals. André Tardieu, French Minister of War, presented a plan on February 5, 1932 for a "preventive and punitive international police force." Britons and Americans joined Germans and Italians in opposing it. All proposals for effective security were rejected by "have-not" States bent upon upsetting the status quo and by "have" States unwilling to accept commitments to defend their neighbors. Without security the French Republic and its allies refused to accept any reduction of their armaments or any grant of equality to the disarmed Powers. This deadlock was never broken. The Conference was still-born.⁴³ Aristide Briand died in Paris on March 7, 1932 and followed his great collaborator Gustav Stresemann († October 3, 1929) to the grave. After the Cardinal-Archbishop of Paris incongruously blessed the soul of the unbeliever, a little old lady in heavy mourning fell on her knees before the bier at

the Quai d'Orsay and murmured: "God keep your soul. To the peace-makers may God give His peace!"⁴⁴ But Briand's successors at Geneva brought not peace but a sword.

The corridor intrigues which helped to wreck the Conference are still shrouded in mystery. There is little reason to doubt the charge that some of the French, German and perhaps American arms firms, the German steel industry, and the metal magnates of Britain were agreed that productivity and profits in the midst of depression could be restored by an arms race. It would be unfortunate for all of them if this pleasant prospect were destroyed at Geneva. Their pressure was not without effect on the French delegation. According to one tale, Albert Thomas, the French Director of the International Labor Office, secured proof of such connivance and promised Brüning at Geneva in May 1932 that he would go to Paris and expose the scandal in the interests of an accord. He went to the French capital with his brief-case full of documents. But before he could act he was found dead (May 8, 1932) in an obscure Paris café. The brief-case had disappeared. What hope?

On September 14, 1932, the German Government, headed by Franz von Papen, threatened to withdraw from the Conference unless the Reich's right to equality were recognized. On December 11 the German Government, headed by Kurt von Schleicher, accepted a declaration from Britain, France, and the United States granting it equality "in principle"—"as part of a system which would provide security for all nations." The five Powers further signified their willingness "to join in a solemn reaffirmation to be made by all European States that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between the signatories by resort to force." One of Schleicher's last acts as Chancellor was to announce on January 26, 1933 that Germany was returning to Geneva to secure "in the shortest time" an arms convention which would achieve equal security for all States by the disarmament of the highly armed Powers.

On February 3, 1933, the German Government, headed by Adolf Hitler, took part in a meeting of the General Commission of the Conference. The Reich was still represented by Herr Nadolny. But he was no longer conciliatory. Complex maneuvering for position ensued, with Nadolny seeking "equality," Paul-Boncour pursuing "security," and the British and American delegations seeking to achieve compromise and to avoid awkward commitments for their own governments. Japan left the Assembly on February 24 and gave notice

of withdrawal from the League on March 27.

Each delegation to the Conference sought a "solution" which would maximize its own strategic advantages and minimize those of potential enemies. The British Government championed the abolition of aerial bombardment in Europe (to protect the cities of England), but insisted that the right to bomb be retained "for police purposes in certain outlying regions" (to leave it free to discipline Afghans, Sudanese, Iraqi, and the north India border tribes). The Marquess of Londonderry, then British Air Minister, later told Commons (May 22, 1935) that he "had the utmost difficulty at that time, amid the public outcry, in preserving the use of the bombing airplane, even on the frontiers of the Middle East and India, where it is only owing to the presence of the air forces that we have controlled these territories without the old and heavy cost of blood and treasure."⁴⁵ To Lord Londonderry, as to many of his fellow Tories, the whole enterprise was at best a mistake. Better to give Hitler what he wanted even at the cost of an arms race. Still better to buy peace by forcing the little States and the weak States to yield up their security and independence. He wrote to his wife in March 1933:

It is no use complaining about the Disarmament Conference; the thing is to get it out of the way without the world being defied by Germany and a war initiated by the Little Entente as a war of prevention. That is the real danger now. The Little Entente are fairly strong and Germany is weak. If Germany rearms the Little Entente's chances of security will seem to them to be diminishing. . . . The great difficulty now is not so much the acquisitive States—I mean those who were despoiled by the Treaty, although their case is hard enough—but the States which have acquired territorial extensions and are unwilling to cede anything.⁴⁶

But no government would assume responsibility for getting the Conference "out of the way." Prime Minister MacDonald sought to revive it by a dramatic proposal on March 16, 1933. The time had come, said he, "to face the facts. . . . The armed nations must be prepared to make their contribution in disarmament. The disarmed nations must be prepared to make their contribution in helping to establish confidence, good-will, security, mutual understanding and international belief in each other. . . . An adjournment pure and simple would be the most heartbreaking confession of failure that this Conference could indulge in. . . . Failure would let loose the passion

that makes for war.”⁴⁷ He presented a draft convention in five parts to run for five years and to replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. It contemplated consultation in case of any threatened breach of the Pact of Paris; the reduction of Continental armies to a standardized base of 200,000 men for Germany, France, and Italy, each to have an eight months' service militia, including police forces and para-military organizations, with supplementary forces for the colonies; the reduction of war material and the prohibition of aerial bombardment “except for police purposes in certain outlying regions”; the prohibition of chemical, incendiary, and bacteriological warfare; and the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission with authority to investigate alleged violations of the agreement.

This verbal *tour de force* was vain. Nadolny demanded equality. Massigli for France demanded security plus no rearmament by Germany plus (perhaps) gradual disarmament by France and her allies. By May the deadlock was again complete. Baron von Neurath hinted that the Reich must insist upon planes, guns, and effectives on a par with its neighbors. On May 11, 1933, Lord Hailsham, British Minister of War, told the House of Lords that any German withdrawal would be equivalent to a rejection of MacDonald's offer, that in this event Germany would continue to be bound by Versailles, and that any breach would bring sanctions into operation. Joseph Paul-Boncour, Foreign Minister of France, expressed himself similarly on the following day. Was this verbiage or a genuine warning to Hitler? Time would tell. Nadolny reported to Berlin. The Cabinet indicated that Hitler would speak to the Reichstag on May 17. Vice-Chancellor von Papen addressed the Stahlhelm at Münster on the 13th:

We must no longer have a pacific conception of peace. In the Middle Ages it was otherwise. The existence of the individual had no exaggerated importance. Pacifist literature depicts death on the field of battle as an unnatural death because it does not understand the ancient Germanic horror of death on a bed, and arteriosclerosis appears to it more virile than a bullet. Pacifists dwell on the horror of the war dead as if a peace corpse were more æsthetic. The representatives of the national revolution are men and soldiers who are physically and morally warriors.⁴⁸

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been visited by MacDonald and Herriot at the end of April, was now advised by Norman Davis to take action before Der Führer's address. On May 16 he issued

a dramatic appeal to all States at the Conference urging acceptance of the MacDonald plan, opposing any increase in armaments above existing treaty limitations, and pleading for a "solemn and definite pact of non-aggression" which should prohibit any crossing of frontiers by armed forces. The text of his plea reached Berlin as Hitler was preparing a final draft of his Reichstag speech. Der Führer decided shrewdly that the time was premature for defiance. Better to be reassuring and to make threats softly by way of testing the temper of his foes.

Germany, he declared in Berlin's Krollopera, had disarmed under the treaty. Preposterous to pretend that the S.A. and S.S. were military organizations: "Their object was and is exclusively the removal of the Communist danger." Germany would never resort to force and did not "wish to take any other path than that recognized as justified by the treaties themselves." Nonsense to pretend that the Third Reich was warlike: "No new European war could improve the unsatisfactory conditions of the present day. On the contrary, the application of violence of any kind in Europe would have no favorable effect upon the political or economic position which exists today." Germany, not France, should demand security. Germany was willing to assume new obligations if she too would benefit from them. "Germany would also be ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her if the neighboring countries will do the same thing on equal terms. But if these countries are not willing to carry out the disarmament measures to which they are also bound by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany must at least retain her demands for equality." The British plan might offer a solution. Roosevelt's suggestions were welcomed. But the Reich must have qualitative equality at once and quantitative equality at the end of any transitional period. But let no one make threats:

The German Government and the German people will under no circumstances allow themselves to be forced to sign what would mean a perpetuation of the degradation of Germany. . . . The attempt has been made in newspaper articles and regrettable speeches to threaten Germany with sanctions, but such a monstrous step would only be our punishment for having pressed for the carrying out of the treaties by our demand for disarmament. Such a measure could only lead to the definite moral and effective invalidation of the treaties. Germany, however, even in this

case, would never abandon her peaceful claims. The political and economic consequences, the chaos which such an attempt would bring upon Europe, would be the responsibility of those who used such means against a people which is doing the world no harm. . . . [In such an event] it would be difficult for us, as a constantly defamed nation, to continue to belong to the League of Nations.⁴⁹

The deputies, including the Social Democrats, unanimously voted a resolution approving the Chancellor's declaration. At Paris enthusiasm was more restrained. In a significant gesture toward meeting French demands for security Norman Davis asserted at Geneva, on May 22, 1933, that the United States would agree to "consult" with other Powers over violation of the peace. "Further than that, in the event that the States in conference determine that a State has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against a violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these States may thus make to restore peace." America would thus relinquish its "neutral rights" to trade with the State declared an aggressor and subjected to sanctions. This statement represented the farthest point to which the United States had ever gone in the direction of international collaboration to achieve collective security.

Hope revived. Two days later the Committee on Security Questions, of which Nicholas Politis of Greece was rapporteur, adopted a sweeping definition of aggression based upon Soviet proposals of February. An aggressor was defined as "that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions: (1) declaration of war on another State; (2) invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State; (3) attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State; (4) naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State; (5) provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection."

The Committee report stipulated that "no political, military, economic or other considerations" could "serve as an excuse or justifica-

tion" for aggression and enumerated the "principal cases in which States might have thought themselves authorized to resort to measures of force against another State under international law as it existed previously to the Pact of Paris and to the Covenant of the League of Nations." It proposed that a commission of five should be set up to ascertain the facts of any alleged aggression and suggested a draft European Mutual Assistance Pact under which recommendations of the League Council for action against aggressors under Article 16 would be binding on the signatories.⁵⁰

Here at last was a proposed pledge of organized peace which promised, if accepted, to calm French fears, to enlist passive American cooperation, and to make possible a disarmament agreement. But Politis and Litvinov, no less than Paul-Boncour, reckoned without Downing Street. Italy opposed the plan. Germany likewise opposed it, though with more reserve. France, the Little Entente, and other small States acclaimed the Politis report, but in the sessions of the General Commission on May 25 and 29 Signor Soragna and Herr Nadolny found support from an unexpected quarter: Captain Anthony Eden, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spokesman for Simon and MacDonald. Britain, no less than Italy and Germany, desired "a less rigid definition" of aggression. Despite Davis's statement, Simon continued to shy away from any commitments to act against peace-breakers.

Spring brought blossoms to Geneva, but the flowers of optimism that had bloomed briefly in May in the Bâtiment Electoral now withered once more. Issues were obscured in a wilderness of committees. Tewfik Rüstü Bey hinted that Turkey desired the abolition of the disarmament of the Dardanelles. The Japanese delegation hinted at Tokio's desire to be released from the naval limitations of the Washington and London treaties. Eden hinted that Iraq would never consent to the abolition of air-bombing "in outlying regions." Paul-Boncour insisted that disarmament was contingent on the organization of security. Delegates yawned and packed their bags. On June 8 the General Commission adjourned to June 27. Most of the principal delegations had already left Geneva. Henderson would negotiate in preparation for a second reading of the draft convention. . . .

A day before adjournment a strange document was signed in Rome: the Four-Power Pact of June 7, 1933—an "Agreement of Understanding and Co-operation" between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The project was Mussolini's, but in its final form it bore little resem-

blance to his initial scheme. Il Duce hoped to pursue a useful diplomatic flirtation with Hitler by championing German rearmament. He was already championing Hungarian aspirations for treaty revision. Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia were staunchly opposed. France supported them with equal firmness. But, reasoned Mussolini, if France could be drawn into an arrangement with the other three Western Powers, this opposition might be circumvented. Here was the germ of many plans as yet unborn: the diplomatic isolation of the USSR, the Rome-Berlin axis, the subordination of the Little Entente to Germany and Italy, the neutralization of Britain, and the immobilization of France. Of these things Il Duce was perhaps not yet dreaming. But there were obvious advantages to Italy in a system of Four-Power conferences in which France would be outvoted instead of enjoying the support of a solid bloc of small States as in the League Assembly.

Mussolini's first move was a bid for British support. On March 15, 1933 Simon received an invitation to come to Rome. On his arrival on the 18th, accompanied by MacDonald, he was shown a draft agreement which Il Duce had already communicated to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin and to M. Henri de Jouvenal, the French Ambassador to Italy.⁵¹ The draft stated that its purpose was the maintenance of peace "according to the spirit of the Kellogg Pact." It championed "the principle of the revision of the treaties of peace," a common policy with regard to European and colonial questions, and equality of arms rights for Germany. Simon and MacDonald suggested modifications to obtain French approval. Daladier, Paul-Boncour, and Jouvenal were favorable, but Herriot denounced the scheme in *Le Démocrate* of Lyon (April 1, 1933) as a project for a Four-Power directory to redraw the map of Europe to the detriment of the interests of France and her allies. The Little Entente and Poland were at once up in arms. The Little Entente Council at Geneva expressed its views on March 25: "Since nobody can dispose of anybody else's property, either directly or indirectly, the States of the Little Entente formulate the most explicit reserves with regard to the eventual conclusion of any agreement of the kind in respect of anything that touches their own rights or policy." Foreign Minister Titulescu of Rumania visited Paris and London. Foreign Minister Beck of Poland visited Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest. Foreign Minister Benes of Czechoslovakia visited Simon at Geneva and assailed the Pact in the Czech parliament on April 25: "While discussing this question at Geneva

with Sir John Simon I was compelled to remind him that frontier adjustments cannot be imposed upon any State and that anyone attempting anything of the sort with Czechoslovakia would have to march an army into her territory. We should know how to defend ourselves." ⁵²

The result of these outcries was the preparation of a French draft and a British draft.⁵³ The French project was accepted by the Little Entente, since it was completely emasculated, but Warsaw was still furious at any scheme which denied to Poland the status of a Great Power. The final text was a compromise between the Italian and French documents. All mention of colonial questions, territorial revision, and German arms equality was omitted. The Preamble specifically mentioned the League Covenant, the Pact of Paris, Locarno, and the "no force" declarations. The signatories agreed merely (Article 1) to "consult together" and "to pursue within the framework of the League of Nations a policy of effective co-operation between all Powers with a view to the maintenance of peace." They further agreed (Article 2) to examine between themselves "proposals to give effect to Articles 10, 16, and 19 of the Covenant." Article 19 authorized the Assembly to "advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable." But Article 10 guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of League members and Article 16 provided for economic and military sanctions against aggressors. The Four Powers likewise agreed (Article 3) to work for the success of the Disarmament Conference and to re-examine between themselves any questions left in suspense. They also declared (Article 4) that they would consult on economic questions. The Pact was concluded (Article 5) for ten years and was thereafter to run indefinitely subject to a right of termination on two years' notice.⁵⁴ The Pact was initialed at Rome on June 7 and formally signed on July 15 by Benito Mussolini and the Ambassadors in Rome of the other three parties: Henri de Jouvenal, Ulrich von Hassel, and Sir Ronald W. Graham.

Content: zero. Il Duce had failed of his purpose. So empty was the agreement that Berlin hesitated to sign, but a phone call from Mussolini to Hitler on June 7 brought German acceptance. The Quai d'Orsay regarded the document as wholly innocuous. Simon agreed and rejoiced that it involved no extension of British obligations in European affairs. Paris in effect reiterated French opposition to any action under Article 19 of the Covenant. London in effect reiterated

British opposition to any action under Articles 10 and 16. Arnold J. Toynbee justly observed that the Four-Power Pact thus "had the ironical and preposterous result of weakening, de facto, all those articles of the Covenant which the final text of the Pact reaffirmed."⁶⁵ On November 20, 1933, Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay indicated to Rome that they would not submit the Pact to their parliaments for ratification until Germany returned to the League.⁶⁶ The Fascist Grand Council resolved on December 6, 1933 that "the continued collaboration of Italy with the League of Nations shall be conditional upon the radical reform of the League in its constitution, organization, and objective within the shortest possible time."⁶⁷ As for the Pact itself, it was never ratified. But in intention if not in outcome Il Duce's initiative foreshadowed things to come.

Meanwhile another international congress had met in futility and, unlike its counterpart in Geneva, had dissolved in haste. On June 12, 1933, in the Geological Museum in South Kensington, delegations of sixty-four States met under the chairmanship of Ramsay MacDonald in a World Economic Conference sponsored by Washington and London. The United States had insisted that war debts and tariff schedules must not be discussed. But the delegates met hopefully. Premier Daladier was a model of cheerfulness: "We have put an end to the instability of currencies!" MacDonald was solemn but optimistic: "Have we come to deliberate and decide as though our respective nations were isolated units in the world? Then we shall fail, and a world which looks upon us today with expectation will have to drain the bitter cup of disappointment. . . . We must not fail."

On June 17, however, President Roosevelt rejected an Anglo-French-American agreement for currency stabilization which had been signed two days previously. Secretary Hull then proposed a general 10% tariff cut which Senator Pittman denied that the American delegation had endorsed. The President sent Raymond Moley, Assistant Secretary of State, to make peace. Moley and Roosevelt refused to discuss currency stabilization. The States still on gold refused to discuss tariff reductions in the absence of agreement to halt further depreciation of the dollar and the pound. Ambassador Ivan Maisky of the USSR declared: "The whole work of the Conference has been deeply penetrated by one fundamental mood, one aspiration: 'adjournment.'" This aspiration was realized on July 27.

Before its realization an interesting *entre'acte* was staged. On June 16 Alfred Hugenberg, German Minister of Economics, presented a

memorandum at London (doubtless motivated by a desire to placate Hitler) demanding the return of the German colonies and proposing that the Powers grant Germany a mandate to use its "constructive and creative genius" to "reorganize" Russia. Litvinov expressed amusement at this "comedy." The German delegation repudiated it. Hugenburg was dismissed by Hitler ten days later. He had revealed the diplomatic objectives of the Third Reich.

Only one diplomat came away from London with something more in his brief-case than he had brought with him: Maxim Litvinov, Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In emulation of his predecessor, Georges Chicherin, who emerged from the unsuccessful economic conference at Genoa in 1922 with the Treaty of Rapallo, Litvinov negotiated new agreements at London with the signatories of the Moscow Protocol of February 9, 1929, which had put the Pact of Paris into immediate effect between the USSR and its neighbors. He now proposed that they adopt the Politis report of May 24 defining aggression. All agreed save Finland, which was dubious, and Lithuania, which would sign no pact to which Poland was a party. Litvinov's ingenuity was equal to the occasion. On July 3, 1933 Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey signed a convention with the Soviet Union adopting among themselves the definition of aggression noted above. On July 5 Lithuania and the USSR signed a bi-lateral convention to the same effect. On July 4 Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Turkey, and the USSR signed a third identical convention, to which Finland adhered on July 23.⁵⁸ Litvinov likewise paved the way at London for the signature on September 2 of an Italian-Soviet non-aggression pact and for the grant of diplomatic recognition to Moscow by the United States on November 17, 1933. Apart from these not inconsiderable achievements on the periphery, and a few agreements on wheat and silver, the London Economic Conference died without issue. The Geneva Disarmament Conference was likewise barren, but not yet dead.

5. DISARMAMENT † OCTOBER 14, 1933

On June 8, 1933 Premier Édouard Daladier, Captain Anthony Eden, the Marquess of Londonderry, and Mr. Norman Davis met in Paris. They discussed the possibilities of agreement on the abolition of "offensive" weapons and on the reduction of French armaments.

Daladier said no reduction was possible without additional guarantees of French security. His American and British friends offered no guarantees. The discussion was adjourned. Mr. Henderson attempted to continue it with the delegates in London, but found them all too busy. On June 29 the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference, which had been in recess since June 7, accepted a recommendation of Bureau that it adjourn until October 16. It asked Henderson to continue his efforts. Only Nadolny dissented and warned that the consequences of adjournment might be very serious. "Uncle Arthur" journeyed to Paris, Rome, Berlin, and Prague in mid-July. He met Hitler in Munich. Der Führer took no more kindly than did M. Daladier to Henderson's suggestion that the two men arrange a personal meeting. They were to meet for the first time five years later under conditions much more gratifying to the Nazi leader. Hitler also rejected a new French suggestion for a probationary period of international supervision of armaments, after which some disarmament might be attempted—providing that the system of supervision and enforcement proved adequate.

In September, Eden and Davis returned to the French capital and accepted the French plan for a preliminary testing period. Daladier promised to consider a substantial reduction of French armaments if the projected system fulfilled French expectations. By the time of the 14th League Assembly, which opened on September 25, the French, British, American, and Italian governments were in accord as to the desirability of a test period of three or four years during which there would be no reduction of existing armaments and no increase in German armaments. Both of these events—far off, if not divine—would be considered in the "second period." Neurath warned the foreign press in Berlin on September 15 that if the other Powers continued to evade their obligation to disarm, Germany would "have the right and the duty to provide for the equality and security of its own people according to its own judgment and without any hesitation or false scruples."

Both Neurath and Göbbels came to Geneva in September. The Propaganda Minister was snubbed, but the Foreign Minister held long discussions on the fringe of the Assembly with Paul-Boncour, Simon, Eden, Suvich, and Davis. He proposed that the transformation of the Reichswehr into a short-service army of 200,000 be permitted during the contemplated probationary period and that the Reich be allowed to have "prototypes" of the weapons possessed by others. Paul-

Boncour was doubtful. Simon and Eden wanted definitions. The negotiations ended on September 29. Göbbels and Neurath returned to Berlin. Simon, Eden, and Suvich left Geneva on the 30th.

On October 6, 1933 the German Ambassadors in Rome and London (but not in Paris) presented notes in reply to requests for definitions of samples or prototypes.⁵⁹ Berlin herein expressed approval of the original British plan of a five-year period of preliminary disarmament, but rejected the French scheme for a probationary period. Germany must have equality forthwith. Germany was willing to abandon claims to any weapons which other Powers might renounce. As for weapons not to be renounced but to be limited quantitatively, Germany must possess what others possessed with quotas to be decided upon later. As for weapons subject to neither prohibition nor limitation, Germany must have complete parity. Norman Davis at Geneva received a copy of this communication on October 7. Daladier, however, was apparently still in ignorance of it on October 8 when he addressed a congress of the Radical Socialist Party at Vichy and indicated that London, Washington, and Rome had agreed to a four-year trial period.

The Bureau of the Conference met at Geneva on the 9th. Henderson could report no progress. The British Cabinet met simultaneously and agreed to support the French proposal despite Germany's rejection of it. Simon left London on the 10th and on the next day reached Geneva, where he conferred with the other delegates. On Thursday, October 12, Nadolny discussed the issue inconclusively with Simon and returned to Berlin. Hindenburg likewise returned unexpectedly to the German capital from Neudeck. The German Cabinet met on Friday and apparently approved the course which Hitler proposed.

But Sir John must first have his say, although, all unknown to him, the Third Reich's decision was already taken regardless of what he might say. The Bureau met on Saturday morning to hear the British Foreign Minister describe the results of the recent negotiation. He averred, with lawyer-like precision and complete disregard of realities, that the conversations had led him to "take the view that the draft convention which the United Kingdom Government put before the General Commission over six months ago, and which has been unanimously adopted as the general framework for the proposed agreement, will require to be in some respects recast." The proposed five-year period must be extended to eight. At the end of eight years there will be "(a) a substantial measure of disarmament actually realized

and completed on the part of the heavily armed Powers, and (b) the achievement of the principle of equality in a regime of security. . . . But in order to attain this it is necessary to proceed by steps. . . . The present unsettled state of Europe is a fact, and statesmen in drawing up their plan have to face the facts. The need therefore for modifying the draft convention so as to accomplish this purpose by a process of evolution is clearly established.”

The proposed eight-year period would begin with the transformation of Continental armies into short-service militias and the establishment of an adequate system of supervision through a Permanent Disarmament Commission. “Without binding myself finally to the length of this first stage, I report that the period of four years was mentioned by several governments, though others have raised the question whether it could not be somewhat shortened.” “But”—and the “but” was all:

This program involves a feature which appears to me to be essential. I must state it with complete frankness to the Bureau—the scheme involves the principle that the Powers now under restriction of the Peace Treaties should not begin to increase their armaments forthwith but should express their willingness to conform to a timetable such as I have indicated. . . . By accepting the principle of no immediate rearmament, and co-operating with the rest of us in framing a convention which is best calculated to restore the sense of confidence which had recently been so rudely shaken, the necessary conditions of success can be established.⁶⁰

Sir John sat down well pleased. Davis, Paul-Boncour, Soragna, Benes, Politis, and others expressed approval. Freiherr von Rheinbaben, Nadolny's substitute, was non-committal. The meeting of the Bureau ended at 12.30. The noon papers in Berlin were already carrying screaming headlines. Reverberations of diplomatic thunder reached Geneva. By 3.00 p.m. Saturday, October 14, 1933, Henderson had received a telegram from Neurath:

On behalf of the German Government I have the honor to make to you the following communication. In the light of the course which recent discussions of the Powers concerned have taken in the matter of disarmament, it is now clear that the Disarmament Conference will not fulfill what is its sole object: namely, general disarmament. It is also clear that this failure of

the Conference is due solely to unwillingness of the highly armed States to carry out their contractual obligation to disarm. This renders impossible the satisfaction of Germany's recognized claim to equality of rights, and the condition on which the German Government agreed at the beginning of this year again to take part in the work of the Conference no longer exists. The German Government is accordingly compelled to leave the Disarmament Conference.

The same afternoon two manifestoes were issued in Berlin—one in the name of the Reich Government ⁶¹ and one in the name of Hitler. Both announced Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations (final notice was received by the Secretary-General on October 21) as well as from the Disarmament Conference. Der Führer's manifesto declared the Reichstag dissolved and ordered a new election and a referendum "to give the German people an opportunity of electing those deputies who, as sworn representatives of this policy and of peace and honor, can give the nation a guarantee of an unswerving representation of its interests in this respect." In a long broadcast speech delivered early Saturday evening Hitler revealed his political genius at its best. He rallied the nation to his cause by an adroit appeal for national solidarity against foreign oppressors. He defied the world in language well calculated to evoke the enthusiasm of frustrated patriots. And he coupled his defiance with such ardent professions of peace and such plausible appeals for justice as to dispel any disposition toward retaliation abroad.

It would be a great day for all humanity if these two nations [France and Germany] would banish, once and for all, force from their common life. The German people is ready to do so. While claiming boldly those rights which the treaties themselves have given us, I will say as boldly that there are otherwise for Germany no grounds for territorial conflict. When the Saar territory has been restored to Germany, only a madman would consider the possibility of war between the two States, for which, from our point of view, there is no national or moral ground. . . .

If the world decides that all weapons are to be abolished, down to the last machine-gun, we are ready to join at once in such a convention. If the world decides that certain weapons are to be destroyed, we are ready to dispense with them immediately. But if the world grants to each nation certain weapons, we are not

prepared to let ourselves be excluded from this concession as a nation with inferior rights. . . .

We have such infinite love for our people that we desire wholeheartedly an understanding with other nations, and whenever it is possible we shall try to attain it, but, as representatives of an honorable nation and as men of honor, it is impossible for us to be members of institutions under conditions which are only bearable to those who are devoid of a sense of honor.⁶²

Baron von Neurath told the foreign press on Monday that the British Government had repudiated its own plan of March. He ridiculed Simon's proposal and asserted that the transformation of the Reichswehr from 100,000 trained men to 200,000 raw recruits would weaken the Reich. "It is pure mockery to explain this second disarmament of Germany by the catchword of no rearmament for Germany. . . . What grounds are given for this impossible plan? The alleged menace to European peace by new Germany. It is really difficult for me today to go objectively into this unprecedented accusation. What action has the new German Government taken from which anyone in the world could, even with any appearance of justice, impute to us anti-peaceful intentions? Who will presume to doubt the peace declarations of our Chancellor Adolf Hitler, which are inspired by the greatest seriousness and the profoundest feeling of responsibility? They must be entirely convincing to everyone who values truth, and I will refrain today from adding a single word to them."⁶³

"*Frieden und Gleichberechtigung!*"—"Peace and Equality of Rights!"—became the slogan of the Nazi election campaign. No one noted that Nazi spokesmen had already declared for home consumption that "equal rights" were nonsense and that Germany acknowledged no rights on the part of others.⁶⁴ Hindenburg decreed the referendum and Reichstag election for November 12.⁶⁵ He further decreed that the "ballots of all accepted election lists must contain, together with the statement of the party, the names of the first ten candidates of each list."⁶⁶ There was of course only one "accepted" list—that of the NSDAP—since all other parties had been outlawed. On October 20 the form of the referendum ballot was disclosed.⁶⁷ It contained the text of the Government Manifesto of October 14 and posed the question: "Do you (*Du*) German man and you German woman agree to this policy of your National Cabinet and are you willing to declare it to be the expression of your own opinion and will and to

espouse it solemnly?" On the green ballot two squares containing circles were captioned "*Ja*" and "*Nein*." The white Reichstag ballot had printed at the top "*NSDAP (Hitlerbewegung)*" and under it 10 names out of 686 candidates: Hitler, Hess, Frich, Göring, Göbbels, Röhm, Darré, Seldte, Papen, and (as a joke) Hugenberg, who had been dismissed from the Cabinet in June. To the right of the names was a square containing a single circle. Voters could either approve the list or invalidate their ballot. Millions of marks were spent in propaganda and demonstration, though there was of course no opposition. Unanimity was demanded. "We Will Not Be a People of Inferior Rights!" "Freedom and Bread in Honor and Peace!" "With Hitler for a Peace of Honor and Equality!" The climax came on November 10. Hitler appealed to the workers from the dynamo hall of the Siemens-Schuckert Electrical Works in Berlin after one minute of silence throughout the Reich. On Saturday evening, November 11, Hindenburg swelled the chorus with an appeal for support of the Cabinet.

On the sunny autumn Sunday of November 12 Germany voted. Almost all voters were inspired and exalted by what they had seen and heard. The doubters had been warned that "No" votes might have grave consequences. The writer, then in Berlin, saw many suspects voting "*Ja*" publicly instead of in polling booths, rather than incur suspicion. Stormtroopers herded late voters to the polls. The result was gratifying: 43,053,616 or 95.3% of the qualified voters cast ballots. Of these 92.2% voted for the Nazi lists while only 7.8% of the ballots were "invalid." On the referendum 43,491,575 or 96.3% of the electorate voted. Of these 95.1% voted "*Ja*" and only 4.9% voted "*Nein*"; 757,756 ballots were invalid.⁶⁸ Hitler and Göbbels herewith perfected the technique of mobilizing unanimity. They used it frequently thereafter. On August 19, 1934, 88% of the German electorate approved Hitler's assumption of the powers of the Presidency.⁶⁹ On March 29, 1936, 98.7% of the voters elected a new "Reichstag of freedom and peace." On April 10, 1938, 99.08% of the electorate endorsed the annexation of Austria. Verily, "Germany is Adolf Hitler, and Adolf Hitler is Germany."

The repercussions abroad of the thunderbolt of October 14 corresponded to Hitler's expectations. In Britain and France consternation and chagrin were expressed, but there was little demand for retaliation. On October 17 Sir John Simon broadcast an address in refutation of Neurath's charges and asserted that "the object of British pol-

icy" was "not to arouse resentful feelings." On the same day Daladier declared that France was "deaf to no appeal, but blind to no act. If one sincerely wishes for understanding, why begin with rupture? If one wishes to respect obligations, why oppose the verification of undertakings?" In Rome there were expressions of official astonishment. At Geneva the Bureau met on October 16. Henderson proposed a reply to Neurath. Some delegations expressed opposition to the secrecy of the recent negotiations and to the fact that they were not consulted in framing the reply. Henderson petulantly pounded the table with his gavel and declared: "If there are no further objections, the telegram will be sent forthwith."⁷⁰ Poland, Turkey, and the USSR abstained from approval. The Bureau adjourned until October 26. The telegram expressed regret "that this grave decision should have been taken by your Government for reasons which I am unable to accept as valid."⁷¹

In the consultations which ensued, Italy favored a speedy termination of the Conference on the ground that all further discussion in the absence of Germany was fruitless. Simon, however, desired only an adjournment to give Berlin an opportunity to "reconsider." Norman Davis was of a like mind. But Daladier and Benes insisted that there should be neither adjournment nor termination. The delegates should rather continue their labors, draw up a convention, and submit it to Germany for signature or rejection. This line of policy at Paris was not altered by a rapid succession of Cabinet changes in which Daladier was succeeded by Sarraut as Premier (October 27), Sarraut gave way to Chautemps (November 23), Chautemps was voted out in turn (January 27) and displaced by Daladier once more on January 30. Joseph Paul-Boncour remained Foreign Minister until Daladier assumed the post for the few unhappy days of his 1934 Premiership. The succession of Louis Barthou to the Quai d'Orsay on February 9, 1934, under Premier Gaston Doumergue, reflected an abrupt shift from Left to Right, but the new Minister also felt that the Disarmament Conference should neither yield to Nazi demands nor confess failure because of the German decision.

At Westminster the new situation was envisaged in terms of compromise and "facing facts." Said Sir John to Commons on November 7:

What we have to do is to see inside the mind of those in Germany—whatever we may think of what they have done—and try to understand why it is that they have exhibited this vehement

resentment. . . . It is no good simply going back and saying that if people had done so and so this might not have happened. We must look at this thing as it is. . . . I do not wish to say anything that would make the resumption of the Disarmament Conference more difficult, but we must face the central fact as it is. The central political issue is how to reconcile Germany's demand for equality with France's desire about security. . . . We stand, as we believe the vast mass of our fellow countrymen stand, for international co-operation with a view to firmly establishing peace, and, at a time like this, when the international order set up since the war is in jeopardy, we declare ourselves, without any qualification, believers and upholders of the League of Nations as the best available instrument for international co-operation. . . . We shall not get out of our difficulties by crying isolation.

On November 24, 1933 Sir John was even more conciliatory toward the Third Reich: "Germany is not a target for dictation. She is a partner in discussion. . . . The adjournment of the Disarmament Conference does not mean the adjournment of work for disarmament. It means the very opposite. . . . We welcome the assurances of Herr Hitler that Germany's one desire is for peace and that she has no aggressive designs." MacDonald agreed as did the Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin, though the latter conceded that "the position is one of extreme difficulty. I think it is well that we should look at the facts."⁷² Looking at the facts consisted in efforts to make new concessions to Berlin. Hitler was vindicated in his first application of Stormtroop tactics to diplomacy.

Under these circumstances the Disarmament Conference slowly approached its tedious demise. Everything was referred to committees—Geneva's traditional mode of evasion and delay. The Bureau adopted a report of a committee on November 11 recommending that unsettled questions be referred to other committees. Most of the delegates went home. Henderson threatened to resign unless the governments displayed more interest in the work. A faint echo of far-off battles long ago reached Geneva: the date was the fifteenth anniversary of the Armistice: "In Flanders fields the poppies grow. . . . If ye break faith with us who die We shall not sleep, though poppies grow in Flanders fields."

But the diplomats did not believe in ghosts. They moved from futility to frustration. From November to April memoranda and re-

joinders were exchanged between Berlin and Paris, with London and Rome conferring and consulting as conciliators.⁷³ The Premier of Belgium, Comte de Broqueville, came dangerously close to the heart of the issue when he told the Belgian Senate on March 6, 1934 that no investigation of German treaty violation was possible; that the rearmament of Germany could be stopped only by a preventive war; and that no one would assume responsibility for such action:

It is certain that at least two of the Great Powers which have a permanent seat on the Council, Britain and Italy, will refuse to order an investigation. Under these conditions, Germany will refuse to permit it. . . . There remains only the second means: a preventive war. . . . To prevent the rearmament of Germany there is no other means than immediate war. For myself, I refuse to throw my country into such an adventure.⁷⁴

The German military budget for 1934-5 was published on March 29—the last budget to be thus revealed. It provided for an increase of expenditures on aerial armaments (forbidden to the Reich by the Treaty) from 78,000,000 marks in 1933-4 to 210,000,000 marks, with an increase in the Reichswehr estimates from 344,900,000 marks to 574,500,000. Anxious British inquiries at Berlin elicited the comment that the Treaty limited Germany arms, but not German expenditures for arms! A French note to London of April 17 asserted that Germany had destroyed the basis of negotiation. It called for the termination of direct discussion and a resumption of the Conference where it had left off its labors the preceding October.

Simon was dubious but cheerful. "I do not believe," he told Commons on May 18, "that we ought at this stage to go to Geneva and start a new initiative." Even if the Conference broke down, this would not mean "the end of the world. On the contrary, on the very day that it happens we have all of us to start new efforts for the same purpose." On the 26th Mussolini announced that the Italian air force would be reorganized at a cost of a billion lire. Efforts at disarmament, he opined, could be "regarded as exhausted." In any event, "War is a phenomenon accompanying the development of humanity. . . . The fundamental virtues of man are revealed to the full light of the sun only in blood-stained struggles."⁷⁵

Barthou and Litvinov met at Geneva on May 18 and found themselves of one mind. Steps should be taken to conclude an "Eastern Locarno." The Disarmament Conference should concentrate its at-

tention on measures to strengthen collective security. Simon dissented: "A conference called for the purpose of disarmament could not be transformed into a conference for devising plans of security on the basis that no disarmament at all was possible." British isolationists were now pressing for an end of all Continental "entanglements." Sir John was for reopening negotiations with Berlin and conceding Germany's right to rearm. Far better to do this than sacrifice "disarmament" in the interests of security. Washington and the northern neutrals were sympathetic since they were equally reluctant to assume any new responsibilities. Barthou waxed ironical. With the support of the Little and Balkan Ententes he reaffirmed the principle that all discussion of disarmament was useless in the absence of the organization of security. Litvinov proposed that the Conference transform itself into a permanent body to organize security.

In the acrimonious debate which followed, Henderson again threatened to resign after Barthou had opposed his suggestion, which Simon and Eden supported, for further French-German negotiations. On June 8, 1934 the Bureau and the General Commission, with Italy dissenting, adopted another formula which avoided the necessity of a choice: "The General Commission . . . invites the Bureau to seek . . . a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments will desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference . . . decides to appoint a special Committee to conduct such preliminary studies as it may consider appropriate in order to facilitate the conclusion of regional security agreements in Europe. . . ." ⁷⁶ The issue was thus resolved by a formula which settled nothing.

The elaborate committee machine of the Disarmament Conference now slowed down and came to a creaking halt. At Henderson's call the Bureau met again on November 20, 1934. It agreed to abandon efforts at disarmament or security and to concentrate its attention on a draft convention to regulate the private manufacture of trade in arms which had emerged on July 2 from the appropriate committee. Hugh Wilson for the United States laid before the Bureau a new draft amplifying the committee report and proposing a Permanent Disarmament Commission to supervise execution. The Bureau decided that this project should be examined by the Committee on the Miscellaneous Provisions of the Disarmament Convention, while other com-

mittees should discuss other parts of the American proposals. But all meetings were postponed.

The Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in, and Private and State Manufacture of, Armaments met February 14, 1935. It referred everything to other committees or subcommittees. The Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions met on February 18 and followed this pathetic example. The British delegation opposed the American plan in the name of "greater simplicity" and "a settlement with Germany." The Reich would oppose any Permanent Disarmament Commission with authority to investigate. Despite the fact that Downing Street had urged permanent and automatic supervision in its memorandum of January 29, 1934, London now opposed the plan, as did Italy, Japan, and Poland. The Commission ought to have power merely to call for explanations when violations were alleged. The proposals for publicity of violations also met with British opposition. Thanks to this obstructionism, no progress could be made even toward the limited objective of an agreement on the trade in arms. Germany openly repudiated the disarmament clauses of the treaty on March 16, 1935. None of the committees met during the second half of the year. On September 14 the United States closed the offices of its Geneva delegation and reduced the staff to one official. A fortnight later the Italian attack upon Ethiopia was launched. The Disarmament Conference was dead.

The diagnosis of the physicians was jaundice. Others spoke of heartbreak. But Arthur Henderson, now in the shadows, still had hope. He had been returned to Commons from Clay Cross in 1933. And in the autumn of 1934 he had journeyed to Oslo for the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. But his illness grew worse in the following summer. An operation was performed in September. It was in vain. He died quietly at his home amid his family on the Sunday evening of October 20, 1935. On the same day Dr. Hans Lammers, Secretary of State in the Reich Chancellery, was quoted in Berlin as saying: "There is no need for a constitution. . . . One thing suffices in the National-socialist State—a fanatical will, based on faith in the Führerprinzip and loyalty to Der Führer." 77 On the same day Germany ceased to be a member of the League of Nations. And on the same day one League member reported "progress" in its relations with another League member: "Italy's Southern Army, storming a fortified enemy stronghold, was reported officially today to have wiped out strong Ethiopian

forces in a fierce fight last Friday at Dagnerrei in the Sciaveli region near the Webbe Shibeli River.”⁷⁸ At least “Uncle Arthur” as he lay dying in London could take comfort in the thought that at long last League sanctions were being imposed upon an aggressor. Death spared him from knowing that this enterprise too would founder ignobly on the rocks of treason.

SWORDS OVER AUSTRIA

I. SCHIKLGRUBER VS. SCHMUTZ

NORTHEAST of Salzburg, on the river which for centuries divided Bavaria from Austria, lies the little border town of Braunau-am-Inn, across from the German frontier village of Simbach. Aside from a railway span, a single bridge connects these communities, with customs officials stationed until recently at each end. The five thousand inhabitants of Braunau are gathered in their old houses about the Stadt Platz, which is embellished with a baroque Rathaus and fountain facing the Gothic church of St. Stephan—completed as to its tower in the year in which Columbus first reached the West Indies. On the east side of the square is the Salzburg Gate Tower. Beyond the portal a street leads toward the Spital Kirche and the Palm Park. Midway down this street on the left-hand side is a former Austrian army barracks. Adjacent to it is a simple stone dwelling now housing the “Gasthaus des Josef Pommers.” Prior to March 1938 this house was wholly inconspicuous, save for a tiny placard in a window of the small restaurant within. On the placard was inscribed:

In this house on April 20, 1889 was born the German Reichskanzler, Adolf Hitler.

Next door, before the barracks, stood a small metal cross and behind it a tablet;

To the memory of Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss, who in these barracks on November 4, 1918 concluded his active military service. On July 25, 1934 he was treacherously murdered in Vienna. The
FATHERLAND FRONT.

Those who perpetrated the murder were the followers of the man born in Braunau. He had written in *Mein Kampf*, page 1:

German Austria must again come back to the great German motherland, and this not at all because of any economic considerations. No, no; even if this reunion, from an economic point of view, were immaterial; yes, even if it were harmful, it must none the less take place. The same blood belongs in a common Reich. The German Volk possesses no more right to colonial political activity so long as it is unable to join its own sons in a common State. Only when the Reich's frontiers include the last German, without the possibility of securing its food-supply, does there grow out of the need of its own Volk the moral right to occupy foreign earth and soil. The plow is then the sword, and out of the tears of war grows daily bread for posterity. So this little frontier town seemed to me to be the symbol of a great task.

The misty-minded Austrian who wrote these words was the son of the illegitimate son of Maria Anna Schicklgruber. Maria married the father of her child when her little Alois was five years old, but her son kept his mother's name for another thirty-five years—until 1877. He then adopted that of his father: Hiedler, Hüttler, or Hitler, variously spelled by various members of this almost illiterate peasant family. Alois Schicklgruber (Hitler) mended shoes and married money. His first wife, fourteen years his senior, helped to secure him a job in the Austrian civil service. He became a customs official with uniforms, buttons, and prestige. Six weeks after her death in 1883 Alois remarried, but his new wife died within the year. Three months later, on January 7, 1885, he married a distant cousin, Klara Poelzl, twenty-three years his junior. She had been a maid in Alois's home during his first marriage. She had later gone to Vienna and then returned to her native village of Spital and married her old employer.

Alois had two children by his first wife: Alois Jr., who later became a waiter in Hamburg, where he died; and Angela, who married a Herr Raupal in Vienna and became a cook in a home for Jewish students. (Her younger half-brother Adolf brought her subsequently to his Berchtesgaden chalet as his housekeeper. Her daughter Geli fell in love with her now famous uncle and in the sequel committed suicide.) Alois Schicklgruber's third wife, Klara, gave birth to Adolf in 1889 and to Paula in 1897. A second son, Edouard, died in childhood. For some years Papa Alois lived with his family in Braunau and performed his

duties at the bridge. In 1896 he retired on a pension and moved to Leonding near Linz with his wife and boy.¹

Three years after Adolf's birth another baby of even humbler parentage was born in the tiny village of Texing in Lower Austria. The place was not far from the Danube to the north and the town of St. Pölton to the northeast. The mother was a smallish peasant girl who had caught the fancy of a young wood-cutter. Their child saw the light without benefit of clergy on the feast-day of St. Francis of Assisi, October 4, 1892. He was named Engelbert, after a sainted archbishop of Cologne. His mother's horrified parents made haste to find a husband for their erring daughter. The wood-cutter was gone or unwilling or unacceptable—the story varies with the teller. A certain Herr Schmutz was agreeable. Within a year the wedding took place and the new family moved to the hamlet of Kernberg, where little Engelbert presently had three half-brothers and a half-sister. Stepfather Schmutz was harsh. Engelbert never adopted his name, preferring to call himself Dollfuss after his mother's family.²

These two children never met, either as boys or as men. But the weird vicissitudes of life and politics were to make them bitter foes. The enmity between the bastard child of Texing and the son of the *Beamter* of Braunau was to bring untold grief to Austria. Engelbert went to the village school at Kernberg and at the age of thirteen was sent by the Bishop of St. Pölton to the school at Hollabrunn (1905--13). He was tiny in stature, whimsical, angelic, and above all pious. For three months he studied for the priesthood and then abandoned it to go to the University of Vienna. His Catholic piety never left him in after life. "There was something faintly ecclesiastical in his manner. His cheeks had the pallor and delicacy of a novice. His eyes were mild and sad. His voice was low and timid. He suggested a very young priest of the Church, one of the boy cardinals of the Renaissance."³

Despite his diminutive size (he was less than five feet tall) the stepson of Herr Schmutz was accepted in the army in the autumn of 1914 and later became a commander of a machine-gun section. He served ably and without wounds on the Italian front and was demobilized amid the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in November 1918. He returned to the University of Vienna. A year later he was appointed secretary to the Bauernbund. Its director, Hofrat Sturm, took him to Berlin, where he pursued his studies and met Fräulein Alwine Gienke, whom he later married. After becoming director of the Lower Aus-

trian Chamber of Agriculture and President of the Federal Railways, his political advancement was rapid in the clerical Christian Social Party of Father Ignatz Seipel. This was the party of Karl Lueger, pre-War Mayor of Vienna, from whom the young Hitler had imbibed much of his anti-Semitism. The party later lost its anti-Semitic complexion, though not its clericalism, which Hitler repudiated. In 1931 Dollfuss became Minister for Forestry and Agriculture. On May 20, 1932 he was asked by President Miklas to assume the Chancellorship. He hesitated, for he was modest and shy. After spending the night in prayer in a little church in a poor quarter of Vienna, he accepted. Seipel on his sick-bed breathed more easily at the news. "Now Austria is in safe hands and I can die in peace." ⁴

The son of Alois Schicklgruber had no such normal life, no such good fortune, and no such easy road to fame. Alois died at Leonding on January 3, 1903, and his widow, Klara, followed on December 21, 1907. Young Adolf had hated the indolent and much-married father who had opposed his son's dream of becoming an artist and insisted that he become a *Beamter* like papa. His mother he loved with a passion which he was never able to transfer to any other mortal woman. Under the influence of his teacher at Linz, Dr. Leopold Poetzsch, he transferred it at length to a mythical Pan-German goddess—Germania. Reciprocally he fixed his resentments upon that which his father symbolized: the Habsburg monarchy with its mosaic of Czechs and Poles, South Slavs and Rumanians on the fringes of the German and Magyar communities. At seventeen he went to Vienna. He failed the entrance examinations to the art academy and was unable to enter a school of architecture because he had never completed his secondary education. He did odd jobs and borrowed schillings from his spinster sister, Paula. He was at length forced to become a building-trades helper. This son of the Kleinbürgertum, thus reduced to a proletarian, rebelled at his poverty and degradation. He developed deep hatred toward workers, toward trade-union leaders, toward Social Democrats, and, above all, toward Jews. "Gradually I began to hate them. . . . I was transformed from a weakly world citizen to a fanatic anti-Semite." ⁵

At twenty Adolf Hitler was doing water-colors in Vienna. He was now "independent," but was still living in misery. He went to Munich in 1912. With the outbreak of war he joined the Bavarian forces with enthusiasm. Here was release, adventure, and fulfillment of romance. He fought on the Western Front and was wounded on the Somme.

He recovered, returned, fought again, won a corporalship and an Iron Cross and was gassed at Ypres in October 1918. When the débâcle came and once more destroyed all meaning in his life, he was convalescing at Pasewalk. Having tasted soldiering, he could not bear to return to civilian boredom. He shunned women and had no friends. He stayed with his Munich regiment and lived through the Soviet regime of 1919. He became an agitator. On a June evening of 1919 he was made member No. 7 in the "German Labor Party," which was the nucleus of the NSDAP. He could not vote, for he was a citizen of Austria. He did not become naturalized as a German until 1932, when he challenged Hindenburg for the Presidency. But he had no interest in voting. His mission was to awaken other voters to the great task of "sawing" Germany from the Jews, the Social Democrats, the Communists, the Liberals, the "World Citizens." The rest is history, in which the frustrations of a lost generation found final expression in the movement led by the twisted and embittered son of the customs official of Braunau-am-Inn.

His Pan-German dream of uniting Austria with the Reich had little in common with the efforts of the German and Austrian Socialists to achieve a union of the two States in 1919 for democratic reasons, nor with the attempts of Catholic leaders in both countries a decade later to achieve *Anschluss* for ecclesiastical and economic reasons. Hitler's conception of *Anschluss* was rather a reversion to the early Middle Ages, when the *Ostmark* or the East Realm (*Österreich*) was a Germanic outpost against the Slavs. From the Slavs the land had been wrested by Karl der Grosse, King of the Franks and first Holy Roman Emperor. Against the Slavs it had been held. A Bavarian dynasty ruled it first and then the Babenbergers and, briefly, the Kings of Bohemia, until it passed to Rudolf of Habsburg in 1276 and to his heirs for the next seven centuries.

Hitler may have been, as some wits asserted, Austria's revenge on Prussia for the Seven Weeks' War of 1866. But his vision of a Pan-Germanic "reunion" of Austria with Germany was historical nonsense. Prior to Bismarck's forcible exclusion of Austria from North German affairs, many of the small German States were under Austrian domination. But Austria had never since the early Middle Ages been under the control of any German State. The Dual Monarchy of the Habsburgs was as much Hungarian as German after the Turks had been driven from the middle Danube in the late seventeenth century. The Bohemians or Czechs had already passed under Habsburg sover-

eighty, along with the *Sudetendeutsch* who lived within their mountain walls. The South Slavic peoples passed under Habsburg control as the rule of the Ottomans receded toward Asia. This polyglot realm fell in ruins in 1918. The pathetic fragment of "Austria" that was left was now indeed purely German in language. But culturally it was quite distinct from the Prussian north. It was solidly Catholic. It showed upon its face and in its spirit that it had served for untold generations as the gracious intermediary between Western civilization and the European southeast during the long centuries when the West was in its essence French.⁶

But the new Austria was an economic monstrosity. Germans and Austrians alike in the epoch of despair after the Armistice desired to be one country. Such a country, however, would leave the defeated Reich larger, more populous, and more powerful than the Kaiser's Empire of 1914 and would enable it to dominate Hungary and to threaten Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and even Rumania. Such a union was unthinkable to the strategists and diplomats of France and the Little Entente. The attempts of the Austrian and German constituent assemblies to achieve union in February and March of 1919 were sternly vetoed by Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint Germain⁷ and Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles.⁸ A succession of international loans, granted on condition of non-alienation of independence, kept Austria alive in unhappy sovereignty. Brüning and Curtius in Berlin, Schober in Vienna, sought to effect a customs union in 1931, but this too was vetoed by the Quai d'Orsay and held illegal by the World Court.⁹ A new international loan of 300,000,000 schillings was arranged for in July 1932, though not actually issued until August 1933. Here again French diplomacy insisted upon no *Anschluss* and a reaffirmation of the pledges of the Financial Protocol of October 4, 1922.

For over a decade the Quai d'Orsay and the Little Entente condemned Austria to a miserable independence unwanted by any considerable portion of its people. When the Nazi revolution in the Reich belatedly converted a large majority of Austrians to the cause of independence by convincing Socialists and Clericals alike that *Anschluss* would now be disastrous, the Quai d'Orsay and the Little Entente were presented with an opportunity of turning a fiction into a reality and frustrating all Pan-German schemes on the Danube for an indefinite period. But they misused their opportunity and trusted the new Cæsar in Rome to keep the Third Reich out of the *Ostmark*—with

results that were ultimately to prove catastrophic.

For Hitler the issue of 1933 was one of finding means of bringing to power in Vienna the Austrian branch of the NSDAP and thus achieving effective union through the Party machine. The issue for Dollfuss was one of finding means to thwart this game. Germany was large. Austria was small. The Austrian NSDAP, however, was negligible. It had won some seats, including fifteen in the Vienna Council, in the municipal elections of 1932, but had not elected a single deputy to parliament in the last national election (1930). Despite subsidies from Munich, it made little progress. In January 1930 Hitler had appointed Alfred Frauenfeld leader of the Vienna *Gau* (district) and in July 1931 he had named Theo Habicht Provincial Inspector of the NSDAP for Austria.¹⁰ Following Nazi victory in Berlin the Party in Austria became a state within a state, controlled from abroad and striving for mastery of the realm. But its followers were few. With foresight and shrewdness its purposes might be frustrated despite support given it by the Third Reich.

The tragedy of Austria after 1933 lay in the inability of those charged with the burden of preserving its independence to come to terms with the only group in Austrian politics and the only class in Austrian society capable of standing as a solid bulwark against Nazi aggression. Dollfuss the peasant boy was too loyal to Property to lean upon the proletariat. Dollfuss the Catholic was too loyal to the Church to collaborate with Social Democracy. Catholicism and Property called upon an indigenous clerical Fascism and upon Italian Fascism to defend Austrian independence against German Fascism. In scorn and fear of the Marxist workers the Dollfuss regime outlawed democracy and entrusted its defense to Little Cæsars at home and to Big Cæsar at Rome. Under the pressure of these doubtful allies, Dollfuss was subsequently compelled to outlaw Socialism as well as democracy. He and his aides therewith destroyed those without whose support against Berlin they must themselves be destroyed by Berlin. Austrian independence was betrayed by its defenders. Property and Catholicism were in the long run also undone. Here too Hitler was to find that his enemies and victims could confidently be relied upon to compass their own destruction and rescue him from the most difficult extremities.

The Little Cæsars into whose hands the unsainted Engelbert delivered himself and his Government were leaders of a typical private militia, subsidized by industrialists and aristocrats and recruited from adventure-hungry peasant lads and grocers' clerks. This militia—the

Heimwehr or Home Guards—developed in the provinces in the middle 1920's to "combat Marxism" and "save Austria." It employed the paraphernalia of Nazi brown shirts and Italian black shirts, but it lacked a single leader. The Vienna branch was headed by Major Emil Fey. His chief rival for control was Prince Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, who owned thirty-six castles and traced back his ancestry a thousand years to Ottokar I. At the age of eighteen he had joined a dragoon regiment and served on the Russian and Italian fronts. Thereafter he became a military adventurer and putschist who took part in the German-Polish conflict in Upper Silesia in 1919 and in Hitler's beer-hall coup of 1923. Like Hitler, he was full of contempt for liberalism and democracy and full of hatred for Marxists and Jews. But he broke with the NSDAP, sold out to Mussolini, and became an advocate of clerical Fascism. Seipel said of him in 1927: "An extremely serious young man, a man who embodies a patriarchal social program, a great hope of Austria."¹¹ In reality he was an irresponsible politician, a luxury-loving man, and a would-be petty despot. Like Franz von Papen, Starhemberg was destined to help bring his fatherland to ruin in the name of "saving" it.

After the strikes and civil disturbances of 1927 the Heimwehr became more than ever a useful agency of terror against the trade unions and the Social Democrats. It resisted Schober's efforts to disarm the private armies. Its "Korneuberg Program" of 1930 demanded the suppression of political parties and the establishment of a Corporative State, to be controlled of course by the Heimwehr. In September 1930 Starhemberg was elected *Bundesführer*. He put up candidates for parliament under the name of the "*Heimathbloc*" and won 8 seats, compared with the Social Democrats' 72 and the Christian Socials' 65. In May 1931 he yielded to the pressure of Fey and other firebrands and handed over his Heimwehr leadership to Dr. Waldemar Pfriemer, who attempted a putsch in Styria. It failed ignominiously. Pfriemer fled to Yugoslavia. Starhemberg was imprisoned for a few days.¹² But in the Austrian, as in the German, Republic, reactionary conspirators were always dealt with leniently in contrast to the treatment meted out to all movements of revolt from the Left. Starhemberg's constant query was: "Austria must become Fascist sooner or later, so why not sooner?"

The Dollfuss Cabinet of May 20, 1932 included for the first time a member of the *Heimathbloc*. It also included Dr. Anton Rintelen, Governor of Styria, who was a Christian Social but sympathetic

toward the Heimwehr. The Dollfuss Cabinet, with the Social Democrats in opposition, had a majority of only one vote in parliament, including the Christian Socials, the *Heimatabloc*, and the "Landbund" group. Better to rely for support, thought the little Chancellor, upon the Fascist private army of Starhemberg and Fey so long as they were ardently clerical and anti-Marxist, rather than upon the Social Democrats, who controlled the municipality of Vienna and 40% of the Austrian electorate. No matter that the Heimwehr had no popular following. It had the benediction of Mussolini and the Church and the blessings of the great families of money and title. Major Fey was taken into the Cabinet as Minister of Public Security in September 1932. His first act was to prohibit all political demonstrations by Nazis, Social Democrats, and Communists. As Nazi outrages multiplied after January 1933, Dollfuss found the forms of political democracy ever more irksome and the support of the Heimwehr increasingly indispensable.

Parliamentary government in Austria died in March 1933. On the 4th day of the month a Socialist motion against the Cabinet's proposal to penalize the workers in a recent railway strike was carried by one vote. When the Chancellor's supporters refused to accept the result on the ground of a minor irregularity in procedure, the President and two Vice-Presidents of the legislature resigned, thereby suspending the assembly. Dollfuss then suppressed parliament with the approval of the Heimwehr and of his own Christian Social Party. After "resignation" and immediate reappointment, he received authority from President Miklas to rule by emergency decrees. A rump meeting of parliament on March 15 was outlawed. Dollfuss was dictator. In a broadcast from Munich Dr. Frank, the Bavarian Minister of Justice, warned that if Vienna persisted in repressing the Austrian Nazis, their German comrades might be obliged to protect them. Protests at such threats elicited no apologies from Berlin. In April, after the Nazis had won 9 out of 20 seats in the Innsbruck municipal election, Dollfuss prohibited all elections, enlisted Heimwehr men as "auxiliary police," and launched a great campaign for membership in the *Vaterländische Front* (VF).

This somewhat artificial creation was designed to mobilize mass support for the anti-Nazi and anti-Marxist dictatorship which Dollfuss had established. Austria might still tolerate political parties, but the VF would be above parties and might become the basis, if necessary, of a one-party State. Following Seipel's inspiration, Dollfuss made the

crutched cross the symbol of the movement. Unlike the hooked cross of Hitler, it was Christian in origin, having been employed by Theodor, by the Crusaders' Kingdom of Jerusalem and by the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre. The VF also had badges, buttons, parades, banners (red-white-red), and a variety of all-embracing activities on the totalitarian model.¹³ Under pressure many Austrians joined.

But the VF was never an effective mass organization. Dollfuss's greatest political asset was his own personality. He was genial and charming. His quaintly undespotic dictatorship was easily tolerated even by its enemies, at least in its gentler moods. He combined earnestness and elfishness in equal proportions. His dwarfish figure helped to make him beloved. Endless jokes about his size added to his political stature rather than diminished it: "The Chancellor has broken his leg falling off a ladder while picking strawberries." "Dollfuss is so worried he paces up and down under his bed all night." "At Geneva he got hold of everything he wanted except the doorknob." "Have you heard? Dollfuss is to be on a new postage stamp—life size!"¹⁴

The little Chancellor in his battle with Hitler always walked on the edge of the precipice and always (until the end) kept his balance. Early in May 1933, following rumors of a Nazi putsch, the Cabinet forbade the wearing of all political uniforms except by the Heimwehr. On May 13 Dr. Frank, accompanied by Dr. Kerrl, the Reich Minister of Justice, arrived uninvited in Vienna to attend a Nazi demonstration planned to challenge a Heimwehr parade. He was allowed to address a meeting, attended by the German Minister, Dr. Reith, but was warned to avoid "political" subjects—as if any subject could be unpolitical to a Nazi! A hundred or so Nazis were arrested. Frank and Kerrl declared in Graz that Berlin would order reprisals for this "affront" to Germany. Therewith the Austrian Minister informed Wilhelmstrasse that Frank would be expelled if he did not depart at once. He left, but the German Government now imposed a visa fee of 1,000 marks, effective June 1, on all Germans going to Austria: to "prevent unpleasantness" arising from forbidden Nazi uniforms on German backs. The actual purpose was to ruin the Austrian tourist traffic and thus bring Dollfuss to terms.

This blow was followed by a Nazi campaign of terror in Austria which led to the formal suppression of the Austrian NSDAP. On June 11 Dr. Steidle of the Tyrol Heimwehr was wounded by Nazi bullets. Bombing outrages took place all over the land.¹⁵ Berlin

named Habicht as press attaché of the German legation in Vienna to give him diplomatic immunity. He was nevertheless arrested and deported to the Reich. Berlin retaliated on June 13 by arresting and expelling the Austrian press attaché. On June 19, 1933 Fey phoned Dollfuss, then in London for the Economic Conference, that he had ordered the dissolution of the Nazi Party after a bomb attack on the Heimwehr police at Krems. The Austrian Nazis, who now went "underground" and amused themselves by cutting phone wires and painting swastikas on sidewalks and buildings, transferred their headquarters to Munich. On July 5 Habicht initiated a long series of broadcasts from the Bavarian capital:

The prohibition of the German Nationalsocialist movement in Austria by the Dollfuss Government was a stab in the back and in its consequences, both political and economic, a crime not only against the future of Austria but against the whole German people. . . . Let us take up the struggle which the Dollfuss Government has thrust upon us and carry it through, ruthlessly and relentlessly, to victory. With us are a thousand years of German history, behind us stands the whole German people, but before us lie, as our goal, the liberation of Austria and the establishment of the German nation. Long live Adolf Hitler, long live the greater Germany! ¹⁶

Neither Austrian protests nor the representations of the Powers stopped these broadcasts, for they were an integral part of the new Nazi technique of provoking civil war and intervention against foreign governments. No less than 84 such broadcasts were made between July 5, 1933 and February 19, 1934. Habicht delivered 21. German aircraft occasionally crossed the frontier to drop leaflets on Austrian towns, abusing Dollfuss and summoning the inhabitants to revolt. On German soil an "Austrian Legion" of Nazi refugees was formed and trained in the arts of insurrection. In November 1933 an auxiliary "*Kampfring*" of Austrians in Germany was established. Vienna's Minister, Herr Tauschitz, protested repeatedly, but was told that encouragement to such groups could not be regarded as contrary to international law unless they were designed to provoke Communist revolutions in other States. These and other activities ¹⁷ convinced the Austrian Chancellor that he must reckon with a determined Nazi effort, fully supported from Berlin, to destroy his regime and his State. In an interview in London he asserted:

What I have to contend with is the possibility of an uncontrolled invasion of Austria by the German Nazis. I am determined to take all measures at my command to prevent such a situation, and I have good ground for believing that I have the sympathy of other countries, both of governments and of public opinion. An independent Austria is the best safeguard for peace in Europe.¹⁸

Dollfuss's efforts to secure support abroad were not unsuccessful, though Paul-Boncour told the Chamber in May with apparent equanimity that the French *tranche* of the Austrian loan had best be deferred until it was clear that Dollfuss could maintain the independence of his country. The Chancellor secured a "good press" in London, however, and by the end of June both the British and French governments were prepared to give moral and financial support to Vienna.¹⁹ But they opposed all suggestions that Austria should appeal to the League of Nations against Germany. Dollfuss looked to his friend and patron, Mussolini, whom he had visited in Rome at Easter.²⁰ Il Duce desired neither any action at Geneva nor any joint demarche by the Powers. He made friendly representations at Berlin in late July. Wilhelmstrasse disclaimed responsibility for terrorism, but asserted that it would do all in its power to halt the radio and aerial propaganda. On August 7 British and French representatives at Berlin called attention to Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles and to the recently signed Four-Power Pact. Herr von Bülow denied any infraction of the treaty, questioned the applicability of the pact, and rejected any foreign "intervention." The Munich broadcasts continued.

Austria's "Millemetternich" sought safety by a mixed policy of repressions, concessions, and appeals for foreign aid. In mid-August he spent some days with Mussolini at Il Duce's villa at Riccione on the Adriatic, bathing, boating, and motoring and securing new assurances of Italian support against the specter—always horrifying to Rome—of Germany at the Brenner Pass.²¹ At the end of the month he obtained the consent of the Powers for the recruitment (contrary to the restrictions of St. Germain) of a special military corps on a one-year service basis to constitute an army reserve. At the end of September concentration camps were established in Austria. On the afternoon of October 2, 1933, in the vestibule of the parliament building, Dollfuss was shot by one Dertil, a renegade Heimwehr man who had turned Nazi. One bullet wounded him in the arm, another glanced off

his chest. His devoted Catholic peasantry was frantic. On his recovery he gave thanks in St. Stephen's for his "miraculous" escape. A decree of November 10 proclaimed martial law to permit the restoration of the death penalty for murder, arson, and public violence.

At the same time reconciliation was sought. Dr. Winkler of the Landbund, Vice-Chancellor from May 1932 until September 1933, always urged a "settlement" with Berlin. Dr. Anton Rintelen was of a like mind. Dollfuss admitted that he had twice received Habicht before his expulsion, but had rejected his proposals for a coalition of Nazis and Christian Socials which would hold elections but remain in power regardless of their outcome. In a broadcast of September 10 Habicht demanded that the rights of the NSDAP in Austria be restored, that it be granted representation in the Cabinet, and that new elections be held at once. Two days later Dr. Reith, the German Minister, approached Dollfuss for an "understanding." The Chancellor indicated that he could not permit the existence of a party which took orders from abroad, but was disposed to consider a settlement on the basis of the cessation of all unfriendly acts by the Reich and a clear recognition of Austria's right to independence. On October 31, 1933 Kurt Schuschnigg, Minister of Education, secretly travelled to Munich at Dollfuss' request and conferred with Rudolf Hess and Heinrich Himmler. Habicht knew of the appointment, but Hitler did not. It was inconclusive.²² On December 15 Frick told Tauschitz in Berlin that Germany would carry through its struggle to the end, but advised Dollfuss to negotiate with Habicht once more. Two days after Christmas Dollfuss instructed Tauschitz to see Neurath:

In the meantime, it has been urged upon the Austrian Chancellor by another private party in touch with Herr Habicht to attempt a solution by a direct conversation between the Austrian Chancellor and Herr Habicht. It has been suggested that Herr Habicht would travel to Austria for the purpose of the conversation.²³

Tauschitz's instructions went on to say that Dollfuss was prepared to meet Habicht again, but only if Habicht made the request with Hitler's approval. In this event he would be granted safe conduct to Vienna and back, provided he travelled incognito and refrained from propaganda.²⁴ On New Year's Day of 1934 Tauschitz saw the German Foreign Minister and received assurances of Hitler's approval of the plan on condition that Habicht visit Vienna after the projected

visit of Fulvio Suvich, Italian Undersecretary of State. Four days later Habicht secretly received his safe conduct for an air trip to the Austrian capital. The date was fixed for January 8. But at the last moment, while Habicht was already over Austrian territory, Dollfuss cancelled the engagement—allegedly because of new Nazi outrages, possibly because of Italian pressure. Habicht returned empty-handed to Munich, but his friend Erbprinz Josias zur Waldeck-Pyrmont of the German Foreign Office lingered in Vienna.

A "tip" to the Austrian police led to a raid on the apartment of Frauenfeld, former head of the Austrian Nazis, at 1.00 a.m. January 12. The raiders found Frauenfeld in conference with Waldeck-Pyrmont and, even more alarming, with Count Alberti, leader of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr. Waldeck-Pyrmont had a photostat of Habicht's ultra-secret safe conduct. When the police took it from him he boasted that many duplicates were available. He was conducted to the German legation and left the country later in the day. Tauschitz protested in Berlin at this breach of faith. A new protest of January 17, accompanied by a threat to appeal to the League, brought no satisfaction but merely a sweeping denial of all charges.

Who sups with the devil must use a long spoon. Dollfuss was perhaps beginning to suspect that the Heimwehr devil was no more trustworthy than the Nazi devil. The gang-leaders of the new Cæsarism, whether big or little, are not gentlemen of honor. But with respect to the Heimwehr at least, Dollfuss was no longer able to cut the toils in which he was entangled.

Renewed suggestions to Paris, London, and Rome regarding the necessity of an appeal to the League against Berlin brought approval from the French capital and also from Prague. But Mussolini was still opposed and Downing Street was doubtful. Eden denied in Commons on January 30, 1934 that the British Cabinet had sought to discourage such a move, but it gave Dollfuss no encouragement. As an alternative Dollfuss on January 8 presented to the foreign offices of the three Western Powers the dossier on Nazi activities which he had prepared for Geneva. Protracted negotiations followed. Downing Street agreed (February 9) that the preservation of Austria's independence and integrity was an object of British policy, but since the Foreign Office had already said this and since it had no intention of doing anything beyond verbalizing, there seemed to be no occasion for further steps.²⁵ Finally, however, even London assented to a Three-Power Declaration to this effect, but only on condition that it contain no new

commitments and be as innocuous in phraseology as possible. On February 17, 1934 the British Foreign Office issued a statement:

The French, Italian and United Kingdom Governments agreed tonight on the following communiqué:

"The Austrian Government has inquired of the governments of France, Great Britain and Italy as to their attitude with regard to a dossier which it prepared with a view of establishing German interference in the internal affairs of Austria and communicated to them.

"The conversations which have taken place between the three governments on this subject have shown that they take a common view as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties."

It will be recalled that His Majesty's Government already has made its own position clear in an aide-memoire handed the Austrian Minister in London February 9 in connection with the dossier regarding Nazi activities in Austria referred to in the above statement.²⁶

But Vienna by this time was already plunged into bloodshed.

2. MASSACRE IN FEBRUARY

September of 1933 was a gala month in *Alt Wien*. It was the 500th anniversary of the completion of the tall and slender spire of St. Stephen's Cathedral. It was also the 250th anniversary of the raising of the siege of Vienna at the hands of the Turkish armies of Mohammed IV. Christendom still preserved some vestiges of unity in 1683. The Catholic defenders were commanded by Duke Charles of Lorraine, Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden, King John Sobieski of Poland, and Count Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, ancestor of the Little Cæsar who now commanded the Heimwehr. On so great an occasion as this the Catholic hierarchy and the Cabinet were agreed as to the most fitting form of celebration. A "General German Catholic Congress," the second of its kind, would be held in the capital. The German thousand-mark visa fee unfortunately kept away most of the visitors from the Reich and thus deprived the Congress of an all-German character. But many clergymen and laymen came from German settlements in Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, and elsewhere. From the Austrian provinces 200,000 people poured in to attend the ceremonies.

The significance of the festival was as much political as religious. It was designed to consolidate the regime on a popular basis of clerical

Fascism. Dollfuss addressed the Congress on September 9 and two days later spoke to the first general assembly of the Fatherland Front (VF). The Cardinal-Archbishop of Vienna, Theodore Innitzer, a *Sudetendeutscher* who had been Rector of the University and Minister of Public Welfare under Schober, was enthusiastic over the new order. Dr. Richard Schmitz, the courtly Minister of Public Welfare under Seipel and now again under Dollfuss, took a leading part.²⁷

Not least imposing among the speakers, though never brilliant in oratory, was Dollfuss's new Minister of Education, who had been Minister of Justice under Buresch: Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg, born in 1897 at Riva on Lake Garda, then the garrison town of his general-father, and educated in the Jesuit school at Feldkirk. He had studied law at the University of Innsbruck and spent a year in an Italian military prison camp after the close of the war. Like Dollfuss he entered politics as a protégé of Seipel. Like Dollfuss he championed the "Christian Corporative State" which was to be based on the principles of the Papal Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* of May 23, 1931, in which Pius XI had denounced both socialism and plutocracy. At the ceremonies Schuschnigg spoke on the mission of Austria in the Christian Occident. "German law and German culture combined with a sense of Catholic responsibility should guide our fatherland along its difficult and laborious path."²⁸

Over against this creed stood Marxism. Despite numerous conversions to the exciting faith of "National-socialism," most of the pious peasantry, much of the greater and lesser bourgeoisie, and almost all the aristocracy and the élite of Church and State found the Fascist clericalism of Dollfuss acceptable, for it served both their prejudices and their interests. But the urban working classes would have none of it. Many a wage-earner was willing enough to go to Mass on Sunday—and to be a non-believing Marxist materialist the balance of the week. Clericalism was no less anathema to the Social Democratic masses than was Italian Fascism or Hitlerism. They had established the Republic. They had organized their own armed militia, the *Schutzbund*, to protect their Republic against reaction. They had built their trade unions and their party organization. In the proletarian suburbs of "Red" Vienna they had erected the largest, most commodious, and most attractive workers' apartment buildings in the world—built by the Social Democratic city authorities, financed by high taxes on the rich, and rented at low rates to workers. They were not revolutionists, save in abstract principle, for they had too large a stake in an

established order which left them free to do these things. But they had earned the bitter hatred of the priesthood, the nobility, and the plutocracy and of many in the lesser orders who followed priests, respected nobles, and emulated plutocrats. Against this hatred they were prepared to defend their hard-won gains. Dollfuss had deprived them of political democracy. They were determined not to be deprived of their unions, their cultural organizations, their municipal enterprises.

Dollfuss found himself pushed by the Heimwehr into ever more severe measures against Austrian Social Democracy. At Starhemberg's demand the Cabinet ordered the dissolution of the *Schutzbund* on March 31, 1933, on the ground that it was plotting violence against the Government. May Day demonstrations were forbidden. The alleged discovery of a "Communist plot" led to the arrest of several hundred persons and the suppression of the insignificant Communist Party some weeks before the NSDAP was banned. Nevertheless the Social Democratic leaders, Otto Bauer, Julius Deutsch, and their colleagues, offered Dollfuss support if he would restore some semblance of parliamentary government. A Socialist petition making this demand secured over a million signatures in the spring of 1933. Fearing that acceptance would drive the Heimwehr and the Right Wing of the Christian Socials into the arms of the Nazis, the Chancellor refused, though the party thus offering him support was the largest in the land, with 1,400,000 regular members—far more than his own VF. He declared that the Nazis could not be fought with Socialist help. The Cabinet would not collaborate with Marxist extremists. A new Constitution was necessary.²⁹

By September the Heimwehr was openly at odds with Dr. Winkler and with the relatively democratic Landbund. It demanded the suppression of the Social Democrats. Dollfuss reorganized his Cabinet on September 21, 1933, dropping Winkler and the Landbund Ministers as well as Vaugoin, Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Christian Social Party. Emil Fey, Heimwehr leader in Vienna, became Vice-Chancellor. A week later Starhemberg announced that the Heimwehr would join the VF en masse and dissolve the *Heimatbloc*. On October 11 Dollfuss made Starhemberg his deputy leader in the VF.

Despite these ominous developments the Social Democratic leaders still hoped for an agreement. Dollfuss seemed conciliatory. In a speech of January 18, 1934, he declared himself ready to give the Socialists a place among the ranks of the defenders of Austrian inde-

pendence. Shortly thereafter the Socialist leaders decided to offer their co-operation once more on condition of a popular referendum on the proposed new Constitution, free elections to the new "corporations," and recognition of the rights of organization and collective bargaining. But Fulvio Suvich visited Vienna, January 18-20. It is probable that he brought word from Mussolini that the Socialist Party must go. At any rate the Heimwehr leaders now intervened. On January 29 Starhemberg hinted at a deal with the Nazis. On January 30 the Tyrol Heimwehr mobilized and forced the Governor to yield to their demand for military (i.e. Heimwehr) rule in the province. Similar steps were taken in Upper Austria (February 6), Styria and the Burgenland (February 7), and Lower Austria (February 9). Dollfuss visited Budapest on February 7 and 8. On his return on the 9th he received the Heimwehr leaders, but no announcement was made of the result of this crucial conference.

Fey, however, now felt free to proceed. Taking a leaf from the Nazi book, he ordered raids on all Socialist headquarters during the first week of February and announced the discovery of a "Bolshevist-Marxist plot." On February 10 he deprived Mayor Karl Seitz of Vienna of his authority over public safety. On Sunday February 11 he addressed a Heimwehr parade: "During the last few days I have made certain that Chancellor Dollfuss is a man of the Heimwehr. Tomorrow we shall start to make a clean job of things in Austria." Fey further announced that bombs and machine-guns had been discovered in Socialist headquarters and that the raid on the *Arbeiter Zeitung* on February 8 revealed evidence of a Red conspiracy. He arrested sundry leaders of the suppressed *Schutzbund*, while the Heimwehr press shrieked: "The enemy is on the Left"; "Merciless offensive against Reds!"

On Sunday evening the arch-"plotter," Otto Bauer, was attending the movies with his family and enjoying Greta Garbo in *Grand Hotel*. When he returned home he received a message from Herr Bernacek, the Socialist leader in Linz, that the local party was expecting a Heimwehr attack on its headquarters the following morning and was prepared to resist. Bauer advised caution. Early Monday morning, February 12, 1934, the Heimwehr sought to search the Linz headquarters for arms and was denied admittance. With military reinforcements it stormed and took the building after heavy fighting. When the news reached Vienna, about 8.30 a.m., the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions met to decide what to do.

Counsels were divided. Bauer still hoped for a compromise. By a margin of one vote a general strike was decided upon for 5.00 p.m. But, by some misunderstanding or sudden inspiration of rage, the electrical workers struck at once and thereby stopped the presses of the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, which were to print the strike notices. The call never went out. While Bauer and Deutsch sought in vain to reach the Chancellor, Dollfuss was attending Mass at St. Stephen's. In the midst of his devotions all the lights went out and all the street cars outside stopped in their tracks. This obviously was the signal for the general strike and for the "Red revolt"!

The Heimwehr machine, with the full approval of Dollfuss, now went into action. Most of the Socialist leaders with the exception of Deutsch and Bauer were arrested as they sought to plead with Miklas and other officials. The general strike never materialized because the necessary orders were never sent out or were intercepted. Without orders from their leaders the well-disciplined Austrian workers would do nothing. The *Schutzbund* members in their municipal apartments awaited commands which never came while Heimwehr gangs moved against them with the support of police and troops. Some of the workers found the arms long hidden away for just such an emergency. Others dug for hours in basements and courtyards and never found them because those who knew where they were had been arrested. The attackers isolated the huge blocks of tenements from one another—the Goethe Hof, the Engels Hof, the Karl Marx Hof, and others—and besieged them separately with rifles, machine-guns, and finally artillery.

During Monday night, Tuesday, Wednesday, and part of Thursday the unequal battle went on. Bullets whistled through the kindergartens and kitchens of the buildings which Dollfuss described as "fortresses." Shells tore huge holes in the walls. The Cabinet declared at once that the Socialists were planning a revolt for the 13th. The Vienna Rathaus was seized by the Heimwehr, which ran its green-and-white flag up over the tower. On Monday evening the Cabinet proclaimed martial law and decreed the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist unions, and all affiliated societies and clubs. An hour before midnight Dollfuss declared in a radio broadcast that the Socialist were "hyenas who must be hunted out of the country." Starhemberg saw 42 bodies laid out at the Goethe Hof and cried: "Far too few shot!" Official reports placed the Government casualties at 102 killed and 319 wounded and the Socialist losses at 193 killed

and 493 wounded. But the *Schutzbunders* estimated that 1,500 of their members had been slain by Tuesday evening. Dollfuss took tea with the Papal Nuncio on Tuesday afternoon during the heaviest fighting. Late Wednesday night in another radio broadcast he pleaded and threatened: "For God's sake, let misguided men at last realize that all resistance is in vain. . . . All those who from now on cease all resistance and surrender to us between 7.00 a.m. and noon tomorrow can count on an amnesty. But the responsible leaders are excluded. After midday there will be no quarter given to anyone!"³⁰

By the end of the week all was over save the punishment of the prisoners. In Graz, Steyer, Linz, and other centres Social Democracy was drowned in blood as it had been in the capital. On the afternoon of Wednesday the 15th, Otto Bauer, Julius Deutsch (badly wounded), and twoscore refugees fled into Czechoslovakia at Bratislava. In a new broadcast from Munich the same evening Theo Habicht advanced a novel theory of the Marxist uprising: "Bolshevist revolutionaries equipped with French trench helmets, Czechoslovak rifles, and Russian ammunition opened fire on the troops. . . . But the fighters on both sides—whether they realized it or not—are but legionnaires of foreign Powers."

In London Prime Minister MacDonald interceded with Baron Georg Franckenstein, the Austrian Minister, on behalf of the arrested Socialist leaders. The British Minister, Sir Walford Selby, was instructed to do likewise at Vienna. On February 17, while Britain, France, and Italy reiterated their championship of Austrian "independence," Dollfuss declared that the week was the saddest of his life. He averred that the Socialists had planned the "rebellion" for years in their tenement "fortresses." "We are not attackers. We did the utmost to spare lives. . . . It was a small but extraordinarily well-armed minority that took up arms against the Government. . . . I hope the blood that flowed in our land will bring people to their senses. . . . We are Christian and humane enough to do the utmost to see that the worker gets his rights." In a broadcast to America the same evening he insisted again that "a small group of fanatics" had attacked the State and society. Eight death sentences were imposed and hundreds were sentenced to imprisonment for varying terms. Koloman Wallisch, Socialist Mayor of Bruck-an-der-Mur, had earned the hatred of the authorities by exposing the Hirtenberg arms scandal and revealing in 1933 that Italy was illegally smuggling arms into Hungary through Austria. He now fled vengeance, but was caught near the

frontier. He was tried in Leoben and hanged at midnight on February 19 in the brightly lighted courtyard of the local prison with other Socialist captives looking on from their cells. As he shouted: "*Es lebe die Sozial Demokratie, hoch! Freiheit!*" hangman Spitzer from Vienna pulled him up from the platform while the hangman's two assistants clung to his legs until he lost consciousness.³¹

Thus the Heimwehr saved the *Ostmark* from the "Red menace," and Dollfuss gave his blessing to the destruction of the only mass movement in Austria capable of saving the land from conquest by the Nazis. The February tragedy made the Chancellor more than ever the prisoner of Fey and Starhemberg and the henchman of Mussolini. On March 17, 1934 three protocols were signed in Rome by Il Duce, Dollfuss, and Julius Gömbös, Premier of Hungary. The first of these instruments pledged the parties to confer and consult on common problems with a view toward pursuing a "concordant policy directed toward the promotion of effective co-operation." The second protocol obligated them to conclude new bilateral agreements for the promotion of trade. The third, limited to Austria and Italy, contemplated preferential treatment for Austrian exports to Italy.³² On May 14 a number of bilateral accords were signed between the three members of the new "Italian bloc." These and subsequent agreements granted favors to Austrian exports in the Hungarian and Italian markets and enlarged the market for Hungarian grain in Italy.

This partial (and, as it proved, transitory) solution of the Austrian economic dilemma was of more political than commercial significance. Mussolini here took advantage of Austria's dependence upon outside defenders and capitalized upon the failure of France and the Little Entente to do anything effective toward Austria's salvation. Gömbös's flirtation with Hitler began in June of 1933, but he perceived more advantages for the present in a deal with Rome. In September 1933 an Italian memorandum on Danubian economic reconstruction, based upon the conclusions of a conference at Stresa a year previously, elicited the approbation of the Little Entente, but led to no action. Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest were ever suspicious of Italian motives in view of Mussolini's championship of Hungarian irredentism. The Rome Protocols confirmed their suspicions. Il Duce was clearly attempting to convert Hungary and Austria into satellites of Italy. The ultimate implications of such a bloc boded no good for France and her Danubian allies. But the immediate result was to build an effective bulwark against any Nazi assault on Austria, and this was pro-

nounced good at Paris, Prague, and London no less than at Vienna and Rome.

On May 1, 1934 the Austrian Cabinet decreed a new Constitution.³³ Clerical Fascism here came fully into its own. Simultaneously Fey assumed the post of Minister of Public Security while Starhemberg was elevated to the Vice-Chancellorship. Odo Neustädter-Stürmer, Heimwehr leader and Minister of Social Welfare, became head of the Fascist labor organization, following the outlawry of all trade unions on March 2. On July 11 Fey yielded the portfolio of Public Security to Dollfuss and became Special Commissioner for defense of the State. At the same time Prince Alois von Schoenberg-Hartenstein, Minister of War and a Habsburg legitimist, also gave up his portfolio to Dollfuss, who promised to rival Mussolini in the number of his Cabinet posts. The Chancellor likewise took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with Dr. Stefan Tauschitz, formerly Minister in Berlin, as his Secretary. The dictatorship of the Christian Corporative State was thus perfected by the personal dictatorship of the peasant boy from Texing—with his careless despotism limited always by the little captains of the Heimwehr and the big captain in the Palazzo Venezia.

The fruits of February were sweet. They might have been long enjoyed save that those who plucked them had reckoned without their cost and had ignored the other Austrian in Berlin.

3. DOLLFUSS † JULY 25, 1934

In mid-June 1934 Hitler and Mussolini met for the first time in Venice. The Cæsar of the Brownshirts had borrowed much from the Cæsar of the Blackshirts. Prior to the March on Rome, Hitler had established contacts with the ex-Socialist who was editor in Milan of the *Popolo d'Italia* and leader of the *Fascisti di Combattimento*, prototype of all the private armies of an age of political piracy.³⁴ Both before and after the beer-hall putsch of 1923, Der Führer had sent agents to Il Duce. He owed more to the Italian tyrant by way of propaganda technique and political artistry than he was disposed to admit. And the idea of a German-Italian alliance against France was fixed in his mind. There were always obstacles seemingly insuperable. How could a Pan-German surrender claims to the 250,000 *Volks-genossen* in the South Tyrol beyond Brenner and around Bolzano?

Hitler urged passionately that they must be sacrificed as the price of an accord. But north of the Dolomites stood the Tyrolean Alps and Austria. Il Duce was no more willing to surrender these to Berlin than to yield the South Tyrol itself. Austria was no bridge to Rome, but a barrier. After January Der Führer-turned-Chancellor faced in the problem of Austria the problem of how to come to terms with Rome—in spite of Austria, because of Austria, or without Austria.

The meeting at Venice was unhappy for Hitler and inconclusive for both participants. Hitler was already anxious over the coming events that were so soon to rend the Third Reich with bullets and blood. The initiative for the Venice meeting apparently came from Berlin. But the arrangements of time and place failed to flatter Der Führer. He arrived on June 14 and departed at 8.00 a.m. June 16 to fly back to the Reich. In the interim there were such speeches, conversations, and ceremonies as befitted the meeting of two potentates. The city was alive with frenzied acclaim for "Duce! Duce!" Hitler arrived first for a concert in the courtyard of the Doges' Palace and was almost ignored. The next morning he came in his raincoat to the Fascist parade in the Piazza San Marco. Mussolini came resplendent in uniform. He was hailed by a cheering crowd as he spoke from a balcony facing the square. Few of the throng paid any attention to Hitler until Il Duce pointed to him. There was lunch at the Venice Golf Club and afterwards a two-hour conference *à deux*; then a motor-launch trip around the Grand Canal; a dinner with forty guests in Mussolini's honor at Hitler's hotel; more talk; and farewell the next morning with Mussolini, now in civilian clothes, saluting, shaking hands, and bidding his great friend good-by.⁸⁵

The public addresses and communiqués, with one exception, revealed nothing. On June 15 the Italian delegation gave the press the unstartling news that the heads of the two governments "have continued and concluded today, in a spirit of cordial collaboration, the examination of the problems of general policy and of those problems which more directly interest the two countries. The personal relation thus initiated will be continued in the future."⁸⁶ Mussolini's principal speech reiterated the stereotypes of Fascism: "We have met in an attempt to dispel the clouds which obscure the political horizon of Europe. . . . Our peace is a virile peace, for peace abandons the weak but accompanies the strong. We are opposed not to the weak but to the unjust. . . . We will defend our patrimony by persuasion if possible, otherwise with the song of our machine-guns. Nobody can stop

the march of the Italian people.”⁸⁷ Fulvio Suvich issued a statement: “Premier Mussolini and Chancellor Hitler reviewed their respective countries’ policies on disarmament, which are already known. They found a substantial identity of views existing between them.”

Suvich and young Galeazzo Ciano, husband of Mussolini’s daughter Edda and then head of the Italian Press Department, suggested to news-hungry reporters that no agreements had been concluded, but that many avenues of co-operation had been discovered. An announcement at Rome indicated that Mussolini would return the visit, probably at Munich in October. News dispatches, representing the desperate guesses of the correspondents, asserted that the two men were agreed as to the maintenance of Austrian independence and as to German re-entry into the League if armed parity were first granted the Reich.

All this was pointless. Hitler had come to discover the terms upon which he might buy Mussolini’s consent to Nazi control of Austria. Mussolini had come to discover the means by which he could prevent a Nazi assault upon Austria. Neither man achieved his purpose. But an indiscreet statement of Ciano hinted at a “deal.” Il Duce’s son-in-law asserted that Hitler had agreed to abandon efforts at *Anschluss*, while Mussolini in turn had agreed not to object to a Nazi becoming Chancellor of an independent Austria. An election would be held in Austria in October. Germany would be invited to join the Rome Protocol bloc.⁸⁸ Berlin reports hinted that Hitler had abandoned the dream of annexing Austria. Official spokesmen at Vienna declared the Venice reports impossible and fantastic.

The mystery is still unsolved. The guess may be ventured that Hitler was willing to “compromise” on Austria as the price of an entente with Mussolini, since he had as yet little to promise Rome and less with which to threaten. Compromise might mean respect for Austrian “independence,” coupled with Rome’s acquiescence in the legalization of the NSDAP in Austria and the grant to it of some Cabinet posts, including if possible the Chancellorship. Hitler had already demonstrated that with the Chancellorship he could take all. Mussolini was desirous of German support as a possible counterweight against France and Britain, but he was not at all disposed to yield up Austria to Berlin nor was he naïve about the purposes and probable results of Hitler’s strategy. Nevertheless he was not above abandoning Dollfuss and accepting some Austrian Nazi—or better some semi-Nazi “non-partisan”—if this would placate Hitler and promote German-

Italian co-operation. But the trick must be turned with a certain decorum and with good faith on both sides; i.e. Il Duce could not grant to Der Führer the same privilege of double-crossing as he reserved for himself. The issue was apparently left hanging fire. Mussolini assumed that it would be dealt with as to its details in later negotiations. Hitler perhaps concluded that his would-be ally was disposed to acquiesce in a sudden blow at the Dollfuss regime providing it should not be followed by outright annexation.

If any name was mentioned at Venice as Dollfuss's possible successor, it was in all likelihood that of the new Austrian Minister in Rome: Dr. Anton Rintelen. The *Völkischer Beobachter* was hinting at this at the end of the month. Rintelen, who had been a law professor, Governor of Styria, and Minister of Education, was a silent, sleepy man who kept himself in the shadows. But he was ambitious and hungry for power. In Styria he had sabotaged the Cabinet's efforts to root out the Nazi organization. He admitted privately that he alone could reach an understanding with the Nazis. But he hotly resented rumors that he had Nazi contacts or was slated to succeed Dollfuss. Mussolini is reported to have warned Dollfuss against Rintelen at Riccione in August 1933 and to have suggested that he be sent to Rome for safe-keeping.³⁹ Rintelen left all social functions in the hands of a vivacious young lady who lived at the legation, carried a German passport, and advertised herself as an anti-Nazi. She was the Minister's niece or cousin, no one was certain which. She was extremely popular and was seen everywhere. The legation staff seemed ill at ease in her presence.⁴⁰ One of Rintelen's servants in Rome, a Signor Ripoldi, later testified that his master had frequently met Nazi agents.⁴¹ However . . . ?

If, as is possible, Mussolini agreed upon Rintelen as a compromise candidate for the Austrian Chancellorship, the Roman Cæsar (who placed no exaggerated evaluation on the Rome Protocols) must have assumed that Rintelen would play the role of conciliator and would effect a *modus vivendi* between clerical Fascism and Nationalsocialism in Austria. Therewith a Berlin-Rome accord might be consummated with Austrian independence buttressed on a stable internal and international basis. The German Cæsar was reluctantly willing to accept this. But he doubtless hoped that if the Austrian door could be opened an inch, it could also be opened a foot and eventually opened wide. It is reasonably certain that the time and mode of the transition were not agreed upon at Venice and that the two men who met were

neither of one mind nor clear in their own minds on this all-important point.

While Rintelen was willing to be used by Hitler for Nazi purposes, he was no blood-and-thunder conspirator. It is possible that he had an understanding with Fey by which Dollfuss was to be quietly eased out and the Cabinet reconstituted as a Nazi-Heimwehr coalition. Perhaps Mussolini and Hitler both approved of some such plan. If this was indeed the scheme, it was spoiled by others. Whether the others included Hitler or merely some of his subordinates is debatable. His control over his sub-leaders was at this time questionable. In any case Rintelen left Rome on a "holiday," went first to Graz, and then took a room in the Hotel Imperial in Vienna's Kärntner Ring on July 23.

Meanwhile a great convulsion had shaken the Reich. On June 17 Vice-Chancellor von Papen delivered a rash address at the University Union of Marburg. He criticized Göbbels, called for freedom of expression, condemned terrorism, and expressed anxiety over a possible "second wave" of the revolution demanded by Nazi extremists. His words murkily reflected a gathering storm. The social radicals in the NSDAP and particularly in the S.A. were grumbling over Hitler's "sell-out" to the aristocrats and industrialists. What was more important, the Stormtroopers under the leadership of Ernst Röhm and his immediate subordinates were openly aspiring to control of the new German army which Hitler had sworn to build. The army, new or old, was ever the reserve of blue-blooded Junkers, who had only contempt for the upstart, bourgeois militarism of the Brownshirts. There was unrest among some of the generals and in certain Catholic circles. What hell-broth was brewing Hitler could only guess. Göring fanned Der Führer's forebodings and convinced him that an S.A. "revolt" was planned for Saturday, June 30, 1934.

In the dark hours before dawn of "Bloody Saturday" Hitler and Göbbels flew from Bonn to Munich. In a frenzy of fear the Chancellor ordered the arrest and execution of sundry Stormtroop leaders who had gathered for a week-end of pleasure. Driving swiftly to Röhm's suburban villa at Bad Wiessee, Hitler surprised his bleary-eyed colleague in a "morning-after" stupor, surrounded by other S.A. commanders and a number of male prostitutes. In Munich under Hitler and in Berlin under Göring and Himmler the Black Guards of the S.S. liquidated the radicals and the leaders of the S.A. along with many other victims of suspicion, spite, or personal revenge. Schleicher and his wife were murdered. Von Papen barely escaped with his life.

Gregor Strasser was kidnapped and beaten to death. Several army officers were slain along with Röhm, Heines, Ernst, et al. and a number of Catholic leaders. Hitler later admitted that 77 persons were shot. Other sources set the number of victims at 1,186. Black Guard guns barked for three days. Hitler explained all to the Reichstag on Friday the 13th of July. The dead were guilty of homosexuality, insubordination, embezzlement, conspiracy, rebellion. "The supreme court of the German people during these twenty-four hours consisted of myself!" Cheers and silence.⁴²

The precise relationship of the "blood purge" to the sequel in Austria is as obscure as the bonds between that sequel and the meeting in Venice. Available evidence suggests the hypothesis that two conspiracies perhaps collided to their mutual confusion. Rintelen and Fey, with the knowledge of German Minister Reith, of Hitler, and perhaps of Mussolini, were bent upon reshuffling the Austrian Cabinet in such fashion as to achieve a Nazi-Heimwehr combination and a German-Italian rapprochement. Whether Dollfuss was to be forced out, persuaded to resign, or converted to partnership is unclear. His wife and children were already at Riccione, where he planned to go on Mussolini's invitation on July 26. This was perhaps pure coincidence. Il Duce perhaps summoned him to discuss the Venice conversations in the hope of persuading him to co-operate. Italy's Cæsar perhaps desired to have Dollfuss safe in Italy while Rintelen and Fey struck their blow. In any event Theo Habicht, the Austrian Legionnaires in Munich, and some at least of the underground Nazi leaders within Austria had different plans, which Hitler may or may not have known about. They were prepared to strike Dollfuss down with a sudden blow and deliver Austria wholly to the NSDAP with no interregnum. Though this plot was not divulged to him, Rintelen could be made to serve here too, possibly for the sake of deceiving and conciliating Mussolini. The little Chancellor and the staunch anti-Nazis in the Cabinet must be liquidated *à la* "Bloody Saturday." The blow must be struck at once, for the purge in the Reich was disheartening to some of the Austrian Nazis. Dollfuss, moreover, might persuade Mussolini to grant him new support against Berlin. The Rintelen-Fey plan must be forestalled. In addition there was fear of Der Führer himself. He might be planning to liquidate the Austrian Nazi movement for diplomatic reasons as he had liquidated the S.A. for reasons of internal politics. Therefore: Forward. Who has no scruples and strikes first wins.

In such an atmosphere of suspicion and hope, of conspiracy and

counter-conspiracy, the puppets and wire-pullers moved toward action with no man trusting his brother. Years hence the dark details of what followed may be clarified. Some will never be known. Whether two plots collided or a single plot went wrong cannot be said with certainty. But of the spirit of the enterprise there was no doubt. Here was the perfect expression of *Kleinbürger* heroics, inspired by blind hate and fierce fanaticism. Here little men embraced soldiering and silly Cæsarism and therewith marched to murder. Here was the almost perfect application of the new politics of assassination and secret war.

On July 12 the Austrian Cabinet decreed the death penalty for the unauthorized possession of explosives, following the discovery that a new flow of arms was pouring across the German border. Several arrests of arms-smugglers ensued. Seven Nazis were scheduled to be tried by court martial in Vienna on July 20. On the 19th Alfred Frauenfeld, who had escaped to Germany, made a threat of civil conflict in a Munich broadcast and asserted that the trial would decide the fate of the Dollfuss regime. The court martial sentenced two of the Nazis to prison and remitted the remainder to the ordinary courts since their offenses had taken place before July 12. On the 23rd another Nazi refugee broadcasting from Munich nevertheless proclaimed "the rapid approach of the day of judgment for Herr Dollfuss." *Der Rote Adler*, Munich organ of the Austrian Legion, declared: "No more time should be lost in clearing the criminals out of the way."⁴³ No death penalties were imposed under the decree of July 12 until the 24th, when two culprits were sentenced. Far from being Nazis, both were Social Democrats. Dollfuss to the end saw the enemy on the Left. One was reprieved. The other, a twenty-year-old Czech worker named Joseph Gerl, was beaten by the police and hanged in the courtyard of the Vienna Assizes. His last words were: "Long live Austrian Liberty!"

In the early morning hours of the day when Gerl died on the gallows, Tuesday, July 24, 1934, the little Chancellor took his last journey. He drove from Mattsee near Salzburg, where he had spent the week-end, to Vienna, where a Cabinet meeting had been scheduled for the forenoon. By Thursday he would be free for a holiday with his family and Mussolini at Riccione. The anticipation was pleasant.⁴⁴ He did not know that the *Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro* was sending out a message predicting a "Communist uprising" in Austria—or if he knew, he did not care. Nor did he know that early the next morning

the same agency would instruct the Nazi press to use only official German accounts of the news expected that day from Austria. He doubtless knew that Rintelen had left Rome and arrived in the capital the day before, but he thought nothing of it. He could not have known that the *Deutsche Presseklische Dienst* was perhaps even then preparing prints of himself, of Rintelen, and of Fey, along with news of the Chancellery and the Ravag radio station, for subsequent distribution to the German press, dated (or perhaps misdated) "July 22."⁴⁵ He entered the light-hearted capital in a light-hearted mood. He was somewhat late, however, and the morning conferences took longer than he had anticipated. The Cabinet meeting was accordingly postponed to Wednesday morning, July 25.

This postponement became known through mysterious sources to a mysterious group of Nazis in the capital and led to a slight change in their plans. The "higher ups" who framed the plot doubtless included persons in Vienna, Munich, and Berlin, but their identity was never revealed. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Dr. Reith, Alfred Frauenfeld, and Theo Habicht knew what was afoot, if indeed they were not in the inner circle of the conspiracy. The actual planners covered their tracks well and employed disciplined subordinates who did not know too much—a familiar protective device in gang tactics and also a familiar error in German diplomatic and military strategy. The execution of the plan was entrusted to a special Black Guard company which had been secretly established as a "*Militärstandarte*" from the ranks of former soldiers in the Austrian army dismissed for Nazi activities in 1933. In May 1934 this group had been secretly incorporated into the Black Guard Corps of Heinrich Himmler and designated as "S.S. (*Schutzstaffel*) *Standarte 89*." It established useful contacts with sympathizers in the Austrian police forces. It included among its leading members thirty-five-year-old Otto Planetta, a former sergeant and now a porter, and Franz Holzweber, a thirty-year-old electrician. This was the body to which the organizers of the conspiracy gave orders to occupy the Ravag station and the Bundeskanzleramt or Chancellery Building as the first step in a Nazi putsch.⁴⁶ These acts were to coincide with the Cabinet meeting of July 24. All the Ministers were to be arrested at a stroke. When word came that the Cabinet meeting was postponed a day, the blow was likewise deferred.

This delay increased the danger of "leaks." At 4.30 Tuesday afternoon a police inspector reported that he had been informed of a Nazi

plot to attack the Chancellery the following morning, seize the Ministers and proclaim a new government under Rintelen. His superiors took no action beyond informing the local police station guarding the Chancellery. On Monday Detective-Inspector Josef Steiner, who was one of the conspirators, told his colleague and fellow Nazi, Police-Inspector Johan Dobler, that action was imminent. Part of the army and police force would participate. Rintelen would be Chancellor. When Dobler seemed hesitant, Steiner declared that all traitors would be shot. Dobler assented but decided to tell the police. Before he could do so, the Tuesday action was postponed and he was told by Steiner that he would receive new instructions not later than 1.00 p.m. of Wednesday. Dobler told Steiner to leave a message for him at 94 Lerchenfelder Strasse—and then phoned the central office of the VF on Kärntner Strasse to ask that the commander, Dr. Stefan, meet him forthwith at the Weghuber Café. Steiner's threat against traitors was not idle. Several days later, after his examination by the police, Dobler was found dead: "suicide."

While waiting at the café about 10 Wednesday morning Dobler met Karl Mahrer, treasurer of the Vienna Heimwehr, and told him his story, suggesting that Fey or Fey's secretary or Herr Karwinsky of the Chancellery be informed. Mahrer at once told his friend Lieutenant Schaufler, who happened also to be in Weghuber's, and phoned Franz Heiderer, another Heimwehr leader, who asked him to come at once to the Heimwehr headquarters to report. Heiderer phoned Major Wrabel, Fey's aide-de-camp, and asked him to see Mahrer at once. Dobler and Schaufler remained in the café. The VF leader never arrived. But Captain Ernst Mayer, also of the Vienna Heimwehr, strolled in and was told the secret. He phoned Fey directly and proposed that he take Dobler to the Central Café in Herren Strasse. Wrabel told Fey the news shortly afterwards (it was now after 11) and Fey ordered Wrabel to proceed with Captain Mayer, Mahrer, and a Detective-Inspector Pflug to the Central Café, where Dobler and Schaufler soon arrived. Wrabel suggested that Dobler go get the instructions awaiting him at 94 Lerchenfelder Strasse. Dobler drove off with Mayer and Schaufler at 11.40 and picked up his message at No. 94:

"89—12.45 p.m. No. 11 Siebenstern Strasse, Bundesturnhalle. Don't pass through Breite Strasse on the way. Steiner."

Dobler rejoined Wrabel, who suggested that he pretend to follow

his fellow conspirators. Mayer and Schaufler returned to the Central Café, where Pflug told them that on Wrabel's orders they were to go to the Chancellery Building on the Ballhausplatz. Before they departed Wrabel sent Pflug and Detective-Inspector Marek to patrol Siebenstern Strasse. It was 11.45 a.m. The Cabinet meeting had already begun when Fey walked in and asked Dollfuss for a few minutes in private. At exactly noon Fey told the Chancellor of Wrabel's report. Eighteen hours had elapsed since the first "leak" to the police and two hours had gone by since Dobler's story had first been told to Mahrer. No precautions had been taken beyond sending two detectives to an obscure street in another quarter of the city. Dollfuss was skeptical, but on Fey's urgent request ordered the Ministers to adjourn and return at 4.00 p.m. War Minister Zehner was told to go at once to the Ministry of Defense and mobilize troops for action. These were the last official acts of the little Chancellor. By a narrow margin of fifty minutes they prevented the seizure of the whole Cabinet. Dollfuss summoned Fey and Karwinsky to his study on the second floor of the east side of the Chancellery Building.⁴⁷

Between 12.10 and 12.35 Marek phoned Wrabel thrice from Siebenstern Strasse, which is outside of the Burg Ring and behind Maria Teresa Platz, paralleling Maria Hilfer Strasse. He reported that numerous soldiers, policemen, and some men without uniforms had entered the Gymnasium and that lorries had drawn up and were being loaded. His calls suddenly ceased. He had been captured by disloyal police in Breite Strasse. Wrabel was still in the Chancellery with Fey, Karwinsky, and Dollfuss, whom he informed of his news. Karwinsky phoned Police-President Dr. Seydl and ordered him to increase the Chancellery guard in Ballhausplatz and Herren Strasse and to send a squad of detectives by car to Siebenstern Strasse. Seydl replied that reports had come of a dangerous plot in preparation in Michaeler Platz, to the east of the Hofburg, or Royal Palace, and a long block away from the Chancellery. All police precautions were concentrated there. Karwinsky told him to carry out the orders he had given him with all speed. Another phone call found Seydl out of reach. Karwinsky phoned the Chief of the State Police and ordered him to send one flying squad to Siebenstern Strasse to arrest all the men in the Gymnasium and another to the Chancellery.

Orders and counter-orders crossed in a confusion which was not wholly accidental. The result was that police reinforcements went to Michaeler Platz and military reinforcements to the Hofburg. To the

Chancellery went only a single officer on a motor-cycle. None of these "guards" had any notion of whom to look for or arrest. As the detective squad reached Siebenstern Strasse it saw eight lorries drive off toward the inner city loaded with "troops" and a few "police." The Gymnasium was next to an army barracks. Already the army was going into action to protect the Chancellery. All was well!

The lorries were filled with 154 men, most of whom were members of S.S. Standard 89. They were disguised as soldiers and patrolmen. Many were in fact members of the army and the police force. They had secured arms in the Gymnasium and were outfitted as part of the crack Deutschmeister Regiment. They thundered down Breite Strasse and Balleria Strasse, across the Burg Ring, through the broad gardens west of the Hofburg and into Ballhausplatz without arousing suspicion. Meanwhile 15 other members of S.S. Standard 89 proceeded to the Ravag radio station in Johannesgasse, shot the police inspector and the director's chauffeur at the gate, stormed the building, and barricaded it against attack. About 1.00 p.m. the announcer, with guns in his ribs, began broadcasting: "The Dollfuss Government has resigned. Dr. Rintelen has taken over control." This was the signal for Nazi risings in the provinces and was part of a plan to throw all defense measures throughout the country into confusion. The Vienna police attacked the station at once with rifles, grenades, and armored cars. After battering in the doors, they dragged out the putschists shortly after three o'clock.⁴⁸ An incredible drama was meanwhile being played out on the Ballhausplatz.

At seven minutes before 1.00 p.m. the lorries of S.S. 89 reached the Chancellery Building. The guard was being changed. The timing was so perfect as to suggest the master hand of Hitler himself. The putschists entered the courtyard en masse behind the regular relief. Once inside they easily disarmed the "defenders," whose rifles were unloaded because they constituted merely a "Guard of Honor." Every detail of the vast and complex structure was known to the invaders. All entries were locked and bolted. One group dashed up the stairs to the Chancellor's suite and overpowered Fey, Wrabel, and several others in a conference room. All members of the Chancellery staff, about 150 in all, were made prisoners. Karwinsky attempted to take Dollfuss to safety through the rear rooms and the back stairway, but the Chancellor hurried off with his valet Hedvicek into his study just as Holzweber and the rebels entered the Pillar Room, which adjoined it. Dollfuss rushed through his study to the corner room

and sought to unlock the next door leading to the hall where once had met the Congress of Vienna.

As he did so, Planetta, revolver in hand, burst into the corner room from a side door at the head of another group of putschists. It was a few minutes past one. Without a word Planetta rushed up to Dollfuss, who had made a move toward his writing-desk and then back to the door, and fired two bullets into the back of his neck. One inflicted a flesh wound. The other penetrated his spine and emerged under his right armpit. With a murmur of "Help! Help!" he reeled, fell to the floor, and was still. Hedvicek and Karwinsky were herded with other prisoners into Pillar Hall. Some time later two of the captives, Johann Greifeneder and Rudolf Messinger, were permitted to attend their wounded leader. They revived him. He was paralyzed. They placed him on a sofa and tried to bandage him as best they could. Dollfuss asked for Schuschnigg, then for a doctor and a priest—all in vain. He whispered to Fey that Mussolini should take care of his family. Bloodshed should be avoided. Rintelen should make peace. Dollfuss probably believed that all was lost, that he had been betrayed by his own friends and that Rintelen was already assuming the Chancellorship. He thanked Greifeneder and Messinger: "My boys, you are very good to me. Why aren't the others like you? I only long for peace. We have never taken the offensive, we have always had to defend ourselves. May the Lord forgive them!" His last words were a message of affection to his wife and children. His small body was drained of blood and his injured spine beyond all healing. At quarter of four he rattled and twitched and died.⁴⁹

What was happening inside the Chancellery was unknown to those without. Events outside were a mystery to those within. The putschists, having failed to capture the entire Cabinet, waited in the barricaded building while Dollfuss bled to death. They waited for Rintelen, who was to be the new Chancellor, with Fey as Vice-Chancellor. Fey seemed willing enough. But Rintelen never appeared. They tried to phone a "Herr Kunze" at a café. He was perhaps Herr Gustav Waechter, who was to have brought Rintelen to the Chancellery if the putschists were successful. They waited for the uprising in the provinces, for the march of the Austrian Legion across the Bavarian border, and perhaps for open armed aid from the Reich. None of these things materialized. The putschists were betrayed by their own superiors and by sudden fears and unanticipated developments among those upon whom they relied. The ringleaders in Vienna never dis-

closed themselves but went into hiding or escaped. The men in the Chancellery hesitated. What to do?

A few minutes after two Dr. Friedrich Funder, editor of the *Reichs-post*, came to the Chancellery door and was told that he should not be alarmed: Rintelen was Chancellor and a new police chief was on the way from Berlin. Funder dashed away to the Hotel Imperial and somehow persuaded Rintelen to give himself up at the War Office, where the Cabinet Ministers were gathered. Miklas designated Schuschnigg as temporary Chancellor. Rintelen was arrested and conducted to a room under guard. In the evening he was told that the Chancellor was dead. "But that is terrible!" he exclaimed. An hour after midnight two detectives came to take Rintelen to police headquarters for examination. He asked them to wait a moment. As they did so they heard a shot. Rintelen had already written farewell notes, declaring that his name had been misused. He now put a bullet through his chest. But he missed his heart and recovered. Seven months later he was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason.

Meanwhile police, troops, Heimwehr men, passers-by, and press reporters gathered in the triangular Ballhausplatz before the Bundeskanzleramt. No one knew quite what had happened or what to do. Heimwehr threats to attack the building were met by Nazi threats from within to defend it by force and shoot the prisoners. Deadlock. About 3.00 p.m. Major Baar von Baarenfels, Heimwehr officer and Vice-Governor of Lower Austria, arrived with news that a new government was sitting in the War Office. Half an hour later Fey and Holzweber appeared on the balcony of the Congress Hall, over the main doorway. The Minister of Public Security called down to Police Captain Eibel and Inspector General Humpel to come unarmed to the rear door on Metastasio Strasse. They were received by Holzweber and allowed to see Fey in the courtyard. He told them that Dollfuss was wounded and that Rintelen was expected momentarily. There should be no attack lest the hostages be butchered. Humpel agreed. Eibel dashed out to an open alarm phone and told headquarters that Dollfuss was wounded and had resigned, that a new government had been formed, and that Fey remained Vice-Chancellor. Humpel suggested a physician. Eibel returned to the rear door and was told that a physician was no longer needed. Thus the news of the death of Dollfuss filtered out of the besieged Chancellery, but it was not generally known for some hours.

At 4.20 Fey again appeared on the balcony with Holzweber's re-

volver at his side and asked for Rintelen. He summoned Humpel once more to the rear door. The Inspector General returned with word that Rintelen was Chancellor and Fey Vice-Chancellor. At the War Office Schuschnigg phoned President Miklas at Velden (where he narrowly escaped a Nazi attempt on his life) and received authorization to take charge of activities and not to recognize any orders issued by the prisoners. Neustädter-Stürmer presently appeared at the Ballhausplatz to tell Fey that Rintelen would not appear and to ask whether he should storm the building. Fey forbade him to take any steps without his authority. Neustädter-Stürmer told him that as a prisoner he had no authority and that the building would be stormed in fifteen minutes, i.e. at 5.45.

But the hour passed and no attack was launched. Fey appeared again on the balcony to say that the putschists were ready to surrender if granted a safe-conduct and military protection to the German border. Neustädter-Stürmer assented, though the Cabinet had imposed as condition for a safe-conduct that there should be "no loss of life among the illegally detained members of the Government." The "ultimatum" was extended to 6.30. From a ground-floor window Fey asked that the putschists be permitted to keep their small arms and be exempt from search. The latter demand was granted, the former refused. Within, the disheartened rebels debated. Some favored shooting the prisoners and resisting to the end. Others wished to yield. Holzweber phoned the German Legation and asked Minister Reith to intervene. Reith promptly arrived, but Neustädter-Stürmer rejected his "mediation." War Minister Zehner reiterated the pledge of safe-conduct and demanded surrender.

The denouement came at dusk. At 7.00 the prisoners were freed—on condition that the rebels be permitted to talk to Dr. Reith. Fey came out the back door, asked Neustädter-Stürmer for a cigarette, and told him that Dollfuss was dead. Karwinsky also emerged and accompanied Reith back into the building. After a secret conversation with the putschists the German Minister came out, exclaimed: "What madness!" and walked away. At 7.20 the front door was opened and the rebels surrendered.⁵⁰

There were 154 prisoners, including 6 policemen, 2 police superintendents, and 1 police inspector. Franz Holzweber in a captain's uniform was the actual leader, though Paul Hudl pretended to be. Schuschnigg arrived and met with the other Ministers in the Burg Garden. They decided to ignore the pledge of safe-conduct because

of the murder of Dollfuss. The putschists were taken to the Marokonner barracks. Thirteen of them were subsequently hanged, including Holzweber, Planetta, and four policemen. At the trial Planetta denied he had intended to kill Dollfuss. He refused to betray those who had organized the putsch. Both he and Holzweber shouted: "Heil Hitler!" at their execution.⁵¹ If their spirits ascended to a Nazi heaven, they must have been cheered four years later by the spectacle of Hitler and the NSDAP transforming them into revered heroes and martyrs worthy of being ranked with the beer-hall putschists of 1923 and with the assassins of Erzberger and Rathenau.

The Nazi uprisings which had belatedly broken out in the provinces were speedily suppressed. The Police-President of Innsbruck was shot dead on the morning of July 25. By Thursday the 26th rebellions were in progress in all provinces save Vorarlberg and Lower Austria. By Friday evening, however, Government forces were masters of the situation, though they suffered 78 dead and 165 wounded. Nazi losses were much heavier. Many refugees fled into Jugoslavia.⁵² Efforts of the Austrian Legion to invade the country from Germany at Kniegswald, Kollerschlag, and Hanging were easily repulsed. Some curious bits of evidence uncovered in the suppression of the provincial revolts left little doubt as to official German complicity. A code was found on the person of Franz Heel, a German hotel clerk who tried to cross the border at Hanging on July 26. Some of its phrases are interesting:

<i>New samples of cutlery not arrived</i>	— <i>Rintelen no more in question.</i>
<i>New samples of cutlery still on way</i>	— <i>Rintelen negotiating.</i>
<i>New samples of cutlery arrived</i>	— <i>Rintelen Chancellor.</i>
<i>Candlesticks not arrived</i>	— <i>Federal army hostile.</i>
<i>Candlesticks on way</i>	— <i>Federal army neutral.</i>
<i>Old samples of cutlery on way</i>	— <i>Dollfuss captured.</i>
<i>Old samples of cutlery not arrived</i>	— <i>Dollfuss free.</i>
<i>Old samples of cutlery arrived</i>	— <i>Dollfuss dead.</i> ⁵³

On July 28, 1934, twentieth anniversary of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia, last services for the little Chancellor were said in St. Stephen's Cathedral after he had lain in state for two days, first in the Chancellery and then in the Rathaus. Schuschnigg spared no effort to dramatize his predecessor as Austria's martyred hero. A great procession wound its way to the cemetery of Heitzinger above the city, where Dollfuss was temporarily laid to rest beside his little

daughter Hannerl, who had died six years before. President Miklas was choked with grief in his eulogy. Starhemberg declaimed: "Dear friend and comrade, leader whom we can never forget . . . your death has given us life. Your death has won the victory. It has assured the independence of Austria . . . so you will live on in the future."

While the mighty ones of State and Church paid homage to the dead, Herr Schmutz in his peasant Sunday clothes and Dollfuss's little mother in her shawl sat weeping. On September 29 the body was taken up and laid in state again at St. Stephen's beside that of Dollfuss's patron and friend, Father Seipel. In June Dollfuss had dedicated a new Memorial Church on Kanzlerplatz, where a crypt had been prepared for Seipel. As he gazed into a corner of the tomb, he had said: "There's room for somebody else there." The remains of both men were now taken together to the *Seipel-Dollfuss Gedächtniskirche* in a solemn torchlight procession.⁵⁴ Still a third service was held in the Vienna Opera House on November 1, 1934. Beneath a towering death mask over the stage, a mourning chorus intoned Verdi's *Requiem* as Arturo Toscanini led the orchestra.⁵⁵ For a few brief years the peasant boy of Texing seemed more potent in death than in life.

But many of the workers of Vienna whose comrades and brothers had died before the Heimwehr guns of February felt no grief. Dollfuss had betrayed them in betraying himself. Underground Social Democracy kept "strict neutrality" during the July days, content to see Clerical Fascists and Nazi Fascists at war. One of the illegal Socialist leaflets distributed after the passing of the little Chancellor was perhaps a more just obituary than all the eloquence of Innitzer, Starhemberg, and Miklas. It declared simply: "The news of the death of Dollfuss was received with delight by the working classes as that of the death of a tyrant and murderer of liberty. Austria is experiencing her June 30th; as in the Reich, Fascists are murdering Fascists and we can look on with satisfaction at the process. Dollfuss is gone—his system must be destroyed too, but never through an alliance with the Brown Fascists."⁵⁶

VICTORY TO THE VANQUISHED

1. BARTHOUSSE

THE mob eddied and swirled around the fountains and monuments of the Place de la Concorde. It raged in the near-by streets and poured over the Champs d'Élysée and the rue de Rivoli. A motor-bus was upset and burned. The Ministry of Marine was ignited. Firemen saved it, though they were beaten and had their hoses cut by the rioters. The police were strangely inert. The mounted *Garde Républicaine* swooped into the great square. But the young Royalist followers of Charles Mauras and Léon Daudet, who called themselves the *Camelots du Roi*, threw handfuls of marbles over the pavements to trip the horses, and slashed at their bellies with razor blades on the end of walking-sticks. The Fascist bands, confident that no democratic Cabinet would order troops to fire on "the People," edged the multitude ever closer to the bridge over the Seine. Across the river was the Quai d'Orsay and the Chamber of Deputies. "Down with the thieves!" To storm parliament would perhaps end parliamentary government and give France a reactionary "authoritarian" regime on a model already perfected across the Rhine and beyond the Alps.

Many in the mob had no objective beyond the joy of rioting. A few Communists, trying to demonstrate against Fascism *and* the Government, were clubbed. The National Union of Ex-Service Men marched in dignity down the Champs and across the Place but refused to go near the bridge. But others were headed for the Chamber: the *Jeunesses Patriotes* of perfumer François Coty; the *Solidarité Fran-*

çaise; the *Croix de Feu* of Lieutenant-Colonel François de la Rocque, most of whose followers were demonstrating on the left bank behind the Chamber; and sundry minor groups of Royalists and Fascists. They tried to rush the bridge. The *Garde* fired. The rioters screamed: "Assassins!" They recoiled and later tried again and were again stopped by a hail of bullets. The bridge was held. The Chamber was saved. But the detested Cabinet had been forced to commit "murder" to protect itself. This sufficed. Toward midnight battered demonstrators began to scatter in order not to miss the last trains on the Métro. Twenty rioters and one policeman were dead; hundreds were wounded; thousands had torn clothes, blackened eyes, and bloody noses.

Thus the creed of the colored shirt and the cult of the Little Cæsars made its début in the capital of the French Republic on the evening of February 6, 1934.¹ This fateful brawl had a double origin: the Stavisky scandal and the weakness and mistakes of Chautemps and Daladier. It also had a double consequence: the coming of Louis Barthou to the Quai d'Orsay and the formation of the anti-Fascist People's Front.

Serge Stavisky, a Russian Jew, had risen from the ranks of petty swindlers to become a magnate of racketeering. He was a friend of André Tardieu, who helped to subsidize de la Rocque, and of Jean Chiappe, Paris police chief who flirted with Fascism. He was also a friend of "respectable" democrats close to Camille Chautemps, Radical Socialist, Freemason, and political opportunist who held the Premiership from November 27, 1933 to January 27, 1934. One of Chautemps's Ministers recommended Stavisky's fraudulent bonds issued in the name of the municipal pawnshop of Bayonne. The scandal broke in December. Stavisky fled and was found dead at Chamonix on January 8—either a suicide or a victim of police agents who knew that he knew too much. The setting was perfect for a general assault on the French Left by the Fascist gangs. With the sympathy of much of the Right, they shrieked insults against parliamentary democracy in the name of public morality. Chautemps resigned, though his Cabinet still had a majority in the Chamber.

Édouard Daladier succeeded. This taciturn son of the South was surnamed "The Bull." He was the erstwhile protégé of Herriot. Although wealthy by marriage, he posed as a leader of the left wing of the Radical Socialists. In fear of a Fascist coup, he and his Minister of the Interior, Eugène Frot, discharged Chiappe on February 3 and

offered him (in vain) the Governorship of Morocco. Chiappe made vague threats. The Right shouted against the Cabinet. The Fascist leagues howled. Daladier and Frot displayed the utmost ineptitude in the prelude to February 6. Frot gave permission for the anti-Government parade of the veterans and Fascists. He took no adequate precautions to prevent disorder. Daladier was scheduled to read his ministerial declaration to the Chamber the same evening. When the mob got out of hand the session was suspended. Insurrection triumphed over parliamentary institutions.² Only guns could stop the rioting. The use of guns enabled the Right to accuse the Left of "assassination" as well as "corruption." On the next day Daladier surrendered his office. By stupidity and cowardice he had betrayed the French Left. By stupidity and cowardice he would later betray France and Europe.

In the sequel the Right found its opportunity while the Left girded its loins for a decisive battle for democracy. The Socialist and Communist parties and the two French labor organizations, the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U., issued a joint manifesto and proclaimed a twenty-four-hour general strike on February 12. In a great demonstration of proletarian solidarity in the Place de la Nation, the People's Front was born, though its final shape was not to be determined until later. Meanwhile a Center-Right Cabinet took office (February 9), headed by aged ex-President Gaston Doumergue.³ He was to receive support from André Tardieu and to bring comfort to de la Rocque with his plans for "constitutional reform." But he also was to be undone by the Left's revolt against reaction. His Cabinet included, as Finance Minister, the man who was destined to succeed him in November: Pierre Étienne Flandin. But the most brilliant member of Doumergue's Cabinet was his new Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou.⁴

Barthou's small and unimpressive figure looms ever larger in the perspective of the diplomacy of the age of the Cæsars, not only by virtue of his own genius but by virtue of the catastrophic muddling of his predecessors and successors. He succeeded Joseph Paul-Boncour, who had taken office at the Quai d'Orsay on December 18, 1932 and held it continuously until the coming of Barthou, save for a few days of early February during which Daladier took the portfolio himself. Paul-Boncour was a miniature Robespierre (whose portrait he always kept before him) and was as impressive a person physically as his successor was undistinguished. With his leonine head, his shock of waving white hair, and his affectation of hats and capes *à la* 1793,

he posed as "Robespierrot"—favorite epithet of his enemies. He made eloquent speeches. He championed peace and conciliation—and paved the way for the destruction of French power on the Continent. He knew the glamorous Arlette Simon, wife of Stavisky. But he did not know the diplomatic game. Here he was as inept as Barthou was clever. Barthou's successor at the Quai d'Orsay was Laval, of whom more anon. He completed the ruin which Paul-Boncour began. It is not too much to say that Barthou was the only French Foreign Minister with ability, foresight, and a grasp of *Realpolitik* during the whole period of the fatal five years after January 1933.

Louis Barthou⁵ was born a Gascon in Oloron Sainte-Marie, August 23, 1862. Although his parents were poor they could afford an education for their gifted son. He studied law, entered politics on the Left, and became Minister of Public Works at the incredible age of thirty-two. Like many French leaders, he drifted Rightward with the passing years—or, more accurately, the parade of party groups moved Leftward while he stood still. He became Premier in 1913 under President Raymond Poincaré. In the First World War he lost a son. In 1920 he was President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber; in 1921 Minister of War under Briand; in 1922 Minister of Justice under Poincaré, now Premier. In the best French tradition of the intellectual in politics, he was a writer, an art critic, a good European, an agnostic, and a connoisseur of rare editions. From his own pen flowed biographies of Danton and Mirabeau; essays on the amours of Richard Wagner, the love-life of Victor Hugo, and the genius of Beaudelaire; works on feminism, politics, art, Morocco, war, history, and belles-lettres. At the age of seventy-two he had lost little of his youthful vigor. With his high-domed forehead, his shrewd, narrow eyes framed in a small pince-nez, his prominent nose, his square mustache and beard fringed with gray, he somewhat resembled Poincaré the Lorrainer, though his features were gentler and more genial. The resemblance was strongest in the bent of his mind and the shape of his foreign policy.

He assumed, correctly, that Hitler's Reich was irrevocably committed to the reconstruction of a formidable war machine dedicated to reversing the verdict of 1918 and to asserting German hegemony over Europe. He assumed that Berlin's prime objective was to detach and destroy France's allies in the East and that any French surrender to this policy meant the end of the Republic as a Great Power and perhaps as an independent nation. He assumed that the Nazi threat

could be met only by keeping Germany diplomatically isolated, by strengthening the ties between France, Poland, and the Little Entente, by making the USSR a member of the bloc committed to opposing Nazi imperialism, and, if possible, by enlisting British and Italian support against the Reich. He assumed that the task of isolating and encircling Germany must be undertaken through the existing machinery of the League of Nations; that the procedures of collective security and sanctions must be strengthened and applied against all aggressors; that the Soviet Union must be brought to Geneva; and that every effort must be made to prevent any sabotaging of the League by Rome and London. Above all, he assumed that an Eastern Locarno must be negotiated, with Germany included in its benefits—i.e. collective protection against aggression, if the Reich would sign. If it would not, then Paris, Prague, Moscow, Warsaw, Belgrade, and Bucharest must conclude a Grand Alliance for common defense against Berlin through a series of mutual assistance pacts within the framework of the Covenant.

Here for the first time—and for the last—was a clear-cut and soundly conceived French program of meeting the threat of the Third Reich. Barthou was not obliged to make bricks without straw, as were some of his successors who recognized too late the correctness of his analysis. Much French influence on the Continent had been lost before Barthou came to the Quai d'Orsay. But nothing had been irretrievably lost. On the contrary a number of recent diplomatic developments had paved the way for the execution of his plan. Paris and Moscow had already concluded a Non-Aggression Pact, initialed August 29, 1931, signed November 29, 1932, and unanimously approved by the Chamber May 18, 1933. Litvinov had a friendly reception in France in July 1933. Herriot had had an equally friendly reception in the USSR in August.⁶ Air Minister Pierre Cot had gone to Moscow at the head of a French air squadron in September 1933. Despite new pacts with Berlin in May 1933, the Kremlin had no hope of lasting peace with Hitler. Litvinov's pacts of July 1933 for the definition of aggression anticipated the diplomatic revolution by which Moscow was to align itself with the Western Powers against Berlin and Rome. At the 17th Congress of the Union Communist Party, January 26, 1934, Stalin championed "Socialism in One Country" and foreshadowed the coming Comintern line of the People's Front.

Danubia and Balkania on the eve of Barthou were even more encouraging. Here too the specter of the Third Reich had evoked

strong desires to devise effective means of common security. A year before, on February 16, 1933, the powers of the Little Entente had signed a "pact of organization" at Geneva, establishing a Permanent Council of the Czech, Rumanian, and Yugoslav Foreign Ministers.⁷ They were pledged to collective security and resistance to "revisionism" whether emanating from Budapest, Berlin, or Rome. The perennial and Francophil Foreign Minister at Bucharest, Nicolas Titulescu, pushed negotiations for a "Balkan Locarno." After much visiting by kings, queens, and diplomats among the Balkan capitals an agreement was at length reached. On the very day on which Barthou took office, February 9, 1934, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Rumania signed at Athens the treaty creating the "Balkan Entente."

This accord was not quite all that had been hoped for.⁸ Supplementary understandings made the Balkan Entente operative as an arrangement for mutual defense only against Bulgaria. But the venture prospered and promised to serve its broader purposes. In Bulgaria the quasi-Fascist *coup d'état* of Colonel Kimon Georgiev (May 19, 1934) which suppressed parliament and for a time made King Boris a virtual prisoner of the army had the paradoxical result of improving Bulgaria's relations with its neighbors. The chief obstacle to Bulgar-Yugoslav amity had been the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) of Ivan Mihailov, which had long been subsidized by Fascist Italy to carry out raids and other acts of terrorism against Yugoslavia from Bulgarian territory—all in the name of Macedonian nationalism and Bulgarian irredentism. Georgiev suppressed the IMRO and arrested its leaders. Mihailov fled to Turkey. A Jugoslav-Bulgar commercial treaty was signed, May 24, 1934. A Rumanian-Bulgar and a Greek-Bulgar rapprochement ensued. In November 1934 the Foreign Ministers of the Balkan Entente adopted "statutes" modeled upon those of the Little Entente, creating a Permanent Council and other agencies. These overlapping Ententes thus promised to become integral parts of Barthou's scheme of a Grand Alliance.

With respect to Poland the prospects were less bright. Fierce and grizzled Marshal Josef Pilsudski, military dictator since his Warsaw putsch of May 1926, was far more anti-Russian than anti-German in his sympathies.⁹ The power-hungry feudal aristocracy which his regime represented had much more in common with Hitler than with Stalin. The rulers of Poland, moreover, resented dependence upon France. They denounced the Four-Power Pact of 1933 and demanded

an "independent" foreign policy as the only means of pulling Poland by its bootstraps to the stature of a "Great Power." Pilsudski's colleague and erstwhile chief of staff, Josef Beck, became Foreign Minister on November 2, 1932. When Warsaw became convinced that Paris would not offer leadership in a preventive war to crush the Nazi menace, it concluded that its best hope of saving the Corridor was to cajole or browbeat Berlin into a bargain. On January 26, 1934, Ambassador Lipski and Baron von Neurath signed at Berlin a ten-year non-aggression declaration, pledging co-operation and "good neighborly relations."¹⁰ This Polish flirtation with the Reich was in some measure a consequence of the French flirtation with Moscow, though the French-Polish alliance of February 19, 1921,¹¹ and the Guarantee Pact of October 16, 1925, remained intact and theoretically unaffected by the German-Polish accord. Barthou hoped that a policy of strength would enable him to both retain Warsaw in the French camp and add Moscow to it as well.

The new French Foreign Minister visited Warsaw April 22-4, 1934. No new commitments were made. The communiqué was vague. But at least it declared that the "basis of the alliance between France and Poland remains absolutely immutable." On May 5 the Polish Ambassador in Moscow signed a protocol with Litvinov extending the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932 to December 31, 1945. Barthou stopped in Prague (April 26-7) and was visited in Paris by Foreign Minister Bogoljub Jevtich of Jugoslavia, June 10-13. He then sped across the Continent to attend the final sessions of the Little Entente Council meeting at Bucharest on June 20. His reception was most cordial in the Rumanian capital, "little Paris" of the Balkans. On June 21 he told the Rumanian parliament, which elected him "honorary citizen": "Know that if a single square centimeter of your territory is touched, France will be at your side." At this, the German and Hungarian Ministers walked out of the diplomats' gallery. Barthou likewise addressed the Skupshtina in Belgrade (June 24-6) and on his return to Paris was visited by Premier George Tatarescu (July 12) and Foreign Minister Titulescu (August 31).

These conferences paved the way for Barthou's project of an Eastern Locarno—with Germany if possible, against Germany if necessary, and in any case with the USSR, Poland, and the Little and Balkan Ententes linked in an interlocking system of security pacts. On May 18, 1934 he met Litvinov in Geneva. A year before, the Chamber had approved ratification of the French-Soviet non-aggression pact.

Herriot had said "The Red Army is a very important organization. . . . Would it be patriotism to shut one's eyes to these solid facts?" Barthou found himself in full agreement with the Soviet diplomat. In December Litvinov had proposed that Poland and the USSR should jointly guarantee the Baltic States and Finland against aggression. Warsaw was negative and evasive. Moscow feared a German-Polish-Finnish entente for aggression against the USSR and welcomed the prospect of either a French-Soviet alliance¹² or an Eastern Locarno as a safeguard. Soviet suspicions of Germany were increased by the German-Polish pact of January 1934 and by Berlin's abrupt rejection of Litvinov's proposal (March 28) that the USSR and the Reich should jointly guarantee the four Baltic States.

On May 18, 1934 Litvinov reverted to the old French thesis that security must be organized in concentric circles: France, the USSR, Poland, the Little Entente, and the Baltic States in the first rank, the Mediterranean Powers in the second, and the naval Powers of the Pacific in the third.¹³ Barthou concentrated attention on the first circle and evolved a program to which Litvinov assented early in June. Both at Paris and at Moscow British approval was deemed desirable for the new dispensation. Barthou went to London and conferred with Sir John Simon on July 8-9. Sir John was persuaded to give his blessing to a projected mutual assistance pact between the USSR, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic States, supplemented by a separate pact between Paris and Moscow for immediate aid under the Covenant against aggression. He suggested that if Berlin would join the first pact, Moscow and Paris should pledge aid to the Reich against an attack by either of them, thus making the arrangement a genuine Locarno on the 1925 model. Barthou assented. Sir John told Commons, July 13: "We have made it entirely plain . . . that we are not undertaking any new obligation at all." But he was sufficiently enthusiastic about the prospects to act as intermediary and to instruct the British Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, and Warsaw, where most objection was anticipated, to present draft texts of three treaties: an Eastern European Pact of Mutual Assistance; a French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact open to signature by Germany; and a covering convention linking both to the League Covenant and the Western Locarno treaties of 1925. Italy was cautiously affirmative. Warsaw and Berlin were silent.

The bargaining now became complex. Warsaw objected to entering into any pact with Czechoslovakia. Berlin objected to entering

into any with Lithuania and insisted on arms equality first. Simon and Mussolini desired to placate Berlin by offering equality to the Reich if it would assent to an Eastern Locarno. Sir John told Commons that Barthou had agreed to such a *quid pro quo*. Barthou vehemently denied this and asserted that there could be no connection between arms equality and the Eastern Locarno.¹⁴ Josef Beck visited Estonia and Latvia in July in the apparent hope of securing their co-operation in opposing the plan. On September 9 at Geneva Barthou and Beck had a stormy scene. The Polish Foreign Minister refused to commit Warsaw to support of the project. On September 10, 1934, in a note to London, Paris, Rome, and Moscow the German Government declared that it would not become a party unless arms equality were granted; that it favored bilateral pacts; and that it would join a multilateral pact only if it pledged the signatories merely to non-aggression and not to mutual assistance against aggressors. Poland followed with a formal reply to Barthou on September 27: Warsaw was reluctant to guarantee the borders of Lithuania and Czechoslovakia; it also preferred bilateral agreements; it would not refuse to adhere, but all interested States (including Germany) must also adhere and the new commitments must be compatible with existing obligations, e.g. Poland's non-aggression obligations toward the Reich.

Upon this rock the plan for an Eastern Locarno foundered. Hitler, unlike Stresemann, would not purchase international guarantees of German security at the price of a formal renunciation of German plans of aggression, nor would he be a party to any plan whereby the Reich would be bound to aid other States against aggression and would simultaneously expose itself to concerted action by other States against possible German aggression. Pilsudski and Beck would do nothing which Germany would not do. They would accept no obligations to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany and still less would they guarantee Lithuania. They had designs of their own against both Prague and Kaunas. They desired to stand aside, moreover, as "neutrals" while Nazi imperialism should be deflected toward non-Polish targets. Barthou had expected the German reply and had feared that Poland might follow suit. His major purpose was to smoke out Berlin and convince Downing Street that the German attitude left the Quai d'Orsay no alternative save the conclusion of a French-Soviet pact. In this he succeeded.

He likewise succeeded in bringing the Soviet Union to Geneva, though here again it was necessary to pay a price which further

widened the breach between Paris and Warsaw. Barthou's first move was to bring about diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the Little Entente. Czechoslovakia and Rumania granted recognition on June 9, 1934.¹⁵ Yugoslavia, however, refused to follow suit. King Alexander Karageorgevich had a holy horror of regicides, despite the fact that his father had come to the Serbian throne in 1903 only through the assassination of Alexander Obrenovich. The Romanov Court was a cherished memory of his childhood, for he had studied at the *École des Pages* at St. Petersburg. The Bolsheviks had killed the Tsar. He would not recognize them, Barthou or no Barthou. But he was willing enough that the USSR should be admitted to the League. Sir John in Commons on July 13 added his blessing. Not to be left behind, Bulgaria and Hungary also hastened to recognize Moscow.

It was agreed by the end of August that the USSR should be invited to join the League, instead of being required to make formal application, and that it should be granted a permanent seat on the Council. Bourgeois Switzerland, Fascist Portugal, and Catholic Ireland were on principle opposed to opening Geneva's door to the Communist Power. More serious were Poland's objections. The new Poland had annexed over four million Ukrainians and White Russians in the war of 1920. Warsaw was notoriously lax in observance of obligations not to persecute minorities. Moscow gave assurances that it would not raise this delicate question. But Warsaw would not agree to vote for Soviet membership without a more tangible *quid pro quo*. On September 13, 1934, at the 15th League Assembly, Josef Beck made an announcement: "Pending the introduction of a general and uniform system for the protection of minorities, my Government is compelled to refuse, as from today, all co-operation with the international organizations in the matter of the supervision of the application by Poland of the system of minority protection."¹⁶ Poland would continue to "protect" its minorities. But so long as the Great Powers refuse to accept obligations comparable to those imposed upon Poland and other Central European States by the minorities treaties of 1919, Warsaw would henceforth ignore the League Council procedure for insuring fulfillment of these obligations. Poland must have "equality" and could no longer tolerate being treated as a nation of "inferior" rights. The Allied and Associated Powers, it was argued, had morally invalidated the minorities treaties by refusing to accept their terms for themselves.

This convenient formula was not lost upon Der Führer at Berlin nor was its sequel. Poland was openly repudiating an integral part of the

settlement of 1919—and a part which had been made a condition of recognition of Poland's independence. What action would the other signatories take? On September 14 Simon, Barthou, and Aloisi solemnly warned Warsaw that treaties could not be abrogated by unilateral action. A desultory discussion produced no change in the Polish position. The Powers acquiesced—for this was in effect, if not in form, the price they had agreed to pay for Polish support of the entry of the USSR into the League. Here perhaps was Barthou's one serious diplomatic mistake. The USSR was certain of admission to the League by the necessary two-thirds vote under Article 1 of the Covenant¹⁷ without Poland's vote. To condone treaty repudiation for the sake of securing that vote was scarcely a course of wisdom.

A secret Council meeting on September 10 had already voted unanimously (Portugal and Argentina abstaining, Poland voting affirmatively) to give the USSR a permanent Council seat. On the following day a letter of invitation to Moscow was drafted. Barthou secured thirty signatures and sent it to Litvinov on the 12th. Three days later, despite De Valera's protests at the procedure, letters were exchanged and the Council voted unanimously (Panama, Portugal, and Argentina abstaining) to invite the Assembly to approve. On September 17 the Assembly referred the issue *pro forma* to its Sixth Committee, where a long debate ensued, all to no point since the question was already decided. Motta of Switzerland opposed Soviet admission on religious and political grounds. Switzerland, Portugal, and the Netherlands voted against admission. Argentina, Belgium, Cuba, Luxemburg, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela abstained. By a vote of 38 to 3 admission was approved. The Assembly adopted the report, September 18, 1934, by 39 affirmative votes, with the same 7 abstentions and the same 3 in the negative. Motta and De Valera championed Christianity and demanded (in vain) Soviet guarantees of liberty of conscience. The Council resolution to give the USSR a permanent seat was then passed unanimously (10 abstentions) and Assembly-President Sandler of Sweden invited the Soviet delegation to take its seats.

The day was the third anniversary of the "Mukden incident." It was observed throughout China—but not at Geneva, where such observance would have been even more appropriate—as "National Humiliation Day." Maxim Litvinov stepped to the rostrum and spoke "with that frankness and moderation which many of you, knowing me

of old, will grant me." He surveyed Moscow's foreign relations and indicated his country's conception of the League:

To many members of the League ten or fifteen years ago war seemed to be a remote, theoretical danger and there seemed to be no hurry as to its prevention. Now war must appear to all as the threatening danger of tomorrow. The organization of peace, for which thus far very little has been done, must be set against the extremely active organization of war. Everybody knows now that the exponents of the idea of war, open promulgators of a refashioning of the map of Europe and Asia by the sword, are not to be intimidated by paper obstacles. . . . Peace and security cannot be organized on the shifting sands of verbal promises and declarations. Nations are not to be calmed into feeling security by assurances of peaceful intentions, however often they are repeated, especially in those places where there are grounds for expecting aggression or where, only the day before, there have been talk and publication about wars of conquest in all directions, for which both ideological and material preparations are being made. We must establish that any State is entitled to demand from its neighbors, near and remote, guarantees for security, and that such a demand is not to be considered as an expression of mistrust. . . . I am convinced that as we observe the fruitful consequences of this stream of fresh forces in the common cause of peace we shall always remember with the utmost satisfaction this day as one occupying an honorable place in the annals of peace.¹⁸

If these high hopes were destined to frustration the fault lay neither with Litvinov nor with Barthou. The French Foreign Minister, like the Soviet Commissar, was pledged to the organization of peace in the only fashion which permits of the maintenance of peace in a world divided into potential aggressors and their victims—i.e. collective obligations of mutual defense on the part of all States concerned with the maintenance of order and law in the international community. In September of 1934 the prospects were bright for the realization of this program. On the 12th, at Geneva, a Baltic Entente came into being to supplement the Little and Balkan Ententes. Representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed a ten-year Treaty of Good Understanding and Co-operation¹⁹ providing for periodical confer-

ences of their Foreign Ministers. This was not a pact of mutual assistance. Certain "specific problems," e.g. Lithuania's quarrel with Poland over Vilna, were excepted from the undertaking to co-ordinate Baltic foreign policy. But here was another step toward the organization of collective security in Eastern Europe. Another six months should suffice to realize Barthou's design.

2. MURDER IN MARSEILLE

An essential feature of Barthou's plan was a French-Italian accord for the effective maintenance of Austrian independence and the resolution of the rivalries between Paris and Rome in the Mediterranean and Africa. He planned to visit Rome on November 6. Preliminary negotiations between the foreign offices were initiated in September. When the archives are opened it may become possible to form an estimate of Barthou's conception of the terms of an accord with Italy. The guess may be ventured that he was not prepared to buy a settlement with Italy on any terms which would undermine the balance of his program of collective security. Unlike his successor, he would not purchase Italian collaboration in the task of building the temple of peace at the price of tearing the temple down. Better in this case to leave Italy outside the sanctum. But whatever the terms might be, he deemed it prudent to secure the assent of France's ally on the Adriatic: Jugoslavia.

Next to Poland, Jugoslavia was the most embarrassing of the allies of Paris in the East. That Belgrade should be chronically on bad terms with Rome and Budapest was all but inevitable in view of the post-Versailles settlement which filled Magyars with bitterness over lost provinces and inspired Jugoslavs with lively apprehension over Italian designs on the Dalmatian coast. That Belgrade should be on equally bad terms with large groups of its own subjects was perhaps unnecessary. A strange king and a stranger dynasty were answerable for violence as the weapon of national unification—and for the counter-violence which the weapon evoked. Alexander Karageorgevich was born in 1888 at Cetinje (Montenegro), where his father Peter lived in exile during the rule at Belgrade of the hated rival dynasty of the Obrenoviches.²⁰ In 1903, when Alexander Karageorgevich was a boy of fifteen, Lieutenant Peter Zhivkovich of the palace guards in Belgrade admitted to the royal residence his fellow officers and co-conspirators

who murdered in their beds King Alexander Obrenovich and his commoner-mistress, Queen Draga. The leader of this conspiracy was a Colonel Dragutin Dimitrevich, nicknamed "The Bee." Since there were no heirs, the Obrenovich line was ended and the Karageorgeviches came into their own. Peter was King. Son George was Crown Prince. But George was a madman who finally had to be put away. Brother Alexander became Crown Prince in 1909. In the Balkan wars of 1912-13, which doubled Serbia's territory, he became a military leader and hero. In 1914 he was named Prince Regent.

Shortly thereafter another murder plot in which Dimitrevich the Bee had a hand achieved its goal: Habsburg Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were shot to death by Serb terrorists at Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, part of "Serbia Unredeemed." Armageddon followed. Alexander accompanied old father Peter into exile once more when the Central Powers conquered his country. He became suspicious of the Bee and his Black Hand Society. He suspected him of republican views and of designs upon his life. Moreover, if the peace of the vanquished must be concluded with Vienna and Berlin, the Sarajevo conspirator had best be liquidated. Alexander turned to Zhivkovich, who had fallen out with his fellow killer of 1903, and had Dimitrevich shot for treason at Salonika in 1917. After victory and annexation and the passing of Peter in August 1921, the Prince Regent became Alexander I, ruler of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

This beneficiary of bloodshed was able and industrious, ruthless and avaricious. He chafed under the democratic Constitution of 1921 and supported Nicholas Pashich and the "Old Serbs" in keeping the culturally advanced Croats and Slovenes in a politically inferior position in the new State. The feud between Pashich and Stephen Radich, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, dominated Yugoslav politics. Pashich died in December 1926. On June 20, 1928, during a session of the Skupshtina, Radich was mortally wounded by a hotheaded Serb deputy. The Croats walked out of parliament and threatened to secede. For a moment the King contemplated granting Croatia independence. But on January 6, 1929 Alexander scrapped the Constitution and proclaimed a royal dictatorship. He changed the name of his State to "Yugoslavia." He imposed "unity" with an iron hand. On September 3, 1931 he issued a new Constitution, nicely calculated to preserve his dictatorship, and named as Prime Minister his old friend General Peter Zhivkovich. A parade of puppet premiers followed,

with Bogoljub Jevtich holding the portfolio of foreign affairs after July 3, 1932.²¹ The suppressed minorities were irreconcilable. Radich's successor, Vladimir Matchek, eschewed violence. But other Croats did not.

Croatian refugees fled to Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary. They organized terroristic acts against Alexander's tyranny with the connivance of officials in these neighboring States. One Dr. Anton Pavelich, chief of the Croat terror organization known as the *Ustaschi*, fled to Sofia in 1929 with another plotter, Gustav Perchec, and joined the IMRO. They and their fellows organized many centers of conspiracy abroad: in Ancona, Brescia, and Bogotaro in Italy; at Janka Pusztá "farm" and at other places in Hungary. When Alexander's agents sought to halt the movements of terrorists across the frontiers, there were shootings, border incidents, and diplomatic protests. Budapest denied allegations of harboring plotters and protested at border killings and mistreatment of Hungarian farmers on the frontier. Belgrade insisted that Hungary was giving aid to the enemies of Alexander's regime. Rome was scarcely less guilty or negligent, but the Serb dictatorship found it safer to discharge its resentments against helpless Hungary.²²

Such were the problems troubling Belgrade when Paris invited King Alexander to visit France in the autumn of 1934. Barthou desired to confer with the Yugoslav monarch with regard to their future policies toward Italy and Austria. Alexander left Shibenik by sea on October 6 and landed at Marseille on the 9th. He stepped ashore about 4.00 p.m. at the Quai des Belges in the old port while a great crowd cheered. Barthou met him at the dock. The two men took seats side by side in an open car which drove into the city amid enthusiastic throngs.

As the car passed the Stock Exchange at the corner of Queen Elizabeth Street at 4.10, a burly man jumped from the sidewalk, evaded a policeman, and approached the royal visitor with a cry of "*Vive le roi!*" While the newsreel cameras clicked, he ducked around the steed of Colonel Piollet of the horse guards, leaped on the right running-board of the car, and began firing a revolver at the King. Colonel Piollet at once cut him down with his saber. He continued firing from the pavement, killing a policeman and wounding several bystanders, until he was slain by the police and the infuriated mob. The King was dead. Louis Barthou was wounded and died in a hospital less than two hours later.

The assassin carried a Hungarian passport bearing the name of

Justus Keleman. His real name was Vlada Georgiev. He was a Macedonian terrorist who was an aide and chauffeur of Ivan Mihailov, leader of the IMRO, for whom he had already perpetrated a number of political murders. He had been "loaned" to the *Ustaschi*. He had apparently received his arms at Janka Puzsta, though Hungary insisted that this terrorist center had been closed in the spring. He was linked in a confused web of conspiracy to Perchec and to Pavelich and Kvaternik, who were arrested in Turin at the French Government's request on October 14. Rome, however, refused to extradite these men to France or permit their interrogation by French detectives. Anti-Italian demonstrations broke out in Zagreb, Ljubljana, and other Yugoslav towns. But Rome and Budapest, like Berlin on the aftermath of the murder of Dollfuss, adopted a "correct" and conciliatory attitude. Italy expressed horror, extended condolences, ordered mourning, and even provided a naval escort for the Yugoslav cruiser which carried the King's body back from Marseille to Ragusa (Dubrovnik), dream city of the Adriatic. From Dubrovnik his remains were carried to Belgrade, where the Sava meets the Danube. There they lay in state before being entombed on October 18 in the colorful Karageorgievich crypt at Oblenez. Behind the coffin, along with President Lebrun of France, King Carol of Rumania, and other notables, walked one of the late King's closest friends and a staunch admirer of dictatorship: Sir Nevile Henderson, British Minister.

The diplomatic crisis precipitated by the deed of Marseille was resolved by French pressure upon Belgrade. Nazi complicity in the assassination was ignored. Pavelich was close to Alfred Rosenberg, and *Ustaschi* propaganda literature, full of threats against Alexander, Barthou, Benes, and Titulescu, was printed in Germany. It is not impossible that the ultimate murderers of Barthou were in Berlin.²³ However . . . ? The Quai d'Orsay, on the eve of a French-Italian rapprochement, induced Jugoslavia to minimize the evidence of Italian complicity and concentrate its attack upon defenseless Hungary. Rome agreed not to shield Hungary in return for a French pledge of no formal accusations against Italy. Jugoslavia could not risk desertion by France in any conflict with Italy. Hungary could not risk desertion by Italy if it undertook to resist Yugoslav demands. It was understood that the Yugoslav attack upon Budapest would not go beyond words. Göring came to Belgrade for the funeral and was reported to have suggested a German-Yugoslav alliance. But the time for this was not ripe. Czechoslovakia and Rumania supported their

partner in the Little Entente in indicting the Magyar State.

After these various understandings had been reached behind the scenes, the public drama was presented upon the Geneva stage. On November 22 Yugoslavia appealed to the League against Hungary, alleging that the criminals had been selected by lot at Janka Pusztá and had left Hungary freely with Hungarian passports. The crime, alleged Belgrade, was but the culmination of years of terrorist activity, inspired and abetted from Budapest. Tibor von Eckhardt replied in a communication of November 24 denying most of the charges. The League Council met in extraordinary session on December 7 and settled the conflict on the 10th by a long resolution which was accepted unanimously.²⁴

This compromise formula refrained from accusing Hungary of direct responsibility, but requested it to "take at once appropriate punitive action in the case of any of its authorities whose culpability may have been established" and to report back to the Council. To placate Yugoslavia and the Little Entente, Alexander was referred to as "the unifier" and "the knightly King" (Barthou received no adjectives) and a commission of experts was set up to study the possibility of an international convention to discourage terrorism. In December Belgrade initiated the brutal eviction of several thousand innocent Hungarian peasants, but soon discontinued its campaign in the face of indignant outcries from abroad. On January 12, 1935 Hungary informed the Council that a detailed investigation had disclosed no official responsibility for the Marseille crime, but that two police officers had been dismissed and three gendarmes transferred for failing to enforce adequate supervision over Croatian refugees. Anthony Eden informed the Council in May that the issue was closed. In November 1937 two conventions emerged from the deliberations of the experts and were widely signed. One set forth general principles "for the prevention and punishment of terrorism," the other established an international criminal court of five judges for the trial of future cases between the signatories.

Meanwhile shy little Prince Peter, aged eleven, who was studying in England at the time of his father's murder, succeeded to the Yugoslav throne under a Regency provided by Alexander's will. The Council of Regency was headed by the late King's cousin, English-educated Prince Paul. His colleagues were Ivan Perovich, a Dalmatian and former Governor of Croatia, and Dr. Radenko Stankovich, Alexander's physician and erstwhile Minister of Education. Although

Prince Paul persuaded Prime Minister Jevtich (who succeeded Nikolai Uzonovich on December 21, 1934) to release Croat leader Matchek from jail, the Regency maintained the royal Serb dictatorship and made no genuine concessions to Croat and Slovene demands for autonomy. The aging Zhivkovich remained Minister of War. On June 20, 1935 "Lucky" Milan Stoyadinovich became Premier and Foreign Minister and prepared himself for a long tenure of office. He was tall, athletic, determined, and fatalistic. His affection for things German was not limited to the beer of the Munich Hofbrauhaus. He was destined to initiate Belgrade's flirtation with the Cæsars at Rome and Berlin—and thereby to play a not inconsiderable role in undoing Barthou's work.

That work was undone chiefly by Barthou's successors at the Quai d'Orsay. Pierre Laval succeeded as Foreign Minister and remained in the post until January 22, 1936—first under Premier Doumergue, who was forced out on November 8, 1934, then under Pierre Étienne Flandin (November 9, 1934–May 31, 1935) and Fernand Bouisson (June 1–4, 1935). After June 7, 1935 Laval held the Premiership as well. Under his leadership French diplomacy made mistakes and suffered disasters without parallel in half a century.

With Barthou's passing the master hand was gone. By a strange coincidence two other astute practitioners of *Realpolitik* at the Quai d'Orsay—both heavy with years and long in retirement—followed Barthou to the grave. Raymond Poincaré, War President and Peace Premier, died on October 15, 1934. Philippe Berthelot, for many years guiding genius and permanent Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, died on November 22, 1934. All the great French diplomats of the old school were gone. Those who came after seemed determined to demonstrate that they were disciples of knavery or folly. Much of what Barthou had done, and more of what he had hoped for, was to be forever lost. But in his brief eight months of office he had built too solidly for the puny figures who followed him to lose everything at once. The bond between Paris and Moscow was to grow despite Laval. Barthou's own words were his best epitaph: "No one ever utterly dies, least of all when he dies well."²⁵

3. VERSAILLES † MARCH 16, 1935

Pierre Laval's diplomacy of catastrophe during 1935 opened and closed with generous gifts to the Cæsar of Rome: the accord with

Mussolini of January 7 and the bargain with Hoare of December 8. These agreements constituted crucial turning-points in the mad and tragic history of the Fascist attack upon Ethiopia. But their implications for the game of high politics among the European Great Powers were of even greater moment. Laval and Simon played the diplomatic game in 1935 precisely as Papen and Hugenberg had played the German political game in 1933—with identical results. Laval spurned Moscow and preferred Rome as ally against Berlin; he paid Rome's price, which was the betrayal of the League of Nations and the whole system of collective security which Barthou had sought to strengthen; in paying this price he opened the door to the repudiation of both the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of Locarno by the Third Reich; and he then discovered sans horror (for he was blind to the end) that the Roman Cæsar had made off with the booty that Laval had offered him, and had forthwith aligned himself with the German Cæsar *against* France. Laval found France strong and respected. He left France weak and contemptible.

Laval's first step was to postpone all action on the Eastern Locarno project for the purpose of placating Pilsudski and conciliating Hitler. He dallied with Berlin and Warsaw throughout November. On December 4, at a special meeting of the League Council called to deal with the Saar, he conferred with Ribbentrop, Nazi commissioner for disarmament questions. Litvinov was anxious and resentful. Rather than risk an open break with Moscow, Laval agreed to put his name to a joint declaration issued at Geneva on December 5, 1935.²⁸ It expressed "the common resolution of the two Governments to carry to a conclusion the contemplated international acts" (the Eastern Locarno); neither would negotiate with others invited to participate, "and particularly with those who have not yet adhered in principle" (i.e. Germany), for the conclusion of any bilateral or multilateral accords which might compromise the project or be contrary to its spirit; each would keep the other informed of all such proposals and "the two Governments will refrain from renouncing the enterprise without having by common consent agreed upon the disutility of continued negotiations."

Despite this agreement, Litvinov's distrust was well founded. Laval now felt free to pursue his negotiations for a "settlement" with Italy—not on terms which Barthou would have deemed wise, but on terms which in retrospect were madness. The result was the bargain of January 7, 1935—of which more anon. Apart from the French-Italian

deal in Africa, which was the essence of the accord and the root of Laval's folly, the agreement reiterated the promise (December 11, 1932) of arms equality to Germany, but declared that no State was entitled to modify its obligations by unilateral action. Should this be attempted, France and Italy would act in concert. As for Austria, the Rome agreement provided no solution and no security for independence. Should Schuschnigg's State be menaced, France and Italy would "consult"—happy word committing no one to anything! They recommended a convention of reciprocal non-intervention to be concluded between Austria and all her immediate neighbors save Switzerland, and to be open thereafter to signature by France, Poland, and Rumania. Laval's bargain with Cæsar was approved for ratification by the French Chamber on March 22, 555 to 9, and by the Senate unanimously on March 26—*after* it had borne its first fruits in Hitler's blow of March 16.

The reception accorded in other capitals to Laval's diplomatic masterpiece was gratifying to its author. Only Moscow was suspicious. Only Warsaw was skeptical. The Little Entente, meeting at Ljubljana on January 11, expressed "satisfaction." The Balkan Entente approved, but voiced the hope on January 20 that the Eastern Pact would now be concluded. The French and Italian Ambassadors visited Wilhelmstrasse on January 4 to inform von Neurath of the agreement. Ambassador von Hassel in Rome raised questions with Il Duce on the last day of the month: Were Britain and Switzerland not to be included in the proposed Austrian convention? How long were France and Italy bound to consult on Austria in the absence of a multilateral accord? Did they reserve for themselves a right of intervention in Austria? Mussolini was evasive. Official Britain was overjoyed. Great vistas of "appeasement" loomed before Downing Street in consequence of the "settlement" at Rome. With almost clocklike regularity the British Cabinet was henceforth, once a year, to pin great hopes on a settlement with Cæsar—and each time it was to be tricked and betrayed for its pawns.

Meanwhile, without a crisis, the problem of the Saar was disposed of. By Articles 45-50 and Annex of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had ceded to France "full and absolute possession" of the Saar coal mines as compensation for the destruction of mines in northern France. The Reich had renounced government of the Saar area to the League as trustee. The League was to appoint a Governing Commission of five members. After fifteen years all Saarlanders over twenty

years of age at the time of voting, and residents in the territory on June 28, 1919, would express their choice as between union with France, reunion with Germany, or maintenance of the League regime. After the plebiscite the League Council would decide on disposition of the territory. On November 24, 1933 Hitler proposed to the French Ambassador in Berlin that the Saar be returned without a plebiscite. On January 30, 1934 he declared that once the Saar problem was settled Germany "would be prepared and determined not only to accept the letter but also the spirit of the Locarno Pact." He proposed a French-German accord. Paris refused. Saarlander Nazis in the *Deutsche Front* initiated a campaign of conversion and terrorism in preparation for the voting, and threatened "long knives" against enemies after victory. On November 28, 1933 the Governing Commission forbade military drilling or the wearing of badges.

The League Council on June 4, 1934 appointed a Plebiscite Commission to prepare voting lists and electoral machinery. It comprised M. Victor Henry, M. Daniel de Jongh, and M. A. E. Rohde of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden respectively, with Miss Sarah Wambaugh of the United States as technical adviser.²⁷ On December 8 a Council resolution invited Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden to send contingents for an international police force to keep order during the plebiscite. Following their acceptance, 1,500 British, 1,300 Italian, 250 Dutch, and 250 Swedish troops were placed at the disposal of the Governing Commission by the Council.²⁸ Meanwhile a French-German economic agreement of December 3, 1934 provided that in the event of a return of the Saar to Germany the Reich would buy back the mines, railways, and other properties for 900,000,000 francs to be paid within five years, partly in coal and partly in notes of the Bank of France circulating in the Saar.²⁹

Neither the Governing Commission, the international police force, nor the League Council in their efforts to safeguard the secret ballot could prevent those Saarlanders who were not already converted Nazis from fearing that votes for France or for the status quo would be discovered and punished by the all-seeing eyes of Hitler's agents. The result of the plebiscite of January 13, 1935 was so nearly unanimous that the NSDAP could claim that all Germans, even when under foreign police surveillance and protected from all pressure, were fanatical disciples of Der Führer. Out of an electorate of 539,541, no less than 97.9%, or 528,105, cast ballots. Of these 477,119 (90.35%) voted for reunion with Germany; 46,613 (8.83%) for the status quo;

2,124 (0.4%) for annexation to France; with 2,197 (0.4%) invalid or blank.³⁰ Five days after the voting the League Council passed a resolution providing for the transfer of the Saar to the Reich on March 1.³¹ Thus ended an experiment in international administration amid a fanfare of Nazi trumpets of triumph.³²

Laval and Sir John Simon now looked forward confidently to a "general settlement" with a surfeited and co-operative Reich. Laval and Flandin came to London on January 31 in response to Sir John's invitation. After protracted discussions a communiqué was issued on February 3. The object of the meeting was said to be the promotion of "the peace of the world in a spirit of most friendly confidence." The Ministers "welcomed the successful results" of recent League action "as evidence of a conciliatory spirit." The British Government "cordially welcomed the declaration by which the French and Italian Governments have asserted their intention to develop the traditional friendship which unites the two nations" and associated itself with them "to collaborate in a spirit of mutual trust in the maintenance of general peace." It further extended congratulations on the conclusion of the Rome agreement regarding Austria and declared that under the Anglo-French-Italian declarations of February 17 and September 27, 1934 it considered itself "to be among the Powers which will . . . consult together if the independence and integrity of Austria are menaced." Hope was expressed that progress might be continued "by means of the direct and effective co-operation of Germany. They are agreed that neither Germany nor any other Power whose armaments have been defined by the Peace Treaties is entitled by unilateral action to modify these obligations. But they are further agreed that nothing would contribute more to the restoration of confidence and the prospects of peace among nations than a general settlement freely negotiated between Germany and the other Powers."

The Simon-Laval conception of this "general settlement" was next set forth. Security must be organized by pacts "insuring mutual assistance in Eastern Europe and the system foreshadowed in the Rome *procès-verbal* for Central Europe. Simultaneously, and in conformity with the terms of the declaration of December 11, 1932, regarding equality of rights in a system of security, this settlement would establish agreements regarding armaments generally which, in the case of Germany, would replace the provisions of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles at present limiting the arms and armed forces of Germany. . . . Germany should resume her place in the League of Nations."

Finally—and this was a relatively new proposal—it was suggested that a Western European air pact, including France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, should be negotiated whereby “the signatories would undertake immediately to give the assistance of their air forces to whichever of them might be the victim of unprovoked aerial aggression by one of the contracting parties.” Other interested Powers were invited to reply.³³

On the evening of February 3 Sir John Simon broadcast an explanation of the projected air pact, his nervous voice and emphatic protestations betraying apprehension lest the Beaverbrook-Rothermere-High Tory isolationists might suspect that new “foreign entanglements” were contemplated. He contended that no commitments beyond those of Locarno were involved, but that the proposal would make Britain a beneficiary as well as a guarantor.³⁴ Laval’s broadcast the same evening bespoke “peace” and “security” and the hope that Germany would respond to the pressing appeal addressed to it.³⁵

Stripped of their embellishments, the Anglo-French proposals of February 3, 1935 constituted an offer to release the Reich from the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and to grant it equality in arms on condition of the acceptance of four pledges: (1) respect for the independence of Austria through participation in the non-intervention agreement proposed at Rome; (2) respect for the integrity of the States east of Germany through participation in an Eastern Locarno; (3) respect for the security of the Western States through participation in a Western European Air Locarno; and (4) respect for the independence, integrity, and security of all other States through resumption of the obligations of the League Covenant. Since each of these arrangements would be reciprocal, Germany would not merely incur obligations but would enjoy all the advantages provided therein. If Simon and Laval expected the Reich to accept these conditions or others of similar import, they were proceeding on the hypothesis that the program of *Mein Kampf* had been abandoned and that the Nazi regime was exclusively concerned with “*Frieden und Gleichberechtigung*.” If they anticipated rejection, their only purpose could have been to compel the Third Reich to lay bare its program of Pan-Germanism, *Drang nach Osten*, and Continental hegemony—in which case the Grand Alliance *à la* Barthou would presumably be forged. But neither then nor later did they or their successors draw Barthou’s conclusions or even accept his premises, despite repeated exposures of Nazi diplomatic objectives. Their hypoth-

eses were half mystery and half muddle. For Berlin it was enough to notice that a promise had been held out and that its conditions were set forth not as a *sine qua non* but as a basis for negotiations.

Hitler noted that Belgium and Italy welcomed the prospects of an Air Locarno, that the USSR and the Little Entente were alarmed, and that Flandin in the Chamber on February 5 hinted that this "might fitly be made the object of a special convention." *Divida et impera* remained the sign of Nazi strategy as it must of necessity be the slogan of all who hope with slender resources to outwit and vanquish overwhelming odds. How to encourage London and Paris to persist in their conciliatory line by pretending to assume obligations of collective security? How to split East and West? How to sabotage collective security beyond Berchtesgaden, Breslau, and Königsberg where the coming Empire was to be conquered? How to serve collective security beyond the Rhine in order to safeguard Germany's rear? How, above all, to set Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay by the ears and cause them to quarrel with one another instead of facing the Reich in unity?

Hitler had answers. On February 14, 1935 Wilhelmstrasse delivered a memorandum to the British Ambassador in Berlin. It was courteous, conciliatory, and clever. "Germany is in agreement with the British and French Governments in a sincere desire to promote the safeguarding of peace, the maintenance of which is in the interests of Germany's security as well as in the interests of the security of other European States." Germany "welcomes the spirit of trustful discussion" and will examine all proposals "in the spirit of a sincere desire for peace as well as a concern for the security of the German Reich in its especially exposed geographical position in the heart of Europe." Germany will also study means of avoiding an arms race, "which danger has arisen from the abandonment by the heavily armed States of disarmament as prescribed by treaties." Most important, "the German Government welcomes the proposition to increase security against sudden attack from the air by a convention to be made as soon as possible which shall provide for the immediate employment of the air forces of the signatories in favor of the victims of an unprovoked air attack. The German Government is ready in principle to employ its air forces [the Reich was forbidden by treaty to possess any air forces!] as a means of deterring disturbances of the peace. It is therefore willing to seek, in free accord with the Powers concerned, ways and means by which such a convention can be realized, which shall

guarantee the fullest possible security to all signatories." But large-scale negotiations lead to friction. Bilateral discussions are preferable. The German Government "would therefore welcome it if, after the preliminary Franco-British discussions, the British Government were first to declare its readiness—as that partner of the London discussions which is, at the same time, the guarantor of the Locarno Pact—to enter into a direct exchange of views with the German Government." ³⁶

This masterly thrust constituted a perfect test of the possibility of dividing Paris and London. Laval registered some anxiety and urged a joint Anglo-French reply to Berlin. A Soviet note to London and Paris of February 20 emphasized the indivisibility of peace and argued that regional agreements as substitutes for European security, "far from 'strengthening the prospects of peace,' could rather be considered as an open encouragement to a breach of the peace." Downing Street insisted, however, on sending its own reply to Berlin, though it accepted *pro forma* the French view as to the indivisibility of the proposals of February 3. Hitler was so informed by the British Government on February 21 in a note suggesting that bilateral negotiations not only were acceptable to London but would be facilitated by a special mission. "It would not be the object of such a meeting to isolate one topic to the exclusion of others." On the following day Hitler gave his *pro forma* concurrence.³⁷ Sir John told Commons on February 25 that he would shortly go to Berlin. Three days later he went to Paris and conferred with a dubious Flandin and a surprised Laval as to the line he should take with Germany regarding the Danubian and Eastern pacts. The date of his Berlin visit was fixed for March 8. Plans were also laid for a visit to Warsaw and Moscow to allay suspicion.

Here was much more than Der Führer had bargained for. He had not persuaded the British Cabinet that it should separate the Western Air Locarno from the projected Austrian and Eastern accords, but he had persuaded it to accept bilateral negotiations. Still better, he had with scarcely half an effort convinced the British Foreign Minister that he should come to Berlin. Simon was coming, to be sure, to discuss the conditions upon which Germany might be granted arms equality. The conditions thus far suggested were highly unpalatable. But the important thing was that he was willing and even anxious to come. Such anxiety for negotiations, such an ardent desire for a "general settlement"—even at the cost of Anglo-French co-operation and most probably, despite denials, at the cost of sundering East and

West in discussions of security—could be made good use of. Der Führer prepared a warm reception for Sir John—and then, with the aid of a British diplomatic blunder, yielded to a new inspiration.

On March 4, 1935 His Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office published, over the initials of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, Parliamentary Command Paper No. 4827 of 1935: "Statement Relating to Defense." This ten-page document was issued in routine fashion in preparation for the debate on armaments scheduled for Commons on March 11. It was general in form and contained no references to the recent negotiations. It merely reviewed the disarmament discussions and British defense policy. And inevitably it referred to the Nazi rearmament program. Section III, § 12 contained the following passage:

On the 28th November 1934 His Majesty's Government drew public attention to the rearmament on which Germany was engaged, and announced a speeding up of the increases in the Air Force already decided upon. The action of His Majesty's Government did not, of course, imply condonation of a breach of the Treaty of Versailles. It merely noted and made public, as a first step, what was known to be proceeding. This rearmament, if continued at the present rate, unabated and uncontrolled, will aggravate the existing anxieties of the neighbors of Germany and may consequently produce a situation where peace will be in peril. His Majesty's Government have noted and welcomed the declarations of the leaders of Germany that they desire peace. They cannot, however, fail to recognize that not only the forces but the spirit in which the population, and especially the youth of the country, are being organized lend color to, and substantiate, the general feeling of insecurity which has already been incontestably generated.⁸⁸

On the morning of March 5 Baron von Neurath informed the British Ambassador that Hitler had a "cold" and would appreciate a postponement of Sir John Simon's visit. Obviously German feelings were hurt and German honor was impugned by the blunt language of the White Paper. Lord Lothian, who as Philip Kerr had once served as Lloyd George's secretary and had joined the hue and cry for "hanging the Kaiser" and making Germany "pay to the last farthing," explained that the Reich would no longer accept cooked-up plans presented on a plate. He now commented sympathetically on the reasons for Nazi irritation.⁸⁹ In some perturbation, Simon asked the Polish and Soviet Ambassadors on March 6 whether their Governments would still welcome a visit. Since neither Pilsudski nor Stalin had "colds," the query was unnecessary. On the 7th Sir John told Commons that Anthony Eden would go first to Paris, then accompany

him to Berlin, and then proceed to Moscow. This procedure was designed to meet French and Soviet objections to Simon's proposed pilgrimage to the Reich. Two days later Neurath expressed the hope that Simon would come to Berlin at the end of March. Reassurances were exchanged. The date was set for March 24.

On March 11 the Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin, Lord President of the Council, explained all to Commons: "If the House expects me today to stand in a white sheet because of the White Paper, it will make a great mistake." With unwitting humor in the light of things to come within six months, he declared that "One of the greatest perils that have met democracies in the past, and meet them today, is when their leaders have not the courage to tell them the truth." And with a wholly unintended irony in the light of things to come within six days, he asserted that Sir John's visit "will take place in about a fortnight's time, and I should like to express the hope that by that time Herr Hitler will be in full possession of his normal strength."

Before a fortnight was to pass, Herr Hitler's strength would transcend the limits of normalcy and become phenomenal. He had come to a great decision. Precisely when it was reached, and in consultation with whom, cannot yet be said with certainty. But some time about the Ides of March he and his advisers had made a correct assessment of Simon and Laval and of the opportunity before them and had decided upon bold action: unilateral repudiation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, without warning and without negotiation. Such an act would be an open challenge to the victors of 1918 and a virtual threat that the Reich was determined to undo the verdict of the First World War. It would enable the Allied and Associated Powers with the full warrant of the law to impose the severest financial, economic, and military penalties, under the impact of which the Nazi regime might well be compelled to yield, since it had as yet no adequate means of resistance. But Hitler took it for granted that the conquerors of the Second Reich were no longer either allied or associated. He assumed that Paris would bluster and threaten, but would do nothing without British support. He assumed that London in its anxiety for "appeasement" not only would take no positive steps to penalize Germany but would sabotage all French efforts in this direction. He assumed that defiance not only would be met with ultimate acquiescence but would precipitate prolonged controversies between London, Paris, and Rome which in turn would furnish new opportunities for German "emancipation." He could not foresee the scope or duration of the

anticipated inter-allied wrangles nor the depths of British desires for "appeasement" nor the completeness of Laval's paralysis, for these things passed all understanding. But he saw enough and he saw truly. His assumptions were correct.

This brilliantly successful venture in the rude diplomacy of the *fait accompli* was foreshadowed by a number of tentative and perhaps experimental steps during the preceding week. The French Cabinet was heavily involved in consideration of measures to compensate for the "lean years" of conscription. Between 1915 and 1919 the average annual French birth-rate was only 11.3 per thousand, compared to 18.8 between 1911 and 1914. During the years when the babies of the War period should come of military age, there would be an annual contingent of conscripts of only 120,000 in place of the norm of 240,000. Marshal Petain urged that military service be extended from one to two years. The text of a draft bill published March 11 by the Minister of War proposed a new military law for the 1936-9 period, authorizing an age reduction from twenty-one to twenty and an extension of the period of service. The Cabinet approved this proposal on the 12th, but the Radical Socialist Party was against it. Flandin thereupon decided to avail himself of the opportunity, afforded by Article 40 of the military law of 1928, to prolong the service period without new legislation. He so informed the Chamber on the 15th and was upheld.

Meanwhile, on the 10th, Göring had informed a representative of the London *Daily Mail*, a pro-Nazi Rothermere sheet, that Germany was building a military air force. On the 13th Berlin announced that the German offer of April 16, 1934 to renounce possession of bombing planes no longer held good. On the 15th it was asserted that Göring, Minister of Air, would be subordinate to Blomberg, Minister of Defense. Work was pushed on a colossal building on Wilhelmstrasse to contain three thousand rooms to house the Air Ministry. That the Third Reich was constructing a military air fleet in violation of the terms of the Treaty had long been suspected abroad. These announcements were apparently designed to test foreign reactions. Aside from a few feeble protests, and these largely unofficial, there was no outcry. Official Paris was preoccupied with the shortage of recruits. Official London was preoccupied with the new British aviation estimates and with optimistic preparation for Simon's journey to Berlin. Any lingering doubts which Hitler may have entertained regarding the wisdom of his contemplated action must have been removed by these developments.

The great blow was struck on Saturday, the 16th of March 1935. Der Führer found Saturday a good day for diplomatic and military strokes, as he had earlier found the late evening a good time for political harangues—and for the same reason: resistance was at a low ebb at the end of a week, no less than at the end of a day. The British institution of the “week-end” and the Christian institution of the Sabbath both assured inaction abroad until Monday morning or later. By then the psychological moment for action would have passed. The banner days of Nazi diplomatic victories are all Saturdays: October 14, 1933; March 16, 1935; March 7, 1936; March 12, 1938; October 1, 1938. On the second of these days three pronouncements were fired from Berlin like machine-gun bullets. One was the text of a statute which was communicated to the British, French, Polish, and Italian Ambassadors:

Law for the Re-Creation of the National Defense Forces

The Reich Government has resolved the following law, which is herewith proclaimed:

1. Service in the defense forces is predicated on universal military service.
2. The German peace army, including police units which have been incorporated in the army, shall comprise twelve corps commands and thirty-six divisions.
3. Supplementary laws for regulating universal military service will be drafted and submitted to the Reich Cabinet by the Reich Minister for Defense.

Signed by the Führer and all the members of the Reich Government.

Another pronouncement came from the NSDAP:

. . . With the present day the honor of the German nation has been restored. We stand erect as a free people among nations. As a sovereign State we are free to negotiate and propose to co-operate in the organization of peace. We again possess the German army in order to defend our German fatherland by force of arms. The liberty and life of our people are sacred treasures which in arms-bristling Europe can be safeguarded only through the rebirth of the German army. The memory of the glorious German army with its glorious history is now no longer a pale historic phantom. National-socialist Germany has again a military force worthy of that tradition, an army of peace which is also ready to defend itself to the last man if attacked, an army of which we can be proud. . . .

In this historic hour the German people do not forget what they owe their leader. They know everything that has been created is his work, that he has alone directed the fate of Germany into new channels, into channels of honor and freedom. The gratitude which the German people offer him for this consists of the boundless trust with which they stand behind him and his statesmanlike deed.

The third pronouncement was a proclamation by Hitler to the German people. Its appeal to frustrated German patriotism was as

adroit as its plea for "sympathy" and "understanding" abroad. Der Führer began with tearful references to the Armistice, Wilson's Fourteen Points, the League of Nations, and the completeness of Germany's unilateral disarmament under the Treaty. The Reich had disarmed. The others had repudiated their pledged word to disarm. Worse, they had added to their armaments. Germany was ready to accept the MacDonalld plan, but others rejected it. Germany was promised equality, but denied it. It was obliged in honor to leave the Conference and the League. But it had made new proposals. They too were declined along with "Italian and English proposals along similar lines."

Under these circumstances, the German Government saw itself compelled of its own accord to take those necessary measures which could insure the end of a condition of impotent defenselessness of a great people and Reich, which was as unworthy as in the last analysis it was menacing. In so doing it proceeded from the same premises which Mr. Baldwin in his last speech so truthfully expressed: "A country which is not willing to adopt the necessary preventive measures for its own defense will never enjoy any power in this world, either moral or material."

But the Reich seeks only peace. It had proposed non-aggression pacts to all its neighbors. It had achieved friendship with Poland. It "has finally given France the solemn assurance that Germany, after the adjustment of the Saar question, now no longer will make territorial demands upon France." But the Soviet army of 960,000 and the extension of French military service to two years create new problems.

Under these circumstances the German Government considers it impossible any longer to refrain from taking the necessary measures for the security of the Reich or even to hide the knowledge thereof from the other nations. . . . For in this hour the German Government renews before the German people, before the entire world, its assurance of its determination never to proceed beyond the safeguarding of German honor and freedom of the Reich, and especially does it not intend in rearming Germany to create any instrument for warlike attack, but, on the contrary, exclusively for defense and thereby for the maintenance of peace. In so doing, the German Reich Government expresses the confident hope that the German people, having again reverted to their own honor, may be privileged in independent equality to make their contribution toward the pacification of the world in

free and open co-operation with other nations and their governments.⁴⁰

The initial reaction of the British press to these declarations was highly gratifying to Berlin. Liberals and Laborites cried out in alarm and indignation. But the great Tory organs which spoke to (and for) those who had elected the National Government⁴¹ were not merely complacent but co-operative. Mr. Garvin's *Sunday Observer* declared that the German act "need cause no surprise. . . . A panic would be an absurdity. What we can't prevent we must reckon with. Germany's equality, often promised, is confirmed in Sir John Simon's impending visit to Berlin. A hard light is now thrown on hard facts. We are now on the bed-rock of realism and that may prove to be the quickest and most reliable route to peace."⁴² Lord Beaverbrook's *Sunday Express* declared that no compulsion of Germany should or would be attempted. Locarno was a mistake and an Eastern Locarno would be a still greater one. "We must keep our heads clear and our hands free. . . . For four centuries we have espoused the quarrels of Europe. Those four centuries of war never brought us one half a century of peace. End them now. With our eyes on the future, not on the past, with our hands laboring to build not destroy, let us turn now to our own people all over the world."⁴³

The Nazi rulers may have expected Britain's isolationists to behave like ostriches. They could scarcely have expected the British Foreign Ministry to behave like Simple Simon. If the diplomatic sequel could be divorced from its ultimately tragic implications, it would be appropriate material for Gilbert and Sullivan. It is a rule of diplomacy as of business that one should never offer to sell for a price something which can be had for nothing. This rule both Simon and Laval forgot. It is a corollary rule that one should never pay for anything which can be had gratis. This rule Hitler remembered. An additional rule holds that one should never forbid another to do something which he has already done unless one is prepared to undo what has been done by force. This rule both Laval and Simon again forgot. The result was slapstick.

With sound instinct unsupported by will, the Quai d'Orsay moved at once for a united allied protest to Berlin, an appeal to the League of Nations, and a consideration of punitive and remedial measures. It made the reasonable assumption that since Sir John had intended to go to Germany to discuss the conditions upon which the Western

Powers would grant to the Reich that "arms equality" which the Reich had now seized unconditionally, he would of course cancel his visit. One does not bargain for stakes already lost. But Laval reckoned without Sir John. On Monday morning, March 18, he hastened to send an independent British communication to Berlin before French pressure upon him should become too heavy. This remarkable document protested mildly at Germany's unilateral action, which was said to be "calculated seriously to increase uneasiness in Europe." It reviewed the communiqué of February 3 and the circumstances giving rise to the proposed visit to Berlin. The meeting had as its object "to carry consultations a stage further on all the matters referred to in the Anglo-French communiqué." Therefore—Downing Street, far from cancelling the journey, requested that the invitation be renewed! Thus:

His Majesty's Government are most unwilling to abandon any opportunity which the arranged visit might afford of promoting a general understanding, but in the new circumstances before undertaking it they feel bound to call the attention of the German Government to the above considerations, and they wish to be assured that the German Government still desire the visit to take place within the scope and for the purposes previously agreed.⁴⁴

Neurath was delighted to give Sir Eric Phipps an oral renewal of the invitation the same afternoon. Paris was outraged. The Quai d'Orsay protested to London and demanded joint action, a three-Power conference (Britain, France, and Italy), and an appeal to Geneva. Simon refused. Germany, he contended, must participate. What point in a conference to discuss treaty-breaking without the co-operation of the treaty-breaker? The most that Sir John would concede was that Eden should go to Paris to meet French and Italian spokesmen in advance of Simon and then accompany Simon to Berlin. Thus baffled, Laval prepared his own protest to the Reich. On Wednesday, March 20, the French Cabinet approved a note to the Secretary-General of the League and another note to Berlin and authorized Laval to go to Moscow. The note to Geneva was dispatched the same day. It declared that Germany had "deliberately repudiated by a unilateral act the contractual engagements embodied in the treaties which Germany has signed."⁴⁵ Under Article 11, §2 of the Covenant, France requested an extraordinary session of the Coun-

cil to examine the situation. The French protest to Berlin of March 21 was sharply worded. Paris made "the most formal protestation against these measures with regard to which it now makes all reservations" and reaffirmed "its firm resolution not to accept in any negotiation that any consideration be given unilateral decisions taken in violation of international engagements."⁴⁶ A simultaneous Italian note followed the French model in declaring that in future discussions Rome could not "simply accept as situations of fact those acts determined by unilateral decision which annul undertakings of an international character."⁴⁷

The high comedy of these communications can be appreciated only in the light of the contemporary and subsequent attitudes of the three Western Powers toward Ethiopia. The Government at Rome, while busily engaged in preparing an act of lawless aggression against a defenseless African kingdom, championed peace and the sanctity of treaties in its protest to Berlin. The Government at Paris, while busily engaged in sabotaging every effort to protect Ethiopia at Geneva, appealed to to Geneva against Germany. The Government at London, which would soon be busily engaged in pretending to invoke League sanctions against Italy to uphold faith in international obligations, was acquiescent toward German treaty repudiation and opposed any League action against the Reich. The Wotan of Wilhelmstrasse rocked with secret glee.

On Thursday, March 21, the German Government rejected the French and Italian protests on the correct assumption that words would not be followed by action. On Friday Sir John, in a long address, as distinguished for its apparent earnestness as for its incoherence, undertook to explain to Commons what had happened and what was about to happen. The proposed visits were to be "exploratory." You "have to enquire and learn the points of view of others rather than to reach a precise position of your own and then present it to other people to accept." (The latter procedure Sir John was content to leave to Hitler.) The visit to Berlin was based upon the German invitation of February 15. He had accepted it with French and Italian approval. The German action of March 16 "came as a profound shock. . . . Everybody can see—I should do no good if I attempted to suppress so obvious a reflection—that unilateral denunciation, whatever the explanation may be, inevitably raises questions as to the value of agreements, and that is a very bad preparation for future agreements." But "to refuse to go, to cancel your engagement,

why sir, it leads you nowhere. We demanded an assurance that the scope of the conversations which I have already described should be in no way restricted." Agreement, to be sure, might be difficult since the German figure for effectives "exceeds what any Power in Western Europe at the present time could match." But we go for peace. Germany must be brought back into the comity of Europe. "We are not contemplating any special agreement between this country and any other." (Hitler would soon change Sir John's mind as to this.) There would be meetings and more meetings. "Our object is to get everybody to face the facts and to face them ourselves, and all the facts."⁴⁸

Not until Saturday, March 23, a full week after the Nazi diplomatic bombshell, was any semblance of agreement arrived at between London, Paris, and Rome. A communiqué was issued at the Quai d'Orsay after the conference:

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pierre Laval, Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, British Lord Privy Seal, and Fulvio Suvich, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, met and proceeded to exchange views on the general situation. In the course of the conversations it was recalled that the visit of the British Ministers to Berlin was of an exploratory character and that the scope and purpose of their conversations would be those agreed upon in the London conversations of February 3, in regard to which the identity of views of London, Paris, and Rome has been affirmed. It was decided that after this visit and the other British visits to Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague, all of which are undertaken with the good wishes of the other two Governments, the British, French, and Italian Foreign Ministers would meet at Stresa on April 11. M. Laval, Mr. Eden, and Signor Suvich noted with satisfaction the complete identity of purpose of their Governments.⁴⁹

This "agreement" was a compromise and a postponement. The British Foreign Minister agreed merely to "explore" and not make any bargain with Berlin behind French and Italian backs. But within two days he would be initiating a bilateral Anglo-German bargain at French expense. He agreed, no doubt reluctantly, that Germany should not be invited to the projected conference at Stresa. In return France agreed that the League Council should not meet until after Stresa. That the "complete identity of purpose" was neither complete nor an identity was clear from the very fact that a conference at Stresa was deemed necessary. Simon might have gone to Paris himself instead of sending Eden, but he wished to avoid any appearance of prior agreement with Paris and Rome before going to Berlin. Postponement was of the essence of Downing Street's program, for with

postponement French determination to do anything beyond verbalizing could reasonably be expected to wane.

The French ardor for action was in any event not pronounced. On the day of the Paris conversations M. Josef Lipski called upon Baron von Neurath to express Poland's private anxieties. But Warsaw could scarcely be counted upon to act if France would take no action. Italy could most certainly not be counted upon. Il Duce was preparing the rape of Ethiopia. Laval was giving him support. For either of them to press for penalties against Germany would be embarrassing. Those who prepare grand larceny and homicide cannot complain of mere breach of contract. French troops were moved up to the German frontier. The Superior Council of National Defense met in Paris. But it was explained that this was a "purely technical rearrangement of defense forces," flowing from the reduction of French forces on the Italian border in consequence of the Laval-Mussolini entente. Having mortgaged himself to Il Duce, Laval could scarcely act against Der Führer, despite the fact that the Rome accord had no meaning save as a basis for a French-Italian front against Berlin.

It was under these circumstances that Sir John voyaged to Berlin on Sunday, March 24. It was by now clear that the Western Powers would acquiesce in what the Third Reich had done. Months of debate might follow, but while the debaters talked, Germany's new army would be trained, equipped, and brought to the highest level of fighting efficiency. Bombing planes, pursuit craft, tanks, heavy guns, submarines, cruisers, dreadnoughts would pour forth from the foundries of the Ruhr, the factories of Saxony, and the shipyards of Bremen and Hamburg. Versailles was already dead, though the rest of its articles might still seem to stand. The verdict of 1918 was already undone, since the Reich was now free to arm to the teeth, to seek allies, and to aspire toward hegemony over the Continent.

This "German miracle" was the fruit of Hitler's genius. But it was made possible only by the incredible folly and blindness of the rulers of the French Republic and of the United Kingdom—of the upper classes which admired Fascism and would sacrifice national interests rather than oppose it; of the middle classes that sought a comfortable peace of isolationist security in a world of illusion; of the befuddled masses that knew little of high politics and shrank from risks even though the shrinking might ultimately mean death; of unscrupulous press magnates, self-seeking arms-makers, cautious financiers; and, above all, of political leaders who furnished no leadership and excused

their irresponsibility by pretending to be responsible to electorates which demanded irresponsibility. Hitler would discover that new surprises and threats could beat Sir John into still greater concessions. Laval would discover that Sir John was quite prepared in the name of peace and the highest morality to sacrifice French interests on the Nazi altar. And Sir John and his successors would discover that Laval, in the name of the highest morality and of peace, was quite prepared to sacrifice Geneva and London alike on the altar of Mussolini. Here with a Gargantuan farce was to turn into tragedy sans dignity or beauty.

The beneficiary was the Third Reich. At Munich, on the memorial to the War dead at the University, is an inscription: INVICTIS VICTI VICTURI—"To the Unconquered from the Conquered who will yet Conquer." This promise Hitler was destined to fulfill.

PACT COUNTER-PACT

I. ISOLA BELLA

ON MONDAY and Tuesday, March 25-6, 1935, Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden conferred at length with Hitler and Neurath in the German capital. Herr von Ribbentrop and Sir Eric Phipps participated. No minutes of these conversations have been published to date, nor is any second-hand account from either British or German sources complete or reliable. The communiqué of March 26 was empty. It simply declared that "a complete clarification of the respective points of view" had resulted from conversations "carried on in the frankest and friendliest spirit." "It was established that the aim of the policy of both Governments is to secure and strengthen the peace of Europe by promoting international co-operation. Both the British and German Ministers are satisfied as to the usefulness of the direct conversations which have been taking place."¹ Sir John's "explanations" in Commons on March 28 and April 9 revealed little, for they were designed to put the best possible face upon a diplomatic fiasco which was little short of appalling.

From available clues, credible rumors, and the subsequent course of events it is possible to reconstruct the outlines of the Berlin conference. Two general techniques were open to Der Führer. He could appear conciliatory and co-operative, to soothe British suspicions. Or he could bluster and threaten, to excite British fears. Which procedure promised a maximum of political advantages? British suspicions were not a factor which needed to be taken too seriously. Sir John and the Cabinet had already demonstrated in word and deed that their confidence in German "goodwill" was almost imperturbable, their anxiety for "appeasement" profound, and their opposition ada-

mant to any program of coercion or encirclement. They had already served Hitler's purposes in slighting Paris and resisting all pressure for punitive measures against the Reich. The German Chancellor assumed that these attitudes were relatively permanent and needed no further encouragement from Berlin. Threats and bluster, however, might shake their optimism with regard to the possibility of a "general settlement." Such a shock might throw London into the arms of Paris and Moscow. But this was improbable since the British Ministers suspected Paris, feared Moscow more than Berlin, and hoped for "compromise" at almost any price. It was more likely to convince them that further concessions to Germany were necessary to achieve compromise. The balance of advantage thus lay in shock-tactics. Hitler employed them to the full with brilliantly successful results.

As for the proposed Eastern Locarno, Der Führer stated flatly that the Reich would accept no commitments to render mutual assistance to other States victims of aggression. In particular it would enter into no such pact with the USSR. Germany favored bilateral non-aggression pacts, or at most multilateral non-aggression pacts, with no obligations beyond consultation, but it would not include Lithuania in any such pact. Aggression, however, was indefinable. Should hostilities break out between the parties to such an agreement, the other parties might well pledge themselves not to aid the aggressor, but under no circumstances should they agree to assist his victims. Mutual assistance pacts between other Powers, with Germany excluded, were objectionable and dangerous. The Reich would oppose them. As for the Danubian pacts to assure non-intervention in Austria, Hitler felt that non-intervention was as difficult to define as aggression. How could he be expected to agree that Italian subsidies to the Heimwehr were permissible, while German support to the Austrian Nazis was not? But Germany would give consideration to any text which others might prepare.

Here was Hitler's Pan-Germanism and Rosenberg's *Drang nach Osten* translated into diplomatic language which even Sir John could understand. The price of "appeasement" or of an Anglo-German accord was a free hand for Nazi aggression in the East. Germany must control the Baltic and "protect Europe from Bolshevism." The gentlemen at Downing Street who had read *Mein Kampf* already knew this. Those who had not had now no excuse for further doubts—though the doubts were to persist and to become gradually sicklied o'er with the pale conviction that perhaps, after all, the price which Hitler de-

manded for peace with Britain was worth paying. But this was for a later day. Hitler had planted his seed, knowing that it would grow and mature in the fertile soil of Tory England.

With regard to the other points in the communiqué of February 3, Hitler made clear what was already obvious: that there was no longer any question of bargaining over Germany's right to arms equality. He denied that any para-military organizations existed in the Reich. But Germany needed 36 divisions of 550,000 troops, including a division of Black Guards and militarized police, equipped with all arms possessed by other Powers. All this was beyond discussion. Germany would not return to the League so long as it was still treated as a nation of inferior rights. To deny Germany colonies was to keep it in a position of inferiority. At this, it may be surmised, Sir John jumped. He was doubtless aware of the colonial agitation throughout the Reich, but not quite prepared for so blunt a demand for colonies as the price of return to Geneva.

The Reich, said Der Führer, favored a Western European Air Pact, but it must have parity in aerial armaments with Britain and France and perhaps more than this if the Soviet Air Force continued to be expanded. Sir John inquired timidly as to when the Reich expected to attain air parity with Britain. Ach, meine Herren, *that* point had already been passed! Sir John broke out in a cold sweat. This to him was news. The Air Minister, the Marquess of Londonderry, had breathed no inkling of this. Simon decided later (and correctly) that Hitler did *not* mean that Germany already had more military aircraft than England, but more than the entire British Commonwealth of Nations. But, my dear sir . . . ? But really! . . . *Jarwohl! Alles für Frieden und Gleichberechtigung!*

By this time, it may be surmised, Simon and Eden were prepared to grasp at any straw. Hitler held one: Germany was prepared to open negotiations for a naval limitation agreement with Britain. In this field at least the Reich was ready to call a halt to the arms race. But only at a price: a German navy 35% as large as the British navy—"with certain reserves." Yes, this would constitute a repudiation of the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles without the consent of the other signatories, but Versailles was in any case dead. Had Simon not come to "face facts"? The British Foreign Minister wiped his brow and assented. Negotiations would be opened. But for the present they must be kept secret lest others raise objections. A German delegation should come to London "for a preliminary discussion

with a view to a naval agreement in the future.”²

Fabelhaft! Heil Hitler! This was far better than expected, for Sir John had capitulated utterly. Simon took his leave a shocked and beaten man. With becoming moderation he told Commons that a “considerable divergence of opinion between the two governments was revealed by the conversations.”³ “At the end of the Berlin interviews I expressed our disappointment at the difficulties disclosed in the way of an agreement. . . . I have endeavored to communicate to the House with complete fairness and candor the salient matters ascertained in this series of visits. . . . His Majesty’s Government, faithful to their assurance that they would take part at Stresa without previously reaching defined conclusions, have not yet formulated their attitude toward these interviews, and I trust that opinion abroad will await the official utterance of the Government before drawing inferences from unauthorized comments and pronouncements.”⁴ This was neither candid nor fair nor faithful. But what were these virtues, after all, compared to the glories of “appeasement”?

Anthony Eden and Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, went on to Moscow. They arrived on the 28th, were met by Litvinov, and entertained at a cordial evening reception. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs toasted King George V and declared: “The coming months, perhaps weeks, will show whether the statesmen of Europe—who cannot fail to see and understand the ominous consequences of any infringement of peace in any part of the world and to feel their enormous responsibility—will show themselves capable of organizing peace in the way urgently required by the international situation, and whether the plan for collective work outlined in London on the 3rd of February will be carried on to its wise and logical consequence.”⁵ Eden agreed and said British policy was based upon the League. The youthful Lord Privy Seal was in this sincere. He was already perhaps beginning to have doubts regarding the Simon line, but such doubts could not be admitted. On March 29 he saw Stalin and Molotov and continued his discussions with Litvinov. On March 31 he boarded the Warsaw train. Litvinov declared on leave-taking: “I wish you all success, for your success will be our success now.” The joint communiqué issued on the same day asserted that Eden had informed Litvinov of the Berlin conversations which “had helped to clarify the European situation.” The British and Soviet Governments found no conflict of interests between them and were determined to “govern their mutual relations in that spirit of collaboration and loy-

alty to the obligations assumed by them which is inherent in their common membership in the League of Nations.”

Mr. Eden and MM. Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov were of the opinion that in the present international situation it is more than ever necessary to pursue the endeavor to promote the building up of a system of collective security in Europe, as contemplated in the Anglo-French communiqué of the 3rd of February, and in conformity with the principles of the League of Nations. It was emphasized in the conversations by MM. Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov that the organization of security in Eastern Europe and the proposed pact of mutual assistance do not aim at isolation or encirclement of any State but at the creation of equal security for all participants, and that the participation of Germany and Poland would therefore be welcomed as affording the best solution of the problem.⁸

At Warsaw, April 1-3, Eden was received by President Moscicki, Marshal Pilsudski and Colonel Beck. The rulers of Poland were still opposed to any collaboration in an Eastern Locarno without German participation. The communiqué said nothing.⁷ In Prague, April 4, “M. Benes and Mr. Eden noted that the objectives of the policy of the two Governments in respect of the maintenance of general peace were identical, and emphasized their sincere and unflinching attachment to the League of Nations.”⁸ In the Czech capital Eden took a plane for Cologne. He was fatigued by his strenuous tour and perhaps disheartened at the Berlin revelations. The plane was battered and tossed by howling winds and sheets of rain. Eden’s nausea became chronic. He reached the Rhine a sick man. The Channel was not soothing. He was obliged to retire for rest and recuperation upon his return to England.

The Eastern Locarno and the Danubian pact were now seen to be doomed. Britain and France might still salvage a Western Air Locarno if they granted parity to the Reich, scrapped the naval clauses of the Treaty, and abandoned the balance of the proposals of February 3. Downing Street was willing. The Quai d’Orsay was dubious. A Barthou, a Delcassé, or a Gambetta, a Palmerston, a Disraeli, or a Lloyd George would doubtless have acted differently. The Nazi menace could still be crushed by a few swift blows. But there were no statesmen in either Paris or London. A “preventive war” was unthinkable. Better to permit the Third Reich to become invincible.⁹

The British Cabinet met April 8 to hear Eden, but he was unable either to report or go to Stresa because of his illness. On the next day Laval announced that a French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact would be considered on his contemplated visit to Moscow. The conference at Stresa opened on April 11. Mussolini, Flandin, Laval, MacDonald,

and Simon were attended by Fulvio Suvich, Alexis Leger of the Quai d'Orsay, and Ambassador Pompeo Aloisi. They met in the morning in the Hall of Music of Boromeo Palace on Isola Bella, off the western shore of Lake Maggiore. Here amid green shores, blue waters, and snowy peaks they discussed their problems until noon of the 14th. In the *Popolo d'Italia* Il Duce wrote on the eve of the meeting that it would lead neither to peace nor to war, but merely to consultation—"the last resource of indecision in the face of reality." Simon reported on his travels. The French representatives submitted a memorandum of protest against the German action for submission to the League Council. The British and Italian spokesmen assented, but doubted whether Germany ought to be mentioned by name. As for any pressure on the Reich, they refused to commit themselves to any financial or economic sanctions, either then or in the event of future treaty-violations. There was apparently no discussion of penalties with respect to the violations just perpetrated and no consideration of military sanctions in any eventuality.

Sir John was alarmed, not lest treaty-breaking go unpunished, but lest the Reich be offended by verbal censure and mutual assistance pacts among other States. "He went to catch a dickey-bird and thought he could not fail, because he had a little salt to put upon its tail." The bird in question was Hitler's offer of diluted non-aggression pacts. Sir John phoned Berlin from Stresa (doubtless wishing that he had insisted on German participation in the conference) to inquire whether the offer would still stand with respect to Germany's eastern neighbors even if they concluded pacts of mutual assistance among themselves. Neurath's answer was affirmative. Simon so informed the conference. To strengthen Simon's hand in his plea for lenient treatment of the Reich, the German Government issued a statement on the 13th declaring that since it had no aggressive intentions, it had no objection to defensive pacts among other States. It could not accept for itself any obligations of mutual assistance, but was ready to conclude agreements for general obligations of non-aggression and arbitration and even of non-support of aggressors.¹⁰ But it condemned mutual assistance pacts as contradictory. Those who had no faith in obligations of non-aggression ought not to have faith in those of mutual assistance. Simon and Mussolini breathed a silent "amen."

The documents which emerged from Stresa might have suggested to the uninitiated that Isola Bella was the "beautiful isle of somewhere." The agreements reached had no relevance to the problem of

power which Hitler had posed to the West. They were not programs of action but formulas of compromise and pledges of further procedural procrastination. The "Joint Resolution of the Conference of Stresa" registered, as usual, "complete agreement on the various problems discussed" and on a common line of conduct at Geneva. "Negotiations should be pursued for the development which is desired in the security of Eastern Europe." With regard to Austria the pledges of February 17 and September 27, 1934, and of January 7 and February 3, 1935, were reaffirmed. The three Powers would "consult together as to measures to be taken in case of a threat to the integrity and independence of Austria" and would recommend negotiations for a general "Central European arrangement." They would "continue actively the study of the question" of an Air Locarno. They further "took into careful and anxious consideration the recent action of the German Government and reports voiced by Sir John Simon of his recent conversation with the German Chancellor."

Sir John was successful in preventing any condemnation of Germany at Stresa, though at the cost of agreeing to condemnation at Geneva—where it would presumably be less resented by the Reich and would be, if possible, even more innocuous. He was also successful in obtaining promises of continued negotiation and pious platitudes giving comfort to Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria in their desire to imitate the German example. The Joint Resolution closed as follows:

It was regretfully recognized that the method of unilateral repudiation adopted by the German Government at a moment when steps were being taken to promote a freely negotiated settlement of the question of armaments had undermined public confidence in security and peaceful order. Moreover, the magnitude of the declared program of German rearmament, already well in the process of execution, had invalidated the quantitative assumptions upon which efforts for disarmament had hitherto been based and shaken the hope by which these efforts were inspired.

The representatives of the three Powers nevertheless reaffirmed their earnest desire to sustain peace by establishing a sense of security, and declared for themselves that they remained anxious to join every practicable effort for promoting international agreement on limitation of armaments.

Representatives of the three Governments took into consideration the desire expressed by the States whose military status is respectively determined by the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly to obtain revision of this status. They decided that other States concerned should be informed of this desire through diplomatic channels.

They agreed to recommend to the other States concerned to examine this question with a view to its settlement by mutual agreement within the framework of general and regional guarantees of security.¹¹

This document was supplemented by an Anglo-Italian declaration, designed to placate France by reaffirming the obligations of Britain and Italy as guarantors of Locarno and declaring "their intentions, should need arise, faithfully to fulfill them." There was likewise a Final Declaration: "The three Powers, the object of whose policy is collective maintenance of peace within the framework of the League of Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe, and will act in close and cordial collaboration towards this purpose." Two words here were significant: "practicable" means were understood to exclude anything beyond verbal condemnation; "Europe" meant "not Africa," where Mussolini was preparing aggression and treaty-repudiation on a vast scale.

The next step was to enact at Geneva the comedy agreed upon at Stresa. The play was short but not good. The object of the actors was to impregnate the Geneva mountain (with pieces of paper) and cause it to go into labor, not to produce a mouse, but something considerably less—i.e. more pieces of paper. Here French apprehensions could be given free rein, for phrases were harmless when all understood that they were not preparations for action but substitutes for action. On April 14 there was published at Geneva the text of an extensive French memorandum to the League Council originally submitted on April 9. It reviewed the disarmament and security negotiations, dwelt upon the enormity of Germany's crime, and solemnly warned the Council that it "would not be carrying out its mission if it looked with indifference upon such a threat to international order. It is its duty to meet the threat by considering the most suitable methods for remedying the situation that has now been created and for preventing its recurrence."¹² The Council met on April 15. One of its first acts was to postpone consideration of Ethiopia's pleas for an examination of the Italian-Ethiopian dispute. On the 16th the British, French, and Italian delegates presented a draft resolution of twelve paragraphs whereby the Council was called upon to make one declaration, one invitation and two decisions. Thus: The Council

1. Declares Germany has failed in the duty which lies upon all members of the international community to respect undertakings which they have contracted and condemns any unilateral repudiation of international obligations;

2. Invites the Governments which took the initiative in the plan of February 3, or which gave approval to it, to continue the negotiations so initiated and in particular to promote the conclusion within the framework of the League of Nations

of agreements which appear necessary to attain the objects defined by this plan, due account being taken of the obligations of the Covenant with a view to assuring the maintenance of peace;

3. Considering that the unilateral repudiation of international obligations may endanger the very existence of the League of Nations as an organization for maintaining peace and promoting security—decides: That such repudiation, without prejudice to the application of measures already provided in international agreements, should, in the event of its having a relation to undertakings concerning the security of peoples and the maintenance of the peace of Europe, call into play all appropriate measures on the part of the members of the League and within the framework of the Covenant; Decides: That a committee shall be appointed to propose for this purpose measures to render the Covenant more effective in the organization of collective security and to define in particular the economic and financial measures which might be applied, should, in the future, a State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by unilateral repudiation of its international obligations.¹³

Laval, Simon, and Aloisi spoke in support of the resolution. Beck expressed skepticism. Litvinov championed collective security. Salvador de Madariaga of Spain reminded the delegates that no new machinery to restrain peace-breakers and treaty-violators was needed: all was provided for in the Covenant. Only there was no will to enforce the Covenant. Discussion of armaments in conventional terms was irrelevant. "The important thing when a man in the street carries a revolver is not to know what is its caliber or even if he has other weapons in his pocket, but to know whether he is a policeman or a criminal." M. Munch of Denmark anxiously proposed amendments to conciliate Germany. In the final discussion of the 17th, Litvinov, with alternate glances at Ethiopia and China, objected to limiting the resolution to "Europe." Simon retorted with heat that the Council must address itself "to a practical problem in a practical spirit, and not at this moment spread the aspirations and endeavor, which we all desire to put into a practical shape, so wide that the whole of our efforts may be lost in shallows and in miseries." Laval and Aloisi agreed. On April 17, 1935 the resolution as submitted was passed unanimously with thirteen votes, Denmark abstaining.¹⁴

A committee was appointed. It appointed sub-committees. The sub-committees reported in June and July. The reports were filed away and forgotten. At a meeting of the Little Entente Council in Geneva on April 18 Benes announced that Czechoslovakia would follow France in negotiating a Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR. The coy Laval had not gone to Moscow, but he and Litvinov had drafted an accord at Geneva. On April 18 Berlin protested to London

at the Geneva "betrayal." On April 20 (Hitler's birthday) the Reich informed the Governments on the Council that it challenged their right to act as judges of Germany and resolutely rejected their resolution. Delegates at Geneva went home. Clerks filed papers. Workmen hammered away at the new League of Nations Palace in Ariana Park. Other workmen in the Ruhr, in Saxony, and in Hamburg hammered away at tanks, planes, guns, and war vessels. Still others built roads through Eritrea and Italian Somaliland to the Ethiopian frontier.

2. DEFENSE AGAINST BERLIN

On May 27, 1935, at the Quai d'Orsay, Pierre Laval and Ambassador Vladimir Potemkin attached their signatures to a Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France and the USSR. On May 16, 1935 Eduard Benes and Ambassador Serge Alexandrovsky attached their signatures at Prague to a Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. These engagements were the only concrete diplomatic measures taken by the French Republic and its allies to redress the balance of power which Hitler's repudiation of the military clauses of Versailles had disturbed. They were likewise the only significant results of the protracted negotiations regarding security which had been so long under way. The project of an Eastern Locarno, the plan of a Danubian pact to safeguard Austria, the proposals for an Air Locarno were all buried in the archives after the débâcle of March and April 1935. But the rising menace of the Third Reich made Moscow the ally of Paris and Prague.

The reluctant Laval was pushed into signature only by Hitler's diplomatic thunder and the sound of plowshares being beaten into swords across the Rhine. To prevent France from being embroiled in a possible conflict in the Far East, he insisted that the Pact be limited in its application to Europe. To pay lip service to collective security and to meet British objections to alliances and blocs, he insisted that it be so drawn as to be compatible with the Covenant and with Locarno. The Kremlin was willing.

The Pact as signed provided in its first Article that France and the USSR would consult immediately upon measures to secure observance of Article 10 of the Covenant⁴⁶ in the event of either of them being threatened with aggression by any European State. Should they be victims of unprovoked aggression by any European State, they would

come at once to each other's aid in the event of the League Council failing to reach a unanimous report on a dispute submitted to it (Article 2).¹⁶ They likewise agreed (Article 3) to come to each other's aid against unprovoked aggression "in application of Article 16 of the Covenant,"¹⁷ even in case of aggression from a non-League member as anticipated by Article 17¹⁸ of the Covenant. All Covenant obligations remained unrestricted by the accord (Article 4). The Pact would take effect on exchange of ratifications, remain in force five years, and then continue in force indefinitely, subject to termination by a one-year notice from either party (Article 5).

An attached Protocol of Signature, which was an integral part of the agreement, specified (Article 1) that the obligation of mutual assistance was limited to cases of aggression against the territory of the parties (i.e. not against their allies) and would be binding even when the League Council should issue no recommendation or fail to reach a unanimous decision. It was further specified (Article 2) that previous obligations on the part of the signatories toward third States remained unaffected and that no interpretation would be placed upon the accord which might be incompatible with such prior obligations (e.g. Locarno) and expose the parties to sanctions. Both Powers (Article 3) reserved the right to become parties by mutual consent to other similar agreements of a regional character for the organization of security through obligations of mutual assistance. The final Article of the Protocol referred to the projected Eastern Locarno agreement in terms of a proposed pact binding the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic States, with a supplementary pact of mutual assistance between France, Germany, and the USSR. The present Pact was declared to be applicable "only within limits contemplated in the three-party agreement previously planned." (*"Les engagements énoncés dans la traité d'assistance franco-soviétique doivent être entendus comme ne devant jouer que dans les limites envisagées dans l'accord tripartite antérieurement projeté."*) However, should either party be a victim of aggression on the part of other European States not referred to in the projected tripartite accord, the other would abstain from any assistance to such aggressor.

The political and military significance of these somewhat involved obligations was not at once apparent. Certain inconsistencies were permitted to creep into the phraseology. The parties agreed to aid one another against aggressors in the enforcement of the League Covenant. But by Article 1 of the Protocol they agreed to come to

one another's defense regardless of action or inaction by the League Council. In principle France and the USSR bound themselves to mutual defense against attack by any European (but not Asiatic) State. But the implied "any" of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Treaty was restricted by Article 4 of the Protocol to a single State: Germany. Thus a Polish or Rumanian attack upon the USSR or an Italian or Spanish attack upon France would not technically require the other ally to come to the defense of the victim, unless—contrary to the usual practice of treaty interpretation—the Treaty should be applied without regard to the qualifying Protocol. Moreover, Article 2 of the Protocol, read in conjunction with the Locarno Treaty, meant in effect that in case of conflict with Germany France must secure British and Italian assent to the designation of Germany as the aggressor before it could claim their assistance or that of the USSR. The Soviet Union on the other hand was under no obligation to secure the approval of other States in its judgment of the aggressor as a condition of aid from (or to) France. This point is perhaps of purely academic interest, since the Locarno Treaty was repudiated by Germany before the French-Soviet pact was ratified.¹⁹

The Czech-Soviet Pact of May 16, 1935 was identical with the French pact save in two respects. By Article 4 Czechoslovakia and the USSR agreed not to aid any aggressor against the other in cases "not giving ground for aid or assistance within the meaning of the present Treaty." By Article 2 of the Protocol of Signature Prague and Moscow accepted as between themselves the limitations of Article 4 of the French-Soviet Protocol and declared that each would aid the other only "in so far as assistance may be rendered by France to the party victim of aggression." The Czech-Soviet Pact, like its French-Soviet precursor, was thus limited to the case of unprovoked German aggression against Prague or Moscow and was further limited by the requirement of French participation. Polish or Rumanian aggression against the USSR would not require Czechoslovakia (or France) to come to Moscow's aid. Polish or Hungarian aggression against Czechoslovakia would not require the USSR to aid Prague, though Paris would still be bound to extend aid under the earlier Czech-French alliance agreements. If Germany attacked Czechoslovakia or the USSR and France stood aside, neither Prague nor Moscow would be bound to aid the other. But if France defended Czechoslovakia (or the USSR) against the Reich, Moscow (or Prague) was bound to intervene.

These limitations and qualifications were in part a consequence of Laval's lack of faith in the whole arrangement. The Czech-Soviet pact was promptly ratified. Ratifications were exchanged June 9, 1935, while Benes was visiting the Soviet capital. Laval, however, took no similar step. His belated trip to Moscow did not take place until May 13-15, 1935, and was little more than a courtesy call. He apparently made no effort to persuade Rumania to enter into a mutual assistance pact with the USSR, despite the fact that Titulescu was sympathetic. Far from endeavoring to secure Poland's participation, Laval assured Beck on his way back to Paris that if the Red Army was ever called upon to defend Czechoslovakia or France it would not need to go through Poland. He added that the purpose of the pacts was less to secure Soviet aid than to forestall a German-Soviet rapprochement. Meanwhile Pilsudski had been gathered unto his fathers. Laval went to Cracow for the funeral on May 18 and there had a long interview with Göring. He did not accept Göring's invitation to come to Berlin, but in all probability he sympathized with Göring's dislike of the French-Soviet entente. He delayed ratification and then, to the disgust of Herriot and in marked departure from the usual procedure for treaties of this kind,²⁰ he submitted the Pact to parliament.

Here, as in the case of the French-Russian agreements of 1892 and indeed in all alliances, the purposes and policies of the parties were of far greater moment in determining what final effect might be given in a crisis to the terms agreed upon than formal technicalities of interpretation. Under Laval's blighting hand, the Pact between Paris and Moscow had no life. His successors took a more generous view of its possibilities, but no military convention was negotiated between the General Staffs and the crucial geographical difficulties in the way of Soviet aid to either Czechoslovakia or France remained unresolved.

The USSR had no common frontier with the Third Reich or the Czech Republic. In order to grant military aid to Prague its forces would be obliged to cross either Poland or Rumania. Both States were almost certain to refuse passage to the Red Army unless compelled to do so by strong French pressure. In the absence of such pressure, the reactionary regimes at Warsaw and Bucharest would prefer by far to see Czechoslovakia and France destroyed and to become themselves vassals of Berlin rather than permit Stalin's legions to cross their frontiers. Neither Laval nor those who came after him saw fit to take any effective action toward the removal of the obstacles. Steps to strengthen French bonds with Moscow were always frowned upon

at Downing Street. After Laval it became a rule of French diplomacy to do nothing which London opposed. The effect of the French-Soviet alliance, through no fault of the Kremlin, was thus to push Warsaw and Bucharest farther into the German orbit without affording Paris any assurance of effective or timely Soviet aid in the event of a conflict with Germany. Thanks to skepticism and irresponsibility at the Quai d'Orsay, the only French alliance of the post-Versailles epoch which promised to confront the Third Reich with an adequate counter-weight in the East was allowed to remain unimplemented. Barthou's Grand Design was here once more betrayed.

3. SIMON TO HOARE

In the interim the curious tale of Anglo-German relations moved toward another Nazi triumph. Late in April Prime Minister MacDonald, with the probable approval of Eden and of Robert Vansittart, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, condemned Hitler's saber-rattling and challenged him to prove his good faith by constructive action for peace.²¹ In an address to Commons on May 2 he made further critical references to German policy—this possibly as a preparation for publicly presenting the next concession to the Reich as a token of Nazi "moderation" and a further step toward "appeasement." He also announced that Simon, while in Berlin, had invited German spokesmen to London to discuss a naval agreement. The Reich had accepted the bid. In the House of Lords (May 7) much sympathy was expressed for Germany and a motion was introduced, though later withdrawn, expressing regret over the Council's resolution condemning German treaty-repudiation. Lord Privy Seal Eden on the other hand denounced isolationism and championed collective security through the League in public addresses on May 16 and 28. Simon kept his peace.

In view of the divided state of British opinion, the occasion was appropriate for a new German move to swing the balance in the direction Hitler desired. The victory of March 16, moreover, had now been won beyond all doubting and the day was come for a new initiative to win new advantages. This time, concluded Hitler and his advisers, more could be gained by conciliatory gestures than by further defiance. The two attitudes must alternate to produce their maximum effect, for Der Führer was dealing with those who could alternately

be frightened by threats into making concessions for the sake of restoring friendship and cajoled by promises into making concessions for the sake of avoiding new frights. He was likewise dealing at times with those who wished to make concessions at the expense of others in the name of "peace" and needed fears of war as a means of obtaining public approval of their policy. Hitler displayed a keen comprehension of the dynamics of Whitehall and a nice adaptability to its various moods. He now called the Reichstag into session for May 21, 1935, and delivered himself of a long address intended for the world and particularly for Britain. The British Cabinet adjourned its discussion of military policy pending news of Hitler's pronouncements, while *The Times* pleaded for understanding and acceptance of the Chancellor's utterances as sincere.

The Reichstag address of May 21, 1935 resembled that of May 17, 1933, in that it was calculated to reassure a suspicious world as to the pacific intentions of the Third Reich. Hitler asserted that the new Germany, having conquered "Marxist internationalism," desired peace not from weakness or cowardice but because National-socialism rejected the idea of conquering alien peoples. "Germany wants peace . . . Germany needs peace and desires peace. And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that such assurances are nothing, and that the only proof of sincerity is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr. Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of an 'assurance' in any case. . . . The world suffers from a regular mania of collective co-operation." This idea was Woodrow Wilson's. Germany had greeted Wilson's ideas eagerly. Germany disarmed. But Germany was betrayed. The others refused to disarm. Germany presented constructive plans, but all were rejected. Germany is "not prepared to be regarded and treated for all time as a second-class nation or one with inferior rights. . . . No one of us means to threaten anybody. It is only that we are all determined to secure and maintain equality for the German people."

Der Führer went on to restate his objections to an Eastern Locarno. There could be no arrangement for mutual assistance between National-socialism and Bolshevism. Mr. Eden might deny Bolshevist aggressive tendencies, but Germany had suffered Communist uprisings and revolts hatched in Moscow. Germany was ready to conclude non-aggression pacts with all her neighbors save Lithuania (and even with Lithuania if persecution of the Germans in Memel should cease), but never mutual assistance pacts. Such pacts were but military alliances

of the old type. "We regret this in a special way because, as a result of the military alliance between France and Russia, an element of legal insecurity has been brought into the Locarno Pact, which is the most definite and most really valuable treaty of mutual assistance in Europe." Obligations of non-aggression and non-intervention must be defined. "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an Anschluss." All Germany asks is "self-determination." (Blessed word!)

Hitler proceeded next to outline thirteen points of German policy:

1. The Reich rejects the Geneva resolution of April 17 because it was not Germany but the other Powers that violated the Treaty of Versailles. Germany cannot return to Geneva unless the Treaty and the Covenant are separated and equality of rights is "extended to all functions and all property rights in international life."

2. Germany will respect all other provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, "including the territorial provisions, and those revisions which shall be rendered necessary in the course of time will be put into effect only by the method of peaceful understanding."

3. The German Government "will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed. . . . In particular they will uphold and fulfill all obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty, so long as the other partners on their side are ready to stand by that pact. In respecting the demilitarized zone, the German Government consider their action as a contribution to the appeasement of Europe, which contribution is of an unheard-of-hardness for a sovereign State."

4. Germany is ready to co-operate in a collective system for safeguarding European peace, but the way must be kept open for treaty-revision.

5. Unilateral imposition of conditions cannot promote collaboration. Step-by-step negotiations are indispensable.

6. "The German Government are ready in principle to conclude pacts of non-aggression with their neighbor States, and to supplement these pacts with all provisions that aim at isolating the war-maker and isolating the area of the war."

7. "The German Government are ready to supplement the Locarno Treaty with an air agreement and to enter upon discussions regarding this matter."

8. In no circumstances will Germany depart from the announced extent and expansion of the German defense forces. Limitation by agreement is possible on the basis of aerial parity with the individual Great Powers of the West, and naval tonnage equal to 35% of the British. "Germany has not the intention or the necessity or the means to participate in any new naval rivalry." Germany concedes to Britain control of the sea.

9. Germany desires the outlawry of weapons and methods of warfare contrary to the Geneva Red Cross Convention. "Here the German Government have in mind all those arms which bring death and destruction not so much to the fighting soldiers as, in the first instance, to non-combatant women and children. . . . They believe it possible to proscribe the use of certain arms as contrary to international law and to excommunicate those nations still using them. . . . For ex-

ample, there might be prohibition of the dropping of gas, incendiary, and explosive bombs outside the real battle zone. This limitation could then be extended to complete international outlawry of all bombing."

10. Germany desires abolition of the heaviest arms, especially heavy artillery and heavy tanks.

11. Germany will accept any limitation whatsoever of the caliber strength of artillery, the size of warships, and the tonnage of submarines or even the complete abolition of submarines by agreement.

12. "The poisoning of public opinion among the nations by irresponsible elements orally or in writing, through the theater or the cinema," should be prohibited.

13. "The German Government are ready at any time to reach an international agreement which shall effectively prevent all attempts at outside interference in the affairs of other States." ²²

From the perspective of 1939 many of these assurances and proposals seem grotesquely suffused with a macabre humor. The mangled women and children of Almería, Guernica, and Barcelona, slaughtered by Nazi bombs, rise in mockery. The ghost of Austria, the specters of Locarno, Versailles, and St. Germain, the truncated body of Czechoslovakia, the shades of a dozen broken pledges leer at such transparency. But in May of 1935 these dead still lived. The treacheries and murders of yesteryear were already forgotten. Hitler assumed then and always that he was dealing with those who live for the moment without memory of what has passed or forethought of what must come. Each hour's promises were believed, regardless of records or prospects. The leaders of Britain and some of the leaders of France knew better, but their followers did not. For reasons of their own, they desired their publics to accept Nazi promises at face value.

Hitler, moreover, was always more or less "sincere" in his promises, not in the sense of saying what he believed, but in the sense of believing—at the time—what he said. Later he would say other things and believe them too, for he was ever self-hypnotized by his own oratory. And he would continue to believe what he had said earlier, for he and his disciples, while monists in principle, were mental pluralists in practice to the point of a multiform schizophrenia. But the "insincerity" was mingled with a shrewd calculus of what verbiage would best impress foreign cabinets, and what impression of the Reich foreign cabinets desired their peoples to accept. The only immutable values in this credo were mystical tribal abstractions: "race," "honor," "equality," "freedom," and the "right-to-live"—i.e. the will-to-power. These values forbade the grant to lesser tribes of freedom or security

or any right to exist, save as bondsmen to the Supermen. During the years of preparation, however, these categorical imperatives of the new ethics required now this interpretation, now that. Definitions and applications could not be always consistent, for these depended upon changing circumstances and shifting dispositions on the part of others to submit or resist. But the ends were ever the ends of the high morality of *Machtspolitik*, brought to perfection by the reverence of *Deutschtum* and *Volkstum* for Wotan and Thor. And ends so noble as these always justify any means necessary for their service. This sincerity of fanaticism was a phenomenon which most of Hitler's sincere foes at home and abroad (apart from pretended "enemies" in high places) were forever incapable of comprehending. Therein were the keys to power and victory.

This oratorical demarche of May 21, 1935 produced the expected results. Laval accepted the proposals as a basis for negotiation. Downing Street made inquiries as to details.²³ Neurath told Sir Eric Phipps on May 31 that Hitler's second point covered all the Articles of Versailles still in force, including those relating to the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Baldwin told a large Conservative audience in Albert Hall on May 27 that negotiations must be pursued for an Air Locarno.²⁴ Sir Herbert Samuel made a plea for speed. Others urged that the proposed expansion of the British air force should be deferred pending negotiations. Simon was opposed to this, but favored every effort to reach an "understanding."²⁵ The Marquess of Londonderry, Minister of Air, was so keenly in favor of a rapprochement with the Reich that he was of at least two minds about the optimum tempo of British aerial rearmament: "I never succeeded in conveying to my most influential colleagues the actual fact that, whereas there was no time to be lost, the imminent peril almost daily predicted by certain newspapers was altogether fantastic."²⁶ Eden and Vansittart were chided for their lack of faith in Der Führer—now shown to be baseless.

Meanwhile Simon's "invitation" to the Reich to negotiate a naval accord began to bear fruit. The Liberal *Manchester Guardian* had declared on March 22 that Berlin would be rebuffed if it sought to lead Simon into separate naval negotiations. But "Liberal" Sir John thought otherwise. On April 26 Downing Street admitted that German naval experts would arrive within a week or so. On the same day Berlin informed London that orders had been given for the assembling of a dozen U-boats of 250 tons each, forbidden by the Treaty but

manufactured during the preceding winter. This information shocked Sir John almost as much as Hitler's bland admission on March 25 that Germany already had as large an air fleet as Britain's. There was again delay. But Hitler's speech soothed injured feelings and presently all was arranged. A German naval delegation headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop reached London on June 2 and negotiations were begun at once.

On June 7, 1935 a long expected reshuffle of the British Cabinet was announced. Since the autumn of 1931 the "National Government" had been in office under renegade Laborite Ramsay MacDonald with the initial support of the Conservative and Liberal parties. In the election of October 1931 the Conservatives secured 54.9% of the popular votes and the Liberals 10.2% compared with the Labor Opposition's 30.7%. But in Commons, thanks to unproportional representation, the National Government had 91% of the M.P.'s in its ranks. The Cabinet still had an overwhelming majority after November 1933, when the Liberals split once more, with renegade Simon and his handful of "National Liberals" remaining with the Cabinet and the followers of Sir Herbert Samuel and David Lloyd George crossing the gangway to the Opposition benches. A new election would be mandatory in 1936. The Cabinet was contemplating "going to the country" in the autumn of 1935. The transfers of portfolios in June were made with a wary eye on the voters, who seemed to be well enough satisfied and disposed to reject Ramsay Muir's harsh (and indeed, as to its choice of adjectives, quite wrong) judgment of the regime: "The worst, the weakest, the most timorous, and the most incompetent Government that Britain has known since the days of Lord North."²⁷

MacDonald and Baldwin exchanged posts on June 7, the former retiring to the sinecure of Lord President of the Council and the latter becoming Tory Prime Minister of a Tory Cabinet faintly diluted with "National Liberals" and "National Laborites." Young Malcolm MacDonald became Colonial Secretary. Viscount Hailsham yielded up the War Office to Viscount Halifax and became Lord High Chancellor. The Marquess of Londonderry yielded the air post Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (later Lord Swinton) and became Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of Lords. Neville Chamberlain remained Chancellor of the Exchequer and Walter Runciman President of the Board of Trade.

Sir John Simon herewith stepped down from the Foreign Office

and was made Home Secretary and Deputy leader of the House of Commons. There was no suggestion in high places that diplomatic ineptitude had anything to do with the change. Sir John believed in his policy despite Lloyd George's assertion that no man in the House "has left such a slimy trail of hypocrisy behind him." Philip Snowden once remarked that if Sir John had "any sense of the pitiable failure he made of the high and responsible office he held . . . he would hide his head in some place of suitable obscurity in the hope that his miserable record would be forgotten."²⁸ But his Tory colleagues shared his purposes, endured his methods, and took no such dark view of his record.

Since Anthony Eden was deemed too young to succeed Simon and had, moreover, earned the enmity of Hitler and Mussolini, he was made Minister Without Portfolio for League of Nations Affairs. As Simon's successor Stanley Baldwin picked an old friend and colleague who had given the impression of being relatively uncommitted as between the "pro-French" and "pro-German" sections of the party: Sir Samuel Hoare. This cultured and mild-mannered scion of an old banking family had been in the British Intelligence Service in Russia during the War, and Minister of Air in Baldwin's first Cabinet. As Secretary of State for India he was chiefly responsible for the new Indian Constitution. His hobbies were tennis, ice-skating, Czechoslovakia, French literature, and Russian émigrés. He it was who brought to a conclusion the negotiations with Ribbentrop.

On June 18, 1935, following two flying visits to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Ribbentrop exchanged with Hoare the letters which constituted the Anglo-German naval accord.²⁹ Britain herein accepted the German proposal that "the future strength of the German navy in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion of 35:100." This was to be a permanent relationship in terms of tonnage, though the Reich reserved the right to invite re-examination of the ratio in case of abnormal construction by other Powers. The ratio would be applied by category as well as globally, though departures from it within the categories would be permitted by common accord. "In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Germany agreed not to exceed 45% of the British submarine tonnage unless a situation should arise

which in German opinion "makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45% above-mentioned," in which case notice would be given and a "friendly discussion" initiated before the right should be exercised.

On June 27, 1919 the captive German High Seas Fleet had been scuttled by its crews at Scapa Flow. During the preceding four years Britain had more than once faced starvation and defeat at the hands of German U-boats. Sixteen years later the British Government granted Germany parity in submarines and a new High Seas Fleet more than one-third the size of the British navy. The excuse was that if Britain rejected this "agreement"—which was an unqualified acceptance of the Nazi demands with no *quid pro quo*—the Reich would build an even larger fleet. Since London had no more intention of compelling Berlin to observe the arms limitations of the Treaty of Versailles on the sea than on land or in the air, the view prevailed at Downing Street that half a loaf was better than none—i.e. that a third of the old German navy was preferable to the whole of it. The British Government thus expressly co-operated with the Reich in repudiating Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Three months to a day had elapsed since Britain had protested Germany's repudiation. Two months and a day had elapsed since Britain had joined a dozen other States in condemning Germany's action. One hundred and twenty years to a day had elapsed since Britain had brought to final ruin another attempt at Continental hegemony at Waterloo. It is not known whether Pitt, Nelson, and Wellington turned over in their graves.

The June capitulation was to the naïve the more astonishing in that Simon and Hoare not only failed to secure the approval of other interested Powers but rushed to signature before they could protest. There is no evidence that the USSR, which would be the first victim of German naval control of the Baltic, was consulted at all or even officially informed. As for France and the score of other States which had helped Britain impose the Treaty of Versailles on Germany, they were all but ignored, though their legal rights and their strategic security were alike profoundly jeopardized by British connivance in the Reich's rearmament at sea. Lord Londonderry told the Lords on June 26 that France and the other signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty "were informed on June 7 of the outline of the Agreement which it was proposed to make with the Germans" (the First Lord of the Admiralty said "fully informed" on the 21st), "and they were invited to communicate any observations they might desire to offer

at a very early date." The French view, he said, had been received before signature, but "their criticism did not appear to us to be of such a character as would justify us in withholding our consent to an agreement which, in our view, held such a promise for the peace of the world." In any case, "to have insisted on prior consultation with other countries would definitely have meant the loss of the Agreement."³⁰ A strong statement of French objections from M. Laval and M. Pietri, Minister of Marine, had reached the British Embassy in Paris on June 17 and Downing Street on the 18th. It was doubtless sent as a basis of further discussion. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the British Cabinet rushed the Agreement to signature with the express object of sweeping aside French protests and confronting Paris with a *fait accompli à la Hitler*.

Whitehall added insult to injury by a number of explanatory utterances. In a broadcast on June 19 Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, virtually apologized for the accord on submarines. He and Londonderry later averred that Germany had agreed to adhere to the rules of Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and had thereby renounced unrestricted submarine warfare.³¹ Sir Bolton in Commons, June 21: "We regard this Agreement . . . essentially as a contribution to world peace and international appeasement. . . . We have to face facts. . . . Germany is already constructing a fleet which is outside the limits laid down in the Versailles Treaty. . . . We are satisfied that a serious error would have been committed by this country had His Majesty's Government either refused to accept the offer or even hesitated unduly to do so." Londonderry in Lords, June 26:

We are a practical people and we have to face the facts of the situation. . . . We believe that the best method of promoting that "general settlement" to which the London communiqué [of February 3] referred is not to enter upon a period of further competitive building but to endeavor, by agreement with Germany, to circumvent the effects of the decision announced by Germany. . . . We believe that . . . we have done a great service to other Powers. . . . The concern that has been expressed in some quarters is not unnatural, in view of the fact that our national security was seriously threatened by submarine attack during the late War. . . . The experience that we gained during those four years, painful and costly though the process was, has

led to the development of improved methods for countering the submarine.

Hoare declared in Commons, July 1, with astounding logic, that the Agreement "in no way affects the rights of any country not a party to the agreement." On July 11 he said again in Commons: "On no account could we have made an agreement that was not manifestly in our view to the advantage of the other naval Powers. . . . In the opinion of our naval experts we were advised to accept the Agreement as a safe Agreement for the British Empire."

The comments of the British press indicated that the Conservative organs were fully in accord with the Cabinet's views and that Liberals and Laborites were befuddled by the magic phrases: "peace," "general appeasement," and "facing the facts." *The Times* asserted: "The new British Government have auspiciously begun their work of stabilization of peace." The Liberal *News-Chronicle*: "It is at least possible to hope it may be the first practical move in building up at last a peace of understanding." The Laborite *Daily Herald*: "Anybody who recalls the pre-War years must realize that the naval agreement is quite a real contribution to armament limitation and general pacification." Lord Beaverbrook's *Daily Express* was more blunt: "The Anglo-German agreement breaks the Versailles Treaty wide open. Nobody seriously believes the Treaty can be maintained any longer in any way. The French do not like the new agreement. They must take their own line over it. For Britain it means no naval race with Germany. So we welcome it."⁸²

The Quai d'Orsay did not welcome it. So indignant were the French Ministers that Downing Street declared on the evening of the 18th that Eden would go to Paris. He began herewith an unpleasant task which he was to pursue for the next two and a half years: that of explaining to the friends of Britain abroad why the British Cabinet insisted upon making bargains at their expense with their enemies. He went to Paris on the 20th, conferred with Laval for two days, spent the 24th and 25th in Rome in vain appeals to Mussolini Africanus, and then saw Laval again before he flew back to London on the 27th. The French Foreign Minister in a statement of the 21st asserted that "Mr. Eden set forth the reasons which had led his Government to take this decision, and I, for my part, did not fail to renew the reservations made by my Government on the subject." Eden told him that the procedure was "exceptional" and would not be followed

by a bilateral air accord. Since London had now sanctioned a German Navy almost as large as the French and certain to be far more modern and efficient, Paris tended toward the view that France must resume complete liberty of action in naval matters.³³ Naval Minister Pietri said at Brest on June 27:

What has surprised us is the precipitate adhesion of England to this German act [of rearmament]—and this in conditions which might make us doubtful, not indeed of England's friendship, but of her traditional prudence. . . . [But] our diplomacy is in good hands. M. Pierre Laval, who guides it as the interest and honor of France demand, has an instinctive knowledge of how to combine the necessary respect for treaty texts with a legitimate sense of realities.³⁴

The compliment was unmerited and the confidence misplaced. Laval was already sabotaging "the necessary respect for treaty texts" in dealing with Italy, and Hoare was neither willing nor able to say him nay. Hoare, hard on the heels of Simon, was sabotaging treaty texts in dealing with Germany, and Laval could do nothing about it. Each accused the other of blindness and excused himself in the name of "realism." In a long programmatic speech on foreign policy before Commons on July 11, 1935, Sir Samuel came close to imitating *Der Führer*. He repeated comforting clichés and made promises which were soon to be dust. The difference was that Hitler persuaded others abroad to believe what he said and derived advantages from their belief, whereas Hoare persuaded nobody abroad and suffered humiliating defeat. At home he persuaded only his own party followers and certain muddled members of the Opposition. That he persuaded himself is doubtful.

The position assured to the French navy is one of great and solid advantage compared to its pre-War position. . . . The British Government took not only a wise course but the only course in the circumstances open to them. . . . It is no good blinking facts. . . . We all want an Air Pact . . . [but] we have got to take the situation as is, and to face facts as they are. . . . [As to Eastern Europe] there is no question of further [British] commitments. . . . I do none the less agree that a war started in the Centre or East of Europe might, indeed, judging by experience, probably would lead to a general conflagration. . . . This is the reason why the British Government is most anx-

ious to see an Eastern and a Danubian Pact of non-aggression concluded at the earliest possible moment. . . . We have to take the [German] Chancellor at his word. . . . Let him now therefore take the next necessary step forward, and help on the negotiation of the Eastern and Danubian Pacts. . . . A change in the status of Austria would shake the foundations of European peace. . . . As long as there is an effective League and a system of collective security, we are ready and willing to take our full share of collective responsibility. . . . We intend to maintain the pledges that we have given in our treaties and in the Covenant, and we are ready to work with Europe upon a basis of collective security.³⁵

All these words were empty and these intentions vain. Hitler declined to answer Hoare's note of August 1 on an air pact and explained in the autumn that such a pact was now out of the question since the Soviet air fleet might destroy Berlin if Germany accepted aerial limitations. The Eastern Pact and the Danubian Pact died. Hoare was to play a high but not honorable role in insuring the death of the League and of collective security. He and his colleagues served "peace" in the name of "realism," and in the name of "realism" they permitted the enhancement of German and Italian power to a point at which peace was to depend no longer upon British and French authority but upon the whims of the Cæsars.

Only one stark reality emerged from the developments of the spring of 1935.³⁶ It was the restoration of that which the First World War had been fought to destroy: the military might of Germany. Neither Hoare nor Laval, nor the Governments of which they were members, nor yet the peoples over whom those Governments ruled, were prepared to use the still immensely superior forces at their disposal to halt the onward march of the German military machine toward a position of potential supremacy. From this unwillingness to act to stop German rearmament flowed logically all the British arguments in favor of the bargain of June 18 and a hundred future arguments for a score of future bargains which would bring the Reich and its allies ever closer to Continental hegemony.

CÆSAR AFRICANUS

I. DUCE'S DILEMMA

Humanity is still and always an abstraction of time and space; men are still not brothers, do not want to be, and evidently cannot be. Peace is hence absurd, or rather it is a pause in war. There is something that binds man to his destiny of struggling, against either his fellows or himself. The motives for the struggle may change indefinitely, they may be economic, religious, political, sentimental; but the legend of Cain and Abel seems to be the inescapable reality, while "brotherhood" is a fable which men listen to during the bivouac and the truce. . . .

The Christian and Socialist "men be brothers" is a mask for the eternal and immutable "*homo homini lupus.*" . . . And man will continue to be a wolf among wolves for a bit of land, for a trickle of water, for a crumb of bread, for a woman's kiss, for a necessity or a caprice; he will continue to ignore others and to ignore himself.¹

THIS poetry of violence was written in 1920 by an ex-pacifist and ex-Socialist turned gang-leader and would-be Cæsar: Benito Mussolini. As fiery editor of the Marxist journal *Avanti* he had distinguished himself as one of the most able and ardent Italian apostles of revolutionary internationalism and proletarian revolt. But when war came and Italy remained neutral, he broke with his comrades and became an "interventionist." With the aid of French funds he founded a new paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, and devoted all his talents to converting his fellow citizens to the cause of armed participation in the struggle. Rome bargained to discover which side would promise more. Paris and London were more generous with the property of their foes than

Vienna and Berlin. By the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Italy was promised much. On May 24 the Italian Government declared war on Austria-Hungary and asked its subjects to sacrifice their wealth and blood in the name of "sacred selfishness."

Despite the débâcle of Caporetto (October 1917), Italy "won the war," in the judgment of most of its patriots and politicians. But at Paris, thanks to Wilsonian idealism and Anglo-French greed, Italy "lost the peace." The spoils of battle awarded to Rome were (to others) impressive: "Italia Irredenta" in the north, including Istria and Trieste plus the Austrian Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass (1919); Zara (1920), Lagosta (1922), and ultimately Fiume (1924) on the Adriatic; the Dodecanese Islands in the Ægean (1923) and confirmation of Italy's title to near-by Rhodes; and advantageous "rectification" of the frontiers of Libya, which had been wrested from Turkey in 1911 in a war of aggrandizement which Socialist Mussolini had denounced bitterly as a criminal manifestation of capitalistic imperialism. But the scales of patriotic diplomacy, where honor and prestige are weighed along with provinces, peoples, and the tangible pawns of power, are like the scales of "social justice" with which economic classes weigh the benefits and deprivations which they derive from their position in the human herd. In both cases satisfaction or dissatisfaction is not a function of what is got, but a function of the relationship between what is got, what is expected, and what others get. By these scales Italy was "cheated" at Versailles. The victorious kingdom, like the defeated Reich, became a resentful nation of "inferior rights" and an unsatiated State bent upon glory and revanche.

This obsession of frustration and defeat lay behind the rise and triumph of Fascism under Mussolini's leadership. Fascism is a phenomenon of the defeated and frustrated. It is a phenomenon of marginal classes and marginal nations, of those driven by debasement and fear into hatred and malice for the supposed authors of their anxieties. It is a phenomenon of national impotence and social decay. The impotent worship power. Those who are weak and afraid conceal their self-pity in creeds of virility and brutality. Those who are dissolute and disintegrating become preachers of order, hierarchy, discipline. Italy was the smallest, weakest, and poorest of the "Great Powers." Therefore Italian patriots were outraged. Italy suffered much from class war and incipient social revolution. Therefore Italian aristocrats, plutocrats, and petty burghers were terrified and indignant. They sought escape from weakness and from the necessity of taking thought

in the middle-class militarism of marching Blackshirts. They took refuge from their insecurities in a new cult of national Narcissism. They sought solace for their fear of responsibility in a despotism which asked nothing of them but obedience. They looked to a Cæsar for salvation. After the "March on Rome" (October 28, 1922) the chief beneficiary of these aspirations was Benito Mussolini.

Like Hitler and all other successful Cæsars of the petty bourgeoisie, Il Duce was himself the incarnation of the tortured ambivalences of the multitudes who flocked to his banner. He had once found Socialism "the greatest drama which mankind is enacting for the purpose of rising above its animal nature and reaching a humanitarian level." But love for humanity turned easily to hatred. "You hate me because you love me," he shouted to the Socialists who deposed and expelled him from the party in 1914. He, too, was moved to hate what he had loved and to love what he had hated, partly by bribery and more by intolerable inner tensions and contradictions. A mankind which had so long denied his importance was by definition a mean and paltry species. Had not Machiavelli and Nietzsche and Sorel said as much? And it was unstable, fickle, and therefore base. "I haven't a friend. And I cannot have one. First because of my temperament, and secondly because of the opinion I hold of my fellow men. That is why I dispense with intimacies and conversation."²

This son of a Socialist agitator revolted against authority and thereby came to pay it reverence. In his youth he was teacher, bricklayer, starveling, political exile, companion of anarchists, and inmate of prisons. Wounded in soul as a rebel, wounded in body as a soldier, he escaped from suffering in a creed of hardness and a vision of himself as Superman.³ Of him could better be said what Anatole France once said of Poincaré: "He is so cowardly that he is capable of any act of courage." His timidity begot a cult of heroism.⁴ His pacifism turned into militarism, his republicanism into monarchism, his Marxism into anti-Marxism, his liberalism into fierce revulsion against democrats, internationalists, humanitarians, Freemasons, and (belatedly) Jews. Millions found comparable comfort and catharsis from agonizing confusion and doubt in disowning what they had once believed and believing what they had once deemed vicious or mad. And in their faith Mussolini found his destiny: "Yes. I am possessed by this mania—to be *someone*. It inflames, gnaws, and consumes me, like a physical malady. I want to make a mark on history with my will, like a lion with his claws."⁵

Here, as in every subsequent Fascism, Cæsar was driven toward paths of glory by personal ambition, by the visions of his intoxicated followers, and by the creed of "heroic" violence in the name of which he came to power.⁶ But the subtraction of all these elements from the equation would still have left a formula of aggrandizement by force. And this not only because of Italy's "inferior" position as a Great Power.⁷ External violence was here a product of internal pressures. Cæsar ruled a realm in which the rich and well-born paid Cæsar tribute for the privilege of grinding the faces of the poor. The stabilization of the lira in 1927 at an over-valued rate precipitated such deflation and unemployment as to plunge Fascist Italy into the Great Depression a full two years before the rest of the capitalistic world. The steady fall of wages and living-standards confronted the regime with a problem of ever more acute misery at the bottom of the social ladder.⁸ "How to be happy, although the mother of twelve ever-hungry children?" asked Signora Teresa Loffredi, champion *Madre Prolifica* of the province of Rome in the parturition sweepstakes of 1934. She answered her question in the one room where she and her offspring and her unemployed husband lived: "Have more children. My children are my greatest and almost my only joy. Having more, and my husband's finding a job, are the things I want more than anything else. Only with no work it is so difficult to feed them."⁹

A Cæsar who cannot supply bread must supply circuses. Fascism's principal contribution to the arts of governance is its all but invincible technique of inspiring its victims and devotees with such fanatical faith in their tribal destiny that they suffer poverty gladly and forget their hunger in dreams of nation, race, and empire. Critics are best silenced not by coercion but by conversion. Conversion is most easily achieved by mobilizing all the resentments of *les misérables* against scapegoats at home and enemies abroad. Preparation for war is the most effective device for enlisting obedience from the masses—for in the simple dichotomy of Mars, "We" must all stand together and "They" are the foes of us all. When this trick is turned, all patriots are bound to hail Cæsar as conqueror and savior. Criticism then becomes treason. Obedience is a virtue above all virtues. Self-sacrifice is the highest duty.

Il Duce learned this lesson early. In 1923 he ordered his cruisers to bombard the Greek island of Corfu in defiance of the League and in vengeance for General Tellini, murdered on the Greek-Albanian frontier. Fifteen orphan children died under the hail of shells. But all Ital-

ian patriots were thrilled. Fascist "honor" was vindicated. Mussolini once wrote: "The Fascist State is a will-to-power and an Empire. The Roman tradition is the idea of force. In the Fascist doctrine, the imperial idea is not only a territorial, military, and mercantile expression, but also one of spiritual and moral expansion. For Fascism, the tendency to the imperial idea means expansion of the nation and is a manifestation of vitality."¹⁰ The price of loyalty was forever the image of Fascismo defiant, threatening the democratic world. "The struggle between two worlds can permit no compromise. . . . Either we or they! Either their ideas or ours! Either our State or theirs!"¹¹

For years Il Duce had warned his subjects that the half decade between 1935 and 1940 would be an epoch of conflict, and that 1935 in particular would be Italy's year of destiny. Italians believed. They sweated and slaved and starved to amass guns and troops for the millennium. But Cæsar's problem was one of choosing a safe target. "Live dangerously" was the Fascist creed. But prudence forbade any challenge to giants. Fascist Italy was without allies. There were satellites: the puppet protectorate of Albania and, after 1934, unhappy Austria and truncated Hungary. These pygmies, however, carried no weight in the balance of power. France and Britain controlled the Mediterranean with overwhelming force. Either one alone could hopelessly outarm Italy, whatever the tempo of Fascist preparedness. Across the Adriatic was Yugoslavia. But behind Yugoslavia stood France. In the east was Turkey. But behind Turkey stood the Soviet Union. Neither Britain nor France, moreover, would tolerate Italian conquest in the eastern Mediterranean—as yet. Where to find a victim?

That the choice fell finally upon the only native kingdom of Africa which still retained its independence was not the result of any sudden decision nor yet the consequence of any grievance or dispute. It was a product of a rankling memory four decades old and of elaborate and secret calculations over a period of years. The Coptic Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia, of late rechristened with its ancient name of Ethiopia, was ruled by the proud and warlike Amharas. They had beaten back all foreign conquerors since the days of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, from whom the reigning dynasty traced its descent. The kingdom remained primitive, feudal, and barbarous in its contented darkness. Roman legions, mailed crusaders, and modern colonial expeditions had shunned the great citadel of the Ethiopian plateau or beat in vain against its ramparts. Young Italy, seeking solace after the French seizure of Tunis in 1881, attempted the conquest of Ethiopia

fifteen years later—with the blessings then of Britain, and the hostility of France. But the hordes of the Emperor Menelik cut the invaders to pieces at Adowa on March 1, 1896, and the venture was ignominiously abandoned.¹²

The resumption of the enterprise by Fascismo was rendered difficult by the awkward circumstance that Italy, in common with other Powers, had solemnly sworn to respect Ethiopia's independence and had pledged itself with equal solemnity to renounce war as an instrument of policy. In the Treaty of Peace signed at Addis Ababa on October 26, 1896, Italy recognized "the absolute and unreserved independence of the Empire of Ethiopia as a sovereign and independent State." In 1897 Italy concluded a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship with Ethiopia and agreed to delimit the frontiers between Ethiopia and Italy's colonial possessions: Eritrea to the northeast and Italian Somaliland to the southeast. On December 13, 1906, Britain, France, and Italy signed a compact to maintain the political and territorial status quo and to make "every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia" in the event of any disturbance of that status quo. By the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Italy was promised "compensations" along the frontiers of Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland in case of British and French acquisitions in Africa at the expense of Germany. The compensations, however, were not to be at the expense of Ethiopia, but at the expense of France and Britain. London made small cessions to Eritrea in 1924. In July 1934 Britain and Egypt ceded Italy an area of desert south of Libya.

In the interim Ethiopia had been admitted to the League of Nations in 1923—with the express support of Italy and France and in the face of some moralistic doubts from Downing Street, inspired by the persistence of slavery in the African kingdom. Italy therewith agreed not merely to respect but to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and the existing political independence" of Ethiopia. This did not prevent Rome and London from attempting two years later to make a deal for economic concessions at Ethiopia's expense. Addis Ababa, however, frustrated the scheme by adroit publicity and protest. An Italian-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship of August 2, 1928, concluded for twenty years, provided for "continual peace and perpetual friendship" and pledged Rome (Article 5) to "submit to a procedure of conciliation or of arbitration the questions which may arise between them, and which they may not be able to decide by the normal processes of diplomacy, without having recourse

to force of arms." In July 1926 Ethiopia ratified the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which Italy had ratified in June 1921. In September 1934 Ethiopia accepted the "optional clause" for the compulsory adjudication of legal disputes. Italy had ratified it in September 1931. In February 1929 Italy ratified the Pact of Paris for the renunciation of war which Ethiopia had ratified in November 1928. In March 1935 Italy accepted the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Ethiopia had already accepted it in September 1931.¹³ On March 14, 1934, moreover, Italy—alone among the European Great Powers—adhered to the Argentine Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of October 10, 1933. This instrument established procedures of peaceful settlement through Conciliation Commissions and pledged the parties to non-recognition of "the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories which may be brought about by force of arms" (Article 2). The first Article declared:

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or those with other States, and that the settlement of disputes or controversies of any kind that may arise among them shall be effected only by the pacific means which have the sanction of international law.¹⁴

The Kingdom of Italy was thus bound by at least nine treaties to safeguard Ethiopia's integrity and independence or to submit disputes with Ethiopia to conciliation, arbitration, or adjudication. As late as September 29, 1934 Rome announced: "Italy does not have any intention that is not friendly toward the Ethiopian Government, with whom we are bound by the treaty of friendship of 1928."¹⁵ No such solemn commitments stood in the way of the first attempt at conquest in 1896. Now, however, despite mock heroics and dreams of glory, Fascist Italy had deliberately pledged itself to membership in a new international order. That order was based upon the renunciation of conquest and the rule of law between sovereignties. "No nation," asserted Woodrow Wilson, "should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."¹⁶ Democratic Italy had agreed. Fascist Italy had agreed. Seven of the nine treaties forbidding aggression against Ethiopia had been negotiated, signed, and ratified by the regime of Mussolini.

How then embark upon war? Does not "national honor," of which

Fascist ideologues are so jealous, require the nation to honor its word—at least when the word is nine times pledged? Quite the contrary. Machiavelli had written in *The Prince* (1513): “A prudent prince cannot and ought not to keep his word, except when he can do it without injury to himself or when the circumstances under which he contracted the engagement still exist.” Fascismo denied equality among individuals, races, nations, and States—not merely equality of capacity or achievement, which none assumes, but equality of rights, which Western civilization has striven for a thousand years to establish. There is one measure for the Supermen and another for the lesser breeds without the law. Il Duce would discover that “circumstances” had changed, that Ethiopia was after all not a State but merely barbarism, that Ethiopia had no rights, and, *mirabile dictu*, that Italy not only would be violating no obligations in undertaking the conquest, but would be fulfilling those obligations in the most effective fashion. The creed was war:

War that brings grief to hearts otherwise closed, that leads to risks and abysses, that puts death before all our eyes, is the great revealer of the most jealously hidden truths. For only at the sight of death does the soul of man go deep and awake in its simplest essence; it is exalted in heroism or it is spent in the ignominy for which it is made and where none without the irresistible event would have cast it. War is justice, nobility, and brotherly pity.¹⁷

There is no evidence that Il Duce or his advisers were at any time deterred from their enterprise by solicitude for Italian treaty obligations. But they devoted much thought to the question of power. Disciples of violence who never comprehend the language of law always comprehend the language of force. There were those who advised that Britain and France would not permit the conquest. Their reasoning seemed sound. Ethiopia, like Persia, Afghanistan, and Siam, had stood at the focal point of rival imperialisms and enjoyed independence because no rival would permit another to snatch the prize. Britain controlled Suez and Aden at either end of the Red Sea. Britain controlled British Somaliland on the shore of the Gulf of Aden, Kenya Colony to the south, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to the west of Ethiopia. The Blue Nile, source of water and wealth for Egypt, arose in Lake Tana in western Ethiopia. For reasons of imperial security, Britain could not permit Italian control of Ethiopia. France also had imperial interests forbidding assent. The only railway in Ethiopia was

under French control. It ran from Addis to the sea at Djibuti, capital of French Somaliland, strategically situated on the Gulf of Aden south of Eritrea.

The Quai d'Orsay, moreover, had rested its entire position in Europe and in the world since 1919 upon the sanctity of treaties and upon the guarantees of the Covenant. Paris could not permit that position to be jeopardized by allowing Rome to reduce such commitments to scraps of paper. In 1914 both Britain and France had accepted war with a Great Power far more formidable than Fascist Italy in preference to permitting the reduction of treaties to "scraps of paper" through the lawless conquest of a small State. Twenty years later every consideration of national and imperial self-interest dictated a similar course—the more so as Paris and London could halt the contemplated murder of Ethiopia without risk of war simply by warning Rome in due time that they would close the Suez Canal to Italian troops and would, if necessary, blockade Italy from Gibraltar.

The advisers of Cæsar who took this view had all history and all logic on their side. Yet Il Duce came to a different conclusion, which, when tested, proved to be sound. Why did he decide that Britain and France would not in the end say him nay? Documentary data on his reasoning are not yet available. But certain surmises are possible. He noted that Paris and London had acquiesced in Japan's conquest of Manchuria rather than risk friction with Tokio, and that some responsible British and French statesmen, with the apparent support of their publics, had even welcomed this adventure in conquest. He noted that the leaders of France seemed to value the Covenant, the Pact, and the whole machinery of banning aggression only as French weapons against Germany, not as a public law of the world society. Promises of Italian aid against the Reich would, he felt, evoke French approbation of the Italian adventure in Africa.

Britain, reasoned Mussolini, would oppose whatever threatened British imperial interests. But if he respected British rights, the Tories would risk no clash with Fascismo. They admired it too much. He did not perceive that the British public might insist on a different definition of British interests. But he assumed that the British public, like all masses in democracies, was stupid and cowardly and irrevocably committed to peace. Downing Street for fifteen years had refused to accept any commitments (apart from the Covenant, which no one took seriously) requiring Britain to defend others in conflicts where British interests were not immediately endangered. And perhaps he

assumed that if the British public became inconvenient, the aristocrats and plutocrats of Toryism could find ways and means of circumventing its desires. These convictions may not have been formulated with such precision at Rome in 1933. But they were at least hunches. They were strengthened in the spring of 1935 by French refusal to halt the Third Reich and by British refusal to defend Austria or Czechoslovakia or anything east of the Rhine. These hunches were not merely a product of Fascist contempt for Liberalism. They revealed a deep intuitive insight into political motivations and dynamics in the democratic Powers. Here once more "Il Duce is always right."

The Fascist decision for war against Ethiopia was reached in secret some time during 1933. General Emilio de Bono, who was to be first Italian commander on the northern front, later revealed part of the tale with the consent and blessing of Mussolini. With all allowances for vanity and exaggeration after the event, his memoirs leave little doubt regarding motivations and timing. De Bono was sent to Africa in March 1932 to investigate and report. In September he accompanied the King to Eritrea. But "in 1932 nothing definite had as yet been settled as regards the character and method of a possible campaign against the probable enemy."¹⁸

By the autumn of 1933 all was settled. "The Duce had spoken to no one of the coming operations in East Africa; *only he and I knew* what was going to happen and no indiscretion occurred by which the news could reach the public."¹⁹ The question, said Mussolini, must be resolved "not later than 1936." Preparations were pushed during 1934. Colonel Ruggero of the Bersaglieri was military attaché at Addis Ababa, where he built up "a special network of reliable informers" to spy upon and corrupt the Ethiopian chieftains.²⁰ He was now appointed head of the political bureau of the High Command in Eritrea. As Minister for Colonies, de Bono sailed once more for Africa on January 7, 1934, after the incident at Wal-Wal had furnished a pretext. He reported that the Negus would not attack. Mussolini replied in a letter of February 26, 1935: "In case the Negus should have no intention of attacking us, we ourselves must take the initiative."²¹

But even then there were doubts and fears. In June of 1935 Mussolini wrote de Bono in a "very secret note" that "if we got into trouble with the English we would naturally be obliged to renounce our offensive action and content ourselves in the beginning with keeping to a defensive which would have insured the integrity of the colony. This was indispensable also to reduce consumption to a minimum,

because our supplies, with the closing of the Suez Canal and the probable superiority of the British fleet over our naval division, would have become more than problematical. But even in this to-be-deprecated case, Il Duce had decided to take the dare.”²² This “dare,” however, would be dangerous only if Britain and France acted together to save Ethiopia and the Covenant. If France did nothing, the risk would be less. If France also persuaded Britain to take no action beyond empty words and futile gestures, the risk would be still less. And if Britain and France together would “co-operate” by denying arms to Ethiopia, there would be no risk at all. The first contingency was probable, the second possible, and the third merely a wild hope. But all three were to be realized, thanks chiefly to Pierre Laval. Thus would Cæsar triumph over Ethiopia and over “the herd of bastards and fools and infinitely blind and ignorant multitudes”²³ who preferred peace to war and who thereby destroyed peace and insured their own defeat at the hands of the conqueror.

2. RESCUE BY LAVAL

If Louis Barthou was the last artisan of French security at the Quai d'Orsay, Pierre Laval was the first artisan of disaster. This butcher's son was born in Châteldon in the Auvergne. As a boy he drove a mail-coach, thereby demonstrating to innumerable commentators after the event that he displayed qualities of leadership at a tender age. He taught school and studied law in his youth and moved to Paris, where he became a labor lawyer in the proletarian suburb of Aubervilliers. His “indefatigable energy and his pungent and convincing eloquence”²⁴ were placed at the disposal of the Socialist Party. He began his parliamentary career by becoming Socialism's youngest deputy in the Chamber in 1914, elected from Aubervilliers in May. Like Mussolini, he was listed by his Government as a dangerous revolutionary at the outbreak of the First World War. Unlike Mussolini, he remained a pacifist and defeatist during the conflict. But in 1919, again like Mussolini, he became a political renegade by renouncing Socialism and moving toward the Right. He lost his seat in parliament (until 1924), but remained Mayor of Aubervilliers. He found it politically profitable (and this supplies a clue to his diplomacy) to flirt with Right and Left at once. He associated himself with Painlevé, Caillaux, and Briand, who awarded him the Ministry of Justice. He also culti-

vated André Tardieu. By such devices he rose at the age of forty-six to the Premiership (January 26, 1931–February 16, 1932). He also held the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a month in 1932 and resumed it upon Barthou's death, coupling it once more with the Premiership in June 1935.

Laval was a squat, dark, and dopey figure—thick-lipped, heavy-lidded, with discolored teeth and forever a white tie, often unwhite because unwashed. He was reputed to be enormously wealthy. He affected a certain ignorance and naïveté, which were possibly not altogether affectations.²⁵ He was a devout Catholic and more than half a Fascist, for he spoke approvingly of the *Croix de Feu* and tolerated its infractions of the law. But he sought also to retain the respect of his erstwhile friends. Wits noted that his name read the same from left to right as from right to left. He was denounced by Franklin-Bouillon as pro-German and defended by Tardieu as pro-Italian. He was praised by Henri de Kerillis as the ally of Fascismo and condemned by Pertinax as the betrayer of France's eastern allies. His vanity caused him to regard himself as the only statesman capable of building "peace." His famed Auvergne cunning reflected itself in clever deals which proved usually to be blunders and sometimes to be irreparable catastrophes.

The secret of Laval's diplomacy—if his record deserves such a name—was his stubborn pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of Italian support for France against the Reich. For this mirage he was prepared to sabotage the Soviet Pact (not because Rome demanded this, but because he feared and hated the bog of Bolshevism). He was equally ready to betray the League of Nations, collective security, and all the foundations of public law and French power in Europe. He sought to buy French security by giving Mussolini a free hand in Africa and by giving Hitler a free hand in Central Europe. In so doing he infuriated Geneva, London, Prague, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Moscow and in return obtained—nothing. His purchase, indeed, was worth less than nothing, for his bargain drove Il Duce squarely into the arms of Der Führer and left France all but defenseless and alone in the face of an overwhelming combination of foes.

This suicidal folly was in some measure the product of Laval's obscure relations with the extreme Right and the French Fascist Leagues. These groups, claiming a monopoly of patriotism, were subsidized from Rome and Berlin and were always ready to sell out the security of the Republic in order to serve the interests of the classes

they represented and the purposes of the foreign Cæsars who helped call them into being. They hailed Laval's deal with Mussolini as an invaluable aid in fighting the People's Front and subverting French democracy.²⁶ They cheered Mussolini's war to the echo and became particularly vociferous after Laval succeeded Flandin in the Premiership on May 31, 1935. In December Laval sought to frustrate legislative efforts to disarm the private armies and to penalize incitements to murder. He played a role in obtaining the "voluntary" disarmament and dissolution of the Leagues—on condition of similar action by the Socialists and Communists, who had no private armies in the genuine sense. Repressive legislation was enacted, however, and went into force on January 12, 1936. Following a vicious attack with stones and clubs upon Léon Blum on February 13, perpetrated by Royalist rowdies, a decree dissolved the *Camelots du Roi*, the *Ligue d'Action Française* and the Fascist Students' Federation. On June 18 the *Croix de Feu*, the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, and the *Solidarité Française* were also dissolved. French democracy was saved, at least temporarily, in spite of Laval. But in the field of foreign affairs the Leagues had already performed well the function expected of them by Mussolini and Hitler—and Laval.

But much of the Center and Left also blessed Laval's folly through ignorance, stupidity, or sheer panic-stricken betrayal. It was to be expected that Henri de Kerillis in the *Echo de Paris* should worship Mussolini as a god and, despite his Catholicism, should refuse to publish a Catholic protest against Italian aggression signed by Jacques Maritain, Paul Claudel, François Mauriac, and others. It was to be expected that *Le Matin* (September 17, 1935) should publish with approval its correspondent's impressions of Cæsar: "His lips smile, and at moments there is such sweetness in his eyes that I can realize only too well why those who once felt this look upon them should now be devoted to the Duce unto death." It was to be expected that the entire Right press should scream: "Sanctions are war!" and that the *Action Française* should demand the assassination of all Left deputies if war should come with Italy. But some wondered why Pertinax should write (July 23, 1935): "We have a great desire to help Italy"; why Geneviève Tabouis in *L'Œuvre* (July 23) should urge that the Powers ought to balk unanimity in the League and leave Italy free to begin war without endangering Geneva; why the Left press should also oppose sanctions; and why the muddled Blum should bless Laval's bargain with Cæsar: "We [the Socialists] voted for the ratification of

the Rome agreements, because we believe this to be in the interests of peace. . . . We could not refuse to approve a diplomatic act which we should have carried out ourselves had we been in power." 27

Barthou's successor deferred the contemplated visit to Rome in the autumn of 1934. Laval encountered difficulties in the way of his projected Roman peace because of Cæsar's insistence upon colonial concessions. *The Times* of London (December 31, 1934) declared it "really unthinkable that so beneficial a settlement" could be "held up by a minor colonial difference." Laval was especially anxious to consummate his rapprochement with Italy before the Saar plebiscite. He resolved to beard the Duce in his den. On the evening of January 3 he took a train for Rome. He was personally welcomed by Mussolini. There were four meetings on the 5th, 6th, and 7th. At the third session Laval spent the midnight hours alone with Cæsar in the Palazzo Farnese, after an official banquet given by the French Ambassador, the Count de Chambrun. Here it was that the accord was completed. The final session was devoted to signatures and felicitations.

The complex Laval-Mussolini agreement of January 7, 1935 contained provisions already reviewed relating to Austria and armaments. A Protocol on Tunis specified that Italian children born in the French colony between 1945 and 1965 would be free to choose French nationality and would be subject to French law after the later date. This abrogated prospectively the convention of September 28, 1896, by which France had perpetuated Italian nationality and Italian schools in Tunis. The heart of the agreement, however, lay in a declaration on economic collaboration in Africa and a treaty on African frontiers. By the former instrument Mussolini got 7% (2,500 out of 34,500) of the shares of the Djibuti-Addis railway, disguised as "collaboration" to develop inter-colonial relations. By the latter, Laval paid a second installment on the frontier "rectifications" which had been promised at London in 1915 and had been initiated in 1919 when Italy secured Jubaland from Britain and certain territories in the desert hinterland of Libya from France. Rome now released Paris from all further obligations to compensate Italy for the African spoils of Versailles and accepted in full settlement two new areas: (1) a small triangle between French Somaliland and Eritrea comprising 13½ miles of coast and 309 square miles of desert; (2) 44,000 square miles of desert south of Libya in the Tibesti mountains. The first region had no inhabitants. It subsequently appeared that the second had sixty-six—who, said Il Duce, "had to be searched for like a needle in a haystack and were eventually

found tucked away in an isolated valley.”²⁸ Mussolini herewith renounced his designs on French North Africa, French Somaliland, and Lake Chad and accepted worthless deserts in final payment.

On the face of the bargain Il Duce had extorted little from the butcher's son. The agreement on Tunis was an Italian concession to France. The railway shares by themselves were of no consequence. The African territories transferred were valueless. If Mussolini got little, he gave less. The defense of Austria was of more concern to Rome than to Paris. To “consult” was innocuous. To “concert” in case of German repudiation of disarmament obligations was also innocuous. If Laval apparently gave little, he unquestionably got less than he gave. He supposed that he had got Italian support against the Reich. He had in fact got nothing. He said he had got “peace.” In reply to Mussolini's toast at the Palazzo Venezia on January 5 he declared: “Peace must be maintained and consolidated. Our civilization must not be allowed to disappear. Let us give an ear to the lesson of the past: it is always through war that civilizations have foundered.”²⁹

But below the surface of the bargain, Laval had performed a great service to Mussolini if not to civilization. In return for Italian diplomatic support (which Il Duce subsequently delivered not to Paris but to Berlin) the French Foreign Minister bartered away Ethiopia's right to life. The accord's inner meaning, which explains in full the mystery of Il Duce's modest demands in other matters, was an assurance of French acquiescence in Cæsar's plans of conquest.³⁰ It is improbable that any formal document to this effect was signed. No document was necessary. Mussolini felt that he could count on Laval's unwritten word, for Laval was so fascinated by his mirage that he could reasonably be expected to pursue it to its empty end and beyond. Documents would be dangerous, for Laval would be ruined if he ever admitted to parliament or public that he had agreed in advance to sabotage and betray the League upon which most Frenchmen still based their hopes of security. He took pains to deny emphatically all such allegations:

As for Ethiopia [he told the Senate on March 26, at the time of ratification] it has been asked whether I may not have forgotten the role of friend and protector which France has always played toward her. I reply that I have forgotten nothing, and that on this point I have not conceded anything with which I

could be reproached. Nothing in the Rome agreements tampers with the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, as these are guaranteed by the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement of the 13th of December 1906, and also—it should not be forgotten—by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

There was nothing [he declared to the Chamber on December 28, 1935] either in the agreements or in the conversations which preceded or followed them that could encourage Italy to resort to war. I am too deeply attached to peace not to want it to be universal and not to be aware that it is fragile. . . . I should have been imprudent, and perhaps even culpable, if I had smoothed the path for some adventure or other in Africa which would deprive us of the presence and the assistance of our neighbor in Europe.

Laval's own language belied his words. He was concerned only with the "presence" (and "assistance") of Fascist Italy, not with that of Ethiopia or the League. Yet the public believed and permitted itself to be duped with the thought that Cæsar was now the ally of France. The Little Entente expressed "satisfaction." The Balkan Entente hoped that the Eastern Pact would now be pushed. Moscow was suspicious. Downing Street gave its blessing. Paris and Rome exchanged military, naval, and air missions in the spring. General Maurice Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff, visited Marshal Badoglio in July. Badoglio visited Gamelin in September and inspected the Maginot Line. Rumors bespoke joint military action to protect Austria. New commercial accords were signed. Laval spared no pains to propagandize the new friendship. Mussolini was quite willing to co-operate in spreading the delusion that Paris had acquired a new "ally." For Il Duce it sufficed that Laval's folly gave him a free hand against Ethiopia.

Even before the agreement was signed Mussolini had found his pretense for aggression, though he was later to abandon it and act without a pretext. On December 5, 1934, Italian and Ethiopian troops clashed at Wal-Wal, a water-hole in the Ogaden desert, 60 miles within Ethiopia from the paper frontier with Italian Somaliland drawn by a treaty of May 16, 1908. This undemarcated line was 180 miles from the shore of the Indian Ocean and was parallel to the coast. Wal-Wal was 240 miles from the sea.⁸¹ But Rome had insisted that it was Italian and had occupied it in 1928. The occupation was uncon-

tested until 1934, when Ethiopian troops, escorting an Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission, challenged the Italian garrison. Tanks and planes drove them off with 130 dead and many wounded. Addis Ababa had protested to Rome on December 6, before it had news of the fighting. Three days later it proposed arbitration under the treaty of 1928. Mussolini replied on December 11 with a demand for a formal apology, a salute to the Italian flag, damages of 200,000 thalers, and the punishment of the Ethiopians responsible for the "attack."

The African kingdom which was thus challenged by Cæsar to combat was symbolized to the outer world by the figure of its sovereign: Ras Tafari Makonnen, crowned in 1930 as Haile Selassie (Amharic for "Power of Trinity"), Negus Negusti or King of Kings, Chosen of God, and Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah. Though small of stature and slight of frame, he bore himself with royal dignity. His thin face, brown and bearded, revealed intelligence and courage. Almost single-handed, he was striving against formidable obstacles to modernize his semi-barbarous feudal realm. His eight million subjects of mixed Semitic and African origin had lived for three millennia in a static society under their tribal chieftains or Rases, knowing little of the outer world below their high plateau and beyond the burning deserts which ringed the table-land. From time to time they had fought off invaders. For the rest, they lived in the pastoral simplicity they had always known, accepting slavery and syphilis, cruelty and penury, with the same untutored assent which they brought to their archaic Christian creed and to their feasts and dances. They resisted change. And Haile Selassie, who knew the outer world, feared that without change they might suffer an enslavement by alien empire-builders far worse than enslavement to their own ancient ways. He strove mightily and with slow success to equip them for living and for defending themselves in the twentieth century. Given time, he would doubtless have succeeded in his task, as the new rulers of China were succeeding. But as the militarists of Tokio would give China no time to secure itself against conquest, so the militarists of Rome would give no time to Haile Selassie to save his realm from the plunderers.³²

The Negus supplemented his native shrewdness by summoning foreign advisers to his sprawling ramshackle capital. General Vergin of Sweden and M. Auberson of Switzerland stood him in good stead. His most trusted adviser was Everett Colson, an American who had had diplomatic and financial experience in China, Washington, Wall Street, and Haiti.³³ France he rightly suspected. He also viewed with

suspicion Sir Sidney Barton, the British Minister, who had been Consul-General in Shanghai and had played a role in precipitating the fatal break between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in 1927. Barton advised him not to carry his dispute with Rome to the League, but when Mussolini, on December 14, 1935, refused arbitration of the Wal-Wal conflict, Haile Selassie appealed to Geneva.

Prolonged and inconclusive correspondence ensued throughout the winter and spring while Il Duce poured troops and guns and tanks and planes through Suez to Eritrea and Somaliland. The League's Secretary-General, Joseph Avenol, was not above conniving in Laval's plot. Downing Street also discouraged and obstructed all action at Geneva. In January³⁴ Teclé Hawarite, Ethiopian Minister in Paris, sought League action to preserve peace under Articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant. Baron Aloisi, Italian representative at Geneva, was a polished diplomat of the old school who had served in Copenhagen, Bucharest, Tirana, Tokio, and Ankara and spent thirteen years in the Paris Embassy. He maneuvered shrewdly, never questioned his instructions, and realized at all times that sacrifice for a principle was a luxury too dear for Fascist diplomacy.³⁵ In his efforts to block action he was abetted by Avenol, Laval, and even Anthony Eden. The formula was "direct negotiation" under the treaty of 1928, while the legions prepared to strike. Italian equivocation caused Haile Selassie on March 16 to threaten to invoke Article 15. But Hitler had just denounced Versailles. The Stresa front was struggling to be born. Paris and London could ill afford to irritate Il Duce. At the end of January, moreover, Italy had suggested to Downing Street that negotiations be opened for the "mutual and harmonious development of British and Italian interests in Ethiopia."³⁶ The Foreign Office had secretly appointed the Maffey Committee to report on the effects upon British interests of a possible Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Despite this action, which was then unknown to Parliament and public, Simon blandly assured Commons (February 13) that there were no indications that Italy's military preparations were "aggressive in character." The leaders of both the Western democracies had no desire to fulfill their pledges to protect Haile Selassie at Geneva.

The "dispute" was thus allowed to drift. On March 22, 1935 Rome told Avenol that Italy would observe the 1928 treaty and was prepared to set up an arbitral commission if direct negotiations failed. Therefore "Article 15 of the Covenant cannot be applicable in this particular

case." New Ethiopian appeals were vain. On the eve of Stresa, Rome told Avenol that Italy was now ready to appoint a commission of arbitration. As for the Stresa Conference, Commons was told by Simon (May 1), by Hoare (August 1 and October 22), by Eden (October 23), and inferentially by Neville Chamberlain (April 6, 1936) that Ethiopia was not "officially" discussed. Clement Attlee declared on May 6, 1936 that the failure of the Government to discuss the issue at Stresa was "one of the most criminal blunders in the whole course of British diplomacy in these disastrous years." In fact it was discussed unofficially, and when Mussolini threatened to send no representative to the special Council meeting of April if the dispute appeared on the agenda, the Council agreed not to include it. Despite Ethiopian pleas, it was likewise omitted from the Council meeting of May on the ground that a "direct" settlement was imminent. Laval opined that Rome's acceptance of arbitration was a guarantee that no resort to force was contemplated. When someone asked MacDonald at Stresa: "And did you not discuss Abyssinia with Mussolini?" he replied: "My friend, your question is irrelevant."³⁷

May brought new anxieties to Addis Ababa. General Graziani was appointed commander in Somaliland. General de Bono became Commander-in-Chief. Italian troops and arms continued to pour through Suez. On May 7 Signor Lessona, Undersecretary for Colonies, declared that Ethiopia was incapable of keeping order and that Italy must settle the problem once and for all. Rome refused to include in the arbitration the crucial question of the location of the boundary and of title to Wal-Wal. Not until mid-May did Rome appoint members of the Commission (Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti and Signor Raffaele Montagna) and then it objected to Ethiopia's appointment of two neutral outsiders: Professor Albert de La Pradelle of the University of Paris and Professor Pitman Potter of Wisconsin and Geneva. On May 11 Ethiopia again requested Avenol to act under Article 15. Haile Selassie repeated the request on May 20 when the Council met. Mussolini had told his Senate on the 14th that no third Power could "arrogate the intolerable claim to intervene." Laval sought to block all action. But on May 25, 1935 the Council passed two resolutions, one asking Avenol to keep the members informed of the progress of arbitration and the other summoning the Council to meet again if the four arbitrators had not selected a fifth by July 25 and had not achieved a settlement by August 25. Aloisi accepted

Potter and La Pradelle, but rejected all suggestions that Rome should pledge itself to refrain from an attack or from further troop movements.

The strange "arbitration" which followed was indeed an irrelevancy.⁸⁸ Between the wolf and the lamb arbitration is impossible. Il Duce was willing to play out the farce, even at the sacrifice of his pretext, as a means of preventing further discussion at Geneva. The Commission met at Milan on June 6, but reached a deadlock by July 9 because the Italian members refused to discuss the question of title to Wal-Wal as a basis for assessing responsibility for the clash. Mussolini asserted at Sassari on June 11 that public opinion abroad was "a ridiculous puppet which will be burned up in the zeal of the Blackshirts." Simon and Hoare were indifferent, but their colleague Eden pressed for a settlement. On June 24 he came to Rome bearing gifts: Britain would persuade Ethiopia to cede part of Ogaden to Italy, and Britain would grant Ethiopia a 50-mile corridor, 12 miles wide, running to the sea at Zeila in British Somaliland. Mussolini at once rejected the proposal.

On August 3 the Council, yielding to Italian demands, instructed the Commission not to discuss frontier questions. It agreed to reconsider the issue on September 4. Laval continued to oppose all efforts to thwart Italy's designs or initiate Council discussion on the merits of the issue. Avenol, in an inspiration of doubtful brilliancy, arranged a cocktail party where Laval advanced new arguments against League action, quite bewildering to Teclé Hawaraite. Professor Gaston Jèze, who was advising the Ethiopian delegation, hinted that Ethiopia was in effect offered a choice between assassination and suicide. But it was made clear that the corpse must lie quiet during the wake.⁸⁹ At long last, the Commission selected a fifth member, Nicolas Politis of Greece. After successive perambulatory meetings in Milan, Scheveningen, Paris, and Berne, characterized by innumerable delays and obstructions on the part of the Italian members, the Commission handed down its conclusion on September 3. It held that neither Ethiopia nor Italy was responsible for the Wal-Wal conflict, and that therefore no damages were owing by either side to the other. The award was accepted by both litigants.

The "dispute" having thus been "settled," Mussolini marched to war.

3. FRAUD AND FORCE

The principal obstacle in the way of the smooth execution of Laval's program to propitiate Cæsar at Ethiopia's expense was the public of Great Britain. The "National Government," having been elected by fraudulent promises in 1931, did not represent that public. All the leading figures in the Cabinet, save Anthony Eden, were staunchly opposed to collective security and to any co-operative measures to restrain Fascist aggression in Africa or elsewhere. They persuaded themselves that no threat to imperial interests was involved in Mussolini's adventure. Except for public pressure, they would have yielded Ethiopia to Italy gladly. But their sense of domestic political realities and their desire to win another election by fraudulent promises caused them ultimately to pretend to embrace a policy which they privately opposed. The pretense was thin and their pledges to the public were soon broken. The result was cheap heroics and hypocrisy in the grand manner.

These subtleties were seemingly lost upon Il Duce. He had not yet learned that Britain's Tories were his best allies—better than Laval—in furthering his anti-British and anti-French aims. He failed to distinguish between motives or between public and politicians in England. He failed to anticipate that Baldwin would hoodwink the British electorate and give Laval full co-operation. He assumed instead that British opposition to his program must be a reflection of imperial greed and selfishness. His leading publicist, Virginio Gayda (*Giornale d'Italia*, May 22-4, 1935), simultaneously accused Britain of planning to attack Ethiopia and of supplying arms to Ethiopia! Later Gayda published the confidential report of the British Interministerial Commission headed by Sir John Maffey as a means of proving that British imperial interests were unthreatened by the Italian conflict. Eden told Commons (February 24, 1936) that Gayda had secured the report by "theft or disappearance," "through an indiscretion or a deliberate breach of confidence."

The report itself, dated June 18, 1935, is noteworthy. The Commission which issued it was appointed on the basis of a suggestion in a Foreign Office letter of March 6, 1935. This letter referred to the circumstance that in January Signor Vitetti, Counsellor of the Italian

Embassy in London, had "described the agreement on Ethiopia secretly reached at the beginning of that month between France and Italy." (That Laval was here revealed to be an unmitigated liar escaped general notice at the time.) The Foreign Office was quite clear that the Italian aim was "the virtual absorption of as much Ethiopian territory as can be absorbed without prejudicing Italian influence and interests in other parts of the world." This goal, concluded the Maffey Commission, need not be opposed: "No vital British interests exist in Ethiopia or its neighborhood sufficient to oblige His Majesty's Government to resist a conquest of Ethiopia by Italy. Italian control over Ethiopia would from some viewpoints be advantageous to Britain. . . . As far as local British interests are concerned, it is a matter of indifference whether Ethiopia remains independent or is absorbed by Italy. From the viewpoint of imperial defense, an independent Ethiopia is preferable . . . but the threat to British interests seems very remote and would only become real in the event of war between Britain and Italy which is an eventuality that presently seems very improbable." It would suffice for Britain to safeguard Egyptian interests in the waters of Lake Tana and grazing rights for the Somali tribes, either through annexation or agreement with Italy. The Open Door should also be assured. "It would be well to seize the occasion to obtain, if possible, rectification of the frontiers of British Somaliland, Kenya, and the Sudan border in order to incorporate in these territories localities that have ties of ethnical and economic affinity with them."⁴⁰

That the conclusions of this remarkable secret document met with the approval of Baldwin, Simon, Hoare, and Chamberlain is scarcely open to doubt. But the temper of British public opinion forbade any acknowledgment of the fact and precluded any implementation of the proposal to join Mussolini in the partition of Haile Selassie's kingdom. The temper of opinion was strikingly revealed to the Cabinet by the "British National Peace Ballot," launched in March 1934 by the League of Nations Union and carried out by a "National Declaration Committee," consisting of the Union and thirty-eight other organizations. Beginning November 12, 1934, at a cost of over twelve thousand pounds, this Committee polled the British public on its answer to five questions. Lord Cecil announced the verdict on June 27, 1935. The poll elicited 11,559,165 ballots and was accepted on all sides as an accurate expression of the views of the entire electorate. The result was as follows:

QUESTIONS	YES	NO	DOUBTFUL ABSENTIONS	
1. Should Great Britain remain a member of the League of Nations?	11,090,387	355,883	10,470	102,425
2. Are you in favor of an all-round reduction in armaments by international agreement?	10,470,489	862,775	12,062	213,839
3. Are you in favor of an all-round abolition of national military and naval aircraft by international agreement?	9,533,558	1,689,786	16,976	318,845
4. Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit be prohibited by international agreement?	10,417,329	775,415	15,076	351,345
5. Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by (a) economic and non-military measures?	10,027,608	635,074	27,255	855,107
(b) if necessary, military measures?	6,784,368	2,351,981	40,893	2,364,441 ⁴¹

This emphatic endorsement of collective security, involving a substantial majority for economic and even military sanctions against aggressors, produced an abrupt and almost comic reversal of program on the part of the Tory leaders. On July 27, 1934 *The Times* declared the ballot "a deplorable waste of time and effort." Simon and

Sir Austen Chamberlain attacked it in Commons on November 8. Baldwin at Glasgow, November 23, 1934, declared, in convenient oblivion of Stimson's initiative of 1932, that "a collective peace system, in my view, is perfectly impracticable in view of the fact today that the United States is not yet, to our unbounded regret, a member of the League of Nations and that . . . Germany and Japan have both retired from it. . . . Never as an individual will I sanction the British navy being used for an armed blockade of any country of the world until I know what the United States of America is going to do." ⁴² On June 28, 1935 *The Times* pronounced the result of the poll "impressive." On July 23 Baldwin, accompanied by Hoare and Eden, received Cecil and a deputation of the Committee and asserted that he accepted the result as a national declaration: "The foreign policy of the Government is founded upon the League of Nations. . . . We value this support. . . . The League of Nations remains, as I said in a speech in Yorkshire, 'the sheet-anchor of British policy.'" The National Government's election manifesto of November declared: "The League of Nations will remain as before the keystone of British foreign policy. . . . We shall therefore continue to do all in our power to uphold the Covenant and to maintain and increase the efficiency of the League. In the present unhappy dispute between Italy and Abyssinia there will be no wavering in the policy we have hitherto pursued."

The National Government, as will be shown below, had already made a compact with Laval to betray Ethiopia and the League of Nations. But since votes could obviously be gained by a pretense of loyalty to Geneva, Baldwin and his colleagues played the pretense for all it was worth. On September 5, by a vote of 2,962,000 to 177,000, the Trades Union Congress passed a resolution calling for the use of "all the necessary measures provided by the Covenant to resist Italy's unjust and rapacious attack." In the campaign preceding the parliamentary election of November 14, 1935, the Cabinet made wide use of a poster showing a fist (presumably that of Baldwin) planted squarely on the Covenant with the caption: "OUR WORD IS OUR BOND." In the polling the Government won 431 out of 615 seats. The Tories were thus assured of another five years in power by pretending to champion a collective security in which they had no faith whatever (and no intention of realizing), but which they knew that the electorate favored.

Tory connivance in Fascist aggression, here and elsewhere, presents a fascinating problem of motivation among a ruling class ready to

abandon national and imperial interests for the sake of its fear of Communism and secret admiration for the Cæsars. While few of the Conservative political leaders could ever bring themselves to speak their inner minds on the issue, this attitude—with a slight shift of symbols—was well expressed by the Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, Monsignor Hinsley, on October 13, 1935: "To speak plainly, the existing Fascist rule, in many respects unjust—it is one example of the present-day deification of Cæsarism and of the tyranny which makes the individual a pawn on the chessboard of absolutism—I say that the Fascist rule prevents worse injustices, and if Fascism—which in principle I do not approve—goes under, nothing can save the country from chaos. God's cause goes under with it."⁴³ Cardinal Schuster of Milan on October 28 hailed the valor of the Italian armies in "opening the doors of Ethiopia to the Catholic faith."⁴⁴ Pius XI belatedly cheered "the triumphal happiness of a great and good people" after the conquest (May 12, 1936). Tory leaders of Britain were not concerned with God's cause or the Catholic faith. But they were profoundly concerned with preventing any diminution of the power or prestige of the Italian Fascist regime. The failure of the Italian campaign or the subversion of that regime through League sanctions they regarded as a calamitous prospect, highly detrimental to the class interests and symbols which they themselves championed. Therefore, having won public approval by a pretense of opposing Fascist aggression, they bent all their efforts toward condoning that aggression and insuring the failure of international efforts to restrain it.⁴⁵

The treachery to come was anticipated in the Anglo-French efforts of the summer to buy off Mussolini. Paris assured Rome in mid-June that all Ethiopian offers to buy arms in France were being rejected. During the autumn French officials at Djibuti interposed every possible obstacle in the way of rail shipments into Ethiopia or the meagre war supplies which Haile Selassie's agents had been able to purchase elsewhere. In January 1936 all Ethiopian transit licenses through French Somaliland were refused, in return for an Italian pledge not to bomb the French-owned railway. Early in the summer of 1935 France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Denmark all imposed restrictions on arms exports to Ethiopia. All British licenses were withheld during the spring. On July 25 Hoare announced that "for the present" all arms licenses to Italy (which had no need of foreign arms) and to Ethiopia (which needed them desperately) would be refused. Haile Selassie complained bitterly but in vain: "The tendency to ac-

cept the principle that strong nations should be aided in this manner is in defiance of all the concepts of modern civilization and constitutes a retrogression.”⁴⁶ Meanwhile no obstacles of any kind were imposed in the way of Italy’s colossal shipments of troops and guns to Ethiopia’s frontiers. The British and French bondholders of the Suez Canal Company (with the British Government owning the majority of the shares) waxed fat, for Mussolini paid \$3.25 (10 gold francs) for every soldier and \$2.00 for every net ton of shipping through the Canal.

Anglo-French pleas to Mussolini had only one purpose: to induce Cæsar to accept as a gift that which he was seeking as a conquest of arms. Early in June Eden urged a pacific settlement under the 1906 treaty. Ethiopia would be induced by Anglo-French pressure to cede territories to Italy. Britain might make small territorial compensations to Haile Selassie. The Tory “Die-Hards” were indignant at such a thought. Il Duce sneered: “We have an old score to settle and a new score to settle and we shall settle them. . . . We shall imitate to the letter those who would now preach us a sermon but who have demonstrated that when they were creating and defending an empire, they took no account of world opinion.”⁴⁷ Haile Selassie asked the League on June 19 to send neutral observers to his frontiers.⁴⁸ Silence. Haile Selassie appealed to the United States to invoke the Pact of Paris. Washington offered “moral support”—and enacted the Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935, to bar American arms to victims of aggression and aggressors alike.

Foreign Minister Hoare told Commons on July 11 that “we have always understood and well understand Italy’s desire for overseas expansion.” But war as a means thereto was unnecessary. However, should Italy resort to war, it need have no fear of effective British opposition. “Let the members dismiss from their minds the rumor as altogether without foundation that we have asked the French Government to join in a blockade of Italy and that we ourselves are preparing some isolated form of coercion. . . . We stand for peace”—even with aggressors. Laval resisted all efforts to extend the scope of League action beyond the Wal-Wal arbitration, averring that with this the Council would have “fulfilled once more its great and noble mission.” But he was quite willing to attempt a diplomatic deal elsewhere, despite Mussolini’s declaration in the *Popolo d’Italia* of July 31 that the problem admitted of “but one solution”—“with Geneva, without Geneva, or against Geneva.”

A Three-Power Conference met in London on August 15, 1935. Eden and Laval sought to elicit from Aloisi a commitment to abstain from force and a definition of Italian demands. Aloisi refused both. Laval and Eden then submitted proposals of their own to Rome, providing for tripartite "collective assistance" to Ethiopia, "particular account being taken of the special interests of Italy." "We did not examine, but we did not in any way exclude the possibility of territorial adjustments to which Italy and Ethiopia might agree."⁴⁹ Haile Selassie had rejected all suggestions of an Italian "mandate" or sphere or protectorate, but was willing to consider economic concessions. Anglo-French-Italian "assistance," with Britain and France abstaining, would mean monopolistic Italian control of the exploitation of Ethiopia. Mussolini received this offer on August 16 as he reviewed departing troops. His reply of August 18 was a flat refusal even to discuss it. The Conference adjourned.⁵⁰

"If you offered me all of Ethiopia on a silver platter," Il Duce was reported to have told the French Ambassador in Rome, "I would refuse it, for I have resolved to take it by force." Armed aggression was now a certainty. There was official talk in Britain of upholding the Covenant by applying sanctions, since this would be popular with the voters and an election was approaching. But no serious doubt was left in Mussolini's mind that this would be but a pretense. All arms were refused to Ethiopia by the Western democracies. When Haile Selassie protested and asked: "Is that real neutrality? Is it just?" he received no answer.⁵¹ Hoare had already told Commons on August 1 that the Government approached the problem "from the realist practical attitude. . . . It is easy and perhaps tempting to jump into the arena impetuously, throw down glove and challenge anyone who disagrees to fight. Supposing, however, that that attitude . . . would cripple the League for a generation to come? Rashness, however courageous it might be, would be folly to the point of criminal folly. . . . It is just because we realize the gravity of the situation that we are determined to take no rash steps which would make the situation irredeemable." Il Duce warned boldly on August 26 that "whoever applies sanctions against Italy will be met by the armed hostility of our country." Other Powers "should follow the example of the United States and leave us alone to fulfill our mission."⁵²

In a pathetic effort to appeal to Western cupidity, Haile Selassie at the end of August granted a vast seventy-five-year oil-prospecting concession to a British subject, Mr. F. W. Ricket of the African

Development and Exploration Company, incorporated in the United States in July as a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company. But Secretary Hull denounced this effort and Standard Oil abandoned it.

At the League Council meeting of September 4 Aloisi submitted a bulky memorandum full of verbal and photographic horrors demonstrating Ethiopian savagery, with special emphasis upon castration. He charged without humor that Ethiopia was planning to attack Italy, that it had "systematically violated all treaties concluded with Italy," and that it had placed itself "openly outside the Covenant of the League of Nations and made itself unworthy of the confidence given when it was admitted. Italy, rising up against such an intolerable state of affairs, defends her own safety, her own prestige, and the good name of the League of Nations." Dr. Jèze replied for Ethiopia and asked action under Articles 10 and 15. Aloisi walked out. Litvinov challenged the Italian thesis and declined to serve on a proposed Commission of Five on the ground that it was a subterfuge to enable League members to evade their responsibilities. The Council appointed the Commission (Britain, France, Poland, Spain, and Turkey), with Salvador de Madariaga as chairman, to seek a "pacific settlement." It held eleven meetings (September 7-24) while Mussolini and Ciano ridiculed its efforts. At Berlin on September 9 Hitler and the Italian Ambassador exchanged greetings and hinted at cooperation. The 16th League Assembly met on the same day and elected Eduard Benes as President. Only the newsreel photographers regarded Teclé Hawaraite as worthy of any attention. On Laval's advice, Benes, with the full support of the delegates, shunned the impending war which the League had been established to prevent. Three years later he was destined to find himself in the same position as Haile Selassie.

In the midst of these nicely calculated evasions Laval and Hoare had a private discussion on September 10 at which the line of Anglo-French policy toward Italy was determined. Hoare desired a pretense of "sanctions" for domestic electioneering purposes. Laval was opposed, but assented on condition that they be so devised as to be innocuous to the aggressor. "We found ourselves instantaneously in agreement upon ruling out military sanctions, not adopting any measure of naval blockade, never contemplating the closure of the Suez Canal—in a word, ruling out everything that might lead to war."⁸⁸ Undersecretary Cranborne later told Commons (March 2, 1936) that

Hoare had kept his hands free to consider other actions subsequently, but had agreed that sanctions should "in the first instance be confined to certain economic and financial measures. His Majesty's Government have repeatedly made it clear that they would not in any event take isolated action." Hoare thus gave Laval a veto on any more drastic pressures. Both men agreed to bar any measures which might halt Italian aggression and thereby provoke Italian retaliation. That Laval communicated this secret bargain to Rome is not open to doubt. Its terms were never deviated from in all that followed. The British voters knew nothing of it and assumed that their Government was in earnest in applying measures of "restraint" against Italy. But after September 10, if not before, Cæsar knew that he need have no fear of effective sanctions.

This compact of treachery was hidden behind a façade of words. Here the arts of mendacity reached new heights. On September 11, before the Assembly, Hoare championed "peaceful change" and freedom of access to raw materials. "The League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance" (some wits understood him to say "assistance") "to all acts of unprovoked aggression. . . . His Majesty's Government will be second to none in its intention to fulfill, within the measure of its capacity, the obligations which the Covenant lays upon it." Laval followed on the 13th: "France is faithful to the League Covenant. She cannot fail in her obligations. . . . No country has welcomed with greater satisfaction the word of the British Secretary of State than France. . . . At Stresa, with delegates of the British Government, we found the chief of the Italian Government animated with the same desire and the same determination to preserve the cause of peace. I know he is ready to continue this collaboration. . . . We are all bound by a solidarity which fixes our duty. Our obligations are inscribed in the Covenant. France will not evade those obligations."⁵⁴

Much of the world listened and believed. Even so shrewd an observer as "Augur" (Vladimir Poliakov) declared that Hoare had pledged to Laval full enforcement of the Covenant against Germany—"in Europe generally and in Austria particularly"—and that Laval in his turn had pledged French military support to Britain in the event of an Italian attack on the British fleet.⁵⁵ The British electorate and the French Left accepted as reality the façade which their leaders had erected. Mussolini knew otherwise.⁵⁶ After September's bargain all

else was prearranged. The elaborate procedure of empty threat and empty counter-threat was necessary only for the sake of appearances. Rome assailed sanctions: "We find it monstrous that a nation which dominates the world refuses us a wretched plot of ground in the African sun. . . . It is not a game of poker. . . . We shall go straight ahead. . . . Never from our side will come any hostile act against a European nation. But if one is committed against us, well, it means war." ⁵⁷ The deft was needless, save to convince Italians that their Duce was defying the world.

On September 18 the Commission of Five issued a plan for "international assistance to Ethiopia," i.e. Italian domination, while London and Paris reiterated their offer "to facilitate territorial adjustments." If possible the League was to be used not to defend Ethiopia but to assist Italy in exploiting it without the need of conquest. Litvinov, Titulescu, and Rüstü Aras denounced the plan. But negotiations regarding it proved brief. Haile Selassie, fearing complete desertion, expressed willingness to discuss the scheme. Mussolini pronounced it "derisory." He told G. Ward Price that he was not "a collector of deserts," that the Italian troops had not been sent "on an excursion trip" and that "there is no such thing as an Ethiopian nation." ⁵⁸ Aloisi declined to take the proposals to Rome. The Italian Cabinet officially pronounced them unacceptable on September 21. The Commission of Five admitted failure. ⁵⁹

On September 26 the Council set up a Committee of Thirteen to study and report. Two days later both Council and Assembly adjourned. Benes asserted that the League "is becoming a new moral, political, and even material force." At the same time Haile Selassie announced (September 28) that Ethiopian mobilization had become necessary, but that his Government would keep its troops away from the frontiers and was prepared to co-operate fully in the preservation of peace." An Italian Cabinet communiqué asserted that Ethiopia was making ready to attack while the League "locks itself in a formal labyrinth of procedure." ⁶⁰

On the eve of aggression Laval sought to obtain British commitments to aid France against Germany. On September 10 Ambassador Charles Corbin asked Sir Robert Vansittart whether Britain was prepared to apply Article 16 in the event of a resort to force in Europe. Hoare replied in a communication released on September 29. He noted that on September 11 at Geneva he had already observed that "the recent response of public opinion in this country showed how

completely the nation supported the government in its full acceptance of the obligations of League membership, which is oft proclaimed as the keynote of their foreign policy. . . . To suggest or insinuate that this policy for some reason was peculiar to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict would be a complete misunderstanding. Nothing could in fact be further from the truth. Any other view would at once be to underestimate British good faith and be an imputation upon British sincerity." But (and the "but" provided the desired loop-hole) Article 16 "is not made applicable as regards a negative act of failing to fulfill terms of a treaty. Further, in case of a resort to force, it is clear that there may be degrees of culpability and degrees of aggression, and consequently in cases where Article 16 applies the nature of the action appropriate to be taken under it may vary according to the circumstances of each particular case. . . . Elasticity is part of security. . . . The world is not static." British opinion will support the League as long as it remains effective. But risks must be collective. "So long as the League preserves itself by its own example, this government and this nation will live up to its full principle." ⁶¹

The curious and significant sequel to this exchange of views was little noted at the time. On October 2 Downing Street informed the Quai d'Orsay that Hitler had assured Sir Eric Phipps that Germany would not join Italy or attack France during the crisis. At the same time Ambassador Cerruti assured Laval that Italy would not respond to economic and financial sanctions by war, but would remain "on the defensive." The equation was simple: Laval and Hoare would keep sanctions on a level which could not impede the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Sir Eric Drummond, Earl of Perth and British Ambassador in Rome, had told Suvich on September 20 that British fleet movements in the Mediterranean were "not intended to imply any aggressive intentions." He repeated this assurance on September 23. In return for this service Mussolini offered his *quid pro quo*: no military retaliation against the feeble sanctions which must be faced. Meanwhile Hoare assured Hitler that Britain would not apply sanctions to German treaty-breaking and perhaps not even against German armed aggression. Hitler offered his *quid pro quo* in turn: no attack on France, no attempt to "draw profit from the present situation," no collaboration with Italy.

Here was a Four-Power Pact in disguise. These British and French pledges to Italy would be kept, since they involved successful deception of the British and French publics and only minor inconvenience

to Rome. Italian pledges to Britain and France would be kept, since war against Powers which (behind the sanctions mask) connived at Italian aggression would be at once an act of ingratitude and suicide. British pledges to Germany would be kept, since violation of them would involve a departure from a fixed Tory policy. German pledges to Britain would not be kept (except for the promise of no attack on France), because Hitler knew that Tory benevolence toward the Reich would never be changed as a result of German breaches of contract. Berlin and London had already fashioned an entente.

With the stage thus set, Il Duce marched. On October 1 he rallied his subjects with bells, sirens, and drums in a great national mobilization. From the Palazzo Venezia he bellowed to the multitude:

Blackshirts of the Revolution! Men and women of all Italy! Italians all over the world—beyond the mountains, beyond the seas! Listen! A solemn hour is about to strike in the history of the country. Twenty million Italians are at this moment gathered in the squares of all Italy. It is the greatest demonstration that human history records. Twenty million! One heart alone! One will alone! One decision! This manifestation signifies that the tie between Italy and Fascism is perfect, absolute, unalterable. Only brains softened by puerile illusions, by sheer ignorance, can think differently because they do not hear what exactly is the Fascist Italy of 1935. . . .

It is not only an army marching toward its goal, but it is forty-four million Italians marching in unity behind this army because the blackest of injustices is being attempted against them, that of taking from them their place in the sun. . . .

For thirteen years we have been patient while the circle tightened around us at the hands of those who wished to suffocate us. We have been patient with Ethiopia for forty years—it is enough now. Instead of recognizing the rights of Italy, the League of Nations dares talk of sanctions. But until there is proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the authentic people of France will join in supporting sanctions against Italy. . . .

And until there is proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the authentic people of Britain will want to spill blood and send Europe to its catastrophe for the sake of a barbarian country unworthy of ranking among civilized nations. Just the same, we cannot afford to overlook the possible developments of tomor-

row. To economic sanctions we shall answer with our discipline, our spirit of sacrifice, our obedience. To military sanctions we shall answer with militarism. To acts of war we shall answer with acts of war. . . .

Never, as at this historic hour, have the people of Italy revealed such force of character, and it is against this people, to which mankind owes its greatest conquest, this people of heroes, of poets, of saints, of navigators, of colonizers, that the world dares threaten sanctions. Italy! Italy! Entirely and universally Fascist! The Italy of the Blackshirt revolution, rise to your feet, let the cry of your determination rise to the skies and reach our soldiers in East Africa. Let it be a comfort to those who are about to fight, let it be an encouragement to our friends, and a warning to our enemies. It is the cry of Italy which goes beyond the mountains and seas out into the great world. It is the cry of justice and victory.⁶²

The mob went wild. Seven times Cæsar was called back to the balcony to salute. On October 2 Avenol received a telegram from Haile Selassie alleging Italian violation of the frontier in the province of Aussa and asking that League observers be sent from French Somaliland to verify the facts.⁶³ On October 2 Suvich denied the charge, but declared that Ethiopian mobilization expressed "the warlike and aggressive spirit of Ethiopia" which had "succeeded in imposing war" on Italy. This was "a direct and immediate threat to the Italian troops, with the aggravating circumstance of the creation of a neutral zone—announced in Addis Ababa with specious explanations—which is in reality no more than a strategic move intended to facilitate the assembling and aggressive preparations of the Abyssinian troops." Thus confronted with "aggression," the Italian High Command had been authorized "to take the necessary measures of defense."

On October 3 Ethiopia informed the Council that Italian planes had bombed Adowa and Adigrat and that a battle was in progress in Agame. Haile Selassie rallied his troops:

It is better to die free than to live as slaves. Soldiers, follow the example of your warrior ancestors. Young and old, unite to fight the invader. . . . Right up to the last moment we shall persist in our efforts for peace. If our repeated endeavors and good-

will fail, our conscience will be pure. God will defend the just cause of our country.⁶⁴

On October 4 at Rome official communiqué No. 11 announced that the army had crossed the frontier between Barachit and Meghea at 5.00 p.m. of the preceding day "in order to repulse an imminent threat from the Ethiopians" and had advanced twenty kilometers, overcoming "the enemy's covering forces which had not been withdrawn at all. . . . The opposition of the Ethiopian forces did not lead to an engagement, while the inhabitants greeted the entry of the Italian troops by waving white flags."⁶⁵ Mussolini declared: "I have reflected well; I have calculated all; I have weighed everything."⁶⁶ The legions of Cæsar were cheered as they went forth to conquest by a new code for Fascist warriors:

The march of armed Blackshirts beyond the frontiers of the fatherland is the fulfillment of human justice and the victory of civilization.

Who follows the path of justice and civilization makes a contribution of his life. . . .

BELIEVE, OBEY, FIGHT is no sooner said than done under the Fascist regime. Believe, because one knows that the Duce can never be wrong; Obey, because one knows that all orders come from him; Fight, because one knows that a battle under his orders means victory. . . .

At the first cracking of rifles the Blackshirts will see a mighty figure of the Duce. They will see him enthroned on the background of the sky behind the enemy, like a gigantic vision in a heroic dream of war. This will be the spiritual reality, meaning that the Blackshirts are terrible and splendid, ready to smash all resistance, bombs in hand, daggers between their teeth, and a sovereign disdain for danger in their hearts.⁶⁷

4. HOARE TO EDEN

The Fascist attack upon Ethiopia in October 1935 resulted in the first effort by the community of nations to apply economic and financial penalties on a world scale against a law-breaking and peace-breaking State. That effort in its initial stages was an inspiration and a vindication for all men and women everywhere who had in any degree

caught the vision which Woodrow Wilson incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations. The governments and peoples of the West had solemnly declared in 1919 and reiterated often thereafter that modern civilization could not be regarded as established and secure until the rule of justice through law should be achieved in the relations between nations. They had affirmed that this goal of an ordered world was obtainable through procedures of legislation, adjudication, and administration for the redress of grievances and the pacific adjustment of controversies. They had asserted the necessity of international agencies for the collective enforcement of peace in order that the weak should be protected against the strong, and the powerful should be induced by a superior power to submit to the ways of the law. They had denied that *Might makes Right* and insisted that *Right* must have *Might* at its disposal to enforce justice upon all. This dream of the Great Society had been shattered by default in 1931, but it still captured men's imaginations in many lands as the only alternative to chaos. The dream seemingly became a reality in the autumn of 1935. Millions demanded that justice be done through international sanctions against the aggressor and through collective defense of his victim. Millions waited in hope and fear upon the outcome of the enterprise.

These hopes were illusory and these assumptions false not because of any lacunæ in the Wilsonian logic, nor yet because of any lack of popular faith in the cause in the European democracies. The enterprise was doomed because the responsible political leaders of France and Britain had at no time any desire that it should succeed. Laval's folly placed Paris in league with the aggressor. France followed British "leadership" at Geneva with muffled drums and with every desire to halt the march of the minor Powers along the road to enforced peace. Britain's leaders sponsored sanctions not out of conviction and not out of any wish to see them succeed. Considerations of domestic political expediency drove them into a course which they had always denounced and desired to repudiate.

On October 5, 1935 the League Council met and discussed the report of its Committee of Thirteen (the Council minus Italy), which recommended that "any violation of the Covenant should immediately be brought to an end." It further appointed a Committee of Six to make recommendations. A note from Ethiopia requested the Council to declare that Italy had resorted to war within the meaning of Article 16 and to apply sanctions. "Ethiopia asks the League of Nations to

declare that treaties must be respected, that the pledged word must be kept, that wars of aggression must be outlawed, that force must give way to justice." At 4.00 p.m. on October 7 the Council received the report of its Committee of Six, which concluded that Italy had "resorted to war in disregard of its covenants." Aloisi protested. He had insisted that the invasion was "quite legitimate" and "even within the framework of the Covenant." Against his vote the Council adopted the reports of both Committees.⁶⁸ The Assembly met under Benes in the early evening of October 9. The only dissent from the Council's findings was voiced by Italy's bondsmen: Herr Pflügl of Austria and M. de Velics of Hungary. Debate continued on the 10th. Aloisi orated: "Caught as she is in the tide of her full spiritual and material development, but confined by historical vicissitudes and international restrictions within territorial limits which are stifling her, Italy is the country which must make her voice heard in this Assembly of the States as the voice of the proletariat calling for justice."

This bombast was vain. Only Albania followed the example of Austria and Hungary in condoning Italy's action, though M. Motta said Switzerland could not participate in sanctions which would endanger its "neutrality." On the 11th Benes announced that of the 54 States represented, 50 had accepted the Council's findings, 3 had dissented, and 1 (Italy) had opposed sanctions. A committee of one delegate from each State was set up "to consider and facilitate the co-ordination of measures" under Article 16. It met on the same day, elected Senhor de Vasconcelles of Portugal as chairman, and established a Committee of Eighteen (the "Little Co-ordination Committee") to recommend sanctions. By October 19 it had adopted five proposals: (1) an arms embargo against Italy; (2) an embargo on all loans and credits; (3) an embargo on imports from Italy, with some exceptions; (4) an embargo on exports to Italy of transport animals, rubber, aluminum, iron ore, scrap iron, tin, and strategic rare metals; and (5) a provision for mutual support in the application of economic and financial measures.⁶⁹

By October 31st, 50 States had accepted the 1st proposal, 49 the 2nd, 48 the 3rd and 4th. On November 2 the Committee of Fifty adopted a resolution of the Committee of Eighteen asking all members to enforce these sanctions by November 18. By December 12, 52 States had accepted the 1st proposal (50 were enforcing it); 52 had accepted the 2nd (47 in force); 50 the 3rd (43 in force); 51 the 4th (45 in force) and 46 the 5th. Austria, Hungary, Albania, and Para-

guay applied no sanctions. Guatemala, Salvador, Luxemburg, and Switzerland deviated appreciably from the program. Others winked at violations. But by way of compensation, Egypt, though not in the League, accepted all the sanctions suggested, while Germany offered no obstruction and the United States barred American arms to both Italy and Ethiopia. On November 11 Rome protested to every State enforcing sanctions. On November 17 the Fascist Grand Council passed a bitter resolution denouncing this "injustice." The great adventure was launched. Few outside observers knew or suspected that its organizers were enacting a farce and were already committed to rescuing the villain and aiding him to bring his victim to ruin.

Any honest effort to carry out the intentions of the Covenant would have involved such pressure on the Italian Government as would compel it to halt its aggression and such aid to Ethiopia as would enable it to offer effective resistance. The first objective required steps to stop the campaign of the Italian armies by cutting them off from their sources of supply, and measures of economic strangulation against Italy designed to create such deprivation and unrest as would compel Il Duce to yield or face revolution. The second objective required steps to supply Ethiopia with modern weapons of warfare, either through grants of arms from public arsenals or through loans to enable Ethiopia to purchase arms from private manufacturers.

This double problem was relatively simple in both its economic and strategic aspects. Italy's sea-borne imports and exports could be almost completely controlled by the sanctionist Powers by virtue of their possession of Gibraltar and Suez.⁷⁰ The Italian armies were fighting in an arena some 2,500 miles from Italy and were entirely dependent for supplies on the Red Sea route, which was completely dominated by Britain and France. Their planes, tanks, and trucks, moreover, were entirely dependent upon foreign oil-supplies. The Italian invasion could have been promptly halted by cutting off oil, closing the Canal, or instituting an effective long-range blockade of metropolitan Italy. On the other hand, France and Britain controlled all sources and channels for the shipment of munitions into Ethiopia. The French railway from Djibuti to Addis Ababa was completely out of reach of the Italian armies (save for air raids) until the end of the war. The roads from the Sudan into western Ethiopia were at all times open. Ethiopia could have been supplied with arms by the sanctionist Powers as readily as Italy could have been prevented from prosecuting its campaign of invasion.

None of these obvious and necessary steps to halt the aggressor and save his victim was at any time taken or even seriously contemplated. Italy was never blockaded. Italian exports were reduced 46% from January 1935 to January 1936 and Italian imports fell off 39%. The Italian gold reserves were reduced by half. But no embargoes were applied to the goods immediately necessary for prosecuting war. Those which were applied were abandoned as soon as they showed promise of producing their intended (or pretended) result. Oil was never included in sanctions.⁷¹ The Suez Canal was kept open at all times, even to the declared shipments of hundreds of tons of poison gas, despite the fact that Italy (April 3, 1928) and Ethiopia (September 18, 1935) had both ratified the convention of June 17, 1925 banning chemical and bacteriological warfare. The British and several other Governments prohibited all arms exports to Ethiopia during the spring and summer of 1935. As late as October 9 the British Cabinet kept its arms embargo in force against Ethiopia. Haile Selassie could get neither public arms nor public loans nor private credits for private arms. The small consignments which could be bought abroad for cash were frequently held up by the French authorities at Djibuti.

The saboteurs of sanctions carefully cultivated the impression that they shrank from effective measures out of fear that Italy would wage war upon them if pressure were carried to the point of accomplishing the only honest purpose which it could possibly have had—i.e. that of stopping aggression and rescuing its victim. They averred that they placed their faith in prolonged Ethiopian resistance and in the slow effects of moderate economic measures against Italy. How Ethiopia could be expected to resist a modern military machine without weapons of defense, how Italy could be expected to yield to measures which neither halted aggression nor seriously disorganized Italian economy, was never explained. The alleged fear of Italian attack was in large measure a pretense. The secret calculations of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were quite otherwise.

Laval strove to attain three goals: (1) preservation of his entente with Rome by conniving in the Italian conquest and sabotaging sanctions; (2) assurance of British support against Germany by "co-operating" in sanctions; and (3) mobilization of the machinery of sanctions for future use against Nazi aggression. The task was hopeless. By striving to realize three incompatible purposes, he lost all three. Baldwin and his advisers were concerned with placating the British public for election purposes. They were in agreement with Laval that war

with Italy must be avoided at all costs, not because Italy could win such a war but because *Italy would inevitably be beaten*. Italian defeat in the Mediterranean would be a defeat for Fascism. It would undermine Cæsar and perhaps open the gates to social revolution. Even an Italian defeat in Ethiopia would so damage Cæsar's prestige as to jeopardize his regime. The Fascist regime must be saved at all costs, for its disgrace and disintegration would promote proletarian radicalism everywhere and endanger the position of the wealthy and the well-born in France and Britain as well. Therefore Mussolini must be saved from his own madness. Therefore Mussolini must, if possible, be persuaded to accept the fruits of victory in successive "peace" plans without exposing himself to further risks of defeat. As to the urgency of this task there was at no time any serious disagreement between the Quai d'Orsay and the men of Whitehall.

Dissension developed between Paris and London over a wholly different question. Should Britain, in return for half-hearted French support of the half-hearted British policy of half-heartedly pretending to restrain Italian aggression in Africa, promise to fulfill the obligations of the Covenant and of Locarno against Germany? Paris desired such a pledge and was willing to pay for it by going as far as necessary with Britain in "coercing" Italy, so long as both understood that Il Duce must not be alienated or confronted with any serious risk of defeat. London was unwilling to assume any definite commitments vis-à-vis the Reich even after France and other States had pledged defense of Britain against a hypothetical Italian attack. This pledge was quite safe: all knew there would be no Italian attack. There would be no effective sanctions which would provoke attack. The British and French leaders had no desire to make sanctions effective and thereby jeopardize Italian prospects of victory.

Mussolini was kept fully informed of the comedy in all of its stages by Laval. He was perfectly capable of estimating the motives and purposes of his pretended "enemies." He therefore knew that he was entirely safe at all times. In this sense the farce of sanctions was pre-arranged—by Baldwin to win an election, by Laval to win British support against the Reich, and by Mussolini to mobilize all Italians behind his regime and to give him the glory of a bogus victory over all the world. Sanctions were his meat and drink, for they converted an unpopular war of conquest against a weak and defenseless State into a Fascist crusade against the degenerate democracies of Geneva.⁷² The entire scheme worked out according to schedule, save that none of

the planners had the wit to foresee that Hitler would be the major beneficiary of their efforts. Baldwin won his election. Baldwin and Laval saved Mussolini and Fascism as they intended. But in the sequel they lost everything else, not because Il Duce defied sanctions and conquered Ethiopia, but because Der Führer seized upon his opening to repudiate Locarno, remilitarize the Rhineland, seal the fate of Austria, and secure Mussolini as his ally. The failure of sanctions, moreover, destroyed any hope of ever enlisting again the support of the small States of the world behind Britain or France to resist aggression.

The performance of the play was accompanied by various military and diplomatic moves and counter-moves from London and Paris which were never made explicit as to their motivation. They were in part designed to consummate the purposes already suggested, in part calculated to create a popular impression in Britain and France that effective sanctions would mean war, and in part inspired by transitory apprehensions lest Mussolini double-cross the double-crossers and wreck the entire plan. By mid-October the British Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria had been joined by a large part of the Home Fleet and even by two vessels from China. Cæsar reinforced his legions in Libya as a "threat" to Egypt and sought to persuade Britain to reduce her squadrons in the middle sea. Downing Street in turn sought from other Mediterranean Powers assurances of support in case of an Italian "attack." Laval reluctantly assented on October 5 on condition that such support be "reciprocal," that it operate in every case of attack from any quarter by land, sea, or air, and that there be no action without prior agreement. The Quai d'Orsay confirmed its pledge to Britain on October 18 since the conditions had been accepted.⁷³ After a full agreement on October 26, Anglo-French naval and air consultations followed in London. The French Government, said Hoare to Commons later (December 19), moved "not a ship, not a machine, not a man." But France agreed "in principle" to mutual defense against attack.

London followed these moves by approaches to other Powers. On January 22, 1936 the British, French, Czechoslovak, Rumanian, Jugoslav, Greek, and Turkish delegations at Geneva dispatched letters to the Co-ordination Committee indicating that they had concluded a Pact of Mutual Assistance against possible Italian attack. The reply of the Spanish Republic (January 24) was non-committal because Madrid feared embroilment with Rome. Mussolini was to repay this solicitude in a different coin within six months. He vehemently pro-

tested these accords in a note of January 24 to all members of the League,⁷⁴ but it is improbable that he felt any anxiety. The British Government, while giving no support whatever to Ethiopia against the Italian invasion, had elaborately safeguarded itself by guarantees from other States against the alleged danger of an Italian attack upon British ports or ships.

Meanwhile, on November 2, 1935, Mr. Riddell of Canada proposed to the Committee of Eighteen that petroleum and its derivatives, along with coal, iron, cast iron, and steel, be added to the embargo list. This suggestion was referred to the Economic Sub-Committee and then to a drafting committee. It was adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on November 5 as Proposal 4A and communicated by the Secretary-General to the League members on November 7. By December 12 ten States, supplying 74.3% of all Italian oil imports had expressed approval: Argentina, India, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Rumania, Siam, and the USSR.

Laval suddenly awakened to the fact that other governments were taking sanctions seriously. Rome protested and threatened. Laval therefore proposed that the meeting of the Committee of Eighteen scheduled for November 29 be postponed on the ground that he was unable to attend.⁷⁵ London acquiesced. In the morning of November 25 Laval phoned Vasconcelles and asked him as a personal favor to postpone the session. Vasconcelles reluctantly agreed. The Geneva communiqué declared that the meeting would be "postponed for a few days because M. Laval is anxious to attend in person and is unable to do so on the 29th." On the appointed day Laval phoned Vasconcelles once more and asked that the date be fixed not earlier than December 11. Vasconcelles insisted on consulting London, but when he discovered London still acquiescent, he accepted the date of December 12.

Time was thus allowed for the completion of an amazing bargain. Its outlines had been under secret consideration since October. Rumor had it that Laval had proposed to Ambassador Cerruti on October 15 the cession of Tigre, Ogaden, and Harrar provinces by Ethiopia to Italy in return for a corridor to the sea through British Somaliland,⁷⁶ but on October 24 the Quai d'Orsay and the British Embassy in Paris denied the report. Laval told the Deputies that a "solution" could only be sought within the Covenant. By the end of October, however, it was known that M de St. Quentin of the Quai d'Orsay and Mr. Peterson of the Foreign Office had concocted a "peace plan"

which had been approved by Laval and forwarded to Hoare. On October 18, after Perth conferred with Mussolini, a semi-official statement from Rome asserted that conversations were proceeding between Paris and Rome and Paris and London. On the same day at Worcestershire, Baldwin hinted that there had been "too much talk about war." "The object we seek is peace." ⁷⁷ Hoare in Commons four days later declared: "There is still a breathing space before this economic pressure can be applied. Can it be used for another attempt at a settlement? Italy is still a member of the League. I welcome that fact. Cannot this eleventh hour be so used as to make it unnecessary for us to proceed further along the unattractive road of economic action against a fellow member, an old friend, and a former ally?" He had already told Sir Sidney Barton to press Haile Selassie for a compromise peace. The Negus refused. Hoare planned to go to Geneva to see Laval and Aloisi.

When Lord Cecil expressed anxiety, Hoare extended reassurances at Chelsea House on October 30th:

Our opponents are trying to make ignorant people believe that there is some disreputable intrigue behind this visit [to Laval] and that it means some sinister change of policy. . . . Our policy has always been perfectly simple—namely, loyalty to the League and readiness to help with any honorable settlement of the dispute that is acceptable to the three parties concerned—the League, Italy, and Abyssinia. That has always been our policy. It always will be our policy, and it is the policy that I shall support at Geneva. In the meanwhile, let us pay no attention to these whippers and innuendoes. Let us take them at their real worth. They are electioneering, pure and simple, and nothing more.⁷⁸

At Geneva Hoare assisted Laval in persuading M. Van Zeeland of Belgium to suggest that the function of "conciliation" be transferred from the Council to a smaller body. The Committee of Eighteen met on November 2. Laval spoke: "We must endeavor to seek, as speedily as possible, for an amicable settlement of the dispute. The French Government and the United Kingdom Government are agreed that their co-operation shall be exerted also in this sphere. This duty is particularly imperative for France, which on the 7th of January last signed a treaty of friendship with Italy. I shall therefore stubbornly pursue my attempts—from which nothing will deter me—to seek for elements that might serve as a basis for negotiations. It is thus that I

have initiated conversation—without the slightest intention, however, of putting the results in final shape outside the League.” Hoare followed: “There is nothing mysterious or sinister in these discussions. It is the duty of all of us to explore the roads to peace. This is what we have been doing and what we shall continue to do. Up to the present time . . . there is nothing to report. If and when the suggestions take more definite form we shall take the earliest opportunity to bring them before the Council in the most appropriate manner. There is nothing further from our minds than to make and conclude an agreement behind the back of the League.”

Van Zeeland then proposed that Britain and France be entrusted with the task of conciliation. There was no vote, but Hoare took the view that this was “the unanimous sense of the meeting” and that he and Laval had received a “moral mandate” to make peace. No further steps were taken until after the Conservative Party had won its overwhelming electoral victory on November 14 with a program of upholding the Covenant and enforcing collective security. On November 21 Mr. Peterson returned to Paris and resumed discussions with M. de St. Quentin. On December 3 it was indicated that their work was done and that Hoare would meet Laval in Paris on the 7th. Laval had meanwhile secured postponement of any consideration of oil sanctions. On December 4 and 7 Laval conferred with Ambassador Cerruti. On December 5, by some strange “leak,” the outlines of the plan came out and were published by “Augur” in the *New York Times*.⁷⁹ On the same day Hoare spoke to Commons:

Any terms emerging from these or other discussions must be acceptable to the three parties to the dispute, Italy, the League, and Abyssinia. I state these facts once again lest anyone is still so foolish as to harbor suspicions that the French and ourselves are attempting to side-track the League and impose on the world a settlement that could not be accepted by the three parties to the dispute. . . . The world urgently needs peace. We and the French, acting on behalf of the League and in the spirit of the League, are determined to make another great effort toward peace. We have no wish to humiliate Italy nor to weaken Italy. . . . I appeal once more to Signor Mussolini and his fellow-countrymen to dismiss entirely from their minds the suspicion that we have sinister motives behind our support of the League. . . . Let them dismiss from their minds the suspicion that we wish to

weaken Signor Mussolini's own position and destroy the Fascist regime. We have not the least desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Italy, and we are most anxious to see a strong Italy, governed by a strong government in whatever form the Italian people may desire.

Hoare was bound for a Swiss holiday, but at Baldwin's urgent request he agreed to stop in Paris on December 7. He met Laval at 5.30 p.m., accompanied by Sir Robert Vansittart and Mr. Peterson of the Foreign Office and by Sir George Clark, the British Ambassador. Laval was buttressed by M. de St. Quentin, M. Rochat, his *Chef de Cabinet*, and M. Alexis Leger, Secretary-General at the Quai d'Orsay. Laval had reached an agreement with Cerruti in the morning. Hoare agreed to stay twenty-four hours. He and the French Foreign Minister labored from 10.15 a.m. until 6.30 p.m. on December 8. Laval is reported to have told Hoare that if oil sanctions were recommended by the Committee of Eighteen, Mussolini would attack the British fleet, which could hope for no aid from the French fleet for two weeks or more. But Hoare needed no persuading. He was already converted.⁸⁰ A "plan" emerged and was accepted. It was agreed that it would be transmitted to Rome and Addis Ababa.

The Paris communiqué of December 8 declared that Hoare and Laval had "sought the formulas which might serve as a basis for a friendly settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. There could be no question at present of publishing these formulas. The British Government has not yet been informed of them; and, once its agreement has been received, it will be necessary to submit them to the consideration of the interested Governments and to the decision of the League of Nations."⁸¹ Laval asked the press to avoid conjecture. Peterson left for London that night with the "confidential" texts for Baldwin's approval, while Hoare caught a train for the Engadine. But on the morning of December 9 the French press published a full account of the plan. Laval apparently sought in this fashion to force Baldwin's hand and compel him to support Hoare's work. Baldwin read of the scheme in his morning newspaper while Peterson was delivering the "confidential" copy. The Cabinet met at 6.00 p.m. It was evidently divided in its views. On December 10 in Commons Baldwin and Eden sought to evade questions by alleging inaccuracies in the press reports.

The Prime Minister asserted: "My lips are not yet unsealed. Were these troubles over, I would make a case—and I guarantee that not a

man would go into the lobby against us." He denied that any communication had gone to Rome or Addis Ababa. The hour was 9.47 p.m. At this very moment Downing Street was wiring the plan to Perth and Barton. The Quai d'Orsay did likewise, though Laval wished to inform Rome first. On December 11 at 5.00 and 5.30 p.m. Il Duce received the plan from the French and British Ambassadors. Haile Selassie did not receive his copy until December 12. Not until December 13 was the plan officially communicated by Eden and Laval to Avenol for transmission to the members of the Council. On the following day the official text was published in the world press.

The Hoare-Laval "peace plan" specified that Britain and France would recommend to Haile Selassie the cession to Italy of eastern Tigre province and the Danakil country southeast of Eritrea along with much of Ogaden province. In return Ethiopia would receive from Italy a narrow strip of southern Eritrea adjacent to French Somaliland, giving it access to the sea at Assab. Since the French railway monopoly to Addis Ababa would presumably not be surrendered, this strip would be merely, as *The Times* of London conceded, "a corridor for camels." Under British and French "influence" to be wielded at Addis Ababa and Geneva, Ethiopia would be persuaded to set aside the southern half of the country, south of 8° and east of 35°, as a zone in which Italy would "enjoy exclusive economic rights." Ethiopian sovereignty in said zone "would be exercised by the services of the scheme of assistance drawn up by the League of Nations. Italy would take a preponderant but not exclusive role in these services." Haile Selassie would accept Italian "advisers," though his chief adviser, to be delegated by the League, would not be "the subject of one of the Powers bordering on Ethiopia."⁸²

Such was the scheme with which Mussolini was to be bribed to discontinue hostilities. He was offered generous annexations, a sphere of exclusive exploitation embracing almost half of what would be left of Ethiopia, and a virtual protectorate over the remainder. Not only would the integrity and independence of Ethiopia, which the League members had solemnly sworn to guarantee, become a memory, but, by a master stroke of political chicanery, the all but fatal surgical operation which the aggressor would be permitted to perform on the body of his victim would be supervised by the League itself, acting as a kind of consulting specialist or, more probably, as mortician. On Sunday, December 8, the Havas correspondent in Addis Ababa received an outline of the plan from Paris. Barton and

Bodard, the British and French Ministers, secured official copies three days later for transmission to Haile Selassie after Mussolini should have been informed. "We felt that we were treated worse than dirt," said the Emperor's adviser, Everett Colson. The Quai d'Orsay, knowing that its Minister had no influence with the Emperor, wished Barton to push the scheme. Barton's instructions asked him to "use your utmost influence to induce the Emperor to give careful and favorable consideration to these proposals and on no account lightly to reject them."⁸³ But Barton also had no influence. The Negus was at his military headquarters at Dessye, far from the capital. Barton and Bodard explained the scheme to officials at the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, but they looked blank.⁸⁴ Colson then flew to Dessye and assisted Haile Selassie in preparing a reply, which was delivered to Bodard and Barton on December 19 and also communicated to the League Council. It declared that the proposal would prepare "the dismemberment of Ethiopia" and the "collapse of the sacred principles of the League and the system of collective security." Ethiopia would be reduced to a status worse than that of a mandated territory.

We are convinced that neither the Council nor the Assembly of the League will support such a project of settlement, which goes outside the framework of the Covenant, is destructive of the very basis on which that organization is founded and is an attack on the independence and territorial integrity of a member State, involving a premium for the aggressor at the expense of the injured party.⁸⁵

The Hoare-Laval scheme had already collapsed before the Ethiopian reply was received. The technique here employed was too crude to insure success. Hoare's successors were to profit by his example and learn that they could sacrifice other peoples on the Fascist altar only after they had carefully prepared the stage with appropriate properties for frightening British and French publics with the specter of imminent war. Fear would then dictate surrender and relieved acquiescence in whatever plans of rewarding aggressors might be concocted by the diplomats of the democracies. Without a war panic such plans would only generate popular indignation. Hoare had failed to prepare the ground adequately. The result was the ruination of the scheme which he and Laval had devised.

The Committee of Eighteen met on December 12. Laval asserted that Italy and Ethiopia had been informed of "our suggestions" and

that the Council would soon be enlightened regarding them. Eden declared them "neither definitive nor sacrosanct. . . . Indeed, we should cordially welcome any suggestions for their improvement." M. Komarnicki of Poland, now acting as Laval's stooge, proposed a postponement of any consideration of oil sanctions pending the judgment of the Council on the new peace plan. The Committee adjourned on the 13th. The Ethiopian legation in Paris declared that Addis Ababa would reject any proposals to reward the aggressor. It asked that the Assembly be convoked for "a full and free public debate." Avenol replied that the President of the Assembly considered it advisable to await the result of the Council's deliberations.

When the Council met on the 18th, it found the plan already dead as a result of loud outcries against it in Britain. Wolde Mariam of Ethiopia asked: "Is it consistent with the Covenant that the Covenant-breaking State should be begged by the League of Nations to be good enough to accept a large part of its victim's territory, together with effective control of the rest under the cloak of the League?" Laval opined that the Council might wish to avoid expressing an opinion until it was known how the disputants had welcomed the suggestion. Eden asserted that his Government would not continue to support the plan if the disputants or the Council failed to approve. A Council resolution of December 19 "thanked" the British and French representatives for their "suggestions." . . . "The Council does not consider that it is called upon to express an opinion in regard to them at present." The plan was dead. No formal Italian answer was ever received. But Laval's purpose had been achieved. Oil sanctions were indefinitely postponed.

Meanwhile Vyvyan Adams, Conservative, offered a resolution in Commons on December 11 "that this House will not assent to any settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute which ignores our international obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations by granting the aggressor State greater concessions after its unprovoked aggression than could have been attained by peaceful negotiations." This motion was later withdrawn, but it had evoked widespread public approval. On the eve of a debate on foreign policy scheduled for December 19, Baldwin deliberated as to his course. The unfortunate but unrepenting Hoare had fallen on the ice in the Engadine and broken his nose in three places. Against his doctor's orders he returned to London on the 16th. On the 17th the Cabinet decided to support him. Baldwin, Eden, and Neville Chamberlain called upon

him at his home to arrange that he should prepare a fighting speech. But the volume of public protests had now grown so large that Baldwin decided to sacrifice his Foreign Minister rather than endanger the Cabinet. Chamberlain and Baldwin called on Hoare again on the 18th and broke the news. Hoare resigned that evening. With bandaged face he gave Commons his apologia on the 19th. His theme was the obvious one: Solicitude for "peace" excuses all:

Ever since I have been at the Foreign Office I have been obsessed with the urgency of two great issues. Day in and day out I have been obsessed with the urgent necessity of doing everything in my power to prevent an isolated war between Great Britain and Italy. I believe these two great issues were two of the issues mainly in the mind of the electorate at the last election—fear on the one hand of a general conflagration and on the other of an isolated war between Great Britain and Italy. . . .

From all sides we received reports no responsible government could disregard—that Italy would regard an oil embargo as a military action or an act involving war against her. . . . An isolated attack of this kind launched upon one Power without, maybe, the full support of other Powers would, it seemed to me, almost inevitably lead to the dissolution of the League. . . . I was pressed on all sides to go [to Paris]. I was pressed in such a way as to make refusal impossible. It was in an atmosphere threatened with war that the conversations began. . . . Within five days the question of an oil embargo was to come up at Geneva, and I did not feel myself justified in proposing any postponement of the embargo unless it could be shown to the League that negotiations had actually started. . . .

I have been terrified at the thought we might lead Abyssinia to think the League could do more than it can, and that finally we should find a terrible moment of disillusionment in which Abyssinia might be altogether destroyed as an independent State. . . .

I ask myself, looking back, whether I have a guilty conscience or whether my conscience is clear. I say with all humility to the House that my conscience is clear. . . . I am sure that in dealing with these grave issues the only course to take is the course one genuinely believes to be the right course. I believe it was the right course.

Baldwin pushed home the theme. Not only must "peace" be served by any means, fair or foul, because war is evil, but war must also be shunned because the British public might repudiate the League if it discovered that the League might lead to war. Commons and country upheld the Cabinet, but Hoare was out and his plan was buried. The Tory strategists had failed to dramatize sufficiently the alleged "danger" of war. This mistake would not be repeated. Hoare was succeeded by his young collaborator, Captain Anthony Eden, who loomed in the public eye as the unsullied knight sworn to enforce the Covenant with clean hands and a pure and shining sword.

In France Pierre Cot opened the parliamentary attack on Laval on December 13. But Laval survived by a vote of 304 to 252 four days later. The Radical Socialists split. The Cabinet was again upheld on December 28. On January 22, 1936, however, it was overthrown on other issues. But the man from Auvergne had done his work so well that French policy under Sarraut and Flandin remained unchanged. And, *mirabile dictu*, it still remained unchanged under Blum and Delbos, the knights of the People's Front. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!* British policy under Eden also remained unchanged. The ultimate result was the rescue of Mussolini and the death of Ethiopia.⁸⁶ But before this result was consummated, Hitler had garnered a new harvest.

WATCH ON THE RHINE

I. LOCARNO † MARCH 7, 1936

There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves or lose our ventures.

THUS spoke Shakespeare's Brutus to Cassius as they planned to rescue Rome from Cæsar's tyranny. The statesmen of Europe twenty centuries later were confronted with another Cæsar whose lawless violence likewise presented them with a crucial choice: to submit or to oppose? The men of France and Britain in whose hands the decision rested were none of them dynamic leaders capable of taking the tide at the flood and finding fortune thereby. They were rather vote-hunters pursuing popularity and administering dishonest policies with consistent firmness and honest policies with flabby vacillation.¹ Nevertheless at the close of January the upsurge of democratic indignation at the betrayal of December had driven from office the most obvious practitioners of folly. To some it appeared at the time that their successors would halt retreat and treason and still save the day. That they did not—because they would not or could not—was a function of their own limitations and those of their colleagues rather than of any visible demoralization on the part of the parliaments and peoples to whom they were responsible. But in the sequel peoples and parliaments acquiesced in the line of their leaders. In the wake of acquiescence came indifference or fear or despair, all alike conducive to irresponsible muddling or prearranged surrender.

Laval's successor in the Premiership was Albert Pierre Sarraut, middle-class son of Bordeaux who had found complacency but not wisdom in the course of his sixty-four years. Poet, journalist, and for more than two decades Radical Socialist deputy from Aube, he

entered the Cabinet under Clemenceau. He served as Governor-General of Indo-China, 1911-14, and again after 1918. He became bureaucratic and reactionary. When he accepted the post of Minister of Colonies under Poincaré in 1922 his party expelled him, but later granted him reinstatement. Successively Ambassador to Turkey, Senator, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Marine, and Minister of Colonies once more, he had had an experience more varied than that of most of his contemporaries, but not one which predisposed him to vigorous championship of democracy or of the colored peoples or of collective security against aggressors. As early as March 1933 he had advocated the return of the German colonies. He briefly attained the Premiership in the autumn of 1933 and then became Minister of Marine under Chautemps and Minister of Interior under Doumergue. In the latter capacity he was so severely blamed for negligence in connection with the Barthou assassination that he resigned. Laval's fall brought him to the Premiership again on January 24, 1936. He was short, heavy, bespectacled, and above all slow and cautious in all he thought and did.

Sarraut's Foreign Minister was Pierre Étienne Flandin, also of the Radical Socialist group. He had been in the air service during the War. His tall figure (six feet, four inches) was physically impressive. But in other respects he added little to the Cabinet's stature. He had been in succession Millerand's private secretary, president of the Aero Club of France, Undersecretary of State in the first and second Millerand Cabinets of 1920, Minister of Commerce under Tardieu in 1930 (he broke with Tardieu two years later), and Minister of Finance under Laval (1931-2) and Doumergue (1934). Despite these various public experiences, he never developed sureness of political touch. Something intangible was lacking. He was colorless, dull of speech, empty of personality. He was the *grand bourgeois* and prosperous businessman. He had many English friends and aped English airs. He succeeded in imitating the pose of many British Tory leaders: that of well-meaning stupidity. But what was with them a politically useful pretense was with Flandin perhaps not entirely a façade.

Unlike Barthou, Flandin had no policy toward the Reich save faith, hope, and charity. Unlike Laval, he was not wholly persuaded that the attempted rapprochement with Italy was worth its cost. But he was willing to be convinced and unwilling to alienate Il Duce. He coupled lip service to the League with gestures of following Britain against Italy, attenuated by sabotage and embellished by vain efforts

to induce Downing Street to support Paris against the Reich. The painful experience which was the ineluctable consequence of his muddling brought him later to the conviction that the Republic should pay almost any price for peace with Berlin. In this mood he was to play a role of dishonor in the fatal betrayal of his country's allies. In 1936 he followed Sarraut in looking to London for aid which never came and in denying to London the aid which at least some of the men of Whitehall were seeking.

In the British capital the new Foreign Minister was popularly regarded as a White Knight of the Grail. Robert Anthony Eden, born in 1897, was young. He was the son of Sir William Eden, artist, cavalry officer, and country gentleman. He was handsome and dashing. He went to Eton and from Eton to Flanders (1916), where his older brother was killed and where he won a military cross and a captaincy. His younger brother Nicholas died at Jutland. Anthony graduated from Oxford in 1922 and married Beatrice Helen Beckett in 1923. He entered Parliament as a Conservative from Warwick and Leamington in the same year. Following a world tour he became Sir Austen Chamberlain's parliamentary private secretary in 1926 and was named five years later Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the first National Government. On New Year's Day of 1934 he became Lord Privy Seal and in June 1935 Minister Without Portfolio for League of Nations Affairs. As a highly popular figure and a staunch advocate of collective security, he was an asset of great worth to his party in the election of November 1935. He seemed, indeed, "a saintly youth with worldly thought untainted, none better loved than he in all the land."²

Unlike many about him, handsome Captain Anthony had a policy. It was based not upon dreamy visions but upon the hard fact, as he saw it, that Britain's future could be secure and prosperous only in a world effectively organized to keep the peace. He did not envisage peace for Britain in terms of buying off the Fascist Powers with other people's property in the hope that they would leave the Empire alone and confine themselves to fighting Communism. He desired that his Government should contribute of its power, and assume responsibilities in proportion to its power and its far-flung interests, in order that the organization of an indivisible world peace might be furthered. But he was constantly thwarted by sabotage from Paris and by the obstructionism of colleagues and superiors who took a wholly different view of British interests—or had no view at all save

fear of commitments. His silent and self-effacing fellow Etonian Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart, who became Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in 1930 after a long and distinguished diplomatic and literary career, apparently shared Hoare's conception of British policy rather than Eden's. Vansittart had a hand in the Anglo-German naval accord and in the Hoare-Laval deal. As the highest permanent official of the Foreign Office he represented the orientation of the administrative machine through which every Foreign Minister must work. That orientation was not conducive to the success of Eden's plan, though Vansittart remained in the background and appeared to conform. Eden also faced Cabinet colleagues who could scarcely be suspected of loyal co-operation in his program. Simon and Hoare (the latter returned to the Cabinet in June) were narrow old men who had no sympathy for Eden's views and who resented his rapid advance—save in so far as they could capitalize upon it for partisan purposes.

Eden's chief obstacles, however, were the two Prime Ministers under whom he served: Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. Baldwin was Eden's patron. He wrote a preface to his young friend's travel book, *Scenic Beauties*, in 1925. He seemed to admire and support Eden. But the temper of his leadership was not such as to aid Eden in overcoming other difficulties and inertias. This now elderly businessman and banker (he was born in 1867, son of the head of the iron and steel firm of Baldwin Ltd.) was a cousin of Rudyard Kipling and a staunch Conservative and imperialist. During the War he presented a quarter of his huge fortune to the Government. He married Lucy Ridsdale, who presented him with two daughters and four sons. She was tirelessly active in public life and she was a political asset to her husband as a platform speaker.

Baldwin's carefully cultivated political personality—a medley of pipes, pigs, the English countryside, and practical solidity—was decorated with a flavor of family piety and a “pose of dull-witted aimlessness.”³ Churchill once referred to him as “a pale reflection of everybody's perplexities.”⁴ His policies, he said, were “guided by the course of events.” This formula compared favorably with MacDonald's “on and on and on, and up and up and up” or Asquith's “Wait and see.”⁵ Bluff integrity and unimpeachable honesty were his garments in office. And yet his electoral victory of 1924 was based upon the fraudulent Zinoviev letter and that of 1935 upon pledges which the Hoare-Laval bargain rendered equally fraudulent. Eden

was his salvation, for Eden's appointment presumably meant that pledges would be fulfilled and public wrath appeased. But with Baldwin as mentor and guide, Eden's fixity of purpose had always to come to terms with those who were ever willing to compromise their principles in the name of the principle of compromise.

In such a setting the crises of 1936 unrolled. Amid the diplomatic complications engendered by Il Duce's African war, Hitler watched and waited for an opportunity to strike a new blow at the shackles binding the Reich. His calculations rested upon a firm foundation of military strategy, political psychology, and *Geo-politik*. His wisdom in applying shock-tactics to diplomacy and his shrewdness in timing made him a man apart, able to convince or override Wilhelmstrasse and the General Staff alike. The problem of 1936, while complex in its details, was of the essence of simplicity in its elements. The basic principle was an ABC of tactics: no army advances with a dangerous enemy at its rear. The advance was to be southeastward and eastward. The enemy at the rear was France. This enemy already showed an indisposition to act. But its armed forces were formidable and its potential allies were, in combination, terrifying. With the whole Rhine Valley unfortified and demilitarized, General Ganelin's well-equipped divisions could paralyze any German move against Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Poland. The security of France itself against invasion from the east required that the German General Staff be prevented from doing what it had done in 1870 and 1914—i.e. organizing and launching an attack from the territories on the left bank of the Rhine. Foch had attributed French ability to parry the 1914 attack to Russian aid in the east. French safety called imperatively for a demilitarized Rhineland.⁶

Der Führer's task was to close the Rhine breach, not necessarily as a means of organizing a new invasion of France, but as a means of rendering the German rear impregnable. He must attempt, moreover, to split Rome from Paris, and Paris from London, and, if possible, bring to an end the danger that either Britain or Italy might aid France in any attempt by Paris to thwart German hopes of hegemony east of the Rhine. The problem was at once legal and military. If the Rhine frontier could be adequately fortified, France would be immobilized and Anglo-Italian obligations to aid France against the Reich would either lapse or be of no practical consequence. If these obligations could be broken, the way would be clear for refortifying the Rhineland—assuming that France would remain passive without British and

Italian support. The nexus between these two aspects of the issue lay in the legal link between Articles 42-44 of Versailles and Article 4 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno of October 16, 1925. The former provisions were as follows:

Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. Article 43: In the area above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden. Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

The Rhine Pact pledged Germany, France, and Belgium to non-aggression and pacific settlement. It guaranteed established frontiers and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Its final article declared:

Article IV. 1. If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a violation of Article II of the present treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

3. In case of a flagrant violation of Article II of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this Article will issue its findings, and the high contracting parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties which have engaged in hostilities. . . .

LUTHER
STRESEMANN
ÉMILE VANDERVELDE
A. BRIAND
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN
BENITO MUSSOLINI

This phraseology was designed precisely to prevent Germany from doing that which Hitler deemed indispensable for safeguarding the German rear. If the Reich should arm the demilitarized zone, France was legally authorized to declare this a "flagrant breach" and an "unprovoked act of aggression," in which case Britain, Italy, and Belgium would all be bound to come at once to France's aid. If London, Rome, and Brussels should respect their obligations, the Reich would be confronted with so invincible a combination as to render hopeless from the outset any attempted repudiation of Locarno. Paris, moreover, had means at its disposal to enforce its rights even if it received no aid from the guarantors of the Rhine Pact. With Might and Right both on the side of the foe, Hitler's problem was seemingly insoluble.

But genius and daring conquer all obstacles. After October 1935 Der Führer leaned toward the assumption that neither Mussolini nor Baldwin desired or intended to assist France in holding the Reich within the terms of the treaties. Before striking, however, the question of the most effective moment and the further question of the moral imponderabilia had to be calculated with care. As for the latter, the groundwork was laid for disguising contemplated law-breaking within the forms of law in a German memorandum of May 25, 1935, which contended that the French-Soviet pact was incompatible with Locarno. The argument was that any French action against the Reich under Article 16 of the Covenant would violate the obligations which Paris had assumed in 1925 unless such action should be authorized by a prior decision of the League Council. The French-Soviet pact contemplated defensive action without the necessity of approval from Geneva. It was therefore incompatible with Locarno.⁷

This reasoning was false. Under Article IV, 3 of the Rhine Pact France could take "immediate action" against the Reich in the event of any flagrant aggression or remilitarization of the Rhineland without waiting for authorization by the Council, even though it agreed to be bound by the Council's subsequent recommendations. It was already established, moreover, that each member of the League could decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant was being committed. These considerations were pointed out in the replies to the German memorandum—from France, June 25; from Britain, July 5; from Italy, July 15; and from Belgium, July 19, 1935.⁸ That Berlin's case was bad law was virtually conceded by the Reich's refusal, then or later, to submit the issue to judicial determination. But Berlin reckoned with London's distaste for the French-Soviet pact and with British and

Italian reluctance to support France against the Reich in the absence of any actual invasion of French territory. These considerations made it useful for Wilhelmstrasse to press the argument that France had already violated Locarno by its agreement with Moscow.

Der Führer felt his way cautiously through a maze of obstacles. He gave no encouragement to Laval's overtures for an understanding transmitted in October through a confidential agent, M. Cermand de Brinon, who was a journalist and old friend of Ribbentrop.⁹ Cautious hints of German action in the Rhineland evoked no outbursts in the French or British press. Paris and London issued "informal warnings" in mid-January against any German effort to repudiate Locarno.¹⁰ Flandin, Sarraut, and Lebrun gathered in London at the end of the month for the funeral of King George V († January 20, 1936) and there met Eden and Neurath. But there is no reliable evidence that Locarno or the status of the Rhineland were then discussed.

The Nazi leaders apparently came to the conclusion during the winter that their objective could be achieved by the tried device of the *fait accompli* more readily than by negotiation. Caution and concealment were therefore in order to lull suspicions abroad. One of Hitler's most useful friends in British political circles, the Marquess of Londonderry, retired from service in the Cabinet in the autumn and made repeated trips to Germany. On January 30-1, 1936 he dined with Göring at the latter's Berlin palace and at Karin Hall, sumptuous hunting lodge in the Schorfheide. The German Air Minister played upon the familiar theme of the necessity of German expansion in the East and hinted at the need of refortifying the Rhineland. By his own account, Londonderry urged a public statement of the German case "to allay suspicions" and suggested that Berlin might well propose a comparable demilitarized zone on the French side of the frontier.¹¹ This proposal did not fall upon deaf ears. It indicated a willingness in certain Tory circles to abandon France and even to view with favor the scrapping of the Maginot Line. Göring was elated.

Londonderry lunched with Ribbentrop and Hess on February 1 and was somewhat disturbed by pleas for the return of the German colonies. But he listened sympathetically to suggestions of an Anglo-German entente against Bolshevism, with Britain to put pressure on France to co-operate. On February 4 Londonderry dined with Hitler, who adroitly played upon Tory fears of Communism. Moscow must be quarantined. Ribbentrop declared that "misunderstanding" of

Germany in England was due to the "international Jews" who made common cause with Bolshevism. In Berlin, Munich, and Berchtesgaden Londonderry conferred with Hitler, Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He "did not receive any direct hint in official quarters" of any plan to refortify the Rhineland,¹² but he did hear rumors and doubtless gave encouragement to his hosts by his complacent attitude. On his return he wrote a letter to Ribbentrop (February 21, 1936) to express thanks and to report on the state of British opinion:

The free and open ventilation of public opinion in this country through the medium of the Press develops among our people a very confused attitude of mind, so that it is very difficult properly to diagnose our real public opinion. . . . On my return I have realized that I have not very clearly in my mind your definite opinion in relation to your desires in Europe itself, nor have I come away with a very clear knowledge of the actual reasons which control your internal policy in relation to the Jews and also in relation to religious bodies. . . . As I told you, I have no great affection for the Jews.¹³

Such soundings as these strengthened the hands of those among Hitler's advisers who urged that Britain could be counted upon as a "silent partner" in the projected enterprise. When Eden was asked in Commons on February 12 whether Britain would fulfill her pledges in the event of a flagrant breach of Articles 42-43 of Versailles, he replied: "The obligations of His Majesty's Government are specified in the Treaty of Locarno itself. His Majesty's Government stand by those obligations and, as has been previously stated in this House, intend, should the need arise, faithfully to fulfill them." Meanwhile Sarraut laid the French-Soviet pact before the Chamber. Marshal Tukhachevsky, Inspector-General of the Red Army, spent the second week of February in Paris conferring with the French General Staff and the Ministers of War, Air, and Marine. What he reported back to Moscow is not a matter of public record. It is possible that he here came to the private conclusion that the pact with France would prove a snare and that the Kremlin should abandon its new line and come to terms with Berlin. In any event the Chamber approved ratification, 353 to 164, on February 27. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate approved in principle on March 4. A general debate in the Upper House was scheduled for March 12.

Eden passed through Paris on his way to Geneva on the first of the

month and was reported to have asserted, in response to French appeals for a pledge of British support, that Britain would abide by her obligations but could express no view on possible contingencies until Paris had made up its own mind as to what action to take in the event of a German breach of the treaties. Two days previously the *Paris Midi* published an interview with Hitler by M. Bertrand de Jouvenal in which Der Führer asserted: "I wish to prove to my people that the idea of hereditary enmity between France and Germany is an absurdity." When asked why he had not revised *Mein Kampf*, he replied (untruthfully) that it had been written at the time of the Ruhr occupation. "I enter my correction in the great book of History." He warned France strongly against the Soviet pact. He offered peace: "The chance is given to you; if you do not seize it, think of your responsibility toward your children."¹⁴ On February 29 Ambassador André François-Poncet was instructed to ask Hitler for an interview to discuss possible bases of a French-German rapprochement. The interview took place on March 2. Hitler and Neurath requested secrecy (the fact of the conversation was not known until *after* March 7) and indicated that they would prepare and submit proposals.

On March 3 the Committee of Eighteen at Geneva scheduled a discussion of oil sanctions for March 10. Il Duce dropped hints that any new sanctions would cause Italy to quit the League and denounce both Locarno and the accords of January 7, 1935. Mussolini may have urged German action as a means of his own protection. He was doubtless aware of the blow in preparation. Rome and Berlin were alike concerned over the possibility that Flandin and Eden might strike a bargain whereby the former would agree to oil sanctions and the latter would pledge British support to Paris to enforce Locarno. This danger must at all costs be averted. A swift blow might well split London and Paris anew and consign oil sanctions to limbo. When to strike? Where to strike?

According to some reports, an assault upon Austria was contemplated. But this would antagonize Il Duce and might drive Britain and France together. Rumor had it that the Rhineland blow was scheduled for March 13 and was moved forward in the light of the situation at Paris and Geneva. The decision was reached at a Cabinet meeting at Berlin on Friday, March 6, attended by the heads of the Reichswehr.¹⁵ Who gave what advice to whom cannot be ascertained. But there is little doubt that Schacht, Neurath, and Blomberg were opposed to the plan on financial, diplomatic, and strategic grounds.

The War Minister and the General Staff warned Der Führer that the new army was not yet ready to offer resistance if the French should march into the Rhineland. Its enforced withdrawal would constitute a major defeat for the Reich. Göring and Göbbels were more hopeful. Hitler at length concluded that the risk should be taken. The moment had come to act. If France struck back, the game might be lost. But, with his usual uncanny insight into democratic defeatism, he felt certain that the French would not march, that Britain would abandon them if they proposed any such action, and that Downing Street could be relied upon to reduce French fulminations to verbiage. *Hitler hat immer Recht!*

The Chancellor issued summons that evening for the Reichstag to meet at noon on Saturday, March 7, 1936. He invited the British, French, Belgian, and Italian envoys to call in the morning at Wilhelmstrasse. They did so. Neurath presented them with a long memorandum. It was a bombshell garlanded with olive branches. It began with the reiteration of the contention that French obligations under the Soviet pact were incompatible with those under Locarno:

The repeatedly friendly offers and peaceful assurances of Germany have been met by France with a military pact with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany and in violation of the Locarno Pact. The Locarno Pact has thereby lost its significance and practically ceased to be. Germany regards herself, therefore, as no longer bound by this extinct pact. The German Government are now compelled to meet the new situation created by this pact, a situation which is aggravated by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact is amplified by an exactly parallel treaty of alliance between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia. In the interests of the natural right of a nation to protect its frontiers and preserve its means of defense, the German Government have therefore restored once more, as from today, the full and unrestricted sovereignty of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

In order to prevent any doubt as to their intentions, and to make clear the purely defensive character of this measure, as well as to give expression to their lasting desire for the true pacification of Europe between nations of equal rights and mutual respect, the German Government declare themselves prepared to negotiate new agreements for the establishment of a system of European security on the basis of the following proposals:

1. The German Government declare themselves prepared to negotiate with France and Belgium for the establishment of a bilateral demilitarized zone and to assent to other proposals with regard to the extent and effects of such a zone, under the stipulation of complete parity.

2. In order to assure the inviolability and integrity of the frontiers in the West, the German Government propose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France, and Belgium with duration which they are prepared to fix at twenty-five years.

3. The German Government desire to invite England and Italy to sign this treaty as guarantor Powers.

4. The German Government are willing to include the Government of the Netherlands in this treaty system should the Government of the Netherlands desire it, and the other treaty partners approve.

5. For the further strengthening of these security arrangements between the Western Powers, the German Government are prepared to conclude an air pact which shall be designed automatically and effectively to prevent the danger of sudden attacks from the air.

6. The German Government repeat their offer to conclude with States bordering on Germany in the East non-aggression pacts similar to that concluded with Poland. Since the attitude of the Lithuanian Government has undergone a certain modification as regards Memel, the German Government withdraw the exception which they once had to make with regard to Lithuania and declare themselves ready to sign a non-aggression pact with Lithuania also, under the stipulation of an effective organization of the guaranteed autonomy of the Memel territory.

7. With the achievement, at last, of Germany's equality of rights and the restoration of full sovereignty over the whole territory of the German Reich, the German Government regard the chief reason for their withdrawal from the League of Nations as eliminated. Germany is therefore prepared to enter the League of Nations again. In so saying, she expresses at the same time her expectation that, in the course of a reasonable space of time, the problem of colonial equality of rights as well as of the separation of the League Covenant from its Versailles Treaty base will be clarified in the course of friendly negotiations.¹⁶

In presenting this communication Neurath declared that German troops had marched across the Rhine at dawn, but that the occupation was merely symbolic. (It was estimated later that this "symbolic" occupation brought 35,000 soldiers into the demilitarized zone by Sunday night and 90,000 by the middle of the week.) He made no reply to François-Poncet's query as to why no negotiations had been initiated. The proposals themselves were adroitly drawn to befog the issue, to confuse the resentful abroad, to please the pacifists, to encourage the defeatists, and to precipitate weeks or months of futile palaver while the western frontier should be rendered impregnable. Points 6 and 7 were harmless gestures. Points 2-5, if accepted, would destroy the whole French alliance system, require Britain and Italy to attack France should Paris ever attempt to come to the military aid of its eastern allies against the Reich, neutralize both Belgium and the Netherlands, and give Berlin *carte blanche* in the East. Point 1, calling for the destruction of the Maginot Line, revealed the masterly hand of the Marquess of Londonderry.

The Reichstag met at noon. The French, Belgian, and British Am-

bassadors stayed away in protest. Hitler delivered a long and self-righteous address in which he indicted anew the authors of Versailles and attributed all sorrow, all misery, and all danger to their handiwork. But Germans seek no heroes' deaths. They are as peaceful as other peoples—and as brave and as honorable. But they are poor. "The Russians have eighteen times more land for each member of the population than the Germans have." As for the treaties, "the German people cannot forever bear the injury done it, should not bear it and will not bear it!" Germany had been saved from Bolshevism. Europe must be saved. Salvation requires peace, equality, co-operation, common sense. But no co-operation with Bolshevism! "I will not have the gruesome Communist international dictatorship of hate descend upon the German people, which cannot only weep but can also laugh heartily enough through its life. This destructive Asiatic *Weltanschauung* strikes at all values. . . ."

Europe, continued Der Führer, is divided into two camps: culture and Bolshevism. Germany seeks understanding with France. Germany seeks understanding with England. But France has compacted with Bolshevism and brought Bolshevism into the heart of Europe via Czechoslovakia. Should France go Bolshevik, Moscow would determine the policies of Paris. Red Russia has 1,350,000 troops, 17,500,000 reserves, and the largest tank equipment and air force in the world. To bring this power into Central Europe destroys the balance of power. Therefore Germany had to act.

Men of the German Reichstag! In this historic hour, when in the Reich's western provinces German troops are just entering their future peace garrisons, we all unite in two holy inner confessions: First, we swear to yield to no force whatever in the restoration of the honor of our people, and prefer to succumb with honor to the severest hardships rather than capitulate. Secondly, we confess that now, more than ever, we shall strive for an understanding between European peoples, especially for one with our western neighbor nations. . . . WE HAVE NO TERRITORIAL DEMANDS TO MAKE IN EUROPE. . . . Peace. . . . Peace. . . .

I have therefore decided today to dissolve the German Reichstag so the German people may pass judgment on my leadership and on that of my associates. During these three years Germany has regained her honor, refound her faith, conquered the greatest economic distress, and finally inaugurated a new cul-

tural advance. This I believe I am entitled to state before my conscience and my God. I now ask the German people to strengthen me and my faith and to give me, through the strength of its will, further individual strength with which to fight ever courageously for its honor and freedom and to provide for its economic well-being. And especially to support me in my struggle for a real peace.¹⁷

The diplomatic sequel to the coup of March 7 was as gratifying to Der Führer as the result of the "election" of the new "Reichstag of Freedom and Peace" on March 29, when 98.79% of the voters did as they were told. Everything depended upon Paris. Would the French Government order its troops into the Rhineland to oust the Reichswehr (which in such an event was prepared to retreat without resistance) or would it acquiesce in an act which inevitably carried with it the certainty of the collapse of all French power on the Continent? There were some hours of hesitation. The French Cabinet met on the morning of March 7. Flandin saw the British, Italian, and Belgian envoys in the afternoon. The Cabinet met again in the evening with the General Staff. Under Article IV, 3 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, France was free to act at once to resist a "flagrant violation." The decision hung fire.

The Ministers ultimately reached a conclusion as disastrous for France in its final consequences as any ever taken by a French Government in modern times. The curious considerations which moved them to a course of catastrophe outweighed all the logic of strategy and diplomacy. Military action would at once rally to the side of France an invincible coalition, regardless of whether Italy and Britain kept their pledges. This coalition would not even depend upon Soviet support, though that would doubtless have been forthcoming if asked for. On Saturday the French Ambassador in Warsaw was assured that the Polish army would march if France marched. Prague was loyal, and would remain loyal even unto death. Jugoslavia and Rumania would also follow Paris. Italy was too preoccupied in Africa to render any assistance to the Reich. The Tory pretense of championing collective security ("Our Word Is Our Bond") would have made it difficult for Downing Street to oppose French action. French mobilization and reoccupation of the Rhineland would have confronted Hitler with a choice between surrender and national suicide. He was prepared to retreat, though such a humiliation might well have ruined

his regime. But the French Cabinet was not prepared to advance.

What were the sources of paralysis? Fear of German bombers over Paris. Fear of alienating a Britain already alienated over Ethiopia. Fear of war. Fear of dictatorship. Ignorance of German weakness. Fear of fear and preference for "peace" today at the cost of no one knew what tomorrow. Pierre Étienne Flandin, with his arm in a sling and his mind in a fog. Albert Sarraut, who decided on mobilization and then changed his mind. But the crucial consideration seems to have been at once sordid and stupid: money. Gamelin advised that the Cabinet could either mobilize two classes or order general mobilization. The former would be pointless and dangerous. The latter would be expensive. It might cost several billion francs. Sarraut was pledged to defend the franc. Despite Laval's desperate deflationary drive, France was still losing gold because of fear of devaluation. Sarraut conferred with Finance Minister Regnier and with M. Tanernery, Governor of the Bank of France. They had no doubt but that such an emergency expenditure would mean devaluation. For the treasury and the Bank and the "200 families" and the *rentier* and employer class, deflation with no devaluation seemed preferable to devaluation and inflation. Flandin had no policy. Gamelin did not insist. Sarraut decided to save the franc—and to sacrifice France.¹⁸

The cream of the jest lay in the fact that the franc was not saved. Devaluation became necessary in September, only six months later, and again in June of 1937. And in September of 1938 the French Cabinet would order a far more expensive mobilization—all to no purpose and two and a half years too late. Austria was to die. Czechoslovakia was to perish. Poland was to be lost, the Little Entente was to vanish, French diplomacy was to meet Waterloo and Sedan combined—all for a few francs in the Ides of March of 1936. And thanks to Flandin's folly, which outfollied Laval, France was to lose even the Soviet alliance which Hitler had used as the pretext to destroy Locarno.

Late Saturday evening Flandin announced the Cabinet's decision to the Press. He bombarded Berlin with words and made it clear that France would act. But the "action" would be under Article IV, 2 and not under Article IV, 3—i.e. France would appeal to the League Council and do nothing in the Rhineland. Immense relief was evident in Berlin and in London. Hitler had won his gamble. Londonderry wrote to *The Times* to express approval of the German action and urge British acceptance of the German proposals regardless of the French attitude.¹⁹ Rothermere's *Sunday Dispatch* (March 8) re-

joined: "The Locarno Pact is dead. It was a commitment in which the people of Britain never gave their sanction. It was made by the government of the day without any mandate from the electorate. It goes unhonored and unsung into the tomb of past political errors." Garvin's *Sunday Observer* rejoiced: "The first effect of Hitler is to put sanctions in their right place which is nowhere." Baldwin told Commons on March 9: "We have no more desire than to keep calm, to keep our heads, and to continue to try to bring France and Germany together in a friendship with ourselves." Eden joined the chorus: "Let us not delude ourselves. . . . There is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities. . . . We are not concerned merely with the past or the present. We are also concerned with the future. One of the main foundations of the peace of Western Europe has been cut away, and if peace is to be secured there is a manifest duty to rebuild. It is in that spirit that we must approach the new proposals of the German Chancellor. . . . No opportunity must be lost which offers any hope of amelioration." Hitler was willing to negotiate forever.

Meanwhile Flandin's telegram to Geneva of March 8 summoned a Council meeting and declared that the Locarno Treaty "cannot cease to have effect otherwise than by a decision of the Council of the League of Nations voting by a two-thirds majority." Belgium joined France in summoning the Council. Sarraut broadcast: "The French Government is firmly resolved not to negotiate under threats. . . . We are not disposed to allow Strasbourg to come under the fire of German guns." The Quai d'Orsay naïvely sought reparations and an admission of guilt from Germany, a pledge of British support against German aggression, and a German pledge to withdraw the Reichswehr or at least not to refortify the Rhineland. All in vain. On March 10 Eden, Halifax, Van Zeeland, and Cerruti met with Flandin and Sarraut in Paris. Flandin was firm: no negotiations without evacuation; sanctions if evacuation were refused. Eden and Halifax were shocked. They had instructions to urge negotiations with Germany after the Council should have condemned the Reich—an act which Berlin agreed not to regard as an obstacle to negotiations! Eden phoned Baldwin and then suggested that the Council meet not in Geneva but in London—a more "neutral" atmosphere—with Germany invited to participate. Here, as in March 1935, Downing Street deemed it unfair that the culprit should be condemned without sitting on the bench with the judges.

Representatives of the Locarno Powers dickered in London from the 12th to the 19th of March. Britain agreed to meet French desires to the extent of urging a partial withdrawal of the German troops. Berlin was negative. Flandin retreated step by step. On March 9 he had received Eden's pledge of continued British observance of the remaining obligations of Locarno vis-à-vis France. But for the rest he got nothing. The Council assembled in London on March 14. Berlin accepted an invitation to participate on condition that the other Powers be "prepared to enter into negotiations forthwith [*alsbald*' or 'as soon as possible'] in regard to the German proposals." The Council asserted that it could give no such pledge. The Reich was nevertheless represented by Ribbentrop after March 19. Flandin asked the Council to establish the fact of a breach of the Treaty and to recommend remedies. France was willing to submit the issue of the incompatibility of the Soviet pact and the Locarno obligations to the Permanent Court. Flandin also recalled the Council resolution of April 17, 1935, and declared that the very existence of the League was imperiled.

Eden replied that the German action involved no threat of hostilities. The Council therefore should avoid the "horrors of war" and contribute to "reconstruction." Ribbentrop promised co-operation. On March 19 the Council voted a resolution proposed by France and Belgium. Chile abstained. Germany voted in the negative. The resolution stated the obvious:

The Council of the League of Nations, on the application of Belgium and France, made to it on March 8, 1936: Finds that the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, 1936, military forces to enter and establish themselves in the demilitarized zone referred to in Article 42 and the following Articles of that Treaty and in the Treaty of Locarno; Instructs the Secretary-General, in application of Article IV, 2 of the Treaty of Locarno, to notify this finding of the Council without delay to the Powers signatories of that Treaty.

On March 19 the Locarno Powers, minus Germany, drew up proposals in London condemning German treaty-violation, reaffirming the obligations of Locarno, providing for consultation among General Staffs for co-operative resistance to unprovoked aggression, and inviting the Reich to submit its dispute with France to the Permanent

Court and to limit and suspend the dispatch of troops and war materials to the Rhineland. Berlin rejected both the Council resolution and the London proposals. On March 24 the Council adjourned after noting that there was no application before it for action.²⁰

There followed protracted exchanges of ingenious but meaningless verbiage: German counter-proposals on March 31; a French memorandum on April 6; discussions at Geneva, April 10; and finally a British "questionnaire" to Berlin on May 7. This document reviewed the negotiations and asked for information: was Germany now ready to conclude "genuine treaties"? "It is, of course, clear that negotiations for a treaty would be useless if one of the parties hereafter felt free to deny its obligation on the ground that the party was not at that time in condition to conclude a binding treaty and His Majesty's Government will welcome a clear declaration from the German Government to remove any uncertainty on this point. . . . The question is really whether Germany now considers the point has been reached at which she can signify that she recognizes and intends to respect the existing territorial and political status in Europe except in so far as this might subsequently be modified by free negotiation and agreement." Was Germany still willing to couple an Air Locarno with an agreement to limit aerial armaments? Moreover, "His Majesty's Government also note the proposal in sub-paragraph 17 of paragraph 22 [of the German memorandum of March 31] for non-aggression pacts between Germany and the States on Germany's southeastern and northeastern frontiers. His Majesty's Government would venture to recall the general outline of such pacts given to Sir John Simon by Baron von Neurath in Berlin on the 26th of March 1935. They would like to know whether the German Government suggest that these pacts should follow generally that outline and whether they agree that these pacts also may be guaranteed by mutual assistance arrangements."

Since Germany was ready to re-enter the League, continued the British questionnaire, the proposed non-aggression pact would operate within the Covenant. Was the Reich also ready to conclude non-aggression pacts with Latvia, Estonia, and the USSR, even though their territories were not contiguous to Germany? Did Germany subscribe to the principle of non-intervention as well as non-aggression? What was the Reich's attitude toward the Permanent Court and toward the international court of arbitration which it had proposed? "There are other matters which will have to be raised at a later date."²¹

In this questionnaire Eden's Cabinet colleagues seemingly permitted the trustful Anthony to carry almost to a *reductio ad absurdum* the process of negotiating while Hitler armed for new victories to come. When Downing Street sought to elicit answers from Wilhelmstrasse, there were repeated evasions and delays. The questionnaire was never answered. Der Führer might well have replied that all the answers could be found in *Mein Kampf*.

On July 23 Blum, Delbos, Van Zeeland, and Spaak met in London with Eden, Halifax, and Baldwin. They found themselves in agreement. "The main purpose to which the efforts of all European nations must be directed is to consolidate peace by means of a general settlement." The formation of blocs must be discouraged. A new agreement should replace Locarno. If it could be achieved, all other problems could be solved.²² Hitler's *fait accompli* was here accepted as a basis for new negotiations. Blum was delighted. Eden was delighted: the three Powers were now looking "definitely to the future" and did not "confine" themselves "to the past."²³ The future, to be sure, arrived. But it was to be made not in London or Paris or Geneva, but in Berlin. The promised "negotiations" came to nothing.

On October 14, 1936 King Leopold of Belgium in a speech to his Cabinet rejected his country's alliance with France and championed isolation and neutrality. Paris was shocked. On April 24, 1937 Belgium ceased to be France's ally. In an exchange of notes Britain and France accepted a pledge from Brussels to defend Belgian territory against any aggression, invasion, or effort to use Belgium as a base for aggression against others; to organize its defenses efficiently; and to remain faithful to the League Covenant. London and Paris likewise reiterated their pledges to continue to defend Belgium. But they released Brussels from all obligations to assist them under the defunct Locarno Pact and the arrangements of March 19, 1936.²⁴ Berlin rejoiced. Here, thanks to the decision of the Quai d'Orsay on March 7, France lost its nearest ally. The others would be lost in the aftermath.

2. ETHIOPIA † MAY 9, 1936

If Hitler was in the end the major beneficiary of the crisis precipitated by Il Duce's war against Ethiopia, Mussolini was the immediate beneficiary of Hitler's coup of March 7, 1936. This blow set London and Paris at loggerheads and destroyed whatever faint hope remained

that Eden might bring Paris and Geneva (to say nothing of his own colleagues) to the view that effective sanctions ought to be imposed on aggressors. After March the Quai d'Orsay demanded action against the Reich and condoned Mussolini's venture more eagerly than before. After March Downing Street—or at least Eden—demanded action against Italy and condoned the German *fait accompli*.²⁵

On January 20 Ethiopia had appealed once more to the Secretary-General for financial assistance and further sanctions. The Committee of Thirteen rejected the plea on January 23. The Committee of Eighteen met on the preceding day and appointed a sub-committee of experts to study the possible effectiveness of an oil embargo. Its report of February 12 concluded that such an embargo would be effective within three or three and a half months in stopping oil-supplies to Italy and exhausting Italian stocks, provided that the United States would limit its oil exports to Italy to normal levels.²⁶ On February 1 Mussolini in the *Popolo d'Italia* warned again that "blockade will mean war" and called upon the students of Europe "who will have to march into the burning fiery furnace" to "bind themselves into a spiritual unity over the politicians' heads." Such appeals were not in vain. Pro-Fascist students at the Sorbonne were already making it impossible for Professor Jèze to teach. But in Commons on February 24 Laborites and Liberals accused the Cabinet of vacillation and called for oil sanctions.

The Committee of Eighteen reassembled on March 2. Signor Bova Scoppa transmitted an oral threat to Flandin that if oil sanctions were voted, Italy would quit the League, denounce the accord of January 1935, man the French-Italian frontier, and withhold all co-operation should any necessity arise to enforce Locarno. This was a far cry from public threats of "war," which were bombast, but Il Duce assumed that Flandin could be intimidated by threats as well as bought with empty promises. The French Foreign Minister at once asked Eden to postpone discussion of oil sanctions pending further "mediation." Eden phoned Baldwin, who approved. Flandin thereupon proposed that the Committee of Thirteen should make a new appeal for peace. Eden agreed but remarked: "His Majesty's Government are in favor of the imposition of an oil embargo by the members of the League and are prepared to join in the early application of such a sanction if the other principal supplying and transporting States who are members of the League of Nations are prepared to do likewise."

On March 3 the Committee of Thirteen voted a resolution appealing

to both belligerents for the immediate reopening of negotiations and providing for a new meeting on March 10 to hear the reply—and presumably to permit the Committee of Eighteen to consider oil sanctions if “mediation” should fail. Eden had pressed for a time limit of forty-eight hours, or at most seventy-two, and the cessation of hostilities. But he was out-maneuvered by Flandin.²⁷ Gayda in the *Giornale d'Italia* hailed the French victory over Britain. Haile Selassie accepted the proposal on March 5. Hitler's blow fell two days later. Il Duce accepted “in principle” on March 8, but all danger was now past. The Committee of Thirteen did not again meet until March 23, this time in London. There was no consideration of further sanctions. After a two-hour private discussion a resolution was approved:

The Committee of Thirteen takes note of the replies given by the two parties to the dispute to the appeal addressed to them on the 3rd of March. It requests its chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, to get into touch with the two parties and to take such steps as may be called for in order that the Committee may be able, as soon as possible, to bring the two parties together and, within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant, to bring about a prompt cessation of hostilities and a final restoration of peace.²⁸

On the same day Mussolini sang in Rome: “Victory kisses our flags and the territory our soldiers have conquered is consecrated to our country forever.” Salvador de Madariaga, as chairman of the Committee of Thirteen, made inquiries of Rome regarding Ethiopian allegations of atrocities. Rome denied them and accused Ethiopia of atrocities. He suggested that Rome send a delegate to Geneva. Rome refused and suggested that Madariaga come to Italy. Ambassador Chambrun returned to Paris with a Roman pledge to honor Locarno on condition of the immediate repeal of all sanctions, recantation of the League verdict, and acquiescence in a “direct” settlement. On April 1 Wolde Mariam wrote the Secretary-General asking financial aid, the removal of obstacles “placed by certain States in the way of the transport of arms consigned to the Ethiopian forces,” reinforcement of sanctions, and measures to compel Rome to respect the laws of war and cease “the systematic destruction and extermination of innocent populations.” On April 6 and 7, following defeat at Lake Ashangi, Haile Selassie made new appeals for aid. Eden induced the Committee of Thirteen to reassemble on April 8.

At this meeting Eden spoke sharply regarding the Committee's inaction on Ethiopian charges of Italian use of poison gas. But Flandin agreed with Mussolini that the Committee was incompetent to discuss

this. A commission of jurists was appointed to study the question. The International Red Cross was asked to supply information regarding the charges. It refused on April 9 on the ground that it was "neutral." The jurists reported that the Council was competent to discuss the issue, but that the conventions forbidding the use of gas provided no penalties for violation. The Committee of Thirteen finally addressed "a pressing appeal to both belligerents to take all necessary measures for preventing any breaches of the international conventions and of the principles of the law of nations." Ethiopia gave assurances on April 10. Rome blandly replied: "A respect for the laws of war has been, and is, the constant goal of the Italian army."

The Committee of Thirteen decided that Madariaga should not go to Rome. Aloisi came to Geneva, but declared that he was there to discuss Locarno and had no other instructions. He intimated that Rome might condescend to send a representative to Geneva after Easter. Eden favored accepting this "offer," with the Committee to remain in session and Madariaga and Avenol to take part in the discussions. Flandin thought otherwise: the Committee should adjourn; the chairman and the Secretary-General should be merely "observers." It was at length decided that the Committee should adjourn to April 16. New Ethiopian appeals were without effect. On the 15th Aloisi returned to Geneva and told Madariaga that Italy was ready to negotiate directly on the basis of the *de facto* situation in Ethiopia and hoped that the outcome "will be such as to enable the Italian Government to resume active participation" in the League. Ethiopia protested and demanded that negotiations be within the framework and spirit of the Covenant. On April 17 Madariaga reported the failure of his efforts. The Committee took refuge in procedural evasions. It decided to make a report to the Council—which consisted of itself plus Italy and Ethiopia. Madariaga drafted a report which was accepted on the 18th.

The League Council met on April 20. Madariaga presented his report. Aloisi declared that any armistice must provide for "virtually the occupation of the whole enemy territory." He further observed that the use of gas was legitimate because the convention of June 17, 1925 "contains no provision forbidding . . . the exercise of the right of reprisals against atrocities." Wolde Mariam asked the application of Article 16 in its entirety. Eden reiterated his willingness to consider further sanctions. As to gas: "If a convention such as this can be torn up . . . how can we have confidence that our own folk, despite

all solemnly signed protocols, will not be burned, blinded, and done to death in agony hereafter?" Echo answered: "How?"

Paul-Boncour played his assigned role: "Conciliation must continue until it arrives at its goal. . . . Passing divergencies must not prevent us from finding ourselves united again in face of the formidable eventualities that now weigh on Europe as a result of certain events. . . . We need peace in Ethiopia in order to address ourselves to the dangers with which Europe is threatened. We need a settlement of the position of a great country vis-à-vis the League of Nations, in order that this country may take part in the work of European construction; and I note with satisfaction that the representative of Italy has graciously drawn our attention on this point to the fact that this is also the desire of his own country." The Soviet Ambassador, Potemkin, sardonically noted the presence of a "tendency to treat the aggressor with a tolerance, and even an indulgence, that actually increases in the same ratio as the aggressor's own arrogance and tenacity." Madariaga was troubled: "But, gentlemen, since the moment when we recognized, now several months ago, that there was an act of aggression and a victim of it, we can only work for conciliation in the somewhat illogical and difficult form of a conciliation between an aggressor and his victim."

The difficulties of logic, however, offered no obstacles to those determined to render unto Cæsar the things that Cæsar demanded. After a long private discussion the Council adopted a wordy and vapid resolution, addressing to Italy "a supreme appeal that . . . she should bring to the settlement of her dispute with Ethiopia that spirit which the League of Nations is entitled to expect from one of its original members." Aloisi voted against it. Ecuador objected. The Council dispersed and did not meet again until May 11.

In the interim Ethiopia was done to death. The Italian invasion from the north under de Bono and that from the south under Graziani had made little progress during the autumn. On November 16 de Bono was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, sixty-three years old and a veteran of many campaigns. He had immense resources of men and machines at his disposal. His task was to win victory, for he was consecrated to the service of his master and the cult of power. Years before in Libya he had pondered over a Latin inscription dug up by his men at a remote outpost. It had been written by a soldier of another age: "Here am I, the Captain of a legion of Rome who serves in the desert of Libya and learns and ponders this

truth: that there are in life but two things, love and power, and no man has both." ²⁹ Badoglio had long since made his choice.

A majority of western military experts had taken the view (and this view was deemed by some to justify the course which London and Paris pursued) that even the vast mechanized armaments which Cæsar had assembled in Eritrea and Somaliland could not in a single season cross the great deserts, scale the Ethiopian plateau, and conquer any large part of the country before next summer's rains should again make operations impossible. This view was based upon geographical and climatic obstacles, and upon the Negus's ability to hold the loyalty of his chieftains and train his troops in guerrilla warfare. It also assumed that the Ethiopian armies would have access to an adequate supply of at least small arms and that the invaders would wage war by lawful and accepted methods. The error of these predictions was in part a tribute to Badoglio's ability as a strategist. It was in larger part a result of other factors.

The decisive elements in Fascist victory would appear to have been the refusal of the sanctionist powers to permit Ethiopia to secure arms, the enormous superiority of Italy in material, and Badoglio's willingness, when thwarted, to resort to illicit and savage tactics of terrorization. One correspondent with the Ethiopian armies asserted: "The primary cause of their defeat was that they had no arms, and were allowed none. The secondary cause of their defeat was Italian air supremacy, exploited eventually by the spraying of mustard gas. The great Ras said that they could not fight the heavens or the burning rain." ³⁰

The invaders had over 300 planes in the North and 100 in the South. The Ethiopians had 11, of which 8 could fly. None was armed. All were slow. All were used to carry dispatches. The Ethiopians had 8 anti-aircraft guns in the North and 5 in the South and almost no ammunition. They had no heavy artillery, no tanks (Badoglio used hundreds), no motor-trucks (the invaders had thousands), no gas masks. Between January and July 1935 Haile Selassie was able to import 16,000 rifles, 600 machine-guns, and half a million rounds of ammunition. In all he could count on not more than 60,000 modern rifles. He was able to mobilize about 250,000 men, but four-fifths of them were without modern weapons. Unofficially but firmly, Britain and France enforced an arms embargo against Ethiopia throughout the conflict ³¹—because of a desire to see Il Duce win, a fear of Italian retaliation, and a reluctance to see a native African army supplied with

contemporary weapons. Courageous Ethiopian troops sought to defend their country against an ultra-modern war machine with spears, sticks, stones, and with their bare hands and bodies. They were able to inflict only a few thousand casualties on the invaders. In the end they failed. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay feigned surprise and regret.

Despite their helplessness, however, the Ethiopian soldiery had fought the enemy to a standstill in both North and South by the close of 1935 and even inflicted serious defeats in the Tembien in January. Cæsar's commanders resorted to *Schrecklichkeit*. On December 6, 1935, ten bombers singled out the village of Dessye, where Haile Selassie had his headquarters. He himself futilely manned a machine-gun in an attempt to fight them off. Here it was for the first time that the Italian aviators made a special target of the Red Cross. The American Mission Hospital was showered with bombs. One observer on the scene called it "the most contemptible, disgusting, and inhumane act of warfare" he had ever experienced in his twenty years as a war correspondent.³² The Ethiopian sanitary service was at best pitiable. Most of the wounded either recovered without aid or died of gangrene. But, reasoned the invaders, if the few who could be accommodated in Red Cross hospitals and camps could be slaughtered in their beds, the morale of the defenders would be shattered.

Downing Street protested to Rome on March 7, 9, 10, and often thereafter at the bombing of British Red Cross units. Sweden protested on December 20, January 14, and March 5. The world was outraged. But the bombing went on. On March 4 at Koren Fascist plane S-62 circled the Ethiopian camp at a low altitude and carefully dropped forty bombs on the British Red Cross detachment. The pilot machine-gunned the doctors, nurses, and wounded as they tried to flee. His name was Vittorio Mussolini.³³

When these tactics did not suffice, worse followed. By March and April Italian squadrons were spraying villages, encampments, peasants, farm huts, roads and forests with mustard gas. The work was easy and pleasant. There was no defense and therefore no danger. Vittorio Mussolini as a boy had never seen a really good fire. So he used incendiary bombs in the Adi-Abo zone:

I don't think a more important reason existed. . . . We also carried grenades containing shrapnel. . . . It was most entertaining work and had a tragic but beautiful effect. . . . I still remem-

ber the effect I produced on a small group of Galla tribesmen massed round a man in black clothes. I dropped an aerial torpedo right in the center and the group opened up just like a flowering rose. It was most entertaining.³⁴

Vittorio's brother Bruno also relished his work of civilizing barbarians:

We had to set fire to the wooded hills, to the fields, and to the little villages. . . . It was all most diverting. . . . The bombs hardly touched the earth before they burst out into white smoke and an enormous flame and the dry grass began to burn. I thought of the animals; God, how they ran! . . . After the bomb-racks were emptied I began throwing bombs by hand. . . . It was most amusing: a big "Zariba" surrounded by tall trees was not easy to hit. I had to aim carefully at the straw roof and only succeeded at the third shot. The wretches who were inside, seeing their roof burning, jumped out and ran off like mad. Surrounded by a circle of fire about five thousand Abyssinians came to a sticky end. It was like hell.³⁵

In a letter to *The Times* of March 25, 1936, T. A. Lambie, the Executive Secretary of the Ethiopian Red Cross, wrote: "The bombing of country villages around Kworam and Waldia, the permanent blinding and maiming of hundreds of helpless women and children, as well as the infliction of similar injuries on soldiers with that most dreadful of all dreadful agencies, Yperite, or so-called mustard gas should cause ourselves to ask the question—whither? Today a few thousand peasants in Wallo will be groping their way down the dark years because of a dictator whose name they have never heard of, but whose decree of ruthlessness has put out their eyes. Wallo is a long way from Charing Cross—yes, but not for aeroplanes. Whither tomorrow?"³⁶

Echo answered: "Whither?" When Lord Cecil raised the question in the House of Lords on March 30, Lord Halifax declared he had "no information" on Italian use of gas. "It would be quite wrong and quite unjust to pre-judge a matter so grave and so vitally affecting the honor of a great country. . . . The first step must be to obtain the observations and comments of the Italian Government." The British Cabinet never thought it worth while to investigate. British Red Cross units were treating hundreds of gas victims by the end of March. But *The Times* declared placidly on April 2: "The use of

poison gas has not been witnessed by an authoritative British observer.”³⁷ Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay, like Achille Rati (Pius XI) in Vatican City,³⁸ had their own reasons for desiring Fascist victory. If the price of victory was the blinding and burning and torture of some thousands of Ethiopians, who cared?

By such devices Ethiopia was broken. Amba Aradam and Amba Alaji in the North were taken in February. The inexorable advance southward continued in March. Harrar was destroyed from the air. Early in April Kworam was taken, then Dessye, and by the end of the month Badoglio’s machine was rolling rapidly toward the capital. On April 27, at Addis Ababa, Princess Tsahai appealed to the women of the West through the foreign journalists:

For God’s sake help us. Get something done that will really harm the Italian armies and not merely the Italian people. . . . Rally your husbands, brothers, sons, and force them to use their massed strength to compel the parliaments and rulers to take action. Do I ask you purely selfishly to do this? No. We are only a small race; but I am seventeen and its leading daughter, and I know, as you know, that if Mankind lets armies and gas destroy my country and people, Civilization will be destroyed too. We have a common cause, you and I. Why therefore do not all do something to drive off this common danger to Humanity, this agony, this death by bombs, shells, and gas, before it again establishes itself as it is doing here now, soon to spread fatally to your homes and your menfolk too? Italian aggression and gas have set Humanity a test. If you fail to help us now, we all shall die.³⁹

She also sent a plea to Herriot. It produced no result. On April 29, Haile Selassie transmitted an appeal through George L. Steer:

Do the peoples of the world not yet realize that by fighting on until the bitter end I am not only performing my sacred duty to my people but standing guard in the last citadel of collective security? Are they too blind to see that I have my responsibilities to the whole of humanity to face? I must still hold on until my tardy allies appear. If they never come, then I say prophetically and without bitterness: “The West will perish.”⁴⁰

On May 2, when all was lost, Haile Selassie left Addis Ababa by rail to Djibuti with his family and a few advisers and thence proceeded

to Jerusalem. He departed from Palestine on a British warship May 23, and reached London June 3. On May 5, Badoglio's troopers entered the Ethiopian capital, already given over to looting and arson. At 5.45 p.m., less than two hours after the entrance of the conquerors into the burning capital, Il Duce summoned all Italy to a victory celebration. Once more he addressed a cheering throng from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia:

Blackshirts of the Revolution, men and women of all Italy, Italians and friends of Italy beyond the mountains and seas: Marshal Badoglio telegraphs: "Today, May 5, at 4.00 p.m., at the head of the victorious troops, I entered Addis Ababa." In thirty centuries of our history Italy has lived memorable hours, but this today certainly is one of the most solemn. I announce to the Italian peoples and to the world the war is finished. I announce to the Italian peoples and to the world peace has been re-established. . . . Ethiopia is Italian. It is Italian in fact because it is occupied by our victorious armies. It is Italian in law because of the law of Rome and civilization which triumphs over barbarism, justice which triumphs over cruel whims, redemption of miseries which triumphs over slavery. . . .⁴¹

On May 9, 1936 Cæsar addressed the populace once more. Again he hailed victory, now crowned with new decrees: "The territory and peoples which appertain to the Empire of Ethiopia are hereby placed under full and complete sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The title of Emperor of Ethiopia is assumed for himself and for his successors by the King of Italy. Ethiopia is ruled and represented by a Governor-General who has the title of Viceroy and from whom will depend also the Governors of Eritrea and Somaliland." Another decree named Badoglio as Viceroy. Graziani was promoted to the rank of Marshal and presently succeeded Badoglio in the new post. Cæsar beamed: "Italy at last has her Empire. It is a Fascist Empire. . . . It is an Empire of peace. . . . The Italian people have created an Empire with their blood. . . . They will defend it against anyone with their weapons. In this supreme certainty, lift your flags, your swords, your hearts to salute the reappearance after fifteen centuries of an Empire on the fateful hills of Rome. Will you be worthy of it?" The mob howled: "Yes, yes." "Is this cry a sacred oath?" demanded Il Duce. "Yes!" "Is it an oath that binds you before God and man?" "Yes!" "Is it an oath that binds you for life or death?" "Yes! Yes!"

"Blackshirts and legionnaires," cried Cæsar, "salute the King!" "Long live the King!"⁴²

3. GENEVA † JULY 4, 1936

Spring brought flowers in the meadows of the Alps, but to Geneva, as to Ethiopia, it brought death. The Council met May 11-13, 1936. A wire from Haile Selassie in Jerusalem asked its members not to recognize the Italian conquest and not to abandon efforts to insure respect for the Covenant. Wolde Mariam was more bitter: "The crime has been consummated. The Covenant has been torn up. Article 10 has been outrageously violated. Article 16 has not been applied." Aloisi proposed that the Ethiopian-Italian item be removed from the agenda: there was no longer any "dispute," for Ethiopia had disappeared. His insistence caused a postponement of the session from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. When Eden, acting as Council President, called upon Mariam to take his place, Aloisi and his staff walked out. The Council decided that the item should remain. Mussolini recalled the whole Italian delegation on the 12th, while the Council resolved "to resume its deliberations on this subject on the 15th of June and considered that in the meantime there is no cause for modifying the measures previously adopted in collaboration by the members of the League."

While the Geneva pretense was thus preserved, "cause" was soon found elsewhere for abandoning sanctions. Woodrow Wilson had postulated a "union of wills" against aggressors as a *sine qua non* of effective sanctions.⁴³ The only union of wills in Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay was a union to condone aggression. The immediate problem was one of winning public support for what appeared to be capitulation. The problem was readily enough solved by manipulation of the appropriate symbols, for public opinion in Britain was ready to run to cover. Arnold J. Toynbee described its temper well when he wrote:

The British electorate of this generation were the children of an age in which a *ci-devant* Christian Society had come to believe that its talent for clockwork (institutional as well as metallic) could dispense it from the need of holding convictions and of summoning up the courage to act upon them when the conse-

quences of such action were likely to be unpleasant. . . . These children of the Enlightenment fell under the yoke of the Goddess Tyche or Fortune, who, under many different names, had repeatedly established her paralyzing dominion over the souls of men and women who had been called upon to live in periods of social decadence. . . . They made their momentous choice neither on the absolute criterion of morality nor on the relative criterion of expediency, but on that trivial distinction between this moment and the next which keeps the sluggard cowering between the blankets when the house is burning over his head.⁴⁴

The Tory leaders of Britain moved adroitly to elicit acquiescence in the decision about to be reached. Eden in Commons on May 6 indignantly repudiated allegations that the Government had "let down" the League. With too patent sophistry, he argued that British oil had not helped the invaders to success, that American non-membership in the League had made further sanctions impossible, that the Suez Canal could not have been closed without League action, that no League resolution to close the Canal could have been passed. He confessed "disappointment" at "the failure of the League." But the League must go on. It must be "reformed." The Government will approach these problems "in a spirit of realism and constructive statesmanship." It asked a free hand—"with this assurance: that it will continue to pursue its policy under the Covenant." On May 14 Baldwin developed the new theme in Albert Hall: war is horrible; on no account must collective security lead to war; the League must be reformed.

As early as April 30 Winston Churchill had asked that sanctions be lifted. Sir Austen Chamberlain followed suit on May 6. Apprehension was expressed lest the new Cabinet of the People's Front in France might develop a belated enthusiasm for sanctions.⁴⁵ Throughout the month of May the tide of sentiment which had found expression in the peace ballot, in the fraudulent election of November, and in the ousting of Hoare, ebbed and receded into the shallows and miseries of frustration and defeat.⁴⁶ The once despised Hoare re-entered the Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty on June 5. (Eden welcomed Haile Selassie to London on the same day.) The voices for continued sanctions had by now become few and feeble. The Cabinet was content to follow the tide down to the sea of surrender, with occasional soundings to reassure itself as to the direction of the flow.

Neville Chamberlain was chosen to break the news. He performed such tasks well and would learn to do them better. At a dinner in his honor at the 1900 Club on June 10, he broke the Cabinet's silence.

The Italian affair in Abyssinia has resulted in a grievous estrangement between two countries with a long and unbroken record of friendship behind them. . . . There is no use for us to shut our eyes to realities. . . . If we have retained any vestige of common sense, surely we must admit that we have tried to impose upon the League a task which it was beyond its powers to fulfill. . . . Surely it is time that the nations who compose the League should review the situation and should decide so to limit the functions of the League in future that they may accord with its real powers. . . . Is it not apparent that the policy of sanctions involves—I do not say war, but a risk of war? . . . That being so, does it not suggest that it might be wise to explore the possibilities of localizing the danger spots of the world and trying to find a more practical method of securing the people by means of regional arrangements which could be approved by the League, but which should be guaranteed only by those nations whose interests are vitally connected with those danger zones? 47

These carefully phrased questions admitted of but one answer. The still popular Eden was obliged to break the news in Commons on June 18: "The fact has got to be faced that the sanctions did not realize the purpose for which they were imposed. The Italian military campaign succeeded. The capital and most important part of Ethiopia is in Italian military occupation and, so far as I am aware, no Ethiopian Government survives in any part of the Emperor's territory." (This was untrue, as the Cabinet well knew, for an Ethiopian Government was still functioning at Gore, west of Addis Ababa. Its communications were relayed by British telegraph agencies to Eritrea, where they were, of course, suppressed. But the Ethiopian Legation in London had established contacts and had informed the Foreign Office before Eden's speech. However . . . ?) "That is the situation which has got to be faced. It is a situation which nothing but military action—from outside the country—could possibly avert. Is there any country prepared to take such military action? Or is there any section of opinion in this country prepared to take such military action? . . . His Majesty's Government, after mature consideration and on the advice which I, as Foreign Secretary, thought it my duty to give, has come

to the conclusion that there is no longer any utility in continuing these measures as a means of pressure upon Italy. . . . If we cling to a course after the objective has become unobtainable, we may lose the greater end for which we are working, the greater end being, in these anxious days, to keep peace."

The day was the 120th anniversary of Waterloo. Simon asserted: "I do not think there is a single member of the League which is prepared to use force. . . . I am not prepared to see a single ship sunk even in a successful naval battle in the cause of Abyssinian independence." Two days later Baldwin followed Eden's lead at Wishaw, Scotland: "We think it right to drop sanctions because we do not believe their continuance, even if all nations desired it, would serve a useful or effective purpose. . . . We have been abused by our political opponents; we have been mocked by them and by Mr. Lloyd George too. For what? Because we have scuttled? Because we have run away? . . . Do these words mean anything unless they mean that we ran away from the Italian navy? Can they have any other meaning? In other words, that we have run away from war? . . . If that fire is ever lighted again on the Continent, no man can tell where the heather will cease burning; and it is not a risk that I for one am going to take for my country so long as I have control in the Government."⁴⁸

This technique, already foreshadowed in dealing with Japan and Germany, was to prove itself the "Open Sesame" of the years to come. The British electorate was devoted to peace and was convinced that peace was indivisible and could be preserved only by assuming the obligations, responsibilities, and risks of collective security through the League. Its Tory leaders (Eden excepted, though he too was forced to play the game) repudiated collective security, denied the indivisibility of peace, and connived both at the sacrifice of others to aggressors and at the destruction of Geneva. How to win approval for such a policy? Formula: frighten the public with fear of war; associate collective security and effective sanctions with war; associate the League with war; praise Geneva, but demand "reform"; make no British sacrifices to Cæsar (this would be contrary to the Tory ethos), but, with a tear and catch of the voice, present the tragedy of those who have been abandoned as indispensable for "peace." The prescription worked.

Labor's resolution of censure was voted down in Commons on June 23, 384 to 170. Cabinet supporters shouted at the Opposition: "Do you want war?" Labor lacked the wit to find an answer which the

public would accept. The fight for the League was lost in London. Neville Chamberlain pushed the victory home at Manchester on June 27:

There is only one sanction which today could have any effect at all on the course of things in Abyssinia, and that is force, and force means war. Mr. Lloyd George himself told us in the House of Commons that, in his opinion, this country would never march to war in an Austrian quarrel. Does he suggest that we should do for Abyssinia what we would not do for Austria? Does he suggest that we should enter upon a war the end of which no man could see; that we should expose our people to the risk of those horrors which so shocked us when they were applied to Abyssinia? ⁴⁹

In France, despite the defeat of reaction and the triumph of the People's Front, the new premier, Socialist Léon Blum, accepted Tory guidance. His Cabinet decided on June 19 to abide by any League decision on sanctions, but indicated that it desired their abandonment.⁵⁰ Other governments—Australia, Canada, Belgium, Ecuador, Poland, and presently all the sanctionist States—followed the British example. On June 20 President Roosevelt declared the war at an end and lifted the American “neutrality” embargo. Two days later Eden announced that the Cabinet was halting all arms shipments into Ethiopia from the Sudan. A letter from Lord Cecil in *The Times* warned: “We cannot escape war by running away from it. . . . There is no escape from blackmail by submission.” But his voice was alone in the wilderness. Only far-off New Zealand and South Africa stood for continuing sanctions. Almost all States had lifted their embargoes and resumed “business as usual” by the end of June. It remained for Geneva only to ratify the capitulation.

On the motion of Argentina the Assembly met in special session on June 30. President Van Zeeland contributed toward the lugubrious task of trying to conceal what was about to happen behind a smoke screen of League “reform.” On June 27 Haile Selassie transmitted a letter from Dejasmach Nasibu to the effect that the Ethiopian Government was functioning at Gore, that it had renounced no rights, and expected the League to apply the Covenant. A letter of Ciano on July 29 was read by Van Zeeland to the delegates: “The Ethiopian population . . . welcomed the Italian troops as champions of freedom, justice, civilization, and order. . . . Italy views the work which

she has undertaken as a sacred mission of civilization and proposes to carry it out according to the principles of the Covenant of the League and of other international agreements which set forth the duties of civilizing Powers. . . . The Italian Government declares itself ready to give once more its willing and practical co-operation to the League. . . . It is in this spirit that Italy acceded to the treaty of Rio de Janeiro [the Argentine Anti-war Pact] of October 10, 1933." M. Motta of Switzerland, with Hungarian and Italian support, privately urged that Haile Selassie be not permitted to speak—or at least not on the first day. British and French efforts to persuade the Negus to keep away from Geneva or to remain silent were unsuccessful. He came. After Señor Cantilo of Argentina, he was the first speaker at the opening session.

Haile Selassie I, Deserted by God, Abandoned by Man, King of the Vanquished, and Conquered Lion of Judah mounted the rostrum, still every inch a monarch. As he did so there was a feeble patter of applause from the floor—and then bedlam from the gallery. The Italian journalists, shouting insults and curses, created such an uproar that they had to be ejected by the guards before the session could proceed. (Rome denounced their expulsion as a slight upon "Italian honor.") Haile Selassie watched in silence. Then he spoke. His words were coals of fire:

I, Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people and the assistance promised it eight months ago, when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in violation of international treaties. None other than the Emperor can address the appeal of the Ethiopian people to those fifty nations. . . . I pray to Almighty God that He shall spare to the nations the terrible sufferings that have just been inflicted on my people. . . . The deadly rain that fell from the aircraft made all those whom it touched fly shrieking with pain. All those who drank poisoned water or ate infected food also succumbed in dreadful suffering. In tens of thousands the victims of Italian mustard gas fell. It is in order to denounce to the civilized world the tortures inflicted on the Ethiopian people that I resolved to come to Geneva. . . . [the invasion began] at a time when a certain Government considered that the European situation made it imperative at all costs to obtain the friendship of Italy. The price paid would be abandonment of Ethiopian inde-

pendence to the greed of the Italian Government. . . .

Apart from the Kingdom of the Lord, there is not on this earth any nation that is superior to any other. Should it happen that a strong government finds that it may with impunity destroy a small people, then the hour strikes for that weak people to appeal to the League to give its judgment in all freedom. God and history will remember your judgment. . . . Is it the Covenant that needs reform? What undertaking can be of any value if the will to keep them is lacking? It is international morality which is at stake, and not the articles of the Covenant. . . . What measures do you intend to take? Representatives of the world, I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of duties for the head of a State. What reply have I to take back to my people? ⁵¹

The question of Haile Selassie was soon answered. Blum spoke, not about Ethiopia or Italy, but about France and the beauties of peace, disarmament, and collective security. Eden spoke: "The facts should be squarely faced. . . . The realities have to be recognized. . . . The continuation of sanctions in their present form can serve no useful purpose." M. Te Waters of South Africa made a plea for the retention of sanctions and asserted that the impending decision would "shatter for generations all international confidence and all hope of realizing world peace. . . . Order is losing to chaos: the spectacle of power has hypnotized the world." Litvinov bluntly denounced the betrayers of the Covenant. Speech followed speech, mingling regret and disgrace with deceit and hypocrisy. On July 2 the Negus addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, accompanied by two resolutions, one asking a loan of £10,000,000 to Ethiopia and the other asking that no recognition be accorded to annexation obtained by force.

On July 3 the corpse-like quiet of the Assembly was shattered by a revolver-shot. With a cry of "*C'est le dernier coup!*" a Czech journalist, Stefan Lux, ended his life in the Assembly hall as a means of drawing attention to Nazi persecution of the Jews. On the following day Arthur Greiser, Nazi President of the Danzig Senate, created a sensation almost equally distressing. He had come to defy the League, denounce Sean Lester, League High Commissioner for Danzig, and warn Geneva not to interfere with the contemplated suppression of the Danzig Constitution, which was under League protection. He defied, he denounced, he warned. The Council yielded by transfer-

ring the task of upholding the Constitution to Poland, which was uninterested. Democracy in the Free City died. Danzig passed under the swastika. Greiser sneered, thumbed his nose at the foreign journalists, and shouted in the corridor that it was high time for German bombing planes to deal with the League as it deserved.

Those without honor cannot be moved from the path of disgrace by shame or insult. The day was July 4, 1936. One hundred sixty years previously the United States of America had proclaimed its independence. The words of Thomas Jefferson evoked no echo: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. . . . Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people." On the birthday of the American Republic, the League of Nations—creation of Jefferson's successor, Woodrow Wilson—died at Geneva. Van Zeeland presented a draft resolution expressing "firm attachment to the principles of the Covenant," soliciting proposals for "reform," and recommending "that the Co-ordination Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant." Ras Nasibu asked a vote on the Ethiopian resolutions. But Van Zeeland put his own draft to a vote: 44 ayes, 4 not voting (Chile, Mexico, Panama, and South Africa), and 1 nay: Ethiopia's. Van Zeeland declared that the Ethiopian resolution on non-recognition was thereby covered. The request for a loan he put to a vote: 1 aye (Ethiopia), 25 not voting, 23 nays. The proceedings closed with an address by Van Zeeland, Premier of Belgium. His country had also fallen under the military power of an invader twenty-two years before. Belgium, however, had not been abandoned. But Van Zeeland declare that his conscience and that of his fellow delegates was clear.

The Swiss authorities forbade Haile Selassie to reside in his near-by villa at Vevey unless he agreed to refrain from all political activity. On the evening of July 5 he went in his long black cloak to the Gare Cornavin and boarded a train for the north. A handful of journalists cried: "*Vive l'Empereur!*" He thanked them, bowed, and disappeared into the night. On the next day Lloyd George at Derby called the British Ministers "rats which scuttle the ship." At Geneva the Co-ordination Committee recommended that all sanctions be lifted July

15. Salvador de Madariaga resigned as permanent Spanish delegate on the 10th. Paris indicated that its pledge to defend Britain in the Mediterranean was at an end. Other pledges followed into limbo. Señor Bassols of Mexico, last of the speakers in the long debate, had said that Ethiopia would endure "as Banquo's ghost called to disturb the tranquillity of Geneva's conscience." But there was no longer any conscience to be disturbed.

On July 15, as sanctions ended, Cæsar exhorted 50,000 from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia: "On this day, the 15th of July in the fourteenth year of the Fascist era, the white flag has been hoisted on the bastions of world sanctionism. It is only a sign of surrender, but one would wish it were a symptom of a return to common sense. The credit for this great victory on the economic front must all be given to the Italian people—to the women, to the children of Italy. Nobody trembled, nobody yielded. We were ready for any sacrifice because we carried in our hearts the certainty that civilization and justice would triumph in the end in Europe as in Africa. And so it has been and so it will be tomorrow and always under the invincible banners of Fascism." 52

In a finale after the curtain, Avenol went to Rome on September 8, on advice from London and Paris, to arrange for Italy's return to Geneva. By Article 16, § 4 of the Covenant, "any member of the League which has violated any Covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a member of the League by vote of the Council." But no move had ever been made to expel Italy. By Article 1, § 2, Ethiopia alone of all the League members was entitled to remain a member, for only Ethiopia had given "effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations." Avenol's bait to Il Duce, however, was a promise to exclude the Ethiopian delegation from the impending Assembly session. The Cabinet of Léon Blum co-operated by forbidding Professor Jèze to serve as an Ethiopian delegate under threat of the loss of his chair at the Sorbonne. Haile Selassie, who went again to Geneva, hastily summoned Everett Colson to act in place of Jèze. The 17th Assembly opened on September 21. For the first time in the League's history an American citizen sat on the floor of the Assembly as a delegate—not of his own Republic, but of an ancient kingdom which the League Powers had condemned to extinction. Eden and Delbos sought to persuade the Credentials Committee to bar the Ethiopian delegation. But a majority favored admission. Eden "withdrew" his objections. By 39 to 4 (Austria,

Hungary, Albania, and Ecuador) Colson, Dr. Martin, and M. Taezaz were permitted to keep their seats. Rome withheld "co-operation."

Despite this meaningless victory of Right over Might, the League States one by one abandoned the Assembly's "Stimson Doctrine" resolution of March 11, 1932, and extended recognition to the Italian conquest by accrediting diplomats to Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy and "Emperor of Ethiopia." Austria acted first, on June 21. (Austria was the next member of the League scheduled for extinction.) Germany followed on October 25. Hungary, Japan, and a score of other States did likewise. Britain pledged recognition (and efforts to induce others to grant recognition) by the Ciano-Perth accord of April 16, 1938. France belatedly followed suit in October 1938.

Meanwhile the League entered upon its slow demise. Before the débâcle only five States had given notice of withdrawal: Costa Rica, January 1, 1925; Brazil, June 12, 1926; Japan, March 27, 1933; Germany, October 14, 1933; and Paraguay, February 23, 1935. After the débâcle, many left Geneva: Guatemala, May 15; Honduras, June 20; Nicaragua, June 26, 1936; Salvador, August 10, 1937; Italy, December 11, 1937; Chile, May 13, 1938; and Venezuela, July 12, 1938. By the close of 1938, the 62 States that had at one time or another been members of the League were reduced to 49. Among the missing, 11 had withdrawn and 2 (Ethiopia and Austria) had been devoured. Of the Great Powers only the USSR, France, and Britain remained at Geneva. Of these only the Soviet Union was loyal to the Covenant. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay had killed the Society of Nations.⁵³

Even as it died, workmen toiled to complete the magnificent new League Palace in Ariana Park. For all its glitter, it was already a sepulchre—or something worse. One of the workers remarked facetiously to a British journalist: "This, monsieur, is a barracks we are building. It will be ready for occupation by the Germans when they march this way." "That's right!" said another. "They will march next time through Switzerland. It's all arranged. . . ." ⁵⁴

4. EAST OF ROME AND BERLIN

By the remilitarization of the Rhineland the Reich interposed a wall of forts and troops between France and its Eastern allies. As soon as the wall should become impregnable these States would be at the mercy of Berlin. The whole French alliance system would then

collapse and France would be reduced to a third-rate Power, dependent for its security upon that least dependable of all allies: a Britain once called Great. Meanwhile Germany would prepare to become Great Germany. These preparations involved, among their preliminary steps, the economic and political penetration of Danubia and Balkania and the building of a coalition with Italy, Japan, and their satellites.

Il Duce's liason with Hitler was initiated as soon as the Quai d'Orsay had carried out Laval's mad bargain. Rumors of a projected German-Italian entente had circulated as early as 1932. Austria was ever the fly in the Fascist-Nazi ointment. A *modus vivendi* was achieved, however, by the German-Austrian accord of July 11, 1936.

The fabricators of the new orientation were Count Galeazzo Ciano and Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop. The former, born in Leghorn in 1904, was son of an admiral who became Fascist Secretary of Transport. After attending college and law school, writing two bad plays, working on a newspaper, and passing the foreign-service examinations, Galeazzo went to Rio, Shanghai, and London and at length became chief of Il Duce's press bureau and then head of the new Ministry of Press and Propaganda. He inherited wealth and married power, for his wife was Il Duce's daughter Edda. His father was made Count of Cortellazzo so that Edda (said some) could be a countess. Young Ciano returned a hero from Ethiopia as a Captain of the Royal Air Force. He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs June 9, 1936. In this role he was entrusted with the delicate task of wooing Der Führer—and was generally regarded as the most likely candidate for Cæsar's mantle when his father-in-law should go to his reward.

Ribbentrop, born in 1893, was the son of an old Rhenish family. He studied in Metz, Grenoble, and London and worked in import houses in Canada before 1914. He enlisted in the 12th Hussars, became a staff officer of von Seeckt, was sent on a special mission to Turkey, and entered the reserves with the rank of General. In politics he was first a liberal, then a guest of the Herren Klub, and finally a Nazi. Having married the daughter of a wealthy liquor baron, Herr Henckel, he took over the business and became a champagne salesman de luxe. As one of Hitler's intimates, he rose rapidly in the ranks and served as Special Commissioner for Disarmament Questions, roving envoy, negotiator of the Anglo-German naval accord, and Ambassador to the Court of St. James's.

Oratorical preparations for the marriage of convenience went for-

ward during the summer and autumn of 1936. At Avellino on August 30 Il Duce declared: "We reject the absurdity of eternal peace, which is foreign to our creed and to our temperament. . . . We must be strong. We must be always stronger. We must be so strong that we can face any eventualities and look directly in the eye whatever may befall. To this supreme principle must be subordinated and will be subordinated all the life of the nation." A week previously Hitler had extended German military service from one to three years. The Nürnberg *Partei Tag* of September 1936 was dedicated to denunciations of Bolshevism. Hitler declared wage increases impossible. But "If I had the Ural mountains with their incalculable store of treasures in raw materials, Siberia with its vast forests, and the Ukraine with its tremendous wheat fields, Germany under National-socialist leadership would swim in plenty." Rosenberg: "The Soviet Union's Government is controlled by Jewish interests and it is money stolen from the Russian people by the Jews that is being used in an attempt to awaken the underworld in all nations to march against European culture and against the holy traditions of all peoples." Göbbels: "Bolshevism must be annihilated. The idea of Bolshevism could have emanated only from the Jewish brain." Hitler denounced Russia and the "Bolshevist Jews" before thousands of marching troops and shouted: "We are ready any hour. . . . I cannot permit ruined States on my doorstep."

Here was the façade of the "Berlin-Rome axis." Ciano journeyed to the Reich in October. On the 25th he reached an agreement with Hitler, Neurath, and Ribbentrop. It was not made public, but in a statement to the press Ciano indicated that the accord covered six points:

1. Active and friendly co-operation for European peace and reconstruction, and also in matters concerning the paralleling interests of Italy and Germany.
2. A determination to defend European civilization against grave dangers threatening its social and cultural structure.
3. Reconstruction of Spain's territorial and colonial integrity, and agreement that the Government headed by General Francisco Franco commands the support of the Spanish people.
4. Co-operation in the Danubian sector within the framework of the Protocols of Rome and the Austro-German accord of last July 11.
5. Conclusion of a new Locarno pact to be strictly confined to Western Europe.
6. Economic concessions to Germany in Ethiopia.⁵⁵

Il Duce, in a speech in Bologna on October 24, offered peace: "We hold out an olive branch. But pay attention. This olive branch

emerges from an immense forest. It is a forest of 8,000,000 bayonets—8,000,000 bayonets whetted to razor-like sharpness and entrusted to young and fearless hearts.” On November 1 at Milan he announced that a “new epoch” had begun. He championed Hungarian irredentism and expressed the “vast sympathy” of the Italian people for Germany. “The meetings at Berlin had as a result an understanding between two countries on definite problems, some of which are particularly troublesome these days. But these understandings which have been consecrated verbally and duly signed—this Berlin-Rome protocol is not a barrier. It is rather an axis around which all European States animated by a desire for peace may collaborate. . . . It is no wonder if we today raise the banner of anti-Bolshevism. This is our old banner! We were born under this sign! We have fought against this enemy! We have conquered it through our sacrifices of blood!” On November 18, 1936 the new partners took their first step in common: simultaneous diplomatic recognition of the rebel regime of Franco as the Government of Spain.

Berlin next looked to the Far East. Japan was the necessary Asiatic counter-weight to the USSR and probable ally in the promised crusade against Moscow. Japan was at odds with the other naval Powers. On December 29, 1934 Tokio had denounced the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. The London Treaty of 1930 expired simultaneously. Japan demanded parity with Britain and America. When it was refused, Japan declined to participate in the London Naval Conference of 1936. The new treaty of March 25, 1936, signed by Britain, America, and France and adhered to by Italy April 16, 1938, provided for no quantitative limitations or reductions of naval arms, but only for qualitative limitations of ship tonnage and guns. Germany and the USSR later accepted these limits, but they were soon exceeded by virtue of “escape clauses” and an Anglo-American agreement to match Japanese construction. In the new naval race Japan was seemingly grooming itself for war with Britain and the United States. The Reich’s involvement in any such conflict would be dangerous. Berlin preferred to believe that Red Russia was Nippon’s chosen foe.

In January 1936 the German Embassy in Tokio and the Japanese War Office and Foreign Office denied rumors that a German-Japanese treaty of mutual military assistance had been signed. But most observers were certain by spring that an entente was in process of negotiation.⁵⁶ Berlin admitted the fact in November. Moscow protested to Tokio. On November 25, 1936, the day on which the new

Soviet Constitution was presented to the Congress of Soviets, Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador signed and published an accord:

GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of co-operating in the defence against Communist subversive activities; have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting States agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures, and to carry these through in close collaboration.

ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.

ARTICLE 3

The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Before the expiry of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the future period of their co-operation.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly and properly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Berlin on November 25, 1936—that is, November 25 of the 11th year of Showa Period.

(signed) Von Ribbentrop, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador
of the German Reich

(signed) Mushakoji, Imperial Japanese Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Ambassador

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL

On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

(a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the exchange of information over

the activity of the Communist International as well as investigatory and defensive measures against the Communist International.

(b) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will within the framework of the existing laws take severe measures against these who at home or abroad are engaged directly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities.

(c) In order to facilitate the co-operation of the competent authorities provided for in paragraph (a) a permanent committee will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures necessary for the struggle against the subversive activities of the Communist International will be considered and discussed.

(signed) Von Ribbentrop

(signed) Mushakoji

Berlin, November 25, 1936⁵⁷

This elaborate pretense of saving civilization from Bolshevism deceived no one. The anti-Comintern agreement was intended for Tory and Catholic consumption and was the perfect façade for the co-operative pursuit of policies aiming at territorial aggrandizement. The protocol, by its use of the words "abroad," "indirectly," and "promote" with regard to those allegedly serving the Comintern, opened wide the door for extensive interventions on a world scale—since any regime or group in any land which fell afoul of Tokio or Berlin could be accused of Bolshevist deviltry. Contemporary rumor from well-informed sources held that the German-Japanese agreement contained a secret understanding whereby Berlin renounced all claim to the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific and the two Governments divided the East Indies into spheres of influence—and perhaps of prospective conquest.⁵⁸

On December 2, 1936 Japan granted formal recognition to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia by reducing its legation in Addis Ababa to a Consulate General—this despite the fact that in 1933 the Italian press had dramatized anti-Japanism and toyed with the notion of "saving" Black Africa from the "Yellow Peril." During the spring of 1937 special envoys and military, cultural, and commercial missions shuttled to and fro between Berlin and Tokio and Rome and Berlin with increasing regularity. On May 31, 1937 Hitler issued a deed of honor conferring on Mussolini the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle. Ciano was similarly honored. Hitler's proclamation to the Nürnberg *Partei Tag* of September 1937 declared: "First, the Treaty of Versailles is dead; second, Germany is free; third, the guarantee of our liberty is our army. . . . The community of

interests between National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy has revealed itself in the last few months to be more and more an element for safeguarding Europe from chaotic madness. . . . Our treaty with Japan serves the same purpose of unity in repelling an attack on the civilized world that today may come in Spain, tomorrow in the East, and the day afterward somewhere else. We are filled with strong hope that other Powers may understand the symptoms of the times in order to reinforce this front of reason for the protection of our peace and culture.”⁵⁹

Following the initiation of Japan's new military assault upon China in August 1937, Berlin and Rome both expressed sympathy with Tokio, though the German military advisers to Chiang Kai-Shek did not leave China until July 5, 1938. On the same day Japan, Italy, and Manchukuo signed a trade treaty. Italy had recognized Manchukuo on November 29, 1937, following formal Italian adherence to the anti-Comintern accord on November 6, 1937. On this date Ciano in Rome affixed his signature, as an “original signatory,” to a protocol bearing the names of Ribbentrop and Ambassador Nasaaki Hotta.⁶⁰ Foreign Minister Koki Hirota toasted the new member of the entente in Tokio at a dinner for the German and Italian Ambassadors.

London registered anxiety. Moscow informed Ciano on November 8 that it regarded the Italian action as unfriendly. Rumors persisted of a secret military agreement against the USSR. On November 25 Göbbels and Matsuzo Nagai, Minister of Transport, exchanged radio greetings in celebration of the first anniversary of the signing of the anti-Comintern accord, now transformed into a Fascist Triplice. The Japanese spokesman asserted: “The Sino-Japanese conflict is for us a holy war to call the Nanking Government to account for its anti-Japanese attitude, free the Chinese people from the Red Peril, and assure peace in the Far East. . . . Our struggle aims to found world peace on a new order and in a great and just spirit. Through strengthening the anti-Communist camp, whose Tokio-Berlin axis is connected with Rome, new and strong foundations are being laid for world peace and the welfare of humanity.”⁶¹

On December 10 Japanese troops stormed Nanking—and inaugurated an orgy of robbery, rape, torture, and wholesale massacre of the inhabitants almost without precedent in modern times. On Christmas Day 1937 it was indicated in Rome that an Italian mission would proceed to Japan. On May 12, 1938 Germany became the fourth State (after Japan, El Salvador, and Italy) to grant *de jure* recognition to

Manchukuo through the signature of a formal treaty establishing diplomatic and consular relations.

For all of its fanfare and unsubtle aiming at an obvious target, the grand strategy of the new Triplice was not fixed by these agreements and utterances. A successful war against Russia would yield at most the Balticum, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus to the Reich, and Siberia east of Lake Baikal to Japan. For Italy it would yield nothing, for no Cæsar at Rome could hope to extend his Empire beyond the Bosphorus with Germany standing between. Italian Fascism looked toward North Africa. No march on Moscow could win this booty. Tokio's dreamers of glory had their eyes on Indo-China, the East Indies, and the Philippines no less than on Mongolia and Siberia.⁶² Some Japanese publicists were committed to war with Britain.⁶³ Even in the Reich the road by land to Bagdad and the road by sea to Africa might ultimately prove easier and more tempting than Bonaparte's route over the steppes. But any dramatization of such objectives would stir alarm in the Western imperialisms, while the crusade against Bolshevism would lull suspicions. Therefore Ribbentrop must say: "Japan will never permit an extension of Bolshevism in Eastern Asia. Germany builds the bulwark against this pest in the heart of Europe. Finally Italy, as Il Duce has explained to the world, will hold the anti-Bolshevist banner high in the South."⁶⁴

For the Third Reich the Triplice could not be rendered strategically useful, regardless of its ultimate purposes, until Central Europe was conquered. British acquiescence must be assured. France must be isolated beyond the Rhine defenses. The problem of the *Drang nach Osten* was one of smashing the barrier of the French alliance system in the East. The bastion of this barrier was Czechoslovakia. Its defenders were linked to Paris and Moscow in a defensive pact. Paris was linked to Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, and Moscow. London was linked to Paris. Therefore any frontal assault on the bastion would mean general war against a world in arms. The alternative was a flank attack. On Prague's right flank stood Poland, already half-way in the German camp.⁶⁵ Along the left flank was Austria. If the *Ostmark* could be seized and if, at the same time, London could be persuaded to induce Paris to abandon Prague, the bastion could be taken with little risk. But this was a problem for the future.

In the interim steps must be taken to destroy French influence in Danubia and Balkania. Truncated Hungary lay beyond the *Ostmark*. The Magyar feudal gentry were sworn never to recognize the fron-

tiers of Trianon as definitive. "*Nem, nem, soha!*" ("No, no, never!") was the national battlecry. In the great square near Budapest's imposing parliament building were symbolic figures of the amputated provinces, draped in mourning. The million Magyars in Slovakia and Ruthenia, the million and a half in Transylvania, the half million in Croatia and Slovenia must be liberated from Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. This national creed was deeply rooted in all patriotic hearts.⁶⁶ But the kingless Kingdom of Hungary was helpless and could at any time be crushed by the Little Entente. Regent Horthy, moreover, and even pro-Nazi Premier Julius Gömbös, who took office in September 1932, were not disposed to make their State merely a German satellite. They preferred Italian support. Gömbös, who appears to have coined the term "Rome-Berlin axis,"⁶⁷ died in a German sanitarium on October 6, 1936. Koloman Daranyi succeeded to the Premiership, with Koloman de Kanya remaining Foreign Minister. On May 19, 1937 Budapest entertained Princess Maria, Queen Elena, and King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, who, for the first time in thirty years, left his country for a State visit abroad.

Berlin maintained close contact with Budapest, but toyed with the plan of bringing to power in Hungary a definitely Nazi regime. The weapons were at hand: Count Alexander Festetics' "Arrow Cross" movement, a copy of the NSDAP with shirts green instead of brown; the "National Will" movement of Major Francis Szalasi; the "National Front" of Francis Rajniss; and the *Turul* association of Fascist students. Horthy tolerated these groups, but when Szalasi attempted a putsch in April 1937, his movement was dissolved and its leaders subjected to brief imprisonment.⁶⁸ The efforts of these groups to capitalize upon peasant unrest by demands for "land reform" made them anathema to the feudal magnates. Subsidies from the Reich made them dangerous. Horthy and Daranyi were at once cognizant of the growing power of Germany (and of the fact that irredentist ambitions could be realized only with German support) and fearful for the fate of the aristocracy under a Nazi regime at home. They therefore sought to develop a line of policy which should be anti-Nazi in domestic affairs and pro-German abroad. For the present this sufficed for Berlin's purposes.

The pattern of Nazi penetration was not different among Hungary's neighbors. The security of Jugoslavia's new frontiers demanded solidarity with Prague, Bucharest, and Paris against Budapest, Rome, and Berlin. But diplomatic collaboration with democracies against

dictatorships stimulated demands for autonomy and domestic democracy on the part of Croats, Slovenes, and the Serb opposition. The dictatorship was committed to "Old Serb" despotism. As yet it stood in no fear of indigenous Nazi groups subsidized from Germany: the *Borbashi* (Fighters) of Hodjera, with blue shirts; the *Zbor* (Reunion) of Ljotich; the Croatian Independents, followers of Pavelich's *Ustaschi*, which plotted the murder of Alexander; and the clerical *Hrvatska Straza* (Croatian guards). Apart from terrorism, none of these groups was large enough to prove either dangerous or helpful to Belgrade.

Despite the opposition of all the democratic and pro-French forces in the Kingdom, Premier Stoyadinovich sought a diplomatic rapprochement with Rome and Berlin. He held that France and Britain would abandon the small Powers of the East in a crisis, that Yugoslavia must recoup trade losses accruing from sanctions against Italy by commercial agreements with Germany, and that "new friends" could be made without losing old ones. Ciano arrived in Belgrade on March 24, 1937, and on the following day signed a five-year political and economic pact with Jugoslavia for mutual respect of frontiers, maintenance of the Adriatic status quo, pacific settlement of disputes, non-support of any aggression against either, and reciprocal suppression of subversive activities in either State directed against the territorial integrity or the existing regime of the other. Ciano laid a wreath on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, visited Alexander's mausoleum, and received from Prince Paul the Grand Cross of the Order of the White Eagle.

To the east lay Rumania, lush in forests, grain fields, and oil reserves. If the conqueror's Peace of Brest-Litovsk (March 4, 1918) represented the ideal blueprint of the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*, the conqueror's Peace of Bucharest (May 6, 1918) was its indispensable corollary. Pending the arrival of a favorable occasion for reducing Rumania once more to vassalage (with Hungary perhaps recovering Transylvania), familiar techniques could be used to promote internal disintegration. Here the tool was the "Iron Guard" of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and General A. C. Cantacuzenu, established in 1931. Its symbol was the swastika, its program anti-Semitic Fascism, its original paraphernalia the trappings of white-robed night riders ("The Legion of the Archangel Michael")—later replaced by green shirts. With funds from Germany, this gang of political buccaneers became a formidable power. On December 19, 1933 its agents assassinated

Liberal Premier Ion Duca. "He came to power," declared Codreanu four years later, "because he had pledged himself to destroy our movement. That was an inhuman act for which he had to atone by death."⁶⁹ The Iron Guard was nominally suppressed after the murder, but re-emerged as the "All-for-Country" party. Its rival was the "National Christian" party founded in 1935 by Octavian Goga and Professor Alexander Cuza. Berlin supplied money and arms to such groups and bought Rumanian newspapers by the score. If its agents could not be brought to power, threats of giving them further aid (and promises of discontinuing such activities) could be used to blackmail Bucharest.

Nicholas Titulescu, perennial Foreign Minister and staunch champion of France and the Little Entente, was the Rumanian thorn in the Nazi flank on the Lower Danube. The Iron Guard placed him on its death list. In 1934 three people died when his train was bombed. He planned to make Rumania at least a silent partner in the new anti-German front of Paris-Prague-Moscow. He welcomed Benes and Prince Paul in June 1936, at a Little Entente conference which reaffirmed the solidarity of the allies. But he failed to persuade King Carol and Premier George Tatarescu to suppress the Iron Guard and other pro-Nazi organizations. According to one tale, Goga, after visiting Hitler, brought Carol a dossier prepared by Himmler's Gestapo. This document was intended to discredit Titulescu by accusing him of sympathy for Bolshevism and of neglect in protecting the King from criticism because of his red-haired Jewish mistress, Magda Lupescu.⁷⁰ Titulescu was abruptly dropped from the Cabinet on August 29, 1936. He received the news on his sick-bed at Cap Martin on the Riviera. Two weeks later he nearly died in Switzerland, allegedly from poison. (Queen Marie was reported poisoned in the following March.) Titulescu's successor was Victor Antonescu, who represented a basic reorientation of Rumanian policy. Carol's Ministers, like those in Budapest and Belgrade, now sought to conciliate Berlin and Rome and simultaneously to suppress domestic Fascist groups by stealing their authoritarian and anti-Semitic thunder.

But full collaboration with the Fascist Powers was impossible as long as any vestiges of French influence remained and as long as Berlin and Rome championed Magyar revisionism. Nazi astuteness and French ineptitude would soon remove the first difficulty, but the second persisted. The slightest sign of opposition to the Cæsars, moreover, brought new blackmail, with the Iron Guard as its vehicle. In March 1937 Tatarescu requested Italy and Germany to recall their

Ministers, who had attended an Iron Guard demonstration in honor of two "martyrs" who had died fighting for Franco in Spain. Berlin and Rome refused. Antonescu was obliged to declare the incident "closed."⁷¹ When Carol exiled his brother Nicholas in April, Co-dreanu sought to make political capital by championing the victim of royal disfavor. In November he issued a warning to the King:

If Rumanian youth should find itself compelled to fight for Bolshevism and international Jewry, they will draw their revolvers and shoot down all those responsible for that policy. . . . Rumanian youths are against the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente because both are drenched in the spirit of world Jewry and Bolshevism. They will fight on the side of the States of the national revolution, for the cross and for nationalist ideals against Communism.⁷²

French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos visited Bucharest on December 8, 1937. French-Rumanian solidarity was reaffirmed. France would sell arms to Rumania. All would be saved. But on December 20, 1937 Tatarescu's Cabinet was beaten at the polls, obtaining only 35.9% of the votes, compared to the National Peasant's 20.4%, the Iron Guard's 15.5%, and Goga's National Christian's 9.1%. The Premier resigned on December 26. Two days later Carol named Goga as Premier in a Cabinet dedicated to anti-Semitism, Fascist dictatorship, and collaboration with Berlin. The German and Italian press celebrated the victory. Bucharest was herewith lost to the Quai d'Orsay. In Belgrade the crowds which cheered Delbos and shouted "*Vive la France!*" were ridden down by the police.

In Bulgaria the German trade drive produced its most spectacular results. Between 1932 and 1936 Germany's share in Bulgaria's imports grew from one-quarter to two-thirds of the total while the German share of Bulgaria's exports increased from one-quarter to well over half.⁷³ This poor land of sturdy peasants offered opportunities for palace intrigue, but there was little chance for the promotion of Fascist parties of disgruntled petty burghers. The army clique headed by Colonel Georgiev which seized power in May 1934 was reactionary in social outlook but tended toward isolationism in foreign policy. Czar Boris reasserted his authority by gradual stages. The premiers after Georgiev were little more than royal puppets. Two members of Professor Tzankov's Fascist-Nazi movement were included in the Cabinet by the end of 1936, but an openly Fascist regime was scarcely

in prospect. Neither were Bulgaria's patriots encouraged by the consequences of their first military alliance with Germany to look too favorably upon a resumption of the venture.⁷⁴ But at least Nazi emissaries in Sofia could count upon Bulgarian support whenever the *Drang nach Osten* should reach the lower Danube with victory banners upon its bayonets and with promises of aid for the realization of Bulgarian irredentist aspirations.

The shadow of the swastika fell no less darkly over republican Greece, cradle of ancient democracy. Modern democracy died in Greece in the summer of 1936. Its friends hoped that, like the little Temple of the Wingless Victory west of the Acropolis, it had been merely dismantled while its foundations were being strengthened.⁷⁵ Its enemies viewed its passing with pleasure and held it gone for good. On September 30, 1923 King Constantine and Crown Prince George had been forced to flee after the military disaster in Asia Minor. The Republic which succeeded was the child of Eleutherios Venezelos. But in 1932 he was ousted from power by the royalists. In November 1935 the dynasty was restored in the person of King George II and approved by a 98% "plebiscite." Venezelos died in his Paris exile on March 18, 1936. Premier John Metaxas, a genial general educated in Potsdam, was irked by the Venezelos Liberals, by the Communist minority which held the balance of power in parliament, and by the trade unions. On August 5, 1936, in the name of frustrating a "Communist plot," he crushed a general strike, decreed martial law, and suppressed the Chamber of Deputies. The Metaxas dictatorship looked to Berlin for diplomatic inspiration as well as for useful techniques in the arts of tyranny.

Beyond Greece lay Turkey—vassal and ally of the Second Reich and *Deutschtum's* former corridor to Bagdad, the Persian Gulf, and India. The new Turkey was no longer the Osman Empire of decrepit Sultans but a vigorous Republic of strongman Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, surnamed "Atatürk (Father of the Turks) by his parliament in 1933. This political and military genius was, like Hitler, the son of a minor customs official—born in 1881 in the then Turkish city of Salonika. Unlike Hitler, he was blond, handsome, and rugged, and in appearance far more "Nordic" than Der Führer. He served the Central Powers well after 1914 and helped defeat the Allies at the Dardanelles. But he had no love for the Reich and less for the subservient Sultanate at Istanbul. After the collapse, he raised the standard of revolt in Anatolia, drove the Greeks from Asia Minor, repudiated the Treaty of

Sevrès, and forced upon the Allies the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, which ended "capitulations" and made Turkey fully sovereign in the Western sense. His purpose was to create a modern, secularized Turkey, "shaking off the live hand of Europe and the dead hand of Islam."⁷⁶ He made himself President-Dictator, but preferred to rule through parliamentary reforms.

Kemal's Turkey, unlike its Balkan neighbors, was not ripe fruit for the Nazi harvesters. The new Turkey, like the old, sought security by playing off Great Powers against one another. In the war of 1921-2 Britain supported Greece, while France was pro-Turkish. After Lausanne, Ankara cultivated the cordial relations which it had already established with Moscow. Turkey, along with newly liberated Iraq, joined the League in 1932 and was prepared to seek safety in the collective organization of peace as long as the Western Powers were willing to co-operate. When the rising power of the Reich began to overshadow Europe, however, Turkey saw an opportunity for new victories in the old game of *Realpolitik*. After the Rhineland coup, Ankara informed the Western Powers that it intended to remilitarize the Dardanelles. Did they prefer negotiations or unilateral repudiation of the Straits Convention of 1923? They preferred negotiations. While the League died in Geneva, a conference assembled at Montreux at the other end of Lac Lemman. Much of the protracted haggling at Montreux was due to British efforts to keep Soviet naval forces out of the Mediterranean (and to secure entry into the Black Sea for British forces) and to Soviet counter-efforts to keep British forces out of the Black sea and to secure access to the middle sea for the Red navy.⁷⁷ The Montreaux Convention of July 20, 1936 was a complex compromise. It provided in principle for continued freedom of navigation; Black Sea Powers (e.g. USSR) could send war vessels of any size through the Straits, but other Powers (e.g. Britain) could send only light surface vessels; in peace-time non-Black Sea Powers could not accumulate more than 45,000 tons of war vessels in the Black Sea; in war Turkey was granted full control of the Straits.

Turkey's old enemy, Britain, was thus forced to make concessions to Turkey's new friend, the Soviet Union. The principal victor, however, was Turkey itself, which sent 30,000 troops into the demilitarized zone at midnight of July 20-1. Italy failed to adhere to the convention. Italian-Turkish negotiations of February 1937 produced no concrete results save a declaration in the Turkish press that Ankara was "attached only to the bloc of peace, and to no other bloc."

Turkey's position between a Britain still clinging to outposts in the Mediterranean, a Russia again dominant in the Middle East, and a Reich slowly pushing toward Istanbul was a dangerous one, but its very danger afforded, for a time at least, a measure of security.

In summary, Hitler's restoration of the watch on the Rhine, coupled with Anglo-French capitulation to both Rome and Berlin, produced repercussions in Danubia and Balkania which threatened the disintegration of the French alliance system. The initial victims promised to be the Danubian and Balkan States themselves. The reduction of France to impotence was threatened as a secondary consequence. The identity of the victims on the third circle of doom was less certain. Berlin might eventually push south and, with Rome as ally, menace Britain in the age-old arena of strife between the Nile and the Euphrates. As if in preparation for such an eventuality, Britain concluded a new alliance with Cairo on August 26, 1936,⁷⁸ and granted Egypt a measure of independence such as the Nile Kingdom had never known since its conquest by Alexander the Great. But the hope in London was that Italy could be bought off and that Hitler would follow the itinerary of *Mein Kampf*. In this event the valley of the Danube would become not a road toward India but a base of operations against Russia.

5. MOSCOW

As a society, as a culture, and as a Power, Russia has ever been for Western Europe the great incalculable and a perennial object of wonder, mystery, and fantasy. From the rise of the first Romanov (Michael, 1613-45) to the decline of the last Romanov (Nicholas II, 1894-1917) and from the Revolution led by Vladimir Ilytch Ulianov (Lenin) to the new world ruled by Josef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin) the great Slav realm has passed Western understanding. New Russia's word picture of the Western societies found expression in an indictment, a challenge, and a threat, long antedating the Russian Revolution:

Arise, ye prisoners of starvation!
Arise, ye wretched of the earth!
For justice thunders condemnation,
A better world's in birth.

Watch on the Rhine

No more tradition's chains shall bind you.
 Arise, ye slaves! No more in thrall.
 The world shall rise on new foundations.
 You have been nought: you shall be all.

—*The Internationale*

New Germany's word picture of Russia was no less an indictment, a challenge, and a threat:

"From West to East" is now the direction from the Rhine to the Vistula, "from West to East" must resound from Moscow to Tomsk. The "Russian" who cursed Peter and Catherine was a real Russian. Europe should never have been forced upon him. In the future, after the separation of the non-Russian territories (the Western provinces, the Ukraine, the Caucasus) he will have to be content to transfer his center of gravity to Asia. . . . Let him turn his "word" to the East where there many be room for it, having first cleansed it of that admixture of ideas of Baboeuf, Blank [*sic*], Bakunin, Tolstoi, Lenin, and Marx, called Bolshevism. In Europe, which is alien to him and which he hates, there is no room for him any more.

—Alfred Rosenberg: *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*
 (Munich, 1930), p. 601

One or the other of these wish-dreams is likely to become reality before the twentieth century has passed its half-way mark. For the faithful follower of Der Führer, Bolshevism represented a "Jewish ferment of decomposition" rendering Russia rotten and ripe for conquest. For the faithful followers of Stalin, Fascism represented the death agony of capitalism—but an agony confidently expected to strike deadly blows against Moscow in its djing frenzy.

Moscow's problem in facing the hostile world of Western capitalism, along with the changing strategy and tactics adopted to meet the problem, can be stated in relatively simple terms. The fundamental purposes to be served were two: (a) the defense of the Communist citadel against external attack; (b) the extension of Communism throughout Western Europe and the world. At times (a) appeared to be but a means toward (b). At other times (b) seemed to be nothing more than a function of (a). Hence the assumed divergence of purposes between the Narkomindel (Soviet Foreign Office) and the Comintern. But both appearances were illusions. As basic goals (a) and (b) were inseparable and had always been inseparable.

Means toward ends were adapted to the exigencies of an unstable international environment. Defense of the citadel required arms. It also required allies—Communist allies if possible, non-Communist allies if necessary. It also required that bourgeois enemies be split into hostile and friendly camps, though permanent friendship with either was precluded and ultimate hostility from both was assumed. An elementary balance-of-power calculus required that collaboration be attempted with enemy States least dangerous against enemy States most dangerous. Defense, above all, required abstention from armed aggression. In war, attack is often the best defense. But any armed Communist attack upon any group of enemies, however successful in its initial stages, would unite all potential foes in the bourgeois world against Moscow.

The promotion of the Communist world revolt required uncompromising advance whenever national revolutionary situations offered a chance of proletarian victory. It required strategic retreat whenever the superior forces of the enemy class made attack suicidal and victory impossible. It required delaying tactics of defense in fixed positions whenever the political terrain in a given country presented opportunities for the successful execution of such a plan. In most situations such tactics could succeed only if non-Communist allies could be found among other party groups and social classes. Such allies would desert in the face of any Communist advance toward revolution. They would demand retreat and passive defense as the price of their support. But when advance appeared impossible and isolated retreat threatened disaster, such a liaison might be worth its price as a means of preventing (or postponing) the complete suppression of a given national section of the Comintern. Such shifts of strategy appeared to some to constitute vacillation. In reality they represented the procedure of all able commanders.

Both Lenin and Stalin found it necessary to utilize all of these devices and to shift rapidly at times from one to another. Lenin accepted German aid as a means of returning to Russia in the spring of 1917. A year later he sought Allied aid against German imperialism. When none was forthcoming, he accepted the conqueror's peace of Brest-Litovsk—and flooded the Reich with revolutionary propaganda. The Soviets were saved from German conquest by the victory of the Allied imperialisms in the West—only to fall victim to blockade, intervention, and subsidized civil war engineered from London, Paris, Tokio, and Washington. The Communist (III) International was established in

March 1919 to summon the world proletariat to revolt against its oppressors and thereby to save Red Russia. Communist rebellion won short-lived victory in Budapest and Munich, but was crushed elsewhere. The Red Army saved the day, however, and all but conquered Poland in 1920. The citadel was, for the moment, safe. The Soviet Union enjoyed peace without security. The World Revolution enjoyed hope without success. The "stabilization of capitalism" ended the possibility of revolutions abroad and confronted the Kremlin with new dangers.

Lenin died on January 21, 1924. Stalin succeeded. Trotsky was sent into exile for infractions of party discipline. "War communism" had been followed by the New Economic Policy (1921-8). This in turn was followed by the first Five-Year Plan. Dissenters grumbled on Right and Left, but the party marched on toward its goals: socialist industry, collectivized agriculture, safety and prosperity for the "Socialist Fatherland." During these years the prerequisite conditions of revolutionary success abroad were lacking. Victory never attends proletarian arms unless a united and revolutionary working class has wide support from a revolutionary peasantry and a sympathetic lesser bourgeoisie, and unless the attack is upon an aristocracy and plutocracy whose hold on the State machine has already been partly broken by bankruptcy, war, or other disasters. These conditions were lacking in the Europe of the 1920's. But a variant of the pattern emerged in China. Whether the Comintern, acting alone in opposition to the Kuomintang, could then have Bolshevized China must remain a moot question. The Comintern preferred alliance with the Kuomintang and helped to bring Chiang Kai-Shek to victory in 1927. When Chiang then joined forces with the Shanghai bankers, the landowners, and the war lords to wage a struggle of extermination against his Red allies, the Communist revolution in China was doomed.

With the postponement of the World Revolution to the Greek kalends, the task of the Kremlin became one of seeking international security for the USSR by other means and strengthening Communist parties in the bourgeois democracies—not for imminent rebellion, which had become impossible, but for electoral and parliamentary activities in competition with liberal and Social Democratic rivals. The danger of a possible renewal of Allied intervention dictated a policy of seeking security through some counter-weight to French hegemony over the Continent. The Germany of Rathenau and Stresemann was less dangerous to Moscow than the Britain of Curzon or the

France of Poincaré. Hence the Treaty of Rapallo (1922), the inauguration of intimate relations between the Red Army and the Reichswehr, and the promotion of Soviet-German diplomatic collaboration. The Comintern inevitably fell under a shadow, for even the impact of the Great Depression on Western capitalism nowhere produced the conditions needed for successful proletarian uprising. Communist parties flourished on mass misery. But while misery reduced the proletariat to apathy or feeble protests, it stirred the *Kleinbürgertum* to a dynamic rage easily deflected by demagogues away from the classes of wealth and title and onto a variety of scapegoats, including Communists.

The triumph of Hitler and the launching of the Fascist offensives after 1933 completely altered the terms of the problem and led Stalin to alter his strategy no less completely. The shift was less a function of social and political change within the USSR than a necessity imposed by a sweeping change in the balance of forces in the outer world. For the parties of the Comintern the issue now was not "To revolt or not to revolt?" but simply "To be or not to be?" Wherever Fascism came to power, it subjected Communist groups to totalitarian suppression along with Socialists and liberals. Democratic capitalism still permitted them to exist and to recruit followers. In neither context was revolutionary action conceivable. But as between suppression and survival there could be but one choice. Hence the tactic of the People's Front confirmed by the 7th Congress of the Comintern (Moscow, July 25–August 20, 1935) and the demand in all countries for common defense of democracy against Fascism in collaboration with liberals and Socialists.⁷⁹

In the international field the menace of the Fascist Powers to the USSR was incomparably greater than any threat from France, Britain, or America. These Powers, moreover, were themselves menaced by the resurgence of Japanese, Italian, and German imperialism. Stalin, therefore, looked to them for aid in common defense, as Lenin had looked in 1918. But while Lenin had got no response from Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, Stalin's appeal was heeded by Barthou, Benes, and their colleagues. Hence Soviet membership in the League, pacts with Paris and Prague, and championship of collective security and the indivisibility of peace. Just as political exigencies within the democracies required Communists to shout softly for revolution and loudly for democracy, so diplomatic exigencies in the relations between the democracies and the USSR required Moscow

to champion the international status quo and become a defender of Versailles, Locarno, and the Covenant.

The new line was imposed from without rather than inspired from within. It nevertheless precipitated a major crisis within Communist ranks. Some party members were too deeply wedded to revolutionary stereotypes to achieve an adjustment to Stalinist strategy. They therefore opposed that strategy and rationalized their opposition in terms of a jargon consonant with their own repertory of labels and symbols. Stalin's strategy in turn begot its own stereotypes and necessitated the damning of dissidents in terms of other conventionalized epithets. Phenomenal bitterness was engendered thereby, for here as always heretics are hated more savagely than infidels. This bitterness confused the vision of many already bewildered Western observers and caused them to resort to fantastic explanations of a relatively simple and familiar phenomenon of revolutionary movements.

A review and critique of the clash, which spilled gallons of blood and oceans of ink, would not be germane to present purposes.⁸⁰ The precise interrelationship of forces is by no means clear in its details from available sources of information. At least three minority groups within Communist ranks were moved to violence (verbal or overt) against the Stalinist line: (1) the "Right Deviationists" who opposed hasty collectivization and rapid industrialization and in some instances favored a *modus vivendi* with the Fascist Powers even at the cost of economic and territorial sacrifices; (2) the "Left Oppositionists" who repudiated all balance-of-power strategy, denied any significant distinction between Fascist and liberal capitalism, and demanded uncompromising World Revolution; and (3) certain military and diplomatic circles which opposed pacts with the Western Powers and favored continued collaboration with the Reich and the Reichswehr—either on the assumption that the Generals could persuade Hitler to call off his crusade and join Russia against the West, or on the assumption that Germany was in any event invincible (or that France and Britain would never oppose its *Drang nach Osten*), that a new Brest-Litovsk was therefore inevitable, and that its terms would be less galling if it were concluded forthwith. Since Stalin's leadership was for each group the prime obstacle, all were united in desiring his removal. Since his enemies had no mass following and no opportunity to recruit them, they were forced to resort to sabotage, wrecking, treason, and schemes of assassination. They accepted Radek's dictum: "Playing politics never pays unless you risk your head."⁸¹

The complex relationship between (1), (2), and (3) would fill many volumes. The relationships between each group and exiled Leon Trotsky are still shrouded in mystery. His principal accusers were his confessed accomplices and agents on trial for their lives in the USSR. His principal defenders, apart from his own disciples, were the sponsors and members of the American "Commission of Inquiry," headed by Professor John Dewey, which held hearings in Mexico City in 1937 and demonstrated, at least to its own satisfaction, that some of the accusations of some of the accusers were false. Trotsky's early writings do not suggest that he would shrink from the tactics attributed to him because of moral or political scruples.⁸² His later writings do not suggest that he would be fastidious about methods or allies in his efforts to remove Stalin.⁸³ His Opposition activities⁸⁴ and his establishment of a "Fourth International" to fight Stalinism and promote World Revolution⁸⁵ do not confirm the impression that he had become a mere academic theorist taking no part in the struggle for Stalin's overthrow. In any event he inevitably became a symbol for both the conspired-against and the conspirators.

The Fascist Powers found in this situation an opportunity to pursue their familiar tactics of internal disintegration. A military plan of campaign against the USSR was not enough.⁸⁶ Here as elsewhere—and far more imperatively than elsewhere—it was necessary to organize espionage and sabotage and, if possible, promote treason, assassination, and rebellion. In 1933 Berlin toyed with a "Russian National-socialist" movement among the émigrés in the Reich. Later Alfred Rosenberg and the War Ministry groomed the "Hetman" of the Ukraine, General Pavel Skoropadsky, for a resumption of his role of 1918: that of puppet-potentate maintained by German arms.⁸⁷ But no Ukrainian "Manchukuo" was possible unless the Soviet Ukraine should first be conquered by Nazi arms. No counter-revolution in the USSR was possible unless the Soviet regime should first be demoralized. The only possible techniques of disruption were those actually resorted to—i.e. intrigue and conspiracy with anti-Stalinist elements in the party, the Red Army, and the diplomatic service.⁸⁸

On July 10, 1934 the OGPU or State Secret Police was abolished and replaced by a Commissariat of Internal Affairs headed by Henry Yagoda. On December 1, 1934 Sergi Kirov, aide of Stalin and party chief in Leningrad, was assassinated. Zinoviev and Kamenev were sent to prison for implication in the plot. Subsequent investigations disclosed a far-flung network of conspiratorial activities, ranging from

the transmission of military secrets to German and Japanese agents to train-wrecking, sabotage, murder-plots, poisoning-schemes, and other old and new devices of political terrorism. On August 19-23, 1936 Kamenev, Zinoviev, and fourteen others were retried on the basis of new evidence linking them with Trotsky in a plan to murder Stalin. All were executed. Other conspirators were tried, January 23-30, 1937, on similar charges, plus conspiracy to aid Germany and Japan in war against the USSR. Karl Radek and Gregory Sokolnikov were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, and thirteen others were shot. In April Yagoda was arrested. Nikolai Yezhov was named his successor. At the end of May, Marshal I. B. Gamarnik committed suicide. In June 1937 Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other high officers were court-martialed for treason and shot. In December Leo Karkhan and a number of other diplomatic figures were executed for treasonable dealings with Tokio. The most sensational trial was held March 2-12, 1938. Nikolai Bukharin, Henry Yagoda, Alexei Rykov, Nikolai Krestinsky, Gregory Grinko, and thirteen others were executed, while Christian Rakovsky and two other defendants were given prison terms.

In all the trials all the major defendants confessed their guilt in full. The material and documentary evidence made public by the prosecution was meager. Details were controverted. But the public records leave no reasonable doubt that those who were sentenced had in fact engaged in most of the activities of which they were accused. These trials were accompanied throughout the Union by numerous local trials, wholesale purges of suspects from the party ranks, and numerous executions for espionage and sabotage. By the summer of 1938 the purge was apparently terminated. By vigilance and ruthlessness Stalin's leadership preserved its authority in the Soviet State—and conceivably saved Moscow from the fate of Vienna, Madrid, and Prague.

Many of the interpretations placed upon these developments abroad belong to legend and folklore. Trotsky and his sympathizers, along with many Socialists, propagated the thesis that Stalin was a Bonaparte, a "Thermidorian," and a moral monster bent upon liquidating all loyal "Old Bolsheviks" in the interests of a privileged, bureaucratic class. If Stalinists accused Trotsky of plotting murder and compacting with Fascist devils, Trotskyites accused Stalin of blood-lust and of selling Socialism into slavery for personal ambition. Stalin's politics were described as "bestial"; the Kremlin clique had "strangled the

Bolshevik Party" and transformed the workers' state into a "sinister caricature"; the Third International had become a "stinking cadaver." ⁸⁹ Fascists took comfort in the thought of Bolshevism devouring itself. Many liberals registered horror and accepted Trotsky's contention that the trials were a gigantic "frame-up." The confessions were dismissed as products of hypnotism, torture, or the "Russian soul." Stalin was suspected of insanity. The USSR, as in 1918, was depicted a falling into chaos. Many non-Fascists denied indignantly that the tactics which the Fascist Powers had consistently employed in all other enemy States could possibly have been applied against the USSR. Many more found it impossible to believe that the defendants could be guilty of the crimes to which they confessed. The simplest and most probable explanation—i.e. the one spread on the records in the public trials—was incredulously laughed to scorn. These fantasies served the cause of the Kremlin's enemies in other capitals. But this evil was assuredly a lesser one than that suffered at the hands of other traitors and Fascist agents by Duca, Dollfuss, Barthou, King Alexander, Titulescu, Azaña, Schuschnigg, and Benes.

In ethics the proposition that the end justifies the means is always questionable. In politics the test of every course of action lies in its results. Moscow sought allies against its Fascist foes. It found what it sought. It contributed to People's Front victories in Spain and France. It helped to save democracy from its enemies in several crises and thereby secured continued tolerance for Communist parties in a number of democratic States. It secured pledges of armed support against aggressors from France, Czechoslovakia, and Outer Mongolia (March 12, 1936). It forestalled invasion from without and frustrated the schemes of traitors and enemies within its frontiers. The price was high both in the blood of dissenters and in loss of confidence among Soviet sympathizers abroad.

The fruits of the new program, moreover, were ephemeral. Anglo-French acquiescence in Hitler's restoration of the armed watch on the Rhine doomed the work of Barthou and Litvinov. Léon Blum and his successors doomed the People's Front in Spain and France. By 1939 the USSR was threatened with the very disaster that the new policy had been designed to avoid: an armed Fascist assault, with the Western Powers passive or aiding the Fascist Triplix.

This aftermath, however, does not prove that Stalin's course was either unwise or dishonest. Any alternative course would have brought nearer the danger of assault. Moscow's fight was a fight for

time. Each year the USSR increased its population of 180,000,000 (1938) by more than 3,000,000 inhabitants. Each year the USSR came closer to Lenin's dream of a completely industrialized Socialist society with its great centers of wealth and power far beyond the reach of any invader and its armies invincible against any combination of foes. Within a few more years the Soviet Union, without allies, could defy the Fascist Triplice even if Tokio ruled China, Rome dominated the Mediterranean, and Hitler had all the Balkans in his hands. Each year the Fascist imperialisms looked upon their prospects of conquering Russia with ever more doubtful enthusiasm. Each year they perceived that the riches of the Indies and the treasures of Africa were slipping from feeble hands and could almost be had for the asking. This prospect might yet save peace for the Socialist Fatherland and hurl the rival hosts of the bourgeoisie at one another's throats. If war should come late, the armed legions of Communism might well be able to fulfill Voroshilov's promise of September 17, 1936: "When the enemy attacks the Soviet Ukraine or Soviet White Russia or any other part of the Soviet Union, we will not only prevent his invading our own country, but will defeat him in the territory whence he comes." In this event the World Revolution would again become practical politics.

If the Stalinist line of 1934-8 failed to realize all the hopes which some of its supporters read into it, and if its cost in treason trials and purges seemed excessive, it at least delayed by a generous margin of years the test of armed combat for the USSR. In the swiftly changing scales of the balance of power, the men of Britain and France who assumed that time fought for the democracies against the Fascist States were victims of a tragic error. But the men of Moscow who assumed that time fought for Communism against the Fascist States were correct in their calculus. Here, if nowhere else, lay the *raison d'être* and the justification for the decisions reached during the years of waiting.

CAMPAIGN IN IBERIA

• I. DEATH AT MADRID

IN two Western democracies, France and Spain, the strategy of the "People's Front" against Fascist reaction resulted in electoral alliances which won victory at the polls. The French Communist and Socialist parties concluded a pact on July 27, 1934. The powerful Radical Socialist Party—neither socialist nor radical, but bourgeois to its core—later joined the alliance. In Spain a similar pact was entered into on January 16, 1936, by the small Communist Party, the Socialists whose Left Wing was led by the revolutionary Don Francisco Largo Caballero, the Left Republicans of Don Manuel Azaña, the Republican Union of Martinez Barrio, the Catalan Left of Luis Companys, and, temporarily, the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista) of Andreas Nin, who, as an ultra-Trotskyite, was redder than the Reds. The Anarcho-Syndicalists of Catalonia and Madrid held aloof. All conservatives viewed the alliance with alarm.¹

Both People's Fronts were dominated by middle-class liberals, with their Communist minorities adhering to a non-revolutionary line in accordance with the Comintern program. Both were tarred with the "Red" label by their Fascist enemies and suspected by frightened conservatives of serving social revolutionary purposes. Socialist extremists in both denounced their Communist partners for abandoning the social revolution. Both were ultimately betrayed by their friends—the Spanish Front by its friends abroad, the French Front by its leaders at home. Both were ultimately beaten by the enemy against whom they had rallied their forces. The tragedy in Spain was more immediate and more poignant. But the tragedy in France doomed Spain to agony and brought disaster to France as well—sans

the dignity and courage which ordeal by fire evoked among the Spanish masses.

In social structure, economic life, and political complexion, twentieth-century Spain resembled the France of 1789. The French Revolution had failed to transform Spanish society. Here, in a poor and sleepy land on the periphery of the moving forces in European society, a primeval and blind nobility, linked with an ignorant and grasping priesthood, outdid the new magnates of industry and finance in grinding peasants and workers alike into the dust of illiteracy and unmitigated misery. Liberals strove, as in the France of the Enlightenment, for the disestablishment of the Church, the division of the great estates, the overthrow of the monarchy. The latter goal was attained in April 1931, with the abdication of Alfonso XIII. But the Republic strove vainly against the inertia and resistance of an aristocracy and a clergy clinging to their ancient prerogatives. The bloated and pampered officers' corps, always monarchists at heart, opposed civilian control. Some 20,000 *grandees* resisted agrarian reform, for they held three-fifths of the arable land while millions of peasants were landless or limited to tiny holdings. Over 80,000 priests, monks, and nuns in a population of 24,000,000 clung to their privileges and their control over education. The Church insisted in the name of God that the monastic orders and ecclesiastical magnates must keep their properties, which included vast holdings of real estate, banks, insurance companies, and public utilities.²

The parties which had sought liberal reform had been beaten by the Right in the elections of November 1933, and all but suppressed by the regime of clerical Gil Robles and reactionary Alexander Lerroux. The People's Front was the answer of the Left to Right reaction. In the election of February 16, 1936, three lists were presented: People's Front, Center, and National Front. The election machinery was in the hands of the Right. Hundreds of thousands of Anarcho-Syndicalists who sympathized with the People's Front refused on principle to vote. The popular vote gave the People's Front 4,206,156 ballots as against 3,783,601 for the Right and 681,047 for the Center. Many Centrists later joined the Left. Some of those who voted Right in February were monarchists or quasi-Fascists. Others were loyal republicans, though hostile to the People's Front. The distribution of votes was such that the Right won 144 seats in the Cortes, the Center 64, and the Left 265. The People's Front majority included 82 deputies from the Left Republicans, 21 from

the Catalan Left, 89 from the Socialists, and only 14 (out of a total of 473 seats in the Cortes) from the Communists. Socialists and Communists together (103) comprised less than half of the People's Front majority. There were no Socialists or Communists in the Cabinet at any time between February and July 1936. Azaña's liberals and their moderate allies controlled Cabinet and parliament alike. The Right opposition was dominated by the 98 followers of Gil Robles in the CEDA.⁸

The victors of February forced out of office reactionary President Niceto Zamora (December 10, 1931–April 7, 1936) and replaced him by Manuel Azaña, who had been Premier since February. Santiago Casares Quiroga, a moderate liberal, held the premiership from May till July. But reform made slow progress. Nobles, priests, plutocrats, and army officers were deprived of their sense of security, but not of their power to resist. Impatient peasants seized estates. Impatient workers fomented strikes. Impatient anti-clericals led mobs which now and again burned churches and monasteries. The Communists, to the disgust of Caballero's Socialists, opposed immediate socialization of land and nationalization of industry. They asked not for social revolution or proletarian dictatorship but for discipline, orderly reform, and vigilant support of political democracy. The men of wealth and title professed to see symptoms of incipient social revolution in local disorders. They therefore prepared to strike back. They secretly mobilized their forces to overthrow the People's Front while its leaders were confused, tolerant, or indifferent.

The seeds of war, however, were sown not only by ancient ruling classes that feared the People as a Great Beast. They were sown as well by those abroad who had aims of their own to pursue. Spain's crucifixion was the handiwork of the Fascist regimes at Rome, Berlin, and Lisbon. It was not the result of alleged schemes of bloody revolution formulated by the People's Front. Still less was it the result of any "Red plot" hatched in Moscow.

The principal objectives of Fascist strategy were determined by *Geo-Politik*. The Western exit of the Mediterranean, on the "life line" of the British Empire from Liverpool to Calcutta, was dominated by Gibraltar and the internationalized zone of Tangier. But Algeciras, on the European shore immediately west of Gibraltar, and Ceuta, on the African shore in Spanish Morocco, if adequately fortified and in Fascist hands, could render Gibraltar useless—or at least close the Straits to British and French shipping, as the guns of Gibraltar could

close them to German or Italian shipping. To the east are the Balearic Islands: Minorca (chief harbor, Port Mahon), Majorca (Palma), and Iviza. A circle with a 250-mile radius drawn about Port Mahon will embrace Valencia, Barcelona, Marseille, Toulon, Corsica, Sardinia, and much of the coast of Algeria. If straight lines are drawn on a map from Sassari in Sardinia to Valencia, from Ajaccio in Corsica to Cartagena, from Marseille and Toulon to Algiers and Oran in French North Africa, from Barcelona to Bizerta in French Tunis, and from Castellon-de-la-Plana to Sicily or Malta, all these lines will intersect one another at the Balearics.

These islands flank the most important single seaway in the French colonial empire, that from Algeria to the Riviera. The alternative route via the Atlantic is flanked on the north by Spain and Portugal and on the south by Rio de Oro and the Canary Islands, both Spanish colonies. Between 1914 and 1918, 700,000 African troops and 240,000 African laborers, came to the defense of France by sea, chiefly from Senegal, Morocco, and Algeria. The plans of the French General Staff in 1936 contemplated the mobilization of 1,500,000 colored troops, of which about half would come from West and North Africa. Effective Fascist control of the Balearics would enable enemy air and sea forces to cut communications between France and its chief source of military reinforcement. Control of Spanish Morocco would enable such forces to sever British and French communications between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Control of Spain, Portugal, Rio de Oro, and the Canaries would jeopardize French and British communications around Africa. Control of the Pyrenees would complete the immobilization of France initiated by the remilitarization of the Rhineland.⁴

These considerations determined the policies of Rome and Berlin in Iberia. Economic interests were subordinated to the military calculus, as in every militarist regime. Hitler declared at Würzburg, June 27, 1937: "Germany needs iron ore. That is why we want a Nationalist Government in Spain, so that we may be able to buy Spanish ore." But German buyers could purchase Spanish ore from Spanish sellers at about the same price regardless of the color of the regime at Madrid. Krupp, the Metallgesellschaft, I. G. Farben, Rheinmetall, and other firms, some of them linked with the British Rio Tinto interests in European Pyrites, Ltd., were interested in Spanish iron, lignite, and sulphur for reasons of profit.⁵ Certain Italian companies had similar interests. Fascismo and Nationalsocialism had an interest in

extending the Fascist cult, defeating the democratic cult, and "saving Spain from Bolshevism." But for Duce and Führer, ideology was but the façade, economics were but the sinews, of strategy. Profits and Propaganda are the tools of Power. And Power is ultimately national fighting capacity.

At no time was the Fascist game in Spain aimed at German or Italian "annexation" or even "occupation" of Spanish territory. Its aim was the creation of a Fascist Spain as a potential ally against the Western Powers. Such a regime could be installed in Iberia only with the aid of Italian and German arms. It might confidently be expected to cooperate in future with Italian and German arms not out of gratitude but out of interest. It would need to deflect resentments at home onto foreign enemies. It would by definition be militant, adventurous, imperialistic. Opportunities for glory and aggrandizement could be found only by co-operation with the Rome-Berlin axis. Such co-operation would be rendered impossible by annexation, which would inevitably arouse all Spanish patriots to indignation. The goal was not annexation but the conversion of Spain into a Fascist State and an ally against France—and, if need be, against Britain.

The technique of the enterprise is not a mystery, even if many details are still unknown. On March 31, 1934, a Spanish monarchist delegation was received by Mussolini and Balbo in Rome. Il Duce is reported to have promised arms and money for the overthrow of the Spanish Republic.⁶ The Italian liaison with Spanish Fascist leaders became more intimate in the spring of 1936. Plans were laid in detail for Italian military aid to rebellion. Meanwhile the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin, with General Wilhelm Faupel as its president, became a liaison between Spanish conspirators and the NSDAP. General Sanjurjo and young José Primo de Rivera spent several weeks in Berlin in the late spring of 1936. Plans were laid for the supply of war materials from the Reich.⁷ Gustav Rader, Nazi publicist, tourist official, and press consultant at the German Embassy in Madrid, was delegated by the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP, by the Propaganda Ministry, and by the Gestapo to watch the Spanish press, to influence Right newspapers, and to act as liaison with Gil Robles and with Juan March, Spanish millionaire "tobacco king." In April 1936, Hans Hellermann, alleged importer in Barcelona, became leader of the Nazi party unit in Spain, consisting largely of the German nationals (c. 15,000) resident in the peninsula. The German consular and diplomatic services were utilized to promote propaganda and conspiracy. Count Wel-

czeck, the German Ambassador, was subordinated to the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP under E. W. Bohle. Millions of marks were poured into Spain, including quotas from the *Fichte Bund*, the *Arbeitsfront*, and even the Winter Relief Fund. A network of spies and propagandists co-operated with Italian agents and Spanish plotters against the People's Front regime. By early July German arms were going regularly to the proper recipients. All these activities are a matter of undisputed documentary record. Posterity may learn more details of the Fascist conspiracy. Its existence is already established.⁸

The military plan was as simple as it was bold. On a given day rebel officers would lead their garrisons to revolt in Spanish Morocco and in all the chief cities of the peninsula. General Goded would fly from the Balearics to Barcelona to assume command in Catalonia. General Sanjurjo would fly from Lisbon to Madrid and become head of the new regime as soon as the revolting troops had seized the capital. General Mola would assume command in the North and General Franco in Morocco and the South. Since some resistance was anticipated, despite the paralyzing swiftness of the contemplated coup, arrangements were made for employing the Foreign Legion and Moorish troops and for securing arms and planes from Italy and Germany. The date finally set was July 17.

But the plan went slightly awry in timing and in execution. On July 12, José del Castillo, a popular lieutenant in the Madrid police force, was murdered by Fascists. On the 13th his comrades kidnapped José Calvo Sotelo, truculent monarchist leader in the Cortes, and later left his bullet-ridden body at a cemetery gate. On Tuesday, July 14, both men were buried—Castillo's coffin draped in a red flag and Sotelo's in royalist trappings, with the dignitaries of the Church and the reaction swearing revenge.⁹ The bitterness precipitated by this double murder and the growing danger that the whole plot would be revealed led to the inauguration of the rebellion in Morocco on July 16. It had already been planned in detail.¹⁰

He who was to become *Caudillo* (i.e. chief, Duce, or Führer) was Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teodoro Franco, born December 5, 1892 at El Ferrol. He was the son of naval paymaster Nicholas Franco and Pilar Baamonde y Pardo. These parents sent three sons into the Spanish army: Francisco, Nicholas, and Ramon the aviator, who gained fame by flying the Atlantic and crashed to death in the Mediterranean, October 30, 1938. Francisco fought the Riffs (1912-25) in the disastrous wars with the rebel followers of Abd-el-Krim. By

virtue of ability and courage he became commander of the Foreign Legion in 1921. In October 1923, he married Carmen Polo y Martinez Valdes, whose mother came from the Asturian nobility and whose father was a wealthy man of Oviedo. Franco was promoted to a generalship at the age of thirty-two. As director of the new General Military Academy, he studied strategy in Berlin, Dresden, and Vincennes. French Minister of War Maginot visited the Academy in 1930 and made Franco a Commander of the Legion of Honor. Franco bitterly opposed the Republic. His Academy was closed and in 1933 he was sent to the Balearics to keep him from temptation. Under Lerroux he helped to organize the savage suppression of the revolt of the Asturian miners in October 1934. According to ex-King Alfonso's aunt Eulalie, Franco told Alfonso in 1934 that he planned to take Madrid in a coup d'état. Alfonso, said Eulalie, contributed \$10,000,000 to the cause and other monarchists were equally generous.¹¹ Minister of War Gil Robles made Franco Chief of Staff. His activities in purging the officers' corps of liberals and putting anti-republican reactionaries in key positions were interrupted by Robles' resignation in December 1935.¹²

After the People's Front victory of February, Goded was sent to the Balearics and Franco to the Canaries because both were suspected of plotting rebellion. Before Franco departed he made plans with Generals Mola and Varelo. He likewise conferred with Colonel Yagüe and José Primo de Rivera, leader of the Fascist *Falange Española*. His plans were jeopardized by the Cabinet's dismissals of unreliable elements from the army. On June 23, 1936, he threatened the Minister of War with rebellion if the dismissals were not halted.¹³ The plot was perfected in its details before he left Spain. Early in July he wrote three letters in code from the Canaries to Madrid, giving final advice on the organization of the rebellion. At noon July 17, Yagüe sent a wire in code from Tetuan to Madrid: "The troops in Africa revolted on the 16th at 11.00 a.m." This was the signal previously agreed upon and now transmitted to Mola, Goded, Sanjurjo, Fanjul, Salequit, Queipo de Llano, and Franco.

The future *Caudillo* was waiting at Santa Cruz de Tenerife. On July 14, José de Sangroniz arrived to tell him that a seaplane to carry him to Tetuan would come to Las Palmas the next day. Franco was ready. He declared that if the coup failed "there will be a long and bloody civil war." He proceeded to Las Palmas on the pretext of attending the funeral of General Balmes. There in his hotel he received

word of the Moroccan revolt. The plane had arrived on the 15th—the same day on which a squadron of twenty-one Italian bombers, part of the Royal Italian Air Force, was ordered to be ready for duty in Spain. The seaplane was British. In it were English “tourists”: Major Hugh Pollard, his daughter Diana, and her friend, Dorothy Watson. Pollard said later: “My family is Catholic, and I could not allow my Spanish friends to be murdered by the Reds. I knew Franco was the man to save Spain.”¹⁴

Señor Luis Bolin had rented the plane in London from the Olley Aircraft Company and persuaded Pollard to act as agent. The pilot was a Captain Beed. He and the young women knew only that they were to pick up “a certain person” in the Canaries. The plane had left Croyden on July 11, stopped for gas at Bordeaux, Oporto, and Casa Blanca, and reached Las Palmas according to schedule. At 2.10 p.m. July 18, 1936, Franco got aboard and the plane was off. First stop Agadir. Next Casa Blanca, 9.30 p.m., where Bolin joined the party. He later became Franco’s press chief. All night long Franco talked and planned in his room in a small hotel. Off again at 4.00 a.m. Landing at Tetuan 7.00 a.m. July 19. He took command of the Moors and the Foreign Legion. That night he broadcast an appeal:

On taking the command of this glorious and patriotic army here in Tetuan, I send to the loyal garrisons and their country the most enthusiastic greetings. Spain has been saved. You may pride yourselves on being Spaniards. Have blind faith. Never doubt. Gather energy, without pausing, for the nation demands it. The movement is marching on. There is no human force which will stop it. I greet you with a strong and hearty embrace. Long live Spain!¹⁵

On September 29, 1936, the rebel National Defense Council installed Franco in the Episcopal Palace in Salamanca and named him head of the Government and Generalissimo of the “Nationalist” land, sea, and air forces.

But the coup became a civil war, for the first blows failed in the crucial centers. Sanjurjo, flying from Lisbon, was killed in an air crash on July 20. At Madrid General Fanjul led the troops in the Montana barracks to rebellion. But the Cabinet armed the trade unions and established a people’s militia which stormed the barracks and crushed the mutineers. At Barcelona the loyal forces also tri-

umphed after heavy street fighting.¹⁶ Goded was captured and shot. Gil Robles fled to France and thence to Libson, where he became rebel purchasing agent. By August 8, the rebels held only the Spanish colonies, the southern coast between Gibraltar and Portugal, and an uncertain area in the northwest. Franco crossed the Straits to Seville and began an advance northward along the border. His Moors and Legionnaires took Badajoz on August 14, massacred several thousand prisoners in the bull-ring, and joined Mola's forces, which captured Irun and San Sebastian early in September. Italian troops landed in Seville. German and Italian planes, tanks, and artillery poured in through Portugal and Spanish Morocco. The civil war was from the outset (and before the outset) an international war. But the coup had failed. *

Those who had beaten the rebellion in the great cities and seized arms to battle the invaders in the bleak mountains of Andalusia and Castile were promptly labeled "Reds"—by Franco's propagandists, by the Fascist and Nazi press, by the "200 families" of France, by the entire French Right, by most of the aristocrats and industrialists of England, by Beaverbrook and Rothermere and Hearst, by many Roman Catholics, and by all enemies of democracy everywhere. All the vast propaganda resources at the disposal of these groups were at once devoted to proving that Franco was saving Spain and Christianity from Bolshevism. The Communists had planned "mobilization" for August 1. "The military were to disappear," wrote Joaquin Arraras, the Caudillo's biographer, "in a mass slaughter, for which there had been charted a careful distribution of assassins."¹⁷ Gil Robles, on the day of the outbreak of rebellion and immediately before his flight, denounced the majority in the Cortes for plotting dictatorship and for forcing their opponents to resort to violence to free themselves from tyranny.¹⁸ The Comintern, declared other rebel apologists, had decided on February 27 to destroy churches and convents in Spain, organize a Red Army, and invade Portugal. By July, 150,000 Red shock troops were trained, with another 100,000 in reserve.¹⁹ The Reds had committed wholesale murder, arson, rape, and mayhem. Sir Auckland Geddes of the Rio Tinto Company offered proof that a Red revolt was in preparation. Caballero was planning a "national soviet."²⁰

With German thoroughness the NSDAP exposed the conspiracy in *Das Rotbuch über Spanien* (Anti-Komintern, Nibelungen-Verlag, Berlin, 1937, second edition: 51-100,000 copies). This extraordinary work, in the best tradition of Julius Streicher's *Der Stürmer*, was

modeled upon *Bewaffneter Aufstand!* by Adolf Ehrh (Eckart, Berlin, 1933), which "proved" by way of "documents" and hideous photographs of atrocities that the Communists had burned the Reichstag and were about to plunge all Germany into bloodshed when Hitler staged his eleventh-hour rescue. The *Rotbuch* was gory with pictures of sex crimes, bodies of ravished nuns, burned churches, mangled corpses, and Communists' instruments of torture. It "proved" that the Comintern ("Von Juden mit Juden") sought to launch the World Revolution in Spain as part of the Jewish world conspiracy against the white race. Franco, like Führer and Duce, was saving his country from a fate worse than death. Thousands of Fascist sympathizers in all lands joined the chorus and at length convinced themselves and tens of thousands of others that the "Reds" were such beasts that they had not only committed innumerable obscenities and atrocities against all the decent people of Spain, but had even perpetrated self-inflicted horrors in order to make false accusations against Spain's saviors. Thus Irun and Eibar were destroyed by the Communists, the massacre victims of Badajoz were myths, and the nightmare of Guernica was a product of Red arson.²¹

Such were the monsters from whom Spain was being saved by Hitler and Mussolini and by Franco's motley assortment of Moors, Legionnaires, and Falangists supported by monarchists and clericals, grandes and capitalists, generals and shopkeepers searching after glory. "We entered this struggle," said Mola, "simply because it was for us a moral duty. The terrible condition of the country compelled us to use force in order to restore law and order. Of course we sacrifice none of the principles of our political creed (Catholic unity, Corporativism, *fueros*, traditional and legitimate monarchy), but today our sole aim is to save the life of our country, to insure respect for the Catholic religion, to exterminate the leprosy of Marxism and the thousand-times-worse leprosy of separatism."²² Politicians joined priests in giving application to a catechism which taught that voters who supported liberalism were guilty of a mortal sin and that Darwinism, Protestantism, and Socialism were criminal creeds.²³ Leaders might know better. But followers believed with an inspired fanaticism which perhaps found its purest expression in the conviction of a simple soldier in the besieged Alcazar: "We believe: we have the Faith. They do not believe: they would stamp out the Faith. They think: that is in the brain. We pray: that is in the heart. . . . As I take my aim, I pray: as I throw a bomb, I pray. . . . The Reds think.

Thinking is nothing. Presently they will give way. We believe. That endures forever." ²⁴

But "they" who were guilty of thinking did not give way. Like the Roundheads of 1642, the embattled farmers of 1775, and those who stormed the Bastille in 1789, they fought freedom's ancient fight. Their crime was to challenge the prerogatives of a proud nobility, a corrupt priesthood, and an insolent military junta. President Azaña carried on. The premiership passed to Caballero on September 4, and passed in turn to the more moderate Juan Negrin on May 14, 1937. The Communist "Fifth Regiment" became the model of the People's Army because it alone believed in obeying officers and subordinating politics to the exigencies of defense.²⁵ Anarchist "organizers of indiscipline" and Trotskyite traitors were crushed in bloody rioting in Barcelona in May 1937. Thousands of anti-Fascist Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, and Americans (and a few courageous Britishers) joined the cause as volunteers.²⁶ Those who fought at Madrid won the first fight against the putschists and the second fight against the rebel armies. They would have won their battle against invasion and rebellion, save that their enemies were to be rescued by one of their friends. This friend was the Premier of the Great Power which would be the first victim of the Fascist conquest of Spain. He was also a liberal, a humanitarian, a Socialist, and a Jew. He was the leader of the People's Front in France.

2. RESCUE BY BLUM

Léon Blum was born in Paris, April 9, 1872, son of an Alsatian merchant who found wealth in the ribbon business. His mother had a passion for justice. His blind grandmother, Mme Picart, kept a bookshop frequented by liberal and radical lawyers, journalists, and students. Léon was brilliant, sensitive, shy. He studied law and after graduating from the Sorbonne with the highest honors in 1894, became a member of the Council of State. Literature was his avocation and presently his life. He was an intimate friend of Socialist Lucien Herr. He became dramatic critic for Jean Jaurès' *Humanité*. He dabbled with novels and plays and wrote a book in defense of free love in 1907. In 1914, his notable work on *Stendhal et le Beylisme* was completed. On the eve of Armageddon Jaurès was assassinated. Blum was shocked out of his ivory tower. He became secretary of the Socialist group in

parliament and Chef de Cabinet of Marcel Sembat, Minister of Public Works. In *La Revue de Paris*, December 1, 1917, he published an anonymous article attacking the Russian Communists for betraying socialism through dictatorship and terrorism. In 1919 he was elected to the Chamber. When the Socialist Congress at Tours voted in 1920 to join the Comintern, Blum sided with the secessionists. *L'Humanité* and the party machine passed into Communist hands. The Socialist Party had to be rebuilt from the bottom. Blum turned his hand to the task.

This strange, tall, foppish figure—elegant, fastidious, almost effeminate—was an æsthete but never an ascetic. His first wife, Lise Dukas, died in 1931, leaving him one son. He married Therese Pereira in 1932. With her he moved from his flat on the Boulevard Montparnasse to an apartment on the Quai Bourbon, Ile St. Louis.²⁷ His socialism was patient, doctrinaire, never brutal. His pacifism was optimistic and naïve. "It is up to the democratic States," he wrote in 1931, "to eliminate the dictatorial governments by peaceful methods."²⁸ He warned France against Italy and the Fascist International, but in the same breath appealed to Italy and Britain to aid France should Hitler come to power in Germany. But Hitler would not come to power. Germany would respect the Covenant and the Pact of Paris.²⁹

In 1934 he welcomed Communist initiative in the formation of the People's Front.³⁰ The elections of April 26 and May 3, 1936 gave the Left 381 seats to the Right's 237. On June 4, 1936, Blum became Premier of a People's Front Cabinet of Radical Socialists and Socialists with the support in parliament of these parties and of the Communists as well. His induction into office was marked by a wave of sit-down strikes. After settling them, he pushed through the forty-hour week and minimum-wage legislation, completed the dissolution of the Fascist leagues, "reformed" the Bank of France, and nationalized the munitions industry. But in the end the *Front Populaire* would stand or fall by its success or failure in foreign policy. In the end it failed and fell. Its fall was implicit in its first steps in dealing with Spain, for the war in Spain put Blum and his regime to its initial test. In that test Blum the Man of Reason, and Blum the Democrat and Socialist, was judged in the scales of loyalty, wisdom, and courage in the service of democracy and of France. He was found wanting. In failing, he served the cause of Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler as well as if he had been a Fascist reactionary or a paid agent of the Cæsars. In reality his services were even more valuable, for no reactionary could have

secured popular support for the policy which Blum pursued. In France the reaction had no need for a Fascist regime: it could always find Left politicians to serve its purposes.

The Socialist deputies declared their solidarity with the Spanish republicans on July 24th. All the parties of the People's Front, with a few dissidents among the Radical Socialists, were sympathetic to the loyalist cause. The Right press, much of it in the pay of Mussolini and Hitler, openly espoused the rebels. The People's Front had beaten the Right and come to power on an anti-Fascist program. The Fascist States were openly aiding the Spanish rebels in an effort to destroy the People's Front in Spain in order to reduce France to impotence. What should Premier Blum and Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos do? Every consideration of ethics, politics, and strategy, every impulse of faith and foresight, dictated adherence to the traditional course prescribed by international law for dealing with such situations.

When a recognized government in a neighboring State is faced with rebellion, it is the legal duty of all other States to abstain from intervention, to render no aid to the rebels, and to impose no obstacles in the way of the government in its efforts to re-establish its authority. Other governments may lawfully sell arms to such a government or permit their citizens to do so. On no account must they permit arms from their territory to reach the rebels. Blum could extend public aid to the Spanish Republic by granting it arms from French arsenals. Or he could merely maintain the status quo—i.e. permit French citizens under existing law to continue selling goods of all kinds freely to Madrid and forbid them under existing law to grant any support to Franco's forces. The former course would probably have enabled Madrid to crush the rebellion within a few weeks. The latter course would have led to rebel collapse within a few months, since Madrid possessed a large gold reserve, already had standing contracts with French arms-makers, and could readily buy enough arms in France to overwhelm the mutinous generals despite the armed aid unlawfully granted to them from Rome, Berlin, and Lisbon.

Blum rejected both alternatives. On July 25 he induced the Cabinet to forbid all arms shipments to Spain, including undelivered consignments on pending contracts. This action, called "non-intervention," was actually an act of intervention since it violated the rights of Spain under customary international law and under its treaties with France. It aided the rebel cause by depriving the Government of arms for its own defense from across the Pyrenees. Blum explained that this step

was the only means of preventing Germany and Italy from intervening openly (which they were already doing) and of forestalling German and Italian diplomatic recognition of the rebels (which they extended on November 18).³¹ He encouraged the French public to believe that this unavowed co-operation with the Fascist Powers was the only alternative to general war. The formula was familiar and was to be used again and again. Here its only possible meaning could have been that Germany and Italy would attack France if Paris accorded to Madrid the treatment always hitherto accorded to recognized governments confronted by rebellion. This, of course, was nonsense. But the masses are easily frightened and seldom inquire into the concrete meanings of magic words.

The mystery of Blum's motivation must be sought in his relations with London and in the psychic Nemesis of all Social Democratic parties and leaders. Laval had sacrificed French interests and collective security by blind subservience to Fascist Italy. Blum and his successor were to sacrifice French interests and collective security by blind subservience to Tory Britain. Blum and Delbos came to London to discuss Locarno on July 22nd. The Foreign Office had never known any French Ministers "so easy to get on with." Blum and Eden grew enthusiastic in a discussion of Proust. The Man of Peace became the slave of Downing Street. He warmly welcomed Schacht in Paris two days after the Reich had doubled the term of military service. He slighted the Little Entente and refused to discuss any military convention with the USSR lest Britain's rulers be offended.

As for British policy in Spain, the ruling classes, the Tory politicians, and most of the diplomats, consuls, and other officials in or near Spain were at once moved to revulsion against the "Reds" and to warm sympathy for the "nice people" who supported the rebellion. Class affiliations were more potent than national or imperial interests. The British Embassy moved from Madrid to Biarritz, where the Marquis Merry Del Val, once Alfonso's Ambassador in London, represented Franco. Alfonso's Foreign Minister, the Duke of Alba, established himself in London as Franco's agent.³² Downing Street continued to deal with the Republic as the Government of Spain. But there was no doubt as to the pattern of loves and hatreds *vis-à-vis* Spain among Britain's aristocracy, plutocracy, and officialdom. Since public sympathy was on the side of Madrid, it was necessary to employ the usual symbols to disguise actual hopes and intentions. Hence much talk of "on the one hand, on the other," "a choice between tyrannies," "most

complex," "localization," "strict neutrality," "non-intervention," "peace," "general appeasement."

There is no conclusive evidence that Downing Street "compelled" Blum to sponsor "non-intervention"—i.e. intervention against Madrid. Such compulsion could have been effective only in case of an actual danger of a Fascist attack on France accompanied by a threat of British desertion if Paris failed to heed London's command. There was no such danger. If there had been, Britain could not desert France even if it would. Did Blum assume such danger or desertion? Perhaps. But he was not a fool. He did not need to be compelled. Like dozens of MacDonalds, Snowdens, Scheidemanns, Eberts, Müllers, Turatis, Kautskys, Kerenskys, et al., he was a democrat first and a Socialist second. This blend of socialism and democracy dictates compromise, conciliation, avoidance of risks, evasion of responsibilities, and ultimately betrayal of its own ideals. He must not challenge the Cæsars even though they threatened France. The more they threatened the less must they be challenged. He must not challenge the Right, even though its press was in Cæsar's pay. He must not provoke Downing Street, even if it did Cæsar's bidding. Hence "non-intervention" to keep "peace." If friends and comrades and all vital interests and ideals were thereby sacrificed, he could shed a sincere tear. But he could not deviate from his course.

He therefore barred French arms to Madrid a full three weeks before London did likewise. He refused to heed the appeal of the Spanish People's Front on July 26. He faced bravely a great outcry against his policy. Socialists and Communists alike denounced him. His own paper, *Le Populaire*, turned against him. His pretense that his course was preventing Fascist intervention was hollow. On July 29, Queipo de Llano over the Seville radio appealed to Britain, Germany, and Italy for arms and declared that Franco would "break with France" when he had won. On July 30, three Italian bombers, part of a squadron of twenty-one assembled July 15 and headed for Spanish Morocco to join the rebels, crashed in Algeria. On the same day Delbos expressed appreciation to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber for assurances of Italian "neutrality" which he had received the same morning. The French Right press screamed against the Spanish "Reds," compared Mola to Napoleon, rejoiced in executions of Spanish Socialists and Communists, and shrieked that Hitler must not permit Blum to arm Madrid.⁸⁸

On August 1, Blum announced that the Cabinet was addressing a

pressing appeal to other States "for the rapid adoption and rigorous fulfillment" of "common rules of non-intervention." Meanwhile, as threat or inducement, the Cabinet reserved "liberty of action" on the arms ban already in force pending international agreement.³⁴ The French Ambassadors in Rome and London suggested a three-Power accord and a joint appeal to other governments. Britain agreed "in principle," but urged that other Powers be included. The Quai d'Orsay then appealed to Germany, Portugal, the USSR, and others. Berlin accepted (August 4) provided that Moscow should accept. Moscow accepted (August 5) provided that Portugal should accept and that foreign aid to the rebels should stop at once. Rome accepted (August 6), but Ciano asked whether the proposed bans would apply to individuals as well as governments and what measures would be taken to insure enforcement. On August 5-6, the French Cabinet drafted and distributed an accord proposing a general ban on the export of all war materials to Spain, including commercial planes and arms ordered before the outbreak of the rebellion, and suggesting as a sanction the exchange of information on all measures to be adopted.

A stormy Cabinet meeting followed in Paris on August 8. The Radical Socialists approved "non-intervention." The Socialists and Communists were bitterly opposed to this program of aiding Fascism to strangle the Spanish Republic. Blum insisted on his plan. The British Ambassador, Sir George Clerk, is reported to have called and threatened to suspend Britain's Locarno obligations if Paris drew back from its proposals.³⁵ Blum and his supporters magnified British pressure to justify their course to themselves and to their critics. The Cabinet agreed and announced that the French arms embargo would continue and would be extended to commercial planes ordered from private firms. Madrid protested at this act of intervention and at the proposed accord.³⁶ The Fascist Powers delayed their replies while London and Paris begged them to "co-operate." Lisbon on August 10 demanded non-intervention by the USSR, respect for the international zone at Tangier, and outside protection for Portugal's Fascist regime in the event of a "Red" victory in Spain. Berlin assured Downing Street on August 8 that no German military supplies, public or private, were going to the rebels and that none would be sent. Simultaneously German planes went to Franco's forces in a steady stream and the commander of the *Deutschland* called on the Caudillo at Ceuta to express Nazi sympathy.

On August 15, 1936, without waiting for specific commitments

from other capitals, London and Paris exchanged identical notes providing for abstention from all intervention, direct or indirect, and declaring their intention to ban the direct or indirect export or re-export to Spain of all "arms, munitions, and materials of war as well as all aircraft, mounted or dismantled, and all ships of war." The ban would apply to all contracts in process of execution. Application was contingent upon acceptance by Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the USSR.⁸⁷ On August 17, the Reich granted grudging approval while denouncing as "Red piracy" Madrid's seizure of German aircraft and search of German ships. On August 19, Britain imposed an arms ban. On August 21, Portugal accepted with six conditions and reservations, including the necessity of "safeguarding Western civilization against all regimes of social subversion" and release of Lisbon from all obligations if any signatory consented to the raising of funds or the enlistment of volunteers (for the loyalists). Britain agreed to defend Portugal against any attack.

Rome accepted on August 21. Ciano refused the ban on "indirect" intervention, but declared that indirect intervention, which London and Paris had pledged themselves to avoid, included enrollment of volunteers and public subscription of funds. Italy thus held the democratic Powers to obligations which Italy refused to accept for itself. On the same day Berlin protested to Moscow and Madrid against anti-Nazi radio broadcasts and the *Völkischer Beobachter* issued a threat: "If they are not capable in Moscow and Madrid of acting like modern civilized nations, then the facts must be made clear to the Bolshevik Jews in another fashion." Germany accepted on August 24, also omitting the preamble banning direct intervention and adding other ambiguous conditions. Hungary followed this example. German military service was extended from one to two years as "defense against Communism." Turkey and Jugoslavia, in obvious anxiety, held the accord to be of an exceptional nature, "not to constitute a precedent or result in even the implicit recognition of a principle [this *was* the principle which the accord *expressly* established!] that a government cannot render to a legal government, on the demand of the latter, aid in the struggle against rebellion." One by one other European States accepted with a variety of interpretations and reservations. There was no single agreement but a multiplicity of replies and comments on the Anglo-French notes of August 15. Each State imposed or pretended to impose embargoes on arms to Spain, with the lists of banned exports displaying little consistency.⁸⁸

Thus, under the leadership of Léon Blum, at the initiative of the two democratic Powers, and in the sacred name of "peace," all Europe was ambiguously pledged to deny arms to the Spanish Republic in its struggle against Fascist attack. Denial of arms to the rebels was already an elementary obligation of customary international law. Denial of arms to Madrid was a departure from law and practice and a violation of the rights of Spain, as Litvinov, Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Foreign Minister, and even Foreign Minister Monteiro of Portugal pointed out in the League Assembly of September 1936.³⁹ Professor Norman Padelford, outstanding American legal authority on the issue, wrote: "To apply to unrecognized and irresponsible rebels the same principles that are applicable to sovereign States and established governments is to encourage rebellion and disorder and to weaken public law and authority. The law cannot long afford to do this."⁴⁰

A price would be exacted from France as a Power and from France as a democracy by the strange Nemesis which here pursued Léon Blum and the *Front Populaire*. The Fascist Leagues were already discredited,⁴¹ but the impetus given by "non-intervention" to Fascist intrigue against the French Republic was enormous. Secret agents of the Berlin-Rome axis, with useful connections among the French politicians and pressmen, plotted the extermination of troublesome anti-Fascist exiles residing on French soil. Carlo Rosselli, editor of *Giustizia e Libertà*, published in Paris, was a thorn in Cæsar's flesh. An agent of the OVRA, a poor fanatic, was sent to France in December 1935 to kill Carlo. He failed. Rosselli fought for the loyalists in the Spanish war and infuriated Mussolini by urging all anti-Fascist Italians abroad to defend Madrid against Il Duce. The loyalist troops which crushed the Italian brigades at Guadalajara were in part composed of Italian anti-Fascist volunteers. Rosselli also obtained from friends in Italy (and published in Paris) secret Fascist documents, including instructions to the Fascist press. Examples:

January 16, 1937—Give no news of the bombardments of inhabited centers by the Spanish "nationalists," and above all deny that it is done by Italian or German aviators.

January 25—Complete silence on the fact that the Hungarian Chief of Staff has been in Milan. Disinterest yourself completely from the Fascist movement in Switzerland.

February 20—Begin and continue a strong campaign against Czechoslovakia. Absolute silence on the date fixed for ending the dispatch of volunteers to Spain.

- February 26—Insist on the eventuality of Eden's leaving the Foreign Office. Have sent from London news of Eden's dismissal.
- March 5—Do not reproduce facts about the metal reserves of the Bank of Italy published in the French papers. Suppress entirely news of the arrival at Naples of the wounded volunteers coming from Spain and transported by our hospital ships.
- April 7—Dilate upon the Yagoda episode in Soviet Russia and play up the supremacy and immorality of the adventurer Stalin.
- April 14—Reproduce and amplify the news of the Stefani Agency about how desirable it would be to burn the contagious quarters of London unworthy of a civilized age. Add that Edward, if he had continued to reign, would have provided for it. . . .⁴²

On June 9, 1937, Carlo Rosselli and his brother Nello were murdered in the forest of Bagnoles-de-l'Orne in Normandy by professional assassins, identity unknown.⁴³ It later appeared that this crime, along with others, was the work of a strange band of Fascist conspirators, the "Secret Committee for Revolutionary Action" (CSAR), partially exposed by René Marx Dormoy, Minister of the Interior, in November 1937. The agents of the CSAR, popularly known as the Cagouards or "The Hooded Men," had high connections in the world of industry, finance, and politics. They got funds from Rome and Berlin. They got arms from Italy and Germany and from the Spanish rebel factory in Toledo. They established secret arsenals and plotted the overthrow of the French Republic by violence. On September 11, 1937, their hired gangsters bombed the headquarters of the General Confederation of French employers. The building was empty. Two gendarmes in the street were killed by the terrific explosion. The Confederation and the Ironmasters Association at once accused the Communists and the People's Front of the crime and charged that they were preparing a reign of terror to establish a proletarian dictatorship. This "Reichstag fire" failed of its purpose.⁴⁴ The investigation left no doubt but that Rome and Berlin were plotting to unleash civil war in France as they had in Spain.

Such revelations produced no change in French policy. Those bent upon suicide are not moved from their course by threats of murder. At the 34th National Congress of the Radical Socialists at Lille, October 27-31, 1937, the followers of Herriot, Daladier, Chautemps, and Delbos accepted Jacques Kayser's report on foreign policy, extolling the course which confronted France with disaster.⁴⁵ This course was irrevocably fixed by Léon Blum in August 1936, in successful defiance

of his followers. On September 3, 1936, "La Passionaria," the political Jeanne d'Arc of the Spanish People's Front and Communist deputy in the Cortes from Oviedo, spoke to 30,000 people at the Velodrome d'Hiver in Paris. (*The Action Française*, August 25, declared that she had once killed a monk by biting him through the throat!) In a moving address she appealed for aid from the people of France to save democracy in Spain. The crowd shouted again and again: "Planes for Spain!" On September 4, 50,000 workers demonstrated for Spain in the Place de la République. Blum was unperturbed. At Luna Park on September 6, he addressed his followers, who interrupted constantly with "Planes for Spain!" But by virtue of his oratorical prowess he finally persuaded them through misrepresentation and bathos and secured an ovation. He played upon their sympathies by depicting "non-intervention" as a personal tragedy for himself. "By giving an example we hoped to pique the honor of the other Powers. . . . There is not a single piece of circumstantial evidence to show that the agreement has been violated." France must keep its "word." For "peace" France must stand aside even if Germany and Italy intervened openly on Franco's side:

Do you think there is any one of your sentiments that I don't share? Do you think my heart is not torn when I think what is happening down there in Spain? Undoubtedly the legal government that has arisen from the expression of universal suffrage, the government of the Spanish Republic would assure us complete security on our Pyrenees frontier, while it is impossible to foresee the ambitions of the rebel generals. On the one hand, security; on the other, danger. Certainly one can plead for rigorous observance of international law. But if certain Powers come to recognize the rebels as the regular government, should we undertake a competition of armaments on Spanish soil? In other words, if certain Powers furnish arms and planes to the [rebel] military forces, should France furnish them to the [Spanish] Popular Front? ⁴⁶

The answer was "No." Only thus could France have "peace." The bewildered crowd shrank in fear of war and cheered its leader. The tide was turned. The clamor subsided. The policy was fixed.

3. COMEDY IN LONDON

When gentlemen tell things which they know to be false to other gentlemen who believe them true, the result is deception. When the other gentlemen know that what they are told is false, the result, to outside observers, is hilarity. But when the first gentlemen also know that the other gentlemen know that what is said is false, the result is play-acting. And when all the gentlemen exchange statements which all know to be false, the play becomes a farce. The farce becomes delectable indeed when all the gentlemen pretend to one another that all the falsehoods are true.

As soon as minutes and memoirs are made public, it will become possible for historians of the future to reconstruct in detail one of the most diverting diplomatic farces of modern times: the proceedings of the London "Non-Intervention" Committee through which all the States of Europe supervised intervention in the Spanish war. Archæologists and classicists of days to come may find evidence in these records that the civilization of the twentieth century was, even in its decadence, not lacking in humor. They may conclude, however, that the quality and purport of the humor were in themselves unmistakable symptoms of decline. In either case those far removed from the event will experience huge merriment over the tale. If some of those closer to it responded at the time without mirth, this was doubtless due to the limitations of their own perspective.

This most undivine comedy can here be barely sketched, for the plot was almost interminable, much of the action tedious, the asides lengthy, the complications of motive, verbiage, and documentation incredibly intricate and fantastic. For present purposes a few program notes will be sufficient.

On August 26, 1936, the Quai d'Orsay invited all States accepting its "non-intervention" proposals to form an international committee to supervise the application of the pledges assumed. Moscow, London, and Rome agreed. Berlin and Lisbon delayed, but under British persuasion Portugal yielded on September 2, and the Reich on September 5. The Committee assembled at the British Foreign Office on September 9. It consisted of diplomatic representatives in London of the twenty-seven participating States. Francis Hemming was named Secretary. W. S. Morrison, Financial Secretary of the Treasury, was

elected President but was soon replaced by Lord Plymouth (Ivor Miles Windsor-Clive). This gentleman (b. February 4, 1889), was not quite comparable in ancestral dignity to the Spanish grandees who served Franco in their own fashion. He was none the less a gentleman, for he owned thirty thousand acres, attended Eton and Cambridge, married Lady Irene Charteris, and belonged to the proper clubs: Carlton, Bachelors', Turf, Travellers, and Beefsteak. He had served on the London County Council, 1913-19, and was a Conservative M.P. from Ludlow in Shropshire in 1922-3. He rose to the rank of Captain of the Gentlemen-at-Arms, 1925-9 and then became Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Dominions, 1929; for Transport, 1931-2; for Colonies, 1932-6; and for Foreign Affairs, 1936.

At the first meeting of the body over which Lord Plymouth was to preside with such conspicuous success, the Portuguese representative threatened to withdraw. When called upon to report as to the measures of "non-intervention" which their Governments had adopted, young Prince Otto von Bismarck for Germany and Dino Grandi for Italy had none to report. The Committee therefore adjourned to September 14, when it drew up rules to discourage complaints over violations. Neither the Spanish Government nor the rebels nor private observers would be allowed to submit charges or evidence. This privilege would be reserved to signatory States. As for a mode of enforcing "non-intervention" pledges in the event of violations, none was provided. But this defect was not serious. The Committee never discovered any violations.

On September 15, Madrid in a note to the "non-intervention" Powers asked the "raising of the embargo on the export of arms to the Spanish Government and rigorous prohibition of the supplying of war materials to the rebels." Protests and proofs were transmitted to Berlin, Rome, Lisbon, and Geneva. Avenol refused to publish them. They were published by the Spanish delegation to the League on September 30. There was no response. Meanwhile an unsuccessful mutiny in the Portuguese navy caused Premier-dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar to rush new aid to Franco, the victory of whose mutiny was confidently expected in Lisbon to discourage mutiny everywhere. Caceres, near the Portuguese frontier, became a German air base, while Italian "volunteers" took over Majorca and converted it into an Italian air base.

The Olympian calm with which these developments were viewed in London was rudely broken on October 7, when Samuel Kagan,

Soviet chargé, issued a note from Moscow, protesting violations, detailing shipments of German and Italian arms to Franco, and threatening that "if violation is not halted immediately, it [the USSR] will consider itself free from any obligation resulting from the agreement."⁴⁷ This was clearly ungentlemanly behavior. Downing Street was dismayed. On October 9, at the fifth meeting of the Committee, the German, Italian, and Portuguese delegates called Moscow names. Blum assured Eden that he would not support the USSR. A communiqué was issued after five hours of discussion. It disposed satisfactorily of the issue:

. . . The Italian representative, after having energetically refuted and repudiated every single point of the allegations directed against Italy, declared all these allegations were entirely fantastic and devoid of any foundation whatsoever. This would easily be proved by an answer which would be given in due time by the Italian Government. German and Portuguese representatives made similar reservations in regard to the positions of their respective Governments. . . . The Portuguese representative expressed his inability to take part in discussion of this matter without instructions from his Government. . . . The Committee decided that, pending receipt of a reply, it would be premature to discuss the proposal for appointment of a committee for investigation. . . .

In view of the fact that no concrete proposals were before the Committee on this occasion, no action could be taken on the statement made by the representative of the USSR.⁴⁸

Plymouth politely declined all Soviet suggestions to insure respect for the obligations assumed. The German note of October 21 hurled accusations at Moscow. On October 22, Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador, read a note proposing that the Spanish Government have restored to it the right to buy arms. "In any case the Soviet Government is compelled to declare it cannot consider itself bound by the agreement for non-intervention to a greater extent than any of the remaining participants in the agreement." The other delegates professed to be shocked and mystified. Maisky declined to elaborate. Two days later Downing Street issued a note listing alleged violations which might be worthy of investigation: three by the USSR, and one by Italy. Portugal again threatened to quit because of renewed anxiety over the future of "Western Civilization." Charges and counter-

charges were exchanged. On October 28, the Committee voted almost unanimously (USSR alone in the negative) that the charges against Portugal and Italy had no foundation. Maisky repeated his formula. Grandi accused Moscow of twenty violations. In this gentlemen's game of arithmetic, all numbers on both sides ultimately added up to zero.

By the end of October, while the Committee debated German and Italian charges against the USSR, the army of Moors, Italians, and rebels which had pushed up the Tagus from Caceres and raised the loyalist siege of the Alcazar in Toledo, was advancing on Madrid in four columns, supported by a hundred German and Italian planes and forty Italian tanks. On November 7, a general assault on the Spanish capital was launched. A "fifth column" of rebel sympathizers was to rise when Franco should breach the defenses. But the unexpected now happened. Some thousands of Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, Americans, and others, all united by an ungentlemanly affection for freedom and a deplorable aversion to Fascism, had reached Spain to defend the Republic and had organized themselves into an International Brigade under General Emil Kleber. Moscow, perceiving belatedly the import of "non-intervention" and fearful lest Fascist victory should discredit the People's Front policy everywhere and render France useless as an ally, had rushed planes, guns, and tanks to Spain. The Republican Cabinet moved to Valencia, but Franco's forces were suddenly smitten hip and thigh by the "Internationals" who rallied the Spanish people's militia and saved Madrid from capture.

Duce and Führer were disappointed but not discouraged. On November 18, in identical communiqués, they recognized Franco's junta as the *de jure* Government of Spain.⁴⁹ Ciano officially received Admiral Antonio Magaz, agent from Burgos, whose credentials in turn constituted rebel recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Albania, Salvador, Nicaragua, and other States followed the example of the Fascist Powers. In March 1937, General Wilhelm Faupel presented his credentials as German Ambassador at Salamanca. Signor Robert Cantalupo did likewise for Italy. In international law premature recognition of rebels which a hitherto recognized government is striving to repress is always an act of unlawful intervention and is often regarded as an act of war: e.g. French recognition of the American rebels, 1778; threatened British recognition of the Confederate States of America, 1861-3; American recognition of Panama, 1903; French recognition of Baron Wrangel's "White" regime in the

Crimea, 1920. Berlin and Rome were here committing an open act of hostile intervention against the Republic of Spain. But in the metaphysics of "non-intervention" this circumstance could be readily ignored.

Eden in Commons on November 20, in a masterpiece of understatement, declared that "it is unhappily true that the agreement has not been as strictly observed by all as could be wished. That fact, however regrettable, does not cause us in any way to modify our decision in favor of the principle of non-intervention." On November 23 he asserted that the Government would not grant belligerent rights to the contestants in Spain nor, in the face of rebel threats to British shipping, concede any right of search and seizure. But it would introduce legislation forbidding British vessels to carry arms to Spain. (An act to this effect was passed on December 3.) On December 2, Ribbentrop replaced Bismarck on the Committee. French and even British opinion was increasingly distressed by the mockery. Some gesture was required. London and Paris therefore proposed on December 5 that a ban on volunteers be instituted, that controls be provided to check movements of arms and men, and that efforts be made to secure an armistice and plebiscite. Moscow agreed. Berlin was evasive. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay continued to plead (December 19 and 25)—perhaps on the assumption that the notable success already achieved in securing observance of the ban on arms would be equaled in a ban on men.

On January 2, 1937, while German cruisers in Spanish waters fired upon loyalist merchant ships, Britain and Italy signed an agreement at Rome whereby each recognized that "freedom of entry to, exit from, and transit through the Mediterranean is a vital interest" to the other. Both disclaimed any desire to modify the status quo in the middle sea. Each would respect the other's rights and promote "peace" and "good relations." Accompanying letters between Perth and Ciano specified that Italy had not and would not engage in any negotiations with Franco to alter the status quo in the Balearics or elsewhere in the western Mediterranean. Ciano had "no difficulty on behalf of the Royal Italian Government in confirming the accuracy of His Majesty's Government's assumption: namely, that so far as Italy is concerned the integrity of present territories of Spain shall in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified." ⁶⁰

The Empire thus having been saved, Britain and France pressed Rome and Berlin for a reply to their suggestions on volunteers. On

January 7, Berlin expressed "unhappy astonishment" at British insistence, and alarm at "the unrestricted stream of Bolshevist elements to Spain." It proposed that all non-Spanish participants in the fighting be ejected, "including political agitators and propagandists." Rome concurred. By way of asserting British leadership, the London Cabinet banned all volunteering in England on January 10. Paris had meanwhile gathered troops and moved its Atlantic fleet toward African waters on reports that 8,000 Germans were about to land in Spanish Morocco. Hitler told François-Poncet on January 11 that this was all a mistake: the Reich had no designs on Morocco. The incident was "closed." Paris banned volunteering on January 15.

Ten days later Rome and Berlin finally "accepted" the British proposals in separate notes, after Göring conferred with Mussolini and Ciano in Rome. After further delays the London Committee adopted a new plan on February 16, 1937, whereby the Powers agreed upon the extension of "non-intervention" to prohibit volunteering as from midnight February 20-1. They would furnish information on measures of enforcement and adopt a scheme of supervision as from midnight March 6-7. All the land and sea frontiers of Spain would be patrolled by agents of an "International Board for Non-Intervention in Spain" consisting of representatives of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the USSR. "Observation" officers were stationed on land frontiers and on ships. They were authorized to report infractions. (None was ever discovered.) After Moscow had graciously withdrawn, the four Western Powers agreed that British and French warships should patrol the rebel coasts, with German and Italian along the loyalist coasts. On March 8 this extraordinarily complex scheme was unanimously approved. On April 20 it went into effect. Meanwhile the United States co-operated independently by imposing its own arms embargo on Spain, in the name of the "new neutrality," on January 8, 1937. "President Roosevelt," declared Franco, "behaved in the manner of a true gentleman."⁵¹

But these posturings, however innocuous, were displeasing to the Cæsars. Had speedy victory attended the Fascist cause, they doubtless would have been endured since they were not an obstacle to intervention but only another element of camouflage. Italian troops poured into Spain. One officer wrote in his diary: "January 7, 1937. Noiselessly the pirates of an ideal depart from their Fatherland, on the most wonderful and the most sacred adventure. The commander of the Naples Division conveys to us greetings from the Crown Prince. The

soldiers have been given amulets with the image of the Christ, the Holy Mother, and the Holy Ghost. Tomorrow, if all goes well, we arrive at Cadiz. The anxiety continues—after all, ours is a pirate ship. But our ‘Papa’ is protecting us. Warships—ours and foreign.”⁵² These troops of Il Duce, after assisting in the capture of Malaga, were scheduled to do what Franco’s Moors had failed to do: take Madrid by flank attack from the northeast via Brihuega and Guadalajara. Mussolini on his way to Africa on a cruise penned a message to General Mancini for distribution to the Italian “volunteers”:

Aboard the *Pola* on my way to Libya I have received your dispatches in connection with the great battle which is proceeding in the direction of Guadalajara. I am following the incidents of the battle with unshakable confidence because I am sure the impetus and daring of our legionnaires will break the enemy’s resistance. To crush the international forces will be a great success, including the political aspects. Tell our legionnaires I am following their action hourly, and their efforts will be crowned with victory.⁵³

But victory eluded the invaders. By a strange fate the propaganda with which loyalist planes showered the Italian columns was written by Pietro Nenni, who in 1911 was Mussolini’s Socialist comrade and shared a cell with him after both had been jailed for sabotage.⁵⁴ Some of the “volunteers” deserted to the anti-Fascist cause. As for the others, more loyalist planes showered them with bombs and bullets. On March 13, 1937, their demoralized retreat was turned into a costly rout, comparable in miniature to Caporetto. For the third time Madrid was saved.

Grandi told the London Committee on March 23 that Italy would not even discuss the withdrawal of volunteers. They must remain until the war was over. He repudiated intimations from Maisky and Delbos that Rome was not observing its obligations. On March 29, Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay announced that no violations of “non-intervention” had yet been established, but that if any existed, the gravest view must be taken of their consequences. Thus, Cæsar: “The Italian troops which are *not* in Spain will stay there!” Thus, the democracies: “There is *no* German or Italian intervention in Spain, but if there is we deplore it!”⁵⁵ On April 15, however, Grandi condescended to “discuss” withdrawals of the troops not there. The “patrol” began on April 20. There were casualties, not confined to

Spaniards. On May 13, a mysterious attack on the British destroyer *Hunter* off Almeria killed eight and wounded twenty-four. On May 22, loyalist planes bombed the Italian cruiser *Barletta* at Palma, killing six officers. On May 29, the German pocket-battleship *Deutschland* at Iviza was struck by loyalist bombs: twenty-three dead, eighty-three wounded.

This "Red outrage" was more than Hitler could endure. "Bolshevists" in process of liquidation are not permitted to strike back. Nazi "honor" demanded retaliation. On May 31 at dawn five German war vessels hurled three hundred shells into Almeria: thirty-five buildings destroyed; one hundred damaged; twenty dead—children, women, and men alike; scores wounded. Rome and Berlin simultaneously announced their withdrawal from the naval patrol and from the discussions in London. Eden expressed hope that the Reich would "take no action which would render the present grave situation graver still." Hull appealed to Berlin and Valencia for peace. Protracted negotiations followed, as London sought to induce Rome and Berlin to resume their "co-operation" in "non-intervention." On June 16, Italy and Germany returned to the sea patrol. London and Paris in a four-Power agreement consented to "consultation" on reprisals in case of future attacks on patrol vessels. This accord, however, was short-lived.

Meanwhile the "liberation" of Spain continued. The Fascist forces moved to crush the Catholic Basques on the north coast who were loyal to Madrid but cut off from other Government territory by rebel forces. On April 26, the Basque "holy city" of Guernica was visited by German bombers, who first used small bombs to drive the inhabitants to cover, then demolition bombs to destroy their homes over their heads, then machine-guns to slaughter the fleeing refugees, finally incendiary bombs to burn the ruins.⁵⁶ A thousand died. The city was a smoking hell. Burgos explained that no rebel planes were in the air that day: the city had been burned by the "Reds." On June 3, a rebel plane crashed on a hill near Vittoria. To this hill the bodies of those slain in the Fascist terror in Burgos had previously been brought.⁵⁷ A general in the plane was killed. His name was Mola. The vagaries of the atmosphere and of internal-combustion engines thus achieved poetic justice. But on June 19 the Italians entered Bilbao.

On the same day Berlin announced that on the preceding Tuesday (June 15) and again on Friday the cruiser *Leipzig* had been attacked off Oran by "Spanish-Bolshevist submarines." Torpedoes had missed

but had dented the hull. Der Führer flew from Godesberg to Berlin, while the Nazi press screamed for vengeance. Ribbentrop in London demanded immediate "consultation" on retaliatory measures. Neurath canceled a visit to Britain. On June 21, consultation broke down because of British and French refusal to join in the naval demonstration against Valencia.⁵⁸ On June 23, Germany and Italy abandoned the naval patrol once more, this time permanently. Fears were expressed that they might now attack or blockade loyalist ports. "The situation," said Chamberlain to Commons on June 25, "is serious but not hopeless. . . . Let us try to keep cool heads."

When the London Committee met for the fifty-fifth time on June 29, 1937, Germany and Italy expressed opposition to any Anglo-French patrol of Spanish waters without Fascist participation. Rome hinted that it might return to the patrol if belligerent rights were granted to Franco. Downing Street was favorable. The Quai d'Orsay was unfavorable. Deadlock. Ribbentrop proposed the grant of belligerent rights, the end of the naval patrol, and the retention of land patrols and "observers." Grandi agreed. The Committee did not. Portugal abolished "control" on its frontiers on July 3. Negrin came to Paris to plead for help. Delbos threatened to "open" the French frontier. Paris phoned London. London phoned Paris. Downing Street was willing to grant belligerent rights on condition of the withdrawal of "volunteers." George Lansbury interviewed Mussolini in Rome and reported his conclusions: "If we can get the responsible government heads to sit around a conference table, many problems appearing insoluble may be solved." On July 10 the Quai d'Orsay announced that it would inform the Committee that it would suspend the right of search by control officers on the Pyrenees unless Portugal restored control. Rome and Berlin registered indignation. Portugal did nothing. Paris abandoned control on July 13.

In this crisis Downing Street came forward with a plan which was to keep the Committee busy in harmless debate for the next twelve months. The British proposals of July 14, 1937 contemplated abandonment of the naval patrol, the immediate restoration of land patrols, and the establishment of international officials in Spanish ports to ascertain whether ships were carrying observers. Both contestants should be granted belligerent rights, but their contraband lists must be limited to the list of prohibited goods adopted by the London Committee. They must grant free passage to ships carrying observers and flying the "non-intervention" flag, so long as such vessels were not

engaged in unneutral service or blockade running; they must not interfere with shipping between neutral ports. The Committee should consider the possibility of establishing observers in Spanish airdromes to control illicit importation of aircraft. It should pass "a unanimous resolution in favor of the withdrawal from Spain of all persons" whose evacuation might be recommended by a technical subcommittee. Belligerent rights should be accorded when "the Non-Intervention Committee place on record their opinion that the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign nationals are working satisfactorily and that the withdrawal in fact has made substantial progress." ⁵⁹

Rome and Berlin now insisted that belligerent rights should precede the withdrawal of volunteers, while Paris and Moscow insisted upon the reverse order. London proposed two subcommittees to debate simultaneously. While the fog of debate grew thicker, the Cæsars became impatient. They desired belligerent rights for Franco in order that the rebel navy, aided by German and Italian units, might impose an effective blockade on loyalist ports without provoking Anglo-French protests. When this prospect became increasingly remote, Rome resorted to an alternative plan. During August "unknown" submarines all over the Mediterranean began torpedoing vessels bound for loyalist ports. Within four weeks twenty-five ships were attacked. Moscow accused Italy of responsibility. On September 6, Britain and France invited ten Powers to a special conference at Nyon "to deal with the intolerable situation created by attacks recently illegally carried out against shipping in the Mediterranean by submarines and airplanes without disclosure of their identity."

What followed was a departure from the script of the play. On September 9, Rome and Berlin declined the invitation and suggested that the London Committee should deal with the problem. For the democratic victims of Fascist "piracy" to invite the pirates to confer with them on means of suppressing piracy was not strange. For the pirates to reject the invitation was also not strange. But, the Cæsars having declined, London and Paris should have apologized in accordance with custom and suggested a "formula" and a subcommittee whereby piracy and non-piracy could be reconciled. Instead, they summoned the conference regardless on September 10, and pushed through a nine-Power agreement, signed at Nyon September 14, by representatives of Britain, France, USSR, Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Jugoslavia. It provided for joint naval action to attack and destroy submarines operating against shipping in a man-

ner contrary to the rules adopted at London in 1930 and 1936. British and French fleets would operate on the high seas throughout the Mediterranean and in territorial waters as well in the western portion of the sea, while the other Powers in the east would patrol their own territorial waters. The signatories agreed to restrict the movements of their own submarines to facilitate destruction of "pirate" U-boats. A supplementary agreement of September 17 extended these arrangements to "pirate" aircraft and surface vessels.⁶⁰

Duce and Führer fumed at this defiance. Submarine sinkings ceased as by magic. Many surprised observers hailed Nyon as decisive: the democracies had demonstrated firmness of will; the dictatorships had yielded; the next step would be to demand genuine non-intervention and insist on the withdrawal of Fascist "volunteers." Paris and London proposed a three-Power conference with Mussolini on September 24, to discuss withdrawal. Simultaneous developments at Geneva seemed to justify these assumptions, despite certain incongruities in the setting. The Eighteenth Assembly convened on September 13, 1937, with Juan Negrin in the chair. Aga Khan, Indian potentate, Moslem "god," racehorse magnate, and plutocrat beyond compare, was elected President. He supplied 2,500 bottles of champagne at the official opening of the new Assembly Hall on September 25. The Secretariat had moved into the \$15,000,000 Palace in 1934 and the Council in September 1936. The Council Chamber was adorned with murals painted by Sert and presented by the Spanish Republic, depicting the liberation of mankind from tyranny, intolerance, and injustice. Sert was now a Franco sympathizer. For the first time in the League's history Spain failed of re-election to the Council on September 20. The Chinese delegates took an early leave from the Assembly festivities. The Spanish delegates did not appear. But the champagne was excellent. The League, like the Church, grew in physical magnificence while its spirit died. Its new sepulcher was a gaudy bauble.⁶¹

And yet life stirred in the tomb—for the last time. China invoked the Covenant against Japanese aggression. The Far Eastern Advisory Committee of 1933 was reconvened with the United States participating. Japan was censured for aggression and for aerial frightfulness. A conference of the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact of 1922 was proposed. On October 2 the Assembly passed a resolution holding that "there are veritable foreign army corps on Spanish soil." "Immediate and complete withdrawal" was urged. "If such a result can-

not be obtained in the near future the members of the League which are parties to the non-intervention agreement will consider ending the non-intervention policy.”⁶² On October 5, President Roosevelt at Chicago denounced aggressors and demanded their “quarantine.” On October 6, the State Department condemned Japanese treaty-breaking.

All these developments, however, were quite deceptive. They meant only that Anthony Eden was waging his last losing fight against his colleagues and superiors. Nyon was the last Geneva gesture of Anglo-French resistance to the program of the Rome-Berlin axis in Iberia. Objection was taken not to purpose but only to method. The Cæsars were to remain free to pursue their crusade in Spain. But they must be gentlemen enough to conform to the rules of etiquette—at least where non-Spaniards were their victims. No sooner was the Nyon “victory” won than Downing Street disclosed a change of heart of which Mussolini and Hitler were quick to take advantage.

On October 2, an Anglo-French note to Rome asserted that since the London Committee was “practically paralyzed,” a three-Power conference to discuss withdrawal of volunteers should be arranged. Recognition of belligerency was held out as bait. Il Duce declined on October 9, and demanded German participation and reference of the issue to the London Committee. Delbos cried: “We must act.” But on a hint from Britain he subsided. On October 13, London and Paris meekly agreed to submit the problem to the London Committee. Said Chamberlain: “It is not in the temperament of our people to bear malice.” The Committee met October 16 and proposed token withdrawals of volunteers as a step toward acceptance of the British plan of July 14. Rome asserted that only 40,000 Italians were in Spain. (Impartial estimates ranged from 60,000 to 100,000.) On October 19, Rome, Berlin, and Lisbon insisted once more that belligerent rights must be granted before any withdrawal could begin. With the deadlock thus unbroken, the Committee returned to the arithmetic game in a new form. Plymouth was authorized to approach Valencia and Burgos to obtain their consent for counting volunteers. Since this would require at least another year, Duce and Führer viewed this outcome with complacency.

The farce of the Nine-Power Pact also fizzled out in futility. The proposed parley met in Brussels November 3, and adjourned November 24, after Japan had declined to participate or accept “mediation.” The resolutions were innocuous. No State would act to aid China. In

Litvinov's words, the Conference said to Japan: "Take your plunder and peace be with you." And to China: "Love your aggressor. Resist not evil."⁶³

Meanwhile Blum's program of "one speech forward and two steps backward" had fallen upon gray days. His "breathing spell" of the spring was a retreat from the original aspirations of the French "New Deal." The franc was devalued once more in June. Blum's Cabinet fell on June 21, 1937. He was succeeded by anti-Socialist Camille Chautemps of the Radical Socialist group. The new Finance Minister, Georges Bonnet, already foreshadowed reaction. The full harvest of Blum's betrayal of Madrid would be garnered only later. In the autumn of 1937 the ultimate evil might still have been averted by a reversal of policy. As the aftermath of Nyon revealed, the Rome-Berlin axis was not yet prepared to risk armed defiance of London and Paris over the Spanish issue or any other. Six months later it would be too late. But no one at Paris would act without London's approval. And London's Tory leaders were already preparing to pay new tribute to the Cæsars.

Fascism's crusade therefore marched forward to new triumphs, with Lord Plymouth and his Committee feigning serene oblivion of that which all the world had eyes to see: an incessant flow to rebel Spain of German technicians, engineers, aviators, and artillerymen, of Italian troops by the thousands, of planes, guns, tanks, and munitions from both Italy and the Reich. Hitler made a gift to Franco of the broadcasting station and its staff which had been employed in Berlin during the Olympic games. Throughout rebel territory portraits of Caudillo, Duce, and Führer everywhere appeared together. On August 22, Santander was taken by the invaders. The Italian Fascists press hailed its fall as a national victory. Mussolini responded to Franco's felicitations:

I am particularly proud that Italian legionnaires have during ten days of hard fighting contributed mightily to the splendid victory of Santander, and that their contribution receives coveted recognition in your telegram. This brotherhood in arms, already close, guarantees the final victory which will liberate Spain and the Mediterranean from any menace to our common civilization.⁶⁴

Gijon in the Asturias, last loyalist outpost on the north coast, fell on October 21. A loyalist offensive at Belchite in Aragon was halted.

The republican capital was moved to Barcelona on October 20. The beginning of the second winter of the war found Franco's final victory still far off, but his forces now held all the Spanish colonies and all of Western and Northern Spain. Madrid, like Shanghai, was a bloody ruin under constant bombardment. But a loyalist army, forged out of raw recruits in the furnace of battle, had emerged. It fought doggedly, bravely, and not without confidence. Its members knew that they could ultimately defeat Franco. They scarcely knew that Paris and London, in the end as at the beginning, would compel them, alone and abandoned, to fight Hitler and Mussolini and Salazar as well. For this task courage and hope were not enough.

MARCH DOWN THE DANUBE

1. VIENNA'S LAST CHANCELLOR

THE Cæsars at Rome and Berlin had a common interest in the Fascist conquest of Spain. While they might differ as to method, they were agreed as to purpose. There was no question of annexation and none of imposing Fascismo or Nationalsocialism upon Iberia. There was only a question of securing strategic bases and diplomatic collaboration from a friendly regime. That regime, despite its reliance upon Mussolini and Hitler for arms, represented an indigenous Fascism, blended of ancient nationalism and modern totalitarianism with a necessary admixture of the time-worn symbols through which men of large bank accounts, men of blue blood, and men in black robes have traditionally elicited obedience.

In Austria, on the contrary, the issue for Berlin was annexation. The issue for Rome was the maintenance of a buffer between Italy and the Reich. Rome would learn that the price of the German alliance was the surrender of Austria. Vienna would learn that those who rely upon gangsters for aid against gangsters must become either the slaves of their defenders or the victims of their enemies. But these lessons had not yet been learned when Dollfuss died and Schuschnigg succeeded to power.

The Nazi putsch of July 1934 failed because Hitler repudiated the putschists. He was not yet prepared to risk war and he had not yet succeeded in setting the stage for *Anschluss* without war. When Il Duce learned of the Vienna tragedy he ordered four army divisions to proceed to the Austrian frontier and intimated that Hitler had betrayed his trust. In a telegram to Starhemberg, who was in Italy, he asserted that the principle of Austrian independence must now be

defended "still more strenuously" and that those responsible for the death of Dollfuss had incurred "the moral condemnation of the civilized world."¹ He then sprang into his car and drove through the evening to Riccione, some two hundred miles from Rome, to join his wife in comforting Frau Dollfuss. He stalked and stamped in the villa gardens until after midnight and resolved never to yield Austria to Berlin. The next morning he returned to his capital after escorting the Chancellor's widow to the airdrome where he had ordered a plane to take her back to Vienna.²

Austrian appeals for aid from the Powers thus evoked a tangible threat from Rome which was sufficient to halt Der Führer. Paris and London offered condolences and declarations. The only sour note in the chorus of support came from Belgrade, where it was darkly hinted that any Italian military occupation of Austria, even to thwart a German invasion, would oblige the Yugoslavs to march.³ Since Hitler refrained from marching, Mussolini took no further action. When the failure of the putsch and the news of Italian troop movements became known in the Reich, Hitler and his aides at once adopted a "correct" attitude, despite unseemly rejoicings in the Nazi press over the murder on the Ballhausplatz. Hindenburg and Hitler sent condolences to Vienna. Habicht, who had indiscreetly asserted that the putschists were "returning" to Germany, was dismissed from his post. Dr. Rieth was recalled from Vienna on the ground that he had not consulted Wilhelmstrasse before negotiating for a safe conduct for the rebels.

The occasion presented a welcome opportunity to dispose of Franz von Papen without shooting him. On July 26, Hitler addressed a letter to his erstwhile Vice-Chancellor, noting Dr. Rieth's misconduct, declaring that the attack on Dollfuss "is most sharply condemned and deplored by the German Government," and asserting that he desired "to bring back to normal and friendly paths our long unfortunate relation to the German Austrian State." He therefore requested Papen, who still had his "full and unqualified confidence," to assume temporarily the post of Minister to Vienna on special mission.⁴ He informed Vienna of the decision on the 27th after he had announced the appointment. After considerable hesitancy, Austria accepted Papen on August 7 not as special envoy but as a regular Minister. It was understood at Vienna that Berlin would disband the Austrian Legion, dissolve the Austrian Nazi organization in Munich, and discontinue press and radio attacks on the Austrian Government. On

August 9 the Austrian NSDAP executive in Munich announced that orders had been issued for the dissolution of the Legion. Papen arrived in Vienna on the 15th, presented his credentials, and left at once on a holiday. He did not return to his new post until October 3. Meanwhile Hitler had assumed the functions of President von Hindenburg, who died on August 2, and secured the approval of the electorate in a referendum on August 19. But the invalid ballots and the "no" votes constituted 12% of the total.⁵ This was almost a defeat. New circuses must be found to amuse the masses. But for the present they could not be found in Austria.

Schuschnigg took up the struggle for Austria's defense on the internal and diplomatic front. When Starhemberg returned on July 26, he persuaded Miklas to make him Chancellor. But on July 30, 1934, a new Cabinet was announced: Schuschnigg, Chancellor; Starhemberg, Vice-Chancellor, Minister of Security, and leader of the VF (Fatherland Front); Fey, Minister of the Interior and Special Commissioner for security; Baron Egon Berger-Waldenegg, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Buresch, Minister of Finance. An amnesty followed in December. At home the watchword was to be conciliation. In search of new guarantees abroad, Schuschnigg visited Mussolini in Florence in August and found him great, charming, and magnanimous.⁶ In September at Geneva the British Government, in accordance with a habit already well established, objected to proposals for any Anglo-French-Italian pact of guarantee to uphold the independence of Austria. Rome's suggestion that Italy be granted a mandate to act for the three Powers was unpalatable to the Little Entente, which also opposed any scheme for a guarantee of Austria by her immediate neighbors. A final suggestion of a guarantee by all European States in the League was deferred. Here as always Hitler could rely upon mutual jealousies among his foes. In speeches to the League Assembly on September 12 and 14 Schuschnigg and Berger-Waldenegg both stressed the importance to the Powers of maintaining Austria's freedom and security. The result, however, was merely a feeble reiteration of the vague obligations already assumed. On September 27, 1934, a pronouncement was issued:

After having proceeded to a fresh examination of the Austrian situation, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and Italy have agreed in the name of their governments to recognize that the declaration of the 17th of February regarding the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of Austria in accordance with the Treaties in force retains its full effect and will continue to inspire their common policy.⁷

Despite German resentment at the publication of the official report on the July revolt, which was issued on the very day on which Papen returned to Vienna, Schuschnigg opened negotiations for the absorption of the Nazis into the VF. He denied the fact later and made no mention of it in his memoirs.⁸ His visits to Paris and London in February 1935 he found "highly gratifying."⁹ But Downing Street still declined all commitments and the Quai d'Orsay feared to offend Italy or the Little Entente. Overtures regarding a possible Habsburg restoration received no encouragement. Despite these disappointments Schuschnigg steered a cautious middle course amid his domestic difficulties and achieved appreciable success.

The Heimwehr leaders were uncomfortable allies. Starhemberg and Fey were incurable schemers, not even above trying to take political advantage of Schuschnigg's grief over the death of his wife in a motor accident on July 13, 1935. In October Schuschnigg made a bargain with Starhemberg through which he was enabled to oust Fey from the Government and from the leadership of the Vienna Heimwehr. By the following spring Schuschnigg felt strong enough to initiate the liquidation of the Heimwehr organization. Starhemberg asserted on April 25 that the Heimwehr "will never be dissolved except over my dead body!" In an effort to discredit Schuschnigg he made public the scandal of the bankrupt Phœnix-Wien Life Insurance Company whose late director had spread money about liberally in order to forestall an official investigation of his affairs. Schuschnigg's own *Ostmärkische Stürmscharen* had received 2,000 schillings. The Chancellor, however, was equal to the occasion. He exposed the complete bribe-budget of the company, which showed that the Heimwehr had received 95,000 schillings.¹⁰

Starhemberg replied by organizing demonstrations and by making a new bid to Mussolini for support. On May 10, 1936, he wired Il Duce, congratulating him "in the name of those who fight for Fascism in Austria and in my own name on the famous and magnificent victory of the Fascist armies over barbarism; on the victory of the Fascist spirit over democratic dishonesty and hypocrisy; and on the victory of Fascist sacrifice and disciplined courage over demagogic falsehood. Long live the resolute leader of victorious Fascist Italy! Long live the victory of the Fascist idea in the whole world!"¹¹ Several foreign governments protested. Schuschnigg was alarmed. But Mussolini was unmoved. On May 13-14, 1936, Schuschnigg deprived Starhemberg of all of his offices except that of patron of the VF

Ladies' Aid. Starhemberg went to Rome in high dudgeon and declared that the fight was just beginning. But Schuschnigg adroitly appointed as Vice-Chancellor one of Starhemberg's rivals in the Heimwehr, Baar von Baarenfels, who had earlier profited from Fey's dismissal by securing the post of Minister of Interior. Starhemberg's last hopes were dashed when Mussolini, after granting him a two-hour interview, wired Schuschnigg his greetings and support on May 16.¹² The Chancellor visited the Duce at Rocco delle Caminate on June 5 and confirmed his victory.

In the autumn Starhemberg and Fey quarreled violently over control of the Heimwehr. On October 10, 1936, Schuschnigg decreed the dissolution of all the private armies, the Heimwehr included. Starhemberg and Fey had no option but to acquiesce. The one went into business, the other resumed his too long interrupted avocations of sport and social gaiety. Schuschnigg might well congratulate himself on thus easily disposing of his unwanted colleagues and of the stormy and ill-disciplined Fascist militia which they had led. He also felt relieved over the agreement with Germany of July 11, though in this case what he took for a new lease of life for his country proved in fact to be the first paragraph of a sentence of death. This, however, Schuschnigg could not foresee.

The clerical Chancellor viewed the future with optimism at the close of the year. He had apparently consolidated on a stable basis the "Christian Corporative State" which Dollfuss had built.¹³ He had freed himself from the burden of an intolerable private militarism. He had seemingly purchased protection from the assaults of the other Austrian in Berlin. He was hopeful for the new regime—authoritarian but not totalitarian,¹⁴ German but still Austrian, dictatorial but not despotic. Schuschnigg's Austria was ruled, as Viktor Adler had once said of the Habsburg monarchy, by "*Absolutismus gemildert durch Schlämperei*"—absolutism tempered by an easy and tolerant carelessness not lacking in charm.

"Personally I have found it hard enough. But the lot of the individual counts for little when what we are all concerned with is the whole."¹⁵ Schuschnigg was lonely and in love with Countess Vera Fugger von Babenhausen, a blonde and beautiful young woman of unusual grace, blessed with four children by a previous marriage. But it was ecclesiastically impossible and politically unthinkable for him to wed a divorcee. Such an Austrian "*affaire Simpson*" would give the Nazis a golden opportunity for mischief-making. Unlike

Edward VIII, Schuschnigg renounced love for the sake of his political duties. He strengthened the Fatherland Front, reintroduced universal military service (October 10, 1936) with the consent of the Powers, decreed amnesty for many political prisoners, and carried on the Dollfuss tradition. "It is the love of Austria that always binds us afresh." ¹⁶

If in retrospect these hopes are seen to have been at all times vain, and this confidence to have been without foundation, Schuschnigg's errors were no different in kind from those of the men entrusted with the defense of European culture at Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. Austria's tragedy was the microcosm of Europe's tragedy. Here, as in the West as a whole, the Church of Rome sought to protect itself from enemies who were harmless by allying itself with friends who were faithless or helpless. It thereby opened the door to its destroyers, whom it hailed in the end as its "protectors." Here too those of wealth and title put the superstitions, prejudices, and fancied interests of their class above their loyalty to the nation and to the democratic creed. Here too those with power to act shunned commitments, evaded responsibilities, and met ruthlessness with compromise, perjury with trust, treachery with conciliation. Brutal when they should have been gentle, weak when they should have been strong, suspicious when they should have had faith, confused when they should have striven boldly never to yield, the defenders of Austria were at last self-betrayed. Their defeat was at once Austria's death and the signal of Europe's doom.

On March 23, 1936, three additional protocols for diplomatic consultation and economic collaboration were signed at Rome by Mussolini, Schuschnigg, and Gömbös. Hungary vetoed Austro-Czech plans for a Danubian pact. Mussolini pressed Schuschnigg to consider an Austro-German rapprochement. The Chancellor was fearful, but had no choice. By early June, terms were agreed upon and approved by Il Duce. On July 11, 1936, an Austro-German accord was announced. Its architects were von Papen and Guido Schmidt. Its text, if there was a text beyond the announcement, was not made public. But a communiqué was issued from Berlin and Vienna:

(1) Following on the declarations made by the Führer and Chancellor on the 21st of May 1935, the Government of the German Reich recognizes the full sovereignty of the Austrian Federal State.

(2) Each of the two Governments considers the internal political structure of the other country, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, as

part of the internal affairs of that country, over which they will exercise no influence, whether directly or indirectly.

(3) The policy of the Austrian Federal Government, both in general and toward the German Reich in particular, shall always be based on principles which correspond to the fact that Austria has acknowledged herself to be a German State. This will not affect the Rome Protocols of 1934 and the supplementary agreements of 1936, or the position of Austria in relation to Italy and Hungary as her partners in these Protocols.¹⁷

Hitler, Mussolini, and Gömbös all exchanged telegrams of felicitation with Schuschnigg. Austria was pledged to act as a "German" State, but Hitler was pledged to respect Austrian independence and to refrain from supporting the Austrian Nazis. The compromise seemed good to Vienna and Rome. Berlin gave it a different meaning. Schuschnigg announced another amnesty, but sought to limit the scope of the concessions made. Dr. Guido Schmidt was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau was named Minister Without Portfolio. For Berlin, these Nazi sympathizers were spies and saboteurs cleverly introduced into the enemy camp. For Vienna they were symbols of reconciliation.

The radio and passport wars were called off. Trade negotiations were initiated. Schmidt began a series of visits to Berlin in November. Papen was promoted to ambassadorial rank. Neurath visited Vienna in February 1937. Nazis rioted in noisy greeting and were suppressed by the police. Schuschnigg sought new support from Mussolini in Venice, but failed to obtain any assurances. London and Paris remained silent. The "truce" continued throughout 1937, but Nazi activities within Austria grew more intense in the autumn and by January Austrian Nazis were openly intimating that Hitler desired a resumption of the struggle: "Der Führer expects Nationalsocialism in Austria to attain of its own volition the unalterable goal he has set before it—liberation and *Anschluss*."¹⁸ Schuschnigg's faith in the Cæsar at Rome and his new confidence in the Cæsar at Berlin were alike misplaced.

Austrian hopes for victory in any renewed contest with the Reich rested no longer on Il Duce but on the chance that Paris and London would act to prevent any German assault upon Vienna. It was beyond dispute that Hitler would never defy a firm Anglo-French veto on annexation if it were supported by the armed forces of Prague, Paris, and London. Such a veto was still within the realm of the possible in 1936, despite Anglo-French reluctance to assume definite commitments. By the close of 1937 the possibility had disappeared, thanks to

the complete triumph in London of those who preferred to yield Austria to Germany, as China had been yielded to Japan, Ethiopia to Italy, and Spain to both the Cæsars. The grave of Austria was dug in Downing Street.

2. EDEN TO HALIFAX

Money, and not morality, is the principle of commerce and commercial nations. But, in addition to this, the nature of the English Government forbids, of itself, reliance on her engagements; and it is well known she has been the least faithful to her alliances of any nation of Europe, since the period of her history wherein she has been distinguished for her commerce and corruption. . . . It may be asked, what, in the nature of her Government, unfits England for the observation of moral duties? In the first place, her King is a cypher; his only function being to name the oligarchy which is to govern her. . . . The real power and property in the government is in the great aristocratical families of the nation. The nest of office being too small for all of them to cuddle into at once, the contest is eternal, which shall crowd the other out. For this purpose, they are divided into two parties, the Ins and the Outs, so equal in weight that a small matter turns the balance. . . . As to engagements, however positive, entered into by the predecessors of the Ins, why, they were their enemies; they did everything which was wrong; and to reverse everything which they did must, therefore, be right. This is the true character of the English Government in practice, however different its theory; and it presents the singular phenomenon of a nation, the individuals of which are as faithful to their private engagements and duties, as honorable, as worthy, as those of any nation on earth, and whose government is yet the most unprincipled at this day known.¹⁹

This harsh judgment of British policy, written by Thomas Jefferson to Governor Langdon, March 5, 1810, was not different from the judgments passed by many Chinese, Ethiopians, and Spaniards during the half decade 1931-6. After February 20, 1938, such views came to be shared by many Austrians and Czechoslovaks—and, in pale and distorted reflection, by a considerable number of Frenchmen, Americans, and even Englishmen.

Hypocrisy is sometimes defined as the tribute which sin pays to morality. The ancient ruling classes of Britain, like the new élites of the totalitarian States, were in their own eyes honest and sincere at all times, for their eyes saw only the standards of their own making and were closed to all other criteria of judgment. The disciples of the new ideologies attained sanctity of soul and purity of heart by fanatical acceptance of a novel and intolerant *Weltanschauung*. The ladies and gentlemen of Britain long ago achieved comparable peace of mind by virtue of their inheritance of the folkways and mores of many generations of gentlemen and ladies born and bred to rule. These traditional standards of "good form"—sedulously cultivated at Eton and Harrow, Oxford and Cambridge, in Parliament and club-room, counting-house and church—were deeply rooted in the inmost being of all families of wealth and title and universally aped by respectful multitudes. Any infraction of the code was emotionally equivalent to the dissolution of personality, the collapse of society, the disintegration of the Empire, and the end of the world. True Christian gentlemen never admitted dissolution. The stratifications of British society were beyond question and had never been seriously questioned since the Great Rebellion. The Empire, acquired in periods of absence of mind, was a legacy forever secure by virtue of its (once) invincible world navy and its (once) dominant world industrialism.

Only complete catastrophe could have shaken the self-confidence and complacency produced by this combination of immutable stereotypes. Any sudden change in the stereotypes would in itself have been equivalent to catastrophe. Any change of objective circumstances short of catastrophe produced no change in the subjective attitudes of self-evaluation or in the accepted picture of the outer world. Adaptation to an unstatic environment might require compromise with those whose power appeared dangerous. Compromise was the traditional success-principle of those who otherwise had no principles but merely prejudices and interests. Compromise, moreover, might require encouragement to others to indulge in self-sacrifice when others were too benighted to perceive for themselves their manifest duty. Adaptation to the somewhat slipshod wishes and dreams of the masses might require that the highest good be occasionally disguised in garments recognizable by, and acceptable to, the lower orders who lived in outer darkness or in a world of sentiment. Both of these recurring problems could always be solved by astute moves behind the scenes, coupled with disarming postures of moral earnestness, well-

intentioned honesty, and vaguely muddled stupidity. These devices, also so ancient to be all but unconscious, were at no time indicative of insincerity or hypocrisy. They constituted proof not of ethical laxness, but of a rich heritage of social sensitivity and acumen in the arts of governance.²⁰

In 1936-8, the rulers of Britain experienced several shifts of personnel in high places. George V died on January 10, 1936. Edward VIII succeeded. Edward, preferring personal happiness to the empty pomp of royalty and being forbidden by Mr. Baldwin to have both, abdicated on December 10, 1936. George VI succeeded and was magnificently crowned the following spring. Meanwhile figures changed in the seats of power as well as in the seats of glory. Mr. Baldwin, heavy with years of threescore and ten, retired to his countryside and his pigs on May 28, 1937. Neville Chamberlain, two years his junior, succeeded. Ramsay MacDonald was called to his reward on November 9. At the Foreign Office young Anthony Eden resigned on February 20, 1938. Lord Halifax succeeded. The change of sovereigns had small result in terms of policies. At worst, public disenchantment was threatened. But the prestige of monarchy came unscathed through the crisis. The change in Prime Ministers also represented no change of policies, for the two elderly gentlemen saw eye to eye. The change in Foreign Ministers involved an apparent change of policy which in reality was a shift of emphasis and method rather than of purposes or basic assumptions.

The new Prime Minister with whom Eden at last found it impossible to co-operate was the third of his name to hold high office. Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) was a wealthy Unitarian who made a sufficient fortune in the screw business in Birmingham to retire at the age of thirty-eight. His first wife died two years after their marriage at the birth of a son called Austen (1863-1937). The husband married his first wife's cousin in 1868. She died seven years later after presenting him with another son, Neville, born March 18, 1869, and with three daughters. Joseph Chamberlain became Mayor of Birmingham and entered Commons at the age of forty. His third wife was an American, Mary Endicott, daughter of Cleveland's Secretary of War. He became Colonial Secretary and aimed at the premiership, but never attained it. He opposed Home Rule for Ireland, championed protectionism and Imperial preference, and for many years urged an Anglo-German entente as preferable to any Anglo-French-Russian combination. He was not, however, an isolationist or a pacifist: "I can say for

myself that I have always protested in the strongest terms against the policy of non-intervention or peace at any price, which I have believed to be an unworthy and ignoble doctrine for any great nation to hold. I have always thought that a great nation like an individual had duties and responsibilities to its neighbors, and that it could not wrap itself in a policy of selfish isolation and say that nothing concerned it unless its material interests were directly attacked.”²¹ He left office in September 1903, to launch a tariff “reform” program which the electorate repudiated in 1906—and accepted in 1931.

Austen went to Rugby and Cambridge, studied in Paris, and became Francophile and anti-German. He entered Commons in 1892 and moved by gradual stages to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer (1918) and leadership in the Conservative Party. As Foreign Minister in Baldwin’s first Cabinet, his first act was to reject the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which would have involved definite British commitments in a general system of collective security. In the name of “special arrangements to meet special needs,” he sponsored Locarno, which brought him fame and a Knighthood of the Garter. With his monocle and title he became the perfect model of the modern aristocrat, despite his bourgeois ancestry. His dress was always immaculate. He once remarked: “Many years ago my father said to me: ‘My boy, to two things in life pay the greatest attention—your frock coats and your enemies. Frock coats are liable to crease; enemies, unless treated very carefully, are liable to increase. They both require “smoothing down” occasionally.’”²² In 1929 Sir Austen retired from the Cabinet. He viewed the new Germany with alarm and opposed the Hoare-Laval deal, but welcomed the end of sanctions. He died on March 17, 1937.

Neville, like Austen, was brought up by his aunts, for his mother also died in childbirth. Like Austen, he went to Rugby. After studying at Mason College in Birmingham, he went into an accountant’s office. He was destined for business. His father sent the two boys to the Bahamas in 1898 to establish an experimental sisal plantation. Neville became manager, with 800 Negroes in his employ. After seven years of effort, the venture failed with a loss of £50,000 to Papa Joseph. This experience, says an admiring biographer, “developed his character” and was “an admirable preparation for Downing Street.”²³ He next went into the metalwork and small-arms business in Birmingham. He was active in the Chamber of Commerce and was elected to the City Council in 1911, the same year in which he married Annie Cole. In 1915 he became Lord Mayor of Birmingham, which

office had been held by his father, five uncles, and a cousin. He was named "Director of National Service" in 1916 to promote recruiting by increasing the mobility of labor. The work failed of its purpose. He resigned seven months later. He entered Commons in 1918 and served under Bonar Law and Baldwin as Postmaster General, Minister of Health, and Chancellor of the Exchequer. He was interested in widows' pensions, slum clearance, housing, and local government, and did capable work in these fields.

This apparently dull and unimaginative businessman was depicted by hostile cartoonists as a mean and calculating small trader or as a gloomy, gawky mortician. With his lanky form and his drooping black brows and mustache he resembled the stock "villain" of nineteenth-century melodrama. Lloyd George once said of him: "A good town clerk of Birmingham in a lean year." He seemed parsimonious both of money and of words. In the Tory reformist tradition, he desired to help the poor—provided they kept in their place and respected the privileges of their betters. After the general strike he did what he could to see that striking miners got no benefit from their action, for he was above all loyal to his class. He had no innate interest in foreign affairs. He paid a visit to Kenya in 1929, but was more concerned with fishing, hunting, and ornithology than with people. In the National Government he again became Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the midst of the budget debate of 1933 he wrote a letter to *The Times* asserting that he had observed a gray wagtail in St. James's Park.²⁴ In August 1936, in the midst of a grave crisis, he spent hours trailing the song of a thrush in the garden of No. 10 Downing Street and discovered that it came from a mimicking blackbird.²⁵

Mr. Chamberlain was not always so adept in making distinctions, though he himself developed considerable skill in the arts of mimicry. His poses were apparently so unconscious and sincere that they were always completely convincing. He was cold, anti-social, without sentiment. His morning coat, wing-collar, and black umbrella stamped him as the cautious *bourgeois gentilhomme*. Birds and fish were his only "human" touches. His mother had died when he was five. He did not marry until he was forty-two. His reserve suggested severe repression, but his inhibitions were so much more powerful than his impulses that he never disclosed his soul to others, and probably never to himself. Impulsiveness, indeed, was one quality of which no one could ever accuse him. He was a model of sobriety and calm calculation. To many the hidden man within was not a warm and ex-

pansive merchant or banker, but rather a descendant of the Scrooges, Bounderbys, and Gradgrinds of Dickens.

He respected the peerage and admonished the masses to thrift. His class was all, for his class was England and the Empire and the world. All his political motivations were conditioned by class loyalties and rationalized in terms of conventional and respectable slogans. Runciman, Hoare, and Sir Douglas Hogg were all under consideration in 1937 to succeed Baldwin. But Hogg went to Lords as Lord Hailsham. Hoare was not sufficiently recovered from disgrace. Runciman was too early or too late. Neville Chamberlain had antagonized fewest people, for he kept his sympathies and antipathies well concealed. He became Britain's first Prime Minister from Rugby. Since he lacked originality he took his foreign policy from Baldwin, Hoare, and Simon.

Since the pattern of their thinking coincided with the Chamberlain tradition, he carried on in the footsteps of brother Austen and father Joe: avoidance of "idealistic" commitments coupled with championship of protectionism, Empire preference, and an Anglo-German entente. It was his pursuit of the latter objective that brought the break with Eden, the fall of France, and the end of the Continental balance of power.

Discerning observers might have perceived slight but unmistakable signs of a shift in diplomatic orientation during the first few months of Chamberlain's incumbency. A conference of the Dominions, called to coincide with the coronation, closed on June 15, 1937. Its resolutions praised peace, non-aggression, international trade, disarmament, and the League, but declared that "differences of political creed should be no obstacle to friendly relations . . . and international appeasement."²⁶ Neurath had been invited to London, but declined to come after the *Leipzig* episode. Chamberlain told Commons on June 25 that the European situation was "serious but not hopeless" and demanded the "utmost self-control." On July 17 Downing Street announced the signature of Anglo-German and Anglo-Soviet treaties for exchange of building plans and restriction on size and gun caliber of war vessels. Thousands of Spaniards died before Italian guns west of Madrid as General José Miaja's troops drove against the rebels in Brunete. When Churchill and Lloyd George questioned the Cabinet on July 19, just before Commons adjourned, regarding German batteries installed around Gibraltar, the Ministers shrugged their shoulders. On July 31 Chamberlain, "wearing a light sporting jacket and a

jaunty soft felt hat," left for his vacation after writing "a personal letter of friendship to Mussolini" in reply to a "cordial message from Rome." Il Duce reciprocated. What these letters contained, who inspired them, what their purpose was, England and the world were left to guess.²⁷ Perth and Ciano got on well. Lady Austen Chamberlain was prominent and useful in Rome, and wore a Fascist pin. Eden was—"difficult."

September of 1937 found the Marquess of Londonderry again visiting Göring in Karin Hall, now enlarged to the dimensions of a palace. He had invited Göring to stay with him for the coronation, but Göring had written, March 24, 1937, that he would not come to England because he and the Reich were constantly being insulted: "I have the feeling that the present Government is so fanatically against Germany that any attempt [at an entente] would be senseless at the present time." But he had invited Londonderry to Germany for the autumn hunting. Göring was most cordial but feigned petulance regarding the unwillingness of certain Britons to be "friends." Germany was therefore obliged to seek friends elsewhere. "The forthcoming visit [to Berlin] of Il Duce, he said, was entirely due to Mr. Eden and Sir Robert Vansittart." Britain should grant Germany possession of Austria and of the German areas of Czechoslovakia and, therewith, military preponderance on the Continent, just as Germany granted Britain mastery of the seas. Only thus could Bolshevism be vanquished. Papen, with whom Londonderry shot stags at Dass, was of a like mind. The Marquess was sympathetic.²⁸

The diplomatic game hung fire on the eve of crucial decisions not yet reached. Tokio defied the Western Powers. They capitulated at Brussels. The British Ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen (whose car was apparently mistaken for that of Chiang Kai-Shek) was machine-gunned and gravely wounded by Japanese planes on August 26. Tokio expressed "deep regret," but evaded demands for punishment of the guilty and guarantees for the future. Eden feebly declared the reply of September 22 "satisfactory" and the incident "closed." The American gunboat *Panay* was sunk on the Yangtze by Japanese aviators on December 12. British ships were bombed and burned in the Mediterranean and the Far East. On November 16 M. Henri Berenger, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Senate, declared—though Tokio and the Quai d'Orsay denied it—that France had agreed to halt arms shipments to

China after Japan had threatened to seize Hainan and blockade Indo-China.

Apart from the Nyon accord and verbiage at Geneva, no action was taken to halt the march of the aggressors. Even this gesture evoked contempt. On October 5 Rome revealed that more "volunteers" were leaving Sicily to aid Franco and that the scores of Italian bombers at Majorca which were engaged in regular raids on the coastal cities of Republican Spain were commanded by Bruno Mussolini. This promising young man derived as much satisfaction from bombing Spanish babies as from burning Ethiopian peasants to death.

On September 24-7, 1937, Il Duce made his long-delayed visit to the Reich. To the music of trumpets and drums, the two Cæsars affirmed their solidarity. No new agreements were announced, but there were hints at a Four-Power Pact and "appeasement" in the West at the price of Fascist victory in Spain and a free hand for Hitler in the East.²⁹ On October 15, Neurath delivered a note to Brussels, where it was received with "satisfaction," pledging German respect for Belgian neutrality providing Brussels agreed never to participate in any military action against the Reich. The United States was in full retreat from the "quarantine" mood of October and, in return for gold, silk, and toys, was supplying Japan with cotton, oil, scrap-iron, ore, guns, aircraft, and other commodities necessary for the conquest of China. On November 6, Rome joined the anti-Comintern. On November 8, the Japanese took Shanghai. On November 10, President Vargas established a quasi-Fascist regime in Brazil. On December 1, Tokio recognized Franco. On December 11, the Japanese took Nanking, and Italy left the League. Meanwhile, on November 15, Downing Street sent Sir Robert Hodgson as agent to Salamanca, thus according *de facto* recognition to the Franco regime. Paris was paralyzed. Delbos visited Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Prague early in December, but the gesture was hollow. On December 28, King Carol appointed Octavian Goga Premier and gave his blessing to a pro-Nazi regime.

It was in such a setting that the momentous decision was reached in London to send a special emissary to Berlin. Simon, Hoare, Hailsham, the Marquess of Lothian (Philip Kerr), Sir Kingsley Wood, and, of course, Londonderry were enthusiastic. Chamberlain assented. He preferred to ignore the Foreign Office and its agents abroad. Secret conclaves of confidential advisers and the use of personal messengers

were more to his liking, the more so as the program he was developing would, if fully revealed, inevitably meet with resistance both from public opinion and from the diplomatic bureaucracy. The experiment of the Haldane mission (1912) must be repeated and must have better results. Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, third Viscount Halifax, Lord President of the Council, was selected for the task. The formula was transparent. He was a joint master of the Middleton Hunt. Göring was German Master of the Hunt. Göring invited him as his guest to a hunting exposition. He accepted.

This tall and somber lord, with big hands, cadaverous face, and bowler hat, was more gawky and funereal in appearance than Chamberlain himself. He was born April 16, 1881, son of Charles Wood and Lady Courtenay. Three brothers born before him all died in infancy. The household was characterized by a deep Anglican religiosity. After Eton and Oxford, Edward married Lady Dorothy Onslow in 1909 and entered Parliament as a member from Ripon in Yorkshire. During the War he was a Major in the Yorkshire dragoons. In 1921 he became Undersecretary for the Colonies and in 1924 Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. In the same year he was named by Baldwin Viceroy and Governor-General of India and granted the title of Baron Irwin of Kirkby Underdale. As Viceroy (1926-31), Lord Irwin prayed, subdued disorders, sought conciliation, and attempted to improve agriculture and education. He dealt openly with Gandhi and initiated the Round Table Conferences which he hoped, despite Tory outcries, might lead to dominion status for India. He was patient, popular, and pious, and moved by a strong sense of moral duty—always a dangerous asset in a politician. He was rewarded for his services with a Knighthood of the Garter. In 1932 he returned to the Cabinet as President of the Board of Education. He was later War Minister and, in 1935, Lord Privy Seal. He had four sons. His tennis was good despite a lame left arm. He accompanied Eden on his travels—to restrain the Foreign Minister, said some, from any non-sense about collective security.

Halifax's mission meant Eden's defeat. He is reported to have opposed the suggestion when it was broached to him, October 23, at a party at the Cliveden Manor estate of Lord Astor. Eden was at the Brussels Conference when Göring's invitation was accepted. Both he and Vansittart opposed the visit. He had not been consulted. He returned, protested, tendered his resignation (November 8), and then withdrew it. Halifax packed his bags. Londonderry later wrote to

Ribbentrop: "I think I may claim to have been partly responsible for putting the idea into Halifax's head that he should go over to Germany and establish a definite contact with the Chancellor and others in your country." ³⁰ "On the eve of his departure," wrote Londonderry, "I ventured to suggest to him (although I was careful to state that I felt sure that no advice that I could give would be necessary) that we should be as firm as possible. 'I should like to see the Germans categorically pinned down to their program,' I said, 'and I think you might be able to get this from them.' . . . At the same time I felt that there was no time to be lost as the situation seemed to me to be rapidly deteriorating, and an understanding between Great Britain and Germany with all its vast potentialities was more than ever vitally necessary." ³¹ Halifax embarked on November 16, visited Göring's hunting show, and spent an hour and a half with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 17. He returned and reported on November 21.

Since those who knew were silent, only surmises could be made as to what views were exchanged during these meetings in the Reich. Halifax was amiable and earnest. His purpose was not to argue but to discover Hitler's desires (whether he had read *Mein Kampf* is doubtful) and, wherever possible, to assent. Hitler had been noisily exploiting demands for the return of the German colonies.³² Such noises had nuisance value and a potential use as blackmail, since the men of Whitehall were prepared to surrender anything (so long as it belonged to others) rather than yield up any of the booty of 1919. Göring and Hitler doubtless assured Halifax that Germany must expand. Halifax doubtless assented. But German expansion must not be at Britain's expense. *Wohin?* Austria . . . Czechoslovakia . . . Danubia, Balkania, perhaps the Ukraine? Halifax was amiable. By some accounts a bargain was struck: Hitler agreed not to raise the colonial question in acute form for six years; Halifax agreed that Britain would interpose no objections to German expansion in Central Europe. But open violence must be avoided. A Western air pact? Perhaps. Germany might even consider returning to Geneva. France? Paris must be induced to abandon Prague and Moscow. Colonies? The Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola might be considered in lieu of Tanganyika. *The Times* had pleaded on October 28 for consideration of Germany's colonial claims. On November 29 it pleaded for consideration of Germany's claims in Central Europe. At the same time Mr. J. L. Garvin in *The Observer*, owned by Lord Astor, urged that German demands be satisfied at the expense of

Austria and Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain said nothing. Halifax said only: "The door is open to friendly relations. Let's hope it stays open." ⁸³

If such a bargain was not struck at Berlin and Berchtesgaden in November 1937, at least an "understanding" was arrived at. All subsequent decisions at Berlin and London for the next year rested on mutual confidence that the understanding was in fact a bargain. Chautemps and Delbos came to London on November 29 to reconsider Anglo-French policy toward the Reich. The conference was strictly secret and the communiqué meaningless: the Ministers had "found fresh evidence of that community of attitude and outlook which so happily characterizes the relation between France and the United Kingdom"; the colonial question would require "much more extended study" and the collaboration of other countries (Belgium and Portugal?); "non-intervention" in Spain was "fully justified"; the "gravity" of the Far Eastern situation was "fully recognized." There would be "co-operation," "appeasement," "free and peaceful negotiations." Delbos went on his travels—and reputedly urged Prague to make concessions to Germany. A French-Yugoslav commercial treaty was signed. But Stoyadinovich went to Rome and later to Berlin. Delbos returned empty-handed. On January 1, 1938, it was indicated that Paris (and perhaps Prague as well) would suspend all arms exports to Jugoslavia and Rumania to bring them to reason. Goga scoffed.

Meanwhile Tory Britain and Nazi Germany moved obliquely toward goals unspoken and ends unseen. Rearmament was pushed. New generals replaced old. At the end of December a shift of posts in the British Foreign Office mystified observers. Sir Robert Vansittart was named to a new position: "Chief Diplomatic Adviser" to the Foreign Minister. He was also awarded the Grand Cross of the Bath. Sir Alexander Cadogan became new Undersecretary. Convenient obscurity hedged the questions of whether this represented promotion or disguised demotion for Vansittart, whether Eden was pleased or distressed, whether Vansittart or Cadogan were here rewarded or punished for accepting the Halifax "line" or the Eden "line"—both of which remained in convenient obscurity. But the tide was now running fast and Der Führer was not the man to miss his chance. He was already moving toward Austria. Certain of his advisers, however, were opposed to taking chances, through either ignorance of the Anglo-German bargain or undervaluation of its worth, possibly in-

spired by fears of Paris and Prague. They must first be dealt with.

At midnight February 4, 1938, after several days of rumored crises, Hitler announced a purge in the ranks of his entourage—this time not by blood but by resignations and new appointments. General Werner von Blomberg, Minister of Defense since January 1933, retired. He was in Capri on his honeymoon. Hitler took his post and designated General Wilhelm Keitel as his adjutant with Cabinet rank. General Werner von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, resigned and was replaced by General Walther von Brauchitsch. General Ludwig Beck remained Chief of Staff. (He was replaced on November 1 by General Franz Holder.) Fifteen generals were retired; twenty-two generals and eight colonels were promoted or shifted. Göring was named a Field Marshal and thus given the highest military rank. Baron von Neurath, Foreign Minister since May 1932, resigned and was replaced by Joachim von Ribbentrop, then Ambassador to London. Neurath was retained in the Cabinet, however, as President of a new Council on Foreign Affairs which included Ribbentrop, Göring, Göbbels, Hess, Brauchitsch, Keitel, Admiral Erich Raeder, and Dr. Hans Lammers. Several shifts were ordered in the diplomatic service. Hjalmar Schacht's long-announced resignation was accepted. He was replaced as Minister of Economics by Walter Funk. The Reichstag session which had been postponed from January 30 was scheduled for February 20.

Blomberg, by marrying his secretary, Erika Grühn, had outraged the Prussian officer caste. But Hitler and Göring attended the wedding. Fritsch retired for "reasons of health." But his health appeared normal. He and other generals were reported on January 28 to have criticized Hitler for dangerous designs on Austria, intervention in Spain, alignment with Italy and Japan, neo-paganism, and party politics in the army. Fritsch was rumored to be under arrest. (He was restored to favor in October, but not to his old post.) Göring was denied the coveted Ministry of Defense, since this would offend the Junkers. Rosenberg was denied the Foreign Ministry, since this would be offensive to foreign opinion and to the diplomatic bureaucracy. Ribbentrop, Brauchitsch, and Keitel were Hitler's men, but quite acceptable. Funk was acceptable to the industrialists. He was subordinated to Göring as director of the four-year plan.

In short, in both diplomatic and military circles the major critics of a bold policy were replaced either by Party men or by more pliant liaison agents between the NSDAP and the services of which they

were in command. The cautious and (on the whole) West-oriented General Staff had repeatedly had its advice ignored by Der Führer. Henceforth Hitler's rule of the Reichswehr was beyond question. Hitler here eliminated also those who opposed the Triple and favored a rapprochement with Moscow against the West. Since corresponding elements in the USSR had already been liquidated, the prospects of an open Reich-Soviet conflict were increased. But before the USSR stood the Balticum, and Poland, and Rumania. Before these stood Czechoslovakia, and beside Czechoslovakia stood Austria. All things come to him who waits—providing he knows when to stop waiting and to strike.

Der Führer had of old the wisdom of the serpent in sensing the trend of distant events. In Bucharest Goga had gone sour and been replaced on February 10 by Miron Cristea, Patriarch of the Orthodox Church and façade for a royal dictatorship. The Iron Guard was at last disbanded. This set-back, however, was more than overbalanced by developments elsewhere. The Spanish rebels retook Teruel on February 22. The French franc fell to 30 to the dollar, possibly under British pressure. Chautemps resigned January 14. Blum tried to form a "National Ministry" and failed. Chautemps came back, with no Socialists in the Cabinet, and won a vote of confidence on January 19, 502 to 1. But this unanimity was the product of fear, not of strength. Chautemps repeated stereotyped formulas. Only Flandin spoke out against him and urged that France follow Britain in abandoning Central Europe and the East to Hitler and making the best bargain possible with Rome and Berlin. His voice was prophetic. Chautemps asked for special financial powers. The Socialists opposed them. A new Cabinet crisis was brewing.

In Britain Eden was now being pressed to the wall by the Tory apostles of an entente with Berlin. The Singapore base was opened February 14. But the Anglo-American-Japanese naval race could be used by Eden's enemies as an argument for "general settlement" in Europe—so long as others must pay the price of peace with the dictators. When Hitler browbeat Schuschnigg into sweeping concessions on February 12, the Cabinet drafted instructions to Sir Nevile Henderson to join France in a warning, but the instructions were first canceled and then changed from a warning to an "expression of interest." Austrian independence and integrity were no longer mentioned. Eden was again beaten. The Tory press, including *The Times*, intimated that Austria should be "written off." ⁸⁴ On February

18 Chamberlain and Eden conferred at length with Ambassador Grandi. The Cabinet was urgently summoned to meet on Saturday afternoon, presumably to discuss an Anglo-Italian settlement. After a three-hour session the Ministers adjourned until Sunday afternoon to consider Hitler's scheduled speech to the Reichstag. Chamberlain urged immediate negotiations with both Italy and Germany. Eden was opposed to them, but was in a small minority.

On Sunday, February 20, 1938, Hitler addressed the Reichstag. Amid old clichés and new threats, he gave the Tories who were hankering after rapprochement an unmistakable indication of his terms:

. . . With one country alone have we scorned to enter into relations: That State is Soviet Russia. We see in Bolshevism more now than before the incarnation of human destructive forces. We do not blame the Russian people as such for this gruesome ideology of destruction. We know it is a small Jewish intellectual group which led a great nation into this position of madness. . . . Any introduction of Bolshevism into a European country means a changing of conditions. For those territories under Bolshevik leadership are no longer sovereign nations having a national life, but sections of the revolutionary center of Moscow. I know Eden does not share this view. Stalin shares it and admits it openly, and in my opinion Stalin himself is a more trustworthy expert and interpreter of Bolshevik views and intentions than the British Minister. We, therefore, oppose any attempt at spreading Bolshevism, wherever it may take place, with disdain, and wherever it threatens us with hostility. . . .

There are more than ten million Germans in states adjoining Germany which before 1866 were joined with the bulk of the German nation by a national link. Until 1918 they fought in the Great War shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers of the Reich. Against their own free will they were prevented by peace treaties from uniting with the Reich.

This was painful enough, but there must be no doubt about one thing: political separation from the Reich may not lead to deprivation of rights; that is, the general rights of racial self-determination which were solemnly promised to us as a condition for the armistice. We cannot disregard it just because this is a case concerning Germany.

In the long run it is unbearable for a World Power, conscious

of itself, to know there are racial comrades at its side who are constantly being afflicted with the severest suffering for their sympathy or unity with the whole nation, its destiny, and its philosophy! . . .

But just as England stands up for her interests all over the globe, present-day Germany will know how to guard its more restricted interests. To these interests of the German Reich belong also the protection of those German peoples who are not in a position to secure along our frontiers their political and philosophical freedom by their own efforts.

This claim to "protection" of *Deutschtum* abroad was left ambiguous, since a definite commitment to annex Austria or partition Czechoslovakia would render the Tory task more difficult. Der Führer declared that Schuschnigg had co-operated in removing "misunderstandings and obstacles to final reconciliation." He denounced Bolshevism in extenso; asserted that colonial claims would be "voiced from year to year with increasing vigor" and could not be silenced by credits; declared that Germany would never return to the League, would recognize Manchukuo, and would hope for Japanese victory in China. He welcomed collaboration with Rome and Tokio, and vehemently denounced freedom of the press in Britain.

If ever international agitation or poisoning of opinion should attempt to rupture the peace of the Reich, then steel and iron would take the German people and German homesteads under their protection. The world would then see, as quick as lightning, to what extent this Reich, people, party, and these armed forces are fanatically inspired with one spirit, one will. . . .

In a recent speech Eden referred warmly to various forms of freedom in his country. There was one very special freedom which had been forgotten: namely, that of allowing journalists to insult other countries, their institutions, their public men, and their government. All this is too stupid to be taken seriously. But in the long run this will prove to be a serious strain on international relations. I gladly state that a section of the foreign press has not taken part in these infamous attacks against the honor of other nations.

Nevertheless, the damage wrought by such a press campaign was so great that henceforth we will no longer be able to tolerate

it without stern objections. This crime becomes especially evil when it obviously pursues the goal of driving nations into war. . . .

Since this press campaign must be considered as an element of danger to the peace of the people, I have decided to carry through that strengthening of the German army which will give us the assurance that these threats of war against Germany will not one day be translated into bloody force. These measures have been under way since February 4 and will be carried out rapidly and with determination.

Under these circumstances it cannot be seen what use there is in conferences and meetings as long as governments in general are not in a position to take decisive steps irrespective of public opinion.⁸⁵

For those with eyes to see, the terms of the Tory-Nazi entente were here stated unequivocally. The Reich would defer its colonial demands but not abandon them. The Reich demanded a free hand in Central Europe. The Reich expressly demanded the suppression of freedom of the press in Britain and a British policy which would not be subservient to public opinion. The Reich implicitly demanded Eden's removal, as did Mussolini.

Eden resigned the same night. Viscount Cranborne, his Parliamentary Undersecretary, resigned with him. Walter Elliott and William S. Morrison contemplated doing likewise but thought better of it. Eden's decision was apparently reached before Hitler's speech. His colleagues begged him during the afternoon to reconsider or to allege ill health as the reason. He refused. His letter to the Prime Minister, which he delivered in the evening at No. 10 Downing Street, declared that "the events of the last few days have made plain the difference between us on a decision of great importance in itself and far-reaching in its consequences. I cannot recommend to Parliament a policy with which I am not in agreement." His "differences in outlook" with Chamberlain had resulted in an "uneasy partnership." Therefore, "with very deep regret," he was leaving the Cabinet, not without appreciation for past help, counsel, and friendship. Chamberlain replied ("My dear Anthony") that he and his colleagues experienced "the most profound regret." "The decision which you find yourself unable to accept is whether the present moment is appropriate for commencement of Anglo-Italian conversations. We had hoped you

would not feel this of sufficient importance to necessitate a parting which is painful to all of us."

Chamberlain thus sought to present the issue solely in terms of Italy, where the Fascist press rejoiced in a new victory. Eden gently corrected him in Commons on Monday, February 21. He noted that Rome had sent troops to Spain within a few days of the signature of the accord of January 2, 1937. No negotiations should be opened until promises were followed by performance, and withdrawal of volunteers was actually begun. It is "never right" to open negotiations because one party "intimates that it is now or never." But "I should not be frank with the house if I were to pretend that it is an isolated issue as between my Right Honorable Friend the Prime Minister and myself. It is not. Within the last few weeks, upon one of the most important decisions of foreign policy which did not concern Italy at all, the difference was fundamental." Few doubted that this cryptic reference was to Germany and the *Drang nach Osten*. Eden's case was simply put:

Agreements that are worth while are never made on the basis of a threat. . . . Of late the conviction has steadily grown upon me that there has been a too keen desire on our part to make terms with others rather than that others should make terms with us. . . . I do not believe that we can make progress in European appeasement, more particularly in the light of events of the past few days, if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure.

Cranborne declared: "To enter into conversations with Italy now would be regarded not as a contribution to peace, but as surrender to blackmail." Chamberlain in his long reply denied Eden's implication: "It is not necessary to enter upon a discussion of our relations with Germany, because it is not over these that this difference has arisen." He hinted at a Four-Power Pact: "The question is whether we are to enter upon negotiations or refuse even to contemplate them, and if there be anybody here who really wishes to obtain peace, do they think they can ever obtain peace by continuing a vendetta and even refusing to talk about their differences? . . . The peace of Europe must depend upon the attitude of four major Powers—Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves. . . . The League as constituted today is unable to provide collective security for anybody."

The debate continued on February 22. Lloyd George declared that

Mussolini had driven Eden out. Churchill asserted: "The day will come when, at some point or other, on some issue or other, we will have to make a stand, and I pray to God that when that day comes we may not find that through an unwise policy we have been left to make that stand alone." The Labor motion of lack of confidence was lost, 168 to 338.³⁸ A dozen Conservatives abstained from voting. None voted against Chamberlain. Steps to open Anglo-Italian negotiations followed at once. On February 25 Richard A. Butler was named Cranborne's successor, while Lord Halifax took over Eden's post. Labor assailed the naming of a peer as Foreign Minister, but on February 28 Commons upheld the choice, 226 to 99.

The great adventure was launched. Within two weeks it would make an end of Austria. Within two months it would require the final desertion of Ethiopia and Spain. Within eight months it would involve the end of Czechoslovakia, the collapse of the French bloc, and Nazi mastery of the Continent. All this was foreseen and desired by the little group into whose hands British foreign policy had now passed. The underlying assumptions and motivations of the "Cliveden clique" will be considered in the next chapter.

3. AUSTRIA † MARCH 12, 1938

January 30, 1938 was the fifth anniversary of Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. Day after endless days he had gazed out upon the misty mountains from the great windows of Haus Wachenfeld, his villa above Berchtesgaden near Salzburg. Beyond lay the Heimatland, Österreich, the country of his birth and of his youth—stretching from the Dolomites to the Danube and from little Braunau-am-Inn, where his father had been *Beamter*, to Burgenland on the Magyar frontier. His personal nostalgia fortified the exigencies of *Realpolitik*, the need for circuses and glory, the promptings of *Deutschtum*, and the *Drang nach Osten*. Five years was long enough to wait. In the fifth year must come *Anschluss*.

Halifax at Berchtesgaden had given him the impression that Britain would bless the venture and tolerate no nonsense from the French. Mussolini was too heavily involved in Spain and too dependent on German support to reiterate the veto of 1934. Just before Christmas Neurath dropped a hint to Ambassador François-Poncet: "Germany cannot any longer watch idly the sufferings of our co-nationalists in

Austria.”⁸⁷ What method? Putsch, intrigue, invasion, some combination? Pragmatically Der Führer must try his weapons and choose those which expediency might dictate.

At No. 4 Teinfaltstrasse, Vienna, a “Committee of Seven” had its headquarters. It had been established after July 11, 1936, to reconcile the Austrian Nazis and the followers of Schuschnigg and to incorporate the former into the VF. The seven consisted of Captain Josef Leopold, Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Dr. Hugo Jury, Dr. Josef Mannlicher, Dr. Oswald Menghin, and Dr. Leopold Tavs, secretary. Most of these men were Nazis. Their secret object was not reconciliation but revolution. Police spies reported suspicious developments at No. 4 early in January. They amassed proofs. No. 4 was raided and Dr. Tavs arrested. Captain Leopold was questioned and then released.

The plan thus revealed and frustrated was daring. *Agents provocateurs* were to stage a riot before the German Embassy in Metternichstrasse. A shot would be fired at General Muff, the military attaché. Blame would be placed on one Walter Leibuscher, a Legitimist and a renegade Nazi who had served the anti-Nazi cause by publishing memoirs of his experiences while a member of the Austrian Legion in the Reich. The attack would arouse indignation in Germany, especially in army circles, and thus pave the way for German intervention. Himmler was apparently consulted and suggested a slight change in technique: Papen should be the target; the Communists should be blamed. The sequel was prepared in various versions. Disorders should be provoked, followed by a march of the Austrian legions over the frontier to save the country from the “Red Menace.” Or the Reichswehr divisions near Munich, under General von Reichenau, should invade Austria. One of the plans was signed “R.H.” (Rudolf Hess?). In either case Austria should be “liberated” by January 30, 1938.⁸⁸

The scheme was ruined by the police raid. Fritsch and Neurath, moreover, were opposed to such adventurism. They were purged on February 4. Papen, on his way from Vienna to Berlin, appeared at Berchtesgaden two days later. He had another suggestion: Schuschnigg should be invited to a conference and browbeaten into capitulation. Papen returned to Vienna on special mission on the 8th and gave to the Chancellor an invitation from Hitler. Schuschnigg hesitated. His Foreign Secretary, Dr. Guido Schmidt, advised acceptance. He had long been an apostle of Pan-German unity. Under pressure from Hitler Schuschnigg had named him to his post in July 1936. He had

visited Hitler in November 1936 and returned in Göring's private plane. Later, between visits to foreign capitals as Schuschnigg's aide, Schmidt returned repeatedly to the Reich. Schuschnigg accepted on February 10. Great secrecy was maintained, but Mussolini learned of the arrangement. Realizing that Hitler had not consulted him and fearing the worst, Il Duce sent his "now or never" plea to Chamberlain.³⁹ In London the pending Berchtesgaden discussion was spoken of in Tory circles as the prelude to an Anglo-German entente and a Four-Power Pact.⁴⁰ Schuschnigg motored from Vienna to Salzburg, accompanied by Schmidt; Dr. Froehlichsthal, his secretary; Major Bartl, his aide; and Hofrat Weber, who stayed in Salzburg. They passed the night in the city. The next morning at the frontier Schuschnigg's bodyguard of six detectives was turned back and replaced by a company of Black Guards, under one Captain Spitzzy, ex-Heimwehr officer and Austrian renegade.

Thus to Hitler's villa, in the legendary abode of Berchta the Evil Fairy, came the last Chancellor of Austria on Saturday, February 12, 1938. He brought with him the documents of the Teinfaltstrasse plot, doubtless hoping to use them at least for bargaining purposes. Hitler affably showed him about the house and garden. They then retired with Schmidt and were presently joined by Ribbentrop. Hitler spoke slowly and calmly and then, as was his wont, more and more excitedly as he warmed to his theme. He charged that Schuschnigg had failed to fulfill his duties as a German. Schuschnigg grew nervous. As a chain-smoker, he craved cigarettes, but smoking was forbidden at Berchtesgaden. When Hitler finally stopped, he quietly referred to his documents and presented his protests. Der Führer was furious. What had he to do with the Committee of Seven? The lawyer-like Chancellor cited more evidence of complicity. Hitler raged and shrieked insults. Schuschnigg threatened to leave. But the lunch hour had arrived. Two other guests entered: General von Reichenau and General von Keitel. Their staffs followed. The atmosphere of the meal was military. After luncheon Hitler stopped discussing and presented demands. Schuschnigg resisted. The irreducible demands were three: amnesty for all imprisoned Nazis and for the Austrian Legion; the appointment of Nazi sympathizers as Ministers of Justice and Interior (Seyss-Inquart must get the latter post); full political freedom for the Austrian Nazis. If Schuschnigg accepted, Hitler would reaffirm Austrian independence. If he refused, the Reichswehr was ready to march. Schuschnigg hedged, left the room to phone Miklas, and returned to

say that nothing could be decided without a full Cabinet meeting. Miklas had told him to leave Berchtesgaden at once. Hitler informed him that he had two days to decide. After hours of intimidation Schuschnigg was exhausted. He left a beaten man.⁴¹

In Vienna President Miklas objected to granting Seyss-Inquart the post of Interior and Public Security, which, in his hands, would mean that the police could no longer be relied upon to act against a possible Nazi uprising. On Tuesday came an ultimatum from Berlin: submit at once or face invasion at midnight. The frantic Chancellor tried to call Mussolini and got no answer. He had long since been abandoned by Paris and London. He capitulated. At 2.00 a.m., February 16, the Cabinet was "reconstructed": the portfolio of Interior and Public Security went to Seyss-Inquart, with Michael Skubl as secretarial buffer between the new Minister and the Chancellor; Dr. Adamovitch became Minister of Justice; Glaise-Horstenau remained Minister without Portfolio; Guido Schmidt was elevated from Secretary to Minister of Foreign Affairs. An amnesty released Dr. Tavs, Anton Rintelen, and many other imprisoned Nazis.⁴²

The "Trojan Horse" was within the walls. Seyss-Inquart, a Sudeten German, had for years been Schuschnigg's "friend" and a secret emissary of Hitler.⁴³ Glaise-Horstenau was openly sympathetic toward National Socialism. He was a *Landsmann* of Der Führer, having also been born in Braunau, but he had risen to the rank of colonel on the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and had been a militant Catholic and Legitimist before becoming a Nazi. Seyss-Inquart went at once to Berlin to confer with Hitler and Himmler. Berlin hailed "cold" *Anschluss* and hinted at a customs union and military co-ordination. The British and French press minimized the importance of these developments, but deep anxiety began to pervade Jewish and Catholic circles in Vienna. The ever indiscreet Papen spoke publicly of a new *Mittel Europe* under German control. At least a few outside observers perceived the drift of events. Arturo Toscanini announced his withdrawal from the Salzburg music festival.

Austria's sands were fast running out. Hitler's speech of February 20 contained no pledge to respect Austrian independence, but only a reference to the accord of July 11, 1936. Schuschnigg, summoning up belated courage, replied on February 24 before the Austrian Corporative Parliament. He declared that the July agreement must be kept. All pledges would be fulfilled. But "thus far and no farther." Cheers. Enthusiasm. The last flush of life in the

VF. Austrian industrialists rallied to the Chancellor.⁴⁴ In a pastoral letter Theodore Cardinal Innitzer, Archbishop of Vienna, appealed for faith in Austria's freedom. Seyss-Inquart hinted at a plebiscite. When he visited Graz on March 1, heiling hordes of Hitlerites, 15,000 strong, many of them in Stormtroop uniform, marched past him in an illegal parade as he returned their Nazi salutes. On the same day Göring spoke in Berlin in celebration of the third anniversary of the creation of the new German Air Force:

We shall become the terror of our enemies, nothing shall stop us from unreserved recklessness. . . . I want in this army iron men with a will to deeds. . . . And when the Führer in his Reichstag speech submitted his proud accounting and uttered the proud words that we would no longer tolerate that 10,000,000 German national comrades should be oppressed beyond our borders, then you know as soldiers of the Air Force that, if it must be, you must back these words of the Führer to the limit. . . . We are burning with eagerness to prove our invincibility.

Seyss-Inquart granted the Nazis of Styria the right to wear swastikas and shout "Heil Hitler!" The Cabinet repudiated his concession. Seyss-Inquart laid plans to visit other provinces "to lay the foundations for an undisturbed organization of the Nazi movement throughout Austria." Most estimates place the number of convinced Nazis in Austria at not over thirty-five per cent of the electorate, but the drift of events caused many neutral and timid souls to profess loyalty to the prospective victors.

Schuschnigg, now perceiving that nothing could save the situation but desperate measures, made a last despairing gesture in hope of rallying support to his lost cause at home and abroad. He negotiated with proletarian leaders (four years too late!) to secure working-class support. The Nazi radio screamed: "Dr. Schuschnigg and the Burgomaster of Vienna have formed a Popular Front with the Communists in order to set Marxist hordes at the throats of the people."⁴⁵ By March 9 the negotiations promised a favorable outcome. Schuschnigg felt that a plebiscite was inevitable. He had begun planning for it on February 16. Better to have it before the Nazis were in full control and Göbbels's propaganda machine got into operation. Mussolini declared later that he had advised Schuschnigg against a plebiscite. On Wednesday, March 9, 1938, the Chancellor unexpectedly announced from Innsbruck that a nation-wide referendum would take

place Sunday on the question of Austrian independence. The Berchtesgaden accord would be fulfilled, "but not an iota beyond it!" The "German peace" would be kept, but "I demand from no one that he should put up with insolence." In his anxiety he permitted the terms of the plebiscite to be fixed by his adjutant, Guido Zernatto, in a form as fantastic as Hitler's own electoral strategems. There would be no voting lists. Only those over twenty-four could vote—to exclude the Nazified youth. Voters would bring their identification papers and vote publicly. All ballots would be marked "Yes." Those wishing to vote "No" must bring their own ballots. On Thursday the rules were changed to permit secrecy, with both "Yes" and "No" ballots of the same size. The negotiations with former leaders of the Social Democratic trade unions threatened to break down on the 10th because of the stubbornness of Herr Staud, the leader of the Catholic, Government-controlled union. But there could be no doubt that almost all workers would vote "Yes." Colonel Wolff for the Legitimists and Emil Fey for the suppressed Heimwehr pledged support to Schuschnigg.⁴⁶ With an impressive majority certain to be obtained, the Chancellor prayed that he might yet find sources of support for the salvation of his regime.

He reckoned without Berlin—and without Paris and London. Ribbentrop arrived in the British capital on March 9 for a brief visit. Halifax appealed to the British press for "restraint." On Thursday Ribbentrop visited Halifax, the Duke of Kent, and the Archbishop of Canterbury. On Friday he saw the King and lunched at No. 10 Downing Street with Chamberlain, Londonderry, Hoare, Halifax, Simon, Inskip, Cadogan, and (strangely) Churchill—and their wives. No hint was forthcoming as to the progress of these "exploratory negotiations" for an Anglo-German entente. While Ribbentrop was wined and dined by his hosts, Berlin prepared to strike. On Thursday Premier Chautemps and his Cabinet resigned because of the refusal of the Socialists to grant him special powers. Blum tried vainly to form a new ministry. All day Friday France was without a government. On Thursday rebel troops in Aragon captured Belchite in a great offensive which would carry them to the sea. Paris was helpless and headless. Rome was silent. London was acquiescent. Another golden moment had arrived.

The preparations were brief. On March 9–10 the German press shrieked and the German radio sent out strange news: "The Kärnt-

nerstrasse is in the hands of a Communist mob." "The Vienna Communists are calling a general strike." "In Vienna German nationals are being grossly maltreated." "Czechoslovakia is supplying the Red mob in Vienna with artillery to support an immediate Bolshevik uprising." ⁴⁷ In Austria the plebiscite campaign was well under way, with the wide distribution of placards, posters showing the death mask of Dollfuss, and a new paper of the VF, *Volksruf*. A VF parade poured through Vienna Friday morning. Trucks and planes scattered leaflets: "Heil Österreich! There can be no Honor without Freedom! Our flag will stay Red, White, Red!" But by four o'clock it was rumored that the plebiscite would be postponed. By six it was clear that it would be abandoned. The *Wiener Neuste Nachrichten* came out for the last time with only this news. The radio played waltzes.⁴⁸ A great fear came. . . .

Nazi rowdies rioted through the capital, many of them paid by the German travel bureau in the Bristol Hotel. Nazi pamphlets declared: "The hour of liberation is at hand. Our leader, Adolf Hitler, will bring work and bread to German Austria. He is coming himself. Austria will become German. The Ostmark will flower. Comrades, do not fail to listen to the radio tonight. The Leader will make an important statement." ⁴⁹ Confusion reigned in the Chancellery. There was no news. By late afternoon the radio was booming every five minutes, between waltzes: "The plebiscite will not take place!" The rowdies vanished from the streets—soon to reappear in uniform. A Jewish shopkeeper in Porzellangasse cried hysterically over and over: "I won't give my children to Hitler," and had to be taken to a hospital. The silence of the sepulcher fell over the city, shot through by the low thunder of savage cheering and by faint cries of anguish and terror.

What had happened? At noon on Friday March 11, 1938, Glaise-Horstenau, fresh from Berlin, delivered a German ultimatum to Schuschnigg: call off the plebiscite or face invasion. At four o'clock another ultimatum arrived by plane: resign by 7.30 or face invasion. Schuschnigg, now at wits' end, tried in vain to reach Mussolini. Il Duce had gone skiing. Official London was busy entertaining Ribbentrop. Paris was paralyzed. To be or not to be? To fight or not to fight? Deserted and alone, Schuschnigg might have emulated the Vienna workers of the February days, or the tortured victims of Tokio in China and of Rome in Ethiopia, or the

defenders of Madrid. But the role of hero or martyr was impossible for him and his regime. He surrendered. Shortly before eight o'clock Schuschnigg's voice, slow and sad, came over the radio:

This day has confronted us with a tragic and decisive situation. I have to give my Austrian fellow countrymen the details of the events of today. The German Government today handed President Miklas an ultimatum with a time limit ordering him to nominate as Chancellor a person designated by the German Government and appoint members of an Austrian Government on orders of the German Government; otherwise German troops would invade Austria. I declare before the world that the news launched in Germany concerning disorders by workers, the shedding of streams of blood, and the creation of a situation beyond the Austrian Government's control are lies from A to Z.

The President has asked me to tell the people of Austria that he has yielded only to force. Since we were not prepared, even in this terrible situation, to shed blood, we decided to order the troops to offer no resistance.

The inspector-general of the army, General Schilhowsky, has been placed in command of the troops. He will issue further orders to them.

And so I take leave of the Austrian people with a German word of farewell uttered from the depths of my heart: "God protect Austria." ⁵⁰

There followed, in the tempo of a death march, the Austrian national anthem, then the opening bars of the Seventh Symphony. . . . Later came the voice of Seyss-Inquart, breathless and stumbling, ordering the Austrian army to make no resistance. Beethoven's First came next and then Schubert's Unfinished Symphony and Mozart and Johann Strauss. To the great music of the great past a world of song and laughter, of culture and *Gemütlichkeit*, died and passed into the tomb.

Around the tomb broke forth a bawling bedlam of murderers, grave-diggers and ghouls, jiggling a grisly *danse macbre* over the corpse. At 11.15 the Austrian radio broke forth into the *Horst Wessel Lied* while Nazi mobs marched, shouted, and plundered Jewish shops. Secret S.S. Standard 99 of the Black Guard had already oc-

cupied the Chancellery and other public buildings. At 1.00 a.m. it was announced from the balcony on the Ballhausplatz that Miklas had appointed a new Cabinet—Chancellor: Seyss-Inquart; Vice-Chancellor: Glaise-Horstenau; Welfare: Dr. Hugo Jury; other Nazis in other posts. The survivors of Schuschnigg's Cabinet, save Guido Schmidt, fled or were arrested. Schuschnigg, disdaining flight, was taken a prisoner to the Belvidere Palace. Seyss-Inquart at once invited Hitler to send German troops into Austria to preserve order: "Austria is free. Austria is National-socialist. . . . One People, One Reich, One Leader. Hail to our Leader! Heil Hitler!"

Even after midnight one faint hope remained, for Berlin was not without fear. German troops, planes, tanks, trucks, were poised on the frontier and had expected the order to move in the early evening. But at nine o'clock Herr Eisenlor, German Minister in Prague, called on Foreign Minister Krofta to ask whether Czechoslovakia was mobilizing. He later telephoned with the same question. At 3.00 a.m. on Saturday morning, March 12, he phoned once more. Each time the answer was negative. German troops crossed the Austrian border in the Tyrol at 5.40 a.m. and began pouring into Austria at many points shortly after six.⁵¹ Had Prague dared to veto the German march, Berlin would have faced retreat or war. If war had been risked, Prague could perhaps have involved Paris and Moscow and therefore Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, and ultimately even a reluctant London in an anti-German coalition. The Reich in March could not face such a combination. Six months later it would be stronger—and the coalition would be gone. Prague would do nothing without Paris. Paris would do nothing without London. London would do nothing. For loss of a nail a shoe was lost; for loss of a shoe a horse was lost; for loss of a horse, a man was lost; for loss of a man. . . . The penalty of Prague's mistake was death.

German troops appeared on the Brenner on Saturday, March 12, and exchanged greetings with the Italian guards. Hitler extended explanations and assurances and later gave Mussolini his gratitude: "I will never forget. . . ." On Saturday, in the company of Keitel and Himmler, Hitler crossed the bridge at Braunau-am-Inn, where once his father had collected customs duties. The ecstatic inhabitants strewed his path with flowers and scooped up handfuls of sacred earth behind his car. At Linz he was met by Seyss-Inquart. At Linz he told the multitudes that he had fulfilled a "divine commission." On Monday morning he visited the graves of his parents at near-by

Leonding while German bombers zoomed endlessly overhead carrying more and more troops and officials to Vienna. Miklas resigned. Austria was annexed. Seyss-Inquart was named *Statthalter* of the *Ostmark*. Der Führer entered Vienna in triumph on Monday, March 14, amid scenes of delirium. After speeches, parades, demonstrations without end, he flew back to Berlin on Tuesday night.

A plebiscite and Reichstag election in Great Germany was ordered for April 10: "Do you approve of the reunification of Austria with Germany as accomplished on March 13, and do you vote for the list of our Führer Adolf Hitler?" Hitler opened the campaign at Königsberg: "This time it is a holy vote." Floods of oratory inundated the Reich. Joseph Buerckel, charged with responsibility for the campaign in the *Ostmark*, extended assurances to the Archbishop and bishops of the Church. Without consulting the Pope, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer and his fellow prelates issued a letter endorsing National Socialism and urging all to vote "Ja." The Archbishop sent a copy in his own hand to Buerckel, signed: "Heil Hitler!" It was broadcast all over Germany. Pius XI reprimanded Innitzer and obliged him to make a partial retraction—which was suppressed by the Nazi censors. Innitzer welcomed Hitler, praised *Anschluss*, and declared that God had fore-ordained Der Führer's struggle against Bolshevism. (On October 8, 1938, Innitzer's palace was raided by Nazi mobs which smashed most of the furniture and sacred objects, threw a priest from a window, and threatened the Cardinal with assault or worse.) On April 10, 99.08% of all the voters of Great Germany and 99.75% of the voters of the *Ostmark* voted "Ja."⁵²

Sic transit gloria Austriae! On the night of doom, thousands fled to Czechoslovakia or Hungary, including Frau Dollfuss and her children. But the borders were soon closed and thousands were jailed or thrown into concentration camps. Schuschnigg was made a captive and threatened with trial for "treason." It was rumored in the spring that he had been permitted to marry his Countess Vera, with his brother acting as proxy, but this was later denied. The last Chancellor was granted no access to the outer world. Major Emil Fey, once Vice-Chancellor and proud leader of the Heimwehr, was found shot to death in his home, along with his wife and son and even his dog.⁵³ "Suicide." Neustädter-Stürmer suffered a like fate. Starhemberg was in Switzerland. Planetta and Holzweber, who had slain Dollfuss, became heroes. Jews were robbed, tortured, and compelled to scrub gutters and sidewalks.

DRANG NACH OSTEN

The map on the following two pages was circulated throughout Germany in March 1938 by the Nazi Party locals immediately after *Anschluss* and was subsequently withdrawn in the face of protests abroad. The only frontiers designated as satisfactory ("Reich borders as racial frontiers") are those between East Prussia and Poland, the Ostmark and Hungary, and Northwestern Germany and the Netherlands, though the new frontiers of truncated Czechoslovakia would now doubtless be included in this category. The shaded area within the USSR corresponds approximately to the region under German military occupation at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918). The legends read as follows:

87,545,000










GERMANS IN EUROPE

The German Population- and Culture-Sphere in the States of Europe

"In the long run it is unbearable for a World Power, conscious of itself, to know that there are folk-comrades at its side who are constantly being afflicted with the severest suffering for their sympathy or unity with the whole nation, its destiny, and its philosophy!"

—DER FÜHRER, *February 20, 1938*

The arrows pointing Eastward show the direction of expansion of the German cities in the Middle Ages.

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">  German Folk-soil  Germandom in the Diaspora  Amputated mixed territory  Border Germans mingled with other peoples  Alpine Romansch in the German culture sphere  German cities established in the East | <ul style="list-style-type: none">  Reich borders as lines of division within the German folk-area  Reich borders as folk-frontiers  Proportion of Germans to total population in various states <p style="text-align: center;">70,000 German folkdom figures</p> |
|--|---|

Scores took their lives. Egon Friedel, author and actor, leaped to his death. Professor Nobel of the Vienna medical school committed suicide with his wife. Göring called a halt to open theft and assault and declared that the Jews must be expropriated and expelled "systematically." Sigmund Freud was permitted to go to England. Art, literature, music, and science were cleansed. Austria was liberated. The Archbishop of Canterbury voiced his approval on March 29, while Lord Redesdale expressed "the gratitude of Europe to Hitler."⁵⁴

The West did nothing. Halifax cried: "Horrible, horrible, I never thought they would do it!"—though he had implicitly sanctioned the doing four months before. Protests were made to Wilhelmstrasse, which bluntly rejected them, and to Ribbentrop, who blithely took his leave of London on Monday, March 14. Chamberlain muttered: "severest condemnation," "profound shock." There was talk of rallying to the League, to France, to Czechoslovakia, but this was sham or rationalization. In Paris Blum formed a new Cabinet on March 13 with the post of Foreign Minister awarded once more to the theatrical and futile Joseph Paul-Boncour. On April 8, by a vote of 223 to 49, the Senate rejected a bill authorizing a capital levy and rule by decree. Blum resigned. Daladier succeeded, with Bonnet as Foreign Minister. French finances and the interests of the *rentiers* were temporarily buttressed thereby, but for French diplomacy the transition was one from disaster to catastrophe.

Elsewhere despair alternated with frantic efforts to snatch booty from the burning. A dim consciousness that Czechoslovakia was now doomed began to pervade Prague. The Spanish loyalists fought in vain to halt the rebel drive to the sea, while Fascist bombers massacred thousands in Barcelona, and Perth and Ciano conferred amiably in Rome. In the East, Poland delivered a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to Lithuania on March 17, demanding full satisfaction for the shooting of a sentry and a restoration of relations, broken off by Kaunas after the Polish seizure of Vilna in 1928. Lithuania had no option but to yield. French power east of the Rhine was a ghost. Paris might propose, but the Third Reich would dispose. Its future triumphs, like its past victories, would be won with Tory aid.

PEACE BY PURCHASE

I. RESCUE BY CHAMBERLAIN

THE foreign policy of Britain's "National Government" since 1931 has been a mystery to most observers.¹ Mr. Stimson was mystified at the outset by Sir John Simon's refusal to respond to American proposals for joint action against Japan. During the ensuing years Downing Street yielded the hegemony of Eastern Asia to Tokio, the mastery of the Continent to Germany, and control of East Africa and the middle Mediterranean to Italy. Each year the mystery deepened, for each year British power and prestige sank to lower depths. The power of Britain's potential enemies came closer each year to the point at which the equilibrium would be irretrievably upset and Britain would be dealing with rivals at once more powerful than the Empire and hungry for Imperial riches. When this point was reached in 1938, policy at Whitehall exhibited no change. Then, as before, every effort was made to assist or condone the aggrandizements of the Fascist Triplíce and to subvert all attempts on the part of their victims or rivals to offer collective resistance. *Cui bono?*

The problem here raised is a fascinating study in semantics, behaviorism, and psychiatry. It cannot here be explored in all its myriad ramifications. Any effort to formulate a pattern of words which will name accurately (and therefore "explain") the complex phenomena under observation must fail of its purpose if the words are simple labels and must, if successful, be equivalent to a cultural history of modern England—a task outside the limits of the present enterprise. Simple formulas are untruths or half-truths be-

cause they blind the observer to much of the pertinent data. "Perfidious Albion" is a familiar stereotype of Irishmen, Frenchmen, Hindus, and Americans. "Realism" is a stereotype employed by those formulating policy to justify or disguise what is done or undone. "Peace-at-any-price," "muddling through," "funk," "mendacity," "stupidity," "conspiracy," "fear," "malevolence," all suggest other familiar patterns of response, all alike useful as apologia or indictments, but unhelpful as analysis.

The diagnosis here advanced is that the mystery of Tory Britain, with all allowances for unique local characteristics, is but another instance of a widespread behavior-phenomenon in Western Europe in the age of its cultural decay. That phenomenon is one which has been repeatedly referred to in these pages. In its consistency, persistency, and universality, it approaches the cosmic majesty of Destiny, Fate, or Nemesis. As data of social science, it may be variously described in the various current vocabularies.

In the terminology of Marx: ruling classes threatened with expropriation create and employ instruments of violence which are intended to protect the power and privileges accruing from their established control of the instruments of production. If the organizers of violence perform their assigned task, the ruling classes are saved. But if they turn upon their patrons, the ruling classes may be destroyed by their own protectors, particularly when they are caught in a web of insoluble social and economic contradictions. In the terminology of Pareto: economic élites menaced by counter-élites from the social substrata employ military élites to safeguard their status at the apex of the social hierarchy. But if the military élites usurp the positions of the economic élites they are called upon to defend, this mode of defense proves fatal. In the terminology of Ivan Pavlov and John B. Watson: organisms give negative responses of fear or rage (i.e. tropisms of withdrawal or hostile approach) to environmental threats against the affective symbols to which they have been positively conditioned. They achieve adjustments either by modifying their own symbol-systems and habit-patterns, by fleeing from or destroying the sources of danger, or, when neither of these adjustments is possible (as in the present case), by relying upon others to cope with the threats. But if the others switch signals and indulge in negative or destructive overt behavior against those threatened instead of against the threateners, the adjustment becomes objectively futile (however subjectively satisfying it may be) and the original organisms perish.

In the terminology of Freud: personalities afflicted with anxiety by virtue of internal conflicts induced by external danger project their aggressions onto external objects. Such aggressions are violent in proportion as they are denied verbal expression or repressed below the level of consciousness. Such projections, when followed by overtly hostile acts, gratify hitherto repressed *id*-impulses in a fashion socially approved and satisfying to the *ego*, and therefore acceptable to conscience—i.e. *super-ego* restraints. When inhibitions or circumstantial obstacles thwart such overt discharge of aggressions, vicarious discharge may be achieved by encouraging others to attack the hated object. But if the aggressions of others are turned backward upon the instigators, the result is disastrous both subjectively and objectively.

These varying formulations attempt to indicate motivations, describe conduct, and suggest risks. The process may appropriately be stated at greater length in less technical language. The rulers of Britain, like all nobilities, plutocracies, and priesthoods in the anxious middle decades of the twentieth century, lived under the shadow of a great fear: social revolution from below which would seek to abolish nobilities, plutocracies, and priesthoods. They therefore viewed with alarm all propensities on the part of the lower social orders to limit or assail the privileges of their superiors, whether in the name of democracy, Socialism, syndicalism, Communism, "Peoples' Front" or merely "Social Democracy" or "Labor." They viewed with approval all devices which would promote "order, hierarchy, discipline" and cause the masses to respect and obey the classes.

Britain's oligarchy was not objectively menaced by domestic proletarian unrest. The Labor party was no threat, for its leaders could be counted upon to disown their own alleged aims in a crisis, as in the General Strike of 1926 and the panic of 1931. The elaborate paraphernalia employed by Fascist regimes to deflect mass resentments into safe channels and to evoke mass respect and obedience was therefore not required in a society in which the masses had never challenged their betters for the past three centuries. The symbols of monarchy, nobility, property, and religion were as efficacious as ever in eliciting loyalty from the common man, whatever his deprivations or insecurities.² But the oligarchy suffered from subjective insecurities which magnified alleged dangers to its position. Its wealth and power, moreover, rested ultimately upon a world-wide Empire. That Empire was potentially menaced—in Africa, the Near and Mid-

dle East, in India and in China—by an old Imperial rival which was now a new class enemy. This enemy was consecrated in word and deed to the ultimate destruction of the patterns of inter-class, inter-racial, and international relations of which the oligarchy was the beneficiary. This enemy, moreover, ruled the largest, most populous, and potentially most powerful of the Great Powers. The “bear that walks like a man” was now the master of the “socialist Fatherland,” which challenged all aristocracy, all capitalism, all imperialism. The oligarchy was not short-sighted, even if its inner doubts caused it to magnify the danger. It correctly envisaged the USSR and the Comintern as the most menacing of all threats to its values and its way of life—even though the recognition was at times unconscious and open acknowledgment of it was rare.

The destruction of the Soviet counter-élite was a constant object of the oligarchy after 1917. The first effort (1918–20) failed. Unsuccessful intervention and blockade were followed by “peace” and a *modus vivendi*. Subsequently there came to power at Rome, Tokio, and Berlin regimes sworn to defend “civilization” (i.e. other oligarchies) against “Bolshevism.” These regimes also threatened the Empire. And their domestic methods, while admirably effective, were ungentlemanly. Nevertheless, in word and deed, they threatened Moscow first. But their threats to Moscow could not be implemented unless they acquired the economic and military means for launching their projected crusade. Since the USSR is vast, amorphous, and potent, the war lords of Japan could not challenge it to battle unless they first had in their hands Manchuria and most of China. They must, therefore, be permitted to “save China from Bolshevism” and, if need be, acquire hegemony over Eastern Asia. For similar reasons the Third Reich could not move eastward against the menace without first securing mastery of Central Europe. Fascist Italy, moreover, must be strengthened in Africa and the Mediterranean as a useful ally of the crusaders.

The exigencies of this logic led to certain obvious conclusions in diplomacy and strategy which were not products of muddling, stupidity, or weakness but of simple *Realpolitik*. They did not emerge all at once, like Minerva from the brow of Jove, nor were they acted upon with perfect consistency. Their content shifted with changing circumstances. They sprang not from any single mind nor from any group of “conspirators,” but rather from the progressive adaptation of accepted assumptions to the unfolding problem. Once the first

steps were taken, other steps followed until the shape of the destination became clear with a cold hard logic of its own.

The USSR must be isolated. The ties between France and her Eastern allies must be broken. France must be immobilized, for any French involvement in the clash to come would, for geographical reasons, entail British involvement—which was precisely what was to be avoided. The immobilization of France required the strengthening of Germany and Italy to a point at which Paris could not challenge them. Hence remilitarization of the Rhineland, threats to French communications in the Mediterranean, and Fascist victory in Spain were all useful devices to supplement British efforts to keep France neutral. A neutralized France must be induced to grant Hitler *carte blanche* in Danubia, Balkania, and the East. By the same logic Italy must be helped to checkmate France, and Japan must be permitted to impose its will on China. Hence all efforts from Geneva, Paris, or Washington to thwart the march of the anti-Comintern crusaders must be sabotaged. In the end the Fascist Triplice must attack the USSR. The Western Powers must remain neutral. The oligarchy and the Empire would thereby be saved, for Communism could not defeat such a combination of foes. It would either be driven back to the Urals or would, by desperate resistance, exhaust itself and its enemies alike to the advantage of British interests.

This program could never be openly acknowledged by Tory officialdom because the masses whom the oligarchy ruled (and even some members of the oligarchy itself) had unfortunately been conditioned to respond favorably to such shibboleths as “indivisible peace,” “collective security,” and “League of Nations.” The problem here was one of winning elections at home by the adroit manipulation of such popular slogans without permitting them to achieve any implementation abroad. The electorate, moreover, must be kept from disillusionment and induced to support the program without being aware of its purposes or implications. In this supreme test of political skill, the oligarchs were not found wanting. Mass fear of “war” and mass attachment to “peace,” “facts,” “compromise,” “realism,” “cooperation,” “friendly relations,” and “general appeasement” could be utilized to evoke approval for policies designed to smash “indivisible peace,” “collective security,” and “League of Nations.” The trick was neatly turned by consistent employment of the necessary stereotypes to disguise the import and direction of the course embarked upon.

A variety of other motivations strengthened the decision. The course, despite its difficulties, was essentially one of inertia. Inertia is always easier than action. The Russian Revolution, moreover, like the French Revolution, represented Atheism, Immorality, Murder, and Theft. The Tories of Chamberlain looked upon it much as Edmund Burke had viewed the France of 1793. They stood for Religion, Morality, and Property. These values Fascism was sworn to protect. The new course, furthermore, involved an arms race. Many of the oligarchs held stock in arms companies. To use public funds for private enrichment was not immoral, provided the funds went for "national defense." The corporation of which Chamberlain himself was once director, the Birmingham Small Arms Company, had once handled all British army contracts.³ The unacknowledged slogan of the new day was: billions for defense, not one penny for collective security. By 1938 the budget of the three defense departments, plus costs of air-raid precautions, had climbed to £283,500,000. It was planned to spend on defense during the next five years more than £1,500,000,000.⁴ Such expenditure helped to reduce unemployment and restore national prosperity. The stockholders in companies producing arms, munitions, aircraft, and ships were not averse to serving the nation in this fashion. They included many aristocrats and numerous dignitaries of State and Church.

The course itself was not without its dangers. It was irrevocable, for if the Cæsars were granted mastery of Europe and Asia, such mastery could not later be taken from them. Should they ultimately utilize their power not to attack the USSR but to wrest concessions from London and Paris or, *horrible dictu*, to inaugurate the partition of the established colonial empires, their demands would have to be met or a new course of costly and dubious resistance would have to be embarked upon. Hence the necessity for more and more armaments. Even in this unhappy eventuality, however, there was still a margin of safety. The colonial possessions of Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, and even France could be utilized to appease Fascist hunger, for these States would no longer be in a position to defend themselves. If the Empire should itself be hard pressed, reliance must be put on Anglo-American solidarity. This last defense was based upon no wishful assumption of American folly, but upon the realistic premise that the United States, for its own security, could not afford to permit the Fascist Triplice to smash the Empire.

There were other risks. Should the Triplice attack the USSR and

win, it might achieve invincibility and then turn against the Empire. Should the Triple alliance attack the USSR and lose, Moscow might spread Communism over Europe and Asia and inevitably attack the oligarchy and emancipate its subject peoples. In this case American aid would be indispensable for salvation. Should Moscow and the Triple alliance by some improbable miracle come to terms and make common cause, all might be lost. These risks were of such a character that the gamble might prove fatal. But the oligarchy was unable or unwilling to adopt any alternative course.

In the playing of the game another consideration of crucial import dominated every move. This too flowed from the premises. The gangsters must not be permitted to destroy themselves. Should they attack Moscow prematurely, should they launch aggression against other States under circumstances in which a great coalition against them might emerge, should they face defeat in any war, it would be imperative for Downing Street to rescue them. Rescue might prove difficult. They must therefore not be allowed to run needless risks. Others must not be allowed to oppose them effectively. If they accomplished their own destruction, not only would they become useless for protection against Moscow, but they would open the door wide to World Revolution. In this event the entire gamble would be lost, for Fascist defeat might well mean Communist victory in Japan, Italy, and Germany alike. Consequently the rescuers must over and over again be rescued from their own rashness. Even if they became enemies of Britain, they must still be rescued—for their defeat would mean the victory of an enemy far more dangerous and formidable.

This Nemesis, which the oligarchy prayed it would never have to face, had already been faced by other oligarchies with discouraging results. Italian aristocrats and entrepreneurs, German Junkers and industrialists, Austrian businessmen and nobles had all bought peace and protection against the Beast of Bolshevism by subsidizing the militias of the Cæsars. Something they had got from their bargain, but in each case they had found themselves enslaved in the end by those whom they had rescued and put into power to save them. The Church at Rome, with all the wisdom of the centuries behind it, had faced the same dilemma and fallen into the same trap. To grant absolutism and omnipotence to Fascism as a means of salvation from Communism was, by this showing, almost as dangerous as to surrender to Communism forthwith. But from this too there was no escape once

the bargain was struck. Those whose fears of proletarian radicalism and whose anxieties over property and privilege drive them to compromise with the brute power of the new barbarians are in the end undone—by their allies if not by their enemies.

Whether this too was to be the fate of Tory Britain was a question mercifully unanswered in 1938. For the oligarchy there was no abandonment of the road which it had taken. Its past has shaped its future in a mold beyond all changing. If Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, so too was the ultimate fate of the Empire there decided. Those incapable of adaptation must either make old formulas work, or perish. The oligarchy was incapable of changing its code, its creed, or its way of life. Half a century ago Ralph Waldo Emerson described its spirit with remarkable accuracy and insight:

Truth in private life, untruth in public, marks these home-loving men. Their political conduct is not decided by general views, but by internal intrigues and personal and family interests. They cannot readily see beyond England. The History of Rome and Greece, when written by their scholars, degenerates into English party pamphlets. They cannot see beyond England, nor in England can they transcend the interests of the governing classes. "English principles" mean a primary regard to the interests of property. . . .

The foreign policy of England, though ambitious and lavish of money, has not often been generous or just. It has a principal regard for the interest of trade, checked however by the aristocratic bias of the ambassador, which usually puts him in sympathy with the continental Courts. It sanctioned the partition of Poland, it betrayed Genoa, Sicily, Parga, Greece, Turkey, Rome, and Hungary. . . .

Their mind is in a state of arrested development,—a divine cripple like Vulcan, a blind *savant* like Huber and Sanderson. They do not occupy themselves on matters of general and lasting import, but on a corporeal civilization, on goods that perish in the using. . . . There is cramp limitation in their habit of thought, sleepy routine, and a tortoise's instinct to hold hard to the ground with his claws, lest he should be thrown on his back. There is a drag of inertia which resists reform in every shape.⁵

To undertake here to identify all the principal movers in the oligarchy, to assess each role, to present all the data in support of the

hypothesis would require many more pages than this book contains. A partial picture must suffice. To quote old voices first, including some which later changed their tune, Lloyd George in a speech at Yarmouth, September 22, 1933, declared:

If the Powers succeed in overthrowing Nazism in Germany, what would follow? Not a Conservative, Socialist or Liberal regime, but extreme Communism. Surely that could not be their objective. A Communist Germany would be infinitely more formidable than a Communist Russia. The Germans would know how to run their Communism effectively.⁶

In Commons, November 28, 1934, Lloyd George asserted:

In a very short time, perhaps in a year or two, the Conservative elements in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe. She is planted right in the center of Europe, and if her defense breaks down against the Communists—only two or three years ago a very distinguished German statesman said to me: "I am not afraid of Nazism, but of Communism"—and if Germany is seized by the Communists, Europe will follow; because the Germans could make a better job of it than any other country. Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend.⁷

In 1934 Mr. L. Lawton wrote in the *Fortnightly Review*:

Whereas formerly German statesmen looked both to the East and to the West, Hitler at present looks to the East only. . . . No one who studies the map of Eastern Europe can doubt that there are immense possibilities of a German-Polish compromise at the expense of others. The idea of including Ukraine within the Western European system, and moving Russia on towards the East is certainly tempting. . . . With Ukraine as part of a democratic federated system there would, it is hoped, come into existence a grouping of States with which Great Britain could be on friendly terms. The moment is long overdue for the creation of some such grouping in Eastern Europe.⁸

Mr. L. S. Amery, former Colonial Minister, wrote in *The Forward View* (1935): "The first condition of European peace today is the frank acknowledgment that Germany's armaments are now her own affair and nobody else's" (p. 71). "The time has come for such a re-

vision of the Covenant as will get rid of all those clauses (more particular 10 and 16) which give an encouragement to the super-State theory of the League" (p. 272). "The doctrine of the inevitable contagion of war is, of course, pure nonsense" (p. 283). "We do not regard ourselves as one of the nations of Europe" (p. 285). "It would be no concern of ours . . . to prevent Japanese expansion in Eastern Siberia" (p. 288).

The great press magnates of Britain have seldom disguised their preferences. Baron Beaverbrook (William Maxwell Aitkin), born in Canada, where he made a fortune of a million pounds before he came to London to become private secretary of Bonar Law, bought up the *Daily Express* and pushed it to a circulation of 2,000,000 by 1929 and 2,500,000 by 1938. He also owned the *Evening Standard*. Lord Rothermere (Harold Sidney Harmsworth, brother of Lord Northcliffe) owned the *Daily Mail*, with almost two million readers, and the *Evening News*. A perusal of the files of these journals will leave little doubt as to the picture of the world in the minds of their owners. In January 1934 the *Daily Mail* and the *Evening News* shouted "Hurrah For The Blackshirts!" and called upon the patriotic youth of Britain to join Sir Oswald Mosley's Fascists.⁹ But this line was soon dropped. Tory Britain had no need of domestic Fascism to achieve its purposes. Rothermere, who once gained circulation by Hun-baiting, soon became an advocate of Hungarian revisionism and a defender of Hitler.¹⁰

Mr. G. Ward Price, the *Daily Mail's* Continental correspondent, in his eulogy of the Cæsars, *I Know These Dictators* (1938), wrote:

The last time the Teuto-Slav conflict broke out, Britain and France were dragged into it. On that occasion Russia was backing Serbia against Austria. She is now backing Czechoslovakia against Germany. If this ancient feud flames up again, it would be well to deflect it into those regions where it can do least harm. Humanity and common sense alike suggest that the broad steppes of Little Russia are a more suitable locality than the densely populated centres of civilization in Western Europe.¹¹

The Astor family, stemming originally from southern Germany, constituted a liaison between the press, the aristocracy, the plutocracy, the Foreign Office, and the United States. Viscount Astor is the son of a wealthy American who migrated to England in the "mauve decade" because the American press insisted on writing feature articles

on his golden bathtubs. The Viscount stood for Eton, medical research, agriculture, scientific nutrition, horse-racing, charity, and hospitals. In 1906 he married Nancy Witcher Langhorne of Virginia, first woman to be elected to Commons. She succeeded her husband as M.P. for Plymouth when he came into his lordship in 1919. She stood for charm, wealth, Christian Science, teetotalism, opposition to reform of the divorce laws (though she herself was divorced from her first husband, Robert Gould Shaw), motherhood, and lavish entertainment in St. James's Square and Cliveden Manor. Lord Astor owned *The Observer*, edited by J. L. Garvin, an elderly Irishman passionately devoted to an Anglo-German entente and Anglo-American co-operation. Lord Astor's younger brother, Major John Jacob Astor, who served in India and lost a leg in the war, bought *The Times* from Lord Northcliffe. He and his editor, Geoffrey Dawson, made the respectable "thunderer" an authoritative organ of Downing Street and the oligarchy.

The Marquess of Londonderry, owner of many mines and large estates, differed from most of his collaborators in a somewhat naïve propensity to state his convictions in print, with the aid of Lady Desborough and Mr. G. Ward Price. Thus:

I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my particular gratitude to Herr Hitler, Field Marshal Göring, Herr von Ribbentrop, and Baron von Neurath for their repeated kindnesses and hospitality to me and members of my family, as well as for affording me many interesting sources of information (*Ourselves and Germany*, 1938, p. 9).

Herr Hitler's conciliatory gestures have been disregarded and his offers brushed on one side, and German armaments have been rapidly and efficiently built upon a model which those who claim to speak with authority in the Reich assert is designed ultimately to make that country invincible on land and sea and in the air. Herr Hitler has repeatedly solicited the good-will of England and the friendly co-operation of the German and English peoples. The time may well be not far off, should the present unsatisfactory and uncertain state of Anglo-German relations be allowed to continue, when the Germans will be able to dispense with the hope of any understanding with us and to strike out along a course of *Weltpolitik* frankly antagonistic to Great Britain and her many imperial and commercial interests. It is to avert

such an unfortunate eventuality as this that I have made every effort to convince the people of this country of the value and importance of a friendly understanding between Britain and Germany (pp. 8-9).

Our Foreign Office appears to condone the associations with Communism and Bolshevism through our affiliation with France, while paying but little regard to the robust attitude of Germany, Italy, and Japan which wholeheartedly condemn Communism and Bolshevism. Bolshevism is a world-wide doctrine which aims at the internal disruption of all modern systems of Government with the ultimate object of what is termed World Revolution. That Germany, Italy, and Japan condemn Bolshevism is an attitude of mind which is not properly appreciated in this country. . . . We fail to recognize that the present condition of Spain is mainly the result of Red machinations. We console ourselves with the reflection that, owing to the Conservatism of the French peasant, Bolshevism will not prevail to any serious extent among the urban industrial population of France, although the Communist representation in the Chamber has increased to the number which Herr Hitler personally prophesied to me over two years ago. Belgium is showing signs of Bolshevism. And Germany sees herself surrounded by Bolshevik countries and militarily and economically hemmed in with what may well be disastrous consequences. We watch this movement with strange equanimity. We throw in our weight under "non-intervention" on the side of the Reds in Spain. Belgium and France do the same. And we wonder why Germany and Italy appear more truculent and challenging as their strength and prestige increase (pp. 21-2).

I was at a loss to understand why we could not make common ground in some form or other with Germany in opposition to Communism. . . . The anti-Communist platform was (and still is) invaluable (p. 129).

Londonderry blessed Hitler's designs on Austria and Czechoslovakia and hoped merely "that they may be realized in a peaceful manner."¹² Londonderry early became a warm friend of Ribbentrop, whom he entertained lavishly, amid distinguished and influential company, at his house in Park Lane. He likewise did not neglect Dino Grandi. With Baldwin, however, he made little progress, being finally forced to resign the Air Ministry. Chamberlain was more amenable.

Other distinguished lords and ladies saw the world much as Londonderry saw it. The Marquess of Lothian, a millionaire bachelor who was once secretary to Lloyd George and later Governor of the National Bank of Scotland, was also a Christian Scientist—with important Catholic connections. He envisaged “peace” in terms of a Tory-Nazi entente and a return of the German colonies. Mary (Baroness) Ravensdale, sister-in-law of Sir Oswald Mosley; Lady (Austen) Chamberlain, usually resident in Rome; Lord Redesdale, whose beautiful blonde daughters, the Honorable Mrs. Diana Guinness and the Honorable Miss Unity Valkyrie Freeman-Mitford, were intimate friends of Der Führer (Mrs. Diana Guinness married Sir Oswald Mosley in Munich on December the fourth 1937.); Lord Swinton (Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister); Lord Hailsham (Sir Douglas Hogg); and of course Simon, Hoare, and Halifax were none of them in fundamental disagreement with the views already suggested.

The “Anglo-German Fellowship,” inspired by Ribbentrop and installed in Unilever House of Lord Leverhulme, Governor of Lever Brothers, helped to bring together like-minded industrialists and aristocrats, such as Andrew Agnew of Shell Oil, controlled by a rabid anti-Bolshevist, Sir Henri Deterding; Lord Barnby of Lloyd’s Bank; Sir Josiah Stamp and Sir Robert Kindersley of the Bank of England; F. C. Tiarks, banker; Lord MacGowan of Imperial Chemicals. Sir Josiah, however, admired Eden and was a dissident: “I believe Hitler manifests undue alarm over the danger of a spread of Bolshevism. It does make a good flag to wave, though, doesn’t it?”¹³ In 1936 the Fellowship sent a mission to Berlin to confer with Göring. It included Tiarks, Arthur Guinness, and a former Cabinet member, Lord Mount Temple, whose first wife was the daughter of Sir Ernest Cassel, a German-Jewish banker.¹⁴ Lord Mount Temple was head of the Anti-Socialist Federation and, until November 1938, president of the Anglo-German Fellowship.

“The City” (London’s Wall Street) was on the whole in sympathy with this orientation, though some of its members had doubts. Said Lloyd George, February 12, 1931: “A Chancellor of the Exchequer must make allowance for the political bias of the City. They have always been against a progressive Government. They have always been tolerant of the faults of a reactionary Government.”¹⁵ Said Baldwin on July 2, 1936, at the Centenary dinner of the City of London Conservative Association: “We know our destination, and although we may not take the direct course, we always have that port

in view. Our aim is constant. Our methods may differ according to the seas we are in and according to the winds that blow. But I feel confident that however great our difficulties we shall be judged at any rate with a kindly criticism in the City of London.”¹⁶ He was not in error. The great banking magnates also saw the world in terms of investment markets, the menace of Bolshevism, the traditional power of British capital, and the sturdy virtues of the new Cæsars. Mr. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, was as much a man of shadows as Sir Basil Zaharoff, the arms magnate. But his influence was great and it was seldom thrown against the views of the oligarchy. In Tory Britain, however, as in pre-War Prussia and Russia, the true representatives of imperialism were less the men of money than the men of title.

On the periphery a circle of prelates, publicists, and pacifists served the cause, wittingly or unwittingly. Dean Inge of St. Paul's preached Anglo-German reconciliation, praised Nazi “patriotic exaltation and disciplined self-sacrifice,” condemned Britain's defense of Belgium and France in 1914 as “monstrous folly,” and found only virtue in Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco.¹⁷ The Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Gordon Lang, took a similar position, but was troubled at the Nazi pogrom of November 1938: “Would that the rulers of the Reich could realize that such excesses of hatred and malice put upon the friendship which we are ready to offer them an almost intolerable strain.”¹⁸ Many Britons visited rebel Spain and praised Franco for saving the land from Bolshevism.¹⁹ The Laborite pacifists, like George Lansbury and James Maxton, were of substantial aid in “educating” the public to the need of concessions for “peace.” Simon and Hoare, Halifax and Chamberlain, Cadogan and Sir Nevile Henderson, the Ambassador in Berlin who praised the Third Reich and publicly deplored criticisms of it by his countrymen,²⁰ were all grateful for such help.

Among other places where these congenial souls from time to time gathered was Cliveden Manor, sumptuous Thames estate of Lord and Lady Astor. Here, at pleasant week-end parties, the mighty men of money, title, and power met in happy discourse. On March 26-7, 1938, Chamberlain played “musical chairs” here and discussed the problem of neutralizing France and pursuing rapprochement with Rome and Berlin. The “Cliveden Set” became known as “Britain's Second Foreign Office,” though Lady Nancy indignantly denied all such allegations. To postulate a “Cliveden conspiracy” is quite un-

necessary and would be quite inaccurate. Cliveden was merely a cheerful rendezvous for ladies and gentlemen whose views coincided. There were, to be sure, occasional doubts and difficulties. Even Londonderry found the Germans "difficult." And Halifax could say: "I often think how much easier the world would have been to manage if Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini had chanced to have been at Oxford."²¹ (Cf. Sir Francis Lacey: "Had Hitler and Mussolini been cricketers, I do not think we should have had all this trouble that is going on in Europe today.")²² But "facts" had to be "faced," and those who met at Cliveden and elsewhere were never in serious disagreement as to how Property, Religion, and the Empire should be safeguarded in a dangerous world.²³

2. CIRCUS IN ROME

Downing Street pursued "appeasement" on three fronts during 1938. In the Far East negative action sufficed. To deny all aid to China, to paralyze all motion at Geneva, to thwart all efforts at Washington or elsewhere to restrain the aggressor was enough to satisfy the war lords of Tokio. The appeasement of the Cæsars at Rome and Berlin called for more active steps. After Austria came Czechoslovakia. Downing Street's task of splitting Prague from its allies, paving the way for surrender without war, and compelling Paris to accept the consequences was not an easy one. For these things time was needed. Meanwhile Il Duce must be placated and Paris must be induced to participate in the process.

The aftermath of *Anschluss* did not interfere with the enterprise, but rather increased Tory anxiety to carry it to a rapid conclusion. On March 17, 1938, Litvinov reaffirmed Moscow's obligations to Geneva, Paris, and Prague, warned that Czechoslovakia was in peril, and proposed a conference to consider collective means of "checking the further development of aggression and eliminating an aggravated danger of a new world massacre." He urged that the United States attend as well as Britain and France. Germany, Italy, and Japan were not to be invited.²⁴ The British Cabinet decided on March 22 that no new commitments to act against aggressors should be assumed. Chamberlain addressed Commons on March 24 and laid down the line of Tory policy for many months to come:

I cannot imagine any events in Europe which would change the fundamental basis of British foreign policy, which is the maintenance and preservation of peace. However, that does not mean nothing would make us fight. . . . Our existing commitments which might lead to use of our arms for a purpose other than our own defense were, first of all, defense of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression. Britain also has treaty obligations to Portugal, Iraq, and Egypt.

The question now arises whether we should go further. Should we forthwith give assurance to France that in the event of her being called upon by reason of German aggression on Czechoslovakia to implement her obligations under the Franco-Czech treaty we would immediately employ our full military force on her behalf? Or should we at once declare our readiness to take military action in resistance to any forcible interference with the independence of Czechoslovakia and invite any other nations which might desire to associate themselves with us in such a declaration?

From consideration of these two alternatives it clearly emerges that under either a decision as to whether or not this country should find itself involved in war would automatically be removed from the discretion of His Majesty's Government and the suggested guarantee would apply irrespective of the circumstances by which it would be brought into operation and over which His Majesty's Government might not have been able to exercise any control. This position is not one which His Majesty's Government could see their way to accept in relation to an area where their vital interests are not concerned in the same degree as they are in the case of France and Belgium. It certainly is not a position that results from the Covenant. For these reasons His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested.

But while plainly stating this decision I should add this: where peace or war is concerned legal obligations are not alone involved and if war broke out it likely would not be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. The [Soviet] proposal appeared to involve less consultation with a view to settlement than concerting of action against an eventuality that has not yet arisen. . . . [This] would aggravate a tendency toward estab-

ishment of exclusive groups of nations which must be inimical to the prospect of European peace. . . .

His Majesty's Government will at all times be ready to render any help in their power toward the solution of questions likely to cause difficulty between the German and Czechoslovak governments. In the meantime there is no need to assume the use of force or, indeed, to talk about it. Such talk is to be strongly deprecated. Not only can it do no good; it is bound to do harm.²⁵

Downing Street thus rejected Moscow's proposal, and declined any commitment to aid Czechoslovakia against German aggression or to aid France in the defense of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain defended "non-intervention" in Spain despite "repeated infringements"—"from more than one quarter." He found "encouragement" in the negotiations with Italy and, in the midst of pleas for accelerating defense plans, expressed "full reliance upon the intention of the Italian Government to make good their assurances." "Appeasement in Europe is an objective to which the efforts of all men of good will should be directed." This façade was flimsy but sufficient. Britons, Frenchmen, and Americans gave thanks that the Prime Minister was committed to "peace."

Meanwhile the conversations in Rome were well advanced. The path was smoothed by new commercial accords signed in London.²⁶ In an age in which Nemesis, goddess of retribution, wrought many masterpieces of irony, one of her most striking achievements was her choice of Britain's spokesman at Cæsar's court. To the dictator who defied the League went, as agent of the Power which destroyed the League, the man who more than any other man (save one) had made the League. His mission was to complete the destruction of that which he had helped to create and, by way of piling Pelion upon Ossa, to arrange for the use of the League to sanction the League's demise upon Cæsar's altar.

In 1919 Woodrow Wilson, founder of the League of Nations, had approved the appointment to the post of Secretary-General of Sir Eric Drummond, younger brother of the Earl of Perth. This quiet Scotsman, shy and efficient, was a Roman Catholic by faith and a bureaucrat by profession. He had entered the Foreign Office in 1928. He served as private secretary to Grey (1911), to Asquith (1912-15), and to Balfour (1915-19), who called him "the perfect private secretary." In London and later in Geneva he organized the Secretariat so skill-

fully that this first international civil service, which was the very basis of the whole League system, was from the outset established upon solid foundations. On June 30, 1933, at the age of fifty-seven, he retired from his post after fourteen years of invaluable service and was succeeded by M. Joseph Avenol.

Shortly thereafter Baldwin appointed Sir Eric British Ambassador to Rome. In 1937, on the death of his brother, he became the sixteenth Earl of Perth. His task in 1938 was to assist Il Duce in carrying to a conclusion the work of demolition which had been so successfully begun. If he ever felt qualms of conscience or twinges of regret, if he ever experienced any sense of loyalty to the dream of a new world order which he had helped to implement or any pang of grief that he should make himself the instrument of the betrayal of Wilson's vision, he kept his sentiments closely concealed in his diplomatic dispatch-case and his tightly rolled umbrella. His was not to reason why. To the end he was the perfect bureaucrat.²⁷

On February 23, 1938, three days after Eden's resignation, Perth gave the Fascist salute as he boarded a train in Rome. He conferred at length in London with Chamberlain and Halifax and returned to Cæsar's city on March 6. After Ciano had concluded consultations with Josef Beck, he met Perth on the 8th and fixed the agenda of the discussion. Rome and Berlin had already "accepted" the British plan for the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. Italy had reaffirmed her pledges of January 2, 1937. *Anschluss* was a distraction but not an interruption. The sweep of Franco's forces towards the sea encouraged hope for a speedy Fascist victory on the peninsula. On St. Patrick's Day Sir Eric gave thanks to the saint who had cleansed Ireland of snakes and perhaps to the Caudillo who was cleansing Spain of "Bolshevism." The cleansing was indeed well on its way. On St. Patrick's Day German and Italian bombers raided Barcelona twelve times within twenty-four hours: 512 men, 245 women, 118 girls, boys, and babies died. The mangled bodies were laid out in long rows in the morgues. The white and bloody faces of the children were frozen in fear and uncomprehending wonder. In New York Patrick Cardinal Hayes, in his first formal press conference in seven years, publicly prayed for Franco's victory.²⁸ In Rome Sir Eric and Count Ciano amiably continued their discussions.

While the Fascist party praised the Italian legionnaires in Spain as "an essential factor in victory," Perth met Ciano for the fifth time on March 23. Three days later they met again—with many meetings

thereafter. No minutes of the negotiations were published and no communiqués issued. But by April 1 it was intimated that an accord had been reached.²⁹ Chamberlain had no thought of "breaking" the Rome-Berlin axis. As a "realist," he knew that the axis was unbreakable despite the strain put upon it by *Anschluss*. Its durability was due to the Tory policy of appeasement. Since Il Duce had successfully wrested much from Britain by acting alone, it was clear that he could wrest more with German support behind him. On April 8 Chamberlain in Birmingham reaffirmed his refusal to pledge Britain to the defense of others. Halifax in Bristol declared that "only harm is done by the perpetual use of the right of the Opposition to hurl provocative language at those responsible for the government of other countries."

On April 15 Franco's forces reached the sea at Vinaroz, thereby cutting Catalonia off from the rest of republican Spain. On Saturday, April 16, at 6.30 p.m., Perth and Ciano attached their signatures to a series of documents under a glare of arc lights in the Hall of Victory of the Palazzo Chigi. At the same time Mr. and Mrs. Chamberlain, having spent a week-end the previous fortnight at Cliveden, began an Easter holiday in the north of Scotland as guests of Lord and Lady Londonderry. All was right with the world. God was in His heaven. Hitler was in Berchtesgaden, contemplating his coming birthday. The Fascist, Nazi, and Tory press were alike in a joyous mood. The London *Sunday Pictorial* carried a bold headline "NO BAD NEWS!"—"While millions of people forgot their worries and went out to be happy, Britain and Italy were shaking hands. . . . All Europe welcomed it. The tension of two dangerous years is relieved."

The complex agreement of April 16 will be found in the appendices of this volume.³⁰ Chamberlain and Mussolini exchanged congratulatory telegrams. The Ciano-Perth letters on Spain constituted an abandonment of British insistence on the withdrawal of Italian volunteers, since they pledged Rome to evacuate only *after* "the termination of the Spanish civil war." Perth specified, however, that "a settlement of the Spanish question" was "a prerequisite of entry into force" of the agreement. But Britain would take steps at Geneva to bring about general recognition of Italian title to Ethiopia. Italy would reduce effectives in Libya to peace strength and would become a party to the naval treaty of March 25, 1936. A "good neighbor" agreement between Britain, Italy, and Egypt provided for the suppression of border raids and efforts of deserters and refugees to organize armed bands. London and Cairo would thus prevent Ethiopians in the Sudan, British

Somaliland, or Kenya from crossing the frontier to oppose Italian control of their native land. Boundaries would be defined. Information would be exchanged on the distribution of military, naval, and air forces and bases in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Mediterranean, and Africa south to 7° latitude (running through Tanganyika) and west to 20° longitude (the Corfu-Libya line). Both signatories would respect the integrity and independence of Yemen and Saudi Arabia and would act to prevent any third Power from acquiring sovereignty or privileges within these States or in any islands of the Red Sea. They would use their good offices to keep peace between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and thwart any outside intervention. Britain here granted Italy a position of equality in Arabia. The two Arab kingdoms became, for all practical purposes, joint Anglo-Italian protectorates. In return Rome recognized London's protectorate over Hadramaut, the vast desert hinterland of Aden, and reaffirmed British water rights in Lake Tana. Hostile propaganda would be eschewed. Italy would not enroll Ethiopians for military service aside from local policing and defense and would grant British missionaries access to Italian East Africa. Both Powers reaffirmed the Suez convention of October 29, 1888, for unrestricted use of the Canal at all times.

Chamberlain and Mussolini thus made a compact of which the victims were to be Ethiopia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and the League of Nations. A Spanish "settlement" was expected forthwith. Franco announced that the war was won on April 19. But since the defeated loyalists were not gentlemen enough to recognize their defeat, the conflict went on. Henceforth Italian intervention on behalf of Franco had the express sanction of Downing Street. Rome intimated that the pledge not to employ African natives for European military service depended upon a similar pledge from France (Italian East Africa had a population of less than 10,000,000; France's African colonies had almost 40,000,000 inhabitants). Rome's assent to a reduction of troops in Libya was a termination of blackmail. Indeed, most of the Italian commitments were pledges to desist from threats which might at any time be easily renewed. Britain pledged itself to do things (e.g. permit Fascist victory in Spain, recognize the conquest of Ethiopia, and concede Italian rights in Arabia) which, once done, could not be undone.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Quai d'Orsay was consulted about the details of the accord before signature. London made it clear that it expected Paris to follow its example. Paris was willing.

Georges Bonnet was Foreign Minister in Édouard Daladier's "anti-Red" Cabinet. By May the franc had fallen to thirty-four to the dollar. France was Britain's vassal. Ciano received Chargé Jules Blondel on April 19. On the same day President Roosevelt declared that "this government has seen the conclusion of an [Anglo-Italian] agreement with sympathetic interest because it is proof of the value of peaceful negotiation."³¹ On April 20 Czechoslovakia recognized Italian title to Ethiopia. (Fascist gratitude for this gesture would be forthcoming in September in impassioned pleas by Il Duce for the complete partition of the Czech Republic.) British War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha visited Rome on April 23 and conferred with Mussolini and Ciano. Rome and London pressed Paris to seal the Pyrenees frontier to ensure Fascist victory in Spain. Paris yielded.

On April 27 Daladier and Bonnet went to London to be told what French policy should be. After seven hours of conferences and much talk of welding the London-Paris axis into an "alliance," a communiqué was issued on April 29. It asserted that the Ministers had examined the results of the Ciano-Perth accord:

The French Ministers approved this contribution to European appeasement. The British Ministers for their part expressed hope that conversations which the French Government have just opened with the Italian Government would lead to equally satisfactory results.

Hope was expressed also that Mediterranean appeasement would lead to withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. As for Central Europe the two governments "found themselves in general agreement on action which could most usefully be undertaken with a view of assuring peaceful and just solutions of the problem." The Far East and the forthcoming meeting of the League Council were likewise discussed. "The two governments decided to continue as far as may be necessary contacts between their general staffs which were agreed upon by virtue of the London exchange of letters of March 19, 1936." "It was recognized once again that Great Britain and France are bound to one another by a close community of interests" and that they must "continue to develop their policy of consultation and collaboration for defense not only of their common interests but also of those ideals of national and international life which have united their two countries."³²

On May 2, 1938, Chamberlain showered praise on Il Duce and declared that a "settlement in Spain" could not yet be defined. Commons approved the Rome accord, 316 to 108. On the same day Hitler

arrived in Rome to return Mussolini's visit of the preceding September. No new agreements were announced. No revealing communiqués were issued. But there was a fiesta. Der Führer brought with him Ribbentrop, Göbbels, Hess, Frank, Himmler, Lammers, Meissner, Bohle, Keitel, and others. Mussolini trained his legions in the goose-step and rechristened it the *passo Romano*, much as Hitler long before had copied the Fascist salute and called it the "German greeting." All alien Jews in the Eternal City were banished or jailed. All houses, roofs, yards, and sewers were searched for weapons. No less than 46,000 plain-clothes men were brought in to guard and cheer the visitors. Along the new triumphal way from the railroad station to the King's palace the vast ruins of ancient Rome and huge new symbols of Fascismo and Nationalsocialism were floodlighted and embellished with flags and banners. Columns of red fire flamed in every archway of the Colosseum as Hitler drove by with the King-Emperor of Italy. Dinners, lunches, receptions, and speeches reaffirmed the solidarity of the Cæsars. Hitler departed on May 9. He visited Florence and was greeted at the Brenner by Seyss-Inquart. In Berlin half a million people hailed his return amid fireworks. Göring declared that the axis was now "steel" and that it was "a dispensation of the almighty gods that two such mighty statesmen should have met in a friendship destined to be everlasting."

As the festivities ended in Rome, a funeral began in Geneva: the 101st meeting of the League Council. The new task assigned to the League by Perth and Ciano was to give League sanction to the League's betrayal. British solicitude for correctness required that Geneva approve the final interment of Ethiopia. On April 11 Downing Street had requested that the agenda include the "clarification" of "the anomalous situation" presented by the fact that some States had recognized the Italian conquest while others had not. The objective was to scrap the "Stimson Doctrine" resolution of March 11, 1932, and thereby prepare the way for the execution of the Ciano-Perth accord. In a pathetic effort to avert the inevitable, Haile Selassie protested Greek and Turkish recognition of Italy's title and, on April 29, made a "token payment" of 10,000 Swiss francs to the Secretariat on Ethiopia's defaulted dues. Anglo-French efforts to exclude Ato Tazaz, spokesman for the Negus, failed. He was supported by distinguished advisers, including Norman Angell, James Brierly, and Herbert Stanley Jevons. Though ill and weary, Haile Selassie came in person on May 11. On the 12th a tragic debate took place. Halifax asserted:

We must not be afraid to face the facts squarely. . . . When, as here, two ideals are in conflict—on the one hand the ideal of devotion, unflinching but unpractical, to some high purpose; on the other hand the ideal of a practical victory for peace—I cannot doubt that the stronger claim is that of peace. . . . Nothing is gained and much may be lost by refusal to face facts. Great as is the League of Nations, the ends it exists to serve are greater than itself and the greatest of those ends is peace. . . .

Haile Selassie answered:

The Ethiopian people, to whom all assistance was refused, are climbing alone their path to Calvary. No humiliation has been spared the victim of aggression. All resources and procedures have been tried with a view to excluding Ethiopia from the League as the aggressor demands. . . . Will law win as against force? Or force as against law? . . . Many Powers threatened with aggression and feeling their weakness have abandoned Ethiopia. They have uttered the cry of panic and rout: "Everyone for himself." . . . The excuse of these weak peoples is their very weakness. It is a certainty that they would be abandoned as Ethiopia has been and between the two evils they have chosen one which the fear of aggression led them to consider the lesser. May God forgive them. . . .

I am of course aware that in justification of the action it has taken the British Government urges lofty preoccupations. . . . But there are different ways to maintain peace. There is the maintenance of peace through right and there is peace at any price. Ethiopia firmly believes that the League has no freedom of choice in this matter. It would be committing suicide if after having been created to maintain peace through right it were to abandon that principle and adopt instead the principle of peace at any price, even the price of immolation of a member State at the feet of its aggressor.

The Council abided by the choice it had already made: suicide. Halifax failed to obtain a formal resolution. But Council President Wilhelm Munters of Latvia announced that "the great majority of members feel, despite regrets, that it is for individual members to decide as they choose." Four delegations objected: New Zealand, Bolivia, China, and the USSR. Unanimity was lacking. Rumor held

that Halifax contemplated resigning—whether from disgust at failure or from shame at his mission no one knew. But if he thought of it, he thought better of it. Downing Street held that Munters's announcement was sufficient to justify recognition.

Before the Council adjourned on May 14, other developments at Geneva followed the pattern of panic and rout. Wellington Koo's petition for aid to China led to an empty resolution "earnestly urging" members to carry out the vague pledges of October and February. No aid was forthcoming. Another resolution (China and the USSR abstaining) granted Swiss demands for absolute neutrality and a release from all sanctions obligations. When the Council ignored Augustin Edward's demand that all coercive provisions be deleted from the Covenant, Chile gave notice of withdrawal from the League.³³ Alvarez del Vayo, at the close of an able speech, offered a resolution which recalled the Assembly resolution of October 4, 1937, and invited the members to end the policy of "non-intervention." Halifax was furious. Bonnet was pained. The meeting was adjourned to permit of secret discussions. Bonnet urged Vayo to withdraw a resolution. He refused. Bonnet phoned Daladier. He then voted against Vayo's motion, though France and Britain had supported the October resolution of which the motion was but a corollary. The British, Polish, and Rumanian representatives joined him. Only Litvinov and Vayo voted for it. The other nine members abstained.³⁴

The shame of Bonnet—bald, beak-nosed politician concerned chiefly with keeping his post—was the shame of France. The French-Italian negotiations stumbled. Il Duce declared at Genoa May 14: "The Stresa Front is dead and buried. . . . [In Spain] Italy and France are on opposite sides of the barricades." Paris expressed "surprise." Rome threatened Tunis. Moscow warned the Quai d'Orsay of desertion if it aided Mussolini to conquer Spain. Daladier declared on May 19: "France is fully capable of assuring the inviolability of her frontiers and her empire by herself."

On May 26 the "non-intervention" Committee accepted a plan for counting and evacuating volunteers from Spain, to be accompanied by restoration of border controls and followed by the grant of belligerent rights. "Progress" was rendered difficult by efforts of Fascist planes to cut off all supplies to the loyalists by bombing French railroad centers (Cerbère, May 26, and Orlu, June 5) and by attacking British and French shipping in Spanish ports. Downing Street protested futilely to Burgos. British opinion was aroused, but the

Cabinet declared the situation to be very "complex." Halifax resumed his vacation. Chamberlain went fishing.

In celebrating solidarity with Franco, Rome hailed Malaga, Guadalajara (!), Bilbao, Santander, and Tortosa as Italian victories. The Fascist press admitted Italian casualties in Spain larger than those suffered by the Italian troops which had conquered Ethiopia. Rome pressed London to press Paris to seal the frontier. London complied. Paris complied. Rome pressed London to hasten a "settlement" in Spain in order to put the April accord into effect. On June 21 the non-intervention Powers once more accepted the British plan while Downing Street ignored new bombings of British vessels. Bomb-shattered Barcelona threatened on June 23 to bomb "the points from which the raiders come." But it took no action. By the end of June thirty-six British seamen had been killed and fifty-nine British vessels bombed. Chamberlain and Perth appealed to Mussolini, who promised to exercise "discreet influence" on Franco. Hodgson returned to London for consultation on June 30. Chamberlain asserted on July 7 that he would run no risks of war to protect "profit-seekers" in the Spanish trade.

"Non-intervention" culminated in a new formula approved by the London Committee on July 5, 1938. This formula was a long-delayed realization of the British proposal of July 15, 1937. In its fantastic and futile complexity it was the Committee's masterpiece. It consisted of 196 paragraphs, spread over 80 pages of fine print. An "International Board for Non-Intervention in Spain," working through two commissions, would supervise the withdrawal of volunteers at the rate of 1,000 per day from the side having fewest and 1,000 plus X from the other in proportion to the total number. The volunteers must first be counted by the commissions. "On the hundred and first day the Commissions will begin the task prescribed in paragraph 48 below of verifying that no foreign volunteers remain unevacuated, and the Commissions will submit to the Board for the International Committee their reports of verification not later than the one hundred and forty-ninth day after the final adoption of the Resolution referred to in paragraph 17 above." An elaborate schedule of activities was prescribed up to the 164th day. Each Commission would have a staff of seventeen. Details, definitions, costs were set forth minutely: 64,000 volunteers would cost £1,220,000 to evacuate; 136,000 would cost £1,460,000; intermediate numbers would cost intermediate amounts. Two funds would be set up. Britain, France, Italy, and

Germany would pay monthly installments, set out in detail. Belligerent rights would be granted when "substantial progress" had been achieved and when 10,000 volunteers should have been evacuated from the side having fewest and "when a proportionately larger number of foreign volunteers have been similarly evacuated from the Spanish party found by the Joint Commission . . . to have the larger number of foreign volunteers" (§ 192, p. 79).⁸⁵

The fate of this proposal was droll. Burgos was silent. Barcelona accepted in principle, but charged that Rome was sending new aid to the rebels. Rome boasted that Italian airmen had shot down 580 loyalist planes since the beginning of the war. Chargé Jules Blondel called upon Ciano on August 9 to assure him that no French aid was reaching the Barcelona government, either officially or unofficially. He protested against reports to the contrary in the Fascist press and against Rome's recent decision to refuse passports to Italians wishing to visit France. Blum demanded pressure on Italy to end aid to Franco. On Sunday, August 7, less than two weeks after Chamberlain had assured Commons that Italy had "kept faith," Chargé Sir Noel Charles called Ciano's attention to the difficulties Paris was experiencing in meeting criticism of its "closed frontier" policy in view of reports of additional Italian aid to the rebels. Ciano smiled blandly.

The full measure of Fascist contempt for Anglo-French diplomacy was revealed when Franco rejected the London plan. The rebel reply was apparently submitted to Sir Robert Hodgson for transmission to the Committee on August 17, but not made public in London until the 25th. As token of its desire "to offer the world obvious proof of its effective collaboration in the laudable efforts of the Committee," Burgos agreed to the withdrawal of 10,000 "volunteers"—subject to *equal* (not proportionate) evacuations from each side and a *prior* (not subsequent) grant of belligerent rights. It also consented "as an extraordinary concession" to respect two safety ports in the enemy zone for vessels carrying foodstuffs. This was offered as proof of a "generous attitude toward foreign commerce" and of "the lofty humanitarian ideals which animate the National Government." But its right to search foreign ships and draw up its own contraband list must be unconditionally recognized. Proportionate withdrawal was said to present difficulties which would "emasculate and sterilize the proposal." The enemy could not be trusted to refrain from "dishonest" practices. Even equal withdrawals would require additional guarantees "in order to avoid the aims pursued developing

into a farce." Spain's land frontiers should be unconditionally closed. But it would be impracticable or intolerable to permit observers in ports or airdromes. "National Spain is fighting for the defense of Western civilization in a heroic and victorious war. . . . It solemnly reiterates its former affirmations that it is fighting for the greatness and independence of the country and does not consent, and will never consent, to the slightest mortgage on its soil, or on its economic life, and that it will defend at all times, to the last handful, its territory, its protectorates and its colonies, if anyone dares to make an attempt against them." ³⁶

There is no reason to suppose that Franco or his supporters believed that this rejoinder had the slightest chance of acceptance by the loyalists or by any of the non-British or non-Fascist members of the London Committee. It was intended to scuttle the whole project of withdrawing volunteers by resuming protracted "negotiations" under the ægis of Downing Street while new Italian aid should be rushed to the stalemated rebel armies. This hope was not disappointed. Lord Plymouth conferred at once with Foreign Office officials. Berlin and Rome lavished praise on the rebel reply. London intimated that its regret would not be allowed to interfere with Anglo-Italian "friendship" despite further postponement of a Spanish "settlement." New British queries were met in Rome with an admission that fresh Italian troops and war supplies were going to Spain. But the supplies were necessary for the provisioning of the forces already there. They could obviously not be abandoned. Had not London agreed in April that they should remain until the end of the war? The new troops were not reinforcements, merely "replacements." Downing Street toyed with the notion of summoning the Non-Intervention Committee, abandoned it, and finally suggested that Secretary Hemming might go to Spain—to "explain" the plan in more detail to Franco, to "discuss" the rebel reply with Burgos, to urge "compromise," to . . . ? But by this time the Spanish tragedy and the London comedy had alike been superseded by a new and world-shattering crisis in Central Europe.

3. DEATH OVER PRAHA

When the petrifacts of man harmonize with the contours of nature, when they incarnate in line and color the cultural unity of diverse

ages and peoples, they become music and poetry in stone. Such a city was the ancient capital of the Kingdom of Bohemia, eloquent with the ancestral echoes of the centuries. Such a city was the modern capital of Czechoslovakia, vibrant with the songs of today's generation and tomorrow's children. Along the banks of the Vltava, with its foaming blue waters rushing northward toward the Elbe, grew a graceful town of domes and spires, blended of bizarre Gothic towers and baroque or rococo palaces and churches. Beyond the Charles Bridge, a structure at once suggestive of a fortress, a fairyland, and a place of worship, rose the crowning hill of the Hradcany with its great castle overlooking the sea of roofs and enclosing the mighty cathedral of St. Vitus. Here in picturesque accents spoke long epochs of peace and strife, stretching from the dim past of piety and persecution to what once promised to be a future of freedom and faith.

This city—Praha to the Bohemians, Prague to the Germans—lies in the center of a plain, ringed on the east by the Adlergebirge and the Riesengebirge of the Sudeten chain, on the north and northwest by the Erzgebirge, and on the west and southwest by the Böhmerwald. The southeast lies open toward the plains of Moravia and Slovakia. Into this basin in the age of the great migrations came the westernmost of the Slavic peoples, the Bohemians or Czechs, with their simpler brethren, the Slovaks, hard behind them. Into this basin between the ninth and the thirteenth centuries came Germans from the north. This medieval Teutonic backwash against Slavdom—constituting the original *Drang nach Osten*—flowed eastward in three parallel streams. Poland lay between the Prussian and the Silesian channels. Bohemia lay between Silesia and the Ostmark. Germans were welcomed to the cities of Bohemia as merchants and artisans. Other Germans, later called "Sudetens," settled as farmers or townsmen in an irregular fringe of territory just within the mountain walls.

The Bohemian kings were also electors of the Holy Roman Empire. Teutons and Slavs lived most of the time in peace under their rule. In the days of the Hussite wars, Czechs pushed Germans back toward the ring of highlands. In the sixteenth century Germans again pressed in upon Czechs. But it was only rarely that the two groups fell afoul of one another. So long as Bohemia was an independent kingdom the relationships between Czech majority and German minority were never relationships of domination and oppression. At times the rulers in the Hradcany wielded power far beyond the chains of mountains around the plains. Under Wenceslaus II (1278–1305) the Bohemian

Crown embraced most of what is now Poland and all of Hungary, including Transylvania, the Banat, Croatia, and Slovenia. Charles IV (1346-71) ruled Silesia, part of Bavaria, and the Mark of Brandenburg including Potsdam and Berlin. But none of the German princes to the north ever extended their sway into Bohemia. The Sudetens for long centuries were subjects of the Bohemian kings. But they never became subjects of the sovereigns of Bavaria, Saxony, or Prussia.

In 1526, however, the Bohemian Crown passed to the Habsburgs. And in 1618 there began in Bohemia the bloody strife between Catholicism and Protestantism which was to continue for thirty years and lay much of Central Europe in ruins. When Czech Protestantism was crushed at the White Mountain at the outset of the conflict, Bohemian independence perished with it. The plain became part of Austria, with the ancient mountain frontier becoming in the nineteenth century the border between the new German Reich and the Dual Monarchy. Vienna governed Bohemia and Moravia. Budapest governed Slovakia and Ruthenia. The Austrians were gentler in their rule than the Magyars, but in both cases the Slavs became subject peoples.

Political resurrection came during the First World War. Émigré patriots formed the Czechoslovak National Council, which in 1918 became the provisional government of a republic not yet born, but recognized by the Allies and dependent for birth upon Allied victory. Its foundations were laid in an agreement signed at Cleveland (May 26, 1915) between representatives of the Council and the Slovak Associations of America, a convention signed at Pittsburgh (May 30, 1918), and a resolution at Geneva (November 11, 1918) voted by the first Czechoslovak Government. At the Paris Peace Conference, Slovakia and Ruthenia were separated from Hungary and awarded to Prague. A new frontier was drawn between Czechoslovakia and Austria. No German territory was annexed by the new State, save a tiny area near Teschen in Upper Silesia, disputed between Berlin, Warsaw, and Prague. Some of the Sudeten leaders raised their voices for retention of Austrian rule. A few looked longingly to the German Republic. Robert Lansing, among others, opposed their incorporation into Czechoslovakia. Despite the views of the Quai d'Orsay and the French General Staff, even some Czechs doubted the wisdom of retaining all the Sudetens in the new Bohemia. But their economic life was inseparably linked with that of the Czechs. Czechoslovakia, moreover, would be a geographically integrated and defensible State only

within its historic mountain frontiers. Hence the old borders were allowed to stand. The Sudetens, who had for three centuries been ruled from Vienna, thus became subjects of Prague once more as they had been for five centuries before 1618.³⁷

The tale of the establishment and the development of the Czechoslovak Republic has been too often told to need retelling here.³⁸ Despite Nazi mendacity and Tory misrepresentation in the year of doom, the devotion of the new rulers in the Hradcany to the ideals of liberalism stood out in Central Europe as a shining beacon amid a rising sea of intolerance and oppression. After 1933 Czechoslovakia remained an island of democracy with all of its neighbors in one fashion or another engulfed by the cults of the new Cæsars. Its leaders and its people remained true to the liberal faith, both in the conduct of their internal affairs and in their foreign policy. They looked to the creed of Wilson and to the great Western democracies for the pattern of their political practice. They looked to Geneva, to the Quai d'Orsay, and to Downing Street for security and leadership in the establishment of an ordered community of nations. If in the end they were undone through treason at home and betrayal abroad, the cause lay in the circumstances that their State was small and weak in a world of giants, and they lived in a Europe in which the wages of brutality and violence were power and the wages of generosity and tolerance were death.

Three men led the Czechoslovaks to independence. None was a demagogue or dictator. All were scholars and gentlemen of humble birth. The first Czechoslovak Government, established abroad in October 1918, was headed by Milan Stefanik, Thomas Masaryk, and Eduard Benes. On October 18 Masaryk formally proclaimed the independence of Czechoslovakia in Washington. He became its President, with Dr. Kramar as Premier, Benes as Foreign Minister, and Stefanik, a Slovak leader who had long lived in France, as Minister of War. Stefanik, who spent the closing months of the year of liberation with the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia, was killed in a plane crash in May 1919 on his return to his native Slovakia. Masaryk and Benes represented the Republic at the Paris Peace Conference.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was the son of a coachman and a cook. He survived apprenticeship to a locksmith and a blacksmith and embarked upon an academic career. His first book was a sociological study: *Suicide as a Mass Phenomenon*. He became a professor in Prague and married an American girl, Charlotte Garrigue, whom he

met in Leipzig and whose name he adopted as his own. He repeatedly jeopardized his academic career by championing unpopular causes. He was assailed as a champion of the Jews, an enemy of the State, a non-Christian, and a free-lover. He continued, often at personal risk, to expose falsehood and to champion justice and truth. These qualities, coupled with a brilliant mind, carried him far. He taught among other places at the University of Chicago and later became a warm admirer of Woodrow Wilson. His political career began at an age when most men have retired from active life. He was sixty-eight when Czechoslovakia became independent. For seventeen years he served the Republic as President. He retired in December 1935 at the age of eighty-five. At his funeral on September 21, 1937, President Benes expressed the feeling of all who knew him: "As we think of that great life, a life so abundantly full, a life which covered nearly a whole century, we think of the amazing wealth of intellectual work and of achievement that it represented, we reflect upon the sense of that great life's pilgrimage, and slowly into our hearts there enters calm, clarity, certainty, firmness, and pride."³⁹

Masaryk's successor as President of Czechoslovakia was he who for seventeen years had been Foreign Minister of the new State. Eduard Benes, born in Kozlany, May 28, 1884, was the child (youngest of ten) of a Bohemian peasant family. He met Masaryk at the University of Prague in 1904. He later studied at the Sorbonne and *l'École libre des Sciences Politiques*. During the war he remained in Paris. If Masaryk was Plato's philosopher-king of Czechoslovak independence, Benes was the practical diplomat and administrator. If Masaryk demonstrated that a philosopher can be a politician and still remain an honest man, Benes demonstrated that a politician can be a diplomat without selling his soul. "I never feel sure of myself except when I am speaking the truth." Benes spoke truth. But he and his State came at last to grief and he went alone and unwept into exile, to follow Masaryk's earlier steps to America and to the University of Chicago. This final pilgrimage away from the tomb of his hopes and toward a new shrine of freedom was necessitated by the fact that the Europe which he had served so well had become a citadel of falsehood.⁴⁰

Among these falsehoods was the legend, sedulously cultivated in Tory and Nazi circles, that Czechoslovakia was "a monstrosity of a country" made up of incongruous nationalities with Czechs oppressing subject peoples and the whole "owned by Moscow" (Lord Rothmere to Wickham Steed, August 10, 1938). Neither the mendaci-

ties of aggression nor the rationalizations of betrayal could alter the truth which Masaryk, Benes, and their countrymen served with unwavering loyalty. At the request of the Quai d'Orsay Czechoslovakia had concluded alliances with France, Rumania, and Jugoslavia, and, following the French example, a mutual assistance pact with the USSR. Prague trusted Paris, as Moscow trusted Paris. Prague and Moscow fulfilled their obligations. Paris did not. All trusted London, even after London had proved unworthy of trust. No less an authority than Lord Halifax could say in a moment of post-mortem candor: "If only Great Britain would say clearly and unmistakably for all to hear that she would resist any unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia, no such unprovoked aggression would be made" (House of Lords, October 3, 1938). Chamberlain and Halifax refused such a pledge on March 24, 1938, and refused it thereafter because those for whom they spoke desired Czechoslovakia's ruin at the hands of Hitler. The Republic was betrayed not by its leaders nor by its people nor by Moscow nor even by the Third Reich, but by the apostles of "appeasement" who fashioned the Tory-Nazi entente.

Prague's treatment of the non-Czechoslovak peoples within the Republic was, without qualification or exception, the most generous and the most democratic accorded by any of the States of Europe, new or old, to the minorities under their control. As in Poland, the minority peoples totaled a third of the whole population. Among 14,480,000 inhabitants in 1930, the Czechs and Slovaks numbered 9,689,000 (66.9%), the Sudeten Germans 3,232,000 (22.3%), the Hungarians 692,000 (4.7%), the Ruthenians 549,000 (3.7%) and the Poles 82,000 (0.5%).⁴¹ Since the new State was unitary, not federal, the Slovaks did not receive the measure of autonomy which some of their leaders believed them to be entitled to under the Pittsburgh agreement. The Ruthenians grumbled little since their lot was infinitely better than that of their co-linguists in Poland and Rumania. Some Poles preferred Warsaw to Prague, while some Hungarians yearned for reunion with Budapest. The Sudetens had never been ruled from Berlin, nor is there any reason to believe, even at the end, that a majority of them voluntarily aspired to annexation by the Reich. All these peoples, almost alone among the minorities of Europe, enjoyed full rights of citizenship and suffrage, equality before the law, freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and their own schools, churches, and cultural institutions. Over a period of twenty years all honest and informed observers concurred in Anthony Eden's judg-

ment of October 3, 1938: "There is no German minority in Central or Eastern Europe that is enjoying today privileges equal to those the Sudeten Germans always had." ⁴²

The genesis of Czechoslovakia's doom must be sought not in the "injustices" of Versailles nor in the "grievances" of "oppressed" Sudetens, but in Nazi Pan-Germanism and the *Drang nach Osten* and in the program of Downing Street and Cliveden. For the rulers of the Third Reich, Czechs and Slovaks were but "Eastern European sub-humanity" beyond the pale of "Aryan" justice and "Nordic" law. A divine mission summoned Der Führer to enslave Bohemia as he had destroyed Austria. Said Herr Frank, Minister of Justice, in 1935: "We are under the great obligation of recognizing as a holy work of the spirit of our folk the laws signed with Adolf Hitler's name. Hitler has received his authority from God. Therefore he is a champion, sent by God, of German Right in the world." ⁴³ The fulfillment of the mission was possible only with British collaboration. With patience and shrewdness and Tory aid, all things were possible. Thus Göbbels:

It is not only natural, but necessary, that the nation's leaders should watch jealously that national forces of our country remain united at a time—of which we believe that the rare moment has come—in which the world is being redistributed. It is necessary to proceed cleverly. A good chess-player moves cautiously. There are problems which cannot be circumvented. They will be solved some day, as, for example, the fact that Germany is the only Great Power without colonies. It is not possible to say when, just as little as one could say when Austria would be incorporated, or the Rhineland occupied. All this takes place step by step at a time when we run the least possible risks. . . . The risks become smaller the more powerful we become. . . . A competition has arisen with the definite intention of competing for the wreath of victory and to demand and regain the place in the sun which we lost by our stupidity.⁴⁴

The instrument of Nazi imperialism in Czechoslovakia was the *Sudeten Deutsche Partei* (SDP). This late creation was the residuary legatee of various Sudeten factions. In 1919 both the German bourgeois party groups, favoring secession, and the German Social Democrats, favoring autonomy, refused to take part in the government at Prague. But in 1922 the bourgeois groups split into "Negativists"

(Nationalists and Nazis) and "Activists" (Agrarians and Christian Socialists), with the latter prepared to co-operate in the Czechoslovak Cabinet and parliament. In 1925 the Activists polled 900,000 votes in the Sudeten districts and the Negativists only 240,000. The Activists joined the Cabinet in October 1926. When the Christian Socialists withdrew four years later, the German Social Democrats replaced them. Thus the great majority of the Sudeten voters, prior to the onset of the Great Depression, supported the parties committed to loyal collaboration with non-German groups within the framework of the Republic.⁴⁵

In view of the fact that political fanaticism is a product of insecurity, it is scarcely strange that the peripheral or marginal members of social groups are more addicted to extremism than those securely at its center. Neither is it remarkable that impoverishment and despair breed revolutionary hysteria. The name and many of the symbols of "National-socialism" originated in pre-War Bohemia among the borderland Sudetens who were more ardent Pan-Germans than were the Austrians or Prussians. After 1919 many of them hotly resented their new lot. They were at no time exploited or oppressed, but the tactlessness of Prague in the first flush of recovered independence did not assuage their indignation. Since the Sudeten towns were dependent for prosperity on international markets, they suffered severe hardships from the world-wide economic collapse after 1929. Their distress was no worse than that of the depressed areas of England or that of many American industrial centers. They enjoyed access to public funds and to work-relief projects along with the other peoples of the Republic, though distribution was based upon the size of the minorities rather than upon the amount of unemployment prevailing among them. Many Sudetens attributed their sufferings to the Czechs, as many Germans attributed theirs to Jews, Marxists, liberals, or Frenchmen. Misery reduced the ranks of the Activists and swelled those of the Negativists. This trend was accelerated after the Nazi conquest of the Reich.

On October 1, 1934, Konrad Henlein, chief of the Sudeten *Turnverband*, issued a manifesto asking support for a United German Party. This hitherto obscure leader had organized a *Heimatsfront* in October 1933 after the "voluntary" dissolution and outlawry of the NSDAP in Czechoslovakia. He was smooth-faced, bespectacled, bourgeois, and scarcely a Messiah. This somewhat dull and plodding war veteran and bank clerk had accepted an appointment as a gymnas-

tic instructor in the Reichenberg *Turnverein* and, by virtue of administrative skill, had become head of the association of German gymnast societies, which had long been hotbeds of ultra-nationalism and anti-Semitism in rivalry with the liberal Czech *Sokol* organization. In the national election of May 1935 the *Heimatsfront* took the name of SDP and won 60% of the Sudeten vote. Henlein refused to be a candidate, but he now had 44 deputies in parliament, constituting the second largest single party in a legislature of many small groups.⁴⁶

Henlein first met Hitler at the Olympic games of 1936. Their relations were not then cordial. Henlein's demands for autonomy were, at least at the outset, genuine demands for self-government within the established frontiers of the Republic. His supporters were in part sincere converts and in part neutral or even hostile persons won to lip-service by the kinds of pressures upon doubters which Nazi organizers were adept at applying. The Little Führer's voyage from loyal advocacy of autonomy to pretended advocacy as a mask for Hitler and finally to open treason (September 15, 1938) proceeded by gradual and secret stages.⁴⁷ He was much irritated at an agreement of February 18, 1937, between the German Activists and Premier Milan Hodza, whereby most of the Sudeten demands were granted, at least on paper. He proposed that each nationality be organized into a National Corporation on totalitarian principles. This move, however, alienated some of his followers, as did the homosexual scandal and suicide of his aide, Herr Rutha. How many of his followers desired that which he never publicly hinted at until the late spring of 1938—secession and annexation to the Reich? How many followed out of fear? How many took the SDP program of "autonomy" at face value? How many followed without reason but merely for the joy of cheering and marching along with their fellows? These questions admit of no answer. By the time of Austrian *Anschluss* Henlein was already in the habit of making frequent visits to the Reich. What plans were laid, what plots were hatched, no outsider could say. But the SDP had in fact become what its outlawed predecessor had been: a camouflaged *Gau* of the NSDAP, directed from Berlin through the Foreign Organization under Ernst Wilhelm Bohle. As such it was an instrument of propaganda, espionage, and potential rebellion to serve the purposes of the Third Reich.

Henlein had long had friends in London, including Sir Robert Vansittart. To many influential Britons he seemed to be a sincere and honest spokesman of "self-determination." These contacts were es-

tablished before Henlein made his peace with Hitler by becoming a secret protagonist of Sudeten secession. They were continued after the bargain was struck. They played no inconsiderable role in implementing the Tory-Nazi rapprochement. Henlein and Hitler were as shrewd as the Tory oligarchy in employing democratic catchwords to serve the purposes of anti-democratic *Machtpolitik*. A fortnight after Austria had been done to death in the name of "self-determination," and six months before the "Peace" of Munich, Major Astor's Geoffrey Dawson in *The Times* (March 22, 1938) foreshadowed the shape of things to come in Bohemia:

If we were to involve ourselves in war to preserve Czech sovereignty over these Germans, without first clearly ascertaining their wishes, we might well be fighting against the principle of self-determination. A dangerous situation thus exists, the remedy for which is to ascertain the wishes of the Sudeten Germans. The best means of doing this would be an international plebiscite, on the lines of that held in the Saar territory in January 1935.

Before the assault on Austria, Hodza told parliament (March 4): "If we are to be faced by the necessity of defending ourselves, Czechoslovakia will defend, defend, defend!" During the assault Prague remained passive. Göring and Neurath gave assurances that the Reich had no hostile designs. Chamberlain in Commons on March 24 declared: "His Majesty's Government take note of, and in no way under-rate, the definite assurances given by the German Government regarding their attitude." His refusal to pledge Britain to defense of Prague and his warning to Berlin not to resort to war could have (for Hitler) but one meaning: if Berlin would refrain from force, London would assist it to obtain what it desired without force. Der Führer appreciated that Chamberlain might require encouragement through threats of force. Such threats might at first be resented, but resentment would merely drive the Prime Minister to new pressure on Prague. Such threats would later be welcomed as a means of rendering pressure effective and convincing Paris and the British public that "concessions" were essential for "peace." "It is now widely taken for granted," wrote Sir Arthur Willert, "that, sooner or later, Germany will bring the Czechs under her thumb by indirect means. . . . The fate of Austria made European capitals less, rather than more, afraid of war. Why, it is asked, should Germany risk coming to blows when she is getting all she wants by bluff?" ⁴⁸

British Minister Basil Cochrane Newton reported to London on March 24 that Benes had received favorably informal British suggestions for "concessions." The German Christian Socialists withdrew from the Cabinet and, following the example of the German Agrarians, joined the SDP, which henceforth had 55 deputies and was the largest single party in the State. On the same day Father Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak reactionaries, demanded Slovak autonomy and asserted: "We are in the midst of a decisive struggle against internationalism and Bolshevism."⁴⁹ Four days later a French newspaper reported from Berlin that Germany would demand that Prague terminate its alliances with Paris and Moscow and grant autonomy to its German, Polish, and Hungarian minorities as a step toward annexation of the border areas by Berlin, Warsaw, and Budapest.⁵⁰ Hodza announced that his Cabinet would prepare a nationalities statute guaranteeing increased rights to all minorities. Berlin welcomed Lord Buxton's suggestion in the British press of a plebiscite to determine whether the Sudetens should accept autonomy, acquiesce in the status quo, or opt for annexation to the Reich. Journalists in London and Paris reported that official opinion in both capitals favored "autonomy" and "neutralization" for Czechoslovakia if only these steps would appease Berlin.⁵¹

Such a combination of pressures against the Republic encouraged Henlein to proceed with his program. While Paul-Boncour, on the eve of the fall of the Blum Cabinet, negotiated futilely with Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Moscow concerning the defense of Prague, Benes proclaimed an Easter amnesty in a vain hope of placating the Little Führer. On April 24, 20,000 Magyars demonstrated in Budapest for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in the name of "self-determination" and "defense against Bolshevism." On April 24, Henlein presented to an approving Congress of the SDP at Karlsbad a new program of demands:

1. Complete equality in the status of Sudeten Germans and Czechs.
2. Recognition of Sudetens as a corporative group.
3. Definition and recognition of Sudeten districts.
4. Autonomous administration of such districts in all departments of public life.
5. Legal protection for Sudetens living outside of Sudeten districts.
6. Removal of injustices inflicted since 1918 and reparation for damage caused thereby.
7. Recognition and enforcement of the principle: German officials in German districts.

8. Full liberty for Sudetens to profess German *Volkstum* and German *Weltanschauung*.⁵²

Henlein's speech at Karlsbad all but discarded the pretense that the SDP was still seeking autonomy. Amid threats and defiance, he demanded that Prague revise "the erroneous Czech historical myth," abandon all idea of a Slavic bulwark against the *Drang nach Osten*, and relinquish the French and Soviet alliances. *Anschluss* with the Reich was for the first time clearly hinted at. Göbbels' propaganda machine gave full support to Henlein's imperatives. The Vienna *Reichspost* (April 25) predicted that Czechoslovakia would not last another year. On April 27 a German Cabinet member told the press: "If the Czechs realized that France and England do not care to squander the life-blood of their soldiers for a foreign State, the Czechs too would settle matters with Germany by ceding the Sudeten regions."⁵³

After April 24 the central issue was whether Hitler would wait for Downing Street to wear down Czech and French resistance or would resort to force at once. The visit of Daladier and Bonnet to London at the end of April was followed by suggestions that the British and French Governments would do all in their power to induce Prague to adopt a course likely to forestall German intervention. Anglo-French "representations" were made at Prague and Berlin on April 30, but their purport was not revealed. On May 13 it was announced in Prague that Henlein had organized a "Stormtroop" corps of the SDP, to be known as the "*Freiwilliger Deutscher Schutzdienst*." It was announced in London on the same day that Baron Mount Temple had arranged for Henlein to visit the British capital.

Henlein's visit to London, May 13-14, 1938, is a curious episode in a drama of fear and threats. Thanks to the pleas of Minister Jan Masaryk, he was not received by any Cabinet member. He saw Sir Robert Vansittart and went to a tea party arranged by Laborite Harold Nicolson and attended by Cranborne. He spent three hours with Winston Churchill and Liberal leader Sir Archibald Sinclair, both of whom found him "moderate" in mood. All circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that the visit was arranged by inner circles in Berlin and London to convince the British Opposition of Henlein's "sincerity" and of the "justice" of the Sudeten demands. Vladimir Poliakov ("Augur") reported in the *New York Times* of May 14 that Chamberlain was prepared to buy peace from Hitler at the cost of colonial concessions and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Henlein pronounced himself satisfied with his journey. On

his return, despite an invitation to confer with Hodza on the nationalities statute, he proceeded to Vienna on a mysterious and probably treasonable mission. Municipal elections throughout Czechoslovakia were scheduled for May 22, May 29, and June 12. On the basis of Henlein's report from London, Hitler apparently decided upon an immediate blow.

The May crisis of 1938 was a consequence of Der Führer's desire either to experiment with preparations for a lightning attack on Prague⁵⁴ by way of seeing whether the French bloc had already disintegrated under Tory and Nazi pressure—or to give Chamberlain new inducements to hasten a settlement on Berlin's terms. On Friday, May 21, while Halifax was telling Jan Masaryk that Prague must make further concessions, Sir Nevile Henderson called at Wilhelmstrasse to inquire about reports of German mobilization on the Czech frontier. He was assured by Ribbentrop and Keitel that all troop movements were "routine." On Saturday morning Henderson called again and received no satisfaction. During the course of the morning three events threw the Continent into a panic: (1) on the border near Eger two Sudetens, George Hofmann and Nikolas Boehm, were shot to death by Czech guards while attempting to flee into Germany; (2) Henlein's party announced its refusal to negotiate with Hodza; (3) Prague, in hourly expectation of an ultimatum or an invasion from Berlin, called out 80,000 reserves and moved 400,000 troops to the frontier zone. Peace hung by a hair.

There is some reason to believe that Prague's first news of the mobilization of several German divisions (a fact which Hitler in September vehemently denied) came from Jan Masaryk, who secured his information from the Foreign Office, which got it on Friday from the British Intelligence Service in the Reich. Henderson in Berlin had had a falling-out with Ribbentrop. When he got no answers to his queries, he ordered special trains for the evacuation of British subjects—thus warning Berlin unmistakably of war. Whether he took this action on his own initiative or on orders from Downing Street is not yet known. Bonnet had received reports from François-Poncet of German mobilization. His preoccupation with "sound money" and his own political ambitions precluded solicitude for French diplomatic influence. Under British pressure he was already moving toward the desertion of Prague. But desertion could not be consummated under the conditions which Hitler had created on May 21. Time was needed and a long preparation of panic and demoralization. The Czech

counter-move forced his hand. Paris announced support of Prague. London, caught off guard, had no option but to support Paris.

German, Polish, and Hungarian inquiries at Prague elicited the explanation that troops had been sent to the border areas solely to "keep order" during the elections. Following the receipt on Saturday evening of alarming reports from Henderson, Chamberlain summoned his Cabinet to an extraordinary Sunday session. Prague was prepared to fight and not to yield. Berlin and Rome cut telephonic communications between Paris and Prague, but Daladier and Bonnet assured Krofta that France would fulfill her obligations. If Paris fought, Moscow would fight. Halifax and Chamberlain, perceiving that Hitler was attempting to confront them with a new *fait accompli* before their own preparations at home were complete, and realizing that Britain could not remain neutral in a general war precipitated by a Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, indicated that London would support Prague and Paris. A "war council" was held at Berchtesgaden, Sunday evening, May 22, attended by Hitler, Göring, Göbbels, Ribbentrop, and the heads of the Reichswehr. In the face of French-Czech and Anglo-French solidarity, the decision was for "peace." The German troops were withdrawn from the frontier on Monday. This "humiliation" was bitter.

On Monday, after Halifax had urged such a step on Grandi, Ciano pleaded for moderation with German Ambassador Mackensen. The Nazi press fumed and raged. Hitler, for once out-bluffed and out-manuevered by a prospective victim and by a united front against him, retreated. Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that Henlein would confer with Hodza after all, that His Majesty's Government in full co-operation with France had urged upon Prague "the need for taking every precaution for the avoidance of incidents and for making every possible effort to reach a comprehensive and lasting settlement by negotiations with representatives of the Sudeten party." He added that Downing Street had "represented to the German Government the urgent importance of reaching a settlement if European peace is to be preserved and had expressed its earnest desire that the German Government should co-operate." Assurances had been received. "The situation appears to have somewhat eased."

Henlein also capitulated on Monday and agreed to meet Hodza. His prior demands that he be granted safe-conduct and immunity from arrest for treason and that Hodza come to confer with him in Karlsbad were refused. On Tuesday, however, he broke off the talks and re-

turned to his home in Asch. On Wednesday, amid flaming verbiage of "blood and soil," he attended the funeral at Eger of the two "martyrs," whom Hitler honored with wreaths. The Nazi press denounced Chamberlain. Berlin made new protests at border violations by Czech aircraft. Prague made counter-charges. The Italian press denied that Germany had suffered a "defeat." On Saturday Sudeten deputies resumed discussions with Hodza. Czechoslovak troops remained on the frontier. On Monday, May 30, the Republic decreed military service for all citizens between six and sixty. In the municipal elections Henlein's followers converted or coerced over 80% of the Sudeten voters into supporting SDP candidates, but the Government parties strengthened their position elsewhere. Czechoslovakia thus refused to be "written off" without resisting.

Chamberlain thus failed, thanks to Czechoslovak and French courage, in his first effort to deliver Czechoslovakia to Hitler. He was compelled to do what he said he would not do: defend Czechoslovakia against Nazi aggression. British military observers on the scene watched the Bohemian borders for new incidents. Henlein told G. Ward Price (*The Daily Mail*, May 26) that the "solution" of the Sudeten problem must be sought through autonomy, or through a plebiscite on annexation to Germany, or, "simpler still," through "direct action" by the Reich. But he hastened to deny the interview after German Minister Eisenlohr in Prague had been reprimanded from Berlin. Hitler was not prepared to risk "direct action" so long as Paris, Moscow, and London were prepared to go to Prague's defense.⁵⁵

Downing Street was willing to surrender Czechoslovakia to Der Führer, since this was essential for the execution of the Nazi program, to which the Tory leaders had given their blessing. But the giving must be disguised as "general appeasement." It must not involve risks of war among the Western Powers. It must be presented to British and French opinion, however, as the only alternative to war. Meanwhile, the further disintegration of the French bloc must be fostered and steps must be taken to ensure that the *Drang nach Osten* would move toward Moscow and not toward Bagdad. On July 3 a French-Turkish pact of friendship was signed, along with a joint declaration regarding the Sanjak of Alexandretta in Syria. Turkish troops marched in, two days later, to share control with French forces. The League of Nations Commission, charged with supervising a proposed election and the transformation of the Sanjak

into an autonomous area, hurriedly retired. It was rumored that Turkey would permit British, French, and Soviet battleships to pass freely through the straits in time of war in return for partial or complete Turkish control of Alexandretta. By financial pressure, London compelled Berlin on July 1 to pay Austrian debts to British creditors.⁵⁶ Downing Street likewise guaranteed a £10,000,000 credit for British exports to Turkey and granted a £6,000,000 loan to Ankara for purchase of British arms.⁵⁷

Meanwhile Premier Stoyadinovich had visited Ciano in Venice in mid-June. Through exchanges of notes on June 24 among Switzerland, Italy, and Germany, the Fascist Powers hailed Berne's release from all League sanction obligations and promised to "respect" Swiss neutrality. Bloody rioting broke out in Palestine. At Évian on July 5 delegates from thirty-two governments met to discuss the problem of refugees from Germany and Austria in accordance with Roosevelt's suggestion. Myron C. Taylor, head of the United States delegation, was elected permanent president on July 7. He denounced "human dumping" and urged that a permanent refugee organization be established to facilitate emigration. A committee, presided over by Earl Winterton, with George Rublee of the United States as director, was subsequently set up in London. But the problem created by Fascist anti-Semitism grew in geometric progression, while "solutions" grew only in arithmetic progression. No State would throw open its doors to penniless refugees or penalize the practice of intolerance by retaliatory measures. Thus encouraged by democratic connivance in its persecutions, Berlin insisted upon robbing the remaining German Jews of all their goods before permitting them to depart. "Appeasement" required that international measures to aid the victims of the Nazi pogrom should not offend the persecutors, since it was obvious to all right-thinking Britons, Americans, and Frenchmen that the "co-operation" of the persecutors was essential for the "rescue" of their victims.

This logic applied to the Czechoslovak Republic no less than to the German Jews. Major Astor and Geoffrey Dawson drew the necessary conclusions, skillfully disguised in the verbiage of right thinking. The fate of Prague was clearly forecast by *The Times* of June 3, 1938:

Czechoslovakia . . . still offers the most urgent problem to European diplomacy, and the letters which continue to reach this office bear witness to the interest taken in its solution by British

public opinion. One which was published yesterday from the Dean of St. Paul's was typical of many, and an effective expression of the view that the Germans of Czechoslovakia ought to be allowed by plebiscite or otherwise to decide their own future,—even if it should mean their secession from Czechoslovakia to the Reich. With this view the majority of Englishmen probably agree. . . . The rigid application of the principle of self-determination everywhere is obviously impracticable; but for the rectification of an injustice left by the Treaty of Versailles the Sudeten Germans have an undoubted case. There is also a great deal to be said for it on another count, for it would afford a welcome example—always supposing that the Sudeten Germans want to be transferred—of peaceful change. In the past there has been too much rigidity in maintaining the status quo to a point at which only violence could alter it. . . .

For all these reasons (economic and strategic) it is easily intelligible that the Czech government might not willingly agree to a plebiscite likely to result in a demand for the transfer of the Sudetens and the loss of their territory for the Republic. Nevertheless if they could see their way to it, and to granting a similar choice to the other minorities, Hungarian and Polish, the rulers of Czechoslovakia might in the long run be the gainers in having a homogeneous and contented people. . . . If it was an injustice that these minorities should have been included in the new Republic, that injustice would be removed; and the neighboring States which take a racial interest in their kinsmen would have to look after them themselves and would lose any sort of claim to interfere in the affairs of Czechoslovakia. It would be a drastic remedy for the present unrest, but something drastic may be needed.

“Drastic” indeed would be the remedy of turning over to the Nazi executioners a State whose leaders and people had been guilty of no crime beyond a devotion to truth and freedom and a mistaken faith in the words of those solemnly pledged to protect them. The list of the betrayed was long and growing longer: Harbin, Peking, and Nanking; Jerusalem, Geneva, and Addis Ababa; Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona; Shanghai, Canton, and Hankow; and, most recently, Vienna. Next would be the city of the Hradcany by the waters of the Moldau.

DESIGN FOR GIVING

. 1. RESCUE BY RUNCIMAN

GLAMIS CASTLE in Forfarshire houses many ghosts, among them doubtless those of Banquo and Malcolm, King of Scotland, done to death by Macbeth, Thane of Cawdor. Near the close of the fourteenth century, by grant of Robert II, Glamis passed to Sir John Lyon of Forteviot. One of his descendants, Sir Claude George Bowes-Lyon, later fourteenth Earl of Strathmore and Kinghorne, married a daughter of the Cavendishes and Bentincks in 1881. She bore him ten children. The Countess's child destined above others for fame and fortune was a girl christened Elizabeth. In her youth she met and married a brother of the Prince of Wales, the Duke of York. In the fullness of time Wales became Edward VIII. For love of a lady Edward VIII shortly became merely Duke of Windsor. Elizabeth's husband thus became King George VI. In June 1938, while a pathetic handful of Londoners celebrated the absent Windsor's forty-fourth birthday, the aged Countess of Strathmore and Kinghorne lay on her death-bed. On June 23 she joined the ghosts of Glamis. Within six days of her passing her daughter Elizabeth Regina was to have gone to Paris with George Rex on an elaborate State visit. But mourning was now in order. M. Albert Lebrun, President of France, sent condolences and assented to postponement.

Politics was in the summer doldrums. Aside from the Mistress of Glamis, there were two deaths of the once great: Samuel Insull, born in Britain and enriched in America, died in Paris on July 15. Dowager Queen Marie of Rumania, granddaughter of Queen Victoria, died at Sinaia two days later. Winston Churchill failed in Commons to secure a reopening of the case of Duncan Sandys, Conservative M.P. who

was at odds with the War Minister as to whether he was subject to prosecution under the Official Secrets Act for revealing, from confidential sources, the lapses and lacunæ of defense measures. Hitler decreed compulsory civilian service for national defense, but few abroad perceived the import of his move. Two remote wars dragged on in China and Spain. Burgos awarded to Count Ciano a Knighthood of the Order of Isobel the Catholic, and to General Göring a Grand Knighthood and the Collar of the Great Imperial Order of Red Arrows. Mr. Chamberlain exchanged letters with Premier Daladier. He declined in Commons to make them public. They were private, he said, and only showed once more "the close accord between the two governments." All this was dull. Far more exciting were the gala preparations for the royal visit. For once the festivities would be unclouded by any political issues. The Prime Minister would stay home.

In mid-July a distinguished British guest arrived in Berlin to attend an aeronautical congress. He had recently conferred with the Prime Minister. But since he held no official post, these contacts were merely those of friends. He was also a friend of Göring, Ribbentrop, and Hitler. The guest was the Marquess of Londonderry. His visit bore fruit. On July 18 something described as "a personal message from Chancellor Hitler to Mr. Chamberlain" was delivered to Viscount Halifax by Captain Fritz Wiedemann, Der Führer's aide-de-camp, who had been a captain on the Western Front in the company in which Hitler was corporal. He desired no high posts or honors, but he enjoyed Hitler's confidence as did few in Der Führer's entourage. He had been in England for several days on one of his periodical visits of exploration. He waited until the day before the departure of the royal party for Paris to deliver his message. All officialdom denied until the morning of the 19th that he had seen anyone of Cabinet rank. But then it was conceded that he had spent twenty minutes with Halifax on the preceding day at the Foreign Minister's house in Eaton Square.

The message, it was intimated, was one of greeting and good-will bespeaking hope for an improvement of Anglo-German relations and for a "non-violent solution" of the Sudeten problem in Czechoslovakia. The Foreign Minister had expressed thanks and replied in kind. On the same day, it was later learned, Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen conveyed similar "assurances" in a call upon Sir Alexander Cado-gan. On July 19 George and Elizabeth were received with pomp and

pageantry in Paris. Madame Lebrun curtsied. King and President exchanged toasts of eternal friendship at a State banquet in the evening. The Queen wore the sash and badge of the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, bestowed by the President. The President wore the Collar of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, bestowed by the King. The guests and the crowds were overjoyed. On the same day Wiedemann flew back to Berlin, where Sir Nevile Henderson had been conferring with Baron Ernst von Weiszaecker of Wilhelmstrasse and where it was taken for granted that Wiedemann had gone to London to discuss British policy toward Czechoslovakia.

Mystery surrounded these moves. The Wiedemann visit was the overture to a drama more wonderful and fearful than any yet played on the diplomatic stage. What passed between Halifax and the visitor? Contemporary press accounts surmised that Wiedemann had urged a Czechoslovak "solution" through a four-power pact, and that Halifax would urge this upon France. It is probable, though this cannot yet be documented, that the essential features of the Munich settlement of September 29 were agreed upon in London on July 18, if not before. At all events, Bonnet met the royal yacht *Enchantress* at Boulogne and conferred privately with Halifax on the train to the capital. In their formal addresses Lebrun and George VI affirmed that "it would now be impossible to recall a period when our relations were more intimate," though happily "our entente does not exclude any other friendship." Whether Halifax this early suggested to Bonnet the price of this intimacy is uncertain. Chamberlain, it was rumored, had for some time been exchanging views with Hitler through secret and unknown intermediaries. Czechoslovakia, it was reported, would not be permitted to stand in the way of an Anglo-German rapprochement. All that was needful was that Downing Street carry the Quai d'Orsay with it in any "general settlement." Paris must "advise" Prague to make "concessions." And Paris must not allow Prague to stand in the way of "appeasement."¹

Chamberlain kept silent. His only admission in Commons was that Prague had recently granted facilities for the attachment of two "observers" to the British Legation, and the observers had denied German reports of Czech mobilization. On July 20, while the King and Queen attended art museums and garden parties and saw *Salammbô* at the Opéra, Halifax conferred with Daladier and Bonnet at the Quai d'Orsay in utmost secrecy, with no secretaries and no interpreters. So earnest was their discourse that the guests at the royal

luncheon were kept waiting. A communiqué spoke of "a spirit of mutual confidence," "action of pacification," and "complete harmony of views." The press opined that Halifax had brought a plan from Hitler for the "solution" (dissolution?) of Czechoslovakia, had refused French pleas for a military guarantee of Prague, and had indicated that there would be no British aid if France defended its ally.² Daladier and Bonnet summoned to the discussion Chautemps, Blum, and Herriot as well as Ambassador Charles Corbin and Czech Minister Stefan Osusky—ostensibly to persuade Halifax to join France in pledging defense of Czechoslovakia. If such was their purpose, they failed. Halifax was doubtless convinced that his French "friends" would yield if confronted with overwhelming threats and pressure. It later became known that at this conference Halifax suggested that Britain might act as "mediator" in the Czech-Sudeten controversy.

On Friday, July 22, while King George dedicated a monument to the Australian war dead and took his leave, it was reported from London that Chamberlain had transmitted to Dirksen an Anglo-French rejection of a German proposal that the four Western Powers "arbitrate" the Czech-Sudeten issue. This, it was hinted, was the plan which Wiedemann had brought to Halifax, and Halifax had taken to Paris. Dirksen returned to Berlin "on a holiday" as the British sovereigns came back to their capital. The proposed procedure was precisely the procedure to be employed two months later. Hints of German proposals for "neutralizing" Czechoslovakia were also current on July 22. If Chamberlain "rejected" such suggestions, was his rejection genuine or *pro forma*—or was it perhaps merely an appeal for delay? He assuredly did not tell Dirksen, then or ever, that Britain would fight to prevent a four-Power dissolution of Czechoslovakia. He needed time to win Paris and the British public to the sacrifice. A "semi-official" account declared that no new suggestions were made, that Dirksen merely voiced Germany's desire for a peaceful solution, and that Chamberlain promised British "good offices" at Prague. On the 23rd Basil Cochrane Newton, British Minister to Czechoslovakia, saw Premier Hodza for the second time in twenty-four hours. He urged maximum concessions to Sudeten demands.³

Paris professed ignorance of the alleged suggestion of a Four-Power Pact, but intimated that any such proposal was unacceptable since it would wreck the League, exclude the USSR, and sacrifice both French and Czech interests. The Quai d'Orsay called Ambassador André

François-Poncet home from Berlin for consultation. Prague and Paris perhaps suspected that Downing Street was in accord with Wilhelmstrasse. What Berlin would demand in the way of sacrifice would depend upon Berlin's estimate of London's willingness and ability to persuade Prague (and Paris) to yield. Chamberlain could give assurances of willingness but not as yet of ability. Pressure on Prague was apparently designed to emphasize the seriousness of the issue and the necessity for compromise—if need be, through the services of a British intermediary. In Paris on July 24 Hore-Belisha, after conferences with Daladier and General Marie Gustave Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff, said that "it looks as though the two general staffs are as one. The French Tricolor and the British Union Jack seem as one flag."⁴ Was the British War Minister entertaining delusions about British military support to Paris in defense of Prague? Hardly. Was he seeking to impress Hitler with Anglo-French solidarity as a means of moderating German demands? Perhaps, though such a gesture was pointless if Hitler already felt certain that London would never defend Prague. Was he seeking to convince Paris that France could rely on British support *if* France yielded to British "suggestions"? Probably. Lieutenant General Horst von Metzch expressed the opinion in Berlin that the Little Entente had already ceased to be a military factor, that Britain and France would give no aid to Czechoslovakia, that the USSR could give none, and that Prague must draw the necessary conclusions.⁵

On July 25, 1938, Nazi leaders in Vienna staged a performance of the putsch in which Dollfuss was slain and paid honor to the thirteen "martyrs." On July 25, 1938, it became known in London that Chamberlain had asked Viscount Runciman to go to Prague to urge new concessions. The idea of sending an "impartial mediator" to push Prague into concessions acceptable to Berlin was said to have originated during the week of the Wiedemann visit. Rumor declared that Halifax had suggested Runciman's name to Daladier and Osusky in Paris, that they had objected, and that he had agreed to designate him merely as an "adviser."⁶ Prague had obviously been consulted in advance, for on July 25 Benes and Hodza agreed "in principle" that Runciman should serve as "adviser"—not as "arbitrator," which would imply an obligation to accept his recommendations.

On Tuesday, July 26, Chamberlain addressed Commons on the eve of adjournment. He reiterated the old clichés and added: "Let not anyone in this country or elsewhere imagine that if we are seeking

peace we are willing to sacrifice, even for peace, British honor and British vital interests." (The interests of others were not mentioned; definitions of "honor" are notoriously flexible.)

The unity existing between France and ourselves is the happier because I think it is generally recognized that it is not directed against any other nation or combination of nations. It is, in itself, a solid buttress of peace and unity strengthened and confirmed by the conversations which took place between Viscount Halifax and the French Ministers in Paris. There is no mystery about them. There have been no new undertakings and no new commitments on either side. There was a general discussion of all matters of common interest to the two countries generally and a complete agreement on them. . . .

In the case of Czechoslovakia it is very difficult for the people of this country . . . to arrive at a just conclusion as to the rights and wrongs of the dispute between Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans. . . . There is no truth in the rumor that we are hustling the Czech Government. Indeed the very opposite is the truth. . . . Regarding the rumor that we had urged the Czech Government to submit their proposals to Henlein before putting them before parliament, certainly we did so. We did so for the very reason that if by any chance an agreed settlement could be reached between Henlein and the Czech Government before any statute was put before parliament, obviously that would be the best solution of all. I do not think that a great amount of pressure was required of us to induce the Czech Government to do something that it has been anxious to do all along. . . .

Nevertheless, as time has gone on, it has begun to appear doubtful whether without some assistance from the outside such a voluntary agreement could take place. . . . In response to a request by the Government of Czechoslovakia we have agreed to propose that a person with the necessary experience and qualities should investigate the subject on the spot and endeavor, if need be, to suggest means to bring negotiations to success. Such an investigator or mediator would, of course, be independent of His Majesty's Government and in fact be independent of all governments, and would act only in his personal capacity. . . . Lord Runciman is not in any sense an arbitrator—he is an investigator

and mediator. Lord Runciman will acquaint himself with all the facts and the views of the two sides. He will, no doubt, see them separately and later may be able to make some proposal to them which may help them. His position is not unlike that of a man who goes down to assist in settling a strike; who has to see two sides when they have come to a point where they cannot get any farther and he is there as an independent and impartial person. . . .

If only we could find a peaceful solution of this Czechoslovak question I should myself feel the way open again for a further effort for a general appeasement—an appeasement which cannot be obtained until we can be satisfied that no major causes of difference or dispute remain unsettled.

This explanation of the genesis and purpose of the Runciman mission was of questionable veracity at a number of points. To say that Czechoslovakia “requested” the mission was to attribute to Prague what had come from Berlin or to present Czech acquiescence to British pressure as Czech initiative. Officials in Prague denied that any “request” had been made, but said that Runciman was welcome. Chamberlain’s description of Runciman’s function masked the fact (which was nevertheless obvious to all) that he was being sent to Prague with the full authority and prestige of the British Government behind him. To present the whole enterprise as an impartial quest for truth and justice in Czech-Sudeten relations was to obscure the fact that its origin lay in the relations between Prague and Berlin and Berlin and London. Chamberlain did not conceal his desire for “appeasement” with the Reich. He spoke of the naval treaty of 1935 as, on Hitler’s part, “a notable gesture of the most practical kind in the direction of peace, the value of which, it seems to me, has not been fully appreciated as tending toward a general appeasement.” The Prime Minister made no suggestions as to who should pay the price of this “appeasement,” nor did he venture to point out that the “general European appeasement” which he sought was in reality nothing more than a Tory-Nazi entente, to be obtained by giving other people’s property to Hitler. Such an admission would have evoked indignation. Mr. Chamberlain would find it necessary for his purposes to evoke fear, panic, and terror, for these would create new enthusiasm for “appeasement.” But indignation would be in bad taste.

Halifax in Lords on July 28 sought to confirm the impression

already created. "Justice" in Czechoslovakia must be achieved "by peaceful means." Runciman, he asserted, had first commented when being told of his mission: "'I quite understand you are setting me adrift in a small boat in mid-Atlantic.' I replied, 'That is exactly the position.'" A "just and reasonable settlement" could be obtained if both sides were "generous" and "conciliatory." Commons adjourned on July 29 for a three months' recess after a wrangle over the Cabinet's inaction in the face of repeated attacks upon British ships in Spain. Wiedemann turned up in Paris on the same day amid more rumors of German suggestions for a Four-Power Pact. Runciman rested in preparation for his labors. Among those named as his advisers were Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, chief of the economic department of the Foreign Office; R. J. Stopford of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; Geoffrey Peto, formerly his parliamentary private secretary; and Ian Henderson of the consular service.

The "mediator" himself, after expressions of cheerfulness, arrived in Prague on August 4 with Lady Runciman and a mountain of luggage and engaged fifteen rooms in the Alcron Hotel. Before leaving Cowes, where he had been yachting, he prayed in Holy Trinity Church. Cartoonist David Low depicted him as an angel arriving at the "Czechoslovak customs" with nothing to declare save one olive branch—"made in Birmingham, slightly used."⁷ The British Legation staff and therefore the Czech Cabinet turned out in top hats to meet this "purely private person." His first public utterance thanked the Sudeten leaders for meeting him at the station. He spoke German, but no Czech.

The problem of Runciman's private conception of his mission is insoluble in the absence of any enlightenment from the Viscount himself. His background furnishes certain clues. He was the son of a shipping magnate. As a business man before 1914, when he was an ardent advocate of Anglo-German rapprochement, he added greatly to his family's huge fortune. As plain Mr. Walter Runciman he had served after the war as President of the Board of Trade. In 1930 he helped reorganize various shipping companies facing bankruptcy or scandal. In 1937 he inherited his father's peerage. He was fond of teaching Sunday school and had sailed twice around the world in his yacht *Sunbeam*. Top hats, morning coats, and domesticity were his affectations. He was immensely wealthy and saw eye to eye on social and international questions with Chamberlain and the Tory oligarchy. He had been a member of the Asquith Cabinet and a friend of Sir

Edward Grey. Upon his arrival in New York in 1937 he had declared that Britain would not "bribe anyone to leave her alone. You know well enough what it means to those who pay tribute—demands for more and more tribute." But he spoke then of British colonies, not of Sudetenland. His high wrinkled brow, his round bald head, his anxious pleading eyes, and his thin-lipped smiling mouth suggested a certain whimsical quality, not belied by his manner and speech. Whatever his own idea may have been, there is no reason to suppose that Hitler or Chamberlain entertained any doubts as to the ultimate outcome of his mission. Even Prague and Paris had suspicions. He was sent, whether he knew it or not at the outset, to consummate the non-violent partition of Czechoslovakia.

On the day of Runciman's arrival the German press warned of "border violations" by Czech aircraft and hinted at stern retaliation. Runciman conferred on August 4 and 5 with Benes, Krofta, and Hodza and, among the Sudeten leaders, with Franz Peters, Ernst Kundt, Heinrich Schicketanz, and Dr. Wilhelm Sebekovsky. Then and later he also saw German "Activists" (anti-Nazi) leaders as well as spokesmen for the other minorities, but his major conferences were necessarily with Henlein's subordinates, sometimes in the Alcron Hotel and sometimes in Sudeten towns. He talked at length with the Little Führer at Rothenhaus Castle on August 18. Lady Runciman and Ashton-Gwatkin accompanied him. The German Chargé, Herr Hencke, and Henlein's deputy, Karl Hermann Franck, participated. All were guests of Prince Max Hohenlohe of Liechtenstein. No reporters were admitted. No communiqué was issued. On August 21 Henlein talked once more with Ashton-Gwatkin in Marienbad. It was reported that Runciman had found him to be a "man of straw" who was obliged to refer all questions to his superiors (i.e. Hitler) for answers. Dr. Vojtech Mastny, Czech Minister in Berlin, returned to Prague on August 13 and again on August 24, but apparently did not see Runciman personally. The British mediator spent endless hours with Sudeten representatives.

While the utmost secrecy was preserved regarding these consultations, it is clear that the Nazi spokesmen began and ended all discussions by insisting upon the Karlsbad program of April 24. This was sufficiently vague to enable Henlein's subordinates and superiors to reject successive offers as inadequate, and sufficiently precise to leave little doubt but that Henlein's purpose was the disruption of the Republic or at least its reduction to military impotence. Any surrender

to demands for "autonomy," "corporate personality," "compensation," and "Nazi *Weltanschauung*" would mean the establishment of a state-within-a-state governed in accordance with totalitarian principles of dictatorship and anti-Semitism. By no conceivable formula could such "autonomy" be reconciled with the liberal principles of equality, toleration, and parliamentary democracy to which Czechoslovakia was committed. The state-within-a-state, which would control the Czech fortifications, would, moreover, be governed from Berlin. Henlein's Stormtroopers were already assuming police functions in a Sudetenland already swarming with secret agents of the Black Guards and the Gestapo.

Between the preservation and the destruction of Czechoslovakia there could be no compromise. Benes and Hodza were willing to grant everything short of what would endanger the security and integrity of the Republic. Henlein and Hitler appeared unwilling to accept anything short of what Prague could never grant. Runciman nevertheless pursued his efforts. Since he was quite unable to bring about any diminution of the Nazi demands, he was perforce obliged, as the only alternative to an admission of failure, to do what he could to wear down Czech opposition to them. "We will never go to Berchtesgaden!" cried Czech patriots. "Because," added the wits "Runciman has brought Berchtesgaden to Prague!" Benes and Hodza were ever fearful of calling down upon their heads the wrath of patriotic opinion, which solidly opposed any suicidal surrender. The publication of the Czech officers' corps declared on August 12: "Those who have consecrated themselves as the first to die have the right to give a warning. The State's authority must not under any conditions be divided, reduced, or undermined—not through one single deed, not through one single word more!"⁸ Despite such pressure the Cabinet made successive concessions and discussed successive plans, culminating in "Plan No. 4," the memorable "last word" of September 5. All in vain. All concessions were rejected as utterly inadequate.

This plan was drafted Monday, September 5, and presented to the Henleinists on September 7. Article I conceded to the nationalities access to all types of public and semi-public employment in proportion to their numbers. Article II guaranteed proportionality in the departments of education, social welfare, and public health, and in the letting of State contracts. Article III promised a loan of a billion crowns on liberal terms, to be issued before the end of the year, to alleviate distress in depressed areas; three quarters of the total would

go to industries in the Sudeten districts employing Sudeten workers. Article IV specified that police functions would be divided between local police and the State gendarmerie. Article V promised further negotiations to cover all new cases of alleged injustice or inequality. Article VI provided for a new language law to insure absolute and practical equality of the Czechoslovak, German, Polish, Hungarian, and Ruthenian tongues.

As regards autonomy, Article VII envisaged the establishment of cantons, within each of which local agencies of government would be elected by proportional representation and secret ballot. These bodies would have jurisdiction over all local functions not essential to the unity and security of the Republic. The cantonal lines would be drawn on the basis of nationality, geography, economic life, and means of communication. All minorities in all cantons would receive full security for their national rights and specific statutory protection of their personal and property rights. Pending new local taxes, the State would provide funds for payment of cantonal executive officials. Article VIII provided for national sections in all important State departments. Article IX recommended moderation by propagandists in order to restore an atmosphere of co-operation. Article X declared the plan an indivisible whole, intended for immediate realization. A final article provided for the drafting of necessary laws by a Commission on which the Government and the Henleinists should be equally represented.⁹

The merit of this program lay in the circumstance that it would presumably compel Henlein and Hitler to make public their choice: either they were bent upon disintegration of Czechoslovakia, in which case they would reject it; or they were genuinely concerned with "justice" and "equality" for the Sudetens, in which case they must accept it. The Karlsbad demands were herewith accepted—provided that their phraseology should be given a liberal-democratic interpretation rather than a totalitarian interpretation. But here precisely was the never-to-be-compromised conflict. In principle and practice, in prejudice and fanatical faith, Hitler and Henlein desired above all else precisely three things: the destruction of political democracy; the destruction of tolerance and equality in racial and political relationships; and the destruction of the integrity of Czechoslovakia. This fact was by now so obvious to all that further discussion of Sudeten "grievances" became absurd. Only two alternatives were left: Britain, France, and the USSR must defend Czechoslovakia against Nazi

imperialism and must make so clear their determination to do so that Hitler would know, beyond all doubting, that aggression against Prague would mean general war; or they must stand aside and consign the only democracy in Central Europe and the only remaining barrier against German domination of the Continent to the fate already suffered by China, Ethiopia, Spain, and Austria.

In the first case, Hitler must again retreat (as Lord Halifax conceded on October 3), for he was not yet prepared to face a world in arms against him. If, contrary to all reasonable expectation, he nevertheless attacked, the war to come would be one in which the Western democracies would be fighting for a cause as worthy as any that ever moved men to face danger in the service of a moral ideal. And it would be a conflict in which the chances of crushing for all time the Fascist menace would be enormously enhanced by the circumstances that China and Spain could still be saved, that Moscow would be fighting on the side of Paris and London, that Rome might still be immobilized, and that America's sympathy and respect for the Anglo-French cause would be at a maximum. In the second case—"peace" by surrendering Prague to the enemy—all these advantages would be lost. The Third Reich in this event would be magnified to the dimensions of an invincible colossus bestriding all Europe. Britain must henceforth do Berlin's bidding. France must accept reduction to a slave State, cringing before an implacable master or, on *Der Tag* to come, offer resistance to a foe pre-ordained to conquer. This was the choice posed to the West in September of 1938 by the swashbuckling Cæsar at Berlin and by the mild-mannered President on Hradcany hill. The tragedy of all that was to follow arose from the fact that the men of Whitehall were already Cæsar's bondsmen.

Runciman's own motivations throughout his mission are still matters of mystery. The principal piece of evidence now available regarding them is Document §1 of the British White Paper, *Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia*, issued by the Cabinet on September 29, 1938 (Cmd. 5847, Miscellaneous §7). This letter from Runciman to Chamberlain was dated September 21, 1938. It opens with a statement which perhaps protests too much: "When I undertook the task of mediation in the controversy between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German party, I was, of course, left perfectly free to obtain my own information and to draw my own conclusions. I was under no obligation to issue any kind of report. In the present circumstances, however, it may be of assistance to you to have the final views,

which I have formed as a result of my Mission, and certain suggestions which I believe should be taken into consideration, if anything like a permanent solution is to be found." Upon his arrival, the issue had been one of autonomy. "The question of self-determination had not yet arisen in acute form." Between the SDP sketch of June 7, embodying the Karlsbad demands, and the Czechoslovak draft of the nationalities statute, the gap was unbridgable. Direct negotiations were suspended on August 17. But Plan No. 4 was communicated to Runciman on September 5 and to the Sudeten leaders on the 6th. "In my opinion—and, I believe, in the opinion of the more responsible Sudeten leaders—this plan embodied almost all the requirements of the Karlsbad eight points, and with a little clarification and extension could have been made to cover them entirely."

From this point on, declared Runciman, the Sudeten extremists sought pretexts for rejecting the plan. They broke off negotiations once more on September 13. Runciman acquiesced in (if he did not encourage) this intransigence and asserted, honestly or as a pretense, that circumstances were now changed and facts must be faced: "It is quite clear that we cannot now go back to the point where we stood two weeks ago; and we have to consider the situation as it now faces us." His functions as mediator "were, in fact, at an end. . . . The Reich had become the dominant factor in the situation; the dispute was no longer an internal one. It was not part of my function to attempt mediation between Czechoslovakia and Germany."

In view of the circumstance that his appointment followed fast upon the visit of a German emissary to London and that his final conclusions had relevance only to Berlin-Prague relations and *not* to Sudeten-Czech relations, this statement might appear to be of doubtful sincerity to some. But if "mediation" be understood to imply bargaining and compromise, the statement is quite correct. For Runciman's new function, in effect if not in design, was to secure acceptance of the most extreme German demands, with no bargaining or compromise. He went on in his letter to assess responsibility for the end of negotiations in unmistakable terms:

Responsibility for the final break must, in my opinion, rest upon Herr Henlein and Herr Franck and upon those of their supporters inside and outside the country who were urging them to extreme and unconstitutional action. I have much sympathy, however, with the Sudeten case. It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; [Who should know better than a British imperialist?] and I have been left with the impression that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas

for the last twenty years, though not actively oppressive and certainly not "terroristic," has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrimination, to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt.

This "revolt" against a rule that was conceded to be neither oppressive nor terroristic Lord Runciman attributed to Sudeten mistrust of Czech promises ("I cannot say how far this mistrust is merited or unmerited"), to "major grievances" (he enumerated none), and to "local irritations" such as ignorance of German by Czech officials, settlement of Czech farmers in Sudeten districts, building of schools for the children of "these Czech invaders," alleged discrimination against German firms in State contracts and against Sudeten unemployed in provision of relief work. "I believe these complaints to be in the main justified. Even as late as the time of my Mission, I could find no readiness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to remedy them on anything like an adequate scale." The Viscount ventured no definition of adequacy.

It was at this point that the tenor of the Runciman letter perceptibly changed. It is possible that the second portion was written long after the first, or appended at the suggestion of Chamberlain. The entire letter, however, is dated September 21, on which day Prague, faced by desertion, yielded to Anglo-French demands for the cession of the Sudeten areas to the Reich. Runciman's conclusions appear to be less an outgrowth of his study of Sudeten-Czech relations than an admission of the exigencies of the Tory-Nazi entente and a plausible rationalization of a decision already arrived at by the Prime Minister on the basis of considerations having nothing to do with Sudeten "grievance" or with Runciman's observations in Sudetenland.¹⁰

Runciman's ultimate purpose was to justify a decision already reached. This he sought to do in the balance of his letter by defending the Sudeten demands for "self-determination" and by emphasizing the necessity of partition for the sake of "peace." These two desiderata were quite distinct. This second was related to the first only by the fact that Hitler demanded annexation under threat of war—after he had reason to believe that such a demand would be looked upon favorably in London. But since Runciman could not say "Might is Right" nor suggest that Tory *Realpolitik* required partition, he was obliged to present his "conclusions" in such a fashion as would suggest to the uninitiated that the Sudetens were "oppressed" (though he had already said they were not), that Hitler's heart bled for them, and that

“justice” demanded their “liberation” from Czech “tyranny” and their union with the Reich. This delicate task Runciman performed to the best of his ability.

The Sudetens had had a feeling of “hopelessness.” But Nazi victory in the Reich had given them new hope. “I regard their turning for help towards their kinsmen and their eventual desire to join the Reich as a natural development in the circumstances.” (The third person plural conveniently lumped all Sudetens together, “kinsmen” concealed the fact that the Sudetens had left Germany almost a thousand years previously, and “joined the Reich” obscured the circumstance that the Sudetens had never been citizens of Germany nor of any German state.) “I did my best to promote” a settlement within the Czechoslovak State, “but not without misgivings. . . . I felt that any such arrangement would have been temporary, not lasting.” (This is as near as Runciman came to conceding that he favored partition from the outset.) But “when I left Prague on the 16th September, the riots and disturbances in the Sudeten areas, which had never been more than sporadic, had died down. . . . Unless, therefore, Herr Henlein’s *Freicorps* are deliberately encouraged to cross the frontier, I have no reason to expect any notable renewal of incidents and disturbances.” (To anyone else this would suggest that most of the Sudetens, once freed from Nazi terrorization and protected by the State Police, would live peaceably with their Czech neighbors and that the price of peace was vigorous action to prevent intervention from Germany. But not so Runciman:

As the State Police are extremely unpopular among the German inhabitants, and have constituted one of their chief grievances for the last three years, I consider that they should be withdrawn as soon as possible. I believe that their withdrawal would reduce the causes of wrangles and riots. Further, it has become self-evident to me that those frontier districts between Czechoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population is an important majority should be given full right of self-determination at once. If some cession is inevitable, as I believe it to be, it is as well that it should be done promptly and without procrastination. There is real danger, even a danger of civil war, in the continuance of a state of uncertainty. [In the preceding paragraph the Viscount had written that there was no danger even of disturbances, without intervention by the Third Reich.] Consequently there are very real reasons for a policy of immediate and drastic action. Any kind of plebiscite or referendum would, I believe, be a sheer formality in respect of these predominantly German areas. A very large majority of their inhabitants desire amalgamation with Germany. The inevitable delay involved in taking a plebiscite vote would only serve to excite popular feeling, with perhaps most dangerous results. I consider, therefore, that these frontier districts should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany, and, further, that

measures for their peaceful transfer, including the provision of safeguards for the population during the transfer period, should be arranged forthwith by agreement between the two Governments.

In this wise Runciman, whose function was "not to attempt mediation between Czechoslovakia and Germany," closed his report on his mediation between Henlein and Benes with the conclusion that Germany should be given part of Czechoslovakia! By this device, he averred, the "honest, peaceable, hardworking, and frugal folk," Czechs and Germans alike in the areas where both would have to continue to live together, would be enabled to "settle down quietly." Plan No. 4 should be applied to the areas which German minorities left within Czechoslovakia. How Czech minorities would fare within the enlarged Reich was not a matter in which Runciman expressed any interest. He next went on (and here the master hands of Hitler and Chamberlain were obviously at work) to suggest the reduction of the rump Czech State to the position of a vassal of the Reich:

It is necessary permanently to provide that the Czechoslovak State should live at peace with all her neighbors and that her policy, internal and external, should be directed to that end. Just as it is essential for the international position of Switzerland that her policy should be entirely neutral, so an analogous policy is necessary for Czechoslovakia—not only for her own future existence but for the peace of Europe.

In order to achieve this, I recommend:—

(1) That those parties and persons in Czechoslovakia who have been deliberately encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czechoslovakia's neighbors should be forbidden by the Czechoslovak Government to continue their agitations; and that, if necessary, legal measures should be taken to bring such agitations to an end.

(2) That the Czechoslovak Government should so remodel her foreign relations as to give assurances to her neighbors that she will in no circumstances attack them or enter into any aggressive action against them arising from obligations to other States.

(3) That the principal Powers, acting in the interests of the peace of Europe, should give to Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against her.

(4) That a commercial treaty on preferential terms should be negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia if this seemed advantageous to the economic interests of the two countries.

Here, more than a week before Munich, were the essential terms of the entire Munich accord and of most of its aftermath. Runciman's four recommendations, translated into the brutal terms of the "practical politics" of which Hitler and Chamberlain were past masters,

meant in addition to the partition of Czechoslovakia: (1) the suppression by the Czechoslovak Government of Communists, Socialists, liberals, and Jews; (2) the end of Prague's defensive alliances with Paris, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Moscow; (3) a meaningless gesture of an international guarantee against "unprovoked" aggression for a vestigial State which would be utterly defenseless, wholly incapable of resisting any German demands, and therefore quite unable to "provoke" aggression or to become a victim of unprovoked aggression; (4) Czechoslovakia's economic enslavement by the Third Reich.

All these things came to pass within a few weeks after Runciman proposed them. He had recommended them after his superiors had already decided upon them. If his function was to encourage Hitler, to wear down Prague's resistance, to assist Chamberlain and his colleagues to ease their consciences and complete their deception of the British public, he performed his work well and is deserving of all the credit attaching to a difficult, dishonest, and dishonorable task carried to success with distinction. If his function was anything other than this the verdict of the future may be otherwise upon Lord Runciman of Doxford.

2. THUNDER IN NÜRNBERG

On August 20, 1938, as the Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente assembled anxiously at Bled in Jugoslavia, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, Regent of Hungary, Premier Bela Imredy, Foreign Minister Koloman de Kanya, and War Minister Eugene Ratz left Budapest for the Reich. Imredy and Kanya had visited Rome exactly a month before to affirm Hungary's solidarity with the Fascist Powers. Seyss-Inquart gave the party a royal welcome in Vienna. On August 22 Horthy and Hitler proceeded from Berlin to Kiel to review the new German battle fleet, comprising one hundred and ten modern fighting ships, including thirty-seven submarines, led by the dreadnought *Gneisenau*. Frau Horthy was granted the honor of christening a new cruiser, the *Prinz Eugen*. The visitors next proceeded to Heligoland, reconstructed as an impregnable marine fortress, and were feted at Hamburg on their return.

At a State banquet in Berlin on the 24th, Hitler hailed the now "permanent historic frontier" between Hungary and Great Germany and rejoiced in their "intimate collaboration with a friendly Italy" as

a "safe and worthy pledge for a just and general peace." (On the same day the Hungarian Supreme Court confirmed a three-year sentence for subversive political activities passed upon Major Ferenc Szalasi, leader of the Hungarian Nazis.) On August 25 a great military parade was reviewed by the Magyar Regent. Foreign military attachés gasped at the sight of four samples of a new weapon: a gigantic field gun, motorized in four detached sections and capable of assembling within two hours. Other new howitzers, tanks, and armored cars testified to undiminished Teutonic prowess in the arts of slaughter. On the 26th Horthy visited Potsdam and then, on his return journey, stopped at Nürnberg. Here he was received cordially by Rudolf Hess and Julius Streicher, who was beginning a new research project to prove that the Pope was tainted with Jewish blood.

These nerve-shattering displays of German armed power were obviously not designed merely to impress the Hungarian ruler. It was hoped that a wider audience would take note and be intimidated. At Bled the Little Entente Ministers attempted belatedly to bribe Budapest out of the Nazi diplomatic orbit. On July 31 the Balkan Entente had granted Bulgaria freedom from the military restrictions of the Treaty of Neuilly in return for a non-aggression pact. The Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Andres Bessenyei-Bakazh, came to Bled to confer with Stoyadinovich who conferred in turn with Krofta and Petrescu-Comnen of Rumania. Offers were forthcoming. The Baron phoned Kanya at Kiel. On August 23 an accord was announced:

The permanent council of the Little Entente states with satisfaction that negotiations conducted throughout the year with Hungary made it possible to reach agreements resulting in Hungary and the Little Entente members pledging mutually to refrain from the employment of force of any kind against one another, and in the three Little Entente members recognizing Hungary's equality in the matter of rearmament. . . . The permanent council of the Little Entente, expressing its satisfaction in the results already achieved, hopes that not only in the interests of the countries concerned but also of all States of the Danube Basin a full arrangement soon will be reached.¹¹

This capitulation was the swan-song of the Little Entente. On August 31 Imredy announced that Hungary's pledge to conclude non-aggression pacts would not be regarded as "effective" until Czechoslovakia solved her "minority problem" to Budapest's "satisfaction." This Hungarian pressure upon Prague was the first fruit of the Berlin visit. The Hungarian Premier announced on September 4 that his Government would introduce military conscription, establish com-

pulsory labor camps, organize a national militia, inaugurate new anti-Semitic measures, attack "revolutionary Nazi influences," and undertake agrarian reform through the division and leasing of large estates to small farmers. The last measure, whether an empty promise of a program of action or not, was highly unpalatable to the feudal aristocracy of the Kingdom. It was deemed necessary to prevent the impoverished and land-hungry peasantry from flocking to the Nazi banners. As for the rest, Imredy asserted: "I will lead you from now on with a firm hand. . . . Our friendship with Italy and Germany is directed against no one. . . . [But] especially in Czechoslovakia, where minorities are in the majority, we will demand increased rights for Hungarian groups. . . . Our country must build a modern strong army so that Hungary's armed forces are again respected among the nations."¹²

In Berlin, as in Budapest, policy toward Prague during August and September of 1938 was a logical outgrowth of a sequence of assumptions already tested and found true. Hirohito had discovered that all the Western Powers were willing to buy peace with Japan at China's expense. Mussolini had discovered that Britain and France were prepared to buy peace with Italy at the expense of Ethiopia and Spain. Hitler and Horthy had discovered that two members of the Little Entente were prepared to buy peace with Germany and Hungary at the expense of the third member. Did it not then also follow that Britain and France could be induced to buy peace with Germany at Czechoslovakia's expense? The French Right had urged such a course for months. Most British Tories, many Liberals, and even some Laborites had advocated this form of "appeasement" for years. All were agreed that Czechoslovakia was not worth the life of a single British soldier. "A monstrosity," sputtered Lord Rothermere. "If you or anyone else," he wrote to Wickham Steed, August 10, "are so foolish as to believe Great Britain and her dominions will fight for the Moscow-owned Prague Government, you are laboring under some strange delusion."¹³

Such assurances as these were music in Der Führer's ears as sweet as the cloudy chords of Wagner. Sweet too were the pipings of Runciman of Doxford. Downing Street was already Hitler's ally. British inquiries in mid-August about German military preparations were *pro forma*. Ribbentrop refused even to discuss them with Henderson and deprecated British "encouragement" to Prague. The pretense that Berlin and London were not acting in unison had to be pre-

served in order that the British public might believe that Chamberlain was seeking "justice" and "appeasement." Hence the need of gestures of dissension. Hence also the need for Nazi "threats," Tory "anxiety," emergency trips to the Reich by the Prime Minister, and, finally, a great "war panic" to enable Downing Street to do Hitler's bidding in the name of "peace."¹⁴ *Entre 'acte*: war in the modern manner at Changkufeng, July 31, between Japan and Russia; Hitler gave Hirohito "moral support"; truce August 11; happy ending with Russ quiescent and Tokio's crusaders against Bolshevism resuming march upon Hankow. Deadlock at Prague. Time for thunder.

A double obligato to Runciman's melody of muted strings now began to whistle and shriek in an ever rising crescendo. One theme of the counterpoint displayed the master hand of Göbbels, the other those of Göring, Himmler, and the Reichswehr. The Nazi Propaganda Ministerium opened a great overture of roaring abuse in the German press against Czech "persecution" of the Sudetens to convince all Germans and all Nazi sympathizers abroad that the restrained and noble Teutons of the Southland were being barbarously tortured by fanatic Slavdom. "Unparalleled Cruelty of the Czech Murder Bandits!" "Incredible Bestiality!" "Murder Unmasked!" "Beaten to Death!" "German Woman Stoned, Wounded War Veteran Knocked Down!" "A Fate as in Red Spain!" "Czech Commune Brandishes the Torch!" "Czech Children Throw Benzine Cans!" "Czechs Wish to Wade in Blood!"¹⁵

Simultaneously, with a shattering roll of drums and a deafening blast of bugles, the Nazi military machine was set in motion in all its fearful symmetry. Amid such a cacophonous uproar, dark with threats of doom and death, it was assumed in Berlin that the imperturbable Benes would falter, that Bonnet and Daladier would shrink in fear, and that all would agree with Downing Street that Prague must yield. The *Berliner Tageblatt* screamed that "Russians" were at work on Czech fortifications. Nazi radio broadcasts raged against the "Czech" murderers of Wenzel Baierle, who was fatally stabbed in a café brawl on August 7 by Robert Hoiden, an Austrian Social Democratic émigré. Three days later, at an "anti-Comintern" mass meeting in Berlin, Hans Krebs, Sudeten member of the German Reichstag, declared that Czechoslovakia must be regarded as the "enemy of Europe" until its alliance with Moscow was liquidated. The Nazi authorities rushed hundreds of thousands of conscript laborers to the Rhineland to complete the fortifications against France. German

reservists were called into service. Trucks and motor-cars were requisitioned for a gigantic "trial mobilization." By the end of August it was estimated that the Reich had over a million troops under arms. Göbbels continued to scream in the German press: "New Czech Terror Wave!" "Cowardly Attack!" "Another Czech Murder!"

As August passed into September the threatening drums of doom thundered ever more menacingly. On August 18 the Gestapo arrested for espionage Captain Thomas Kendrick, British passport officer in Vienna. Protests by Henderson brought his release and expulsion. The Nazi press demanded that Runciman force Prague to yield. On August 24 Ashton-Gwatkin paid a flying visit to London to confer with Lord Halifax. Before he returned, Deputy Franck published a Sudeten party proclamation on August 26 canceling instructions to "forgo the right of self-defense" and urging members of the SDP to resist attacks by "Marxist terrorists." It was rumored in Berlin and Prague that the Reich had warned various capitals, including Belgrade, Bucharest, and Moscow, but not including Paris, that Germany might soon be obliged to act to "sponsor" the Sudeten demands. The Cabinet in London apparently reached a decision to deliver an informal warning to Hitler against any resort to violence and to increase British pressure on Prague. The first task was entrusted to Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer. He spoke on Saturday, August 27, in Lanark, Scotland. He urged peace, friendship, and appeasement but asserted that British policy had been "fully and accurately declared in Mr. Chamberlain's speech in Parliament on March 24 of this year. That declaration holds good today. There is nothing to add or to vary in its content." In short, Britain would still assume no commitment to defend Czechoslovakia or to aid France in defending Czechoslovakia. But "the beginning of a conflict is like the beginning of a fire in a high wind. . . . Who can say how far it would spread or how many may be called to beat it out?" Sir John concluded:

We are convinced that, given good will on all sides, it should be possible to find a solution which is just to all legitimate interests. And there is no need to emphasize the importance of finding a peaceful solution, for, in the modern world, there is no limit to the reactions of war. This very case of Czechoslovakia may be so critical for the future of Europe that it would be impossible to assume a limit to the disturbance that a conflict might involve, and every one in every country who considers the consequences has

to bear that in mind. . . . What [Secretary Hull] said and what President Roosevelt said a few days later in Canada must awaken a responsive echo in many British hearts. The British Government, therefore, have used their influence with all sides in the Czechoslovak dispute to urge the adoption of reasonableness in efforts to reach a solution. . . . Lord Runciman . . . is not an arbitrator nor a judge—he is a mediator and friend. . . . He is at Prague at this moment in no sense as a representative of the British Government but as a representative of all men who desire justice and love peace. . . . There is some reason for hope, because all the peoples of Europe hate the horrors of war, and nowhere can a government be so indifferent to the thoughts and opinions of its people as to ignore their feeling that these things ought to be avoided.¹⁶

On Monday, August 28, Sir Nevile Henderson arrived suddenly in London. Chamberlain called the Cabinet into session for Tuesday. As it met, Hitler appeared unexpectedly at Kehl, opposite Strasbourg, on a sudden "inspection tour" of the Rhineland fortifications facing the Maginot Line. General Joseph Vuillemin, commander of the French air forces, had been cordially received by Hitler and Göring in Berlin on August 18. Now, however, the wave of fear was spreading. Henderson conferred with Halifax, Simon, Vansittart, and Chamberlain. The French Cabinet moved to suspend the forty-hour week in key industries and reinforce troops on the frontier. Stocks and foreign currencies tumbled on Wall Street. The plan for the autumn maneuvers of the British fleet, announced on Saturday, provided that forty battleships would leave the Channel ports on September 6 and proceed to Invergordon, Scotland, facing the North Sea. . . .

The British Cabinet meeting of Tuesday, August 29, closed with the announcement that Henderson would return to Berlin with new instructions. "The Ministers expressed their entire agreement with the action already taken and the policy to be pursued in the future." The purpose of action, policy, and instructions was kept a close secret. Henderson reached Berlin on Thursday, but did not see either Hitler or Ribbentrop. On August 31 it was reported from Prague that a British compromise plan had been presented to Henlein and to the inner council of the Cabinet. On September 1, at Runciman's request, Henlein saw Hitler and Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden while Deputies

Franck and Sebekowsky saw Benes in the Czech capital. On the 2nd Runciman intimated that the deadlock was broken. The Berchtesgaden communiqué asserted that Der Führer had received Henlein's report "with interest." "There resulted a complete accord in their judgment of the situation."¹⁷ The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* issued a new appeal to the West for neutrality: "It is impossible for Germany to have on its frontier a small State containing 3,500,000 Germans which has anti-German alliances. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States would be opposed, of course, to similar alliances concluded by one of its neighbors with a non-American Power."¹⁸ Hitler was reported to have sent Henlein back to Prague with counter-proposals. The British mediators were evidently anxious to reach a settlement before the Nürnberg Congress of the NSDAP, scheduled to open on September 5. The ultimate result of their anxiety was "Plan No. 4" of September 7, already reviewed. In the light of Chamberlain's admission that Downing Street, far from "hustling" Prague into concessions, had urged full consideration and delay, the hypothesis is plausible that Chamberlain, Henderson, Newton, and Runciman welcomed the "Plan" chiefly because of its lateness, in the certain knowledge that Hitler would reject it and that the war panic was already sufficiently far advanced to make possible the "solution" which they were already committed to.

On Monday, September 5, 1938, as the Government of Chile suppressed an armed Nazi rebellion and Paris called out reserves, the tenth annual *Parteitag* of the NSDAP opened in Nürnberg. This was the "Congress of Great Germany." The sessions between 1933 and 1937 had been dedicated seriatim to Victory, Will, Freedom, Honor, and Labor. Once more the hundreds of thousands of the faithful gathered to goose-step and applaud. Once more Der Führer and his aides drew strength and confidence from the regimented echo of their own oratory. Once more the blindly fanatic multitudes were moved to frenzied exaltation by flags and uniforms, standards and banners, music and lights and pageantry of potent beauty benumbing all reason and beckoning to death and paradise. Der Führer's initial proclamation, read as usual by Adolf Wagner, mentioned Czechoslovakia only by inference: "Party comrades! More threatening than ever, Bolshevik danger of the destruction of nations rises above the world! A thousandfold, we see the activities of the Jewish virus in this world pest!" But Great Germany is strong and invincible and has great and strong Powers as friends. Thanks to autarchy, the Reich is now im-

mune to any blockade. Thanks to God and National Socialism, the bloodless victory in Austria had been won. . . . Henlein arrived at Nürnberg's Deutscher Hof and conferred into the small hours with Der Führer, as did Ernst Eisenlohr, German Minister to Prague. Hitler refrained from accepting or rejecting "Plan No. 4." Downing Street refrained from endorsing it.

At this point Major Astor's "thunderer" prematurely hurled a bombshell. It was surprising only to those who had forgotten that early in May, at one of Lady Astor's luncheons, Chamberlain had told American correspondents that Czechoslovakia should cede Sudetenland to the Reich. But British memories, like French, are short. At Pointe de Grave on September 4 Bonnet had declared that France would "remain faithful to all its pacts and treaties." On Sunday, September 5, *The Times* had asserted that any grant of totalitarian Nazi autonomy to the Sudetens would transfer "their personal spiritual allegiance from the head of their own State to the Führer of the neighboring Reich; the Prague government would not be master in its own house." This therefore could not be granted. "No central government," began the bombshell editorial of September 6, "would still deserve its title if it did not reserve in its own hands defense, foreign policy, and finance. . . . [But] the Germans are going beyond the mere removal of disabilities and do not find themselves at ease within the Czechoslovak Republic." The conclusion?

In that case it might be worth while for the Czechoslovak Government to consider whether it should exclude altogether the project, which has found favor in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous State by the secession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation with which they are united by race. In any case the wishes of the population concerned would seem to be the decisively important element in any solution that can hope to be regarded as permanent and the advantages to Czechoslovakia of becoming a homogeneous State might conceivably outweigh the obvious disadvantages of losing the Sudeten German districts of the borderland.

The Nazi Press waxed enthusiastic. But the balance of the British Press waxed indignant. Paris was horrified. Ambassador Corbin asked for an explanation from Halifax. Jan Masaryk called to protest. All assumed correctly that *The Times* was speaking for the Foreign Office. Halifax saw Dawson. The "suggestion" was obviously pre-

mature, for the war panic had not yet reached the necessary stage of hysteria. Beaverbrook and Rothermere agreed that the partition of Czechoslovakia might, after all, be the best means of preserving peace. The Trades Union Congress and the Labor Party, in a joint statement of September 7, championed the indivisibility of peace and called for staunch defense of Czechoslovak integrity as well as for an immediate summoning of Parliament. Even some of the uninitiated Tories were shocked. On the evening of September 7 a communiqué was issued from No. 10 Downing Street: "The suggestion to the effect that the Czechoslovak Government might consider as an alternative to their present proposals the secession of a fringe of alien population in their territory in no way represents the views of His Majesty's Government." At the same time the Foreign Office declared that the proposals of Plan No. 4 "do appear, in the official view, to represent a basis upon which future negotiations between the parties might well be conducted." At least they should be examined "in a spirit of mutual good will."

A second bombshell was curiously enough manufactured out of a riding crop. On Tuesday morning, September 7, at Moravska Ostrava (Mährisch-Ostrau) a Henleinist crowd gathered in ugly mood outside the courthouse where eighty-two Nazis were being held on charges of arms smuggling. When mounted police sought to clear the square, Deputy Franz Mai was lightly flicked on the shoulder by a policeman's riding whip. Neither he nor any other member of the crowd was injured. When the news reached Prague, however, the SDP deputies, headed by Herr Kundt, who were about to resume discussions on the basis of Plan No. 4, declared that in view of this "outrage" no further negotiations were possible. In view of the "unexampled excesses of the State Police and the beating of Sudeten deputies," it was clear that the government was not in earnest and "does not control the situation sufficiently to begin discussions in detail in the present circumstances."¹⁹ A Sudeten delegation called upon Runciman and Hodza to protest while the Nazi Press screamed in renewed horror against Czech "terrorism." Henlein came back to Prague, but returned to Nürnberg the following day. The negotiations were never resumed.

Thursday, September 8: thousands of Henleinists demonstrated in Sudeten towns, singing the *Horst Wessel Lied* and *Deutschland über Alles* and shouting "Heil Hitler!" "Perish the Jews!" "One Volk, One Reich, One Führer!" Runciman saw Benes. All leaves were can-

celed in the French Atlantic fleet. Rome, which had hitherto kept silent, unofficially warned Prague to accept the Karlsbad program and to turn a deaf ear to promises of aid from Paris and Moscow.²⁰ Halifax canceled his projected visit to Geneva. Chamberlain called a Cabinet meeting for Monday and conferred with Halifax, Simon, Wood, and Malcolm MacDonald, Colonial Secretary. Henderson visited Göring at one of his hunting lodges near Nürnberg.

Rumor had it that Halifax, Vansittart, and Cadogan, with the possible support of Runciman, favored a British endorsement of Plan No. 4 and a clear warning to Hitler that Britain would fight beside France if the Reich attacked Prague. Chamberlain, Simon, and Hoare, with the probable approval of Henderson and Newton, opposed further commitments. On Saturday, September 10, the *Daily Mail* declared that the Cabinet had decided at midnight to tell Berlin "in precise and formal terms" that Britain would not stand aside if Czechoslovakia were attacked. Henderson would deliver a note to this effect in Nürnberg within a few hours, "probably to Adolf Hitler himself." Henderson on the 9th canceled plans to go to Berlin and decided to remain in Nürnberg, thereby giving credence to the report. But at 12.25 p.m. on Saturday, Downing Street issued an official denial: "In view of statements which have appeared in the last day or so regarding reported decisions of the Ministers it can be stated authoritatively that no such statements should be regarded as authentic." A Foreign Office spokesman said that no new note had been sent to Germany and no new instructions had gone to Henderson. Attlee and Churchill were consulted by Chamberlain, but evidently learned nothing. It was finally declared that Henderson had neither had nor sought any interview with Hitler, but "there is every reason for the British Ministers to feel assured that the views of His Majesty's Government have been fully conveyed in the proper quarters."²¹

This was, for once, the truth. But the "views" remained a secret. Rumor alleged that Ribbentrop had cast aside Henderson's "warnings" on the ground that he knew more of the British official mind than the Ambassador and was certain that Britain would not fight. There is no reason to believe that any "warnings" were conveyed, apart from advice that Hitler must refrain from open force and give Downing Street time to secure acceptance of his demands without force. Henderson's reports of Saturday were said to be reassuring. On Friday Anthony Eden visited the Foreign Office for the first time since his resignation and spent a half hour with Lord Halifax. He

made a longer visit on Sunday. On Monday morning, on the eve of Hitler's final address at Nürnberg, he published a letter in *The Times*, declaring: "It would be the gravest of all tragedies if from a misunderstanding of the mind of the British people the world were again to be plunged into conflict." He declared that it was his own view that "a settlement of the Sudeten problem by conciliation is of the utmost urgency in view of the growing realization of the far-reaching consequences of any resort to a decision by armed force in Central Europe." Chamberlain thus secured Eden's collaboration in his efforts to convince the British public that Hitler was threatening war and that the Cabinet was leaving no stone unturned to preserve "peace." Der Führer was at no time a victim of any "misunderstanding" of Tory policy. Another pretended "warning" was issued Sunday night in the form of a statement to the press from an anonymous but "responsible" spokesman of Downing Street. The Foreign office perhaps desired a stern warning. But Chamberlain toned it down. It merely said that British security was intimately bound up with that of France; Britain had the sympathy of the United States; Hitler had been fully informed and, since he had repeatedly professed his desire for peace, his sincerity would not be doubted.²² With this the British Government waited to hear Der Führer's words from Nürnberg. These developments had but one meaning for Hitler: he could now count on Tory support for the partition of Czechoslovakia. The only condition imposed was that he refrain from force—but pretend to be about to resort to force.

The excited scurrings of the diplomats in other capitals over the week-end were veiled in secrecy. The 102nd session of the League Council and the 19th Assembly convened in Geneva. Under German pressure Warsaw apparently agreed not to support Prague and Paris. Under Anglo-French pressure Warsaw agreed not to support Berlin. Jugoslavia and Rumania also sought neutrality, though Litvinov and Bonnet at Geneva evidently pushed Foreign Minister Petrescu-Comnen into a position in which he dared not reject outright suggestions that Bucharest must permit the passage of Soviet troops to defend Czechoslovakia. In Moscow Czech Minister Zdenk Firlinger expressed full confidence in Soviet military support. Tokio gave "moral support" to Berlin. Roosevelt denied that he had given "moral support" to London and Paris. The northern neutrals decided under pressure not to insist upon the deletion of Article 16 from the Covenant. Halifax was reported to have prepared a plea to the League

Assembly, comparable to his plea to the Council in May regarding Ethiopia, in which he would propose the emasculation of Article 16 and the resurrection of Article 19 as a means of facilitating the non-violent partition of Czechoslovakia in the name of "peaceful change."²³ If he had any such intention, it was abandoned as premature.

Meanwhile developments within Czechoslovakia moved toward a climax. In a broadcast address in Czech and German on Saturday evening, September 10, President Benes spoke with moderation and hope: "I am talking to you as a people who want security and peace and who aim at human dignity and good will. . . . We are endeavoring to guarantee the individual against the whole, minority against majority, and freedom of thought and national rights. . . . Our democracy is proud of having always been a disciplined democracy and it is proud that that claim has been maintained by self-control of all its citizens. . . . Let us observe calm and keep quiet and have faith in ourselves, in our country, in our state, and in our future prosperity. Let us be ready to make sacrifices, but let us be optimists even in a time of great difficulties. Above all, let us not forget that faith and good will move mountains and that they will bring us happily out of all present European troubles."²⁴ Nazi provocateurs now moved heaven and earth to precipitate bloodshed in order to justify invasion. Czech police were stoned and fired upon in many Sudeten towns. Viscount Runciman was at Petrohad Castle, spending the week-end with Count Ottokar von Czernin von Chudenitz. Late Sunday morning he was visited by two Sudeten deputies, while a mob beneath the windows shouted: "Heil Hitler!" "We want a plebiscite!" "Free us from Czechoslovakia!" "You are the liberator of three and half million Sudetens!" Runciman from the balcony made his first and last public utterance during his mission. It consisted of two sentences: "Men and women of Bohemia, you live in a beautiful country—perhaps one of the world's most beautiful. May God grant that this beautiful country have peace and that you will all continue to live in it in unity."²⁵

At Nürnberg the *Parteitag* of the NSDAP moved from climax to climax in great waves of fabricated fanaticism. The objective of the stage managers was less to mobilize the patriotic furor of the Teutons behind Der Führer (that had been long ago achieved) than to inspire the outer world with fear. On Thursday Hitler permitted an anonymous general to be quoted: "We will never make war on the Czechs, but if the lives of our German brethren are not safe, the day may

come when we shall consider that the Czechs have started a war with us. In such a case, of course, we shall remember that attack is the best method of defense. . . . Runciman keeps dilly-dallying. . . . Henderson brings nothing but words.”²⁶ Dark hints were dropped by “unofficial” Nazi spokesmen that Hitler would be content with nothing less than Sudeten *Anschluss*. On Friday night, September 9, he addressed 180,000 district leaders on Zeppelin Field: “At a time when there are clouds on the horizon, I see about me those millions of unflinching, nay fanatical, Nationalsocialists, whose leadership you constitute and for whose leadership you are responsible. Just as I could rely blindly upon you in the days of our struggle, so today again Germany and I can depend upon you.”²⁷

On Saturday reports were circulated that 200,000 German troops were massed in Austria opposite the Czech frontier. More panic abroad. *Pro forma* denial from Berlin. Hitler spoke to 60,000 Hitler Jugend: “Germany will stand united, come what may. . . . When Providence takes me from my people, I will hand to the next Führer a country welded by iron bonds.” Göbbels denounced “democracy and its offspring Bolshevism” and asserted that Czechoslovakia was a “Communist stronghold in Central Europe,” with a president who owed his election to Communist votes! Göring raged and waved his arms for an hour and a half before 25,000 members of the *Arbeitsfront*. He declared that he had hoarded food-supplies to resist blockade and had conscripted labor for work on the western fortifications:

Present demands require increased hours of labor. It will be necessary to work ten hours or even more . . . but only for the glory of the Reich, not for private profit. . . . Germany is getting stronger every year and no one can stop us. . . . Our arms industries are going at high pressure in every branch. And we have the advantage of having started first, well ahead of the others. . . . Trust the Führer and do not waver. I do not deny that there is a crisis. A petty segment of Europe is harassing human beings. The democracies of course are looking for the causes of this unrest outside the frontiers of this little bit of Europe. But we know what is going on. This miserable pygmy race without culture—no one knows where it came from—is oppressing a cultured people and behind it is Moscow and the eternal mask of the Jew Devil. The democracies believe all lies and are talking about war. . . . It would be better for England to estab-

lish peace in that little Jew state of hers down there. . . . We have done everything for peace. The Italian-German friendship is firmer than ever. Our two countries together with Japan in the Far East are the only bulwark against Bolshevism. . . . Our fortifications in the West will halt any Power under the sun. . . . Remember that as long as the Führer and the nation are one, we are invincible.²⁸

This effort was apparently too much for the corpulent Field Marshal. He was reported on Sunday to be suffering from bronchitis and leg inflammation and to have retired to the country for rest upon his physician's advice. Hitler addressed 100,000 Black Guards and Stormtroopers, including not only new divisions from the Ostmark but some of Henlein's henchmen. He was violent, but still vague. By Monday afternoon all the world was waiting in fear for his closing address, which, many believed, was to decide the issue between "peace" and "war." But Hitler's sole function here was to aid Chamberlain to crack Czech, French, and British nerves. This required convincing artistry. Hitler was an artist. In the closing portion of his long address at Nürnberg on Monday evening, September 12, 1938, Der Führer led his battalions of bayoneted words to the attack, reinforced by withering cross-fires of applause and blinding detonations of hysterical cheering. Over all the ether waves of the Western world came a roar like unto that of the Beast of the Apocalypse. In it were mingled the hoarse voice of implacable fanaticism, with a lie or a threat in every breath; the fierce mob-shouts of defiance and death; the awe-inspiring outbursts of tremendous hand-clapping; the hypnotizing and heart-rending monotony in every pause of "Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil!" From tens of thousands of throats came a bestial screaming as appalling as the maniacal outbursts of the orator of doom. Never did a Hamlet feign lunacy with more terrifying effect:

. . . Today we again see plotters, from democrats down to Bolsheviks, fighting against the Nazi State. . . . We are being insulted today, but we thank God that we are in a position to prevent any attempt at plundering Germany or doing her violence. . . . These [Sudeten] Germans, too, are creatures of God. The Almighty did not create them that they should be surrendered by a State construction made at Versailles to a foreign power that is hateful to them. . . . They are being op-

pressed in an inhuman and intolerable manner . . . brutally struck . . . terrorized or maltreated . . . pursued like wild beasts for every expression of their national life. . . . I can only say to representatives of the democracies that this is not a matter of indifference to us. And I say that if these tortured creatures cannot obtain rights and assistance by themselves, they can obtain both from us. An end must be made of depriving these people of their rights. . . . (Last May the liar Benes and the criminal Government at Prague decided to use brute force against the Sudetens.) In order to make this demonstration plausible before the elections Dr. Benes and the Czech Government invented the lie that Germany had mobilized troops and was about to invade Czechoslovakia. . . . The Jewish fabricators of these press lies hoped to bring about war by this means. . . . The Prague Government needed this lie as a pretext for their own monstrous work and terrorist oppression in influencing the election. . . . You all understand that a Great Power cannot submit a second time to such a base attack. In consequence I took the necessary precautions . . . on May 28.

I may assure you that since May 28 the most gigantic fortifications that ever existed are under construction [in the West]. . . . On the construction of the defenses there are now 278,000 workmen in Dr. Todt's army. In addition, there are, further, 84,000 workmen and 100,000 men of the labor service as well as numerous engineer and infantry battalions. . . . Before the beginning of winter Germany's fortifications in the West will be finished. Their power of defense is already in existence to its full extent. . . . These most gigantic efforts of all times have been made at my request in the interest of peace. In no circumstances shall I be willing any more to regard with endless tranquillity a continuation of the oppression of German compatriots in Czechoslovakia. . . .

I demand that the oppression of 3,500,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia shall cease and be replaced by the free right of self-determination. We would regret it if thereby our relations with other European nations should suffer harm. However, we are not to be blamed. . . . I am not willing to allow a second Palestine to be created here in the heart of Germany by actions of other statesmen. The poor Arabs are defenseless and perhaps deserted. The Germans of Czechoslovakia, however, are neither

deserted nor defenseless. . . . We all have a duty never to bow again to a foreign will. May this be our pledge, so help us God! ²⁹

Der Führer thus committed himself, on September 12, 1938, to the "liberation" of the Sudetens by the Reich. Did this imply a decision to risk a world war if Prague's allies came to her aid? Perhaps. Certainly Hitler and Chamberlain desired Benes and Daladier and the British and French publics to think so. But more probably it implied that by September 12 Hitler had received secret assurances that Chamberlain was confident of inducing French and Czech surrender and would order the Runciman report closed with a recommendation of partition. Britain would not fight to defend Czechoslovakia. This Hitler knew long before September 12. The gamble that he took was also Chamberlain's gamble. They wagered that under the impact of British pressure and German threats, Paris would abandon Prague, and Prague would yield.

3. THE HOME OF THE EVIL FAIRY

Hitler's Monday blast from Nürnberg was Downing Street's cue for raising the curtain on the next act of the play which the man from Birmingham and the man from Braunau had written between them. On Tuesday London and Paris pressed Benes to accept anticipated German demands for a plebiscite. Since a plebiscite could have but one outcome under the conditions of terrorism which the Henleinists had already created, this was a proposal for the partition of Czechoslovakia. British and French opinion were to be appeased by the vocabulary of democracy. But the war threat must be dramatized before public assent could be counted upon. Chamberlain called in the Defense Ministers to confer with the "inner Cabinet," consisting of four old men: Simon, who had condoned the Japanese conquest of Manchuria; Hoare, who had condoned the Italian conquest of Ethiopia; and Halifax, who had condoned the German conquest of Austria.

In Sudetenland Henlein now attempted a putsch—and met with dismal failure. On Tuesday the SDP issued an "ultimatum" demanding within six hours the lifting of martial law in the German districts and the withdrawal of troops and police. When Hodza and Benes ignored the ultimatum, the Henleinist leaders summoned their fol-

lowers to revolt. Some responded with attacks upon barracks and public buildings with arms supplied from the Reich. The issue was never in doubt. After a day of confused fighting, in which some scores were killed on both sides, Czech troops restored order everywhere. The would-be putschists fled by the thousands to Germany, where they were received as "refugees" from the Czech "terror." On Thursday, September 15, Henlein issued a proclamation demanding *Anschluss*. Prague ordered his arrest for treason. He fled at once to the Reich, accompanied by Deputy Franck, and left his somewhat bewildered and already defeated followers to wage the "just battle" to which he called them. If Berlin and London had entertained hopes of consummating the partition of Czechoslovakia in this fashion, they were now disillusioned.

The British Prime Minister had already taken the necessary next step. On Wednesday night Downing Street released an official statement:

The Prime Minister has sent the German Führer and Chancellor, through His Majesty's Ambassador to Berlin, the following message: "In view of the increasingly critical situation, I propose to come over at once to see you with the view to trying to find a peaceful solution. I propose to come across by air and am ready to start tomorrow. Please indicate the earliest time at which you can see me and suggest a place of meeting. I should be grateful for a very early reply. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN." The Führer and Chancellor has replied to the above message that he would be very ready to meet the British Prime Minister on September 15. The Prime Minister is, accordingly, leaving for Germany by air tomorrow.

Chamberlain left Heston airport, west of London, early the next morning for Munich. He took with him William Strang, Chief of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office, and Sir Horace Wilson, who was to be his constant companion and emissary during the following days. Halifax was pushed into the background. Wilson had long been the Prime Minister's "industrial relations adviser," comparable in role to Sir Frederick Leith-Ross (economic adviser) and Robert Vansittart (diplomatic adviser). Like them he was a man of shadows, neither bureaucrat nor politician, but a little of both. He seldom visited the Continent. But he knew much of press and publicity. His sly, cadaverous face was not that of a diplomatic Machiavelli, but that of a behind-the-scenes manipulator of propaganda. Such an expert Chamberlain now needed above all others.

He had no need to visit Hitler to ascertain his desires or intentions. He had the whole apparatus of the British and German foreign serv-

ices at his disposal to discover them. Moreover, he already knew them—and approved. Hitler had no need to invite Chamberlain to discover his intentions or desires. He already knew them—and approved. But the execution of their bargain sans war, which neither one intended or desired, required war threats, panic, and drama to produce French surrender and British acquiescence. For this the decision to fly to the Reich was the perfect device. The sixty-nine-year-old Prime Minister took to the air for the second time in his life (everybody said the first time) to snatch peace from the jaws of hell. This was unprecedented, alarming, and thrilling. Great crowds cheered at Whitehall and Heston.

Chamberlain's Cabinet colleagues were won to approval and to praise of the Prime Minister's "courage." Attlee and Sinclair were summoned to Downing Street and gave their blessing. On the 15th it was announced that Parliament would be called into special session to hear Chamberlain's report. This move likewise served a double purpose of heightening fears of war and silencing possible criticisms of Chamberlain's "personal diplomacy." In Paris there was immense astonishment and enormous relief. Daladier immediately claimed credit, averring that he had phoned Chamberlain in the afternoon to suggest some "exceptional procedure" to maintain peace.³⁰ That the Premier of France should take pride in having proposed a visit which was to reduce the Republic to shame and impotence was a tribute to Chamberlain's perfect planning.

Cæsar and Mikado brought fuel for the flames of fear which Chamberlain was fanning. Dark hints were dropped in Tokio of armed support of Germany and Italy—and of the liquidation of Anglo-French interests in the Orient. Mussolini's *Popolo d'Italia* printed an open letter to Runciman declaring "a Czechoslovak nation does not exist" and demanding plebiscites for all nationalities under Prague's rule. "You could make it known that England will think seven times before going to war to conserve that monstrous fiction of a State. . . . The game is absolutely not worth the candle." Here was a new challenge to all Britons and all Frenchmen. Were they to risk a war of inconceivable horror against a formidable coalition simply for the sake of denying to the Sudetens a right of "self-determination"? Nonsense. The thought was appalling. "Good old Neville!"

While Mrs. Chamberlain prayed in Westminster Abbey, her husband landed at the Munich airport at 1.00 p.m., Thursday, September 15, 1938. He was cheered by a large crowd and greeted by Rib-

bentrop, Henderson, Herbert von Dirksen, and Count Ernst von Weiszacker. A special "bomb-proof" train (Hitler's own) took the party up into the Alpine valleys, where station crowds did more cheering, and finally brought them to the Grand Hotel in Berchtesgaden. Dr. Otto Meissner met the guests with four cars which climbed the steep ascent to Berghof, Hitler's mountain home in Obersalzberg, some eight miles distant and more than half a mile higher than the town. On arrival a company of Black Guards presented arms before the spacious building. Hitler walked down the stairs in the rain to exchange cordial handshakes and smiles with his British friends.

Here amid the Alpine peaks nestled Hitler's chalet, successor to the modest Haus Wachenfeld, far above the valley named in folklore as the dwelling-place of Berchta, female demon and fearful fairy often invoked to frighten Bavarian children. From here Hitler had many times looked with longing into his coveted Austria. Here the Nazi potentates had frequently forgathered for party conferences. Here Frau Raupal, half-sister of Der Führer had long kept house. Here her daughter had met Uncle Adolf and had fallen victim to her morbidity and had taken her life. Here had come at various times the Duke of Windsor, David Lloyd George, the Marquess of Londonderry, Lord Halifax, and other British dignitaries. Here Schuschnigg had come to suffer humiliation and to hear terms of surrender. Here the man from Birmingham and the man from Braunau settled the fate of Czechoslovakia to their mutual satisfaction.

The Berchtesgaden "conference" of September 15, like wicked fairy Berchta, was a myth. But myths are indispensable in high politics no less than in fairy tales. From 5.00 to 8.00 p.m. the discussion went on amid luxurious tapestries and upholstery, each man using his own native tongue and employing a Nazi aide as interpreter. Chamberlain remained only long enough to preserve appearances. There is no reason to doubt that the "settlement" had been agreed upon long before, with only the details of execution remaining to be worked out. The inevitable communiqué was non-committal but promised more to come:

Berchtesgaden, September 15, 1938. The Führer and Reich Chancellor had a discussion today on Obersalzberg with the British Prime Minister, in the course of which a comprehensive and frank exchange of opinion on the present situation took place. The British Prime Minister will return to England tomorrow to confer with the British Cabinet. New discussions will take place in a few days.

Chamberlain later told Commons (September 28) what he wished Commons and the world to believe took place:

At this first conversation, which lasted three hours and at which only an interpreter was present besides Herr Hitler and myself, I very soon became aware the situation was much more acute and much more urgent than I had realized. In courteous but perfectly definite terms, Herr Hitler made it plain he had made up his mind the Sudeten Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich. If they could not achieve this by their own efforts, he said, he would assist them to do so and he declared categorically that, rather than wait, he would be prepared to risk a world war. . . .

So strongly did I get the impression that the Chancellor was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia that I asked him why he had allowed me to travel all that way, since I evidently was wasting my time. He said if I could give him there and then the assurance the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination, he was quite ready to discuss ways and means of carrying it out. If, on the contrary, I told him such a principle could not be considered by the British Government, then he agreed it was no use to continue our conversations. I was of course in no position to give there and then such assurance, but I undertook to return at once to consult my colleagues if he would refrain from active hostilities until I had had time to obtain their reply. That assurance he gave, provided, he said, nothing happened in Czechoslovakia of such a nature as to force his hands, and that assurance has remained binding ever since.

I have no doubt now, looking back, that my visit alone prevented an invasion for which everything had been prepared, and it was clear to me that with German troops in the positions they then occupied, nothing anybody could do would prevent an invasion unless the right of self-determination was granted, and that quickly, to the Sudeten Germans. And that was the sole hope of a peaceful solution.

Chamberlain's purpose in explaining the conference, like his purpose in making the visit, was to build up an impression of crisis and imminent war which could be averted only by the partition of Czechoslovakia. This "solution" had to be served up in a sauce palatable to democratic tastes. Hence the references to "right of self-

determination" (which was nonsense) and "returning to the Reich" (which was falsehood). For the rest, the bargain was already closed. Whether Chamberlain did in fact experience any private anxiety lest Der Führer break his pact by an armed attack upon Czechoslovakia may never be known. If this was indeed the case, the Prime Minister must have welcomed his worry as much as he disliked it, for it made it easier to spread fear in England and France with less strain upon his conscience.

His most serious problem lay less in any likelihood of sudden violence from the Reich or of dissent from his colleagues than in the possibility of French resistance. The defenses of Paris had been breached, but full capitulation had not yet been wrested from the defenders despite their demoralization.⁵¹ Chamberlain's plane landed in Heston airport early Friday afternoon. He emerged with a broad smile and an air of confidence. He received an ovation. The German Chargé greeted him warmly: "I hope you feel that you have been successful. At any rate, you have conquered the hearts of my countrymen." "They were very kind to me," replied the Prime Minister. "Very kind. I have had a great time. Why, people even ran out to wave as the plane flew over them!" To reporters he declared: "I feel satisfied now that each of us [he and Hitler] fully understands what is in the mind of the other. . . . I would advise you not to accept prematurely any unauthorized report of what took place in the conversation. I shall be discussing these talks tonight with my colleagues and others—especially Lord Runciman. Later on, perhaps in a few days, I am going to have another talk with Herr Hitler. Only this time he has told me it is his intention to come half way to meet me—to spare an old man another such long journey."

Runciman returned by plane from Prague the same day. "It may not be necessary for me to go back," he said on landing. "It is a very delicate situation. Everything is on the knees of the gods." He was reported to have brought a memorandum from Benes rejecting all proposals of cession or plebiscites. Chamberlain conferred with Simon, Hoare, and Halifax in the evening. Halifax had conferred earlier in the day with Dino Grandi and the Earl of Perth, as well as with the Archbishop of Canterbury and two Labor leaders, Attlee and Arthur Greenwood. A deputation from the National Council of Labor, consisting of Sir Walter Citrine, Herbert Morrison, and Hugh Dalton, warned that labor would resolutely oppose any plan for a Sudeten plebiscite. This was scarcely disturbing, but suggested that

the war panic had not yet been pushed to the requisite degree of frightfulness.

In remote Geneva the 19th Assembly had come together with many delegations absent. Its irrelevant deliberations were unwept, unhonored, and unsung. Among the foreign ministers of the Great Powers, only Litvinov appeared, though Bonnet made a brief visit. Geneva had withered away to the point at which it was no longer useful even as a façade. Earl De La Warr, Lord Privy Seal, came in haste from London on September 16 to urge that the sanctions article be diluted. "Each case must be considered on its merits." Even in case of flagrant aggression, there is "no automatic obligation to apply either economic or military sanctions," but only an obligation to consult. Each State must judge for itself whether it would act against an aggressor. The Earl hastened back to London without waiting to hear Dr. Wellington Koo's pathetic plea that the members invoke Article 17 against Japan, apply an arms embargo against the aggressor and grant aid to his victim in accordance with previous resolutions, and take action to deter Tokio from continuing to use "barbarous methods of warfare." He pleaded against abandoning Article 16 and asked whether the League was "to be no more than an Egyptian mummy dressed up with all the luxuries and splendors of the living but devoid of life." Silence gave assent.

In all that followed, the League was indeed a mummy, for its slow-moving procedures, already petrified by Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, were never resorted to even for the purpose of lending respectability to the new betrayal of Woodrow Wilson's dream. On September 19 the Council did indeed ask Tokio to assume membership for the settlement of its "dispute" with China. On September 22 the wolf declined to discuss the fate of the lamb with the sheep at Geneva. Britain again asked an optional and discretionary interpretation of Article 16. The Council held on the 28th that sanctions were applicable to Japan. None was attempted. Tokio warned of reprisals. On the 29th the Assembly passed a resolution hoping for European peace and associating itself with Roosevelt's messages. On September 30 the Assembly resolved to sever the Covenant from the Treaty of Versailles and adopted a report permitting the League to deal with any "war or threat of war" without unanimity. On the same day the Council resolved that sanctions against Japan were discretionary; invited an investigation of Chinese charges of Japanese use of poison gas; and appointed a committee (Britain, France, and Iran) to "take

note" of the release of foreign volunteers by the Spanish Republic. All of this was verbiage. Litvinov kept urging support of Czechoslovakia and conferred with French and Rumanian representatives, all to no purpose. He threatened to appeal to the League on behalf of Czechoslovakia, also to no purpose. To stir mummies to life is difficult, even for a Litvinov. The morticians had performed their work too well.

To return to London: Chamberlain met the full Cabinet on Saturday morning, September 17, and again in the afternoon. No statement was issued, but reports suggested a division of opinion. A small group, comprising Alfred Duff Cooper, Malcolm MacDonald, and perhaps Halifax himself was said to oppose the Chamberlain-Hitler plan on the ground that it would constitute a betrayal of Czechoslovakia and of the Czech, Jewish, and democratic minorities in Sudetenland. Another faction opposed Chamberlain's suggestion that Britain should "guarantee" a truncated Czechoslovakia, possibly not understanding that such a pledge would be meaningless save as a cheap gesture. Simon, Hoare, and Sir Kingsley Wood were reported to be opposed to any British commitments beyond the Rhine. After five hours of discussion and a further visit of Grandi to the Foreign Office the Cabinet adjourned. There is no reason to believe that Chamberlain took all of his colleagues completely into his confidence. Had he done so the institution of the "inner Cabinet" would have been unnecessary. Like God, the Prime Minister moved in mysterious ways his wonders to perform.

On the same day Chamberlain invited Daladier and Bonnet to come to London on Sunday. Here and hereafter Chamberlain acted as the intermediary for conveying Hitler's demand to both Prague and Paris. That the intermediary was also collaborator was not fully appreciated at the Czech and the French capitals. That the collaborator had in Bonnet a secret co-collaborator was likewise not suspected. The King interrupted his holiday at Balmoral Castle to receive Runciman in the capital. Chamberlain received Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. Most observers in Paris mistakenly anticipated a "strong" French stand in favor of Czechoslovakia's integrity. Henlein simultaneously announced the formation of a Sudeten "Freikorps" along the Czech frontiers: "Benes persists in lying. . . . He is too much of a coward to acknowledge that his policy has collapsed. . . . Knowing full well the consequences, he turns Bolshevist-Hussite hordes in uniform, in the shape of hate-filled Czech soldiery, loose upon de-

fenseless Sudetens. . . . We therefore assume for ourselves emergency rights." Prague replied by proclaiming a state of emergency throughout the country. The official Polish press initiated a clamor for annexation of Czech Silesia, anticipating correctly that the outcome of Chamberlain's program would be the partition of Czechoslovakia. At the door of No. 10 Downing Street sat a black cat—an omen of "good luck," said many. For whom?

Sunday, September 18, 1938, will ever be memorable to future ages as Europe's doomsday—not because a threatened war broke out, but because a sham war was "averted" by a bargain which in its ultimate implications spelled the demise of Western civilization on the Continent. In a broadcast at noon Premier Hodza appealed to his countrymen for courage and "determination to defend what is ours." He rejected a plebiscite and voiced Prague's resolve to seek peace by negotiation while "defending completely the integrity of the State." In Trieste, which he visited for the first time since his assumption of Cæsar's mantle, Mussolini told a cheering throng that the Czechoslovak problem demanded a "totalitarian" solution. Chamberlain, as a "flying messenger of peace," had appreciated the gravity of the situation. "If a line-up of universal character is brought on for or against Prague, let it be known that Italy's place is already chosen. . . . The world of Hebrewism has for sixteen years been the irreconcilable enemy of Fascism." But all roads led to London. The *Daily Mail* carried an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden by G. Ward Price in which Der Führer expressed confidence in Chamberlain's "sincerity and good will" and asserted that "this Czech trouble has got to be ended once and for all and ended now." Germany had been obliged to double its air force because Czechoslovakia was an ally of Soviet Russia. Germany had studied the Maginot Line and built a better one. But no German wanted war with either France or Britain. "This infernal Czech tyranny," however, must stop. "Stop it shall!"

On Sunday morning Daladier and Bonnet flew to London and were met at Croydon airport by Chamberlain and Halifax. With unconscious humor the Premier exclaimed to the Prime Minister: "What a magnificent gesture your air trip to Germany was!" After conferring with Ambassador Corbin the French visitors drove to 10 Downing Street amid cheering crowds and there went into conference with the "inner Cabinet" plus Vansittart, Cadogan, Runciman, and Ash-

ton-Gwatkin. From 11.00 to 1.30 they talked and again from 3.30 to 7.40 and from 9.30 till after midnight. Police kept watch on milling crowds in Whitehall. Amid cries of "No concessions to Hitler!" and "Stand by the Czechs!" Miss Ellen Wilkenson, Laborite, shouted: "We say to Neville Chamberlain—we do not trust you. We believe you went to Germany to fix up the sale of liberties of Czechoslovakia." This effervescence was troublesome, but not serious. More important as a reflection of mass sentiment, and as a device to steer that sentiment in the desired direction, were the prayers for peace all over the Empire. The Archbishop of Canterbury issued the call, having doubtless been advised to do so by Halifax on Friday. The King prayed in Windsor Castle. The Queen prayed in Crathie Parish Church. Mrs. Chamberlain prayed with a great throng in Westminster Abbey at the tomb of the unknown soldier who had apparently died to make the world safe for hypocrisy. Hour after hour the discussions at No. 10 Downing Street went on. Jan Masaryk, Czech Minister, presented a note in the afternoon asserting that no "solution" would be valid without Czechoslovakia's assent. Honest men are often naïve.

What went on behind closed doors during these hours of worldwide anxiety and heartbreak can only be surmised from the prior and subsequent decisions reached. In his official explanation to Commons of September 28 Chamberlain declared that Runciman, on the evening of September 16, had recommended the "solution" embodied in his letter of September 21. But France had first to be consulted. Therefore Daladier and Bonnet had been summoned to London:

During these conversations, the representatives of the two governments were actuated by the desire to find a solution that would not bring about a European war and therefore a solution which would not automatically compel France to take action in accordance with her obligations. It was agreed that the only means of achieving this object was to accept the principle of self-determination.

Accordingly the British and French ministers at Prague were instructed to inform the Czechoslovak Government that continuance within Czechoslovakia of districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Germans would imperil the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and all hopes of peace. The Czechoslovak Gov-

ernment was asked to agree immediately to direct the transfer to the Reich of areas inhabited by a population of more than fifty percent Germans.

The Czechoslovak Government were informed that to meet their natural desire for their security in the future His Majesty's Government would be prepared as a contribution to the pacification of Europe to join in an international guarantee in regard to new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. Such a guarantee would safeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia by substituting a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of the existing treaties with France and Russia which involved reciprocal obligations of a military character. In agreeing to that guarantee His Majesty's Government were accepting a completely new commitment. We were not previously bound by any obligations toward Czechoslovakia other than those involved by the Covenant of the League.

This tale told nothing of the Sunday discussions of September 18 which preceded the decision. It is scarcely likely that the Britons were obliged to spend the whole day and half the night browbeating their French guests into surrender. Daladier had assuredly been advised by Chamberlain of the necessity of sacrificing Czechoslovakia long before this day. But the sore-beset and ill-advised French Premier with the weak mouth had been already intimidated and demoralized. His smirking Foreign Minister was Chamberlain's agent in consummating Daladier's disintegration. The debate centered not on the principle of partition but rather on the best method of consummating the betrayal of France's allies and presenting it to the world in plausible guise. Daladier and Bonnet apparently insisted upon the façade of an Anglo-French "guarantee," since this would be helpful in securing public assent in France. Chamberlain and his colleagues at first dissented, since such a pledge might be denounced in the High Tory press. Both sides knew that the issue had no relationship to "protecting" what would be left of Czechoslovakia. With the mountain barriers of Sudetenland surrendered, Prague would henceforth be completely at the mercy of Berlin. Since it could offer no resistance to future Nazi demands, it could never become an object of future "aggression." But Parliament and public had to be placated. The result was compromise: the guarantee would be "international" rather

than Anglo-French; it would operate only against "unprovoked" aggression; it would thus leave loop-holes of escape in the event that anyone in the future should take the guarantee seriously. That such a cheap and sorry gesture could be regarded by its perpetrators as "good politics"—i.e. as an effective means of eliciting popular acquiescence in their respective countries—could only mean that the gentlemen in Downing Street had implicit confidence in the stupidity, moral irresponsibility, and unquenchable thirst for peace-at-any-price of the vast majority of Britons and Frenchmen. This confidence—let the day perish!—was not misplaced.

At ten minutes past the midnight which divided Sunday from Monday (and divided one epoch from another) the conference ended. The Ministers emerged in a pouring rain. The black cat and the crowds had sought shelter. Daladier listlessly issued the text of a communiqué—as usual empty of all content. It read:

After full discussion of the present international situation representatives of the British and French governments are in complete agreement as to the policy to be adopted with a view to promoting a peaceful solution of the Czechoslovak question. The two governments hope that thereafter it will be possible to consider a more general settlement in the interests of European peace.

But the secret was out. The press of all the world on the morning after blazoned the substance of the Anglo-French demands upon Prague. They were presented to the Czechoslovak Government on Monday:

*The Anglo-French Proposals presented to the Czechoslovak
Government on September 19, 1938*

THE representatives of the French and British Governments have been in consultation today on the general situation, and have considered the British Prime Minister's report of his conversation with Herr Hitler. British Ministers also placed before their French colleagues their conclusions derived from the account furnished to them of the work of his Mission by Lord Runciman. We are both convinced that, after recent events, the point has now been reached where the further maintenance within the boundaries of the Czechoslovak State of the districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Deutsch cannot, in fact, continue any longer without imperiling the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and of European peace. In the light of these considerations, both Governments have been compelled to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia's vital interests cannot effectively be assured unless these areas are now transferred to the Reich.

2. This could be done either by direct transfer or as the result of a plebiscite. We realize the difficulties involved in a plebiscite, and we are aware of your objections already expressed to this course, particularly the possibility of far-

reaching repercussions if the matter were treated on the basis of so wide a principle. For this reason we anticipate, in the absence of indication to the contrary, that you may prefer to deal with the Sudeten Deutsch problem by the method of direct transfer, and as a case by itself.

3. The area for transfer would probably have to include areas with over 50 per cent. of German inhabitants, but we should hope to arrange by negotiations provisions for adjustment of frontiers, where circumstances render it necessary, by some international body, including a Czech representative. We are satisfied that the transfer of smaller areas based on a higher percentage would not meet the case.

4. The international body referred to might also be charged with questions of possible exchange of population on the basis of right to opt within some specified time-limit.

5. We recognize that, if the Czechoslovak Government is prepared to concur in the measures proposed, involving material changes in the conditions of the State, they are entitled to ask for some assurance of their future security.

6. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared, as a contribution to the pacification of Europe, to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. One of the principal conditions of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of existing treaties which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character.

7. Both the French and British Governments recognize how great is the sacrifice thus required of the Czechoslovak Government in the cause of peace. But because that cause is common both to Europe in general and in particular to Czechoslovakia herself they have felt it their duty jointly to set forth frankly the conditions essential to secure it.

8. The Prime Minister must resume conversations with Herr Hitler not later than Wednesday, and earlier if possible. We therefore feel we must ask for your reply at the earliest possible moment.³²

This ultimatum, so far as I have been able to discover, is completely without precedent in the annals of diplomacy. Never before in the history of the Western State system has a Great Power in alliance with a small Power, upon whose integrity and independence the security and prestige of the Great Power rested, collaborated with another Great Power (in virtual alliance with itself) to present to its small ally demands for its own suicide at the behest of a third Great Power, at once the potential enemy of all three. Some experiments, being fatal, can only be attempted once. The ultimatum was coupled with threats, sugared with empty promises, and smeared over with formulas of deceit intended for British and French home consumption. The object of the sacrifice was to safeguard "European peace" and—*mirabile dictu!*—"the safety of Czechoslovakia's vital interests." Prague's objection to a plebiscite were used to justify demands for

cession without a plebiscite. Prague's surrender of its alliances with France, the USSR, Rumania, and Jugoslavia were depicted as a small loss compared to the great gain of an international guarantee. A forty-eight-hour time limit was implied. The threat of desertion was not put in writing. This was unnecessary. Benes, Hodza, and Krofta would understand. If not, Newton and de la Croix would tell them.

The men of the Hradcany were not quite capable of comprehending so appalling a piece of perfidy. They groped in bewilderment at the news of what they could only term, in broken voices, "the greatest betrayal in history." On Monday morning the French Cabinet unanimously endorsed Sunday's decision, though Paul Reynaud, Georges Mandel, Henri Queuille, and César Campinchi were reported to have opposed the plan. Stefan Osusky emerged from an hour's talk with Bonnet at the Quai d'Orsay haggard of mien and with his eyes filled with tears: "They have condemned my country without a hearing." Bonnet later made an apologetic explanation to the French Press, declaring that "all regrets about the past are now useless." The Cabinet was averting "mourning and misery in millions of homes" and would try to make the surgical operation on Czechoslovakia "as painless as possible." Newton and de la Croix called on Benes in the morning to warn him against any hasty action. The ultimatum was officially presented at 2.00 p.m. Prague inquired of Paris as to whether France would honor its obligations in the event that Czech rejection of the ultimatum should be followed by German aggression. No answer was forthcoming. The Czechoslovak Cabinet met in the evening to formulate its painful decision. At Rome Sir Noel Charles, British Chargé, called on Ciano. Perth returned to his post on Tuesday. The Fascist Press continued its attacks on Prague.

On Tuesday, September 20, Hitler received Imredy and Kanya at Berchtesgaden to discuss Hungary's demands. Ambassador Lipski called at Wilhelmstrasse with regard to Poland's demands. Horthy enjoyed a hunting trip with Göring in East Prussia. Mussolini at Udine orated: "We prefer to be feared rather than loved and we care not if we are hated because we have nothing but contempt for those who hate us." While the vultures gathered, Prague prepared its answer. In the evening Newton and de la Croix were handed a note. It protested, pleaded for reconsideration, recalled Prague's loyalty to her allies, warned that France would be imperilled by German domi-

nation of a truncated Czechoslovakia, and proposed arbitration under the German-Czech treaty of 1925. Within a few hours, after phone conversations between London and Paris, the Western Powers sent to Prague a new ultimatum rejecting the Czech answer and demanding an immediate "yes" or "no." De la Croix was instructed to warn Prague of the dangers of a "negative or dilatory attitude." Astor's *Times* declared soothingly that Czechoslovakia later "will come to believe the ultimate gain will be more real than the immediate sacrifice."

At 2.15 a.m. on Wednesday Benes received the French and British Ministers with their urgent demands. They made it clear that if Prague rejected the ultimatum, France and Britain would not come to Czechoslovakia's defense in the event of a German invasion. At Bucharest it was intimated that Rumania's willingness to give transit to Soviet troops for the defense of Czechoslovakia was contingent upon French defense of Prague. The USSR was not bound to aid Czechoslovakia without French support. Litvinov nevertheless considered such aid despite French repudiation of the alliance. He told the League Assembly on Wednesday that the USSR had refrained from all intervention and advice in the negotiations between Prague and the SDP and that it considered it quite "inadmissible" that Prague should be asked to make concessions "in order that we should be set free from the necessity of fulfilling our obligations under the treaty bearing our signature. Neither did we offer any advice in the contrary direction." Prague had never doubted Moscow's determination to carry out its pledges.

But when, a few days before I left for Geneva, the French Government for the first time inquired of my Government as to its attitude in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, I gave the French representative in Moscow, in the name of my Government, the following perfectly clear and unambiguous reply: "We intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact, together with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by the way open to us; our War Department is ready immediately to participate in a conference with representatives of the French and Czechoslovak war departments in order to discuss measures appropriate to the moment. In an event like this, we shall consider desirable that the question be raised in the League of Nations, if only as yet under Article 11, with the object, first, of mobiliz-

ing public opinion, and, secondly, ascertaining the position of certain other States whose passive aid might be extremely valuable." We said further that it was necessary to exert all means of avoiding an armed conflict and we considered one such method to be immediate consultation between the Great Powers of Europe and other interested States, in order, if possible, to decide on the terms for a collective demarche. This is how our reply was framed.⁸³

Subsequent efforts were made by British and French leaders to excuse their own conduct by casting doubts on Moscow's sincerity. In fact, only the USSR remained loyal to its promises. Those promises were reiterated at Geneva on September 21. The pledge of 1935 was to defend Prague if Paris defended Prague. Moscow had already concentrated more troops near the Polish-Rumanian frontier than were contained in the entire Polish army. Rydz-Smigly and Beck were panic-stricken. Rather than risk Russian invasion they were ready to join Paris, Prague, and Moscow against the Reich.⁸⁴ Bucharest was already prepared to join the coalition. Britain would have had no option but to join if Paris defended Prague. There is no evidence, save the word of Neville Chamberlain, that Hitler was prepared to challenge such a coalition to war, since his defeat would have been a foregone conclusion. But it was precisely such a defeat—above all, a defeat in which the Red Army might play a major role—that Chamberlain and Daladier were most anxious to prevent. The Hradcany and the Kremlin already knew that Paris would not defend Prague. Should Moscow then act alone?

For Moscow to act alone might have been to play directly into the hands of Hitler and Chamberlain. Any diplomatic or military initiative by the USSR might have rallied Tories everywhere to support of Der Führer. The Government at Prague, moreover, was as much anti-Communist as the Government at Paris or London, despite Dr. Göbbels's allegations. Yet if Prague resisted with Moscow's help—or even alone—there was a possibility that popular sympathy in both France and Britain might turn out the Cabinets in office and force intervention, thus creating a great coalition à la Barthou. But Rudolf Beran, leader of the reactionary Agrarian Party, threatened to summon Nazi aid if Benes summoned Soviet aid. Benes might have arrested him for treason, and, with Russian aid certain and French involvement probable, might have risked all in one courageous stroke.

But he was weary of betrayals. He yielded. The Nemesis of the West was again at work. Capitulation to Fascism, even if it meant suicide, was deemed preferable to salvation if salvation could be had only with Communist aid.

After many hours of agonizing debate the Prague Cabinet surrendered at 3.30 p.m., Wednesday, September 21, 1938. An official communiqué announced the decision:

. . . We had to depend upon our friends' help, but when we were threatened with force it became evident that the European crisis had become so serious that our friends advised us to purchase freedom and peace by sacrifices, inasmuch as they could not help us. Two Great Powers told us with the full weight of their conviction and authority that only by territorial sacrifices on our part could security and peace be assured. We wished to suggest a settlement of the dispute by arbitration, but the suggestion was rejected by others. England and France, two democracies, informed us that solution by arbitration could not solve the difficulty. It was their opinion that peace and freedom could not be established by such procedure. They informed us that they could not extend aid in the event we were attacked by Germany and they were of the opinion such a conflict would have been inevitable had Czechoslovakia refused to cede the territories of the German population.

Inasmuch as Russia was willing to come to our help only on condition that France came first and, moreover, only after the League of Nations should have determined that Czechoslovakia was attacked and that Germany was the aggressor, we found ourselves facing the threat of war menacing not only the State but associated nations as a whole. . . . The President of the Republic and our Government could do nothing but accept the suggestions of the two Powers. . . . Nothing else remained, because we were alone. . . .

At 5.00 p.m. Krofta received the ministers of France and England and presented to them the Government's answer to the demarche which they had presented to the President of the Republic at 2.00 a.m. In its answer the Czechoslovak Government initiated negotiations for a formal solution of the nationalities problem in the manner which the ministers proposed on September 19. . . .⁸⁵

Krofta's note declared that Czechoslovakia sorrowfully accepted the terms under "extraordinary pressure." It emphasized the promised guarantee and the safeguarding of Czechoslovakia's vital interests and assumed that no invasion would be tolerated until the international commission should fix the new frontiers with Prague's collaboration. Vain hopes! Angry crowds milled through Prague denouncing Benes and demanding war. In a radio address Hugo Vavrecka, the new Minister of Propaganda, declared that the Cabinet had no alternative: "It is a case without parallel in history that our allies and friends should impose conditions upon us which are usually

imposed upon vanquished enemies. It is not a lack of courage that induced our Government to take the decision which grips our hearts. . . . God knows that more courage is needed for living than for committing suicide. . . . We resolved to offer ourselves as a sacrifice for world peace, just as centuries ago the Divinity sacrificed Himself on the Cross for the benefit of mankind. We shall not blame those who left us in the lurch, but history will pronounce a judgment about these days.”⁸⁶

On Thursday morning Premier Hodza resigned. A new Cabinet, in which Kamil Krofta retained his post, was formed by one-eyed General Jan Syrový, Inspector-General of the army. Benes pleaded for calm and unity. Representatives of all parties from Communist to Fascist addressed a great multitude before the parliament building in support of the “Government of National Defense.” Anger and despair at betrayal gave way in some circles to frantic hopes that the nation would still be permitted to fight to preserve its integrity.

Chamberlain prepared to return to the Reich to make Hitler a gift of Sudetenland. The Polish and Hungarian envoys called at Downing Street on Wednesday with demands for shares of the loot. Krofta received an ultimatum from Warsaw demanding Teschen and threatening invasion. Mussolini reiterated his demands at Treviso. Litvinov at Geneva declared that Paris and London had ignored offers of Soviet aid and were granting “bonuses” for saber-rattling. In Britain and France relief at “peace” was already giving way to a sense of outrage. Winston Churchill returned from Paris and called upon his countrymen to realize the scope of “the disaster into which we are being led.” He declared that the capitulation was “a complete surrender of the Western democracies to the Nazi threat of force” and would free twenty-five German divisions to threaten the Western Front. Sir Archibald Sinclair said: “Do not let us prate of justice and self-determination.” Laborites organized a campaign of protest. In a Wednesday address to the English Speaking Union at Stratford-on-Avon, Eden mildly denounced the Cabinet’s action. The French Socialist and Communist parties adopted resolutions denouncing the desertion of Czechoslovakia and demanding a special session of parliament. *Le Temps* began to waver in its enthusiasm for surrender. Impending Cabinet resignations were rumored. It had clearly become necessary to revive the war panic in order to insure public acquiescence in the gifts to Hitler which Chamberlain had promised at the abode of Berchta.

4. THE HILL OF THE PAGAN GODS

By all canons of reason the "crisis" should have ended with the Czech capitulation of September 21. Why did it continue and become even more acute? The labored explanations of Neville Chamberlain and his associates are well known: Hitler at Godesberg made new demands. He asked immediate German military occupation of the areas to be ceded. He also insisted upon humiliating conditions of cession and upon the annexation of districts of mixed or doubtful language. Prague rejected these demands. Paris and London did not insist on their acceptance, but regarded them as unreasonable. Hitler refused to yield. All Powers therefore prepared for war. But at the last moment, in response to desperate appeals, Hitler agreed to a four-Power parley and accepted terms which were a compromise between the Berchtesgaden and the Godesberg demands. Thus "peace with honor" was saved at the eleventh hour.

That Hitler insisted upon wide annexations and immediate military occupation is clear, though here as always his demands were a reflection of his assumptions regarding risks. Thanks to Chamberlain, he knew that the risks were small. That Chamberlain was in some measure surprised and shocked by these demands is probable, but by no means certain. He perhaps feared that Der Führer was, after all, some sort of madman who was resolved to use naked force quite needlessly because he loved its beauty. He perhaps feared that Hitler preferred war without victory to victory without war and was bent upon breaking the terms of their bargain. On the other hand the question of the precise scope and mode of Czechoslovakia's sacrifices was not a matter of serious concern to a British Prime Minister who had already decided that the Czechoslovak Republic must go and had compelled Paris and Prague to accept the principle of partition. Even the questions of a time limit and of immediate occupation were not in themselves of sufficient magnitude to justify what seemed to be a belated decision to fight. That Hitler was prepared to fight over such details is most doubtful. That he desired Chamberlain to believe that he intended to fight is less doubtful. That Chamberlain believed him is possible. But that Chamberlain intended that Britain should fight or permit France to fight over the tempo and procedural details of Czech partition, after he had long since decided not to fight and not to

permit France to fight over the principle of partition, is so utterly improbable as to approach the preposterous.

The much advertised discrepancy between the Berchtesgaden and the Godesberg demands, moreover, was mythological. If such a discrepancy existed, Chamberlain could readily enough have demonstrated its existence by making public the minutes, notes, or memoranda exchanged at Berchtesgaden. But the White Paper of September 28 and Chamberlain's speech of the same day contained no such material. Aside from questions of time and method, the Anglo-French ultimatum to Prague of September 19 contained nothing incompatible with what Hitler asked at Godesberg. Chamberlain relied upon simple affirmation of the discrepancy. He conveyed the impression that the Berchtesgaden proceedings were informal and oral and involved only the "principle" of "self-determination" and not the details of its application. If no details were agreed upon, there could be no "discrepancy" between two alleged sets of demands. If details were agreed upon and subsequently departed from, this fact could be readily shown by permitting parliaments and public to compare two sets of documents. This was precisely what was not permitted. Here, then, is presumptive evidence, albeit negative and circumstantial in character, that the discrepancy was a fiction, probably concocted by Hitler and Chamberlain in concert. In the Munich accord Hitler was freely granted immediate military occupation—by stages, to be sure, but occupation would be by stages in any case. In terms of territory he received more than his maximum initial demands. There was no "compromise" and no "peace with honor." Why, then, the new crisis?

The most plausible hypothesis is not that Chamberlain was shocked, confused, and befuddled, first resisting new demands, then shrinking back from the brink of war, and finally yielding before threats of hostilities. His masterly management of the entire drama all but precludes these possibilities. Neither is it likely that a decision for war was reached and then rescinded because of the advice of strategists that the Reich was already invincible. Chamberlain never contemplated war with Germany, regardless of Berlin's demands on Prague. Hitler never contemplated war with France and Britain. The two men understood each other and were agreed that the dramatization of a non-existent war danger would be desirable for its effects upon British and French opinion. After September 21 fear of war and relief at surrender gave way in the democracies to shame, alarm, and indigna-

tion. The Prime Minister was cognizant of Abraham Lincoln's dictum: "You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time." The partition of Czechoslovakia, already assented to in the diplomatic sphere, could not be carried through to a successful conclusion without parliamentary and public support in the democracies. That support was crumbling before a rising flood of protest at the betrayal. Should Hitler launch a local war against Prague in the knowledge that Chamberlain and Daladier would not intervene, this flood might sweep both men from office and precipitate Anglo-French intervention. Here was the actual crisis. How to meet it? A simple accord with Hitler on the basis of the Berchtesgaden demands and the London ultimatum would be inadequate, for these were already the objects of heated attack. A simple acceptance of "new" and "more extreme" demands would serve only to raise the tide of indignation and still further jeopardize the whole scheme.

The solution of this double dilemma was a work of genius. Hitler must be cautioned against even a local war, though he must continue to play as belligerent a role as possible in order to spread new alarm in the West. Prague must finally be broken into accepting any German demands, but must first be encouraged to play a role of resistance—also to spread alarm in the West. Above all, a new threat of war must be manufactured in order that indignation at surrender might again give way to public panic at the prospect of Armageddon. The terms of the original "surrender," moreover, must be made to appear "just" and "honorable" by comparison with alleged "new" terms which Hitler was supposed to be insisting upon under threat of immediate hostilities. The "new" demands must be "resisted" even by the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street—for gestures of resistance would recreate and aggravate the war panic. The peoples and parliaments of Britain and France must be brought to the very brink of war and then snatched back at the last possible moment through apparent "concessions" by Hitler, making possible a settlement on the basis of the "original" demands, which would now appear eminently moderate, desirable, and even welcome as an escape from an appalling prospect of universal slaughter and destruction. Such a settlement not only would be accepted but would be hailed with wild enthusiasm in both the democracies if it could be presented in the guise of the magic phrases which Chamberlain had already found so useful: "general settlement" and "European appeasement."

In short, the steps from Godesberg to Munich were prearranged, as were the steps from London to Berchtesgaden and from Berchtesgaden to Godesberg. This is not to say that the man from Braunau and the man from Birmingham wrote out between them the whole text of the play, with acts and scenes neatly timed and each player, including the dupes and dummies, assigned his precise role and his precise lines. This was unnecessary. As fellow politicians the two men understood each other without this. And if they played between themselves their own little game of threat and counter-threat, this play-within-a-play was also part of the larger plot. Authorship of this masterpiece was mixed. Hitler was ably assisted by Ribbentrop, Reichenau, Keitel, and others, with the talented hand of Göbbels indicated at certain points. Il Duce was likewise helpful. Rydz-Smigly and Horthy furnished comic relief as ghouls. Chamberlain was aided by Sir Horace Wilson, by Simon, Hoare, and Halifax, and by Vansittart and Cadogan in uncertain measure. He was also aided by Bonnet. Daladier, the baker's son, was stooge. Roosevelt was given a front seat among the spectators, half-persuaded that the play was real, and induced to hiss and clap at the proper moment—*pour encourager les autres*. Litvinov sat in the last row of the gallery, unable to change the playbill or warn the audience that most of what it beheld was optical illusion produced with mirrors. But almost alone among the onlookers he found the lines familiar and knew how the plot would turn out.

Act II opened on Thursday, September 22, at Godesberg on the Rhine, between Bonn and Köln. This famous health resort—named “Mount of the Gods” in ancient days—boasts numerous modern hotels and a castle built in 1210 by Archbishop Teoderich I. Der Führer stayed always at the Dreesen, which he had already visited no less than sixty-seven times. It was on the terrace of the Rhine Hotel at Godesberg that he had stood at midnight on June 29, 1934, gazing moodily at the crowd of merrymakers, turning to Göbbels at his side for comfort, and at length receiving dispatches and phone calls from Göring in Berlin. It was from Godesberg that Hitler and Göbbels went to the airport at Bonn and soared off southward into the black night, Munich-bound, to begin before dawn the fearful butchery of friends and colleagues which was to give the day forever the name of “Bloody Saturday.” To the Hotel Dreesen Hitler now came again. Chamberlain, acting on the adage: “If you don't concede the first time, fly, fly again,” flew from Heston to Köln with Wilson

and Strang. On alighting at half past noon, he was again received by Ribbentrop, Dirksen, and Henderson. He saluted the Hitler body-guard and was driven to Bonn and then across the river to Godesberg, where he put up at the Petershof. After lunch he motored down the mountain, crossed the Rhine once more by ferry, and proceeded up the opposite bank to the Dreesen, where Hitler met him on the balcony, attended by Göbbels, Ribbentrop, and Keitel.

The first "conference" lasted from 4.10 to 7.17. Chamberlain issued a communiqué, promising resumption on the morrow and appealing for calm and order in Czechoslovakia. Amid deep secrecy and a fog of press speculation, the discussion was resumed on Friday at the Dreesen, interrupted, continued by a curious exchange of letters between the hotels, and then continued later in the evening and brought to a conclusion at 1.30 a.m. Saturday with a communiqué referring to a "friendly spirit," a "German memorandum" to be transmitted by Chamberlain to Prague, and "sincere thanks" from Der Führer to the Prime Minister for his efforts for "peace." Sir Horace made cryptic utterances and announced that the Prime Minister was flying back to London Saturday morning. The exchange of letters across the Rhine, with nothing of their content as yet made public, led to alarming rumors of a rupture. Both German and British sources wrapped the conference in deep mystery, nicely calculated to spread fear. After the close of the midnight conference Chamberlain increased the anxiety by declaring: "I cannot say it is hopeless."

The fabrication of a new war panic proceeded apace. On Friday evening Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay suddenly informed the Czechs that they could not "continue to take responsibility of advising them not to mobilize." In a cruel frenzy of fear and hope, President Benes issued a call for general mobilization at 10.26 p.m. Troops moved to the frontier. The Nazi Press raged against the Czech "terror" and printed false reports about loss of life in border fighting. Vladimir Potemkin, Acting Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had unwittingly contributed to the panic by handing a note to the Polish Chargé at 4 a.m. Friday warning Warsaw that Moscow would denounce its non-aggression pact with Poland if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Exactly twenty-four hours later the French Government ordered partial mobilization after Daladier had issued a statement the preceding evening hinting that the discussions had been broken off and declaring "in the event of Czechoslovakia's being the victim of unprovoked aggression, France will immediately take the necessary

measures of assistance." Half a million troops were called up and air-raid measures were rushed.

It was in England that it was most imperative to evoke new paroxysms of terror over the imminence of war. On Thursday fourteen gas-mask stations were opened in London. All citizens were ordered to report for fittings except children under five "for whom other arrangements are being made." Great crowds gathered for fittings. London hospitals made arrangements to remove their patients to make room for air-raid casualties. Radio announcers gave awe-inspiring instructions to bewildered citizens as to how they might escape sudden death. Stretchers were unloaded from trucks in Whitehall. School-teachers were told to await instructions for the evacuation of their pupils from the capital. Some spoke of removing the whole population of the world's largest metropolis to country districts. Country gentlemen were asked to billet children. Lady Londonderry hurried down from Scotland and opened her Park Lane house as a recruiting station for women transport drivers. By Sunday the ARP (Air Raid Precautions) was broadcasting horrendous alarms in cinema theaters, on bulletin boards, and from loud speakers on trucks. Thousands of men all over England were piling sandbags around public buildings and—most fearful of all—digging huge holes in most of the public parks. These yawning graves, it was indicated, would be covered over with corrugated iron and earth and would constitute civilian shelters during raids.

The underlings who ordered these measures were of course acting in good faith. The Cabinet members who planned the terror campaign were not, though it is impossible to say how many of their colleagues were taken into confidence by Chamberlain, Simon, Hoare, and Halifax. These measures for the most part had no relevance to actual defense against air raids. There is no recorded instance of air squadrons attacking civilians with gas bombs. They are much too expensive and wholly ineffective. The spraying of mustard gas offers greater possibilities, but against this horror shelters are unnecessary and masks are useless. Trenches in public parks and the distribution of gas masks are laughable as protection against air attack. But the populace, knowing nothing of the hoax, did not laugh. It recoiled in a cold sweat—which was precisely the effect which Chamberlain desired to achieve.

The Prime Minister flew back to London on Saturday and met his inner Cabinet at 3.35 and the full Cabinet at 5.00. The text of the final

"German Memorandum" was issued on Sunday, the 25th. The other documents exchanged across the Rhine were reproduced in the White Paper issued September 28. Chamberlain's note to Hitler of Friday morning objected to Der Führer's demand for immediate military occupation of Sudetenland. "I do not think you have realized the impossibility of my agreeing to put forward any plan unless I have reason to suppose it will be considered by public opinion in my country, in France and, indeed, in the world generally as carrying out the principles already agreed in an orderly fashion and free from the threat of force." Military occupation would be deemed "an unnecessary display of force. . . . The Czech Government would have no option but to order their forces to resist." But if the threat of invasion were removed "I would urge them to withdraw their forces."

Hitler's long reply was stage thunder. It assailed Prague's "madness," "will to destruction," and "ruthless and barbarous" oppression of the Sudetens. "What interests me, your Excellency, is not the recognition of the principle that this territory is to go to Germany, but solely the realization of this principle, and the realization which both puts an end in the shortest time to the sufferings of the unhappy victims of Czech tyranny, and at the same time corresponds to the dignity of a Great Power. I can only emphasize to your Excellency that these Sudeten Germans are not coming back to the German Reich in virtue of the gracious or benevolent sympathy of other nations, but on the ground of their own will based on the right of self-determination of the nations, and of the irrevocable decision of the German Reich to give effect to this will." The Sudetens must have the immediate "protection" of Berlin. Prague was untrustworthy. It had accepted the principle of partition only to gain time. If it is impossible "to have the clear rights of Germans in Czechoslovakia accepted by way of negotiation," Germany is "determined to exhaust the other possibilities which then alone remain open to her."

Chamberlain's brief rejoinder asked Hitler to submit the memorandum and map embodying the demands which he would pass on to Prague in his capacity as intermediary. "Since the acceptance or refusal of your Excellency's proposal is now a matter for the Czechoslovak Government to decide, I do not see that I can perform any further service here, whilst, on the other hand, it has become necessary that I should at once report the present situation to my colleagues and to the French Government. I propose, therefore, to return to England."

The Godesberg Memorandum (Document No. 6 of the White Paper) opened with new blasts regarding the "completely intolerable" situation of the Sudetens, the consequent "danger to the peace of Europe" and the necessity of cession "without any further delay." The map showed in red the areas to be ceded at once and in green those to be subject to a plebiscite; Czech forces must withdraw and German military occupation must follow "without taking account as to whether in the plebiscite there may prove to be in this or that part of the area a Czech majority"; evacuated areas must be "handed over to Germany on the 1st October" with all military, economic, and traffic establishments and materials intact; Prague must discharge all Sudeten political prisoners and all Sudetens in the army and police; plebiscites must take place, by German "permission," before November 25 under an international commission, with all residents as of October 28, 1918 permitted to vote; both parties would withdraw their military forces from plebiscite areas; a simple majority would decide sovereignty.

These exchanges set the stage for the new crisis. Hitler had made "new" demands. Chamberlain had objected. But he would transmit them to Prague, where they would be rejected. Hitler would then march and war would be on—unless . . . ? Benes, Syrový, and Krofta were to all appearances completely deceived by the play. The Czech reply of Sunday, September 25 (Document No. 7) is the only paper in the collection whose authors can be suspected of honesty. It asserted that the Memorandum constituted a "de facto ultimatum" going "far beyond what we agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French plan" and depriving Czechoslovakia "of every safeguard for our national existence. . . . Hitler's demands in their present form are absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable to my Government. Against these new and cruel demands my Government feel bound to make their utmost resistance, and we shall do so, God helping. The nation of St. Wenceslas, John Hus, and Thomas Masaryk will not be a nation of slaves. We rely upon the two great Western democracies, whose wishes we have followed much against our own judgment, to stand by us in our hour of trial."

Downing Street released the text of the Memorandum on Sunday and the Czech reply on Tuesday. It asked Prague on the 25th whether it would consider participating in a conference of Powers to discuss methods of applying the Anglo-French plan. The French Cabinet met Sunday afternoon, unanimously rejected the Memorandum, and pledged support to Prague. Daladier and Bonnet flew to London, as

they had done a week previously, with General Gamelin this time accompanying them. The British Cabinet met at midnight. The Anglo-French conversations adjourned at 12.40 a.m. Monday and were resumed at 10.00. Prague agreed to a conference, but asked (Document No. 8) "for definite and binding guarantees to the effect that no unexpected action of an aggressive nature would take place during the negotiations, and that the Czechoslovak defense system would remain intact during that period." Chamberlain had said in his query to Prague that although the Memorandum was Hitler's last word and he doubted very much "that he could induce Herr Hitler to change his mind at this late hour," he might nevertheless make a last effort to persuade Der Führer "to consider another method of settling peacefully the Sudeten-German question, namely, by means of an international conference attended by Germany, Czechoslovakia and other Powers which would consider the Anglo-French plan and the best method of bringing it into operation." The Prime Minister now sent a personal letter to Hitler via Sir Horace Wilson (September 26, Document No. 9) noting that Prague still accepted the Anglo-French plan but had rejected the proposal for immediate evacuation and German occupation, as Chamberlain had anticipated. He proposed, since they were "in complete agreement as to the imperative necessity to maintain the peace of Europe," that a German-Czech parley be arranged to discuss the method of territorial transfer, with British participation if desired. The alleged imminence of Armageddon was underlined by a Monday statement from Downing Street to the effect that if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia "the immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her assistance and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France."

This apparent negation of the whole Chamberlain policy since March was not what it seemed to be. Halifax was to say later (October 3) that a British guarantee of Czechoslovakia would prevent any aggression. There is no reason to doubt the validity of this statement, nor any convincing evidence which would suggest that Hitler was prepared to invade a Czechoslovakia guaranteed by Britain. The declaration of September 26 was not such a guarantee, for Czechoslovakia had already been surrendered. It was merely another warning to Hitler to give Chamberlain time to complete the surrender and another device to enhance the war panic by strengthening (for the moment) the will to resistance at Prague and Paris in order that the prospect of hostilities would be dramatically impressed upon the

quivering consciousness of the masses. The declaration of September 26, coupled with Anglo-French approval of Czech mobilization on the 23rd and the Czech rejection of the Godesberg Memorandum on the 25th, served this purpose admirably.

Other devices followed in rapid succession. Daladier, Bonnet, and Gamelin returned to Paris and asserted that France would now defend Czechoslovakia in case of an invasion. On Monday evening Hitler in the Berlin Sportpalast breathed fire and blood anew. He denounced Benes as a liar and scoundrel, declared German patience exhausted, and demanded surrender by October 1. "If this problem is solved there will be no further territorial problems in Europe for Germany. . . . We do not want any Czechs. . . . We are resolved! Let Herr Benes choose!" Roosevelt was finally prevailed upon to intervene, either by British suggestion or by his own genuine anxiety. He cabled a plea to Hitler and Benes not to break off negotiations. Argentina expressed support. Daladier and Chamberlain expressed thanks. Benes expressed gratitude and devotion to pacific settlement. Warsaw broke off negotiations with Prague. Mussolini in Verona pleaded with London and Paris to abandon Prague before it should be too late. Alone among the potentates, Mussolini issued no public orders for military measures. To some observers this signified that, despite the Rome-Berlin axis, he would strive for neutrality, to others that Duce and King were at odds, and to still others that Mussolini had no need to frighten his subjects as a means of securing approbation for a bargain to which Italy would at best be merely an accessory.

On November 30, 1938, Count Ciano told the Chamber of Deputies that a secret emissary of Hitler had conferred with Il Duce near Venice on September 25 and that, on September 26 at 7.30 p.m., Der Führer had informed Mussolini of his "decision" to invade Czechoslovakia at 2.00 p.m., September 28. Cæsar had then ordered partial mobilization without publicity. Plans had been made for a conference at Munich on September 29 to co-ordinate German and Italian military action. Hitler, declared Ciano, had assented to the Munich "peace" parley only on condition that Mussolini come in person. How much of this tale is true there is as yet no means of knowing. Rome had much to gain by pretending that complete solidarity between Rome and Berlin had prevailed and that both Powers had prepared for general war. Even if the Foreign Minister spoke truth, the inference that Hitler had actually decided upon war against Prague is not necessarily warranted. Another inference is equally plausible:

Berlin, having found threats of war completely effective in serving Chamberlain's purposes and inducing public panic at London and Paris, saw no harm (and possibly much benefit) in convincing Rome likewise that the Reichswehr was about to march. Il Duce would necessarily shrink from Italian participation in any general war. He had insisted repeatedly on the pacific partition of Czechoslovakia—and his utterances were as much pleadings as threats. A notice that Berlin was ready to march, however devoid of foundation it might be, would therefore stir him to new efforts for "peace"—which, in conjunction with Tory efforts, would facilitate the realization of Hitler's program.

Tuesday, September 27, brought new excursions and alarms. "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is," declared Chamberlain in a broadcast, "that we should be digging trenches and fitting gas masks because of a quarrel in a far away country. . . . I was taken completely by surprise" by Hitler's demand for immediate military occupation. "I must say that I find that attitude unreasonable." But we cannot involve the Empire in war for a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbor. "If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that. I am a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me. But if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted." This gem of ambiguity was as perfect in its content as was the weary and worried tone of the voice in which it was delivered. The Prime Minister enhanced fear of war by suggesting that Hitler was "unreasonable" and perhaps must be resisted. But he left the door ajar for the second betrayal. The issue of Czechoslovakia was not "large" enough to fight over. This admission would have been indiscreet if it had involved any risk of allaying public apprehension. But with all the drums and trumpets of the world now throbbing and shrieking with war panic, this risk was slight. By Tuesday, and still more by Wednesday, everyone throughout the Empire and the world was utterly convinced that war was just around the corner. So firmly fixed was the conviction that few asked the question as to how war could come over an issue of whether Hitler should get Sudetenland a little sooner or a little later. Those who asked were thrown into new panic by dark hints that Der Führer was perhaps after all a madman.

The Reichskanzler was willing enough to play the role. In a long reply to Roosevelt he reviewed the grievances of the Sudetens and of

Germany in a vein of frenzied paranoia, thereby making a significant contribution to the new art of employing feigned insanity as an instrument of national policy. He concluded: "It does not rest with the German Government, but with the Czechoslovak Government alone, to decide whether it wants peace or war." In a reply to Chamberlain via Sir Horace (September 27, Document No. 10) Der Führer denied Czech allegations of a discrepancy between the Berchtesgaden and the Godesberg demands: "I must openly declare that I cannot bring myself to understand these arguments or even admit that they can be regarded as seriously put forward." From one point of view this was not playing cricket, since the whole essence of the war scare which was essential to the Chamberlain-Hitler program was this alleged discrepancy. But it had already been so dramatized that no one any longer had doubts. Therefore it was perhaps useful to have Hitler deny it as a further means of playing upon the madman motif. Der Führer went on at length to insist on immediate military occupation, to indict Prague for insincerity and deception, to urge that Britain and France allay Czech fears as to the scope of the German occupation, and to express regret at talk of any "attack" on Czech territory or any infringement of "independence" or any "economic rift."

In these circumstances I must assume that the Government in Prague is only using a proposal for the occupation by German troops in order, by distorting the meaning and object of my proposal, to mobilize those forces in other countries, in particular in England and France, from which they hope to receive unreserved support for their aim and thus to achieve the possibility of a general warlike conflagration. I must leave it to your judgment whether, in view of these facts, you consider that you should continue your efforts, for which I should like to take this opportunity of once more sincerely thanking you, to spoil such maneuvers and bring the Government in Prague to reason at the very last hour.

ADOLF HITLER

On the same Tuesday, September 27, Chamberlain cabled Benes, and Newton left a new memorandum with Krofta. These communications were not made public, since their purpose was to terrorize Prague rather than the British public. They declared that even if the Czechoslovak Republic fought for its integrity and even if other Powers came to its aid, the ultimate result would still be the cession of Sudetenland to the Reich.⁸⁷ Such a threat appeared to mean that even if Germany should be defeated in war by a Grand Alliance, Downing Street would still insist on the partition of Czechoslovakia and the realization of the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*. The latter objective was indeed a major consideration behind the Tory program. But London

knew full well that Hitler would never challenge such a Grand Alliance to war, since defeat would be certain, and that if he did, any annexation of new territories by the defeated aggressor would be wholly unthinkable. But even a local German-Czech war would almost inevitably become a general war with the Reich in the end beaten—and Moscow administering part of the beating. This would irretrievably ruin all Tory hopes. Hitler must therefore be rescued. Even a local war must therefore be averted. It could more easily be averted by action at Prague than at Berlin, since Czechoslovakia was the weaker party and had already been browbeaten into accepting the principle of partition. Hence the threat to Prague on September 27. Hence also the warning to Hitler on September 26.

Wednesday, September 28: All France in panic; all England digging graves in parks and donning gas masks; shudders, tremors, horrors, all the fearsome muddling-trembling-stumbling hysteria of blind, shrinking flight before the hot breath of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, conjured up out of the vasty deep by the riding crop of the man from Braunau and the rolled black umbrella of the man from Birmingham. Dawn brought terror twice redoubled with the news that the British fleet would mobilize before the day was done (Duff Cooper had issued the order shortly before midnight and Chamberlain had approved in the morning) and that Hitler would demand Czech surrender by 2.00 p.m. Thursday and, if unsatisfied, would send his legions across the frontiers on the morrow. Roosevelt sent messages to Rome, Tokio, and Moscow asking that they use their influence for peace. German liners in foreign ports were ordered home. The *Europa*, approaching the Channel, was ordered back to Bremerhaven. British naval reservists reported. The playing fields of Eton were dug up for shelters. Wide open yawned the jaws of hell. . . .

Commons assembled at 2.45 p.m. The members already had available the White Paper issued the same day, containing Runciman's strange letter, which none found strange and all found persuasive because all were filled with a wish to believe. The other documents spoke for themselves. The brink of war was no time to read between the lines. Chamberlain in black formal coat and inevitable wing collar, with solemn face and funereal air, looked more the mortician than ever. He began a long address from detailed notes, now and again wringing his thin hands in anxiety. Few doubted but that he was at last telling all and preparing the nation and the world for the shock of war. ". . . Unhappily our hopes have not been fulfilled.

Today we are faced with a situation which has had no parallel since 1914." He referred with faint contempt to Czechoslovakia "with its heterogeneous population" and expressed regret that Article 19 of the Covenant had not long since been used to achieve "revision by agreement." In July there was deadlock in Prague and fears that Berlin might interfere.

For His Majesty's Government there were three alternative courses that we might have adopted. Either we could have threatened to go to war with Germany if she attacked Czechoslovakia, or we could have stood aside and allowed matters to take their course, or, finally, we could attempt to find a peaceful settlement by way of mediation. The first of those courses we rejected. We had no treaty liabilities to Czechoslovakia. We always refused to accept any such obligation. Indeed, this country, which does not readily resort to war, would not have followed us if we had tried to lead it into war to prevent a minority from obtaining autonomy, or even from choosing to pass under some other Government.

The second alternative was also repugnant to us. However remote this territory may be, we knew, of course, that a spark once lighted there might give rise to a general conflagration, and we felt it our duty to do anything in our power to help the contending parties to find agreement. We addressed ourselves to the third course, the task of mediation. We knew that the task would be difficult, perhaps even perilous, but we felt that the object was good enough to justify the risk.

Here was no mention of actual issues or real alternatives but only the plausible pretense of the "honest broker" seeking justice. He reviewed at length the Runciman mission, putting new layers of old colors on the portrait which the Viscount had already painted. By September 14 war threatened. "In these circumstances, I decided that the time had come to put into operation a plan which I had had in mind for a considerable period as a last resort. . . . I resolved to go to Germany myself to interview Herr Hitler and find out in personal conversation whether there was yet any hope of saving the peace. I knew very well that in taking such an unprecedented course I was laying myself open to criticism on the ground that I was detracting from the dignity of the British Prime Minister, and to disappointment, and perhaps even resentment, if I failed to bring back a satisfactory

agreement. But I felt that in such a crisis, where the issues at stake were so vital for millions of human beings, such considerations could not be allowed to count. . . . I confess I was astonished at the warmth of the approval with which this adventure was everywhere received, but the relief which it brought for the moment was an indication of the gravity with which the situation had been viewed." (Here Neville the playwright, Neville the actor, and Neville the critic were agreed: "Very good, Neville, very good!")

There followed Berchtesgaden and return and a Cabinet meeting "attended also by Lord Runciman, who, at my request, had also traveled from Prague on the same day." Runciman recommended Sudeten "self-determination"—"at once"—plus Plan No. 4 for what would be left and neutralization "as in the case of Switzerland." But France must be consulted. France agreed. Ultimatum to Prague followed. Chamberlain called it "advice." We "took account of the probability that the Czechoslovak Government would find it preferable to deal with the problem by the method of direct transfer rather than by means of a plebiscite, which would involve serious difficulties as regards other nationalities in Czechoslovakia." Prague agreed. "His Majesty's Government were profoundly conscious of the immense sacrifices to which the Czechoslovak Government had agreed, and the great public spirit they had shown. These proposals had naturally been put forward in the hope of averting a general disaster and saving Czechoslovakia from invasion. The Czechoslovak Government's readiness to go to such extreme limits of concession had assured her of a measure of sympathy which nothing else could have aroused."

Poland and Hungary had now made demands. Not cricket. Too bad. "However, on the 22nd I went back to Germany to Godesberg on the Rhine where the Chancellor had appointed a meeting place as being more convenient for me than the remote Berchtesgaden." Warm welcome. Demonstrated desire of the German people for peace. Explained Anglo-French plans for transfer and guarantee. No objection from Hitler, but he said others, including Italy, must join and no non-aggression pact with new Czechoslovakia would be possible until other minorities were satisfied. He found proposals too dilatory and evasive. He submitted memorandum.

Hon. Members will realize the perplexity in which I found myself, faced with this totally unexpected situation. I had been told at Berchtesgaden that if the principle of self-determination

were accepted Herr Hitler would discuss with me the ways and means of carrying it out. He told me afterwards that he never for one moment supposed that I should be able to come back and say that the principle was accepted [ironical laughter]. I do not want hon. Members to think that he was deliberately deceiving me—I do not think so for one moment—but, for me, I expected that when I got back to Godesberg I had only to discuss quietly with him the proposals that I had brought with me; and it was a profound shock to me when I was told at the beginning of the conversation that these proposals were not acceptable, and that they were to be replaced by other proposals of a kind which I had not contemplated at all.

What to do? “I withdrew, my mind full of forebodings. . . .” In view of language difficulty, some comments on paper seemed wise. Exchange of letters. Memorandum and map. “I spoke very frankly. I dwelled with all the emphasis at my command upon the risks which would be incurred in insisting on such terms. . . . Language and manner . . . of . . . ultimatum . . . would profoundly shock public opinion in neutral countries and I bitterly reproached the Chancellor on his failure to respond in any way to the efforts which I had made to secure peace.” At the end, in private, “he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berchtesgaden, namely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe; that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than German. . . . He wanted to be friends with England and thought if only this Sudeten question could be got out of the way in peace he would gladly resume conversations. It is true, he said ‘There is one awkward question, the Colonies!’” (Members: “Spain!” Laughter.) “. . . These are not subjects for idle laughter. . . . He said . . . ‘but that is not a matter for war. . . . There will be no mobilizing about that.’” Transmission of memorandum. Czech rejection. Paris pledged to Prague. “In reply we told them [the French] that if as a result of those obligations, French forces became actively engaged in hostilities against Germany, we should feel obliged to support them.” Sent Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin “as a last effort to preserve peace.” Letter. Warning. Answer. “I believe he means what he says.” The Prime Minister now approached his climax:

I felt impelled to send one more last letter—the last last—to the Chancellor. I sent him the following personal message:

"After reading your letter I feel certain that you can get all essentials without war and without delay. I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements for transfer with you and representatives of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy if you desire. I feel convinced that we could reach agreement in a week. However much you distrust the Prague Government's intentions, you cannot doubt the power of the British and French Governments to see that the promises are carried out fairly and fully and forthwith. As you know, I have stated publicly that we are prepared to undertake that they shall be so carried out. I cannot believe that you will take the responsibility of starting a world war which may end civilization, for the sake of a few days' delay in settling this long-standing problem."

At the same time I sent the following personal message to Signor Mussolini:

"I have today addressed last appeal to Herr Hitler to abstain from force to settle Sudeten problem, which, I feel sure, can be settled by a short discussion and will give him the essential territory, population and protection for both Sudetens and Czechs during transfer. I have offered myself to go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with German and Czech representatives, and if the Chancellor desires, representatives also of Italy and France.

"I trust your Excellency will inform the German Chancellor that you are willing to be represented and urge him to agree to my proposal which will keep all our peoples out of war. I have already guaranteed that Czech promises shall be carried out and feel confident full agreement could be reached in a week."

In reply to my message to Signor Mussolini, I was informed that instructions had been sent by the Duce to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin to see Herr von Ribbentrop at once and to say that while Italy would fulfill completely her pledges to stand by Germany, yet, in view of the great importance of the request made by His Majesty's Government to Signor Mussolini, the latter hoped Herr Hitler would see his way to postpone action which the Chancellor had told Sir Horace Wilson was to be taken at 2 p.m. today for at least 24 hours so as to allow Signor Mussolini time to re-examine the situation and endeavor to find a peaceful settlement. In response, Herr Hitler has agreed to postpone mobilization for 24 hours.

Whatever views hon. Members may have had about Signor Mussolini in the past, I believe that everyone will welcome his gesture of being willing to work with us for peace in Europe—

Shortly before this point of interruption, Lord Halifax in the balcony received a Foreign Office envelope from a special messenger who had dashed madly up the stairs. The hour was 3.40. Halifax

ripped it open, read a paper signed "A. C." (Alexander Cadogan), showed it to Baldwin, and then moved to bring it to the Prime Minister. He motioned to Sir Horace Wilson, who beckoned to Lord Dunglass, Chamberlain's Parliamentary private secretary, who seized the message, ran downstairs, and handed it to Simon, who looked at it and passed it to Chamberlain just as the House was applauding his reference to Mussolini. He looked at the message and beamed:

That is not all. I have something further to say to the House yet. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him at Munich tomorrow morning—

A wild bedlam of cheering, shouting, stamping, clapping, and frantic waving of White Papers swept the House, contrary to all its rules, in one of the most unrestrained and spontaneous demonstrations of joy in its history. The Prime Minister went on:

He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted and I have no doubt M. Daladier will also accept. I need not say what my answer will be. [AN HON. MEMBER: "Thank God for the Prime Minister!"] We are all patriots, and there can be no hon. Member of this House who did not feel his heart leap that the crisis has been once more postponed to give us once more an opportunity to try what reason and good will and discussion will do to settle a problem which is already within sight of settlement. Mr. Speaker, I cannot say any more. I am sure that the House will be ready to release me now to go and see what I can make of this last effort. Perhaps they may think it will be well, in view of this new development, that this Debate shall stand adjourned for a few days, when perhaps we may meet in happier circumstances.

Chamberlain was smiling, pale, breathless, exhausted, and, at the end, in tears. All the appropriate emotions were convincingly registered. Simon also wept. The Opposition was as enthusiastic as the Government. Attlee seconded the proposal to adjourn. Sinclair expressed relief, gratitude, and hope. Mr. Maxton, Labor's militant pacifist, approved and declared his party "as keen for peace as anyone." George Lansbury wished Chamberlain "God-speed." "I also wish to say on behalf of my friends anyhow, and, I believe, on behalf of millions of people in this country, how very grateful we are that he has

taken the initiative that he has, and how we wish and hope and pray that success will crown his efforts." One lost and lonely voice in all the House was raised in protest—that of Labor's "wild man," Willie Gallacher:

No one desires peace more than I and my party, but it must be a peace based upon freedom and democracy and not upon the cutting up and destruction of a small State. I want to say that the policy of the National Government has led to this crisis. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Yes, and if there is peace at the moment it is the determined attitude of the people that has saved it. Whatever the outcome the National Government will have to answer for its policy. I would not be a party to what has been going on here. There are as many Fascists opposite as there are in Germany, and I protest against the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

This incongruous cry evoked no echo. Commons adjourned at 4.27 p.m. until Monday, October 3. Nancy Astor dashed up to extend congratulations. Many other members followed her. Winston Churchill offered his good wishes. But Anthony Eden walked out with a stony stare. Crowds wept with joy outside, as Chamberlain, on his way to Downing Street with his wife, cried out to them: "It's all right this time!"³⁸ Queen Mother Mary left the private gallery in tears. A whole nation lacrymated with relief and happiness.

"Good old Neville!" The prosaic businessman from the Midlands had become a deity. The undramatic alderman from Birmingham had achieved the greatest triumph of his career in the greatest melodrama he had ever written. He had played his part with such sincerity that he half believed in it. His audience believed utterly, for he was completely convincing. Here, as elsewhere, the true test of faith is to believe what is absurd.

5. IN HITLER'S HOUSE

"When I come back I hope I may be able to say, as Hotspur says in *Henry IV*, 'Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck a little flower, safety.'" Thus spoke Neville Chamberlain to a cheering throng at Heston airport Thursday morning, September 29, as he boarded a Reich-bound plane for the third time within a fortnight. Again he

was accompanied by Wilson and Strang, plus Ashton-Gwatkin, Sir William Malkin, and several Foreign Office specialists. Munich, birthplace of the NSDAP and sacred shrine of the eighteen who died on November 9, 1923, became the Mecca of all the great. Mussolini, whom Hitler had met at the frontier at Kufstein for a preliminary discussion, arrived first with Der Führer. Daladier and staff reached the airport soon afterwards and were put up at the Hotel of the Four Seasons. Two British planes landed twenty minutes later with the guests from London.

Cheering Bavarian crowds surrounded the Regina Palace Hotel, headquarters of the British delegation, and lined the streets to the magnificent Führerhaus, near the more modest Braun Haus. This imposing structure was part of a group of buildings housing the central headquarters of the NSDAP. They had been planned in part by Der Führer himself, who was always keenly interested in architecture. The buildings were reconstructed and enlarged in the spring of 1934 to house most of the central agencies of the multitudinous divisions, bureaus, and auxiliary organizations of the Party. The Führerhaus, Hitler's own executive headquarters, was a rhapsody of pagan glory, dedicated to the great deeds of the divinities, arch-angels, and the saints of Nazidom and fit to be the throne of the Almighty.

A late informal luncheon at the Führerhaus was followed by a gathering of the potentates in Hitler's private office at 3.00 p.m. Chamberlain was meeting Mussolini for the first time. Daladier was meeting Hitler and Mussolini for the first time. An agenda was easily agreed upon. Hitler insisted on the commencement of military occupation of Sudetenland on Saturday, but otherwise was a generous conqueror. "I am not going to quibble about a village." At 8.30 the conferees adjourned for dinner with Germans and Italians dining together at the Duce's headquarters in the Ducal Palace and the French and British separately in their hotels. At 10.00 the conference was resumed. Sir Horace issued platitudes to the waiting correspondents. An American journalist, Frederick T. Birchall of the *New York Times*, noted a detail: "Some of the British onlookers have been greatly interested in the appearance here of a compatriot not now in public office who slipped in unobtrusively in the afternoon and who has been eagerly interviewing leading Germans ever since. He is the Marquess of Londonderry."³⁹

Shortly after midnight all was settled. At 12.35 a.m. (Friday)

signatures were attached to a Four-Power Accord, dated as of the preceding day. Its full text follows:

AGREEMENT CONCLUDED AT MUNICH ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1938.

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement which has already been reached in principle for cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment:

1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October.
2. The United Kingdom, France, and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.

4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territories by German troops will begin on the 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order:

Territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2d of October; territory marked No. II on the 2d and 3d of October; territory marked No. III on the 3d, 4th, and 5th of October; territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October.

The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

5. The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

6. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

7. There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population, and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

8. The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any

Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offenses.

ADOLF HITLER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN
ÉDOUARD DALADIER
BENITO MUSSOLINI

Munich

September 29, 1938

Annex to the Agreement

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

Declaration

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.

Supplementary Declaration

All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.

Composition of the International Commission

The four Heads of Government here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them today, shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.⁴⁰

The tumult and the shouting died on Saturday morning. Despots, dupes, and dramatists alike took their leave from the Bavarian capital in a drizzling rain. "I have always had in mind," said Chamberlain, "that if we could find peace in Czechoslovakia it might open the way to appeasement in Europe. I hope there will be obvious measures of demobilization taken everywhere." Daladier remarked: "I have had the pleasure personally to establish that no feeling of hate or enmity of any kind prevails in Germany against France. Be assured that the French on their part feel no hostility towards Germany." Führer and Duce found comment unnecessary. In the afternoon Mussolini

returned to Rome, Daladier to Paris, and Chamberlain to London. Each received an ovation. In the French capital great crowds cheered the Premier as if he were a conqueror returning in triumph. Gamelin greeted him warmly. Chautemps kissed him on both cheeks. Many wept—not with grief, but with joy. Daladier stepped to a microphone and spoke of “peace,” “mutual concessions,” “spirit of co-operation,” “general settlement.” “Never did the people of France possess in so great a degree as today esteem in the hearts of all the great nations.” At Heston airport Chamberlain cheerily waved a piece of paper at the exuberant throngs. On it was a typed agreement, as a bilateral addenda to the Four-Power Pact, signed by Chamberlain, who had proposed it, and by Hitler’s scrawling hand. He read it with fervor:

We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today, and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German naval agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to the assurance of peace in Europe.

Crowds gathered in drenching rain outside Buckingham Palace. The setting sun broke forth and projected a rainbow on the eastern sky (this was probably not prearranged) as the Prime Minister and his wife drove up to report to the King and Queen. Still larger crowds milled about Downing Street far into the night while the Cabinet met. “Good old Neville!” “Speech, speech!” “We want Chamberlain!” Impromptu cheer-leaders led the throngs in song: *Rule, Britannia, Land of Hope and Glory, O God, Our Help in Ages Past*, and *For He’s a Jolly Good Fellow*. From the balcony of 10 Downing Street Chamberlain told the joyous multitude that his achievement was comparable to Disraeli’s at the Congress of Berlin in 1878: “My good friends, this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe,” he added, borrowing a phrase from Baldwin, “it is peace for our time.” (Chamberlain was sixty-nine.)

“We thank you,” said the Prime Minister. “We thank you from the bottom of our hearts for your welcome.” “And *we* thank *you*,” responded the crowd. “Now,” he rejoined paternally, “I recom-

mend you to go home and sleep quietly in your beds." He vanished. Police cleared the street. One man wanted to stay all night before No. 10 shouting over and over: "Thank God, England and Germany together at last!" But even he finally went home to bed.⁴¹

Hitler returned to Berlin on Saturday and received an ovation. Chamberlain wrote to Daladier to soothe suspicions. He thanked him for his "co-operation" and opined that the sentiments in his accord with Hitler "are true of your own country no less than my own." He anticipated "renewed and continuous co-operation with you in further efforts for consolidation of European peace through the extension of good will and confidence which so happily inspire the relations between our two countries." Only one member of the Prime Minister's Cabinet resigned in protest: Alfred Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty. As Hitler entered Sudetenland in triumph, Chamberlain met Commons on Monday, October 3. He announced a loan of £10,000,000 to Czechoslovakia and praised Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier, and Roosevelt. Hoare and Halifax denied any desire to exclude the USSR. In Washington Sumner Welles hailed the new opportunity "for the establishment by the nations of the world of a new world order based upon justice and upon law . . . [and upon] the sanctity of the pledged word; non-intervention . . . and the settlement of disputes and the revision of treaties wherever necessary by peaceful negotiations and in a spirit of equity rather than by resort to the use of force or to the threats of force." In the Commons debate of Monday and Tuesday only Alfred Duff Cooper displayed any emotion of regret:

It was not for Serbia or Belgium we fought in 1914, though it suited some people to say so, but we were fighting then, as we should have been fighting last week, in order that one Great Power should not be allowed, in disregard of treaty obligations and the laws of nations and against all morality, to dominate by brutal force the Continent of Europe. . . . Throughout these days the Prime Minister has believed in addressing Herr Hitler through the language of sweet reasonableness. I have believed he was more open to the language of the mailed fist. . . . I tried to swallow them [the Munich terms], but they stuck in my throat. . . . I have perhaps ruined my political career, but that is of little matter. I have retained something which is to me of greater value—I can still walk about the world with my head erect.

The Prime Minister registered boredom. Inskip said that the British guarantee of Czechoslovakia was already in effect. Baldwin praised Chamberlain. Morrison said that the Prime Minister was "frightened out of his life." James Maxton praised him for keeping peace. Cranborne said "peace with honor" was a "wicked mockery." Eden and Sinclair uttered empty words. David Lloyd George said nothing. There was nothing to say. Chamberlain was God. He looked at his work, pronounced it good, and declared he had nothing to be ashamed of. Those who criticized him were "war-mongers." Those who might have been tempted to assail him for hypocrisy and to lay bare the secret calculus of his policy were also silent, knowing that the British public—now hopelessly demoralized by fear—would again give its blessing to "good old Neville" even if it were told that "general appeasement" was but a mask for giving Hitler the mastery of Europe for his war against Moscow. In either case the result was "peace" for Britain, whatever the cost in blood and tears to others, and the ruling classes and most of the masses were quite content. Only Winston Churchill spoke on Wednesday with a certain bluntness:

I begin by saying what everybody would like to neglect or forget, but what must, nevertheless, be stated—namely, that we have sustained a total, unmitigated defeat. We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves. We must expect that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the triumphant Nazi Power. The series of alliances in Central Europe upon which France relied for safety has been swept away. I see no reason to think it can be reconstituted.

The road down the Danube, with all its coal and iron, the road to the Black Sea and Turkey, has been broken. It seems to me that all the countries of Mittel Europa and the Danube Valley, one after the other, will be drawn into the vast system of Nazi politics, not only power military politics, but power economic politics radiating from Berlin. I believe that can be achieved quite smoothly and easily without firing a single shot. . . .

[Germany may make demands on Britain in a few years or months which] may effect surrender of territory or surrender of

liberty, and I foresee and foretell a policy that will carry with it restraint of freedom in Parliament, on the platform, and in the press. Then, with the press under a control half direct but more potently indirect, every expression of public opinion doped and chloroformed into acquiescence, we shall be conducted by stages along our journey.

No one cared. At the end Chamberlain asserted that the charge of betraying Czechoslovakia was "simply preposterous." He had "saved" Czechoslovakia. Commons upheld him on Thursday, October 6, by a vote of 366 to 144. No Conservative dared to vote against him, though a score abstained. The Prime Minister went to Scotland to fish, doubtless wrapped in droll thoughts of the strangeness of the world which apotheosized him for dream-deeds which were fiction and knew or acknowledged nothing of his actual accomplishment. The whole Tory program was now achieved at a blow. The curtain fell. In far-off India Gandhi said: "Europe has sold her soul for seven days of earthly existence."

The glory that was known by the third Chamberlain as he crowned his work for Anglo-German "peace" was undimmed by sordid thoughts of price. The price would be paid by others. Should Nemesis ever descend upon Britannia, the House of Chamberlain would feel little of the pain. Mrs. Neville prayed and rejoiced. Austen's widow had just returned from a charity holiday in Fascist Spain, where she had met Franco and been "favorably impressed." Neville fished—and perhaps reread the quatrain written on the eve of Berchtesgaden by Britain's poet laureate, John Masefield:

As Priam to Achilles for his son,
So you, into the night, divinely led,
To ask that young men's bodies, not yet dead,
Be given from the battle not begun.⁴²

If a later generation of Britons should ever be obliged to pay the price of the deed of Munich, it might find another verse more appropriate: Thomas Gray's curse of the Welsh Bards on Edward I.⁴³ With a few slight shifts of words, it might well serve as mankind's ultimate verdict on the peacemaker from Birmingham:

Weave the warp, and weave the woof,
The winding sheet of all our race.
Give ample room, and verge enough
The characters of hell to trace.

Design for Giving

Mark the year, and mark the night,
 When Whitehall echoed with afright. . . .

Thou friend of France, with unrelenting fangs,
 That tear'st the bowels of thy mangled Mate,

Be thou forsworn, who o'er thy country hangs
 The scourge of Heav'n. What terrors round him wait!
 Amazement in his van, with Flight combined,
 And sorrow's faded form, and solitude behind. . . .

Now, Brothers, bending o'er th'accursed loom
 Stamp we our vengeance deep, and ratify his doom.

Neville, lo! to sudden fate

(Weave we the woof. The thread is spun.)

Half of thy heart we consecrate.

(The web is wove. The work is done.)

TORY TRIUMPH

1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA † OCTOBER 1, 1938

DURING the long evening hours of September 29, 1938, two gentlemen from Prague waited in the Regina Palace Hotel in Munich while the Four deliberated behind closed doors. One was Dr. Hubert Masarik, who had come as representative of the Prague Foreign Office. The other was Dr. Vojtech Mastny, Minister to the Reich. At 7.00 p.m. they succeeded in seeing Ashton-Gwatkin, but learned nothing. At 10.00 Sir Horace Wilson received them and outlined the terms in preparation for the dismemberment of their Republic. They objected. He returned to the Conference. Ashton-Gwatkin assured them that their protests were useless, since the British Government had approved the German plan. "If you do not accept this plan you will have to settle your affair alone with Germany. Perhaps the French will put it in a more amiable way, but believe me, they think the way we do; they will keep out."

At 1.30 a.m. the two gentlemen from Prague were called into a room and met by Wilson, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Alexis Leger of the Quai d'Orsay. The agreement was read. Mastny asked questions. The British Prime Minister yawned repeatedly. He found this anticlimax boring and wanted to go to bed. Bad enough for Hitler to keep him up so late. As for two Czechs . . . ! Masarik asked Daladier and Leger whether they were waiting for an answer. Daladier kept silent. Leger said that there was very little time. No answer was necessary because the plan was already accepted.¹ There was mutual embarrassment—as might occur in a courtroom should the attorney for the defense assume the role of prosecutor and then step up

to the bench as judge and pronounce a death sentence on his client. Nothing remained to be said.

The Cabinet in Prague met at noon on Friday, September 30. There was nothing to say or do, save acquiesce. "The Czechoslovak Government protest the decision of the Four Great Powers, which was entirely one-sided and taken without Czechoslovakia's participation." Premier Jan Syrový told his troops that it was "the saddest moment of my life. . . . We were abandoned. We stood entirely alone. . . . We shall fulfill the conditions imposed upon us by force." Twilight fell over the Hradcany and then night. One hour after midnight, at 1.00 a.m. Saturday, October 1, 1938, the first German troops crossed the frontier from Aigen in Upper Austria to begin occupation of "Zone I." An ultimatum from Warsaw had demanded that Prague give up Teschen by Saturday noon. Prague yielded. Polish troops marched in on Sunday. Prague agreed to negotiate a settlement with Hungary. The international commission at Berlin was already instituted: Count Ernst von Weizsaecker of Wilhelmstrasse, Dr. Mastny, and Ambassadors Nevile Henderson, André François-Poncet, and Bernardo Attolico. As it began its work all the Czechoslovak Legionnaires, elderly heroes of 1918—year of liberation and year of victory when they had been feted as crusaders of independence in the United States, Britain, and France—discarded and sent to London and Paris all their British and French medals and decorations.

The aftermath of Munich was in fact the reversal of 1918's verdict. Twenty years before, the Second Reich in its bid for world hegemony had been defeated. By a strange paradox the crushing treaty which was imposed upon the vanquished was insufficient to prevent them from becoming victors in the aftermath, thanks to the eagerness with which the erstwhile victors accepted their own defeat. And by a stranger paradox, final German victory in the First World War, which forever eluded the Junkers and war lords of Potsdam, was belatedly won without firing a shot by an Austrian corporal transfigured into Führer and God for eighty million Teutons.

Autumn was harvest-time. If the customary German *Erntedank Fest* of October 1 had to be postponed, the later festival of garnering the fruits of Munich was relished all the more. For Munich meant German mastery of *Mittel Europa* to the Black Sea and the Ægean. The bastion of Czechoslovakia was the key to the Little Entente and to French influence in the East. With the bastion surrendered to the

Reich by Chamberlain and Daladier, the whole hinterland was lost. Hitler entered Eger on Monday and Karlsbad on Tuesday. Kamil Krofta resigned as Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and was replaced by Dr. Frantisek Chvalkovsky, formerly Minister to Italy. On Wednesday, October 5, Eduard Benes relinquished the Presidency of the Republic which he had helped to bring into being. In a letter which Premier Syrovky read over the radio, Benes declared that "the very sad events of these last days" have "weighed upon our spirits and our hearts, but they have not broken our faith nor our ideals toward our people, our nation, and our State. . . ." He felt that his remaining in office "might constitute an obstacle to the new conditions which now confront this State."²

As Benes took his leave, others elsewhere also drew the necessary conclusions from the Peace of Munich. In Rome Perth began daily consultations with Ciano for further "appeasement." Paris announced its decision to send an Ambassador to Rome and recognize Italian title to Ethiopia. Walter Funk, Nazi Minister of Economics, arrived in Istanbul from Belgrade and proceeded to Ankara, where he negotiated a loan of 150,000,000 marks to Turkey for German machinery and arms. Meanwhile, the international commission at Berlin confined its activities to hearing, approving, and executing German demands. It agreed to accept the Godesberg Memorandum. It agreed to delimit the frontier on the basis of the language line as of October 28, 1918—as determined by the Habsburg census of 1910. On October 13, after Chvalkovsky had conferred with Ribbentrop at Berlin, the commission announced that it had "unanimously decided to refrain from any plebiscite." It "took cognizance with satisfaction of the noteworthy progress attained thus far in the settlement of pending questions." Some hundreds of British war veterans who had been organized to supervise the plebiscites stayed at home.

The new German-Czech frontier was drawn in its final form not by the commission at Berlin but by a German-Czech commission on the basis of German dictation and Czech acceptance. A German-Czech accord, announced on November 23, provided that Berlin might expel Czechs who had come into Sudetenland after January 1, 1910, and Prague might expel Germans from its redefined territories who had entered after that date. All Germans remaining under Prague were allowed until March 29, 1939 to opt for German citizenship, thus insuring that most of the 250,000 Germans still within the new Czech borders would become citizens of the Reich—and pre-

sumably members of the NSDAP. The entire population of the annexed areas prior to January 1, 1910 had German citizenship automatically conferred upon it with no option, save for non-Germans who might choose Czechoslovak citizenship.³ The new frontier deviated at a few points from the Godesberg line, but the districts within the line not annexed to the Reich were more than matched by other districts not demanded at Godesberg but now annexed regardless. Czechoslovakia lost to the Reich 11,000 square miles with a population of 3,500,000, including, by Czech estimates, 750,000 non-Germans.⁴

Meanwhile Warsaw and Budapest scrambled for other spoils. On October 9, Polish troops seized Bohumin (Oderberg) three days ahead of schedule. Budapest strove to annex most of Slovakia and all of Ruthenia. Warsaw desired Hungary to annex Ruthenia in order to establish a common Polish-Magyar frontier as a new barrier to the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*—and as a means of preventing an autonomous Ruthenia from becoming a source of separatist agitation among Poland's five million Ruthenians (Ukrainians) to the East. Berlin desired her new vassal to retain part of Ruthenia as a corridor to Rumania and the Ukraine.

Since all power rested with the Reich, the issue was never in doubt, despite Hungarian hopes, Italian oratory, and Polish anxiety. Budapest broke off negotiations with Prague on October 13 and threatened to appeal to the four Munich Powers. Hitler and Ribbentrop received Chvalkovsky and Daranyi in Munich on the 14th. Hitler vetoed the plan for a Four-Power conference. Rome found itself in "complete agreement" with Berlin on the 16th. In a feeble counter-gesture, made immediately after Germany had granted a commercial credit of 60,000,000 marks to Poland for German machinery, Josef Beck went to Bucharest on the 19th. He offered King Carol a slice of Ruthenia if he would assent to Hungarian annexation of the remainder. Slovak and Ruthenian Ministers went to Munich to make new appeals to Ribbentrop. But Hitler had already vetoed Hungarian annexation of Ruthenia. As a realist Carol perceived that the Polish-Rumanian bloc was now a wall of paper, and that his only hope of saving Transylvania was to co-operate with Hitler. He rejected Polish pleas. Beck returned empty-handed to Warsaw on October 10.

After further proposals and counter-proposals, embellished with empty Hungarian threats to invade Czechoslovakia, the problem was neatly settled. Ribbentrop flew to Rome on October 27. German-

Italian arbitration of the Prague-Budapest dispute was proposed and accepted. On November 2, Ribbentrop and Ciano met in Vienna, conferred with Chvalkovsky and Kanya, and handed down their award. Hungary received a generous portion of southern Slovakia (but with Bratislava on the Danube left to Prague) as well as all the fertile lowlands of Ruthenia, including Ungvar, the capital. Prague (i.e. Berlin) retained the barren mountain corridor of northern Ruthenia. Magyar occupation of the ceded territories began November 5 and was completed November 10. Budapest celebrated. Prague acquiesced. Warsaw was glum and Bucharest worried. Paris and London were silent.

By these bargains Poland annexed some 400 square miles with a population of 240,000, including 160,000 non-Poles, while Hungary annexed almost 5,000 square miles with approximately 1,000,000 inhabitants, including 250,000 non-Magyars. Since all evidence pointed toward a Nazi program of employing the new rump Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) within the truncated Czechoslovak State as a center of separatist agitation among the neighboring Ukrainians, Warsaw's rulers had difficulty in reconciling themselves to its retention by Prague. They continued to hope that Italian influence might induce Berlin to permit its annexation by Budapest. When this hope waned, they massed troops in the Carpathians and sought to stir up local disorders. But on November 25, 1938 Germany and Italy warned Warsaw and Budapest that the Vienna award must stand. Imredy's failure to obtain all of Ruthenia and the unpopularity among the nobles of his "land reform" program caused his own party to force his resignation on November 23, but he formed a new Cabinet four days later. Kanya was replaced by Count Stephen Csaky. Hungary was already a German satellite with only the form of its subordinate relationship to Berlin still to be determined. The uneasy imperialists at Warsaw and Bucharest were now without allies and were confronted by an invincible Reich which they could neither defy nor resist.

The old Czechoslovakia was dead. The new and rechristened "Czecho-Slovakia" was a German dependency. The Reich reserved German railway and canal rights across Moravia between Silesia and the Ostmark. Czecho-Slovakia's new frontiers were guaranteed not by the Munich Powers but by Germany for its own purposes. In domestic as in foreign affairs the new Czecho-Slovakia conformed to Berlin's desires. It became a trinity of Bohemia, Slovakia, and Carpa-

tho-Ukraine. In the latter two areas the anti-Semitic followers of the late Father Hlinka were in the ascendancy. They promptly outlawed the Communist Party. On October 20 it was dissolved throughout the Republic and on October 21 Chvalkovsky told Ambassador Alexandrovsky that Prague had no further interest in its mutual-assistance pact with the USSR. Many Jewish organizations were suppressed. Multitudes of homeless refugees, chiefly Jews and German anti-Nazis, were denied admission to both Czecho-Slovakia and the Reich and wandered in the fields without food or shelter between the lines of sentries. The Masonic lodges were dissolved. The trade unions were sundered from the Socialist Party and faced "coordination" on the Nazi model. Leftist papers were suppressed. The entire press were censored. Pictures and statues of Benes were everywhere removed, and then those of Masaryk. Both men were widely denounced as traitors.

In a word, the remnant of Czecho-Slovakia became a quasi-totalitarian vassal State of the Third Reich. The French alliance was allowed to lapse into a dishonored death. The Little Entente was at an end. Czecho-Slovakia was "neutralized." Anti-Nazi voices in Prague were stilled, while Göbbels abruptly turned off the anti-Czech propaganda campaign in the Reich. On November 30 the National Assembly, without enthusiasm, elected the colorless Dr. Emil Hacha as President. Syrový stepped down to the post of Minister of Defense—of a defenseless land. Hacha named as new Premier the reactionary pro-German leader of the Agrarian Party, Rudolf Beran, who had long been a personal enemy of Benes. Hacha declared on December 1: "We should never forget that Germany in many fields has always been an example to us." Lord Runciman's recommendations of September 21 were thus carried out to the letter. Czecho-Slovakia became that which Hitler and Chamberlain desired it to become.

2. FRANCE IN THE SHADOWS

French patriots by the scores of thousands turned out to hail the returning heroes. They lined the twelve miles between Le Bourget airdrome and the Ministry of War on the Boulevard St. Germain. They followed the triumphal car, singing, throwing flowers, shouting themselves hoarse with joy. The great Premier, whom they

cheered as perhaps no French leader had been cheered since Napoleon, stood up and bowed at the tribute. His great Foreign Minister beside him smiled and waved at the throng. Both men were warmly greeted at their destination by the Chief of the French General Staff while the crowd chanted *La Marseillaise*. The next day was Sunday. All the week-end was given over to rejoicing. The Arc de Triomphe, massive monument to France's greatest conqueror, was draped with the tricolor. An immense multitude, at once exuberant and reverent, cheered the Premier as he rekindled the flame beneath the arch where rested the Republic's unknown soldier. The victors of the present thus honored the hero dead of the mighty past and rededicated themselves, amid new triumphs, to the ideals for which an earlier generation had offered the supreme sacrifice. Everywhere was feasting, dancing, and unparalleled celebrations on a scale unknown since the Armistice of 1918.

The Premier was Daladier. The Foreign Minister was Bonnet. The Chief of Staff was Gamelin. The dates were October 1-2, 1938. The occasion was the return from Munich. That which Paris and all France herewith hailed in a delirium of ecstasy was the most catastrophic French defeat since Sedan and the most calamitous peacetime débâcle in all the annals of French diplomacy. Daladier and Bonnet had come back from the sepulcher of all French power, all French hopes, all French dreams. In Munich they had buried the cause for which a million and a half Frenchmen died. There they had entombed the victory of 1918, the whole French alliance system, every hope of security, and every remaining vestige of order and the rule of law in international society. There they had interred the past, destroyed the present, betrayed the future. The Power which had thrice invaded France within a century was now the invincible master of the Continent. Therefore Paris celebrated and paid such honors to the authors of defeat as it had seldom paid to its greatest kings and captains.

This weird and tragic spectacle was a product of forces not dissimilar to those at work in Britain. Here, too, a whole population had been driven by its leaders into such a panic of war fear that it could celebrate "peace" in a frenzy of joy and could greet the supposed authors of the "peace" as demigods. That the peace was a peace of international betrayal and national death mattered not, so long as the immediate price seemed to be paid by others. The leaders themselves were half-paralyzed by the terrors of their own creation and half-

committed by class prejudice and political superstition to the Tory line. They therefore left all decisions to Downing Street and acquiesced in the result because that result meant a new victory for Fascism, a new defeat for Communism, a fatal blow at the People's Front, and, above all, escape from responsibility.

The rulers of France dreaded war not *per se* but because this war would have to be fought against Fascism in the name of the People's Front and in alliance with Moscow. It would therefore have to be fought at home against the "200 families," the financial oligarchy, the corrupt magnates of the press, the great industrialists, and the reactionary remnants of aristocracy, since these elements would be secret allies of France's enemies and secret enemies of France's allies. With these elements much of the befuddled *petite bourgeoisie* and the conservative peasantry was emotionally identified. The Radical Socialist Party spoke for the farmers and little businessmen. Daladier and Bonnet were its leaders. They knew well that their party was brought to power by alliance with the Socialists and Communists in 1936; that the Tory program meant the end of France as a Great Power and the collapse of the entire treaty system upon which the Republic had relied for security for twenty years; that Czechoslovakia was doomed and Poland, Rumania, and Jugoslavia were lost; that Hitler would now bestride the Continent like a colossus; and that France would be helpless and friendless save for Perfidious Albion. What was for them more important was escape from a war in alliance with Bolshevism and against the self-appointed Fascist saviors of property, religion, and the family. What mattered was escape also from that which would have averted war without surrender: a solid front of liberal, Socialist, and Communist opposition to Berlin, willing to face war if necessary and therefore able to halt aggression without war by the organization of superior force. Such a front, whether as a barrier to war or as a basis for war, would have produced economic and social consequences advantageous to the Left and dangerous for the Right. Workers and peasants, though they paid and bled, would in the end gain a stronger strategic position in the Republic. The moneyed *élite* would suffer. Nothing else mattered. Hence surrender, disguised as a "victory" for "peace."

By a stranger irony only a Left Cabinet could play this role, as the leaders of the Right fully recognized. A Right Ministry would be repudiated by Left public opinion. But a Left Ministry could serve the purposes of the Right, even at the cost of antagonizing

some of its supporters, for it would retain the support of others and still be viewed by the millions of the stupid and naïve as a "Left" regime. The question of Radical motivations goes to the roots of the dilemma of European Liberalism and Socialism in the twentieth century. Where peasants and workers accept leadership by middle-class politicians who identify themselves psychologically with élites of wealth and title, the result is foregone. Left leaders shift Rightward and finally serve the Right in the name of Left symbols. This was the whole history of parliamentary politics in France under the Third Republic. This was the history of German Social Democracy, of British Labor, of the French Socialists, and of almost all comparable groups elsewhere in every period of crisis calling for a final choice. The German Republic was delivered to reaction in 1919 by Ebert, Scheidemann, and Noske, and in 1932-3 by Braun, Severing, Leipart, and Wels. Britain was delivered to the Tories in 1931 by MacDonald, Snowden, and Simon. The Spanish People's Front was betrayed in 1936 by Léon Blum. Daladier, Bonnet, and Chautemps, all democratic Radical Socialists, were victims of an identical destiny. None of these men consciously willed the results of their decisions. They were merely incapable of any alternative course and were content to accept the consequences of what they did. From their acts came incalculable tragedy for the causes they pretended to serve—and, paradoxically, for the causes also which they actually served.

In France as in Britain voices of protest on the Left were stilled by the fierce roars of the hell-hounds of war, followed by the skillfully staged canonization of the "peacemakers." In France as in Britain voices of protest against this deception were raised on the Right by those whose devotion to Nation and Empire was more potent than their fear of the masses, their hatred of radicalism, or their admiration of the Cæsars. In both countries the artisans of disaster carried the day because of the paucity and paralysis of protestants of all persuasions—and because the masses, as Hitler had long ago discovered, were "a more easy prey to a big lie than a small one."

As the crisis developed, Daladier aped Chamberlain's "realism" and sought to take credit for the journey to Berchtesgaden. Georges Bonnet pretended in public (until the end) to favor fulfillment of French obligations toward Prague and conceded in private that he desired an entente with the Reich—even at the cost of the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia. He helped to inspire anti-Czech and defeatist articles in the venal Paris press. When he and his Premier went to London on

September 18, they might have encouraged those in Downing Street, including Duff Cooper, Vansittart, and even Halifax, who resented the Chamberlain-Hitler-Runciman program. But they preferred the pretense of yielding to Tory pressure. There is no evidence to suggest that Chamberlain at any time threatened Paris with desertion if France became involved in war with Germany in defense of Czechoslovakia. In the Cabinet meeting of September 27 Bonnet denied that France could rely on British support, but Daladier corrected him.⁵ Such a threat would in any case have been empty, for elementary geographic and strategic considerations bound Britain to join France in any war against the Reich, as every Tory spokesman had conceded for many years. Daladier and Bonnet thus held the whip hand at all times. By vigorous intervention at Prague and Berlin, they could have compelled Downing Street to support a Grand Alliance sufficiently potent to deter German aggression or to crush the Third Reich if it unsheathed the sword. But they preferred to leave all leadership to Chamberlain-Daladier out of timidity and irresponsibility, Bonnet out of secret approval of the Cliveden program.

In order to leave the issue in no doubt, Bonnet indulged in repeated misrepresentation. To Downing Street he exaggerated the weaknesses in the French war machine and concealed its strength. He ignored Germany's strategic and economic limitations (which were reported to have been presented to Hitler at length in a Reichswehr memorandum of September 26).⁶ He fed Vuillemin's fears and ignored Gamelin's confidence. On September 18 he apparently told London that Litvinov had assured him at Geneva that the USSR could not come to Czechoslovakia's defense. On his return to Paris he circulated reports that Moscow had been asked to initiate military conversations and had refused. In both cases the truth was the exact opposite of his utterances. Litvinov had from the first pledged Soviet aid, as he made abundantly clear at Geneva on September 21, with no denial from Paris or Prague. Refusal to initiate military conversations came from the Quai d'Orsay, not from the Kremlin. At the end (September 27-8) Daladier and Bonnet lent their full support—already unnecessary—to the Chamberlain program. They ordered François-Poncet in Berlin to tell Der Führer that they would accept Sudeten occupation on October 1. They ordered Corbin in London to tell Halifax that they favored an appeal to Mussolini for a Four-Power Conference.⁷

Their Cabinet colleagues offered little criticism and no effective

opposition to this course. On September 13 Georges Mandel and Paul Reynaud advised a firm policy, but were outmaneuvered by the extra-Cabinet intrigues of Joseph Caillaux and Pierre Étienne-Flandin, both of whom demanded capitulation. The Anglo-French betrayal of Czechoslovakia on September 19 caused Mandel, Reynaud, and César Campinchi to threaten resignation, but appeals for "unity" dissuaded them.⁸

The French press exhibited its customary pattern of mendacity and venality. The very surprising cleavages of opinion displayed in the French newspapers did not correspond to party lines. Two conservative and industrialist papers, *Journée Industrielle* and *Le Petit Bleu* stood for vigorous defense of the nation and its allies. *Le Jour*, *Le Matin*, and *L'Intransigeant* were defeatist or confused. The Radical *L'Œuvre* ran Geneviève Tabouis's anti-Fascist column and simultaneously pleaded for peace at any price. The Communist *L'Humanité* followed the party line of collective security and opposition to Fascist aggression. After September 21 the Socialist and Communist parties adopted resolutions opposing the partition of Czechoslovakia and demanding the convocation of parliament. Blum's *Le Populaire* wobbled in pathetic indecision. The Socialist leader confessed "shame" at Prague's betrayal and "cowardly relief" at Munich. He finally joined the chorus in praise of Daladier. He had not perfected his Marxist dialectic to the point of perceiving that within two months Daladier would be contemplating arresting him!

On the Right, André Giraud (Pertinax), Henri de Kerillis in *L'Époque*, and Emil Bure in *L'Ordre* pleaded for firm support of Prague. But Flandin in *Le Journal* urged Czechoslovakia's desertion from the outset of the crisis, denounced all war measures, and demanded that parliament be convoked. Before mid-September *La République* (Left) joined *Le Jour* (Right) in campaigning for a plebiscite and the neutralization of Czechoslovakia. Marceau Pivert, dissident Socialist, rallied considerable trade-union and pacifist support behind the slogan: "No War for Czechoslovakia." The semi-official *Le Temps* oscillated, but on the whole favored surrender to Berlin. On September 28 *Le Matin* went so far as to deny that the British fleet had been mobilized or that German mobilization had been scheduled for 2.00 p.m. Without denial the Right press quoted Daladier and Bonnet as saying of the British pledge of September 26 to defend France: "We have not received any confirmation" and "From an official of no importance." Daladier conceded its authen-

ticity—on October 4. On September 29 the Cabinet belatedly suppressed an issue of *L'Action Française* for charging that "traitors" at the Quai d'Orsay would attempt to sabotage "peace." It also suppressed Fascist Doriot's *La Liberté* for printing a manifesto by Flandin charging that France was being duped by war-makers. Flandin's anti-war proclamations were torn off kiosks by the police. But the campaign of defeatism had already reached its goal.

After Munich everyone joined in the chorus of praise save the Communists and a few reactionary Nationalists. Press comments on October 1 suggested the mood. Blum: "We can go back to work and sleep soundly again." Maurice Prax in *Le Petit Parisien*: "Peace! That grand word, that sacred word, can at last be spoken, can at last be written and printed. Peace!" Jean Prouvost in *Paris-Soir*: "Peace! Peace! Peace! The world can breathe again; we still can live!" *L'Information*: "A great victory for peace!" *Le Temps*: ". . . a new spirit in international affairs . . . a spirit of conciliation." Strasbourg rechristened its Avenue de la Paix "Avenue Chamberlain" and its Avenue de la Liberté "Avenue Edouard Daladier." *L'Œuvre* asked contributions for a gift for Mrs. Chamberlain. Funds were collected for a French villa for her husband. President Lebrun congratulated the Premier for his "civic courage" and "far-seeing and vigilant patriotism." Flandin exchanged congratulatory telegrams with Hitler. This, however, was too much for some of his colleagues in his "Democratic Alliance." They quit the party in disgust.

On October 4 Daladier went before the Chamber to declare that he had saved peace. He demanded a vote of confidence and power to rule by decree. Amid loud cheers he was upheld by a vote of 535 to 75 with only three abstentions. The opposition consisted of the 73 Communist deputies; 1 Socialist, Pierre Bloch; and 1 Nationalist, Henri de Kerillis. Léon Blum's 155 Socialists joined the majority. On the request for authority to rule by decree, they abstained. The request was approved, 331 to 78. The Senate approved 286 to 4. Daladier was showered with eulogies. "I accept my popularity," he said, "with the modesty that is only one of the forms my duty takes."

After Pavia (1525), when Francis I was taken prisoner by Charles V, the French King wrote to his mother that he had lost everything in the world save his honor and his life. At Munich the rulers of the French Republic surrendered honor for a short lease of life—and discovered presently that they had lost both. Chamberlain and Daladier brought back not "peace with honor," but dishonor without peace.

In the words of Winston Churchill: "France and Britain had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war." In the face of a shame and disgrace without precedent in French diplomacy, there were no resignations from the French Cabinet, none from the diplomatic service, none even from the General Staff. Gamelin was silent when a visitor remarked: "General, you have just lost thirty-five divisions!"—the Czech army. Voices in Prague prophesied that Skoda artillery would again bombard Antwerp and Paris. The Reichswehr learned the secrets of the Maginot Line from the Czech fortifications and assiduously perfected the science of demolishing them with Nazi howitzers. Only one French military leader retained his honor: General Louis Faucher, former head of the French army mission in Prague. He resigned his rank, joined the Czech army, and declared that he would never again set foot on French soil. Only one party in the Republic remained patriotically loyal to La Patrie: the Communists!

The price of Munich in foreign affairs would necessarily be paid in successive installments. The pitifully transparent rationalizations of defeat in which all French leaders indulged during October could not conceal the present and future cost of the débâcle. Moscow refrained from all official comment, but on October 4 the *Journal de Moscou* declared that France "no longer has an ally in Europe except Britain. What now is the value of France's word? . . . What now is the value of the French-Soviet pact since France has just torn up her treaty with Czechoslovakia—a treaty that bound her much more strongly?" Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest recognized that French power on the Continent was now at an end. On October 12, in quest of "appeasement" with Italy, Bonnet named Robert Coulondre as new Ambassador to Berlin and appointed the veteran André François-Poncet as Ambassador to the "King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia." Raffaele Guariglia came to Paris as Italian Ambassador. But Cæsar reciprocated this belated recognition of his role as conqueror with loud outcries from his Deputies for French territories, while Ambassador André watched the demonstration from the gallery. Japanese forces came ever closer to Indo-China. Nazi agitation in Alsace assumed alarming proportions. Tory voices in Britain were raised in favor of meeting German colonial demands through French concessions. Chamberlain and Halifax visited Paris on November 25, but nothing of their discussions with Daladier and Bonnet was revealed. All was left in abeyance. Popular horror over the atrocious

November pogrom in the Reich rendered colonial concessions and other forms of appeasement difficult. These must come later. . . .

The price of Munich in domestic affairs was soon obvious. Compromise with Fascism abroad is ultimately incompatible with preservation of democracy at home. Blum's betrayal of Republican Spain in 1936 now came back to him with interest. The People's Front was already shattered by the sabotage of the moneyed élite and by the irresponsibility of its leaders. Munich was its death-knell. Rather than permit the rising tide of Fascism to express itself through the Right, Daladier made himself the instrument of reaction and of a bitter class war waged by industrialists, financiers, and *rentiers* against the proletariat. The pretexts were as plausible as those employed to justify the "peace" with Hitler. France must work, save, and produce to meet new dangers. The mobilization and related extraordinary expenses had cost over eight billion francs during September. Security, solvency, and prosperity demanded "unity" and "sacrifice." Above all, France must be cleansed of Communism. The paid press took up the cry with vigor. At the Marseille Congress of the Radical Socialists on October 28, the Premier denounced the "Reds." He made Reynaud his Minister of Finance and used his new decree power to launch a general assault upon Blum's "reforms," beginning with the forty-hour week.

This offensive of reaction provoked protests and strikes. Daladier, now the "strong man," resorted to mobilization and courts martial. Blum joined Thorez and Léon Jouhaux of the C.G.T. in impassioned denunciation. Daladier threatened their arrest and permitted rumors to circulate regarding the possible dissolution of the Socialist and Communist parties. By the end of November tens of thousands of workers all over France had occupied factories or walked out of them on strike. A one-day General Strike was ordered for November 30. But it was broken in many industries by mobilizing workers into the army. Hundreds of labor leaders were arrested. Thousands of workers lost their posts. The strike was a failure. Daladier spoke of having saved France from Bolshevism. Beaten, embittered, and betrayed, the working masses vowed vengeance. By sabotage, obstructionism, and local strikes they threw French capitalism into such confusion that no program of deflation and retrenchment could restore solvency and no appeals for support could restore the unity or power of the Republic.

What price peace with the Cæsars? For the Third French Republic

the price was to be far more than the desertion of its allies and the loss of its prestige and security as a European Great Power. Should the Cæsars menace the West instead of marching on Moscow, France would pay the price of the Tory-Nazi entente by ceding pieces of her colonial empire and perhaps even portions of her metropolitan territories to those who asked for them. Folly to talk of resistance, for all possibility of resistance had been surrendered. Opposition would mean crushing defeat at the hands of foes now rendered invincible. Therefore demands must be met. This "peace" might be eternal (unless future Cabinets should embark upon a suicidal course of trying to thwart the Triplice), but the price of peace would be French reduction—*Mein Kampf* spoke of "annihilation"—to the status of a serf State. *

Such States, as Prague had already learned, cannot afford the luxury of democracy, liberty, or republican institutions. These too must be whittled away and eventually abandoned. If French labor resisted reaction successfully, it could resist only through revolutionary action. Revolution within would give enemies without their opportunity to strike France down. If labor's resistance was unsuccessful, reaction would triumph and French democracy would become a memory. The France which Daladier and Bonnet condemned to death in Hitler's house was not merely the powerful and respected France of Barthou, Briand, Poincaré, Clemenceau, Delcassé, the Bonapartes, and the Bourbon kings. It was also the liberal and equalitarian France of Blum and Zola, of Jaurès and Gambetta, of Louis Blanc and Mirabeau, of Danton and Rousseau and Voltaire. *La Grande Nation*, as a Great Power and as a colonial empire, died at Munich. The Republic of the Enlightenment and of the Rights of Man also died. The bourgeoisie which had fought for freedom and made France great would be left at length with nothing but its wealth. In the end that too would vanish, for those who sacrifice all other values on the altar of Property discover ultimately that the altar itself is gone. In the new cult of Power, Poverty, and Persecution, the France of old would find no place of honor among the worshippers.

3. DUSK OVER WESTMINSTER

Is it right or even prudent for England to incur any sacrifices or see other, friendly nations sacrificed merely in order to assist Germany in building up step by step the fabric of a universal preponderance? . . . Successive British Gov-

ernments [have] agreed to make concessions and accept compromises which not only appeared to satisfy all German demands but were by the avowal of both parties calculated and designed to re-establish if possible on a firmer basis the fabric of Anglo-German friendship. . . . [But] the action of Germany towards this country . . . might be likened not inappropriately to that of a professional blackmailer whose extortions are wrung from his victim by the threat of some vague and dreadful consequence in case of refusal. To give way to the blackmailer's menaces enriches him; but it has long been proved by uniform experience that, although this may secure for the victim temporary peace, it is certain to lead to renewed molestation and higher demands after ever shortening periods of amicable forbearance. The blackmailer is usually ruined by the first resolute stand made against his exactions and the determination to face all risks of a possible disagreeable situation rather than to continue in the path of endless concessions. But, failing such determination, it is probable that the relations between the two parties will grow steadily worse.

There is one road which, if past experience is any guide to the future, will most certainly not lead to any permanent improvement of relations with any power, least of all Germany, and which must therefore be abandoned: that is the road paved with graceful British concessions—concessions made without any conviction either of their justice or of their being set off by equivalent counter-services. The vain hopes that in this manner Germany can be “conciliated” and made more friendly must be definitely given up. . . . Men in responsible positions, whose business it is to inform themselves, and to see things as they really are, cannot conceivably retain any illusion on this subject. Germany will be encouraged to think twice before she gives rise to any fresh disagreement if she meets on England's part with an unvarying courtesy and consideration in all matters of common concern, but also with a prompt and firm refusal to enter into any one-sided bargains or arrangements and the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe. There will be no surer or quicker way to win the respect of the German Government and of the German nation.⁹

These observations were made by Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office in 1907. Thirty-one years later Winston Churchill offered a prognosis of the probable consequences of an alternative course:

Undoubtedly the Government could make an agreement with Germany. All they have to do is to give her back her former colonies or such others as she may desire; to muzzle the British Press and platforms by law of censorship; to give Herr Hitler a free hand to spread the Nazi system and dominance far and wide through Central Europe. After an interval, long or short, we should be drawn into a war, but by that time we should be confronted with an antagonist overwhelmingly powerful and find ourselves deprived of every friend.¹⁰

The course of events after January 1933, and particularly after Munich, lent weight to these melancholy forecasts. But for the Tory High Command there could be no turning back. All bridges were burned. Downing Street must go forward with "appeasement" and hope against hope that the Triplice would in the end attack the USSR rather than the Western Powers. Meanwhile plausible explanations had to be offered of the decisions already taken, and of those about to be taken, in order that public disillusionment at the price of "peace with honor" would not become politically dangerous.

Only a few of the shams perpetrated in the service of this objective can here be noted. On October 10, 1938 Earl Winterton, who held the Cabinet sinecure of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, asserted in a speech at Shoreham that defense of Czechoslovakia would have been impossible because the USSR had offered no help to Prague and "only made very vague promises, owing to her military weakness." Ambassador Maisky protested to Halifax. The Cliveden cabal found it useful to make Moscow the scapegoat of the Munich débâcle. It found an ally in a strange quarter. Colonel Lindbergh had for some months made it a habit in British social circles of lavishing praise on the German and Italian air forces and speaking deprecatingly of French and Soviet aviation. On August 16 he and his wife left England and went to Moscow, where for ten days they were hospitably entertained by Soviet air officials. He returned to London on September 10. He was reported to have declared at Cliveden that the Nazi air force, single-handed, could easily defeat the combined squadrons of France, Britain, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Soviet aviation in particular, opined the Colonel, had been demoralized utterly.¹¹ Lindbergh was taken to see Lloyd George—presumably to convince him that Russia was militarily worthless and that the pending "peace" was therefore inevitable. A British weekly, *News Review*, could say after the event:

The man who turned the scales against war last week was Colonel Charles Augustus Lindbergh. . . . In Berlin he was cordially received. In Russia he was an honored guest. When he returned home he had already drafted an amazing report for the American Government. A copy was passed to the French General Staff. Details filtered through to London. The document showed that the much vaunted Soviet Air Force was riddled with inefficiency, whereas Germany's was strong and well

organized. With the Lindbergh report in their possession, British and French military chiefs sat down to form their own estimate of the relative air strengths of Germany and Russia. . . . Bonnet was particularly alarmed. . . . Certain of Neville Chamberlain's advisers urged him to make peace with Hitler whatever the cost in view of the facts unearthed by "Lindy." . . . German secret agents obtained copies of the Lindbergh findings. . . . Adolf Hitler knew from that moment how far he could go.¹²

On October 10, as Lindbergh was preparing to go to Berlin to be feted by Nazi air officials, eleven Soviet aviation leaders in a letter to *Pravda* accused him of making "slanderous and insolent anti-Soviet utterances" at Cliveden and acting as a biased witness and "lackey and flatterer of German Fascists." "Lindbergh had the task in English reactionary circles of testifying to the weakness of Soviet aviation and thereby giving Chamberlain an argument for capitulation in Munich on Czechoslovakia. Lindbergh has fulfilled this task of his masters."

Lindbergh kept silent. Nancy Astor hurled accusations at Claude Cockburn, editor of *The Week*, who first revealed Lindbergh's role at Cliveden. She declared that the whole story was "Communist propaganda." She first denied that Lindbergh had been at any Cliveden dinner recently or made any remarks on Russia. Later she conceded that he had attended a luncheon. "He did talk about Russia in general."¹³ But Lady Nancy couldn't remember what he said or who was there! The Colonel subsequently accepted from Hitler the Service Cross of the Order of the German Eagle With Star, the second highest decoration in the Reich. He did not deny reports that he was contemplating moving to Berlin, where authorities searched for living-quarters for him among houses and apartments taken from Jewish families.¹⁴

This cheap stage-play, following hard upon the Munich melodrama, doubtless caused millions of Britons to believe that the partition of Czechoslovakia was necessitated by German aerial invincibility and Soviet perfidy or incompetence. Had not the world's most famous flyer said so in a "secret," "inside" exposé? That the tale was fantastic and irrelevant did not prevent it from serving its purpose. Lindbergh made no "report" to the American Government, but merely circulated a mysterious memorandum. Governments do

not rely for information regarding the military forces of other States on such sources. All governments maintain permanent diplomats, consuls, military, naval, and air attachés, and widespread intelligence services for such purposes. The content of the story, moreover, was a falsehood. On October 8 Pierre Cot, former French Air Minister, revealed in *L'Œuvre* that France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia alone had more planes than the Reich and that with only half of the Soviet fleet added to their forces they would command squadrons outnumbering those of Italy and Germany combined.¹⁵ That any air ministry in any capital attached any great significance to any of the opinions of Colonel Lindbergh regarding the quantity or quality of any national air force or national production potentials in aircraft is so improbable as to approach the absurd. But the engineers of the Tory-Nazi entente perceived the value of utilizing Lindbergh's name to lend credence to the panic which they had manufactured to mask their objectives.

Lloyd George broke his long silence on October 26 to declare that "a bad peace is no peace at all. I will tell you what we shall find, and I am speaking now as one who has taken a great part in the affairs of this country at the most critical moment in the whole of its history: we shall have forfeited honor; we shall have lost the respect of the world, and, what is still worse, we shall have lost our own self-respect. And in the end there will be no peace. There will be war, and war without friends. . . . We handed over a little democratic State in Central Europe, wrapped in the Union Jack and the Tricolor, to a ruthless dictator who will deny freedom to both Czechs and Germans alike. . . . I know something about armaments. The French army is today the best army in Europe, and the Russian army is the greatest army in the world so far as numbers are concerned and so far as its air force is concerned."¹⁶

Berlin lost little time in warning Downing Street that it would not tolerate such utterances. As early as October 9 at Saarbrücken Hitler denounced Duff Cooper, Eden, and Churchill: "We know that the aim of these men would be to start war. . . . We know further that now, as before, there is lurking threateningly the Jewish international world enemy which has found living expression in Bolshevism. . . . We want peace. . . . It is also part of the task of securing world peace that responsible statesmen and politicians refrain from constantly meddling talk." Amid a chorus of similar warnings in the Nazi Press the *Frankfurter Zeitung* declared:

The English and French must make it clear, beyond doubt, whether their Governments are capable of carrying out a policy of peaceful understanding and of settling the differences which exist between the two axes or whether "public opinion" will not allow this. We cannot enter into agreement with Chamberlain only to be suddenly confronted with a Churchill. We cannot afford to offer our hands to Daladier only to discover suddenly that a Mandel has taken his place. . . . As long as Churchill and Lloyd George are able to deliver provocative radio speeches across the ocean, even if their own Government disavows them, we cannot suppose that England's public opinion is really ready for understanding. . . . All further progress must therefore be preceded by a final clarification within England and France.¹⁷

Downing Street lost little time in heeding these warnings. In the midst of the crisis Sir John Simon banned the showing in Britain of a Paramount Newsreel containing an interview with Wickham Steed. The ban was achieved by a "request" to the company (accompanied by tacit threats of reprisal), transmitted by Ambassador Kennedy, whom Simon and Chamberlain represented as "co-operating" with them "in the public interest." The October issue of *The March of Time*, dealing in part with "The British Dilemma," was likewise banned. An unofficial censorship of the press, the radio, and the cinema, already highly effective through official "requests," silent threats, and pressure upon advertisers, became increasingly ironclad. Many potential critics of the Cliveden line were converted. Even an editorial writer in the Communist *Daily Worker* (October 3) was so far deceived as to write that Communists shared the "general relief" that Chamberlain had spared Europe from "the horrors of the ghastly calamity" of war.¹⁸ Critics who could be neither converted nor frightened into approval by the war bogey were intimidated by threats of prosecution for libel or for violation of the sedition act and the official-secrets act. Orders to the press during September and October were generally obeyed. Informal but effective restrictions upon book-publishing had long been in force. All criticism of Chamberlain was barred from the ether waves by the British Broadcasting Company. A "national register" was prepared as a step toward conscription—and, if need be, toward the introduction of the Continental system of tracing the movements of all subjects through police cards.¹⁹ American co-operation was enlisted in keeping unpleasant

facts from the British public—and from the American public. On October 10 John Strachey landed in New York to begin a lecture tour during the course of which he would be certain to speak unflatteringly of the Cliveden cabal. His visa was canceled in transit by the American Consulate in London on the ground that he was a “Communist,” an allegation which he denied. He was refused admission and, when released on bail, forbidden to lecture. Other avowed foreign Communists were admitted freely. The hand of Downing Street reached far.

The Tory leaders meanwhile moved to perfect the diplomatic structure of “appeasement.” A reshuffle of posts at the end of October rewarded Runciman with the Lord Presidency of the Council, vacated by Viscount Hailsham. Earl Stanhope succeeded Duff Cooper at the Admiralty and was succeeded as Minister of Education by Earl De La Warr. “Ruthless” Sir John Anderson, former Governor of Bengal, became Lord Privy Seal. Thus reinforced, the Cabinet pursued its destiny. The long promised “general settlement” with Germany was next in order. Berlin hinted that it was willing to conclude a pact for aerial limitation with Britain if London would accept the small end of a ratio of 3:1. While this proposal was not deemed acceptable, Chamberlain apparently heeded Hitler’s objection to any further expansion of British armaments. The proportion of bombers to chasers in the British Air Force, already fixed at 2:1 was changed in November to 1:2. Demands for a Ministry of Supply to organize industry for the defense services were rejected. The Prime Minister was evidently in agreement with Der Führer that new British armaments must be purely defensive, not offensive.²⁰ Chamberlain told Commons on November 1 that Polish, Hungarian, and new German annexations at Prague’s expense did not involve Britain’s “guarantee” because the terms thereof were not yet fixed and it was merely a pledge of aid against “unprovoked” aggression. He regretted that some saw a “sinister political motive” behind Herr Funk’s trade drive in the Southeast. Germany must be conceded mastery of *Mittel Europa*:

Geographically Germany must occupy the predominating position in relation to the States of Central and Southeastern Europe. I do not see any reason why we should expect a fundamental change to take place in these regions. Far from this country being concerned, we have no wish to block Germany out of

these countries or encircle her economically. . . . There may be some competition, but competition is a thing on which we have thrived in the past. In my view, there is room both for Germany and ourselves in the trade with these countries and neither of us ought to try to obtain an exclusive position there.

Unfortunately for Tory purposes, Hitler displayed no disposition to charge against the Soviet windmill and leave the West in peace. On the contrary he was reported in reliable quarters to be making overtures to Moscow for a rapprochement.²¹ He was likewise reported to have struck a bargain with Il Duce: in return for abandonment of Italian championship of Hungarian claims to Rutenia, Berlin agreed at the end of October to lend support to Roman demands for "self-determination" in French Tunisia.²² What was even more disturbing, Nazi spokesmen now revived their demands for the restoration of the German colonies. On October 29 Franz Ritter von Epp insisted that all must be handed back or compensation must be made elsewhere for those not returned. Whitehall muttered that rich Tanganyika could never be given up. The Union of South Africa would not yield German Southwest Africa. Der Führer declared in a sinister vein on November 8: "It only remains for us (Britain, France, and Germany) to agree over colonies which were taken away from us on pretexts contrary to justice. . . . Nazi Germany will never go begging. We do not go to Canossa. We wish to negotiate, but if others decline to grant our rights we shall secure them in a different way."

Such subtle suggestions as these stirred Westminster to new activity. Garvin's *Observer* proposed that France cede Togoland and Kamerun to the Reich. Oswald Pirow, South African Defense Minister, had already embarked upon a new "Runciman mission." He reached Lisbon October 25 and then visited London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Berlin, and Rome to negotiate ("unofficially" and in strict secrecy) about Germany's colonial "grievances." Mention was made in informed circles of the possibility of satisfying the Reich with Portuguese Angola, the Belgian Congo, a slice of French Equatorial Africa . . . ? But Pirow was discouraged. On December 6 he predicted war by spring, forgetting that war, like love, requires two. Those who have surrendered all possibilities of resistance cannot resist unless they choose to commit suicide.

Progress toward appeasement had meanwhile been delayed by a sudden discarding of sheep's clothing at Berlin. The pretext was the fatal wounding on November 7 of Eduard vom Rath, Third Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris, by a young Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, crazed with grief and desperation at the persecution of his family and his people. The Nazi Press shrieked for vengeance upon the Jewish "hostages" in Germany and intimated that Eden, Churchill, and Duff Cooper were responsible for the murder. During the following week Jewish shops all over the Reich were smashed and looted; over five hundred synagogues were stoned, burned, or demolished; insurance payments were confiscated by the Government; some sixty thousand Jews were herded into concentration camps, scores were tortured to death and hundreds driven to suicide; all were robbed; a "fine" of a billion marks was imposed upon the survivors; German Jewry was ruthlessly ousted from its last hope of livelihood (retail merchandising) and driven into ghettos or into penniless exile. The organ of the Black Guards, *Das Schwarze Korps*, hinted that the German Jews would be starved and driven to crime and then exterminated with fire and sword. Britain, America, and the democratic world were outraged. President Roosevelt summoned Ambassador Hugh Wilson home from Berlin and voiced the indignation of the American public in vigorous language. Chamberlain was forced to express regret over the pogrom and to make gestures toward aiding the refugees. Some might be settled, he hoped, in British Guiana—or in Tanganyika. He even felt obliged to protest at Nazi insults to British leaders. He told Commons on November 14 that no British mandates would be returned to the Reich. He would obviously be compelled to await the waning of indignation before resuming discussions of the possible transfer of Portuguese, Dutch, or French colonies. His collaborator in Berlin was not being helpful. Earl De La Warr declared on December 4:

Within a fortnight of Munich, [we have seen] the wildest abuse of ourselves, attacks on our politicians that amounted to an attempt at interference in our internal affairs, and defiance of every canon of civilization in treatment of the Jews that has aroused anger and dismay in every quarter of the globe. It may seem decadent to insist on continuing to lead civilized lives. . . . There is also a deep and growing feeling that there is nothing

we can do that can satisfy them, that friendly words and friendly actions are mistaken for cowardice and that only armaments can speak effectively.

There were also difficulties regarding "appeasement" with the Roman Cæsar. Mussolini's *Informazione Diplomatica* of October 12 asserted: "Against the Italo-German bloc of 125,000,000 . . . there is no longer anything to be done. The only thing that can be done is to make a final peace, a true peace, a peace on the Munich model." Such indeed was Chamberlain's intention, and for his purposes no sacrifices by others seemed too great to be borne. The first step was to put into operation the Ciano-Perth accord. By its terms its execution was contingent upon a "settlement in Spain." But Franco's victory (announced April 19) was still remote. The Caudillo asserted that continued loyalist resistance could only be explained "by a total absence of patriotism and the criminal spirit of the Red leaders."²³ Acceptance of the "Non-Intervention" Committee's plan of July 5, which was to be followed by the grant of belligerent rights to the rebels, was equally remote. Chamberlain turned to new devices. Il Duce agreed at Munich to withdraw 10,000 Italian "volunteers." Barcelona simultaneously discharged all foreign volunteers on the loyalist side. The Fascist veterans were received as heroes in Naples on October 20. By official admission Italy had suffered over 12,000 casualties in the Iberian campaign, including 3,000 dead. This left, according to *The Times* of October 6, a mere 60,000 to 90,000 Italian troops still in Spain. But the gesture sufficed.

On November 2, Commons approved, 345 to 148, the Cabinet's decision to put the accord into effect. Chamberlain declared that the war in Spain was no longer a threat to European peace. Halifax explained in Lords that: "It has never been true, and it is not true today, that the Anglo-Italian agreement has value as a lever, as some think, which might be used to make Italy desist from supporting Franco's forces. . . . Premier Mussolini has always made clear from the first that he is not prepared to see Franco defeated." Here at long last the British Foreign Minister openly admitted that the Cabinet was pledged, at Il Duce's command, to Fascist victory in Spain. Eden observed mournfully: "We are constantly giving and they are constantly taking." On November 16, exactly seven months after its signature, the accord was put into operation by a supplementary agreement at Rome. Downing Street therewith formally sanctioned

continued Italian intervention in Spain, recognized Italian title to Ethiopia, and acknowledged Cæsar as co-partner in a joint protectorate over Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Fascist victory in Spain was no longer essential to London to complete the immobilization of France, since Munich had resolved this issue. But it was still essential to appease Il Duce. The Tory oligarchy was as fully prepared to pay this price as it had been from the outset. To grant belligerent rights to Franco would make possible a German and Italian blockade of the loyalist ports and starve the Republic into submission. For this, French approbation was needful. Daladier and Bonnet were willing enough, since all decisions at the Quai d'Orsay were now made in London. But Il Duce, too, refused to play cricket. On November 30 he permitted his deputies to greet Ambassador François-Poncet, who had brought the gift of French recognition of Italy's title to Ethiopia, with loud outcries of "Tunisia!" The crowds and the press added: "Nice! Savoy! Corsica! Djibouti!" The Mediterranean status quo, "stabilized" by the Anglo-Italian agreements of January 2, 1937 and April 16, 1938, was evidently not yet satisfactory to Cæsar. Fascismo raged against Paris and declared that sanctions had invalidated the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935, the ratifications of which had never been exchanged. Paris protested. London registered regret. Rome demanded a Munich peace in the middle sea. Chamberlain, facing facts as boldly as always, concluded that this issue was too large to leave to a Simon, a Hoare, or a Runciman. He declared that he and Halifax would visit Rome on January 11. . . .

In the Far East, Tokio had also drawn its own conclusions from Munich. On October 21, Japanese forces took Canton and on the 25th Hankow. Hong Kong was cut off from its hinterland. The Yangtze was closed to all foreign shipping. Poland recognized Manchukuo on October 19. The British gunboat *Sandpiper* was struck by Japanese bombs five days later. Tokio protested to France on October 29 at arms shipments to China and made veiled threats against Indo-China. On October 27 Washington released an elaborate protest to Japan of October 6 against violations of the Open Door and the Nine-Power Pact. Tokio indicated that the pact was obsolete and asserted, politely but unmistakably, that it proposed henceforth to exclude the Western Powers from Eastern Asia. But Chamberlain was reassuring. He told Commons on November 2:

China cannot be developed into a real market without the influx of a great deal of capital, and the fact that so much capital is being destroyed during the war means that even more will have to be introduced after the war is over. It is quite certain that it cannot be supplied by Japan. Therefore, when anyone appears to contemplate a future in which Japan has a monopoly of the Chinese trade and we shall be excluded from it, I think it is flying in the face of facts. It is quite certain that when the war is over and the reconstruction of China begins she cannot be reconstructed without some help from this country.

If these words were anything more than verbiage, they meant that Tory Britain would assist Japan to exploit a conquered China, to the exclusion of other foreign interests and even to the detriment of established British interests, in the hope of thereby saving Hong Kong and the East Indies. Washington's anti-Japanese, anti-Fascist, and pro-British orientation was bankrupt, since Westminster was now openly aiding the Fascist Triplix. Though new doubts regarding the Far East began to be voiced in London by the end of November, Downing Street was irrevocably committed to sacrifice any and all other States to the exigencies of the program it had embarked upon in 1931. Should this program fail to save the Empire, American aid would be needed. It was announced on November 8 that George Rex and Elizabeth Regina would visit President Roosevelt in the spring. Eden, who seemingly had made his peace with his colleagues, visited the United States in December. He declared in New York on December 9:

To be conscious of shortcomings is not to proclaim that we are faint-hearted, still less to suggest that we are decadent. . . . We do still care, deeply, strongly, and for the same things. . . . We all want peace. . . . Nor are we calling out for help to others, nor seeking to lure others to pull our chestnuts from the fire. We have no such intention. We know that we are destined, in our land and in our generation, to live in a period of emergency of which none can see the end. If throughout that testing time, however long or short it be, we hold fast to our faith, cradle it in stone, and set steel to defend it, we can yet hand on our inheritance of freedom intact to the generations that are to come.

Despite denial, his presence and his message were a call for aid. Thus the mightiest and most self-complacent of Empires looked be-

latedly to others for help against the doom its leaders had prepared through their constant sacrifice of others for the enhancement of Fascist power. Britain had once beaten a Germany far weaker than the Germany of Hitler only with the combined military aid of France, Italy, Russia, Japan, the United States, and almost a score of lesser allies. The new Reich had Italy and Japan as allies and all of Southeastern Europe at its feet. France had fallen to the rank of a vassal State. America would not save a Britain beyond saving and could not if it would. Russia waited for the capitalist wolves to devour the capitalist sheep. A brief respite for the sheep might be had if the wolves attacked the Red Bear. But mutton is more palatable than bear meat. *Sic transit gloria Britanniae.*

4. NIGHTFALL

The course of post-Munich diplomacy in January of 1939 suggested the troubled waters of some mighty stream, poised midway between two cataracts and swirling over tumultuous rapids in violent eddies and crosscurrents. The crisis passed had resulted in a disastrous decline of influence and prestige for the Western Powers. The crisis to come was still shrouded in mists, but it was already clear that, whatever its form, it could have no outcome other than a further weakening of Anglo-French power and a new victory for the Fascist Tri-*plice.*

Nazi imperialism, like Nazi anti-Semitism, was a product both of the Hitlerian *Weltanschauung* and of the desperate exigencies of Fascist economics. Feverish prosperity resulting from heavy public spending was accompanied by an ever mounting debt, with no recovery of private investment. Only 20% of new capital issues during 1938 represented private business. An increase of 6% in national productivity during the year was accompanied by an increase of 33% in currency circulation, backed by a Reichsbank reserve of gold and foreign exchange of only 0.92% (January 3, 1939)—an all-time low. An increasingly unfavorable trade balance added to Berlin's difficulties. Stock values declined. For the masses living standards fell as hours of labor increased. The Nazi economic machine could be kept running and unrest could be silenced only by new "confidence" which could be created only by new diplomatic or military triumphs.

The issue was not whether the Reich would strike again, but when

it would strike and in what direction. Having been granted strategic freedom of action by Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich, Hitler could move Eastward or Westward at will. Der Führer concealed his plans and, like all shrewd commanders, held himself ready to move in either direction as circumstances might dictate. Despite persistent Polish and Magyar resentment at the Vienna settlement of November 2 and occasional border clashes between Czechs and Hungarians, Nazi agents continued to groom Carpatho-Ukraine as the nucleus of a new vassal state to be carved out of Poland and the USSR. While the economic "Gleichschaltung" of Czecho-Slovakia was accelerated during December, plans were laid for a German military highway from Silesia to the Ostmark across Moravia. Schneider-Creusot sold to the Czecho-Slovak Government its half-share in the Skoda arms plants, which would henceforth equip not France's allies but Hitler's legions. Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky in Berlin and Cossak Hetman Popov, who came from Berlin to Carpatho-Ukraine early in January, were hopeful of Nazi support for the "liberation" of all Ukraina. Grand Duke Vladimir, pretender to the Russian throne, visited Berlin in mid-December, but denied that he would accept German aid to recover the Romanov crown. White Russian General Anton Denikin charged in Paris on December 20 that Hitler was plotting to seize the Ukraine and the Caucasus. He denounced fellow-émigrés for accepting money and support from Berlin and Tokio. Premier Augustine Volosin of Carpatho-Ukraine declared on January 6, 1939: "The creation of a great Ukraine will be realized in the near future. I believe Ukrainians of the whole world will be able to return to a liberated fatherland, to their brothers who are now so brutally oppressed by Poland and Soviet Russia."

Moscow scoffed at such utterances, protested to Prague at Popov's activities, and declared them Nazi camouflage to disguise designs against the West. Bonnet was reported on December 20 to have told Moscow that it could rely on French military aid against the Reich only in case of a German invasion and not in the event of a German-inspired Ukrainian insurrection. But everyone knew that Munich had killed the French-Soviet pact and that France could no longer aid the USSR, even if it would. Warsaw registered anxiety. On December 11, 1938, the Polish Government rejected pleas for autonomy from its own five million Ukrainians. On the same day, in the Memel provincial elections, Nazi candidates secured 87% of the votes. London and Paris expressed hope that Berlin would not wrest Memel

from Lithuania and were apparently told to mind their own business. Warsaw warned Prague on December 16 and 23 to halt the anti-Polish agitation of Ukrainian émigrés. Beck hastened to conclude new trade agreements with Lithuania and the USSR and to renew the non-aggression pact with Moscow. As a Polish-Soviet rapprochement was thus initiated, Warsaw spokesmen asserted that Poland would fight any attempt at dismemberment. Beck conferred with Hitler in an ultra-secret conference at Berchtesgaden on January 5, but the results were obscure. Rydz-Smigly, like Stalin, necessarily hoped that the Nazi offensive would move toward the West. With France reduced to impotence, any effort to breathe new life into the French-Polish alliance was futile. Any German-Polish bargain at Russia's expense would probably prove fatal to the weaker partner. The alternative of a Polish-Soviet mutual assistance pact was unlikely to be realized. Whether Warsaw under the circumstances could maintain its security between mighty neighbors depended upon decisions not yet reached in Moscow and Berlin.

Bucharest was no less anxious over the *Drang nach Osten*. King Carol, after vain efforts to secure aid in London and inconclusive visits with Göring and Hitler in the Reich, took a leaf from the Nazi book and established an indigenous Fascism to save Rumania from Hitler. On November 30 Cornelius Codreanu and thirteen of his fellow prisoners, all convicted political murderers, were shot to death "while trying to escape." The Iron Guard was mercilessly crushed. The Reich press raged against "Jewish" and "Masonic" assassins and predicted revolution in Rumania. But on December 10 Berlin and Bucharest concluded a new trade pact. While some observers, including Augur, opined that Rumania would be the Reich's next target, Carol strengthened his despotism and shared with others the hope that Berlin would move Westward.

Elsewhere in Balkania similar hopes alternated with similar fears. In Belgrade Stoyadinovich courted both the Cæsars, sought to play them off against one another, and prayed that German-supported Magyar irredentism would look toward Transylvania rather than Croatia. Sofia and Athens waited upon the decisions of the mighty. In Turkey death came for Kemal Ataturk on November 10, 1938, but the strong new State which he had forged carried on under President Ismet Inonu. Ankara also viewed the *Drang nach Osten* with alarm, but Turkey's peril was not yet imminent.

On the Western front the Reich combined new moves to secure

a free hand in the East with alarming gestures suggesting that the Western Powers, rather than the USSR, might after all become the chosen target. On December 6, 1938, Ribbentrop and Bonnet signed in Paris a declaration of "pacific and good neighborly relations." "The two Governments take note that between their countries no question of a territorial order remains in suspense and they solemnly recognize as definitive the frontier between their two countries as it is at present established." They agreed to "consult" regarding future controversies. If this document had any value higher than that of the paper on which it was written, it could have but one meaning: Paris here recognized the military consequences of Munich and gave Berlin *carte blanche* in the East. The *quid pro quo*, if any, was renunciation—for the moment—of German claims to Alsace-Lorraine (but not to French mandates or colonies) and German discouragement—perhaps—of Italian ambitions at the expense of France.

In dealing with Britain the Nazi regime pursued its customary strategy of insult, blackmail, promises, and threats. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, arrived in London on December 14 on a mysterious mission, apparently having to do with the Nazi plan to expand exports as the price of permitting Jewish refugees from the Reich to take part of their money with them. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, went to Berlin on January 4, 1939, on an equally mysterious mission. George Rublee followed him on January 10 to discuss the ransom plan. That the Reich was seeking a trade accord with Britain and possibly a loan was probable. That Chamberlain and Norman were prepared to do all in their power to rescue Hitler from his financial difficulties was more than probable. But no open move could be made, since British and American opinion would be shocked by any such gesture, particularly if coupled with acceptance of Nazi plans to expand German markets through anti-Semitic persecutions. Pending developments elsewhere, the Tory-Nazi entente hung fire.

On December 30, 1938, it became known that British Admiralty officials were in Berlin to discuss Germany's demand for submarine tonnage equal to Britain's. The Anglo-German naval accord of June 18, 1935, often praised by Chamberlain, had granted the Reich a submarine fleet 45% as large as Britain's with the option of building up to 100% of British tonnage. This option Wilhelmstrasse now proposed to exercise, though Germany already had 65 submarines (of smaller tonnage) to Britain's 51. Amid deep secrecy it was rumored

that the Reich also desired to construct additional cruisers and to avail itself of the escalator clause of the 1937 naval agreement in order to build battleships of 40,000 tons with 18-inch guns. Here as always the "Soviet menace" was cited as justification. No concrete result of the Berlin discussions was announced. These moves were not conclusively indicative of a Nazi decision to challenge British sea-power. But since Chamberlain's quest for appeasement required ever new concessions, Hitler saw no reason for not charging all the traffic would bear.

For the Nazi war lords the question of East versus West could not be decided without giving some consideration to the desires of the Reich's allies in Tokio and Rome. For Japan, where the "moderate" Prince Konoye was displaced in the premiership on January 4, 1939, by "Fascist" Baron Hiranuma, any German assault on the USSR before the completion of the conquest of China would afford little opportunity for sharing in the spoils. Neither could the Tokio militarists hope to seize British and French possessions in the Orient in the event of a German drive against the West unless the "China incident" were first liquidated. Wang Ching Wei's peace overtures of December had no immediate results save his expulsion from the Kuomintang on the first day of the new year and a purge of the party ranks of all defeatist elements. Chiang Kai Chek obtained small favors from the Western Powers by threatening to make a bargain with Moscow. So long as his forces could still offer resistance, Tokio was obliged to hope for a postponement of the next European crisis. If Germany moved against Moscow, Japan's prize would be Eastern Siberia; if against Paris and London, then Hong Kong, Indo-China, and the East Indies. The latter booty was much more tempting and far less heavily defended. It could therefore be surmised that whatever advice Tokio tendered Berlin was inspired by hopes for a Nazi *Drang nach Westen*.

For Il Duce there could be no choice. Italy could gain nothing from a crusade against the USSR. Mussolini had been defeated in his efforts to forge a new Polish-Hungarian barrier against the *Drang nach Osten*. Ciano's visits to Budapest could not alter Magyar dependence on the Reich. Compensation for Rome could be realized only at the expense of France, and only with German support against the French. The campaign for French colonies initiated on November 30 was intensified through press agitation and public demonstrations. Rioting broke out in Tunis on December 8. Two days later Gayda demanded Italian participation in the management of the Suez

Canal. He warned Paris of the fate of Prague and intimated that French Somaliland and the Addis-Djibouti railway must pass into Fascist hands. Ciano hinted at war. On December 22 it was revealed that Rome had informed Paris (December 17, 1938) that it no longer regarded the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935 as binding. Ratifications had never been exchanged. Far from giving up the railway shares and the real estate ceded to Italy by Laval's catastrophic pact, Rome pressed for new cessions in fresh fulfillment of the promises of the Treaty of London of 1915. Gayda warned that if France proved stubborn, "Italy is ready to accept the offensive on any front and with any means." Verbal threats were accompanied by troop movements from Ethiopia toward French Somaliland, though any intention of invasion was disclaimed. It was hinted that Rome might be satisfied with "independence" for Tunis, participation in the Suez Canal, and a free port at Djibouti.

The Fascist clamor for partition of the French colonial empire was based upon the realistic supposition that France, even with British support, could never dare to resist the military might of the Rome-Berlin axis. Only with American and Soviet support could London and Paris meet the Fascist Triplix on equal terms. At a Socialist Congress on December 26 Blum advocated such a four-Power bloc against Fascism. His supporters approved, but his words were idle. Munich had ended any such prospect, at least for the near future. Should Germany move Eastward, the USSR could hope to offer effective resistance, even without allies. But should the axis move Westward, France and Britain would be beaten unless powerful allies came to their aid. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were thus under an increasingly desperate necessity either to join forces with Moscow or to push the Fascist Powers into an assault on the USSR at all costs. The first objective they were unwilling to contemplate. How to achieve the second?

The salvation of the West through a German war against Russia was attainable only by convincing Hitler that his path of least resistance lay to the East and by convincing his allies that they stood to gain something from such an enterprise. The first condition could scarcely be realized as long as the USSR remained armed to the teeth and Britain and France were without allies, hopelessly outarmed by the greater Reich which they had helped to create, and governed by Chamberlains and Daladiers. The second condition also offered difficulties. To achieve it, Japan must be estopped from expansion

Southward and deflected toward Outer Mongolia and Siberia. And since Italy could gain nothing by the anti-Soviet crusade, Mussolini must be paid in other coin to give it his blessing.

This double problem dominated Tory diplomacy at the turn of the year. On December 6, 1938, Earl Plymouth announced that the Cabinet was contemplating the extension of export credits to China. He warned Japan of the "incalculable consequences" of closing the Open Door. Downing Street, having already hailed the Anglo-American trade agreement of November 17 as a symbol of solidarity, expressed approval of reiterated American championship of the Open Door; blessed the \$25,000,000 credit to China through the Export-Import Bank, announced December 15 in Washington; and looked to the United States to keep Japan within bounds. These gestures of belated and feeble aid to China were of doubtful efficacy. Tokio indicated that it regarded the Nine-Power Pact as dead and that the "new order" in East Asia would comprise a bloc of Japan, Manchukuo, and China in which the privileges of the Western Powers would be curtailed or terminated. Hiranuma's assumption of the premiership signified renewed determination to crush Chinese resistance, but it did not necessarily foreshadow any program of war against the USSR. Whatever the West might do, Japan's path of least resistance lay Southward. In the event that France and Britain should be driven to the wall in Europe by the Cæsars, Tokio would strike at their Oriental possessions.

To London's distress, Paris failed to comprehend the problem of "appeasing" Mussolini. Daladier referred on December 5 to "the firm resolve of all Frenchmen to assure, by all the means in their power, the absolute integrity of the territory over which the French flag floats." On December 14 Bonnet told the deputies: "There cannot be the slightest equivocation. France will never consent to giving up an inch of territory to Italy, and any attempt to realize such a claim can only lead to an armed conflict." On December 19 he reiterated this defiance and coupled it with references to Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunis, and Somaliland and to British support of France against aggression. Three months previously he had denied that France could count on Britain. Four months previously he had made similar brave pledges in defense of Prague. Small military and naval reinforcements were sent to Djibouti, where a few hundred troops faced 250,000 Italian and colonial soldiers in neighboring East Africa. Ciano's note of December 17 was answered on the 26th with an acknowledgment

and an expression of willingness to exchange ratifications of the accord which Rome had just repudiated and to redress "grievances." But no French territory would be ceded and Rome's suggestion of "arbitration" *à la Munich*, with Hitler and Chamberlain as participants, was rejected. On the same day Daladier and Bonnet pressed Chamberlain and Halifax to stop in Paris on their way to Rome for their projected January visit. On January 9 the Premier returned to Paris from a ten-day tour of Corsica, Tunisia, and Algeria which the Fascist press denounced as a "provocation." Daladier made new promises: "I shall maintain France. I shall maintain the French colonial empire."

Under these circumstances British policy oscillated between pledges of "firmness" and new preparations for "appeasement." As for Germany, Malcolm MacDonald declared on December 7 that colonies are "not now an issue in practical politics." Londonderry echoed this sentiment. A bill to guarantee export credits provided £75,000,000 for the promotion of foreign trade, of which £10,000,000 would be used to facilitate exports to markets which the Government might desire to have or to hold for reasons of national interest. This threat played its part in bringing Schacht to London. On December 13 Ambassador von Dirksen, his staff, and all German journalists in London boycotted the fiftieth anniversary dinner of the Foreign Press Association when they learned that Chamberlain's speech would deplore the attitude of the German press in calling Baldwin a "guttersnipe." Chamberlain aroused German wrath once more on December 15 by distinguishing between German statesmen and the German people and by opining that British finances and arms would triumph in any war of long duration. On December 19, to the tune of a confidence vote of 340 to 143, Chamberlain in Commons sought to conciliate the Nazis, but declared: "I am still waiting for a sign . . . that they are prepared to make their contribution to peace." He defended Munich by alleging that the alternative would have been simultaneous war with Germany, Italy, Japan, and insurgent Spain—this despite the fact that Franco had proclaimed his "neutrality" during the September crisis and that the Cæsars had not contemplated general war, but had capitalized, with Chamberlain's aid, on the threat of it. The Prime Minister denied for the hundredth time charges of bad faith on the part of Italy and indicated that his slogan was still "peace with the dictators."

Who would pay the next installment of the price of this peace? In

his references to the French colonies, Chamberlain first declared that Britain had "no specific pledge" to defend them. But at the Press dinner, he asserted that "our relations with France are so close as to pass far beyond mere legal obligations, since they are founded on identity of interests." In Commons on December 14 he asserted that the Anglo-Italian agreement to respect the Mediterranean status quo "certainly applies to Tunis." Any attack upon Tunis "would be a matter of grave concern." Here, as in dealing with Prague in the spring, Chamberlain warned against war, but declined to assume any pledge of defense. It was not strange that some Frenchmen feared that Tunis might suffer the fate of Sudetenland. On December 19 he spoke of Anglo-French relations as "cordial" and expressed gratitude at Bonnet's pledge of December 14 to place all the forces of France at Britain's disposal to resist unprovoked attack. But he made no reciprocal pledge covering the French colonies, merely opining that "intentions" were "more significant than actual treaties." Paris wondered anxiously what his intentions were.

As preparations for the Rome visit proceeded, it became known on December 29 that Chamberlain and Halifax would visit the Pope as well as Mussolini. On the same day Chargé Roger Cambon called at the Foreign Office to express the French desire that Chamberlain should not attempt "mediation" between Paris and Rome. He disclaimed any such intention, but the Italian press was confident that he could not escape his favorite role. The Quai d'Orsay begged the British Ministers to stop in Paris. They hesitated, lest Il Duce be offended, but finally agreed to stop for "tea." Meanwhile on December 23 Franco's armies launched a "Chamberlain offensive" in Catalonia designed to break through if possible to Barcelona in order to convince the conferees in Rome that rebel victory was assured and that belligerent rights should be granted. Chamberlain had denied on December 19 that Italy was sending new troops to Spain, but asserted that belligerent rights would not be granted save in accordance with the non-intervention plan or withdrawal of foreign troops. The rebel drive reached Artesa and Borjas Blancas on January 4, but was held up on the second loyalist defense line. Miaja launched a "Chamberlain offensive" of his own in Estremadura and drove some miles into Badajoz province toward the Portuguese frontier.

If these events were disturbing to the Tory leaders, developments at the Eighth Pan-American Conference at Lima were more reassuring. Here the efforts of Hull to achieve an effective agreement for

continental defense—which might conceivably promote indifference among both North and South Americans to the fate of the British Empire and even attract Canada into its orbit—were largely frustrated by Argentina, here as always a British dependency. The Declaration of Lima of December 24, 1938 merely pledged the American Republics to “consult” in the event of any threat to their peace, integrity, or independence. If Washington was gratified by the purpose of this pledge, Downing Street was more gratified (as were Rome, Berlin, and Tokio) by the feebleness of its implementation.

There remained the problem of placating Mussolini. The necessity of compensating Il Duce for his acquiescence in any *Drang nach Osten* was appreciated by Hitler and Chamberlain. Il Duce sought German and British support of his Mediterranean and African ambitions. What would he regard as sufficient compensation? On the principle that he who asks little gets nothing and he who asks much gets something, his spokesmen clamored for everything in sight. The greater the demands the greater the opportunity for advantageous bargaining. Mussolini might agree to withdraw more troops from Spain in return for a French colony or two. He might agree to postpone demands for French colonies in return for belligerent rights for Franco and assurance of Fascist victory in Spain—which would make Tunis and Algeria indefensible. He might for the moment be content with a British loan and with non-territorial concessions at Tunis, Djibouti, and Suez. His problem was to win German support and induce Chamberlain to browbeat Paris into concessions and to acquiesce in further intervention in Spain.

In this situation the Reich remained reserved. While appreciating the necessity of supporting his ally, Hitler had no desire to be drawn into conflict with France and Britain over Rome's ambitions. This contingency, however, was remote despite Daladier's bluster. France could not resist Italian demands without British support. Such support might well wreck the Chamberlain program of appeasement. With Downing Street willing and anxious to compensate Cæsar, the only issue was whether compensation should be attempted first at the expense of Spain or of France. If France were compelled to yield to Fascist blackmail in Africa, Fascist victory in Spain would ultimately be assured in any case. If the Spanish Republic were crushed first by Fascismo, French colonial communications in the Mediterranean would become untenable. Who should first be butchered to make Chamberlain's Roman holiday a success? Which course would in-

volve the least sacrifice of British interests?

Chamberlain and Halifax, accompanied by Cadogan, took tea in Paris with the French Ministers on January 10. Bonnet expressed confidence that the British leaders understood the French position and, in imitation of the example of the United States, announced that 45,000 tons of French wheat would be made available to Barcelona. The Spanish Republic might yet be saved, not by wheat but by planes, tanks, and artillery. All arms for its defense, however, were still denied to it by the "non-intervention" Powers and by Washington as well. As his British guests reached his capital, Il Duce's legionnaires aided Franco's forces to capture Montblanch and Falset. On January 15 Tarragona was taken. Heroic loyalist resistance insured many months of fighting before Franco's victory should be complete, but the fate of Spanish democracy appeared already sealed, barring some belated change of policy in foreign capitals. Although rebel victory would in all likelihood render French North Africa indefensible and insure Fascist penetration of Latin America, no effective steps were taken in Paris or Washington to terminate tacit collaboration with the Rome-Berlin axis and the Tory-Nazi entente in their fixed program of delivering Spain to Fascism. Whom the gods would destroy they first make irresponsible.

His Majesty's Ministers, amid much pomp, conferred in Rome with Mussolini, Ciano, and Pius XI, January 11-14, 1939. Mussolini championed "peace with justice." Chamberlain championed peace "by the method of negotiation." But without a war panic the Tory leaders could not silence French and domestic objections to any open surrender of the interests of others to Cæsar. Secrecy and deception were therefore the order of the day. "No new commitment, arrangement or agreement," declared the laconic communiqué of January 12, "has been asked for or entered into by either Government." But the visitors had "learned" the Italian viewpoint—which the Fascist press had screamed to the world for two months and Perth (scheduled to retire in April) had presumably conveyed to London long since. Gayda expressed doubt as to whether Chamberlain had sufficient "understanding" and "capacity for sacrifice" to appease Italy. Observers spoke of the conference as a "failure" with the British and Italian positions "far apart." But it may be surmised that plans were laid by the Tory leaders for preventing Il Duce from resuming anti-British agitation or embarrassing Hitler's plans by bribing Rome with new concessions at the expense of France and Spain or, as a possible

alternative, at the expense of the lesser Powers of the Near East.

While the discussion in Rome proceeded, Hitler opened his new Chancellery building and received the diplomatic corps on January 12. Monsignor Cesare Orsenigo, Papal Nuncio and Dean of the corps, expressed hope that "the peaceful procedure which was so effective in Munich and that so completely conforms to the wishes of all peoples may become the accepted method in the future of mediating international controversies." Der Führer echoed this sentiment and praised the "wise discernment of the Powers." "The natural and vital necessities of nations must sooner or later be admitted and not be obstructed by force." Downing Street and Il Duce cried "Amen!"

As Chamberlain returned to London, the Fascist press vented its spleen on France and indicated that all issues must wait upon Franco's final victory. Czaky visited Berlin and announced Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay belatedly followed the United States in protesting Japan's closing of the Open Door. Fascist forces moved against Barcelona. This latter development led to public outcries in Britain and France for an end of the farce of "non-intervention." Chamberlain and Bonnet announced on January 18 that any change of policy would have "grave consequences" and could not be considered. To the end and beyond, the damned are doomed to aid their destroyers in bringing faggots to the stake at which they must die. Dark rumors hinted at a Fascist spring offensive against the West.

By mid-winter of 1939 the prospects were that the Western Powers would suffer at least one more major diplomatic defeat, of which Italy would be the major beneficiary, before Hitler should make an irrevocable choice between East and West. While Spain (and therewith France) could still be saved by French intervention, the temper of political leadership at Paris was such that *La Grande Nation* had become clay in the hands of the potter. But a "Mediterranean Munich" might well require another war panic to frighten the British and French masses into acquiescence. Apart from a slowly rising tide of unrest among his own followers, Chamberlain anticipated no difficulties in manufacturing such a panic, for Mussolini and Hitler were certain to give him full co-operation. That it would eventuate differently from the panic of September was improbable, for France was already a passive object of Tory-Fascist diplomacy and no longer able to act on its own behalf. In the United States Secretary Ickes denounced the Reich, and Sumner Welles, on Decem-

ber 22, brusquely rejected German protests. President Roosevelt in a moving address to the Seventy-Sixth Congress on January 4, 1939, hinted at the end of the "new neutrality" and possible economic pressure upon aggressor States. Chamberlain expressed approval. But American pacifists and isolationists would have none of Roosevelt's medicine. The United States continued to bar arms to the Spanish Republic and to sell them freely to Germany, Italy, and Portugal. The United States continued to express alarm over Fascist domination of Latin America and to acquiesce in the Fascist conquest of Spain—which would insure Fascist domination of Latin America. The United States continued to protest at Tokio's campaign in China and to supply Japan with all the necessary materials to complete the conquest. Under these conditions London and Paris could count on no American aid against the Triplice. Chamberlain's Britain continued to pursue appeasement. Daladier's France continued to be the victim.

Moscow, like Washington, could and would give no support to the European democracies so long as their leaders pursued a program of suicide. No other program was in prospect for 1939, nor could any other be implemented effectively with European hegemony already delivered to the Cæsars. As for the *Drang nach Osten*, Poland and Rumania appeared to be doomed to vassalage or partition at German hands. This victory could be won without war, or, at worst, at the cost of local conflict in which Warsaw and Bucharest would soon fall to the invaders. Beyond lay the Ukraine. But the price of the Ukraine would be a desperate and prolonged armed combat with the USSR. Such a combat, however much desired by Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, might wreck the Third Reich and leave a weakened Italy at the mercy of London and Paris. The road toward Bagdad and India was easier. The game of blackmail against France and Britain entailed fewer risks.

West or East? Time would tell. "Through wood and dale the sacred river ran, then reached the caverns measureless to man, and sank in tumult to a lifeless ocean; and 'mid this tumult Kubla heard from far ancestral voices prophesying war."

DEFEAT

I. THE HOLLOW MEN

IN *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* Edward Gibbon relates the tragic tale of the Emperor Valens, whose folly was fatal to himself and his realm. In classic prose the great historian of the decadence of ancient culture tells how the Visigoths, in fear of the even more barbarous Scythians, persuaded Valens to permit them to cross the Danube. Valens, also in fear of the Scythians, granted the Visigoths leave to settle on Roman soil on condition that they defend the frontier against the wild hordes without. They agreed and "solemnly protested that, if the gracious liberality of the Emperor would permit them to cultivate the wastelands of Thrace, they should ever hold themselves bound, by the strongest obligations of duty and gratitude, to obey the laws and to guard the limits of the republic" against the Scythians. Presently, however, the new "defenders" made demands which Valens was unwilling to grant.

The imprudence of Valens and his ministers had introduced into the heart of the Empire a nation of enemies; but the Visigoths might even yet have been reconciled by the manly confession of past errors and the sincere performance of former engagements. These healing and temperate measures seemed to concur with the timorous disposition of the sovereign of the East: but on this occasion alone Valens was brave; and his unseasonable bravery was fatal to himself and to his subjects. He declared his intention of marching from Antioch to Constantinople, to subdue this dangerous rebellion.¹

Valens marched. On the 9th of August A.D. 378, "a day which has deserved to be marked among the most inauspicious of the Roman

calendar," he attacked those who had been granted wealth and power to save the Empire from its foes, but who had now become "rebels" and "invaders." Near Hadrianople the battle was joined. The Roman cavalry fled. The infantry was surrounded and cut to pieces. Valens was slain. From this blow the Empire never recovered, though none then perceived its ultimate import and the tempo of dying was slow. The Visigoths henceforth roamed through the provinces with little hindrance. Thirty-two years later they sacked Rome. Four decades after this disaster the Eternal City was taken and looted by the Vandals. Another two decades sufficed to bring the Western Empire, already a fiction, to an end. The Scythians played little part in its destruction.

The rulers of Western Europe in the twentieth century of the Christian era displayed as little wisdom as Valens and less courage. If their problems were more complex, their alternatives were not more numerous. Two tribes of "barbarians" threatened their heritage: Communists and Fascists. They drove the vanguards of the former back toward the East and, having failed in their efforts to destroy Red Muscovy, they concluded a truce with its masters. But when the horde-leaders of Fascism arose closer to home and promised protection against the Bolshevik savages, the men of wealth and title in the West took them at their word and spurned Muscovy's offers of aid against the new danger. The barbaric Cæsars who pledged themselves to save "civilization" alternately offered protection (at a price) against Communism and held up the bogey of their own displacement by bloody revolutionaries if their own power should be menaced or their whims denied. The leaders of the West therefore upheld their power and granted their demands. Too late they discovered that they had thereby sealed their own doom. That their ultimate fate would be different from that of Valens appeared improbable, however long the years might be before their final end.

The cultural matrix of this doom was as complex as modern society. But the anatomy and physiology of Nemesis were as simple as the elemental processes of life itself. The experience of frustration among living things, man included, stems most commonly from inability to achieve adjustment to environmental change. Survival in a world in flux requires dexterity in the adaptation or discarding of old habits, and in the improvisation of new ones which will be objectively relevant to the terms of the task in hand. Reluctance to abandon cherished formulas which no longer make for adaptive behavior spells

failure. Ineptitude at evolving new devices to cope with unprecedented situations spells failure. When failure becomes chronic, the consequence is extinction.

If Western European culture is today facing death, the source of its danger lies in the inability of those in the seats of power to abandon or modify old symbols, values, and practices which are irrelevant to the exigencies of a new day. It lies also in inability to devise new symbols, values, and practices calculated to serve the good life in a changed world in which old ways no longer work. The culture crisis of the twentieth century is intelligible only in terms of the specific nature and content of this frustration. Throughout the Western nation-states the old élites of land and the new élites of money traditionally wielded influence and enjoyed power and privilege in a social setting dominated by the twin deities of Property and Sovereignty. Out of feudalism and absolutism were born those concepts of private ownership and of national independence upon which the whole superstructure of modern communities and of the Western State System came to rest. The institution of Property as it has developed in the modern age was the legacy of feudal aristocrats to burgher-merchants and artisans. The institution of Sovereignty was the legacy of royal rulers to burgher-citizens and patriots. The rise of the bourgeoisie to social and political ascendancy in the West reached its full flood with the progress of science, the acceleration of technological change through invention, the rise of industrial entrepreneurs, and the emergence of a machine economy competitively producing goods for a mass market. The rule of the bourgeoisie brought national Sovereignty to full flower with the cult of nationalism becoming a new mass religion.

By the late decades of the nineteenth century the new world of Property and Sovereignty had come fully into its own. It was a world of competitive enterprise among independent producers in which production for profit made for constantly greater efficiency in the output of an ever greater volume of goods and services. It was a world of competitive politics among independent nation-states in which the quest for power made for national unity, for vigorous trade, and for the rapid development of the backward areas of the earth. Economic competition postulated individual risk and insecurity, with occasional exploitation of the less favored and periodical losses to all in depressions. But the lure of riches for the few, beyond the hopes of Midas, and the reality of unprecedented wealth for the

many, beyond the imaginings of all earlier spinners of Utopias, led all to pronounce a blessing on the system of "capitalism" which made prosperity and progress possible. By the same token political competition in *Weltpolitik* postulated national risk and insecurity, with a constant burden of armaments and occasionally disastrous wars. But visions of empire, beyond the dreams of all the great conquerors, and the exaltation of all patriots in worship of the fatherland, led all to look with favor upon the division of the civilized world into independent national sovereignties. In both cases the complex patterns of collective feeling and action which were thus pronounced good were not the product of deliberate fabrication, but were the comforting residues, inherited and familiar, of an unplanned past in which Providence or Progress or some unseen but beneficent hand caused all things to turn out for the best in the best of possible worlds.

Along with this faith, the blindness of which became belatedly apparent, the new people of the machine age inevitably developed a more intimate and tangible confidence in Reason and in Freedom. From these values grew, in aspiration if not always in fulfillment, the fairest dream of modern man. Science and the machine were products of untrammelled creative intelligence, applied to the problem of bending nature to serve man's needs. Competitive enterprise was possible only through the freedom won by throwing off the shackles of feudalism and the static restraints of a parochial folk-society. Freedom to produce and sell and buy seemed inseparable from freedom to think, to talk, to worship, and to vote. Liberty and Property were but two sides of the same coin. Both affirmed the worth of man and the dignity of individual personality. The humanitarian ideals of fraternity and equality, far from appearing to be obstacles to the enjoyment of property, seemed indispensable conditions of such enjoyment. The new vision of brotherhood and peace among nations was no antithesis to Sovereignty, but the natural goal of international life. The dream was of a world in which Man would at long last be master of his fate and captain of his soul because he would at last be free of the bonds of slavery and serfdom, free from exploitation and oppression, free from ignorance, bigotry, and superstition. He would be able and anxious to find truth in the freedom of the marketplace and to apply truth to the solution of all his problems and to the constant amelioration of his common life. The dream found expression in political democracy and in social democracy, in "reform" and in the New Freedom, in the visions of Jefferson and Lincoln, Gladstone

and Mazzini, Gambetta and Marx, in "internationalism" and in the covenant of Woodrow Wilson.

In contemporary Europe this dream lies in ashes. The culture which bred the dream is dying. The cause of the tragedy lies in the inadequacy of cherished attitudes and habits resting upon accepted definitions of Property and Sovereignty in the face of the exigencies of a new economy of abundance and a new world society of interdependent communities. Corporate industry and the rise of cartels, trusts, and trade unions, all within the legal and institutional framework of the eighteenth century, progressively destroyed the old competitive order without substituting for it any new pattern of productive and distributive relationships commensurate with the demands of new markets. In the markets of late capitalism the ability of consumers to purchase the output of industry at prices profitable to producers seemed somehow to be less than the ability of producers to turn out goods and services in abundance. Lacking wit or will to preserve and develop an economy of plenty by modifying the established patterns of incentives and rewards, the men of the twentieth century returned perforce to an economy of scarcity in which idle and profitless factories and idle and hungry workers coexisted in incongruous juxtaposition. By the same token, the pattern of interstate relations which became fixed in the pre-industrial era was incompatible with the world economy and the world society created by the machine. Lacking will or wit to preserve and develop that society by so modifying the creed of Sovereignty and the cult of nationalism as to permit of effective world organization, modern man returned perforce to international anarchy in which all nations were threatened with disaster by the efforts of each to seek self-salvation.

The moot question as to whether paralysis of wit and will is a cause or result of cultural decadence may be left to the morphologists of history and the specialists of *Kulturgeschichte*. It is enough to notice that just as the rulers of Rome were unable to cope with the new problems of the fourth and fifth centuries, so the rulers of the West are unable to cope with the new problems of the twentieth century. In both cases the "problems" are creatures not of natural disasters but of inter-human maladjustments. *A priori* such problems are susceptible of analysis and solution by the application of human intelligence. But intelligence fails when thought and action are dominated by the symbols of a dead age. When emancipation from the past, adaptation to the present, preparation for the future become achievements be-

yond the capacity of those called upon to act, the floods of misfortune rise ever higher and presently engulf faith in intelligence itself. Therewith comes a great fear. With fear marches anti-rationalism, mysticism, pursuit of mirages, persecution of scapegoats, and a retrogression to superstition and magic. When these creeds of despair have established their dominion, they bring with them inexorably an accelerated descent of the whole society toward the primal chaos out of which it once emerged.

This process, already well advanced in the Europe of today, appears on the surface to be a consequence of the corruption and blindness of élites; of the betrayal or stupidity of the masses; of the senseless slaughter of youth; of the senility and ineptitude of the elders; of the ruthlessness of the outer barbarians; or of the cowardice of those who defend the frontiers. It is forever all of these things. It is always more than these things. But whether, once begun, the process is attributable to some variety of cultural senescence, to some weird withering away of the roots of mind and heart and will, must remain a mystery. In the end the people of dusk who face the night are incapable of comprehending even these questions.

Fear is father of the Nemesis which drives victims of this fate to self-destruction. The disequilibrium of a decaying culture reflects, and is reflected in, the maladjustments of millions of neurotic personalities. The human psyche is at best an unstable system of socially acquired restraints upon fear, rage, and love—or, in psychoanalytical terminology, upon id-impulses potentially driving the ego toward incest, murder, and suicide. When war, famine, pestilence, and death breed universal despair, those who are trampled underfoot by the Horsemen of the Apocalypse seek to flee from danger or to destroy the sources of their misery. Since fear is ever an evil counselor, its addicts flee more frequently from dream-dangers than from actual perils and often discharge their aggressions not upon objects relevant to their woes but upon substitute targets which happen to be handy or helpless. Ghost-chasing and witch-hunting are devices useful to insecure élites to protect them from the wrath of the masses. But these devices, which can only be employed among masses already panic-stricken, themselves reflect the demoralization and fright of the ruling groups which resort to them.

Fear is everywhere the basic motivation to public action in what Konrad Heiden has aptly termed *Das Zeitalter der Verantwortungslosigkeit*. Those with wealth and power in the Western societies

lived in a world which could only be saved from ruin by a new departure in economic relationships either through a renunciation of monopolistic privileges and a consciously directed return to a truly competitive capitalism or through the socialization of the means of production in a planned economy. That world likewise required for its salvation a new departure in international relations either through a genuine renunciation of the pursuit of power and the practice of war by sovereign states or through the merging of sovereignties into a federation of mankind organized to keep the peace and to serve the common purposes of its members. The more remote benefits of these innovations were to be had only at the cost of immediate deprivations, material and psychic, which were beyond the endurance of those called upon to accept them. In their efforts to cling to their vested interests in the old order, they destroyed competitive capitalism, blocked the path for democratic socialization, and reduced all efforts at the organization of peace to a tragic farce. When they led the nations to Armageddon in 1914, they recoiled in horror from the hideous "accident" in which they found themselves entangled. With horror came fright. And fright became terror when three years of agony led in one great community to a revolt of the masses, which annihilated the classes hitherto enjoying wealth and power.

In its ultimate ramifications the panic which the Russian Revolution inspired among the wealthy and well-born of Western Europe is the clue to the politics of the epoch of dread. Élites fear masses only when their members are troubled in conscience or are acutely aware that mass miseries are of such magnitude that traditional symbols for eliciting obedience have become of dubious efficacy. Despite the "stabilization of capitalism," the failure of "World Revolution," and, in Calvin Coolidge's phrase of 1923, the "encouraging evidences (in Russia itself) of returning to the ancient ways of society," the fear of peasant or proletarian revolt became a determining factor in the political behavior of European aristocrats and industrialists.

Such fear was well founded. Had it served as incentive to efforts toward removing the sources of mass misery and thereby diminishing the potential market for Communism, it might have promoted salvation. Such efforts would have required some sacrifice of interests and redefinition of privileges on the part of the mighty. They would also have involved the reshaping of traditional values and ideals. The plutocracies and aristocracies of the West were incapable of such reorientation. Their members, with few exceptions, behaved

like frightened children or hysterical psychotics. Their first move was to attempt to starve and bludgeon the Russian masses into a return to what they chose to call "sanity." By blockade, intervention, and subsidized civil war, they starved and slaughtered millions—all the while expressing sincere horror at the butchery by the Bolsheviks of their paid agents and of the aristocrats and plutocrats of the Czarism. But they failed to smash the Communist citadel. Defeated, they made "peace" and waited for a new opportunity to essay the killing of the Red dragon. Meanwhile they sought salvation at home in new expedients which were as much a tribute to their short-sighted ingenuity as to their already chronic blindness and folly.

The rise and spread of Fascism were the product of this searching. All Fascist movements spring from the panic-stricken desperation of the little men of the lower middle class who find escape from their fears through conversion to the mystic cult of irrationality, xenophobia, and "heroic" intolerance. The practitioners of the cult were adepts in employing the devices of democracy to encompass democracy's destruction. But no Fascist movement anywhere was ever brought to power by the democratic electoral process, for none ever won a majority of any electorate to its cause. In each instance of victory the gang-captains were brought to power by the élites of land and industry, of commerce and finance, of army and church. The Little Cæsars of the colored shirts promised protection to Property, Morality, and Religion against "Bolshevism" in return for money, power, and an opportunity to establish their tyrannies. Those who lived by Property, Morality, and Religion and who viewed peasant and proletarian radicalism with alarm turned willingly to their would-be rescuers who had risen from the ranks of the lesser bourgeoisie. The racketeers and gunmen of the new creed of violence were given control of the machinery of government by the men of money in order that they might rescue their patrons from the subversive preachers of class hatred from the lower social orders. Over and again the patrons were obliged to rescue the rescuers from their own folly or from the wrath of those unwilling to be rescued. Since this process, once begun, was all but irreversible, the patrons were obliged to pay ever higher tribute to the gang-leaders who peddled "protection." This tribute was at first the sacrifice of the freedom of others. Ultimately the patrons were obliged to abandon their own freedom and even a portion of their privileges in favor of a new élite of political pirates whose hunger for power, and for the loaves

and fishes of authority, was insatiable.

Down this path have fearfully stumbled in mad and melancholy procession most of the aristocracies, plutocracies, and priesthoods of the Continent—first in Italy, then in Germany, later in varying tempo in Austria, Poland, Portugal, Hungary, Spain, and other States. In the barbaric cult of middle-class Cæsarism all sought refuge: the feudal gentry of ancient name who feared the pressure of land-hungry peasants; the great entrepreneurs who feared the exactions of their wage-earners; the industrialists and financiers who welcomed “protection” for Property against proletarian radicalism; the clergy of the Church of Rome, and of some other churches as well, who bought “protection” for Religion against Marxist atheism; the peasantry who either believed promises of land distribution or merely rejoiced in a cause which vocalized their primitive folk-resentment against rationalism, urbanism, and the alien world of metropolitan culture; some even of the proletarians who believed promises of “socialism” and “revolution” or who became passive or hostile toward their own leaders who had betrayed them; and, above all, the timid burghers, still decent and sane, not yet converted to Cæsarism, still clinging to liberty, but finally persuaded by force or fraud to support Cæsar’s shirted legions for defense against the bogies and bugaboos conjured up out of darkness by the new magicians. Finally, in the arena of *Weltpolitik*, the diplomats and strategists of the Western Powers, caught in the fears and vacillations of the élites for whom they spoke, joined the parade of those who sought to buy peace and protection from the Little Cæsars, now grown formidable with the booty which patrons, enemies, and victims alike brought eagerly to their altars.

What measure of security did the tribute-payers buy with their Danegeld? In the paying they surrendered, for others and at length for themselves, most of the human values which have been the distinctive contributions of Western culture to the enrichment of the life of the race. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity were yielded up with small regret, for all of these seemed to the fearful to have become dangerous to Property and to Sovereignty. The dignity of the individual, the privacy of the home, the sanctity of the church, the rule of Reason, the creed of toleration and compromise, the vision of “peace on earth, good will to men” were likewise abandoned since the new tyrants would have it so in order to further their ends. In the name of *Kultur*, culture itself was sacrificed. Wrote Thomas Mann:

Culture! The scornful laughter of a whole generation mocks at the word. It refers, of course, to the cherished goal of our whole liberal bourgeois outlook. As though genuine culture were anything else but precisely this: liberalism, good citizenship! As though it were not the exact opposite of crudeness and human impoverishment, and no less the opposite of a wretched inertia and flabbiness which remains flabby no matter how stiffly it stands at salute! As though, in a word, culture, whether as a matter of form, as desire for freedom and truth, as the conscientious guiding spirit of life, as endless painstaking, were anything at all but moral discipline itself! . . .

The small man crazed by the fury of thinking . . . believes in violence, and in only one thing more; he believes, even more passionately, in the lie. Among all the European ideals—truth, freedom, justice—which he thinks to have liquidated, truth is the one he most hates and rejects. In its place he puts the “myth.” It is a word which bulks as large as the heroic in his vocabulary; and what he means by it, one discovers, is the abolition of the distinction between truth and humbug. . . .

It is heartbreaking to see the weakness of the older cultural group in face of this barbarism; its bewildered, confused retreat. Dazed and abashed, with an embarrassed smile it abandons one position after another, seeming to concede that in very truth it “no longer understands the world.” It stoops to the foe’s moral and mental level, adopts his idiotic terminology, adjusts itself to his pathetic categories, his stupid, spiteful, and capricious propaganda—and does not even see what it is doing. Perhaps it is already lost.²

Along with these losses went the loss of the humane ideal and the surrender of the hard-won conviction that arbitrary power and lawless violence are evil. Wrote André Maurois:

The movement which has been called Fascism is a reaction of despair on the part of societies seeking order at any cost. During the glorious peace of the 1920’s men had forgotten the price of security; they had believed that other values could be superior to it. But from the moment when they felt their lives and their possessions threatened and inadequately protected by governments which were no longer able to govern, they yearned, as Paul Valéry has put it, for discipline or death. In a disorder

which almost looked like the chaos following on the fall of the Roman Empire men rediscovered and paid tribute to the value of force. Under the feudal system people had willingly submitted themselves to the superior strength of a warrior because he guaranteed them protection against barbarians and brigands. Similarly the middle classes of modern Europe, anxious as they once were for liberty, have accepted the authority of parties composed of a minority of the population, but of a minority which is ready to fight. The ideal of gentleness and of love is a peacetime ideal; it cannot subsist in time of war.³

As the will to war waxed into the fanaticism of ever-threatening violence, the will to resist among the defenders of the Western tradition waned into impotence. Words of warning were idle. Irrefutable evidence of the consequences of their course produced no change of course among the doomed.⁴ The diplomats of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay pretended that in this wise they had purchased "peace." Ignorant multitudes, and even some of the mighty, believed the pretense. Even when purchased peace crumbled to bloodstained dust, they still believed, for the will to believe untruth is the mark of the decadent and the damned. The worshippers of the nation-state believed that they had purchased the safety of the shibboleth of Sovereignty—and continued to believe long after the far-flung tentacles of the Fascist International had reached out into every land to perform its task of corruption and disintegration. The priests and bishops who sold Christendom into bondage to the new pagans believed that at least the Church of God had been rescued from church-burning heretics. For many of them the spectacle of Franco's Nazis and Moors "saving" and "purifying" Catholicism through seas of Spanish blood evoked no change of conviction. Doubts came only when the pagans of the Third Reich themselves demolished churches, seized the wealth of the hierarchy, herded priests into jails, and stoned the homes of cardinals and archbishops. By then their doubts were futile.

Was Property saved? Some of the men of land and money were content enough with their bargain. The nobles of Italy, the Junkers of Prussia, the grandees of Spain regained something of the privileges, if not the power, of the feudal gentry of old. The industrialists of Lombardy, the Rhineland, and Saxony, with labor beaten or hypnotized into serfdom, waxed fat on the profits of weapons for the gods of war. But competitive capitalism was as dead in the Fascist

realms as in Red Russia. The difference lay only in the fact that in Russia the capitalists were also dead, while in the Fascist empires they lingered on and even prospered, no longer as independent entrepreneurs but as parasitical bondsmen of the bureaucrats of totalitarianism. If their new masters should fare well and suffer them to exploit the poor in peace—still better, if their new masters smashed Moscow and gave them new profits from contracts needful for the imperial crusade, they might indeed retain the privileges, if not the influence, of a propertied plutocracy.

But if their new masters should come to ruin, swiftly through defeat in war or slowly through an inner decay of the corporative economy, they would be undone. In the wake of such disaster would almost certainly come social revolution and the abolition of Property. Precisely because of this peril, the men of land and money in the Western democracies were ever obliged to rescue the Fascist regimes, for they, too, feared ruin if their counterparts elsewhere were destroyed. Precisely because of this fear the rulers of France and Britain in every crisis gave all to the new conquerors rather than permit them to risk defeat. In the giving Property and Sovereignty alike were reduced to ghosts. Property was "saved" by the destruction of all that had hitherto made property meaningful as an institution and as a way toward progress. Under bellicose Fascism the holders of property, whether small men or great monopolists, held their holdings at the pleasure of the gang-captains whose rapacity knew no limits and whose pseudo-heroism might well drag the propertied classes to irremediable ruin. In the decadent democracies the holders of property kept their posts by tribute to foreign blackmailers. They lived under an ever-growing fear that those who had "saved the world from Bolshevism" would proceed to despoil them utterly of their imperial riches and even of their domestic wealth, once granted the omnipotence incessantly demanded under threat of violence. But, like the Bourbons, they learned nothing and forgot nothing. Driven remorselessly by fear, they walked the road to the guillotine which they had themselves erected for others. Thus in the end was Property saved, as Religion and Morality and Culture were saved, by the same devices that Valens had employed to protect his realm from the Scythians. There was little prospect that the ultimate results would be different.

The processes here at work were not unique to Western civilization or to the modern age. A political scientist of ancient Athens

depicted the physiognomy of decay in terms as fresh as tomorrow's newspaper:

Tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty. . . . The leaders of the poor deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people, at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves. And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as best they can. And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy. And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality. . . .

This, and no other, is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector. How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? . . . Having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen. . . . Some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf—that is, a tyrant? . . . Then comes the famous request for a bodyguard, which is a device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career. . . . At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes everyone whom he meets; he is to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to everyone!

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader. . . . And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war. Now he begins to grow unpopular. Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak their minds. . . . And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything. And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purge of the state. . . . And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require. . . .

If there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and spend them. . . . Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can no longer be a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, have fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves.

—Plato's *Republic*, translated by Benjamin Jowett, in *Dialogues* (New York: Random House; 1937), Vol. I, pp. 822–8 *passim*.

A modern seer described the same process in terms applicable to the decadence of all cultures:

The more radical the political elimination of the matured old order of Estates and callings, the more formless and feckless the electoral mass, the more completely is it delivered into the hands of the new powers, the party leaders, who dictate their will to the people through all the machinery of intellectual compulsion . . . and treat public opinion merely as the weapon to be forged and used for blows at each other. But this very process, viewed from another angle, is seen as an irresistible tendency driving every democracy further and further on the road to suicide. . . . In the Late Democracy, *race* bursts forth and either makes ideals its slaves or throws them scornfully into the pit. It was so, too, in Egyptian Thebes, in Rome, in China—but in no other Civilization has the will-to-power manifested itself in so inexorable a form as in this of ours. The thought, and consequently the action, of the mass are kept under iron pressure—for which reason, and for which reason only, men are permitted to be readers and voters—that is, in a dual slavery—while the parties become the obedient retinues of a few, and the shadow of coming Cæsarism already touches them. . . .

Through money, democracy becomes its own destroyer, after money has destroyed intellect. . . . Men are tired to disgust of money-economy. They hope for salvation from somewhere or other, for some real thing of honor and chivalry, of inward nobility, of unselfishness and duty. And now dawns the time when the form-filled powers of the blood, which the rationalism of the Megalopolis has suppressed, reawaken in the depths. Everything in the order of dynastic tradition and old nobility that has saved itself up for the future, everything that there is of high money-disdaining ethic, everything that is intrinsically sound enough to be, in Frederick the Great's words, the *servant*—the hard-working, self-sacrificing, caring *servant*—of the State, all that I have described elsewhere in one word as Socialism in contrast to Capitalism—all this becomes suddenly the focus of immense life-forces. Cæsarism *grows* on the soil of Democracy, but its roots spread deeply into the underground of blood tradition. . . . There now sets in the final battle between Democracy and Cæsarism, between the leading forces of dictatorial money-economics and the *purely political* will-to-order of the Cæsars. . . . [This is the] *final battle between Economics and Politics*, in which the latter *reconquers* its realm.

—Oswald Spengler: *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1928), Vol. II, pp. 457, 463f.

With the triumph of the new Politics of Cæsarism, Property and Sovereignty alike are in the old sense gone, along with Freedom and Reason. The élites of land and money, in destroying democracy and clinging blindly to privileges which democracy appears to threaten, herewith encompass their own doom.

2. THE LOST SOULS

Since all believers are ever tempted to confuse their own convictions with the immutable fundamentals of the Universe, they are readily led to suppose that the subversion of their faith signifies the end of the world. This common human trait has caused many Liberals to view Communism and Fascism as the destroyers of civilization and to assume that the world-wide triumph of either would be equivalent to the cultural demise of modern man. The agnostic may well contend that all values are relative, that each creed reshapes the Cosmos in its own image, that old ways pass and new ways arrive, that totalitarianism, whether Black or Red, has contributions of its own to offer which are different from those of Liberalism but are not necessarily inferior or debased.

The time is not ripe for any final assessment of the new anti-liberal ideologies which have swept over the Western world during the years of its tribulation. It is evident that European Liberalism has decayed with the decay of the class which gave it birth. Its bourgeois defenders are all but paralyzed. They have suffered defeat by default. The only other social stratum which might be expected to seize the torch of freedom from failing hands is the urban proletariat. But workers who have embraced revolutionary Marxism have either met unmitigated defeat at the hands of the élites they proposed to destroy, or won victory (in Russia) in the name of dictatorship which seems on the surface, despite its profession of Liberal objectives, to be as fatal to the values of historic Liberalism as is the cult of the Cæsars.

Elsewhere those who are lost to the Liberal faith—nobles, industrialists, the inert peasantry, and the middle millions of little men—have embraced a creed and a way of life which repudiate utterly not only the *Weltanschauung* of the Russian Revolution but likewise that of the French Revolution, the American Revolution, the Great Rebellion, and the whole tradition of liberty from Magna Carta to modern democracy. It is evident, regardless of the issue of whether the world is thereby doomed, that a particular world is in process of being done to death by the weakness of its champions and the onslaughts of its foes.

The dynamics of Liberalism's self-destruction as manifested in the realm of diplomacy have been explored at some length in the preced-

ing pages. The present and prospective shape of the new cultural forms evolved by the barbarians of the twentieth century is not primarily an object of the present inquiry. Whatever shape the new world may take, its gods will be new and jealous gods and the old faith of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Age of Reason will be as dust beneath the feet of the conquerors. Man is the slave of his symbols. New symbols challenging the old are often foreordained to victory. There is no inevitability in the "ultimate" vindication of "Justice," "Reason," and "Freedom," any more than the recapture of the lost liberties of the dead citizens of Rome was implicit in the overwhelming of the Empire by the Teutonic barbarians. The destroyers of ancient culture, however, were simple people of a new dawn who looked with awe and even reverence upon what they demolished. They therefore sought to rebuild. After long centuries of darkness they succeeded in re-creating in a new mold some of the values and institutions of the great imperium which had forever passed away. Today the new barbarians sneer at that which they doom to death. Out of their ruthlessness and contempt no Renaissance of Western culture in its historic configuration is likely to emerge. Dr. Hans Kohn has aptly stated the probabilities which flow from this circumstance:

The new barbarian is different from former barbarians. He comes equipped with the latest devices and instruments of technique. He despises reason, but he accepts and cultivates science and technology and puts them to a new demoniacal use. Without the guidance of reason, without a faith in man and humanity, all our achievements and discoveries become meaningless tools of destruction. It is questionable how far force can be creative and productive in exceptional circumstances, but there seems no doubt that force, veering round in an intellectual vacuum, can only result in the most unbridled reign of terror, which threatens to undermine the foundations of civilization.⁵

But the end is not yet. The conceptions and misconceptions persistently entertained in what is left of the West continue to play their fatal role in completing the processes of disintegration. It is therefore not irrelevant to recapitulate *en passant* the criteria of evaluation currently applied in the surviving European democracies to the mystic realms beyond the Rhine and the Alps.

As regards the Fascist Empires, the most persistent belief which has

hitherto been employed as the motivation or rationalization of policy is that they will ultimately attain a state of inner and outer equilibrium or satiation, making possible "general appeasement" and neighborly relations with the democracies. By way of accelerating the arrival of this happy condition, it is contended, the new Cæsars must be permitted and perhaps even encouraged to seek the redress of "grievances." They must be allowed to persecute and expel their enemies and victims since the liquidation of these unfortunates will, after all, bring persecution to an end. They must be allowed to recover old lands and conquer new lands, for only thus will the "injustices" of 1919 be righted and the "causes of war" removed. They must be allowed freer access to the markets of the world and they must be permitted to conquer new markets from their competitors, by fair means or foul, for only thus will they attain prosperity—and prosperity makes for "reasonableness" and contentment. On no account must they be resisted, for "war solves no problems." On no account must they be opposed by their own weapons, for if democracy fights Fascism with the tools of its enemies it will automatically destroy itself. A policy of concessions and of "live-and-let-live," it is argued, will eventuate in a new *modus vivendi* in a world in which peace and plenty are again assured, regardless of ideological divergencies.

These illusions promise to persist to the end, for the will to believe is here more potent than the evidence of the senses. Scores of observers have long since stated with crystal clarity the inner nature of the dynamics of Fascism.⁶ Economic and social stability and political satiation, even in a limited and relative sense, are impossible in these institutionalizations of cultural decay. The new Cæsars are men sinking into a quagmire—now slowly, now swiftly, at this moment pulling themselves out by dexterous movements suggesting escape, at the next grabbing desperately at every stick and stone, at all times seizing hold of others within their grasp and dragging them down into the vortex. Fascism "solves" the problem which arises from the disappearance of competitive enterprise in the free market of classic capitalism by building the national economy on the avowed basis of private monopoly. This system of mass exploitation is parasitic and destructive to such segments of the business order as are still left free from its blighting hand. Cumulative impoverishment is dealt with through mysticism, witch-hunting, and heroic military adventures. Unemployment, the paralysis of the capital-goods industries, and the drying up of the sources of private investment are remedied by colos-

sal governmental expenditures for public works and armaments. All the "laws" of a free-market economy are suspended in a system in which money and credit and the soaring superstructure of public debt are based on nothing more tangible than hypnotic "confidence" in the regime.⁷ Confidence is maintained by terror, propaganda, forced loans, and all the political and economic tricks of tyranny. The system survives only by constant expansion of arms expenditures, by incessant saber-rattling and adventurism, and in the end by the robbery of persecuted scapegoats at home and helpless victims of imperialism abroad. The ineluctable consequences postulated and predicted for such a social order have been abundantly realized in practice.

In 1934 the present writer declared:

In the Third Reich the aristocracy is driven toward conquest by hunger for land and glory. The plutocracy is driven toward conquest by the shrinking of its markets, by the diminution of its profits through the impoverishment of domestic consumers, by the bright prospects of gain to be got by forging the weapons of war and by using them to conquer new markets in the East. The neurotic middle-class masses are driven toward conquest by nationalist megalomania, by hero-fantasies, by morbid longings for murder and suicide bred of the insecurities and tensions of a diseased society. The Nazi leaders are driven toward conquest by all these pressures and by the exigencies of internal politics in a dictatorship which must become increasingly unstable and insecure with the further disintegration of the economic and social order of monopolistic capitalism.⁸

In 1937 E. B. Ashton wrote:

The growth of a Fascist nation knows no saturation point. Its every expansion, whether justified or not, serves to increase its strength—and every increase in its strength, in turn, calls for new fields to conquer.⁹

In 1938 Aurel Kolnai wrote:

Even today I see the chief peril in the famous "have-nots" theory—its smug simplicity and cheap generosity—with bleak conceit and Sunday-school priggishness lurking behind it. As if dæmonic evil were really a "product" of unjust "curtailment"

and, better still, could be spirited away by a stingy tip, or even by a lordly donation! As if a drug addict could be cured just by offering him some good Burgundy (without even, at the same time, locking up all stores of morphia within his reach)! ¹⁰

There is nothing in the record of the years of decadence to suggest that these judgments are at any point in error. The totalitarian States of Duce, Führer, and Mikado must conquer and exploit other communities or perish. The hollow men of the West have given them lease of life by abetting their courses of robbery and violence and have refused to compel them (or even permit them) to perish. Out of the nettle of domestic autarchy and the bramble of democratic defeatism, the Cæsars have snatched fresh flowers of evil and have at last won military omnipotence. The formidable machines of war at their disposal cannot be dismantled, for the military economy of the Garrison State has no foundation other than preparation for armed aggrandizement. The tools of Mars must be multiplied manyfold and must ever be used to crush such resistance as may be offered and to browbeat those incapable of resistance into granting gifts under threat of invincible violence.

Quo vadit? The frightened élites of the West have hoped that the great war machines which, by their connivance, they have brought into being will move against Moscow. They have prayed that the Fascist coalition will thereby destroy the Bolshevik bogey and give to the legions of the Cæsars ample room for theft and glory while the West is left in complacent peace. Such an enterprise is possible. If it should achieve victory or even a stalemate, the crusade might leave to the West some decades of relative quiet, since the resulting slaughter and destruction in Eastern Europe and the Orient would long preoccupy the Powers of the Fascist Triplice. But if the crusaders should meet with defeat, the "Red hordes" of Muscovy might well sweep over the ruins of Fascism in Europe and Asia alike. And if, as is quite possible, the Cæsars prefer to threaten with attack those who no longer possess a will to resist rather than invading a vast realm whose millions of defenders will fight to the death, they will move forth against the remnants of the West and demolish the vestiges of democratic culture as thoroughly as Goths, Vandals, Huns, Saxons, Angles, and Norsemen once ravaged Britain, Gaul, and Iberia.

Regardless of whether Russia or the States of Western Europe are the first victims of the coming barbarian invasion, the would-be con-

querors must either annihilate their foes or themselves be annihilated. It is difficult to perceive any bases of stability emerging from this process, for the Fascist allies, if victorious against common enemies, may reasonably be expected to fall afoul of one another. In this vista of incessant conflict the declining populations of Central and Western Europe will be first militarized, then brutalized, and at length reduced to a miserable peasantry scrabbling about in the ruins of new feudal realms. Under the whips and bludgeons of petty despots and war lords who mask the emptiness of death and the peace of exhaustion with the trappings of empire, *les misérables* who survive will sink into a dark ages comparable to the chaos of a thousand years ago.

Meanwhile what of the Communist devils from whom the new barbarians will thus have "saved" civilization? Under Communist leadership Russia alone among the Great Powers exhibits the phenomenon, strange in an age of decay, of a population expanding with extraordinary rapidity not from conquest but from the loins of its people. Russia alone displays a constant expansion of capital-goods industries and a constant increase in productivity, not based upon theft or magic or militarism gone mad but upon a steady advance in technology and upon a diffusion of increased purchasing power among wide masses. The Socialist Fatherland is still crude and primitive. Its peoples are not the effete cosmopolites of the Western cities, but are sons and daughters of sturdy stocks coming for the first time in their young history into a full consciousness of their own capacities. Its rulers are not gentlemen-aristocrats nor corrupt politicians nor yet the maniacs of a *Kleinbürgertum* which has found its soul by losing its mind. Neither are they peasants or proletarians, despite their class vocabulary. They are representatives of a new élite, recruited from the ranks of the masses and gifted with political power (and with incomes more generous than those of the unskilled) by virtue of painfully acquired talents of organization, management, planning, symbol manipulation, and military prowess. The élite of the "new civilization" of Soviet Communism¹¹ is not wholly stabilized, homogeneous, or united. Factional quarrels and the intrigues of Fascist foes may continue to result in repressions and purges. Despite the exigencies of Socialist planning and defense, the stifling Prussian regimentation which makes for a maximum of efficiency in industry and war will never be attained in the USSR, for its leaders and its peoples are still individuals, not automatons.

The Western sophisticates who postulate for Red Muscovy a

future either of middle-class democracy on the Western model or a future of totalitarianism on the Cæsarian or Bonapartist model are reckoning without the creative energies of an awakened Slavdom and are ignoring past achievements and present trends in a society irrevocably based upon collectivized agriculture and socialized industry. Trotskyites, to be sure, delight in "proving" that Stalinism and Fascism are identical,¹² thus improving upon the verbal pyrotechnics of the Stalinists themselves, who are content merely to prove that Trotskyism serves Fascism's purposes without being quite one with it. In other camps there are those who prove that Fascism or Communism is, after all, the most perfect form of democracy or that Liberalism is identical with Bolshevism. Such verbalizations are either the dishonest devices of unscrupulous propagandists or the intellectual drivel of psychopathic fanaticism. The labels used describe nothing which has reality in the objective world.

If Soviet Communism is not Fascism, neither is it the democracy which the West has hitherto cherished without being able to preserve or defend it. The Soviet élite commands obedience within a narrow, quasi-theological framework of words. It permits no free market for talk, any more than it permits a free market for the buying and selling of goods and services. Like other totalitarian systems, it is dedicated to order, hierarchy, discipline. Its leaders rule with intolerance and ruthlessness. The means they have devised to serve their ends appear to defeat the ends in the eyes of many Western liberals—who, in Europe at least, are now utterly incapable of devising any means to serve their own ends. Power corrupts. Dictatorship brutalizes. Socialist planning involves the regimentation and debasement of the individual. *Q.E.D.*

It is imperative to recall, however, that the goals which men strive for and the ends which they attain bear some relationship to the symbolic values and verbalized programs to which they have pledged their faith. The Communist rulers of the USSR are committed to ideals which stem from the Western tradition in the days of its glory. Despite their parochialism of class and creed and all the ugly apparatus of dictatorial governance, they are sworn by the shades of Marx and Lenin to the ultimate objectives of a classless and stateless society, to equality and fraternity, to emancipation from tyranny and superstition, to the reign of Reason and Science, to internationalism and the brotherhood of man. Their crimes are many. They have renounced God and held all priesthoods in contempt. They have

repudiated Sovereignty in favor of their own formula of world organization. They bury traitors instead of praising them. Worst of all, they have repudiated Property in favor of Socialism. "In every ordered State," once wrote Anatole France, "wealth is a sacred thing; in democracies it is the only sacred thing." Hence democratic abhorrence of Bolshevik atheists, thieves, and assassins. But horror and fear do not alter the fact that the masters of the Kremlin are still rationalists in a world of unreason, still equalitarians in a world of resurrected feudalism, still catholics in a world of tribal divinities, still experimental pragmatists in a world of inflexible bigotry and blind dogma. The ultimate shape of the civilization they are helping to build will be conditioned by these beliefs—the more so as the economic and social foundations upon which they are building are not destructive but productive of the values to which they are sworn.¹³

To what destination does Moscow's road lead? If left alone and in peace the USSR will continue along its chosen path toward socialist industrialization. Since its economy is not contracting but expanding, since its expansion is not a product of robbery, conquest, or preparation for war, the Soviet Union, for all its dreams of a proletarian world, will never in any presently visible future take the sword against non-socialist States. In the face of danger it offered its arms to help the West defend a common heritage against Fascist aggression. The offer was at first accepted and then in fear refused. After Munich the USSR faced two alternatives in its relations with other Great Powers, neither of its own devising. It could anticipate either an armed assault against it by the Fascist Triplice, abetted by the democratic Powers, or it could look forward to being left alone while Rome, Berlin, and Tokio busied themselves with the partition of the established colonial empires. In the latter event it will stand aside, since any intervention will but delay the inevitable disintegration of British and French power. The ultimate beneficiary of that disintegration is likely to be the USSR. In the former event, it will be obliged to fight for its life against formidable odds.

If that fight should be lost, it is improbable that the penalty of defeat would be anything worse than withdrawal from peripheral provinces into the remote and impregnable fastnesses of Eastern Russia, Western Siberia, and Central Asia, where a better day might be awaited. If that fight should be won, the Communist victors might conceivably make peace with the vanquished on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum* if the cost of destroying the vanquished ap-

peared excessive and if, as is probable, Britain, France, and the United States should threaten armed intervention to rescue Fascism from utter defeat at Moscow's hands. If, however, the defeated aggressors should be hopelessly crushed in the field and destroyed by domestic revolution, Moscow might well send its legions far over Europe and Asia to emancipate Slavs, Magyars, Germans, Italians, and Chinese from the thralldom of the bankrupt and broken Cæsars.

In this eventuality World Revolution would become practical politics and the danger would arise of an armed clash with the bourgeois democracies. These Powers, while never willing to fight Fascism even to protect their own riches, might display an unprecedented eagerness to resort to arms to save the world from the Bolshevism which Fascist folly had unleashed. Such a conflict would lead ultimately to a stalemate. Geographical obstacles would render it impossible for Britain, France, and America (by this time given over to their own brands of Fascism) to reconquer Central Europe from the enemy. By the same token the militarists of Japan could scarcely hope to recover control of a Bolshevized China. But neither could Moscow inflict serious damage on Britain, Japan, or America.

In all these imaginable contingencies of the days to come, Western Liberalism in its European homelands would appear to be marked for death. And in all imaginable contingencies the creed of the new Cæsars, already putrid with the stench of decay, would seem likewise to be doomed—either through violent and bloody extinction or through temporary triumph followed by slow retrogression to the primeval darkness to which its disciples look for surcease of their strivings. It is possible that on the European Continent Communism alone may survive as a living force. If its enemies detest this prospect, they have only their own maniacal folly or their irresponsible, fear-stricken stupidity to thank for the fact. Whether Communism will live only on the steppes of Eurasia while the outer world to East and West descends into night, or will serve as the force which may recreate a world society on new foundations remains a secret locked in the womb of time.

3. THE KINGDOM OF DEATH

Europe's crisis in the years of twilight has long since impressed reflective observers not simply as a new contest for ascendancy

among Great Powers, comparable to past contests, nor yet as a class war or incipient social revolution, comparable to the earlier displacement of aristocracies by plutocracies. From the perspectives of the future, the crisis may indeed appear to have been little more than this. But it is more probable that it will loom through the time to come as a world-shattering transvaluation of values, involving the submergence of Western culture after a millennium of uninterrupted evolution in successive waves of anti-Western fanaticism bespeaking the bigotry, brutality, and ignorance of those epochs in which old worlds die and new worlds are as yet unborn.¹⁴

Property and Sovereignty are already perishing under the impact of the barbarians, along with Reason and Freedom and the gentler graces of civilized living. Among the artifacts of Western man which seem destined to disappear in the night which lies ahead is the whole system of international relationships which has hitherto prevailed in the Western world. This conclusion flows not from any conviction of ultimate inevitability with regard to the transformation of systems of independent nation-states into world imperiums or into chaotic congeries of warring principalities. It flows rather from the circumstance that the diplomacy of the 1930's has destroyed the world balance of power upon which the survival of the Western State System has always depended, and that present prospects are not bright for any restoration of equilibrium.

It is true that the balance has been temporarily destroyed before and has always been restored. The France of Louis XIV and Napoleon I and the Germany of Wilhelm II established their hegemony over other members of the System and were all at length cast down by coalitions of their victims and enemies. In each such instance, however, the balance was upset and redressed in the course of prolonged and general military combats in which those threatened by the aspirants to world dominion played the game of *Realpolitik* in its classic form. By so doing they sought protection for their existence as independent States and ultimately achieved salvation by marshaling to their cause most of the other Powers whose rulers also felt themselves menaced. In the present situation *Realpolitik* has degenerated into formlessness. The balance has been destroyed without war. No Power contemplates war to restore it. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay have yielded the mastery of Europe to the Rome-Berlin axis and have surrendered control of Eastern Asia to Tokio, all without firing a shot in defense of the positions they once held.

Such a development is without precedent in the Western State System. Its consequences are likely also to be without precedent.

The motives and assumptions which have caused the rulers of the British Empire and the French Republic to abandon the principles of *Realpolitik* after centuries of devotion to its practice have been abundantly suggested in the preceding pages. The alarm of decadent ruling classes over threats to their prerogatives caused them to condone the rise of the Cæsars as bulwarks against the menace of Moscow. They shrank from crushing the Cæsars when they could still have been crushed without war. They shrank even more fearfully from war when they perceived belatedly that force alone could stop the onward march of those dedicated to the destruction of the State System. Victory in war would destroy the "protectors" of Property and open the gates to proletarian radicalism. Defeat in war would mean their own destruction. War was therefore forbidden not by the Pact of Paris but by the calculus of class interest. The Cæsars were handed the keys to the fortress for the asking.

By an ironical paradox these decisions for "peace"—at the price of the betrayal of national and imperial interests—were made by the very gentlemen of wealth and title (or by the pseudo-Left dupes among the politicians) who were constantly being accused by radicals and pacifists of war-mongering for private profit. Profit there was in abundance, for the fear of the war which could never be undertaken was used to justify stupendous armament programs. But the profiteers of the arms race and all the élites of land and money in the democracies were most firmly resolved to abstain from any armed resistance to the Fascist Triplice. To acknowledge this as an objective would be fatal. But it was easy and plausible to capitalize upon popular dread of war and to argue, year after year, that compliance with Fascist demands was the only road to peace.

Therewith began that process of demoralizing and corrupting utterly the masses in the European democracies in order to evoke approval for the course of suicide which their political leaders and social superiors had embarked upon. The deception was carried to its highest perfection in Britain, since the British ruling classes were of old most skillful in the art. Masses wanted "peace." Masses wanted collective security as a means thereto. But collective security would halt the Fascist crusaders. They must not be halted but assisted. Therefore: praise the League but betray the League and then denounce it for its ineffectiveness. Therefore: pay lip

service to collective security but picture it not as a safeguard against war but as a source of war. War-makers can obviously be stopped only by war. Masses want peace. Therefore, war-makers must not be stopped. Masses acquiesced and even celebrated the decision. In France the shabby, flabby figures of Blum and Flandin, Paul-Boncour and Laval, Bonnet and Daladier aped the masters of Tory hypocrisy across the Channel.

By 1939 this process had been continued long enough to produce two clearly predictable consequences which were not clearly anticipated by the artisans of the new pacifism. On the one hand the Fascist Triplice had taken unto itself, with the aid of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, such formidable components of power that it was now literally invincible and irresistible. By the end of the decade France and Britain had lost all possibility of offering armed resistance even if they would, for resistance would mean overwhelming defeat. China was lost. Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain, all the Eastern allies of France were lost or at the mercy of the Triplice. In 1914-18 Britain and France were pushed to the wall and succeeded in beating a far less formidable coalition only with the armed aid of Italy, Russia, Japan, the United States, and a score of lesser allies. Italy and Japan were now allies of the Reich. The Reich was a vast arms factory, larger in territory and population than the Germany of 1914 and infinitely more powerful in the field. Despite wheedling and pleading and royal visits, there could be no assurance that America would come again to the aid of Britain and France in an armed contest with the Fascist Powers. The Soviet Union, having been spurned and excluded from the counsels of the West, would assuredly not aid unless it were itself attacked. After Munich, London and Paris had no option but to resist new demands and thereby face certain defeat—or to yield to new demands whatever their nature. In a community in which there is no police force, those who buy "protection" from gangsters are soon the victims of the gangsters. They must pay—or else! They pay, even unto the last penny and sou.

Another consequence of the mass demoralization engineered by the political leaders of the democracies was that after Munich they could scarcely hope to mobilize public support even for a war which might conceivably be won. For a decade and more they had found it useful to circumvent popular opposition to their policies by dramatizing fears of armed hostilities. The Triplice aided them in their task by hideous atrocities in China, Ethiopia, and Spain. The mas-

sacres at Shanghai, the rape of Nanking, the butcheries in Badajos, Guernica, and Barcelona, the agony of the Amharas under the thunder-birds of war, dropping eggs of fire and excrement of flaming death—all had their effects on the panic-stricken West. In September 1938 public approval of surrender could be had only by fabricating a shrieking terror of imminent doom. The man in the street in Britain and France, thanks to pacifist propaganda, thanks to the horrors perpetrated by the soldiery of Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito, thanks above all to systematic intimidation by his own government, now envisages war as a certainty of sudden and horrible death, not only for himself but for all his family as well.

Whether in the present generation any government in Britain or France, save perhaps a revolutionary government, can ever rally a courageous and united people to its support in a foreign war has become a moot question. An army stricken with panic is a military liability. Defense forces lacking courageous civilian support are worthless. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay have turned civilian blood to water by repeatedly taking refuge from responsibility in panic fear. Their constant cries of "Wolf! Wolf!" have bred not indifference but paralyzing anxiety mingled with contempt. Should a decision for war ever be made, the disillusionment which would attend such an admitted bankruptcy of the policy of "appeasement" would add its burden to the already difficult task of the propagandists charged with manufacturing enthusiasm. French labor, smarting under the vicious assaults of reaction, would ask why it must fight and for whom. A call to war against the Fascist Powers in 1935 or 1936 would doubtless have evoked loyal popular support in both the democracies. In 1939 or 1940 it may evoke sabotage or revolution. Under such circumstances war cannot be risked. War will not be risked. There will be no call.

The meaning of this is clear: France and Britain have already abdicated their position as Great Powers. In a State System resting upon the assumption of violence, power is fighting capacity. A diplomacy unsupported by ability and willingness to fight is a diplomacy of shadow-men and ghost-States. The Britain and France of The City and the Bourse will not fight and could not if they would. The Britain and France of Labor and the People's Front, should these causes ever be revitalized and come to power, might too late be willing to fight, but the men of money and title would sabotage the enterprise. The enemy moreover will be invincible. War will

mean defeat. The ruling classes of the States foredoomed to defeat are themselves foredoomed to decline and destruction. If the Triple Alliance moves against Moscow, the propertied classes of France and Britain may enjoy a few more years of anxious "peace." If not . . . ?

The nature of this "peace" is not in doubt. It will not be the peace of third-rate Powers who have nothing coveted by conquerors and can therefore abstain from playing the power game. It will not be the peace of those honorably defeated by honorable foes. It will not in its terms resemble the peace of Utrecht or Vienna or Frankfurt or Portsmouth or Versailles. There will be no terms. There will be only endless humiliation and blackmail. It will be—indeed, it is already—worse than the peace which the burghers of the Netherlands might have enjoyed had they submitted in the early seventeenth century to His Most Catholic Majesty and to the Duke of Alva instead of resisting. It will be worse than the peace which the American colonists would have known had they remained loyal to George III instead of rebelling. It will be a peace worse than that which India has known under British rule or Syria and Madagascar under the French. It may in the end resemble the peace which Japan has brought to China or the Cæsars have brought to Spain. It will at best be not different in kind and very little different in degree from the peace which Runciman and Chamberlain brought to Prague. It may well resemble, in the words of Oswald Spengler, the peace which comes with the end of History:

World peace—which has often existed in fact—involves the private renunciation of war on the part of the immense majority, but along with this it involves an unavowed readiness to submit to being the booty of others who do *not* renounce it. It begins with the State-destroying wish for universal reconciliation, and it ends in nobody's moving a finger so long as misfortune only touches his neighbor. . . . On this *spiritual* premise a second Vikingism develops. The state of being "in form" passes from nations to bands and retinues of adventurers, self-styled Cæsars, seceding generals, barbarian kings, and what not—in whose eyes the population becomes in the end merely a part of the landscape. There is a deep relation between the heroes of the Mycenaean primitive age and the soldier-emperors of Rome, and between, say, Menes and Rameses II. In our Germanic world the spirits of Alaric and Theodoric will come again. . . .

With the formed state, high history also lays itself down weary to sleep. Man becomes a plant again, adhering to the soil, dumb and enduring. The timeless village and the "eternal" peasant reappear, begetting children and burying seed in Mother Earth—a busy, not inadequate form, over which the tempest of soldier-emperors passingly blows. In the midst of the land lie the old world-cities, empty receptacles of an extinguished soul, in which a historyless man-

kind slowly nests itself. Men live from hand to mouth, with petty thrifts and petty fortunes, and endure. Masses are trampled on in the conflicts of the conquerors who contend for the power and the spoil of this world, but the survivors fill up the gaps with a primitive fertility and suffer on. And while in high places there is eternal alternance of victory and defeat, those in the depths pray, pray with that mighty piety of the Second Religiousness that has overcome all doubts forever. . . . Only with the end of grand History does holy, still Being reappear. It is a drama noble in its aimlessness, noble and aimless as the course of the stars, the rotation of the earth, and alternance of land and sea, of ice and virgin forest upon its face. We may marvel at it or we may lament it—but it is there.¹⁵

Is it possible that some future leadership at Westminster or in the Palais d'Élysée will find this peace intolerable? Is it conceivable—after all allies have been lost, all friends betrayed, all principles compromised, all ideals besmirched and prostituted, after the cup of shame and insult is full, after all the goods of others have been given up, after outlying posts and colonies have been surrendered—that men will arise in Britain and France to call their countrymen to arms in order to halt an endless terror even at the risk of a terrible end? It is possible though scarcely probable, since fear is cumulative and contagious. If such a belated reckoning is attempted, there may occur a savagely one-sided war. In an article entitled “Götterdämmerung” in the Reichswehr journal, *Deutsche Wehr* (June 13, 1935), the enemy spoke quite plainly:

In such a war there will be no longer victors and vanquished, but survivors and those whose name is stricken from the list of nations. Many an apparently invincible Colossus in reality stands on feet of clay, and what one or two generations ago was impossible has today already become possible: with a single powerful blow to break a nation's spiritual backbone, to destroy it forever and trample it in the dust.

Just this is the essence, the numbing aspect of the war of annihilation. The élite lies torn to shreds and poisoned on the battlefields. The survivors, a leaderless, demoralized mob of human beings crushed and broken by nameless horrors and sufferings, by unspeakable terror, stand defenseless and without any will before their victors—clay in the potter's hands. . . . Their number does not matter. . . . Fifty million trembling fellaheen are not more difficult to bring into subjection than five; for many million times nought is still nought. A nation will no

longer want *something* from its opponent, but will *put an end to its opponent*—make an end of it, once and for all.¹⁶

After the collapse of collective security and sanctions in 1936, Arnold J. Toynbee in his Greek Ode on Ethiopians and Europeans foreshadowed the possible fate of the West:

Without our arms or art, these men could dare
War's utmost frightfulness, since men they were,
And, in close fight, to death untrembling passed,
Still freemen, battling nobly to the last.
But we, whose science makes us strong and great,
Are doomed to share the tortures of their fate,
Yet not their soldier's grave; the gods in scorn
Withhold that privilege from men forsworn.¹⁷

The European future rests either with Moscow or with the Berlin-Rome-Tokio triangle. If Red and Black totalitarianism declare a truce, the Fascist Triplice will sweep the Anglo-French colonial empire from the map of the Eastern hemisphere. If they embark upon a death grapple for world mastery, Britain and France will be impotent spectators and, unless the bear and the wolves literally devour one another, they will become victims of the victor. Europe, Asia, and Africa will live during the coming decades under the ægis of Fascist world hegemony or of Communist World Revolution—or perhaps of one followed in the fullness of time by the other. There will be little place in such a world for British aristocrats and investors, nor for French *rentiers* and imperialists, nor yet for the politicians who have hitherto spoken for these groups. The spinners of illusion will lose their last illusion. The betrayers will know their last betrayal, not because there is justice in the Universe, but because, in Machiavelli's words: "The prince who contributes toward the advancement of another power ruins his own."

With the fall of these last dishonored representatives of a great cultural tradition, Western Liberalism—ever looking backward to the reason and freedom it will have lost forever—will pass into the tomb. Its legacy will either be ground into the mire under the boots of the conqueror or will, by a stranger fate, be recaptured and brought to life again in a new form by the disciples of Marx and Lenin. In either case a world will have died because its guardians yielded to fear and fell to earth beneath a burden which they were no longer able or willing to carry.

And what of the "New World" of the transatlantic West? Americans are Europeans and are a part of the European culture which is facing death. That they can in the end escape the destiny of that culture is improbable. Their geographical remoteness from the new citadels of barbarism, their older and more deeply rooted democratic traditions, and the greater reserves of wealth and power at their disposal may enable them to escape the more appalling consequences of economic maladjustment and social conflict. But the specter of fear spans oceans with ease. And with fear come frustration and folly and bigotry. There are already some among the landowners of Brazil, the entrepreneurs of the Argentine, the financiers of Manhattan, and the industrialists of the North American Middle West who fear their social inferiors with a desperate hatred and see promise of profit and security in the lure of authoritarian cults. It is possible that in the Americas as in Europe the democratic way of life may be corrupted by Money and betrayed through the inability of its custodians to adjust their habits to new problems. It is possible that it may perish through war if the United States should be tempted by interest or sentiment to essay the rescue of Britain and France by an armed struggle against the Triplice. With the USSR as ally such a struggle might be crowned with victory. Without such an ally its end would almost certainly be defeat, followed by domestic fanaticism and despotism. It is possible that American democracy may perish through war if the United States and its neighbors seek by arms to "save the world from Bolshevism" in the event that the military defeat of Fascism in Europe and Asia should open the gates to widespread social revolution abroad. It is possible that it may perish through peace if the defenders of freedom in North and South refuse to fight domestic treason and foreign aggression.

The verdict of time on the foreign policy of the United States during the years of Europe's decline does not encourage optimism. Lip-service to law, order, and peace was accompanied by a practical indifference to lawlessness, anarchy, and war abroad, by collaboration with the Toryism which allied itself with the barbarians, by attempted flight from responsibility through a "neutrality" which penalized victims of aggression and rewarded the aggressors. Fear of German and Italian military might did not prevent the free sale of American arms to Rome and Berlin. Denunciation of Japanese imperialism was accompanied by policies which enabled the war lords of Tokio to secure over half of their means of conquest from Amer-

ican exporters. Anxiety over Fascist intrigue in Latin America did not prevent tacit co-operation with Rome, Berlin, and London to insure the Fascist conquest of Spain—though all knew that the victory of Fascism in Iberia would spread the totalitarian cult throughout the American Republics of the South and create unexampled opportunities for political intrigue, commercial imperialism, and military penetration by the Triplice. Here, too, the paralyzing hand of fear threatened immense danger to the power of the United States and to the Liberal tradition in its last stronghold.

These adumbrations of disaster, however, suggested only possibilities, not probabilities, and assuredly not certainties. The roads to safety were many. But safety in the disintegrating world society of the twentieth century is not to be found by the roadside, nor handed down from heaven, nor achieved by waiting or by compromise or by yielding to indifference or isolationism. It can only be earned. The price of the prize is high and difficult of payment. If the Americas are to escape Europe's Nemesis, they must profit by European experience. Their classes and masses must contrive to keep free of the blighting hand of fear. They must develop new talent in adapting old values to unprecedented problems and in evolving solutions which are not merely satisfying to the devotees of ancestor-worship but are pertinent to the alleviation of contemporary social insecurities. They must redefine Property so that economic stability again becomes compatible with human freedom even in the late capitalism of the machine age. They must redefine Sovereignty so that effective international collaboration becomes possible—no longer on a world scale, for the world community is already broken into fragments, but on a scale coextensive with the Western hemisphere. There will be little security for any of the American Republics unless there is collective security for all, organized among equals and buttressed by collective forces of defense. There will be little democracy anywhere in the Americas unless the democratic ideal is vigorously reaffirmed and adequately implemented throughout the Americas. And democracy and security alike will elude the searchers unless a more hopeful measure of economic well-being can be achieved with its benefits widely distributed among all races, classes, and countries.

These imperatives are far more easily stated than realized. Whether they are realizable depends upon the patience and good will and inventiveness of American leaders in all walks of life. The prospects of

their realization will be furthered if North and South can achieve not merely symbiosis but synthesis. The North brings to the task mechanical ingenuity, administrative skill, pragmatic experimentalism, and the mightiest machinery of industrial production on all the planet. The South brings Latin logic, social sensitivity, a great literary and religious heritage, and untold riches of mineral and agrarian wealth. Both together combine the most cherished attributes of the European tradition, reinforced by thousands of European émigrés and by more thousands to come, driven to flight by their loyalty to freedom and reason and humanism. If the light of Western learning is to be kept burning anywhere outside the twilight kingdoms of the doomed, it will be kept burning where courageous and open-eyed men and women are determined that the flame shall remain alive and bright. In the generations which lie ahead in the remoter future such defenders of the faith may well be found among the awakened and emancipated peoples of Russia, India, and China. In today's generation they will be found—if they are capable of finding themselves—in America.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

AJIL—*The American Journal of International Law*.

APSR—*The American Political Science Review*.

Cmd.—British "Command" Papers, presented by the Prime Minister or some other Minister to Parliament "by command of His Majesty," published and printed by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London.

Commons—House of Commons, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, as of dates indicated.

DIA—*Documents on International Affairs*, edited by John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (London: Humphrey Milford-Oxford University Press), issued annually under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

JO.Ch.—Parliamentary Debates of the Chamber of Deputies, *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, as of dates indicated.

JO.S.—*Ibid.*, Senate.

LNOJ—*Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Geneva, as of dates indicated.

LNTS—*League of Nations Treaty Series*.

Lords—House of Lords, *Parliamentary Debates*, as of dates indicated.

SIA—*Survey of International Affairs*, by Arnold J. Toynbee and others, (London: Humphrey Milford-Oxford University Press), issued annually under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

I : ARMS AND THE MAN

1. AFTER JANUARY

Cf. Paul Joseph Göbbels: *Vom Kaiserhoff zur Reichskanzlei* (Munich: Eher; 1934), pp. 218-20; and Kurt Ludecke: *I Knew Hitler* (New York: Scribner's; 1937), pp. 551-2.

Ludecke, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

3. For an account of the Beerhall putsch of 1923 and of Hitler's subsequent political career, see Frederick L. Schuman: *The Nazi Dictatorship* (New York: Knopf; 1936), pp. 3-94.
4. Arnold J. Toynbee: *SLA, 1933*, p. 143.
5. Adolph Hitler: *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Eher; 17th edition, 1933), pp. 252-3.
6. In 1914-15 Franz von Papen served as military attaché in the German Embassy in Washington. On December 28, 1915, following his exposure by a woman agent of the British Secret Service, he was expelled from the United States along with the naval attaché, Captain Boy-Ed, for clumsy conspiracies to destroy ships and bridges. In April 1916 he was indicted for a plot to blow up the Welland Canal and made subject to arrest should he ever return to America.
7. Cf. John W. Wheeler-Bennett: *Wooden Titan. Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History 1914-1934* (New York: Morrow; 1936), pp. 310-15, 386-9.
8. Interview with Schleicher, March 1933, in the *New Statesman and Nation*, London, July 7, 1934, pp. 6-7.
9. Göbbels, op. cit., pp. 251-4.
10. W. Gehl: *Die nationalsozialistische Revolution* (Breslau: Hirt; 1933), pp. 76-80.
11. Cf. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 201-12, 330-9, and for a more detailed account, Douglas Reed: *The Burning of the Reichstag* (New York: Covici Friede; 1934).
12. *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, No. 17, p. 83.
13. *Ibid.*, 1933, No. 25, p. 141.
14. Gehl, op. cit., pp. 110-21.
15. *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, No. 81, p. 479.
16. *Ibid.*, 1934, I, p. 75.
17. Text in *The Nazi Dictatorship*, 2nd edition, 1936, pp. 513-16.

2. THE CULT OF ANNIHILATION

18. See Alfred Vagts: *The History of Militarism* (New York: Norton; 1937).
19. Cf. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 95-109, and Aurel Kolnai: *The War against the West* (London: Victor Gollancz; 1938), pp. 213-14.
20. The *Horst Wessel Lied*, author's translation from *The Nazi Dictatorship*, p. 94.
21. Cf. Hans Kohn: "Intellectual Roots of National Socialism," *Harvard Guardian*, April 1938, pp. 5-8.
22. Cf. Harold D. Lasswell: "The Psychology of Hitlerism," *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. IV, pp. 373-84. See also his "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State vs. the Civilian State," *The China Quarterly*, Special Fall Number, 1937, pp. 643-9; his *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1930); his *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: McGraw-Hill; 1935); and his *Politics—Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: McGraw-Hill; 1936).
23. Cf. Konrad Heiden: *A History of National Socialism* (New York: Knopf; 1936).

3. VOLK AND VÖLKERBUND

24. Cf. Wickham Steed's Introduction to Aurel Kolnai: *The War against the West*.
25. The *New York Times*, December 13, 14, 1937.
26. Robert Ley, leader of the *Arbeitsfront*, to 15,000 Hitler Youths in Berlin, February 10, 1937, as quoted in the *New York Times*, February 11, 1937.
27. The passages here quoted are from the 1935 edition. The translations are in part those of the author and in part taken from "Friends of Europe" publication No. 38: "Germany's Foreign Policy as Stated in *Mein Kampf*," with a foreword by the Duchess of Atholl, M.P. (London, 1936). The only English translation of Hitler's work, *My Battle* (October 1933), is a highly abbreviated mistranslation which is wholly unreliable.
28. Cf. Roger Shaw: "The Unknown Rosenberg," *Review of Reviews*, November 1934; and Charles Sarolea: "German Anti-Christ," *Current History*, June 1935.
29. Cf. *Mein Kampf*, pp. 696-705.
30. *Völkischer Beobachter*, June 30, 1931.
31. Alfred Rosenberg: *Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der NSDAP*, p. 16.
32. *Völkischer Beobachter*, July 18, 1935; cf. Rosenberg's *Blut und Ehre* (Munich: Eher; 1933), pp. 270-3, 355-81.
33. See also Henri Lichtenberger: *The Third Reich* (New York: Greystone; 1937), pp. 85-137, and Aurel Kolnai, op. cit., "The Ethnic Idol," pp. 427f.; "The German Claim," pp. 514-671, and likewise pp. 141-9, 415-26.
34. See Kolnai, op. cit., p. 561: "The real European adversary is and remains the West, with everything that clings to this name." The Vienna *Reichspost*, March 29, 1934, published an alleged secret memorandum on Nazi foreign policy, contemplating by gradual stages the annexation of Austria, the conquest of Czechoslovakia, and an alliance with an enlarged Hungary and Belgium to be followed by the annihilation of France. The initial Nazi assumption that Russia would offer less resistance to German conquest than France was necessarily reversed by the diplomatic and strategic developments of 1935-8.

4. WORDS OVER WEAPONS

35. John T. Whitaker: *And Fear Came* (New York: Macmillan; 1936), p. 90.
36. Edwin A. Jenkins: *From Foundry to Foreign Office* (London: Grayson & Grayson; 1933), pp. 249f.
37. Cf. John T. Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 122f.; Mary Agnes Hamilton: *Arthur Henderson: A Biography* (London: Heinemann; 1938), pp. 445-6, 411f.; George Slocombe: *A Mirror to Geneva* (London: Jonathan Cape; 1937), pp. 235-50; John W. Wheeler-Bennett: *The Pipe-dream of Peace* (New York: Morrow; 1935), pp. 13f.
38. Henry L. Stimson: *The Far Eastern Crisis* (New York: Harper; 1936), pp. 164-5. On August 2, 1938 Sir John Simon indignantly denied an allegation in the *Contemporary Review* that he had declined to join Stimson in refusing to recognize territorial conquests in violation of the Kellogg Pact.

He further denied "the original yarn about some differences with Stimson" (the *New York Times*, August 3, 1938). He did approve, reluctantly, the Assembly Resolution of March 11, 1932, containing the "Stimson Doctrine," which was repudiated by the Chamberlain Cabinet in the Ciano-Perth accord of April 16, 1938. But Sir John never approved joint action with the United States under the Nine-Power Pact which Stimson had urged upon him.

39. Henry L. Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
40. George Slocombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-2.
41. The *Manchester Guardian*, December 8, 1932, and Stimson, p. 224. Cf. John T. Whitaker, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-16.
42. *SLA*, 1933, pp. 512-14. The Tory press in Britain fully approved Simon's stand. Thus the *Morning Post*, November 16, 1931: "Nothing could be more foolish than any attempt on the part of the League Council to invoke against Japan the 'economic sanctions' stipulated in Article 16 of the Covenant. . . . A policy which risked embroiling the world for the sake of peace would be a mockery. What is at issue is something more important than the dignity of the League of Nations." And again, January 30, 1932: "For our part, although we do not believe in peace at any price, we value it enough to beware of entering into superfluous danger in a doubtful cause. Japan, broadly speaking, is the only element making for order and good government in the Far East." Also the *Daily Mail*, November 5, 1931: "Japan's presence in Manchuria has been a benefit to the world. . . . Not for a moment would the people of this country permit an attitude of hostility toward Japan." November 21, 1932: "The Japanese reply to the Lytton Report re Manchuria was issued last evening. It is an exceedingly able document which will convince all reasonable people that Japan has right on her side. . . . It would be an outrage on humanity to bring about such a solution [as the Lytton Report] in order to save the face of the League of Nations. But the misguided idealists who have so openly taken sides with the Chinese war lords and Communists mean to make strenuous efforts to force Great Britain into some wild scheme of economic and financial boycott of Japan which they hope would drive Japan from Manchuria." December 10, 1932: "Japan is rendering good service to civilization by restoring law and order in Manchuria. . . . Fortunately Sir John Simon's wise and moderate policy prevailed with the Assembly of the League of Nations." February 27, 1933: "Any embargo of arms to the combatants must be applied equitably to both sides. But any embargo would mean ominous interference with British industry." These and other excerpts are to be found in Norman Angell: *Peace with the Dictators?* (London: Hamish Hamilton; 1938), pp. 141-4.
43. "Even as Gibbon dates the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire from the reign of the first Emperor, so did the decline of the Disarmament Conference begin at its opening session." John W. Wheeler-Bennett: *The Pipe-dream of Peace*, p. 13.
44. George Slocombe: *A Mirror to Geneva*, p. 175.
45. The Marquess of Londonderry: *Ourselves and Germany* (London: Robert Hale; 1938), p. 57.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

47. *DIA*, 1933, pp. 144-93.
48. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, p. 346.
49. *DIA*, 1933, pp. 196-208.
50. *SLA*, 1933, p. 278.
51. Cf. C. F. Melville: "Europe in Two Camps," *Fortnightly Review*, April 1, 1933.
52. *SLA*, 1933, pp. 207f. Cf. Robert Machray: "The Significance of Dr. Benes," *Fortnightly Review*, June 1, 1933.
53. The texts of all the drafts are reproduced in *DIA*, 1933, pp. 240-9; cf. Francesco Salata: *Il Patto Mussolini* (Milan: Mondadori; 1933).
54. *The New York Times*, June 8, 1933; *DIA*, 1933, pp. 240f.
55. *SLA*, 1933, p. 220.
56. *The New York Times*, November 21, 1933.
57. *SLA*, 1933, p. 223.
58. *DIA*, 1933, pp. 230-3.

5. DISARMAMENT † OCTOBER 14, 1933

59. *L'Europe nouvelle*, October 21, 1933; *DIA*, 1933, pp. 279-81.
60. *SLA*, 1933, pp. 302-5.
61. Fritz Berber: *Locarno: Eine Dokumentensammlung* (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt; 1936), translated as *Locarno: A Collection of Documents* (London: Hodge; 1936), pp. 80-1; cf. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 254-5.
62. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, October 15, 1933.
63. *DIA*, 1933, pp. 294-8.
64. "We do not demand 'equal rights' for Germany, as we are not ourselves disposed to grant equal rights to others. There can, and shall, be no equal rights; what we demand is truth and honor. . . . We Germans are not on a level with other nations; nay, we have a right which cannot be compared with that of anybody else." Wilhelm Stapel, *Der Christliche Staatmann* (1932), quoted in Aurel Kolnai: *The War against the West*.
65. *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, I, No. 113 (October 14), p. 729.
66. *Ibid.*, No. 116 (October 19), p. 746.
67. *Ibid.*, No. 113 (October 14), p. 732 and No. 117 (October 20), p. 747.
68. *Deutsche Reichsanzeiger und Preussische Anzeiger*, No. 279, November 29, 1933.
69. Cf. Arnold J. Zurcher: "The Hitler Referenda," *APSR*, February 1935, pp. 93-9.
70. George Slocombe: *A Mirror to Geneva*, pp. 246-7.
71. *SLA*, 1933, p. 310.
72. Commons, November 27, 1933.
73. *DIA*, 1933, pp. 324-8. For texts of this and subsequent German and French communications see French Blue Book: *Négociations relatives à la réduction et à la limitation des armements, 14 octobre 1933-17 avril 1934* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale; 1934). Cf. British White Papers, Cmd. 4512, 4498, and 4559 (1934).
74. *Le Soir*, March 7, 1934.
75. *SLA*, 1935, I, p. 33.

76. *DIA*, 1934, pp. 171-3.
 77. *The New York Times*, October 21, 1935.
 78. AP dispatch from Mogadiscio, Italian Somaliland, October 20, 1935.

II · SWORDS OVER AUSTRIA

1. SCHIKLGRUBER VS. SCHMUTZ

1. Cf. John Gunther: *Inside Europe* (New York: Harper; 1936 edition) pp. 20-2.
2. J. D. Gregory: *Dollfuss and His Times* (London: Hutchinson; 1935), pp. 38-42.
3. George Slocombe: *The Tumult and the Shouting* (London: Heinemann; 1936), p. 425; Gregory, op. cit., pp. 45-8, 57-9.
4. Gregory, p. 153.
5. *Mein Kampf*, pp. 67, 69. Cf. Stephen H. Roberts: *The House that Hitler Built* (London: Methuen; 1937), pp. 3f.
6. Cf. statement by Dr. Seipel in R. H. Bruce Lockhart: *Retreat from Glory* (New York: Putnam's; 1934), pp. 101-2.
7. "The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power." Cf. Nina Almond and Ralph H. Lutz: *The Treaty of St. Germain* (Hoover War Library Publications, No. 5. Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1935).
8. "Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
9. Cf. Margaret M. Ball: *Post-War German-Austrian Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1937); Jean Basdevant: *La Condition internationale de l'Autriche* (Paris: Sirey; 1935); G. E. R. Gedye: *Heirs to the Habsburgs* (London: Arrowsmith; 1932).
10. *The Death of Dollfuss*, translated by Johann Messinger (London: Archer; 1935), pp. 17-20.
11. J. D. Gregory, op. cit., pp. 156-68.
12. Cf. M. W. Fodor: *Plot and Counter-Plot in Central Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1937), pp. 157-9.
13. Kurt Schuschnigg: *My Austria* (New York: Knopf; 1938), pp. 205-9.
14. Cf. *The New Statesman and Nation*, June 10, 1933; *The Literary Digest*, April 7, 1934.
15. *The Death of Dollfuss*, pp. 25-34.
16. *Völkischer Beobachter*, July 7, 1933.

17. *The Death of Dollfuss*, pp. 64-80.
18. *The Literary Digest*, June 24, 1933.
19. Cf. Eden to Commons, June 21, 1933.
20. *The New Statesman and Nation*, April 22, 1933.
21. J. D. Gregory, op. cit., p. 224.
22. Kurt Schuschnigg, op. cit., pp. 224-7.
23. *The Death of Dollfuss*, p. 93.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-4.
25. Sir John Simon to Commons, February 13, 1934.
26. *The New York Times*, February 18, 1934; *DIA*, 1933, p. 394.

2. MASSACRE IN FEBRUARY

27. J. D. Gregory, op. cit., pp. 227-8.
28. Kurt Schuschnigg, op. cit., pp. 209-14.
29. *SLA*, 1934, pp. 456f.
30. For eyewitness accounts of the fighting see the admirable dispatches of Frederick T. Birchall and G. E. R. Gedye in the *New York Times*, February 14f., 1934, and John Gunther's *Inside Europe* (1936 edition), pp. 290-7, where the confusion of the Schutzbund defense is well presented. Cf. Julius Deutsch: *Der Bürgerkrieg in Österreich* (Karlsbad: Graphia; 1934).
31. Naomi Mitchison: *Vienna Diary* (London: Gollancz; 1934), pp. 232-48; F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace* (London: Gollancz; 1938), pp. 18f.
32. *LNTS*, Vol. 154 (1934-5), pp. 285, 295, 303, Nos. 3554, 3555, 3556.
33. Cf. Arnold J. Zurcher: "Austria's Corporative Constitution," *APSR*, August 1934, pp. 664-70.

3. DOLLFUSS † JULY 25, 1934

34. Kurt Ludecke: *I Knew Hitler*, pp. 66-70.
35. Vernon Bartlett: *Intermission in Europe* (New York: Oxford; 1938), pp. 220-4.
36. *DIA*, 1934, p. 292.
37. *Corriere della Sera*, June 16, 1934.
38. AP dispatch in the *New York Times*, June 16, 1934.
39. M. W. Fodor, op. cit., p. 228.
40. J. D. Gregory, op. cit., pp. 278-80.
41. John Gunther, op. cit., p. 313.
42. Cf. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 423-61.
43. *The Brown Network* (Introduction by the Earl of Listowel) (New York: Knight; 1936), p. 174.
44. J. D. Gregory, op. cit., pp. 277-8.
45. Cf. p. 110 of *The Death of Dollfuss*. In this reproduction, headed "*Volkerhebung in Österreich*," the captions report that Dollfuss is dead and Rintelen is negotiating for the formation of a new government. The Austrian Government subsequently took the view that the date "July 22" was correct and that this anticipation by three days of the events of July 25 proved that the German authorities were partners, if not instigators, of the putsch. While other evidence of German official connivance is overwhelm-

- ing, this particular exhibit may prove no more than that those who issued it on July 25 misdated it.
46. *Das Neue Tage-Buch* (Paris), May 21, 1938, citing *Das Schwarze Korps*, organ of the S.S. for May 12, 1938.
 47. *The Death of Dollfuss*, pp. 115-22.
 48. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-4.
 49. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-33.
 50. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-45. For eyewitness accounts see John Gunther's *Inside Europe* (1936 edition), pp. 298-313, and M. W. Fodor's *Plot and Counter-Plot in Central Europe*, pp. 227-35. Schuschnigg's evaluation of these events, along with the subsequent testimony of Greifeneder and Messinger, are to be found in *My Austria*, pp. 229-39.
 51. John T. Whitaker: *And Fear Came*, pp. 171-4; the *New York Times*, July 31, 1934.
 52. *The Death of Dollfuss*, pp. 157-209.
 53. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-6.
 54. J. D. Gregory, op. cit., pp. 303f.
 55. Kurt Schuschnigg, op. cit., pp. 145-7.
 56. G. E. R. Gedy in the *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 146, pp. 276-84.

III · VICTORY TO THE VANQUISHED

1. BARTHOUS

1. Cf. Alexander Werth: *France in Ferment* (New York: Harper; 1935), *passim*; and *Which Way France?* (New York: Harper; 1937), pp. 47-64. Cf. Ralph Fox: *France Faces the Future* (New York: International Publishers; 1936), pp. 29-43; and Laurent Bonnevey: *Les Journées Sanglantes du 6 février* (Paris: Flammarion; 1934).
2. Geoffrey Fraser and Thadee Natanson: *Léon Blum: Man and Statesman* (Philadelphia: Lippincott; 1938), p. 235.
3. Cf. Pierre Lafue: *Gaston Doumergue, sa vie et son destin* (Paris: Plon; 1933).
4. Cf. *SLA*, 1934, pp. 387f.
5. Cf. Octave Aubert: *Louis Barthou* (Paris: Quillet; 1935); Wilhelm Herzog: *Barthou* (Zürich: Verlag die Liga; 1938). See also Georges Suarez: *Briand* (Paris: Plon). In this definitive four-volume biography of Briand, of which the first volume was published in the spring of 1938 and of which I have been privileged to see the second and third volumes in manuscript, there are numerous anecdotes about Barthou and many illuminating characterizations of his personality and activities.
6. Édouard Herriot: *Eastward from Paris* (London: Gollancz; 1934).
7. On the earlier history of the Little Entente see John O. Crane: *The Little Entente* (New York: Macmillan; 1931); Robert Machray: *The Little Entente* (New York: R. R. Smith; 1930); Gerhard Schacher: *Central Europe and the Western World* (New York: Holt; 1936), pp. 27-101; F. Codresco: *La Petite Entente* (Paris: Bossuet; 1933).

8. Cf. *SIA*, 1934, pp. 508-35.
9. Cf. E. J. Patterson: *Pilsudski, Marshal of Poland* (London: Arrowsmith; 1935).
10. Text in *DIA*, 1933, pp. 424-5.
11. *LNTS*, Vol. 18, p. 13.
12. See the interesting report of a rumored French-Soviet alliance, projected in December 1933 for completion in April 1935, in Linton Wells: *Blood on the Moon* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1937), pp. 350-3.
13. Cf. *SIA*, 1935, pp. 58f.
14. See Barthou's speech at Bayonne, June 15, in *Le Temps*, June 16, 1934.
15. Texts of documents in *Le Temps*, June 11, 1934.
16. *LNOJ*, 15th Assembly, September 13, 1934.
17. Article 1 of the Covenant reads as follows: ". . . Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval, and air forces and armaments."
18. *LNOJ*, 15th Assembly, September 18, 1934.
19. *LNTS*, Vol. 154, pp. 95-9. Cf. Robert J. Kerner and Harry N. Howard: *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935* (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1936). Also Norman J. Padelford: *Peace in the Balkans* (New York: Oxford; 1935).

2. MURDER IN MARSEILLE

20. For a brief but illuminating treatment of the origin and subsequent history of this dynastic rivalry see Ferdinand Schevill: *The History of the Balkan Peninsula* (New York: Harcourt, Brace; 1933), pp. 309-26, 524-32.
21. On Alexander and his regime see *La Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui* (Belgrade, 1935); Wilfred Hindle: "A Dictatorship Nears Its Crisis," *Fortnightly Review*, February 1, 1933; John Gunther: *Inside Europe* (1936 edition), pp. 354-69; M. W. Fodor: *Plot and Counter-Plot in Central Europe*, pp. 43-53; and Douglas Reed's brilliant chapter, "Serb Soliloquy" in *Insanity Fair* (New York: Covici Friede; 1938), pp. 262-76.
22. Cf. *SIA*, 1934, pp. 537f. and review of earlier Hungarian-Yugoslav controversies in *LNOJ*, December 1934, pp. 1772-1838.
23. Cf. Wilhelm Herzog, *Barthou*, pp. 247-304.
24. *LNOJ*, December 10, 1934; the *New York Times*, December 11, 1934; *SIA*, 1934, pp. 570-2.
25. Octave Aubert: *Louis Barthou*, p. 210.

3. VERSAILLES † MARCH 16, 1935

26. *JO.S.*, December 18, 1934, p. 1398; *DIA*, 1934, pp. 184-5.
27. Cf. *LNOJ*, June 1934, pp. 653-66.
28. *Ibid.*, December 1934, pp. 1701-5, 1729-30.
29. *Ibid.*, February 1935, pp. 243-7.

30. *Ibid.*, February 1935, p. 247.
31. *Ibid.*, February 1935, p. 137.
32. On the earlier aspects of the problem see Michael T. Florinsky: *The Saar Struggle* (New York: Macmillan; 1934). For a reproduction of the ballot and an account of the plebiscite itself, see James K. Pollock: "The Saar Plebiscite," *APSR*, April 1935, pp. 275-82.
33. British White Papers, Cmd. 4798 (1935) and Cmd. 5143, Misc. No. 3 of 1936: "Joint communiqué issued on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic as the result of the Conversations between the British and French Ministers in London, February 1st to 3rd, 1935." Cf. *Le Temps*, February 5, 1935; *L'Europe nouvelle*, February 9, 1935.
34. *The Times* (London), February 4, 1935.
35. *Le Temps*, February 5, 1935.
36. AP dispatch in the *New York Times*, February 16, 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 35-6.
37. Blue Book Misc. No. 3, Cmd. 5143, of 1936.
38. Full text in *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 38-47.
39. Letter in *The Times*, March 11, 1935.
40. All texts from the *New York Times*, March 17, 1935.
41. Cf. E. P. Chase: "British Political Parties in 1933," *APSR*, February 1934, pp. 102-9.
42. *The Observer*, March 17, 1935.
43. *The Sunday Express*, March 17, 1935.
44. British White Paper, Cmd. 4848 of 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 64-6.
45. *Le Temps*, March 22, 1935; the *New York Times*, March 22, 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 66-7.
46. *The New York Times*, March 22, 1935.
47. *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 68-9.
48. Commons, March 22, 1935.
49. *The New York Times*, March 24, 1935; on the French army, see Shelby Cullom Davis: *The French War Machine* (London: Allen & Unwin; 1937), and *Reservoirs of Men* (Geneva: Kundig; 1934).

IV : PACT COUNTER-PACT

1. ISOLA BELLA

1. *The Times* (London), March 27, 1935.
2. MacDonal to Commons, May 2, 1935, citing Simon's "invitation" to Hitler of March 26.
3. Simon to Commons, March 28, 1935.
4. Simon to Commons, April 9, 1935.
5. *SLA*, 1935, I, p. 150.
6. *The New York Times*, April 1, 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 75-6.
7. *The Times*, April 4, 1935.
8. Communiqué, April 4, *The Times*, April 5, 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, p. 77.

9. Professor Arnold J. Toynbee aptly characterizes French policy as follows: "Throughout the fourteen years preceding Herr Hitler's advent to power in 1933 it had been the consistent foreign policy of France to sacrifice everything else for the sake of retaining the power—without the will—to make a preventive war upon Germany if and when the occasion should arise; and now, when the occasion had arisen—and this very largely as the result of French intransigence—France acted on her feelings, at the price of stultifying her policy, by refraining from playing the trump card which she had insisted, at such cost, upon keeping in her hand." *SLA*, 1935, I, p. 154.
10. British Blue Book, Cmd. 5143, No. 12.
11. British White Paper, Cmd. 4080 of 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 80-2.
12. *LNOJ*, May 1935, pp. 569-71; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 93-8.
13. *LNOJ*, May 1935, pp. 551-2; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 98-9.
14. *LNOJ*, May 1935, pp. 550-64.

2. DEFENSE AGAINST BERLIN

15. Article 10 of the Covenant reads as follows: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."
16. Article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant asserts: "If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice."
17. Article 16 of the Covenant reads as follows: "1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking States, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking States and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. 2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. 3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking

States, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League. 4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon."

18. Article 17 of the Covenant reads as follows: "1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council. 2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. 3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. 4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute."
19. Cf. Henri Torres's report to the French Chamber, *Journal des Nations* (Geneva) February 10, 11, 12, 1936; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 119-35; cf. H. Gloves: *La France et l'Union Sovietique* (Paris: Rieder; 1935).
20. Cf. Frederick L. Schuman: *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* (New York: McGraw-Hill; 1931).

3. SIMON TO HOARE

21. Cf. the *New York Times*, April 26, 1935.
22. *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 159-75.
23. Cf. Blue Book Misc. No. 3 (Cmd. 5143) of 1936, No. 22.
24. The *New York Times*, May 28, 1935.
25. Commons, May 31, 1935.
26. The Marquess of Londonderry: *Ourselves and Germany*, p. 74.
27. Ramsay Muir: *The Record of the National Government* (London: Allen & Unwin; 1936), p. 7.
28. Quoted in John Gunther: *Inside Europe* (1936 edition), p. 250.
29. *LNTS*, Vol. 161, No. 3701; British White Paper, Cmd. 4953, 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 142-5. The texts of the supplementary accords, putting into effect as between Great Britain, Germany, Poland, and the USSR the qualitative limitations of the London naval treaty of 1937, will be found in Cmd. 5637 of 1937, Cmd. 5679 of 1937, Cmd. 5794, 5795, 5739 of 1938. Cf. S. Erck-

- ner: *Hitler's Conspiracy against Peace* (London: Gollancz; 1937), pp. 173-94.
30. Lords, June 26, 1935.
 31. Commons, June 25, 1935, and Lords, June 26, 1935.
 32. Quoted in the *New York Times*, June 19, 1935.
 33. Cf. Admiral Lacaze: *France's Naval Policy* (Paris: Centre d'Informations Documentaires; 1936).
 34. *Le Temps*, June 28, 1935; *DIA*, 1935, I, pp. 153-4.
 35. Commons, July 11, 1935.
 36. For a good summary see Vera Micheles Dean: "Europe's Struggle for Security," *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 19, 1935.

V · CÆSAR AFRICANUS

1. DUCE'S DILEMMA

1. *Popolo d'Italia*, March 7, 1920, quoted in Herbert W. Schneider: *Making the Fascist State* (New York: Oxford; 1928), pp. 274-5.
2. Emil Ludwig: *Nine Etched from Life* (New York: McBride; 1934), pp. 311-42.
3. On Mussolini's life and motivations see George Seldes: *Sawdust Caesar* (New York: Harper; 1935), and Gaudens Megaro: *Mussolini in the Making* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1938).
4. On Mussolini as a victim of fear see Angelica Balabanoff: *My Life as a Rebel* (New York: Harper; 1938), pp. 100-1.
5. Quoted in F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, p. 34.
6. Cf. G. A. Borgese: *Goliath: The March of Fascism* (New York: Viking; 1937), and Herman Finer: *Mussolini's Italy* (New York: Holt; 1935).
7. Cf. Muriel Currey: *Italian Foreign Policy* (London: Nicholson; 1932), and Elizabeth Munroe: *The Mediterranean in Politics* (London: Humphrey Milford; 1938); cf. Ion S. Munro: *Through Fascism to World Power* (London: MacLehose; 1933).
8. Cf. Gaetano Salvemini: *Under the Axe of Fascism* (New York: Viking; 1936); Royal Institute of International Affairs: *The Economic and Financial Position of Italy* (2nd edition, London, September 1935).
9. AP dispatch in the *New York Times*, January 12, 1934.
10. *Popolo d'Italia*, August 4, 1932.
11. Mussolini quoted in Hamilton Fish Armstrong: *We or They—Two Worlds in Conflict* (New York: Macmillan; 1936), p. 35.
12. On European diplomacy relating to Ethiopia prior to 1914 see Ernest Work: *Ethiopia: A Pawn in European Diplomacy* (New York: Macmillan; 1935).
13. Cf. W. B. Stern: "The Treaty Background of the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute," *AJIL*, April 1936, pp. 189-203.
14. Press release, U. S. Department of State, April 28, 1934.
15. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 28.
16. President Wilson's address to the Senate on "A World League for Peace," January 22, 1917.

17. This quotation, often attributed to Mussolini, comes from the pen of one of his early aides, Soffici; translation by Herbert W. Schneider: *Making the Fascist State*, pp. 259-60.
18. Page 7 of Emilio de Bono: *Anno XIII—The Conquest of an Empire* (London: Cresset; 1937), translation of *La Preparazione e le Prime Operazioni*, with an introduction by Mussolini, published in Rome in the autumn of 1936. Cf. the *New York Times*, October 26, 1936; the *Literary Digest*, January 23, 1937; Geoffrey T. Garratt: *Mussolini's Roman Empire* (London: Penguin; 1938), pp. 27-73.
19. Emilio de Bono, op. cit., p. 13.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-4.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
22. Cf. AP dispatch from the *New York Times*, October 26, 1935.
23. See footnote 17 above.

2. RESCUE BY LAVAL

24. *L'Humanité*, May 8, 1914.
25. Alexander Werth: *Which Way France?* pp. 99-103.
26. Cf. R. Millet and S. Arbellot: "Les Ligues et les groupements," *Le Temps*, January 24, 27, 28, 29, through February and March, and April 23, 24, 26, 1935; also *SIA*, 1935, II, pp. 32f.
27. All quotations from Alexander Werth: *Which Way France?* pp. 125-6, 174f., 188f.
28. *The Daily Mail*, September 19, 1935.
29. *SIA*, 1935, I, pp. 108f.
30. George Martelli: *Italy against the World* (New York: Harcourt, Brace; 1938).
31. Cf. Ethiopian Memorandum to Secretary-General of the League, January 15, 1935, *LNOJ*, February 1935, pp. 253-8; cf. General Virgin: *The Abyssinia I Knew* (London: Macmillan; 1936).
32. On Haile Selassie's career see Asfa Yilma: *Haile Selassie—Emperor of Ethiopia* (London: Sampson Low, Marston; 1936) and Robinson MacLean: *John Hoy of Ethiopia* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart; 1936).
33. George Steer: *Cæsar in Abyssinia* (Boston: Little, Brown; 1936), pp. 27-30.
34. Cf. *LNOJ*, February 1935, pp. 252-74, and June 1935, pp. 727-8.
35. Cf. the *New Statesman and Nation*, November 16, 1935, and the *Living Age*, October 1935, pp. 135-6.
36. Hoare to Commons, October 22, 1935.
37. Cf. Alexander Werth: *Which Way France?* pp. 134-9.
38. For a full account see Albert de Lapradelle: *Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien* (Paris: editions Internationales; 1935), a 672-page documented study of the dispute; see also *LNOJ*, *passim*, May-October 1935; John H. Spencer: "The Italian-Ethiopian Dispute and the League of Nations," *AJIL*, October 1937; and Pittman B. Potter: "The Wal Wal Arbitration," *AJIL*, January 1936.
39. Frederick T. Birchall in the *New York Times*, August 3, 1935.

3. FRAUD AND FORCE

40. *Giornale d'Italia*, February 19, 1936, quoted by Arnaldo Cortesi, the *New York Times*, February 20, 1936.
41. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 51.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 50
43. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 104.
44. The *New York Times*, October 29, 1935.
45. *SLA*, 1935, II, pp. 48f. and 103f.; cf. P. Vaucher and P. H. Siriex: *L'Opinion Britannique, la Société des Nations et la guerre italo-éthiopienne* (Paris: Hartmann; 1936).
46. The *New York Times*, July 21, 1935.
47. Address at Cagliari, the *New York Times*, June 9, 1935.
48. *LNOJ*, August 1935, pp. 972-3.
49. Eden to the League Council, *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 174.
50. See communiqué and comments by Herbert Matthews in the *New York Times*, August 19, 1935.
51. August 12, 1935, *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 175.
52. The *Daily Mail*, August 26, 1935.
53. *JO.Ch.*, December 28, 1935.
54. *LNOJ*, 16th Assembly, September 11 and 13, 1935.
55. The *New York Times*, September 16, 1935.
56. "The most charitable account of their conduct would be that they were bluffing, while, on a harsher interpretation, they were deliberately throwing dust in the eyes of the electorate of the United Kingdom and of the governments and peoples of all the States members of the League whom they persuaded to participate in the imposition of economic sanctions." Arnold J. Toynbee in *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 185.
57. Interview with Mussolini in *Le Matin*, September 17, 1935.
58. The *Daily Mail*, September 19, 1935.
59. *LNOJ*, November 1935, pp. 1620-7.
60. The *New York Times*, September 30, 1935.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*, October 3, 1935.
63. *LNOJ*, November 1935, p. 1603.
64. Asfa Yilma: *Haile Selassie*, p. 269.
65. *Corriere della Serra*, October 5, 1935.
66. *Le Petit Journal*, September 27, 1935. Cf. Franz Joseph: "I have examined and read everything, and, with a serene conscience, I set out on the path to which my duty points." July 28, 1914, cited in *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 200.
67. The *Paris Herald*, September 19, 1935.

4. HOARE TO EDEN

68. *LNOJ*, November 1935, pp. 1223f.
69. *DIA*, 1935, II, pp. 192-262.
70. On Britain's strategic position in the Mediterranean see Elizabeth Monroe: *The Mediterranean in Politics*, pp. 5-70, and Liddell Hart: *Europe in Arms* (New York: Random House; 1937), pp. 116-33.

71. On the economic consequences of sanctions in Italy see Royal Institute of International Affairs: *International Sanctions, passim*; League of Nations Documents, General, 1936, I; British White Paper, Cmd. 5094 of 1936, Appendix I, summarized in *SLA*, 1935, II, pp. 431f.
72. One of Mussolini's most ardent admirers in Britain, Major E. W. Polson-Newman wrote in *Italy's Conquest of Abyssinia* (London: Thornton Butterworth; 1937, pp. 299-300): "The League of Nations policy played into his hands in its endeavor to frustrate his enterprise; and it might well have done him serious harm by seeming to condone his actions. . . . The adherents to type of the policy of the League Powers must have been a great relief [to Mussolini] in many ways. Although the imposition and maintenance of sanctions made Italy's task more difficult, this was more than counteracted by the way they strengthened the bonds between Mussolini and the Italian people in a grim determination to see the Abyssinian campaign through to the bitter end."
73. British White Paper, Cmd. 5072 of 1936.
74. *The New York Times*, January 25, 1936.
75. *The Manchester Guardian*, November 26, 1935, and *Journal des Nations* (Geneva) November 26, 1935.
76. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), October 16, 1935.
77. *The New York Times*, October 20, 1935.
78. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 284.
79. Also in the *Manchester Guardian*, December 6, 1935.
80. Cf. George Martelli: *Italy against the World*, pp. 208-12.
81. *SLA*, 1935, II, pp. 300-1.
82. *The New York Times*, December 14, 1935.
83. Cmd. 5044 of 1935, p. 19.
84. George Steer: *Cæsar in Abyssinia*, pp. 202-15.
85. *The New York Times*, December 20, 1935.
86. On the League and Ethiopia in general see Victor Margueritte: *The League Fiasco (1920-1936)* (London: Hodge; 1936); and, for a pro-Fascist account, Jean Bastin: *L'Affaire d'Ethiopie et les diplomates, 1934-37* (Brussels: Universelle; 1937).

VI · WATCH ON THE RHINE

1. LOCARNO † MARCH 7, 1936

1. Winston Churchill: "First, the Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved that there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently impossible to comply with these three conditions." *The Evening Standard*, June 26, 1936.
2. From Gilbert and Sullivan's *The Sorcerer*. Cf. Harold J. Wilson's article on Eden in the *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1936; *Review of Reviews* (London), January 1935; Victor Gordon Lennox: "Anthony Eden," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1938; Alan Campbell Johnson: *Anthony Eden—A Biography* (New York: Ives Washburn; 1939). Cf. John Green: *Mr. Baldwin: A Study in Post-War Conservatism* (London: Sampson Low; 1933).

3. "The Unofficial Observer": *Our Lords and Masters* (New York: Simon & Schuster; 1935), p. 43.
4. *The New Statesman and Nation*, November 21, 1936.
5. *Ibid.*, November 14, 1936.
6. S. Erckner: *Hitler's Conspiracy against Peace*, pp. 207-13.
7. Cf. F. J. Berber: *Locarno*, pp. 157-67.
8. Cf. Blue Book Misc. No. 3 of 1936, Documents 28, 29, 30; Sir John Fischer Williams: "Sanctions under the Covenant," *British Year Book of International Law*, 1936; and Quincy Wright: "The Rhineland Occupation and the Enforcement of Treaties," *AJIL*, July 1936.
9. Cf. Augur in the *New York Times*, October 25, 1935.
10. *The New York Times*, January 16, 17, 1936.
11. The Marquess of Londonderry: *Ourselves and Germany*, pp. 79-87.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-13.
14. F. J. Berber: *Locarno*, pp. 181-2.
15. *SLA*, 1936, pp. 258f.
16. F. J. Berber: *Locarno*, pp. 224-5.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-227; the *New York Times*, March 8, 1936.
18. Cf. Alexander Werth: *Which Way France?* pp. 226-7 and Paul Einzig: "Franc-Wise and France-Foolish," *Ken*, June 16, 1938.
19. The Marquess of Londonderry: *Ourselves and Germany*, pp. 120-2.
20. For a detailed account of these discussions see F. J. Berber: *Locarno, passim*; *SLA*, 1936, pp. 252-370; *DIA*, 1936, pp. 1-286. Cf. R. B. Mowat: *Europe in Crisis* (London: Arrowsmith; 1936).
21. *The New York Times*, May 9, 1936.
22. *SLA*, 1936, pp. 348-9.
23. Commons, July 27, 1936.
24. For a good discussion and texts of documents see Henri A. Rolin: *La Belgique Neutre* (Brussels: Larquier; 1937).

2. ETHIOPIA † MAY 9, 1936

25. Cf. *Le Temps*, April 12, 1936.
26. British White Paper, Cmd. 5094 of 1936, Ethiopia No. 3.
27. Cf. Geneviève Tabouis in *L'Œuvre*, March 3, 1936.
28. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 342.
29. John T. Whitaker: *And Fear Came*, pp. 9-10.
30. George Steer: *Cæsar in Abyssinia*, pp. 8, 51; cf. Herbert Matthews: *Two Wars and More to Come* (New York: Carrick & Evans; 1938).
31. G. T. Garrett: *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, pp. 63f.
32. Linton Wells: *Blood on the Moon*, pp. 387-90.
33. George Steer, op. cit., pp. 279-80.
34. From his memoirs, *Voli sulla Ambe*, quoted in F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 37-8.
35. Quoted in Bertrand Russell: *Power* (New York: Norton; 1938), p. 29.
36. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 112.
37. Cf. George Steer, op. cit., pp. 282-3.

38. G. T. Garrett, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
39. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 356.
40. *The New York Times*, April 30, 1936.
41. *Ibid.*, May 6, 1936.
42. *The New York Times*, May 10, 1936. Cf. Liddell Hart: *Europe in Arms*, pp. 116-33; Margaret Boveri: *Mediterranean Cross Currents* (New York: Oxford; 1937); M. H. H. Macartney and P. Cremona: *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy 1914-1937* (New York: Oxford; 1937); William L. Langer: "Tribulations of Empire: the Mediterranean Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1937.

3. GENEVA † JULY 4, 1936

43. "In President Wilson's estimation the *conditio sine qua non* of success was a determination to unite in resistance to aggression: 'The union of wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot be resisted and which I dare say no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist.' The reader may possibly conclude that it is the absence of this 'union of wills,' rather than any technical obstacles, or lack of efficacy in the measures available, which prevents the sanctions of the Covenant from being the safeguard of peace and deterrent of aggression which they were considered to be by their designers. The question still remains whether, if the world lacks the spirit of courageous and self-sacrificing co-operation on which sanctions depend, any alternative course is available whereby the calamity of war can be permanently averted." Royal Institute of International Affairs: *International Sanctions*, pp. 212-13.
44. *SLA*, 1935, II, pp. 449-50.
45. See Augur in the *New York Times*, May 5, 1936.
46. Cf. *SLA*, 1935, II, pp. 442-69.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 463-4.
48. *The New York Times*, June 21, 1936.
49. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. 446.
50. *Le Temps*, June 20, 1936.
51. *The New York Times*, July 1, 1936.
52. *Ibid.*, July 16, 1936.
53. Cf. Lord Davies: *Nearing the Abyss—the Lesson of Ethiopia* (London: Constable; 1936).
54. Phillip Gibbs: *European Journey* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran; 1934), pp. 106-7.

4. EAST OF ROME AND BERLIN

55. *The New York Times*, October 26, 1936; on the preliminaries and the immediate aftermath, see *SLA*, 1936, pp. 575-83.
56. Augur in the *New York Times*, April 5, 1936.
57. *DIA*, 1936, pp. 297-9.
58. Augur in the *New York Times*, November 26, 1936.
59. *Ibid.*, September 8, 1937.
60. *Ibid.*, November 7, 1937.

61. *Ibid.*, November 26, 1937; G. E. R. Gedyce: "The Fascist International," *Fortnightly Review*, February 1937.
62. Cf. the Tanaka Memorial of 1927 in *The Puppet State of Manchukuo* (Shanghai: China United Press; 1935) pp. 204-38; on the strategy of a Soviet-Japanese war, see Gregory Bienstock: *The Struggle for the Pacific* (New York: Macmillan; 1937), pp. 229-42; and T. H. Wintringham: *The Coming World War* (New York: Seltzer; 1935), Appendix. See also Tota Ishimaru's predictions of general war in 1939 in *The Next World War* (London: Hurst; 1937), pp. 58f.
63. Cf. Tota Ishimaru: *Japan Must Fight Britain* (New York: Telegraph Press; 1936).
64. Introduction to F. L. Mödlhammer: *Moskaus Hand im Fernen Osten* (Berlin: Niebelungen [Anti-Comintern]; 1937).
65. Cf. *SLA*, 1936, pp. 393-401.
66. This prayer appeared in six languages on the envelope of a map of "Hungaria 896-1918," showing in movable segments the territories lost by the Treaty of Trianon, published by the "Hungarian Women's National Association" and widely distributed during the middle 1930's. Cf. C. A. Macartney: *Hungary and Her Successors: the Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-1937* (New York: Oxford; 1936); Count Stephen Bethlen: *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace* (New York: Longmans; 1934).
67. *SLA*, 1936, pp. 460-2.
68. F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 182f.
69. Cf. *Living Age*, October 1937, pp. 141-4.
70. *The New York Times*, August 30, 31, September 1, 2, 1936.
71. *Ibid.*, March 10, 1937.
72. *Ibid.*, November 6, 1937.
73. Cf. John C. De Wilde: "Germany's Trade Drive in Southeastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Report*, November 15, 1936; Cf. F. Elwyn Jones: *Hitler's Drive to the East* (New York: Dutton; 1937); Henry C. Wolfe: *The German Octopus* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran; 1938).
74. On January 24, 1937 Premiers Stoyadinovich and Kiosseivanov signed a laconic pact of rapprochement. "Article 1. There shall be inviolable peace and sincere and perpetual friendship between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Bulgaria." This pact was a substitute for Bulgarian membership in the Balkan entente, which would have required a formal renunciation of Bulgarian irredentist hopes. By 1939 the prospects were bright that these hopes might eventually be realized by German support of Sofia.
75. Cf. M. W. Fodor: *Plot and Counter-Plot in Central Europe*, pp. 63f.
76. H. E. Worthem: *Mustapha Kemal of Turkey* (Boston: Little, Brown; 1931), p. 92.
77. For a detailed account see D. A. Routh: "The Montreux Convention," *SLA*, 1936, pp. 584-651.
78. Cf. *SLA*, 1936, pp. 662-701.

5. MOSCOW

79. Cf. G. Dimitroff: *Working Class Unity—Bulwark against Fascism*, address of August 2, 1937 before the 7th Congress of the Comintern (New York: Workers Library Publishers).
80. See Frederick L. Schuman: "Leon Trotsky, Renegade or Martyr?" in the *Southern Review*, Summer, 1937, and comments thereon in "Correspondence" section by Malcolm Cowley, Max Eastman, John Dewey, Carleton Beals, and James T. Farrell; rejoinder by Sidney Hook: "Liberalism in the Case of Leon Trotsky," *Southern Review*, Autumn, 1937, and letters in "Correspondence" section by Sidney Hook, Carleton Beals, James T. Farrell, and Frederick L. Schuman. The principal works on the Moscow trials are: *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center* (Moscow, 1937) and *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites"* (Moscow, 1938), both verbatim reports of trials issued by the Peoples Commissariat of Justice of the USSR; Maurice Edelman: *G.P.U. Justice* (London: Allen & Unwin; 1938); Dudley Collard: *Soviet Justice and the Trial of Radek and Others* (London: Gollancz; 1937); and *The Case of Leon Trotsky*, transcript of hearings in Mexico City (New York: Harper; 1937).
81. See Paul Scheffer: "Stalin's Revenge," *Fortnightly Review*, March 1937.
82. Leon Trotsky: *The Defense of Terrorism* (London: Allen & Unwin; 1921), pp. 23-4: "The man who repudiates terrorism in principle—i.e. repudiates measures of suppression and intimidation towards determined and armed counter-revolution, must reject all ideal of the political supremacy of the working class and its revolutionary dictatorship. The man who repudiates the dictatorship of the proletariat repudiates the Socialist revolution, and digs the grave of Socialism." P. 60: "We were never concerned with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about the 'sacredness of human life.' We were revolutionaries in opposition, and have remained revolutionaries in power. To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him. And this problem can only be solved by blood and iron."
83. Leon Trotsky: *The Revolution Betrayed* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran; 1937), p. 278: "In the last analysis, Soviet Bonapartism owes its birth to the belatedness of the world revolution. But in the capitalist countries the same cause gave rise to fascism. We thus arrive at the conclusion, unexpected at first glance, but in reality inevitable, that the crushing of Soviet democracy by an all powerful bureaucracy and the extermination of bourgeois democracy by fascism were produced by one and the same cause: the dilatoriness of the world proletariat in solving the problems set for it by history. Stalinism and fascism, in spite of a deep difference in social foundations, are symmetrical phenomena." Pp. 165-6: "Healthy young lungs find it intolerable to breathe in the atmosphere of hypocrisy inseparable from a Thermidor. . . . The more impatient, hot-blooded, unbalanced, injured in their interests and feelings, are turning their thoughts in the direction of terrorist revenge. . . . Although completely impotent to solve the problem which

it set itself, this individual terror has nevertheless an extremely important symptomatic significance." Pp. 287-8: "Individual terror is a weapon of impatient or despairing individuals, belonging most frequently to the younger generation of the bureaucracy itself. But, as was the case in tzarist times, political murders are unmistakable symptoms of a stormy atmosphere, and foretell the beginning of an open political crisis. . . . There is no peaceful outcome for this crisis. No devil ever yet voluntarily cut off his own claws. The Soviet bureaucracy will not give up its positions without a fight. The development leads obviously to the road of revolution. . . . The bureaucracy can be removed only by a revolutionary force. And, as always, there will be fewer victims the more bold and decisive is the attack. To prepare this and stand at the head of the masters in a favorable historic situation—that is the task of the Soviet section of the Fourth International."

84. Cf. A. Weisbord: *The Conquest of Power* (New York: Covici Friede; 1937), pp. 1096-9.
85. The *New York Herald Tribune*, October 28, 1938.
86. See the sensational and somewhat unreliable work by Ernst Henri: *Hitler over Russia?* (New York: Simon & Schuster; 1936), pp. 181-203.
87. Cf. Ladislas Farago: "And Now to the Ukraine," *Ken*, October 20, 1938.
88. Cf. F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 118-19; Maurice Edelman, op. cit., pp. 218f.; Max Radin: "The Moscow Trials," and Balticus: "The Russian Mystery" in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1937.
89. Trotsky's phrases in his letter of October 18, 1938, on the occasion of the founding Congress of the Fourth International, reproduced by Paul Tobenkin in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 28, 1938.

VII : CAMPAIGN IN IBERIA

1. DEATH AT MADRID

1. Harry Gannes and Theodore Repard: *Spain in Revolt* (New York: Knopf; 1936), pp. 79-86.
2. See Geoffrey Brereton: "Will Spain Follow Russia?" *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 150, pp. 43-50; Gannes and Repard, op. cit., pp. 161-226; and the admirable work by Frank Manuel: *The Politics of Modern Spain* (New York: McGraw-Hill; 1938).
3. Cf. Charles A. Thompson: "Spain: Issues behind the Conflict," *Foreign Policy Report*, January 1, 1937, citing Spanish official sources; cf. Frank Jellinek: *The Civil War in Spain* (London: Gollancz; 1938), pp. 216f. This is by all odds the most detailed, authoritative, and fascinating study of the background and early phases of the conflict. Cf. E. Allison Peers: *The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936* (New York: Oxford; 1936).
4. Cf. S. Erckner, *Hitler's Conspiracy against Peace*, pp. 218-55, and Elizabeth Monroe: *The Mediterranean in Politics*. Professor Max Gruen in a lecture in Germany in April 1938 declared: "The war in Spain is a European war that is being waged for supremacy in the Mediterranean. . . . If Spain falls into the hands of Franco, then Gibraltar is threatened, and the trans-

port of French troops from the colonies will be made almost impossible because of the fortified Balearic Islands. . . . We demand what was stolen from us—our colonies. In case of war, Italy will annex a part of southern France." Quoted from the *Manchester Guardian*, April 18, 1938, in F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 141-2.

5. Frank Jellinek, op. cit., pp. 279-80.
6. G. T. Garratt: *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, pp. 136-8.
7. See the *Manchester Guardian*, August 5, 1936; *Journal des Nations* (Geneva), November 25, 1936; Charles A. Thompson: "Spain: Civil War," *Foreign Policy Report*, January 15, 1937.
8. Most of the documents revealing the methods and purposes of these Nazi activities were seized in the German Consulate in Barcelona. See texts and photostats in *The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain* (London: Gollancz; 1937), especially pages 15f., 32f., 58f., 80f., 110-35, 196f., 239, and 241-56. Robert Sencourt in *Spain's Ordeal* (New York: Longmans, Green; 1938), p. 87, admits the authenticity of this material, as do other Franco apologists.
9. Cf. Robert Sencourt, op. cit., p. 93, and Frank Jellinek, op. cit., pp. 262f.
10. Joaquin Arraras: *Francisco Franco* (London: Geoffrey Bles; 1938), pp. 175-6.
11. Cf. the *Literary Digest*, June 12, 1937.
12. The best biography of Franco in English is Joaquin Arraras, op. cit., written by an ardent sympathizer. See also the German work by Rudolf Timmermans: *General Franco* (Olten: Walter; 1937).
13. Robert Sencourt, op. cit., pp. 88-9. The letter read in part: "Those who claim that the army is disloyal to the Republic are not telling the truth: they are deceived by those whose turbid passions give them the tone of conspirators. But it is a wretched service to the patriotic cause to misrepresent the restraint, the dignity and the patriotism of the officers till they seem like figures of conspiracy and disaffection. From the lack of equity and justice of the public bodies in their treatment of the army in the year 1917 arose the military juntas of defense. Today you can virtually say that, on a similar plan, military juntas have again been formed. The writings which appear secretly under the initials U.M.E. and U.M.R. are authentic symptoms of their existence and herald future civil struggles, if one does not take the trouble to deal with them, a thing which I feel would be easy, if one thought it out on principles of justice and equity." Cf. Frank Jellinek, op. cit., pp. 256f.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
15. Joaquin Arraras, op. cit., p. 195.
16. Frank Jellinek, op. cit., pp. 307-9 and 318-28.
17. Joaquin Arraras, op. cit., p. 159.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-2.
19. Letter of the Spanish bishops, July 1, 1937, in Robert Sencourt, op. cit., pp. 84f.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-91.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-7, 237-48. Cf. Harold G. Cardozo (correspondent of the *Daily Mail*): *The March of a Nation* (New York: McBride; 1937), pp. 73-4 and 280-3.

22. *Current History*, June 1937.
23. G. T. Garratt, op. cit., pp. 130-2, quoting *Nuevo Ruipalda enriquecido con varios apendices* (14th edition, 1927).
24. G. McNeill Moss: *The Epic of the Alcazar*, p. 257, quoted with approbation by Robert Sencourt, op. cit., p. 161.
25. See articles by Ralph Bates in the *New Republic*, October 20 and 27, 1937.
26. Among the many accounts of the military aspects of the war, the more notable of those sympathetic to the loyalist cause are, in addition to Jellinek, the following: Geoffrey Cox: *Defence of Madrid* (London: Gollancz; 1937); Herbert Matthews: *Two Wars and More to Come* (New York: Carrick & Evans; 1938); Ramon Sender: *Counter-Attack in Spain* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1937); Peter Merin; *Spain between Death and Birth* (New York: Dodge; 1938). For a description of rebel terrorism by an ex-rebel, see Ruiz Vilaplana: *Burgos Justice* (New York: Knopf; 1938). For a sympathetic view of the republican cause by a Catholic, see Alfred Mendizabel: *The Martyrdom of Spain*, with a Preface by Jacques Maritain (New York: Scribner's; 1938).

2. RESCUE BY BLUM

27. See Richard L. Stokes: *Léon Blum: From Poet to Premier* (New York: Coward-McCann; 1937), and Geoffrey Fraser and Thadee Natanson: *Léon Blum: Man and Statesman*. Cf. John Gunther's pen portrait in *Inside Europe* (1936), pp. 97-109.
28. Léon Blum: *Peace and Disarmament* (London: Jonathan Cape; 1932) p. 187.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-7, 46-7.
30. See Walter R. Sharp: "The Popular Front in France: Prelude or Interlude?" *APSR*, October 1936.
31. *L'Europe nouvelle*, August 15, 1936.
32. Robert Sencourt, op. cit., pp. 136-7.
33. Alexander Werth: *Which Way France?* pp. 370f.; cf. Richard Stokes, op. cit., pp. 259-61.
34. *Le Temps*, August 3, 1936.
35. Alexander Werth, op. cit., pp. 378-9.
36. See Vera M. Dean: "European Diplomacy in the Spanish Crisis," *Foreign Policy Report*, December 1, 1936.
37. *L'Europe nouvelle*, September 26 and 29, 1936; Norman L. Padelford: "The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War," *AJIL*, October 1937, pp. 578f.
38. See Report of Francis Hemming, Secretary of the Non-Intervention Committee in Spain, No. 2 (1936), Cmd. 5300.
39. Cf. *LNOJ*, Special Supplement, No. 155, 17th Assembly, pp. 49, 64, 84.
40. *AJIL*, October 1937, p. 586.
41. Cf. Alexander Werth: "French Fascism," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1936.
42. *Current History*, July 1937, p. 76, quoting *Giustizia e Libertà*.
43. See Gaetano Salvemini: "The Rosselli Murders," the *New Republic*, August 18, 1937, and G. Salvemini: *Carlo and Nello Rosselli* (London: For Intellectual Liberty; 1937).

44. See "Hooded Treason in France," *Ken*, June 2, 1938; F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 130-140.
45. Cf. Jacques Kayser: *Rapport sur la Politique Extérieure*, 34^{me} Congrès Radical et Radical-Socialiste, Lille, October 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1937. See Robert Dell: "Fascism's Debt to Paris," the *Nation*, November 20, 1937.
46. The *New York Times*, September 7, 1936; Alexander Werth: *Which Way France?* pp. 382-9.

3. COMEDY IN LONDON

47. AP dispatch, *New York Times*, October 8, 1936.
48. *Ibid.*, October 10, 1936.
49. "In consequence of the fact that General Franco has taken possession of the greater part of Spain, and the development of a situation which shows with increasing clarity that in the remaining part of Spain one cannot speak of the exercise of a responsible governing power, the Fascist Government has decided to recognize the government of General Franco and send to that government a chargé d'affaires to begin diplomatic relations. The chargé d'affaires will go there immediately. The present diplomatic representatives [to the Madrid Government] have been recalled." *New York Times*, November 19, 1936.
50. *Ibid.*, January 4, 1937.
51. The *New York American*, February 1, 1937, in Raymond L. Buell: "United States Neutrality in the Spanish Conflict," *Foreign Policy Report*, November 15, 1937.
52. G. T. Garratt: *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, pp. 184-5.
53. The *New York Times*, March 20, 1937.
54. See George Seldes: "Mussolini versus His Past," *Ken*, April 21, 1938.
55. Frank Jellinek: *The Civil War in Spain*, p. 367.
56. See George Steer: *The Tree of Gernika* (London: Hodder & Stoughton; 1938). In the United States Senate, May 6, 1937, William E. Borah declared: "Here Fascism presents to the world its masterpiece. It has hung upon the wall of civilization a painting that will never come down—never fade out of the memories of men. So long as men and women may be interested in searching out from the pages of history outstanding acts of cruelty and instances of needless destruction of human life they will linger longest and with the greatest horror over the savage story of the Fascist war in Spain. . . . No language can describe the scene at Guernica, and Guernica was not a single instance; it was simply a culmination of a long line of unspeakable atrocities. It was not a military maneuver. The city was a long distance from the battle line. The attack had no legitimate military objective. An unarmed, non-combatant city was singled out for the most revolting instance of mass massacre of modern times. It was Fascist strategy."
57. See Ruiz Villaplana: *Burgos Justice*, pp. 77-9.
58. See communiqué in the *New York Times*, June 27, 1937.
59. *Ibid.*, July 15, 1937.
60. Cf. *AJIL*, Vol. 31 and Supplement, pp. 179-81.

[Pp. 293-307] Notes: VIII · March down the Danube 547

61. Cf. George Slocombe: *A Mirror to Geneva*, pp. 336-40, and Victor Margueritte: *The League Fiasco*, pp. 253-4.
62. LNOJ, records of the 18th Assembly.
63. See articles in *Events—A Monthly Review of World Affairs*, edited by Spencer Brodney, for July-November 1937, by William E. Lingelbach, A. Whitney Griswold, W. P. Morgan, J. S. Shapiro, Charles A. Beard, G. Nye Steiger, Sidney B. Fay, and others, including the present writer.
64. *The Times*, August 28, 1937; cf. Ruiz Villaplana, op. cit., p. 234.

VIII · MARCH DOWN THE DANUBE

1. VIENNA'S LAST CHANCELLOR

1. *SIA*, 1934, p. 475f.
2. J. D. Gregory: *Dollfuss and His Times*, pp. 296-7.
3. See communiqué from Berlin, *New York Times*, July 31, 1934.
4. *Ibid.*, July 27, 1934.
5. Cf. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 461-7.
6. Kurt Schuschnigg: *My Austria*, pp. 253-5.
7. *SIA*, 1934, p. 485.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 486-7.
9. *My Austria*, p. 257.
10. Cf. Margaret Ball: *German-Austrian Relations*, pp. 254-6. Dr. Wilhelm Berliner, late director of the Phoenix-Wien, had given 500,000 schillings (c. \$93,500) to the Jewish National Fund, 494,000 to the Nazis, 182,000 to the Peasants' Union, 95,000 to the Heimwehr, 9,000 to the Legitimists, 108,000 to Rintelen, and 1,098,000 to the Austrian press.
11. *SIA*, 1936, p. 430.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 433.
13. Cf. Mildred Wertheimer: "Austria Establishes a Fascist State," *Foreign Policy Report*, September 25, 1935.
14. Cf. *My Austria*, pp. 266-72.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
16. *Ibid.*, p. xxxii.
17. *SIA*, 1936, p. 450.
18. From *Aufbruch*, December 1937, illegal organ of Austrian Nazis, quoted in the *New York Times*, January 9, 1938.

2. EDEN TO HALIFAX

19. Thomas Jefferson to Governor J. Langdon, March 5, 1810. I am indebted to Dr. Saul Padover for bringing this letter to my attention.
20. See Robert Briffault: *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire* (New York: Simon & Schuster; 1938); Kingsley Martin: *The Magic of Monarchy* (New York: Knopf; 1937).
21. Sir Charles Petrie: *The Chamberlain Tradition* (London: Lovat Dickson; 1938), p. 116. Cf. Stuart Hodgson: *The Man Who Made Peace: Neville Chamberlain* (New York: Dutton; 1938).

548 Notes: VIII·March down the Danube [Pp. 307-330]

22. *Current History*, May 1937.
23. Sir Charles Petrie, op. cit., p. 212.
24. *The New Statesman and Nation*, January 28, 1933.
25. *The Daily Telegraph*, August 8, 1936.
26. See Herbert Heaton: "British Dominions in Conclave," *Events*, August 1937.
27. See Charles A. Beard: "On the Diplomatic Front," *Events*, September 1937.
28. The Marquess of Londonderry: *Ourselves and Germany*, pp. 144-53.
29. *Events*, November and December 1937.
30. *Ourselves and Germany*, pp. 155-6.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.
32. See Hjalmar Schacht: "Germany's Colonial Demands," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1937. Cf. A. L. Kennedy: *Britain Faces Germany* (New York: Oxford; 1937).
33. See "England behind the Falseface," *Ken*, May 19, 1938; H. N. Brailsford: "Britain Approaches the Führer," the *New Republic*, December 22, 1937; and contemporary accounts of the Halifax mission in *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Yorkshire Post* (Eden's paper), the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *Chicago Daily News*.
34. Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr. in the *New York Times*, February 17, 1938.
35. *The New York Times*, February 21, 1938.
36. Cf. H. N. Brailsford: "British Labor's Lost Chances," the *New Republic*, April 27, 1938.

3. AUSTRIA † MARCH 12, 1938

37. M. W. Fodor: "Finis Austriae," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1938.
38. *Ibid.*, and Eugene Lennhoff: *The Last Five Hours of Austria* (London: Rich & Cowan; 1938), pp. 73-7.
39. Cf. M. W. Fodor, loc. cit.
40. See the *New York Times*, February 14, 1938.
41. No minutes of this conference are as yet available. Schuschnigg's own memorandum was reported to have been taken out of Austria on March 11 by Herr Zernatto, his deputy, but it has not yet been published. See M. W. Fodor, loc. cit.; Eugene Lennhoff, op. cit., and Anton Kuh: "Escape from the Mousetrap," the *Nation*, June 11, 1938.
42. G. E. R. Gedye in the *New York Times*, February 16, 1938.
43. See Ludwig Lore: "Dr. Seyss and Mr. Inquart," the *Nation*, April 30, 1938.
44. See text of memorandum in the *Nation*, April 2, 1938.
45. Eugene Lennhoff, op. cit., pp. 52-7.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-2.
48. Cf. Robert Young: *A Young Man Looks at Europe* (London: Heinemann; 1938), pp. 315-26.
49. Eugene Lennhoff, op. cit., pp. 72f.
50. *The New York Times*, March 12, 1938.
51. M. W. Fodor, loc. cit.
52. See Sidney B. Fay: "The Nazi Absorption of Austria," *Events*, May 1938.

53. Douglas Reed: *Insanity Fair*, pp. 406-7.
54. See M. W. Fodor: "The Cemetery of Europe," the *Atlantic Monthly*, August 1938; Sigmund Neumann: "The Austrian Republic: An Obituary," the *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Summer, 1938; Peter F. Drucker: "The Social Revolution in Austria," the *New Republic*, July 6, 1938; Anton Kuh: "Escape from the Mousetrap," the *Nation*, June 4 and 11, 1938; Eugene Lennhoff, op. cit., *passim*; F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 157-66; William Orton: *Twenty Years' Armistice, 1918-1938* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart; 1938), pp. 232-46.

IX · PEACE BY PURCHASE

I. RESCUE BY CHAMBERLAIN

1. For instances of incomprehension on the part of acute British observers, see Norman Angell: *Peace with the Dictators?* (London: Hamish Hamilton; 1938), pp. 132-61 and R. W. Seton-Watson: *Britain and the Dictators* (New York: Macmillan; 1938).
2. See H. R. G. Greaves's admirable little volume of essays: *Reactionary England* (London: Acorn Press; 1936).
3. See J. M. Clynes, *Memoirs, 1924-1937* (London: Hutchinson; 1937), p. 253.
4. Statement Relating to Defense, Cmd. 5682, March 1938; also Cmd. 4827, March 1935 and Cmd. 5107, March 1936.
5. Ralph Waldo Emerson: *English Traits* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1887), pp. 283f.
6. Quoted in R. Palme Dutt: *World Politics, 1918-1936* (New York: Random House; 1936), p. 261.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 293. The post-Versailles British Envoy in Berlin, Viscount D'Abernon, viewed with alarm any prospect of a German-Soviet rapprochement. Cf. *The Diary of an Ambassador: Versailles to Rapallo, 1920-1922* (New York: Doubleday, Doran; 1929), pp. 21f.: "It was apparent to those who took a world view that Western civilization was menaced by an external danger which, coming into being during the war, threatened a cataclysm equalled only by the fall of the Roman Empire. This danger arose from the sweeping success in 1917 of the revolution against the Czarist regime and the establishment in Russia of a fanatical Communist Government, animated by hatred of all political organizations which stood in the way of a world victory of the Soviet creed. . . . Public opinion both in France and Germany was so concentrated upon the Rhine frontier questions that it relegated the vastly more important problem of the defense of Europe against Asiatic communism to the category of the non-urgent. And yet there is little doubt that a blind persistence in the policy of maintaining the war grouping of the Allies against Germany would eventually have led to Germany being forced into close alliance with Russia. . . . An Asiatic revolt under German direction against established institutions and supported by German industry and science may be considered an unnatural combina-

tion. But were it to come into being, the danger to European civilization would be dire in the extreme. . . . On broad grounds of European interest the case was strong (for the Locarno policy of peace in the West and a free hand for the Reich in the East) for all nations who regarded Western civilization as a precious heritage. It was even stronger when judged from the special standpoint of the British Empire. Apart from the general danger resulting from the spread of communism, the anti-English bias in Russia throughout the Nineteenth Century had to be borne in mind. The pressure of Bolshevik propaganda in combination with the traditional political hostility might create a force of huge potentiality. Resistance to communistic propaganda, the maintenance of peace in Europe, the avoidance of another Great War, the establishment for security for respective frontiers, the preservation of society on existing lines, were capital objects of British policy. But there was more than this. England's stupendous and vital interests in Asia were menaced by a danger graver than any which existed in the time of the old Imperialistic regime in Russia. Hostility to England or jealousy of the intrusion of British civilization into Asia were indeed of old standing. For the last seventy years of the Nineteenth Century, rivalry between England and Russia had been a dominant fact in history. But the Bolsheviks disposed of two weapons which Imperial Russia lacked—class-revolt propaganda, appealing to the proletariat of the world, and the quasi-religious fanaticism of Lenin, which infused a vigor and zeal unknown to the officials and emissaries of the Czar. In the presence of the menace of such forces no solution of the European problem could be tolerated by English statesmen which threatened the exclusion of Germany from the European combination and left her a prey to Russian wiles and Russian influence. . . . Communism had already shown its power over French troops at Odessa in 1919. . . . Such were some of the arguments which from the first made reflective men skeptical of any permanent benefit to Europe or to England from the policy of pure compulsion against Germany." This view, which lies behind Tory policy toward both Germany and Japan since 1931, was formulated by Lord D'Abernon in 1921.

9. *The New Statesman and Nation*, January 20, 1934.
10. See Norman Angell: *Peace with the Dictators?* pp. 144-5, 161, 164.
11. G. Ward Price: *I Know These Dictators* (New York: Holt; 1938), p. 173.
12. *Ourselves and Germany*, p. 163.
13. Interview in Los Angeles, the *New York Times*, February 22, 1938.
14. See Ladislas Farago: "How Hitler Conquered England," *Ken*, May 5, 1938.
15. Quoted in H. R. G. Greaves, op. cit., p. 28.
16. Stanley Baldwin: *Service of Our Lives* (London: Hodder & Stoughton; 1937), pp. 46-7.
17. See quotations in Norman Angell: *Peace with the Dictators?* p. 139.
18. *The New York Times*, November 12, 1938.
19. See Arnold Lunn: *Spanish Rehearsal* (New York: Sheed & Ward; 1937), and G. M. Godden: *Conflict in Spain, 1920-1937* (London: Oates; 1937).
20. *Ourselves and Germany*, p. 136.
21. *The Living Age*, January 1938, p. 455.
22. *Current History*, June 1938, p. 53.

23. See Claud Cockburn: "The Cliveden Set," *Current History*, February 1938; "England behind the Falseface," *Ken*, May 19, 1938; Frederick L. Schuman: "The Perfidy of Albion," the *New Republic*, April 20, 1938, and "The London-Berlin Axis," *Events*, May 1938; Robert Dell: "Chamberlain's Treason," the *Nation*, March 12, 1938.

A clear indication was given to Berlin that Downing Street would not resist German expansion to the East by Anthony Eden's address to his constituents at Leamington on November 20, 1936: "These [British] arms will never be used in a war of aggression. . . . They may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in our own defense and in the defense of the territories of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in the defense of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression in accordance with our existing treaty obligations. They may, and if a new Western European settlement can be reached, they would, be used in the defense of Germany were she the victim of unprovoked aggression by any of the other signatories of such a settlement. These, together with our Treaty of Alliance with Iraq and our projected treaty with Egypt, are our definite obligations. In addition our armaments may be used in bringing help to a victim of aggression in any case where, in our judgment, it would be proper under the provisions of the Covenant to do so. I use the word 'may' deliberately, since in such an instance there is no automatic obligation to take military action. It is, moreover, right that this should be so, for nations cannot be expected to incur automatic military obligations save for areas where their vital interests are concerned." On March 3, 1937, in Lords, Lord Halifax asserted that while the Government did not disinterest itself in these areas, "we are unable to define beforehand what might be our attitude to a hypothetical complication in Central or Eastern Europe" (*SLA*, 1936, pp. 367-8).

Eden and Halifax were thus in agreement, at a time when Eden was Foreign Minister and posing as the champion of collective security, that Britain should assume no commitments to defend victims of aggression in Eastern or Central Europe. This was the only assurance which the leaders of the Third Reich required. It meant that, so far as London was concerned, they had a free hand in the East. Then and later, the only stipulation insisted upon by Downing Street was that Nazi imperialism must achieve its purposes without war, since war might involve Britain by involving France. After Munich this stipulation was no longer necessary, since France could no longer honor any of its remaining obligations in the East. The Tory *carte blanche* to Hitler with respect to the *Drang nach Osten* was thus given in the autumn of 1936—and by none other than Anthony Eden!

2. CIRCUS IN ROME

24. *The New York Times*, March 18, 1938.
 25. *Ibid.*, March 25, 1938.
 26. See Cmd. 5694, 5695, 5702, Treaty Series Nos. 18, 19, 20 (1938).
 27. See George Slocombe: *A Mirror to Geneva*, pp. 78f.
 28. Ernest Hemingway: "The Cardinal Picks a Winner," *Ken*, May 5, 1938, and the *New York Herald Tribune*, March 25, 1938.

29. See Augur in the *New York Times*, April 2, 1938.
30. Official text in Cmd. 5726 of 1938, Treaty Series No. 31.
31. The *New York Times*, April 20, 1938.
32. *Ibid.*, April 30, 1938.
33. LNOJ, 101st Meeting of the Council, *passim*; for a résumé, see *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, May 1938, and *Events*, July 1938.
34. Robert Dell: "Diplomacy Hits a New Low," the *Nation*, June 4, 1938.
35. Cmd. 5793 of 1938: "The Text of a proposed Resolution reaffirming and extending the Non-Intervention Agreement, and providing for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain, for the grant in certain circumstances of belligerent rights to the two parties in Spain, and for the observation of the Spanish frontiers by land and sea, adopted by the International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain at a Plenary Session held on Tuesday July 5, 1938, for transmission to the two Spanish parties for their approval." One shilling, three pence, net.
36. AP dispatch from London, the *New York Times*, August 22, 1938.

3. DEATH OVER PRAHA

37. Cf. *Germany and Czechoslovakia* (Prague: Orbis; 1937).
38. Cf. Kamil Krofta: *A Short History of Czechoslovakia* (London: Williams & Norgate; 1935; *Germany and Czechoslovakia* (2 vols. Prague: Orbis; 1937); Edgar P. Young: *Czechoslovakia—Keystone of Peace and Democracy* (London: Gollancz; 1938).
39. Eduard Benes: *Masaryk's Path and Legacy* (Prague; Orbis; 1937). Cf. Karel Kapek: *Masaryk on Thought and Life* (New York: Macmillan; 1938); Emil Ludwig: *Nine Etched from Life*, pp. 45-96; Bruce Lockhart: *Retreat from Glory*, pp. 67f.; John Gunther: *Inside Europe* (1936 edition), pp. 330-3; and Thomas G. Masaryk: *The Making of a State* (New York: Macmillan; 1938). See also Donald A. Lowrie: *Masaryk of Czechoslovakia* (New York: Oxford; 1938), and Thomas Mann: "In Memory of Masaryk," the *Nation*, October 9, 1937.
40. See Pierre Crabites: *Benes* (London: Routledge; 1934).
41. *Ibid.*, p. 218; E. P. Young: *Czechoslovakia*, pp. 365-6.
42. In 1934 Arnold J. Toynbee wrote that Czech treatment of the Sudetens was "almost up to the Swiss or Canadian standard of inter-communal fraternity: a light shining in the darkness of East-European national oppressions and vendettas" (*SLA*, 1933, p. 197). Cf. E. P. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 200f.; R. W. Seton-Watson: "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1938; Joseph Chmelar: *National Minorities in Central Europe* (Prague: Orbis; 1937); and *The German Problem in Czechoslovakia* (Prague: Orbis; 1936); Elizabeth Wiskemann: *Czechs and Germans* (New York: Oxford; 1938).
43. Quoted in Wickham Steed's Introduction to Aurel Kolnai: *The War against the West*.
44. Quoted from *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*, April 8, 1938, by F. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, p. 56.

45. E. P. Young, op. cit., pp. 203-7.
46. See Ludwig Lore: "The Rise of Konrad Henlein," the *Nation*, April 9, 1938.
47. See Pertinax: "*Vorspiele zu Runcimans Mission*," *Das Neue Tage-Buch* (Paris), August 13, 1938; cf. Josef Fischer, Vaclav Patzak, and Vincenc Perth: *Ihr Kampf—Die wahren Ziele der SdP* (Karlsbad: Graphia; 1937); Dorothy Thompson: *Czechoslovakia on the Record* (New York: Listy; 1938).
48. The *New York Times*, March 27, 1938.
49. The *New York Herald Tribune*, March 25, 1938.
50. Emile Bure in *L'Ordre*, March 28, 1938.
51. The *New York Times*, March 31, 1938.
52. *Ibid.*, April 25, 1938. See also *The Times* (London), September 6, 1938. These demands, along with most of the more significant documents of the Czech-German "crisis" between April 24 and October 13, 1938, are reproduced in *International Conciliation*, November 1938, No. 344: *The Crisis in Czechoslovakia* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
53. AP dispatch from Berlin, the *New York Times*, April 28, 1938.
54. See S. Fowler Wright's remarkable fiction fantasy, *The War of 1938 (Prelude to Prague)* published in 1936 (New York: Putnam's; 1936).
55. See Frederick L. Schuman's article in *Events*, July 1938; *Le Temps* and *Le Petit Parisian*, May 22-June 5, 1938; *Das Neue Tage-Buch* (Paris), June 11, 1938.
56. See Cmd. 5787 and 5788 of 1938.
57. For texts of three Anglo-Turkish accords of May 27, 1938 see Cmd. 5754, 5755, and 5756 of 1938.

X : DESIGN FOR GIVING

1. RESCUE BY RUNCIMAN

1. Cf. dispatch of Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr. in the *New York Times*, July 21, 1938.
2. AP dispatch from Paris, July 20, 1938.
3. AP dispatch from London, July 23, 1938.
4. The *New York Times*, July 25, 1938.
5. *Ibid.*, article by Guido Enderis.
6. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1938.
7. *Time*, August 15, 1938.
8. From dispatch of G. E. R. Gedye, the *New York Times*, August 13, 1938.
9. See summary by G. E. R. Gedye in the *New York Times*, September 9, 1938. Another version in nineteen articles was issued by Reuter and published in *The Times* (London), September 10, 1938, and reproduced in *International Conciliation*, No. 344, pp. 405f. This version does not differ in substance from the summary given here.
10. See Dorothy Thompson: "On the Record" and Walter Lippmann: "Today and Tomorrow" in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 1, 1938, and following days.

2. THUNDER IN NÜRNBERG

11. The *New York Times*, August 24, 1938.
12. *Ibid.*, September 5, 1938.
13. See exchange of letters between Lord Rothermere and Wickham Steed in the former's *Daily Mail*, summarized in the *New York Times*, August 16, 1938.
14. It may be of interest to some readers that the analysis here suggested was formulated by me in substantially the form in which it is here expressed long before the "surrender" of September 18, 1938. See "The Perfidy of Albion" in the *New Republic*, April 20, 1938; "The London-Berlin Axis" in *Events*, May 1938; and "War by Blackmail" in *Events*, October 1938, which went to press September 15.
On September 16, 1938 Frank McIlraith, London correspondent of *Smith's Weekly* of Sydney, Australia, cabled his paper "that there would be no war unless the Czechs began it—Hitler had already decided before Chamberlain's visit that Germany could not sustain a war; that the Czech crisis would be settled ultimately by a Four Power Conference; that Russia would be kept out of the talks; that an attempt would be made to bind Germany and England closer together." See *Smith's Weekly*, September 16 and October 8, 1938, and *The British Australian and New Zealander*, November 24, 1938.
15. All these headlines, with texts in kind, are taken from a single issue of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 17, 1938. For weeks the entire Nazi Press was filled with similar material.
16. The *New York Times*, August 28, 1938.
17. The *New York Herald Tribune*, September 3, 1938.
18. *Ibid.*, September 3, 1938.
19. Sudeten Party communiqué, Prague, September 7, 1938, from the *New York Times*, September 8, 1938.
20. *Informazione Diplomatica*, issued by the official Stefani News Agency, summarized in AP dispatch to the *New York Times*, September 9, 1938.
21. Foreign Office statement of September 10, 1938, in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 11, 1938.
22. *Ibid.*, September 12, 1938.
23. Edgar Ansel Mowrer in the *Chicago Daily News*, September 11, 1938.
24. The *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 11, 1938; International Conciliation, November 1938, No. 344, pp. 407-10.
25. See dispatch of G. E. R. Gedye in the *New York Times*, September 12, 1938, and of Walter B. Kerr in the *New York Herald Tribune* of same date.
26. AP dispatch of Louis Lochner from Nürnberg, September 8, 1938.
27. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1938.
28. The *New York Times*, September 11, 1938. In this, as in other addresses, the various translations in the English and American press differ slightly from one another and when official texts were supplied these differed considerably in some instances from what was actually said. The translations here given are based upon comparisons between the various versions and,

with respect to Hitler's final address, upon the direct broadcast of the speech.

29. The *New York Times*, September 13, 1938.

3. THE HOME OF THE EVIL FAIRY

30. See Pertinax in the *Chicago Daily News*, September 15, 1938.
 31. See illuminating dispatches of John Elliott from Paris in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 16, f., 1938; cf. Vera Micheles Dean: "A Lesson in Nazi Technique." *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, October 7, 1938.
 32. Document II, British White Paper: "Correspondence Respecting Czechoslovakia," Cmd. 5847, September 28, 1938.
 33. The *New York Times*, September 22, 1938; International Conciliation, No. 344, pp. 421-2.
 34. See M. W. Fodor in the *New York Sun* and the *Chicago Daily News*, October 5, 1938. Beran subsequently admitted publicly that there was no Soviet "desertion" of Prague.
 35. AP dispatch in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 22, 1938.
 36. The *New York Times*, September 22, 1938.

4. THE HILL OF THE PAGAN GODS

37. See summary of Czech "White Paper" (suppressed in Prague and smuggled to Paris) by Walter B. Kerr in the *New York Herald Tribune*, November 13, 1938, Part II.
 38. See dramatic account by Joseph Driscoll in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 29, 1938.

5. IN HITLER'S HOUSE

39. The *New York Times*, September 30, 1938.
 40. Cmd. 5848, Misc. No. 8 (1938) No. 4.
 41. Joseph Driscoll in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 1, 1938; Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., in the *New York Times*, October 1, 1938.
 42. *The Times* (London), September 16, 1938.
 43. Thomas Gray's "The Bard," on the butchery of the poets of Wales by Edward I. Some genealogists contend that Chamberlain is a descendant of Edward I through eighteen generations.

XI · TORY TRIUMPH

1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA † OCTOBER 1, 1938

1. *L'Ordre* (Paris), November 11, 1938; *Das Neue Tage-Buch* (Paris), November 19, 1938.
 2. The *New York Times*, October 6, 1938; cf. M. W. Fodor and John T. Whitaker in the *Chicago Daily News*, October 6, 1938.
 3. The *New York Times*, November 24, 1938.
 4. See Paul B. Taylor: "The Partition of Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Policy Report*, November 15, 1938.

2. FRANCE IN THE SHADOWS

5. Pertinax: "Can Germany be Checked?" *This Week*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, November 27, 1938.
6. See Geneviève Tabouis: "What Can France Do?" the *New Republic*, November 9, 1938. On the diplomatic background, see her admirable *Blackmail or War* (London: Penguin; 1938, Spring).
7. See Robert Dell: "Fraud Rules in Europe," the *Nation*, October 22, 1938; Frank C. Hanighen: "Why France Sold the Pass," the *New Republic*, October 26, 1938. See the files of *Journal des Nations* (Geneva), the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Chicago Daily News* (especially the dispatches of E. A. Mowrer), the *New York Times*, and the *New York Herald Tribune* (especially the dispatches of John Elliott and Walter Kerr) for September and October 1938.
8. See Alexander Werth: "France's Tragic Decline," the *Nation*, October 8, 1938.

3. DUSK OVER WESTMINSTER

9. "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with Germany," reproduced as publication No. 16 by the Friends of Europe; quoted in Douglas Reed, *Insanity Fair*, pp. 360-3.
10. Cf. Winston Churchill: *While England Slept* (New York: Putnam's; 1938; speeches, 1932-8).
11. See Joseph Driscoll: "Lindbergh's Role in Crisis Diplomacy," the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1938; Frederick L. Collins: "Why Did Hitler Give Lindbergh a Medal?" *Liberty*, December 17, 1938. Cf. George Fielding Eliot: "The Military Consequences of Munich," *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 15, 1938.
12. *News Review* (London), October 6, 1938.
13. See the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 11, 1938.
14. The *New York Times*, November 16, 1938.
15. See Richard Mowrer in the *Chicago Daily News*, October 7, 1938.
16. AP dispatch from London, October 26, 1938.
17. Wallace R. Deuel in the *Chicago Daily News*, October 31, 1938.
18. See *News Review* (London), October 13, 1938. The writer was reproved and repudiated by the Party Secretariat.
19. See Sam Brewer: "Britain Races along Path to Fascist Rule," the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 13, 1938.
20. See *Time and Tide* (London), November 26, 1938.
21. See M. W. Fodor in the *Chicago Daily News*, November 16, 1938; cf. Walter Duranty in the *New York Times*, October 11, 1938.
22. See Pertinax in the *New York Times*, December 4, 1938.
23. The *New York Times*, December 5, 1938. Among the more valuable accounts of the Munich crisis and its aftermath are Hamilton Fish Armstrong: "Armistice at Munich," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1939; Bernadotte E. Schmitt: *From Versailles to Munich, 1918-1938* (University of Chicago Press, 1938); R. W. Seton-Watson: "Munich and After," *Fortnightly Re-*

view, November, 1938, and Vera M. Dean: *Europe in Retreat* (Knopf, 1939).

XII : DEFEAT

1. THE HOLLOW MEN

1. The Student's Gibbon, edited by William Smith (London, 1856), p. 204.
2. Thomas Mann: "Mankind, Take Care!" the *Atlantic Monthly*, August 1938.
3. André Maurois: "The Tragic Decline of the Humane Ideal," the *New York Times Magazine*, June 19, 1938.
4. See Rudyard Kipling's "The Old Issue," pp. 107-12 of Rudyard Kipling: *The Five Nations* (New York: Doubleday, Page, for *Review of Reviews*; 1914). *

2. THE LOST SOULS

5. Hans Kohn: *Force or Reason* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1937), pp. 44-5.
6. See, *inter alia*, G. A. Borgese: *Goliath: The March of Fascism* (New York: Viking; 1937); Robert A. Brady: *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* (New York: Viking; 1937); R. Palme Dutt: *Fascism and Social Revolution* (New York: International; 1934); C. Hartley Grattan: *Preface to Chaos* (New York: Dodge; 1936); Aurel Kolnai: *The War against the West* (London: Gollancz; 1938); Stephen H. Roberts: *The House that Hitler Built* (London: Methuen; 1937); Felix Witmer: *Flood Light on Europe* (New York: Scribner's; 1937); Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler: *Fascism for Whom?* (New York: Norton; 1938).
7. See Shelby Cullom Davis: "Capitalism after Munich," *Events*, November 1938.
8. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, p. 504.
9. E. B. Ashton: *The Fascist—His State and His Mind* (New York: Morrow; 1937).
10. *The War against the West*, p. 674.
11. See Sidney and Beatrice Webb: *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (2 vols. New York: Scribner's; 1936).
12. For an astounding example of verbal jugglery, see Max Eastman: "Stalinism Becomes Fascism," in Bernarr Macfadden's *Liberty*, December 10, 1938.
13. See Frederick L. Schuman: "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered," the *Southern Review*, Autumn, 1936.

3. THE KINGDOM OF DEATH

14. See Jan Huizinga: *In the Shadow of Tomorrow* (New York: Norton; 1936).
15. Oswald Spengler: *The Decline of the West* (New York: Knopf; 1929), Vol. II, pp. 434-5.
16. S. Ereckner: *Hitler's Conspiracy against Peace*, pp. 281-2.
17. *SLA*, 1935, II, p. v.

DOCUMENTS

FRENCH-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS OF JANUARY 7, 1935

(*Documents on International Affairs, 1935, I, pp. 19-24*)

DECLARATION, JANUARY 7TH, 1935

The Foreign Minister of the French Republic and the Head of the Italian Government,

Whereas the conventions of today's date have assured the regulation of the principal questions which previous accords left pending between them, and principally the questions relating to the application of Article 13 of the agreement of London, April 26, 1915;

Whereas the litigious questions which might arise in the future between their governments will find their solution either by diplomatic consultations or by procedures established by the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and by the general arbitration act;

Declare the determination of their governments to develop the traditional friendship which unites the two nations and to collaborate in a spirit of mutual confidence in the maintenance of general peace.

In view of this collaboration they will proceed between themselves with all the consultations which the circumstances warrant.

Set forth in duplicate, in Rome, January 7, 1935.

(Signed)

PIERRE LAVAL

(Signed)

MUSSOLINI

TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND ITALY REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THEIR INTERESTS IN AFRICA, JANUARY 7, 1935

The President of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of Italy, desirous of developing in Africa the relations of friendship and good neighborliness which exist between the two nations, and to this end, of regulating in a definitive manner the questions pending under the conventions of September 28,

1896 relating to Tunis and the accord of London of April 26, 1915 in its Article 13, have delegated as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the French Republic:

M. Pierre Laval, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of Italy:

M. Benito Mussolini, Head of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who having recognized their full powers in good and due form, have concluded the following agreements.

Title I

§ 1. (An agreement re the rights of Italian subjects and colonial subjects in Tunis, to be regulated by a special protocol.)

Title II

§ 2. (Frontier between Libya and French Possessions. Here follows a detailed geographical account of the new frontier by which France ceded to Italy 44,000 sq. miles of the Tibesti region.)

§ 3. (Provision for actual demarcation and limitation of the boundary by a survey committee.)

Title III

§ 4. (Similar to § 2 & 3 re border between Eritrea and French Somaliland Coast, ceding 309 sq. miles to Italy.)

§ 5. (Same as 3.)

§ 6. (French recognition of Italian sovereignty over the island of Doumeirah and adjacent islands.)

§ 7. The treaty will be ratified and the ratifications will be exchanged at Rome in the shortest possible time and will come into force on the date of exchange of ratifications.

In faith whereof the below-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty, in double, and have thereto set their seals.

Concluded in Rome, January 7, 1935.

(Signed)

PIERRE LAVAL

(Signed)

MUSSOLINI

Attached—Protocol re Tunisian Questions.

Austria and Central Europe

The two governments declare themselves to be agreed to recommend to the principal States interested the conclusion of an accord of non-interference in the (other's) internal affairs, and agree reciprocally not to assist nor favor any action which has for its end the violation of the territorial integrity or any regime, political or social, of any of the contracting parties.

The accord herein envisaged is to be concluded between Italy, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria—that is to say all the countries bordering on Austria—and Austria itself.

It is to be open to adhesion by France, Poland, and Rumania, being thus extended to neighboring states and succession states as well as to Austria and to France.

Further, the Italian Government and the French Government in considera-

tion of the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of Austria announce from today that in case this independence and this integrity are menaced the French and Italian Governments will consult amongst themselves and with Austria to consider measures to be taken. This consultation will be extended by Italy and France to other states with the object of insuring their co-operation.

Colonial Economic Interests

The head of the Italian Government and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs have recognized the opportunity to develop the economic relations of their metropolitan territory with their colonies in Africa and neighboring areas and pledge themselves to take the necessary measures to realize this collaboration. In the field of this collaboration is included Italian participation in the railway between Djibouti and Addis Ababa.

Armaments

The Italian and French Governments in reference to the declaration on equality of rights of December 11, 1932, find themselves in accord in recognizing that no country may modify, by a unilateral act, its obligations in the matter of armaments, and that in case such an eventuality is realized, they will consult one another.



TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN
FRANCE AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 167, p. 404, No. 3881)
(The Exchange of Ratifications took place at Moscow, March 27, 1936.)

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and

The President of the French Republic,

Being desirous of strengthening peace in Europe and of guaranteeing its benefits to their respective countries by securing a fuller and stricter application of those provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which are designed to maintain the national security, territorial integrity, and political independence of States;

Determined to devote their efforts to the preparation and conclusion of a European agreement for that purpose, and in the meantime to promote, as far as lies in their power, the effective application of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty to this end and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Monsieur Vladimir Potemkin, Member of the Central Executive Committee,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredited to the President of the French Republic;

The President of the French Republic:

Monsieur Pierre Laval, Senator, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. In the event of France or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics being threatened with or in danger of aggression on the part of any European State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and reciprocally France undertake mutually to proceed to an immediate consultation as regards the measures to be taken for the observance of the provisions of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

2. Should, in the circumstances specified in Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, France or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics be the object, notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful intentions of both countries, of an unprovoked aggression on the part of a European State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and reciprocally France shall immediately come to each other's aid and assistance.

3. In consideration of the fact that under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations any member of the League which resorts to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15 of the Covenant is ipso facto deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, France and reciprocally the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertake, in the event of one of them being the object, in these conditions and notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful intentions of both countries, of an unprovoked aggression on the part of a European State, immediately to come to each other's aid and assistance in application of Article 16 of the Covenant.

The same obligation is assumed in the event of France or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics being the object of an aggression on the part of a European State in the circumstances specified in Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

4. The undertakings stipulated above being consonant with the obligations of the High Contracting Parties as Members of the League of Nations, nothing in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as restricting the duty of the latter to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world or as restricting the obligations resulting for the High Contracting Parties from the Covenant of the League of Nations.

5. The present Treaty, both the French and Russian texts whereof shall be equally authentic, shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Moscow as soon as possible. It shall be registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

It shall take effect as soon as the ratifications have been exchanged and shall remain in force for five years. If it is not denounced by either of the High Contracting Parties giving notice thereof at least one year before the expiry of that period, it shall remain in force indefinitely, each of the High Contracting Parties being at liberty to terminate it at a year's notice by a declaration to that effect.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals.

Done at Paris, in duplicate, this 2nd day of May 1935.

(Signed)

V. POTEMKIN

(Signed)

PIERRE LAVAL

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

Upon proceeding to the signature of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance of today's date, the Plenipotentiaries have signed the following Protocol, which shall be included in the exchange of ratifications of the treaty.

1. It is agreed that the effect of Article 3 is to oblige each Contracting Party immediately to come to the assistance of the other by immediately complying with the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as they have been issued in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant. It is further agreed that the two Contracting Parties will act in concert to insure that the Council shall issue the said recommendations with all the speed required by the circumstances and that, should the Council nevertheless, for whatever reason, issue no recommendation or fail to reach a unanimous decision, effect shall none the less be given to the obligation to render assistance. It is also agreed that the undertakings to render assistance mentioned in the present Treaty refer only to the case of an aggression committed against either Contracting Party's own territory.

2. It being the common intention of the two Governments in no way to contradict, by the present Treaty, undertakings previously assumed towards third states by France and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in virtue of published treaties, it is agreed that effect shall not be given to the provisions of the said Treaty in a manner which, being incompatible with treaty obligations assumed by one of the contracting Parties, would expose that Party to sanctions of an international character.

3. The two Governments, deeming it desirable that a regional agreement should be concluded aiming at organizing security between Contracting States, and which might moreover embody or be accompanied by pledges of mutual assistance, recognize their right to become parties by mutual consent, should occasion arise, to similar agreements in any form, direct or indirect, that may seem appropriate, the obligations under these various agreements to take the place of those assumed under the present Treaty.

4. The two Governments place on record the fact that the negotiations which have resulted in the signature of the present Treaty were originally undertaken with a view to supplementing a Security Agreement embracing the countries of North-Eastern Europe, namely, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic States which are neighbors of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; in addition to that agreement there was to have been concluded a Treaty of Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, and Germany, by which each of those three States was to have undertaken to come to the assistance of any one of them which might be the object of aggression on the part of any other of those three states.

Although circumstances have not hitherto permitted of the conclusion of those Agreements, which both Parties continue to regard as desirable, it is none the less the case that the undertakings stipulated in the France-Soviet Treaty of Assistance are to be understood as intended to apply only within the limits contemplated in the three-party Agreement previously planned. Independently of the obligations assumed under the present Treaty, it is further recalled that, in accordance with the Franco-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression signed on November 29, 1932, and moreover, without affecting the universal character of the undertakings assumed in that Pact, in the event of either Party becoming the object of aggression by one or more third European Powers not referred to in the above-mentioned three-party agreement, the other Contracting Party is bound to abstain, during the period of the conflict, from giving any aid or assistance, either direct or indirect, to the aggressor or aggressors, each Party declaring further that it is not bound by any Assistance Agreement which would be contrary to this undertaking.

Done at Paris, this 2nd day of May 1935.

(Signed) V. POTEMKIN

(Signed) PIERRE LAVAL



TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic

and

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Being desirous of strengthening peace in Europe and of guaranteeing its benefits to their respective countries by securing a fuller and stricter application of those provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which are designed to maintain the national security, territorial integrity, and political independence of States,

Determined to devote their efforts to the preparation and conclusion of a European agreement for that purpose, and in the meantime to promote, as far as is in their power, the effective application of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty to this end and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic:

Monsieur Eduard Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Monsieur Serge Alexandrovsky, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

(Articles 1-3, identical with French-Soviet Pact, Arts. 1-3, and Articles 5 and 6 identical with Arts. 4 and 5.)

4. Without prejudice to the preceding provisions of the present Treaty, it is stipulated that should either of the High Contracting Parties become the object of an aggression on the part of one or more third Powers in conditions not giving ground for aid or assistance within the meaning of the present Treaty, the other High Contracting Party undertakes not to lend, for the duration of the conflict, aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor or aggressors. Each High Contracting Party further declares that it is not bound by any other agreement for assistance which is incompatible with the present undertaking.

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

(3 articles, of which 1 and 3 are identical with 1 and 3 of French-Soviet Protocol of Signature of May 2, 1935; Article 2 reads as follows:)

2. The two governments declare that the undertakings laid down in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the present Treaty, concluded with view to promoting the establishment in Eastern Europe of a regional system of security, inaugurated by the Franco-Soviet Treaty of May 2, 1935, will be restricted within the same limits as were laid down in paragraph 4 of the Protocol of Signature of the said Treaty. At the same time, the two Governments recognize that the undertaking to render mutual assistance will operate between them only in so far as the conditions laid down in the present Treaty may be fulfilled and in so far as assistance may be rendered by France to the Party victim of the aggression.



BRITISH-ITALIAN ACCORD OF APRIL 16, 1938

(Cmd. 5726 of 1938, Treaty Series, No. 31)

PROTOCOL

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Italian Government, animated by the desire to place the relations between the two countries on a solid and lasting basis and to contribute to the general cause of peace and security, have decided to undertake conversations in order to reach agreement on questions of mutual concern; and the said conversations having taken place;

His Excellency the Right Honourable the Earl of Perth, G.C.M.G., C.B., His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome, and

His Excellency Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have drawn up the present Protocol and have signed the Agreements and Declarations annexed hereto, each of which shall be regarded as a separate and self-contained instrument:

- (1) Reaffirmation of the Declaration of January 2, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean, and of the Notes exchanged on December 31, 1936;
- (2) Agreement regarding the Exchange of Military Information;
- (3) Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East;
- (4) Declaration regarding Propaganda;
- (5) Declaration regarding Lake Tana;
- (6) Declaration regarding the Military Duties of Natives of Italian East Africa [Ethiopia];
- (7) Declaration regarding the free Exercise of Religion and the Treatment of British religious Bodies in Italian East Africa;
- (8) Declaration regarding the Suez Canal.

The said instruments shall take effect on such date as the two Governments shall together determine.¹ Except in so far as any of them contain provisions with regard to their revision or duration, each of the said instruments shall remain in force indefinitely, but should either Government at any time consider that a change of circumstances renders the revision of any of these instruments necessary, the two Governments will consult together with a view to such a revision.

The two Governments agree that, immediately after the taking effect of the said instruments, negotiations will be opened, in which the Egyptian Government will be invited to participate so far as all questions affecting Egypt or the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan are concerned, with a view to a definitive agreement on the boundaries between the Sudan, Kenya, and British Somaliland on the one side and Italian East Africa on the other; and with regard to other questions affecting reciprocally

(a) Italian interests on the one hand and British, Egyptian, or Sudan interests on the other hand in the above-mentioned territories, and (b) the relations between those territories.

These negotiations will also include the question of commercial relations between the Sudan and Italian East Africa.

It is also agreed that negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government will take place as soon as possible on the subject of commercial relations between Italian East Africa and the United Kingdom, India, and British colonies, oversea territories, protectorates and mandated territories administered by the Government of the United Kingdom, including the subject of the application, on conditions to be established, to the whole of Italian East Africa of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed at Rome on June 15, 1883. These negotiations will be inspired by the common desire to further commercial relations between these territories and to insure adequate facilities for trade.

¹ The accord was put into effect as of November 16, 1938.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

(Signed) PERTH
(Signed) CIANO

Annex 1

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby reaffirm the Declaration signed in Rome on January 2, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean, and the Notes exchanged between the two Governments on December 31, 1936, regarding [the maintenance of] the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean.

Annex 2

Agreement regarding the Exchange of Military Information that the government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government agree in the month of January each year a reciprocal exchange of information shall take place through the Naval, Military, and Air attachés in London and Rome regarding any major prospective administrative movements or redistribution of their respective naval, military, and air forces. This exchange of information will take place in respect of such forces stationed in or based on:

- (1) overseas possessions of either party (which phrase shall for this purpose be deemed to include protectorates and mandated territories) in or with a seaboard on the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Gulf of Aden, and
- (2) territories in Africa other than those referred to in paragraph (1) above and lying in an area bounded on the west by longitude 20° east [center of Libya] and on the south by latitude 7° south [center of Tanganyika]. Such exchange of information will not necessarily preclude occasional communication of supplementary military information, should either party consider that political circumstances of the moment make it desirable.

The two Governments further agree to notify each other in advance of any decision to provide new naval or air bases in the Mediterranean east of longitude 19° east [Sicily] and in the Red Sea or approaches thereto.

Annex 3

ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT REGARDING CERTAIN AREAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government,
Being desirous of insuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in regard to areas of the middle East referred to in the present agreement,

Being desirous, moreover, that the same friendly spirit which has attended the signing of today's protocol and of the documents annexed thereto should also animate their relations in regard to those areas,

Have agreed as follows:

1. Neither party will conclude any agreement or take any action which

might in any way impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or Yemen.

2. Neither party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to Yemen or in any territory which either of those states may hereafter acquire.

3. The two parties recognize that in addition to the obligations incumbent on each of them in Articles 1 and 2 hereof, it is in the common interest of both of them that no other power should acquire or seek to acquire sovereignty of any privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or Yemen, or which either of these States may hereafter acquire including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of those States or in any islands of the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by Article XVI of the treaty of peace signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923.

In particular they regard it as an essential interest of each of them that no other power should acquire sovereignty of any privileged position on any part of the coast of the Red Sea which at present belong to Saudi Arabia or Yemen or in any of the aforesaid islands.

4. As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by Article XVI of the treaty of peace signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923, and which are not comprised in the territory of Saudi Arabia or Yemen, neither party will in or in regard to any such island firstly, establish its sovereignty or secondly, erect fortifications or defences.

It is agreed that neither party will object to: Firstly, the presence of British officials at Kamaran for the purpose of securing sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca in accordance with the provisions of the agreement concluded in Paris on June 19, 1926, between the governments of Great Britain, North Ireland, and India on the one part and the government of the Netherlands on the other; it is also understood that the Italian Government may appoint an Italian medical officer to be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer under the said agreement; secondly, the presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish, Little Hanish, and Jebel Zukur for the purpose of protecting fishermen who resort to those islands; thirdly, the presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak, and Jebel Tier of such persons as are required for the maintenance of lights on those islands.

5. The two parties agree it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and within the territories of those States. But while they will at all times exert their good offices in the cause of peace they will not intervene in any conflict which despite their good offices may break out between or within those States.

The two parties also recognize that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other power should intervene in any such conflict.

6. As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the east and south of the present boundaries of Saudi Arabia and Yemen or of any of the future boundaries which may be established by agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Governments of Saudi Arabia or Yemen on the other:

(1.) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone:

No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or Yemen (which both parties have undertaken to respect in Article 1 hereof) within any territory at present belonging to those States or within any additional territory which may be recognized by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to either of those States as the result of any agreement which may hereafter be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the government of either of them;

The Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake or cause to be undertaken any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works of purely defensive character for the defense of said territories or of communications between the different parts of the British Empire. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not enroll inhabitants of any of these territories or cause them to be enrolled in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defense;

While the Government of the United Kingdom reserve the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(2) The Italian Government declare they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

7. The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden protectorate as defined in the Aden protectorate order of 1937 Italian citizens and subjects (including Italian companies) shall have liberty to come with their ships and goods to all places and ports and they shall have freedom of entry to travel and residence and the right to exercise there any description of business, profession, occupation or industry as long as they satisfy and observe the conditions and regulations from time to time applicable in the protectorate to citizens, subjects, and ships of any country not being a territory under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection, or mandate of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

8. Should either party at the time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of entry into force of the present agreement such as to necessitate modification of the provisions of the agreement, the two parties will enter into negotiations with view to revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the agreement.

At any time after the expiration of a period of ten years from the entry into force of this agreement either party may notify the other of its intention to terminate the agreement. Any such notification shall take effect three months after it is made.

Annex 4

DECLARATION REGARDING PROPAGANDA

The two Governments welcome the opportunity afforded by the present occasion to place on record their agreement that any attempt by either of them

to employ the methods of publicity or propaganda at its disposal in order to injure the interests of the other would be inconsistent with the good relations which it is the object of the present Agreement to establish and maintain between the governments and peoples of their respective countries.

Annex 5

DECLARATION REGARDING LAKE TANA

The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on April 3, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on December 31, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them.

*Annex 6*MILITARY DUTIES OF NATIVES OF
ITALIAN EAST AFRICA

The Italian Government reaffirms the assurance which they gave in their Note to the League of Nations on June 29, 1936, that Italy on her side was willing to accept the principle that natives of Italian East Africa should not be compelled to undertake military duties other than local policing and territorial defense.

*Annex 7*DECLARATION REGARDING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
AND THE TREATMENT OF BRITISH RELIGIOUS BODIES
IN ITALIAN EAST AFRICA

Without prejudice to any treaty engagements which may be applicable, the Italian Government declare that they intend to assure to British nationals in Italian East Africa the free exercise of all cults compatible with public order and good morals; and in this spirit they will examine favorably any request which may reach them from the British side to assure in Italian East Africa religious assistance to British nationals; and that as regards other activities of British religious bodies in Italian East Africa in humanitarian and benevolent spheres, such requests as may reach the Italian Government will be examined, the general line of policy of the Royal Government in this matter and the principles of legislation in force in Italian East Africa being borne in mind.

Annex 8

DECLARATION REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby reaffirm their intention always to respect and abide by the provisions of

the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29, 1888, which guarantees at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal.



EXCHANGES OF NOTES

between Perth and Ciano at Rome, April 16, 1938

Troops in Libya

During our recent conversations your Excellency has referred to the question of the strength of Italian forces in Libya.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Head of the Government has given orders for a diminution of these forces. Withdrawals have already begun at the rate of 1,000 a week and will be continued at not less than this rate until the Italian Libyan effectives reach peace strength. This will constitute an ultimate diminution of these effectives by not less than half the numbers present in Libya when our conversations commenced.

(Signed) CIANO

[Formal acknowledgment of the receipt of this note.]

(Signed) PERTH

Italian Volunteers in Spain

Your Excellency will remember that, in the course of our recent conversations, I gave your Excellency certain assurances regarding the policy of the Italian Government in connection with Spain. I now wish to reaffirm those assurances and to place them on record.

First, the Italian Government have the honor to confirm their full adherence to the United Kingdom formula for the proportional evacuation of the foreign volunteers from Spain, and pledge themselves to give practical and real application to such an evacuation at the moment and on the conditions which shall be determined by the Non-Intervention Committee on the basis of the above-mentioned formula.

I desire secondly to reaffirm that if this evacuation has not been completed at the moment of the termination of the Spanish civil war all remaining Italian volunteers will forthwith leave Spanish territory and all Italian war material will simultaneously be withdrawn.

I wish thirdly to repeat my previous assurance that the Italian Government have no territorial or political aims, and seek no privileged economic position, in or with regard to either Metropolitan Spain, the Balearic Islands, any of the Spanish possessions overseas, or the Spanish zone of Morocco, and that they have no intention whatever of keeping any armed forces in any of the said territories.

(Signed) CIANO

Abyssinia

[Formal reply, taking note of] the reaffirmation contained . . . [in the

above note]. His Majesty's Government . . . will, I feel sure, be gratified at its contents. In this connection I hardly need to remind your Excellency that His Majesty's Government regard a settlement of the Spanish question as a prerequisite of the entry into force of the agreement between our two Governments.

I have further the honor to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, being desirous that such obstacles as may at present be held to impede the freedom of member States as regards recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia should be removed, intend to take steps at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of clarifying the situation of member States in this regard.

(Signed) PERTH

London Naval Treaty

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the Italian Government have decided to accede to the Naval Treaty signed in London on March 25, 1936, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 of the Treaty. This accession will take place so soon as the instruments annexed to the Protocol signed this day come into force.

In advising your Excellency of the foregoing I desire to add that the Italian Government intend in the meantime to act in conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid Treaty.

(Signed) CIANO

[Formal acknowledgment of the receipt of the above note.]

(Signed) PERTH

Bon Voisinage agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Egyptian Government, and the Italian Government

The Italian Government on the one hand and, on the other hand, in respect to Kenya and British Somaliland, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and, in respect to Sudan, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government;

Desiring to provide for friendly relations in East Africa;

Undertake, in addition to proceeding with due course to the discussion of detailed questions connected with frontiers between Italian East Africa and Sudan, Kenya, and British Somaliland as provided in the protocol signed today by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government, at all times to co-operate for the preservation of good neighborly relations between the said territories and to endeavor by every means in their power to prevent raids or other unlawful acts of violence from being carried out across the frontiers of any of the above-mentioned territories;

Agree that in view of the fact that by virtue of the Italian decree of the 12th of April 1936, slavery was prohibited in Ethiopia, as it had already been abolished in other above-mentioned territories, the good neighborly relations referred to above shall include co-operation to prevent evasion of anti-slavery laws of the respective territories;

Agree that the nationals of the other party shall not be enrolled in native troops, bands, or formations of a military nature maintained in the above-mentioned territories, including in particular any such nationals who are deserters from troops, bands, or formations maintained in or refugees from territories of the other party.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective governments, have signed the present agreement.

Done at Rome in triplicate on the 16th of April 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which have equal force.

(Signed) PERTH

(Signed) MOSTAFA EL SADEK

(Signed) CIANO

INDEX

- Abd-el-Krim, 268
Adamovich, Dr., 324
Adams, Vyvyan, 199
Adler, Viktor, q. 301
Adowa, 158
Afghanistan, 42
Aga Khan, 293
Aggression, definition of, 37, 38
Agnew, Andrew, 344
Alaric, 23
Aldrovandi Marescotti, Count Luigi,
171
Alexander, King, 101, 106f.
Alexandrovsky, Ambassador, 137, 456
Alfonso XIII, King, 264, 269
Almeria, 290
Aloisi, Baron, 102, 133, 136, 170, 179,
180, 182, 188, 224; q. 223
Alvarez del Vayo, Julio, 280, 355
Amery, L. S., q. 340
Anderson, Sir John, 471
Angell, Norman, 353
"Anglo-German Fellowship," 344
Anschluss, *see* Austria
Anti-Comintern, *see* Fascist Triplíce
and Rome-Berlin axis
Anti-Semitism, 18, 58, 473f.
Antonescu, Victor, 249, 250
Argentina, 486
Argentine Anti-War Treaty (1933),
159
Arraras, Joaquin, 271
Ashton, E. B., q. 507
Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank, 382, 383, 395,
414-15, 443, 451
Asquith, Lord, 348
Astor, John Jacob, 342, 398
Astor, Lady (Nancy Witcher Lang-
horne Gould), 342, 345, 398, 442, 468
Astor, Lord, 312, 341
Attila, 23
Attlee, Clement, 400, 408, 411, 441;
q. 171
Attolico, Bernardo, 452
"Augur," *see* Poliakov, Vladimir
Austria: (1932-4), 55-91; (1934-8),
297f.; and Laval-Mussolini accord,
111; and declaration of September
1934, 299; and Rome Protocols, 302;
accord with Germany, 1936, 302-3;
and Halifax mission, 313f.; end of,
321f.
Avenol, Joseph, 170, 171, 172, 185, 223,
238, 284, 349
Azaña, Manuel, 263, 265, 273
Baarenfels, Baar von, 88, 301
Babenhausen, Countess Vera Fugger
von, 301
Badoglio, Pietro, 168, 224, 225, 229
Baierle, Wenzel, 394
Balbo, Italo, 267
Baldwin, Stanley, 191, 194, 196, 199,
200, 201, 205, 220, 231, 306, 308, 343,
448, 484; and disarmament, 50; and
Hoare-Laval plan, 196; and Peace
Ballot, 176; q. on White Paper, 118,
145, 146; on sanctions, 233; on The
City, 345
Balearic Islands, 266
Balkan Entente (February 9, 1934), 52,
97, 111, 168
Baltic States: and pacts of July 1933,
42; Eastern Locarno project, 99f.;
entente of September 12, 1934,
103
Barnby, Lord, 344
Barrios, Martinez, 263

- Barthou, Louis, 49, 51, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101-9, 257, 261; q. 109
- Barton, Sir Sidney, 170, 194, 197, 198
- Bauer, Otto, 71, 72, 73, 74
- Beaverbrook, Lord, 122, 150, 271, 341, 399, 526
- Beck, Josef, 39, 98, 100, 132, 136, 140, 349, 421, 454, 479
- Beck, Gen. Ludwig, 315
- Belgium: termination of alliance with France, 220; new neutrality, 311
- Benes, Eduard, 39, 49, 107, 132, 136, 137, 180, 182, 188, 257, 361, 362, 377, 384, 397, 402, 406, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 428, 431, 433, 435, 453
- Beran, Rudolf, 421, 456
- Berchta, 409
- Berenger, Henri, 310
- Berger-Waldenegg, Baron Egon, 299
- Berthelot, Philippe, 109
- Bessenyei-Bakazah, Baron Andres, 392
- Bilbao, 290
- Birchall, Frederick T., q. 443
- Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 59, 284
- Bloch, Pierre, 462
- "Bloody Saturday," 80, 427
- Blomberg, General Werner von, 9, 10, 119, 211, 315
- Blondel, Jules, 352, 357
- Blum, Leon, 165, 201, 220, 234, 236, 238, 261, 273, 274-80, 282, 295, 316, 326, 331, 357, 378, 461, 462, 464, 482
- Bodard, M., 198
- Boehm, Nikolaus, 370
- Bohle, E. W., 268, 353, 366
- Bolin, Luis, 270
- Bolshevism, *see* Communism
- Bonnet, Georges, 295, 331, 352, 355, 369, 370, 371, 398, 401, 412, 413, 414, 416, 419, 427, 457, 458, 459, 460, 463, 478, 480, 483, 485, 488
- Bono, General Emilio de, 171, 224; q. 162
- Borah, William E., q. 546
- Boris, King, 250
- Bose, Herbert von, 14
- Bouisson, Fernand, 109
- Bowes-Lyon, Sir Claude George, 375
- Brauchitsch, General Walther von, 315
- Braun, Otto, 10
- Brazil, 311
- Brest-Litovsk, 26
- Briand, Aristide, 32
- Brierly, James, 353
- Brilow, Herr von, 66
- Broqueville, Comte de, q. 51
- Brüning, Heinrich, 33
- Brussels Conference, November 1937, 294-5
- Buerckel, Joseph, 330
- Bukharin, Nikolai, 260
- Bulgaria: rapprochement with Jugoslavia and Greece, 97, 541; recognition of USSR, 101; and Rome-Berlin axis, 250-1
- Buresch, M., 299
- Burke, Edmund, 337
- Butler, Richard A., 321
- Buxton, Lord, 368
- Caballero, Francisco Largo, *see* Largo
- Caballero, Francisco
- Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 314, 326, 376, 400, 414, 427, 441, 487
- Cagoulards, 281
- Caillaux, Joseph, 461
- Calvo Sotelo, José, 268
- Cambon, Roger, 485
- Camelots du Roi, 92, 165
- Campinchi, César, 419, 461
- Cantalupo, Robert, 286
- Canterbury, Archbishop of, *see* Lang, Cosmo Gordon
- Cantacuzenu, General, 248
- Caporetto, 154
- Carol, King, 107, 249, 250, 311, 454, 479
- Carpatho-Ukraine, 478f.
- Casares Quiroga, Santiago, 265
- Castillo, José del, 268
- Catholic Church, Roman, 302, 338, 488, 498, 500; *and see* Pius XI
- Cecil, Lord Robert, 174, 194, 227, 234
- Cerruti, Ambassador, 183, 193, 217
- C. G. T., 94, 464
- Chamberlain, Austen, 176, 231, 306; q. 307
- Chamberlain, Lady Austen, 310, 344
- Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 23
- Chamberlain, Joseph, 306-7
- Chamberlain, Neville, 146, 171, 199, 200, 306-10, 319-20, 326, 331, 337, 343, 349-52, 356, 357, 363, 370, 372, 376, 379, 396, 398, 400, 406-11, 413, 414, 416, 423-32, 436-42, 445-9, 463, 486-8; q. on sanctions, 232, 234; on *Leipzig*, 291; on malice, 294; on

- Czechoslovakia, 347-8, 367, 434-5; on Runciman, 380-1; on London conference with Daladier, 415; on German mastery, 471-3; on Open Door, 475-6; on Nazis, 484; on Tunis, 485
- Chambrun, Count de, 166, 222
- Changkufeng, 394
- Charles IV, 360
- Charles V, 462
- Charles, Sir Noel, 357, 419
- Chautemps, Camille, 49, 93, 295, 314, 316, 326, 378, 446
- Chiang Kai-Shek, 245, 256, 481
- Chiappe, Jean, 93, 94
- Chicago, University of, 362
- Chicherin, Georges, 42
- Chile, 355
- China, 29-32, 245f., 256, 355, 412
- Chudnitz, Count Ottokar von Czernin von, 402
- Churchill, Winston, 231, 309, 321, 326, 369, 375, 400; q. on capitulation, 423; on defeat, 448; on dishonor, 463; on concessions, 466; on sanctions, 538
- Chvalkovsky, Frantisek, 453, 454, 456
- Ciano, Galeazzo, 78, 235, 240, 241, 245, 248, 278, 279, 287, 288, 331, 349, 350, 352, 357, 371, 373, 376, 419, 433, 453, 455, 481, 487
- Ciano-Perth accord (April 16, 1938), 239, 350, 353; text, 565-73
- Citrine, Sir Walter, 411
- Clark, Sir George, 196, 278
- Claudé, Paul, 165
- Clemenceau, Georges, 257
- Cliveden clique, 321, 345
- Cockburn, Claude, 468
- Codreanu, Cornelius Zelca, 248, 249, 250, 479
- Cole, Annie, 307
- Coleridge, S. T., q. 489
- Colson, Everett, 169, 198, 238, 239
- Comintern (Communist III International), 12, 240-6, 253-62
- Comité des Forges, 33
- Communism, 21, 26, 253-62, 491f., 496f., 509f.
- Companys, Luis, 263
- Constantine, King, 251
- Coolidge, Calvin, q. 496
- Corbin, Charles, 182, 378, 398, 414
- Corfu, 156
- Cot, Pierre, 201, 469
- Coty, François, 92
- Coulondre, Robert, 463
- Covenant of League of Nations: Article 1, 531; Article 10, 533; Article 15, 533; Article 16, 533; Article 17, 534; separated from Treaty of Versailles, 412
- Cranborne, Viscount, 180, 319, 320, 369, 448
- Cristea, Miron, 316
- Croatia, 105-7
- Croix, Victor de la, 419, 420
- Croix de Feu, 164, 165
- Crowe, Eyre, q. 466
- Csaky, Stephen, 455, 488
- Cunliffe-Lister, Sir Philip (Lord Swinton), 146
- Curzon, Lord, 256
- Cuza, Alexander, 249
- Czechoslovakia, 321f., 60, 360f.; pacts of July 1933, 42; and USSR, 101, 139-40, 564-5; Eden's visit, 132; crisis of May 1938, 358-374; partition of, 375f., 440-50; 451f.
- D'Albernon, Viscount, q. 549-50
- Daladier, Édouard, 39, 42, 43, 44, 93, 331, 352, 369, 371, 376, 378, 379, 406, 413, 414, 416, 417, 427, 433, 473, 445, 446, 447, 457, 458, 459, 484; q. on currencies, 41; on Czechoslovakia, 428; on Neurath, 49; on frontiers, 355, 483; on modesty, 462
- Dalton, Hugh 411
- Danzig, 236-7
- Danubian pact, 132, 137, 152
- Daranyi, Koloman, 247, 454
- Dardanelles, 252
- Darré, Walter, 13
- Daudet, Léon, 92
- Davis, Norman, 35, 37, 42, 43, 44, 49
- Dawson, Geoffrey (*The Times*), 342; q. on Czechoslovakia, 367, 373, 398
- De La Warr, Earl, 412, 471; q. 473
- Delbos, Yvon, 201, 220, 238, 250, 275, 276, 277, 291, 294, 311, 314
- Denikin, Anton, 478
- Deterding, Sir Henri, 344
- Deutsch, Julius, 71, 73, 74
- Deutschland*, 290
- De Valera, Eamon, 102
- Dewey, John, 259
- Dimitrevich, Dragutin, 105

- Dimitrov, Georgi, 11, 12
 Dirksen, Herbert von, 378, 409, 428, 484
 Disarmament Conference, 28f., 42f.
 Dobler, Johan, 84
 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 55, 57, 58, 61, 63, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 80, 82, 85, 86, 298; q. on independent Austria, 66; on Mussolini, 66; on February massacre, 74; death of, 76f.
 Dollfuss, Frau, 330
 Doriot, Jacques, 462
 Doumergue, Gaston, 49, 94
 Drummond, Sir Eric, *see* Perth, Earl of
 Duca, Ion, 249
 Duff-Cooper, Alfred, 413, 436, 447
 Dunglass, Lord, 441
- Eastern Locarno, 51, 98, 99, 110, 129, 132, 137, 142, 152
 Eckhardt, Tibor von, 108
 Eden, Captain Anthony, 38, 42, 43, 52, 68, 108, 117, 123, 125, 128, 130, 131, 132, 140, 147, 150, 170, 171, 172, 173, 178, 179, 196, 199, 201, 204, 209, 210, 217, 218, 220, 222, 230, 233, 234, 238, 276, 285, 294, 306, 310, 312, 314, 316, 319, 320, 363, 400, 442, 448; q. on oil sanctions, 221, 231, 232; on gas, 223; on failure of League, 231, 236; on "non-intervention," 287; on Almeria, 290; on Sudetens, 264, 401; on Spain, 474; in New York, 476; in Leamington, 551
 Edward VIII, 302, 306, 375
 Edwards, Augustin, 355
 Egypt: alliance with Great Britain (August 26, 1936), 253; and Ciano-Perth accord, 350
 Eisenlohr, Ernst von, 329, 372, 398
 Elizabeth, Queen, 375, 376, 415
 Elliott, Walter, 319
 Eltz-Rubenach, Baron von, 10
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, q. 339
 Endicott, Mary, 306
 Epp, Ritter von, 472
 Ernst, Karl, 14, 81
 Esthonia, 42; *and see* Baltic States
 Ethiopia: 53, 157-63, 179f., 221f., 224-9, 235f., 241, 244, 350, 353-5
 Eyres-Monsell, Sir Bolton, 149
- Fanjul, General, 269, 270
 Fascism: genesis of, 15f., 497; in France, 92f.; genesis of, in Italy, 154f.; and crisis of Western culture, 491f.; misconceptions concerning, 505f.
 Fascist Triplix, 240-6; *and see* Germany, Italy, Japan
 Faucher, General Louis, 463
 Faupel, General Wilhelm, 267, 286
 Feder, Gottfried, 6
 Ferdinand, Archduke Francis, 105
 Festetics, Alexander, 247
 Fey, Emil, 62, 63, 65, 71, 72, 75, 76, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 299, 300, 301, 326, 330
 Finland, 42; *and see* Baltic States
 Firlinger, Zdenk, 401
 Flandin, Pierre Étienne, 94, 109, 113, 116, 119, 132, 201, 203, 209, 215, 216, 217, 218, 221, 222, 223, 316, 461
 Four-Power Pact, 66, 183, 323, 378, 382
 "Fourth International," 259
 France: and Disarmament Conference, 32f.; and Four-Power Pact of 1933, 38-41; and Austria, 66, 68, 69, 74, 75, 297, 299, 331f.; and Versailles, 118-37; and Locarno, 202-20; accord with Italy (1935), 110-11, 166-8, 482, 559-61; accord with Britain (1935), 113f., 149-52; pact with USSR, 94f., 99-103, 110, 137-41, 561-4; and Ethiopia, 157-200, 220-39; and Spain, 266, 275f., 292-3, 355-8; and Czechoslovakia, 358f., 375f., 415-19; and Munich, 440-50, 456f.; accord with Germany, 480; decline of, 515f.
 France, Anatole, q. 155, 511
 Francis I, 462
 Franck Karl Hermann, 383, 395, 397, 407
 Franckenstein, Georg, 74
 Franco, General Francisco, 242, 250, 268, 269, 271, 272, 275, 311, 350, 356, 358, 474, 485; q. on salvation of Spain, 270; on Roosevelt, 288; on loyalty of army, 544
 François-Poncet, André, 211, 213, 288, 321, 370, 379, 452, 463, 475
 Frank, Dr. Hans, 63, 64, 353; q. 364
 Franklin-Bouillon, M., 164
 Franz, Josef, Emperor, q. 537
 Frauenfeld, Alfred, 68, 82, 83
 Freeman-Mitford, Miss Unity Valkyrie, 344
 Freud, Sigmund, 331, 334

- Frick, Wilhelm, 10, 67
 Friedel, Egon, 331
 Fritsch, General Werner von, 315
 Frot, Eugène, 93, 94
 Funder, Dr. Friedrich, 88
 Funk, Walter, 315, 453
- Gallacher, Willie, 442
 Gamarnik, Marshal I. B., 260
 Gambetta, Léon, 494
 Gamelin, General Maurice, 168, 216,
 379, 432, 433, 446, 460, 463
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 30; q. 449
 Garbo, Greta, 72
 Garrigue, Charlotte, 361
 Garvin, J. L., 122, 217, 313, 342, 472
 Gayda, Virginio, 172, 222, 481-2; and
 Chamberlain visit to Rome, 486-8
 Geddes, Sir Auckland, 271
 General Act for the Pacific Settlement
 of International Disputes, 159
 Geneva Protocol of 1924, 307
 George II, 251
 George III, 517
 George V, 209, 306, 375, 376, 377, 413,
 415
 George VI, 306, 413
 Georgiev, Colonel Kimon, 97, 250
 Georgiev, Vlada, 107
 Gerecke, Gunther, 10, 14
 Gerl, Joseph, 82
 Germany: Nazi Revolution, 3f.; and
 Disarmament Conference, 33f.; Pan-
 Germanism, 56f., 59-60, 129; *Drang
 nach Osten*, 26f., 129, 246f., 254f.,
 478f.; and Four-Power Pact of 1933,
 38-41; and Austria, 55-6, 61f., 64-9,
 76-91, 297f., 302-3, 312-14, 321f.,
 346f.; and Eastern Locarno, 95-100,
 106-8; repudiation of Versailles,
 111f., 118-37; naval accord with Brit-
 ain, 130, 145-52; and French-Czech-
 Soviet pacts, 137-41; and repudiation
 of Locarno, 202-20; accord with
 Italy, 79f., 241, 353f.; accord with
 Japan, 242-6; intervention in Spain,
 267f., 278f., 286, 292-3, 546; colonial
 claims, 313, 318, 466, 472f.; and
 Czechoslovakia, 359f., 375f.; and
 Munich, 440-50; accord with France,
 1938, 480
 Gibbon, Edward, q. 490-1
 Gibraltar, 309
- Gienke, Alwine, 57
 Gijon, 295
 Gil Robles, José Maria, 264, 265, 267,
 269, 271
 Giraud, André ("Pertinax"), 164, 165,
 461
 Gladstone, William, 493
 Glaise-Horstenau, Dr. Edmund, 303,
 324, 327, 329
 Göbbels, Paul Joseph, 3-4, 10, 11, 13,
 43, 80, 212, 245, 353, 371, 427, 428;
 q. on treason, 3; on Bolshevism, 241;
 on place in the sun, 364; on Czech
 prosecution, 394
 Goded, General, 268, 269, 271
 Goga, Octavian, 249, 250, 311, 316
 Gömbös, Julius, 75, 247, 302, 303
 Göring, Hermann, 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 80,
 107, 119, 140, 209, 211: 288, 310, 312,
 313, 315, 344, 367, 371, 376, 394, 396,
 400, 419; q. on unreserved reckless-
 ness, 325; on "No one can stop us,"
 403
 Graham, Sir Ronald W., 40
 Grandi, Dino, 284, 286, 289, 317, 343,
 371, 411, 413
 Gray, Thomas, q. 449
 Graziani, General, 171, 224, 229
 Great Britain: and Manchurian crisis,
 29-32; at Disarmament Conference,
 32f.; Four-Power Pact of 1933, 38-41;
 Economic Conference of 1933, 41;
 and Austria, 66, 68, 69, 74, 75, 297f.,
 299, 309f., 312-14, 321f.; and Ver-
 sailles, 118-37; naval accord with
 Germany, 130, 145-52; and Locarno,
 202-20; and Ethiopia, 111, 157-200,
 219-39, 350; and Spain, 265f., 276f.,
 278f., 287, 291-3, 311, 355-8; accord
 with France, 1935, 113f.; accord with
 Italy, 1938, 349-52, 565-73; alliance
 with Egypt, 253; and Czechoslo-
 vakiya, 363f., 415-19; and Munich,
 440-50; general policies, 309f., 332f.;
 decline of, 515f.
 Greece, 251f.
 Greenwood, Arthur, 411
 Greiser, Arthur, 236
 Grey, Sir Edward, 383
 Grinko, Gregory, 260
 Gruen, Max, q. 543-4
 Gruhu, Erika, 315
 Guariglia, Raffaele, 463

- Guernica, 290
 Guinness, Mrs. Diana, 344
- Habicht, Theo, 61, 65, 67, 74, 81, 83, 298; q. 65
 Habsburgs, 59, 300
 Hacha, Emil, q. 456
 Hadramaut, 351
 Haile Selassie, 169, 171, 177, 178, 179, 182, 185, 194, 197, 222, 225, 226, 228, 230, 231, 234, 237, 238, 353; q. on Hoare-Laval peace plan, 198; on security, 228; on justice, 235; on League suicide, 354
 Hailsham, Lord, 35, 146, 309, 311, 344, 471
 Haldane mission, 312
 Halifax, Lord, 146, 217, 220, 306, 312, 313, 314, 321, 326, 331, 349, 353, 354, 355, 363, 370-1, 377, 378, 381, 382, 396, 398, 400, 401, 406, 407, 413, 414, 427, 429, 432, 440, 463, 467, 486-8; q. on mustard gas, 227; on Oxford, 346; on provocative language, 350; on Ethiopia, 354; on Mussolini and Franco, 474; on Central Europe, 551
 Hanfstängl, "Putzi," 4
 Hassell, Ulrich von, 40, 111
 Hawarite, Teclé, 170, 172, 180
 Hayes, Patrick Cardinal, 349
 Hearst, William Randolph, 271
 Heiden, Konrad, 495
 Heimwehr, 62, 63, 68, 71, 72, 73, 75, 300, 301
 Heine, Heinrich, q. 22
 Heines, Edmund, 14, 81
 Hellermann, Hans, 267
 Hemming, Francis, 283
 Henderson, Arthur, 28, 29, 38, 44, 45, 49, 52, 53
 Henderson, Ian, 382
 Henlein, Konrad, 365, 368, 369, 372, 383, 384, 396, 397, 399, 407; and Hitler, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371, 406; q. on direct action, 372; on Benes, 413
 Henry, M. Victor, 112
 Hermann the Teuton, 23
 Herr, Lucien, 273
 Herriot, Édouard, 39, 378; q. 99
 Hess, Rudolf, 4, 13, 209, 315, 322, 353, 392
 Himmler, Heinrich, 14, 80, 322, 329, 353, 394
- Hindenburg, Oskar von, 8
 Hindenburg, Paul von, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 44, 47, 278, 299
 Hinsley, Monsignor, q. 177
 Hiranuma, Baron, 481, 483
 Hirohito, Emperor, 393, 394
 Hirota, M., 245
 Hitler, Adolf, 3-15, 24, 43, 55-60, 61f., 76, 78, 81, 114f., 118f., 128f., 141f., 206f., 209, 288, 297f., 303, 313, 315, 316, 319, 321, 323, 329, 366, 367, 371, 391, 393, 396, 424, 425f., 430f., 434-5, 443f., 446, 453, 454, 469, 472; q. on lies, 6; on program, 11; on disarmament, 36-7, 46-7; on May 21, 1935, 142-4; on March 7, 1936, 214-15; on Spanish ore, 266; on Urals and Ukraine, 241; on Rome-Berlin axis, 242f.; on February 20, 1938, 317-18; on September 5, 1938, 397; on September 9, 1938, 403; on next Führer, 403; on September 12, 1938, 404, 406; on Czech tyranny, 414; in Sportpalast, 433; on natural necessities, 488
 Hlinka, Father Andrej, 368
 Hoare, Sir Samuel, 147, 171, 172, 178, 179, 181, 182, 183, 194, 196, 200, 231, 309, 311, 326, 400, 406, 413, 429; q. 150-1; on electioneering, 194; on roads to peace, 195; on support of League, 195
 Hoare-Laval peace plan, 197f.
 Hodgson, Sir Robert, 311, 356, 357
 Hodza, Premier, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371, 372, 378, 379, 384, 399, 406, 414, 419, 423
 Hofmann, George, 370
 Hogg, Sir Douglas, *see* Hailsham, Lord
 Hohenlohe, Prince Max, 383
 Hoiden, Robert, 394
 Holder, General Franz, 315
 Holzweber, Franz, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 330
 Hoover, Herbert, 30
 Hore-Belisha, Leslie, 353; q. 379
 Horthy, Admiral Nicholas, 247, 391, 392, 393, 427
Horst Wessel Lied, 19
 Hotta, M., 245
 Hudl, Paul, 89
 Hugenberg, Alfred, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 41
 Hull, Cordell, 41, 180
 Hungary, 60, 75; recognition of USSR,

- 101; and murder of Barthou, 106-8; and Rome-Berlin axis, 247f., 479; and Rome protocols, March 1936, 302; and end of Czechoslovakia, 391f., 454f.
- Ibero-American Institute, 267
- Ickes, Harold, 489
- Imredy, Bela, 391, 392, 419; q. 393
- IMRO, 97, 106, 107
- Inge, Dean, 345
- Innitzer, Theodore Cardinal, 70, 325, 330
- Inskip, Sir Thomas, 326, 448
- Insull, Samuel, 375
- International Red Cross, 223
- Internationale*, the, 253-4
- Iron Guard, 248, 249, 250, 315, 479
- Irwin, Lord, *see* Halifax, Lord
- Italy: at Disarmament Conference, 32f.; Four-Power Pact of 1933, 38-41; and Austria, 61, 66, 68-9, 72, 76, 77-80, 297, 299, 302, 321f.; and anti-Comintern, 241, 244-5, 311, 335f., 353f.; accord with France, 1935, 110-11, 166-8, 559-61; accord with Britain, 1938, 349-52, 565-73; and Versailles, 118f., 128f.; and Locarno, 202f.; conquest of Ethiopia, 157-200, 220-39, 353-5; intervention in Spain, 267f., 279f., 286, 292-3, 546; and Munich, 433f., 440-50, 481f.
- Japan: and Manchurian crisis, 29-32; at Disarmament Conference, 32f.; and anti-Comintern accord, 242-6; attack on China, 1937, 245f.; as bulwark against Bolshevism, 335f.; relations with Western Powers, 310-11, 412, 475f., 481
- Jaurès, Jean, 273
- Jefferson, Thomas, 493; q. 237, 304
- Jeunesses Patriotes, 92, 165
- Jevons, Herbert Stanley, 353
- Jevtich, Bogoljub, 98, 109
- Jèze, Gaston, 172, 221, 238
- Jongh, Daniel de, 112
- Jouhaux, Léon, 464
- Jouvenal, Henri de, 39, 40
- Jugoslavia: and Barthou, 98f., 104f., 106-8; and USSR, 101; and repudiation of Locarno, 215; and Rome-Berlin axis, 248, 479; and Spanish non-intervention, 279; and Nazi putsch in Austria, 1934, 297f.; relations with France, 1937, 314; accord with Bulgaria, 541
- Jung, Edgar, 14
- Junkers, 7, 8
- Jury, Dr. Hugo, 322, 329
- Kagan, Samuel, 284
- Kahr, Gustav von, 4, 14
- Kalkreuth, Count Eberhard von, 8, 15
- Kamenev, Leo, 259, 260
- Kampfring*, 65
- Kanoye, Prince, 481
- Kanya, Koloman de, 247, 391, 392, 419, 455
- Karageorgevich, Alexander, 104
- Karakhan, Leo, 260
- Karlsbad demands, 368, 383, 384
- Karwinsky, Herr, 84, 85, 87
- Kayser, Jacques, 281
- Keitel, General Wilhelm, 315, 323, 329, 353, 370, 427, 428
- Keleman, Justus, 107
- Kemal, Mustafa, *see* Mustafa Kemal
- Kendrick, Captain Thomas, 395
- Kennedy, Joseph P., 413, 470
- Kerillis, Henri de, 164, 165, 461, 462
- Kerr, Philip (Lord Lothian), 117, 311, 344
- Kerrl Dr., 64
- Ketteler, Wilhelm von, 15
- Kirov, Sergei, 259
- Klausener, Erich, 14
- Kleber, Emil, 286
- Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe, 310
- Kohn, Hans, q. 505
- Kolnai, Aurel, q. 507-8; q. 525
- Komarnicki, M., 199
- Koo, Wellington, 353; q. 412
- Krebs, Hans, 394
- Krestinsky, Nikolai, 260
- Krofta, Kamil, 329, 422, 423, 431, 435, 453
- Kundt, Ernst, 383, 399
- Kuomintang, 256
- Lacey, Sir Francis, q. 346
- Lambie, T. A., q. 227
- Lammers, Dr. Hans, 315, 353; q. 53
- Lang, Cosmo Gordon, 326, 331, 345, 415
- Lansbury, George, 345, 441; q. 291

- Lansing, Robert, 360
 Largo Caballero, Francisco, 263, 265, 273
 Latvia, 42; *and see* Baltic States
 Laval, Pierre, 109, 110, 113, 116, 122, 125, 126, 132, 136, 137, 140, 149, 152, 163, 165, 166, 168, 170, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 216; q. on naval agreement, 150; on peace, 167; on Ethiopia, 167
 Laval-Mussolini Agreement of January 7, 1935, 166f., 475, 482, 559-61
 Law, Bonar, 308, 341
 Lawton, L., q. 340
 League of Nations: Manchurian crisis, 29-32; Fascist demand for reform, 41; entry of USSR, 100-4; and repudiation of Versailles Treaty, 135-7; and Italian policy toward Ethiopia, 170-201; and repudiation of Locarno, 218-19; and conquest of Ethiopia, 220-39; and Danzig, 236-7; withdrawals from, 42, 239, 311, 355; and Nine-Power Pact, 293; and intervention in Spain, 293; and Syria, 372; and Spain, 353f., 412-13; Committees and Commissions, 180, 182, 187, 188, 193f., 221f.; *and see* Covenant
 Lebrun, Albert, 107, 209, 375
 Lebrun, Mme, 377
 "Left Oppositionists," 258
 Leger, Alexis, 133, 196, 451
 Legion of the Archangel Michael, 248
 Leibuscher, Walter, 322
 Leipert, Theodore, 9
Leipzig, 290
 Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 407
 Lenin, Nicolai, 253, 255, 256, 257, 519
 Leopold, King, 220
 Leopold, Captain Josef, 322
 Lerroux, Alexander, 264
 Lessona, Signor, 171
 Lester, Sean, 236
 Leverhulme, Lord, 344
 Libya, 350f., 482f.
 Lima, Declaration of, 486
 Lincoln, Abraham, 493; q. 426
 Lindbergh, Charles A., 468, 469
 Ligue d'Action Française, 165
 Lipski, Josef, 98, 126, 419
 Lithuania, 42, 331; *and see* Baltic States
 Little Entente, 52, 60, 75, 97, 101, 111, 168, 392; *and see* Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania
 Litvinov, Maxim, 29, 38, 42, 51, 52, 98, 99, 102, 110, 131, 132, 136, 236, 261, 280, 346, 355, 401, 412, 415, 423, 427, 460; q. on League, 103; on Japan and China, 295; on assistance to Czechs, 420
 Llano, Queipo de, *see* Queipo de Llano
 Lloyd George, David, 146, 237, 257, 309, 320, 344; q. on Simon, 147; and Chamberlain, 308; q. on Communist Germany, 340; on The City, 344; and Lindbergh, 467; q. on bad peace, 469
 Locarno, Pact of, 207f., 307f.
 Loffredi, Teresa, 156
 London, Treaty of (April 26, 1915), 158, 482f.
 London Economic Conference (1933), 42
 London Naval Treaty (1936), 242
 Londonderry, Lady, 429
 Londonderry, Lord, 42, 130, 146, 209, 213, 310, 311, 326, 346, 350, 376, 424, 443; q. on bombing, 34; on Disarmament Conference, 4; on aerial rearmament, 145; on Washington Naval Agreement, 148, 149; on free press and Jews, 210; on Halifax, 313; on Anglo-German relations, 342; on Bolshevism, 343; on Austria and Czechoslovakia, 343
 Lossow, General von, 4
 Lothian, Lord (Philip Kerr), 117, 311, 344
 Low, David, 382
 Lubbe, Marinus Van der, 11
 Lueger, Karl, 58
 Lupescu, Magda, 249
 Lux, Stefan, 236
 Lyon, Sir John, 375
 MacDonald, Malcolm, 146, 400, 413; q. 484
 MacDonald, Ramsay, 29, 34, 39, 41, 50, 74, 132, 141, 146, 171, 306
 MacGowan, Lord, 344
 Machiavelli, Niccolo, q. 160
 Mackenson, Ambassador von, 371
 Madariaga, Salvador de, 136, 222, 223, 238; q. 224
 Maffey, Sir John, 170, 174
 Magaz, Antonio, 286

- Maginot, 269
 Mahrer, Karl, 84
 Mai, Franz, 399
 Maisky, Ivan, 41, 131, 285, 286, 467
 Manchuria, 29, 30, 32; *and see* Japan
 Mandel, Georges, 419, 461
 Mann, Thomas, q. 499
 Mannlicher, Dr. Josef, 322
 March, Juan, 267
 Mariani, Wolde, 199, 222, 223; q. 230
 Marie, Queen of Rumania, 375
 Maritain, Jacques, 165
 Martinez Barrios, Diego, 263
 Marx, Karl, 333, 494, 519
 Mary, Queen Mother, 442
 Masarik, Dr. Hubert, 451
 Masaryk, Jan, 362, 369, 370, 398, 415
 Masaryk, Thomas, 361f.
 Masefield, John, q. 449
 Massigli, M., 35
 Mastny, Dr. Vojtech, 383, 451, 452
 Matchek, Vladimir, 106, 109
 Mauras, Charles, 92
 Mauriac, François, 165
 Maurois, André, q. 499-500
 Maxton, James, 345, 441, 448
 Mayer, Ernst, 84
 Mazzini, G., 494
 McIlraith, Frank, q. 554
Mein Kampf, 4; q. 24-7, 56, 58
 Memel, 478
 Menelik, Emperor, 158
 Menghin, Dr. Oswald, 322
 Metaxas, General, 251
 Metzsch, General Horst von, 379
 Miaja, General José, 309, 485
 Mihailov, Ivan, 97
 Miklas, President, 58, 63, 89, 91, 299,
 323, 324, 329, 330
 Mola, Emilio, 268, 271, 277, 290;
 q. 272
 Moley, Raymond, 41
 Molotov, M., 131, 132
 Montagna, Raffaele, 171
 Montreaux Convention, July 20, 1936,
 252
 Moravska Ostrava, 399
 Morocco, 288
 Morrison, Herbert, 411
 Morrison, William S., 283, 319, 448
 Moscicki, President, 132
 Moscow Trials, 259-61
 Mosley, Sir Oswald, 341, 344
 Motta, M., 102, 188, 235
 Mount Temple, Lord, 344, 369
 Muir, Ramsay, q. 146
 "Mukden incident," 102
 Munich, Peace of, 440-50; text, 444-5
 Munters, Wilhelm, 354
 Mushakoji, M., 244
 Mussolini, 38, 40, 66, 68, 76, 78, 81, 132,
 133, 154, 160f., 163f., 178, 179, 186,
 191, 192, 197, 298, 299, 301, 303, 311,
 319, 321, 324, 325, 327, 351, 352, 353,
 356, 393, 408, 423, 433, 440, 441, 443,
 481f., 487f.; q. on war, 51; on virile
 peace, 77, 153; on having friends, 155;
 on making mark in history, 155; on
 imperial idea, 157; on "collector of
 deserts," 182; from speech of Octo-
 ber 1, 184; on blockade, 221; on
 victory, 222; on "Ethiopia is Italian,"
 229; on world sanctionism, 238; on
 eternal peace, 241; on Bolshevism,
 42; on Guadalajara, 289; on San-
 tander, 295; letter to Chamberlain,
 310; q. on Italy and France, 355; on
 Prague, 414; on being feared and
 loved, 419; on Italo-German bloc,
 474; text of accord with Laval (Janu-
 ary 7, 1935), 559-61
 Mussolini, Bruno, 311; q. 227
 Mussolini, Vittorio, q. 226
 Mustafa Kemal, 251, 252, 479

 Nadolny, Herr, 33, 35, 38, 43, 44
 Nagai, Matsuzo, 245
 Nasibu, Dejasmach, 234, 237
 Nazi Party, *see* NSDAP
 Negrin, Juan, 273, 291, 293
 Nenni, Pietro, 289
 NEP (1921-8), 256
 Neurath, Baron Konstantin von, 10, 43,
 45, 98, 117, 118, 128, 133, 145, 209,
 211, 212, 241, 303, 309, 311, 315, 321,
 367; q. 47
 Neustädter-Stürmer, Odo, 76, 89, 330
 Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935
 (U. S. A.), 178
 Newton, Basil Cochran, 368, 378, 419,
 435
 Nicolson, Harold, 369
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 19, 23
 Nin, Andreas, 263
 "Non-Intervention" Committee, 275f.,
 283f., 355f.

- Norman, Sir Montagu, 345, 480
 NSDAP, 3-15, 15f., 47, 48, 59f., 61f., 79,
 120, 398; and see Hitler, Adolf
- Oberfohren, Ernst, 9, 14
 Obrenovich, Alexander, 101, 105
 OGPU, 259
 Oldenburg-Januschau, Baron von, 8
 Onslow, Lady Dorothy, 312
 Orsenigo, Monsignor Cesare, q. 488
 Ost-Hilfe scandal, 8, 9
 Osusky, Stefan, 377, 378; q. 419
- Pact of Paris, 1928, 159
 Padelford, Norman, q. 280
 Pan-Americanism, 521-2
 Panay, 310
 Papen, Franz von, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14,
 15, 33, 80, 298, 299, 302, 303, 310, 322,
 524; q. 8, 35
 Pareto, Vilfredo, 333
 Pashich, Nicholas, 105
 "Passionaria, La," 282
 Paul, Prince, of Jugoslavia, 108, 248
 Paul-Boncour, Joseph, 33, 35, 38, 39, 43,
 49, 94, 331, 368; q. 224
 Pavelich, Anton, 106, 107
 Pavlov, Ivan, 333
 Peace Ballot, British National, 174, 176
 Perchek, Gustav, 106, 107
 Permanent Court of International Jus-
 tice, 159
 People's Front, 94, 257, 261, 263, 264,
 274, 275
 Perovich, Ivan, 108
 Perth, Earl of, 183, 194, 197, 287, 331,
 348, 349, 350, 356, 411, 419, 453
 Perth-Ciano accord (April 16, 1938),
 239, 350, 353; text, 565-73
 Persia, 42
 "Pertinax," 164, 165, 461
 Peter, King of Jugoslavia, 105, 108
 Peters, Franz, 383
 Peterson, Mr., 193, 195, 196
 Peto, Geoffrey, 382
 Petrescu-Comnen, M., 401
 Pfriemer, Waldemar, 62
 Phipps, Sir Eric, 123, 128, 145, 183
 Pietri, M., 149; q. 151
 Pilsudski, Josef, 97, 100, 117, 132, 140
 Pirow, Oswald, 472
 Pittman, Key, 41
 Pius XI, 70, 177, 228, 486-8
- Pivert, Marceau, 461
 Planetta, Otto, 83, 87, 90, 330
 Plato, q. 502
 Plymouth, Lord, 284, 285, 294, 295, 483
 Poelzl, Klara, 56
 Poetzsch, Dr. Leopold, 58
 Poincaré, Raymond, 109, 257
 Poland: 42, 49; at Disarmament Con-
 ference, 32, 53; pacts of July 1933,
 42; and Barthou, 97-8; repudiation
 of minority treaty, 101-2; Eden's
 visit, 1935, 132; and French-Soviet
 pact, 140; and repudiation of Lo-
 carnò, 215; and Lithuania (March
 1938), 331; and end of Czecho-
 slovakia, 454f.; and *Drang nach
 Osten*, 479
 Poliakov, Vladimir ("Augur"), 187,
 195, 369
 Politis, Nicholas, 37, 38, 172
 Pollard, Hugh, 270
 Polson-Newman, E. W., q. 538
 Popov, Blagoi, 11, 478
 Portugal, 278f., 313
 Potemkin, Vladimir, 137, 428; q. 224
 Potter, Pitman, 171, 172
 POUM, 263
 Pradelle, Albert de la, 171, 172
 Prax, Maurice, 462
 Price, G. Ward, 182, 372, 414; q. 341
 Primo de Rivera, José, 267, 269
 Probst, Adelberg, 14
 Prouvost, Jean, 462
 Puszta, Janka, 106, 107, 108
- Quadragesimo Anno* of May 23, 1931,
 70
 Queipo de Llano, 269, 277
 Queuille, Henri, 419
 Quiroga, Santiago Casares, 265
- Radek, Karl, 260; q. 258
 Rader, Gustav, 267
 Radich, Stephen, 105
 Raeder, Admiral Erich, 315
 Rajniss, Francis, 247
 Rakovsky, Christian, 260
 Rapallo, Treaty of (1922), 42, 257
 Rath, Ernst vom, 473
 Rathenau, Walter, 256
 Ratz, Eugene, 391
 Raupal, Geli, 4, 56, 409
 Ravag radio station, 83, 86

- Ravensdale, Baroness Mary, 344
 Redesdale, Lord, 331, 344
 Reichenau, General von, 322, 323, 427
 Reichstag fire, 11
 Reith, Dr., 64, 67, 81, 83, 298
 Reynaud, Paul, 419, 461
 Rheinabben Freiherr von, 45
 Rhineland, 206f.
 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 8, 110, 146, 147, 209, 218, 240, 241, 244, 245, 287, 291, 315, 326, 331, 343, 353, 370, 371, 393, 396, 400, 409, 427, 428, 454, 455, 480; q. on Bolshevism, 246
 Riddell, Mr., 193
 "Right Deviationists," 258
 Rintelen, Dr. Anton, 62, 67, 79, 80, 81, 88, 89, 324
 Rivera, José Primo de, *see* Frimo de Rivera, José
 Robert II, King of Scotland, 375
 Robles, Gil, *see* Gil Robles, José Maria
 Rocque, François de la, 93
 Rohde, M. A. E., 112
 Röhm, Ernst, 14, 80, 81
 Roman Empire, fall of, 490f.
 Rome-Berlin axis, 352f.; *and see* Germany, Italy
 Rome Protocols: (March 17, 1934), 75; (March 1936), 302
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 35, 36, 41, 234, 401, 433, 434, 436, 489; q. on Anglo-Italian agreement, 352; on "quarantine," 294
 Rosenberg, Alfred, 26, 107, 259, 315; q. on Bolshevism, 241; on Russia, 254
 Rosselli, Carlo, 280, 281
 Rothermere, Lord, 216, 271, 341; q. on Czechoslovakia, 362, 393; on Manchuria, 526
 Rublee, George, 373, 480
 Rumania: policies at Disarmament Conference, 32-53; pacts of July 1933, 42; and Barthou, 98f.; recognition of USSR, 101; and French-Soviet Pact, 140; and repudiation of Locarno, 215; and Rome-Berlin axis, 248-50, 479; Goga, premier, 311, 316; relations with France (1937), 314; Cristea, premier, 316
 Runciman, Lord, 30, 309, 379, 382, 383, 393, 397, 399, 400, 411, 414, 471; q. on paying tribute, 383; letter to Chamberlain, 386-91; q. on Bohemia, 402
 Russian Revolution, 596f.
 Ruthenia, 360, 363; *and see* Carpatho-Ukraine
 Rydz-Smigley, Edward, 421, 427, 479
 Rykov, Alexei, 260
 Saar, 111, 112, 113
 St. Germain, Treaty of, 66, 528; Article 88, 60
 St. Quentin, René de, 193, 195, 196
 Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 284
 Samuel, Sir Herbert, 145, 146
 Sanctions, (against Italy), 188f., 231f., 238; oil, 193, 199, 211, 221f.
 Sandys, Duncan, 375
 Sangroniz, José de, 269
 Sanjurjo, General, 267, 268, 270
 Santander, 295
 Sarraut, Albert, 49, 201, 202, 209, 210, 216, 217
 Saudi Arabia, 351
 Schacht, Hjalmar, 211, 315, 480
 Schicketanz, Heinrich, 383
 Schicklgruber, Maria Anna, and Alois, 56
 Schleicher, General Kurt von, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 33, 80
 Schmidt, Guido, 302, 303, 322, 323, 324, 329
 Schmitt, Kurt, 13
 Schmutz, Herr, 57, 70, 91
 Schneider-Creusot, 478
 Schoenberg-Hartenstein, Prince Alois von, 76
 Schroeder, Baron von, 8
 Schuschnigg, Kurt, 67, 70, 89, 299, 300, 301, 303, 316, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330; q. on love of Austria, 302; on farewell, 328
 Schuster, Cardinal, 177
 Schutzbund, 70, 71, 73
 Schwerin-Krosigk, Lutz von, 10
 Scoppa, Bova, 221
 SDP, 364, 366, 368, 369, 372, 406
 Sebekovsky, Dr. Wilhelm, 383, 397
 Seipel Ignatz, 58, 62, 91
 Seisser, Lieutenant von, 4
 Seitz, Karl, 72
 Selby, Sir Walford, 74
 Seldte, Franz, 10, 11
 Sembat, Marcel, 274
 Severing, Karl, 10
 Seys-Inquart, Arthur, 322, 324, 325, 328,

- 329, 330, 353, 391; q. on "Austria is free," 329
- Shaw, Robert Gould, 342
- Simon, Arlette, 95
- Simon, Sir John, 29f., 39, 43f., 48f., 99f., 113f., 116, 119, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 133f., 136, 141, 145f., 171f., 326, 332, 396, 400, 413, 427, 429, 441; q. from speech to Commons, on visits, 131; on sanctions, 233; from speech of August 27, 1938; on Czechoslovakia, 395-6; on Stimson, 526
- Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 369, 408, 441, 448; q. on capitulation, 423
- Singapore base, 316
- Skoda, 478
- Skoropadsky, General Paul, 259, 478
- Skubl, Michael, 324
- Snowden, Philip, 147
- Sokolnikov, Gregory, 260
- Solidarité Française, 92-3, 165
- Soragna, Signor, 38
- Sotelo, José Calvo, 268
- South Tyrol, 76, 77
- Spaak, Paul, 220
- Spain: rebellion and civil war, 263-96, 351; non-intervention in, 277-96, 355-8; and League of Nations, 355
- Spengler, Oswald, q. 503, 517-18
- Stalin, Josef, 117, 131, 132, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261
- Stamp, Sir Josiah, q. 344
- Standard-Vacuum Oil Co., 180
- Stanhope, Lord, 471
- Stankovich, Dr. Radenko, 108
- Stapel, Wilhelm, q. 527
- Starhemberg, 62, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 297, 299f., 330; q. from eulogy on Dollfuss, 91
- Stavisky, Serge, 93
- Steed, Wickham, 362, 393, 470
- Steer, George, 228; q. 225
- Stefanik, Milan, 361
- Steidle, Dr., 64
- Steiner, Josef, 84
- Stimson, Henry, 30, 31, 332
- "Stimson Doctrine," 239, 353
- Stopford, R. J., 382
- Stoyadinovich, Milan, 109, 248, 314, 373, 392, 479
- Strang, William, 407, 443
- Strathmore and Kinghorne, Countess of, 375
- Strasser, Gregor, 5, 14, 81
- Streicher, Julius, 271, 392
- Stresa Conference, 132-5, 171
- Stresemann, Gustav, 23, 256
- Sudetens, 359, 360, 363, 365, 368, 376; and see SDP
- Suez Canal Co., 178
- Suez Convention (October 29, 1888), and Ciano-Perth letters, 351
- Suvich, Fulvio, 43, 68, 78, 125, 133, 183, 185
- Swinton, Lord (Cunliffe-Lister, Sir Philip), 146, 344
- Switzerland, and League of Nations, 355f.
- Syria, 372
- Syrový, Jan, 423, 431, 452, 456
- Szalasi, Francis, 247, 392
- Tabouis, Geneviève, 461
- Taezaz, Ato, 353
- Tana, Lake, 351
- Tanev, Wassil, 11
- Tanganyika, 313
- Tardieu, André, 32, 164
- Tatarescu, George, 98, 249, 250
- Tauschitz, Herr von, 65, 67, 76
- Tavs, Dr. Leopold, 322, 324
- Taylor, Myron C., 373
- Teruel, 316
- Teschen, 360
- Te Water, q. 236
- Tewfik, Rüstü Bey, 78
- Thomas, Albert, 33
- Thorez, Maurice, 464
- Thyssen, Fritz, 7, 15
- Tiarks, F. C., 344
- Titulescu, Nicolas, 39, 97, 98, 107, 140, 249
- Torgler, Ernst, 11
- Toscanini, Arturo, 91
- Toynbee, Arnold J., q. on Four-Power Pact, 41; on British temper, 230; on Ethiopians and Europeans, 519; on French politics, 533; on Hoare-Laval deal, 537; on Sudetens, 552
- Trotsky, Leon, 256, 259, 260, 273, 510; q. on terrorism and Soviet Bonapartism, 542-3
- Tsahai, Princess, q. 228
- Tukhachevski, Marshal, 210, 260
- Tunis, 166, 355, 482f.
- Turkey, 42, 49; policies at Disarma-

- ment Conference, 32-53; pacts of July 1933, 42; and Rome-Berlin axis, 251-3, 479; and Spanish non-intervention, 279
- Tzankov, M., 250
- U.S.A.: Manchurian crisis, 29-32; sanctions offer, 33, 37; policies at Disarmament Conference, 32-53; and Economic Conference of 1933, 41; and USSR, 42; Spanish arms embargo, 288; and Japanese aggression, 293-4, 310-11; prospects of, 520-2
- USSR: German threat to, 26-7, 129, 478; policies at Disarmament Conference, 32-53; and Economic Conference of 1933, 41; pacts of July 1933, 42; non-aggression pact with Italy, 42; and U.S.A., 42; and Barthou, 96f.; negotiations for pact with France, 99-103; recognition by Czechoslovakia and Rumania, 101; entry into League, 100-4; accord with France (December 5, 1935), 110; accord with Great Britain (1935), 131-2; mutual assistance pact with France, 137-41, 561-4; mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia, 139-40, 564-5; and Fascist Triplice, 240-6; general line of foreign policy, 253-62; and Spanish non-intervention, 278f.; and Nyon accord, 292-3; as threat to Britain, 335f.; proposes joint action against aggressors (March 1938), 346; and aid to Czechoslovakia, 420-2; prospects of, 509f.
- Ustaschi, 106, 107, 248
- Valens, Emperor, 490-1
- Van der Lubbe, Marinus, 11
- Vansittart, Robert, 141, 182, 196, 205, 310, 312, 314, 366, 369, 396, 400, 407, 414, 427
- Van Zeeland, M., 194, 195, 217, 220, 234, 237
- Vargas, Getulio, 311
- Vasconcelles, Senhor de, 188, 193
- Waterlandische Front (VF), 63, 71
- Vavrecka, Hugo, q. 422-3
- Vayo, Alvarez del, *see* Alvarez del Vayo, Julio
- Venzelos, Eleutherios, 251
- Vergin, General, 169
- Versailles, Treaty of: Article 80, 60, 66; Articles 42-4, 207f.; severed from Covenant, 412; q. on *Anschluss*, 528
- Veuillemin, General, 396, 460
- Victor Emmanuel, 239, 247
- Vienna, award of (November 2, 1938), 455
- Vladimir, Grand Duke, 478
- Volosin, Father Augustin, q. 478
- Voroshilov, Klementi, q. 262
- Waechter, Gustav, 87
- Wagner, Richard, 23
- Waldeck-Pyrmont, Erbprinz Josias zur, 68
- Wallisch, Kolomon, 74
- Wal-Wal, 168, 170, 172
- Wambaugh, Sarah, 112
- Wang Ching Wei, 481
- Waterloo, 148
- Watson, John B., 333
- Weiszacker, 377, 409, 452
- Welzeck, Count von, 267-8
- Welles, Sumner, 489; q. 447
- Wenceslas II, King of Bohemia, 359
- Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., q. 526
- Wiedemann, Captain Fritz, 376-7, 382
- Wilkenson, Ellen, q. 415
- Willert, Sir Arthur, q. 367
- Wilson, Sir Horace, 257, 407, 427, 441, 451
- Wilson, Hugh, 52, 473
- Wilson, Woodrow, 23, 24, 187, 237, 348, 362; q. on renunciation of conquest, 159; on "union of wills," 230; on sanctions, 540
- Winterton, Earl, 373, 467
- Wood, Sir Kingsley, 311, 400, 413
- World Economic Conference (1933), 41
- Wrabel, Major, 84, 85, 86
- Zernatto, Guido, 326
- Zhivkovich, Peter, 104, 105, 109
- Zinoviev, Gregory, 205, 259, 260

DATE OF ISSUE

This book must be returned
within 3, 7, 14 days of its issue. A
fine of ONE ANNA per day will
be charged if the book is overdue.

--	--

327.40

S241E

Europe on the eve

13855